


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SHANGHAI

REVOLUTION & DEVELOPMENT IN AN ASIAN METROPOLIS

Edited by Christopher Howe



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SHANGHAI
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AN ASIAN METROPOLIS

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SHANGHAI

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AN ASIAN METROPOLIS

Edited by
CHRISTOPHER HOWE

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PREFACE

The idea that the Contemporary China Institute might hold a conference on Shanghai first arose in a discussion between Lynn White and myself in Hong Kong in the summer of 1972. It seemed to us then that there were a number of scholars whose work in or close to this field was known to specialists but which, if framed in a collective project, could reach a wider audience and achieve a significance that isolated publication denied it. Proposals for such a conference were subsequently supported by the Institute's Committee and, in July 1977, we finally assembled in the learned and beautiful surroundings of Clare College, Cambridge.

In addition to those reading papers, we had the benefit of a number of discussants: Madame Marianne Bastid-Bruguière, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris; Mr Nigel Crook, School of Oriental and African Studies; Mr Brian G. Hook, University of Leeds; Professor Rhoads Murphey, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; Mrs Suzanne Paine, Clare College, Cambridge; Professor Lucian W. Pye, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Professor Stuart R. Schram, School of Oriental and African Studies; Dr Brunhild Staiger, Institut für Asienkunde, Hamburg; and Professor Kenneth R. Walker, School of Oriental and African Studies. Many of the points raised in the discussions have been incorporated in the final papers, and Lucian Pye has kindly written a Foreword that encapsulates our conclusions as succinctly as it is possible for one person to do.

As will be seen, most of us believe that Shanghai has had, and will have, a pivotal role in the evolution of modern China and we hope that our papers do some justice to this tremendous subject.

We are all much indebted to the School of Oriental and African Studies for its financial support of this project; to the Master of Clare College for providing such a splendid venue; to Lt.-Col. T. W. Baynes for handling all the administration and travel arrangements; to Kate

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Owen for a great deal of typing and secretarial work, and to Mrs Caroline Oakman, for acting as rapporteur and for other editorial assistance.

I am grateful to David Goodman for help in romanizing personal names. Any remaining errors are my responsibility.

Christopher Howe

FOREWORD

Lucian W. Pye

Why select Shanghai as the window through which to look at the new China? One of the world's largest cities can hardly be considered 'average' or 'typical', and no Sinological sociologist in search of the Chinese equivalent of the Lynds's 'Middletown', Warner's 'Yankee city' or Hunter's 'Regional City' would settle for Shanghai. The reason for choosing Shanghai, aside from its intrinsic historical interest, is that the city is not average but critical – critical in the sense that serious analysis of nearly all of the important aspects of life in China must, eventually, confront Shanghai and its special place in the Chinese scheme of things.

Whether the subject is heavy industries, such as steel or petrochemicals; or light industries, such as textiles or electronics, Shanghai commands attention. Shanghai's political significance in the history of revolutionary China reaches from the founding of the Chinese Communist Party there to the more recent dramatics associated with the Gang of Four. If the subject is learning, be it scientific and technological or cultural and artistic, Shanghai cannot be ignored, for its educational system is the most diversified and its middle schools the most comprehensive in all China. It goes without saying that any study of Chinese urban matters must deal extensively with that country's largest city, but it is equally true that the special districts of the Shanghai periphery illustrate the best of China's suburban planning, excellent examples of farming, and a wide range of rural industries. The systematic study of Shanghai, in short, directs attention to most of China's critical problems and to her prospects for modernization.

Since 1949 Shanghai has been the major dynamo for the Chinese economy, and it is destined to bulk large in the current efforts to fulfil the Four Modernizations by the end of the century. It is, however, paradoxical that Shanghai should achieve such importance for China's development, because for nearly one hundred years many Chinese

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depicted the economic history of Shanghai in terms of foreign 'exploitation' – the city was a cancer destroying the vitality of China. Then suddenly, in the early 1950s, the new authorities in Peking discovered that what had been created in Shanghai could, surprisingly, be 'exploited' for the development of the rest of China. How could it be that all that came before, which was supposed to be so bad, could turn out to be so valuable?

Clearly something extraordinary was created in Shanghai which did not die when the foreign connections were broken, and possibly more important, when much of Shanghai's indigenous capital and its most talented managers fled to Hong Kong where they created the amazing expansion of that city's economy. It is unlikely that scholars will ever agree as to exactly what kind of a social and economic phenomenon Chinese and foreigners jointly created in Shanghai during the Treaty Port era – yet in my judgment the introductory historical review in this volume by Marie-Claire Bergère is one of the most balanced and penetrating brief accounts ever written. The problem is that for some people pre-war Shanghai was a grotesque anomaly that shamelessly refused to mask its social ills; while for others, the city will be remembered as the liveliest and the most dynamic commercial and radical-intellectual centre in the East. Fortunately, when the provocative issue of historical interpretation is set aside and attention is turned to contemporary developments, there can be no debating the proposition that Shanghai has been an indispensable source of wealth and talent for the People's Republic.

True, China's political masters in Peking, no doubt sensitive about their pre-1949 years of blackening the reputation of the city, have been consistently reluctant to acknowledge openly their indebtedness to Shanghai's capabilities. For nearly thirty years Shanghai has been denied any significant replenishment of capital by the central authorities, yet the city has persisted in being the principal source of funds for that same central government. It has also been the main source of technical skills and administrative talents for China's industrial development. Within a year of the establishment of the People's Republic, Shanghai was producing a fifth of all of China's industrial output. Even more impressive is the fact that, during the *First Five Year Plan*, Shanghai provided, through taxes and profits, a sum 'sufficient to finance 64% of all the basic construction investment plan for industry throughout China' (Howe, p. 166). Furthermore, even though during the *First Five Year Plan* when Shanghai was being starved of new resources

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and received only from one to two per cent of national investment, it still achieved a 14% growth in industrial output. In spite of having to export to the rest of the country some eighty textile mills and numerous other factories, the city clung to its traditional role of being the pacesetter of China's industrial development. For example, with the advent of the electronics industry, Shanghai quickly moved to the forefront, and it now has nearly as many such plants as its next two closest rivals, Peking and Tientsin, combined.

Perhaps the most remarkable quality of Shanghai is that over the years its schools and universities have consistently produced the most skilled and disciplined workers and the most imaginative and professional managers and administrators in China. Government policy has steadily transferred much of this talent to other parts of the country. The exact number of people who have been required to leave Shanghai to help develop other parts of China is impossible to determine. The emigration has included not only Shanghai's contribution to the national programme of 'sending down' educated youth to the countryside, but also a specific programme of reassigning skilled labour to build up industries elsewhere. Christopher Howe judges that since 1949 at least one million skilled workers have been sent out from Shanghai, but certain Shanghai officials have told foreign visitors that nearly two million Shanghaiese, not including the educated youth, have been sent to the rest of the country.

All of these accomplishments occurred in spite of government policies designed, until recently, to equalize regional differences: policies which thus favoured other parts of China to Shanghai's disadvantage. No one can say what Shanghai might have accomplished had the city been treated more sympathetically during the last thirty years and had its marginal advantages been more systematically realized. In any case, current government policies are changing and Shanghai is now to be the beneficiary of much of the regime's new programmes of modernization.

Aside from themes, in economic history, the story of Shanghai provides a key for understanding the Chinese political process. In particular, it dramatically illustrates the remarkable, but rarely appreciated, fact that in Chinese politics locally based power rarely champions local interests. To a degree unique among nations, Chinese politics is largely insensitive to geography and to the particular interests of regions. Cliques may be formed among people from the same place, but the policies they advocate do not necessarily, or even

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usually, represent the distinctive interests of their locality. This is not to say that officials, in the past as well as at present, may not seek to reduce the impact of national policies on their localities, but such actions are quite different from trying to change national policies in ways that would favour local geographical interests. Throughout Chinese history it has not been considered legitimate to engage in the articulation of the special interests of any locality. This tradition, which has been reinforced by the communist ideals of centralized government, has produced some bizarre effects in Shanghai, largely because of the city's unique character.

Since the founding of the People's Republic, Shanghai's political leaders have consistently failed to assert the special economic and cultural interests of their city. Indeed, quite to the contrary, they have over considerable periods advocated policies and programmes diametrically opposed to the interests and the welfare of the people they presumably represented. The Shanghai 'Radicals', whom we are now supposed to call 'Ultra-Rightists', were at the forefront in articulating the very policies which were the most detrimental to the economic, cultural and social interests of the citizens of Shanghai. The city with the broadest and strongest educational system had leaders that worked for the near-destruction of Chinese education; the city that had economic advantages that could have made it be the principal supplier of goods for the entire country had a leadership that espoused regional and local self-sufficiency and autarky; the city that had the highest-paid and most productive workers in the country also had a leadership that denounced material incentives. That Shanghai's leadership could be so impervious to local interests explains much about the nature of power in China. In his contribution to this volume, David S. G. Goodman documents the extreme radicalism of the Shanghai leadership in a variety of policy areas, including the militia, education, the military, industrial management, and economic development programmes. The outburst of joyful exuberance which followed the announcement of the 'crushing' of the Gang of Four is proof that the citizens of Shanghai are not entirely fools when it comes to understanding their own self-interests, and, paradoxically, once the city came under more direct control of the 'centre' its inherent advantages were encouraged and Shanghai is now rapidly becoming the most cosmopolitan city in China.

Indeed visitors to China uniformly testify that, since October 1976,

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the pace of life in Shanghai has steadily picked up, and that its shops are manifestly more numerous, better supplied, and filled with more customers than those in other Chinese cities. The people of Shanghai seem anxious to shed their unnatural parochialism of the last thirty years and revert to being once more a part of the modern world.

Historically Shanghai was quick to adopt innovations: it first encountered trains only seven years after the completion of the first transcontinental railroad in America; its first textile mills were built before any in the American South, and by 1930 it had, according to some methods of calculation, the largest mill in the world; its first cinema opened only five years after San Francisco got its first large movie house; and by the late 1930s its Commercial Press was publishing each year as many titles as the entire American publishing industry – most of which were, of course, pirated.

Today, Shanghai, unleashed by the goals of the Four Modernizations, is striving to reduce the gap in technology and culture between itself and the modernized world, a gap which has become wider during the last thirty years. It starts with an 'old' city, in which it appears that not a single structure has been erected in the former International Settlement and French Concession, and a ring of new industrial suburbs where workers live in high-rise flats adjacent to their factories and plants. Physically, much of old Shanghai is run down and shabby, but it is likely that, as China enters a new phase of determined modernizing, Shanghai will again assert itself as the country's most advanced and dynamic city.

In the pages that follow scholars from several countries examine numerous facets of the development of Shanghai since 1949. Some have chosen to concentrate on what might appear to be relatively esoteric aspects of Shanghai life, such as the role of the Shanghai dock workers during a period of political upheaval; others have painstakingly collected, from obscure sources, key statistics which reveal economic trends and past conditions – such as figures on the standard of living of workers in the 1930s; while others have painted with broader brushes, but always with care about facts and evidence.

The drafting of these papers was done before China was firmly on its current course of pursuit of the Four Modernizations, but this does not date the volume because their analyses skilfully trace the zigs and zags of Chinese policies since 1949 and, collectively, they vividly set the stage for understanding precisely what is now taking place in China.

FOREWORD

Thus anyone interested in current Chinese developments, and in that country's prospects for modernization, can greatly benefit from this volume because the authors, in explaining the past, illustrate from many different perspectives the reasons why China's leaders have come to the programmes they now espouse.

ABBREVIATIONS

<i>CFJP</i>	(<i>Chieh-fang jih-pao</i>)	<i>Liberation Daily</i>
<i>CKCNP</i>	(<i>Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien pao</i>)	<i>China Youth Daily</i>
<i>CNP</i>	(<i>Ch'ing-nien pao</i>)	<i>China Youth</i>
<i>CQ</i>		<i>The China Quarterly</i>
<i>CR</i>		<i>China Reconstructs</i>
<i>CWR</i>		<i>China Weekly Review</i>
<i>FBIS</i>		<i>Foreign Broadcast Information Service</i>
<i>HC</i>	(<i>Hung-ch'i</i>)	<i>The Red Flag</i>
<i>HHJP</i>	(<i>Hsin-hua jih-pao</i>)	<i>New China Daily</i>
<i>HHPTYK</i>	(<i>Hsin-hua pan-yüeh k'an</i>)	<i>New China Semi-Monthly</i>
<i>HHYP</i>	(<i>Hsin-hua yüeh-pao</i>)	<i>New China Monthly</i>
<i>HHYPP</i>	(<i>Hsüeh-hsi yü p'i-p'an</i>)	<i>Study and Criticism</i>
<i>HMWP</i>	(<i>Hsin-min wan-pao</i>)	<i>New People's Evening Daily</i>
<i>HWJP</i>	(<i>Hsin-wen jih-pao</i>)	<i>Daily News</i>
<i>JMJJP</i>	(<i>Jen-min jih-pao</i>)	<i>People's Daily</i>
<i>JMWHS</i>	(<i>Jen-min wen-hsüeh</i>)	<i>People's Literature</i>
<i>JPRS</i>		<i>Joint Publications Research Service</i>
<i>KMJJP</i>	(<i>Kuang-ming jih-pao</i>)	<i>Enlightenment Daily</i>
<i>LTP</i>	(<i>Lao-tung pao</i>)	<i>Labour Daily</i>
<i>MY</i>	(<i>Meng-ya</i>)	<i>The Sprout</i>
<i>NCNA</i>		<i>New China News Agency</i>
<i>PR</i>		<i>Peking Review</i>
<i>SCMP</i>		<i>Survey of the China Mainland Press</i>
<i>SPRCM</i>		<i>Survey of the People's Republic of China Magazines</i>
<i>SHWHS</i>	(<i>Shang-hai wen-hsüeh</i>)	<i>Shanghai Literature</i>
<i>SWB</i>		<i>Survey of World Broadcasts</i>
<i>TKP</i>	(<i>Ta kung pao</i>)	<i>Impartial Daily</i>
<i>WHP</i>	(<i>Wen-hui pao</i>)	<i>Cultural Daily</i>
<i>WYP</i>	(<i>Wen-yi pao</i>)	<i>Literary Gazette</i>
<i>WYYP</i>	(<i>Wen-yi yüeh-pao</i>)	<i>Literary Monthly</i>

PART ONE

THE MODERN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE

1

‘THE OTHER CHINA’:
SHANGHAI FROM 1919 TO 1949

Marie-Claire Bergère

In 1953 Rhoads Murphey published a book called *Shanghai: Key to Modern China*.¹ Twenty-five years later, the same writer asserted that this was not the right key, and that Shanghai, bridgehead for penetration to the West, had played hardly any role in the evolution of modern China.² The quarter of a century which has passed invites us to take stock; and it allows us to analyse the experience of treaty ports, in particular the port of Shanghai, without too much good – or bad – feeling.

For the Revolution of 1949 eliminated, if not Shanghai itself, at least the model of development inspired by the West of which the city had become the symbol. Without doubt this elimination was less radical than is generally admitted. The specific quality which Shanghai retained within the communist framework was owed, it is thought, to the survival of certain characteristics inherited from a century of historical experience (1842–1949).

It was towards 1919 that the Shanghai model reached its peak whilst, at the same time, revealing its weakness. In fact, from one world war to the next, Shanghai did not cease to develop, increase its population, and strengthen its economic power, its political and its cultural influence. The degrading of its international status, however,

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endangered the foundation of a prosperity which, for a century, had been built upon integration with the world market, and on a relative independence from the bureaucratic Chinese government. It is true that Shanghai held other trumps: – her exceptionally favourable geographical situation; advances made in the spheres of industry, technology and finance; an active middle class and a relatively established working-class tradition. But it was the development of maritime commerce with the West which made the site of this port at the mouth of the Yangtze so important. It was the flow of Western capital and technicians which stimulated the growth of the modern sector, aroused the competitive spirit of the national bourgeoisie, and speeded up the formation of the working class. How could this transplant from the West evolve at the very moment when the upsurge of Chinese nationalism, war, and revolution pushed back the presence of foreigners until they disappeared?

This question leads immediately to another, which concerns the very nature of a 'treaty port'. Was it simply (as Murphey thinks) a foreign zone cut off from the rest of China? Or a privileged place of confrontation between two civilizations neither of which would give in to the other? Or, was it, as studies by J. K. Fairbank suggest, a Sino-foreign base, governed by a condominium (or synarchy) characterized by a partial fusion of the values and practices found in the two communities? The majority of writers who have tackled these problems have done so by way of institutional and economic studies, generally focused on the second half of the nineteenth century or on the early twentieth century, during which the system was at first forming, and later functioning normally. Equally revealing, and much less studied, are the years of its decline. It is at that point that one can grasp what foreigners contributed which is lasting, and take stock of what remains after them, including the Chinese reactions to this foreign exposure. With regard to the latter, one must not forget to distinguish between xenophobic and anti-urban attitudes triggered by the existence of a westernized metropolis such as Shanghai on the one hand and the appearance in Shanghai itself of a new tradition, that of Chinese modernism, on the other.

Since 1919, nationalism has dominated the history of Shanghai as it has that of the whole of modern China. But the rise of nationalism in a society as cosmopolitan as Shanghai, is of a kind that dispels all hope of an escapist return to the past.

For the nationalism of Shanghai reflects a new vision of the place of

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China in the world (demand for equality) and of the role of foreigners in China (desire for co-operation). Shanghai is at once more open to the outside world and more aware of the place which China should have in it. Nationalism and cosmopolitanism proceed in a parallel and complementary fashion.

In this sense, Shanghai was different, and was seen and rejected as such by the Kuomintang and then by the Communists, both of whom described the city as 'foreign'. But foreign to what? To China? or to the dominant, rural and bureaucratic tradition which, after the fall of the Empire, was resuscitated under the Kuomintang regime, just as it was later to be under the Maoist strategy? But if Shanghai had simply been a foreign, non-Chinese city, would she not have been swept quickly aside by this rejection since 1930? But instead, right up to 1949, Shanghai continued to display her vitality and originality in the midst of the most difficult conditions: of repression, invasion, and of chaos. From where does this amazing capacity for survival come? Is the prime importance given to business enough to explain the stability of Shanghai and its relative invulnerability in face of successive political regimes? One thinks of Hong Kong in the 1960s. One thinks back, too, to the communities of merchants, ignored or ill-treated for long periods by the Imperial power and by Chinese officialdom. One thinks of the smugglers, sailors, pirates, the intellectuals on the loose; of all this minority, marginal China; this *other* China of which Shanghai would, in so many ways, be a modern extension; the transplanted foreigners having found in the non-orthodox tradition a small but particularly fertile piece of land. The history of the years 1919–49 illustrates how the 'Shanghai phenomenon' took root, and explains why it continued after the revolution. One can condemn the past; it is much more difficult to abolish it.

THE UPSURGE OF A NEW SOCIETY 1919–27

The golden age of a colonial-style Shanghai, the age of the *taipan* and Anglo-Indian architecture, closed with the First World War. After the war, the world economic situation, the shrinking of state power in China, and the decline of the old Imperial powers all favoured the growth and expansion of the city. Thus between 1919 and 1927, Shanghai reached the height of its time-honoured destiny.

About 1919 the Chinese economy reaped the benefits of exceptionally favourable circumstances. A heavy demand for raw materials

THE MODERN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

and food from the Western countries stimulated growth and development of the export trade as the fall in gold value lowered the prices to be paid (in Chinese, i.e. silver money) for imports. The volume of foreign trade turnover grew whilst the deficit in the balance of trade was reduced. It was a fortunate paradox for industrial enterprises based in China that they benefited simultaneously from the demand created before the war by imports from the West, and from the relative protection which came in the wake of the decline of these imports during and immediately after the war. The stimulants of the international situation exerted themselves essentially upon China's modern sector – and, thus, particularly upon Shanghai, which was its most important component.³

The imports and exports of Shanghai (which represented about 41 per cent of the global value of all Chinese external trade) grew as shown in Table 1.1. Deeply affected by the world freight crisis during the war, the port became more active than ever. During this 'period of flourishing private enterprise'⁴ the rate of China's industrial growth reached 13.8 per cent per annum.⁵ In Shanghai the number of cotton mills increased (Table 1.2) and new industries appeared: clothing,⁶ milling (the Mao-hsin Co. built no less than eight factories in Shanghai between 1913 and 1919)⁷ and in 1919 the Tobacco Co. of Nan-yang Bros. (*Nan-yang hsiung-ti yen-ts'ao kung-ssu*) moved its head offices from Hong Kong to Shanghai. The creation of numerous machinery workshops illustrated the progress of heavy industry.⁸

The development of credit and of modern Chinese banking accompanied the growth of commerce and industry. In general, the new Chinese banks more often than not had some official character and were concerned less with financing private enterprise than with subsidizing public administration. The Shanghai banks – there were twenty-six at the end of the war⁹ – are the exception. It is true that through the Chekiang financial group they were very closely linked to traditional banks, *ch'ien-chuang*, which were still the principal financiers for national enterprises (Table 1.3). The twenty or so foreign banks which operated in China were all represented in Shanghai, where they continued to monopolize the financing of external commerce and the control of flows of precious metals and foreign currency.

Economic prosperity, the creation of jobs which came with it, and the chance of riches which the city offered, drew to Shanghai an influx of newcomers. It is estimated that the population of the city increased from one million inhabitants in 1910 to nearly two and a half millions

SHANGHAI, OR 'THE OTHER CHINA'

Table 1.1. *The evolution of Shanghai's imports and exports (1919-47)*
(Pre-1932 data in thousands of Hai-Kwan taels; data for 1933 to 1947 in thousands of Chinese dollars)

	Imports	Exports	Total
1919	261,701	259,729	521,430
1920	383,918	193,795	577,713
1921	425,514	210,528	636,042
1922	419,593	218,051	637,644
1923	417,870	276,838	694,708
1924	483,470	276,455	759,925
1925	431,888	306,185	738,073
1926	596,555	361,900	958,455
1927	455,317	330,506	785,823
1928	548,608	362,220	910,828
1929	624,646	364,041	988,687
1930	679,742	312,668	992,410
1931	833,568	277,476	1,111,044
1932	510,373	158,324	668,697
1933	736,220	315,758	1,051,978
1934	600,483	272,305	872,788
1935	507,695	288,975	796,669
1936	555,183	362,274	917,457
1937	510,811	404,672	915,483
1938	274,896	233,039	507,935
1939	558,156	594,693	1,152,849
1940	758,309	1,372,810	2,131,119
1941	786,498	2,042,450	2,828,948
1946	1,285,297,885	255,583,677	1,540,881,562
1947	7,994,195,307	3,851,779,360	11,845,974,667

Source: Hsiao Liang-lin, *China's Foreign Trade Statistics 1864-1949* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), p. 176.

Table 1.2. *Growth of cotton mills in China and in Shanghai at the time of the First World War*

	Number of looms in China	Number of looms in Shanghai	Number of mills in China	Number of mills in Shanghai
1913	823,152 ^a	480,880	—	—
1919	1,428,040 ^a	886,122	45	26
	1,248,282 ^b			
1925	3,339,728 ^a	—	125	58

Source: Yen Chung-p'ing, *Chung-kuo mien-fang-chih shih-kao* (*Draft History of the Cotton Industry in China*) (Third edition, Peking: Scientific Publishing House, 1963), p. 355; D. K. Lieu, *The Growth and Industrialization of Shanghai* (Shanghai: China Institute of Pacific Relations, 1936), p. 29; *Wu-ssu yun-tung tsai Shang-hai shih-liao hsüan-chi*, pp. 8-9.

^a Figure given in *Wu-ssu yun-tung*.

^b Figure given by Yen Chung-p'ing.

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Table 1.3. *The rise of traditional ch'ien-chuang banks at the time of the First World War*
(Capital data in Chinese dollars)

	No. of banks	Capital	Average capital per bank
1913	31	1,600,000	51,600
1920	71	7,700,000	109,000

Source: *Shang-hai ch'ien-chuang shih-liao* (Materials for the History of *ch'ien-chuang* in Shanghai) (Shanghai: People's Publishing House, 1960), p. 191.

in 1920.¹⁰ Stimulated by demand and speculation, the price of land increased. In the central district of the International Settlement the *mou** which was worth 30,000 *taels*† in 1911, was worth 40,000 in 1920.¹¹ Shanghai suffered less and, somewhat later, the effects of the world recession of 1920–2.¹² The imports problem in 1921, and the Stock Exchange crisis which disturbed the financial markets in the same year, were integral parts of the bouts of over-speculation which periodically inflamed the city. More serious was the crisis in Chinese cotton manufacturing in 1923–4.¹³ This heralded the end of a golden age which, in 1925, was marked by the onset of continuing civil war and revolutionary problems.

This short decade of prosperity – scarcely time enough for a war and its aftermath – was, nevertheless, sufficient to transform a commercial port into an industrial city and to nurture a new, Chinese nationalist urban class. During these same years, the foreigners worked to preserve their privileges and sometimes even to increase them. The foreign population of Shanghai was a small minority of 23,307 people. The International Settlement (35,503 *mou*) and the French Settlement (15,150 *mou*) were only a small fraction of an urban zone which encompassed the old Chinese city and the industrial districts of Nantao, Chapei, and Pootung.¹⁴ The importance of the foreign settlements was due to their international status as defined by the nineteenth-century treaties and by diplomatic procedure applied thereafter. In Shanghai (as in all other treaty ports) foreign residents had extraterritorial rights and were answerable only to their respective consulates.

* Approximately 1/16 of a hectare.

† The *tael* is an old monetary unit which represents roughly 38 grams of pure silver, that is in 1920: \$1.24, or 6s 9½d (39p).

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Against a tax payment (and, eventually, a customs surtax) the rate of which was not determined by the Chinese authorities, their merchandise was exempt from all further control. Local administration (police, refuse collection, public health) was the responsibility of the foreign authorities entitled to collect taxes to finance it. The Land Regulations of 1845, 1854, 1869 and 1898, and the *Règlement* of 1868, allowed the creation of municipal authorities, independent of the Chinese authorities who, in the Settlements, lost all legal and fiscal jurisdiction. If the French municipality, subject to the authority of the consulate and thence to the government in Paris, was a 'bureaucratic autocracy',¹⁵ the Shanghai Municipal Council of the International Settlement constituted 'a representative oligarchy',¹⁶ relatively autonomous with respect to the local consulate body and the diplomatic corps of Peking, even though British influence remained dominant there.

In both cases the continued existence of these privileged groups, and of these states within the state, rested on the relations of the existing forces. Not that the strength of the municipal police forces or that of the Volunteer Corps was very important: they constituted only a few thousand men. But foreign gun-boats were anchored in the Whangpoo and cruised on the Yangtze, reminders of the political and military power of the countries who kept world order.

In their Settlements, foreigners designed their own parks, and built their own churches, schools, colleges and hospitals. They brought in their missions, sporting and cultural clubs, charitable organizations and folklore societies, their bars, their cafés and their big hotels. They built their own warehouses and factories, they continued to have their special postal service, and to publish their newspapers: a dozen daily and weekly papers in different languages were published, the most important of which, the *North China Daily News*, was printing about 3,000 copies at the time of the First World War.¹⁷ The residents of the Settlements benefited, in addition, from the provision of electricity for domestic and industrial use (the electricity generating plant in the International Settlement was the most powerful in China and its prices were among the lowest in the world), a water service, two companies running electric trains, and an urban telephone network, although they were not provided with a good sewage system! The public services were laid on by contracting companies.

The *raison d'être* of this 'model settlement' was business. Twenty foreign banks had their head office or their agent in Shanghai.¹⁸ In

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1919, of sixteen foreign cotton mills in China, fifteen were in Shanghai.¹⁹ Large trading firms were centred in Shanghai, notably the British Jardine Matheson, the German Carlovitz & Co. and the Japanese Mitsui Bussan Kaisha. These firms were continually expanding and diversifying.

The foreign residents of Shanghai were deeply attached to the privileged international status which assured their safety, comfort, and prosperity. After the 1914–18 war had shaken the world order, as the old imperialist forces began to decline, and as the powerful tide of Chinese nationalism began to rise, 'old Shanghai hands' mourned the 'tragedy of the Washington Conference' and denounced 'the waves of this absurd generosity'²⁰. They saw in a distant and uncertain future, the abolition of extra-territoriality. In China, foreign Chambers of Commerce and Residents' Associations were determined not to surrender any of their privileges, and, moreover, tried to increase them; some even dreamt of building an enormous, free international zone at the mouth of the Yangtze taking in the whole of Shanghai and the country immediately behind it.²¹

As the territory of the Settlements, and in particular that of the International Settlement, was increasingly unable to meet demographic and industrial requirements, and as the Chinese government refused to readjust its boundaries,²² the Shanghai Municipal Council practised a policy of indirect extension, by building External Roads (48 miles in 1925) in Chinese territory. These roads were maintained and policed by the Council, who also placed a tax on local residents. Thus the External Roads Areas, in the suburbs to the west (7640 acres) and to the north of the International Settlements (283 acres), escaped the administration and sovereignty of the Chinese. After the 30 May Movement in 1925 the building programme was interrupted, but the legal status of the External Roads was only settled two years later with the establishment of the Kuomintang government.²³

The Council applied similar tenacity to leading two other rearguard battles: that of the 'Mixed Court', and that of the representation of the tax-paying Chinese. Created in 1864 to settle differences between Chinese residents of the Concession, the Mixed Court ceased being a Chinese court in 1911 when the Consular Corps took upon itself the right of naming and paying its magistrates. In spite of numerous attempts by Chinese authorities, up to 1926 the Council refused to repeal the 'temporary measures' of 1911.²⁴ The problem of the representation of Chinese tax-payers in the International Settlement in the

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Council had been an issue since 1905, and it presented itself afresh in 1919 when tax-payers refused to pay the increased municipal taxes, rallying to the cry of 'no taxation without representation'. The protestors, however, only succeeded in obtaining the creation of the Chinese Advisory Committee, and they had to wait until 1927 to send three councillors to take full part in the Council.²⁵ In spite of the concessions which they were forced to make by the 30 May Movement, the foreigners safeguarded their privileged positions in Shanghai. But already the conditions for dialogue between the Chinese and foreign communities had been deeply disturbed by the rise of new urban classes: a business class, a working class, and an intelligentsia.

Immediately after the First World War, the precipitate disintegration of traditional social structures, and the decline of Confucian ideology, loosened the hold which the bureaucracy held over the Chinese bourgeoisie. At the same time, economic prosperity favoured their business undertakings. The development of industry in Shanghai at this time reflected that of Chinese industry (Table 1.4). For the Chinese capitalists it was a period of unprecedented profit-making (Table 1.5), and of annual dividends which often surpassed 30 per cent (in 1919 the Commercial Press paid 34 per cent)²⁶ and sometimes reached 90 per cent (the Ta-sheng cotton mills, for example).²⁷ A new generation of businessmen appeared, formed of industrialists, including such men as H. Y. Moh (Mu Hsiang-yueh), C. C. Nieh (Nieh Ch'i-chieh), the Chien brothers (Chien Chao-nan and Chien Yu-chieh) and the bankers, K. P. Chen (Ch'en Kuang-fu) and Chiang Kia-ngau (Chang Chia-ao). These young Chinese managers founded their own

Table 1.4. Growth of Chinese cotton mills in Shanghai 1914-27

	Factories	Looms
1914	7	160,900
1919	11	216,236
1920	21	303,392
1921	23	508,746
1922	24	629,142
1924	24	675,918
1927	24	684,204

Source: Yen Chung-p'ing, Tung-chi tzu-liao, pp. 162-3.

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Table 1.5. *Profits from Chinese businesses in Shanghai*
(Chinese dollars)

	Profits from the no. 1 mill of the Shen-hsin Co.	Average profits of the <i>ch'ien-chuang</i> banks
1915	20,000	25,111
1919	1,000,000	37,723
1920	1,100,000	32,371
1921	600,000	38,778

Sources: Yen Chung-p'ing, *Mian-fang-chih shih-kao*, p. 172; *Ch'ien-chuang shih-liao*, p. 202.

professional associations, the Shanghai Bankers' Association (*Shang-hai yin-hang kung-hui*) in 1917, and the Chinese Millowners' Association (*Hua-shang sha-ch' ng lien-ho-hui*) in 1918. They also tried to take control of long-established organizations such as the guilds and the General Chamber of Commerce of Shanghai (*Shang-hai tsung-shang-hui*) which after the war was still dominated by the old elite of comprador-merchants such as Chu Pao-san and Yu Hsia-ch'ing.²⁸ Being nationalistic, the Shanghai bourgeoisie demanded the re-establishment of customs autonomy and took part in all the struggles for the restoration of sovereign rights of China on the local level, including the return of the Mixed Court (Chinese representation at the Council), and also on the national level, for example, in the dispute over the restitution of Shantung. They did not, however, repudiate totally the presence of foreigners; they needed their capital and their experts. Indeed the group aspired to an '*entente cordiale economique*'²⁹ and to a co-operation which would preserve independence and promote the mutual benefit of the Chinese and of their foreign associates. Being liberal, the group denounced the incompetence, irresponsibility and brutality of the warlords; it hoped to restructure the Republican State on the basis of a federation of autonomous provinces, which would remedy the lack of a central government whilst preventing the return of an arbitrary and despotic regime whose victims had so often been the merchants.³⁰ Thus the bourgeoisie dreamt of having a political role, a fact reflected in the strange session of the General Chamber of Commerce on 23 June 1923, during the course of which the Chamber 'declared independence' of the government of Peking (which it saw as illegal) and established a Committee of Popular Government (*Min-chih wei-yuan-hui*) composed of its own members. Merchant power wanted to take on the running of the country!³¹

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The wave of industrialization which made the fortunes of a conquering bourgeoisie, also brought with it the development of a working proletariat.³² In 1921, Shanghai accounted for about a quarter of the one and a half million Chinese workers employed in modern factories and associated services (transport, postal service, docks). These 300,000 to 400,000 workers, chased from the countryside by squalor and calamities (*ts'ai-min*), constituted a very badly qualified work force. Moreover, the *pao-kung* hiring system perpetuated, even in the urban milieu, a network of personal dependence. The presence of an immense number of poor and unemployed in the countryside meant that wages could be kept at the lowest level. There was no social legislation governing working conditions, and the weakness of the proletariat was increased by the presence of a great number of women and children working in the textile industry.

From 1919 to 1927, however, the proletariat became a socially and politically important force on the local and national levels. At first (in 1918) favourable economic conditions encouraged the bosses to satisfy worker demands for more money. Then, in May-June 1919, the Shanghai proletariat joined forces with the United Anti-Imperialist Front, and strikes of workers followed merchant boycotts and student demonstrations. The decisive factor in this was the intervention of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) founded at a Congress in Shanghai in July 1921. The CCP organized a Secretariat of Chinese Unions whose leaders, Chang Kuo-t'ao and Teng Chung-hsia, struggled to develop the workers' movement in Shanghai. Provoked by the assassination of a Chinese worker in a Japanese cotton mill, the demonstrations of 30 May 1925 showed how much progress had been made. The Shanghai proletariat became the moving force of the anti-imperialist protest. The workers' strikes continued for three months in the Japanese and English factories of the International Settlement. They were organized by the Shanghai General Union which, under the direction of Li Li-san and Liu Shao-ch'i, brought together 117 unions and 218,000 members. In 1926 the success of the Northern Expedition (*Pei-fa*) shifted the centre of gravity of the workers' movement from the revolutionary base in the Canton area, towards the valley of the Yangtze. In two attacks (in November 1926 and February 1927) the Communist unions of Shanghai tried to launch a revolutionary strike. That of 18 March chased away the Northern Troops from the city, but repression followed hot on the liberation and after the failure of the united front, the coup of 12 April, perpetrated by Chiang Kai-shek with the help of the bourgeoisie, the secret societies and the mob,

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marked the beginning of a white terror which destroyed the revolutionary workers' movement of Shanghai.

Should one be more surprised by this brutal and definitive collapse, or by the extraordinary rise which preceded it? This rise was due in great part to the initiatives of the Communist leaders representing the radical intelligentsia of which Shanghai was about to become the capital.

Under the chaotic and brutal regime of the warlords, Peking, home of the intellectual renaissance of 1915–19, was gradually deserted by its writers and academics. In the spring of 1926 more than fifty university teachers returned to Shanghai. Shanghai offered to these newcomers the relative safety of its Settlements. Also, the Ratepayers Association refused in six consecutive years (1920–5) to approve the Printed Matter Byelaws put forward by the Municipal Council to restrict the freedom of the press. This, however, did not stop the Council from bringing Chinese editors before the Mixed Court and invoking 'a law of censure promulgated by Yuan Shih-k'ai . . . in 1914'.³³ Nonetheless, the main printing businesses in the country were to be found in Shanghai: the Commercial Press (*Shang-wu yin-shu-kuan*) founded in 1897 and re-started in 1921 as a result of efforts by Wang Yu-wu,³⁴ and its rival, the Chinese Publishing Co. (*Chung-hua shu-chü*). Amongst numerous smaller enterprises, some such as the Tai-Tung Co. made their fortune by tying their fate to that of the new intelligentsia.³⁵

Shanghai was also the centre of the foreign press (twenty-six newspapers and magazines in 1921) and of the Chinese press (over eighty publications).³⁶ This modern publishing industry had organized itself from the beginning of the century in companies, and used advanced technical processes such as rotary printing, engraving on copper, etc.³⁷

This outpouring also included Saturday School novels and 'mandarin duck and butterfly' fictions (*Yuan-yang hu-tien p'ai*) which were loved by a large public of workers and tradesmen.³⁸ The same public also discovered the joys of the cinema and flocked to the Empire and the Apollo, and to the Palace theatre which, from its opening in 1925, specialized in showing Chinese films. Alternatively they went to the Odeon where Paramount films were shown, and where at the opening programme they presented *Dorothy Vernon of Haddon Hall*, starring Mary Pickford.³⁹ Compared with the aristocratic Peking culture, that of Shanghai looked to its opponents like a 'comprador culture', ruled by commercial gain and foreign fashion. But, in reality, it was a dynamic

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culture, open to new ideas and able to interest wider social groups than those comprised by the traditional educated elites, and one on to which cosmopolitan romantic or revolutionary ideas could be grafted.

From 1921 the Creation Society (*Ch'uang-tsaio she*) brought together believers in art for art's sake (Kuo Mo-jo, Yü Ta-fu) before becoming, towards 1925, an organization of young leftists, as the literary revolution gave place to revolutionary literature. It was in Shanghai that the controversies about art were unleashed, and towards 1927 all the great names in new Chinese literature were found there – from Kuo Mo-jo to Hsü Chih-mo, Mao Tun to Yü Ta-fu, without forgetting, of course, the greatest of them all: Lu Hsün.

Between 1919 and 1925 an enterprising, cosmopolitan, urban society blossomed in Shanghai; it was a new Chinese society. For Shanghai very obviously was Chinese. The numerical ratio of the different communities gives a very clear indication of this. What does it matter, one might say, if there are two and a half million Chinese as long as 23,000 foreigners rule them, reducing them to slavery and silencing them? But in Shanghai it was not so, and indeed, even the administration of the Settlements rested on a Sino-foreign consensus. The municipal authorities always looked for the prior agreement of the most respected Chinese residents. Concerned as it was with the problems of day-to-day management, this collaboration was no foundation, however, for the development of a Sino-foreign society.

The contact between the different communities remained very slight. In most cases they simply met the demands of professional life and went no further. The presence of the foreign minority, nonetheless, had many repercussions on the ordinary life of the Chinese community. The relations of dependence were painfully obvious. Humiliation showed up at every crossroad – in the brutality of a policeman, in the grimace of a blond child.⁴⁰ But hardly had it come to life, than resentment was mitigated by a desire to be initiated and informed, and by a reflex action of imitation.

The dynamics of Shanghai society could not be limited to admiration/imitation and humiliation/protest relationships with foreigners, nor to this sensitive and ambiguous nationalism. At a time when the decline of central government and the bureaucratic system gave the hitherto fettered forces of the traditional Chinese society (such as tradesmen, contractors, dissenting writers or rebellious students) a chance to blossom out, the international status of Shanghai partly protected them from chaos and anarchy which in traditional China

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were the usual counterparts of the breakdown of bureaucracy and which for centuries had been the normal consequences of previous liberating breakouts. In Imperial China the buds of capitalism and heterodox criticism, which often blossomed thanks only to a weakening of the political and ideological order, would not survive the problems which this weakening brought with it. Anarchy remained the only alternative to orthodoxy. The exceptional rise of Shanghai in the 1920s was born of the coincidence between the retreat of bureaucratic restrictions which freed the energies, and the existence of an island of relative security and order – ‘the refuge of the Settlements’ – which preserved them. The new society which was emerging in Shanghai celebrated simultaneously ‘the triumph of the West’ and the revenge of minority groups long excluded from the Confucian establishment. Thus the bridgehead of world civilization was also an outpost of unorthodox China for whom modernization was only the most recent heresy. The presence of the foreigners broke down some of the old barriers. But it created other contradictions which were just as formidable. The nationalist awareness, which was more precocious, more violent, and more complex in Shanghai than elsewhere, effectively led the new society to reject the very foreign presence which favoured its own success. The bourgeoisie called instead for the help of a national state power, to whom it would fall first victim.

THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT COMES TO RECONQUER SHANGHAI (1927-37)

From its establishment, the government of Chiang Kai-shek threw itself into a policy of national restoration which the Westerners, made prudent by the events of 1927, did not oppose, even if often they tried to slow it down. The re-examination of the controversial problems of Shanghai’s legal status, which occurred between 1927 and 1937, did not result in a revision of the Land Regulations, but the Chinese authorities did manage to regain part of the rights of which they had been deprived by abusive practice.

The Provisional Court, which succeeded the Mixed Court in 1927, gave way in 1930 to a Shanghai Special Area District Court, and then to a Provisional Court of Appeal (Second Branch of the Kiangsu High Court), both regularly integrated into the Chinese judicial system from which all foreign interference was excluded.⁴¹ In May 1930 the number of Chinese representatives at the Shanghai Municipal Council rose

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from three to five, with the foreign councillors still occupying nine seats.⁴² Finally, the Chinese municipality reaffirmed its control on the External Roads Area where the Council met increasing difficulties in levying taxes and preferred to negotiate a *modus vivendi*.⁴³

The Greater Shanghai Municipality (*Shang-hai shih cheng-fu*), organized by the laws of July 1927, April 1928, and 1930, which brought together under its authority the different Chinese parts of Shanghai and its outskirts, was put under the direct control of the central government. It waged a war of attrition against foreigners, raising incidents and difficulties, proposing a more and more restrictive interpretation of the treaties and sometimes ignoring them completely. Realism and prudence led the foreigners – residents and diplomats – to reject this test of strength. But, from compromise to compromise, their privileges became fewer and the Chinese authorities acquired a real right of supervision over the affairs of the Settlement.

The first offensive was unleashed in June 1927 when the superintendent of the Shanghai customs announced the creation of a consumer tax of 30–35 per cent on tobacco and alcohol. Foreign companies refused to pay this tax which had just been added to the import tax of 5 per cent – the only payment they felt compelled to make. In fact, the treaties did not allow for any exemption clause for foreigners; but the rules of extra-territoriality prevented the Chinese authorities from prosecuting foreigners, thus depriving them of any means of obtaining taxes. However, the channels of distribution of imported goods penetrated deeply into the interior of China and were, therefore, vulnerable to pressure placed on them by the local authorities. Because of these commercial considerations, some large foreign companies such as the British American Tobacco Co. and the Socony Co. (a subsidiary of the Standard Oil Co.) drew up private agreements by means of which they accepted surtaxes which could reach 20 per cent and brought in – for Shanghai alone – \$2 million* per month.⁴⁴

In the Settlements, the Chinese authorities strove to increase their control of public opinion, or, at least, of the schools and press where this was formulated and expressed. To limit the independence of the schools and missionary colleges attended by young Chinese (St John's College, Shanghai Baptist College) and to contain the critical spirit and frequent animosity of the press in the Settlements, the Chinese authorities first of all demanded the registration of private schools,

* On the Shanghai market, the value of the silver dollar varied around 0.7 taels.

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including foreign schools (applying the law of 1926) and then in 1932, the registration of all newspapers. Some foreigners, by invoking the treaties, refused to submit to these measures. Such was the case of President Rankin, Dean of the University of China, in Chu-jen, near Shanghai. The quarrel about the registration of schools lasted several years, but, being badly supported by their diplomatic representatives, the majority of heads of these establishments gave in. Strong pressure was brought to bear upon the newspapers by the Chinese authorities, who abolished the reduced postal tariff for recalcitrants. The *North China Daily News*, followed by the *Shanghai Evening Post*, subjected to threats and sanctions in this way, had to make concessions. In 1932 the Chinese authorities even obtained the suppression of the *China Forum*, edited by Harold Isaacs.⁴⁵ Forbidden by the treaties to exercise their judicial powers, the Chinese authorities made the weight of their administrative power felt.

The alliance which he had made in April 1927 with the Shanghai mob gave Chiang Kai-shek strict control over the activities of Chinese residents in the Settlements. The gangsters did not stop, like the police or the tax-collectors, at the limit of the Settlements. Under the leadership of Tu Yueh-sheng, Huang Chin-jung and Chang Hsiao-lin, the members of the 'Green Gang' (*Ch'ing pang*), 20,000 or perhaps 100,000, became so many agents of the Kuomintang, ready to kidnap rich merchants who refused to pay money, or to abduct militant communists and union leaders. The complexity and the lack of co-ordination of police and judicial procedures in the three administrative sections of the city paralysed the repression. Crime increased and with it the underground authority of the Kuomintang. The Settlements, the international status of which was thus degraded, no longer offered to Chinese residents more than an imaginary refuge. The reconquest of Shanghai from the foreigners went hand in hand with tighter control over the new social groups which had blossomed during the preceding years.⁴⁶

In the Nanking decade the bourgeoisie in Shanghai declined. The Kuomintang regime, much more hostile than had been admitted towards a laissez-faire economy and private enterprise – though it were national – refused to let the bourgeoisie participate in local administration, and superseded them in most of their economic functions.⁴⁷

Chiang's coup of 12 April 1927 had used ten million dollars of financial assistance given by the bourgeoisie. But the alliance was broken some weeks later when, to obtain new funds (thirty million

dollars), Chiang brought a real reign of terror to the rich merchants whose children were kidnapped and ransomed and who themselves were either arrested or, like Fu Hsiao-en (*Tsung-yao*), the president of the General Chamber of Commerce, forced to flee. Subsequently, and in spite of isolated initiatives by T. V. Soong, the regime was openly mistrustful of the bourgeoisie, even if it often tried to use its wealth.

It was in Shanghai that the Chinese City Council (*Tsung-kung-chih*) was established in 1905 as the first representative Chinese municipal government.⁴⁸ Faithful to the tradition of guilds and Charitable Halls (*shan-p'ang*) and wishing to meet the challenge of foreign municipalities, influential people participated in local administration. Suppressed by Yuan Shih-k'ai, this municipal activity was slow to be reborn, despite several attempts in 1924 and 1926.⁴⁹ The law of July 1927 which established the Municipality of Greater Shanghai put an end to this tentative decentralization of administration.⁵⁰ The mayor, named by central government, was an all-powerful civil servant assisted in the exercise of his duties by a dozen offices – the most important of which was the Office of Social Affairs. The local elites remained completely excluded from this municipality of civil servants designated by the government and controlled by the local branches of the Kuomintang. After this the bourgeoisie lost even the ability to express themselves in their own organizations. The General Chamber of Commerce, which gathered together the most influential businessmen within the International Settlement and which had often displayed political independence, was taken over by a government-appointed committee in April 1927. After the Third Congress of the Kuomintang in March 1929 it was 'reorganized' and the new Chamber of Commerce of the Municipality of Greater Shanghai was placed under the direct control of the Kuomintang. A more radical organism, whose creation dated from the May Fourth Movement, the Federation of Street Unions, disappeared. The bourgeoisie, which then lost any chance of playing an independent political role, could not expect anything from a government which was more anxious to fill its coffers than to support economic development. In 1933 the disgrace of the Finance Minister, T. V. Soong, took away from the business circles their principal spokesman *vis-à-vis* the Nanking authorities. The restoration of customs and excise autonomy, demanded by all the Chinese Chambers of Commerce for so long, led to the establishment in 1934 of prohibitive import taxes over raw materials and industrial equipment. Instead of being the protection hoped for, in the short term it spelled ruin for

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many Chinese factories. The 'coup' of March 1935 which brought the Bank of China and the Communications Bank under direct control of the government put an end to the financial power and independence of the Chekiang banking group. In the following months, monetary reform and introduction of notes (*fa-pi*) allowed the government to extend its control, at least indirectly, over commercial banks, including the traditional *ch'ien-chuang*. Once the financial groups were under control, it was not difficult for governmental circles to turn to the commercial and industrial sphere. With the economic depression helping, T. V. Soong through the Bank of China, and H. H. Kung through the Central Bank, acquired the majority of shares in many businesses, cotton mills, factories, tobacco works, etc. and increased their investment by the intermediary of the China Development Finance Corporation.

In a few years, the old business middle class had been replaced by a class of officials/capitalists working privately or publicly with their own capital or funds from the State. This group, included T. V. Soong and H. H. Kung who went into business, and capitalists who were reconverted to bureaucracy after the banking 'coup' of 1935. Typical of the latter were Wu T'ing-chang, who became Minister for Industry in 1935, and Chang Kia-ngau, who moved in the same year from the Bank of China to the Ministry for Railways. These officials/capitalists generally associated with the Political Study Clique (*Cheng-hsueh hui*) and remained, therefore, dependent on a government they could no longer influence. After almost twenty years (1911-28) - time enough for a republic that was not liberal but impotent - the Kuomintang regime returned to the Imperial tradition of bureaucratic capitalism.

The lack of sympathy of the regime towards the national bourgeoisie was accompanied by deep distrust of the working class which became the object of constant supervision and repression.⁵¹ The immediate objective was to eliminate all communist influence. After the arrests and executions of April 1927, the General Labour Union was put under the control of the army and of the Green Gang. The Law of Expediency of March 1928 allowed the arrest of any organizer of strikes for being a trouble-maker.

This law was invoked to arrest the ringleaders during the strike at the General Edison Co. in 1930 and at the British American Co. in 1933. In spite of losses suffered in 1927, the Communists led by Li Li-san did not immediately give up the tactic of insurrectional strikes. In 1928, 110 strikes broke out in Shanghai and there were even more in

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the following year. But these attempts, condemned as suicidal inside the Communist Party itself, could not continue in the face of intensified repression. The law governing unions of October 1929 forced them to submit the workers' organizations to a whole series of controls: prior approval from the government; notice and minutes of meetings; prohibition of regional federations; the appointment of administrative watchdogs over unions of civil servants, and obligatory arbitration procedure to settle disputes. The working world was henceforth to be under the bureaucracy of the State and the Party. And when the law was not enough to assure their submission, the Green Gang always was.

After 1931-2, communist influence was only exercised over small groups of clandestine militants organized by Liu Shao-ch'i and Lo Chang-lung. The proletariat ceased to be a coherent political force. And when the world economic crisis threatened between 1932 and 1935 to lower their standard of living even more, the workers of Shanghai could only rely on the support of the Yellow Unions. These moderate organizations, directed by Kuomintang agents and manipulated by the Green Gang, often seemed more like rackets than unions (although the ambiguity of their role was shown by the career of their leader, ex-postman Chu Hsüeh-fan,⁵² who became Minister for Telecommunications after 1949). The wildcat strikes, which were purely economic and which multiplied just before the Sino-Japanese war, showed the misery and impotence of a working class deserted by its leaders.

The Nanking government experienced more difficulty in the suppression of the intelligentsia.⁵³ After the dissolution of the National Student Association in 1929 and the prohibition of the literary Creation Society, the foundation of the League of Left-wing Writers (February 1930) marked the reappearance of a radical movement open to communist influence. The activity of the League dominated the Chinese literary scene. Its publications, which increased in order to be better able to thwart censorship, imposed the reign of socialist realism. Published in 1933, the novel by Mao Tun, *Midnight (Tzu-yeh)*, illustrated this new current of thought in presenting a documentary study of the Shanghai middle class. But this new mass literature (*ta-chung wen-hi*) did not inspire enthusiasm such as had been inspired in the May Fourth Movement. It was no longer so easy to mobilize students. The economic crisis made their condition materially more difficult. The university administration tried, not without success, to bring calm and

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discipline back to the campuses, to guide students to scientific studies, and to enlist them in official paramilitary groups. The students in Shanghai – 10,520 in 1934⁵⁴ – from then on were almost as numerous as those in Peking. But they were more under the thumb of a political power whose headquarters were very close.

The government of Nanking, however, looked less in fact for the adherence of the intellectuals, than for their detachment from politics. But the increasing pressure from Japanese imperialism undid their aims. Each new attack – the Tsinan incident in May 1928, that at Mukden in September 1931, and the tension in summer 1935 – provoked great waves of student demonstrations in Shanghai as in all the large Chinese cities. In January 1932, after the incident of Shanghai, the Fudan University Volunteers fought by the side of the 19th Army against the groups of Japanese landing troops. The anti-Japanese movement in Peking in December 1935 found a vast echo in the intellectual and financial circles of Shanghai, which got ready to ensure the National Salvation (*chiu-guo*). But, directly exposed to the dangers of aggression and nearer the anti-Japanese centre of Sian, Peking remained, until 1937, at the head of the student movement. The seizure of Shanghai by the government did not silence the voice of the intelligentsia as it did that of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat; it simply gave back its importance to the old intellectual capital.

In 1937, however, the reconquest of Shanghai by the national bureaucracy was far from complete, and the life of the city continued to be largely governed by the evolution of the international economic situation. The world-wide depression was a more important determinant of the Shanghai market than the government economic policy.⁵⁵ Paradoxically, its effects were favourable at first. The amazing depreciation of silver (which between 1928 and 1931 lost more than half its value on the international market) effectively devalued the Chinese currency and its stimulation of exports made up for the closure of certain Western markets. The devaluation's effect of slowing up imports enabled it to replace the customs tax which was still insufficient to protect the national industries.⁵⁶ Since Shanghai was responsible for a growing share of China's external commerce (44.8 per cent in 1928–31)⁵⁷ it was the main beneficiary of these developments (Table 1.1).

In two years, and in spite of very high prices, imports of industrial equipment rose by 50 per cent, reflecting a new upsurge (more limited,

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however, than that of 1919–24) of modern industry. In Shanghai the number of spindles in the Chinese cotton mills increased from 684,204 in 1927 to 1,005,328 in 1931.⁵⁸ This equipment represented 41 per cent of the production capacity of China's cotton mills. During the same period, the Japanese cotton mills of Shanghai also expanded rapidly as did their flour mills and tobacco factories.

In 1932 the crisis came, opening the way to a new depression which lasted until 1935. The devaluation of the pound sterling in 1931, followed by that of the US dollar in 1934, created a rise in the price of silver which was made sharper by the purchasing policy being pursued by the USA in accordance with the Silver Purchase Act of 1934.* Unfortunately the Chinese importers did not allow this rise to be fully reflected in their prices, and thus the purchasing power of silver did not increase as quickly in China as in foreign markets. This disparity created a massive output of metal outside the country, and the lowering of prices and the scarcity of metal brought with them a heavy deflation, the restriction of bank credit, and then, in 1935, the abolition of the silver standard in China.

The loss of Manchuria in 1931, the Japanese military expedition which ravaged the industrial suburbs of Shanghai in January 1932, and the desolation of the countryside after the Yangtze floods of 1931, all added to the crisis. In 1932, foreign trade showed a steep decline (in the port of Shanghai the value of trade tumbled from 1,111,044 Hk *taels* in 1931 to 668,697 Hk *taels* the following year).⁵⁹ In 1935, twenty-four of the ninety-two Chinese cotton mills in Shanghai shut down⁶⁰ and the economy had still not recovered when, in July 1937, the Sino-Japanese war broke out.

The economic growth of Shanghai under the Nanking regime was less rapid than it had been in the preceding decade. In 1934 the town had three and a half million inhabitants, its factories provided half of China's modern industrial production⁶¹ and its port, with traffic of 35.4 million tons, ranked among the largest in the world. But the progressive paralysis of the national bourgeoisie and the government's persistent lack of interest (until 1935 at least) in commercial and industrial problems, left this growth to the vagaries of foreign stimu-

* This law obliged the American Treasury to buy back silver on foreign and home exchange markets until the price of metal reached \$1.29 per ounce. From 1934 to 1937 1.6 million ounces were bought back in this way and the price of metal rose by 300 per cent.

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lation and to the initiative of foreigners who at that time concentrated 46.4 per cent of their total direct investments in China (worth more than one billion American dollars) in Shanghai.⁶² But although the restoration of the bureaucracy hindered the growth of the new Chinese society, it did not basically modify the relationship with foreigners. The destiny of Shanghai was decided outside China and the loss of its international status after 1937 was to be the direct cause of its decline.

THE END OF THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS (1937–1949)

A town held hostage

After 1937, Japanese aggression achieved what Chinese nationalism had not succeeded in accomplishing in the previous decade. But the disappearance of the city's international status did not bring in the end of foreign imperialism; it simply substituted Japanese military law for a western condominium.

As a late-comer to Shanghai, Japan after the First World War had persistently demanded better representation of her interests in the administration of the International Settlement.⁶³ The two representatives that it had sent to the Shanghai Municipal Council since 1918 no longer seemed to reflect the importance of the Japanese colony, which in 1935 numbered 20,000 residents. In its efforts to obtain an agreement more in keeping with its interests, Japan relied upon Chinese nationalism. But the aggressive policies of the Japanese, and the upsurge of patriotic resistance which they provoked, prevented the consolidation of an anti-Western alliance. During the Shanghai Incident (January–February 1932) Japanese troops retaliated to the boycott of Japanese goods by devastating Woosung, Chapei, and certain parts of the International Settlement. The confrontation between Westerners and the Chinese gave way to a tripartite confrontation from which the Japanese were to emerge as temporary victors.

The siege of Shanghai (August–November 1937) was an unprecedented catastrophe for the town. The novelist, Pa Chin, who was an eyewitness, described in his novel *Huo* (The Fire) the violence of the fighting that ravaged Chapei. On Black Saturday (14 August) Chinese bombers dropped explosives intended for the Japanese gunboats on the Settlement. There were 2,000 deaths, 2,500 wounded, and blood

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flowed in the gutters of Edward VII Avenue.⁶⁴ When the resistance ceased and the 'Lone Battalion' withdrew, the Japanese troops occupied the Chinese city and districts round Hongkew and Yangtzepoo, to the north of the International Settlement.

The administration of the Greater Shanghai Municipality was then given to the puppet government of Tatao, which in 1938 was placed under the authority of Fu Hsiao-en (the former president of the General Chamber of Commerce of Shanghai driven out by Chiang Kai-shek in 1927). After Fu's assassination in October 1940 the government of Nanking placed Ch'en Kung-po at the head of the Special Municipality of Shanghai.⁶⁵

Right up to the attack on Pearl Harbor (December 1941) the status of the Settlement was conserved. But already its territory was drastically cut down. The Japanese refused to evacuate the zones of Hongkew and Yangtzepoo and access to them was controlled by their troops. Posted on the bridges of Soochow Creek, they stopped cars and passers-by, demanding salutes and money.⁶⁶ The occupying forces sought to extend their control to the western suburbs in the zone round the External Roads, the area formerly disputed by the Municipal Council and the Chinese authorities. These suburbs had been deserted in 1940 by the British garrison and had become a den of theft, corruption, and gambling. It was at the heart of these 'badlands', at 76 Jessfield Road, that the puppet government of Wang Ching-wei set up its special police torture chambers.⁶⁷ Even right inside the International Settlement, the Japanese put on the pressure. After several violent electoral campaigns, in April 1941 they gained a third seat on the Shanghai Municipal Council. They controlled the large official Chinese organizations situated in the Settlement; telephones, the Post Office, the radio, the Communications Bank and the Central Bank. They tried to muzzle the Chinese and Western press by having the journalists killed. The head of Wong of the *Shen pao* was found under a lamp-post, and Samuel H. Chang of the *Shanghai Evening Post* and J. B. Powell escaped death only by a miracle.⁶⁸ The final Japanese seizure of the International Settlement was completed the day after the attack on Pearl Harbor, when at dawn on 8 December 1941 Japanese troops entered the centre of the city. The French Concession was spared, for Japan preferred to exert diplomatic pressure on the Vichy government. From 1942 Japan made known her intention to return the administration of the Settlement to the government of Wang Ching-wei. The Western powers anticipated this by renouncing their treaty rights in

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January 1943. In August 1943, Ch'en Kung-po became the first mayor of a Shanghai which had been reunified to the advantage, and under the control, of the occupying forces.

'A Lonely Island' (Ku-tao Shang-hai)

With the disappearance of the Settlements, the Maritime Customs and the doctrine of the Open Door, the institutional and ideological underpinning of Shanghai's development was destroyed. The city's economic base was also directly affected. The war cut Shanghai off from her domestic and foreign markets. The great international port became 'a lonely island'. From 1938 the Yangtze was banned to foreign ships. The Pacific blockade of August 1937 disrupted Chinese coastal navigation and in July 1940 this blockade became harsher and also affected foreign ships.⁶⁹ Activity in the port of Shanghai declined (Table 1.6) and the value of the foreign trade handled by the port dropped by 55 per cent between 1937 and 1938. Commerce with the hinterland continued at a slower pace: goods for south-western, Free China, moved along contraband channels; in the occupied zone Japanese companies enjoyed an almost complete monopoly. Shanghai turned in on herself, progressively reduced to her own market.

At this time the city also lost part of its industrial equipment. The military operations of 1937 destroyed 5,255 workshops and factories. Estimates of the damage varied from 350 million to 4,500 million Chinese dollars. In addition, after July 1937, 152 factories were transferred to Free China. (In December, the Commercial Press was set up in Changsha.) Nonetheless, despite all, a revival of industrial

Table 1.6. *Decline in traffic through the port of Shanghai at the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war*

(Thousands of tons)

	Ships directly from abroad	Ships from Chinese coastal ports	Ships from inland
June 1937	753	649	252
June 1938	457	237	166
June 1939	699	281	129
June 1940	527	231	57

Source: Statistics taken from maritime customs records quoted here by R. W. Barnett, *Economic Shanghai*, p. 152.

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activity was stimulated by the abundance of both manpower and money. Chinese refugees numbering hundreds of thousands (or even millions) swelled the population of the Settlements⁷⁰ and money flowed freely from inland China. Specialists and technicians were easily recruited from the Jewish émigrés driven out of Central Europe by Nazism (there were about 25,000). In order to avoid control by the Japanese troops still stationed in Hongkew and Yangtzepoo, Chinese businessmen moved south of the Soochow Creek, thereby changing the city's industrial centre of gravity. And although the scale of the enterprises declined, production activity was diversified. The workshops, often housed in what had been private houses, manufactured all kinds of consumer products: soap, glue, furniture, toys, bulbs, pens, hosiery, and mechanical and electrical equipment in growing quantities.⁷¹ In Hongkew and Yangtzepoo, Chinese business concerns, especially spinning factories, were confiscated or dismantled by the Japanese. Foreign warehouses alone were started up again.

For what markets did these industries work? Until the outbreak of the Pacific War, Shanghai developed its textile exports for south-east Asia and for French or British dominions where the retreat of these powers had left an open field for new suppliers. Products from Shanghai went as far as Free China and even to the Communist Zone. But the most important outlet was undoubtedly that offered by the local market: an agglomeration which now totalled five to six million inhabitants.

The great majority of these lived in squalor. The Japanese levies and transport difficulties hampered supplies to the town and, despite imports from Indo-China, the price of rice went from \$12.5 a *picul** in 1938 to \$60 in 1940. There was a succession of riots in the Settlement in November 1937, in August and December 1939, and in June 1940.⁷² In four years wages doubled but prices, stimulated by inflation, quadrupled. People were dying in the streets; in 1938 the Shanghai Municipal Council had more than 100,000 bodies picked up.⁷³ Workers' strikes broke out in Pootung in 1939 and in the Tramway Companies of the Settlement in 1940. Manipulated by the Special Service Section of the Japanese army and by the Nanking authorities, the strikes aimed firstly to weaken the position of the West, and then to inaugurate the reign of puppet-like unions.⁷⁴

If it was hard being poor, it was at times dangerous to be rich.

* The *picul* is worth 60.5 kilograms (133 pounds).

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Businessmen who did not join Free China had difficulty in continuing their work. The Japanese confiscated the factories of the spinning-mill owners who, in 1937, after the seizure of Hongkew and Yangtzepoo, refused to collaborate with them.⁷⁵ And how could the Chinese manufacturers and carriers compete with the subsidiary companies of the Japanese Central China Development Company to whom the puppet authorities complacently promised exemption from taxes, preferential tariffs or monopoly of exploitation?⁷⁶ However, until 1941 foreign spinning mills which resorted to importing goods to ensure procurement of supplies of raw materials and fuel were still making good profits.⁷⁷ But from 1938, the issue of money by the puppet government and by the occupation troops (the military yen) disorganized the monetary market and accelerated inflation.

In these circumstances there was no choice for Chinese capitalists but to become the front men for the Japanese and to assign their capital to speculation and gambling rather than to legitimate business. Those tempted by the profits of collaboration risked being kidnapped, held to ransom, or executed by the agents of the Kuomintang. If they had chosen the other camp, undoubtedly they would have landed up at 76 Jessfield Road. In this war of secret services in which blow was exchanged for blow, 'banker for banker, editor for editor',⁷⁸ the bourgeoisie of Shanghai played the role of hostage. After the period of the merchant, and that of the Kuomintang bureaucrat, came that of the gangster. Shanghai was no longer in Shanghai: it survived in the hearts of those exiled in Szechuan who cherished the hope of reconquering her, and of finding once again everything that she stood for in their eyes.

Backward into the Revolution

In January 1947 one of Shih Tung-shan's films was a great success in Shanghai: *The Cloud and the Moon* described the physical and moral destitution of a group of students who, after eight years of anti-Japanese resistance in the Yangtze valley, returned to Shanghai and found, instead of their hoped for new world, a society of traffickers, an aristocracy of dishonest dealers.⁷⁹ For Shanghai, the years of Civil War were years of wild inflation. The continual money shortage of the government, incapable of financing its growing military expenses, was the primary cause of this inflation. The lack of stability of the balance of trade added to the difficulties. The export trade was paralysed by

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the disorganization of the domestic market and by the unrealistic official quotation of the Chinese dollar. In just one year the funds built up in the war were exhausted. Thereafter the deficit was exclusively financed by the issuing of notes: \$40 billion a day in 1947. In Shanghai, where capital from the Chinese interior found an outlet and where the government spent a third of its money, prices increased by 33.7 per cent a month during the 1945-8 period.⁸⁰ As it became sharper, this rise caused panics, such as that of the week of 8-15 February 1947;⁸¹ and in October of the same year the index of wholesale prices leapt from 74,367 to 108,350 (1931=100) and the banks fixed their interest rate at 16 per cent a month.⁸² The government tried to cut inflation. In 1946 it readjusted the rates of exchange to stimulate exports; it sold property confiscated from the enemy and its allies to increase its resources: it froze civil service salaries to reduce public spending; it financed the import of cereals, raw cotton and coal to break market prices.⁸³ But the exhaustion of its currency soon forced the government to take drastic measures: the freezing of workers' wages in February 1947 and monetary reform in August 1948. The legal note (*fa-pi*) was replaced by a new currency, the gold yuan.⁸⁴

In this reform, certain people were compelled to hand over to the government all their valuables in currency and in gold and to register all their possessions abroad. The currency reform was accompanied by a further freezing of prices and wages, and was enforced by the Shanghai Economic Supervision Office under the direction of Chiang Ching-kuo. The economic police, often careless in their choice of target, created a reign of terror which made the population rise up against the government, but not even that halted inflation.

Shanghai's economic activity was only maintained thanks to help from abroad. In 1946-7 deliveries carried out in the name of UNRRA*⁸⁵ reached around 500 million American dollars and in the following year imports were part of the China Relief Programme and the Economic Co-ordination Administration. Those supplies, made it possible to provide the city with rice, to stock the warehouses with raw cotton, and to reconstruct industrial equipment.

The influx of refugees and their capital, and the influx of relief goods from UNRRA, brought about feverish activity. It was this false prosperity that struck visitors ('riding high for a fall', remarked Doak Barnett) but it was not able to mask the difficulties of the economy of

* United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

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Shanghai. The city was poorly supplied, and particularly violent hunger riots broke out in the spring of 1947. Many factories had to close their doors when the second half of the Civil War cut them off from their raw materials and markets.⁸⁶ At the beginning of 1948 only 20 per cent of the 3,000 mills were working to full capacity. The nationalized sector escaped relatively lightly as it received privileged treatment from the State: 3 per cent (monthly) loans from the official banks, special allowances of imported raw materials (especially raw cotton) and energy supplies.

This nationalized sector was greatly developed after 1945 when the government entrusted large official companies with the administration of plants confiscated from the Japanese and their collaborators. In Shanghai, for example, the China Textiles Industries controlled seventeen spinning mills. The enormous profits that the majority of the official companies made served to finance the Civil War effort of the government.

The inflation provoked a redistribution of riches which favoured the high political bureaucracy, the Soong, the Kung, and all the carpet-baggers, the corrupt speculators, and the administrators who revolved around them. From the Gold Scandal (1945) to the Rice Scandal (1947) their riches grew and grew. When the factory-owners managed to get their mills into working order they also made large profits as the price of manufactured products increased faster than production costs. But supply difficulties and competition with official companies limited their field of action. Consequently, they demanded that state companies be returned to the private sector. In 1947 the government gave them partial satisfaction by putting the China Textile Industries and the China Merchants Steam Navigation Company up for sale.⁸⁷ After the war, the situation of the industrial workers appeared relatively better than that of the working classes in general. Skilled labour was scarce and the government decided to link wages to the price index. After the blaze of inflation in 1947, wage restraints were imposed. But, incapable of controlling the rise in prices and threatened by the unrest of the workers, the government restored the index-linking of wages only to abolish it again in August 1948. So the workers in employment benefited from a measure of protection against inflation. But after 1947 the general slump sent thousands of unemployed on to the streets. In March, according to the Bureau of Social Affairs, unemployment reached 200,000, twice the level of 1945. The middle class – civil servants, teachers, paid workers in the public sector, small investors –

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were the main victims of inflation. Their income dwindled daily. For many it meant destitution.

These social difficulties brought a general disenchantment with the regime which increasingly resulted in violence. In vain did the Shanghai General Labour Union as an official body bring back together about 500,000 union members. In vain did a law of 16 June 1947 reinforce governmental control of the unions – fierce strikes broke out and were harshly suppressed. In February 1948 tanks were mobilized against Factory No. 9 of the Sung Sing (Shen Hsin) Company.⁸⁸ Students organized great demonstrations of protest against the brutalities of the American troops in December 1946; against the famine and the Civil War in May to June of 1947; against the famine and American aid to Japan in April to May of 1948. The government retaliated with arrests, the establishment of special tribunals, and punitive assaults in the dormitories of Chiao Tung University in April 1949.⁸⁹

The authorities used the existence of communist plots to justify the brutality of this repression. Communist influence is, in fact, difficult to discern. In 1947, Chu Hsüeh-fan, the veteran of moderate trade unionism in Shanghai, went to Hong Kong, and in the following year he took a seat at the All China Labour Congress of Harbin at which the Chinese Communist Party reaffirmed its interest in the workers' problems and the urban proletariat. But the hostility to the Kuomintang regime seemed due above all to a liberal current whose spokesmen were intellectuals like Ch'u An-ping, editor of *Kuan-ch'a* (*The Observer*), or Wang Yun-sheng, editor of *Ta-kung Pao*. The liberals denounced the corruption, incompetence and the despotism of the regime, and demanded an end to the Civil War, and the establishment of a true democracy. But they recognized the legitimacy of the government of Nanking and in this respect behaved as loyal opponents.⁹⁰ Through Shanghai a Third Way passes, which, as a Peking economist observed at the time, 'has been advocated by Jesus Christ, Confucius and contemporary professors'.⁹¹

In 1948–9 Shanghai was a city in reprieve, living off foreign subsidies, where a decadent bureaucracy and a newly emergent society confronted one another. Cut off from the hinterland and almost a stranger to the convulsions in which the latter was writhing, she seemed to follow her own dream, that of a modern Chinese destiny, both national and world-wide. In May 1949 an uninvited revolutionary army, inspired by the prospect of cleansing the Augean stables,

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entered by night a city whose doors were closed to it. What other welcome could it expect from this monied capital of cosmopolitanism and vice?

THE SHANGHAI MODEL OR 'THE OTHER CHINA'

The Chinese Communists equated socialism and industrialization and, under the influence of the Soviet model, they closely associated industrialization and urban life. They could not, therefore, ignore Shanghai, with its port, its kilometres of quayside and warehouses, its dozens of banks, its 3,000 factories, its skilled manpower, and its technicians and administrators. Competing with Manchuria as the principal industrial centre of the country;⁹² Shanghai obviously had its part to play in the construction of a modern national economy. From 1949–57, 69,000 craftsmen had to leave Shanghai for new industrial centres.⁹³ In 1964 yet again, the campaign 'Learn from Shanghai' gave as an example the little mechanical workshops set up long before the Revolution which continued to be an important supplier of industrial equipment.⁹⁴ But though ready to acquire equipment and skills, the new rulers condemned the type of development which Shanghai, in their eyes, stood for: a colonial development dominated by foreigners who responded neither to the national situation nor to its needs. The prevalence of consumer industries, the neglect of areas yielding raw materials and fuel; the resulting recourse to imports; a market often limited to the urban area itself – all these factors indicated a lack of integration of Shanghai with the national economy. Her position at the inlet of the Yangtze no longer offered anything exceptional to a regime which had decided to give first place to connections with the rest of the continent (i.e. with the USSR) and then fall back on its national bases. In the long run Shanghai was to be nothing but a passing anomaly brought about by the presence of foreigners in China. After the Revolution, once her shameful past had been erased, there was nothing left for her but to become one city among many others.

This analysis found echoes in the West and particularly in Rhoads Murphey's recent work, *The Outsiders*, where he describes the treaty ports as 'tiny and isolated islands in an alien Chinese sea which all along resisted and then rejected them'.⁹⁵

But the stigma of imperialism which marked the history of Shanghai could not possibly obliterate the economic role which the city had played for a century during the Western interlude. Its industrialization

had progressed with the import of foreign technology. Its relative integration into the world market made it live at the pace of international affairs which it came to understand. Due to contact with foreign commercial expertise several generations of Chinese businessmen had enlarged their experience and perspectives.

What difference does this progress make, one may ask, if its impact is limited to a privileged area and does not extend to the rest of the country and if it only serves to accentuate the dualistic structure, the break between Shanghai and the Chinese provinces? It is on a study of these links that the appreciation one might have of the economic role of the treaty ports depends. As far as they have been tackled, these studies have generally come to negative conclusions. One decides, in a rather contradictory fashion, that while the coherence of the traditional socio-economic system had hindered the spread of innovations,⁹⁶ the diffusion of goods which were manufactured or imported by the open ports ruined rural craftsmanship; and, finally, that there was a strict correlation between rural misery and the growth of the open ports: each famine, each civil war which ravaged the one brought for the other an increase in imports, in population and in activity.⁹⁷

The history of Shanghai partially bears out these conclusions. From the Sino-Japanese war onwards, the activity in the city was only sustained thanks to the influx of capital going into the banks, and of refugees who provided cheap labour. From 1938-41 (for the Settlements) and from 1946-9, it was the imports and the foreign assistance which provided the essentials in the form of supplies and raw materials. Shanghai then no longer had any outlet other than the ocean. But can the conclusions drawn from an analysis which applies to such a short period of time explain the nature of the treaty port? Can one make an abstraction from the foreign or Civil War? Shanghai was not always just a metropolis under siege. During its golden age, at the beginning of the 1920s, its relations with the hinterland governed its activities just as much as did the swing of international economic affairs. In the autumn of 1921 when the provinces of the north, struck by famine, could not provide them with wheat, twenty-one flour mills in Shanghai (out of a total of twenty-five) were obliged to close down.⁹⁸ At the same time, the stagnation in the output of raw cotton in the face of growing demand from a textile industry in a state of expansion was one of the causes of the great rise in cotton prices which heralded the cotton spinning crisis of 1923-4.⁹⁹ Also, the closure of the rural market affected the sale of manufactured goods. In 1920 Shanghai reduced by

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half her exports of textiles to the northern provinces which had fallen prey to the drought.¹⁰⁰ In the summer of 1921 the demand had disappeared in the country areas of the Yangtze ravaged by floods. But from autumn onwards, Szechuan, which had been spared all this, came on to the market making very large purchases which enabled the cotton mills of Shanghai to maintain their production. Did not the old China hands, moreover, take the Szechuanese demand as an indicator for the textile market in Shanghai?

The relation between the country market and the urban industries does not emerge so clearly in Shanghai as in Tientsin for example. The complexity of the relations with the hinterland; the interference of the international climate and the amount of speculation often clouded the analysis and prevented the case of Shanghai from being a typical one. But the fragmentary data we have suggest an integration of the economy of Shanghai, at least relative to that of the national market. The great rise of Chinese industry in 1920-2, that is to say in the actual period of world depression, is explained by the role of demand from within the country. This resistance of companies to the foreign crisis shows up their national character.¹⁰¹

The thrust of treaty ports, particularly strong in the case of Shanghai, spread to other regions. Inland China, traditional China, reacted, but without always being able to escape from its own sluggishness. The challenge of modernization is taken up most often in terms of traditional economics. The effort at adaptation shows itself in the apparition of hybrid techniques and structures. W. Skinner has defined this phenomenon as 'false modernization'.¹⁰² That of 'transitory modernization' seems to us more appropriate, for it points up the progress achieved by traditional techniques in the twentieth century (such as, for example, the introduction of a weaving machine with a metal frame, *t'ieh-lun chi*). The analysts, especially sensitive to the contrast between old and new methods, have paid little attention to this progress; it seemed negligible to them in as much as they placed it within a system which they judged to be *in toto* backward. But this transitory modernization is not the result of a spontaneous revolution. (Let it suffice to note that many traditional-improved techniques have been imported from Japan.) It represents an elaboration of the traditional system under foreign pressures transmitted through treaty ports.

The propagation effect can be seen in an even more direct way in the creation of new modern industrial centres close to treaty ports.

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All around Shanghai a series of satellite towns developed in this way from 1917-22: Nantung, Changchow, Sungkiang, Wusih. This industrial growth was not only the result of the strong influence of the treaty port; it was not a conquest of the interior by the treaty port. For by bringing into play many traditional local factors, it was also a reconquest of the treaty port by the interior; a utilization of the treaty port resources – especially its financial and technological resources – for the needs of a development which aimed at the elimination of foreign presence and the satisfaction of national needs. This decentralization reflects the concern of the Chinese capitalists. It seeks in one movement to weaken colonial privilege and to improve the costs of production by building factories closer to the zones which provide them with raw materials. The location of new industries close to, although outside the treaty port, reflects the impact of the latter.¹⁰³

However fragmentary they might be, these facts lead us not to reduce the connections between treaty ports and the interior to a simple confrontation between the West and traditional China. Dualism would be no argument here: it exists in all countries both underdeveloped and developed. The importance that it acquires in China does not spring only from the cohesion and the resistance of the traditional system but also from the rapid progress in the modern sector and the national bourgeoisie. In other words, one can impute it equally well to the success as to the failure of the treaty ports. During the century-long Western interlude, a modern Chinese tradition has been established.

This tradition expresses a fundamental requirement: that of a development which is at once national and open to the rest of the world. It marks a deep rupture with the Sinocentrism and the policies of a rural and bureaucratic state. This more or less complete integration into world civilization characterizes every manifestation of life in Shanghai – the negotiations of a businesslike bourgeoisie capable of surveying equally attentively the Stock Exchanges of London or New York and the Szechuanese market, the growth of a Communist Party and a workers' movement which up to 1927 had been part of the international revolutionary scene; the activities of an intelligentsia familiar with liberal, Marxist-Leninist, Trotskyist, anarchist, or esperantist philosophies.

Does this cosmopolitan character cut Shanghai society off from China? The rejection of Shanghai by the Kuomintang (which nevertheless took many resources from the city) betrays the impatience of

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bureaucracy with everything which does not come under its direct authority. The condemnation which communism brings to this capital of 'imperialists, compradores and bureaucrats',¹⁰⁴ should not surprise one. Faced with a peasant, national and military revolution, Shanghai embodies another tradition: working-class, intellectual, and internationalistic. The minority ideas, the ideas temporarily rejected by history, always run a great risk of being judged as unimportant deviations. After the triumph of the Maoist Revolution, such different historians as Rhoads Murphey and Jean Chesneaux judge Shanghai to be foreign to the 'real China',¹⁰⁵ China in their eyes being rural China. How then to describe the existence of Shanghai? Can a city of several millions of Chinese not be Chinese? Or, equally, ought one to consider Shanghai as a 'false China'? Or, to paraphrase E. W. Fox, should we call Shanghai 'the other China'?¹⁰⁶ A China just as real as that of the countryside, with its roots deep in the tradition of the trading classes but opening up to a new vision of the world and its own role in the world. The China of the minority; marginal China, but just as authentic as the rural China. Always repressed by political, bureaucratic, and centralizing powers, this 'other China' has again been excluded by the Communist regime. But it rises up once again in Hong Kong and in all Chinese communities overseas who were the first in the past to recognize and uphold Sun Yat-Sen.¹⁰⁷ Will the end of a certain Maoist obscurantism bring in China itself the resurgence of this modernist, democratic and internationalist way of thinking, a direct product of the May Fourth Movement of which Shanghai was the cradle and remains the symbol? The policy of the Four Modernizations, if achieved, can only in the long term weaken the bureaucracy which will have initiated it, and favour the return of the 'other China'.

PART TWO
POLITICAL LIFE

2

POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN
SHANGHAI, 1949–1951

Richard Gaulton

THE REVOLUTION MOVES TO THE CITY

When the People's Liberation Army captured China's major cities in 1948 and 1949, the Chinese Communist Party encountered a host of new problems peculiar to urban environments. The tasks of administration, reconstruction, and revolutionary transformation provided a challenge to the Communists unlike those they had faced in winning state power. Recognizing the difficulty of these tasks, the Communists approached them warily.

The Party's official attitude toward the cities of China was mixed, reflecting mixed recollections of its previous urban activities. After initial success in the cities, especially in organizing workers, the Party suffered a crippling blow in Chiang Kai-shek's coup of April 1927.¹ Within a few years, the Party leadership was driven from the cities, eventually to seize power primarily through a peasant-based rural revolution. Throughout twenty years of struggle in the countryside, however, the Party maintained links with its underground organizations in urban areas. It never abandoned the goal of returning to the cities.² In a report delivered in March 1949 at the Seventh Plenary Session of the Party Central Committee, Mao Tse-tung identified urban work as the Party's main task:

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From 1927 to the present the centre of gravity of our work has been in the villages. . . The period for this method of work has now ended. The period of 'from the city to the village' and of the city leading the village has now begun. The centre of gravity of the Party's work has shifted from the village to the city.³

In the same address, however, Mao warned of the peril of the 'sugar-coated bullets' of the bourgeoisie, which could wound or destroy unwary comrades. Clearly, the cities were the arsenals producing these weapons of counter-revolution.⁴ The cities were seen as places of great opportunity, but also of great danger.

Shanghai, China's greatest industrial centre and port, its most populous and most cosmopolitan city, epitomized these opportunities and dangers. Moreover, Shanghai's special status within China, its singular role in China's history and economy, and its importance as the focal point for foreign observers of the revolution, made the city different from all others occupied by the Communists. Shanghai's political, social, and economic complexity necessitated a special application of Chinese Communist urban policy. Party leaders were familiar with the cynical prediction that 'the Communists will ruin Shanghai and Shanghai will ruin the Communists'. Even before the PLA crossed the Yangtze and drove toward the city, the Party began to formulate an urban policy that would, they hoped, suit the special conditions of Shanghai.

Building support among the population and mobilizing the masses to perform practical tasks in aid of the revolution were the necessary foundation for the Party's urban policy. Chinese Communist theory and practice have long stressed mass activity as an essential element in the solution of social problems. As early as 1919, in the essay, 'The Great Union of the Popular Masses', Mao Tse-tung had revealed his faith in the power of the masses to transform society.⁵ His faith found its classic expression in the 'Report on the Hunan Peasant Movement' (1927), in which he wrote:

several hundred million peasants will rise like a mighty storm, like a hurricane, a force so swift and violent that no power, however great, will be able to hold it back.⁶

The most powerful manifestation of the importance of mass support for the Party and its programmes came during the anti-Japanese war and the Civil War, when peasants were organized to provide a multitude of practical and essential services to the army and the guerrilla forces.

People's war as it was fought by the Communists involved the masses providing recruits, supplies, guides, intelligence, and auxiliary services to the fighting forces, and denying them to the enemy. To translate popular support into practical activity, the Party developed an effective mobilization policy suited to the conditions of rural warfare.

To Marxist-Leninists, purely spontaneous mass activity cannot be successful, for it lacks direction and perseverance. Nor can mass activity be brought under absolute control, because it will lose its energy and turn into mere compliance.⁷ According to Mao, the contradiction between control and voluntarism, direction and spontaneity, can only be resolved by the correct application of the mass-line style of leadership: 'In all the practical work of our Party, all correct leadership is necessarily "from the masses, to the masses".'⁸

The Chinese Communists developed their leadership and mobilization techniques in the context of a rural revolutionary war. When the Party occupied the cities, it had to modify those techniques to fit new circumstances. In the rural areas the basic organizational unit coincided with the primary socio-economic unit, the village, which was small and had a relatively simple social and economic structure. Cadres of peasant origin were able to organize and lead fellow peasants on the basis of face-to-face communications. Between 1946 and 1948, land reform created a strong tie between the poorer peasants and the Communists, without disrupting production. The war provided a dominant theme for all political work.

In a city like Shanghai, the basic units of production and social identity did not coincide; work centred on the factory, but residents identified with a great variety of groups based on residence, kinship, local origin, occupation, or workplace. The social structure and division of labour were extremely complex. The Party suffered from an acute shortage of cadres, especially cadres from urban backgrounds who shared some experiences with the masses. Because production techniques were complicated, radical reforms might cause production to decline sharply. Alienation of the bourgeoisie would deprive the Party of critical business and managerial skills. Thus, the Party found it impossible to transfer its rural techniques directly into the cities.⁹

Shanghai emerged from the Second World War with a population swollen to 6 million by refugees, a languishing economy cut off from its usual markets and supplies, a run-down industrial plant, and severe inflation that rewarded speculation instead of investment and impover-

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ished everyone who depended on a fixed income. The end of the war generated some short-lived optimism, but the economic crisis intensified and wiped out minor gains even before the Civil War began in earnest. Unemployment, inflation, and war combined to demoralize the population, and conditions worsened as the Civil War turned against the Nationalists.¹⁰

Demoralization and cynicism were widespread in Shanghai between 1945 and 1949. The common saying, 'business is better than working, hoarding is better than business, speculation is better than hoarding', reflected pessimism about the economy. Political despair was eloquently expressed by Ch'u An-p'ing, the editor of the liberal magazine *Kuan-ch'a* (*The Observer*):

Under this sort of government, living is much easier for those who do not observe the law, who are immoral, and lacking in goodwill as compared with clean, law-abiding citizens. . . Except for a minority who have been able to maintain their own ideals, most people have already turned toward speculation, are not to be trusted, will not take responsibility, and commit evil deeds.¹¹

The people of Shanghai were not simply apathetic; they were alienated from politics. In general, avoidance of political discussion and commitment, concern with personal matters, and apparent lack of interest in the outcome of the struggle between the Nationalists and Communists reflected a deliberate choice, and was not the product of a narrow, tradition-bound view. Richard Solomon has rightly emphasized the fear of involvement in the 'tiger world of politics' as an element in Chinese political culture.¹² As the Civil War intensified, economic conditions deteriorated, and powerful figures sought to protect their fortunes and positions, individuals felt helpless and threatened in the political arena. Avoidance seemed to be the best policy.

Almost all former Shanghai residents with whom I have spoken referred to 1945-9 as a time of 'dog-eat-dog' individual struggle. Outside his small circle of family and friends, the individual often felt isolated and vulnerable. Many residents tended to interpret their problems in a narrow, personal way and to search for individual solutions to them. Often they were fatalistic about their chances. Shanghai's disastrous inflation was spoken of as if it were a natural disaster, a storm beyond human control. Until it subsided each individual would simply do his best to survive.¹³

The Nationalists' abortive currency reform of August 1948 was a crushing blow to Shanghai's morale. When PLA forces crossed the

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Yangtze on 21 April 1949, few residents had faith in the Nationalists' ability, or even willingness, to defend the city. The people of Shanghai awaited the arrival of the Communists with resignation. As one resident of the city summarized his outlook:

We had been ruled since 1937 by the Japanese and since 1945 by Chiang Kai-shek, and during that time we lost everything. How could Mr Mao Tse-tung be worse?¹⁴

MUTUAL PRECONCEPTIONS

When Ch'en Yi's Third Field Army entered Shanghai on 25 May 1949, neither the Communists nor the city's residents were entirely lacking in knowledge of each other. Based on limited experience and information, each had built up preconceptions and expectations about the other. Of course, these preconceptions differed among the various groups making up the revolutionary forces and Shanghai's population. Because their experience of each other was severely limited it was inevitable that their mutual perceptions contained elements of myth and illusion.

As Marxist-Leninists, the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party looked to China's cities as potential revolutionary centres. Shanghai itself was the cradle of the Party, which had held its First Congress there in 1921. The cities, especially industrial Shanghai, were the home of the proletariat, the leading class of the revolution, as well as the national bourgeoisie, an important member of the United Front. Shanghai's glorious revolutionary history dated from the May Fourth Movement and included not only the ill-fated labour movement of the 1920s but also the patriotic and anti-imperialist movement of the 1930s and 1940s.¹⁵ Underground organizations loyal to the CCP were active in many spheres of Shanghai society. As China's largest and wealthiest city, with nearly half the country's modern industry, Shanghai was a major potential source of strength for the economic reconstruction and modernization of China by the Communists, whose goal was to raise industrial production from 10% to 30% or 40% of total production within ten to fifteen years.¹⁶ Thus, ideology, history, and economics combined to produce a favourable attitude toward Shanghai among CCP leaders.

The Party remained officially optimistic in spite of Shanghai's peculiar economic situation. For the city was essentially an outpost of the world economy, dependent for its prosperity on foreign supplies

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and markets, and it was not closely integrated with the Chinese economic system.

The city of Shanghai, born out of Western commercial enterprise and organized in its economic life largely along Western lines, was in effect superimposed on a peasant civilization.¹⁷

Under the Nationalist government, foreign and state capital held dominant positions in the city's economy. In a discussion of China's urban economy Hsü Ti-hsin, who after Liberation was to become director of Shanghai's Bureau of Industry and Commerce, traced the economic problems of the cities to (1) the oppression of rural areas by the cities; (2) 'excessive abnormal prosperity' in the cities because of speculation, hoarding, and smuggling; (3) the contradictions between bureaucratic and private capital and between large and small cities; and (4) the crisis brought on by dependence on foreign imperialism, the dominance of bureaucratic capitalists, and the effects of war, inflation, and exorbitant taxes. However, Hsü argued, Liberation would eliminate the economic crisis and land reform would abolish the contradiction between urban and rural areas.¹⁸

Shanghai was a centre of foreign and bourgeois culture. After 1945 the foreign resident population never regained its pre-war peak of about 50,000, but there was still a substantial European presence in the city. Foreign-owned newspapers, American films, and schools where Chinese pupils were taught in foreign languages were all signs of cultural influences opposed by the Communists. Shanghai's middle and upper classes cultivated a distinctively Europeanized cultural style.

Shanghai's cultural character was largely responsible for the anti-urban populist sentiments of the peasants who made up a majority of the CCP and PLA. These negative attitudes, which H. Arthur Steiner has described as 'a peasant-inspired and Puritanical distrust of the cities', evoked suspicion and hostility among peasant cadres and soldiers.¹⁹ Even before Shanghai became a major city, Kiangsu people had been commonly stereotyped as cunning, crafty, refined, luxury-loving, and endowed with exceptionally good business sense.²⁰ The city's neon lights, European architecture, modern utilities, and vice and corruption contributed to its reputation for evil; it seemed part of a cultural world thoroughly alien to a Chinese peasant. The Communist leadership put a great deal of effort into training PLA troops assigned to capture cities, hoping thereby to win popular support by ensuring discipline, and also to overcome the soldiers' negative attitudes toward

the 'luxury-loving' urban populace.²¹ However, the anti-urban attitudes of Party members and soldiers were reinforced by some higher-level cadres, who emphasized the 'vicious and lavish' style of urban life.²²

Shanghai's population had diverse preconceptions concerning the Communists. For the most part, they had little concrete information about the Party, its army, and its programmes. Older citizens had memories of communist activities of the 1920s and many were aware that the CCP had been active in the anti-Japanese patriotic movement of the 1930s. In 1945 and 1946, during the short-lived period of negotiation before the Civil War commenced in earnest, Communist organizations operated relatively safely in Shanghai's turbulent post-war atmosphere. Some CCP propaganda was circulated, journalists' reports of conditions in the liberated areas were published, and accounts of wartime battles against the Japanese occupation gained currency. A college instructor, a liberal, reported the excitement in his group when Mao's essay 'On New Democracy' (1940) became available in Shanghai at the war's end. Five or six of his friends passed it around, then met for an animated discussion on the practicality of Mao's programme for China.²³ After the Civil War began, most reports on the liberated areas came under Nationalist censorship, and several independent newspapers were closed. As the general credibility of Chiang's regime declined during the Civil War, so did the credibility of official statements concerning the character of the Communists.

As the PLA won battle after battle against Chiang's troops, and a Communist victory became a real possibility, the CCP took on greater importance. It became the only conceivable alternative to the discredited and demoralized Kuomintang and its government, and for some that was enough to place the party in an attractive light. Among the intelligentsia, the orientation toward the Communists 'shifted from something like reserved disapproval to qualified support'.²⁴

When the Communists entered Shanghai, supporters of the new regime quickly expressed their happiness, showering the new rulers with the highest praise. To some partisans, Liberation resembled the arrival of heaven on earth. *Shang pao* (*Commerce Daily*), the organ of the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce, was ecstatic:

Three days ago, Shanghai was still a hell in which the bandits let loose slaughter and plunder. Today, it is a paradise in which there is freedom, democracy, stability, and prosperity.

Three days ago, Shanghai was still a butchery in which the people's assets

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were being plundered by the monopolistic capitalists led by Chiang-Soong-Kung-Ch'en. Today it is the land of blissfulness in which the city's five million may attend freely to the ploughing of their own fields.

Three days ago, Shanghai was still the base in which imperialistic aggressive capitalists carried out the suction of the blood of China's national industrial and commercial enterprises. Today it is the joint workshop of the whole body of our national industrialists.²⁵

In a slightly more restrained tone, another newspaper advanced a similar argument – that Liberation had transformed Shanghai and that the 'old Shanghai' no longer existed but had become a 'new Shanghai' when PLA soldiers crossed Soochow Creek:

From yesterday, Shanghai is no longer the lair of the Imperialists and the KMT [Kuomintang] bandits, but has become the great democratic metropolis of the Chinese people. From yesterday, Shanghai is no longer the base of the Imperialists for the aggression of China, the base of the Big Four Families for the exploitation of the Chinese people, but has been turned into the strong bastion of the Chinese people for the building of the New China of New Democracy.²⁶

The Chinese Communist Party was less effusive, more circumspect, and more realistic. In its inaugural editorial, *Liberation Daily*, the official organ of the CCP in Shanghai, expressed both sides of the Party's ambivalent attitude toward the city:

Shanghai is the economic and industrial centre of China, the entrepôt for China's domestic and foreign trade, the lair of the influences of imperialism, bureaucracy, and feudalism, the centre of China's working classes; the meeting place of China's revolutionary youth and progressive cultural movement; and the cradle of China's revolutionary movement of the past few decades.²⁷

The editorial proceeded to point out that the elimination of the Kuomintang had not done away with all evil influences in the city. Liberation was to be only the first step in the transformation of Shanghai into a revolutionary city and of its residents into revolutionaries.

INITIAL REACTIONS

The careful preparation of PLA units occupying Shanghai contributed to a positive first impression of the Communists among Shanghai citizens. In contrast to the departing Nationalist troops, who looted what they could before fleeing the city or disguising themselves as civilians, PLA soldiers seemed models of youthful enthusiasm and strict

discipline. In the weeks after Liberation many stories of the good behaviour of the PLA troops circulated in Shanghai. Soldiers who refused to accept even water from civilians, who weighed firewood when requisitioning it and returned an equal amount of a higher grade, or who slept on the sidewalk instead of commandeering rooms were rare enough in Shanghai's experience to stand out in the minds of all observers.²⁸ As the newspaper *Impartial Daily* noted, minor incidents of good behaviour produced a major effect:

public transportation facilities have been restored, and there is not a single soldier of the Liberation Army who rides the vehicles without buying a ticket, and there are no attempts to disturb the ordinary queue in order to have prior access to the vehicles. This may look like a small matter, but its significance and repercussions are far-reaching.²⁹

The sophisticated Shanghaiese also circulated tales of the innocence and naïveté of the peasant troops of the PLA. 'Yokel stories' about the misadventures of soldiers were common – true or apocryphal stories of first encounters with city traffic, modern conveniences, and sharp city business practices. Occasionally, articles and letters appeared in the Shanghai press criticizing city-dwellers who were condescending in their attitude toward the PLA, or attacking businessmen who took advantage of the young soldiers.³⁰ The soldiers' innocence and youth contributed to a feeling of security on the part of the populace.

After Liberation, the PLA strove to maintain its favourable image. Shanghai residents were forbidden to collect 'comfort packages' for the soldiers, because some people had used this practice as a form of extortion.³¹ Official propaganda stressed the close ties between the army and the people. In one dramatic and widely publicized incident, a speeding PLA truck ran down and killed a student. The army paid for the funeral and sentenced the driver to death, but reduced the penalty after appeals by the family and fellow students of the dead youth.³² For the most part, the PLA relied on its distinctive work style to create a positive impression.³³

Like the PLA, the new governmental authorities tried to make a favourable impression in the first days after Liberation. In order to prevent disorder, restore confidence, keep residents from leaving the city, and encourage businesses to continue or resume operating, the government sought to reassure the populace that policies would be pragmatic and administration rational.³⁴ CCP leaders met with representatives of various groups, assuring them that the government recognized their interests and valued their co-operation. On 4 June, for

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example, the Light Industry Department of the Shanghai Military Control Commission (MCC) invited about 250 directors, engineers, and technical experts to a conference at which mayor and MCC chairman Ch'en Yi asked for their suggestions concerning future policy.³⁵ Similar meetings were held to solicit the advice and gain the confidence of business groups, educational administrators, and leaders in other circles.

To an economically oriented city like Shanghai, the most encouraging initial sign was the new government's sober recognition of the primacy of economic problems. At Liberation, almost all of Shanghai's factories had suspended operations, as inflation and inadequate supplies crippled virtually all branches of the economy. In the eyes of most Shanghaiese, and of the CCP as well, economic recovery took precedence over social transformation:

Only with the speedy restoration of all public and private industrial enterprises in Shanghai and their normal operation will a real revolutionary order be set up. It is true that the abolition of the evil systems of the old social order is an imminent need. But this work of abrogation must be preceded by a period of careful planning.³⁶

Mao Tse-tung himself had gone even further in stressing the primacy of economic work, stating that unless production were restored and developed and the livelihood of the people improved, the Revolution would fail and the Party would be unable to maintain its political power.³⁷

Lacking qualified cadres, the Party had no choice but to rely on non-Party elements to assist in economic reconstruction. Capitalists, technicians, intellectuals, and officials of the Nationalist administration who were not classed as active counter-revolutionaries were encouraged to co-operate with the government. The new rulers of Shanghai made few specific promises to the business and financial community, but this was a welcome contrast to the hyperbolic style of the previous regime.

The Communists generally succeeded in favourably impressing Shanghai's people in the first days after Liberation. However, positive impressions often existed for reasons the Party found unsatisfactory, or they were expressed inappropriately. Many businessmen expected a return to normality and a chance to make windfall profits.³⁸ Workers saw Liberation as a chance to assert themselves against their bosses, and an epidemic of labour-management disputes broke out in Shanghai shops and factories as workers made demands, struck, or

even occupied factories. For the moment, the government was unable to control either the assertion of grievances or their settlement, except in a few cases.³⁹ Among the common people, initial support for the new regime was partly an expression of relief at the end of the Civil War and the departure of the Nationalists. Expressions of support might come in ways unintended by the Communists. One enthusiastic writer of a letter to the *China Weekly Review* strongly supported the government but expressed himself inappropriately:

I do pray our Almighty God that the new regime will be perpetuated and that its established principles and exemplary discipline will be maintained. May God bless our new rulers!⁴⁰

In spite of the difficulties facing them, Shanghai's new leaders also felt a qualified optimism. Comparatively little damage was done to the city during the battle for Shanghai, partly because of effective action by the People's Peace Preservation Corps (*Jen-min pao-an tui*), a workers' picket organization that guarded factories and facilities from destruction and sabotage and persuaded Nationalist units to surrender.⁴¹ Utilities kept functioning or resumed operations shortly after Liberation. Food that had been kept from the city during the fighting began to be brought in, and newspapers printed scores of notices of the imminent arrival of ships carrying materials for Shanghai industries. By mid-June 1949, about half of Shanghai's factories had resumed operations, and although there remained serious shortages of industrial materials, especially cotton and fuel, the long-term outlook seemed good.

In June, however, Shanghai and its new rulers experienced a succession of shocks. A typhoon and flood did great damage in the city's food supply area and caused thousands of refugees to enter Shanghai just as the city was trying to send war refugees back to their homes. More critical for the city's future was the Nationalist blockade of the port, which went into effect on 26 June. Aeroplanes from Taiwan and the Choushan Islands bombed several ships attempting to reach Shanghai, and the danger, combined with high insurance rates, effectively isolated Shanghai from the foreign supplies and markets that had been essential to the city's former prosperity. Harassing air raids by the Nationalists in American-supplied aeroplanes added to the city's sense of siege. The rate of inflation continued to be very high.

Under this economic threat, the Communist leadership in Shanghai formed a new outlook. As Ch'en Yi stated in August in his report on

takeover work at the First Conference of Representatives of People of All Circles:

Since the liberation of Shanghai, difficulties have been caused by the enemy blockade, and a small proportion of the 'people have become irresolute, expressing pessimism, doubt, and even complaint.⁴²

At the same meeting Jao Shu-shih, head of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee, conceded that lenient economic policies had failed to yield the expected results, and warned Shanghai that hard times were ahead:

To transform the old Shanghai, completely dependent on the imperialist economy for its existence and development, into a new Shanghai which does not rely at all on the imperialist economy and is truly independent, is not an easy thing. It is extremely complicated and formidable work, and moreover, we must pass through a stage of temporary, superficial 'retreats' and 'bottlenecks'.⁴³

Jao proposed a comprehensive programme to overcome the effects of the blockade and develop Shanghai's economy. He called for full support for the liberation of all China, a decentralization of Shanghai's population, and transfer of schools and factories to the interior, a shift to products suitable for domestic consumption, increased rural production, improved transportation links between Shanghai and the interior, and a campaign of thrift and economy.⁴⁴ If firmly implemented, these measures would have completely transformed Shanghai. An *Impartial Daily* editorial stated that 'Shanghai as a producing city can maintain only a population of three million', and urged half the population to leave.⁴⁵

Anti-urban sentiments prevailed among some top-level leaders, and the old images of luxury-loving bourgeois decadence were once again applied to Shanghai. One of the more extreme descriptions appeared in *Ching-chi chou-pao* (*Economic Weekly*) of 25 August 1949:

Shanghai is a non-productive city. It is a parasitic city. It is a criminal city. It is a refugee city. It is the paradise of adventurers. In a word, Shanghai is a city where consumption is greater than production, indeed, one may even say a city where waste is greater than consumption.⁴⁶

Many Shanghai residents opposed the drastic dispersal plan. Despite encouragement from the government and the favourable publicity given to organizations that moved to the interior, few industries seem to have left the city. In February 1950 it was reported that six plants had moved to Tientsin, one of the few confirmations that transfer had

occurred.⁴⁷ In August 1949 the press featured stories about the repatriation of refugees and the planned conversion of factories to new products.⁴⁸ However, these conversions were dictated by supply and market opportunities rather than by the government's policy. Apprehension among some residents caused *Impartial Daily* to emphasize that repatriation 'did not involve the compulsory departure from Shanghai of those who have the means to remain in the city'.⁴⁹

Opposition to the dispersal plan was reflected in at least one article. The newspaper *Cultural Daily* printed a long article by Shen Li-jen entitled 'A Private View on the Dispersal of Industries from Shanghai'. It warned against 'blind dispersal', cautioned against the 'negative measure' of 'dispersal because of present difficulties' and urged only dispersal that would bring prosperity to both Shanghai and the rest of China. Shen favoured the removal only of whole industries: linked industries such as cotton yarn, textiles, dyeing, spindle machines and equipment, and repair works; and 'closely related institutions' such as financial and technical research institutions and trade organizations.⁵⁰ If Shen's suggestions had been followed, it would have been necessary to move all of Shanghai's textile industry – or, more to the point, none of it.

Shen's views represented a 'pro-Shanghai' outlook that saw a bright economic future for the city once current difficulties had been overcome. In spite of Jao Shu-shih's apparent endorsement of the contrary image of a parasitic and luxury-loving city, dispersal was never effectively implemented. The economic relationships that had made Shanghai grow in the century before Liberation made it impossible to disperse the city in a few years after it. The CCP leadership was forced to adjust its conception of Shanghai to accord with the realities of the city and to undertake a programme of economic reconstruction over the next few years.

BUILDING MASS SUPPORT

The foundation of the Party's programme for Shanghai was the creation of widespread popular support and its transformation into practical achievements by means of mass mobilization. Unable to cope immediately with the economic and administrative problems of Shanghai, the new regime sought to build mass support not only by distributing material benefits, which could be made available only to a few, but by propaganda and the provision of moral and symbolic

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benefits to a mass public. A new policy had to be devised to deal with the special character of Shanghai's propaganda apparatus and audience. A variety of mechanisms of presentation, including both the mass media and face-to-face communications, were used to reach all sectors of the population. The authorities sought to identify themselves with popular cultural themes and values in order to create a favourable affective response. The Party and government also endeavoured to introduce and popularize a set of symbols, including a new political vocabulary, which it expected the people to use to structure their response. As will be seen, the Communists met with mixed results in carrying out their propaganda plan.

The propaganda apparatus

Because of poverty and illiteracy, China did not have a national media network in 1949. Most newspapers circulated locally, but a few published editions in several cities. *Impartial Daily*, for example, put out editions in Shanghai, Tientsin, Chungking, and Hong Kong, and was probably China's most widely read newspaper. Only a few magazines circulated outside the city of publication. Most radio stations broadcast weak signals. Besides, few people owned receivers. Within Shanghai, however, there was a relatively dense network of communications – newspapers, magazines, and radio stations – which the Communists took over intact.

In January 1949, Shanghai had fifteen daily newspapers in Chinese and four in English, as well as a large number of tabloid 'mosquito papers', only some of which were published regularly.⁵¹ Many of the dailies were controlled by Kuomintang cliques, and few survived Liberation without being confiscated and closed or reorganized. By January 1950 there were eight dailies in the city of which the largest were *Liberation Daily*, the CCP paper; *News Daily*, a popular morning paper, and *Impartial Daily*, which was read especially by professionals and intellectuals.⁵²

Low literacy rates and a shortage of newsprint held down the circulation of all newspapers. According to a survey of Shanghai workers in 1950, 46% were illiterate, and fewer than half had had any schooling.⁵³ Estimates of circulation figures seem low in relation to Shanghai's population. *News Daily* printed about 140,000 copies in early 1950, and its popularity was attributed to its 'non-political' character – it carried more classified advertisements than any other

Shanghai newspaper, specialized in local news of Chekiang and Kiangsu, and featured 'human interest' news.⁵⁴ The authoritative *Liberation Daily* probably printed about 100,000 copies, but its emphasis on political interpretations of events and its use of a highly politicized vocabulary made it difficult for people with poor or limited reading ability to understand. The government and the newspapers frequently expressed the hope that citizens would share newspapers and that group subscriptions and the establishment of regular newspaper-reading groups would make it possible for newspapers to reach the entire population.⁵⁵ However, sectors of the Shanghai population, including many illiterate workers and most handicraft workers, labourers, shop workers, and housewives, remained outside the newspaper network.

Magazines had a much smaller impact, even though the number of them increased in the year after Liberation. By the end of November 1949, sixty-six magazines had registered with the Shanghai MCC;⁵⁶ by early 1951, the total had risen to eighty.⁵⁷ Only three were classified as periodicals of general interest; the remainder specialized in particular topics and contented themselves with a small circulation.⁵⁸ *Chan-wang* (*Outlook*), the most widely read of the general-interest magazines, had a circulation of 20,000 in Shanghai, but the total circulation of magazines published in the city was under 300,000 monthly in late 1949.⁵⁹ Given the limited literacy rate in Shanghai, the printed media catered to specific groups within the general population, and in that sense none had a mass appeal.

