palgrave
macmillan

Napoleon and the Transformation of Europe

Alexander Grab



Napoleon and the Transformation of Europe

European History in Perspective
General Editor: Jeremy Black

Benjamin Arnold *Medieval Germany*
Ronald Asch *The Thirty Years' War*
Christopher Bartlett *Peace, War and the European Powers, 1814–1914*
Robert Bireley *The Refashioning of Catholicism, 1450–1700*
Donna Bohanan *Crown and Nobility in Early Modern France*
Arden Bucholz *Moltke and the German Wars, 1864–1871*
Patricia Clavin *The Great Depression, 1929–1939*
Paula Sutter Fichtner *The Habsburg Monarchy, 1490–1848*
Mark Galeotti *Gorbachev and his Revolution*
David Gates *Warfare in the Nineteenth Century*
Alexander Grab *Napoleon and the Transformation of Europe*
Martin P. Johnson *The Dreyfus Affair*
Peter Musgrave *The Early Modern European Economy*
J. L. Price *The Dutch Republic in the Seventeenth Century*
A. W. Purdue *The Second World War*
Christopher Read *The Making and Breaking of the Soviet System*
Francisco J. Romero-Salvado *Twentieth-Century Spain*
Matthew S. Seligmann and Roderick R. McLean
Germany from Reich to Republic, 1871–1918
Brendan Simms *The Struggle for Mastery in Germany, 1779–1850*
David Sturdy *Louis XIV*
Hunt Tooley *The Western Front*
Peter Waldron *The End of Imperial Russia, 1855–1917*
Peter G. Wallace *The Long European Reformation*
James D. White *Lenin*
Patrick Williams *Philip II*

European History in Perspective
Series Standing Order
ISBN 0–333–71694–9 hardcover
ISBN 0–333–69336–1 paperback
(outside North America only)

You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in the case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series and the ISBN quoted above.

Customer Services Department, Palgrave Ltd
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England

Napoleon and the Transformation of Europe

Alexander Grab

palgrave
macmillan



First published 2003 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010
Companies and representatives throughout the world

PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin's Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries.

ISBN 0–333–68274–2 hardback
ISBN 0–333–68275–0 paperback

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Grab, Alexander I., 1946–
Napoleon and the transformation of Europe / Alexander Grab.
p. cm.—(European history in perspective)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0–333-68274–2—ISBN 0–333–68275–0 (pbk.)
1. Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, 1769–1821—Influence.
2. France—History—Consulate and First Empire, 1799–1815. 3. France—Foreign relations—1789–1815. 4. Europe—History—1789–1815.
5. Napoleonic Wars, 1800–1815—Influence. I. Title. II. European history in perspective (Macmillan Press)

DC202.5.G74 2003
940.2'7—dc21 2003042907

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
12 11 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03

Printed in China

Contents

List of Maps

Acknowledgments

This work has benefited from the generous help of several colleagues and friends. A number of colleagues deserve my gratitude for reading parts of the manuscript and providing me with useful comments: Don Horward, Carlo Capra, Geoffrey Symcox, Bill Baker and Massimiliano Ferri. Special thanks go to Richard Blanke, who very kindly agreed to read the entire manuscript and made many invaluable suggestions that helped me produce a better book. I owe a special debt to Suzanne Moulton, the Assistant Administrator of the Department of History at the University of Maine, who, very patiently and meticulously, read through several drafts of my manuscript and made numerous corrections and stylistic improvements. I am indebted to my wife Julie, who has always been ready with advice and encouragement, without which completing the work would have been much more difficult. I dedicate the work to her and my daughter Sonali.

Lastly, I would like to mention my father, Walter Grab, a scholar of German history, who taught for many years at Tel Aviv University. He read the early versions of some of the chapters but, regrettably, will not be able to read the final product as he died in December 2000. We did not always agree about everything, but his encouragement, assistance, and stimulation over many years have been highly instrumental in making me the historian that I am today.

Introduction

Ever since his fall from power in 1815, Napoleon has aroused enormous interest among historians. More has been written about him than any other French – possibly even European – historical figure (by the latest reckoning more than 220,000 volumes). A major reason for this huge interest is Napoleon's meteoric rise to prominence from relatively obscure origins in peripheral Corsica. Bonaparte was only 26 years old when he was appointed commander of the Italian front, 30 when he became First Consul, and 35 when he crowned himself Emperor. Napoleon's numerous military victories and the important legacies that he left to France, including Code Napoleon and the *lycées*, also explain the considerable interest in him.

Although the literature on Napoleon in the English language is extensive, it is rather uneven.[1] There is a vast bibliography on Napoleon's military campaigns and his diplomacy, as well as on his private life, but much less attention has been devoted to the economic, social, administrative, and cultural aspects of the Napoleonic years. Although nobody doubts the importance of Napoleon's battles and military policy for understanding the Napoleonic period, it is equally important to investigate the tax system that paid for these campaigns and the policy that conscripted the soldiers for his army. The biographies of Napoleon's generals are important, yet so are the less-explored biographies of his ministers and prominent officials in France and his satellite states.

A second shortcoming of the Napoleonic bibliography is its Franco-centric nature.[2] Until recently, most English-language books on Napoleon have focused on France, devoting relatively limited space – a chapter or two – to developments in his annexed and satellite states.[3] Yet one must insist that Napoleon was as much a part of European history as he was of French history.

Indeed, to fully understand Napoleonic policies, we need to study them in a European context. Clearly, a critical component of Napoleon's

historical role was his effort to consolidate French hegemony throughout Europe and establish himself as its dominant ruler. To achieve these goals, Napoleon incessantly intervened in other countries and reshaped the map of Europe. He annexed foreign territories, created new satellite states, altered borders, toppled dynasties, and imposed new governments. He also exploited the human and financial resources of occupied Europe, conscripted young men into his *Grande Armée*, and imposed taxes and war contributions. Since French resources were inadequate for his military campaigns, his ability to tap European resources was indispensable in sustaining and expanding his Empire. To put it bluntly, without drafting European conscripts and extracting financial support from other countries, Napoleon would have been unable to create his *Grande Armée* and wage his many campaigns. Likewise, Napoleonic economic policies must also be studied within a European setting. The Continental Blockade, his most significant policy after 1806, required the collaboration of the rest of Europe, and French economic domination in Europe meant that his satellite states had to grant French industry and commerce favorable conditions without reciprocity.

But a discussion of Napoleon's European policies cannot be limited to military operations, conquests, and exploitation. Reform programs that transformed and modernized the internal structures of various countries constituted a highly significant component of Napoleon's continental impact. Indeed, the Napoleonic regime possessed a Janus face: reform and innovation combined with subordination and exploitation.

In fact, the two aspects were linked. To maximize revenues and recruit men more efficiently, Napoleon and his officials initiated broad reforms in the subject states, designed to create a central state apparatus consisting of a centralized bureaucracy, a uniform tax system, a conscripted army, a uniform court system, and an effective police force. They also launched the transformations of European societies by subjecting the Church to the State, reducing the power of the nobility, and advancing the interests of non-nobles by opening government and military positions to them and selling them national property. Other major changes included the introduction of Code Napoleon, which stressed legal equality and property rights; abolition of the seigneurial system; elimination of internal tolls and the formation of national markets; secularization of Church property; and the introduction of secondary education. To be sure, the depth and impact of these reforms varied from country to country, depending primarily upon how well prepared each society was to adopt the changes. But in many of the countries that comprised his

Grand Empire, Napoleon's policies undermined a great deal of the traditional structure and paved the road toward a more modern society. Napoleon modeled his reforms throughout Europe on French laws and institutions. Revolutionary France had initiated many of these changes, and Napoleon exported them throughout Europe. Aside from increasing his ability to exploit his satellite states, his reform policies aimed at integrating the Continent, thereby enhancing French domination in Europe. In addition to these pragmatic considerations, Napoleon and his officials were convinced that the French system was simply the best and that Europeans would be grateful once they experienced the benefits of French laws and institutions.[4] In sum, the policies that Napoleon launched as a French and a European ruler, reformer, and military commander were closely linked. In his view, France's role was to provide a model for the improvement of the rest of Europe, while Europe's function was to acknowledge the supremacy of the French structure and supply the resources to aggrandize France's position in Europe.

The last decade has witnessed some efforts by historians to rectify the Franco-centrism that has characterized much of the previous Napoleonic bibliography, and to explore Napoleon within a European context. An unprecedented number of English-language works on Napoleon's rule outside France appeared in the 1990s. Important works such as Stuart Woolf's *Napoleon's Integration of Europe* (1991) and Michael Broers' *Europe under Napoleon, 1799–1815* (1996) provide a wealth of information and analysis on the entire Continent, the former topically and the latter chronologically. Other volumes on Napoleonic Europe, recently published, include: a small but useful volume by Geoffrey Ellis, *The Napoleonic Empire* (1991); a helpful guide by Clive Emsley, *The Longman Companion to Napoleonic Europe* (1993); Charles Esdaile, *The Wars of Napoleon* (1995); and more recently, a volume of valuable articles edited by Philip Dwyer, *Napoleon and Europe* (2001).

A number of excellent studies on the internal developments in single countries have also appeared during this same period: Christopher Blackburn, *Napoleon and the Szlachta* (1998); Michael Broers, *Napoleonic Imperialism and the Savoyard Monarchy, 1773–1821: State Building in Piedmont* (1997); Frank Bundy, *The Administration of the Illyrian Provinces of the French Empire, 1809–1813* (1987); Milton Finley, *The Most Monstrous of Wars: The Napoleonic Guerrilla War in Southern Italy, 1806–1811* (1994); Brendan Simms, *The Impact of Napoleon: Prussian High Politics, Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Executive, 1797–1806* (1997), and John Lawrence Tone, *The Fatal Knot: The Guerrilla War in Navarre and the Defeat of Napoleon*

in Spain (1994). John Davis, Michael Rowe, and Alexander Grab have added important articles on the Kingdom of Naples, the left bank of the Rhine, and the Republic and Kingdom of Italy, respectively. Finally, the many valuable articles on various states published in *The Proceedings of the Consortium on Revolutionary Europe, 1750–1850* (hereafter abbreviated to *CRE*) also demonstrate the growing interest in Europe under Napoleon.

The present volume is an addition to this growing bibliography on Napoleonic Europe. It does not pretend to be exhaustive, by any means; it is a work of synthesis, based primarily on secondary literature, whose principal innovation is its structure, namely its comparative discussion of Napoleonic changes in a wide variety of countries. It focuses on the principal events and developments in the ten countries that comprised the Napoleonic Empire at one time or another: France itself, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, the Illyrian Provinces, Italy, Portugal, Poland (the Grand Duchy of Warsaw), Spain, and Switzerland. The Napoleonic period in each country is the subject of a separate chapter, presented in the form of a chronological narrative covering the period from the Revolutionary years to the fall of Napoleon. Each chapter discusses the pre-Revolutionary period, the context of the French invasion, the incorporation into the Napoleonic Empire, the various territorial changes, the types of governments Napoleon imposed, the principal officials he appointed, significant military operations, the Napoleonic exploitation of resources, the effects of the Continental Blockade, and the collapse of Napoleonic rule. The primary objectives of this volume, however, are to describe and analyze the Napoleonic reform programs in each country and to assess their success or failure, their impact on the local populations, how the latter responded to the changes, and the legacy of the Napoleonic period.

As this book attempts to demonstrate, aside from being a brilliant military commander, diplomat, and harbinger of change in France, Napoleon was also a major reformer and a catalyst of modernity on a European scale. In other words, the Napoleonic years marked a period of transition from the Old Regime to the modern era. By building the central state, abolishing the privileges of the Church and nobility and weakening their grip on power, advancing the interests of the bourgeoisie, proclaiming legal equality, and promoting economic unity, Napoleonic rule paved the way for the modernization of Europe.

Yet as this volume also demonstrates, Napoleonic reform programs and their effects were uneven throughout Europe.[5] For example, their impact

on the Kingdom of Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium was greater than on Spain, the Kingdom of Naples, or the Duchy of Warsaw. This is not surprising, of course, given the wide diversity of conditions in the various countries and the different durations of French rule. The former group of countries was economically developed and had already experienced a period of reform, while the Kingdom of Naples and the Duchy of Warsaw, where noble privileges and the seigneurial system were deeply entrenched, had experienced little or no change at all. Belgium and northern Italy, which were occupied by the French in the 1790s, had more time to adopt the reforms than states that became subject to Napoleon after 1806. In Spain and the Kingdom of Naples, popular revolts posed obstacles to the implementation of the reforms, but in northern Italy and Belgium violent popular protest was rare and short-lived. In sum, an analysis of these and other differences allows us better to understand the uneven pace and depth of Napoleonic reforms in the various parts of the Grand Empire.

There is still much to be learnt, of course, about the Napoleonic subject states and their societies, including the peasantry, the urban middle and lower classes, the new tax systems, the administrative and judicial structures and their personnel, public disorder and police response, and the implementation of educational reforms. It is hoped that this work will help to stimulate continued interest in Napoleonic Europe and encourage further research into these and other aspects of this important period.

To Julie and Sonali

1

The Formation of the Napoleonic Empire

France had begun expanding its boundaries before Napoleon seized power in November 1799. Revolutionary France invaded and occupied neighboring countries as early as 1792, soon after the outbreak of the First Coalition War. This war ushered in a period of more than two decades of international conflicts, the so-called Coalition Wars, between France and European alliances consisting of Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and other less powerful countries. The revolutionary governments justified the occupation of foreign lands, using the theory of "natural frontiers" and declaring their intention of liberating oppressed people from tyrannical regimes. In reality, the French armies requisitioned provisions and imposed heavy war contributions on occupied regions, thereby alienating their populations. The Directory annexed Belgium and established several satellite "sister" republics: the Batavian (Dutch), the Helvetic, and four Italian states – the Cisalpine, Ligurian, Roman, and Neapolitan. The French introduced in all of them constitutions and legal and political structures based on the French system, and compelled them to pay for the upkeep of the French armies stationed on their soil.

Following his rise to power, Napoleon Bonaparte intensified French imperial expansion. He annexed Piedmont and the Rhineland to France and transformed the Cisalpine Republic into the Republic of Italy, with himself as President, and the Helvetic Republic into the Swiss Confederation, appointing himself as its "Mediator." As Geoffrey Ellis points out, it was after his coronation as Emperor in 1804, however, that "the pattern of subjugation changed and so did the nomenclature, a sign that Napoleon's imperial ambition was evolving from the earlier republican forms into a much larger

dynastic system."[1] During the years 1805–10, Napoleon pursued his most aggressive imperial policy, launching numerous military campaigns, subjugating much of Europe, and creating his "Grand Empire." He annexed new territories to France and established several satellite kingdoms, appointing mostly his relatives as their rulers. The Napoleonic Empire, which constituted the most remarkable French hegemony in Europe, reached the height of its territorial expansion at the end of 1810. Napoleon's victories cannot be explained, however, solely by his ambitions and military and diplomatic talents. As Martyn Lyons points out, "They reflected the powerful energies released by the French Revolution, and they were made possible by France's superior resources, both of manpower and agricultural wealth."[2] He inherited from the Revolution a conscription system that he improved and that was instrumental in building the *Grande Armée*, his principal tool for gaining control over a good part of Europe.

The territories that comprised the Napoleonic "Grand Empire" were divided into three groups: *pays réunis* (annexed lands), *pays conquis* (conquered countries), and *pays alliés* (allied countries).[3] The first group consisted of territories that were annexed to France and were directly ruled by Napoleon. Those lands constituted the "formal French Empire." The second category included satellite states that were entrusted to French rulers. Finally, the *pays alliés* constituted allied countries whose territory was expanded by Napoleon in some cases, and which continued to be governed by their native rulers. The "Grand Empire" encompassed all three groups of lands and was distinct from the smaller "formal French Empire," which included only the annexed countries.

This chapter presents a general survey of the formation of the French Empire within the context of the international relations and the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars from 1792 to 1810.[4] It outlines the principal military and diplomatic events and their territorial and political consequences.[5]

THE FIRST COALITION WAR

The Revolutionary Wars began in April 1792 when France declared war against Austria, which was soon joined by Prussia.[6] The Pilnitz Declaration by Leopold II of Austria and Frederick William II of Prussia, and the presence of *émigrés* in neighboring countries, aroused suspicion and hostility among many revolutionaries. When the Austrian government rejected a French ultimatum to expel the *émigrés* from German

territory, the French Legislative Assembly declared war on Austria. An initial French thrust into Belgium ended in a total fiasco and soon the Prussian army invaded France. Its commander, the Duke of Brunswick, issued the famous Manifesto, threatening to destroy Paris if the French royal couple were hurt. This helped to trigger the "Second Revolution" (10 August 1792), which established the first French Republic. In September, the French army defeated the Prussians at Valmy and forced them to retreat. Paris was thus saved and French national morale received a much-needed boost. The Revolutionary government carried the war into neighboring countries. In late October 1792, General Custine led a French army into the left bank of the Rhine. General Montesquiou invaded Savoy and Nice and added them to the Republic. The greatest victory, however, was that of General Dumouriez, who defeated the Austrians at Jemappes (6 November) and occupied Belgium. On 19 November, the Convention declared France the protector of liberated nations throughout Europe. France's occupation of Belgium, the threat that it posed to the Netherlands and the opening of the River Scheldt for commerce alarmed Britain. Following the execution of Louis XVI, Britain, the Netherlands and Spain withdrew their ambassadors from Paris, whereupon the Convention declared war on all these states (February–March 1793). Naples and lesser Italian states also joined the coalition against France. Thus by mid-1793, France faced much of Europe.

The Revolutionary government reacted by ordering the conscription of 300,000 men, thereby provoking counter-Revolutionary revolts in the Vendée and elsewhere. Against such formidable opposition, military reverses were almost unavoidable. In March 1793, Dumouriez not only was defeated by the Austrians at Neerwinden in Belgium but defected to the enemy. The Austrians reoccupied Belgium and invaded France. In the Rhineland, the Prussians beat Custine and occupied Mainz (July). In the south, a Spanish army crossed the Pyrenees into France. Meanwhile, counter-Revolutionary rebels gained control of important cities, including Lyons, Marseilles, and Toulon. The conditions of Revolutionary France seemed desperate. The National Convention responded by issuing the famous *levée en masse* (August 1793), ordering a national draft and the mobilization of all the resources toward the war effort. Soon, the French began to recover. In October, General Jourdan beat the Austrians at the battle of Wattignies, weakening their hold over Belgium. In the east, Generals Hoche and Pichegru defeated the Prussians in the Palatinate while the British were driven out of Toulon in December. The decisive French victory, however, came on 26 June 1794 when Jourdan defeated

the Austrians at Fleurus and forced them to evacuate Belgium. That same month, Pichegru crossed the Dutch border and in January 1795 entered Amsterdam. By May, he had completed the occupation of the Netherlands, and the Dutch Patriots had formed the Batavian "sister" Republic. In October 1795, the Convention annexed Belgium to France. Simultaneously, the French completed their occupation of the left bank of the Rhine. Prussia, whose ruler was more concerned with assuring his fair share of Polish territory in the Third Partition of that country, signed the Treaty of Basle with France (April 1795), recognizing French domination over the left bank of the Rhine in return for territorial compensation for Prussia on the right bank in Germany. Spain also signed a peace treaty with France, leaving Austria as France's only major adversary on the Continent. The French Directory was thus able to concentrate its efforts on the German front where two large armies under Generals Jourdan and Moreau faced Archduke Charles, brother of the Austrian Emperor. The French armies sought to march along the Danube to Vienna, but a series of setbacks at the hand of Charles forced them to retreat to France.

Meanwhile, France and Austria also faced each other in northern Italy where the Directory had appointed the 26-year-old General Napoleon Bonaparte as commander of the Army of Italy (March 1796). His assignment was to create a diversion and tie up Austrian forces in order to facilitate the main French campaign in Germany. But Bonaparte upset this strategy through a series of rapid victories over the Austrians, which transformed the Italian front into the principal one. In April 1796, he led his poorly equipped army into Italy and within days had defeated the Austro-Piedmontese armies at Montenotte, Millesimo, Dego, and Mondovi. To save his capital, Turin, King Victor Amadeus III signed the Truce of Cherasco. Bonaparte then crossed the River Po into Lombardy, which belonged to the Habsburg Empire. In May 1796, Bonaparte defeated the Austrians at Lodi and entered Milan. After establishing a new administration in Milan and imposing war contributions on the Lombard population, Bonaparte marched eastward, taking Peschiera, Legnano, and Verona, which belonged to the Venetian Republic, and then turned south. To save their states from French invasion, the rulers of the Neapolitan Kingdom, Modena, and Parma signed armistice agreements with Bonaparte. French forces then invaded the Papal State and occupied the Legations of Bologna and Ferrara. To prevent Napoleon from marching on Rome, Pope Pius VI signed the Treaty of Tolentino, where he surrendered his claim to the Legations and agreed to pay the French 21 million francs (February 1797). Another French division

occupied Livorno in Tuscany, the main port of British trade in the Italian peninsula.

In July 1796, Bonaparte began besieging Mantua, the main Austrian quadrilateral fortress. For the next seven months Mantua was the focus of hostilities between France and Austria. The Austrians sent several armies in an effort to free Mantua, but Bonaparte defeated each of them (Battles of Lonato, Castiglione, Bassano, Arcole, and Rivoli). On 2 February 1797, the Austrian general Würmser finally surrendered Mantua. Bonaparte next ordered his army to advance toward Vienna. In April, after his unstoppable march had reached Leoben, 100 miles from Vienna, Archduke Charles requested a truce.

Formal peace negotiations with Austria dragged on for several months, during which time Bonaparte consolidated French power in northern Italy. In May, French troops entered Venice and set up a new pro-French republic. Bonaparte then established the Cisalpine Republic, merging Lombardy, the Papal Legations, Modena, and other regions. At the same time, Genoa and its surroundings were transformed into the pro-French Ligurian Republic. Finally, on 17 October 1797, Bonaparte and Count Ludwig von Cobenzl signed the Treaty of Campo Formio, officially ending the War of the First Coalition. Austria recognized France's possession of Belgium and the left bank of the Rhine, as well as the existence of the Batavian and Cisalpine Republics. The Ionian Islands, which had belonged to Venice but were then occupied by France, remained under French rule. As compensation for its losses, Austria received Venice and the Dalmatian coast. Austria also agreed to support the convening of a congress at Rastatt (Baden) to negotiate peace between France and the Holy Roman Empire. In a secret article, the Emperor agreed to use his influence at Rastatt to gain the approval of the other German states for the cession of the left bank of the Rhine to France. Campo Formio signified a major victory for France and a severe blow for Austria.[7] It ratified the emergence of France as the new hegemonic power in Italy, a reality that would last until the collapse of the Napoleonic Empire in 1814. It also confirmed the territorial gains that France had made in Germany and its leading role in the future reorganization of that country. Finally, it gave France a foothold in the eastern Mediterranean by granting it the Ionian Islands. Austria lost its dominant position in Italy and was about to lose it in Germany. By inflicting a humiliating defeat on Austria, Campo Formio made that country an irreconcilable enemy of France, prepared to fight France again at almost any moment to regain its position.

The Italian campaign constituted a personal victory for Bonaparte, making him extremely popular in France and launching his Continental reputation. More than just a military commander, he demonstrated his skills and ambitions as a politician and a diplomat when he created the Cisalpine Republic and negotiated treaties with various Italian rulers and the Austrians.

THE SECOND COALITION WAR

The continental peace established at Campo Formio did not last very long. A mere 14 months later, a second anti-French coalition consisting of Britain, Austria, Russia, the Ottoman Empire, Portugal, and Naples was formed and war broke out again before the end of 1798. Britain had never made peace and its leaders remained convinced that they would have to renew the war on the Continent to defeat France. The other states joined the new anti-French alliance because of continued French aggression, most notably its increasing domination over the Italian Peninsula, its intervention in Switzerland, and Bonaparte's Egyptian expedition.

In the Peninsula, the Directory used the killing of General Duphot in a riot in Rome as a pretext to invade the Papal State. In February 1798, General Louis Berthier entered Rome and proclaimed the Roman Republic, where he held supreme power, and deported Pope Pius VI. In December 1798, the French occupied Piedmont, forcing its monarch Charles Emmanuel IV to leave for Sardinia. As for Switzerland, its strategic importance for France only increased after Bonaparte conquered northern Italy, since it controlled the passage between Germany and Italy. The Directory also hoped to seize the treasuries of several rich cantons. In early 1798, a French army under General Brune invaded Switzerland and occupied Berne, confiscating its treasury, which was used to finance Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt. In April, the French annexed Geneva, a center of smuggled English goods, and gave full support to the proclamation of the pro-French Helvetic Republic. French troops remained in Switzerland to protect the new republic, requiring the Swiss to pay for their upkeep. European powers were alarmed by the expansion of French power through the creation of satellite "sister republics," which they saw as a violation of Campo Formio.

Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt further convinced European powers of the French Republic's insatiable territorial appetite. Following his return from Italy, Bonaparte proposed to lead an expedition to Egypt,

aiming to hurt English commercial interests in the eastern Mediterranean and cut the route to India. In May 1798 he sailed from Toulon with 200 ships, 35,000 troops, and 170 scholars to explore Egypt, which belonged to the Ottoman Empire. In July, Bonaparte defeated the Mamelukes, who ruled Egypt, in the battle of the Pyramids and occupied Cairo. Shortly thereafter, however, British Admiral Horatio Nelson destroyed almost the entire French fleet at the Battle of Aboukir, causing Bonaparte to be stranded in Egypt. Bonaparte ruled over Egypt for about a year but failed to achieve any of his original plans, and in August 1799 sailed back to France, abandoning the remains of his army. Particularly provoked by this expedition were the Ottoman Empire and Russia, which had its own imperial ambitions in the eastern Mediterranean. The Russian Tsar Paul I, who became the protector of the Knights of St John of Jerusalem, the masters of Malta, was further aggravated by Napoleon's occupation of that island on his way to Egypt (June 1798).

Italy, Switzerland, and Germany were the main theaters of fighting during the Second Coalition War. The first shots were fired in southern Italy when the Neapolitan army occupied Rome (November 1798). Soon, however, the French drove the Neapolitan army out and invaded the Kingdom of Naples, forcing King Ferdinand IV to flee to Sicily and supporting the formation of the Parthenopean Republic (January 1799). French control of the Italian Peninsula was now complete, except for Venice. Before long, however, French forces and the Italian republics came under attack by coalition forces and popular insurgencies. In northern Italy an Austro-Russian army, led by the veteran Russian general Alexander Suvorov, defeated Moreau's army at Cassano d'Adda (April 1799) and ended the Cisalpine Republic. Suvorov then restored Charles Emmanuel IV in Piedmont. French forces in Naples withdrew north to aid Moreau's army but were defeated by Suvorov on the Trebbia River (June 1799). In July, Mantua surrendered to the Allies. Thus, Suvorov conquered northern Italy in less than three months. Widespread popular anti-French revolts, provoked by looting and heavy impositions by the French armies and encouraged by Allies' victories, erupted in Piedmont, Tuscany, and Umbria. A counter-Revolutionary revolt swept through southern Italy and brought to an end the Neapolitan Republic (June 1799). With the collapse of the Roman Republic in September, the French lost all their Italian "sister republics," except for the Ligurian.

Simultaneously, the French also suffered setbacks in Germany. In March 1799, General Jourdan was defeated by Archduke Charles at Ostrach and Stockach. Archduke Charles then invaded Switzerland, and after beating

the French forces under Masséna outside Zurich, he occupied that city (June 1799). The Allies failed to drive the French out of Switzerland, however. Instead, Charles returned to Germany and Masséna strengthened his forces and defeated the Russian army of Korsakov in Zurich before Suvorov managed to arrive there. Suvorov was now forced to evacuate Switzerland in order to salvage his own army. Thus, the Helvetic Republic survived and the French retained their supremacy in Switzerland. Similarly, an Anglo-Russian expedition force of 34,000 men invaded Holland to restore the Orangist regime but suffered a defeat at Castricum (September 1799) and pulled out. In effect, the Allies' defeat in Switzerland and Holland undermined the Second Coalition. Tsar Paul I decided to withdraw from the Coalition due to disagreements with Austria.

In October 1799, Bonaparte returned to France from Egypt and two months later seized power. To consolidate popular support, Bonaparte had to bring the war to a successful end. As in 1796, France faced the Austrians in Germany and Italy. In Germany, Moreau's forces defeated the main Austrian army at Stockach (May 1800). The First Consul decided to launch his own campaign in northern Italy and restore French domination there. In May 1800, the First Consul ordered 60,000 troops to cross the Alps via the Great Saint Bernard Pass. Bonaparte soon entered Milan and reestablished the Cisalpine Republic. He then defeated the Austrian army under General Melas at Marengo (14 June).

The War of the Second Coalition came to an end, however, only after the Army of the Rhine, led by Moreau, defeated the Austrians at Hohenlinden (December 1800). France and Austria concluded the Treaty at Lunéville (9 February 1801), which reaffirmed the concessions that Austria had made at Campo Formio. Emperor Francis II affirmed his recognition of French annexation of Belgium and control of the left bank of the Rhine. He also recognized France's satellite republics: the Cisalpine, Ligurian, Batavian, and Helvetic. Austria retained Venice and its possessions in the Adriatic.

The Treaty of Lunéville left Britain once again without a Continental ally. It was unable to prevent Portugal, its close ally, from being invaded by Spain with support from Bonaparte, and being forced to close its ports to trade with Britain. Another blow to the British was the formation of the League of Armed Neutrality by which Russia, Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia agreed to close the Baltic Sea to British trade (December 1800). At the same time, any hopes that Bonaparte might have had of forming a broad coalition against Britain were shattered by two events, which occurred almost simultaneously. In March 1801, Tsar Paul was assassinated and his successor, Alexander I, reversed his Anglophobe policy.

The next month, a British squadron led by Admiral Nelson bombarded Copenhagen, destroyed the Danish fleet, and forced Denmark to abandon the Armed Neutrality League; the League itself soon dissolved. France also suffered a major setback in Egypt when its army was defeated by the British (March 1801) and the Turks captured Cairo and Alexandria. In September 1801, General Jacques Menou surrendered to the British, thus ending the French fiasco in Egypt.

These setbacks and war-exhaustion among the French people persuaded Bonaparte to begin peace negotiations with Britain. Britain was also weary after the long years of war. While its territory remained safe, owing to the supremacy of the Royal Navy, it had suffered economic hardships, which led to public unrest. British public debt had also increased. Under these conditions, public pressure to negotiate peace with France grew and Prime Minister William Pitt the Younger, who had supported the war, resigned (March 1801). He was replaced by the malleable Henry Addington, who had long opposed Pitt's anti-French policy. After more than seven months of negotiations, France, Holland, Spain, and Britain signed the Treaty of Amiens (March 1802). The treaty was certainly generous with France, affirming its "natural borders" and recent acquisitions, including French control of Belgium, the left bank of the Rhine, Geneva, and Piedmont. France agreed to pull its troops out of the Papal State and the Kingdom of Naples and to respect the integrity of its satellite states and Portugal. Britain agreed to return to France, Holland, and Spain their overseas possessions, which it had captured since 1793, except for Ceylon (formerly Dutch) and Trinidad (Spain), and to evacuate Malta and Elba.

The peace of Amiens marked the official end of the Second Coalition War and was welcomed with enthusiasm in both countries. After all, it had been ten years since the beginning of hostilities in 1792. In fact, this was the only time during the period 1792–1814 that Britain and France were not at war. Lunéville and Amiens recognized the dominant place of France in western Europe, most notably its hegemony in Italy and Germany. British supremacy on the seas was reaffirmed as well. Amiens consolidated Bonaparte's power in France and a plebiscite confirmed him as Consul for Life (August 1802).

THE THIRD COALITION WAR

Amiens proved to be a mere truce. Hostilities between Britain and France resumed in May 1803, less than 14 months after peace had been signed.

Bonaparte was unwilling to abide by the obligations of the treaty and he continued to intervene in neighboring countries. He also failed to pull French troops from the Batavian Republic. He did withdraw from Switzerland but ordered French forces back into that country when the pro-French Helvetic government was threatened by an uprising (September 1802). He then imposed a new constitution that consolidated French influence in Switzerland. Bonaparte also continued to strengthen his power in northern Italy. He made himself the president of the new Italian Republic, dictated a constitution based on the French model, and annexed both Elba and Piedmont in 1802. Finally, French influence was also increasing in Germany where Bonaparte played the decisive role in the 1803 reorganization.

Bonaparte also raised English suspicions by his expansionist naval and colonial policies. Even before Amiens, Bonaparte had dispatched an expedition under General Charles Leclerc to regain the former French colony of Santo Domingo, where Pierre Toussaint L'Ouverture had declared the island's independence (May 1801). The expedition restored French control and Toussaint L'Ouverture was deported to France, where he died (April 1803). The French colonial adventure ended in failure, however. The French army was decimated by yellow fever, and an anti-French revolt liberated most of the island from French rule by the end of 1803. This revolt, combined with French difficulties in maintaining effective contact with its colonies, and American threats, convinced Bonaparte to sell the Louisiana Territory to the United States (May 1803), if only to keep it from falling to Britain. Meanwhile, however, Bonaparte was also challenging British naval supremacy in the Mediterranean where the French fleet compelled the Dey of Algiers to conclude a pact with France (1802).

British commercial and manufacturing interests were also frustrated by France's refusal to open up European markets to their goods. Instead, Bonaparte imposed new tariffs on manufactured goods, and the Dutch, Swiss, and Italian markets remained closed to British merchants. Bonaparte, wishing to defend French merchants and manufacturers, refused to negotiate any concessions to British traders. Few of these actions violated the letter of the Treaty of Amiens, but "they certainly infringed what the British regarded as its spirit, and gave them reason to suspect that the First Consul would soon dispense with the agreement itself."[8] The British felt that peace had no chance unless British commercial interests were satisfied. The underlying problem was that while Britain wished to preserve the status quo and the balance of power

in Europe, Bonaparte continued to threaten both those premises. After repeated British protests yielded no result, Addington's government announced a decision to hold on to Malta in violation of the Treaty of Amiens. In May 1803, it declared war on France and quickly reoccupied French and Dutch colonies in America. The French then occupied some Neapolitan ports, Hanover, and Cuxhaven. Bonaparte also prepared a flotilla along the English Channel and assembled the Army of England, 150,000 strong, around Boulogne in preparation for crossing the Channel. British naval superiority prevented him from carrying out his invasion plans, however.

