

CAPITAL CITIES

LES CAPITALES



PERSPECTIVES
INTERNATIONALES

INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES

EDITED BY
JOHN TAYLOR, JEAN G. LENGELLÉ and CAROLINE ANDREW

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INTRODUCTION

The papers and the commentary in this collection are a product of an international colloquium entitled “Capital Cities: How to Ensure their Effective and Harmonious Development,” which was held in Ottawa, Canada, December 6 to 8, 1990.

The written volume unfolds as the conference did, and, like it, can be considered in five parts:

- I. What Is a Capital City?
- II. The Roles and Activities of Capital Cities
- III. Capitals: Symbolism and the Built Environment
- IV. Capitals for the Future
- V. Avenues for Research

The reader is, however, invited to enter the volume through the door of greatest interest, as the papers and much of the commentary will stand alone, despite the rationale the organizers placed upon it.

In many respects, the colloquium was initiated and was an effort to address the last item on the program, “Avenues for Research,” not just in the final session, but throughout the event. The program reveals some of the research concerns—realistic or not—of the organizers. It thus seems only normal to ask, Who were the organizers?

The organizers and sponsors were two. First was the National Capital Commission (NCC), charged by the federal government with the planning and development of the National Capital Region, an area over which it has practical influence by right of eminent domain of the senior government, but no de jure control under the Canadian constitution. In recent years, its avenues of influence have altered quite dramatically, shifting from an emphasis on the tangible or “built” capital to an emphasis on its intangible qualities. And the shift has been made in a context—both national and international—that seems to be demanding some modification of the nation-state. The NCC lacked an autonomous research arm that might be used in such a theatre of change.

The second major organizer was “Canada’s Capital Tri-University Study Group,” representing the three universities in the capital region: the Université du Québec à Hull; the University of Ottawa; and Carleton

University. They have expertise and interest, both in their research and in their teaching programs, in the National Capital Region, but were lacking a vehicle or a focus for their special skills, which seemed to complement each other's and also those of the NCC.

Neither group was interested in agonizing over problems already addressed elsewhere, and to which solutions had been found. Nor did either wish to ignore concerns that were at the centre of agendas elsewhere.

The strategy was to work out and then pose some rather general questions to a number of scholars and administrators—most from other places—who had a reputation for thinking about either cities in general or capital cities in particular. Their written papers, their brief statements at the colloquium and the general discussion became, in part or whole, the raw material for keynote speakers, chairs and commentators, Canadians all. In this way, the organizers hoped a wide body of experience could be interpreted in a peculiarly Canadian fashion, without restricting the range of discussion.

It might also be said that peculiarly Canadian prospects formed the subtext of the conference: it followed on a wrenching summer that had seen the collapse of the Meech Lake Accord, the Oka crisis and a profound disillusionment with the political process. A strained civility marked the conference, which began in irony as delegates, on a glorious winter's day, lunched in the very Meech Lake conference centre in which the Accord had been hammered out.

But this was not the only preoccupation that marked the conference. Clearly, for the Europeans the matters of consuming interest were a capital for a united Germany, and one for the solidifying European Community. Where would these capitals be? What would they do? What would they mean?

And, finally, delegates were gently reminded of the rather parochial nature of Canadian and European concerns when compared with the daily life-and-death problems of capital cities in the developing world, and of those of marginalized groups all over the world. Capitals also have embedded in their spaces and activities a dark side of the human experience.

Such contemporary influences in a sense reinforced what was probably the dominant, and somewhat paradoxical thread in the conference: that capitals undergo change in different ways and by different means, even though they are often faced with similar and perennial roles and functions. They can have much in common, but at the same time are idiosyncratic.

At any rate, it became clear from the first that capitals were and are different in both time and space. They are profoundly influenced by their cultures and their histories. Some, for example, are capitals of the "head",

others of the “heart”. Moreover, they have mutated and itinerated in the past and are likely to do so in the future, though whether as utopias or dystopias is not certain.

Such change, it became clear, was not whimsical, but had profound meaning for and influence on respective capital cultures. They, indeed, may be among the most important institutions of any culture and can be trifled with at some peril. They are certainly not mere pork barrels to be filled or emptied at the whim of their masters, or even simple reflectors of, or the embodiment of, an existing condition. Rather, they may be instrumental: the beginning and not the end of stasis and innovation alike. There is little reason to think their role will be much different in the “global” world, so much a part of the conference agenda.

Conferences are as a rule the product of the work and ideas of many. This one was no exception. Our host for the conference and the person who initially brought the organizers together was Jean Pigott, the then chair of the National Capital Commission (NCC). Moral and financial support and an elegant introductory statement was provided by Graeme Kirby, the then executive vice-president and general manager of the NCC. Pierre Allard, retired from the NCC, was a wise choice as a member of the organizing group. The man who made it all work, from beginning almost to the end, and to whom never enough credit can be given, was Alain Guimont, at the time with the policy branch of the NCC. His work was brought to completion by Ron Desroches, responsible for strategic management at the NCC.

The heads of the three universities—Robin Farquhar, president of Carleton University; Jacques Plamondon, rector of the Université du Québec à Hull; and Marcel Hamelin, rector of the University of Ottawa—provided not only benediction for the tri-university group, but graced the conference personally and provided memorable hospitality.

Their working teams in the tri-university group—one of the first efforts in the national capital to bring the three universities together—did much to shape the questions that informed the conference and to identify the participants. They were as follows: from the University of Ottawa, Professor Caroline Andrew, Political Science, and Senator Gerald Beaudoin, of the Faculty of Law, Civil Law Section; from the Université du Québec à Hull, Jean G. Lengellé, dean of Graduate Studies and Research, and Professor Pierre Delorme, of the Department of Administrative Science; and from Carleton University, Professor Katherine Graham, of the School of Public Administration, and Professor John H. Taylor, of the Department of History.

Finally, a note of thanks is due to “Convergences”, the facilitators who

brought us all together at the same time from many parts of the globe; to the graphics designers who prepared the conference material; to the keyboarders, translators and secretaries, particularly Manon Leclerc and Francine D'Amour of the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Ottawa, who converted our words into usable and printable forms; and to the team at Carleton University Press, particularly Steven Uriarte, David Lawrence, and Madge Pon, who made the final publication possible.

John Taylor, Jean G. Lengellé, Caroline Andrew

INTRODUCTION

Les articles ainsi que les commentaires de ce recueil proviennent du colloque international intitulé *Les capitales : conditions de leur développement efficace et harmonieux* qui s'est tenu à Ottawa, au Canada, du 6 au 8 décembre 1990.

Le volume est agencé comme l'était la conférence et peut donc être subdivisé en cinq parties :

- I. Qu'est-ce qu'une capitale?
- II. Les rôles et les activités des capitales.
- III. Les capitales : le symbolisme et le cadre bâti.
- IV. Les capitales du futur.
- V. Les axes de recherche.

Toutefois, le lecteur pourra aborder l'ouvrage comme bon lui semble car les articles et une grande partie des commentaires sont autonomes, et ce en dépit de l'agencement logique voulu par les organisateurs.

À bien des égards, le colloque avait été mis sur pied pour traiter de la dernière question mentionnée supra — Les Axes de recherche — et ce, non comme dernier point de discussion, mais bien comme thème du colloque lui-même. En un sens, le programme révèle quelques-unes des préoccupations des organisateurs en matière de recherche, qu'elles soient réalistes ou non. À ce stade donc, il serait peut-être indiqué de mentionner qui étaient les organisateurs.

Le premier d'entre eux était la Commission de la Capitale nationale, la CCN, mandatée par le gouvernement fédéral pour planifier et aménager la région de la Capitale nationale — région où la Commission opère en vertu du droit d'expropriation à des fins publiques, détenu par le gouvernement fédéral, mais sur laquelle la constitution canadienne ne lui permet aucun contrôle de jure. Pendant les dernières années, ses sphères d'intervention ont considérablement changé; de la capitale « bâtie » ou tangible, l'accent a maintenant glissé vers ses propriétés intangibles. Par ailleurs, ce changement s'est produit dans un contexte, national et international, qui semble appeler une modification de l'État-nation. La CCN ne disposait pas alors d'une aile de recherche autonome qui pourrait servir dans le contexte de tels changements.

Le second organisateur en importance, *le Groupe d'étude inter-universitaire sur la Capitale du Canada*, représentait les trois universités de la région de la Capitale : l'université du Québec à Hull, l'Université d'Ottawa et Carleton University. Leurs programmes de recherche et d'enseignement reflétaient les compétences et les intérêts de ces universités pour la région de la Capitale nationale, mais il leur manquait un point de convergence, un véhicule pour canaliser leurs aptitudes, qui, avec celles de la CCN, semblaient pourtant se compléter mutuellement.

Ces partenaires ne voulaient ni s'éterniser sur des problèmes déjà traités ailleurs, et pour lesquels il existait déjà des solutions, ni adopter la politique de l'autruche sur des questions qui étaient au centre de discussions ailleurs.

La méthode consistait à formuler des questions plutôt générales et à les poser ensuite à un certain nombre de chercheurs et d'administrateurs — provenant principalement d'autres lieux — qui s'étaient bâti une réputation en se spécialisant dans le domaine de l'urbanisme en général ou dans celui des capitales en particulier. Leurs réponses sont devenues le point de départ des conférenciers principaux, des présidents et des commentateurs, tous des Canadiens. Les organisateurs comptaient ainsi permettre l'interprétation d'un vaste ensemble de connaissances selon une approche tout à fait canadienne, sans pour autant limiter le champ de discussion.

On pourrait aussi ajouter que certaines considérations essentiellement canadiennes se profilaient en filigrane dans cette conférence : cette dernière se tenait après l'été de tous les malheurs qui avait vu l'agonie et la mort de l'Accord du Lac Meech, la crise d'Oka et une profonde désillusion pour ce qui touche à la politique. Tenue sous le signe d'une bienveillance quelque peu embarrassée, cette conférence à commencé ironiquement, par une belle journée d'hiver, par un déjeuner dans ce même centre de conférences du Lac Meech où l'Accord avait été élaboré avec difficulté.

Toutefois, d'autres préoccupations s'étaient aussi manifestées lors du colloque. De toute évidence, les Européens étaient vivement préoccupés par la question d'une capitale pour une Allemagne ré-unifiée, et d'une autre pour la communauté européenne en voie de réalisation. Où se situeraient ces capitales? Quels seraient leurs rôles? Que signifieraient-elles?

Finalement, on a gentiment rappelé aux participants le caractère plutôt chauvin des préoccupations canadiennes et européennes quand on évoque les questions de vie et de mort auxquelles doivent quotidiennement faire face les capitales des pays en voie de développement ainsi

que celles des blocs marginalisés du monde entier. La vie des capitales est aussi insufflée des ténèbres de l'aventure humaine.

De telles influences contemporaines ont, en un sens, renforcé ce qu'était probablement le thème prépondérant et la trame quelque peu paradoxale de cette conférence : les capitales changent de différentes façons et par différents moyens, et pourtant elles assument souvent les mêmes rôles et les mêmes fonctions. Elles ont de nombreuses choses en commun et possèdent pourtant leurs caractéristiques propres.

De toute façon il était clair, d'emblée, que les capitales ont différé et diffèrent les unes des autres, dans le temps comme dans l'espace. Elles sont profondément influencées par leur culture et leur histoire. Certaines, par exemple, sont les capitales du «cerveau», d'autres celles du «coeur». Qui plus est, elles ont connu des mutations et ont erré dans le passé, et rien ne les empêche d'en faire autant dans le futur. Reste à savoir si leur périple feront d'elles des utopies ou des « dystopies ».

Une telle mutation, ne relève pas de quelque aléas, mais revêt plutôt une profonde signification pour leur culture et exerce sur elle une influence considérable. Les capitales pourraient en effet se classer parmi les institutions les plus importantes dont dispose une culture et ce serait un peu jouer avec le feu que de les prendre à la légère. Elles ne sont surtout pas des assiettes au beurre que l'on remplit ou que l'on vide au gré des caprices de leurs maîtres, ou encore de simple reflets ou incarnations d'une condition existante. Elles seraient plutôt, le début, et non la fin, à la fois de l'immobilisme et de l'innovation. Il y a peu de raisons de penser que leur rôle serait vraiment différent dans un monde « planétaire ».

Les colloques sont généralement une alliance des efforts et des idées de plusieurs. Celui-ci n'échappait pas à la règle. Présidente de la Commission de la Capitale nationale, Mme Jean Pigott était l'animatrice du colloque et celle qui a rassemblé les organisateurs au départ. M. Graeme Kirby, à l'époque vice-président exécutif et directeur général de la CCN, a offert son soutien moral et financier et prononcé un élégant discours d'ouverture. La nomination de M. Pierre Allard, retraité de la CCN, au sein du comité organisateur a aussi été un choix judicieux. Celui sur qui reposait tout le succès du colloque, du début à la presque toute fin, et pour qui nous ne tarirons jamais d'éloges, était M. Alain Guimont, de la Direction des politiques de la CCN, à l'époque. Son travail a été parachevé, en phase finale, par M. Ronald Desroches, de la gestion stratégique à la CCN.

Les dirigeants des trois universités — M. Robin Farquhar, président de Carleton University, M. Jacques Plamondon, recteur de l'Université du Québec à Hull et M. Marcel Hamelin, recteur de l'Université d'Ottawa — n'ont pas seulement apporté leur bénédiction au Groupe d'étude inter-

universitaire, mais ont honoré la conférence de leur présence et ont fait preuve d'une hospitalité inoubliable.

La CCN et le Groupe d'étude inter-universitaire — une des premières initiatives pour réunir les trois universités de la capitale nationale — ont beaucoup fait pour formuler les questions et choisir les participants. En faisaient partie : la professeure Caroline Andrew (science politique) et le sénateur Gérald Beaudoin (faculté de droit), tous deux de l'Université d'Ottawa; M. Jean G. Lengellé, doyen des études avancées et de la recherche, et le professeur Pierre Delorme (sciences administratives), de l'Université du Québec à Hull; et enfin, de Carleton University, la professeure Katherine Graham, de l'École d'administration publique, et le professeur John H. Taylor (département d'histoire).

Pour terminer, nous remercions *Convergences*, les facilitateurs qui ont rassemblés les participants des quatre coins du globe, les concepteurs graphiques, les traducteurs et les secrétaires, particulièrement Francine D'Amour et Manon Leclerc de la Faculté des sciences sociales de l'Université d'Ottawa, qui ont transformé nos gribouillages en des messages intelligibles et l'équipe de Carleton University Press, particulièrement Steven Uriarte, David Lawrence, et Madge Pon, grâce à qui une publication finale a été possible

John Taylor, Jean G. Lengellé, Caroline Andrew

I

**WHAT IS A CAPITAL CITY?
QU'EST-CE QU'UNE CAPITALE?**

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CAPITAL CITIES: WHAT IS A CAPITAL?

John Meisel

What distinguishes the capital from other places? Does it have a particular place in human affairs and among cities? How can the place be identified, and does it change once it becomes a capital?

A number of worldwide sociopolitical developments impose certain limits and conditions on the answers one is likely to proffer to these questions. One of these follows from the ongoing information revolution and from changes in ubiquitous economic patterns. These developments are accompanied by two concurrent but seemingly incompatible tendencies. On the one hand, McLuhan's global village is upon us: globalization places a great many activities and thoughts in a worldwide context, interfering with national, regional and local perspectives. Values, organizations, activities and entertainment are increasingly not only shared by people throughout the world but also often influenced by far-flung multinational companies claiming the world as their oyster. This means, for instance, that the same television programs are seen in many countries, creating reference points that are widely shared throughout the world. But at the same time, people seem to hanker for more intimate local experiences and networks. Thus, on the one hand, a newspaper, for example, *USA Today* is available via satellite not only throughout America but elsewhere as well, cutting into the markets of more localized media. But, on the other hand, local neighbourhood weeklies, which are often free and sustained merely by advertising, cater to the needs of people at a cozy, parochial level. It is there that a distraught pet owner can advertise the loss of a loved kitten. These two concurrent but somewhat opposing tendencies impinge on traditional mindsets engendered by national and regional contexts. It is likely that the way in which capitals are perceived and utilized will become affected by the changing networks in which people increasingly find themselves.

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Another almost ubiquitous trend also affects capitals. It is the widespread predilection for placing great confidence in markets, rather than government planning, and the related tendency towards privatization. Capital cities thrive on *dirigisme*: when decision making by policy makers is replaced by that of scattered consumer choices, the sites of the former planners and allocators lose influence and become less relevant.

A related third factor also enhances this trend. Pluralism is in the ascendancy almost everywhere, subtly changing the emphasis in people's priorities from shared, widely flung values embracing the whole community to more limited ones. In Canada, for instance, the efforts of dominant elites, which historically focused on achieving national unity, improving relations between French and English, and methods of mitigating regional economic disparities, are now much more diversified and dispersed. Feminism, multiculturalism, redress of grievances of native populations, helping the handicapped: these are new concerns added to those that pre-occupied earlier generations. They rivet the attention of the political class on topics that are subnational and that deal with only a part of the population. Equally important, they occupy the time and energy of activists, many of whom might previously have concentrated on pan-Canadian issues. As a consequence, the elite structure of the country is undergoing change. Where previously the dominant groups tended to be male, of British and French origin, and largely coming from middle-class families, the present composition of the movers and shakers is much more diversified. Whatever the salutary consequences of this process—and they are significant—it also results in the political agenda being taken up with sectorial rather than country-wide concerns. While the decisions about many of these are normally taken in the capital, they need not necessarily be so, and hence what might be called “the new pluralism” may impinge on the place of capital cities in the lives of communities.

A final thought so insistently throbs in my consciousness that I cannot suppress it, although its relevance to the opening topic is at best marginal. It is that capital cities are an important index to the dominant political values of their countries. And the lesson a capital city teaches may shed unusual light on the community it serves, light that is not revealed elsewhere. This fact is strikingly evident in a comparison of Washington and Ottawa. The conventional wisdom, nourished no doubt by an oft-quoted analysis of Herschel Hardin in *A Nation Unaware: The Canadian Economic Culture* (Vancouver, J.J. Douglas 1974), argues that Canada's value system predisposes the country towards public enterprise, which is handled well here, whereas the United States finds private enterprise more congenial and has developed it with great panache. The public sector, in

this view, is disparaged in the United States and prized in Canada. But the magnificent architecture of Washington strongly challenges this view. Public buildings, including the offices of the major government departments, make an extremely eloquent statement about the importance attached to the State and its role in the national life. In the Ottawa area, by contrast, most government departments are housed in private buildings leased from various developers. The majestic aura of Washington is totally lacking, with the exception of only a few edifices scattered throughout the region with minimal impact. The sole exception is Parliament Hill: a tiny enclave now completely dwarfed by commercial structures nearby. The alleged public enterprise culture has allowed the private sector to thwart the physical enshrinement of the country's heart in pleasing public places, whereas the supposed capital of a market-driven society displays immense splendour through public edifices protected from commercial intrusion. The layout and architectural nature of capitals is here seen to express philosophies that may consciously be denied about the beliefs and priorities of national communities.

The complexity of the matters under discussion is revealed by the fact that, as you will have seen and will continue to experience, Ottawa, through the efforts of the National Capital Commission, has made heroic and often successful efforts to offset the consequences of the heavy intrusion of the private sector, allied to the parties holding office at various times. The lesson to be learned from this is perhaps that both values and capital cities are immensely subtle and complicated things, the full nature of which requires extensive study.

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UNE CAPITALE EST-ELLE L'EXPRESSION D'UNE SÉMIOSPHERE NATIONALE OU LE LIEU DE MISE EN SCÈNE DU POUVOIR ?

Claude Raffestin

Autour d'un mot. . .

En français, le mot « capitale » est une ellipse de l'expression « ville capitale » dont l'usage est déjà repérable au XV^e siècle. A partir du XVII^e, on parle le plus souvent de « capitale ». La même observation vaut pour l'italien et l'anglais. On a conservé, d'ailleurs, dans la période contemporaine, l'expression *capital city* en anglais. Le substantif « capitale » procède du latin *capitalis*, dont la racine est *caput* (tête). Il en va de même en allemand avec le mot composé *Hauptstadt* (*Haupt* signifiant la tête). Le caractère agglutinant du mot composé allemand n'a pas suscité l'ellipse.

Les langues que je viens d'évoquer appartiennent toutes au groupe indo-européen, et il n'est pas inutile de remonter à l'origine du mot « tête » et à son emploi, qui ne sont pas purement métaphoriques, pour comprendre l'apparition du mot dans ce contexte. Émile Benveniste, lorsqu'il traite de l'autorité du roi dans *Le Vocabulaire des institutions indo-européennes*, explique que le mot grec *Krainein* s'utilise à propos de la divinité, qui sanctionne d'un signe de tête et, « par imitation de l'autorité divine, du roi qui donne force exécutoire à un projet, une proposition mais sans l'exécuter lui-même »¹. Ainsi, *Kraino* (signe de tête) devient « l'expression spécifique de l'acte d'autorité-divine à l'origine, puis royale, et même susceptible d'autres extensions précisées par les contextes – qui permet à une parole de se réaliser en acte »². Ainsi, dès les origines, dans le groupe indo-européen, l'autorité sanctionnerait par des « signes de tête » pour faire passer de la parole à l'acte. Le signe est l'expression

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métonymique de l'autorité : l'autorité réside dans le roi (*rex*), qui est aussi celui qui trace les limites (*regere fines*), d'une ville par exemple. L'autorité résidant dans un homme, celle-là peut s'exercer de partout et, en tout cas, là où est cet homme à un moment donné. Cela signifie que l'autorité, celle-là même qui se manifeste par un « signe de tête », n'est pas une chose mais l'exercice d'un pouvoir qui est consubstantiel au roi légitime ou reconnu comme tel. Finalement, le lieu d'où se manifeste le « signe de tête » n'est rien d'autre que le support de la « personne investie », c'est tout au plus une localisation accidentelle qui peut être changée, s'il y a nécessité. Etymologiquement, la capitale ne serait pas d'abord un lieu mais « une personne qui dans un lieu manifesterait son autorité par des signes de tête ». Autrement dit, l'importance du lieu serait secondaire et la capitale ne serait pas d'abord une ville. Bien évidemment, on se réfère là à un contexte politico-religieux et socio-linguistique dont l'ancienneté s'enracine dans des populations nomades ou semi-nomades.

Si pour des raisons évidentes, relativement à l'évolution des structures et des pratiques politiques, le lieu a fini par supplanter la personne investie de l'autorité, on commettrait une erreur grave en pensant que ce qui, pour certains, s'apparente au mythe, n'a pas perduré sous des formes remanentes à travers l'histoire. Faisons le chemin à l'envers pour trouver les traces de ces fondations aujourd'hui presque oubliées. Londres ne fut-elle pas pendant la dernière guerre mondiale bien plus que la capitale du Royaume-Uni ? Ne fut-elle pas, en effet, la capitale temporaire de la France libre, d'où partaient les paroles d'un général méconnu dont les « signes de tête » finirent par s'imposer ? Combien d'autres gouvernements en exil, toujours à Londres, n'ont-ils pas utilisé la capitale britannique comme support d'un pouvoir vacillant mais bien réel ? La Suisse n'a-t-elle pas pendant longtemps eu une capitale mobile, en vertu de l'institution du *vorort*, dont la ville qui lui servait de siège temporaire jouait le rôle de capitale ? Avant Addis Ababa, Aksoum, Harrar et Gronda n'ont-elles pas, quand bien même avec un moindre éclat, été le siège du pouvoir éthiopien ? Jusqu'à la Révolution française, la cour n'a-t-elle pas été ce « centre mobile » sur lequel on s'orientait³⁷ ?

Héritage de mots, héritage d'idées, disait Léon Brunschvicg, philosophe français quelque peu oublié. Il s'agit sans doute de cela mais, à mon sens, de beaucoup plus. Le langage est un territoire, au même titre que le territoire matériel dans lequel nous vivons, qu'on peut soumettre à une archéologie du savoir dont Michel Foucault nous a donné quelques clés. La langue possède une épaisseur dont les appareils conceptuels gardent des traces alors même que les origines sont oubliées. Se couper de cette épaisseur, c'est rompre une continuité entre les mots, les idées et les

choses. La rupture de cette continuité est le tribut payé au scientisme par les sciences humaines, qui ont choisi la voie du réalisme métaphysique. Considérer une capitale comme une ville investie de fonctions particulières dites politiques ne m'apparaît pas seulement réducteur – tout modèle l'est par nature – mais erroné dans l'exacte mesure où l'on oublie que le pouvoir n'est pas une chose mais une communication, autrement dit l'exercice d'une relation. Foucault, à qui on doit une des plus pertinentes analyses du pouvoir, l'a remarquablement démontré en expliquant que le pouvoir est consubstantiel à toute relation⁴. Le pouvoir ne se possède pas, il s'exerce.

Dans ces conditions, il est difficile de se représenter la « fonction de capitale » – appelons-la ainsi en attendant quelque chose de plus précis – comme n'importe quelle autre fonction qui s'épuise et trouve sa fin dans la réalisation du besoin qui l'a faite naître. Bien que le langage courant et le sens commun ratifient aisément « le besoin de pouvoir », celui-ci n'appartient pas, même selon les analyses les plus fonctionnalistes, à l'ensemble des besoins traditionnels, et cela pour la bonne et simple raison que son exercice est satisfait à l'occasion de toutes les relations déclenchées par la satisfaction justement... de ces besoins.

Le pouvoir, comme l'a fort justement défini Jean-William Lapierre, est la capacité de transformer par le travail tout autant l'environnement physique que l'environnement social⁵.

La capitale n'est pas un lieu fixe...

A fortiori elle n'est pas une ville, ou plutôt elle n'était pas d'abord une ville. Norbert Elias, grand sociologue allemand qui vient de mourir à 93 ans, définissait le « centre mobile » qu'était la cour comme « l'organe représentatif » des structures sociales de l'ancien régime. La domination du roi sur le pays n'était qu'une extension de l'autorité du prince sur sa maison et sa cour⁶. Et Elias d'ajouter : « Rien, si ce n'est le désir de réunir toutes les fonctions dans un seul complexe, n'indique un lien fonctionnel avec la ville. On pourrait transplanter une telle maison sans grands changements à la campagne. Son propriétaire n'appartient au tissu urbain qu'en sa qualité de consommateur »⁷.

Elias insiste sur ce problème de l'appartenance : « Il est certain que les hommes de cour sont des citadins, la vie citadine les a marqués dans une certaine mesure. Mais leurs liens avec la ville sont bien moins solides que ceux de la bourgeoisie exerçant une activité professionnelle »⁸. On ne peut mieux montrer l'opposition qu'il pouvait y avoir entre la fonction

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de capitale et les autres fonctions urbaines⁹. Alors que les fonctions économiques, pour autant qu'elles manifestent une certaine importance, ont besoin de structures urbaines fixes, la fonction de capitale, jusqu'à un certain point, peut s'en passer : « L'opposition s'est conservée même si elle ne s'exprime plus à travers le phénomène curial »¹⁰.

Il n'est pas rare, en effet, que la fonction de capitale, dans certains États, soit dispersée pour des raisons diverses. En Afrique du Sud, le siège du gouvernement est à Pretoria et le siège du parlement est à Cape Town. Si en Suisse, le gouvernement et le parlement sont à Berne, le tribunal fédéral est à Lausanne et à Lucerne celui des assurances. Rien n'empêche d'imaginer une décentralisation de fonctions économiques mais, en général, celles-ci, pour des raisons d'économies externes, offrent une plus grande résistance au déplacement, et cela d'autant plus que la décision est de nature privée. La translation de la fonction de capitale n'est pas non plus aisée, comme Brasilia peut en témoigner, en raison des liens et des habitudes tissées au fil du temps, mais elle semble néanmoins assez facile selon les circonstances. Il ne s'agit pas d'entrer dans le détail de ces translations politiques, mais leur évocation est indispensable pour comprendre la nature de la fonction de capitale.

Cette fonction tient plus aux hommes de pouvoir qu'aux choses dans la mesure où ceux-là sont porteurs, tout à la fois, d'un projet politique et d'un projet social. Lorsque Pierre le Grand décide de créer Saint-Petersbourg, il a « en tête » un projet socio-politique fondamental : occidentaliser la Russie et créer une marine de guerre. Dès lors, Moscou, ville continentale et siège de la tradition, ne saurait lui convenir. Il déplace donc la capitale et il crée cette ville admirable sur la Néva.

En Italie, le déplacement de la capitale de Turin à Florence puis à Rome souligne les progrès de l'unité italienne dans les deux premières décennies après 1850. En l'occurrence, il s'agit de la conjugaison d'un projet politique et d'une agrégation territoriale corrélative.

Le déplacement de la capitale au Japon de Kyoto à Tokyo est évidemment l'expression d'une modernisation portée par l'ère du Meiji.

La décision d'Ataturk de transférer la fonction de capitale d'Istanbul à Ankara s'inscrit également dans un projet dont la volonté, de rompre avec un passé par trop compromis, est très forte.

Brasilia, pour y revenir, est un cas sensiblement différent car la nouvelle capitale, réalisée dans les années soixante, n'est rien d'autre que la concrétisation d'un projet constitutionnel de la République brésilienne de 1889, formulé au lendemain de la chute de l'Empire. Le projet brésilien de la seconde moitié du XX^e siècle est plus confus qu'il n'y paraît car s'il y a la volonté de créer une capitale dans l'intérieur pour faire opposition

au Brésil atlantique centré sur Rio de Janeiro, il n'est pas évident que la société brésilienne ait vraiment compris que son avenir se décidait aussi sur ses frontières continentales avec les autres États latino-américains.

La preuve en est le faible développement des relations trans-frontalières. Le mythe du Sertao n'a pas joué à plein quant à un développement régulier, tout au plus assiste-t-on à une croissance anarchique par exploitation.

Finalement, il est loisible d'affirmer que si la capitale a besoin d'une « résidence », elle n'exige pas une ville *a priori*. La sédentarisation d'une capitale est un accident, inévitable dans la période contemporaine, compte tenu du développement des structures administratives de l'État moderne, mais un accident seulement, si l'on ne retient de la fonction de capitale que la notion de pouvoir, nomade par excellence, qui la fonde. D'ailleurs, la nomadisation de la capitale se survit dans les grands États, à l'occasion du déplacement des chefs. La capitale est là où se trouve M. Clinton, qui, en catastrophe, peut être appelé à prendre une décision d'importance même s'il est en visite à l'étranger. Il en va de même pour M. Yeltsin ou M. Mitterrand. C'est, sans nul doute, moins net pour un président d'État africain ou latino-américain, qui n'a pas à sa disposition l'arsenal technique des grandes nations. En effet, paradoxalement, ce sont les moyens de communication ultra-perfectionnés qui, occasionnellement, recréent « le nomadisme de la capitale. » Quoi qu'il en soit, ces situations sont exceptionnelles. Néanmoins, au nomadisme concret de la fonction capitale s'en est substitué un autre de nature abstraite. Lorsque la fonction de capitale est définitivement sédentarisée, « enfermée » dans une ville, il se déclenche un processus de mobilité abstrait qui peut s'exprimer par la sémantisation, la désémantisation et la resémantisation de la ville capitale. Chaque gouvernement va laisser des traces dans la capitale : il va détruire ou restaurer, construire ou embellir, agrandir ou marquer. Bref, il y aura persistance d'anciennes significations ou gain de nouveaux signes. C'est la mise en scène de la fonction de capitale et, par conséquent, la mise en scène de l'État à travers une sémiosphère¹¹.

Rites, Symboles et Sémiosphère

Avant d'aborder le concept de sémiosphère proposé par Jurij M. Lotman, sémiologue russe, il convient, me semble-t-il, de faire une incursion dans le monde des rites et des symboles du pouvoir, qui sont étroitement liés à la mise en scène de la fonction de capitale.

L'ouvrage de David I. Kertzer *Rituals, Politics and Power* m'aidera à mettre en place certaines idées qui feront mieux comprendre ultérieure-

ment la sémiotique. J'utiliserai l'édition italienne de l'ouvrage de Kertzer car l'édition anglaise m'est demeurée inaccessible¹².

Kertzer prétend, et à mon sens il a raison, que la politique ne peut pas être sans symboles ni rites d'accompagnement. Ces rites et ces symboles font partie de la culture, terme pris au sens anthropologique, et comme tels ils naissent, ils se développent, ils s'usent et finissent par disparaître, encore qu'incomplètement souvent, car, avec un peu d'attention, on en découvre parfois des traces, des rémanences détachées du contexte original et dès lors dénuées de signification immédiate, mais qui, reprises dans une « pâte idéologique » nouvelle, ont un sens.

Il y a les rites et les symboles du pouvoir mais il y a aussi le pouvoir des rites et des symboles. La contemplation de la place Rouge, à Moscou, brillamment éclairée la nuit tombée, avec ses gigantesques étoiles rouges sur les tours du Kremlin, est chargée de symboles qui imposent à la foule un silence qu'il est difficile de qualifier. Si l'on ajoute à cela le cérémonial de la relève de la garde à la porte du mausolée de Lénine, l'observateur est complètement inondé de symboles et de rites, dont le pouvoir confine alors au religieux. N'est-il pas surprenant d'ailleurs que le rituel de la place Rouge, si bien réglé, soit mis en cause dans d'autres républiques de l'URSS où les statues de Lénine sont déboulonnées ou jetées à bas ? Les symboles et les rites de la place Rouge sont en phase de désémantisation dans certaines républiques de l'URSS et cela nous amène avec Kertzer à poser le problème en termes généraux : ce sont les symboles qui donnent un contenu au rituel. Les symboles sont caractérisés par trois propriétés : la condensation du signifié, la polyvalence et l'ambiguïté. Par la condensation s'explique la manière dont des symboles déterminés représentent et unifient une riche variété de signifiés¹³. La polyvalence est étroitement liée à la condensation et elle montre comment un même symbole peut être entendu dans des sens différents par diverses personnes. Cela est d'une grande importance lorsque on utilise le rituel pour construire une solidarité politique en l'absence de consensus¹⁴. Dans ces conditions, l'ambiguïté est de règle puisque le symbole n'a pas de signifié unique et précis. La complexité et l'incertitude du signifié des symboles seraient ainsi à l'origine de leur force. Les rituels facilitent la diffusion des mythes.

À cet égard, les capitales constituent des lieux privilégiés pour manifester, à travers les cérémonies, le pouvoir des rites et des symboles : « le corps de Lénine s'est désormais transformé en un icône du régime soviétique ; manquer de respect au rituel qui l'environne constitue un sacrilège »¹⁵. Comme l'explique Kertzer, « une des raisons qui font du rituel un puissant instrument de légitimation est que le rituel permet d'associer une image particulière de l'univers avec une forte concentration d'émo-

tions qui se réfèrent à cette image même »¹⁶. Rites et symboles véhiculent une vision déterminée du monde qui imprègne le peuple dans une action sociale standardisée.

L'emploi des symboles et des rites permet de modifier une capitale sans la déplacer en transformant le décor, en instaurant des pratiques, en créant de nouveaux lieux de rassemblement et de communion, en instituant de nouvelles règles, etc. Aménagée et durable, la capitale devient le symbole concret de l'État, la partie caractéristique du tout, de la même manière, et selon le même mécanisme métonymique.

On peut résumer la situation par le schéma suivant :

Localisation des capitales et système sémique

Système sémique/ Mouvement	Sans modification du système sémique	Avec modification du système sémique
Sans translation	1.1 stabilité absolue	1.2 instabilité sémique
Avec translation	2.2 instabilité géographique	2.2 instabilité absolue

(Tiré de Claude Raffestin, *Pour une géographie du pouvoir*, Paris : Litec, 1980.)

Tous ces cas sont évidemment intéressants, mais les situations 1.2 et 2.2 retiendront plus particulièrement mon attention car elles touchent au problème de la sémiosphère, que je voudrais aborder maintenant.

La sémiosphère est un concept forgé par Jurij M. Lotman, dans les années quatre-vingts. Lotman a puisé chez I. V. Vernadski des éléments fondamentaux pour élaborer son mécanisme de la sémiosphère, qui n'a pas que des rapports d'ordre sémantique avec la biosphère du grand naturaliste. Il y a là, très probablement, des interrelations et des phénomènes de fertilisation croisée qui sont du plus haut intérêt. Quoi qu'il en soit, il n'est pas possible d'entrer dans les détails, dont la nature épistémologique est, en large partie, hors sujet.

Lotman a réalisé un transfert de concept, mais aussi de mécanismes de la biosphère à la sémiosphère, qui est un espace sémiotique qu'on peut considérer comme un mécanisme unique : « *la semiosfera è quello spazio-semiotico al di fuori del quale non è possibile l'esistenza della semiosi* »¹⁷. L'existence de cet univers, la sémiosphère, fait devenir réalité l'acte sémiotique singulier. Même si la sémiosphère a un caractère abstrait elle est délimitée par une frontière, c'est-à-dire une discontinuité sémiotique. Naturellement, cette frontière n'a aucun « caractère visible, » dans la mesure où elle est la somme de « filtres. » Elle s'apparente davantage à

une limite de type mathématique qu'à une frontière territoriale. Néanmoins, cette frontière joue le rôle d'interface entre espace extérieur et espace intérieur puisque c'est par elle que se réalise la sémiotisation de l'extériorité pour l'intériorité.

À cet égard, Lotman compare les points de la frontière de la sémiosphère au récepteur sensoriel qui traduit les stimuli externes dans le langage de notre système nerveux¹⁸. La sémiosphère est une « personnalité sémiotique » dont le fondement est empirique et intuitif et dont il est difficile de donner une description formelle. Pourtant, en tant que mécanisme, la frontière de l'espace sémiotique n'est pas un concept abstrait, mais un système qui traduit les communications externes dans le langage interne de la sémiosphère et vice versa. Cela permet de transformer la non-communication externe en information interne. Dans les cas où l'espace culturel acquiert un caractère territorial, la frontière assume un sens spatial également. Je veux dire par là que dans un dispositif territorial concret, au centre se trouve « le temple des divinités culturelles, » qui organisent le monde interne, tandis que sur la périphérie s'établissent ceux capables de traduire, ceux capables d'être ambivalents. La crise survient lorsque la traduction ou l'ambivalence ne fonctionnent plus. La culture ne crée pas seulement son organisation interne mais encore son organisation — ou sa désorganisation — externes.

Toute évolution rapide, pour ne pas dire *révolution*, dont l'emploi est par trop connoté, contribue à remanier la sémiosphère non seulement dans ses éléments mais dans sa structure même. En effet, toute modification « élémentaire » change les rapports, et donc le fonctionnement, de la sémiosphère. Cela veut dire que les systèmes sémiotiques dominants antérieurs à la modification sont réordonnés. La réordination génère la production de nouvelles informations.

Pour Lotman, « La sémiosphère a une profondeur diachronique parce qu'elle possède le système complexe de la mémoire et ne peut fonctionner sans celle-ci »¹⁹. Même si la sémiosphère peut apparaître chaotique, il n'en est rien car il y a toujours une corrélation dynamique, entre les éléments, qui tend à constituer le comportement de la sémiosphère²⁰.

La sémiosphère est le mécanisme de la sémiotisation que le pouvoir fait fonctionner pour faire « des signes de tête. » Ceux-ci ne sont finalement que les produits d'un processus complexe. À certains égards, la sémiosphère peut apparaître comme une « boîte noire, » encore que cette expression ne convienne pas vraiment bien. Ce n'est qu'une approximation et rien de plus.

Peut-être conviendrait-il d'utiliser l'expression de Paul Watzlawick, qui distingue la réalité de premier ordre, celle de l'observation ou de

l'expérience, et la réalité de second ordre, qui est le cadre dans lequel les « faits » reçoivent une signification ou une valeur.²¹ Il y a, en tout cas, une homologie entre sémiosphère et réalité de second ordre. Dans les deux cas, il s'agit de constructions dont le caractère idéologique n'échappera à personne.

La polysémie même du mot « idéologie » contraint à en cerner le sens par rapport à la sémiosphère. À côté des différentes acceptions qu'il repère, Ferruccio Rossi-Landi a montré avec une remarquable efficacité que l'idéologie est un projet social et un mécanisme de programmation sociale nourris par une histoire : « *Gli individui imparano cioè a eseguire programmi che sono stati elaborati da precedente lavoro umano sociale* »²².

Il y a une indéniable liaison entre rites, symboles, sémiosphère et idéologie. Les rites et les symboles constituent une superstructure révélatrice d'un mécanisme de sémiotisation et d'un mécanisme de programmation. La sémiosphère et l'idéologie ne ressortissent pas du domaine du visible comme les rites et les symboles, mais ceux-ci sont là pour témoigner de la présence et de l'action de celles-là. Les rites et les symboles, en tant que « produits sociaux, » sont des cristallisations qui renvoient à la sémiosphère et à l'idéologie sans lesquelles il ne saurait y avoir de manifestation visible. De là à songer à une visualisation de la sémiosphère et de l'idéologie il y a plus qu'un pas à franchir, et proposer une représentation quelconque ne constituerait pas nécessairement un gain de compréhension et de clarté. L'appréhension de ces deux mécanismes doit se limiter pour l'instant, du moins me semble-t-il, à l'analyse des rites et des symboles concrets et matérialisés. Cela n'interdit évidemment pas de repérer des iconographies dont l'expression est abstraite ou plus abstraite que celles relevant, par nature, du visible.

Il est tentant, néanmoins, de proposer une visualisation surtout dans le cadre de cette analyse, car on ne peut que difficilement se défendre contre l'idée obsédante qu'il y ait superposition d'un territoire concret, la ville, et d'un territoire abstrait, le mécanisme de sémiotisation et de programmation. Mais, justement, il convient de s'en défendre, car c'est peut-être une idée facile dans l'exacte mesure où elle est obsédante. En écrivant cela, je songe aux tentatives de R. D. Sack de visualiser le concept de territorialité²³ La représentation graphique fige un système qui n'est pas achevé, et de loin. Il faut se garder de visualiser ce qui, par essence, est flou et encore en évolution. Je crois qu'il en va de même pour la sémiosphère, dont les éléments sont finalement très mobiles. Ce renoncement à la visualisation n'est pas un aveu d'impuissance mais, bien au contraire, la reconnaissance d'un processus en devenir.

C'est à partir de la sémiosphère et de l'idéologie que le pouvoir peut

mettre en scène la capitale. Dans cette perspective, la capitale est d'abord un lieu comme un autre qui peut être investi par un processus de sémiotisation et de programmation, qui en tant que « territoire abstrait » est indépendant de toute connotation géographique. Il est sans doute, pour un contemporain, difficile de se représenter une capitale sans la lier immédiatement à un lieu fixe, sans l'assimiler à une ville. Pour comprendre ce phénomène de « décollement », il faut se reporter à un pouvoir en émergence. Tout nouveau pouvoir qui s'instaure, véhicule avec lui une sémiosphère et une idéologie qui vont saturer tout le vide laissé par l'ancien régime. À l'occasion d'un changement de pouvoir radical, consécutif à une révolution profonde, la sémiosphère est souvent complètement remaniée, et cela postule souvent un changement géographique, car il n'est pas possible dans l'ancienne capitale d'effacer les signes et les symboles de l'ancien régime, surtout si leur inscription s'est réalisée dans la longue durée. Dans ces conditions, il est souvent plus simple de procéder à une translation géographique, dont le choix sera longuement pensé, pour ensuite procéder à une sémantisation du lieu élevé au rang de capitale. La translation géographique n'est pas une fin en soi mais un moyen pour permettre à la nouvelle sémiosphère de déployer tous ses effets dans un cadre peu ou pas connoté par l'ancien régime. Les raisons pratiques mises à part, n'importe quelle ville, dans ces conditions, peut servir de support territorial à la nouvelle capitale. La création d'une nouvelle capitale est donc moins une opération de nature géographique, malgré les apparences, qu'une opération idéologique au sens de la mise en place d'un nouveau projet et d'une nouvelle programmation sociale. S'il fallait donner un exemple, on pourrait citer Bonn, qui illustre parfaitement ce « décollement. »

Cela dit, ce n'est pas non plus, en aucun cas, une opération du type *tabula rasa*. Si tel était le cas, cela signifierait qu'il y a négation de l'histoire et qu'il y a une reconstruction globale, ce qui, à la lettre, est impossible, même si tout totalitarisme rêve de refaire l'histoire chaque matin. Les exemples sont assez nombreux pour qu'on ne s'y arrête pas davantage.

On ne peut en effet, faire table rase du passé car on se priverait de tout un ensemble de signes et d'images, de rites et de symboles, de pratiques et de connaissances dont la présence est nécessaire pour élaborer un style politique et pour renforcer le lien social d'une nation. Que la capitale soit créée de toutes pièces, *ex nihilo* en quelque sorte, ou qu'elle soit remodelée et réaménagée, elle n'en continue pas moins à jouer toujours le rôle fondamental de donatrice de sens. Elle donne du sens à travers la sémiosphère qu'elle matérialise.

Avant d'être un espace concret, la capitale est un espace abstrait, non

matériel, car elle est une la sémiosphère qui produit de l'information et l'émet dans le reste du pays. Elle agit comme filtre et décide de ce qui doit être retenu, de ce qui ne doit pas l'être, de ce qui doit être diffusé et de ce qui ne doit pas l'être. Dans cette perspective, la capitale, même celle du régime le plus révolutionnaire, évolue dans une situation paradoxale de *double bind*, car elle assume tout à la fois un rôle conservateur et un rôle progressiste : elle édicte la norme et la fait respecter, mais elle énonce aussi les réformes et les fait appliquer.

En tant que centralité, plus politique et culturelle que géographique, d'ailleurs, la capitale assume une communication qui est plus rapide dans le sens centre-périphérie que dans le sens inverse. L'information du centre est fluide, elle s'écoule aisément vers les marges alors que l'information en provenance de la périphérie est caractérisée par un degré élevé de viscosité. Autrement dit, la capitale cherche, presque partout et presque toujours, à s'assurer le monopole de la communication de l'information. « La position idéologique passe pas le langage, parole ou écriture »²⁴.

Les rapports entre langue et pouvoir ne sont pas négligeables : « ici, puisque existe, semble-t-il, une concomitance générale entre le fait de la domination politique et celui de l'écriture, c'est évidemment le texte écrit qui sert à la fois de support à la transmission de l'idéologie en son temps et de trace qui nous permet de la connaître aujourd'hui »²⁵. Le pouvoir « parle » et par conséquent il se réfère en tout cas à une langue naturelle, voire deux ou plus. Le bi—ou multilinguisme ne sont pas rares mais ils constituent néanmoins, dès l'origine, une faiblesse du pouvoir. Se référer à deux langues c'est déjà admettre qu'il y a, implicitement, deux « organisations possibles du réel », c'est introduire une fracture ou tout au moins une fêlure qui, même imperceptible, risque avec le temps de s'élargir et à travers laquelle la substance du pouvoir s'échappera par dispersion.

Lorsque les révolutionnaires de 1789 prendront conscience qu'une moitié de la France n'utilise pas quotidiennement le français, ils chargeront l'abbé Grégoire de faire une enquête et un rapport sur les patois. Comment diffuser, en effet, les lois, les règlements et les normes de toutes sortes à des Français qui ne parlent pas et a *fortiori* ne lisent pas le français? L'enquête de Grégoire est un modèle du genre mais la place me manque pour la décrire et en apprécier toute la valeur. Je ne m'arrêterai que sur un point à savoir le mot patois, qu'il utilisera pour qualifier les idiomes parlés en France, à l'exception du français. On sait que le mot s'est progressivement enrichi de connotations péjoratives. Le mot était d'autant plus malheureux qu'il a été appliqué à des langues qui étaient illustrées par une littérature, poésie et prose, dont l'importance qualitative était loin

d'être médiocre. L'éradication des « patois » mettra beaucoup de temps en France et ne sera achevée qu'après la mise en place de l'instruction publique gratuite et obligatoire avec Jules Ferry sous la III^e République.

Ainsi fut nié, sans autre forme de procès, tout le travail social linguistique de la moitié des locuteurs, français de nationalité, sinon de culture. Dans ce cas, la sémiosphère ne laissait pénétrer que ce qui ressortissait du français. Il est paradoxal, mais néanmoins cohérent, que dans le même temps, après l'invasion de la Suisse, les autorités d'occupation, par décret, aient imposé à l'ancienne Confédération la reconnaissance du français et de l'italien, à côté de l'allemand. C'est le Directoire qui a été le fondateur du plurilinguisme helvétique dans la forme sinon dans les faits. La Confédération des XIII cantons d'avant 1798 était germanophone, l'allemand étant la seule langue officielle de la Diète. D'ailleurs, au moment de la Restauration, en 1815, l'allemand est redevenu la seule langue officielle en Suisse.

En matière de langue, le pouvoir de la capitale agit souvent selon un code d'homogénéisation et de hiérarchisation²⁶, la stratégie étant de réaliser une aire où prédomine un, et un seul « capital constant » linguistique. La présence d'une académie constitue souvent l'expression de ce code. Elle joue le rôle de gardienne de la langue et fonctionne comme une sémiosphère particulière. La cérémonie du dictionnaire à l'Académie française en est l'illustration par excellence : il y a les mots qui sont retenus... et les autres. Mais en même temps, on peut mesurer là les limites d'un tel mécanisme qui « ouvre » et « ferme », qui « permet » et « interdit. »

La langue n'est évidemment pas indépendante de ce qui la sous-tend en matière politique et économique. En effet, la langue n'est jamais que le reflet d'une puissance, jamais la puissance elle-même puisque ce sont les structures socio-politique et socio-économique qui en assurent la diffusion. C'est bien pourquoi si l'on peut établir quelques parallèles entre le français, l'espagnol et l'anglais, il n'en va pas de même pour l'italien et l'allemand, dont l'histoire se déroule tout différemment en raison même d'une unification politique plus tardive. La capitale, cependant, dans beaucoup de pays n'en demeure pas moins un lieu d'intense travail sur la langue car elle impose, choisit et exclut, même en l'absence d'institution spécifique. C'est encore plus vrai aujourd'hui avec le développement des médias modernes car, selon les pays, la radio et la télévision imposent une certaine prononciation, bannissent les accents trop marqués et, d'une certaine manière, exaltent tel ou tel type de mot porteur en soi d'un message.

La sémiosphère est souvent créatrice d'un « sacré », qui n'est pas d'essence religieuse mais qui s'y apparente par la forme. Des expressions telles que « mystique républicaine » et « égoïsme sacré » en témoignent

éloquement. Quand bien même le pouvoir politique s'efforce de se distancier de la religion, il finit par être contraint à une recreation du « sacré » pour se garantir et se renforcer dans son intériorité. C'est une invention proprement moderne, comme l'a montré Julien Benda : on a « glorifié l'application des hommes à se sentir dans leur nation, dans leur race, en tant qu'elles les distinguent et les opposent, et on leur fait honte de toute aspiration à se sentir en tant qu'hommes, dans ce que cette qualité a de général et de transcendant aux désinences ethniques... »²⁷.

L'évocation du peuple et l'invocation même au peuple sont des caractéristiques de la période contemporaine ouverte par la Révolution française, qui a fait entrer le peuple dans l'histoire et l'a mis en scène par la même occasion. Le terme n'est pas excessif car le peuple est à « comprendre comme le signifiant majeur de la domination moderne dans l'État ; il est par conséquent à lui seul, mais pas le seul, un authentique mythe de puissance »²⁸. Le mythe renvoie, ici, au sacré ou du moins à l'une de ses formes domestiquée par le pouvoir d'État.

Mais les rémanences ou les reconstitutions du sacré se donnent aussi à déchiffrer dans les conceptions territoriales. La sémiosphère d'un État national, même de l'État le plus laïc, préserve malgré elle la notion du sacré à travers l'histoire originelle du territoire. Le territoire des sociétés modernes est investi par le sacré, ne serait-ce qu'à travers le rôle que l'on y fait jouer à la frontière. Une inscription relevée sur le monument aux morts de Cavour, en Piémont, en donne une bonne illustration : « Pour revendiquer les limites sacrées que la nature a placées comme frontières de la patrie, ils ont affronté, impavides, une mort glorieuse... »²⁹. Dans ce cas la sémiosphère et l'idéologie ne gardent pas la trace du sacré mais sont à l'origine d'un sacré à l'usage politique, dont la manipulation est courante.

Dans cette perspective, le territoire politique contemporain est un espace « consacré » au sens que Mircea Eliade donne à ce terme : « pour l'homme religieux, cette homogénéisation spatiale se traduit par l'expérience d'une opposition entre l'espace sacré, le seul qui soit réel, qui existe réellement, et tout le reste, l'étendue informe qui l'entoure »³⁰. Il suffirait de substituer à « homme religieux », « homme d'État » pour conserver dans le contexte politique moderne tout son sens à la phrase.

La sacralisation du territoire par l'État moderne se réalise par le recours à des « cosmologies idéologiques », qui fonctionnent comme une hiérophanie révélatrice d'un « point fixe », d'un « centre », celui-là justement de la sémiosphère. L'homme politique, celui qui fait le « signe de tête », s'oriente par rapport à « son centre du monde », son territoire, dont l'interprétation renvoie à la sémiosphère. S'il est vrai que l'homme d'État

ne recourt pas explicitement au sacré, il n'en agit pas moins comme si le territoire était défini par référence au sacré. Les militaires n'ont-ils pas pris l'habitude de parler du « sanctuaire? » Jusqu'à il y a peu de temps, la frontière des pays de l'Est était défendue comme l'enceinte d'un temple autrefois.

On notera l'identification entre « naturel » et « sacré » qu'il est loisible d'observer au détour du jeu idéologique et qui donne toute sa valeur à l'affirmation de Prieto, qui définit l'idéologie comme : « tout discours se référant à une connaissance de la réalité matérielle qui vise à "naturaliser" cette connaissance, c'est-à-dire à l'expliquer ou à la faire apparaître comme étant la conséquence nécessaire de ce qu'est son objet »³¹. Toute naturalisation tend à sacraliser dans la mesure où il n'y a plus de place pour « autre chose. »

En matière de territoire, la sémiosphère américaine a créé une idéologie du territoire promis qui, à entendre Theodore Roosevelt, n'est rien d'autre que le monde : « L'américanisation du monde est notre destinée. » La sémiosphère américaine est saturée par la « double détermination du discours américain, messianique et impérial, la "manifest destiny" qui associe une théologie de l'expansion à une stratégie délibérément planétaire, toutes deux enracinées solidement dans la conscience américaine à travers l'idéologème de la terre/territoire promis(e) »³². Ce mythe américain était déjà en place avant la proclamation de l'Indépendance³³ et il s'appuie sur des arguments forgés par Jefferson : propriété par le sang, propriété par l'argent, propriété par la sueur. À cela s'ajoutent d'autres arguments censés fonder la territorialité américaine, qui se résume finalement à un mot rassembleur : américaniser, qui veut dire évangéliser, émanciper, régénérer³⁴. Les Américains deviennent les pèlerins de l'Occident, qui transportent avec eux la grande masse des arts et des sciences, l'ardeur et l'assiduité...³⁵ Nixon fera écho à Roosevelt : « nous ne sommes pas impérialistes, nous souhaitons seulement apporter un mode de vie »³⁶. Ce vocabulaire de nature prophétique est une des conditions de la légitimation de rapports de pouvoir expansionnistes. Cela se confond, d'ailleurs, pour les Américains avec des expressions du type « lutte pour la civilisation, » « défense des valeurs » et « croisade pour la paix et la liberté. »

Il s'agit bien là d'une réalité de second ordre, dont il a été question plus haut, qui n'est ni juste ni fausse mais qui s'apparente à une méta-information inexplicable par elle-même mais dont le fonctionnement assure la mobilisation des énergies populaires.

Mais enfin qu'est-ce qu'une capitale ?

Sans doute est-il temps d'expliciter le phénomène complexe de la capitale en tant que centre organisateur : elle est un acteur couplé avec une sémiosphère. L'acteur assume une fonction hiérarchique, hiérarchisée et hiérarchisante, qui se traduit par un « agir » dont l'expression est rituelle et symbolique. Le modelage de la capitale se réalise par référence à la sémiosphère, dont le mécanisme génère des programmes et des projets.

Pour montrer ce mécanisme en acte, je peux imaginer des couples d'opposition du type conservation/innovation, centralisation/décentralisation, stimulation/inhibition.

Les acteurs de la capitale — ou l'acteur collectif si l'on préfère — peuvent être les champions et les instigateurs de la nouveauté ou, au contraire, les gardiens de la tradition. Cela dit, ces couples d'opposition binaire ne sont pas entièrement satisfaisants dans la mesure où ils ne sont pas exclusifs : la modernité et la tradition peuvent se renforcer l'une l'autre, s'appuyer l'une sur l'autre par contraste. La sémiosphère de la France pompidolienne a parfaitement compris ce principe du tiers non exclu, car elle se voulait moderne et traditionnelle tout à la fois. Le Centre Pompidou, à Beaubourg, en est un bel exemple : on n'imagine plus le quartier des Halles sans la « raffinerie », comme disent encore certains chauffeurs de taxi parisiens ! La sémiosphère de la France de Mitterrand n'est pas sensiblement différente, et la pyramide du Louvre s'alimente à la même source : créer des discontinuités pour souligner la tradition et intégrer l'esprit du temps tout à la fois.

L'innovation peut être plus radicale, comme dans le cas de Lisbonne, qui, après le tremblement de terre de 1755, a été reconstruite dans le style pombalin selon une conception moderne liée à une pensée urbanistique résolument différente de celle du passé³⁷. L'innovation, dans ce cas, est la conséquence d'une catastrophe naturelle qui contraint à faire du nouveau plus qu'à refaire du neuf. Mais il s'agit là d'une occasion unique qui se présente rarement dans l'histoire d'une capitale. Berlin, dans la période contemporaine, a été placée devant un tel dilemme mais dans des conditions socio-culturelles et socio-politiques complètement différentes, en l'absence d'une sémiosphère bien délimitée et bien définie : en fait Berlin n'était plus la capitale de l'Allemagne fédérale. La réunification va poser le problème, un demi-siècle après.

La sémiosphère, qui s'alimente à de multiples codes, joue sur tous les flux : travail, monnaie, information. Elle sectionne, détache, combine, recompose, de manière à donner de nouvelles représentations que l'acteur

branche sur différents réseaux pour accroître son pouvoir. La tendance profonde de la capitale (acteur + sémiosphère) est de tout transformer en signes et en symboles, dont la diffusion est de plus en plus rapide. La capitale procède à un captage, s'empare de tout ce qui est mobile pour faire des plus-values de plus en plus grandes en matière d'information car elle est surtout un accumulateur et un amplificateur de l'information. La capitale, pour préserver sa primauté, est contrainte à « bouger », à être mobile, et elle y parvient en général en jouant sur les réseaux d'information. Elle fait évoluer l'information, en la modifiant, en la rendant plus rapidement obsolète, en l'usant en quelque sorte. C'est, sans doute, pourquoi l'idée de mode est tellement caractéristique des capitales. Il ne s'agit pas seulement de la mode au sens immédiat et étroit du terme, celle du vêtement, mais de la mode dans tous les domaines culturels car il y a aussi les modes de la pensée : des penseurs à la mode se retrouvent dans toutes les capitales. Une mode chasse l'autre mais dans ce cas le contenu n'a guère d'importance car c'est la position qui importe. La capitale joue la position bien davantage que le contenu.

Le couple centralisation/décentralisation appartient à beaucoup de sémiosphères nationales et fonctionne souvent d'une étrange manière dans la synchronie et la diachronie. Dans la synchronie, on constate moins une tendance qu'une exploitation d'opportunités au gré des circonstances : le pendule oscille entre les deux pôles. En revanche, dans la diachronie, la centralisation l'emporte globalement même dans des pays qui connaissent une activité traditionnellement décentralisée. C'est assez surprenant de constater, par exemple, que la Suisse est plus touchée par la centralisation alors que le fédéralisme classique en était assez éloigné. Autrement dit des changements sont intervenus dans la sémiosphère helvétique, dont le fonctionnement s'est sensiblement modifié depuis 40 ans. Le partage entre canton et confédération a beaucoup « bougé », encore que l'on tente de sauver les apparences.

Le couple stimulation/inhibition est l'un des codes fortement manipulé par l'acteur, qui à travers lui manifeste la primauté de son action. Code hiérarchisant par excellence, il fonctionne sur le mode de l'incitation et de l'interdiction. Pierre le Grand interdisant toute construction de pierre en dehors de sa nouvelle capitale et incitant la noblesse à s'installer à Saint-Petersbourg illustre parfaitement ce phénomène. Il serait aisé d'aligner de multiples exemples rendant compte de ce jeu sur les codes, encore que cela ne présenterait qu'un intérêt médiocre.

On aura compris que la capitale fonctionne comme un macro-commutateur, qui agit sur tous les circuits de l'enveloppe spatio-temporelle. On aura compris aussi que la capitale, avant d'être une ville,

est un pouvoir couplé avec une sémiosphère dont les effets affectent la nation dans laquelle il est installé.

Que la capitale constitue ensuite une ville avec des fonctions multiples, politiques, économiques, culturelles et sociales, ne fait aucun doute, mais ce n'est au fond qu'une dérivation accidentelle. Le principe de la capitale, malgré toutes les apparences, n'est pas de nature géographique mais de nature anthropologique. La mise en forme géographique d'une capitale ne survient véritablement qu'après sa mise en forme anthropologique au sens large du terme.

S'il n'existe pas une théorie de la capitale c'est, à mon sens, parce qu'on s'est fourvoyé dans l'identification de « l'objet » capitale. Il ne faut pas partir de l'idée de ville, mais de celle d'un pouvoir s'exerçant à travers une sémiosphère, et se projetant dans une ville existante ou dans un projet de ville. La caractéristique urbaine est donc tout à fait secondaire, quoi qu'on en pense. Pourtant, au fil du temps, l'idée de ville est devenue obsédante et la capitale a été traitée comme un type spécifique de ville. Le « réceptacle » a pris le pas sur les relations institutionnelles et sur les contenus idéologiques, du moins pour les géographes sinon pour les historiens et les sociologues³⁸. La capitale ne peut être vraiment conçue comme ville qu'au moment de la traduction du couple acteur-sémiosphère dans une structure morphologique, ce qui implique une composition à travers une mise en scène, à laquelle je vais réserver la dernière partie de cette communication.

La diathétique urbaine ou la mise en scène de la capitale

La sédentarisation de la capitale dans une ville existante ou à créer débouche sur le problème de l'arrangement urbain, de l'arrangement spatial (diathétique), qui, dans la mesure du possible, doit être au service du pouvoir et traduire les éléments significatifs de la sémiosphère et de l'idéologie.

Il est évident qu'on peut chercher à établir des correspondances entre des codes abstraits et des morphologies concrètes pour démontrer les tentatives de traduction de la sémiosphère dans les formes architecturales, mais il semble plus intéressant de partir de l'effet que font les capitales sur les voyageurs pour voir si l'observateur est sensible, à travers ses propres descriptions, à certains phénomènes. Je me référerai pour cela à Philippe Gut³⁹.

Il est intéressant de noter à propos de Turin ce qu'en dit une bourgeoise parisienne du XIX^e siècle. Il n'est pas besoin de demander si c'est

une capitale, elle est jugée de suite par sa beauté : « les rues sont larges, les boutiques magnifiques, le monde afflue de tous côtés... On se croirait à Paris pour tout »⁴⁰. Gustave Flaubert est moins enthousiaste mais il n'en retombe pas moins sur certaines caractéristiques : « Ville belle, alignée, droite, ennuyeuse, stupide... » ; « la singerie de Paris est partout, en voyage, quelque chose qui fait lever les épaules de pitié »⁴¹.

Bien que ces deux appréciations soient écrites dans un style fort différent, elles dénotent des caractéristiques que l'on s'attend à trouver dans une capitale : beauté, grandeur, régularité, mouvement.

Bien sûr, il s'agit de voyageurs français pour lesquels la référence est Paris. Paul de Musset, le frère du poète, n'échappe pas à ce travers quand il juge Milan : « Malgré le luxe, la bonne compagnie et les ressources de cette grande ville mieux vaut le véritable Paris, quand on l'a sous la main, qu'un Paris en abrégé »⁴². D'une manière assez générale, comme le relève Gut, « la capitale de la Lombardie ne suscite pas l'enthousiasme chez des gens somme toute soucieux d'exotisme même s'ils s'en défendent »⁴³.

Florence, en revanche, attire plus de louanges que Milan. Pour Musset, Florence est une des villes les plus aimables du monde, l'animation des rues, leur propreté, la joie populaire qui éclate à chaque pas lui semble l'expression d'un « bonheur réel » : « On sent à chaque pas la libéralité d'un gouvernement paternel et intelligent. La Toscane est un échantillon de ce que pourrait être l'Italie entière »⁴⁴.

Florence sera capitale de l'Italie de 1865 à 1870, et cela semble donner raison à notre Français en voyage ! Capitale du royaume d'Italie par accident, Florence sera mise en scène à travers les palais qu'elle possède en grand nombre : la cour du palazzo Pitti, le parlement du palazzo della Signoria, etc. C'est assez dire que Florence n'est qu'un réceptacle de fonctions mais pas vraiment une ville destinée à demeurer une capitale. Cela dit, des journaux se transféreront à Florence et toute une série d'institutions s'y acclimateront pendant une brève période. Le transfert de la capitale à Rome aura de graves conséquences pour Florence, qui, pour assumer son rôle, avait procédé à des aménagements générateurs de dépenses qui ne seront pas compensées⁴⁵.

Avant d'être la capitale de l'Italie, Rome sera vue par les voyageurs soit comme le symbole de l'Antiquité soit comme celui de la chrétienté. Surdéterminée par son passé, Rome est tout à la fois idéale et inadéquate pour être la capitale du nouveau royaume.

En un peu plus d'un siècle, Rome a probablement connu des arrangements importants en matière d'urbanisme mais ils ne peuvent que très mal rivaliser avec les monuments de l'Antiquité, de la Renaissance et du Baroque. En fait de mise en scène, la capitale a surtout imposé à l'Italie

toute sa symbolique liée à l'histoire romaine : le fascisme s'est drapé dans les oripeaux de l'Antiquité, dont il n'a pris que des formes vidées de toute véritable signification. Par ailleurs, Rome en tant que centre culturel ne pouvait guère être remodelée par une sémiosphère d'origine piémontaise, dont les valeurs n'avaient pas la même universalité que celles de la Rome impériale et *a fortiori* de la Rome pontificale.

Quittons ces exemples historiques pour plonger dans l'actualité la plus immédiate, dans ce qu'on pourrait appeler la *hot history*, avec d'une part Berlin et d'autre part Moscou. La chute du « mur », qui ne me semble pas pouvoir être gratifié d'une majuscule, pose le problème de la capitale de l'Allemagne réunifiée. Bonn, la capitale fédérale, ne pourra probablement pas, à terme, demeurer la capitale de la nouvelle Allemagne pour des raisons historico-géographiques, mais aussi et surtout pour des raisons symboliques. Capitale écartelée, au sens propre du terme, pendant 45 ans, Berlin est une ville trop chargée de symboles pour ne pas être aménagée et restaurée en tant que centralité politique et culturelle. Géographiquement, Berlin n'est pas moins excentrique que Bonn et ce n'est certainement pas de ce côté là qu'il faut chercher des arguments. On ne voit pas non plus l'intérêt qu'il y aurait à chercher une solution dans un quadrilatère dont les sommets sont occupés par Francfort, Würzbourg, Erfurt et Kassel. Ce serait attribuer à la centralité géographique une importance qu'elle n'a plus et qu'elle n'a peut-être jamais eue. Par conséquent, on peut écarter l'idée que la capitale de la nouvelle Allemagne s'implante à Fulda ou à Erfurt ! On peut également écarter l'idée d'une nouvelle capitale créée de toutes pièces quelque part sur l'ancienne frontière de la RDA et de la RFA. Ce pseudo-centre de gravité aurait toutes les chances de cumuler tous les désavantages de l'articiel sans aucun avantage à la clé. Deux capitales ne sont pas non plus envisageables du point de vue politique ; cependant, on peut concevoir que si Berlin redevient capitale à part entière, Bonn peut néanmoins servir de capitale-relais de certains points de vue vers les institutions de la CEE, compte tenu de sa proximité de Bruxelles et de Luxembourg.

Il est évidemment prématuré de faire des hypothèses trop précises, mais il y a une forte probabilité pour que Berlin renoue avec son passé de capitale unique. (Depuis que cette communication a été écrite, Berlin est effectivement redevenue la capitale de l'Allemagne réunifiée).

En matière de mise en scène du pouvoir, le problème qui va se poser aux Allemands ne sera pas simple du point de vue symbolique. En effet, il ne sera pas facile d'intégrer 45 ans d'histoire que l'Est a vécus et que l'Ouest a mal vécus. Il ne sera pas possible, en effet, de mettre entre parenthèses une histoire dont les adhérences sont encore fortes, il ne sera

pas non plus possible de ne pas intégrer ce qui a séparé comme ce qui a réuni. La nouvelle Allemagne est en train de se construire une nouvelle sémiosphère : celle de l'Ouest n'est pas suffisante et celle de l'Est part en lambeaux. La reconstitution d'une nouvelle sémiosphère ne se fera qu'à partir d'un projet social commun aux deux Allemagnes réunifiées. Sans doute est-ce pour cela que le choix d'une capitale, Berlin par exemple, sera difficile, et par conséquent il devra pour un temps être différé. Même si les deux Allemagnes parlent l'allemand, parlent-elles la même langue pour autant ?

À l'inverse de la sémiosphère allemande, qui est à reconstruire, la sémiosphère soviétique est en train de se transformer et Moscou, en tant que capitale, pourrait bien en subir les conséquences. Il y a quelques semaines des journaux évoquaient la possible suppression de la relève de la garde devant le mausolée de Lénine, et même le possible transfert du corps de Lénine dans un autre lieu ! Cette mise en question de la principale « icône » du régime n'est évidemment pas du goût de l'Armée rouge ni non plus de certains cercles conservateurs. L'aboutissement des réformes fera-t-il disparaître tout un décor, toute une mise en scène du pouvoir à Moscou ? Il est, là encore, difficile et prématuré de faire des hypothèses quant à l'évolution à long terme, mais il faut s'attendre à des transformations significatives qui reflèteront la crise du régime actuel ébranlé dans ses certitudes d'hier.

Comment conclure ?

La capitale, je pense l'avoir assez souligné, n'est pas d'abord une ville ; et pour cette raison, et d'autres encore, en tant que « chose, » n'est pas l'apanage de la géographie, qui s'arrogerait le droit d'en faire un objet scientifique. Elle est bien plus que cela, c'est pourquoi, d'ailleurs, elle est devenue un objet auquel l'historien, le sociologue, l'anthropologue, l'urbaniste, le politologue et le linguiste, pour ne citer qu'eux, peuvent légitimement s'intéresser et considérer qu'il s'agit d'un domaine commun à partager. Partage scientifique dont l'urgence s'impose pour maîtriser les problèmes qui se posent à certaines capitales en phase d'aménagement ou de réaménagement.

En tant qu'objet d'interrelations, la capitale ne dévoile toute sa complexité qu'au moment où elle doit être constituée de toutes pièces car elle n'est pas alors, comme on le pense trop souvent, la sommation de techniques et de compétences urbanistiques, d'analyses géographiques, de données anthropo-sociologiques et de culture historique. La capitale est

la tentative de représenter une culture en acte, une sémiosphère passée et présente, susceptible d'orienter l'avenir et dans laquelle une nation, ou du moins une fraction majoritaire de celle-ci, puisse trouver sa raison d'être et sa cohérence. Qui contestera que Paris, Londres et Washington reflètent respectivement les nations française, anglaise et américaine ? Capitales cohérentes, elles saisissent tout à la fois le passé, le présent et le futur des collectivités qu'elles incarnent, dans la mesure où elles s'efforcent par de multiples institutions d'irriguer et de drainer tout autant la substance matérielle que spirituelle des peuples qui les ont illustrées.

Washington démontre bien qu'une capitale peut être créée et s'imposer si la sémiosphère et l'idéologie nationales sont suffisamment puissantes.

À l'inverse, une capitale comme Berne n'exprime pas véritablement la Suisse dans son ensemble. Elle n'est qu'une capitale du consensus : le consensus n'étant jamais qu'un accord sur le minimum. Dans ce cas, capitale et ville sont parfaitement dissociées, même si l'on feint de l'ignorer.

C'est assez dire que la capitale, pour être cohérente, doit résulter d'un processus complexe qui combine simultanément dénomination, structuration et réification, c'est-à-dire les trois éléments fondamentaux d'une action territorialisante réussie⁴⁶.

Notes

- ¹ Benveniste, Émile (1969). *Le Vocabulaire des institutions indo-européennes*, tome 2: pouvoir, droit, religion. Paris : les Éditions de Minuit. p. 35.
- ² Ibid., p. 37.
- ³ Raffestin, Claude (1987). « La Fonction capitale est-elle nomade », in *Urba* 217. p. 132-135
- ⁴ Foucault, Michel (1976). *Histoire de la sexualité*. I. La Volonté de savoir. Paris : Gallimard. p. 121
- ⁵ Lapierre, Jean-William (1968). *Essai sur le fondement du pouvoir politique*. Paris, p. 677.
- ⁶ Elias, Norbert (1985). *La Société de cour*. Paris : Flammarion.
- ⁷ Ibid.
- ⁸ Ibid.
- ⁹ Raffestin, op. cit.
- ¹⁰ Ibid.
- ¹¹ Raffestin, op. cit.
- ¹² Kertzer, David I. (1989). *Riti e simboli del potere, sagitari*. Paris: Laterza.
- ¹³ Ibid., p. 20-21.
- ¹⁴ Ibid.
- ¹⁵ Ibid., p. 55.
- ¹⁶ Ibid., p. 57.
- ¹⁷ Lotman, Jurij M. (1985). *La semiosfera*. Venezia : Marzilio Editiori, p. 58.
- ¹⁸ Ibid., p. 59.
- ¹⁹ Ibid.
- ²⁰ Ibid., p. 69.
- ²¹ Watzlawick, Paul (1988). (dirigé par), *L'Invention de la réalité, Contributions au constructivisme*. Paris : Seuil, p. 223-266.
- ²² Rossi-Landi, Ferruccio (1978). *Ideologia*. Milano : Isedi, p. 191 et sq.
- ²³ Sack, Robert David (1986). *Human Territoriality*. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.
- ²⁴ Châtelet, François et Gérard Mociret (1981). (sous la direction de). *Les Idéologies, des pharaons à Charlemagne*, tome 1. Verviers : Marabout, p. 23.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Raffestin, Claude (1980). *Pour une géographie du pouvoir*. Paris : Litec.

²⁷ Benda, Julien (1965). *La Trahison des clercs*. Paris : Grasset, p. 14.

²⁸ Châtelet, François, op. cit., tome 3. p. 53.

²⁹ Guichonnet, P. et Cl. Raffestin (1974). *La géographie de Frontières*. Paris.

³⁰ Eliade, Mircea (1965). *Le sacré et le profane*. Paris : Gallimard, p. 21.

³¹ Prieto, Luis (1975). *Pertinence et pratique*. Paris : les Éditions de Minuit, p. 196.

³² Korinman, Michel et Maurice Ronai (1981). « Les Idéologies du territoire. » in *Les Idéologies*, tome 3. de Rousseau à Mao. Verviers : Marabout, p. 222.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Raffestin, op. cit.

³⁸ Cf. (1988). *Le città Capitali degli stati pre-unitari, atti del LIII Congresso di storia del risorgimento italiano*.

³⁹ Gut, Philippe. « Les Capitales de l'Italie pré-unitaire vues par les voyageurs français, » in *Le Città capitali...* p. 437-466.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Turco, Angelo (1988). *Per una teoria della complessità*. Milano : Unicopoli.

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ON THE NATURE OF CAPITALS AND THEIR PHYSICAL EXPRESSION

Amos Rapoport

In this paper, I consider the nature of capitals and their physical expression, cross-culturally and historically, and derive implications for the present and future. These will emerge from the discussion. However, there is an underlying taxonomic premise: that, in general, single monothetic attributes cannot define or identify complex entities such as capitals. Rather, multiple (polythetic) attributes must be used, not all of which need to be present in any given case; every member of the type will possess many of the characteristics and each attribute will be shared by many members of the type. Thus, no single attribute is both sufficient and necessary for membership in the type (Rapoport 1988a, 1989, 1990b, sp. 69-74). In practice, one often begins with *exemplars* (cf. Rosch 1978), in this case possibly traditional “great or imperial capitals” (Cornish 1971 (1923)), against which more ambiguous instances are judged, using multiple attributes.

The multiple attributes defining capitals will be derived intuitively, from general knowledge, the literature and examples. The analysis of a large and diverse body of evidence (Rapoport 1990a) may, in principle, lead to a reduced core set of attributes; such an analysis is also important because little has been written about capitals as a type, as opposed to specific capitals (but cf. Gottmann 1977, 1983).

What is a capital?

“Capital” comes from the Latin *Caput* (head) and thus derives from “headquarters,” not “city.” This is culture-specific, so that the Swazi equivalent

umphakatsi (see later) derives from *phakatsi*, meaning “inner” or “heart” (Kuper 1972). In fact, many definitions are rather ethnocentric and “tempocentric” (cf. Abler, Adams and Gould 1971, 203; Cornish 1971; Eldredge 1975, vii; *Sage Urban Studies Abstracts* 1990; Sjoberg 1960; Ucko, Tringham and Dimbleby 1972, 236; Gottmann 1977). However, their commonalities are significant: strong and lasting centrality (e.g., as transactional centres, or centres of government and administration); exceptionally wide interests; images that symbolize national identity, status and power, so that resources are lavished on them; pre-eminence over other cities; exercise of control: political, of power, wealth, decision making; and, above all, their function in the organization of territory.

The culturally neutral, cross-culturally valid definition of a city is also as an instrument for the organization of surrounding territory, making it dependent, integrating regions and generating effective space (Wheatley 1971, 388, based on Friedmann; cf. Trigger 1972, 577, Rapoport 1977). This avoids definitions based on the presence of a few highly culture-specific elements (Wheatley 1972, 622-623; Ucko, Tringham and Dimbleby 1972, 643-645; Andrews 1973), or on the basis of size, density, heterogeneity, literacy, etc., as in Weber’s well-known definition. This implies that cities are special organizers of space, since all humans, and even animals, have special sites, locales and organized systems of settings; some of these we call cities and some of *those* we call capitals. Moreover, cities and states arose together, since most early cities were city states (Wheatley 1971, 398).

Since both capitals and cities organize and control territory, this is a necessary but not sufficient attribute. The general question is whether capitals differ qualitatively from other cities, or whether the difference is one of degree: are capitals like cities, only more so? If that is the case, is the morphology different and are any attributes shared with cities expressed more strongly in capitals? Is the nature of the organizing function different? Is it a matter of size or the extent of the area organized?

Usages such as *cultural, business, art or agriculture capital or the film, artichoke, etc., capital of the world* refer to capitals as the top of a given hierarchy, the centre of centres. They organize and control larger territories, with more centralization and control, with more authority and more redistribution of resources. It is interesting that Brasilia was to organize and develop the interior of Brazil by being created there. Although partly an aspect of modernism, to try to use urban form and organization as an instrument of social change (Holston 1989), that effort also continues the traditional role of capitals as an essential component of the system of authority of the ruler and the organizing function. Thus, in Europe,

capitals created modern national states by gradually organizing hundreds of thousands of self-contained, nearly isolated units (Pounds 1989).

The size of the city itself may be a factor. In traditional situations, capitals tend to be large, as in the case of early Chinese capitals (Wheatley 1971, 138-141). Çatal Hüyük is identified as the centre of a larger polity on the basis of its relatively large size for the seventh millennium B.C. (Todd 1976). When most settlements were small, or populations dispersed, denser settlements of relatively large numbers of people were in themselves impressive, although the actual sizes and populations were small by present-day standards (Mumford 1961, 48, 61; Kamau 1976, 333; Hardie 1980; Randles 1972; Moosa 1990). Moreover, their populations were heterogeneous (Isbell 1978a; Hull 1976, 33ff), a characteristic that was also rare and hence impressive. Size was reinforced (i.e., redundancy increased) through the use of city walls, towers, gates and moats, the latent function of which was at least as important as their defence function (Mumford 1961, 37; Ucko, Tringham and Dimbleby 1972).

In the United States, this is clearly not the case: New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and so forth, are not even state capitals. Elsewhere, large cities still tend to be capitals, whether national (Paris, London, Rome, Mexico City) or state (São Paulo, Bombay, Sydney). Generally, since 1800, the trend has been towards smaller cities as capitals (Gottmann 1977).


The *type* of control may also be different, as well as its strength and explicitness. There are various forms of control: through overall cultural influence, including education; through military power, effective administration and justice; by controlling economic resources; by controlling information flows; through culturally appropriate legitimization. Capitals achieve strong control through redundancy: the use of multiple means of control. Traditionally, a capital is a centre of roads, communication, education and literacy; of excellence, so that anyone aspiring to success has to be there; of culture—art, crafts, lifestyle, speech, fashion, etc.—hence a centre of style from which diffuse intellectual, religious, social and aesthetic standards; of rituals and ceremonials, especially those significant for the entire society, legitimating and fortifying the ruler and reinforcing cohesion; of justice and law; of continuity with the past, through the site, name, myths of origin, tombs and so forth. Many, if not most of these functions, need appropriate settings and thus physical expression. A capital is thus a centre of symbolism, of culture-specific expression of grandeur, elaboration, sacredness, resources invested, etc.

As a *centre* a capital contrasts with the provinces or backwaters, that is, the *periphery* (Rapoport 1989), a contrast still very useful in discussing the politics of space (cf. Gottmann 1980). The capital becomes the focal

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point of contact with the periphery and other polities; influence, power, control, sanctity, well-being and economic goods (through redistribution) flow towards the periphery, which looks to the centre, and resources, tribute, etc. flow to the hub, allowing major investment of resources, including labour.

Figure 1



Centrality is reinforced by an emphasis on meaning and symbolism, which can be achieved in various ways. One is by assemblies at the capital of chiefs and subordinate kings (Fritz 1986, 49, 52), another through the residence there of conquered kings (Isbell 1978) or through pilgrimages. Hence, capitals often dominate and are centres of road systems (Sjoberg 1960; Cornish 1971; Lekson et al. 1988; Isbell 1978a; Morris and Thompson 1985; etc.). However, although “all roads lead to Rome,” or to Cuzco (Isbell 1978) or Ife (Kamau 1976), this also is culture-specific and there are exceptions such as Kandy (Duncan 1990; see later).

Another way, to be discussed later, is through the sacred. Capitals become cosmic centres, centres or navels of the world, or *axes mundi*, through which sacredness enters and diffuses to the periphery. Built environments become real by participation in the symbolism of the centre (Eliade 1959, 5; Mumford 1961; Wheatley 1971; Smith 1972; Geertz in Wilentz 1985; etc.). In this specific sense, traditional capitals are also the centres of centres.

There is a hierarchy from the countryside, through the village, town, city and provincial capital to the principal capital. In terms of the distinction between the functions of capitals and their morphological attributes (Gottmann 1977; Wheatley 1971, 1972) one can suggest that, in the hierarchical organization of settlements, function is defined by settlement distribution, whereas morphology is an aspect of the two other levels of analysis: settlement layout, and the nature of buildings and building

complexes (cf. Ucko, Tringham and Dimbleby 1972, xxii).

Although meaning is central for the understanding of all environments, it is even more so for capitals. Whatever the culture-specific meanings, capitals and their central enclaves exhibit the *highest* levels of meaning (Rapoport 1988b; 1990d, sp. 219-225).

In terms of the distinction between the vernacular and the high-style, capitals, and especially their central enclaves, are the most controlled from above, the most explicit and theory-based, intended to be impressive and communicate power or to demonstrate cleverness, up-to-dateness (or, alternatively, traditionality) (Rapoport 1969 sp. 2; 1990b). They exhibit the grandest urban design, spaces and buildings, the most sophisticated expression of elements and the most lavish use of resources. This, however, leads to the discussion of how capitals are given physical expression.

Physical expression

Built environments in general make manifest images, schemata and symbols, and thus communicate meaning, including political meaning (Laswell 1979; Goodsell 1988). Although frequently implicit, this is often explicit where control, authority and the like need to be given the strongest possible expression and become mnemonics (Rapoport 1990d).

In all capitals, and certainly in central enclaves of traditional capitals, the culturally relevant elements used in all built environments receive their highest and strongest expression. The stone enclosure walls of Zimbabwe (Garlake 1982a, 1982b; Huffman 1983) and the decorations and art of Ife (Kamau 1976) communicate, respectively, the power of the Shona state or glory of the Yoruba royal lineage. Sets of such elements (repertoires) are generally used in high-style, elite or sacred areas to emphasize such meanings (Rapoport 1990a, 1990d; cf. Fritz 1986; Duncan 1990; Hull 1976; Kuper 1972; etc.). They are found in their most developed and most redundant form in the centres of major capitals. Although always culture-specific, regularities can be found: location; size and scale; restricted visual or physical access; elevation or height; special materials, colours, decoration or artistic elaboration; courts and gates; platforms; special elements; etc. (Rapoport 1990a; Flannery 1976; Freidel and Sabloff 1984; Duncan 1990; Fritz 1986; etc.).

This implies that capitals, and especially their cores, are front regions *par excellence*, that is, they communicate the desired meanings (Rapoport 1977, 1990d). This is why so many resources are devoted to them. The

construction of monumental and ceremonial complexes demands much effort and planning, and astonishing amounts of labour (cf. Isbell 1987 on Peru; Haddingham 1975 on ancient Britain; Hammond 1972 on the Maya; Lekson et al. 1988 and Nabokov and Easton 1989, 361, on Chaco Canyon; Fowler 1974, 1975 and Nabokov and Easton 1989, 95, 103, on Cahokia; cf. Rapoport 1990a). Not only do the results overawe—the ability to construct demonstrates authority and control.

Built environments are also systems of settings for culturally appropriate activities and behaviour (Rapoport 1990c, 1990d). Capitals provide stages and props for ceremonies and rituals—what have been called shrines or theatres of power (Goodsell 1988; Cohen 1987; Geertz 1980; Strong 1983; Richards 1978; etc.). By using appropriate repertoires, political authority is communicated and relevant institutions appear mighty, impressing large audiences. Appropriate elements dramatically communicate culture-specific schemata of political authority, act as mnemonics, legitimate acts, secure compliance and reinforce the official definition of the state.

The concepts of behaviour and role settings thus combine with the dramaturgical analogy (Rapoport 1990c, 1990d) and incorporate Kenneth Burkes's five ingredients of drama: scene, act, agent, agency and purpose (Kuper 1972, 415). As for all settings, one may ask: who does what, where, when, including/excluding whom and why (Rapoport 1977, 1990c, 1990d)? Since capitals may differ from other cities by the type of control, it becomes possible to suggest that charisma may be relevant. Using the five attributes of charisma (*the mirum, tremendum, majestas, energicum and fascinans* (Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1989, 312, citing Goetze 1977) it is possible to suggest that the design of traditional capitals may be understood as reinforcing the first four, emphasizing the theatre of power through the physical environment. More recent, nontraditional capitals, while still lavishing resources, do not do that.

There is one fairly recent exception where this was done very explicitly: Nazi Germany. State monuments of enormous scale were constructed, manifesting the *Führer's* word in stone, “fetishes” and images of national identity demonstrating the grandeur of the culture, state and charismatic *Führer* by dominating the capital (as in Speer's Berlin plan) (Blomeyer 1979). In Zeppelin Field, Nürnberg (the party capital), huge spaces, buildings, massed crowds, flags, insignia, light and sound (fixed, semifixed and nonfixed feature elements) combined to create “unearthly” and “impressive and out of this world atmosphere” (Blomeyer 1979, 55-56)—the ultimate political theatre. It overawed, overwhelmed and dwarfed the individual, making him or her feel unimportant. On a smaller scale,

this was also achieved by the entry sequence to Hitler's office at the Chancellery. Although not as effectively or explicitly, cities were seen as "monumental propaganda" and an "important political problem" in the Soviet Union (*Khudozhnik i Gorod* 1975). This was even more the case in the capital: witness the scale of spaces and buildings, and the lavish metro, in Moscow. A more interesting comparison, however, is between Nazi Germany and the pharaoh's palace in ancient Egypt (Uphill 1972) and medieval Kandy in Sri Lanka (Duncan 1990).

Many semidivine kings, for example in West Africa, were characterized by the attributes of fearsomeness and sanctity, and their capitals tried to reflect that physically (Morton-Williams 1972, 883; Connah 1987; Kamau 1976). More than most, the pharaoh used a setting to produce feelings of awe in subjects and visitors. This "palace" included government buildings, offices, barracks, storerooms, arsenals and so on, and could be the size of a city, an "inner city" as it were. Rameses III had a palace in every major city in Egypt and, in that sense, the capital was where the king was. The one analysed (Per Rameses) shrouded the pharaoh with dignity and with hieratic trappings of state so that his very appearance was a "veritable epiphany" (Uphill 1972, 722). It was a device to emphasize the king's power by producing suitable feelings of awe through a series of architectural illusions that created psychological feelings of subservience by remarkable stage management. As in Nazi Germany, the visitor was cowed through scale, architecture, space, sequence of movement, sound, ritual and so forth, and what is described is "not a hundredth part of the whole" (Uphill 1972, 733).

In Kandy (Duncan 1990, 119ff) the landscape was a stage set used for a series of civic rituals intended to reinforce charismatic rule (as they were in South Asia generally [cf. Richards 1978]). The efficient performance of such rituals required a proper arrangement of the stage—the city, palace, temples, etc. In the Hindu tradition, space and time were highly symbolic, and pilgrimage sites needed to be difficult to reach. In the case of Kandy, roads were kept in bad condition (very different from Rome or Cuzco). Embassies were deliberately delayed for months to emphasize the difficult ritual passage to the god king (Duncan 1990, 140ff), effectively turning the passage into a pilgrimage. There was a complex sequence of going up to Kandy, entering the city, the palace and finally the audience hall. The various levels, movements, climbs and elements were highly ritualized and were intended to make visitors feel small. The audience ritual itself was stage-managed to make visible the assertion that the king was a god on earth. Indeed charcoal braziers were used to reduce oxygen and make visitors feel faint (Duncan 1990, 150).

In such ways, capitals became “ruling machines” (Uphill 1972). In them, culture-specific elements become material manifestations of the power of the state, reinforced by appropriate rituals and ceremonies, so that fixed, semifixed and nonfixed elements worked together. In effect, morphological attributes of traditional capitals express their functional attributes as centres of control. This is made noticeable physically and acts as a mnemonic for insiders and outsiders. It is significant that capitals were always chief targets for invading armies, largely on symbolic grounds. They were sacked, burned, ploughed under, salted and renamed, and their tutelary gods destroyed or carried away to the conquering capital. Also, when a new ruler, religion or ideology arose internally, new capitals were often formed with a new physical expression, although the function remained constant (on India: King 1976; Christianity in Europe: Krautheimer 1983; neo-Confucianism in Korea: Nemeth 1987; Moslem India: Noe 1984; generally: Mumford 1961; Ucko, Tringham and Dimbleby 1972 and Sjöberg 1960, among others).