Radio seemed to be an ideal medium for overcoming the barrier of illiteracy. There were many radio stations in the city – twenty-one in early 1951.⁶⁰ Nevertheless, for several reasons, radio remained the least important of the mass media in Shanghai. First, radio was considered a form of entertainment, and private programming was designed to meet audience expectations. Second, radio receivers were owned by relatively privileged people, not by the working class and the poor, whom the government hoped to reach. The same groups that were isolated from the printed media lacked access to a radio and leisure to listen.

Of all the mass media, the cinema and the theatre seemed the most promising channels for propaganda. Shanghai had more than fifty film theatres and about one hundred theatres and halls, with an audience much broader than those of the other media. In 1951, Shanghai was reported to have a film audience of two million and a theatre audience

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of three million per month, figures probably comparable to those at Liberation.⁶¹ However, the Communists had great difficulty in making effective use of film and theatre propaganda.

The film audience continued to prefer American films for some time after Liberation. In early 1949, 75% of the audience patronized American films,⁶² and throughout the summer more than two-thirds of the films shown were produced in the US.⁶³ By June 1950, Hollywood's share of the audience was down to 28.3%,⁶⁴ but it took the rising anti-Americanism and the US trade embargo of the Korean War to push American films entirely off Shanghai screens. Films were imported from the Soviet Union to make up for the shortage of Chinese films from the state-operated studios, but audience response was lukewarm. In October 1950 only 12.5% of the audience attended Soviet films, and only 10.2% attended films produced by China's state studios.⁶⁵ The uneven quality of the first films from the state studios contributed to their ineffectiveness as propaganda among the experienced Shanghai audience.⁶⁶ After China's entry into the Korean War, documentaries and fictional films about the conflict received a wide showing and seem to have evoked a more positive response, perhaps because of the relatively direct emotional appeal of patriotic 'war movies', which Chinese film-makers had considerable experience in producing.⁶⁷

To overcome their problems with media propaganda, including their own inexperience, the Communists relied on a propaganda system that substituted organization for technology and concentrated on face-to-face persuasion. The critical problem in this approach was a lack of effective propagandists. To communicate their views to Shanghai citizens, the Party and government needed people who spoke the local dialect, and who were also reasonably well versed in Communist ideology. Such people were rare. We cannot estimate the number of Shanghai underground Party workers who surfaced at Liberation, nor can we know how many former Shanghai residents returned from the Liberated areas after 1949, but the number was certainly quite small in relation to the large population of the city.⁶⁸

Cadres worked under intense pressure to fulfil tasks in both production and propaganda. Since the government's basic policy was to restore Shanghai's economy, propaganda work often received scant attention. In some units cadres neglected it entirely; in others, they held a few meetings or classes to present government and Party policy to large groups. Although large meetings saved time and energy, they were criticized as formalistic and ineffective.⁶⁹ In late 1950 the

Shanghai press published many articles deploring lackadaisical methods of propaganda work and offering suggestions for improvement, indicating official dissatisfaction with the overall performance of cadres in this area.⁷⁰

On 1 January 1951, the CCP Central Committee promulgated a 'Decision on the Establishment Throughout the Party of a Propaganda Network for the Masses', calling on Party branches to establish a programme of regular and systematic propaganda work. Ideally, propaganda networks would intersect in a nationwide system including both workplaces and residential areas.⁷¹ By the end of 1951, however, only 66% of Party branches in Shanghai had set up networks, and 15,311 propagandists had been recruited.⁷² *Liberation Daily* reported in December 1951 that 55% of a sample of 7,234 propagandists 'were acting positively and could usually be effective'.⁷³ A national survey published a month later gave 52% as the proportion of effective propagandists in Shanghai, a figure that compared favourably with those for most other areas.⁷⁴ Despite the attention given to promoting propaganda work during the 'Resist America - Aid Korea' campaign, success was limited.

Small, face-to-face meetings conducted in workplaces and residential areas were the Party's preferred method of propaganda work.⁷⁵ Because Party and Youth League members were few, small groups were often led by activists recruited from the masses. In efforts to assist these inexperienced leaders, Shanghai's newspapers printed a great deal of detailed advice on how to conduct study groups and newspaper-reading groups and manage wall and blackboard newspapers in factories, schools, and residential areas.⁷⁶ Ambitious young people who wanted to become small-group leaders were advised to cultivate 'Bolshevik-style' friendships, emphasize production, cherish their comrades, and ask frequently for the advice of Party members.⁷⁷ The Party also published *Hsüan-ch'uan shou-ts'e* (*Propaganda Handbook*), a small monthly periodical explaining current propaganda themes and providing illustrative material, cartoons, and suggestions for effective work.

The formal propaganda network in Shanghai, like the mass media, tended to be concentrated among certain sections of the population (the literate, workers in large factories, workers in state-owned enterprises, students) and to exclude the illiterate, the very poor, the unemployed, workers in small private industries and handicrafts, temporary workers, shop workers, and non-working women. Given the severe

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shortage of cadres and the government's emphasis on economic reconstruction, this 'elitism' in propaganda and organization was justifiable and perhaps inevitable.⁷⁸ However, it meant that a large percentage of Shanghai's people – those for whose benefit the revolution had been carried out – had to be reached by indirect, unsystematic methods if they were to be reached at all.

Propaganda themes

In their propaganda work in Shanghai, the Communists emphasized themes associated with several different sets of values, some of which were derived from traditional Chinese culture. It is sometimes argued that Communist ideology and traditional Chinese values are polar opposites. For example, Franz Schurmann states:

the values of Chinese Communist ideology diverge sharply from traditional Chinese values. Thus, struggle differs from harmony, the stress on public life differs from the earlier Chinese love of privacy, collectivism differs from earlier beliefs in individuality.⁷⁹

Nevertheless, the Communists attempted in the period immediately after Liberation to identify themselves with several important traditional notions about authority. They also promoted and identified with a set of ideals best classified as 'modern' or 'liberal', in addition to the revolutionary ideals (values) explicit in their ideology. In the first years after Liberation, traditional and modern propaganda themes seemed to outweigh revolutionary themes in the mix selected by the new regime.

At times, the new government sought to depict itself in terms of traditional authority patterns. The cultural achievements of leaders were stressed in biographical sketches: a portrait of mayor Ch'en Yi emphasized his literary interests and achievements of the 1920s – 'in becoming a general, he has not cast off the role of the scholar'.⁸⁰ The government also employed the venerable device of appearing to respond to petitions. In June 1949 newspapers carried many letters protesting against the activities of silver speculators; shortly thereafter the MCC launched a crackdown on their activities.⁸¹ During the Campaign for the Suppression of Counter-revolutionaries, the MCC reported that it had ordered arrests after having 'received demands to take action from people of all walks of life'.⁸² The traditional value of social harmony was reflected in the slogan 'mutual benefit to both

labour and capital', and class conflict was given less prominence. One remarkable cartoon, which would have found favour under the most reactionary regime, depicted a capitalist and a worker pushing a cart with big new tyres labelled 'collective contract' and 'labour discipline', having discarded the broken wheels of 'excessive exploitation' and 'exaggerated leftism'.⁸³ Traditional themes in propaganda were probably designed to attract the support of people in Shanghai who had been left out of the city's process of modernization.

According to conventional criteria, Shanghai was China's most modern city, and modern values such as nationalism, economic and bureaucratic rationality, and social reform were strongly held by sections of the population. Since these groups tended to be concentrated in critical branches of Shanghai's economy and society, the government tried to build support among them by stressing in its propaganda the modern and liberal aspects of its programme.

Attempting to claim the banner of nationalism and refute Kuomintang claims concerning the alien character of communism and the CCP's subservience to the Soviet Union, the Communists placed a heavy emphasis on symbols of national identity. Sun Yat-sen's portrait was featured at rallies and parades, and on National Day it was given a prominence equal to Mao's.⁸⁴ Soong Ch'ing-ling, a powerful living symbol of nationalism to many Chinese, appeared often in Shanghai. Unification of the whole country, and CCP independence in contrast to Chiang's dependence on the United States, were recurrent themes in all types of propaganda.

The Shanghai government took practical and symbolic action to affirm to Chinese and foreign residents that it was a firm defender of national interests. The case of William Olive, an American consular employee who was compelled to apologize and pay compensation for disrupting a parade and damaging state property, was but one of many well-publicized incidents in which the regime exacted expressions of submission from foreigners who were accused of mistreating Chinese citizens.⁸⁵ Foreigners found that government business had to be conducted in Chinese, and such signs of Western influence as place-names of foreign origin began to disappear. To Shanghai residents who carried anti-foreignism too far, by, for example, objecting to the display of portraits of non-Chinese such as Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, the official reply stressed the contributions of these foreigners to China's revolution.⁸⁶ With the outbreak of the Korean War, nationalism often took the form of anti-Americanism, occasionally de-

scending to the level of crude xenophobia.⁸⁷ In general, however, propaganda stressed the modern or liberal aspects of nationalism and played down both its traditional forms and the revolutionary nationalism of Liu Shao-ch'i's *On Internationalism and Nationalism*.

The new government sought to project an image of efficiency and administrative rationality. As soon as the Shanghai MCC was established on 27 May 1949, it began taking over units of the old government in a process which A. Doak Barnett has aptly compared to the reorganization of a bankrupt corporation, with the MCC acting as receiver.⁸⁸ The MCC set up committees on politics, military affairs, finance and economics, and culture and education, to supervise the takeover of various units and their gradual transfer to the newly established Shanghai Municipal People's Government. Preparations for a new representative body began with the August 1949 meeting of the First Conference of Representatives of People of All Circles, which included delegates from old and new mass organizations, the democratic parties, and functional interest groups. Not until October 1950 did the Second Conference carry out the authoritative functions of a People's Congress. Local government offices were established for each ward by mid-1950. In general the takeover went smoothly despite the lack of cadres with administrative skills. The government called on all 'politically pure' Nationalist functionaries to stay at their jobs, promising that they would retain their status and salary.⁸⁹ Ch'en Yi reported in August 1949 that, except for the staffs of the Investigation and Personnel departments of the old government, 95% of the staff of organs taken over by the MCC remained at their posts.⁹⁰ The retention of these administrators and experts, at least temporarily, reinforced the desired impression of rationality and pragmatism.

Especially in the first years after Liberation, the government was careful to avoid the exaggerated rhetoric associated with the Kuomintang government, which had eroded its credibility with promises that the 1948 Gold *Yuan* currency reform would end inflation and that Shanghai would be defended 'like Stalingrad'. The new leadership's extreme reaction to the economic difficulties of the summer of 1949 was an uncharacteristic excess. The government acted with greater restraint when a second severe economic crisis hit the city in early 1950, causing 1,454 of about 12,000 factories in the city to suspend operations and more than 6,000 business establishments to close between January and May.⁹¹ Nearly 3,000 factories and shops applied for permission to close in May alone, and another 500 asked to

be allowed to suspend operations.⁹² Although they maintained that the long-term outlook was excellent, the city's leaders freely acknowledged economic difficulties and used the word 'depression' to describe them.⁹³ Anticipating the slump, *Impartial Daily* echoed sober official statements when it editorialized in December 1949 that 'we shall definitely be in for a period of hardship in 1950'.⁹⁴

In focusing on themes of nationalism, administrative rationality, and social reforms such as reducing corruption or retraining prostitutes for productive work, the People's Government cast itself as a modern, progressive, 'liberal' regime. The explicitly revolutionary themes of internationalism, class conflict, proletarian leadership, and domestic social revolution received less attention. When the people of Shanghai were being prepared for China's intervention in Korea, the threat to China's security was given as the main reason for China's action, more important than China's internationalist duty to assist the Korean revolution. Propaganda themes were apparently designed for maximum appeal to the 'modernist' in Shanghai. Concern for economic reconstruction was one of the main reasons for emphasizing moderate policy rather than revolutionary ideology, at least in the period before the *Wu-fan* campaign.

Popularization of new political symbols

In addition to using directive propaganda, the government sought to influence popular responses to its programmes by introducing and popularizing a new set of political symbols.⁹⁵ The most important of these were linguistic symbols. Even in the first years after Liberation, the Chinese language as it was spoken and understood in Shanghai underwent considerable change as the government and its partisans promoted new terms and a new style of expression. Inevitably, the spread of these symbols profoundly affected the way Shanghai's citizens thought about politics.⁹⁶

One set of new terms was inspired by the social and political needs of the government and society; the vocabulary of the old society was inadequate to express the circumstances of the new. Suddenly confronted with a barrage of political terms developed by the CCP over twenty years of struggle, the general population had to learn the meaning of words such as *kan-pu* (cadre), *chih-kung* (employees and workers) and *t'u-kai* (land reform).⁹⁷ These terms were necessary to describe the government's structure, practices, and programmes. A

second category of terms and stylistic devices was more obviously propagandistic in purpose and was promoted by the government to contribute to political mobilization by raising the political awareness of the people and encouraging them to think along ideologically approved lines.⁹⁸ A number of practices contributed to the formation of a new political language: the frequent introduction of sets of slogans, the application of military vocabulary to civilian activities, the coining of words with favourable connotations for things and activities approved by the government, and the revival of old terms, often with new connotations.⁹⁹ For example, the classical words *ying-hsiung* (hero) and *kung-ch'en* (a meritorious vassal) were applied to model workers and revolutionary martyrs.¹⁰⁰

Newspapers, speeches, small-group sessions, and propaganda classes paid a great deal of attention to introducing, explaining, and popularizing new terms and slogans. Letters from readers asking for explanations of relatively simple terms, such as *kung-ho-kuo* (‘republic’) and *jen-min ta-ch'ung* (popular masses), were often published along with definitions.¹⁰¹ Authoritative articles and editorials attempted to explain to the public the subtle distinctions between *chieh-chi* (classes) and *chieh-ts'eng* (social strata) and between *wu-ch'an chieh-chi* (proletariat) and *kung-jen chieh-chi* (working class).¹⁰² According to one former Shanghai resident, his study group spent most of its time trying to master new terms and had little opportunity to use them in discussion. Some members were inhibited from expressing themselves by the fluency of more ‘politically advanced’ members in the ‘new language’. The ability fully to understand *Liberation Daily*, which consciously addressed itself to readers who had ‘graduated’ from other newspapers, was a mark of status.¹⁰³

The new vocabulary was often difficult for people to master, but the style of most government communications, which was much closer to the vernacular than the style used by the Nationalists, made it possible for ordinary residents to understand them. Public proclamations couched in common language rather than the literary style had a more direct impact on more people and increased the force and apparent sincerity of the message. Workers who learned the new political vocabulary were able to use it effectively by incorporating new words into standard grammatical patterns. One article in *Impartial Daily* urged all readers to ‘Study the Grammar of the Working People’, implying that the working-class vernacular had been promoted to the highest linguistic status.¹⁰⁴

In addition to changes in language, *Liberation* brought to Shanghai

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a new gallery of authoritative political symbols that the people had to learn to interpret. The national flag, the Liberation Army flag, and pictures of leaders such as Mao Tse-tung caused few problems in interpretation, and those who made unauthorized use of these symbols were soon corrected. Letters in newspapers sharply criticized the enterprising Shanghai capitalists who used the national and PLA flags as tobacco trademarks.¹⁰⁵ Other symbols promoted by the government required reinforcement in order to insure 'correct' interpretation. Constant identification of the USSR as China's close friend and the epitome of progress in material and social life led some people to the undesirable idea that China had 'only changed from calling American imperialism "papa" to calling the Soviet Union by that name'.¹⁰⁶ The Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, which claimed 200,000 Shanghai members in October 1950, endeavoured to promote and reinforce positive reactions to the symbol of the USSR.¹⁰⁷

Effective control of communications media in Shanghai facilitated a relatively rapid transformation of the set of political symbols. Residents found that there were material and status incentives for developing the ability to interpret and manipulate the new linguistic symbols. The effective transformation of the political way of life of a city of five million was a more formidable task than promoting the acceptance of approved symbols. From the leadership's point of view, propaganda and symbolic manipulation were insufficient, because they failed to involve the population in actions that would both demonstrate and reinforce a commitment to the new system. Transforming popular support into action required the organization and mobilization of the people of Shanghai.

POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN SHANGHAI

The new government viewed mass mobilization not simply as a goal in itself but primarily as an instrument with which to consolidate political control, carry out practical tasks, and, eventually, assist in 'the social revolution in Shanghai. Economic slumps, the Nationalist blockade and bombings, and the pressure of the Korean War created an atmosphere of crisis in which the government's deficiencies in politically and technically capable manpower and its lack of experience in urban work loomed as potentially disastrous shortcomings. The government had three main goals in mobilizing the masses in the initial period after Liberation: to involve the masses directly in dealing with

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practical problems such as maintaining public security, rebuilding the economy, and providing public services; to arouse the political consciousness of the people; and to increase popular commitment to the government and its policies through mass participation in practical activity on their behalf. Mobilization in Shanghai up to the end of 1951 achieved these ambitious goals only in part.

Mass organizations provided the overall framework for popular political activities.¹⁰⁸ Within a few days of Liberation preparatory committees were formed to begin the work of organizing the Shanghai General Labour Union, the Shanghai Federation of Democratic Women, and the Shanghai Federation of Democratic Youth.¹⁰⁹ In the following months the emphasis was on building a large membership.¹¹⁰ Large-scale parades, demonstrations, and rallies involved members directly but not regularly in political activities. Although they generated emotional involvement, mass activities could not promote a lasting commitment, and participants often viewed them as a lark rather than as serious political action.¹¹¹

For most people, more significant activity in mass organizations came at the branch or local level, when political activity was added to or intruded on their daily routine. Typical activities for factory workers included technical education classes, political classes, small-group or newspaper-reading sessions, and production competitions directed by the union branch. For others, the focus was on activities organized on a residential basis. Shanghai led China's cities in establishing residents' organizations. These organizations developed into the main form of contact between the government and the non-working population.

The first street committee branch in Shanghai was established on 15 January 1950.¹¹² By December 1951 there were 2,083 street and lane committees in the city, with 24,862 members.¹¹³ These committees co-ordinated a broad range of activities, promoted and organized participation in campaigns, and supervised public services. In Chin-chia lane, a model for street work, more than seventy separate organizations were established within a year, including a Party branch, a Youth League branch, a committee to manage the water supply, street-cleaning groups, a children's bookstore, a co-operative, and a night school. During 1950 this predominantly working-class lane, inhabited by many pedicab drivers, participated in anti-blockade and anti-bombing work, conducted winter curfew work, promoted bond sales, and campaigned for signatures on peace petitions. After Chin-chia lane held its own Conference of People's Representatives of All

Circles, the co-ordination of all these activities was said to have improved greatly.¹¹⁴

Residents' committees involved many citizens in public activities for the first time. To provide guidance for these inexperienced political workers, newspapers printed accounts of model organizations and provided advice on practical matters.¹¹⁵ The newspaper *Daily News* published the book *Chü-min sheng-huo shou-ts'e* (*Handbook of Residents' Life*), which included detailed instructions on how to conduct political activities, propaganda work, study, public security work, and welfare work, including the management of public services.¹¹⁶ In a city like Shanghai, where in 1950 the average population of the twenty urban districts (*ch'ü*) was more than 200,000, and the population of the largest approached 400,000, street and lane committees provided an important level of administration between the government and the people.¹¹⁷

Branch-level and local organizations directed the masses in practical work to execute the government's programmes. Thus, they were the critical link between policy-making and implementation. Street and lane committees were particularly active in public security work. In November and December 1950, district governments organized 742 winter curfew service teams with 26,691 members. By the end of March 1951, 6,860 of the 10,486 lanes in urban districts had set up winter curfew organizations, and a total of 1,814 teams with 155,159 members had been organized.¹¹⁸ The curfew teams conducted night patrols and stood watch at important installations to prevent criminal activity and sabotage. According to one participant, the winter curfew team simply formalized an informal security system that had already been operating on his street by agreement of the residents. However, as a result of its formalized status and the participation of some enthusiastic newcomers, the curfew system operated more regularly and efficiently.¹¹⁹ In model districts such as Ping-yüan-fen, winter curfew work not only assisted in performing police functions for which the Public Security Bureau lacked manpower but also served as the basis for organizing literacy classes, work in the 'Resist America - Aid Korea' campaign, and other activities.¹²⁰

The government also depended on mass mobilization to implement its economic policies in both production and consumption. Unions played the most important role in organizing increased production and promoting it by political means. The clearest example of organizing for production was the campaign to draw up Patriotic Pacts (*Ai-kuo kung-yüeh*) in all units. The Common Patriotic Pact of People of All Circles in Shanghai, which was written in the spring of 1951, included general

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pledges to obey the law, support the Chinese volunteers in Korea, and oppose American imperialism in Japan, Taiwan, and Shanghai itself.¹²¹ At lower levels, however, pacts were expected to be more specific, committing the signers to particular actions and often to economic goals. A small group in a cotton mill promised to protect public property by avoiding waste and guarding against sabotage, to follow the work schedule and work hard, to avoid seeking personal advantage at the expense of the public, and to hold meetings every two weeks to examine the results of their work.¹²² Workers in a native products company were even more specific, vowing to pay their trade union fees by the tenth of each month and to donate 5,000–10,000 *yuan* per month to the patriotic campaign.¹²³ Ideally, each pact was to be specific and its wording concise enough to permit memorization. Nationalism, reinforced by group solidarity, provided motivation for increased effort.

Production competitions were another way of mobilizing for increased output. Labour emulation drives, sparked by formal challenges issued by advanced workers or model production teams, were closely associated with the 'Resist America – Aid Korea' movement. Competitions acquired their own military vocabulary. Workers did not merely 'propose' a contest, they issued 'challenges to combat' (*p'iao-chan k'ou-hao*) to rivals.¹²⁴ The feats of individuals who were designated as advanced or model workers served as the basis for widespread emulation drives. Two hundred and forty-four industrial production teams in Shanghai took up the challenge of the team led by Ma Heng-chang of Shenyang.¹²⁵ Successfully organized competitions created an intense, militarized atmosphere in the workplace. Individuals who made technical innovations or increased production by rationalizing procedures were most likely to be recognized as models, and since material rewards for ordinary workers were based on individual production, workers had individual as well as collective incentives to exert themselves in competitions.¹²⁶

Complementing the production campaign were programmes to conserve scarce commodities. People were urged to eat an ounce less of rice a day, or to eat gruel twice a week instead of rice.¹²⁷ Electricity conservation became a major goal. The interruption of petroleum imports by the blockade forced the Shanghai Municipal Power Corporation to convert to the use of coal for fuel, and the bombing raid of 6 February 1950 damaged the power plant and emphasized the vulnerability of the city's power supply. After the raid, newspapers

carried many suggestions for saving energy, ranging from a mild request not to use hair-dryers to a sterner call for the elimination of neon lights and a prohibition on electric utensils.¹²⁸ With the exception of some residents' organization and union campaigns to conserve materials in production, the programmes to save resources were neither well organized nor persistently promoted.

Austerity gradually came to be accepted as a feature of a progressive lifestyle. Glamorous Chinese and Western fashions gave way to cotton clothing and the 'Lenin suit', some luxurious restaurants closed or converted to cater to a mass clientele, and the conspicuous consumption of automobiles, nightlife, and fine furnishings decreased. The new styles were adopted not out of political commitment but for reasons of fashion or practicality – wealthy Shanghaiese recognized that the public display of wealth was imprudent at a time when local committees were soliciting bond sales and patriotic donations and collecting information for the tax offices. The new styles were difficult for some to master; newspapers pointed out that it was not proper to wear neckties with the Lenin suit and cautioned against engaging in inappropriate behaviour such as gambling or dancing while wearing the new style.¹²⁹

Mass mobilization was also an approach to the provision of social services that the municipal and district governments were unable to supply directly. Residents' committees organized street cleaning, welfare work, sanitary and health inspections, assistance in census-taking, vaccination campaigns, and other services. Most of the activities of basic-level organizations, whether in work-places or residential areas, were related to 'community interests' – that is, they did not divide the community along clear-cut social lines. Conflicts of interest might occur, for example between the lane clean-up committee and some residents unwilling to spend extra time cleaning their property, but these were not based on any systematic cleavage. Clean-up and austerity drives and the provision of public services had no human targets. The Campaign to Suppress Counter-revolutionaries and the 'Resist America – Aid Korea' movement, although directed at specific enemies, were aimed against spies, saboteurs, and American imperialists, who had little social support in Shanghai. Unlike the *Wu-fan*, these campaigns did not threaten the tenuous solidarity of newly formed communities and organizations by promoting class conflict.¹³⁰

The government's definition of economic work as the main goal of mass organizations led to an elitist organizational strategy. Family

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Women's Associations (*Chia-t'ing fu-nü lien*) were organized in many areas and received much publicity in the winter of 1949-50, before the formal establishment of the Democratic Women's Federation. These associations organized housewives and non-working women to participate in sewing, cooking, and literacy classes and assisted in the bond drive and clean-up campaigns.¹³¹ There were no membership requirements, and some of the associations had as many as one thousand members.¹³² Nevertheless, when the Shanghai Democratic Women's Federation was formally inaugurated, only 20,000 of its nearly 300,000 members were housewives. The majority were working and professional women, reflecting deputy mayor P'an Han-nien's statement that 'the main task of the Women's Federation is production'.¹³³ Little was reported of Family Women's Associations after the summer of 1950.

Political mobilization strategy in Shanghai was designed to meet a number of government aims. Mass organizations contributed to the solution of the acute practical problems of increasing production and maintaining public security, and they assisted in the provision of services to broad sectors of the population. As 'transmission belts' and vehicles for propaganda, they brought a large proportion of Shanghai's people into contact with their government. As channels of information, they educated Shanghai's rulers about the economic and social complexities of Shanghai, and as training centres they helped recruit the activists and cadres necessary to operate the city's administrative machinery.

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MOBILIZATION POLICY

A strongly positive and activist response to these mobilization efforts was characteristic of a small minority of the population, and tended to be concentrated among young people, students, and workers. Activists sought leadership positions in mass organizations and aspired to join elite groups such as the Party or Youth League. In the weeks after Liberation more than 4,000 students volunteered for the Southward Bound Service Corps (*Nan-hsia fu-wu tui*), an auxiliary force organized to accompany the PLA in its campaign in South China.¹³⁴ The New Democratic Youth League enrolled 60,000 members in 1,901 branch organizations in Shanghai within a year of Liberation. Only 258 of these branches were in factories and enterprises; 76.2% of the city's schools had branches of the Youth League.¹³⁵ Administrative cadres

were intensively recruited in Shanghai in the early 1950s, primarily from among ‘progressive’ ex-Nationalist personnel who went through short-term political training sessions; some of these no doubt qualified as activists. Most of the Party’s recruits were workers, students, and intellectuals.¹³⁶

General acceptance of the new system and its institutions, a far more common response than activism, depended on a certain degree of political mobilization. Shanghai citizens who responded in this way joined one or more mass organizations and became involved in a variety of political activities. Certainly, they participated in parades and mass demonstrations, and they were among the 2,430,000 reported to have marched in ‘Resist America – Aid Korea’ parades on 1 May 1951 and the 3,070,000 said to have signed peace petitions.¹³⁷ As union members, or residents of organized streets and lanes, they were probably organized in production or austerity campaigns, street-cleaning or curfew work, or small groups. As workers, students, members of literacy classes, or newspaper readers they were frequently exposed to official information and interpretation, which they generally accepted. They became familiar with the new political vocabulary and symbols, and perhaps even began to use them to understand and analyse their experience. Some developed a political identity in terms of the Chinese nation, or perhaps even their class, and they may even have begun to practice political analysis of their problems. These men and women were becoming political, but they were far from being socialists or communists.¹³⁸ They represented the partial success of propaganda and mobilization policy.

Many citizens made no positive response to the mobilization efforts of the Communists. Social isolation was an important factor in this – large groups of Shanghai residents continued to live beyond the pale of political life. Written propaganda excluded illiterates. The very poor, many of whom had no regular residence or employment, were not reached by the city’s organizational network. Apprentices, shop workers, and handicraft workers, who in many instances lived and worked on the same premises and were often bound to their employers by parochial ties, lived under their employers’ control and were almost completely isolated from the outside world. Women tended to be excluded from politics unless they were workers, professionals, or students. All of these groups were kept out of politics during the early years after Liberation not only by their social circumstances but also by the narrow focus of the Communists’ mobilization strategy.

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Deficiencies in the implementation of mobilization policy created problems for the Communists. Mismanagement, formalism, and bureaucratism were shortcomings often criticized by both the masses and the authorities. After reminding its readers that there had been no freedom of assembly before Liberation, *Impartial Daily* complained that now there were too many meetings, and often they were held without adequate preparation or a clear purpose.¹³⁹ Zealous cadres and activists organized so many meetings and classes in some units that production suffered. Workers on long shifts resented extra activities not directly related to production.

Under pressure to participate in a variety of political activities, local activists or cadres and the masses often settled for a ritualistic formal compliance with requests but showed no initiative. The Patriotic Pact campaign produced many examples of formalism, and there were criticisms of 'empty' pacts unrelated to real work or production. Some units simply copied the pacts drawn up by other organizations, no matter how inappropriate they were.¹⁴⁰ It was also common for cadres in charge of local blackboard newspapers or wall papers to make the error of copying articles from the Shanghai dailies, ignoring local news and the specific concerns of their audience.¹⁴¹ In many cases, formalism was the result of excessive demands on the time and energy of both activists and the masses.

The inability of the local leaders to communicate effectively with the masses led to other difficulties. Articles on propaganda work constantly stressed the need to tie propaganda to the daily concerns of the masses and to avoid 'chasing after beautiful phrases'.¹⁴² The often different cultural and class backgrounds of the organizers and the masses posed a serious problem. According to a report from a housewife in a lane organized by the Federation of Democratic Women, educated women were disdainful of the organizers, with an attitude of 'I understand everything better than you, yet you are coming to organize me.' Those with a low cultural level were fearful of having to attend too many meetings, undertake labour, and do air-defence work. The result was that only children came to meetings.¹⁴³ In another district, overworked lane cadres concentrated on assisting a few people rather than on reaching the masses. A mutual aid society was organized in the lane, but residents cynically referred to the aid society (*hu-chu-hui*) as the 'confusion society' (*hu-tu-hui*).¹⁴⁴ Reports of deficiencies rarely included specific, practical suggestions for avoiding problems. Usually, they

confined themselves to admonishing organizers to 'stay close to the masses'.

Despite shortcomings in its execution, the propaganda and mobilization policy designed by the Party for Shanghai was a reasonable attempt to cope with the city's problems. The Communists did not destroy Shanghai, nor did the city defeat the Communists. Instead, it forced them to abandon their initial optimism and the sudden pessimism of the summer of 1949 and to discard their simple conception of the city for one more closely related to reality. The CCP did not renounce its goals for Shanghai, but only changed its strategy. Lacking experienced cadres, confronting a complicated social and economic structure, and facing a grave economic crisis, the Party understandably chose to apply its efforts to Shanghai's key economic and social centres, to the relative neglect of other areas. Intellectuals, managers and administrators, and workers in state-owned and large private enterprises were the chief targets of propaganda and mobilization policy.

The Communists achieved considerable success in mobilizing the population to perform practical work such as providing social services and assisting in the maintenance of public security. It is more difficult to judge their success in building among the people a deep and lasting political commitment to their authority. The Korean War helped the Party to increase its popular support through nationalist appeals; at the same time the material needs generated by the war helped relieve Shanghai's economic crisis. By the end of 1951 the city's leaders were confident enough of their political strength and economic security to launch a major campaign (the *Wu-fan* campaign) against the bourgeoisie. The foundation for this mass movement was laid by the propaganda and mobilization policy of the first years after Liberation.

SHANGHAI AND CHINESE POLITICS: BEFORE AND AFTER THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

*Parris Chang**

Shanghai is one of China's twenty-nine provincial-level units: an object of central control that should support and implement policy decided by the national authorities. Compared with other local units, however, what distinguishes Shanghai is the degree to which it has been a source of influence over the Chinese political scene since the 1960s. It was the base from which Chairman Mao Tse-tung launched the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) in 1965 and a vanguard in Mao's crusade thereafter. In 1967 Shanghai came under the control of Radical leaders, and this 'Shanghai group' turned it into the stronghold of China's radical political forces and used it to contend for national power. For almost a decade during 1967-76, Shanghai's inputs into national policy, leadership personnel, and elite conflict were considerable and unprecedented.

What are the factors that account for Shanghai's political prominence? Why did Mao choose it as a base to launch the GPCR? How was the 'Shanghai group' formed? Through what channels and using what resources did Shanghai (more precisely, the Shanghai leadership) influence national policy and shape Chinese politics? This essay attempts to analyse these and other questions relating to the role of Shanghai in Chinese politics since the mid-1960s.

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BEFORE AND AFTER THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

THE BUILD-UP TO THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

On 10 November 1965, the *Cultural Daily* of Shanghai published an article entitled, 'On the New Historical Play "Hai Jui Dismissed from Office"' under the byline of its editor, Yao Wen-yuan. Although carrying an innocent and innocuous title, the article reflected a political conflict that had been developing in the leadership of the Chinese Communists since 1959; it generated further controversy in the leadership after its publication, and it marked the opening shot of Chairman Mao's crusade – the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

The leadership conflict originated in the summer of 1959 when Marshal P'eng Teh-huai, then a Politburo member and Minister of Defence, severely criticized Mao's Great Leap and commune policies and openly attacked Mao's leadership in a Politburo meeting in Lushan. The opposition to Mao was defeated and P'eng was disgraced. The disasters created by some of the Great Leap and communization measures, and the deep economic crisis in 1960–2, however, had vindicated P'eng's earlier criticisms and made him a martyr in the eyes of many Chinese.

It is well known that Mao harboured strong resentment against the popular historical play 'Hai Jui Dismissed from Office' (which was performed in many Chinese cities in 1961–2), which he saw as an attempt to reverse the verdict on P'eng Teh-huai. The play, by Wu Han, a vice-mayor of Peking and a well-known historian, pictured Hai Jui as a righteous Ming Dynasty minister who returned land to peasants and brought oppressive and corrupt officials to justice only to be cashiered for his concern for the welfare of the people through court intrigue. In the play, the demand was made that the unfair dismissal be reversed so that this 'righteous official' could again serve the people.¹ In Mao's mind, the play was an attack on his leadership – it insinuated the unjust dismissal of P'eng, portrayed P'eng as the righteous Hai Jui and sought to bring P'eng back to office. Hence Mao called for the censure of the playwright Wu Han in a central work conference in September 1965.

However, other Party leaders refused to act upon his demand. To his consternation, several ranking Party leaders even rushed to the defence of Wu Han. Among Wu's defenders were Teng Hsiao-p'ing, the Party's general-secretary, and particularly P'eng Chen, the first Party secretary and mayor of Peking and concurrently a member of the Party Politburo and Central Committee (CC) Secretariat. Most significantly,

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P'eng Chen was then heading the Party's 'Five-man Cultural Revolution Group' – an agency charged with the overall responsibility of rectifying the nation's cultural and ideological work.

Since the central Party apparatus and the Peking Party machine were controlled by officials unsympathetic to his design, Mao felt compelled to seek support elsewhere, and he turned to the CCP Committee of Shanghai to prepare an attack against Wu Han and, by extension, his powerful protectors in the leadership. This was later recounted by Mao himself in October 1966:

Then Peking couldn't do a thing; nor could the centre. It was in September or October last year when this question was raised: If there was revisionism in the centre, what would the regions do about it? I felt that my views couldn't be accepted in Peking. Why wasn't the criticism of Wu Han started in Peking but in Shanghai? This was because there were no available men in Peking.²

Thus Yao Wen-yuan's article was Mao's opening counter-attack. But why choose Shanghai instead of Canton, or Wuhan, or any other place? There are several important reasons.

To begin with, Shanghai is located in east China – a region to which the Chinese leadership has attached special importance. The city is China's largest metropolis and possesses all kinds of resources unmatched by other places. It produces 15% of the nation's gross industrial output,³ and many provinces look to it for assistance and guidance in their economic development. Shanghai is also a major cultural centre of China (next in importance only to Peking), and the place where a large number of China's cultural and intellectual elite live and work; hence it wields immense influence throughout the country. All of these factors were well known to Mao, and he probably calculated that a political initiative from Shanghai would quickly attract nationwide attention and generate the impact he desired.

If the strategic location and the resources of Shanghai were the necessary conditions of Mao's decision to turn to Shanghai, the sufficient condition was to be found in the Shanghai leadership, in which Mao had staunch supporters who controlled resources crucial to his design. Among them was K'o Ch'ing-shih, who, until his death in April 1965, was concurrently a Politburo member, vice-premier, first secretary of the CCP East China Bureau and of the Shanghai CCP Committee and mayor of Shanghai. There is no question that K'o was a Maoist stalwart; he actively campaigned for Mao's Great Leap

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policies in 1957–8⁴ – for which he was promoted to the Politburo in May 1958 – and continued to display firm support for Mao on wide-ranging issues in the first half of the 1960s.

Aside from the ideological affinity between K'ao and Mao, K'ao's support for Mao can also be partly explained in terms of rivalry between himself and P'eng Chen. As in the Soviet politics in which the leaders of the Leningrad party organization (e.g., G. Y. Zinoviev and S. M. Kirov) were contenders of the national leadership and Zinoviev used Leningrad as a power base to challenge the Soviet central leadership,⁵ there were some parallels in the jealousy and tension between the leaders of Shanghai (China's Leningrad) and Peking (China's Moscow). Between K'ao and P'eng, the latter was senior in Party rank and enjoyed greater political prominence due to his added responsibilities at the Party centre, while K'ao was primarily a regional leader and did not exert the same kind of political influence on the national scene as P'eng did.

The competition and rivalry, both covert and overt, between these two leaders manifested itself over a number of policy issues. For example, P'eng displayed a critical attitude toward Mao's leadership in the early 1960s and allowed *Pei-ching wan-pao* (*Peking Evening News*) and *Chien-hsien yüeh-pao* (*Front Line Monthly*), both controlled by the Peking Party apparatus, to publish satirical essays in 1961–2 to attack, albeit subtly, Mao's Great Leap and commune policies.⁶ On the other hand, K'ao not only actively promoted Mao's radical programmes in the 1950s but also remained an ardent defender of Mao's leadership in the 1960s even after many of the Maoist measures had proven disastrous. K'ao may have perceived the Great Leap differently from P'eng (and leaders of other localities) because he did quite well in the late 1950s and had suffered much less the economic dislocations and adverse consequences of the Leap inflicted upon other provinces. As pointed out by Lynn White, Shanghai benefited considerably from the Leap and scored impressive economic gains – as a result of the decentralization, Shanghai was able greatly to expand its machine-building and other heavy industries, control and dispose more revenues than before, and offer more jobs and other benefits to the local population.⁷

P'eng and K'ao also took different positions on cultural and ideological work. In the September 1962 CC Plenum, Mao had called for a rectification in China's cultural sphere to cleanse the influence of bourgeois forces. P'eng and others such as Lu Ting-yi and Chou Yang, director and deputy director of the CC Propaganda Department, were

at best lukewarm to Mao's demand and dragged their feet. In contrast, K'o expressed total support and convened a meeting in Shanghai in early 1963 to urge artists and writers to emphasize and accentuate in their work the successes of China's socialist construction in the past thirteen years. K'o's proposal was given a cold reception by key officials in the Party's Propaganda Department; when a meeting on 'Literary and Art Work' was convened by that Department in April 1963, Chou Yang pointedly said that 'all themes in writing can reflect the spirit of our time' and that writers should 'not consider the portrayal of the present as our only major work'.⁸

Closely involved in Mao's efforts to rectify the cultural and ideological spheres was his wife. She became actively engaged in the reform of Peking Opera from late 1962 and energetically promoted the 'revolutionary modern drama' to portray workers, peasants and soldiers in socialist revolution and construction. The Peking Party Committee under P'eng Chen and the Ministry of Culture under Lu Ting-yi, which together controlled the best known and most prestigious theatrical organizations, refused to co-operate, and even obstructed her endeavours. Frustrated in Peking, she turned to Shanghai. Unlike P'eng, K'o was extremely helpful and mobilized the manpower and resources in Shanghai to provide Chiang Ch'ing with a base of operation. Shanghai became the pacesetter of 'revolutionary modern drama' and in late 1963 sponsored a festival of modern drama, the first of its kind in the nation, to publicize the achievements of theatrical reform in east China.

What had taken place in Shanghai and elsewhere did not escape Mao's attention. In fact, during 1964 he repeatedly criticized the problems in art and literary circles and kept pressing those in charge to carry out a thorough reform.⁹ He also realized that if he were to project his will he had to overcome resistance from key central leaders, therefore he actively manoeuvred to enlist support. Surprisingly, one important target of Mao's co-optation was P'eng Chen who had hitherto showed lack of enthusiasm, if not altogether antipathy, toward the Maoist policy. In the summer of 1964, Mao appointed P'eng to head the 'Five-man Cultural Revolution Group', a new office set up to direct and oversee a sweeping 'cultural revolution'. Thereafter, P'eng was given special political prominence; for instance, in September 1964, the press accorded him the honour of being the Chairman's 'closest comrade-in-arms', suggesting he was a potential successor to Mao.

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At this point it is worth noting that Mao was already manipulating the succession problem to serve special political purposes. In July 1964 Mao called for the training of China's 'revolutionary successors' and, in so doing, he was raising the issue of his own successor and casting doubts on his heir-apparent, Liu Shao-ch'i. To hint of cultivating a 'counter-heir' put pressure on Liu to display loyalty and to back Mao's policies lest he risked the withdrawal of Mao's endorsement. Mao also used his own succession to co-opt support from ambitious aspirants (e.g., P'eng, Lin Piao, and Teng Hsiao-p'ing) among the leadership. By making them compete with each other, Mao succeeded in dividing P'eng from Liu and Teng in 1964-5.

On the other hand, Mao did not forget to reward the Maoist stalwart in Shanghai. When the National People's Congress met in December 1964, K'o Ch'ing-shih was elevated to the rank of vice-premier. K'o was, according to Chiang Ch'ing, a member of Mao's inner circle. In the spring of 1965 he visited south-west China to enlist the support of provincial leaders for Mao's cause, but he contracted a serious illness during the tour and died in Szechuan in April 1965.

The untimely death of this Shanghai leader was a great loss to the Maoist camp, for Mao not only lost an active, important follower, but K'o's positions as first Party secretary and mayor of Shanghai fell to Ch'en P'i-hsien and Ts'ao Ti-ch'in, whose loyalty towards Mao had yet to be tested. Fortunately, however, the person in control of Shanghai's cultural and propaganda apparatus, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, was a proven Maoist, and in spite of K'o's death, Mao could rely on Chang's support to launch his counter-offensive from Shanghai.

The details of Chang's career help explain the roots of what came to be known as the 'Shanghai group' in subsequent years. Chang had worked in Shanghai continuously since 1949. In 1950, he was deputy chief of the East China Bureau of the New China News Agency, and rose to be director of the Literary Work section of the Propaganda Department of the Shanghai CCP Committee in 1956. When an 'anti-rightist' campaign was launched throughout China in the summer of 1957, he ruthlessly purged many 'rightists' in Shanghai's cultural circles. He also actively cultivated young 'proletarian' writers 'armed with the thought of Mao Tse-tung' - Yao Wen-yuan was one such propagandist recruited and patronized by Chang. In the autumn of 1958, Chang published an article in the Party journal of Shanghai, *Chieh-fang* (*Liberation*), advocating the introduction of supply systems in the rural communes and in the cities to accelerate China's transition

to communism. It was at this time, if not earlier, that he came to Mao's attention. Mao ordered that the article be reproduced in the *People's Daily* (13 October 1958) and personally added an 'Editor's Note'.¹⁰ This described Chang's article as 'basically correct, but somewhat one-sided' and urged readers to discuss the 'important issue' raised in it. The issue of the supply system was debated also in the higher Party circles and in the press for more than two months;¹¹ and although Chang's radical proposal was eventually rejected, the episode seemed to have helped his political career in subsequent years.

In the spring of 1963 Chang was promoted to be director of the Propaganda Department of the Shanghai CCP Committee, replacing Shih Hsü-min.¹² The change of guard at the top of Shanghai's cultural and propaganda apparatus came as a result of power-play. As we have seen, since late 1963 K'o Ching-shih had collaborated with Chiang Ch'ing to push revolutionary modern drama and the reform of art and literature in Shanghai. This involved replacing Shih Hsü-min with the more radical Chang Ch'un-ch'iao because Shih had strong ties with conservative propaganda officials in the central leadership, and with local 'bourgeois' literary figures, and had also proved unco-operative.¹³

This shift was to have far-reaching consequences, for, as Shanghai's 'cultural czar', Chang was not only instrumental in mobilizing the manpower and resources under his control to promote the Maoist literary reform in 1963-4, but was also closely involved in Mao's scheme to launch the opening move of the GPRC from Shanghai in 1965. According to Chiang Ch'ing, Chang took an active part in the preparation of the article published under Yao Wen-yuan's name on 10 November 1965, and made several trips to Peking to consult him prior to its publication.¹⁴ Yao, who was known for his talent for invective, was introduced to Chiang Ch'ing by Chang and was assigned the task of writing the article.¹⁵

It remains to examine the stand taken by Shanghai's two top leaders, Ch'en P'i-hsien and Ts'ao Ti-ch'iu, who became the first Party secretary and mayor, respectively, after K'o Ching-shih's death in April 1965, and thus could have had a say in the publication of Yao's article and have affected Mao's plan to use Shanghai as a base to launch the GPRC. According to Chiang Ch'ing, the secret preparation of the article began in early 1965, and K'o was one of the very few who had knowledge of the scheme.¹⁶ Ch'en and Ts'ao were kept in the dark even after K'o died, and they did not find out until the article was in its sixth draft.¹⁷ Once they knew about the article, a Maoist publi-

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cation alleged, 'they not only opposed its publication but actually plotted to strangle it at its birth'.¹⁸

However, the matter was not that simple, nor the evidence presented by the Maoists conclusive. To begin with, as director of the Shanghai Party Propaganda Department, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao had control over the media, and his independence had been enhanced by his promotion in March 1965, making him concurrently a secretary of the Shanghai CCP Committee. More importantly, standing behind Chang was Chairman Mao, and other Shanghai leaders could not oppose the publication of the article without incurring the displeasure of Mao. In fact, the Shanghai leadership agonized over what to do, as mayor Ts'ao Ti-ch'iu was quoted as saying:

What was mostly on minds at that time was our relationship with Peking, with P'eng Chen in fact. Should we alert him? If we did not, he would be caught unawares. If we did, it would be against the wishes of Chairman Mao. What were we to do? Our Secretariat puzzled over the problem again and again.¹⁹

It seems most likely that, although Ch'en and Ts'ao were not enthusiastic toward the article, they did not block its publication – this may partly explain why they allegedly claimed credit for having assisted Mao's cause.²⁰ It is also clear that the Shanghai leadership withheld information about the article from P'eng Chen prior to its publication, for P'eng read the article only after it had appeared in print and instructed his aide to ring the *Cultural Daily* and the Shanghai CCP Committee to find out who was behind Yao's attack.²¹ Only then did the Shanghai leadership advise P'eng of the background to the article. According to the Maoists, Ch'en and Ts'ao were mortally afraid of P'eng Chen, even more afraid of Liu Shao-ch'i, and, 'as soon as the article was published, they warned P'eng Chen . . . of his danger'.²²

Whatever misgivings Ch'en and Ts'ao may have felt toward the episode surrounding Yao's article, they did back Mao in his political tug-of-war with P'eng Chen in 1965–6. For example, after Yao's article was published by the Shanghai *Cultural Daily*, P'eng called up provincial authorities throughout China not to publicize it, and largely succeeded in minimizing the public impact of Yao's attack on Wu Han. Confronted with P'eng's manoeuvre, Mao left Peking and came to Shanghai in the second part of November 1965 to plan counter-moves. Ch'en P'i-hsien, who also headed the CCP East China Bureau,

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was instrumental in securing major provincial newspapers in the East China area to defy P'eng Chen – on 24 November, *Chekiang Daily*, *Fukien Daily*, Kiangsu's *New China Daily* and Shantung's *Masses' Daily*, reproduced Yao's article, while the *Anhui Daily* and *Kiangsi Daily* followed suit on 25 and 26 November respectively.

Although the support Ch'en and other Shanghai leaders rendered Mao was not really decisive in the Mao-P'eng conflict, they did at least provide Mao with an important base of operation. In fact, Mao and his close advisers seemed to feel more secure in Shanghai and launched their major actions from there. Thus when Mao convened a top Party meeting in December 1965 to purge Lo Jui-ch'ing, the PLA chief of staff and P'eng's ally, the conference was held in Shanghai. Again, it was Shanghai where Chiang Ch'ing convened a 'Forum on the Literary and Art Work in the Armed Forces' during 2-20 February 1966, 'under the auspices of minister of defence Lin Piao'. The forum subsequently produced a document which attacked the anti-party and anti-socialist 'black line' dominating China's literary and art circles and called for a 'great socialist revolution on the cultural front'.

IN THE VORTEX OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

Our evidence indicates that Shanghai was the power base from which Mao, during 1965-6, directed political counter-offensives against his opponents in the Party, and that top Shanghai officials such as Ch'en P'ei-hsien and Ts'ao Ti-ch'iu were highly supportive of Mao's actions. To their woe and sorrow, however, these officials were in turn to suffer political disgrace in the winter months of 1966-7 as the Maoists seized control of Shanghai and ousted them from office. As will be shown below, the Maoist victory did not come easily, for the Shanghai power-holders fought for their survival with all the resources and strategems at their disposal. The arduous struggle between the power-holders and Maoist rebels in Shanghai, and the turmoil and chaos generated in the course of the struggle, presented, in microcosm, twists and turns of the GPCR which were paralleled in other parts of China.

As a matter of fact, the Shanghai leadership handled the first wave of the GPCR with considerable skill. Ch'en and Ts'ao were in almost total control of the Party apparatus and local government after the two staunch Maoists Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and Yao Wen-yuan had gone to Peking to work for the new Cultural Revolution group (set up by Mao to direct the GPCR movement) in May 1966. While Ch'en and Ts'ao

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made forthright-sounding speeches calling for the rout of revisionism and the capitalist power-holders, their true aim was to control the movement. When students in Shanghai rose to attack the school authorities in June, following the lead of students in Peking, the power structure quickly dispatched 'work teams' to schools and colleges and factories to clamp down the rebellion. When the rebels challenged the rule of the work teams they were repressed and persecuted.

The work teams were able to suppress the opposition partly because they skilfully manipulated the sacred aura of Party authority, claiming that the Party dispatched work teams and that 'to oppose the work team is to oppose the party',²³ and in most cases they won support from the majority of students and teachers. In fact, the policy to send work teams was created by Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing in Peking, and was apparently designed to counterbalance and nullify Mao's policy of sparking a mass movement from the educational institutions. In any case, the Shanghai authorities carried out the policy faithfully and kept the situation under control.

Consequently, mayor Ts'ao was quoted as saying that the GPCR in Shanghai was far less chaotic than in Peking and that Shanghai was a model for the rest of the country.²⁴ In a conversation with Ts'ao in Shanghai in July 1966, Liu Shao-ch'i allegedly commended the leadership of Shanghai in these words: 'Shanghai is very orderly. There is no disruption. This shows that your Municipal Committee enjoys high prestige and commands the obedience of the masses.'²⁵

The inability of the Maoists to incite a large-scale rebellion in Shanghai should also perhaps be attributed to these factors: the Shanghai administration was competent, it had improved the livelihood of the citizens, and it was relatively popular with major segments of population. Most outside observers believe that even during the acute economic crisis of the Great Leap, people in Shanghai suffered less than their countrymen in other parts of China, and that the economic recovery there was much faster. A Western writer who was in Shanghai in 1965-6 made this cogent observation:

The radicals could not bear the thought that perhaps the prestige of the Municipal Committee arose from a genuine respect on the part of the people for a government that had visibly improved their lot. Everyone remembered the three bad years (during the Great Leap); everyone knew that Shanghai had come a long way since 1962. Perhaps it had all been done with the trick mirrors of revisionism, but it had been done.²⁶

Meanwhile, in Peking, Mao's revolution forged ahead. In the

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Eleventh CC Plenum held in the first half of August 1966, Mao and his supporters managed to defeat Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing and censured them for authorizing the dispatch of work teams in June to subvert the GPCR. Moreover, Mao acclaimed the rebellion of Red Guards and encouraged them to storm the 'bourgeois headquarters' in Peking and the provinces and to ferret out the 'capitalist power-holders' who had enforced the Liu-Teng 'bourgeois reactionary line'.

Soon after the Plenum, Red Guard and other 'rebel' organizations mushroomed in Shanghai (as well as throughout the nation). Two major and rival student groups were the General Headquarters of Red Guards from Shanghai schools and colleges, a conservative organization loyal to the Party establishment, and the Revolutionary Committee of Red Guards from Shanghai schools and colleges, a radical group. Such famous and influential Red Guard groups as the Peking University Commune, the Chingkangshan Headquarters of Tsinghua University, the Red Flag Regiment of the Peking Aviation Institute, and the Red Rebels of the Harbin Military Engineering College also set up their liaison centres in Shanghai and sent their members to reinforce the local rebels. Present, for example, were two firebrands, Nieh Yuan-tse and Kuai Ta-fu. Toward the middle of September 1966, Shanghai's normal population had been greatly swollen by the influx of over a million Red Guards from Peking and other areas. Acting jointly or in competition with one another, these Red Guards commandeered municipal transport, occupied public buildings, thronged streets and alleys, staged mammoth rallies to denounce the 'handful of powerholders taking the capitalist road' in the Shanghai power structure, and called for bitter rebellion.

In the autumn of 1966 the workers of Shanghai were also on the move, responding in their own way to the incessant calls to rebel. Supporters of the Maoist cause formed the 'Shanghai Workers' Revolutionary Rebel Headquarters' (Workers' Headquarters, for short), to challenge the Shanghai authorities, and one of its key organizers and leaders was Wang Hung-wen who was to rise prominently in national politics in the 1970s. On the other hand, the Scarlet Guards (a coalition of many labour groups, also known as Workers' Red Militia Detachments) revolted, not against the ideological revisionism of the Shanghai leadership, but to remedy their social and economic grievances. Similarly, many demobilized soldiers also organized themselves into a Red Guard Army to demand the improvement of their lot.

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Realizing that their political survival was at stake, the incumbent municipal power-holders employed an ingenious series of tactics for self-preservation. For example, they recruited and organized their own 'royalist' Red Guard and rebel groups and incited them to fight against the Maoists.²⁷ They did not oppose the GPCR openly. They attended many meetings to applaud the formation of Red Guard organizations in Shanghai and to welcome Red Guards from Peking; they delivered speeches to support Mao in which they purposely co-opted the revolutionary slogans, and used the media to portray them as resolute supporters of the GPCR. To restrict the scope of the rebels' activities and to prevent Red Guards from joining forces with the workers, the Shanghai leadership also placed great emphasis on economic production and forbade workers from leaving their posts to take part in the GPCR.²⁸

At the same time the Shanghai leaders 'lobbied' in Peking, seeking support to strengthen their hands in coping with the rebels. For example, Ma T'ien-shui, a Shanghai Party secretary, complained at a meeting in Peking in November 1966 that the GPCR was having adverse effects on economic production and pleaded with the central leaders to restrain rebels' political activities.²⁹ The concern with economy, whether or not it was merely a pretext to suppress the GPCR and a ploy for self-preservation (as alleged by the Maoists), was genuinely shared by premier Chou En-lai and other leaders who had the major responsibility in running the nation's economy.³⁰ Consequently, the central leadership did place increased emphasis on economic tasks and impose certain restrictions on the Red Guards. Another top central leader, T'ao Chu, who had risen to number four in the Politburo hierarchy after the summer of 1966 and was an 'adviser' to the Cultural Revolution Group, also came out to defend leaders of Shanghai and other provinces who were assailed by the Maoists for executing Liu Shao-ch'i's 'bourgeois reactionary line'. He exculpated or played down their offences, saying that 'whatever mistakes were committed, they have an organizational basis, because the lower level has to obey the higher authorities and central directives (issued by Liu in the name of the Party) must be carried out'.³¹

On the other hand, those in charge of directing the GPCR manoeuvred to remove obstacles to their crusade. In Peking they gradually gained an upper hand in December 1966, and succeeded in reversing the previous policy of moderation; thus, on 26 December the *People's Daily* editorially authorized the extension of the GPCR to farms and

factories. Moreover, in Shanghai and other areas, they actively co-opted and mobilized the workers to intensify the attack on the local power-holders. Directing these operations in Shanghai was Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, a former Party secretary of Shanghai.

As we have seen, Chang left Shanghai to work for the Cultural Revolution Group in Peking in May 1966. His new functions were, among others, to topple his former superiors and colleagues. Hence, when an obscure cadre from the Shanghai Seventeenth Cotton Mill, named Wang Hung-wen, brought some thirty rebellious workers to Peking in October 1966 to 'make accusations' against the Shanghai authorities, Chang went out of his way to befriend them. Apparently, under Chang's arrangement, Wang Hung-wen was received, together with other revolutionary rebels, by Mao and Lin Piao.³² While the Chang-Wang 'connection' seemed trivial at the time, it was through this contact with Wang that Chang secured support from segments of the workers and manipulated the GPCR in Shanghai after November 1966.

Emboldened by his experience in Peking, and apparently basking in the warm light of Maoist approval, Wang Hung-wen returned to Shanghai to recruit more workers to fight the Party establishment. He quickly formed the 'Shanghai Workers' Revolutionary Rebel Headquarters' (see above, p. 76). If a Shanghai source can be trusted, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao had a hand in the formation of this labour organization.³³ On 9 November more than 20,000 of its members and supporters held its inauguration rally at Shanghai's Culture Square and demanded, among other things, that the municipal committee recognize it as a revolutionary mass organization.³⁴ When their five demands were rejected, more than one thousand rebels of the Workers' Headquarters, led by its commander, P'an Kuo-p'ing, commandeered a train and headed for Peking the following day to present complaints to Chairman Mao. However, the train was stopped at Anting station in the outskirts of Shanghai on the orders of the municipal authorities, and they were told to return to their work-posts.

Infuriated, the rebels occupied the station. Wang Hung-wen, deputy commander of the Workers' Headquarters, and a score of militant rebels also lay on the rail track to block trains coming into and leaving the station. The Fourteenth 'Shanghai Express' was forced to make an unscheduled stop and was held up for twenty-four hours at the station. When the curious Western passengers on the express took pictures of the acrimonious scene, the rebels shouted anti-imperialist and anti-

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revisionist slogans at them. The municipal authorities apparently informed Peking of the trouble at Anting, for the director of the Cultural Revolution Group, Ch'en Po-ta, addressed a cable to the recalcitrant rebels and urged them to go back to their work, thereby strengthening the hand of the Shanghai leadership.³⁵ However, in the early morning of 12 November Chang Ch'un-ch'iao suddenly arrived from Peking and went straight to Anting to deal with the rebels behind the back of his former colleagues. In his capacity as Chairman Mao's emissary, Chang negotiated with Wang and reached a settlement: the workers were to return to their jobs, but Chang endorsed the Workers' Headquarters as a 'revolutionary' organization and concluded with it a three-point agreement.³⁶ In so doing, he not only severely undercut the authority and damaged the prestige of the Shanghai leadership, but also greatly boosted the standing of the new labour group. Since the Workers' Headquarters was now politically endorsed by Chang on behalf of the central leadership, its ranks were swelled by new members and it expanded its political strength rapidly. The audacious Wang Hung-wen also emerged from the Anting Incident a hero and leader among the rebels.

By December 1966, the municipal authorities had lost control of the situation. They were deluged by denunciations and calls for rebellion from radical students and workers, and besieged by demands from other groups for jobs, wages, housing and other requests for economic betterment. The authorities apparently yielded to some of these demands as a way of building local support. For instance, they reinstated the workers who had been laid off and paid them back wages, authorized wage increases for other workers, promised greater welfare benefits, and re-hired workers who had been sent to rural areas to support agriculture. They also paid the expenses of workers who wanted to travel to Peking to make complaints to higher authorities or to exchange revolutionary experience. Although some groups got what they wanted, most did not and they sought to enforce their demands by demonstration, labour strikes and other anomic measures. The work stoppage and labour strikes organized by the Scarlet Guards totally paralysed Shanghai's railway and waterway transport, and law and order in Shanghai deteriorated rapidly.

All of these developments were later blamed on the city's 'capitalist power-holders' who allegedly used the tactics of 'economism' to undermine the GPCR. According to the Maoists, a handful of capitalist power-holders incited workers to leave their work posts so as to

sabotage the national economy and employed 'economism to direct the general direction of the struggle, in an effort to lead dignified political struggle onto the evil road of economic struggle, and at the same time to corrupt the revolutionary will of the masses with material benefits'.³⁷ This, of course, is only half the story. Undoubtedly, in the face of the Maoists' attempt to topple them, the municipal leaders did not wish to create more enemies or weaken further their own position and, hence, were more responsive to the economic demands of various rebel groups than they might normally have been. However, it is not true that the 'handful' initiated 'economism' to sabotage the GPCR; rather, it was the persistent attack on the power structure, launched in the name of the GPCR, that ultimately caused the breakdown of the authority of the municipal leadership, thereby opening the floodgates to spontaneous demands by workers, peasants and other underprivileged segments of the population for social and economic betterment.

Instead of supporting those rebels who wanted to redress their socio-economic grievances, the Workers' Headquarters, led by Wang Hung-wen and under the guidance of the Cultural Revolution Group officials in Peking, twice attempted to break strikes organized by the Scarlet Guards. On 4 January 1967, the Maoists took physical control of *Cultural Daily*, and on the following day, they also took over *Liberation Daily* and *Hsin-min wan-pao* (*New People's Evening News*) as a first step towards seizing power in Shanghai. *New People's Evening News* was placed under the direct control of the Workers' Headquarters and published under the new name of *Shang-hai wan-pao* (*Shanghai Evening Paper*) soon thereafter. On 5 January various Maoist groups led by the Workers' Headquarters published a 'Message to the people of Shanghai' in *Cultural Daily* to declare war against the municipal authorities, calling for revolutionaries to wrest power from the 'capitalist power-holders'. By then the municipal organizations were thoroughly paralysed and unable to exercise any authority. On 6 January many of the hapless municipal leaders were indicted before a million-strong mass rally staged by the Workers' Headquarters and other Red Guard groups which announced their ousting from office – some of them, including mayor Ts'ao Ti-ch'iu were placed under arrest by the 'revolutionary rebels'.³⁸ On the same day, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and Yao Wen-yuan were sent back to Shanghai by the Cultural Revolution Group to direct the takeover. On 8 January the Workers' Headquarters issued an 'Urgent Notice' calling for workers to return to work, to restore the city's disrupted transport and public utility services and to resume factory production.

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With these actions by the rebels, Shanghai entered a new phase of the GPCR which had a profound impact throughout China. From this time, rebellion was no longer restricted to the level of words and meetings – concrete actions had been taken by the rebels to oust the incumbent Party and government officials and to establish their own control. The rebels in Shanghai were the first to cross the Rubicon, and their revolutionary actions greatly emboldened the rebels elsewhere. On 12 January the *People's Daily* editorially acclaimed Shanghai's 'January Revolution' and presented it as an example to be emulated by the revolutionaries throughout China – and they did so with great enthusiasm.

Spearheading the revolution in Shanghai was the Workers' Headquarters, and the driving force behind it was Wang Hung-wen who had replaced P'an Kuo-p'ing as its commander in late December 1966 or early January 1967. Apparently Wang was a talented and energetic labour organizer, and his able leadership enabled the Workers' Headquarters steadily to expand its strength and political influence. He was also closely involved in many actions against the municipal authorities and the Scarlet Guards and boosted the Maoist cause in Shanghai immensely. Chang Ch'un-ch'iao also played an important role in bringing down the Shanghai power structure. Although in Peking during most of the second half of 1966, he was apparently in close contact with the Maoist rebels in Shanghai. Through his connection with Wang Hung-wen, he seems to have stage-managed important actions taken by the Workers' Headquarters and other Maoist groups which eventually led to the Maoist takeover of Shanghai.

It is true that Chang's power base in Shanghai was not solid. He faced strong opposition from large numbers of workers and Red Guards, while those who supported him, both labour and student groups, were initially in a minority; however, the fact that he enjoyed Chairman Mao's confidence and had the full backing of the Cultural Revolution Group did have much political influence. Thus when the students of Fudan University set up a 'Committee to Examine the Chang Ch'un-ch'iao Question' and planned to call a meeting to expose his activities in Shanghai in the 1930s,³⁹ Peking quickly came to his rescue and threatened his detractors with arrest if the meeting were held.⁴⁰ Moreover, in his effort to establish control over Shanghai, Chang also had the support of local PLA officials. Although the PLA adopted a hands-off posture before 1967 and had co-operated with the municipal authorities on some occasions, the central leadership, in a

change of policy, had ordered PLA units to intervene on the side of the leftists on 23 January and the Shanghai Garrison under commander Liao Cheng-kuo complied with the order and switched support to Chang, thereby greatly strengthening his hand.

Thus, on 5 February 1967, the Maoists in Shanghai set up the 'Shanghai People's Commune' and proclaimed the takeover of power from municipal Party and government authorities; Chang and his close associate Yao Wen-yuan were 'elected' director and deputy director, respectively, of the Commune. Editorials of *Cultural Daily* (6 and 8 February) hailed the establishment of the new revolutionary organ of power as an 'event of unparalleled significance', 'the birth of the new Paris Commune in the sixties of the twentieth century' and a product of 'the creative application of the Mao Tse-tung thought'.

Rebels in Honan, Peking, Harbin and possibly other places soon followed the example to establish communes in their own localities. Although a telegram from the Shanghai People's Commune leadership saluting Chairman Mao asserted that it had acted under his inspiration, Mao was ominously silent and neither the *New China News Agency* nor the *People's Daily* reported the event in Shanghai. A Red Guard source subsequently revealed that Mao had second thoughts and summoned Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and Yao Wen-yuan to Peking for consultation during 12-18 February 1967. In his three talks with the two new Shanghai leaders, Mao raised many questions and expressed the concern that if other cities and provinces followed Shanghai in setting up communes the name of People's Republic would have to be changed to 'People's Commune of China', which would then require new diplomatic recognition by other nations.⁴¹ So, on 23 February, the Shanghai People's Commune, on instructions from Peking, changed its name to the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee, which was not to be based on the principles of the Paris Commune, but on those of the 'three-way alliance' among the revolutionary masses, revolutionary cadres, and representatives of the PLA.

With the establishment of this new organ of power, a new power elite emerged. As might be expected, Chang and Yao became the number one and number two leaders of Shanghai, but there were other major changes. Except Ma T'ien-shui and Wang Shao-jung, formerly secretary and alternate secretary of the Shanghai CCP Committee, who were co-opted into the new leadership nucleus, all the other former top officials of the Shanghai CCP Committee were disgraced (see Table 3.1). Strongly represented in the new power structure were

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a large number of revolutionary rebels (Table 3.2), and in this regard Shanghai was more revolutionary than other provinces.

Among the rebels promoted was Wang Hung-wen, who was appointed a 'leading member' of the Revolutionary Committee in February 1967. Undoubtedly, Wang's ability to organize and mobilize workers helped to account for his promotion at this juncture. A more important factor, however, was his continuing loyalty to Chang and the Cultural Revolution Group. In 1966-7 there were certainly other equally, if not

Table 3.1. *Shanghai Communist Party Leadership before the Cultural Revolution*

Name	Position	Remarks
Ch'en P'i-hsien	First secretary	Purged
Ts'ao Ti-ch'iu	Secretary; mayor	Purged
Ma T'ien-shui	Secretary	Co-opted
Wang Yi-ping	Secretary	Purged
Chang Ch'un-ch'iao	Secretary	Co-opted
Liang Kuo-pin	Secretary	Co-opted
Yang Hsi-kuang	Alternate secretary	Purged
Wang Shao-jung	Alternate secretary	Co-opted

Table 3.2. *Leading members of the Shanghai Revolutionary Council, 1967-9*

Name	Background
Chang Ch'un-ch'iao	Revolutionary cadre
Yao Wen-yuan	Revolutionary cadre
Ma T'ien-shui	Revolutionary cadre
Wang Shao-jung	Revolutionary cadre
Liao Cheng-kuo	PLA; commander, Shanghai Garrison
Wang Hung-wen	Rebel
Hsü Ching-hsien	Rebel
Wang Hsiu-chen	Rebel
Chu Hsi-chih	Rebel
Ch'en Kan-feng	Student Red Guard - Rebel
Chin Tzu-min	Rebel
Feng Kuo-chu	Rebel
Chou Li-chin	Rebel
Yang Fu-chen	Rebel
Li Shih-yen	PLA; political commissar, Shanghai Garrison
Kao Chih-jung	PLA; naval officer

more, capable labour organizers in Shanghai (e.g. P'an Kuo-p'ing, the initial commander of the Workers' Headquarters, and Keng Chin-chang, the leader of the Second Regiment, a major member organization of the Rebel Headquarters). Although initially they co-operated with Chang Ch'un-ch'iao to fight the Shanghai Party authorities, subsequently they parted ways with Chang and challenged his leadership. On the other hand, Wang continued to follow Chang's lead and successfully persuaded most member groups of the Rebel Headquarters to support Chang and the policies of the Cultural Revolution Group.

It should be pointed out that, although Chang Ch'un-ch'iao was a radical in terms of national politics inasmuch as he was a leader (deputy director) of the Cultural Revolution Group which sought to project the radical goals of the Cultural Revolution throughout China, he seemed to have moderated his radical stance in Shanghai after power was seized from the 'capitalist power-holders', and he himself assumed the responsibility of governing Shanghai. He then, after all, had something to conserve, and his efforts to restore public order, to resume normal economic production, and to re-establish a viable administration in Shanghai after February 1967, compelled him to enforce strict labour discipline, to reinstate a large number of former middle-level cadres and to turn against unruly and protesting groups (previously acclaimed as 'revolutionary rebels'). These actions angered many groups in Shanghai and caused a sharp polarization within the ranks of the revolutionary rebels who had joined hands in the second half of 1966 to oppose the former Party authorities. Moreover, in the distribution of leadership posts and patronage, Chang had apparently shown favouritism toward his cronies, and this also offended many who were neglected. From the spring of 1967 until the summer of 1968, those workers and Red Guards who were alienated from the new 'establishment' in Shanghai clamoured for a second 'massive upheaval' and posed a serious threat to the new political order in Shanghai which Chang Ch'un-ch'iao had been trying to consolidate since February 1967.⁴² Added to Chang's political difficulties were attempts by Chu Hsi-chih, chief of the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee Political Propaganda section, and other rebels outside the Revolutionary Committee to expose Chang's inglorious past - he was accused of attacking Lu Hsün, under a pen name, in the early 1930s, of being a KMT prisoner in the early 1940s, and of being a renegade.⁴³

That Chang was eventually able to weather his political storm and consolidate control over Shanghai, was due primarily to two factors.

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Firstly, he continued to enjoy the full backing of Peking. Despite strong evidence for Chang's infamous past activities, such powerful leaders as Chiang Ch'ing, K'ang Sheng and even Chairman Mao himself apparently protected him.⁴⁴ Secondly, local military support was crucial; in fact, from the end of February 1967 onwards, the military assumed control of Shanghai's harbour, airport, post office, radio station, newspapers and major factories, and greatly helped the efforts of the Shanghai leadership to restore order and economic production. Backed by Peking and local PLA authorities, Chang was ruthless in suppressing the opposition. Many rebel groups, such as the Second Regiment, Workers' Third Headquarters (led by Ch'en Hung-k'ang), Red Guard Army, and even Red Revolutionaries (which supported Chang until early 1967) were branded as counter-revolutionary organizations and disbanded, and their leaders were arrested.

Wang Hung-wen, who previously led the pro-Maoist workers to help Chang seize power during Shanghai's 'January Revolution', again played an immensely vital role in Chang's crackdown on the opposition. The labour group, the Workers' Headquarters, headed by Wang, became an important source of political support and power base for Chang; during 1967-8, it greatly expanded and had over one million members. In addition to numerical strength, the Workers Headquarters also had its military muscle, for tens of thousands of its members were armed.⁴⁵ In the summer of 1967, Chiang Ch'ing had put forward a slogan *Wen Kung Wu Wei* (Attack with Words and Defend by Arms) and called for the leftist rebels to be armed to fight against the suppressive activities of conservative military authorities in many localities.⁴⁶ It was in response to her instigation that Wang proceeded to organize a '*Wen Kung Wu Wei* Army'. In December 1967 alone, this labour army undertook seven large-scale actions using naked force to put down those rebels who challenged Chang's rule in Shanghai.⁴⁷

Thus Chang and Wang had forged a close political alliance. On the one hand, Wang was a highly valuable political asset and had sustained Chang on several critical occasions. On the other hand, Chang also returned the favour by grooming Wang and putting him in important leadership positions. For example, under Chang's aegis, Wang was chosen as head of Shanghai's Congress of the Workers' Representatives when this new, city-wide labour organization was formed in December 1967, thereby making him the labour leader of China's largest industrial metropolis.⁴⁸ Throughout 1967, Wang also published many

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articles in the *People's Daily*⁴⁹ – apparently a measure devised by Chang and his Cultural Revolution Group colleagues in Peking to cultivate and promote Chang as a revolutionary labour leader at the national level. It should be pointed out that, besides his loyalty to Chang, Wang was quite talented and a rather skilful organizer and administrator and that these qualities figured considerably in his steady political rise in Shanghai. Indeed, by the end of the 1960s, he had already risen to the third-ranking position in Shanghai's power hierarchy, behind only Chang and Yao, and had shouldered the heavy responsibility of actually governing Shanghai, as his two superiors were in Peking most of the time.

THE RISE OF THE SHANGHAI LEADERS IN NATIONAL POLITICS

As will be shown below, for almost a decade after 1967, leaders of Shanghai had exerted greater influence on Chinese politics than those of any other province. This was made possible, in part, by the concurrent positions that the two ranking Shanghai officials occupied in the Cultural Revolution Group during 1966–9. These enabled them to participate in deliberations at the highest leadership level and to shape the course of the GPCR and other national policies. To be part of this organization was quite important, for the Group had superseded the Party's defunct Central Committee Secretariat after the summer of 1966 and became, in the words of Chiang Ch'ing, 'a secretarial team of the Politburo Standing Committee' doing the work of 'sentinel and staff' and putting forward ideas and suggestions to 'the Chairman, Vice-Chairman Lin, Premier Chou and the Politburo Standing Committee for consideration'.⁵⁰

Moreover, the two Shanghai leaders were in Mao's inner circle; they developed close personal relationships with both Mao and his wife and had his confidence. In September of 1967, for example, Chang accompanied Mao on an inspection tour of north, central-south and east China, and acted as Mao's spokesman to relate the latter's instructions during and after the tour. Similarly, Yao's relationship with Mao and Chiang Ch'ing was very close. Yao's article in November 1965, which set in motion a chain of events which began the GPCR, was written at 'Chairman Mao's personal request, under the direct guidance of Comrade Chiang Ch'ing, and with the concrete assistance of Comrade Chang Ch'un-ch'iao'.⁵¹ Although appointed vice-chairman of the

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Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee in February 1967, Yao spent most of his time in Peking serving as Mao's secretary.⁵²

As the leaders of Shanghai enjoyed Mao's confidence, they were assigned some important roles in the preparation for the Ninth Party Congress. In 1968, for example, a ten-man core group headed by Chang and Yao assumed responsibility for preparing the draft of the new Party constitution. When the Congress was held in April 1969, both Chang and Yao were elected to the Politburo – marking for the first time since 1949 a provincial-level unit which was represented by two officials in the Politburo. In addition, four other officials from Shanghai, Wang Hung-wen, Hsu Ching-hsien, Wang Hsiu-chen(F), and Yang Fu-chen(F) were elected members of the Central Committee.⁵³

In comparison with its strong showing at the Tenth Party Congress in 1973, the Shanghai group did not do too well during the 1969 Party gathering, which was dominated by the PLA men. Indeed, from the summer of 1968 onward, conservative forces had pressed hard to wind down the GPCR, a strong 'Thermidorian reaction' became discernible in Chinese politics, and the radical political forces, of which the Shanghai group was a part, were severely weakened. In the course of the reconstruction of provincial Party organizations in 1970–1, moreover, the ranking leaders in half a dozen provinces who espoused the radical cause earlier were edged out by the conservative-moderate elements.⁵⁴ In the vicissitudes of Chinese politics, the Shanghai leaders were able to survive the strong conservative backlash and retained control over Shanghai,⁵⁵ which became the lone radical stronghold; and the radicals' influence in national politics was further eroded.

Ironically, it was Mao's heir-apparent Lin Piao who saved the radicals from further political eclipse and gave them an opportunity to rebound. This was because from September 1970, Mao and Lin were engaged in a fierce power struggle, and Mao had turned to the radicals and other leaders for support. The radical leaders did actively support Mao and were closely involved in a series of manoeuvres against Lin and his followers.⁵⁶ In early 1971, for example, Wang Hung-wen acquired an additional position as the first political commissar of the Shanghai Garrison – an appointment which was not publicly revealed until April 1972, but which empowered him to have a say in local military affairs and enabled him to watch closely and even to checkmate the actions of Lin's backers in the Shanghai area.⁵⁷ In particular,

Chang, who was the first political commissar of the Nanking Military Region, which encompasses Shanghai, Kiangsu, Chekiang and Anhwei, was strategically positioned to shape local PLA actions. It was probably because Chang held the pivotal position in East China and was so important to the Mao camp that he was marked for abduction and physical liquidation by Lin's followers as the first step in their contingency plan to seize power from Mao.⁵⁸ It was reported that, when Mao was travelling in central-south and east China to recruit support from local leaders during August–September 1971, he too was the target of an assassination plot by Lin's followers, but that Wang Hung-wen was instrumental in nullifying the plan and in saving Mao's life.

Thus, the radical leaders proved to be invaluable to Mao, both in his life-and-death struggle with the Lin Piao group and in his struggle with Liu Shao-ch'i and other capitalist-roaders during the GPCR crusade in the 1960s. They were highly rewarded at the Tenth Party Congress in August 1973. Not only were Chiang, Chang and Yao re-elected to the Politburo, and Chang made a member of the nine-man Politburo Standing Committee, but, most spectacular and astonishing of all, the young former labour organizer Wang Hung-wen was elevated to vice-chairmanship of the Party, officially ranked number three in the Party hierarchy behind only Chairman Mao and the first vice-chairman, Chou En-lai. The rise in political influence of these Shanghai leaders had apparently facilitated the election of their followers from Shanghai and elsewhere to the new Central Committee, so that of China's twenty-nine provincial-level units, Shanghai had the largest representation.⁵⁹

The Shanghai radicals also benefited from the purge of Lin Piao's followers from positions of power at the centre. For example, the downfall of Ch'en Po-ta, who used to be with the radicals but switched to support Lin in 1969–70 for opportunistic reasons, gave Yao Wen-yuan undisputed control over the centre's propaganda apparatus. Most important of all, Lin's demise removed Mao's formally designated successor from the scene and created the vacancy which the radicals could and did aspire to fill. In spite of Peking's propaganda to disassociate Chairman Mao from the Gang of Four after their arrest in October 1976, there is evidence that Mao placed high hopes on the four and tried to groom them for the post-Mao leadership.

On the other hand, the Lin Piao affair and its political aftermath were also mixed political blessings to the radicals. For one thing, the shocking circumstances of Lin's death and the subsequent exposé of

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Lin's alleged heinous crimes did not reflect well on the GPCR, inasmuch as Lin was closely involved with its planning and execution. Moreover, Lin's demise and the purge of his followers in the leadership ranks provided a new impetus to the drive of the conservative officials to rehabilitate their colleagues who had been deposed in the GPCR. Indeed, a large number of disgraced veteran cadres, including those who had committed serious political crimes in the eyes of Mao and the radicals, were 'liberated'. One outstanding example was Teng Hsiao p'ing, who was the Party's secretary-general and a vice-premier of the State Council; purged as 'the second top capitalist-roader in the Party' in 1966, he disappeared, in disgrace, from public life until 1973.

The restoration of these former 'capitalist-roaders' to office had serious political implications. Their political comeback squeezed out or blocked the political advance of young cadres who were promoted during the GPCR, and weakened the power base of the radical leaders who had achieved political prominence as a result of their support for the GPCR. Meanwhile, the reinstatement in recent years of those who opposed the GPCR also increasingly called into question the legitimacy of the GPCR.

Under the guise of denouncing Lin Piao's ultra-leftist crimes, the conservatives did their utmost to discredit the GPCR and its 'newborn things', and, once restored to power, they moved step by step to modify and dilute innovations introduced in the GPCR, and resurrected policies which Mao and his radical supporters had sought to do away with.

It is within this political context that the radical leaders, from 1973 onwards, pushed a series of campaigns to reverse 'retrogression and restoration', to defend the values of the GPCR, and to reaffirm its 'newborn things'. Submerged in these campaigns was an insidious struggle for power (particularly for Mao's succession) in which the radicals devised various tactics and used all the resources at their disposal to seek control of the Party leadership.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The preceding pages have attempted to show Shanghai as occupying a peculiar and unique place in China's political landscape since the 1960s. In the first half of the 1960s, Shanghai was the base from which Mao launched the GPCR, as its leaders engaged in inner-party

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struggle. After the summer of 1966, the Shanghai elites were split over Mao's crusade, but supporters of Mao prevailed, took control of Shanghai in February 1967, and made the city a stronghold of radical political forces. Since then, and particularly after the Tenth Party Congress in August 1973, the leaders of Shanghai were concurrently leaders at the centre.

It is true that other provincial leaders have also concurrently held central and local posts (for example, both K'o Ch'ing-shih and T'ao Chu were vice-premiers; P'eng Chen and Li Ching-ch'uan were vice-chairmen of the National People's Congress). It is also true that at one time or another provincial leaders have exerted considerable influence on a given policy issue (Wu Chih-p'u, first secretary of the Honan CCP committee during 1958-61, for example, had a discernible impact on China's communization in 1958).⁶⁰

What seems to be uniquely striking about the Shanghai leadership is that three of the top Shanghai leaders were inside the Party leadership nucleus and, together with Chiang Ch'ing, formed a tightly knit clique. Unlike leaders of most of the other provinces, moreover, the Shanghai radical group was in active contention for national power. The radicals not only controlled and used Shanghai as their base, but also developed a national constituency and placed their followers in control of youth leagues, trade unions and militia organizations in many provinces and cities. In their preparation to seize control of national power, the three top radicals also transferred many local officials to Peking and placed them in key central positions. It was this combination of being in Chairman Mao's inner circle, of holding strategic positions in the leadership nucleus, and of building a national base of support, that enabled the group to make such an impact on Chinese politics in the decade after 1966.

SHANGHAI DOCKERS IN THE
CULTURAL REVOLUTION:
THE INTERPLAY OF POLITICAL
AND ECONOMIC ISSUES*

Raymond F. Wylie

INTRODUCTION

The Cultural Revolution is a major landmark in the development of China since 1949, and its impact is felt in Chinese politics even today. The great port city of Shanghai figured prominently in this momentous struggle, both as a bell-wether of revolution and a major arena of conflict. The city's industrial workers were relatively late entrants into the fray, for the students had preceded them by several months. But the entry of the workers was decisive. They had the power – and the willingness to use it – which was to prove the undoing of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee (MPC). And it is the central role played by industrial workers in Shanghai that justifies the characterization of the struggles of 1966–7 as a 'Great *Proletarian* Cultural Revolution'.¹

In this paper, I wish to examine this role in some detail. The issue has generated a good deal of controversy among students of Chinese politics, but few firm conclusions have as yet emerged.² While we cannot rehearse all of the arguments here, there are three basic questions which merit close attention. First, what political and economic issues did the Shanghai workers raise during the Cultural Revolution, and what was the relationship between them? Second, did the incumbent Party authorities attempt to exercise political control over the dissident workers, and, failing in this, resort to offering economic inducements to various occupational groups in order to divert and fragment the workers' movement? Third, after the Party officials were

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overthrown, how successful were the workers in establishing a new power structure through which they could realize their aspirations, and what was the response of the Maoist leadership in Peking? Answers to these questions will contribute considerably to our understanding of the role of the industrial working class in the Cultural Revolution in Shanghai, and, perhaps, in other major Chinese cities as well.

While there have been a number of general treatments of the Cultural Revolution in Shanghai, little attempt has been made to analyse the role of specific occupational groups.³ Within the city's industrial labour force, I have selected the dock-workers as a case study in the transportation sector. Shanghai is China's largest seaport, and it occupies a pivotal position in both maritime shipping and inland commerce on the Yangtze River. The Shanghai dockers have played a role of considerable importance in modern Chinese history, and this was true of their participation in the Cultural Revolution as well.⁴ In 1965-7, the dockers were a highly concentrated work-force of some 12,000-15,000 out of a total industrial work-force of some 1.2 million in Shanghai at that time.⁵ Within the ranks of the dockers, I shall focus on the Fifth Loading and Unloading District which is one of nine such divisions in the harbour. This is an important district, for it handles a wide range of domestic and foreign cargo, and occupies a central down-town location not far from important Party and government offices, including the Shanghai MPC. During the Cultural Revolution, the Fifth District received national and international attention due to the industrial chaos engendered by the struggle in the harbour.⁶

It could be argued that the experience of the dockers during the Cultural Revolution was atypical. Against this view we can point to the fact that the organization of the dock-workers is similar enough to that of other urban labour groups to suggest some comparability of behaviour. Also, that the working conditions of the longshoremen were sufficiently complex to allow a wide variety of responses as they were aroused to action in the course of the struggle. (See pp. 99-103.) On the other hand, the turbulent history of the docks, the diverse origins of the work-force, and the strenuous, irregular nature of the work performed might be used to argue that dock-workers had an exceptional degree of volatility. As Stephen Andors has suggested, despite the important reforms made after 1949, 'work on the Shanghai docks . . . was still very hard',⁷ and this factor might well have made the dockers more susceptible to arguments for immediate economic reforms than workers in other industries. Nonetheless, in this respect it can be argued that the docks are matched by other important industries in

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Shanghai, including the steel, railway, and shipbuilding sectors, and that in this sense the stevedores are not unique. We can, therefore, conclude tentatively that the dock-workers do constitute a case study of some validity in an overall evaluation of the role of the industrial working class in the Cultural Revolution in Shanghai.⁸

SHANGHAI HARBOUR AND THE FIFTH DISTRICT

Before entering into the main body of our discussion, it might be useful to sketch a brief profile of the Shanghai harbour, particularly the Fifth District.⁹ Like all of China's seaports, the Shanghai harbour is under the jurisdiction of the General Bureau of Sea and River Navigation, a section of the Ministry of Communications in Peking. Below the General Bureau is the Northern District Marine Transport Administration, based in Shanghai, which is responsible for all sea and river shipping north of the Yangtze River. At the operational level, the Shanghai docks are under the direction of two separate agencies, the Shanghai Harbour Affairs Inspectorate, and the Shanghai Harbour Affairs Bureau. The harbour itself is organized into nine geographical units known as Loading and Unloading Districts (or, alternatively, as Working Areas). Each of these in turn is subdivided into a variable number of sections according to the layout of the wharf or the nature of the cargo being handled. In addition, there are three other areas designated as Loading and Unloading Stations, as well as a number of support facilities including a railway terminal, ship-repair yard, and so on. (See the official sketch map, p. 124.)

Although the administrative chain of command runs vertically from the local sections right up to the ministry in Peking, the system of Party Committees and groups attached to each level provides a series of horizontal linkages to corresponding Party organizational levels. In Shanghai, the MPC's Transportation and Communications Bureau has close political and administrative ties with the Harbour Bureau, and is of course concerned with the operation of the docks. The Cultural Revolution in the Shanghai harbour, then, was a complicated struggle involving both the vertical administrative hierarchy emanating from Peking and the horizontal Party apparatus based in Shanghai. As we shall see, this dual structure of authority allowed a vice-minister from Peking temporarily assigned to Shanghai to play a key role in ensuring a rebel victory in the Cultural Revolution on the Shanghai docks. In this special situation, the lower-level Party Committees in the

Shanghai harbour found their authority undermined by an upper-level administrative official, even though he was probably a Party member himself.

The Fifth Loading and Unloading District is one of the more important units in the Shanghai harbour. (This was at least true during 1965–7, for which our statistics are valid.) Originally built and operated by a variety of foreign and domestic commercial interests, the pier was much improved after 1949, when the original stone structure was paved with concrete. Other, more colourful, improvements were said to include the demolition of a jail in which British merchants incarcerated unruly ‘wild chickens’ (*yeh-chi*). These were the longshoremen of the past, day-labourers who had no secure employment on the docks, but were forced to seek it on a daily basis.¹⁰ The pier itself was divided into four sections with a total length of some 1,200 metres, and was capable of accommodating six 10,000-ton ocean-going freighters at one time. The district had 44 warehouses with a total storage area of about 114,000 square metres, and was well mechanized, utilizing some 240 pieces of machinery of both Chinese and foreign manufacture. The district handled about 3 million tons of cargo annually, out of a total of 14.424 million tons (not including intra-harbour commerce) for the entire harbour in 1965.¹¹ Of the district’s freight, 60% was foreign and 40% domestic, and of the foreign volume 60% was export and 40% import. This relatively high proportion of foreign trade gave the Fifth District special importance in the eyes of the Harbour Bureau and longshoremen alike, and helped draw domestic and foreign attention to it during the Cultural Revolution.

Approximately 2,500 workers were employed in the Fifth District, which maintained a twenty-four-hour continuous operation based on three shifts.¹² A standard shift was eight hours, of which one hour was devoted to political study and discussion (at least in theory – see pp. 97–8 following) and forty minutes to lunch or dinner. The average work-day was thus of the order of six hours and twenty minutes; often it was less, for the dockers also engaged in political activities (study, meetings, rallies, etc.) in the intervals between the arrival and departure of ships, and on rainy days, when the wharf did not operate at full capacity. Nor were the workers engaged in traditional ‘coolie’ labour, for some 78% of the work was done by machine, with the remaining 22% involving such manual tasks as loading and unloading the ships’ holds and stacking cargo in the warehouses. The dockers in the Fifth

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District were well paid by Chinese standards as of 1966–7; the average wage for regular, senior workers was 80 *juan*, with a spread from 70 to 90 *juan*. (As we shall note later, the lower grades of workers were paid substantially less than this.) Retirement age was normally 55 on pension (a proportion of the normal wage), although permission could be sought to continue to work on full salary. As a rule, however, the workers were encouraged to retire on schedule, or, perhaps, to serve in some special capacity as an instructor of apprentices. On the job, all employees were issued with helmets, work clothes, life preservers, tools and other special equipment. Finally, social needs were met by an infrastructure of dining halls, club rooms, dormitories (for those who lived too far away for daily commuting, or who had to work night shifts), and activities such as fortnightly films.¹³

In spite of this positive picture, life in the Fifth District was not completely harmonious. As the Cultural Revolution enveloped the harbour, an endless array of contradictions emerged to disturb the apparent unity between the Party Committee and the workers, and within the ranks of the workers themselves. There were three major types of tension on the docks – political, economic, and inter-generational. Although they were interwoven to a considerable extent, it is possible to distinguish between them for purposes of analysis. Political tensions revolved around the authority of the District Party Committee, and the degree of support it could elicit from the worker rank and file. This issue became acute in the course of the Cultural Revolution as the dockers grew increasingly critical of the local Party Committee in the name of a higher loyalty to the Party centre in Peking, as represented by Mao Tse-tung and his thought. Economic tensions were primarily a function of the elaborate system of job classifications and rates of remuneration enjoyed by groups of workers in certain job categories. Like other Chinese enterprises, the Shanghai harbour employed a complex system of ‘regular’, ‘practice’, ‘apprentice’, ‘contract’, and ‘temporary’ workers who enjoyed vastly different wages and other economic benefits.¹⁴ Since the Party authorities were closely identified with this economic system, the workers’ economic discontents were often voiced as criticisms of the Party Committee’s political authority. Similarly, those dockers seeking to challenge the political authority of the Party often appealed to the economic grievances of the rank and file in order to gain support.

Generational tensions were closely associated with political and economic problems, for the older, regular workers tended to support

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the Party Committee and its policies, and, coincidentally, benefited from the highest wages and most favourable working conditions. The younger, irregular workers, on the other hand, were more prone to question the authority and policies of the Party Committee, and also enjoyed considerably less attractive wages and working conditions. Support of, or opposition to, the Party Committee was not however a simple function of age and wage levels, for there was a certain degree of overlapping in these attitudes. Some older workers, for example, did not enjoy wages or conditions appropriate to their age, and tended to be critical of the Party Committee. Similarly, some younger workers who had achieved a higher status than their age would suggest were often supportive of the Party Committee. The situation on the docks was, in the words of the new Revolutionary Committee, 'exceedingly complex', and this should be borne in mind in the subsequent discussion.

POLITICAL DISCONTENTS

Political tensions were generally held in check by the authorities up to the mid-1960s, and they did not constitute a major challenge to the Party Committee in the Fifth District or elsewhere in the Shanghai harbour. During the spring of 1966, however, a wave of study and criticism swept Shanghai's schools and universities, issuing in the Cultural Revolution in the city's educational and cultural circles. The dockers in the Fifth District were aware of the debate over the question of Wu Han and other 'bourgeois academic authorities', and had followed the course of events in the mass media in their own study sessions. The controversy also affected members of their families who were involved in education, and the main lines of the debate soon found their way into the longshoremen's homes throughout the city. Nonetheless, the issue was viewed as a rather esoteric concern of the students and teachers, although the young dock-workers attending night school were more involved than the older dockers. It was only on 1 June 1966, after Nieh Yuan-tzu's overtly political *ta-tzu-pao* (big-character poster) at Peking University was broadcast with Mao Tse-tung's approval, that the workers in the harbour began to rouse themselves to greater action. Little work was apparently done on that day, for the dockers reportedly plastered the Fifth District with some 10,000 posters, an average of four per person!¹⁵

Initially, the main target of criticism was the former Party secretary of the Fifth District (let us call him Chang), who had held office for

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eight years. Chang had come to the post in 1958, and his tenure included the year of the Great Leap Forward, which placed severe demands on the dockers, and the subsequent 'three bitter years' of recession, 1959–61. It is not surprising, then, that the dockers found a great deal to criticize in his stewardship. Chang had since been promoted to a position in the Harbour Bureau, and he adopted a low profile as the wave of mass criticism swept over his old bailiwick. This probably suited the new Party secretary (let us call him Ch'en) very well indeed, for Ch'en could deflect the workers' growing animosity toward the remote Chang and conveniently away from himself. However, this made things uncomfortable for Ch'en's fellow committee members, many of whom had served under Chang and were thus implicated in the latter's unpopular policies. If Ch'en simply deflected rather than refuted the workers' accusations, the hostility being directed against Chang could easily be turned against anyone who had worked with him during the previous eight years.¹⁶

Many of the political issues raised in the initial stages of the Cultural Revolution simply reflected the new slogans emanating from Peking. The workers called for intensified study of 'Mao Tse-tung's Thought', for the exposure of 'revisionist elements' in the Party leadership, and for the overthrow of 'bourgeois authorities' suspected of restoring capitalism. Soon the charges became more specific, with Chang being accused of failing to study and apply Mao's thought, adopting superior airs and a bureaucratic work-style, refusing to carry out the mass line, and so on. According to some of the workers, Chang's misuse of the time set aside for political study was highly detrimental to worker morale:

Only three periods a week were given over to study of any kind. In fact these three periods were used to study technique and safety and for the assessment of prizes. Such prizes and bonuses were the main means of management, and involved monthly, quarterly and yearly prizes for 'economy in work', 'quality', 'safety', 'rational suggestions', etc. This set worker against worker. The managers made the dock an independent kingdom, which sought only to build up profit.¹⁷

As the campaign wore on, the charges became much more personal, and Chang and other individual cadres were subjected to abuse on a number of issues. They were accused of being reluctant to leave their offices, avoiding physical labour on the docks, enjoying high salaries and personal privileges, and favouring certain workers over others in assignments and promotions.

Not surprisingly, the agitated workers soon came to the conclusion

that Chang was a 'bourgeois authority taking the capitalist road', and that his period in office constituted a 'dictatorship over and suppression of the workers' in the Fifth District. In a very short time, the formalistic criticism of the Party Committee's work-style had developed into a personal attack on Chang and some of his committee members, and this culminated in an across-the-board rejection of the former Party secretary as a class enemy to be exposed and removed from office. For the time being, only a few of the incumbent committee members were directly linked with Chang's era of 'dictatorship'. Still, the denunciation of Chang and his intimates did raise the question of the political legitimacy of the rest of the committee, who were accused of having followed Chang's leadership 'slavishly' over the previous eight years.

The mounting drive against Chang was spearheaded by the younger, more volatile dockers in the Fifth District. It was, in fact, this segment of the work-force that was to prove the Party Committee's undoing during the Cultural Revolution. Ironically, this group was a product of the Party-directed expansion of Shanghai's educational system in the years after 1949. During these years, increasing numbers of literate and ambitious graduates from secondary and technical schools began to arrive on the docks. These young men were not typical of the traditional Shanghai stevedore; they were well educated by Chinese standards, and were clearly not the illiterate, downtrodden 'wild chickens' of the past. To some extent, they could be described as politically aware 'worker-intellectuals', and they had brought a new dimension to the Fifth District since at least the late 1950s. Once on the docks, they had distinguished themselves as an aspiring class. They continued their education by attending night courses at a variety of institutions, and demonstrated a new (to the average Chinese) ability to master technical knowledge and manipulate the increasing amount of machinery on the docks.

Apparently they were prone to tinker with the Party's political machinery as well, criticizing the cadres (many of whom had relatively low educational levels) on a variety of fronts, including the familiar charge that they were office-bound bureaucrats who avoided hard work and drew high salaries. These charges were of course not acceptable to the Party cadres, nor, apparently, to a good many of the older, regular workers, who tended to respect the Party's overall performance in spite of specific grievances which I shall discuss later.¹⁸ As a result of combined Party suspicions and elder misgivings, in the past these young men had found political advancement an uphill

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struggle. Popularly referred to as 'juvenile delinquents' by the Party and its supporters, the 'Young Turks' had frequently failed in their efforts to become members of either the Party or the Youth League. Although the British jail was gone, a new breed of unruly 'wild chickens' had suddenly appeared on the docks, and they were to spread their wings in the course of the Cultural Revolution.

The educational level of the Shanghai working class had been steadily rising, and by the mid-1960s this development was leading to tensions between older and younger generations in the harbour. During the Cultural Revolution, these generational tensions gradually manifested themselves as political conflicts between the authority of the Party Committee and the initiative of the younger workers. Unlike their elders or their more conservative peers, a small but resolute number of the younger dockers neither uncritically admired nor feared the local Party Committee. They were increasingly prepared to challenge its authority as the Cultural Revolution progressed, especially when the challenge could be justified by a higher loyalty to the Maoist Party centre and 'Mao Tse-tung's thought'.¹⁹

ECONOMIC GRIEVANCES

Unlike some of the younger elements, most workers did not seek a direct confrontation with the local Party Committee. They accepted the committee's political legitimacy, and instead raised grievances centring on specific economic problems. One general issue that affected almost everybody was that of wage levels. As the research of Christopher Howe has indicated, the Shanghai industrial workers had some cause for complaint; despite increases in real wages prior to 1957, there was a decline during 1959-62, some recovery in 1963, and wage stabilization thereafter until the early 1970s. 'Even on the most favourable assumptions', Howe concludes, 'no increase in real wages seems to have taken place' throughout the 1960s.²⁰ The success of the Party's policy of wage stabilization, then, resulted in tight budgets for the workers in the Fifth District. For example, one of the dockers interviewed claimed that although he earned 63 *yuan* a month, and his wife 37 *yuan* from her job, raising a family of three children was still a tight squeeze: 'Enough?' he laughed in response to a question, 'We can get by, but it is never enough.' Despite the Party's general policy of wage stabilization, grievances over wages and other economic issues tended to be expressed in specific terms. That is, few of the workers

argued that the Party's overall wage policy was faulty; instead, they claimed that the local Party Committee had failed to apply it 'rationally' according to local circumstances, or in light of the needs of particular groups of workers. Hence, fierce criticisms could be made against the cadres and their wage policies in the Fifth District, without bringing up the larger and more delicate issue of the Party's wage policies in general.²¹

Let us now consider some of the specific economic grievances that agitated the dockers in the Fifth District during the Cultural Revolution. As indicated by the complaint quoted previously, one main source of friction was the use of various incentive schemes designed to increase productivity in the harbour. Certain types of incentives were used to achieve specific results in different areas of work: wages might be calculated on the basis of piecework; cash premiums would be distributed for target fulfilment; bonuses or non-cash prizes would be presented for useful proposals or innovations; and workers who set the pace in emulation campaigns might be praised or promoted by the Party officials. There was doubtless sound managerial rationale behind many of these practices, and most of them are widely used in other countries.²² Nevertheless, because of the strong emphasis on egalitarianism in China, the personal competitiveness that these techniques encouraged was especially troublesome to worker morale. As the new Revolutionary Committee put it, these practices 'set worker against worker', and they were singled out for special criticism during the Cultural Revolution. Particularly acute were grievances voiced by the employees outside the regular reward system – the old and weak, the young and inexperienced, and the many irregular workers who had no job tenure on the docks.

While many regular workers (especially those in their prime) found these incentive schemes acceptable and even desirable, they had other specific grievances on their minds. For the older workers, one issue that generated much concern was the practice by the Party authorities of transferring workers who had been doing heavy labour to lighter tasks as they got older. This was a reasonable enough policy, but it was administered in a way that penalized the older workers. For often, workers so transferred found that the Party Committee had simultaneously cut their wages, typically from 84 *yuan* per month to as little as 54 *yuan*. In certain instances, this reduction in salary occurred some ten years before retirement, and many family men in their mid- to late forties found the financial strain intolerable.

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Many younger workers also found cause for complaint in the Party's handling of the wage issue. One grievance was strongly voiced by the technical school graduates who had come to the docks to work alongside their less educated comrades. According to their terms of employment, they were to be designated as 'practice workers' in their first year, during which time they would receive a monthly wage of 36 *yuan*. The authorities, however, routinely reclassified these young graduates as mere 'apprentices', which gave them rather lower status and much lower wages; only 18 *yuan* monthly. In a job-tight, employer's market, this was an astute financial move on the part of the management, and it probably had the further benefit of soothing the ruffled feelings of the young non-graduate apprentices. As the graduates saw it, however, they were being treated unfairly, and they were quick to join in the swelling tide of criticism of the Party cadres as the Cultural Revolution enveloped the harbour.

Other complaints were raised by the contract and temporary workers. For a variety of reasons, Party policy beginning in the early 1960s favoured the increasing use in Shanghai of workers who were not placed on the regular payroll. These employees were largely recruited from young, urban unemployed or from surplus manpower in the suburban communes, and were hired for specific periods of time. Their terms of employment were inferior to those enjoyed by regular employees, and usually included lack of job security, lower wages and benefits, and inferior working conditions. (Typically a contract worker would receive 40 *yuan* a month, while a regular employee doing similar work would get 70 *yuan*.) Not surprisingly, these workers, most of whom were younger than the regular dockers, grew restive under these conditions and sought to improve them. The fluctuating nature of work on the docks brought these short-term workers to the Shanghai harbour in large numbers, and they quickly flexed their muscles as the Party Committee came under fire during the Cultural Revolution. Unlike many of the regular employees (of all ages), the contract workers had little to lose and much to gain by joining the campaign to overthrow the Committee's political authority.²³

As the case of the contract workers illustrates, job-related grievances were often a complex of economic, political, and generational dimensions. Another example of this was the effect of the policy of retirement at 55, which was a source of much tension between the older and younger workers. For retirement involved a substantially lower income, much to the discomfort of the retirees.²⁴ In consequence, the Party's

policy of encouraging retirements at the stipulated age was not popular with many of the older dock-workers. Still, the Party adopted this position for the obvious reason that early retirement of elder – and highly paid – workers naturally opened the door for young men eager to accept entry-level positions at lower wages, and often on a contract basis. This policy was thus not only good economics in a developing economy; it was also good management in a young population. Nonetheless, the policy proved an especially troublesome issue before and during the Cultural Revolution, for it set the old workers against the young if Party cadres tried to enforce retirement, and the young workers against the old if the cadres allowed too many exceptions.

As the Cultural Revolution developed, contradictions such as these caused endless trouble for the Party Committee and its relationship with the longshoremen. Sometimes, under great pressure, the authorities tried to resolve these tensions, but this simply made things worse by transforming economic grievances into political conflicts. Take, for example, the case of the contract workers, a vigorous group whose economic interests were in potential conflict with those of the regular workers, old and young alike. In particular, the senior workers did not want the plight of the contract workers improved at the cost of upsetting the existing wage differentials between higher and lower job categories. According to one account, the Party authorities attempted to satisfy these older dockers by circulating an alleged Central Committee document raising the stipulated wages of veteran workers from 80–90 *yuan* a month to 96–120 *yuan*. Thus, the Party Committee could have it both ways – the wages of the lower-paid dockers could be raised as they demanded, but at the same time the senior workers could take comfort in having their traditional wage differentials maintained intact. Unfortunately for the authorities, the rebel dockers did not see things in this light. Rather, they drew the conclusion that the Party Committee was attempting to ‘buy’ the loyalty of the older workers, and thus split them off from the emerging rebel factions in the harbour. The Party cadres thus found themselves accused of attempting to fragment the unity of the masses by bribery and other ‘tricks’, in order to protect their own authority. In the eyes of the rebels, this was a most serious political offence for which the Party officials would have to be held accountable.²⁵

This complex interplay of economic and political grievances placed Ch'en, the new Party secretary, in a very difficult position. He perhaps had no personal ‘black record’ from the past (at least in the Fifth

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District), but what of the other members of his committee, many of whom had been in their posts for several years? Very soon, Ch'en found himself defending the records of many of his subordinates, and in the process incurring the workers' suspicion that he was attempting to 'cover up' for his associates. The more Ch'en tried to stand up for the other committee members, the more his own prestige and authority fell under question in the eyes of the agitated workers. Allied to this issue was the problem of actually dealing with the many 'unreasonable practices' that his predecessor had allegedly introduced into the docks during his long tenure in office. Ch'en was caught on the horns of a dilemma: if he acknowledged the legitimacy of the workers' economic grievances and sought to alleviate them, he would compromise the integrity of his committee and seriously disrupt labour organization and productivity in the Fifth District. Yet if he rejected or tried to deflect the workers' criticisms, he would appear in their eyes to be no better than his discredited predecessor, and hence worthy of exposure and removal from office. Ch'en chose the latter course of action, and thus transformed simmering economic grievances on the part of many of the workers into a violent confrontation over his own political legitimacy, and that of his entire Party Committee as well.

THE WORK TEAM

Ch'en and the Harbour Bureau officials quickly took fright at the vigour with which the workers were voicing political and economic grievances. They were especially alarmed over the damage that the rising wave of agitation might inflict on the stability and productivity of China's major port. Even the victorious rebels later admitted that the Party authorities did not really appreciate the significance of this new mass movement, for they had never experienced one like it before. In particular, they did not know how to handle the economic issues, and feared that the mass movement would ultimately lead to chaos on the docks, and that Shanghai's economy would suffer in consequence. It was at this critical juncture, argued the rebels, that the Party authorities made the fatal mistake of allowing their economic fears to lead to the political error of attempting to 'manipulate and repress' the burgeoning worker movement. In any event, this was how the rebel minority saw it at the time, and they were to succeed in gradually switching the focus of the confrontation between the Party cadres and the workers from economic to political issues.²⁶

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In order to control the increasingly disruptive forces in the Fifth District, the MPC and the Harbour Bureau sent in a special 'work team' to take the matter in hand. The use of work teams to oversee mass movements was common Party practice, and they usually carried considerable weight. In this case, the team was headed by the deputy director of the Harbour Bureau, and one of his first moves was to isolate the Fifth District from the adjacent docks and the local neighbourhood.²⁷ At this stage, there were no firm factions among the dockers, but only informal opinion groups that tended to be either supportive or critical of the Party Committee in the district. Little by little, however, isolated individuals became more outspoken in their criticisms, and openly voiced their opposition to the work team's attempt to control the Cultural Revolution on the docks. In response, the Party authorities singled them out as 'negative examples' from which the other workers could learn. As the rebels put it, this was the traditional tactic of 'killing a chicken to scare the monkeys'.