Britain was not alone in its hostility toward the growing power of France. Tsar Alexander I saw France as a threat to the balance of power in Europe and was particularly concerned about the expansion of French power in Germany and Bonaparte's design on the Ionian Islands and his expansionist plans in the Ottoman Empire. The last straw, however, was Napoleon's gratuitous kidnaping and execution of the Duc d'Enghien. When Napoleon rejected a Russian demand to evacuate Hanover, Russia broke off diplomatic relations with France and began negotiations with England. William Pitt, back in power, offered Russia an annual subsidy to form a new alliance against Napoleon, which Russia accepted (April 1805). Austrian Emperor Francis II was still resentful of the fact that France had replaced Austria as the major power in Germany and northern Italy. He was also concerned that Napoleon's coronation meant that the French emperor planned to replace the Habsburgs as the Holy Roman Emperor. In early 1805, Napoleon made himself King of the Kingdom of Italy, annexed the Ligurian Republic to his Empire, and entrusted the Duchy of Lucca to his sister Elisa. The Austrians feared that Napoleon planned to expel them from Venice. In August, Austria joined Britain and Russia in a Third Coalition. Soon Sweden and Naples followed suit. Napoleon, for his part, had signed alliances with Spain and Bavaria. Once he heard about the formation of the Third Coalition, the French emperor ordered the Army of England, which then became the *Grande Armée*, to march into Germany. The appearance of the French army surprised the Austrians. In October 1805, the French forced General Mack's army of 27,000 to surrender at Ulm. Napoleon then entered the Habsburg capital and, just two weeks later, decisively defeated a Russo-Austrian army at Austerlitz, which many consider to be his greatest victory. Alexander I retreated while Francis was obliged to sue once again for peace. At the Treaty of Pressburg (26 December), Napoleon imposed humiliating terms on Austria, forcing it to renounce all its lands in Italy

and Germany, as well as most of its Adriatic territories. Austria ceded the Veneto, Dalmatia, and Istria (except for Trieste) to the Kingdom of Italy; Voralberg and the Tyrol to Bavaria; and its Upper Rhine territories to Baden and Württemberg. Austria also had to recognize Napoleon as the King of Italy and pay an indemnity of 40 million francs. It lost three million people altogether and, in the words of Paul Schroeder, "[was] reduced to political, military, and fiscal impotence."[9] The Napoleonic Empire was once more the dominant power in western and central Europe.

While Napoleon had his way with the armies of the Third Coalition, he was decisively defeated at sea. On 21 October 1805, a British fleet under Nelson destroyed the Franco-Spanish fleet led by Admiral Pierre-Charles de Villeneuve at Trafalgar, although Nelson was killed in the battle. The British triumph essentially concluded the naval struggle between Britain and France and ended Napoleon's hopes of either invading Britain or restoring a French overseas empire.

With full control over northern Italy, Napoleon next ordered his army to invade the Kingdom of Naples (December 1805). General Masséna easily defeated King Ferdinand's troops and forced him to flee to Sicily, where he stayed under British protection until 1814. Southern Italy became a French satellite state under Napoleon's brother Joseph. In Germany, Napoleon became the guarantor of the sovereignty and territorial expansion of his allies, Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden, and would later create several new satellite states, most notably Westphalia, in northwestern Germany. Most significant for Napoleonic hegemony in Germany was the formation of the Confederation of the Rhine (July 1806), which recognized Napoleon as its protector and agreed to provide him with troops. This was followed by Francis II's abdication as the Holy Roman Emperor, bringing to an end the thousand-year *Reich* founded by Charlemagne (August 1806).

FROM JENA AND AUERSTÄDT TO TILSIT

Only now did Prussia, which had remained neutral since its withdrawal from the First Coalition in 1795, show renewed intent in confronting Napoleon.[10] After Austerlitz, Napoleon increased pressure on Prussia to side with France. In February 1806, he forced Prussian King Frederick William III to sign a humiliating treaty that included territorial concessions, the closing of Prussian ports to British trade, and recognition of the new Napoleonic order in Germany and Italy in return for Prussia's

annexation of Hanover. With the formation of the Confederation of the Rhine, however, Prussia found that it could not accept France's dominant position in Germany.

Confident in the military legacy left by Frederick II, Frederick William mobilized his army in the summer of 1806 and signed an alliance with Tsar Alexander I. Although Prussian troops initiated hostilities by invading Saxony, the French army moved very quickly and, on 14 October, soundly defeated the Prussian army at Jena and Auerstädt. Shortly thereafter, Napoleon entered Berlin where he issued the Berlin Decree, which proclaimed the Continental Blockade against Britain. In December 1806, Napoleon invaded Prussian Poland where he would later establish the Duchy of Warsaw. In February 1807, continuing eastward, Napoleon met a combined Russian–Prussian army at the bloody but indecisive battle at Eylau. In June, however, he inflicted a major defeat on the Russians at Friedland, and Alexander I asked for a truce.

In late June, the two rulers met on a raft on the Niemen River, and on 7 July signed the Treaty of Tilsit. Russia recognized Napoleon's brothers as kings of Naples, Holland, and Westphalia. Russia also ceded the Adriatic port of Cattaro and the nearby Ionian Islands to France. In return, Napoleon left Russia a free hand in Turkey and the Baltic, which Alexander I used to occupy Finland in 1808. Alexander also agreed to mediate between France and Britain and, in case of failure, to join the Continental Blockade and exert pressure on Denmark, Sweden, and Portugal to do the same. A separate treaty between France and Prussia was concluded two days later; Prussia survived only in mutilated form, losing half of its population and close to half of its territory. Its territories west of the Elbe became part of the new Kingdom of Westphalia, while its Polish provinces were converted into the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. Prussia was also forced to join the Franco-Russian alliance against Britain, suffer French occupation of its territory, and pay a war indemnity of 140 million francs. The Convention of Paris (1808) restricted the Prussian army to 42,000 men. Prussia was relegated to the level of a third-class power and for the next few years would cease to play a role in German affairs. The Treaty of Tilsit was a great success for Napoleon, marking a new peak in his influence and the rise of France to a Continental power.[11] His dominant position and the reign of his relatives in western and central Europe were acknowledged by Russia and would soon extend to Spain. Napoleon's hegemony in Germany became unchallenged with the defeat of Austria and the dismemberment of Prussia. Highly significant was the Tsar's agreement to join the Continental System. Finally, the formation of the Duchy of Warsaw signified the expansion of Napoleonic influence into eastern Europe.

A FOURTH WAR WITH AUSTRIA (1809)

In late 1808, while campaigning in Spain, Napoleon received the news that Austria was preparing for another war against France, and rushed to Paris to prepare for the new threat. The French difficulties in Spain and their defeat in Portugal convinced Austria that France was vulnerable after all and that now was the time to avenge the defeats of Ulm and Austerlitz and reverse the humiliating peace of Pressburg. Clearly, Austria was unwilling to tolerate Napoleon's growing domination in Europe, particularly in Germany and Italy. A war party at the Viennese court, led by Chancellor Philip von Stadion, was confident that the Austrian army was finally prepared to win a war against France. This confidence was based on the military reforms that Archduke Charles had introduced since Austerlitz.[12] Charles had built up a regular army of 300,000 men and added a citizen militia, *Landwehr*, with about 200,000 men. He also sought to improve military training and the supply system and, most importantly, borrowed the system of independent corps from Napoleon. At the same time, Charles doubted that the Austrian army had successfully implemented the reforms or that it was ready for war, and therefore advised caution. The war party prevailed, however, and Charles assumed command of the principal Austrian army in Germany. Austria received no support from any other European country, however, aside from a small British subsidy. It hoped that by launching a war, it would encourage anti-French revolts in Germany similar to those in Spain. Thus Charles issued proclamations calling on Germans to rise up against Napoleon, yet except for the insurrection of Major Ferdinand Schill in Westphalia that was suppressed at the end of May, nothing of that sort happened. The Rhenish Confederation's population remained passive while the German princes, fearing that an Austrian victory would endanger their recent territorial acquisitions, remained loyal to Napoleon.

The only significant exception was the anti-Bavarian revolt in Tyrol, triggered by the Austrian invasion of Bavaria in April 1809.[13] Bavaria had received Tyrol only in 1805 and had then revoked its autonomy, imposed high taxes, and tried to conscript Tyroleans. The local clergy was also hostile to the liberal Bavarian ecclesiastical policies. The leader of the insurgency was Andreas Hofer, an innkeeper known for his strong anti-French views and support for Tyrolean independence. He aroused the population to rise "for God, the [Austrian] Emperor and the homeland." The mountainous terrain favored the insurgents, who were able at

first to defeat French and Bavarian forces and to occupy Innsbruck, the region's capital.

The renewed Austrian war preparations caught Napoleon at a difficult time. The Spanish insurrection persisted, and with much of the *Grande Armée* pinned down in Spain, Napoleon faced manpower problems. There were also signs of public fatigue in France in the face of the continuous wars and sacrifices. In December 1808, Clemens von Metternich, Austrian ambassador to France, wrote: "It is no longer the French people who are waging war, it is Napoleon alone who is set on it . . . Even his army no longer wants this conflict."[14] But Napoleon prepared for war as efficiently as ever; recruitment proceeded smoothly and produced tens of thousands of new conscripts. He also called the Imperial Guard from Spain and, along with the *Grande Armée* left in Germany and about 90,000 troops from the Confederation, he amassed an army of more than 170,000 soldiers to face Charles in the spring of 1809.

The two sides clashed on three fronts: southern Germany and Austria constituted the major front, while northern Italy and Poland served as secondary theaters.[15] The war began when Austria invaded Bavaria (April 1809). Napoleon quickly responded and won four victories within four days at Abensberg, Landshut, Eckmühl, and Ratisbon. Despite its heavy losses, however, the Austrian army was not destroyed, and Charles retreated in orderly fashion toward Bohemia. In May, Napoleon occupied Vienna but still needed to defeat the main Austrian army before he could force the Habsburgs to sign for peace. When he tried to cross the Danube in order to confront Charles, he was defeated at Aspern-Essling, east of Vienna. Six weeks later, however, Napoleon defeated the Austrians at Wagram (5–6 July). Although both sides suffered huge casualties – 37,000 Austrians and 32,500 French – it was Charles who requested an armistice, which both sides signed at Znaim (12 July).

Meanwhile, an Austrian army under Archduke John had invaded northern Italy and defeated a Franco-Italian army under the Viceroy of the Kingdom of Italy, Eugène de Beauharnais, at Sacile (April 1809) and captured Venetia. As a result of the early reverses suffered by Charles, however, John was forced to retreat to Austria to assist his brother. Eugène then pursued the Austrians and defeated them on the River Piave, near Conegliano (May), and at Raab in Hungary (June). The Austrians also suffered defeat in Poland. Initially, Joseph Poniatowski failed to stop an invasion by Archduke Ferdinand into the Duchy of Warsaw, and after suffering heavy losses in the battle of Raszyn near Warsaw (April), had to retreat, allowing the Austrians to occupy the capital. Poniatowski then

invaded Galicia and forced Archduke Ferdinand to withdraw from Warsaw. The Austrian defeat at Wagram then brought the hostilities to an end there, as well. A British expedition that landed on the island of Walcheren, off the coast of the Netherlands, in an attempt to help the Austrians came too late and ended in a fiasco (August–September). The British were slow to advance and an outbreak of "Walcheren fever" (malaria) incapacitated thousands of British soldiers, who were forced to retreat. Only in Tyrol did the rebels continue fighting after Wagram; in August, Hofer forced a French army under Marshal Lefebvre to withdraw from their province, and became the regent of his liberated homeland.

In October 1809, Austria and France signed the Treaty of Schönbrunn. Once again, Austria paid a heavy price for its attempt to challenge Napoleon. Francis I had to cede Carinthia, Carniola, Croatia, and Dalmatia, including the port city of Trieste. These areas were reorganized as the Illyrian Provinces and annexed to the Napoleonic Empire. Austria also had to cede Salzburg, Berchtolsgaden, and the Inn district to Bavaria, and western Galicia to the Duchy of Warsaw. In total, Austria lost 67,000 square kilometers, its access to the sea, and more than three million subjects. In addition, it was also forced to pay an indemnity of 200 million francs, limit its army to 150,000 men, and join the Continental Blockade. After signing the Treaty of Schönbrunn, Napoleon ordered a new offensive in Tyrol, and this time the French and Bavarians succeeded in breaking the insurgents' resistance. Hofer was forced to go into hiding until January 1810, when he was betrayed and captured. He was soon executed at Mantua. Napoleon decided then to divide Tyrol, returning northern Tyrol to Bavaria and awarding southern Tyrol to the Kingdom of Italy.

Less than six months after Schönbrunn, Franco-Austrian relations experienced a sudden turnabout when Napoleon married Francis I's daughter, Marie Louise, in order to strengthen his legitimacy among the ruling dynasties of Europe. Marie Louise was his second wife. His first wife, Josephine, had never given birth to an heir and Napoleon divorced her (December 1809). His first choice for this second marriage had been the Tsar's sister, but Alexander I refused to give his consent. Napoleon then turned to Austria's new chancellor, Metternich, a strong advocate of rapprochement with France, who persuaded Francis to accept Napoleon's proposal.[16] In March 1811, Marie Louise gave birth to a son who received the title "King of Rome," but never rose to power.

One leader who opposed Napoleon's second marriage was Pope Pius VII, who refused to give Napoleon permission to divorce Josephine. However,

Map 1 Europe, 1812

the most important reason for the deterioration in relations between Napoleon and Pius was the latter's refusal to cooperate with Napoleon on the Continental Blockade and close his ports to British ships. This led to French occupation of the Adriatic port of Ancona in 1805 and other ports a year later. Pius VII, for his part, refused to recognize Joseph Bonaparte as the new king of Naples. In February 1808, Napoleon ordered his troops to occupy Rome and in May 1809, annexed Rome and the remains of the Papacy to his Empire. Pius resorted to his ultimate weapon; he excommunicated Napoleon a month later. Napoleon then ordered the Pope's exile, which lasted nearly three years, first to Savona and later to Fontainebleau.

CONCLUSION

It is useful to conclude this chapter by listing all the lands that were brought within the Napoleonic Empire. Some of the *pays réunis* were annexed to France before Bonaparte assumed power: Avignon (1791), Savoy (1792), Nice (1793), Belgium and Luxemburg (1795), and Geneva (1798). During the Consulate, Bonaparte incorporated Piedmont and the Rhineland (1802) into France. As Emperor, Napoleon accelerated the process of territorial annexations: Liguria (1805); the Kingdom of Etruria (Tuscany) and Parma (1808); Rome and its environs and the Illyrian Provinces (1809); the Kingdom of Holland, Hanover, and Hansa cities of Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck, and the Grand Duchy of Oldenburg (1810). At its territorial peak in 1812, the formal French Empire had 130 departments with a population of 44 million inhabitants.

Some of the *pays conquis* had their origins in the "sister republics." Others were created by Napoleon, who appointed French rulers, many of them his relatives, to govern them. Those states included the Swiss Confederation (created in 1803); the Republic of Italy (1802), which was transformed into the Kingdom of Italy in 1805; the Kingdom of Naples (1806); the Grand Duchy of Berg (1806); the Kingdom of Holland (1806); the Kingdom of Westphalia (1807); the Duchy of Warsaw (1807); and the Kingdom of Spain (1808).

The *pays alliés* included most of the members of the Rhenish Confederation, most notably Saxony and the southern German states of Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden. Napoleon elevated the status of all four rulers and considerably increased their territories.

2

The Janus Face of Napoleon's Rule: Reform and Exploitation

Napoleon's imperial rule over Europe possessed a Janus face, combining reform and innovation with subordination and exploitation. Reform and exploitation were tightly linked. Napoleon initiated changes in his subject states in order to be able to draft soldiers more efficiently and augment public revenues. Under pressure from Napoleon, allied states like Bavaria and Württemberg introduced reforms designed to improve their capacity to raise the military quotas they owed France and raise the taxes necessary to pay for their armies. The reforms were modeled on the French system and were also meant to integrate Europe and facilitate Napoleon's domination over the Continent. Aside from those practical motivations, the Emperor was convinced that introducing the French system everywhere was advantageous to the occupied nations since, in his opinion, French laws and institutions were the best and most effective in Europe.[1] Marshal Masséna echoed this belief, typical of what Stuart Woolf named "cultural imperialism," when he stated: "Only the efforts of France can stop Europe from falling back into barbarism into which her enemies are plunging her."[2] Napoleon was confident that the people of Europe would be grateful to him once they recognized the benefits of the French organization. In 1807 he wrote his brother Jerome, the ascending king of the Kingdom of Westphalia, which he designed as a "model state" for the rest of Germany, "What people will want to return under the arbitrary Prussian rule, once it has tasted the benefits of a wise and liberal administration?"[3] In reality, however, the intensity of the reform programs, their

effects, and the success of their implementation varied from state to state.[4] Belgium, the Rhineland, and northern Italy experienced the successful application of many Napoleonic changes. On the other hand, in southern Italy and the Duchy of Warsaw, the impact of the reforms was more limited while in the Illyrian Provinces the Napoleonic transformation had barely any effect at all. This chapter will discuss the Napoleonic reform programs, the reasons for their uneven implementation in the various states, and the ways in which Napoleon exploited Europe.

THE NAPOLEONIC REFORM POLICIES

On a European level, the main significance of the Napoleonic rule lay in marking the transition from the *ancien régime* to the modern era. Napoleon was a forerunner of change, launching reform policies that paved the way for the long process of modernization of European states and societies. In the context of early nineteenth-century Europe, modernization meant a number of elements: centralized states with professional bureaucracies based on merit; uniform taxation; conscripted national armies; a state police force; the end of the privileged position of the nobility and its monopoly over power; secularization through the reduction of Church power and its subjection to the State; the political and social advance of the bourgeoisie, namely non-noble, well-off, educated classes; legal equality; property rights; dissolution of the seigneurial system; the formation of national markets; and the emergence of nationalism. Revolutionary France had launched many of these changes and Napoleon disseminated these reforms throughout Europe in an effort to integrate the Continent on the basis of the French model.[5] Despite the fact that the outcome of the Napoleonic reform policies in Europe fell short of the stated goals and the French model,[6] Napoleon succeeded in replacing a great deal of the traditional structure with new laws and institutions in many of his subject states, thereby facilitating their passage into the modern period.

As we saw in the previous chapter, the territorial and governmental changes were an important part of the Napoleonic transformation of Europe. Napoleon created new states and abolished old ones, altered borders, annexed lands to France, and replaced old dynasties with his own rulers. Of particular significance was the reorganization of the German map, where hundreds of tiny anachronistic principalities were wiped out and their territories merged with larger states. The end result

was a reduction in the number of German states from more than 300 to 39. In Italy, ten states were consolidated into three parts. Obviously, the consolidation of these two countries made it easier for Napoleon to control them. It also enabled him to grant territories to his allies and create new satellite states where he appointed his relatives as rulers. At the same time, the Napoleonic reorganization of their maps marked an important phase toward Italian and German unification, though Napoleon himself had no intention of unifying them.

The most significant internal change launched by the Napoleonic regime was the construction of a centralized bureaucratic state characterized by uniform and rational administrative, financial, legal, and military structures based on the French system. What John Davis said about Italy was true about most other subject states as well: "What had remained only aspiration in even the most powerful of the eighteenth-century monarchies was finally put into practice in the systematic reorganization of the administrative, bureaucratic and financial institutions that was carried through in the brief period of French rule."[7] In the *pays réunis*, Napoleon rigorously applied the same laws and decrees that he promulgated in France. In his satellite states, the Emperor and his officials proclaimed French-like constitutions, establishing coherent political and legal foundations. Satellite and allied states created uniform and efficient bureaucracies, opening them to non-nobles who were increasingly appointed on the basis of merit rather than birth. Based on the French model, states were divided into departments run by prefects or their equivalents, who carried out government orders and provided ministers with vital information about their regions. These detailed reports gave rise to the development of statistical data so indispensable to the functioning of effective and orderly governing institutions.[8] Financial reforms set up a uniform and equitable tax system with a single property tax (in some countries based on land assessment), and efficient tax collection by state officials. Code Napoleon, with its emphasis on legal equality and property rights, was translated into a number of languages and introduced into various subject states along with the jury system, a uniform court hierarchy, and judicial due process. Annual conscription systems laid the basis for the formation of national armies. Imitating French educational reforms, satellite states created a uniform school system that they controlled. All these changes significantly transformed relations between the State and civil society.

The growing effectiveness of the State's apparatus also signified a rising authoritarianism. The crushing of any opposition and censorship, which Napoleon established in France, were extended to his subject states.

The Napoleonic regimes strengthened their repressive machinery by increasing the police force and creating the *gendarmerie* to combat lawlessness, brigandage, desertion, and any other challenge to their power.[9] In sum, the Napoleonic regimes were more coercive and in a stronger position than former states to enforce the laws and require citizens to acknowledge and obey the governments. Central states increased their presence in citizens' daily lives, becoming more effective in reaching remote areas to ensure that all citizens fulfilled their conscription duties and paid taxes.

The consolidation of the centralized states required governments to undermine the privileged position and influence of the Church and nobility. The Napoleonic authorities were particularly successful in weakening Church power and subordinating it to the State. The Concordat became effective in many states. The Napoleonic authorities abolished the tithe, dissolved religious orders, and confiscated and sold ecclesiastical property.[10] States gained control over educational and welfare institutions and took over registration of births, marriages, and deaths, previously run by the Church. They established religious freedom and introduced civil marriage and divorce. In Spain the French abolished the Inquisition. In Italian and German states Jews were emancipated, receiving the freedom to choose an occupation and own land, although for the most part they did not become equal citizens. In sum, by shrinking the material basis of the Church and appropriating its civil functions, the Napoleonic regimes provided momentum toward the secularization of European societies.

Governments had less success in weakening the nobility, although the latter did experience an assault on their privileges and a loss of power. Their monopolies on administrative, military, and judicial positions were broken and their fiscal immunity and right to establish their own courts were eliminated. In other words, the Napoleonic Empire marked the loss of autonomy among the nobility and forced them to recognize the supremacy of the central state. It was most obvious in Germany, perhaps, where hundreds of imperial knights lost their tiny principalities. At the same time, however, nobles preserved their property and remained the predominant class enabling them to resist government attempts to eliminate their seigneurial privileges, the most serious assault on their power. In the Kingdom of Naples, the Duchy of Warsaw, and in several German states, the authorities revoked the feudal regime, thereby bringing to an end the seigneurial fees and obligations the peasants owed their landlords. In German states, however, peasants needed to redeem their

landlords for the loss of their fees, which they were unable to do, and hence their emancipation remained a dead letter. In the Duchy of Warsaw and the Kingdom of Naples the nobility continued to control and even increase its power vis-à-vis the landless peasantry well into the nineteenth century.

Linked with the weakening of the nobility's hold on power was governmental promotion of members of the bourgeoisie to top posts in the administration and the military. The bourgeoisie also expanded its property by buying Church land, and their sons were the main beneficiaries of the new secondary schools, which prepared them for public offices. Those benefits went hand in hand with Napoleon's efforts to rally the propertied classes to his support. In northern Italy and the Rhineland a new elite, consisting of old nobles and bourgeois citizens, emerged under Napoleon, replacing the exclusive old nobility. In other words, Napoleonic rule provided momentum to social mobility and the advance of the middle classes. Increasingly, the criteria needed for social progress became wealth and merit rather than birth. Napoleon also created an economic environment that benefited merchants and industrialists, most notably with the formation of national markets. The authorities abolished internal tolls, constructed roads and canals, and established uniform weights and measures and a national currency. Entrepreneurs also benefited from contracts to supply food, clothing, and arms to the growing armies. No wonder, then, that the propertied classes were the principal supporters of Napoleon's regime.

Although the scope of the reforms was broad and government goals noteworthy, the extent of the reform policies as well as the rigor and success of their implementation varied from state to state. Generally, administrative, financial, judicial, military, and ecclesiastical reforms enjoyed a great deal of success, while socioeconomic reforms, like the abolition of seigneurial privileges, met with strong resistance from local elites and their implementation was inadequate. Paradoxically, Napoleon himself sometimes undermined his own reform policies, thereby revealing the contradictions in his policies. In a number of states, he compromised with conservative elites, allowing them to preserve their privileges as long as they recognized his supreme position. In 1803, he enabled the Swiss elite to restore its power in return for recognition of his dominant position as "Mediator" and a pledge to provide him with Swiss troops. He allowed the Polish nobility to continue its control over the peasants, contradicting the new Constitution and Code Napoleon, as long as his supremacy was recognized and he received Polish military contingents.

In Westphalia, his German "model state," the peasants were required to redeem seigneurial fees, which, in practice, meant the survival of a significant element of the traditional order. Napoleon also ignored Code Napoleon when he permitted recipients of land grants to preserve the seigneurial system. Furthermore, fiscal pressure by Napoleon caused deficits in many states, hampering their ability to carry out their reform policies.

When discussing the efficacy and impact of the Napoleonic government, Michael Broers provides a useful distinction between the "inner empire," the "outer empire," and "intermediate zones."[11] Aside from most of France, the "inner empire" included the Low Countries, western and south-western Germany, and northern Italy. There, the Napoleonic rule was most effective in transforming the existent structures and left a profound institutional legacy that remained after Napoleon's fall. The "outer empire" (lands acquired after 1807) consisted of Tuscany, the Papal territories annexed to France, the Hanseatic cities, Spain, and the Illyrian Provinces. Those countries were less adaptable to Napoleonic change and their societies were less amenable to acculturation than the "inner empire." The success of the implementation of the Napoleonic reform programs was much more limited there than in the "inner empire." The "intermediate zones," which included the Kingdom of Naples, the Swiss Confederation, and the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, stood somewhere in between the former two groups.

There were several principal factors that determined how responsive states were to changes launched by the Napoleonic authorities:

1. The structural preconditions that existed at the time of the Napoleonic occupation were the most important factor by far.[12] Countries that possessed a developed economy and a strong urban class of entrepreneurs and professionals were much more ripe to adopt the Napoleonic reforms than countries dominated by feudalism and a powerful landed nobility that resisted change. Likewise, states that experienced successful enlightened reforms prior to the Napoleonic occupation were more likely to adopt the Napoleonic changes than states where social elites prevented earlier efforts to transform the political, social, and legal systems. Such a difference existed between Lombardy and southern Italy. The former, where the Napoleonic Empire had great impact, had experienced economic development, the rise of an entrepreneurial rural and urban classe, and the Habsburg enlightened reform policies prior to Napoleon. In southern Italy, on the other hand, where feudal

relations dominated the countryside and reform programs had failed due to opposition by the clergy and the nobility, the Napoleonic reforms had only a limited effect.

2. The duration of Napoleonic domination also affected implementation of the reforms.[13] The length of French domination throughout the Empire was uneven, ranging from several months in Portugal to close to 20 years in Belgium, Lombardy, and the Rhineland. Obviously, the changes introduced by Napoleon needed time to take firm root. Countries brought into the Napoleonic sphere of influence after 1806–7, like the Duchy of Warsaw or Illyria, had a relatively short exposure to French reform policies and insufficient time to get used to the changes and enforce the reforms in a meaningful way. Time was also a factor in training state bureaucrats. Local officials needed time to gain expertise in the new French legal system and administrative procedures, while the population had to have time to get accustomed to and accept the new rules and institutions. Time was also needed to suppress local resistance to Napoleon and acquire the loyalty of the elite.
3. The position of the various states within the Grand Empire also had an impact on the reform policies. Here, the distinction among *pays réunis*, *pays conquis*, and *pays alliés* became significant. The reforms were pursued more rigorously in the *pays réunis*, which were ruled directly by Napoleon, than in the *pays conquis* or the *pays alliés*.[14] Once annexed to France, Napoleon automatically extended to the *pays réunis* all the French legislation and administrative institutions. In addition, he himself had more means to overcome resistance to his decrees than did his representatives in the subject states. Moreover, the rulers in the satellite states differed in the degree of rigor with which they enforced Napoleon's orders and reforms. In the Kingdom of Italy, Napoleon's Viceroy Eugène completely obeyed the French Emperor, but Joachim Murat in Naples and Louis Bonaparte in Holland refused to fully implement the Napoleonic policies, wishing to assert their independence. As for the rulers of the *pays alliés* in the Confederation of the Rhine, many of them failed to introduce any reforms, while others tended to adopt only a part of the Napoleonic changes.
4. The extent and intensity of local resistance to Napoleon's policies also determined the success of the reform policies in Napoleonic Europe.[15] Opposition to Napoleon took many forms and cut across class lines. Napoleon faced resistance from rulers who delayed and even refused to apply different policies, nobles who objected to the abolition of their privileges, and clergymen who opposed the Concordat and the

banishment of the Pope from Rome. As for popular resistance, it took the form of insurrections, brigandage, and violations of specific laws by individual citizens. The popular classes reacted against conscription, heavy taxation, requisitions, and looting by crossing armies. Despite heavy Napoleonic pressure, only three enduring revolts broke out in Europe during that period: Calabria (1806–8), Iberia (1808–13), and Tyrol (1809). A few areas, most notably northern Italy (1806 and 1809) and Westphalia (1809), experienced short uprisings. Of the three major insurrections, the Spanish revolt prevented Joseph Bonaparte from ruling his state and implementing his reforms effectively. Likewise, the revolt in the Kingdom of Naples interfered with Joseph's ability to carry out his new policies there.

THE EXPLOITATION OF OCCUPIED EUROPE

Occupied Europe paid a heavy price for the Napoleonic domination. Napoleon incessantly exploited its human and financial resources. Clearly, without drawing on the human and economic resources of Europe Napoleon could not have built his huge *Grande Armée* or expanded his imperial rule. For his part, Napoleon took for granted his right to use the resources of occupied Europe; as he indicated in a letter to his sister Caroline, "Above all, my wish is that people should do what suits France; for I have conquered kingdoms in order that France should reap the benefits."[16]

There were five principal ways in which Napoleon took advantage of his satellite states and annexed territories: (1) Military conscription; (2) financial impositions; (3) economic concessions to French industry and commerce; (4) land grants to his favorites; and (5) the imposition of the Continental Blockade.

Military draft

Napoleon conscripted hundreds of thousands of young European men, incorporating them into his *Grande Armée*.[17] This was, undoubtedly, the most hated Napoleonic policy and aroused much resistance in every country. While conscription had existed in parts of *ancien régime* Europe, Napoleon expanded it to unprecedented levels and extended it to states that had never experienced it before. He and his representatives

introduced an annual draft in the Italian Republic (1802), the Kingdom of Naples (1806 and 1809), the Grand Duchy of Berg and the Kingdom of Westphalia (1807), and Holland and the Hanseatic cities (1810). Satellite states and allies adopted the French conscription system in order to improve their capacity to draft soldiers and provide their quota. Where the French system was not introduced, the authorities improved the implementation of traditional methods of recruitment. The steady supply of European troops enabled the Emperor to ease the pressure on the French population, thereby diminishing internal opposition to conscription in France. Strong resistance and high rates of desertion throughout Europe forced most states to improve their repressive machinery to enforce obedience to the law. In some countries, resistance to the draft diminished over the years. Indeed, conscription efforts proved successful, and some satellite states, such as Westphalia, Bavaria, the Kingdom of Italy, and the Duchy of Warsaw, drafted ever more soldiers with increasing efficiency. Rulers of satellite states viewed the formation of national armies as a way to assert their independence from Napoleon and reduce the number of French troops on their soil. The total number of European troops who served under Napoleon amounted to 720,000.[18] The Rhenish Confederation committed 126,000 men, the Swiss Confederation 12,000, and the Kingdom of Naples 16,000. Indeed, in the final years of the Grand Empire, the *Grande Armée* looked increasingly like a European rather than a French army. The multinational composition of Napoleon's army was most evident during the Russian campaign, where over half of his 600,000 troops were non-French.

Financial impositions

To pay for his costly armies and campaigns, Napoleon had to rely heavily on the fiscal resources of his satellite states since France was unable to guarantee him enough revenue. Especially after 1806, Napoleon based his fiscal policy on the principle that "war should support war."[19] Naturally, the more revenues he collected from occupied Europe, the less he needed to secure from France, thus reducing internal opposition to his tax policies. In addition to taxes and requisitions, the French Emperor also compelled his satellite states to raise and equip national armies, which fought under him, and to pay for the upkeep of French armies stationed on their soil. It is estimated that between 1804 and 1814 the conquered territories paid half of Napoleon's military expenditures.[20]

Moreover, the Napoleonic armies lived off the land and looted territories they crossed or occupied. Often, top generals made fortunes in subject lands. Napoleonic fiscal pressure and the need to devote most revenues to military expenses caused crippling deficits in many states. To increase their revenues, some governments responded by introducing the more rational French tax system. To cover their deficits, states also followed the French example of confiscating and selling Church property. Indemnities paid by vanquished enemies constituted another source of income for the Napoleonic regime. For example, Austria and Prussia made contributions of 350 and 515 million francs, respectively. Indeed, as Jacques Godechot put it, "It was solely thanks to conquests and permanent war contributions that the deficit remained moderate."[21] In sum, without the extensive financial support from occupied Europe, Napoleon would have been unable to maintain and expand his empire.