There were attempts to make capitals imposing, as awe inspiring as possible and “glittering” to communicate the social, political and cultural power of the ruler. For this, resources were used to give physical expression to, and to communicate culture-specific meanings, often through noticeable differences (Rapoport 1977, 1990a, 1990d). Although important sites can be known (associational) they are usually marked perceptually and the strength (redundancy) of marking tends to go up as the size and complexity of societies and their settlements go up (Rapoport 1977, 1990c, 1990d). However, even among Australian Aborigines, although the marking of domestic sites is minimal and is largely associational (Rapoport 1975, 1990d), sacred sites frequently coincide with major natural features such as rocks, water-holes, etc. (Rapoport 1975; Sutton 1988). These are endowed with sacred and mythological meanings, are places of pilgrimage and mnemonics for rituals and ceremonies, that is, are elaborated with nonfixed and semifixed feature elements.

By analogy, capitals and their central enclaves should be strongly marked. In Tokyo, the Imperial Palace features a very large, green space commonly absent in Japanese cities; so do castles and temples elsewhere in Japan. The central parts of all capitals are similarly made noticeable using repertoires of culturally appropriate elements. Some African capitals, for example, become noticeable, by trying to impress with the prestige of size and to overawe with large walls and gates (which also provided security). In some, broad plazas and avenues, used for impressiveness and for meetings and processions, contrasted noticeably with the urban fabric, emphasizing not only the capital but the centre within it, made more

noticeable by the palace, with its complex architectural forms, and ostentatiously visible and audible ornaments. Elaborate court etiquette and lifestyle noticeably emphasized the mystical aura and prestige of rulers (Hull 1976, 33ff, 89, 102-103).

There seem to be two morphologies of capitals and ceremonial centres: dispersed—where the centre stands alone (e.g., some Maya, Monte Albán)—and the more common, compact variety where it forms part of a nucleated settlement (Teotihuacán, Tenochtitlán) (Bray 1972; Blanton in Flannery and Marcus 1983, 109; Wheatley 1971, 305ff). More generally, centres can relate to the elements they organize in these two ways, and the former may gradually change to the latter (Rapoport 1981), as the latter may be dispersed to compact ceremonial centres (Wheatley 1971, 316-327).

Figure 2



(Based on Rapoport 1981, Fig.3, a, b: p. 452)

It may be difficult to distinguish between the two morphologies. Persepolis, the Achaemenid capital of Iran, had no permanent dwellings (as far as I know). These were erected when the king came. It was purely a grand, monumental, ceremonial sacred enclave (Wheatley 1971, 438-439). Zimbabwe, the Shona capital, had a largely rural population of between ten thousand and thirty thousand, who lived in homesteads and thatched houses—that have left no trace. Like Persepolis, Zimbabwe was primarily a political centre. The Great Stone Enclosure was not defensive or residential, but symbolic, its size showing the power of the state and rulers in permanent and obvious fashion, not least through the awe-inspiring impact of the control over labour they communicated. There were no carefully designed public monuments, avenues, parade grounds, markets or temples. The palace on the hill for the ruler and his court, his private shrines in which rituals took place were rarely if ever seen by ordinary people. A domestic vocabulary was used, stone enclosures being common in Shona settlements, but given its highest expression. Thus, both centres,

while functionally identical, were highly culture-specific in their expression. Monte Albán and Tenochtitlán both emphasize the sacred—temples, tombs and altars—and use monumentality—scale and decoration of public structures, plazas, pyramids and ball-courts—as settings for rituals and ceremonies, but also in highly culture-specific ways.


Note that, first, the role of such areas can be inferred from archaeological remains and, second, that even in nucleated settlements only *parts* manifest capital functions in full form. Although there may be some overflow, in the form of avenues, causeways, axes and the like (e.g., Bacon 1967; Broda, Carrasco and Matos 1987; Aveni, Calnek and Hartung 1988), the full repertoire of devices available is used to its fullest in these central parts to emphasize their grandeur and significance. For example, when Hanoi was built as the capital of Vietnam in the eleventh century C.E., it had two parts: the royal city and an “ordinary commoners” city, of which the royal city gradually became an even smaller part (Hoang and Nishimura 1990). Although the original Cairo, “Al Qahirah,” designed as the Fatimid capital of the Islamic world, was intended only for the court and military staff of the khalif and grew, its relative size also became smaller as the rest of the city grew faster.

This was also the case in Beijing, New Delhi, St. Petersburg and other capitals. In most large, especially modern capitals, the capital function is often hardly apparent, giving a symbolic advantage to smaller cities, although not too small, a possible reason for the generally smaller size of capitals since 1800 (Gottmann 1977). This was part of the rationale for Brasília. In Rio, government buildings were scattered throughout the city and other aspects of the city dominated. There was no ceremonial focus identifying the capital (Eldredge 1975, 478). In Brasília, the central function would be government, other functions being secondary. As a ceremonial and symbolic city, it could express the grandeur of the nation rather than, say, that of royalty.

There is thus a tension between what one could call the “capital-specific” part of capitals (assuming that it is distinct rather than having its elements dispersed) and the general urban fabric. Several questions are posed: What are their relative sizes? Are their orders different? Is the city as a whole handled differently from the norm in that culture, and how? Is there a gradient as one moves away from the capital-specific area?

All cities have a physical order, so that cross-culturally there are different orders (Rapoport 1984). The question is then whether the capital portion has a special and different order *within* a given culture. This may be Washington and Canberra as opposed to the prevalent grid or, on the contrary, the grid of Bello Horizonte; the totally un-Brazilian character of

Figure 3



Brasília; or the skyscrapers, boulevards and freeways of centres of Third World capitals. Or, as in Beijing, it may be the types of buildings and spaces, materials, colours, height and the many components of the repertoire that produce noticeable differences (Rapoport 1977, 1990a, 1990d).

Although I have been emphasizing the importance of meaning in the physical expression of capitals, it seems essential to distinguish among three distinct levels of meaning (Rapoport 1988b, 1990a, sp. 219-225). High-level meanings related to cosmologies, world views, cultural schemata, philosophical systems and the sacred; middle-level meanings that communicate status, identity, wealth, power and the like, the latent rather than instrumental aspects of activities; low-level, everyday and instrumental meanings that enable settings to be used appropriately (Rapoport 1990d, 221).

Even in traditional situations, relatively few people understood the high-level meanings, whereas all needed to understand low-level meanings in order to behave appropriately. However, high-level meanings were at least potentially available. In preliterate societies, or where literacy was limited, the built environment was the only medium for encoding group memory over time. Such mnemonics could be destroyed by destroying the built environment; this is no longer the case. As other symbolic systems become available, initially writing (cf. Goody 1977) and then, as what has been called World Three (Popper 1972) becomes more widespread, the built environment loses its role as a communicator of high-level meanings.

The increase of the scale and heterogeneity of societies also plays a role. With more diverse groups and more variability within groups, lexical meanings are replaced by idiosyncratic ones (Rapoport 1977, 316-322, 1990d). Another consequence is an increase in the number and specialization of settings. As a result, middle-level meanings become very

important and lower-level meanings need very high redundancy, leading to a proliferation of signs, lights, neons, billboards, advertising and other semifixed elements that become more important. These tend to mask the perceptual identity of capital elements. The height symbolism of traditional Bangkok or the colour symbolism of traditional Beijing worked because they were lexical, clear, explicit symbols; they cannot work when meanings are implicit and idiosyncratic. No longer can whole cultural landscapes try to express a single sacred schema as in Khmer Cambodia (Wheatley 1971; Duncan 1990; Giteau 1976).

In Persepolis also, the design established a parallelism between worlds designed to invoke the cooperation of the gods, and to diffuse divine authority to the four quarters (Wheatley 1971, 438-439). The Balinese royal palace “was itself, in its sheer material form, a sacred symbol, a replica of the order it was constructed to symbolize” (Geertz 1980, 109). This is no longer possible, partly because the idea of the sacred, which underlies these examples and many other traditional capitals, is no longer available as the major form of legitimation (cf. Rappaport 1979). For one thing, the sacred order has been replaced by a geometric order as will be seen in the next section.

An early example of this change, which we now see in developing countries, was St. Petersburg, which combined modernization (as Westernization), reflected in the plan and architectural style, with grand scale and impressiveness made possible by the still autocratic nature of the ruler. Even that becomes more difficult later because of changes in views about the relationships between governors and governed (cf. Goodsell 1988). One result is legalism, impersonality, bureaucracy, expertise and efficiency, difficult to communicate symbolically in principle, and even more difficult to communicate through built environments.

One could argue that new high-level meanings are being communicated, such as equality, democracy and accountability. This, however, is doubtful. The difference between nineteenth century and twentieth century ideal American cultural landscapes shows the loss of symbolic content, both sacred and political, and its replacement by low- and middle-level meanings, the highest being an “agreeable environmental experience” (Jackson 1984, 20). Similarly, an analysis of American city council chambers (Goodsell 1988) suggests a loss of high-level meanings. Their exteriors certainly do not communicate such meanings, nor do county courthouses (Wood et al. 1979).

Thus, capitals currently cannot communicate high-level meanings. It is even difficult for them to be impressive or to inspire awe. The most impressive metropolises and megapolises are not necessarily capitals;

when they are, the capital elements seem minor. In modern industrial societies, political preeminence is no longer necessary to achieve economic, educational, scientific or artistic preeminence, nor can it be communicated symbolically. Even impressive ceremonies, rituals and parades commonly used in traditional capitals (and formerly in Nazi Germany) are no longer possible in democratic countries, and neither are the special settings necessary for them. Moreover, parades and festivals increasingly become entertainment.

Traditionally, a single guiding schema could structure the cultural landscape from the tomb and farmstead to the region (cf. Nemeth 1987; Kamau 1976). This reached its peak in the capital and diffused from that centre, which it marked physically, weakening as it reached the periphery (cf. Morris and Thompson 1985, see later). Even when the sacred order is replaced by a geometric order, the latter can still communicate grandeur, centrality and the like, as in Versailles, Karlsruhe, St. Petersburg or papal Rome, although it weakens over time (cf. London as imperial capital). Finally, in modern capitals, the effective communication of high-level meanings through the environment virtually ceases for the reasons suggested above. This argument seems to be supported by cross-cultural and historical examples.

Cross-Cultural and historical examples

Typically, thinking of “capitals” suggests a very few cities, although some reflection and research changes that view. There are currently 160-odd countries, each with a capital, and many countries and capitals have disappeared. There are also hundreds of cases where capitals have been shifted repeatedly (Wheatley 1971, 448) or where there has been more than one national capital. Many countries were previously separate countries or city states, of which there were very many all over the world; in third century C.E. Japan alone, there were thirty, each with its capital (Moosa 1990). I counted 145 major capitals in Cornish (1971) (1923), few of which are capitals now, and he leaves out many areas of the world and very many capitals; moreover, single names may represent many successive distinct capitals (e.g., Delhi). By now one is probably dealing with many hundreds of national capitals, and has not yet considered capitals of provinces, states, cantons or republics (cf. Fisher 1967), let alone county or district capitals.

Thus, a complete count, cross-culturally and historically, should reveal more than a thousand, possibly several thousand, cities with the status

and function of political capitals. Moreover, all continents (except pre-contact Australia) had capitals, even if these were nomadic or seminomadic. This large and diverse body of evidence is important (Rapoport 1990a). At least in principle, a polythetic set of attributes, and even a core set, become possible, as does the testing of hypotheses, although I use the examples less formally.

Reference to nomadic capitals raises questions about the origins of capitals. Since all humans organize space, at what point can one speak of capitals? Without exploring this systematically, I will begin with what are clearly at least protocapitals and proceed roughly chronologically to contemporary events. But first, a brief discussion of the origin of organizing centres and cities generally.

Most settings in traditional cultures are only comprehensive in terms of high-level meanings, involving the imposition of an order on the chaotic world to make it habitable. This could only be done by attempting to re-create a cosmic or divine order on earth, a reflection, however imperfect, of celestial archetypes, a divine, higher harmony and order. This way of thought is summarized in Eliade's (1959, ch. 1) four points: reality is a function of the imitation of celestial archetypes; it is achieved through participation in the symbolism of the centre, expressed by the *axis mundi*; geomantic and other techniques of orientation are necessary to define sacred space in opposition to profane; this often involves an emphasis on cardinal directions.

High-style buildings, temples, palaces and tombs were a more perfect reflection of the cosmic schema used in all settings. Capitals, as organizing centres, contained many of these elements, achieving high redundancy through congruence among urban form, architecture, sculpture and other such symbols, ceremonies and rituals. They also achieved the highest level of the sacred symbolism specific to that culture, which provided the only acceptable form of legitimation (cf. Rapoport 1979). A weaker version of that order was found in provincial capitals, and in even weaker form in other cities, and, even less precisely, fully and elaborately as the periphery was reached. There was a hierarchy of perfection with the peak at the centres of principal capitals (Morris and Thompson 1985; Kamau 1976; Nemeth 1987; Wheatley 1971, 423-425; etc.).

These centres fix the point of ontological transition, the *axis mundi*, where sacredness enters the world, is focused and concentrated and diffused outwards, often to the cardinal points; hence the frequent importance and size of gates. In this way, the group's territory was assimilated to the sacred order, whether tribal lands, city state, kingdom or empire. This went beyond "symbolism" in our sense; the capital, if properly laid

out and used ritually, became a cosmic machine designed according to a "sacred technology" (Lannoy 1971; cf. Tuan 1974; Wheatley 1971; Duncan 1990; Fritz 1986; Nemeth 1987). Although found widely, it is possibly most explicit and elaborated at Angkor, in Cambodia, although that claim is made for each area (cf. Kamau 1976; Tuan 1974; Uphill 1972).

The general principles were always expressed in culture-specific ways, whether in rituals and movements within cities or pilgrimages to them, or whether the sides of cities faced cardinal directions (as in China or India) or their corners (as in Mesopotamia) (Wheatley 1971, 440). The overall shape of cities could be square, with two crossed axes, as is often emphasized (cf. Rykwert 1976; Wheatley 1971; Duncan 1990), but could also be circular (Kamau 1976; Kuper 1972; Hardie 1980; Hull 1976; Tuan 1974, 155-156, 160). In both cases, the centre, *axis mundi* or *omphalos*, needed vertical emphasis to link the two-dimensional plan to heaven. Again, culture-specific elements were used: vines, trees, pillars, domes, ziggurats, pyramids, mounds, platforms, temple mountains, etc.

The *axis mundi* was the central axis of the universe, kingdom, city of temple, and could be moved or duplicated, since it was an attribute of existential rather than geometric space. Thus, in ancient Egypt, where there was no attempt to create an ideal urban landscape as a whole (Kemp 1972, 661), each major temple was the hub of the universe (Smith 1972, 714). Such centres can also be mobile, or move periodically as was the case in Africa generally (Connah 1987; Hardie 1980; Kuper 1972; Hull 1976; see later).

The primacy of ceremonial centres in organizing territory of seminomadic groups to empires, has been recognized generally (cf. Mumford 1961; Müller 1960; Wheatley 1971, 1972; Tuan 1974) and for many specific cases in the traditional world (e.g., Kuper 1972; Kamau 1976; Fritz 1986; Smith 1972; Rykwert 1976; Tadgell 1989; Duncan 1990; Hull, 1976; Isbell 1978a; Nemeth 1987; etc.). Organizing centres, then cities, began with a spiritual, ritual or sacred role—as ceremonial centres. As cities and capitals acquired other, more secular roles and functions, including territorial control, these were subsumed into the all-pervading religious order. Capitals in particular retained that ceremonial character.

The sacred is also primary in the organization of nomadic (Rapoport 1975, 1982), tribal and pre-urban societies. Ceremonial centres, having legitimacy, facilitate interaction and alliances through various means, leading to increasing social complexity and increasingly complex relations with other groups (Isbell 1987). Tribal shrines can be seen as the beginning of the effective organization of space.

Even in Aboriginal Australia, space was organized in complex ways,

usually around sacred noticeable features in the landscape, which acted as mnemonics at centres for rituals (Rapoport 1975; Sutton 1988). In the resulting large, temporary camps, groups were occasionally organized by the directions of their territory (Rapoport 1975), as was the case in Cuzco (Isbell 1978) and in the symbolic Iroquois capital known as the Longhouse (Rapoport 1969). That capital was the place where the Great Council Fire was lit (Cornish 1971, 250-251). A sacred fire (and a ball-court [cf. Meso America]), was also at the centre of each Creek and Yukchi community (Nabokov and Easton 1989, 105).


The Algonquin chief Powhattan reigned over thirty different tribes living in nearly two hundred "loosely knit villages" (Nabokov and Easton 1989, 55) although it is not clear whether he had a capital. Anasazi Chaco Canyon, however, with Pueblo Bonito in the centre, formed a ritual and redistributive centre of almost urban complexity. From it radiated roads in all directions for hundreds of miles, linking Chaco with dispersed populations in over a hundred communities (Lekson et al. 1988). It was an axis mundi, a place where earth, as the middle, communicated with heaven and the underworld (Nabokov and Easton 1989, 361), as was the case in all pueblos (cf. Saile 1990). In that way Chaco was a centre and organizer of space, marked by size and scale: a precinct of over one square mile with huge public structures and many platform mounds.

Cahokia, the most complex centre in North America north of Mexico, was at the centre of a large region with many secondary hubs, which themselves were most impressive (cf. Poverty Point, La., with a plaza 1,800 feet across). It had a large population and size, and was marked symbolically by over a hundred pyramids and mounds, six major plazas at the centre and palisades, all more important than buildings, and representing a major investment of labour (Fowler 1974, 1975; Nabokov and Easton 1989, 95, 103).

The Zulu had temporary cities, some of considerable size (close to 2,000 dwellings). These rarely outlasted the founder and were primarily aggressive concentrations of humans and cattle, and centres of political and military power (Hull 1976, 23-24), i.e., centres for control. Note that the sedentary Ibo had no capitals, because they had no centralized kingship; centralization of power and control seem essential to the existence of capitals.

Each Tswana state was centred on the kgosi ("king" or "chief") (Hardie 1980). The states and their capitals (with populations up to 30,000) moved periodically, sometimes every three to four years, but were always reconstructed the same way. They were circular (as is the case in southern Africa generally) and used a social rather than geometric schema (as in Africa

Figure 4




THE ZULU CENTER OF UMGUNGUNDHLUVU (OF DUNGAAN)

(Based on Hull 1976, p. 23-24)

generally [Hull 1976]). The complex layout reflected social status, learned from earliest times, reinforced by initiation and duplicated in seatings at gatherings in the *kgotla*, a circular fenced space with a few trees, which was the setting for judgment, administration, ceremonies and tribal gatherings. The adjoining Great Cattle Kraal was a place of ritual and political importance, in which initiation ceremonies took place and the chief was buried. Each ward in a town had a *kgotla*, each town had a main *kgotla* and the centre of the capital was the principal *kgotla* adjoining the *kgosis*'s compound and cattle kraal. There is thus a hierarchy of a culturally specific element—a space.

Many capitals are centred on spaces: plaza, maidan, axis, *enceinte* or sacred precinct. This is the case with the Swazi (Kuper 1972) where the *sibaya* was the equivalent, clearly contrasting with the culturally incompatible spatial and architectural form of the English colonial capital. The *sibaya* was a large open space, sometimes translated as "cattle byre," reflecting the religious as well as the economic and legal significance of cattle. It was a spiritual and ritual centre, a setting for national gatherings and mnemonic for social status. It was located in the *umphakatsi*, the principal royal village, rebuilt in each reign on a sanctified site. Ritual continuity was achieved by naming, by transferring sacred objects and incorporating parts of the previous capital (in this connection the rebuilding of the Old City of Warsaw as the first act after World War II is significant). Its physical form was a microcosm of the Swazi cosmos, reflecting the merging of sacred and secular in Swazi kingship, and was a sacred cosmic centre where cosmic forces combined with political, economic and military into a symbol of national identity (Kuper 1972, 417). This ideal, enduring schema was, as is often the case, more important than specific expressions using new building forms, materials and services. The internal

Figure 5



PLAN OF A SWAZI UMPHAKATSI

(Based on verbal description, Kuper 1972, p. 417)

morphology of the *umphakatsi* itself distinguished between sacred and secular.

The Swazi capital, like the examples that follow, is a special site, a centre, a symbol of the whole that communicates important latent meanings, and a setting for events and rituals. As in other cases, culture-specific elements are used and the capital has its own centre and gradient. In Africa generally, capitals are “giant villages” of rural dwellings marked by the ruler’s compound, with a large open space for public judgments, etc. (Randles 1972). Thus, at the centre of each Yoruba state, was a capital ruled by an oba or divine king whose palace was at the centre. Both circular and rectangular forms were found (in the north and south respectively). The political system, and social and physical environments, all reflected a schema and were microcosmic replicas of the supernatural cosmos (Morton-Williams 1972, 888; Kamau 1976, 335). The model was meant to structure the whole world, but is only clear (occasionally) in capitals—above all in Ife, to which all roads led since it was the crossroads of the earth, the centre of centres. It became the paradigm for capitals and was reflected even more perfectly in the oba’s palace at the centre, where the schema was followed most consistently. There is the usual hierarchy of perfection, with the centre of the principal capital being the most perfect.

This is shown clearly by comparing an Inca provincial capital (Huanuco Pampa) with smaller settlements and with Cuzco (Morris and Thompson 1985; Isbell 1978a).

As the unifying and controlling centre of the Inca empire, the centre of Cuzco provided the paradigm, which weakened towards the periphery of the realm. Weaker versions were incorporated in planned provincial capitals, which were centres of other settlements, and superimposed uniformity over diversity, as was the case in Nazi Germany (Blomeyer 1979, 57).

In both cases, a superimposed political landscape, noticeably different from the surroundings, became a major instrument of control. The system of roads, bridges and waystations radiating from Cuzco was far more elaborate than instrumental needs required; the infrastructure also had the latent function of being a visible mnemonic of Inca rule. With no markets, even warehouses became symbolic of the redistribution of resources.

A provincial capital like Huanuco Pampa (Morris and Thompson 1985) was intrusive, being very different from local settlements. Its urban form, architecture and goods were lesser versions of those found in Cuzco. Like Cuzco, it was divided into four quarters, its huge plaza not only communicating power but providing a setting where many people could participate in rituals that were most important aspects of administration, legitimating Inca rule. In Cuzco, all these physical and ritual attributes reached their peak. It was the most perfect physical expression of a complex Andean cosmological model, virtually unchanged over 4,000 years and expressed in ceremonial centres that were protocapitals (Isbell 1978a). This cultural tradition was used to define and emphasize Cuzco's role as imperial capital. It was also a microcosm of an empire, in which lived conquered kings and where people were spatially arranged by place of origin (cf. Aboriginal camps [Rapoport 1975]). It was also a complex cosmic symbol, being laid out in the shape of a profile puma, its residents being known as "members of the puma" (Isbell 1978a). Cuzco meant "navel" (cf. Eliade 1959) and was an *axis mundi*. At the central plaza (huacaypata), through contact with other realms, spiritual power was acquired and radiated along imaginary lines indicated by shrines and associated rituals, again using traditional Andean prototypes (Isbell 1978b; cf. Haddingham 1987), throughout the Valley of Cuzco and beyond along the four roads leading to the four quarters of the empire, itself called *tawantisuya*, referring to four divisions.

Cuzco, as a "cosmic machine," has parallels with capitals in China, India, Sri Lanka and Korea discussed below, and also with Tenochtitlán and the Aztec realm (cf. Broda, Carrasco and Matos 1987). At its centre, the *templo mayor* was sanctified in terms of founding myths, astronomy, mountains and pilgrimages to other temples (Aveni, Calnek and Hartung 1988). As a sanctified site it was the centre of the capital, which itself was the centre of the realm. From this ceremonial centre, which was a mnemonic reinforced by live re-enactments, radiated the four causeways dividing the city, beyond which radiated imaginary lines of force that structured the realm and the whole world (cf. Marcus 1976 on the Maya). Again, we find a cosmic model, applied at many scales, that reaches perfection at the centre of the capital.

The traditional Chinese capital was a cosmological symbol of great

complexity, the pivot for the universe and the axis of the kingdom around which revolved the microcosm of state and from which diffused sanctity and wellbeing (Tuan 1974; Wheatley 1971). As elsewhere, ceremonies of establishment and periodic rituals were important (cf. Rykwert 1976; Duncan 1990) as were geomantic principles and the symbolism of shape and layout. The ideal was a walled square divided into 16 quarters around the central precinct (Wheatley 1971, 411; cf. Kamau 1976 on the Yoruba), with crossing axes leading to gates facing cardinal directions, the north-south axis being the more important as the celestial meridian. It was *symbolic* (associational), blocked visually and physically, and thus very different from the superficially similar Baroque axis, which was *visual* (perceptual) and *geometric*, and revealed (Rapoport 1977, 350).

The critical symbolic centre was a walled inner city including the ruler's palace, altar of the God of Soil and Temple of the Ancestors. This was conceived as a microcosm of the realm, so that there was a parallelism of cosmos and empire. From that centre there were gradients of status and power within the city, continuing beyond and gradually encompassing the whole country and world. The ceremonial prescription was rarely fully met, but was always used and most clearly expressed in the centres of capitals; it was also reproduced elsewhere, for example, Nara, then Kyoto, in Japan (Wheatley 1971, 414).

In medieval Korea, as in China, a single celestial prototype was used in the location, layout and design at all scales from tombs, through farmsteads, villages and towns, to cities and regions. The whole cultural landscape was an "architecture of ideology" (Nemeth 1987).

In Korea, as elsewhere, when a new ideology replaces the old a new cultural landscape is needed to obliterate the old (cf. Constantine's new Christian capital at Constantinople [Krautheimer 1983] and examples in this paper). The Korean neo-Confucian Yi dynasty attempted to reshape the cultural landscape of the whole country, using the new capital at Seoul (which replaced the Buddhist capital at Kaesong) as the model for cities, towns, villages and farmsteads, in ever weaker form. Using cosmo-magical principles (cf. "sacred technology" [Lannoy 1971]; "astrobiology" [Wheatley 1971]), a celestial model, based on geomancy combined with neo-Confucian ideals and institutions, was applied to create a physical environment that harmonized and cooperated with "local currents of the cosmic breath" (Nemeth 1987, 36) and both reflected cosmic order and, once again, actively channelled cosmic forces.

Kandy, the medieval capital of Sri Lanka, was the centre of a country itself sacred (Duncan 1990; cf. Geertz in Wilentz 1985 on Java). The first capital, Anuradhapura, continued to inspire awe and influenced Kandy, as

did Vijayanagara in southern India (see below). Kandy combined Buddhist and Hindu sacred schemata and used two models: the Asokan (emphasizing temples) and Sakran (emphasizing palaces and lakes), to create a complex cosmic capital at the hub of a series of concentric zones starting at the country's periphery. The capital reflected, in some detail, the structure of the kingdom, was structured in the image of celestial space, and was legitimated through foundation myths and rituals. Like many other examples, it was built as a rectangle (ideally square?) with axes leading to four symbolic gates facing the cardinal directions. Although the relationship among all its parts was symbolic, the eastern part was more significant, and its central enclave was a concrete representation of the city of the gods high upon its cosmic mountain. By being located at the centre of a mandala, the king's palace was at the summit of Mount Meru and at the centre of the universe. The king thus acquired the liminal status of a god who could control the world through the magical power of parallelism and homology (Duncan 1990).

The city became a cosmic machine, where divine power entered and, together with sanctity and good fortune, diffused outwards. Not only rituals and ceremonies, but the urban landscape itself became causally efficacious, not just a setting for kingship but, if properly laid out and used, essential to its practice. "Stunning subjects with the sheer magnificence of the surroundings" (Duncan 1990, 88) was more than impression management or theatre, and all aspects of the urban landscape, not only temples and the palace, had this essential role. Any changes—new buildings, streets, lakes, moats and waterways, gateways, towers and planting—were not "aesthetics" but "magic," and basically different from our cities.

This very complex allegorical landscape was probably not known to most users even then, and the city was used without that knowledge of the high-level meanings (Rapoport 1988b, 1990d, 219-225). Also, the king, nobles and peasants interpreted this landscape and changes to it differently (Duncan 1990). Nonetheless, the strength and clarity of the schema, and the high-level meanings the urban landscape was capable of communicating, are important, as is the capital's essential role of governance. That ended when, after the British conquest in 1815, the capital was moved to Colombo.

There is some argument about whether Chinese and Hindu capitals were different or similar. However, a good case can be made that, behind their very different culture-specific appearances, the basic principles were similar (Wheatley 1971, 450-451). These include: the cosmic ordering of space as a square or rectangular microcosm with cardinal orientations of axes to gates; reliance on geomancy and "astrobiological" thought; their

role in ensuring the maintenance of prosperity by diffusing power through cosmo-magical symbolism; the symbolism of centre and the physical emphasis of the *axis mundi*, although in China it was the emperor's palace and in southern India, the temple sanctuary.

The urban and architectural morphology of Vijayanagara, the capital of the most important empire of southern India, emphasized the magnificence and power of the divine hero-king, who, through close relations with the divine and his actions, promoted prosperity through redistribution of wealth and created and maintained harmony with the cosmic order (Fritz 1986). The city was both a setting for rituals and played a part in them, so that fixed, semifixed and nonfixed feature elements contributed to its function as an embodiment of cosmic order and cosmic city.

This character, based on rules of consecration and layout following the shastras, and based on sacred Vedic enclosures, applied to all settlements—camps, villages, forts, towns and cities (Tadgell 1989; cf. Lannoy 1971)—and above all to capitals. As usual, these were expressed in culture-specific ways in northern and southern India. More important, the Moslem and the English colonial traditions show the change from a sacred to a geometric order and, later, even nongeometric order based on health, the good life and pleasant environments, that is, most middle-level meanings.

The capital of Moslem India moved several times. In 1638, it was transferred to Delhi. The new capital, Shahjahanabad, used two models (Fatehpur Sikri and Ispahan) and grew very fast, with a population of a half million by 1660. The first element built was the Red Fort, with its 20,000 inhabitants – a royal inner city, one found frequently in India, and called *antepura* (inner town), although, in this case, without the usual sacred meaning. The geometry of the Fort, continued by axes, structured the whole city (Noe 1984). Although mosques terminated these axes, and the geometry was skewed to face the mosque in the direction of Mecca (QIBLA), the complex order is geometric and dimensional rather than sacred: it is no longer a cosmic city, sacred in itself, although it still expresses the ruler's power.

Canals and shade trees were most important and structured both the Fort and city. Based on Persian models, they are an allegory of paradise with its four sacred rivers flowing to the cardinal directions from the central "waters of life." This cosmic reference, however, is only metaphorical and very different to Angkor or Kandy. The city may be modelled on the Persian paradise garden but in an earthly, experiential rather than sacred sense, as is implied by an inscription in Shah Jahan's Hall of Private Audience in the Fort: "If there is paradise on earth, it is here, it is here, it is here" (Noe 1984, 21). It is significant that in spite of this, Shahjahanabad,

like other capitals and ideological landscapes, was destroyed by the British after the mutiny of 1857.

If Shahjahanabad marks the transition from the sacred to the geometric order, this is fully developed in the Baroque city, being already dominant in medieval and postmedieval Europe (Pounds 1989; Wilentz 1985; Krautheimer 1983). Still intended to impress, overawe and express power, the capital is not a cosmic city. Also, in the nonfixed feature domain, the rituals that I have been discussing are replaced by spectacles (Strong 1973; Wilentz 1985). Urban design, architecture and illusion are still used but now as settings for royal *fêtes*—a secularization paralleling the replacement of the sacred by the geometric order. Both city and spectacle are still the “theatre of Power” (Cohen 1987), but there is no claim to cosmic efficacy or even reference to it.

This becomes clear when one considers the new imperial capital of New Delhi, and not only from the nature of the city itself, but the fact that like other *colonial* capitals the physical landscape seemed suitable for the new postindependence *national* capitals with, at most, symbolic conversion by renaming.

The new capital, begun in 1911, used the three-part arrangement of English colonial towns in India: native city, cantonment and civil lines (King 1976; cf. Rapoport 1977). It reflects the needs of institutions new to India, and the abstract sociospatial structure is made concrete by physical forms on the ground. It is built for two separate worlds, deliberately contrasting the colonial with the native landscape as a symbolic noticeable difference, as was the case with the use of the English Romantic landscape at Ootacamund, the summer capital of the Madras presidency (Kenny 1990; Rapoport 1977, 351-355).

New Delhi still symbolized total control, but not only was the order geometric, based on a hexagonal pattern with three axes establishing visual links to some of the monuments of the previous cities in this area, there was also an emphasis on the quality of the urban environment (also found at Ootacamund, which is based on English spa towns [Kenny 1990]). This results in an eclecticism between European Baroque models of autocratic capitals—with later nineteenth century town-planning models such as the garden city—that emphasize residential environmental quality. The image was of a Western industrial state of imperial grandeur, as shown by the size and scale of spaces. The city was huge—32 square miles by 1931 (King 1976) and of very low density—so that one can no longer speak of an overall shape, cosmic or other. The rapidly growing bureaucratic and administrative functions influenced the nature of the capital elements, including government house and secretariat and, later, legisla-

tive assembly and council of state. Although an attempt is made to give them symbolic importance through shape, size, location, elevation, spacing and axial relationships, they can no longer dominate the city, most of which is residential and devoted to traffic and, increasingly, shopping, offices and hotels.

It is significant that New Delhi was essentially a Western European capital. In spite of the many culture-specific differences, Europe as a whole was quite different from the cultural realms I have been discussing. There is no notion of the cosmic city and even the sacred element is weak, possibly dating from ancient Rome and the Etruscan cities (Müller 1960; Rykwert 1976) and certainly inconspicuous since the long hiatus without major capitals (Pounds 1989). Even fourth- and fifth-century C.E. Christian capitals seem to attach little importance of the sacred (Krautheimer 1983).

After monarchy in the true sense was ritually destroyed in 1649 in Britain and 1793 in France, and only relics remained, even highly autocratic, specially founded capitals like St. Petersburg were largely secular, as were apparently religious imperial ceremonies that celebrated the tsar's worldly preeminence (Wilentz 1985). The physical expression of centre and grandeur of Karlsruhe and Versailles were secular and almost private. London, as an imperial capital, was hardly a grand setting for royal spectacles. Its dominance was military, economic and cultural. Beginning with postrevolutionary France, the state is increasingly symbolized by flags, statues and other such symbols. Flags on public buildings, statues and monuments, like Napoleon's tomb or the Arc de Triomphe with the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, become crucial (Wilentz 1985). Political meaning is increasingly communicated by single elements, fixed and semifixed, rather than the city or even parts of it. Even in Early Christian Europe, it is not urban form that is important, but the siting of a few elements, what Krautheimer (1983) calls "political topography," notably the location of buildings and monuments within cities. In the case of the mobile capitals of Germany between the tenth and fourteenth centuries C.E., political centres are indicated by three elements: legislature, royal residence and sepulchre (Cornish 1971, 126-128), the latter usually in churches (cf. Krautheimer 1983). This applies even in the case of papal Rome, where the basis of the rule is sacred.

Of course, as new elements develop in capitals, whether monuments, parliaments, secretariats, ministries, courts or presidential mansions, or even opera houses, bridges and stock exchanges, there is an attempt to make them grand and impressive, but the element of awe is missing. Over time, the grandeur and impressiveness tend to weaken. In addition, since the seventeenth century, Western capitals have emphasized long vistas, controlled

facades, elegant plazas, royal gardens and cultural and other amusements for the ruling elite. The city is adorned (Eldredge 1975, 16); there is a focus on aesthetics unlike the focus in, say, Kandy. There is still a major investment of resources, but in terms of culture-specific notions of environmental quality, which still reach their highest expression in capitals.

In the United States particularly, and the New World generally, because of decentralization, capitals are always less important and there is no sacred order; also, as countries of immigration, more recent nations are relatively heterogeneous and pluralistic. It is thus useful briefly to consider two New World capitals.

Ottawa was an existing settlement when designated as capital. Various plans were intended to shape a capital "comparable to the great capitals of the world" (Lindsey 1989). That it was not clear what that meant, and that lexical symbols were apparently lacking, is shown by the continuing conflicts based on different views about how civic design could communicate national meaning. One result was an inevitable dilution of whatever notions existed because a process of negotiation became necessary (Lindsey 1989). It also suggests the difficulty of communicating high-level meanings through physical design. (This is also shown by the plan of Salt Lake City, the grid of which appears purely geometric although based on a sacred, biblical model (Ezekiel, ch. 48; Revelations, ch. 21) (Wheatley 1971, ch. 5, fn. 5: 445-455) with a temple at the centre. At the same time, a search for meaning remains important, with an ongoing attempt to "invent tradition," that is, to impose or transmit cultural codes (Taylor 1989). There is a search for symbols that may no longer be there, nor be capable of being communicated through built form as they were in traditional capitals.

I have suggested that capital elements represent the high style at its peak. In Ottawa, various high style devices were tried in a search for culturally acceptable messages of national distinctiveness and virtue. Given the context, one would expect a major clash with the vernacular order, precisely what seems to occur: the planning of Ottawa can also be interpreted as an attempt to reconcile the two (Taylor 1989).

Given the Canadian capital's lack of shared and clear symbols, the eclecticism found in New Delhi is even stronger than in Ottawa: every Western planning approach of the twentieth century has been tried. It is significant that political control and bureaucratic order are most successfully reflected in the preservation of nature, in watercourses and parks, maintenance, beautification and a tidier environment than elsewhere. The greater investment of resources has led to higher levels of current values: recreation, comfort, cleanliness, a high level of services and standard of living, a pleasant lifestyle and cultural facilities and galleries, museums

and performing arts centres. These are found, and sought by all modern cities and are a good example of Jackson's point (1984, 20) that the highest current level of meaning is an "agreeable environmental experience."

Canberra was designed as a new capital based on Baroque forms used for over 200 years, but recent developments in many ways resemble Ottawa, as becomes clear from an analysis of a recent competition (Warren 1990). Its aim was to show how urban design could enhance the social, commercial and civic life of the centre of the city of Canberra. Emphasized was the need for a focus to symbolize the separate identity of the Canberra community as distinct from the national seat of government, which has, until now, been the major influence on planning and design. It is taken as self-evident that this symbolic centre is to be commercial and developed by private enterprise to achieve first-class function and appearance. Important elements emphasized include parking, transportation interchanges, cultural centre, restaurants, offices, hotels, a casino and other tourist facilities. Since Canberra now has independent status, state and city administrative and judicial facilities are mentioned. The difference from all the traditional examples could hardly be greater.

The same conflict, showing the ambiguity and lack of clarity of the meaning of capitals, appeared in the ongoing debate about the capital of a reunited Germany (Schemann 1990). Regarding Berlin, the debate seems to be more about continuity of place and idea, the name and associational qualities, than perceptual qualities and symbolism of physical form. Its large population was mentioned, as was its social, economic and cultural leadership, although proponents of Bonn saw these as disadvantages. They were also more likely to discuss physical aspects, but these concerned environmental quality. The modesty of Bonn and its lack of monuments were praised, and its being a quiet, pleasant university town with beautiful housing, located on a scenic stretch of the Rhine. Also mentioned was the fact that, after 40 years as a capital, it has at least some concert halls, good restaurants, boutiques and galleries (Schemann 1990). All these elements, like the 30 major museums and some of the finest theatres in Europe used as an advantage of Berlin, are linked to the good life and to environmental quality, and are thus totally different from the criteria for traditional capitals. Even more significant was the debate itself, which questioned the desirability of the very idea of "centre."

Conclusion

The attributes of capitals and how these are expressed physically have emerged from the discussion. To derive implications for the planning and design of capitals, three things require research. First, which of the attributes, if any, are still relevant and likely to continue to be so, that is, constancy and change, cross-culturally and over time? Second, are there still high-level meanings associated with capitals, and to what extent are they shared, and by whom? Third, to what extent can urban form and architectural elements communicate meanings such as national identity, purpose, pride and aspiration, given continuing instrumental functions of capitals, and what repertoires are available?

Centrality, still a core attribute, is weakening in the face of decentralization and multiple centres of influence and power. Capitals often continue as front regions that are meant to communicate desired messages, although these are ambiguous and there is much disagreement about what they should be. In increasingly heterogeneous societies, there are few, if any, lexical symbols and often no shared cultural essence.

Current shared values, such as democracy, equality, high standards of living and health, do not really have physical equivalents, other than good environmental quality, the attributes of which mainly communicate middle-level meanings of multiple groups. In developing countries, development (meaning Westernization) is still a widely shared high-level meaning. Centres of capitals, as front regions, use higher standards of services, skyscrapers, freeways, airports, shops, hotels, national libraries and universities to communicate these meanings. Better communications, bank and business headquarters and the frequent presence of substantial expatriate communities also emphasize their centrality in contacts with the larger world. There are thus extreme contrasts between the centres of national capitals and the rest of the city, provincial capitals and, even more, the periphery. But such contrasts weaken with development and are absent in developed countries where lifestyle and environmental quality are rather uniform (cf. Rapoport 1981). They are also becoming less acceptable, given a climate of egalitarianism and equitable distribution of resources among regions, settlements and parts of settlements.

The type or form of control has also changed. In addition to economic and military power, it is bureaucratic control, responsive, accountable government, delivering security, justice and services efficiently. Unlike charismatic rule this does not depend on, nor is it communicable through, high-level meanings of settings or public rituals or ceremonies. There are

no special elements necessary for success beyond those used in business.

It is unclear which physical elements can communicate “national identity” even if that becomes an accepted goal, or how. Such attempts may actually conflict with the settings currently required. Thus, attempts to give national identity to hotels, office buildings, airports, universities and the like have not been impressive (cf. Barnard 1984). It has even proven difficult to design postcolonial parliament buildings (let alone capitals) as national symbols (Vale 1989), due to lack of clarity in the concept, variability of interpretations, conflicts, etc.

Built environments are no longer needed to communicate high-level meanings. Values such as democracy, equality, freedom, fairness and the rule of law are communicated through actions and through other symbolic systems, notably constitutions and other documents, legal codes, bureaucratic requirements, etc. Capitals are systems of settings for activities meant to provide and safeguard the good life and standard of living. In contradistinction, traditional capitals as artifacts were in *themselves* essential components of the system of authority or, at least, a material embodiment of it. They were always the highest expressions of high style, front regions that encoded cultural values through repertoires of culture-specific elements. This depended on shared schemata and strong control, the former now absent and the latter difficult if not impossible. City planning and even architectural design involve innumerable negotiations and compromises.

Cities as a whole have no overall form and, as such, cannot communicate any meanings. It is doubtful that high-level meanings can be communicated by parts of cities or even single elements. Moreover, capital elements are an ever-smaller part of large agglomerations and even small cities; they also become less visible amidst the proliferation of signs, advertisements, lights and other semifixed elements that provide the requisite redundancy to identify the very much more numerous types of settings. Moreover, many of these new elements dominate capital functions. Thus, in Meiji Tokyo, ministries (i.e., bureaucracy) housed in the new Western buildings near the Imperial Palace created a noticeably different area and communicated the intended high-level meanings. Today, these ministries are hardly noticeable vis-à-vis hotels and office buildings, which new ministries resemble, and hardly noticeable with respect to Tokyo as a whole. The new town hall, unlike the last, is far from that centre and essentially a more lavish office building.

Arguably, the function of capitals continues and, in many cases, they are still centres; still dominant; still contrasting with periphery as the

place where one must be to succeed and as the source of values, fashions, lifestyles, manners and so on. But even in those cases there are no physical equivalents of urban morphology. Thus, although function is still important and, in some cases even more important (cf. Gottmann 1977), morphology has become much less important. If capitals still project power, it is not through the physical environment.

Attempts to impose monumentality, as in Albany, New York, are often seen negatively, possibly because government today becomes increasingly like a corporation. Citizens play the dual role of shareholders and consumers of the end product: good government. Governments are expected to be competitive, provide good management and give value for money, each citizen judging success or failure and, if dissatisfied, ousting the management, since authority is only delegated. The setting for this type of government may well be the office tower or suburban corporate centre.

Since most governments are expected to be secular, sacred symbols that legitimate and create awe are unavailable; "civil religion" is also frequently lacking. There is often a deep distrust of government, a reluctance to allow oneself to be manipulated by symbols, as was the case in recent totalitarian states.

Yet, the view persists that a capital must somehow act as a national symbol and remain an important embodiment of national identity and power. For a time, certain forms derived from Baroque Europe seemed to work, possibly because they coincided with the emergence of nation-states and major capitals in the seventeenth century (Pounds 1989, 7, 225; Taylor 1989, 81). The last time it truly worked was in Washington, DC and, possibly, New Delhi. In this connection, it is important to distinguish between *traditionalistic* forms (based on self-conscious adherence to historical, or allegedly historical, models) and *traditional* forms, which "unselfconsciously" adhere to customary ways (Stock, cited in Duncan 1990, 224; cf. Rapoport 1989). Most capitals and parts of capitals have lost traditional areas, or they have been preserved as museums and tourist attractions. Such preservation may also be a form of defensive structuring (Siegel 1970; Rapoport 1977, 1990d) and is not confined to capitals (cf. Rowntree and Conkey 1980).

For some time to come, in developing countries, symbols of modernity may still be available. As we have seen, however, they are often in conflict with *national* identity and, in any case, will soon be used by other cities. All that seems left are attempts to achieve higher standards of environmental quality, but these are sought by all cities and achieved by many that are not capitals.

It thus seems that the search for symbolic, high-level meanings for capitals, which can be communicated through built environments, is doomed to failure. There appear to be no physical forms or repertoires of attributes that can communicate appropriate (or any) high-level meanings. Whether they *need* to be doomed is an interesting question for further reflection and research.

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THE CHANGING ROLE OF CAPITAL CITIES: SIX TYPES OF CAPITAL CITY

Peter Hall

The first point to make is elementary: not all capital cities are alike. Some are capitals solely because they are the seat of government; at least one (Amsterdam), however, is a capital but not the seat of government. Capitals in federal systems may have less well-developed governmental functions than those in centralized states. Although most seats of government attract other national functions (commerce, finance, the media, higher education), not all do so to an equal degree. We can usefully distinguish the following cases:

- (1) *Multi-function capitals*: Such capitals combine all or most of the highest national-level functions (London, Paris, Madrid, Stockholm, Moscow, Tokyo).
- (2) *Global capitals*: These are a special case of (1). They are cities that also perform supranational roles in politics, commercial life or both (London, Tokyo).
- (3) *Political capitals*: Created as seats of government, political capitals often lack other functions, which remain in older, established, commercial cities (The Hague, Bonn, Washington, Ottawa, Canberra, Brasilia).
- (4) *Former capitals*: Often the converse of (2), such cities have lost their role as seats of government but retain other historic functions (Berlin, Leningrad, Philadelphia, Rio de Janeiro) (Gottmann 1983).
- (5) *Ex-imperial capitals*: A special case of (3), these are former imperial cities that have lost their empires. They may, however, function as national capitals and perform important commercial and cultural roles for the former imperial territories (London, Madrid, Lisbon, Vienna).
- (6) *Provincial capitals*: A special case in federal nations, provincial capitals overlap with (3). They are cities that once functioned as *de facto*

capitals, sometimes on a shared basis, but have now lost that role, retaining, however, functions for their surrounding territories (Milan, Turin, Stuttgart, Munich, Montréal, Toronto, Sydney, Melbourne). New York is a very special case, almost *sui generis*, of a global provincial capital.

(7) *Super-capitals*: These cities function as centres for international organizations; they may or may not be national capitals (Brussels, Strasbourg, Geneva, Rome, New York).

Some might argue that not all these cases deserve to be treated as capitals. But all perform roles that are capital-like and are performed by capital cities elsewhere. In any case, I shall try to argue that it is important to try to distinguish these overlapping roles, because they are changing in different ways and evolving in different directions.

The political role

The twentieth century has seen three important political changes that have profoundly affected the roles of capitals as seats of government. The first is the dismemberment of empires, both land-based (Germany, Austria and now Russia) and sea-based (Britain, France and Portugal). The second is the development of new federal systems (Australia, South Africa, Germany, Spain and recently, the former Soviet Union) and the development of more decentralized systems within a centralized framework (France). The third is the development of new supernational groupings (the League of Nations, the United Nations and its agencies, the Council of Europe, the European Community [EC]). All three trends have precursors in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (the dissolution of the Spanish Empire; the creation of the United States and the Dominion of Canada; the Congress of Vienna), but all three have sharply accelerated in the twentieth century.

The effects on certain cities have been profound. Vienna lost its role as capital of a land-based empire, and with it much of its political and economic importance; ever since 1918, its public buildings have been anomalously too large and too grand. The same happened to Berlin after 1945. In both cases, the effects were exacerbated by the division of Europe into two rival blocs, with the concomitant loss of trading relations and trading functions. The leading provincial cities of Germany were granted a new lease on life after 1945, as the effective power-sharing capitals of the Federal Republic; Munich, in particular, regained much of the role it had

lost to Berlin in 1871. Thanks to the Treaty of Rome, Brussels acquired an importance and a dynamism that would otherwise have been denied it.

In all these cases, change occurred suddenly and drastically in the aftermath of war. Elsewhere, changes were more gradual, even unnoticeable. London and Paris have not self-evidently suffered from the loss of empire; if their economies are experiencing partial contraction, this is not the cause. The major Australian cities have not notably lost importance since the belated rise of Canberra; nor has the autonomy of Barcelona, Bilbao or Sevilla threatened the primacy or vigour of Madrid. The United Nations is still no more than marginal to the New York City economy.

These historical examples point to a number of lessons, all important for the future of capital cities. A rather drastic political change—the sudden and total dismemberment of an empire, the division of a country—is required to bring about a major shift in the role and the fortunes of a capital city. Otherwise, change tends to be marginal, and existing urban economies tend to retain a great deal of resilience. Major global cities may lose political empires, while retaining much of the associated economic and cultural hegemony over their former territories. Very large cities are not greatly affected by additions to, or subtractions from, their overall role.

The economic role

The categorization of capital cities shows very clearly that political capitals do not necessarily attract related economic functions. Rather, capitals that have developed such functions have done so because of historic contingency. In particular, the great European capitals grew on the basis of centralized regal power in the period between the sixteenth and the eighteenth centuries, which also happens to be the period when great trading empires developed. The two forces interacted and assisted each other; the political dominion and the economic one grew in parallel. On the basis of their trading functions, the capitals developed financial roles. Central power and trade demanded legal codification and legal enforcement, engendering a set of specialized functions: courts, lawyers and ancillary activities. Further, because these cities were centres of culture and of conspicuous consumption, local demand gave rise to universities, theatres, art and architecture, concert halls, and newspaper and book publishing and their twentieth-century media offshoots. These functions tended to assist one another, demand from one being met by supply in another. And with the progressive growth of the service economy, most of

these functions have tended to expand in scale and importance.

However, these functions do not necessarily belong together. In states that have specialized political capitals, we find that, typically, many or most of the other functions remain elsewhere, either in the former capital or in the most important existing commercial centres. In the United States, for instance, New York dominates the commercial, financial and entertainment worlds, and has a very important role in law, education and publishing. Washington has developed some independent cultural life in the last quarter-century, but is still a shadow of its near neighbour. In Canada, these functions are distributed among the provincial capitals but are disproportionately clustered in Montréal and Toronto; they are notably underdeveloped in Ottawa. In Australia, the situation is precisely the same, with Sydney and Melbourne dominating in most areas. Canberra has acquired a cultural status through deliberate government action (ANU, the new art galley), but still cannot compete with the older, established centres. In every one of these examples, the political capital was a relatively late arrival, appearing after the country's initial urban hierarchy was already well developed.

Even in Europe, the continent where the all-powerful multifunctional capital is best developed, there are exceptions. States that, from the start, have been federal or confederal may divide economic and cultural roles among several centres, as in Switzerland. In Italy, where commercial life has been well developed in the northern plain ever since Roman times, Milan and Venice have retained their commercial and cultural roles since unification; Milan in particular has remained the dominant high-level service city of Italy, only slightly behind London and Paris. In Germany, the federal structure that has existed since 1949 underlines a long tradition of urban autonomy going back to the Middle Ages; Hamburg, Frankfurt and Munich have regained the functions and prestige they partially lost in 1871. In the Netherlands, Amsterdam has always been the primary commercial, financial and cultural centre (and, by reason of the presence of the royal palace, the capital), though the government has been located in The Hague. Although, The Hague has attracted some headquarters such as that of Royal Dutch Shell, but it remains fundamentally a monofunctional city. In all of these cases, accidents of historical evolution explain the separation of functions; but these are not rare anomalies.

Forces for change

We can distinguish three major forces for change over the coming two decades: political, technological and economic.

(1) *Political forces for change*

For the next decade at least, the most momentous political change seems certain to be the effective dismemberment of the Russian empire, both within its 1917 boundaries and outside them. Nationalism has become a major political force in Europe once again, just as it seemed to be surrendering to supranationalism. Within Eastern Europe, this seems to spell a return to the political geography of 1918 to 1939, with strong national capitals. But the unknown factor is the impact of German reunification on that country's hierarchy. We know now that Berlin will again become the political capital, with perhaps some residual functions left in Bonn. What is unclear is whether that change will lead to reconcentration of other aspects of national life in the capital, including finance, commerce, culture and the media.

Within the boundaries of the former Soviet Union, the new Commonwealth will develop with greater autonomy than in comparable federations. But again, there is an unknown factor: the degree to which—as with the British and French empires in the 1950s—the former imperial capital can continue to be an important source of cohesion by reason of its established cultural hegemony. The Russian empire of 1917, it must be stressed, was a true, long-established empire built on five centuries of expansion from a single metropolitan core; it was not, like the Hapsburg empire, an uneasy forced federation of former autonomous states. Further, a large part of it was and is within the mother country of Russia. Even the other constituents—incorporated relatively late and with highly distinctive traditions, such as Soviet Central Asia—have effectively been integrated into the Russian cultural sphere, Solzhenitzyn notwithstanding, through one or two centuries of forced acculturation. Therefore, provided the transition can be handled, there appear to be relatively good prospects that Moscow will remain the cultural capital of the former USSR and its satellites. Once again, the likelihood is that Europe will return to an earlier state of affairs.

The other unknown is the relationship of these changes to the enlarged and strengthened EC. Until late in 1989, it appeared an almost certain prospect that the single European market would produce a greatly enhanced political super-capital in Brussels, almost certainly involving the *de facto* transfer of the parliament from Strasbourg, and the parallel development of an economic super-capital in the home of the future

European federal bank, whether this were London or Frankfurt. Although both developments are still possible, they have been overshadowed by the emergence of a reunited Germany as the dominant partner in the new EEC, the appearance of Berlin as a major player on the European stage and the possible transfer to the German capital of major banking functions. The future is a good deal less certain than it appeared just a few years ago.

No changes of similar magnitude seem likely to shape the fate of capital cities in other parts of the advanced industrial world, with the possible exception of Canada, where the future and stability of the federation are threatened by the ongoing constitutional crisis. Boundaries will change in some less stable parts of the world, political units may even appear and disappear for shorter or longer periods, but the overall scene seems relatively stable. In so far as changes are in prospect, as in Canada, they seem mainly to concern the possibility of further internal devolution within federal states. It may well be that the 1990s—following on the heels of the liberal economic reforms that swept the world in the 1980s—will prove to be a decade of regional and local autonomy, of demands for relative freedom from the centre. How far these movements develop, how successful they prove, is too speculative a question to answer here.

(2) Technological forces for change

Two developments already in progress seem virtually certain to affect the relationships between capital cities and the other centres in their nations' urban systems. These are the information revolution and the development of new systems of high-speed ground transportation.

Information: A good deal of recent research on information-based services seems to agree that higher-level producer services will remain concentrated in the cores of the most highly developed central metropolitan areas of the most highly developed national economies (London, Paris, New York). The recent recovery of the New York City economy, based on the successful transition to a service-based economy, seems to confirm this. However, specialized subdivisions of large service corporations, such as research laboratories, may decentralize a very short distance from headquarters, while more routine producer services (financial services such as insurance or credit card operations) may decentralize some distance to "back offices" in smaller centres with lower costs, though generally within easy travelling distance of the major metropolitan centre (Croydon or Reading in southeast England; the Paris-area new towns; Stamford, Connecticut; Tysons Corner, Virginia; Concord, Walnut Creek, San Ramon, Pleasanton, Dublin, California). The dominant reason appears to be the search for lower rents and for a supply of the right kind of nonorganized,

fairly docile, reasonably well-educated female clerical labour (Baran 1985, Nelson 1986, Mills 1987). Although this phenomenon might have occurred without technological development, it has been powerfully aided by the development of data-processing and communications technologies.

There is an important open question: Are certain types of "head office" activities also decentralizing? Recent statistics indicate a decline in HQ-type employment in some major cities, such as San Francisco, accompanied by continued rapid suburban growth (cf. Beers, 1987, for a popular account). Experts suggest that the United States may be witnessing the development of "poly-nucleated" cities on the Los Angeles model, with the development of "urban villages" or "new downtowns" as at Tysons Corner, where the traditional downtown is only one of a number of major information-processing centres. Improved information technologies could of course contribute powerfully to this process.

However, metropolitan regions as in general continue to expand. Research points to a process of circular and cumulative causation: areas with existing concentrations of information industries make the heaviest demands for information technology. Within the EC, for instance, there are big variations even in telephone subscribers per 100 inhabitants: in the United Kingdom, between London (42) and Northern Ireland (23); in Germany, between West Berlin (53) and Regensburg (24); in France, between Paris (42) and Franche Comté or Lorraine (23). Even more extreme differences exist for Telex and Prestel (Goddard and Gillespie 1988, 137). Within Britain, the ratio of international to local calls for London is much higher than in the north. Even at the consumer level, semi-anecdotal evidence suggests that personal computer ownership in Britain—overall, by far the highest in Western Europe—may vary from 35 to 41 percent in Wales, to as little as 1 to 7 percent in Scotland (Batty 1988, 162; Steinle 1988, 82). So services are most heavily concentrated in metropolitan regions and innovations will occur there first, even if they spread fairly rapidly to other parts of the country. Further, specialized technical services are always more readily available there. And in turn, this encourages the development of yet more specialized firms, engaged both in the provision of hardware and software and in the production of information based on that foundation.

Thus information-rich regions—including capital regions—get even richer, while poor regions become relatively poorer. This is paradoxical, because it flies right in the face of the technological forecasting literature, which suggests that information technologies bring diffusion and an evening-out of advantages across the whole territory. That would be true only if the process of technological adoption were supply-led; but research

suggests that it appears to be demand-led. So there is an accelerating centre-periphery contrast.

The resulting picture of locational change is thus dominated by the controlling global cities, which increasingly relate more to each other than to the rest of the world: London, New York, Tokyo. They sit in the centres of vast and spreading metropolitan regions, within which more routine information functions are constantly banished to more peripheral, low-cost suburban locations. Even such routine functions, as service delivery and information distribution and retrieval can be standardized and spread across the entire national and international space, driven by the new information technologies. These technologies thus permit the spread of control of the leading centres, and cement their power (Castells 1989, 151, 169).

However, Stanback and Noyelle's work shows that, during the 1970s, these global cities—what they term “national nodal centres,” only four in number (New York, Chicago, San Francisco and Los Angeles)—have continued to augment their service functions, though less rapidly than the next level of the hierarchy, which the authors label regional nodal centres” (Boston, Philadelphia, Atlanta, Houston, Minneapolis, Phoenix). That conclusion, however, may have been biased by being based on data for 1970 to 1980, a decade when New York was experiencing severe problems, while places like Houston and Denver boomed; the 1980s record may look very different.

Similarly, the work by Cheshire and Hay on the European urban system in the 1970s and 1980s concludes that some of the best performers were either second-rank cities in the bigger countries—places such as Bristol, Toulouse, Florence and Stuttgart—or the smaller national capitals such as Brussels, Amsterdam and Copenhagen. But there is an exception: older industrial and port cities that serve as provincial capitals for old industrial regions, such as Glasgow, Liverpool and Dortmund, did not do well at all. A number of such British provincial centres did rather badly in substituting information services for lost goods-handling jobs during the 1970s, though a few (Bristol, Cardiff, Edinburgh) did relatively well (Hall 1987); an even wider analysis indicates that both London and the major provincial cities were decentralizing producer-service jobs to surrounding subdominant centres (Gillespie and Green 1987).

London in particular is an anomaly: a national-nodal, in fact international-nodal, city that nevertheless experienced economic decline in much of the 1980s—a decline that reversed only towards the end of that decade. However, recent analysis confirms a paradoxical feature of the London economy in decline: there has been virtually no differential effect on overall unemployment rates, which have remained marginally below the

national average. Because the labour force has proved very mobile, the decline in jobs and the decrease in the workforce have kept in step. People have moved away for housing reasons, but once out of London many eventually find jobs there (Buck, Gordon and Young 1987, 97). The point again needs stressing, however: London's loss has been associated with growth of small subcentres within the metropolitan sphere of influence.

How can this somewhat contradictory evidence be reconciled? In part, by a notion of geographical resorting. The cores of the great metropolitan regions may be shedding lower-level functions to other centres, including subcentres within their own spheres, while they continue to dominate the most information-rich activities. Second-level cities, including the provincial capitals of larger countries and the national capitals of smaller ones, may be growing for a variety of reasons, including the fact that they so far exhibit few diseconomies of scale, and may in fact be the beneficiaries of governmental deconcentration programs (such as the French *métropoles d'équilibre* policies of the 1960s and 1970s). But on whatever national scale, the distinction between information-rich and information-poor regions remains an important one.

High-Speed Ground Transportation: An equally important development is the spread of high-speed train systems. These systems began in 1964 with the original Tokaido line of the Japanese Shinkansen, followed in 1976 by the inauguration of British Rail's Inter-City 125 service and then, in 1981, by the French TGV (*Train à Grande Vitesse*) line from Paris to Lyon. It seems virtually certain that the 1990s will see completion of at least a skeletal European network linking the national capitals and leading provincial cities, and taking much of the present air traffic up to a critical limit of about 880 kilometres, as has already been observed on the first TGV line from Paris to Lyon. Meanwhile, the Japanese are working on their alternative linear-motor technology, which, unlike the European system, demands a completely new, dedicated infrastructure.

The outcome of the competition will clearly depend on a host of factors, including speed, cost, the capacity of the existing system for upgrading, and the degree of existing congestion. At present, the first factor is highly uncertain. The latest TGV technology has achieved over 500 kilometres per hour on test and over 300 kilometres per hour in regular service; indications are that it might eventually run regularly at nearly 400 kilometres per hour. The Japanese plan to operate their linear-motor car at 500 kilometres per hour, perhaps more. Because conditions are so different, it seems likely that the Japanese technology will be used in Japan but not in Europe. The critical unknown is whether the United States—so far, virgin territory for the new train technologies—will buy either or both.

These systems must boost the fortunes of the cities they serve, particularly those that gain early connection. Both the Shinkansen and the TGV seem to have aided their terminal cities (Tokyo/Osaka, Paris/Lyon) while weakening intermediate cities (Nagoya). This means that the form of the high-speed network, and in particular its hub points, will be crucial for competitiveness in the information age. A particular role is almost certain to be played by the relatively few interconnection points between the rail service and intercontinental air services. In Europe, where this is understood very well, the French are already planning a mega-development around Paris's Charles de Gaulle Airport, and the Germans are seriously contemplating moving the main Frankfurt train station to the airport. These two cities are likely to compete with each other, and with Brussels, for the title of the top information cities of Europe. The French have also routed their TGV northern line—the future European trunk line—with a major interchange at Lille, that somewhat deindustrialized industrial capital of the Nord Pas-de-Calais region, thus launching it into the information age.

It appears fairly clear that the main effect of technological change will be to fortify rather than to weaken the roles of major cities, including national capitals. But the effect will not be uniform, because high-speed trains will find their optimal locus in the range from about 300 to about 600 kilometres. High-order cities, including capital cities, bunched within these limits may enjoy some advantage over the rest. The effect will be most noticeable in Europe, where the new trains should give a real comparative advantage to the "Golden Triangle", bounded by London, Paris and Frankfurt, over more peripheral centres such as Madrid, Berlin, Copenhagen and even Milan. But much will depend on the operational characteristics, in particular the average speed, of the new system.

(3) Economic forces for change

The most important economic changes are the shift to an information economy and the globalization of corporations. Both should favour the highest-order global capitals, but perhaps increase pressure within them for local deconcentration.

The two trends go together. The majority of observers have stressed the most dramatic consequence during the 1980s: the internationalization of financial transactions, with the advent of twenty-four-hour global trading among the three dominant stock markets of London, New York and Tokyo. But there are other, almost equally well-publicized aspects, such as the increasing concentration of publishing and media empires, which similarly suggests geographical monopolization in just a few

leading centres. There are of course limits to this process: Rupert Murdoch, for instance, cannot run the whole of his newspaper empire from London or New York, or even from one city in Australia. However, certain aspects, such as book publishing and television production, are likely to be driven by economies of scale.

What this means, of course, is concentration in global metropolitan cities, not necessarily capital cities. Although there are important linkages—between media empires and governments, for instance—these will necessarily appear in each national capital. The complexities of control of such vast conglomerates seem likely to concentrate the headquarters operations in one place or, at most, two. As the continuing importance of New York shows, the capital function may not be relevant in this regard.

What is relevant factor is the quality of international information linkages. These fall into two main groups: electronic and personal. As already noted, the largest cities tend to have the richest and highest-quality information technology networks. They also have the richest sets of potential interconnections for personal movement, in the form of international airports (and, in the future, high-speed train connections). These advantages tend to be cumulative, though they might be weakened by congestion of airspace around major airports and by the progressive build-up of connections in second-rung competitors (Manchester against London, Boston against New York, Osaka against Tokyo, Brussels against Paris; in Europe, smaller capitals with airports that serve as hubs for national flag carriers may have a special advantage in this regard). Therefore, the only reasonable supposition is that the position of the global centres will continue to be strengthened; at most, a few regional competitors, well-located within a few hundred kilometres' radius, might offer competition as sites for decentralization of certain functions.

The impact of policy

During the 1950s and 1960s, governments in Europe made vigorous efforts to promote decentralization away from their national capital regions. The British required industrial development certificates from manufacturing firms wanting to locate in the London area, and promoted their assisted areas; the French, likewise, sought to limit industrial growth in Paris, and began their *métropoles d'équilibre* program; the Dutch sought to promote their remoter northern and eastern provinces. These policies were not pursued with the same force after 1980, for at least two reasons. First, they posited large-scale investment in basic manufactur-

ing industries, such as automobiles, which was no longer so desirable. Second, the economies of the capital cities themselves were not as strong as before: deindustrialization took away a substantial share of the manufacturing base in both London and Paris during the decade after 1975. In particular, those sectors of the major metropolitan regions that had been highly manufacturing-dependent (east London; eastern Paris; northern New Jersey) tended to become virtually depressed areas, equally deserving of help as traditionally assisted areas.

As a result, in nearly every country, the nature and scale of assistance changed. Government policies targeted relatively small zones for intensive redevelopment in the form of mega-developments carried through by public-private partnerships. Typically these were inner-city areas adjacent to central business districts, where the sudden collapse of the traditional manufacturing or goods-handling base had created large areas of dereliction. Policies, in the form of enterprise zones, urban development corporations or infrastructure provision, were directed at redeveloping and revalorizing this land for new uses appropriate to the information economy, thus providing for outward expansion of the traditional commercial core. As the policies of the Thatcher government in Britain clearly showed, such areas might equally be in the capital city or in major provincial cities; the problems and responses were the same, conditioned only by the different commercial potential of the land.

Policies, in other words, became much more value-neutral in regional terms; even in countries that had earlier produced strong regional policies (Britain, the Netherlands), regional policy as such lost its virtue. This shift was of course underscored by the profound, worldwide shift toward more laissez-faire policies in the 1980s, but it did not occur on that account alone, and indeed was already observable in the 1970s. The basic cause was the shift in the problem.

Underlying the change in the 1980s, however, was a shift in perception of the problem, which seems to have followed with a time lag of about a decade. Basically, traditional left-wing local authorities in old manufacturing and port cities (or old manufacturing and port districts within metropolitan cities) found it difficult at first to come to terms with structural change; only from the mid-1980s did they come to recognize that it was final and irreversible. Almost everywhere in the world, in the early 1990s, such older industrial places—east London, the British provincial cities, northern New Jersey, Kanagawa prefecture—are actively promoting the recycling of old industrial land. The policy shift is virtually complete.

What does this mean for the capital cities? It almost certainly means that the attempt to relocate established manufacturing industry in distant

provincial regions is dead. The technopolis program of the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry might appear an important exception, but it is basically different from previous policies: it does not seek to move established undertakings, but aims instead to create innovative milieus with the capacity to generate their own further growth. The assumption here is consistent with *laissez-faire* thinking: that is firms and their employees will best be able to make their own economic calculations.

That said, the economic experience of capital cities has varied somewhat from case to case. In some, the impact of deindustrialization upon the entire urban economy has been more serious than in others. London, for instance, became a symbol of the global metropolis in the 1980s, when deregulation of financial services in the City of London brought an explosion in financial-service jobs. This proved short-lived, however, and was barely enough to turn around a decline in overall employment that began in the 1960s. Further, job losses have been particularly concentrated in the old industrial and port area of east London, while gains have occurred in the centre and west, a dichotomy also observed in Paris.

Tokyo is almost at the opposite extreme to London: there, the continued strength of the financial and corporate sector has added thousands of office jobs in the Maronouchi and Otemachi districts and retailing jobs in the Ginza and Shinjuku, while high-technology industry has continued to expand at the metropolitan fringe. But even here, the old industrial strip of Kanagawa prefecture, next to the Tama River to the south of Tokyo, has experienced fairly massive deindustrialization. Local action by the prefecture and its constituent cities has sought to compensate for the resultant losses by recycling land into office and research use. The policy seems to have been fairly successful, since it has accorded with a general tendency for commercial development to decentralize into suburban subcentres astride major commuter rail stations, a tendency equally well seen in Kawasaki, in Kanagawa prefecture, and in Omiya, in Saitama prefecture, on the opposite side of the city.

Will these forces continue to operate in the same direction, and with the same force, in the 1990s? A global recession could greatly slow down the whole job-creation and land-development process. But the long-term trend seems unmistakable. A major question for the future is this: If the tertiarization of the economy continues, may not the pressures for deconcentration spill out of the national capital regions altogether, thus benefiting the second-order cities which have borne much of the brunt of deindustrialization in the 1970s and 1980s? There are some signs of this, in the relative vigour of a city like Lyon, in the decentralization of some routine financial-service employment to British provincial cities, and in the

attempts of both the British and Japanese governments to decentralize civil service jobs out of the capitals. But as yet, they are straws in the wind.

The ultimate solution: moving the capital

During the last thirty years, a dozen countries in South America and Africa have actually relocated their capital city, generally establishing a completely new capital, Washington or Canberra style, in a greenfield location or on the site of a small existing city. Argentina has considered doing the same (Gilbert 1989, 234). The reasons are varied and invariably involve political motives, but congestion and the resulting inefficiency in the old capital are usually cited. Some moves were logical and even necessary, in that new nation states were being created; many were overambitious in terms of available financial and organizational resources, and have proved failures. There are far fewer cases of recent deliberate relocation in the most advanced industrial countries; Bonn's establishment in 1949 as federal German capital was a reflection of the division of the country a year before. Since 1960, the Japanese have twice seriously considered moving the seat of government from Tokyo; the current explosion of land values has triggered the debate for a third time, with Sendai, north of Tokyo, and Nagoya, among the favoured alternatives (Miyakawa 1983, Anon 1988). In the United Kingdom, alternative capitals have been discussed from time to time, but the idea has never received serious official consideration.

Table 1: New Capital Cities in Africa, Asia and Latin America Since 1960

Year	Country	New Capital	Old Capital
1956	Brazil	Brasilia	Rio de Janeiro
1957	Mauritania	Nouakchott	Saint Louis (Senegal)
1959	Pakistan	Islamabad	Karachi
1961	Botswana	Gaberone	Mafeking
1963	Libya	Beida	Tripoli/Benghazi
1965	Malawi	Lilongwe	Zomba
1970	Belize	Belmopan	Belize City
1973	Tanzania	Dodoma	Dar Es Salaam
1975	Nigeria	Abuja	Lagos
1983	Ivory Coast	Yamoussoukro	Abidjan
1987	Argentina	Viedman/Carmen de Patagones*	Buenos Aires

* Since abandoned. See Hardoy, below.

Source: Gilbert 1989, Table 1

The likelihood is that governments will draw back both from the direct financial costs and indirect disruption that would inevitably be entailed. The federal German government had serious doubts about the likely cost (estimated at \$50 million to \$150 million) of moving from Bonn to Berlin after reunification, on top of the huge costs of absorbing the former German Democratic Republic (Phillips 1990), but considerations of tradition and symbolism overrode economic arguments. Other countries, with no such major political change in prospect, are even less likely to take the plunge.

Apart from the cost and disruption, there are two other reasons why other countries should be cautious. The first, pointed out by Jean Gottmann, is that capital cities often act as the hinges between different regions of the country (Gottmann 1983); it would be very difficult to move them without engendering huge regional rivalries that would express themselves politically. The other is that cities, above all major global cities, now increasingly compete with each other to attract top-level global activities, transnational capital and elite populations (Gastelaars 1988, Lambooy 1988). Because of this fact, national governments are less likely to countenance a move that could compromise the position of their leading city and, by implication, their country. Therefore, the likelihood is that they will seek to decentralize more routine government functions to provincial cities, leaving the capital as an ever more specialized command and control centre for government and, by implication, their nations' economic and political life.

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COMMENTARY: WHAT IS A CAPITAL?

Beth Moore Milroy

Discussion began in the light of the papers presented by professors Raffestin, Rapoport and Hall, and was concerned with the extent to which a state today can decide the form and semiotic content of its capital city, as compared to it being shaped mainly through inadvertence or by forces engaged in projects other than capital-building.

The papers offered many insights into the questions prepared for this session by the colloquium organizers, such as: What is a capital city? What distinguishes the capital? Does it have a particular place in human affairs and among cities? How can that place be identified? In addition, the papers opened up avenues for considering these questions within the particular set of circumstances associated with our time in history. During most of the session, participants discussed capital cities as a phenomenon whose character and relationships are changing because contexts are changing.

Notably, the new contexts include changes in ways that economic power and culture can be expressed in geographic space because of recent technological innovations. For example, a state's capacity to build into its capital city things that are specific to it seems considerably reduced today because information technologies have helped both to internationalize capitals and to standardize the image of success. Under such conditions there is less room for a state to express its uniqueness.

More specifically, the discussion seemed to me to circle around four themes: (1) the city as a capital versus the capital city as a place where people live out their everyday lives; (2) the symbolic manifestation of capitals; (3) the spatial manifestation of capitals; and (4) the capital city in the context of its state's history and international relations.

The City as a Capital Versus the Capital City as a Space of Everyday Life

Capital cities were recognized as doubly bound to be good physical environments where real people live out ordinary lives, as well as symbolically rich cities that capture the qualities a state wishes to portray to the larger world. For this very reason they seem to risk having a "front" and "back," a showpiece and a dark side. Conventionally, attention has been given to the "fronts" of capitals, where the focus is on making elites comfortable and conveying elite symbols. Participants asked how one might simultaneously honour the city and its inhabitants as a local community, on the one hand, and the city as a place to convey an entire state's aspirations, on the other.

Participants also considered the locations in today's world where originality arises or persists. One speaker noted that in Latin America uniqueness was confined to old, central city districts and to squatter settlements. All the rest is internationalized and not special to any one country or city. Uniqueness and special meanings today seem to originate only where international capital does not reach or where a very strong force of will is used to build or preserve uniqueness.

The Symbolic Manifestation of Capitals

Central questions expressed in the papers were: What sorts of values could be symbolized in built form today? And how could this symbolism be achieved without being overbearing? Clearly, new images are always needed because there is a continuous process of investing and divesting symbols with meaning. An example given of this ongoing process was the reduction in symbolic force of Moscow's Red Square as a key symbol of communism and of the Soviet Union, followed by its resymbolization as a space of struggle between the focus of reform in the various republics and the old guard.

However, when it came to all-encompassing themes for a capital, some doubt was expressed that high-level symbolic meanings were still possible—for example, the denotation of a philosophical or political world view—because of increasingly heterogeneous and complex societies. It was even doubted that dropping to mid-level values such as health and good-quality environments would generate appropriate meanings for capital cities. These values are weak candidates because they are probably not unique to capitals.

Why is this apparent disintegration of high-level values occurring? Is it because of heterogeneity? Because new information technologies largely collapse the importance of space? Or because the conditions for constructing a common *projet* social have either disappeared or become so weak as to lack the necessary appeal to unite the people of a state in common action. One contributor gave the example of a country attempting to decide how to celebrate its seven hundredth anniversary, but being unable to choose a focus because the country lacks a common purpose at this time.

Another contributor wondered how effective the metaphors of agora and theatre might be today for communicating intangibles, as ways of focusing on functions still related to capital cities even if these functions are in flux: the agora or forum as a metaphor for exchange and dialogue, and the theatre or processional route for cultural expression.

Quite different ideas were presented during discussion of this fundamental point. One was that the need for the modern city to perform as a meeting place has been substantially eroded because communication no longer necessarily requires a physical environment in the traditional sense. Consequently, the forum or agora is also undermined as a focal feature, although it may work occasionally in some cultures and in some seasons. The same shift in meaning applies to the theatre of procession. Processions once served ritualistic functions that kept a world intact, so to speak. However, they are no longer needed for such shared functions and instead serve purely as entertainment. The freeing of general communication and specifically cultural expression from the necessity of shared space converts them to something else. The metaphors are therefore not directly applicable.

But this is not to say that dialogue and exchange cease being important functions for a capital. Often, when one notes that communication is readily conducted a-spatially these days, one forgets that communication always has the concept of communion within it. However, that was as far as this session's participants went in disaggregating the concept of communication during the discussion. Another contributor pointed out that capitals are the proper places in which to put much more emphasis on this role of communion. In so doing, the shapers of capital cities would also be able to confront the observation made earlier by a participant that a capital city is always an instrument of capital. This confluence of points comes from noting that capital looks for only certain types of information and not for the communion aspect of communication. However, there are other bodies traditionally found in capitals such as universities, specialized institutes, and indeed theatres, that facilitate communion in the sense of contemplation of cultural, spiritual and intellectual values. These

organizations can be part of the process of signifying communion to the whole nation. It would seem that it is in this function that there is some opportunity to offset somewhat the observation that a capital city is a tool of capital, and to renew communication through renewed communion or contemplation of values.

It was also suggested that political culture plays a role in the symbolization process. In effect, when studying what a capital can be, one must investigate what it is possible to symbolize at a given time. A dramatic example was given concerning West Germany before and after the Second World War. During the Nazi period, symbolism was widespread and evident. In the postwar period the range of intentional national symbolism was reduced to practically nothing because people would not accept it. This was a clear case of desanctification of a state. However, it was observed that this was only one example among many in which the guardians of a capital have had to walk on eggs. In Europe, it is common for the capital not to be the strongest city in a nation, whether by economic, military or even cultural standards. Examples given were Belgium, The Netherlands, Switzerland and Czechoslovakia. Capitals such as these can represent a delicate balance among different regions and cultural groups in a country, a balance that must be maintained.

The Spatial Manifestation of Capitals

Is a capital necessarily fixed in one place or can it be itinerant? If mobile, how much of it can be moved and how often before its legitimacy is jeopardized? Or, is mobility a way of confirming the state's power in its furthest reaches? Which aspects of a capital can be moved effectively: the parliament? the judicial court? What is the effect if it merely changes residence from time to time, as in the case of colonial Canada's seat of government, which moved between Kingston, Montréal, Québec City and Toronto; or the case of the ambulatory capital of the former West Germany, which generally met in Bonn, but from time to time met in Frankfurt or Berlin? It is important to note, said one participant, that considerable power is invested in the assemblage of bureaucrats and in the smaller units of a federal state. These people, who probably prepare 80 percent to 85 percent of state legislation, meet where it is convenient, and this could be in any part of a country. Is it not then necessary to be careful to identify exactly what can be moved without fanfare and what, when moved, carries greater import?

In reflecting on some European experience, and particularly that of Brussels as the capital of both Europe and Belgium, participants considered which part of a city is actually the capital: All of it? The old core only? For instance, the Belgian constitution states that the capital of the country and the seat of government is the city of Brussels. This thereby decrees only a small portion of the city one associates with Brussels as the capital, a section containing perhaps a hundred thousand inhabitants. The Brussels most people identify with has about one million inhabitants. All the same, while for Belgians Brussels is the capital, it is nonetheless only one city among several from a political perspective. Carrying this a step further, one participant suggested that in effect all of Belgium is the capital of Europe, not solely Brussels. If Belgium is more properly identified as the capital of Europe than Brussels, then it is a capital of ten million people and of course has a much larger geographic expanse. It was this contributor's view that one needs to distinguish between the constitutional, political, administrative and judicial senses of the expression "capital" in order to keep from lurching about on constantly moving ground.

The Capital City in the Context of Its State's History and International Relations

A capital is distinguished from other cities by its particular relationship to the nation-state, as several participants noted. Among other metaphors used in the papers and discussion to illustrate possible relationships between a capital and its state were the capital city as head, as heart, and as hinge. Often, a capital chosen for a unitary state has been the most populous or the most economically powerful. However, in federated states, small cities have often been chosen, which become purely political capitals. In these cases, where the political functions are detached from other functions (as for example, in Bonn), the resulting city remains fairly small. In contrast, what drives other capital cities such as London or Paris is the whole bundle of economic and cultural functions that are wrapped around the political function. Political cords, one participant said, are relatively short compared with all the others that get woven into a city. It was agreed that a capital city could not be understood apart from its history and the history of its state, taken broadly to include culture, economy, religion and international relations.

The way capitals are chosen was discussed and various hypotheses were put forward as to why a given city gets the nod over another. Some

claimed, for instance, that it might be chosen for pragmatic reasons, others said as a compromise, another said it could be chosen as a consolation prize, or chosen for being environmentally pleasing. The reasoning claimed for the latter was that because capitals are information, and because those who manipulate information have power, and because those with power like to live in environmentally pleasant places, capitals will tend to be in such places. There was agreement, though, that this hypothesis fails utterly to explain the location of some prominent capitals.

Another set of comments placed capital cities in international perspective, especially in relation to empires, acknowledging that most of the capitals that had been discussed were either the creators of or the creatures of Empire. Because empires had changed or gone, the relationship between capitals and the expanse of power had altered. One contributor noted that this subject had been treated by Spengler in *The Decline of the West*, in which he showed that menaced capital cities correlate with crumbling empires. Another participant noted that archaeological evidence in South and Central America suggests that, in several empires, the elites disappeared and the culture crumbled because of social revolt. Apparently, in those cases, the political system ran out of answers for, or failed to pay attention to, the pressures and needs of the population and so revolts began. However, there is also counter-evidence, as another participant noted. The decadence of cities does not always precede the decadence of empires. After all, Constantinople was a city in full splendour when the Ottoman empire dissolved. The same was true of Vienna, and Dakar was a beautiful African capital when the collapse of French West Africa occurred. We were cautioned not to confuse the terms "nation-state" and "empire" so as to be able to identify when a capital city was the capital of a state and when of an empire.

Another participant referred to the Canadian economist Harold Innis, who, although he did not concern himself with capitals as such, was concerned with political and economic power, time and space, and these in the context of empires and communication. In quite a number of suggestive pieces, he relates the nature of political power to the dominant medium of communication, and tries to show that particular political forms, including of course the sites of governments, are related to the nature of the communication medium that is used.

Several examples were given of states apparently attending to the location and brilliance of their capital cities in lieu of tackling deep social problems. It is quite simply easier to deliberate over state trappings than to find solutions to vastly uneven distributions of income, poverty, illiteracy,

illness and homelessness, all of which a state wishes to hide from view in its capital, the window through which the world peers into one's country. These actions signify a nation's values just as much as bedecked parade routes and towering fountains.

With this we returned to the beginning of these themes, to the point that capital cities tend to have a front and a back where different national values prevail. Space is never vacant, never fails to convey values. All physical form and processes within a capital exude information about what is and is not valued in that state, even if we prefer not to acknowledge some of these as the choices our state has made.

To conclude, the answer to the question, "What is a capital city?" is far from simple. An entire research program could be shaped out of the questions and discussion of this first session.

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II

**RÔLES ET ACTIVITÉS
DES CAPITALES/
THE ROLES AND ACTIVITIES
OF CAPITAL CITIES**

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RÔLES ET ACTIVITÉS DES CAPITALES

Louise Quesnel

Dans la recherche d'une définition de la capitale, l'on trouve tour à tour des références à la composante territoriale et spatiale, à la composante symbolique, et à la composante sociale. Premièrement, la capitale est un espace défini par une étendue géographique, par des caractéristiques topographiques et par une situation spécifique dans le système écologique global. Deuxièmement, la capitale est porteuse de valeurs et de messages référant au sentiment d'appartenance nationale et à l'image qu'un pays veut donner de lui-même. Et troisièmement, la capitale est aussi un lieu où vivent et travaillent des populations et où œuvrent des entreprises. C'est donc une réalité complexe, qui demande à être appréhendée sur plusieurs plans. Ce n'est pas une ville comme les autres.

L'objectif de cette partie du colloque consiste à aborder particulièrement la question de l'effet de cette complexité de la ville capitale sur les responsabilités et les obligations des autorités publiques engagées dans la gestion politique de la capitale.

La responsabilité politique

La responsabilité politique qui lie les autorités dans un régime démocratique se définit en fonction des différentes communautés envers lesquelles les dirigeants politiques sont redevables. Déjà se pose la difficulté de l'identification appropriée de ces commettants, dont les volontés et les opinions sont interprétées et traduites en interventions politiques. S'agit-il de la collectivité nationale dans son ensemble, qui cherche à se retrouver dans l'espace de la capitale sans y être enracinée dans son existence quotidienne, ou s'agit-il des populations locales, immédiatement touchées par les décisions et aux prises quotidiennement avec leurs résultats concrets, comme

résidants ? Une grande partie de la difficulté de bien identifier les activités de la ville capitale trouve ici son explication.

L'espace symbolique

Des fonctions liées à la symbolique nationale doivent évidemment être soutenues par l'espace de la capitale. Ce point est d'autant plus important qu'il est celui qui vient en premier lieu à l'esprit de ceux qui gèrent cette ville particulière, dans la perspective selon laquelle une ville capitale doit être belle et propre, et ne devrait pas laisser voir les côtés négatifs de la société. Ville-reflet des succès et non des échecs du système de régulation sociale, ville-miroir des grandeurs et non des décadences. Ainsi, à la veille des grandes réunions et des événements diplomatiques qui ont cours dans les capitales, s'affaire-t-on à «nettoyer» les quartiers centraux et à en éloigner les itinérants, indice d'une réalité urbaine que l'on veut cacher.

Les fonctions de représentation et de régulation

Ainsi en arrive-t-on à constater que, dans la capitale, deux réalités doivent être gérées, sinon réconciliées. Celle des fonctions spéciales de représentation et de symbolique qui accompagnent le statut de capitale, et celle des fonctions courantes de régulation sociale et de production de services qui incombent à toute ville d'importance.

Compte tenu de cette situation particulière, la problématique de la capitale devrait retenir les questions suivantes.

Partage des responsabilités

Quelles responsabilités particulières l'État central ou national doit-il assumer dans la prise en charge des problèmes locaux ? En revanche, quelle place la ville devrait-elle accorder à ses responsabilités « obligées », c'est-à-dire celles dont elle ne peut se départir tant qu'elle conservera son statut de capitale ? Et puisque les responsabilités peuvent tisser des liens de dépendance qui viendraient heurter les désirs légitimes d'autonomie locale, d'autres questions surgissent concernant le point d'équilibre à atteindre entre l'autonomie à laquelle aspire la communauté locale et le contrôle étatique approprié.

Soutien financier accru

Sur un plan plus institutionnel, on ne peut faire l'économie d'une réflexion sur les arrangements possibles entre les différentes composantes étatiques. Les collectivités locales, qui sont l'apanage d'une capitale, devraient-elles jouir d'un régime municipal dérogatoire, particulièrement en ce qui concerne le soutien financier attendu de la part des instances politiques étatiques ? Cette question préoccupe au plus haut point les dirigeants politiques locaux.

La dynamique urbaine

Si ces questions réfèrent à des dimensions d'ordres administratif et institutionnel, elles ne doivent pas faire oublier une problématique plus générale, qui aborde un niveau peut-être supérieur de difficultés. C'est celui de l'articulation de la dynamique urbaine spécifique à une capitale. Celle-ci accueille, par définition, une proportion particulièrement élevée d'employés du secteur tertiaire public, encore que les grandes compagnies du secteur privé ne dédaignent pas d'installer leurs bureaux tout près de ceux des grands commis de l'État. Peut-on dire aujourd'hui que le dynamisme des capitales repose d'abord et avant tout sur celui de la grande entreprise publique internationale ? Mieux encore, est-il possible de concevoir la capitale sans souhaiter la présence de la grande entreprise dite privée ? La mixité des fonctions économiques et la cohabitation du politique et de l'économique devraient-elles définir la capitale de demain ?

Les villes internationales

Sur ce point, la capitale entre maintenant en compétition avec d'autres grandes villes internationales et n'échappe pas aux courants qui structurent ces dernières. Parmi les facteurs les plus marquants, mentionnons la tertiarisation poussée de l'économie et l'insertion de la dynamique urbaine dans les réseaux internationaux. Pendant longtemps, les capitales bénéficiaient d'un statut particulier à cause de leur ouverture sur le monde. Cette situation a bien changé aujourd'hui, alors que les métropoles recherchent aussi cette fenêtre sur le monde, de sorte qu'il y a lieu de s'interroger sur les aptitudes des capitales à supporter la concurrence des grandes métropoles dans leur quête de statut international. Cette problématique concerne particulièrement les capitales qui ne sont pas

également des métropoles. Sous plusieurs aspects, les capitales ont à réagir à des forces puissantes qui tendent à les éloigner de leur fonction unique de capitale pour définir dans ces lieux un espace économique qui prend de l'importance jusqu'à devenir aussi stratégique que leur fonction initiale. Les capitales de demain seront-elles encore des villes où le fait politique sera prédominant ? Ou bien nous verrons-nous placés dans une situation où l'identification d'un lieu spécifique pour la politique et pour l'économique sera illusoire ?

Certains diront qu'aujourd'hui, toutes les villes se ressemblent. Mais notre intérêt pour les capitales dénote une volonté de refus de cette affirmation, puisque la plupart des interventions annoncées dans ce colloque s'appuient sur une recherche de solutions aux problèmes particuliers du type de ville qui constitue notre objet. C'est à partir d'une réflexion sur les rôles et les activités des capitales actuelles que nous serons en mesure de connaître et d'analyser les particularités des capitales.