In one celebrated case, a young electrician had the audacity to post a *ta-tzu-pao* declaring that he did not want the work team on the wharf, and calling for its dissolution. The Party Committee immediately came to the defence of the work team, and accused the young rebel and his supporters of being 'sham leftists'. The committee demanded that the offenders write self-criticisms, and even distributed copies of Liu Shao-ch'i's works (probably *How to Be a Good Communist*) as an antidote to their growing 'disloyalty' to the Party. But these rebellious dockers had obviously apprised themselves of the new interpretation of Party loyalty emanating from the Maoist headquarters in Peking. Loyalty to the Party, they replied, meant above all loyalty to Chairman Mao and the Central Committee, but not necessarily to the Party Committee in the Fifth District of the Shanghai harbour.²⁸

This reply enraged the Party Committee, but they were becoming uncomfortably aware that the situation in the Fifth District was getting out of hand. By late July, the workers were dividing into three major groups and numerous minor factions. The most visible group were the 'rebel' minority, who tended to be young, well-educated, and concerned with both political and economic issues. Nevertheless, their interest focused on the highly political issue of authority, of their right to exercise 'mass authority' against the Party Committee, and the committee's duty to acknowledge this authority.²⁹ The largest group by far were the 'moderates', older, less well-educated dockers who were respectful of the Party Committee's political authority, but felt that

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they had legitimate economic grievances that the Party could amend. Caught between these increasingly agitated groups of workers were the Party Committee, and a substantial number of workers of diverse ages who continued to acknowledge both the political and economic authority of the Party secretary and his cadres. These were the 'conservatives', individuals who were tied to the Party Committee for a variety of reasons including sentiments of loyalty, a privileged economic position, and fears of losing their jobs.³⁰

Although, from the Party Committee's point of view, the situation in the Fifth District had deteriorated considerably during June and July, it was not yet completely out of control. Try as they might, however, they could not permanently isolate the district from developments outside the harbour. August was a bad month for the Shanghai cadres. It witnessed Mao's personal *ta-tzu-pao* calling upon the nation to 'Bombard Headquarters', the startling fall of Liu Shao-ch'i from the number two position in the Party, and the creation of the Peking Red Guards with Maoist approval.³¹ By late August, these student militants were streaming into Shanghai to help the local youth to make revolution by destroying the 'four olds' (old ideas, habits, customs, culture) and challenging the authority of the MPC. The rebellious students were rapidly crossing the critical psychological divide between verbal protest and physical violence, but Peking's obvious support for the student protesters prevented the Party officials in Shanghai from taking forceful action against them. The city's workers were relatively isolated from the turbulent students, however, and the Party felt much more confident in the industrial sector.

This confidence collapsed when word came from Peking in late August that the use of work teams in the Cultural Revolution was part of Liu Shao-ch'i's 'revisionist line', and that they should be disbanded forthwith.³² This undermined the position of the Party Committee, for they had closely co-operated with the work team, and were thus implicated in its fall. Still, the Committee regained some credibility by implementing the new policy of establishing Red Guard organizations to absorb the energies of the young rebels. Two separate groups were set up in the Fifth District – a 'Red Guard Detachment' to single out and struggle against 'problem cases' among the dockers, and a special 'materials team' to investigate their backgrounds and compile individual reports ('black material') on them. Initially, the Red Guard Detachment was able to recruit many of the wharf's more outspoken rebels. To the young radicals, it seemed that the Party Committee was

at last heading in the right direction, for the organization of the Red Guards had been approved by no less a person than Mao Tse-tung himself.³³

The Red Guards and the materials team threw themselves into their new mission with enthusiasm, and before long they had singled out no less than 32 'counter-revolutionaries, old and new', and a staggering 532 'problem cases' out of a total of some 2,500 workers in the Fifth District. These individuals suffered a variety of abuses: some had posters written against them, others were given tall hats, and all were branded with such titles as 'Four-Family Village', 'Anti-Party Clique', 'Five Anti-Party Cliques', and so on. Apparently, some of the more serious offenders were sentenced (if only symbolically) by the Party Committee-Red Guard alliance to life imprisonment, or even death.³⁴ A certain amount of physical violence was introduced into the struggle at this stage, and workers under suspicion had their homes ransacked by Red Guards searching for incriminating evidence. In many cases 'good workers' suffered the same indignities that were 'rightfully' (as the rebels phrased it) visited upon 'counter-revolutionaries', 'social parasites', and other undesirable types among the stevedores.

By late October when the campaign against the 'problem cases' peaked, the situation on the docks was becoming chaotic. Far too many 'problem cases' had been uncovered, and the ensuing struggle was setting up intolerable strains within the ranks of the workers. Eventually, the turmoil on the docks caused the Red Guards to split off into 'rebel' and 'moderate' factions, with the radicals increasingly difficult for the Party Committee to control. Several young rebels were summarily thrown out of the official Red Guard organization after they posted a *ta-tzu-pao* questioning the leadership of the committee during this traumatic phase in the Cultural Revolution. The emerging rebels soon found themselves under the close surveillance of the Party's political cadres, who shadowed their every move at subsequent meetings, and even in their dormitories. Finally, after collecting sufficient information on the suspects, the cadres exposed their 'crimes' in a series of defamatory wall posters.

The collection of dossiers with personal and career information from an individual's past was of course a common practice in China, and the rebel workers had eagerly participated in the practice in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution. Now they discovered that the shoe was on the other foot, and that the Party authorities were meticulously copying in full each and every wall poster that the rebels displayed. As

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the rebels well knew, by this and other means the Party Committee were preparing dossiers on them, and these dossiers would be used to 'settle accounts' in the future. Indeed, it was the collection of this 'black material' which frightened the rebels, and introduced a new note of desperation into the struggle. Many of the rebel leaders were young, well-educated and politically ambitious, and they knew that if the Party Committee remained intact during the struggle, they would pay a severe price for their indiscretions.³⁵

THE OVERTHROW OF THE PARTY COMMITTEE

Nevertheless, the growing difficulties of the Party Committee (and the discredited work team) weakened their prestige among the workers, and their earlier success in sealing off the Fifth District could not be maintained. Many of the younger dock rebels began to establish links with similar groups within the city's universities and other industrial sectors. According to one account, the dockers were among the earliest rebel workers to achieve some degree of identity, for by October they had joined with their counterparts in the textile and steel industries to form the first city-wide organization of worker rebels.³⁶ This group (some 2,000 strong) eventually established Shanghai's major rebel force, the Shanghai Workers' Revolutionary Rebel Headquarters. This was the huge rebel force that took shape at a mass rally on 9 November in Culture Square in down-town Shanghai. The MPC resolutely opposed its formation, and it was only after a desperate flight to Peking (in commandeered trains) that the rebels caught the attention of the Maoist headquarters. Side-tracked at Anting, a small town just outside Shanghai, the rebels were visited by Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, who overruled mayor Ts'ao Ti-ch'iu and bestowed formal approval on the new rebel organization.³⁷

The rebels in the Fifth District took heart at this turn of events, and they soon established ties with the Workers' Headquarters, which became a valuable liaison centre for new rebel groups throughout the city. In addition, the new organization provided a key structural link between policies emanating from the Maoist headquarters in Peking and emerging rebel groups in Shanghai. Three of the more outspoken young workers now felt strong enough to form a 'Rebel Detachment' in the Fifth District. Of the nineteen original members, seven were middle-aged or older workers, and twelve were young. But generational gaps did not obscure their prime concern, namely, the re-

trieval of the 'black material' that the Party Committee had been collecting on them. The confiscation of this material had by this time become a major issue among rebel groups throughout the city, and those on the docks shared this concern. Some of the early idealism in the Cultural Revolution was beginning to fade, as Party officials and rebel workers struggled over control of the all-important dossiers which in the end could make or break a man.

At first, the Rebel Detachment moved cautiously, for Chang Ch'unch'iao's decision to approve the formation of rebel worker groups in Shanghai was by no means universally popular. The Party Committee in the Fifth District were hostile to Chang's action, and they were able to mobilize support among many of the moderate and conservative workers. Many of these dockers posted *ta-tzu-pao* on the pier deploring the rebels' hijacking of the train, and arguing that any legitimate grievances could be worked out within individual work units. Bearing in mind that the initial membership of the Rebel Detachment was a paltry 19 out of some 2,500 dockers, the rebels had to keep a fairly low profile. Nonetheless they clung to the belief that many ordinary workers secretly supported them, but were afraid to join their group openly for fear of Party censure.

In early December, the Rebel Detachment held their first public meeting. Although their numbers had increased from 19 to 96, this new figure represented a mere 4% of the work force in the Fifth District. The Party secretary had put up stout resistance to the rebels' meeting, and gave in on the issue only after fierce argument. Thus, the rebels were legitimized and allowed to operate in the open, but their small numbers suggest the limits of their grass-roots appeal. In fact, the moderate and conservative workers took a leaf from the rebels' book and organized their own force, the Scarlet Guards, to help keep the Rebel Detachment in check. This put the rebels on the defensive, for the Scarlet Guards were much larger in terms of membership, and enjoyed the backing of the Party Committee and secretary Ch'en.³⁸ Still, the rebels knew that the tide was running in their direction outside the Fifth District, for the Maoist headquarters in Peking had declared that the collection of all 'black material' was prohibited, and that existing dossiers should be publicly destroyed. This turn of events gave the rebels the opening for which they had been waiting, and they decided to stage an all-out confrontation with the Party Committee and the Scarlet Guards.³⁹

On 25 December 1966, the Rebel Detachment forcibly occupied the

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Party Committee building and sealed the offices said to contain the infamous 'black material'. This infuriated the Party secretary, and the next day he called a big meeting in the dining hall to mobilize support against the rebels. The Scarlet Guards responded vigorously. They surrounded the small rebel band in the dining hall and tried to start a fight then and there. Realizing that their base of support on the wharf was too small, the rebels fled the clutches of the 'deceived workers' and headed for the offices of the Northern District Marine Transport Administration in down-town Shanghai. There the rebels prevailed upon a vice-minister of the Ministry of Communications to intercede in their quarrel with the Party Committee in the Fifth District. The minister was normally stationed in Peking, but had come to the Northern Administration in Shanghai during the 'four clean-ups' movement in 1964.⁴⁰ As a high Peking official, he carried considerable authority in the Shanghai Harbour Bureau, and he agreed to come to the Fifth District to listen to the two sides of the debate between the Party Committee and the Rebel Detachment. After several days of intermittent discussions, the minister finally expressed his agreement with the rebels' demands. This settled, the rebels urged the minister to convince the Party secretary that he should accept the rebels' terms, while they on their part would return to the docks to apprise the workers of the situation.

By this time (27 December), Shanghai was in an uproar. Massive battles were staged throughout the city between Workers' Rebels and Scarlet Guards⁴¹ and it was doubtless apparent to secretary Ch'en that Peking was coming down firmly in support of the Workers' Rebels, and that the once powerful Shanghai MPC was tottering on the brink of collapse. He was now being told by a vice-minister of the Ministry of Communications that he was in the wrong, and that he should sign the four demands of the Rebel Detachment. At 5.35 in the morning the beleaguered official finally gave in and affixed his signature to the controversial document before him.⁴²

The rebels returned to the Fifth District in triumph, and posted three *ta-tzu-pao* (of 100,000 characters each!) detailing the long list of 'crimes' carried out by secretary Ch'en and his 'black committee'. In addition to the political and economic grievances which we have already discussed, the rebel workers lodged a new series of accusations against the cadres: colluding with the Shanghai MPC; suppressing the Cultural Revolution; collecting 'black material' on the workers, especially the rebels; resorting to bribery to win over adherents; instigat-

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ing masses to fight masses; causing production slowdowns on the docks; damaging state property; and so on. Finally, the rebels charged that the Party Committee's incorrect handling of the Cultural Revolution had plunged the Shanghai docks into chaos. This, in turn, had impaired China's prestige throughout the world, and had weakened the international appeal of 'Mao Tse-tung's Thought'.

For many of the dockers, however, these details were now academic; it was more important to shed one's former affiliation with the Scarlet Guards and affiliate with the Rebel Detachment if possible, or hastily organize one's own 'rebel' group and join the growing bandwagon.⁴³ As for the discredited Party officials, they were unceremoniously stripped of their authority and publicly humiliated at a series of large-scale 'struggle meetings' on the docks.

THE STRUGGLE OVER ECONOMIC ISSUES

In the flush of victory, the rebels returned to the docks to propagandize their triumph to the rank and file. Once the initial euphoria had passed, the rebels sat down to carry out a rectification campaign within their own ranks. They were still a very small group; during the final showdown with the Party Committee, their numbers had increased to 180 or so, but this still represented less than 8% of the work-force in the Fifth District. The rebels decided in the course of their internal rectification to keep their ranks relatively pure, but to allow for some expansion. Very quickly, the Rebel Detachment grew to a total of 432 members, or some 18% of the work-force – still a small elite group among the longshoremen. In consequence, a wide variety of new organizations of lately aroused rebels soon emerged in the district, many of whom harboured suspicions or even grievances against the dominant rebel group.

With the common enemy now in disgrace, the original rebel organization found it increasingly difficult to maintain its former unity. The Rebel Detachment, although the most prestigious group, quickly lost its unquestioned status as the *only* rebel organization in the district. Increasingly, it had to compete for influence with leadership factions which began to fragment from the Detachment itself, and with the newly established groups emerging from the rank and file. In many cases, discontented leaders who left the Detachment recruited the former conservatives and moderates into new rebel groups, thus forming unholy alliances in their quest for power. Even so, most of the

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former 'deceived workers' were excluded from participation either in the original Rebel Detachment, or in the new rebel groups. By January 1967, the total number of rebels of all persuasions peaked at about 50% (roughly 1,250) of the entire work-force in the Fifth District.⁴⁴

As a result of the rebels' victory and their own defeat in the struggle over the Party Committee, many former moderate and conservative dockers began to drop out of the struggle for power. They did not, however, return to their work-posts, for by late December the social fabric of the docks had been torn asunder by the months of bitter struggle. Most cadres had been removed from office or were too intimidated to perform their normal functions, and confusion and animosity within the ranks of the workers led to massive work stoppages.⁴⁵ As the rebels phrased it (in order of importance), 'anarchism broke out, the organization of the wharf fell into chaos, the workers left their posts, and the machines stopped working'. It became obvious that the rebel takeover had led to a drastic decline in the productivity of the harbour.

The disarray in the Fifth District could not be concealed, for it handled a good deal of external trade, and the foreign ships and crews in the dock could not be wished away. These ships began to pile up in the harbour as the turn-around time steadily lengthened in consequence of the growing worker absenteeism on the piers. According to an official account, at the peak of the chaos at the beginning of the New Year: 'Silence fell over a number of Shanghai's docking areas. The volume of cargo handled fell until it reached a third of normal.' (On a daily basis, the volume of maritime freight handled in Shanghai fell from a normal level of 80,000 tons to about 30,000 tons.)⁴⁶ Industrial disputes of this magnitude could hardly be concealed from foreign business concerns who traded with China, and before long the Western press was carrying reports to the effect that the Shanghai dockers had gone on strike for higher wages and better conditions, as in a capitalist country. This analysis was not strictly accurate, for the dockers were absconding from their posts for a wide variety of reasons peculiar to the Cultural Revolution. Nonetheless, the charge had enough truth to be acutely embarrassing to the rebel forces at all levels, from the Maoist camp in Peking down to the Rebel Detachment in the Fifth District.⁴⁷

An interpretation of the massive work breakdown in Shanghai's industrial sector that has gained wide currency places the blame squarely on the shoulders of the discredited Party cadres. It is claimed

that they tried to sabotage the Cultural Revolution with a final, desperate attempt to provoke a massive strike by bribing the discontented workers with monetary incentives and encouraging them to leave their jobs to 'exchange revolutionary experiences' throughout the country. As Victor Nee, one exponent of this view, concludes, 'economist' policies 'could only serve to undermine the conditions in which the Cultural Revolution could be successfully carried out'.⁴⁸ Nee's conclusion is probably correct, but is his premise? Was 'economism' a tactic schemed up by the tottering cadres in a last-ditch attempt to destroy the workers' revolutionary movement? Or, on the contrary, were there other, powerful sources of economic discontent that arose among the workers themselves, over which the disgraced cadres had little influence? As I have already suggested, many unpopular economic practices *did* in fact exist in the labour relations structure of the docks. In this sense, then, the phenomenon of 'economism' that swept over the Fifth District in late December 1966 and early January 1967 was firmly rooted in the material life of the workers.

To many ordinary workers on the pier (including a good number of the rebels), a central goal of the Cultural Revolution was to eliminate 'unreasonable practices', practices that had proved counter-productive to labour morale and efficient work habits in the past. This becomes clear when we consider the names of the myriad of new rebel groups that sprang up in the wake of the victory of the original Rebel Detachment. Within two weeks of the fall of the Party Committee some sixteen new organizations arose to put forward their claims: these included the 'Old Workers' Preparatory Group', 'Young Workers' Preparatory Group', 'Revolutionary Apprentices', and even the '57th Headquarters', so called because all of its members had come to work on the docks in 1957. (In this sense, the Rebel Detachment could be called the '63rd Headquarters', for many of its leaders arrived on the docks after graduation from middle school in 1963.)⁴⁹ The occupational basis of these new rebel groups is all too apparent, and it is no wonder that their main concerns focused on concrete economic issues specific to the composition of the group in question. Normally, the obvious economic tendencies of these groups would have been held in check by the local Party Committee. By the turn of the year, however, Party control was severely compromised by the demise of the committee and its adjuncts such as the trade union organization in the Fifth District. The inherent interest-group proclivities of these worker organizations were thus free to develop in purely economic directions.

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This potentially explosive situation was exacerbated by the fact that December, when labour discipline began to weaken, is traditionally the accounting month in Chinese enterprises. It is at this time of the year that key decisions are taken concerning the payment of bonuses and the allocation of profits to capital reserves, social welfare, or lump-sum payments to the workers. It is not surprising, then, that in the special conditions of December 1966 the dockers pressed their normal economic interests somewhat harder than usual, and that the Party authorities were rather more inclined to appease the workers on this issue.⁵⁰ In some cases, individual cadres sought to redeem their past errors and curry favour with the workers by awarding bonuses, back-pay, and time off in an unusually generous fashion. In other instances, the workers – conservatives, moderates and rebels alike – absolutely refused to take no for an answer if the cadres proved reluctant to indulge their demands.

In one celebrated case in the Fifth District, a Party cadre who was said to be ‘taking the capitalist road’ tried to avoid a group of rebel workers who were on the lookout for him. After eluding his pursuers for some time, he finally had to go to the toilet, but was espied en route by the rebels. He managed to lock himself in the washroom, which was immediately surrounded by the discontented workers, who proceeded to apprise him of their demands for higher wages, back-pay, time off work, and so on. The cadre resolutely refused to accede to their demands, arguing that he would be exceeding his authority if he did so. The workers, however, would not be moved, and after a full seven hours cooped up in the toilet, the cadre gave in and signed an order authorizing the workers’ demands. My informants related this story with considerable humour, explaining that the workers in this instance were ‘misguided *rebels*’ (my emphasis), but it was, they concluded, a ‘rather typical’ case during this period.

In analysing the causes of ‘economism’, a case can be made that many of the Party cadres did open a Pandora’s Box by approving worker demands for the material benefits already discussed. Likewise, we can probably accept the claim, made in official sources, that certain cadres tried to instigate dissension among the masses by giving larger amounts of back-pay to some workers than to others.⁵¹ The important point, however, is whether the majority of the cadres approved the workers’ economic demands for the express purpose of destroying the Cultural Revolution, or for other reasons ranging from ‘correcting past errors’ to merely ensuring survival in an increasingly chaotic situation.

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Take our unfortunate political cadre locked in the toilet, for example: was he trying to sabotage the Cultural Revolution by bribing the rebel workers with back-pay and wage increases, or was he simply giving up the struggle after seven hours in isolation? My informants were able to handle this question with ease. They pointed out that when the workers (especially the older ones) made their demands on the Party cadres, 'they could not distinguish between public and private interests, so this is something to which the political cadres should pay close attention'. The implication of these remarks is unambiguous: Party cadres, because of their higher political consciousness, should be able to distinguish between those demands of the masses which are correct, and those which are erroneous. The unfortunate cadres were thus doubly damned – damned by the militant rebel elite if they acceded to demands for improved economic benefits, and damned by the ordinary rank and file if they did not.

My informants' interpretation of 'economism' as a major impediment to the development of the Cultural Revolution was most revealing in this regard, for they claimed that:

One obstacle against the revolution is the reactionary line, but another strong obstacle is the old ideas and customs of the people themselves. Some of the older workers still had backward ideas ... so some of them mixed up revolutionary and self-interest motives.

It was quite clear in March 1967, when the interviews took place, that the members of the new Revolutionary Committee were very much of the opinion that the workers themselves were as much a source of 'economism' in the Fifth District as was the deliberate, 'black revisionist line' of the Party cadres. Even these rebel leaders did not subscribe to the thesis that the discredited Party officials were largely responsible for the wave of 'economism' in the Fifth District. Or, if the cadres were culpable in this regard, it was not only because some of them encouraged the workers in their economic demands, but also because others did not restrain them sufficiently.⁵²

CENTRAL AUTHORITY RESTORED

In fact, the rapid spread of 'economism' throughout the Fifth District was not confined to the moderate and conservative majority among the workers, but found ample reflection within the ranks of the rebels themselves. The Rebel Detachment was still the largest and most

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influential organization, but competed with some fifteen other factions also claiming to be rebels. As we have seen, most of these new groups were based on occupational interests, and their attitude toward securing immediate economic reforms was by no means hostile. Nevertheless, many of the rebel leaders realized that their victory had led to chaos, and a drastic decline in labour discipline and in productivity. With the demise of the Party Committee, the Rebel Detachment and its factious allies were the only group capable of responding to calls in the national media for the restoration of normal production levels throughout Shanghai industry. Accordingly, in the last days of December, the rebels established a 'frontline headquarters' to be responsible for 'making revolution and grasping production', a two-fold task that proved exceedingly difficult to accomplish.⁵³ In light of plummeting production levels, the small rebel minority probably represented a very high proportion of the labour force actually on the docks. As the disgruntled dockers began to desert their posts on a variety of pretexts, the rebel groups soon found themselves to be leaders without many followers.

In an attempt to establish some degree of unified thinking and action, the rebel leadership agreed to study certain of Mao Tse-tung's writings. This attempt to establish revolutionary unity on the basis of Mao's thought proved abortive, however, for the groups found adequate justification for a number of opposing views in Mao's ideas. The Rebel Detachment came out with a clear stand, claiming that the masses were wrong in demanding immediate economic benefits and that they must be awakened to their errors. Another leadership faction took an absolutely contrary view, maintaining that economic reform was a major goal of the Cultural Revolution, and that the mass movement was entirely correct on this issue. A third view was that, while the masses' increasing concern with economic issues was wrong, their revolutionary enthusiasm should be encouraged, but they should also be educated and their mistakes corrected.

In the face of massive desertion by the rank and file, the rebel leadership finally agreed on a common front based on the third alternative. They would go among the dockers to encourage their revolutionary initiative, at the same time awakening them to their 'economist errors'. Accordingly, on 1 January mass meetings were held in each of the pier's three shifts, where the rebels presented their common programme. They argued that while the workers had legitimate economic grievances, these issues should not become the central

concern of the Cultural Revolution. Rather, the workers were urged to focus their attention on the decisive issue of political power, namely, the overthrow of the former 'revisionist' Party Committee and the establishment of a new, 'revolutionary' organ of power. Only then, the rebels maintained, could the economic issues raised by the rank and file be given careful consideration, and dealt with in an appropriate manner later on. In the interval, the dockers were urged to return to work and participate in the task of setting up a new political structure in the Fifth District.

This was a reasonable appeal, but by this point in the struggle tempers were running high, and the rebels received a cold reception from their audiences. The workers countered with an equally reasonable suggestion that political and economic reforms were not incompatible, and that they could be pursued simultaneously.⁵⁴ Facing a deadlock on this crucial issue, the rebels changed tack and the next day three old workers were encouraged to post a *ta-tzu-pao* entitled 'Against the Reverse Current'. The tactic adopted was clearly one of intimidation, for the wall poster argued that those workers pursuing immediate economic benefits were conscious or unconscious 'dupes' of the still-functioning Party authorities at the higher levels. The old workers warned that:

We true revolutionaries should not be duped, but should stick to our posts . . . We warn the Party authorities of the Northern Administration that the economic losses are incalculable, but we will be able to make a clear account of them!

The Rebel Detachment followed up this warning with another wall poster of its own, praising the original poster, and again stressing that any participation in 'economist activities' bore the suspicion of collusion with the corrupt Party officials. These stern warnings apparently did not have the desired effect; while some of the workers did declare that the old workers' wall poster was truly revolutionary, a good many others simply characterized it as a 'poisonous weed'.

The continuing split in the ranks of the stevedores was clearly manifested with the arrival of some university students to 'exchange revolutionary experiences' with the Fifth District. These students (from Fudan and Chiaot'ung Universities in Shanghai) immediately expressed their agreement with the 'anti-economist' *ta-tzu-pao*, and decided to stage musical performances in support of its three authors. Rather than helping to unite the dissident workers, however, the

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student performances led to further polarization; the minority who supported the campaign against 'economism' attended the student shows, while the majority stayed away.⁵⁵ The students thus introduced new tensions into the already chaotic situation. They quickly moved in to work alongside those dockers who were trying to keep the work of the district moving along, and this involved them in filling the posts previously vacated by the striking workers. In this sense, then, the students could be regarded as 'strike-breakers', although the situation was not simply that of an ordinary industrial dispute.⁵⁶ In due course, the rebel student-worker alliance began to make some headway in persuading workers to return to their jobs on the wharf, and production picked up during the first few days in January.

The dockers' renewed enthusiasm for work soon evaporated, however, when it was discovered that some had been able to squeeze higher wages and back-pay (and in some cases promotions) out of the Party officials than others. Nor did they listen to the rebel plea to forget these inequities for the time being, in view of the fact that many of the increases and promotions were invalid anyway, and would be reviewed 'at the proper time'. The important thing, said the rebels, was to get on with the job and the question of wages and conditions could be settled correctly later. For many workers, however, the payment of from 100 to 3,000 *yuan* in back-pay was not a matter to be taken lightly, and they retorted that they would be only too happy to return to work after the wage issue in particular had been settled to their satisfaction.⁵⁷ By this time, the arguments over money were getting out of hand, and many rebel groups also began to be caught up in the increasingly bitter struggle over the pay packet.

At this point, the workers in the harbour and indeed throughout the city began to lose control of the situation. This led to alarm in Peking, and the Maoist leadership decided that something had to be done to prevent the crisis in Shanghai from worsening. On 5 January, with the prior approval of the Central Cultural Revolution Group, rebels within *Cultural Daily* (like *Liberation Daily*, a major Shanghai newspaper) seized control of the newspaper and issued a 'Message to All Shanghai People', urging them to 'grasp revolution and stimulate production'.⁵⁸ Chang Ch'un-ch'iao was dispatched to the city to help co-ordinate the struggle against the tottering MPC, and to restore some semblance of order in the city. If Chang is to be believed, when he first arrived in Shanghai he was not consciously thinking of 'seizing power' on a grand scale; nor, he recalled, did he ever use the term, 'January Revolution',

in the early stages of the campaign to overthrow the MPC. At this stage, his main concern was to tackle the industrial chaos that had engulfed the city. In particular, he took alarm at the situation in the harbour, for:

The piers were in such a state of paralysis that foreign vessels entering Shanghai harbour were unable to unload or load cargoes. Taking advantage of the situation, imperialists lost no time in broadcasting to the world, saying that the wharf workers in Shanghai went on strike. They did so with the malicious intention to attack and slander us. Some foreign merchant ships displayed our national flag upside down. This greatly irritated the rebels and wharf workers.⁵⁹

Although the growing anarchy on the docks was not mentioned in *Cultural Daily's* message of 5 January, Chang's concern with the situation in the port found reflection in the important 'Urgent Notice' issued by thirty-two Shanghai rebel organizations on 9 January. In this document, the discredited officials of the MPC were charged with having 'even incited dockers to stop work, causing difficulties in running the port and damaging the international prestige of China'.⁶⁰

Upon his return, Chang quickly set about restoring order in Shanghai, and the harbour was given special attention. Large contingents of students and PLA soldiers were dispatched to take the place of the absent dockers on all three shifts. The rebel leadership in the Fifth District devoted their efforts to persuading recalcitrant dockers to return to work and to restoring badly disrupted production schedules. Gradually, success was achieved in both endeavours: by 7-8 January, many dockers who had ostensibly departed in order to 'exchange revolutionary experiences' had agreed to return, and by the 14th most of those who had accepted sums of money during the height of 'economism' had arranged to pay it back, either in cash or in regular instalments. Production quickly picked up; on 13 January some 2,000 tons of freight were handled, and by the 23rd the Fifth District was apparently back to its normal daily capacity of 8,500 tons.⁶¹ Chang Ch'un-ch'iao made several personal visits to the docks to ensure that all was well, and it was reported that he was especially impressed by the sight of thousands of students working side by side with the longshoremen and the PLA troops.⁶²

Meanwhile, the rebel leadership had raised the question of a new political structure in the Fifth District. At first, a series of huge rallies were held to denounce publicly the 'bourgeois authorities' who had been so recently overthrown. In particular, the first secretary of the

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Northern Administration was heaped with abuse for allegedly stimulating the 'ill wind of economism'. However, once the rebels had vented their wrath on the fallen cadres, they moved on to consider the issue of new political leadership on the docks. The rebels realized that they had not effectively established leadership over the critical middle- and lower-level administrative cadres who were essential to the task of maintaining production. While these cadres had not openly flouted the authority of the rebels' 'front-line production command', it was apparent that they had not gone out of their way to co-operate with it either. As far as the cadres were concerned, they were responsible to Party and bureaucratic chains of command, and until such time as these were replaced officially, they would not be moved merely by rebel appeals.⁶³

It was in the context of administrative confusion, then, that on 11 January the Central Committee issued a statement in support of a new campaign to 'seize power' throughout Shanghai.⁶⁴ Assisted by the students and soldiers, and by 'other revolutionary mass organizations', the rebels moved to seize all 'Party, government and financial powers' in the Fifth District. It was a time-consuming process, for the rebels were not uniformly represented in all of the specialized departments that made up the administrative apparatus of the district. Little by little, however, the rebels established leadership cores in the central accounting department, among the machine operatives, and in the warehouses of the four individual sections. The rebels could now count on better co-operation with their 'frontline production group' on the part of the lower- and middle-level cadres, and, by 17 January, the 'seizure of power' was symbolically completed when the rebels took control of the official seal of the Party Committee.⁶⁵

The question of a new structure of power on the docks was still unresolved, however, and attention now turned to this contentious issue. For the rest of the month, the longshoremen followed the city-wide debate over whether a radical 'commune' type of administration should be established in the city, based on the model of the Paris Commune of 1871. On 5 February, in fact, a metropolitan 'Shanghai People's Commune' was established under the leadership of Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, and it was expected that similar structures of power would be set up in the harbour.⁶⁶ The dock-workers did have some notion of the general ideas behind the commune, and had in the past participated in regular 'workers' congresses' at the district level. At these congresses, according to an official account, 'the responsible

comrades brief all the workers . . . [and] . . . receive the supervision of the broad masses of the workers'.⁶⁷ Even allowing for the probability that these congresses were controlled by the Party, they at least provided a basic prototype for the new commune structure that was under discussion. In many ways, the idea of a commune system was very attractive, but it generated a good deal of hostility on the part of many large rebel organizations who felt that they had not been adequately represented in the leadership of the fledgling organization.⁶⁸ The commune also left open the question of the role of the Communist Party, and this was to prove its ultimate undoing at the hand of the Party centre in Peking.

After prolonged discussions, Mao Tse-tung personally denied official approval to the commune concept in Shanghai, and on 24 February Chang Ch'un-ch'iao returned to the city to convey this decision to the various rebel organizations. In place of the commune, which was said to be too idealistic and impractical for China, Chang offered the model of the new 'Revolutionary Committee' that had recently been established in Heilungkiang province. Unlike the worker-dominated communes, these Revolutionary Committees were to be based on the 'three-in-one alliance' of experienced cadres, worker rebels, and PLA representatives. The new idea was duly implemented in Shanghai, and on 24 February Chang proclaimed the establishment of the 'Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee' under his leadership.⁶⁹ In the harbour, independent organizations among the stevedores were disbanded, or, in many cases, gradually fused into 'great alliances' at the district level. Political power began to gravitate to the new Revolutionary Committee in the Fifth District; here, the army's role was more symbolic than substantive, and the actual running of the pier was undertaken by a joint committee of worker rebels and 'revolutionary' and/or rehabilitated cadres.⁷⁰

While the new Revolutionary Committee system at least held out the possibility of increased worker participation in decision-making in the Shanghai harbour, its independence was seriously compromised by the continuing role of the Communist Party. Indeed, this was one of the central questions which Chang Ch'un-ch'iao addressed in the course of his important speech of 24 February. In theory, the Paris Commune model did not allow for an elite political organization such as a communist party, and Chang was forced to address this sensitive question: 'Were we right to proclaim the Commune, and, after its creation, do we still need a Communist Party?' In reply, Chang referred his audience to his

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recent discussions with Mao Tse-tung in Peking. Mao, he said, had felt the commune idea was somewhat premature for China, but that the Communist Party was quite essential:

I believe that we need it because we need a hard core, a bronze matrix, to strengthen us on the road -we still have to travel. You can call it what you please, Communist Party or Socialist Party, but we must have a Party. This must not be forgotten.⁷¹

There is little doubt that Chang shared this view. As Andrew Walder has observed, Chang was not a political 'romantic' – upon his return to Shanghai, his main task was 'not to engineer a utopian Commune, but to forge some sort of political unity by any means in order to remedy the economic and administrative paralysis that had befallen the city'.⁷² It is not surprising, then, that the Communist Party – as represented by Chang himself on behalf of the Party centre in Peking – was to play its traditional 'leading role' in the new Revolutionary Committees in Shanghai. In the case of the longshoremen, it was to be a revived Party organization that would determine the pace and scope of the many reforms for which they had struggled so vigorously during the Cultural Revolution.

For the ordinary dockers in the Shanghai harbour, the Cultural Revolution had at last come to an end. It had been a long and gruelling struggle, and in the early days it is unlikely that many of the longshoremen fully understood the drama that they were ultimately to stage. Emotions were running high at the end, and many problems both public and personal remained to be settled in the future. Henceforth, the new Revolutionary Committees would be charged with restoring normal labour relations and productivity on the docks. Equally, they would undertake the task of awakening the worker masses to the need to fight against self-interest, and to subordinate private desires to the public good. The conflict with the 'bourgeois authorities' in the Party had become an inner struggle within the minds of the workers themselves.

CONCLUSION

Before drawing any conclusions from this paper, I must reiterate my earlier note of caution. The role of the dock-workers in the Cultural Revolution might well be somewhat atypical of the Shanghai working class in general, and different again from the industrial proletariat in

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other cities of China. Nevertheless, certain specific points do emerge from the experience of the longshoremen during 1966-7. These, in effect, answer the three questions raised in the opening paragraphs of this study:

(1) Most of the dockers raised a wide variety of political and economic grievances against the Party Committees in the harbour, and also against adjunct bodies such as the trade union branches. A minority of 'rebels' linked economic injustices to political control, and went so far as to question the legitimacy of the local Party authorities. While this introduced a note of sharp conflict into the Cultural Revolution right from the beginning, the bulk of the workers did not join the rebels in impugning the political legitimacy of the Party Committees. The large body of 'moderates' avoided challenging the Party officials' political status, and instead concentrated on securing a number of specific economic reforms and benefits. As for the sizeable group of 'conservatives', they made few demands of any kind against the Party cadres, and in fact defended them against the mounting criticism of the other two factions.

(2) In response to this worker agitation, the Party authorities attempted to defend their economic policies and political legitimacy, even at the cost of alienating the moderate majority as well as the rebel minority. As the Cultural Revolution progressed, the rebels succeeded in shifting the spearhead of the struggle from economic to political issues; that is, from securing occupational reforms to overthrowing the authority of the local Party branches. After the fall of the Party Committees, however, the majority of the dockers (including many rebels) returned to their original economic concerns, and rejected the rebel leadership's plea that all economic issues be put aside until the question of political authority was settled. The rapid spread of 'economism' on the docks was more a function of the workers' initiative than of official scheming, although both elements were doubtless present.

(3) The *stevedores* failed to legitimize a new political organ of power through which they could realize their economic demands; rather, they allowed their overwhelming desire for immediate economic reforms to destroy all attempts to unite on the basis of a common political programme. As a result, the rebel leadership proved unable to maintain labour discipline and productivity, thus precipitating the decisive intervention of central authority and the termination of potential worker control in the Shanghai harbour. When Chang Ch'un-ch'iao returned to Shanghai in early January 1967, he did not find a

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united worker administration on the docks with which he would be forced to negotiate. On the contrary, he found a fragmented movement whose internal contradictions he was able to manipulate to the advantage of the Party centre in Peking. The establishment of new 'Revolutionary Committees' represented, in essence, the reassertion of Party control over mass political activity in Shanghai, including the harbour.

Indeed, the subsequent revival of the Party makes one wonder if the Cultural Revolution had any permanent impact on the Shanghai harbour at all. For example, the Fifth District made national headlines once again in early 1974, when the *People's Daily* drew attention to deteriorating relations between the dock-workers and the local Party Committee. In language reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution, the stevedores raised a number of political and economic grievances against the Party leadership, including their neglect of political work, failure to carry out the mass line, carelessness toward the introduction of mechanization, reliance on incentives and pressure to increase production, and so on. In sum, the dockers bitterly complained that:

The leadership of our district always talks about relying on the masses, but the masses are forgotten when work is carried out. Herein lies the cause of not much change in the features of our district over the past few years. The leadership has looked upon the workers not as masters of the wharf but as slaves of tonnage. This is a reflection of the revisionist enterprise-operation line in our district.⁷³

According to an appended 'investigation report' by correspondents of *Liberation Daily* and *Cultural Daily*, the charges made by the dock-workers were 'completely true'. After the appearance of the workers' *ta-tzu-pao* exposing these problems, the Party committee in the Fifth District was reported to have called a special meeting and 'pledged to accept sincerely the workers' criticism' and to rectify their erroneous leadership. To the editors of *People's Daily*, this incident in the Shanghai harbour was of great significance for all of China:

The big-character poster sounds a bell of warning to us: If the Party Committee does not grasp major issues, those things criticized in the Great Cultural Revolution may appear once again and there is still a possibility for socialist enterprises to step onto the revisionist road.⁷⁴

We cannot go into this intriguing issue now, except to note that the long-term impact of the Cultural Revolution in the Shanghai harbour might constitute a worthwhile case study for future research.

As this paper has suggested, Shanghai's dock-workers provide an

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excellent point of focus for students of contemporary China. For generations, the Shanghai longshoremen have been actively involved in Chinese politics, and the period of the Cultural Revolution is no exception. As China gives increasing priority to international trade, this group is sure to grow in numbers and power.⁷⁵ As such, they will continue to be a barometer of working-class opinion on issues of both regional and national importance, and will remain a significant subject of academic inquiry, in normal times and periods of crisis alike.




Diagram of the Shanghai harbour district.

THE SHANGHAI CONNECTION: SHANGHAI'S ROLE IN NATIONAL POLITICS DURING THE 1970s

David S. G. Goodman

There has been a generally accepted assumption amongst Western observers of China that there was a 'Shanghai Group' active in Chinese politics between 1969 and 1976. In addition, it has been a common assumption that this group and Shanghai itself were the focus of radicalism during this period. Thus Shanghai's three leading cadres – Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Yao Wen-yuan and Wang Hung-wen – were frequently identified, together with Chiang Ch'ing, as the 'Shanghai Radicals' even before their denunciation as the Gang of Four in October 1976.¹

There does certainly seem to be ample evidence of a Shanghai Connection at the higher levels of decision-making during the first half of the 1970s. The erstwhile 'Shanghai Radicals' were all prominent national-level cadres and Politburo members, with Wang Hung-wen the third-highest-ranking cadre after Mao and Chou from 1973 to 1976. Moreover (particularly after Lin Piao's death) a high proportion of national campaigns and models emanated from Shanghai. For example, in education the movement to train worker-peasant teachers was based around the Shanghai Machine Tools Plant. The campaign to establish an urban militia was modelled on the 'Shanghai Experience' first popularized in the Shanghai No. 17 Cotton Textile Mill under Wang Hung-wen's leadership. Shanghai units took the lead in criticizing Confucius after 1969; and Fudan University's *Study and Criticism* was the first local theoretical journal to appear after the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR).²

The impression of a specifically Shanghai influence is reinforced by the accusations levelled at the Gang of Four since their fall. In these accusations not only are the Gang of Four said to have used Shanghai as a 'power base',³ but there are also constant references to both their

radicalism and that of Shanghai. The notion of a radical Shanghai influence is the more convincing because it seems (superficially at least) consistent with the city's pre-1949 traditions of radicalism and anti-bureaucratism highlighted by Marie-Claire Bergère elsewhere in this volume. The Gang of Four have been accused of manipulating the 'ultra-leftist' 516 during the GPCR,⁴ and have been equated with the Trotskyites in the Soviet Union and described as 'ultra-left in form but ultra-right in essence'.⁵ Furthermore, the post-Gang of Four leadership has stressed Shanghai's 'glorious revolutionary tradition' (in Su Chen-hua's words),⁶ as for example in a *People's Daily* article of late October 1976 which reminded readers of the city's past radicalism.⁷

These assumptions, impressions, and accusations are to be reconsidered in order to assess the role of Shanghai in national politics between 1969 and 1976. Although it is now clear that there was a group in Chinese politics during this period – at least in the minimal sense of their being accused together – it remains an open question as to whether and in what senses this was a specifically Shanghai group. For a start, the identification of the Gang of Four as a unit with Shanghai and as opposed to any other constituency is by no means automatic. Whilst Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Yao Wen-yuan, and Wang Hung-wen were respectively the first, second and third ranking cadres in the city throughout this period, Chiang Ch'ing, the other member of the Gang of Four, held no position in the Shanghai leadership. Between 1969 and 1976 her formal connections with that city were minor, and there were no occasions such as the East China Drama Festival of December 1963 when she had launched her 'revolutionization' of dramatic art. Originally an actress in Shanghai, Chiang Ch'ing can certainly be associated with that city, but it is an involvement which predates the 1970s. Indeed all four had some association with Shanghai during their political lives, but they were all also national leaders and there is no necessary reason why (without further investigation) they should be assumed to have a local rather than a national perspective on politics.

For their part, the Chinese accusers of the Gang of Four have not suggested that they were guilty of regionalism or 'Independent Kingdomism', as was the case with many of the provincial-level leaders attacked during the GPCR. On the contrary, while the Gang of Four are accused of exploiting Shanghai as a 'power base', their accusers have been at great pains to differentiate between the city and its leadership. For example, the Gang of Four are said to have 'committed atrocious

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crimes behind the backs of . . . the city's ten million people', and to have 'hoodwinked the masses'.⁸ Although it is possible that these accusations are accurate, it may also be more desirable politically (in a period of uncertainty) for Hua Kuo-feng and the current Chinese leadership to exaggerate the distinction between Shanghai and the Gang of Four. Any assessment of the Shanghai Connection must thus depend on a more independent examination of the accusations that the Gang of Four used Shanghai as a 'power base', as well as on a consideration of the relationships between the Gang of Four, the Shanghai leadership, national politics, and developments in Shanghai.

PROVINCIAL GROUPS IN CHINESE POLITICS

In general, the analysis of groups and group activity in communist politics is fraught with difficulties of both conceptualization and empirical observation.⁹ China is no exception, as those (e.g. Oksenberg and Liu) who have attempted more general studies of group activity have found.¹⁰ More particularly the role of provincial-level units at national level in China has been the subject of much detailed and prolonged research and discussion for over a decade.¹¹ Unfortunately, there has been little agreement. Discussion has polarized basically between those who argue that political power rests exclusively with the centre, and those who see the provincial-level units as having at least an equal share. Those who argue that the system is centralized see the provincial-level units as 'branch agencies' of central government, who have little or no influence on the formulation of national policy. On the other hand those who advocate a more decentralized view argue that national policy is at least partially decided by discussions either between the provinces and the centre, or among the provinces with the centre arbitrating.

Much of this discussion has centred on competing interpretations of the role of leading cadres at provincial level and of the nature of provincial-level variations in the implementation of national policy. In the centralist view, provincial-level leaders are the agents of the centre in the province, who pass on directives and supervise the implementation of central policies. In the decentralized argument they are the representatives of the province who articulate their province's interests in dealing with both the centre and other provinces. A similar disagreement arises out of the question of provincial variations. There can be little doubt that the provincial-level units do differ in their implemen-

tation of national policies. It is a long-standing principle of Chinese Communist administration 'to do the best according to local conditions'. In any campaign, a central directive lays down the broad outlines and aims, but it is up to lower levels to arrange the concrete details of implementation. However, interpretation of the significance of these variations differs. Those who argue that political power is centralized maintain that these variations are just the local adaptations of central policy that they appear to be. On the other hand, those who advocate the decentralist view claim that these variations are the expression of provincial interests and reflect the attitudes of the province in the formulation of the policy.

However, to a large extent both these interpretations are not only over-simplified, but also unrealistic and misconceived in their methods of explanation. There can in fact be no such simple explanation of the centre-province relationship in general, and the role of provincial-level units in particular. In the first place, this is not an 'open' relationship, and the evidence that can be produced is consequently circumstantial and inferential. Secondly, strictly speaking there is not one centre-province relationship but many, since the provinces are not identical. Admittedly there may be common characteristics in each provincial-level unit's relations with the centre, but it is just as likely that there are important differences, and it is the determinants of these differences that need to be isolated. Thirdly, it is not inconceivable that the role of provincial-level units in national politics changes over time, and indeed many have argued that it is only since 1958 that political power has become decentralized. Fourthly, the relationship between centre and province must be seen in the context of a complex network of hierarchies which interlock both horizontally and vertically within the political system. Relations between any province and the centre are effected by the interaction of the provincial-level units of the vertically organized hierarchies, of the central units of the same, and of their inter-level relationships. Finally, when there are divisions within the centre (as emerged between 1960 and 1966) there is not a simple single relationship between centre and provincial-level unit. A provincial-level unit may appear to be resisting the centre when in fact it is responsive to another part of the centre.

Moreover, both these interpretations are conceptually and methodologically suspect. They proceed from assumptions which are unrealistic and depend upon the kind of information which cannot be extracted from an examination of the Chinese political system. Both

make *a priori* assumptions about the nature of the relationship between the centre and provincial-level units. The centralist view emphasizes harmony; the decentralist, conflict. Whatever the defects of the group approach when applied to Communist-Party states, it has demonstrated that although there is no Western Liberal-Democratic pluralism, there is also no total monolith.

In between the poles of pluralism and total centralism is a grey-shaded area which may well include the possibility of provincial-level units as actors in a group process. However, the obsession with explanations of 'interest' is to a large extent a red herring. The observation of competing national and sectoral (localized or otherwise) interests is difficult enough in relatively 'open' political systems. It is, however, virtually impossible in the Chinese context. Not only may there be no necessary conflict of interests, but the actors themselves may see events in a different perspective from that of the outside observer. For example, the first secretary of a provincial-level Party Committee could conceivably act in his province's long-term interests by supporting a central policy which is unfavourable to the province in the short-term. There is no independent assessment of provincial or national interests, and it is the leading cadres in the formal political system at these levels alone who can be seen to articulate interests. Any discussion of interests thus becomes a circular argument.

In a similar vein, the concept of 'province' is extremely vague. It is in fact the formal provincial-level leadership that is under examination, and it is their behaviour which should be the focus of analysis rather than concepts of 'province' and 'interest'. Where the latter is largely hypothetical the former is real and observable.

As several prominent social scientists have emphasized, the role of the 'political middleman' is an essential part of the relationship between centre and locality in a political system.¹² Provincial-level leading cadres in China would appear to be 'political middlemen' *par excellence*. They are appointed by the centre and dependent on it for their political future. However, the provincial-level leading cadre who does not also satisfy local requirements will find it difficult to implement national policy. In a very real sense they are both national and provincial politicians. They may be seen as both the representatives of the region to the centre, and the agents of the centre in the region. The problem for analysis lies in distinguishing between these two roles, and trying to assess which was of greater importance. Unfortunately, analysis is further complicated because (especially after 1957)

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provincial-level leaders hold concurrent central positions. Thus, the three Shanghai leaders – Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Yao Wen-yuan and Wang Hung-wen – were also formally national leaders.

Consequently, Shanghai's role in national politics will be examined through the behaviour of its formal political leadership. In particular, given that there is no necessary conflict between the centre and Shanghai, the occasions when there appeared to be – that is, when there were apparent local variations from the national norm in the formulation and implementation of policy – clearly have to be the focus of attention. In attempting to determine whether there was a specifically Shanghai group active in national politics, it is the leadership's acts and attitudes at those times which will be considered in order to see whether such apparent variations are better explained by national or by specifically Shanghai considerations. In this analysis, it will be assumed that there is an essential identity between the Shanghai leadership, the Shanghai media, and developments in Shanghai. This seems a reasonable assumption given that severe disagreement would almost certainly have led to political change – at least in terms of personnel movements – yet Shanghai's leadership was extremely stable between 1969 and 1976.¹³

In view of the methodological and technical problems of investigating potential provincial (or in this case, municipal) group activity in Chinese politics, discussion will proceed first with a brief overview of national-level political conflict during the period since the GPCR. Secondly, it will consider political developments in Shanghai within this national context. It will then continue with an examination of the accusations against the Gang of Four that they used Shanghai as a 'power base'. Finally, it will return to the relationship between the Gang of Four and Shanghai and the nature of the Shanghai Connection.

POLITICAL CONFLICT IN THE 1970s

There can now be little doubt that the period since the GPCR has been one of intense political conflict and debate within the Chinese leadership. In many ways it is a period reminiscent of the 1920s in Russia. There have been debates over the correct strategy for development, a series of inner-party purges with little or no mass involvement, and (apparently) the triumph of the *apparatchik*. For many years now it has been fashionable to talk of 'radicals' and 'moderates' (or 're-

volutionaries' and 'pragmatists' etc.) within the Chinese leadership. Although it has been suggested that all Communist-Party states develop a similar kind of 'dualism' within the Party's leadership,¹⁴ such conceptualizations of Chinese politics probably owe more to Mao's theory of contradictions. There is clearly a need for a careful definition of the divisions within Chinese politics since 1969 if only because in abstract such terms may be misleading. There is after all no necessary reason why Shanghai's radicalism in the 1970s should be equated with that of the 1930s.

If one looks at the period from April 1969 to October 1976 as a whole then it would appear that the major source of divisions within the leadership was the events of 1966–8. The GPCR was of great symbolic value for all the leadership, and the concept of Cultural Revolution was partially enshrined in the ideology as a continuing process.¹⁵ However, in retrospect the GPCR was the subject of widely differing interpretations and its significance for the future was the touchstone of debate.

The key to understanding the importance of the GPCR in this context is to be found in the rhetoric of political debate. Perhaps the best example is the attempt to revise the definition of 'socialist new-born things' which occurred at the end of 1974. Previously this phrase had been used to refer to those developments highlighted during the GPCR once the dust of the initial onslaught on the party-state system had subsided. These 'new-born things' included Chiang Ch'ing's revolutionary model dramas, the *hsia-hsiang* of educated youth, bare-foot doctors, 7 May cadre schools, educational reform, and above all the new (and mainly younger) cadres who had achieved power as a result of the GPCR.¹⁶ In December 1974 an article in *Red Flag* redefined these 'socialist new-born things' in terms less favourable to the events of 1966–9 and more positive about the development of the Cultural Revolution after 1969. Although, with one exception, the previous items defined as 'new-born things' were included in this redefinition, it is the exception and the additions which show the crucial difference. The exception was the new cadres. Instead emphasis was laid on the 'Three-in-one combination of old, middle-aged and young in leadership groups at all levels'. The additions included not only an emphasis on centralized Party leadership, but also the 'Criticize Lin Piao, Criticize Confucius' campaign and the 'many advanced units in agriculture, industry, commerce, culture and education'.¹⁷ In fact the attempt at redefinition was not successful, and after February 1975 the

definition of the 'socialist new-born things' was more in keeping with its pre-December form. Thus, for example, an article in *People's Daily* defined the 'new-born things' as a reduction of the differences in wages, the 7 May cadre schools, cadre participation in labour, the *hsia-hsiang* of educated youth, and worker-peasant-soldier theoretical contingents.¹⁸

Policy debates

In fact, the debate on development throughout the 1970s appears to have polarized along similar lines. It is possible to identify two tendencies within the leadership which refer back to the experiences of the GPCR. One – which can be defined as 'radical' – is more idealistic and enthusiastic about the radical aspects of the GPCR. The other – which can be defined as 'moderate' – is more cautious in retrospect about the effects of the GPCR on development and has sought to temper its more obvious excesses.

Although these two tendencies were first systematically outlined by Harry Harding with respect to 1969–70,¹⁹ they can also be identified throughout the 1970s and are most easily observed in the criticisms of Teng Hsiao-p'ing during the summer of 1976.²⁰ For example, on the military, Teng was accused of advocating the development of a modernized and professionalized army of 'iron and steel'. Instead of emphasizing its political attitudes and involvement, he was said to have been more concerned with military preparedness.²¹ On economic development, Teng was said to have abandoned the line of self-reliance and advocated faster and more economically efficient growth through the import of a high level of foreign technology. Teng further transgressed on this score because he is said to have advocated the greater export of China's natural resources (notably oil and coal) in order to pay for those imports. Teng was accused of 'desperately opposing and negating the worker militia'²² and there was clearly a debate on the correct role for the people's militia. On the one hand it was suggested that the militia should continue its role as a part-time public security and Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA) auxiliary. On the other, it was argued that the militia should be placed on a more permanent basis in charge of public security (as opposed to the PLA which had previously had this role) with its own independent organization.²³ Finally, it is also clear that there was a debate on education policy. On the one hand there were those who strongly advocated the educational reforms implemented since the GPCR, and on the other, those (mainly pro-

fessional educationalists) who were concerned about the effects of this 'de-professionalization' on the management and subsequent quality of education.²⁴

However, it should be noted that the identification of these two tendencies does not indicate that the leadership was divided between two antagonistic groupings. In the first place, although these tendencies cannot help but be somewhat programmatic²⁵ they represent the limits of policy debate rather than alternative competing programmes. The differences between the two are questions of emphasis, not of mutual exclusiveness. Both accept the need for the GPCR, growth and leadership – but they differ in their degree of emphasis. Consequently, most policies that have emerged since 1969 have been compromises between these two tendencies. Moreover, both tendencies are possible strategies for development within the framework of Mao Tse-tung Thought. If this appears at times somewhat confusing – as for example in the relationship between 'haste' and 'moderation' – it is because of the essentially contradictory nature of Mao's dialectics of development.²⁶ Finally, although these tendencies certainly divide the leadership they cannot explain the total pattern of political conflict since 1969. For example, if there were only two factions divided along the lines of these tendencies, then it would be impossible to explain the fall of Lin Piao.

Non-policy-oriented cleavages

This suggests that there are other cleavages which divide the Chinese leadership. It is reasonable to argue that the origin of these other non-policy-oriented cleavages can also be found in the events of 1966–8. This was a period of great trauma and drama for all cadres, when fortunes were made and lost and conflict was endemic, even at leadership levels. Given that one of the major tensions in the debates of the period had been that between the 'new' (and young of the GPCR) and 'veteran cadres' (i.e. pre-GPCR cadres) this seems a reasonable assumption. Moreover, the constant references to the GPCR since 1969 cannot help ease these tensions, particularly when rehabilitated veteran cadres (i.e. those purged during the GPCR) are liable to be labelled 'unrepentant capitalist roaders'.

Assuming this to be the case, apart from the basic division between those who initiated the GPCR and those in the party–state system who came under attack, it is possible to identify at least five non-policy-

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oriented cleavages. First, there is the cleavage between those who were part of the decision-making process before the GPCR and those who only became part of the leadership as a direct result of their attack on the party-state system during it, and consequently may be assumed to be more radical in outlook. Second, there is the difference between, on the one hand, those cadres who achieved or maintained political power during the GPCR and, on the other, those who were removed from office and only later rehabilitated. Third, amongst those who were part of the decision-making process before the GPCR, there is a cleavage between those who maintained their positions and those who gained in political power. Fourth, there is a division between PLA and civilian cadres. Many of the latter had been associated with mass organizations which had clashed – regardless of their political outlook – with PLA units when the army became actively involved. Finally, within the PLA there is a cleavage between cadres from the pre-GPCR regional army commands, many of which had been closely associated with the former party-state system, and those who during the GPCR were part of the PLA's central departments or its centrally directed units which had been sent in to reorganize several regional commands.²⁷

It is therefore suggested that both the post-1969 trends in policy preferences and other cleavages within the leadership can be traced back to the attitudes developed and experiences undergone by cadres during 1966–8. The resulting attitudes to the GPCR can be seen as varying along a political spectrum ranging from the most favourable (radical) to the most hostile (moderate). However, since at least the non-policy-oriented cleavages within the leadership are cross-cutting rather than reinforcing,²⁸ the relationship between radical and moderate should be regarded as a continuum rather than a divide.

SHANGHAI: CAMPAIGNS, INITIATIVES AND MODELS

Political developments in Shanghai between 1969 and 1976 are to be examined for two reasons. The first is to consider Shanghai's position in the political debates of the period. The second is to look at Shanghai's role in the formulation and implementation of policy – through the initiatives and models which it promoted – particularly to see whether it was at variance with the rest of the country.

Certainly in terms of the symbolism of the GPCR, Shanghai's attitude to the GPCR after 1969 would appear to be extremely positive. Throughout the period the old and the old order were the

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major target of struggle; the new and the positive gains of the GPCR received the most positive emphases. Perhaps the best example of the attack on the older order is the campaign to criticize Confucius. This campaign surfaced on the national stage shortly before the Tenth Party Congress met in August 1973.²⁹ However, for a good four years before its implementation throughout China this campaign had been part of Shanghai's political life. At first this was directed specifically against the 'bourgeois' line of the GPCR. As one report on the campaign stated in July 1969:

the repudiation of Confucianism means the repudiation of that rank renegade Liu Shao-ch'i and of revisionism.³⁰

Later on the campaign became less concerned with Liu Shao-ch'i and concentrated more on the old order in general. Thus, in May 1970 the Chuansha county 'Writing Group' was said to be active against Confucius in connection with their work at 7 May Cadre Schools;³¹ and in early 1971 the Shanghai People's Publishing House distributed a booklet of articles written by workers, peasants and soldiers criticizing the old order.³²

By contrast during the period 1969–76 Shanghai seems to have deliberately kept memories of the most radical phases of the GPCR in the forefront of people's consciousness (especially when compared to other provincial-level units), and to have heaped praises on the 'new' and young. In terms of the symbols of the GPCR in this process of 'memory-prodding', three examples stand out. The first is the celebration of the fourth anniversary of Mao's first inspection of the Red Guards in Peking in August 1966. Although this anniversary went largely uncelebrated nationally, in Shanghai the Red Guards Congress held a mass meeting. Other areas may have held similar celebrations, but Shanghai is the only one which seems to have given the event any publicity.³³ The second is the publicity given to the Shanghai Workers' Revolutionary Rebel General Headquarters long after other similar organizations everywhere else had been disbanded. This organization had been largely responsible for the 'January Storm' of early 1967, and the movement to 'seize power from below'. It had been their initiatives on 5 and 9 January which had led (or forced) the central authorities to sanction the 'seizure of power'.³⁴ Although like other mass organizations it had been denied independence and brought under centralized and Party control after 1968,³⁵ unlike the rest it had not been disbanded. It was active until at least 1971, when it was reported to

have organized Mao-study classes.³⁶ Finally, if of a slightly different order, there is Shanghai's unique behaviour in greeting the announcement of Teng Hsiao-p'ing's dismissal in April 1976. In articles, at rallies, and in broadcasts throughout the country at this time, three slogans were very much in evidence – 'Defend Chairman Mao', 'Defend the Party Centre headed by Chairman Mao', 'Defend Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line.'³⁷ To these Shanghai alone added a fourth – 'Defend the victorious fruits of the GPCR.'³⁸

It might well be argued that all three of these examples were meaningless gestures since they in no way advocated a return to the situation as in 1966–7. However, this would be to miss the point. The importance of the symbolism of the GPCR is not what it actually entailed during 1966–9, but what it has come to mean since. This can be seen especially in Shanghai's emphasis on the new and young after 1969. For the Red Guards who demonstrated on the streets of Shanghai the GPCR had meant a chance to come back from the countryside to the city and to take out some of their resentment against 'the system'. In substance, Shanghai's emphasis on the youth since 1969 has been the reverse. Like the other large cities, Shanghai was not slow to restart the *hsia-hsiang* movement after the GPCR, if only because of the constraints of population. Educated youth were resettled mainly in the border provinces of the north-east and south-west.³⁹ However, this time certain mistakes were avoided. Comfort teams were regularly sent to groups of resettled youth,⁴⁰ and there were a number of chances for these educated youths to return to Shanghai for visits or longer periods. Thus, for example, delegates of educated youth from these provinces attended meetings on youth work held in Shanghai, such as that of December 1970,⁴¹ and when the universities and colleges reopened, many of the new worker-peasant-soldiers from outside Shanghai were in fact resettled youth.⁴² Similarly, but perhaps slightly ahead of other cities, Shanghai sought to restore Party control over the young who remained through the re-creation of the Youth League (CYL). Throughout the early 1970s a campaign was waged to 'consolidate and build' the CYL as quickly as possible by emulating the example of the Shanghai No. 17 Cotton Mill.⁴³ In fact, the first provincial-level congress of the re-established CYL was held in Shanghai on 12 February 1973.⁴⁴ The real significance of Shanghai's emphasis on youth as one of the 'socialist new-born things' lies not in the substance of its policies but in its stress on the role played since the GPCR by the 'new cadres who . . . fought valiantly at the forefront of

this struggle'.⁴⁵ A radicalism of the 1970s it may have been, but it certainly was not the anti-bureaucratism of the 1930s.

Given its retrospective attitude to the GPCR, it is no surprise to find that Shanghai appears to have promoted the radical tendency through both the initiatives it took in the formulation of specific policies and the models for emulation which it promoted. Shanghai's stand has been identified in five broad policy areas: on the militia, education, the PLA, industrial management, and the strategy for economic development. The quality of information available on each of these is varied but there is enough to identify both Shanghai's preferences in terms of the two tendencies in the policy debate, and its local variations from the national norms.

The militia

There can be little doubt that Shanghai took a radical position in the debate on the militia. The debate which emerged during 1973 to 1976 over the role of the militia had been initiated by Shanghai, which had promoted its own experiences during the GPCR as a model for emulation. Prior to the GPCR the militia had been seen mainly as auxiliary police and economic shock troops to aid production. Militiamen served on a part-time basis, were not armed or heavily trained, and came under the joint control of the Party and the PLA, with the latter having greater responsibilities in general.⁴⁶ However, a new-style urban militia emerged during the GPCR. Its immediate forerunner was the 'Red Sentinels' – localized vigilante groups of workers operating as factory guards in order to limit industrial sabotage and restore order in factories and plants.⁴⁷ Building on this, Wang Hung-wen initiated the new urban militia as an experiment in the factory where he was a security worker – the Shanghai No. 17 Cotton Textile Mill. This new urban militia – since referred to as 'the Shanghai Experience' and hence explicitly associated with that city⁴⁸ – differs in several important respects to its pre-GPCR predecessor. Although the rural militia has traditionally played a public security role this was a new departure for the urban militia, which was now not just to be responsible for policing activities but also had civil defence and fire-fighting functions. However, the real departures in militia policy (which also marked the new units off from the contemporary rural militia) came in organization and training. The urban militia was to have its own command structure under the relevant Party

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Committee and without PLA involvement. Militiamen were to be armed and their heavier duties and longer periods of training were to involve them in regular tours of duty and secondment at full pay from their usual work-place.

The new urban militia was established throughout Shanghai in 1971,⁴⁹ and first promoted as a national model toward the end of 1973. The emergence of this model on to the national stage took place through an article published in the first issue of *Study and Criticism*⁵⁰ which was then later republished in *People's Daily* and *Liberation Army Daily*.⁵¹ This article outlined the importance of an armed working class by reference to the Paris Commune. This attitude continued to be emphasized by Shanghai through 1976. Thus, for example, at a rally to celebrate Teng Hsiao-p'ing's dismissal in April 1976, a 'representative of the militiamen' is reported to have said:

The important role played by the Peking worker-militia in smashing the counter-revolutionary political incident at Tien An Men Square proved once again that 'to build up an armed force of the masses with industrial workers as its main body is of extreme importance' for the consolidation of the proletarian dictatorship and for the prevention of capitalist restoration.⁵²

Although this 'new experience' was generally publicized and discussed it was not universally implemented. Separate militia commands were established in Peking, Tientsin, Canton,⁵³ and Anhwei. Elsewhere the 'fresh experiences of Shanghai in urban militia building' were merely noted, as in Hupeh,⁵⁴ or the militia was partially reorganized under the PLA's supervision, as in Changchow.

Education

On education too there seems little doubt that Shanghai promoted the radical tendency throughout the early 1970s. It appears to have been almost unreservedly on the side of the 'de-professionalization' of education and in favour of the training of worker-peasant teachers, the admission of worker-peasant-soldier students to higher education, correspondence courses, examination reform and more emphasis all round on open-door schooling. Perhaps the most famous example of Shanghai's policy on education is the 21 July Workers' College at the Shanghai Machine Tools plant. During the 1960s the factory had experimented with spare-time education for its workers. Through training its own technical staff, on and off the job, and through

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'maintaining independence and keeping the initiative in our own hands and relying on our own efforts' it claimed to have gained higher levels of technical development and output.⁵⁵ On 21 July 1968, Mao issued an approbatory directive:

It is still necessary to have universities; here I refer mainly to colleges of science and engineering. However, it is essential to shorten the length of schooling, revolutionize education, put proletarian politics in command and take the road of the Shanghai Machine Tools Plant in training technicians from among the workers. Students should be selected from among workers and peasants with practical experience, and they should return to production after a few years' study.

After the GPCR the drive to 'train a technical contingent of the working class' was put on an even more formal basis with the establishment of a 21 July Workers' College at the plant. Thereafter this experiment was popularized as a national model for emulation. By the end of 1975 there were reported to be 6,000 such colleges throughout China (of which 1,200 were in Shanghai) with over 460,000 students.⁵⁶

The emphasis in Shanghai's education policy was all on mass involvement, open-door education, and the undesirability of the pre-GPCR educational system. Shanghai took the lead in even taking formal education out of the classroom by establishing correspondence study courses in higher education. At first these were started for middle-school graduates who had been sent down to the countryside. About 30,000 were enrolled on these courses by mid-1974.⁵⁷ Later on these activities were expanded both in subject matter and enrolment. Thus, for example, in late 1974 Shanghai's First Medical College was running a correspondence course in brain surgery.⁵⁸ Although both these phenomena were adopted nationally, and in general education policy emphasized nationally the needs to 'serve the people' and 'put politics in command', both were initiated in Shanghai and there is no evidence of resistance as there was elsewhere.⁵⁹

The PLA

After 1971 the Shanghai media provided little publicity about the PLA either in Shanghai or generally. On the other hand, whenever the PLA was mentioned throughout this period it was in terms of its political functions rather than its military. Surprisingly enough one of the PLA units promoted by Shanghai during this period for its political role was

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Unit 8341. This is surprising because this unit was in fact based in Peking and had been associated with the Peking General Knitwear Mill during the GPCR. However, it was first singled out as a model for national promotion by the Shanghai media in 1969. In particular it was promoted for its implementation of the 'Three Supports and Two Militaries'.⁶⁰ Thus, for example, a PLA unit at Chianganan shipyard in Shanghai was said to have learnt from the experiences of 8341 and consequently been able to help the shipyard launch two ships ahead of schedule.⁶¹ This is perhaps somewhat ironic in view of Unit 8341's later role in Chinese politics. During 1976 it was not only singled out for praise for its role in suppressing the 'counter-revolutionary political incident' in Tien An Men Square during April,⁶² but was also praised for its role in overthrowing the Gang of Four.⁶³

Of Shanghai's own PLA units the 'Good Company of Nanking Road' received the most publicity throughout the period. For example, in 1970 it was praised for its work in giving military and political training at more than 80 middle and primary schools. In these exercises they stressed the values of arduous struggle, economy and self-reliance.⁶⁴ Later, in 1976, it was stated that this unit was an 'advanced pacesetter' in the struggle against Teng Hsiao-p'ing and the 'bourgeoisie inside and outside the Party'. This unit, like Unit 8341, had been a 'new-born thing' in that it had been brought into Shanghai politics as a 'Support-the-Left' unit during the GPCR.⁶⁵

Although PLA units were only ever mentioned in a political context in Shanghai, there is an apparent contradiction in that they were rarely mentioned for their public security work. The explanation of this lies in Shanghai's attitude on the new urban militia as previously outlined. While before 1973 Shanghai acknowledged the role of the army in public security, as in a joint editorial of the Shanghai papers during July 1970,⁶⁶ it has not proved possible to find any such references after this date.

Industrial management

In industrial management, Shanghai appears again to have been over-emphasizing the radical tendency to the exclusion of the moderate. Throughout the period it criticized the concepts and practices of material incentives, overstaffed offices, and 'experts', and advocated placing 'politics in command' and promoting the initiative of the workers. Thus, for example, in 1970, *Cultural Daily* published four

articles by workers criticizing various practices in industry. They objected to the over-expertization of factories, claiming that these should be run by the working classes, and that it was a false equation to say that the lack of technical knowledge meant the lack of qualification to run a factory. They claimed that leaving factory management to the 'professional experts' meant the growth of bureaucracy and bureaucratic practices. Not only would management become overstaffed but it would introduce material incentives 'in the attempt to use the idea of personal fame and profit to corrupt the workers' minds'.⁶⁷

Similarly in early 1974, much publicity was given to the criticisms of some Shanghai dock-workers who had attacked what they described as 'the revisionist way of running enterprises'. This, they claimed, was based on material incentives, overstaffed offices, and the neglect of politics and workers' initiative. The dock-workers' criticisms had arisen because of the introduction of an incentive scheme. A blackboard was established in the No. 5 yard which showed on a daily basis how much tonnage had been moved. Those teams which over-fulfilled their quotas were rewarded not with cash payments, which were not formally allowed, but with gifts of fountain pens, enamel mugs and invitations to dinner. They responded by raising the slogan 'Be the masters of the wharf and not the slaves of tonnage' in a *ta-tzu-pao* which they posted at the end of January.⁶⁸

Whether it was intended or not, this practice was publicized nationally and repeated elsewhere. In the following month a rash of similar industrial *ta-tzu-pao* appeared throughout the country emulating the Shanghai experience. Not all were occasioned by an attack on material incentives, but dealt in general with the problems of industrial management. Thus, for example, the workers at the Lanchow Chemical Engineering Works Synthetic Rubber Factory criticized 'retrogression' in industrial management – i.e. the re-establishment of offices and personnel removed during the GPCR.⁶⁹ Again, a similar *ta-tzu-pao* was posted by workers in a factory under the Tientsin Rugs Company.⁷⁰

Furthermore, it is interesting to note Shanghai's reaction to a central directive on production in 1974. In July 1974 the Party centre had issued what was described as 'an important directive' on 'grasping revolution and promoting production'.⁷¹ In the context of that summer this directive clearly indicated a concern with production on the part of the central authorities. The other provinces responded by holding

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rallies to support the Party centre's instructions.⁷² However, Shanghai responded by arranging a rally on 8 July 'to exchange experiences in criticizing Lin Piao and Confucius'. Moreover, at this rally a worker from No. 5 Steel Works made a speech in which he said:

Our steel works wants to train a number of fighters who oppose and combat revisionism in the course of struggle. This is a major matter in consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat.⁷³

Not only did no other provincial-level unit make such a statement, but its tenor is clearly very different to that of the original central directive.

Economic development

Finally, on the question of economic development strategy, Shanghai promoted policies and models emphasizing self-reliance and sacrifice. The model of the Shanghai Machine Tools Plant in both industry and education has already been mentioned. However, this preference was also evident in more purely economic activities.

For example, in late 1974, a Seven-Year Agricultural Development Plan was published for Chiating county in Shanghai.⁷⁴ Since discussions on a new *Five Year Plan* were about to (or had already) started, it is reasonable to assume that this lower-level plan was intended as some kind of example. The plan outlined the areas in which Chiating was weakest and in need of improvement sooner rather than later. Most of these were connected to construction work. However, the plan pointed out that the state was not able to provide all necessary construction materials. For example, in each of these seven years there would be a shortfall of 47–50% in supplies of cement between what the county needs and the state can provide. Since Chiating already had high agricultural yields there was a need for the development of more small-scale local industry, larger supplies of material, and a higher level of mechanization. However, as the plan stressed, since Chiating neither had an adequate local industrial infrastructure nor was rich in natural resources, rapid agricultural development could only come through self-reliance and the peasants' sacrifice.

Throughout the period, it was emphasized that such self-reliance and sacrifice can bring results. Large plants were encouraged to learn from small-scale enterprises who had 'defied poverty and run the factory through diligence and frugality'.⁷⁵ Moreover, self-reliance was defined in a wider sense which included rejection of foreign assistance

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in any form. Thus, for example, a joint editorial of the two Shanghai dailies entitled 'Indigenous methods are inexhaustible' stated in language reminiscent of the GPCR:

We of the working class have the might of Mao Tse-tung and industrious hands. We can create any miracle in the world.⁷⁶

Heavy criticisms were levelled at those who argued that China had to look abroad for aid in technological development on the grounds that she was inferior.⁷⁷ Instead it was stressed that:

A factory, however big, and a nation, however rich, should never forget to bring into full play the revolutionary spirit of paupers.⁷⁸

Furthermore, work and products which 'reflected showiness and emphasis on "foreign things"' were explicitly criticized as 'bourgeois ideas'.⁷⁹

It is thus clear that Shanghai through its policy initiatives and promotion of models was actively in support of the radical tendency during this period, and not just subject to it. On many occasions Shanghai was responsible for policy initiatives of a radical nature which only later became national phenomena. This is hardly surprising given Shanghai's obvious attachment to the symbols of the GPCR. Nor is it surprising given the composition of Shanghai's leadership during this period.⁸⁰ In terms of non-policy-oriented cleavages, all of Shanghai's eighteen leading cadres appear far more radical than moderate. Almost all owed their post-1969 political positions entirely to the parts they had played in launching the attack on the previous Shanghai administration during the GPCR. Even the three leading cadres who had been 'power-holders' in Shanghai before the GPCR – Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Ma T'ien-shui and Wang Shao-yung – fall into this category. The radical nature of this leadership group is emphasized by its stability since the GPCR. Unlike other provincial-level units, by September 1976 it still contained a large number of those who had been the 'representatives of the mass organizations' during the GPCR; had lost none of its immediate post-GPCR leaders (and those cadres who had been brought into the leadership had come from similar backgrounds); and contained no cadres who had been removed from office during the GPCR and later rehabilitated.

Moreover, it is also clear that in terms of local variation (from central norms and policies) Shanghai seems to have had a high degree

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of independent political action. Throughout this period Shanghai frequently took the initiative in implementing and promoting policies which only later were adopted nationally. Campaigns such as those to criticize Confucius and later Lin Piao;⁸¹ and models for emulation such as the urban militia and the 21 July Workers' College, were introduced here long before they received explicit central approval. However, strictly speaking these were not anti-centre acts since at the time of their implementation, discussion on the correct strategy for development continued, and consequently experiments were only frowned upon in retrospect. Furthermore, all of Shanghai's initiatives were within the limits of policy debate, if verging on the radical extreme. It is in the search for an explanation of this process that the accusations levelled at the Gang of Four that they used Shanghai as a 'power base' have been considered.

THE GANG OF FOUR IN SHANGHAI

Shanghai as a 'power base'

The general accusation that the Gang of Four had used Shanghai as a 'power base' was made in a speech by Wang Yi-ping (a vice-chairman of the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee) at the Second National Conference on Learning from Tachai in Agriculture.⁸² According to Wang Yi-ping,

Shanghai, China's largest industrial city, was for many years an important base of the Gang of Four in plotting to usurp Party and state power. They practised revisionism, created splits and engaged in intrigues and conspiracies, thereby committing atrocious crimes behind the backs of Chairman Mao, the Party Central Committee, and the city's 10 million people.

In this context, the Gang of Four were specifically indicted on five counts. They were said to have created 'counter-revolutionary opinion'; developed their own organization to which they had 'recruited deserters and renegades'; engaged in 'activities to split the Party'; plotted 'counter-revolutionary armed rebellion'; and attempted to 'undermine the movements to Learn from Taching and Tachai'.

Even a cursory examination of the accusations that the Gang of Four used Shanghai as a 'power base' suggests two interesting conclusions. The first is how little many of the 'crimes' they are said to have committed actually had to do with Shanghai. Indeed, many of those

accusations explicitly linked to Shanghai were in fact repeats of those made elsewhere against the Gang of Four, but originally without reference to Shanghai. The second is that, rhetoric and hyperbole apart, both those accusations which refer explicitly to Shanghai, and those which do not, appear to have some substance.

For example, among those accusations in Wang Yi-ping's speech which do not refer directly to Shanghai is one which suggests that the Gang of Four had moved against Chou En-lai after the Tenth Party Congress in 1973. Particularly in the light of recent events, it is reasonable to assume that this was the case. The movement to criticize Confucius, which had already been running in Shanghai for some time, was launched on to the national stage shortly before the Tenth Party Congress. In this initial onslaught, a major target for criticism was the Duke of Chou, described as 'the "sage" whom Confucius most worshipped'.⁸³ Given that the Chinese character for 'Chou' in Chou En-lai's name is the same as that for the Duke of Chou, and also given the regime's control of the media – where new and important articles, particularly those at the start of a campaign, have to be passed for publication – the obvious equation is hardly accidental.

More particularly, there would appear to be some truth in the accusations which do refer explicitly to Shanghai. For example, although it is evident that Shanghai did not ignore the 'Learn from Taching' and 'Learn from Tachai' movements throughout the 1970s, as was claimed, it would appear that the Tachai movement was not promoted during 1976, as was also suggested. Thus in late 1970 a campaign to 'Learn from Tachai in Agriculture' was under way in Shanghai,⁸⁴ and in 1975 Shanghai propaganda workers were praised for their work in publicizing the movement to 'Learn from Tachai'.⁸⁵ However, the last reference it has proved possible to find to Tachai and Tachai-type counties, to which the Gang of Four are said to have been opposed, is in an article on the agricultural plan published at the end of 1975.⁸⁶

Again, the Gang of Four are accused of having subverted the militia for their own purposes:

While they interfered in its affairs in an attempt to create chaos and splits they seized hold of the militia and tried to make it a 'second armed force' independent of the PLA and turn it into a tool for carrying out their schemes . . . They refused to let the PLA Shanghai Garrison exercise control over the militia and forced it to hand over arms and funds to the militia. They set up a separate militia headquarters under their direct control and independent of the PLA garrison.

As has already been mentioned, it certainly was the case that the new urban militia was armed, had its own command structure, was independent of the PLA, and was under the Municipal Party Committee. In addition, between April and September 1976 it appeared that the Gang of Four were stressing the need to develop the urban militia in order to strengthen their position in any possible political conflict. In the first place, the urban militia provided them with a mass following and an organizational base, which they had previously lacked. Secondly, the need to develop the urban militia was said to have become a priority as a result of the 'sabotaging activities of counter-revolutionaries',⁸⁷ such as Teng Hsiao-p'ing, whose latest manifestation had resulted in the Tien An Men Incident. By stressing the danger to the regime and the subsequent need for an armed urban militia, the Gang of Four were thus also hoping to show the more extreme aspects of the moderate position (as represented by Teng Hsiao-p'ing) to be in an antagonistic contradiction to the current Maoist line.⁸⁸

Finally, there does seem to be some substance to the accusation that the Gang of Four had their own 'underground' organization and created problems elsewhere according to the 'counter-revolutionary tactic of "stabilizing" Shanghai, creating turmoil in other places and seizing power amidst the chaos'. Leaving aside rhetorical camouflage and silly stories about 'Shadow Cabinets'⁸⁹ – which can be proved neither true nor false – there is the suggestion of a connection between Shanghai and the troubled provinces. Shortly after the fall of the Gang of Four there were twelve provinces which reported having experienced 'near civil-war situations' or the like 'in the recent past'.⁹⁰ There are another two where it is reasonable to suppose that similar problems had existed,⁹¹ although none were immediately reported. Of these fourteen 'troubled' provinces, eight had been sent 'educated youth' from Shanghai at the end of the GPCR, and Wang Hung-wen was reported (even before September 1976) to have been personally involved in a ninth (Chekiang).⁹² (The eight provinces were in fact the only ones to receive resettled educated youth from Shanghai at the end of the GPCR.)⁹³

The evidence on those accusations which refer to Shanghai does seem to suggest that the Gang of Four used the Shanghai administration to their own ends. However, the concept of 'power base' in this context is somewhat misleading. There is little evidence that Shanghai itself was their source of power, or that the Gang of Four were in any sense *of* Shanghai. On the contrary, the fact that many of the

accusations said to link them with Shanghai do not in fact refer to that city indicates that they were a nationally oriented group rather than a Shanghai-oriented one. Certainly, the national promotion of the 'Anti-Confucius' campaign and the urban militia, as well as the resettlement of educated youth, are all examples of the uses to which Shanghai's administration was put in the service of inner-party conflict at the centre.

A Shanghai group?

While it is observable that Shanghai was radical during the 1970s, it is almost self-evident that the Gang of Four should be placed at the radical end of the radical-moderate continuum. In terms of the non-policy-oriented cleavages within Chinese politics, all four owed their post-1969 positions almost exclusively to their roles in the GPCR. Prior to the GPCR only Chang Ch'un-ch'iao held a position of leadership – as a deputy secretary of the Shanghai Party Committee. During the GPCR they were each in the vanguard of the attack on cadres in the party-state system: Chiang Ch'ing, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and Yao Wen-yuan at national level; Chang Ch'un-ch'iao within the Shanghai Party Committee; and Wang Hung-wen in the streets and factories of Shanghai. It is thus hardly surprising that all four showed a positive attitude towards the GPCR and the radical tendency. From the few statements that were attributed to them as individuals before September 1976 this would seem to be the case. Thus, for example, both Chang Ch'un-ch'iao⁹⁴ and Yao Wen-yuan⁹⁵ warned about 'bourgeois right' and 'capitalist restoration'; while in his report to the Tenth Party Congress Wang Hung-wen stressed 'going against the tide', as compared to Chou En-lai's emphasis on 'discipline'. Certainly, since their fall, their accusers have placed them firmly in the radical category. For example, they have been blamed for the worst excesses of the GPCR,⁹⁶ and for rigidly dichotomizing in the post-GPCR policy debates.⁹⁷ An interesting confirmation is provided by the change in the symbolism of the GPCR at the time that the Gang of Four were dismissed. The change was heralded in the *People's Daily* editorial of 10 October 1976, which now issued the call to 'consolidate the Cultural Revolution', and failed to mention the 'socialist new-born things' of the GPCR, or 'capitalist roaders' (unrepentant or otherwise), as had previously been the case.

Although both Shanghai and the Gang of Four were radical in terms

of national politics, there is little to indicate that the Gang of Four took the position they did because of developments in Shanghai. On the contrary, it seems more reasonable to argue (particularly given the evidence that the Gang of Four used the Shanghai administration) that Shanghai's policy initiatives came about as a result of prompting from the Gang of Four. These initiatives appear to indicate local political action but it is quite clear that in many cases they were not local phenomena nor did they result from local circumstances or considerations. Certainly even the two most famous Shanghai models of the period owe their promotion to the national position of the Gang of Four. The argument that the emphasis on the new urban militia is best understood in the context of national-level political conflicts has already been mentioned. The second example is perhaps more surprising. Although it is true that Mao first singled out the Shanghai Machine Tools Plant as an example of training 'worker-technicians', it is not true that the 21 July Workers' College was a purely Shanghai-grown phenomenon. In fact it is quite clear that the 21 July Workers' College was established not on the initiative of the Shanghai Party Committee, but as a result of experiments carried out by Tsinghua University (Peking) in Shanghai during 1969.⁹⁸ Since October 1976, Tsinghua University has been identified as another base of the Gang of Four.⁹⁹

Furthermore, in purely personnel terms it is almost impossible to conceive of the Gang of Four as a solely Shanghai group. If they had been more of a Shanghai group than a radical group in national politics then one would have expected this to be reflected in those later dismissed as 'followers of the Gang of Four'. After all, Lin Piao's departure was followed by a series of dismissals within the PLA's central organization. However, neither the remainder of the Shanghai leadership, nor those cadres who had previously served in Shanghai but were now based elsewhere – for example, Wang Pi-ch'eng (the second secretary in Yunnan) and Wang Liu-sheng (the second secretary in Hupeh and first political commissar of the Wuhan Military Region) – have been removed from office; and Ch'en P'i-hsien, a pre-GPCR Shanghai party secretary, has been rehabilitated since the Gang of Four's dismissal. Instead, those who have been dismissed along with the Gang of Four – such as Mao Yuan-hsin (a leading cadre in Liaoning) and Chuang Tse-tung (the Minister of Sports) – are most easily identified in terms of the radical position in Chinese politics.

It is thus extremely difficult to escape the conclusion that the Gang

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of Four were a Shanghai group only in the sense of being (at least partially) *in* Shanghai rather than in the sense of being of that city. The real reason why they are identifiable as a group is not because of the city of Shanghai, but because of their position in Chinese politics since 1969.

THE SHANGHAI CONNECTION: A POSTSCRIPT AND CONCLUSION

In an earlier discussion on a similar theme – the role of Szechwan and the south-west in national politics during the early 1960s – I concluded that the question of provincial variations and initiatives is best understood in terms of a ‘group’ process in Chinese politics. There can be no doubt that there are instances of what seems to be independent political action on the part of provincial-level units. However, these occur only at times of central indecision, discussion and deliberation. This suggests that at such times of inner-party debate, provincial-level leaders may implement policies in order to influence the central decision-making process.¹⁰⁰

A similar process appears to have been in operation in Shanghai during the 1970s. The Shanghai leadership (under the Gang of Four's guidance) took the initiative in promoting policies in Shanghai in order to influence the central decision-making process. Moreover, as in the south-west during the 1960s, this mechanism was employed more out of national than provincial-level considerations. However, there is a difference between these two examples. Although it is possible to view the whole period since 1969 as one of central indecision and debate,¹⁰¹ Shanghai seems to have been able actually to create more debate where Szechwan in the 1960s did not. The best examples are Shanghai's promotion of the ‘Anti-Confucius’ campaign of 1973, and the urban militia during 1975–6. The explanation for this difference seems to lie with the greater political clout of the Gang of Four. To a certain extent, therefore, this account of the Shanghai Connection confirms those more centralist accounts of Chinese politics. Disputes at the centre may well be partially played out in the provinces, but the centre still calls the directions and moves the pieces.

By way of an afterthought, however, further speculation may well slightly modify this account of the relationship between Shanghai, radical politics, and the national scene. Shanghai is China's largest urban complex, has the greatest concentrations of intellectuals and what may be described as ‘middle-class’ (or more accurately ‘pro-

Table 5.1. *Non-policy-oriented cleavages in Chinese politics, 1969-76*
 Politburo Members 1969-76, in terms of experiences during 1966-8

		Radical			Moderate		
		Outside party-state system, 1965	Inside party-state system, 1965				
			Gained in power 1966-8	Maintained position 1966-8	Purged 1966-8		
Radical	Initiators of GPCR	(Wang Hung-wen) 1976 (Yao Wen-yuan) 1976 (Yeh Chun) 1971 (Chiang Ch'ing) 1976	(Chang Ch'un-ch'iao) 1974 (Hsieh Fu-chih) 1972 (Li Hsueh-feng) 1970 Wang Tung-hsing	(Chen Po-ta) 1970 (Tung Pi-wu) 1975 (Kang Sheng) 1975 (Chou En-lai) 1976 (Chu Te) 1976 (Mao Tse-tung) 1976			
		PLA	(Lin Piao) 1971	Yeh Chien-ying			
Moderate	Non-initiators of GPCR	Li Te-sheng (Chiu Hui-tso) 1971 (Wu Fa-hsien) 1971 (Li Tso-peng) 1971		Liu Po-ch'eng	Su Chen-hua		
		Civilian	Chen Yung-kuei Ni Chih-fu Wu Kuei-hsien	Chi Teng-kuei Wu Te Hua Kuo-feng	Saifudin Wei Kuo-ch'ing Li Hsien-nien	(Teng Hsiao-p'ing) 1976	
		PLA centre		Chen Hsi-lien Hsu Shih-yu (Huang Yung-sheng) 1971			

Note: (Xxx Xxx-xxx) 197-: purged/died and year

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Table 5.2. *Shanghai's leadership, 1969-76*

Name	Post-GPCR position	Pre-GPCR experience
Chang Ch'un-ch'iao	First secretary Chairman	Deputy secretary, Shanghai
Yao Wen-yuan	Second secretary Vice-chairman	Journalist in Shanghai
Wang Hung-wen	Secretary Vice-chairman	*Security cadre, Shanghai No. 17 Cotton Textile Mill
Chou Chun-lin	Secretary Vice-chairman Commander, Garrison District	With PLA, Nanking
Wang Hsiu-chen	Secretary Vice-chairman	*Worker at Shanghai No. 30 Cotton Mill
Ma T'ien-shui	Secretary Vice-chairman	Secretary, Shanghai
Hsü Ching-hsien	Secretary Vice-chairman	Low-level cadre in Shanghai municipal administration
Wang Shao-yung	Vice-chairman	Secretary, Shanghai
Kao Chih-jung	Vice-chairman	PLA Navy, Shanghai
Liu Yao-tsung	Vice-chairman	PLA, Shanghai
Chou Lin-ken	Vice-chairman	
Wang Yi-ping	Vice-chairman	
Chen Kan-feng	Vice-chairman	Student, Tungchi University
Yang Fu-chen	Vice-chairman	*Model worker, Shanghai No. 1 Cotton Textile Mill
Wu Chuan-kuei	Vice-chairman	
Chou Li-chin	Vice-chairman	
Feng Kuo-chu	Vice-chairman	Low-level cadre in Shanghai Municipal administration
Chin Tzu-min	Vice-chairman	*Worker, Shanghai Electrical Factory

*Indicates leading member of Shanghai Revolutionary Rebel Workers General Headquarters during the GPCR.

fessionals and middle-management'), has laid greater emphasis on youth for similar reasons, and has a high level of economic development. As we have seen, it has been radical throughout the 1970s. This has meant, particularly when compared to the moderate position, that it has stressed policies concerned more with the urban areas than the rural, the proletariat and intellectuals than the peasantry. In a very general sense the radical position is concerned with the problems of a more advanced 'socialist' society – such as wage differentials and 'bourgeois right' – than is the moderate. Moreover, the most extreme radical position is also the most expressivist. This too can be associated

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(perhaps more vaguely) with Shanghai, in terms of the general relationship between the urban, middle-class, intellectual young and the tendency to protest and espouse 'radical chic'. It is a relationship long speculated about since 1968 and recently supported by research findings, although admittedly of Western liberal democracies.¹⁰² Shanghai clearly was fertile ground for the Gang of Four. It is after all difficult to imagine that Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Yao Wen-yuan, and Wang Hung-wen – two journalist-propagandists, a workers' leader (and an ex-actress, Chiang Ch'ing) – would achieve such prominence together in any of China's other provincial-level administrations.

Nonetheless, this speculation does not detract from the conclusion that it was the Gang of Four who created Shanghai's role in national politics during the early 1970s and not vice versa. The Shanghai Connection in the first half of the 1970s was an aspect of intra-elite conflict and not an example of a wider pluralism.

PART THREE
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND
LIVING-STANDARDS

6

INDUSTRIALIZATION UNDER
CONDITIONS OF LONG-RUN
POPULATION STABILITY:
SHANGHAI'S ACHIEVEMENT
AND PROSPECT

Christopher Howe

INTRODUCTION

The history of Shanghai's industrialization since 1949 has two particularly interesting aspects. On the one hand it is an important and still imperfectly understood part of China's overall economic development; on the other, it is a story of comparative interest for those concerned generally with the relationship between urbanization and industrial growth and the role of large cities in poor countries.

With regard to the first, it is widely known that Shanghai is China's largest industrial city, and many are also aware of work emphasizing that, in some senses, Shanghai is 'exploited' by the rest of the Chinese economy. Quite why, in spite of policies to change the spatial distribution of industry, Shanghai still accounts for such a large share of China's industrial output, and how much and by what mechanisms Shanghai contributes to China's financial and economic development are, however, still far from clear. In the course of this essay I hope to throw some further light on both these points.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND LIVING-STANDARDS

Turning to the general theme, our starting point is the observation that since the end of the Second World War the speed and economic characteristics of urbanization have differed from those illustrated in the experience of the early and second generation industrializers. First, the pace of urbanization has become very rapid. Whatever cut-off point is taken to define 'urban' (i.e. concentrations of 20,000, 50,000 or 100,000 persons), the rate of increase of urban population is usually in the range of 4%–6% per annum. This rate is frequently double the rate of growth of population as a whole and is not, as frequently believed, the result of an uncontrolled flood of migration into urban areas. Migration has been important (as it was in earlier urbanizations), but the problem now is that migration has been reinforced by high natural rates of growth of population – frequently of the order of 3% per annum. This is in sharp contrast to the demographic patterns found, for example, in early nineteenth-century England or late-nineteenth-century Japan, where lack of urban infrastructure led to rates of mortality that frequently matched or even exceeded fertility. Thus one could almost reverse the conventional wisdom and argue that it was the early industrial city in which migration was the main growth factor, while in contemporary industrializers it is the high natural rate of growth that is the main problem.

Another aspect of recent urban growth is the tendency for the larger cities – particularly cities of half a million or more in size – to grow particularly rapidly. And in many countries growth is especially spectacular in *one* primate city – usually the capital. This has given rise to images of a future in which whole populations are progressively incorporated in a small number of agglomerations of enormous size.

One reason why these trends have given rise to serious anxieties among scholars and policy makers is that the speed of urbanization appears to have exceeded the growth of modern sector – particularly industrial – employment. Urban growth is thus associated with highly visible poverty, and with the expansion of 'marginal', low-productivity, irregular work. Although these phenomena were present in earlier urbanizations, their role in emphasizing indigenous inequalities and comparison with standards in the advanced economies makes them less acceptable and hence more socially and politically destabilizing than used to be the case. This excessive urban growth has given rise to the suggestion that cities are becoming 'parasitical', i.e. that they absorb for non-productive use human and capital resources needed for investment that will raise incomes and contribute to desirable development, and that, in sum, many developing countries are 'over-urbanized'.¹

INDUSTRIALIZATION AND POPULATION STABILITY

Apart from these broad issues, the economic analysis of urban growth has two further major objectives. One is to explore the economic significance of the colonial origins of many urban systems. This type of analysis frequently leads to the conclusion that the abolition of the colonial political order has left an urban structure inappropriate, in that former relationships with the outside world produced a bias in urban development towards centres of government, coastal regions, and centres of raw material extraction. The policy outcome of this type of argument is that new urban centres should be established – frequently in inland locations.

The second subject is the problem of city size. This has been an interesting field of inquiry because, while there has been a presumption that large cities are 'uneconomic', analysts have had to face the fact that such cities continue to grow – frequently at rates above those found in smaller cities. This is even true of the Soviet Union, which has for years had a policy of avoiding urban 'gigantism' while tolerating the relentless growth of large cities, particularly Moscow. Various explanations have been offered for what, given the premise, is an economic paradox. One is that if industry is partly or wholly privately owned, then growth occurs because industrialists enjoy the *benefits* of locating industry in large cities while many of the *costs* (e.g. public facilities and housing) fall on the public or on the government. The implication of this view is that government fiscal policy should change the incidence of costs to change the spatial incentives to investment, or should control investment directly by licences or other planning instruments. Alternatively, some scholars have pointed to evidence that lack of managerial skills and shortage of information make it impossible for private sector leadership to reach rational decisions on location, and that they therefore tend to become geographically inert or to locate close to governmental power, the advantages of which are very obvious.

Recent research, however, has suggested that large cities may not be as 'uneconomic' as has been thought. This is a difficult topic to explore satisfactorily, since many of the benefits generated by large cities are necessarily described in nebulous terms. In spite of this, some effort is now being devoted to looking very closely at the relationship between city size and industrial costs. The latter may be considered in two categories: 'public' costs (i.e. costs of government services and urban infrastructure including roads and public utilities), and direct industrial costs of all kinds. Unfortunately, the data needed for these measurements are rarely available in developing countries, and indeed,

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systematic economic data for individual cities are rare in general. Nonetheless, some studies have been undertaken on public costs in Germany, Japan, and the United States. The results vary slightly, but mostly suggest that unit costs do indeed appear to reach a minimum in cities of between 200,000 and 500,000 people, and then begin to increase modestly. Work on total industrial costs is extremely rare, but an exceptionally important study undertaken by Morse for the Stanford Research Institute in India found little evidence that costs rose with urban size after the lowest point in the cost curve had been reached in cities of 200,000–300,000.

On their own these cost data, which refer to 'inputs', lead to no decisive policy position; they must be considered in conjunction with data on productivity and incomes which are the relevant 'outputs'. And on this score, even in such diverse economies as Japan, the United States, and the USSR, the evidence suggests that the highest productivity and incomes are found in the largest cities and that this phenomenon is so pronounced that the slight apparent upturn in costs associated with larger cities is unimportant. Quite why it is that large cities generate high productivity and incomes is uncertain. As a supplier to itself and to adjacent markets the large city, like the large country, can of course usually justify the largest scale of operation in production; it generates productive and efficient inter-industry relationships, and, if large enough, can also offer such crucial services as airports, communications and media networks, institutions of higher education, and a mass of ancillary financial and related services.²

Another advantage of the large city is the scale of its labour market. From such a market, the innovative and expanding employer can recruit staff of any skill and experience level, and can hire, on an *ad hoc* basis, skills for which his demand is real, but limited in the early stages of growth. The labour market also provides the mechanism by which, as new high-pay industries arise, the city sheds its low-paid industries to small towns. So crucial are these phenomena that one analyst has said that, from an economist's viewpoint, the labour market *is* the city.³

It is in the context of these controversies and of this modern industrial and demographic history that Shanghai is so interesting. For it provides a case study of the economic implications of an attempt, by a revolutionary socialist government, to bring about substantial changes in the national urban structure and in the location of economic activity. Success in this required control, even suppression, of the development of its largest city; a city oriented to foreign trade, shaped

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by hostile colonial forces, yet rich by Chinese standards and containing a large share of the skills needed for the economic development of China. The successive answers to the problems raised by this policy are the core of this paper.⁴

PERFORMANCE AND CONTRIBUTION TO THE NATIONAL ECONOMY: 1949-57

The Shanghai economy of which the Communist Party found itself in control had long played a large role in the modern sector of China's economy. Accounting for 1% of total and about 9% of the urban population, the city in 1949 was producing a fifth of the nation's industrial output and, according to one estimate, contained a third of the nation's industrial capital equipment.⁵ The gap between the city's shares of capital equipment and output suggests that at the time of the takeover, the general disarray into which industry had fallen was particularly severe in Shanghai. This was indeed the case. General dislocation of distribution and raw materials supply and the effects of hyper-inflation were important factors in the situation. They were compounded by problems specific to the city. For example, Shanghai was the centre of the textile industry, which had been operating below capacity for several years as a result partly of acute raw material supply difficulties, and partly of the authorities' determination to keep the foreign exchange rate at a level that made Chinese textile exports uncompetitive.⁶ Shanghai as a financial as well as an industrial centre also suffered particularly badly from the outflow of funds and entrepreneurs who moved themselves and their businesses abroad, notably to Hong Kong where they became the foundation of the Colony's post-war industrial development. The problems created as a result of successive political, exchange rate, fiscal and monetary shocks led one Shanghai writer to describe the economy as being 'like a ball spinning with the wheel but never seeming to stop at the desired number'.⁷

This low level of initial activity explains the extraordinarily high rates of industrial growth illustrated by the data in Tables 6.1 and 6.2, which are our starting point for the evaluation of the city's economic performance between 1949 and 1957. Table 6.1 is an index of the rate of growth of the Gross Value of Industrial Output from 1949 to 1977. In Table 6.2, growth rates for significant sub-periods and for the long-term trend (1952-77) are shown and compared with national data. The sub-periods with which we are immediately concerned are those of

Table 6.1. *Index of gross value of industrial output 1949–77*

Year	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963
Index	100	102	160	195	268	286	275	372	389	584	837	[850]	[541]	[555]	[627]
% increase on previous year		+2	+57	+22	+37	+7	-3	+35	+5	+50	+43	[+2]	[-36]	[+3]	[+13]
Year	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	
Index	658	824	947	[947]	1007	1158	1329	1460	1576	1701	1803	1910	1931	2097	
% increase on previous year		+5	+25	+15	[0]	+11	+15	+15	+10	+8	+8	+6	+6	+1	+9

Notes and sources

Square brackets denote that estimates for year to year change are based partly on qualitative statements and are therefore subject to substantial error.

For the years available, I have used the *yuan* index (based on 1957 prices) estimated in National Foreign Assessment Center, *China: Gross Value of Industrial Output, 1966–77* (Washington, 1978), pp. 50–1. I have interpolated estimates based on Chinese data for the eight years in the 1950s not included in this series. In addition, by use of fragmentary data and by interpretation of statements about current levels of plan fulfilment and industrial production that appeared in the Shanghai press, I have made crude estimates for 1960–3.

1949–54 P'an Han-nien, 'Shanghai's achievements in finance and economic work during the past five years', *HHPTK*, 1955, 4, pp. 96–9.

1955 *HWJP*, 28 Aug. 1957.

1956 *HWJP*, 28 Aug. 1957.

1958 *WHP*, 14 June 1959.

1959 *CFJP*, 18 May 1960.

1960 A favourable report appeared in *CFJP*, 18 Oct. 1960. But in the final quarter, the agricultural downturn must have had repercussions on light industry in particular, although no report implies that output fell below 1959.

1961–3 *ACNA*, 23 Feb. 1972; *CFJP*, 1 Dec. 1961; *CFJP*, 30 Sept. 1962; *CFJP*, 25 July 1963; *CFJP*, 17 Aug. 1963; *CFJP*, 1 Oct. 1963; *CFJP*, 8 Dec. 1963; and *CFJP*, 16 Dec. 1963.

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Table 6.2. *Rates of growth of gross value of industrial output 1949–77, Shanghai and national data compared*

	Shanghai (% p.a.)	National (% p.a.)	Significance
1949–52	24.9	34.81	Post-war recovery
1952–57	14.81	17.94	<i>First Five Year Plan</i>
1957–65	9.84	8.90	Pre-Cultural Revolution recovery from Great Leap
1965–70	10.03	11.70	Cultural Revolution
1970–77	6.73	8.77	Post Cultural Revolution
1957–77	8.79	9.55	Long-run post- <i>First Plan</i> period
1952–77	9.97	11.25	Long-run trend

Sources: As Table 6.1.

1949–52, which is commonly regarded as the period of post-war recovery; and the period 1953–7, that of the *First Five Year Plan*. The trend data in Table 6.2 show extremely rapid growth of 24.9% per annum for the earlier period followed by growth of 14.81% per annum during the *Plan*. Both of these Shanghai rates are below the national rates and this is reflected in Shanghai's falling share of total industrial output (Table 6.3). Nonetheless, even the slower rate of the *First Plan* was well above the long-run rate of just under 10% per annum achieved in the city over the whole period 1952 to 1977.

In the years up to 1957 radical change occurred in the structure of Shanghai's industry. In 1949, the heavy sector accounted for 13.6% of output and textiles 62.4%. By 1957, the heavy sector had nearly tripled its share while that of textiles had nearly halved (Table 6.4). In fact, contrary to the impression given by post-Leap literature, the structure of industry changed more rapidly between 1949 and 1957 than in any other period. Since 1959, change as measured by the share of heavy industry has been small (Table 6.5).

In Table 6.6 we may inspect the employment dimension of these

Table 6.3. *Shanghai's share of national gross value of industrial output, selected years 1949–77*

1949	1952	1957	1965	1970	1977
21%	19%	16%	17%	16%	14%

Source: Derived from data in National Foreign Assessment Center, *China: Gross Value of Industrial Output, 1965–77*.

Table 6.4. Shares of heavy, light, and textile industries in total gross value of industrial output, various years 1949–1970s (%)

	1949	1957	1958	1959	1962	1975/1976
Heavy industry	13.6	36.5	45.6	52.5	50	53.4
Light industry	24.0	26.9	21.9	20.7	50	46.6
Textile industry	62.4	36.6	32.5	26.8	50	46.6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Note: There are dozens of references to the relative shares of the three sectors in total output. Many of these claims unfortunately conflict, sometimes because of revisions, sometimes, presumably, because different prices have been used. It is therefore important that as far as possible we use data from either single or closely related documents that link several years together.

Sources: *WHP*, 14 June 1959; *CFJP*, 18 May 1960; *PR*, 1964, 41, p. 20; *PR*, 1975, 3, pp. 11–12; *PR*, 1978, 4, p. 11; *SWB*, 23 Feb. 1976; and *NCNA*, 11 Dec. 1977.

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Table 6.5. *Rates of growth of industrial sectors 1949-73 (%)*

	1949-59	1959-73
Heavy industry	41.69	6.25
Light industry	22.03	4.83
Textile industry	14.07	2.37

Sources: As Table 6.4.

Table 6.6. *Population and employment, various years 1949-1970s*
(millions)

	1949	1952	1955	1956	1957	1958	1970s
Total urban population	5	5.9	6.5	6.75	7.2	—	5.7 } 6.25 }
Total employment	2.185	—	2.57	2.71	2.418	2.82	2.9
Industrial workers and staff	0.508	0.51	—	—	0.77	0.97	1.5/1.8
Employment in small-scale production	—	—	—	—	—	0.5	0.35/0.5
Total workers and staff	0.5+	—	—	1.7	1.78	2.66	2.6(?)
Employment as % of total urban population	44	—	40	40	34	—	51 } 45 }

Notes:

Population The data for 1949-57 are (with the exception of the 1952 interpolation) year-end estimates based on Chinese reports. The 1953 (mid-year) census figure for Shanghai was 6.2 million. The figure of 5.7 million is widely reported in the early 1970s (i.e. 1971-6). The figure of 6.25 million is based on an important Japanese report that quoted populations for both the core urban area and for the townships and satellites in the suburban counties. An exhaustive listing of 1970s data for the urban core is in Judith Banister, 'Mortality, fertility and contraceptive use in Shanghai', *CQ*, 1977, 70, pp. 255-314.

Total employment The data for total employment are largely based on estimates in Christopher Howe, *Employment and Economic Growth in Urban China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), chapter 2. The figure of 2.9 million is my interpretation of the 'nearly three million' frequently referred to in the sources. In estimating the percentage of the population in employment for the 1950s, I have simply divided line 2 by line 1. However, for the 1970s, I believe the 'nearly three million' may include employment in the county townships and satellites in which new industry is growing. I have therefore had to use the larger inclusive population figures quoted in line 1 to indicate the range of possibilities.

Industrial workers and staff Figures for the 1970s vary and the two quoted illustrate the probable range.

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Table 6.6 (cont.)

Employment in small-scale production Data for 1949–57 are described in Howe (1971). Post-1958 data are those for production organized at lane and neighbourhood levels. This employment is almost entirely female and, in 1958–60, was reported to total half a million. It is difficult to compare these data with earlier figures, and the quality of and definitions of 1970s data are not clear. Nonetheless, what we have suggests that this type of employment is below the peaks touched in the Great Leap by a significant margin.

Total workers and staff Data on this category are conflicting. Some reports imply about 1.6 million, others quote a figure of 2.6 million. I have quoted the latter.

Sources:

Population

1949 and 1955	<i>CFJP</i> , 31 July 1955. <i>HWJP</i> , 10 Aug. 1955.
1956	<i>CFJP</i> , 10 March 1957.
1957	<i>WHP</i> , 7 Jan. 1958.
1970s	<i>Jin-min chū-goku</i> , 1974, 10, p. 33. <i>SWB</i> , 8 Jan. 1976.

Total employment

1949 and 1957	Howe (1971), p. 39.
1955	<i>CFJP</i> , 31 July 1955.
1956	<i>WHP</i> , 2 Sept. 1957.
1958	<i>WHP</i> , 14 June 1959.
1972	<i>NCNA</i> , 24 Dec. 1973.

Industrial workers and staff

1949	<i>HWJP</i> , 8 Aug. 1956.
1952	<i>HWJP</i> , 28 Dec. 1957.
1956	<i>CFJP</i> , 11 Aug. 1956.
1957	<i>HWJP</i> , 28 Dec. 1957.
1958	<i>WHP</i> , 14 June 1959; <i>Chung-kuo ch'eng-shih ti-li tzu-liao hsüan-chi</i> , pp. 75–8, and <i>HHPYK</i> , 1959, 6, pp. 52–3.
1972–3	<i>Jin-min chū-goku</i> , 1974, 10, p. 33, and <i>NCNA</i> , 27 Sept. 1972.