Economic concessions to French commerce and industry

Napoleon was determined to secure French economic domination over Europe, which benefited French industrialists and merchants in particular. To achieve this goal, the Emperor forced his satellite states to grant nonreciprocal advantages to French industry and commerce.[22] Even when territories were incorporated into the Empire, it did not mean automatic free passage for their goods into French markets, as the cases of Holland and the Hanseatic cities demonstrated. He prohibited the import of industrial products into France while requiring subject states to reduce their tariffs on French products, seal their borders to goods from other countries, provide French merchandise free passage through their territories, and supply French industry exclusively with the raw materials it needed. These policies caused severe dislocation of industries in other countries, now cut off from their traditional markets, but this was of no concern to Napoleon. In 1808, he demanded that the Kingdom of Italy prohibit textile imports, except for French goods, and export raw silk exclusively to France for the benefit of the silk industry of Lyons. Napoleon explained his perspective to Eugène: "French trade should also triumph there [in Italy] . . . My fundamental principle is, France first and foremost."[23]

Land grants (*dotations*)

After 1806, Napoleon made numerous land grants, located in states like Westphalia, Hanover, the Duchy of Warsaw, and the Italian Peninsula,

to favorite military officers and public servants.[24] Those land grants consisted of royal domains of toppled rulers or Church lands seized by Napoleon. By 1814, the Emperor made 4994 such awards, totaling 30 million francs. The largest part went to the military: 824 generals received 1261 grants worth over 16 million francs. They provided the recipients with economic security and social prestige and helped tie the interests of the new imperial elite to the future of the Empire. The largest recipients included Napoleon's sisters, Pauline and Elisa, and his favorite marshals, Berthier, Ney, and Davout. In addition to the large grants, there were numerous small awards in the form of income deriving from Napoleon's confiscation abroad. These *dotations* were exempt from taxation, thereby shrinking the tax base of the satellite states. In the case of the Duchy of Warsaw, the loss amounted to 20 percent of the state's revenues. These land grants also infringed on the sovereignty of local rulers and constituted one more proof of the control that Napoleon wielded in his satellite territories. Significantly, the receivers of these estates were able to retain the traditional seigneurial fees, thereby defying Code Napoleon. In the words of Stuart Woolf, "No better example could be given of the unresolvable contradictions between the modernizing ideals of integration of the French administrative class and the practice of exploitation that accompanied the expansion of the Empire."[25]

The Continental Blockade

The establishment of the Continental Blockade against Britain was the most important Napoleonic policy after 1806. On 21 October 1806, Napoleon issued the Berlin Decree, declaring that Britain was in a state of blockade. The decree prohibited all trade between Britain and Europe and ordered the seizure of goods originating from Britain or its colonies and the incarceration of all English subjects on the Continent. Britain was the most powerful and consistent enemy of France, and Napoleon forced the Continent to help him win his conflict with the British. By closing European markets to British exports, Napoleon aimed to stifle British commerce and industry, the two pillars of the British economy, bankrupt the government, create unemployment, and provoke social unrest in Britain. Ultimately, Napoleon expected that the ensuing crisis would hamper the capacity of Britain to subsidize anti-French coalitions and force Britain to sue for peace on his terms. Another important objective of the blockade was the protection of French industry against British competition and the establishment of France as the dominant economic

power in Europe. This goal was compatible with Napoleon's policy of forcing his satellite states to favor the French economy.

The economic warfare against Britain had its roots during the Revolutionary decade. The Convention and the Directory had prohibited British trade with France and its satellites, a policy that continued under the Consulate and the early Empire. Two important factors stimulated Napoleon to declare the blockade at the end of 1806: the defeat at Trafalgar made it abundantly clear that a French invasion of Britain was unfeasible; and secondly, the expansion of Napoleonic domination in Europe in 1805–6 and control of the northern coast of Europe, in particular, following the defeat of Prussia, enabled the Emperor to impose such an unprecedented system on the Continent. Soon the economic warfare escalated. The British, who had begun their own blockade against the French Empire in May 1806, retaliated against the Berlin Decree with the Orders in Council (January and November 1807), ordering neutral ships to sail first to British ports and pay duties before continuing to the Continent. Napoleon countered with the Milan Decrees (November and December 1807), ordering the confiscation of ships that had stopped in British harbors. This escalation clearly rendered impossible maritime trade by neutral countries.

The Continental Blockade became the linchpin of French international policy.[26] Extending the blockade to the entire European coastline and assuring its effective implementation became the principal goals of Napoleon's foreign policy after 1806. Yet aside from launching economic warfare against Britain, instituting the blockade, as Paul Schroeder put it, aimed at establishing "[French] political control over the states of Europe, allies and neutrals alike."[27] In other words, imposing the blockade went hand in hand with Napoleon's European imperial plans. To achieve both goals Napoleon used military and political means: he exerted pressure on other states to join the new system, invaded countries that refused to enforce the blockade and changed their governments, altered boundaries of his satellite states, annexed territories to the French Empire, and created new political entities. Under French pressure Russia, Prussia, Denmark, and Spain joined the Continental Blockade in 1807 while Austria adhered to it in 1810. The crowning of his brother Louis as the King of Holland (1806), the invasion into Portugal (1807) and Spain (1808), the annexation of the Papal State (1809) and Holland and the Hanseatic cities (1810), the formation of the Illyrian Provinces (1809), and finally, the invasion of the *Grande Armée* into Russia (1812) were all motivated by Napoleon's desire to expand the blockade,

guarantee its success and, equally important, establish French hegemony over Europe.

The Continental Blockade hurt the British economy, which depended heavily on exports. In 1805, for example, one-third of all British exports went to Europe. The years 1808 and 1811 were particularly rough for Britain. Especially harmful was the loss of the Baltic trade, which supplied Britain with grain and vital naval products like tar and timber. Trade with Spain and the Italian Peninsula dropped substantially as well. British export of colonial goods to Europe was crippled. The blockade hit hard at British cotton, wool, and metallurgical industries. Production declined and piles of unsold textile goods accumulated in British factories. A shortage of raw material closed silk workshops in London. Unemployment increased and wages declined, particularly in the industrial Midlands and the North, provoking social unrest, most notably the destruction of machines by the Luddite movement.

Yet Napoleon failed to ruin Britain's economy or force its government to sue for peace. Britain relentlessly continued to pursue its war efforts in Iberia despite its economic difficulties. Finding new markets to offset the losses in Europe helped Britain weather the storm. Lacking naval power, Napoleon was unable to prevent Britain from exporting its products to other continents. Most important for British exports were South American markets. British exports to South America increased from £8 million in 1805 to £18 million in 1809.[28] Britain also increased its exports to its own colonies, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the United States until 1810.

Not surprisingly, Europeans resented the blockade because of its adverse effects on them. Consumers were deprived of British manufactured goods as well as colonial staples like coffee and sugar. More significantly, the blockade harmed European textile industrialists by denying them essential raw materials like cotton and indigo. The blockade destroyed overseas trade and caused a drastic decline in maritime activity in European harbors, hurting merchants, industrialists, ship builders, and port communities. In the words of François Crouzet, "most of them [ports] had lost their position as international *entrepôts* and had become mere regional ports. As for their industries, they were relatively far less active."[29] The blockade also hurt landowners who depended on the export of grain and other products to Britain and who witnessed a decline in agricultural prices. The Empire's exports declined steadily from 456 million francs in 1806 to 330 million in 1809.[30] At the same time, however, the Continental System benefited textile and metal industrialists

in various parts of the Empire, including France, Belgium, and the Rhineland, by eliminating British competition.

Extensive smuggling of British goods into Europe also helped Britain withstand the economic impact of the blockade. Napoleon was never able to hermetically seal the European coastline to British products, despite his numerous military and political moves. Widespread corruption among officials, who ignored the blockade's rules in return for bribes, further undermined the blockade. British products entered Europe through many areas, including Iberia, Holland, Heligoland, Malta, and the Adriatic Sea. In an effort to fight smugglers, the Emperor tightened the blockade through the Fontainebleau Decree (October 1810), which stiffened penalties, established rewards for information leading to the discovery of smuggled goods, and, most importantly, ordered British goods to be publicly burned throughout the Continent. The authorities implemented this order rather harshly; between 16 November and 3 December 1810, they made 56 bonfires in 45 locations.[31] Napoleon also increased the number of imperial troops and French customs officials in major ports.

The French government encouraged the production of substitutes for colonial staples: chicory for coffee, beet sugar for cane sugar, woad for indigo. Cultivation of cotton was attempted in southern France and Italy. The quality of the substitutes was inferior, however, and the quantities produced were insufficient for Europe's needs. In sum, demand for British and colonial goods remained high; France did not possess enough economic power to replace Britain and its colonies as the supplier of Europe. These shortcomings and the damage the blockade inflicted on the French economy caused Napoleon to compromise his own system. In 1809, he began selling special licenses to French merchants, allowing them to trade with Britain, and in July 1810, he institutionalized that license system through the Saint Cloud decree. Export licenses were designed to help landowners and merchants who depended on exports, particularly grain, wine, and silk. The sale of licenses also meant a source of income for the state and augmented customs revenues. Clearly, economic needs prevailed over political considerations. In August and September 1810, Napoleon proclaimed the Trianon Tariffs, authorizing the entry of British colonial products into the Empire and imposing exorbitant duties on them.

Officially, the Continental Blockade continued until 1813. But on 31 December 1810, Alexander I inflicted a major blow on the Napoleonic economic warfare when he reopened Russian ports to British trade and

imposed high duties on French goods. But even before the Russian withdrawal from the Continental System, it was the licensing system that demonstrated the inconsistencies of Napoleon's anti-British policies and began eroding his own economic warfare. By allowing trade with Britain, the Emperor acknowledged his failure to enforce the blockade and hence his inability to win the economic war against Britain. The blockade stimulated much opposition to Napoleon in Europe and was regularly violated by smugglers and the British. Napoleon simply did not marshal the strength to eliminate these violations or to implement the blockade effectively.

3

France

THE COUP OF BRUMAIRE

Of all the Revolutionary governments, the Directory lasted the longest (1795–99).[1] Although it had some successes, including the defeat of some royalist threats and the elimination of the public debt and the worthless *assignats*, the Directory's rule was characterized by a great deal of corruption and instability, which precipitated its removal from power. Most importantly, the Directory failed to build a strong base of support to offset the opposition of the Jacobins and the royalists. Twice, in 1797 and 1798, the Directory staged a coup, annulling election results in which the royalists and Jacobins gained many seats, thereby discrediting the electoral process and unwittingly preparing the way for the use of force in changing the government. Another weakness was the persistence of crime and disorder, including peasant revolts in western France, known as the *chouannerie*. Harsh anti-religious measures added to the government's unpopularity and deepened the religious schism in France. Although the Directory solved the public debt problem, it did so by canceling much of the national debt, thus alienating many lenders. Friction and rivalry among the five members of the Directory further weakened the government.

Upon his return from Egypt (9 October 1799), Bonaparte found a French nation in deep crisis. A new European coalition had defeated France in Germany and had driven the French out of Italy. Several generals lost faith in the Directory's ability to run the war effectively. More peasant insurrections broke out in the southwest. Most citizens grew tired of the instability that had resulted from ten years of Revolution

and war. Bourgeois property owners were seeking a strong government that would assure stability, law, and order, and guarantee their gains from the Revolutionary period. By late 1799, it became clear that the Directory was unable to solve the crises and that a political change was necessary.

The *Brumairiens*, the group that conspired to overthrow the French government, consisted of former nobles, ex-clergymen, former members of the Convention, and some intellectuals. Among the conspiracy leaders were Emmanuel Sieyès, who joined the Directory in May 1799, Maurice Talleyrand, France's foreign minister, Joseph Fouché, the minister of police, and Director Roger Ducos. The conspirators needed a popular general, however, to bring down the Directory. Bonaparte was not their first choice, but General Barthélemy Joubert had died in battle and General Jean Moreau refused to commit himself. The plot resulted in the coup of 18–19 Brumaire (9–10 November 1799). On the first day, using the threat of a fictitious Jacobin plot, Sieyès decreed the transfer of the Legislature to a suburb of Paris and called a meeting of both Legislative Councils for the next day. Bonaparte was charged with "protecting" the delegates. The next day, many suspicious delegates demonstrated hostility to the change of meeting place and to the troops who surrounded the Assembly Hall. They angrily challenged Bonaparte to respect the Constitution. Some even demanded the young general be outlawed, forcing him to leave the Legislative Hall. The plot seemed doomed, but Lucien Bonaparte, one of the plotters who served as the president of the Council of 500, saved the day. He convinced the troops that General Bonaparte had been assaulted by the delegates and exhorted them to evict the representatives from the Assembly. The troops obeyed and cleared the chamber in no time. To legitimize the illegal change, the *Brumairiens* gathered a rump legislature later that evening to approve a new political structure. An interim executive consisting of three consuls – Bonaparte, Sieyès, and Ducos – replaced the Directory. France remained calm, which demonstrated how unpopular the Directory had become. Brumaire also signified the continuing depoliticization of France, a process that had begun under the Directory and persisted under Napoleon.

The coup of Brumaire marked the end of the Revolutionary period and the beginning of Napoleonic France. The Napoleonic period was divided into two parts: the Consulate (1799–1804) and the Empire (December 1804–14). During the Consulate, France officially remained a republic but it soon became clear that the coup had fundamentally transformed the nature of the French government. Napoleon Bonaparte

concentrated the real power in his own hands, while public participation in the political process, which characterized the Revolutionary decade, dissipated. Bonaparte, who served as First Consul during the Consulate years, launched numerous dynamic changes aimed at consolidating the central state and establishing his authoritarian power. He constructed a strong executive and an effective administration, ended the conflict with the Church, stabilized financial conditions, established law and order and crushed the royalist opposition, introduced legal uniformity through the Civil Code, implemented successfully military conscription, and formed a central secondary education system. Indeed, the Consulate period was one of the most dynamic periods of change in French history. While the formation of the Napoleonic authoritarian rule constituted a departure from the ideals of the French Revolution, many of his reform policies were a continuation of programs and changes launched during the Revolutionary decade. To consolidate his power, Bonaparte allied himself with the propertied classes, who triumphed during the Revolution, and bolstered their achievements. In 1799, most people accepted his rule or remained indifferent to the new regime. In 1804, Bonaparte's power reached new heights and his decision to become Emperor was virtually unopposed. This chapter will discuss Napoleon's authoritarian rule and the reform programs he launched to modernize France.

FROM CONSUL TO EMPEROR

The interim executive was charged with preparing a new constitution. The *Brumairiens*' principal objective was to prevent the return of royalists and Jacobins to power, consolidate law and order, and assure the interests of the propertied classes. Those aims, they believed, could be achieved by establishing a strong central government. Bonaparte insisted on entrusting one of the three consuls, the First Consul, with extensive authority. The Constitution of Year VIII, proclaimed on 15 December 1799,[2] reflected Bonaparte's will and was characterized by a powerful executive, a weak legislature, and the virtual elimination of popular sovereignty. Bonaparte became the First Consul and possessed much wider power than the other two consuls, who had merely "consultative votes." In effect, Bonaparte was the only consul who initiated legislation; controlled public finance, internal security, defense, and foreign policy; and appointed public officials. The First Consul chose the other two junior consuls: Jean Cambacérès, a former moderate Convention deputy, who remained very

loyal to Napoleon until the end of his reign,[3] and Charles Lebrun, who had served under the Bourbons.

Bonaparte retained the seven ministries that had existed under the Directory: war, marine and colonies, finance, foreign relations, interior, police, and justice. A treasury ministry and a ministry of ecclesiastical affairs were added in 1801 and 1804, respectively. The ministers possessed little autonomy. They advised Bonaparte, executed the law, nominated administrators, and supervised departmental officials. Bonaparte appointed as ministers trusted advisers and experienced officials who had served under the Old Regime and during the Revolutionary period. The most prominent ministers included Charles Gaudin, the minister of finance, who served during the entire Napoleonic rule; Talleyrand, who ran foreign relations until 1807; Lucien Bonaparte, who held the ministry of interior and was replaced by Jean Chaptal; and Fouché, the notorious minister of police.

The First Consul initiated legislation by submitting proposals to the Council of State. That body further epitomized the centralization of the new regime;[4] its 30 to 50 members were chosen by Bonaparte, who also presided over its sessions. The Council of State served as an advisory body to Bonaparte and drafted legislative bills that were then presented to the Legislature. The Constitution weakened the legislative branch by dividing it into three chambers, each having a different role, and by depriving it of initiating legislation. The first chamber, the Tribunate, which consisted of 100 members over the age of 25, discussed bills but had no authority to vote on them. The Legislative Body, which comprised 300 members at least 30 years old, voted on the bills without discussing them. Members of both institutions were appointed by the Senate, the third body of the Legislature, whose main role was to "conserve" the Constitution by reviewing the constitutionality of the legislative proposals. The Senate consisted of 80 members (by the end of the Empire the number increased to 140) over the age of 40, and included generals, bankers, bishops, top officials, and some intellectuals. They held office for life, were chosen by the Consuls, and were co-opted by material benefits.

The Constitution emptied popular sovereignty of any substance. It established a three-tier electoral process that effectively undercut the participation of most voters in the electoral system and guaranteed a conservative outcome. While universal male suffrage was established, most voters voted solely for a communal list that comprised one-tenth of their number. The government selected local administrators from this list. Members of the communal list then chose a departmental list of

one-tenth of their number, and the authorities selected departmental officials from that list of notables. Finally, the departmental list chose one-tenth of its members for a national list of candidates eligible for public office. The Senate selected tribunes and legislators from among these national notables. The Constitution of Year VIII made no mention of citizens' rights, except for the prohibition of nocturnal house search, thereby further stressing the authoritarian nature of the new regime.

To legitimize his power and the new political system, Bonaparte submitted the Constitution of Year VIII to a plebiscite. It gave lip service to popular will. In February 1800, the government announced that three million people had voted in favor while only 1562 rejected the constitution. In reality, Lucien Bonaparte falsified the plebiscite's results, doubling the "yes" votes.[5] Significantly, most eligible voters chose not to vote, demonstrating their indifference to the new regime. Indeed, the plebiscite did not change the fact that the Constitution of Year VIII was imposed by force. Many former supporters of the Revolution approved that constitution because they were weary of the instability of the Directory years and entrusted the protection of their achievements to a general who would soon become a dictator.[6]

The establishment of Bonaparte as First Consul laid the foundation for his dictatorship. During the first two years of the Consulate, Bonaparte took advantage of his powerful position and introduced legal and institutional changes designed to strengthen his rule. Most notably, he crippled the Tribunate, the most independent body of the Consulate period, by purging its most prominent members, who were critical of him, and by dividing that body into three sections. He also reduced the power of the Council of State, eliminating its control over the final drafting of laws. Bonaparte succeeded in changing the public mood from indifference to widespread support for his rule by achieving religious pacification through the Concordat, guaranteeing the property rights of buyers of Church land, and by ending the Second Coalition War. Bonaparte's immense popularity explains the overwhelming majority that ratified his elevation to Consul for Life (August 1802).[7] The Senate declared the Constitution of Year X, which increased his power considerably. Bonaparte was authorized to name his successor and the other two consuls, conclude treaties, and select justices of the peace. Bonaparte also received the power to suspend the Constitution, disperse the Tribunate and the Legislative Body, and overrule their decisions, and legislate without first submitting new laws to the Council of State. The new constitution also changed the electoral system, entrusting more power to the wealthy. Cantonal assemblies selected

district and departmental colleges from among the 600 largest taxpayers in each department, who in turn nominated candidates for vacancies in the legislative bodies. The First Consul wielded much influence on the colleges through the appointment of their presidents and his ability to add members to them. In sum, as Jean Tulard concluded, the Constitution of Year X transformed the republic of Brumaire into a monarchy in all but name.[8]

Less than two years later, on 18 May 1804, the Senate drew up the Constitution of the Year XII, proclaiming Napoleon as Emperor. Using the royalist conspiracy against Napoleon, the authorities decided to transform the Consulate into a hereditary Empire, thereby establishing the Napoleonic regime on a more permanent foundation. A plebiscite confirmed Napoleon as an Emperor, once again by a huge majority. On 2 December 1804, with Pope Pius VII present, Napoleon and Josephine were crowned at the Cathedral of Notre-Dame in Paris in an ostentatious ceremony that was immortalized by the painter David.

The formation of the hereditary Empire cemented the dictatorship of Napoleon, who found it unnecessary to call for more plebiscites. The moribund Tribunate became useless and was suppressed in August 1807. Likewise, the Legislative Body lost any power; its sessions became more rare, and after 1812 it ceased convening. The Senate remained completely subservient to Napoleon. The formation of a hereditary Empire was designed to discourage plots and internal opposition against Napoleon and strengthen the foundation of the Napoleonic rule. Externally, the imperial crown was intended to elevate Napoleon from the status of a general who seized power illegally to a monarch equal to other European dynasties.

THE OPPOSITION

Bonaparte tolerated no resistance to his policies. "There must be no opposition," he commented. "What is government? Nothing, if it does not have public opinion on its side." The formation of the Bonapartist authoritarian regime did not go unchallenged, however. During the Consulate years, the First Consul faced opposition from three groups: the liberal elite, former Jacobins, and the royalists.

The liberal opposition consisted of middle-class intellectuals, supporters of Enlightenment ideas.[9] They were strong advocates of civic liberties and vociferously opposed Bonaparte's rising dictatorial power. Many of

them, most notably Marie-Joseph Chénier, Pierre Daunou, Jean-Baptist Say, and the most outstanding among them, Benjamin Constant, were members of the Tribunate. Those "Ideologues," as Bonaparte derogatorily labeled them, used the Tribunate to criticize the government and challenge various legislative proposals, such as the Concordat, the formation of the Legion of Honor, and the restoration of slavery in the colonies. On a few occasions, the government was forced to alter and even withdraw its projects. Another prominent name in the liberal camp was Germaine de Staël, the daughter of Jacques Necker. Through her writings and her salon in Paris, she sharply criticized Bonaparte's dictatorial ambitions. But the "Ideologues" lacked popular support and remained an ineffective opposition. In 1802, Bonaparte purged Constant and other opponents from the Tribunate and curtailed the powers of that body. In 1803, he exiled de Staël from Paris.

While the liberals opposed Bonaparte's regime through speeches and writings, other opponents tried violent means to topple Bonaparte. During the Consulate, assassination attempts and conspiracies against Bonaparte proliferated. It was primarily the royalists who tried those methods. The only attempt on Bonaparte's life that almost succeeded happened on Christmas Eve 1800, when a bomb (*machine infernal*) exploded at rue Saint-Niçaise while the First Consul was on his way to the opera. Although Fouché assured Bonaparte that royalists were behind that attempt, the First Consul exploited it to crush the left opposition and ordered the deportation of 130 Jacobin activists from France (January 1801).

The royalists posed the greatest threat to the Bonapartist regime. They supported the restoration of the Bourbon dynasty to the French throne. But Bonaparte rejected this aspiration and wrote Louis that his return to France would require him "to march on 100,000 corpses."[10] The royalists constituted a particularly dangerous menace to the Consulate since they enjoyed widespread popular support in rural areas in western France and were assisted by the *émigrés* and England. The insurgency of the *chouans* in western France began under the Convention, largely as a protest against conscription.[11] In 1799, during the Second Coalition, the *chouannerie* expanded. Armed bands of *chouans*, many of whom were deserters, attacked merchants, government officials, and buyers of national property. The clergy also contributed to the counter-Revolutionary agitation. Clearly, Bonaparte could not tolerate those violations of law and order and carried out a merciless military campaign to eradicate the *chouans*. He also undermined support for the counter-Revolutionaries among Catholics by signing the Concordat. The British stopped their

financial support of the rebels when they realized that the movement was growing weaker.[12] In 1802, the *chouan* revolt came to an end. When they recognized that their cause was losing, royalists Georges Cadoudal, an ex-*chouan* commander, and General Charles Pichegru led a conspiracy to abduct Bonaparte and restore the Bourbons. In late 1803, the authorities discovered the conspiracy and arrested the accomplices. Pichegru was found dead in his prison cell and the authorities sentenced 20 plotters, among them Cadoudal, to death.

THE SOCIAL ELITE

Along with his unforgiving treatment of the opposition, Napoleon also exerted major efforts in building up support for his regime among the French population. He understood that in order to stay in power he needed to expand his social base of support beyond the *Brumairiens*. Gaining the backing of the notables, whom the Napoleonic regime itself helped to define and promote, constituted a key component in his drive to extend support for his government.

This modern, progressive elite of wealth and talent demonstrated openness and left behind the privilege, exclusivity, and social pretension that characterized the nobility of the *ancien régime*.[13] Landownership constituted the main feature of the approximately 100,000 notables, whom Napoleon labeled the "masses of granite."[14] Some originated from the old nobility, although most came from the ranks of the Revolutionary bourgeoisie and the wealthy farmers who increased their holdings during the Revolutionary decade by purchasing confiscated land that had belonged to the Church and the *émigrés*. In the words of Jean Tulard, "At the beginning of the century, an elite could not conceive its own existence without landed property. It was still the possession of land that determined the hierarchy."[15] Land provided security at a time of disastrous inflation of the *assignats* and constituted a source of social prestige and promotion. Aside from property owners, the notables included local administrators, officials in civil administration, free professionals, and wealthy entrepreneurs.

The notables constituted Napoleon's principal pillar of support. They wielded considerable local influence and helped him to implement his policies in their communities. Napoleon preserved their social and material gains, making them the main beneficiaries of his rule. The French Consul made sure that the titles to their recently purchased property

were recognized by the returning *émigrés* and the Church. Napoleon nominated them to administrative and judicial positions, assured their property rights through Code Napoleon, restored law and order, and guaranteed their sons education in the *lycées*. The notables continued to dominate French society until the 1848 Revolution.

Along with his recognition of the power of the notables, Napoleon also created a new imperial nobility. Early on he took steps to accommodate the old nobility, primarily in order to weaken their support for the Bourbons. Shortly after the coup, the new regime rescinded two recent directorial laws that harmed ex-nobles: the Law of Hostages and the forced loan on the rich. The former threatened the arrest of relatives of *émigrés* and nobles in subversive regions. In October 1800, Bonaparte also lifted the sequestration of unsold property of *émigrés* and in April 1802, granted amnesty to *émigrés* provided they returned to France before 23 September and agreed to swear loyalty to the new Constitution. Only the most extreme *émigrés*, not more than 1000, were denied amnesty. *Émigrés* who were able to recover their unsold property, as well as many nobles who never left France, remained the wealthiest landowners in their community, thereby regaining prestige and local influence. Napoleon continued to court the former nobles and appointed them to various high posts. One-third of his ministers and at least one-fifth of his generals were of noble extraction.[16]

In May 1802, Bonaparte took an important step toward the formation of a French aristocracy when he founded the Legion of Honor. It signified a departure from the Revolutionary policies that had abolished all exclusive orders and titles. That institution "was meant to consecrate the preeminent place of the army in society."[17] Of 32,000 members that Napoleon introduced into the Legion of Honor, only 1500 were civilians. Endowing senators with *senatories*, which included a residential palace and a substantial annual income, constituted another step toward the aristocratization of French society. Upon the creation of the Empire in 1804, Napoleon granted the title of Prince and an annual endowment to each member of his family. Beginning in 1806, Napoleon awarded military officers with hereditary fiefs in the Italian Peninsula, the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and German states.

In March 1808, Napoleon proclaimed the imperial nobility, establishing a hierarchy of princes, dukes, counts, barons, and knights, and authorizing its members to possess a coat of arms. Through the imperial nobility, the Emperor aimed at creating "an elite with a vested interest in the preservation of the Empire and the Bonapartist dynasty."[18] It also

enabled him to promote and reward military officers and civil servants and detach the old nobility from the Bourbons. Finally, forming an imperial nobility and a court was in harmony with Napoleon's imperial rule, aiming to place his regime on equal footing with other monarchies. At the top of the new nobility stood the Emperor's relatives, the former Consuls Cambacérès and Lebrun, ministers, and 16 marshals. By 1814, Napoleon had created 3263 titles. A majority of 59 percent came from military officers, while 22 percent were top civil servants and 17 percent were other notables.[19] Socially, most imperial nobles descended from the bourgeoisie (58 percent), while 22 percent came from the old nobility and 20 percent were drawn from the popular classes.[20]

The creation of a national nobility constituted a departure from the ideals of the French Revolution. Critics of Napoleon viewed it as the restoration of one of the most offensive characteristics of the Old Regime. And yet the new Napoleonic elite differed from the Old Regime nobility in several significant ways.[21] Service to the state, accumulation of wealth, and merit rather than birth constituted the new criteria for becoming a noble. The new nobility consisted of generals and top administrators rather than feudal lords with ancient ancestry. Unlike the old nobility, the new elite came from a variety of social origins, was an open elite, and received no tax exemptions or legal privileges. In sum, by forming a nobility based on new criteria and by allying himself with the notable class, Napoleon helped to bury the old society of orders and consolidate the new social reality created by the French Revolution.

THE CONCORDAT

Bonaparte understood that reconciliation with the Church was a highly important step in delegitimizing the royalist camp and strengthening his rule. The French Revolution left a legacy of a divided Church, an alienated Catholic population, and a deep crisis in relations between France and the Papacy.[22] The National Assembly had stripped the Church of its property and privileges and had turned the clergy into public servants, requiring them to take an oath of loyalty to the Revolutionary state, a most controversial legislation.[23] Only seven bishops took it while the lesser clergy was equally divided between "constitutionalists" and "refractories." The Revolution also introduced civil marriage and divorce, appropriated the registration of births and deaths, and emancipated Protestants and Jews. Refractory clergy then joined the counter-Revolutionary forces and

many priests were arrested and guillotined. The disruption of religious practices and public worship and the launching of "de-Christianization" during the Reign of Terror further exacerbated the tension between Church and State. The Directory launched additional measures against "non-juror" clergy and, in 1798, French troops helped to establish a Roman Republic and exile Pope Pius VI.

Bonaparte viewed religion as a tool to assure social order and increase state power. His religious opportunism is best summed up in the statement, "By turning Catholic I ended the war in the Vendée, by becoming a Moslem I established myself in Egypt, by becoming an ultramontane I won the Italians. If I were governing a country of Jews, I would rebuild the temple of Solomon." Ending the religious conflict promised important political advantages for Bonaparte, hence he offered to negotiate an agreement with the Pope soon after climbing to power. Peace with Rome meant papal recognition of his rule, bolstering his support among Catholics, undermining the royalist opposition, and inducing priests to serve the new regime. Through an agreement with the Pope, Bonaparte also wanted to reaffirm State authority over the Church. As Portalis, his minister of religion, put it, "The good order and public security do not permit that the Church institutions are left to themselves."[24] He also wanted the Church to sanction the new owners of Church property and thus gain their support. Finally, an agreement with the Pope was intended to gain support in the heavily Catholic-occupied areas of Belgium, the left bank of the Rhine, and Piedmont.

The First Consul initiated conciliatory steps toward the Church soon after the Coup of Brumaire. Celebrating the *decadi* was not enforced anymore. He annulled the deportation of priests who agreed to cooperate with his government. Many churches that had closed during the Revolution were reopened. The new Pope Pius VII was also interested in resolving the conflict with France, hoping to restore the supremacy of the Catholic Church in France and reverse many of the Revolutionary changes. Bonaparte's reconquest of northern Italy also induced Pius VII to begin negotiations because he feared a French invasion of Rome.

In July 1801, after nine months of laborious negotiations, the two sides signed the Concordat.[25] It acknowledged Roman Catholicism as "the religion of the vast majority of French citizens." Bonaparte successfully resisted papal demands to recognize Catholicism as the state religion, thereby preserving religious pluralism in France. The Pope recognized the new owners of Church property. French dioceses were reorganized and the incumbent bishops, both refractory and constitutional, were

replaced to the satisfaction of Bonaparte and Pius VII, who wanted a docile episcopacy. The First Consul was authorized to nominate new bishops and the Pope invested them with spiritual authority. The bishops nominated the lower clergy, although they needed government approval. The clergy continued to be paid by the State and swore loyalty to the government.

The Concordat was highly controversial in France. Royalists and counter-Revolutionary ecclesiastical leaders were enraged because it sanctioned many revolutionary changes and legitimized Bonaparte's rule. Anti-clerical revolutionaries opposed the restoration of the Church and the Pope to a prominent position. Bonaparte unilaterally added to the Concordat the "Organic Articles," a list of 77 provisions designed to restrict the powers of the Pope in France and confirm the State's supremacy over the Church. The Organic Articles revived some Gallican traditions: publication of papal bulls and the activity of papal legates in France needed government approval, as did the creation of new parishes and religious holidays. The Articles required the higher clergy to reside in their diocese, allowing them to leave only with the government's permission. There were to be ten archbishoprics, 60 bishoprics, and 3000 parishes – one for each canton. The Legislative Body approved the Concordat in April 1802. A Department of Religious Affairs, headed by Portalis, was instituted in the interior ministry. Subsequently, several new laws elevated the status of Catholicism; for example, Sunday became a holiday for state officials and the Gregorian Calendar was restored as of 1 January 1806.

The Concordat preserved several important changes established by the Revolution, including religious pluralism, state control over the Church, and the permanency of the sale of Church property. Bonaparte benefited from the Concordat in many ways. His regime was recognized by the Pope, government authority over the Church was confirmed, and he could expect the clergy to support his policies. The schism that had divided the French Church since 1790 ended, thereby reducing domestic tension. Church support for the royalist opposition ceased and the refractory bishops, an influential source of opposition to Bonaparte, were dismissed. Finally, Bonaparte consolidated landowners' support for his regime by receiving papal recognition of the new land titles. As for the Pope, his main achievements were regaining some control over the French Church and restoring its unity.

Napoleon was also concerned with French Jews, aiming to regulate their economic activities and religious practices in order to accelerate their assimilation. He believed that this would turn them into useful

citizens. In September 1791, the French Revolution proclaimed full equality for French Jews. In 1806, responding to complaints about Jewish money lenders, Napoleon issued a one-year moratorium on debts to Jews in Alsace. He then convened an Assembly of Jewish Notables to discuss the compatibility between Jewish beliefs and the duties of Frenchmen, and to transform Jews into French citizens. In 1807, the authorities assembled the *Grand Sanhedrin*, consisting of rabbis and laymen, which declared that Jews would fulfil their duties like any French citizen. In 1808, the regime organized the Jews in regional committees, called consistories, to run the practice of Judaism, appoint rabbis, and collect communal taxes. A central consistory in Paris with a chief rabbi would govern the whole system. Another decree, known as "the infamous decree," established restrictions on Jewish lenders. To accelerate assimilation, the government required Jews to assume family names.

STATE ADMINISTRATION

An essential component of the Napoleonic state was a streamlined, central, and uniform administration designed to carry out government orders efficiently. The Reign of Terror instituted a centralized machinery that had persisted under the Directory. Bonaparte retained the Revolutionary division of France into departments; in 1799, France was divided into 98 departments, a number that steadily rose, reaching 130 at the peak of France's territorial expansion in 1810. The First Consul appointed a hierarchy of officials to run the departments, elevating state centralization and administrative unity to new heights. The government's chief representative in the department was the prefect, "the hallmark of his centralizing drive, and his prime instrument for pacifying the country."[26] Many had served in Revolutionary assemblies while others had held positions in civil administration, the army, and the legal professions. Most prefects originated from the bourgeoisie, although Napoleon also appointed old nobles to this position. The prefects, who were subordinate to the Interior Minister, had extensive power; in the words of Jacques Godechot, the prefect was "a miniature emperor" in his department.[27] They executed government orders and were responsible for public order, conscription quotas, a stable food supply, public works, budgetary issues, and proper tax collection. Prefects also provided the Interior Minister with vital information about the department's condition. To assure their commitment to the State and prevent prefects from

developing local loyalties, Napoleon never appointed prefects to serve in their native departments, and he replaced them every few years. Prefects were assisted by a Council of Prefecture and a General Council, which convened for only 15 days a year to allocate taxes. They were also aided by a growing bureaucracy.