ANCIENT CAPITAL CITIES AND NEW CAPITAL CITIES OF LATIN AMERICA

Jorge E. Hardoy

Twenty independent republics form the group of countries known as Latin America. This designation is based on the Latin origin of the countries' official languages and their Latin backgrounds.¹ Since World War II, several former British colonies in the Caribbean, Central America and northern South America have also become independent nations, and, in addition, there still exist in the region territories politically associated with, or dependent on, France, Holland and the United States.

In recent decades, the United Nations has divided Latin America and the Caribbean into several regions: the Caribbean; Central America (including Mexico and Belize); temperate South America (Argentina, Chile and Uruguay); and tropical South America. The estimated population of Latin America and the Caribbean in 1990 was 485.7 million people. For the purposes of this paper, I will concentrate on the group of twenty independent nations known as Latin America, whose official languages are French, in Haiti; Portuguese, in Brazil; and Spanish, in the other eighteen countries.

The first country to gain independence was Haiti, in 1804. It was rapidly followed by most of the former colonies of Spain, with the exception of the Dominican Republic, which, after a painful half-century, was freed in 1844, and Cuba, which became independent in 1898. Panamá was part of Colombia until 1903, when it became a protectorate of the United States.

At the moment of declaring their independence from Spain, the new nations adopted the republican system of government. Brazil became a constitutional monarchy in 1822 when independence from Portugal was declared and, in 1889, a federated republic with its capital in Rio de Janeiro.

I Capital cities in Latin America have long histories

Fifteen of the present twenty capital cities of Latin America were founded in the sixteenth century, one in the seventeenth century, two in the eighteenth century, one in the nineteenth, and one in the twentieth century. This means that eighteen of today's capital cities were founded during the colonial period. In 1521, Mexico City was established as a Spanish city on the site of Tenochtitlán, the Aztec capital, which was one of the largest cities in the world around 1500. Many Latin American capitals were founded in what we could define as areas of comparatively dense indigenous populations or in the proximity of indigenous settlements. These include Guatemala City, San Salvador, Bogotá, Caracas, Quito, Lima, Asunción and Santiago de Chile. Only a few were established in historically unsettled territories or in territories sparsely settled at the moment of foundation. These include Panamá City, Buenos Aires, Montevideo, Port-au-Prince and San José.

The search for gold and the presence of an indigenous people, who were soon distributed among the conquerors under the *encomienda* system and used as servants or for agricultural and building activities, were of paramount importance in the choice of the original sites. This explains the location of several of the present capital cities in the interior of each territory. Of course, an area with a dense indigenous population also meant a healthy climate, good lands for agriculture, the presence of water, and wood for construction and fuel. In some, production had been enhanced by the indigenous cultures: extensive irrigation systems existed in the Rimac Valley, where Lima was located, and slopes were terraced on the hills surrounding Quito.

As sea trade was not of great importance among the indigenous cultures, very few ports existed at the time of the Spanish conquest; these were mostly located in the Yucatan Peninsula, in Laguna de Terminos (state of Tabasco, Mexico) and on the Caribbean and Pacific coasts of Guatemala. Sea ports were fundamental for shipping the mineral resources produced in the mountainous areas in the interior. The success of Lima and, to a lesser extent, of Santiago as colonial centres is linked to the proximity of two of the safest natural ports in the Pacific: Callao and Valparaíso. Many early Spanish settlements were in the Caribbean seaports, among them Santo Domingo and Havana. A safe harbour was important in the growth of Santo Domingo during the first decades of the sixteenth century, and in establishing the position of Havana in the trade between America and Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The port function also explains the political and commercial

importance of Salvador (Brazil's first capital), of Rio de Janeiro after the 1760s and, during the last decades of the eighteenth century, of Buenos Aires and Montevideo.

A continuous use of certain areas, from the indigenous habitation through the colonial and early independent periods until the present, is remarkable but not unusual. Urban history has many examples of primate cities with a much longer and continuous occupation despite cultural and political changes. Delhi, Baghdad, Cairo and Damascus have been the leading urban centres in their territories for a thousand years or more, and during most of their history these cities have been the administrative capitals and also the main commercial and cultural centres of vast areas.

The location of several capital cities changed in the colonial centuries for a number of reasons, in some cases due to a new site within the limits of a modern city or metropolitan area. In 1671, Old Panama was captured and burned by the privateer Henry Morgan; a new city was designed and built shortly after in a heavily fortified peninsula, now called Ciudad Vieja, twenty kilometres to the southwest. Pedro de Alvarado founded Santiago de los Caballeros de Guatemala in July 1524, in Yzimch, the capital of the Cakchiquel, a Mayan-speaking culture. It was abandoned and burned in 1526. The following year the Spaniards founded a new town in the Valley of Almolonga, at the foot of the del Agua Volcano. This second foundation—known today as Pueblo Viejo (Old Town)—was almost totally destroyed by a landslide in November 1541, and was followed by a third settlement in the nearby Panchoy Valley, present day Antigua. Antigua remained Guatemala's capital until 1776, when it was badly damaged by an earthquake. A decision was soon made to move the capital to the Valle de la Ermita, some thirty kilometres distant from Antigua, where the construction of the new capital began three years after.

The location of San Salvador was changed twice, in 1528 and 1539, after its foundation in 1525. The three sites were always in close proximity. Buenos Aires was founded in 1536 and abandoned some years later; the second foundation took place in 1580, some two kilometres to the north of the original site. Santo Domingo was founded in 1498 on the southern coast of Hispaniola. It was destroyed by a hurricane in 1504 and subsequently moved to the opposite shore of the Ozama River. The history of Rio de Janeiro, which was the capital city of Brazil until the late 1950s, also shows the displacement of an original settlement to a nearby site within the urban limits of the colonial city. The rest of the present capital cities established by the Spaniards remain in their original sites.

Those national capitals established in the colonial period often achieved high administrative, religious and cultural rank. By 1620, as

shown in Table 1, four of them were the sees of archbishoprics and seven of bishoprics, eight were the sees of audiences (legal courts) and the rest of lower levels of government. Five had universities. Out of the ten most populous cities in 1630, seven are now national capitals; five present capital cities had not been founded at that time.

I have studied in some detail the period from 1580 to 1630, with a view to correlating the urban scale of ninety-six urban centres of Spanish origin with urban functions, and have found that the population growth of the fifteen capital cities founded before 1630 was steady but not among the highest, with the exception of Havana.² Between 1580 and 1630, Havana was the city of Spanish America with the highest growth due to the concentration of services and shipyards demanded by the fleets returning to Spain. Other cities with rapid growth in that period were mostly mining centres such as Durango, La Plata (Sucre) and Potosi; seaports (in addition to Havana) like Portobelo, Tampico, Callao and Cartagena; and agricultural centres supplying mining cities and administrative capitals, such as Puebla, Tlaxcala and Cochabamba.

In the territory of most *audiencias* (legal courts), the index of primacy of the main city increased. In the *audiencia* of Mexico, Mexico City's primacy with relation to Guanajuato, Puebla and Oaxaca had increased from 2.00 in 1580 to 3.26 by 1630; in the *audiencia* of Guatemala, the primacy of Guatemala City (Antigua) grew from 0.62 to 1.43 in relation to San Cristóbal (Chiapas), Sonsonate and Granada; and in the *audiencia* of Quito, Quito's primacy grew from 1.63 to 2.30 in relation to Cuenca, Guayaquil and Loja.

In the early years of the nineteenth century, the administration of the Spanish empire was divided in four viceroyalties: the viceroyalty of Mexico, with its capital in Mexico City, which included present-day Mexico and the Spanish colonies in the Caribbean and Central America; the viceroyalty of Peru, with its capital in Lima, which included present-day Peru and the small area of Peru absorbed by Chile after the War of the Pacific in the 1970s; the viceroyalty of New Granada, with its capital in Bogotá, which included Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador; and the viceroyalty of the Plata River, with its capital in Buenos Aires, which included Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia. Guatemala, Venezuela, Cuba and Chile were captaincies-general, with capitals in Guatemala City, Caracas, Havana and Santiago, respectively.³ Each viceroyalty was divided into several intendancies and governments.⁴

The territory of each intendancy and government was defined in relation to an existing urban centre of a certain hierarchy and regional influence. The sees of the intendancies of La Paz and Paraguay and of the

Table 1: Population (in number of *vecinos*) and Function of Present Capital Cities in 1630

City	Date founded	Administrative Rank				Religious		Education	Number of <i>vecinos</i> ^b
		Vice-royalty	Audiencia ^a	Capt. General	Government	Archbishopric	Bishopric	Universities	
1. Mexico City	to 1521	x	x	-	-	x	-	x	15,000
2. Antigua Guatemala	1524-1541-1777	-	x	-	-	-	x	-	+1,000
3. San Salvador	1525-28-39	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+200
4. Tegucigalpa	1579	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+100
5. Managua	nineteenth century								
6. San José	seventeenth century								
7. Panamá City	1519	-	x	-	-	-	x	-	+500
8. Havana	1520	-	-	x	x	-	x	-	1,200
9. Port-au-Prince	eighteenth century								
10. Santa Domingo	1498-1502	-	x	-	-	x	-	x	600
11. Caracas	1567	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	300
12. Bogotá	1538	-	x	-	-	x	-	x	2,000
13. Quito	1534	-	x	-	-	-	x	x	3,000
14. Lima	1535	x	x	-	-	x	-	x	9,500
15. La Paz	1548	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	200
16. Santiago de Chile	1548	-	x	x	x	-	x	-	500
17. Buenos Aires	1536-1580	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	200
18. Montevideo	1726								
19. Asunción	1537	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	650
20. Brasilia	Construction began in late 1950's								

^a The **audiencia** was the legal court with the higher authority over a territory. In addition to the eight mentioned in the table, around 1620 there were **audiencias** in Guadalajara and La Plata (Sucre).

^b It is impossible to estimate the population of the cities included in this table because of the lack of census data. The number of **vecinos** (adult males born in Spain or of Spanish ancestry, mostly allowed to carry arms and be elected to the **cabildo** or municipal government) is the best available source because of its comparability. The data are taken from the **Compendio y Descripción de las Indias Occidentales** by Antonio Vázquez de Espinosa. The **Compendio** was completed in the late 1620's and published by the Smithsonian Institution, Washington, DC, in 1949.

government of Uruguay, all in the viceroyalty of the Plata River, were La Paz, Asunción and Montevideo; the sees of the intendancies of Guatemala and El Salvador were Guatemala City and San Salvador. Quito and Caracas were also sees of intendancies in the viceroyalty of New Granada. With few exceptions then, most of the present capital cities of Latin America held a high position in the administration of Spain in America. The exceptions were Santo Domingo, as the Haitians ruled the Dominican Republic between 1822 and 1844; Tegucigalpa, as the see of the intendancy of Honduras was in the town of Comayagua; and San José, as Costa Rica was part of the intendancy of Leon (Nicaragua), with the see in the town of Leon. The sees of most intendancies and governments were located in already existing cities and towns, which are now national or provincial, state or departmental capitals.

In addition, at the end of the eighteenth century, there were eleven *audiencias*. Eight sees of the *audiencias*, which constituted the highest court of appeal and also acted as the viceroy's or governor's council, were located in Mexico City, Santo Domingo, Panamá City, Guatemala City, Bogotá, Quito, Lima, Santiago de Chile and Buenos Aires; the other three sees were in Guadalupe, La Plata (present-day Sucre) and Manila (in the Philippines).

II Some failed attempts to build new capital cities

Even before the Latin American republics gained their independence, one of the early leaders of the revolution against the Spanish crown, the Venezuelan Francisco Miranda, thought of uniting the former colonies in a federal republic whose capital he suggested be located in a central place, possibly the Isthmus of Panamá, and be given the name of Colombo in memory of Christopher Columbus. Miranda died in 1816 in a Spanish prison before his own country gained complete independence,⁵ but his concern to place the political centre of Hispano-America in the Isthmus of Panamá is worth looking at. Of course, the strategic and commercial role played by the Isthmus during the colonial period was recognized by Spain, which made great efforts to fortify Panamá City, on the Pacific coast, and Portobelo, on the Caribbean coast.

Miranda's successor in leading the revolt against Spain in the north of South America was Simon Bolivar. Already in 1815, in the first version of his *Letter from Jamaica*, written while he was in voluntary exile, Bolivar summarized the situation in Latin America and suggested the union of New Granada (Colombia) and Venezuela, with Maracaibo as its capital. In

the second and final version of his *Letter from Jamaica*, once more he suggested Maracaibo as the capital but also presented an alternative site by the sea, in Bahia Honda; a new city to be named Las Casas and located on the northern border between Colombia and Venezuela. "We have been harassed," he wrote, "by a conduct which has not only deprived us of our rights but has kept us in a sort of permanent infancy with regard to public affairs." He did not envisage the former Spanish colonies as a great republic and he was sceptical of the federal system because "it is overperfect, and it demands political virtues and talents far superior to our own," but he rejected a monarchy and hoped to "avoid falling into demagogic anarchy or monocratic tyranny." Bolivar outlined the desirable conditions for the new capital city he proposed: a healthy climate, easy access, an impregnable site, good lands for agriculture and cattle-raising, and a good supply of wood for construction.

In 1819, Colombia and Venezuela united under the name of Great Colombia, to be joined later by Ecuador. The idea of a capital by the sea in a corner of a vast territory with a complex and mountainous topography and very bad roads lost all meaning, and was dropped when Great Colombia disintegrated in 1830, the year of Bolivar's death. However, the Congress of Colombia approved the construction of a new city, to be called Bolivar, to serve as the capital, the plan and location of which were to be decided by the Congress. After long debates, Bogotá was approved as the provisional capital of Colombia.

In 1850, while he was exiled in Santiago de Chile, the Argentine educator, writer and politician Domingo Faustino Sarmiento wrote a short volume he called *Argiropolis*. He proposed the creation of a new nation embracing Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay, with a new city, called Argiropolis, as its capital. The location proposed by Sarmiento was the Island of Martin Garcia, not far from the confluence of the Parana and Uruguay rivers, on the northeastern shore of the La Plata River. Sarmiento thought of a small city that would balance the excessive centralism of Buenos Aires in relation to the provinces of the confederation. "If a geographic map of Argentina is consulted," he wrote, "one can notice that, if compared to almost any country in the world, it is the most ruinously organized regarding the proportional distribution of its wealth, power and civilization all over the confederate provinces." Sarmiento wanted the Congress to overcome the errors that allowed the confederation to have only one port—the port of Buenos Aires—equipped for foreign trade, and suggested the need to promote river navigation to carry the benefits of trade to both the littoral provinces and Paraguay. Alberdi, the author of an essay that led to the text of the 1853 national constitution of Argentina,

saw the old South American capitals as “the headquarters and the fortresses of colonial tradition;” therefore, they were a threat to political freedom.⁶ He judged them unable to incorporate the reforms required by the new people, capable of learning and operating the new governmental system; obviously, he was referring to the immigrants that he, like Sarmiento, had tried to encourage to settle in Argentina.

The three initiatives I have mentioned—Miranda’s Colombo, Bolívar’s Las Casas and Sarmiento’s Argiropolis—were proposed in periods of armed struggles in Venezuela and Colombia and, several decades later, in Argentina. Civil wars threatened the disintegration of new nations that were plagued by regional rivalries and the struggle between conservatives and liberals. New political capitals were seen as one of the factors that would help to overcome these rivalries, but also as necessary for a more balanced development and national unity.

III The primacy of capital cities remains unchallenged

The majority of the new republics—whose boundaries roughly corresponded to the colonial *audiencias*, captaincies-general or *intendancias*—adopted their most populous cities as their capitals. For instance, the present territories of Cuba, Chile and Venezuela are those of the three former captaincies-general with the same name; the territories of Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras are those of the former *intendancias* of Guatemala, Comayagua (Honduras) and El Salvador; modern Uruguay, the territory of the colonial government of Uruguay; Ecuador and Peru, the territories of the *audiencias* of Quito and Lima. There are some exceptions. Buenos Aires became the capital city of Argentina by the federal law of December 21, 1880, after a long conflict between the economic interests of the city and port of Buenos Aires and the economic interests of most provincial (state) governments. The inauguration of Brasília as the third capital city of Brazil took place in 1960. It replaced Rio de Janeiro, which had been the capital city since 1763, when the colonial government had been moved from Salvador (Bahia). Managua became the capital city of Nicaragua in 1858, when, after a long conflict, the conservative interests centred in the city of Granada and the liberals from the city of Leon agreed to look for a compromise capital. Since 1839, Sucre has been the constitutional capital of Bolivia, meaning the site of the judicial branch of government, but the actual seat of government, where the executive and the congress operate, has, since about 1890, been the city of La Paz. Nevertheless, every year, the National Congress symbolically opens its session in

Sucre. Tegucigalpa became the seat of the government of Honduras in 1880, replacing Comayagua after a long period of political warfare.

At the time most Latin American countries gained their independence, during the second and third decades of the nineteenth century, their capital cities were small in population and area. Mexico City, which had 112,926 inhabitants in 1790, when a city census was taken by one of the last viceroys, and Rio de Janeiro were the only two cities with over 100,000 people. These were followed by Havana, with a population estimated at about 90,000, and Lima, with about 60,000. Buenos Aires, Caracas and Santiago de Chile had about 50,000 inhabitants, followed by Guatemala City, Quito and La Paz, with at least 20,000 inhabitants and at most slightly over 30,000. San Salvador had 12,504 inhabitants in 1807. The population of the other present capital cities was below 10,000 inhabitants and some, like San José, Tegucigalpa, Port-au-Prince, Santo Domingo and Asunción, probably had less than 5,000.

Although small villages—gradually incorporated into the urban areas—existed in the outskirts of some capital cities, their built-up area only partially covered the original gridiron set by the Europeans at the time of their foundation centuries before. Only Lima, Santo Domingo, Panamá City, Havana and Montevideo were surrounded by defensive walls, and these were demolished in the middle of the nineteenth century. By then, the five cities had expanded beyond the walls, but Lima and Santo Domingo still had sizeable unbuilt areas within the walls.⁷

Even in the 1850s, only three capital cities—Havana, Rio de Janeiro and Mexico City, in that order—had over 100,000 inhabitants (but still less than 200,000: Table 2). Six more—Lima, Buenos Aires, Quito, La Paz, Santiago and Guatemala City—had over 50,000 but 99,999 or less inhabitants. Probably six—Asunción, San José, Port-au-Prince, Tegucigalpa, Managua and Santo Domingo—had less than 10,000 inhabitants. Panamá was part of Colombia. The annual rate of population growth of all capital cities between 1850 and 1870 was very low, with two exceptions: Montevideo and Buenos Aires. Beginning in the 1850s, Uruguay and Argentina, and to a lesser degree Brazil, began to receive numerous European immigrants, especially from the impoverished rural areas of Italy and Spain—and in Brazil, also from Portugal—who found most good and accessible agricultural land already in private hands. As a result, many settled in the capital cities and in selected regional centres in the interior, close to the agricultural areas opened to production by recently built railways. Immigration to the rest of Latin America was still very low and the total population in most countries grew very slowly, following natural trends: high mortality rates counterbalanced equally high birth rates.

While Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay and, to a lesser degree, Chile began to urbanize rapidly, rural population weighed heavily in the distribution of population in the other nations. This situation is clearly reflected in the number of inhabitants of the capital cities in 1850 and 1870 and in their rates of annual population growth between 1850 and 1870 (Table 2).

The picture changed quite radically between 1870 and 1890, and between 1890 and 1910. The period between the 1880s and the First World War was one of massive immigration, in comparison with total population, for Argentina and Uruguay, to a lesser degree for Brazil and Chile, and also for small populated countries such as Costa Rica and former British colonies, now independent nations, like Trinidad and Tobago and Belize.⁸ Smaller numbers of immigrants also went to Colombia, the Dominican Republic and Guatemala. This was reflected in the annual rate of population growth of their capital cities, specifically: Buenos Aires (by 1910 the largest agglomeration in Latin America), Rio de Janeiro and Montevideo (with similar growth rates in 1850-1870), as well as population increases in Santiago de Chile, Bogotá, Santo Domingo, San José and Guatemala City (Table 2). Rural migrants began to flow to the capital cities during those decades and mortality rates declined as a result of the introduction of potable water, sewers and better health services. The impact of immigration and the first phase in the industrial development of some countries, based on import substitution, were very important in the transformation, both in the size and in the urban landscape, of the larger capital cities. Between 1870 and the 1990s, Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, Montevideo, Santiago de Chile and also some cities in the interior such as São Paulo and Rosario, and sea ports recently incorporated into international commercial routes, like Porto Alegre, Bahía Blanca and Barranquilla and others, experienced such physical, demographic, architectural, economic and cultural changes that we could call them new cities.

European immigration ceased during the First World War, but was renewed after 1920 and continued in growing numbers almost until the economic crisis of 1930. This second major transatlantic migration was more evenly distributed within each national territory, as a result of the opening-up of new agricultural areas, public and private colonization programs, the expansion of railway systems and industrialization. In 1930, the national populations of Paraguay, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panamá were below a million inhabitants. These five countries, along with Haiti, El Salvador and the Dominican Republic, which had more than 1.0 million but less than 2.5 million inhabitants in 1930, were predominantly rural. In four of these places—the exceptions were Honduras, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic and Paraguay—the annual growth rates

Table 2: Population of Capital Cities of Latin America, 1850-1930 (thousands)

	1850	1870	1890	1910	1930
1. Havana	199	223	243	364*	632
2. Rio de Janeiro	163*	418 (72)	658	1446 (20)	1480*
3. Mexico City	166	211	296	471*	1049
4. Buenos Aires	74*	187 (69)	663 (95)	1575 (14)	2101*
5. Lima	85*	76 (76)	104*	156*	265*
6. Quito	75*	76*	79*	95*	135*
7. La Paz	68 (54)	69	55 (00)	91*	157*
8. Santiago	65*	118 (65)	364 (95)	461 (07)	857 (30)
9. Guatemala	50*	50 (80)	61 (93)	86*	155*
10. Caracas	42*	60 (73)	70*	79*	181 (26)
11. Bogotá	30 (51)	41	111 (05)	138 (12)	240*
12. San Salvador	25*	29*	30*	57*	89
13. Montevideo	17*	86*	203*	291 (08)	534*
14. Asunción	9*	17*	35 (86)	72*	93*
15. San José	7 (44)	25 (64)	44 (92)	N/A	98 (27)
16. Port-au-Prince	N/A	21 (74)*	N/A	N/A	216 (50)
17. Tegucigalpa	N/A	10*	12 (87)	22 (19)	22 (35)
18. Managua	N/A	N/A	N/A	27 (20)	83 (40)
19. Panamá	N/A	N/A	N/A	37 (11)	82 (30)
20. Santa Domingo	N/A	N/A	N/A	30 (20)	71 (35)

* estimated

N/A: not available

Source: Data bank of the project "Population and Urban Change," IIED-AL and IIED-Human Settlements Programme, funded by the Rockefeller Foundation and the Tinker Foundation. This research project, completed in April 1991, produced a data bank with the census population of all human settlements of Latin America and the Caribbean with a population of 10,000 inhabitants or more as of 1980, for the period 1850-1980. Data from 276 national population censuses form the data bank. In total, over 3,000 settlements had a population of 10,000 inhabitants or more as of 1980. Figures in brackets indicated nearest available year.

between 1913 and 1930 were less than 1 percent, as against 1.71 percent for all Latin America and above 2.5 percent for Argentina and Brazil. The population of the capital cities of each of these eight countries was well below 100,000 inhabitants in 1930, despite the high annual growth rates of San José, Santo Domingo and Panamá City (Table 2). In contrast Buenos Aires had in 1930 over 2,000,000 inhabitants and Rio de Janeiro and Mexico City over a million. Mexico City and Caracas, and to a lesser degree Bogotá, Havana, Santiago de Chile and Guatemala City, grew very rapidly between 1910 and 1930. In the last six cases, the causes of growth were rural migrations and a higher natural increase in population.

The population primacy of capital cities was clearly established by 1930 in the majority of the Latin American countries. For example, according to the 1930 census, the population of Mexico City was 2.44 times the combined population of Guadalajara, Monterrey and Puebla and already comprised 6.32 percent of the national population; in 1914 (also a census year), the population of Buenos Aires was 3.76 times higher than the combined population of Rosario, Cordoba and La Plata and comprised 19.98 percent of the national population of Argentina. The estimated population of Panamá City in 1930 represented 15.85 percent of the population of Panamá; that of Montevideo, in 1933, 32.98 percent of Uruguay; that of Santiago, in 1930, 16.2 percent of Chile; that of Havana, in 1931, 16.5 percent of Cuba; that of San José, in 1927, 10.8 percent of Costa Rica. Higher primacies and a higher concentration of the national population in the capital cities were recorded in two former British colonies, Belize and Trinidad and Tobago, and also in Paraguay. The degree of primacy and of concentration of the national population in the capital city was lower in nations with a more balanced distribution of urban population, like Brazil, Colombia and Mexico. For instance, the growth of São Paulo, of Belo Horizonte (the new capital city of the state of Minas Gerais, in Brazil); of Medellín, in Colombia, and of several mid-size centres (with less than 100,000 inhabitants in 1930) was more rapid than the growth of their respective national capitals.

IV Rates of population growth of capital cities and of other large cities

Most Latin American countries have developed around a single urban centre, with the exception of Ecuador and Brazil, where Guayaquil and São Paulo are the most populated and industrialized cities, and Colombia, where Medellín and, to a lesser degree, Cali challenge Bogotá in industrial

activities if not in population. But in the less populated countries of Central America, including Panamá, the Caribbean and also Paraguay and Uruguay, there are no secondary cities (except in Honduras) to challenge the population and industrial primacy of the capital cities. The same is true of the more populated countries like Mexico, Argentina, Peru, Venezuela and Chile.

There is not much talk these days in Latin America about the social, economic and political consequences of the dominance of a primate city. In the 1960s, some governments attempted, in different ways, to intervene in national urban systems. Brazil's governments concentrated public investments in the nine largest metropolitan areas (Brasília was later included on the list) and tried to decentralize away from the coast and the Rio de Janeiro-São Paulo-Belo Horizonte area. Peru attempted to decentralize through a regional redistribution of industries, and Cuba, through the improvement of living conditions in rural areas, the creation of many rural towns, the use of ration cards and a virtual stop to investments in Havana. Several secondary cities at a considerable distance from the capital or primate city were selected as growth poles or industrial centres in Mexico, Venezuela, Chile and Colombia during the 1960s. At best, the results were doubtful, as private investments failed to respond to government incentives or because government commitments to national integration and regionalization were not or could not be followed by the needed investments. The growth-pole model of decentralization was short-lived. It was replaced during the early 1970s by a more integrated approach combining rural development and growth poles, as in Allende's Chile and in several of the small countries of Central America and the Caribbean. Whatever the scope and depth of such policies, the demographic, industrial, commercial and cultural primacy of the capital cities, with the exception of Brasília and Quito, has not been challenged, and even the exception of Quito is only partial, as Quito remains the cultural centre of Ecuador.

The population primacy of the metropolitan area of Mexico City has historically been overwhelming. In 1940, the total population of the metropolitan area was equivalent to the combined population of the next 14 largest agglomerations; in 1950 it was equivalent to the next 19; in 1960 to the next 22; and in 1970 and in 1980, to the next 24. Despite a decline in the annual rate of population growth (from 5.5 percent in 1960-1970 to 4.7 percent in 1970-1980), between 1970 and 1980 the metropolitan area of Mexico grew by 5.3 million inhabitants, a number equivalent to the aggregate population growth of the next 27 agglomerations in Mexico. During the last two decades, the primacy of the Mexico City metropolitan

area over Mexico's urban population has remained unchanged at approximately 38 percent.

Costa Rica is a small country. Its population is concentrated in a central plateau where San José, the national capital, Alajuela, Cartago, Heredia and other small cities are located. San José is the only agglomeration in the country with over 100,000 inhabitants. From the early years of this century, San José's primacy has been noticeable. Already, by the 1927 census, it represented 10.8 percent of the national population. Although some mid-sized centres, by Costa Rican standards, grew faster than San José during the last intercensal period (1973-1984)—e.g., Cinco Esquinas, San Vicente and San Isidro, all in the province of San José and not very distant from the national capital—San José's growth in absolute numbers (92,000 in 1973-1984) was higher than the aggregate population increase of the next 15 largest agglomerations, all with populations of 10,000 inhabitants or more in 1984 (with an increase of 61,400 persons in the same period).

In 1982, Chile had 32 urban centres with 25,000 inhabitants or more, including Santiago de Chile. During the last intercensal period (1970-1982), Santiago added 1,150,000 inhabitants, while the combined population growth of the other 34 centres, distributed from the far north to the Strait of Magellan, was 814,000. Already, in 1920, 13.5 percent of the national population of Chile was concentrated in Santiago.

Although several provincial (state) capitals and other cities in Argentina grew faster than the Buenos Aires metropolitan area during the last intercensal period (1970-1980), such as Mendoza, Tucuman, Salta, Santiago del Estero, Mar del Plata (all with 200,000 inhabitants or more in 1990) and also many smaller provincial capitals and other cities such as Neuguen, La Rioja, Posadas, Rio Cuarto and San Nicolas, the population added to the Buenos Aires metropolitan area during those ten years (1,622,721 inhabitants) was equivalent to the combined population growth of the next 10 agglomerations.

Even aside from Brasília, a new capital city built on an empty site in the late 1950s, and which expanded to 540,000 inhabitants by 1970, 1,180,000 by 1980 and 2,400,000 by 1990, most capital cities of Latin America have grown rapidly since 1950 (Table 3), although the annual rates of population have in many cases begun to decline during the last decade or two and, in Buenos Aires and Montevideo, since the 1950-1960 period. However, the annual growth rates, between 1970 and 1980, of the metropolitan areas of eight capital cities—Mexico City, Lima-Callao, Bogotá, Caracas, Santo Domingo, Asunción, Quito and Managua—were over 4 percent, despite one or two preceding decades of even higher

annual rates of growth (Table 3). Three more—Guatemala City, La Paz and San José—grew at annual rates over 3 percent but lower than 3.9 percent. The three capital cities with the lowest annual rates of growth are Santiago de Chile, Buenos Aires and Montevideo; Chile, Argentina and Uruguay are the three countries of Latin America that urbanized early and, by the 1960s if not earlier, two-thirds or more of their national populations were classified as urban.

The population growth of the capital cities of Latin America can also be approached from a different perspective: the average number of new inhabitants added per year to the cities' populations during the last decade and the projection for the next decade. Six capital cities—Mexico City, Buenos Aires, Lima-Callao, Bogotá, Brasília and Caracas—added 100,000 inhabitants or more per year from 1980 to 1990 (Table 4).⁹ The Mexico City metropolitan area added 578,000 per year and Lima-Callao, 219,000. Three more—Santiago de Chile, Santo Domingo and Asunción—added, during the last decade, an average of more than 50,000 but 99,999 or less inhabitants per year. In addition, 37 cities of Latin America that are not national capitals added an average of between 50,000 and 99,999 people per year during the past decade. This makes a total of 51 urban centres, national capitals or not, that added an average of 50,000 or more per year in that period.

Projections to the year 2000 show a somewhat different picture. The average number of new inhabitants to be added per year between 1990 and 2000 to the seven largest national capitals—those with a projected population of three million inhabitants or more in the year 2000—will be equivalent to, or slightly lower, than the figures of the previous decade (Table 4).¹⁰ Lima-Callao will add a larger number of people between 1990 and 2000 than during the last decade, while five other places will show a decline, especially Caracas, which apparently has saturated the possibilities of its valley and of the more suitable surrounding areas. The population is also settling in Valencia, Maracay and other not very distant cities. Of course, the number of inhabitants in the metropolitan areas of national capitals, their annual rate of growth and the number of new people they add depend on the definition given to the limits of the metropolitan areas. These are periodically redefined as they consolidate agglomerations in their peripheries by expanding their territories.

The national capitals of smaller countries face a totally different situation in terms of population. Asunción, Guatemala City, Quito, La Paz, Managua, Port-au-Prince, Panamá City, Tegucigalpa, San José and San Salvador, all national capitals of countries with ten million inhabitants or less in 1990 (estimated), will have to absorb, between 1990 and 2000, a

Table 3: Population of the National Capitals of Latin America in 1950, 1960, 1970, and Annual Rate of Population Growth for 1950-1960, 1960-1970 and 1970-1980 (thousands)

City	Population		Annual Rate 1950-1960	Population 1970	Annual Rate 1960-1970	Population 1980	Annual Rate 1970-1980
	1950	1960					
1. Mexico City	3,050	5,220	5.5	9,120	5.7	14,470	4.7
2. Lima-Callao	1,050	1,750	5.2	2,920	5.3	4,590	4.6
3. Buenos Aires	5,251	6,930	2.8	8,550	2.1	10,060	1.6
4. Bogotá	700	1,320	6.5	2,370	6.0	3,720	4.6
5. Caracas	680	1,310	6.8	2,120	4.9	3,170	4.1
6. Santiago de Chile	1,430	2,120	4.0	3,010	3.6	3,740	2.2
7. Brasilia	40	140	13.3	540	14.5	1,190	8.2
8. Santa Domingo	250	470	6.5	890	6.6	1,440	4.9
9. Asunción	210	280	2.9	450	4.9	820	6.2
10. Guatemala City	400	544	3.1	733	3.0	1,020	3.4
11. Quito	220	340	4.4	530	4.5	810	4.3
12. La Paz	270	380	3.5	550	3.8	810	3.9
13. Managua	110	210	6.7	420	7.2	640	4.3
14. Havana	1,198	1,448	1.9	1,751	1.9	1,940	1.0
15. San José	200	300	4.1	450	4.1	630	3.4
16. Panamá City	120	260	8.0	350	3.0	420	1.8
17. Port-au-Prince	130	260	7.2	500	6.8	540	0.8
18. Montevideo	1,070	1,150	0.7	1,210	0.5	1,190	-0.2
19. Tegucigalpa	72	134		273			
20. San Salvador	161	255		335			

Source: Based on United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat), **Global Report on Human Settlements, 1986** (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), Table 6, and IIED-AL data bank of urban centres with 10,000 inhabitants or over as of 1980.

Table 4: Estimated Population in 1980 and 1990 and Projected Population for 2000 of the National Capitals of Latin America and Average Number of New Inhabitants Per Year Between 1980 and 1990 and 1990 and 2000 (thousands)

City	Population 1980	Estimated Population 1990	Average No. of New Inhabitants Per Year, 1980-1990	Projected Population 2000	Average No. of New Inhabitants Per Year, 1990-2000
1. Mexico City	14,470	20,250	578	25,820	557
2. Buenos Aires	10,060	11,710	165	13,180	147
3. Lima-Callao	4,590	6,780	219	9,140	236
4. Bogotá	3,720	5,270	155	6,530	126
5. Santiago de Chile	3,740	4,550	81	5,260	71
6. Caracas	3,170	4,180	101	5,020	84
7. Brasilia	1,190	2,400	132	3,720	132
8. Santa Domingo	1,440	2,170	73	2,950	78
9. Havana	1,940	2,040	10	2,210	17
10. Guatemala City	1,020	1,460	44	2,100	64
11. Asunción	820	1,350	53	2,010	66
12. Quito	810	1,220	41	1,800	54
13. Montevideo	1,190	1,220	3	1,270	5
14. La Paz	810	1,210	40	1,770	56
15. Managua	640	950	31	1,390	44
16. San José	630	880	25	1,210	33
17. San Salvador	—	—	—	—	—
18. Tegucigalpa	—	—	—	—	—
19. Port-au-Prince	540	580	4	740	16
20. Panamá City	420	520	10	660	14

Source: Based on United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat), **Global Report on Human Settlements, 1986** (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), Table 6. I am using Habitat's figures because of their comparability. Real figures are somewhat different; for instance, the population of the metropolitan area of Mexico City was 14,952,101 in 1980 and 19,843,720 (estimated) in 1990 and will be 23,510,262 (projected) in 2000 and 26,759,106 (projected) in 2010 (*Atlas de la ciudad de México*, ch. 10, 413).

much higher number of new inhabitants per year than between 1980 and 1990. For instance, each year, San José will have to absorb six times more inhabitants than Ottawa will between 1990 and 2000, and four times more than Edmonton; the three cities had a comparable estimated population in 1990. Port-au-Prince, the capital of impoverished Haiti, will absorb slightly fewer people than Vancouver, between 1990 and 2000.

Montevideo is the only national capital, and also the only metropolitan area of Latin America with over one million inhabitants, which had practically no population growth between 1980 and 1990, and will probably lose population between 1990 and 2000. This is explained by the very slow population growth of Uruguay during the last decades and the redistribution of the national population towards the tourist areas along the eastern coast and some specialized agricultural areas in the northwest.

V Environmental problems of the capital cities of Latin America

Because of their size and the number of new inhabitants they add annually, most capital cities face truly overwhelming environmental problems, which pose a threat of unknown dimensions and diversity to the quality of life of their inhabitants. Contrary to many expectations, gross death rates in the central city—the federal or capital district—can, in some cases, be slightly higher than gross death rates in the suburban administrative units that form the metropolitan area. Given the higher quality of health services and the higher percentage of the area of the central district with water and sewer systems, the explanation must probably be sought in other environmental conditions, such as overcrowding and factors causing stress.

A high percentage of the inhabitants of the capital cities and their metropolitan areas are very poor and live in a variety of shelters, many of them built by their occupants on public or private land they have invaded. This has resulted in urban districts of many sizes, in a variety of urban and suburban locations. When the decision to invade is made, public lands (where the danger of eviction is lower) and areas with access to public transport are favoured over sites safe from floods and landslides. The shelters constructed on these sites, whether owned, rented or illegally built have two main environmental problems: overcrowding and shoddy construction, and the presence of pathogens due to the lack of basic infrastructure and services. Many diseases and medical problems, such as diarrhea, dysentery, parasites, bronchitis, typhus, food poisoning and loss of vision, could

be prevented by an improvement in the delivery of potable water, sewers, and better systems of garbage collection and disposal. Overcrowding and poor-quality housing help spread influenza, tuberculosis, meningitis, measles and mumps, a situation aggravated by the undernourishment of many dwellers in capital cities, especially children.

Working conditions for many industrial workers are bad. Despite existing legislation, most middle- and small-sized factories and small workshops are poorly lit and ventilated, and offer no protection against dust, noise and toxic substances. Family workshops have spread illegally in all low-income districts, often operating within the family home.

The number of poor settlements has grown much faster than the rate of population growth in all capital cities. Many of these settlements are on dangerous sites. During the last two decades, earthquakes have resulted in the loss of numerous lives and the destruction of the shelters and belongings of many poor households in Managua (where the central districts were completely destroyed in 1970 and only very partially rebuilt), in Guatemala City in 1976, in Mexico City in 1986, in San Salvador in 1986 and, more recently, in Lima, Santiago de Chile and Quito.¹¹

Landslides have killed thousands, resulted in vast destruction and paralyzed the activities in the central districts of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil's former capital city, as well as in La Paz and Caracas. Hurricanes have several times devastated Havana, Santo Domingo and Port-au-Prince; floods are a permanent threat to many poor suburban districts in Buenos Aires, Lima and Santiago de Chile. Heavy rains, coupled with poor drains, have brought communications to a stop for many hours in districts of Buenos Aires and Caracas, and produced landslides of mud and rocks (called *huaicos*) along the Rimac River, which crosses metropolitan Lima. Uncollected garbage limits the natural run-off of surface water and thereby increases the dangers of flooding in low-lying settlements.

Poor marginal settlements are frequently built in the vicinity of factories and industrial areas, which contaminate the air and dispose of their untreated wastes in neighbouring rivers and lands. The high density of these settlements and the use of inflammable building materials such as wood and cardboard increases the danger of fires to the structures, as well as accidental fires within them.

Although the quality of the living and working environments of the poor is the largest environmental problem of Latin America's capital cities, and the elimination of human excreta the most serious one, there are others that have gained national recognition as threats to the health and security of the population, notably air pollution. With a few exceptions, such as Brasilia and Quito, the largest concentrations of industries and motor

cars in Latin American nations are in their capital cities, specially in the suburban districts of Mexico City, Buenos Aires, Santiago de Chile, Lima and Caracas. The situation is particularly serious in Mexico City, where the high-altitude valley surrounded by mountains traps pollution, and in Santiago de Chile, where the Andes range stops winds coming from the Pacific Ocean. The great concentration of poorly-maintained automobiles and buses in the central districts and the use of inefficient stoves and heaters also contributes to air pollution.

Only in recent years have public authorities in Latin America begun to give attention to the impact of noise on health. Perhaps the principal cause of noise in Mexico City, Bogotá, Quito and Lima is air traffic, given the location of their airports in the middle of heavily built-up districts. Alternative sites for these airports are very distant and access would be too costly. Traffic noise has increased (although few reliable measurements are available) with the construction of highways crossing the central districts of metropolitan Mexico City, Caracas, Bogotá, Buenos Aires and Quito, and with the concentration of traffic in the early morning and late afternoon in the intersections and squares of the central districts in all capital cities, even in Brasília in the area around the bus terminal.

But the greatest environmental impact of capital cities is on their surrounding area. Because of their population and size, they demand a high input of resources: water, fossil fuels, lands and all the foods and materials their population and enterprises require. "The more populous and spread out the city and the richer its inhabitants, the larger its demand on resources is likely to be and the larger the area from which these are drawn."¹² Water needed for residential use is frequently heavily contaminated. "The Rimac River (which is the main source of water for Lima) receives such a variety and quantity of contaminated substances that water, even after going through the process of making it drinkable, can harm the health of Lima's population."¹³ Although the Rimac receives discharges from mines located up river, two-thirds of the contaminated substances are discharged within the limits of the metropolitan area, as a result of an insufficient network of sewers and uncollected garbage in the precarious settlements on both margins of the river. River pollution from city-based industries and untreated sewers has led to the contamination of the Bogotá River, and the La Paz River, which passes through Bolivia's capital city. The latter has become so polluted that horticultural production downstream has been impaired.

Uncontrolled physical expansion and solid and liquid waste disposal are particular examples of impact on the regions that surround capital cities. Given the lack of effective public land-use control, many legal

subdivisions are approved without reference to a metropolitan-wide plan. In addition, there are many unauthorized subdivisions and a proliferation of illegal squatter communities, often as a result of the enforced eviction of inhabitants from more centrally located sites. The result of unplanned urban expansion is a patchwork of different uses, the segregation of the poor in distant locations, high infrastructure costs, high commuting costs and time, and the use of lands unsuitable for human life. Vast amounts of vacant and under-utilized lands, frequently owned by state agencies, are another result of the lack of government action.

Capital cities such as Buenos Aires, Bogotá, Santiago de Chile, Asunción and Montevideo continue to expand over rich agricultural land. Lima's expansion has taken place over desert lands made productive through costly investments in irrigation. Mexico City was built on non-consolidated and earthquake-prone lands. As a result, the central districts are gradually sinking and have been destroyed many times. Mexico City's physical expansion initially took place over the dry bed of Texcoco Lake, which still surrounded the city in the nineteenth century and has now disappeared, causing high levels of dust. In the 1940s and 1950s, the city expanded to the mountains that surrounded the valley, destroying beautiful natural landscapes. All capital cities, by their uncontrolled expansion, are destroying the natural landscapes that surround them: the mountain slopes in the Caracas, Quito, La Paz and Mexico City metropolitan areas; the ravines in Quito and Guatemala City; river and sea shores in Buenos Aires, Havana, Montevideo, Lima-Callao and Santo Domingo. Once an area of natural beauty is built over, it is almost impossible to recover it for much needed recreational uses and aesthetic diversity in otherwise grey and dull suburban areas that expand endlessly, sometimes to 30 to 40 kilometres or more from the ancient cores.

VI Final Comments

When I began to prepare this paper, I looked for a definition of a capital city. Although I believe we could find a consensus among the inhabitants of a country on what a capital city means to them—the most obvious one would be the seat of the national government—I wanted to check whether one or more precise definitions existed. My first surprise was to find the short treatment given to this issue in Arnold Whittick's *Encyclopedia of Urban Planning*: a capital city is "the chief city or town of a country, generally the seat of government. Sometimes a country is thought of as having two capitals, that which is the seat of government and that which is

the commercial centre," like The Hague and Amsterdam in the Netherlands; Bern and Zurich in Switzerland; Brasília and São Paulo in Brazil; Quito and Guayaquil in Ecuador; Madrid and Barcelona in Spain; Rome and Milan in Italy; Delhi and Bombay in India; Rabat and Casablanca in Morocco; Ottawa and Toronto in Canada; and Washington and New York in the United States.

But these are exceptional cases. In most countries, including those in Latin America (with the exception of Brazil and Ecuador), the fact remains that the capital city is the seat of government (national, state or provincial), and it is also the seat of many other activities. The great majority of national capitals are the seat of the national government, the main commercial centre and, frequently, the principal industrial and cultural centre. This is the case with all Latin American national capitals except Brasília and Quito.

Only exceptionally has a new city been planned in Latin America as a seat of government and host of a variety of other functions, mostly cultural and commercial: Guatemala City, in 1776, after the former capital, Antigua, was destroyed by an earthquake and, by decision of the King of Spain, a new site was chosen; Panamá City, after Old Panamá was burned and sacked by privateers in 1671, also by a decision of the King of Spain; and Kingston, after Port Royal was destroyed by an earthquake in 1692, by a decision of the King of England. These three examples belong to the colonial period. More recently, Brasília was established in 1956 as the seat of government for Brazil and as a cultural centre.

When existing cities were selected as the capital of a pre-Columbian kingdom or empire, like Teotihuacán and, centuries later, Tenochtitlán in Mexico, or Chan Chan and, centuries later, Cuzco in Peru, or of a Spanish viceroyalty (Mexico City and Lima and, centuries later, Bogotá and Buenos Aires, or Salvador and then Rio de Janeiro in colonial Brazil) or of a recently independent Latin American nation, most of the activities that in due time would give those cities a pre-eminence over other urban centres in their territories, such as administrative roles, commercial, cultural and what we would call industrial functions for those regions and times, already existed in the future capitals or were soon moved there.

Once a city was designated as a seat of government, its history became closely linked with that of the country. In many ways, the fortunes of a political system are reflected in decisions that mould the capital city. The growth of Tenochtitlán and Cuzco must be associated with the military and commercial expansion of the Aztec and Inca empires; the magnificent architecture and intense commercial activities of Mexico City during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with the wealth of the viceroyalty

of New Spain. It is impossible to trace all the different ways by which the national capitals of the newly independent countries benefited from public investments and incentives to private investors: e.g., world or regional fairs in the past, olympic games and a world soccer tournament in recent decades; large public parks and avenues in the past, university campuses, museums and highways in recent decades. All the privileges and power that highly centralized governments can mobilize are more visible in national capitals than in the provincial or state capitals. Buenos Aires benefited from the pre-1880 economic boom, as did Quito from the high oil prices of the late 1970s. The large public investments required by Brasília were possible because of the so-called "economic miracle" of Brazil during the late 1960s and early 1970s, which left the country with a wider gap between the incomes of the rich and the poor and with massive numbers of poor and destitute.

In theory, a national capital can grow indefinitely, maintaining comparatively high rates of population growth, but only as long as the political system that supports the city economically—and the bureaucracy—justifies its privileges. After all, many capital cities of Latin America enjoy a privileged status as federal districts in the political and administrative structure of their nations, or receive preferential treatment in budget allocations of national governments that still decide the use and spatial distribution of an overwhelming share of public investments.

Throughout the twentieth century, the building of new capital cities has been the concern of several political leaders in the Third World. The discussion of moving a capital city to another location has also been of occasional interest to some political leaders in Latin America, but only on one occasion, the case of Brasília, was the decision to build a new city adopted and implemented. On a second occasion, concerning Viedma, the national Congress approved the move, and construction began but was soon interrupted.

Brasília

The idea of moving the capital of Brazil from the coast to the interior was not new when, in 1946, a new constitution proclaimed the necessity of transferring the capital to the central highlands. Already in 1822, Jose Bonfacio, one of the leading forces in the proclamation of Brazil as a constitutional monarchy, proposed to move the capital from Rio de Janeiro to a site inland close to Brazil's three main river systems: the Amazon, the São Francisco and the Parana-Plata. In 1892, a special commission reserved an area of 10,000 square kilometres for this purpose and soon the limits of the area were defined. In 1956, the decision to move the capital of Brazil

to this new location was finally adopted and the creation of a new decentralized federal agency called *NOVACAP* (Nova Capital or New Capital) was approved. The body was given sufficient autonomy to undertake the planning and construction of Brasília, which was inaugurated April 21, 1960, by President Juscelino Kubitschek.

Several political, economic and administrative objectives justified the selection of this site, 890 kilometres north of São Paulo. One was to stimulate Brazil's economic growth by integrating the largely unsettled new territories inland with those near the Atlantic coast, already in the process of development. A second objective was to create a new material and spiritual climate for an administration that found it difficult to reach desirable levels of efficiency in Rio de Janeiro, a city of great personality and charm, but plagued with transportation problems and with a shortage of well-located places for new public administrative buildings, due to its topography. Brasília was also intended to become a symbol of a new Brazil seeking to show the world its potentialities and future course. Brasília was neither a case of reconciling the interests of rival cities, as Canberra or Ottawa had been in their time, nor of seeking to unify regions with opposing interests, as was Washington.¹⁴ Instead, it was seen as a force promoting a more equitable regional distribution of the nation's population and wealth. Brasília's estimated population in 1990, about 2,400,000, represented 1.6 percent of Brazil's national total, but its growth between 1960 and 1990 represented 2.84 percent of Brazil's overall growth. Still, the impact of Brasília in the movement of population from the coast to the interior has been small; other political and socioeconomic forces played the major roles in, for example, the opening of the Amazon forest to spontaneous settlements. Likewise, massive migrations continue from the north and northeast, especially since the serious drought of the early 1980s, to the cities of the industrialized centre-south region, where São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte and Curitiba are located. Between 1960 and 1990 the combined population growth of these four metropolitan areas was 26,414,000, which represented 31.82 percent of Brazil's urban population growth in those three decades. Although never before in history has a new city grown to 2,400,000 inhabitants in thirty years, Brasília's growth has not had a significant impact, at least not yet, in the spatial distribution of Brazil's population. It has undoubtedly contributed to some changes, but one wonders what a bureaucratic and minor cultural agglomeration, despite its size and growing local commercial market, can represent in the future urbanization of Brazil. The industrial, commercial and cultural weight of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Belo Horizonte in the centre-south region has not slowed down, nor has that

of Salvador and Recife in the northeast, of Fortaleza in the north and of Curitiba and Porto Alegre in the south.

Thirty years is too short a period in which to evaluate changes such as those expected from the construction of a new capital city in the interior. However, it is debatable whether more significant economic, demographic and spatial changes can be expected than those that have already taken place, unless more forceful measures to decentralize industrial activities, implement deep changes in the rural areas and create a "new country" in the interior are adopted. Brazil is in the midst of a deep economic recession, whose full impact is yet to be seen. It is plagued by the worst social problems in Latin America, if only because of the number of people affected by them.

Was it enough to move the new capital city to a site 900 kilometres from the coast to promote the unsettled areas in the interior, or would it have been wiser to promote a network of cities of different sizes advancing much deeper into the areas with the best potential for development? Has Brasília helped to decentralize the federal administration of Brazil and make it more flexible and less costly? Has Brasília helped to reduce the congestion in the large metropolises of Brazil? To what degree are the economic problems that have plagued Brazil during the last two decades associated with the massive public investments required to build up such a large city in the wilderness and with the subsidies granted to encourage the bureaucracy to move there? Has Brasília helped to challenge the economic and political power of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro and their cultural domination of the country? My answer to these five questions is coloured by a very moderate optimism. At the end, one lesson can be learned from the Brazilian experience. Those who created the city had the courage to continue the construction of Brasília and speed up the movement of the federal bureaucracy, probably because they felt that once the construction had began and a timetable had been adopted for moving the bureaucracy, any delay, and there were several, could have many negative political and economic repercussions.

Viedma

There are moments in the history of nations when moving the capital city to a different urban centre or to an unsettled site has been considered necessary by political leaders. In all cases, the design and architecture of the new capital are less important than the conception of a new nation and of the society that will build that nation. I do not think there is a better or worse political and economic moment to choose a new capital city. Washington and Ottawa were designated capital cities at

moments in the history of the United States and Canada when their construction could seem to many a low priority. Why were Philadelphia or New York, Toronto or Montréal not chosen? Local economic rivalries could not have weighed very heavily in a decision that apparently meant so much for the future of both territories. When I visited Washington for the first time in the late fall of 1953, and Ottawa in the summer of 1960, both looked to me like enlarged towns full of bureaucrats, with few distinguished buildings and a dull cultural life, and, in Washington, with serious social and racial problems. By then, some 150 years had elapsed since they had been selected as capital cities, and no one could deny the domination already acquired by the United States in the world economy and the potential of Canada to belong to the group of leading nations. Both the United States and Canada faced many problems, but they had political stability and were on their way to a new, more advanced stage in their economic and social development. Both had many dynamic urban centres, well interconnected and with a diversity of functions.

Since my first visits, Washington and Ottawa have become attractive places to live, although predominantly bureaucratic, with all the limitations and advantages large bureaucracies represent. The high quality and efficiency of the administration in the two countries is largely associated, I believe, with the characteristics of Washington and Ottawa, despite the growing complexity of both national governments. They are cities that have grown under democracies and have been developed in recent decades by stable regimes that, despite their imperfections, show a consistent political, economic and social dynamism.

All Argentinians were deeply surprised in late April 1986 when President Alfonsín announced that Argentina needed a new capital city and that he was going to send a proposal to the Congress to move the federal government to an existing small agglomeration in northeastern Patagonia, the twin towns of Viedma-Carmen de Patagones. The reasons invoked by President Alfonsín were three: to help reduce congestion in Buenos Aires by decentralizing the federal bureaucracy; to help develop Patagonia and its vast hydroelectric, fuel, mineral, land, fishing and tourism potential; and to restore some spatial and economic balance in the country by promoting the development of the interior and a federal system of government. In early 1986, Argentina was hesitantly living through a transition to a representative, democratic government after eight years of ruthless military dictatorship, and faced a serious economic situation partially due to a large foreign debt, inflation and a chronic shortage of private investment. The Alfonsín government had a good record on human rights and concern for social issues, but also a lack of

clarity about how it was going to manage the economy of the country. However, the political timing seemed propitious because the two majority parties had reached a certain consensus about the need to give the fullest support to representative government.

No one was surprised when, in June 1987, the National Congress approved the transfer of the capital city from Buenos Aires to Viedma, the creation of a province (or state) in the city of Buenos Aires, and the need to undertake a regional development plan for Patagonia. The extraordinary aspects of this history were the apathy with which Alfonsín's grand scheme was received in Congress and by the people; the arbitrariness of the choice of Viedma with respect to other alternatives or, even more important, with respect to Buenos Aires; and the lack of any analysis about the implications of moving the capital city in a moment of economic and political crisis and growing social unrest. In comparison, the moment chosen to create Brasília was more propitious in every sense.

A national commission was created to design and implement the construction of the new capital city, another commission to implement the transfer of the administration, and a third one to produce ideas for the development of Patagonia. The project for the unnamed national capital remained for a long time (at least until late 1987) one of the best-kept secrets in Argentina, seen by some foreigners but very few Argentinians; the gradual transfer of the administration was to begin in 1988 and, at least symbolically, President Alfonsín planned to move to Viedma before the end of his constitutional term, in late 1989, but that move never materialized, nor was there a plan for Patagonia. Nowadays, no one in Argentina talks of moving the capital city to Viedma. The three commissions have been dissolved, the last one in late 1989.

Few people, outside the small group in the government who helped Alfonsín launch the idea of a new capital city of 400,000 inhabitants by the year 2000, took much time to ponder the implications of the transfer.¹⁵ It is hard to believe that the development of Patagonia—a largely unsettled territory of one million square kilometres and two million inhabitants dispersed in a dozen mid-size centres and many smaller ones and with a harsh climate—was tied to the transfer of the capital city, rather than to other policies and projects that required sizeable public investments in infrastructure and large private investments in productive schemes. It is also difficult to believe that true federalism depended on the transfer of the capital city to a new location rather than in a change of attitude by the political leadership, both at the central and the provincial level, and that the growth of the Buenos Aires metropolitan area, which combines for Argentina the industrial characteristics of São Paulo, the cultural primacy

of Rio de Janeiro and the commercial predominance of both, was going to lose its traditional functions.

To deflate Buenos Aires, to look towards the south and to reform the public administration were basic to Alfonsín's grand scheme: to found the Second Republic was an attractive slogan, one perhaps influenced by French advisers who were at that time assisting Alfonsín's government in training an elite bureaucratic corps and preparing decentralization schemes.

Viedma belongs to the past, at least for the time being. The provincial government of Río Negro still functions in Viedma, and the city of Buenos Aires, which was to become a new province (with or without some of the adjoining municipalities) or a federal territory, remains the national capital and the central city of a metropolitan area with close to twelve million inhabitants, and the undisputed commercial, industrial and cultural centre of Argentina.

Epilogue

Perhaps we have reached the end of an era when the need for new capital cities has been a controversial issue in many nations. There are not many reasons to support the founding of new national capitals, other than those invoked when Brasília and Islamabad were created, but there could be reasons to support new provincial or state capitals, as religious or tribal rivalries can require changes in the political boundaries within nations, and several nations are beginning to occupy and develop their unsettled territories.

Very few independent nations will be created in the near future. If any are created, it will be the result of a division in an already independent country—a rather unlikely possibility—or because of the split of a union of republics. But even in these cases political leaders will have a variety of choices of existing cities and towns. Of course, political leaders of recently independent nations, like Tanzania and Nigeria, or of much older republics such as Argentina, facing critical political and economic situations and plagued by centralized, inefficient, oversized and poorly motivated bureaucracies, might be tempted to propose new locations for the national capital of their countries. There is no end to the fantasies of modern politicians, and in the end we must recognize that there is little that cannot be achieved with the right type of leadership and foresight, even the goals expected to be fulfilled with the creation of a new capital city.

Notes

- ¹ Paraguay also uses Guarani as an official language.
- ² Jorge E. Hardoy and Carmen Aranovich, "Urbanización en América Hispánica entre 1850 y 1630," *Boletín del Centro de Investigaciones Históricas y Estéticas*. 11 (May 1969): 9-89.
- ³ The duties and powers of captains-general were similar to those of viceroys but their jurisdiction was smaller.
- ⁴ The intendancies had an intermediate hierarchy between the *cabildos* or local governments and the central government, represented in America by viceroys.
- ⁵ In July 1811 Venezuela declared its independence from Spain, although important sections of the country remained for some time under the control of Spain.
- ⁶ Juan B. Alberdi, *Bases y puntos de partida para la organización de la República Argentina*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1966. 155.
- ⁷ Walls or elaborate systems of fortification defended the principal commercial ports, such as Havana, Santo Domingo and Panamá City, already mentioned, and Cartagena, San Juan de Puerto Rico, Campeche, Veracruz and Cartagena in Hispano-America and Salvador, Recife and Rio de Janeiro in Brazil.
- ⁸ Between 1851 and 1930, 5,481,000 immigrants arrived in Argentina and 3,850,000 in Brazil.
- ⁹ Five cities of Latin America that are not national capitals also added 100,000 inhabitants or more during the last decade: São Paulo, 595,000 per year; Rio de Janeiro, 216,000; Belo Horizonte, 130,000; Curitiba, 165,300 (all in Brazil); and Medellín, 116,000 (Colombia); Monterrey 92,000 (Mexico). Of course, these estimates will have to be checked once the figures of the 1990 national population censuses are available.
- ¹⁰ For example, the Buenos Aires metropolitan area will add, according to recent projections, 147,000 inhabitants per year between 1990 and the year 2000, while for the previous intercensal periods the figures were as follows: 167,000 per year between 1960 and 1970; 162,700 between 1970 and 1980; and 165,000 between 1980 and 1990.
- ¹¹ The 1986 earthquake in Mexico City and the 1940 earthquake in Lima were true catastrophes.
- ¹² Jorge E. Hardoy and David Satterthwaite, "Environmental problems in Third World Cities: A Global Issue Ignored?" Paper prepared for the conference, "Cities: the Mainspring of Economic Development in Developing Countries," Lille, Nov. 1989. Also IIED, London, 1990.
- ¹³ Municipalidad de Lima Metropolitana, *Plan del centro de Lima*. Lima, 1989.

¹⁴Government of Brazil, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cultural Division. J.O. de Meena Penna, "Brazil builds Brasília." May 1960.

¹⁵In 1986 the combined population of Viedman and Carmen de Patagones was around 60,000.

LE STATUT DES CAPITALES EUROPÉENNES

Francis Delpérée

Dans le *Dictionnaire général de la politique* qu'il publie à Paris en 1863, Maurice Block définit de manière laconique la capitale : c'est le « siège du gouvernement. » À l'appui de cette définition, il fournit l'explication suivante : « Paris, Londres, Vienne, Berlin, Copenhague, Stockholm, Madrid, Lisbonne, etc. sont devenues des capitales, parce que ces villes sont habitées de temps immémorial par le souverain, autour duquel se sont naturellement groupées les autorités supérieures. La Rome ancienne est devenue capitale parce qu'elle a conquis peu à peu le pays qui l'entourait. »

La définition est d'ordre technique¹. L'explication, elle, est plus politique ou plus symbolique. Comment ne pas conjuguer ces préoccupations lorsque référence est faite au choix d'une capitale ?

Encore faut-il savoir si ces justifications conduisent à donner à la capitale un statut particulier. Sur ce terrain, la diversité règne en maître. Même si on laisse de côté l'examen des différences géographiques, économiques, sociales et culturelles, chacun reconnaît qu'il faut faire du droit comparé à l'échelle de l'Europe pour définir les différents statuts de ses capitales.

Ces problèmes sont bien connus. Mais aujourd'hui, de nouvelles questions apparaissent sur le vieux continent. Quelle capitale, pour quelle Europe ? Compte tenu de l'affaissement des murs, y compris des enceintes institutionnelles, le sujet est d'une particulière ampleur. Dans une Europe à la recherche de ses limites géographiques et de ses structures institutionnelles, la question des capitales européennes ne peut, moins que jamais, passer inaperçue.

I. L'emplacement de la capitale

Dans la vie d'un État, le choix de la capitale peut représenter un *choix technique*. Comme le dit la constitution belge, dans son article 126, « la ville de Bruxelles est la capitale de la Belgique et le siège du gouvernement. » La capitale sert donc à désigner le lieu où les activités des pouvoirs publics doivent être localisées, en totalité ou en partie. Elle est à la fois la résidence du chef de l'État², le centre des activités gouvernementales, le lieu d'implantation des principales administrations (notamment des ministères), le siège des assemblées politiques, en tout cas de celles qui ont vocation nationale³, et le chef-lieu des principales juridictions, par exemple, de celles qui exercent leurs attributions sur tout le territoire de l'État.

Dans la mesure où les préoccupations d'efficacité technique peuvent être déterminantes, rien n'empêche d'élire une capitale qui ne peut se prévaloir d'aucun titre historique, qui n'est pas le centre de l'activité économique, sociale ou culturelle du pays, et qui n'est pas non plus la ville démographiquement la plus importante. Rien n'empêche non plus de morceler ces lieux techniques en tenant compte des fonctions politiques à remplir. Rien n'empêche enfin de prévoir des solutions de repli, c'est-à-dire des lieux où les autorités publiques pourraient poursuivre leurs activités, quels que soient les événements.

Les *capitales artificielles* ne sont pas monnaie courante en Europe. Rome, Paris, Londres, Madrid, Lisbonne, Bruxelles, Luxembourg et d'autres encore présentent la particularité de cumuler les fonctions de centre politique et économique, sans qu'il soit toujours permis de préciser si la centralisation du pouvoir a été facteur d'essor commercial ou industriel ou si le développement économique et financier d'une ville a justifié que s'y implantent aussi les services essentiels de l'État.

La Haye, aux Pays-Bas, et Berne, en Suisse, peuvent néanmoins être classées au rang de ces capitales créées spécialement dans ce but, ou de ces villes érigées en siège, exclusif ou partiel, des institutions publiques de l'État.

Les *capitales éclatées* sont aussi présentes en Europe. Elles ont la spécificité de ne recueillir sur leur territoire qu'une partie des institutions publiques de l'État. Elles partagent avec d'autres villes le soin d'abriter les autorités investies de fonctions importantes dans l'État. Quelques exemples illustrent le raisonnement.

Paris est la capitale de la France : le chef de l'État, le gouvernement, l'administration, le Parlement, le Conseil constitutionnel, le Conseil d'État, la Cour de cassation, etc., y ont, en règle générale, leurs activités, mais le Congrès, qui réunit les membres des deux assemblées aux fins

d'exercer la fonction constituante, tient ses séances à Versailles. Berne est la capitale de la Suisse, mais, comme le précise l'article 115 de la constitution helvétique, tout ce qui concerne le siège des autorités de la Confédération est l'objet de la « législation fédérale » et, en vertu de cette disposition, le législateur a précisé que le Tribunal fédéral aurait son lieu d'implantation à Lausanne et le Tribunal fédéral des assurances (sociales) à Lucerne.

Dans cette perspective fonctionnelle, des *capitales alternatives* sont également concevables. La constitution suédoise, par exemple, ne manque pas de souligner, dans son article 50, que les réunions du Riksdag doivent avoir lieu « dans la capitale du Royaume », et donc à Stockholm. Mais elle ajoute aussitôt que cette règle est passible d'exceptions pour tenir compte de la sûreté ou de la liberté du Riksdag. Dans ces cas, il appartient au Riksdag lui-même ou au speaker de choisir et de faire connaître un autre lieu de réunion⁴.

La constitution autrichienne s'exprime dans le même sens. Sur proposition du gouvernement, le président de la République peut, en cas d'urgence, autoriser les autorités publiques à se réunir en un autre lieu du territoire.

Lorsqu'il est inspiré par des raisons techniques, le choix de la capitale peut donc connaître des accommodements. Ceux-ci tiennent compte du développement que connaît, sur un plan géographique, la configuration des villes et, sur un plan institutionnel, l'organisation des institutions publiques.

Le phénomène est simple. La définition de la capitale se fait par référence à une circonscription territoriale. Celle-ci — ville, municipalité, arrondissement, district — a été découpée de manière stricte au XIX^e ou au début du XX^e siècle. Mais sa population, contenue dans des limites étroites, déborde très vite dans des banlieues, des quartiers ou des entités périphériques. La capitale devient, d'un point de vue plus sociologique que juridique, une unité de plus en plus vaste et de plus en plus homogène au regard de l'économie, des transports ou de services hospitaliers⁵. En d'autres termes, il y a divorce entre l'aire sociologique et l'aire politique de la capitale⁶. Pour résoudre ces distorsions, faut-il s'efforcer de faire rentrer le sociologique dans une politique prédéterminée⁷ ?

Dans le même moment, l'action des institutions publiques va en se diversifiant. L'administration, pour ne citer que cet exemple, a cessé d'être exclusivement celle des départements ministériels. Sous réserve de leurs services extérieurs, ceux-ci siègeront en principe auprès des ministres qui en assurent la direction. Mais qu'en est-il des services publics économiques, sociaux et culturels qu'ils créent, des entreprises publiques qu'ils

constituent, des régies ou des sociétés d'économie mixte qu'ils organisent, au besoin avec le concours du secteur privé ?

En somme, les capitales européennes qui sont le plus souvent restées dans les limites que leur assignait la géographie politique du XIX^e siècle ont vocation d'accueillir toujours plus d'institutions et de services. Pour des raisons pratiques, la notion de capitale tend alors à se distendre. Elle reste un lieu, et même un chef-lieu, mais n'a pas nécessairement les limites précises qu'on avait cru, de prime abord, devoir lui attribuer.

Les raisons techniques ont donc tendance à s'estomper. Il en résulte que, pour l'État, le choix de sa capitale devient, pour l'essentiel, un *choix politique*.

C'est une manière pour lui d'afficher son *identité*. Comme le relève A. Pizzorusso dans ses *Lezioni di diritto costituzionale*, l'État a besoin de signes d'identification⁸ : un drapeau, une devise, un hymne national, mais aussi une ville-capitale qui servira, spécialement à l'étranger, de point de référence. La Pologne sans Varsovie, la Grèce sans Athènes, la Finlande sans Helsinki... ! Le symbolisme du choix de la capitale est à ce point vif que la perte ou le recouvrement de ce symbole — Berlin et l'Allemagne — peut être signe de division ou d'unité d'un pays et que l'occupation de la capitale (par exemple, par une armée étrangère) peut équivaloir à une défaite militaire sans appel et conduire à l'annexion du pays tout entier. De même, la division de la capitale (Nicosie), et la dispersion physique de ses habitants, peut être le signe de profondes transformations institutionnelles et marquer une rupture dans l'organisation institutionnelle de l'État.

C'est aussi une façon pour l'État de rappeler son *histoire*. Il indique ainsi le lieu qui a été le berceau d'un pouvoir même rudimentaire et non institutionnalisé, en se référant à une tradition monarchique ou féodale qui liait l'exercice de l'autorité à la possession d'un territoire et des villes qui y étaient sises : Paris et les Capétiens, Madrid et la maison d'Autriche.

Ou bien, dans une perspective plus contemporaine, le choix de la capitale entend rappeler les luttes qui, dans une ville particulière, ont marqué son indépendance ou modifié profondément son statut. Bruxelles, disait le congressiste Raikem, mérite « un témoignage éclatant de reconnaissance pour sa conduite dans les journées de septembre » (1830)⁹. « La ville de Bruxelles, ajoutait-il, célèbre par sa glorieuse défense contre les attaques d'une soldatesque cruelle, commandée par un chef farouche, jouira du bienfait d'être le siège du gouvernement ; la Constitution lui garantira ce droit¹⁰. » Ce qu'établit l'article 126 de la Constitution belge, quatre mois après l'insurrection nationale¹¹.

Le choix de la capitale est encore une manière pour l'État d'exprimer une *préoccupation ou une volonté politique* non déguisée. C'est un procédé commode pour faire connaître, à l'intérieur comme à l'extérieur, une option de caractère idéologique ou institutionnel. Un exemple illustre le propos. L'Italie unifiée choisit Rome pour capitale pour des raisons historiques qui sautent aux yeux, ainsi que pour des raisons économiques et administratives qui imposent ce choix plutôt que celui d'une ville du nord ou du sud, *a fortiori* des îles. Mais aussi, pour des raisons proprement politiques, dont la doctrine italienne ne fait pas mystère.

Comme l'écrit Franco Ferrarotti, « dans l'imaginaire collectif italien, Rome se présente avec une certaine ambivalence, ce qui n'est pas sans générer quelques difficultés au niveau des rapports entre la capitale et l'État italien. » En effet, précise l'auteur, « Rome est une capitale que l'on peut qualifier de strabique : centre national d'un État moderne dont l'unité politique n'est centenaire que depuis peu et simultanément centre international d'une des cinq grandes religions universelles¹². » D'un point de vue politique, le choix de Rome traduit donc la volonté de l'État italien d'inscrire son action et son intervention dans un espace qu'il n'entend pas laisser uniquement à la discrétion d'un pouvoir spirituel (qui exerce au surplus un magistère universel) alors qu'il sait, par les dispositions de sa propre constitution (article 17) et par celles des accords du Latran, qu'il devra composer avec lui, y compris au coeur de la capitale romaine.

Dans cette perspective politique, le choix très concret de la localisation de la capitale peut être porteur de préoccupations qui ne sont pas purement techniques ou géographiques. Une capitale au centre du pays ou à l'une de ses extrémités, dans une zone urbaine fort peuplée ou sur un site vierge, dans un lieu d'accès facile ou dans un camp retranché...

Le choix de la capitale peut encore présenter une importance symbolique. Les textes juridiques, pour autant qu'ils existent¹³, accréditent une pratique et cultivent une tradition¹⁴. S'il est permis d'utiliser cette expression, la capitale représente l'État. Elle en est la vitrine. C'est dans cet esprit que divers États n'hésitent pas à donner à leur ville-capitale un nom qui correspond au leur : le Luxembourg en Europe, la Tunisie ou l'Algérie en Afrique, le Mexique en Amérique centrale.

Peu importe, en l'occurrence, si le symbole est plus ou moins bien choisi, s'il est accepté de bonne ou de mauvaise grâce par les citoyens de l'État. Bruxelles est volontiers qualifiée de microcosme belge, dans la mesure où la capitale accueille, sur son territoire, des ressortissants des trois communautés qui composent la Belgique, mais aucune d'elles ne se retrouve exactement dans la capitale. Paris est ville-lumière, ville-phare,

ville-centre dans l'hexagone, mais rien ne pourra convaincre les habitants de Lille, Bordeaux, Lyon ou Marseille que leurs intérêts s'identifient nécessairement à ceux des « Parisiens ».

Le symbole de la ville-capitale vaut plus pour l'extérieur que pour l'intérieur. Il est perçu comme tel à l'étranger. Celui-ci considérera volontiers que tout ce qui touche la capitale a nécessairement des répercussions sur l'État. En bien — un succès économique, une création culturelle, une innovation sociale, une victoire politique, un événement international — comme en mal — un revers économique, un échec culturel, le marasme social, une défaite politique, des faits de la vie quotidienne¹⁵.

II. Le régime juridique de la capitale

On ne saurait prétendre qu'un statut uniforme sert à définir le régime juridique des capitales européennes. L'impression de diversité prévaut. Et ce pour plusieurs raisons, les unes factuelles, les autres institutionnelles.

Les raisons factuelles tiennent aux réponses différentes que les États européens ont pu apporter à quelques questions simples. Convient-il que la capitale du pays soit une ville de grande importance (Paris, Londres) ou une cité de dimension plus réduite (La Haye) ? Convient-il qu'elle soit en même temps centre de l'activité politique et capitale économique ou culturelle (Paris, Londres, Madrid) ou qu'elle remplisse seulement l'une de ces tâches (La Haye, Berne) ? Convient-il qu'elle soit cumulativement capitale de l'État et siège d'institutions internationales (Bruxelles, La Haye, Luxembourg, Paris) ou qu'elle se garde de cette confusion des fonctions ? Des réponses uniformes ne sont pas apportées à ce genre de questions. Elles déterminent pourtant, dans une large mesure, le statut de la capitale.

Les raisons institutionnelles tiennent aux situations différentes que présentent les États européens. Chacun sait que la carte institutionnelle des États d'Europe est particulièrement bigarrée ; il y a des monarchies et des républiques, des systèmes unitaires, régionaux et fédéraux de gouvernement, des régimes parlementaires et présidentiels et même des régimes d'assemblée, des démocraties représentatives, directes ou semi-directes... Comment la situation des capitales ne se ressentirait-elle pas directement de ces régimes distincts ? Une idée s'esquisse ici. *Le régime juridique d'une capitale est tributaire du système politique et administratif de l'État dont elle est le centre.* Ou, pour exprimer la même idée sous une autre forme, la capitale n'est que la pièce d'un ensemble par lequel l'État définit les traits essentiels de son organisation territoriale.

Cette conception institutionnelle de la capitale est trop souvent perdue

de vue. Le statut de la capitale est étudié pour lui-même. Il est sorti de son environnement institutionnel. Ce type d'analyse ne paraît pas satisfaisant.

Si l'on veut bien tenir compte de la perspective globalisante, trois modèles de capitale peuvent apparaître sur la carte de l'Europe. La capitale peut être lieu de décision, de discussion ou d'intégration. Il va sans dire que ces modèles ne s'excluent pas l'un l'autre. Dans la pratique, ils auraient même tendance à se recouvrir, au moins en partie. Chaque capitale européenne emprunte à l'un ou l'autre, ou à l'un et l'autre modèle ses traits distinctifs.

La capitale peut, d'abord, apparaître comme le *lieu de décision*. Dans un État unitaire, en particulier, elle est même le lieu par excellence du pouvoir politique. Des dossiers s'y préparent. Des ordres et des commandements s'y expriment. Des services y sont rendus au public. D'une certaine manière, tout vient de la capitale et tout y retourne.

La capitale parle au nom de l'État. Ou, si l'on préfère, l'État parle par sa capitale. Il s'exprime par les parlementaires, les fonctionnaires, les magistrats qui y trouvent le siège de leurs activités. De ce fait, toute décision vient du centre, c'est-à-dire de la capitale, et se transmet aux extrémités.

Comment ne pas rappeler ici la définition classique qu'Alexis de Tocqueville donnait, il y a près de cent cinquante ans, de l'État centralisé ? « Un corps unique, et placé au centre du royaume, qui règlemente l'administration publique dans tout le pays ; le même ministre dirigeant presque toutes les affaires intérieures ; dans chaque province, un seul agent qui en conduit tout le détail ; point de corps administratifs secondaires ou des corps qui ne peuvent agir sans qu'on les autorise d'abord à se mouvoir ; des tribunaux exceptionnels qui jugent les affaires où l'administration est intéressée et couvrent tous les agents. » Et encore : « Un peuple... court vers la centralisation comme de lui-même. Il faut alors bien moins d'efforts pour le précipiter sur cette pente que pour l'y retenir. Dans son sein, tous les pouvoirs tendent naturellement vers l'unité...¹⁶. »

Les modifications que la pratique institutionnelle a pu apporter à cette idée de centralisation — décentralisation, déconcentration... — ne peuvent elles-mêmes manquer de se référer, jusque dans leur appellation, à l'idée de centre politique de décision, c'est-à-dire à l'idée de capitale.

Cette conception de la capitale-centre peut se développer dans une perspective conflictuelle. Elle conduit à opposer la capitale aux autres collectivités politiques qui sont organisées dans l'État. Ce schéma de confrontation s'inscrit dans un « vieux clivage inscrit dans notre inconscient collectif comme une charge héréditaire¹⁷. »

Nul ne peut ignorer, à ce propos, la querelle des Jacobins et des Girondins. En France, par exemple, l'État s'identifie volontiers au pouvoir

central, à Paris, à l'administration qui y a son siège et à l'autorité qui s'y exerce. De leur côté, les municipalités se présentent comme le lieu d'exercice de l'autonomie locale ; elles apparaissent comme des contre-pouvoirs. Elles considèrent que leur organisation et leur fonctionnement sont les gages d'un gouvernement modéré, comme dit Montesquieu, et les remparts de la liberté. En d'autres termes, il y aurait entre la capitale et le reste, parfois qualifié de « province », une opposition irréductible. La capitale ne pourrait se développer qu'au détriment de la province. La province ne pourrait vivre que moyennant l'affaiblissement de la capitale.

Dans une perspective plus dynamique, la capitale peut être le lieu de recherche d'un équilibre entre le centre et les extrémités. Sans doute la capitale aura-t-elle tendance à développer des comportements qui iront dans le sens de l'unité, de la cohérence, de l'efficacité. Elle cherchera à disposer des meilleurs instruments possibles pour l'exercice correct des tâches générales de l'État et pour la dispensation des services les plus appropriés aux besoins des citoyens. Elle sera, pas seulement à titre symbolique, mais aussi institutionnel, la garante de l'unité nationale, convaincue que la solidarité ne s'impose pas d'elle-même, qu'elle est toujours le résultat d'efforts patients et redoublés. Elle laissera volontiers entendre que les crises économiques et sociales que connaissent les États européens ne permettent pas la dispersion des efforts. Les interventions toujours plus significatives de l'État dans des secteurs importants de la vie sociale requièrent que la capitale ait son mot à dire dans ces entreprises.

Mais, d'autre part, la capitale ne peut perdre de vue qu'elle est, elle-même, une collectivité locale, qu'elle peut à son tour tirer profit de cette autonomie que l'État concède à chacune des collectivités territoriales, qu'elle peut contribuer, par une gestion rationnelle et attentive aux besoins des citoyens, au bon fonctionnement de l'ensemble. La capitale peut adopter des comportements — analogues à ceux des autres grandes villes ou cités de l'État — qui peuvent servir la cause d'une administration régulière et harmonieuse. En d'autres termes, la capitale peut être la première bénéficiaire des règles qui visent à ôter au gouvernement central une part de ses responsabilités.

Lorsque la capitale est comprise comme le lieu de la décision politique, un problème spécifique ne peut être perdu de vue, celui du maintien de l'ordre dans la capitale. Le problème est simple. Dans la capitale, les pouvoirs les plus importants sont concentrés, des autorités s'y réunissent, les titulaires du pouvoir se rencontrent, se parlent, délibèrent et, en conséquence, prennent les décisions qu'ils jugent les plus pertinentes. Comment préserver la règle du libre exercice de ces pouvoirs publics ? Comment faire en sorte qu'ils ne statuent pas sous la pression de la rue ?

Comment éviter qu'ils soient excessivement attentifs à des préoccupations localistes ?

Une solution est de laisser les tâches du maintien de l'ordre aux autorités et aux forces de police, qui sont celles de la collectivité territoriale qui est en même temps capitale. La police dans la capitale est la police de la capitale. Point de statut particulier à ce point de vue, mais un régime particulièrement respectueux des libertés locales et de la gestion des affaires municipales.

Une autre solution est inspirée par la crainte de laisser le maintien de l'ordre public dans les mains de personnalités qui pourraient se laisser influencer ou paralyser par des considérations locales¹⁸. Elle tient compte aussi du danger que pourraient représenter des initiatives prises au nom de l'intérêt communal à l'encontre de l'intérêt national. Elle conduit à étatiser la police de la capitale : le pouvoir de police est placé entre les mains du pouvoir central ; le personnel de police devient, pour sa part, un personnel d'État.

Une solution mixte laisse à la capitale le soin de maintenir l'ordre sur la voie publique, de réprimer des attroupements hostiles ou des manifestations tumultueuses à l'encontre des pouvoirs établis. Elle confère à ces mêmes autorités locales le droit de requérir l'assistance de forces de police nationales si elles sont dans l'impossibilité de faire face à des débordements de foule. Elle concède aussi l'exclusivité du maintien de l'ordre dans un certain nombre de zones prédéterminées de la capitale — les palais législatifs, le palais du Roi ou du Président de la République, le quartier des ministères, le palais de justice... — à des forces de police spécifiques, qui seront, en règle générale, celles de l'État.

La capitale peut aussi apparaître, dans un État, comme un *lieu de discussion*. Elle est moins le lieu du pouvoir que celui du débat politique. Elle est le point de rencontre entre les composantes de l'État. Spécialement dans un État composé — un État fédéral ou un État régional, — elle doit offrir les moyens de poursuivre la discussion sur les questions d'intérêt national (ou fédéral).

Ce peut être un problème d'aménagement urbanistique. Il faut des locaux, des hémicycles, des salles de réunion pour organiser ces rencontres entre représentants des collectivités régionales, des communautés autonomes ou des cantons. C'est surtout un problème d'aménagement institutionnel. Il faut que le statut de la capitale témoigne de la préoccupation d'accueillir non seulement les porte-parole du gouvernement central, qui y ont naturellement leur place, mais aussi ceux des gouvernements particuliers, et de les traiter de manière équivalente. La capitale doit alors se donner pour objectif de ne pas être seulement le lieu où

fonctionne un système particulier de gouvernement — celui d'un Land, d'un canton ou d'une région, — ni non plus le lieu où s'organise le seul système central de gouvernement ; elle doit, en plus, être le lieu où les autres collectivités politiques acceptent de se rencontrer et de participer à la gestion de l'État.

Donald C. Rowat ne s'y est pas trompé lorsqu'il écrit, aux premières lignes d'un ouvrage sur le statut des capitales fédérales, que « tout État fédéral affronte une tâche redoutable lorsqu'il s'essaye à décider de la manière dont sa capitale nationale devrait être gouvernée¹⁹. »

L'État fédéral rencontre, d'abord, les difficultés communes à tous les États pour l'aménagement de la capitale. Comme dans les autres États, le gouvernement national peut souhaiter conduire, ou à tout le moins contrôler, le développement de la capitale dans l'intérêt de la nation tout entière. Pour leur part, les autorités locales auront tendance à se prévaloir du droit de la capitale de se gouverner elle-même. Si des majorités politiques différentes se révèlent au plan national et au niveau de la capitale, des luttes d'influence risquent de se développer.

Mais une difficulté spécifique apparaît dans l'État composé :

If the national capital of a federal union comes under the government of any one state of the union, that state is in a position to dominate the federation's capital, and the central government does not have control over its own seat of government²⁰.

L'État fédéral est nécessairement un État à multiples structures. Par la force des choses, la ville-capitale est située sur le territoire de l'un des États membres. Des luttes d'influence peuvent s'établir entre la capitale et cet État membre ; des oppositions d'intérêts peuvent se révéler à cette occasion. Dans ce débat, la capitale ou l'État membre qui l'abrite peuvent chercher à provoquer l'arbitrage d'autres autorités publiques, y compris celui du gouvernement central.

Un autre scénario peut aussi s'esquisser. La solidarité géographique entre la capitale et l'un des États membres peut les inciter à faire oeuvre commune contre le gouvernement central et à acquérir, au coeur de l'État fédéral, un poids politique que les partenaires de la fédération ne pourront que difficilement contester. La fédération bascule au profit de l'État membre sur le territoire duquel se trouve la capitale...

Dans cette discussion institutionnelle, une réalité est souvent perdue de vue. Les intérêts de l'État fédéral, ceux d'un État fédéré, ceux de la capitale ne sont pas seuls à devoir être pris en compte. Il y a lieu aussi

d'envisager les intérêts des autres États fédérés, pris individuellement ou globalement. Deux questions distinctes apparaissent ici. Primo, pourquoi l'un des États fédérés serait-il mieux traité que les autres, pour la gestion *des affaires fédérées*, à raison de sa seule situation d'État qui abrite la capitale du pays ? Secundo, pourquoi ce même État fédéré aurait-il plus de poids que les autres au sein de la fédération et influencerait-il plus que les autres la conduite des *affaires fédérales* ?

Les intérêts fédérés ne peuvent être méconnus. Ces intérêts sont d'ordre culturel. La capitale fera-t-elle écho, par exemple, à leurs préoccupations linguistiques ou éducatives ? Ces intérêts sont aussi d'ordre économique ou social. La capitale sera-t-elle attentive à son rôle de plaque tournante et évitera-t-elle de tirer, pour elle-même, les avantages de sa situation privilégiée ? Sera-t-elle soucieuse plus de coordination que d'injonction ? Dans les États fédéraux, l'affirmation d'un strict principe d'égalité entre les entités composantes et sa concrétisation dans l'organisation des institutions fédérales permet, en principe, d'éviter les dérapages institutionnels.

Ces intérêts sont encore d'ordre financier. « Un véritable cordon ombilical²¹ » relie le budget de l'État fédéral au budget de la capitale. Il n'empêche que la capitale, l'État membre et l'État fédéral disposent de patrimoines distincts affectés à des besoins spécifiques. Dans l'État fédéral, une règle s'impose : coordonner les efforts en fonction de moyens distincts, harmoniser les activités et les initiatives, établir un règlement financier aussi précis que possible des participants de chacune des entités de l'oeuvre commune.

On sait que, dans des États pluricommunautaires comme la Belgique²² ou la Suisse²³, des solutions institutionnelles ont été conçues pour ne pas exacerber les réactions des collectivités fédérées, qui auraient tendance à considérer que la capitale leur est « étrangère, » sinon « hostile. »

La capitale peut encore être un *lieu d'intégration*. Un phénomène essentiel ne peut être perdu de vue. Sur le territoire de la capitale, plusieurs collectivités politiques, mais aussi plusieurs circonscriptions administratives, se superposent. Elles risquent aussi de se concurrencer, voire de se paralyser. Cela va de la municipalité à la région, en passant par l'agglomération, la métropole ou le district, sans parler de l'arrondissement, de la zone urbaine ou de la société de développement régional.

La question de l'intégration de ces structures diversifiées et des groupes humains qu'elles recouvrent pose à la doctrine constitutionnelle des problèmes importants. Trois d'entre eux retiennent ici l'attention.

Le premier problème est, de prime abord, fort simple. La capitale est une ville. D'un point de vue administratif, elle s'identifie à une ou

plusieurs municipalités. Celles-ci vont-elles être soumises au droit municipal commun ? Le statut de capitale requiert-il, au contraire, que des règles particulières soient définies pour la gestion de ces collectivités locales ? Plusieurs réponses peuvent être apportées à cette question.

Dans une perspective élémentaire, la capitale est une commune comme les autres²⁴. Son organisation, son fonctionnement, son personnel, ses moyens financiers sont, toute proportion gardée, pareils à ceux des autres communes de l'État. Les textes n'aménagent pas pour la capitale de régime dérogatoire. La pratique non plus, encore qu'il soit parfois difficile de vérifier si les aides procurées par les pouvoirs publics à des manifestations, à des travaux ou à des activités qui se déroulent dans la capitale — le Bicentenaire à Paris, le Mondiale à Rome, un sommet européen à Dublin... — ne traduisent pas, dans les faits et dans les chiffres, l'existence d'un régime particulier (voire privilégié). Il va sans dire que, dans les États qui pratiquent le régime de large autonomie locale, cette conception aboutit à préserver au profit de la capitale un régime de libre gestion de ses intérêts particuliers. La ville de Stockholm est présentée, par exemple, comme un modèle du genre. Elle est « une commune suédoise de droit commun... », écrit L. Malvoz, mais ce statut « a permis à la ville de mener, sous son entière responsabilité, sa propre politique²⁵. »

Autre perspective. En raison de sa situation de capitale, une commune reçoit un statut dérogatoire à celui des autres municipalités. Le terme de « district » est souvent utilisé, par analogie avec l'expression américaine, pour caractériser ce régime juridique particulier. On ajoutera, cependant, qu'il n'a pas la faveur sur le continent européen. Les raisons de cette méfiance sont tant d'ordre psychologique qu'institutionnel.

Les explications psychologiques sautent aux yeux. Les habitants d'une capitale « à statut spécial » nourrissent le sentiment d'être des citoyens de seconde zone, qui ne bénéficieraient pas de tous les droits — spécialement électoraux — qui reviennent à leurs compatriotes. Les autorités de cette même capitale éprouvent, de leur côté, la sensation d'être placées sous surveillance, sinon sous la tutelle ou la direction des autorités centrales, alors que les autres villes et communes bénéficieraient des avantages d'une gestion autonome.

Les explications institutionnelles ne peuvent non plus être perdues de vue. Qui dit statut spécifique dit, d'abord, des règles particulières d'organisation, avec notamment des règles spécifiques de désignation des autorités de la capitale. Qui dit statut spécifique, dit aussi attributions particulières. C'est évidemment l'originalité de la démarche. Il faut, dans cette conception, s'efforcer de définir quelles sont les tâches, les missions et les responsabilités d'une capitale. Définir l'activité d'une commune ne pose pas de

problème. Chacun est censé la connaître, à un point tel que maints instruments constitutionnels ou législatifs ne se préoccupent même pas de la définir ou d'en procurer des exemples. Est d'intérêt communal, ce qui ne revient pas aux autres collectivités politiques... Dès l'instant où il convient de procurer une définition positive des missions de la capitale, de les distinguer de celles qui reviennent à l'État, à la région ou à la province, les difficultés techniques apparaissent. Faute de pouvoir les résoudre aisément, les autorités publiques seront tentées de renoncer à l'idée du statut particulier.