Employment in small scale production

1958–60	<i>CFJP</i> , 18 May 1960; <i>NCNA</i> , 28 Feb. 1960; <i>NCNA</i> , 25 May 1960; and <i>NCNA</i> , 6 March 1961.
1970s	<i>NCNA</i> , 23 Feb. 1972; and <i>NCNA</i> , 24 March, 1975; and <i>CR</i> , 1975, 10, p. 9.

Total workers and staff

1949, 1956, 1957	<i>WHP</i> , 2 Sept. 1957.
1958	<i>NCNA</i> , 6 March 1961.
1970s	Visitors' Reports and <i>CR</i> , 1972, 7, p. 16.

developments. The Table includes data for urban population and three significant segments of the employed work force: total employment, wage-earning employment in industry, and wage-earning employment in all sectors. It will be seen that between 1949 and 1957 total employment grew at 1.27% per annum, while modern industrial employment grew at 5.34% per annum. The figure for total employment must be related to population growth of 4.66%. The nature of

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this growth will be discussed below, but we may observe at once that the proportion of the population in employment is estimated to have dropped by a quarter, with a momentary upturn in 1956. The exact implications of this for unemployment depend upon the age/sex structure of the population, but clearly, the proportion of dependants to workers in the population was growing.

The data on factory employment are interesting since not only do they reveal considerable growth, but in conjunction with the Gross Value of Industrial Output data, we may calculate that worker productivity increased considerably. Indeed, between 1949 and 1957 it approximately tripled, growing at an annual rate of 12.5%.

The full significance of the output and employment data are only revealed in relation to data on the growth of capital stock in industry. Unfortunately the sources on this topic conflict – although it is clear that investment in Shanghai was on a scale far below that found in other industrial areas of China.⁸

The data on capital are of three kinds:

- (1) capital: output ratios,
- (2) statements relating the scale of investment in Shanghai to various national investment data that are known,
- (3) various statements about industrial investment between 1950 and 1958 from which investment between 1952 and 1957 can be calculated.

Statements in category (2) tend to be very consistent in their various forms. The greatest difficulty is that of reconciling crucial data on the capital: output ratio (from which capital may be estimated from known values of output at 1952 prices) with one particular statement to the effect that the capital stock increased by 57% between 1952 and 1958. The estimates based on the capital: output ratio suggest growth of capital of 1.55% per annum compared to growth of 4.49% deduced from the figure of a 57% increase in 1957–8. Two explanations, however, are available to explain these differences. One, is that the data showing the larger increase ignore depreciation. The other is that these data ignore the capital 'exported' from Shanghai, in particular the eighty textile mills transported to other cities. I am inclined to think that the depreciation factor is the important one and indeed, if this is the case, all the reported figures for investment and the capital stock can be reconciled if a depreciation rate of 3.3% is applied to the series obtained by the use of the figure of a 57% increase between 1952 and 1958.

Table 6.7. *Budgetary revenues and expenditures in Shanghai: 1953–1960*
(Millions of Yuan)

	1953		1954		1955		1956		1957		1958		1959		1960	
	Result	Plan Result	Plan Result	Plan Result	Plan Result	Plan Result	Plan Result	Plan Result	Plan Result	Plan Result	Plan Result	Plan Result	Plan Result	Plan Result	Plan Result	Plan Increase
1. Total income ('Revenue collected for state')	1,125	—	2,705	—	3,237	—	4,154	—	4,779	5,963	7,500	(9,472)	(10,837)	(14,531)		+34%
2. 'Local income'	124	280	298	338	305	348	350	370	463	1,154	1,492					
3. Income from enterprises in local income	—	70	72	101	107	161	164	244	304	866	1,234	4,859			7,908	
4. Contribution to the centre	1,003	—	241	(72)	3,049	—	3,869	—	4,399	4,811	6,245	(7,954)	(9,178)	(12,487)	6,850	+37%
5. Local expenditure	154	244	219	215	188	265	285	369	380	1,152	1,255	1,518	1,659	2,044		+29%
Items of local expenditure:																
6. I Expenditure on economic construction:																
7. a. Expenditure on industry	—	100	79	50	41	93	103	160	180	910	1,019	652	896	1,022		+14%
8. b. Basic construction investment	16	—	60	—	46	120	92	125	137	720	850	599	851	1,024		+20%
9. c. Basic construction investment in industry	—	—	15	—	—	—	48	52	74	540	660	380	—	—		
10. d. Expenditure on agriculture	—	—	4	—	5	10	—	7	—	—	—	30	24	70		+192%
11. II Social, cultural, educational expenditures	—	74	71	80	68	100	105	133	142	169	171	242	208	376		
12. III IV Administration and other expenditures	—	70	69	85	79	70	77	70	66	62	65	92	90	90		+0%
13. Circulating capital 1954–5, Loans post 1958	—	17	17	17	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	536	465	555		+19%
14. Central expenditure: All departments	—	—	—	—	400+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		
15. Central expenditure: basic construction investment	193	—	193	—	184	—	175	216	243	60	150	—	—	379	162	
16. Surplus/deficit on local budget	—	—	+51	+34	+45	0	+1	0	+83	0	+130	0	+156	0		

Notes:

- This table has been constructed from data in the Shanghai budgets, economic plans, and work reports for 1954–60. Most of the data are as reported, others are derived by direct implication. Data on investment expenditures (lines 7–9 and 15) are in several cases based on plan and work reports rather than budgets. Unfortunately data available are by no means perfectly consistent – for example, percentage changes reported for an item frequently differ from directly reported totals. In general, discrepancies are small, although capital construction data (particularly those for 1957) provide several unsatisfactory examples of contradictory sources.
- In 1959 there were important changes in budgetary practice and accounting and, in addition, ten rural counties were added to the municipality. This affects comparability of data shown in lines 1, 3 and 4. A particular problem is that 1959 and 1960 budgets do not include a figure for gross income accruing to the state in Shanghai comparable to earlier data. The data in brackets adjust the newly defined totals to make them consistent with earlier figures.
- Line 1, *total income*, represents the gross fiscal revenue accruing to the state in Shanghai, i.e. it covers 'local' and 'central' income, including revenue from railways, customs, bond sales etc.
- Line 2, *local income*, is revenue made up of (a) revenue from sources allocated exclusively to the municipality and (b) the municipality's share of revenue divided with the central authorities. In each year, local income includes the surplus brought forward from the previous year and for 1954 and 1955 it also includes small allocations of working capital routed through local budgets.
- Line 4, *contribution to the centre*, is total income minus local expenditures. Figures in brackets for 1954 and 1955 are payments to the centre from 'local income' alone.
- Line 5, *local expenditure*, is divided into four categories: (I) economic construction, (II) social/cultural/welfare, (III) administration, and (IV) other. For each year the items under these four categories are shown to equal total local expenditure, although in the actual budget reports (e.g. 1954–5) they do not always do so since small sums of working capital and contributions to the centre were described as local expenditure. Within (I), three easily confused categories are shown separately in lines 7–9. Total expenditure on economic construction and industry includes working capital and expenses excluded from investment data. The difference between total and industrial investment is mainly investment in housing and urban utilities. In the early years, expenditure on utilities was almost the only capital expenditure allowed, and this was justified in terms of industrial needs.
- Line 13 refers to the change in practice in 1959, as a result of which all working capital was to be supplied by the People's Bank, through local budgets. It also reflects agreed local provision for budgetary reserves.
- Line 14, *total central expenditure*, refers to investment expenditure by centrally controlled enterprises and to other expenditure on social, cultural, and educational activity (category II) made by various central agencies in Shanghai. Unfortunately this rare figure is only available for 1955 and even for that year is described as 'incomplete'.
- Line 15, *central basic construction investment*, represents investment outlays by central enterprises in Shanghai; this figure includes expenditures in plant and items such as workers' housing – it is therefore equivalent to local basic construction investment in line 8.
- The evolution of the budgetary system is best described in Nicholas R. Lardy, *Economic Growth and Distribution in China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).

Sources:

- Budget forecasts and results: 1954–6 in *CFJP*, 26 Dec. 1955; *HWJP*, 9 Aug. 1956; 1956–7 in *HWJP*, 28 Aug. 1957; 1957–8 in *CFJP*, 7 Nov. 1958; 1958–9 in *CFJP*, 14 June 1959 (*SCMP*, 2061); 1959–60 in *CFJP*, 18 May 1960 (*SCMP*, 2291).
- Plans, results and work reports: *CFJP*, 28 Aug. 1957; *CFJP*, 11 Aug. 1956; *CFJP*, 7 Nov. 1958; *WHP*, 14 June 1959 (*SCMP*, 2057); *CFJP*, 18 May 1960 (*SCMP*, 2296), and *HWJP*, 1 Jan. 1959.

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In whatever way the data problem is handled, a basic point remains: the marginal productivity of investment in Shanghai was extremely high. Comparing gross with gross, it is certain that while Shanghai contributed more than 14% to the total increase of Gross Value of Industrial Output during the *First Five Year Plan*, investment in Shanghai (industrial or total) was not more than 1% to 2% of national investment in any comparable category.

These figures are the most striking measurement of Shanghai's 'contribution' to the national economy during the *First Five Year Plan*. They are, however, by no means the only ones. Another is the sum of profits and taxes – 'accumulation' – remitted through the budgetary systems for the financing of the *Plan* in other cities and regions. This sum is reported to have been 16,000 million *yuan* (Table 6.7): more than sixteen times the total central basic construction investment in Shanghai and thirty-two times central industrial investment. From the national viewpoint, this sum was sufficient to finance 64% of *all* the basic construction investment planned for industry throughout China during the *Plan* period.⁹

Finally, in addition to this financial contribution, Shanghai directly exported fixed and human capital to other parts of China. The extent of fixed capital exports is not known (apart from references to the 'eighty' textile factories). Of human resources, it was reported that between 1950 and 1957, 258,000 workers were assigned to employment in other cities; of these, 69,000 were skilled workers or cadres with managerial skills. Most of these will have been in industrial work and the sacrifice involved in this contribution can be judged by comparing these figures with the size of the local industrial labour force in Shanghai, which was approximately 800,000 at the end of the *Plan* period.¹⁰

POLICY IN AND TOWARDS SHANGHAI 1949-57

This analysis, based as it is on statistical materials, conceals almost more than it reveals. It suggests a *pattern* of growth: a pattern consistent with a role assigned to Shanghai by the central political authorities. Actually this was far from being the case. The evolution of policy at national and local levels was at first far more random than this, and the pattern fluctuated violently from year to year. Between 1949 and 1952, the Shanghai economy went through a series of convulsive upheavals. At the outset, the private, capitalist sector of the city was

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paralysed by uncertainty and other factors. Indeed, immediately after the takeover less than half the city's private manufacturing units were functioning, and since the sector accounted for four-fifths of Shanghai's industrial capacity, their revival and growth were essential. At first this revival was promoted under the banner of Mao's theory of New Democracy. This strategy had been evolved by Mao before the capture of power and it envisaged a long transitional period during which the private sector would be tolerated and even encouraged, to be followed ultimately by peaceful absorption into the public sector.¹¹ In pursuit of this policy the East China and Shanghai authorities took a number of practical measures. Banks, for example, were instructed to support the private sector, and the Party imposed new rules and procedures that ended a period of anarchic confusion in industrial relations. Then, in June 1950, Mao made a speech in which he affirmed the New Democracy policies and called for a three- to five-year period of recovery before serious socialist planning could begin. This speech had a powerful impact in Shanghai and contributed to an upsurge of confidence and activity. Unemployment dropped rapidly and the price inflation inherited from the late 1940s subsided. Expansion in the private sector was exceptionally fast and industrial output in the first six months of 1951 rose to double the level achieved in 1950. This boom was abruptly terminated by two political movements: the Three Antis and Five Antis campaigns. The former was a movement aimed at corruption in the bureaucracy while the latter was directed at abuses and alleged crimes in private industry and commerce. The Five Antis (that got under way in the spring of 1952) totally undermined confidence and crippled economic activity of almost every kind. So severe was the downturn initiated by these movements that by mid-1952 a new movement was launched to start the economy moving again and, by the end of 1952, with the economy at full capacity, it was necessary to decide what role Shanghai was to play in the developments specified in China's *First Five Year Plan* for 1953-7.

The precise role assigned to Shanghai in the unpublished *drafts* of the *First Plan* is unknown. However the events of 1952 and 1953 make it clear that the policy of restricting Shanghai's growth, and of treating the city as a source of funds and human capital, was already being formed and was already being resisted. The fundamental reason for taking a negative, extractionist view of Shanghai, was that the Party (and Mao in particular) had adopted the view that an economic strategy that permitted the private sector an active role in China's

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development was incorrect. Thus a major object of the *Plan* as described in documents published in 1953 and 1954, and as revealed in the *Plan* when finally published in 1955, was to build up large-scale public industry to a point where it could dominate private industry. The private sector was to be 'reformed, controlled and restricted'. In an article published in Shanghai in 1953, socialist industry was described as 'a little island in a big sea', and in Shanghai this was the case.¹² In 1953 the private sector still accounted for more than 63% of Shanghai's output, and in 1955 Shanghai's position was reflected in the fact that it still accounted for 50% of the nation's private sector output. All this was as important in determining the limited role assigned to the city in the *Plan* as the often quoted policy of shifting the location of industry away from Treaty Ports towards inland areas.¹³

Discouraging as these policies must have been to the Shanghai population, from the very beginning there was resistance to them. For example, in 1953 to 1955 (as in every year of the *Plan*), Shanghai public sector output exceeded the *Plan* targets.¹⁴ Second, at the micro-level, there is much interesting evidence of refusals by enterprises and local planning authorities to comply with central directives allocating their skilled workers to other cities.¹⁵ Indeed, in 1953, recruitment teams from the Shanghai shipyards were making clandestine expeditions to look for skilled workers in other cities.¹⁶ Nonetheless, as the *Plan* progressed, control of the private sector and of the allocation of resources tightened, and the state's policy of suppressing capital investment in Shanghai and of expanding industry in inland areas was implemented. It was impossible to build, it was believed, on a foundation that was 'split, chaotic, abnormal, harmful, old-fashioned and unbalanced'.

By 1955 the economy of Shanghai had moved into a position of crisis. Three problems were exceptionally serious. First, the national campaign against the private sector had disproportionately damaging effects in Shanghai, since, as noted, the private sector's share of output was far above average. Second, the city's concentration in textile and consumer goods made output heavily dependent on agriculture. In 1954 agriculture performed badly, thereby depressing output in the textiles, tobacco, vegetable oil and food processing industries. The net effect of this was to cause industrial output in 1955 to fall by 3% (Table 6.1).

This industrial depression was reinforced by a depression in the traditional commerce and service sectors. These were very labour-

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intensive, and their decline under pressure from the socialist sector led to the loss of several hundred thousand jobs.

This decline in the demand for labour coincided with an expansion on the supply side, for the agricultural situation had stimulated an unprecedented inflow of migrants into the city. Between June 1953 and April 1955 the population increased from 6.2 million to 'over seven million'. Migrants accounted for more than half of this increase. Many of the migrants were job seekers and it is clear that whatever the precise demographic structure of the population in 1955, the creation of additional jobs equal to only 18% of the increase in population between 1949 and 1955, must have been inadequate. As a result of these developments, the publication of the *First Five Year Plan* in July 1955 was followed by a major 'sending down' campaign. This was aimed at securing an absolute reduction in the total population of one million and was described as 'completely in accordance with the *First Five Year Plan*'.¹⁷ Another contemporary article stated:

From now on we must endlessly mobilize and encourage large numbers of Shanghai people to go to participate in agricultural and industrial production, and in construction, in areas outside Shanghai.¹⁸

This approach to Shanghai's problems persisted through 1955 and into the spring of 1956. In January of that year, however, two important developments occurred, both of which may be regarded as prerequisites for the new policy of developing the seaboard cities announced later in the summer. First was the socialization of the private sector in January 1956. Like the socialization of agriculture, this took place at an unforeseen pace and had two implications for Shanghai. It transformed the possibilities for injecting capital into the city, since such capital could now be applied across the board rather than to the enterprises in the old public sector. Also, the incorporation into planning of the private sector with its thousands of small enterprises added to the pressure to decentralize control of the economy.¹⁹ Since Shanghai, even under central control, managed consistent over-fulfilment of plans, this development was bound to increase the scope for further expansionism initiated by the city leadership. Parallel to these developments was Chou's speech of January 1956 on *The Problem of Intellectuals*. This called for a political truce with the non-Party intelligentsia. These were particularly numerous in Shanghai where they constituted an under-utilized human asset capable of immense new contributions to the city's economy.

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In the spring of 1956 Mao completed the circle of policy reformation and urged that in the new socialist upsurge the policy of restricting Shanghai and the seaboard cities had to be revised. Despite publication of the *First Plan* (which still contained the definitive statement of the old policy) in July 1955, by August 1956 the new policy was being implemented. Shanghai Party Secretary K'o Ch'ing-shih made a major speech in that month in which he laid down a detailed blueprint for the future.²⁰ This included targets for the level and structure of industrial output by the end of the *Second* and *Third Five Year Plans* respectively. No one reading the press of these weeks can fail to be struck by the enthusiasm with which the new policy was greeted, and also by the orgy of self-criticism in which the Shanghai Party indulged as it beat its breast for its involvement in the old policies. This turning point was, in spite of all that followed, decisive. Chairman Mao himself was later to refer to 1949–56 as 'the seven years that were wasted', and many materials published in China in the 1970s omit all reference to the restrictive policy towards Shanghai as practised and justified from 1952 to 1955.

There were many reasons for this new constellation of policies of which two were exceptionally pressing. One was that the difficulties of securing a high national rate of industrial growth had proved greater than anticipated. We have few details of early drafts of the *First Plan*, but those we have confirm that the version of July 1955 was the result of successive scaling down of targets for investment in industrial output. Also, by 1956, it was becoming clear that resources would be needed for agriculture on a scale not anticipated in the early 1950s. The conclusion, therefore, was that the utilization of existing industrial and urban capital had to be as intensive as possible, and that, in future, more investment had to be allocated to regions where short-run marginal returns would be high. Shanghai's performance in the first three years of the *First Five Year Plan* had demonstrated the extraordinary returns that could be achieved in the city: returns that reflected the city's locational advantages, the availability of under-utilized capital, and of a whole range of complementary resources in the city.

These resources included the labour force, and this brings us to the second major reason for the new policy – the immobility of labour. In the early days of labour planning it was not foreseen that the transfer of labour between cities and regions would be more difficult than the transfer of physical or financial capital. But it was. In Shanghai's case this was partly because real wages were appreciably higher than

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elsewhere, and it had not proved possible to make substantial, rapid changes in these. Thus even when employment was scarce, it was rational for the unemployed to subsist in Shanghai, waiting for a job, rather than accept allocation to other areas.

In spite of over-fulfilling the *First Plan* by 35%, and of the favourable policy developments in 1956, the Shanghai economy by late 1957 still faced serious problems. The most important of these was shortage of capital, for although there were still references to the under-utilization of capital in the city, at many points in the economy the limits to the process of growth without investment of the kind that had occurred between 1949 and 1957 were being reached. The opportunities for increasing capital productivity in industry by minor repair and innovation, and by the intensification of shift working, had limits; and in some respects also, the 'slack' in the utilization of overhead urban capital was exhausted. Housing standards, for example, had declined sharply between 1949 and 1956 and were for many reaching intolerable levels.

The structure of industry was also a cause of concern. As we have seen, Shanghai's traditional strength lay in the textile and light industry sectors and these were still predominant in 1957. This had several important implications: it meant (a) that Shanghai's growth was bound to be slower than in cities in which the more favoured heavy industry was proportionately more important; (b) that industrial performance was likely to be relatively unstable because these industries depended significantly on agriculture for raw materials; (c) that the city was not achieving obvious complementarities by developing capital goods and materials supply industries; and (d) that there was inadequate development of industries based on advanced technology, such as the electronics and chemicals industries, in which the city's highly educated population could be expected to have a comparative advantage.

Both the natural deceleration of growth, and the need to further improve the industrial structure of the city, called for further investment. From the national point of view, the case for such investment was, as already argued, that the returns were likely to be high relative to those available elsewhere. From the Shanghai perspective, the need radically to accelerate the city's economic transformation was reinforced by a further deepening of the population and employment problem. As illustrated already, population growth between 1949 and 1957 was nearly four times as rapid as the rate of growth of total employment. Of this, two-thirds may be attributed to natural increase,

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the balance to migration.²¹ In terms of additions to the labour force, the contribution of migration was considerably larger. At first the impact of the gap between the expansion of the labour force and that of the capital stock had been mitigated by increasing shift work, by shortening working hours, by abolishing child employment, and by limiting the expansion of female employment. These measures were essentially once for all, and the latter in particular was very unpopular. Looking to the *Second Five Year Plan* (1958–62) as it was envisaged between mid-1956 and early 1958, the planners estimated that while additions to the labour force would be 100,000 per annum, and to the population (via natural increase) 200,000 per annum, industrial growth would not lead to any *net* expansion of employment. One reason for this was that the large increase of employment in 1956 had led to over-manning in many enterprises; another was that the growth of employment in the bureaucracy was to be restricted; another was that the labour employed in low productivity services and trades constituted a source of potential employees for the modern sector; and, finally, employment opportunities would continue to be limited by further growth of productivity of the existing employees – particularly in industry. As deputy mayor Hsü Ch'ien-kuo frankly put it:

The possibility of the present excess labour force and the newly growing labour force finding employment in this city, either now or within a fairly long period in the future, is not great.²²

As a first solution to these problems the planners proposed three groups of measures: strict control in migration through *hu k'ou* work; continuous 'sending down' to the countryside and to other cities of dependants, school graduates, and skilled workers and staff; and measures to limit natural population growth. In early 1958 it was reported that the crude rates of birth, death and natural increase were about 40, 11 and 29 per 1,000 respectively, and the planners suggested that dissemination of contraceptive techniques and the practice of later marriage could reduce the natural rate to below 2% by 1962.

These policies were not unique to Shanghai. They were part of a national 'small and medium' city policy which, according to one article, was based on the view that large cities were essentially a capitalist device to create labour markets in which the exploitation of wage labour was relatively easy, and that, in addition, urban costs were higher in large cities. Under the new policy it was proposed that cities up to 300,000 be 'generally developed'; that cities up to 700,000

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could have 'restricted development'; and that 'large' cities – especially those of one million or more – should be 'generally halted'.²³ Under this policy, the position of Shanghai was clear: its population was at least to be stabilized, at best reduced. Taken in conjunction with output plans for 1962 and 1967, we see that the city was called upon to achieve industrialization without urbanization.

SHANGHAI'S GREAT LEAP FORWARD

The Great Leap Forward provided Shanghai with an opportunity to accelerate the growth and structural transformation of its industry in an unprecedented way. To understand the rationale for this, and the mechanisms that made it possible, we must remind ourselves of three aspects of the Shanghai situation as it was emerging in the spring of 1958: (1) specific structural problems in the Shanghai economy that provided the local planners with obvious goals; (2) institutional and planning reforms that enabled the city to articulate these goals and to mobilize and commit resources to achieve them; and (3) Shanghai's economic and political policies as seen from the central, national perspective.²⁴ Let us look at each of these.

The structural transformation that had already occurred between 1949 and the end of the *Five Year Plan* in 1957 was considerable. As can be seen in Table 6.4, the heavy sector had increased its share of the Gross Value of Output from 13.6% to 36.5% while textiles had dropped from 62.4% to 36.6%. Although to some extent this reflected variations in utilization of capacity, the growth of the heavy sector (in particular of electrical generating) had been substantial. Nevertheless, as may be deduced from the low levels of investment, this had been brought about by policies that involved little new capital construction, i.e. mainly by increasing intensity in the utilization of the capital stock and by small investments in repair and partial modernization. This type of progress was bound to run into diminishing returns and, in any event, in 1955 and 1956 the planners became vividly aware of their dependence on external sources of supply for raw materials. By 1958 they had also perceived that, if they could strengthen the basic materials and metallurgical sectors, development of machine building would then provide them with a rounded economy from which excessive dependence could be eliminated. The materials problem in the form of a raw cotton shortage had, of course, been a constraint on the textile industry since the 1940s, and it had been particularly significant

in 1955. It was in the smaller 'Great Leap' of 1956, however, that lack of coal, wood, paper, pig iron, sheet steel and chemicals all became acute problems. So serious was this, that the plan for 1957 called for an unprecedented *reduction* in industrial output of 3.6% compared to the level achieved in 1956. Measures to improve the situation started at once, notably through investments in metallurgy and extraction in the provinces of Hunan, Kiangsi, Shantung and Fukien, all of which undertook to use the new facilities to supply the city.²⁵ This was only beginning, as the Leap was to show.

The institutional changes relevant to the Great Leap affected overall economic planning, the management of industry, and the fiscal system. The basic planning reforms followed from the handing down to local (provincial and municipal) control of many enterprises previously planned from the centre. Shanghai was particularly affected since textile and light industrial enterprises were the main groups to be handed down. At the same time, sub-central planners were given much wider powers to co-ordinate movements of raw materials and labour, and the enterprises themselves were also given increased authority *vis-à-vis* external planners of all kinds. It was anticipated that these changes would encourage local initiative and eliminate inflexibilities and other irrationalities inherent in the previous system under which there were two large sectors, one centrally and the other locally controlled, and large areas of confusion and lack of co-ordination between them.

The handing down of enterprises to the local levels also had fiscal implications. The reason for this was that a share of the profits from such enterprises were a major source of local budget revenues. Moreover, this change coincided with other fiscal reforms, which, although complex in detail, had the net effect of making local budget incomes larger and more predictable. It is true that the growth of local *incomes* did not automatically mean that local powers over the level and composition of local *expenditures* were transformed. As we shall see, however, in 1958 the fiscal system played a crucial role in the Great Leap, and even thereafter continued, I believe, to give the local planners a position in the national economy different from the one they had occupied during the *First Plan*.²⁶

The reader might anticipate that these comments on the development of goals specific to Shanghai, and on the acquisition of powers that made their achievements more feasible, were part of an argument that Shanghai's Great Leap was a result of decentralization. This is not

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the case. For while it is true that local initiative was unleashed during the Leap, the speed and direction of change were so marked precisely because local and national goals coincided. The Leap called for a dramatic, nationwide acceleration of output, and Shanghai proved to be uniquely capable of delivering this. For years skilled and semi-skilled manpower, administrative capabilities, complementary services and some capital, had remained under-utilized. During the Leap these were combined with a large investment of new capital with marked effect. There is no doubt that Shanghai's role in the Leap was greatly facilitated by the close relationship between Mao and the city's mayor, K'o Ch'ing-shih. Not only is it probable that Mao supported K'o in Shanghai, but we find that K'o's own rise in the political scene was partly the result of his becoming a national figure in the campaign for the Leap.²⁷

The most useful indicators of the Leap's progress from 1958 to early 1960 are the data on industrial plans and out-turns summarized in Table 6.8 and those for total fiscal income and expenditures on basic construction investment (lines 1 and 8) in Table 6.7.

The planned increase in output of 35% for 1958 was announced in November of that year and was the result of successive upward revisions. It was substantially exceeded. This upsurge was concentrated in the metallurgy, machinery and electrical sectors. A great deal of the increase reflected Shanghai's participation in the nationwide campaign to produce iron and steel. Crude steel output from Steelworks 1 and 3

Table 6.8. *Plans and out-turns in industry, 1956-60*
(per cent change of gross value compared to previous year)

	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960
Actual increase	- 3	+ 35	+ 5	+ 50.2	+ 43.3	[+ 2]
Planned increase		+ 17.8	- 3.6	+ 35	+ 45/ + 50	+ 45
Difference		+ 17.2	+ 8.6	+ 15.2	- 1.7/ - 6.7	- 43

Note: In 1957 the plan stipulated a reduction in output. In 1959 a range of 45% to 50% was given for the planned increase.

Sources: Actual increases as Table 6.1.

Plans

1956 *CFJP*, 28 Aug. 1957.

1959 *CFJP*, 14 June 1959.

1957 *CFJP*, 28 Aug. 1957.

1960 *CFJP*, 18 May 1960.

1958 *CFJP*, 7 Nov. 1958.

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tripled, while blast furnace construction leapt ahead. In 1957 Shanghai's total blast furnace capacity was approximately half a million tons per annum and it depended on scrap and pig iron from Manchuria and from Maanshan in the middle Yangtze valley. During 1958 work began on four more furnaces (which were to double output) and it was reported that small-scale furnaces were producing at an annual rate of more than two million tons per annum in 1958 and 1959. In the short run most of this development proved abortive. Two of the four large furnaces were never completed and the small-scale furnaces disappeared in Shanghai as they did elsewhere.²⁸

The 1958 Leap in investment was equally spectacular. Local investment in basic construction in 1958 comfortably exceeded the total invested in the whole of the *First Five Year Plan* and was supplemented by central expenditure (Table 6.7).

It is clear from the 1959 documents that Shanghai's progress in 1958 had been too fast, too lacking in co-ordination with other regions, and too absorbent of labour. Indeed, K'uo Ch'ing-shih led the national campaign to restore nationally co-ordinated planning referred to as the campaign to make the country a 'single chessboard'. The 1959 *Plan* was accordingly adjusted downwards to meet 'national requirements'. This adjustment is indicated by the reduction of planned levels of local spending shown in lines 6-9 of Table 6.7. Even more significant, it was announced that while Shanghai's long-term growth was to continue, it had to be consistent with the labour and population constraints originally outlined in the gloomy days of January 1958. Thus the planners emphasized that Shanghai had to depend on rapidly rising labour productivity and on specialization in the production of 'high grade, precision, large and acme commodities'. In the budget for 1960 this policy of building on quality and high technology was reflected in plans for unprecedented expenditures on education and scientific work.

The Shanghai Leap was, then, in some respects different from that in other parts of China. Errors were made (especially in the iron and steel campaign), there was confusion, waste, and problems resulting from excessive decentralization. Nonetheless, as a result of the Leap the city acquired new capital resources, improved the rationality of its economic structure, secured central acquiescence in a level of local investment far higher than it had previously enjoyed, and set itself on a path of industrial development that was to enable it to maintain its position as China's leading industrial city despite profound changes in the domestic and international economy. Even in the metallurgical sector,

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the errors of the Leap were overcome and in spite of its locational disadvantages the city became China's second largest steel producer.

Finally, and in a sense most remarkably of all, these achievements were not at the expense of either the national fiscal system or the welfare of the population. For because the level of activity and productivity rose so rapidly, it was possible to combine increases in local spending with a tremendous increase in the city's remittances to the centre. The city's fiscal contribution can be seen in Table 6.7, line 4. Rising welfare is indicated by changes in employment and in expenditure on social, cultural, educational and housing projects.

The employment increase of over 400,000 in 1958 reflected in particular the absorption of unemployed women into small-scale production. From Table 6.6 it will be seen that employment, and employment in the small-scale sector, reached peaks which have probably never been exceeded in the twenty years since the Leap. The best aggregate indicator of social welfare expenditure is line 11 of Table 6.7. This shows that upward momentum of this was strong and it must be borne in mind that similar expenditures by enterprises and organizations were also rising. Our third welfare indicator – housing – is a most important one, since the 44% growth of population between 1949 and 1958 had not been accompanied by anything like a commensurate increase in the net housing stock. The impact of the Leap on this situation may be judged by the following statistics. Between 1950 and 1957 average completions of residential housing were 230,000 sq. m. a year. For 1958 the figure was 1,380,000; for 1959, 950,000; and the plan for 1960 was 1,500,000.²⁹ Taken together these indicators show that, for a short period at least, the city was achieving the best of all worlds.

DOWNTURN AND RECOVERY IN THE 1960s

The general trend of the Shanghai economy after the Great Leap is indicated in Tables 6.1 and 6.9. As the bracketed data show, statistics disappeared in the early 1960s from Shanghai as from the national scene. Nonetheless, careful reading of the qualitative comments in *Chieh-fang jih-pao*, and partial data published in 1964 and 1965, enable us to make a reasonable guess as to when the upturn began and what the year-to-year changes were. The most important conclusion to be drawn from these Tables is that the downturn that followed the Great Leap in Shanghai was not as severe as might have been expected. For

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Table 6.9. *Shanghai and national changes in gross value of industrial output, 1957-65 (%)*

	1957-9	1959-60	1960-1	1961-2	1962-3	1963-4	1964-5
Shanghai	+115	+2	-36	+3	+13	+5	+25
National	+73	+4	-40	+2	+21	+20	+24

Sources: As Table 6.1.

as Table 6.9 shows, Shanghai's Leap was probably higher than the national one, yet the downturn of 1960-1 was probably no worse than the national downturn - indeed, I estimate it to have been slightly milder. This is all the more surprising in that whereas the national Leap in output reflected in part the coming-on stream of major investments made in 1953-5, the Shanghai advance could not have been planned at all until 1956, and was mainly assembled in 1958. Looking at the entire period from the eve of the Leap (1957) to the year in which the pre-Leap position is believed to have been generally regained (1965), we find that Shanghai grew more rapidly than the Chinese economy as a whole and therefore increased its share of total output (Table 6.3). This standard of performance was never achieved either before or subsequently, although progress between 1965 and 1970 remained brisk in spite of Shanghai being a major centre of political activity during the Cultural Revolution.

Returning to the post-Leap downturn, the data and other evidence affirm that the economic crisis in Shanghai was very serious. Planning at this time consisted largely of arguing about the allocation of raw materials between industrial enterprises.³⁰ The other new and interesting problems that emerged related to agriculture. The redefinition of the city boundaries to create a rural periphery of ten counties with a population of about four million was designed to give the city direct access to food and raw materials, and to enable it to develop this periphery in an intensive way. This was reflected between 1958 and 1960 in the city's greatly increased investment in agriculture (Table 6.7), but in the early 1960s it had to provide the rural counties with considerable emergency financial aid.³¹ The desperate quest for food is also revealed at this time by the reversion of land from non-agricultural to agricultural purposes.³²

Even when the situation was still obviously very difficult, the

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industrial priorities continued to be clearly articulated and acted upon – in particular, reconstruction and development of the steel industry, investment in chemicals and other materials industries, and also in the electrical and electronic sector.³³ (By the early 1960s Shanghai probably accounted for a third or more of China's total output of radios.³⁴)

In the analysis of the Great Leap, I argued that Mao's links with K'o Ch'ing-shih and K'o's own role as an activist in that movement were very important. It is fascinating, therefore, to find that in the 1960s K'o was equally at home with conservative leadership and pragmatic policies. In 1963 Chou En-lai came to Shanghai for the Spring Festival, shared a platform and with K'o, and made important speeches on the subject of Shanghai's unique potentialities in the national economy.³⁵ In the following year, the city acquired an asset that further emphasized its developing status: an airport designed for international traffic.³⁶

By late 1964 and early 1965, signs of powerful economic advance were visible, and in October 1964 a major survey article by Ts'ao Tich'iu on the city's economy analysed its recent growth.³⁷ This article described recent progress, emphasizing that the city's reformed industrial structure (in particular the development of materials industries) made it far less vulnerable to fluctuations in agriculture. The article also revealed that, as planned, the rate of labour productivity had risen in the *Second Five Year Plan* (1958–62); indeed, the data suggest that the industrial work-force was virtually static between 1957 and 1962. In the same period Shanghai's fiscal contribution to the centre rose from the sixteen-billion-yuan level of the *First Plan* to thirty-eight billion. From the data in line 4 of Table 6.7, it may be deduced that most of the latter increase was achieved between 1958 and 1960; nonetheless the figure remains remarkable and the emphasis on the city's fiscal role significant. As far as is known to the author, this article is the only major survey and policy statement on Shanghai's economy published in the 1960s. Not until after the Cultural Revolution do we find comparable material again.

SHANGHAI SINCE THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

Data on the output of Shanghai's industry in the 1970s are shown in Table 6.1. It will be observed that the narrowing of the differential between the national rate of industrial growth (which was 50% above

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the Shanghai rate up to 1957) has been maintained. The process of restructuring Shanghai's industry has also continued. Steel continues to be a major development sector and, overall, the city's share of steel produced in modern plant increased from 4% in 1957 to 22.3% in 1973.³⁸ With an annual output of four to five million tons, only Anshan is larger, and the next producer (Wuhan) is well below at approximately two million tons. The youth of the industry is reflected in its modernity. It is particularly interesting to note that one of the two oxygen furnaces imported in 1970 went to Shanghai, and that since then the city has pioneered the development of this most modern smelting process. The growth of steel is to continue, since a major investment in steel is to be made in Shanghai in the 1980s as a result of the long-term agreement with Japan.³⁹

Apart from the vehicle and machine building industries, two other industries whose development has been particularly important are electronics and industries related to oil. The significance of these is that the output of both have exceptional linkages and potency in the modernization of other industries. Oil-related industries provide a whole range of synthetic materials used in manufacturing, and electronics permeates industrial modernization by its applications in control engineering. The dominance of Shanghai in the electronics sector is indicated by a recent listing of the major plants producing electronic instruments in China. Altogether sixty-two plants were listed, of which six were in Tientsin, ten in Peking, and fifteen in Shanghai.⁴⁰

Shanghai's importance in oil refining and petro-chemicals is naturally more restricted since the city is not very close to a major operating oilfield (although it is not too far from Shengli). Nonetheless, the city's refining capacity was, in 1975, estimated to be the third largest in China, and to account for 8% of all refining.⁴¹ The city's involvement in oil expansion goes far beyond refining, for it is now a force in machinery and pipeline manufacture, and in petro-chemicals. Involvement in machinery manufacture for the petroleum industry began as early as 1960. Interestingly, one of the most important enterprises, the Shanghai Petroleum Machinery Plant, was originally a textile mill. Shanghai is also the leading producer of fractionating towers and the Hutung Shipyard was responsible for the survey ships *Kantan I* and *II*, which are reported to be playing a major role in offshore oil prospecting. In 1975, a listing of the major manufacturing plants for the oil industry found thirteen of them to be located in Shanghai, compared, for example, with only ten located in the whole

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of Kirin, Liaoning and Heilungkiang, which, as important producers of oil, one would have expected to be the natural location for this type of industry. In petro-chemicals, the Shanghai General Petro-Chemical Works (of which construction was only started in 1974) has been described as the largest construction project ever undertaken in Shanghai. It includes six major and four auxiliary plants, including an ethylene cracker. When fully on stream, the plant will undoubtedly provide a major stimulus to the Shanghai economy, particularly to the man-made fibres industry.⁴²

Let us turn now from our evaluation of Shanghai's recent industrial and economic performance to examine what has happened to the novel proposals made in 1957 and 1958 for a long-term process of industrial growth without urbanization. From Table 6.6 it will be seen that since 1957 the population of the city proper has declined, while total employment and employment in modern industry have continued to grow. However, if 1958 is taken as the turning-point, the subsequent growth of employment is negligible. Thus, in effect, the period 1959–1970s has been one in which genuine expansion and labour rearrangement have produced a level of employment equal to the artificially high employment achievements of the Great Leap. The net effect of this has been to raise the employed proportion of the labour force from 34% in 1957 to about 45% in the 1970s. This latter figure is higher than the 44% estimated for 1949, and marginally higher even than estimates of the pre-war percentage. Precisely what these figures mean cannot be known without age/sex structure data. Unfortunately we remain ignorant of this.⁴³

To assess the current demographic and employment situation is difficult. Official published data are extremely scarce although a mass of figures reported to visitors have been most usefully collected by Judith Banister. According to these, natural increase in the city is now about zero.⁴⁴ To accept this involves accepting birth and death rates of about six per thousand. The death rate is just plausible; the birth rate is much more of a problem, even allowing for the effect on fertility of losses from the child-bearing segments of the population due to sending down. Another difficulty with the nil increase hypothesis is that, if it is correct, this state of affairs has occurred very recently. The reasoning for this is as follows. In the late 1950s natural increase was at least 3% per annum and a similar rate was envisaged for 1958–62.⁴⁵ There is one claim that by 1963 fertility had dropped, perhaps reducing the natural increase to 1.5% per annum.⁴⁶ Unfortunately it is arguable that this drop (even if correct) was a response to economic and food

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problems as much as to the success of family planning programmes. To understand what may have happened since the mid-1960s, we need to look at emigration and total population figures. According to these, between the mid-1960s and 1970s the population dropped by about half a million; *but net emigration between 1966 and 1974 appears likely to have been in the range of 1 to 1.5 million – 130,000 to 190,000 per annum.*⁴⁷ This implies that the natural rate of population growth between 1966 and 1974 was between 1% and 2% per annum. Thus, to accept that by the early 1970s the natural increase was about zero, implies that in the late 1960s the natural rate was much higher than these averages, i.e. in a range of 2%–4%. Perhaps a more plausible scenario is a steady drop from 3% in the late 1950s, punctuated by an exceptional decline in the early 1960s and perhaps by a rise during the Cultural Revolution as a result of the collapse of controls on the marriage age, to a level of 1%–1.5% in the mid-1970s.

The data on emigration also suggest that the employment problem in Shanghai must be, and will remain, fairly difficult. For as we have seen, the net growth of total employment since 1957 has been small, and since 1958 has been negligible, so that employment of new entrants to the labour force depends mainly on retirements or jobs vacated by skilled workers sent away to other cities. In the mid-1970s new entrants were about 200,000 per annum of which, at most, 50,000–60,000 net were being sent down. This leaves 140,000–150,000 job seekers, a figure which could be matched by retirements only on the most peculiar assumptions about the age structure and mortality rates of the work force. If, as we have estimated, the rate of sending down of skilled workers is about 50,000 per annum, there must in each year be a shortfall in jobs. The planners, therefore, face the paradox that a level of sending down adequate to stabilize and even slightly reduce the population, is insufficient to stabilize the employment participation rate. In theory, there must be a stable state in which this problem does not occur, but reality, shaped by Shanghai's demographic and economic history, is not so simple.

CONCLUSIONS

This analysis of Shanghai's development over the past thirty years illustrates a number of important points. To begin with it establishes that large, previously colonialized cities can make a decisive, positive contribution to the national economy. Shanghai's performance may be

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measured in terms of its output, its contribution to the fiscal system, to foreign trade, and to the national supply of human skills. The indicators are all positive. And all of this has probably been achieved without changing the city's status of having the highest average real wage in China.

The instruments used to obtain this result have been numerous and, by most standards, radical. They include control of fertility, of population movement, of the labour force, of investment, and of the real wage rate. It has taken time to find how the various policy instruments should be applied and related to each other, but eventually the city demonstrated that it could regain its viability and vitality under a totally new economic and political order.

The city is, therefore, a worthwhile subject for the student of planning. At the same time, however, the secret of the city's growth lies equally in the willingness of the central authorities to recognize their limitations and the significance of the unplannable. For as we saw, the early policy of restriction and extraction was, by 1955, converting the city from an asset to a liability. Its rate of growth was declining, profits and remittances to the centre were below those planned, and the city had become a centre of intrigue, political repression, and cultural conflict. The reversal of these early policies was a crucial element in the ultimate success of China's *First Plan* and laid the foundation for future growth.

The rationale for this early change of direction was, most obviously, recognition that the city's scale advantages and under-utilized capital equipment could not be ignored.

More fundamental to the city's development, however, has been the significance of the initial stock, growth, and self-awareness of its human resources. I mean here not just industrial skills narrowly defined, but the whole range of technical, educational, managerial and political skills possessed by the population. As a pre-war centre of foreign penetration, Shanghai benefited exceptionally from the educational efforts of Western missionaries and other educators in China, who between them produced a population with a degree of literacy and a knowledge of the outside world unknown elsewhere in China. Also, when we look at Shanghai after 1949, we find that even at the shop-floor level the labour force possessed skills well above the national average: skills that were acutely scarce in China after 1949 and that, unlike the city's capital resources, were immobile and required provision of appropriate incentives.

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This complex of inherited skills was reinforced in the 1950s and 1960s by new programmes of educational expansion, so that, for example, by the 1970s Shanghai had succeeded in making lower-middle school education almost universal, with nearly three million pupils in the junior- and middle-school systems combined.⁴⁸ Above this, there are sixteen universities and specialized colleges, 37 factory-run universities, 12,000 factory-run technical colleges, and other variously described institutions.⁴⁹ Even allowing for the one million skilled workers sent to other areas between 1949 and 1970, the effect of this expansion must have been considerable.

Other evidences of the technological vitality of the city are its proliferating publishing activities, local television, libraries and cinemas, all involved in the dissemination of technical knowledge. In 1970 the city also established a Station for the Exchange of Scientific Information and Technical Experience. This elaborate organization has its work divided into 63 areas of study, with branch offices in all ten districts.⁵⁰

At the apex of all this are Shanghai's Research Institutes. These are organized in many ways, but of the Research Institutes under the Chinese Academy of Science engaged in work closely related to industry, fifteen are in Shanghai. These include Institutes working on computer technology, electronics, optics, metallurgy, precision instruments and nuclear physics.⁵¹ There can be no doubt that this array of research skills is linked at every level to economic activity, and has been a major reason for Shanghai's re-emergence as the industrial leader of China. Ironically, to some extent this could not have been fully foreseen. For it is only in the last decade that the exceptionally skill-intensive electronics and oil-related industries have become major Chinese priorities. When they did emerge in this way, Shanghai had the capacity, in terms both of skills and of the basic metallurgical and machinery industries, to develop them at a pace that only the Peking region could equal.

Can this pace continue? There are sound reasons for thinking that during the 1980s Shanghai's progress may well decline relative to that in other cities. These arguments partly relate to demography and labour utilization, and partly to investment and technology. The demographic question-mark arises because continuation of a policy of sending down youth must ultimately have radical consequences for the age structure and fertility of the population. If annual rustication continues, the population will age, its fertility will decline until the rate

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of natural increase is negative, and, by the mid-1980s, it will have a significantly smaller proportion of its members of working age. Even if rustication ceases, demographic echoes of the unusual population changes of the past twenty years will continue to provide the planners with difficulties.

A second problem arises out of the changing pattern of labour allocation. It will be recalled that since 1958 policy has been to achieve industrial growth without urbanization. This has been done, not only by drawing into the labour force housewives and others unemployed before 1958, but also by the planned transfer of workers from low-productivity goods and services sectors to the modern industrial sector. Thus productivity growth has been determined by capital accumulation and technical advance in the 'modern' sector *and* a combination of technical upgrading in low-productivity enterprises and actual transfer from the low- to high-productivity sectors. Eventually, the latter processes must begin to exhaust themselves and the rate of productivity growth will move towards the rate of change in the modern sector alone. Also, we must bear in mind that some of the growth of output since 1958 has reflected increased productivity of the pre-war capital stock obtained by small-scale upgrading, enlargement, and other improvement. The evidence of Western studies of this type of progress (in which productivity appears to be augmented without net investment) is that it lasts for about ten years.⁵² If this line of argument appears pessimistic, it should be noted that output per man does indeed now appear to be declining. For the periods 1952-62, and 1966-75, official data suggest rates of labour productivity increase of 7.5% and 5.3% respectively.⁵³

On the positive side, the possibilities for Shanghai remain interesting and there is no doubt that recent changes in China will favourably affect Shanghai in various ways. For example, during and after the Cultural Revolution, the Shanghai intelligentsia had severe problems. Some were reportedly killed and thousands imprisoned and mistreated.⁵⁴ Elitism and liberalization in education will, therefore, be welcomed and will provide both the incentives for, and the instruments of, productivity increases. On the economic front, not only will the general drive for economic growth favour the city, but several new trends will have specific implications for its growth prospects. For example, the expansion of foreign trade and the emphasis on links with Japan are both bound to increase the city's importance relative to cities in sites less able to benefit from these changes. For whereas in the 1950s

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the policy of industrialization through trade depended primarily on rail connections with the Soviet Union, current policies require an enormous expansion of shipping and port facilities, in both of which Shanghai is deeply involved. The city is also well placed for contacts with Japan and is indeed already 'twinning' with both Osaka and Yokohama. Second, crucial changes in raw material policy are conspiring to improve the city's industrial base. The first relates to the oil industry, in which, as we have seen, Shanghai has already played an important role. If, as seems probable, the emphasis in oil exploration is switched from onshore to offshore locations, the impact on the city will be tremendous. For whereas it is now located far from most of the major sources of oil in north China, offshore development to the west of the Okinawa trough (probably in co-operation with Japan) would place Shanghai in a unique position, both to supply materials and equipment, and to obtain inexpensive access to new oil output.⁵⁵

The second development is in the metallurgical sector. At present Shanghai has to draw most of its raw material for iron and steel from considerable distances. Thus, as long as China remained committed to a policy of self-sufficiency in these materials, the city was locked into a relatively unfavourable position. Now, however, policy is to import high quality ores – notably from Australia – and, at a stroke, this removes the one serious weakness in Shanghai's metallurgical situation. All of these major economic trends are embodied in the decision to locate in Shanghai a major new steel plant, to be supplied by Japan, and to draw its raw materials from foreign sources.

Notwithstanding these important events, which will surely accelerate industrial growth in the early 1980s, we must conclude by returning to our basic analysis, which indicates that in the long run the role of urban Shanghai (as at present defined) is likely to change. One sense in which it will change is that what the city will increasingly contribute to China is not only the output of its capital- and skill-intensive sectors, but human skills. And these in turn will take the forms of training and consultancy, rather than of the permanent transfer of workers embodying these activities. This transition – from supplying goods and workers to supplying pure skills – will mark the final stage in Shanghai's relationship to its suburbs, to its region, and to the Chinese economy as a whole. In it, the city's influence and relative importance may be less visible and less quantifiable than they have been in the past, but they will be nonetheless potent for that. Indeed, they may be more so. For at the present time the Chinese are proposing to move towards a

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system of planning by economic regions, and this could have profound implications for Shanghai. Before 1949, the city's development suffered repeatedly from its inability to control disordered conditions in the hinterland: a hinterland to which it was integrally linked by the deltaic transportation network and which provided important shares of its raw materials and markets. When, in the late 1950s, the city's territorial jurisdiction was expanded to include the suburban counties, this was a major step forward in consolidating the strengths of the core urban area. Not only did this change enable the city to plan improvements of its food and raw material supply, but use of urban resources for the general development of the periphery raised incomes from agriculture and paved the way for the growth of rural industry in areas adjacent to the city. These changes reduced the starkness of the rural-urban gap, lessened peasant motivation to migrate, and enabled the city to organize a systematic out-migration and the settlement of some of its surplus population, which was effective if not popular. Without these developments it is unlikely that urban population control and all that followed from it could have been achieved. If the result of current developments is, in effect, to enlarge the territorial span of planning still further, this must generate for the city a multitude of opportunities, and in this way, Shanghai as the focus of an east China region may come to exercise a combination of political and economic leadership that has always been denied to it in the past. It is true that change in this direction would have its dangers: in particular it could accentuate the differences between China's advanced and backward regions. But these problems need not prove unmanageable, and for the next decade at least, the economic interests of Shanghai and the Chinese economy as a whole are likely to be broadly the same.

THE QUEST FOR FOOD SELF-SUFFICIENCY

Robert Ash

INTRODUCTION

Agriculture in the suburbs of Shanghai has faced the same demands for food and raw materials as in other areas of China. However, the peculiarly symbiotic nature of economic relations between city and suburbs has made the search for agricultural self-sufficiency particularly pressing. This was presumably one of the factors underlying the decision to extend Shanghai's boundaries in 1958.¹ The incorporation of a large and rich agricultural area would reduce external dependence for basic commodities and, by increasing the municipal authorities' control over agricultural production, supply and distribution, facilitate planning.

With this in mind, the question I have tried to answer in this paper is: 'How far have the suburbs succeeded in meeting Shanghai's agricultural needs in the years since 1949? Originally, I hoped to approach this by considering the relationship between suburban agriculture in all its aspects and total demand. It would have involved an investigation of the production and consumption not only of all basic and supplementary foods, but also of industrial crops, such as cotton. However, so much material has emerged in the course of preparatory research that, for reasons of space, I have been forced to adopt a more modest objective. As it now stands, the analysis is largely limited to an examination of the basic question as it has affected just two crops: food grains and vegetables. Some consideration is given to supplies of other foodstuffs and to the production of the principal economic crop, cotton, but this is mainly determined by the light it can throw on the central analysis.

The arrangement of the paper is as follows. The first part sets out production data for the period 1949-78² and considers the trends and

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fluctuations revealed by them. In Part 2, the consumption aspect is introduced in an attempt to investigate and quantify the relationship between grain and vegetable demand and supply in Shanghai. The estimates presented there provide a basis for examining the extent to which Shanghai has had to depend on external sources of supply for these commodities over the past twenty-nine years. There is a brief discussion too, of the consumption of pork and other supplementary foodstuffs. A concluding section summarizes the main findings and indicates some of the more important implications that stem from them.

Although source materials for Shanghai are rich, they are not always comprehensive or uniformly reliable. Indeed, there are many gaps and inconsistencies. It is a salutary reminder that authoritative estimates for the entire period are unavailable for production, consumption, or population. The various series presented below are therefore in no way definitive; they are simply the most accurate that I have been able to obtain. In all cases, I have tried to verify them by making simple cross-checks for internal consistency. Where assumptions have been introduced, I have based them, wherever possible, on relevant data relating to conditions in Shanghai. In some cases, I have made additional calculations in order to see how the original estimates would be changed by the introduction of alternative hypotheses. It is reassuring that such revisions do not materially alter the arguments advanced in the text. However, as further information becomes available, there is no doubt that a more accurate and up-to-date assessment of the issues considered here will be possible.

THE PERFORMANCE OF AGRICULTURE IN SUBURBAN SHANGHAI

The incorporation of ten additional counties into Shanghai in 1958 means that any investigation of suburban agriculture needs to consider two separate, but overlapping, areas. These I shall refer to as 'old' and 'new' Shanghai (the municipality as it existed before and after the reorganization). To the extent that the boundary extensions were a means of removing the fundamental contradiction between agricultural production and urban demand, a comparison of the two is central to any assessment of agricultural policy in Shanghai.

Table 7.1 on the following page shows grain production in old, Shanghai.³

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 Table 7.1. *Output of food grains in old Shanghai, 1949-57*

	Total output (million metric tons)	Average yield per unit of arable area* (100 kg per ha)	Arable area (ha)	Output per head of total population (kg)	Output per head of rural population (kg)
1949	0.036	32.93	10,800	7.10	71.00
1952	0.043	—	—	7.27	121.06
1953	0.049	—	—	7.42	123.66
1954	0.040	34.73	11,500	6.30	104.99
1955	0.044	51.15	8,500	6.69	111.54
1956	0.050	53.40	9,300	7.34	118.99
1957	0.035	47.63	7,200	4.79	80.80

* Average annual yield from *all* the harvests per unit of land cultivated.

Notes and sources:

Total output in 1955 can be estimated by subtracting the combined areas under cotton and vegetables from Shanghai's arable area (so obtaining the grain arable area) and multiplying by the average yield. Relevant data can be found as follows: cotton area from *LTP*, 11 Nov. 1955; vegetable area derived from total output data in *HWJP*, 28 Aug. 1957 and the yield given in Kenneth R. Walker, *Provincial Grain Output in China, 1952-57: A Statistical Compilation* (London: Contemporary China Institute, School of Oriental and African Studies, 1977); Shanghai's arable area from *CFJP*, 12 Sept. 1956. The average grain yield is from *HWJP*, 28 Aug. 1957.

Estimates of total output for 1952-4 and 1957 are obtained from the index of grain output in *Nung-ts'un kung-tso t'ung-hsün (Rural Work Bulletin)*, 1958 no. 2.

For 1956 I have preferred to accept the report in *Ch'ing-nien pao (Youth Daily)* 15 Feb. 1957, that Shanghai's grain output increased by 0.12 *yi chin* in 1956.

The 1949 total output is based on the statement in *HHYP*, 1955, 4, that grain production in 1954 was 12% above the 1949 level.

Yields are from the following sources:

1949 *CFJP*, 30 Sept. 1959. See also *WHP*, 2 Oct. 1959.

1954 From information in *HWJP*, 15 Feb. 1957.

1955 From information in *HWJP*, 28 Aug. 1957.

1957 *WHP*, 2 Oct. 1959.

The population figures on which the per capita estimates are based are shown in an appendix to this paper, pp. 218-21.

The steady increase in output up to 1953 may reflect net improvements in productivity as well as recovery from pre-Liberation depressed levels. But the upward momentum was not maintained and despite an excellent harvest in 1956,⁴ grain production in 1957 (the last year of the *First Five Year Plan*) was at its lowest level for the entire period. It is instructive that the poor performance after 1953 stemmed mainly from a contraction in arable area, not lower yields. Indeed, the

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average yield continued to rise. In fact, underlying the fall in total production was a change in the cropping structure, as land was transferred from grain to other crops, especially vegetables. This was an important development, designed to rationalize suburban agriculture⁵ and to enable it to make a more positive contribution to the city's needs.

The inability of the suburbs to grow sufficient grain to meet Shanghai's requirements is suggested by the tiny absolute volume of grain produced there. But it is the per capita estimates that illustrate most dramatically the grave imbalance between available food supplies from the suburbs and urban needs. In these circumstances there was bound to be heavy dependence on outside sources of supply, adding to the burden on extraction and transport. To what extent this was alleviated by the extension of Shanghai's arable area is shown in Table 7.2.

The estimates for 1949 and 1955-7 are hypothetical since new Shanghai only existed after 1957. They are included here in order to provide a basis for assessing long-run agricultural growth and as a measure of the improvement in indigenous grain supplies that could have been achieved, had Sungchiang been under the control of the municipal authorities from the start.⁶

Strictly speaking one should take 1958 as the base year in examining agricultural growth in new Shanghai; in practice, this is extremely difficult because of the absence of reliable data for that year. In any case, in order to minimize possible distortions, it is more useful to compare blocks of years. On this basis, the average rate of growth of grain output in new Shanghai can be shown as follows:

	Average rate of growth of grain production in new Shanghai between 1955-7 and 1972-4
Total output	4.42% p.a.
Output per head of total population	3.47% p.a.

By 1973 per capita output was double its 1957 level. If we divide the period at 1965, it is true that we find a slackening in the growth rate during the last decade. Nevertheless, apart from occasional setbacks (notably in 1969-71 and perhaps after 1974), the upward trend has remained remarkably consistent.

The rapid annual rate of increase during 1957-65 is at first glance

Table 7.2. *Output of food grains in new Shanghai, 1949-78*

	Total output (million metric tons)	Average yield per unit of arable area (100 kg per ha)	Arable area (ha)	Output per head of total population (kg)	Output per head of rural population (kg)
1949	0.702	32.69	215,000	100.29	334.29
1955	1.080			118.62	412.21
1956	1.209			127.87	445.14
1957	1.018			101.90	363.57
1955-57 average	1.102			116.13	406.97
1961	1.124				
1965	1.831	74.80	244,000	166.45	421.89
1969	1.970	89.70	[220,000]	169.69	411.27
1970	2.003	90.00	223,000	184.44	412.14
1971	1.605 +	75.00 +	[220,000]	150.96 +	334.69 +
1969-71 average	1.874 +			168.36 +	386.03 +
1972	2.180	99.15	[220,000]	198.18	436.00
1973	2.340	106.13	[220,000]	211.19	460.63
1974	2.380	108.23	[220,000]	213.26	461.24
1972-74 average	2.300			207.54	452.62
1978	2.509	120.13	208,000	220.09	464.63

Notes and Sources:

Total output estimates for 1949, 1956-7 and 1961 are official Chinese estimates made available to me by Professor K. R. Walker. They are close to figures that can be obtained independently by adding suburban output (from Table 7.1) to that of Sungchiang administrative district. This is the approach used to derive the figure for 1955: the relevant information is in *HHJP*, 1 Dec. 1957; and Mechanization Bureau, *Chung-kuo nung-yeh chi-chieh-hua wen-p'i* (*Problems of Agricultural Mechanization in China*) (Paoting: Hopei People's Publishing House, 1958).

Yields for 1965 and later years are from the following sources:

1965 Communication from K. R. Walker. See also *Shang-hai chiao-ch'ü nung-yeh hsüeh Ta-chai* (*Let Agriculture in the Suburbs of Shanghai Learn from Tachai*) (Shanghai: Agricultural Publishing House, 1974), p. 34.

1969 *SWB*, 8 April, 1970.

1970 *ibid.*, 8 March, 1972.

1971 *ibid.*

1972 *CFJP*, 28 Sept. 1973.

1973 *Shang-hai chiao-ch'ü nung-yeh hsüeh Ta-chai*, *op.cit.*, p. 34

1974 *HHYPP*, 1975, no. 2, p. 66; and see *ibid.*, 1975, no. 10.

1978 Personal communication from K. R. Walker,

Total output data for 1965, 1970 and 1978 are also from K. R. Walker. Combined with yields, they enable grain arable area to be derived. For the remaining years, I have estimated total output by multiplying an assumed constant area of 220,000 hectares by average yields. This grain area is given in *Shang-hai chiao-ch'ü nung-yeh hsüeh Ta-chai*, *op.cit.*, p.34. The assumption of an unchanging area is too simplistic: though such stability may have been planned, in some years actual area diverged from this level. Accordingly, the figures shown above exaggerate or understate true production.

For population data, see below, pp. 218-21.

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surprising. Because of severe natural disasters and serious problems of management and organization arising out of the Great Leap Forward, the years from 1959 to 1961 have generally been considered a period of zero growth. Although there is no reason to suppose that the same symptoms were not present in Shanghai, it may be that they were less severe and less long-lasting than elsewhere. The small size of the agricultural sector (even after 1958) made it easier to adjust to the difficulties than in larger administrative areas. By the same token, once the decision to reverse economic priorities in favour of agriculture had been taken, the impact of the provision of modern inputs may have been more immediate.⁷

There is less need for qualification in speaking of the success achieved since 1965. Even allowing for the bias introduced by the assumption of an unchanging grain area, it is unlikely that total production fell much below the levels shown in the table. The clearest evidence of the sustained advance is that yields continued to rise almost uninterruptedly. To have attained an average grain yield of over 74 quintals per hectare by 1965 was itself a considerable achievement; to have sustained further rapid rises in subsequent years (so generating significant increases in per capita output) was even more so.

The principal source of growth during this period has undoubtedly been the large-scale provision of modern inputs to suburban agriculture.⁸ Since 1965, mechanization has advanced rapidly: by the end of 1972 there were already almost 20,000 tractors operating in the suburbs (a thirteen-fold increase over 1965)⁹ and 76% of the arable area was cultivated by mechanical means. By 1975, this figure had reached 88% and plant-protection, threshing and processing were also semi- or fully-mechanized.¹⁰ The electrification of irrigation and drainage facilities has also been basically completed – as early as 1972, 96% of the arable area was drained and irrigated through the use of electrically driven machinery.¹¹

Increased supplies of chemical fertilizers have been a major source of higher productivity. In 1959 large and small fertilizer plants were set up in all ten counties in the suburbs and by 1973 they were supplying half of all chemical fertilizers used in the suburbs. The average application per arable hectare was reported to be 637.5 kilograms,¹² well in advance of the national average and already higher than the national target cited by Teng Hsiao-p'ing in 1974.¹³

However, the rise in total grain production was not entirely uninterrupted. In 1969–70 growth ceased and in the following year output fell sharply. Chinese sources explain the decline in terms of adverse

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natural factors and the ideological struggle between the 'two roads', the fall in production being partly attributed to the short-lived ascendancy of 'capitalist' over 'socialist' tendencies within the rural population.¹⁴ Reports do speak of unfavourable climatic conditions in 1970—of initial drought followed by heavy rainfall.¹⁵ But the ideological complexion may have been the more important factor. Translated into economic terms, it manifested itself as a fundamental conflict of interest between peasants and planners: a conflict perhaps inherent in the multiple objectives of the plans and present to some extent throughout the period. The fact that marketed supplies of vegetables in 1970–1 were well above what might have been expected from the planned area may provide a clue to the simultaneous fall in grain production. For it may be that in the search for higher incomes, peasants in the suburbs were transferring land from grain to the higher-value crop, vegetables.¹⁶

This is an issue more appropriately considered later. First, it will be useful to examine the production of vegetables, the other major food crop grown in Shanghai are shown in Table 7.3.

In marked contrast to that of food grains, the growth of vegetable production in old Shanghai was both rapid and consistent: during the *First Five Year Plan* period, total and per capita output apparently more than doubled. The evidence of Table 7.1, which shows a contraction of the arable area under grain, gives one clue to the sustained rise, for that contraction was complemented by a significant expansion of the vegetable area. At the same time, yields moved upwards. As a result, whereas the area reduction offset the rise in yield to cause a net decline in total grain output, in the case of vegetables the two reinforced each other and led to a rapid and sustained increase in total production.

Sufficient information is not available to show precisely when the major expansion in vegetable cultivation occurred. The agricultural plans for 1951 and 1952 give no indication of any such development and it is unlikely that major changes were contemplated before 1954. Indeed, not until early in 1955 did the central role of vegetable production in suburban agriculture receive explicit and prominent recognition.¹⁷

Even when the expansion did occur, it was not without attendant difficulties. In particular, in the final years of the *First Five Year Plan* period there is abundant evidence of serious problems in the vegetable sector. In the first half of 1956, the purchase price of vegetables fell by an average of 18%, compared with the corresponding period of the

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Table 7.3. *Output of vegetables in old Shanghai, 1949-57*

	Total output (million metric tons)	Average yield per unit area (100 kg per ha)	Arable area (ha)	Output per head of total population (kg)	Output per head of rural population (kg)
1949	0.16	199.07	8,000	31.76	0.06
1954	0.35	—	—	55.33	0.15
1955	0.53	380.78	14,000	82.00	0.23
1956	0.66	468.30	14,000	97.85	0.27
1957	0.84	504.90	16,700	116.88	0.32

Notes and sources:

Total output for 1956 is given in *HWJP*, 28 Aug. 1957. The vegetable area can be found by subtracting the combined areas under grain (see Table 7.1) and cotton (see *CFJP*, 12 April 1956, and Table 7.12 below) from Shanghai's total arable area. Then average yield is output divided by area.

Total output for 1954 and 1955 can be derived from information in *HWJP*, 15 Feb. 1957. The 1955 average yield is from Kenneth R. Walker, *op. cit.*, p. 19. From these figures the area under vegetables in 1955 is easily obtained.

Average yield in 1957 is from *Nung-yeh chih-shih chiao-hsieh ts'an-k'an tzu-liao* (*Reference Materials for Teachers of Agriculture*) (Shanghai: Educational Publishing House, 1959), pp. 80-2, 'The Great Achievements of Shanghai's Agriculture in the Last Ten Years'. The vegetable area can again be obtained by subtracting the combined areas under grain and cotton (for the latter, see *CFJP*, 4 Sept. 1957) from Shanghai's arable area (as given in *HWJP*, 15 Feb. 1957). Yield times area then gives total output. 1949: these estimates are very approximate. The total output is based on the statement in *HWJP*, 2 Oct. 1959, that marketed supplies of vegetables from the suburbs in 1949 were 870,000 *chin* per day. The average yield is from *CFJP*, 28 Sept. 1973, which stated that the 1972 yield of 12,900 *chin/mou* was 4.86 times that of 1949. Area is then simply total output divided by average yield.

previous year.¹⁸ The effect on co-operatives specializing in the production of this crop was immediate: incomes declined (in some cases by as much as 30%), and peasants threatened to switch from vegetable to grain or cotton production.

The situation was exacerbated by difficulties associated with restrictive practices adopted by retailers in the city. These merchants, in pursuit of maximum profits, had organized themselves into groups in order to buy and sell vegetables, thereby seeking to control their supply and price. Preferring, as one Shanghai newspaper put it, 'big profits and small sales to small profits and large sales' they were able, acting in concert, to buy cheaply from the state-run wholesale organization,¹⁹ subsequently raising the retail price by curbing the quantity offered to

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the customers. The result was predictable: 'vegetables were piled up until they went rotten. A very tense situation developed because of the shortage of marketed supplies and a big gap emerged between wholesale and retail prices.'²⁰ As incomes of peasant producers fell, those of the retailers rose sharply. According to a representative investigation, average per capita retail income in May 1956 was 96% higher than it had been in the previous February. No wonder that the peasants wryly reflected that the slogan 'grow more vegetables to serve the city' should be changed to 'grow more vegetables to serve the retailers'.²¹

Against this background the failure of vegetable cultivation to expand during 1956 is readily understandable. The fall in purchase price and the restrictive practices of the retailers violated the interests of the farmers who, not unnaturally, looked to the cultivation of other crops in order to regain their previous income levels. Only because of a significant increase in average yield did total production continue to rise. Although it was claimed in early autumn that the situation had improved,²² it is clear that the consequences of the crisis were longer-lasting.²³ In fact, in October 1956 a new problem began to emerge as large numbers of peasants streamed into the city, setting up their own vegetable stalls in an attempt to circumvent the market restrictions by selling directly to the urban inhabitants.²⁴

Not until 1957 was the situation brought under control. But now the pendulum moved far in the opposite direction, and in a new atmosphere, with controls relaxed and free markets for supplementary foodstuffs re-emphasized,²⁵ a major expansion in vegetable cultivation took place. This reinforced the continued rise in average yield to raise total output by almost 30%.

Vegetable data for new Shanghai are less readily available and the difficulties of interpretation are also greater. However, the relevant information is set out in Table 7.4.

The interpretative problem stems from the fact that available data sometimes refer to actual production, sometimes to marketed supplies. It will be asked how anyone can be sure that marketed supplies do not include vegetables produced outside the suburbs. The answer is that self-sufficiency in Shanghai is widely claimed to have been achieved since 1958 or 1959.²⁶ I have therefore assumed that all reported figures, whether referring to output or marketed supplies, have their origin in suburban agriculture. The outcome is that except for 1958, there are two series: one showing what output would have been, had the

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Table 7.4. *Vegetable production in new Shanghai, 1958-78*

	Average yield per unit of arable area (100 kg per ha)	Total output (million metric tons)	Marketed supplies (million metric tons)
1958	—	1.03	—
1959	—	—	1.19
1965	750.00 +	0.90 +	—
1968	—	—	1.46
1970	829.95	1.00	—
1971	—	—	1.25
1972	967.50	1.16	—
1974	926.25	1.11	—
1978	1009.80	1.45	—

Notes and sources:

Except for 1958, all total output estimates are derived from yield data and an assumed constant arable area of 12,000 hectares. This is the area given in *Shang-hai chiao-ch'ü nung-yeh hsüeh*, *op. cit.*, p. 43. It is said there to be a stable, unchanging area, based on a criterion of 0.03 *mou* of vegetables per head of urban population – but see remarks in 7.2.

Total output in 1958 is from *HWJP*, 23 Sept. 1959.

Marketed supplies data are from the following sources:

1959 From information in *HWJP*, 2 Oct. 1959.

1968 *SWB*, 31 July 1968.

1971 *SWB*, 22 March 1972.

Yields are from the following sources:

1965 *Shang-hai chiao-ch'ü nung-yeh hsüeh Ta-chai*, *op. cit.*

1970 *SWB*, 8 March 1972.

1972 From *CFJP*, 28 Sept. 1973, cited in *She-hui chu-i hsin nung-ts'un*.

1974 From information in Shang Su-ti, *Shang-hai ti-li chien-hua (A Simple Geography of Shanghai)* (Shanghai: People's Publishing House, 1974).

1978 Communication from K. R. Walker.

planned area been maintained unchanged; the other, indicating actual output on the basis of marketed supplies.

To try to verify the data for 1958 and 1959 would be a fruitless task because of familiar difficulties associated with the collapse of the statistical system during the Great Leap. However, there is no reason to reject either the figures showing big increases in vegetable production during these years or the claim that self-sufficiency had been attained. The incorporation of Sunghiang into Shanghai must after all have added significantly to the area permanently planted under this crop.²⁷ In addition, to meet the exigencies of the depression conditions which began to emerge in 1959, temporary expansion may have been

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undertaken in an effort to increase immediate supplies of food. This would have made good sense, for such expansion need not have encroached on grain production: vegetables could be substituted for industrial crops. The fact that cotton cultivation in the suburbs was reduced by 22% in 1959 lends credence to the argument.²⁸ If it is correct, it is quite possible that the additional cultivation consequent upon the change in boundaries and the emergency re-allocation of land generated an increase in vegetable output that was sufficient to meet Shanghai's basic needs.

The findings that emerge from the fragmentary data for the years after 1965 can be summarized briefly. A planned area of 12,000 hectares, combined with guaranteed yields of 750 quintals, suggests a minimum vegetable requirement for the city 'proper' of around a million tons.²⁹ Since yields were frequently higher than this, the minimum requirement was in fact exceeded. However, the information on marketed supplies shows a gap between this minimum and *actual* output that is too great to be explained simply in terms of rising yields. It is safe to conclude that peasants in the suburbs – in some years at any rate – changed their cropping pattern in favour of vegetable production. More specifically, given the costs and rewards of growing various crops, it is likely that the extension of the vegetable area was at the expense of a contraction of that under grain. To this extent, the vegetable data are a further indication of the basic conflict of interest between peasants and planners mentioned above.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AGRICULTURAL DEMAND AND SUPPLY IN SHANGHAI

Any analysis of agricultural demand and supply requires some knowledge of actual or required consumption levels. Such information is frequently unavailable for Shanghai, making it necessary to derive estimates from assumptions. There are further complications: care must be taken to distinguish consumption needs, often expressed in terms of processed grain, and production, which may be given as raw grain. In a city with a large hinterland, some account has to be taken of suburban requirements. Agricultural products are also needed for purposes other than human consumption: for example, as seed and fodder within the suburbs; and for processing within the city itself.

Table 7.5 shows estimated rural and urban grain requirements

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Table 7.5. *Rural and urban grain requirements and the grain deficit in old Shanghai*

(million metric tons)

	Rural grain requirements	Urban grain requirements for food purposes only	Urban grain requirements for all purposes	Partial deficit	Overall deficit
1949	0.145	0.990	1.103	1.100	1.212
1952	0.103	1.225	1.364	1.285	1.424
1953	0.108	1.283	1.429	1.345	1.491
1954	0.111	1.313	1.463	1.384	1.533
1955	0.113	1.344	1.497	1.414	1.567
1956	0.121	1.393	1.551	1.464	1.622
1957	0.124	1.490	1.659	1.579	1.748

Notes and sources:

Rural grain requirements are obtained from the population data in the appendix and an assumed per capita consumption (for all purposes) of 580 *chin* p.a. (290 kg). This is a high figure (cf. 485 *chin* per head of rural population in Kiangsu in 1955-6 - *HHJP*, 17 Sept. 1957), but it is based on consumption data for Sungechiang administrative district - that is, the area contiguous with Shanghai. See *HHJP*, 17 Sept. 1957. Data in *Nan-fang jih-pao* (*Southern Daily*) indicate similar consumption levels in the richer areas of Kwangtung. The figure I have used is also consistent with figures for Chekiang.

Urban grain requirements are derived in the same way. The assumed consumption level for human food is 440 *chin* per head (220 kg): this is consistent with data for Shanghai given in *CFJP*, 4 March 1955, and with urban consumption figures for 1955-6 for all Kiangsu in *HHJP*, 17 Sept. 1957. In order to obtain total urban grain requirements, a ratio of human to total needs of 90% is assumed (for justification of this, see Chu Ching-chih, *Wo-kuo ti liang-shih cheng-ts'e ho shih-chen liang-shih kung-ying kung-tso* (*China's Food Policy and the Work of Supplying Grain to her Cities*) (Shanghai: Financial and Economic Publishing House, 1958).

The partial deficit is a measure of grain imports required to meet all rural needs and urban human food needs. The overall deficit takes non-human food requirements into account. The deficits are simply actual suburban output minus rural and urban requirements.

in old Shanghai. By deducting them from suburban production, it is possible to measure the grain deficit facing the city between 1949 and 1957.

The nature of the production and population data and of the assumptions underlying the calculations leave room for a significant margin of error. However, it is reassuring that figures showing the volume of central supplies of grain entering Shanghai during the *First Five Year Plan* are of the order of 1.4-1.6 million tons³⁰ - closely in line with the deficits shown above.

What emerges most strikingly from these estimates is the inability of

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suburban agriculture to make any net contribution to urban grain supplies. Not only was grain unavailable for city use, but not even the suburbs' own needs could be met. On average, almost two-thirds of rural grain requirements had to be imported during the *First Five Year Plan* period. Moreover, as Shanghai's cropping pattern changed in favour of non-grain crops, the situation was bound to deteriorate.³¹ The fact that in 1957 suburban agriculture could meet little more than a quarter of *its own* needs illustrates the point dramatically and underlines the urgency of the situation as it faced the planners on the eve of the *Second Plan*.

Although the introduction of the Central Purchase and Central Supply (CPCS) Scheme in November 1953 was designed to regulate the acquisition and distribution of basic foodstuffs, it is clear that for much of the *First Plan* period control over marketed grain supplies in Shanghai was far from effective. Cadres were criticized for having set urban grain consumption targets too high and it was admitted that this, combined with poor management, had hindered control over grain sales.³² Thus, urban sales in 1954 were 26.85% up on 1953; and the upward trend continued during the first half of 1955.³³ An editorial even referred to grain coming in on an 'ad hoc' basis, indicating severe disruption of supply planning. It concluded that 'unless the trend is reversed, state control over grain sales will become very difficult and CPCS plans will be jeopardized'.³⁴

In these circumstances, the summer of 1955 saw much emphasis on the need for economy in urban grain consumption.³⁵ At first the campaign seems to have met with success.³⁶ But the improvement was temporary and by the second half of 1956 grain sales were again running at an excessively high level.³⁷ Demographic factors were partly to blame, but it is clear that inadequate control over supplies and continuing extravagance in consumption were also important contributory factors.

In short, the failure to control available supplies adequately, and the deficiencies inherent in the production structure of suburban agriculture, combined to create serious difficulties in planning a rational supply of grain to the urban inhabitants of Shanghai. It was this situation which the extension of the municipal boundaries in 1958 was presumably designed partly to ameliorate. But what was the impact of the extension? Were the once-for-all addition to the suburban arable area of Sungchiang administrative district and Ch'ungming county and the growth in output during the 1960s and 1970s able to offset the

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Table 7.6. *Rural and urban grain requirements and the grain deficit in new Shanghai*
(million metric tons)

	Rural grain needs	Rural surplus over needs	Urban needs for food purposes	Urban needs for all purposes	Partial deficit	Overall deficit
1949	0.609	+0.093	1.078	1.198	-0.985	-1.105
1955	0.760	+0.320	1.427	1.586	-1.107	-1.266
1956	0.788	+0.421	1.483	1.648	-1.062	-1.227
1957	0.812	+0.206	1.582	1.758	-1.376	-1.552
1955-57 average	0.787	+0.316	1.497	1.664	-1.182	-1.348
1965	1.259	+0.572	1.465	1.628	-0.893	-1.056
1969	1.389	+0.581	1.320	1.467	-0.739	-0.886
1970	1.409	+0.594	1.320	1.467	-0.726	-0.873
1971	1.430	+0.220	1.320	1.467	-1.100	-1.247
1969-71 average	1.409	+0.465	1.320	1.467	-0.855	-1.002
1972	1.450	+0.730	1.320	1.467	-0.590	-0.737
1973	1.473	+0.867	1.320	1.467	-0.453	-0.600
1974	1.496	+0.884	1.320	1.467	-0.436	-0.583
1972-74 average	1.473	+0.827	1.320	1.467	-0.493	-0.640
1978	1.566	+0.943	1.320	1.467	-0.377	-0.524

Notes and Sources: Basic data from Tables. 7.2 and 7.5 and appendix.

much greater rural grain requirements and so generate rising grain transfers from suburbs to city? Table 7.6 is an attempt to answer this question.

In contrast to the deteriorating situation in old Shanghai, the data for the enlarged municipality afford a more optimistic interpretation. The estimates for the 1950s are hypothetical, though they remain a useful indicator of the extent to which the incorporation of Sungchiang administrative district could have eased the difficulties in providing for the city's food requirements from indigenous sources. Even allowing for the food needs of a much larger agricultural population, the richness of Sungchiang was such that its inclusion would have permitted suburban agriculture to make a net contribution to urban grain supplies. Specifically, the deficit for the entire municipality would have been reduced by about 18% during 1955-7 (in absolute terms, over a quarter of a million tons).

The estimates for the years since 1957 attest to an impressive

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achievement. In 1957, on the eve of the boundary extensions, one and a half million tons of grain would have been required from outside in order to feed and meet the other needs of Shanghai's population. By 1965 this had been cut to about one million tons; and by 1974 required grain imports (now mainly from abroad) were only about half a million tons. The average overall deficit for 1972-4 was 40% smaller than for the previous three years and 60% smaller than it had been in 1955-7.

If these figures are to be believed, Shanghai has already made great progress towards the attainment of grain self-sufficiency and even allowing for a reasonable margin of error, we may suppose that this aim will become reality within the foreseeable future. At the very least, there is little room for doubt that the deficit has very significantly narrowed during the last twenty years. However, the departure from the trend-line in 1970-1, when import requirements rose by over 40%, suggests a caveat to this favourable interpretation: unless the threat of such fluctuations can be eliminated, the margin between self-sufficiency and the need to import will remain narrow and precarious, making planning correspondingly more difficult.³⁸

Lack of information makes it more difficult to examine demand and supply in relation to vegetables, especially in new Shanghai. Fortunately, such precise calculations are less crucial, for it seems clear that during most of new Shanghai's existence, basic self-sufficiency has been

Table 7.7. Estimates of Shanghai's vegetable deficit during the first plan
(million metric tons)

	Total vegetable requirements	Actual output	Deficit
1954	0.89	0.35	-0.54
1955	0.91	0.53	-0.38
1956	0.95	0.66	-0.29
1957	1.01	0.84	-0.17

Notes and sources:

Total requirements are simply total population times an assumed constant per capita requirement of 140 kg p.a. (see *HWJP*, 28 Aug. 1957). Note that this figure almost certainly refers to all vegetable needs, including processing.

Output data from Table 7.3.

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achieved. Only before 1958 were vegetables imported on a large scale and I have therefore tried to give an indication of the relationship between supply and demand during the *First Five Year Plan* only.

The steady decline in the deficit during these years is a clear vindication of the cropping pattern changes that were being undertaken. Remember too, that the figures show the extent to which production fell short of *all* vegetable requirements (including those for processing). If human consumption in Shanghai is examined in isolation, the situation is even more sanguine.

Table 7.8. *The relationship between vegetable consumption and output in Shanghai*
(million metric tons)

	Total human vegetable consumption	Actual output	Deficit/surplus
1954	0.58	0.35	-0.23
1955	0.76	0.53	-0.23
1956	0.72	0.66	-0.06
1957	0.70 (est.)	0.84	-0.14 (est.)

Notes and sources:

Total consumption is obtained by multiplying total population by per capita consumption, as given in *HPYK*, 1957, 24, p. 63. Although the per capita figures are for Shanghai's urban population, in the absence of information on rural consumption, I have had to use them as proxies for consumption per head of total population in the municipality.

Output data from Table 7.7.

The estimates suggest that by the end of the *First Five Year Plan*, Shanghai was approaching self-sufficiency in the provision of its vegetable consumption needs.³⁹ Only the burden of supplying the processing industry necessitated the continuation of imports.

A slightly different assessment of the vegetable sector's performance is obtained by comparing suburban production not with requirements, but with planned output. The relevant data are set out in Table 7.9.

In relation to the targets, Shanghai's deficit was smaller than shown in Table 7.7: indeed, in 1957 production was substantially higher than had been planned. For the most part, the fluctuations of these years can be seen as another reflection of the crisis in vegetable production discussed earlier. The very high output target for 1956 strongly

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Table 7.9. *Planned and actual production of vegetables in 1956 and 1957*

(million metric tons)

	Planned output	Actual output	Deficit/surplus	Actual as percentage of planned
1956	0.84	0.66	-0.18	78.57
1957	0.69	0.84	+0.15	121.74

Notes and sources:

Planned output from *HWJP*, 28 Aug. 1957.

Actual output from Table 7.7.

supports the belief that a major expansion in vegetable cultivation was anticipated. In the event, the marketing crisis of that year prevented this from taking place and instead the unchanging area combined with only a modest rise in yield to bring output to a level well below the planned figure. Official reaction to this was apparently to scale down the target for 1957, so that the revised planned output was only 4.5% above the 1956 level – and almost 20% below the original 1957 target. But because of the elimination of outstanding difficulties and the reintroduction of incentives to improve cultivation, the major expansion did at last take place, enabling the revised target to be overfulfilled by some 20%.

For reasons already given it is not possible to analyse the situation in new Shanghai in such detail; nor, however, is it necessary, for the findings are sufficiently clear as to require less comment. As early as 1959 self-sufficiency was being claimed.⁴⁰ Not that this was in itself a guarantee of consumer satisfaction. In the first quarter of 1963, for example, although enough vegetables were produced to provide each member of the urban population with well in excess of what had been consumed in the 1950s, prices were set too high to clear the market.⁴¹ In these circumstances, the purchase price was reduced in April of that year.⁴²

Since the rationalization of new Shanghai's cropping pattern, the allocation of 12,000 hectares to vegetable cultivation and the attainment of an average yield above 750 quintals have ensured a minimum output of 0.9 million tons. In reality, because the area planted has often exceeded 12,000 hectares and yields have been more than 750 quintals, supplies have been even greater. Thus, in 1968 it was

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reported that 4,000,000 kilograms of vegetables were entering the Shanghai markets every day – an average of 0.63 kilograms per head of urban population (about 230 kilograms a year).⁴³ In the 1970s annual sales have averaged a million tons and in the peak year they exceeded this by 35%.⁴⁴ With marketed supplies at such levels, Shanghai is now an important exporter of canned and frozen vegetables.⁴⁵

The analysis to this point has been concerned with the supply of just two food crops, cereal grains and vegetables. Consideration ought also to be given to one other important source of calories, pork. Until the end of the *First Five Year Plan*, pork supplies from the suburbs were severely limited and in 1956 reports spoke of this as the most serious food shortage in Shanghai.⁴⁶ It is true that the 1950s saw a steady increase in pig numbers, but this was quite insufficient to meet the city's requirements.⁴⁷

The boundary extensions brought about an immediate improvement by adding significantly to indigenous sources of supply.⁴⁸ In addition, with continued emphasis on pig-breeding, numbers rose rapidly: in 1965 the pig population stood at 3,355,000; by 1968 it had increased to about 4,300,000; and by 1973 it had further risen to 5,500,000 – 5,700,000.⁴⁹ Not all of these were available for human consumption, but it is clear that in relative as well as in absolute terms, the number of pigs marketed in Shanghai has also been on the increase in recent years.

Table 7.10. *Recent trends in pig-breeding in Shanghai*

	Total number of pigs in suburbs of Shanghai	Number of meat hogs marketed	Meat hogs as percentage of total
1965	3,355,000	1,470,000	43.82
1973	5,570,000	2,700,000	48.47

Sources: All the figures are from *Shang-hai chiao-ch'ü nung-yeh hsüeh Ta-chai*.

With the help of a few simplifying assumptions, it is possible to obtain a rough estimate of the pork availability implied by these figures: see Table 7.11.

These figures are a very crude indicator of pork availability. Nor do they take account of imports: in the early 1950s well over 90% of the pigs needed in the city had to be imported;⁵⁰ by contrast, in recent

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Table 7.11. *Supplies of pork into Shanghai from the suburbs: 1965 and 1973*

	1965	1973
Number of meat hogs marketed	1,470,000	2,700,000
Average live weight (kg)	70	70
Total live weight (million tons)	102,900	189,000
Carcass weight	72,030	132,300
Pork weight	61,226	112,455
Pork availability per head of urban population p.a. (kg)	9.28	17.25

Notes and sources:

Average live weight is given in *Shang-hai chiao-ch'ü nung-yeh hsüeh Ta-chai*.

Carcass weight: assumed to be 70% of live weight.

Pork weight: assumed to be 85% of carcass weight (cf. 82% for Taiwan, as given in Research Institute of Agricultural Economics, National Taiwan University, *Long-Term Projections of Supply, Demand and Trade for Selected Agricultural Products in Taiwan* (Taipei, 1970)).

years the enlarged suburbs have been able to provide about half of urban pork requirements.⁵¹ But as with vegetables, not all supplies are for indigenous domestic consumption: some are destined for foreign consumption in restaurants and even more for processing. Nevertheless, it is likely that urban consumption has now reached a level that is very high by Chinese standards. During the *First Five Year Plan* per capita consumption of pork averaged about 10 kilograms a year.⁵² It may be that as late as 1965 little change had taken place. But since 1965 the large increase in marketed supplies must have had a profound effect.

Pig-breeding in Shanghai has been emphasized not only as a means of increasing meat supplies, but also as a source of organic manure. As recently as January 1975 a Shanghai journal stated that 'rearing pigs is primarily for fertilizing the fields and increasing the production of food grains'.⁵³ Yet the economic logic of this has not always been understood by the peasant farmers. An example from a commune in Chiating county cites the concern of some members who felt that an increase in pig numbers was bound to encroach on grain production. In the face of such scepticism it had to be pointed out that even allowing for the land needed to grow feed, the fertilizer which the pigs would ultimately provide would still enable a net rise in grain output to be achieved.⁵⁴

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To examine pig-rearing and the provision of pork in the detail they deserve is not possible here for reasons both of space and of lack of information. But even the remarks made above suggest some important findings. It is clear enough that pig numbers in the suburbs have risen substantially since the mid-1960s and that pork supplies in Shanghai now provide a high level of urban consumption. But problems persist and finding the balance between private and collective breeding, devising price policies that will encourage peasants to release more organic manure to the collective sector, and even simply convincing them of the desirability of further rises in pig numbers, are likely to remain important areas of policy debate in the future.

If lack of information makes it difficult to analyse developments in the pig sector, it is almost impossible to make any firm comment about changes in the supply of other non-staple foods. Supplies of fish, poultry, mutton, beef, dairy produce and fruit, though doubtless still quite small, are nevertheless an important supplement to the basic diet of cereals, vegetables and pork. Consumption of such foodstuffs seems to have changed little during the *First Plan* period,⁵⁵ when urban demand could not always be met. Since the late 1960s, however, reports indicate a steady improvement in their supply.⁵⁶

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Perhaps the most important event in Shanghai's recent economic history was the decision to extend the municipal boundaries in 1958. The economic rationale of this was touched on in the introduction to this paper. On the basis of the evidence subsequently presented there seems little doubt that it has been vindicated by the subsequent performance of suburban agriculture.

In old Shanghai irreconcilable contradictions existed between suburban agricultural production and municipal agricultural requirements. Grain production was not sufficient to meet the needs of the rural population, let alone those of the urban residents. In these circumstances the increasing emphasis on supplementary food production (especially vegetables) made good sense, for here at least the suburbs could hope to make a significant contribution to city supplies. Yet such piecemeal rationalization could not alter the basic fact that in the face of the enormous demand of China's largest city, Shanghai's agriculture would never approach self-sufficiency in food and industrial crop production. Even if the planners' most sanguine expectations

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could be fulfilled, imports of grain and other essential items would remain necessary.

The boundary extensions brought under the control of the municipality a large and immensely rich agricultural area. Even allowing for the increase in rural population which it also entailed, it at once permitted a major improvement in indigenous supplies of basic agricultural commodities. Thereafter, rapid and sustained growth, combined with further rationalization of the cropping pattern, created a suburban agriculture which promised to provide all-round self-sufficiency. In 1974 official reports looked back on twelve consecutive 'bumper' grain harvests. Since 1965 the average grain yield has been 75 quintals per hectare or more; that of vegetables has exceeded 750 quintals. Since 1970 the target of raising one pig per *mou* of arable land has been fulfilled. Yields of major economic crops, such as cotton and rape, have also made significant advances.⁵⁷

But there is a qualification to this success story. I pointed out earlier that for lack of information, the production series presented in this paper is incomplete for 1975–6–7. We may suppose that the absence of data is no coincidence. For China as a whole, the agricultural performance during 1975–7 was very disappointing. Two years of bad weather, exacerbated by the effects of ideological conflict, kept grain output at its 1975 level;⁵⁸ indeed, growth seems not to have been resumed until as late as 1978.⁵⁹ Recent evidence suggests that Shanghai's experience may have closely followed the national pattern. Predictably, local reports have blamed the subversive activities of the Gang of Four for the disappointments of these years. The most damning charge laid against them is that they attempted to supplant 'Mao Tse-tung Thought' with 'Chang Ch'un-ch'iao Thought' in an effort to restore capitalism. Thus:

Not only did they oppose the movement to 'learn from Tachai' and Mao's policy towards agriculture; they also made frantic efforts to restore capitalism. Mao Tse-tung advocated 'taking agriculture as the foundation and industry as the leading factor', but they weakened and ruined the agricultural sector. They cut agricultural investment, withheld basic construction materials and seriously impeded suburban irrigation, mechanization and basic agricultural construction work. . . Frontline workers were removed from agriculture and in some brigades incomes were raised while production declined.⁶⁰

Whatever the precise role of the Gang of Four in these events, it is clear that in recent years Shanghai's agriculture went seriously awry. Against this background we may readily accept the estimate of the US

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Central Intelligence Agency that grain output in 1975 was some 10% below the 1974 level⁶¹ and the report of another US source that there was no growth in the following year.⁶²

Such evidence indicates serious disruption of the suburban agricultural economy after 1974. However, the long-run significance of this trend must not be exaggerated. Recent policy pronouncements have shown the new government's commitment to rapid agricultural growth: in 1978 suburban grain production was apparently restored to its former level. Ultimately, the events of the most recent period may therefore prove to have been little more than a temporary hiccup.

The fundamental changes outlined in this paper have had profound implications for planning and welfare in Shanghai. The rapid increases in agricultural production and consequent narrowing of the grain and other deficits have enabled the planning authorities to improve their control over the supply and distribution of essential commodities. The ability to meet food and raw material needs from within the municipality has eased the tensions and uncertainty which inevitably exist where there is dependence on outside sources of supply. It may also have eased the burden upon the transport system. The urban population has benefited from having a guaranteed source of basic and supplementary foodstuffs available at stable prices.⁶³ The rural population too has gained through the higher incomes resulting from the growth and diversification of agriculture.

Although it is impossible to chart annual changes in per capita income in the suburbs, there is no doubt that there have been significant improvements. In 1972 the annual distribution to each commune member was, on average, 147 *yuan* – a 50% rise over 1957.⁶⁴ Prices also seem to have moved in favour of the rural sector: procurement prices of major agricultural and subsidiary products have apparently risen steadily,⁶⁵ while the retail prices of important capital items needed by agriculture have fallen by up to two-thirds.⁶⁶

One reason for the increase in peasant incomes has been the growing diversification of suburban agriculture. During the *First Five Year Plan*, income from subsidiaries constituted 20–30% of gross income; but by 1973 it had risen to more than 38%.⁶⁷ The role of subsidiaries in generating higher incomes has on the whole been welcomed. However, as their importance has increased, so too has the danger of burgeoning 'capitalist' attitudes, as peasants concentrate on subsidiary activities at the expense of more fundamental work.⁶⁸ The existence of almost 5,000 suburban industrial enterprises, paying wages considerably higher than

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those available in the rural sector,⁶⁹ has also encouraged labour to abandon agricultural work in favour of industrial occupations.⁷⁰

The increases in agricultural productivity that underlie the improvements in rural living standards and the entire agricultural transformation in the suburbs have largely been achieved through a process of modernization.⁷¹ Mechanization, electrification, water-conservancy work and the large-scale provision of modern inputs have together played a pre-eminent role in Shanghai's agricultural growth. As a result, the suburban rural sector has been modernized to a degree unequalled elsewhere in China, except in the suburbs of the other great cities.

The reform of Shanghai's cropping pattern has been the other important ingredient in the rapid agricultural growth of the last decade and a half. Traditionally the rate of land utilization in the suburbs was not high: even where two crops a year were grown, yields were frequently quite low. But during the early 1960s communes and brigades began to experiment with triple cropping and, by 1965, over 33,000 hectares were supporting three crops a year.⁷² That this policy was not unanimously acceptable is clear from the critical comments of some peasants who believed that sown area yields on double-cropped land could be raised by more than the net increase available from the cultivation of a third crop. As they put it, 'three times three isn't as good as two times five'.⁷³ Such objections notwithstanding, by 1973 almost 60% of the suburban grain area was planted under three crops a year.⁷⁴

This development was an important step in the evolution of a stable and rational cropping structure. It is true that in old Shanghai, cropping changes had made the best use of the scarce resources available: with so tiny an arable area, it was sensible to concentrate on those crops (e.g. vegetables) in whose production the suburbs could make a real contribution to the city's needs. But in new Shanghai, the much larger farm area for the first time made it possible to create a structure of production which, while 'taking food grains as the core', could yet hope to meet other basic agricultural needs of the city. Moreover, as yields continued to rise, further crop diversification became possible. In 1957 grain, cotton and vegetables would have accounted for over 95% of putative new Shanghai's arable area (see Tables 7.1 and 7.2); but by the 1970s these same crops constituted less than 90% of a smaller farm area,⁷⁵ so enabling the cultivation of other important crops (e.g. rape) to be extended. At present it would

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seem that a fairly stable cropping pattern has been established, designed to meet both the human and industrial requirements of Shanghai. In the western counties of Chinshan, Sungchiang and Ch'ingp'u, emphasis is on food grains; elsewhere the most common pattern is of cereals with cotton, except in communes immediately adjacent to the city 'proper', where priority is given to vegetables.

The discussion of cropping pattern changes raises one interesting question: has the growth in grain output in new Shanghai been achieved only at the expense of a decline in cotton production? In the 1950s Sungchiang administrative district was, after all, a major producer of raw cotton.⁷⁶ If, therefore, the subsequent rise in grain production had been accompanied by a contraction in the supply of this essential raw material, our assessment of the suburban agricultural performance might be less sanguine than the food grain data on their own would otherwise warrant.

Data for cotton production are unfortunately fragmentary. However, Table 7.12 gives what I hope is a reasonable approximation of levels of production since the later 1950s.

It is apparent that since the creation of new Shanghai the cotton area *has* declined. By the 1970s about 20% less land was planted under this crop than in 1957. But the substantial rise in yields that had occurred in the meantime more than offset this reduction, enabling supplies of raw cotton to be increased.⁷⁷

The area contraction of 1958 may simply have been part of the current Great Leap strategy. However, as depression conditions emerged, subsequent reductions are likely to have been less an expression of confidence in a new cropping pattern based on smaller area and higher yields, than a reflection of the urgent need to give priority to increasing food production. Whether or not the cotton acreage fell much below 80,000 hectares during 1960-2 it is impossible to say, although with industrial retrenchment and the re-allocation of resources to producing food, this may have been the case. In any case, the increased area planned for cotton in 1963 suggests that by this date the worst effects of the depression years had been overcome and a more rational cropping structure could be introduced.

Despite the renewed expansion, the cotton area of 1957 was never re-attained. However, this permanent contraction was not matched by a corresponding extension of grain: on the contrary, the grain area of the late 1960s and early 1970s was itself smaller than it had been in 1957 (similarly for vegetables too). Taking these crops together, their

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Table 7.12. *Cotton production in new Shanghai*

	Total output (metric tons)	Average yield (kg per ha)	Sown area (ha)
1957	51,200	450.74	113,300
1958	—	—	97,600
1959	—	—	80,000
1963	—	40% above 1962	11,300 ha above 1962
1965	—	897.60	—
1968	[105,000]	1,122.00	—
1969	[93,800]	1,002.32	—
1970	[84,000]	897.60	—
1972	82,225	860.20	95,300
1973	89,600	957.44	93,300
1974	[80,500]	860.20	—

Notes and sources:

The hypothetical estimate for 1957 is obtained by combining data for suburban Shanghai and Sungchiang administrative district. Sources are as follows: *HWJP*, 15 Feb. 1957; *Nung-yeh chih-shih chiao-hsüeh ts'an-k'ao tzu-liao* and *Ti-li chih-shih (Geographical Knowledge)*, 1976, 2 (for Shanghai). *TKP*, 13 Nov. 1957 (for Sungchiang).

The sown area for 1958 is from *CFJP*, 18 May 1960; and for 1959 from *HWJP*, 21 Sept. 1959 (see also *CFJP*, 10 Oct. 1959). For the 1963 information, see *FBIS*, 5 April 1963 and 6 Dec. 1963.

The 1972 and 1973 sown areas can be found in *SWB*, 31 May 1972 (1972) and *ibid.*, 9 Jan. 1974 (1973).

Yield data are from the following:

1965 *FBIS*, 1965/237, ddd3.

1968 *SWB*, 11 Dec. 1968.

1969 *ibid.*, 8 April 1970.

1970 *ibid.*, 6 Jan. 1971.

1972 *ibid.*, 7 Nov. 1973.

1973 *ibid.*, 9 Jan. 1974.

1974 *ibid.*, 22 Jan. 1975.

Figures in square brackets are derived by assuming a sown area of 93,300 hectares.

total area seems to have fallen by more than 43,000 hectares, compared with the late 1950s.⁷⁸ Thus there appears to be no evidence of grain having replaced cotton.

While the yield performance of cotton in Shanghai has paralleled that of food grains, the two crops exhibit different trends after the mid-1960s. In the case of cereals, yields have continued to rise; by contrast, cotton yields seem to have reached a peak towards the end of the 1960s and subsequently to have stabilized at a slightly lower level.⁷⁹

The achievements of Shanghai's agricultural economy during the

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last two decades are obviously not to be underestimated. But nor are the costs and tensions which they have entailed. The most fundamental problems have stemmed from the inability to reconcile a basic conflict of interest between the material self-advancement sought by the peasants and the broader economic objectives pursued by the planners. The contradiction between grain and vegetable production is an admirable illustration. If the aim is to seek all-round agricultural self-sufficiency in Shanghai, as long as normal yields can be maintained, it makes good sense to keep a fixed ratio between the various crop areas. However, from the peasants' point of view it has been more rational to substitute vegetables for grain. For example, in the mid-1950s:

one *mou* of land suitable for growing two [grain] crops a year usually yields, at best, 800 *chin* per *mou* and thereby provides a maximum income of 80 *yuan* p.a. By way of comparison, the income from growing vegetables is generally 200 *yuan* a *mou*. In 1954 members of co-operatives specializing in vegetable production could earn 1.67 *yuan* a [labour] day – and as much as 3 *yuan* or more in the best areas; whereas the average reward from cultivating paddy ... was only around 1.2 *yuan* a day.⁸⁰

In the 1950s the difference in income available from growing vegetables and grain posed a minor problem because the interests of planners and peasants largely coincided. But after 1958 this was no longer so. Admittedly, the collectivization campaigns of 1955–6 narrowed the income differential. But the 60% gap which still existed⁸¹ remained a strong inducement to switch to the higher-value crop. And even if the extension of triple cropping and other technical improvements had led to higher grain yields, there had also been increases in those of vegetables.⁸² That this conflict of interest has lasted to the present day is made abundantly clear in an article published in December 1976:

Mao advocated that we 'take grain as the core and go for all-round development'. At one moment they [the Gang of Four] cried, 'Shanghai must be self-sufficient in food grains' and 'peasants who grow vegetables mustn't eat marketable grain' – and they accordingly reduced the vegetable area in order to plant more grain crops, thereby making vegetable supplies very tight. But at other times they ranted on about it being essential not to rely on outside sources for vegetable and supplementary food supplies, advocating 'taking vegetables as the core', 'giving top priority to vegetables' and saying 'we mustn't criticize if the output of grain drops'.⁸³

Although I have cited the contradiction between grain and vegetable cultivation as an illustration, other high-value crops have held

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similar attractions. Nor has the contradiction only manifested itself in terms of competition for land. In one brigade in Ch'ingp'u county, when the grain area was reduced in 1971 labour and other inputs were concentrated on the preferred subsidiary crop (in this case, melons).⁸⁴ In a production team in Nanhui, the re-allocation of labour from cotton to beans led to such neglect that by harvest time, the weeds in the cotton fields were taller than the crop itself!⁸⁵ The general situation was summed up in a review of suburban agricultural development since 1965 which admitted that 'contradictions have shown themselves in competition between grain and economic crops for land, fertilizer and labour'.⁸⁶

Further policy uncertainty has been generated by the tension between planning and pricing decisions. For a crop like vegetables, whose production has always been partly market-oriented, this has been particularly pressing. Orthodoxy lies in emphasizing the role of planning: if production targets are fulfilled, municipal requirements will be met. But an implicit assumption is that to guarantee supplies and clear the markets an appropriate price (or prices) can be found that will satisfy both consumers and producers. In reality, determining what is 'appropriate' is far from easy, especially when production is subject to strong seasonality.⁸⁷ For this reason, increasing attention has been given in recent years to devising a rational price structure for vegetables.

Essentially, the approach has been to regulate the price according to the seasonality of production. When production is low and costs high, prices are raised; in times of high output they are lowered. It is a policy designed to appeal to the interests of individual, collective and state alike. Yet the elimination of gluts and shortages that it was intended to bring about has apparently failed to materialize; instead, it has encouraged the emergence of 'capitalist' tendencies amongst peasants in the suburbs. For as members of the production team responsible for marketing became acquainted with the timing and probable range of price adjustments, they attempted to control the volume of supplies coming into the markets in order to improve team incomes. In anticipation of a price reduction, extra supplies were unloaded; when prices were about to rise, supplies were withheld. As a result, not only did the price adjustments fail to stabilize the vegetable market, they increased the severity of fluctuations.⁸⁸

How this problem will be resolved remains to be seen. If experience has shown that planning on its own cannot provide a solution, it has also shown that devising an appropriate price policy is extremely

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difficult. In the meantime official statements talk vaguely of the need for simultaneous pricing and planning measures and for better co-ordination between all those engaged in vegetable transactions – marketing officials in the teams, wholesale and retail buyers in the city and individual consumers.

Perhaps enough has been written to indicate some of the strengths and weaknesses of agricultural policy in Shanghai since 1949. Overall it is a story of remarkable agricultural growth – and at a time when much of China's agricultural sector has performed disappointingly. Even allowing for quite a wide margin of error in the estimates presented here, the trends which they reveal are so clear as to leave little room for doubting the impressive nature of the achievement, especially since the mid-1960s.

But it would be wrong to extrapolate too readily from Shanghai's experience. In particular, it is important to remember the special factors which have favoured the area's rapid development. The topography of the Yangtze Delta region, facilitating drainage and irrigation, is one such factor; climate is another. The benefits of lying next to a huge urban and industrial centre can hardly be exaggerated, with all that this has meant for markets and input supplies (not least, the enormous quantity of nightsoil available to suburban farmers). Above all, the immense richness of Shanghai and the fact that the suburbs have themselves become an industrial, as much as a rural, area⁸⁹ has conferred on agriculture there unique advantages. In the national agricultural context Shanghai has always occupied an anomalous position: in 1957 the suburban grain yield was already almost 135% above the average for China⁹⁰ and higher too than that of the richest province, Chekiang. With the rapid growth that has taken place in the suburbs in the intervening years, the gap can only have widened still further. Much of the suburban success derives from the high degree of modernization which Shanghai's agriculture has undergone and recent statements indicate that this is the direction in which China's agricultural transformation will proceed. But whereas in the tiny agricultural sector of the municipality this process has been rapid, in China it is bound to be slower and far more costly.

What of future progress in the suburbs? Can further rises in yields be sustained or has production now reached a plateau? It is instructive that grain yields in Shanghai are already a good deal higher than those achieved nationally by Japan.⁹¹ Indeed, they probably compare favourably with those achieved in the richest regions of that country –

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even taking into account the different cropping patterns of the two regions. At the same time, the experience of those production teams which have attained average grain yields of over 150 quintals a hectare⁹² might indicate that the potential for further growth is far from exhausted. But before we take this experience as a model for the rest of the suburbs, we need to know the conditions in which such high yields were achieved: results obtained on a small area may be repeated more generally with much greater difficulty. What is clear is that the pace of future growth will depend critically on the availability of modern inputs and the efficiency with which they are used. Although Shanghai's agriculture has already been highly modernized, recent policy pronouncements continue to emphasize the provision of modern inputs as holding the key to future developments.⁹³ Particularly important is likely to be the response to further increases in the application of chemical fertilizers. Availability of this input per hectare of arable land is already high in Shanghai. However, it is still far below that of Japan⁹⁴ and there seems no reason to suppose that yields will not continue to rise as application is raised to still higher levels. Against this the response to such increases may now depend critically on the success with which new seed strains can be developed which will absorb such large amounts of fertilizer efficiently. If this is so, long-run agricultural research programmes will have a very important role to play.

All in all then, while we may reasonably speak of the continuing potential for further growth, we may feel less confidence in predicting the speed and effectiveness with which that potential is realized. In addition, even if the purely technical obstacles to growth can be removed, there remain 'institutional' obstacles to be overcome. With a small farming area, and the rich rewards offered by the cultivation of some non-staple crops or the performance of other subsidiary rural activities, the conflict between private, material self-interest and the attainment of broader economic objectives can be expected to continue. In a sense, recent denunciations of the Gang of Four and revelations about the resurgence of capitalist attitudes in the suburbs are most revealing for their resemblance to earlier attacks on Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao. Whatever the precise role of such groups or individuals may have been, their real economic significance is perhaps best seen as a reflection of fundamental contradictions inherent in the economic system. In the absence of any significant change in basic economic policy, these contradictions will presumably continue to

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manifest themselves and threaten the smooth implementation of planning decisions. Although such factors may not ultimately prevent the attainment of all-round self-sufficiency in Shanghai, they may well make progress towards that goal slower and more halting than the planners would wish.