Each department was divided into four or five *arrondissements* administered by sub-prefects who were nominated by Napoleon from among the notable lists. At the municipal level, mayors ran cities and towns with the aid of advisory councils. Mayors of large cities were selected from the notables by Napoleon while prefects nominated mayors of small towns with fewer than 5000 inhabitants.

THE POLICE

Securing law and order and suppressing opposition to his rule were two of Napoleon's most important goals. The Ministry of General Police, which he inherited from the Revolutionary period, was designed to accomplish those objectives. In the words of Michael Sibalis, the police "did exercise tight control over all public expressions of opinion, did pay a network of secret agents to keep the nation under surveillance, and did detain the regime's enemies in special state prisons without charge or trial."[28] The Directory established the Police Ministry in January 1796, yet it remained ineffective until summer 1799 when Fouché became the Minister of General Police. An ex-terrorist, Fouché was in charge of the police for eight years (1800–02; 1804–10) and created a formidable machinery that constituted the first modern political police.[29] Fouché himself possessed considerable power and was feared even by Napoleon. In 1802, Bonaparte abolished the Ministry of Police because of Fouché's opposition to the Concordat and to Bonaparte's bid for a life consulship. Soon, however, the royalist conspiracy of Cadoudal unfolded and Napoleon revived the General Ministry of Police (July 1804), entrusting Fouché with broader authority. With the assistance of Pierre-Marie Desmarest, the head of the secret police, Fouché reorganized the police, centralizing it and bolstering his control over its personnel. He divided the French Empire into four districts, three of them headed by councillors of state who reported directly to him. Paris and its surroundings constituted the fourth district, whose Prefect of Police possessed considerable power and was largely independent, reporting directly to Napoleon. In the major cities, Fouché appointed general police commissioners who were responsible to him. Napoleon was

highly interested in issues of law and order and police activities and met often with Fouché.

The police arrested common criminals and smugglers, supervised highways and public places, checked workers' passbooks (*livret*), and ran prisons. Yet Fouché's primary goals were to repress any political opposition to Napoleon and to uncover conspiracies. He established a network of informers and agents throughout the Empire, spying on dissidents. He kept detailed files on thousands of citizens, including ministers, generals, and writers. The Ministry of Police was also in charge of censorship.[30] The French Revolution eliminated restrictions on printing, and in 1790, 335 journals appeared in Paris alone.[31] Napoleon tolerated no criticism, however. He closed down 60 of the 73 newspapers in the capital and ordered the rest to refrain from criticizing the government. In 1811, Jean-Marie Savary, Fouché's successor, suppressed most of the remaining Parisian papers, allowing only four to continue to appear, with merely one newspaper per department.[32] The *bureau de presse* in the Police Ministry was in charge of censoring the press; no political news could be published without the censor's approval, while editors had to be confirmed by the government. Criticism of the *Grande Armée* and praise of the Bourbons or England were prohibited. The *Moniteur*, although privately owned, became the official paper of the regime. Printers and book dealers needed government licenses to operate and their activities were regulated. The government stopped the circulation of "dangerous" books. On the other hand, authors of books favorable to the regime received financial awards.

THE JUDICIARY

Along with the new administration, the Constitution of Year VIII also established the judiciary structure,[33] which Bonaparte viewed as essential for the maintenance of law and order. He followed the system formed during the Revolution, although as time progressed Bonaparte's control over the judicial system increased. The hierarchical court structure certainly suited the centralized structure of the Napoleonic State. The First Consul and the Senate appointed their personnel from among departmental notables, except for justices of peace. All judges, aside from the justices of peace, held their office for life, which gave them independence, yet they depended on the government for their salaries and promotion. Bonaparte also appointed other court officials like notaries and procurators.

Initially, each commune had a justice of peace who was elected for three years. They were the lowest level of justice available in small towns and were designed to resolve minor disputes promptly. In 1801, their number was reduced from 6000 to nearly half after their jurisdiction was changed from communal to the larger cantonal jurisdiction. Each *arrondissement* received a Court of First Instance, dealing with civil and correctional jurisdiction. Twenty-nine courts of appeal were established, on the average one for every four departments. Along with a criminal court in each department, they were supervised by the Court of Cassation. The law also provided for the retention of commercial, military, and maritime courts. In February 1801, the State established several "special courts" to combat brigandage. In 1802, the election of the justices of peace was abolished, and from then on they were appointed by Bonaparte from a list of two candidates submitted to him by the Cantonal Assembly. As Emperor, Napoleon was also given the right to appoint the heads of the Court of Cassation. In October 1807, a *senatus consultum* enabled Napoleon to purge the membership of the courts, which he used to get rid of former Republican supporters.

CODE NAPOLEON

At St. Helena, Napoleon is reported to have remarked, "My glory is not to have won forty battles, for Waterloo's defeat will destroy the memory of as many victories. But what nothing will destroy, what will eternally live is my Civil Code."[34] Along with the secondary education system, the Civil Code was the most durable legacy of the Napoleonic period and laid the foundation of national unity.[35] It has remained the basis of French civil law to the present day and is known for its brevity, clarity, and accessibility.

Pre-Revolutionary France contained hundreds of local codes and customs, many deriving from feudal jurisdiction. In southern France Roman Law prevailed, while Common Law dominated in northern France. The Revolutionary governments declared the need to unify the law and took some initial steps toward legal unification, most notably the revocation of feudal law. At the same time, however, they also proclaimed thousands of new laws, further complicating the legal system. Napoleon intended to replace this legal diversity with a uniform law code that would enhance national unity, strengthen the State's authority, and benefit property owners.

In 1800, the First Consul appointed four distinguished legal experts to prepare an outline for the new code. The Council of State, with

Bonaparte presiding over more than half of its meetings, examined that outline. The Code was also discussed in the Tribunate. On 21 March 1804, the Civil Code, comprising of 2281 articles, finally appeared. For the first time, France possessed a clear, concise, and orderly civil code, which took the name 'Code Napoleon' in 1807.

In the view of Jean Tulard, "The Civil Code legitimized the abolition of the *Ancien Régime*."[36] It Ratified important Revolutionary principles, including legal equality, careers based on merit, an end to feudal privileges, freedom of religion, secularization of the law, and freedom of occupation. Most significantly, the Code embodied a modern concept of property ownership. Its framers believed that property was the cornerstone of society, thus the Code guaranteed the gains made by property owners during the Revolution.[37] It confirmed the right of proprietors to use and dispose of their possessions as they saw fit. In particular, land, the main source of wealth, was freed of the remaining feudal restrictions and could now be traded freely. The Civil Code also gave employers advantages over their workers. For example, it prohibited workers from organizing, a ratification of the *Le Chapelier* Law proclaimed in 1791.

Family was the second important area in the Civil Code.[38] It regulated family property, including the marriage contract and the division of property among heirs. It outlawed primogeniture, allowing all sons to become property owners. It permitted, however, one child to inherit a larger share of the property than other heirs, overruling the Revolutionary law that required an equal division of property among all heirs. Code Napoleon confirmed the secularization of marriage, thereby placing it under State jurisdiction. Divorce, prohibited under the Old Regime but legalized by the Revolution in 1792, was also permitted by Code Napoleon, but on only three grounds: ill treatment, criminal conviction, and adultery. These limits considerably reduced the number of divorces in comparison with the Revolutionary years.

The Code significantly strengthened the patriarchal structure of the family. Napoleon believed that disciplined families and obedience to the father would extend to the political sphere and strengthen the head of state, create loyal citizens, and consolidate law and order. The father was the head of the family and controlled the family's property. He decided the fate of the children, could veto their marriage, and was even authorized to send them to jail. The Code subordinated wife to husband. Article 213 stated that "The woman owes obedience to her husband." She had to follow her husband wherever he moved and was not permitted to sign

a legal contract on her own. The Code also made it easier for men to obtain a divorce than for women.

Owing to its simple, concise, and coherent style, the Civil Code had immense influence and attraction outside France. Napoleon used the Code as a tool of domination and ordered its introduction in his satellite states,[39] including Belgium, the Netherlands, parts of Germany, Italy, and Switzerland. It aided in rallying the local propertied classes to Napoleonic rule and helped to spread Revolutionary ideas throughout Europe. In the words of Godechot, "It constituted the most tangible and the most durable trace of the revolutionary expansion."[40]

The Civil Code was followed by other codes: the Code of Civil Procedure (1806); the Commercial Code (1807), which dealt with issues like bankruptcy law and commercial disputes; the Code of Criminal Procedure (1808), which retained trial by jury; and the Penal Code (1810), which preserved capital punishment and long prison terms with hard labor.

MILITARY CONSCRIPTION

No other issue aroused as much opposition to the Napoleonic regime as military conscription. The Revolutionary governments laid the foundation for national conscription. In March 1793, the Convention called up 300,000 new draftees, and in August it proclaimed the *levée en masse*. In September 1798, the Directory launched annual conscription through the Jourdan–Delbrel Law. Men between 20 and 25 years of age were eligible for four years of military service; exempt were married men, widowers with children, and the handicapped. Later, Napoleon authorized hiring substitutes, which favored the well-to-do. The Directory failed, however, to implement the conscription law effectively. Napoleon, on the other hand, put teeth into the conscription law, turning annual conscription into a routine and thereby amassing a huge army.

Conscription became the most contested policy between State and society.[41] It fell largely to the rural population, which was unaccustomed to military service, disrupting its traditional way of life and separating recruits from their families and farms for years. It is no wonder, then, that conscription met with widespread opposition, resulting in tens of thousands of conscripts evading the draft. In the words of Woloch, "a general resistance to conscription remained the foremost domestic challenge to the Napoleonic state."[42] Desertion and draft dodging were

the most common methods of avoiding military service. In some regions they reached epidemic proportions. Deserters frequently received assistance from family and friends. They drained military manpower and supplies, stealing clothing and weapons. A number of deserters joined brigand bands, although most tried to resume civilian life. Some eligible draftees married prior to the annual draft while others disqualified themselves from the draft through self-mutilation. Sometimes the well-to-do received undeserved medical exemptions through bribes. Clearly, the State could not tolerate such a challenge to one of its most important policies, thus it enacted harsh measures to suppress resistance to conscription.[43] The authorities tightened draft regulations, centralized the conscription bureaucracy, and imposed stiff penalties on fugitives. They billeted soldiers with families of deserters. The *gendarmerie*, national guard, and mobile columns were expanded and sent to pursue draft dodgers. The government also tried to lure deserters back to military service through amnesties.

Ultimately, the Napoleonic regime won the conscription struggle. The number of refractory draftees declined in the final years of Napoleon's rule and the draft proceeded more rapidly and smoothly. Indeed, the draft became an annual routine that most French learnt to accept. During 1800–14 Napoleon drafted more than two million conscripts.[44] Enforcing conscription and strengthening its machinery contributed considerably to the build-up of the State's power. Ultimately, it expanded state control over the everyday life of French citizens. Conscription officials penetrated remote communities and compelled their inhabitants to obey state laws. In sum, through the draft, more than any other policy, the central State increasingly became a reality the governed were unable to ignore. In the long run, military service was also an important way of promoting patriotic feelings and "making peasants into Frenchmen."[45] For many young men, recruitment was the first time they came in contact with the State, heard nationalist propaganda, and met soldiers from other provinces, all of which enabled them to transcend their provincial identity and start viewing themselves as Frenchmen.

FINANCIAL REFORMS

The Directory left Bonaparte a legacy of chaotic financial conditions, including public debt, deficits, inflation, and depreciated paper money.[46] A rise in prices of basic necessities provoked widespread discontent.

The Directory initiated several reforms to overcome the financial crisis. It removed the *assignats* from circulation and reimbursed creditors two-thirds of the debt through bonds they could use to purchase national property. In practice, it amounted to writing off two-thirds of the national debt, which exasperated creditors. The Directory also proclaimed new indirect taxes and tried to improve collection of direct taxes. Yet property assessments were based on old, inaccurate surveys, thereby rendering taxes arbitrary, hence tax arrears remained an ongoing problem. The government also imposed a forced loan on the wealthiest citizens, but due to opposition, it recovered only a fraction of the amount it had hoped to collect. The insufficient internal revenues meant that the Directory depended upon contributions from occupied countries, which financed more than one-fourth of the 1798–9 budgets.[47]

The shaky fiscal conditions and the unpopular financial policies considerably weakened the Directory and contributed to its collapse. In late 1799, the state coffers were virtually empty.[48] Bonaparte needed to stabilize fiscal conditions quickly. Finance Minister Martin Gaudin managed public revenues, particularly tax collection, while a Ministry of the Treasury ran expenditures. Bonaparte aimed at augmenting state income and restoring public confidence in the financial system, particularly among the propertied classes. He proceeded with considerable caution, preserving noncontroversial parts of the Directory's financial structure. The main financial innovations under Napoleon pertained to the credit system and the establishment of a more centralized and rigorous financial administration.

Military expenses constituted the largest expenditure, amounting to more than half of the budget. Between 1805 and 1810, military costs averaged 350 million francs annually, but with the Russian campaign in 1812, they jumped to 600 million.[49] Marine expenses reached 100–200 million annually. Public works rose from 25 million francs in 1803 to 154 million in 1811. The ministries of Foreign Relations, Finances, Treasury, Interior, Justice, and Religion had smaller budgets.

Taxes constituted the principal source of state revenues. The First Consul added no new direct taxes to the ones set up during the Revolution. The land tax, created in 1791, was the principal direct tax, providing almost three-fourths of the government's income from direct taxes.[50] Landowners complained that it was excessive and inequitably distributed, forcing Napoleon to reduce it. To establish real-estate tax on an equitable and uniform basis, Napoleon launched a land survey (September 1807).[51] The French cadaster coincided with land surveys in

the Kingdoms of Holland and Italy. It was a gigantic operation that progressed slowly; of 47,000 communities, only 10,000 had been assessed by the end of the Empire.

Tax on personal property was paid primarily by urban residents for their domestic servants, horses, carriages, and chimneys, and provoked much resentment among the well-to-do. The yield from personal property tax diminished substantially after September 1803, as more and more municipalities replaced it with higher duties on consumer goods, to the benefit of the wealthy. Taxes on doors and windows and a license fee paid by entrepreneurs completed the list of direct taxes.

State income from direct taxes was diminishing, and in 1813 it amounted to a mere 29 percent of the total revenues. To compensate for the declining revenues from direct taxes, the Napoleonic authorities gradually increased indirect taxes, restoring pre-Revolutionary tributes, despite their detrimental effect on the lower classes. In Napoleon's opinion, "the only quality of a good fiscal system was its yield. What had to be found were various taxes that were easy to apply and automatically productive. The indirect tax under these conditions became the ideal tax."[52] The Revolutionary government had abolished many unpopular indirect taxes, most notably the salt *gabelle*. The Directory imposed duties on tobacco, playing cards, carriages, silverware, and alcohol. Napoleon increased alcohol duties several times. After Austerlitz he felt secure enough to create new indirect taxes and increase old ones. Particularly significant was the restoration of the hated salt tax (April 1806). In December 1810, the government reestablished state monopoly of the manufacturing and trade of tobacco. Those changes quadrupled revenues from indirect taxes between 1806 and 1812. A third group of revenues consisted of customs, stamp fees, registry taxes, the lottery, and the post. The State also continued to draw income from the sale of national property.

The principal innovation of the Napoleonic tax policies, however, was the establishment of an efficient tax-collection apparatus.[53] Under the Directory, tax collection was largely ineffective due to the absence of specialized tax receivers and the lack of government control. Soon after the coup of Brumaire, Gaudin created a new departmental collection apparatus in each *arrondissement*. Collectors in towns where contributions exceeded 15,000 francs were appointed by the First Consul. Napoleon also increased the personnel engaged in indirect tax collection. In 1804, the authorities created a central body to levy the duties on alcohol, tobacco, playing cards, and carriages.

In the monetary sphere, the Napoleonic innovations were designed to place the French currency on a uniform basis. In April 1795, the Directory had established the franc as the national currency and had fixed its metallic composition. Yet monetary disorder persisted; the old *livre* and foreign coins continued to circulate and shortage of species was rampant. Napoleon drew a lesson from the disastrous experience of the *assignats* and refused to issue paper money, basing French currency on metallic currency.[54] In March 1803, the authorities established a new monetary standard, the *franc de germinal*, and regulated its content, size, and weight. For the first time, France possessed a currency whose real and face values matched. The new French currency became one of the strongest in Europe and lasted for the next 125 years.

Tied to the monetary stabilization were the Napoleonic reforms in the area of public credit. The French ruler refused to borrow since he feared repeating the ruinous experience of the Old Regime. At the same time, Napoleon could not ignore the issue of credit since taxes were insufficient to cover all the regime's expenses and because he had inherited debt from the previous governments. Founding the Bank of France constituted the most important reform in the area of credit.[55] The French Consul aimed at establishing a national bank that would furnish credit to the State and to entrepreneurs. Formed in February 1800, the Bank of France was privately owned and possessed an initial capital of 30 million francs. In April 1803, following a period of financial instability, the government increased the bank's capital to 45 million francs and granted it the exclusive right to issue bank notes. Later, the authorities doubled the bank's capital to 90 million francs. In 1808, the Bank of France was authorized to set up branches in other cities. With the growing military expenses, the Treasury constantly resorted to short-term loans from the Bank of France.

Yet the improvement in the French financial organization and the increase in revenues were insufficient to cover all the public expenses due to the escalating military costs. It was only thanks to taxes and requisitions from occupied territories, along with war contributions paid by vanquished enemies, that the Napoleonic regime was able to reduce the deficit.

THE EDUCATION SYSTEM

Napoleon's educational reforms laid the foundation for two lasting legacies: the French secondary schools, the *lycées*, and a centralized education system. Napoleon viewed state control of education, especially at the

secondary level, as essential for the consolidation of his rule. In 1803, Portalis wrote: "Public education belongs to the State, for individual families must be directed according to the plan of the great family which includes them all."[56] Napoleon set up a national education system characterized by uniformity, a hierarchical structure, centralization, state control, and a standardized curriculum. Through the centralization and development of the education system, Napoleon expected to achieve two main goals. He clearly aimed at molding the minds of young Frenchmen, instilling in them patriotism, loyalty to his regime, and respect for social hierarchy and property. In 1805, he stated: "There will be no settled political state, so long as there is not a teaching body with settled principles. So long as one does not learn from childhood whether to be republican or monarchist, Catholic or nonreligious, etc, the State will not form a nation; it will rest on a vague and uncertain base; it will be constantly exposed to changes and disorders."[57] Secondly, he intended to train and prepare the students to become efficient and skilled bureaucrats, in response to the growing administrative needs of the French State.

Under the *ancien régime*, education was not a primary concern for most people; neither did the State allocate any means to pay for it. The Church exerted considerable influence over education. During the Revolution, education became an important part of republican ideology and Revolutionaries viewed universal primary education as an essential feature of a progressive nation.[58] In 1793, the Revolutionary government proclaimed new education programs, including free primary schools in every commune. Due to the war, however, it lacked the resources to implement this program. The Constitution of 1795 and the Daunou Law (October 1798) laid down the fundamental principles of a system of public education, both primary and secondary.[59] But the Directory had little success in primary education due to a shortage of teachers, insufficient resources, and the opposition of the rural population to republican education. It had more success with secondary education. In 1795, it instituted a nationwide secondary education program, establishing *écoles centrales* in various departments.

Napoleon preserved some of the Revolutionary educational programs, establishing them on a more solid foundation. He paid little attention to primary schools, content to leave them in the hands of municipal authorities. Elementary education, in Napoleon's view, was given to the poor with little beyond moral principles and good work habits. Likewise, Napoleon ignored education for girls, believing that they needed no formal education. "Girls," he said, "cannot be brought up better than by

their mothers. Public education does not suit them, as they are not called into public life; manners are everything for them; marriage is their whole destination."[60] In May 1802, Antoine Fourcroy, a celebrated chemist and member of the Council of State, presented a program that laid the foundation for a new educational system. The chief objective of the law of 1802 was the creation of 45 *lycées*, designed to train primarily sons of the well-to-do for state service. The four that opened in Paris were the largest; the *Lycée Imperial* had 1000 students while the *Lycée Bonaparte* taught 800.[61] Napoleon aimed at regulating every aspect of secondary education. As he put it, he wanted to be able to look at a clock at any time of day and know exactly what every pupil in France was studying. The curriculum consisted of Letters and Science. The authorities nominated both teachers and administrators and controlled the process of student admission. They also provided 6400 scholarships, 2400 of them to sons of government officials and military officers. The remaining 4000 were filled through competition, although in reality preference was given to sons of wealthy families.[62] Military discipline prevailed in the *lycées*; students wore uniforms, were divided into "companies," and held ranks.

Besides the *lycées*, there were also secondary schools run by the municipalities and the Catholic Church. Many bourgeois citizens resented the military regimentation and the irreligious environment in the *lycées*, and preferred to enroll their sons in these schools. In 1813, an official report indicated that 68,000 pupils studied in the *lycées* versus 47,000 in private institutions. This competition and the absence of uniformity among the different types of schools stimulated Napoleon to organize a new body, the Imperial University, a corporation of teachers "charged exclusively with teaching and public education throughout the Empire" in order "to direct political and moral opinions." This central educational authority was designed to enhance uniformity and obedience to the Napoleonic regime. A 144-article decree, issued in March 1808, placed all secondary schools under its authority. The Imperial University awarded degrees while its Grand Master appointed and promoted teachers, opened new schools, and issued rules regarding teaching, discipline, and finances. In 1809, Napoleon instituted the *baccalauréat*, the national examination pupils had to pass when they graduated from the *lycées*, and necessary for admission to institutions of higher education. In the first year, 31 students received the degree; in 1813, it was awarded to 1700.[63] In practice, however, the Imperial University was never as effective in imposing a uniform educational program throughout France as it was meant to be. For example, the clergy's role in teaching and running schools actually

increased under Napoleon compared with the Revolutionary years, due to a shortage of qualified teachers.

The Imperial University also controlled higher education, which consisted of specialized schools and institutions. One of them was the *École Polytechnique*, founded in 1794 to train engineers, although during the Empire it trained predominantly military personnel. Special schools for law, medicine, physics, chemistry, and other disciplines were projected. In 1808, the *École Normale* was founded to train teachers. The graduates and teachers in these and other institutions became the intellectual elite of France.

NAPOLEON'S LEGACY

The Napoleonic rule, along with the preceding Revolutionary decade, brought the Old Regime to an end and launched the modernization of French state and society. Napoleon destroyed the Revolutionary ideals of popular sovereignty and free speech, and restored monarchical rule. Yet at the time same, he consolidated many significant changes of the Revolution and established many of France's laws and institutions that have lasted to the present day. In fact, Napoleon carried out many of the Revolutionary reforms more effectively than his predecessors and initiated important innovations himself.

Napoleon's most important legacy was the creation of a strong central State. It went hand in hand with the formation of his authoritarian rule and the strengthening of the executive branch. The new State was a secular State, free of the divine ideology that had justified the *ancien régime* monarchy. The Concordat confirmed the State's supremacy over the Church and the latter's loss of property during the Revolution. State apparatus was based on a centralized, efficient, and hierarchical bureaucracy ranging from prefects to mayors. It was staffed by salaried and professionally trained officials who, in principle, were appointed on the basis of their talent instead of birth and nepotism and operated according to fixed rules. French subjects became citizens equal before the law, and the government was now dealing with individuals directly rather than through intermediary bodies. This modern State was well informed, collecting data on its citizens and the country's general conditions, which helped it govern effectively. A powerful police force assured law and order and suppressed opposition. Napoleon stabilized public finances, establishing uniform taxes, initiating a land survey, and creating an

efficient tax collection, national currency, and the Bank of France, all of which lasted long after his fall. Military conscription constituted the basis for the creation of a modern national army, becoming an annual routine the French learnt to accept. The Civil Code, Napoleon's most important and durable legacy, established legal uniformity and sanctioned legal equality and property rights and has remained the basis of French law until today. Likewise, the *lycées*, the core of Napoleon's centralized education reform, exist to this day. Even the Bourbons, despite their conservatism and nostalgia for the *ancien régime*, recognized the benefits of the Napoleonic state apparatus and retained much of it.[64]

Another important Napoleonic legacy was his ratification of the Revolutionary principle that grounded social mobility in wealth and merit instead of birth, thereby providing a boost to the development of nineteenth-century French bourgeois society. Napoleon helped to define and fully endorse the new elite of the notables, which consisted of landowners, professionals, entrepreneurs, and the educated classes. They constituted the backbone of the Napoleonic government, which, in return, protected their gains of the Revolutionary decade. Napoleon confirmed their land purchases, guaranteed their property rights, established internal security, and appointed them to government posts. The old nobility, on the other hand, never regained their birth privileges, seigneurial rights, or sole grip over government positions. The Emperor replaced the old nobility with a new nobility that was based on wealth accumulation, skill, and service to the State. The obsolete society of orders had disappeared forever.

4

The Netherlands

THE NETHERLANDS IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

In the eighteenth century the Netherlands, known then as the United Provinces, constituted a loose confederation of seven sovereign provinces: Gelderland, Holland, Utrecht, Zeeland, Overijssel, Friesland, and Groningen. Each province had a vast autonomy that, in practice, belonged to an oligarchy of patricians. The United Provinces had a weak central government. The provinces nominated a central official, the Stadholder, whose executive authority was restricted to foreign policy, military, and naval command. The Stadholder position was monopolized by the Orange family. The provincial assemblies sent representatives to the Estates General, whose decisions were effective only if approved by all seven provinces. There was no Dutch citizenship and it was difficult to speak about a Dutch nation.

Economically, the United Provinces suffered a decline in the eighteenth century.[1] The urban economy deteriorated and the population of the cities shrank. Financially, the United Provinces lost its central place to London, its industry lagged behind that of Britain, and its international trade declined. Agriculture also experienced a crisis, although it began recovering in the 1750s. Yet despite the decline of overseas trade, the United Provinces remained an affluent society and an important maritime power. It possessed colonies, including Ceylon, Java, the Cape of Good Hope, and the West Indies islands. Dutch financiers subsidized large portions of the British and American national debts.

THE PATRIOT REVOLUTION

In the 1780s, the Dutch experienced a major upheaval in the form of a civil war and revolution, precipitated by economic decline. Political tension was rising between the pro-Stadholder Orangist camp and the anti-Stadholder Patriot movement. Initially, the Patriot opposition consisted of conservative aristocrats who opposed the extensive power of Stadholder William V (1751–95), and prosperous burghers who resented their exclusion from political power. The Patriots denounced William V for eliminating traditional local liberties and for concentrating excessive power in his own hands. They demanded the restoration of those liberties and the creation of a more open and broadly based political system.[2]

Tension between the Orangists and the Patriots was exacerbated by the deterioration of relations with Britain. William V strongly supported Britain in its American war while his opponents, many of them merchants, resented the British commercial competition and wished to restore Dutch power at sea. They assisted the Americans, thereby increasing tension with Britain. In December 1780, Britain began the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War, inflicting a disastrous defeat on the Netherlands and paralyzing Dutch shipping.[3]

The Patriots blamed William V for the defeat and for the severe economic crisis. One of their leaders, Joan Derk van der Capellen, denounced the Prince of Orange for suppressing the ancient Dutch liberties and urged the people to emulate the Americans and arm themselves to regain their freedom and establish a government dominated by burghers.[4] In 1782, the Patriots began organizing armed civic militias. This agitation forced William V to leave the Hague (September 1785). Several provinces suspended the Prince as Captain General. The Patriots won their greatest victory in Utrecht, where the first democratic municipality was elected in 1786. In the summer of 1787, they also gained control in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and Delft. In many small towns, Patriots demanded the restoration of citizens' control. A clash in May 1787, which left 80 dead, demonstrated the growing hostility between the Orangists and the Patriots.

The Patriots were weakened, however, by a rift between moderates and radicals. The latter did not limit themselves to opposition to the Stadholder, but also targeted the entire ruling oligarchy and demanded the convening of a popular assembly. This alienated the aristocrats, who merely wished to reduce the Stadholder's power and feared that radical reforms would undermine their power.

What ultimately sealed the fate of the Patriot Revolution was foreign intervention. In September 1787, the Prussian monarch Fredrick William II, William V's brother-in-law, sent 26,000 troops into the United Provinces to help the Orangists crush the opposition. The British subsidized that invasion. The Patriots quickly surrendered and thousands of them fled into Austrian Netherlands and France. William V regained his authority and dissolved Patriot clubs and the militia.

THE BATAVIAN REPUBLIC (1795–1801)

Against this background, the French Revolution constituted an inspiring development for the Patriot exiles in France. When revolutionary France declared war on Britain and the Netherlands (February 1793), Patriot emigrants fought alongside the French. After defeating the Austrians at Fleurus (June 1794), the French, under General Charles Pichegru, invaded the Netherlands. Numerous Patriotic clubs organized in large cities and armed themselves. The revolutionary movement of 1795 was a continuation of the anti-Orangist Patriots of the 1780s.[5]

The French advance forced William V to flee to Britain and the French troops entered Amsterdam (January 1795). These events launched a new Dutch Revolution. The Batavian Republic (1795–1806) replaced the United Provinces, becoming France's first "sister republic." Important reforms ended the *ancien régime* and laid the foundation for a new united state. Those changes did not come, however, without much upheaval and struggle that reflected the divisions within Dutch society and between moderate and democratic Patriots.

The French added to the instability through their frequent interventions, designed to shape the Batavian Republic according to their interests. Its coastal location and possession of considerable shipping and banking resources made the Netherlands an invaluable French ally against Britain. In May 1795, the Batavian Republic signed a treaty with France at The Hague. In return for French recognition, the Dutch agreed to pay France 100 million guilders and concede Maastricht, Venlo, and Dutch Flanders to France. A secret clause allowed 25,000 French troops to stay in the Netherlands at Dutch expense. These onerous obligations aggravated the financial condition of the Batavian Republic.

Upon the formation of the Batavian Republic, the Patriots quickly removed the Orangist oligarchs from power. By March 1795, they held the municipal and provincial positions and dominated the Estates

General. Under the new system all males above the age of 20, except paupers, were eligible to vote. In January 1796, a new National Assembly was elected, consisting of mostly middle-class delegates, although clergymen and members of noble families were also elected. The Assembly voted to separate Church and State and granted equal rights to Jews.[6] Drafting a constitution, however, was the Assembly's primary and most controversial task. Delegates were divided on whether the new republic should stay a decentralized state or become a united republic. The Federalists rejected a strong central government and supported the retention of provincial autonomy. Support for the federalist position came mostly from moderate Patriots, chief among them Rutger Jan Schimmelpenninck, a lawyer from Amsterdam. He believed that the unitary government should run foreign policy and leave internal administration to the provinces. Schimmelpenninck and the moderates also advocated a tempered form of democracy, proposing a system of electors rather than direct elections.

The Unitarists, largely democratic Patriots, advocated a strong central state and the elimination of the traditional sovereignty of the provinces. Prominent Unitarist leaders included Isaac Gogel, the future finance minister; Pieter Vreede, a wealthy cloth merchant; and Johan Valckenar, a law professor who had spent many years in France. They saw the elimination of provincial sovereignty as a way to undermine the powerful oligarchic families who controlled local governments. Moreover, a unitary state was more conducive to the idea of all the Dutch becoming citizens with equal rights. A major goal of the unitarist program was to establish a national fiscal system and consolidate the provincial debts into one national debt. This favored the indebted provinces, most notably Holland. Democrats also strongly championed the separation of Church and State and the abolition of the slave trade.

In August 1797, after a furious debate, the Assembly ratified a 918-article constitution. It was full of compromises, satisfying nobody. While it established a united republic, it also confirmed the internal independence of the provinces. Voters decisively rejected the constitution in a plebiscite. A new National Assembly endlessly debated a new constitution. In addition to the political stalemate, economic difficulties and a Dutch naval defeat by the British at Camperdown (October 1797) further discredited the government. In January 1798, a French-supported coup, led by Unitarists, purged the Assembly of federalists. The Assembly then adopted a new unitarist constitution modeled on the French constitution of 1795 with an executive of five directors. It replaced the provinces with eight

departments, proclaimed civil rights, granted male suffrage, and abolished restrictions on internal commerce. With the exclusion of Orangists and Federalists from voting, the electorate overwhelmingly approved the constitution.

The new radical government lasted less than five months, however. The Directory increasingly resorted to authoritarian measures, including arrests of opponents and the purging of voter lists, which alienated many citizens. Discord within the radical camp also undermined the government. In June 1798, General Daendels, the commander of the Batavian army, staged a coup supported by the French government, driving the radicals out of power.[7] A new Assembly, dominated by moderate Patriots, was elected in July 1798. The legislature kept the unitarist constitution, aiming to strengthen the central government and erase the autonomy of the provinces.

Yet the continuous instability alienated many citizens from politics. Although they stayed in power for three years (until September 1801), the moderates accomplished little and failed to enforce the unitarist principles. Local officials, many of them old notables who had returned to power, successfully resisted the government's efforts to turn them into simple executors of its orders.[8] Fiscal hardships and lack of adequate personnel also accounted for the authorities' failure to enforce the laws. Economic difficulties persisted and the national debt mushroomed. To solve the problem of acute deficits, Finance Minister Gogel tried to produce a new national tax program, including an increase in direct taxes and the creation of a tax collection bureaucracy. Considerable resistance in the Assembly delayed the program's ratification until March 1801 when much of the unitary state structure had crumbled and the new plan remained a dead letter. A national system of poor relief and efforts to abolish the guilds also failed. In sum, while a unitarist constitution was adopted, and the departmental commissioners constituted the embryo of a unitary Republic, the Batavian authorities were unable and unwilling to carry out a significant centralization policy.

Meanwhile, in 1799 the British government and William V tried to restore the House of Orange in the Netherlands. This was part of the Second Coalition campaigns. William V urged the Dutch people to revolt and reestablish the old Republic. In August 1799, an Anglo-Russian army landed in northern Holland and advanced toward Amsterdam. A sympathetic revolt failed to materialize, however. In October, a Franco-Dutch army under General Brune defeated the British at Castricum, forcing them to retreat to England.