Une troisième perspective peut encore être esquissée. Tout compte fait, la capitale n'est peut-être que l'espèce particulière d'un genre, qui serait celui de la « grande ville » ou de la « métropole ». Plutôt que d'ignorer les problèmes particuliers qu'elle doit rencontrer en raison de sa taille, de la localisation ou de ses responsabilités, plutôt que de construire à son intention exclusive un statut qui paraîtra discriminatoire, pourquoi ne pas établir un régime juridique spécifique pour les grandes agglomérations urbaines, étant entendu que dans la plupart des cas, la capitale sera l'une d'elles²⁶ ?

Telle est la solution française qui soumet les communes de Paris, Lyon et Marseille à un régime communal dérogatoire : les lois du 31 décembre 1982 partagent ces villes en arrondissements et leur confèrent du même coup un statut juridique à deux étages, avec les difficultés inhérentes à pareil système²⁷.

Tel est, en effet, le deuxième problème. La capitale doit-elle être porteuse d'une ou de plusieurs volontés politiques ? Ici encore, plusieurs réponses peuvent s'esquisser.

Dans une perspective simple, la capitale est pourvue d'autorités communales. Celles-ci vont s'exprimer en son nom. Elles vont traduire le plus étroitement possible les préoccupations des habitants de la capitale, y compris à l'encontre du gouvernement national, qui a pourtant son siège dans la capitale. Des conflits peuvent apparaître. Mais ils se développent sans intermédiaire et sans tierce partie. D'une certaine manière, la structure communale oblitère l'action des autres institutions qui, pour une part au moins, pourraient intervenir dans le ressort de la capitale : agglomération, département, province, etc.

Dans une deuxième perspective, tout aussi simple, la capitale est dépourvue d'autorités communales. Elle reçoit un autre statut, par exemple celui d'un Land dans l'exemple autrichien²⁸. Ou, si l'on préfère, la capitale reçoit le double statut d'une commune et d'un Land, étant entendu que les deux entités coïncident d'un point de vue géographique.

La formule présente des avantages incontestables. Voici la capitale qui

est en mesure de défendre ses intérêts et ses préoccupations. Pas seulement sur un plan local, ou dans un dialogue inégal avec l'État central. Elle est en mesure de débattre, sur pied d'égalité, avec la collectivité générale, mais aussi avec les autres collectivités de même nature, et peut espérer infléchir les décisions qui seront prises au sommet dans un sens qui tienne compte de ses propres aspirations et de celles de ses habitants. Elle peut, par exemple, dans le contexte d'un fédéralisme coopératif, contribuer au bon fonctionnement de l'ensemble et espérer tirer profit des efforts de solidarité nationale.

Une troisième perspective s'efforce de concilier les deux premières. Plusieurs niveaux de pouvoir distincts sont préservés. Plusieurs personnes juridiques dotées de diverses autorités, de divers personnels et de divers moyens, sont mises en place. En même temps, il est prescrit que les hommes et les femmes qui assumeront des responsabilités à ces différents niveaux seront les mêmes.

Cette formule est actuellement expérimentée à Bruxelles. Dans une étude sur les institutions bruxelloises²⁹, on faisait récemment cette observation. « Il y a une région, une agglomération, trois commissions. À l'issue des élections régionales, il y aura 75 personnes, hommes et femmes, qui composeront le Conseil régional. L'idée neuve, c'est que les 75 membres du Conseil régional sont seuls appelés à exercer des fonctions délibérantes et exécutives à Bruxelles. Le « Conseil des 75 » est le vivier dans lequel il faut puiser pour composer les diverses autorités dont sont pourvues les 5 collectivités. En somme, une seule volonté politique doit sortir des urnes et contribuer à composer les diverses autorités bruxelloises. C'est simple. Il suffisait d'y penser ».

On présume évidemment que les mêmes personnes, appelées à intervenir à des titres divers dans des institutions distinctes, agiront en fonction des mêmes impératifs et des mêmes préoccupations et contribueront ainsi à donner à l'ensemble institutionnel plus de cohérence et d'efficacité. Mais que se passerait-il si ces mêmes personnes, soucieuses de dissocier au maximum leurs responsabilités multiples, en venaient à changer d'attitude en fonction des enceintes dans lesquelles elles siègent ?

Le troisième problème est celui de la coopération entre les structures qui se superposent sur le territoire de la capitale.

Cette question est longtemps passée inaperçue dans la mesure où, dans une conception traditionnelle, la capitale se définissait avant tout en fonction d'une localité préexistante, d'un groupement d'hommes qui s'étaient implantés sur son territoire et d'un sentiment d'appartenance collective à cet ensemble. Les compétences de la capitale se déterminaient

à partir des problèmes qui concernaient exclusivement la satisfaction des besoins de cette collectivité humaine, « problèmes dont la solution était, a priori, sans incidence au plan de l'ensemble de la nation ou même des autres collectivités³⁰. » Il était aussi admis que la capitale pouvait résoudre ces problèmes par ses propres moyens.

Cette conception est aujourd'hui remise en cause. La capitale est une entité artificiellement découpée. Elle groupe des ensembles d'habitants qui ne se sentent pas nécessairement liés les uns aux autres. Elle s'efforce de satisfaire leurs besoins communs, mais aussi celui de l'ensemble de la nation. « Ce passage de la collectivité naturelle à la collectivité artificielle³¹ » est un phénomène particulièrement significatif.

L'articulation des structures implique la concertation entre les différents niveaux. Elle est requise pour les décisions nationales à incidence locale. Elle s'impose aussi pour les décisions locales à incidence nationale. L'autonomie de chacun des niveaux de pouvoir peut s'en trouver atteinte, mais elle permet seule une harmonisation des efforts déployés aux différents niveaux. La coopération peut prendre des formes institutionnelles : une agglomération, une métropole, un district réuniront, par exemple, un ensemble de villes et de communes dont l'une d'elles est la capitale, pour gérer en commun des services déterminés. La coopération peut aussi être plus fonctionnelle : elle repose alors sur des accords particuliers conclus entre les collectivités autonomes pour la gestion d'un service déterminé.

III. Le choix d'une capitale pour l'Europe

La diversité du statut des capitales européennes n'est pas sans incidence sur le choix d'une capitale pour la Communauté européenne.

Dans une perspective fonctionnelle, rien ne fait obstacle au choix d'une capitale à plusieurs sièges : la Commission à Bruxelles, la Cour de justice à Luxembourg, l'Assemblée européenne à Strasbourg, sans parler des sommets itinérants des chefs d'États et de gouvernement (Dublin, Venise, Copenhague, Madrid, etc.).

Si l'on adopte une perspective plus politique, l'on s'attachera à situer le siège des institutions européennes, et spécialement de l'Assemblée parlementaire, là où se trouve effectivement le lieu du pouvoir politique. Il ne fait pas de doute que, pour tenir compte du poids du Conseil des ministres et de la Commission dans le fonctionnement des institutions européennes, ce lieu politique se trouve à Bruxelles. Mais ce choix, s'il doit

se confirmer, peut susciter d'autres questions politiques : convient-il que la capitale d'un État membre soit aussi capitale de la Communauté ? faut-il préférer la capitale d'un petit plutôt que d'un grand État ? importe-t-il d'être attentif aux modalités concrètes que, dans l'ordre interne, cette capitale a choisies (ou reçues) pour son organisation ? Toutes questions qui restent largement ouvertes.

Si un choix symbolique devait être pratiqué, d'autres critères encore seraient à prendre en considération : Athènes ou Rome, pour rappeler d'antiques héritages, Londres, Paris ou Madrid pour choisir de grandes métropoles, Strasbourg ou Berlin pour célébrer des réconciliations, Bruxelles pour indiquer des points de convergence géographique...

Conclusion

Un État sans capitale, cela n'existe pas. Une capitale sans État, non plus. Nul ne peut songer à isoler artificiellement l'État de sa capitale.

Le propos s'inscrit en opposition du discours *municipaliste* qui tend à considérer que la capitale est toujours une commune comme les autres. S'il est vrai que, dans certains États européens, la capitale ne jouit pas d'un statut dérogatoire, ces solutions témoignent d'une conception institutionnelle que les États entendent faire prévaloir, celle de la liberté et de l'égalité des communes. Mais ailleurs, d'autres préoccupations institutionnelles affluent et les États n'hésitent pas à concevoir, pour la capitale mais peut-être aussi pour d'autres situations administratives complexes, des régimes spécifiques.

Le propos s'inscrit aussi en rupture du discours *environnementaliste*, qui tend à accréditer l'idée que la capitale n'est jamais qu'un territoire à aménager, comme les autres. S'il est vrai que, dans nombre d'États européens, les préoccupations d'organiser l'espace se manifestent, en particulier — et à bon droit, — dans la ville-capitale et que le souci s'exprime d'y concevoir un aménagement rationnel des activités économiques, sociales et culturelles, l'on ne peut perdre de vue que cette zone est aussi destinée à accueillir les activités de la puissance publique, ceux qui les prennent en charge et ceux qui en bénéficient. Il y a là des affectations spécifiques qui ne peuvent être perdues de vue.

Le propos s'inscrit encore en contradiction avec un discours naïvement *uniformisateur*, qui aurait tendance à soutenir que toutes les capitales du monde se ressemblent puisqu'elles remplissent les mêmes fonctions et répondent globalement aux mêmes préoccupations. C'est le

moment de rappeler que la capitale n'est qu'une pièce d'une machinerie institutionnelle plus vaste et plus complexe. Elle est l'un de ses ressorts essentiels, une pièce centrale de l'ensemble. Son fonctionnement est ordonné au bon fonctionnement d'une organisation qui est celle de l'État.

Comme dans un miroir, la capitale renvoie l'image de l'État.

Notes

- ¹ Pour sa part, le Centre d'études et de recherches en administration locale définissait récemment la capitale comme « le siège des pouvoirs publics fondamentaux » (*L'administration des grandes villes dans le monde*. Paris : PUF 1986, p. 2).
- ² Selon l'article 44 de la constitution luxembourgeoise, « le Palais grand-ducal à Luxembourg et le château de Berg sont réservés à l'habitation du Grand Duc. »
- ³ Encore que, selon le droit parlementaire classique, on considère qu'il appartient à l'assemblée elle-même de choisir le lieu de ses travaux. La constitution française du 4 novembre 1848 établit, par exemple, dans son article 32 que « l'Assemblée nationale détermine le lieu de ses séances. » Voir, aussi la constitution du 24 juin 1793, qui, dans son article 52, réserve au corps législatif le soin de déterminer le lieu de ses séances et d'y exercer la police, ainsi que dans l'enceinte extérieure qu'elle arrête ; dans son article 75, elle en tire une conséquence pratique : « Le Conseil exécutif réside auprès du Corps législatif. »
- ⁴ Voir aussi l'article 109 de la constitution luxembourgeoise : « La ville de Luxembourg est la capitale du Grand-Duché et le siège du gouvernement. Le siège du gouvernement ne peut être déplacé que momentanément pour des raisons graves. »
- ⁵ Sur ce thème, voir *Les régions capitales de la Communauté européenne. Un avenir commun* (préface de M. Giraud), Paris, Economica 1984. Même si les termes de *région* et de *capitale* ont, sur le continent européen, une signification juridique précise, il faut reconnaître que, lorsqu'ils sont accolés, les deux mots prennent une connotation plus sociologique. Comme l'écrivent les auteurs de cet ouvrage collectif, « à la dimension et à la complexité des besoins nécessaires à la vie urbaine a correspondu un accroissement des fonctions des administrations ou collectivités chargées d'en organiser le développement » (p. 9).
- ⁶ Dans le même sens, B. Chardon, *Gouverner les villes géantes, Paris, Londres, New York* (préface de R. Drago), Paris, Economica 1983, p. 35.
- ⁷ Sur cette question, voir. F. Delpérée, « Le statut juridique des villes », in *Villes et États*, Bruxelles, Crédit communal, 1989/4, p. 24.
- ⁸ A. Pizzorusso, *Lezioni di diritto costituzionale*, Rome, Il Foro italiano, 1984, p. 210.
- ⁹ Raikem, in E. Huyttens, *Discussions du Congrès national*, vol. 4, p. 110, cité par M. F. Rigaux, « Annales bruxelloises, » in *La Région de Bruxelles-Capitale* (sous la direction de F. Delpérée), Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1989, p. 16.
- ¹⁰ *Ibidem*. P. Wigny, (*Droit constitutionnel. Principes et droit positif*, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1952, p.76) en déduit que « sauf force majeure, les pouvoirs publics ne pourraient être transférés dans une autre ville, comme le fut le gouvernement français qui, pendant la Commune de 1870, s'établit à Versailles. »
- ¹¹ Comme l'a relevé J. Cl. Escarras (« Le statut de Bruxelles, » in *L'administration*

des grandes villes..., p. 39), seule la ville de Bruxelles—entendue au sens précis et institutionnel de l'expression—est capitale de la Belgique. Il n'y a pas lieu, en l'occurrence, de se laisser induire en erreur par diverses expressions, inscrites jusque dans le texte de la constitution, et qui font référence à un territoire géographiquement plus étendu : région bilingue de Bruxelles-Capitale, région de Bruxelles-Capitale, arrondissement de Bruxelles-Capitale. Ces diverses entités comprennent dix-neuf communes ; la ville de Bruxelles est seulement l'une d'elles.

¹² F. Ferrarotti, « Les rapports entre capitale et État en Italie, » in *Villes et États*, Bull. Crédit communal, 1989/4, p. 67.

¹³ On ne peut qu'être frappé du laconisme, ou du silence, de nombreux textes constitutionnels sur les questions de l'emplacement ou du statut de la capitale. Peut-être ces documents considèrent-ils qu'il n'y a pas lieu de rappeler des évidences ? Peut-être estiment-ils, comme dans certains États fédéraux, que la question de la capitale est l'apanage des États unitaires ? Les manuels de droit constitutionnel sont, eux aussi, particulièrement discrets sur ce sujet.

¹⁴ Comment ne pas citer aussi, dans cette perspective, l'exemple de la cité du Vatican, « fausse cité, car incluse dans la ville de Rome, mais cité-État et siège de l'Église catholique..., curieux mélange du local et de l'international » (M.-J. Domestici-met, « La Cité du Vatican, » in *L'administration des grandes villes...*, p. 5).

¹⁵ Une idée s'impose alors. Tout ce qui intéresse la capitale intéresse, par la force des choses, l'État qui l'abrite. Le public étranger attentif à la vie d'un autre État marquera donc un intérêt particulier pour ce qui se passe dans les capitales des autres États. À raison de la centralisation des réseaux d'information, il est symptomatique de constater que la grande presse rend compte, avec une particulière ampleur, de ce qui se produit dans les capitales européennes. Elle rend moins compte d'événements plus décentralisés.

¹⁶ A. de Tocqueville, *L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution*, 1856, Paris (coll. Idées), p. 128.

¹⁷ P. Bernard, *L'État républicain au service de la France*, Paris, Economica, 1988, p. 236.

¹⁸ A. de Laubadere, *Traité élémentaire de droit administratif*, 3e éd., Paris, LGDJ, 1963, t. 1, p. 510.

¹⁹ D. C. ROWAT, *The Government of Federal Capitals*, University of Toronto Press, 1973, p. XI.

²⁰ D. C. Rowat, op. cit.

²¹ *Les régions capitales de la Communauté européenne...*, p. 123.

²² F. Delpérée, « Le statut de Bruxelles, » in *La réforme de l'État, 150 ans après l'indépendance nationale*, Jeune barreau de Bruxelles, 1980, p. 331.

²³ H. Boeschenstein, « Bern, » in *The Government of Federal Capitals...*, p. 291.

- ²⁴ F. Delpérée, « Le statut de Bruxelles, » in *La réforme de l'État, 150 ans après l'indépendance nationale*, Jeune barreau de Bruxelles, 1980, p. 24 : « Il y a un droit commun communal qui va s'appliquer à la ville comme à la campagne, dans une métropole d'un million d'habitants et dans un village de moins de cent personnes, dans une grande ville industrielle et dans un hameau de montagne. L'explication est simple. Dans un État, les individus sont égaux quelle que soit leur situation économique, sociale ou culturelle. Pourquoi les collectivités locales ne seraient-elles pas soumises au même régime ? »
- ²⁵ L. Malvoz, « Stockholm, commune et capitale de la Suède, » in *Villes et États* (cité), p. 66 ; du même auteur, « Autres villes, autres réalités (Bruxelles, Paris, Stockholm), » C. H. Crisp, 1987, no 1165-1166, p. 43.
- ²⁶ « Les grandes villes (françaises) connaissent des impératifs qui expliquent certaines particularités de leur gestion et de leur implantation dans le département et la région dont elles constituent la métropole » (F. et Y. Luchaire, *Droit de la décentralisation*, Paris, PUF, 1989, p. 525). Comme l'explique J. Rivero (*Droit administratif*, 13e éd., Paris, Dalloz, 1990, p. 511), la formule permet peut-être d'« apaiser les soupçons d'ordre politique » que ce type de réformes peut susciter.
- ²⁷ F. et Y. Luchaire, *Droit de la décentralisation*, Paris, PUF, 1989, p. 531 ; G. Dupuis et M.-J. Guedon, *Institutions administratives. Droit administratif*, Paris, A. Colin, 1988, p. 205 ; G. Vedel et P. Delvolve, *Droit administratif* (11e éd.), t. 2, p. 527 et la bibliographie citée. On consultera, avec un intérêt particulier, la thèse de S. Dreyfus, *Les capitales et leur statut juridique*, Paris, 1980, même si les données factuelles doivent être actualisées.
- ²⁸ Constitution autrichienne, art. 108-112. Voy. H. P. Rill, « Vienne, capitale d'un État fédéral, » in *Villes et États* (cité) p. 37 ; H. Schaffer, « Les compétences du pouvoir local en Autriche, » in *La décentralisation en Europe* (sous la direction de Ch. Debbasch), Paris, CNRS, 1981, p. 48 : « Les organes de Vienne sont en même temps ceux de la commune et ceux du Land ; » H. HALLER, « Vienna, » in *The Government of Federal Capitals...* p. 181.
- ²⁹ F. Delpérée, « Les institutions, » in *La Région de Bruxelles-Capitale*, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1989, p. 60.
- ³⁰ J. Rivero, « Rapport de synthèse sur les compétences du pouvoir local dans les pays européens, » in *La décentralisation en Europe*, p. 285.
- ³¹ J. Rivero, op. cit.

WAYS OF GOVERNING FEDERAL CAPITALS

Donald C. Rowat

All cities of the world are struggling with similar problems of urban growth and living. But the governing of capital cities presents a special problem, that of achieving a just balance between the interests of the local residents and the interests of the nation. And the governing of *federal* capitals presents an additional basic problem: the relationship of the federal capital to the state or province in which it is geographically situated. A comparative study of how existing federal capitals are governed can give us some guidance on how these two fundamental problems may be solved.

These problems are what prompted me some years ago to make a comparative study of federal capitals, and to edit a comprehensive volume of essays by experts on the subject, called *The Government of Federal Capitals*, which was published in 1973. This book, which covered all seventeen of the capitals of the countries that then had federal constitutions, shows that there is no standard model for the government of federal capitals.

The fathers of the American Constitution took the view that, as a basic principle of federalism, the federal capital should come within a special federal territory, so that it would not be governed or dominated by any single state in the federation. This principle was followed by the Latin American federations and others, such as those of Australia and India. But it was by no means adopted by all federations. Several, like Canada, accepted the view that the federal capital should continue to be governed by the province or state in which it was situated, and should be treated in much the same way as any other city within that province. Examples of such capitals are Ottawa, Bern and Bonn.

The book reveals that the federal capitals were about evenly divided between those governed within a federal territory and those that were not. One federal capital, Vienna, was a member state of the federation, with its

own state government. Since 1973, one federation has become a unitary state (Cameroon), two have disintegrated (the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia), and one state-governed capital has moved into a federal territory (Lagos, to Abuja). The net result is that, of the fourteen existing federal capitals, eight are within federal territories, five are state-governed, and one is itself a state of the federation. Also, one state-governed capital will soon move (Bonn to Berlin) and become a state. Thus it seems that federations cannot make up their minds about how their capitals should be governed.

Another interesting finding of my study was that there is no clear correlation between the degree to which a federation is decentralized and the fact that its federal capital is or is not governed within a federal territory. In other words, within the relatively decentralized federations, there are not only capitals governed within a federal territory, but others coming under the jurisdiction of one of the states, as well as Vienna, a capital that is itself a state.

Most people would agree that federations that have been politically centralized under an authoritarian regime are not very relevant for our purposes. We have much more to learn from the experience of genuine, decentralized federations. Therefore, I have chosen for detailed examination only capitals in relatively decentralized federations, and for the sake of brevity have picked only two examples of capitals in federal territories (Washington and Canberra), one in a state or province (Ottawa), and a federal territory that may become a state (Delhi). Another reason for picking these particular capitals is that Washington and Canberra have acquired self-government since my book was published; Delhi has a long history of self-government; and Ottawa is a good example of the difficulties facing a federal government when its capital comes under the control of a province or state. Also, all of these capitals have suffered from a typical problem faced by large cities: the rapid urban growth of their metropolitan areas.¹

Washington

My first example, then, is Washington, which is coterminous with the District of Columbia. It is the oldest federal capital territory, and it provided the prototype for most, if not all, of the others. Since the states have no legal jurisdiction over the District, it is governed for state and local purposes under laws passed by Congress and approved by the president, and comes under the executive power of the president.

Few people know that, during the nineteenth century, Washington and Georgetown were self-governing municipalities within the District of Columbia. Their local governments were abolished in 1871. The main reason was that an energetic mayor decided to modernize the city with ambitious construction projects, but overspent the budget and got the city into serious debt. Another reason was opposition in Congress to the enfranchisement of blacks in Washington after the Civil War. The local governments were replaced by a territorial government, which had a presidentially appointed governor and council, an elected house of delegates and an elected, nonvoting delegate to the federal House of Representatives. But this arrangement lasted only three years. For a hundred years after 1874, the District had no self-government, and for most of that time its residents had no vote in federal elections.

There is a special reason why self-government was not restored until 1973. Most of the white population had moved into the surrounding metropolitan area in Maryland and Virginia, where it had full voting rights and elected local governments. This exodus left a population in Washington that was over two-thirds black. Many whites therefore opposed the extension of voting rights to Washington's residents, and the southern Democrats in control of the congressional committees that governed the federal district were reluctant to create an elected city council that would have a black majority. In 1961, however, an amendment to the American Constitution gave the residents of Washington a vote in presidential elections. In 1968, they gained the right to elect a board of education, and in 1970, the right to elect a nonvoting member to the House of Representatives.

During this period the main agency administering the city had been a three-person board of commissioners, all appointed by the president. In 1967, however, the board was abolished in favour of an appointed city council of nine, plus a so-called mayor as chairperson and administrative commissioner. President Johnson took the unusual step of appointing a majority of blacks to the council and also a black, Walter Washington, as mayor. Washington was later reappointed by President Nixon. Finally, in 1973, Congress passed a bill, which was signed by the president on December 24, providing considerable self-government for Washington. Known as the "Home Rule Charter," it was approved by the residents in a referendum in May 1974.

Under this Charter, the residents elect their own mayor, a governing council of thirteen members and advisory neighbourhood councils. Five of the councillors, including the chairperson, are elected at large and the

other eight from wards. The District's government is responsible for most municipal and state functions. Hence, many District services formerly administered by federal agencies are now consolidated under the city's administration.

But Congress has retained important powers over the District's government, including line-item approval of its budget and the power to disallow its acts within thirty legislative days. Also, the District is not allowed to change the building height limitations of the District court system, or such federal institutions as the National Zoo or the National Capital Planning Commission. And any change in the District's government must be approved not only in a referendum but by Congress.

In typical American style, the District's governmental powers are separated, so the mayor does not chair the council and is not even a member. The mayor is in charge of the whole administration, and his or her independence from the council helps to explain why the council was unable to prevent or adequately scrutinize the actions for which former Mayor Marion Barry was charged in court. The mayor also has power to veto acts of the council, though this veto may be overridden by a two-thirds vote of the council. Finally, the mayor is responsible for producing a comprehensive plan for the District, but this must be approved by the council and the federal National Capital Planning Commission.

Partly as compensation for the District's extra costs of being the national capital, and partly as a substitute for being unable to tax federally owned lands, the District receives about fifteen percent of its budget as a federal payment. Before the District was granted self-government, however, the federal payment was about thirty-five percent of its budget. Supporters of self-government argue that fifteen percent is not nearly enough, and that the federal government has no business approving the District's expenditures when eighty-five percent of the revenues to pay for them are raised locally.

The federal government also exercises control over the District through its power to give detailed approval to the budget. As an example, while I was there in October 1989, the president vetoed the District's budget because he opposed the allocation by the District's government of funds to support abortions. He decided to veto the whole budget because he did not have an item veto. Hasty meetings were called, and Congress had to remove the offending allocation in order to have the District's budget restored. There have also been numerous examples of Congress changing allocations in the District's budget. A professor at Howard University, Charles Harris, has studied many of these examples in detail. Although accepting my thesis that in federal capitals there is an inevitable clash

between local and national interests, he has concluded that, in most of his examples, the changes were illegitimate interferences in local affairs rather than actions to serve an overriding national interest.² He has therefore proposed that Congress and the president should no longer have power to approve the District's budget.

Partly because of these continuing limitations on self-government, a strong movement has developed in favour of full voting representation in Congress and statehood for the District. In 1978, Congress passed a proposed constitutional amendment to give the District full voting representation in both the House and the Senate, but it failed to get the necessary approval of thirty-eight states. Then a constitutional convention drafted a statehood constitution, and in 1983, the District petitioned Congress to admit it to the Union as the State of New Columbia.

It should be noted that the District of Columbia is now only a small part of a huge urban national capital area, which has five times the population of the District. The latter's population has actually shrunk in the last twenty years by about 100,000. It is now about 650,000, while that of the whole metropolitan area is over 3.5 million. Most of the urban population now lives in the surrounding states of Maryland and Virginia, in about sixty municipalities. Thus, four fifths of the metro population have both state and local self-government, with no direct federal control. This is important to remember when discussing the extent of federal control over the capital.

The lack of federal control over the whole national capital area is surprisingly similar to the Canadian government's lack of control over its national capital region. Despite the existence of a federal district, the problems of planning, governing and controlling the development of the whole capital area are very much like ours. The American National Capital Planning Commission has no more jurisdiction outside the District than Canada's National Capital Commission has over the National Capital Region. As in Canada, various federal departments and agencies have become involved in the development of the area, thus creating the problem of co-ordinating their activities.

Washington's main problem as a capital is not that it is badly governed. The underlying problem is that the affluent white population has moved out, leaving much of the city as a black slum. The whites moved to escape school and housing integration and to enjoy self-government in Maryland and Virginia. The exodus created a serious problem of government not only for Washington, but for the whole national capital region: that of co-ordinating development and services.

This problem has been partly solved by the creation of the Washington

Area Council of Governments, which the federal government supported. This Council now has nineteen member governments. It also has as members the representatives from the metro area in the Maryland and Virginia state legislatures and in the United States Senate and House. It is a big body of 250 members with a sizeable administration, headed by a Director. There is a smaller board of directors as its executive body, of which the District's government is a member, and many policy committees. Similar councils of governments exist in other metropolitan areas of the United States, but this is one of the most successful. It has solved some of the metropolitan problems, but is essentially a co-ordinating body, not a metropolitan government, and cannot enforce its will or run many government services.

Although the metro area's governments have formed this co-ordinating council, the involvement of the federal government, two states and sixty municipalities in governing the region means that the difficulties of co-ordination are almost insurmountable. To extend the boundaries of the District would require Maryland and Virginia to surrender large portions of their territory now containing whole cities. It would also require an amendment to the Constitution, which would have to be approved by three quarters of the states. Thus, American experience with the District of Columbia shows that serious problems can be caused by creating a federal district that is too small to accommodate the future growth of the urban population.

Canberra

My second example, Canberra, is a capital that was moved to a federal territory and built from scratch, like Brasilia, Islamabad and, more recently, Abuja, in Nigeria. Hence, it is not surprising that Canberra was at first governed and serviced by the federal government. What is surprising is that it was such a long time before a locally elected government was installed. The main reason may be that Canberra's population remained very small until long after the Second World War, even though the new capital was begun in 1910.

Just as Ottawa was chosen, among other reasons, to avoid locating the capital in Québec city, Montréal or Toronto, Canberra's location was chosen as a compromise between Sydney and Melbourne. It is between the two largest cities in the country, though closer to Sydney than to Melbourne. The Australian Capital Territory is entirely surrounded by the state of New South Wales. The Territory's area is 910 square miles. This is

thirteen times the area of the District of Columbia (sixty-nine square miles).

The Territory had little or no population to begin with, so civil servants and embassy staff did not want to live there. As a result, the federal departments and the embassies postponed their move from Melbourne as long as possible. During the first thirty or forty years, Canberra, like Brasilia, was greatly overbuilt for the resident population. Although it was a fully planned and architecturally attractive city, its facilities were inconveniently spread out. By the end of the Second World War, Canberra was still a town of only 17,000. However, it finally became large enough to include most city facilities and to be regarded as an attractive place in which to live. As a result, in recent years, its population has grown astronomically, and the population of the Australian Capital Territory is now about 280,000.

At first, the federal agency mainly responsible for governing the Territory was the Ministry of Home Affairs (renamed Interior), but many other departments and agencies, and later the National Capital Development Commission, were also involved, and there has been a serious problem of co-ordinating their activities. This difficulty gave support to the idea of an all-purpose governing council for Canberra. Although Canberra had no elected city government, the Ministry of the Interior had by 1930 set up an advisory council consisting of four federal officials and eight elected members. After 1946, the residents also elected a member to the federal House of Representatives. At first, this member had a vote only on matters relating to Canberra. As of 1965, however, the position carried with it full membership in the House, and, in 1972, the member was appointed minister for the Capital Territory in the Whitlam Labour government.

As Canberra's population grew, proposals were made for a partly or fully elected governing council for the Territory. For instance, an influential study group of Australia's Royal Institute of Public Administration proposed an elected council in 1965. Then the Ministry of the Interior produced a report on self-government for the Territory, and in 1968 sponsored a three-day conference on the subject in Canberra. But a serious problem was that many of Canberra's residents opposed self-government, so action was postponed.

The switch to a Labour government after twenty-three years brought about many changes that affected Canberra's administration. The old Ministry of the Interior was broken up, and the functions of administering Canberra and collecting municipal taxes there were taken over by a new Department of the Capital Territory (later to become the Department

of the Territories). The National Capital Development Commission, however, was left with its original responsibilities of planning and supervising construction in the Territory. There was much concern among professionals, both in and out of government, about the fragmentation of authority among the departments and agencies administering the Territory, and this added further support to the proposal for self-government.

Partly as a result, in 1974, the Territory was given a second seat in the House and two representatives in the Senate, and its advisory council was replaced by a fully elected Legislative Assembly of eighteen members elected by proportional representation.³ In the first election of December 1974, there was a wide party distribution of seats: seven Liberal, four Labour, two Australia Party and five independents. However, the new Assembly was essentially advisory, and the residents of the Australian Capital Territory would have to wait another fourteen years to receive a real measure of self-government.

Although most members of the Legislative Assembly favoured greater self-government, among the residents of Canberra there was a growing opposition to the idea. This was partly because the Australian Capital Territory had been reasonably well governed by the federal agencies involved, because the many civil servants working for these agencies feared being transferred to a territorial government, and because the residents feared either an increase in taxes or a drop in the standards of services, or both. When a referendum on the question was held in 1978, 63.5 percent of the local electorate voted for no change in government arrangements. Nevertheless, the proponents of greater self-government continued their activities, and various models were proposed. One of the main divisions of opinion was between a grant of municipal powers only and grant of both municipal and state-level powers.

Finally, in 1988, partly as a device to transfer rising costs to the residents, the Territory was granted a large measure of self-government. This included state-level powers and a parliamentary form of government, with a Legislative Assembly of seventeen members and a cabinet of four members, including a chief minister. The voting system provided was a complicated d'Hont scheme of proportional representation. As a result, in the first election, held in May 1989, there were 117 candidates. The ballots took six weeks to count, and several parties, including a party opposed to self-government, were elected. Since no party held a majority, Labour formed a minority government. It was soon defeated and replaced by a coalition of opposition parties, which, oddly enough, included members of the party opposed to self-government, who had by this time become reconciled to the new system.

As in the United States, the federal government has kept some key controls over the Capital Territory. One is the power to disallow actions of the Legislative Assembly. Another is the power to amend the Territory's form and powers of government and its voting system, which is the subject of much controversy. A third is the power of the governor general to dissolve the Assembly. Opponents claim that this power would be exercised on the advice of the federal cabinet, and that there ought to be an administrator in place of the governor general. Another is the planning power. Development within the Territory must conform to plans produced by the federal National Capital Planning Authority (which replaced the National Capital Development Commission), but the Authority has no representatives from the territorial government.

In May 1990, a seminar was held at the new University of Canberra to celebrate the completion of the first year of self-government for the Territory, and I was invited to give an address on other federal capitals. An observation I made while there was that, because of the impossibility of completely separating national and local interests in a federal capital, each level of government ought to be represented in the relevant institutions of the other. For instance, the territorial government should have representatives on the National Capital Planning Authority, and the planning committee of the Legislative Assembly should have representatives from the federal government. Otherwise, there are bound to be clashes between the two levels of government.

Another observation was that the devolution of power in the Territory is not yet complete. My reason for this conclusion was based on the way in which the Territory has been developed. There are now four satellite cities, which are clearly separated by several kilometres from the Canberra city centre and from each other. One of these, Belconnen, which contains the University of Canberra, now has a population greater than the city centre (about 80,000 versus 60,000). Another city, Woden, has a population equal to the city centre, and the two others, Tuggeranong and Weston Creek, have populations of about 50,000 and 30,000. Each satellite city is now a distinct community with its own interests, which are different from those of the city centre. My conclusion, therefore, was that each, including the city centre, should have a municipal government of its own, and that the territorial government should handle only state-level services. So far, the satellite cities have not been asking for self-government for themselves, but this is probably because many residents of the Territory formerly opposed self-government. Now that they have it, their opposition is rapidly disappearing, and they are likely to demand this next logical step.

A third observation I made was that all of the satellite cities are expanding rapidly, and the urban population will soon be pressing upon the Territory's boundaries. Already, there is a small but growing city outside its boundaries, Queanbeyan. People settle there to escape the higher costs and more rigid zoning regulations within the Territory. And already, a number of "gentlemen farmers" commute to jobs in the Territory from nearby points in New South Wales. Therefore, my prediction was that, despite the large size of the Territory, before many years Canberra will have the problem that most other federal capitals have had to face: the spread of a growing proportion of its urban population beyond its legal boundaries.

Delhi

My third federal capital, Delhi, is unusual: the seat of government, New Delhi, is a federal territory within a federal territory, the Union Territory of Delhi. New Delhi, like Islamabad, was built adjacent to an existing city, which has since surrounded it. The two form a single urban area. Legally, it is not clear which one is the official capital. In 1981, New Delhi, which includes the embassies, had a population of about 400,000, while Delhi's population was nearly six million, and that of the Union Territory was 6.2 million, having nearly doubled in ten years. Since 1981, the Territory's population growth has continued to explode, and it is the third most populous metropolitan area in India, next to Bombay and Calcutta.

The government of the Union Territory is rather complex. New Delhi is governed by a federally appointed committee, but the city of Delhi has its own elected governing council—a huge one, with 106 members. On the executive side, however, it has a commissioner who is appointed by the central government. Delhi's municipal corporation also takes in the Territory's rural area, which has many villages with locally elected councils. Adjacent to New Delhi is a military cantonment, which is also controlled by the central government. The residents of the Territory elect seven representatives to the lower house of Parliament and have three in the upper house.

Since 1966, there has been for the whole territory an elected metropolitan council that advises the central government on state and federal functions. It has sixty-one members, five appointed by the federal government and fifty-six directly elected. On the executive side, there is a lieutenant governor and an executive council (or cabinet) of four members, all of whom are appointed by the federal government. The executive council

is customarily chosen on the advice of the metropolitan council, following the British tradition of parliamentary government. A second tier of government has thus been installed above the level of the local governments.

While the Congress-I party was in power at the federal level, the opposition Jan Sangh party had at times a majority on both the Delhi and metropolitan councils, and so was able to dominate local government in the Territory. The Delhi example shows how far a federal government can go in granting self-government to its capital territory and still retain ultimate control. It has done so mainly by keeping executive and financial power, and direct control over New Delhi as an enclave within the Union Territory of Delhi.

In May 1990, the federal government announced a plan to turn the Union Territory into a state, with an eighty-four-member assembly. New Delhi would remain a federal district under central control. This plan would abolish the metropolitan council and probably the municipal corporation, since its area of jurisdiction is coterminous with the Territory except for New Delhi and the cantonment. It has already been argued that having these two governments cover much the same area is an unnecessary duplication.⁴ However, the plan had not been approved by the time of the government's defeat in the election of June 1991.

Although turning the Territory into a state would give it more autonomy, this move would not solve its main problem: the influx of population from the adjacent states of Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Punjab and Rajasthan, and the appearance of thousands of squatters on vacant lands having no city facilities. The solution requires the development of satellite cities in the adjacent states, but, so far, the necessary co-operation of these states has not been forthcoming, even though the central government has created a National Capital Region Development Board. Also, changing the Territory into a state would create a new problem, that of satisfying the interests of the central government in its national capital area beyond the boundaries of New Delhi. Very likely, the new state of Delhi would at times refuse to satisfy these interests unless special arrangements were made to represent them in the new state government.

Ottawa

The last capital I will discuss is Ottawa. Unlike Washington, Canberra and Delhi, Ottawa is a federal capital that is not within a federal territory. And it is one of the most difficult federal capitals to govern. This is so for three reasons: Canada's constitution grants the power over local government to

the provinces, Canada is a very decentralized federation, and the control over Ottawa's metropolitan area is split between two provinces. While Ottawa and the other municipalities on the south side of the Ottawa river come under the laws of Ontario, those on the north side are under the laws of Québec and have a different majority language (French), religion (Roman Catholic) and legal system (Roman civil law). Legally, the federal government has no control over its own capital area. Yet, after the war, the population exploded on both the Ontario and Quebec sides of the river. As a result, there arose serious problems of unplanned developments and unco-ordinated services.

By now, close to two thirds of the metropolitan population lives outside Ottawa, which has a population of about 350,000, compared with about 900,000 for the whole census metropolitan area. While Ottawa is only the eighth largest city in Canada, its census metropolitan area is the fourth largest, after Toronto (3.4 million), Montréal (2.8 million) and Vancouver (1.4 million). Directly across the river from Ottawa is the old city of Hull, with a population of about 70,000. However, there are now three larger satellite cities, two with populations over 100,000: Gatineau, east of Hull, and Nepean, west of Ottawa. Gloucester, east of Ottawa, is rapidly approaching 100,000. Other urban municipalities on the south side are Kanata, to the west, and Vanier and Rockcliffe Park, which are islands within the boundaries of Ottawa. Another on the north side is Aylmer, to the west.

In spite of the federal government's lack of legal control over the national capital area, it has a long history of involvement in the development of the area. As early as 1899, it created the Ottawa Improvement Commission, which mainly bought land for driveways and parks. The Commission's name was changed in 1927 to the Federal District Commission, but the new name was misleading because the District was not a federal territory like the District of Columbia, and the Commission had no real power over it. The Federal District's boundaries were only lines drawn on a map. Soon after the war, the federal government hired a French planner, Jacques Gréber, to produce a comprehensive plan for the capital's development, including a green belt. Though the federal government had no power to implement the plan, the local municipalities did go along with its main lines, and the federal government succeeded in making major improvements; for example, it removed the railways from the centre of Ottawa, paying the cost of this work. Soon, however, the urban population began spreading into the area designated as a green belt. In 1958, the Diefenbaker government decided to buy what remained of it on the Ottawa side of the river, as the only way to save it. At the same time,

the Commission's name was changed to the National Capital Commission, and that of the District to the National Capital Region, which was enlarged to 1,800 square miles, twice the size of the Australian Capital Territory. But again, the Region is only a line on a map, and the NCC has no legal control over it.

The postwar problems of Ottawa's rapidly expanding metropolitan area were becoming so serious that, by 1967, the year of Canada's centennial, the proposal for a federal capital territory was being actively discussed. This was why I began my study of other federal capitals in 1968. But the proposal was eventually abandoned because of the rise of separatism in Québec, which refused to surrender the necessary territory on its side of the river. Instead, in 1968, Ontario and, in 1970, Québec, created second-tier territories on either side of the river, and this partly solved the problems of metropolitan planning and government for the National Capital Region. I will now trace these developments since 1967 in more detail, starting with the creation of the regional governments.

The two regional governments

In 1968, the government of Ontario passed legislation creating the Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton, with a council made up of representatives from the city and sixteen surrounding municipalities that had previously been part of Carleton County. The area chosen for the region included several rural townships, and was about the same size as the part of the National Capital Region on the Ontario side of the river. The boundaries, however, were not made coterminous: this is a good illustration of the lack of co-ordination resulting from the division of governmental responsibilities in the capital area. The reorganization also included the creation of a regional transit commission and the consolidation of the numerous school boards within the region into four.

The first chairman of the new regional council, Dennis Coolican, was appointed by the provincial government in mid-1968 for a term of four and a half years. Thereafter, however, the "supermayor" was to be chosen by the regional council itself. In addition to the chairman, the council had thirty members, of whom sixteen, a majority, were from Ottawa's council and the remaining fourteen from the other sixteen municipalities. In 1973, however, the Ontario government consolidated nine of these municipalities into three.

The regional government exercises certain functions for the whole area, and charges the cost to the local municipalities. Its services include water and sewerage, regional roads and streets, welfare, health, indigents in hospitals, homes for the aged, and the borrowing of money. It was also

given responsibility for regional planning; in 1973, it produced a plan of proposed development to the year 2000. After approval by the provincial government, the plan became binding on all of the municipalities within Ottawa-Carleton. Although this plan provided for an orderly development of the region on the Ottawa side of the river, the National Capital Commission had no official say in its framing.

A basic flaw in this scheme of regional government was that it excluded the urban area on the Québec side of the river, where the same need for reorganization existed. This urban area was split up among four municipalities west of the Gatineau River and four situated east of it. In 1970, however, the government of Québec set up a regional government for Hull and thirty-one neighbouring municipalities, called the Outaouais Regional Community. In nature, composition and functions it is very similar to the Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton. In 1973, it completed a development plan. As with the plan for Ottawa-Carleton, the federal government had no direct say in its formulation.

The Community's region is very large, encompassing much rural and uninhabited land to the north, and its boundaries even go beyond those of the National Capital Region on the Québec side. The result has been objections from both the urban and rural municipalities that the Community is too big. The Québec government has proposed to replace it by consolidating the rural municipalities into larger units and the urban ones into one or two cities, but cannot get the local municipalities to agree on a reorganization. One municipality has recently voted to withdraw from the Community, the future shape of which remains uncertain.

Even though regional governments have been created on both sides of the Ottawa River, the Ottawa-Hull metropolitan area is still split into two parts governed by the independent actions of two different provincial governments, and two different regional authorities and sets of municipalities. If the federal government had exclusive jurisdiction over the National Capital Region, it could create a single governing authority for the whole territory, as Canberra has done. It could do this without abolishing existing municipalities or even the regional governments, by creating a higher level of government of the whole Region and delegating to it the equivalent of provincial powers and functions.

A new problem is the likely spread of the urban population beyond the boundaries of the National Capital Region and the two regional governments, especially to the east, on both the south and north sides of the river. There has been a recent proposal to expand the boundaries of the National Capital Region beyond Cumberland to the east. Yet the National

Capital Region and the regional government boundaries were set up only a few decades ago and enclose huge rural areas. This illustrates how difficult it is to predict future urban growth and, hence, to draw boundaries that will contain it.

The inclusion of Hull in the capital area

In addition to the creation of the two regional governments, another significant development after 1967 was the inclusion of Hull as part of the national capital. In February 1969, the federal-provincial constitutional conference agreed to a statement about the national capital that included the following sentence: "The cities of Ottawa and Hull and their surrounding areas shall be the Canadian Capital Area".⁵

Although there was no plan for a constitutional amendment to confirm this change, in May of that year the Trudeau government made a dramatic change in policy designed to cement Hull's marriage with Ottawa as part of the national capital. It unveiled a \$200-million plan for the construction of federal buildings and aid to municipal services in downtown Hull over the next twenty-five years. It planned to direct about twenty-five percent of its new office space to that area, and estimated that, by 1995, the area would accommodate 36,000 public servants. Early in 1970, it also announced that a new bridge was to be built from the centre of Ottawa to downtown Hull, just west of the national archives building. It made this announcement without first consulting Ontario, Québec or local governments, even though they were obviously concerned, especially with the nature and cost of the approaches to the bridge. However, they went along with the proposal and the new Portage Bridge was completed in 1974. By mid-1973, the 1,700 employees of the federal Department of the Environment had moved to Hull, the first of the federal buildings at Place du Portage was complete, and the first 2,000 employees of the Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs had moved in. This impressive shift of English-speaking public servants to workplaces in Hull has resulted in many of them moving to the Québec side of the river, thus changing the linguistic and religious composition of that area's population.

Another action by the federal government to include the Québec side of the river as part of the capital was the placing of the new Canadian Museum of Civilization in downtown Hull. And in October 1990 the government announced its intention to proceed with a new \$490-million national archives building, to be located in Gatineau. It will be the first major federal building to be located in that city.⁶

Proposals for governing the area

I will conclude my discussion of Canada's capital by commenting on the proposals made since 1967 for governing the Ottawa-Hull area. At that time, the federal, Ontario and Québec governments were determined to try to solve the capital's problems without creating a federal territory, and instead were discussing the idea of a "tripartite organization" for the area, in which all three governments would participate. In June 1970, the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism published a research study, *The Federal Capital*, in which it seemed to favour an eventual federal territory and even included a long appendix on proposed institutional arrangements for the territory. However, it weakly recommended instead a "tripartite agency," the same term as was used by the three governments in their constitutional discussions. Perhaps recognizing the constitutional difficulties inherent in a tripartite *governing* organization, it proposed that this "tripartite agency" should at first be only advisory and restricted to co-ordinating plans for the development of the capital area.

In 1973, Douglas Fullerton, a former chairman of the National Capital Commission, was appointed by the Trudeau government to make a special study of the federal capital. In his report, published in 1974, he too fell short of recommending a federal territory. Although favouring a federal territory eventually, he proposed as an interim arrangement a supraregional council representing all interests in the National Capital Region.⁷ This council would have about twenty-five members, with those appointed by the federal government equal in number to those appointed by the governments of Ontario and Québec, and at least half being representatives from the municipalities in the region. There would be some cession of powers by the three senior governments to this new body. How it could exercise both federal and provincial powers without a constitutional amendment was never clearly explained.

In any case, the idea of Québec's separation from the rest of Canada was by now growing in that province, and when the Parti Québécois came to power in 1976, it refused to co-operate in any scheme for the federal capital. The idea of a federal territory slipped off the public agenda for some years. Then the defeat of the separatist referendum in Québec in 1980 and the election of a federalist Liberal government there made possible a revival of the idea of a federal territory. Evidence of this is the proposal made in 1986 by Andy Haydon, former chairman of the Ottawa-Carleton regional council, that the capital region should become Canada's eleventh province.⁸ However, the failure of the Meech Lake Accord in 1990 has pushed the idea into the background again. There is now little hope that Québec would surrender the necessary territory on its side of the

river. Yet Andy Haydon again revived the idea in November 1990, his main reason being the neglect of the capital region by both Ontario and Québec.

Despite the refusal of the federal and provincial governments to give serious consideration to the idea of a federal district, and despite the opposition of some local politicians to the idea for fear of losing their jobs, public opinion polls taken in the national capital area over many years have shown strong local support for the idea, even on the Québec side of the river.⁹ A recent poll, taken in September 1986, found that forty-eight percent of the respondents in the National Capital Region said they would favour a federal district, while only forty-two percent said they would not.¹⁰ No doubt, one of the main reasons for this strong support for a federal district by the residents of the National Capital Region is, as Haydon sensed, their feeling of neglect by the governments of Ontario and Québec, whose provincial capitals are far away in Toronto and Québec City.

In considering whether a federal territory may be desirable for Canada, there is much to be learned from examining carefully and fully the experience of federal capital territories elsewhere, especially capitals such as Washington and Canberra, which are in decentralized federations comparable to Canada's, and where recently a more desirable balance between national and local interests has been worked out. At the same time, the Ottawa-Hull area is in some ways unique. It has a special problem of balancing the interests of the populations on each side of the Ottawa river. These populations have not only different dominant languages and religions, but also different traditions and systems of law. So if Canada is to have a federal capital territory, the governments concerned will have to design a scheme of territorial government suited to its special needs.

Conclusions

What general conclusions may be drawn from a study of our examples? First, I will discuss some general problems of federal capitals, and then will tackle the question of whether or not they should be within federal districts.

A conclusion about all federal capitals is that a fair division of costs between the central government and the local residents is very difficult to achieve. It is difficult even to discover the existing division, because one must wrestle with such imponderable questions as how much the local residents would have paid for services if they had not been part of a federal capital. In Australia, the responsible ministries, a committee of Parliament and the Australian Grants Commission spent years wrestling with

questions such as this. The essays in my book give very sketchy information on the sharing of costs. Not only is it virtually impossible to get an adequate picture for a single capital, but the financial figures are not comparable from one capital to another. About all we can conclude is that, in state-governed capitals, the federal government seems to pay less than in federal territories, and that, in federal territories, it pays more in new capitals and less in large capitals having a big, commercial tax-paying sector.

Nor is it possible to gather much information on the extent to which federal governments have tried to control the growth of the capital by moving or decentralizing governmental organizations to other parts of the country. A few precedents may be cited. Before the creation of Bangladesh, the executive and administrative capital of Pakistan was located in Islamabad, West Pakistan, while the legislative capital was in Dacca, East Pakistan, so as to placate the East Pakistanians. But it was an awkward arrangement and, as history proved, did not achieve in its objective. Other examples are the location of the supreme courts of West Germany and Switzerland in cities other than Bonn and Bern. But these are only cases of establishing the relatively small legislative or judicial branch of government outside the capital, rather than moving or decentralizing executive departments. The basic reason Bonn and Bern are so small is that the federal ministries of Germany and Switzerland are relatively small, and this is because of the nature of the federation of these countries: for many purposes of administration, the states and even local governments act as agents of the central government.

In the federations of the English-speaking world, where the federal government administers more of its own programs, there may be a greater danger of centralization in the capital city. At the same time, federal governments in decentralized federations that have their capital within a federal territory do not seem to have been at all inhibited from geographically decentralizing their departments, a notable example being the United States. In fact, when the capital was new, as with Canberra and Brasilia, the problem was the reverse: persuading federal departments that they should move *into* the territory. Hence, there is no reason to believe that turning Canada's capital into a federal territory would make a policy of decentralization more difficult. In any case, whether or not federal capitals are in federal territories, a policy of decentralization would reduce the high rate of metropolitan growth in federal capitals and, consequently, the attendant problems.

My main conclusion regarding the best form of government for federal capitals is that federal districts are particularly appropriate in decentralized federations, where the sharp division of powers between the central

and state governments would otherwise prevent the central government from having adequate control over its own capital. This is especially true where the federal capital has a relatively small population and is primarily a "civil service town," like Canberra and even Washington, because the federal presence and interests are clearly predominant. From this perspective, Ottawa is a strong candidate to be in a federal district.

In Delhi's case, on the other hand, one can argue that the city is so big, and has so many commercial, business and other interests, that the federal government's interests do not predominate, and hence the Union Territory ought to be a state. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the central government would no doubt retain control over its seat of government, New Delhi, which is a relatively large enclave within the Territory. In the same way, the American government has its direct interests in the seat of government satisfied by keeping control of the Mall and its adjacent federal monuments and buildings, including the Capitol and the White House.

Although federal districts make it easier for federal governments to control their own capitals, they often leave other basic problems of governing the capital unsolved. Thus, a federal district may not permanently solve the problem of governing the capital's metropolitan area, because the urban population may expand far beyond the boundaries of the district, as it has done in Washington, Delhi and most other areas. Since a federal territory must be created by a constitutional amendment, its boundaries are very difficult to expand to accommodate urban growth. This problem will not arise if the territory is made big enough at the start to contain any conceivable future growth of the urban population. However, it will then contain a large borderland rural area whose interests are different from those of the urban area and need not be under federal control for many years.

Moreover, countries with federal territories do not seem to have solved the problem of co-ordinating the local activities of the federal agencies within them, or the problem of providing an adequate degree of self-government for their residents. We have seen that Washington and Canberra lacked self-government for many years. Even though they now have a significant degree of self-government, there is still a problem of federal dominance. Because the federal government has ultimate constitutional and financial power, its interests will predominate even if at times they do not represent the true national interest and cause unnecessary interference in purely local matters. This is especially likely to be the case in centralized federations, where authoritarian regimes are not uncommon. But

it also seems to be the case in Washington, probably because the District government has not yet been granted enough autonomy.

Turning now to the idea of a federal capital within a state, such an arrangement is not likely to be a problem in centralized federations, where there is little chance of serious disagreement between the federal and state governments. There, the federal government would wield enough control over the development and nature of its capital to meet national objectives. But as our survey shows, this is not likely to be true in decentralized federations like Canada. Even in Canada's case, however, where the National Capital Commission has no direct power to implement its plans and the federal government has no direct control over its own capital, the federal capital is famous for the beauty of its driveways and parks and for the national institutions created by the federal government. Ottawa's case shows that, even without constitutional power over its capital, a federal government can still have much control over the development of its capital through its spending power.

To sum up, my conclusion regarding the best form of government for federal capitals is that a federal district is particularly appropriate for decentralized federations, especially if the population of the federal capital is relatively small and the interests of the federal government are therefore predominant. As shown by Delhi and recent developments in Washington and Canberra, the traditional Canadian view that a federal district means no self-government is false: it is quite possible to have a relatively high degree of self-government, including municipal governments, within a federal district. On the other hand, a federal district is no panacea. Washington and Delhi are but extreme examples of a typical problem faced by federal districts: the uncontrolled growth of the urban population outside the boundaries of the district.

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Notes

- ¹ For information on the capitals dealt with, and for my general conclusions, I have relied heavily on my book, as updated in the comparative ch. 6 of the Fullerton report and by visits to Washington and Canberra in 1989 and 1990. See Douglas H. Fullerton, *The Capital of Canada: How Should It Be Governed?*, vol. 1, ch. 6. (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974). Most of my population figures are from *Statesman's Yearbook, 1989-90*.
- ² Harris and Harris, 1989.
- ³ This recent history of self-government for Canberra relies mainly on Bruce Juddery, "Self-Government of the Australian Capital Territory," *Australian Journal of Public Administration* (Dec. 1989): 411-421.
- ⁴ L.M. Singhvi, "Delhi", in Rowat (1973), 153.
- ⁵ Constitutional Conference, Second Meeting, Ottawa, February 1969, "Conclusions of the Meeting" (Doc. no. 96, mimeo.), 5-6.
- ⁶ *Ottawa Citizen*, 31 Oct. 1990: A1-2.
- ⁷ Fullerton, 1974, vol.1, ch.15.
- ⁸ *Ottawa Citizen*, 6 Jan. 1986.
- ⁹ Fullerton, 1974, vol. 2, appendix B-1.
- ¹⁰ *Ottawa Citizen*, 6 Jan. 1986.

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CIRCULATION DES FEMMES MUSULMANES DANS L'ESPACE PUBLIC ET POLITIQUE FORMEL : LE ROLE « CAPITALE » DE TUNIS

Lilia Labidi

L'importance des capitales comme espaces symboliques : voilà un des thèmes centraux du colloque. Nous ne pourrions pas comprendre le rôle que jouent les capitales dans la vie politique de leur pays sans les voir comme des lieux de représentation symbolique des mouvements et des forces politiques. Nous devrions envisager les capitales comme des scènes de théâtre où les acteurs politiques soulignent leur participation — leur entrée, leur absence, leurs périodes de force ou de faiblesse — et où ils illustrent, sur un plan symbolique, la construction de leur action politique dans une société donnée et dans une conjoncture particulière.

Cette étude théâtrale, voire même symbolique de la capitale devient donc une façon privilégiée de saisir les moments de transition socio-politique et de voir l'émergence de nouveaux groupes ou de nouvelles forces politiques. Une analyse détaillée de la façon dont ces groupes marquent une capitale ou se représentent dans l'espace public d'une capitale nous renseigne sur le fonctionnement du système politique et sur les rapports entre groupes et classes politiques de cette société.

Une telle analyse est particulièrement éclairante pour étudier l'entrée des femmes sur la scène politique. Dans presque tous les pays, le XX^e siècle a vu les femmes arriver à la citoyenneté politique. Mais à l'intérieur de ce constat général, les formes, les moments et l'articulation précise de l'émergence des femmes comme acteurs politiques prennent des trajets différents selon les sociétés. Et justement, cette spécificité se lira bien sur la scène politique qu'est la capitale : institutions, forces politiques et

dynamismes sociétaux étant présents de façon concrète, la mise en place de leurs interrelations s'inscrivant dans la forme urbaine de la capitale.

L'intérêt de tracer l'émergence de la participation politique des femmes à travers la lecture de l'espace symbolique des capitales ne tient pas seulement à la capacité de cette forme d'analyse de bien tenir compte des spécificités nationales ; il tient aussi à sa capacité d'intégrer la richesse des analyses féministes sur la dichotomie « privé-public » de nos sociétés et sur l'association des femmes avec le privé. Ces analyses ont exploré les multiples facettes de la ségrégation sexuelle des sociétés, qui définissent certaines fonctions et certains espaces comme « privés » et d'autres comme « publics ». La scène politique est publique par définition ; elle se définit aussi comme masculine. La lecture de l'espace symbolique des capitales permet de situer l'analyse à l'intérieur d'une théorisation féministe et donc de voir toute la portée de l'entrée politique des femmes.

Cette présentation fait donc partie des préoccupations théoriques à l'égard des rapports entre les espaces publics et privés dans nos sociétés, et soulève des préoccupations pratiques à l'égard des différences entre des pays de la région arabo-musulmane. La présence des femmes musulmanes dans l'espace public arabo-musulman ne se pose pas dans les mêmes termes selon les pays. Pourquoi les femmes tunisiennes ont-elles toute la liberté de circuler, de conduire, de voyager, et pas les saoudiennes ? Comment les femmes tunisiennes sont-elles parvenues à occuper l'espace public et le champ politique formel dans les mêmes termes que les hommes ? C'est ce que nous tenterons de comprendre.

Les tâches qui impliquaient le déplacement des femmes urbaines se faisaient traditionnellement dans un espace circonscrit par des pratiques rituelles : toilette au bain-maure, visites aux morts, fêtes religieuses et cérémonies (mariage, naissance, circoncision), et où elles étaient toujours accompagnées par un homme de la famille (Labidi 1989). Par exemple, les femmes ne pouvaient se baigner à la plage que la nuit et sous un regard protecteur masculin. Toute autre sortie était suspecte et entraînait la marginalisation si elle ne trouvait pas de justification conforme aux codes. L'activité politique de résistance des femmes se faisait également dans ce cadre (Labidi 1985) : transmission des messages, port des armes et soins aux blessés.

La ségrégation de l'espace en était la cause (Perrot 1984), l'espace public réservé aux hommes étant le produit d'une ségrégation sexuelle (Micaud 1980). Pourtant dès le début du XX^e siècle, quelques éléments donnent à penser que l'ordre spatial du champ politique de la capitale a connu une mutation. On retrouve dans les sources, des indications sur les

déplacements des femmes devenus de plus en plus fréquents à Tunis et dans sa banlieue nord et sud.

On signale que des femmes organisaient des réunions à l'occasion des fêtes religieuses, que d'autres poussaient des you-you lors des arrestations de militants, enfin des contacts s'établissaient entre des féministes tunisiennes et celles du Proche Orient (Kraiem 1986). La capitale allait promouvoir des débats, discussions et polémiques en Tunisie, tant sur la gestion des déplacements des femmes autour de la scolarisation (S. Zmerli 1906) que sur le voile (Bourguiba 1929). Ces questions étaient portées sur la scène publique par les intellectuels S. Zmerli, Tahar Haddad, Chedly Khairallah, Mohamed Salah Neifer, Mohamed Salah Ben Mrad et Habib Bourguiba, qui contribuèrent au débat en versant dans le dossier leur lecture des faits, leur interprétation et leur vision, chacun à partir de son milieu.

Opinions religieuses et politiques spécifieront l'espace à occuper par les femmes, qui au demeurant n'occupaient toujours pas l'espace public et le champ politique formel (Rassam 1981). Par ailleurs, la Tunisie, depuis le début du siècle, fut périodiquement agitée par des vents de révolte. Avec les années trente, le malaise avait atteint son apogée. Les discriminations étaient multiples : les enfants n'accédaient pas aux écoles pourtant financées par les Tunisiens ; le tiers payant, le congrès eucharistique et le centenaire d'Alger offensaient les Tunisiens dans leurs croyances religieuses. L'inhumation des Tunisiens naturalisés sera le moment où le peuple exaspéré criera son amertume. Émeutes, grèves et manifestations vont éclore partout. La différence culturelle devient le signifiant d'une revendication bafouée par les autorités coloniales. La jeunesse tunisienne rompant avec le réel, générateur de souffrance et d'angoisse, déplacera sa libido pour édifier un monde nouveau conforme à ses désirs, transposera les objectifs de ses instincts, de telle sorte que le monde extérieur ne puisse plus opposer de déni à leur satisfaction. C'est dans ce contexte qu'hommes et femmes tentent la reprise d'une parole différente, neuve, autre, rompant avec l'insignifiant pour réaliser l'exceptionnel, échapper à la misère et à l'aliénation, renonçant à la règle qui avait servi à dévaloriser le père pour accoucher d'un nouveau sens, celui de l'ordre, sans renoncer à toutes les valeurs de la culture précédente. Des jeunes contestataires se projettent dans une lutte pour un avenir meilleur pour lequel ils vont se battre, désirant faire disparaître ce qui a blessé le sentiment national, leur identité. Le colon avait fait du Tunisien et de son identité de musulman une sorte de quintessence du mal. Le réel devenait source de plaisir, à partir de toutes sortes de souffrances et de privations.

À cette même époque, le geste d'une jeune Tunisienne, lors d'une conférence organisée par les socialistes à l'Essor, en se dévoilant (Labidi 1984) déchaîna les passions et introduisit le désir dans le champ politique. D'autres événements se produiront autour de l'irruption du corps féminin dans l'espace public et le champ politique formel, annonçant une rupture avec l'échelle des valeurs passées et les capacités d'une capitale à réaménager les symboles et à produire de nouveaux signes au plan local, national et régional.

Les femmes occupent l'espace public

La participation des femmes tunisiennes aux rassemblements et aux manifestations politiques en période coloniale 1930-1955 s'ordonne autour de deux hypothèses :

1. L'émergence des femmes dans l'espace public dans les pays musulmans et les propositions de réformes du pouvoir central sont liées à l'intensité de la vie politique et à la variété du champ culturel de leur capitale.
2. Les lieux de rassemblements et itinéraires des manifestations des femmes dans la capitale inaugurent un nouvel ordre géopolitique et culturel.

Cette lecture repose sur les témoignages et, en leur absence, sur l'ouï-dire. La fiction consiste à lever le refoulement sur ce qui fut la dialectique du moment de lutte, où l'expérience se retrouve dans la recherche de l'image du soi et où sont conservés quelques repères au plan de leur identité tout en réinventant de nouvelles situations où il fait bon vivre.

Les sources d'information sont de trois ordres :

1. Des biographies de femmes appartenant à l'élite politique des années trente (Labidi 1990a) qui introduisent le lecteur sur les traces des manifestantes dans leur incursion dans le monde extérieur et hors des espaces circonscrits par des pratiques rituelles, tout particulièrement les récits de Chadlia Bouzgarou et de Khédija Rebah.
2. Des photographies (Labidi 1988, 1990b). Dans ce cas précis, nous avons très peu de photos sur l'époque qui précède la Deuxième Guerre

mondiale. (Toutes celles dont je dispose montrent des signes d'ordonnement et de gestion de l'irruption du corps féminin dans l'espace public par les organisations politiques masculines, essentiellement à partir de 1944.)

Mes recherches ne m'ont pas permis jusqu'à ce jour de retrouver des photographies inscrivant dans les faits historiques l'appel lancé par Chadlia Bouzgarou à partir d'une fenêtre pour attirer l'attention du Bey sur les conditions des déportés politiques : ou encore, cette manifestation concernant l'accueil réservé par des femmes tunisiennes à Éric Labonne au port lors de son arrivée. Ni même le rassemblement des femmes devant l'Hôtel Majestic, où était descendu Daladier quand elles ont demandé à le rencontrer.

3. Des articles de journaux de l'époque (voir la liste des articles en annexe) en langue française, qui peuvent nous renseigner sur la façon dont on percevait ces manifestantes.

L'ensemble de ces sources permet de mesurer les capacités d'une capitale politique dans un pays musulman à gérer l'irruption du corps féminin, et à formuler un nouvel ordre culturel et géopolitique à partir des itinéraires que les femmes ont empruntés de 1930 à 1955.

J'utiliserai pour mon argumentation trois événements, qui se sont produits en 1935 et fin 1938, conférant à la capitale une nouvelle signification idéologique.

En 1935, une femme interpelle le Bey à partir d'une fenêtre. Chadlia Bouzgarou, dans sa biographie, dit :

J'entendais toujours mon oncle Si Lahbib parler, et je lisais par ailleurs le journal *Tunisie-France* qui critiquait les Tunisiens et le parti. Je comparais entre ce que j'entendais et ce que je lisais. C'est de là que commença ma formation. Je me suis engagée dans l'action politique en 1934 quand ils ont conduit mon oncle à Borj le Boeuf et que les Français commençaient à utiliser la force. Un jour, Ahmed Bey était sorti dans Tunis.

J'eus alors l'idée de lui dire qu'il ne fallait pas oublier les déportés politiques. Je suis montée au Bureau de mon oncle, sa femme Moufida y habitait pendant son exil, et du balcon j'ai dit : « Monseigneur, avec les déportés, monseigneur avec les déportés. » Ce qui ne manqua pas de provoquer un trouble à Bab Souika. C'était une époque de grande répression.

J'ai posé des questions sur la suite de son itinéraire et je me suis rendue chez mon oncle Ahmed à Bab Sidi Abdesalam. Avec mes cousines, nous disions : « Monseigneur, avec les déportés, monseigneur, avec les déportés. »

La *Dépêche Tunisienne* du 2 janvier 1935 rapporte un événement produit par des hommes et jugé « déplacé, » « irrévérencieux à l'égard du souverain, » ainsi qu'un petit incident dans la mosquée « causé par l'insistance de certaines personnes voulant absolument s'adresser directement au souverain pour lui demander, paraît-il, le retour des agitateurs en résidence dans le Sud. » À aucun moment, la présence des femmes n'est évoquée. Les chroniqueurs obéissants à l'ordre dominant, ne retiendront pas ce signe comme révélateur d'un affrontement, d'une crise ou d'un défi. Et pour cause. Cet appel à partir du balcon est troublant à double titre :

- A. Il remet en question les pouvoirs du Bey, pointe ses limites et interpelle l'idéologie sur laquelle repose l'ordre sociétal : la voix de la femme « Awra » dans le cadre des référents traditionnels. Ce qui ne serait qu'un cri lancé par la fenêtre va devenir un manifeste.
- B. L'appel de 1935 par une jeune femme sort du cadre des référents culturels traditionnels et fait apparaître l'émergence des femmes comme sujets, désirant avoir un père, une liberté, et qui ne se contentent plus d'une information, d'une formation.

Ce fait, isolé, ne restera pas sans portée historique. En 1938 justement, un groupe de femmes, entre l'arrivée d'Éric Labonne et de Daladier, se produiront à deux reprises dans l'espace public pour faire entendre leurs voix — à des autorités françaises, cette fois.

Chadlia Bouzgarou, instigatrice de ces opérations, décrit l'occupation de l'espace, donnant aux événements un sens nouveau et une portée politique à ce que n'avait été considéré en 1935 que comme un geste déplacé et irrévérencieux. Elle dit :

Habib Thameur étudiait la médecine en France. Ne connaissant personne, il venait chez nous à partir de minuit remettre des tracts à mon mari pour les distribuer aux Tunisiens qui étaient encore là. Cela faisait neuf mois que

nous n'entendions plus le nom du parti. L'oppression sur les Tunisiens était grande. Les étudiants tunisiens en France ont entendu dire à Éric Labonne que Tunis était calme, sans agitation et sans la présence du parti. Les leaders étaient tous arrêtés. Habib Thameur recherchait quelques personnes pour crier le nom du Bourguiba, celui du parti et démentir de la sorte les propos tenus à Éric Labonne. Mon mari Mohamed Salah lui dit : « Après les morts, les combats, et les violences, il n'y a plus personne. Tout le monde a peur. Dès que trois personnes, quatre personnes se rencontrent, elles sont arrêtées. » Qui pouvait faire une telle chose ? C'était très difficile. Je les écoutais puis j'ai dit : « Et si l'on en voyait les femmes ? » Il me répondit : « Les hommes, et encore, pourront-ils y parvenir ? C'est une question de mort, de prison, de torture. Regarde les exactions faites. Il est égal à la France de tuer... »

J'ai dit : « Ça ne fait rien. Celui qui meurt sera un héros et celui qui vivra sera heureux—l'important c'est que notre pays gagne. »

Après insistance, il dit : « Entendu si tu peux réussir ! »

Je connaissais quelques personnes qui s'intéressaient à la question : les filles Fourati, Zakia et Jamila. J'avais entendu parler de leurs sentiments à l'occasion du 9 avril. De leur fenêtre, elles insultaient les soldats, qui fouillaient et frappaient les passants... J'ai demandé à Med Salah, si parmi ses connaissances, certains permettraient à leurs épouses de nous rassembler devant l'ambassade. Je suis sortie avec les filles Fourati ; nous n'avons rencontré aucune femme. Personne ne fut crédible. Nous étions peu nombreuses, alors nous sommes retournées à la maison chercher ma soeur. Nous nous sommes déguisées pour que personne ne nous reconnaisse et que l'épouse de mon oncle ne soit pas dérangée par notre conduite. Nous avons mis des voiles, des turbans et sommes sorties. Nous n'étions que quatre — c'était très peu mais je pensais qu'il nous fallait réussir et démentir le résident général.

En passant par la rue Jules Ferry, là où se trouvent les fleuristes, j'ai pensé nous constituer en délégation. J'achèterai un bouquet de fleurs et nous dirons : « Nous ne sommes pas venues nombreuses pour que l'on nous laisse passer. » J'ai consulté Zakia, elle dit : « d'accord. » Je n'avais

que vingt francs pour payer la calèche. J'ai alors dit au fleuriste : « Peux-tu me donner un bouquet et je te paierai demain ? » Il m'a répondu : « Non. » J'ai alors retiré mes boucles d'oreilles et je les lui ai données. Je pensais que je serais arrêtée. J'ai dit au marchand : « Je passerai demain les reprendre ou quelqu'un d'autre viendra te payer et tu lui remettras les boucles. » J'ai croisé deux femmes, je leur ai dit : « Venez, nous allons voir un spectacle. » Je ne voulais pas les informer. C'était la veille de « l'Aid el Fitr. » Nous étions six personnes. Nous constituions une délégation plus importante déjà. Arrivées au port, les destouriens ne nous avaient pas reconnu. Ils nous maltrahaient. Ils nous disaient : « le sang de vos frères est encore sur les murs, et vous, vous portez les couffins aux français. Que Dieu vous punisse. » J'ai eu peur que l'on nous batte. Je me suis approchée de l'un d'eux et lui ai dit : « Si nous avons un conseil à vous donner... » ils ont alors compris. »

Les autorités françaises avaient vidé le port. Il n'y avait que les officiels, les consuls. On nous demandait qui nous étions. On répondait : « nous apportons des fleurs de la part des anciens combattants. » Les Français étaient contents. À la même époque, ils louaient des femmes pour pousser des *you-you* pour rassurer l'opinion publique. Nous avons été placées au premier rang pour accueillir le résident général. J'ai dit à l'une des filles Fourati : « tu remettras les fleurs au résident général et tu diras que nous sommes envoyées par nos soeurs les tunisiennes pour vous souhaiter la bienvenue et pendant ce temps, moi je crierai quelques phrases que m'a donné Habib Thameur et que j'avais apprises :

« Vive la Tunisie
 Vive la France
 Vive le Bey
 Vive le résident général
 À bas les privilèges
 Vive Bourguiba
 Vive le Destour »

« Après l'appel à la prière on tira sept coups de canon et ils annoncèrent l'arrivée du résident. On nous présenta. Arrivées devant lui, on lui remit le bouquet et nous avons récité les phrases. Il est rentré aussitôt. Nous avons été entourées par les gardes et arrêtées. »

Cette manifestation a contribué à faire apparaître des qualités féminines inconnues jusque là de l'opinion publique, comme les sentiments de courage et de créativité, en s'adaptant aux circonstances nouvelles avec intelligence et patriotisme. Contrairement aux articles de 1935 en 1938, les médias relèvent l'incident et le commentent. Pendant un mois, nous allons retrouver plusieurs titres dans les journaux relatifs à l'événement, qu'ils appelleront tantôt « incident, » tantôt « manifestation. » *La Presse de Tunisie* du 29 novembre 1938 juge qu'il s'agit d'une « la manifestation ridicule de quelques agitateurs » qui ne doit pas faire croire à de l'hostilité de la part de la population tunisienne, que ce serait sottise de dramatiser un incident de minime importance. L'auteur ajoute, « il faut déplorer qu'une intervention ne soit pas venue à temps empêcher cet incident de se prolonger pendant tout le parcours sur l'avenue Jules Ferry où un important service d'ordre était cependant organisé. » Le journaliste cherchait à minimiser l'importance de l'incident. « Geste discourtois et manifestation de quelques agitateurs »—« en raison de l'indulgence prolongée qui a permis aux agités de se croire maîtres de leurs actes. »

Une mise au point de Mme Bourguiba viendra apporter un nouvel éclairage. Publiée dans *Tunisie Socialiste* du 1^{er} décembre 1938, elle dit : « À la suite de votre article du 24-11 intitulé : « Muflerie caractérisée, » mon désir est de mettre au clair le sens de cette manifestation qui m'a paru faussé non seulement dans certains journaux d'information, mais même dans quelque mesure par votre rectification bienveillante. » Protestant contre l'interprétation donnée du fait, elle ajoute : « réduit à l'action de quelques parents qui seraient venus selon les traditions implorer la clémence du gouvernement en faveur du chef du Destour. »

La Dépêche Tunisienne du 16 décembre 1938 désigne les manifestantes par un groupe de « femmes arabes » et « hurlant. » Deux termes qui prennent dans ce contexte une signification péjorative, laissant insinuer le désordre, la malice... » D'abord, un groupe de femmes arabes que l'on avait eu l'imprudence de laisser pénétrer dans l'enceinte réservée aux délégations, celles-ci dûment filtrées, accompagnant la sortie du représentant de la France par les cris : « Vive le Destour, vive Bourguiba, à bas les privilèges. » Après cet

éclairage, il devient évident que la lecture des chroniqueurs est en opposition avec les qualités dont les femmes ont fait preuve : le courage, la bravoure, la créativité, l'adaptation aux circonstances nouvelles avec intelligence et le patriotisme, toutes ces valeurs ont été négligées. Les médias, regard de la culture dominante dans ce cas précis, ne voient dans l'événement qu'un incident de minime importance, un groupe de jeunes arabes hurlantes, agitatrices, en somme, quelques femmes agitées. Qualités que le parti saura apprécier puisque quelques jours plus tard, il fera appel à Chadlia Bouzgarou :

Salah Eshkiri m'a dit : « Mme Chadlia aucune manifestation n'a pu aboutir. Dès qu'ils entendent siffler, les manifestants se dissipent. Pourquoi ne sortiriez-vous pas les encourager ? » J'ai alors pris avec moi les filles Fourati et les cousines maternelles de ma mère, Zeineb et Nejiba, qui n'étaient pas encore mariées, pour faire aboutir la manifestation. J'ai pris le drapeau. Nous passions à Bab Souika, la population criait : « la femme tunisienne, la femme tunisienne. » J'ai répondu : « inutile d'applaudir, rejoignez-nous. » La manifestation était devenue importante. En passant devant El Bigua, les agents ont sifflé mais la manifestation s'était poursuivie. On nous interroge : « qui d'entre-vous parle ? » C'était naturellement celle qui avait le drapeau. Il s'avança vers moi et dit « que demandez-vous ? » J'ai dit : « Nous sommes heureux d'accueillir le nouveau chef du gouvernement. Nous avons une correspondance à remettre à M. Daladier. Nous avons forcé le passage. Ils ont voulu frapper les manifestants. » Le commissaire dit : « Nous voulons fraterniser. La preuve que votre geste nous touche, nous vous accompagnons chez le nouveau résident. » C'était la fin de l'après-midi. Il était à l'Hôtel Majestic. Un homme vint nous dire : « Je représente M. Daladier. Donnez-moi votre missive. » Je lui répondis : « nous vous demandons de relâcher nos leaders. »

Sur le chemin du retour, nous voulions agrandir la manifestation, alors nous nous sommes rendues à la Kasba faire entendre nos voix à Bourguiba : « libérez nos leaders, libérez nos leaders. À bas le colonialisme. » Toujours à pied, nous passons devant la prison. J'étais enceinte ; je sentais le

bébé descendre. J'ai envoyé chercher trois carrosses. La police vint nous arrêter. Nous étions des hommes et des femmes. Quatre jours plus tard, nous passions en jugement.

Le parti dut compter sur la participation des femmes à la politique— ce qui lui avait garanti le succès dans ce cas. Elles illustrent le mieux la modernité du mouvement en rupture avec le vieux destour. Les médias, de leur côté, avait fini par prendre en compte l'apport des femmes. *La Presse de Tunisie* du 28 décembre 1938 dit : « Le tribunal même qui les avait acquittées les a frappées trop durement cette fois, comme avec le désir de rattraper sa bienveillance précédente... Nous aurions aimé que l'on tienne compte de la jeunesse des délinquantes, qui, si elle ne légitime pas leur maladresse politique, excuse dans une très large mesure leur témérité et la rend extrêmement sympathique. » *Tunis Socialiste* du 6 janvier 1939 annonce que douze dames musulmanes et treize destouriens ont été déférés en correctionnelle pour avoir organisé une manifestation interdite, à l'arrivée de Daladier, et condamnés à un mois de prison sans sursis.

Ce troisième fait consécutif et réalisé par le même groupe contribue à attirer un regard positif sur les femmes, sur la participation des femmes à la vie publique et politique, tant de la société tunisienne que du parti, des chroniqueurs et journalistes et enfin des autorités françaises. La condamnation à la prison confirme le caractère politique et idéologique de l'acte des femmes.

Celle qui fut négligée en 1935 interpellera la conscience politique en 1938 avec l'arrivée d'Éric Labonne et forcera la sympathie avec l'arrivée de Daladier. Ces faits ont ceci de particulier : ils contribuent à la mise en lumière de l'espace comme enjeu où celui qui contrôle l'espace, les événements et les idées concrétise le pouvoir politique (Lowry 1979). Les femmes, en manifestant dans les rues, en se rassemblant, ont fait éclater l'idéologie de l'espace dichotomisé en zone intérieure/zone extérieure, Médina/ville européenne. Tunis, lieu d'affrontement autour de l'émergence de la circulation des femmes dans l'espace public et politique formel, permettra d'introduire, en 1956, le code du statut personnel, des réformes dans la vie des citoyens à la mesure de l'intensité de la vie culturelle et politique.

Réaménagement des valeurs

Je tenterai de montrer comment, à partir des biographies de Chadlia Bouzgarou et de Khedija Rebah, se fit la conquête de l'espace urbain. Lieux

de rassemblements et itinéraires des manifestations ont été pour la gente féminine un moment qui inaugurerait un nouvel ordre culturel et géopolitique, qui ne peut plus maintenir les valeurs traditionnelles sans un réaménagement des espaces où sont venus s'inscrire les désirs, défis et passions des femmes et des hommes. Le dépouillement des biographies permet de relever une différence entre l'occupation de l'espace dans les années trente et celle des années cinquante.

Dans les années trente les manifestations étaient improvisées et se limitaient à la Médina. Les circuits étaient courts. Seules les manifestations lors de l'arrivée de Labonne et de Daladier les ont conduit à faire des incursions dans la ville européenne :

- en 1935, de Bab Souika à Bab Sidi Abdesalem, lors de la promenade du Bey
- en avril 1938, de la Casbah à Bab Souika lors du jugement de Belhouane
- en novembre 1938, de la rue Jules Ferry au port, lors de l'arrivée d'Éric Labonne
- en décembre 1938, de Bab Souika à El-bigua lors de l'arrivée de Daladier

Dans les années cinquante, les manifestations sont plus organisées et touchent la ville européenne et Carthage, lieu du pouvoir central :

- en 1951, de la rue Garmathou (de la rue Zarkoun à Bab Bhar) au TGM (gare) et Carthage
- en 1952, du TGM à Carthage, lors de l'arrivée de de Hautecloque

Les lieux de rassemblements sont variés et riches en signification : ce sont des espaces traditionnels et des espaces nouveaux, sacrés et politiques.

L'enseignement que l'on peut tirer de cette lecture, c'est que l'improvisation cède la place à l'organisation, les cris de 1935 aux rassemblements à portée politique à partir de 1938. Tunis prenait avec les manifestantes une nouvelle signification idéologique, précisant la valeur de leur geste et justifiant leur pouvoir. Deux arguments se précisent : les biographies permettent de mettre en avant deux instants dans la vie politique où, dans les années trente, les femmes font des incursions dans l'espace public qui sont limitées à la Médina, et, dans les années cinquante, elles investiront la ville européenne en étant plus organisées et encadrées par le Mouvement National.

Les cris des femmes à partir des fenêtres, les paroles des femmes dans l'espace public, transgressent les tabous et sont les deux éléments qui sont à la base du discours des femmes à portée politique, celui de leur émancipation, de la libération.

Avec les biographies des femmes, dans la capitale, lors des manifestations et rassemblements, nous retrouvons une différence dans le vêtement et dans la tenue corporelle. Voilées et têtes recouvertes dans les années trente, elles seront libérées dans les années cinquante des tabous et dégagées des contraintes sociétales. Le visage, qui a été jusqu'à là recouvert, apparaît en public, animé de passion et de désir, inaugurant la modernité, la liberté, une ouverture de l'inconscient.

La lutte contre la ségrégation de l'espace dans la capitale permettait aux femmes de réaménager leur vie psychique et sociale en fonction des courants de changements produits dans le cadre traditionnel, et en se servant de leurs émotions pour réaliser une adaptation satisfaisante.

Le nouveau repère qui est venu a été le congrès de Ksar Hellal. Dans le cas des femmes, on peut avancer que le rassemblement au port et devant l'Hôtel Majestic ont été les signes d'une introduction à un nouveau langage. Attirées par les actions qui offriraient des débouchés à leur agressivité refoulée — protestation consciente ou inconsciente — les femmes tunisiennes ont réussi à utiliser la cité comme théâtre pour dire leur différence avec les générations passées qui avaient échoué à restaurer l'idéal du Moi. La création dans ces rassemblements et manifestations dans la capitale avait permis à nos sujets de se projeter dans des itinéraires qui dépassaient le cadre spatial et étaient investis d'une nouvelle signification et d'un ensemble socio-symbolique en rupture avec le discours dominant, qui finira par se rallier à elles. Disposant de nouveaux signifiants les féministes des années trente avaient produit un discours subversif.

Nous pouvons avancer, pour conclure, que :

1. Chadlia Bouzgarou, Khédija Rebah et de nombreuses militantes activistes de la même époque, originaires de petites villes et peu concernées par les valeurs dominantes de la capitale, ont pu s'employer à introduire un nouvel ordre culturel (Mernissi 1990) pour l'ensemble de la société — ce qui corrobore l'hypothèse (Leca 1980) selon laquelle Tunis a été le théâtre des initiatives politiques de résistance masculines réussies grâce à des leaders originaires des petites villes. Les régions apportaient leur contribution et refaçonnaient la capitale, permettant à celle-ci de représenter les valeurs des Tunisiens.
2. La capitale, espace favorable au brassement des idées, sera une occasion pour les intellectuels, poètes et artistes originaires des petites villes d'exposer leurs idées, de débattre leurs projets de société variés, permettant à la pensée politique (Labidi 1990c) des femmes d'y

prendre appui et de s'enraciner dans des textes comme « Notre femme et la législation en Islam » de Tahar Hadad, l'article sur le « voile » de Habib Bourguiba, des nouvelles des écrivains, les écrits des hommes de religion comme ceux de Mohamed Salah Ben Mrad, Fadhel Ben Achour, Mohamed Salah Enaifar, et développer des actions culturelles et sociales, en rupture avec les valeurs traditionnelles. (À Tunis, l'élite constituait un plus grand pourcentage de la population que dans les autres villes. De 1955 à 1969, l'élite à Tunis représentait 29 p. 100, alors que cette population ne représentait que 17,6 p. 100 (Caman, Aubray et Sraieb 1973) dans les autres régions).

3. Tunis, capitale d'un pays musulman, caractérisée dans les années trente par une différenciation entre privé/public, intérieur/extérieur, Médina/ville européenne, fut en mesure de gérer l'irruption du corps, le désir des femmes. L'indifférenciation (Zartman 1980) public/privé où les femmes étaient parties prenantes depuis 1935 à la faveur d'un événement historico-politique, a permis le réaménagement des symboles (Labidi 1991, Morsy 1980) et a produit de nouveaux signes aux plans ; local, national et régional.

En terminant, faisons un léger détour dans le temps et l'espace amorcé dans notre introduction et en utilisant la presse comme référent. La manifestation de novembre 1990 à Riadh, déclenchée par des Saoudiennes au volant de leurs voitures (*Le Monde* 14 novembre 90) témoigne certainement d'un conflit. Inaugure t-elle un changement ?

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Liste des articles sur lesquels nous nous appuyons

Titre du journal, date, titre de l'article

- Presse* 19.11.1938 : Incidents
- Tunis socialiste* 1.12.1938 : Après une manifestation
- Dépêche Tunisienne* 16.12.1938 : La manifestation destourienne
- Presse Tunisie* 28.12.1938 : La manifestation destourienne
- Dépêche tunisienne* 29.12.1938 : Au tribunal correctionnel, acquittement de manifestantes destouriennes. La déposition de M^{me} Bourguiba
- Dépêche tunisienne* 29.12.1938 : La vie au palais, manifestation fasciste. Manifestantes en correctionnelle
- Le petit matin* 29.11.1938 : Le destour et l'arrivée à Tunis de Eric Labonne
- Tunis socialiste* 05.01.1939 : En correctionnelle
- Tunis socialiste* 06.01.1939 : En marge du voyage présidentiel, les manifestants destouriens sont condamnés à des peines de 15 jours à deux mois de prison

COMMENTARY: THE ROLE AND ACTIVITIES OF CAPITAL CITIES

Maureen Covell

This session was organized around a series of questions. How do capitals manage pluralism in society? How do they manage relations between national and local levels of government? How do they reflect the values of the country, and how do they act as a centre for the communication of those values? How does a capital manage the two roles of capital for the country and city for those who inhabit it?

These questions are related to the questions raised in the first session and to the emerging themes of the conference's discussions. These themes can be specified as a series of tensions involved in the roles of capital cities. First, there is the tension between the role of capital as the capital of a whole country, an "official" place, and the role of the capital as a city with inhabitants who live there because that is where they live rather than because it is a capital, and whose needs are not always congruent with the official needs of the capital.

This tension is related to the question of the political structure of capitals. Professor Rowat argued that capitals should achieve a just balance between the interests of the local inhabitants and the interests of the nation. However, the political forms through which this balance is attempted are various. Some capitals have the political structures of other cities in their countries, some are federal territories with either direct rule by the national government or some form of oversight.

In their official roles, which include that of symbolizing national values, capitals are also subject to tensions. Who defines the national values that the capital is to symbolize? What if there is disagreement about these values, for example, on a regional basis? Should capitals reflect a plurality of values and even disagreements over national values, or should they reflect a single set of values? Which way of being best creates national

unity? If capitals reflect dignity and aspirations, is this a true portrait of their nation, and if it is not, does this disparity reflect the depiction of an ideal towards which the nation strives or is it the assertion of a particular orthodoxy that reinforces the position of a particular ruling class?

Capitals can reflect their countries in both intended and unintended ways. In her paper, Professor Labidi spoke of the public space of Tunis as dominated by males and of the attempts of the women of the city to claim a place in that public space. In the same way, Professor Hardoy's text describes the distinction in many Latin American capitals between the inhabitants who exist legally because their births have been registered (as their deaths will be), and those who have no legal existence because they are unknown to the official record-keepers and often live in dwellings that are also unregistered. In the same way, it is the whole city of Washington, not just the official buildings and monuments, that mirrors American society. The emergence of a previously "invisible" group into the public space of the capital can be a symbol of their emergence into the political life of the country.

In the area of intended symbolism, there is tension between an impressive capital and an accessible capital. Several delegates to the conference spoke of the need for a dignified capital whose planning and architecture inspire respect for government and for the nation. However, Professor Delpérée spoke of the role of the capital as a place of dialogue. For this role to be performed, people have to feel at home in their capital rather than excluded. There are many factors that influence this openness. Some capitals are designed to be exclusive. Imposing buildings and, at the limit, fortress-like official buildings and streets that are easily sealed off by the army mark their physical landscape and symbolize the political landscape. This tension between impressiveness and accessibility is related to the tension between the capital as capital and the capital as a place where people live, since it is often the "official" requirements of the capital that, rightly or wrongly, arouse the hostility of the inhabitants.

This question is also related to the question of multifunctional capitals. At one extreme, there are the "macrocephalous" capitals, where the capital city is almost the whole country. Montevideo would be an example of such a capital, and similar situations exist in many African countries. The ultradominant capital such as London or Paris also exists. At the other extreme are the "small towns," such as Bonn and Ottawa. In part, divisions of opinion on this issue are related to divisions on how impressive the capital should be. A capital that is also the centre of business, finance, culture and education will of necessity be larger and more impressive than a capital whose main business is government.

On the other hand, it is no coincidence that many of the capitals that are major cities are also imperial capitals (or ex-imperial capitals) and, while they may be a true symbol of a country's history, may not be a symbol of a country's aspirations or of what many feel is the "best" country. The German debate over the choice of Bonn or Berlin as capital was largely cast in the terms of the choice between prestige and openness. Democracy is not always the most "impressive" form of government, losing in terms of spectacle to less open forms.