APPENDIX: SHANGHAI'S POPULATION

Estimating Shanghai's population is a major exercise in itself. Up to the end of the *First Five Year Plan*, it is possible to get a fairly good idea of the size of both urban and rural population in the municipality and of the changes that were occurring over time. But for the subsequent years, the difficulties are much greater. It will be apparent from what follows that the approach I have used to estimate population is not always very rigorous (at least, in the sense in which a demographer would use that word). However, for the limited purposes of this paper, precise figures for every year are not necessary: as long as the totals are roughly correct and the trends a reasonable approximation to reality, we can feel some confidence in the per capita estimates derived from them. In any case, as I have already pointed out, even allowing for quite a wide margin of error, the conclusions that stem from the estimates presented in the text are so clear as to leave little room for doubting their validity.

OLD SHANGHAI:

Firm data for old Shanghai are available as follows:

Table 7.A1. *Available data for old Shanghai*

	Total population	Rural population	Urban population
1949	5,000,000	500,000	4,500,000
1953	6,204,000		
1955	6,500,000	390,000	6,110,000
1956	6,750,000	416,000	6,330,000
1957	7,200,000	427,000	6,770,000

Sources:

(a) Total population

1949 *CFJP*, 14 Feb. 1950 and 9 March 1950.

1953 Cited by Christopher Howe, *Employment and Economic Growth in Urban China, 1949-1957* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 34.

1955 *ibid.*, p. 34.

1956 *ibid.*

1957 *WHP*, 6 June 1958.

(b) Rural population

1949 *CFJP*, 10 March 1950 and 11 March 1950.

1955 From information in *HHYP*, 1955, 4, p. 97.

1956 *CFJP*, 12 Aug. 1956.

1957 *HWJP*, 15 Feb. 1957.

(c) Urban population: obtained by subtraction.

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In order to fill the remaining gaps, I have calculated as follows. For total population in 1954, I have taken a figure mid-way between the totals for 1953 and 1955. For 1952, I have assumed a growth of 4.7% between 1952 and 1953 (the average growth indicated in Howe, *op.cit.*). As for rural population in the years 1952-4, on the basis of the evidence for later years I have assumed that rural population constituted 6% of the total figure.

Then the complete series for old Shanghai is as follows:

Table 7.A2. *The population of old Shanghai, 1949-57*

	Total population	Rural population	Urban population
1949	5,000,000	500,000	4,500,000
1952	5,920,000	355,000	5,565,000
1953	6,204,000	372,000	5,832,000
1954	6,350,000	381,000	5,969,000
1955	6,500,000	390,000	6,110,000
1956	6,750,000	416,000	6,330,000
1957	7,200,000	427,000	6,770,000

NEW SHANGHAI:

In order to assess longer-run trends in Shanghai's suburban agriculture, I have referred in the text to putative new Shanghai – that is, the municipality as it would have existed had the boundary extensions of 1958 occurred earlier. Population estimates for the years in question are as follows:

Table 7.A3. *The population of 'putative' new Shanghai: 1949. 1955-7*

	Total population	Rural population	Urban population
1949	7,000,000	2,100,000	4,900,000
1955	9,105,000	2,620,000	6,485,000
1956	9,455,000	2,716,000	6,739,000
1957	9,990,000	2,800,000	7,190,000

Notes and sources:

The starting point is the information from *Chung-kuo chi-chieh-hua wen-p'i*, that Sungchiang administrative district's rural population in 1956 was 2,300,000. On the analogy of the experience of old Shanghai, let Sungchiang's rural population grow by 3% in 1956-7. Then the figure for 1957 is 2,370,000

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Table 7.A3 (cont.)

Suppose further that in Sungchiang the urban component of total population was 15%. Then Sungchiang's urban population must be:

1956 = 405,000

1957 = 420,000

And Sungchiang's total population (by simple addition):

1956 = 2,705,000

1957 = 2,790,000

By more simple addition new Shanghai's various population totals can be obtained: the results are as shown above.

For 1955 the approach is the same: as in old Shanghai, let new Shanghai's total population rise by 3.85% in 1955-6; further, let the rural component be 28.75%. Then:

1955 TP = 9,105,000

RP = 2,620,000

Finally, 1949: here I have followed the experience of old Shanghai and assumed that new Shanghai's total population in 1956 was 35% above that of 1949 and that the rural component was 30% of the total.

The difficulties are considerably greater for new Shanghai in the year after 1958. Many of the fragmentary pieces of information that have been made available in recent years are simply not acceptable (see, for example, the comments made by Dr J. S. Aird in *CQ*, 73 (1978)). My own starting-point is set out in the following figures from an official Chinese source (and made available to me by K. R. Walker):

Shanghai, 1978	
Urban population	6,000,000
Rural population	5,400,000
Total population	11,400,000

We are further informed that since 1968, Shanghai's urban population has remained constant at 6.00 millions. By making some assumption about the rate of growth in the 'rural' areas of the municipality, it is possible to derive a series, admittedly tentative, of rural population – and so by simple addition of total population too.

I shall assume therefore that during 1974-8, rural population in Shanghai increased by an average of 1.2% p.a.; and by 1.5% p.a. during

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the preceding five years. Then the following figures are easily obtained:

Table 7.A4. *The population of new Shanghai*

	Rural population	Total population
1969	4,790,000	10,790,000
1970	4,860,000	10,860,000
1971	4,930,000	10,930,000
1972	5,000,000	11,000,000
1973	5,080,000	11,080,000
1974	5,160,000	11,160,000
1978	5,400,000	11,400,000

Estimates are also required for 1965. This poses even greater difficulties and in order to break the Gordian Knot, I shall make the heroic assumptions that Shanghai's total population in 1965 stood at 11.00 millions (for some justification of this, see the article by Judith Banister in *CQ*, 70 (1977), especially Table 1) and that between 1965–9 rural population grew, on average, by 2.5% p.a. Then, the municipality's rural population would have been 4.34 millions in 1965.

CHANGES IN THE STANDARD OF LIVING OF SHANGHAI INDUSTRIAL WORKERS, 1930-1973

Bruce L. Reynolds

INTRODUCTION

This paper attempts to gauge the change in the living-standards of industrial workers in municipal Shanghai over two time-spans: 1930 to 1956, and 1956 to 1973. Three data sets are employed. The first is a survey of 305 industrial worker households conducted by the Shanghai Bureau of Social Affairs in 1929-30. The second is a similar survey, of 505 Shanghai worker households, conducted in 1956, and devised with the intention of achieving comparability with the 1930 study. The third data set consists of prices, wages and scattered household budget studies drawn from reports of visits to China and from official Chinese sources in the 1970s.

The paper has three parts. In Part 1, we compare 1930 with 1956. We first compare the actual market baskets purchased by the average households in each survey. We then value and aggregate each market basket, using prices for 1930 and for 1956, in order to reach conclusions as to the change in living-standards during that period. In Part 2, we compare 1956 with 1973. Here, we lack a market basket. Instead, we ask how much it would cost, at 1973 prices, to live the way workers did in 1956; and then ask whether this amount was greater or less than average 1973 household incomes. In Part 3, we note some limitations on the validity of our results, including difficulties with the data, non-wage aspects of welfare, and the influence of rationing. Appendices which present more detailed information and which test the data sets for consistency and bias are available from the author.

CHANGES IN LIVING-STANDARDS, 1930-1973

1. COMPARISON OF 1930 WITH 1956

Consumption baskets

Table 8.1 presents a comparison of the quantities of various goods consumed by the two sample populations. As the table shows, consumption in quantity terms increased in most categories, including rice, meat, vegetables, cloth, and living-space. The shift from kerosene and combustible grasses to charcoal and coal (presumably in response to the quadrupling, shown in Table 8.2, of the prices of the first two goods) is the most striking change in the 1956 consumption pattern.

Table 8.1. *Shanghai per capita annual consumption baskets, 1929-30 and 1956* (in *catties*, except as noted)

Commodity	1929-30	1956	% increase
rice	240.17	270.74	12.5
wheat flour	15.17	15.68	3.4
pork	9.78	16.21	65.7
beef, mutton	1.89	2.29	21.2
chicken, duck	0.76	2.70	255.3
fish, shellfish	10.17	27.39	169.3
eggs	1.85	7.02	379.5
vegetables	159.57	193.50	21.2
vegetable oil	12.58	10.20	-18.9
animal oil	0.47	0.71	73.2
sugar	2.40	4.17	73.8
cigarettes (20)	24.21	32.36	33.7
alcoholic beverages	13.43	6.46	-51.9
tea	0.55	0.15	-72.3
cotton fabrics (m ²)	6.43	14.00	117.7
kerosene	19.17	0.40	-91.9
coal	43.14	228.17	428.9
combustible grasses	242.77	78.24	-67.8
leather shoes (pair)	0.17	0.27	58.8
rubber shoes (pair)	0.10	0.51	410.0
stockings (pair)	1.26	2.08	65.0
living space (m ²)	3.22	4.78	48.5

Units: 1 *catty* = 1.1 lb or 0.5 kg.

Note: Original figures for eggs are converted assuming 12 eggs = 1 *catty*. Original figures for tea and alcoholic beverages are converted assuming 14.58 *taels* = 1 *catty*. Original figures for cotton cloth converted assuming 1 *chih* = 1/3 m.

Source: 'Changes in the living-standards of Shanghai city workers in the past 27 years', *T'ung-chi kung-tso (Statistical Work)*, 1957, 13, p. 7. Figures for 1929-30 accord with the original study. (This source henceforth cited as *Changes*.)

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 Table 8.2. *Retail Prices: 1930, c.1956, 1973*

Commodity	1930 (\$/catty)	1956 (yuan/catty)	1973 (yuan/catty)
rice	0.0737	0.175	0.170 ^{acf}
wheat flour	0.067	0.180	0.155 ^{hj}
pork	0.356	0.890	0.973 ^{acj}
beef, mutton	0.280		
beef	0.281	0.725	0.600 ^j
mutton	0.200		
chicken, duck	0.405		
chicken	0.440	0.900	1.169 ^f
duck	0.360		
fish, shellfish	0.223		
fish	0.230	0.250	0.351 ^c
shellfish	0.190		
eggs	0.353*	0.575	0.850 ^{acghj}
vegetables	0.031	0.042	0.050 ⁿ
Chinese cabbage	0.028	0.030	0.035 ^k
white greens	0.047	0.100	0.150 ^k
vegetable oil	0.238	0.750	0.880 ^c
animal oil	0.351		
sugar	0.108	0.800	0.688 ⁱ
cigarettes (20)	0.089	0.250	0.230 ^e
alcoholic beverages	0.119		
Shaohsing	0.103		
rice wine		0.800 ^k	0.800 ^k
tea	0.377	1.750	2.000 ^k
cotton fabrics (m ²)	0.163		
white cotton			
cloth (m ²)	0.315	1.100	1.260 ^{df}
kerosene	0.080	0.418 [†]	
coal	0.015	0.0165 [†]	0.025 ^k
grasses	0.0026	0.010 ^k	
leather shoes (pair)	3.45	15.0	12.0 ^{ac}
rubber shoes (pair)	1.33	5.0	4.0 ^f
stockings (pair)	0.246	1.22 ^m	1.37 ^f
rent per m ² /year	2.54	1.353 [‡]	2.825 ^{acd}

Units: 1 catty = 0.5 kg.

Notes:

* Assumes 12 eggs = 1 catty.

† Shanghai Price Book reproduced in Chen p. 418-19. These are official prices (*p'ai-chia*) for Shanghai, 1956.

‡ This is estimated rent for the 1956 Shanghai sample. Their accommodations were relatively spacious, and this rent relatively low. For all Shanghai, an average per capita living space of 2.11 square metres, and a monthly rent of 6 yuan (Howe (1968) pp. 79-82), coupled with 4.73 persons per household (average for the Shanghai 1956 sample) gives a much higher average Shanghai rent of 7.21 yuan per square metre per year.

CHANGES IN LIVING-STANDARDS, 1930–1973

Sources:

1930

Shanghai Bureau of Social Affairs, *Standard of Living of Shanghai Industrial Workers* (Shanghai, 1931), pp. 111–14, 149–52, 157. Price is calculated by dividing per-household purchases in value terms by per-household purchases in quantity terms. This means that for commodity groupings (e.g. fowl, seafood, vegetables), the price shown is a weighted average of the commodities within that group, where the weights are the actual expenditures, on each commodity, by the households in the Shanghai survey. These weights were calculated and used to derive the 1956 and 1973 prices for these commodity groupings. (This source henceforth cited as *Standard of Living*.)

The weights used were as follows:

<i>rice:</i>		<i>fish, shellfish:</i>	
unglutinous	0.60	fresh mullet	0.26
<i>sien</i>	0.40	fresh white fish	0.12
		silver carp	0.06
<i>beef, mutton:</i>		salted white fish	0.15
beef	0.95	other fish	0.24
mutton	0.05	other seafood	0.17
<i>chicken, duck:</i>		<i>sugar:</i>	
chicken	0.69	white	0.77
duck	0.31	brown	0.23
<i>vegetables:</i>			
Chinese cabbage	0.83		
white greens	0.17		

1956

Tsakok, pp. 149–50, except as noted. The author informed this writer that although the prices which she reports range from 1949–59, they cluster in the mid-1950s, and a large proportion are from Shanghai. Her sources are S. Ishikawa, *Chū-goku kei-zai no chōki tenbō* (*The Long-Term Future of the Chinese Economy*) (Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, 1971), and a single refugee informant.

1973

Drawn from reports of visitors to China over the period December 1972–February 1974, as follows:

^a Jan Prybyla, 'A Note on Incomes and Prices in China', *Asian Survey*, 15, 3 (March 1975), p. 262 (trip was February 1974).

^b *Milwaukee Journal*, 10 July 1975, pp. 1, 12 (report of a trip of US journalists, summer 1974).

^c *China News Analysis*, summer 1974, B/3b, 'Report on Prices in 9 Regions' (no source given, but these prices appear to come from travellers emerging from China).

^d 'Two Family Accounts', *CR*, 1975, 4, pp. 14, 34–5.

^e Trip diary of Robert Scalapino (accompanied visit of delegation of National Committee for US–China Relations, December 1972): Shanghai prices.

^f Bruce Reynolds, trip diary from visit of a delegation of five economists from Yale University, October 1973: Shanghai prices.

^g Scalapino: Peking prices.

^h Reynolds: Ch'ang-sha prices.

ⁱ Reynolds: Tientsin prices.

^j 'How High Off the Hog', unpublished manuscript by James Nickum containing price data from visits to the PRC.

^k Tsakok, pp. 147–9.

^m Dwight H. Perkins, *Market Control and Planning in Communist China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 237.

ⁿ Average price of vegetables in Shanghai in 1976, from Thomas Weins.

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Some articles of consumption listed in the 1930 survey are not included in the two market baskets, because the units employed in 1930 were not standardized. Despite these and other exclusions, the market basket in Table 8.1 includes 68% of total 1930 household expenditure.¹

Table 8.3. *Normalized Retail Prices: 1930, 1956, 1973*

Commodity	1929-30	1956	1973
rice	1.00	1.00	1.00
wheat flour	0.91	1.03	0.91
pork	4.83	5.09	5.72
beef, mutton	3.80	4.14 ^b	3.53 ^b
chicken, duck	5.50	4.73 ^b	6.33 ^b
fish, shellfish	3.03	1.38 ^b	2.00 ^b
eggs	4.79	3.29	5.00
vegetables	0.42	0.24	0.29
vegetable oil	3.23	4.29	5.18
animal oil	4.76	5.02 ^c	5.64 ^c
sugar	1.47	4.57	4.05
cigarettes	1.21	1.43	1.35
alcoholic beverages	1.61	5.28 ^b	5.44 ^b
tea	5.12	10.00	11.76
cotton fabrics	2.21	3.25 ^b	3.84 ^b
kerosene	1.09	2.39	2.53 ^d
coal	0.20	0.094	0.15
grasses	0.035	0.057	0.06 ^d
leather shoes	46.81	85.71	70.59
rubber shoes	18.05	28.57	23.53
stockings	3.34	6.97	8.06
rent (m ² /year)	34.47	7.73	16.62
rent (all-Shanghai) ^a	—	41.20	—

Notes:

^a The rent paid by the 1956 sample is atypically low. I give here the normalized rent for the whole Shanghai population (including non-workers), based on 7.21 *yuan*/m² (see Table 8.2, note †).

^b For these five commodity groups, 1956 and 1973 prices are available for only one of the components of the group. I have assumed that the ratio of the available component's price to the commodity group price in 1956 and 1973 is the same as in 1929-30 (for example, referring to Table 8.2, 'chicken, duck': 0.405/0.440 = (0.828)/0.900; and 0.828/0.175 = 4.73).

^c 1956 and 1973 prices unavailable. I assume a % price rise equal to the % rise in the price of pork.

^d 1973 price unavailable. I have assumed a 6% increase over 1956, based on rise in the retail price index for all of China.

Source: Each entry is equal to the price of the given commodity divided by the price of rice in that year, from Table 8.2. Thus, the table shows the cost of each commodity in *catties* of rice.

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Prices

The prices in Table 8.2 permit us, in Table 8.4, to aggregate and compare the two market baskets. But these prices offer other insights, which are worth touching on here.

First, regarding the changes in price structure which have occurred, we may ask: are these changes due primarily to market forces – changes in per capita income, in cost conditions, and so forth – or to

Table 8.4. *Market baskets aggregated and compared*

Commodity	1930 Basket		1956 Basket	
	Prices (1)	1956 (2)	1929-30 (3)	1956 (4)
rice	240.07	240.07	270.74	270.74
wheat flour	13.80	15.63	14.27	16.15
pork	47.24	49.78	78.29	82.51
beef, mutton	7.18	7.82	8.70	9.48
chicken, duck	4.18	3.59	14.85	12.77
fish, shellfish	30.82	14.03	82.99	37.80
eggs	8.86	6.09	33.63	23.10
vegetables	67.02	38.30	81.27	46.44
vegetable oil	40.63	53.97	32.95	43.76
animal oil	2.24	2.36	3.38	3.56
sugar	3.53	16.13	6.13	19.06
cigarettes	29.29	34.62	39.16	46.27
alcoholic beverages	21.62	70.91	10.40	34.11
tea	2.82	5.50	0.77	1.50
cotton fabrics (m ²)	14.21	20.90	30.94	45.50
kerosene	20.90	45.82	0.44	0.96
coal	8.63	4.06	45.63	21.45
grasses	8.51	13.84	2.74	4.46
leather shoes (pair)	7.96	14.57	12.64	23.14
rubber shoes (pair)	1.81	2.86	9.21	14.57
stockings (pair)	4.21	8.78	6.95	14.50
living space (m ²)	110.99	24.89	164.77	36.95
Total	696.52	694.52	950.85	808.78
Money Equivalent	\$51.33	Y121.53	\$70.08	Y141.54
1956 basket divided by 1929-30 basket:				
	1930 prices	1956 prices		
	1.37	1.16		

Note: Money equivalent: Totals multiplied by 0.0837 (1930 price of rice) and 0.175 (1956 price of rice).

Source:

- (1) and (3): column 1 of Table 8.1 times columns 1 and 2 of Table 8.3.
- (2) and (4): column 2 of Table 8.1 times columns 1 and 2 of Table 8.3.

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central government pricing policies? Here, it is instructive to inspect each 1973 price and to ask whether it continues, or reverses, the direction of change between 1930 and 1956. Such an exercise reveals that (ignoring rice, grasses and rent) of 19 prices, 1973 reverses the 1930–56 trend in twelve cases, and continues it in only seven. (In all seven cases, the trend is upward; and all seven goods appear to be income-elastic.)

This suggests that government policy by 1956 had skewed the price structure away from what the market might have dictated. Casual empiricism reinforces this conclusion: 1956 foodstuff prices (normalized) are on average lower than 1930 prices, while prices for manufactured consumer goods (cloth, shoes) are higher. One would expect the opposite to obtain in an industrializing economy. But when the investment priorities of the *First Five Year Plan* are considered – starving consumer goods for the sake of heavy industry – the shifts in Table 8.4 make good sense.

Second, the normalized level of rents is revealing. Recent visitors to China often characterize rents in China as ‘nominal’. But rent of 2.825 *yuan* per square metre in 1973 (based on just such accounts) equates to 16.62 *catties* of rice – nearly 50% of the 1930 rent, thus hardly ‘nominal’. And this figure, based on model ‘workers’ estates’, may under-estimate 1973 rents as badly as the 1956 ‘Shanghai sample’ rent does – in which case true rents in 1973 may be two or three times the 1930 level.²

To be established definitively, these points would have to be pursued more thoroughly. But the above discussion suggests how useful a detailed knowledge of inter-temporal price variations can be for understanding economic policy.

Comparison of living-standards

Table 8.3 values and aggregates the market baskets from the two periods. We find that no matter which set of prices is used, the 1956 market basket is larger than that for 1930. Using 1930 prices yields a ratio of 1.37, or a 37% increase in per capita real income. Using 1956 prices, the ratio is 1.16. Goods which figured heavily in the 1956 basket relative to 1929 were goods whose 1956 prices were low relative to 1929.³ This being so, we know on theoretical grounds that 1.37 is an upward-biased estimate of the real-income increase, and 1.16 is downward-biased, with the ‘true’ change in real income (subject to

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the qualifications addressed in Part 3) lying somewhere between the two.⁴

2. COMPARISON OF 1956 WITH 1973

Given that the Shanghai industrial worker's living-standard rose moderately between 1930 and 1956, what of the subsequent two decades? We have no market basket for 1973, and therefore our methodology changes: we estimate the rise in consumer goods prices during this period, and compare it with the rise in the household income of industrial workers.

Prices present little difficulty. The 1956 basket of goods cost 141 *yuan* (Table 8.4). At 1973 prices, this basket would have cost 162 *yuan*. By this measure, consumer goods prices rose 14.5% over the period. (Of course, the 1973 worker could have chosen to buy a different set of goods. To that extent, this methodology understates the rise in real income.) Estimating 1973 household income, by contrast, requires an uncomfortably long string of assumptions.

We first need a monthly wage. Official figures give the 1971 average annual wage in industry as 650 *yuan*, and for 1975, 720 *yuan*.⁵ Taking a straight-line average, 1973's wage would have been 685 *yuan*, or 57.08/month. This accords well with the estimates of Western scholars – for example, Riskin (1975, p. 217) gives 60 *yuan*.

In moving from this figure to the average annual wage of Shanghai industrial workers, we must evaluate three complicating factors: the figure of 57 *yuan* is for workers and staff, not just workers; it is for all workers, not just industrial workers, and it is for all China, not just Shanghai.

The first two of these roughly cancel each other out. Let us assume that staff are 5% of the total labour force, and that their wages are on average $2\frac{1}{2}$ times those of workers.⁶ Then the figure of 57 *yuan* for workers and staff would overstate the wages of workers proper by $6\frac{1}{2}$ %. Balancing this is the fact that industrial workers and staff make more than the average for all workers and staff, by a margin of roughly the same size.⁷

The third consideration requires that we adjust the figure of 57 *yuan* upward. Shanghai wages have historically led the rest of China. In 1956, average wages for workers and staff were 852 *yuan* – almost the nation's highest wage, and 40% above the national average.⁸ There has been a conscious policy of reducing this disparity; indeed, during

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the period 1952-6, although Shanghai wages grew by 15%, the national average was 37%. Still, this policy cannot have eliminated the gap, even today. We might assume, for purposes of argument, that wage and investment policies have continued to act in a fashion which holds Shanghai's rate of increase in money wages to half the national average. Then the period 1956-73, which saw national wages grow just 12% (from 610 to perhaps 685 *yuan*) would have witnessed a growth in Shanghai industrial worker wage - one-twelfth of 904, or 32% above 57 national mean. On this basis, let us adopt 75 *yuan* as the monthly Shanghai industrial worker wage - one-twelfth of 904, or 32% above 57 *yuan*.

To move from this figure of 75 *yuan* to a figure for monthly household income requires a knowledge of the number of workers per household. We must also take into account the fact that while at least one household member must be earning the industrial wage (since otherwise we would not be dealing with an industrial worker household), the other wage-earners in the family may be employed elsewhere in the state sector, or in co-operative enterprises, where wages are lower than in state-sector industry. Table 8.5 summarizes these considerations, and provides an estimate of the increase in household income over the period.

The implications of Table 8.5 for change in living-standards between 1956 and 1973 are simple. Household income increased by perhaps 33%. Given a 15% increase in goods prices, this implies an increase of only 18% in real income, or less than 1% per year. More important, this increase came almost entirely from an increase in labour force participation: from 1.58 workers per household to 2.31. Most of the figures in Table 8.5 are fairly reliable. But an error margin of perhaps 25% should be placed around the figure of 39 *yuan* from secondary wage-earners in 1973. Both the labour force participation rate and the average wage of secondary wage-earners are quite uncertain. Working through the implications of such an error margin, we can conclude that the increase in real income of industrial worker households over this period fell within the range of 6-30%: that is, at worst, there was virtually no increase, and at best, the increase was well under 2% per year.

3. SOME FURTHER QUALIFICATIONS

The broad conclusions of the preceding two sections are first, that living-standards of Shanghai industrial workers in 1956 were perhaps

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Table 8.5. *Hypothetical reconstruction of monthly household income in 1956 and 1973 (yuan)*

	1956	1973	% change
principal wage-earner	$1 \times 71 = 71$	$1 \times 75 = 75$	6
secondary wage-earners	$0.58 \times 26 = 15$	$1.31 \times 30 = 39$	260
monthly household income	86	114	33
wage earners/household	1.58	2.31	46

Derivation:

wage of principal wage-earner: we assume that the principal wage-earner is an industrial worker, and give the industrial wage for each year as derived in the text.

wage-earners per household: 1956: for Shanghai as a whole, labour force was 2.4 million, population was 7 million, and labour force participation was therefore 0.34 workers/capita. Average family size in 1930 was 4.62. Using the figure for 1956 gives 1.58 workers per household. 1973: Chinese sources give participation rates for the 1970s in a range of up to 50% (I am indebted to Christopher Howe for this figure). $0.50 \times 4.62 = 2.31$.

secondary wage-earners: 1956 $0.58 = 1.58 - 1.00$. We derive a monthly wage for secondary wage-earners of 26 *yuan* by working backwards from a known total monthly household income. Monthly income was 86 *yuan*. (Consumption expenditures shown in Table 8.4 of 141.54 *yuan* were 68.2% of total annual per capita spending of 207.54. Multiplying by 4.62 persons per household and dividing by 12 months gives monthly household spending of 79.90. In addition, 6.10 *yuan* was saved: *Tung-chi kung-tso, loc. cit.*)

If the principal wage-earner earned 71 *yuan* of this total of 86 *yuan*, and if the remaining 15 *yuan* came from an average 0.58 secondary wage-earners, then the implied monthly wage of the secondary wage-earners is 26 *yuan*.

secondary wage-earners: 1973: $1.31 = 2.31 - 1.00$. We assume that wages of secondary wage-earners rose by 15%, from 26 to 30 *yuan*.

25% above the 1930 level; second, that this rise continued in the subsequent seventeen years, at a comparable pace; and third, that the average number of workers per industrial worker household fell from a level of 2.06 in 1930 to perhaps 1.58 in 1956, and rose again thereafter to perhaps 2.31 in 1973.

The purpose of this section is to raise some further issues bearing on the reliability of these conclusions. Most of these issues relate to both time intervals.

Steady change or cyclical change?

Clearly, living-standards within each period experienced ups and downs. Many scholars, for example, adopt the working assumption that 1933-6 represents the pre-war economic peak, to which China returns by 1952.⁹ Again, we should distinguish between macro-economic and micro-economic conditions; it is possible that Shanghai

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workers fared better than the Chinese average. Indeed, an index of real earnings for sixteen Shanghai industries rises from 100 in 1936 to 315 in 1946.¹⁰ This rise seems excessive, however; indeed, it would imply a drastic decline in living-standards over the subsequent ten years. In any event, we should stress that our conclusions about living-standards at the demarcation points of our two time-intervals are not meant to imply that the transition over those intervals was regular or smooth. Regarding the period after 1956, one supposes that, in fact, Shanghai living-standards declined during the period 1959–61, returned to their 1958 peak only by the mid-1960s, and rose moderately thereafter.

New goods and quality changes

Some goods enjoyed by industrial workers in 1956 were unavailable in 1930. The same holds for 1973 *vis-à-vis* 1956. An estimate of living-standards and their change which uses a 'market basket' containing only the goods available in the starting year will be downward-biased. Similarly, ignoring improvements in quality, which might particularly be expected in clothing and housing, risks underestimating increases in living-standards. How serious might these biases be?

A national survey in 1956 found that annual per capita consumption in industrial worker households in 1956 was 0.0053 for record players and 0.0168 for bicycles, both unavailable in 1930.¹¹ Making some quite liberal assumptions about depreciation and prices, these and other 'new goods' can be made to increase the value of the 1956 market basket by perhaps 10%.¹² I would judge that the role of new goods in the second period is of the same order of magnitude.

What about quality changes? With regard to clothing, quality between 1930 and 1956 is unlikely to have improved, and may in fact have declined. In 1930, almost 90% of the cotton cloth purchased by Shanghai workers was imported.¹³ The higher quality of these goods was reflected in the average price of \$0.134 per foot, versus \$0.105 for Chinese manufactured cloth. It is likely that the Chinese-made cloth which largely replaced these imports in the 1950s was of a quality intermediate between the two extremes. Cloth quality in the years after 1956 probably increased. This consideration might justify reducing our estimate of the 1930–56 welfare increase by one or two percentage points, and raising that for 1956–73.

The same conclusion seems to hold for housing. Square metres per

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capita is an exceedingly uninformative measure of housing. Because of this, and because there are some reasons for believing that quality changes were in fact substantial, an extended discussion seems warranted.

The 1929-30 survey of living-standards distinguished four types of housing:

Table 8.6. *Industrial worker housing in Shanghai, 1930*

Type of dwelling	Residents per dwelling	Total residents	%	
(a) 2-storey with court	15.08	154,400	20.4	
(b) 2-storey, no court	12.95	234,000	30.9	
(c) 1-storey, tile roof	8.80	244,000	32.2	
(d) 1-storey, straw roof	6.17	124,000	16.4	
		Totals	756,000	100.0

Source: *Standard of Living*, p. 139.

In terms of per capita floor-space, these dwellings were roughly comparable. But their quality varied enormously, declining in the order shown. Contrasting (a) with (b) and (c), the former benefited from a courtyard of perhaps 150 square feet; from more widespread electric or oil streetlamps; from floors of wood (or cement) rather than mud; from more readily available tap water (although even there, one tap would be shared by a row of houses); and from substantially more window-space per square metre. Category (d), straw-roofed huts with bamboo or mud walls, was occupied by 'the absolutely destitute' - impoverished peasants from north of the Yangtze who drifted into Shanghai and set up squatters' huts on the outskirts of the city or along the Soochow Creek. In contrast to the other three categories, these huts had no windows, no floors, and no drainage or sanitary sewers. Their construction cost was perhaps ten or twenty dollars.

How had the picture shown in Table 8.6 changed by 1956? An official of the Shanghai Land and Building Management Bureau reported in 1966 that in 1960 there were over one million persons (or perhaps 15-20% of the population) living in 'slum dwellings', of which one-quarter had grass roofs.¹⁴ Referring to Table 8.6, if we suppose that dwellings of type (c) and (d) meet the 1965 definition of 'slum

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dwelling', then in 1930, straw-roofed huts were one-third of slum dwellings, and slum dwellings housed roughly half of the (in this case industrial) population. This admittedly fragmentary and qualitative evidence may still, perhaps, permit us to conclude that insofar as quality changed, it improved.¹⁵ Certainly, according to this 1965 testimony, straw huts in 1956 housed somewhere below 10% of the population, compared to 16% in 1929–30.

What of quality changes in housing between 1956 and 1973?¹⁶ Between 1949 and 1973, 76 public living-quarters were built in Shanghai, the smallest one having 8,700 residents, 35 buildings, and 40,000 square metres of living-space. In the early years of the 1950s, some of these buildings were one-storey, but most of those built since 1960 have been 4–6 storeys. These 76 public-sector projects accounted for 25% of all housing in Shanghai in 1973. Because these projects were newly built, and because they were multi-storey, it seems certain that they offered a per capita living-area above the Shanghai average. In those to which Western visitors have been taken, every two or three families share a kitchen (with gas cooking facilities and tap water) and a toilet.

New housing in Shanghai is allocated by the Municipal Housing Bureau through ten Housing Departments (one for each of the ten urban districts). One's house is linked to one's job – where you live depends on where you work. Because modern industry has more bureaucratic influence than most other sectors of a Chinese city, and also because it is clearly administratively easier to plan large new housing projects in conjunction with large new factories, one may speculate that industrial workers, and particularly workers in the new, large-scale modern industrial sector, probably enjoy a share of this public-sector housing out of proportion to their numbers in the city's population. In the case of the *Fan-kua Lung* workers' quarters, for example, two-thirds of the residents in 1973 were workers. All this suggests that between 1956 and 1973, the quality (and also the quantity) of housing consumed by Shanghai industrial workers must have increased.

Summarizing this discussion of quality changes and new goods: it seems likely that taking this issue fully into account would not significantly modify our results for 1930–56; but that regarding 1956–73, because of improvements in the quality of housing and clothing (as well as new goods), the true living-standard has risen more rapidly than we have suggested.

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Change in hours worked per week

Shorter hours of work can surely temper a worker's impatience with slowly rising weekly wages. The Shanghai work day has been shrinking over the course of time, from 10.61 hours in 1930 to perhaps 8 today.¹⁷ To the extent that we believe that today's worker has the option of working 10.61 hours, and chooses not to, we would judge his living-standard to have risen roughly 25% by this reduction in hours. In addition, the 1956 household supplied fewer workers to the labour force than the 1930 household, calling for a further upward revision in the 1956/1930 comparison. This sword cuts the other way for the 1973/1956 comparison. Virtually all of the increased household income in 1973 results from the addition of roughly one new wage-earner per household. This means that the added income has cost the household a reduction in leisure time and/or 'household' production. In an economy with few labour-saving household appliances, this cost may have been substantial.

Non-wage benefits

Early in the 1950s, the Chinese established a labour insurance system under which any worker whose income was interrupted for any reason other than simple unemployment was guaranteed a percentage of his salary. The same system provided medical benefits free of charge (and to dependents at half price). By 1956, this system covered 7.4 million workers and staff.¹⁸ By 1965, coverage had been extended to 20 million workers and staff.¹⁹ As Table 8.7 shows, in the years 1953-6, payments

Table 8.7. *Non-wage benefits, 1953-6*

	(billion current yuan)	% of wage bill
fringe benefits	4.394	12.8
enterprise bonus funds	0.406	1.2
people's scholarships	0.605	1.8

Source: 'Statistical materials concerning the improvement in the living standards of workers and staff', *T'ung-chi kung-tso*, 1957, 14, pp. 13-14, reproduced in *Kung nung ch'ün-chung sheng-huo chuang-k'uang tiao-ch'a tzu-liao* (*Census materials on the Living Conditions of the Agricultural and Industrial Masses*) (Sian: Shansi People's Publishing House, 1958), pp. 123-6. Fringe benefits (*fu-chia kung-tzu*) include labour insurance; worker and staff medical expenses; cultural, educational and welfare expenses of workers. Enterprise bonus funds had a variety of uses. People's scholarship funds were used for education of the children of workers and staff.

of this sort amounted to an effective 15.8% increase above the paid-out wage bill.

Extent and implications of rationing

Ever since the early 1950s, consumer goods in China have fallen into three categories: (1) goods whose prices are set by the state, and whose consumption is formally rationed via a coupon system; (2) goods whose prices are state-set, but whose consumption is not formally rationed (although if the state price is not market-clearing, queue rationing will occur); (3) goods sold freely at market-determined prices. By 1956, perhaps 40% of an urban worker's expenditures, and 50% of the goods in our market basket, fell into category 1, and most of the rest into category 2. Rationing of edible oils began in November 1953, of cotton cloth in September 1954, of grains in August 1955, of pork in November 1956, and of coal and kerosene in 1957.²⁰

There are two motivations for formal or informal rationing: to avoid a long-term price rise in the given good, or to avoid short-term price fluctuations. In the period up to 1956, only one good, housing, fell clearly under the first of these headings. Rents were clearly held below a market-clearing level through a combination of formal and informal rationing. The government's motivation here was a desire that housing be distributed on some basis other than money income. But for other rationed goods, the government's purpose was to avoid short-run price fluctuations, which would have posed both administrative and political problems. For these goods, then, the government attempted to set a price which would equate supply and demand over the long haul, and to achieve short-run balance via periodic rationing.²¹

What are the implications for our conclusions on rationing of this second sort? If the quantities in our 1956 market basket were long-run averages, then we could overlook rationing. But this is not always the case. It seems likely, for example, that grain consumption in 1956 was abnormally low, and that cotton cloth consumption was abnormally high.²² Generally, we can say that where rationing kept consumption of some goods below the level which would otherwise have prevailed at existing prices, and if the goods in question were goods whose 1956 quantities exceeded the 1930 quantities, then to correct for rationing we would wish to increase our estimate of the real income rise between 1930 and 1956; while if the rationed goods are those less heavily consumed in 1956 than in 1930, the reverse is true.²³ Intuitively, a

rationed good is more highly valued by consumers than its market price indicates. Then when we use prices to aggregate and compare market baskets, the weights on rationed goods are 'too low'. If the rationed goods are those which figure prominently in the 1956 basket, then the aggregated value of the 1956 basket is 'too small' relative to 1930. Of the 50% of 1956 consumption which was subject to rationing, half or slightly more of the rationed goods were goods whose quantities had increased substantially by 1956. Thus the biases introduced by rationing appear to be offsetting.

The implications for our second period, 1956-73, are considerably more severe, for two reasons. First, we have no physical quantity data for 1973. This means that we are more dependent than in the first comparison on the validity of our money income and price data, and we cannot evaluate the direction of bias, if any. Second, rationing by 1973 had become extremely widespread, and more sophisticated.²⁴ With the exception of fresh leafy vegetables and certain spices, all foodstuffs - grain, meat, fish, bean curd, sugar, salt, oil, etc. - are now rationed. Light industrial products are universally rationed, including for example cotton cloth, most synthetic cloth, soap, and light bulbs. Major consumer durables such as TVs, bicycles and sewing machines are usually subject to dual rationing: 'industrial certificates' (received on the basis of the worker's wage) are needed, and in addition the worker's employer (or some other collective group to which he belongs) must provide a specific allocation order out of the total allocation to that collective. Ration tickets may be specific to a particular good (usually the case for foodstuffs), or broadly generic (such as 'light industrial coupons', or 'industrial certificates'.) Some tickets carry a geographic limitation: grain coupons, for example, may be national (good anywhere in China), provincial, or municipal. Tickets may also carry time limitations. A monthly pork ration booklet may have fifteen numbered tickets, of which only the first five may be presented during the first ten days of the month. Tickets may be denominated in physical quantity, in value, or not at all. Most significant of all, the degree of access to goods which a particular ration coupon provides is subject to change by the government after the ticket is issued. For example, if a festival falls during the first ten days of the month, the meat vendors may announce that ticket no. 6, and perhaps even no. 7, may be used during that period. When the supply of bicycles is tight, the authorities may choose to equate supply and demand by stipulating that now, purchase of a bicycle must be accompanied by 45

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industrial certificates instead of 35. A pork ration ticket which last week allowed purchase of one *yuan* worth of pork, this week may allow purchase of two *yuan* worth.

These devices, now so widespread, permit the Chinese authorities to offset fluctuating supplies by raising or lowering the 'true' price (money plus ration tickets) while leaving the money price unchanged. In this respect, the rationing system betrays the same motivation that was paramount in 1956: to avoid apparent short-term price fluctuations. But with so widespread a system, it seems certain that the structure of consumption, and perhaps the overall level of consumption as well, have been affected, in the long as well as the short run.

How does this possibility affect our analysis of 1973 real income? Most importantly, it implies that our estimate of the increase in consumer prices (15%) is probably too low. A pound of pork now costs its *yuan* price (roughly unchanged since 1956) *plus* a certain number of ration tickets. The black-market price of those coupons must be added to the *yuan* price to judge the 'true' price of pork in 1973. (This is true even if the purchaser is using his own ration coupons, since he has the alternative of selling them on the black market.) Then the appropriate measure of the price level is the weighted average of goods prices adjusted in this manner. Such a measure would surely show an increase of more than 15% between 1956 and 1973, although the extent is unclear. Whether this would cause us to revise our estimate of the change in real income depends on the (black-market) value of the coupons which each family receives from the government. If 'adjusted' prices have risen an extra 10% since 1956, but the black-market value of coupon tickets issued to families has increased their money income by 10% as well, then our estimate remains unchanged. Since we lack this sort of information, we can only say that the existence of widespread rationing and an active black market in ration coupons widens the margin of error which we must place around our estimate for 1973.


CONCLUSION

The quantitative work of the preceding pages provides a broad sense of the trend in real incomes of industrial worker households in Shanghai: during both periods, real incomes rose, although at relatively slow rates. It is important to place these results in a broader context, by considering why they might be useful. We might wish to use this information to evaluate the performance of the Chinese economy (and,

implicitly, of the government) during the two periods. If so, our conclusion would be that as far as industrial workers were concerned, there was little to choose between economic policy in the two periods. If, on the other hand, we wish to apply these results to an estimate of the worker's state of mind – to hazard a guess at whether he grew happier or less content – then it becomes important to explain *how* the increase in living-standards was achieved.

First, was the increase steady, or cyclical? In the case of both our periods, it was the latter. Incomes presumably rose up to (or into) the Second World War, then fell, then rose again up to 1952 or 1953, and remained roughly constant up to 1956. In the second period, incomes at first rose, then fell during the crisis years of the early 1960s, and rose amid continued fluctuations from 1962 or 1963 onward. Second, did families provide more labour to the market, or less? Here, the two periods contrast. 1956 families achieved higher incomes than in 1930 despite roughly 25–35% less work. 1973 families, if they achieved any increase in purchasing power over 1956, did so only by increasing labour-force participation by roughly 40%. It seems likely that the 1973 family, then, felt impatient for further income increases. (The wage increases of 1977–8 are an implicit confirmation of this conclusion.) Third, many of the intangible aspects of worker welfare – equal income distribution, fringe benefits, social security programmes of various sorts – increased sharply, and in a once-and-for-all fashion, in the 1950s. This again diminishes the extent to which real income increases between 1956 and 1973 could have increased worker satisfaction.

Quantitative estimates of welfare, such as these, never fail to draw the fire of social scientists and historians whose questions are of a broader sort. The considerations raised here, as well as the qualifications which we have placed around our estimates, are a tacit recognition of the need for scepticism. But before we can move beyond mere numbers, we must have at a minimum a proximate sense, no matter how hedged about with caveats, of what those numbers show.



Map of Greater Shanghai.

PART FOUR
THE SUBURBAN TRANSFORMATION

9

SHANGHAI-SUBURB RELATIONS,
1949-1966

Lynn T. White III

Shanghai is China's largest 'city'. The meaning of this fact is less evident, and may be more interesting, than it first seems. Social scientists often distinguish 'urban' areas from 'rural' ones; but they run into problems, because many social processes obviously cross the line. In traditional times, walls made the division clear. Modern, developed cities have torn down their walls in favour of wide suburban streets, which link grey and green areas instead of dividing them.

Gideon Sjoberg refers with splendid disdain to 'city-limit sociology'. The problem with an emphasis on urban boundaries is that it obscures as much as it illuminates about the complex webs of human activity that centre on cities, but also spread out far from them. Around Shanghai, for example, there is a belt of ten rural counties, called 'suburbs' (*shih-chiao*). They are included in the political jurisdiction of Shanghai municipality, which is a province-level unit in the Chinese administrative system. It may be argued that these suburbs are essentially 'rural', or that they are essentially 'urban', or that they are something in between. In fact, their economic functions are thoroughly mixed between agriculture and industry. This is a region that grows largely industrial crops and vegetables for city use, in economic units whose mode of organization resembles a factory as much as it resembles most farms. In comparison with more truly rural areas, this region uses

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more fertilizer, has larger commercial accounting units, sends more family members to work in city factories, and has an atypically modern communications system – and political style. It also has much industry, both heavy and light. It is heavily populated. The landscape of the suburbs is green and rural, but their functions are increasingly integrated by buses and barges into a huge metropolis that is grey and urban.

Conceivably the 'urban' areas might be defined to extend as far as people live at high density. If this kind of measure, in the form of a standard density threshold, is used to determine Shanghai's boundary, then this city is probably the eighth largest in the world.¹ Kiangsu province, which surrounds most of Shanghai municipality and used to include it administratively, averaged 436 people per square kilometre in the early 1950s. This was the greatest density in any Chinese province, 37% higher than the second densest (Shantung).² Average concentrations in the flat part of southern Kiangsu, close to our main focus of interest at Shanghai, may well have been ten or twenty times greater. The middle of Shanghai is one of the most densely populated places on earth. More than 100,000 persons live on each square kilometre in the central parts of the city.³

In the suburban counties, the traditional network of canals makes transport between fields and towns exceptionally efficient.⁴ Thus commercial distribution in the broad, combined rural 'suburbs' of Shanghai, Soochow, and Wuhsi in fact occurs on a single huge market. There is much to trade, because the riverine deltaic land is fertile (except for saline strips near the coast). The annual days of sunlight are sufficient to allow a multi-crop paddy agriculture, whose caloric yield per unit of land is very high. This is the basis of the dense rural populations.

The triangle of land above Hangchow Bay, below the Yangtze River, and east of Lake T'ai is thus an unusual platform for economic and political development. It is certainly not typical of China as a whole. Only a few other large environments in the world are demographically comparable. Cultural, political, and economic exchanges flow easily between green places and grey ones through this area.

PRE-1949: INHERITED MODERNITY ON THE YANGTZE FLATLAND

The traditional canal system of the Shanghai delta, and the political and cultural syndromes that derived from it, make this area interesting

from a comparative perspective. The city-country interface is regularly a problem in general studies of development. Many political scientists have studied the rate at which urban immigrants from rural areas make new demands on urban institutions. In most developing nations, the state is an urban institution. Many economists advocate the wide dispersal of resources all over a developing country, so that labour-intensive kinds of enterprise may be promoted and dualism between the urban and rural sectors may not become too severe. It is unnecessary to detail these researches here,⁵ but their relevance to the atypical east China delta – where urban and rural styles are traditionally difficult to distinguish from each other – should be evident.

Two types of cities emerged on the delta before 1949. First, there were administrative centres, whose foremost example is Soochow. These 'orthogenetic' cities (to use Redfield's word) were 'parasitic' (Hoselitz). They were 'political-intellectual centres' (Pirenne), where the grain tax was administered. A particular kind of moral culture was upheld in exams there, to certify administrators. Frederick Mote has adduced much evidence from the physical layout of traditional Chinese cities, from their types of urban buildings and clothing, from the importance of rural elements in the old urban culture, and from market patterns, to argue that city-country relations at such places in China were generally different from those of the West.⁶

There was also another kind of city, based on imported culture, of which the foremost example in China was undoubtedly Shanghai. Such a 'heterogenetic' city was 'generative' of growth, an 'economic centre' for the surrounding countryside (the terms are respectively those of Redfield, Hoselitz, and Pirenne). Shanghai's skyline, clothing, food, politics, and social structure were different from those of traditional centres like Soochow. Even the boundary of its built-up area was fairly distinct, because the productivity in agriculture of any land at the edge was high. Nonetheless, the pervasive canal system connected modern cities like Shanghai or Woosung to the countryside just as surely as they connected more traditional places like Soochow or K'unshan.

Scholars have disputed the particular effects of urban development on nearby rural 'suburbs'. Two broad schools of thought predominate in this field. The first can be represented by Fei Hsiao-t'ung, the most prominent Chinese anthropologist, who in 1939 published a village study of K'aihsienkung, near Lake T'ai and close to the present borders of Shanghai. Fei attributed the rise of tenancy and the decline of rural industry there to the influence of absentee capital and

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industrial competition from new cities.⁷ This view is consonant with research by Chen Han-seng and R. H. Tawney. But a second and opposite kind of argument appears in the writings of H. D. Fong, M. Yang, J. Potter, and R. Myers,⁸ who point out that the dynamic industrial growth of places like Shanghai created more, not fewer, sources of stable income for adjacent rural areas. According to this second line of thought, the establishment of new urban markets for rural products, and of new jobs for urban immigrants who retained links to village families, made the peasants less dependent on the vagaries of weather for their sustenance. It may also have increased their mobility into new and more complex social roles.

The present aim is not to take a position in this debate, but to explore its bases. The two schools of thought agree that 'cities' influenced suburban 'countryside'. That point of agreement may well be more important than their differences, which concern moot attempts to calculate the net effects of these changes on village and city life. The dispute has been more useful in emphasizing the web of interrelations between city and country than in estimating the costs and benefits of modernization for each of them as if they were really separable.

Fei or Tawney, like Fong or Myers, all suggest the dependency of rural and urban areas on each other. These contending arguments on domestic Chinese relationships began before the more famous debates about international Latin American *dependencia*. In each case, the connections between suburbs and metropolitan centres were emphasized by scholars, who differed mainly on the benefits of these connections. Built into each of these discussions is an implicit query: How neat is the distinction between centre and periphery, in the first place? The Shanghai case may serve to show the importance of this question.

1949-51: LIBERATION AND LAND REFORM

It was not local support that brought the communist government to power in east China. In 1949, General Ch'en Yi's Third Field Army took the Yangtze delta only because it had garnered political resources elsewhere. There had been some local Communist guerrilla activity in marshes west of Shanghai during the late 1930s, but the Japanese were finally able to establish a 'Model Peace Zone' in the delta during most of the Pacific War. Their collaborationist mayor of Shanghai, Ch'en

Kung-po, officiated over a region that saw less conflict, and less incorporation of village militias into Communist military bands, than was common at the same time in the foothills surrounding the North China Plain.⁹ In east China, peasant nationalism was politically less important than bourgeois and proletarian kinds of nationalism.¹⁰ The peasant nationalism that brought Communists to power in Shanghai was not a local product. Nonetheless, some of the most important Communist leaders whose forces arrived in Shanghai had extensive city experience before their guerrilla days.¹¹ Many (including Chou En-lai) were from east China; and others were urban too, despite certain rustic airs.

For many months after May 1949, when Communist military officers took the delta, their principal concerns were to preserve order, to win the civil war in the south, and to cajole bureaucrats from the Nationalist period back to work. Other policies, especially policies for rural areas, had low priority. There were not enough loyal cadres available to implement even the main goals quickly. Land reform in the Yangtze delta was nearly as delayed as that in the comparable Pearl River delta, which was liberated five months later.¹² Following the autumn harvest of 1949, many rich peasants, as well as poor and middle ones, joined new Communist-sponsored peasants' associations in the delta. Not until March 1950 did an assembly of 500 representatives establish the Shanghai Suburban Peasants' Association (*Shang-hai shih-chiao nung-min hsieh-hui*).¹³ It was the end of June before Peking sent down an Agrarian Reform Law – and a fairly moderate one, at that. To implement it, Jao Shu-shih, chairman of the East China Military Administration Committee, indicated that landlords' surplus capital would be taken for redistribution, and this included animals, tools, surplus grain, surplus housing, and land. But he also suggested that implementation of the land reform would be slow and accommodating, in such a productive area: 'In the Shanghai-Nanking-Hangchow-Ningpo region, where population is concentrated and foodstuffs are short, the technology of agricultural production is relatively advanced.' In this area, only 'rich peasants of a semi-landlord type' were directly harmed; most of their rented-out land was requisitioned without compensation, but also without struggles. 'The rented-out land of all other rich peasants should as a rule not be touched.'¹⁴ Even 'rich peasants of a semi-landlord type' were allowed to keep fields that they had previously worked with hired labour.

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The new government in east China was clearly wary of harming rural production, especially near an industrial base that had not yet fully recovered from the effects of World War, Civil War, and Kuomintang blockade. Jao Shu-shih was frankly conservative in saying: 'Agrarian reform should not be carried out this autumn or winter in those areas where land ownership and tenancy are too complicated and a successful leadership cannot be ensured (for instance, in the suburbs of certain big cities, or in the neighbouring districts of the suburbs), despite the fact that the masses are well-qualified to take up the work.'¹⁵ In November, Peking announced a special amendment to the Agrarian Reform Law, especially for suburbs. It provided that the timing of reform would be left to local governments, and that city governments should draw up their own schedules and submit them to the Regional Military Administration Committees (MACs) or province-level governments for approval.¹⁶ Since Shanghai had province status, and since the leadership of the relevant MAC was virtually identical to that of the city, this amendment provided great local autonomy.

The central government also published a handbook for cadres conducting land reform in the suburbs of large cities.¹⁷ These special rules emphasized that suburban agricultural output was essential for urban markets, and 'many landlords are also industrialists or businessmen'. Furthermore, 'in suburban villages, many residents are not peasants. They are mostly poor people and unemployed workers from the city.'¹⁸

In the suburbs at this time, crops were planted, grown, harvested, and distributed by organizations that increasingly resembled industry more than agriculture. Communications systems and local administrative services in the delta were more like those in cities than those in the hills of Szechwan or Kwangsi. Land and labour resources were increasingly allocated to industrial rather than agricultural uses. Under these circumstances, the Shanghai government developed a two-tier system to certify suburban land ownership after the reform. Formally, all pre-Liberation deeds were declared invalid, and new deed decisions during the mild 1950 post-harvest reform were recorded in 'land ownership certificates' (*t'u-ti so-yu cheng*). But much of the refugee and landlord property that became available was distributed only on the basis of 'state-owned land use certificates' (*kuo-yu t'u-ti shih-yung cheng*).¹⁹ Most property that had previously belonged to family meetings, temples, churches, schools, and urban industrialists and merchants was

'purchased by the government' and doled out under this second kind of certificate. Urbanites' 'investments in the suburbs which are advantageous to agricultural development' were 'protected', and special rules applied to land owned by revolutionary soldiers, Overseas Chinese, dependants of revolutionary martyrs, and 'workers'. The cadres' handbook was so flexible that it strengthened the officials who were sent down from Shanghai with the mandate to implement it without upsetting suburban production. It forged new links between suburbs and city.

Land reform in the flat delta brought home to peasants the power and determination of the new Chinese government more surely than any other early policy did. Nevertheless, there was less violence and less conflict between local and non-local people in implementing the reform near Shanghai than occurred in other areas, even relatively rich ones such as Kwangtung. Nationally established rules clearly favoured capitalist owners over landlords, but many rentiers in the delta could more or less legitimately claim to be in the bourgeois category, on account of their urban connections. The property of entrepreneurs who promised to build new factories or housing on their land within three years was exempted from reform.²⁰ The stepwise raising of land-reform goals that Vogel describes for Kwangtung²¹ also pertained in east China, and followed much the same schedule, although this experience was less severe in Shanghai.

At the time of spring planting in 1951, land reform was declared 'complete' in some suburban areas. Despite the obvious political implications of this change in the suburbs, the leadership placed surprising emphasis on the purely technical benefits of the reform. Canals were deepened for better irrigation. High-yield seeds were provided at low prices by the government (particularly for improved cotton, an industrial crop). Meetings were called at which peasants declared a willingness to produce specific quotas – a move toward planning, and toward further integration of the green and grey areas.²² On this basis, peasant associations increased their membership during the main 1951 growth season, and the Shanghai branch of the People's Bank liberalized its agricultural loan policies for them.²³

In May 1951, urban household registration procedures were tightened.²⁴ Struggle meetings in the suburbs became somewhat more severe during the autumn, largely because the 'Three Anti' and 'Five Anti' movements in cities and the Korean War abroad both made China's political atmosphere generally more tense. During the autumn,

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especially after harvest, meetings directed against landlords became harsh in some areas. A few death sentences were executed upon particularly recalcitrant landlords, in places where government officials considered the reform to be incomplete. Many of the persons under attack in the suburbs moved to Shanghai and tried to change their identities. This was the most drastic of all post-Liberation campaigns in the suburban delta, but it was less violent in east China than in areas such as Szechwan, where the landlord system had been more oppressive. An indication of the mixed tenor of this time is the fact that local grain taxes in the suburbs were less progressive after the harvest of 1951 than after that of 1950.²⁵ The 1951 move toward a tax that did less to level incomes in Shanghai suburbs partly reflects the ownership changes that occurred in some places that year, but it also reflects the government's will to raise rural production incentives.²⁶

1952-56: RATIONS, CO-OPERATIVES, AND URBAN EXTENSION TO THE SUBURBS

Most projects for direct urban extension to the suburbs awaited the end of land reform, because of other demands on sparse cadre resources. In the fields of basic education and schistosomiasis (liver fluke) control, however, some progress was made early. The Municipal Education Bureau doubled the number of part-time schools in Shanghai's suburbs from 1949 to the end of land reform.²⁷ During the slack months of 1951-2, a Shanghai Suburbs Peasant Education Committee²⁸ began campaigns for 'winter study' (*tung hsüeh*), to teach literacy. In the next few years, many trade unions and other urban agencies sponsored cultural activities and film showings in rural areas near the city.²⁹ In addition, large numbers of medical personnel from urban hospitals had been temporarily sent down to army barracks and other suburban places, to fight schistosomiasis, a disease that crucially delayed the Communists' 1950 plans to capture Taiwan.³⁰

Economic projects were the most important spurs to urban-suburban integration. Industrial changes were based on two different kinds of semi-rural technology: either scaled-down 'modern' technology or traditional techniques employed in more differentiated kinds of organization.³¹ Official encouragement for the first kind of rural change took the form of simpler procedures enabling Shanghai enterprises (still mostly private) to set up rural construction projects.³² On the other hand, modern marketing and sub-contracting arrangements sometimes caused a re-

naissance of purely traditional production techniques. When imported methods of advertising and commercial management were used to distribute the products of cottage industry such as embroidered bedspreads and silk apparel, they expanded the market for suburban handicrafts and spurred industrial organization in these old peasant activities.³³

Agricultural marketing changes were just as important as industrial changes for intensifying urban aspects of the green suburbs. The 1953 census – which included an effort by the Shanghai police to list, by name, all members of all households in the urban area – became the basis for issuing grain ration tickets in 1954. It coincided with the organization of conferences for rural cadres from Shanghai's suburbs and from nearby areas of Kiangsu, to approve state grain-purchasing policies. The official purpose underlying these steps was to extract and use the urban food supply more efficiently.³⁴

Not all of the agricultural links between city and suburb were governmental, or even legal. By 1954, some entrepreneurs in Chiating and Sungchiang counties were illegally buying large quantities of rice and soya beans, secretly transporting them to Shanghai, and selling on the black market.³⁵ These counties were still part of Kiangsu, but even before they were incorporated into Shanghai's own province (during the Great Leap), both official and unofficial agencies there had worked to intensify connections with the urban system of the delta.

The most important constraint the government faced in moving from land reform to co-operatives was a shortage of rural managers, particularly accountants, for these quasi-industrial units in the green area. The government's efforts to train such people, and to staff the big new farms, were indistinguishable from its effort to train socialist businessmen to oversee industries in the city proper. From 1949, certain Leftist university students, loyal 'retained cadres' (*liu-yung kan-pu*) from Kuomintang days, and talented trade unionists, were schooled in book-keeping. Some of these cadres were assigned to suburban branches of state economic agencies. In addition, urban workers in Shanghai who came originally from the suburbs were available to be trained for later supervisory jobs in rural areas. As one source put it, 'Many of the peasants are dependants of workers', who were thus 'demanding to be organized' along more industrial lines.³⁶ In any case, some of these peasant-workers were put into accountancy and loyalty courses.

Only three 'lower-level' Agricultural Producers' Co-operatives (APCs) had been established in the suburbs by the end of 1952.³⁷ One

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year later the number had increased almost to 400.³⁸ Co-operativization in some areas went slowly. For example, by the end of 1953 in Nanhui county, which is one of Shanghai's less prosperous suburbs, more than 2,000 Mutual Aid Teams had been formed, but only two Co-operatives.³⁹ Shanghai journals pointedly praised poor peasants who were given official stipends to study accounting and then returned to their agricultural suburban units to help set up the new Co-operatives.⁴⁰

By the end of 1954, over 900 Co-operatives had been established in the Shanghai suburbs, and one out of every four peasant households had joined.⁴¹ After the 1955 harvest, partly because other areas had not supplied Shanghai's grain need well that year,⁴² the local government pushed for more centralized rural management. Soong Ching-ling (San Yat-sen's widow) was sent into neighbouring Sungchiang county, Kiangsu, to allay the 'worries of middle peasants when taking part in co-operative work'.⁴³ By mid-November, three out of every five peasants in Shanghai had joined Co-operatives; and by 5 January, four out of every five had done so. With Soviet models in the background, three tractor stations and various new transmission lines and irrigation systems were planned for the suburbs.⁴⁴

The schedule for complete co-operativization, originally planned at the end of 1955 for the end of 1957, was sharply accelerated and changed during the quick 1956 'socialization of industry' in grey Shanghai. Even before the mid-January 1956 Lunar New Year, lion dances and parades celebrated the full collectivization of the farming economy of Shanghai.⁴⁵ A conference of representatives of APCs from the suburban areas was attended by 2,000 rural delegates. At a ceremonial meeting in the middle of town, a member of the Municipal People's Congress 'announced on the spot' that all the red-envelope applications, which the peasants brought to request authorization for their collectives, would be accepted. Probably no one in attendance was sure exactly what this would mean on the ground, but the grand community celebration was cheerful, and it duplicated exactly the festivities surrounding the simultaneous change in Shanghai's urban industry. The Co-operatives were treated like factories.

1955-57: LIBERALS, TYPHOONS, AND COMPROMISES

The red banners and vague gaiety surrounding this basic ownership change represented an inversion of the spirit of struggle meetings.

This salubrious mood suited the quasi-liberal *Zeitgeist* of urban China during 1956-7. The local party newspaper assured readers: 'Many landlords and rich peasants have undergone reform through labour', so 'those who have relatively good records' might 'change their status and be called "peasants"'.⁴⁶ It was decreed that such people should not be elected to leading posts in Co-operatives. But even former landlords who had mediocre political records could become ordinary Co-operative members. No wage discrimination was to be allowed against them, and their offspring were classed as ordinary 'peasants'. Shanghai Co-operatives quickly implemented these provisions.⁴⁷

Expansiveness was also evident in the large sizes of the new suburban organizations. Conferences were held in Shanghai to sponsor amalgamations of rural units. Detailed information was published about Hsienfeng (Vanguard) APC, the largest one in the suburbs, which comprised 3,000 families on 16,000 *mou* of land. It included four villages (T'angnan, P'engp'u, Paohsing, and Chennan), as well as parts of Hsinhua Township and Fenshui and Tach'ang boroughs. For the 14,000 people living there, Hsienfeng superseded these previous administrative units in importance.⁴⁸

Now that socialization had legitimized Shanghai's main farming units, municipal cadres devoted more resources to them. A city-run state company was charged with 'planting trees and flowers' in the suburbs.⁴⁹ From urban Shanghai middle schools, 40,000 students were mobilized in three days of January 1956 to go to nearby fields and pull schistosomiasis snails out of the mud.⁵⁰ The most important suburban project was electrification. Transmission lines already existed along the main delta railways (connecting Shanghai with Hangchow, Soochow, and Woosung), and the initial grid of electric lines long predated 1957.⁵¹ But local feeders, for power irrigation near small towns, were now undertaken. On 1 July 1956 the first large power irrigation system was inaugurated in the western suburbs of the city, to increase vegetable growth for urban consumption.⁵² Urban instructors, students, workers from the newly socialized electric machinery factories, peasants, and soldiers from local barracks all helped to set up 103 electric pump stations and to dig artificial catchment basins that served 71,000 *mou* of land, farmed by 11,800 families. The government quickly organized the rural technical workers in this campaign to form a rural 'trade union' (*kung-hui*: but the term in Chinese really means 'work association' - which states the meaning better in this case).⁵³ The steering committee of this Shanghai Agriculture Water Conservancy

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Union consisted entirely of 'peasants', but they provided the infrastructure for a new, non-traditional kind of farming.

To distribute new suburban produce, the already high efficiency of the old canal system in the flatlands had to be raised further. This could easily be done. More barges could be built, and reinforced concrete was found to be a cheap building material for them. They could be motorized to carry heavier loads quickly. And Shanghai's boat people could be offered some government services and encouraged to live onshore if they were willing. If they were not willing, they could be compelled by economic necessity and new technology to hitch their boats in collective trains, behind officially controlled new canal tugs.⁵⁴

The crops from Shanghai suburbs increasingly consisted of vegetables, cotton, and pork, rather than grain. Although the reported suburban acreage in rice had increased by 77% between 1949 and 1956, the acreage in wheat had declined by 23%.⁵⁵ During the *First Five Year Plan*, Shanghai scored worse than any other province-level unit in fulfilling the planned increase of grain production. It scored higher than any other province-level unit in fulfilling the planned increase in cotton.⁵⁶ The municipal government clearly was not forcing national planners' mandates on suburban peasants. Hog-raising was encouraged, partly to feed urban demand for protein and partly to supply organic fertilizer. By 1956, the number of hogs in the suburbs had increased 566% since 1949, and the acreage planted to corn had gone up 380%.⁵⁷ To encourage still more pig production, the local wholesale price of pork was raised by 11% the following year.

A major 1956 typhoon may have spurred rural collectivism somewhat, and in any case government pressure caused all but 4% of Shanghai's peasant households to be co-operativized by mid-February 1957.⁵⁸ The quick expansion of related administrative tasks caused problems. It was reported of some new APC cadres that they 'are not democratic in their work style. Some of them even accept bribes. Certain co-operative members do not care for co-operative property, and especially they do not take care of draught oxen.'⁵⁹

In this quasi-liberal time, the peasants could air their own grievances. Suburban farmer Shen Yu-ming, for example, testified before the Shanghai People's Congress to criticize the state food companies for excessive commercial profit margins.⁶⁰ As the national political climate liberalized still further in the spring of 1957, resentments caused by co-operativized distribution of the typhoon losses in 1956 were fully expressed. Under the headline, 'Is Co-operativization Disadvantageous

to Middle Peasants?' a Shanghai newspaper wrote sheepishly in the following terms:

Not all middle peasants had their 1956 income reduced after joining the co-operatives . . . but some, mainly the upper-middle peasants, did have lower incomes. This is because they previously hired temporary workers, rented their oxen to other peasants, and ran sideline businesses before they joined the Co-operatives. Since then, they have not participated in these slightly exploitative activities . . . Because upper-middle peasants have been given little work in the division of labour, their income has of course gone down . . . Some people hold that in Co-operatives, poor peasants take advantage of middle peasants.⁶¹

A well-off peasant from Sungchiang county (then in Kiangsu) provided a Shanghai newspaper with statistics to assure readers that his situation was still prosperous. His income – receipts minus taxes, fertilizer costs, and tool costs – was 330 *yuan* for the year preceding collectivization. In the Co-operative, he had earned 400 work points, worth 1.2 *yuan* each, and his resulting 480 *yuan* were clear of costs for taxes, fertilizers, and tools, which were now all borne collectively. While suggesting that this case was not typical, the newspaper argued that any peasants who worked hard could still increase their incomes.⁶²

The Suburban Work Committee of the municipal Party ordered all APCs to report the percentages of their members whose incomes had decreased during the 1956 typhoon season.⁶³ At this time, some resources were specially earmarked for use on private plots where production was more efficient for some perishable and other commodities. When a suburban Co-operative member claimed that municipal grain companies were reducing the amount of feed available for local hogs, his complaint was published in a newspaper.⁶⁴ Wang Ch'iu-ken, chief of the North Suburban District, and Chang Yü-hsiu, director of Kuangming APC, complained that restaurants and mess halls in the city were selling swill (kitchen refuse, *kan-chiao*) commercially rather than allowing rural units to have it free. 'With their lips, they talk about the worker-peasant alliance; but in fact, they try to disintegrate the worker-peasant alliance.'⁶⁵

The government made special efforts to publicize the prosperity of the APCs and their benefits to the grey city. For the Spring Festival of 1957, Shanghai imported 100,000 hogs, which were fattened at stations in the suburbs before being consumed.⁶⁶ For the same holidays, 10,000 quintals (*tan*) of living fish were brought to a lake run by the municipality at Fangchiayao in Ch'ingpu county, Kiangsu. Even Easter

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received its due, and 'Christian members of APCs on the outskirts of Shanghai were given special time off to celebrate this festival'.⁶⁷

Considering the number of published urban protests against Party rule during the height of the Hundred Flowers in May, surprisingly few such blooms came from the suburbs. Everyone recognized that many of the 1956 problems in the suburbs had been caused by the typhoon. The municipal Party relied more on low-level leaderships in its APCs than in its factories; and accordingly, its share of the rural mistakes was lower. Above all, the old canal and communications system really did support quasi-industrial accounting units of APC size. For all these reasons, the impact of the Hundred Flowers on rural affairs came not from springtime criticisms, but from the latter effects of the Anti-rightist Campaign and Great Leap Forward.

1957-58: RUSTICATED BUREAUCRATS AND ADDED COUNTIES

As early as July 1957, the whole leadership of Shanghai – government and opposition alike – began to pour into its rural outskirts. Urban bureaucrats were sent out because they had been criticized and needed more serious labour experience. The 'rightist' critics were sent out because their criticisms revealed faulty ideas that might be reformed in rural work. Many of the early rusticates were soldiers, who helped with the 1957 summer wheat harvest and rice transplantation⁶⁸ – and possibly also worked out basic logistics for the groups of civilians that followed.

The 1957 summer also saw the first large-scale rustication of school graduates from Shanghai. In a single, unified campaign, they were signed up to go to the suburbs, to counties such as Paoshan and Fenghsien, which were not yet incorporated into Shanghai, and to tea-growing areas in southern Anhwei. They served largely as accountants, shipment expeditors, and animal feeders.⁶⁹ This was the first large-scale rustication of educated youths to the countryside.⁷⁰ It was by no means the first *hsia-fang*. Rustication policies had been used before, usually to accomplish specific tasks;⁷¹ but they were not residential and general rustications of the kind that began in 1957 and have continued later among school graduates.

Rural styles of life were pressed on urban youth in 1957-8 more seriously than ever before. A Shanghai All-City Pig-Feeding Champion, Miss Yao Feng-chu from the eastern suburbs, was propagandized as a heroine at this time. It was no bourgeois beauty

contest that she won. She awoke each day at 4:30 a.m., to prepare several thousand *catties* of hog feed, fetch 60 to 70 buckets of water and wash the sties. Such an excellent worker could maintain almost 100 collectively owned hogs, plus three more privately on the side.⁷² Few urban youths had Yao's rural competence, but many studied it.

In August, 18 APCs formed a Joint Committee to Recruit Co-operative Members among middle-school graduates in Shanghai city.⁷³ The establishment of Co-operatives made it a bit easier to assimilate urban people into rural work. At this time procedures were established whereby peasant Co-operative members could test students' qualifications before voting on their admission to full membership.

The allowance of gradual stages in the commitment of urbanites and suburbanites to each other made for flexibility in the assignment of people from urban to rural work. A minor drought in the delta area in the autumn of 1957 quickly brought urban aid. Students, teachers, and administrators in units that ranged from Commerce Bureaux to People's Courts - all turned out to join the Resist Drought Campaign.⁷⁴ The whole management of Nanyang Tobacco Company was ordered, one Sunday, to board suburban buses to the east and north suburbs, where they spent the day carrying water. At night, they were bused back into the grey part of the city.

A Socialist Education Campaign⁷⁵ was launched at the Rural Work Conference called by Shanghai Party cadres on 25 September 1957. At this closed meeting, 431 urban and rural officials planned to accommodate the city folk whom they scheduled to flood the suburbs during the next few months. By December, 'in order to struggle for a Great Leap in agricultural production in 1958', many kinds of urban and suburban units divided their personnel into groups that could be rotated from fields to offices, so that no collapse of urban administrative services would occur.⁷⁶ The East District of the suburbs moved its whole government office to a relatively small village named Chingnan.⁷⁷ Following this lead, the first Party secretaries of all the suburban districts shifted their staffs to co-operatives, where they were joined by related cadres from the People's Procuracy, the Public Security Bureau, the Youth League, and also several urban districts.⁷⁸ Six functional offices of the North Suburban District, for example, joined to form a delegation of 318 cadres, including 23 with the rank of section chief or above, who all 'went down' to be stationed in townships.⁷⁹

Rustication was intensified among three functional groups: doctors,

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soldiers, and teachers. In late 1957, a group of medics went for three months to work in villages.⁸⁰ Shanghai No. 1 Hospital celebrated the 1958 New Year by using the vacation to send a medical corps on tour through the northern suburbs.⁸¹ The commander of the Shanghai Garrison in January ordered large numbers of his troops to help peasants dig more canals in the delta.⁸² When the Great Leap intensified in the spring, many people came out of the grey city for short periods to help with planting and literacy campaigns.

Where urbanites went, urban capital followed. An 'industrial district' was established at Minhsing, on the Hwangpoo River south of Shanghai, by 1956, but little construction took place there until 1958.⁸³ Three other industrial districts were projected on the northern outskirts at P'engp'u (for a machine-building centre), to the southwest at Ts'aohoching (instruments and watches), and in Taop'u to the northwest (chemicals).⁸⁴ Although planning for these and other projects had been afoot for some time, the Great Leap speeded the investment of all resources in them. Many Co-operatives were eager to become less agricultural. Co-operatives lobbied openly for industrial capital, in the hope of creating new local jobs. Within a week of the time it became known that the Shanghai No. 1 Iron and Steel Company was looking for land on which to build a subsidiary blast furnace, a suburban co-operative offered space and clinched the deal.⁸⁵

In 1958, the extent of the Shanghai suburbs changed sharply. In January, three large new rural counties, Chiating, Paoshan, and Hsinchuang (also called Shanghai county), were added to the province-level city.⁸⁶ On 12 December, the municipality was expanded to include seven more counties: Chinshan, Ch'ingp'u, Ch'uansha, Ch'ungming, Fenghsien, Nanhui, and Sungchiang. This vast extension of Shanghai's territory – and the three or four million citizens who lived there – obviously expanded the opportunities faced by suburban planners. Many of these counties had close connections with Shanghai before 1958, but formal incorporation made the marriage legitimate.

These regional changes, approved by the State Council in Peking, were aimed at creating a Shanghai that could be self-sufficient in most non-grain commodities. By April, the three nearby counties were already planning to increase production of non-staples (particularly hogs and chickens) and to plant over 300,000 new fruit trees.⁸⁷ By 17 December, only five days after Ch'uansha county became part of Shanghai, a new Ch'uansha programme to produce more vegetables and meat was announced.⁸⁸ The local increase in self-sufficiency at this

time laid one of the bases for Shanghai politicians' greater independence and importance on the national scene in subsequent years.

Shanghai leaders, in particular the new party secretary K'o Ch'ing-shih, had apparently convinced the national elite that their city had done a good job in its earlier, restricted suburbs and deserved a wider area. This decision may also have been expedited by the fact that Shanghai remitted large taxes to Peking throughout the *First Five Year Plan*. Shanghai's expansion was based on traditionally strong links between city and country in the delta.

1958-62: OVER-URBANIZATION

Closer connections between the green and grey cities meant that Great Leap policies quickly spread from central Shanghai to its 'rural' counties. It meant also that the effects of these changes rebounded just as quickly back to the metropolis.


Shanghai was not among the pioneer areas to set up People's Communes. This campaign started in Suip'ing, Honan; then spread especially to Jokan, Liaoning, and Chuchi, Chekiang, whence it spread to Heilungkiang, Kirin, Shensi, Shansi, Anhwei, Kiangsu, Fukien, Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and the suburbs of Peking, before Shanghai leaders acted on the idea at all. The first 62 Communes in Shanghai Municipality were set up only in September 1958 in response to the Party Central Committee's practically mandatory *Decision on the Problems of Establishing People's Communes in the Countryside*. By the end of September, 98% of all households in China had joined Communes. Shanghai's leaders could not have delayed longer.⁸⁹

The average population of these new agricultural units was about 60,000 near Shanghai, much higher than the national average. It is possible, as G. William Skinner argues,⁹⁰ that local communications were too underdeveloped to handle crops from such populous agricultural units effectively. But the lower Yangtze's canal system allowed more efficient transport than in any other large part of China. It is also highly probable that span-of-control problems, inherent in the size of the first Communes, made them nothing more than nominal, umbrella-like organizations.

By June 1959, Shanghai had more than 100 Communes.⁹¹ Each of these massive farms included one or several townships (*hsiang*) and often a central town (*chen*). The Anti-rightist movement, which in late 1957 had increased the staffs of township committees, was a prerequisite

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to the Leap. For example, in Hsinchuang county the townships of Paonan, Huats'un, Shangchung, Hsinchuang, Chuhang, and Hungch'iao, along with Ch'ipao Town, amalgamated to form the Ch'iyi People's Commune.⁹² This unit, in the rich vegetable and cash-crop area near the grey city, included 74 previous APCs (with 12 brigades, 110 teams, 719 natural villages, 109,000 people, and about 100,000 *mou* of land). Some units were larger and even less 'rural' than this. Hungch'i Commune, just across the Hwangpoo from the big city, had as many as 527,000 people.



Land use in the Shanghai province – level unit.

Most Shanghai Communes, however, were smaller. The initial group averaged 38 previous APCs. Some outlying ones, such as Hengsha Commune (which administers the island of the same name) contained only 15 APCs, which had previously been organized in a single township. Many examples suggest that the size of Communes varied inversely according to their distance from the metropolis.⁹³

The Shanghai modernizers' first impulse, to set up huge marketing units, was related to the already quasi-urban nature of the countryside. The main function of Communes was still agricultural; but their mode of organization was industrial. Their traditional technologies were even 'modern', at least in the sense that few other means are more efficient at producing calories per unit of land. The high labour intensity of these rural operations scarcely distinguishes them from some manufacturing processes in central Shanghai. The Commune's large size was itself seen as modern. Shanghai's suburban Communes were (and in their present reduced state, still are) among the largest industrial-style corporations in the municipality. Agribusiness is rural, but it is like many other big businesses in Shanghai.

A few Party cadres even wanted to urbanize the suburban farmers' living arrangements. Traditional villages were scattered; so Leap plans called for new 'satellite farming towns', containing up to 15,000 peasants. The capital costs of housing, and the slow returns on it, prevented much progress with this vision. At a place in Paoshan county, however, a 'peasants' new village' (*nung-min hsin-ts'un*) was built, with a public kitchen and houses of two or three stories, plus a huge chicken coop to increase poultry output.⁹⁴

Some policies implicit in this reorganization may initially have been popular with the peasants. Shanghai's suburbs had long planted more cash crops than the central economic planners in Peking wanted.⁹⁵ The Great Leap furthered this tendency. In November 1958, it was openly reported that Shanghai Communes were cultivating 80% more land for vegetables than in the previous year.⁹⁶ When it became evident that the communards were going to increase the amount of land in rapeseed rather than in rice, this fact could be reported in a newspaper rather than hidden under a bushel.⁹⁷

The traditional diversity of delta crops was also intensified during the Great Leap. Propaganda encouraged the peasants to raise – privately – more chickens, more hogs, and more fish.⁹⁸ The agribusinesses were also mandated to do more manufacturing. Mach'iao Commune, in Hsinchuang county, ran 24 major factories at the height of the Leap. Some plants that had been quickly established were inefficient; but others using simple technology proved profitable. A Brigade of Hsingwu Commune (a place in Sungchiang that is marginal by delta standards) set up a factory to make hemp sacks. The average income per household rose by 20 *yuan* because of the factory after the last harvest of 1959. This was an average increase of 29% of work-

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point-derived income for these families.⁹⁹ On the other hand, certain kinds of production were hard to collectivize. Communal silkworm raising was fraught with difficulties, because epidemics tended to spread among the insects in centralized places where the worms were reared.¹⁰⁰ City officials were slow to face some of these problems.¹⁰¹

The most important kind of centralization in the Great Leap was commercial. Following the expansion of Shanghai's boundaries, the city's Party Finance Department dispatched nearly 500 cadres to patrol transactions in Commune markets.¹⁰² County-level branches of state corporations standardized their 'production and distribution contracts' (*ch'an-hsiao ho-t'ung*) with Communes. These annual agreements, concluded in March, covered cotton, grain, oils, chickens, ducks, eggs, pigs, fish, and vegetables – all in one document.¹⁰³ The Communes undertook to supply certain amounts of the goods, and the state corporations sold them in city markets.¹⁰⁴ The Leaping extension of Shanghai's municipal boundaries automatically made the city 'self-sufficient' in some commodities. Shanghai in 1959 grew three-quarters of the fruit it consumed, and 97% of its vegetables with some surplus to export.¹⁰⁵

The Great Leap's effects on urban-suburban relations can also be seen in higher rates of commodity transfer out of the grey city into the green one. The Shanghai Department Store Corporation (*Shang-hai shih pai-huo kung-szu*) had branches in each county seat and in many communes.¹⁰⁶ But when the Leap lost steam in early 1959, its rural sales decelerated – even while the statistics were still being reported.

Data from Huayangch'iao Commune suggest that suburban trade was invigorated by the establishment of accounting units at roughly the natural village level (50 to 150 households). But the establishment of Communes, which were 100 or more times as large, caused trade growth to slow, as the table below shows. This occurred even while productive inputs to agriculture (mostly brought by the new well-financed collectives) increased as a portion of total sales.

The post-Leap economic shortfalls were due to low labour incentives, overly centralized commercial accounting, and bad weather – factors that the socialist government was initially unable or unwilling to correct. Shortages of food and industrial inputs in the grey city dramatized the importance of rural areas, and especially the close suburbs. When it became evident that the Leap had caused disorder in rural markets, urban cadres did what they could to increase supplies to rural areas.

SHANGHAI-SUBURB RELATIONS, 1949-1966

Table 9.1. *Gross retail volume at Huayangch'iao Commune market, Sungchiang county*

Twelve-month period	Retail sales (in <i>yuan</i>)	Agricultural inputs (%)	Increase over 1950 (%)	Increase over previous period (%)
1950 (pre-reform)	709,562	NA	—	—
1951 (land reform)	776,260	NA	9.4	9.4
1952 (mutual aid)	966,176	NA	36.16	24.46
1954 (co-ops)	1,266,258	30.16	78.46	31.06
1956 (high APCs)	1,569,053	32.78	121.13	23.91
Oct. 1958-Sept. 1959	1,669,762	49.46	135.32	6.4

Source: Computed from data in *HWJP*, 7 Oct. 1959.

A 'fertilizer accumulation movement' (*chi-fei yün-tung*) was conducted by urban district governments in Shanghai during early 1959.¹⁰⁷ The city government also ordered its corporations in foods, textiles, leather, and marine products to find wastes that could be converted into manure.¹⁰⁸ Urban swill was extremely important for raising output on suburban fields. This was especially true in the 1950s and 1960s, before much capital had been invested in synthetic fertilizer factories.¹⁰⁹ To make more manure, pig-raising was propagated intensely when the Leap began to falter. In later 1959, a Shanghai Municipal Hog-Rearing Work Congress insisted that the slogan 'one acre, one pig' (*yi mou, yi chu*) should be enforced.¹¹⁰ Early in 1960, Chinsan county cadres held a campaign for 'three changes' (*san hua*) in hog-rearing procedures.¹¹¹

Another obvious way the city could help the suburbs recover from Leap problems was to provide technical service teams. This movement advocated 'four changes' (*szu hua*).¹¹² Mechanics from the city garages could be persuaded to 'use their holidays' by going out to the suburbs to repair tractors and pumps. The Shanghai Agricultural Pesticide Company sent service teams to sell its products and show peasants how to use them. Urban school groups were increasingly dispatched to help with harvests, and more urban teachers were assigned to suburban half-farm/half-study middle schools.¹¹³

City people, rather than ruralites, have been mainly responsible for the reclamation of new suburban lands. Sedimentation causes the coast of the delta triangle to lengthen about one mile every 60 years.¹¹⁴ Increases on Ch'ungming, Ch'anghsing, and Hengsha islands are even

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faster and can easily be accelerated by dyking.¹¹⁵ In traditional times these operations enriched gentry families,¹¹⁶ but this opportunity is now assumed by the People's Government. In the decade beginning in 1959, no less than 30,000 Shanghai workers helped local peasants build dykes that reclaimed 100,000 *mou* of alluvial land.¹¹⁷

Hengsha Island saw a major influx of population in 1959.¹¹⁸ This island is atypical of many reclaimed areas because it established a Commune rather than a State Farm. Some boat people were settled there and were organized into fishing Brigades (*yü-yün ta-tui*). Money was put into housing, schools, and communal dining facilities to attract residents to this somewhat modern community.¹¹⁹ In other places, county-level agencies of Ch'ungming, Paoshan, Fenghsien, and Nanhui took charge of 12 State Farms (*kuo-ying nung-ch'ang*), mostly on poor land and largely populated from the city.¹²⁰

Sojourns in semi-urban counties near Shanghai sometimes helped government authorities persuade city folk to reside further afield later.¹²¹ After schoolteachers and students from the Shanghai Music Conservatory worked in the suburbs, they were later dispersed to more fully rural places throughout East China.¹²² Urban schoolchildren, who went to nearby fields for 'four quick' (*szu k'uai*) help with harvests, might later be persuaded to venture as far as Sinkiang.¹²³ Arrangements for periodic send-downs between particular suburban communes and particular urban institutions accustomed young urbanites to volunteering for rural labour, and it was hoped that later they might go further.¹²⁴

Some urban institutions could supply agronomic expertise, not just unskilled labour. Natural scientists were urged to go to the suburbs and do applied research for the peasants.¹²⁵ The Shanghai Civil Aviation Administration put more planes into crop-dusting.¹²⁶ A shipyard revamped a boat to pump snail pesticides into schistosomiasis areas, especially Nanhui county.¹²⁷ An engineering school drew blueprints for small fertilizer plants,¹²⁸ and the local electric company claimed that by the end of 1961 its grid was fine enough to run pumps on 62% of Shanghai's farmland.¹²⁹

Planners had long mooted more heavy-industrial development in Shanghai's suburbs, to supplement the cottage and 'green' industries. The Leap simultaneously slowed these plans because of lack of funds and made high officials more conscious of the need to realize them. Pump and fertilizer factories were prominent in the schedule of progress. The first major investment after 1958 was at Minhsing, for

electric machines.¹³⁰ By 1960, Minhsing had a population of 100,000.¹³¹ A four-lane highway linked it with Shanghai. Although Minhsing received much publicity as Shanghai's 'first' satellite town, it in fact had predecessors. The military airport at Taichang and the headquarters of the East Sea Fleet at Wusung (along with the Shanghai First Iron and Steel Factory there) were large-scale modern projects in the suburban areas before Minhsing. Even earlier, under the Kuomintang, Chiangwan just north of Shanghai had been established as a model Chinese city, to contrast with the foreigners' International Settlement.

Plans for more satellite towns prospered during the post-Leap era, although there were few spare funds to finance them. In 1961, much effort was put into constructing a chemical fertilizer factory at Wuching, between Minhsing and Shanghai on the Hwangpoo. A machine tool complex was established at P'engpu, and an industrial district for explosive, flammable, and poisonous materials was set up near T'aopu.¹³² Both of these places are on the close northern outskirts of the city.

Light suburban industry, processing agricultural products with modern technology, was also encouraged in communes. From pre-1949 times, the communists inherited 35 small paper mills in the Shanghai area. In the Leap, pulping machine investments were authorized for Sungchiang and Ch'ungming, where rice-straw and reeds were available in quantity.¹³³ East of the city, small-scale cotton-ginning factories were encouraged. Partly due to a lack of local coal and iron ore, Shanghai avoided some of the excessive Leaping of the North China Plain; few if any 'backyard steel mills' were established on the delta.¹³⁴

Two effects of the Leap were dual and opposite: the ambition to establish larger, industrial-type enterprises created a permanent infrastructure for even closer green-city/grey-city links than had existed before. But the economic problems caused largely by that ambition tended to slow suburban development in the short run. The Leap era began with a call to use more machine tractors,¹³⁵ and it ended with a campaign to use more draught oxen.¹³⁶ The general movement sent finance cadres out to suburban Shanghai towns,¹³⁷ but another result was an informality that in 1962 allowed Lunghua Temple, on the southern outskirts of the city, to hold a large three-day fair, which was in effect a free-market sale of produce that peasants brought on bicycles.¹³⁸ The tension between these two effects of the Leap shaped city-suburb relations in subsequent years.

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1963-66: 'SOCIALIST EDUCATION' AS THE SUBURBS'
CULTURAL REVOLUTION

By 1963 the municipal government could justifiably claim that: 'Rural-urban relations between Shanghai and its outskirts have increased tremendously in recent years.'¹³⁹ Urban products changed agricultural life. The number of suburban tractors had risen $8\frac{1}{2}$ times since the end of 1958, and the use of chemical fertilizers and insecticides had increased $2\frac{1}{2}$ and 5 times respectively. By 1963, fully 90% of the suburban vegetable gardens and 80% of the rice fields were irrigated by electric pumps.

The political import of these economic links was enhanced by the fact that few levels separated Shanghai's rural leaders from the very top of the CCP hierarchy. The 'special district' (*chüan ch'ü*) level intervened between province and county in other parts of China during the early 1960s, but no evidence has been found of any 'special districts' in Shanghai. Mayor K'o Ch'ing-shih - a deputy premier under Chou, and a friend of Mao since they had been members of the same small study group at Yen-an - was an important national leader. The directness of communications to Peking, and the tendency of high leaders to advocate for Shanghai's suburbs whatever policies they considered most progressive in general, were exceptional. For example, Chou En-lai himself spoke to the Shanghai Science and Technology Commission in 1963, and he called on the city to lead China's agricultural modernization.¹⁴⁰

In the post-Leap period, Shanghai's Communes continued to have an important political role. An obscure local editor, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, was appointed to head the Shanghai CCP Propaganda Department in 1963.¹⁴¹ Increasingly his office used its journal for the suburbs, *Nung-ts'un chih-pu sheng-huo* (*Rural Branch Life*), to spread the good word about everything from class struggle to planting 'four early' cotton.¹⁴² Various stages of the Socialist Education Movement¹⁴³ threatened the positions of rural leaders and strengthened the hand of the municipal government that had a role in evaluating rural cadres. The result was a centralization of controls over suburban careers.

New peasants' associations were also created at this time. By 1964 the city's Agricultural Bureau was able to call upon their leaders, and on enthusiasts called 'six-good commune members', to adopt more specific production goals for grain, cotton, and rapeseed.¹⁴⁴ Agricultural accounting was further standardized. Agencies representing the whole municipality organized dyke repair simultaneously in

more than one county, extended gas lines to new towns, and laid a 14,000-volt cable across the Whangpoo to run pumps in Ch'uansha.¹⁴⁵ The local Reclamation Bureau (*Nung-k'en chü*) consolidated its State Farms in Ch'ungming, Fenghsien, and Nanhui, whose land by 1964 had been expanded to 300,000 *mou*, employing 18,000 'workers'.¹⁴⁶

Shanghai's government in the Socialist Education period was active, even somewhat effective, in telling its peasants what to grow. The rearing of rabbits and sheep was encouraged in some areas.¹⁴⁷ A municipal corporation also persuaded peasants on Ch'ungming Island to raise mountain goats – although the environment on that big sandbar is distinctly less than alpine.¹⁴⁸

Agricultural mechanization in the suburbs was impeded by several problems: the difficulty of developing effective machines for paddy culture, the capital cost of good equipment, and political pressures when two different production teams needed to use the same machine at the same prime time in a crop cycle. To cut costs, the municipality by the mid-1960s was strongly encouraging the use of draught oxen. In Ch'uansha alone, nine 'exchange meetings' to sell cattle were held within a short time, and 868 head were quickly traded.¹⁴⁹ To spur less expensive farm technologies, urban handicraft workers were told to invent new 'semi-mechanized farm tools'. Peasants were paraded through an exhibition of these machines, held at a park in the centre city.¹⁵⁰ Finally, to reduce political strains between accounting units, some Communes began to charge rent on machinery that was lent to Production Teams. This represented a municipal policy, advocated without apologies.¹⁵¹

Tensions between 'radical' and 'revisionist' policies spurred adherents of each of them to reach out for more suburban support. Some politicians wanted to bring the peasants socialism; others wanted to bring them more fertilizers, insecticides, and schistosomiasis cures.¹⁵² By late 1965 the Socialist Education Movement was being propagated by 350,000 loudspeakers in the Shanghai Suburban Wired Broadcasting Network.¹⁵³ This medium was supplemented by storytellers, students, librarians and book exhibits, all sent down from the grey city.¹⁵⁴ The message was that poor and lower-middle peasants should be favoured over persons from richer families. For example in school admissions, a report from the Mach'iao Agricultural Middle School indicated that affirmative action was taken for children of the poorest farmers.¹⁵⁵

Tensions between suburban residents of different class backgrounds

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were exacerbated by the increasing diversity of economic life of Shanghai's outskirts. Even before the Socialist Education Movement, farmers in Fenghsien county had complained because they were ineligible to use the recreation clubs and swimming pools set up by unions of industrial workers who lived there.¹⁵⁶ Such conflicts may well have been inevitable, due to the wide range of labour productivities in industrial and agricultural processes at this area's stage of development. Although urban cadres were instructed to 'go listen to peasants' opinions' and 'learn from staff in the rural areas',¹⁵⁷ the difference in real returns to labour was not easy to eliminate. It underlay many other inequalities.

One means of moderating the discontent of low-paid suburban workers in this dual economy was to give their representatives more authority to set compensations. This could be done in sectors where changed labour incentives made for relatively little output change. During the Socialist Education Movement, poor and lower-middle peasants were recruited in 'distribution small groups' (*fen-p'ei hsiao-tzu*) to reform suburban work-point systems.¹⁵⁸ By early 1965, a Shanghai Municipality Poor and Lower-Middle Peasants' Association was established.¹⁵⁹ Within a week, county-level associations were founded too.¹⁶⁰ Their main function was to publicize suburban labour models: the inventor of a better way to reclaim land, a model raiser of collective pigs, a peasant expert in late double-cropping of rice.¹⁶¹ This agricultural union also took a hand in making school admission policies and in forming Young Pioneer organizations.¹⁶²

When the Second Congress of the Association met in early 1966, 13,000 representatives attended. Some speakers averred that 'when people listen to the words of Chairman Mao, the fields will listen to the words of the people'.¹⁶³ But revolutionary rain dancing was not the whole agenda; specific agricultural techniques were also discussed. Mayor Ts'ao Ti-ch'iu, who was later criticized during the Cultural Revolution, made a speech emphasizing technical improvements. The Peasants' Associations were active in organizing a suburban news correspondents' network for better socialist propaganda, but they also propagated less spiritual notions, such as the use of a new type of stove that saved fuel.¹⁶⁴

The Cultural Revolution is beyond the scope of this essay, but really it had long since begun in the suburbs by the time city people began quarrelling publicly over philosophy, music, and (finally) economic organization. As Ray Wylie has pointed out, the Cultural Revolution

in the Shanghai countryside was 'basically a continuation and intensification of the Socialist Education Movement'.¹⁶⁵ By no means did the Poor and Lower-Middle Peasants' Associations represent all opinion in the suburbs. Even in the mid-1960s, the teahouse tradition, fortune-telling, geomancy, traditional stories, and impromptu local politics were rather alive and well in Shanghai's delta. A *Cultural Daily* reporter was shocked to discover these things in Fengching, Sungchiang county, in 1965. He suggested that the local Party Committee emplace spittoons in Fengching's main teahouse, so that at least the floor might be pristine.¹⁶⁶

In November and December of 1966, Shanghai suburbanites were inspired by urban disunity to organize for their own interests. Commuting contract workers demanded union membership and the good wages that accompany it.¹⁶⁷ Sent-down students, many of whom still preferred the grey city over the green one, returned to live in the metropolis, and to join Red Guard groups of many different political complexions.¹⁶⁸ Some rural Party Committees financed factions which, they hoped, might support their own survival. As their opposition in one suburb put it:

A handful of rotten eggs in the Paoshan County CCP Committee and County People's Council, while presiding over the distribution work conference of commune leaders, have sabotaged the Party's policy under the pretext of advocating extensive democracy . . . Some even went to the extent of inciting the masses to draw on basic reserves, accumulated in the past, in the year-end distribution.¹⁶⁹

Also, some grain warehouses were pilfered.¹⁷⁰ Finally, diverse suburban groups sponsored many rallies, both in the big city and in county seats.¹⁷¹ Never has the political modernity of the suburbs been more obvious than in the speed with which such groups organized to articulate their interests at this time. They acted exactly like city people, who were then doing exactly the same thing.

In 1966, Shanghai was declared an 'Outstanding Farm Unit'.¹⁷² Its productivity per land unit, in several crops, had been China's highest that year. The city has usually been more proud of its factories than its fields; but the bases of prowess in them both tend to converge, as the products of the delta diversify. A commune in Paoshan became the 'Sungnan Industrial-and-Agricultural People's Commune', to reflect the new situation.¹⁷³ The landscape of the suburbs was still rural, but their organization and functions by the mid-1960s had become largely industrial. There was no place to build the city walls.

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'City' is a concept that shades off into the countryside. In fact, there are many different kinds of 'rural' areas in China. The cultural, economic, and political differences between various countrysides may be as great as the differences between grey and green places in the Shanghai delta. Marxists have often asserted that farm and factory labour would someday come to be alike, for reasons that are not entirely clarified in that theory. But the development process is as interesting as the future. The number of different styles of work and politics which arise during this social change is astounding. On Shanghai's delta, modern forms of organization have been used in fields not only because of the progressive ideas of socialist planners, but also because the communications structure there can support types of work which strongly resemble what happens nearby, in the grey part of the metropolis.

THE SPATIAL DEVELOPMENT OF SHANGHAI

Ka-iu Fung

INTRODUCTION

From a geographical point of view, the increasing concentration of population in cities and the spatial growth of urban centres are significant components of the urbanization process.

Spatial growth of cities, involving the transformation of land use from rural to urban, has been closely associated with the urbanization experience of both developed and developing countries. The encroachment upon agricultural land in urban fringe areas by expanding cities constitutes a major problem. Fast but often disorderly growth has often brought about land speculation and inflation in land prices, greatly exacerbating the problem of acquiring land for public use. This problem is particularly acute in urban Japan. In developing countries in south-east Asia, the Middle East and Latin America, another problem of a different nature has also emerged. The urban fringe areas in these regions are characterized by the presence of squatter settlements erected by immigrants from the countryside. This illegal occupancy of urban fringe land has introduced confusion in land use, and presented thorny problems for the planned development of urban areas. In our view, these land use problems are as significant in the study of urbanization problems as the 'urban ills' generated by the high population concentrations or by the rapid increase of population in cities.

In this paper we shall investigate the character and pattern of spatial growth in China's major cities, with special reference to Shanghai, during the decade 1950-60 when China was undergoing intensive industrialization accompanied by a rapid rate of urbanization. Because of complete dependence on Soviet assistance in industrial and urban planning in the early stages of industrialization, it is necessary first to examine the impact of the Soviet model of centrality upon Chinese

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policies towards development of cities and their fringe areas. This paper also deals with the implementation of new approaches to industrial and urban development; approaches made in order to arrest the rapid spatial growth of cities, after policies towards coastal industrial centres were modified in mid-1956. The pattern of spatial development in Shanghai is examined in the context of these policy changes.

THE SHANGHAI DELTAIC PLAIN: A BRIEF GEOGRAPHICAL SETTING

The huge delta of the Yangtze is clearly divided into two major regions: the north and the south. The Shanghai deltaic plain occupies the southern portion, and possesses a peculiar physiographic characteristic. Unlike most deltas, this part of the Yangtze delta does not slope towards the river mouth. Instead, it resembles a half saucer tilting gently upstream. In terms of micro-relief, the Shanghai deltaic plain consists of three units. The eastern part, primarily composed of the shoreline zones along the north, east and south of the delta, lies at about five metres above mean sea level. The central part, which is occupied mainly by both banks of the Hwangpoo River is about one metre lower than the eastern part. The western part, the lake district, has an average altitude of only about two and a half metres above mean sea level.¹

The delta area also includes three major islands: Ch'ungming, Ch'anghsing and Hengsha, all formed by the deposition of sand and silt brought down by the Yangtze. The island of Ch'ungming ranks largest of the three, having an area of 1,083 square kilometres. Hengsha Island is the smallest with an area of only 42 square kilometres.² These islands divide the Yangtze estuary into three separate channels.

The major stream of the Shanghai deltaic plain is the Hwangpoo Kiang which originates from the *T'ai Hu* (T'ai Lake) to the west. It empties its water into the Yangtze near Woosung. From its source, the river flows in a west-east direction, but turns sharply northward about seven kilometres below the town of Minhsing. This abrupt change of direction of flow is attributed to the slightly higher relief of the eastern part of the delta which has been described above. The major tributary of Hwangpoo River is the Soochow Creek, also known as Woosung River. This originates from *Tai Hu* and flows in a predominantly west-east direction. The confluence of Soochow Creek and Hwangpoo

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River is located at Hwangpoo Park in Shanghai, and the two waterways physically divide the city into three parts. Besides these major waterways, the Shanghai deltaic plain is traversed by numerous natural and artificial channels, forming a dense network. Murphey estimates that the delta contains at least half a million miles of canals and artificial waterways.³ These channels provide drainage for the level terrain, irrigation water for agricultural development on the fertile soils of the deltaic plain, domestic water supply, and a convenient network for the movement of people and goods throughout the region.

The Shanghai deltaic plain and the major islands to the north are located within a zone bounded by 119° 0' and 121° 50' longitude east and 30° 45' and 31° 50' latitude north. The climate is subtropical, i.e., warm and humid. The annual average temperature is 15.6°C and the annual average precipitation 1,151.6 millimetres⁴ (an equivalent may be found in the south-eastern United States). Further, because the region is located on the east coast of continental Asia and in a convergence zone of cold, dry and warm, humid air masses, its climatic pattern is influenced by both the Asiatic monsoons and by temperate cyclones. Seasons in the Shanghai region are quite distinct. Generally, summer and winter are longer than spring and autumn. The weather in spring is warm but unsettled. Summer is the hottest and the wettest part of the year. The average temperature is about 30°C, and the average rainfall 150 millimetres. Autumn is short, but the weather sunny and pleasant. Winter is the longest and coldest season of the year. The average temperature generally drops below 10°C, and occasionally invasions of cold air masses from the north may reduce the temperature to -5°C. Snowfall is infrequent.⁵

Because of the favourable terrain, fertile soils, ample water supply and equable climate, as well as the presence of a large local market, the delta area of Shanghai has become one of the most highly commercialized agricultural regions in east China. The dominant crops in the region include rice as a staple grain crop, and mulberry and cotton as economic crops grown mainly for Shanghai's textile industry.

SPATIAL GROWTH OF THE MUNICIPALITY

While the natural advantages of the geographical location of Shanghai have contributed to the city's economic development, the physiography of the deltaic plain has played an important part in the city's spatial growth. The level terrain and alluvial materials of the delta

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provide excellent conditions for urban development. The city has grown rapidly outwards in all directions since it was established as one of China's five treaty ports by the Western powers in 1840. Through mainly accretional expansion of foreign concessions and further development when the city was under first Japanese, then Nationalist rule, Shanghai expanded from a small walled settlement to an urban centre of metropolitan dimensions (Map 1). At the time of the Communist take-over early in 1949, the city's built-up area covered about 80 square kilometres.⁶ Since then, another major accretional growth has taken place, and the total urban area had increased to 116 square kilometres by 1957.⁷

During the 1950s, not only did the built-up areas of Shanghai spread rapidly outwards, but the suburban areas also underwent drastic changes. Early in 1949 when Shanghai was placed under the administration of the Shanghai Military Control Commission, the original twenty urban districts and ten suburban districts were temporarily retained. However, changes in the administrative boundaries of the suburban districts took place in 1952,⁸ 1955, 1956,⁹ 1958,¹⁰ 1959,¹¹ and 1960,¹² with the most significant expansion occurring late in 1958. On 17 January 1958, the municipal government of Shanghai gained jurisdiction over the three adjacent counties of Chiating, Poshan, and Shanghai, when over 863 square kilometres of territory was added. In December of the same year, the administrative boundaries were further extended to include the surrounding hsiens of Ch'uansha, Nanhui, Fenghsien, Chinshan, Sungchiang, Ch'ingpu, and Ch'ungming.¹³ This drastic expansion increased the total area of the municipality to 5,910 square kilometres, and it has remained at this size ever since.

IMPACT OF CITY BUILDING UPON SUBURBAN AGRICULTURE: A NATIONAL OVERVIEW

During the *First Five Year Plan* period when China launched its industrialization programme, many major cities, particularly the key-point cities, underwent very fast rates of spatial expansion; rates unprecedented in the urban history of China. Within a span of only a few years many cities had expanded to several times their size at the time of Liberation. Table 10.1 shows that the urban area of Chengchow, a key-point city in Honan, increased almost nine times from 1949 to 1957. During the same period the built-up area of Peking



Satellite imagery of the Shanghai deltaic plain.

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 Table 10.1. *Spatial expansion of selected Chinese cities 1949-57 (km²)*

City	1949	1957	Total area increased	%
<i>Peking</i> (National Capital)	60 ^a	240 ^b	180	300
Shanghai	80 ^c	116 ^d	36	45
Tientsin	61 ^e	97 ^e	36	59
<i>Sian</i>	13 ^f	65 ^f	52	400
<i>Chengchow</i>	5.23 ^g	52 ^g	46.77	894

Note: Cities italicized are key-point cities designated for intense industrial development during the *First Five Year Plan* period.

Sources:

^a Chang, Sen-dou, 'Peking: The Growing Metropolis of Communist China', *The Geographical Review*, 55, 3 July 1965, p. 319.

^b *Chien-chu chung te Bei-jing (Peking Under Construction)* (Peking: Peking People's Publishing House, 1958), p. 5.

^c *HWJP*, 8 Aug. 1957.

^d *WHP*, 2 Nov. 1957.

^e *Ti-li chih-shih (Geographic Knowledge)*, 1958, 11, p. 495.

^f *Ch'ang-chiang jih-pao (Yangtze Daily)*, 27 Sept. 1957.

^g *Chien-chu hsieh-pao (Journal of Architecture)*, 1959, 11, p. 13.

increased by three times. Even the urban area of Shanghai, a non-key-point city at the eastern seaboard, expanded by almost fifty per cent.

Several factors contributed to the phenomenal spatial growth of Chinese cities during this period. These include a rigid adoption of the Soviet model of industrial centrality, indiscriminate acceptance of Soviet theories and principles of urban planning by the Chinese industrial and urban planners, and the indulgence of Chinese municipal officials in building large modern socialist cities.

When China began her industrialization programme in 1953, heavy dependence was placed upon Soviet industrial planning and design. The Chinese adopted the Soviet concept of industrial centralization, with emphasis on massive industrial projects located in a few selected urban centres. Most of the new above-norm industrial projects were clustered in eighteen key-point cities. At the beginning of the *First Five Year Plan*, China built eleven to twenty above-norm industrial plants in each of twelve cities, and over twenty-one above-norm projects in each of six industrial centres. In Sian, an important key-point city in the interior, forty-two industrial projects, fourteen post secondary colleges, twenty-two secondary and vocational schools and thirty cadre training centres were built within a short span of five years.¹⁴ Similar

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patterns of industrial concentration prevailed in other cities. An article on the problem of industrial distribution revealed that an exceedingly large number of textile factories were concentrated in Peking, Shihchiachuang, Hantan and Chengchow. Certain types of industry established ten plants in Sian and six plants in Taiyuan.¹⁵ Such a high degree of concentration of large industrial plants in a few places was also typical of the spatial pattern in Hungary and Poland – East European satellites of the Soviet Union.¹⁶

During the *First Five Year Plan*, model plans of large Soviet cities were universally adopted for the planning of all Chinese cities, despite wide variations between Russian and Chinese urban centres with regard to size, type, geographical location, terrain characteristics and cultural attributes. Thus even the plan for a small workers' town of less than 20,000 inhabitants would include all the urban features and amenities of a large city. These included large municipal public squares with wide central boulevards, east-west axis roads, civic centres for municipal government buildings, district parks, and several sports stadiums.¹⁷ Also, public squares, a typical feature in Soviet cities, became a basic land use characteristic in many plans for Chinese cities. These included municipal squares, district central squares, traffic squares and other squares of special types. All of them occupied large amounts of land. For example, the area of the municipal central squares in the urban plans of Lanchow, Loyang and Harbin exceeded the nine-hectare *Tien An Men Square* in Peking. In some cities, the district central squares were planned to be larger than Red Square in Moscow!¹⁸

In order to provide space for large municipal public squares, large public parks and sixty-metre-wide boulevards in the centres of existing cities, a large number of buildings and residential housing had to be demolished. One official report stated that since Liberation, a total of 2.08 million square metres of built-up area had been demolished in the cities of Peking, Wuhan, Taiyuan and Lanchow. As much as one-fifth of the existing buildings and dwellings in Taiyuan and Lanchow were taken down to make way for new construction, although these buildings were still in good condition. According to the data of National Bureau of Statistics, the total demolished area in 175 cities in 1956 amounted to 2.48 million square metres.¹⁹ Because of the general shortage of empty space available for new developments in most existing Chinese cities, these large-scale displacements of existing buildings within urban areas has played a key role in pushing the urban

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front rapidly into the surrounding suburban territories. Thus, the spatial extent of many Chinese cities has increased by several times their original size since Liberation.