THE BATAVIAN REPUBLIC (1801–6)

Additional progress toward a united Dutch state would have to wait until 1805. Until then "subordination to central authority was more in name than reality."[9] The years 1801–4 witnessed a restoration of much of the traditional civic autonomy and the return of the urban patricians to leading positions. Bonaparte played an important role in this turn of events. He was hostile to the democratic principles and the electoral process in the Batavian Republic and was determined to abolish them. The First Consul also accused the Dutch Directory of incompetence for not preventing British merchandise from entering the Netherlands and for the failure of Dutch bankers to provide him with financial assistance in 1800. No less important was Bonaparte's desire to establish good relations with the Dutch elite, the wealthy burghers and the patriciate. With Talleyrand's authorization, Semonville, the French ambassador, prepared a new constitution approved by members of the Batavian Directory. In September 1801, the legislature declared its opposition to the constitutional changes but the French general Augereau dissolved that body. This was the third coup in the Netherlands since January 1798. The new constitution created an executive of 12 regents authorized to initiate legislation and nominate officials. The regents appointed a weak legislature of 35 members. The 1801 coup ended the representative system established in 1795. Conservatism and much of the traditional structure were restored. Numerous Patriots, unitarists, and democrats were purged from power while many aristocrats, who supported the Orangist party, returned to top positions. Provinces and cities regained much of their former autonomy.

The main problem faced by the government remained the mounting deficit. The regents hoped that the peace of Amiens (1802), which returned all the colonies except Ceylon to the Batavian Republic, would stimulate trade and reduce its military obligations to France. Those expectations remained unfulfilled, however, for the peace was short-lived and Bonaparte did not let the Netherlands stay neutral. While preparing to invade the British Isles, the French Consul demanded that the Dutch Republic contribute 9000 troops and provide vessels to help transport the invading army.

The increased military expenses aggravated the financial conditions of the Batavian Republic. Along with debt-service, those expenses caused a succession of high deficits after 1800.[10] The resumption of war deepened the commercial crisis, diminishing the Republic's ability to recover

financially. The regents were unable to increase the State's revenues and halt the fiscal deterioration. Napoleon was quickly losing faith in the capability of the Batavian government to rule the Netherlands effectively while serving his interests. The poor Dutch performance when confronting the British in the colonies, and the ineffective implementation of the trade embargo against Britain, exasperated the French ruler. Moreover, Napoleon was convinced that, if left alone, the Netherlands would join France's enemies.[11]

In late 1804 Napoleon was ready to intervene and install a new, more vigorous government designed to implement a viable financial reform program and respond fully to his political, military, and economic demands. In March 1805, he nominated the veteran politician Schimmelpenninck to head the Dutch Republic with the title of Grand Pensionary. A new constitution entrusted Schimmelpenninck with broad executive power. The weak legislature, nominated by the Grand Pensionary, had no power to initiate legislation and could only debate legislative projects submitted by the executive. Once again, the small voter participation (4 percent) in the plebiscite on the new constitution demonstrated the public's distance from the new system imposed by Napoleon.

Schimmelpenninck stayed in power only until June 1806, but his reform policy swept away the organization of the past and laid the foundation for the nineteenth-century Dutch nation state.[12] The power and range of responsibilities of executive officials and bodies, including the five state secretaries of war, marine, finance, interior, and foreign affairs (later justice was added), increased and they set national policies. A central, uniform, and more specialized bureaucracy was created. Towns and departments became increasingly subordinate to The Hague. The government was authorized to nominate and terminate local functionaries while state officials were empowered to inspect poor relief and public works, formerly under the exclusive control of the provinces. Local communities had to abide by a growing set of national policies and regulations. They grew more dependent on the government's financial support and were required to obtain permission from the executive to levy local taxes.

Reforming the fiscal system constituted a major policy under Schimmelpenninck. Between 1795 and 1803, the national debt increased from 760 to 1126 million guilders.[13] A structural tax reform was essential to the Republic's survival. Aiming to increase public revenues, Gogel submitted a major tax reform to Schimmelpenninck that took effect in January 1806.[14] Gogel meant to achieve several goals with his General

Taxation Plan: replace the tax variations among provinces with a national tax system, establish tax payment in proportion to income, and save tax collection costs. Gogel viewed fiscal unity as a way to strengthen the national government and weaken the old oligarchies. His plan boosted direct taxes, including land tax and tax on rent, and sumptuary taxes on servants, horses, jewelry, and pleasure carriages. To establish a uniform and fair assessment of the land tax, Gogel created a Cadaster Commission to evaluate property.[15] Gogel's tax reform also abolished and lowered the duties on foodstuffs, thereby reducing the pressure on the poor. To centralize the new system, Gogel established a national tax bureaucracy whose members were to be appointed, supervised, and salaried by The Hague. To save on administration expenses, he curtailed the number of officials. Gogel proposed no tax on merchants, which explains the support the tax plan received in the maritime departments against the opposition of the inland departments.

THE KINGDOM OF HOLLAND (1806–10)

In June 1806, Napoleon converted the Batavian Republic into the Kingdom of Holland and nominated his brother Louis as its ruler.[16] Napoleon's excuse for this change was the deterioration of Schimmelpenninck's eyesight. More important, however, were serious disagreements between the Emperor and the Batavian government. Napoleon had nominated Schimmelpenninck to head the Batavian Republic "to do [his] bidding . . . without demur or procrastination . . . and to mobilize the whole of its naval and military forces in the next phase of the life and death struggle with Britain."[17] Increasingly, however, the Emperor feared that Schimmelpenninck was becoming too independent. The Dutch demanded their naval force back after the plan to invade England was aborted, whereas Napoleon wanted still to use it against Britain. Louis, the Emperor believed, would be easy to control.

To give the change an aura of legality, Napoleon demanded that a Dutch delegation present a formal request to Louis to become the "King of Holland." A Franco-Dutch treaty guaranteed the territorial integrity of the Netherlands and its colonies. Schimmelpenninck opposed the change but remained isolated; he resigned on 4 June. A day later, a Dutch delegation submitted a petition requesting Louis as sovereign, which Napoleon "accepted."

Not quite 28 years old when he became a monarch, Louis stayed on the Dutch throne for four years (1806–10). Louis had participated in the Italian and Egyptian campaigns and the wars of 1800 and 1805, but showed no particular military talent. His unhappy marriage to Hortense, the daughter of Josephine de Beauharnais, produced three children, the third being Louis Napoleon, the future Napoleon III.

Contrary to Napoleon's expectations, however, Louis identified strongly with the Dutch people. He learnt Dutch and often traveled around his kingdom to better understand his new countrymen, gaining their affection and support. Louis's advisers were mostly Dutch rather than French. He made great efforts to protect his kingdom from the harmful consequences of Napoleonic policies, most notably the Continental Blockade.

Under the new monarchical system, Louis served as the executive. Dedicated to his duties, he worked assiduously. He presided over the Council of State and issued legislative decrees. Initially, his cabinet comprised eight ministers: finance, war, marine, interior, foreign affairs, justice and police, colonies, and a secretary of state. He later added a ministry for ecclesiastical affairs and one for water.[18] The legislature met twice a year, each session lasting two to four months. Louis submitted many legislative proposals, and the final bills often reflected compromises between his motions and Dutch tradition.

Louis continued carrying out Schimmelpenninck's centralization policies, bringing to completion many reform projects. Initially, he also retained a number of the ministers and advisers from the previous regime, most notably Gogel. While he tried to balance the rival groups of republicans and conservative nobles, he gave preference to the latter, thus endorsing their return to power, which had already begun in 1801.[19] In his Council of State, conservative aristocrats had a majority and he appointed many of them to head departments and municipalities. Significantly, however, they had to recognize the supreme power of the central State.

Louis supported the local government law of 1807, which confirmed the increasing power of the State and the dissolution of the remaining provincial autonomy. The Kingdom of Holland contained 11 departments, each run by a *landrost* nominated by the king and analogous to the French prefect. The *landrost* selected a council of leading citizens to assist him. Every quarter was administered by a *drost*, the counterpart of the French subprefect. Cities of over 5000 inhabitants were headed by a mayor. City officials reported to representatives of the king. The municipalities' need

for financial help from the State enabled the government to increase its control over them.

The severe financial crisis remained the kingdom's main problem. Although the new tax system generated more income, it could not keep up with the rising military expenditures. Landowners protested the new property assessment, and the new tax collection met with opposition from the local authorities. The incompetence and dishonesty of financial officials compounded the problems. Economic hardships also made it difficult for many to pay taxes. The financial difficulties and the widespread opposition led Louis to consider revisions in Gogel's plan, which the finance minister resisted. Growing strain between the two led to the resignation of Gogel in May 1809. His frustrations and the kingdom's mounting deficit notwithstanding, Gogel had laid the foundation of a unified modern fiscal system in the Netherlands.

Another reform supported by Gogel was the abolition of the guilds, which he viewed as part of the oligarchies' apparatus of social and economic control.[20] He believed that stripping the guilds of their autonomy and monopolistic powers would strengthen the central administration. In January 1808, the legislature abolished the guilds, despite stiff resistance. The opposition prevented the implementation of the measure in various communities, however, and it was only in 1818 that the existence of the guilds was actually terminated.

Primary education constituted another important area of governmental reform under Louis. Traditionally, communities ran elementary education. Increasingly, however, they needed the financial support of The Hague, which enabled the latter to gain more control over education. In 1806, the experienced education official Adriaan van den Ende, who strongly believed in centralizing the education system, drafted the School Law, which extended the jurisdiction of the national government over primary education. The law established a set of basic educational standards for private and public schools. Teachers were required to have a certificate awarded after a standardized examination. Fifty-six inspectors were in charge of supervising the schools. This emphasis on primary education in the Netherlands differed from other Napoleonic states where the emphasis was on secondary schools. Not surprisingly, "By 1811, . . . the Dutch had organized the most effective and comprehensive system of elementary education in Europe."[21]

The kingdom launched other important changes that strengthened and unified the Dutch State. In 1809, a unified Dutch law code took effect, replacing the various regional customary laws. To Napoleon's

chagrin, the new code left out parts of his Code Napoleon, most notably civil marriage and divorce law. In 1810, the Napoleonic Penal Code was introduced, though not before it was amended to suit Dutch traditions. In March 1809, a uniform set of weights and measures was proclaimed.

Louis paid much attention to hydraulic policy. Annual floods, especially a disastrous inundation in 1809, demonstrated the need for a national water program. He elevated the director of the Commission of Water, Twent Van Raaphorst, to minister and proclaimed national regulations for the examination of local dykes. The king increased the budget for *Waterstaat* and completed projects initiated in 1804–5. Louis also encouraged the development of Dutch cultural institutions. The national archives, the Royal Library at The Hague, and the Rijksmuseum in Amsterdam were set up during his reign.

As in other satellite states, Napoleon imposed military demands on the Kingdom of Holland, ordering Louis to expand the Dutch army to 50,000 men and build more warships. Louis refused to introduce conscription, however, insisting that it ran contrary to Dutch custom, and instead filled his army with volunteers and foreign mercenaries.[22] Dutch troops fought with Napoleon against Prussia and Austria and participated in the Spanish and Russian campaigns.

Economically, the Kingdom of Holland experienced industrial and commercial decline. The war, and especially the Continental Blockade, hurt these two branches considerably. Shipbuilding and its related industries suffered in particular, but also textile, paper, and tobacco products deteriorated.[23] The blockade deprived industries of essential raw materials and drove their prices up, hurting Dutch competitiveness. It also prevented Dutch merchandise from reaching colonial markets. Moreover, in September 1808, the Kingdom of Holland lost important markets in France, Belgium, and Germany due to exports restrictions imposed by Napoleon. The blockade also caused maritime traffic entering the Netherlands to fall drastically, from 2700 vessels in 1805 to 259 in 1809.[24] The overall value of Dutch trade declined by about 30 percent during the Continental Blockade period. Many merchants evaded the blockade's restrictions, finding new routes by which to ship their goods. In fact, the Kingdom of Holland provides the best example of disobedience by a satellite state to the blockade. Trade with England continued, some by special licenses, but mostly through smuggling. Shops in Leiden displayed without disguise quantities of British manufacture[25] while warehouses in Amsterdam and Rotterdam were stuffed with colonial goods. The proximity to Britain facilitated the illegal traffic. Dutch officials were

mostly complacent in enforcing the embargo, effectively allowing British merchandise into their territory. Moreover, Louis was unwilling to enforce effectively the embargo against Britain, realizing how desperately his country needed that commerce. He delayed issuing royal decrees, interpreted imperial decrees loosely, and granted licenses for trading with England.

The Emperor was dissatisfied with his brother's close identification with the Dutch citizens and his failure to establish an army of 50,000 soldiers. Louis's lack of compliance with the blockade and his failure to suppress the smuggling of British goods, however, constituted the most important reason for the growing tension between the two brothers. In October 1808, Napoleon accused Louis of not enforcing the blockade, insisting that "none of the laws of the Blockade is observed," and that more than a hundred ships cross from Holland to England each month.[26] Nine months later, the Emperor reprimanded Louis: "Your customs regulations are poorly executed, and consequently all the connection of England with the Continent is made through Holland."[27] The strain in the relations between the two brothers came to a head during the British expedition to Walcheren.[28] In August 1809, the British landed 40,000 men, the largest contingent they had sent to the Continent so far, in Walcheren, on the Belgian coast, aiming to open the River Schelde and attack Antwerp. Due to the incompetence of their commander, however, the British achieved none of these goals and, by late December, were forced to withdraw after losing 4000 men to an epidemic. Dutch troops participated in the defense of the Low Countries against the British. But they were few and did not perform well, giving Napoleon another opportunity to charge Louis with incompetence. On 6 September 1809, the Emperor wrote Louis, "you are not a King and you have no idea how to be one . . . You have neither army nor navy and yet you pretend to be a free and independent state." He then added, "I shall always regret having given you a kingdom."[29] Napoleon concluded that to stop the smuggling of British goods he would have to occupy the Dutch coast, and in February 1810 he ordered French regiments to occupy the southern provinces of the Dutch Kingdom. Annexation of the Netherlands to France was just a matter of time. In April, the French army occupied Rotterdam, The Hague, Leiden, and Utrecht. In June, after learning that French forces under Oudinot were ordered to enter Amsterdam, Louis announced his intention to defend the city. Most of his ministers insisted, however, that the city was indefensible. Louis reacted by abdicating (1 July 1810) and left for Bohemia, where he received asylum from the Austrian emperor.

INSIDE IMPERIAL FRANCE (1810–13)

On 10 July 1810, Napoleon officially annexed the Netherlands to his Empire, appointing Charles Lebrun as Governor-General. Lebrun had overseen the incorporation of Genoa into the French Empire and was now charged with the same responsibility in the Netherlands. A council of high officials assisted him. A number of them had served under Louis, including Gogel and van Maanen, the chief judicial official. Devilliers Duterrage, the head of the state police, was responsible for enforcing the blockade and suppressing any opposition. These officials answered to a new office for the Dutch departments in Paris. A legislature consisting of notables was retained for decorative purposes. Prefects from France and Belgium headed the administration of the seven new departments. The Dutch establishment consisted of a typical Napoleonic amalgam of middle-class and patrician officials.[30]

Napoleon's main goal in annexing the Netherlands was to assure the implementation of the blockade and put an end to smuggling. Under the watchful eye of Duterrage, the regulations were forcefully applied by the coast guard and customs bureaucrats. They often used needless brutality, carrying out arbitrary arrests and house searches and arousing considerable public hostility. At the same time, corruption, extortion, and demands for bribes by officials were rife. The severe new measures succeeded, however, in interrupting trade with Britain and reducing smuggling.

Other Napoleonic policies during these final French years also led to much discontent. Napoleon preserved high tariffs on Dutch imports into the Empire, thereby arousing much resentment among Dutch industrialists. Prohibitions on imported salt, essential for the important salt-fish industry, remained in effect. Napoleon's decision to annul two-thirds of the interest on Dutch public debt hurt people who had invested in it.[31]

The most unpopular policy, however, was the introduction of conscription, a step Louis had adamantly refused to take. Sporadic anti-conscription riots erupted in 1811–12, but they failed to prevent the implementation of conscription. State officials were aware of the widespread opposition to conscription and avoided the full enforcement of that policy. Between January 1811 and July 1812, they recruited less than half of the eligible conscripts. The well-to-do commonly bought substitutes. Draft dodging and desertion rates were high.

Once the magnitude of the fiasco in Russia, where most of the 14,000 Dutch contingent perished, became known, opposition to the Napoleonic regime intensified. Napoleon was denounced as a tyrant, and support for

the restoration of the Orange dynasty increased. Riots erupted in various cities, the worst in Leiden, which was invaded and plundered by thousands of peasants in April 1813. Lebrun reacted by subjecting the press to harsher censorship and burning nearly two million francs' worth of confiscated goods. The courts imposed stiff penalties on offenders, including executions and deportations, which only increased the alienation of the population.

Following Napoleon's defeat in Leipzig, French control over the Netherlands rapidly became untenable.[32] Napoleon had to evacuate Germany and, in early November 1813, Russian and Prussian troops crossed the Dutch border and were warmly welcomed by the population. Amsterdam grew increasingly agitated and hostile to the French. On 15 November 1813, a crowd rose up and destroyed French residences, setting fire to customs houses, warehouses, and imperial symbols. Soon, Lebrun and the military government left Amsterdam, thereby confirming the end of French government in the Netherlands.

THE AFTERMATH AND THE NAPOLEONIC LEGACY

Meanwhile, at The Hague, Karel van Hogendorp, a major Orangist figure, formed a provisional government and invited Prince William VI, son of the former ruler, to assume power. On 2 December, the new ruler entered Amsterdam and was proclaimed sovereign of the Netherlands, assuming the name William I. In March 1814, William accepted a new unitarist constitution. In the Congress of Vienna, the Allies annexed Belgium to the new "Kingdom of the United Netherlands," thus creating a powerful buffer state designed to resist French aggression.

The Netherlands paid a heavy price for having been a French satellite state since the mid-1790s. It fell into a grave financial crisis as a result of Napoleon's demands, its trade with England suffered a major decline due to the blockade, and thousands of young Dutch died in Russia. At the same time, as Simon Schama has stated, while the French period produced much discontent, "The experiences of the past twenty years . . . had wrought irreversible changes in the public life of the Dutch which King William, as much as anyone, acknowledged and legitimized."[33] The Napoleonic legacy, in other words, paved the way for the establishment of modern Holland. The Batavian Republic and the Kingdom of Holland undermined the provincial autonomy and laid the foundation for a national state. The authorities created a new centralized state apparatus,

including administrative and judicial organization, and competent and experienced Napoleonic officials continued to serve under William I. A new central fiscal system, comprising a modern tax structure, land registry, and a national debt, was instituted and the guilds were abolished. Jews and Catholics received equal rights. The authorities set up a department of education and Dutch primary schools became a model for Europe. Louis also centralized the Dutch hydraulic policy and established cultural institutions that exist to this day. In sum, the nineteenth-century Dutch monarchy was the heir of the Batavian Republic and the Kingdom of Holland.

5

Belgium

EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BELGIUM

Belgium, also known as the Austrian Netherlands, belonged to the Austrian Empire in the eighteenth century. The Habsburgs received the former Spanish Netherlands in the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) following the War of Spanish Succession. The Austrian Netherlands comprised ten provinces: Brabant, Luxemburg, Limburg, Gelders, Flanders, Hainault, Namur, Malines, Tournai-Tourmaisis, and West Flanders. In their midst was the large Bishopric of Liège, an independent member-state of the Holy Roman Empire.

Each province enjoyed a broad degree of self-rule based on traditional privileges and liberties. Until 1789, no common government or institution existed for all ten provinces, aside from those installed by the Habsburg rulers. Following the War of Austrian Succession, Maria Theresa confirmed provincial autonomy in return for higher taxes. The clergy and the nobility, the two upper estates, enjoyed many privileges and possessed considerable wealth and political power. The Church owned more than half of the land and had considerable social and cultural influence. The nobility also owned much real estate. Urban guilds and corporations, the dominant element in the Third Estate, also possessed important privileges and controlled the towns. The bourgeoisie, including lawyers, bankers, manufacturers, and merchants, was gradually expanding. The peasantry constituted the largest social group in this mainly agrarian country. Some were prosperous, although rural pauperism remained a major problem. All three estates were represented in the assemblies of Provincial Estates, yet no Estates General of all the provinces met between 1634 and 1790.

By the end of the eighteenth century, the population of Austrian Netherlands, including the Bishopric of Liège, had reached almost 2.7 million.[1] These territories, with their commercial centers – most notably Brussels, Ghent, Antwerp, and Bruges – constituted the most prosperous part of the Habsburg Empire. The Belgian economy continued to expand during the long period of peace that followed the end of the Seven Year War. The introduction of new farming methods and the development of uncultivated land increased agricultural production. The launching of the Industrial Revolution expanded the textile sector in particular.

THE BELGIAN REVOLUTION

In the late 1780s, the Austrian Netherlands underwent a revolution. Sweeping reforms by the Austrian Enlightened Absolutist Joseph II (1780–90),[2] which were designed to centralize his government, hurt powerful Belgian interests and caused much discontent. He attacked the influential Catholic Church by closing scores of "useless" monasteries and introducing the Patent of Toleration, aimed at guaranteeing equal rights for Protestants and Jews. The closing of the old theological seminaries and the opening of a new, state-controlled General Seminary in Leuven provoked considerable protest. In January 1787, Joseph II also reorganized the entire Belgian administrative and judicial system, replacing the old provinces with nine new administrative districts run by intendants appointed by him.

Those changes, which reduced provincial autonomy, aroused widespread resistance and led to a three-year struggle between Joseph II and the Belgian population.[3] The Austrians faced two opposition groups. The first party, the conservative Statists, led by Henri van der Noot, a lawyer from Brussels, sought to restore traditional Belgian autonomy and Estates privileges. The second opposition group, known as the Vonckists, or democrats, led by Jan François Vonck, advocated the expulsion of Austrian rule through popular revolution. Inspired by Enlightenment ideas and events in revolutionary France, the Vonckists supported legal equality and a new parliamentary system open to all citizens.

Agitation spread throughout Belgium. The Estates of Brabant and Hainaut refused to approve taxes. In June 1789, Joseph II reacted by suppressing the Estates of Brabant and abolishing the *Joyeuse Entrée*, the fourteenth-century charter guaranteeing their rights and autonomy. Encouraged by the revolutionary events in France, the Belgian opposition

stiffened. In August 1789, a revolution expelled the Prince-Bishop from Liège and, in December, Brussels drove the Austrians out of the city. Belgium was now free of Austrian rule.

In January 1790, the Belgian Estates General proclaimed the independence of the "United Belgian States." Soon, however, the coalition between conservatives and democrats dissolved. Van der Noot and the traditional elite assumed power and excluded the Vonckists from the government. The latter demanded the convening of a new national assembly representing the Belgian nation and not the Estates. In March 1790, violence erupted and democrats were attacked; some of them were arrested, although most, including Vonck, fled to France. Belgian independence was short lived, however. In November 1790, with international approval, the new Austrian Emperor Leopold II reoccupied Belgium.

Meanwhile, in April 1792, the French government declared war on Austria and, on 6 November, French general Dumouriez, helped by about 2500 Belgian *émigrés*, defeated an outnumbered Habsburg army at Jemappes, thereby initiating the first French occupation of Belgium.[4] Many Belgians, primarily in the cities, welcomed the French, hoping for the restoration of Belgian independence. Dumouriez supported Belgian sovereignty, hoping to become the head of such a state.

On 15 December 1792, the French Convention declared the elimination of the vestiges of the Old Regime in territories under its control, including Belgium. It suppressed the tithe and seigneurial fees and privileges, and ordered the confiscation of Church property. Local authorities opposed to the French were dissolved and new elections were announced, with the exclusive participation of supporters of revolutionary principles. Municipalities were ordered to provision the French army. The decree aroused a general protest in Belgium. Only Jacobins supported the French policy.[5] Two weeks later, the conservatives won an overwhelming victory in elections for the new Belgian Convention. To guarantee the new policy and prevent a counter-Revolutionary victory, France formally annexed Belgium (February 1793).

French rule ended quickly, however. In March 1793, the Austrians defeated Dumouriez at Neerwinden and regained control of Belgium. They suppressed Belgian democrats and re-empowered the Statists, who reestablished the traditional local liberties and restored the tithe and seigneurial fees. Austrian rule lasted for only 15 months, however. In June 1794, after their victory at Fleurus, the French reoccupied Belgium.

BELGIUM ANNEXED TO FRANCE (1795–1800)

This time French rule lasted for almost 20 years. For the first 15 months, the French government left most of the old Belgian structures intact. It imposed high war taxes – 80 million francs, six times more than the Austrians exacted annually [6] and heavy requisitions. Then, on 1 October 1795, France annexed Belgium. Economic benefits to be gained from this developed country, along with the wish to spread revolutionary ideology and sanction the possession of an area that France aspired to and fought over for centuries, accounted for the annexation.[7]

French authorities quickly established their revolutionary laws and institutions in Belgium. Much of this reorganization took place between late 1795 and early 1797. In the words of Henri Pirenne , "[during this period] Belgium passed from the Ancien Régime to the Revolution . . . All the national past was swept away."[8] Louis Bouteville, an energetic and experienced official, ran the Belgian territories and played a key role in transforming them. He abolished seigneurial rights, the tithe, noble privileges, and the guilds. The uniform French tax system replaced old taxes. Internal trade became free and tariffs between France and Belgium were abolished, opening the French market to Belgian entrepreneurs. Belgian citizens became equal before the law, and the French legal structure replaced the various Belgian judicial systems. Bouteville also restructured the Belgian administration, dividing the country into nine departments headed by prefects. Appointed mayors ran the towns. After December 1796, any new French legislation automatically became applicable in Belgium.

Belgians were now considered French citizens. At Campo Formio, Austrian recognition of France's annexation of Belgium made the unity between the two countries even more definitive. Support for the French policies came from some Vonckists and Jacobins. Most Belgians remained hostile to the new regime, however, abstaining in protest from the elections of October 1797. Those who did participate voted for opponents of the French government. Clergymen were at the forefront of the opposition, rejecting the enactment of freedom of religion and divorce. In September 1796, the government suppressed religious orders that provided no education or charity and sold their property; and, in September 1797, it obliged the clergy to take an "oath of hatred" of royalty. Hundreds of priests who refused to comply were arrested and 35 of the most unyielding were deported to Guyane. The Directory also prohibited clerical robes in public, banned the ringing of church bells,

and enforced the republican calendar. Confiscation and sale of Church land persisted.

Many Belgians resisted the anti-religious policies. They sheltered recalcitrant priests and refused to use the republican calendar or attend republican celebrations. It was the introduction of military conscription in September 1798, however, that stimulated a serious revolt. The insurrection, known as "The Peasants' War," exploded in Flemish regions; it began in early October in Flanders and spread later to the German-speaking part of Luxemburg. Thousands of rebels, mostly rural inhabitants, roamed the countryside, toppled French symbols, attacked French sympathizers, and set fire to conscript rolls. While this revolt marked the greatest challenge to the French in Belgium, it was short-lived. The peasants received no help from the nobility and bourgeoisie. By early December 1798, French forces were able to suppress the revolt and restore order. Repression was harsh; the authorities imposed martial law for about a year, arresting hundreds of priests and sentencing to death hundreds of suspected rebels. Conscription met with little success; by the end of 1799, the authorities had drafted only a quarter of the 22,000 men Belgium was ordered to provide.[9]

NAPOLEONIC BELGIUM

Belgians greeted the coup of Brumaire with apathy and accepted the new regime with resignation. Voter turnout in the 1800 plebiscite on the Constitution of Year VIII was lighter than in France. Few Belgians participated in the plebiscites of 1802 and 1804 either. Many Belgian notables refused to serve in the Napoleonic administration. At the same time, the French grip on Belgium was further consolidated by the Treaty of Lunéville. Clearly, any aspiration to restore Belgian independence was unrealistic.

Napoleon's main goal was to strengthen Belgium's union with France. To achieve that, he exerted efforts to restore public order and eliminate any vestiges of the old regional diversity, thereby enhancing administrative centralization. The prefects served as his most important tool to achieve these objectives. All but two of them were French, reflecting his belief that his countrymen would carry out his orders more efficiently. Indeed, the prefects did execute the Napoleonic policy quite effectively. A number of Belgian officials also served as prefects in French departments.[10] Members of the Belgian bourgeoisie and some old nobles filled

intermediary and lower administrative posts in Belgium. For example, Count de Merode and the Duke d'Ursel served as mayors of Brussels, while Baron de Selys served in Liège. Including Belgians in the administration was obviously essential to acquire their support. The Napoleonic authorities also replaced the former diverse legal system with a uniform structure. The various Napoleonic codes entered into effect and the government set up the French uniform court hierarchy.

Replacing the Dutch language with French as the official language in Flemish regions constituted another part of the government's effort to strengthen Belgium's merging with France. Until 1795 Dutch was used by the local administration of Brabant and Flanders, but then the French authorities abolished it as an official language, using French exclusively in government acts, official correspondence, and court verdicts. In an effort to "Frenchify" the Flemish regions, prefects prohibited printing in Flemish and closed Flemish newspapers. French became the language of public life throughout Belgium and the language of the well-to-do, who filled most official positions and were able to distinguish themselves linguistically from the popular classes, who lacked education.[11] In reality, without knowing French one could not have a public career or expand one's business.

French was also the dominant language in the new school system. *Lycées* were established in major Belgian cities. Primarily, they served sons of the propertied classes who were trained to become state functionaries. In 1807, a school of law was set up in Brussels and two schools of medicine opened in Ghent and Liège. The government paid little attention to elementary education. Most of the 350 primary schools for children aged six to ten were poorly equipped. Illiteracy was rampant among the rural population and the urban poor.

As in France, the main beneficiaries of Napoleonic rule in Belgium were the propertied classes whose support Napoleon sought. They benefited from the buttressing of law and order, the guarantee of property rights, and papal recognition of the new owners of Church property. Buyers of Church property included French financiers and bourgeois landowners and administrators, who felt little or no religious qualms. After the signing of the Concordat, some small farmers also purchased national property.[12] In the department of Jemappes, the bourgeoisie purchased 75 percent of the total national property.[13] Wishing to gain the loyalty of the old nobility, Napoleon returned their confiscated land to some of them.

The Napoleonic regime created a stimulating environment for the beginning of the Industrial Revolution in Belgium. Stability and peace

increased entrepreneurs' confidence and willingness to invest. The removal of internal customs and barriers and the opening of the French market created a larger market for Belgian products. The Napoleonic regime also stimulated Belgian industry by protecting it from British competition. It improved infrastructure, gave prizes to innovators, and established uniform currency and weights and measures. An abundance of cheap labor due to the growth of the Belgian population – by 1806 it amounted to 3,350,000 inhabitants – also favored economic expansion.

Indeed, Belgium soon developed into one of the most advanced industrial regions in the French Empire.[14] Textile entrepreneurs introduced innovations and production rapidly increased. In 1798, Lievin Bauwens, a tanner from Ghent, smuggled parts of a spinning jenny, the new spindle machine, out of England and established two spinning mills, one at Passy, near Paris, and another one in Ghent, the first mechanical spinning mills on the Continent. The number of workers in the cotton industry rose from about 1300 in 1806 to almost 12,000 in 1816.[15] Another businessman, English engineer William Cockerill, brought modern textile machinery to Verviers, in the former principality of Liège. By 1810, 86 manufacturers in Verviers employed 25,000 workers and production was 88 percent higher than under the *ancien régime*. Indeed, during the French period Verviers and Ghent became major European centers of textile production. That prosperity, however, failed to improve the living conditions of textile workers, whose wages remained very low. Much of the workforce consisted of poorly paid women and children. Workers had to present to their employer the notorious *livret*, thereby placing themselves at his mercy.

Coal mines in Hainault and Liège also developed, mostly through investment of French capital. Increasing demand from France and other parts of the Empire stimulated a growth in coal production. Mines in just four Belgian departments employed half of the Empire's 70,000 coal miners.[16] The Belgian departments produced almost half of the Empire's coal. Metallurgical production also developed markedly; the number of blast furnaces increased from 59 to 87 (1789 to 1811). During the same period, production of pig iron rose from nearly 24,000 to 37,300 tons, while iron manufacturing expanded from 17,382 to 27,925 tons. Large orders from the French military stimulated the arms industry in Liège, which possessed the fourth largest arms industry in the Empire. Textile factories in Ghent and Hodimont also produced uniforms for the troops.

Commercially, the port of Antwerp, inactive since 1585 due to the closing of the River Scheldt by the Dutch, experienced a revival during the

early years of Napoleonic rule. The French declared the Scheldt open to international navigation in the early 1790s, and in 1796 maritime traffic resumed in Antwerp. During the years 1800–5, harbor activity expanded considerably, with hundreds of ships arriving from different parts of Europe and America.[17] This commercial boom came to an end with the Continental Blockade. Between 1808 and 1813, maritime traffic dwindled drastically in Antwerp. After repelling the English invasion of Walcheren (1809), Napoleon ordered the construction of defensive works at that port and its development for the imperial navy and the construction of military ships.

The improvement in relations between Church and State was highly significant in reconciling the Belgian population to the French regime and gaining support for unity between the two countries.[18] Bonaparte ended the Directory's religious persecution. Many priests who had been condemned to deportation were released in November 1799, and a month later the authorities allowed the reopening of many churches. The government also replaced the Oath of Hatred of royalty with a plain promise of fidelity to the Constitution. It was, however, the Concordat that was the main instrument in rallying the Belgian clergy to the Napoleonic regime. Most clergymen accepted the Concordat and support for the First Consul increased among Belgians. Religious life in Belgium was largely normalized; crosses reappeared on churches, the use of bells was restored, priests again wore their robes in public, and religious ceremonies and processions resumed. In November 1801, the authorities changed the boundaries of the dioceses, replacing the nine old dioceses with five new ones, the first such change since the rule of Philip II (1559). The new bishops, all of them French and nominees of Napoleon, played an important role in reconciling the Belgian Church to the Napoleonic regime. They praised the Emperor and preached devotion to him. By 1803, most clergy had pledged fidelity to the Constitution. Still, some clerical opposition persisted, as will be explained later.