This debate is also related to the debate over centralization and decentralization. In purely financial terms, the construction of an "impressive" capital takes resources and, in most countries with limited resources, takes them from other areas. In the United States and Canada, attempts have been made to avoid piling up resources in this way. Washington and Ottawa are the capitals, not New York or Toronto or Montréal. The same is often true at the state or provincial level, where the capital is often not the major city and where, for example, capitals and universities are distributed among cities. Certain countries in Europe, such as Germany and Switzerland, have split up the functions of a capital among two or more cities.

On this question, the conference divided. Some delegates argued that in order to be a factor of national unity, particularly in federations such as Canada, a capital should be impressive, and should have all national institutions, including national museums and galleries. Others argued that modern democracies and federations in particular had to be founded on the acceptance of plurality and diversity, and that a small capital that was not "greater" than other cities best reflected this value.

A final tension lies in the role of capital cities as symbols of both the political systems and values of their countries and of the governments of the day. Capitals are prizes, but they can also be the objects of distrust. When people are estranged from their political system, they are often estranged from the capital that is its symbol. If this is the case, urban planning, wide vistas and impressive buildings are not a solution. On the contrary, they serve as symbols and rallying places for the antisystem protesters.

The roles of a capital city, then, are various. It is a place to live, the seat of the government, and the symbol, both intentional and unintentional, of the political system and society of which it is the capital. It is not surprising that there is disagreement over how these roles are to be carried out, and that there are tensions among them. It was the "role" of Session II to offer both an exploration and some suggestions about the performance of these roles.

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**CAPITALS: SYMBOLISM AND
THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT/
CAPITALES : SYMBOLISME
ET CADRE BÂTI**

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CAPITAL CITIES: DOES FORM FOLLOW VALUES?

Anthony Sutcliffe

Capital City Aspirations

This conference on capital cities is being held in one of the world's numerous capital cities. Capital cities exist not by virtue of their own size or economic importance, but because of their relationship to a national state. National states have emerged slowly since the later Middle Ages as the most common solution to the effective government of a world that is divided into a large number of territorial masses and of racial and ethnic groups, not to speak of religions. Even federal states, such as Canada and the United States, have normally had a national capital, even if, like the United Provinces or—it may be said—the European Community, they have at first tried to prevent the domination of any one city or region by not designating an official capital.

If the capital city is an almost universal phenomenon, we may at first feel justified in looking for a common feature or features, including even physical characteristics. This search, however, will be largely fruitless, for capitals vary just as much as other towns and cities. Perhaps their only common feature is perceptual, in that each capital city is usually seen by detached observers as in some sense representative of its state and its characteristics. Washington, DC, for instance, is often seen as representing an anti-urban nation. London is dirty, disorganized and antiquated. Paris is elegant and chaotic, and so on. This perception is largely a product of journalism or foreigners' tittle-tattle, and is neither scientific nor objective.

However, the city or national authorities often harbour a general belief that the face of the capital can be altered to produce an image appropriate to national or civic mythology. This image can relate to nationality, historical tradition, administrative efficiency, political or cultural aspirations, or some other virtue appertaining to the country or the city itself.

Most capitals have, in great or small ways, thus been altered or transformed in order to create or reinforce an ideal or the expression of a goal. Whatever the form, it is seen as capable of improvement, and the choice of improvement is largely determined by values.

Ottawa is too obvious a case to ignore on this occasion. There were many good reasons for siting the capital at Ottawa (formally Bytown) in the 1850s and retaining it for the 1867 federation, but the established presence of a large and well-appointed settlement was not one of them. The federal government, therefore, began a long effort to equip and beautify Ottawa that accelerated during the premiership of Mackenzie King. King's goal of creating a worthy capital for Canada had many practical elements, such as new roads and open spaces. However, imagery also played an important part. Ottawa has been fully studied by others, some of whom are present at this conference, and it will not be my main example in this paper. It must be observed, nevertheless, that Ottawa has drawn extensively, like many of the other capitals created since the nineteenth century, on the older European capitals, and especially on Paris and London. In these two cases, however, the origins of the capital city model date back to the Middle Ages, and any discussion of the relationship between form and values must rest firmly on these earlier historical foundations.

The city as an expression of societal reality

Before we embark on a historical analysis of capital city form, however, some reference must be made to the theories of urbanism recently developed by David Harvey, Manuel Castells and others, according to which the form and functioning of a city are an expression of its societal circumstances as defined within the concepts of historical materialism. According to this approach, class, capital, and power shape the city and use it to perpetuate themselves. Architecture and planning express ideology, conflict, and the fundamental contradictions that promote societal change. The city, as an important locus of these contradictions, plays a key role in societal change.

This analysis cannot be taken fully into account in what follows. In the first place, the analysis has never been made predictive or even fully operational hypothetically or in terms of data collection. Secondly, capital cities tend to combine, especially in their physical forms, the power that accompanies administrative functions with the power linked to the bourgeoisie and capital. This duality makes it very difficult to distinguish local and national forces affecting urban form. Consequently, no attempt will be made in what follows to adhere to the neo-Marxist analytical frame-

work, which in any case is not fully suited to the discussion of architecture and planning because of the independent influence of professionalism and personal taste.

Functional components of the capital city

National governments have of course, in the first instance, used their capital cities to provide administrative and legal facilities. To carry out these functions, the cities have needed to be centres of communication and, sometimes, the national governments have provided means of communication or have improved the existing ones. To a decreasing extent, capital cities have been centres of national defence and there has been a military presence. Constricting fortifications have affected the form of the city but have gradually been superseded and removed. All the above elements would, however, normally have produced only a very small capital city and most capitals have been very large. Indeed, they have usually been the largest cities in their respective countries. It is not our purpose here to explain the genesis of great size, but it normally means that substantial private interests are present in the capital city. Sometimes they have constituted a separate interest; in London, the commercial City remained physically separate from the royal and administrative city of Westminster until the seventeenth century. In the Middle Ages, the Church was a distinct and largely independent interest, owning and administering large areas of the capital city. Governments have often tried to tame these interests and to encourage or require private building development to conform to their overall schemes for the cities, at any rate from the seventeenth century onwards. This raises the question of the activities of the architect. Although an independent artist, might the architect not have conformed to the government's view of acceptable design and led the unsuspecting, independent client into symbolic acceptance of state authority and values? In the industrial period, nevertheless, market-related urban forms have tended to prevail in capital cities, except perhaps in the socialist world where state and urban objectives may have been combined, as in the influential Moscow plan of 1935.

Capital cities in history

Capital city form was, of course, dependent on the emergence of specific national institutions and the stage of economic development. In order to

emphasize relevance to Ottawa, we shall neglect the capital cities of the ancient and medieval worlds, even though they are of great importance to any comprehensive studies of capital cities. Instead, we shall begin with the European capital that emerged from the seventeenth century in an ideological and artistic climate influenced by the Renaissance and the rise of absolute royal authority. This would be the reference point for Ottawa, as it would for its shadowy exemplar, Washington, DC.

By the end of the Middle Ages, we encounter a simple state apparatus based on a royal palace and the courts of law. With the Renaissance, the idea grew up, in Italy first of all, of setting off the palace and perhaps linking it to the courts and the city hall. These links were to be designed on Renaissance principles, using piazzas and perspectives. The most impressive realization was in Rome in the late sixteenth century, under the guidance of the popes. Defence was essential and usually took the form of complex, anti-artillery earthworks with wide thoroughfares leading to the centre.

At first, efforts to integrate the whole of the capital city by a comprehensive architectural or planning scheme were very limited. More was done in the eighteenth century, but it was usually the product of a restrictive absolutism and it flourished mainly in Germany. Berlin was the most important of the cities to be affected, but economic stagnation prevented the Baroque planning schemes of the time from being linked to dynamism and growth. Paris saw some fragmentary steps, but constitutional states such as England and Holland did not follow the example. London, reflecting the weakness of the Crown, developed an aristocratic quarter, the West End, which was more impressive than any royal achievement. The City meanwhile resisted replanning after the Great Fire of 1666, preferring the retention of existing private properties, and a quick return to commercial normality, instead of new Renaissance plan, however logical and beautiful.

Where governments imposed a form on the capital city, it was always of the classical type. The reason was normally that it reflected the ordered system of existence that the government could offer to its subjects and was designed to persuade the populace that the monarch was omnipotent and infallible. It was in consequence applicable to states other than royal, princely or imperial examples. Its use in republican states was begun in Washington, DC, in 1791, and this example was followed in the nineteenth century, notably in the newly independent republics of Central and South America. In many of these cases, Paris had also become an influence by the end of the nineteenth century.

In the nineteenth century, the replacement of absolutism and the establishment of personal and property rights meant that it was more

difficult to acquire land for public improvements, but the confirmation of land rights was gradually accompanied by a clear compulsory purchase procedure. Increasingly, government intervention was seen as a means of establishing the initial conditions for private development, which could now be controlled by building regulations—and later, by planning schemes—imposed in the interests of public health and convenience rather than on the basis of royal whim. In the accelerated economic growth of the nineteenth century, imposing cities could grow at little expense to the authorities if a basic scheme could be laid down and defended against legal challenge. New York, though not a capital, provides an excellent example of directed dynamism of this type. Where it was absent, as in London, unrestrained growth tended to obscure the capital status of the city, at least in physical terms. Control was also lost in Tokyo, while in Paris, Berlin and Rome an intermediate result emerged. At the end of the century, imperialism led to further public work and a new, rhetorical image, but the main influence now came from a few decades earlier, the Paris of the Second Empire.

The First World War ended the heyday of the great capitals. After 1918, cities tended to reflect primarily their economic power above all, whether or not they had capital status. New York became, visibly and in reality, the world's leading city, without being the capital even of the State of New York, let alone of the United States. Only dictators pursued classical plans for their capital cities, and the fact that they now seem completely inappropriate is a measure of the change in the reality of the capital city after 1918. The late President Ceausescu's dreams of a grandiose Bucharest make the same point in an even more recent context. Instead, the capital city has come to be shaped, ironically, by capital. The city of towers—most of them private towers—has become the common expression of the twentieth-century capital city. Capitals without big business functions, such as Canberra, have avoided this fate, but they have usually remained small and remote as well. In an era of deregulation and privatization, and the erosion of the big national antagonisms in Europe and between the superpowers, the survival of the old public functions and values of the capital city are perhaps in doubt. But the emergence of this variant of the disurbanization thesis of the 1970s suggests that the current discussion has already moved dangerously far from its historical basis. To correct this imbalance we shall turn to Paris, "everybody's favourite city" (after San Francisco, of course).

The Parisian example

Parisian influence on the design of capital cities was largely the result of a very successful adaptation of Renaissance aesthetic principles to the large, expanding city of the industrializing world in the nineteenth century. It was also due in part to the hospitable, international stance of Paris as a centre of world culture, after its cruder imperial aspirations had finally collapsed in 1815. By the later nineteenth century, it housed considerably more international organizations than any other city, including London. By dint of regular events, it made itself the home of the world international exhibition after London had first developed the idea in 1851. It was widely visited by foreigners, and many young people from abroad studied there, especially in architecture and the other arts. Although the more annoying features of Parisian life as perceived by foreigners, such as blatant short-changing and rudeness, were present in the nineteenth century, the authorities and the population generally recognized the advantages of the foreign presence and most visitors and temporary residents after 1815 went home with a very favourable impression. As a centre of the arts, largely unsullied by heavy industry and greedy commerce, Paris was seen as a centre of fashion in all aesthetic fields, and Parisian examples were readily recognized as exemplars in capital cities worldwide. Indigenous products often seemed crude or jejune in comparison, and purchasers and decision-makers could readily decide to import the Parisian alternative or—with greater or lesser success—to copy it. Because Paris offered, from the cityscape as a whole to the smallest item of jewellery, a complete design array, the choice of one item could lead to the adoption of others. Ultimately, there was the possibility of achieving the creation of a complete Parisian environment with the associated cultural manifestations of music, theatre, and a local school of all the arts. Should inspiration flag, renewed visits to Paris were always possible, and visitors always found there greater wonders than they had previously seen.

Henri IV and the Parisian mode of design

The Parisian mode of design started to develop around 1600 under King Henri IV. This foundation for capital city planning has been neglected and it merits careful attention here as the source of long-lived innovations. As the sixteenth century approached its close, the Renaissance aesthetic and Renaissance styles of architecture had made only a limited and fragmented impact on Paris. They were inserted almost at random in an overcrowded

medieval city, and they provided an element of contrast rather than a basis for transformation. They expressed accentuated social divisions rather than an enlightened community. To some extent, the Paris cityscape reflected the social and political reality of the French kingdom, with social strains and divisions exacerbated by religious strife. At the same time, sixteenth-century improvements in Italian cities were also for the most part fragmentary, based on individual buildings or groups of buildings. Not until the last decades of the century did the Italians show how means of achieving a broader urban coherence could successfully be put into effect.

It was with the accession of Henri IV, in 1589, that some of the necessary conditions were created in Paris. An astute compromise on the religious issue ended the Wars of Religion, which had done so much harm, while Henri's personal enthusiasm for Italian art and architecture prompted him to introduce the best of it to France, and especially to Paris. All this is well known in the history of architecture, of course, but less fully appreciated is the king's plan to modernize and regulate the city of Paris in order to make it cleaner, healthier, and in general a more effective national capital. With Henri IV, Paris would for the first time enjoy a coherent urban strategy, within which construction schemes such as the Place Dauphine could be more easily understood.

On March 11, 1601, Henri IV informed the Bureau de la Ville that "...now that the country is at peace, regard must be paid to the embellishment of the kingdom, and in particular to finishing the projects begun by his predecessors, namely the Pont-Neuf and the (water supply) fountains." The connection between beauty and practicality that this statement implied was fully reflected in the two projects with which he wanted to begin, and whose incomplete state provided clear justification for further expenditure. The Pont-Neuf, begun in 1574, was an integrated masonry structure that matched the finest examples of Renaissance design in Italy. The water distribution system, begun in the later sixteenth century, involved the construction of a number of "fountains," which, notwithstanding the impression given by their name, were masonry pavilions that allowed access to junctions in the conduits and also bore the pipes, carrying the water to the users outside in the streets. As these structures were virtually devoid of windows, their outside walls offered scope for decoration and inscription, and they were seen as significant additions to the architectural distinction of the city.

When Henri IV was able to move on to projects of his own, he maintained the connection between beauty and utility. Indeed, he clearly developed a modernization strategy for Paris in which public regulation and royal projects were associated. The most striking of his many initiatives

were two large piazzas in the royal and aristocratic district of the city, planned and built to a single design; and a system of rectilinear streets, radiating from a semicircular piazza in the northeast. Some adjacent existing streets were, additionally, identified for regularization. In 1607, the king ordered Sully to require the owners of sites on the new street running south from the Pont-Neuf to adopt identical facades, in order to provide *un bel ornement* at the end of the bridge. As at the Place de France, the king appears to have had in mind a perspective effect leading from an important royal piazza into the burgess city. The connection between royal beauty and burgess utility, through the streets, was suggested a little later when, in 1608, a royal decree required all the streets of Paris to be cleared of obstructions and rubbish. Taken as a whole, and in the context of an extended regulation of private building, Henri's scheme bore comparison with the new Rome, planned and built by the popes in the later sixteenth century. Indeed, the radiating street system based on the Place de France was strikingly similar to the Piazza del Popolo concept.

Work started on a number of these new projects in the early 1600s. With so much property owned by the Crown, some of it let to a range of tenants from royal family members to commoners, and with numerous building schemes under consideration or under way, the royal surveyors must have been in a constant state of observation and adjustment. However, the temptation must be to give priority in this account to the Place Dauphine, the triangular piazza at the western end of the Île de la Cité, because it was built as an extension of a big sixteenth-century project, the Pont-Neuf, and because it was adjacent to the rambling palace and centre of royal administration, which had come to occupy most of the western part of the island during the the Middle Ages.

Henri IV entrusted the work to his minister Sully, Grand Voyer de France. The architect is unknown, but De Brunhoff has suggested Claude de Chastillon (1547-1616), a royal "topographical engineer" from 1589. He would also have been, in De Brunhoff's opinion, the architect of the other big piazza, the Place Royale (now Place Vendôme), which was launched in 1604. Babelon, on the other hand, thinks that the design could be the work of a committee appointed by Sully, including the two royal architects, Louis Metezeau and Jacques II Androuet Du Cerceau. The royal ordinance launching the Place Dauphine was not published until 1608, but this Piazza was the more practical of the two and it progressed roughly in step with the Place Royale.

In such major projects, the big problem was to inject a commercial rationale that would attract private investment and thus ensure both the completion of the scheme to an acceptable standard and an attractive

return to the royal treasury. To leave a big piazza half completed would probably frustrate any royal plans for promoting further schemes, and discourage private owners from adopting regularizing features elsewhere in the city. The Place Dauphine's location at a previously remote extremity of the Île de la Cité was transformed by the completion of the grandiose Pont-Neuf in 1601. The earlier decision not to line the new bridge with houses, for the first time in the city's history, created a potential demand for commercial space half way across, while proximity to the palace just to the east suggested a demand for temporary accommodation for provincial and foreign visitors with legal or diplomatic business in Paris. Civil lawsuits could require lengthy residence in the city, and accommodation directly accessible to the palace would be of great value.

Whether or not Henri IV was aware of all these considerations, he envisaged an important commercial function for the Place Dauphine. The lease was given, in 1607, to a leading courtier, Achille de Harlay, first president of the Parlement de Paris, and sites were gradually sold to purchasers thereafter. The scheme was much larger than the current remains might suggest. The extension of the Palais de Justice in the nineteenth century covered the eastward extension of Place Dauphine sites across the Rue de Harlay. A north-south row of facades on the east side of the Rue de Harlay was extended by a row of eight houses facing the Seine on the north bank, and a similar row of eight houses facing to the south. According to an engraving by De Chastillon, these houses, together with the whole of the Place Dauphine, had been completed by 1642, and the interior space east of the Rue de Harlay had been filled with a formal arrangement of trees. This was a big scheme, and its completion indicates that it had been a commercial success. Indeed, it came to be occupied by a succession of rich provincials pursuing lawsuits, and by army officers. As a result, many of the houses were taken up by furnished rooms, and the false arcades were filled with shops, workshops and restaurants. The atmosphere was noted for its liveliness and this must have attracted the type of rich *flâneur* that Paris had tended to generate ever since suitable streets and squares were available for this pastime. Commercial success reinforced the qualities of the design.

Its most important feature was the false arcade with its stone piers and semicircular arches. This arcade, together with the open arcade of the Place Royale, set a pattern for Paris until the 1850s. Above the arcade stood two full floors with identical fenestration and a pitched roof with dormer windows. The facades were built of brick with stone dressings. The design managed to combine a Renaissance character with recent French traditions of aristocratic design. By concentrating on piazzas, Henri IV was able

to draw on the best Italian examples. The Place Dauphine was, in the opinion of Girouard, almost certainly inspired by the piazza at Livorno. The design was influenced, according to De Brunhoff, by Palladio and Serlio. The Place Royale project, in the southern part of the Marais, north of the Rue Saint-Antoine, was much more remote. Its site was that of the Hôtel des Tournelles, which the Crown had abandoned. Henri IV had decided to use the site to build houses for immigrant Italian silk workers, whom he wanted to attract to Paris as part of his mercantilist economic program. It was Sully who, in 1603, advised him to desist from this modest scheme, and to build an elegant square with an architectural ordinance. The king compromised by agreeing to build a square piazza, but reserving the north side for manufacturing. Letters patent were issued in 1605, and Sully supervised the whole project. In 1608, the north side was converted from manufacturing to houses, suggesting an improved perception of the piazza's social status. The sales of sites envisaged shops under the arcades, and at first it was not an aristocratic piazza. Babelon believes that it was intended to be a closed space much more than the Place Dauphine, which was expected to attract a lot of commercial movement.

The design, in Babelon's view, was very much the creation of Italian influence. Alberti's model proportions for a large, square area were followed, and the very concept of a large, square piazza in the centre of a city was essentially Italian. Arcaded squares had been built at Florence, Pienza and Vigevano. Babelon associates this emulation with French rivalry with Italy, especially as the queen was Italian.

The facade design of the Place Royale was similar to that of the Place Dauphine, prompting the suggestion that the same architect was involved in each. However, the roof treatment was different, with very tall pitched roofs divided from each other every four bays from short lengths of hipped roof. Large pavilions stood in the middle of each facade. The general effect was a combination of French traditions and Italian principles, and it may reflect the piazza's location on the edge of the city, near the Porte Saint-Antoine. The scheme was a success, but its whole history was much more equivocal than that of the Place Dauphine.

Little is known of the Place de France, which was only partially implemented. Plans and elevations for this semicircular piazza were drawn up in 1609 by Jacques Alleaume and Claude de Chastillon. Nothing of the piazza was built, but building lines were laid down for the new streets where vacant land was available. The only one to be fully implemented was the Rue de Turenne, which ran south towards the Place Royale, with which it was directly linked by the east-west street running through the piazza, now the Rue des Francs-Bourgeois. This impressive scheme would

have provided a clear structure for one of the least favoured parts of the city, and would have linked it more directly to more animated and central areas. It was inevitably a long-term project, and it lapsed a few years after the untimely death of the king, in 1610. Even where sections of new street were successfully reserved, there was no application of architectural ordinances.

Although urban reconstruction through piazzas proved easier to implement than new streets, the latter approach was wide-ranging and comprehensive. Henri IV clearly hoped to regularize the existing streets by enforcing new building regulations. In December 1607, Henri IV issued an edict controlling urban building. The new edict banned the construction of wooden houses (houses with timber frames fell into this category), of additions to facades that hung over the street, and of houses that projected structurally over the street. It was not a completely new departure, for medieval Paris, like other large cities, had developed rules and practices, mainly to prevent one property from threatening the use of others. These rules, which were to survive into the nineteenth century, were known collectively as the *Coutume de Paris*. They were mainly concerned with party walls. It had also become the practice during the Middle Ages to lay down a building line (*alignement*) for each house. These lines were enforced by the Bureau de la Ville. An order of Henri II in 1554 requiring the demolition of houses that infringed the building line was very little applied, but it did suggest a growing royal concern for the achievement of the full potential width of the Paris streets at a time of increasing wheeled traffic. A similar indication was provided by an ordinance of Charles IX in 1560, requiring owners to remove any projections over the thoroughfare when required to do so by the judges. When all the interventions of Henri IV are pieced together, the ideal of an efficient, regularized, beautiful city emerges. It is clear that the king was personally committed to this objective rather than to the creation of palaces or religious buildings. His assassination in 1610 almost certainly had a negative impact on this program, both in terms of the generation of further projects and the implementation of the system of regulation. However, Henri IV had laid the foundations of the ordered beautiful city, which most of the rest of this study will show emerging.

Once Renaissance principles had been applied to the French capital under royal direction, the way was clear for the establishment of a tradition of design and state enterprise. The next important stage came in the reign of Louis XIV (1643–1715), when the Crown sought to stress the *French* national character in a wide range of activities, both public and private. Architecture and the other arts were seen as central to this process of education, and in setting up a number of academies, the Crown sought

to bring together leading practitioners who would agree on ideals and desirable practices. The Crown would then broadcast them by ensuring that all royal projects, from music and theatre to palaces and libraries, followed these French, royal and national principles. The aristocracy and the Church, both particularly docile under Louis XIV, would follow suit, and France would be covered with a multitude of public buildings, country houses and urban improvement schemes, all of them reflecting a single aesthetic ideal, which, though clearly drawing on the Renaissance, would be distinct from orthodoxy elsewhere in Europe, and notably from that in Italy, which hitherto had claimed to be the fount of the Renaissance.

The creation of an *academic* architecture allowed nobles and even commoners to build in a style that echoed the big royal schemes in the cities. This opened the way for a partnership between royal, municipal and private interests in urban design. Whereas Henri IV had had little success in persuading private owners to extend the impact of his piazzas by redeveloping existing streets in a common style, in the eighteenth century, Parisian owners and their architects began to move towards a modest, co-operative style in their facades. It was known as an *architecture d'accompagnement*, enhancing the effect of nearby mansions and other ambitious buildings, or producing a general conformity along the street frontage. This effect was enhanced by royal building regulations in 1607, 1667 and 1783.

In this new climate, the Crown and the municipal authorities in the 1750s launched the city's most ambitious schemes of embellishment so far, combining a giant piazza, an existing thoroughfare and new streets. This was the Place Louis-XV (now Place de la Concorde) and Rue Royale project of the 1750s and 1760s. Although the construction of standard facades in the Rue Royale was not voluntary, for they conformed to a design by Gabriel, they reflected the willingness of the owners to accept a common design that they had previously been reluctant to accept, even in piazzas like the Place Vendôme. Purchase of one of these new sites now offered a prestige location of considerable commercial value, and the way was cleared for the Rue de Rivoli project under Bonaparte (1806), and similar ordinated frontages under the Second Empire.

Notwithstanding its much greater scale, the reconstruction of Paris under the Second Empire clearly conformed to the design mode whose origins dated back to the time of Henri IV. As under Louis XIV, it expressed continuity, artistic validity and modernity, a potent and persuasive combination. Most of the new streets were built without an architectural ordinance, which would have depressed the value of sites away from prestige

locations, but the formula of architectural conformity was reinforced. This practice was not solely the product of public regulation, because the municipal city of Paris did not attract large-scale manufacturing, even in the nineteenth century, as a large middle-class population developed and the large, stone-built apartment house emerged as standard accommodation. In a speculative climate, owners played safe and commissioned standard designs, while the architects—who were for the most part less distinguished than their colleagues who specialized in public work—were only too pleased to conform to an architectural orthodoxy that dated back at least to the Rue de Rivoli, if not earlier.

Napoleon III and Haussmann rebuilt Paris exactly at the moment when Paris could readily be seen as the epitome of the modern capital. Railways made it more accessible, and the international exhibitions, beginning in 1855, showed that the French government wanted to take full advantage of its potential. From the 1860s, other capitals began to copy Paris, or at least to covet its features. London, meanwhile, failed to inspire, even in the British Empire. Its ordered, aristocratic West End, which had impressed the future Napoleon III in the 1840s, was the product of spontaneous, aristocratic enterprise, its maze-like grid expressing localism and individualism rather than the social and political hierarchy reflected in Paris. Paris would remain the exemplar until after the Second World War, when the physical example of New York, and the largely theoretical ideal of the Modern Movement, displaced Haussmann's Paris in favour of a capital city of towers and autoroutes.

The London model

The new ideal of towers and rapid traffic movement allowed cities like London their opportunity to emerge as respected capital-city environments. War-damaged sites could be rebuilt with towers, and fringe districts could accommodate new roads at low compensation costs and with minimal disturbance to the residential areas of the middle and upper classes. The shift to an asymmetrical aesthetic and to a functional/expressionistic form, and the eradication of elegant decoration, allowed even the most disordered cities to reinforce their image at low cost. These post-1945 projects reflected individualism and even opportunism, and they expressed the might of private capital rather than national power. Even Chandigarh, a new administrative centre designed by a French architect, Le Corbusier, eschewed the whole of the classical French style. It expressed

the authority and expertise of the professional planner rather than the authority of the state, except perhaps in the capital area of courts and administrative buildings.

The new emphasis on variety and spontaneity, together with the rejection of autocratic government, allowed London to present an alternative capital form after 1945. Although the maze of medieval streets in the City reflected the merchant role of medieval London, redevelopment and wartime destruction had undermined their role as a model. The West End was a very different case and it gained respect, as reflected for instance in Sir John Summerson's *Georgian London* (1948). The West End provided a large area built on tasteful, classical lines, without royal interference. The Crown's role had of course been limited by the revolutions of the seventeenth century, which had so favoured the aristocracy, a development that contrasted with events in France. Even the attempt to create some basic features of an imperial capital at the turn of the nineteenth century in the area of Buckingham Palace, the Mall and Trafalgar Square, had not succeeded in reshaping London and indeed had passed virtually unnoticed.

The component of London that offered a clear contrast to Paris was the great suburban ring that had grown up between the nineteenth century and the Second World War. This great sweep of peaceful domesticism, linked to a benign natural environment, was discovered by S. E. Rasmussen in his *London: The Unique City* (1938). These ordered suburbs, developed mainly for a modest but professional clientele, sprang at first from the genteel West End, but they came to house the bulk of the London middle class. The terrace, the villa and the cottage, and their related streets of more or less sylvan appearance, evolved and multiplied during the century. They were the multiple, variegated equivalents of the universal Paris apartment block. Only the connoisseur, like Rasmussen, however, could detect here an expression of London's distinctive capital status, though H. J. Dyos developed the idea with a series of publications following his *Victorian Suburb* (1961). When Ian Nairn launched his great attack on the "anonymous" British urban environment in the late 1950s, his *Outrage* and *Counter-attack* singled out the suburbs for special denigration, as his notorious coinage, "subtopia," implied. Nairn was a man of the black and the white, calling for ultra-urban environments in the towns and an utterly arcadian countryside. His work had great influence, harmonizing as it did with the New Brutalism of the Smithsons. In any case, London's Abercrombie-inspired planning after 1943 prevented further suburban spread and foreshadowed densities above suburban level for new development. London failed to develop the system of express roads needed to free the suburbs from their dependence on an overcrowded

centre and to develop a decentralized infrastructure on the lines of Los Angeles. London would thus remain focused on a centre that needed much more than the addition of office towers in the City and elsewhere to conform to world norms for large capital cities.

The “post-industrial” capital

Since the early 1970s, changes in the world economy, in architecture, and most recently in the world politico-strategic climate, have begun to produce new changes in the capital city ideal. Capital cities have never been big centres of manufacturing, mainly because of their high congestion costs; and the economic disturbances of the 1970s and the 1980s damaged or destroyed many of the industries that had retained their place in the capitals, or established themselves on their outskirts between 1900 and 1939 in the aftermath of the electrical and automobile revolutions. Meanwhile, tertiary employment continued to expand, partly because labour-saving innovation was more limited in the tertiary sector than in manufacturing. These changes reduced the demand for new housing for manual workers, but accentuated the problems generated by prosperous middle-class people seeking to live and entertain themselves within reach of their metropolitan employment.

Architecture’s response was clouded by two developments in design fashion. One was the rejection of the regimentation and mediocre repetition generated by the Modern Movement and, still more, by what was identified as the “International Style,” a cheap, degraded version of modern architecture used mainly for office blocks. The other was the ideology of “small is beautiful,” “participation,” and later, the “green movement” and “community architecture.” These movements, beginning with the world economic downturn in the later 1960s, were a protest against the effects of the rapid economic growth of the 1960s and its associated ideology of gigantic progress and technocratic planning. They also coincided very conveniently with a period of slower economic growth in which investment could no longer generate new products and ideas as readily as in the past. In addition, uncertainty about the future produced an escape to the past. In architecture, these developments produced an extraordinary return to historic and fantastic forms. “Preindustrial” and “postmodern” coincided, and there was a return to the vernacular. More important was the rapid progress of conservation, retaining even quite ordinary buildings from the past either because they symbolized continuity, or because they were genuinely regarded as superior to modern products.

Britain produced the most striking expression of these trends, in the shape of Prince Charles's intervention in design debates and his authorship of a striking book of architectural advice, *A Vision of Britain* (1988), presaging a return to classicism as the preferred style for major buildings. His much-quoted remark, "Can you imagine the French doing this on the banks of the Seine?" nevertheless reveals that the Parisian model is one of his inspirations.

It would be premature to detect a revival of classical design for capital cities. Even in Paris, the main progress towards this end has been achieved through conservation. Mitterrand's *grands projets* and the fantastic housing of Bofil and others in the New Towns are modernistic or expressionistic for the most part. Their scale is often modest, like the opera house of the Bastille, but there is little or no pastiche or vernacular. Of course, work has been under way in other capital cities, but Paris provides, as so often in the past, the world example. In this sense, the classical model, within which the new schemes have to fit after the earlier embarrassments of the Montparnasse Tower and the Défense, has survived and continues to dominate. Projects in other world capitals also seem to have this quality of modest participation rather than striking disruption, but it follows that the classical mode will only be prominent where the city already has a strong classical form.

Conclusion

Ottawa, like other small capitals of federal states, seems a long way away from the giant capital cities of Europe and Asia. Its main exemplar, Washington, DC, has been virtually ignored so far. Canberra, its closest equivalent within the Commonwealth, has been mentioned only once. These smaller, federal capitals deserve some attention.

Small federal capitals tend to be founded cities, and this means that they begin with a plan or building scheme. The plan is normally the work of an individual architect, planner or committee. The opportunity is normally seen as a very significant one, both for the designer and the country. All participants and observers tend to see the plan as expressing the identity of the country, and as generating a worthy addition to the world's array of capital cities. These objectives are a challenge, for the worthy new capital city will tend to be a classical or, later, modernistic design, while the country is associated with rural pursuits, tribalism, a pre-Columbian tradition or a socialist revolution. The federal structure, moreover, usually means that great regional differences exist, not to speak of more

disruptive tensions, and a case can be made for expressing these in the design of the capital. The eclectic result, however charming, is bound to detract from the classical ideal, and even to suggest a country of provincial hicks. Interior and exterior decoration usually provides the answer to these problems, as in the case of frescos and murals at Brasilia and Mexico City. Among Ottawa's many distinctions is its participation in more than one phase of capital city design. The model for the initial plan was clearly London, or at any rate Westminster, with an official city of ministries, embassies and hotels serving a stately palace of democracy, and separated from it by manicured lawns that struggle to survive in the unique climate of the Ottawa Valley. The commercial and residential city expanded to the southwest along a grid of streets oriented on the parliamentary facade but, in other respects, no different from most of the new towns founded in the westward expansion, as Gilbert Stelter has shown. To the northeast, the original Lower Town of the lumbering days was left virtually alone. Only on the eastern heights did elegant suburbs develop on English lines, in New Edinburgh and elsewhere.

Until the Canadian boom of the early 1900s, Ottawa remained a modest place, and by the collapse of the boom, in 1913, little had been done in Ottawa to reflect the new prosperity. The years between the wars were as difficult for Canada as for other primary producers, but the country benefited from the revival of the United States in the 1930s and the post-war world economy created by the United States worked very much in the interests of Canada. It was now, under the direct or indirect influence of Mackenzie King, that Ottawa was reshaped in an eclectic fashion, drawing on principles of classical design, but also adapting to the motor vehicle and reserving and enhancing large areas of open space on American "park system" lines. Ottawa's position as the meeting point of the United States, Québec and Europe was very helpful in securing good designers and in integrating their work. The result was a restrained but vigorous eclecticism that is now receiving greater appreciation as a result of the collapse of modern architecture.

This design mode was so powerful and so recent that Ottawa generally resisted the wave of modern architecture. The excellent National Arts Centre is of modest dimensions, and one of the three universities, all of which have very modern buildings, lies outside the centre. The axial structure of the city centre has allowed the parallel route of the Queensway to solve the main traffic problems without disrupting the original centre.

Ottawa thus reflects the functions and the aspirations of the Canadian federation more clearly than a first glance might suggest. Its links with European democracy are reflected in the original, British plan. Classical

design symbolizes a united, powerful and prosperous Canada, and also the historical tradition linking Ottawa to the capitals of Europe and their culture. Its accommodation of motor traffic reflects both American motorization and ambitious traffic engineering, and European sensitivity to the environment. Meanwhile, its almost exclusively administrative, business and military role have produced a growing middle-class population. Many of them are transients. There are few poor and few rich, and the residential neighbourhoods reflect moderate comfort and a high sense of respectability. It is true, of course, that consideration of Hull and Nepean would change this picture to some degree, but Ottawa, like Washington, DC, has deliberately been retained as a capital city that can to some extent stand apart from the broader problems of the region. This issue in itself could justify another paper, but memories of the Nepean flood disaster of 1979 alone are enough to dissuade me from entering this contentious area.

**THE CREATION OF
WASHINGTON, DC:
POLITICAL SYMBOLISM AND
PRACTICAL PROBLEM SOLVING IN THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF A CAPITAL CITY
FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA, 1787-1850**

*Milton C. Cummings, Jr.
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“The city of Washington—the central star of the constellation which enlightens the whole world.”

—The Marquis de Lafayette

Washington is “a city capable of growing to a point that could make it a bearable resting place for those fated to live in it.”

—The Duc de La Rochefoucauld

Early History

The fourth river is called Patawomeke, 6 or 7 myles in breadth. It is navigable 140 myles, and fed as the rest with many sweet rivers and springs, which fall from the bordering hils. These hils many of them are planted, and yeeld no lesse plentie and varietie of fruit, then the river exceedeth with abundance of fish. It is inhabited on both

sides....The river above this place maketh his passage downe a low pleasant valley overshadowed in many places with high rocky mountaines; from whence distill innumerable sweet and pleasant springs.¹

So wrote the English explorer Captain John Smith in 1627, in his *General Historie of Virginia, New England and the Summer Isles*. The marshy area he described would, some sixteen decades later, be selected as the site for the construction of a new capital city for the newly created United States of America. That new city, in turn, would become a social and political instrument, designed to reflect a spirit of openness and political inclusion, whether in its geographical location, in the design of its buildings or in the arrangement of its thoroughfares. The planned capital city would mark the beginnings of professional architecture in America. And, over time, it would come to symbolize, as its planners had hoped, the nation's ideals and aspirations.

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the native Americans who had inhabited the fertile Potomac Valley for 10,000 years were gradually pushed out by the advancing colonists.² The first permanent Virginian settlement took place at Jamestown in 1607, and it was not until early in the next century that settlers began to move into the upper Potomac Valley in significant numbers. Over the years, large tobacco plantations began to dominate the region.³ As trade with England became an increasingly important aspect of the economic life of the area, a number of regional towns, such as Alexandria and Georgetown, sprang up. Both were already thriving commercial centres in 1790, when the Founding Fathers were scouting around for a site for a permanent national capital.⁴

The moveable government

A nation's capital is like a flag. It signifies more than the material elements that comprise it, and it may also represent the nation's political consciousness: the public's hopes and dreams and expectations for the state. A nation without a stable, established capital faces obvious practical problems of administration. In addition, a state without an identifiable capital to which the citizenry can relate lacks a unifying symbol that is replaceable by no other means. And this is precisely the plight of the early American Confederation from 1774 to 1790. During those sixteen years the Continental Congress met in

- Philadelphia: September 5, 1774, to December 12, 1776;

- Baltimore: December 20, 1776, to February 27, 1777;
- Philadelphia: March 4 to September 18, 1777;
- Lancaster, Pennsylvania: September 27, 1777;
- York, Pennsylvania: September 30, 1777, to June 27, 1778;
- Philadelphia: July 2, 1778, to June 21, 1783;
- Princeton, New Jersey: June 26, 1783, to November 4, 1783;
- Annapolis, Maryland: November 26, 1783, to June 3, 1784;
- Trenton, New Jersey: November 1784, to December 24, 1784;
- New York City: January 11, 1785, to March 4, 1789.

The first Congress under the Constitution met in New York City on March 4, 1789, and adjourned September 29, 1789. From December 6, 1790, until November 1800, Congress met in Philadelphia.⁵

The troubles posed by an impermanent centre of government extended beyond the inconveniences legislators suffered from being constantly on the road, although those inconveniences were not insignificant. The transport of records, safety considerations and housing problems all made the task of governing an inchoate republic more difficult than it already was.⁶ Above all, the constant dislocation lent an atmosphere of instability to the new government.

It was recognized from the outset that the location of the centre of government would be of material as well as symbolic importance. Public revenues would be spent for construction and maintenance. And, equally important, proximity might enhance influence. Understanding the benefits to be had, a number of communities in New Jersey, Virginia and Maryland offered themselves as potential sites. A bidding war broke out. On May 26, 1783, the Maryland state senate offered the Continental Congress thirteen dwellings and thirty thousand pounds to locate the capital in Annapolis.⁷ In June, Virginia upped the ante, offering thirteen residences, all necessary public buildings, three hundred acres of land, and one hundred thousand pounds.⁸

Notwithstanding the generous possibilities, no agreement could be reached, because neither of the two main sections of the country, the North or the South, each with very different economic and social institutions, would consent to having the nation's capital in the other region. The sectional tension made agreement on any site impossible, and the lack of a consensus on a permanent capital prevented the other work of government from moving forward.⁹

The politics of location

In 1784, Thomas Jefferson composed a list of potential sites for the national capital, probably for use in congressional debate on the matter. In his notes, Jefferson enumerated the relative advantages and disadvantages of each prospective site:

North River—recommended for the permanent seat of Congs. chiefly by its security against foreign danger.

Falls of Potomac—By 1. geographical centrality—2. proximity to Western Country already ceded—3. inducement to further cessions from N.C., S.C. & Georgia—4. remoteness from the influence of any overgrown commercial city.

Falls of Delaware—By 1. centrality with regard to the number of inhabitants—2. centrality as to no. of States & of Delegates—3. facility of obtaining intelligence from sea.¹⁰

The geographical location of the site, then, was a vital consideration, not simply for easy transportation to the capital city, but for a broader type of access, notably the power to influence the social and political life of the federal city itself. This broader access, it was felt, could well influence the kind of legislation that came from the capital city, and would be powerfully affected by the geographical location chosen. Considerations of this kind were of vital concern in 1790. It was an age when the apparently insoluble sectional conflicts facing the nation had almost ruptured the union created under the Articles of Confederation, had nearly prevented the creation and then approval of the new constitutional government, and thereafter continued to threaten national solidarity. The slavery question was the most obvious manifestation of the schism, but slavery also reflected broader differences in the two regions' social and economic life. Could the interests of an agrarian society and those of a commercial society be represented in the same political structure? Many, particularly in the South, believed not.

Nor was the problem of access illusory. Transportation by stage coach proceeded at the rate of about two miles per hour.¹¹ Eighteenth-century Georgia was farther from Philadelphia in 1790 than Georgia is from any spot on earth in 1990. Proximity very likely did mean greater access, and with greater access could come more direct influence.

But the symbolic element was just as real. A national capital located in the North would inevitably give the impression of a Northern-focused government. The political consciousness of the country would be aimed toward the North. Diplomacy with foreign nations would be carried on in the North. Legislation affecting slaveholding and other vital nationwide questions would be discussed and passed in the North.

Thus, at a time when the nation was constantly confronted by the threat of disunion, Jefferson, in 1784, already recognized that an important advantage could be obtained by placing the permanent capital in an area closer to the South. When a possible national capital in Annapolis, Maryland, was under consideration, Jefferson noted "the soothing tendency of so Southern a position on the temper of the S. States."¹²

The problem of determining a site satisfactory to both Northern and Southern interests became so intractable that at one point, in the fall of 1783, the Confederation Congress adopted a plan that would have created two capitals, one at Georgetown, the other below the falls of the Delaware River.¹³ Although this plan was revoked a year later, it was indicative of the major political problem confronting a nation that had to select a site for a capital city with only minimal guidance from history or tradition. Under such conditions, the decision could not be directed by inherited circumstance, but had to be made squarely by the political system and its agents.

The fragile government set up under the Articles of Confederation lacked the stability to deal with so divisive a question. It was left to the constitutional convention in 1787, struggling to establish a new government on a more solid foundation, to take the next step forward. In Article One of the Constitution, Congress was authorized

to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular States and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the Legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dry-docks, and other needful buildings.

This important constitutional provision reflected the perception that, if the diverse states were to be able to pull together, a solution would have to be found to the problem of locating a capital that could serve as an enduring, material indication of national stability and unity. But in order to reach an agreement on a site, some important, ingenious and intricate political deals would have to be made.

Site selection: Politics and symbolism

When the debate over location was taken up in 1789 by the new national legislature, the House first proposed Baltimore and then a site at Wright's Ferry, in Pennsylvania. Both proposals, however, were rejected by the Senate, and the Congress recessed before an agreement could be reached.¹⁴

To resolve the difficulty and facilitate an agreement, the administration engaged in some of the first legislative leadership to be practiced in the new republic. For, in addition to the problem of finding a permanent residence for the government, the various states were faced with the oppressive debt accumulated during the War of Independence and the Confederation period. The Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, intent on establishing a powerful central government, had proposed federal assumption of the national debt, for which he needed congressional support. With the help of some political manoeuvring by Jefferson, the administration, he felt, could perhaps resolve two problems at once, through "what was then described as 'a bargain', but which as a familiar feature of legislative procedure, is more commonly spoken of as a compromise."¹⁵ The debt assumption problem was described by the historian Wilhelmus B. Bryan as the burning issue of the time,¹⁶ and it was the urgency of this issue that finally enabled the administration to resolve the problem of selecting a site for the national capital.

Hamilton's proposal for funding the state debts through national assumption of the obligations occupied much of the second session of Congress. The proposal was met by spirited resistance from the Southern states, because the industrial, trade-oriented North accounted for the greatest portion of the debt, and the Southern states were not inclined to fund it, union or no union. This was the predicament in which the administration found itself in the summer of 1790.¹⁷

Jefferson notes how he and Hamilton devised a plan to resolve both intractable problems. After prolonged discussion of the debt assumption issue and the question of where to put the capital, Hamilton and Jefferson concluded that a compromise, or trade-off, might be worked out that could solve both the debt bill and the capital location problem in one stroke. After a preliminary vote in Congress went against the debt assumption plan, Jefferson and Hamilton went to work. As Jefferson described it:

As I was going to the President's one day, I met him (Hamilton) in the street. He walked me backwards & forwards before the President's door for half an hour.

It was finally agreed that...it would be better that the vote of rejection (of the Assumption) should be rescinded, to

effect which some members should change their votes. But it was observed that this pill would be peculiarly bitter to the Southern States, and that some concomitant measure should be adopted to sweeten it a little to them. There had been propositions to fix the seat of government either at Philadelphia, or at Georgetown on the Potomac; and it was thought that by giving it to Philadelphia for ten years, and to Georgetown permanently afterwards, this might, as an anodyne, calm in some degree the ferment which might be excited by the other measure alone.¹⁸

The deal was struck, though to the dismay of many Northerners, who objected strongly to so southerly a location. Representative Fisher Ames of Massachusetts complained, "We are sold by the Pennsylvanians and the assumption bill with it."¹⁹ Yet the deal held, thanks to what Jefferson called the "stock-jobbing herd," who were willing to compromise on the location of the capital in exchange for the debt assumption.²⁰

On July 16, 1790, the Residence Bill became law, followed three weeks later by the assumption measure.²¹ Entitled "An Act for Establishing the Temporary and Permanent Seat of the Government of the United States," the bill called for a district of one hundred square miles at some site between the mouths of the Eastern Branch (currently known as the Anacostia River) and the Connogochegue, a stream flowing into the Potomac, seventy-eight miles north of the present city of Washington. This district was to be the permanent seat of government, with three commissioners, appointed by the president, to oversee its development. During the ten years between 1790 and 1800, while the capital was being developed, a temporary location in Philadelphia would be used, thus assuaging somewhat the discomfited Northerners. On the first Monday of December, 1800, the capital would be moved permanently to the new site.²²

George Washington had not actively participated in the process up to this point, and had only cursorily mentioned in his journal that Congress had presented two bills to him that day, one being the Residence Bill.²³ Nevertheless, it is likely that awareness of Washington's association with the Potomac region was a critical factor in the bill's acceptance.²⁴

In any case, once the president was given explicit responsibility for selecting the exact location of the new capital, Washington took an intense personal interest in the task. A great nation, he believed, would require a great capital city.

It was the first time in history that a democratic state had set out to establish a "deliberately created city" as its national capital where there had been no city before. The only prior example of a nation building a

capital *de novo* was St. Petersburg, and in that case the planners enjoyed the relative administrative advantage of autocratic government.²⁵

In October, 1790, Washington made a tour of the region in which the Residence Bill stipulated that the capital should be located. The area was caught up in capital fever, as Washington stopped in each of the many towns striving to be chosen as the permanent seat of the national government. Citizens from each town offered him presentations proclaiming the relative advantages of their location and delivered petitions requesting that their town be chosen. The citizens of Georgetown contended that theirs was a site that “will at once contribute to the beauty, health, and security of a city intended for the seat of Empire.”²⁶

Although this was the spot ultimately selected, it seems likely that the decision to select the Georgetown location had already been made long before Washington’s tour took place. Months before Washington’s trip, which he ostensibly took to survey the area and to select a site, Jefferson was referring in letters to what would eventually be the location. As Jefferson had written to James Monroe on July 11, 1790: “The bill for removing the federal government to Philadelphia for 10 years & then to Georgetown has at length passed both houses.” On the same day, he wrote a similar letter to John Randolph.²⁷

On September 17, Jefferson sent a memorandum to Charles Carroll, who owned land at the confluence of the Potomac and Anacostia Rivers, setting forth a number of conditions that might pertain to any sale of land for the capital. Jefferson concluded: “It is understood that this conveyance will have been preceded by articles of agreement signed by all the proprietors of the lands in and about those several spots which have such obvious advantages as render it presumable to every one that some one of them will attract the president’s notice and choice.”²⁸ Jefferson sent a copy of the memorandum to Washington.

Thus, it seems likely that Washington’s travels through the eighty-mile length of the territory specified in the Residence Bill had some other purpose than that of simply locating a site. At the very least, the prospective location seems to have been narrowed down to areas in the southernmost part of the specified region. The travels, then, were designed to have symbolic meaning: to convey the message that all towns and hamlets alike had a chance of being selected and of being honoured with the national capital. And, as has been seen on many other occasions in democratic politics, a symbolic message can hold as much import as the somewhat inconsistent reality. The excitement and sense of community generated by the president’s tour was very real, even though the substantive aim of the travel had been largely accomplished in advance. The

leading citizens of Hagerstown, a site that probably never was a serious contender, met the president three miles outside the town and then conducted him through its main street, where he was greeted by the ringing of bells and “the welcome applause of the gratified inhabitants.” The town’s newspaper also records that, later that evening, “the town was illuminated, bonfires appeared in all quarters and every demonstration of joy was exhibited on the happy occasion.”²⁹

Designing a democratic city

On January 22, 1791, the three commissioners called for by the Residence Bill were appointed by President Washington. Daniel Carroll, Thomas Johnson and David Stuart were all close friends of Washington. Carroll had served as a Maryland representative in the Continental and the United States Congress. Johnson, “perhaps the most distinguished public man of his day in Maryland,”³⁰ would later become a Supreme Court justice; and Stuart (who was a practising physician and related to Washington through marriage) lived on a two-thousand-acre estate outside Fairfax Courthouse, Virginia, and so was familiar with the inhabitants of what would become the new capital area.³¹

Two days after making the appointments, Washington reported to Congress that “after mature consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of the several positions,”³² he had chosen a site, as well as commissioners, who would soon set about surveying the boundaries for the capital. Washington also requested that Congress amend the Residence Bill to include the town of Alexandria and the area south of the Eastern Branch in Maryland. Congress quickly acceded to the request.

Two men had been hired to survey the capital area. Andrew Ellicott, thirty-six years old, was a professional surveyor of considerable renown. He had previously surveyed the western boundary of New York state, and at thirty-two had been elected a member of the American Philosophical Society.³³ It was not Ellicott’s task to plan the new city, but simply to do the survey work and make a report as quickly as possible on the required topographic data.³⁴

The other surveyor was Major Pierre Charles L’Enfant, a French military engineer who had joined the army of the Continental Congress a month before Lafayette. Having distinguished himself for his artistic skills, L’Enfant went to New York after the war to work as a professional architect. His skills in his chosen line of activity were so well respected that he received the commission to design the Federal Hall, where Congress had met when it convened in New York. His boast of being able to command

“whatever business I liked” was not entirely an exaggeration.³⁵ And he was to prove a man who had the vision to match his pride.

In a letter to L'Enfant outlining the nature of his new duties, dated only March 1791, Jefferson wrote: “The special object of asking your aid is to have drawings of the particular grounds most likely to be approved for the site of the federal town and buildings.”³⁶

L'Enfant's commitment to the creation of a capital “worthy of a great republic” was unmatched. Indeed, his internal calling would eventually exceed the mandate given him by the nation. His vision of the city Washington might someday become would be a driving force in the development of the capital in subsequent decades, and would leave his name forever associated with it.

In a letter to George Washington, dated September 11, 1789, applying for a position as one of the planners of the new capital city, L'Enfant displayed the passion that he felt for the task:

No nation perhaps ever had before the opportunity offered them of deliberately deciding on the spot where their Capital city should be fixed, or of combining every necessary consideration in the choice of situation—and altho' the means now within the power of the country are not such as to pursue the design to any great extent it will be obvious that the plan would be drawn on such a scale as to leave room for that aggrandizement & embellishment which the increase of the wealth of the Nation will permit it to pursue at any period however remote....³⁷

Among L'Enfant's other considerable qualifications, the fact that he was a Frenchman was a decided advantage in his selection. American public sentiment was distinctly in favour of France, to whose help they owed their very independence.³⁸ Moreover, France was a nation that during this period seemed, to many Americans, to share fundamental political values with the United States.

L'Enfant zealously set about his new task. On March 11, 1791, he reported to Jefferson on his arrival in Georgetown, apologizing that heavy rain and thick mist had forced him to make a preliminary survey of the area on horseback only.³⁹

Washington's choice was for a site near Georgetown, but he had instructed L'Enfant to limit his surveying to the Eastern Branch, supposing, correctly, that this would prevent real estate holders in the area from charging inflated prices for the land.⁴⁰ Washington and the others apparently assumed that the new capital could be located on a specific site once the problem of securing the hundred-square-mile district had been resolved.

Jefferson had made a rough plan for a capital city eleven blocks long and three blocks deep along the Tiber River, with three blocks set aside for the president's estate and three for the Capital building, the pair connected by an eight-block strip of "public walks." While Jefferson's walks were suggestive of what L'Enfant would ultimately include in his own plan as the Mall,⁴¹ L'Enfant's plan for the city was on a far grander scale than those envisaged by any other planners at the time.

Washington, who had been directing the negotiations for land through correspondence, arrived in Georgetown on March 28 to conclude the matter. Through a combination of charisma, appeal to public sentiment and veiled threat, he was able on March 29 to convince several landowners who had been holding out for higher prices to sell. He recorded in his journal, "I represented that the contention in which they seemed to be engaged, did not in my opinion comport either with the public interest or that of their own; that while each party was aiming to obtain the public buildings, they might by placing the matter on a contracted scale, defeat the measure altogether...."⁴² Washington wrote soon thereafter to Jefferson, reporting the successful outcome of the meeting, and noting that the area to be included contained "all the land from Rockcreek along the river to the eastern-branch and so upwards to or above the ferry including a breadth of about a mile and a half, the whole containing three to five thousand acres."⁴³ One day earlier, on March 30, 1791, Washington officially announced the selection of the new capital site.⁴⁴

Having resolved the most pressing of the administrative problems related to selecting the capital site, Washington now turned his attention to other affairs. The dominant force in shaping the direction of the new capital would now be Pierre L'Enfant.

Almost from the outset, the Frenchman was unable to restrict himself to his relatively narrow survey assignment, and by unrelenting efforts he gradually appropriated for himself the central role. An undated "Note relative to the ground lying on the eastern branch of the river Potomac" is presumed to have been presented on March 29 by L'Enfant to Washington. In that report, L'Enfant had already moved beyond the bounds of his original mandate, stressing Jenkins Hill as a promising site for the Capitol building, suggesting specific locations for bridges and proposing a "large avenue... a street laid out on a dimension proportioned to the greatness ... which the Capital of a powerful Empire ought to have."⁴⁵

And by June 12, when he visited Washington at Mount Vernon, L'Enfant, who had been hired ostensibly to do survey work and to prepare some general proposals for a cityscape, had already worked out a "progress map," accompanied by a report of several pages containing recommenda-

tions for building a grand capital city.⁴⁶

By mid-August the final L'Enfant plan was completed. It called for roads eighty feet across, with thirty feet on either side for pedestrian walkways, overhung by a double row of trees. There would also be ten feet separating the trees from the building lots. A main avenue, now Pennsylvania Avenue, would cross the city diagonally, from the Anacostia River to Georgetown. The Capitol would stand on Jenkins Hill, "a pedestal waiting for a monument." The "Presidential Palace" and grounds would lie toward the other end of the avenue. The two sites would be connected by large public walks. And the broad streets and walks would lend themselves to an atmosphere of openness.

I placed the three grand Departments of State contiguous to the principal Palace and on the way leading to the Congressional House the gardens of the one together with the park and other improvement on the dependency are connected with the publique walk and avenue to the Congress house in a manner as must form a whole as grand as it will be agreeable and convenient to the whole city which from the distribution of the local (residents) will have an early access to this place of general resort and all along side of which may be placed play houses, room of assembly, academies and all such sort of places as may be attractive to the learned and afford diversion to the idle.⁴⁷

The public space

The early effort to create a grand open space was an expression in civic design of principles of government that had earlier been expressed in words by the architects of the Constitution. To the planners of Washington, this was to be a government that provided access for its citizens, and did not attempt to prevent it, as other forms of government had done. The open space, so conducive to "early access to this place of general resort," was a device to drag people to the public area, near the seat of power and the decision-making institutions of the polity. One can almost feel the influence of Madison, that architect of political structures, in the pages of the L'Enfant report. In "Federalist No. 39," Madison had written:

...we may define a republic to be, or at least bestow that name on, a government which derives all its powers directly

or indirectly from the great body of the people; and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior. It is essential to such a government, that it be derived from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it.⁴⁸

It was “the great body of the society” that would have access to the structures of the young republic’s new capital. The “learned” as well as the “idle” would have a place in the open public sphere.

But L’Enfant himself was not to be employed at the task much longer. At the first scheduled sale of land in the still-undeveloped city, on October 17, 1791, L’Enfant was to have had copies of his plan available for prospective buyers. The sale was important, as much for raising funds for the project as for being a symbolic demonstration of the government’s commitment to the city. But the plans were not available, partly due to L’Enfant’s insistence that just the right plan should be made available to the printer. The delay was compounded by difficulty the printer had in obtaining a satisfactory copper reproduction plate. Although Washington did not hold L’Enfant accountable for this minor crisis,⁴⁹ further actions on his part would undermine his superiors’ confidence in him.

At the sale, when the commissioners, who held ultimate statutory authority over the project, requested L’Enfant to show his own maps, he refused. L’Enfant argued that higher prices could be achieved if buyers were unable to see precisely where in the city their prospective purchase was. Thus, the only plans available at the sale were of one-block units; no plan provided a picture of the entire layout of the city. L’Enfant justified his behaviour in a letter to Tobias Lear, the president’s secretary, in which L’Enfant also defended himself against the growing criticism of the commissioners. L’Enfant suggested that their motives might be based not on reason but on “resentment in my opposition to them.” The commissioners had, he argued, become caught up in their own power.⁵⁰

L’Enfant’s earnest self-defence might have saved his job if things had ended there; but they did not. Commissioner Daniel Carroll, who had purchased land on a site south of the proposed Capitol building, had begun construction of his house when surveys indicated that it extended into the street. L’Enfant demanded that he move the house. When Carroll failed to do so, L’Enfant ordered workmen to demolish the house. The outraged commissioners reported to Washington about the affair: “On our meeting here today, we were to our great astonishment informed that, Major. L’Enfant, without any Authority from us, & without even having submit-

ted to our consideration, has proceeded to demolish, Mr. Carroll's house."⁵¹

Washington turned the matter over to Jefferson, urging him to rebuke L'Enfant, but not so as to risk "losing his services; which, in my opinion, would be a serious misfortune."⁵² Jefferson, in turn, wrote a highly restrained letter to L'Enfant, who, we must remember, had just had a man's house torn down: "In future," wrote Jefferson, "I must strictly enjoin you to touch no man's property, without his consent." He told L'Enfant that the job was still his, "but only on condition that you can conduct yourself in subordination to the authority of the Commissioners, to the laws of the land, & to the rights of its citizens."⁵³

Three months later relations with L'Enfant reached a boiling point, when he refused again to turn over the map so that it could be reproduced. Ellicott, to whom the task of reproducing the map had been given, was understandably bewildered. In a report to the commissioners about his efforts to prepare the city design for engraving, Ellicott wrote: "We met with difficulties of a very serious nature. Major L'Enfant refused us the use of the original. What his motives were, God knows."⁵⁴

Three days later came L'Enfant's final mistake: a letter demanding that either the commissioners be released, or that he be freed to act independently of them.⁵⁵

Within days, L'Enfant was out of his cherished job. On February 27, 1792, Jefferson wrote him a letter of dismissal: "I am instructed by the President to inform you that notwithstanding the desire he has entertained to preserve your agency in the business, the condition upon which it is to be done is inadmissible, & your services must be at an end."⁵⁶

Jefferson wrote to George Walker, who had earlier been negotiating with L'Enfant in order to get him to modify his demands, "On the whole I am persuaded the enterprise will advance more surely under a more temperate direction; under one that shall proceed as fast and no faster than it can pay."⁵⁷

L'Enfant was out, but even this fact reflected the principles for which the city he so loved would stand. Even creators of great vision—even genius—would have to function within the bounds of the rule of law, and endure the constraints of the democratic hierarchy of authority. The designer of the great republican city was discharged because he would not conform to its requirements.

L'Enfant rejected any offer of remuneration at the time.⁵⁸ Only years later, in 1810, when he was deeply in debt, did Congress pass a bill appropriating \$1,394.20 "for his services in laying out the plan of the city of Washington." The sum represented \$666.66 and interest accrued since March 1, 1792.⁵⁹

Perhaps the most grievous blow to L'Enfant was that when the engravings of his plans for the city were finally made, some modifications had been introduced, including a "change in direction and alignment of Massachusetts Avenue, which was straightened" from its earlier curvature in the L'Enfant design.⁶⁰ What was just as important to him, and quite unjust, his name appeared nowhere on the new engraving, which would be the widely disseminated copy of the grand design for Washington.

L'Enfant died in obscurity in 1825 at the age of seventy, in the care of William Digges, in Prince George's County, Maryland. He was buried on the Digges estate. Only in 1909 was the body disinterred and taken to the Capitol rotunda, where a memorial service was held, and then reburied at the National Cemetery in Arlington, Virginia. A copy of L'Enfant's plan for the capital is engraved on his tombstone.⁶¹

In the years following his dismissal, L'Enfant's plan was almost universally derided as being too grand ever to match the reality of the city that was only slowly beginning to emerge. It became widely known as the "city of magnificent distances," and the "city of magnificent intentions."

Thomas Twining, visiting in 1796, described the city as simply a vast clearing in the middle of the woods, "in the centre of which I saw two buildings on an extensive scale...."⁶² The two buildings were a tavern and the Capitol building, then under construction.

Indeed, the perception that the city had been planned on too grand a scale was widely shared. And, as John Reps points out, this sentiment was not without foundation: "Part of the mall had been enclosed and was used for cattle grazing, many of the squares were used as vegetable gardens, and crops were planted within the street lines beyond the little groups of houses clustered here and there around the principal buildings."⁶³

The grand design for the city had other important consequences as well. James Sterling Young writes in *The Washington Community, 1800-1828* that the distribution of these little clusters of houses had an effect not only on the subsequent development of the topology of the city, but also on the social and political interactions of the public officials who staffed the different branches of government. The tendency of residents to live close to their own centres of power limited their association largely to members of their own branch of government. Capitol Hill, for example, was the location for legislators' residences, while the area surrounding the White House was occupied primarily by members of the executive branch. The ruggedness (often virtual impassibility) of the terrain further accentuated the distinctness of the separate spheres of power. Young writes: "Far from being a transitory phenomenon, due simply to the newness of the capital, the configuration of communities-within-a-commu-

nity was endemic to the governmental establishment, persisting well into the second half of the century.” He adds that “the “separation of powers” became a separation of persons, and each of the branches of government became a self-contained, segregated social system within the larger governmental establishment.”⁶⁴

Had L’Enfant’s plan for a great republican capital been overly grand and optimistic? This was, after all, the same question many critics had asked concerning the founders’ plan for the republic itself.

The Irish poet Thomas Moore penned these lines upon a visit to the city in 1804:

This embryo capital, where fancy sees
Squares in morasses, obelisks in trees;
Which second-sighted seers, ev’n now, adorn
With shrines unbuilt, and heroes yet unborn,
Though naught but woods and Jefferson they see,
Where streets should run and sages ought to be.⁶⁵

Implicit in democracy is a certain amount of faith. Faith in the masses. Faith in the future. Faith in possibility. And the architects of the national city, just like the founders of the nation itself, had taken a leap of faith, venturing to lay a foundation upon which the future would be free to build.

The architecture of democracy

The criticism was not limited to what many saw as an excessively vast scale of development; it also extended to the nature of the public buildings being erected. The buildings were, well, foreign, being predominantly in the classical style of Greece and Rome. As one visitor complained:

This embryo metropolis, with its foreign decorations, should have set a better example to the young republic, by surrounding itself first with good roads and substantial bridges, in lieu of those inconvenient wooden structures and dangerous roads, over which the legislators must now pass to their duty. I think, too, that good taste would have preferred native decoration for the seat of the legislature.⁶⁶

By the time the Capitol was being built, American architecture had already begun to show a break from British cultural domination. The choice of L'Enfant as the architect who would transform New York's city hall into the Federal Hall was a reflection of this departure.⁶⁷

But it would not be the highly elaborate Louis XVI style, predominating in France, that would take hold in America. Jefferson, a talented amateur architect in his own right, found his ideal in the dignity and grandeur of Rome.⁶⁸ And it would be the architectural preferences of Jefferson and Washington that would be decisive. Talbot Hamlin writes that, "It is by no mere chance that the Roman eagle came to roost again in America and, in a new form as the American eagle, became next to the flag itself the universal symbol of the United States."⁶⁹

Efforts to recapture in architectural form the classic republican spirit reflected the larger national belief that something truly unique was taking place in the new nation: that it occupied a special place among the countries of the world. It was almost to be expected that leaders should look beyond the bounds of contemporary design, to forms that symbolized genuinely unique moments in the history of nations: classical Greece and republican Rome.

America, after all, had turned to classical political ideals in establishing its "new republic." Political debates were carried on, as Hamlin notes, in newspapers by men who used pseudonyms such as "Brutus" or "Civis."⁷⁰ And at the same time that America was being born, new discoveries, such as those of Pompeii and Herculaneum, were giving a new immediacy and reality to the ideals of the classical age.

In March, 1792, advertisements inviting designs for the presidential residence and for the Capitol building were sent out.

The architect James Hoban from Charleston, South Carolina, travelled to Washington to survey the prospective site. On July 17, 1792, his design for the "Presidential Palace" was selected from among the few that had been submitted in the relatively short interim, probably because of the positive review it received from George Washington.⁷¹ Hoban was thereupon hired to oversee development of the project.

Although Hoban's designs have not survived in their original form, they called for a building with two wings, although these were left out of the final structure. Within two days, Hoban and the commissioners "went to the site of the palace that he might lay out the foundations—a great part of the materials for the foundation now lying on the spot."⁷² In just over two months, the cornerstone was laid.

The commissioners' attention next turned to consideration of the

plans submitted for the Capitol, all of which were found to be inadequate. A second competition, held in August, again failed to yield an acceptable proposal. Thereupon, Stephen Hallet, a noted French draftsman working in Philadelphia, was hired to produce a plan. However, in October, a letter arrived from Dr. William Thornton, an amateur architect in the West Indies, asking for permission to submit a design. Thornton was instructed to send his designs directly to the president in Philadelphia, where Hallet would be sending his own plans.

Once the two competing plans had arrived, the decision was quickly made. Washington was taken with Thornton's classical design, commending it for its "grandeur, simplicity, and convenience."⁷³ Thus, Jefferson wrote to commissioner Daniel Carroll that "him whose decision is most important" had preferred the Thornton design. Although, under the terms of the law, it had been the commissioners' duty to select the plan, the decision had already been made. But no public announcement would be forthcoming, Jefferson informed Carroll, until "the plan shall be laid before you and approved by you."⁷⁴ The commissioners were being presented with a *fait accompli*.

The story of Dr. William Thornton is a fascinating one. At the time of the design competition, the thirty-one-year-old medical doctor had had no training or experience in the field of architecture. As he wrote a few years after winning the prize: "I lamented not having studied architecture, and resolved to attempt the grand undertaking and study at the same time. I studied some months and worked almost night and day, but I found I was opposed by regular architects from France and other countries."⁷⁵ "When I travelled I never thought of architecture. But I got some books and worked a few days, then gave a plan in the ancient Ionic order, which carried the day."⁷⁶

Within a month of his design's success, the versatile Dr. Thornton received a gold medal from the American Philosophical Society for a monograph on language, including a plan for teaching oral speech to the deaf.⁷⁷

While the designer of the Capitol was an amateur—albeit gifted—architect, his co-workers included Hallet, George Hadfield, a graduate of the Royal Academy who was brought over from England, and Benjamin Latrobe, a noted architect who also had worked in London before moving to Philadelphia. All were what we would understand today as professional architects. Thus, the development of the architecture for the capital is seen by many as the beginning of the architectural profession in the United States.⁷⁸

Latrobe was hired in 1803 as Surveyor of Public Buildings, an assignment that stemmed in part from his friendship with Jefferson,⁷⁹ and their

shared commitment to classic Greek design.⁸⁰ This friendship with Jefferson also allowed Latrobe to overrule objections even by Thornton to modifications made in the interior design.⁸¹

After the Capitol building was burned in 1814 by the British, Latrobe supervised its rebuilding. He gave the Greek design the distinctively American tobacco and corncob columns,⁸² in an effort to symbolize the unique contribution of American political forms to the democratic and republican experience that the architecture was taken to represent.

In addition to his public duties, Latrobe also had a private role, that included planning the City Canal for the Washington Canal Company, and designing several of the early mansions built in the city. In architectural design, the early years of the nineteenth century have been called "Latrobe's Washington."⁸³

By the time City Hall was constructed in 1820, the Latrobe model had been set, and others would follow: Hadfield's design of City Hall

... echoed the clean classic lines that were Latrobe's signature. ... Its quiet exterior, a central Ionic portico flanked by two Ionic-columned wings, enclosed interiors that were notable for their stark simplicity. The building...inspired a new appreciation in the early twentieth century as it conformed to Classical Revival tastes.⁸⁴

Despite efforts by civic planners to promote grand design, the city of Washington did not impress the congressmen moving to the new capital in 1800. One described it darkly:

One wing of the Capitol only had been erected, which with the President's House, 1 mile distant from it, both constructed with white sandstone, were shining objects in dismal contrast with the scene around them. ... The desolate aspect of the place was not a little augmented by a number of unfinished edifices....⁸⁵

Nevertheless, steady improvements were made during the Adams and Jefferson administrations, accelerated by a Congress which, now that it actually had to live in the capital, was more agreeable to releasing funds for public buildings and city improvements.

Then came a catastrophe. On the evening of August 24, 1814, British soldiers arrived and set fire to many of the most important buildings, including the Capitol, the President's House, and the Treasury. The Patent

Office was saved by Commissioner Thornton, who met them at the door “Are you Englishmen or Goths and Vandals? This is the Patent Office, the depository of the ingenuity of the American Nation, in which the whole civilized world is interested. Would you destroy it? If so, fire away and let the charge pass through my body.”⁸⁶ The soldiers moved on.

Having passed through that baptism of fire, the national capital, less than two decades old, had begun to develop a sense of identity. One resident reported that surviving the British attack had created a sense of “civic spirit” among the city’s residents.⁸⁷ Building resumed with a new vigour and heightened commitment to the symbol of national identity that the city was becoming. David Warden, writing in 1816, suggested that the city had largely recovered from the disaster, and described the Washington of that time:

The most eligible places have been selected for public squares and public buildings. The capitol is situated on a rising ground, which is elevated about eighty feet above the tide-water of the Potomac. This edifice will present a front of six hundred and fifty feet, with a colonade of two hundred and sixty feet, and sixteen Corinthian columns thirty-one feet and a half in height....

The President’s House consists of two stories, and is a hundred and seventy feet in length....

The Public Offices, the Treasury, Department of State, and of War, are situated in a line with, and at the distance of four hundred and fifty feet from the President’s House.⁸⁸

Although little new work was started during President Monroe’s first term, construction of the Hadfield-designed City Hall got under way in 1820; and this, along with Latrobe’s renovation of the Capitol and the other restoration work, all served to create an atmosphere unique to the city that was just two decades old.

In 1828, Congress authorized a railroad line into the city, and by August, 1835, the steam-driven Washington Line was sending and receiving daily runs between Washington and Baltimore. The trip, just over two hours, cut the stage-coach time in half.⁸⁹ Technology was bringing the city closer to the rest of the nation.

The relative decline in the launching of grand new public building projects during the Monroe era (1817-1825) underscores the importance of a political leader’s ideology and cast of mind in the development of

architectural monuments. Great works were undertaken by presidents who had a broad vision of what the democracy should be, and how it ought to be reflected in the capital. Constance McLaughlin Green comments on the ascendance of Monroe to the presidency as follows: "What was gone was not evident in the autumn of 1817. The missing element was the warmth and the intellectual's view of life which had distinguished the capital of Jefferson and Madison."⁹⁰

The "hand of the Prince" has often been a crucial factor in the construction of the great architectural and civic monuments of history. And the guiding influence of a few singular leaders was essential in the American experience as well. A series of presidents, who conceived of a capital and a nation on a grand scale, created the framework within which even those of a lesser vision would operate.

The major public buildings constructed between 1817 and the century's midpoint bear the imprint of Robert Mills, Latrobe's outstanding student, who had, by the 1820s and 1830s established himself as the leading architect in the capital city. Mills' 1836 designs for the Treasury and Patent Office buildings stressed the classical themes that had now become the identifying symbols of Washington: The porticoes of the Patent Office, now the National Portrait Gallery, are purported to be of precisely the same dimensions as those of the Parthenon.⁹¹ Along with the Old Post Office, designed in 1839 by Mills, these three public structures were as much monuments to the classic ideals of public government as they were functional structures. Henry Adams described a Washington in 1850

...with wheel-tracks, meandering from the colonnade of the Treasury hard by, to the white marble columns and fronts of the Post Office and Patent Office which faced each other in the distance, like white Greek temples in the abandoned gravel-pits of a deserted Syrian City.⁹²

These temples to the democratic idea were all the work of Mills. But Mills' most notable monument was the real thing. In 1836, he won a competition sponsored by the Washington National Monument Society for the design of a memorial to George Washington, whose centennial birth date had been celebrated four years earlier. Through appeals for donations, the society had raised over \$30,000 within a few years, a vivid display of the affection felt by the nation for "the first citizen."

Mills' design called for an obelisk to rise five hundred feet into the air. At its base would be a peristyle temple similar to those of ancient Greece,⁹³ a fitting memorial to the modern Cincinnatus. The temple was never built,

and construction of the monument required thirty-seven years (1848 to 1885). But Mills' Washington Monument is today one of the most recognizable memorials in the world, and an important attraction for visitors to the city.

It was also in George Washington's centennial year that Congress commissioned the noted sculptor Horatio Greenough to create a statue of Washington. This work, like the monument, attracted its share of controversy, in part because Greenough, like the important Washington architects, had used classical stylings: Washington was depicted assuming a traditional Roman pose, naked from the waist up. Art historian Joshua Taylor wrote that Greenough saw the sculpture "as a chance to consolidate the likeness of Washington the man with that of Washington as the personification of the republic. The truth of Washington lay not in his physical lineaments but in his symbolic existence as father of this country. The form, then, should follow the symbolic function."⁹⁴

Greenough's statue of Washington was eventually consigned by wary congressmen to the collections of the Smithsonian Institution, well away from the precincts of the Capitol building. The Smithsonian Institution itself came about as the result of a bequest, in 1835, of just over half a million dollars, by an Englishman who had never been to America, James Smithson. For years, the money remained idle, and was even the source of some controversy, as losses were incurred due to bad investments in state bonds.⁹⁵ Finally Congress acted, in August 1846, to carry out Smithson's will by creating an institution "for the increase and diffusion of knowledge among men." And when Congress did act, appointing regents and authorizing construction of a Smithsonian Institution building, few events had so excited the residents of the capital. Writes Green:

It affected everybody—day laborers, skilled artisans, merchants handling building supplies, people hoping for improvements in the city's appearance, and, above all, men eager to have the capital attain eminence in the American intellectual world.⁹⁶

Even as the regents disputed over the precise nature and mission of the Smithsonian Institution, Robert Mills was commissioned to produce a design for its headquarters building. But it was not Mills' plan, but that of James Renwick, another noted architect, that was finally chosen. The cornerstone for his Norman turreted castle of red sandstone was laid in 1849.⁹⁷ A newspaper reporter observed, "If there is one question set at rest

in this community, it is that public opinion has decided that the national metropolis shall be distinguished for the cultivation of the mind."⁹⁸

Thus, at the midpoint of the nineteenth century, the architectural pattern for Washington had been set. The city had been made distinctive by its reflection of the ideals of political participation, represented in its revival of the architecture of the classical age of democracy. Those major public buildings that deviated from this norm, such as the red sandstone Smithsonian, only served, by way of contrast, to emphasize the predominant pattern.

And so, by 1850, only six decades after the city's official establishment, on L'Enfant's vast public Mall, the Smithsonian building contrasted sharply with the other important public buildings, which were white, either sandstone or marble. And the Washington Monument was making its protracted ascent into the clouds.

Just a year before, the Mall had ceased being used for agricultural and grazing purposes.⁹⁹ In ten more years, the population of the nation's capital city would still only be 61,122. But the cast had been set.

Public response

Throughout the process of capital building, public reaction was mixed. Among those who comprised the first national government in Washington in 1800, there was little positive sentiment. Representative Griswold of Connecticut complained that the city was "both melancholy and ludicrous, ...a city in ruins."¹⁰⁰

President John Adams' state of the union message tried to assuage the doubters: "In this city may...self-government which adorned the great character whose name it bears be forever held in veneration..."¹⁰¹

But even early advocates of the city had their reservations. President Jefferson, who believed that it held great promise for the future, nevertheless called the city "that Indian swamp in the wilderness," and retreated to Monticello whenever he could.¹⁰²

Of course, even during the earliest period, the capital did have its ardent supporters, those who shared L'Enfant's vision of a capital "worthy of the concern of a great empire."¹⁰³ But such vision takes time.

The Englishman Francis Baily, travelling through the district two years before the transfer of government, was among the many visitors who found that the reality of the town did not match the enthusiastic descriptions of the speculators. Estimating that there were no more than two

hundred houses in the area, he mocked: "The truth is, that not much more than one-half the city is cleared,—the rest is in woods; and most of the streets which are laid out are cut through these woods, and have a much more pleasing effect now than I think they will have when they shall be built...."¹⁰⁴

The Duc de La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt saw the city more optimistically, recognizing that it was well situated to become a centre for commercial activity, being located at the crossroads between North and South, East and West.¹⁰⁵

But most observers, especially during the early years, could not see past the barren streets and vast, open spaces. "To lay out the plan of a city is one thing," wrote Scottish visitor John Duncan in 1817, "to build it is another."¹⁰⁶

The frequently critical English commentator, Frances Trollope, found the city, unlike much else in American society, to her liking when she visited in 1830. Reacting to criticisms she had heard from previous visitors to the capital, she wrote:

It has been laughed at by foreigners, and even by natives, because the original plan of the city was upon an enormous scale, and a very small part of it has been as yet executed. But I confess I see nothing in the least degree ridiculous about it; the original design, which was as beautiful as it was extensive, has been in no way departed from, and all that has been done has been done well.¹⁰⁷

Alexis de Tocqueville, one of the most perceptive commentators on American society, visiting about the same time, saw the tendency to create grandiose civic plans and monuments as one of the defects of a democracy:

When the Americans planned to build a capital, they marked out a vast extent of land for a huge city; that city, even today, has hardly more inhabitants than Pontoise, but according to them it should one day hold a population of a million. They have already rooted up trees for ten miles around, lest they should get in the way of the future citizens of this imagined capital. They have erected a magnificent palace for Congress in the center of the city, and given it the pompous name of the Capitol.¹⁰⁸

Charles Dickens was also among the waves of European visitors who crossed the Atlantic in the first half of the nineteenth century to view the new nation first hand. And like many others, Dickens, who visited the capital in 1842, found much to fault in the city:

Take the worst parts of the City Road and Pentonville. ... Burn the whole down, build it up again in wood and plaster..., plough up all the roads; plant a great deal of coarse turf in every place where it ought not to be; erect three handsome buildings in stone and marble, anywhere, but the more entirely out of everybody's way the better; call one the Post Office, one the Patent Office, and one the Treasury; make it scorching hot in the morning, and freezing cold in the afternoon, with an occasional tornado of wind and dust. ... And that's Washington.
Such as it is, it is likely to remain.¹⁰⁹

But it did not remain so. Each passing year filled in further the blank spaces that the ambitious plan had left. And population growth carried with it its own set of problems. By 1867, the head of the city police force would describe the area north of the Mall as a shantytown of families packed into cardboard tenements. In that area, which would further deteriorate as freed and escaped slaves continued to migrate to the city in the wake of the Civil War, "crime, filth and poverty seem to vie with each other in a career of degradation and death...."

The reality of the city, then, did not fully match the dreams of its founders. Perhaps no ideal worth holding can ever be fully realizable. But over time, the city did develop to become the flourishing democratic capital that its founders had envisioned.

Conclusion

We have seen how a completely new capital city for the recently established United States of America developed from a virtual wilderness area in 1790 to a still-struggling but substantial city of over forty thousand in 1850. That city of 1850, in turn, was the base for the present-day international capital city of Washington, with a metropolitan area population of 3.9 million people. In reviewing the history of how this capital city came

to be, several general propositions emerge about its development and its role in the nation of which it is a part.

- (1) *It required a considerable amount of plain good luck—Machiavelli's Fortuna—to establish the foundation for the thriving capital city and national symbol that Washington, DC has become.*

Several diverse factors had to come together in order for the plans for a new capital city to be launched successfully. There were the Northern state debts, without which Northern legislators would never have even considered a capital as far south as the Potomac River. There was also Alexander Hamilton's specific plan for the national assumption of those debts, which provided a concrete bargaining chip for negotiations between Northern and Southern political leaders. Immensely important was George Washington's residence in and association with the region, making it a more palatable and acceptable choice to most Americans. Had the father of his country lived in North Carolina, for example, this particular factor inducing agreement on the site for a new capital city would have been lost. The inability of Northerners to agree on one capital site in the North was also an important factor. Ten capital moves in fifteen years were eight or nine too many. Even the chance meeting outside George Washington's office of the two political adversaries, Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson, was a stroke of luck that helped to bring an agreement about.

At a more fundamental level, if any of the requirements of political necessity, co-mingled with idealism and a quite remarkable degree of vision and foresight, had been lacking, the city would have evolved in a different direction.

- (2) *In order for the symbolic aims of the founders of the capital city to be realized, a number of practical political problems had to be solved, and a series of pragmatic political deals had to be cut. Politics preceded effective symbolism.*

The trade-off of debt assumption against for a Southern location of the capital indicated a willingness on the part of the North—though it was by no means universal—to engage in political give-and-take with the South. This was a kind of accommodation that many felt had been lacking in earlier years. A common Southern perception had been that the relationship among the states had been dominated by the North. The South's acceptance of the debt assumption program also demonstrated an increased acknowledgement of shared common interests.

The Hamilton-Jefferson linkage of the debt assumption with the problem of locating the capital, in a complex and fragile political package, was only the most salient of a number of political deals that had to be made before any of the symbolic ideals of nationhood could be given substance. Adequate funding of the new capital city by a reluctant Congress, agreement on a specific site, even the naming of the new city, were all practical problems that had to be resolved. And behind each resolution stood a deal that had been made, a compromise that had been reached.

- (3) *The influence of a small number of key individuals was decisive in giving Washington the form it has taken.*

Had George Washington's preference for the Potomac region not been clear, where would the capital be located today? Had Jefferson and Washington preferred English Baroque or French Louis XVI styling, what architectural framework would have been set? Had L'Enfant been more practical and less "grandiose" (as he was criticized for being) in his conception of the city, or had he been less zealous in the pursuit of that vision, would the avenues of the capital have been as broad, or the public spaces as open, or the public structures as accessible as they are today? As political scientists and students of history, we look for broad patterns and major trends. But we cannot ignore the impact of the "hand of the Prince," actions by those rare individuals in history who do not merely react to the world as they find it, but shape it to meet their own ideals and desires. This "hand of the Prince" effect can be particularly decisive in the early stages of any complex political enterprise.

- (4) *The geographic location of the capital city in a highly pluralized society served as an important symbol of the genuinely national focus of the new government.*

As the central focus of national political consciousness, any capital city relays important information about the outlook of a nation simply by its geographical placement. Will one region be emphasized? Will others be overlooked? Any time that a capital is placed—some might say isolated—well within the confines of one distinct region (social, cultural, or political), residents of other regions will have grounds for concern that their unique values and interests may be underrepresented. This remains as true today as it was in 1789; and the call is often heard, particularly at election time, to throw out some incumbent who has "gone native," or has absorbed the values of the "inside the beltway" mentality. In short,

geography has its own symbolic reality. This fact can be accentuated in the face of a potentially divisive sectional conflict such as existed between the North and the South in the late eighteenth century.

The “sectional controversy” in the United States, of which slavery was only the most conspicuous issue, and which extended to contrasting social and economic patterns that affected every aspect of life, was the overarching factor in national politics during the early years. It had eroded the legitimacy of the national government under the Articles of Confederation; it had nearly undone the constitutional convention. And the threat it posed to the sustained vitality of the new government continued to be of deep concern to thoughtful leaders such as Washington and Jefferson.

By means of a political bargain, they succeeded in locating the national capital in a more central geographical setting, closer to the South, than had ever been considered before. A national capital so situated, they believed, would assuage the fears of many Southerners that their values and interests were being subordinated to those of the Northern states. It would also reflect a truly national outlook on the part of the central government. For Jefferson, the southerly location was an “anodyne” for these concerned Southerners. Geography, then, could be used to resolve practical problems of governance, but it also could be used to convey a message—of equity, balance and unity—to the states. Moreover, by demonstrating the benefits of mutual co-operation and compromise, the deal itself was a symbol.

(5) *The young nation’s efforts to establish a sense of national identity, stability and continuity were severely hindered during the last quarter of the eighteenth century by the lack of a permanent seat of government. By contrast, efforts to achieve a greater national identity were greatly aided, as the nineteenth century progressed, by the emergence of a capital that could reflect the country’s political ideals and expansive possibilities.*

Ten moves for the nation’s capital between 1774, and the final transfer to Washington in 1800, suggested an unstable governmental system, and inspired little confidence in the new national government. A securely established national capital, one that could inspire awe, and even reverence, would signal a firm foundation for the new nation, and could symbolize the boundless opportunities that lay ahead. The founders of the new capital set out to build a city that would be “worthy of a great republic,” and would reflect the “greatness... which the Capital of a powerful Empire ought to have.” Aside from specific considerations of architectural and

civic design, whatever else the capital was to be, it had to display a grandeur and proportion sufficient for the majesty that the nation was expected to achieve.

The importance placed on citizens' attitudes toward the capital was reflected in George Washington's dramatic tour through the region in which the capital district was to be placed. Although the exact site had already been largely determined, Washington nevertheless travelled throughout the full length of the region. The purpose of the trip was not the selection of a site. It was the extension of participation in selecting a site, or at least the feeling of participation, to a broad segment of society. Washington therefore stopped in towns that clearly had little chance of being chosen, happily accepting petitions, listening to speeches and participating in parades. The entire process was as much an act of celebration of the new nation's forthcoming capital, as it was an effort to address the practical question of choosing a particular location.

(6) *The physical aspect that Washington, DC assumed was a reflection, in considerable measure, of the ideas and ideals held by its principal creators. Form followed values.*

L'Enfant's grand design for the new capital, heartily accepted by both Jefferson and Washington, was not simply an attempt expediently to resolve the practical problems of civic planning for a city that would be created where none had stood before. Expedience and practicality were not elements for which the plan was noted. Criticisms that the plan reflected an unduly optimistic outlook for the city's future were heard for half a century; and indeed, during much of that time those criticisms seemed to have merit. Cattle grazed on what was intended to be a great public mall, where citizens from the nation were to gather to discuss the great political questions. The wide roads, deep in mud, seemed to extend in every direction, and were largely devoid of buildings. The "city of magnificent intentions," it was called derisively. And the derisive description was true.

The vastness of the scope of the original plan was more than an indication of the faith of the founders that the city would develop into a prosperous political and commercial centre. Equally as important, the systematic planning for a future that seemed to promise limitless development symbolized the founders' strong faith in the prospects of the republic itself. An inchoate, young republic composed of a few, often discordant, states might not require a grand capital to manage its national affairs. But the founders of Washington, DC, saw it as a place where, some-

day, the administration of a “powerful empire” would be conducted. The scale of the plan represented not only expectations about the growth of the city, but about that of the nation. It was a material symbol, constructed of wood and brick and marble, of faith in the future of the United States.

The openness of the city was also one of its characteristics, an option that was available to the planners of a city that was constructed *de novo*. Public space was used by the Greeks as an area for education and the exchange of ideas, and the grand malls and public walkways of Washington were clearly designed with this ideal in mind. Moreover, the buildings would be accessible to the general public. Individuals would be able to approach and enter its structures directly, just as citizens would be able to approach the new democratic government itself. Openness, a much-used word nowadays, found early, tangible support in the physical composition of the cityscape.

If the layout of the city seemed too grand to many critics, some observers also felt that the architecture was un-American: “How foreign it all is.”

But Jefferson, the gifted amateur architect, and Washington, the “modern Cincinnatus,” looked past contemporary French and English design to the classical modes of ancient Greece and Rome. These designs of “grandeur and simplicity,” as Washington had called them, evoked images of democratic Athens and republican Rome, and reflected the widespread public sentiment that America, too, was special. The classical styling, in shining white sandstone or marble, had become a distinctive feature of the city by the third decade of the nineteenth century: appropriate for the capital of a nation calling itself the “new republic” in an age of monarchy.

(7) *The establishment of a number of distinctive cultural and educational institutions was an important step in the development of Washington. In time, as those institutions developed and matured, they gave a special character to the quality of life in the capital city.*

The Capitol building itself, one of the most recognizable structures in the political world, has come to symbolize representative democratic institutions, and has been the model for a number of parliament buildings around the world. The characteristic memorials of the city, particularly the Washington Monument, reflect the intentions of early civic planners that the city and its structures should promote patriotism, and establish an atmosphere of stability and durability, not only for the city, but for the

nation it represents.

But developments largely unrelated to politics have also been of critical importance in making Washington unique. These found an early and broad expression in the Smithsonian bequest, which has resulted, over the past century and a half, in one of the great museum complexes of the world.

By 1821, two colleges, which in time became major universities, had been established in the District of Columbia; and in later years they were joined by several other institutions of higher learning. The National Theater opened its doors on E Street in 1835, and has been a venue for legitimate theatre performances almost continuously since that date. And, of course, there was the Library of Congress, established in 1800, and destined to become one of the great national libraries of the world. These institutions, and many others, have gone a long way to define and to enrich the quality of life in the capital of the United States.