The rapid urban expansion also stemmed from idealism of local municipal officials who wished to build large, modern, socialist cities. In 1954 city officials were criticized for indulging in the preparation of plans for million-person cities occupying areas of several hundred square kilometres, and for being overzealous in implementing prematurely long-term plans to create the spacious appearance of large cities. Premature and disorderly developments were commonplace in some city fringe areas. Department stores, theatres, municipal offices and other public buildings were erected at sites where there were few or no residents, as these areas were designated for future developments.²⁰ A Polish delegation of architects and urban planners noted these phenomena while touring the Chinese cities. The problem was especially serious in the city of Nanking. New construction was scattered throughout the northern, eastern and western suburbs, although there was still ample empty space within the urban limits that could have been used for construction.²¹

The impact of rapidly growing cities upon suburban agriculture was significant. Large amounts of productive suburban farmland in China were encroached upon by large industrial plants and workers' housing projects. This large-scale rural-urban land use conversion became a commonplace phenomenon within the suburban territories of key-point cities after the implementation of the *First Five Year Plan* in 1953, and it also spread to the seaboard industrial centres. Despite the lack of detailed aggregate national statistical data on the total amount of suburban farmland that was converted into non-agricultural use during the entire *Plan* period, the scattered evidence available suggests that the magnitude of this conversion was considerable. A sample survey conducted in eight cities, for example, revealed that 77,451 *mou* of vegetable fields in the suburban areas were absorbed by municipal and industrial construction in the period 1953 to 1954.²² A Shanghai newspaper reported that from 1954 to 1956 the population of Harbin, a key-point industrial city in the province of Heilungkiang, north-east China, increased from 1.21 million to 1.47 million, but that the acreage of market gardens was reduced from 4,980 hectares to 2,662 hectares.²³ This means that over one-quarter of the original acreage of market gardens was encroached upon by the rapidly expanding built-up area of the city. The absorption of suburban farmland by urban expansion

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also prevailed in non-key-point cities. In the suburban area of Foochow, a coastal city facing Taiwan across the Formosa Strait, there were 7,040 hectares of land cultivated by 115,000 peasants at the time of suburban land reform in 1952. By 1956, seven per cent of this arable land was converted into industrial and residential uses while the rural population increased by 25 per cent.²⁴ It was revealed in an official source that at the end of the *First Five Year Plan* period, the total area expropriated for municipal and industrial uses in China amounted to over twenty million *mou*.²⁵ A significant proportion of the expropriated land represented highly productive market gardens in the suburban area.²⁶ The loss of considerable areas of productive suburban farmland inevitably led to a sharp decline in the local production and supply of fresh vegetables to urban residents. Thus they became much more dependent on distant sources. In a technically advanced country, or one with an efficient transportation system, the sources of supply of perishable agricultural produce are not necessarily located near the market. Fresh vegetables and liquid milk may be shipped hundreds of miles from farms to large urban centres with minimum spoilage. For example, in the United States, large market gardens or truck farms are no longer common phenomena of the urban fringes. Many suburban farms producing vegetables and other perishable produce for the city have long been displaced by premature subdivisions of land and land speculation. To meet the demand of the megalopolis of the north-east and other large urban markets, long-distance transport of perishable farm produce has become a common practice. For example, fresh vegetables are shipped from California to New York in trucks equipped with sealed chambers of nitrogen gas. Despite the four-day journey, the vegetables arrive at the eastern market in such a fresh condition that they appear to have been on the road for only twelve hours! Even fresh milk for bottling has been distributed by refrigerated trucks from Arkansas to both Florida and California.²⁷ Long-distance transfer of perishable agricultural produce is also practised in Japan, a highly industrialized country with rapidly expanding cities.²⁸

In China, surplus vegetables produced in the subtropical south, especially in the delta region of the Pearl River, could in theory have been diverted to urban centres in the interior and in northern China where there were shortages. However, because of the country's backwardness in modern technology and the extremely poor transportation system, attempts to relieve subsidiary food shortages in many of the rapidly expanding large cities by means of long-distance inter-

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provincial transfer incur very high transportation costs, excessive amounts of spoilage and waste, and place an extra burden on the railway system.

In Shanghai, to guarantee the daily supply of four million *catties* of fresh vegetables in 1957, an average of one million *catties* had to be imported daily from distant sources such as Kwangtung, Hopeh, Shensi, Inner Mongolia, Kansu, Honan and Fukien.²⁹ The shipping of seven billion *catties* of vegetables from Shantung, Kwangtung, Chekiang and Kiangsi to Peking, Tientsin, Hankow and other northern cities, and to new mining and industrial districts, is reported to have involved over 18,000 railway freight cars.³⁰

Throughout the entire *First Five Year Plan* period, the central authorities instituted a succession of policies to alleviate the problem of chronic shortages of vegetables in large urban centres in China. These measures included persuasion of peasants in the 'near suburbs' to increase vegetable production; stimulation of expansion of vegetable acreage of agricultural co-operatives located on the urban fringes by means of financial incentives; and introduction of the urban free market. However, all these measures failed to achieve the intended objective.

A NEW STRATEGY TOWARDS URBAN CONTAINMENT

The problem of the fast and often chaotic spatial growth of urban centres was appreciated by high-ranking economic planners in China as early as mid-1955, and a negative attitude developed towards large cities. At the second session of the first National People's Congress held on 5-6 July 1955, Li Fu-ch'un, chairman of the State Planning Commission, commented on the draft of the *First Five Year Plan*, and urged that the task of urban construction be focused on the development of small and medium-sized urban centres and the restriction of further expansion of large cities.³¹ From available evidence, this appeal was ineffective, as the large cities in China continued to grow unabated.

A resolution concerning development and planning of new industrial cities and new industrial districts was passed at a meeting of the Standing Committee of the State Council on 8 May 1956. It introduced the principle of urban development and distribution of industry within the context of regional planning, with guidelines for

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optimal size of urban centres and location of industries within large industrial centres.

For the first time in China, the concept of designing and developing new cities, and the distribution of industry as an integral part of planning of a city region or an economic region, had emerged. Such regional plans were to encompass planning of all major construction, industries, energy supply, transportation, communications, irrigation, agriculture, forestry and urban areas in accordance with the physical and economic conditions of a region and the long-range economic development plan of the state. The Department of Urban Construction, the State Economic Commission, and the State Planning Commission jointly formulated regulations governing such planning. Execution of such plans lay within the jurisdiction of the People's Committees of the Provinces, Autonomous Municipalities or Autonomous Regions.

Initially, priority was given to planning ten regions, each centred on one or two major industrial centres in the interior. These ten urban-centred planning regions included the Paotow-Huhohao'te Region, the Sian-Paoki Region, the Lanchow Region, the Sining Region, the Changyih-Yumen Region, the Sanmenhsia Region, the Hsiangfan Region, the Hsiangchung Region, the Chengtu Region and the Kunming Region (Map 2).

The resolution also strongly emphasized decentralization of manufacturing activities to small and medium-sized cities within a region. Under special circumstances when new industrial developments had to be undertaken in large cities, they were to be located at a certain distance from the central city. Furthermore, new industrial districts were to be established at greater distances apart. Since population increase also contributed to spatial growth of cities, the resolution set guidelines on the optimum size of urban population. Urban centres with a population between 30 and 50 thousand, and not exceeding 100 thousand, were considered as ideal. Those with 200 to 300 thousand inhabitants would only be built in localities where suitable conditions prevailed. Larger cities with over 300,000 population would not be built unless absolutely necessary.³²

This departure from the Soviet model of industrial centralization initiated a new phase of urban and suburban development in China. For economic and national security reasons, the Chinese began to build small cities and to disperse all industrial functions. Also, a new concept

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of the city region emerged. By means of urban-centred planning units, the Chinese hoped to arrest the accretional growth of built-up areas in large urban centres. This was to be achieved by dispersing population and industries from large industrial centres to satellite towns in their environs.

SUBURBAN DEVELOPMENTS IN SHANGHAI

On the eve of the Communist take-over, Shanghai ranked as the largest among China's industrial centres and was one of the world's great cities. One might have expected that when the new regime launched its industrialization programme, Shanghai would have a rate of expansion as rapid as the new industrial centres in interior China. This, however, was not to be the case. From the outset, the Chinese leadership expressed its intention to transform Shanghai from a foreigner-dominated city into a 'truly prosperous new people's city'.³³ However, when China launched her *First Five Year Plan* in 1953, Shanghai was not designated as a key-point city. The reasons for this were the extremely disproportionate concentration of the nation's industry in Shanghai and its vulnerable location on the eastern coast-line.

Prior to 1953, a new locational policy for the nation's industry was adopted by the central government. The main objective of this policy was to achieve a more balanced regional economic development. Top priority was given to developing industries in the interior. Because of this national policy rapid territorial expansion took place in all these new industrial bases. Large-scale encroachment into surrounding suburban areas by municipal and industrial construction became a commonplace phenomenon.

During these early years the expansion of built-up areas in Shanghai was small relative to that in key-point cities. Nevertheless significant developments took place on the urban fringe. Two major urban-oriented developments were undertaken in suburban Shanghai which contributed to the expansion of the city's built-up areas. These included the relocation of specific types of industry from the urban area and the construction of workers' villages.

In February 1950 a disastrous explosion occurred in Fuhua match factory, located in a densely inhabited section of Peking, which caused the destruction of two thousand homes and over five hundred casualties. The Government Administrative Council immediately issued a

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directive instructing all municipal governments to remove from urban areas all factories involving raw materials of a noxious, poisonous or explosive nature as well as warehouses storing similar types of materials. It was suggested that this particular type of industry³⁴ should be relocated in open spaces outside the cities. The Shanghai municipal authorities took immediate steps to relocate about one hundred chemical plants and small workshops from the densely settled industrial districts within the city to the less populous suburban areas. The appearance of chemical factories beyond Shanghai's city limit initiated the transformation of land use in the suburban areas of the metropolis.

The second development concerned housing. After the establishment of the new regime on the Chinese mainland, the provision of housing for factory workers was considered to be an urgent task by the central administration. Thus, even before the initiation of industrial development, large-scale construction of 'villages' for industrial workers had already taken place in old industrial cities as well as new industrial bases in the interior. In 1952 and early 1953 workers' housing projects mushroomed in Shanghai, Peking, Wusih, Tsinan, Tsingtao, Hangchow,³⁵ Shenyang, Chungking,³⁶ Canton, Swatow,³⁷ and Chengtu.³⁸

Because of the availability of reserved land for municipal and industrial construction in suburban areas after the suburban land reform, and in anticipation of large-scale urban expansion, nearly all these new workers' living quarters were erected outside the city limits. In Shanghai it may even be possible that rudimentary urban planning and re-zoning of existing land within the urban area had already been carried out. Soon after the Urban Construction Committee of Shanghai Municipality was established on 19 September 1951, a study of the city's population distribution and density, and urban land use patterns was initiated.³⁹ This assembled data which were then used as the basis for the general planning and development of urban Shanghai. Meanwhile, the immediate task of the committee involved the transformation of the existing intermixture of residential and industrial land uses into discrete residential zones and industrial zones. Another important assignment of the Committee involved removal of shack areas scattered within existing industrial districts of the city.

In order to transform the disorderly urban land use patterns and to alleviate the high population density problem in urban Shanghai, the Urban Construction Committee located the first housing project for Shanghai's industrial workers in peripheral areas outside the city

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boundaries. This housing development project, the largest ever initiated in Shanghai, consisted of 20,000 units for workers' living quarters, dispersed among nine separate sites. Ten thousand dwelling units were concentrated in north-eastern Shanghai, and the other ten thousand units in northern, western, and southern Shanghai (Table 10.2). These projects comprised integrated community facilities such as living quarters for workers and their dependents, schools, day-care facilities, markets, clinics and other public amenities.⁴⁰ To eliminate long-distance travel by workers between the places of residence and factories, all the new villages were located in close proximity to the existing industrial districts of Yangpoo, Yunin, Chapei, Ch'angning and Luchiawan located within the urban area proper (Map 3). The siting of these large housing estates for workers seems to have followed the Russian model of placing workers' housing at close proximity to factories.

NEW PHASE OF DEVELOPMENT IN SUBURBAN SHANGHAI

The closing years of the *First Five Year Plan* witnessed an abrupt revitalization of Shanghai's industrial growth and significant changes in the structure of the city's modern manufacturing industries, leading to a new direction of development in the suburban areas of this largest industrial centre in China. The primary force behind these new developments was the modification of the nation's regional industrial policy early in 1956.

MODIFICATION OF THE LOCATIONAL POLICY

The Chinese leadership was apparently dissatisfied with industrial performance in the *First Five Year Plan*. This was regarded as a severe setback by the central authorities, who firmly believed that industrialization was the important key to the modernization of China's economy. Consequently, an alternative policy, or modification of existing policies, was sought to achieve faster and greater economic development without incurring large capital investments.

In April 1956 the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party reviewed reports on the work of thirty-four industrial, agricultural, transport, commercial, financial and other departments of the central government. Following the discussion on

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these reports, Mao Tse-tung issued an important document at the meeting – *On the Ten Great Relationships*, which identified the ten most pressing problems existing from administrative decisions or policies of the central government since the founding of the People's Republic. One of these ten crucial problems concerned the relationship between industry in the coastal region and that in the interior. When discussing this particular problem with members of the Politburo, Mao candidly admitted the weaknesses of the locational policy, saying: 'In the past few years we have not laid enough stress on industry in the coastal regions. I think we should make some changes.' He then outlined several reasons for the need to modify the policy. These included: 'The technical level of coastal industry is high, the quality of its products good, its costs low, and it produces many new products. Development of coastal industry will have a stimulating effect on the technical level and quality of national industry as a whole.' Mao further stressed the need for developing industry of the coastal region: 'If we do not utilize the industry of the coastal region, we cannot establish industry in the interior. We must not simply maintain coastal industry. We must also develop it where appropriate.'⁴¹

Although this document was never publicly announced in any official media at that time, an elaboration of its main theme could be found in a report presented by Chou En-lai at the Eighth Congress on 16 September 1956. Referring to the dependency of development of industry in the interior upon coastal industry, Chou emphatically pointed out: 'New industrial bases will be built in the interior to maximize use of resource potential, but this policy must be carried out in a *planned way*.' This would mean, according to Chou, that the existing industrial bases in coastal areas must be fully utilized. Supply of industrial materials, equipment, and capital and technical personnel necessary for industrial construction in the interior, would be dependent upon existing industrial cities in the coastal region. The existing industrial bases near the coast were thus regarded as the starting point of the industrialization of China. Chou revealed that expansion of coastal industry was already underway, and that its further development would be achieved during the *Second Five Year Plan*.⁴² Superficially, it seems that the primary objective of the new locational policy was to accelerate the process of national industrialization and modernization. In our view, the modification of locational policy implied the beginning of 'self-reliance' as a major policy for

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national economic development. The Chinese leadership began to look for internal resources to achieve the national goal of building an industrial socialist state.

IMPACT OF THE MODIFIED LOCATIONAL POLICY ON SUBURBAN SHANGHAI

To implement the modified locational policy of the central government, the municipal government of Shanghai introduced a local policy, emphasizing full utilization of the potential of the city's existing industry and its rational development.

Substantial increases in capital investment were assigned to capital construction of industry in the city, involving primarily the expansion and innovation of existing industrial facilities. During the period 1950 to 1957, the total investment of Shanghai's capital construction (Central and local) reached 2 billion *yuan*; 0.868 billion *yuan*, or 43.4 per cent of the total amount, was invested in industry (Table 10.3). In 1956 the level of construction investment was 0.268 billion *yuan*. However, in 1957, investment in industry alone climbed to over 0.380 billion *yuan* – which was the highest in the entire *First Five Year Plan* period (see

Table 10.2. *Distribution of new workers' villages in Shanghai, 1952*

Site number	Name*	Number of dwelling units	Location
1	Changpei	3,500	
2	Kungchiang	3,000	Futung
3	Fengcheng	1,100	(east Shanghai)
4	Anshan	2,310	
	Chinchuan and		Taichiang
5	Yeechuan	4,000	(north Shanghai)
	Choyang Eighth		
6	Village	1,000	Chinyu
7	Choyang	3,000	Hsinch'eng
8	Tienshan	1,000	(west Shanghai)
9†	Jihhuei	1,000	Nanhsi
			(south Shanghai)

† This site was located inside the city. Source: *HWJP*, 29 Oct. 1952.

* *Shang-hai-shih chiao-tung-tu* (*Map of Communication of Shanghai Municipality*). Edited and drawn by the Survey Team of the Urban Construction Bureau of Shanghai Municipality (Shanghai Publishing House, 1976).

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Table 10.3. *Investment in Shanghai's capital construction 1950-57*

Type	Amount (Billion yuan)	%
Industry	0.868	43.4
Agriculture		
Forestry, water conservancy	0.212	10.6
Others	0.920	46.0
Total	2	100.0

Source: HWJP, 1 Sept. 1957.

Table 10.3). According to other sources of information, investment in industry reached as high as 44.88 per cent of the annual total investment in capital construction in Shanghai, if investment from various departments of the central government in the city's industry was included.⁴⁴

CHANGES IN SHANGHAI'S INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE

The local policy to utilize the city's industry fully and to develop it rationally eventually brought about important changes in the industrial structure as well as rapid industrial expansion in the city.

Table 10.4. *Planned shares of capital investment in various sectors in Shanghai, 1957*

Sector	%
Industry	32.16
Construction	5.00
Agriculture	5.30
Transportation	6.76
Public utilities	23.68
Education and health	19.00
Labour reform	2.62
Others	5.48
Total	100.00

Source: HWJP, 28 Aug. 1957.

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These changes led to a new direction of development in suburban Shanghai after mid-1956.

In 1949 over 90% of Shanghai's industry was light industry, among which textile manufacturing occupied over 60%. Since the implementation of the new policy, greater emphasis has been given to expanding heavy industry. In 1956 75.94% of the total capital input into industry was allocated to heavy industry, while 17.02% went to light industry, and only a mere 7.04% to the textile industry.⁴⁵ A similar investment pattern was reported in 1957, with 72.4% of the investment allocated to heavy industry and 19.8% and 7.8% to light industry and textile industry respectively.⁴⁶ This new investment policy brought about very rapid growth in the machinery industry, iron and steel refineries, oil refineries and the chemical industry, which played a significant part in the transformation of Shanghai's industrial structure. Substantial increases in the proportion of heavy industry at the expense of an appreciable decline in the textile industry was recorded. By the closing year of the *First Five Year Plan*, a balanced as well as diversified industrial structure was achieved in Shanghai.

ESTABLISHMENT OF INDUSTRIAL DISTRICTS IN SUBURBAN SHANGHAI

After 1956, large-scale relocation of industrial plants from the urban areas to the suburban areas was made possible by substantial increases in capital investment in the industrial sector. From mid-1956 to the end of 1957, the Department of Industry in Shanghai invested 130 million *yuan* for the relocation project.⁴⁷ Within less than two years, four new industrial districts⁴⁸ were established in the suburban areas of the city. Thus a new spatial pattern of industrial land use emerged in Metropolitan Shanghai.

The four new manufacturing centres created after mid-1956 were the Tsaohoching Industrial District, the Taichang Industrial District, the Kaochiao Industrial District and the Pengp'u Industrial District (Map 4). Each of these new industrial nodes contained organized groups of industries of different but related types of industry (Table 10.5); this constituted its unique characteristic. With the exception of Kaochiao, which was located at about ten miles from Shanghai, all the other new industrial developments were established at the urban fringe. The average distance between these industrial districts and the central city is less than three miles.

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Table 10.5. *New industrial districts in suburban Shanghai*

Industrial districts	Approximate location	Total area (km ²)	Types of industry
T'aopu ^a	Chenyu district	2	Essentially a chemical industrial district. Including dyeing factory, dyeing material factory, saccharin plant, rubber recycling plant, organic chemical factory, synthetic fibre factory, fountain pen factory, other industrial plants producing organic glass, sulphuric acid and pharmaceutical products.
Pengp'u ^b	Chiangwan district	3.4 ^c	Electrical machinery factory, iron works and iron foundries.
Tsaohoching ^c	Lunghua district	2.45 ^c	Precision scientific instrument plants.
Taichang ^d	Taichang district	—	Iron works and iron foundries.
Kaochiao ^f	Kaochiao district	—	Primarily a chemical district, oil refinery.

Sources:

^a *WHP*, 30 Oct. 1954.

^b and ^c *HWJP*, 15 June 1956.

^d *CFJP*, 24 July 1956.

^e *CFJP*, 6 April 1957.

^f *WHP*, 6 July 1958.

To the Chinese city planners, this spatial organization of related types of industries was expected to promote efficiency in industrial production. Close proximity of industries of related types reduced transportation costs in shipping of semi-processed products, and thus lessened total capital investment. For example, in 1956 a number of large iron works and iron foundries in urban Shanghai were relocated to the Taichang Industrial District in the suburban area lying to the north of the city. These plants included Chunghua Iron Works, Taitung Iron Works, Tehhua Iron Works, Shunho Foundry, and a number of other iron works and foundries. Before the relocation of these factories, Shunho Foundry was a major supplier of casting moulds for Chunghua Iron Works. Because these two factories were seven miles apart, shipping of casting moulds had involved high transportation cost. Further, because these two factories were located within the densely populated area of Shanghai, large-sized casting moulds had to be shipped at night.⁴⁹

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SATELLITE TOWN DEVELOPMENT IN THE CITY REGION
OF SHANGHAI

Because of the ever-increasing demand for Shanghai's industrial goods and industrial equipment by other industrial centres, the rate of industrial production and capital construction in the city was greatly accelerated. The year 1958 witnessed an enormous upsurge of capital investment in the city's industrial sector. The total investment that year amounted to about one billion *yuan*, which was equivalent to 262% of the total investment in 1957, or 71% of the total investment in the entire *First Five Year Plan*.⁵⁰ This high level of capital investment was a key factor in Shanghai's vigorous industrial expansion. Wu's study on distribution of industrial plants in seventeen Chinese cities from 1949 to 1960 revealed that a total of 43 new plants were built in Shanghai, second only to Peking where 66 new plants were added.⁵¹ Available sources indicate that, in 1958 and early in 1959, a large number of above-norm industrial plants, mainly in the heavy industry category, were built in Shanghai.

Following the policy to decentralize industrial functions in the city, the Municipal People's Committee of Shanghai and the Department of Industry erected new industrial plants in the newly established and existing industrial districts located in the suburban areas. This contributed to the rapid expansion and numerical increase of industrial nodes in the Shanghai City Region. By 1959 at least twelve industrial districts existed in Shanghai. The new ones included Minhsing, Woosung, P'utung, Wooching, Hsinching, Changchiao and Chouchiatao. Most of these were located at an average distance of about twenty miles from Shanghai. Each of these industrial districts contained related types of industry, such as chemicals, iron and steel, scientific instruments and textiles. The accelerated development of new industrial districts in suburban Shanghai is reflected by the unprecedented amount of suburban land designated for industrial use by the Municipal People's Committee. In his speech at the Second Meeting of the Third People's Congress in Shanghai held in mid-1959, the mayor revealed that over 36,800 *mou* of land (equivalent to nearly 9.5 square miles) was approved for use for industrial construction. This surpassed the total amount of land used for industrial purposes during the entire period of the *First Five Year Plan* by over 50%. It was also revealed that over 85% of the land was used for industrial construction, transportation and warehouses in the industrial districts of Minhsing,

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Woosung, Pengp'u, Tsaohoching, Chouchiatao and T'aop'u⁵². As these industrial districts were scattered in the suburban area, despite the large-scale transformation of land from non-industrial to industrial use, rapid expansion of the central city and encroachment upon market-garden land around the city fringes were avoided.

The concept of the city region which had emerged in mid-1956, was first implemented at the beginning of 1958 when expansion of suburban areas took place in many major cities. Within that year, 58 city regions were established.⁵³ The most notable expansion and administrative reorganization of suburban areas took place in Peking, Tientsin and Shanghai, the three special municipalities in the People's Republic.

In January 1958, the incorporated territory of Shanghai included the counties of Chiating, Paoshan and Shanghai (Map 5). This administrative change increased the total area of Shanghai's suburban areas by over 863 square kilometres, and its population by 650,000.⁵⁴ Towards the end of 1958 another large-scale expansion took place in the city region of Shanghai. The administrative boundaries were further extended to include seven surrounding counties (Map 6). The City Region Government made public decisions on a variety of important matters such as decentralization of industrial activities from the central city, control of population distribution, agricultural land-use management and planning, development and utilization of the local transportation system, and mobilization of manpower.

A salient feature in the city regions of China is the development of satellite settlements in the suburban areas. The adoption of a central policy to build small and medium-sized cities and to disperse industrial activities from large cities, for economic and national security reasons, added impetus to such development.

To implement the central policy of industrial decentralization in Shanghai, the Second Meeting of the First Congress of Shanghai Municipality was held between December 1957 and January 1958. A resolution concerning the construction of satellite towns in Shanghai's suburban areas was passed. It was stressed in the meeting that these satellite settlements would not be allowed to be developed into dormitory towns or sanatorium towns,⁵⁵ implying the creation of balanced and self-contained communities specifically designed for dispersing the city's population and industries.

When the City Region of Shanghai was established in January 1958, one of the major objectives was to provide a wider range of sites to be

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selected for industrial district and satellite town development. Specifically, the incorporation of this large territory into Shanghai's City Region enabled the planners to locate future satellite towns at an optimal distance from the central city. As conceived by Shanghai's urban planners, the optimal distance between the central city and the satellite settlements lies within a range of twenty to seventy kilometres.⁵⁶ This would certainly prevent the latter from being absorbed into the former and aggravating the problem of rapid expansion of built-up areas of large cities, while retention of certain mutual co-ordinations in industrial production was possible.

Undoubtedly economic aspects were given the highest priority in satellite town development. The planners proposed the use of existing town sites and industrial districts located at or near water and railway transportation facilities. Preference of site selection was to be given to suburban towns possessing urban infrastructures, power supply, sewage system, good roads, and residential housing. Thus, the need for capital investment in the construction of these urban facilities would be minimized. To conform with the state policy of building small and medium-sized cities, and to avoid heavy concentration of industrial activities in one locality, the Shanghai planners adopted the state guideline of restricting urban population within the range of 50,000 to 200,000 for the new satellite communities in the City Region of Shanghai.⁵⁷

Within each of these communities, separate independent neighbourhoods were to be created, designed primarily to shorten the distance between residence and place of work. Each 'cell' clustered around a factory or major commercial centre. Factories were sometimes surrounded by parks which in turn were ringed by workers' housing projects. Within the neighbourhood were scattered schools, markets, clinics and shops.⁵⁸ To facilitate efficient industrial production, each of these satellite towns accommodated related types of industry, which shared the same unique characteristics of the industrial districts established earlier.

Drafting of the general development plan for Shanghai's suburban areas and a survey of potential sites for satellite town development were both initiated in February 1958. The plan encompassed design of distribution of satellite towns and their industry, distribution and organization of agricultural communes responsible for supplying subsidiary foods to the urban population of the parent city and the satellite towns, and detailed planning of transportation networks

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within the entire municipality. It also included preliminary planning of the first satellite town in the City Region of Shanghai, the Industrial District of Minhsing, and other potential sites for future satellite town developments at Wuch'ing, Peiyangchiao, Nanchiang, Huangtu and Ant'ing (Map 7).⁵⁹

The new Industrial District of Minhsing, established soon after 1957, was selected as the site for Shanghai's first satellite town. The criteria for its selection, as proposed by the Shanghai Institute of Urban Planning and Design, were primarily the favourable geographical attributes of that particular site. The town of Minhsing is spatially separated from the parent city. It is located at about 30 kilometres south of Shanghai, on the left bank of Hwangpoo River. The terrain of the town site is level, but it lies above the highest flood level on record. Thus no expensive engineering project for flood prevention would be necessary. The site possessed another natural advantage for industrial development. Ships up to 10,000 tons can reach Minhsing on Hwangpoo River and berth along the town's waterfront. There are also good land transportation facilities connecting Minhsing and Shanghai. Besides being served by a branch line of the Huhang Railway (Shanghai-Hangchow Railway), Minhsing is linked directly with Shanghai by a new high-quality motor road built in 1958. The north-south oriented transport artery branches off Chungshan Road West in Shanghai, passing through the industrial district of Tsaohoching, and the towns of Muilun, Hsinchung, Kuchiao and Pehchiao before reaching Minhsing. By means of this new Shanghai-Minhsing Highway, the travel time between Shanghai and its new satellite town is only thirty minutes.⁶⁰ Other additional favourable factors included the availability of power and water supply, roads, urban infrastructure, and public amenities.⁶¹ This first satellite town of the Shanghai City Region was designated as a heavy industrial centre. A number of large modern industrial plants, including heavy machinery factories, metallurgical plants and Shanghai's largest integrated iron and steel works were installed in 1958 (Map 8).

SPATIAL REORGANIZATION OF AGRICULTURAL LAND USE IN THE CITY REGIONS

After the establishment of city regions in China, a new spatial pattern of agricultural land use emerged in the new administrative and planning units. Large-scale conversion of urban fringe crop land into

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intensively cultivated market gardens took place, forming a zonal structure of varied intensity in agricultural land use.

The National Conference on Agricultural Work held early in 1959 played an important role in this new development. At the Conference, the relationships between agricultural planning and the newly established rural communes were discussed. Following the discussion a number of new agricultural policies were adopted. One of these urged the agricultural communes located near urban centres to set up special vegetable bases, and to plan vegetable production according to the size of the urban population.⁶² As a consequence of the introduction of this new policy, the agricultural zone within many urban regions has been organized into two major categories of vegetable-producing bases. The first agricultural sub-zone in the near suburb is classified as a class one vegetable base, producing 70% or over of the vegetable needs of the city. It is a specialized and year-round horticultural area which is intensively cultivated with high inputs of labour and fertilizer, and with mechanical irrigation being practised. The second sub-zone, in the far suburb, is generally a less intensively cultivated area, producing a major food crop. It is located at a greater distance from the city, and designated as a class two vegetable base. Within this sub-zone, only some vegetables are grown, either on a year-round or seasonal basis, in areas where the soils are suitable for certain types of vegetable crops.⁶³ For example, within the municipality of Peking, the suburban areas were subdivided into two concentric zones. The inner zone, known as the 'near suburb', accounted for about 7% of the entire city region. It lies immediately outside the new built-up area where a large number of post-secondary schools and research institutes, government buildings, museums, factories and workers' housing projects are located. This entire 'near suburb' has been designated as a special agricultural area where vegetables and fruits are grown intensively for supplying the urban market of Peking. The outer encircling zone, known as the 'far suburb', covers over 90% of the city region. It has been designated as a supply base for the city's requirements of coal, lumber, construction materials, dairy products, some grain and water.⁶⁴ Similar spatial reorganization of agricultural land use is evident in the Shanghai City Region (Map 9). The city's built-up areas are now completely encircled by a relatively broad circular zone of market gardens. These vegetable plots are cultivated by members of twelve rural communes located on the urban fringe area. Outside the horticultural zone is the traditional cereal grains and cotton producing area. Changes in agri-

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cultural land use also occurred at Minhsing. Originally, prior to the formation of agricultural communes in 1958, only two of the thirty-three Advanced Agricultural Producers' Co-operatives located around Minhsing produced vegetables. After the amalgamation of these thirty-three Advanced Agricultural Producers' Co-operatives into an agricultural commune, a significant change in agricultural land use took place. This new commune, known as the Machiao Commune, was designated by the Municipal People's Committee of Shanghai as the vegetable production base for the new satellite town. The thirty-three production brigades of the commune formulated a new plan on agricultural land use. Over 10,000 *mou* of the commune's 72,096 *mou* of farmland was converted into market gardens. Most of these vegetable fields were located as near as possible to the town site. Other factors governing the location of these fields included terrain conditions, soil types and accessibility to transportation facilities.⁶⁵

CONCLUSION

During the late 1950s and early 1960s, many senior Soviet urban planners were still advocating the extension of administrative control of municipal governments over their suburban territory, and the need for unified planning of the suburban areas and the central city.⁶⁶ Thus it appears evident that the new concept of city region which emerged in mid-1956 is a Chinese innovation. Putting this concept into practice represented a major departure from the Soviet model of urban planning which the Chinese had adopted earlier. It is, indeed, a significant development in the socialist planning of China.

To the Chinese, cities play important roles as growth centres, and hold the key to industrialization and modernization of the nation. However, it has been realized that, in order to avoid the undesirable effects of uncontrolled urbanization, excessive spatial growth and population increase in metropolitan centres must be arrested. The building of small and medium-sized cities has been encouraged. At the same time there has been a tendency in larger cities towards dispersal of the population to the environs and of decentralization of all new industrial developments to satellite towns. The implementation of this new policy is not 'anti-urbanism', as postulated by some Western scholars on Chinese urban development. On the contrary, this new thinking in urban development design represents an emergence of a new concept of Maoist socialist urbanism.


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The spatial reorganization of urban and agricultural land use in the city region revives the urban-rural symbiosis which is traditional to China. Specifically, the establishment of a vegetable production belt around the central city and its satellite communities is a significant development towards that goal. When vegetable farming is located in close proximity to the industrial city, supply of fresh vegetables to the urban residents can be ensured; there will be an abundant supply of organic fertilizer from the urban areas. Workers and other urbanites are often mobilized to help in vegetable production whenever there is a seasonal labour shortage. Also, one of the major objectives of the commune system in China is the ultimate mechanization of the agricultural sector. The development of satellite industrial communities ringed by market gardens and dispersed throughout the city region, as exemplified by the new settlement patterns in the City Region of Shanghai, will certainly aid the diffusion of technological innovation, and thus greatly accelerate the achievement of this objective.


Apparently, the new regime has realized that both industry and agriculture constitute major components of material production in the national economy, and that to speed up the tempo of economic growth, it is necessary to promote a close alliance, in the form of mutual assistance and co-operation, between workers and peasants. The increased contact of workers and peasants also serves to achieve the ideological goal of eliminating the schism between city and countryside, industry and agriculture, and mental and manual work.

The market gardening belt that encircles cities also serves as a 'green fence' to stop the spread of built-up areas. While there has been a state policy to locate as few new industrial activities as possible in the central city, any expansion of a satellite town beyond its planned area is restricted. In the satellite town of Minhsing, for example, regulations restricting the conversion of market-garden land into industrial or other non-agricultural uses have been strictly enforced.⁶⁷ The Chinese model of urban and regional planning demonstrates that, with proper control and spatial planning of both urban and agricultural land use in the suburban areas of the city region, as exemplified by Shanghai, excessive spatial growth of urban centres can be avoided.

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


Map 1 Territorial expansion of Shanghai.



Map 2 The urban-centred planning regions.

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


Map 3 New workers' villages in Shanghai, 1952.




Map 4 New industrial districts in suburban Shanghai, c. 1956.

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
Map 5 The City Region of Shanghai, 1958 (January).

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


Map 6 The City Region of Shanghai, 1958 (December).


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Map 7 Proposed satellite towns in the City Region of Shanghai, 1958.



Map 8 Preliminary town plan of Minhsing, 1958.



Map 9 Land-use map of Shanghai City Region.

PART FIVE
CULTURE AND IDEOLOGY

11

THE EMERGENCE OF WORKER-
WRITERS IN SHANGHAI

Lars Ragvald

We know from the speeches of the first meeting of literary celebrities in July 1949, that the new cultural leaders of China intended, from the very beginning, to carry out some kind of widespread literary popularization in the country.¹ The meaning of popularization, not to speak of the means of achieving it was, however, by no means self-evident. Mao, in his speeches in Yen-an in 1942,² had spoken of two kinds of literature existing side by side: one adapted to the needs of the great majority of workers, peasants and soldiers, and another, more advanced kind, serving the cadres. In the communist areas, under wartime conditions, this might have been an adequate picture. The great majority of the recipients of the literary efforts in those areas were illiterate, and special forms of popular theatre had to be adopted to cater to their needs. Genres such as the novel, the short story etc., by their very nature belonged to the more advanced kind. From 1949 on, however, when the readership broadened to include the literate workers and the middle and upper classes of the cities, the diversity of levels and needs threatened to undermine the simplicity of the above criteria. Both the mass literature and the advanced literature developed during the Yen-an period had a strong rural tinge that did not particularly appeal to urban residents.³ The fact that the Chinese Communist revolution

since the thirties had been out of real contact with the city proletariat became a serious problem for literary creation in the fifties. The Chinese Communist movement had not produced its Gorky; in fact, none of its writers had a working-class background or sufficient experience of working-class life to be able to portray it from the 'inside'.⁴

It is the intention of this study to outline the emergence of the first generation of Chinese worker-authors, or rather the most well-known of them: the Shanghai worker-authors like Hu Wan-ch'un, Fei Li-wen and T'ang K'o-hsin. Due to limitations of space, I shall concentrate primarily on the circumstances of their emergence and deal to a much smaller degree with their works. The term 'worker-writer (or -author)' is taken to refer primarily to the social origin and formative social experience (as expressed in creative writing) of a writer. In China, a distinction is normally made between 'writer' (*tso-che*) and 'author' (*tso-chia*) the latter of which indicates acceptance as a mature writer. In this study I use this distinction, adhering strictly to the practice of the major Chinese literary journals, to show the changing status of the most successful worker-writers. To limit the scope of the study (in the case of writers mentioned by name) I have focussed almost entirely on writers of short stories (*tuan-p'ien hsiao-shuo*) and short novels (*chung-p'ien hsiao-shuo*) which were genres that required more skill than, for example, poetry. It was, in fact, only within these two genres that worker-writers achieved national recognition before the Cultural Revolution, and the only thing which clearly distinguishes the literature and art of Shanghai after 1949 from those of the rest of the country is precisely the large number of this kind of worker-writers (and authors) that emerged in that city. In the course of the exposition I will also, in order to throw some light on the general question of proletarian literature in China, avail myself of some more general material pertinent to the situation of literature in Shanghai and the whole of China.

Not only did there not exist a single worker-writer within the communist movement in 1949, but there were as well almost no works on the life of workers. The Cantonese woman author, Ts'ao Ming, had written a novel about conditions at a factory after arriving in north-east China in 1948, but the book, *Yüan-tung-li (Energy)*, was written hastily from the 'outside'. It did not compare with the many contemporary works on the countryside such as Ting Ling's, *The Sun Shines Over the Sangkan River*.⁵ Needless to say, this presented serious problems for the Party in its attempts to influence the reading habits of the city proletariat.

'WORKER-WRITERS' IN SHANGHAI

Limiting our attention for a moment to the authors and writers who could provide more advanced literature, there were in 1949 basically three major categories, all with experiences different from those of the urban proletariat: (1) The veteran authors from the KMT areas with roots in the twenties and thirties, for example Pa Chin, Mao Tun, and Lao She; (2) authors with a similar background, but who had later gained experience in the communist areas, such as Ho Ch'i-fang, Ting Ling, and Yeh Yi-ch'ün; and (3) military correspondents and cultural workers in the communist armies (mostly of intellectual background) and other Red Army cadres such as Liu Pai-yü, Ma Chia and Ch'en Ch'i-t'ung. Some of these, like Pa Chin, had in the thirties described proletarian conditions but reached hardly any proletarian readers. Soon after 1949, the first two categories were absorbed as leading cadres in the new cultural organs and, with few exceptions, did not produce any further literary works. The third category provided the major source of literary talent in China well into the sixties. Later, well-known authors emerging out of this group include Hao Jan and Ju Chih-chüan.

In 1949 most of the writers of the third category were still immature, which meant that there were few authors politically in tune with Party policies. The new situation also gave rise to quite a few problems over how best to employ the available authors. The new minister of culture, Mao Tun, found it necessary to defend the existence of professional writers (authors) to produce quality literature, pointing to the USSR and Western Europe to prove his case.⁶ In Shanghai in 1949-50, there was a long and inconclusive debate over whether those writers not yet able to serve the needs of the workers might continue to serve the bourgeoisie. Due to the particular experience of the authors, the literature of those days had a strong bourgeois flavour and most authors found it difficult to write works glorifying revolutionary events. Political leaders like Hu Ch'iao-mu and Ho Lung early expressed their dissatisfaction that the literature did not correspond to the 'greatness of the era'.⁷ Middle class readers also, but for opposite reasons, disliked the stereotyped attempts to depict the 'greatness of the era'.⁸

The major efforts in 1949-50 (on the part of the cultural apparatus) were no doubt on popularization, particularly among the industrial proletariat. Although popularization was at no stage to be confused with or opposed to the creation of quality literature, there was in 1950 a tendency to encourage worker-writers at any cost and quickly. The distinction between 'writer' and 'author' was undermined by the

frequent use of the term 'literary worker' to designate all categories of writers. In some of the major cities, such as Peking, Tientsin and Shanghai, this popularization took movement-like proportions. The five guidelines put forward for this activity in June 1950 in Peking⁹ are representative of those for other cities and therefore deserve to be mentioned. They were: (1) Literary work should encourage increased economic production (this utilitarian theme remained predominant with regard to literature by proletarian writers at least until the time of the Cultural Revolution); (2) There should be a special committee in the factories to exert leadership over literary work (this function was normally fulfilled by the trade unions, the Youth League, the Women's Association, and other mass organizations); (3) All literary groups and organizations in Peking were to support literary work in the factories (at this time the Writers' Union was not yet well established; thus this refers both to professional writers and other cultural workers who until 1953 were united in the motley Association of Literary Workers); (4) Sending down (*hsia-fang*) must have a clear objective, viz. to make the professionals penetrate deeper into the daily life of the workers, in order for them to be able to create and to help the workers create edifying works stimulating production; (5) To train a nucleus of amateur writers among the workers so as to popularize literature in the factories.

The popularization campaign of 1959-60 seems to have been most successful in Tientsin, where it was reported that groups of amateur writers had been established in a large number of factories.¹⁰ Generally speaking, most of the activity remained of local value, being restricted to staging plays and writing poems and short stories on wall newspapers and preparing performances for major festivals like May First. It was, however, reported that some of the amateurs in Tientsin had produced reportage literature (*pao-kao wen-hsüeh*) of some literary value. Two of the best Tientsin worker-amateurs, Tung Nai-hsiang and Ta Lü, had short stories published in the organ of the Association of Literary Workers, *Jen-min wen-hsüeh* (*People's Literature*).¹¹ This, however, was more an indication of the political pressure to sustain the movement in 1950 than of the literary ability of the two contributors.

Peking and other cities also produced a crop of worker-amateurs in these early days, but few broke through to become worker-writers and those who did so later disappeared in the Anti-Rightist Campaign. Lin Mohan, in 1958,¹² explained that in the eagerness to bring up worker-

writers during the first years after 1949, no distinction was made between those who had just become workers and those who had long experience on the shop floor. In some cases intellectuals who had only been working for a couple of months were counted as worker-writers. That kind of writer did not command any respect among his fellow workers, Lin claimed, and only wanted to get away from the factory as soon as possible. That was, of course, not the intention behind the literary movement in the factories, which was designed first of all to rear activists with some literary and propaganda talent that could be relied upon to spread Party policies among the workers. Promising activists were attached to the trade union and Party press as correspondents and acted as links between the activities of the many cultural clubs run by the local trade unions and the Party leadership. It was from among these correspondents that almost all the later successful worker-authors emerged.

Literary activity among the workers was, on the whole, outside the jurisdiction of the Association of Literary Workers and directly in the hands of the special cultural organs of the trade unions. A few of the purely literary periodicals, however, like the organ of the Wuhan branch of the Association, *Ch'ang-chiang wen-yi* (*Yangtze Literature*), had many workers among its correspondents as early as 1950.¹³ A similar role to the one played by the trade union press in promoting literary attempts among the workers was played by the local Party press.

In Shanghai the trade union daily, *Lao-tung pao*, carried a regular literary supplement for worker-amateurs and writers, *Kung-jen wen-yi* (*Workers' Literature*), but unlike Peking and Tientsin this, the largest industrial city of China, could not celebrate any great victories in fostering proletarian writers during the first two years after 1949. Naturally, a popularization movement had also taken place in Shanghai and a particular literary magazine, *Ch'un-chung wen-yi* (*Masses' Literature*), had even been set up for this purpose. The local literary leaders, however, for one reason or another, had not emphasized proletarian writings in the same way as in Peking and Tientsin. In 1951-2 these leaders became the targets of criticism for waste and losing their ideological orientation.¹⁴ The main reason for this criticism was probably that they had been directly responsible for the shooting of the film, 'The Life of Wu Hsün', which had in summer 1951 occasioned Mao's first direct intervention into literary matters since 1949.¹⁵ Most of the literary periodicals of the city were discon-

tinued, but this was also a general trend over the country as a whole in order to ensure a tighter ideological control by the centre.

The two campaigns that followed this intervention, the Three Antis and the Five Antis, with their strong emphasis on reducing waste and corruption, far from promoting the popularization movement, actually had the effect of slowing it down. As efficiency in production was stressed even more than previously, activities that could be said to interfere with production were less tolerated. Even in Tientsin, popularization was markedly reduced in scope.¹⁶ Although there were many examples of continued activity at the grassroots level in the industrialized areas, it seems safe to state that from 1952 to 1956 there existed no real mass movement for literary creation among the workers anywhere in China. This lull also roughly coincides with the much greater stress on professional creation by the established authors, which was manifested most clearly in 1953 at the Second Congress of the Association of Literary Workers (now significantly renamed the Writers' Union).¹⁷

In Shanghai, a more business-like approach to the problem of fostering proletarian writers now replaced the earlier mass movement. About thirty of the most promising literary activists who had emerged in 1951 were selected for special training at the local broadcasting station.¹⁸ There, they had meetings twice a week, where they discussed and corrected their manuscripts under the guidance of the employees of the literary section of that station and studied literary theory and creation. This group, which contained virtually all of the later well-known worker-authors in Shanghai (and China), was under the supervision of the Propaganda Department of the city. This was of decisive importance as the Department was strong enough to convince the factory managements, local Party Committees, and the trade unions of the need for trainee-writers being allowed time off. In addition to this elite group, there existed another, larger one around the *Lao-tung pao*. Judging from reports in the *Wen-yi pao* (*Literary Gazette*), it would appear that these arrangements, if not unique in the country, were nevertheless more successful in Shanghai than elsewhere. This did not mean, however, that the elite group had no problems. The motivation of the trainees differed considerably and many were said to be more interested in monetary rewards than in the message their writings were supposed to contain. This problem, which was caused by the relatively high fees paid even to trainee-writers, did not cease to trouble the literary leaders until many years later. In addition to the increased

incomes earned from writing, there also existed the possibility of making use of literary talent to improve one's social position. For example, at the instigation of the Propaganda Department, all the promising trainees were given jobs as cadres in their respective trade unions, which not only gave them time to write, but also enabled them to get more insight into the whole mechanism of the enterprises they were working in. The history of the best-known of the three most important worker-authors in Shanghai, Hu Wan-ch'un, can serve as an example.

Hu, who had been working in a private steel mill for more than ten years, was somehow mobilized in the literary movement in 1950.¹⁹ In 1951, he became a correspondent of the *Lao-tung pao* and also received training as a correspondent at the local Party paper, *Chieh-fang jih-pao*. His writings in those days were, of course, only short reports without literary pretensions. He improved his writing ability by bombarding the editorial boards with reports that were corrected and sent back to him for further improvement until finally passed. In 1952 the steel mill where he worked was nationalized. He then wrote a report in the form of a short story which was accepted by the prestigious *Wen-hui pao*. That happened in March 1952 in the midst of the Five Antis campaign. It is likely the campaign helped him, since the *Wen-hui pao* might not normally have published his rather crude short story. In any event, he was, a few months later, enrolled into the elite group at the broadcasting station. After a period of training he finished his second short story, *Winning the Red Flag*, which like the first, was not much above the level of ordinary newspaper reporting. It was published in the Shanghai *Ch'ing-nien pao*. Soon afterwards, in the beginning of 1953, he became a cadre specializing in technical control work. He also became propaganda manager of the local trade union and even its vice-chairman. Later, when instructing amateur writers, Hu claimed that he had been pretty busy in those days performing his nominal tasks. Yao Wen-yüan, however, in the preface to Hu's *A Man Made of Special Stuff*²⁰ said that Hu was often given time off by the Party Committee of the mill for literary creation. In 1954 Hu made many unsuccessful attempts to break through into the periodicals for quality literature. Later, when looking back on his efforts of those days, Hu admitted that he had not really been good at writing then, having approached it too much like a journalist. The same can be said of T'ang K'o-hsin who had started writing somewhat earlier than Hu, and of Fei Li-wen who first began to write in large quantities in 1953-4.²¹ None of these three worker-authors

were even within reach of becoming members of the Writers' Union in those days; they were no more than promising literary propagandists closely adhering to the needs of Party policy. All of them quickly became cadres, but for some reason Hu Wan-ch'un advanced faster than the others to become an administrative cadre in 1954.

As the first generation of worker-writers were still trainees, they had only indirectly been involved in the rumblings of the Shanghai literary and art circles in 1952. At that time some of them (as literary activists) had been called upon by the editorial board of *Chieh-fang jih-pao* to express their opinions on the literature then available to worker-readers.²² Not surprisingly, they did not praise it.

In 1954-5, in the wake of Mao's second major intervention in literary affairs, the contradictions already apparent in 1952 between Hsia Yen (who was in charge of literary affairs in the East China Region) and the Yen-an generation of authors (backed by the Propaganda Department of the city) became acute. The fact that the editorial board of the *Wen-yi pao* was censured for not promptly carrying articles by marxifying 'nobodies' on the interpretation of the Ch'ing dynasty novel, *The Dream of the Red Chamber*, led by analogy to attacks on virtually all other editorial boards of literary magazines for neglecting 'nobodies'.²³ However, the question of worker-writers was not yet on the agenda and what happened was, according to the Shanghai veteran author Wang Jo-wang, that veteran Yen-an authors posed as 'newborn forces' to force the organ of the local Writers' Union, the *Wen-yi yüeh-pao* (*Literary Monthly*), to publish their works.²⁴ The ensuing *Su-fan* (Counter-Revolutionary) campaign, however, with its hunt for hidden KMT agents in the society and its literary corollary, the Hu Feng campaign,²⁵ clearly greatly benefited worker-writers in the sense that reports on the advance of the movement in the factories were in great demand. This time, however, the Propaganda Department, whose people used the opportunity to wrest the power in literary affairs away from Hsia Yen's supporters, did not make use of worker-writers in this struggle. Wang Jo-wang, in May 1957, revealed that he had by that time been well aware of the effort to overthrow Hsia Yen and his supporters. He said: 'I clearly realized what was in the making at that time, but did not dare to speak out because the sectarians were supported by the Party Committee.'²⁶ One of those who benefited from this was a young propagandist, Yao Wen-yüan, who, as a result of the purge of Hu Feng supporters, was recruited into literary work on behalf of the Writers' Union. Consequently, he

expressed a very different opinion of what had happened:

The Writers' Union achieved great success in the Su-fan campaign, a few members were proved to be counter-revolutionaries and exposed. The Hu Feng supporters in the *Wen-yi yüeh pao* were cleaned out . . . During this campaign, a group of activists loyal to the Party emerged. An air of righteousness spread in the offices and got the upper hand during the campaign . . . and some excellent activists were recruited into the Party.²⁷

Among the Yen-an generation proper, those who most obviously benefited from the campaign were people like Chang Ch'un-ch'iao who became director of the office in charge of literature and art of the Propaganda Department, and Chou Erh-fu, Yeh Yi-ch'ün and K'ung Lo-sun, who dominated the Writers' Union. It became very difficult to refuse manuscripts from this group and the non-Party editor of *Wen-yi yüeh-pao*, Wei Chin-chih, confessed in 1957 that his hands had trembled when having to deal with such manuscripts.²⁸

Nationally, as well as in Shanghai, the outcome of these campaigns was that literature was again, as during the Korean War, tied more closely to propaganda. The collectivization of agriculture and the socialization of industry and commerce at the end of 1955 and the beginning of 1956 provided the themes. The question of rearing a large number of young writers was greatly emphasized. However, there was no particular emphasis on raising worker- or peasant-writers. The special national bi-weekly for guiding and promoting the creative efforts of young writers, *Wen-yi hsüeh-hsi* (*Literary Study*) which first appeared in 1954, never regarded the emergence of worker-writers as a special question with its own problems.²⁹ Worker-writers were seen primarily as propagandists in the factories. The vast majority of post-1949 young authors and writers who by 1955 dominated the literary scene were of middle-class background, like Lui Shao-t'ang, Liu Pin-yen and Wang Meng.

In Shanghai, the special groups for training worker-writers were abolished in 1955 and later replaced by an organization for training young writers in general, run jointly by the local Youth League and the Writers' Union.³⁰ The Yen-an author Ha Hua was in charge of this activity. Yao Wen-yüan also gradually became involved in this kind of work. Seminars on literary creation were held at which well-known professionals like Wei Chin-chih and T'ang T'ao lectured. Some literary activity on the cultural club level (i.e. in the factories) was again encouraged to suit the needs of the various campaigns. The first generation of worker-writers was favoured by the rapid social and

economic transformations of that period and frequently had works published in the press. Normally, however, they were now referred to as young writers rather than worker-writers.

In March 1956, following an important meeting of the Council of the Writers' Union, a conference of young writers was held in Peking.³¹ Since little had been done previously to bring up young writers, most localities had difficulty in finding representatives to attend the conference. In Changsha, where very little work had been done in the field of literature, a veritable manhunt had to be undertaken³². Shanghai, of course, was more advanced, but there too the attitude to youth work had been slack, especially at the cultural club level. Two of the Shanghai worker-writers, Hu Wan-ch'un and Mao Ping-fu, were sent to attend the meeting in Peking and thereafter received training for three months at the special school for training literary talents, the *Wen-hsüeh chiang-hsi So*, set up by the National Writers' Union.³³ On their return to Shanghai, they, together with most of the former members of the elite group at the broadcasting station, were transferred to the editorial boards of the local literary magazines, in particular to the newly established Shanghai bi-weekly for young writers, *Meng-ya* (*The Sprout*).

For the majority of the first generation of worker-writers, the beginning of 1956 meant sudden recognition as real writers. The person who perhaps most deserved this break-through was Hu Wan-ch'un. He had spent a considerable part of 1955 studying at the school of the national trade union and had also been allowed to spend some time at the seaside resort of Peitai-ho in northern Hopei.³⁴ There he wrote his most successful story to date, which immediately made him the most promising worker-writer in Shanghai and the protégé of the local Propaganda Department. The story, which significantly did not depict the ongoing campaigns and transformations, dealt with memories from his own childhood. It appeared under the title *Flesh and Blood* (*Ku Jou*) in the first issue of *Wen-yi yüeh-pao* in 1956. Yao Wen-yüan, in reviewing the short story more than a year later, stated that its strength was the feeling of reality it emitted, although Hu's mastery of literary language was still far from perfect.³⁵ The story was awarded an international prize (in the USSR) and was translated into English, Japanese and Russian. It was this success that opened the way for Hu to the school of the Writers' Union and to the editorial board of *Meng-ya*.

The recognition of worker-writers in Shanghai and elsewhere had

been a matter of political circumstances (the Hu Feng campaign). As soon as they were enrolled into the local Writers' Union they were more or less forgotten and treated as if they were established authors. The opportunities for much-needed further guidance were small. Only a few of the experienced authors, such as Wei Chin-chih, Ha Hua, Wang Jo-wang and Chao Tsi, devoted any time to helping them.³⁶ New developments, such as the effect on China of the Soviet thaw, turned attention away from narrowly task-oriented literature. What was more, from the middle of 1956, the established authors were free to criticize the dogmatism and schematism that had dominated the literary field. National literary leaders like Mao Tun and Chou Yang asked for more experiments in literary creation, and thought that the time had arrived to adopt a more critical attitude to the writings of the 'new emerging forces'.³⁷ The worker-writers who, with few exceptions, were favoured by precisely the kind of schematism that went hand-in-hand with depicting the successes of ongoing campaigns were the ones worst hit by this. Furthermore, the whole intellectual climate changed with the start of the movement to Let a Hundred Flowers Blossom and a Hundred Schools of Thought Contend. Many old authors who had been silent since 1949 were now reactivated. Most newspapers and magazines started favouring essays rather than reportage literature. In Shanghai, by the end of 1956 all the literary supplements previously favouring worker-writers, except that of the *Lao-tung pao*, had switched over to publishing essays. None of the worker-writers in Shanghai were able to respond to the Soviet-inspired realism that for some months at the end of 1956 and the beginning of 1957 stirred the literary scene. Events simply passed them by. Moreover, the fact that so many of the most promising had been brought into editorial work presented them with still other problems. Cut off from their usual sources of inspiration, they lost confidence and ceased literary creation altogether.³⁸ Only a few of the very best, like Hu Wan-ch'un, did any creative writing in 1956-7, and even his work during this period proved far inferior to his earlier *Flesh and Blood*.

On a somewhat higher level, within the local Writers' Union, there developed serious contradictions. The older generation of authors, particularly those from the non-Yenan areas, used anti-dogmatism as a pretext to strike back at the young activists who had pressed them hard earlier. Yao Wen-yüan and several other young critics, in the beginning of the Hundred Flowers movement, also criticized dogmatic and bureaucratic tendencies in the literary field. But very soon it became

clear that they themselves would be threatened if liberalism went unchecked, as they had attained their present positions by brandishing Marxist dogmas. The enmity latent from the purge of the Hu Feng 'elements' from the *Wen-yi yüeh-pao* in 1955 was also fresh in everybody's mind. According to Wang Jo-wang,³⁹ some people wanted to keep *Meng-ya* 'safe' from liberalization and out of reach of the old, non-Yenan authors. This could not be seen very clearly in 1956, but from the beginning of 1957, *Meng-ya* maintained a very different line from most other literary magazines, staying much more consistently orthodox all through the stormy spring days. When in January and February 1957 there was a short pause in liberalization, with something resembling a rectification in a few localities, *Meng-ya* took exactly the same rigidly puritanical attitude as Yao Wen-yüan manifested in the *Wen-yi yüeh-pao*. The worker-writers were kept outside the conflict which arose when Yao, Wang Tao-ch'ien and other young propagandists and critics rebutted the wide-reaching attacks on dogmatism and schematism mounted by the Wuhan author, Yao Hsüeh-yin.⁴⁰ The veteran Yenan authors also tried to keep out of that conflict as they were less threatened than their younger supporters.

How firmly *Meng-ya* was in control of the non-liberals in Shanghai could be seen in May-June 1957 when the intellectuals of the city were encouraged to express their criticism of the Party and its policies (the *Ming-fang* period). *Meng-ya*, unlike the other important magazine for young writers, the *Wen-yi hsüeh-hsi*, never allowed any criticism of general aspects of the literary policy since 1949 (or even since 1942) to appear in its columns. Nor did it allow criticism of socialist realism. Anticipating by more than a year Mao's famous slogan of integrating revolutionary romanticism and realism, it suggested precisely that direction as a solution to the crisis in literary production. Whereas in the *Wen-hui pao* and *Wen-yi yüeh-pao* the established non-Party authors were encouraged to express criticism of their situation, to which they responded by complaining of arbitrary rules for publishing, low incomes, bureaucratic waste, and arbitrary Party interference in matters of creation, in the *Meng-ya* it was the young writers and in particular the worker-writers who were called upon to look at their situation.⁴¹ A storm of criticism resulted, but one very different from that expressed by the more senior members of the local Writers' Union. Whereas the major problem of the latter was too little freedom, the worker-writers complained of the opposite: too much freedom; that is, too little special care shown by the Party. Many complained bitterly that the demand

for high standards shut them out from the magazines and that for the first time for years the *Wen-yi yüeh-pao* had not carried a single story by a worker-writer in its May 1957 issue. Other equally important problems appeared to be lack of spare time to polish their writings and the difficulty of writing for those who were working full-time as editors and journalists. It would seem that there had been quite some pressure to send the worker-writers back to their original jobs because they had been so unproductive since 1955. In July 1957, Yao Wen-yüan claimed that many of the young writers he had been in contact with would willingly leave for the factories again.⁴² Looking at the arguments by the worker-writers in *Meng-ya*, however, it seems highly questionable that such a mood predominated. On the contrary, Hu Wan-ch'un, Fei Li-wen, Fan Fu-keng, and most others thought that they had greatly benefited from having time to study and meet other people engaged in literary work. They thought that a longer stay on the editorial boards would do them more good than harm.⁴³ Of the more well-known worker-writers only T'ang K'o-hsin asked to be transferred back to the factory, but he added that he would prefer to work as a cadre with time off for writing and studying.⁴⁴

From the various arguments in *Meng-ya*, it can be seen that there were in Shanghai in 1957 about 200 young worker-writers with some writing ability, many of whom had been released from industrial production. To some extent the Party leadership responded favourably to the criticism and suggestions they had expressed. The city Party Committee agreed to back a kind of vacation for literary creation. The *Lao-tung pao* journalist, Ah Chang, was one of the first to take advantage of this privilege.⁴⁵ However, the debate that was to follow was broken off in August by the Anti-rightist campaign and developments took quite a different turn.

Except for Fei Li-wen, who seemingly sided with Wei Chin-chih and Wang Jo-wang in expressing more general criticism of the 'sectarianism' of the Party leaders in Shanghai, none of the worker-writers had come into serious conflict with the Party. When the Anti-rightist campaign swept away a large number of non-Yenan, veteran authors such as Hsü Chieh and Sun Ta-yü, the primary reason was their political engagement outside strictly literary matters. Pa Chin, Wei Chin-chih and the majority of the old, non-Yenan authors who had been outspoken but avoided general politics, survived. The purge of the former group of authors was carried out mostly by the younger propagandists like Yao Wen-yüan. The worker-writers who could be

counted upon as loyal supporters of the Party were used against, e.g., Wang Jo-wang who had become a national target as a 'Party traitor'. Yao Wen-yüan, as a member of the Party Committee of the local Writers' Union, did the major 'beating' and Hu Wan-ch'un and others were used to repeat and develop a few of the more personal arguments he had used.⁴⁶ The more well-known worker-writers were also relied upon to praise Soviet literature in November 1957 and they were then more and more frequently referred to as 'worker-writers' rather than 'young writers'. Their advancement in the hierarchy of the Shanghai literary world, however, did not yet equal the breathtaking strides taken by Yao Wen-yüan, who became the totally predominant young critic and theorist in Shanghai. The leaders of the Propaganda Department and the Cultural Bureau, Shih Hsü-min and Hsu P'ing-yü, more and more directly took over command. Taken together, the changes brought about by the Anti-rightist campaign signified a victory of the Propaganda Department over any tendency towards independence by the local Writers' Union. That situation seems never to have been fundamentally reversed.

The fact that many of the well-known young writers had sided with the older generations in criticizing many aspects of the literary policy of the Party, as carried out since 1949, caused serious concern among the literary leaders of China.⁴⁷ Lu Ting-yi, at the end of a long series of meetings of the Party group of the National Writers' Union in September 1957, admitted⁴⁸ not only that there could exist bourgeois tendencies as a leftover from the old society, but that such tendencies could also emerge from within the new society. The material basis for this, he thought, was to be found in inequalities in the distribution of the means of livelihood. He called these inequalities an expression of 'bourgeois rights'. One should, he suggested, be more strict towards young writers and avoid courting them as much as before. He said that some of the young writers who had received very high fees had settled in the big cities and their lifestyle had suffered. Many young writers had been taken into 'creative groups' and, far too early, had become professionals. Young writers should not just 'experience life' for brief intermittent periods, but should settle among the masses and participate in labour for a long period. Although there had been no serious case of 'rightism' among the worker-writers in Shanghai, the policy outlined by Lu Ting-yi was initially followed in their case. During the following months, together with other writers and authors, a number of worker-writers were sent out to participate in manual labour.⁴⁹

However, Hu Wan-ch'un was allowed to continue using the method of 'experiencing life', that is, working for a short time at various places in order to be able to write reports and maybe short stories about them.

All previous political interventions in literature had been followed by sending down writers and authors to the production line on a large scale. Especially since 1955, the question of bringing up a new generation of writers had also been given attention. At the end of 1957, however, while both these aspects were again stressed, a new element, that of fostering new writers from among the proletariat, entered into the picture. The preoccupations of top Party leaders like Mao over how to create intellectuals who were both ideologically reliable and expert⁵⁰ were felt even in the working out of literary policies. An editorial in *Wen-hui pao*⁵¹ claimed that even the worker-peasant-soldier-writers could change ideologically if they stayed away from manual labour too long. Close relations between writers (authors) and the labouring masses should be perpetuated.

Prior to the Hundred Flowers Movement, there had been (during 1955 and 1956) a shortlived popularization and reactivation of the cultural clubs as units of literary creation. This time something more thoroughgoing was planned. In Shanghai, popularization primarily referred to the industrial proletariat. For years the Party leaders had been trying to influence the reading habits of the literate workers and employees.⁵² The existence of a large number of private book-stores and publishing houses had not made this an easy task. In 1956-7 most of these were nationalized or put under government control. But it was not enough to reach the ordinary workers. Their low incomes effectively isolated them from most cultural activities. For the worst off, even visits to the theatre were out of the question.⁵³ Amateur activities were thus the only way to reach these people.

In his (somewhat ritualistic) self-criticism in January 1958, the vice-director of the Cultural Bureau in Shanghai, Hsü P'ing-yü, reviewed the then existing organizational structure and promised a mass movement during the year.⁵⁴ The decisive factors, he stressed, were organization and guidance. Both had, he said, been dealt with in a haphazard way before and not even all the districts in Shanghai had yet set up cultural offices. Hsü suggested that more freedom be given to the production units themselves, as, earlier, many initiatives had been stifled when organization had been carried out by mass-culture workers. He did not mention, however, that this stifling had to a large extent resulted from the resistance of local management committees

and Party Committees to anything that might interfere with production. Shih Hsü-min, the director of the municipal Propaganda Department, left nobody in doubt when a few days later he addressed the literary and art organizations on the nature of the coming movement.⁵⁵ The objective of creation, he said, was primarily to stimulate the economic effort of the Great Leap Forward. At another meeting it was announced that one of the major goals would be to produce cheaper literature. The earlier tendencies of the literary workers (particularly in theatre) to charge amateurs for training them was condemned and it was suggested that that problem would have to be solved by sending the professionals to work at the grass-roots level. To provide the local young writers with a much-needed forum, it was decided that *Meng-ya* should be changed into a magazine promoting mass creation. At this early stage of the literary leap, worker-writers had already become the most frequent contributors to the journal, reversing the trend of 1956–7.

Indicating that a veritable leap was under way in literary popularization, large rallies of literary activists were held all over the city. The P'ut'o district, for example, announced that it planned to set up 1,000 literary and art groups within a year with a total of 40,000 participants.⁵⁶ In the factories, the literary and art movement was very soon used, almost exclusively, to propagate new techniques and to announce political decisions at the local and central levels. The very meaning of the term 'literary work' became dangerously eroded and was often equated with 'propaganda work'. Literary and art production by the masses quickly assumed all the characteristics of industrial production. A quantitative approach predominated. Within two weeks the P'ut'o district had exceeded its 'plan' for 1958 (12,000–14,000 'works') by large margins,⁵⁷ and needless to say that figure was only a fraction of what was reported at the end of the year. One of the reasons for this conceptual confusion, which also affected the attitude to works by the professional authors, was that the Party leadership became directly involved in the mass movement. The mayor of Shanghai, K'o Ch'ing-shih, openly warned the professionals against adopting a superior attitude towards the 'works of the masses still in a budding state'.⁵⁸ While this no doubt was quite necessary to overcome resistance to mass 'literature' among the editors and veteran critics, the effect was to silence all criticism and release the most unbridled praise of the 'buds'. Yao Wen-yüan, when for the first time reviewing a collection of works by Hu Wan-ch'un, who in this new climate was not really a 'bud', but

nearly a 'veteran', compared him favourably with European classic authors such as Stendhal.⁵⁹ In order to do so he deliberately focused only on the ideological aspects of the works. The collection named after one of the stories in it, *The Beginning of Love*, contained works that would a year earlier have still been considered crude and schematic, but were not so in 1958. Yao's only criticism was that Hu tended towards a 'cool' and 'observing' rather than an engaged language.

Hu Wan-ch'un and the other worker-writers in Shanghai were the only members of the Writers' Union who greatly benefitted from the aesthetic criteria of the Great Leap. They were much more accustomed to the now-prevailing topics of economic production and ideological transformation of workers than their colleagues, and were also favoured by the editorial boards because of their social origin. They became frequent contributors not only to the local *Wen-yi yüeh-pao* but also to *Jen-min wen-hsüeh* and the recently-established national bimonthly for novels and quality short stories, *Shou-huo (Harvest)*.⁶⁰ One can, therefore, speak of the first generation of worker-authors in 1958. Some of these, like Chang Ying and Lu Chün-ch'ao,⁶¹ were not trainees from the broadcasting station, but came from the first groups of correspondents of *Wen-yi yüeh-pao* and *Meng-ya*. At a meeting of the Shanghai branch of the Writers' Union in February 1959⁶² it was said that about three hundred of the correspondents had proved to be relatively good at writing. Twenty-four of them, mostly workers, were invited to join the Union. Of a total of about five hundred members the worker-writers (and -authors) constituted almost one-sixth.

The author status of some of the worker-writers was dictated by political rather than artistic criteria. Seen purely from the point of view of literary creation, the addition of a considerable number of worker-writers was not an important event for the Shanghai Union. None of these could, as writers, be compared with the large number of post-Yenan cadres who took up the pen in the middle of the fifties and became well-known precisely in 1957-8. These included former army cadres like Wu Ch'iang and Ju Chih-chüan. Ju was probably the best female short-story writer to emerge in modern China. Her style was terse and observant, more reminiscent of Lu Hsün than of the looseness and verbosity typical of Chinese fiction in the fifties (and subsequently). Also, unlike most of her contemporaries, she did not attempt to create towering heroes nor to impose a moral message on her story. The relative uniqueness of her writing in China makes it into a test-case of the status of aesthetic criteria. While her short story, *Pai-*

ho-hua (*The Lily*),⁶³ justifiably aroused some attention in 1958 among established authors and critics, the Party critics remained conspicuously silent. Her style did not fit the ideas of the Great Leap era. Not until 1962 did Yao Wen-yüan care to comment on her works.⁶⁴

The major event in 1958-9, however, was neither the breakthrough of the worker-writers, nor that of the cadres, but the mass movement mentioned above. Considerations originating from this movement came to dominate the performance as well as the organizational structure of literary and art circles in China. Initially, however, a distinction was made between literature by the masses and literature by the professionals. The latter were expected to increase their production and to serve the needs of the Great Leap, but they were at first not tied directly to particular political and economic tasks. Furthermore they were not organizationally tied to the Propaganda Department as closely as to the mass movement until the latter part of 1958.

During the early stage of the movement, the organizational measures that Hsü P'ing-yü had hinted at materialized.⁶⁵ The former independent literary and art structures of the trade unions, the Youth League, the Women's Association, the municipal Cultural Bureau, and the various cultural associations (including the Writers' Union), set up a joint committee for promoting mass literature and art. This united leadership was extended down to the district level. All this was but another step towards direct leadership by the Propaganda Department, which, of course, greatly facilitated the co-ordination of literature and art with political and economic efforts. It was also decided to set up amateur literary and art groups in factories, schools, government institutions, and lanes. Every factory and district office with more than fifty employees was to have its own literary and art groups. This was a manifold expansion compared with 1957.

Activities at the grass roots were to start with a song movement, including composition and performance, and competitions in the districts and on the city level between advanced units.⁶⁶ Following the song movement there was to be a drama movement which was supposed to culminate in a city-level performance in October 1958. These plans were all carried out although the timing was modified because of the sudden decision to collect and publish old, and in particular modern, folk poetry in April 1958.⁶⁷ In Shanghai alone, several million pieces were collected and at some stage even the army had to be used as a screening institution to select publishable poems to

be submitted to more specialized units for further selection and editing.⁶⁸ Two thousand of the best folk poems were published in Shanghai. The mass movement was also supposed to give rise to a large number of short stories and novels. Given the low cultural level of most workers, that required collective efforts and efficient guidance. The Party cadres responsible for propaganda, and in some cases even the branch secretaries, directly joined in the creative efforts. In the latter part of 1958 these were formalized into outright collective creation when many factories started to write factory histories and sometimes even novels.

In 1957 Shanghai had had 89 worker/ amateur groups for literary creation with a total of 899 members.⁶⁹ By the end of 1958, there were hundreds of thousands of people who had at some stage been involved in collective or individual literary creation. Together they produced more than five million pieces of 'literature'.⁷⁰ A vast flora of literary magazines was started to provide an outlet for this immense activity. In addition to the four leading magazines, *Wen-yi yuèh-pao*, *Meng-ya*, *Shou-huo* (*The Harvest*), and *Yuèh-chin wen-yi* (*Leap Forward Literature*), where the mass writers appeared only in special issues, four new city-wide magazines, *Ch'ün-chung wen-yi* (*Masses' Literature*) *Chieh-k'ou wen-yi* (*Street Corner Literature*), *Kung-jen hsi-tou* (*Workers' Experimental Writing*) and *Gh'ing-nien-kung* (*Young Workers*) also appeared. Most of the city's districts issued regular magazines and so did a few factories.

After the proclamation of the General Line⁷¹ in June 1958, this whole apparatus was put in motion to propagate this policy in the city. The professionals, including Hu Wan-ch'un, wrote model articles for the wall newspapers in the city which were then emulated by the amateurs. The almost incredible activity that was released led Yao Wen-yüan to write:

The works by workers exceed two millions. Many excellent works and excellent worker-writers have emerged. This fact thoroughly destroys the superstitious belief that literary creation is only the work of a few 'authors'. The great proletarian literary army recruits its forces from this inexhaustible source and builds from it its own strong units. We believe that even if the authors do not write there will from among the revolutionary cadres and workers, peasants and soldiers steeled in the torrential struggles, emerge representatives of their own . . . and that these will create historical epics reflecting this era . . . We must beat down the erroneous idea of 'quality' and hoist the progressive and revolutionary banner of proletarian literature.⁷²

Yao here chose to demarcate clearly 'proletarian' literature from

'bourgeois' quality literature. To him, even the term 'author' had a bourgeois ring and he therefore disregarded the fact that a number of the 'worker-writers' in fact had the status of 'authors'. Yao's views were those prevailing during the latter part of 1958 and part of 1959.

With the exception of a few folk poems, the mass literature was filled with political slogans and very stereotyped. From October 1958, therefore, the centre started to ask for quality as well as quantity. The mass movement, however, was still given priority over other kinds of literary production. The only way to improve quality was to intensify guidance and training. But the number of creative groups was too staggering to make meaningful guidance possible in all but a few cases. The city therefore concentrated its efforts on a few spots, hoping to be able to extend from these later on. This stage of the movement was called 'pilot creation'. It was part of a national plan to produce a number of relatively good works to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the People's Republic in 1959. A city-wide headquarters for pilot creation was set up with Hsü P'ing-yü and Yüan Wen-shu as leaders.⁷³ All districts, counties, and factories were to set up similar headquarters under the respective Party Committees. They had to forward weekly reports on the progress of the pilot creations to the city headquarters. This constituted the last step towards complete and direct Party control over all literary creation in the city. The various subordinate headquarters were empowered, to quite an extent, to use the professionals within their area to guide and train the pilot creative groups. Most of the professionals were therefore unable to write anything on their own. The plans for literary production among the pilot groups and those of the professionals were now co-ordinated into one.⁷⁴ In this way the so-called Three-in-One method of creation was established: i.e., creation by the masses, guided by the specialists and under supervision of the Party. At one stage, it was said that several hundred novels were in the process of being written. But as none of these works were heard of after the movement ended in 1959, it is probably safe to assume that they, like the previous mass creations, were not very successful.

The mass movement reached its culmination during the first few months of 1959. The activities were then extended to a large-scale collection of popular, and, in particular, revolutionary stories. The major accomplishment, however, was the publishing of the reminiscences of old cadres.⁷⁵ In May and June 1959, the economic difficulties created by the Great Leap forced the Party to use its resources

elsewhere. The mass movement therefore more or less fell apart on its own. The first links to break were the theatrical groups.⁷⁶ Only under severe pressure had they agreed to perform at cost in factories and rural areas of Shanghai. When the pressure eased they simply did not go. Similarly, the professional authors cut down their guidance activities when the creation headquarters started to function less well. Many of the pilot creations were not completed. At a meeting called by the committee in charge of mass literature and art in June 1959,⁷⁷ Hsü P'ing-yü asked himself if there was a contradiction between literary creation and industrial production. He himself did not think that there was, but if one could be proven to exist, he said, creation would then have to be curtailed.

As the mass movement started to disintegrate, the professionals again became more prominent and a cautious criticism of some aspects of the excesses of 1958 could be heard. Some literary leaders like Ho Ch'ifang and Mao Tun⁷⁸ insisted that the distinction between quality literature on the one hand and popular and folk literature on the other, should not be overly politicized. If all quality literature were to be excluded from 'good' literature, Ho insisted,⁷⁹ then that would mean discarding almost the entire literary heritage and maybe even Lu Hsün. Soon, however, the conflict inside the Party top leadership over how to evaluate the Great Leap put a stop to rational discourse on the many questions to which this movement had given rise. When the outcome of the Lushan meeting began to be known in August 1959, the propagandists used the opportunity of refuting 'rightist opportunism' to strike back ferociously at their critics.⁸⁰ Yao Wen-yüan appeared as the most energetic defender of the Great Leap in literature in Shanghai and in the country. By subordinating the question of literary talent and skill to world outlook, he tried to disarm those critics who had questioned any aspect of the Leap:

It is wholly unimaginable that a person with a low level of political consciousness should have an outstanding artistic talent enabling him-profoundly to reflect real life. Because the world outlook of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie are fundamentally different, the concept of talent will be different for those two classes. In the eyes of the bourgeoisie, a very talented young proletarian literary worker may look like a person with a 'very low level of literary talent' or one who is 'totally exempt of it', who could be attacked and silenced.⁸¹

Just at the turning point of the Great Leap in April 1959, Hu Wan-ch'un wrote his first really successful piece of literature after *Flesh*

and Blood. It was the most opportune thing he could have done as it furthermore happened to be a piece of movement literature couched in the idealism of 1958. The work, *A Man Made of Special Stuff*,⁸² was the first successful piece of movement literature ever to be written by a worker-writer and, what was more, the main character, the worker, Wang Kang, was a Party member. The story follows the common pattern of difficulty—Party intervention—solution, but is convincingly written. In addition, the literary level of the language is considerably higher than in Hu's previous works. Hu was praised to the skies by the Shanghai Party leaders and held up as an example to rebut critics of the Great Leap in literature. Yao Wen-yüan, who had already become Hu's most frequent reviewer, wrote the introduction to the story when it was published in book form. Hu's reward for this timely success was nomination to a national meeting of cultural and educational heroes.⁸³ It was in this period that Hu became widely known as *the* worker-author in China. During the extremely prolonged session of the Shanghai Writers' Union in March and April 1960, where the critics of the Great Leap and the upholders of 'revisionist' ideas on literature were all condemned, Hu and some of his fellow worker-authors for the first time appeared as important spokesmen of the Party Committee of the Union.⁸⁴

Despite the suppression of 'revisionism' and criticism of the Great Leap, the mass movement could not be revived in 1960. The impact of the economic disaster was so severe that by the end of the year a large number of magazines, including *Meng-ya*, had to be discontinued. Only *Wen-yi yüeh pao* and *Shou-huo* survived. In 1961–3 there was, therefore, severe competition for printed space. As in 1956, the veteran authors became active and dominated the scene. The established worker-authors, however, did not disappear, but they were not particularly favoured. It was possible to criticize and analyse their writings from an artistic as well as political point of view. They therefore had to exert themselves to maintain their position. In fact, some of them, in particular Fei Li-wen and T'ang K'o-hsin, achieved impressive maturity as authors in this period.

The works (in particular short stories and short novels) written in 1961–3 differed significantly from those of the previous period. After the collapse of the Great Leap, there was for some time no major movement and consequently no need for the organizational innovations of 1958. There was therefore much more variety in the literary production of those years in spite of the fact that the number of writers

dwindled drastically. Some of the best works published since 1949, like Ju Chih-chüan's *San-tsou yen-chuang* (*Three Visits to the Yen Village*),⁸⁵ now appeared. As in 1956-7, political essay-writing flourished. The worker-authors did not venture into essay-writing and remained faithful to their previous subject-matter of working-class life. Reflecting the general political atmosphere, their characters were portrayed somewhat less heroically than during 1958-60. T'ang K'o-hsin, for example, in a short story published in 1961, *Sha k'uiying*,⁸⁶ very successfully portrayed the class feeling of ordinary workers with low political consciousness.

Hu Wan-ch'un seems to have been rather closely tied to the faction around Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and Yao Wen-yüan in the Shanghai Propaganda Department (and Writers' Union).⁸⁷ But it is not easy to say whether he was directly involved in the struggle between this faction and that of the main body of the Yen-an generation that began in 1959 and continued until Chang and Yao emerged victorious in 1965-7. From 1963, however, when popularization again became the major (and soon the only) objective of literary and artistic activities, his writings were closely attuned to the needs of the Shanghai Propaganda Department (where Chang Ch'un-ch'iao was now in charge). As in 1959, Hu managed to write the best piece of movement literature of the period. In his short novel, *Nei-pu wen-t'i* (*Internal Affairs*),⁸⁸ he again had recourse to his hero of 1959, Wang Kang, who this time appeared as the manager of a factory. This new short novel was far more complex than *A Man Made of Special Stuff*. Most important, it portrayed a contradiction within the management committee of the factory between the conscious and courageous, represented by Wang Kang, and the vacillating and muddled, represented by his fellow factory manager Hsü and the chief technician Ting Wang. Most of the worker-authors did not dare to construct this kind of contradiction and certainly Hu must have been guided by members of the Chang-Yao faction in doing so. The plot, although reminiscent of the simplistic plots in vogue subsequent to the Cultural Revolution, was well constructed and convincing. There were no totally bad villains nor any highly conscious proletariat ready to back the persons who like Wang Kang dared to go 'against the tide'. Hu's other well-known piece of movement literature from this period, *Family Affairs*,⁸⁹ was shorter and more stereotyped. It depicted the contradictions in a working-class family between the young son who had just finished his technical education and his father who represented the class-consciousness of the proletariat. The theme became important in

1963-4 as the danger of forgetting the hardships of the old society and of giving rise to a new bourgeoisie was raised by Mao and other leaders.⁹⁰ Hu's story, despite its schematic nature, is the best one written on the existence of these problems within a working-class family. None of the other worker-authors equalled Hu in producing quality movement-literature. This is the major reason why his name came to overshadow those of the other worker-authors.

From 1964 there was a further massive popularization movement in the cities and in the countryside. All established authors, including the worker-authors, disappeared as creative writers and served only as instructors or editors. Hu Wan-ch'un's *Flesh and Blood* was widely distributed all over the country for guidance purposes and as a textbook in class feeling for workers. A large number of new worker-writers emerged, but few published more than once. It was therefore hardly possible to identify any literary break-throughs in this period. The highly politicized nature of the literature made it at least as stereotyped as that of the Great Leap.

During the Cultural Revolution the important worker-authors became leading literary cadres. As such they replaced the Yen-an generation and the majority of the cadre authors who were relegated to editorial work or sent down to 'experience life'. Hu Wan-ch'un and Fei Li-wen, for example, took a very active part in the purge of the old literary leaders that cleared the way for themselves.⁹¹ Unlike the propagandists, like Yao Wen-yüan and Hsü Ching-hsien, however, none of the worker-authors advanced to become important political leaders. They remained within the literary circles.

The organizational situation during and immediately after the Cultural Revolution constituted a logical development of that that had arisen during the later stages of the Great Leap. Everything was gathered into the hands of the Propaganda Department, and the Writers' Union even ceased to exist. Amateurism became the main trend, but professional authors, albeit in smaller numbers than before, did exist and were normally organized into local creative groups. Some new professionals were recruited from among the new amateurs, in particular since 1970, but the majority were old and middle-aged. Hu Wan-ch'un was placed in charge of the creative group in Shanghai.⁹²

Since the fall of the Gang of Four in October 1976 the organizational situation has again changed. Everything now resembles the situation before the Cultural Revolution. The first generation of worker-authors have been replaced as literary leaders by the very

ones they replaced in 1966-7, the Yen-an authors and other cadre authors.⁹³

Literary creation prior to the fall of the Gang of Four was extremely task-oriented. The political leaders of Shanghai used the literary machine to further their political aims, tying writing very closely to the needs of current political struggles within the Party. Therefore, the impact of the impressive apparatus of amateur groups in the factories and formalized literary training at the cultural palaces of the various districts⁹⁴ could not be converted into production of quality literature. In terms of popularization, the efforts of the Cultural Revolution may have been successful, but no variety resulted. A large number of new worker-writers rallied around the new literary monthly, *Chao-hsia* (*Morning Glow*) which became the organ of the Shanghai Propaganda Department. Their writings, however, were clearly inferior to those of the worker-authors in the sixties. Hu Wan-ch'un's major piece of this period, *Chan-ti ch'un-ch'iu* (*Battlefield Annals*),⁹⁵ was also weaker than what he had written previously. Like many of his earlier works, it was written to fulfil a political task: that of showing the struggle between 'cultural revolutionaries' and 'bourgeois authorities'. His characters, however, are ridiculously simplified, with totally 'good' heroes and totally bad and treacherous villains. The love story of the work typically takes place between two middle-aged cadres who had been too absorbed by revolutionary struggles in their youth to find time to indulge in love-life. In a way this novel epitomizes the predicament of the Chinese worker-writers and -authors. They were all raised by the Party for the purpose of making propaganda. The pressure on them to conform to the various movements and campaigns was always higher than on other writers and authors. Their limited experience of the revolutionary struggles before 1949 forced them to deal with a much more tightly prescribed 'reality' than the cadre authors.

A study of Chinese worker-writers and worker-authors is by its very nature a study of the most politicized and stereotyped part of modern Chinese literature. Such defects in the literature produced by these authors are today readily admitted by the Chinese press, but it is still far too early to say whether the new political and organizational situation will allow the modicum of independence for literary activities necessary for original and creative worker-authors to emerge.

STUDY AND CRITICISM:
THE VOICE OF SHANGHAI
RADICALISM

John Gardner

INTRODUCTION

Study and Criticism (*Hsüeh-hsi yü p'i-p'an*) was the most influential journal published in Shanghai during Mao Tse-tung's last years. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the part it played in Chinese politics during that troubled period in which rival elites jockeyed for position as the Succession Crisis unfolded.

From its first appearance on 15 September 1973, *Study and Criticism* (hereafter *SAC*) aroused considerable interest in China and abroad. At that time few journals were being published as the Cultural Revolution had forced the closure of the major periodicals of the sixties such as *Historical Research* (*Li-shih Yen-chiu*), *Philosophical Research* (*Che-hsüeh Yen-chiu*) and *New Construction* (*Hsin Chien-she*). Consequently, *SAC* promised to be an exciting new source which, according to a note for readers in its inaugural issue, would devote itself each month to matters of philosophy and social science, 'study and sum up the rich experience of the socialist revolution', 'criticize revisionism and the bourgeoisie', and generally contribute both to culture and to the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Ironically, in the light of what has since transpired, it invoked the slogan of letting 'one hundred schools contend' and pledged itself to stimulating academic debate.¹

Ostensibly *SAC* was the organ of Fudan, one of China's most prestigious universities. But its Shanghaiense provenance, its appearance a few days after the Tenth National Party Congress, and its format and contents suggested strongly that this was no ordinary 'university journal' (*ta-hsüeh hsüeh-pao*). From the outset it was widely regarded by Western observers to be the mouthpiece of those leaders on the left of the Chinese political spectrum, who were variously described as the

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'radicals', 'ideologues', 'extremists', 'ultra-leftists' and 'Shanghai Mafia'. *SAC* was reputed to be their answer to *Red Flag* (*Hung-ch'i*), the journal of the Party Central Committee. It was even rumoured that Mao Tse-tung himself had blessed the newcomer as some sort of 'alternative voice' for Chinese communism, although the evidence for this consisted largely of the fact that some scholars believed the bold calligraphy on its cover to be the brushwork of the Chairman. If true, Mao appears to have lost his enthusiasm for this particular 'socialist new-born thing' remarkably quickly, as the calligraphy changed with the fifth issue and a third hand appeared on the eighth and all subsequent numbers.

Whatever Mao's personal role in establishing the journal may have been, it was read avidly in the three years of its existence and, from April 1974, was on the all-too-short list of periodicals to which foreigners were permitted to subscribe. Each issue contained between eighty and ninety-six pages devoted to the major campaigns and topics of the day. In addition to straightforward accounts of revolutionary achievements it published numerous articles which used historical and literary themes to veil arguments on contemporary issues. Often the veils were thin, but sometimes they were so opaque that it was virtually impossible to discern what lay beneath. In many cases there appeared to be more here than met the eye; on occasions there seemed to be less. Even the most experienced students of China's esoteric communications system confessing themselves baffled over the true meaning of a number of contributions.

And then, in October 1976, *SAC* was suddenly suppressed. The October issue had actually been published unusually early, on 27 September, but within days of the arrest of the Gang of Four it disappeared from the shelves of bookshops in China and Hong Kong. Foreign subscribers waited in vain for their copy of the thirty-eighth issue. Fortunately, even the well-oiled censorship machinery of the Chinese authorities is less than perfect, and a handful of copies did slip through the net.

With the arrest of the Gang most university journals ceased publishing (it is probable that all did, but as only a selection are regularly received in the West one cannot say for certain). But this was little more than a brief pause to permit editorial reshuffles and to carry out the 're-tooling' required to switch from the batch production of articles calling for a deepening of the criticism of Teng Hsiao-p'ing to ones attacking the latest nest of would-be restorers of capitalism. Even in

Liaoning, that leading provincial fiefdom of the Gang, the university journal scarcely missed a blink and by the end of 1976 was recording the fact that Chang T'ieh-sheng, the province's erstwhile favourite son, was a 'counter-revolutionary clown' and not, as had previously been thought, a 'hero in going against the tide'. But *SAC* was clearly an Augean stable which no Chinese Hercules felt able to clean. It remains suppressed and has been singled out for special mention by the Chinese authorities.

On 26 December 1976, Wang Yi-ping, vice-chairman of the recently 'reorganized' Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee, described *SAC* as 'one of the most outrageous and, above all, scandalous magazines', when he addressed the Second National Conference on learning from Tachai.² The following month *Historical Research* devoted eleven pages to chronicling its wickedness. According to this account, *SAC* had 'not only purloined a great many state secrets and cooked up anti-Party, anti-socialist poisonous weeds, it also bolstered the Gang of Four's power, made false accusations, stirred up trouble everywhere and did a lot of evil'.³ This, and later attacks, catalogued specific offences, often referring to particular articles or even passages within them.

In essence all the major charges relate to the Gang's alleged attempt unscrupulously to seize power as the Succession Crisis unfolded, by using *SAC* as a propaganda instrument to create a 'counter-revolutionary' public opinion which would further their ambitions. To this end the journal attacked senior Party leaders who stood in their way, most notably Chou En-lai, Teng Hsiao-p'ing and Hua Kuo-feng. At the same time it attempted to legitimate Chiang Ch'ing and her colleagues by endorsing their politics and by pressing their personal claims to high office.

Such allegations are, regrettably, the common currency of Chinese political exchange. Those who have waded through the 'crimes' of Lin Piao, Liu Shao-ch'i and the 'capitalist roaders' and a host of earlier ne'er-do-wells are rightly sceptical about accepting such charges at face value. But the Gang of Four case differs significantly from most earlier struggles in one very important respect. For the Gang of Four and their supporters were propagandists *par excellence*. Whereas previously foreign scholars very often found themselves in the unsatisfactory position of having to assess the winners' verdict on their enemies without recourse to what the losers had to say, the Gang's opinions are a matter of *public* record to a considerable extent. The availability of *SAC* in its entirety

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removes the nagging suspicion that one is being regaled with material lifted out of context. Post-hoc allegations are valuable signposts to articles and passages in *SAC* which are now deemed to be heretical, if not actually treasonable, but one is in the happy situation of being able to check instead of having to take the accusers' word for it.

It is also worth noting that the Chinese media have improved dramatically since the arrest of the Gang. Although the tenor of reports remains as biased as ever, there is now a willingness to provide a wealth of detailed information on recent events which contrasts markedly with the narcoleptic, fact-free jargon which so often served as a substitute for news in the years immediately following the Cultural Revolution. In the case of *SAC* the articles published since its demise provide data which complement rather than contradict what can be learned from an examination of its contents. This chapter will consider the 'case against' in some detail, but a convenient starting-point is to place the journal within the organizational context of the Gang's propaganda machine so as both to highlight its importance and to delineate the 'Shanghai connection'.

THE ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT

Insofar as the Cultural Revolution was a battle to put 'true' revolutionaries in control of the 'superstructure' it is scarcely surprising that, by the early seventies, leftists should have seized the commanding heights of much of China's intellectual, cultural and educational life. Nor is it surprising that the left should have fought so hard to retain and exploit their domination in these areas in order to combat the return of veteran cadres in the Party, state and military hierarchies which subsequently took place in the wake of the Lin Piao affair. Indeed, the Gang are alleged to have bemoaned the fact that they had little strength outside the propaganda machine.⁴

It fell to Yao Wen-yüan to mastermind propaganda operations. In the Cultural Revolution he had emerged, in Bennett's splendid phrase, as China's 'polemicist laureate'⁵ and had acquired both the general political and specifically 'literary' offices which enabled him, by 1973, to dominate the media. Organizationally, his control rested on the creation of two major 'writing groups' in Peking and Shanghai respectively, which produced a flood of articles for publication in the national newspapers, *Red Flag*, the university journals and elsewhere.

In Peking a 'mass criticism group of Peking and Tsinghua uni-

versities' was set up under the direction of Ch'ih Ch'un and Hsieh Ching-yi,⁶ the leading leftists on the Tsinghua campus. Consisting of over thirty persons, the group 'concocted' over 219 articles, 181 of which appeared under such pseudonyms as Liang Hsiao (Two Schools), Kao Lu (High Road) and Ch'u Lan (First Wave). But this Peking-based group was less influential than the 'writing group' operating under the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee which was, of course, directly controlled by Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Yao Wen-yüan and Wang Hung-wen. Thus it has been claimed:

Liang Hsiao began business in 1973 and in 1976 was the authorized spokesman of the Gang of Four and hogged the most prominent space in many newspapers. *But as far as seniority, membership and the scope of its activities was concerned, it ranked lower than its Shanghai counterpart.*⁷

The Shanghai group, in fact, was established as early as 1971 and, by the mid-seventies, had the Shanghai press, publishing, broadcasting and literary and art circles 'under its thumb'. It controlled eight journals, including *SAC*, and 'churned out' more than 1,000 articles under dozens of pen names.

The two individuals who headed this group had supposedly become 'sworn followers' of Chang and Yao as early as 1966. Their names have not been officially published, although various clues have been provided as to their identity. Thus they have been presented as 'clients' whose power rested solely on the patronage of their masters. One is reported to have said 'what we are today we owe to Chang and Yao', while the other loyally proclaimed 'we obey nobody but Chang and Yao'. Chang and Yao are supposed to have maintained close contact by letter and phone with the senior of the two.⁸

The identity of the junior of the two leaders remains unknown,⁹ but the admittedly scanty documentary evidence strongly suggests that the senior figure was Hsü Ching-hsien. Before the Cultural Revolution she was a low- or middle-ranking cadre in the Shanghai municipal government apparatus, but became Chang's aide during its course and, in 1968, was identified as a member of a group charged with the important task of revising the Party constitution. In 1972 she was identified as a member of the Shanghai Dance Drama troupe which would suggest, as one might expect, that she possessed prior experience of, or at least an inclination towards, cultural work. By the time *SAC* was established she was a member of the Party Central Committee, a secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee, and vice-

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chairman of the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee. In short, she was a classic example of the 'helicopter cadre', to use Teng Hsiao-p'ing's disparaging phrase for those who rose speedily in the Cultural Revolution. Moreover, in a confession of 5 November 1976, she admitted playing a major part in the Gang's propaganda activities, although *SAC* was not specifically mentioned.¹⁰

Hsü and her colleague boasted that '*SAC* is a little *Red Flag*' and, indeed, claimed to 'transmit the spirit of the Centre quicker than *Red Flag*'. They claimed a national role as an opinion-maker for their journal by arguing that 'other provinces and cities must look at this magazine, and follow its political climate'.¹¹ Their aim was to provide intellectual respectability for the Gang of Four by pressing their claims as Marxist theoreticians. For example, one of them argued that 'Communist Party leaders are invariably engaged in theoretical work; and (an) authority in theory will one day turn into an organizational authority and naturally will become a leader.'¹² Under their direction the Shanghai writing group served as the Gang's 'intelligence agency' and 'think tank'. Its members 'placed anyone under surveillance, no matter who he may be . . . They secretly reported their findings to the Gang in the form of letters, investigations, reports and minutes of forums. No less than 1,000 secret reports were submitted to the Gang.'¹³

The names of other members of the writing group are not known, and an examination of *SAC* itself provides few clues to their identity. For the journal went to enormous lengths to withhold meaningful information about the people who were actually behind it. At no time did it give the names of any member of its editorial board and, despite the Futan affiliation, 'the editorial offices were not to be found on the campus'.¹⁴ Articles were 'signed' but an analysis of contributors is significant primarily for the fact that it reveals the excessively secretive way in which the real identities of writers were camouflaged.

A device used to good effect was the extensive use of pseudonyms. Whatever *SAC*'s zeal in praising the present at the expense of the past and in pursuing the new instead of the old, it followed the Chinese tradition with a fervour which would have pleased many of the 'Confucians' it attacked. Some writers favoured simple character combinations like the Che Chün (Philosophy Contingent) or Hung Hsüan (Red Propaganda) which are easily recognizable as pseudonyms. Many, however, resorted to that literary punning in which Chinese take such a delight, using characters found in real names but which are

homonyms for other characters having an appropriate meaning. Thus one encountered 'names' like Chin Sheng-hsi (Today Surpasses Yesterday), Shih Yi-ko (Group of Eleven), Li Hsin (Establish the New), Tsung Kung-hui (General Trade Union), Hsin Ping (New Soldier) and, one of the most famous, Lo Ssu-ting (Screw). Some names, 'real' enough in standard Chinese, became puns when read in Shanghai dialect.¹⁵

Another technique was to ensure that very few names appeared with any real frequency. Even if one is rash enough to assume that each name was reserved solely for the use of a single author, whether individual or collective, patterns are still loath to emerge. The sorry fact is that almost seventy-five per cent of the individual authors named on the contents pages appear only once. Only eight authors can be regarded as regular contributors with eight or more articles to their credit.

Anonymity also obstructs the search for occupational or organizational affiliations. In the vast majority of cases the place of work or profession of the authors is not given and, where it is, it is the authors of 'one-off' contributions who predominate. Yen Feng is the only one of the eight most prolific writers to be identified and then merely by the laconic affiliation of 'Futan University' which appears on just one of his articles. The same is true of collective articles emanating from factories, dockyards, university departments, middle schools, revolutionary committees and other work units. Although such articles account for almost twenty-five per cent of *SAC*'s total output, only a handful of these units figure on more than one occasion.

SAC then projected a very 'democratic' image. Its articles were supposedly authored by hundreds of citizens from 'all walks of life', the great majority of whom were unknown. The aim, clearly, was to suggest to readers that this was a forum in which 'young workers' and 'worker-peasant-soldier students' could express their views alongside university professors and Party secretaries.

However, the high calibre of many apparently 'amateur' contributions, together with the existence of a small core of regular contributors, leads us to infer that the journal followed the standard practice of guiding and 'assisting' less experienced authors to produce work which was acceptable in both a literary and political sense.

Furthermore, there was undoubtedly a university connection and Futan University contributed more articles than any other institution. Seven collective articles were written by the university's Education

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Revolution Group, the Mathematics Department's student society, and the Departments of History, International Politics and Philosophy. Fifteen members of the university each contributed one article (eight students, one member of the workers' propaganda team and six who were presumably academic staff), and Yen Feng wrote eleven. The only other academic institution of any importance was Shanghai Teachers' University which contributed eight articles. Two were collective, one by a student, four by teachers, and one by the deputy secretary of the University Party Committee. Other universities and middle schools also contributed, but on a 'one-off' basis.

Two factories also stood out for the frequency of their contributions. One was Wang Hung-wen's old stamping ground, the No. 17 Textile Mill. This produced two collective articles and five authored by one of its 'young workers'. The No. 5 Iron and Steel Plant, also later identified as a stronghold of the Gang, contributed eight on a collective basis.

Although the identity of the hard core of activists who produced *SAC* remains unknown, their influence was undoubtedly great and extended far beyond the environs of Shanghai. None of the pseudonyms currently used by the Peking group ever appeared in *SAC* but it is significant to note that the most famous of the Shanghai writers, like Lo Ssu-ting, Chai Ch'ing and Fang Hai regularly contributed to Peking publications and, on occasions, *SAC* articles were reprinted in *Red Flag* and elsewhere.¹⁶ We can now direct our attention, more profitably it is hoped, to the actual contents of the journal.

THE ATTACK ON CHOU EN-LAI

Whether one accepts the official assessment of the Gang as a group of unprincipled careerists motivated solely by wild ambition, sees them as passionately committed activists dedicated to the speedy and total revolutionization of Chinese society, or adopts an intermediate position, it seems inevitable that Chou En-lai should have become their primary target. His ability to retain Mao's confidence, to inspire loyalty among cadres at all levels, and to command the affection of the 'broad masses', gave him a stature denied to all other Chinese leaders.¹⁷ His political record in and after the Cultural Revolution, including his attempts to protect his colleagues and to restore to them much of the power and influence they had enjoyed in the mid-sixties, and his willingness to reverse the worst aspects of the Cultural

Revolution policies (as in 1972 when he sought to raise academic and scientific standards) showed that he was unlikely to succumb to the blandishments of the most leftist elements in the leadership. By 1973 he was already seriously ill,¹⁸ but the reappearance of Teng Hsiao-p'ing in April, and the 'balanced' leadership elected by the Tenth Party Congress served as a warning that the premier's own solution of the Succession Crisis was unlikely to consist of allowing Chiang Ch'ing and her supporters to monopolize the most senior positions.

Consequently, Chou had to be attacked, but this could hardly be done openly for obvious reasons. Instead, the Gang used *SAC* (and other journals) to mount a campaign of innuendo against him. And the principal technique was to resort to the ancient practice of 'using the past to satirize the present' (*chieh ku feng chin*). For, as a subsequent allegation put it:

The Gang of Four's writings on history were aimed at what is happening today. The Gang of Four used ancient history, modern history, Chinese history and world history as ammunition . . . Yao Wen-yuan said to Lo Ssu-ting of the Gang's Shanghai writing group: 'History creates roads. The burden of history is very heavy. Don't think of history as being far apart from us. Today's struggle always reflects historical struggle.' The meaning of these words is very clear and plain today. Yao Wen-yuan wanted Ssu-ting to make every effort to use innuendo in writing about history, put a cloak of historical struggle on today's struggle, and create a road for usurping Party and state power.¹⁹

The campaign against 'Confucius'

Most of the attacks on Chou appeared under the cloak of the anti-Confucian campaign. This really began on 7 August 1973 when *People's Daily* published an attack on Confucius by Yang Jung-kuo, a Professor at Canton's Chungshan university who was ultimately to be criticized for 'using the past to serve the Gang'.²⁰ Shortly after the article's appearance, Yao Wen-yuan phoned from Peking to let his Shanghai writers know that the Central Committee had decided to launch a nationwide campaign, and instructing them to prepare an article attacking Chou. This article, entitled 'On Worshipping Confucianism and Opposing Legalism' appeared in the first issue of *SAC* under the name of Shih Lun. Shortly thereafter, it is claimed, Chiang Ch'ing called on propagandists to produce articles 'attacking prime ministers', and *SAC* responded with a spate of libels against Chou.²¹

Provided that one does not quibble unduly over the use of the term 'prime minister' and accepts it as a catch-all for persons holding high

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office or exercising great influence on a particular ruler, practically every issue of the journal carried articles attacking a long line of 'Confucians' from the Spring and Autumn era to the People's Republic. A by no means exhaustive list includes the Sage himself; Mencius; Wang Wan and Lu Pu-wei of Ch'in; Tung Chuang-shu of Western Han; Han Yu of T'ang; Ssu-ma Kuang and Chu Hsi of Sung; and, to leap to the twentieth century, Hu Shih, Chiang Kai-shek and Lin Piao.

Despite the vast range of the articles, they constantly reiterated a crudely distorted interpretation of the struggle between 'Legalists' and 'Confucians' throughout Chinese history, painting a picture of complete polarization between the former, who were 'progressive' and the latter, who were 'reactionary'. It is difficult to find a single article which, taken in isolation, can be regarded as definitive proof that Chou En-lai was the target; it would be foolish to expect to do so. Indeed, Lo Ssu-ting is reputed to have told his followers not to 'reveal everything in one article' and to 'let the readers wonder about some words'.²² Cumulatively, however, the articles did constitute an attack on Chou as one who had opposed the upheavals of the Cultural Revolution and attempted to 'restore the old'.

Thus the article by Shih Lun, mentioned above, was the first of many which portrayed Confucius as an extreme conservative. According to this, he lived at a time when China was undergoing a violent transition from a slave-owning society to a 'feudal' era. Instead of moving with the forces of history, Confucius chose to represent the interests of the slave-owning aristocracy, and stubbornly resisted the reforms adopted by the newly emergent landlord class. He sought to put back the clock by calling for 'reviving states that have been extinguished and restoring families whose lines of succession have been broken'. He deplored the upheavals of the times, crying that 'there is no order in the land' (*t'ien-hsia wu-tao*) and urging a return to the old institutions embodied in 'the code of the duke of Chou' (*Chou kung ti tien*), a convenient pun on the premier's name.²³

Mencius similarly called for a return to the past. Although the slave-owners were completely in decline in his day he called for the preservation of their 'hereditary official ranks and honours'. He insisted that the old slave system was better than the feudal era and asserted that the 'ways of ancient kings' constituted the correct models to emulate.

The eventual consolidation of landlord power under the Han did not

destroy Confucianism, for, at this stage, the doctrine was taken over by the big landlords who had now become 'reactionary' in their turn. And so on to the present day. In Republican days Chiang Kai-shek revived Confucianism;²⁴ subsequently Lin Piao venerated the Sage²⁵ and, it was emphasized, 'restorationists' of the 1970s also followed his words. Confucians of all eras looked to the past, venerating the ways of ancient kings and old institutions much as Confucius had looked back to the duke of Chou. They abhorred change, condemned revolutionary violence for producing a 'terrible mess' (Mencius) and tried at all times to resist 'new-born things'.