Napoleon also ordered the Church to preach obedience to the conscription law. Indeed, Belgium had to provide thousands of conscripts annually. From 1798 to 1813, 216,111 conscripts (6.12 percent of the population) were incorporated into the Napoleonic army.[19] The number of Belgian casualties during those years amounted to 79,000, or 35 percent of the draftees.[20] While the broad anti-conscription revolt of 1798 was never repeated, many Belgians evaded the draft through desertion, self-mutilation, and fraud. As in France, the authorities responded by

stiffening penalties and increasing the mobile columns. With time, Belgians became progressively more accustomed to the annual draft, and the conscription machinery operated increasingly smoothly.

Aside from hostility to conscription, Napoleon also faced opposition from a dissident ecclesiastical group, led by Corneille Stevens, a priest from Namur, that resisted any compromise between Church and State. Persistent Napoleonic efforts to turn their Church into a state instrument following the Concordat and the addition of the "Organic Articles" provoked the formation of a dissident ecclesiastical group. The deterioration of relations between the Emperor and the Pope turned Belgian public opinion increasingly against Napoleon, and a growing segment of the clergy refused to pray for him following the papal excommunication of Napoleon and the exile of the Pope from Rome in 1809. Stevens published anti-Napoleonic pamphlets; De Broglie and Hirn, the bishops of Ghent and Tournai, joined the opposition, were incarcerated, and later were forced to resign. Most priests in Ghent and Tournai refused to recognize the new bishops Napoleon had nominated. Napoleon reacted by arresting hundreds of recalcitrant priests. Economic difficulties also added to dissatisfaction in Belgium. The war in Spain deprived Belgium of a major market for its cotton products. Increases in indirect taxes provoked indignation and the price of colonial foodstuffs became prohibitive. By 1813, the textile industries, which had previously prospered, entered a deep crisis and thousands of workers were laid off.[21]

The increasing unpopularity of the Napoleonic regime in Belgium in the later years was reflected in the hostile sentiments aroused by the Werbroeck affair. Werbroeck, a supporter of Napoleon and mayor of Antwerp, was suspected of fraud and involvement in smuggling and was removed from office. Napoleon put him on trial and his property was confiscated. Werbroeck was acquitted but Napoleon ordered a retrial and the defendant died in prison. The Belgian public viewed Werbroeck as a victim of injustice, perpetrated by an arbitrary regime.

The débâcle in Russia and the successive defeats of 1813 further undermined Napoleonic rule in Belgium. By that time, only very repressive measures by the police and tight censorship kept the government in control.[22] In early 1814, the Allied forces swept through Belgium, and on 1 February 1814, the French evacuated Brussels. Only Antwerp, defended by Carnot, offered any resistance. Most Belgians greeted the end of the Napoleonic regime with relief.

THE AFTERMATH AND THE NAPOLEONIC LEGACY

Most nobles and clergy favored the return of the Old Regime under the Habsburgs, hoping to restore their privileges. They asked the Allies to let the Habsburgs return, but Metternich had already ceded Austrian claims to that region. Britain supported the idea of uniting Belgium with Holland to create a strong buffer state on the northern border of France to prevent French expansion. William I of Holland desired this unity, as did Belgian professionals and commercial classes, who feared the possibility of the reestablishment of the Old Regime. The First Peace of Paris (May 1814) placed Belgium under the control of Holland. The Allied victory at Waterloo secured the new arrangement, which the Congress of Vienna approved.

Belgium was the first country to be invaded and annexed by the French and it remained part of the French Empire for almost 20 years. Economic growth, the emergence of an entrepreneurial class, the Austrian reforms, and the Belgian Revolution created a receptive atmosphere for the Napoleonic reforms. Except for the peasant revolt in 1798, Belgium never challenged the French rule in any significant way. Still, many Belgians remained hostile to Napoleon's Church policies, conscription, and high taxes. The French period irrevocably undermined the Old Regime and signified an irreversible transformation toward a modern Belgian society and state. Ecclesiastical power suffered a decline following the confiscation of the Church's property and its subjection to state control. Most importantly, the French regime destroyed the traditional provincial autonomy and paved the way for the formation of a centralized state, thereby opening up new perspectives of national independence to the Belgians. A uniform bureaucracy, one legal code, and a single tax system replaced the old decentralized organization. Internal economic barriers and customs were abolished and a national market developed. The Napoleonic regime prepared many Belgians for service in post-Napoleonic governments, thus helping to lay the foundation for the administrative modernization of Belgium. The Emperor also encouraged Belgium's industry by protecting it from British competition and opening the French market to its products. Napoleonic rule benefited the bourgeoisie through the sale of Church land, the opening of administrative positions, and the introduction of secondary education. The Napoleonic government also gave a major boost to the learning of the French language in Belgium. Belgium remained under Dutch rule until 1830, when it revolted and gained its independence.

6

Germany

EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY GERMANY

Early Modern Germany was a loose confederation of more than 300 states that constituted the main part of the Holy Roman Empire.[1] That Empire, founded by Charlemagne in 800, also included non-German areas like the Austrian Netherlands (Belgium) and Bohemia. The Emperor, who was chosen by seven "electors" (in the eighteenth century the number increased to nine), had always, since 1436, come from the Habsburg dynasty. German states had long varied widely in size and power. In the eighteenth century, the strongest states were Habsburg Austria and Hohenzollern Prussia. Then came middle-sized states such as Bavaria, Saxony, and Hanover, whose rulers maintained armies, collected taxes, and played some role in German, and even European, politics. The rest of Germany consisted of ecclesiastic principalities (like Mainz, Cologne, and Trier), over 50 free cities (such as Hamburg and Frankfurt), and numerous smaller secular states, some covering merely a few square miles, ruled by imperial knights.

Ever since the Peace of Westphalia (1648), when Europe was increasingly dominated by absolute monarchies, the Holy Roman Empire (*Reich*) had seemed an aberration. In theory, the Emperor continued to command the allegiance of the German rulers. Yet in reality, the Emperor's ability to enforce his will was nonexistent. The Empire possessed no central administration or tax structure, no effective army, no unified legal system, and conducted no foreign policy. The power of the emperors derived from their own Habsburg lands and not from the Empire itself. An Imperial Diet (*Reichstag*) continued to meet but its decisions had little

authority in the various states. In sum, as the eighteenth century drew to a close, it became increasingly obvious that the *Reich*'s days were numbered.

In the second half of the eighteenth century, Enlightened Absolutists such as Joseph II and Frederick II launched reform policies in the Austrian Empire and Prussia. Other German rulers also initiated reforms, trying to centralize their states and augment their revenues. These centralization efforts met with resistance from the nobility, the Church, and from cities, often forcing the rulers to make concessions. In Bavaria, for example, both Maximilian III and Charles Theodore tried to introduce new taxes and reduce the power of the Estates, who succeeded, nevertheless, in defending their rights. Charles Frederick of Baden was more successful with his enlightened reform policy. He applied physiocratic principles to the economy of his land and improved education.

Of approximately 24 million inhabitants in Germany in 1800, 80 percent lived in rural communities. The nobility owned the largest portion of land, although their possessions varied from huge estates to modest domains. Other major landowners included princes and the Church. Nobles possessed privileges and held a virtual monopoly of top posts in the government, military, and the Church. In the eighteenth century, the ranks of the nobility were expanded by the addition of some urban bourgeoisie who acquired land, offices, and titles. As for the peasantry, most owned insufficient land and lived on the margin of subsistence. Their conditions were worse east of the Elbe where serfdom still prevailed. But even in many western regions where serfdom had declined and peasants were freer and better off, they were often still subject to landlords to whom they owed seigneurial fees and labor obligations. In addition, they had to pay taxes and support their parishes and village communities.

GERMANY DURING THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD

Most German intellectuals welcomed the French Revolution with enthusiasm[2] and viewed it as a new chapter in human history. The poet Friedrich Gottlieb Klopstock called it "the century's most noble deed." Kant described it as a "moral act," while Johann Gottlieb Fichte and George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel considered it a source of inspiration and an "act of reason," respectively. Some public unrest, sparked by the outbreak of the French Revolution, was quickly suppressed.[3] Not surprisingly, German governments were hostile to the Revolution and banned

secret societies and censored or closed newspapers. Bavaria banned the French *Moniteur*, while the Elector of Mainz reversed his enlightened reform policies and ordered his officials to monitor correspondence.[4] Rhenish rulers welcomed thousands of French *émigrés*. Koblenz, in the Electorate of Trier, became a center of counter-Revolution.

In April 1792, after France declared war on Austria and Prussia, Prussian forces invaded France but were forced to withdraw after their defeat at Valmy (September 1792). Soon thereafter, French troops under General Custine invaded the Rhineland. The Convention declared the River Rhine as France's "natural border." In March 1793, the *Reichstag* joined the First Coalition but it was able to offer only limited help for the war effort. In July 1793, Prussia drove the French out of the Rhineland. By early 1795, however, the French reoccupied most of the Rhineland. Meanwhile, King Frederick William II of Prussia, who was more interested in assuring his share in the imminent Third Partition of Poland, withdrew from the war. In the Treaty of Basle he recognized French domination over the Rhineland. In return, France promised Prussia compensation on the right bank of the Rhine and recognized Prussian hegemony in northern Germany. In other words, Prussia was willing to sacrifice imperial interests and smaller German states for its own territorial expansion. Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden soon followed suit, signing similar treaties with France.

Hostilities between Austria and France continued in Germany and northern Italy, however, until the Treaty of Campo Formio. With respect to Germany, the treaty stipulated that a congress would convene at Rastatt (Baden) to negotiate peace between France and the Holy Roman Empire. Secretly, though, Emperor Francis had already recognized French control over the left bank of the Rhine and promised to make every effort at Rastatt to secure the cession of that territory to France and to compensate dispossessed princes with lands on the right bank. Austria itself was to receive the Bishopric of Salzburg. In other words, the Austrian Emperor, just like the Prussian monarch, sacrificed the Empire's territorial integrity to advance his own interests. Campo Formio thus prepared the ground for the subsequent territorial reorganization of Germany and the end of the Holy Roman Empire itself nine years later.[5]

The Rastatt Congress convened in November 1797 but negotiations proved to be a farce due to German powerlessness vis-à-vis France. Bonaparte made a brief appearance, demanding the cession of the entire left bank of the Rhine to France. By early 1798, the German delegates

had officially conceded the left bank to France and accepted the secularization of the ecclesiastical states.

THE TERRITORIAL REORGANIZATION OF GERMANY UNDER NAPOLEON

In the Treaty of Lunéville (February 1801), Emperor Francis recognized France's possession of the left bank of the Rhine and accepted the need to compensate German princes who had lost land there. Lunéville thus confirmed both France's growing influence in Germany and Austria's declining power there. It ratified the terminal conditions of the Holy Roman Empire and ushered in the radical territorial reorganization of Germany that had been initiated at Campo Formio.[6] The *Reichstag* appointed a nine-member committee to draw up the plan of territorial changes and compensations. In reality, however, Bonaparte had the final say in the redrawing of the German map. German states sent envoys to Paris to negotiate with Talleyrand and offered him bribes to secure the lands of their choice. French decisions were incorporated into the final report of the *Reichstag*, the *Reichsdeputationshauptschluss*, and the Emperor proclaimed it as law in April 1803.

The *Hauptschluss* radically transformed Germany's map in response to two principles: "mediatization" and secularization. The former signified the subjugation of lesser territorial units to stronger states, while the latter meant the annexation of ecclesiastical principalities by larger secular states. The decree eliminated 112 small states, mostly free cities and ecclesiastical units. Of the 51 free cities, only six survived, and of the ecclesiastical states, only three endured. More than three million inhabitants changed rulers.

The main beneficiaries of this territorial reshuffling were Prussia, which received five times the territory it had lost on the left bank, and a number of middle-sized states, forming Third Germany: Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, Hesse-Kassel, Hesse-Darmstadt, and Nassau. Bonaparte's influence in Germany increased dramatically, and, owing their expansion to French pressure, the middle states remained dependent upon him. Austria, on the other hand, received only two small additional bishoprics, Brixen and Trent. Moreover, many of the abolished ecclesiastical states had traditionally been strong supporters of the Emperor. The new territorial arrangement did simplify the map of Germany. The Empire now became an entirely anachronistic organization whose formal dissolution seemed

inevitable. Most princes no longer supported common imperial goals, preferring to profit from the growing weakness of the Empire instead.

Napoleon continued to intervene in Germany. In May 1803, following the resumption of hostilities with England, he ordered the occupation of Hanover, which belonged to the English monarch.[7] Hanover's army was dismantled, its arms and revenues were transferred to France, and it was forced to maintain a French occupation army and close its borders to English commerce. In March 1804, Napoleon shocked many Europeans when he dispatched French troops into Baden to arrest the Duc d'Enghien, a Bourbon prince whom he suspected of participating in a conspiracy against him. Following a perfunctory trial before a military tribunal, the prince was executed. Despite this violation of his territory, Duke Charles Frederick of Baden refrained from any protest. The other German states demonstrated similar timidity and refused to challenge the French ruler.

During the last three years of its existence (1803–6), the Empire was in disarray, unable to deal with the changes imposed by Napoleon. The *Reichstag* was now an essentially moribund institution, engaging in endless and futile debates over how to restore parity between Catholic and Protestant states. The imperial knights came under attack by various rulers who dispatched troops to their lands and annexed them. In August 1804, Francis himself placed another nail in the Empire's coffin when he assumed the new title "Francis I, Emperor of Austria." He clearly responded to the declining position of Austria in Germany, preferring to pay more attention to his own territories.

Napoleon's rising influence in Germany and other parts of Europe alarmed Tsar Alexander I, who shared with France the responsibility for Germany's reorganization. Soon, Britain, Austria, and Russia formed the Third Coalition. In response, Napoleon signed treaties with Bavaria, Baden, Württemberg, and Hesse-Darmstadt. The French victories at Ulm and Austerlitz further eroded Francis's position in Germany. In the Treaty of Pressburg he conceded the Tyrol and the city of Augsburg to Bavaria, and his three southern German allies were released from their ties with him. The rulers of Bavaria and Württemberg were elevated to kings while Baden's ruler was promoted to Grand Duke, with Napoleon as guarantor of their new titles.

Napoleon's triumph in 1805 prepared the ground for yet another major territorial transformation in Germany. The new changes resulted in the demise of many smaller units that had been spared in 1803 and were now annexed by the middle states. The main casualties in the new

restructuring were numerous petty secular princes, including the houses of Schwarzenberg and Kaunitz, and numerous imperial knights whose territories were "mediatized" by larger states. In addition, Nürenberg was absorbed by Bavaria, while Frankfurt was given to Karl von Dalberg, the Archbishop-Elector of Regensburg and a faithful ally of Napoleon. The 1806 territorial reorganization of Germany continued the process begun in 1803, decisively eradicating the old political order. Out of more than 300 states, less than 40 survived the Napoleonic onslaught.

Under these circumstances the Empire was doomed. In an effort to save it, Dalberg proposed that Napoleon himself assume the imperial crown, but the latter rejected the idea. Instead, Napoleon proposed the creation of a new confederation of German states, designed to consolidate his domination over Germany, provide him with military assistance, and serve as an effective counterbalance to Austria and a buffer between France and the eastern powers. The states of the Third Germany had little choice but to obey him.[8] On 16 July 1806, 16 German states, including Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, and Hesse-Darmstadt, formed the Confederation of the Rhine (*Rheinbund*) under French tutelage. By 1808, the number of the Confederation's members reached 39. This new reality inflicted a death blow to the Empire. The constitution of the *Rheinbund* formally separated the member states from the *Reich*, and so rendered the imperial crown meaningless. As a result, Francis II, the 54th Holy Roman Emperor since Charlemagne, abdicated his imperial title on 6 August 1806, although he continued as Emperor Francis I of Austria.

The 1006-year-old Holy Roman Empire thus expired. Its end, together with the establishment of the Confederation of the Rhine, marked another major victory for Napoleon and further consolidated his hegemony in Germany. During the years that followed, the French Emperor carried out additional territorial and political changes in Germany. Most important was his defeat of Prussia and its elimination as a key player in German affairs. The Tilsit Agreement stripped Prussia of all its territories west of the Elbe and most of its Polish possessions, reducing its area and population by half. Soon afterwards, Napoleon formed the Kingdom of Westphalia out of the western Prussian provinces. He also created the Grand Duchies of Berg (1806) and Frankfurt (1810). In 1810, in an effort to tighten the Continental Blockade, Napoleon annexed the entire German North Sea coast to his Empire, including Hamburg, Lübeck, and Bremen.

During the years 1806–13, when Napoleonic supremacy in Germany was at its peak, the country was divided into four major parts: (1) areas annexed to the French Empire; (2) the Confederation of the Rhine;



Map 2 Germany, 1812

(3) Prussia; and (4) Austria. Aside from the territorial transformation of Germany, the Napoleonic period was also characterized by reform policies in all four segments. In the words of Thomas Nipperdey, "It was at this time that the foundations of the modern state and the modern society in Germany were laid."[9] The changes were imposed from above

by Napoleon, his French representatives, German rulers, and their ministers. The creation of a central state administration, which aimed at integrating their diverse lands and increasing their capacity to fulfil their obligations to Napoleon, constituted the most successful part of the reform policies. German governments also took some initial steps to open their societies, although these reforms were much less forceful and effective than their efforts to centralize their governments. Consequently, important parts of the traditional structure, particularly in rural areas, changed very little.

Much of the rest of this chapter examines the reform policies, their causes, and their impact in the Rhineland, Hansa cities, and the *Rheinbund*.

THE RHINELAND

During the Napoleonic period, the left bank of the Rhine (the Rhineland) extended over an area of 21,000 square kilometers (8200 square miles) with a population of 1.8 million. Prior to its annexation by France, it consisted of as many as 101 small states, including the archbishoprics of Mainz, Cologne, and Trier; the electorate of the Palatinate; the free cities of Worms and Speyer; and numerous petty secular and ecclesiastical principalities.

France ruled the Rhineland for 20 years (1794–1814), longer than any other part of Germany. This region experienced the most radical changes in Napoleonic Germany.[10] On the other hand, as James Sheehan notes, "Nowhere were the tensions between emancipation and exploitation more apparent than in the Rhineland."[11] This was certainly true in the 1790s; French promises of liberation were hard to reconcile with demands for high war contributions and provisions for the republican army, causing alienation among the local population. This contradiction became evident in Mainz after General Custine imposed requisitions and war contributions during the first French occupation in 1793.[12] A local revolutionary club of German Jacobins had hailed the French as liberators, but the bulk of the local population remained hostile to the French. The brief revolutionary experiment in Mainz ended when the Prussian army conquered the city in July 1793. Upon their return to the Rhineland in 1794, the French continued to force Rhinelanders to help maintain their costly armies, exacerbating popular discontent.[13] A plan to create an independent Cisrhenan Republic (1797) remained unrealized after its main supporter, General Lazare Hoche, died unexpectedly.

Conditions in the Rhineland gradually improved following Campo Formio, as the French government became more confident that the Rhineland would remain under its rule. It launched reform programs in order to integrate the territory with France and replaced the military authority with a civilian administration, nominating François Rudler, an Alsatian, as Commissioner for the entire area. Rudler proclaimed important reforms designed to eliminate the Old Regime and construct new social and political realities based on the French system. Rudler divided the Rhineland into four departments and replaced the diverse Rhenish laws and institutions with a uniform administration.[14] He abolished the tithe, the seigneurial regime, the guilds, and internal tolls, and introduced a uniform tax system. Effective implementation of some of the reforms met with difficulties, however, due to a shortage of competent administrators.

The reaffirmation of the Austrian Emperor's cession of the Rhineland in the Treaty of Lunéville was followed by the annexation of the Rhineland into France (22 September 1802). Greater political stability, improved law and order, and enhanced administrative and legal uniformity characterized the Napoleonic period in the Rhineland and helped to improve the implementation of reform programs. Code Napoleon introduced legal unity, replacing the multiple pre-Revolutionary Rhenish laws. Frenchmen assumed the top administrative positions while lower-level officials were all natives. Some came from the old nobility but in the cities businessmen played the leading role. All but one of the mayors of Aachen, Krefeld, and Cologne had a business background.[15]

The nobility lost its titles and privileges. Many German nobles had fled during the revolutionary wars and their property was now confiscated. Those who stayed were sometimes able to expand their possessions by purchasing confiscated Church land. The Catholic Church, which wielded considerable influence and owned much property in pre-revolutionary Rhineland – 10 percent of cultivable land – was a major casualty of French rule. French authorities stripped the Church of its privileged position, dissolved monasteries and convents, sold their lands, and turned priests into salaried state officials. They also promulgated freedom of religion, introduced civil marriage and divorce, and granted Protestants and Jews equal rights.

Under Napoleon, a new class of Rhenish notables consisting of old nobles and members of a nascent bourgeoisie emerged as the new elite.[16] Some of them rallied to Napoleon out of enlightened idealism, although most supported his regime because it provided them with career

opportunities and the ability to enlarge their property. The expanded Napoleonic bureaucracy enabled this class to gain government positions. The Rhenish bourgeoisie expanded its property base by purchasing more than half of the *émigrés* and Church land placed on the market after 1803.[17] The textile and metallurgical industries grew rapidly as their owners took advantage of free trade, access to the large French market, and protection from British competition. Peasants also benefited from the elimination of the seigneurial system and the tithe, and some of them were able to buy land.

Along with these benefits, however, Rhinelanders also paid a price for their annexation by France. New tariffs disrupted traditional economic ties with the rest of Germany. Police surveillance was stepped up and censorship restricted their freedom of speech. Eighty thousand Rhinelanders were conscripted to the French army, and over half did not return home.[18] The tax burden was considerably heavier than under the Old Regime.[19] French replaced German as the official language of the government and the education system. These disadvantages notwithstanding, Napoleonic rule never faced strong opposition in the Rhineland. Support of the notables, an efficient administrative system, suppression of crime and banditry, opportunities to expand economically, industrial development, Code Napoleon, and the end of the seigneurial system all enhanced the stability and prosperity of the Rhineland, and made Napoleonic rule acceptable to most of the population.

THE HANSA CITIES

In December 1810, Napoleon annexed the Hanseatic cities of Hamburg, Lübeck, and Bremen to the French Empire in order to tighten the Continental Blockade.[20] Napoleon suspected that these cities were not enforcing the blockade. Hamburg was the principal distributor of English goods on the Continent and controlled the mouth of the Elbe River, while Bremen controlled the Weser. The wealth of these cities also motivated the Emperor to annex them.

Napoleon ordered a wholesale introduction of the French system into these lands. The French divided the area into three departments, replaced the governing senates of the cities with a uniform administrative structure, and introduced Code Napoleon. Hamburg became the seat of a governing commission that ran all three departments. Its head, Marshal Davout, was uncompromising in implementing the new system. Since the three traditionally self-governing cities were unaccustomed to centralized government, Davout staffed his administration with French officials to

guarantee implementation of new legislation. French *gendarmerie* and troops enforced conscription and combated smuggling.

The French rule harmed many interests in the Hanseatic cities and provoked widespread hostility. The local elite resented its exclusion from power, and conscription led to extensive desertion. Heavy fiscal impositions, which included new taxes and the upkeep of French troops, caused hardship for the lower and middle classes. French customs policy excluded entrepreneurs from French markets. The Continental Blockade hurt colonial trade, crippled the textile industry, and caused widespread unemployment. Effective enforcement of the blockade also disrupted the extensive smuggling of British and colonial goods in northern Germany, causing hardship for those who had made their living that way. The French authorities punished smugglers harshly; in 1812 in Hamburg alone, they burnt British merchandise worth 555,000 francs.[21]

THE CONFEDERATION OF THE RHINE

By 1808, the *Rheinbund* consisted of 39 states and included an area of 355,000 square kilometers (138,700 square miles) with a population of 14 million.[22] Only Prussia, Austria, Danish Holstein, and Swedish Pomerania remained outside the Confederation. Assuming the title of the Confederation's "Protector," Napoleon himself controlled its defense and foreign policies and appointed Dalberg as the Prince Primate of the league. As a French satellite, the primary purpose of the *Rheinbund* was to supply troops to Napoleon. In 1808, the *Rheinbund* committed to provide Napoleon 126,000 men.[23] The *Rheinbund* also paid for the upkeep of French soldiers in Germany.

The *Rheinbund* remained a rather loose confederation, frustrating the hopes of Napoleon and Dalberg that it would develop a strong centralized government. A central diet, which was supposed to regulate relations among members and negotiate with Napoleon, never met. The rulers of the individual member states were determined to preserve their independence and resisted attempts by Napoleon to centralize the *Rheinbund* and weaken their authority. Napoleon did recognize their sovereignty and refrained from interfering with their domestic affairs, so long as they provided him with troops, abided by the Continental Blockade, and acknowledged his supremacy in Germany.

At the same time, however, Napoleon's dominant presence and the new reality he had created in Germany compelled most of the *Rheinbund*'s

governments to introduce reforms designed to strengthen and centralize their states.[24] External pressure and internal needs stimulated them to transform their political structures and, to a lesser degree, their societies. Napoleon encouraged development of a more cohesive and unified *Rheinbund* that would facilitate his domination in Germany and enhance his ability to exploit its human and fiscal resources. Napoleon's military and financial demands forced these states to modernize and create more efficient administrative, fiscal, and military systems to meet those impositions. The acquisition of many diverse territories in 1803–6 created another incentive to German rulers to centralize and unify their states.[25] Besides modernizing their administration, German rulers tried to achieve these goals by reducing the power and revoking the privileges of corporate institutions and traditional elites, most notably the nobility, the clergy, and formerly free cities. Their attempts to transform their societies were, however, much less vigorous than their administrative and judicial reforms, and frequently remained incomplete. This was especially true in rural areas where nobles, many of them mediatized imperial knights, preserved their property and traditional status and were able to contest the peasants' liberation from the seigneurial system. In the final analysis, these governments were unable and unwilling to strike at the heart of the interests of the nobility whose support they needed. Yet, however limited the actual changes were, they did mark the beginning of a break with traditional society and started paving the way for the formation of a modern bourgeois society of free property owners and citizens equal before the law.

The extent and intensity of these transformations varied greatly from state to state, however, depending on local circumstances, the degree of opposition to reforms, the size and diversity of the newly annexed lands, and the amount of initiative shown by the governments. In fact, 19 of the states in the Confederation failed to launch any reforms at all.[26] *Rheinbund* states can be divided into three groups with respect to the intensity and impact of reform. The first group consisted of states newly created by Napoleon: the Kingdom of Westphalia and the Grand Duchies of Berg and Frankfurt. They were controlled by Napoleon, who organized their entire state structures along French lines. A second category consisted of the expanded southern and western states like Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden, where governments launched broad reform policies, selectively using the French model. A third group comprised the states in northern and central Germany that largely refrained from introducing reforms.

The Grand Duchy of Berg

Located in northwestern Germany, the Grand Duchy of Berg was the first satellite state that Napoleon created east of the Rhine.[27] It was formed to increase French control over the region between the Rhine and the Weser, and better combat smuggling of English goods into the Empire. In March 1806, Napoleon announced the fusion of the Duchies of Berg and Cleves, which had belonged to Bavaria and Prussia, respectively, and appointed General Joachim Murat, the husband of his sister Caroline, as ruler of the new state. The Emperor later increased Berg's territory, but in 1810 annexed one-quarter of the Grand Duchy to his own Empire to reduce the smuggling of English merchandise across the Rhine. At its peak, Berg's population reached one million. In 1809, after Murat left Berg to become the King of Naples, Napoleon appointed his four-year-old nephew, Prince Louis Napoleon, as the new Grand Duke of Berg, himself serving as the regent.

The wide differences among Berg's provinces necessitated an extensive reorganization to give the new state cohesion. In March 1809, Jean-Claude Beugnot, Berg's chief official, described its diversity: "The Grand-Duchy of Berg has been made out of provinces formerly possessed by fifteen sovereigns holding various ranks in the political system of Germany. Each one of these provinces has preserved until now its peculiar laws, statutes and customs supplemented by the Roman Law, the Canon Law, the feudal institutions, the doctrine of the universities, and the authority of commentaries."[28]

Murat spent little time in his new principality due to his military campaigns, but he did begin laying the foundations of new political and administrative structures. His principal minister, Jean-Antoine Agar, ran the state's finances; the Francophile Bavarian jurist Fuschius served as the Interior Minister. To increase state revenues, he abolished the tax exemptions of the nobility. He also introduced conscription. Administratively, he divided Berg into six (later eight) districts, each run by a provincial councillor who resembled a prefect. A Supreme Court of Appeals was established in Düsseldorf, the capital, and a commission was appointed to adapt Code Napoleon to the Grand Duchy. Other reforms included the sale of ecclesiastical lands and the abolition of internal customs. An Assembly was established but Murat convened it only once.

After Murat left, Beugnot became the principal official in Berg, while Fuschius and Count Nesselrode, a Saxon general and diplomat, served as ministers of justice and interior, respectively. Napoleon instructed

Beugnot to accelerate Berg's integration into the imperial system. The most significant reform was the abolition of feudalism (December 1808 and January 1809). It was, however, "a modest" reform,[29] for it obliged peasants to pay landlords compensation for the elimination of seigneurial fees and services. Most peasants were unable to afford such payments and so the seigneurial structure changed little.

Administratively and judicially, Berg looked increasingly like a French province. Prefects ran its four departments and Code Napoleon entered into effect (January 1810). The new legal system meant the loss of the nobility's jurisdictional privileges. The authorities also established state control over the Church, suppressed religious orders, and sold their land. French coinage and tariffs were introduced as well. The government also established three *lycées*, although a plan to set up a university in Düsseldorf remained unfulfilled. In May 1812, a 14-member Council of State was installed to examine legislation and budgets. Along with Berg's territorial expansion, its military quota also rose, reaching 8180 by 1811. Conscription proceeded smoothly despite popular resentment, but military costs burdened the state. To raise additional revenues, the authorities introduced a uniform direct taxation based on the French system. The implementation of the new tax system, particularly the land tax, was hindered by the lack of an accurate land survey. Indirect taxes, including fees on salt and tobacco, also rose and, together with customs, tripled public revenues by 1813. In sum, Berg's financial system was modernized, but it also imposed a heavy burden on the population.

Even more aggravating than the rising taxes was the serious economic damage caused by the Continental Blockade and by French customs barriers.[30] Berg possessed the most prosperous industrial base in Germany, including flourishing textile mills, reputable metal manufacturers, and the Ruhr coal and iron mines. To prevent competition with French industry, however, Napoleon imposed high tariffs on their import into France and other satellites. Consequently, Berg's exports declined from 60 million francs prior to the blockade to 11 million francs in 1811. The blockade also impeded the importation of cotton into Berg, which hurt its textile industry. As a result, numerous mills closed and thousands of skilled workers were dismissed and forced to emigrate. In the words of Eli Heckscher, "Berg, on the whole, suffered nothing but injury from the Continental System."[31] Berg's industrialists petitioned to be annexed to the French Empire in order to gain access to its large market, but to no avail. The same industries that crumbled in Berg flourished in the

Rhineland cities. No wonder, then, that those cities strongly opposed the annexation of Berg to the Empire.[32]

One cannot end the discussion of Berg without mentioning the famous German poet Heinrich Heine, who was born in Düsseldorf in 1797 and spent his youth under Napoleonic rule. He admired Napoleon and viewed him as a liberator who was responsible for spreading the ideas of the French Revolution throughout Europe.[33]

The Kingdom of Westphalia

The Kingdom of Westphalia, which lasted slightly more than six years (August 1807–November 1813), was the largest of the new states created in Germany by Napoleon.[34] Located in northern Germany, Westphalia consisted of Brunswick, Hesse-Kassel, and lands taken from Hanover, Prussia, and some smaller states. It extended over 43,500 square kilometers (17,000 square miles) and had a population of two million. Kassel was the capital and the seat of the royal court. Napoleon chose his youngest brother Jerome as the King of Westphalia. His youth and inexperience made it easy for Napoleon to control him. This was already obvious in 1803 when Napoleon forced Jerome to divorce his American wife, Elizabeth Patterson, and marry Princess Catherine of Württemberg in order to cement France's relations with that state.

Westphalia served much more than just a dynastic purpose, however, as Napoleon also intended it as a buffer state against Prussia. Moreover, the Emperor meant it to serve as a "model state," based on the French system, for other German states. By demonstrating the superiority of the French system, Napoleon aimed to convince other rulers to follow the French example and thus bolster his own hegemony over Germany. In November 1807, he wrote Jerome, "It is necessary that your people should enjoy a liberty, an equality, and a degree of well-being unknown to the people of Germany . . . What people would wish to return to the arbitrary government of Prussia, once they have tasted the benefits of wise and liberal administration?"[35] The Napoleonic "model state" fell rather short of the Emperor's plans, however. Fiscal deficits, as well as the nobility's resistance to reforms, impeded the implementation of many changes.

From the beginning, Napoleon and his representatives invested considerable effort in creating a modern centralized state in Westphalia. As in Berg, this was all the more critical given the wide diversity of regions and the need to meet military and financial obligations. Before Jerome

even arrived in his new capital, Napoleon appointed a regency of four French officials to lay the foundations of the new state's administration. In November 1807, a constitution modeled on French law was proclaimed under the auspices of Napoleon at Fontainebleau. It was the first modern constitution in German history. It declared Westphalia a hereditary kingdom to be ruled by Jerome and his descendants. It promulgated legal equality and religious freedom, suppressed feudal privileges and corporate bodies, as well as their tax exemptions, and ended the nobility's exclusive right to public office. The constitution also introduced Code Napoleon and an assembly of 100 representatives. Conscription was introduced and Westphalia was required to supply Napoleon with 25,000 troops.

Jerome's propensity for extravagance and his jovial character notwithstanding, he took his duties seriously. Napoleon aimed at consolidating the legitimacy of the new monarch through the creation of an enlightened state. But as with Napoleon's other relatives who were installed in satellite states, Jerome was required to align his policies with French interests. Napoleon ran Westphalia's foreign policy and French officials played a decisive role in running the new state. Justice Minister Joseph Simeon, an old and experienced jurist, was the principal minister.[36] French Generals Jean Baptist Eble and Valentine Salha held the war portfolio in succession. Jerome appointed two experienced German administrators, Baron Ludwig von Bülow and Gustav von Wolffradt, to run finance and the interior. He also nominated middle-class people, albeit to lesser positions. One of them was Jacob Grimm, the co-publisher of the famous *Grimm's Fairy Tales*, who held the position of court librarian.