(8) *At some point, well beyond the years 1787-1850 covered in this essay, Washington passed a threshold and entered what might be called a "take-off stage" in its development as a city.*

The signs of this new stage in the city's life began to accumulate after 1950. Much of the new growth continued to occur because of Washington's position as the seat of the national government. But in the years following 1950, it became increasingly clear that Washington's development was no longer based solely on the resources of the national government. Instead the city began to generate an energy and growth of its own as new activities, new institutions and new nongovernmental enterprises began to flourish and to congregate in the area. The thought began to be expressed that "Washington is no longer just a government town." Major publishing firms, national retailers, new national sports franchises, indigenous arts institutions, and the national headquarters of large corporations all have a much stronger presence in Washington today than they did just forty years ago. Moreover, as in the other major cities of the nation, this growth has taken on a momentum of its own.

(9) *Over time, Washington has come to play one of the prime roles its founders envisaged for it as a capital city for the nation. The city has become a focal point, a national stage, where some of the great public issues of the day are dramatized and debated by the people.*

Every year an estimated twenty-one million people come to visit the city of Washington. Every four years the inauguration of the president of the United States in Washington is watched by a television audience of 150 million Americans.

The 1963 March on Washington, climaxed by Martin Luther King's "I have a dream" speech, was an integral part of the nation's movement toward passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. And many other causes and issues have been dramatized and debated in the "public space" at the core of monumental Washington. From farmers on tractors rallying to protest economic distress in the farm belt, to demonstrators—both pro and con—on abortion, a wide variety of groups have come to Washington to dramatize their viewpoints and to seek redress from their government. And, in the age of television, this use of the "public space" is now beamed to the entire nation.

* * * * *

The propositions in the preceding discussion are the major generalizations that appear to us to emerge from an examination of the first sixty years of the development of Washington, DC. Although the findings may be suggestive, we do not know, of course, the extent, if any, to which these generalizations apply to other capital cities in the world. In order to determine whether the patterns that manifested themselves in Washington prevail more generally in other cities, systematic and extensive comparative analysis would be required. We hope, however, that the propositions we have set forth may be useful as initial basepoints for further research on the development of capital cities in the nations of which they are a part.

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CULTURAL HEGEMONY AND CAPITAL CITIES

Anthony D. King

In this chapter, I want to address some of the larger forces affecting all contemporary cities, particularly capital cities, and especially those likely to affect the production of symbols and the meanings that they may have for the different populations exposed to them. Moreover, so far as all aspects and dimensions of the built environment—the totality of its physical and spatial form—have symbolic functions, I shall not privilege any particular part of it. Squatter settlements on a city's periphery have as much to say about a society and polity as the architect-designed icons in the central plaza.

Let me begin by recognizing what, at first sight, might appear to be two contradictory processes taking place in the contemporary world. The first is the increasingly articulate process of “globalization,” defined by Robertson as “the crystallization of the entire world as a single place” and the emergence of a “global human condition” (Robertson 1987a, 38; 1987b, 23). The other, in apparent opposition to this, is the multiplication of nation states, each supposedly with its own culture and, presumably, its own national capital.

I want to examine these processes in some detail to see what they tell us about cities in general and capital cities in particular, about the ways in which their symbolism and built environments are both produced and consumed. I shall begin with the question of nation-states.

Nations and capitals

To make an obvious point, capital cities are largely, if not entirely, the product of the era of nation states. Although we recognize the imperial significance of Bursa or Istanbul to the Ottomans, of Delhi to the Moguls, of imperial Vienna or London, it is the demise of great empires and the

rise of the nation state which we would acknowledge as the driving force behind the proliferation of capital cities. It is worth reminding ourselves how very recent, in the longer historical term, this process is.

In what we might call the *pre-national* phase of world history, the few thousand years up to the French Revolution, there were, at the end of the eighteenth century, some twenty of what we would now recognize as nation-states.

In the first part of what we might call the *nation-forming* phase, the 150 years from the Congress of Vienna (1815) to the formation of the United Nations (1945), the number tripled, from 23 to 67. In the second part of this phase, the forty-five years between 1945 and 1990, the number of states tripled again, from 67 to 186 (Birch 1989, 25; Knight 1989, 33), each presumably with a national capital.

Yet if, as many scholars of the nation and nationalism point out (Birch 1989, Gellner 1983, Smith 1990), the nation is the most important unit for organizing contemporary economic, political, social and cultural experience, the last fifty, and especially the last twenty years have also seen the massive rise of supranational movements and forces. Although not undermining the strength and salience of the concept of the nation as such, these have certainly weakened the power of that concept to explain different aspects of cultural reality, both in its material sense and in terms of cultural consciousness and subjectivity. I am referring here to capitalism, communism, ethnicity, race, gender, religion and, subsuming in many ways all of these, urbanization and urbanism. I would argue, therefore, that in the economic, ecological, financial, cultural (if not political) realms, we are now well into the third *postnational* phase of societal and cultural development. Some, indeed, would put it more positively and suggest that, in many respects, this is a "global" phase (Featherstone 1990).

In this relatively short period of two centuries (1800–2000) in the history of humankind, during which the concept of the nation has developed and flourished, the principal oppositional orthodoxy has come from Marx: it was that the socialist revolution would "infuse and subvert the nationalist ethos" (Smith 1990). Yet, as Smith continues, not only has this not occurred, but the very opposite has taken place: the revolution has been capitalist, not socialist. Since the Second World War, the three great cultural imperialisms of the world that, in Smith's view, have transcended nationalism have been, until 1989 at least, Soviet communism, American capitalism and Europeanism. To these, we can add three increasingly powerful and growing ideologies, racism, ethnicity, and fundamentalist religion, as well as the rising influence of the women's, peace, green and ecological movements. These ideologies are transmitted through an

all-pervasive telecommunications and media culture, which is both supranational and subnational.

The “cultural imperialisms” I have mentioned are not, of course, in any sense “popular movements”: they do not, save in exceptional circumstances, arise from “the folk”. Generally, they are technical, elitist and authoritarian. And what I shall argue is that they are largely constituted in, produced through and, especially, transmitted by metropolitan cities. I shall suggest that modern urbanism represents a distinctive form of supranational cultural hegemony and that the particular task of the national capital is somehow to subvert this, to keep hold of the idea of “national identity” and to “knock the nation into shape”.

These two processes are, of course, complementary. It is precisely the increased sense of globality in the world, of a global consciousness as such, even though expressed in “national” categories, that has resulted in the various peoples in the world and the varieties of social formations in which they exist—tribes, groups, empires—being reduced the world over to one single form of political organization, the modern nation-state. As an outgrowth of colonialism, it is the power of mimesis working on a global scale.

The logical outcome of the nation-state is a nationally organized apparatus: a system of government, administration, education, military, and, of course, a national capital. In the view of Wallerstein (1991) and others, the nation-state is the principal unit in the modern world attempting to produce, reproduce and represent “national culture”. This includes cultural policies for language, for the arts, for the organization of space (through urban and regional planning) (Rodwin 1970) constructing a system of schools, museums, galleries and archives, for representing “national” histories and cultures (as in the National Portrait Gallery), as well as the nation’s own representations of other people’s cultures (in London or New York, for example, the Museum of Asian Art). In addition, the capital city constitutes a set of symbolic architecture and urban spaces (Vale 1992).

Paradoxically, therefore, as each nation-state strives to become separate and different from the rest, by adopting the standard apparatus and policies, it also becomes increasingly the same. This is especially the case in regard to the nation’s relationship to “modernity.”

The notion of “modernity” is problematic and, regardless of the burgeoning literature, which supposedly (in the context of the “postmodern”) has addressed this issue in recent years, this is a notion that still requires to be more thoroughly deconstructed. But the present occasion is not appropriate for this task. Instead, for the time being, I shall accept the notion of “the modern” that prevails in contemporary literature.

The assumption is that the nation, and especially the capital, expresses “modernity.” This seems critically important for “new nations” (we may think of Islamabad, Lilongwe or Abuja), but also for those seeking to escape from the economic, social and spatial constraints of a colonial past (Brasilia) (Holston 1989).

But the notion of “modernity,” of course, is a chimera, constructed on a misleading, misunderstood, unacknowledged set of premises. It is a mirage, grasped at out of a particular phase in history (1890–1960). It is misunderstood because it emerges at a distinct moment in the development of the capitalist world economy, one that has organized social, cultural and economic resources in a particular way, in a particular part of the globe. Its social, urban and architectural manifestations we are well familiar with.

Globalization

The process of globalization—the consciousness of the world as a single place—occurred neither evenly, nor, in different realms, simultaneously. It is quite evident today that there is a global economy that Knight (1989, 21) distinguishes from the world economy thus: the former includes activities that are globalized, that is, products are produced to global standards and marketed globally, whereas the latter refers to the aggregate production of all nations. We are well aware of 24-hour global trading in securities, global systems of production by global corporations and global management strategies. There are global communications and scientific networks, airlines, news agencies, weather forecasting, as well as intellectual, cultural and scientific exchanges. There is also, increasingly, a global participatory, consumption-oriented popular culture, though we should recognize, as I discuss below, the distinction between globalized production and differentiated, indigenized consumption.

There is not, however, a single global polity, even though we may recognize the proliferation of international government and non-government organizations (Knight 1989, 33). I want, however, to consider in more detail the question of global culture: whether, and how far it exists, who is producing it, and where it is produced and consumed. By culture, I mean (drawing on Lash 1990, 43) a whole set of cultural goods and services that have both use values (the material properties of goods such as those of a building or an automobile) as well as sign values (signifying something, and where the signifiers can be representations, symbols or information). The places where such global cultures are being constructed

(I use cultures in the plural, as I would maintain that a number of them compete for hegemony in the modern world) are, I suggest, in the global cities.

The notion of the global or world city has become familiar since the 1980s. My choice of "global" rather than "world" stems from Knight's distinction indicated above. I see such cities as producing (cultural) goods to global standards, marketed globally, and both the cities and the institutions within them positioning themselves in relation (especially) to the global (cultural) economy.

Global cities

Let me, at this point, add some concrete information to these abstract formulations. In defining what they see as a "world city", Friedmann and Wolff, for example, are concerned with "the spatial articulation of the emerging world system of products and markets through a global network of cities." Their interest is in

the principal urban regions in this network in which most of the world's active capital comes to be concentrated, regions which play a vital part in the great capitalist undertaking to organize the world for the efficient extraction of surplus ... the world economy, defined by a linked set of markets and production units, organized and controlled by transnational capital: world cities are the material manifestation of this control, occurring exclusively in core and semi-peripheral regions where they serve as banking and financial centers, administrative headquarters, centers of ideological control and so forth (Friedmann and Wolff 1982, 309).

For such a system, Sassen-Koob (1984, 140) suggests there is need for "nodal points to coordinate and control this global economic activity." The production of highly specialized services, top-level management and control functions constitute components in what she terms "global control capability" (Sassen-Koob 1986, 88; also 1991). For Ross and Trachte such cities are "the location of the institutional heights of world-wide resource allocation," concentrating "the production of cultural commodities that knit global capitalism into a web of symbolic hierarchy and interdependence" (Ross and Trachte 1983, 393-4). Other studies suggest that such world cities tend to specialize in particular aspects of marketing, financial and other service activities, increasingly in the quaternary sector.

As we can see then, apart from Friedmann's reference to "centers of

ideological control," the principal emphasis in these accounts is not on *culture* as such but on the economic and political functions of such cities in the world economy. Friedmann combines various criteria to come up with his own table of a "world city hierarchy." These criteria include: the city as a major financial centre; headquarters for transnational corporations (including regional headquarters); rapid growth of the business services sector; an important manufacturing centre; a major transportation node; population size. Although Friedmann's hierarchy privileges the representation of economic and corporate power of a "world city," a more recent, and simpler, hierarchy has been produced by Knight (1989, 41), who classifies major cities according to the number of international organizations they host (headquarters and regional secretariats). These criteria add more of a social, political and cultural dimension to the notion of a "world city hierarchy." Combining this information with that of Friedmann, Thrift (1987) and Smith and Feagin (1987) on the number of transnational corporation headquarters in major world cities, we can construct Table 1:

World city	International organizations	World city	TNC HQs*	World city	Financial centre (1 of 4 levels)
Paris	866	New York	59	London	1
(Brussels	862)	London	37	New York	1
London	495	Tokyo	34	Paris	2
New York	232	Paris	26	Tokyo	2
Tokyo	65	Rome	6	Rome	3
Rome	445	Mexico City	1	Mexico City	3
Mexico City	69	Buenos Aires	1	Buenos Aires	4
Buenos Aires	59	Seoul	4	Seoul	4
Seoul	33				

*Transnational corporation headquarters

It is clear that, after Paris, London, New York and, possibly, Tokyo have been listed, constructing such a table becomes increasingly problematic, as some cities (Brussels, Rome or Geneva) figure highly in the "international organization" chart but not as financial centres; others (Zurich, Amsterdam) figure in two columns but not three. My table, in fact, is simply meant as a representative exercise; it is not intended to possess any inherent "truth."

In terms of my own concerns, namely, identifying the cultural influence of cities, such data, though useful, have limited value. Of much

greater import is the historical development of the city in relation to the development of the world's cultures, its economy, and its social and cultural composition in relation to its larger national, colonial, imperial and world history. We need different kinds of data to measure what Bourdieu (1984) refers to as the "cultural capital" (both in nature and "quantity") of a city. But before addressing this question, let me comment on the existing data and formulation of world city hierarchies.

First, the major global cities commanding economic and corporate power in the capitalist world economy are, with the exception of Tokyo, mainly in the increasingly postindustrial service economies of Europe and North America. Despite the huge size of many Third World cities (Mexico City 19.4 million, São Paulo 15.3 million, Cairo 13.3 million, Shanghai 12 million, Rio de Janeiro 10.2 million, Buenos Aires 9.9 million, Seoul 9.6 million, Beijing 9.5 million, Calcutta 9.2 million, Bombay 8.2 million, Tianjin 8 million, Jakarta 7.3 million, Manila-Quezon City 6.7 million) (*Times* 1989: 44)—which rank among the twenty largest cities of the world, with the possible exception of Hong Kong and Singapore—few wield economic and corporate power. However, the status of some of these as significant centres of *cultural* power and influence is another issue: Bombay, for example, in relation to the largest film industry in the world, or Tehran (6 million) in regard to religious power and influence. And such cultural influence can be out of all proportion to a country's economic strength. (I have not yet mentioned Moscow - 8 million - which is a special case.)

Second, any assessment of the cultural power of particular global cities and their ability to exercise cultural hegemony on a global scale must recognize the historical significance of colonialism in determining global city status (King 1990a). Between 1700 and 1800, when much of the modern world was beginning to be put into place by the world empires of Europe, the capitals of these empires were among the world's ten largest cities (London, Paris, Lisbon, Amsterdam, Madrid, Vienna, St. Petersburg) (Chase-Dunn 1985, 289). The surge of interest in postcoloniality (Ashcroft et al. 1989; Minh-Ha, 1989; Spivak 1990) in North America, Australia, Latin America and Africa is witness to the continuing dominance of what were once colonial languages (English, French, Spanish) and the centrality of linguistic issues to contemporary cultural politics. The continued dominance of English and French (albeit in numerous indigenous varieties) as world languages must also be linked (in terms of their cultural institutions and apparatus) to the cultural predominance of London, Paris and New York (the latter a colonial city for the first one and a half centuries of its existence). Likewise, Rio de Janeiro and Bombay owe their economic, demographic and cultural significance to their essentially

colonial histories. It should be recognized, however, as I shall discuss below, that such cities owe their cultural status and authority as much to elements of a linguistic diaspora they bring in from “outside” the boundaries of their state as to what they contribute from the “inside” of those boundaries.

I am suggesting, therefore, that these three cities, London, Paris and New York (though not only these), from a combination of economic, corporate and financial power, cultural capital and privileged languages, contribute disproportionately to a potential “global culture.” How far, therefore, do these cities exercise some form of cultural hegemony in the world system?

Cultural hegemony and world cities

Gramsci’s original notion of hegemony implied the domination of one class over another by both political and ideological means. In his conception, it was the state that was the chief instrument of the coercive force, winning popular consent by ideological domination achieved through the institutions of civil society: Church, family, educational institutions and so on (Lears 1985). What I want to ask about are the possibilities of cultural hegemony in relation to the world system as a whole, and whether this is (or could be) exercised through specific hegemonic global cities.

There are three realms in which we might consider the city to have a hegemonic cultural role: the first considers the city as a distinctive social and cultural formation; the second, the city as the site for the accumulation of cultural capital; the third, the city as built environment, as space and image.

The city as social and cultural formation

The first way in which we might think of the culturally hegemonic role of global cities is to see them as the privileged sites for the production of culture, whether in terms of values/ideas/ways of life, modes of representation, or cultural goods and services. I would like to draw here on Redfield and Singer’s classic article on “The Cultural Role of Cities” (1954) and make use of their two basic categories: the orthogenetic (the city of moral order: the city of culture carried forward) and the heterogenetic (the city of the technical order) where “local cultures are disintegrated and new

integrations of mind and society are developed." It was, for Redfield and Singer, the heterogenetic transitions that have grown with the development of "the modern industrial world-wide economy." There are various important issues here.

Major world cities manifest the highest degree of cultural plurality in terms of the numbers of significant proportions of racial, ethnic and religious groups present.

How is this cultural plurality being lived, constructed and institutionalized, either in social policies or theoretical debates? And what are the political, economic, social, racial, historical and cultural conditions prevailing in any one nation, state, or global city, that affect this issue? How, for example, in New York or Paris, do economic opportunities or colonial histories affect the nature of the pluralistic culture that is emerging?

Two points are worth noting. As I have mentioned elsewhere (King 1990b), the sites for the first significant experience of "multiculturalism," the meeting of Europe and non-Europe, of widely different races, cultures and religions, as well as very different economic and technological levels, were the old colonial cities in the global periphery (Jakarta, Cape Town, Manila, Saigon, Bangkok, Singapore, Bombay, Calcutta, etc.) and the experience of constructing cultural pluralism was totally dominated by the economic, social and political conditions of colonialism.

Only since the end of the colonial era (effectively in the last 30 to 40 years) has the possibility of creating a "truly" global and multicultural, multicontinental city moved to a handful of world cities, mainly at the core: Los Angeles, New York, London, Paris, Amsterdam, Hong Kong (all of them, it should be noted, either ex-colonial or ex-metropolitan). Even then, their ethnic/racial/cultural/religious composition is strongly determined by the particular histories and geographies of the world empires to which they belonged. (There is not, to my knowledge, any utopian city—maybe Auroville in India?—in which a proportionate number of representatives of every nation, race, religion, live together, amicably or otherwise, to establish some model of "global culture").

It is especially on the basis of both the cultural composition and the cultural production of these cities that contesting theorizations, as well as practices and social policies (in terms of education, housing, welfare or planning) are being made; in the process, they are *actively* constructing notions of race, ethnicity and gender. These will result from a combination of ideology, history, policy (the allocation of resources) and, not least, modes of production. Few recent instances of commodification can rival, in the capitalist world, the rapidly growing market in ethnicity. (The most

rapidly growing city is Ethni-City). Others will have noted that the demise of authoritarian communism has resulted in increasing antisemitism and other xenophobias.

In this sense, specific cities—Los Angeles, New York, Paris, London—become the privileged sites for the construction of transnational cultures; privileged because they operate in “world” languages. For where cities on the periphery are still actively engaged in nation building, global cities in the core (their economic structures increasingly oriented to global advertising, global marketing, global management strategies) are actively engaged in world building.

The city as site for the accumulation of cultural capital

The second sphere in which we might think of cultural hegemony and global cities is in regard to the massively expanding realm of the global cultural economy, that realm of ideas, images, ideology and signs that forms an ever-increasing proportion of postindustrial economies. The sector that produces cultures, the information, advertising and communication industries, the world of film, video, TV, disc, tape, satellite, cable, publishing, press, telematics, is, in the economies of world cities, increasingly oriented to foreign markets. In the mid-1980s, the foreign business of the top ten American advertising agencies accounted for half their revenues.

I am making a distinction here between the technological hardware of contemporary culture — the TV sets, CD players, ghetto blasters, still or video cameras, and cassette players (the means of mechanical reproduction) — and the software — the packaged sounds, visual images, tactile sensations, exotic tastes and even smells. Initially made for a culturally plural domestic market, the export of culture is now big business. But it is not only culture in the sense of arts and music, but also economic, educational, management and design culture: the world of “junk bonds”, “financial instruments”, (Sassen 1991), forms of knowledge, theories of the world (“global culture”, “world system”). The move by institutions of research and higher education into the world market in education leads to the transnationalizing of the curriculum; the growth in exports of architectural, planning and design services (King 1990b), as professions position themselves in relation to global clients, leads either to what are perceived as transnational constructions of culture (“postmodern architecture”) or the mobilization of the pseudo-vernacular (as in programs for revitalizing “Islamic Design”).

These are all examples of the “cultural take-away”, the export of cultural goods and signs. Other forces encourage cultural production for the “eat here” industry, particularly the massive expansion of tourism on a world scale. Tourism lives on cultural difference. If difference does not exist, it has to be invented: ethnicity is commodified, history is excavated, and the vernacular remobilized. In 1950, some 25 million people travelled beyond their own national borders; in less than forty years (to the mid-1980s) this number had grown by thirteen times, to 325 million (Knight 1989, 27).

But culture has become increasingly significant in a second, more existential sense; in Wallerstein’s terms (1991), it has become the “ideological battleground of the world-system”; contesting opinions are held about the world’s cultural future and the strength of various viewpoints and interest groups within it. And whilst these have an economic dimension, they are not confined to this. We may think of the Rushdie affair and, not least, current issues concerning ethnicity, racism, gender and Islam.

In a chapter headed “Towards a Transnational Space,” Mattelart and Delcourt (1984) suggest that the increasing commercialization of the cultural sector and the parallel development of the new technologies of communication have projected culture into the heart of industrial and political structures. In no way different from other commodities in the global marketplace, culture has been internationalized through competition: as the media’s traditional function of preserving the *res publica* is eroded by considerations of cost and profitability, deregulation subverts public systems of transmission. As with the export of other advanced producer services, the logic of marketing culture is to make it into a global product.

The city as built environment

The third realm in which we can conceive of the city as having a culturally hegemonic role is that of the city as built environment. Cultures, as the distinctive products of particular economic, political and social conditions, and also of modes of production, are inscribed in space: in landscapes, in building and urban form, in the physical and spatial forms of the built environment. Social categories are spatially expressed. Cultures are constituted in space just as the spaces, the images, the buildings, actively engage in the constitution of the culture.

In this context, therefore, we can discuss at least part of the topic under the theme of architecture, urbanism and the mode of production. We can, in the first instance, establish sufficient common as well as

distinctive features of specific urban formations at different phases in the development of the capitalist world economy: the city (the built environment) of mercantile capitalism, the colonial port city, the city of industrial or monopoly capitalism, the postcolonial city, and so on (King 1990).

In the development of the capitalist world economy from the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries, there are three features that I want to highlight.

The first, for which we are largely indebted to David Harvey (1985), is the intrinsic connection between urbanization and capitalism, whether in relation to the role of cities in the accumulation process, or to the circulation and investment of capital in the built environment.

The second, which I am taking from Immanuel Wallerstein (1991), is the increasing importance of the nation-state in the organization of culture (through education, museums, or the construction and mobilization of “history”) to construct national cultural identities and their modes of representation. This is the period of the “invention of tradition.” (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983).

The third, which I am taking from Foucault, is the array of what were to become the transnational discourses of “science,” of rationality, stemming from the Enlightenment and the capitalist-industrialist transformation of Europe—the discourses of medicine, of science, of “man”—and what is important for our discussion here, of architecture, planning and urban design. These were to form the foundations on which notions of the “modern” were grounded (Rabinow 1989), the norms and forms of the modern city.

It is with the arrival of what is generally, though inadequately, termed the “modern Western” city (in fact, the city of industrial, commercial and colonial capitalism) that we should begin our discussion of cultural hegemony, because it is in this so-called “modern” city (I use the term as a short-cut), with its prerequisite of a market in land, that the cultural logic of early and monopoly capitalism, and of Western rationality and humanism, is to be found. Harnessed with specific technology and energy systems, this particular mode of production produced a form of urban space and built environment that, more than was ever the case before, gave rise to what was taken as a “transcultural form”. This is not to say that its “cultural aspects” were eliminated; nor am I arguing for a simple technological determinism.

In both the core and the periphery of the capitalist world economy, colonialism was often, though not always, the chief instrument in the construction of this new form of urbanism. It also included the various discourses of sanitation, housing, social control and, ultimately, urban

planning to which urbanism gave rise: in the core, it contributed to the markets and generation of surplus on which the expansion of metropolitan urban culture was based; in the periphery, it provided often, though not always, the circumstances by which the norms and forms of the “modern” capitalist city were introduced as a tool to incorporate the economy and society into the world economy. The railroad station was probably the first modern building type to exist on a global scale, an early harbinger of what was later to become a global, urban-architectural and spatial culture, a culture that was to include the high-rise skyscraper at the centre, the notion of planning, and the single family suburban homes on the periphery, despite its numerous and extensive variations.

I want to speak about this “transnational urban culture” at three levels: the first, at the level of reality, is the production of urban space within the capitalist world economy; the second, at the level of discourse, asks what are the official and nonofficial discourses that both produce the physical and spatial reality of the city and inform the way in which it is consumed, interpreted and experienced; and the third, and least understood level, considers the effects of the physical and spatial environment as a hegemonic device for the production of culture.

Hegemony, in Gramsci’s words, is the “spontaneous” consent given by the mass to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant group (Lears 1985). One of the most obvious examples of this “direction” is the control over the production and utilization of space, and the built environment in general, by dominant groups (Markus 1982, 1986).

What Gramsci was concerned about was the way in which ideas function in society, not least as mechanisms of control. One way of pursuing this question is to see how ideas are embodied in language, and how language and linguistic categories are mapped out in space.

Here, we might refer to a whole body of work that has emerged in the last few years and focuses on the way specific cultures get territorialized, inscribed in space, mapped out, and literally grounded. Buildings—schools, mental asylums, prisons, libraries, museums—as socially constructed institutions reproduce in their very conception, as well as their internal spatial orders, both the ideologies and the social and cultural categories of groups in power: buildings are classifying devices that map the world of dominant groups. Beyond the building, the different spaces of the city, the street, the park, the ghetto, the suburb, not only represent a given social order but, in their physical, spatial and symbolic forms, actually participate in the construction of social and cultural existence. They are part of the discourse on society, which is, to a large extent, constituted both in and through the buildings and spaces it creates (Markus 1982, 1986).

The built environment acts as a grid, a taxonomic force that impresses the ideology of the dominant culture onto the urban landscape. If only in a subliminal sense, the built environment acts as a coercive, disciplinary force, a context for the construction of subjectivity. As Jackson Lears points out, Gramsci anticipated Foucault's emphasis on the role of "discursive practice" in reinforcing domination; he realized that "every language contains the elements of a conception of the world ... The available vocabulary helps mark the boundaries of permissible discourse, discourages the clarification of social alternatives and makes it difficult for the dispossessed to locate the source of their unease, let alone remedy it." These comments can be directly translated into spatial terms.

It is the dominant ideology that also largely produces the cultural symbols, symbols that have a political function in reinforcing existing structures. Both in the cities of the core as well as those transferred to the periphery, the built environment as a whole becomes perhaps the most significant cultural symbol in the discourse on "modernity." Architecture and the organization of urban space become a legitimizing language in the process of social transformation (nowhere is this better seen than in cities such as Rio de Janeiro or Bombay), where the powers of capital, embodied in material form, dominate and subordinate the environments of the dominated. Just as "people don't speak language; the language speaks them," so also, architectural language, created by capital and real estate interests, speaks architects.

Gramsci argued for this centrality of language in cementing a given group's prestige and cultural leadership; I would argue that this goes beyond formal speech, beyond discourse, to the much larger symbolic universe of urban space, or urban image and building forms. The built environment is a hegemonic symbolic universe. Who controls space helps to control consciousness: space is a powerful instrument of cultural hegemony; hegemonic culture does not depend on brainwashing the masses but, rather, on making some forms of experience more available than others (Lears 1985, 81).

This then is my final model for considering the way in which cultural hegemony may manifest itself in world cities. As built and spatial form, the archetypical capitalist city, along with the theories, knowledges and images it has generated, presents to the rest of the world the model against which it reacts, or with which it is compared, the "norm" from which to aberr (New York City becomes the image of the archetypical "the modern").

Capitals and Symbols

In the preceding pages, I have highlighted the globalizing, even hegemonic forces that, in the way they affect metropolitan cities and modify the identity and consciousness of those who live in them, increasingly contest the idea of the nation and consequently undermine any clear-cut notion of a “national capital.” My thesis, in short, is that major cities, particularly global cities, are subverting the older idea of “the nation.”

Other contemporary scholars have identified similar circumstances, though they emphasize different solutions. For Knight, the task for the major metropolis is “to position itself in the global society, to perceive and respond to the opportunities created by globalization” (1989, 19).

Are these two tasks, serving the nation and serving the world, reconcilable? Moreover, what do these two roles suggest for the theoretical understanding of cities: What is their social structure? What is the society to which they belong? For which people do they have meaning? What do these two roles suggest for questions of symbolism or even planning and urban design? I will conclude by replying briefly to some of these questions, but first I wish to draw attention to some ideas relevant to the concerns of this volume.

Querrian (1986) makes a distinction between the metropolis and the capital according to the following characteristics:

The Metropolis

1. Is not a centre and has no centre. It is made up of networks through which the world economy circulates.
2. Unlike the capital, it has no identity to preserve—it feels free to exploit all regions of the world.
3. Is often more maritime than continental.

The Capital

1. Is a centre that accumulates and consumes national wealth.
2. Has an identity to preserve, and is primarily concerned with subjugating the national territory and population to a common heritage.
3. Is necessarily more bound to hinterland.

- | | |
|---|---|
| 4. Works to free economic flows from all obstacles. | 4. Seeks to control the economic flux so as to reproduce state apparatus and social hierarchy. |
| 5. Is placed where people congregate, where migrants find predetermined destination. Puts an incongruous mix of beings into circulation. Has its own mode of space-time for those to whom principles of sovereign people and nation do not apply. A place of experimentation. | 5. Centre of capital represents political power by which it has subjugated its territory: is sporadically busy but vacant at night. Not heart of metropolitan life. |

It would seem evident that, especially in the last three decades, few capitals have been able to maintain these distinctions that Querrian suggests. It has not been possible to extract the economic from the political, nor the cultural and ethnic from the social. All cities have had, of necessity, to look to their economic base and global restructuring, in terms of the internationalization of both capital and labour, a reconsideration that has had major impacts on the form, space and social composition of all cities. In the "Western" city at least, the nation's original "indigenous" inhabitants have increasingly moved to the suburbs; industrial, commercial and residential activities are all leaving city centres (Prud'homme 1989).

Increasingly, the inner city is occupied by new migrants, foreign workers and the social and ethnic sectors of the population who, both culturally and politically, are greatly under-represented in the counsels of the nation. In Prud'homme's estimation, foreign workers and their families represent 25 percent of the population in major European cities, which are coming increasingly to resemble those of the United States (Prud'homme 1989, 53). The capital supposedly represents the nation, yet the nation is not represented by the social and ethnic composition of the capital: ethnic minorities, single women, the elderly, the poor, single parents and the disadvantaged. The monuments and images of the capital are consumed by the tourist gaze.

Old identities of class and nation are being replaced by a multiplicity of subjectivities, many of them relatively recently learnt. Dolores Hayden,

walking round Los Angeles, discovered over 80 percent of statues in the city were male. Few cities with significant black populations in Britain, the United States and, no doubt, elsewhere are without Nelson Mandela halls, or other dedications. The landscapes of modern corporate capital line city fringes all over the world: in city centres, the icons of capital establish their own identities (Zukin 1991).

The social structure of contemporary cities, including national capitals, has become increasingly problematic to unravel, as sociologists are discovering. With increased attention to the spatial dimensions of society, "society" itself as a concept is called into question (Giddens 1989). Societies are defined less by the territorial limits of the nation-state and more by their place in an international division of labour structured by long-term historical (and colonial) connections (King 1990a): Turks moving between Turkey and Germany; Indians, between the Gulf, Britain and the United States and Canada; the British, between Australia, North America or the Middle East. In these contexts, meanings, like identities, are multiple.

Ironically, therefore, the most successful capital city will be the one that, in the forms and spaces of its built environment, in its allocation of its resources, most successfully combines the symbols of its national past with representations of the rapidly emerging conditions of contemporary globality.

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Appendix One

The world city hierarchy

Core Countries		Semi-Periphery Countries	
Primary	Secondary	Primary	Secondary
London†***	Brussels†*		
Paris†** Milan*			
Rotterdam	Vienna†*		
Frankfurt Madrid†*			
Zurich			Johannesburg*
New York***	Toronto*	São Paulo*	Buenos Aires†***
Chicago**	Miami*		Rio de Janeiro***
Los Angeles***	Houston*		Caracas*
	San Francisco*		
Mexico City†***			
Tokyo†***		Sydney*	Singapore†*
Hong Kong**			
			Taipei†*
			Manila†**
			Bangkok†**
			Seoul†**

Source: Friedmann (1986) "The World City Hypothesis", *Development and Change* 17 (1): 72

Note: † National Capital.

Population size categories (recent estimates referring to metro-region)

* 1-5 million;

** 5-10 million;

*** 10-20 million

COMMENTARY: CAPITAL CITIES AS SYMBOLIC RESOURCES*

Gilles Paquet

In the first session of this colloquium ("What is a Capital City?"), participants examined three questions: what is a capital city? What are the role and activities of capital cities? And, what are the links between material and symbolic resources in capital cities? It became clear, during the discussion, that a capital city is simultaneously three separate entities. First, it is a *sociopolitical forum*, stylized to provide a locus where the citizenry can take part in and shape a national discourse, and to serve as a social learning mechanism for government. Secondly, *it is an economic production and distribution centre for public goods and services*, which has either evolved or been designed to perform these tasks or functions for a nation-state. To these two aspects of capital cities as material going concerns, one must add, thirdly, that a capital city is also *a pattern of symbolic resources* recognized by citizens and, it is to be hoped, echoing the ethos and values of the population.

The sociopolitical communication role, the economic functions and the symbolic vocation of capital cities are not necessarily calling for the same type of physical/material base: efficient form in one dimension may not translate into effectiveness in another. Moreover, these three dimensions are affected differently by a number of transnational (geographical, technological and sociological) forces that impact on large cities everywhere. Consequently, it is rare that all these forces converge in a single urban form for a capital city, and some have suggested that capital cities are and can only be the unintended consequences of forces that do not lend themselves to simple modelling

Much has been written on the economic significance of the social technology of governmental and bureaucratic functions in capital cities,

* The assistance of Anne Burgess in the preparation of this paper is gratefully acknowledged.

and on the constraints this technology imposes on its spatial form. Much has also been written on the powerful planning powers that central governments have used to shape capital cities functionally, if not always aesthetically, to get them to perform well in these capacities. And much has been written about the rich national institutional cauldron that exists in capital cities, shaping the centralized communication system that makes up the polity, giving voice to the citizens and improving their communicative competence. Much less has been written about capital cities as symbolic resources. Such dimensions are quietly acknowledged as "social capital" (Coleman 1988), facilitating the despatch of the economic and communication functions of capital cities. However, much too little is made of the importance of the language of belonging, of the national symbols and myths embodied (well or not) in capital cities, and of the crucial importance of these intangible symbolic resources to the effectiveness of state strategies and to the workings of civil societies.

Four papers on symbolic resources

This session ("Capitals: Symbolism and the Built Environment") has challenged the hypothesis that capital cities are the outcome of random processes. It has shown clearly that *form follows values*, and that, while there may be many different ways for values to shape the form of a capital city, these are not innumerable. It has also been suggested that the links between values and form lend themselves to a number of "*modest general propositions*" about the site of capital cities, their architectural style and design, and their capacity to adapt and adjust to external constraints without loss of continuity.

- (1) Anthony Sutcliffe posed the basic question: Is the *form* of capital cities an echo of the underlying values of societies? He conjectured picturesquely that it was, in a way.
- (2) Theodor Hanf chronicled the power of conviviality, the resilience of the vernacular reality of Beirut and the capacity of this reality to rule the roost under extraordinary circumstances.**
- (3) Milton Cummings and Matthew Price threw some light on the process of producing Washington as a capital city, and on the extent to which the resolution of practical problems (technical, political, etc.) served

** Hanf offered this paper in lieu of one not available. It does not appear in this volume, but may be obtained directly from the author.

the construction of a capital city that symbolizes the country well; in the process, they generated no less than seven “modest general propositions.”

- (4) Anthony King put the notion of capital city in the context of a world that is increasingly globalized, and he analyzed the paradox of capital cities attempting to reflect national idiosyncrasies at a time when they tend to become more and more alike (sociologically, architecturally, materially, etc.) as a result of worldwide forces.

The underpinning game

These four vignettes have emphasized, in different and often oblique ways, the centrality of symbolic resources in the “special life of capital cities.” Sometimes this special life is fitted into neoclassical templates, but, at other times, it is a cultural artifact emanating from changing mixes of populations. Sometimes it is the result of a large number of bargains and deals with a mix of intended and unintended moves that realize what no planner could have accomplished; while at other times, many of those local forces are moulded by transnational sweeps that succeed in making a baroque city look and sound different, even though materially it may appear rather similar to many others. In each successful capital city, a soul has been acquired through a variety of means, and the capital city as a pattern of symbols takes on a life of its own that corresponds to a sort of social armistice among the locals, the nationals and the denizens of the world. The locals benefit a great deal from the centrality of the capital and redistribute material resources toward themselves; the nationals consume symbolic resources, helping to bind the nation together; while both groups export some of their tax burden to the denizens of the world who have a taste for exotic travel.

This non-zero-sum game is often neither explicitly analyzed nor even acknowledged. Each cluster would appear determined to maintain the illusion that they are the only winners, while expending much effort to hide their gains from all the others. The locals complain about the national and international constraints imposed on the development of their city, while raking in the tangible benefits in terms of quality of life; the nationals complain about the excessive costs of the pomp and circumstance that surround national celebrations, while boasting with national pride as soon as they leave the national territory; the international community complains about the parochialism and exploitation that mar capital cities,

while overdosing on thrills in Ottawa, Washington or Paris. The ensuing cacophony in the forum has led us to regard capital cities as the most disingenuous of places: there is double and triple entendre everywhere, and one is never sure whether *mise en scène* and window-dressing may not have put a moustache or a mask on real life.

The accumulation of cultural capital, the need to cater to exogenous desires much more than to local needs, the sense of having to *faire ressemblant* while hiding all the warts, and the obligation to arbitrate among widely divergent interests have made capital cities the paradise of brokers-cum-planners, for the stakes are high. The major tools of these planners appear to be engineering or aesthetic in flavour (bridges, monuments, parks, etc.) and involve mainly material resources, but their real levers are in the world of representations and symbolic resources: theirs is the task of persuading one or the other stakeholder that some addition to the body would provide an aggrandizement of the soul, but what is at stake is the soul. Yet because they are more exoconscious than other cities, capital cities become surreptitiously managed by bureaucracies that feel answerable to the world much more than to the locals or the nationals. As a result, capital cities that do not have a strong vernacular may be easily disfigured, to the point that neither the nationals nor the locals (intimidated though they might be by what they see in the mirror presented to them) can no longer recognize themselves in that mirror.

Analyzing both realities and representations

An analytical framework is “a set of relationships that do not lead to specific conclusions about the world of events” but can serve in organizing in a preliminary way the object of the inquiry; it is “the mold out of which specific types of theories are made” (Leibenstein 1976). This is the sort of scaffolding that is necessary at this stage, whether dealing with capital cities or other major national issues (Paquet 1991).


One must distinguish two playing fields. The first-order reality (what we call the “terrain of realities”) is the material socioeconomy: it connotes the flows of material resources generated under different technical, legal, social, political or economic arrangements, through which capital cities perform their economic, political and social functions. The second-order reality (what we call the “theatre of representations”) connotes the images and interpretations of, and the conversations about, material reality that constitute the symbolic order and that underpin decisions by different social actors to act in certain ways and to value goods or agency differently.

Myths and values play an important role in shaping the representations and perceptions of social actors.

The theatre of representations is not a simple mirror image of the terrain of realities. Distortions, generalizations, focalizations, and sheer fantasizing are more present in the construction of these representations and interpretations than (for instance the framing of first-order reality) by so-called first-order realities themselves (Twersky and Kahneman 1981).

To stylize this dual approach to the socioeconomic terrain, we use a simple scheme called *le tablier des pouvoirs* (Tenière-Buchot 1986-87). This framework, sketched in Figure 1, marks out the "terrain of realities" and the "theatre of representations," and positions the principal actors in a socioeconomic game at the four corners of a rectangle according to their degree of influence and dependency: from bottom to top, the influence of an actor increases, from left to right, its dependency increases.

Figure 1 Tenière-Buchot's tablier des pouvoirs



At the northeast corner lies the citizenry. It is the most influential group in the sense that it bestows legitimacy and is the source of power, but it is also the most dependent group for it is myopic, ill-informed and, therefore, at the mercy of information or disinformation generated both by government officials and the clerisy in trying to enlist its support. At the northwest corner is the locus of government: usually the most influential and least dependent group, for it is in possession of political legitimacy and is master in the allocation of public resources. In the capital

cities game, there are obviously many levels of government (or jurisdictions) that may have different degrees of influence and independence. At the southeast corner is the clerisy (planners, urbanologists, etc.), the group most dependent on the citizenry and governments for largess. Nominally, it is not very influential, but it has a great deal of power through its capacity to affect representations, and to mould the opinions of both governments and the citizenry. Finally, the media are at the southwest corner. Nominally, the most independent but least influential group, the media, echo somewhat what is happening on the terrain of realities; however, even though censured by the prince, courted by the citizens and pressured by the clerisy, this is a group that can also play a key opinion-moulding role through its selective reporting.

Any approach that puts exclusive emphasis on the material economy of capital cities makes no allowance for interference through the echo box of representations. Yet this constructed second-order reality or symbolic order has a dramatic influence (albeit indirect) on the allocation of material and financial resources. This symbolic order emerges from and shapes the forum. "The construction of a symbolic order ... entails the shaping of cultural traditions: values and norms on the one hand; customs and ways of doing things on the other. Perhaps the most important component of this cultural way of life is that embedded in the forms and styles of public institutions ... (that) become incorporated in systems of ideas that are symbolically reinforced in laws, official speeches and documents, constitutional provisions and their public discussion, advertisements, and other public relations behaviors" (Breton 1984).

The symbolic order is not created in a sociopolitical vacuum, and it does not translate into just any architectural or design form. The presumption that either a perfect market or a perfect forum can be relied upon to provide all the necessary socioeconomic coordination, and to command the form of the capital city, is indefensible (Elster 1986). A more interesting approach recognizes explicitly the imperfections of market and forum and the way these imperfections affect the final outcome. For as a result of these imperfections, norms (i.e., legitimate expectations about action), conventions, laws and so forth are constructed (Coleman 1987). The need to identify the dynamics that drive the debates and the construction of expectations and norms in such imperfectly competitive public arenas become concerns as central as the understanding of the structure and performance of imperfectly competitive markets, if one is to probe the construction of capital cities.

Second-order realities and symbolic resources

The construction of second-order reality in the theatre of representations is collectively arrived at. As a collective decision, it may be viewed as a process of conflict resolution, as the interplay of different games being played by different social actors. Trebilcock et al. have identified a number of games being played out at the same time (the electoral game, the political game, the bureaucratic game, the special-interest group game, the media game, etc.), but they have emphasized almost exclusively the interactions among these games on the terrain of the material socio-economy (Trebilcock et al. 1982). What must be added to this material and financial playing field is the fact that, since none of the groups involved are really capable of apprehending any "so-called objective reality," these groups construct their own "second-order realities" (Watzlawick 1988).

Two central elements are at the core of the construction of representations by the different groups involved in public issues: (1) the vision-distorting glasses all individuals wear because of the experience with which they anchor their perceptions (Kahneman and Twersky 1979) and (2) the attentional deployment of the group: "the structure of attention forms the network of communication between individuals, and lies at the heart of the system of resource deployment" (Berger 1989). The attention of the citizenry is the scarce resource that opinion moulders compete for; mobilizing the attention of the public is the way to frame and reframe problems and issues.

The dynamics of communication in the forum centre on the problem of attention deployment: far from being the locus of perfect competition between ideas and attention-grabbing issues, the forum is pregnant with important synergies. The media and clerisies play on these, and tend to dramatize issues to ensure that they remain in the forefront of the collective psyche. To do so, they draw on the sociocultural background of the citizens, on their myths, sensitivities, propensities and fears, to ensure that the citizens are mobilized (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988).

6. The co-evolutionary development of capital cities

One of the points one might derive from the four papers presented in this session is that there appears to be a fundamental hegemony of vernacular forces over the will of planners in successful capital cities. Yet there is also a subtle acknowledgment that discontinuous planning interventions

are necessary to enable capital cities to survive in a changing world and to graduate to the realm of world cities with a special character. It is as if capital cities were evolving most of the time in a corridor—governed by the forces of the market, local and national politics in the forum and a limited dose of national symbolism—but as if there were the need, from time to time, for drastic interventions, *actions structurantes* that allow capital cities to escape from the tyranny of small decisions.

L'Enfant in Washington and Gréber in Ottawa (to mention only two) have had determining impacts. But their actions had to be planned non-permanent surgical interventions designed to reframe the image of a city in the case of Ottawa and a rural landscape in the case of Washington, to shift their development paths and to give them a renewed capacity to echo the vernacular forces. Had it been the case that the *actions structurantes* were not adopted and ingested by the vernacular reality, the efforts of these planners would have failed as miserably as those of landscapers, whose paved walkways are ignored while everyone continues to walk the beaten paths. Anthony Sutcliffe's argument about the "superiority" of the baroque style for capital cities is potent to the extent that he can show that this mould has allowed a number of different vernaculars to express themselves effectively. The case of Beirut is interesting for its apparent lack of any need for planning intervention in a world where the ground is in motion, and where the changes commanded by the vernacular forces are more than enough to test the absorptive capacity of the population. In that context, the Cummings/Price propositions are nothing less than an attempt to codify the dynamics of *the co-evolutionary development of the social, economic, political and symbolic dimensions of capital cities*—the capital city evolving in a process of intercreation with its local/national contexts, very much like the co-evolution of birds with plants they feed on, and vice versa (Norgaard 1984). But Cummings and Price also try (1) to understand what is the right balance between the myopic, individual competitive race toward efficiency *and* the need for a collective and even coercive search for resilience through public management in the evolution of capital cities, and (2) to find the right timing in switching from one regime to the other and back. Ilan Vertinsky has shown that this maintenance of both an appropriate balance and an effective capacity to switch very quickly from one regime to the other is the source of resilience for a whole range of systems ranging from animal populations (slugs) to modern socioeconomic systems (Japan) (Vertinsky 1987).

The co-evolutionary development of capital cities with their environment is the result of the interactive evolution of the sociomaterial and symbolic orders—of the forum, the market and symbols—in such a way

as to allow the best possible fit between capital city and country, given external constraints (Norgaard 1984). It is a sequential process based, among other things, on some sort of *moral contract*, defining the conditions under which the private or the collective regime will prevail, and what mix of local, national and international preferences will rule the roost. There is constant danger that one of the regimes will become hegemonic. In the case of capital cities, the bureaucracies charged with the relevant social carpentering have an extraordinary power, based on a large number of constituencies, and the likelihood is that they will all be at odds about the future of the city. The role of such bureaucracies in ensuring that the capital city will echo the country's racial, ethnic, religious and cultural mix is constantly challenged by the need to respond to legitimate local concerns and to the transnational forces shaping world cities.

Capital cities have the central challenge of internalizing as much of the national diversity as possible, without running the risk of decaying into an ethnic zoo, or a schizophrenic entity showing a bright face to the world while hiding its dark vernacular. The soft propositions of Cummings and Price make much of "plain good luck," practical politics, key individuals, a pluralized geographical base, political will and the practical use of "distinctive cultural and educational institutions" as important formative forces. They say little, however, about the mechanism of switching from local myopic market forces to politico-bureaucratic planning or back.

The carrying capacity of capital cities

In the animal world, the forces underpinning the switch to collective management modes are basic instincts; in human systems, these forces emanate from the theatre of representations, for, as Joan Robinson used to say, "from the standpoint of evolution, it seems plausible to say that ideology is a substitute for instinct." Planning as an ideology may take many forms, which range all the way from scientific management to social mobilization and to the recovery of political community (Friedmann 1987). Nevertheless, whatever the ruling ideology of planning in a capital city may be the effectiveness of planning depends on the capacity of the public arenas and institutions in the capital city (in which problems are framed and collectively defined) to carry out the required actions.

To be able to develop such a carrying capacity, the social architecture of capital cities needs to embody an ideology that will call for hierarchies in time of disorientation, and to have a socio-administrative infrastructure imbued with this ideology. Capital cities need, therefore, at a minimum,

a legitimizing mission statement that can only be forged in the forum, and a major investment in the development of “communities of operatives” that will provide the capital city with a large echo box for the issues that top the agenda (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988).

An ecology of capital cities as public arenas and agencies of opinion-moulding (where the public discourse defines, selects, adapts and reverberates the new directions) would reveal the need for a basic prerequisite. The capital city or region must first come to be regarded as a legitimate *national symbol* per se. This is a *sine qua non* without which nothing can be accomplished. Yet, unless some long-run, forward-looking, imaginative thinking is incorporated into *projets mobilisateurs* capable of attracting the right amount of attention and interest in the forum, and the right force of resolve from the political machine, the capital city will never be a national symbol. This requires “intellectual entrepreneurs of ideology” (as Douglass North calls them) capable of providing some original *projet mobilisateur* (North 1981).

One tempting *projet mobilisateur* for capital cities is the role of an agency of transfer payments. As Jane Jacobs explains in the final paragraphs of her second-last book, capital cities remain “vivacious longest” because they thrive on what she calls “transfers of decline” (military production, inter-regional transfers, promotion of trade between advanced cities and backward ones—all activities likely to drain cities of their creative energy). Jacobs suggests, however, that behind this “busyness at ruling, a capital city of a nation or an empire, vivacious to the last, at length reveals itself as being a surprisingly inert, backward and pitiable place” (Jacobs 1984).

Capital cities capable of building on symbolic resources, rather than on transactions of decline, are likely to develop a much greater carrying capacity. While there is no simple recipe for building up this sort of capacity, some basic points deserve to be made, for they transpired from the four papers:

- (1) Capital cities are central places built not on commercial or industrial centrality but on a centrality of cultural power. The sociocultural underground of the national economy is an important basis of comparative advantage: practical use of culture and *esprit de corps* is fundamental in a large number of successful adaptations of national economies to ensure international competitiveness (Stoffaes 1987). Capital cities play a key role in this function, much like the central core of a marshalling yard; but they also play a key role as the source of cultural mobilization and the reframing of the national reality to

make the capital city the place, not where things necessarily happen, but where things are initiated, facilitated or co-ordinated.

- (2) The physical form of the built environment has a direct rapport with this cultural and informational centrality. The capital city must build the psychosociological space necessary to set *the stage for the production and allocation of symbolic resources* that underpin the leadership role it wishes to take on. Unless capital cities can capture the attention of the nationals, and provoke a certain amount of exaltation, there is little hope that they will become public arenas of consequence or make practical use of cultural features to promote the nation's competitiveness. What this physical space should be, and how it might be designed, is a matter of experimentation; some thirty years ago, Henri Lefebvre examined, and labelled *utopie expérimentale*, "l'exploration du possible humain, avec l'aide de l'image et de l'imaginaire, accompagnée d'une incessante critique et d'une incessante référence à la problématique donnée dans le 'réel' (Lefebvre 1961). In such experimentations, the central forces are the self-reinforcing mechanisms and the positive feedbacks generated by agglomeration economies, for they are establishing historical path-dependence but may also be amenable to planning (Arthur 1988).
- (3) Reframing the notion of capital city to endow it with the quality of a national symbol, and producing and allocating the symbolic resources necessary for it to perform its role, is what we call *working at modifying representation*. This reframing is undoubtedly the trigger mechanism, but it requires both (1) the "communities of operatives" capable of channelling this force, and (2) a physical setting that acts as both an appropriate *encadrement* and a booster of the underlying ideology. This pair of criteria underlines the central importance of a complex of physical spaces and public arenas that is likely to affect the nationals, and provide them with the possibility of creating a certain kind of identity. To create such a social and physical environment, one has to step back and plan an intervention, in the manner that therapists plan their work to reframe their clients' representations: they try to modify the mechanism of production of representations. This planning calls most of the time for a change in the rules of the game, because these rules shape the actors' representations.

An example of such an intervention was the National Capital Commission's (NCC) widely publicized shift from an emphasis on the physical

aspects to a primary concern with the symbolic dimensions of Canada's national capital. It did not in any way reduce the NCC's scale of operations in the Ottawa area; it simply allowed the NCC to define clearly its philosophy in a mission statement and the citizens to interpret and make sense of the NCC's various interventions, thereby legitimizing such actions and feeding the cumulative process of identity building. The practical use of public arts, the design of public places readily usable by visitors and the multiplication of symbolic public works have all made Ottawa into a more meaningful capital for the citizenry.

Conclusion

The four papers presented in this session, and the animated discussion that followed, emphasized the multivocational nature of capital cities and the need to escape from an image of operational administrative centres. Capital cities play many roles and few of them (economic, administrative, sociopolitical, symbolic, communication, etc.) reflect anything but one facet of their multiplex relationships.

In a fundamental way, capital cities are mostly bound to fail in their ambitious undertaking of representing the *genre de vie* of the country, the national socioeconomy and a forum for the world interests of the nationals: they can represent the daily life of a nation only very obliquely and in a stylized manner; they are often far from the country's metropolises, and thus at the margin of the main marketplace; and they provide a window on the world scene, but most of time the nation plays such a minor role on the world scene that the pomp and circumstance appear rather artificial.

Yet the pomp and circumstance provide capital cities with some symbolic visibility both inside and outside the country. This may not be absolutely necessary, but it is most certainly helpful if capital cities are to play their many roles with a modicum of efficiency. These cities have symbolic ruling to perform, and they need to operate from a physical base that provides some basic elements that generate respect. Since respect no longer comes from ostentatious and conspicuous castles and cathedrals, these need to be replaced by other symbols.

Canada was perhaps the most appropriate place to hold a colloquium in which the search for such new symbols would figure prominently on the agenda. Canada, we were reminded recently, is "the first post-modern nation-state, with a weak centre acting as a kind of holding company for a few activities, chief among them the business of handing out equalization payments" (Grimond 1991). Those are the very "transactions of

decline" that Jane Jacobs has shown to be the recipe for producing "pitiable places." The challenge is one of defining what might be the role of a capital city in a postmodern nation-state, and how this role can best be played. This is at the core of a most important process of redefining nation-states in the new globalized socio-economic order. It is all the more important when one remembers that there is a real possibility that most countries may be on the way to becoming postmodern states: decentralized, multicultural societies where most of the national's affairs are unimpeded by the centre.

It may be that very few "modest general propositions" have percolated from the debates in this session, but, as F. Scott Fitzgerald might have put it, "a lot of foolish ideas died there." Perhaps the most important of these rejected ideas was that capital cities can be reasonably discussed on the sole terrain of realities. Not only was the centrality of symbolic resources reaffirmed in the light of the experiences of a number of older capital cities, but the greater importance of symbolic resources for postmodern capital cities was evoked during all the debates. If the postmodern nation-state is not to become a post-mortem nation-state, it is quite clear that the capital city as symbolic resource will have to find a way to embody the foundations of the strategic state that is necessary for the nation to survive. It will also have to find a way to generate the mobilization necessary for the strategy to be carried out.

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IV

**CAPITALES DE L'AVENIR/
CAPITAL CITIES
IN THE FUTURE**

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CAPITALES DE L'AVENIR

Anne Buttimer

Nous sommes invités cet après-midi à orienter nos discussions vers l'avenir des villes capitales. Pour nous, les universitaires surtout, il est plus facile de suggérer des interprétations pour le passé que de spéculer sur l'avenir. Pendant les années soixante-dix, on a joué avec la futurologie — il y aurait beaucoup à dire sur *L'Europe 2000* — mais en 1990, alors que le troisième millénaire approche, on devient plus prudent (ou silencieux) sur ce sujet. D'où viennent nos images du futur ? Des milieux intellectuels ou des contextes sociaux ? Ce que je voudrais suggérer ici, c'est qu'il serait prudent de nous rendre compte des filtres avec lesquels nous avons interprété le passé ; parce que ces lunettes-là jettent leur propre lumière sur notre vision du futur.

Dans notre parcours très sélectif de cas en majorité euro-américains, hier et ce matin, le propos était concentré sur quatre grands intérêts sociaux : les questions d'*ordre*, les questions d'*identité*, les questions de *niche*, et les questions d'*horizon*. Il est concevable qu'il s'agisse ici d'intérêts universels ; mais chaque civilisation a eu ses propres façons de les atteindre. Un des grands défis des villes de l'avenir sera d'accueillir une diversité d'aspirations au sein d'une constellation urbaine, un défi qui sera exceptionnellement important dans les villes capitales.

Parmi les métaphores à travers lesquelles on a essayé de saisir le caractère des villes capitales, il y a, par exemple, la métaphore de la « tête, » la métaphore du « cœur, » et encore ce matin la métaphore du « corps » : la métropole vue comme incarnation physiognomonique des valeurs économiques, commerciales, et culturelles, et point l'axe principal du réseau urbain et de l'économie nationale. Dans une quatrième vision, présentée par M. Raffestin hier, il y a l'image de la ville capitale post-moderne : des formes symboliques et des espaces où s'exerce le pouvoir. « Aménagée et durable, la capitale devient le symbole concret de l'État, la partie caractéristique du tout, de la même manière, et selon le même mécanisme métonymique. »

Chacune de ces métaphores jette sa propre lumière sur le phénomène de la capitale. Elles diffèrent pourtant quant à leur efficacité à éclaircir ces quatre grands intérêts humains. Les questions d'*ordre*, dans le contexte des villes capitales (capitalistes) de l'Occident au XX^e siècle, par exemple, pourraient s'exprimer selon l'opposition « tête »/« corps » vis-à-vis de l'horizon global : la métropole, point de cristallisation d'un État, s'ouvrant *ad extra*, tournée vers l'extérieur. À propos des questions d'*identité*, la ville capitale devient plutôt le « coeur » d'une nation, et son défi principal est de créer un chez-soi pour tous ses habitants ; donc s'ouvrant *ad intra*, essayant d'accueillir les divers *pays* et *cultures* qui se trouvent aux confins de cette nation. (Je n'insiste pas sur les analogies familiales, par exemple, les rôles respectifs du père et de la mère dans la création d'un « chez-soi » ...). La métaphore « corps, » évoquant d'abord les questions de physiognomonie physique, éveille aussi des liens « tête »/« coeur, » mais elle implique surtout des questions de *niche* vis-à-vis de celles de l'*horizon*.

Face aux défis de l'avenir — l'accroissement énorme des populations, surtout dans les pays en voie d'urbanisation rapide, l'urgence de nous libérer de l'esclavage de l'automobile, et l'espoir d'atteindre une meilleure justice et plus de créativité dans la civilisation urbaine — peut-être nous faut-il aussi nous libérer de ces métaphores. Chacune offre un reflet de l'expérience européenne et nord-américaine, surtout des modèles du baroque et du néo-classicisme que nous affectionnons. Il y a eu d'autres traditions urbaines, plus anciennes encore, qui méritent attention. Pensons à Teotihuacán, à Tenochtitlán, à Bagdad, à Ch'ang-An. Face aux grands défis du XXI^e siècle, pourquoi ne pas considérer l'histoire des modèles sud-américains, des modèles orientaux, et leur capacité à répondre aux quatre grands intérêts humains ; pourquoi ne pas en tirer des leçons ?

Constatons que l'identité de la capitale, dans l'avenir comme dans le passé, sera très étroitement liée à l'identité de la nation-État et à son avenir dans le contexte des systèmes économique-politiques créés par les pouvoirs occidentaux. Pour nous, pour les universitaires en tout cas, la formule « sémiotique » a beaucoup d'attrait comme « autopsie » du passé récent. On pourrait même constater l'amnésie apparente de l'iconographie de la plupart des villes capitales de l'Occident : des paysages urbains (« médailles frappées de l'image d'une civilisation ») qui reflètent une politique d'accommoder à la fois les deux rôles « tête de l'État » et « coeur de la nation. » Transposer ces constatations en termes capables d'évoquer des visions de rechange de l'avenir constitue un grand défi au plan épistémologique aussi bien qu'au plan pratique. J'ai l'impression qu'on aime tellement la prison, le *quod erat demonstrandum* de nos démarches hypothético-déductives dans l'explication de l'espace et du pouvoir, qu'on n'ose pas sortir de nos

métaphores et de nos chers modèles du passé occidental.


Nous sommes actuellement à Ottawa, capitale du Canada. Aurions-nous quelque message à laisser à nos hôtes après ce colloque ? Rappelons-nous le défi lancé hier dans l'invitation de la Commission de la capitale nationale :

Premièrement, la mission de cette commission est de faire en sorte que la capitale soit un lieu de rencontre pour les Canadiens et les Canadiennes. Un endroit où chacun puisse y partager espoir, rêves et aspirations, ce qu'on a en commun et ses différences, et où l'on puisse y célébrer tout ce qui fait l'originalité du Canada.

Après nos discussions de ces jours-ci, réfléchissons concrètement aux souhaits que l'on pourrait formuler pour l'avenir de cette ville capitale.

Si vous me le permettez, je voudrais vous présenter une image du défi auquel nous-mêmes, « experts » formés dans la deuxième moitié du XX^e siècle, faisons face. Nous nous trouvons actuellement dans une période qui a perdu l'optimisme des années soixante, quand la plupart d'entre nous étudiaient le phénomène urbain. À ce moment-là, la futurologie était le passe-temps à la mode et une recherche lucrative. Beaucoup de plans visionnaires furent mis en place, mais la réalité n'a pas fait écho à nos aspirations. Il y a donc beaucoup de réflexion à poursuivre sur « le mythe et la réalité, » *l'ethos et la structure* des plans qui se sont concrétisés. Nous avons vécu un cycle d'étapes de pensée et de pratique comme celles que l'Occident a traversé plusieurs fois depuis les images aristotéliennes de « la cité idéale. »

Il y a eu des moments de créativité dans la pensée et dans la pratique urbaine que je symbolise comme des moments Phénix :



PHÉNIX, *cri-du-cœur* de l'humanité, évoquant de nouveaux horizons pour la vie et la pensée ...

Phénix, surgissant des cendres, annonçant à la fois une libération des éléments oubliés ou supprimés dans le quotidien, et aussi des visions d'un autre futur. Souvent le message n'est ni compris, ni acceptable, et le Phénix doit mourir encore. Une fois entendu pourtant, l'esprit prométhéen s'attache à en faire des plans de construction, et à bâtir pour l'humanité ...




FAUST, *eines Menschen Geist in seinem hohen Streben*, sans relâche ...

Pensons aux constructions de Pierre le Grand, Haussmann, Moses, et Gréber. Que Faust s'arrête dans ces travaux, et Méphistophélès est prêt à lui voler son âme. L'histoire « Phénix-Faust » est même plus dramatique dans l'histoire sociale des universités, des commissions urbaines, des églises, des nations. L'accomplissement des projets de construction soulève presque toujours des paradoxes, des contradictions entre l'*esprit* original de libération et de nouveauté d'un côté, et la *réalité* des constructions de l'autre côté. Compte tenu de cette tension, que l'on réfléchisse :

NARCISSE, pèlerin aux Muses d'Hélicon ...

Narcisse fait un pèlerinage aux Muses du mont d'Hélicon. Là, il y a un choix : ou bien se regarder dans le miroir des eaux de l'Hippocrène (formé par Pégase), ou bien se mettre à l'écoute des Muses.

Il suggère que nous nous trouvons face au défi de Narcisse. À nous de choisir entre ces deux options dans nos spéculations sur l'avenir des capitales. Dans cette période du post-modernisme, esclaves du jeu des



pouvoirs économiques et sémiotiques, notre défi comme chercheurs est de faire le choix entre le regard narcissique sur notre reflet dans les eaux d'Hélicon et l'appel à d'autres visions qui nous permettraient d'envisager des alternatives.

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BERLIN OR BONN? THE DISPUTE OVER GERMANY'S POLITICAL CENTER

Theodor Hanf

Federal balance or hegemony of a regional power center: the controversy over these two concepts determined long periods of German history. The French used to refer to it as the “querelles allemandes.” The major changes that took place within just less than a year, from the autumn of 1989 to the autumn of 1990, seem to have put a final end to the dispute.

On October 2, 1990, the German division came to an end. This happened not as a result of a merger of the two parts, but by five newly created states situated in the former German Democratic Republic joining the Federal Republic of Germany and coming under its constitution. This constitution, the “Grundgesetz,” gives the federal states a strong position, assigns subsidiary duties to the federation, grants the states a part in the federal legislation, and guarantees equal living conditions in all parts of the country by means of transfer payments from the economically stronger to the economically weaker states. In other words, it creates a balance of self-assured states and rules out hegemonial demands. This worked in the Western half of the country for over forty years.

After the collapse of the Communist regime, large majorities voted to accept this constitution in an election that took place in the Eastern parts of the country. Consequently, as of October 2, 1990, the Federal Republic of Germany has sixteen instead of eleven States, the number of citizens has increased by almost a quarter, and the national territory has grown by almost a third. The name, flag, and national anthem are still the same—there were no “querelles” concerning either the constitution or the national symbols—with one exception.

No agreement could be reached on where the capital of the unified Federal Republic should be. The government of the “old” Federal Republic wanted to leave the decision on a capital up to the future all-German

parliament, while the last government of the German Democratic Republic insisted that before they entered the union, Berlin had to be designated the capital city, and seat of both government and parliament. In the spring of 1990, a major debate began on the issue of where the capital should be, a dispute in which there were no clear-cut sides. The lines of conflict ran straight through East and West Germany, straight across political parties and ideological camps.

During the negotiations of the two governments on the unification treaty, during which the technical details of the entry of the new States were laid down, it was agreed that a formal compromise should be reached to prevent the issue from holding up the unification process. Berlin was declared the capital, but the decision on the future seat of the government and parliament was tabled for consideration at a later date. Berlin thus became the “capital city” in name, without the legislative bodies, which had just been elected, having had a chance to adjudicate the case. The real issue as to where Germany’s political center should be located—where parliament and the seat of government should be—would be left to the first all-German parliament.

The roots of this dispute go way back. The debate touches symbolic values as well as material interests, cuts across all factions, and has produced strange alliances.

Ten centuries and seventy-three years: conflicting traditions of German capitals

Johann Wolfgang Goethe summed up the political culture of Germany by stating that it had neither a capital nor provinces. This formula unquestionably characterizes the historical reality of a good one thousand years.

The German kings and emperors of the Holy Roman Empire were traveling rulers. The people did not come to the government, the government came to the princes and the people. The functions of the political-geographic centers were very limited: from 936 to 1531, the coronations of the rulers took place in Aachen; from 1531 up to the end of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806, the kings and Kaisers were elected and crowned in Frankfurt. The Reichstag—the parliament of the former Reich—convened in Augsburg, Nürnberg, Speyer, and Regensburg; from 1663 to 1806 in Regensburg only. The Reichskammergericht—the Supreme Court of the Reich—until 1689 had its seat in Speyer, afterwards in Wetzlar.

The Court Chancellery of the emperors changed with the residence of

the elected monarch: Munich under an emperor from Wittelsbach, Prague under an emperor from Luxembourg, Vienna under the Habsburg emperors from 1533 on. In addition to those locations where the functions of the entire state were exercised, there were many more where government functions of the member states were carried out: the city republics of the imperial cities, the residences of the ecclesiastical elected monarchs and the secular hereditary monarchs. This gave rise to hundreds of towns having the character of a regional “capital”, with castles, administration buildings, churches, museums, theatres, and opera houses. Just less than hundred years after Goethe, Thomas Mann wrote of the “old and the true” Germany that it was “neither metropolitan nor provincial.” There was no German Paris, London, or Moscow, but rather a variety of small and medium-sized towns with political and administrative functions that were limited in terms of both scope and territorial range; and which underwent an extremely diversified and rich cultural development. To cite just one example: two-thirds of all opera houses that exist today are found in the successor states of the Holy Roman Empire.

After the end of this Reich in 1806, the German political system changed under Napoleon’s bold strokes, when the number of individual states was reduced drastically. The Napoleonic system was subsequently replaced with the German Confederation of 1814/15. Two of the member states stood out in terms of both size and strength: Prussia and Austria, both of which had just as many—or more—holdings outside as inside the Confederation. Their capital cities, Berlin and Vienna, grew in the nineteenth century into metropolitan cities of modern territorial states with strongly centralized functions, while the traditions of the former Reich continued to exist in the so-called “Third Germany,” the area of today’s West Germany. The “capital” of the German Confederation was Frankfurt, which remained an independent city republic. This was where the National Congress of Representatives of the member states had its seat, where the politics of the Confederation were determined. The first elected German parliament also met in Frankfurt in 1848, the year of the revolution. St. Paul’s Church became the symbol of the first attempt in Germany to establish a democracy in place of domination by princes. The attempt failed: Prussian and Austrian troops drove the delegates away; the forces of monarchical restoration won.

Within the Confederation, Prussian-Austrian tensions grew and finally led to the Prussian War against the majority of the Confederation. Prussia triumphed. It annexed many of the North-West German federal states, including the imperial city of Frankfurt. The German Confederation broke up, and Austria was excluded from Germany. After a further Prussian

military victory—in the war with France under the rule of Napoleon III—Bismarck in 1871 founded the German empire (the so-called Second Reich). This Reich of Bismarck's had little in common with the former Reich and its diversified balance of power. Nor did it have much in common with the German Confederation, in which Prussia, Austria, and the middle states of the "Third Germany" maintained an equilibrium. It represented a "hegemonial federation:" Prussia alone occupied two-thirds of the territory of the Reich and dominated because of its military and soon afterwards its economic strength. The capital of Prussia, and after 1871, of Germany, now diminished by the exclusion of Austria, was Berlin: the hegemonial metropolis of a Germany ruled by Prussia.

From this point on, perceptions of Berlin were characterized by ambivalences that were difficult to reconcile. Up to the first decade of the nineteenth century, Berlin was the capital of one of the most enlightened, modern, and tolerant of German states. Here is where the Huguenots found refuge from religious persecution, where immigrants from many lands found predictable laws and chances for economic betterment. Here is where academic reform created the basis for industrial and economic progress. The former Prussians had good reason to be proud of their metropolis.

There were already very mixed attitudes among the inhabitants of Rhineland and Westfalia, who in 1815 had been beaten into becoming Prussians against their will at the Vienna Congress and who felt discriminated against as Catholics in a state dominated by Protestants. The citizens of the territories annexed in 1866 also felt like "coerced Prussians." Although the southern German states were not under direct Prussian rule, they were dependent on Prussia in all matters concerning the entire state, and this was symbolized by Berlin.

Very soon, however, Berlin's image acquired new facets. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the city had become an important industrial center with a large laborer population. It grew into a center for social democracy and trade unionism. The loss of the First World War was succeeded by the democratic revolution: the Republic was proclaimed in Berlin.

Consequently, the period of the Weimar Republic, short as it was, was the one in which democratic Germany lived longest in harmony with its capital, Berlin. In the 1920's, it became a flourishing cultural metropolis, even though it never reached the rank in Germany of a Paris in France or a London in Great Britain.

In 1933, however, Berlin became the center of National Socialist tyranny. Here is where the mass murder of European Jews was planned,

here is where Hitler's wars of aggression were orchestrated and from here they were directed. Berlin was certainly not the center of the Nazi movement; in the last free election the National Socialist Party in Berlin lost considerable strength. And Berlin was unquestionably the center of anti-Nazi resistance; it was Prussian officers for the most part who, on July 20, 1944 tried to eliminate Hitler and his regime. They were executed in Berlin. Nevertheless, both at home and abroad, Berlin had become associated with the image of a power center of Nazi Germany right up to its final destruction. In short, Berlin was Germany's capital for almost three-quarters of a century, and it was the capital of a democracy for almost as long as it was the capital of a totalitarian dictatorship, though a short time in more than a thousand years of history, and certainly not its most fortunate time.

Ambivalences of the post-war capitals: discourses and interests

In 1945, Germany was divided into U.S., British, and French zones of occupation, and so was Berlin. When the Cold War began, the Iron Curtain fell right across Germany, right across the city of Berlin, and around the western sectors of Berlin. The two Germanys had come to be.

Starting out, the German Democratic Republic regarded itself as the keystone of a socialist Germany. Berlin was consequently proclaimed the "capital of the GDR" and became the seat of the government. West Berlin for years remained the target of repeated attempts to integrate it into the communist territory of power by strangling all corridors to the West. To counteract these attempts West Berlin became the "display window of the west" and the "lighthouse of the free world." It was the dogged perseverance of the Western powers, but also the stamina of the people of Berlin, that enabled the city to withstand such pressure. The failure of the 1948 blockade as a result of the famous "Berlin Airlift," and the brutal move to cut off East Berlin from the attractions of the West by the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961, revealed more vividly than anywhere else in the world that the Communist system was not able to succeed without force, and that in terms of attractiveness it was clearly the underdog. To secure the legal position of the West in Berlin (that is, the right of the western allied powers to remain in the city), it was maintained that Berlin should remain the capital of Germany. In view of the non-ending threats, whoever believed that Berlin was not a suitable capital for the new democratic Germany did not dare express such sentiments for fear of jeopardizing the position of the city.

When the Federal Republic was established in the West of the country—claiming just like the German Democratic Republic to represent all of Germany—the search began, not for an alternative capital, but for a temporary one. Frankfurt, which many West German politicians proposed as seat of the government, was considered primarily because its long historical tradition gave it the genuine claim to be the capital. Instead, however, Bonn was chosen, an idyllic medium-sized town overlooking the Rhine, which had been spared the ravages of the war and was the clearest antithesis to a metropolis imaginable.

Carrying the tag “makeshift,” Bonn developed its own style of modesty. Parliament was accommodated in the auditorium of the local Teacher’s College. The President of the Federation and the Chancellor resided in villas built during the “Gründerzeit” in the nineteenth century. For years, the Social Democrats kept their party headquarters in a shack to demonstrate that they were ready to pick up and move to Berlin any time. But it was a modesty not devoid of elegance. Bonn, an ancient town founded in Roman times, had been the residence of the elector-archbishops of Cologne since the late Middle Ages and thus had been the capital of an important territory before it succumbed to Prussian domination. A Romanesque cathedral, Baroque castles of the Electors, a well-kept and fashionable old part of town, and wealthy sections with fin-de-siècle villas gave it so much city flair that to dismiss it as provincial requires a certain amount of maliciousness.

No matter whether this capital was makeshift or not the practical needs of government and parliamentary business made it necessary to restore old and construct new buildings, and this undertaking by and large respected Bonn’s medium-sized town character. As years went by, the makeshift capital became less and less makeshift. The governments of Brandt and Schmidt in the 1970’s and that of Kohl in the 1980’s had a new government district built; and the Bundestag is still undergoing extensive reconstruction today. Though the Bonn of the government and parliament remained unpretentious, it fulfilled all the functional requirements of a de facto capital of a central power. The derisive jokes about the “federal village,” propagated during the initial years of the Republic, began to let up. The Federal Republic was gradually becoming accustomed to Bonn.

And people were beginning to identify Bonn more and more with the success of this Republic, which had become affluent and influential, but which systematically cultivated understatement in the way it came across both at home and abroad. Bonn was an expression of this understatement.

Those who longed for the power and grandeur of the Bismarck Reich

and its capital were becoming older and fewer. A younger generation was discovering more and more that the old Prussian saying of "More than meets the eye" was a fitting description for the capital city of Bonn.

The unexpected obligation to choose: arguments and counter-arguments on the issue of the new capital

Up until November 9, 1989, there had been no discussion on where the capital should be. One lived well with the idea of Berlin being the capital in name and one worked and lived well in Bonn, whose "makeshift" character was no longer being pointed out so often. The Social Democrats had an elegant new party headquarters, which continued to be called the "shack" only out of tradition. The question about a capital attained a status similar to that of the reunification issue: both belonged to the realm of political eschatology.

The events of 1990 were a disaster in terms of the prognosis-making talents of both politicians and political scientists. For the people affected, and especially for the German people, these events came as a completely unexpected gift. Even as the Berlin Wall was falling to pieces, only a very few thought that the two Germanies would become united. On the evening of November 9, 1989, Walter Momper, the Mayor of West Berlin, was still speaking about the "people of the GDR"; even the Chancellor, who was the first to sense the dynamics of the events, initially believed that unification would at best be a slow and gradual process.

As the unification surprisingly started to speed up, making the question regarding a capital acute, some of the protagonists ran into trouble with public comments and statements, which often had to be revised the moment they came off the press. Mayor Momper had just spoken out in favour of the GDR taking an independent route, when the interests of his city forced him to announce Berlin's claim to becoming the capital. His counterpart in Bonn, Mayor Daniels, had assured Mikhail Gorbachev during the latter's visit in the summer of 1989 that Bonn was only acting as a temporary substitute for Berlin and that it now had to plead in its own interest under the completely altered circumstances.

In the spring and summer of 1990, the capital city issue had become a favourite topic among politicians, editorial writers, and authors of letters-to-the-editor. The advocates of Berlin first presented legal arguments: Berlin had always been the capital and therefore there was nothing to discuss. Berlin had also been the only metropolitan city in Germany and no other city could even dream of competing with Paris, London, or Moscow:

only a metropolis could be a capital. The new geopolitical position of Germany was another favourite argument: Berlin was located in the center of the continent, which had just recently grown together. It was able to produce ties with Eastern Europe, which, according to Momper, would provide a key role for German politics.

Certainly, the history of Berlin was very changeable, but no more changeable than the history of Germany. Both the dark and the sunny sides of history had to be considered: the tolerance shown by old Berlin, its republican tradition, its role in the resistance and in defending democracy during the postwar period. Berlin was where the collapse of both Nazism and Communism was so apparent. Here was where the partition of the country was felt so terribly hard and consequently here was where unity should be manifested. And finally, the new unified Berlin, which could now boast buildings of the Empire, the Prussians, and the East German capital, offered sufficient possibilities for stately representation. Moving the capital to Berlin would be expensive, but, the argument went, when it came to matters of such central importance for the nation, the cost issue should not have top priority.

Pro-Berlin arguments patronized Bonn, claiming that although it might serve its purpose as a makeshift capital, as a permanent capital it was out of the question: "Berlin—what else?"

Certain undertones in the remarks of those in favour of Berlin, which border on arrogance, appear to have inspired some views in favour of Bonn. According to one Minister President, the new Berlin arrogance had revived memories thought to have been overcome. Berlin in a united Germany was situated on the periphery, just sixty kilometres from the Polish border, and in constant danger of triggering off a new German "Drang nach Osten." A huge city, if bolstered by the attraction of being the seat of the parliament and government, it could upset the federal balance and have effects similar to those evidenced in France and England with their overwhelming metropolitan cities. Berlin, with all due respect to its "sunny sides", was also a city of the dark side of Germany's history. Berlin as the capital was an "option for Emperor William," as one Minister put it, a choice to restore an obsolete national mysticism. It would not be fitting to the representatives of the new democratic Germany to carry out their work in the same buildings in which the leaders of National Socialist or Communist Germany had ruled.

On the other hand, Bonn has come to symbolize the forty best years of Germany history. A modest capital city can be befitting to a state, as had been seen in the Netherlands, Canada, the USA, and Australia. Because it cannot be hegemonial, it can foster an even development of all parts of

the country. Furthermore, Bonn is located "close to Europe." Despite the fact that Europe will be opened to the east in the future, the continuation and intensification of European integration is the first obligation of German policy. And finally, the cost factor is in no way irrelevant in a democracy: tax money must be spent in a responsible way. Bonn happens to already have a government district and 1.3 billion deutschmarks have been earmarked for further development up to the year 2000. The rehabilitation of the new Federal States in the Eastern part of the country is going to strain the financial strength of the Republic to the breaking-point, even without the government and parliament being moved from Bonn to Berlin.

In the summer of 1990, a third chain of arguments made its way to the fore: "Germany always stood in the middle of tensions between east and west... one more reason to take this fact into consideration. Two centers, Bonn and Berlin, that would be the ideal solution," as was suggested by Marion Gräfin Dönhoff, the doyenne of German journalism. Politicians worked on a compromise: Berlin as the capital with certain representative functions including that of seat of the Federal President, the Federal Assembly (who vote on it every five years), and Bundestag meetings on "special matters." Bonn would remain the headquarters of the government and parliament.

Cross-cutting cleavages: lobbies for Berlin and Bonn

It is not difficult to understand why the mayors of Bonn and Berlin campaigned for their respective cities in the capital contest. However, the lobbies for one or the other ran through all the political formations. The debate was publicly introduced at the beginning of June, 1990, by Lothar de Maizière, the former Prime Minister of the German Democratic Republic. He called for Berlin to be designated the capital, and seat of government and parliament in the unification treaty: "I cannot imagine any other city being the capital." A host of politicians agreed, including Willy Brandt, Hans Jochen Vogel, the leader of the Social Democratic party, the mayors of Frankfurt and Munich, as well as Social Democrats, Foreign Minister Dietrich Genscher, and Otto Graf Lambsdorff, the leader of the Liberal party. Wolfgang Schäuble, the Christian Democratic Minister of the Interior, also argued that one cannot support Berlin for forty years and then turn around and deny having done so. The most prominent of Berlin's supporters was Richard von Weizsäcker, the President of the Federal Republic. On June 29, 1990, he was awarded Honorary Citizenship

by the parliaments and governments of the two halves of Berlin. On this occasion he made a spectacular plea for proclaiming Berlin the capital and seat of the government: "Only in Berlin do we really come from two parts, but remain one. ... Berlin is one of the most valuable things the GDR has to bring to unification. ... This is the place for the responsible political leadership of Germany." The President, who as the son of a top public official was raised in Berlin and became one of its mayors, left no doubt as to where his sympathies lay. It was astonishing that they could bring him to overstep the constitutionally defined bounds of his post by taking such a public stand. But it was even more astonishing that this President, who ordinarily shows extreme sensitivity to public opinion, was obviously mistaken: many agreed with him, but many others did not. His position mobilized Berlin's opponents, especially since the Berlin government used it, along with far more dubious entreaties, in a 4.5 million Deutschmark advertising campaign.

There was talk, for instance, of "centrifugal forces of the German states," of the danger of "reverting back into the feudal structures of German particularism," and about the nation-state not being obsolete. The President, along with his co-lobbyists, whose services he had not requested, were bitterly attacked. It was becoming evident, Berlin's opponents protested, that Berlin was to become the central location for the political and economic show of strength in Germany and Europe. Berlin had been an artificial solution right from the beginning, a capital that had only Prussian hegemony to thank for its status. After Marxism fortunately landed on the scrap heap of history, it was time that historicism and national mysticism followed. Speaking out in favour of Bonn were Rita Süßmuth, Speaker of the Parliament, Finance Minister Waigel and Health Minister Blüm; Christian Democrats Geissler and von Hassel, leading Social Democrats such as Ehmke, Glotz, Ingrid Mathäus-Maier, and Jutta Ditfurth, one of the top political figures in the Green party. Johannes Rau, the Social Democratic Minister President of North Rhine-Westfalia, and his Christian Democratic counterpart in Hessen, Walter Wallmann, advocated a "third solution:" Berlin as the representative capital and Bonn as the seat of the government and parliament. Mayor Momper dismissed this third solution as a cheap trick.

The Chancellor, who made no attempt to hide his lack of fondness for the President, did not take a clear stand: there were gentlemen, he claimed, in the upper class—whether supposed or real—who had a lot of time to deal with this issue. He didn't have this kind of time and currently there were more important things to do than to play up the question of a

capital. Kohl had no intention of taking a position before the all-German Bundestag elections were held, on a question over which the opinion of the voters was just as divided as the opinion made known by the media. It was difficult to derive a definitive picture from opinion polls, because the question asked varied considerably. In the choice between Berlin or Bonn there are majority groups in favour of Berlin; since early summer 1990, however, majorities emerged who advocate the "third solution."

Being and consciousness: comments on the political economy of the capital city issue

When Berlin's supporters were forced to realize that they were not going to be able to steer the decision on a capital in their favour by a surprise coup and that it was going to take a long debate in the two houses of parliament, they decided to modify their argumentation. Social arguments came to the fore, replacing historical and national ones. Berlin, they said, needed to function as seat of the government and parliament for economic and structural reasons. As a result of the war and the partitioning of the country, it had suffered tremendous losses. It was not so much a prestige question as it was a social question, professed Mayor Momper in September.

Above all, it is probably a budget question. The West Berlin budget of 25.5 billion Deutschmarks receives a federal subsidy of 13 billion. The amount of federal aid it will need after it has been united with the Eastern sector has been estimated at more than twice that amount. It is obvious that higher subsidies would be much easier to justify politically if the government and parliament moved to Berlin. The situation in Bonn is no different. In Bonn and in the areas around it, a third of all jobs are directly or indirectly dependent on federal institutions. A total of nearly 250,000 people are said to be affected.

Federal subsidies are a necessary requisite for every solution to the issue as to where the seat of the parliament and government should be. And if the capital moves, they will be considerably higher. The predicted costs of relocation range from 4-7 billion Deutschmarks (Mayor Momper) to 80-100 billion (Minister President Rau). This fall, the estimates drawn up by the federal government on the cost of unification—without relocation of the capital—had to be constantly corrected. A central question in the election campaign was whether taxes would have to be raised. The answer seems to be "yes." Under these conditions, opinions such as the one voiced by the Social Democratic budget expert Mathäus-Maier gained

importance: “Every billion invested in moving people or constructing stately public buildings is uncalled for.” Financial Minister Theo Waigel thinks along the same lines: “At the moment I need every mark for people, for investments, and not for lofty buildings.”

Lüder, a friend of Berlin’s and member of the Liberal Party, pointed out a further political-economic perspective. The number of supporters of Berlin among members of parliament is not terribly large. “Too many people have settled in the charming federal village. Your home determines your consciousness. A front yard overlooking the Rhine is more idyllic than a balcony of a tenant building in Berlin-Steglitz.”

Towards the end of 1990 it became more and more apparent that not only was this a decision of great symbolic importance, but that there were substantial interests involved.

Preliminary Decisions

During the campaign for the parliamentary elections on December 2, 1990, the question where the future seat of the parliament and government should be had temporarily faded into the background, or, rather, been pushed into the background by the big parties. As the electorate was just as divided over this question as the parties, every candidate had to fear that a statement on his or her part in favor of either Berlin or Bonn would make him or her automatically unpopular with a number of his prospective constituents. But it was even before the elections that a decision was made that weighed the scales in favour of Berlin. The Federal Constitutional Court decided that for the first all-German elections the clause in the election law that only parties winning at least five percent of the votes are to be included in the distribution of parliamentary seats, was not to be applied to the former German Democratic Republic. Instead a separate 5 percent clause was introduced, this time for the five new Länder (states). This decision enabled the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS)—the successor of the former communist state party—as well as the most outspoken opponents of the old East-German regime, the civil rights advocates of the Bündnis 90—to gain seats in the Bundestag (the Federal Parliament). Both parties identified—if for very different reasons—strongly with the German Democratic Republic and its capital Berlin. The only party of the old Federal Republic that had shown very little enthusiasm for the German reunification and whose members mostly had little use for the symbol of a German nation-state, the Grüne, narrowly missed the necessary 5 percent and lost their seats in the Parliament.

Soon after the election and the formation of a new government both Bonn and Berlin supporters opted for a quick decision. The reason that was given was that both cities had to know what was what in order to plan their respective futures.

The Social Democratic Party debated the question of the location of the German capital at the party congress. A preliminary ballot to find out the trend resulted in two hundred and three votes for Bonn and two hundred and two for Berlin; the party decided not to bind its members to a mandatory party vote.

Now the state parliaments and the governments of the federal states initiated debates on the Berlin/Bonn issue. Here psychologically important preliminary decisions were made. Of the sixteen states only four opted for Bonn: North Rhine-Westfalia (on whose territory Bonn is situated), Rhineland-Palatinate, the Saar and Bavaria, that is, states in the West and South. The new Lord Mayor of Berlin, Diepgen, and the Minister-President of Brandenburg, Stolpe, declared that a slight majority in the Federal Parliament in favor of Bonn would not finally settle the question; "Then everything is just going to begin." A lot of pressure was exerted particularly on members of the Federal Parliament from the new states. Minister Krause, a cabinet member from East Germany, threatened every East German delegate voting for Bonn with public denunciation in his constituency and with being scratched from state party lists. As a consequence, a change in the rules of procedure of the Federal Parliament was considered, to facilitate separate voting on the question of the location of the future seat of the parliament and the government. This was rejected, however, by the majority of the members of parliament. The Social Democrats proposed having a referendum instead of a vote in parliament. This would have made a constitutional amendment necessary, however, and for this there was no majority in the Federal Parliament.

A basic mistrust of plebiscitary decision-making processes played as big a role here as the pragmatic consideration that a referendum would probably yield just as narrow a result as a parliamentary decision, but would generally stir emotions even more.

The most important preliminary decision was probably made when Chancellor Kohl, who had for a long time refused to comment at all, eventually spoke out in favor of Berlin, not—as he pointed out—in his function as chancellor, but as a "simple delegate." He made this announcement after his party had suffered a severe defeat in his own state, the Rhineland-Palatinate. Now his party was still in power in only one state in West-Germany, but in four in East Germany and in Berlin. In view of these circumstances, his decision might have smacked of opportunism, but it

certainly had an influence on those delegates in his party who were still undecided.

The vote was finally cast in the Federal Parliament on June 20, 1991.

The day of the parliament

There is a history of important decisions having been reached by bare majorities in the parliament in Bonn. Both the chancellors Adenauer and Brandt were elected in a similar manner. Decisions on joining the European Community and NATO also came about in this way. In the decision over the provisional capital there had been only a slight majority for Bonn over Frankfurt. In the decision facing the parliament, however, attempts to reach a compromise had been made over the weeks and up to the last hours before the debate.

A proposal was finally presented to the Federal Parliament, known as the "consensus proposal Berlin/Bonn." It was supported by members of the Christian Democratic Party (CDU), who feared that a clear decision for either Berlin or Bonn could lead to feelings of resentment on the part of the losers for years to come. Thus they proposed to split the functions of a capital: The Federal President, the Federal Parliament and the Federal Council should move to Berlin, while the Federal Government was to remain in Bonn. In this way, the delegates making the request argued, the promise given to Berlin would be fulfilled while Bonn could retain many of its employees. Communication problems would not play much of a role, after all since Germany was about as big as the state of Utah, and smaller than Texas.

A large majority of delegates were not willing, however, to accept a geographical separation of the legislative from the executive. The "consensus proposal" was rejected by 489 to 147 votes.

Consequently, the Federal Parliament had to decide on either Berlin or Bonn as the seat of parliament and government. The supporters of both cities bolstered their proposals with concessions to the other city in an effort to win the floaters.