According to *SAC* the reactionary Confucians were able to resist progress by a variety of tactics which usually involved high-sounding appeals for stability and order on the one hand, and a ruthless willingness to savage their opponents wherever the opportunity presented itself. Thus Confucius preached 'benevolence' and 'propriety' as a means of quieting the 'confusion' of his era which had resulted from the offensives of the newly emergent landlord class and revolts by the slaves.²⁶ He rejected 'struggle' by emphasizing that 'the superior man is respectable and not contentious, sociable and not partisan'.²⁷

Under the Western Han similar methods were used:

In the face of the peasant uprisings at that time, Tung Chung-shu cried with alarm that feudal rule was in the process of disintegrating (like a wall of deadwood and dung) that would collapse at the slightest push. Therefore he had to seek help from the reactionary doctrines of Confucius and Mencius by advocating the hypocritical, conservative and reactionary theory of resigning oneself to fate and being contented with one's lot in a vain attempt to use it to build the dyke against the torrent of peasant uprisings.²⁸

This tactic was still being used by reactionaries in the twentieth century. Chiang Kai-shek made use of the Sino-Japanese war to smother class differences, preaching the idea of an 'overriding national consciousness' and urging people to subordinate themselves to his command in the interests of national unity.²⁹

In reality Confucians were not the moralists they claimed to be, and *SAC* made a point of emphasizing their ruthlessness in dealing with progressive elements. Confucius' 'benevolence' and 'propriety' had not prevented him from ordering the execution of Shao-cheng Mao and the public display of his corpse. Shang Yang was 'crushed to death under the wheels of a chariot and his whole family was murdered'. Sang Hung-yang, who so ably argued the Legalist case in the Salt and Iron Debate of 81 B.C. was executed shortly thereafter on the order of the Confucian general, Huo Kuang.³⁰

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Although *SAC*'s coverage of the Legalist–Confucian struggle spanned over two millennia of Chinese history, special attention was devoted to the rise of the state of Ch'in, its unification of China, and the subsequent collapse of the short-lived Ch'in dynasty. It was argued that although Confucius had neglected this 'barbarian' state, as its power increased Confucian scholars flocked to its court. Indeed, Lü Pu-wei, a 'political representative of the slave-owning class', actually succeeded in 'usurping' power and becoming prime minister. Within Ch'in the Confucians continually and systematically attempted to resist and undermine the progressive reforms advanced by the landlord class, and sought to defend the interests of the slave-owners. Even under Ch'in Shih Huang, the first Emperor, the Confucian premier Wang Wan tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to restore the old elite by conferring titles and privileges on nobles but recently deprived of them.³¹

And the Confucians eagerly awaited the Emperor's death. For despite unification, the 'restorationist' forces of the former aristocrats of the six states remained powerful. They hoped to regain their 'lost paradise' and were assisted unwittingly by the landlord class which had become complacent after its early successes and was inclined to compromise with the old order. This lack of vigilance enabled Chao Kao, a former aristocrat, to place on the throne his puppet, the eighteenth son of Ch'in Shih Huang. Thereafter, Chao went on to slaughter almost all the Legalists at the Ch'in court, a bloody process culminating in the execution of Li Ssu, the architect of the Legalist political system. He even assassinated the Second Emperor and, although Chao too was put to death, the dynasty was so weakened that it was destroyed by rebellion within a year.³²

Subversion, then, was the real danger. The Legalist Han Fei had pointed out that 'a fortress could most easily be taken from within'. Han also knew from which quarter the danger would come, and 'he particularly took heed of those Confucian disciples who wormed their way into administrative organs, who did their utmost to advocate the reactionary theories of "following the ways of former kings", who opposed and obstructed criticism of the reactionary Confucians'.³³

In its long catalogue of Confucians who had practised 'restoration and retrogression' (*fu-pi tao-t'ui*) the last person to be named was Lin Piao, whose attempt to 'revive states that have been extinguished' had caused him to be 'crushed to death in a despicable end'. But the battle was not over for, as a particularly significant passage put it:

Naturally, the class he used to represent still exists today, and the handful of 'those who have fallen into obscurity' are still around. These people will never

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be reconciled to their failure and in their death-bed struggle will engage in a last trial of strength with us. Regarding this, we must maintain a high degree of revolutionary vigilance. We must resolutely strike down whoever seeks to revive states that have been extinguished.³⁴

SAC, therefore, left its readers in little doubt that the anti-Confucian campaign had contemporary targets. It was essential to 'continually purge the Party of agents of landlords and the bourgeoisie who sneaked into it: for although 'calling themselves "communists", they were the greatest opponents of communism'. The journal gave massive coverage to the campaign, and Ting Wang's figures demonstrate vividly the contrast with the much more restrained treatment provided by *Red Flag*. In the last four months of 1973, *SAC* published twenty articles on the subject and *Red Flag* only eight. In 1974 the figures were eighty-seven and thirty-six respectively.³⁵ It is also noteworthy that on the occasions when *Red Flag* reprinted *SAC* articles it sometimes took care to remove or dilute references which could be seen as clear attacks on the premier. For example, an *SAC* reference to the 'duke of Chou's' institutions became the more neutral 'old' institutions in *Red Flag*. Similarly, 'Confucius and the Confucians are all Political Swindlers' became 'Confucius and Lin Piao are Political Swindlers', the implication being that those who had been close to Lin deserved as much scrutiny as those who had been close to Chou.

The anti-Confucian campaign died down in 1975 but other themes were used to smear the premier. His clear preference for the 'nuts and bolts' of government rather than 'contributing' to Marxist theory made Chou an obvious target of the movement to criticize 'empiricism' in 1975. Articles critical of those who 'worshipped' things foreign could also be related to Chou's attempts to build up better relations with the outside world and also, where necessary, to learn from societies which were technologically more advanced.³⁶

The Water Margin campaign

Literary themes were also employed, most notably in the campaign to criticize the epic novel, *Water Margin (Shui Hu)*. This campaign was particularly complex and mystifying, not least because the multiplicity of characters in the novel, and the new interpretations of their diverse roles, endowed it with a peculiarly opaque quality even by Chinese standards. But the criticism of the official Sung Chiang seems clear enough. According to the 1975 version this central character first threw

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in his lot with the rebels of Liangshan, but subsequently 'sold out' to the Imperial authorities in order to further his own interests, and was thus guilty of 'capitulationism'. It has since been alleged that Sung Chiang was used by the Gang as a surrogate for both Chou and Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and there is no reason to doubt this.³⁷

The notion of 'selling out' was, in fact, an important addition to the Gang's armoury of accusations. An inherent weakness of many anti-Confucian articles was the oft-repeated claim that 'reactionaries' infiltrated and subverted 'progressive' movements almost from the moment of their conception. Although perhaps convincing to those of a paranoid disposition, this assertion was flawed as a total explanation. Why, readers might ask, did the Legalists, revolutionaries, etc, not take effective measures to eradicate such elements at the outset? And how was it that Chou En-lai and other 'Confucians' could work alongside Chairman Mao himself for so many decades without being detected? The idea that an individual could begin as a progressive but would either lack 'staying-power' or would subsequently be corrupted and become reactionary appealed both to commonsense and to Maoist doctrine.

Indeed, this line was pursued in one of the last attacks on Chou to be published in *SAC*. When Chou died in January 1976, *SAC* published no eulogy, an insult rubbed home by the fact that it marked the passing of K'ang Sheng, widely regarded as a close associate of the Gang, with a highly flattering article.³⁸ From November 1975 to December 1976, however, the journal did carry a three-part article on the treason of Wang Ching-wei, and in July 1976 returned to this subject with a further article discussing the earlier one. This final comment claims that although Wang was undoubtedly a traitor in the second half of his life, he had been a revolutionary in the first half. It has since been alleged that Hsü Ching-hsien was responsible for this, following a conversation she had had with Chang Ch'un-ch'iao.³⁹

THE ATTACKS ON TENG HSIAO-P'ING AND HUA KUO-FENG

At the fourth National People's Congress in January 1975 Chou En-lai revived the pre-Cultural Revolution slogan of the 'four modernizations', thus initiating his final attempt to put China's quest for 'wealth and power' on a firm basis. Because of his illness, however, it fell to Teng Hsiao-p'ing to spearhead the drive to develop China's flagging economy and, in the process, to emerge as Chou's likely

successor. As the most prominent 'capitalist roader' to have returned to power (and subsequent events have shown that he was indeed 'unrepentent', as was to be alleged in 1976), Teng, too, was attacked by *SAC*. Like Chou he was a target of the campaign to criticize 'empiricism' and *Water Margin*, and was also the victim of 'historical' attacks. On one occasion both men were linked, when *SAC* published an article on Thiers, in which the nineteenth-century French leader was caricatured to resemble Teng. This article explained that Thiers was so 'fierce' because he had the powerful backing of Bismarck, the 'iron chancellor', the implication being that Teng was Chou's man.⁴⁰

It was not until 1976, however, that *SAC* was able to denounce Teng openly. On 7 April he was dismissed from all his posts in the wake of the Tien An Men Incident. Six days later *SAC* published its April issue and was the first journal to provide highly detailed and condemnatory articles on Teng's activities in 1975, when he supervised the preparation of three policy documents intended to serve as a basis for the 'four modernizations'. These were 'On the General Programme of Work for the whole Party and the whole Nation', 'Some Problems in Accelerating Industrial Development', and 'On Some Problems in the Field of Science and Technology'.⁴¹ Space does not permit either a lengthy summary of their contents or an adequate treatment of *SAC*'s response. But it is hoped that the following paragraphs will convey the gist of the arguments used on both sides.

Although couched in terms of 'consolidating and furthering' the 'successes' of the Cultural Revolution, Teng's documents concentrated on its negative aspects and offered a damning critique of the serious problems besetting China in 1975. They dwelt at length on the prevalence of factionalism in many areas and units, and the tendency of some people to confuse antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions, to elevate trivial issues to the level of ideological principle, to regard themselves as the only true revolutionaries and to persecute vindictively those who disagreed with them. They bemoaned the way in which political slogan-shouting had become a substitute for productive work; the inability or unwillingness of managers to manage and workers to work; the refusal to value and utilize effectively the skills of the experienced and educated; and the xenophobic reluctance to 'make foreign things serve China'. They demanded that the leadership of Party Committees be strengthened at all levels and in all sectors; that there should be a greater emphasis on centralization,

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hierarchy, responsibility and discipline; and that those with the most skills should be adequately recompensed.

A crucial theme in the documents concerned the interpretation to be given to three of Mao's directives which called, respectively, for study of the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, for promoting stability and unity, and for building up the national economy. Teng's line was that:

Chairman Mao's three important directives are one interconnected and inseparable entity. Not one of them can be discarded nor should any one of them be grasped in isolation. We must take these three directives as the key link . . .⁴²

This formulation, especially when considered in the context of the 'pragmatic' tone of the three documents, was extremely significant. By arguing that Mao's case for study of 'the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat' was of no greater weight than the two other directives, Teng was, in effect, negating the primacy of class struggle, implying without too much subtlety that the concept of 'politics in command' should be played down. In its April 1976 issue, *SAC* gleefully pounced on this as the starting-point for the first of many denunciations of Teng's 'three poisonous weeds'.

It quoted remarks reportedly made by Mao somewhat earlier, when he had become aware of the contents of the three documents: 'This person does not grasp class struggle; he has never referred to this key link. Still his theme of "white cat", "black cat", making no distinction between imperialism and Marxism'. The Chairman's allusion was to a statement made by Teng in 1961 when, with characteristic insouciance, he had asserted that 'it doesn't matter if a cat is black or white; if it catches mice it's a good cat'. That remark, said *SAC*, had been 'precisely intended to blur the distinction between socialism and capitalism' and his 1975 formulation of 'taking three directives as the key link' was no better. It was simply Teng's method of 'changing the Party's ultimate goal from realization of communism to "four modernizations" and ascribing all the tasks of the Party during the entire historical period of socialism to production and construction'. In fact, he was aiming at 'capitalist restoration'.⁴³

In like manner, the journal reported Teng's strictures on 'factionalists'. Why, it asked, in listing 'anti-marxist class enemies' had Teng been so reluctant to mention 'all the persons in power within the Party taking the capitalist road?' These people were 'the principal target of the socialist revolution, and the most dangerous enemies under the

dictatorship of the proletariat'. What was wrong with ousting them? Moreover, *SAC* suggested, the struggles of the Cultural Revolution had benefited many. Far from hurting experienced old cadres it had 'enabled many of them to generate greater revolutionary youthfulness'.

Teng's proposals for improving the economy were derisively dismissed as manifestations of his belief that 'good production is good politics', and his aim of creating systems of industrial organization on the lines of the capitalist world and the Soviet Union. *SAC* waxed eloquent in defending the democratization of management which had resulted from the Cultural Revolution and claimed Teng wanted 'to reduce the workers of socialist China to slaves again' by imposing 'bourgeois dictatorship in the form of "control, checks and coercion"'. His case for adequate incentives was contemptuously described as 'putting banknotes in command', while his willingness to 'make foreign things serve China' was the product of a 'comprador' mentality.

And so the anti-Teng campaign continued. By September 1976 it was being claimed that he was a faithful disciple of Bernstein, that his 'bourgeois democratic world outlook had never been remoulded'. Incapable of improvement he clung to the old birthmarks that exist in a socialist society 'like a fly attracted to dirt'.⁴⁴

The most masterly smear, however, had appeared in an article 'On Capitalist Roaders' in May. This noted that revisionism, like capitalism, was international in character and that the bourgeoisie both inside and outside the Party, together with counter-revolutionaries, would 'invariably collaborate with international imperialism, revisionism and reaction'. As proof of this assertion it rhetorically asked: 'Haven't people like Brezhnev described Lin Piao, Teng Hsiao-p'ing and their like as "the healthy forces that represent China's real interests"?'⁴⁵ Without actually establishing the slightest link *SAC* had successfully produced a form of words which identified Teng with both the greatest traitor in the history of Chinese Communism and the greatest foreign enemy!

The political eclipse of Teng did not, however, leave the 'Gang', without powerful rivals. For, to the surprise of outsiders and, no doubt, of most Chinese it was Hua Kuo-feng who became acting premier after Chou's death, and premier and first vice-chairman of the Party after Teng's disgrace. His relations with the Gang in 1975 must remain a matter of speculation, for later claims that he had worked closely with Teng in preparing the policy documents discussed above cannot be accepted unquestioningly due to the lack of contemporary evidence.

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Nevertheless his appointment as 'heir apparent' must have been, as alleged, a blow to Chang Ch'un-ch'iao. Hua, too, became the object of attack in the pages of *SAC*. As with Chou, the attacks were oblique but the meaning was clear.

In its April 1976 issue, *SAC* dutifully carried the Central Committee's communiqué on Hua's appointments. But the following month it published an intriguing article on 'Ssu-ma Kuang's Year on Stage' which discussed the fate of Wang An-shih's reforms. Wang, that most controversial of statesmen, had never accepted the appellation of Legalist, but had been described as such hundreds of years before *SAC* honoured him with the title. Summoned to the court of Emperor Shen-Tsung in 1069 he masterminded a series of major reforms dealing with matters of finance and trade, national defence and public order, and education and the imperial bureaucracy. The reform period continued after he left office in 1076 but ended abruptly with the death of Shen-Tsung in 1085. Wang's measures had been attacked by a number of conservatives and, in 1085, under the leadership of Ssu-ma Kuang, they at last had the opportunity to act. They speedily dismantled the reforms and destroyed Wang's life's work.

The parallels between the reform era and the Cultural Revolution (or indeed, the whole period since 1949) were obviously attractive and *SAC* had from its first issue used Wang An-shih as a symbol for Mao and for radical leaders just as Ch'in Shih Huang and earlier Legalists had been used. This particular article, which condemned Ssu-ma Kuang for his 'complete reversal of verdicts' and commitment to 'restoration' was intended as a negative example, demonstrating just how easily and speedily a reactionary prime minister could destroy the work of his predecessor. Readers were obviously being invited to consider Hua in that light.

In September, in its penultimate issue, *SAC* carried another article which appears to be an attack on him. 'Continue to Purge the Revolutionary Ranks of "Termites"' was based on a letter of Lu Hsün (whose name was much-invoked in the pages of *SAC*) warning against the danger of the enemies within. It described as 'termites' those opportunists and speculators who pretended to be revolutionary and who usurped high leadership positions. Such people were double-dealers who deceived and cheated true revolutionaries. They led the revolution to defeat chiefly by altering the revolutionary line. 'This was so in the democratic revolution period in which Lu Hsün lived, and is even more so in the socialist revolution period today.'⁴⁶ The 'termites' listed in

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the article ended with Teng Hsiao-p'ing, but it is evident that he could hardly be regarded as the final infestation as he had been dismissed six months earlier.

The article went on to rally the faint-hearted. It acknowledged that in the past some people had become weary of constant struggle, 'shaking their heads and heaving sighs'. This was because they found themselves in the declining camp and felt the threat of impending doom. Others were simply anxious to avoid controversy. Such attitudes were criticized and readers were sternly instructed to get 'well prepared mentally for protracted struggle'.

SAC AND THE GANG'S LEADERSHIP CLAIMS

In addition to attacking 'conservative' leaders, SAC bolstered the Gang's claims to be China's leading revolutionaries. This was done by concentrating on certain issues and treating them in a manner which presented a highly favourable picture of radical policies and radical leaders. The journal took an extremely positive view of the *achievements* of the Cultural Revolution and gave little attention to the disruptions it had caused. In its historical articles it identified with the progressive Legalists and, on occasions, published articles which were thinly disguised eulogies of Chiang Ch'ing.

It is surprising that education was given extensive coverage, with a total of forty-three articles. This field had experienced more dramatic transformations as a result of the Cultural Revolution than any other, and SAC proudly described the switch from an elitist and excessively academic system which placed too high a value on abstruse theory, to one which provided relevant, practically oriented education for the 'broad masses' within a decentralized and democratized framework.⁴⁷ But the journal was not content simply to defend what had been achieved. In 1975, for example, it actively propagated the campaign to restrict 'bourgeois right', to eradicate steadily the remaining pockets of privilege and inequality. Chang Ch'un-ch'iao had been active in this direction since at least 1958, and SAC carried his major article 'On Exercising All-Round Dictatorship Over the Bourgeoisie', as well as a number of contributions from humbler members of society.⁴⁸

The journal's approach to the Legalists has been neatly summed up by *Historical Research*:

They were affirmed without exception and dressed up in beautiful phrases to appear as progressive as the proletariat. Consequently, Legalists were mass-

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produced under the pens of the 'Gang of Four' and their parrots . . . They emerged absolutely, consistently and perpetually progressive. 'Legalist' virtually became a cliché transcending class, time and space, and the symbol of wisdom and perfection.⁴⁹

The Legalists were the champions of reform, the bringers of 'new-born things'. Their determined rejection of the past was epitomized in Han Fei's famous story of the man of Sung who, on seeing a hare kill itself by running into a tree stump, assumed that the process would regularly be repeated and that, provided he kept an eye on the stump, he was guaranteed a steady supply of fresh meat. Those who looked to the past were 'stump watchers', the Legalists were not.⁵⁰

SAC also praised the Legalists' recognition of the link between progress and violence, arguing that 'China's "fine tradition" consists of daring to fight and daring to make revolution, not "loyalty, filial piety, benevolence and love", nor "leniency and magnanimity".' Legalists rightly advocated severe punishment for transgressors, because they knew that the dangers of restoration were ever at hand, and such measures as Ch'in Shih-huang's burying alive Confucian scholars was therefore justified. At the same time, as if to reassure the Gang's opponents, *SAC* emphasized that Legalists like Liu Pang treated well enemies who surrendered to them.⁵¹

In most instances individual Legalists could not be identified with individual members of the Gang in the way that Confucians represented Chou En-lai. But there is one interesting exception to this and it relates to Chiang Ch'ing. The charges against her claim that she readily identified with those notable ladies Lü Hou and Wu Tse-t'ien, and used propaganda praising them to pave her way to power. *SAC* did contain feminist references from time to time. In one article, for example, the Ming scholar Li Chih was praised for his willingness to accept women as the equals of men, to take them as his students, and to encourage them to choose their own spouses and to ignore arranged marriages. One is tempted to see in this a reference to Mao and Chiang Ch'ing in their halcyon days in Yen-an, although it is possibly fanciful to do so.⁵²

However, favourable references to the Empress Lü and to the help she gave her husband certainly seem to allude to Chiang Ch'ing.⁵³ And one particular article on the Empress Wu is almost impossible to interpret other than as an attempt to press Chiang's claims to succeed her husband.⁵⁴ This noted Wu Tse-t'ien's humble origins and her role as a concubine to Emperor T'ai Tsung of T'ang. After his death, Wu

became a nun but was later recalled to court by the Emperor Kao Tsung. The article's discussion of Kao Tsung's decision to divorce his queen and install Wu in her place, and the 'big storm' it caused at court (with Wu being compared to notorious concubines of the past) is very similar to the stories which circulated concerning Mao's marriage to Chiang. As queen, Wu ably assisted Kao Tsung in conducting state affairs and 'pushed a Legalist line of persisting in reforms and opposing retrogression'. She was personally responsible for the dismissal or demotion of more than twenty 'big bureaucrats'.

After Kao Tsung's death, Wu suppressed the revolt of her conservative enemies and, as one who 'did not hesitate to break the net of feudal rites and ethics', deposed his successor, Jui Tsung, and ascended the throne as Empress. Her rule, allegedly, was a major triumph of the reformers over the conservatives, and her regime had a 'broad social foundation'. She opposed reactionaries, raised to high office many persons of relatively humble origin, and gathered round her a group of outstanding statesmen with Legalist inclinations. Published in January 1975, at a time when Chou En-lai had just succeeded in moving his protégés into key positions, this article appeared to be saying not only that Chiang would be an outstanding ruler in her own right but that she might be willing to set aside a succession settlement if it were not in her own interests.

This, of course, raises the question of just how Chiang Ch'ing might have expected to do so, given the Gang's acknowledgment of their lack of support among the military, noted earlier in this chapter. One possibility is that they hoped to use the militia, and *SAC* published an interesting article relating to this in its inaugural issue. 'The Paris Commune and the Arming of the Workers',⁵⁵ dealt with a sensitive subject, in view of the role of the Paris Commune as a radical symbol in the Cultural Revolution. This article insisted that a strong workers' militia was essential to resist external aggression and to oppose capitalist restoration at home. It urged that the workers' militia be strengthened with more weapons, and argued that armed workers were the best guarantee that political power would not be usurped by adventurers. A willingness to accept an armed working class was, in fact, the hallmark of the true revolutionary. The article, allegedly, was the product of Wang Hung-wen and Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and suggests that, as early as 1973, the Gang viewed the militia as a possible source of support as a showdown.

The idea of violence also figured in an article published in

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September 1976.⁵⁶ The Tangshan earthquake was inevitably linked in the minds of the superstitious with dynastic collapse, coming as it did after Chou's death and at a time when it was known to all that the Chairman himself was seriously ill. Yao Wen-yüan, however, attempted to use the earthquake to the Gang's advantage by having *SAC* publish a particularly tasteless piece on the Earthquake Proclamation issued by Hung Hsiu-ch'üan, the Taiping leader, in 1853. This praised Hung for his 'revolutionary optimism' and noted that it was after the Nanking earthquakes that the Taipings had gone on to win great victories. It quotes his proclamation as saying:

When the earth turns, it actually signifies the advent of a new earth.
When Heaven turns, it means the permanent establishment of a new heavenly kingdom.
March onward and kill the foes boldly.
Troops in the capital must step up patrols and eliminate defectors.
The moment has come to unify the land.

Then *SAC* went on to commit its greatest crime and biggest mistake. It tampered with Mao's words. In April 1976, we have since been told, Mao instructed Hua Kuo-feng to 'act according to past principles', a bland and neutral phrase which suggests only that continuity be maintained. The Gang, however 'tampered' with this, changing it to 'act according to the principles laid down'. This latter formulation was designed to suggest that Mao had left some sort of 'last testament' favourable to the Gang, which they could triumphantly produce as 'evidence' to support their claims to power in any subsequent settlement. In its thirty-eighth and final issue, *SAC* uttered this forgery, and the axe quickly fell.⁵⁷ It is a fitting irony that those who claimed most loudly to be Mao's most loyal followers should have been condemned as his ultimate betrayers.

NOTES

I. BERGÈRE: 'THE OTHER CHINA': SHANGHAI FROM 1919 TO 1949

- 1 Rhoads Murphey, *Shanghai, Key to Modern China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953).
- 2 Rhoads Murphey, *The Outsiders. The Western Experience in India and China* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977). Quite a number of topics developed in this book were presented in a former study by Rhoads Murphey: *The Treaty Ports and China's Modernization: What went wrong?* (Ann Arbor: Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies, 7, 1970).
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- 5 John Key Chang, *Industrial Development in Pre-Communist China* (Chicago: Aldine, 1969).
- 6 Chou Hsiu-luan, *Ti-i-ts'i shih-chieh ta-chan shih-ch'i Chung-kuo min-tsu kung-yeh ti fa-chan* (*The Development of Chinese National Industries During the First World War*) (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House, 1958), p. 76.
- 7 *Mao-hsin Fu-hsin Shen-hsin tsung-kung-ssu so-chou-nien chi-nien ts'e* (*Commemorative-Book on 30th Anniversary of the Mow Sing, Foh Sing and Sung Sing Mills*) (Shanghai, 1929); see also *China Weekly Review*, 27 Aug. 1921, pp. 654-6.
- 8 Chou Hsiu-luan, p. 57; *The Chinese Economic Bulletin*, 1 April 1922, p. 3; and Shanghai Economic Research Institute et al., *Ta-lung chi-ch'i-ch'ang ti fa-sheng fa-chan yü kai-tsoo* (*Origin, Development and Transformation of the Ta Lung Engineering Company*) (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House, 1958).

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- 11 Richard Feetham, *Report of the Hon. Richard Feetham to the Shanghai Municipal Council* (Shanghai: *North China Daily News and Herald*, 1931), vol. 1, p. 346.
- 12 M.-C. Bergère, *Les problèmes du développement*, chap. 5.
- 13 M.-C. Bergère, *Les problèmes du développement*, chap. 10.
- 14 R. Feetham, 1, p. 17. In 1927 the Greater Shanghai Municipality spread over 1,187,741 mou. This included, in addition to the urban districts, rural areas and distant villages such as Woosung, where the Whangpoo meets the Yangtze.
- 15 The expression belongs to Robert W. Barnett, *Economic Shanghai: Hostage to Politics* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941), p. 6. For a study of the French Settlement, see Charles B. Maybon and Jean Fredet, *Histoire de la Concession Française de Shanghai* (Paris: Plon, 1929). Also Michael Sinclair, 'The French Settlement of Shanghai on the Eve of the Revolution of 1911', Ph.D. thesis, Stanford University, 1973.
- 16 R. W. Barnett, p. 7.
- 17 A more detailed description is in A. Feuerwerker, *The Foreign Establishment in China in the Early Twentieth Century* (Ann Arbor: Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies, 29, 1977).
- 18 H. G. H. Woodhead ed., *The China Year Book 1921-1922* (Tientsin: Tientsin Press, 1921), pp. 317-19.
- 19 Institute of Historical Research, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, *Wu-ssu yun-tung tsai Shang-hai shih-liao hsiün-chi* (*Collection of Materials on the May Fourth Movement in Shanghai*) (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House, 1960), table between pp. 8 and 9.
- 20 *North China Herald*, 14 Jan. 1922, p. 74, and 3 Dec. 1922, p. 621.
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- 22 The last revision was in 1898 in the case of the International Settlement, and 1914 for the French Settlement.
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- 26 *North China Daily News and Herald*, 15 May 1920, p. 376.
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- 28 On this new generation of industrialists and their ideology, see M.-C. Bergère, *Revue d'Histoire* (as cited, n. 3).
- 29 The expression belongs to H. Madier, President of the French Chamber of Commerce in China.
- 30 M.-C. Bergère, *Les problèmes du développement*, chap. 8.
- 31 *Shang-hai tsung-shang-hui yueh-pao* (*Monthly Journal of the Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce*), 3, 7 (July 1923).
- 32 Jean Chesneaux, *Le Mouvement ouvrier chinois de 1919 à 1927* (Paris: Mouton, 1962).
- 33 Lee-hsia Hsu Ting, *Government Control of the Press in Modern China 1900-1919* (Cambridge, Mass.: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 1974), pp. 67-72.
- 34 Jean-Pierre Drege, *La Commercial Press de Shanghai 1897-1949* (Paris: *Mémoires de l'Institut des Hautes Etudes Chinoises*, vol. 7, Collège de France, Institut des Hautes Etudes Chinoises, 1978).
- 35 Leo Ou-fan Lee, *The Romantic Generation of Modern Chinese Writers* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973), p. 14.
- 36 *The China Year Book 1921-1922*, pp. 115 ff.
- 37 Hu Tao-ching, 'Shang-hai hsin-wen-chih ti pien-ch'ien' ('Evolution of Shanghai Newspapers'), *Shang-hai yen-chiu tzu-liao* (*Research Materials on Shanghai*) (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House, 1936), pp. 379-97. By the same author, 'Shang-hai hsin-wen-t'ung-hsun shih-yeh ti fa-chan' ('The development of the Shanghai press agencies'), *Shang-hai yen-chiu tzu-liao hsü-chi* (*Supplement to the Research Materials on Shanghai*), 1939, pp. 704-13.
- 38 Eugene Link, 'The rise of modern popular fiction in Shanghai', Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1976.
- 39 Hu Tao-ching, 'Shang-hai tien-ying-yuan ti fa-chan' ('The development of film theatres in Shanghai'), *Shang-hai yen-chiu tzu-liao hsü-chi*, pp. 532-56.
- 40 See the short story by Chu Tz'u-ch'ing: 'Pai-chung-jen: shang-ti ti jiao tzu' ('The whites: God's elected race'), *Peiyung* (*Silhouette*), 1929; French translation in M.-C. Bergère and Tchang Fou-jouei, *Sauvons la patrie! Le nationalisme chinois et le mouvement du Quatre Mai* (Paris: Publications orientalistes de France, 1977), p. 121.
- 41 R. Feetham, I, p. 173.
- 42 R. Feetham, I, p. 130.
- 43 F. C. Jones, *Shanghai and Tientsin* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940), pp. 30-5.
- 44 John C. Vincent, *The Extraterritorial System in China: Final Phase*

- (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard East Asian Monographs, Harvard University Press, 1970), chap. 5.
- 45 John C. Vincent, *The Extraterritorial System*, chaps. 4 and 6.
- 46 Y. C. Wang, 'Tu Yueh-sheng 1888–1951, A Tentative Political Biography', *Journal of Asian Studies*, 26, 3 (May 1967), pp. 433–56.
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- 49 'Shang-hai shih chih chin-hua shih-lüeh' ('History of the progress of the organization of the town of Shanghai'), *Shanghai yen-chiu tzu-liao*, pp. 75–8.
- 50 'Shang-hai shih cheng-fu yen-ke' ('Evolution of the municipal government of Shanghai'), *ibid.*, pp. 83–5.
- 51 On the workers' movement at that time, see Alain Roux, 'Le mouvement ouvrier à Changhai en 1928–1930', Thèse de 3ème cycle, University of Paris, 1970; A. Roux, 'Une grève en 1928 à Changhai: un détournement d'héritage', *Le Mouvement social*, 89 (Oct.–Dec. 1974); A. Roux, 'Le poids du passé dans le mouvement ouvrier chinois entre 1920 et 1937: le cas du syndicat de la Nanyang', communication presented to the European Congress of Chinese Studies, Sept. 1976; and Walter E. Gourlay, 'Yellow Unionism in Shanghai 1927–1937', *Harvard University Papers on China*, vol. 7.
- 52 Howard L. Boorman, *Biographical Dictionary of Republican China*, 4 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967–71), vol. 1, p. 449.
- 53 C. T. Hsia, *A History of Modern Chinese Fiction* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1st edn 1961, 2nd edn 1971), chap. 5; and John Israel, *Student Nationalism in China 1927–1937* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966).
- 54 Y. C. Wang, *Chinese Intellectuals and the West* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966), p. 367.
- 55 M.-C. Bergère, 'Pour une histoire économique de la Chine moderne', *Annales, Economie, Sociétés, Civilisation*, July–Aug. 1969, pp. 861–75.
- 56 Department of Overseas Trade, *Trade and Economic Conditions in China 1931–1933*, report by Louis Beale (London, 1933).
- 57 Yen Chung-p'ing, *Chung-kuo chin-tai ching-chi shih t'ung-chi tzu-liao hsüan-chi* (*Collected Statistics on the Economic History of Modern China*) (Peking: Scientific Publishing House, 1955), p. 69.
- 58 Yen Chung-p'ing, p. 109.
- 59 See Table 1.1.

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- 60 A. Feuerwerker, *The Chinese Economy 1912–1949* (Ann Arbor: Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies, 1, 1968), p. 22.
- 61 D. K. Lieu, *Industrialization of Shanghai*, pp. 13–14.
- 62 Hou Chi-ming, *Foreign Investment and Economic Development in China 1840–1937* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 14.
- 63 Robert W. Barnett, *Economic Shanghai: Hostage to Politics 1937–1941* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941), p. 10.
- 64 J. B. Powell, *My Twenty-Five Years in China*, pp. 299–300.
- 65 John H. Boyle, *China and Japan at War 1937–45* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), p. 112; and R. W. Barnett, *Economic Shanghai*, p. 12.
- 66 F. C. Jones, pp. 65–6; and J. B. Powell, p. 325.
- 67 R. W. Barnett, p. 29; and J. H. Boyle, p. 283.
- 68 J. B. Powell, chap. 31.
- 69 R. W. Barnett, chap. 5.
- 70 *ibid.*, p. 44.
- 71 *ibid.*, chap. 5.
- 72 *ibid.*, pp. 50–9.
- 73 *ibid.*, p. 46.
- 74 *ibid.*, pp. 62–72.
- 75 *ibid.*, p. 89.
- 76 John H. Boyle, pp. 116–18.
- 77 R. W. Barnett, p. 102.
- 78 John H. Boyle, p. 283.
- 79 *China Weekly Review*, 22 March 1947, pp. 98–9, ‘Portrait of a Nation on the Way’.
- 80 Chou Shun-hsin, *The Chinese Inflation 1937–49* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 24.
- 81 *China Weekly Review*, 15 Feb. 1947.
- 82 A. Doak Barnett, ‘Riding High for a Fall’, *China on the Eve of Communist Takeover* (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 20.
- 83 Chou Shun-hsin, pp. 57, 61, 67–87, and 132.
- 84 A. Doak Barnett, *China on the Eve*, p. 72; Chou Shun-hsin, p. 61.
- 85 Chou Shun-hsin, pp. 173–84.
- 86 *ibid.*, p. 97.
- 87 *China Weekly Review*, 26 April 1947, pp. 241–3, ‘Government Owned China Textiles Industries Inc. Under Fire’.
- 88 A. Doak Barnett, *China on the Eve*, ‘Pressures on Labor’, pp. 71–83.
- 89 Suzanne Pepper, ‘The Student Movement and the Chinese Civil War’, *CQ*, 43 (1971), pp. 698–736.
- 90 Suzanne Pepper, ‘Socialism, Democracy and Chinese Communism: A Problem of Choice for the Intelligentsia 1945–49’, in Chalmers Johnson ed., *Ideology and Politics in Contemporary China* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1973), pp. 161–218.

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- 91 Fan Hung, quoted by S. Pepper, 'Socialism, Democracy and Chinese Communism', p. 184.
- 92 A. Doak Barnett, *Communist China: The Early Years 1949–1955* (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 241, regards Shanghai as the second most important industrial centre in the country. According to the calculations of R. M. Field and of others, however, in 1949 Shanghai was ahead of all other regions, as far as the value of its industrial production was concerned: R. M. Field and others, 'Industrial Output by Province in China 1949–1973', *CQ*, 63 (1975), pp. 409–34.
- 93 Christopher Howe, *Employment and Economic Growth in Urban China 1949–1957* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 37.
- 94 T. Rawski, 'The Growth of Producer Industries', in Dwight H. Perkins ed., *China's Modern Economy in Historical Perspective* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975), p. 231.
- 95 R. Murphey, *The Outsiders*, p. 225.
- 96 See, for instance, the implied conclusion of A. Feuerwerker, *The Chinese Economy 1912–1949*, p. 17.
- 97 For example, R. Murphey's survey of Tientsin in *The Outsiders*, pp. 212 ff.
- 98 *Bulletin Commercial de l'Extrême-Orient*, Jan. 1922, pp. 35–6.
- 99 M.-C. Bergère, *Les problèmes du développement*, chap. 7.
- 100 1920 Report on the foreign trade of China.
- 101 M.-C. Bergère, *Les problèmes du développement*, chap. 5.
- 102 G. W. Skinner, 'Marketing and Social Structures in Rural China', *Journal of Asian Studies*, 24, 2 (Feb. 1965).
- 103 M.-C. Bergère, *Les problèmes du développement*, pp. 516–19.
- 104 Quoted from R. Murphey, *Shanghai: Key to Modern China*, p. 27.
- 105 R. Murphey, *The Outsiders*, p. 129.
- 106 Edward W. Fox, *L'Autre France* (translated from the English) (Paris: Flammarion, 1973). In his study, Fox stresses the role of Protestant provincial society in the making of modern France, the society described so well by Jean Monnet in the first chapter of his *Mémoires* (Paris: Fayard, 1976).
- 107 We could perhaps identify the 'other China' with the maritime China put forward by J. K. Fairbank in, amongst other articles 'East Asia, our one China problem', *Atlantic*, Sept. 1976.

2. GAULTON: POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN SHANGHAI,
1949–1951

- 1 Jean Chesneaux, *The Chinese Labor Movement 1919–1927*, trans. H. M. Wright (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968) is the most accessible source on Shanghai labour and politics in the 1920s. See also Harold R. Isaacs, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution*, 2nd rev. edn (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961; New York: Atheneum, 1966).
- 2 Ying-mao Kau, 'Urban and Rural Strategies in the Chinese Communist

- Revolution', in John W. Lewis ed., *Peasant Rebellion and Communist Power in Asia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974), pp. 253–70, and John W. Lewis, 'Political Aspects of Mobility in China's Urban Development', *American Political Science Review*, 60 (1966), pp. 901–6, discuss the interplay of urban and rural revolutionary forces.
- 3 Mao Tse-tung, 'Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China' (delivered on 5 March 1949), *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, 5 vols. (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1961–77), vol. 4, p. 363.
 - 4 *ibid.*, p. 374.
 - 5 Mao, 'The Great Union of the Popular Masses', trans. Stuart R. Schram, *CQ*, 49 (1972), pp. 76–87.
 - 6 Mao, 'Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan', *Selected Works*, vol. 1, p. 23.
 - 7 See Ezra Vogel, 'Voluntarism and Social Control', in Donald W. Treadgold ed., *Soviet and Chinese Communism: Similarities and Differences* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1967), pp. 168–84.
 - 8 Mao, 'Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership', *Selected Works*, vol. 3, p. 119. For discussions of the mass line in theory and practice, see John W. Lewis, *Leadership in Communist China* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963), pp. 70–100; Mark Selden, *The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 208–77; H. Arthur Steiner, 'Current "Mass Line" Tactics in Communist China', *American Political Science Review*, 45 (1951), pp. 422–36; and James R. Townsend, *Political Participation in Communist China*, new ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 72–6.
 - 9 Kenneth Lieberthal, 'Reconstruction and Revolution in a Chinese City: The Case of Tientsin, 1949–1953', Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 1972, pp. 5–10, provides a brief discussion of salient differences between the countryside and the cities.
 - 10 See J. A. Ahlers, 'Shanghai at the War's End', *Far Eastern Survey*, 14, 23 (25 Nov. 1945), pp. 329–33; A. Doak Barnett, *China on the Eve of Communist Takeover* (New York: Praeger, 1963), pp. 17–24, 71–82; Chang Kia-ngau, *The Inflationary Spiral. The Experience in China, 1939–1950* (New York: MIT Technological Press, John Wiley & Sons, 1958), chap. 4; and Université de l'Aurore, 'L'état présent de l'industrie à Shanghai (début de 1949)', *Bulletin de l'université de l'Aurore*, ser. 3, 10 (1949), pp. 298–315, for observations on the post-war economy of Shanghai.
 - 11 'Critique of Bullitt's biased unhealthy report on his visit to China', *Kuan-ch'a (The Examiner)*, 3, 9 (25 Oct. 1947), p. 5; cited in Suzanne Pepper, 'Socialism, Democracy, and Chinese Communism: A Problem of Choice for the Intelligentsia, 1945–49', in Chalmers Johnson ed., *Ideology and Politics in Contemporary China* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1973), p. 175.
 - 12 Richard Solomon, *Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 135–53.
 - 13 General impressions in this paragraph are distilled from interviews with

- former residents of Shanghai, most of which were conducted in Hong Kong in 1972–3. The sample is obviously unrepresentative, since it includes only those who left Shanghai (many because they were opposed to the Communist government) and since it is weighted toward literate and middle-class individuals. I have used interview data primarily to illustrate points derived from other sources and to provide a context for particular incidents.
- 14 Interview with a former Shanghai businessman, Hong Kong, 1973.
 - 15 Chang Hui and Pao Ts'un eds., *Shang-hai chin pai-nien ko-ming shih-hua* (*History of the Revolution in Shanghai in the Past Hundred Years*) (Shanghai: Shanghai: People's Publishing House, 1963), provides a summary of important events.
 - 16 Jen Pi-shih, 'Report to the First Congress of the New Democratic Youth League' (April 1949). Section entitled 'Restoring and developing industrial production' in Liu Shao-ch'i et al., *Hsin min-chu chu-i ch'eng-shih cheng-ts'e* (*New Democratic Urban Policy*) (Hong Kong: New Democracy Publishing House, 1949), chaps. 5–6.
 - 17 Rhoads Murphey, *Shanghai: Key to Modern China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 1. This is the best introduction to Shanghai's economy and economic geography. See also D. K. Lien, *The Growth and Industrialization of Shanghai* (Shanghai: China Institute of Pacific Relations, 1936).
 - 18 Hsü Ti-hsin, 'The Economic Reform of Cities', *Chinese Press Survey* (Shanghai) (hereafter cited as *CPS*), 4, 5, 11 June 1949, pp. 5–7. Translated from *Shang pao* (*Commerce Daily*) (Shanghai), 2, 3 June 1949. The article was reportedly written before the capture of Tientsin by the PLA.
 - 19 H. Arthur Steiner, 'Chinese Communist Urban Policy', *American Political Science Review*, 44 (1950), p. 62.
 - 20 Wolfram Eberhard, 'Chinese Regional Stereotypes', *Asian Survey*, 5 (1965), p. 599.
 - 21 Before entering Shanghai, all members of the Third Field Army studied (1) the eight-point 'Proclamation of the Chinese People's Liberation Army' issued by Mao and Chu Te, in Mao, *Selected Works*, vol. 4, pp. 397–400; (2) the instructions of the East China Bureau of the CCP regarding the work programme in Kiangnan cities; and (3) the three charters and twelve-point regulations governing the entry of troops into cities. *CFJP*, 28 May 1949.
 - 22 Steiner, 'Urban Policy', p. 62, quoting *NCNA*, 6 Jan. 1948.
 - 23 Interview with a former Shanghai college instructor, Hong Kong, 1973.
 - 24 Pepper, 'Socialism, Democracy, and Chinese Communism', p. 217.
 - 25 *Shang pao*, 27 May 1949. Translation in US Consulate-General, Shanghai, *Chinese Press Review* (hereafter cited as *CPR*), 901 (29–31 May 1949), p. 4.
 - 26 *Shang-hai jen-min* [*Shanghai People*], 26 May 1949. Translated in *CPR*, 899 (25–7 May 1949), p. 2.
 - 27 *CFJP*, 28 May 1949. Translated in *CPR*, 900 (28 May 1949), p. 1.

- 28 See for example the *North China Daily News* (Shanghai), 28 May 1949; and the Shanghai *TKP*, 28 May 1949. The behaviour of PLA troops in Shanghai was remarked on by all observers.
- 29 *TKP*, 30 May 1949. Translated in *CPR*, 901 (29–31 May 1949), p. 3.
- 30 For examples, see *CFJP*, 21 June 1949, and 2 Aug. 1949.
- 31 *CFJP*, 13 June 1949.
- 32 *ibid.*, 6 June 1949, and 16 June 1949.
- 33 See *Chung-kuo jen-min chieh-fang-chün ju-ch'eng cheng-ts'e* (*The Policy of the Chinese People's Liberation Army on Entering Cities*) (n.p.: New China Bookshop, 1949). A dramatic reconstruction of the PLA experience is the play by Shen Hsi-meng, Mo Yen and Lu Hsing-chen, *On Guard Beneath the Neon Lights* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), originally performed in 1956 under the title *Ni-hung-teng hsia ti shao-ping*.
- 34 For general information on urban policy in the period immediately after Liberation, see William Brugger, *Democracy and Organization in the Chinese Industrial Enterprise, 1948–1953* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976); *Kuan-yü ch'eng-shih cheng-ts'e ti chi-ko wen-hsien* (*Several Documents Concerning Urban Policy*) (Hantan: North China Bookshop, 1949); Lai Chih-yen ed., *Chieh-kuan ch'eng-shih ti kung-tso ching-yen* (*Experiences in the Work of Taking Over Cities*) (Canton: People's Publishing House, 1949); Liu *et al.*, *Hsin min-chu chu-i ch'eng-shih cheng-ts'e*; and Steiner, 'Urban Policy'. Important case studies include Lieberthal, 'Reconstruction and Revolution in a Chinese City' (on Tientsin); and Ezra Vogel, *Canton under Communism: Programs and Politics in a Provincial Capital, 1949–1968* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), chap. 2.
- 35 *CFJP*, 4 June 1949. Translated in *Daily Translation Service* (Shanghai: Millard Publishing Co.), 6 June 1949, p. 5.
- 36 *CFJP*, 28 May 1949. Translated in *CPR*, 900 (28 May 1949), p. 2.
- 37 Mao, 'Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh CC', p. 365.
- 38 See, for example, the *New York Times* article 'Red Moves Please Shanghai Bankers', 4 June 1949.
- 39 One of these may have been the case of the *Shanghai Evening Post & Mercury*, an American-owned English-language newspaper. Randall Gould, the editor and publisher, closed his paper during a labour dispute which he charged was initiated by the government. See Gould, 'Shanghai During the Takeover, 1949', *Annals of the American Association of Political and Social Science*, 277 (1951), pp. 182–92. It is worth noting that the British-owned *North China Daily News* continued to be published until 1951.
- 40 *CWR*, 18 June 1949, p. 46.
- 41 *Chieh-fang-hou Shang-hai kung-yün tzu-liao* (*Materials on the Shanghai Workers Movement after Liberation*) (Hong Kong: reprint, n.d.), pp. 1–4, cited in Brugger, *Democracy and Organization*, p. 72.
- 42 Ch'en Yi, 'Report on work of the Shanghai Military Control Commission and People's Government', in Lai, *Chieh-kuan ch'eng-shih ti kung-tso ching-yen*, p. 6.

- 43 Jao Shu-shih, 'Report to the Shanghai Conference of Representatives of People of All Circles', 8 Aug. 1949, *Shang-hai chieh-fang i-nien* (*One Year of Liberated Shanghai*) (Shanghai: Liberation Daily Publishing House, 1950), part 2, pp. 7-11.
- 44 *ibid.*
- 45 *TKP*, 11 Aug. 1949.
- 46 Chou Yu-Kuang, 'The economic reform of Shanghai', *Ching-chi chou-pao* (*Economic Weekly*), 25 August. 1949, as translated in *CPS*, 6, 1 (1 Sept. 1949), p. 18.
- 47 *CWR*, 25 Feb. 1950, p. 184.
- 48 See *CFJP*, 6 Aug. 1949, and 9 Aug. 1949, for stories of the repatriation of 400,000 refugees and the planned conversion of a woollen mill and perfume factory to the production of cotton goods and soap.
- 49 *TKP*, 11 Aug. 1949.
- 50 Shen Li-jen, 'A private view on the dispersal of industries from Shanghai', *WHP*, 15 Aug. 1949. Translation in *CPS*, 6, 1 (1 Sept. 1949), pp. 23-4.
- 51 Alun Falconer, 'Changes in Shanghai's Press', *CWR*, 11 March 1950, p. 28.
- 52 *ibid.* The others were *Shang pao*, the former Chamber of Commerce organ; *Cultural Daily*, with features especially for students; *New People's Evening News*; and the specialized *Labour Daily*, published in simple language by the Shanghai General Labour Union, and *Youth Daily* of the New Democratic Youth League. There were also still a number of mosquito papers.
- 53 *Shang-hai chieh-fang i-nien*, part 1, p. 79. This figure seems high and may be an over-estimate. Paul F. Harper, 'Trade Union Cultivation of Workers for Leadership', in John W. Lewis ed., *The City in Communist China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971), p. 129, reports that the proportion of literates in the proletariat at that time was only 20 or 25%.
- 54 Falconer, 'Changes in Shanghai's Press', p. 27.
- 55 See, for example, 'How to organize workers to read newspapers', *CFJP*, 3 Dec. 1950.
- 56 *CFJP*, 5 Dec. 1949. The Shanghai press regulations were considered a model for the country. See Liu *et al.*, *Hsin min-chu chu-i ch'eng-shih cheng-ts'e*, pp. 175-7.
- 57 *Hsin Shang-hai pien-lan* (*New Shanghai Guidebook*) (Shanghai: *Impartial Daily*, 1951), pp. 179-80.
- 58 *ibid.*
- 59 *WHP*, 27 Nov. 1949.
- 60 *Hsin Shang-hai pien-lan*, pp. 185-96. Of these, two were government-owned, two were owned jointly by the government and private interests, and seventeen were private operations.
- 61 *Chü-min sheng-huo shou-ts'e* (*Handbook of Residents' Life*) (Shanghai: *Daily News*, 1951), p. 198.
- 62 Kuo Mo-jo, 'Report on Culture and Education', in *The First Year of*

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- Victory* (Peking, 1951), p. 40, as cited in Jan Leyda, *Dianying: An Account of Films and the Film Audience in China* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1972), p. 188.
- 63 *CWR*, 24 Sept. 1949, p. 54.
- 64 Kuo, 'Report on Culture and Education', p. 40.
- 65 Hsia Yen, 'Report on Cultural and Educational Work in Shanghai', *China Monthly Review*, Dec. 1950 (supplement), p. 8.
- 66 See Leyda, *Dianying*, pp. 181–7 for reviews of several films of 1949 and 1950.
- 67 See the letter to the editor in *TKP*, 31 Dec. 1950, in which a viewer describes his passionate response to the film *Resist America and Aid Korea*.
- 68 Ying-mao Kau, 'Recruitment and Mobility of Urban Cadres', in Lewis ed., *The City in Communist China*, p. 100, gives no figures for Shanghai but reports that for five other cities in 1949, Party membership as a percentage of population totalled 0.17%. If applied to Shanghai, this ratio would yield about 8,500 Party members in 1949.
- 69 *TKP*, 16 Jan. 1950, p. 3, is a typical criticism.
- 70 See, for some of many examples, *WHP*, 27 Dec. 1950 (supplement); *CFJP*, 4 Oct. 1950; and *CFJP*, 10 Nov. 1950.
- 71 *JMJP*, 1 Jan. 1951.
- 72 *CFJP*, 25 Dec. 1951. See also John Gardner, 'The *Wu-fan* Campaign in Shanghai: A Study in the Consolidation of Urban Control', in A. Doak Barnett ed., *Chinese Communist Politics in Action* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), pp. 498–500.
- 73 *CFJP*, 12 Dec. 1951.
- 74 *JMJP*, 1 Jan. 1952.
- 75 Martin King Whyte, *Small Groups and Political Rituals in China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974). Chapter 4 discusses the ideal forms of small-group operations based on manuals and handbooks from the period 1949–52.
- 76 For examples, see the specific advice on how to break the 'silent situation' in a small group in *CFJP*, 22 Jan. 1950; instructions on forming a newspaper-reading group in *WHP*, 20 March 1950; and detailed directions for the division of labour for a wall newspaper in *WHP*, 22 March 1950.
- 77 *WHP*, 13 Aug. 1949.
- 78 See Lieberthal, 'Reconstruction and Revolution', pp. 281–319, for a detailed discussion of this pattern of organization development in Tientsin.
- 79 Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, 2nd edn (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. 49. See also Arthur F. Wright, 'Struggle vs. Harmony: Symbols of Competing Values in Modern China', *World Politics*, 6 (1953), pp. 31–44.
- 80 Chiu Yang, 'Ch'en Yi, from Scholar to General', *TKP*, 29 May–4 June 1949, as translated in *CPS*, 4, 5 (11 June 1949), pp. 136–9. Chiu was a classmate and longtime friend of Ch'en.
- 81 *CFJP*, 7 June 1949.

- 82 *TKP*, 1 June 1951.
- 83 *China Monthly Review*, Nov. 1950, p. 110.
- 84 *CFJP*, 1 Oct. 1949. See the instructions for displaying portraits of leaders in *WHP*, 24 Nov. 1949.
- 85 *CFJP*, 8, 9, 10 July 1949. Translated in *CPR*, 928 (9–11 July 1949). *CFJP*, 14 June 1949, carried three articles on p. 1 concerning alleged mistreatment of Chinese by foreign residents.
- 86 *HWJP*, 23 Nov. 1949. Translated in *CPR*, 1030 (2 Dec. 1949), p. 10.
- 87 See Wen-hui C. Chen, *Chinese Communist Anti-Americanism and the Resist America Aid Korea Campaign* (Los Angeles: University of Southern California, Studies in Chinese Communism, 1955), for a selection of extreme examples.
- 88 Barnett, *China on the Eve*, pp. 339–40. Steiner, 'Urban Policy', provides a general description of urban government structure.
- 89 *HWJP*, 17 Nov. 1952, cited in Kau, 'Recruitment and Mobility of Urban Cadres', p. 101.
- 90 Ch'en, 'Shang-hai shih chün-kuan-hui ho jen-min cheng-fu ti kung-tso pao-kao', p. 6.
- 91 See Hsü Ti-hsin, 'Report on Conditions of Industry and Commerce in Shanghai', *China Monthly Review*, Dec. 1950 (supplement), p. 2. The crisis was partly the result of central government's measure to dampen inflation and strengthen control over local finances. See Lieberthal, 'Reconstruction and Revolution', pp. 261–2.
- 92 Hsü, 'Report on Conditions of Industry and Commerce', p. 2.
- 93 *ibid.*
- 94 *TKP*, 5 Dec. 1949, See also Ch'en Yi's address to the Second Session of the Conference of People's Representatives of All Circles, *CFJP*, 14 Dec. 1949.
- 95 See Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), for an introduction to the importance of political symbolism.
- 96 Claus Mueller, *The Politics of Communication: A Study in the Political Sociology of Language, Socialization, and Legitimation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 13–42, discusses the effects of government policy to structure language and communication under the heading of 'directed communications'.
- 97 See Li Chi, *General Trend of Chinese Linguistic Changes Under Communist Rule*, Studies in Chinese Communist Terminology, 1 (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1956), pp. 15–20.
- 98 *ibid.*, pp. 20–37.
- 99 *ibid.*
- 100 Li Chi, *A Preliminary Study of Selected Terms*, Studies in Chinese Communist Terminology, 2 (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1956), pp. 7–9, describes the origin and use of *ying-hsiung*. For a reader's query on the use of the 'feudal term' *kung-ch'en*, see *WHP*, 17 Oct. 1950 (supplement).
- 101 *CFJP*, 27 March 1950; *ibid.*, 14 June 1949.

- 102 *ibid.*, 7 July 1949: *ibid.*, 16 Dec. 1949.
- 103 Interview with a former teacher, Hong Kong, 1973.
- 104 'Study the grammar of the working people', *TKP*, 15 June 1950.
- 105 *TKP*, 2 Dec. 1950; *CFJP*, 9 Jan. 1951.
- 106 *WHJP*, 23 Nov. 1949; translated in *CPR*, 1030 (2 Dec. 1949), p. 10.
- 107 *NCNA*, 1 Nov. 1950.
- 108 Introductions to mass organizations in this period may be found in A. Doak Barnett, 'Mass Political Organizations in Communist China', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 277 (1951), pp. 76-88; and Chao Kuo-chun, *The Mass Organizations in Communist China* (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for International Studies, 1953).
- 109 *CFJP*, 1, 2 June 1949.
- 110 The Shanghai General Labour Union claimed 700,000 members in November 1949, according to *CFJP*, 3 Nov. 1949; by February 1950 the figure was reported to be 1,000,000 in *CFJP*, 7 Feb. 1950. The Federation of Democratic Women enrolled 300,000 members by September 1950, according to *China Monthly Review*, Sept. 1950.
- 111 Interviews with former Shanghai students and office clerk, Hong Kong, 1973.
- 112 *WHP*, 25 Jan. 1950.
- 113 *CFJP*, 15 Dec. 1951.
- 114 *WHP*, 29 Dec. 1950.
- 115 See, for example, the article on handling finances for street and lane committees in *WHP*, 20 Oct. 1951 (supplement). An article in *CFJP*, 1 Nov. 1950, explaining how an alley with a common water meter might distribute the water fee, indicates how detailed this advice could become.
- 116 This handbook, intended for residents' committee members and activists, also included sections on applying political analysis to economic life and daily activities.
- 117 *Hsin Shang-hai pien-lan*, p. 40.
- 118 *ibid.*
- 119 Interview with a former Shanghai shop-worker, Hong Kong, 1972.
- 120 *CFJP*, 17 March 1951.
- 121 *Chü-min sheng-huo shou-ts'ê*, p. 14.
- 122 *HWJP*, 21 July 1951. Translated in Wen-hui C. Chen, *Wartime 'Mass' Campaigns in Communist China: Official Country-wide 'Mass Movements' in Professed Support of the Korean War* (Lackland Air Force Base, Texas: Air Force Personnel and Training Research Center, 1955), p. 19. See also Liao Kai-lung, *Ai-kuo yün-tung lün chi* (*Collection of Essays on the Patriotic Movement*) (Peking: Haiyen Bookshop, 1951).
- 123 *HWJP*, 30 Aug. 1951.
- 124 See Brugger, *Democracy and Organization*, pp. 162-7; also Li, *General Trends of Linguistic Changes*, p. 24.
- 125 *NCNA*, 24 March 1951. Translated in US Consulate-General, Hong Kong, 87 (22-24 March 1951).

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- 126 Brugger, *Democracy and Organization*, p. 163.
- 127 See the letter from an enthusiastic participant in *TKP*, 1 Nov. 1950.
- 128 *WHP*, 12 March 1950; *TKP*, 11 Feb. 1950.
- 129 *WHP*, 30 Dec. 1949; *TKP*, 28 Jan. 1950.
- 130 See Gardner, 'The *Wu-fan* Campaign in Shanghai', p. 498. David J. Finlay, Ole R. Holsti, and Richard Fagen, *Enemies in Politics* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967), chap. 1, discusses some aspects of the idea of an enemy.
- 131 *WHP*, 8 Dec. 1949.
- 132 *ibid.*, 9 Dec. 1950; *CFJP*, 24 March 1950.
- 133 *China Monthly Review*, September 1950, p. 18, reported the following membership figures: 162,000 professional and working women, 70,000 peasants, 32,000 students, 8,000 teachers, 4,000 government workers, and 20,000 housewives for a total of 296,000 members.
- 134 *Hsin Shang-hai pien-lan*, p. 462.
- 135 *Shang-hai chieh-fang i-nien*, p. 87.
- 136 Kau, 'Patterns of Recruitment and Mobility', pp. 103–5, 108.
- 137 *TKP*, 1, 3 May 1951.
- 138 An instructive account of the beginning of political penetration into the daily lives of Shanghai residents is provided in Shirley Wood, *A Street in China* (London: Michael Joseph, 1958).
- 139 *TKP*, 16 Jan. 1950.
- 140 *WHP*, 31 March 1951 (supplement). See also *JMJP*, 15 Aug. 1951. Examples of inappropriate pacts, such as that of a primary school that pledged not to evade taxes and to report fully its capital assets, are reported in Chen, *Wartime 'Mass' Campaigns*, p. 21.
- 141 *WHP*, 24 Aug. 1951 (supplement).
- 142 *ibid.*, 25 July 1951 (supplement).
- 143 *CFJP*, 19 March 1950.
- 144 *WHP*, 29 Dec. 1950.

3. CHANG: SHANGHAI AND CHINESE POLITICS: BEFORE
AND AFTER THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

- 1 See *JMJP*, 30 Nov. 1965, and Wu Han, *Hai Jui Pa Kuan* (Peking: Peking Publishing House, 1961).
- 2 Mao Tse-tung, 'A Talk at the Work Conference of the Center, October 25, 1961', in Jerome Ch'en ed., *Mao* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969), pp. 96–7.
- 3 Robert M. Field et al., *Provincial Industrial Output in the People's Republic of China 1949–75* (Washington DC: US Department of Commerce, 1976), p. 11, Table 3. The figure is for 1975.
- 4 See Parris H. Chang, *Power and Policy in China*, 2nd and enlarged edn. (University Park, Pa.: Penn State University Press, 1978), pp. 66–7; also Lynn T. White III, 'Leadership in Shanghai, 1955–69', in Robert A. Scalapino ed., *Elites in the People's Republic of China* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972), pp. 327–8, 337.

- 5 See Robert Vincent Daniels, *The Conscience of the Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 207-8 and 270-2, and Merle Fainsod, *How Russia is Ruled*, revised edn (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 150-5.
- 6 For an account of P'eng's opposition to Mao, see Parris Chang, *op. cit.*, pp. 134-5.
- 7 Lynn White, *op. cit.*, pp. 327-30.
- 8 Yao Wen-yuan, 'Criticize Chou Yang, Two-faced Counter-Revolutionary Element', *HC*, 1967, 1, pp. 14-36.
- 9 See 'The Tempestuous Combat on the Literary and Art Fronts: A Chronicle of the Struggle Between the Two Lines on the Literary and Art Front 1949-66', *Current Background* (Hong Kong: American Consulate-General), 842 (8 December 1967), p. 17-18.
- 10 Parris Chang, *op. cit.*, p. 100.
- 11 *ibid.*
- 12 He was identified in that post by *JMJP* for the first time on 15 April 1963, although he may have held that job since late 1962. Information on Chang is drawn from Parris H. Chang, *Radicals and Radical Ideology in China's Cultural Revolution* (New York: Research Institute on Communist Affairs, Columbia University, 1973) and especially Ting Wang, *Biographies of Wang Hung-wen and Chang Ch'un-ch'iao* (Hong Kong: Ming Pao Monthly).
- 13 Ting Wang, *op. cit.*, p. 170 and Lynn White, *op. cit.*, pp. 337-8. The fact that K'o, Chiang and Chang were originally from Shangtung may have been a factor facilitating their collaboration in policy matters.
- 14 Chiang Ch'ing, *Wei Jen-min Li Hsin-Kung (To Perform New Merits for the People)* (Kunming: Yunnan People's Publishing House, May 1967), p. 12.
- 15 'Criticize the alien class element Yao Wen-yuan', *KMJP*, 18 June 1977.
- 16 Chiang Ch'ing, *op. cit.*, p. 11.
- 17 Editorial, *Hung-wei chan-pao (Red Guard Battle Paper)* (Shanghai: Revolutionary Committee of Red Guards from Shanghai Schools and Colleges), 8 Jan. 1967.
- 18 *ibid.*
- 19 Quoted in Neale Hunter, *Shanghai Journal* (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 20.
- 20 Leaders of the Shanghai CCP Committee were said to have boasted that they helped the preparation and publication of Yao's article; see Chiang Ch'ing, *op. cit.*, p. 12.
- 21 Chang, *Power and Policy in China*, p. 162.
- 22 Quoted in Neale Hunter, *op. cit.*, p. 21.
- 23 Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing reportedly stated that 'dispatching the work teams embodies the leadership of the Party. You are sent by us; to oppose you is to oppose us'; see 'Excerpts of Teng Hsiao-p'ing's self-criticism', *Ming pao* (Hong Kong), 20 May 1968.

- 24 See Neale Hunter, *op. cit.*, p. 42.
- 25 Quoted in *ibid.*
- 26 *ibid.*
- 27 See various articles in *Hung-wei chan-pao* (Shanghai), 4 Jan. 1967. Among the Red Guard groups, the General Headquarters of Red Guards from Shanghai Schools and Colleges, which consisted of large numbers of college students from Tungchi and Chiaotung University, was considered by both Chinese and outside observers to have been very close to the power-holders. Although the Scarlet Guards had overlapping interests with the power-holders and both colluded from time to time, the former were not totally controlled by the latter as it is often alleged.
- 28 See 'The Shanghai CCP Committee cannot Shirk from the Responsibility for Brutal Repression on the Workers' Movement', in *ibid.*, 8 Jan. 1967. According to this source, the power-holders laid off workers or deducted their wages when they left their jobs to take part in the GPCR.
- 29 *ibid.*
- 30 Premier Chou En-lai's concern for the adverse impact of the GPCR on the national economy was clearly manifested in a Red Guard rally on 15 September 1966, in which he, unlike Lin Piao who spoke on the same occasion, discouraged Red Guards from establishing revolutionary ties in factories, enterprises and communes, and proclaimed that to carry out industrial and agricultural production well would have a great effect 'upon our socialist construction, upon the *Third Five-Year Plan*, upon the people's livelihood in the town and country, and upon the GPCR' as well as upon 'our support to the Vietnamese people in their anti-US struggle and upon the revolutionary struggle of the oppressed peoples of the world'. *JMJP*, 16 Sept. 1966. Other central leaders such as Yu Ch'iu-li and Po I-po also expressed misgivings on expanding the GPCR.
- 31 'The Record of the Words and Deeds of T'ao Chu is undermining the Great Cultural Revolution', *Chin sung* (*Sturdy Pine*) (Shanghai: Liaison Centre of the Mao Tse-tung Thought, the Red Guard, and the Wuhan Revolutionary Rebel Headquarters), 7 Feb. 1967.
- 32 See *Jen-min hua-pao* (*People's Pictorial*), 1968, 11.
- 33 This is based on Ssu-ma Pu-p'ing, 'Wang Hung-wen and the "Shanghai Gang"' (part 2), *Nan Pei Chi* (*South-North Pole*), 80 (1976), p. 73. Chang's role in the formation of the Workers' Headquarters – which has often been described as a spontaneous action on the part of some revolutionary workers – has not been mentioned by any other writer. With the advantage of new information and hindsight, it seems most likely that the Cultural Revolution Group in Peking (and Chang especially) were behind it.
- 34 *ibid.*; also Neale Hunter, *op. cit.*, pp. 137–8.
- 35 Ch'en's telegram was reproduced in Neale Hunter, *op. cit.*, pp. 139–40.
- 36 *ibid.*, pp. 141–3; also Ssu-ma Pu-p'ing, *op. cit.*, pp. 75–6. Hunter raised

- the question whether Chang was acting on his own and whether there was a split in the Cultural Revolution Group in Peking, for the tone of Ch'en Po-ta's cable was quite different from the settlement Chang concluded with the rebels in Anting. That Chang was sent by Mao and his mission superseded Ch'en's cable was stated in a very authoritative Red Guard publication, *Hung-se tsao-fan pao* (*Red Rebel News*) (Shanghai: Liaison Centre of the Red Rebel Regiment; Harbin Military Engineering Institute), 8-9 (28 Feb. 1967), p. 3.
- 37 *WHP*, 5 Jan. 1967; also editorial, *JMJJP*, 12 Jan. 1967.
- 38 *Hung-wei chan-pao*, 16 (8 Jan. 1967).
- 39 See *Hung-se tsao-fan pao*, 4 Feb. 1967. These same Fudan University students were the hardcore members of the Red Guard group 'Red Revolutionaries', and they actually opposed the municipal leadership and supported Chang in the autumn of 1966, but their attitude toward Chang changed drastically after mid-January 1967.
- 40 *China Topics* (Hong Kong), 511 (8 Jan. 1969), p. 8.
- 41 'Chairman Mao's Speech at His Third Meeting with Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and Yao Wen-yuan', *Selections from Chairman Mao* (US Joint Publications Research Service), 49, 826 (12 Feb. 1970), p. 44.
- 42 See Lynn White, *op. cit.*, pp. 359-65.
- 43 See *NCNA* (Shanghai), 12 March 1978, in (Hong Kong), 13 March 1978. According to this dispatch, two campaigns were launched on 28 January 1967 and 12 April 1968 by the revolutionaries in Shanghai to bombard Chang; subsequently, more than 10,000 people who either took part in the campaigns, or had knowledge of Chang's past, were arrested and tortured.
- 44 Apparently, Chiang Ch'ing and K'ang Sheng were Chang's protectors in Peking. Ironically, after October 1976, Peking resurrected the accusations made by the Shanghai students in 1967 to the effect that Chang had collaborated with the KMT elements in his earlier career and was a KMT agent. Moreover, K'ang Sheng, who covered up Chang's infamous past and aided the radicals' cause until his demise in December 1975, is now repudiated posthumously by Peking.
- 45 See 'Shanghai's Wen Kung Wei Army grows and matures amid the class struggle', *WHP*, 26 March 1968.
- 46 Ting Wang, *op. cit.*, p. 92. As a result of her instigation, rebels throughout China raided military headquarters, seized weapons from the soldiers and military warehouses and caused many armed clashes.
- 47 *WHP*, 26 March 1968.
- 48 *JMJJP*, 6 Dec. 1967 and 10 Jan. 1968. Reportedly, Chairman Mao was favourably impressed by Wang who, at the age of 33, 'commanded' more than two million workers; and Mao was said to have cited this fact to defend his decision in 1973 to promote Wang to the vice-chairmanship of the Central Committee and Military Affairs Committee; see Ting Wang, *op. cit.*, p. 68.
- 49 See *JMJJP*, 12 July, 20 Sept., 3 Oct., and 6 Dec. 1967.

- 50 Chiang Ch'ing, *op. cit.*, p. 1.
- 51 *WHP*, 20 May 1967; also *Hung-wei chan-pao*, 16 (8 Jan. 1967).
- 52 A Red Guard source quoted Lin Piao as saying (in 1968) that Yao was in charge of the 'Staff Office of the Party Chairman' and was Mao's 'most trusted person'; see *Issues and Studies*, 8, 6 (1972), p. 80.
- 53 In addition, Wang Wei-kuo and Ch'en Kan-feng were elected alternate Central Committee members. Reportedly, Wang Hung-wen attracted considerable attention during the gathering for his audacity in opposing the election of Ch'en Yi (then Politburo member and Foreign Minister) to the Central Committee, and even Chou En-lai and Tung Pi-wu were unable to get Wang to drop his opposition; Wang finally consented to Ch'en's inclusion only after Mao's personal intervention. See Ssu-ma Pu-p'ing, *op. cit.* (part 5), 82 (16 March 1977), p. 38.
- 54 These include P'an Fu-sheng, chairman of the Heilungkiang Revolutionary Committee, Wang Hsiao-yu, chairman of the Shangtung Revolutionary Committee, Liu K'o-p'ing, chairman of the Shansi Revolutionary Committee, Li Ts'ai-han, chairman of the Kweichow Revolutionary Committee, Li Yuan, chairman of the Hunan Revolutionary Committee, and Liu Chieh-t'ing and Chang Hsi-t'ing, vice-chairmen of the Szechuan Revolutionary Committee.
- 55 When the Shanghai CCP Committee was set up in January 1971, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao was made first secretary, Yao Wen-yan second secretary, Wang Hung-wen, Hsu Ching-hsien, Ma T'ien-shui, Wang Hsiu-chen (F), and Chou Chun-lin secretaries.
- 56 When Mao and Lin clashed in the Lushan Plenum in August 1970, reportedly over 100 Central Committee members supported Lin. The Shanghai leaders were solidly behind Mao, and Wang Nung-wen was particularly outspoken in opposition to Lin Piao, according to Ssu-ma P'u-p'ing, *op. cit.* (part 5), 82 (16 March 1977), p. 38. For examinations of the Mao-Lin struggle, see Michael Y. M. Kau ed., *The Lin Piao Affair* (White Plains, N.Y.: International Arts and Sciences Press, 1975), Introduction; and Philip Bridgham, 'The Fall of Lin Piao', *CQ*, 55 (1973), pp. 429-49.
- 57 Lin's followers, Wang Wei-kuo (an alternate Central Committee member), Li Wei-hsin and Chiang Teng-chiao, were commanding officers of air force units in Shanghai and also held positions in the Shanghai Garrison.
- 58 See 'Outline of "Project 571"', in Kau, *op. cit.*, pp. 88, 90-5.
- 59 Shanghai had 12 representatives in the 1973 Central Committee; they were Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Chang Wei-min, Chin Tsu-min, Chou Chun-lin, Chou Hung-pao, Chou Li-chin (F), Chu Chia-yao, Hsu Ching-hsien, Ma T'ien-hsui, Wang Hsiu-chan (F), Wang Hung-wen and Yao Wen-yuan; all of them except Chou Chun-lin, commander of the Shanghai Garrison since 1971, and Chou Li-chin, have been purged. Three other Shanghai functionaries, Feng Ping-teh, Wang Hsiang-chun (F), and Yang Fu-chen (F) (who was previously a full member) were elected alternate members.
- 60 Chang, *Power and Policy in China*, pp. 80-99, 180-1.

4. WYLIE: SHANGHAI DOCKERS IN THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

- 1 That is, 'proletarian' in a descriptive sense, if not in the Marxist theoretical sense that the original Chinese term implies.
- 2 A recent study of the Cultural Revolution in Shanghai which attempts an interpretative reassessment of the movement is Andrew G. Walder, *Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and Shanghai's January Revolution*, Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies, 32 (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, 1978). All references to Walder's monograph in this article are to the original mimeographed manuscript, which the author generously sent to me prior to its formal publication.
- 3 A pioneering attempt to analyse interest groups in China during the Cultural Revolution is Michel Oksenberg, 'Occupational Groups in Chinese Society and the Cultural Revolution', Michel Oksenberg *et al.*, *The Cultural Revolution: 1967 in Review*, Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies, 2 (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, 1968), pp. 1-44. An early study of the Cultural Revolution in Shanghai is Neale Hunter, *Shanghai Journal: An Eyewitness Account of the Cultural Revolution* (New York: Praeger, 1969). Also see Lynn T. White III, 'Shanghai's Polity in Cultural Revolution', in John W. Lewis ed., *The City in Communist China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971), pp. 325-70.
- 4 For a brief official account of the political role of the Shanghai dockworkers prior to 1949, see Ch'en Kang, *Shang-hai kang ma-t'ou ti pien-ch'ien* (*The Transformation of the Shanghai Docks*) (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House, 1966). This useful account has been translated in *Chinese Sociology and Anthropology*, 5, 3 (spring 1973) and 7, 2 (winter 1974-5); and in Stephen Andors ed., *Workers and Workplaces in Revolutionary China* (White Plains, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1977). The reference cited here is to pp. 76-84 in the Andors text, which is the version used throughout this paper. The symbolic role of the Shanghai dockworkers in China today is well illustrated by the new 'revolutionary' Peking opera, *On the Docks* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1973). Regardless of the opera's artistic merits, it was vigorously promoted in the Chinese mass media during the Cultural Revolution. For example, see Revolutionary Rebel Detachment of the Workers of the Fifth Loading and Unloading District, Shanghai Harbour Bureau, 'Dockers Have Ascended the Dramatic Stage', *HC*, 1967, 9, pp. 36-7. Translated in *JPRS*, 42168, pp. 14-17.
- 5 This figure is the author's estimate based on statistical figures from my interview notes, the accounts provided by Hunter and Tannebaum (n. 6 below), and the official study by Ch'en Kang (n. 4 above). For more precise figures, see n. 11 and n. 12 following.
- 6 See, for example, Neale Hunter, 'Port in a Storm', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 22 June 1967, pp. 663-4, 667; and Gerald Tannebaum, 'How the Shanghai Workers Took Over Their Wharves', *Eastern Horizon*, July 1967, pp. 6-17. (Other brief reports appeared in various Western news-

- papers.) I was able to visit the Fifth District in March 1967, just as the docks were settling down after the 'January Revolution'. Unless otherwise noted, information on the Fifth District in this article is based on my interviews with the new Revolutionary Committee which was then running the pier. Accounts of the Fifth District in the Chinese press will be referred to later on in this article, and need not be cited here.
- 7 Andors, *op. cit.*, p. xxix.
 - 8 For several leftist writers, the Fifth District represents a unique microcosm of the Cultural Revolution. Tannebaum (*op. cit.*, p. 17) declares that the story of the workers in this district, 'which is typical in so many respects, expresses the world-wide significance of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution'. For others, the young rebel leaders of the Fifth District 'represent the true rationale of the Cultural Revolution and the fulfilment of its purpose'. See David Milton and Nancy Dall Milton, *The Wind Will Not Subside: Years in Revolutionary China, 1964–1969* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1976), p. 262.
 - 9 Basic information on the organization of China's shipping industry is in Audrey Donnithorne, *China's Economic System* (New York: Praeger, 1967), pp. 262–5. For Shanghai in particular, a good deal of useful material can be found in the official account by Ch'en Kang cited in n. 4 above. For an official sketch map of the Shanghai harbour, and a further useful source of technical information on the port, see p. 124.
 - 10 For an official account of the dockers' working- and living-conditions prior to 1949, see Ch'en Kang, Andors, *op. cit.*, pp. 39–60.
 - 11 The figure for Shanghai's total tonnage in 1965 (14.424 million tons) is taken from Ch'en Kang, Andors, *op. cit.*, p. 116. The figure for the Fifth District (3 million tons) is from my personal notes, and is also mentioned in Tannebaum, *op. cit.*, p. 6. In addition, I was told that in 1966 the daily average of freight handled in the Fifth District was 8,500 tons.
 - 12 Both my notes and Hunter's account ('Port in a Storm', p. 663) give employee figures of 2,500 for the Fifth District; Tannebaum (*op. cit.*, p. 9) cites a figure of 2,400. It is assumed that this number (2,400–2,500) represents the total of regular, full-time employees and relatively permanent contract workers, but not of short-term, temporary labour brought in at peak periods only. Both my notes and Tannebaum (*op. cit.*, p. 6) give the level of mechanization in the Fifth District as 78%, while Ch'en Kang (Andors, *op. cit.*, p. 115) claims that as of 1965 the Shanghai harbour had an average level of mechanization of 75%, with more than 2,000 machines operating throughout the harbour.
 - 13 For an official account of the dockers' living-conditions since 1949, see Ch'en Kang, Andors, *op. cit.*, pp. 120–37.
 - 14 On worker allocation and types of employment in Chinese industry, see Charles Hoffman, *The Chinese Worker* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1974), pp. 62–92. For a useful overview of working-conditions in Chinese industry in the 1960s, see Christopher Howe, 'Labour Organization and Incentives in Industry, Before and After the

- Cultural Revolution', in Stuart R. Schram ed., *Authority, Participation and Cultural Change in China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 233-56.
- 15 The full text of the *ta-tzu-pao* written by Nieh Yuan-tzu and her colleagues at Peking University is in *PR*, 9 Sept. 1966, pp. 19-20. The figure of 10,000 *ta-tzu-pao* is probably a nicely rounded exaggeration, but the general point of worker enthusiasm in this regard is well taken.
 - 16 The phenomenon of 'guilt by association' is a common feature of both traditional and communist China. During the increasingly doctrinaire atmosphere of the Cultural Revolution, Party cadres and ordinary workers alike avoided contact with 'problem cases' within their ranks. When some 32 dockers in the Fifth District were publicly labelled as 'counter-revolutionaries' in the early stages of the movement, they found themselves effectively ostracized by their workmates, most of whom feared to be seen in public with them.
 - 17 This passage is cited by Bruce McFarlane, who interviewed the Revolutionary Committee of the Fifth District in the spring of 1968. See E. L. Wheelwright and Bruce McFarlane, *The Chinese Road to Socialism: Economics of the Cultural Revolution* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), pp. 69-70.
 - 18 These accusations are no doubt partly valid, but they are somewhat exaggerated, and this probably irritated the cadres and senior workers. Ch'en Kang, for example, claims that 'many' (i.e. not all) leading cadres on the docks 'regularly participate' in labour, and this is probably true. (Ch'en Kang, Andors, *op. cit.*, p. 124.) Regarding salary levels, the Revolutionary Committee in the Fifth District told McFarlane that the 'bosses here got one to two times the wage of ordinary workers'. Even by Chinese egalitarian standards, this differential is not out of line, but nevertheless, it was pointed out that 'since the Cultural Revolution these irrational salaries have been cut'. (Wheelwright and McFarlane, *op. cit.*, p. 70.)
 - 19 Mao Tse-tung, in fact, was not above utilizing his own personality cult in order to legitimize the anti-establishment feelings among this young and restless stratum of the population. In a conversation with Edgar Snow on 10 December 1970, Mao remarked (in Snow's paraphrase) that 'there was need for more personality cult, in order to stimulate the masses to dismantle the anti-Mao Party bureaucracy'. See Edgar Snow, *The Long Revolution* (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 169.
 - 20 Christopher Howe, *Wage Patterns and Wage Policy in Modern China, 1919-1972* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 152-3.
 - 21 In the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, it is likely that few workers had any clear idea of general wage policies in China. As the movement wore on, however, official Party policies in several sectors of the economy came under general criticism; for example, the Maoist centre in Peking responded to worker sentiment by condemning the entire system of contract and temporary labour. For further details, see

- the minutes of a meeting between worker representatives and the Central Cultural Revolution Group (26 December 1966), in Chung Hua-min and Arthur C. Miller, *Madame Mao: A Profile of Chiang Ch'ing* (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1968), pp. 234–42.
- 22 For a full discussion of various incentive schemes used in Chinese industry, see Hoffman, *op. cit.*, pp. 93–122; and Howe, *Wage Patterns*, pp. 118–51.
- 23 On the substantial differences in material benefits between regular employees and contract and temporary workers, see Lynn T. White III, 'Workers' Politics in Shanghai', *Journal of Asian Studies*, 36 (November 1976), pp. 108–14.
- 24 According to Ch'en Kang (Andors, *op. cit.*, p. 126), there were more than 4,000 retired dock-workers in Shanghai as of 1964. It is not known what role, if any, they played in the Cultural Revolution, although they doubtless were interested in seeing their own economic interests furthered in the name of correcting 'unreasonable practices'.
- 25 This incident was related to Bruce McFarlane in the spring of 1968 during his visit to the Shanghai harbour. See Wheelwright and McFarlane, *op. cit.*, pp. 118–19.
- 26 This accords with Andrew Walder's conclusion regarding the Shanghai MPC, who were highly concerned about the possible damage to the city's economy that might result if the workers were brought into the Cultural Revolution. Walder argues that while the actions of the MPC were not highly 'repressive' of the workers' political initiatives, mayor Ts'ao Ti-ch'in's insistence on 'established Party procedures' was a 'stereotype of the unresponsive bureaucrat . . . [and] . . . in the eyes of the dissidents, the hallmark of revisionist leadership'. See Walder, *op. cit.*, pp. 59–60. In politics, of course, perceptions often determine behaviour, even if they are not in themselves 'realistic'.
- 27 The sealing off of individual work units was a common practice of the work teams throughout China during the Cultural Revolution. For details of a similar attempt at the Peking First Foreign Languages Institute, see Milton and Milton, *op. cit.*, pp. 133–4.
- 28 For details on the work team in the Fifth District, see Wheelwright and McFarlane, *op. cit.*, pp. 118–19. For a discussion of Mao's 'leader-centred conception of the Party' and other relevant issues, see Stuart R. Schram, 'The Party in Chinese Communist Ideology', in John W. Lewis ed., *Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 170–202.
- 29 The increasing political assertiveness of the rebels (whether students or workers) is of great importance in understanding the Cultural Revolution. The rebels' attitude on this issue was nicely summarized in late 1967 by a member of Shanghai's new Municipal Revolutionary Committee. He told Joan Robinson that the 'general meaning' of Mao Tse-tung's famous *ta-tzu-pao* of 5 August 1966 ('Bombard the Headquarters') was perfectly clear: 'Mao Tse-tung's line was to have faith in

- the masses, to respect their initiative, and to accept the risk of disturbances without timidity.' See Joan Robinson, *The Cultural Revolution in China* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1969), p. 55. For Mao's own advice to senior officials on this sensitive issue, see his 'Talk at the Report Meeting' (24 October 1966), in Stuart Schram ed., *Chairman Mao Talks to the People* (Talks and Letters: 1956–1971) (New York: Pantheon Press, 1974), pp. 264–9.
- 30 It should be emphasized that these three classifications are not rigid, for a good deal of crossover occurred as the Cultural Revolution developed. Nonetheless, these three distinctive groups did persist right until the end of the movement, although their specific membership lists probably changed somewhat.
- 31 The text of Mao's *ta-tzu-pao* of 5 August 1966 is in K. Fan ed., *Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao: Post-Revolutionary Writings* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1972), pp. 279–80.
- 32 In its important resolution of 8 August 1966 (the 'Sixteen Points'), the Central Committee spelled out the end of the work teams by declaring that, in the Cultural Revolution, 'the only method is for the masses to liberate themselves, and any method of doing things on their behalf must not be used' (Point 4). Full Chinese and English texts of this resolution are in *CCP Documents of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, 1966–1967* (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1968), pp. 33–54. In the Fifth District, a modified work team continued to function under the new designation of 'liaison team', but its authority was effectively destroyed by the Central Committee resolution.
- 33 In fact, the Party Committee in the Fifth District was able to recruit several of the more militant workers to join this new Red Guard organization, including some future members of the Revolutionary Committee. Eventually, however, these embryonic rebels were expelled from the Red Guards because of their growing criticism of the direction of the Cultural Revolution on the docks.
- 34 These rather drastic 'sentences' are possibly exaggerated, but they were mentioned in an official source. See 'Shanghai Workers Play Vanguard Role in Cultural Revolution', *PR*, 1968, 8, p. 19.
- 35 There is little doubt that many young, aspiring members of the industrial political elite saw in the Cultural Revolution an opportunity to advance their own interests. In light of the tremendous shake up in Shanghai politics as a result of the fall of the Gang of Four in 1976, however, it is uncertain if those who rose in the Party hierarchy during 1966–7 can maintain their positions. On the current attitudes of the new leadership, see the speech by Wang Yi-p'ing, vice-chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee, 'How the Gang of Four Used Shanghai as a Base to Usurp Party and State Power', *PR*, 1977, 6, pp. 5–10. For some of the Gang of Four's alleged misdeeds in the field of maritime transport, see *PR*, 1977, 9, pp. 17–19.
- 36 Based on an official account by Chu Yung-chia, a member of the

- Shanghai MPC, to a group of visiting Americans. See Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, *China! Inside the People's Republic* (New York: Bantam Books, 1972), p. 89.
- 37 For details of the 'Anting Incident', see Hunter, *Shanghai Journal*, pp. 132–51.
- 38 The Scarlet Guards in the Fifth District of the docks were, of course, part of the huge city-wide organization of the same name. On the emergence and later disintegration of the Scarlet Guards, see Hunter, *Shanghai Journal*, pp. 167–72, 191–209. Until their demise in late 1966, the moderate Scarlet Guards greatly outnumbered the more radical Workers Rebels throughout the city. Walder is probably correct in suggesting that the Scarlet Guards were not simply a 'tool of the MPC', but he does concede that they were 'sympathetic to the MPC's position'. (Walder, *op. cit.*, pp. 62, 66.) Certainly, in the case of the Fifth District, the Party Committee and the Scarlet Guards were highly supportive of each other until they were both discredited by the Maoist centre in the closing days of 1966.
- 39 The relevant document is the 'Urgent Directive' issued jointly by the Military Commission and the Central Committee on 5 October 1966. Full Chinese and English texts of this document are in *CCP Documents*, pp. 87–92. The Shanghai MPC and its subordinate branches were able to procrastinate on this directive until mid-December, when the growing rebel organizations throughout the city decided to force the issue. For more details, see Hunter, *Shanghai Journal*, pp. 111–31.
- 40 The 'four clean-ups' movement, formally designated the Socialist Education Movement, was launched in 1962 to rectify the Party administration. By 1965 it had faltered in the cities, and was supplanted by the Cultural Revolution. For more information, see Richard Baum, 'Revolution and Reaction in the Chinese Countryside: The Socialist Education Movement in Cultural Revolutionary Perspective', *CQ*, 38 (1969), pp. 92–119.
- 41 For details on the violent conflicts between rebel and moderate factions among the Shanghai workers, see Hunter, *Shanghai Journal*, pp. 191–205.
- 42 The four demands of the rebel dockers were the following: (1) The Party secretary should confess his 'intrigues and duplicity' to all three shifts on the wharf; (2) The Party Committee should announce publicly the complete 'rehabilitation' of the members of the Rebel Detachment; (3) The Party Committee should admit that the rebels' sealing of the offices containing the 'black material' was a 'revolutionary action'; (4) The Party Committee should acknowledge that its action in surrounding the rebels with 'deceived workers' was an attempt to 'instigate masses to fight masses', and the Committee should accept responsibility if anything like this were to happen again. Also see Tannebaum, *op. cit.*, p. 11.
- 43 As Lynn White has correctly surmised, the Scarlet Guards collapsed after they realized that the Workers Rebels were receiving strong support from

- the Maoist centre in Peking. Later, when it became inescapable that the centre was also backing Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, most of the moderate organizations gradually declined. White, 'Shanghai's Polity', p. 353.
- 44 This 50% figure was provided by the new Revolutionary Committee whom I interviewed. Hunter ('Port in a Storm', p. 663) also mentions this 50 per cent figure.
- 45 One is reminded of Craine Brinton's comments on the increasing destructiveness of revolutions as they develop: 'The intricate pre-revolutionary network of customary interactions among individuals . . . is temporarily all torn apart. John Jones, the man in the street, the ordinary man, is left floundering.' Likewise, many of the ordinary dockers and cadres in Shanghai were increasingly bewildered as the Cultural Revolution progressed in ever more radical directions. See Craine Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution* (rev. edn) (New York: Vintage Books, 1965), pp. 255–6.
- 46 This estimate of the decline in production was made in an official account, 'Storm in the Port of Shanghai', *CR* 1967, 4, pp. 29–31. The daily figures were given to Joan Robinson by a member of the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee in November 1967. See Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 60.
- 47 In a later study, Evelyn Anderson reflected this interpretation by stressing that the workers' strike action in Shanghai was directed primarily 'against the harsh living and working conditions of the workers' own everyday existence'. See this and other comments in her article, 'Shanghai: The Masses Unleashed', *Problems of Communism*, Jan.–Feb. 1968, pp. 12–21.
- 48 Victor Nee, 'Revolution and Bureaucracy: Shanghai in the Cultural Revolution', in Victor Nee and James Peck eds., *China's Uninterrupted Revolution (From 1840 to the Present)* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975), p. 332. This is a standard left interpretation, and is the one officially espoused by the Chinese. See also Gerald Tannebaum, 'The 1967 Shanghai January Revolution Recounted', *Eastern Horizon*, May–June 1968, pp. 12–13.
- 49 On this point, see Milton and Milton, *op. cit.*, p. 261. For a list of various colourful worker groups in the Shanghai harbour prior to 1949 (e.g., 'Five Tigers and One Leopard'), see Ch'en Kang, Andors, *op. cit.*, p. 65.
- 50 On the importance of December as an accounting month, and the implications of this for 'economism', see Jean Esmein, *The Chinese Cultural Revolution* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1973), p. 172.
- 51 This claim is made in 'Storm in the Port of Shanghai', p. 16.
- 52 It is therefore all the more disappointing to see new works of historical synthesis appear that still place the lion's share of blame for 'economism' on the Party officials in Shanghai. See, for example, Maurice Meisner, *Mao's China: A History of the People's Republic* (New York: The Free Press, 1977), pp. 321–2.
- 53 As the Cultural Revolution developed in Shanghai, there was an interest-

ing escalation in the amount of damage to the economy which was deemed acceptable by the rebels. Initially, they maintained that the Cultural Revolution would lead to an increase in production in the short term; later, economic dislocation amounting to some 10–20 per cent of production came to be regarded as inevitable until such time as the MPC was overthrown. On this point, the author's own recollections are confirmed in Hunter (*Shanghai Journal*, p. 296), who refers to a figure of 10%, with some degree of variation. By late December 1966, however, production in Shanghai had fallen much lower than the rebels had anticipated, and they became genuinely concerned with restoring it as soon as possible.

- 54 As we have seen (n. 21 above), the Maoist authorities in Peking had suggested as much by condemning the use of contract labour, and ordering the disbursement of back-pay and other economic benefits to the disgruntled workers. Judging from the experience of the Shanghai dock-workers, one must question the Miltons' conclusion that it was their 'revolutionary consciousness which distinguished the Shanghai workers' movement from the interest-oriented struggle of the nation's contract workers'. Milton and Milton, *op. cit.*, pp. 193–4.
- 55 Futan and Chiaot'ung Universities were among the most influential rebel strongholds in Shanghai, and they played an important role in the Cultural Revolution in the city. While the rebel students at Futan eventually ran foul of Chang Ch'un-ch'iao in late January 1967, the 'All the Way' rebels at Chiaot'ung emerged as Chang's strongest supporters among the city's students. For more information, see Neale Hunter, 'All-the-Way Rebels', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 3 Aug. 1967, pp. 245–8. Apparently, this university–harbour interaction is long-standing. Ch'en Kang, for example, claims that in 1947–8, 'hoodlums' from the Shanghai docks harassed dissident students at T'ungchi and Chioat'ung Universities, and even invaded the campuses and beat up the students. See Ch'en Kang, Andors, *op. cit.*, p. 69.
- 56 Anderson, *op. cit.*, p. 16, refers to the student and army units who helped relieve the congestion in the docks as 'strike-breakers', as does Walder, *op. cit.*, p. 106–7. However, this is a much too simplistic characterization of the role of the students and soldiers in the context of the Cultural Revolution.
- 57 The figure of 100 *yuan* in 'retroactive pay' is mentioned in 'Storm in the Port of Shanghai', p. 19. The figure of 3,000 *yuan* is taken from Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 59, although it does not refer specifically to the dock-workers.
- 58 The complete text of this 'Message' is in *PR*, 1967, 13, pp. 5–7.
- 59 See 'Talk by Chang Ch'un-ch'iao to the Anhwei Delegation' (22 July 1967), in David Milton, Nancy Milton, and Franz Schurmann eds., *People's China: Social Experimentation, Politics, Entry onto the World Scene, 1966 through 1972* (New York: Random House, 1974), pp. 301–2.
- 60 For the full text of this 'Urgent Notice', see *PR*, 1967, 4, pp. 7–9.

- 61 These figures would indicate that in early January production levels in the Fifth District fell to less than 25% of normal capacity, or well below the two-thirds decline previously cited for the Shanghai harbour as a whole. Indeed, there is little doubt that the Cultural Revolution followed a stormier course in the Fifth District than elsewhere on the docks.
- 62 Chang, 'Anhui Delegation', Milton, *People's China*, p. 302.
- 63 It is surprising that these cadres continued to defy the rebels, for in the weeks following the overthrow of the Shanghai MPC in early January 1967, the streets were filled with errant cadres being publicly humiliated by the victorious rebels. The downcast cadres were even scrutinized on television, and some were actually driven to suicide during this trying period. This public humiliation of the deposed officials was later denounced by the Maoists in Peking, but by then much of the damage had already been done. For further details, see Hunter, *Shanghai Journal*, pp. 206–15.
- 64 For the Chinese and English texts of this message, see *CCP Documents*, pp. 155–8.
- 65 The formal 'seizure of power' on 17 January was apparently in response to a cable from the Central Committee praising the Workers Headquarters for its 'Urgent Notice' of 9 January calling for resolute opposition to the spread of 'economism'.
- 66 For a discussion of the Paris Commune and its short-lived counterpart in Shanghai, see John Bryan Starr, 'Revolution in Retrospect: The Paris Commune Through Chinese Eyes', *CQ*, 49 (1974), pp. 106–25.
- 67 Ch'en Kang, Andors, *op. cit.*, pp. 120–1.
- 68 According to Chang Ch'un-ch'iao himself, certain rebel groups were so alienated at the time that they established their own 'New Shanghai People's Commune' in defiance of the one previously set up under Chang's personal leadership. See Chang, 'Anhui Delegation', Milton, *People's China*, pp. 303–4.
- 69 For a useful survey of this confused period between the commune and the Municipal Revolutionary Committee, see Walder, *op. cit.*, pp. 111–16.
- 70 Even after the establishment of the new Revolutionary Committees in the harbour, it proved extremely difficult to rally the workers behind them. On this point, see Proletarian Revolutionaries of the Sixth Loading and Unloading District, Shanghai Harbour Bureau, 'It is Necessary to Topple Self-Interest in Order to Realize the Great Alliance of Revolutionaries', *Hai-kang chan-pao (Seaport Battle News)*, Shanghai. Reprinted with notes in *HC*, 1967, 11, pp. 36–9. Translated in *JPRS*, 42269, pp. 51–8. For some first-hand observations on the operation of the new revolutionary committee in the Tientsin harbour, see Maria Antonietta Macciocchi, *Daily Life in Revolutionary China* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), pp. 151–60.
- 71 Mao Tse-tung as quoted by Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, in K. S. Karol, *The Second Chinese Revolution* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1973, 1974), pp. 229–30. The original text of Chang's remarks is in a specialized col-

- lection of 'reference materials on the Cultural Revolution', *SCMP*, 4147. Also see Mao's comments in Schram, *Talks to the People*, pp. 277–9.
- 72 Walder, *op. cit.*, p. 148. Walder makes the sensible point that Chang's emphasis on restoring order in Shanghai did not necessarily contradict his own 'radical' brand of politics, but merely indicated his desire to prevent Shanghai from descending even further into social chaos. For an overview of the continuing unrest besetting Shanghai as the new Municipal Revolutionary Committee began to exercise power, see Vivienne B. Shue, 'Shanghai After the January Storm', *The Cultural Revolution in the Provinces*, Harvard East Asian Monographs, 42 (Cambridge, Mass.: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 1971), pp. 66–93.
- 73 This article was published in *JMJP*, 1 Feb. 1974. The text we have used is 'Be the Masters of the Wharf, Not the Slaves of Tonnage: A Revolutionary Big-Character Poster from the Workers of the No. 5 Loading and Unloading District of the Shanghai Harbour Affairs Bureau', as translated in Andors, *op. cit.*, pp. 383–8. The passage cited is on p. 384.
- 74 *ibid.*, p. 383.
- 75 In 1973, the Chinese launched a major port expansion programme, described by one writer as 'the most significant attempt to upgrade transport infrastructure since the Great Leap'. Paul Strauss, 'What About the Ports?', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 1 Oct. 1976, pp. 48–9. For an official account, see Hsiang Jung, 'Ports of China', *PR*, 1977, 10, pp. 14–17.

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- 1 For examples, see Jurgen Domes, *China After the Cultural Revolution* (London: Hurst, 1977); Doak Barnett, *Uncertain Passage* (Washington: Brookings Institute, 1974), and Colina MacDougall, 'A Chinese Who's Who', *The Financial Times*, 15 March 1976.
- 2 Henceforth in order to avoid confusion, the events of 1966–9 will be referred to as the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR), as opposed to the more generalized notion of 'Cultural Revolution'.
- 3 Wang Yi-p'ing's speech to the 2nd National Conference on Learning from Tachai in Agriculture, in *PR*, 1977, 6, p. 5.
- 4 'Down with everything – the Gang of Four's scheme to sabotage the GPCR' in *PR*, 1977, 7, p. 10.
- 5 'The Gang of Four and the Trotskyites', *ibid.*
- 6 Speech at Shanghai Meeting for Party cadres, 27 October 1976, in *PR*, 1976, 45, p. 4.
- 7 'Rejoice at Shanghai's excellent situation', *JMJP*, 30 Oct. 1976, p. 1.
- 8 'How the Gang of Four used Shanghai as a base to usurp Party and State power', in *PR*, 1977, 6, pp. 5 ff.
- 9 See H. Gordon Skilling, 'Interest Groups and Communist Politics: An Introduction', in Skilling and Griffiths eds., *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 3.

- 10 Oksenberg, 'Occupational Groups in Chinese Society and the Cultural Revolution', in *The Cultural Revolution: 1967 in Review* Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies, 2 (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, 1968); and A. Liu, *Political Culture and Group Conflict in Communist China* (ABC-CL10, 1976).
- 11 Two extreme positions in this debate are to be found in Doak Barnett, *Cadres, Bureaucracy and Political Power in Communist China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), and Audrey Donnithorne, 'Central Economic Control' in Ruth Adams ed., *Contemporary China* (London, 1969), p. 151. A more recent statement of this debate is the discussion between Chang and Falkenheim in *Problems of Communism*, 21, 4, pp. 67 ff.
- 12 See Gluckman, Swatz and Tinker, in M. J. Swatz ed., *Local-level Politics* (Chicago, 1968).
- 13 See comments on p. 147.
- 14 See, for example, Barghoorn, 'Soviet Russia: Orthodoxy and Adaptiveness', in Pye and Verba eds., *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 450.
- 15 For example, in the 1975 Constitution of the People's Republic of China.
- 16 See, for example, 'The growth of Socialist new things through struggle', *JMJP*, 6 May 1974.
- 17 Chih Heng, 'Develop the Socialist New-born Things', *HC*, 1974, 12, p. 3.
- 18 'It is necessary to enforce the dictatorship of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie', *JMJP*, 10 February 1975.
- 19 Harry Harding, 'China: toward revolutionary pragmatism', in *Asian Survey*, 11, 1 (Jan. 1971), pp. 51 ff.
- 20 A major source for extracts from documents said to have been compiled by Teng, and criticisms of his 'programme', is *HHYPP*, 1976, 4, pp. 9-47. A summary of Teng's alleged line on education is in *Vento dell'est*, 41 (March 1976).
- 21 *HC*, 1976, 9, p. 22.
- 22 *NCNA*, 11 April 1976. Speech by Shih Shang-ying, deputy head of the Leadership Group of the Shanghai Militia Command.
- 23 See Tom Bowden and David S. G. Goodman, *China: The Politics of Public Security* (Conflict Study, 78), pp. 15 ff. on this debate.
- 24 On the debate on education, see D. I. Chambers, 'The 1975-1976 Debate over Higher Education Policy in the PRC', in *Comparative Education*, 13, 1 (March 1977), p. 3.
- 25 On this point, see Edwin A. Winckler, 'Policy Oscillations in the PRC: A Reply', in *CQ*, 68 (1977), pp. 735 ff., especially pp. 741 ff.
- 26 Stuart Schram, *Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974), Introduction, especially pp. 24 ff.
- 27 For an analysis of Chinese politics based on these cleavages, see David S. G. Goodman, 'China: the Politics of Succession', in *The World Today*, April 1977, p. 131.
- 28 See Table 5.1, in which an attempt has been made to categorize the

- members of the Politburo active between 1969 and 1976 in terms of these non-policy oriented cleavages, as an illustrative example.
- 29 For an extremely useful, if now somewhat dated, account of the anti-Confucian campaign, see Merle Goldmann, 'China's Anti-Confucian Campaign, 1973-74', in *CQ*, 63 (1975), p. 435.
- 30 Shanghai Radio, 4 July 1969.
- 31 *JMJP*, 24 May 1970.
- 32 'Thoroughly criticize the teachings of Confucius and Mencius' (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House, February 1971), translated in *SCMP*, 2nd series, 293.
- 33 Shanghai Radio, 19 August 1970.
- 34 See Bridgham, 'Mao's Cultural Revolution in 1967 - the struggle to seize power', in *CQ*, 34 (1968), p. 7.
- 35 Clearly not without some difficulty. A report on the third anniversary of the 'January Storm' noted that: 'Some muddle-headed comrades in our ranks claimed that without the leadership of the Party we still could have won victory in the struggle to seize power in the January Revolution, firmly held and properly exercised the power that had been taken over and carried out work just the same.' Shanghai Radio, 11 Jan. 1970.
- 36 *ibid.*, 18 Jan. 1971.
- 37 For reports on other provincial-level units see *PR*, 16 (1976).
- 38 *HHYPP*, 1976, 4, p. 10.
- 39 The full list of provinces to which Shanghai is reported to have sent educated youth is:
- | | | |
|----------|----------------|---------|
| Yunnan | Kirin | Kiangsi |
| Kweichow | Heilungkiang | Anhwei |
| Liàoning | Inner Mongolia | |
- 40 See, for example, report of Shanghai Radio, 3 Jan. 1971.
- 41 *ibid.*, 21 Dec. 1970.
- 42 Yunnan Radio, 11 Dec. 1970.
- 43 See, for example, Shanghai Radio, 13 March 1971.
- 44 The regulations for the congress were decided at a Shanghai Municipal Party Committee Meeting on 22 November 1972; *ibid.*, 25 Nov. 1972.
- 45 *ibid.*, 25 Jan. 1970.
- 46 For differences in militia, militia background and the debate, see Bowden and Goodman, *op. cit.*
- 47 *NCNA*, 18 March 1969.
- 48 For example, Chengtu Radio, 19 June 1976.
- 49 Shanghai Radio, 12 Sept. 1974.
- 50 'The Paris Commune and Workers' Armament', *HHYPP*, 1973, 1.
- 51 *JMJP*, 29 Sept. 1973.
- 52 *ibid.*, 10 April 1976.
- 53 Canton Radio, 19 Oct. 1974.
- 54 Hupeh Radio, 8 Nov. 1974.
- 55 Luttwak's comments on the Shanghai Machine Tools Plant are interesting: 'Seeing China Plain', in *Commentary*, Dec. 1976, p. 32.

- 56 *NCNA*, 2 Jan. 1976.
- 57 *NCNA*, 6 June 1974.
- 58 *SCMP*, 5753.
- 59 See Chambers, *op. cit.*
- 60 For example, Shanghai Radio, 1 Jan. 1970.
- 61 *NCNA*, 30 July 1970.
- 62 See Tom Bowden and David S. G. Goodman, 'The Heroes of Tien An Men', in *Journal for Defence Studies* (Dec. 1976), p. 20.
- 63 *PR*, 1976, 44, p. 18.
- 64 *NCNA*, 27 Feb. 1970.
- 65 *JMJP*, 11 Aug. 1976.
- 66 *WHP* and *CFJP*, 28 July 1970.
- 67 Shanghai Radio, 24 April 1970.
- 68 *JMJP*, 1 Feb. 1974.
- 69 *ibid.*, 16 Feb. 1974.
- 70 *ibid.*, 24 Feb. 1974.
- 71 Yunnan Radio, 6 July 1974.
- 72 e.g. in Hunan, Hunan Radio, 12 July 1974; and in Szechuan, Szechuan Radio, 16 July 1974.
- 73 Shanghai Radio, 9 July 1974.
- 74 *HHYPP*, 1974, 9, p. 53.
- 75 Shanghai Radio, 5 April 1970.
- 76 *WHP* and *CFJP*, 12 April 1970; Shanghai Radio, 11 April 1970.
- 77 Chin Feng, 'Get rid of the mentality of self-betittlement', *HHYPP*, 1974, 8, p. 35.
- 78 Shanghai Radio, 5 April 1972.
- 79 *ibid.*, 24 July 1975.
- 80 The leadership has been defined as the secretaries and deputy secretaries of the Party Committee, the chairman and vice-chairman of the Revolutionary Committee, and the commander of the Garrison District. For details see Table 5.2.
- 81 Lynn White III, 'Shanghai', in Edwin A Winckler ed., *A Provincial Handbook of China*, p. 42 (forthcoming).
- 82 Translated in *PR*, 1977, 6, p. 5.
- 83 Yang Jung-kuo, 'Confucius – a thinker who stubbornly upheld the slave system', in *JMJP*, 7 Aug. 1973, translated in *PR*, 1973, 41, p. 7.
- 84 Report of Shanghai Conference on Learning from Tachai in Agriculture, Shanghai Radio, 5 Dec. 1970.
- 85 *SCMP*, 5999.
- 86 *HHYPP*, 1975, 10, p. 10.
- 87 *JMJP*, 10 April 1976.
- 88 For an account of the significance of the public security issue during 1976, see Bowden and Goodman, 'The Heroes of Tien An Men'.
- 89 *Ming Pao* (Hong Kong), 27 Dec. 1976.
- 90 For example, Fukien Radio, 20 Dec. 1976.

The twelve were:

Yunnan	Fukien	Hopei
Kweichow	Chekiang	Kansu
Liaoning	Kiangsi	Chinghai
Szechuan	Anhui	Inner Mongolia

- 91 The reasoning is as follows: nine provinces have appointed new first Party secretaries since 9 October 1976. Of these one (Ningsia) was caused by the death of the incumbent; and four (Chinghai, Kiangsu, Chekiang and Kwangsi) were caused by the incumbents being posted elsewhere to similar positions of responsibility. It would be reasonable to believe that the remaining four appointments (in Heilungkiang, Kweichow, Yunnan and Kirin) were caused by the dismissal of the incumbents as part of a post-Gang-of-Four purge. However, since all four were pre-GPCR ‘power-holders’ and all, in terms of the non-policy-oriented cleavages within the leadership, were towards the moderate end of the political spectrum – e.g. Chia Ch’i-yun in Yunnan, who had been the pre-GPCR first Party secretary in Kweichow and purged during the GPCR – this seems unlikely. A more reasonable explanation is that they were removed because they had been, or were, unable to deal with the difficult situation. If the problems were serious enough it might well explain why these cadres were replaced before any disturbances were publicly reported. Assuming this to be the case, Heilungkiang and Kirin should be added to the list in n. 90 – Yunnan and Kweichow already having been listed.
- 92 In the summer of 1975 at the time of the labour troubles in Hangchow: see *What’s Happening on the Chinese Mainland*, 2, 17, p. 2.
- 93 Shanghai mentioned the following eight provinces as having received resettled educated youth during 1969/70:
- | | | |
|----------|----------------|--------------|
| Yunnan | Anhui | Heilungkiang |
| Kweichow | Liaoning | Kiangsi |
| Kirin | Inner Mongolia | |
- See reports in *SWB*, 7 Aug. 1970; 31 Dec. 1970; and 18 Jan 1971.
- 94 ‘On exercising all-round dictatorship over the bourgeoisie’, *HC*, 1975, 4 p. 3.
- 95 ‘On the social basis of the Lin Piao Anti-Party clique’, *HC*, 1975, 3, p. 20.
- 96 ‘Down with everything’, *PR*, 1977, 13, p. 13.
- 97 See the statement attributed to them: ‘Better a late proletarian train than a punctual capitalist one’, *PR*, 1976, 48, p. 16.
- 98 Report of forum on revolution in education, *NCNA*, 27 July 1970, and ‘Follow the example set by Tsinghua’, Shanghai Radio, 5 Aug. 1970.
- 99 *PR*, 1977, 12, p. 23.
- 100 ‘Li Jing-quan and the Southwest Region, 1958–1966: the life and “crimes” of a “local emperor”’; *CQ*, 81 (1980).
- 101 See, for example, *op. cit.*

- 102 See, for example, Alan Marsh, *Protest and Political Consciousness* (Sage, 1978); and 'Explorations in unorthodox political behaviour' (ECPR Workshop: Mannheim, 1973).