The Council of State, named by Jerome, drafted laws and advised the King. The Legislature was dominated by the nobility and consisted of 70 landowners, 15 entrepreneurs, and 15 members of the intelligentsia. They were named by departmental electoral colleges, which represented the wealthiest taxpayers. In reality, however, this legislature proved to be a farce. Not wishing to provide the conservative nobility with a forum to check his reforms, Jerome convened it only twice.

Local administration in Westphalia was based on the French model but was staffed entirely by Germans. It consisted of eight departments run by prefects, mostly nobles, nominated by the king. Appointed mayors headed the towns. However, a shortage of competent local officials led to problems in implementing the government's orders. Simeon worked assiduously to introduce a uniform legal system and court structure. Code Napoleon, translated into German, came into effect in 1808. The new judicial hierarchy was filled by Germans. The authorities also formed

a single market by removing trade barriers and introducing a uniform currency and a unified commercial code.

Westphalia made the greatest progress among the Confederation's states toward becoming a society of equal citizens. Jerome removed all the discriminatory laws against Jews in January 1808, including special taxes, residential and occupational restrictions, and exclusion from schools and the army. In sum, Jews became equal citizens as a result of the first complete Jewish emancipation in Germany.[37] With the help of Code Napoleon, the new constitution, and an enlightened state bureaucracy, Simeon sought to destroy the nobility's privileges and the old seigneurial structure. The nobility lost its monopoly of government and military positions, its tax privileges, and its right to collect tolls. The new regime also tried to subordinate the Church to the State; priests were required to preach obedience to the sovereign, read conscription decrees to their parishioners, and celebrate royal birthdays and French victories. The Church lost its tax exemptions, its control over education and welfare, and the right to fill ecclesiastical offices without state approval. The authorities also closed down many religious orders and confiscated their land.

As in the other Napoleonic satellites, however, the Westphalian nobility remained the dominant class.[38] Nobles dominated the ranks of the prefects, military officers, and the legislature. As the largest landowners, nobles preserved their local influence. Most significantly, however, they were able to block implementation of decrees ending the seigneurial regime, the most controversial and important of Jerome's reforms. A royal decree in January 1808 allowed peasants to own land and move freely, but while it abolished their seigneurial obligations, it also required the peasants to redeem them. As in Berg, emancipation remained a dead letter since most peasants lacked the means to pay for their redemption. Many landlords also retained sufficient local influence to obstruct implementation of the decree.[39] Moreover, Napoleon himself contradicted Code Napoleon by exempting from the seigneurial reform the estates he bestowed upon his favorites. On the whole, the Napoleonic regime was unwilling and/or unable to challenge the powerful nobility more effectively. Seigneurial relations persisted in the Westphalian countryside, which exposed the contradictions of the Napoleonic system in that German "model state."

Financial constraints also kept the Westphalian authorities from accomplishing welfare and education reforms, thereby hampering Napoleon's efforts to establish a "model state" in Westphalia. The

government issued welfare regulations designed to reduce indigence, and established a central bureau of welfare to provide work for the poor and teach children a trade. Towns were charged with caring for their poor but most of them lacked the resources to do so. In fact, pauperism and vagabondage rose due to economic hardship caused by the Continental Blockade and by military requisitions. There was also little progress in the area of education. Reorganization programs for primary and secondary education remained largely on paper, and financial hardship forced the closure of two out of the five existing state universities.

Napoleon's costly military demands constituted the main cause for the financial difficulties of Westphalia. In the words of Herbert Fisher, "Napoleon ruined Westphalia, treating the kingdom as a mere financial and military asset in his great game of politics."[40] Westphalia was obliged to raise an army of 25,000 men and pay for the 12,500 French troops stationed in Westphalia.[41] To achieve this goal Jerome introduced conscription. Seventy thousand Westphalians were drafted and another 30,000 volunteered between 1809 and 1813. Indeed, Westphalia produced more soldiers per capita than any other Napoleonic satellite. Out of 22,000 Westphalians who marched into Russia, only 1500 survived.

Military costs were the state's largest expenditure. Servicing the huge debt inherited from the former rulers of this region and maintaining Jerome's extravagant court expenditures also burdened Westphalia's treasury. Napoleon diminished Westphalian revenues by exempting from taxation the imperial fiefs that he granted to generals and aides. In the words of Helmut Berding, "No state suffered more the effects of those donations than the Kingdom of Westphalia."[42] Economic difficulties shrank the Westphalian population's capacity to pay taxes. The Westphalian economy suffered considerably from the Continental Blockade, which interrupted its commercial ties with England. Moreover, to prevent competition with its own products, France forbade the export of Westphalian goods into the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Italy. The authorities sought to meet their increased financial burden by establishing a more effective tax system. Most tax exemptions were abolished and the fiscal administration was improved. Land tax constituted the principal source of revenues. Since annual tax increases did not suffice to cover mounting expenses, the authorities resorted to the sale of national properties, forced loans, and suspension of payments to creditors. Still, the accumulated debt, estimated at 140–200 million francs in 1812, kept rising.[43]

The high taxes and conscription aroused popular resentment. The army as a whole, however, remained loyal to Jerome, and most

Westphalian nobles viewed Napoleonic rule as unshakable. In 1809, however, when Austria began a war against France, several insurrections broke out. The most famous of those revolts was led by Major Ferdinand von Schill, a Prussian officer who wished to expel the French from northern Germany. Seeking to exploit Napoleon's preoccupation with Austria, Schill led a regiment into Westphalia (April 1809) and tried to incite a general uprising, but Jerome's troops quickly suppressed his insurrection. Schill, who was killed in the battle at Stralsund, became a national hero.

The Grand Duchy of Frankfurt

Upon the establishment of the *Rheinbund*, Napoleon gave Frankfurt to Dalberg. In February 1810, Napoleon granted the city of Regensburg to Bavaria in return for its help in the war against Austria, and compensated Dalberg by handing him Fulda and Hanau and elevating his territory to a Grand Duchy. The small state had a population of 300,000 inhabitants.[44] While Dalberg enjoyed some autonomy in running Frankfurt, the French resident there, Theobald Bacher, controlled his policy. The Emperor expected Dalberg to enforce the Continental Blockade, and, in late 1810, the authorities in Frankfurt burnt English goods worth more than 800,000 francs. Frankfurt provided Napoleon close to 7000 soldiers and paid for quartering French soldiers.

The constitution of the Grand Duchy was modeled on that of Westphalia. Dalberg served as the executive and formed a Council of State to discuss reforms. The Legislature, which represented the wealthiest citizens, was convened by him only once. The state was divided into four departments and Code Napoleon came into effect in 1810. The government broke up guilds and established new taxation. Seigneurial dues and services were abolished, but as elsewhere, they persisted since peasants had to buy their freedom. The Church was placed under state control, and monasteries were dissolved. Religious freedom was proclaimed, and in 1812 Jews became equal citizens, although they had to pay for their rights.

Napoleonic German Allies: Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden

Aside from Berg, Westphalia, and Frankfurt, the governments of Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden launched the most extensive reforms in

Napoleonic Germany. As important allies of France they had been rewarded with substantial new territories. The Bavarian ruler, Max Joseph of the Wittelsbach dynasty, annexed no fewer than 80 different political entities. Baden's gains were even greater relative to its size: it quadrupled its territory, thanks largely to the efforts of its representative in Paris, Sigismund von Reitzenstein. Frederick II of Württemberg roughly doubled his territory. In 1806, Napoleon elevated Max Joseph and Frederick II to royal status, and Baden's Charles-Frederick to Grand Duke. To further cement his alliance with these states, the French Emperor arranged marriages between his relatives and their dynasties: Eugène de Beauharnais married Max Joseph's daughter Augusta; Stephanie de Beauharnais, Josephine's niece, married the grandson of Baden's ruler; and, as previously noted, Jerome married Catherine, Frederick's daughter.

The authorities of all three states needed to initiate extensive changes in order to integrate their new lands. Their greatest achievement was the formation of a strong central state. The chief minister, Count Maximilian von Montgelas, was the chief architect behind the reforms in Bavaria.[45] He was an experienced administrator, influenced by the Enlightenment and committed to the formation of a bureaucratic, centralized state. In 1806, Montgelas abolished the Bavarian Estates and constructed a central government of four ministries and an advisory Council of State. In June 1808, he replaced the old provincial governments with 15 administrative districts, each run by a *Generalkommissar*, similar to a French prefect. The new central bureaucracy, which consisted of professionally trained officials recruited from the nobility and the bourgeoisie, was subordinate to him. In May 1808, King Max Joseph proclaimed a constitution, the only one in the Confederation except for Westphalia. It ended serfdom and proclaimed legal equality, the right of private property, and freedom of religion. A new assembly, consisting of representatives of the largest taxpayers, mostly nobles, was promised but was never summoned. In 1811, Montgelas abolished internal tolls and established uniform weights and measures. In Württemberg, King Frederick II was the main force behind the centralization efforts. Previously, he had to share power with a strong *Landtag*, but after assuming the royal title, Frederick abolished the old constitution and the diet and ruled as an absolutist monarch. He divided Württemberg into twelve administrative regions run by *Landvogte* subordinate to him. In Baden, first the moderate minister Johann Brauer and then the more forceful von Reitzenstein pursued a reform program designed to centralize state bureaucracy and introduce administrative uniformity into its 2000 communities.[46] Reitzenstein established

a five-member central cabinet, abolished the towns' autonomy, and divided Baden into ten circles, each run by a prefect-like *Kreisdirector*. Like Bavaria, Baden and Württemberg appointed members of the bourgeoisie to their bureaucracy. In the legal sphere, they eliminated the nobility's courts and declared all citizens equal before the law. In 1808, Baden introduced Code Napoleon, the first German state to do so, and it remained the basis of Baden's judicial system throughout the nineteenth century.

Reducing the nobility's power and privileges was a crucial part of the centralization efforts. In all three states nobles lost their monopoly on public offices and army commissions. In Bavaria, Montgelas eliminated the nobles' tax exemptions and their authority to operate judicial courts. In Württemberg and Baden the nobility lost their seigneurial jurisdiction. In the former the nobility also lost their fiscal exemptions. All three states also eliminated the independence and privileges of the formerly free cities, appointing state bureaucrats to run them. Municipal citizens now paid taxes and were drafted like the rest of the population. Urban guilds were undermined by new decrees guaranteeing freedom of occupation and trade.

Similarly, all three governments subordinated ecclesiastical matters to the state. They abolished the clergy's privileges and immunities, broke up monasteries, and sold Church property. Bavaria, where the Catholic Church had extraordinary influence, carried out a particularly rigorous secularization policy,[47] in part to solve its fiscal deficit. Churches in all three states lost their monopoly over welfare. Württemberg also abolished the monopoly the Lutheran Church had over education. States acquired a say in clerical nominations and training and regulated religious celebrations. The authorities decreed parity between Catholics and Protestants. Bavaria also allowed Jews greater freedom of worship and granted them state citizenship, although some restrictions remained. Württemberg abrogated the special taxes on Jews and allowed them to own land and choose a trade.[48] Baden proclaimed the most progressive Jewish legislation, although even here Jews were denied full equality. The Bavarian government restructured the school system, including the secondary schools and the universities. Reitzenstein also reorganized the 400-year-old University of Heidelberg, laying the foundation for its future national role.

The three southern German states modeled their armies on the French military structure and introduced universal conscription. They contributed tens of thousands of troops to the Napoleonic campaigns. For example, Bavaria fought alongside France against Austria (1809) and provided 33,000 men to the Russian campaign. High military costs

caused budget deficits that required fiscal reforms. The abolition of tax exemptions was aimed at increasing revenues. In Bavaria, Montgelas ordered a new land assessment and introduced new indirect taxes. Nonetheless, the Bavarian public debt climbed to 118 million gulden in 1811.

Aside from financial problems, the implementation of reform programs faced other difficulties that hampered their effectiveness. The nobility, including many mediatized imperial knights, not only retained their considerable property but were "never completely subject to the principle of equality before the law."[49] Nobles still had greater access than non-nobles to public office. While Montgelas brought seigneurial jurisdiction under state supervision in Bavaria, he was unable to eradicate it. The Bavarian nobility, although less than 1 percent of the population, maintained strong local influence and were able to subvert many reforms at the local level. They were also strong enough to prevent the introduction of Code Napoleon. In Baden, noble opposition also hampered Reitzenstein's efforts to unify that state as rigorously as he had hoped. Most significantly, in all three states the nobility's resistance prevented the full implementation of agrarian reform. The abolition of personal serfdom meant little since very few serfs remained in these states. Seigneurial fees and obligations persisted since peasants lacked the means to pay an indemnity. For the most part, where nobles contested the abolition of fees or demanded higher indemnities, the courts ruled in their favor. And so, in spite of Montgelas's great efforts to change rural society, Bavarian peasants remained economically dependent on their landlords until 1848. Aside from the nobility, towns and municipal corporate bodies also added their opposition to the centralization efforts in ways that the new bureaucracies were not always able to overcome.[50]

Other German states

Two other southern German states, Hesse-Darmstadt and Nassau, allied with France, increased their territories considerably, and initiated broad reforms. The Hessian Grand Duke dissolved the estates, centralized his administration, reformed taxation, and did away with many of the nobility's fiscal privileges. He also introduced Code Napoleon and the French court system. Nassau, which consisted of numerous former imperial fiefs, underwent a rigorous centralization process led by Chief Minister Baron Ernst Marschall.[51] He set up a uniform tax system based on real estate and income taxes, allowed no exemption, and expropriated monastic

lands. Serfdom was also abolished, Code Napoleon was adopted, and seigneurial payments and services were subject to state regulations.

Most of the German states that failed to introduce major reforms, including Saxony and both Mecklenburgs, were located in central and northern Germany. Unlike the western and southern states, the size and composition of these states saw little or no change and so they saw no need to introduce deeper reforms. Saxony, for example, due to its common border with Prussia and Bohemia, was one of Napoleon's most important allies in the Confederation. For this reason, Napoleon elevated its ruler, Frederick-August, to King, gave him some Prussian territory, and in 1807 made him ruler of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. Saxony's only major reform was the granting of civic equality to Catholics.

THE COLLAPSE OF NAPOLEONIC GERMANY

In early 1813, following the fiasco of Napoleon in Russia, Tsar Alexander I ordered his army to pursue the French into central Europe. Driving Napoleon out of Germany became one of the Tsar's primary goals. The former Prussian chief minister, Baron Karl vom Stein, who had served as the Tsar's adviser on German affairs, became Governor-General of the German areas liberated by Russian forces. Stein called for the establishment of a united "Third Germany" alongside Austria and Prussia and hoped to see a popular uprising in support of this plan. But no such uprising erupted and the Allies, as well as the Rhenish Confederation's rulers, were strongly opposed to the formation of a "Third Germany."

Prussia supported the Russian intervention in Germany. The Prussian authorities had responded to the decisive defeats at Jena and Auerstädt and the subsequent drastic reduction of Prussian territory at Tilsit with a series of reforms designed to modernize state and army. Ultimately, those reforms aimed at enabling Prussia to face France and restore its position as a major player in European affairs.[52] The reform policies, which were led by Stein and his successor, Karl von Hardenberg, included the emancipation of the serfs, self-government in Prussian towns, the formation of a new cabinet of five ministries with well-defined functions and broad authority, tax reforms, abolition of the guilds and other restrictions on economic activity, and the revocation of limitations suffered by the Jews. Opposition by the nobility was unable to nullify the reforms but forced the government to scale them back. An important aspect of the Prussian changes was the military reorganization launched by Gerhard von

Scharnhorst and Neithardt von Gneisenau. They were convinced of the need to merge the nation and the army and to have soldiers who were imbued with patriotic duty. They purged the army of many of the generals responsible for the 1806 disaster, convinced the King to establish a modern War Ministry and open military careers to merit thereby eliminating the aristocratic monopoly over the officer ranks, and established new military schools. Prussia also introduced conscription and a popular militia (*Landwehr*), which expanded the armed forces quickly from 42,000 to 280,000.[53]

In February 1813, Frederick William III signed an alliance with the Tsar at Kalisch. A month later, the King issued the "Appeal To My People," pledging that his army "will fight for our independence and the honor of the *Volk*," and calling on Germans to join the struggle for the fatherland. The patriotic rhetoric used by Frederick William was an effort to capitalize on nationalist ideas advocated by a growing number of thinkers and societies who called for German unity and independence. In his "Addresses to the German Nation" (1807–8), Johann Gottlieb Fichte insisted that German political independence was indispensable to preserve the German language, the key to the nation's identity. Fichte also supported Frederick William's "Appeal." Ernst Arndt tirelessly propagated the idea of German unification and called on the German people to rise up against Napoleon. Nationalist writers exalted independent medieval Germany, contrasting it with the divided Germany of their times. In 1813, a number of patriotic poems and articles calling for a struggle against France were being published and discussed in reading societies. Yet most Germans remained unaffected by these nationalistic ideas and failed to take part in what became known as the "War of Liberation." Aside from Prussia, the population of the Rhenish Confederation remained indifferent to Frederick William's "Appeal." Even in the case of Prussia, popular mobilization derived from hatred of French exploitation rather than German nationalism.[54] Despite his patriotic rhetoric, the Prussian monarch was motivated primarily by traditional dynastic goals and territorial ambition and not by the desire to establish a united Germany. In fact, Frederick William feared a popular uprising and, more than anything, his "Appeal" was aimed at pressuring German rulers to abandon their alliances with Napoleon. In the final analysis, the German "War of Liberation" was fought by states and monarchs inspired by principles of state and dynastic interests. Their goal was the elimination of Napoleonic hegemony in Germany, dissolution of the Confederation of the Rhine, and the restoration of their own traditional powers.

To be sure, anti-French uprisings did break out in various German states but they were stimulated primarily by economic hardships, high taxes, and opposition to conscription. In Berg, serious anti-French riots by armed textile workers succeeded in gaining temporary control of several towns in early 1813. They were ruthlessly suppressed, however, and 17 of the rebels were executed. In Westphalia Jerome spent much money in 1813 raising a new army, which aroused widespread resentment.[55] A revolt broke out in Kassel and many of Jerome's troops deserted to the Allies, although he managed to restore order with French help. In February 1813, Hamburg also erupted in revolt, which was suppressed only in May, while an uprising in Dresden, the Saxon capital, enabled the Prussians to occupy that city in the same month.

In southern Germany, however, conditions remained calm. And, for the time being, most of the rulers of the Rhenish Confederation remained loyal to Napoleon. In May 1813, Napoleon defeated the Allies in Lützen and Bautzen but was unable to destroy their armies. In August 1813, Austria joined the anti-French coalition after Metternich failed to convince Napoleon to make concessions and negotiate peace. In October, Bavaria became the first Confederation state to break with Napoleon when its king concluded the Treaty of Ried with Austria,[56] under which he agreed to join the anti-French coalition in return for Austrian assurances that he would be able to retain his recent territorial gains. This agreement was highly significant since it effectively sanctioned the order Napoleon established in southern Germany and eliminated the possibility of restoring the old imperial territorial structure.

In mid-October 1813, the Allied coalition defeated Napoleon in the Battle of Leipzig, forcing him to retreat beyond the Rhine. This marked the collapse of Napoleonic rule in Germany. The other members of the Confederation of the Rhine, including Württemberg, Baden, and Hesse-Darmstadt, deserted Napoleon and rushed to join the Allies in return for guarantees of their territorial integrity. Westphalia, Berg, and Frankfurt were doomed. As the Russians were approaching Kassel at the end of October, Jerome fled and the Kingdom of Westphalia ceased to exist. Russian troops invaded Berg in November and placed the Duchy under Allied administration. The Grand Duchy of Frankfurt ended its brief existence when Dalberg left Frankfurt shortly after the Battle of Leipzig. The quick fall of those states demonstrated how little support the Napoleonic regime had locally. By late December, Prussian forces had crossed into

the left bank of the Rhine and Prussian officials soon replaced the Napoleonic administrators there.

THE AFTERMATH AND THE NAPOLEONIC LEGACY

In 1815, the Congress of Vienna had the task of reassembling Germany and determining its new features. Post-Napoleonic Germany became a confederation of 39 independent states, an organization that persisted with very few changes until 1866. Prussia was the biggest winner; its pre-1806 position in northern Germany was restored. The Hohenzollern received almost half of Saxony, most of "Great Poland" (Poznania), Swedish Pomerania, and considerable new territory in western Germany, including most of the Rhineland and the former states of Berg and Westphalia. Prussia remained thus split into eastern and western parts. Austria won back Tyrol and received Salzburg. Bavaria received additional lands, most notably the Palatinate on the left bank of the Rhine. Hanover was restored and promoted to kingdom status and returned to the British monarchy. Hamburg, Lübeck, Bremen, and Frankfurt regained their free city status. Mainz was annexed by Hesse-Darmstadt. Most of the remaining small states in central Germany were left unchanged.

Napoleonic rule had a greater impact on Germany than on any of his other satellites except for the Italian peninsula. Thomas Nipperdey summed up the Napoleonic legacy in Germany: "In the beginning was Napoleon. His influence upon the history of the German people, their lives and experiences was overwhelming at a time when the initial foundations of a modern German state were being laid."[57] Territorially, the changes were momentous. While the Congress of Vienna introduced some territorial changes and altered some of the boundaries that Napoleon had established, on the whole it was content to ratify his large-scale revision of the German map: the abolition of the old *Reich*, the reduction of more than 300 pre-Revolutionary German states to less than 40, the secularization of the ecclesiastical states, the mediatization of the imperial knights, the elimination of most of the free cities, and the expansion of the southern middle states.

Aside from redrawing the German map, the Napoleonic period also launched the modernization of state and society, although the degree of change varied throughout Germany. In the annexed Rhineland, where changes were the most extensive, the seigneurial system was revoked, a new elite was created, the Church lost its property and much of its

power, and French laws and institutions and a more egalitarian bourgeois structure replaced the old order. In the *Rheinbund*, the authorities of many states were most rigorous and successful in their efforts to centralize their states, establishing central bureaucracies and uniform legal and fiscal systems, and creating conscripted armies. They eliminated internal tolls, paving the way for the formation of national markets. They curtailed the nobility's power, abolishing their tax exemptions and their judicial power. They brought the Church under state control, sold its property, and eliminated the special status of free cities. Yet many shortcomings in this modernizing drive persisted. Ultimately, the attempts by German princes to transform their societies were more hesitant and their implementation more limited than their centralization policies. Most importantly, the nobility preserved their property and local power and remained the predominant force throughout post-1815 Germany. They were thus able to prevent the elimination of the seigneurial regime in the countryside and preserve its control over the peasants. While the nobility lost its monopoly over government positions, it continued to hold most of these posts, thereby limiting the access of non-nobles to prominent positions. Education reforms had few accomplishments and Jewish emancipation remained partial. These limitations notwithstanding, the Napoleonic period marked a challenge to the traditional political and social order in Germany and "created some of the preconditions for a capitalist society, legally equal, religiously tolerant and rationally governed bourgeois society."[58]

7

SWITZERLAND

PRE-NAPOLEONIC SWITZERLAND

On the eve of the French Revolution, the Swiss Confederation constituted a loose federation of small sovereign regions, surpassed in complexity and diversity only by Germany. The most powerful and privileged regions were the 13 cantons, all German-speaking: Zurich, Berne, Lucerne, Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden, Glarus, Zug, Basle, Fribourg, Solothurn, Schaffhausen, and Appenzell. Essentially, each canton viewed itself as an independent state. They were bound through various agreements to a second type of Swiss polity known as "allied districts," which included the Bishopric of Basle, the Abbey and town of St. Gallen, the Grisons, Valais, Bienne, and Mulhouse. A third form of territory, the "subject districts," were ruled by other cantons or "allied districts." For example, French-speaking Vaud and a part of Aargau were governed by Berne, the largest and strongest canton; the Grisons dominated Valtelina and Chiavenna. In addition to this complex variation, the canton of Geneva, an independent republic, and Neuchâtel, a principality ruled by the King of Prussia, were linked to the Swiss Confederation through treaties, although neither constituted an official part of it.

The Swiss Confederation possessed no central government, no uniform administration, and no unified law. Each province had its own government, legal system, and administrative structure. A diet, with representatives from various cantons and their allies, met to discuss issues of common interest, such as war, peace, and commercial treaties. Yet that assembly lacked the means to enforce its decisions, which were binding only when consensus prevailed. The Confederation possessed no army, leaving each

canton to establish its own armed force. Internal tariffs and the absence of a common currency impeded the formation of a national market.

Urban oligarchies of various types dominated the cantons. Some, like Berne, Lucerne, and Fribourg, were ruled by aristocratic families. In Berne, for example, an oligarchy of 68 patrician families monopolized the governing institutions, while Zurich and Basle were dominated by the guilds. Other cantons, such as Uri, Schwyz, and Zug, were run by citizen assemblies. Feudal privileges persisted in many rural communities. Peasants owed the Church and landlords tithes, seigneurial fees, and labor services. Many Swiss lacked the freedom to settle where they wanted to or choose the occupation they desired. Throughout the eighteenth century, various groups and regions revolted in an effort to end their oppressive conditions, but the ruling elite suppressed those insurrections.

SWITZERLAND AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

Traditionally, the Swiss Confederation had close ties with France, and in 1777 the two countries renewed their alliance. Thousands of Swiss soldiers served in the French army and as guards in the Royal Palace in Paris. The French Revolution, then, aroused considerable interest in Switzerland. The cantonal governments and the urban elite reacted to the events in France with fear and suspicion, imposing censorship on revolutionary news and welcoming French *émigrés*.

On the other hand, a group of Swiss exiles founded a revolutionary Helvetic club in Paris in 1790–1,[1] aimed at spreading the French Revolution into Switzerland. French reforms gained support, particularly in the subject districts, which wished to become independent. Revolutionary clubs were founded in French-speaking provinces, such as Vaud, whose population opposed Berne's domination. In 1791, supporters of the Revolution in that area celebrated Bastille Day, despite its prohibition by the Bernese authorities. Peasants in Schaffhausen, Valais, and St. Gallen demanded the commuting of feudal payments. In 1794, the inhabitants of the village of Staefa, in the canton of Zurich, published a memorandum calling for the elimination of privileges and the establishment of a more egalitarian society. The authorities sentenced the leaders of the Staefa movement to life in prison. In December 1792, the aristocratic government of Geneva was replaced by a revolutionary government, and in July 1794, a brief Reign of Terror was unleashed in that city.

The Swiss Confederation remained neutral during the First Coalition War. France honored that neutrality although it did occupy the Bishopric of Basle. The killing of hundreds of Swiss guards by Parisian crowds in the Tuileries Palace (August 1792) aroused much indignation in the Confederation, but caused no change in Swiss policy. After 1795, the Directory grew more aggressive and began to interfere in the internal affairs of the Swiss Confederation. The new policy was a part of France's broader expansionist policy in Europe. Bonaparte urged the Directory to intervene in Switzerland in order to gain control over the Simplon Pass, so essential for communication with northern Italy. He also called for the formation of a united Switzerland as an ally of France.[2] The Directory also coveted the treasuries of several wealthy cantons, most notably Berne. Following the Coup of Fructidor (September 1797), Jean Reubell, who was hostile to Switzerland, became a Director, while Lazare Carnot and François de Barthélemy, both friends of the Confederation, were replaced. The Directory began exerting pressure on the Confederation, demanding the expulsion of French *émigrés* and of Wickham, a British agent and anti-French agitator. The French government also sent agitators to various Swiss towns to incite revolutionary ideas. In October 1797, Bonaparte tore the three provinces of Valtellina, Chiavenna, and Bormio from the Grisons and annexed them to the Cisalpine Republic. This damaged Switzerland strategically and exposed it to attacks in the southeast.[3]

French intervention in Switzerland received ardent support from two prominent Swiss citizens who admired the French Revolution: Frédéric-César Laharpe and Peter Ochs. Laharpe, a native of Vaud and advocate of Enlightenment ideas, served for 12 years as a tutor of the future Russian Tsar Alexander I. He was an enthusiastic supporter of Vaudois independence from Berne. In 1797, he settled in Paris and strongly encouraged the Directory to invade Switzerland. Ochs, a distinguished citizen of Basle, served as a top official in that city and called for the establishment of a unified Switzerland. In December 1797, he met in Paris with Reubell and Bonaparte, urging them to intervene in Switzerland to help create a modern democratic state. Ochs also drafted a constitution for a united Helvetic Republic patterned after the French model.

This context affected Switzerland, which soon underwent major changes. In early 1798, pressure from rural districts forced the authorities in Basle, Zurich, Lucerne, Schaffhausen, and Solothurn to proclaim legal equality and a set of civic liberties. In January, Vaud revolted against Berne and declared its independence as the Republic of Leman. The French invaded Switzerland in support of Vaud, and in March 1798

General Brune occupied Berne, subjecting it, for the first time in its history, to foreign domination. In April 1798, Geneva was annexed to France and became the capital of the new French department of Leman.

THE HELVETIC REPUBLIC

Berne's collapse marked the dissolution of the Swiss Confederation. France's decisive military strength easily defeated the old oligarchies and terminated the anachronistic Swiss system. The French Directory supported the establishment of a new Helvetic Republic, "one and indivisible." On 12 April 1798, 121 deputies from ten cantons convened at Aarau, formally proclaiming the Helvetic Republic, ratifying its new constitution, modeled on the 1795 French constitution.

The new constitution laid the foundation of modern Switzerland. The executive consisted of a five-member Directory while the legislature comprised two chambers. The new constitution abolished all privileges and proclaimed legal equality, civic liberties, and the right of private property. It established, for the first time, a common Swiss citizenship,[4] and universal male suffrage. Internal tolls and customs were removed and uniform weights and measures were established. The cantons lost their traditional independence and became administrative units run by prefects nominated by the Directory. The former subject regions became cantons, thereby raising the number of cantons to 18.

The new Helvetic government legislated a series of important reforms inspired by the revolutionary changes in France and intended to build a new state and promote national unity.[5] It abolished feudal dues and ecclesiastical privileges and confiscated Church possessions, declaring them national property. Freedom of the press was proclaimed, torture was abrogated, and a unified penal code was introduced. The authorities created a single currency – the Swiss franc – and centralized the postal system. They reorganized the tax system, established a land tax, abolished a special tax on Jews, and rescinded guild restrictions. The minister of education, Philippe Stapfer, modernized and secularized the school system.

The new government, however, faced major difficulties in implementing the constitution and the reforms. French plundering, war, economic hardships, and political divisions marked the five-year existence of the Helvetic Republic. The strongly entrenched sentiments of local autonomy stimulated strong resistance against the centralization efforts of the Helvetic Republic. Like the Italian and Batavian Republics, the

Helvetic Republic was a French satellite. The French imposed heavy requisitions and levies to maintain the *armée d'Helvétie*. Brune confiscated Berne's treasury of 16 million francs, soon to be used to finance Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt. The French also plundered the treasuries of Fribourg, Solothurn, Zurich, and Lucerne, and extorted contributions from many cantons. Those burdens and the curtailment of the traditional sovereignty met with stiff opposition in cantons such as Schwyz, Uri, and Zug. Led by Alois Reding, an experienced officer from Schwyz, these cantons rose against the new government.[6] French troops crushed the uprising in early May 1798, however, forcing the rebels to accept the new system. The French commissioner Rapinat, who was most responsible for the French extortions, eliminated from the government the most anti-French members and forced the appointments of Ochs and Laharpe. France then compelled Switzerland to sign an alliance treaty (August 1798); it guaranteed the Helvetic Republic its territorial integrity in return for Swiss troops, financial support, and free passage through its territory.

In 1799, Switzerland became a theater of the War of the Second Coalition. Britain, Austria, and Russia aimed to expel the French from Switzerland. Swiss aristocrats and conservatives supported the coalition, hoping that it would restore the old regime. In early June, Austrian Archduke Charles forced General Masséna to evacuate Zurich and entered the city, to the joy of *ancien régime* partisans. Supporters of the old system returned from exile and prepared to reestablish the former Confederation. The Austrians were not eager, however, to get involved in internal Swiss politics, and after failing to dislodge Masséna from his position on the Limmat, Charles withdrew to Germany. Masséna then defeated Korsakov in the second Battle of Zurich (September 1799). The French victory over the Second Coalition saved the Helvetic Republic, and the French restored their domination over Switzerland.

Switzerland paid a very high price for the war, however. The invading armies ravaged much of its eastern and southern territories, thereby compounding the earlier French looting of cantonal treasuries. The Swiss population had to maintain the French army, 72,000 strong. Masséna imposed heavy taxes, aggravating the economic crisis and fiscal deficits, and spreading much discontent. Growing political instability also characterized the next three years (1800–3). Divisions between the pro-French Unitarians, who advocated a united Swiss state, and the conservative Federalists, who favored a weak central government and the restoration of the cantons' old powers, marked the political life of the Helvetic Republic. A series of coups and constitutional changes marked that period. In June 1799, Ochs was forced to resign as a director after being

accused of transferring state secrets to France. Laharpe tried to strengthen his power within the Directory, but his adversaries forced him to retire. In early January 1800, they replaced the Directory with a provisional Executive Commission of seven members. The Commission then replaced the two legislative chambers with a single body.

Meanwhile, the independence of the Helvetic Republic was recognized at Lunéville. Still, Bonaparte was determined to preserve French control over Switzerland, so essential to retain the territorial link between Germany and Italy. In May 1801, he presented his own draft of a constitution, the so-called Malmaison constitution, designed to reconcile Unitarians and Federalists. He divided power between the central government and the cantons, a compromise that satisfied no one, and so the struggle continued. In September, the Unitarian majority in the diet strengthened the central government. A month later, the Federalists, receiving help from French envoy Raimond Verniac, gained control of the government and dissolved the diet. They appointed their own supporters to all the offices and altered the constitution. In April 1802, however, the Unitarians staged another coup, regaining power and issuing yet another constitution.

Shortly thereafter, Bonaparte ordered French troops to withdraw from Switzerland, ostensibly out of respect for Swiss independence and to convince the European governments of his moderation.[7] But the French Consul never intended to give up his dominant position in Switzerland and viewed the evacuation as temporary. The strategic value of Switzerland was too high and he had no intention of letting that country fall under the influence of another power.[8] The French withdrawal deprived the Helvetic government of its main support and only increased the political turmoil in Switzerland. The Federalists, led by Alois Reding, took advantage of the French evacuation and revolted, forcing the central government to flee from Berne to Lausanne. Twelve rebelling cantons formed a new federal diet. Clearly, no solution to the Swiss crisis could be found but through French intervention.[9] Sure enough, Stapfer appealed for French help, and in September 1802, the First Consul ordered French troops to return to Switzerland in support of the Helvetic government.[10] Subsequently, the rebel diet dispersed and its leaders were arrested.