The Berlin proposal entitled "The Completion of German Unification," called for a relocation of the parliament and "essential government functions" in Berlin. Bonn was to remain, after the move, the "administrative center of the Federal Republic of Germany". It was recommended that the Federal Council remain in Bonn.

The Bonn proposal, known as "the federal state solution," called for

both the parliament and the government to remain in Bonn; for a move of the Federal President and the Federal Council to Berlin, and for sessions of the Federal Parliament on “especially important political occasions” to be held in Berlin, as well.

Both proposals provided for the creation of a federalism commission, which was to guarantee a fair distribution of public institutions over all states—and financial support for which ever city lost.

The debate was long and intense. Almost all speakers tried to be fair, with only few exceptions: Willy Brandt compared Bonn to Vichy, another delegate announced that he would not accept a decision against Berlin both were reprimanded by political friends and foes alike.

After months of public dispute the debate in parliament did not really bring out any new arguments. What was of interest, however, was where the emphasis was placed.

Many speakers made *statements on the historic and symbolic importance* of the decision. Bonn supporters pointed out that “German history reaches back a thousand years before the partial German state with Berlin as its capital was founded in 1871.” (The Vice President of the Federal Parliament, Klein). “In 1866 Bismarck forcibly demoted Frankfurt from its position of imperial and capital city, after which Berlin became the capital of a nation-state with pretensions of a world power, symbol of a period of dramatic politics with few highs and profound lows. Berlin was a short and bad phase of German history....” (Grotz, M.P.). Berlin supporters retaliated: “German history includes the whole of Germany, with all its good and bad aspects. This is not a valid argument, neither against Berlin nor Bonn.” (Foreign Minister Genscher). “Neither national socialism nor communism were invented in Berlin, but both were eliminated there.” (Jahn, M.P.).

The Bonn supporters regard their city as “the symbol of a new beginning” (Glottz, M.P.). “Bonn stands for a new Germany, different from the one that was defeated in 1945” (Holtz, M.P.). “The name Bonn is associated with the longest and most peaceful period in our history” (Minister Blüm). “Bonn stands for a self-assured, but modest Germany. It is the symbol of federal, social and peaceful politics” (DeB, M.P.). The youngest delegate in the house declared: “The young generation is developing a self-assurance that can do without symbols of national grandeur and pomp” (Bury, M.P.).

The Berlin supporters, on the other hand, emphasized that it was not “a decision for a renewed capital of the Reich and Berlin, which has matured in the years of democratic development after the war ...” It was rather the Berlin of those “who in this city overcame the blockade, resisted

the partition, defied the wall and attained freedom in a peaceful revolution" (Vogel, M.P.).

Most of all, Berlin "is the only East-West city that we have to offer" (Gysi, M.P.). To make it Germany's real capital "was a step that could not be replaced by anything, anything at all, towards the realisation of Germany's political, social and human unity" (Thierse, M.P.).

This aspect was primarily emphasized by East German delegates, sometimes in moving words: "What is it that we have been waiting for forty years? The economy is going to the dogs. Young people are moving to the West. Why are we still living in the East? Because we wanted to save a part of Germany across these bad times: The new old Länder and mostly also Berlin as our capital, ... which kindled the fire of the revolution, ignited in Leipzig, ... which is more suited than any other German city to further the unity between East and West" (Elmer, M.P.).

Apart from the symbolic value of the choice of Berlin as "the completion of German unification" there are also very concrete economic expectations on the part of those in favor of Berlin and on the other hand *economic fears* on the part of the Bonn supporters. That East must not become a welfare case: "Here a conscious political decision for a center east of the Elbe has an important function. A decision for Berlin would mean an economically fruitful investment of trust in the development of the new Länder" (Thierse, M.P.). "One had to give millions of people in the new federal states a new perspective and fulfill their hopes and longings" (Skowron, M.P.).

The Bonn supporters think very differently on this point: "We regret that this decision... is falsely built up as a symbolic decision for the completion of German unity What the new states need now is effective help and not surrogate symbolism" (Baum, M.P.). "The extra money that a move to Berlin would devour would be sorely missed by the new states" (Fuchs, M.P.). "How much use are new government buildings in Berlin to an unemployed docker in Rostock? How much help is the move of the Federal Parliament to Berlin to a single mother in Dresden and an automobile worker in Zwickau?" (Matthäus-Meier, M.P.). "A stable democracy in the new states is not threatened by the question of the location of the capital, but by the social question" (Antretter, M.P.). The economic expert of the Social Democrats, Wolfgang Roth, summed up the misgivings over Berlin: "There is too much talk of historical awareness and not enough of financing the future."

Different opinions of economic and political aspects also become apparent in answers to questions what the *effects* of the choice of Bonn or Berlin would be on the *German Federal system*. "We do not need an

all-powerful political and economic center whose surroundings are doomed from the start to lose in the competition" (Schwalbe, M.P.). "Federalism has produced strong and prominent cities in the old Federal Republic of Germany, also because Bonn has just restricted itself to being the seat of the government" (Lühr, M.P.). "The necessary financial resources to modernize Berlin and change it into a world capital ... will handicap the other cities ... in their development. Whoever puts the seat of the government and the parliament into a major city, let alone into the largest in the whole country, sets off a pull towards this city, and does so consciously" (Glötz, M.P.). "Large cities... stand against federalism and regionalism, which have played such an important part in the development of the German Federal Republic" (Lowak, M.P.). "Bonn has proved its worth ... especially because it does not pose any danger of centralization, neither culturally, industrially nor as far as power politics are concerned: We don't want to be recentralized and go to Berlin, but we want the Federal Parliament and the government to remain in Bonn" (Lowak, M.P.).

The Berlin supporters saw the matter in a completely different light. "People speak of Berlin as a metropolis or call it moloch Berlin, thinking of Prussian centralism, but they forget that Prussia is dead and that Berlin is today a city in the economically weak Land Brandenburg" (Etlmann, M.P.). "Our democratic and federal system rests on such a solid basis, that this would not be changed by Berlin as the seat of the parliament and the government" (Geiger, M.P.). The weightiest argument of the Berlin supporters remains that twelve of the sixteen states voted for Berlin, thereby giving Berlin their federal blessing. This was pointed out by a dozen delegates. But there were also symptoms of a new conceit. "In the European concept, can Bonn be the answer to London and Paris, to Rome and Budapest?" (Mahlo, M.P.). "That Berlin becomes the capital and the seat of the parliament is also part of a normal European state of affairs" (Jäger, M.P.).

What does the choice of Berlin or Bonn mean for *Germany's position towards Europe*? The Berlin supporters have "a concept of Europe that includes again and permanently Eastern Europe" (Thierse, M.P.). They opt for "a Europe that is more than today's Europe of the Twelve," and which includes Northern Europe, the CSFR, Poland and Hungary; and in which "Berlin is no longer in a marginal position, but has a geopolitically central function" (Chancellor Kohl).

"Our neighbours in the East don't mean less to us than our neighbours in the West" (Foreign Minister Genscher). The decision for Berlin should thus "also be a decision to overcome the separation of Europe" (Schäuble, M.P.).

The Bonn supporters see this differently. "Yes, of course we want to

turn to the East, but our future doesn't lie in the East, but the future of the East lies in the West ..." (Lamers, M.P.). They fear that some Berlin supporters "have a separate German way" in mind again; "looking towards Warsaw and Moscow, one loses sight of Paris and Brussels" (Müller, M.P.). They do not want "the same old toy for megalomaniacs. Our place in the world has been won by reticence, modesty, sedulousness and patience" (Roch, M.P.). "A Europe without boundaries, a Europe of regions has no need of the old-style power center of a nation-state" (Bury, M.P.). Therefore: "Bonn stands for Europe" (Glotz, M.P.).

Most delegates contributed to the debate by either pleading for the *practicality* of a decision for Bonn *or* for the *credibility* of the parliament that had to stand by its earlier resolutions to return to Berlin. The Bonn supporters pointed out that the last parliamentary resolution on Berlin as the capital was made as long ago as 1962. What was right then, can be wrong now" (Glotz, M.P.). The Parliament, they claimed, had changed its opinion on many things, for instance on the question of Germany's Eastern border. "One cannot change opinions like one's shirt. But one must be able to give new answers in new situations" (Pflüger, M.P.). Statements for Berlin "for me were a symbol of our willingness to defend the freedom and the security of Berlin, as long as that freedom was threatened" (Holg, M.P.). But at the present time they were not willing "to spend a single Mark to shift a well-functioning system, as it exists in Bonn, to Berlin—solely for reasons of prestige" (Lühr, M.P.). "Let us not create an additional problem by this move. We are a rich and productive country, but even the strongest may collapse, if its burden becomes too heavy. Therefore let us choose the practical and reasonable way. Let us decide for Bonn" (Matthäus-Meier, M.P.).

In the face of the pragmatic reasons of the Bonn supporters, the Berlin supporters called upon principles: "Trust, credibility and reliability are high values.... Can it be true that a promise is now regarded as meaningless and void, only because the conditions under which it was made have changed with the German reunification?" (Voger, leader of the opposition). "Are the declarations that we made more than forty years ago to be consigned to the waste paper basket?" (von Schorlemer, M.P.). "A lie about the capital would be fatal" (Lucyga, M.P.). I do not want to swerve from what I thought, wanted, wished and promised in the past" (Foreign Minister Genscher). Chancellor Kohl gave biographical reasons for his option: he had been in a still-damaged city of Berlin, when he was seventeen, then shortly before July 17, 1953 (when the workers in East Berlin revolted against the communist regime), and again in June, 1987, when Ronald

Reagan urged Gorbachev to open the Brandenburg Gate—and he had never had any doubt that he was in the German capital, more than ever on the night of October 2, 1990, the night of the reunification. “These are not historical reminiscences, that one can simply push out of one’s mind, it’s the realization that Berlin was the focus of the German partition and of the longing for a German reunification ... for me Berlin has also always been the chance to overcome this partition.”

Altogether no less than one hundred and ten delegates spoke in the debate, another one hundred and five delegates had their written speeches put on record and eleven gave personal statements.

A quantitative analysis of the arguments offered in the speeches and statements yields an interesting picture:

Arguments

I- History and Symbolic Value

Pro Bonn	No.	Pro Berlin	No.
1000 years of German history 73 years of Berlin as capital	5	History has to be accepted with its highs and lows	6
Bonn: symbol of a new beginning of the first successful German democracy, Germany’s happiest time	44	Berlin’s democratic achievements in the 1st and 2nd republic Berlin: symbol of freedom and unity	8 19

II- Effect on the new Länder

Every Mark has to be spent for the new states, not for building a second capital	31	Berlin as the capital will complete the unification and the integration of the new states	43
The costs of moving cannot be justified by the desire for the German unity	30	Berlin as the capital will provide an economic boost for the East	13

III- Federalism

Bonn stands for the economic and political success of federalism	34	Majority of states favour Berlin	12
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Megalopolis Berlin threatens balanced development of federalism	25	Metropolis as capital is return to normal	7
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IV- *Europe*

Bonn stands for strong and reliable ties to the West and for European integration	28	Berlin is the center of a larger Europe	7
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V- *General*

Bonn stands for <i>practicability</i> and <i>sensible</i> financial policy (II)	5 61	Berlin stands for <i>credibility</i>	70
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This table shows clearly what the most important arguments of the Bonn and Berlin supporters were. Bonn supporters put the emphasis on Bonn's economic and political success story one that they wanted to see continued in the larger Federal Republic. Berlin supporters accorded Berlin, as the capital, a central role in the completion of the unification. It is mostly arguments of economic practicability that are offered in favour of Bonn and against a move to Berlin; arguments of this kind play only a marginal role for Berlin supporters. The focal point of the arguments in favour of Berlin is to maintain one's credibility by keeping earlier promises. A more pragmatic political culture is thus opposed to a more symbolically oriented one.

On June 20, 1991, this pragmatic culture was defeated, if by a slight margin. Some three hundred and thirty-eight delegates voted for Berlin, three hundred and twenty for Bonn. The votes, arranged according to party membership, were distributed as follows:

	Pro Bonn	Pro Berlin
Christian Democratic Union (CDU)		
Christian Social Union (CSU)	164	154
Social Democratic Party (SPD)	126	110
Free Democratic Party (FDP)	26	53
Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS)	1	17
Bündnis 90 / The Green Party	2	4
Independent	1	-
	<hr/> 320	<hr/> 338

But for a single vote, Berlin was chosen only thanks to the seventeen votes of the PDS, the successor party to the old East German communist state party. The majority of the delegates from the new states voted for Berlin. Among the delegates from the old Federal Republic of Germany there was a majority of votes for Bonn.

Many observers were surprised by the majority vote of the Bundestag for Berlin. But it really comes as a surprise that the decision was so close: the majority of the leading politicians from the Federal President to the Chancellor, the Foreign Minister, the Minister of the Interior, former Chancellor Brandt and the leader of the opposition Vogel, had strongly campaigned for Berlin. The pressure exerted by public opinion, particularly on East German delegates, was enormous.

The Bonn supporters had to concede that pressing for a quick decision had probably been a mistake. It is not certain that in a few years the influence of politicians like Brandt, Genscher, Vogel or von Weizsäcker, who are emotionally still strongly influenced by the concept of the nation-state, would not have been considerably weaker. There are also, of course, younger politicians who passionately took Berlin's side, but all in all it was mostly younger delegates who spoke out for Bonn. It is also in no way certain that the decision for Berlin can be seen as a general turning away from the pragmatic political culture of the old Federal Republic. A large number of those who voted for Berlin did so in response to the exceptional situation brought about by the reunification, particularly from a wish to provide the new citizens in the East at least with a symbol, as practical help proved to be a lot more difficult than expected.

Implementation problems of symbolic politics: an outlook

The decision for Berlin, reached in the Bundestag, soon proved to be exceedingly complex and difficult to implement. To win as many delegates as possible over to Berlin, the Berlin proposal contained considerable concessions to Bonn. According to the decision, Bonn was to remain "the administrative center of the Federal Republic of Germany," only "essential sections" of the government were to move to Berlin. But what is an essential section of the government? Intense discussions have commenced: there are plans that provide only for a relocation of the top levels of the ministries. According to other plans about half of all the ministries are to remain in Bonn. One year after the decision for Berlin, there has been furthering of these plans. Bonn has been promised

compensation for government agencies that move to Berlin and Berlin also has to relinquish federal agencies. In the Federalism Commission a heated debate is going on about an equal distribution of federal agencies to all Länder. Every established agency naturally resists relocation.

According to the decision, the Federal Parliament is to have completed its move within four years. There is a refusal on its part to be housed in provisional quarters, and it wants to move only when conditions in Berlin will be approximately as good as in Bonn. Nobody believes any longer that this will happen before at least another eight years.

Furthermore, the government has not submitted an estimate of the actual costs of the relocation, proposals on how to finance it. In Berlin, meanwhile, real estate prices and construction costs are sky-rocketing.

About 170,000 further apartments are needed. The civil servants refuse to make the move under such conditions and are playing for time. Irate financial policy experts demand a relocation law with precise budgetary standards. Berlin supporters fear that such a new law could start the fight over the seat of parliament and government all over again.

All prognoses of the economic development in the new states have turned out to be too optimistic and have to be corrected continually. The financial policy of the Federal Republic of Germany, once so solid, now shows dramatic budgetary deficits. Further tax increases seem inevitable. What is at stake now is the credibility of German financial policy. German citizens have been promised that there will be no additional costs for them in connection with unification; are they now willing to pay, in addition, not only for the new states but also for a symbolic capital policy as well?

A former minister of finance, when asked about the possibility of revising the Berlin decision, answered caustically that Bonn would probably remain, for a very long time, what it had been for a very long time: an enduring provisional arrangement.

CAPITALE-VILLE, VILLE-CAPITALE, UNE APPROCHE HOLISTIQUE

José Vandevoorde

D'une vision exclusivement esthétique de l'art d'organiser les villes, l'urbanisme moderne s'est tourné vers une approche beaucoup plus technocratique. Et cette manière de procéder n'a pas tellement résisté aux mouvements de contestation nés de la décennie des années soixante. Peu à peu, le réflexe de constituer des équipes pluridisciplinaires s'est généralisé. La synthèse des approches pluridisciplinaires reste néanmoins embryonnaire et ressemble davantage à un résumé qu'à une réelle synthèse. En fait, aucun crédit n'est généralement alloué à la synthèse d'une problématique donnée, et on se retrouve avec un urbanisme parlé d'un côté et un urbanisme planologique de l'autre. La simple connaissance des principaux paramètres semble satisfaire tant les techniciens qui les établissent que les politiciens qui doivent les utiliser. Donc, en connaître davantage à propos des relations qui existent entre ces différents paramètres est souvent considéré comme superflu, et souvent probablement trop compliqué à réaliser. Tout est dans tout, dit-on fréquemment, c'est évidemment une façon de constater l'impuissance de ne pouvoir savoir exactement ce que contient ce tout. Ces études apparemment complètes mais qui ne sont pas synthétiques ne peuvent pas tenir le coup. Voici un exemple : vouloir expliquer le fonctionnement d'un poste de radio en disant qu'il y a des boutons, des condensateurs, des transistors, des haut-parleurs, et en négligeant tout simplement les relations qui existent entre ces différents éléments, est absurde. Or, seules les relations entre les différentes composantes de ce fameux poste de radio, sont les plus importantes, et le vecteur de ces relations, l'électricité en l'occurrence, explique véritablement le fonctionnement de ce poste de radio. Et c'est ce qui manque fondamentalement en urbanisme : la connaissance, c'est la compréhension

qui existe entre les différents paramètres. La référence philosophique de ce cas d'espèce par rapport au canevas habituel est, précisément, l'holisme.

L'idée de base de l'holisme repose sur le principe que chaque énoncé scientifique est tributaire du domaine tout entier dans lequel il apparaît. La vision holistique est donc une très belle perspective, mais quel peut être son apport concret — plus particulièrement, dans la création d'une capitale, ou dans la mise en place des fonctions ou des mécanismes qui font d'une ville une capitale. Pour éclairer les décideurs dans leur choix, la démarche classique consisterait à découper le phénomène capitale en différentes parties, un petit peu comme nous l'avons fait d'ailleurs. Les caractéristiques physiques, la symbolique, le support en matière de bureaux, les logements, la perception de l'usage d'une capitale par la population, etc.

Déjà, l'étude entre les paramètres et la problématique générale reste souvent incomplète et basée, la plupart du temps, sur des idées toutes faites. Mais que sait-on des relations qui existent entre le symbole imaginé et la perception qu'en aurait l'habitant de Princeton ? Pas plus qu'on ne sait si telle décision politique va augmenter le prix des loyers ou l'augmentation du parc bureaux, avec ses conséquences sur la circulation. Or, le problème actuel est qu'il n'y a aucune vérification scientifique du lien entre capitale et politique des transports par exemple. Une étude urbanistique classique finaliserait l'approche de cette globalité par un résumé de la symbolique, de celui des besoins en bureaux, de l'espace public, de l'emploi ... Mais, le problème est que ce résumé ne synthétise en rien le fonctionnement du sujet étudié. La sociologie urbaine en général n'apporte que des modèles, vision simplifiée, parfois même idéalisée, mais souvent aussi réductrice de la réalité.

Les méthodologies actuelles en urbanisme ne sont certainement pas à rejeter comme telles, mais elles doivent être complétées par cette approche holistique. Cela signifie qu'il convient d'analyser davantage la recherche en termes de relation entre les paramètres d'une question donnée. Il convient de faire ressortir la quintessence de la notion de *globalité*, qui fait qu'une capitale est bien plus que l'addition de bâtiments abritant les institutions parlementaires, d'habitants, de flux de circulation, de comportements, etc., mais bien un organisme vivant fluctuant, qui est, plus que tout autre, une ville ouverte sur le monde extérieur.

Ceci m'entraîne vers cette deuxième partie, pour parler de Bruxelles dans une vision qui ne sera peut-être pas d'ailleurs tout à fait aussi holistique que j'aurais aimé le faire. Jusqu'ici, Bruxelles a déjà été bien souvent évoquée. Je voudrais donc vous en dire un mot, essentiellement au niveau de son rapport avec l'Europe. Son rôle en tant que capitale de la Belgique, de la Flandre, mais pas de la Wallonie, de son rôle aussi de capitale d'elle-

même, font que de ces situations extrêmement complexes que Francis Delpérée a déjà évoqué s'établissent des similitudes et, de par là, des liens entre Ottawa et la Belgique. On retrouve cette même complexité et cette même difficile relation entre les hommes et les organes qui font fonctionner leur société. Ceci me rappelle ce que nous a dit ce matin M. Hanf à propos de Beyrouth. Si on devait faire ces mêmes tests à Bruxelles, je ne crois pas que les résultats seraient aussi positifs que ceux recueillis dans la capitale du Liban. Il en est peut-être de même au Canada. Ne serait-il pas intéressant de créer un axe Ottawa-Bruxelles, né de similitudes et d'échanges d'idées entre ces capitales en mutation ? Bruxelles, indépendamment de son rôle européen, a toutes les caractéristiques d'une ville à part entière. En effet, la ville présente une activité secondaire et tertiaire assez importante, une population au profil socio-économique extrêmement diversifié et une image culturelle assez variée, avec bien sûr ses points forts et ses faiblesses. Sa fonction de capitale de la Belgique lui a permis un score au niveau du taux d'emploi de 180 p. 100. Ceci est positif. Mais en même temps, la ville a un taux de chômage de 10 p. 100, alors que la moyenne pour la Belgique est de 8 p. 100.

Le rôle que joue l'Europe à Bruxelles a accéléré le développement du tertiaire, le secteur des services. Ce rôle a aussi eu un impact positif sur son cosmopolitisme. Il y a à Bruxelles 27 p. 100 d'étrangers (contre 8 p. 100 au niveau national). Ces 27 p. 100 se répartissent en 13 p. 100 de ressortissants des pays développés et 14 p. 100 de ressortissants des pays du Tiers monde. Cela sur un territoire qui est tout petit, puisque Bruxelles représente 0.5 p. 100 de la superficie du territoire national.

La population de Bruxelles représente 10 p. 100 de la population totale de la Belgique.

Une partie non négligeable de la population active à Bruxelles réside en dehors de la ville, puisque, nous l'avons vu, le taux d'emploi y est de 180 p. 100. Cela signifie que le financement de la ville en tant que région, basé sur l'impôt des personnes physiques, ne lui revient pas dans sa totalité. Qui donc va payer le prix des infrastructures, par exemple, les routes et autoroutes qui mènent à Bruxelles ?

En ce qui concerne l'introduction de la Communauté européenne (CE) à Bruxelles, ne faut-il pas rappeler la création de la Communauté européenne du charbon et de l'acier, premier embryon de la CE ? La CECA, créée en avril 1951, avec la France, l'Italie, la Belgique, les Pays-Bas, le Grand Duché de Luxembourg, avait son siège provisoire à Luxembourg. La CECA avait choisi initialement comme siège Liège, petite ville de Belgique, pôle important de l'industrie charbonnière et sidérurgique. Liège n'avait pas d'aéroport à l'époque, avec pour résultat une installation

provisoire de la CECA à Luxembourg. Strasbourg va se prêter alors à l'accueil du Conseil de l'Europe.

Lors de la création de la CEE et de l'Euratom, c'est le Luxembourg qui refuse cette fois la concentration des institutions sur son territoire, craignant une perte d'identité face à l'afflux potentiel d'étrangers. C'est ainsi que, dès 1958, les premières institutions européennes commencent à s'installer à Bruxelles, plus particulièrement la Commission de la Communauté européenne.

En septembre 1979, une étape importante de la Communauté européenne est franchie. C'est l'élection au suffrage universel des députés du Parlement européen, étape fondamentale dans la création de l'Europe.

Le traité signé en 1965 officialisait la fusion entre la CECA, la CEE et l'Euratom, avec un siège à Bruxelles. Bruxelles accueille alors le Conseil des ministres, la Commission de la Communauté et les commissions parlementaires, c'est-à-dire une partie du Parlement. Un certain nombre de facteurs favorables avaient dicté le choix du siège à Bruxelles. Sa situation géographique, qui, au temps des six pays, était un carrefour et qui le reste encore au temps des neuf. Les infrastructures de communication extrêmement denses en Belgique et aux Pays-Bas sont tout à fait favorables à ce choix de Bruxelles.

Bruxelles a une caractéristique particulière, favorisant ainsi cette vocation internationale: c'est d'être au noeud de deux cultures, au carrefour des cultures germaniques et latines. Aucun des trois grands de l'Europe, la France, la RFA et la Grande Bretagne, ne tiennent à permettre par le développement d'une capitale continentale sur le territoire des deux autres grandes puissances, des prérogatives qui, à terme, pourraient nuire à cette espèce d'équilibre parfois très difficile dans la Communauté européenne. Il faut ajouter que Strasbourg résiste assez remarquablement à cet argument, parce que, bien que la ville soit en territoire français, elle est allemande sous bien des angles. Cela explique peut-être aussi l'attachement que les Anglais et les Italiens mettent à soutenir le rôle de Bruxelles en tant que capitale européenne.

Il est intéressant de remarquer que cette course à la capitale de l'Europe, à la capitale unique, se joue actuellement essentiellement sur un seul objet : le Parlement.

Qu'il y ait trois sièges différents pour les institutions n'est remis en question que pour des raisons de fonctionnalité, mais une fois encore le titre de capitale se joue essentiellement sur le siège du Parlement.

Le Parlement européen représente donc dans l'esprit des citoyens, et dans celui des hommes politiques, quelque chose de très fondamental. Cette institution est pour le moment la plus faible des trois instances

communautaires principales. Le Conseil des ministres fonctionne depuis longtemps et il en sort des décisions. La Commission fabrique des réglementations en matière industrielle, agricole, culturelle, d'environnement, de pollution, etc. La Commission est bien en avance sur les débats longs et difficiles du Parlement, alors que ce Parlement est le reflet, l'image et le symbole de la cohésion d'un fédéralisme démocratique européen. Il est donc évident que le parlement emportera avec lui le choix de l'emplacement de la capitale européenne. Si la lutte est engagée entre Strasbourg et Bruxelles, c'est précisément que ce rôle symbolique du Parlement européen est largement pris en considération. D'autres facteurs pèsent aussi sur le choix, tel l'aspect négatif pour Bruxelles d'une circulation difficile dans le quartier européen, ou l'absence de vie culturelle importante à Strasbourg. Les enjeux peuvent quitter totalement les domaines de la géomorphologie ou de la géopolitique pour rejoindre le niveau politique pur. Les grandes familles politiques se constituant au-dessus des groupes nationaux, ce seront progressivement ces familles politiques qui, au-delà des intérêts nationaux, vont réaliser des choix peut-être jusqu'à la localisation de la capitale européenne. Pour illustrer ces nouvelles orientations, les « verts » allemands, les « Grün, » le parti des environnementalistes, se préoccupent beaucoup de savoir comment à Bruxelles vont s'installer les bâtiments des administrations européennes sans compromettre l'équilibre de la ville, sans compromettre les espaces verts et la vie urbaine traditionnelle.

Il y a donc là des soucis politiques qui viennent s'inscrire au-dessus d'intérêts purement nationaux. Ce matin même, l'identité américaine a été évoquée, identité à laquelle toute une population veut adhérer, et la capitale en est l'image concrète ; on y trouve les éléments supports d'une fierté nationale, on y crée même un musée des autochtones, ce qui, pour nous Européens, paraît assez étrange. Aujourd'hui en Europe, et plus particulièrement dans l'Europe des douze, le mysticisme national est en voie d'extinction et cette richesse qui réside dans la diversité ne pourra que se renforcer par la régionalisation. Voici un exemple. Il existe en Europe depuis peu un programme d'enseignement appelé le programme ERASMUS. Il permet à n'importe quel étudiant de changer d'université tout en continuant ses études par tranches de six mois, et cela dans chacun des douze pays. Il a fallu pour cela refondre certains enseignements dans nombre de pays pour répondre à cet objectif communautaire d'échange. Ce déplacement des étudiants européens dans tous les pays d'Europe va probablement modifier le comportement des particuliers, et leur donner cette dimension européenne nouvelle. L'identité européenne ne résidera-t-elle pas dans la diversité des populations, dans un programme social commun

et dans le tissu dense des relations ? La capitale doit rassembler les organes qui dynamisent ces caractéristiques. C'est pour cela qu'en m'adressant à M. Sutcliffe, qui cherchait dans le classicisme une réponse pour donner une image de la capitale, je dis que cette image du classicisme a fait son temps dans les capitales européennes puis américaines. C'est aujourd'hui une image contemporaine qui est attendue, une image qui exprime notre époque, qui exprime la démocratie et non pas un pastiche éculé.

L'enchaînement des localisations successives des bâtiments pour l'Europe à Bruxelles montre une volonté des eurocrates de concentrer les implantations dans un même lieu de la ville et non d'émigrer dans une banlieue, aussi verdoyante soit-elle.

Leur souci est de rester dans la ville. À Luxembourg, l'implantation du secrétariat général du Parlement sur un plateau en dehors de l'enceinte urbaine suscite de la part des eurocrates de violentes critiques; ils considèrent qu'ils ont été mis à l'écart de la ville, interprétation qui n'est pas forcément fausse.

L'insertion dans une ville ancienne, dans une ville au tissu dense et complexe, d'entités aussi importantes que celles du Parlement européen et des autres grandes institutions, est une opération extrêmement délicate. C'est ainsi que le futur Parlement européen à Bruxelles a vu ses premières esquisses réalisées à l'initiative d'entrepreneurs, de « développeurs, » sur un terrain aux formes invraisemblables. La « Région bruxelloise » qui était naissante en 1986, pris conscience du développement désastreux qui se préparait et força les entreprises, au travers d'un plan d'ensemble et de conventions, de réaliser un projet global dans une perspective à long terme.

Dans le quartier européen de Bruxelles, « l'Espace Bruxelles-Europe, » tel qu'il est appelé aujourd'hui, se situe l'essentiel des bâtiments abritant les Institutions Européennes.

Un axe important y mène, portant un nom symbolique : la rue de la Loi. Cette avenue rejoint le parc de Bruxelles où d'un côté se situe le Palais royal, et de l'autre côté les chambres (Chambre et Sénat).

Le long de la rue de la Loi, et dans son environnement immédiat, se trouvent une série de puissants ministères qui, eux aussi, voulaient se trouver près des bâtiments institutionnels belges et, notamment, le très puissant ministère des Travaux publics. Quand il fut demandé en 1965 de trouver un emplacement pour la Commission des Communautés européennes, c'est tout simplement le terrain qui se trouvait en face du ministère des Travaux publics et était occupé par un grand couvent qui fut choisi. On y construisit le « Berlaymont, » qui abrite la Commission des Communautés européennes. Ce bâtiment essaima rapidement puisque

aujourd'hui la Commission des Communautés européennes occupe quarante et un immeubles dans la ville, pratiquement tous dans la proximité du « Berlaymont. » Le second grand ensemble est le Conseil des ministres, dont les bâtiments sont en construction et font face au « Berlaymont. » Le troisième grand ensemble s'est installé non loin, une gare ayant permis de trouver dans le tissu urbain dense un emplacement où l'on a pu construire un complexe de 250 000 mètres carrés, abritant le Parlement européen avec son grand hémicycle et l'ensemble de son administration. Actuellement, le Parlement européen occupe quatre immeubles où se réunissent les commissions parlementaires. L'axe qui fait face au Parlement européen rejoint lui aussi le Palais royal. Il y a donc une sorte de symbolique qui rejoint les institutions. Par contre, la largeur de ces avenues n'a rien de symbolique.

Une dernière image montre l'expression architecturale du Parlement, qui est encore en gestation. Il fallait que l'expression de ce bâtiment fut représentative et démocratique, encore que jusqu'ici personne n'ait pu m'expliquer ce qu'était une architecture démocratique, d'autant que le complexe doit être représentatif mais aussi représentatif de la culture européenne.

Depuis le premier projet du Parlement européen, chaotique et désaxé, les esquisses évoluèrent, au travers du plan directeur, vers la recherche d'une certaine symétrie autour d'un axe qui se raccorde à un axe urbain. Le parlement retrouvait ainsi la dignité qu'il requiert.

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COMMENT UNE CAPITALE DEVIENT MACROCÉPHALE EN AFRIQUE SUBSAHARIENNE : LE CAS DE LOMÉ AU TOGO (AFRIQUE DE L'OUEST)

Gabriel Kwami Nyassogbo

Malgré son retard dans l'urbanisation, l'Afrique tropicale est marquée, depuis la fin de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, et surtout après les indépendances, par un phénomène important : l'accroissement très rapide de la population urbaine. Mais cette urbanisation galopante est très mal répartie. Elle s'est particulièrement concentrée sur les capitales, qui sont généralement des ports. Compris entre 5 et 8 p. 100 par an, les taux d'accroissement dépassent parfois 13 p. 100. La capitale du Sénégal, Dakar, a connu une croissance annuelle de 8,5 p. 100 entre 1921 et 1955, et de 16 p. 100 entre 1955 et 1960 (M. Santos 1971). Comment ne pas s'inquiéter de l'évolution de ces villes macrocéphales qui concentrent entre 10 et 25 p. 100 de la population totale et parfois plus de la moitié des citadins des pays qu'elles écrasent ? Abidjan, Dakar, Nairobi, Kinshasa ... aujourd'hui toutes des cités millionnaires, se trouvent dans ce cas. Il est évident que cette forme d'urbanisation inégale et vertigineuse n'est pas sans conséquences fâcheuses sur l'évolution des jeunes nations d'Afrique noire.

À travers l'exemple de Lomé, la capitale du Togo, malgré sa taille démographique modeste, nous verrons comment une capitale devient macrocéphale et les principaux problèmes posés par ce type de croissance.

D'abord, une brève description du contexte général des capitales de l'Afrique subsaharienne permettrait de mieux comprendre nos propos.

I La macrocéphalie, caractéristique des capitales africaines

Les capitales de l'Afrique subsaharienne sont en voie de macrocéphalisation rapide, suivant la voie tracée par leurs aînées latino-américaines et asiatiques. Ce type d'urbanisation, qui plonge ses racines dans l'histoire coloniale, est chaque jour renforcé par les gouvernements nationaux, issus des indépendances, qui veulent faire des capitales la vitrine d'un développement apparent et trompeur.

A - Quelques faits qui illustrent la macrocéphalie

La macrocéphalie, développement monstrueux d'une seule ville au détriment d'une poussière de minuscules centres urbains qu'elle domine sans partage, est d'abord d'ordre démographique.

Les capitales de l'Afrique tropicale ont toutes connu une croissance spectaculaire, surtout après la période d'indépendance. Léopoldville, la capitale du Congo Belge, créée par Stanley en 1881, avait 20 000 habitants une quarantaine d'années plus tard, en 1923. (M. Pain 1984). Devenue capitale du Zaïre, Kinshasa (son nouveau nom), s'étendait en 1978 sur près de 200 kilomètres carrés, avec 2 millions d'habitants (M. Pain 1984). Elle doit avoir aujourd'hui entre 3 et 4 millions d'âmes, à peu près comme Lagos, la capitale du Nigeria.

Cette gigantesque cité rassemble près de 7 p. 100 de la population nationale et plus du quart des citoyens du pays. La deuxième ville, Lubumbashi, ne suit que très loin derrière, avec seulement 7 p. 100 de la population urbaine et 2,13 p. 100 de tous les Zaïrois.

En Côte-d'Ivoire, si Abidjan dépasse aujourd'hui les 2 millions d'âmes, avec près de 20 p. 100 de la population nationale, la deuxième ville, Bouaké, au contact de la forêt et de la savane, n'en compte à peine que 300 000, soit 6,6 fois moins que la capitale.

La tendance est à peu près la même partout : Dakar au Sénégal, Nairobi au Kenya, Luanda en Angola... La croissance est si forte que le temps de doublement de la population est compris entre six et dix ans.

La suprématie des capitales africaines est encore beaucoup plus affirmée sur le plan économique, illustrant les importantes disparités qui caractérisent les pays du tiers monde. Donnons encore l'exemple de Kinshasa, qui concentre dans ses murs 17,4 p. 100 du produit intérieur brut (PIB) de tout le Zaïre, 36,20 p. 100 pour le Shaba, la zone minière (M. Pain 1984). Elle détient, toujours selon la même source, 50 p. 100 de l'industrie manufacturière, 42 p. 100 du secteur de la construction, 30 p. 100 des salaires du pays, 43 p. 100 des salaires des employés des banques et des assurances, ce qui confère aux Kinois un pouvoir d'achat élevé. En

1969-1970, 60 p. 100 des travailleurs des industries de transformation y étaient en activité. Dans certaines capitales, la concentration des activités industrielles se renforce davantage. De 77,5 p. 100 en 1969, le nombre total de sièges sociaux des entreprises industrielles de Dakar est passé à 82,5 p. 100 de l'ensemble sénégalais en 1976, et celui d'Abidjan de 74 à 83,5 p. 100 pour la Côte-d'Ivoire durant la même période (A. M. Cotten et Y. Marguerat 1977).

La consommation est également très forte dans ces capitales. Kinshasa seule absorbe la moitié des produits pétroliers et 72 p. 100 de l'énergie électrique basse tension, avec 75 p. 100 des abonnés de tout le Zaïre.

La même hégémonie se retrouve dans la répartition des équipements socio-collectifs de niveau élevé (collèges, hôpitaux, etc.). Quant aux universités, sauf dans de rares cas, elles sont installées uniquement dans les capitales. La répartition des cadres supérieurs (professeurs, médecins, avocats, etc.) suit presque à peu près toujours la même tendance.

Seuls quelques pays font exception à la règle générale. Certains sont caractérisés par « la dislocation des fonctions économiques et politiques » (A. Franqueville 1984), avec un système bicéphale. Il s'agit entre autres du Burkina Faso (Ouagadougou et Bobo Dioulasso), du Cameroun (Yaoundé et Douala), du Bénin (Porto-Novo et Cotonou). Quelques cas d'urbanisation moins concentrée sont à signaler, surtout au Nigeria, où, malgré la taille démesurée de Lagos (entre 3 et 4 million d'habitants), on rencontre une multitude de villes, notamment au sud-ouest, en pays Yoruba. Au nord, Kano est une métropole régionale. Au Ghana, la présence de Kumassi (plus d'un demi-million d'habitants) et du port de Sekondi-Takoradi à l'est, constitue une sorte de contre-pouvoir à Accra.

Cette évolution générale est d'abord le produit de l'histoire coloniale, avant d'être renforcée après la période d'indépendance.

B - La macrocéphalie, produit de la colonisation

On peut dire, sans exagérer, que le système macrocéphale qui caractérise aujourd'hui les capitales africaines est d'abord le produit de l'histoire coloniale.

La situation géographique et le site sont des éléments importants ayant guidé les responsables coloniaux dans l'implantation des premiers centres urbains. La nécessité d'être en contact avec la métropole a eu pour résultat l'établissement de la plupart des capitales sur la côte, d'où leur caractère excentrique.

Les pays maritimes qui n'ont pas leurs capitales sur la côte sont rares : le Kenya (Nairobi), l'Éthiopie (Addis-Abeba), le Cameroun (Yaoundé), la République Populaire du Congo (Brazzaville), son voisin sur la rive

opposée du fleuve Congo, le Zaïre (Kinshasa). Même dans ces cas, le choix du site et de la position géographique ne sont jamais le fruit du hasard. Des considérations climatiques, orographiques (Nairobi, Addis-Abeba), la situation sur un fleuve ou à la confluence de deux fleuves (Kinshasa, Brazzaville, etc.) ont souvent guidé les fondateurs de ces villes. Les mêmes considérations ont joué pour le choix des capitales des quatorze pays enclavés, comme le Burkina Faso, le Niger, l'Ouganda, le Botswana et la Zambie.

Cette situation géographique sur la côte a très tôt favorisé la création d'infrastructures portuaires destinées à drainer les biens et les produits de l'intérieur. Les voies de communication terrestres (voies ferrées et routes) iront dans le même sens.

Sièges du pouvoir colonial, les chefs-lieux de colonies furent au début les premiers centres urbains à bénéficier des équipements élémentaires. La nécessité d'avoir des liaisons aériennes avec la métropole renforcera l'hégémonie de ces capitales, qui seront bientôt les seuls centres à s'occuper du commerce d'import-export et à avoir des relations avec le monde extérieur. Vastes chantiers, ces villes ont attiré une importante main-d'oeuvre de régions proches et lointaines, et même de colonies voisines, suivant l'importance accordée au chef-lieu.

C'est ce contexte colonial qui a fait naître le gigantisme urbain auquel nous assistons en ce moment. « Dakar, métropole ouest-africaine » (A. Seck 1970) a largement bénéficié de son rôle de capitale des Fédérations de l'AOF et du Mali avant leur éclatement. La disparition de l'arrière-pays de l'AOF explique la grave crise urbaine à laquelle la métropole sénégalaise est sérieusement confrontée aujourd'hui (A. Seck 1970), ainsi que l'ensemble du pays.

C - Le renforcement de la macrocéphalie après l'indépendance

Si elle est née avec la colonisation, la macrocéphalie a été favorisée et renforcée partout en Afrique tropicale après l'indépendance. Celle-ci a nécessité d'importants efforts d'équipement pour asseoir et consolider la souveraineté nouvellement acquise. Les nouvelles capitales étaient transformées en de véritables chantiers : les palais présidentiels, les ministères, les assemblées nationales, les sièges des partis (unique pour la plupart), les ambassades, les hôtels et les nouveaux services renforcèrent, au début des années d'indépendance, le poids prépondérant des capitales sur les autres villes (K. Nyassogbo 1980c). La concentration du pouvoir politique et administratif dans la capitale au détriment des autres villes a entraîné celle des autres formes de pouvoir : démographique, économique et financier, social et culturel. « L'hégémonie urbaine de la capitale est tout

simplement la transposition spatiale de l'hégémonie de l'État et de la centralisation du pouvoir » (Y. Marguerat 1990).

L'absence de contre-pouvoirs urbains est également liée à l'effet de prestige. Les pouvoirs publics sont généralement obnubilés par le souci de présenter aux « visiteurs de marque » une « capitale digne de ce nom, » qui cache le mal-développement et la misère générale du pays. Des réalisations de prestige, encouragées le plus souvent par des bailleurs de fonds de pays développés dont le seul souci est le profit rapide, l'emportent sur des actions de développement, profitables au grand nombre.

Cette croissance démesurée a pour conséquences le chômage, la pénurie de logements, la dégradation générale des services, ainsi que du niveau de vie des citadins, l'apparition et le développement d'activités dites « informelles » ou de l'économie populaire urbaine, la misère générale, en un mot le « développement du sous-développement. » Par les hommes et les biens qu'elles drainent, les capitales stérilisent leurs arrière-pays respectifs. La mauvaise planification et l'incapacité des régimes issus de la période d'indépendance de changer l'orientation et les structures économiques et sociales des appendices des pays industrialisés que sont encore ces anciennes colonies devenues nominalement souveraines, expliquent la primauté des villes capitales. Partout, la capitale est la ville la plus peuplée, sauf au Cameroun. Loin de disparaître, l'urbanisation « dépendante » continue de faire encore ses ravages.

II Un exemple de capitale macrocéphale : Lomé au Togo

Lomé, malgré sa taille démographique modeste (375 499 habitants en 1981), en rapport avec celle du pays (2 719 567 habitants en 1981 répartis sur 56 600 kilomètres carrés), est un exemple de macrocéphalie qui se développe d'un recensement à un autre.

A - Les débuts de Lomé

Le choix de Lomé, déjà créé à la suite de la diaspora des Ewé de Notsé à 90 kilomètres plus au nord vers la fin du dix-septième siècle, comme capitale du Togo allemand en 1897, est un facteur déterminant dans l'évolution de cette ville. Baguida, aujourd'hui un quartier de l'est de Lomé, et Zébé, à 45 kilomètres à l'est également, furent respectivement capitales de 1884 à 1887 et de 1887 à 1897. Avant le transfert du siège de l'administration coloniale, nécessité par des considérations politiques (Zébé, trop proche du Dahomey, possession française), Lomé était déjà un « paradis fiscal » où le commerce était florissant. Avec son wharf construit en 1900,

éliminant ainsi Aného du trafic international qu'elle monopolisait jusque-là, et les trois lignes de chemins de fer, doublées chacune d'une route, Lomé devint « le noeud obligatoire de tous les échanges maritimes, ferroviaires et routiers » (Y. Marguerat, 1985).

Lomé se vit rapidement dotée d'équipements commerciaux, d'écoles, de dispensaires, et plus tard d'un Cours complémentaire, devenu Lycée Bonnacarrère, du nom d'un gouverneur du Togo, d'un hôpital moderne et d'une piste d'atterrissage pour avions légers.

Toutes ces réalisations faisaient de Lomé, depuis l'époque allemande, le point privilégié qui attirait les populations de l'intérieur. Toutes les conditions étaient réunies pour une future cité macrocéphale.

B - Les signes de la macrocéphalie

La population et le paysage urbain de Lomé donnent la mesure du gigantisme de la capitale togolaise, par rapport aux autres villes que sont les agglomérations érigées administrativement en chefs-lieux de préfecture, au nombre de vingt et un.

L'analyse démographique ne peut se faire qu'à partir de 1960, date du premier recensement national.

Lomé qui n'avait que 6 444 habitants en 1924, en comptait 73 646 au premier recensement national de 1960, soit 11,5 fois plus qu'en 1924 et 5,1 p. 100 de la population nationale. Ce chiffre représentait également 53 p. 100 des citadins des sept communes urbaines. À la même époque, la deuxième ville Sokodé, au centre du pays, abritait seulement 14 877 âmes et était comprise 4,9 fois dans la capitale, qui faisait 6,2 fois la troisième ville, Palimé (11 902 habitants), dans la zone cacaoyère et caféière. Une dizaine d'années plus tard en 1970, lors du second recensement, il fallait 6,6 fois Sokodé (30 727 habitants) et 9,7 fois Palimé (20 308 habitants) pour retrouver la population de Lomé (192 745 âmes). La capitale a donc plus que doublé sa population. De 5,1 p. 100 et 53 p. 100 en 1960, sa part est passée en 1970 respectivement à 9,9 p. 100 et 63,9 p. 100 de la population de tout le pays et des sept communes urbaines.

Avec un taux d'accroissement annuel de 6,1 p. 100 entre 1970 et 1981, au dernier recensement, la capitale togolaise se retrouve avec 375 499 personnes dans ses murs. Cela représente plus de la moitié des citadins des vingt et une villes, soit 54,9 p. 100, et 13,8 p. 100 de la population nationale. L'écart entre Lomé d'une part et la deuxième et la troisième ville d'autre part s'est davantage creusé : désormais, la deuxième ville, toujours Sokodé (46 660 habitants) et la troisième, Kara (28 902 habitants), au nord du pays, qui a bousculé Palimé désormais au quatrième rang, sont respectivement comprises huit et treize fois dans la capitale.

Sur le plan démographique, Lomé a acquis tous les caractères d'une capitale atteinte de macrocéphalie, sans cesse renforcée d'un recensement à un autre.

La prépondérance de la capitale est également remarquable dans tous les secteurs de la vie nationale.

Capitale politique et administrative, Lomé est le siège du gouvernement, de l'Assemblée Nationale, du ou des partis politiques, des organisations des jeunes, des femmes, du ou des syndicats. Les services administratifs les plus importants y sont situés. À ce titre, toutes les grandes décisions, de quelque nature que ce soit, y sont prises.

Lomé est également la capitale économique et financière. Elle détient le monopole des importations et des exportations officielles. Déjà en 1906, sur dix-sept firmes dans le Togo allemand, on en dénombrerait douze à Lomé, et seulement cinq dans le reste de la colonie : quatre à Aného, l'ancienne capitale, et une à Kété-Kratchi, dans le Ghana d'aujourd'hui (Y. Marguerat 1985). Aujourd'hui, près de 80 p. 100 du commerce et à peu près la même proportion d'entreprises industrielles s'y sont implantés. Toutes les banques y ont leur siège. La répartition des salaires distribués par l'État, le plus gros employeur du pays, en mars 1967, donne une idée de la concentration du pouvoir économique et financier dans la capitale. Avec 129 482 000 francs CFA sur un total de 219 433 000 francs à répartir dans tout le pays, Lomé détenait plus de la moitié : 59 p. 100. Palimé, au deuxième rang, suivait très loin derrière avec une masse salariale de 3 251 000 francs, soit seulement 1,5 p. 100 du total et près de quarante fois moins que la capitale. Sokodé, au deuxième rang pour sa population, suivait immédiatement Palimé, avec à peu près la même masse salariale : 3 244 000 francs.

Les équipements scolaires et sanitaires sont répartis à peu près de la même façon. Pendant longtemps, le seul lycée du pays était le lycée Bonnacarrère. Aujourd'hui, malgré un effort dans le sens d'une meilleure répartition, Lomé compte cinq Lycées (quatre modernes et un technique) sur les vingt-cinq (dont vingt-trois lycées modernes et deux lycées techniques) que fréquentent les jeunes Togolais. Malgré une tentative de transfert de l'École Supérieure d'Agronomie à Kara, « la ville du président, » l'unique université du pays est pour le moment à Lomé, qui est aussi la seule ville à être dotée d'un centre hospitalier universitaire.

Au risque de nous répéter, empruntons encore une fois à Marguerat (1985) cette formule, qui nous semble bien résumer la situation dans tous les secteurs de la vie nationale : « La capitale accapare, avec un septième de la population togolaise, la moitié des citadins, 21 p. 100 des élèves de l'enseignement primaire et secondaire, 27 p. 100 des lits d'hôpitaux,

40 p. 100 de la consommation de ciment, 55 p. 100 des médecins et 74 p. 100 des pharmaciens, 59 p. 100 de la consommation d'eau potable et 69 p. 100 des abonnés, 77 p. 100 des employeurs, 88 p. 100 de l'électricité consommée en 1982-1983, soit 83 p. 100 de la basse tension et 91 p. 100 du courant industriel.... »

Malgré la création de chefs-lieux de régions, au nombre de cinq, dont Lomé et Kara, la macrocéphalie se renforce. Lomé risque d'avoir, si la tendance se poursuit, près d'un million d'habitants vers l'an 2 000, avec toutes les conséquences que cela comporte.

III Les conséquences de la macrocéphalie

Les conséquences d'une telle évolution urbaine sont trop bien connues pour qu'il soit nécessaire de nous étendre longuement. Nous évoquerons cependant quelques points saillants du cas togolais.

A - Dans l'arrière-pays

Les disparités économiques entre régions et entre groupes socio-professionnels constituent une caractéristique importante du sous-développement. Ces disparités sont encore très marquées d'une part entre villes et campagnes, d'autre part entre la « primate-city » et les autres villes.

Par « l'effet-démonstration » (M. Santos 1971) qu'elle produit sur les ruraux et les autres citoyens à partir de réalisations de prestige comme les hôtels de grand standing (l'Hôtel du 2 Février avec ses trente-quatre étages par exemple), la Maison du parti unique au pouvoir (le Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais), le gigantesque immeuble qui abrite les services administratifs et financiers de l'État, ainsi que ceux abritant les banques (la nouvelle tour de la Banque Centrale des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest, la Banque Ouest-Africaine de Développement, le Fonds de la Communauté Économique des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest, etc.), la capitale stérilise l'arrière-pays. Elle draine aussi bien les hommes que les biens sans contre-partie suffisante. Les importants prélèvements que les pouvoirs publics opèrent sur le milieu paysan par l'intermédiaire de l'Office des Produits Agricoles du Togo (OPAT), organisme d'État qui a le monopole de la commercialisation des produits agricoles de base (café, cacao, coton), sont bien connus. Ils sont de préférence investis dans la capitale. Tous ces faits attirent les ruraux et les citoyens des centres secondaires, où les possibilités de promotion individuelle et collective sont extrêmement réduites. C'est la capitale qui prend d'abord et qui redistribue à sa convenance. Cela

aboutit à terme à la concentration de la population migrante dans la capitale, secondairement dans les autres villes.

L'attention particulière dont bénéficient les citadins, plus spécialement les Loméens, s'explique par les risques de révolte politique et sociale que les pouvoirs publics voudraient éviter. Les mouvements de contestation ne commencent-ils pas généralement dans les capitales ? La manifestation organisée par les étudiants le 5 octobre 1990 à Lomé en est une preuve.

Dans les pays où la population n'est pas dense, les départs vers les villes, et surtout la capitale, aboutissent à un dépeuplement massif des campagnes. La production agricole s'en ressent de façon aigüe et les citadins ont du mal à se nourrir à partir de l'agriculture nationale. C'est le cas du Gabon et du Congo en Afrique Centrale, où les villes font « un vide » autour d'elles.

La suprématie de Lomé empêche l'émergence de centres secondaires et le développement du reste du pays par les investissements massifs, les ressources monétaires et la main-d'oeuvre qualifiée qu'elle attire à elle, sans aucune proportion avec sa population. C'est ce qui explique le faible taux de croissance démographique des autres villes, mis à part Kara (8 p. 100 par an, le plus élevé du pays; voir carte no. 1).


B - Au sein de la capitale

Les conséquences internes sont aussi désastreuses que dans l'arrière-pays.

L'un des problèmes les plus graves est celui de l'emploi. Il y a dans toutes ces capitales une distorsion importante entre la population active et les emplois offerts. La population se livre à toutes sortes de métiers pouvant lui assurer sa survie. Les petits vendeurs, les cireurs de chaussures, les gens de maison, les tailleurs, les couturières, les horlogers sont très nombreux. C'est ce secteur dit « informel » qui accueille la plus grande partie des citadins du tiers monde. Ailleurs, on se propose de l'appeler « économie populaire urbaine. »

Les difficultés d'emploi pour une grande partie de la population conduisent à la délinquance sous toutes ses formes, à la criminalité, à la prostitution. Même si ces maux à Lomé n'ont pas encore atteint les proportions inquiétantes de métropoles géantes comme Lagos, ils risquent de se développer si la tendance actuelle se poursuit.

La population a du mal à se loger. L'entassement est de règle au sein des basses couches populaires, même si, à Lomé, on ne peut vraiment pas parler encore de bidonville comme dans les cités géantes multimillionnaires d'Amérique latine (K. Nyassogbo 1980c).



Source: K. GOZO : Composition et distribution géographique de la population togolaise. Analyse des données du Recensement général de la population et de l'habitat, Novembre 1981. Ministère du Plan et des Mines, Direction de la Statistique, Lomé, 1989. p. 59

Les équipements les plus élémentaires font défaut dans les nouveaux quartiers périphériques : eau potable et assainissement, électricité, etc. La crise des années quatre-vingt est venue s'ajouter aux maux déjà existants pour aggraver un malaise général important. On note l'effondrement de la dépense publique consacrée aux services sociaux : écoles, santé. Les conditions de vie se dégradent pour la majorité de la population.

La forte concentration humaine aboutit également à l'extension démesurée de l'aire géographique urbaine. Si Lomé a vu doubler ses habitants entre les deux recensements de 1970 et de 1981, l'espace urbain est passé de 1 900 à 6 000 hectares durant la même période, soit plus de trois fois la superficie de départ.

Un certain nombre de faits concourent à cet éclatement spatial sans précédent. D'abord, on peut évoquer l'apparition d'une nouvelle génération plus instruite que les précédentes, donc occidentalisée, aux moyens financiers accrus et aux goûts plus raffinés. Cette génération exige de grands espaces pour ses habitations, ses jardins et parterres abondamment arrosés même durant la saison sèche, ses paillotes, ses terrains individuels de jeux pour les enfants. On n'hésite pas à construire sur deux, voire même quatre lots, soit entre 1 200 et 2 400 mètres carrés. Il y a ensuite les terres prises par l'État pour ses réalisations (l'université couvre 300 hectares, les 2 000 hectares de Lomé II, les réserves administratives et militaires, etc.). Cette extension démesurée, qui s'explique également par l'habitude des maisons individuelles basses (qui font de Lomé une ville basse), entraîne des difficultés croissantes d'entretien des VRD, sans cesse plus longs, donc plus onéreux, devant des moyens financiers dérisoires. « Avec trois fois plus d'habitants que Washington, Dakar par exemple dispose d'un budget... soixante dix-huit fois moins élevé » (Y. Gery 1990).

Toutes choses égales par ailleurs, Lomé connaît dans une certaine mesure la même crise urbaine que les métropoles géantes. Mais cette crise est souvent dissimulée par la stratégie mise en œuvre par la population pour sa survie, les réalisations de prestige déjà évoquées et les grandes conférences internationales, entre autres la signature des Accords de Lomé III et Lomé IV qui lient les soixante-six pays d'Afrique, des Caraïbes et du Pacifique aux douze États de la Communauté économique européenne .

IV Vers une issue ?

La taille démesurée des capitales africaines et les nombreux problèmes qui s'y posent constituent un défi, non seulement pour les planificateurs, les aménageurs et les autorités municipales, mais aussi et surtout pour les

responsables politiques. Cette urbanisation galopante est une menace d'explosion politique et sociale, que rien ne peut plus dissimuler. La deuxième Conférence internationale des capitales du monde (la première ayant eu lieu ici même à Ottawa en 1987), tenue à Dakar, « métropole ouest-africaine » du 11 au 13 juin 1990 sur le thème « Planification et gestion des capitales du Monde, » et le Colloque international, tenu à Ouagadougou, du 1^{er} au 5 octobre de la même année sur un thème similaire, « Maîtriser le développement urbain en Afrique subsaharienne, » témoignent de l'attention que les chercheurs, les responsables municipaux et les pouvoirs publics accordent aux problèmes urbains.

Quelles sont les différentes stratégies mises en place pour atténuer les effets de la crise urbaine ?

A - Le développement rural

Le développement rural est perçu partout comme un moyen pour freiner la croissance trop rapide des villes, notamment des capitales devenues envahissantes et monstrueuses. L'importance de l'exode rural dans cette urbanisation extraordinaire explique cette mesure. En augmentant la production agricole et le revenu des paysans, en installant quelques équipements socio-collectifs pour les populations rurales, en traçant et en modernisant les routes, en désenclavant, on a pensé à juste titre que la paysannerie serait moins attirée par le « mirage urbain. » La forme de scolarisation en Afrique étant également responsable des migrations rurales, il a même été question dans certains pays, dont le Togo, de la « ruralisation de l'enseignement » pendant les années soixante.

Ce noble objectif a partout abouti à des échecs. L'agriculture a eu du mal à « décoller, » faute de moyens et de plans cohérents. La modernisation des infrastructures de communications et de transports a au contraire encouragé et amplifié les rythmes de l'exode rural. Les problèmes se sont aggravés.

B - La politique de régionalisation

Les planificateurs et les responsables d'aménagement du territoire, avec l'accord des autorités politiques, ont procédé à la création de « régions, » à la tête desquelles a été placé un centre régional. Ces centres régionaux ont pour objectifs d'impulser le développement régional. C'est ainsi que le Togo a été divisé d'abord en quatre, puis cinq régions administratives, le Ghana en cinq régions également. Ailleurs, on a parlé de départements ou de provinces. Quelle que soit la terminologie utilisée pour désigner la même réalité, la politique de régionalisation a produit des effets limités, malgré le développement timide de certains centres

secondaires. Au Togo, les chefs-lieux de régions comme Atakpamé, Sokodé, Kara et Dapaong ont légèrement profité de la création de régions administratives par la mise en place et le renforcement de certains services et équipements. L'économie a été rarement touchée par cette politique de régionalisation.

Que signifie régionalisation si les régions n'ont aucune autonomie administrative et financière ? Que signifie un centre régional si le pouvoir de décision est fortement concentré dans la capitale ? Les régions doivent toujours s'adresser à cette dernière, même pour les décisions les plus élémentaires. C'est la capitale qui accorde sa charité, le plus souvent à la tête du client.

La Côte d'Ivoire est même allée plus loin, en accordant plus de pouvoir aux municipalités, dotées de moyens financiers accrus. Les maires sont élus. C'est la politique de « municipalisation » initiée depuis 1980. Mais là aussi, les résultats sont maigres (A. Dubresson 1990).

Dans certains pays, il est question d'un second pôle national pour contrebalancer le poids prépondérant de la capitale. C'est le cas du Togo qui a choisi Kara, au nord du pays, au cours des années soixante-dix (K. Nyassogbo 1991). Là aussi, il y a eu échec en raison de choix économiques absolument irrationnels.

C - Une solution hardie : le déplacement de la capitale

La situation excentrique de presque toutes les capitales africaines (pas seulement des capitales côtières) et les difficultés internes de toutes sortes propres aux métropoles géantes, ont entraîné dans certains pays des solutions hardies et radicales, qui exigent beaucoup de courage et de volonté politiques : le déplacement pur et simple de la capitale, souvent loin de l'ancienne. Initié par le président Kouibitchek au début des années cinquante avec la création de Brasilia au centre géographique du vaste Brésil, le déplacement de la capitale est en cours dans trois pays : Tanzanie avec Dodoma, Nigeria avec Abuja et Côte-d'Ivoire avec Yamoussoukro, « le village natal » du président Houphouët-Boigny.

Seulement, le déplacement d'une capitale coûte cher. Les difficultés économiques et sociales, aggravées par la crise des années quatre-vingt, ont freiné pour le moment l'ardeur des responsables politiques.

D - Les autres mesures

Outre les solutions évoquées ci-dessus, qui dans la plupart des cas sont loin d'infléchir la croissance vertigineuse des capitales africaines, d'autres mesures sont prises, ici ou là, pour améliorer les conditions de vie des couches les plus déshéritées de la population urbaine.

1 - L'emploi

L'emploi reste l'un des problèmes les plus graves dans les grandes villes, d'où la multiplicité des petits métiers. Certains pays réorganisent le secteur dit « informel », avec l'aide des organisations non gouvernementales, par la formation à la gestion. C'est le cas, par exemple, des fabricants de mallettes à Dakar, qui bénéficient de l'appui de l'ENDA - RUP. Ces mallettes fabriquées à partir de matériaux de récupération (morceaux de zinc) sont vendues non seulement à Dakar et au Sénégal, mais aussi dans les pays occidentaux (*Lettre Urbaine*, 16, 1988).

2 - Le logement

Le logement est également un problème ardu peu maîtrisé dans les grandes villes africaines. Ce problème trouve son origine, dans beaucoup de cas, dans l'absence de maîtrise du système foncier. Dans ce domaine, les solutions sont variées, suivant les pays. Il s'agit par exemple de mettre plus d'ordre dans le système foncier en réglementant la profession de géomètre. C'est le cas du Togo (D. Felli 1991). Ailleurs, on parle de trames assainies et de parcelles viabilisées.

La formation à l'autoconstruction est également à l'ordre du jour un peu partout (M. Tamiatto 1980). Les candidats au logement construisent eux-mêmes leurs demeures, avec ou sans prêt bancaire. La Banque mondiale participe de plus en plus à ces opérations.

L'État et les promoteurs immobiliers interviennent dans beaucoup de villes pour loger les citadins. Mais, dans la plupart des cas, ces logements, généralement dits « sociaux, » sont trop chers pour ceux à qui ils sont au départ destinés. Ils sont aussi insuffisants.

La vie est très difficile dans ces cités géantes pour la plus grande partie des citadins, qui mettent de multiples stratégies en œuvre pour leur survie. Il y a une véritable crise urbaine, liée fondamentalement à l'urbanisation dépendante, conçue au départ pour les économies dominantes.

Conclusion

La macrocéphalie urbaine qui caractérise l'Afrique subsaharienne et l'ensemble du tiers monde n'est pas seulement l'apanage des métropoles millionnaires, face à une nuée de minuscules cités de quelques centaines de milliers d'habitants et parfois même moins. Des villes de taille démographique et économique plus modeste, de moins d'un demi-million d'habitants, peuvent être également atteintes de la maladie de la macrocéphalie. L'exemple de Lomé, la capitale togolaise, en est un exemple.

Les nombreuses stratégies collectives et individuelles mises en œuvre pour améliorer les conditions de vie des citoyens et infléchir le rythme de croissance des métropoles géantes sont loin d'atteindre les effets escomptés. Ces échecs répétés sont liés au caractère sectoriel et géographique des opérations. Seule une vision globale, dans le cadre d'une véritable politique d'aménagement du territoire et de réorientation des structures économiques, tournées vers le développement interne des pays d'Afrique tropicale, peut avoir une chance de succès. Toute action, dans le cadre des économies fortement dépendantes et dominées de l'extérieur, qui ignorerait le phénomène de dépendance ne peut aboutir qu'aux résultats que l'on sait. Mais tout cela demande une forte dose de courage et de volonté politiques.

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Notes

- ¹ Étaient considérées jusqu'à l'indépendance comme villes au Togo les communes urbaines définies à l'époque coloniale au nombre de sept : Lomé, Aného, Tsévié, Palimé, Atakpamé, Sokodé et Bassar.
- ² C'est cette poussée vigoureuse de Lomé qui a amené les pouvoirs publics à choisir Kara comme deuxième pôle politique et économique du pays. Malgré la volonté politique affirmée et l'importance des actions engagées, les objectifs sont loin d'être atteints. Voir K. Nyassogbo, « La Maîtrise du développement urbain en Afrique subsaharienne, » Colloque de Ouagadougou, 1990.

CAPITAL CITIES IN EUROPE: DIRECTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Paul Drewe

Du jour où est née outre Atlantique cette modernité excentrique en pleine puissance, l'Europe a commencé de disparaître. Les mythes se sont déplacés. Tous les mythes de la modernité sont aujourd'hui américains. Rien ne sert de s'en affliger. À Los Angeles, l'Europe a disparu. Comme dit I. Huppert : « Ils ont tout. Ils n'ont besoin de rien. Ils envient certes, et admirent notre passé et notre culture, mais au fond nous leur apparaissions comme une sorte de Tiers Monde élégant ».

Jean Baudrillard, *Amérique*.

Capital cities in Europe: capitals or cities?

To say that capital cities are both capitals and cities sounds like a tautology. It is more meaningful to ask: To what degree do cities serving as a seat for the central government differ from or resemble other cities? As far as Europe is concerned, this question can be answered using the results of a study by Brunet et al. (1989). This study covers 165 agglomerations with more than two hundred thousand inhabitants in the European Community, Switzerland and Austria. Brunet and his team rank the agglomerations in terms of sixteen indicators, which were selected to measure the European importance (*taille européenne*) of cities as competitors in the forthcoming "United States of Europe." The ranking is based on trump cards in the fields of international relations, communications, economic power, research and technology and culture. The maximum score per indicator is six or ninety-six for all indicators. London is

number one with a total score of eighty-three points. The sixteen indicators are also aggregated by Brunet into groups in order to define the profiles of the cities. Both ranks and profiles can be used to answer our initial question (see Table 1). Since the data base is not yet available, the results must be taken at face value.

Luxembourg, being too small, was not included in the study. Amsterdam and Berlin are considered capital cities for the following reasons: it is in the "capital" of Amsterdam where the queen (or king) is inaugurated; Berlin has been selected as the future capital of Germany.

European capitals do not form a homogeneous group. They cut across classes and profiles with a few major exceptions. In accordance with the table, they will be found in a variety of ranks and profiles. They usually cluster with other cities, but in Rank 1 we find London and Paris form an exclusive pair of capital cities. On the other hand, London is grouped with Bern in profile 1, and also, for example, with Frankfurt, which is not a capital.

The abbreviation "EITrc" means high scores on all groups of indicators, particularly on economic power and international relations. There seem to be two groups of capital cities: those with either stronger or weaker emphasis on international relations and those seven marked by research and culture. But even these "common denominators" are shared with other, non-capital cities (such as Geneva, Venice and—to a lesser extent—Trieste). Therefore, there is every reason to first study the functioning of capital cities as cities, even if they are viewed as cities *sui generis*, because their future also depends on their functioning regularly in defiance of change and coping with the uncertainties that go with it.

The times they are a-changing: sources of uncertainty

It looks as if we are living in a time of parenthesis, a time between eras marked by the rise of new key technologies such as microelectronics and two of its offspring: information technology and flexible automation. One could add new materials, biotechnology, medical engineering and environmental (energetic) technologies to the list of new key technologies. The postwar period of industrialization offers little guidance to coping with recent technological change, let alone recipes for success. It is long waves in economic development that seem to offer a way to understand technology "backwards," or in a historical perspective. But when it comes to new technologies and a new economic cycle, we have to manage with conjectures without refutation (Drewe 1987a). The only definite conclu-

Table 1: European Capitals: A Classification

PROFILES

RANK	1 Eltrc	2 ER	3 ITe	4 Ti(-)	5 I	6 TCr	7 RC	8 eitrc	9 D—	10 e	11 c	12 rest
1 (81-83)	{London}					{Paris}						
2 (70)												
3 (63-66)			(Amsterdam)			Rome Brussels		Madrid				
4 (52-58)						Copenhagen Athens	(Berlin)					
5 (43-51)				Lisbon		Vienna The Hague						
6 (35-42)					Bonn	Dublin						
7 (26-34)	Bern											
8 (18-25)												

“TRUMP CARDS”:

E= Economic Power

T= Communications

C=Culture

I= International Relations

R= Research & Technology

D= Demography

(Lower case letter represents a weaker influence)

Source: Adapted from Brunet, et al. (1989)

sion is that technological change is an important determinant of the long wave (Ayres 1989). What is also uncertain is the diffusion of new key technologies among countries. International comparison shows that countries, especially newly industrialized ones, are engaged in a technology race to promote more or less the same basic innovations (the outcome of this international technology race seems to depend on relative R&D investments and international competitiveness or specialization). The desire to be a winner in this race seems to be the single most important motive for participating in the creation of a single European market. Yet the forthcoming completion of this market is still a major source of uncertainty. This uncertainty includes its impact on export-market shares, relative especially to Japan, the United States and the newly industrialized countries. The impact of "1992" on industrial sectors depends on the respective level of intracommunity penetration as well as on existing barriers other than tariffs. The single market will also affect the tertiary sector (financial and producer services) and the transport sector.

Another source of uncertainty is the imminent opening of the market of Eastern Europe. This development implies that the changes ahead are not limited to the domain of high technology referred to above. Adopting the terminology of the product life cycle (or portfolio method), the future does not only belong to present "question marks" and future "stars." With Eastern Europe, there is also a future for "cash cows," that is low- and medium-tech products that have reached the stage of maturation in the life cycle. This contrasts with high-tech "question marks" and "stars" that relate respectively to the take-off and rapid growth stages of the life cycle of an industry.

Both the global and the "European" changes will affect the relative position of regions and cities in Europe in one way or another. Recent research suggests that regions (cities) located in the central European corridor (from Greater London/East Anglia to Lombardia/Piedmont) or the European sunbelt (from Venice to Valencia) are more likely to be among the "winners." This, however, is not an iron law of historical necessity. Both the corridor (popularized as the "banana") and the sunbelt include less-developed regions, too. And there are also more-developed regions outside these axes. Moreover, a distinction has been made between established economic centres (such as the top-of-the-bill regions of Munich, Stuttgart and Paris) and centres that are newcomers (e.g., the Hamburg region and the Ruhr area).


Economic-technological perspectives

The functioning of cities may be a multidimensional phenomenon that cannot be reduced to economic-technological aspects. The latter are essential notwithstanding. Economic survival depends, first of all, on existing economic activities that are vital to the prosperity of a city (or region). Measuring the vitality or performance of existing economic activities is not only a matter of profit, turnover, investment, employment and export. It is the value added that deserves special attention as an indicator of income generation. A study by Allaert (1990) of the Belgian agglomerations can serve here as an example. Existing economic activities come in clusters. Hence the importance of identifying complexes or *filières* based on input-output relations. Moreover, if the origins of purchases and destinations of sales are known, it is possible to determine to what degree the city in question depends economically on other cities either in the same country or abroad.

Of course, the long-term prospects of a city's economic development cannot be imagined as a simple extrapolation of current facts. To extrapolate from existing weaknesses inevitably results in an unattractive economic future. This is, for example, the case in the Randstad Holland, where the agglomerations of Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague were not able to keep up with the macroeconomic pace of the late 1980s, relatively speaking, even though they were among the country's most important producers of value added, in absolute terms (consult Drewe [1990a] for details). There are several reasons why even present strengths cannot be simply extrapolated. One of them is economic-technological change. Conventional classifications of economic activities may not sufficiently encompass this change. Dutch researchers have constructed a new typology of manufacturing firms akin to the application of new key technologies such as flexible automation and information technology, including logistics (see Figure 1, adapted from Machielse and De Ruijter, 1988).

Economics of scope (rather than scale) may produce a historical alternative to mass production. This is a matter of a low degree of standardization and a high degree of diversification as far as products are concerned. The typology shown in Figure 1 has been extended to include, as a necessary complement, two types of producer services. One is the handling of goods through distribution, logistics and wholesale. The other consists of information-intensive commercial services. The rather static conception of a city's economic future is also challenged by the very fact that products move through a life cycle: from take-off, through rapid

Figure 1: A new typology of manufacturing firms



growth and maturation to saturation. Note, however, that with the emergence of flexible automation even the product life cycle can be turned into a variable. This possibility is referred to as “short product (part) life” flexibility (Formica 1990).

The concept of product life cycle forms the basis of the portfolio method mentioned earlier (see Carnoy et al. [1987] for an extensive application of this method to the Walloon region). The emergence of new or improved products, processes or services requires firms that are innovative. As Mignolet (1986) has shown for the agglomerations of Antwerp, Brussels and Liège, the probability of a region being able to renew itself economically can be analysed as a product of three partial probabilities, involving access to

- new ideas (according to a model of R&D);
- investments (a model of investment decision making);
- regions (a location model).

Each of the three partial probabilities has an objective as well as a subjective component. Innovativeness is not a purely economic-technological phenomenon, particularly, when it is interpreted as an innovative environment. We shall return to this later. Thinking of the future economy of a city, one also has to consider the possibility of attracting investors or firms from other cities (regions) including foreign countries. In fact, this is more often than not the single most popular strategy of urban economic development, practised even to the detriment of the prospects of existing economic activities. However, the acquisition of companies from elsewhere can hardly be a substitute for endogenous developments. At the most, it can help to strengthen the existing economic structure.

There are different ways of assessing the attractiveness of a city or region for external investors. The approaches range from a macroanalysis of the attractiveness of a foreign country for foreign investors (e.g., McKinsey and Company 1988) to a microanalysis of potential locations that starts from a portfolio of companies (or one company in particular) looking for a suitable location, sometimes even tailor-made to their requirements (e.g., Plant Location International 1988). The kind of productive environments found in European cities can be illustrated by the results of a principal components analysis of the locational characteristics of forty-two West German cities (Drewe 1990b). Four components have been extracted from twenty-one location factors. They have been labelled "economic dynamics," "proximity to airports," "old industrial structure" and "specific addition." Table 2 gives a detailed account of the first component.

The economic dynamics of West German cities with more than 150,000 inhabitants are a matter of a high level of purchasing power and sales of both luxury and consumption goods. But the rents of shops and offices also reach a high level, as do the prices of real estate and land. (These cost aspects have been neglected by Brunet et al. [1989]). Moreover, dynamic cities are also rich in entertainment opportunities and they are well connected by both rail and road. It is not too surprising to find this type of productive milieu in larger cities, such as Frankfurt, rather than in the more provincial, medium-sized towns of West Germany. Some cities score significantly on more than one component, being either among the top ten or the bottom ten cities as far as the respective scores are concerned. Take, for example, Frankfurt, which scores high on "economic dynamics," "proximity to airports" and "specific addition." Hence, the productive environment of (West German) cities tends to be too complex to be characterized by just one typical set of location factors.

Table 2 Component 1: "Economic Dynamics"

Locational aspect	Loading
Rent level	-0.85
Real-estate price level	-0.80
Entertainment opportunities	0.79
Purchasing power	0.71
Price of land	-0.70
Sales of luxury goods	0.70
Sales of consumption goods	0.70
Railway structure	0.60
Road structure	0.50

Scores per city

1. Frankfurt	-2.28	33. Osnabrück	0.87
2. Düsseldorf	-1.93	34. Lübeck	0.91
3. München	-1.88	35. Ludwigshafen	0.92
4. Köln	-1.68	36. Gelsenkirchen	0.98
5. Stuttgart	-1.60	37. Braunschweig	1.01
6. Hamburg	-1.33	38. M. Gladbach	1.04
7. Bonn	-1.08	39. Bielefeld	1.05
8. Wiesbaden	-1.00	40. Herne	1.12
9. Mainz	-0.99	41. Solingen	1.27
10. Berlin	-0.85	42. Hamm	1.93

^a eigenvalue: 5.3; percentage of variance "explained": 25%

An additional analysis has been carried out for fifteen selected cities in West Germany. It has been shown that the ranking of cities in terms of their endowment with locational factors does not mirror the ranking based on aspects (that are supposed to be) valued by managers. The rank correlation coefficient calculated for the overall scores does not exceed 0.39. Cities such as Düsseldorf and Frankfurt rate higher on "managers' quality of life" than on locational qualities. The opposite holds true for other cities, particularly Bremen, Mannheim and Hanover (see Drewe 1990b, for details). One may hypothesize that the image or prestige of cities in the eyes of managers does not reflect, or only partly reflects, the less conspicuous reality of location factors.

Cities, in order to survive economically, need a strategy of economic-technological development. We have sketched out some of the most vital topics along with the analytical tools that can help to find the right strategy.

What cities also need is an assessment of the impacts of new technology. Information technology and telematics in particular should be singled out for special attention and comment. Telematics organizes "those applications of computer techniques and information engineering for which the bridging of significant physical—and any related organizational or cultural—distances by network connectivity is an essential feature" (Arnbak 1990, 16). The societal acceptance of this new technology may still be uncertain. But the potential impacts of a large variety of both professional and home applications (from computer-integrated manufacturing to teleplays) are far reaching. They extend well beyond the realm of the urban or regional economy (some of the salient effects will be quoted later in this paper). When related to the relevant goals, the impacts appear

as either opportunities or risks. It is the (potential) risks that tend to be glossed over by the advocates of telematics (or other new technologies for that matter). For a European example of what is meant here and what is recommended as technology assessment, the reader is referred to the so-called *MANTO*-project from Switzerland (Rotach et al. 1987, Keller and Rotach 1990, Drewe 1989a). This project deals with the effects on seven subsystems of twenty-one potential applications of telematics in Switzerland, covering a period of several decades. The results are embedded in uncertainty and expressed in terms of scenarios. Switzerland, for the purpose of this study, has also been divided into six types of regions.

Competition, a new paradigm of urban policy

It cannot be denied that the economic (technological) perspectives of cities are an important topic when it comes to directions for the future. But it is an entirely different matter to view the economic dimension as the only one that really counts. The tendency to do so is evident today in Europe (and elsewhere): the concept of competition seems to have turned into the new paradigm of urban policy (May 1989). The numerous ratings of cities published recently are symptomatic of this. The fact that competition has not been clearly defined, properly theorized or thoroughly analysed, however, has not reduced the concept's persuasive force. Reference is often made to the economic crisis that has led, among other things, to the rise of unemployment in cities. Another point that is brought up is the increasing competition between firms and the forthcoming creation of a single European market.

The new paradigm has transformed the perception of cities in more than one respect. It affects the relationship between city and economy, city and space, as well as city and state. The latter can be illustrated by the decentralization policy, especially in France. Less tutelage by the central state based on Paris has opened the way to more competition among the other French cities. What has also changed is the very notion of space and territory. Continuous geographic space has been replaced by abstract, discontinuous space. Countries are increasingly perceived as networks of cities or as points in space (Beckouche et al. 1988). This new perception occurs at the expense of interstitial spaces, such as urban hinterlands, but also of intra-urban spaces. The new paradigm is most directly expressed by the notion of the city as a quasi-direct factor of production. This notion also holds, for example, for universities seen as factors of production, thereby reducing them to professional schools and science factories. As a

result, the other roles of the university, such as as a finishing school and a cultural institution, are badly neglected (cf. Scott 1989). Cities are sometimes even seen as analogous to firms. But what happens if a city loses the race (only a few will probably be chosen)? Can it really go bankrupt and, if so, are its citizens employees who can be sacked or replaced? Certainly, if the analogy is carried too far, its absurdity will be revealed. The price that has to be paid for pushing the paradigm of competition is the neglect of important and even rising social costs not just of private enterprise but of life in cities in general. Social refers to all aspects that are not strictly economic.

The social costs of city life

The picture of European cities drawn by Brunet et al. (1989) is highly unrealistic. Not only do they omit economic or business costs, but the world according to these scholars, is also a world, without social costs. It is therefore necessary to establish some facts before sketching the ecological, social and cultural development perspectives of cities.

To illustrate our argument, we have analysed the quality of life in the ninety-five departments of France, according to a study published by *Le Point* (1988). See also Bailly and Cunha (1983) for a comparative analysis of the 1978 and 1981 surveys of *Le Point*. The French weekly, in 1988, used seventy-seven indicators to rate quality of life and divided these into eight major themes. The eight "hit parades" (*palmarès*) that resulted from this have been aggregated to rank the departments according to their overall quality of life. We have taken a selection of the basic data (the forty-seven indicators that have been published) and subjected it to a principal components analysis. As a result three components have been identified: The first (and most important) component is of special interest here (see Table 3). Note that component 1 cuts across the *a priori* clusters of indicators or themes. A high level of economic and social benefits and a high level of social costs are co-extensive. Economic benefits refer to indicators of wealth including the relative absence of low-income households and old people on a minimum pension. Social benefits refer to the richness in health, cultural and social facilities, while social costs are expressed by various indicators of criminality, but also by drug addiction, long-term unemployment (excluding, however, juvenile unemployment) and traffic jams. The scores on the first component per department have been mapped in Figure 2.

**Figure 2: The quality of life in the departments of France:
Scores on component 1**




Table 3: The quality of life in the departments of France: Component 1^a

Indicator	Theme ^b	Loading	Indicator	Theme ^b	Loading
Burglaries	VI	0.93	Movie going	VIII	0.79
Crimes against property	VI	0.89	Juvenile unemployment	III	-0.77
Car thefts	VI	0.88	Local radio stations	I	0.76
Crimes against persons	VI	0.87	Traffic jams	VI	0.74
Drug addiction	II	0.86	Higher education	I	0.72
Major hospital equipment	II	0.84	Low-income households	V	-0.72
Disposable income	V	0.83	Day nurseries	VII	0.71
Long-term unemployment	III	0.82	Students	I	0.61
Festival	VIII	0.81	Juvenile delinquency	VI	0.61
Income tax	V	0.80	Advanced secondary education	VIII	0.52
Museums	VIII	0.80	Minimum pensions	V	-0.51

Scores per Department

1. Paris	6.35	86. Lot	-0.87
2. Bouches-du-Rhône (Marseille)	2.65	87. Haute-Loire	-0.91
3. Alpes-Maritimes/Nice	2.13	88. Aveyron	-0.92
4. Hauts-de-Seine (Île-de-France)	1.80	89. Vendée	-0.95
5. Nord (Lille, Roubaix, Tourcoing)	1.64	90. Haute-Saône	-0.98
6. Rhône (Lyon)	1.40	91. Gers	-1.01
7. Val-de-Marne	1.34	92. Cantal	-1.07
8. Gironde (Bordeaux)	1.22	93. Mayenne	-1.09
9. Hérault (Montpellier)	1.21	94. Creuse	-1.11
10. Var (Toulon)	1.17	95. Lozère	-1.19

^a eigenvalue: 13.7; percentage of variance "explained": 42%

- ^b I = (demographic) dynamism
 II = health
 III = (economic) crisis
 IV = environment
 V = wealth
 VI = criminality
 VII = social facilities
 VIII = culture

Figure 2 suggests a correlation between component 1 and population density. This hypothesis has been tested (by means of discriminant function and canonical variate analysis). It has been corroborated as shown in Table 4. Component 1 also correlates with economic structure and net migration, though to a lesser extent. The mean score on the first component is highest in departments dominated by the tertiary sector. It is also highest in departments with either the highest net gains or net losses in migration.

Table 4: Population density and quality of life (component 1): ninety-five French departments

Population density (groups): inhabitants per km ² ^a	Score on component 1 (group means)
1 more than 300	2.55
2 170 to 300	0.72
3 95 to 170	0.42
4 70 to 95	-0.33
5 50 to 70	-0.51
6 less than 50	-0.84

^a in 1982; source: Jayet (1988, 12).

The French example demonstrates that living in high-density areas or big cities—seen from an aggregate point of view—is advantageous as far as economic and certain social benefits are concerned, but only at the price of increased social costs. As a correlate, firms located in big cities incur high business costs (see, for example, Table 2).

Ecological perspectives: limits to urban growth

Back in 1972, the Club of Rome signalled the limits to growth on a global scale. It was an effort of little avail. But today the urgency of this human predicament can scarcely be ignored. Moreover, it has become increasingly apparent that ecological problems are also urgent urban problems. Physical planning in the Netherlands, for example, had until 1988 been focused on the environmental problems of rural areas rather than on the malfunctioning of cities as ecological systems. The recent recognition of urban environmental problems contrasts sharply with the planners' and politicians' pleas to further increase the density of existing urban areas: the so-called compact city is still the paradigm for physical planning in the Netherlands.

In the empirical studies that have been quoted so far—except for that of Brunet et al. (1989)—we find ad hoc indicators of urban ecology, either as aspects of productive environments (Drewe 1990b) or of the quality of life (*Le Point* 1988).

What we need, however, is a more thorough and systematic analysis in order to be able to sketch ecological directions for the future of cities in Europe. Starting from an extended concept of the urban or regional economy, ecological problems can be tackled from three angles as problems that

- affect intrinsic values such as health or biological survival;
- influence the productive milieu or factors of production;
- stimulate environmental innovations such as new or improved products, processes or services.

The first angle can be illustrated by an exploratory empirical analysis focusing on West Germany. This analysis is an attempt to determine whether it is healthier to live in the countryside than in the city (Drewe 1988/1989). The question, after it had been formulated more precisely, was explored stepwise (applying a multivariate approach). The data used for this exploration are those of the “Environmental Atlas of the Federal Republic of Germany.” Koch (1985) has compiled forty indicators of environmental quality (air, water, drinking water, soil, waste and nature). The Atlas covers all politico-administrative areas of the country, that is, 328 municipalities and districts (*Landkreise*). The relevant results of the multivariate analysis are summarized in Table 5.

The analysis shows that the number of cars per square kilometre is high, but does not show its growth rate. The quality of the air suffers from sulphur dioxide emission. There is evidence of a relatively high mortality rate from lung cancer. There is not much space left for nature because of an extensive built-up area. Water consumption has reached a high level, but sewage disposal does not present a problem. This specific set of seven urban environmental indicators correlates with a high population density (explaining 79 percent of the variance, as shown by means of linear regression analysis). This is why the first factor has been labelled “urbanization.” Low-density areas tend to exhibit a pair of environmental problems: one related to intensive agriculture, the other to problems of drinking water pollution. Compared to these results, the Environmental Atlas, in which the politico-administrative areas are ranked according to their average score on **all** indicators, produces fallacies of average. According to the Atlas, southern cities, such as Munich or Stuttgart, or West Berlin, are not among the top ten problem cities of Germany.

Urban ecological problems also tend to have an unfavourable influence on the productive milieu. In the case of the forty-two West German

cities (noted in section 3), environmental quality proved to be linked with the third component, the one labelled "old industrial structure." Moreover, the quality of the air was ranked third by the mayors of fifteen cities in West Germany as a determinant of the quality of life: as important as cultural opportunities, although less important than career opportunities and housing costs. Environmental problems, finally, can stimulate innovations. This, however, requires environmentally conscious consumers, stringent legislation, and the availability of state subsidies for investors. Air, water, waste, soil and energy constitute potential markets for environmental innovation (including the application of telematics). Environmental innovation may even give rise to a new branch of high-tech industry (consult *Impulse* [1989] for an account of the current situation).

Generally speaking, environmental protection is part of the so-called fourth market—that of infrastructure facilities (together with energy, transportation, urban planning, communication and health care). This market usually amounts to a quarter of a country's gross national product. Its reason for existence lies in the fight against the negative effects of the other three markets, that is, the markets for consumer products, investment products and goods purchased by the state (Krupp 1989).

Table 5: Factor 1^a: "Urbanization"

Locational aspect	Loading		
Car density	0.91		
Built-up area	0.90		
Sulphur dioxide emission	0.78		
Water consumption	0.62		
Sewage disposal	-0.57		
Car density (trend)	-0.47		
Lung cancer	0.42		
Scores per city			
1. Oberhausen	2.79	319. LK. ^b Ansbach	-1.30
2. München	2.66	320. LK. Bernkastel-Wittlich	-1.35
3. Gelsenkirchen	2.58	321. Rhein-Hunsrück-Kreis	-1.36
4. Essen	2.52	322. LK. Uelzen	-1.38
5. Herne	2.48	323. LK. Straubing-Bogen	-1.39
6. West Berlin	2.45	324. LK. Main-Spessart	-1.43
7. Bochum	2.41	325. LK. Gifhorn	-1.50
8. Nürnberg	2.28	326. LK. Neustadt/Aisch-Bad. W.	-1.53
9. Stuttgart	2.12	327. LK. Lüchow-Dannenberg	-1.54
10. Mülheim a.d. Ruhr	2.09	328. LK. Cochem-Zell	-1.68

^a eigenvalue: 4.9; percentage of variance "explained": 25%

^b LK.: Landkreis

The social question

The 1970s taught us that concentrations of vulnerable groups and deprivation were coterminous. Vulnerable groups consist mainly low status groups, ethnic groups and cramped households. Deprivation manifests itself in housing stress, unemployment and deficient social amenities. The spatial pattern of concentration or segregation, however, is not uniform. In the 1970s, vulnerable groups and deprivation were in some cities mainly concentrated in inner residential areas. In other cities, major concentrations also occurred in certain outer areas. This diagnosis is based on quantitative evidence from eight cities in northern and central Europe (Drewe 1983, 1987b). During the 1980s the population decline of cities and inner city areas has slowed down. Yet concentrations of vulnerable groups and deprivation have not only persisted, but, more often than not, they have intensified because of economic decline and rising unemployment.

This view may be challenged by success stories of economic recovery such as that of the so-called Cambridge Phenomenon. There are more sides to success than just high-tech development and its profits; we are also witnessing a process of increasing marginalization of a number of groups: the public sector (where pay has been held down), the unemployed, the low-paid, casual and part-time employed, and women. This occurs despite the fact that the unemployed have been reduced in number (Crang and Martin 1989) and is just one example of what has been called the neglect of interstitial spaces, that is, intra-urban spaces. With marginalization leading to spatial polarization, the spatial pattern is far from simple. Similarly, on a regional scale, a technopolis may drain the urban hinterland of its potential for endogenous development, instead of stimulating a renewal of the economic structure of the entire region. A technopolis may also exist as an enclave thriving on international networks of co-operation while generating only limited regional spin-offs in the long run (Duché 1989).