6. HOWE: INDUSTRIALIZATION UNDER CONDITIONS OF
LONG-RUN POPULATION STABILITY

- 1 A concise survey of the problems in poor countries and historical background is found in Gerald Breese, *Urbanization in Newly Developing Countries* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1966). Contemporary themes are also discussed in Raanen Weitz ed., *Urbanization in Developing Countries: Report on the Sixth Rehovot Conference* (New York: Praeger, 1973). Two important case studies published recently are, S. V. Sethuraman, *Jakarta: Urban Development and Employment* (Geneva: ILO, 1976); and H. Lubell, *Urban Development and Employment: The Prospects for Calcutta* (Geneva: ILO, 1976). For the study of Shanghai, analyses of the nature of metropolitanism, and of the relationships between regions and their urban structures are highly relevant. A major effort to look at China in this way is made in papers by Skinner, in G. William Skinner ed., *The City in Late Imperial China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1977).
- 2 Much interesting work has emerged on this theme from the Institute of Urban and Regional Development, University of California, Berkeley, in particular the Institute's Working Papers: 125, William Alonso, *The Question of City Size and National Policy* (1970); and 109, David Darwent, *Externality. Agglomeration Economies and City Size* (1970). A longstanding and original critic of conventional thinking on urban economics is Jane Jacobs, particularly in *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (London: Pelican, 1972), and *The Economy of Cities* (London: Pelican, 1972).
- 3 Wilbur R. Thompson, *A Preface to Urban Economics* (Baltimore: John Hopkins, 1968), chaps. 1 and 2.
- 4 Materials on Shanghai's post-1949 development are found everywhere in the national press and the city has a large office of the New China News Agency. At various times since 1949 six daily papers have been published in Shanghai of which the most important for this paper have been: *Chieh-fang jih-pao* (*Liberation Daily*) 1949-65; *Hsin-wen jih-pao* (*Daily News*) 1949-59; and *Wen-hui pao* (*Cultural Daily*) 1949-59. These papers carry full accounts of the annual economic plans and results, budget forecasts and results, city work reports and reports on the individual industrial, commercial, educational etc. sectors - usually reports given at major political meetings. For 1954-60 these reports are virtually complete.

Outstanding Shanghai journals with economic materials include *Ching-chi chou-pao* (*Economic Weekly*) 1949-54; *Shang-hai kung shang tzu-liao* (*Materials on Shanghai's Industry and Commerce*) 1951-2; *Shang-hai kung shang* (*Shanghai Industry and Commerce*) 1956-9; *Hsüeh-shu yüeh-k'an* (*Academic Monthly*) 1957-63.

- Several Chinese studies of Shanghai have been produced. Most deal qualitatively with specific subjects, but among surveys of the city, the following are particularly valuable: *Shang-hai chieh-fang yi-nien* (A year of Shanghai's Liberation) (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House, 1950); *Shang-hai chieh-fang shih-nien* (*Shanghai's Ten years of Liberation*) (Shanghai: Shanghai Literature Publishing House, 1960); Shang En-tai *et al.*, *Shang-hai ti-li ch'ien-hua* (*An Introduction to Shanghai's Geography*) (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House, 1974); and articles on Shanghai in *Chung-kuo ch'eng-shih ti-li tzu-liao hsüan-chi* (*Selected Materials on China's Urban Geography*) (Peking: The Commercial Press, 1959), pp. 59-88; in *Shen-chou chün-pien* (*Great Change in China*) (Hong Kong: Economic Reporter Publishing House, 1975), pp. 103-15, and in *Jin-min chü-goku*, 1974, 10, pp. 12-43.
- 5 *HWJP*, 8 Aug. 1956: Table 6.3.
 - 6 Many aspects of this story are analysed in Chang Kia-ngau, *The Inflationary Spiral* (New York: John Wiley, 1958). A rich source on raw material and foreign trade for the late 1940s is the Shanghai paper, *China Weekly Review*, especially issues published between 1946 and 1948.
 - 7 *China Weekly Review*, 5 July 1947.
 - 8 Details of annual levels of investment are cited in the sources to Table 6.7. Data on the capital output ratio are in *HWJP*, 28 Dec. 1957; and a 57% increase in the capital stock between 1952 and 1958 is reported in *Chung-kuo ch'eng-shih ti-li tzu-liao hsüan-chi*, p. 78. Other sources used are *NCNA*, 3 June 1959; *HWJP*, 1 Jan. 1959; *CFJP*, 11 Aug. 1956; *HWJP*, 23 Sept. 1957, and *CFJP*, 21 Sept. 1957.
 - 9 *CFJP*, 21 Sept. 1957; data on the total investment planned in industrial basic construction was given by Li Fu-ch'un in his *Report on the First Five Year Plan for the Development of the Economy of the People's Republic of China in 1953-1957* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1955).
 - 10 Data on emigration are reported and discussed in Howe (1971), chap. 2, especially Table 6.13.
 - 11 This is analysed in, Christopher Howe and Kenneth R. Walker, 'Mao the Economist', in Dick Wilson ed., *Mao Tse-tung in the Scales of History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 174-222.
 - 12 *WHP*, 17 Dec. 1953.
 - 13 *ibid.*, 11 March 1953; and *LTP*, 20 Nov. 1955.
 - 14 *HWJP*, 30 Sept. 1957.
 - 15 *CFJP*, 13 Jan. 1953, and 15 Jan. 1953.
 - 16 *ibid.*, 24 Jan. 1953.
 - 17 *JMJP*, 3 May 1955, and *CFJP*, 3 Aug. 1955.
 - 18 *CFJP*, 26 May 1955.
 - 19 Of the 26,000 industrial enterprises in Shanghai in 1956 only about 2,000 had more than 100 employees. Most of these would have been in the private sector prior to January 1956. In 1976 'small-scale' factories still accounted for 90% of all units. *HWJP*, 8 Aug. 1976, and *PR*, 1976, 4, p. 55.

- 20 *HWJP*, 8 Aug. 1956.
- 21 This section is based on Howe (1971), chap. 2.
- 22 *WHP*, 7 Jan. 1958.
- 23 *Chi-hua ching-chi* (Planned economy), 1958, 1, pp. 25–7.
- 24 This section is based largely on the plans, work reports and budgets for 1958–60. A major article on industry is, ‘Allow Shanghai’s industrial base to make a Great Leap’ *HHPYK*, 1958, 3, pp. 73–4. For the origins, progress and decline of the Leap, speeches by K’o Ch’ing-shih are always significant, notably his ‘Summing up speech’ at the Shanghai Municipal People’s Congress, *WHP*, 5 Sept. 1957; ‘Full steam ahead, accelerate the building of a socialist Shanghai’, *JMJP*, 25 Jan. 1958; ‘The Key to the Great Leap Forward’, *HHPYK*, 1958, 14, pp. 2–4; ‘The whole country must be taken as a chessboard’, *HHPYK*, 1959, 4, pp. 84–6; ‘K’o Ch’ing-shih’s Report’, *HHPYK*, 1959, 6, pp. 53–5; ‘Continuously raise the productivity of labour’, *HHPYK*, 1959, 9, pp. 142–6; ‘Speech to advanced producers’, *CFJP*, 22 Oct. 1959, and ‘Shanghai industry’s present tasks’, *NCNA*, 15 Feb. 1961.
- 25 *NCNA* report on ‘This year’s struggle in Shanghai to overcome raw material difficulties’, *HHPYK*, 1957, 8, p. 51; other materials on Shanghai investment in various provinces appear in ‘Shanghai helps six provinces to build industry’; in 1960 the city planned to invest 175 million *yuan* in coal and iron bases in east China, *CFJP*, 18 May 1960; *NCNA*, 27 March 1958.
- 26 Lardy, chap. 3.
- 27 K’o, who was first Party secretary in Shanghai from 1955, was appointed mayor in November 1958. For other information on the city’s political leadership see Lynn T. White III, ‘Leadership in Shanghai, 1955–69’, in Robert A. Scalapino ed., *Elites in the People’s Republic of China* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972), pp. 302–77.
- 28 A coherent analysis of the iron and steel campaign in Shanghai is found in M. Gardener Clark, *The Development of China’s Steel Industry and Soviet Technical Aid* (Ithaca, N.Y.: 1973). The evolution of the campaign can also be followed from the Shanghai press and New China News Agency Reports.
- 29 Christopher Howe, ‘The Supply and Administration of urban housing in Mainland China: the case of Shanghai’, *CQ*, 33 (1968), pp. 73–87. Data for 1959 and 1960 are in *CFJP*, 18 May 1960.
- 30 See especially *CFJP*, 24 Feb. 1962; *ibid.*, 27 Feb. 1962, and *ibid.*, 28 Feb. 1962.
- 31 *CFJP*, 17 Nov. 1962.
- 32 *ibid.*, 8 June 1962.
- 33 *ibid.*, 28 Dec. 1961; *ibid.*, 8 May 1963; *ibid.*, 20 Feb. 1963, and *ibid.*, 11 Nov. 1963.
- 34 This estimate is based on data in *ibid.*, 12 Aug. 1962.
- 35 *ibid.*, 25 Jan. 1963; *ibid.*, 30 Jan. 1963.
- 36 *ibid.*, 23 April 1964.

- 37 *ibid.*, 1 Oct. 1963; *ibid.*, 22 Feb. 1965, and *PR*, 1964, 41, pp. 19–22.
- 38 Alfred H. Usack, Jr. and James D. Egan, 'China's iron and steel industry', in Joint Economic Committee, *China: A Reassessment of the Economy* (Washington: 1975), p. 285; 12 July 1972; *NCNA*, 3 Oct. 1972; *NCNA*, 18 Dec. 1972; and William W. Clarke, 'China's Steel: the Key Link', *US China Business Review* (July–Aug. 1975), pp. 27–40.
- 39 This plant will have an initial capacity of three million, and a final of six million, metric tons of crude steel, i.e. it will more than double Shanghai's output. *JETRO China Newsletter*, 18 (1978) pp. 5–6.
- 40 Bohdan O. Szuprowicz, 'Electronics in China', *US China Business Review* (May–June 1976), pp. 21–42.
- 41 This section is largely based on The National Council for US–China Trade, *China's Petroleum Industry* (Washington: 1976).
- 42 *NCNA*, 30 Aug. 1975.
- 43 Banister, pp. 281–3; age structure for the Luwan District is reported in Paul E. Ivory and William R. Lavelly, 'Rustication, Demographic Change, and Development in Shanghai', *Asian Survey*, 1977, 5, pp. 440–55.
- 44 Banister, pp. 268–77.
- 45 *WHP*, 7 Jan. 1958.
- 46 Banister, p. 268.
- 47 Data on the net outflow of rusticated youths are collected in Thomas P. Bernstein, *Up to the Mountains and Down to the Villages* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), Table 5. These report an outflow 1965–74 of one million. In addition to this loss, however, we must take account of the outflow of skilled workers reported as totalling one million between 1950 and 1972. Taken with data for earlier years, I believe this must imply an annual outflow of at least 50,000 skilled and production workers between 1965 and 1974, a period in which the total population fell from about 6.2 to 5.7 million. It is not, I think, arguable that the one million workers sent out are included in the count of rusticated youths (or vice versa) since these categories of emigrants have always been considered separately. Howe (1971), p. 37; *NCNA*, 5 Nov. 1963; and *NCNA*, 23 Feb. 1975.
- 48 *SWB*, 1 Sept. 1973.
- 49 *Jin-min chü-goku*, 1974, 10, p. 37; *NCNA*, 1 Oct. 1972; and *NCNA*, 28 Dec. 1975.
- 50 *NCNA*, 11 July 1972; *ibid.*, 1 Oct. 1972.
- 51 *Directory of Scientific Research Institutes in the People's Republic of China* (Washington: National Council for US–China Trade, 1977–8).
- 52 S. Hollander, *The Sources of Increased Efficiency: A Study of Du Pont Rayon Plants* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965).
- 53 Tables 6.1 and 6.6.; *PR*, 1964, 41, p. 21, and *CR*, 1975, 10, p. 10.
- 54 *JMJJP*, 4 Feb. 1978.
- 55 Selig S. Harrison, *China, Oil, and Asia: Conflict Ahead?* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), especially figures 3 and 4.

7. ASH: THE QUEST FOR FOOD SELF-SUFFICIENCY

- 1 During February and November 1958, the boundaries of Shanghai were extended to embrace the fertile administrative district of Sungchiang and Ch'ungming Island. The consequent incorporation of ten countries added over three million rural inhabitants to Shanghai's total population and extended the arable area by over 340,000 hectares.
- 2 Data for the years 1975-7 have apparently not been published. See below, pp. 192-3.
- 3 Minor discrepancies in this and later tables are the result of converting from Chinese measures and rounding off.
- 4 It may seem puzzling that output should have been highest in a year often associated with natural disasters. Although the evidence is conflicting, there is no lack of support for the estimate shown in Table 7.1. For example, both Soochow and Sungchiang administrative districts (areas contiguous with Shanghai) reported rises in output in 1956. See also *CNP*, 15 Feb. 1957; *HWJP*, 15 Feb. 1957 and 28 Aug. 1957, and *CFJP*, 30 Aug. 1957.
- 5 The change was 'rational' not only in the sense that it brought the cropping pattern more into line with the suburbs' factor endowment, but also because it enabled peasant income to rise.
- 6 To the extent that grain supplies for Shanghai actually originated in Sungchiang, the estimates for 1949 and 1955-7 are not hypothetical.
- 7 But notice that the choice of 1957 as base year to some extent exaggerates the growth in grain output in new Shanghai before 1965, since 1958 was a bumper year, while production in 1957 was below average.
- 8 And on favourable terms: in July, 1963 the price of machinery for use in the suburbs fell by an average of 20% (*Current Background*, 4 July 1963).
- 9 *CFJP*, 18 Sept. 1973, cited in *She-hui chu-i hsin nung-ts'un* (*New Villages of Socialism*) (Shanghai: 1973). Also *SWB*, 20 Dec. 1972 and 23 Oct. 1974.
- 10 *HHYPP*, 1975, 10, p. 3. Consideration was also given to the mechanization of transplanting and paddy harvesting.
- 11 *ibid.*, p. 3. See also *She-hui chu-i hsin nung-ts'un*.
- 12 This figure refers to the entire arable area, not just the grain area. See *She-hui chu-i hsin nung-ts'un*.
- 13 For Teng Hsiao-p'ing's remarks, see *FBIS*, 10 Dec. 1974. Also US Senate, Joint Economic Committee, *China: A Reassessment of the Economy* (Washington, DC: US Printing Office, 1975), especially the essay by A. Erisman.
- 14 See, for example, *HHYPP*, 1974, 5, pp. 37-9; and *Pa-erh ta-tui kao-ch'an wen-ch'an ching-yen* ('August Second' Brigade and its Experience in Achieving High and Stable Output) (Shanghai: People's Publishing House, 1973).
- 15 For example, *SWB*, 16 Sept. 1970, 20 Jan. 1971, and 23 June 1971.
- 16 See also below, p. 198.
- 17 Thus, *CFJP*, 4 March 1955: in accordance with the special characteris-

- tics of the suburbs, ‘in developing agricultural production ... the important thing is not to produce food grains, cotton and such economic crops, but rather to promote large-scale vegetable production and animal husbandry (including poultry) in order to serve the city’.
- 18 The account that follows is based largely on *CFJP*, 12 Aug. 1956. But see also *HHPYK*, 1956, 15, pp. 168–9.
- 19 The State Vegetable Corporation had purchased their wholesale supplies from the peasants at the lower price.
- 20 *CFJP*, 12 Aug. 1956.
- 21 *ibid.*
- 22 *ibid.*, 1 Sept. 1956.
- 23 For example, *CFJP*, 11 Sept. 1956, reported an ‘extremely tense’ situation in the supplementary food markets of Shanghai.
- 24 Some idea of the huge volume of vegetable transactions at this time can be found in *CFJP*, 28 Oct. 1956.
- 25 *ibid.*, 23 Feb. 1957. On the importance of free markets, *HHJP*, 16 July 1957, is useful.
- 26 One of the earliest claims that self-sufficiency had been attained is contained in *HWJP*, 2 Oct. 1959. See also *Shang-hai chiao-ch’ü nung-yeh hsüeh Ta-chai*.
- 27 In 1975 Shanghai county alone had almost 3,700 hectares planted under vegetables. Even if this reflects more recent expansion, the close proximity of the county to the city would lead one to suppose that vegetable cultivation had always been important here. See *HHPYK*, 1975, 11, p. 6.
- 28 *CFJP*, 18 May 1960.
- 29 The urban per capita availability implied by this ‘minimum requirement’ is confirmed in *Shang-hai chiao-ch’ü nung-yeh hsüeh Ta-chai*.
- 30 Communication from Professor K. R. Walker.
- 31 The deficit increased by 17% between 1953 and 1957.
- 32 *CFJP*, 16 June 1955.
- 33 *ibid.* Sales in the first quarter of 1955 were 6.12% up on the last quarter of 1954 and 13.38% higher than in the first quarter of that year. Although sales fell off in spring, 1955, in April and May they were still 13.03% and 23.82% higher than in the same months of the previous year.
- 34 The situation was made worse by the attitude, common among some urban inhabitants, that because of Shanghai’s importance as an industrial centre, her grain supplies would always be met by the state. If this were true, ‘what does it matter if a bit extra grain gets used up?’ Or again: ‘I buy food with my own money and I’m entitled to dispose of it [the food] however I want – not according to the dictates of someone else.’ These quotations are taken from an article which throws fascinating light on the attitudes of many urban inhabitants of Shanghai towards calls for greater economy in grain consumption. See *CFJP*, 7 April 1955.

- 35 See, for example, *CFJP* throughout August 1955.
- 36 *CFJP*, 27 July 1955, states that in June 1955, grain sales were 14% below the level of the previous month.
- 37 One investigation revealed that during July–October, 1956 sales were 15.6% above those of the same period in 1955. *CFJP*, 18 Nov. 1956.
- 38 In 1971 Shanghai's grain deficit constituted about 38% of total grain imports into China. (Import data can be found in A. Erisman, 'China: Agriculture in the 1970s', in *China: A Reassessment of the Economy*.)
- 39 Table 7.8 shows that self-sufficiency had been achieved in 1957. But the total consumption figure is based on an unconfirmed per capita estimate which may really have been exceeded.
- 40 *HWJP*, 30 June 1959, talks of self-sufficiency in vegetable supplies having been basically achieved in the first half of 1959, with an average of 60,000 *tan* being marketed every day.
- 41 *WHP* (Hong Kong), 19 April 1963: according to this source, the problem 'is not the shortage of vegetables, but how to promote their sale'.
- 42 *TKP*, 16 June 1963, says that it was 27.8% below the level which had prevailed in April 1962.
- 43 *SWB*, 31 July 1968.
- 44 *ibid.*, 12 March 1975.
- 45 *ibid.*
- 46 See, for example, *CFJP*, 1 Sept. 1956. The proportion of the city's pork requirements coming from the suburbs was only 4% in 1954 and 10% (anticipated) in 1955 (*ibid.*, 14 April 1955).
- 47 The following figures indicate the size of Shanghai's pig population in the 1950s:

1951	29,000
1954	96,700
1955	157,000
1956	261,090

- (From data in *CFJP*, 11 Jan. 1955 and 4 March 1955, and *HWJP*, 15 Feb. 1957.) To put these figures into perspective, note that Shanghai consumed over 1,700,000 pigs in 1953 (*CFJP*, 4 March 1955).
- 48 In old Shanghai in 1956 there were 261,090 pigs (see above, n. 47). In new Shanghai in 1958 the number was estimated to be 1,160,000 (*TKP*, 1 July 1959).
- 49 *Shang-hai chiao-ch'ü nung-yeh hsüeh Ta-chai*. See also *Ta-li fa-chan yang-chu shih-yeh (Develop Pig-Breeding on a Large Scale)* (Peking: Agricultural Publishing 1974). The 1968 estimate is derived from information in *SWB*, 28 Oct. 1970.
- 50 See the data in n. 47.
- 51 *Shen-chou chü-pien (Great Changes in the Fatherland)* (Hong Kong: Economic Reporter, 1975).

52 *HHPYK*, 1957, 24, p. 63, gives the following information:

Pork consumption per head of urban population (kg)	
1953	13.91
1954	10.02
1955	7.10
1956	9.24
1957	9.58 (est.)

53 *HHYPP*, 1975, 1, p. 48.

54 *ibid.*, pp. 45-6.

55 The following figures show average annual consumption per head of urban population of beef, mutton and eggs in Shanghai (kg):

	Beef	Mutton	Eggs
1953	1.40	0.29	3.04
1954	0.73	0.26	2.39
1955	1.24	0.20	1.79
1956	1.27	0.46	2.82
1957	0.99 (est.)	0.26	2.81

(From *HHPYK*, 1957, 24, p. 63.)

56 See, for example, *SWB*, 15 Oct. 1969; 6 Jan. 1971; 22 March 1972; 10 Oct. 1973, and 30 Jan. 1974. A notable achievement also has been the attainment of a surplus of edible oil in Shanghai (self-sufficiency having apparently been achieved as early as 1964 or 1965): *ibid.*, 15 Jan. 1975.

57 *Shang-hai chiao-ch'ü nung-yeh hsüeh Ta-chai*.

58 US Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, *Current Economic Problems and the Prospects for 1985* (February 1978).

59 US Central Intelligence Agency, Feb. 1980.

60 *JMJP*, 25 Dec. 1976.

61 US Central Intelligence Agency Research Aid, *China: Agricultural Performance in 1975* (March 1976).

62 US Department of Agriculture, *People's Republic of China Agricultural Situation: Review of 1976 and Outlook for 1977* (Washington, D.C.: 1977).

63 From a report of 8 June 1972, we learn that the price index of non-staple foodstuffs was only 2.4% above its 1965 level. Grain and cotton prices have remained stable since 1949: *SWB*, 14 June 1972.

- 64 *She-hui chu-i hsin nung-ts'un*. The only income series I have found is for a commune in Sungchiang county:

Average per capita income (<i> yuan</i>)	
1970	120.5
1971	131.7
1972	148.4
1973	137.5

(From *HHYPP*, 1974, 5, p. 36.)

- 65 *SWB*, 4 Oct. 1972, cites a 90% rise since 1950.
- 66 Selling prices of chemical fertilizers, insecticides and diesel oil have been reduced by between one-third and two-thirds. *ibid*.
- 67 *CFJP*, 6 June, 1956. And Shang Ssu-ti, Su Chün-Kung and Shih Wen-pin eds., *Shang-hai ti-li chien-hua* (*A Simple Geography of Shanghai*) (Shanghai: 1974).
- 68 For an example in Ch'ing-p'u county, see *Shang-hai chiao-ch'ü nung-yeh hsüeh Ta-chai*.
- 69 *SWB*, 7 Nov. 1973, cites a 10% differential between rural and suburban industrial earnings.
- 70 An interesting account of the attractions of suburban industry is given in a case study of Ma Lu Commune (Chiating county) in *Shang-hai chiao-ch'ü nung-yeh hsüeh Ta-chai*.
- 71 See above, p. 208.
- 72 *Ch'üan-kuo nung-yeh hsüeh Ta-chai hsien-chin tien-hsing ching-yen hsüan-pien* (*Selected Representative Progressive Experience Throughout China in the Movement to Learn from Tachai*) (Peking: Peoples Publishing House, 1975). See also *HHYPP*, 1975, 10, p. 6.
- 73 *Shang-hai chiao-ch'ü nung-yeh hsüeh Ta-chai*.
- 74 *ibid*.
- 75 The grain and vegetable acreages are given in earlier tables; for cotton, see below p. 212. The arable area in 1957 would have been about 380,000 hectares; in the 1970s it was 365,000 hectares.
- 76 At the end of the *First Five Year Plan* Sungchiang had a cotton area of more than 100,000 hectares (see, for example, *Chung-kuo nung-yeh chi-chieh-hua wen-l'i*). In 1957 total production was 46,500 metric tons (*TKP*, 13 Nov. 1957).

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Cotton data for the suburbs of old Shanghai are as follows:

	Total output (metric tons)	Average yield (kg per ha)	Sown area (ha)
1949	1,190	141.37	8,360
1952	3,050		
1953	5,180		
1954	3,560	287.98	12,330
1955	7,670	546.04	14,000
1956	2,570	203.46	12,600
1957	5,000	392.03	12,600

Sources: 1955 sown area (*LTP*, 11 Oct. 1955) and average yield (*HWJP*, 16 Sept. 1955) give total output for this year. Then output for the other years, except 1949, is obtained from an index of total production given in *Nung-ts'un kung-tso p'ung-hsün (Rural Work Bulletin)*.

Yield data can be obtained from the following sources:

1954 *HWJP*, 16 Sept. 1955.

1956 *ibid.*, 28 Aug. 1957.

1957 *WHP*, 2 Oct. 1959 and *HWJP*, 23 Sept. 1959.

Information for 1949 is as follows: total output from *HHYP*, 1955, 4 p. 97. The average yield is given in *Nung-yeh chih-shih chiao-hsüeh ts'an-k'ao tzu-liao*.

Sown area is simply total output divided by yield.

- 77 *HHJP*, 30 Oct. 1955, does contain a preliminary cotton yield for Sungchiang Administrative District of about 900 kilograms a hectare. On Sungchiang's cotton area, this would have yielded a total output of about 90,000 tons – and when added to old Shanghai's own production, indicates a total output for putative new Shanghai of almost 100,000 tons. This is roughly the same as the highest recorded output in the 1960s and 1970s and is in excess of average production in recent years. However, the very high Sungchiang yield for 1955 remains unconfirmed; in any case, conditions in 1955 were exceptional, whereas a yield of 900 kilograms per hectare seems to have become normal in Shanghai since the later 1960s.
- 78 This loss probably reflects an increase in the area sown under oil crops as well as an absolute decline in farmland occasioned by water-conservation works, industrialization, new building projects . . . etc.
- 79 Thus, the average yield for 1968-70 was 1,009.8 kilograms/hectare, compared with 890.12 kilograms for 1972-4. Ideological factors associated with the Cultural Revolution may have been partly to blame for the slow-down in growth, but even more important is likely to have been a purely agronomic factor. If the experience of China was followed in Shanghai, we can assume that as grain production returned to its pre-crisis level of the early 1960s, so priority in the allocation of chemical fertilizers shifted towards cotton (see Chao Kang, *Agricultural Production in*

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- Communist China* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970), p. 159). If so, the rapid rise in cotton yields in Shanghai during the 1960s is quite acceptable. Thereafter the declining response to further applications of fertilizer, combined with non-economic factors, may have hindered continuing yield improvements. For further evidence on this last aspect, see J. C. Liu, *China's Fertilizer Economy* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1971), p. 120.
- 80 *CFJP*, 4 March 1955.
- 81 State Statistical Bureau, *Nung-yeh ho-tso-hua ho 1955-nien nung-yeh sheng-ch'an ho-tso-she shou-i fen-p'ei ti t'ung-chi tzu-liao (Agricultural Collectivization and the Distribution of Income in Agricultural Producers' Co-operatives in 1955: Statistical Materials)* (Peking: Statistical Publishing House, 1957).
- 82 For qualitative evidence attesting to the continuing attractions of vegetable cultivation, see *Shang-hai chiao-ch'ü nung-yeh hsüeh Ta-chai*.
- 83 *JMJP*, 25 Dec. 1976.
- 84 *Shang-hai chiao-ch'ü nung-yeh hsüeh Ta-chai*.
- 85 *ibid.*
- 86 *ibid.*
- 87 Seasonality has traditionally characterized the production of vegetables in Shanghai: in particular, January–February and July–August are months when vegetables have been in short supply. Some progress seems to have been made in overcoming such shortages, although the problem has not been entirely resolved. See *HHYPP*, 1973, 1.
- 88 See *HHYPP*, 1976, 6, pp. 61–3, for a good discussion of the problem of devising an appropriate price structure for vegetables. See also *SWB*, 12 Nov. 1975.
- 89 *KMJP*, 8 Dec. 1977, states that 60% of total income in the suburbs' ten counties derives from industrial enterprises.
- 90 From information given to me by Professor K. R. Walker.
- 91 See Statistics and Information Department, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, *Statistical Yearbook of Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 1976–77* (Tokyo: 1978).
- 92 *Shang-hai chiao-ch'ü nung-yeh hsüeh Ta-chai* contains some examples.
- 93 See, for example, *SWB*, 13 Dec. 1977.
- 94 See Christopher Howe, *China's Economy: A Basic Guide* (London: Paul Elek, 1978), p. 90.

8. REYNOLDS: CHANGES IN THE STANDARD OF LIVING OF
SHANGHAI INDUSTRIAL WORKERS, 1930–1973

- 1 Shanghai City Government Bureau of Social Affairs, *Standard of Living of Shanghai Labourers* (Shanghai, 1934), *passim*.
- 2 My estimate of 1956 rent is 5.3 times the 'Shanghai sample' rent: 41.70/7.73 (see Table 8.3). $(16.62/34.47) \times 5.3 = 2.57$.
- 3 Consumption of five goods declined, and wheat flour rose only 3.4%.

These six goods account for roughly 30% of 1930 spending, rice for 35%, and goods for which consumption markedly increased, for the remaining 35%. Assume the price of rice unchanged between 1930 and 1956, and calculate $P56/P30$ for each good in Table 8.3. The unweighted average of these relative prices is 1.91 for the first six goods versus 1.67 for the rest (excluding rice). The weighted average (using the severest test – 1956 prices and quantities from column 4 of Table 8.4) is 2.01 vs 1.42. Thus if we set rice aside, we can conclude that the prices of goods whose consumption increased between 1929 and 1956 fell relative to the prices of those goods whose consumption declined.

- 4 The methodologies underlying the figures 1.37 and 1.16 are conceptually equivalent to the calculation of a Laspeyres and a Paasche price index. For a discussion of the respective upward and downward biases of these indexes given these particular price and quantity shifts, see Robert Y. Awh, *Microeconomics* (New York: Wiley, 1976), p. 109.
- 5 1971: *PR*, 1971, 40, p. 14. Christopher Howe, *Wage Patterns and Wage Policy in Modern China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1973), p. 31, notes that this may over-estimate actual wages. 1975: New China News Agency, in *SWB*, 10 Dec. 1975 (Supplement).
- 6 Nai-ruenn Chen, *Chinese Economic Statistics* (Chicago: Aldine, 1967), pp. 472–4, gives 1956 production workers as 8.6 million and engineering and technical personnel as 0.45 million, or roughly 5%.
- 7 For all China, the 1956 differential was 8.8%; for Shanghai, 5.2%. Howe (1973), pp. 48–9.
- 8 Howe (1973), p. 40.
- 9 T. C. Liu, Alexander Eckstein, and others have taken this approach.
- 10 *Shang-hai kung-ch'ang lao-kung t'ung-chi* (1947), Table 12, p. 36, in Howe (1973), p. 25.
- 11 *Changes*, p. 7.
- 12 I price bicycles at 160 *yuan*, record players at 80 *yuan*, and other durables at 20 *yuan* per capita per year, and assume depreciation over 8 years.
- 13 Shanghai City Government, Bureau of Social Affairs, *Standard of Living of Shanghai Labourers* (Shanghai, 1934), p. 149 (henceforth cited as *Standard of Living*).
- 14 Christopher Howe, 'The Supply and Administration of Urban Housing in Mainland China: The Case of Shanghai', *CQ*, 33 (1968), p. 85.
- 15 One should note, again, that much of this improvement must have occurred in the pre-1949 period, given the estimates of Chao, Howe and Hollister that there was no increase and probably a decline in per capita living-area in Shanghai, 1949–56. See Howe (1968).
- 16 The following information was received at a briefing during a visit to the Fan-kua Lung (Pumpkin Land) workers' living-quarters in October 1973. See Bruce Reynolds, *Observations on the Chinese Economy* (notes on a

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- visit to the People's Republic of China by the Yale Economists Delegation, October 1973), pp. 49-51.
- 17 Shanghai Municipal Government, Bureau of Social Affairs, *Wage Rates in Shanghai* (Shanghai, 1935), Table 1.
 - 18 Feng-Hua-mah ed., *Ten Great Years: Statistics of the Economic and Cultural Achievements of the People's Republic of China*, compiled by the State Statistical Bureau, Peking (reprinted Bellingham: Western Washington State College Press, 1974), p. 149.
 - 19 Kallgren, p. 541.
 20. D. Perkins, *Market Control and Planning in Communist China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), pp. 185-92; C. Y. Cheng, *Income and Standard of Living in Mainland China* (Hong Kong: URI, 1957), pp. 352-61.
 - 21 Perkins, *op. cit.*, p. 158.
 - 22 *ibid.*, pp. 185-6.
 - 23 As can be demonstrated by indifference curve analysis.
 - 24 R. Munro, *Washington Post*, 11 Nov. 1977, and communications from T. Wiens and W. Parrish.

9. WHITE: SHANGHAI-SUBURB RELATIONS, 1949-1966

- 1 See Peter Hall, *The World Cities* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), p. 11.
- 2 Based on calculations from Etsuzō Ōnoe, 'Regional Distribution of Urban Population in China', *The Developing Economies*, 8, 1 (March 1970), p. 110, which reports from the 1953 census.
- 3 *KMJP*, 11 Jan. 1954. Also, Reuters, 13 August 1959. A figure of 8,500 persons per sq. km is given in *Ching hu ti-ch'ü tzu-liao mu-lu (Catalogue of Materials on the Nanking-Shanghai Area)* (Taipei: National Security Bureau, 1967), p. 20; this is in the broad range of the 4,138 persons per sq. km for all of Hong Kong, which is not a flat area (or also broadly consistent with 13,192 for Hong Kong Island only), reported orally for 1976 to the author by personnel of the Hong Kong Government Department of Census and Statistics. The extremely dense figure for central Shanghai is in line with similar cases elsewhere. The Mongkok district of Kowloon in 1976 contained 144,360 persons per sq. km. It is amazing, but such crushes do occur.
- 4 For a detailed study of the pre-1949 pattern of shipping along canals in the delta area, see Mantetsu, Chosabu (South Manchurian Railroad Company, Investigation Department), *Chū Shi no min-sen-gyō So-shū min-sen ji-tai chō-sa ho-koku (The Civilian Shipping Industry in Central China: An Investigation Report on Soochow Civilian Shipping)* (Tokyō: Hakubunkan, 1943).
- 5 Just a few examples: John W. Mellor, *The New Economics of Growth: A Strategy for India and the Developing World* (Ithaca: Cornell University

- Press, 1976); parts of Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); or practically any work by Wayne Cornelius. A new contribution will be Henry S. Bienen and Michael N. Danielson, *The Comparative Politics of Urban Development* (forthcoming).
- 6 Frederick W. Mote, 'The City in Traditional Chinese Civilization', in J. T. C. Liu and Wei-ming Tu eds., *Traditional China* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 48.
 - 7 Fei Hsiao-tung, *Peasant Life in China: A Field Study of Country Life in the Yangtze Valley* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1939). The whole debate is summarized, and continued, in Jack M. Potter, *Capitalism and the Chinese Peasant: Social and Economic Change in a Hong Kong Village* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 160-203; bibliographical references to various publications in the battle are on pp. 207-12.
 - 8 Potter, *Capitalism and the Chinese Peasant*; and Ramon H. Myers, *The Chinese Peasant Economy: Agricultural Development in Hopei and Shantung, 1890-1949* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).
 - 9 See Chalmers A. Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1937-1945* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), pp. 65-6, 129-31, for a description of sporadic Communist dominance in some delta areas. A model revolutionary opera, 'Shachiapang', concerned this marshland activity - which, however, was not crucial to the Red Army's victory in east China.
 - 10 The classic work on proletarian nationalism in Shanghai is Harold Isaacs, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951).
 - 11 See John W. Lewis, 'Political Aspects of Mobility in China's Urban Development', *American Political Science Review*, 60, 4 (1966), pp. 901-10.
 - 12 See Ezra F. Vogel, *Canton Under Communism: Programs and Politics in a Provincial Capital, 1949-1968* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 94ff.
 - 13 *LTP*, 18 March 1950.
 - 14 Report by Jao Shu-shih at the Second Session of the East China Military Administration Committee, Shanghai, 14 July 1950; see *Current Background*, 10. Land requisition was of three sorts: (1) *mo-shou*, or simple confiscation; (2) *cheng-shou*, relatively polite requisition, but without compensation; and (3) *cheng-kou*, requisition with payment. Warm thanks go to Prof. Edwin Moise for helping to clarify this speech by Jao Shu-shih.
 - 15 Jao Shu-shih, Report at Second Session of East China Military Administration Committee, Shanghai, 14 July 1950.
 - 16 *NCNA*, Peking, 21 Nov. 1950.

- 17 *Ch'eng-shih chiao-ch'ü t'u-ti kai-ko t'iao-lieh* (*Regulations for Land Reform in Urban Suburbs*) (Peking: New China Bookshop, 1950).
- 18 *ibid.*, pp. 8–10.
- 19 *ibid.*, pp. 4–5.
- 20 *Shanghai News*, 14 Feb. 1951.
- 21 Vogel, *Canton Under Communism*, pp. 91–121, is the best concise description of a Chinese land reform available anywhere.
- 22 *Shanghai News*, 28 March 1951.
- 23 *ibid.*, 8 May 1951.
- 24 *Shang-hai kung-shang tzu-liao* (*Materials on Shanghai on Shanghai Industry and Commerce*), 2, 36 (5 May 1951), p. 1303.
- 25 The taxes were percentages of a household's average annual income per capita, expressed in *catties* (*shih chin*) of grain. In November 1950, some sample *catty* weights (and tax percentages) were: 100 (0%), 500 (11%), ceiling tax for 3,112+ (42%). By October 1951, however, the lowest rates had been raised and the ceiling had been brought down: 100 (8%), 500 (14%), top tax for 2,000+ (30%). Compare *Shanghai Kung-Shang tsu-liao*, 2, 87 (31 Oct. 1951), p. 3153, with *Shanghai News*, 24 Nov. 1950).
- 26 A statistical summary of the results of land reform in Shanghai can be found in *Shanghai News*, 8 Dec. 1951.
- 27 *ibid.*, 8 May 1951.
- 28 *Shang-hai shih chiao nung-min chiao-yü wei-yüan-hui*, *HWJP*, 7 Jan. 1952.
- 29 *NCNA*, Shanghai, 4 Aug. 1953 and 22 Nov. 1954.
- 30 *CFJP*, 6 March 1952. Also *HWJP*, 11 Jan. 1952.
- 31 See Jon Sigurdson, 'Rural Industrialization in China', in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *China: A Reassessment of the Economy* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 411–14.
- 32 *Yi pao* (*Further News*) (Shanghai), 4 Jan. 1952.
- 33 *NCNA*, Shanghai, 20 May 1955.
- 34 *JMJP*, 11 Dec. 1953.
- 35 *CFJP*, 14 July 1954. For more information on other such grain networks in east China, see Lynn White III, 'Low Power: Small Enterprises in Shanghai, 1949–67', *CQ*, 69 (1978), pp. 45–76.
- 36 *NCNA*, Shanghai, 31 Oct. 1955.
- 37 *ibid.*, 14 Dec. 1954.
- 38 *ibid.*, 31 Oct. 1955.
- 39 *ibid.*, 8 April 1954.
- 40 See *Chang-wang* (*Prospect*) (Shanghai), 29 (30 July 1955), p. 27, on the model accountancy student Lu Shih-ken, a junior-middle graduate in Luhang near Shanghai. Lu held a 'B-grade People's Scholarship' (*yi-teng jen-min chü-hsüeh chin*) and used new skills to help his mutual aid team (*hu-chü-tsu*) increase its income. Lu's surname is included in the town name of Luhang, suggesting he might have been from a rich family, but he had been adopted into a local poor-peasant family named Ling after his father's death. Social mobility by adoption is an old story in China; by the 1950s it takes new forms.
- 41 *CFJP*, 14 Dec. 1954.

- 42 *LTP*, 11 Oct. 1955, and especially Thomas P. Bernstein, 'Cadre and Peasant Behavior Under the Conditions of Insecurity and Deprivation: The Grain Supply Crisis of the Spring of 1955', in A. Doak Barnett ed., *Chinese Communist Politics in Action* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), pp. 365–99.
- 43 *NCNA*, Shanghai, 13 June 1955.
- 44 *ibid.*, 5 Jan. 1956.
- 45 *ibid.*, 18 Jan. 1956.
- 46 *CFJP*, 5 Feb. 1956.
- 47 *NCNA*, Shanghai, 2 March 1956.
- 48 *Chan-wang*, 4 (28 Jan. 1956), p. 11. The suburbs also contained 27 other APCs at this time. 'Township' here translates *hsiang*; 'borough' translates *chen*.
- 49 *Hsin-min pao-wan k'an* (*New People's Evening Gazette*) (Shanghai), 24 Feb. 1957. The company, presumably based on a previous florists' guild, was the *Shih hua-mu kung-szu*; the plan was a *tsai-shu chung-hua chi-hua*.
- 50 *LTP*, 24 Jan. 1956. The relevant pest is the *ting-lo-shih* (spiral-shell snail).
- 51 See Audrey Donnithorne, *China's Economic System* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1967), pp. 132–33.
- 52 *NCNA*, Shanghai, 1 July 1956; and *Chan-wang*, 26 (7 July 1956), p. 24.
- 53 *LTP*, 5 July 1956. *Shang-hai shih nung-yeh shui-li kung-hui*.
- 54 Shanghai, unlike Canton, never had a formal, boundaryless 'urban-district-on-the-water' (*shui-shang shih-ch'ü*); but many efforts were made to move boat people ashore. After Liberation, some Shanghai seamen whose ships had left for Taiwan led this movement among their sampan-bound brethren. See *LTP*, 2 March 1951.
- 55 *CNP*, 15 Feb. 1957.
- 56 See Lynn White III, 'Leadership in Shanghai, 1955–69', in Robert A. Scalapino ed., *Elites in the People's Republic of China* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972), pp. 311–12, which refers to two different 1958 reports from *Nung-ts'un kung-tso P'ung-hsün* (*Rural Work Bulletin*). This source can now be confirmed for the 1949–54 subperiod by *CFJP*, 12 Feb. 1955.
- 57 *CNP*, 15 Feb. 1957.
- 58 *ibid.* also gives statistics from which it can be calculated that there were 398 higher APCs in the suburbs at this time, with an average of 225 households each. The article also gives an index, based on 1950, of total crop extraction from Shanghai suburbs to the city (apparently measured by weight) in 1954 and 1956; but the meaning of such an aggregate weight index would be hard to specify.
- 59 *ibid.*
- 60 *Chan-wang*, 32 (18 Aug. 1956), p. 7.
- 61 *CNP*, 19 March 1957. The term 'slightly exploitative' is *ch'ing-wei po-hsiao* – a modernizing concept?
- 62 *ibid.*, 15 Jan. 1957.
- 63 *HWJP*, 23 Nov. 1956. These percentages were published in rounded

- terms, as politely as the circumstances demanded. In one co-operative, the figure for declining income was about 10%, and for fairly stable incomes, about 20%.
- 64 *HWJP*, 4 May 1957.
- 65 *ibid.*
- 66 *ibid.*, 17 Jan. 1957.
- 67 *NCNA*, Shanghai, 21 April 1957.
- 68 *HWJP*, 8 and 23 July 1957.
- 69 *ibid.*, 20 July 1957.
- 70 See Lynn White III, *Careers in Shanghai: The Social Guidance of Personal Energies in a Developing Chinese City, 1949–1966* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978). Chap. 2 contrasts ‘technical’ with ‘residential’ rustication and discusses usage of the words *hsia-fang*, *hsia-hsiang*, and *hui-hsiang*.
- 71 For an example, see a report on mid-1950s Shanghai rusticates to Fenghsin, Kiangsi, in *CFJP*, 16 Jan. 1958.
- 72 *Chan-wang*, 10 (8 March 1958), p. 28.
- 73 *Lien-ho cheng-ch’iu she-yüan wei-yüan-hui*. *HWJP*, 2, 8 and 9 Aug. 1957; and *NCNA*, Shanghai, 5 Aug. 1957.
- 74 *K’ang-han yün-tung*. *HWJP*, 15 Sept. 1957.
- 75 *She-hui-chu-yi chiao-yü yün-tung*. The same term was used in the 1960s for a different and larger campaign. See *HWJP*, 27 Sept. 1957.
- 76 *ibid.*, 10 Dec. 1957, speaks of ‘batches’ of officials on these name lists in suburban agencies. Some were ‘first-rank responsible cadres of the district level’.
- 77 *ibid.*, 5 Dec. 1957.
- 78 *ibid.*, 22 and 30 Nov. and 10 Dec. 1957.
- 79 *ibid.*, 13 Dec. 1957.
- 80 *ibid.*, 5 Oct. 1957.
- 81 *Hsin-min pao-wan k’an*, 22 Feb. 1958.
- 82 *HWJP*, 9 Jan. 1958.
- 83 Chang Hsu-tang, ‘Minhang – Shanghai’s First Satellite Town’, *PR*, 16 Feb. 1960, pp. 17–18.
- 84 *NCNA*, Shanghai, 15 June 1957.
- 85 *ibid.*, 30 March 1958. The company’s main plant is in Woosung.
- 86 *WHP*, 18 Feb. 1958. ‘Hsinchuang’ in 1958 was called ‘Shanghai’ – a market town some distance south of the metropolis, originally having the same name. The confusion has since been cleared up by renaming the smaller place, although the county name is technically unchanged. See also *CFJP*, 30 July 1958, which describes the creation of P’utung county (which lasted until 1961) and the absorption of the previous suburban districts into various counties.
- 87 *HWJP*, 12 April 1958.
- 88 *ibid.*, 17 Dec. 1958.
- 89 *1967 Fei-ch’ing nien-pao (1967 Yearbook of ‘Bandit’ Affairs)* (Taipei: Bandit Affairs Research Journal Publishing House, 1967), pp. 1014–15.

- 90 G. William Skinner, 'Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China', *Journal of Asian Studies*, 24, 3 (May 1965).
- 91 *NCNA*, 11 June 1959.
- 92 *HWJP*, 17 and 22 Sept. 1958.
- 93 Chiating's Malu Commune, in September 1958, was formed from two *hsiang* and one *chen*. Paoshan's Hungch'i Commune contained $2\frac{1}{2}$ of the previous *hsiang*, plus two *chen*. Paoshan's Hsienfeng Commune comprised $3\frac{1}{2}$ *hsiang*. P'utang's Tungfeng Commune had four *hsiang* and two *chen*. The numbers of the first Communes in the counties of Shanghai at the end of September were: Chiating, 7; Paoshan, 7; Shanghai, 6; and P'utang, 3. The 23 Communes of this central area included 879 previous APCs. They ranged from 5,000 to over 20,000 households. *HWJP*, 26 and 30 Sept. 1958. In the seven non-core counties that were added later (which produce largely rice to the west, and rice and cotton to the east), the Commune sizes were smaller on average.
- 94 *Tien feng (Celestial Wind)*, Shanghai, 23 (17 Dec. 1959); and Reuters, 15 Aug. 1959.
- 95 See n. 56 above and the associated text.
- 96 *HWJP*, 28 Nov. 1958.
- 97 *ibid.*, 21 April 1959.
- 98 *NCNA*, 11 June 1959.
- 99 *Chieh-fang (Liberation)*, Shanghai, 7 (July 1960), p. 19. W. R. Geddes, *Peasant Life in Communist China* (Ithaca: Cornell Society for Applied Anthropology, 1963), p. 17, suggests that collectivization may have affected long-term birth rates because the number of males in a household became the main determinant of its income, as property's role lessened. Geddes indicates that the tradition of female infanticide was thus hard to eliminate. Income levelling may, however, have caused previously destitute peasants to raise more girls; this was probably an important influence on total population growth. Geddes' data are from K'aihsienkung (east of Lake T'ai, not far from the Shanghai border), where Fei Hsiao-tung had also worked.
- 100 See Geddes, *Peasant Life*, p. 44.
- 101 *HMWP*, 30 March and 10 Dec. 1962.
- 102 *HWJP*, 27 Dec. 1958.
- 103 *ibid.*, 27 March 1959.
- 104 *ibid.*, 3 Nov. 1959. The same paper, on 6 November, reported a visit of some urban cadres to inspect warehouses in Malu Commune, for whose security they were responsible.
- 105 *NCNA*, 10 March and 19 July 1959; and *HMWP*, 11 and 14 April 1962. The self-sufficiency in vegetables is not very impressive, considering that in 1957 a much smaller Shanghai had already produced all but 17% of its vegetable consumption; see *NCNA*, 31 July 1960.
- 106 *HMWP*, 23 Oct. 1960.
- 107 *HWJP*, 5 Feb. 1959.
- 108 *JMJP*, 24 April 1958.

- 109 Japan's fast, modern development also depended on efficient use of urban fertilizers and silt for the needs of the fields. As late as 1970, three-quarters of the households in Tokyo did not have flush toilets. Latrines were cleaned by trucks, whose contents were treated and then applied as fertilizers.
- 110 *HWJP*, 17 Nov. 1959. The Congress was called *Shang-hai shih yang-chu kung-tso ta-hui*.
- 111 *HMWP*, 7 April 1960. The three changes were: (1) semi-mechanization of fodder cutting; (2) installation of running water for use in pigsties; and (3) the use of a wheeled cart for pig-related transport.
- 112 *HMWP*, 13 Nov. 1959. The four changes were mechanization, irrigation, chemical fertilization, and electrification.
- 113 *Hsüeh-shu yüeh-k'an* (*Academic Monthly*), Shanghai, 1958, 7, p. 22; and *NCNA*, 14 Dec. 1961.
- 114 This is most recently reported in Shang En-tai, Su Chün-kung, and Shih Wen-pin eds., *Shang-hai ti-li ch'ien-shuo* (*Introduction to Shanghai Geography*) (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House, 1974), pp. 18–19; but they criticize such data as being 'subjectivist', estimated by 'reactionary scholars' and 'imperialists'. They do not provide any estimate from more reliable sources. Over time, the rate of coast-lengthening has variously accelerated, slowed, or sometimes even gone to zero.
- 115 *NCNA*, 8 Sept. 1961.
- 116 Frederic Wakeman Jr., *Strangers at the Gate* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966), pp. 153–6, describes the 'sand offices' (*sha-so* or *sha-chü*) in Kwangtung of the 1840s. Revenue from 'sand fields' (*sha-t'ien*) supplemented *likin* to subsidize gentry militia costs.
- 117 Shanghai Radio, 22 Oct. 1969. In the Ch'anghsing group, a recent map shows a road and bus route connecting the towns of Fenghuang and Yüansha, although at high tide these points used to be on widely separated islands. See *Shang-hai shih chiao-t'ung t'u* (*Shanghai Communications Map*) (Shanghai: People's Publishing House, 1975). A satellite photo shown to the author by Prof. Václav Smil also indicates that the Ch'anghsing group has now become a single island.
- 118 *Chan-wang*, 38 (18 Sept. 1959), p. 33. Hengsha and Ch'anghsing islands are in Paoshan, rather than Ch'üansha, because ferries come from the nearest proper harbour, Woosung.
- 119 *Ibid.* Because of space limitations, the author cannot adequately deal here with Shanghai's suburban boat people. They will be considered in another format later.
- 120 *HMWP*, 13 Oct. 1964.
- 121 See Thomas P. Bernstein, *Up to the Mountains, Down to the Villages* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); and Lynn White III, 'The Road to Urumchi: Rustication from Shanghai' (forthcoming article).
- 122 *HWJP*, 30 Aug. 1958.
- 123 *HMWP*, 3 Oct. 1960.
- 124 Concerning the particular commune connections of the Shanghai North

- Middle School, the Shanghai CCP Public Transport Department, and the Luwan district government, see (respectively) *HMWP*, 5 June 1961, 27 Oct. 1960, and 23 Oct. 1960.
- 125 *NCNA*, 25 March 1961.
- 126 *Ibid.*, 28 April 1961.
- 127 *ibid.*, 19 March 1961.
- 128 *ibid.*, 14 April 1961.
- 129 *ibid.*, 2 Dec. 1961; see also *ibid.*, 18 Jan. 1961.
- 130 Minhsing was on the tourist route for Western visitors in the early 1960s. For details, see Edgar Snow, *The Other Side of the River* (New York: Random House, 1961), pp. 539–40; Frederick Nossal, *Dateline Peking* (London: MacDonald, 1962), pp. 189–91; and Robert Guillain, *When China Wakes* (New York: Walker, 1966), chap. 6. Also *PR*, 16 Feb. 1960, pp. 17–18; and *NCNA*, 10 Oct. 1959. An interview with an ex-worker in the Minhsing Electrical Manufacturing School indicated that there is also an aircraft factory in that town, as well as a ball-bearing works.
- 131 *NCNA*, 1 Sept. 1959. The highway came under severe criticism during the Cultural Revolution as an extravagance.
- 132 *CFJP*, 19 April 1954. Both P'engp'u and T'aop'u are on the close northern outskirts of the city.
- 133 *NCNA*, 12 Feb. 1959.
- 134 For a different emphasis, on large steel mills in Shanghai, see *ibid.*, 19 Oct. 1960.
- 135 *HMWP*, 20 Nov. 1959.
- 136 *ibid.*, 15 Dec. 1962.
- 137 *TKP*, Peking, 13 March 1962.
- 138 'Shanghai Letter', *South China Morning Post*, 30 April 1962.
- 139 *NCNA*, 24 Sept. 1963. See also Chin Chung-hua (journalist and deputy mayor), 'China's Biggest City Aids Agriculture', *CR*, 1963, 4, p. 44.
- 140 *NCNA*, 30 Jan. 1963.
- 141 White, 'Leadership in Shanghai', p. 337.
- 142 *HMWP*, 17 Oct. 1963. *Rural Branch Life* had a large but limited circulation. Copies are apparently unavailable outside China.
- 143 See Richard Baum and Frederick C. Teiwes, *Ssu-ch'ing: The Socialist Education Movement of 1962–1966* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968).
- 144 *HMWP*, 12 April 1964.
- 145 *ibid.*, 6 Oct. 1963; 14 April, 7 May, and 20 Sept. 1964. See also *ibid.*, 12 Dec. 1962.
- 146 *ibid.*, 21 March 1964.
- 147 *ibid.*, 7 June 1966.
- 148 *ibid.*, 8 Dec. 1965. This action probably made Shanghai self-sufficient in mountain goats (*shan-yang*). Ch'ungming, a suburban county, is China's third largest island, after Taiwan and Hainan. It is as flat as the proverbial pancake, except for man-made dykes.
- 149 *HMWP*, 2 Oct. 1965.

- 150 *ibid.*, 8 Oct. 1965.
- 151 *ibid.*, 18 June 1965. The Machine Agricultural Tools Factory began charging rent on machines at this time.
- 152 On insecticides, *HMWP*, 22 April 1964. On cures for liver fluke, see *NCNA*, 13 April 1964, and *HMWP*, 18 June 1965; and for 'paddy-field itch' (*tao-t'ien p'i-yen*), *HMWP*, 22 June 1965. On general health work, *HMWP*, 17 June, 26 Aug., and 8 Sept. 1965.
- 153 *Shang-hai chiao-ch'ü yu-hsien kuang-po wang*; *WHP*, 31 Oct. 1965. Probably either the 350,000 figure is misreported, or else many small radios are included and the network extends in east China beyond Shanghai's provincial boundaries.
- 154 On storytellers, *WHP*, 26 Jan. 1965, and *HMWP*, 28 Nov. 1965. On students, *HMWP*, 16 Aug. 1963, and many other sources. On librarians and books, *HMWP*, 1 July 1964, and *WHP*, 21 Jan. 1965.
- 155 *HMWP*, 8 Oct. 1964. See also information in the 12 October issue on 'plough-and-read primary schools' (*keng-tu hsiao-hsüeh*) in Nanhui county, where 80% of the students were from poor or lower-middle peasant families.
- 156 *KMJP*, 15 Nov. 1962.
- 157 *HMWP*, 18 Dec. 1965.
- 158 A Chinshan example is reported *ibid.*, 2 February 1964. Greater compensation for poor peasants was accompanied by pressure to deposit half of their earnings in a 'trust co-operative' (*hsin-yung ho-tso she*). On the work-point system generally, see Andrew Nathan, 'Paying the Chinese Farmer', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 27 Feb. 1964; and Chen Mae Fun, 'Paying the Peasants', *ibid.*, 3 Nov. 1966, p. 263.
- 159 *HMWP*, 27 Feb. 1965.
- 160 *ibid.*, 2 March 1965. Ch'ungming county, Shanghai's largest by area where the navy may have some local influence, was the slowest to form this group. Although all top Shanghai leaders participated in the congresses, these associations may have been pre-Cultural Revolution 'radical' attempts to reform suburban policies.
- 161 *HMWP*, 27 Feb. and 15 June 1965.
- 162 *WHP*, 27 July 1965; and *HMWP*, 20 Oct. 1965.
- 163 *HMWP*, 12 and 15 March 1966.
- 164 *CFJP*, 24 Dec. 1966; and *HMWP*, 3 June 1966.
- 165 Ray Wylie, 'The Great Debate', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 14 Sept. 1967. The Cultural Revolution in urban areas, too, was an organic outgrowth of the socialist education movement.
- 166 *WHP*, 14 Aug. 1965.
- 167 See Lynn White III, 'Workers' Politics in Shanghai', *Journal of Asian Studies* 36, 1 (1976).
- 168 Lynn White III, 'Shanghai's Polity in Cultural Revolution', in John W. Lewis ed., *The City in Communist China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971), pp. 341-8.
- 169 Shanghai Radio, 14 Jan. 1967.

- 170 Ray Wylie, 'The Red Guards Rebound', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 7 Sept. 1967.
- 171 A Chiating meeting of 40,000 is reported in *NCNA*, 26 Jan. 1967. Various media noted large suburban meetings that supported various political lines.
- 172 *ibid.*, 30 March 1966.
- 173 *HMWP*, 6 Aug. 1966.

10. FUNG: THE SPATIAL DEVELOPMENT OF SHANGHAI

- 1 Hsi-ti Shang *et al.*, *Shang-hai ti-li chien-hua (Introduction to the Geography of Shanghai)* (Shanghai: People's Publishing House, 1974), pp. 2-3.
- 2 *ibid.*, p. 6. This maze of water channels can be clearly seen in Band No. 6 and Band No. 7 of the Landsat imagery. Landsat is primarily an earth resource surveillance and remote sensor experiment satellite launched by NASA in mid-1972. One of the multispectral imaging systems on board is a four-channel scanner. Each of the four sensors detects and records radiant energy of selected wavebands within the electromagnetic spectrum. For example, Bands No. 4, 5, 6 and 7 detect radiant energy within the regions of 0.5-0.6 μ (green), 0.6-0.7 μ (red), 0.7-0.8 μ (infra-red), and 0.8-1.1 μ (near infra-red), respectively. Both Band No. 6 and Band No. 7 imagery are excellent for observation of the land-water interface. All water bodies appear in a very dark tone which strongly contrasts with the light tone of land surfaces.
- 3 Murphey, R., *Shanghai: Key to Modern China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 49.
- 4 Shang, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-3.
- 5 *Shanghai Yearbook 1946 (Shang-hai nien-chien 1946)* (Shanghai: Gazetteer Office, 1946), Section B, p. 5.
- 6 *HWJP*, 8 Aug. 1957.
- 7 *WHP*, 11 Feb. 1957.
- The twenty urban districts of Shanghai in 1949 were Hwangpoo, Laccha, Hsinch'eng, Tsingan, Chiangning, Put'o, Chiangning, Yimiao, Fenglai, Kushan, Luwan, Ch'angshu, Hsuhui, Chapei, Pehchan, Hungkuo, Peiszechuan Lu, Tinanchiao, Yunin and Yangpoo. The ten sub-urban districts were Kaochiao, Yangching, Yangshi, Lunghua, Hsinching, Chenyu, Taichang, Wocsung, Chiangwan and Hsinhsi.
- 8 *HWJP*, 21 Oct. 1952.
- 9 C. S. Chen, *Shanghai* (in Chinese), (Research Report 38, Geographical Research Centre, Graduate School, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1970), p. 4.
- 10 *WHP*, 18 Feb. 1958.
- CFJP*, 20 Dec. 1958.
- 11 *Chung-hua jen-min kung-ho-kuo hsing-cheng chü-hua chien-t'se 1959 (A General Handbook of the Administrative Districts of the People's Republic of China 1959)*, (Peking: Peking Atlas Publishing House, 1959), p. 2.

- 12 *ibid.*, 1960, p. 2.
- 13 *WHP*, 18 Feb. 1958 and *CFJP*, 20 Dec. 1958.
- 14 Yen-hsing Cho, 'To Arrange Urban Construction Work in accordance with the Principle of Thrift and Diligence', *Chi-hua ching-chi* (Planned Economy), 1957, 12, p. 5.
- 15 Hsing-wen Yang, 'Two Problems concerning Distribution of Industry', *Chi-hua ching-chi*, 1957, 8, p. 15.
- 16 J. C. Fisher ed., *City and Regional Planning in Poland* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1966), p. 261.
- 17 *Chien-chu hsüeh-pao* (Journal of Architecture), 1958, 4, p. 3.
- 18 Cho, *op. cit.*, p. 5.
- 19 Wen-ke Wang, 'Campaign Against Waste and Conservatism, Energetically Improve Urban Construction Work', *Chien-chu hsüeh-pao* (*Journal of Architecture*), 1958, 4, p. 4.
- 20 *Ch'eng-shih chien-she* (*Urban Construction*), 1957, 7, p. 10.
- 21 *Chien-chu hsüeh-pao*, 1956, 1, p. 102.
- 22 *Cheng-tu jih-pao* (*Chengtu Daily*), 23 July 1957.
- 23 *HWJP*, 4 May 1957.
- 24 *Fu-chien jih-pao* (*Fukien Daily*), 25 May 1957.
- 25 This represents an average annual loss of over one-half of a million acres which is equivalent to approximately half the amount of average annual loss of agricultural land to non-agricultural uses in the United States.
- 26 *HHPYK* 1958, 6, p. 70.
- 27 Edward Higbee, 'Agricultural Land on the Urban Fringe', in Gottmann and Harper eds., *Metropolitan on the Move: Geographers Look at Urban Sprawl* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1967), p. 62.
- 28 J. D. Eyre, 'Sources of Tokyo's Fresh Food Supply', *The Geographical Review*, 49 (1959), p. 468.
- 29 *HWJP*, 25 Oct. 1957.
- 30 'Basically Solve the Problem of Vegetable Supply', *HHPYK*, 1957, 13, p. 150.
- 31 *Jen-min shou-ts'ê 1956* (*1956 People's Handbook*) (Peking: *Impartial Daily*, 1956).
- 32 *Chung-hua jen-min kung-ho-kuo fa-kuei hui-pien* (*Compendium of Laws and Ordinances of the People's Republic of China*), 3 (Jan.-June 1956), pp. 106-12.
- 33 *China Digest*, 10 Aug. 1949, p. 10.
- 34 *Nan-fang jih-pao* (*Southern Daily*), 19 Oct. 1950.
- 35 *CFJP*, 6, 7, 12 Oct. 1952.
- 36 *Nan-fang jih-pao* 14 Sept. 1952.
- 37 *ibid.*, 6 Oct. 1952.
- 38 *ibid.*, 27 April 1953.
- 39 *HWJP*, 20 Sept. 1951.
- 40 *HWJP*, 29 Oct. 1952.
- 41 Stuart Schram ed., *Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed - Talks and Letters: 1956-1971* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1974), pp. 65-7.
Also in Huang Ting ed., *Addenda to Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, 1949-1959*, 3, pp. 75-91 (Chinese text).

- 42 Chou En-lai, 'Report on the Proposal of the Second Five Year Plan concerning the Development of National Economy', *Chung-hua jen-min kung-ho-kuo fa-kuei hui-pien*, 4 (1956), p. 126.
- 43 'Report on the Budget Balance of 1955 and the Budget of 1956', *HWJP*, 9 Aug. 1956.
- 44 *ibid.*, 28 Aug. 1957.
- 45 *ibid.*, 9 Aug. 1956.
- 46 *WHP*, 1 Oct. 1957.
- 47 *ibid.*, 6 July 1958.
- 48 The first industrial district in suburban Shanghai, known as the Taopu Industrial District, was established in 1954.
- 49 *CFJP*, 24 July 1956.
- 50 *ibid.*, 7 June 1959.
- 51 Yuan-li Wu, 'Principal Industrial Cities in Communist China: Their Regional Distribution and Ranking', in E. Stuart Kirby ed., *Contemporary China*, 5, 1 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1963), pp. 1–32.
- 52 *CFJP*, 6 June 1959.
- 53 M. B. Ullman, *Cities of Mainland China: 1953 and 1958* (Washington: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, International Population Reports, Series P-95, 59, 1961), pp. 42–4.
- 54 *WHP*, 18 Feb. 1958.
- 55 *ibid.*, 18 Feb. 1958.
- 56 Interview given to the author by planners from the Bureau of Urban Planning and Administration in Shanghai, 21 June 1977.
- 57 Sen-t'ieh Ch'ien (Shanghai Institute of Urban Planning and Design), 'The Planning Problems of Shanghai's Satellite Towns', *Chien-chu hsueh-pao*, 1958, 8, p. 31.
- 58 *ibid.*
- 59 *WHP*, 10 Jan. 1959.
- 60 *ibid.*
- 61 *Ch'ien, op. cit.*, p. 32.
- 62 *HWJP*, 19 Jan. 1959.
- 63 *TKP*, 7 April 1961.
- 64 Chih-kang Chang, 'The Great Peking', *Ti-li chih-shih (Geographical Knowledge)*, 10 (1959), pp. 486–7.
- 65 *CFJP*, 29 Dec. 1959.
- 66 V. Kucherenko, 'Several Questions Concerning Urban Development in the Soviet Union', in 'The Future of Our Cities', *Pravda*, 1 June 1960. Translated in *Current Digest of Soviet Press*, 12, 23, pp. 23–6.
- 67 Interview given to the author by planners from the Bureau of Urban Planning and Administration in Shanghai, 21 June 1977.

11. RAGVALD: THE EMERGENCE OF 'WORKER-WRITERS'
IN SHANGHAI

Note on sources

For many readers, the majority of the periodicals upon which this chapter is based will be unknown. I have, therefore, modified the reference conventions

slightly to accommodate this. Translations of the titles of all the periodicals peculiar to this paper are given where first encountered in the text, and below is a list of all these periodicals (in order of appearance in text and notes) together with their title translations and abbreviations (Ed.).

<i>Jen-min wen-hsüeh</i>	(JMWHS)	<i>People's Literature</i>
<i>Kung-jen wen-yi</i>		<i>Workers' Literature</i>
<i>Ch'ün-chung wen-yi</i>		<i>Masses' Literature</i>
<i>Chiang-chiang wen-yi</i>		<i>Yangtze Literature</i>
<i>Wen-yi pao</i>	(WYP)	<i>Literary Gazette</i>
<i>Wen-yi yüeh-pao</i>	(WYYP)	<i>Literary Monthly</i>
<i>Wen-yi hsüeh-shi</i>		<i>Literary Study</i>
<i>Meng-ya</i>	(MY)	<i>The Sprout</i>
<i>Shou-huo</i>		<i>The Harvest</i>
<i>Yüeh-chün wen-yi</i>		<i>Leap Forward Literature</i>
<i>Chieh-k'ou wen-yi</i>		<i>Street Corner Literature</i>
<i>Kung-jen hsi-tso</i>		<i>Workers Experimental Writing</i>
<i>Ch'ing-nien-kung</i>		<i>Young Workers</i>
<i>Hsi-ch'ü pao</i>		<i>Drama Monthly</i>
<i>Shanghai wen-hsüeh</i>	(SHWHS)	<i>Shanghai Literature</i>
<i>Wen-hsüeh p'ing-lun</i>		<i>Literary Criticism</i>
<i>Wen-hsüeh chih-shih</i>		<i>Literary Knowledge</i>
<i>Shanghai wen-yi</i>		<i>Shanghai Literary Monthly</i>

- 1 Wang Yao, *Chung-kuo hsin-wen-hsüeh shih-kao* (*An Outline History of Modern Chinese Literature*) (Hongkong: Po Wen Book Company, 1972), 2, pp. 446-8.
- 2 *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1969), 3, pp. 69-99.
- 3 Chou Yang, 'Struggle to create still more excellent works of literature and art', *WYP*, 1953, 19.
- 4 The terms 'inside' and 'outside' are used in this study in a sense similar to that found in the works of the Hungarian literary theorist, George Lukács. 'Inside' thus refers to the ability of a writer to enter into the subjective complexities of a social group or stratum. See George Lukács, 'Critical Realism and Socialist Realism', in George Lukács, *The Meaning of Contemporary Realism* (London: Merlin Press, 1963).
- 5 Both these novels appeared in Peking in 1949 and were later reprinted many times. Wang Yao, 2, *passim*.
- 6 Mao Tun, 'Strive to reach a still higher stage', *HHYP*, Oct. 1960, pp. 1450-1.
- 7 See articles by Hu Ch'iao-mu, in *HHYP*, Nov. 1950. and T'ien Han, in *Hsi chü pao* (*Drama Monthly*), 8 (1954).
- 8 Ting Ling, 'Advance into the new era: on the literary tastes of the intellectuals and literature and art for the workers, peasants, and soldiers', *WYP*, 1950, 11.
- 9 Report from a meeting of the local Cultural Association. *JMJJP*, 2 June 1950.

- 10 Wang, Yao, 2, p. 448.
- 11 See *JMWHs*, 1950, 6.
- 12 Lin Mo-han, 'Some questions concerning the workers' movement for literature and art', *Pei-ching jih-pao* (*Peking Daily*), 3 Sept. 1958.
- 13 'Correspondence work at the Ch'ang Chiang Literature', *WYP*, 1951, 8.
- 14 The Shanghai cultural leaders almost came to epitomize all 'bad' tendencies to be criticized in the Chinese press. Lars Ragvald, *Yao Wen-yüan as a Literary Critic and Theorist - The Emergence of Chinese Zhdanovism* (Stockholm: University of Stockholm, 1978).
- 15 *ibid.* The criticism of the film was the beginning of an ideological rectification that continued well into 1952.
- 16 'Investigating the writing of literature among workers in Tientsin', *WYP*, 1952, 11-12. It was argued in the article that the workers did not have sufficient time to study literary creation and that the time of the professionals was too valuable to be spent on guidance.
- 17 In this case the commonly used term 'Writers' Union' is preferred to the more consequent 'Authors' Union' (*Tso-chia hsieh-hui*).
- 18 'A workers literary writing group', *WYP*, 1954, 15, p. 29. See also Kung Lo-sum, 'The brilliant achievements of ten years of worker-writing in Shanghai', *WYYP*, 1959, 10, pp. 37-42. Note that the *WYYP* changed its name in October 1959 to 'Shanghai wen-hsüeh' (*Shanghai Literature*).
- 19 See Hu Wan-ch'un, *Ch'ing ch'un* (*Youth*) (Peking: China Youth Publishing House, 1956); and *Wo shih tsen-yang hsüeh-hsi ch'uang-tso ti* (*How I Learned Creative Writing*) (Peking: People's Literature Publishing House, 1965).
- 20 Hu Wan-ch'un, *T'e-shu hsing-ko ti jen* (*A Man Made of Special Stuff*) (Peking: People's Literature Publishing House, 1959).
- 21 Yao Wen-yüan, 'Days of spring breezes and blossoming peaches and plums . . .', *WYYP*, 1959, 5, pp. 52-62. This article presents quite a comprehensive picture of different generations of worker-writers in Shanghai. It is written, however, with the intention of defending the Great Leap, and Yao, in order to show the achievements of that movement, tends grossly to underrate the status of the worker-writers and worker-authors, calling them 'amateur writers'.
- 22 'A worker's opinion with regard to authors and artists', *CFJP*, 11 June 1952; and 'What do Shanghai workers demand of the literary and art workers?', *ibid.*, 12 June 1952.
- 23 See Lars Ragvald, *op. cit.*, chap. 1.
- 24 Wang Jo-wang, 'Dig up the roots of factionalism', *WYYP*, 1957, 6, pp. 13-14.
- 25 This campaign was primarily intended to stop tendencies towards independence manifested by various groups of cultural workers. Lars Ragvald, *op. cit.*, chap. 1.
- 26 Yao Wen-yüan, 'Four tricks used by the anti-Party careerists: unmask the schemes of the right-wing element Wang Jo-wang', *CFJP*, 2 August 1957.
- 27 *ibid.*

- 28 Wei Chin-chih, 'The "wall" and the "moat" as seen in the *Wen-yi yüeh-pao*', *WYYP*, 1957, 6, pp. 10-13.
- 29 Mao Tun who was a frequent contributor to the *Wen-yi hsüeh-hsi* also failed to see these problems.
- 30 Fei Li-wen, 'From the Heart', *WYP*, 1957, 6, pp. 15-16.
- 31 See *Ch'uan-kuo ch'ing-nien wen-hsüeh ch'uang-tso-che hui-i pao-kao, fa-yen-chi* (*Record of Reports and Statements Made at the National Conference of Young Literary Workers*) (Peking: China Youth Publishing House, 1956).
- 32 'Why doesn't literary creation flourish in Hunan?', *Hsin Hu-nan pao* (*New Hunan Daily*), 2 June 1957.
- 33 Fei Li-wen, *op. cit.*, and Mao Ping-fu, 'Bringing up new forces - gust by gust', *MY*, 1957, 10. To the knowledge of the author a complete collection of *MY* is only available in the library of Union Research Institute, Hongkong.
- 34 See n. 19.
- 35 Yao Wen-yüan, 'Works praising the communist spirit of the working class', *WYYP*, 1958, 10, pp. 95-7.
- 36 See Fei Li-wen, *op. cit.*
- 37 Mao Tun went as far as to admit that creative talents had been stifled under the previously prevailing conditions: 'Bring up new forces, expand the literary army', *WYP*, 1956, 5-6, p. 19.
- 38 See, for instance, Fan Fu-keng, 'I would like to continue working in the editorial department', *MY*, 1957, 10.
- 39 At a meeting called by the Shanghai Party Committee referred to in *CFJP*, 8 May 1957.
- 40 Yao Hsüeh-yin, 'Miscellaneous thought on literary creation', in *WHP*. Shanghai was somewhat independent until summer 1957. Criticism of Yao Hsüeh-yin appeared most concentratedly in *WYYP*, 1957, 2, and in *MY*, 1957, 3.
- 41 This criticism under the headline, 'Give greater support to the new literary army' for months remained a regular feature of *MY*. Particularly interesting articles can be found in *MY*, 10, 11 and 12.
- 42 Yao Wen-yüan, 'More on dogma and principle', *WYP*, 1957, 18, p. 3. (An English translation of a considerably revised version of this article is available in *Current Background*, 910.)
- 43 They admitted, however, without exception, that they could do much less writing when working as editors. See, for example, Fei Li-wen and Hu Wan-ch'un, 'three points of view', *MY*, 1957, 10.
- 44 T'ang K'o-hsin, 'Let me return to the factory!', *MY*, 1957, 10.
- 45 'The spring of Shanghai literature', 7 May 1957. The Writers' Union in 1955 had decided that amateurs who could produce publishable manuscripts should be given a few weeks' leave to polish their works. This decision, however, had no effect, as it had not been clearly stated who was to pay for the leave. See 'The agony of a spare-time writer', *WHP*, 8 June 1957.
- 46 See, for example, Ah Chang, 'The soul of Wang Jo-wang', *MY*, 1957, 16.

- 47 See D. W. Fokkema, *Literary Doctrine in China and Soviet Influence 1956–1960* (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1965), pp. 147–91.
- 48 ‘The speech by Lu Ting-yi, director of the Propaganda Department of the Communist Party Central Committee, at the enlarged conference of the party group of the Writers’ Union’, *WYP*, 1957, 25.
- 49 All the important worker-writers now declared their willingness to return to the production line. See articles in *WYP*, 1958, 1.
- 50 See Stuart R. Schram ed., ‘The Cultural Revolution in Historical Perspective’, in Stuart R. Schram ed., *Authority, Participation and Cultural Change in China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 52–3.
- 51 ‘The road to building an army of authors from the working class’, *WHP*, 30 Dec. 1957.
- 52 Almost every large-scale campaign since 1949 had been accompanied by attempts to stamp out ideologically ‘bad’ literature. See Lars Ragvald, *op. cit.*, chap. 2.
- 53 See ‘The opinions of mass culture workers on cultural work’, *WYP*, 1957, 13, p. 10; and ‘At the forum sponsored by the Municipal Party Committee . . .’, *Lü-ta jih-pao* (*Lushun-Dairen Daily*), 13 May 1957.
- 54 *WHP*, 14 Jan. 1958.
- 55 ‘Ten thousand mass movement activists take the oath’, *ibid.*, 27 Jan. 1958.
- 56 ‘The P’u-t’o district rears many flowers in literature and art’, *ibid.*, 9 Feb. 1958.
- 57 ‘Flowers of mass literature and art are blooming everywhere in the P’u-t’o district’, *ibid.*, 29 March 1958.
- 58 ‘One hundred flowers are blooming furiously; creation flourishes’, *ibid.*, 1 March 1958.
- 59 Yao Wen-yüan, ‘Introducing *The Beginning of Love*’, *ibid.*, 10 March 1958.
- 60 See, for example, Fei Li-wen, ‘Men of steel and steeds of iron’, *Shou-huo* 1958, 5; and T’ang K’o-hsin, ‘The diamond’, *ibid.*, 1959, 6.
- 61 Lu wrote one of the best short stories of the period, ‘Force Nine Storm’, *JMWHS*, 1959, 8–9.
- 62 ‘Report of the situation of the Shanghai branch of the Chinese Writers’ Union presented at the annual meeting of the Shanghai branch’, *WYP*, 1959, 4, pp. 3–6.
- 63 Originally published in *JMWHS*, 1958, 6.
- 64 Yao Wen-yüan, ‘There are persons of inexhaustible resources as yet uncovered’, *SHWHS*, 1962, 9, pp. 63–71. Yao’s comments were not unfavourable but he thought that Ju represented one extreme (the unheroic) in the Chinese literature of those days.
- 65 ‘The Shanghai Municipal Committee and the District Committees of the Party have set up committees for work in the field of literature and art among the masses’, *WHP*, 13 March 1958.
- 66 *ibid.*
- 67 The collection of folk songs and folk poetry took movement-like proportions after the publication of the editorial, ‘Collect folk songs on a

- large scale throughout the country', *JMJP*, 14 April 1958. The main reason for this movement was probably a speech by Mao at Chengtu where he suggested carrying out a collection of folk songs. Lars Ragvald, *op. cit.*, chap. 8.
- 68 'The whole Party is mobilized to collect folk songs', *WHP*, 23 April 1958.
- 69 Ho Ta-li, 'The creative activities of workers in the field of literature and art during 1958', *Wen-hsüeh p'ing-lun (Literary Criticism)*, 1959, 1, pp. 127–31.
- 70 Shih Hsi-min, 'Further develop the mass movement for literary creation', *JMJP*, 18 Dec. 1958.
- 71 This was not a clearly defined policy but an orientation expressed by the slogan 'Go all out, aim high, and achieve greater, faster, better and more economic results in building socialism.'
- 72 Yao Wen-yüan, 'Thoroughly carry out the General Line, develop socialist literature and art', *MY*, 1958, 12, pp. 30–1.
- 73 'Pilot creation in Shanghai shows first buds', *WHP*, 18 Nov. 1958.
- 74 The city planned to produce 325 short stories and novels by 1 October 1959. Many more, however, were announced to be under preparation in factories and other small units. See report on literary planning in *ibid.*, 6 Nov. 1958.
- 75 The major reason for this was that the old cadres were not expected to accompany the movement. Professionals were put at their disposal and those with the most promising stories were given time off for literary creation. See 'New developments in the movement for literary creation among old cadres in Shanghai', *ibid.*, 7 July 1959.
- 76 'Our commentator', *ibid.*, 15 June, 1959.
- 77 'The committee for mass work in the field of literature and art of the Shanghai Municipal Committee hold a city-wide meeting of mass literature and art cadres . . .', *ibid.*, 23 June 1959.
- 78 Mao Tun, 'On the rich harvest of short stories and some questions concerning creation', *JMWHs*, 1959, 2.
- 79 Ho Ch'i-fang, 'Some questions arising in the discussions on literary history', in Ho Ch'i-fang, *Wen hsüeh yi-shu ti ch'un-t'ien (The Spring of Literature and Art)* (Peking: The Writers' Publishing Company, 1964), pp. 124–59.
- 80 At the Lushan Plenum, Mao succeeded in putting a stop to all criticism of the Great Leap. The critics were branded as 'rightist opportunists'. See Stuart R. Schram, *op. cit.*, pp. 60–1.
- 81 Yao Wen-yüan, 'Lun pian-ho t'ui-chien' (Polemics and a recommendation), *SHWHS*, Nov. 1959, pp. 52–3.
- 82 Originally published in *WYP*, 1959, 6.
- 83 'Intellectualization as manifested in a worker', *Wen-hsüeh chih-shih (Literary Knowledge)* 1960, 7. (After 1959, this was the most important national magazine for training and guiding literary talents.) As Hu had all the qualities then required (working-class origin, Party membership and some writing ability) he was held up as a model to be emulated by young writers throughout the nation.

- 84 See 'Record of important events from a meeting of the members of the Shanghai branch of the Chinese Writers' Union', *WYP*, 1960, 26.
- 85 Originally published in *SHWHS*, 1961, 1.
- 86 Originally published in *ibid.*, 1962, 2.
- 87 It would appear that this faction was formed during and immediately after the Great Leap. There is some evidence of increasing tension between its leading members and other literary and cultural leaders in Shanghai during the first years of the sixties. See, for example, the biased but on the whole verifiable account in 'Chronology of events in the Struggle Between the Two Lines on the Cultural Front Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China Seventeen Years Ago', *Current Background*, 842. See also Lars Ragvald, *op. cit.*, chap. 8.
- 88 Originally published in *SHWHS*, 1963, 11-12.
- 89 'Chia t'ing wen t'i', *ibid.*, 1963, 4.
- 90 See Stuart R. Schram, *op. cit.*, *passim*.
- 91 Interviews in Hongkong 1974-5. Pa Chin was struggled against particularly severely.
- 92 *ibid.*
- 93 See reports in the organ of the re-established Shanghai branch of the Writers' Union, *Shang-hai wen-yi* (*Shanghai Literary Monthly*), 1978, 1-2.
- 94 Most of the districts in Shanghai now have cultural palaces for cultural activities. Almost all the big factories have some kind of literary training. The most promising amateurs can (or at least before the fall of the Gang of Four could) get some time off for intense training and creation. There were no direct monetary rewards for successful works. Interviews in Hongkong 1974-5.
- 95 Published in *Chao-hsia ts'ung-k'an* (*Morning Glow Publications*) (Shanghai: Shanghai Literature Publishing House, March 1975), pp. 1-97. These publications were issued irregularly between 1972 and 1976. Normally, every issue focused on a particular genre.

12. GARDNER: *STUDY AND CRITICISM: THE VOICE OF SHANGHAI RADICALISM*

- 1 *HHYPP*, 1973, 1, p. 94.
- 2 *JMJP*, 25 Dec. 1976.
- 3 'Investigate the Gang of Four's journal "Study and Criticism", *Li-shih yen-chiu* (*Historical Research*), 1977, 1, p. 29.
- 4 'How the Gang of Four used Shanghai as a base to usurp Party and State power', *PR*, 1977, 6, pp. 5-10.
- 5 Gordon Bennett, 'Mrs Mao's literary ghost', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 1968, 62, p. 197.
- 6 Ch'ih Ch'ün was a member of the PLA 8341 unit, who became chairman of the Tsinghua Revolutionary Committee; Hsieh Ching-yi, daughter of Hsieh Fu-chih, had served as a political instructor in the same unit and was vice-chairman of the Tsinghua Revolutionary Committee. Both were arrested in October 1976.

- 7 'Such was "this Writing Group"', *PR*, 1977, 50, p. 18 (my emphasis).
- 8 *ibid.*; *Li-shih yen-chiu*, 1977, 1, p. 29.
- 9 Hsü's 5 November 1976 confession appears in 'Document of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party' (*Chung-Fa*, 1976, 24), in *Issues and Studies*, Oct. 1977, pp. 89–90; her 5 June 1977 confession appears in 'Document of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party' (*Chung-Fa*, 1977, 37), in *Issues and Studies*, July 1978, p. 89 (my emphasis).
- 10 *Chung-Fa*, 1977, 37, in *Issues and Studies*, Sept. 1978, pp. 78–80.
- 11 *Li-shih yen-chiu*, 1977, 1, p. 29.
- 12 *PR*, 1977 50, p. 17.
- 13 *ibid.*, p. 16.
- 14 'Shanghai newsmen denounce journal controlled by Gang of Four', *NCNA*, 27 March 1977.
- 15 According to a Shanghaiese informant, whom I employed to examine my author index of *HHYPP*.
- 16 For example, the first attack on Chou En-lai (discussed below) was published by *Hsüeh-hsi yü p'i p'an* in September 1973 and by *Hung ch'i* one month later.
- 17 The Tien An Men Incident demonstrated vividly the genuine affection felt for Chou among cadres and masses alike, and the remarkable Chou cult which has arisen since October 1976 has almost elevated him to the level of Mao.
- 18 After the premier's death, Teng Hsiao-p'ing delivered an oration in which he revealed that Chou was known to be suffering from cancer as early as 1972.
- 19 Peking Radio, 23 Jan. 1978, in *SWB*, 27 Jan. 1978.
- 20 Canton Radio, 11 May 1978, in *SWB*, 15 May 1978.
- 21 *NCNA*, 27 March 1977, p. 14.
- 22 Peking Radio, 23 Jan. 1978, in *SWB*, 27 Jan. 1978.
- 23 'On Worshipping Confucianism and Opposing Legalism', *HHYPP*, 1973, 1, pp. 44–52.
- 24 'The two-line struggle between worshipping Confucius and opposing Confucius during the War of Resistance against Japan', *HHYPP*, 1974, 6, pp. 3–9 (*SPRCM*, 786, 20 Aug. 1974).
- 25 'Lin Piao's "Theory of Innate Genius" and Confucius's "Theory of the Mandate of Heaven"', *HHYPP*, 1974, 4, pp. 7–10.
- 26 'Han Fei: chief anti-Confucian General of the Later Warring States', *HHYPP*, 1974, 9, pp. 8–14.
- 27 'Refute "a Superior Man is respectable and not contentious, sociable and not partisan"', *HHYPP*, 1974, 5, pp. 25–6.
- 28 'Why Lin Piao extolled Tung Chung-shu', *HHYPP*, 1974, 5, pp. 14–17.
- 29 'The two-line struggle', *HHYPP*, 1974, 6, pp. 3–9.
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A CHRONOLOGY OF MODERN SHANGHAI 1842-1979

1842-1918

- 1842 Treaty of Nanking designates Shanghai as a Treaty Port.
- 1849 French Concession defined.
Shanghai Library opened.
- 1854 Foundation of Shanghai Municipal Council.
First American Consul takes office.
- 1860 Chinese Shanghai Municipality created from Shanghai County.
- 1861 Chinese newspaper (*Shang-hai hsín-pao*) begins publication.
English language newspaper (*Shanghai Daily News*) begins publication.
- 1865 First telephone wires laid (Shanghai to Woosung). Gas street lighting installed in British-American Concession.
- 1869 Trinity Church (designed by Sir Gilbert Scott) opened.
- 1872 China Merchants Steam Navigation Co. founded.
- 1876 Rail link to Woosung completed (later abandoned).
- 1879 St John's Missionary University established.
- 1882 Electric lighting in Public Gardens.
- 1890 First textile mill established by Li Hung-chang.
- 1895 Mrs Little starts an anti-footbinding movement.
- 1896 First Sino-foreign bank established.
Chinese University established (*Nan-yang kung-hsüeh*).
- 1898 First taxes levied on vehicles and land.
Rail link to Woosung re-established.
- 1900 Indian troops come to protect British in Shanghai from the Boxer threat.
- 1902 Two Oldsmobile cars registered.
- 1905 Shanghai-Nanking railway opened.
- 1908 Public tram service opened.
- 1911 Aeroplane flown over the city by M. Vallon.

CHRONOLOGY

- 1914 First World War.
1918 First Chinese bishop consecrated (Anglican).

1919–1927

- 1919–21 Economic boom caused by the First World War.
1919 March Creation of the Commercial Federation of Shanghai (*Shang-hai shang-yeh kung-f'uan lien-ho-hui*), more radical than the General Chamber of Commerce.
May–June 'May Fourth Movement' in Shanghai.
May–1920 Boycott of Japanese goods.
May Strike of Shanghai students.
June Solidarity strikes of merchants and bankers.
August Creation of the Federation of Street Unions (*ma-lu lien-ho-hui*) grouping the small merchants.
1920 June Organization of the Chinese Ratepayers' Association of the International Settlement.
December Chinese Ratepayers' Association elects an advisory committee to represent the interests of the Chinese residents at the Shanghai Municipal Council.
June–December Commercial crisis caused by monetary factors and the closing of Japanese and Western markets.
1921 spring–winter Speculation crisis on the Stock Exchange (*Hsin-chiao feng-ch'ao*).
July Foundation in Shanghai of the Creation Society (*Ch'uang tsao-she*) by Kuo Mo-jo and Yü Ta-fu. Founding Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in the French Settlement and creation of a Chinese secretariat for the organization of labour.
1921 summer–1922 spring summer Workers' protest movement and stepping-up of strikes. Repression of trade unions and strikers, momentary setback for the workers' movement.
1922 end-1923 Crisis in the Chinese spinning-mills of Shanghai.
1923 First radio broadcasting station established.
July Start of a new anti-Japanese boycott. Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank opens.
1924 August Economic crisis caused by the war between Kiangsu and Chekiang warlords.
1925 May 30 Police of the International Settlement suppress an anti-imperialist demonstration caused by the murder of a Chinese worker in a Japanese spinning-mill in Shanghai.

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- 1–26 June General strike of workers, students and merchants.
June–1926 Anti-Japanese and anti-British boycott.
- 1925 summer Rebirth of the Shanghai workers' movement under the Shanghai General Trade Union, directly linked to the Communist Party.
- 1926 April Three Chinese representatives admitted to the Shanghai Municipal Council.
August The Powers sign treaty surrendering the Mixed Court. A Provisional Court established.

1927–1937

- 1927 February Failure of an insurrectionary strike launched by the Shanghai General Trade Union.
March Kuomintang troops of Chiang Kai-shek enter Shanghai. trade unions of Shanghai.
March Kuomintang troops of Chiang Kai-shek enter Shanghai.
12 April Suppression of the revolutionary movement of Shanghai by Chiang Kai-shek: arrest and execution of trade union leaders, dismantling of communist organizations.
- 1927 April Chinese business circles of Shanghai make Chiang Kai-shek a loan of 10 million dollars.
May The government of Nanking wrings a fresh loan of 30 million dollars out of Chinese businessmen in Shanghai.
July Law establishing the municipal government of the Chinese city (Greater Shanghai Municipality).
- 1928 January–July New wave of extortion and intimidation of the Chinese business community.
March Emergency law allowing the arrest of strike leaders.
April Revision of the law governing the organization of the Greater Shanghai Municipality.
- 1929 March Anti-Kuomintang demonstration by the students of Shanghai. The General Chamber of Commerce put under the control of the Kuomintang, and suppression of the Federation of Street Unions.
- 1929–31 Economic prosperity.
- 1929 July Launching of a fresh anti-Japanese boycott.
October New trade union law according to which the workers' organizations are subject to control of the government and

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- Kuomintang. Dissolution of the National Student Association and prohibition of the Creation Society.
- 1930 February Integration of the Chinese courts of the International Settlement and the national legal system; creation of a District Tribunal (Shanghai Special Area District Court) and of a provincial court of appeal (Second Branch of the Kiangsu High Court).
- March Foundation of the League of Left-wing Writers in Shanghai.
- May Return to customs autonomy.
- September Conference of the Third Party (*Ti-san-tang*).
- October Abolition of *Likin*.
- December Press law establishes strict censorship.
- 1931 January Arrest in Shanghai of the communist leader Ho Meng-hsiung.
- June Arrest in the French Settlement of Hsiang Chung-fa, general secretary of the Communist Party.
- September Arrest of Teng Yen-ta, leader of the Third Party. Mass demonstration in Shanghai and beginning of an anti-Japanese boycott which is to last two years.
- 1932 January–February ‘The Shanghai Incident’: Japanese landing party encounters resistance of 19th Nationalist Army.
- 1932–35 Economic depression.
- 1933 January The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party leaves Shanghai for the Soviet base of Kiangsi.
- April Suppression of the old monetary unit, the *tael*.
- November T. V. Soong, ally and spokesman of the business circles of Shanghai, surrenders the Treasury to H. H. Kung.
- 1935 March ‘Bank Coup’ places the Bank of China and the Bank of Communications under government control, and ends the power of the Chekiang group.
- November Currency reform; the silver standard abandoned; the right to issue money exclusively reserved for governmental banks.
- December Solidarity strike of the students of Shanghai following students’ demonstration in Peking. Formation of the Shanghai Cultural Workers’ National Salvation Association. Shanghai becomes the main centre of the National Salvation (*Chiu-kuo*) Movement.
- 1936 May Reconstruction in Shanghai of the National Student Association. Sixty representatives of 18 cities form the All-China

CHRONOLOGY

Federation of National Salvation Associations, in Shanghai.
November Arrest in Shanghai of seven leaders (the Seven Gentlemen) (*Ch'i chun-tzu*) of the National Salvation Association.

1937-1949

- 1937 July Incident at the Marco Polo bridge and beginning of Sino-Japanese War.
- 1937-49 August Inland transfer of 135 Shanghai factories. Japanese troops besiege and blockade the Chinese districts of Shanghai.
14 August 'Black Saturday': the International Settlement bombed by mistake by Chinese aeroplanes.
August Establishment of a 'peaceful blockade' of the Chinese coast by Japan. Suspension of the activities of Hwangpoo Conservancy Board until December 1939.
November Serious rice riots in the International Settlement. Setting up of a new municipality in the Chinese city of Shanghai: the Tao Tao Municipal Government (*Ta-tao shih cheng-fu*).
December Formation of the Shanghai Citizens' Federation, grouping together about a hundred pro-Japanese businessmen.
- 1938 April Reorganization of Tao Tao Municipal Government to form the Special Municipality of Shanghai.
October Fu Hsiao-en, ex-chairman of the General Chamber of Commerce, becomes mayor of the Special Municipality of Shanghai.
- 1939 May Arrival of Wang Ching-wei in Shanghai, where negotiations begin for the establishment of a national collaborationist government.
August Rice riots in the International Settlement.
September Strike of the tramway companies of the International Settlement and of the French Settlement.
October Assassination of Mayor Fu Hsiao-en.
- 1940 Autumn The new French Consul-General, R. J. de Margerie, asserts the authority of the Vichy Government over the French Settlement.
November Franco-Japanese agreement recognizing the right of the collaborationist government of Wang Ching-wei to appoint judges of the Chinese courts of the French Settlement. Chen Kung-po succeeds Fu Hsiao-en as Head of the Special Municipality of Shanghai.

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- 1941 August The Japanese obtain a third seat in the Shanghai Municipal Council.
8 December The day following the attack of Pearl Harbor, Japanese troops enter the International Settlement.
- 1943 January The Western powers cede their rights and privileges.
August The Japanese likewise renounce their Settlements and their extra-territorial rights.
- 1945 10 September Nationalist troops enter Shanghai.
- 1946 May Wu Kuo-chen is appointed mayor of Shanghai. His dynamic administration earns him the nickname 'The La Guardia of China'.
December Massive student demonstrations on the theme: 'Protest Against American Brutality'.
- 1947 8-15 February Panic inflation.
February The wage index of the workers is frozen.
5-18 March Week of repression directed at the liberal and radical elements in Shanghai.
May-June Student demonstrations against hunger and civil war.
June Labour Union Law re-enforcing government control of the trade unions through the intermediary of the General Labour Union of Shanghai.
- 1948 February Tanks used to suppress strikes in Factory No. 9 of the Sung Sing Company.
April-May Student demonstrations against hunger and American aid to Japan.
19 August New freeze of prices and salaries. Monetary reform of the gold *yuan*. Chiang Ching-kuo sets up a short period of 'economic terror' against speculators.

1949-1955

- 1949 25 May Chen Yi's communist forces enter Shanghai, which is abandoned without a fight by the Nationalists.
December Chen Yun outlines anti-inflationary programme.
- 1950 27 January Third Field Army officially establishes new East China Regional Government.
late summer and autumn Rapid improvement in the economy.
autumn Suppression of Counter-revolutionaries Campaign includes purges of some proletarian 'secret societies' and unions.

CHRONOLOGY

- 1950–1 winter ‘Winter defence’ and ‘Resist America, Aid Korea’ campaigns lead to registration (*teng-chi*) of previous KMT affiliates and many other foreign-associated and non-communist organizations.
- 1951 June Private transactions in foreign currency, gold, and silver are outlawed; police raid on the Shanghai Stock Exchange to ‘arrest speculators’. 56% increase in industrial output reported.
- 1951–2 Five-Anti Campaign to cleanse business practices; Three-Anti Campaign to purge corrupt Party cadres.
- 1952 August Regional Government in East China ceases to be ‘organ of highest state power’ and becomes ‘organ representing the Central People’s Government’ – with no personnel changes.
late Jao Shu-shih, the key political officer of the Third Field Army, joins Liu Shao-ch’i’s delegation to Moscow.
- 1953 spring Shanghai units refuse to allow their workers and staff to go to other parts of China: ‘planning is planning; work is work’.
September Li Fu-ch’un affirms that private enterprises have a positive role in development.
- 1954 Contracts between food merchants and local commodity corporations are regularized; census; rationing; many early ‘joint state-private enterprises’ formed.
February Fall of Jao Shu-shih, for collaboration with national ambitions of Kao Kang.
April Shanghai Party Committee meeting declares itself ‘basically united’ and in obedience to the Centre’s line; Jao’s dismissal is not yet announced.
- 1955 K’o Ch’ing-shih (member of Mao’s study group at Yen-an) is appointed first secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee.
March–April Fall of P’an Han-nien, apparently for insufficient radicalism in applying central policies to Shanghai. Yang Fan, Head of the Shanghai Public Security Bureau for the previous five years, also purged. Severe depression in industry; rising unemployment.
spring New campaign against private sector.
May–August Population swells by migration to ‘over seven millions’. Plan to reduce city by one million announced.
1 September New tax-estimation system for Shanghai industries.

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1956-1965

- 1956-7 Liquidation of Counter-revolutionaries (*su-fan*) coincides with the evolving Hundred Flowers. Period of liberalism. Shanghai concerts celebrate the bicentenary of Mozart, the seventy-fifth anniversary, of Moussorgsky; new literary magazine, *Meng-ya* (*The Sprout*); opening of a Protestant theological seminary with 65 students; Fudan University professors are sent to Cairo and Berlin to teach; more than 3,000 attend Christmas mass at St Ignatius Cathedral; many other signs of liberalism.
- 1956 January Shanghai economic meeting to implement previous November's Peking conference directives on the socialization of industry. Gala celebrations welcome the city's 'transition to socialism' on 20 January.
- 2 May Mao delivers the first version of the Hundred Flowers speech, later played by tape recorder at closed meetings for non-communist Shanghai notables.
- summer Shanghai Democratic League 'actively admitting' new members. Shanghai urban districts reduced from 21 to 15; suburban districts from 1 to 3.
- August Plans announced for Shanghai's *Second* (1958-1962) and *Third* (1963-1967) *Five Year Plans*. Heatwave.
- December Ts'ao Ti-ch'iu, at a meeting of 10,000 cadres, avers that a 20-25% reduction of the Municipal Committee's staff would save one-sixth of its budget, and that half of the 14,000 reports the Council received in 1956 were unnecessary.
- 1957 spring Large *hsia-fang* campaign to reduce city's population.
- May Heyday of Hundred Flowers critiques of Party administration.
- August Sung Li-wen reports on 1956 High Tide and proposes a *reduction* in industrial output for 1957.
- September Shanghai People's Congress legitimates the Anti-Rightist Movement, begun in criticism sessions three months earlier.
- autumn Staffing changes to streamline administration send many cadres to 'lower levels' and often to suburbs. Reorganization of the court system, university and school admissions staffs, many factories and offices.
- November Shanghai transfers 250 high Party cadres from economic to cultural work.
- 1958 January Plans to stabilize city population announced.

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- February Three counties (Chiating, Paoshan, and Shanghai or 'Hsinchuang') are added to the municipal jurisdiction.
- spring Plan for Shanghai to supply capital to East China provinces in return for markets and raw materials.
- second half, esp. September Creation of People's Communes in Shanghai suburbs; process completed by January 1959.
- November Hsü Chien-kuo announces escalating Great Leap industrial successes for 1958. P'utung county is organized within Shanghai's jurisdiction.
- December The State Council approves the addition of seven counties to the municipality: Chinshan, Ch'ingp'u, Ch'uansha, Ch'ungming, Fenghsien, Nanhui, Sungchiang.
- 1959 January Party announces continuation of Leap Forward in Shanghai at slightly slower speed and with integration in national plans.
- February Teng Hsiao-p'ing and Li Fu-ch'un make speeches in Shanghai on the city's industrial future.
- spring Movement to strengthen economic inspection and clear warehouses, because of Leap materials shortages.
- summer-1960 summer Addition of at least 80,000 new Party members in Shanghai.
- 1959 September Junior- and middle-school population reported as nearly two million, compared to 562,000 in 1949. Students in higher education reported as increasing from 20,000 to 46,000 in same period.
- 1960 January Urban districts are completely reorganized; 10 contiguous ones within the city, plus Minhsing and Wusung urban districts in satellite towns.
- May Ts'ao Ti-ch'iu announces a planned 45% leap forward in industrial production for 1960.
- 1961 P'utung county is absorbed into Ch'uansha county and adjacent urban districts.
- spring 'Second Hundred Flowers' in Shanghai brings forth few blossoms of criticism. Labour unrest reported in factories.
- 1962 June Orders issued for ploughing up of unutilized construction land.
- August Improvement in handicraft output.
- September Severe typhoon.
- Temple fairs and other small urban markets show economic recuperation after good harvests.

CHRONOLOGY

- November Interest-free loans made to suburban People's Communes.
- 1963 January Chou En-lai praises Shanghai. Output of chemicals and equipment for agriculture given priority.
spring Chang Ch'un-ch'iao appointed to head the Municipal Party Propaganda Department. Mayor K'o thus takes a hard line against local dissidents (especially writers) who resent the results of the Leap.
December Chiang Ch'ing present at the East China Drama Festival, and later at other conferences involving the PLA.
- 1964 Wusung and Minhsing urban districts revert to Paoshan and Shanghai counties respectively. Thereafter, the 10 districts and 10 counties of Shanghai long remain constant (except for some minor shifts between them). The army expands its role in organizing athletic training, radio clubs, navigation clubs, shooting clubs, swims across the Hwangpoo, factory militias, and 'love the people months' to foster the popularity of the police. More soldiers participate in suburban harvests. Military summer camps are expanded for schoolchildren. 'Political departments' following the PLA model are established in some government units, even in a few handicraft co-operatives and street factories.
April Increase in cotton sown area reported. Completion of Shanghai International Airport.
May Cable under the Hwangpoo links P'utung to the East China electric grid, spurs development east of Shanghai.
August Good harvest in suburbs.
- 1965 February Industrial situation reported highly favourable.
9 April Mayor K'o Ch'ing-shih dies. Liu chairs the funeral committee, including Mao, Chou, Lin, Lo, even Chang Ch'un-ch'iao. At the end of the year, economic Party leader Ts'ao Ti-ch'iu is elected mayor.
middle-1966 middle About 20,000 new members, largely youths, are admitted to the Party in Shanghai.
- 1965 summer The army holds a municipal militia work conference to strengthen its organization in factories 'with demobilized servicemen and veterans as the backbone'.
10 November Shanghai's national importance is emphasized by the *Cultural Daily* publication of Yao Wen-yüan's critique of 'Hai Jui Dismissed from Office', written by a deputy mayor of Peking. This begins the Cultural Revolution on the national scene.

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1966-1979

1966 March Shanghai designated an 'Outstanding Agricultural Unit' in China.

spring Local Cultural Revolution attacks are launched against publisher Li Chün-min and musician Ho Lü-t'ing.

August Red Guard groups emerge from school clubs. The 'Sixteen Points' of the Central Committee paralyse public security cadres in Shanghai. Mass rallies are called by various groups. The Party educational leader in Shanghai, Ch'ang Hsi-p'ing, called a 'revisionist' by Peking Red Guard Nieh Yüan-tzu, is defended by Ts'ao Ti-ch'iu.

September Many official calls, by Ts'ao, Chang, Chou, Lin, for Red Guards to stay out of factories and fields.

November Workers' General Headquarters demands recognition from Municipal Committee, which refuses. Four hundred workers commandeered a train for Peking, but are stopped in the suburbs, where Chang Ch'un-ch'iao finally signs their demands on 12 November. At the end of the month, student Red Revolutionaries raided the Shanghai post office and *Liberation Daily* office, demanding that a statement by Nieh Yüan-tzu be printed and distributed.

December Conflicts between more and less radical workers occur in factories and in the post office, after radical tabloids are distributed. Ts'ao Ti-ch'iu and Ch'en P'ei-hsien are criticized by the Workers' General Headquarters. Scarlet Guards and suburban peasants also hold rallies and sit-ins, declaring a general strike at the end of the month. Scarlet Guards now head for Peking, but they conflict with a Workers' Headquarters group at K'unshan. Railroad signals are cut.

1967 January Chang Ch'un-ch'iao returns to Shanghai; he uses the seized *Cultural Daily* to organize disparate radicals. But Keng Chin-chang, without military support, attempts a similar organization of other workers.

February Chang presides over the Shanghai People's Commune, with Army support, for three weeks. He is opposed by Keng groups. Many opposition leaders and students returned from the countryside are arrested.

March The new Revolutionary Committee orders schools reopened, youths back to the countryside, restoration of law and order.

CHRONOLOGY

- April The city's economy still sluggish; backlog on wharves. District Revolutionary Committees put down opposition over the next year and more with difficulty.
- autumn 'Three-way alliances', 'attack with words, defend with force' groups, and Mao Tse-tung Thought propaganda teams, are established in many units, often with Army participation.
- 1968 January A new 'Great Leap Forward' is announced in Shanghai.
- autumn Editorials cite the need to re-establish a strong Party. May 7 cadre schools are established by urban districts in the suburbs.
- November Record harvest reported.
- 1969 July A local campaign is mounted against the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius, before this becomes national or is associated with criticism of Lin Piao.
- 1970 The national emphasis on self-sufficiency in each province, and some difficulties in rebuilding Shanghai's hinterland markets and supply sources, temporarily hinder expansion.
- August Network of Stations for Scientific Information and Exchange established.
- 1971 September Lin Piao is purged as Defence Minister by a civilian coalition, including Shanghai 'radicals', Chou En-lai, and Mao Tse-tung. The Party is further strengthened in local politics.
- 1972 February The Shanghai Communiqué is finalized on a trip by the US President to China. Report that one third of employees in industry and communications are female.
- 1973 February Shanghai holds first province-level Congress of the Young Communist League since the Cultural Revolution.
- March Large increases in agricultural machinery output reported for 1965-73.
- August Shanghai leaders Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and Wang Hung-wen are elevated to the Standing Committee of the Politburo. Wang, aged 36, presents the new national constitution at the Tenth CCP Congress and is listed third (after Mao and Chou) in protocol rosters.
- September Shanghai begins to publish a monthly journal *Hsueh-hsi yü p'i-p'an* (*Study and Criticism*), a potential rival in the ideological field to *Hung-ch'i* (*Red Flag*).
- 1974 January Hsü Shih-yu is replaced as commander of the East China Military Region by Ting Sheng, in a general reshuffling of

CHRONOLOGY

- high military assignments announced by Chou En-lai. Construction of Shanghai General Petro-Chemical Works begins.
- 1975 January Chou En-lai, at National People's Congress, proposes 'comprehensive modernization' in agriculture, industry, national defence, and science and technology. This implies greater use of efficient economic processes at Shanghai.
- 1976 October After the death of Mao Tse-tung, the three most prominent Shanghai leaders (Chang, Wang, Yao) join Mao's widow in the notorious Gang of Four. Su Chen-hua, a naval commander who had been purged in 1967 and rehabilitated in 1972, heads the new local administration. Shanghai politicians are less nationally ambitious for a while. Disappearance of *HHYPP*.
- 1977 August Financial recovery reported.
December Major articles in national press emphasize Shanghai's economic importance and record.
- 1978 February Announcement of huge new steel complex to be built by the Japanese at Paoshan.
March Shanghai's first secretary announces that: 'Shanghai will become China's major scientific and technical base.'
April Budget data reveal income shortfalls 1974-6. Shanghai installs China's first computerized telephone enquiry system.
- 1979 February Reports of mass meetings and sabotage in protest against the Rustication of Shanghai youth.

Note

This chronology is based on materials supplied by Marie-Claire Bergère and Lynn White, which were supplemented by the editor with other information from standard sources.

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