There are more changes to come in the 1990s and beyond that will raise the "social question." What about the social dimension of the single European market, for example? The single market entails personal freedom of movement and a European space of professional mobility. But what about those who, being unemployed and low skilled, are professionally "immobile." The single market will produce or accelerate social mutations in various sectors and regions, not all of which are foreseeable. And what about technological change such as the application of telematics? This is, in general, a question of how the various advantages and disadvantages (monetary as well as nonmonetary) of adopting a new technol-

ogy are distributed among different socioeconomic or other groups. This may even hold for a country, such as Switzerland, with an extremely low rate of unemployment. The danger of a large-scale application of telematics is that it might aggravate existing inequalities to the extent of producing a "divided information society." This can be illustrated by the impact on employment of telematics applications (Rotach et al. 1987). Even if the overall job gains and losses are expected to be balanced—as in the Swiss case—the disadvantaged can be expected to lose more and to gain less in the process (other things being equal). Given the unequal exposure to functions facing reduction, along with the unequal access to winning segments of the labour market, there is also the danger of an unequal diffusion of telematics applications, which would tend to increase existing disparities in regional development (see Schütte [1990] for the Federal Republic of Germany).

The social question of 1990 is a complex one, with old and new elements intermeshing. To develop a viable strategy, one first has to define the problem(s) in an adequate way—a tricky task because, as we have learned from past experience, the problem is often articulated and constructed by local politicians and other interested parties "in such a way as to make the response relevant and meaningful (or at least appear so)" (Edwards and Batley 1978, 220-1). This holds for vulnerable and deprived groups and for ethnic groups in particular (Drewe and Hulsbergen 1986). Marginality and integrated upgrading in Managua can serve here as an illustration (Drewe and Hulsbergen 1986/87). Our choice may look rather outlandish, but the approach is based on previous research in the Netherlands as well as other European countries. To define the "social question" adequately, one needs both spatial and nonspatial variables.

The former refer to

- deprivation (shortages in housing, technical infrastructure and employment);
- living environment (e.g., type of neighbourhood)

The non-spatial variables are

- vulnerability (person-specific dependencies reflecting the way households gain a living, aspirations, and degree of organization and participation);
- socioeconomic status (occupation, formal occupation and income);
- position in the life cycle (age, sex and household composition and size);
- origin (urban/rural origin, duration of stay in neighbourhood/city and [in Europe] ethnic origin).

A multivariate analysis of survey data has shown that marginality in

five selected barrios of Managua is a multidimensional phenomenon (technically speaking, the canonical correlations between the basic variables turned out to be rather low). Thus, there is reason for integrated upgrading.

Marginality, as a phenomenon, is relative. The need for upgrading is not equally urgent in the areas studied (one of them did not even qualify as a marginal area at all and served as an area of reference).

In the 1970s and early 1980s different strategies for urban social renewal applied in Europe (see Drewe [1987b] for a summary review of the research evidence from more than nine selected cities and more than four selected countries in northern and central Europe). Among the strategies of urban social renewal reviewed are large-scale clearance and subsequent redevelopment, *laissez faire*, rehabilitation that is socially selective in favouring medium- and high-income groups and, finally, integrated rehabilitation that tries to avoid or limit this kind of social selectiveness.

It is still the case that only a nonselective, integrated rehabilitation or upgrading seems adequate with regard to vulnerable groups and deprivation. But it must be adapted to the changing reality of the 1990s (this implies, for example, a different price tag, reconsidering self-help and the so-called informal sector, and social experiments with telematics applications). In any case, it is urgent to put vulnerable groups and deprivation back on both the political and the research agendas because "the burdens of modernization fall inequitably on the poor, the unskilled, and the lower middle class who are least able to pay the emotional and financial price," or what may be called the hidden modernization tax (Meltzer 1984, 37).

Cultural imponderabilia

Important changes in urban form seem to result primarily from changing land values related to long waves in the economy and the adoption of innovations (Whitehand 1989). Long waves of technological development within the economy cause urban development cycles through building cycles. This has been demonstrated by Barras (1987) for Britain in a historical analysis that starts in 1850. This explanation of urban form, however, is far from perfect (Whitehand 1989). The economics of land use leave unexplained variations in urban form, such as variations in the heights and types of building, which are due to cultural factors (not just architectural styles). There are also different roles of private and public agents responsible for change in the townscape, for example, where housing is concerned. In any case, not only townscapes (town plan, land use

and building forms) but landscapes too are tangible aspects of urban culture. The Emilia Romagna Landscape Plan can serve as an example, even if the case is far from settled in Italy (*Urbanistica* 1987). The maintenance of the cultural identity embodied in the townscapes and landscapes of Emilia Romagna (or of Europe in general) is constantly threatened by a certain ideology of modernity. This ideology tends to homogenize urban form, repeating, it would seem, the North American model. The latter has already been adopted by quite a few cities in Europe and elsewhere so that it may appear as rather a universal pattern today. In a recent study published in the United States, the question was asked whether the heritage of European design theory and practice provides a satisfactory basis for revitalizing and sustaining "American" towns and cities (Attoe and Logan 1989). The four stances in European urban design investigated were functionalist, humanist, systemic and formalist. Attoe and Logan do not think that "America" can learn from "Europe." They answer the question with a "qualified no." In reverse, the question is barely discussed in Europe, as the case of Rotterdam shows (Drewe 1990c).

What is really at stake here is the European cultural identity or *genius loci* of cities. Of course, this is not only a matter of urban form. With the forthcoming economic and political integration of Europe, the cultural identity of a country, region or city will increasingly depend on the language (Mourik 1989). But if it comes to cultural products that are language-specific, for example, books, television programs and (partly) movies, the single European market is going to be a threat—especially to the cultural identity of smaller countries, for example, the Netherlands and Flanders, and their languages. Literature and history, too, can be important sources of inspiration for defining (maintaining) the cultural identity of cities and regions, as illustrated by Darras (1988) and Nora (1984). The latter has introduced the concept of *lieux de mémoire*. The meaning of *lieu* is threefold: material, symbolic and functional. These aspects usually coexist.

An extended concept of the urban or regional economy may help us to grasp the importance of cultural imponderabilia (like the analysis of ecological problems).

Cultural imponderabilia

- affect intrinsic values of culture, education and regeneration;
- can influence the productive milieu or factors of production;
- can stimulate the economic performance of a city or region.

The necessary operations regarding the intrinsic values are not limited to safeguarding them. Care, use or conservation, consolidation and modification are also acceptable, as in the case of the Emilia Romagna

Landscape Plan. How about “culture” as an ingredient of the productive environment? The German research evidence presented earlier indicates that “culture” in terms of opportunities for entertainment, like museums and theatres, is one of the prime locational aspects that make up the component labelled “economic dynamics” (see Table 2). As to the locational aspects valued by managers, the supply of culture ranks third. It embraces theatres, operas, ballets, concerts, expositions, galleries and museums.


That the supply of culture can be of considerable importance to the local economy has been demonstrated for Amsterdam by means of input-output analysis (Wesseling and Van der Vegt 1989). In this study, culture has been defined as performing and creative arts, distribution and exhibition plus supporting institutions. Apart from the direct economic impact on employment and production in the sector itself, important indirect economic benefits accrue to other sectors from the cultural sector via

- the spending of income earned in the cultural sector;
- purchases made by this sector in other sectors of the local economy;
- the spending of visitors attracted by the cultural sector.

Politico-administrative aspects and the importance of innovativeness

The future of cities is a many-sided topic. So far we have scanned the economic-technical and ecological perspectives, the social question and cultural imponderabilia because these topics seem of strategic importance. But if an urban strategy is to be devised these elements must be integrated. That is where the politico-administrative aspects come in. Given

Figure 3: The Governing, Administering, and Managing (GAM) Matrix



the diversity of the politico-administrative systems in Europe, we can only sketch the outlines. Figure 3 sets the stage for the discussion (Meltzer 1984, 26).

The rows in Figure 3 refer to levels of government rooted in the usual three-tier system of national state, region and city, whereas the columns contain various functional subsystems. Meltzer uses this matrix as an analytical tool to discuss ways of dealing with modernization and equity in relation to management and organizational control. He emphasizes the complementarity of environmental and social welfare approaches to urban planning (consult Table 6 for the buzz words commonly used to describe these approaches [Meltzer 1984, 153]).

Table 6: Urban planning: Two approaches


Environmental approaches	Social welfare approaches
Technology	Humanism
Macro-orientation	Micro-orientation
Stress on external factors	Stress on internal factors
Rational decision making	Decision making by negotiation
Efficiency	Equity
Political pluralism	Cultural pluralism
Comprehensiveness	Selectiveness
Effecting change	Cushioning change
Experts	Citizenry
Government	Community
Absolute measures	Relative measures
Stability	Mobility
Ends	Means
Planning product	Planning process
Methods	Values
Materializing the future	Modifying reality
Affluence	Poverty
Normativeness	Dysfunctionalism
Disaggregation	Aggregation
Space and uses	Program and services
Elitism	Participation
Centralization	Decentralization

To achieve this integration, substantive knowledge is needed of the kind sketched out in the preceding paragraphs. Spatial planning plays an important part in integrating the different functions concerned with land use, space, facilities and infrastructure. However, this integration implies first that the analysis of the various functional qualities and potentials is connected not only with the design of spatial development perspectives,

but also with strategic projects.

This analysis includes the appraisal of alternative perspectives and projects. Perspectives and projects must also be combined with each other in a mixed-scanning approach. Spatial development perspectives need to be translated into concrete projects to avoid the kind of abstraction often encountered in conventional spatial planning. It does not suffice, however, to compile a list of ad hoc projects, because such a list will lack cohesion. Finally, it is necessary to combine and coordinate the work carried out at different spatial levels into a harmonious whole. This must be done in order to account for higher level impacts, say, on the development of a city, which, in turn, can contribute to higher level developments. This approach (summarized in Figure 4) has been experimented with in the case of Dutch provinces by Drewe et al. (1989).

Figure 4: The “Zeeland approach” in a nutshell



As far as the levels of government are concerned, there are two issues that at present deserve special attention in Europe: metropolitan governance and decentralization. First, there is a new dimension to the age-old problem of government: the central city has increasingly become as dependent on the surrounding subregions (or other central cities for that matter) as these subregions are on the central city. A new metropolplex world and a new function for the old central city needs to be created.

“The new metropolitan/metropolplex city represents a dramatically different pattern of urbanization in the face of an evolving twentieth- and twenty-first-century welfare and technological age and a sharply changing spatial, demographic, economic, social, and political landscape”

(Meltzer 1984, 16). The making of the Randstad Holland as a polycentric metropolis is an interesting case, especially when compared to the metropolis of the Île-de-France (Drewe 1990a). But the results may be slow in coming, because to make the new metropolitan/metropolplex city work, it is imperative to replace competition by co-operation. Recent experiences from the corporate sector teach us that 70 percent of the joint ventures do not live up to expectations or are cancelled, owing to dissension between partners. Co-operation only works when it creates a "value added" for all the partners involved.


Decentralization is a hot issue concerning vertical relationships among levels of government. According to May (1989), decentralization (in France) is closely related to a loss of legitimacy of the central state and to weak performance of the state with regard to the equitable distribution of resources is concerned. Decentralization, among other things, has given rise, as indicated, to competition as the new paradigm of urban policy. The lower levels of government have reacted differently to the new situation, especially in the field of economic intervention. During the years 1982-1986, in some regions (*régions de programme*) it was the communes that were most actively intervening, for example, in Rhône-Alpes and the Île-de-France. In other regions it was either the department (of Picardie, Alsace) or the region itself, notably the *Conseil Régional* (as in the cases of Nord Pas-de-Calais and Lorraine).

This is, however, a rather simplistic classification based on the respective share of the three levels in the total intervention per region, as compared to the national average. In the period under study, a total of almost 27 billion French francs was spent (cf. Guesnier 1988). Some expect the "United States of Europe (USE)" to become a "Europe of regions" at the expense of the national states. This would produce a dramatic shift of power in the respective three-tier systems. Moreover, a rise of transborder co-operation among members of the European Communion (EC) is at hand, particularly in northwest Europe (Maillat 1989). A federal structure may be more satisfactory as a response to this kind of development than some forms of decentralization. Switzerland, the Federal Republic of Germany (on the point of merging with the German Democratic Republic) or Belgium (as a newcomer) could provide a model not just for other member states of the EC, but also for the future "USE." As these examples show, there exist in Europe today sufficient incentives to search for fresh forms of governing, administering and managing. What really counts in the light of the myriad changes and uncertainties is to create an innovative environment (*milieu innovateur*) that encompasses more than just political or administrative aspects.

“Technology and innovation are not ‘black boxes’ that spread throughout regions, nations or the world. Instead, they are the result of explicit decisions of firms concerning the types of products and processes their business will include” (Malecki 1983, 112). Management consultants have identified the climate and mechanisms within firms that may help firms to manage innovations (Little 1985). This enterprise-focused approach does not, however, tell the full story. Nor does a technology-based approach. Experience teaches us that the local environment is of increasing importance to economic development or restructuring (Pecqueur 1989). GREMI, a European research group investigating innovative milieux, has provided us with an array of case studies from all over Europe (see, among others, Aydalot and Keeble [1989]). The qualitative empirical evidence can be cast in the form of a general hypothesis reformulating the findings of GREMI:

- the more effectively local potentials are used for endogenous development,
 - the more important the role of small- and medium-sized enterprises,
 - the more synergetic, and
 - the more open or extroverted the environment, the more innovative the city or region and the more likely its (economic) survival.
- Each of the four preconditions influences the others and is influenced

Figure 5: A model of regional synergy.



by them. The economic-technological perspectives of cities (regions) have a bearing on almost all of the ingredients of innovative milieu. (Consult Aydalot and Keeble [1989] and the subsequent research of GREMI [Perrin 1989] for further details.) From the point of view of governing, administering and managing, it is synergy that deserves special attention, or the synergetic network of enterprises, research and politics depicted schematically in Figure 5. A more detailed picture of the types of relations and partners involved is given in Table 7 (Aydalot 1989, 32).

Table 7: The environment of innovative firms

Type of relations	Partners	External to the firm Market relations	Nonmarket relations	Internal to the firm
Labour	Labourers	Formation of a labour market	Role of unions	Internal training
	Engineers, scientists	Reemployment of engineers	Informal contacts personal relations	Inter-establishment mobility
	State		Adaptation of training centres	
Inputs markets	Firms	Relations between suppliers and specialized sub-contracting, co-operation between SMEs	Associations, clubs, chambers of commerce	Vertical integration
Scientific and technical knowledge	Universities, government research Firms	Research contracts market for scientific instruments Specialized sub-contracts, co-operation between SMEs	Spin-offs, personal contacts	R & R laboratories of the firms
Specialized services	Service enterprises	Venture capital		Specialized departments of the large firm
Innovation impetus	State, public agencies Firms	Public spending, contracts, subsidies Subcontracting	Clubs, informal meeting, points	

In the case of Zeeland, mentioned earlier, an attempt has been made to identify the synergy empirically, together with other ingredients of innovative environments (Drewe et al. 1989). One of the first findings was that an open environment in Zeeland means transborder co-operation with the province of East Flanders.

Of course, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. An innovative environment is a matter of experimentation rather than one of fads and fashion. Experiments must be evaluated in their proper context and, if proven successful, looked at again to see whether they can be transplanted to a different context. It does not suffice to rate cities according to their endorsement of "research and technology" as Brunet et al. (1989) have done. To measure this endowment, Brunet et al. combined several indicators: technopolises, engineers, executives and technicians, research, universities, culture and telecommunication. These potentials do not provide conclusive evidence of the existence of innovative milieux—nor does the existence of a technopolis, science park, science and technology city or whatever else it may be called (Drewe 1989b). Take, for example, the proliferation of technopolises in France. There is no guarantee that they will all qualify as innovative environments in the end, unless the above preconditions are fulfilled.

Capital cities in the future

The future of capital cities (in Europe), then, depends at least as much on their functioning regularly as cities as on their being capitals. This is particularly true when it comes to coping with the many-sided changes ahead and the uncertainties these changes necessarily involve. The bigger the capital city, the more serious the danger of malfunctioning and, hence, the more complex the task. Capital cities possess certain *sui generis* qualities, including a unique political, cultural and administrative function. A plan that would stress this function while treating the rest only as a "supporting act" could not provide sufficient direction for the future of capital cities in Europe, not even for the future "Brussels, DC." Let us recall that European capitals do not constitute a class alone.

All cities, in order to survive economically, need a strategy of economic-technological development. They also need an assessment of the impacts of new technologies.

What is special about capital cities is the dominance of the public economic sector. This fact asks for a more detailed economic analysis, ideally an input-output analysis. This has been done using the input-output table

for Amsterdam (in lieu of The Hague, for which there is no available information), notably the study of Van der Vegt et al. (1989, 46-7). It shows the importance to the local economy of the sector of public administration as an intermediate consumer, employer and producer of value added. In terms of wages and salaries, it is the single most important employer in Amsterdam. As a nonprofit sector, it produces some 8 percent of the city's total value added. Whether the economic importance of public administration will produce positive or negative multiplier effects is not clear, and the analysis does not fully explain the attractiveness of the capital city's public sector for potential investors from other parts of the country or from abroad. The attractiveness still remains a matter of other locational factors. Washington, DC, for example, ranks only seventeenth out of thirty-one American metropolitan areas when it comes to Fortune 500 corporate headquarters—the same rank as Detroit, Miami, Portland and Seattle (see Kirpatrick 1989). As far as Europe is concerned, we can have a closer look at the productive milieu of the German capitals of Bonn and Berlin. We find both of them among the top ten cities with respect to “economic dynamics” (Table 2), with Bonn being in a slightly better position. Managers prefer Bonn as a location to Berlin. Bonn scores sixth out of fifteen German cities; Berlin scores thirteenth. The former and potential future capital still labours under some serious handicaps related to infrastructure: rail, road and air (for example, no intercontinental airport) (Drewe 1990b).

The French example demonstrates that living in high-density areas or big cities, seen from an aggregate point of view, is advantageous as far as economic and certain social benefits are concerned, but only at the price of increased social costs. The prime example is Paris, which also happens to be one of the two most prominent capital cities in Europe.

An extended concept of the urban or regional economy may help to reconcile production with social costs. It can also serve as a “conceptual antidote” to the paradigm of competition. That is why it is important to study not only the economic-technological perspectives, but the ecological perspectives, the social question, and cultural imponderabilia as well.

Ecological problems affect health and biological survival; they influence the productive milieu, but they can also stimulate environmental innovations. Research evidence available for the Federal Republic of Germany indicates that West Berlin suffers from serious environmental problems but these seem to be more strongly related to a high population density more than its potential status as a capital city. Being a capital, on the other hand, may be a reason for a city to pay special attention to natural beauty. Note that the future Randstad Holland (including Amsterdam,

Rotterdam and The Hague) is conceived of as a Green (Heart) metropolis with other capital cities serving as a model (cf. Tummers-Zuurmond 1990). Special attention to natural beauty, however, does not mean that capital cities can dispense with tackling urgent environmental problems, in particular those related to car density or urbanization in general.

"Burdens of modernization fall inequitably on the poor, the unskilled, and the lower middle class who are least able to pay the emotional and financial price" (Meltzer 1984, 37). The social question of 1990 is a complex one with old and new elements intermeshing. Hence the urgency of putting vulnerable groups and deprivation back on the political agenda. A nonselective integrated rehabilitation or upgrading still seems to be the right strategy, provided it is adapted to the changing reality of the 1990s. This holds for all cities. But if the social question is taken seriously, then capital cities are necessarily cast for the leading part in implementing the new policy, to maintain their credibility. It is on their territory that a start has to be made with making "the least well-off group as well off as possible." Being an important employer provides a concrete opportunity to fight injustice linked to ethnic origin, sex or the like (Drewe and Hulsbergen 1986).

Cultural imponderabilia affect intrinsic values of culture, education and regeneration. They tend to enhance the productive milieu and, in attracting tourists and visitors, are important "cash cows", in the disrespectful language of economists. These are not *a priori, sui generis* qualities of capital cities, though quite a few capital cities in Europe have a strong Cultural profile (see Table 1, column 6). There is only one other profile marked by a capital C, namely column 7, which contains only two cities (Paris and Berlin). The remaining capitals are characterized either by profiles with a small c, or with no c at all. According to the researchers, C stands not only for cultural facilities in the broadest sense (*rayonnement culturel*), but also for universities, congresses, presses and publishing. Incidentally, Berlin, which has previously been cited twice for its handicaps, scores extremely well on entertainment opportunities (second out of forty-two with Munich being first) and the supply of culture (first out of fifteen cities).

But there is more at stake here than just locational factors. Capital cities are national symbols, as expressed in characteristic townscapes and landscapes. They are also rich in *lieux de mémoire*, not only material ones. Capital cities may play an important part in preserving the cultural identity of European countries after 1992.

Economic-technological, ecological, social and cultural perspectives need to be integrated to devise an urban strategy. Spatial planning plays

an important role in achieving integration. If the existing ways of governing, administering and managing are not up to this task, then new ways have to be found. An example might be the creation of a new metropolitan metropollex city or, eventually and even more dramatic, a new politico-administrative structure for Europe. Co-operation and synergy is the name of the game. What really counts in the light of the myriad changes and uncertainties is to create an innovative environment. This, of course, applies not only to capital cities, but to other cities as well. As capitals usually cover the national besides the local and regional level, they can serve as laboratories, providing opportunities for systematic observation, experimentation or practice. Furthermore, whatever legitimacy has been lost in recent years can be recovered by rediscovering the public as client, and by using the opportunities offered by the new information technology or telematics (see for example Rotach et al. [1987], Kubicek and Rolf [1986] or Boisard [1990]). The concentration of public administration in capital cities provides an excellent opportunity for experiments to improve the functioning of the administration through better internal and external bases of information and communication, to ease citizens' access to public administration and to protect the privacy jeopardized by the new technology. It should be clear that social experiments are needed in order to reach the vulnerable groups. Some may regard the creation of innovative environments primarily as a remedy for the problems faced by "peripheral" regions: old industrial regions, mixed regions with old industries and new sectors that are technologically dependent on outside regions, or regions where agriculture is still important. But the creation of such an environment cannot be regarded as less relevant to established economic centres or capital cities simply because they have much more to lose. As Herodotus has pointed out, "the cities that were formerly great have most of them become insignificant; and such as are at present powerful, were weak in olden time"

One does not have to go back in time that far. Just imagine if somebody had asked us in 1960 which cities would be "winners" or "losers" in 1990 (see Drewe [1990c] on the future of Rotterdam). The long-term future of cities, including capitals, is not predictable. All one can do is venture some alternative scenarios. It may indeed be possible to achieve a more or less balanced development: coping successfully with economic-technological change, respecting both ecological limits to urban growth and cultural imponderabilia, and reducing distributive injustice. One can also imagine a future shaped by short-term economic concerns and dominated by competition as the new paradigm of urban policy. According to this scenario, economic growth will be achieved, but at a price—which is

to say, with considerable cost, ecologically, socially and culturally. But cities may also fail to achieve economic revitalization. There are some likely candidates for this in Europe. But let us not identify them by name. Who would like to be among those who provoke a negative self-fulfilling prophecy.

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WORLD CITY/CAPITAL CITY: NEW YORK IN THE CHANGING GLOBAL SYSTEM

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“If New York imitates the great cities of the the past, it must decline.”¹

“There is every reason why New York should be the most prosperous city in the country. It is the premier city of the United States, and indeed the world.”²

“New York is... entered upon a new ascendancy at the same time as it experiences decline and decay. This duality is its fatal attraction, its vanity and its charm.”³

The map of the world is changing. And with it the world urban system is also changing. What we see emerging is a network of world cities interlocked through information flows, directed by former national elites newly realigned into transnational elites. More than simply core and periphery, the emerging world order comprises a major integration and rationalization of the world economy and the world legal order. What Napoleon once sought to do with arms, world capital is doing with the internationalization of the money economy and new information technology. But the process is lumpy and uneven. A good portion of the world will be left out of the new order and will not participate in this transformation in the near or middle-term future. This segment of world population will not necessarily be exploited. It will simply be ignored. The new world will consist of a cluster of integrated advanced economies participating in the flows and interactions, deriving their well-being by standing astride the streams, siphoning a percentage off as bankers and salespeople have always done. But countries and cultures irrelevant to the flows will be left out. Regions and populations not needed will be relegated to the status of subsistence bystanders. But by standing still they will be perceived and will perceive themselves as falling relatively further and

further behind. Such countries can provide, as they have in the past, some materials and cheap labour, and, in an age of reduced transportation costs, even land. (But as information substitutes for material inputs, by making industrial and distribution processes much more efficient, unskilled labour will be less needed than ever. And fewer inputs will be needed as inventories are monitored on a world basis.) In areas where inputs of land, labour and materials are exploited, an imported or locally recruited elite will provide ties to the international system as representatives of the external information/control system.

The global information economy carries with it two conflicting forces. One is the power to centralize the control of wealth and information in a few hands, driven by the imperatives of unbridled capitalism. This force has a countervailing twin: the power of intervention, imitation and transformation of the underlying economic structure via information access. The networked personal computer is a powerful force for the creation of independent coalitions (Gorbachev no doubt realized that the centralized Soviet economic and political system could not survive the ubiquitous computer and the photocopier, but that the Soviet Union itself cannot survive without them.) But since interactive networks transcend space and locales, their adoption will tend to diminish the importance of the local community in space as a common organizing principle.

As Manuel Castells has emphasized, the meliorative effects of the countervailing force are mediated through institutional structures. The key question for the future, then, is: to what degree will these countervailing effects be permitted to occur in the various global settings under transformation.⁴

John Friedmann has provided a useful list of characteristics of emergent world cities. World cities are "basing points," he writes, for the organization and articulation of production and markets. These basing points will evolve into a hierarchy of nodes of control. The internal structural changes that occur in world cities are driven by the extent to which those cities are integrated into the world economic network. World cities attract and concentrate international capital in liquid form and in physical investment in real estate and land. World cities attract large numbers of in-migrants from areas of population surplus and limited economic opportunity.

Friedmann further argues that world cities concentrate the inherent problem of industrial capitalism: the conflict between the need for territorial community and the functional efficiency of the economy. World city formation therefore fosters spatial and class polarization, social costs that exceed the fiscal capacity of the state and an underclass of the unemployed

or the poorly paid. As a consequence world cities are increasingly exposed to periodic social and fiscal crises, and face a propensity of the business and governmental leadership to shift social costs to the politically weakest or most disorganized sections of the population.⁵

Earlier, Friedmann and Goetz argued that world cities faced dual contradictory pressures: they have found themselves deployed to make the world safe for capital and, at the same time, to articulate and promote their own national economies within the world system. These antagonistic forces result in conflict between the protagonists of transnational capital and the established national bourgeoisie, between national leaders oriented to the states and those oriented to transnational capital, and, finally, between the populace of the world city and the national polity. These conflicts are embedded in the structure of the world system for the foreseeable future and shape the discourse and tension within the local and national political systems.⁶

Friedmann's analysis underscores the convergence of urban theorists regarding the physical and economic characteristics of evolving world cities. Most urbanists agree on what they see happening, but there has emerged a division between what we might loosely term Left and Right critiques of the social values, causes and likely consequences of the recent transformation of the world city. Those on the Right see the emergence of the world city as another phase of world economic development, a rising tide that lifts all boats, both those of the world city and those of its trading partners around the world. The world city is alleged to be the great generator of economic change through information flows and the substitution of knowledge for material production. Those on the Left, however, view the emergence of the world city as a threat to the democratic tradition, a further concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a few on an international scale of vast proportions. They fear the centralized control of flows of ideas and information through subservient and uncritical media: lords of information who will rule the uninformed serfs. And they fear the creation of a vast subclass of the impoverished and near-poor who are unable to function within the new information economy and are thereby relegated to the level of idle proles.

The two descriptions are not mutually exclusive, and they characterize, to some degree, the world cities of the present, and New York, in particular. Each allows that the world city is networked to a system of world capitalism and is a major node on that system. Each node is characterized by

- a high value of financial transactions and control of flow of capital;
- a high level of information flow;

- a high level of business services to support capital transfers;
- legal assistance;
- accounting firms;
- public relations and advertising firms;
- banking establishments;
- affluent elites who control decisions;
- “near elites” and professionals to serve elites;
- a high level and high quality of personal services demanded by these two groups;
- a high level of cultural and entertainment services demanded by these two groups;
- a high level of world and national transportation services, especially air;
- a high level of “idea” industries: publicity and media;
- a displacement of manufacturing and routine services and an increase in networking of face-to-face contacts;
- increasing use of computer and information technology;
- increasing use of communication links and communication technology;
- an increase of office space in centres of control;
- fluidity and upward generational mobility for some groups who pass threshold acceptances;
- as a byproduct of a decline in manufacturing and service jobs, an increase in unemployment among the unskilled;
- the growth of an economically, formally disengaged section of the population.

I have briefly sketched the broad outlines of this emerging global context as a necessary preface to the topic of this paper, which deals with New York’s evolving role and internal changes. I have focused on New York because I am completing a book with Eugenie Birch of Hunter University on New York’s changing role in the world economy. One cannot write about New York without writing about the world context. New York is a good place to start to understand what is happening to the world urban system. New York has always expressed and amplified the forces acting on large cities.

A trenchant example of this occurred on the afternoon of Friday, September 8, 1989, when ninety-five thousand rail commuters, headed north on a steamy, late summer day out of Manhattan, found themselves stranded in Grand Central Terminal. A fire had started in the signal system along the tracks in the South Bronx. A twenty-two year old Bronx man, wheeling a shopping cart filled with three hundred pounds of copper

cable, was later arrested near the Harlem Line. It was alleged that he had intended to sell the wire as scrap to a local junk dealer. The fire resulted from short-circuit sparking at the point where the signal wire was cut and removed.⁷

This bizarre event provides a succinct metaphor for the entwining effects of the city's ills on both the rich and the poor. The image of thousands of affluent bankers, lawyers and executives delayed in their daily exodus to their pleasant suburbs via the gauntlet of the South Bronx, stymied for hours by an entrepreneurial urban miner of locally available metals, embodies all of the features and problems of New York's contemporary condition as a world city. Here were the executors of New York's global functions, captives of a nineteenth-century transportation system, falling victim to the theft of a copper signalling system in an era when copper wire is fast being replaced by the new technology of optical fibre (whose scrap value, ironically, will be close to nil). For his part, the enterprising Bronx thief will probably have little chance to participate in the emerging fibre-optic information economy, except perhaps to the extent he can stimulate fear and cause occasional breakdown. What joins his world with that of the affluent is a shared territoriality in the form of a short rail corridor in Upper Manhattan and the Bronx, and whatever moral community they share in the form of the residual fragmented polities of city and state. But the global city is not a moral community, at least not yet. New York's constituent piece of the global city lies in Midtown and in Lower Manhattan. It certainly does not include the south Bronx. Nevertheless, the futures of these two worlds are intertwined politically, economically, spatially and socially. They have been juxtaposed by powerful technological and economic forces.

Cities, particularly cities like New York, like to see themselves as directing the forces of change—the colossus sitting astride the harbour. To some extent, they do control or at least are the locus of decisions of control. At any given moment they seem to be in control. But over secular time they are, in physical and functional terms, merely the products of forces swirling outside their control. They choose to some degree how they respond to those forces. They become what they can become, some doing it better than others. As Eugenie Birch has demonstrated in a perceptive review of New York's history, New York has done it better than most cities for much of its history.⁸

Whether it can continue to do so is another matter. New York has been, and continues to be, a reflection of its nation-state and of the relative position of that nation-state in the world's political and money economy. As the United States has gone into relative economic decline, so too

has New York.

New York has been subjected in recent years to a number of turbulent external forces:

- The evolution of a world economic system based on information flows.
- The deindustrialization of the United States, including the sale of capital plant and assets to foreign nationals and firms. New York's own industrial base has been devastated and reduced, some lost to offshore producers, some to locations elsewhere in the United States, notably New Jersey, and some simply abandoned through the death of firms. But the sale of capital assets has helped New York's economy: Wall Street firms handled much of the paperwork and earned handsome commissions there by generating a local prosperity based on the general decline of the country. This phase, seems, however, to have come to relative halt for the present.
- The transformation and substitution of political power for economic capital, reducing New York's monopoly of domestic control and transferring it to Washington. The emergence of what Castells calls the "Warfare State" has partly driven this process.⁹
- The loss of urban cultural and information monopoly and the emergence of other competitive national centres such as Los Angeles, and, to a lesser degree, Atlanta, Boston and San Francisco (and one might add Toronto) as international cultural and transportation alternatives to New York.
- The spin-off of centre-related functions not needed in Manhattan, that is, the further specialization and refinement of the tip of the control hierarchy in New York's two business centres, Lower Manhattan and Midtown. More affluent and more powerful members of Manhattan's business elite are becoming fewer in number. They are also increasingly living and working in multiple locations, of which Manhattan is only one. Robert Murray Haig's famous question, "Why not live in the city?" has now become, "Why not live in more than one place?"
- The elite world business centre is surrounded by urban fabric from an earlier era, offering an opportunity matrix for the upwardly mobile poor from the Third World, especially Latin America and Asia. Surrounding the twenty-first century postmodern centre of world capital, we see emerging a city that is a Third World spin-off, resembling the New York of the nineteenth century with its low wages and sweatshops. The offshore transfer of production has now given way to onshore importation of low-wage labour. The process

of labor improvement through union organization has been undermined by the shrinking of the world. What will it mean to have maquiladoras in the old industrial hearts of American cities? Until wage rates equalize on a worldwide basis, union power will diminish in America and wage rates will drop in American cities. The impact of this process on national and local urban politics in the United States will likely be profound. Indeed, its effects are already being felt.

- Friction between new immigrant arrivals, such as Koreans, and earlier migrant groups from America's less attractive past, such as southern blacks and migrants from the former colonial dependency of Puerto Rico. But even among these groups significant upward mobility has occurred, a rule of thumb being that for every black or Hispanic who loses to the overwhelming odds of the drug-ridden ghettos, about two make it out. Even so, at any moment in New York, one out of four black males and one out of ten Hispanic males are in prison, a systemic failure of massive proportions and evidence of a threat to the order needed to maintain New York's position as a world centre. Crime and fear could result in further concentration of global activities within Manhattan or, alternatively, in further dispersion to safer parts of the metropolitan area and out into the exurbs, thereby accelerating a process that is already at work in the spinning-off of back-office functions.

It is not by chance that the general descriptors of world cities fit New York so well, for New York, of course, has been the pre-eminent world city during the post-World War II period, the period of American world economic leadership. But New York's status as a world capital goes back much further in time. There is a variety of indicators of world city status. Population size and world rank has, from the second half of the nineteenth-century, been a popular but crude measure of urban world importance. The consolidation of the Greater City of New York in 1898 was driven in part by the desire of New York's leaders to declare New York the largest city in the world. In 1800 New York was not in the top twenty-five urban agglomerations in the world. The largest city was Peking, China, with a population of 1.1 million. London was the second largest with 860,000. But by 1850, New York was the seventh largest city with 680,000 people, and London was first with 2.3 million. By 1900, after the consolidation of 1898, New York, with 4.2 million, had jumped to second place, with London still in the lead at 6.5 million.

It is not certain at what moment the New York metropolitan area became the largest urbanized place in the world, but it was probably about

1915, depending, of course, on how one defines the urban agglomeration. For the next half century New York/northeast New Jersey remained the world's largest urban area in population. But in 1980, the New York agglomeration, with 15.6 million people, slipped to second place, yielding to Tokyo, which had reached 17 million. London had fallen to seventh place with 10 million. These trends are expected to continue. By the end of the century the largest cities of the world are projected to be Mexico City with 26.3 million and São Paulo, Brazil, with 24 million. Tokyo will be third, New York sixth and London about thirtieth. The largest cities in the year 2000, in terms of population, will undoubtedly be found in the Third World, notably Latin America, South Asia and the Middle East. But the three primary economic "basing points" will still be Tokyo, New York and London. Frankfurt, of course, may play an increasingly important but, nevertheless, secondary role within Europe, as a united Germany exerts its economic influence. The important point is that population size is no longer a measure of world prominence and power, if, indeed, it ever was.¹⁰

New York has been a dominant North American world city since the establishment of the United States in the eighteenth century, when it became, briefly, the first capital of the new republic. New York has always been both competitive and co-operative with other cities in its national urban system. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries New York was one of a chain of ports vying for dominance of transatlantic and coastal trade. But New York's rivals, such as Boston, Newport, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Norfolk, Charleston, Savannah and New Orleans, never threatened New York's supremacy. With the opening of the continent through river and later rail connections, internal cities, such as Chicago, Cleveland, St. Louis, Buffalo and Detroit, became important manufacturing and trading centres, but none approached New York's dominance in finance, international export trade and small goods production. But with the shift of the national population centre westward, New York's location became increasingly a disadvantage for the production and shipping of heavy goods. New York's manufacturing sector increasingly specialized in light goods whose value-to-weight ratio was high, such as apparel, jewelry, millinery and watches.

New York's ability and willingness to shift with changed economic circumstances became a valuable survival trait in its competition with other urban centres. In the early twentieth century, New York's chief urban competitor was Chicago, hub of the great industrial and agricultural Midwest. Chicago generated its own form of innovation, notably in architectural building forms. It was Chicago that taught New York how to build skyscrapers. Chicago created and dominated agricultural commodity markets

and became a great centre of industrial production. Even by the end of the twentieth century the tallest building in North America is in Chicago, not New York, and Chicago dreams of a mile-high skyscraper, now technically feasible, even if humanly and economically a dubious proposition. But, like being largest in mere population numbers, being tallest in building height is a hollow claim to urban dominance in the absence of dominating economic energy and vitality. Chicago is no longer the chief world competitor to New York. Los Angeles now claims that role, thanks to the emergence of California and particularly southern California as an economic growth centre poised on the American edge of the dynamic Pacific Rim. But there is another competitor to New York's dominance in a different mode, and that is Washington, DC, the political capital of the country. Forty years of America's global involvement, if not hegemony, has pushed a sleepy southern city into the front ranks of global political involvement and cosmopolitan culture. Washington no longer is the political appendage of New York's economic dominance, but increasingly enjoys an independent existence as political power is translated into economic power.

At the same time New York is increasingly identifying itself with its counterpart world cities, notably Tokyo and London, and, perhaps to a lesser degree, with Frankfurt. When the Nikkei, Dow and London Indexes ultimately become fused into a single world stock market indicator, New York's identity will also be merged with that of its competitor/co-operator counterpart world cities. As a consequence, New York's financial and information centre will increasingly tend to dis-identify with its own nation-state and also with the greater city of New York. This could have an adverse impact on the priorities New York City places on solutions to its internal problems. And it will also affect the willingness of the declining American nation-state, acting through its political capital, Washington, to help New York deal with its problems of physical and social decay. The result may well be that New York will become less and less like the rest of America, and Manhattan will become less and less like the rest of New York City. As one astute urbanist recently commented: New York City, as we have known it, may become an obsolete concept.

As this is a colloquy on capital cities, it is appropriate to ask what these forces and trends mean, in the American case, to Washington, and in the Canadian case, to Ottawa. One might expect that the American and Canadian nation-states will become less salient to their respective populations. Elites and their information flows and controls will, for better or worse, cross boundaries as if they did not exist. One may debate the value of a North American common market, but it is almost a reality and will

soon include Mexico in significant ways. Perhaps this is the meaning, in symbolic terms at least, of the two new embassy/consular buildings on Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington. Belonging to Canada and Mexico, they are the only diplomatic structures on this "Main Street of America." What really is the special relationship expressed by these sitings? In the emerging North American common market, does Canada risk losing its separate identity? And is Mexico less at risk? And what of the United States as it has been known in the past? What transformations lie ahead for it? How will these transformations reshape its cities? And will Washington or Ottawa eventually face the transformations and problems now confronting New York? These are important questions for future study.

Imperial Washington grew through the postwar years as a reflection of American world hegemony. That era is now coming to a close, but Washington's role as a world centre of power will continue to make this city the political locus of the global consortium of advanced economies. New York's self-declared role as capital of the world, based on the location of the United Nations' headquarters, has had a hollow ring in recent years. But with the resurgence of the United Nations as a force for world law and order—a product largely of the Gorbachev reforms—New York City may recover some of its international lustre. But we should keep in mind that the United Nations is *in* New York, not *of* it, and that more and more of its functions are being located in other cities of the world. New York's role as a political capital will continue to be a derivative of its global economic functions. And those politics will filter through Washington and through multinational corporate influences based increasingly in Tokyo, London and other true political capitals outside the United States.

World capitals set much store by cultural symbols, institutions and memorable architectural statements. New York's Lincoln Center and Washington's Kennedy Center may be unsophisticated, even inept, architectural designs (because their architects were chosen more for political than for design reasons). But both are now performing arts centres equal in artistic quality to any in the world. New York remains the cultural capital of America and, to a degree, of the world. It is this function that is most alive and vibrant in New York and it is this function that preserves the city's status as a world capital. This will not diminish and it may even increase.

As intellectual capital and capital of American social experiment—which New York has been for generations—the Athens on the Hudson is in relative decline, but only because New York is now everywhere. New York has successfully exported its music, its books and its educated people

throughout the country. New York culture is now available wherever one goes.

The best city architecture and planning of recent years has gone to Washington, more so than to New York. New York has proceeded unimag-inatively to slum up its Midtown with banal and timid postmodern sta-lactites that darken and deaden sidewalks. Lower Manhattan's skyline has been mutilated and demeaned by the dull, boxlike, scale-less filing cabi-nets of awkward speculative office buildings, the products of bottom-line speculators. Only the World Finance Center, developed by the Toronto firm of Olympia and York (which has since given up a large share of its control of the project), is an urban design that is sophisticated, elegant and up to the cultural and design standards New York likes to think it embodies but so rarely achieves in its buildings. The World Finance Center, built on filled land in the Hudson, designed by Cesar Pelli and co-ordinated by Alex Cooper, artfully extends the 1811 Manhattan grid. It softens the over-powering dominance of the Port Authority's twin-towered World Trade Center. This is high quality architecture, designed for the affluent finan-cial community in lower Manhattan. The hermetically sealed atrium, a delightful space reminiscent of London's Crystal Palace, speaks to the needs of the world financial capital. Protected from outside penetration, it nevertheless can look out on the surrounding world from beneath the lacy fronds of palm trees—an unintended reminder of those warm tropi-cal climes in southern latitudes where many of the nonparticipants are concentrated. Outside the crystal palace, the problems loom and persist. The list is staggering:

- a pervasive sense of danger and fear;
- mentally ill and drug-crazed people roaming and living on the streets;
- random and unprovoked assault and murder;
- a general loss of public civility in streets and public places;
- widespread and visible poverty;
- growing numbers of single-parent households;
- growing numbers of teenage pregnancies;
- intergenerational welfare dependency and growth of a permanent underclass;
- drug-addicted babies;
- drug-based economy in some neighborhoods;
- growing HIV-infected/AIDS population;
- aids-infected babies;
- hospital overcrowding;

- infrastructure decay (some estimates put the cost of New York's infrastructure repairs over the next ten years at \$50 billion);
- joblessness, especially among minorities;
- extremely high housing costs;
- shortage of housing for low and moderate-income people;
- large proportion of housing stock in aging, obsolete structures;
- growing slum areas, loss of housing stock through arson, under-maintenance and disinvestment;
- organized crime resulting in a tax on economy and corruption of public officials;
- public transit that is obsolete, crowded, ugly and unclean, dangerous and expensive;
- air pollution problems;
- sewage not adequately treated before discharge into waterways;
- sludge discharge in ocean to be halted in near future—alternative disposal methods not yet found;
- water pollution in harbour and coastal waters;
- good water supply but heavy losses due to leakage, not dependable in drought and not adequately metered;
- solid waste disposal sites filling up—alternative solutions will be necessary in a not distant future;
- toxic sites in some areas, some not known or monitored;
- high electricity costs;
- schools demoralized, unable to convey basic skills, decaying physically;
- growing numbers of people ill-equipped to staff businesses in an information age;
- automobile use growing in core areas;
- trans-Hudson crossings not adequate to meet demands;
- rail and transit connections to city not adequate;
- highway and expressway capacity exceeded, delays, tie-ups frequent;
- insufficient taxi service, especially in some areas;
- airports crowded and difficult to use, especially John F. Kennedy;
- airports not linked to transit system;
- declining upper/middle class residential tax base;
- declining commercial tax base;
- departure of some finance, insurance and real estate (FIRE) head offices from centre;
- lack of jobs in outer boroughs;
- departure of manufacturing from outer boroughs;
- population of New York City diminishing as proportion of regional

and national populations, loss of political power and ability to command resources to address problems;

- decline in the competitiveness of the Port of New York compared to other American ports;
- loss of local ownership of capital assets, especially real estate, to foreign investors;
- gridlock in region, negatively impacting growth of region's economy and spillovers to New York City;
- (in Manhattan) skyscrapers of excessive size and undistinguished design, and badly located, which reduce light and air and cause excessive congestion at street level;
- pedestrian congestion in downtown and midtown areas of Manhattan;
- loss and endangerment of architecturally and historically valuable properties;
- lack of civic amenities and open spaces in many areas;
- growing distance of open countryside from city as suburban development spreads;
- destruction and defacement of public property and the public realm;
- loss of the community as a moral order and a place of shared responsibility;
- racial and ethnic division and hostility;
- recent prosperity built on the information economy, thus subject to vagaries of the market, shuffling of paper, nonproductive speculation and import-weighted trade imbalances;
- growing competition from other cities in the United States, other parts of the region, especially New Jersey, and other world cities;
- paralysis in large-scale public decision making of the kind that once characterized New York City and propelled it to pre-eminence (due probably, in part, to a public loss of confidence that the benefits and costs of such projects are justly shared);
- national and state problems—black migration from the South, Puerto Rican poverty, the mentally ill and deinstitutionalized—inflicted on the city without concomitant provision of resources to address them;
- prospects of immediate budget shortfall, at both city and state levels;
- prospects of further departure of firms from Manhattan;
- adjustment to Charter reform, especially methods of handling planning issues and prioritizing and siting capital expenditures;
- threatened secession of Staten Island.

But New York is not without important assets that can be used to confront its problems:

- enormous investment in capital stocks, buildings and infrastructure, much of which has been amortized or paid for by previous generations;
- in-migration of young, ambitious, bright people, many from foreign countries;
- many strong higher education institutions;
- the leading cultural institutions of the country;
- focus of capital decision and information flows for the United States and a large share of the world;
- the headquarters of many global firms remain at the centre;
- rapid and high quality business and legal services;
- headquarters of the United Nations;
- skyline unequalled in the world;
- a mythology of place in the collective human mind;
- media and communications centre;
- a history of pragmatic problem-solving;
- ethnic and racial richness and diversity unequalled anywhere;
- continued national and international attraction and opportunities for the very ambitious and talented who want to make it in the toughest and most highly rewarded arenas of competition in business and the arts.

New opportunities have arisen for New York, mostly derived from the city's changing role in the world economy. These include

- strength and growth in the finance, insurance and real estate (FIRE) sector over the past decade;
- commercial building boom in Manhattan in the 1980s has added significantly to the tax base;
- development of the Teleport centre for financial communications;
- adoption of fibre-optics communications;
- restoration of some of New York's great civic and cultural assets: the Public Library, Carnegie Hall, Central Park, Union Square and Bryant Park;
- elimination of graffiti on subway cars and physical improvement in some subway stations;
- some addition of back-office jobs to outer boroughs, including Morgan Stanley in Brooklyn and Citicorp in Long Island City;
- improved standards for urban design, exemplified in the World Financial Center and Battery Park City developments;
- continued development of waterfront;

- signs of increased concern and commitment by citizens' groups and the corporate sector.¹¹

Whether the assets and opportunities are sufficient to overcome the serious problems New York faces remains to be seen. Predicting New York's future has always been risky business; surprises, both good and bad, are inevitable. But it is clear that New York City and the New York Metropolitan Region are at a crossroads. The future of New York is only partly within its own control. A good deal will depend on whether the national government in Washington recognizes the need to maintain New York as one of three or four "world cities," not for New York's sake but for the economic health and competitiveness of the country and on how much Washington acknowledges that the problems of New York have largely been created by national policies and historical forces and events. Rather than risk offering forecasts or predictions, I will conclude by presenting two alternative hundred-year scenarios for the future of New York. The message I wish to convey through these scenarios is that New York can respond to its changing global role in several very different, possible ways. Only time will tell which of the scenarios turns out to be the more accurate description of eventual reality:

The extrapolation scenario

It is the year 2090. Your business requires you to travel to New York and, though you dread the prospect, you have no choice. Face-to-face contacts are still important in making deals. You must endure a series of hardships to travel by a crowded six-hundred-passenger airship to the outskirts of the city. As your aircraft descends toward Stewart International Jetport (SIJ) across the sprawled New York Region, you can make out your ultimate destination in Manhattan through the smog. At the tip and centre of the island are two large clusters of skyscrapers, not much greater in number or bulk than existed in 1990. But now they are together called "The Manhattan World Metrocenter," replacing the old New York City, which ceased to exist as an official entity in 2050. Here in the Metrocenter, an integrated group of powerful elites control world flows of resources, wealth, money, intellectual properties and raw materials through information networks connected to other world nodes, notably Tokyo, London, Frankfurt and Singapore.

These elites work in concentrated, defined areas that are sealed off from those not having business in the area, have high police protection and require passes to enter. Alas, these business areas have few new ameni-

ties outside the individual buildings comprising the clusters, since they simply continue the office-building pattern of the 1980s and 1990s. But they are safe from crime and the sight of homeless derelicts. The sun and even the sky are often not visible from the sidewalks, but the elite workers have adjusted to this deprivation through the use of artificial environments inside their buildings, including computerized simulations of real environments that are pleasant and green. New housing has been built as part of the business centre complex and the elite may walk to work unmolested, since police guards stand at every corner (some are real persons and not just "simu-cops"). Outside the Metrocenter, it is a different world.

Here there are the "Borolands," large decaying areas first built in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and now occupied by large numbers of surplus, alienated individuals, many of whom are drug addicts. Drugs, of course, are now legal in such areas; they are available through the welfare system for the substance-dependent, but only in designated areas in the Borolands.

Interspersed among the Borolands are zones for local sweatshops and *maquiladoras*, which are now permitted in designated "onshore" enclaves. These are islands of the Third World in the city, where the older forms of work rules and protections do not apply. Workers in these new kinds of enterprise zones sign agreements that they understand that they are second- or third-tier employees and must neither attempt to unionize nor to lobby for application of OSHA, EPA or other standards. They are, of course, paid the same wages as they would be paid in offshore or border district *maquiladoras*. Everyone benefits through this arrangement, it is said. There is a long waiting list for these jobs.

The automobile is still in use in major corridors because much of the new development is located in loose agglomerations and low-density areas in the peripheral counties. These areas are safe and somewhat prosperous, but the denizens are not particularly oriented to the metro region. Rather they relate to the national and international culture, as mediated through their home "external contact centre," a fibre optic, networked computer-based console with high resolution 3-D interactive imaging. This centre permits them to communicate with others so equipped, receive controlled, highly processed information, conduct shopping and perform certain work tasks. Only those who have been accepted into the first-order information class have access to this network. The processing of information and the creation and transmission of artificial environments is a chief occupation of the Metrocenter elites.

Most individuals, except those in the lowest category still possess and extensively use vehicles powered by fossil fuels. The resultant air pollu-

tion is more than marginally worse and grid congestion has become an accepted and permanent feature of the regional highway system. But new systems internal to each vehicle purify the entering air so passengers are not subjected to excessively toxic levels of bad air. And gridlocked travellers have full access to entertainment and communications networks, so time not moving is not “down-time,” but is regarded as productive.

Two of the East River bridges—the Manhattan and the Williamsburgh—have been removed, having been declared publicly amortized and beyond their usable life span. In reality, neglect of simple periodic maintenance in the late twentieth century and early twenty-first century was responsible.

Water pollution in the region has been stabilized but is still a serious problem. The use of Hudson River water caused a deterioration of water quality but, of course, became necessary as the old Croton system watersheds became built up with new subdivisions. It was just another example of the inability of the local citizenry to protect valuable infrastructure that had come down from previous generations. But each successive generation grew to accept the deterioration, since it occurred relatively gradually and was perceived to be driven by natural and inevitable economic forces. It was a perception economists had helped to convey, thereby forcing hard public choices into the future, where many business leaders thought such choices permanently belonged.

One of the casualties of the process was the shutting down of the subway systems serving the inner areas of the region. The first step was the removal of obsolete elevated lines, probably a good move. Then came limited service and the closure of the system in the early morning hours, and finally total shutdown. The claim was that the old induction-motor technology was obsolete and expensive. In reality, the failure of civic culture made subway travel so dangerous that only criminals and the foolhardy chose to use it. Surface-level buses came to be the substitute. They are not so bad and, with the elimination of all but elite jobs in Manhattan, the daily strain of commuting is not much worse than in the late twentieth century.

The populations of the area have little to complain about. The AIDS epidemic has been brought under relative control through attrition (death) and quarantine of the HIV-infected. Females who are both drug-addicted (now termed substance-dependent) and HIV-positive are required to be sterilized to prevent their bearing defective offspring. Those who nevertheless become pregnant have their pregnancies forcibly terminated through chemical means.

There is little need for the large numbers of non-elite populations who do not work to travel outside their neighbourhoods. They can sit at home

and enjoy a life of modest leisure. Their lives are shorter than before. Elderly populations, who once were such a drain on the resource base, have been sharply reduced in numbers through modern technologies that terminate their social-and mind-support systems when they wish or when their computer link shows that their time has come. Since the latter happens without much warning and is out of the control of the individual, it has come to be accepted as pretty much a natural occurrence.

The public schools have espoused the voucher system. Since most city youth are not interested in school and see no future in the work force, most do not use their vouchers. Those who do use them have better schools, since many marginal schools have been phased out and costs are much less, permitting the remaining schools to be better funded. For those not in school, education is through television watching: students get a "awareness certificate" if their cumulative viewing meters register the required minimum number of hours of suitable programs. Of course, most are not able to read or do arithmetic, but as they are not expected to enter the information labour force, they have no need for these skills. Such individuals are shunted off into highly realistic TV simulation settings that provide them with pseudowork and an agreeable feeling of engagement in the affairs of the world. Again, the creation and distribution of such settings is carried out by the elites in the Metrocenter.

Stewart International Jetport has become the major air terminus for the region, largely by default. It was the easiest solution to a knotty problem. Unfortunately, Orange County and the Hudson Valley have become noise-ridden and despoiled with airport sprawl spreading outward from nearby freeway interchanges. In the absence of any rail connections, it is difficult to travel to Manhattan from SIJ and the highest-order elites use helicopters to make the journey. Unfortunately, you are not in this category and must make the trip by an archaic, fossil-fuel-powered bus. You accept your temporary fate.

After passing through miles of technocorridors, maquilazones, and Borolands, the bus finally arrives at your authorized checkpoint entry to The Manhattan World Metrocenter. You show your papers and enter a very special, safe and privileged place. The world and the New York area have their problems but who would trade them for the pure chaos of an earlier time? Nevertheless, you look forward intensely to completing your business as soon as possible and getting back to your electronic home office in the green Ozarks.

An alternative scenario

It is the year 2090. You are a passenger in a new global space vehicle gently and quietly descending onto the offshore New York Spaceport platform from an altitude of two hundred miles. Your journey from Tokyo Spacedrome has taken a mere forty-five minutes in semiorbital flight. There are no windows in your craft but you can watch the land approaching through the high-resolution monitor in front of you. The curvature of the earth is quite apparent and the entire eastern seaboard is laid out before you, from Washington to Boston. You think you can see the trace of the new high-speed electromagnetic rail system (ERS) that links the major cities along the coast like beads on a string. But, because you are still too high in your approach, it is only in your imagination. But the line is indeed there and you have used it several times already. The old air shuttle and Amtrak rail systems are memories only. Fully integrated with metropolitan personal rapid transit and connected to the Spaceport, the ERS is safe, nonpolluting and easy to use.

The outlines of the New York Urban Region are now clearly in view. Like Venice, New York appears to float on the sea. And as in the case of Venice, the sea is no longer the creator and fountainhead of the city's economic life. It is now merely an aesthetic delight, a glittering backdrop to the busy activities of the working day and a pleasure-giving resort for leisure hours. But not "merely:" the recovery of the New York waterfront was certainly one of the great urban achievements of the early twenty-first century.

At the centre is Manhattan Island, sitting like a great ocean liner at rest in its own spacious home harbour. Attending it to the east, is the hundred-mile-long Long Island, shaped like an enormous fish with its tail pointed toward Europe. To the west, across the broad Hudson River, is the mainland of the United States, the rest of the country, with New Jersey in the front row. A little to the south is a smaller island, Staten Island, moored at the shore of New Jersey but tethered to Long Island by the cables of a graceful bridge draped across the Narrows, the channel to the ocean. To the north, the broad blue line of the Hudson carries the eye past the Palisades and the Bronx, through the Catskill Mountains to the rest of New York State and eventually to its capital city, Albany. The unfortunate slab towers, built for the state government in an architecturally less enlightened time, are barely visible in their monotonous geometric ranks. If nothing else, they are unmistakable landmarks when seen from lower levels. The smaller, more recent state buildings are much better and more

human in scale, but they are not visible yet, since you are still about a hundred miles up.

The towers of Manhattan are now coming into view. They are still an awe-inspiring sight though many are considered obsolete. Transportation access and communication breakthroughs have made extensive vertical concentrations of people and high buildings irrelevant and unacceptable. Official plans call for the eventual removal of the most oppressive structures. Activist historic preservation groups have successfully taken a stand against removing the most memorable buildings. But many of the duller specimens of the 1960s and the so-called "postmodern" period have already been removed, to no one's dismay. "Trump's Folly" went years ago. Less happy was the necessary removal of two of the bridges that once crossed the East River, left to rust beyond repair by a thoughtless generation. But two bridges remain, restored to their original glory: the Brooklyn Bridge with its marvellous secular gothic arches, and the Queensborough Bridge, its soaring spires finally back in place.

The greening of the city is now clearly visible through the clear smog-free atmosphere. Trees and gardens dot the urban landscape even in unlikely places such as high rooftops. Also visible is the completion and elaboration of Frederick Law Olmsted's original regional park plan for New York, which celebrated, in 2057, the two hundredth anniversary of the opening of Central Park. It was another great achievement of the planners and progressive city governments of the early twenty-first century.

Now more of the smaller buildings have become visible. There are still many structures remaining from the nineteenth century, but large areas have also been cleared and rebuilt from scratch. The new row houses are barely distinguishable from the old, however, for the urban designers have drawn their lessons from their predecessors and have carefully blended the new fabric into the old. A few residual high-rise filing cabinets remain here and there, but no one would think of building in this ugly way in the late twenty-first century.

What you cannot see, but what is truly the miracle of the city, is the great progress made in the social and economic conditions of the people. It took several generations to achieve, and some said it could not be done. But it was done. Perhaps it was driven by the challenge of other economically powerful countries moving rapidly ahead of the United States; perhaps it was the realization that the only real barrier to improvement in the social and economic life of the city was the belief that it could not be done. Once that was disposed of and the focus was placed on the children—their education and their future—a real breakthrough occurred.

The city that had brought so many in past generations to prosperous participation in American life was again able to provide upward mobility and a meaningful life and livelihood to the majority of its citizens. New York was once again a city of relative civility and hope. What a contrast to the mean and brutal days of the late twentieth century and what historians had come to call the “neglectful generation.”

The space vehicle has now slowed its backward descent into the spaceport to a few feet per second. It is possible to look downward onto the large receiving platform sitting in the southeastern water quadrant of the New York region, far enough away from the city to reduce the vehicle noise level to a small hum in the distance, close enough for five-minute access to mid-Manhattan via the ERS tube and from there to the rest of the region and the eastern seaboard. Customs and immigration formalities have all been accomplished electronically while en route. The trip has been tiring but nothing like that of twentieth century travellers, who had to make their way through the chaos of John F. Kennedy airport. The improvements made there in the latter part of the last century helped somewhat, but most New Yorkers were happy when the airport was finally abandoned and the land added to the Gateway National Park as a biosphere reserve and bird sanctuary.

Touchdown! Welcome to New York/World City.

Which scenario will New Yorkers—and Americans—choose?

Is there really a choice?

Notes

- ¹ Andrew Sinclair, in Arnold Toynbee, ed., *Cities of Destiny*. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), 335.
- ² Peter D. Salins, in Peter D. Salins, ed., *New York Unbound*. (London: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 1.
- ³ Andrew Hacker, in Salins, 1988, *op. cit.* 218.
- ⁴ Manuel Castells. *The Informational City: Information Technology, Economic Restructuring and the Urban-Regional Process*. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1989).
- ⁵ Manuel Castells. *The Informational City: Information Technology, Economic Restructuring and the Urban-Regional Process*. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1989).
- ⁶ John F. Friedmann and Wolff Goetz. "World City Formation: An Agenda for Research and Action," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*. 6 (1982): 309-44.
- ⁷ *New York Times*. Sept. 9, 1990, 8; Sept. 12, 1990, 14.
- ⁸ Eugenie L. Birch, "Prelude to World City: New York City from Dutch Colony to Economic Capital, 1625-1860." Paper presented at the Third International Conference on American Planning History. Cincinnati: Ohio. Dec. 2, 1989.
- ⁹ Castells, *Ibid.*: 233-39.
- ¹⁰ Barclay G. Jones and W. F. Shepherd, "Cities of the Future: Implications of the Rise and Relative Decline of the Cities of the West," *Journal of Planning Education and Research*. 6, 3, (Spring 1987): 162-66.
- ¹¹ For further discussion of these problems and opportunities, see David A. Johnson and Eugenie L. Birch, *New York: The World's City* (title tentative). (London: Belhaven Press, forthcoming).

COMMENTAIRE : CAPITALES DE L'AVENIR

Alain-G. Gagnon

On se demande si la direction que prendront les capitales nationales peut être comprise à partir de la lecture du passé, ou si de nouvelles dynamiques sont à l'oeuvre dont il faudra tenir compte pour mieux saisir comment elles s'inscrivent dans l'ensemble des forces politiques et sociales. La question du symbolisme physique de la capitale se pose-t-elle encore ? Lorsque l'on parle de la direction que pourront prendre les capitales à l'avenir, on peut retenir six missions distinctes.

D'abord, il y a une mission culturelle, qui s'exprime à travers les musées, les centres d'animation, les universités, et autres. Deuxièmement, il y a la mission sociale, qui se traduit par une redistribution des fonds à ceux qui vivent dans la région immédiate de la capitale nationale. Troisièmement, la capitale a souventes fois une vocation éducative auprès des habitants du pays. La présence des institutions politiques et des universités rend compte de ce fait. La mission économique de la capitale est aussi importante, en ce qu'elle permet aux résidents de la région de ne pas avoir à se déplacer à l'extérieur pour satisfaire leurs besoins essentiels. Quatrièmement, la capitale peut aussi avoir une vocation sportive permettant d'exprimer la fierté nationale des citoyens sous une forme ou sous une autre. Cinquièmement, on associe souvent la fonction de coercition à la capitale puisqu'elle doit, jusqu'à un certain point, assurer le maintien du système politique, en ayant recours à la force s'il le faut. Finalement, la capitale s'enorgueillit d'avoir une mission démocratique en ce qu'elle permet aux élites politiques de circuler.

L'ensemble de ces missions nous amène à nous interroger sur le concept d'autorité. En somme, est-ce que les capitales sont là pour représenter l'autorité ou encore pour l'imposer ? Cette interrogation fait ressortir l'importance de la fonction régulatrice de l'État et de la capitale. L'idée d'opter pour une vision des choses aux dépens d'une autre prend ici tout son sens.

L'ensemble des présentations ont essentiellement porté sur le passé ; on a fait peu de cas des nouvelles dynamiques qui sont à l'oeuvre dans la construction des capitales et, parfois, dans leur démembrement au profit d'autres régions (par exemple, Bonn contre Berlin). Le thème des contraintes est central à la présente discussion. Deux types de contraintes ont été soulevés au cours des échanges : des contraintes intérieures et des contraintes physiques.

Les contraintes intérieures sont celles qui relèvent de la composition sociologique, comme, par exemple, la formation de blocs linguistiques ou encore ethniques, la fragmentation des élites, ou la formation de familles idéologiques. Ces contraintes ont un poids politique significatif. En outre, elles risquent de compliquer la tâche des dirigeants des capitales, étant donné qu'elles aspirent à devenir les symboles autour desquels pourront se rassembler les communautés linguistiques, les familles politiques et autres regroupements, en mettant l'accent sur leurs points en commun. Il se peut par ailleurs que les symboles choisis n'aient pas les effets escomptés. C'est ainsi que l'Acte constitutionnel de 1982 ne représente pas pour tous les Canadiens un symbole d'unité.

Les contraintes physiques sont celles qui portent sur le cadre bâti de la capitale. Est-ce que les preneurs de décisions ont été capables d'intégrer les contraintes liées à la présence de la capitale dans la vie des gens vivant dans la région immédiate ? En d'autres termes, est-ce que les décideurs ont réussi à donner une orientation au développement de la capitale qui permette aux citoyens d'en tirer profit ?

Au cours des échanges, il a aussi été question du danger que la capitale, surtout dans les pays en voie de développement — par exemple Lomé, — donne une image inexacte du pays et des problèmes sociaux auxquels les gens sont confrontés. La capitale est souvent utilisée par les autorités politiques pour masquer les vrais problèmes, tels les inégalités régionales et sociales. La présente démarche nous a permis de faire l'examen des potentialités de la capitale, à la fois pour apporter des correctifs aux injustices sociales et, en cas d'échec, pour permettre aux gens de s'en servir pour dénoncer les preneurs de décision.

Les capitales sont devenues dans plusieurs pays du Tiers monde, des endroits donnant l'image, souvent erronée, que de meilleures conditions d'existence prévalent dans ces pays. Prisonnières des modèles occidentaux, les capitales de plusieurs pays africains, par exemple, souffrent d'un étalement urbain dont les coûts ne peuvent pas être absorbés, causant des problèmes énormes aux dirigeants politiques. Les capitales se transforment souvent en territoires où l'on se contente de faire seulement la « gestion » des populations qui s'y agglomèrent, tout comme on ferait la gestion

d'un déficit devenu incontrôlable. Les populations sont laissées à leur propre sort, vivant en marge de la société.

Les défis sont nombreux et la nature des interventions varie énormément. Dans certains pays, la capitale se veut à la fois le centre culturel et politique, alors que dans d'autres pays, elle est le coeur économique et politique. Le fait que les capitales exercent des fonctions variées complique l'analyse que nous pouvons en faire. La capitale exerce habituellement un pouvoir hégémonique sur l'ensemble du territoire et sur les forces économiques en présence puisqu'elle peut, en théorie, régler l'ensemble des échanges économiques et sociaux. Pour ce faire, la capitale a besoin d'asseoir son autorité sur la reconnaissance de sa légitimité par l'ensemble des intervenants.

La « sociologie dynamique », pour utiliser l'expression de Pierre Hansard, nous offre certains enseignements. Cette notion est intimement reliée à celle de l'historicité, à savoir que les capitales évoluent continuellement, que certaines disparaissent, et que d'autres sont en pleine expansion. C'est en ce sens que l'analyse des pratiques sociales est utile pour la présente réflexion. Le jeu politique, avec ce qu'il implique—les tensions, la cohésion sociale ou les contradictions internes—est au centre des interrogations soulevées par les participants du présent colloque. Dans ce contexte, l'historicité devient un instrument d'analyse et permet de mieux comprendre les forces qui entraînent le changement social et le processus d'adaptation des capitales nationales aux réalités quotidiennes et aux tendances lourdes d'une époque donnée.

C'est ainsi que le déplacement ou non d'une capitale nationale est déterminé par des facteurs aussi divers que la structure de classes dans une formation sociale, la structure économique, ou encore les éléments fondateurs d'un pays. L'historicité, comme outil d'analyse, constitue une approche enrichissante et recèle des éléments qui nous permettent de saisir la dynamique du changement social et les forces qui l'influencent.

La sociologie dynamique nous permet de prendre en compte l'entrée en scène de nouveaux acteurs sociaux et politiques. Ces nouveaux acteurs ne peuvent être ignorés dans l'interprétation de l'évolution des forces du pouvoir. Dans le cas canadien, le rapatriement en 1982 de l'Acte constitutionnel et l'insertion d'une Charte canadienne des droits et libertés sont venus confirmer des changements de fond au chapitre de la répartition du pouvoir politique. C'est devant pareille situation que la sociologie dynamique nous permet de saisir les changements fondamentaux qui remettent en question l'ordre existant, et en proposent un nouveau.

Le présent colloque suggère que c'est la fin des disciplines cloisonnées. Tous ceux qui sont intervenus à cette table ont fait montre d'une

ouverture exceptionnelle pour une approche pluridisciplinaire de la réalité politique et sociale. Ce nouveau cadre d'analyse nous permet d'échapper à nos propres biais, en offrant une lecture plus globale. Pour saisir la situation politique qui prévaut dans les capitales nationales, il est important d'utiliser une approche qui soit éclectique, c'est-à-dire ouverte à l'ensemble des disciplines, afin de comprendre les forces en présence et d'en tirer les enseignements nécessaires pour atteindre une plus grande justice sociale.



**AVENUES FOR RESEARCH/
DIRECTIONS DE RECHERCHE**

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DIRECTIONS DE RECHERCHE :

INTRODUCTION

Paul-André Linteau

La dernière étape de ce colloque vise à faire le lien entre l'expérience des autres capitales et celle d'Ottawa et à ouvrir des pistes de recherche. Les textes précédents ont permis de constater que le vocable « capitale » recouvre une grande diversité de situations. Si toutes les capitales partagent une caractéristique commune, celle d'être le siège de l'État et de ses principales institutions, les différences émergent dès qu'on examine les autres fonctions — notamment économiques et culturelles — de ces villes ainsi que leur taille et leur poids relatif dans leurs pays respectifs.

Dans le cas d'Ottawa, plusieurs participants ont souligné certains traits qui font sa spécificité. On peut les regrouper autour de quatre grands thèmes.

Premièrement, Ottawa est la capitale d'un pays fédéral. À ce titre, elle doit partager avec les dix capitales provinciales les attributs (notamment les parlements), la légitimité et la symbolique attachés au statut de capitale.

Deuxièmement, Ottawa est la capitale d'un pays bilingue. Elle doit donc chercher à être représentative de cette réalité. Il y a des coûts et des contraintes rattachées à cette nécessité du bilinguisme. En outre, le groupe linguistique minoritaire étant principalement concentré dans une seule province, Ottawa a le défi de faire reconnaître sa légitimité par une population francophone pour qui le centre de pouvoir le plus important se trouve à Québec.

Troisièmement, Ottawa est d'abord et avant tout une capitale politique. Elle ne draine pas les grandes ressources économiques pour lesquelles le centre de décision est à Toronto (et secondairement à Montréal et à Vancouver). Elle n'est pas non plus le principal foyer culturel du pays, puisque ce rôle est assumé par Toronto pour la population anglophone et par Montréal pour la population francophone. Son *hinterland* régional, confiné par ceux de Toronto et de Montréal, est restreint

et limite sa capacité d'exercer des fonctions métropolitaines de niveau supérieur.

Quatrièmement, Ottawa a un mode de gestion original. La responsabilité en est partagée entre, d'une part, des institutions politiques électives aux niveaux municipal et régional, qui relèvent des provinces, et, d'autre part, la Commission de la capitale nationale, création du gouvernement fédéral. Ainsi, le double défi qui se pose à toutes les villes capitales — être attentives aux besoins de leurs propres citoyens tout en représentant l'ensemble du pays — se trouve-t-il ici incarné dans des institutions distinctes.

Les débats sur l'avenir de la capitale du Canada doivent tenir compte des contraintes qu'imposent ces caractéristiques. Les exemples étrangers peuvent-ils être utiles dans ce cas ? On doit constater que bien peu de capitales dans le monde partagent simultanément toutes les caractéristiques énumérées précédemment. Plusieurs en présentent toutefois quelques-unes, et ce sont probablement celles-là qui peuvent permettre les comparaisons les plus riches et les plus utiles avec la situation particulière d'Ottawa.

OTTAWA, CHRISTALLER, HOROWITZ AND PARSONS

J.A. Laponce

I am honoured to have been asked to speak at this concluding session that ends three days of deliberations on the state and the status of capital cities, honoured but humbled. I am not a specialist on the subject of capitals. I can only claim to be a heavy user. And that is probably why I speak last. It is a little as if, at the end of a medical convention, a patient had been asked to give the concluding address. Or, to change the comparison slightly, it is as if anxious parents concerned about the growth or their adolescent son or daughter, over-anxious may be, would, after consulting a large number of specialists, turn finally to an old-fashioned general practitioner and ask him (it was always a he in my adolescent days): What do you really think? What shall we do?

I shall play the role of that general practitioner, and the National Capital Commission will not mind if, for the sake of rhetoric, I cast them in the role of anxious parents. Let me reassure them right away: I shall pronounce the adolescent to be in very good health; nevertheless, as the doctors I knew never failed to do, I will write a prescription.

The old-fashioned general practitioner, who used to make house calls to young people in good health, had bedside manners that I now replicate. While engaged in small and soothing talk, he would open his bag of tools and medical instruments, finger through it and select a variety of items. The process was a ritualistic prelude to the auscultation and the diagnosis.

Before you, now, I thus open a bag of old-fashioned analytical models; they go by the names of Christaller, Horowitz and Talcott Parsons: a geographer, a psychologist and a sociologist.

I shall use them, one at a time, to reflect and comment on what we have discussed in the last three days: the variety of types of capital cities and their very different problems. I shall use them also to map the directions that could be taken by future research, and will use them finally to suggest a specific prescription for Ottawa.

Christaller, first. Studying the location of cities in southern Germany before the Second World War and relating their spatial position to the functions that they performed, Christaller identified three different logics in the use of physical space: the logic of the economy, the logic of transportation and the logic of politics (Christaller 1960). The logic of the *economy* can be summarized by the archetype of the circle (I simplify Christaller's hexagons). In the centre of the circle we find the higher functions, those covering the whole space (the central offices of banks or companies, for example) while, at the peripheries, we find specialized functions such as farming. And that is why we do not hunt the countryside when we search for a lawyer. The logic of *transportation* is expressed by the archetype of the straight line (again I simplify Christaller), the straight line that minimizes distance and cost. For that reason the Prairie settlements come to the railway, instead of the railway going to them. The logic of *politics* is rendered by the archetype of the quilt where strong boundaries separate units of varying shapes and dimensions, units such as provinces, cities, communes or electoral districts.

The circle, the line, the boundary: each has its own logic operating at two distinct levels: that of real space—geography—and that of mental perceptions—iconography (Jean Gottmann 1980).

Meshing the Christaller and the Gottmann distinctions produces a sixfold typological grid suggesting that we study the iconography as well as the geography of capitals in terms of their functionality in the economic, transportation and political domains. Missing from the matrix is the cultural dimension, a dimension which is, like politics, of the quilt variety. For good measure let us add it to the research model offered by Table 1.

Travelling the matrix of Table 1 is, by and large, what we have done at this conference, but I note that, notwithstanding repeated calls to attend to the iconographic, we have offered little empirical evidence concerning perceptions and attitudes.

It would be particularly important to have perceptual data concerning the capital cities of federal states, since those capitals may well have to respond to different logics at the actual and at the perceptual levels. In the Canadian case, it may be that the English Canadian provinces' desire for more power (the logic of the quilt) is coupled with their wanting the capital to have more visibility and more status (the logic of the circle).

More generally, we should expect that most capital cities will be motivated in their development by the logic of the circle and will be encouraged to be high-visibility centres by their peripheries, at least when nation-building has been successful. Capitals are central places par excellence. But there

are exceptions. Our discussions have suggested that, in multinational states, a capital's high visibility may indeed be dysfunctional. Low iconographic salience may then be an advantage. The example of Bern comes to mind. I shall return to that subject.

Table 1: Analytical grid for the study of capitals

		Functions			
		Political	Economic	Transport	Cultural
Level of analysis	Geography				
	Iconography				

Reviewing the evidence and the explanatory power of Christaller's central place theory, the British geographer, Bird (1977), concluded that centrality resulted more from mental constraints than from the constraints of space on behaviour. We produce centrality because we like it. We use the archetype of a centre with a circle around it to explain our relations to the cosmos, and that archetype becomes a model that we keep using over and over again to organize and to explain.

How central is Ottawa among central places? We know how to answer the question on the basis of the demographic, economic and transportation data. We know that the economic, financial and the population centres are elsewhere. Most of the foreign participants at this conference had to change planes in Montreal or Toronto in order to reach the capital, and they are unlikely to have attributed this inconvenience to some kind of delaying ritual akin to the purposeful disrepair of the roads leading to the old capitals of the Andes, described by Professor Hardoy in his chapter; and they are unlikely to have thought that landing in Toronto or Montreal and going up again towards Ottawa was a form of kowtow to the authorities of the land. Obviously, Ottawa is not an economic or a transportation centre. What we miss most for the proper assessment of its centrality as well the centrality of other capital cities is, to repeat, perceptual data on whether and to what extent the capital is perceived to be and desired to be central by the citizen-spectators of the nearby or distant peripheries. What distinction do these spectators make between government, regime and capital city? What images, what hopes, what resentments; more

generally, what functions do they associate with the notion of capital? We lack, judging by the discussion of this conference, sufficient iconographic data to perform a good comparative analysis of world capitals.

As a very modest pre-test of what could become a larger study of central location, I asked eighty-two Vancouver political science students to draw a map of Canada, then to locate five cities on that map, and finally to record the order in which the cities had been entered. Only one respondent started with Ottawa, while six started with either Montreal or Toronto.¹ More interestingly, only 37 percent mentioned Ottawa at all, compared to 42 percent for Montreal and 50 percent for Toronto. Having similar data for the other provinces and for other countries would help to determine whether the Ottawa score is abnormally low. But even if it were low compared to the scores of other capitals such as Rome or London, would such a low score be good or bad? To put the question differently: would such a low score be dysfunctional? Former Prime Minister Trudeau would undoubtedly have considered a low score to be worrisome. My guess is that Maureen Covell, Claude Raffestin and Francis Delpérée would disagree and say that such a lack of salience is probably a good thing.

Multilingual capitals, even when the languages in contact are not in conflict, have a serious communication problem. They are always in danger of appearing out of focus, if not afflicted by symbolic dumbness, by gaps in understanding.

Claude Raffestin opens his paper with a beautiful metaphor: "La semi-sphère est le mécanisme de la sémantisation que le pouvoir fait fonctionner par des signes de tête." Raffestin portrays the powers that be as a calm sovereign, so sure of being watched, so sure of being the focus of attention that a mere movement of the head suffices to give a command.

Un État tranquille se fait obéir par les mouvements de tête de sa capitale. Mais imaginez une capitale qui serait bilingue dans deux cultures aux signes de tête contraires. Normalement l'approbation se signifie par un mouvement de tête sur l'axe vertical, mais en Bulgarie ce même mouvement signifie le refus. Que ferait le monarque d'un État bilingue imaginaire si le Bulgare était l'une de ses langues officielles et qu'il lui fallut signifier son consentement d'un signe de tête? Rendre des capitales bilingues hautement visibles, c'est aussi montrer, assez fréquemment, qu'on ne se comprend pas. Certaines capitales s'accommoderont donc fort bien d'un rôle effacé, et cela afin d'être plus efficaces.

Mais le pouvoir politique, à la différence du pouvoir administratif, saurait-t-il, lui, se satisfaire d'un tel manque de visibilité? Cela m'amène à prendre Horowitz dans ma trousse de consultation.

My having shifted from one language to another probably created a break in the normal flow of communication. That would illustrate the point I just made. Bilingual capitals cannot avoid such breaks. They affect the prime minister's speeches as they affect ceremonies at the war monument. Bilingual capitals are sometimes at their most effective when they do not speak. But it is in the nature of politics to want centrality and it is in the nature of democracy to want to speak. Bilingual capitals have problems opposite to those of Molière's character: they cannot be mute.


I just said that politics likes centrality. That is what brought me to Horowitz.

Horowitz is an American psychologist who asked his subjects to locate the self by pointing to their own body (Horowitz 1935). Where am I? Where is my inner self? The instinctive reaction of his respondents was to point either to their forehead or to their chest, the men more frequently to the head, the women more frequently to the chest (Himelstein 1964). This sexual difference suggests, by analogy, a distinction between the capitals of the head and the capitals of the emotions, a distinction made by, Amos Rapoport in his chapter, but it also shows, whether one points to the head or to the chest, the commanding position given to the self, in a high and a central location. That seems obvious and the ridiculous is nearby (pointing to the side of the head is quite different from pointing to the centre), but that very obviousness needed to be unveiled in order to show the considerable strength of a spatial archetype that sustains and constrains our perceptions.

Extrapolating from Horowitz's findings as well as from Mackinder's geopolitical assumptions about people's mental maps of the world, I hypothesized that mapmakers would tend to locate at the centre of the world the capital of the state of which they were citizens. To test that hypothesis, I compared the first Mercator maps to appear in the primary school textbooks of twenty different states, and recorded, inside a single rectangle, the position of the capital city of each of them. The corpus of texts selected for this exercise had been collected by *UNESCO* in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

By positioning the continents here or there, the map makers had the choice of putting their own state and its own capital either on a side of the map or in its centre. Measuring on each map the position of the capital in relation to the map's vertical and horizontal axes and then locating inside the same rectangle all the locations so determined produces the map displayed in Figure 1, a map showing Athens to be slightly north of Paris, and Rome to be to the north west of Brussels.

Figure 1: Location of the capital city of one's country in selected primary school textbooks of the 1950's using Mercator projection world maps (based on Laponce, 1975).



Note the location of Amsterdam, Stockholm, Moscow, Rome, Brussels, Washington, Athens and Paris. It is as if the cartographers, while drawing maps for the instruction of school children, had answered the Horowitz question about their collective national self and placed their own capital at the head or at the chest of the world. The exceptions, the capitals located at the peripheries, came from colonies or former colonies that still used the models given them by their colonizers. Note, in that respect, that Ottawa is half way between centre and periphery. This Canadian hesitation between the European and the American maps of the world is probably still representative of today's perceptions, since both types of maps are used in the schools. That points to the importance of measuring a capital's perceived centrality not only within the state but at the global level as well.

The need for centrality is likely to vary from culture to culture and from time to time. When asked where he wanted the capital city of his empire to be located, Alexander the Great is reported to have spread his hand on a map and used his fingers to point to a variety of directions, thus signalling, may be, that he needed a roving capital of the kind described by Milton Cummings in his study of the early years of the American republic, or, more probably, to signal that he did not want a single location for a very diverse aggregation of conquests. By contrast, Plato recommended that the capital of the ideal state be located in the centre of an island isolated from the rest of the world by deserted shores. Jean Gottmann (1973, 1980) uses these two models, the Alexandrian and the Platonic, to contrast

two ways of perceiving and settling physical as well as mental space. He views the Platonic as an older, somewhat outdated model; the Alexandrian being better adapted to the modern age. France is still Platonic, though far less so than it used to be; while Canada, Germany and or India, especially the latter, are Alexandrian. Professor Nyassogbo, who despairs at the macrocephalic tendencies of African cities, would undoubtedly agree with Jean Gottmann and prefer a more balanced Alexandrian model for the modern African state.

I assume it is more difficult for a Judeo-Christian culture than for a culture rooted in polytheism to accept the Alexandrian pattern. But, obviously, factors other than the religious are at work, for example, the imperial conception of the state that continues to shape the French structuring of political space, as noted by Anthony Sutcliffe in his chapter.²

We need more research on the psychological gratifications and frustrations occasioned by capital cities to the populations that they rule and serve. And we need to take into consideration that these populations are not only, as Jorge Hardoy frequently reminded us in the discussion, the total populations of the states concerned but also, of course (an "*of course*" that tends to be forgotten), the local populations. The populations to be considered are additionally, in the case of the world cities described by Anthony King, the foreigners who will, most of them, never see the capital in question, but who nevertheless constrain that capital's structure because of its highly rewarding symbolic value. If the Venetians wanted to fill the canals to bring their cars closer to their homes, if Britain wanted to turn the mother of parliaments into a skyscraper, would the world allow that to be done? Unlike London, Rome or Paris, Ottawa is free of these foreign constraints and, except for Parliament Hill, quite free of nationwide constraints as well. The Ottawa planners and the National Capital Commission thus have a relatively free hand, the major constraint under which they operate being, at the time of writing, the need to project the image of a bilingual government. Donald Rowat's controversial proposal to carve a federal district out of Quebec and Ontario is one way of doing so, but one that is unlikely to be supported by Quebec unless the constitution be fundamentally changed in the direction of a binational system of government.

The call for more data on the needs that are satisfied by capital cities, as a function of their centrality and visibility, brings me to Talcott Parsons, since the needs in question will vary according to the functions to be performed.

Talcott Parsons invites us to take a very distant view of our subject and to come back closer to it after noting the seemingly contradictory

trends that agitate political systems the world over. It may seem puzzling that Belgium would change from a unitary to the federal state (described by Professor Delpérée) at the very time that the Belgian government pushes for European unification and makes the considerable efforts (described by Professor Vandevoorde) to ensure that Brussels becomes the capital of a united Europe. Similarly, we see Canada joining the United States in a free trade agreement at the very time when it is brought to the verge of splitting into two autonomous if not independent entities. One could multiply the examples.

Are these seemingly contradictory movements of integration and desegregation, in fact, related? The clearest theoretical explanation of such a relation is in Parson's analysis of the evolution of societies by means of the dissociation of functions (Parsons 1966).

Durkheim thought that the division of labour was the basic motor for social change. Parsons adds a slower but even more fundamental mechanism: the division of functions. The more complex a society becomes, says Parsons, the more it will need to loosen the ties among the various functions that it has to perform in order to adjust to the demands of the environment (the total environment: physical, biological, social, economic and cultural).

The primitive tribe can merge its various functions into common institutions because these functions respond to the same logic. But, in contemporary industrial societies—as the failure of the Soviet experiment well illustrates—each function tends to have its own logic. The logic of politics, equality, for example may be inappropriate for the economy; and the logic of the economy, profit, for example, may be unadapted to a religion embedded in authority and belief, and equally unadapted to a cultural sphere that will often be inspired by the model of the inward-looking chapel rather than that of a universal church. Thus we see, in advanced industrial states, politics, religion, culture and the economy each pulling their own way.³ Some mononational states, which rested their authority and legitimacy on their performance of the defence and political functions, are now disengaging from these fields to concentrate on the maintenance of cultural boundaries. By contrast, multinational states as diverse as Canada and the former Soviet Union are under pressure to disengage the economic from the political and the political from the cultural. David Johnson says that the centralized Soviet system could not survive the personal computer and the photocopier. It could not survive the centrifugal effects of ethnic pride.

In an increasingly Alexandrian world, each system seeks its own boundaries, hence its own centre. It is thus no wonder that capital cities

are subjected to the complex pressures for change analysed by Peter Hall.

Twenty years ago, Ottawa was an exclusively political capital. It has now added to its core political function a very fine cultural landscape with its National Arts Centre and its various museums. But to the 40 percent of Canadians who have never visited Ottawa, and to the large number of those who spend only a few days in the capital, does this cultural finery make any difference? The surveys commissioned in 1989 by the National Capital Commission give part of the answer. The words that come to mind in association with the name of the city are overwhelmingly political. Ottawa is generally liked and admired, but the surveys I have seen fail to distinguish the outsiders from the residents, those who know it from those who have never been there, and they fail also to distinguish the respondents by province and by language group. My very limited contribution to the perceptual data on the subject is in the answers that my Vancouver students gave in December, 1990, to the question: What words or images come to your mind in association with the word "*Ottawa*?"

Restricting the catch of words and images to those mentioned by more than 5 percent of subjects (only twenty-five students in this pre-test) leaves us with only four words; "*capital*," "*government*," "*parliament*," and "*snow*." A similar question about monuments let only two words pass the 5 percent test: "*Parliament*" and "*The National Gallery*." And when we restrict the universe to the 60 percent of respondents who have never seen Ottawa, then only one word comes to mind: "Parliament."⁴

Parliament is an extremely strong symbol; it is probably to Ottawa what the Eiffel tower is to Paris. In that sense Ottawa is, symbolically speaking, in good shape. Its dominant condensing image expresses well its dominant function: that of a modern capital in an Alexandrian world, a modern capital that need no longer be, as the traditional courts or capitals of Europe had to be, a concentration of a multifunctional system. Having an art gallery is excellent for the natives and the visitors, but unlikely to affect the perceptions of the outsiders.

Since, according to the surveys of the National Capital Commission, the residents of Ottawa are generally pleased to live in a city that offers a soft and gentle environment as well as the excitement caused by the proximity of the powers of the state, one could stop here and pronounce the still relatively young capital in very good health. But I promised a prescription.

Not knowing the future shape of Canada in the years to come complicates the writing of such a prescription. If Quebec were to separate, which seems unlikely at the time of writing but remains a possibility, then Ottawa would want to emphasize its political function even more than it

does at present. If Quebec remains subordinated to Ottawa, then, on the contrary, a low-key strategy—the Bern strategy—might be preferable, in order to de-emphasize the country's linguistic divisions.

But while it was modulating its political image according to circumstances, Ottawa might also want to project itself more forcefully on the international scene. Canada is the only major country at the juncture of the two dominant world languages of science: English and French. Drawing on its local resources it could become a major world conference centre for scientific communication. True, English dominates the sciences, but more at the level of writing than at the level of speech. Whether in English or in English and French, Ottawa could play a major role in scientific communication. This conference and other conferences of a similar nature are models that could be writ very much larger. An arts centre for the locals, a major scientific conference and research centre for the world. Museums opening on the past, a science centre to help shape the future.

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Notes

- ¹ Out of 82 answers, the mentions of specific cities were as follows: Vancouver 78, Edmonton, 49; Calgary, 44; Toronto, 41; Montreal, 35; Victoria, 34; Ottawa, 31; Winnipeg, 28; Regina, 16. The answers were obviously given on a west to east axis. Our restricting the number of cities to only five worked against Ottawa, but it remains that the pull of Ottawa was not so strong as to overcome the ease of reading Canada as a string of provincial capitals, and it remains that Montreal, though to the east of Ottawa, was mentioned more frequently.
- ² Is the monotheism of the Christians and Moslems fighting for the control of Beyrouth a factor leading to spatial separation or, on the contrary, to the willingness to share a common space? Theodor Hanf suggests that the length of residence in the city or in its centre may be a crucial intervening factor, the newcomers being the least tolerant of cohabitation. To plot more accurately the conflict for valued central space in the multiethnic city, one needs also distinguish, as does Professor Labidi Lilia in her chapter, the public from the private space of political, economic, social, and religious interactions.
- ³ The Parsonian model suggests that research on capitals could proceed by comparison of their performance of the four basic functions of (1) goal setting—mostly a political function, (2) integration—mostly a social function, (3) adaptation—mostly an economic function and (4) pattern maintenance—mostly a cultural function.
- ⁴ A question on statues showed the war monument to be the only one to be mentioned by those who had never been in Ottawa. The statues of John A Macdonald and John Diefenbaker were the only two other statues to be mentioned by those who knew Ottawa. Surprisingly, Terry Fox's statue was not mentioned, although I had found, in a previous survey, that Terry Fox was the most popular hero among Canadian students.