THE MEDIATION ACT (1803)

Bonaparte was now determined to impose a settlement that would assure stability and French domination in Switzerland. To Talleyrand he wrote,

"a stable and solid government, a friend of France, that's my first wish."[11] In late November 1802, the Consul summoned to Paris the "Helvetic *Consulta*," consisting of more than 60 delegates of both camps, to discuss his proposal for a constitution. What emerged from that meeting was the Mediation Act, which Bonaparte ratified on 19 February 1803. The Mediation Act ended the Helvetic Republic and its unitary structure and restored the federal system. Bonaparte believed that a stable Switzerland required the reestablishment of cantonal autonomy and the domination of the former ruling elite. To a disappointed Ochs, Napoleon retorted, "Mister Ochs, the revolution is over." By endorsing the revival of the federal structure, the First Consul turned the powerful anti-French Federalists into his grateful supporters while the Unitarians, who had been dependent on the French all along, had no choice but to side with him.[12] Through the Mediation Act, Bonaparte restored the old autonomy of the cantons and the power of the old elites who, in return, recognized his supremacy in Switzerland.[13] The Mediation Act clearly demonstrated that he was willing to compromise with the ruling class and dilute the route of reform for the sake of guaranteeing his power.

The Mediation Act recognized the existence of 19 cantons, including the 13 old ones and six new ones created from subject and allied territories: St. Gallen, the Grisons, Aargau, Thurgau, Ticino, and Vaud. Geneva, Bienne, and the Bishopric of Basle were annexed by France. Neuchâtel remained under the Prussian king while the Valais, where France had begun building the road over the Simplon, remained under French protection. The cantons recovered their autonomy and were free to reinstate their previous governments. Each canton had its own constitution. The cantons regained jurisdiction over customs, coinage, and post. A feeble Federal Diet constituted the central government. It consisted of representatives from all cantons with the six largest cantons having two votes each. But its authority was restricted to issues of foreign policy and war. The seat of government rotated annually among the six largest cities, the *Vorvort*. The mayor of the *Vorvort* became the *Landamman*, or the chief confederate magistrate. The *Landamman* conducted foreign policy, supervised the construction of roads and canals, and was in charge of internal security. Each canton provided a quota of troops according to its population and paid for the costs of the army and public works. Freedom of speech and faith were not included in the Act, yet it did preserve important elements from the Helvetic period. Most significantly, it maintained the former subject territories as equal cantons. The distinction between sovereign town and subject country inhabitants was replaced by

the reaffirmation of legal equality. Freedom of all Swiss citizens to dwell and own property anywhere in the confederation was recognized. Finally, the Act preserved internal free trade.

THE MEDIATION ACT PERIOD (1803–13)

During the Mediation Act period the cantons recovered their traditional authority at the expense of the weakened central government. The major cities regained their authority and privileged position vis-à-vis the countryside. The urban aristocracy secured its power in Berne, Lucerne, Fribourg, Solothurn, Basle, and Zurich by basing the franchise on high property qualifications and giving a larger number of seats to cities in the cantonal legislatures. In Berne, 21 out of 27 members of the city council were patricians. In Zurich, the Grand Council, under the influence of the aristocratic party led by Hans von Reinhard, reestablished high redemption fees for tithes and ground rents. This provoked a peasant revolt (March 1804), which was suppressed with the help of troops sent by Berne, Fribourg, and the central government.[14] Clearly, the ruling elite was determined to crush any challenge to its power.

Conservatism prevailed in other areas, as well. In various cantons, convent land confiscated during the Helvetic period was returned. Free press was suppressed and censorship was introduced. A standard currency was never established, leaving each canton to continue to mint its own coins. Internal tolls were reestablished in many areas despite the constitutional prohibition. The authorities intervened more forcefully to regulate the morals and private lives of their citizens.[15] Zurich, for example, prohibited the inhabitants of Wintertur from completing construction of a theater begun under the Helvetic Republic, while Schaffhausen forbade its citizens to dance and ride their sleds on Sunday.

On the other hand, the increased internal stability and autonomy secured by the Mediation Act enabled cantonal governments to launch various reforms. The new cantons guaranteed legal equality and allowed many of their citizens to participate in political life. Many cantons set up uniform administrative and judicial structures throughout their territories. They also managed welfare programs, established local police, maintained roads, stabilized their financial structure, and introduced important educational reforms.[16] The Swiss educational system was now viewed as one of the principal tasks of the State and became a model throughout Europe. Teaching methods and teacher preparation were

enhanced. Higher education was reorganized, including the academy in Berne and the University of Basle. The school founded in Yverdun by Henry Pestalozzi gained considerable esteem, as did the elementary schools and methods established by Emmanuel von Fellenberg and Gregoire Girard. The government also launched important public works. In 1807, it began diverting the River Linth, leading to the draining of marshland, making it available for agriculture.

While Switzerland remained officially independent and neutral, in reality it was a Napoleonic satellite. Napoleon had the right to intervene in its internal affairs. He nominated the first *Landamman*, Louis d'Affry of Fribourg, and controlled him and his successors. In September 1803, the Swiss Confederation was forced to sign another alliance with France, committing it to provide France with 16,000 soldiers. In 1809, Napoleon added to his title "Mediator of the Swiss Confederation," which underlined his dominant position.

Switzerland was increasingly subject to France economically. It had to abide by the Continental Blockade, despite the grave damage to its economy.[17] The Confederation played an important part in that system because of its geographical location and the frequent use of its territory by smugglers of British goods. This was one of the reasons for the earlier annexation of Geneva into the Empire. In 1806, Napoleon threatened Switzerland with military occupation if it did not vigorously combat smuggling. The Diet obeyed and imposed severe penalties on smugglers. Not trusting the Swiss, however, Napoleon dispatched a French customs inspector to supervise the execution of the blockade in 1810. That same year, Napoleon ordered Eugène to occupy Canton Ticino, where smuggling was rife. In Basle, nine of the most prominent citizens were sentenced to prison for smuggling.[18] Many textile factories in eastern Switzerland, which depended on imported cotton, languished and more than 30,000 workers remained unemployed.[19] Napoleon further harmed Swiss industry by effectively barring its products from France and Italy through high customs.

The Emperor also damaged the Confederation by amputating parts of its territory. In 1806, he gave Neuchâtel to Marshal Berthier as a fief. As mentioned earlier, he also ordered Italian troops to occupy Canton Ticino. To better control the Simplon Pass, Napoleon annexed the Valais to the French Empire (1810), turning it into the department of Simplon. In fact, many Swiss feared that the Emperor would annex the entire Confederation as he had done with Holland and the Papal State.

As usual, conscription aroused much opposition, making it impossible for the Confederation to meet its quota. Some cantons recruited criminals,

while others relied on volunteers. Schwyz drafted men who had derided religion and Solothurn supplied smugglers.[20] Recruitment difficulties persisted and Napoleon consented to reduce the Swiss quota to 12,000. In 1812, 9000 Swiss soldiers marched with Napoleon into Russia. Only 700 returned home.

The Swiss government sided with Napoleon until his defeat at Leipzig. The Diet then declared Switzerland's neutrality and its withdrawal from the Continental System. Metternich wanted Switzerland to join the anti-Napoleonic coalition, but most Swiss officials were determined to stay neutral. Only the most conservative forces gave the Austrian chancellor total support and appealed to him for help to eliminate the Napoleonic system. In December 1813, a large Austrian–Bavarian army invaded Switzerland, rendering any resistance hopeless. The Mediation Act's regime collapsed.

THE AFTERMATH AND THE NAPOLEONIC LEGACY

The patricians in Berne and other cantons wanted to restore the old Confederation, including "allied" and "subject" districts. This threatened to provoke a civil war. Under pressure by foreign powers, led by Tsar Alexander, the Bernese aristocracy yielded, and in April 1814 a diet with representatives from all 19 cantons convened in Zurich. In September, Valais, Neuchâtel, and Geneva, which had been part of the French Empire, were readmitted to the Confederation, bringing the total number of cantons to 22.

In August 1815, after lengthy discussions, the Diet proclaimed a new constitution, the so-called Federal Pact, which largely restored the old system and which lasted until 1848. Most importantly, the principle of the federal system prevailed. The cantons gained full sovereignty and were free to negotiate agreements with foreign countries as long as they did not harm the Confederation. The Confederation had no permanent central authority except for a diet that ran foreign policy and constituted the supreme military authority. The old privileged forces reinstituted their power in the various cantons. Swiss citizenship and freedom of occupation and worship were eliminated. The Congress of Vienna recognized Swiss neutrality and ratified the final cantonal borders.

The reaction of 1814–15 was, undoubtedly, facilitated by the Mediation Act, which had entrusted considerable power into the hands of the cantonal traditional elites. At the same time, however, the Napoleonic period

laid the foundations of nationhood and the organization of modern Switzerland. The old subject districts retained their independent cantonal status and had equal representation in the diet. A federal army, supervised by the diet, was formed. Under the Helvetic Republic, Swiss citizens experienced unified institutions and laws for the first time. Vestiges of feudalism virtually disappeared while civic liberties and legal equality became a reality. Swiss citizens, especially in rural areas, who had previously been denied political rights became enfranchised. The Federal Pact stated that political rights were not to be the exclusive privilege of one class of citizens. The Swiss franc as a single currency, uniform weights and measures, and modern public education, all instrumental in modernizing and unifying Switzerland, date from the Napoleonic period. In 1848, following years of internal conflicts, Switzerland adopted a new constitution, which formed a powerful federal government and proclaimed many of the liberal reforms that had been first established during the French era.

8

Spain

EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY SPAIN

The Spanish monarchy had reached a low point under its last Habsburg rulers in the late seventeenth century. Some slow improvement was taking place under the Bourbons, who rose to the Spanish throne in 1700. In the second half of the eighteenth century, the enlightened absolute monarch Charles III (1759–88), assisted by Ministers Conde de Aranda, Pedro de Campomanes, and Joseph de Floridablanca, launched an extensive reform policy aimed at strengthening the State and reviving the economy.[1] The government stimulated commercial and industrial growth but accomplished little in the agricultural sector. Charles III expanded trade with the Spanish colonies in South America by abolishing the monopoly held over colonial trade by the port of Cadiz and opening it to all the major ports. Internal free trade was also established. Following mercantilist principles, the government created state manufacturers of luxury goods, including wool, tapestries, and silk, and granted them monopolies and financial assistance. High tariffs protected Spanish industries from foreign competition. Charles also sought to subordinate the Church to the monarchy, gaining more control over the Inquisition and, in 1767, expelling the Jesuits from Spain.

Despite those reforms, many of the old economic and social structures of Spain persisted. Facing strong opposition, Charles III never seriously challenged the wealth and privileges of the Church and the nobility. No new taxes were introduced and the autonomy of the powerful municipalities endured. Most importantly, despite much talk of agrarian reform and land distribution, little changed in the countryside.[2] Rural Spain,

where most people lived, continued to be sharply divided between wealthy landowners and poor peasants. Most peasants, especially in the center and the south, eked out a living and were burdened by high taxes, seigneurial dues, and the tithe. Subsistence farming and low productivity characterized much of the Spanish agriculture. The landlords showed no interest in agrarian improvement. A demographic rise in the eighteenth century increased demand for land and aggravated agrarian misery.

The nobility, whose number increased through multiplication of the petty nobles (*hidalgos*), owned considerable property and continued to benefit from seigneurial privileges. The Church possessed extensive lands and wielded considerable influence. The number of monasteries and clergy was very high; in a population of 10.5 million inhabitants in the late eighteenth century, there were 2000 monasteries and 200,000 clergy.[3] With the growth of overseas trade, banking, and manufacturing, the bourgeoisie in Barcelona, Cadiz, Seville, and Madrid did increase but its power remained limited.

In 1788, Charles III died and his son Charles IV ascended to the throne. Charles IV showed more interest in hunting and carpentry than in state affairs and was influenced by his domineering wife, Maria Luisa. The *Cortes* recognized their elder son, Ferdinand, Prince of Asturias, as heir to the throne. Under the new monarch, Spain continued to face economic stagnation and budget deficits.

SPAIN AND REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE

Under Charles III, Spain and France had been allies, signing an anti-British coalition, the third "Family Compact," in 1761. The French Revolution alarmed the Spanish establishment and caused tension between the two countries.[4] French *émigrés* found shelter in Spain, exacerbating the poor relations. Prime Minister Floridablanca shelved reform plans, increased the number of troops in the Pyrenees, and imposed rigid censorship on news from France. Meanwhile, Charles IV appointed Manuel Godoy, a member of the lower nobility who served in the Royal Bodyguard, as the new prime minister.[5] Godoy had close relations with the queen and owed his rapid rise to power to her.

As France turned more radical, Charles IV became increasingly concerned about the fate of his cousin, Louis XVI, and pressured the French Republic to spare his life. Two months after the execution of Louis XVI, France declared war on Spain, ending 60 years of alliance. The Spanish army invaded southern France and, with the British, occupied Toulon.

In April 1794, however, the French pushed the Spanish forces across the Pyrenees and occupied northern Spain. These losses stimulated Godoy to sign the Peace of Basle (July 1795) with France, and the latter returned to Spain its territories. The Treaty of Basle provoked the British, who began attacking Spanish ships. A rapprochement between Spain and France followed and they signed the Treaty of San Ildefonso (August 1796), which placed Spanish troops and Spain's navy under French command. Godoy hoped that the French alliance would bolster his political power in the court in the face of growing opposition to his rule. The alliance with France meant war with Britain, with dire economic consequences for Spain. The British defeated the Spanish navy at Cape St. Vincent (February 1797), disrupted Spain's trade with America and the flow of silver from its colonies, and seized the Spanish colony of Trinidad.

SPANISH ALLIANCE WITH NAPOLEONIC FRANCE (1800–7)

After Bonaparte's rise to power, Spain was subjected to increasing demands from its northern neighbor and approached the status of a French satellite. This was evident in the second Treaty of San Ildefonso, signed in October 1800. Spain agreed to give France six ships and ceded to it the vast Louisiana Territory, which it had acquired only 40 years earlier. In return, the First Consul agreed to create a new principality out of Tuscany for the Spanish rulers' daughter Luisetta and her husband Louis. Bonaparte also demanded that his ally help compel Portugal to cut its ties with Britain and enter the French sphere of influence. Godoy, who had resigned in 1798 but returned to head the Spanish government in 1801, complied with the Consul's demands, hoping that support from Bonaparte would consolidate his own position in Spain. In May 1801, Godoy led a Spanish army into Portugal in what became known as the "War of the Oranges." The Portuguese quickly capitulated and, in the ensuing treaty, surrendered a small border area to Spain and pledged to close their ports to English ships.

Following the Treaty of Amiens, Spain became neutral. When hostilities between France and England resumed, Bonaparte insisted that Spain pay France a monthly subsidy of six million *livres* for recognizing Spanish neutrality. Spain was now in its weakest position vis-à-vis France since 1793. Its subsidy to France only aggravated Britain and, in October 1804, a British squadron intercepted four Spanish frigates carrying treasure from South America. Spain reacted by concluding a maritime alliance

with France (January 1805). Ten months later, Admiral Nelson destroyed the Franco-Spanish fleet at Trafalgar. This naval disaster and the forced subsidy to France increased opposition in the Spanish court to friendship with France. Even Godoy began looking for ways to break away from Napoleon and, during the Prussian campaign, sought to ally with Britain and Russia. However, Napoleon's quick victory over Prussia persuaded Godoy to return to support France. In February 1807, Godoy declared Spain's adherence to the Continental Blockade and sent 14,000 troops to serve under Napoleon in northern Germany. Yet the damage was done; Spain proved to be an untrustworthy ally.

Meanwhile, Napoleon prepared to invade Portugal to force it to break its ties with Britain. Besides, occupying Portugal would have given him an opportunity also to intervene in Spain, topple the Bourbons, and install a more reliable regime.[6] Godoy collaborated with France, hoping to realize an old plan to carve out a Portuguese principality for himself. In October 1807, he and Napoleon signed the Treaty of Fontainebleau, which permitted French troops to march through Spain and proposed to divide Portugal into three parts: the north for the now-displaced King and Queen of Etruria; the south for Godoy; and the center, including Lisbon, for France. Godoy also committed Spanish troops to assist France in conquering Portugal. In late November 1807, General Junot occupied Lisbon but the proposed partition of Portugal never took place due to the short duration of the French occupation.

The agreement with Godoy notwithstanding, Napoleon concluded that the Spanish could not be trusted and that its army was unable to sustain a prolonged war.[7] Various economic and political crises also rendered the Spanish government unstable. Rising military expenditures and Napoleon's own financial pressures had drained the Spanish treasury. Inflation further destabilized the economy and aggravated the conditions of the masses. Frequent agricultural crises during the reign of Charles IV, including a disastrous harvest in 1803–4, caused much misery.[8] On top of this, Spain's colonial trade was hampered by the British navy.

The economic crisis required a serious reform policy. However, the growing opposition to Godoy's policies and a bitter division between him and Prince Ferdinand overwhelmed the Spanish court and led to political paralysis. Ministers were busy assuring their political survival rather than thinking about the conditions of the State. Ferdinand resented his mother's close relations with Godoy and suspected that they were conspiring to exclude him from succession in favor of one of the *infantes* and to have Godoy serve as Regent. At the end of 1807, Count Tournon-Simiane,

a French observer in Madrid, wrote to Napoleon, "All classes of society hate Godoy and accuse him of being the enemy of the country. The grandees, the nobility, the clergy, the merchants, the people, all see him as the country's oppressor."[9] Godoy's adversaries criticized his venality and begrudged his appointments of relatives and natives of his region to top positions. The high nobility resented their exclusion from power and Godoy's tyrannical methods. Godoy also alienated the Church by selling extensive ecclesiastical properties in an effort to solve the state's financial crisis. The military blamed him for appointing his favorites as officers, for placing Spanish troops under Napoleon, and for allowing the French army to cross into Spanish territory. Consequently, Ferdinand received support from a growing number of opponents of Godoy. Many Fernandists also favored close ties with Great Britain and wished to liberate Spain from its subjection to France. As the *partido fernandista* gained strength, Godoy's position grew precarious and his dependence on Napoleon increased.

TOPPLING THE BOURBONS

Napoleon never entirely trusted the Spanish Bourbons, who were, after all, related to his enemies, the French Bourbons. In October 1807, Ferdinand appealed to Napoleon for support, offering to marry one of his relatives. Yet the turmoil within the Bourbon government and its earlier attempt to break away from the alliance with France convinced Napoleon that he needed to replace that dynasty with a more reliable regime. Using the Portuguese campaign as a pretext, he dispatched more French troops into northern Spain and occupied the cities of Pamplona, San Sebastian, and Barcelona. By March 1808, the French army in Spain numbered about 100,000 men[10] and was marching on Madrid. It soon became clear that Napoleon intended to occupy the entire Peninsula.

The French occupation of northern Spain intensified the hostility against Godoy. In March 1808, a large crowd of Ferdinand's supporters attacked Godoy's palace at Aranjuez and arrested him. Two days later, a frightened Charles IV dismissed Godoy and abdicated in favor of Ferdinand, who was enjoying immense popularity. The latter succeeded to the throne as Ferdinand VII and appointed a new cabinet. Fearing that the popular Ferdinand would become too independent, Napoleon was determined to get rid of him. On 23 March, Joachim Murat entered Madrid with 40,000 soldiers. Meanwhile, Charles IV retracted his abdication, claiming that he had been forced to resign, and sought Napoleon's

support. The following month the French Emperor invited the entire royal family to meet him at Bayonne, near the Spanish–French border, and forced both father and son to renounce the Spanish crown. He offered the throne instead to his older brother Joseph, the ruler of the Kingdom of Naples. Charles IV and Maria Luisa, as well as Godoy, spent the rest of their lives in exile. Ferdinand spent the next six years at Talleyrand's estate at Valencay.

THE LAUNCHING OF THE SPANISH REVOLT (1808)

During this time, rough behavior by French soldiers in Madrid aroused general revulsion and increased tension in the Spanish capital. Anti-French sentiment culminated on 2 May 1808 when the remaining members of the royal family, including the youngest prince, were about to be escorted to Bayonne. Hundreds of *Madrilenos*, mostly from the lower classes, attacked Murat's troops and fierce fighting persisted for the entire day. The next day, after Murat gained control over the city, the French executed many civilians. The *Madrilenos* suffered between 400 and 500 dead while the French had 14 fatalities.[11] Francisco Goya immortalized the fighting in Madrid and the executions the day after in two famous paintings, entitled *Dos de Mayo* and *Tres de Mayo*.

The insurrection of *Dos de Mayo* marked the beginning of an anti-Napoleonic uprising in Spain that would last until the expulsion of the French from Iberia in 1813. Indeed, when Murat boasted that suppressing the insurrection in Madrid had delivered Spain to the Emperor, the Spanish War Minister Gonzalo O'Farril remarked with greater foresight, "You should say that it places Spain beyond his reach forever."[12] The Peninsular War, also labeled "The Spanish Ulcer," continuously drained the human and financial resources of Napoleon and was one of the major reasons for the collapse of his Empire. In St. Helena Napoleon himself acknowledged his difficulties in Spain when he told Las Cases, "I admit that I started off on the wrong foot in this whole [Spanish] business . . . the whole thing remains ugly, since I lost out . . . ."

Initially, however, Napoleon was confident that resistance to his rule would not last and that the propertied elite would support him. Indeed, the central government and some ecclesiastical leaders accepted the change of regime and many officials extended their allegiance to Murat. The Council of Regency even helped Murat restore order. Clearly, the elite in Madrid were more frightened of popular reaction than of the

French. Initially, the provincial authorities as well remained passive and followed the supine central government; they were overawed by the Napoleonic army and apprehensive of the masses.[13] But the latter, including members of the urban middle and lower classes, as well as peasants, soon pressured local leaders to form *juntas* and raised the banner of revolt. Asturias was the first region to declare independence and organize resistance. In Oviedo, the provincial capital, hundreds of peasants and students forced the authorities to defy Murat, and the regional assembly declared war on Napoleon. Other provinces, including Murcia, Valencia, Galicia, parts of Old Castile, Aragon, and Catalonia, also revolted against the French and established regional *juntas*. The Catalans forced the French to withdraw to Barcelona. Andalusia, with its rebellious cities of Seville, Cadiz, Granada, and Cordoba, constituted the most powerful region of insurrection. Only areas heavily garrisoned by French forces, including Madrid, remained calm.

Clearly, Napoleon totally misread the mood of the Spanish people and their readiness to oppose his regime. Among all the Napoleonic satellite states, Spain demonstrated by far the fiercest popular resistance to French domination. The rebels comprised the entire spectrum of Spanish society. Members of the nobility, clergy, military commanders, and old administrators staffed the provincial *juntas* that led the uprisings. From the beginning, the Spanish uprisings proceeded along provincial lines. No central authority existed and every rebelling province created its own supreme *junta*. The *juntas* raised provincial armies, imposed taxes, and proclaimed laws. The common people, however, constituted the backbone of the insurrection and through guerrilla warfare wore down the French army, which was unaccustomed to this kind of relentless popular resistance. They reacted against French taxation, requisitions, and looting. The rebels were also stimulated by "Religion, Country, and King," which symbolized a struggle on behalf of their communities and provinces, as well as for Spanish independence. Ferdinand embodied patriotic ideals for many Spaniards who viewed his forced abdication by Napoleon as a threat to their independence. The clergy played a prominent part in the uprising, appealing to their parishes to fight against the "Godless French." The revolt drew upon patriotic sentiments that were tightly linked to the building of a Catholic nation during the *Reconquista*. In addition, the Spanish uprising can also be seen as a protest against an old regime that had vacillated and failed to take a decisive stand against Napoleon.[14]

Meanwhile, Joseph Bonaparte arrived at Bayonne (June 1808). To legitimize the change of government, Napoleon assembled 150 Spanish

notables in Bayonne to meet his brother and draw up a constitution. Many notables refused to appear, however, most notably Gaspar Melchor Jovellanos, a leading writer and humanist. Still, among the 91 representatives who did show up, there were a number of ministers led by Mariano Luis de Urquijo. They recognized Joseph as King of Spain and approved a new Napoleonic constitution that left intact the fundamental principles of the Spanish Catholic and royal traditions. Conciliatory to the Spanish lay and clerical elite, the Constitution declared Roman Catholicism as the only legal faith and reaffirmed feudal privileges. Joseph also received the recognition of the *Junta di Gobierno* and the Council of Castile, the two principal bodies of the Spanish government. On 7 July Joseph was consecrated as King of Spain by the Archbishop of Burgos. He then appointed a government and left for Madrid.

Joseph met immediately with a hostile Spain and asked Napoleon to send more troops. On 18 July he wrote in despair, "My position . . . is one in which a king never was before. I have not a single partisan."[15] Fighting was already raging, although the French routed the new provincial armies, which were poorly trained, inadequately equipped, and lacking in discipline. Even regular Spanish troops were no match for the French, a consequence of the absence of military reform in previous decades.[16] Lack of cooperation among the provincial armies rendered them even less effective. During the first months of the war, the French won their greatest victory at Medina de Rioseco in the province of Valladolid.

The sequence of Spanish defeats was broken on 19 July 1808, however, when an army led by General Castanos forced Dupont's French army, 20,000 strong, to surrender at Bailen in Andalusia. The defeat at Bailen was the first surrender by an imperial army, signifying the end of the myth of Napoleonic invincibility. It stimulated the Spaniards to stiffen their resistance, encouraged the British to increase their military force in the Peninsula, and, in 1809, helped to inspire the Austrians to confront Napoleon yet again.[17] The news of Bailen alarmed Joseph, who left the Spanish capital in panic after staying there for a mere 11 days. He retreated north and, by the end of August, the French withdrew from virtually all the territories they had gained south of the Ebro River. Madrid celebrated its liberation from the French. The Council of Castile proclaimed Ferdinand VII as the legitimate King of Spain. The sizeable territory of the Iberian peninsula and the fact that its provincial armies were so dispersed posed major difficulties for the French army, which could not defeat all the *juntas* and besiege all the rebelling cities at once.[18]

In August, the French failed to conquer Saragossa, the capital of Aragon, after a two-month siege. Saragossa, which was heroically defended by its population under General Joseph Palafox, illustrated more than any other battle that the French were fighting against the entire civilian population and not just against an army. In the same month, French forces also suffered a major defeat at Vimiero, in Portugal, and were forced to evacuate that country.

The French defeats and Joseph's withdrawal stimulated resistance in Portugal and Spain. Many Spaniards believed that victory over the French was imminent. To achieve that goal, however, the provincial *juntas* needed to form a central government in order to coordinate their military efforts. Initially, the Council of Castile tried to assert its authority over the provincial *juntas*, but they rejected the leadership of that obsolete and discredited institution that had collaborated with the French. In September 1808, it was agreed that each provincial *junta* would send two delegates to Aranjuez to form a new *Junta Central*, called the *Suprema*. This new body consisted of 35 deputies, mostly conservative aristocrats and some liberals. Jovellanos, the most prominent member of the *Junta Central*, advocated a constitutional monarchy. The main objective of the *Junta Central* was to lead the military campaign and expel the French.

INTERVENTION BY NAPOLEON

The Spanish had every reason to feel confident in their ability to drive the French out. Following Joseph's evacuation of Madrid, French domination was limited to the northeastern coast and to parts of Navarra and Aragon. A dispirited Joseph acknowledged the profound hatred of the Spanish people for the French and asked Napoleon to let him return to Naples. He warned Napoleon that if the French tried to reoccupy Spain, "Every house will be a fortress . . . Not one Spaniard will be for me . . . ."[19] The Emperor was determined, however, to erase the shame of Bailen and reverse the situation in Spain. He was furious with Joseph's decision to evacuate Madrid and rejected his plea to abdicate. To regain Spain, Napoleon led 200,000 men of the *Grande Armée* into Iberia.[20] The French forces were far superior to the Spanish troops. In early November, they defeated the armies of Blake and Palafox. On 30 November, French infantry and Polish cavalry overwhelmed the Spanish at the Somosierra Pass, north of Madrid, and, in early December 1808, Napoleon entered Madrid. The *Junta Central* fled south to Seville.

Thus the *Junta Central* failed quite miserably to accomplish its military goals; rather, its record was "one of unbroken defeat."[21] It lacked the means to implement its programs and had no real authority to enforce its will on the provincial *juntas*, which remained suspicious and hostile to it. Moreover, many Spanish officers were incompetent and poorly disciplined. They were often jealous of each other and so coordinated their actions ineffectively. Much of the Spanish army itself was insufficiently trained, inadequately supplied, and badly organized. Recruitment difficulties and high desertion rates exacerbated its problems. In late 1808, the *Junta Central* could deploy only 150,000 soldiers, a far cry from the 500,000 it had initially projected. Consequently, by the time the *Junta Central* was dissolved in January 1810, much of Spain was once again under French military control.

Napoleon stayed in Madrid for less than three weeks, because an English force under General John Moore was advancing from Portugal, threatening to cut his communications with France. As Napoleon left Madrid to face Moore, however, the latter retreated to the port of La Coruña in Galicia. In mid-January 1809, Napoleon finally departed Spain for Paris upon hearing that Austria was mobilizing for war. Napoleon never returned to Spain. Marshal Soult pursued Moore to La Coruña, and in the ensuing battle the British commander was killed while most of his army was safely evacuated in British vessels.

THE OCCUPATION OF SPAIN BY FRANCE

Napoleon's brief expedition into Spain succeeded in securing the roads from the French border to Madrid and in providing the French with a wider territorial base. Marshal Victor defeated the Spanish army at Ucles in January 1809 and at Medellin in March. Marshal Lannes conquered Saragossa (February 1809), overcoming a heroic Spanish resistance in which 54,000 people perished and a third of the city was ruined.[22] The Spanish resolve was also obvious in Gerona, which the French occupied on their third attempt, but only after a seven-month siege (December 1809) that cost them 14,000 casualties. Meanwhile, however, the French suffered a setback in Portugal when Marshal Soult had to evacuate Oporto and retreat to Galicia (May 1809). In June, British General Wellesley invaded Spain and advanced toward Madrid. Joseph confronted the British–Spanish–Portuguese army at Talavera, 70 miles southwest of Madrid. The two-day battle (27–28 July) was indecisive, but

exhaustion and fear of entrapment convinced Wellesley to retreat to Portugal. He was rewarded with the title Duke of Wellington for his stand at Talavera. The French failure to destroy Wellington's forces was significant. The British commander consolidated his position in Portugal and successfully resisted a major French invasion into that country in 1811. In 1812 and 1813, he again invaded Spain and played a crucial role in expelling the French from Iberia.

For the moment, however, the French were gaining the upper hand. The victory over the Austrians at Wagram enabled Napoleon to send reinforcements to the Peninsula. In November 1809, at the battle of Ocaña, the French inflicted upon the Spanish their worst rout of the war; Spain lost 10,000 dead and 26,000 prisoners. Ocaña shattered Spanish morale. Most significantly, Andalusia, the largest, most populous, and wealthiest Spanish province, now lay open to the French. Its capital, Seville, served as the temporary seat of the *Junta Central*. Joseph, who was in financial difficulty, could hope now to benefit from the riches of Andalusia. In January 1810, the French invaded Andalusia and easily captured Cordoba, Granada, and Seville. The *Junta Central* hastily left Seville and moved to the Isle of Leon in the port of Cadiz, where its members resigned after appointing a Regency. The new body would clear the way for the convening of the *Cortes* later that year. Cadiz was the only Andalusian city that held out, owing to the arrival of the Duke of Albuquerque with 12,000 soldiers. Soon, Marshal Soult began the long siege of Cadiz. For the rest of 1810 and 1811, the French continued to extend their military control over Spain, occupying Asturias, Valencia, and the southern coast of Catalonia, as well.

But Napoleonic control of Spain was never secure and stable, despite his victories. No single national government was ever able to dominate the whole of Spain during the years 1808–13. A number of rivals, including Joseph's government, French generals, the *juntas*, guerrillas, and the *Cortes* of Cadiz vied for power and exerted varying degrees of authority in various parts of Spain. While the French occupied most of the country, they never pacified it. Spain's large size and relentless guerrilla resistance prevented the French from controlling many regions, except when their troops were present. The British presence in Portugal constituted a constant threat to the French grip over Spain. Wellington and his Anglo-Portuguese army intervened in Spain and maintained contact with Spanish rebels. In sum, the "Spanish Ulcer" would not heal; it constantly drained the human and fiscal resources of the Napoleonic Empire and contributed to its demise.

JOSEPH'S RULE IN SPAIN

The victorious Napoleonic campaign in late 1808 enabled Joseph to return to the throne.[23] In January 1809, he entered Madrid and, right from the beginning, exerted genuine efforts to be accepted by the citizens of his new kingdom, by learning to speak Spanish, for example. A man of liberal convictions, Joseph attempted to launch Napoleonic reform policies designed to modernize Spain's administrative and judicial structures and promote economic development. He revoked concessions he had made to the Church and the nobility at Bayonne, abolishing seigneurial rights, eliminating the Inquisition, and suppressing two-thirds of the monasteries and convents. Joseph tried to maintain his kingdom's independence from Napoleon. He was aware of the fact that to stay in power he needed to satisfy the interests of the Spanish people. In late 1810, he wrote his wife Julie, "I can stay here only as long as I can make the Spanish nation happy."[24] Yet for all his efforts and good intentions, Joseph was unpopular among the Spaniards, who labeled him *el rey intruso* (the intrusive king) and derisively called him *Pepe botellas* (Joe Bottle) for his supposedly excessive drinking habits. Joseph remained "a foreign prince reigning in their capital against their will, and kept there by foreign bayonets."[25] The heavy tax levies and requisitions imposed by French generals added to Spanish hostility.

The Napoleonic constitution, which Joseph tried to enforce, established a government of eight ministries, and a *Cortes*, consisting in part of royal appointees and a majority of delegates elected by indirect election. It also proclaimed civil rights, legal equality, freedom of occupation, and a ban on arbitrary arrest. Joseph's ministers were members of the Spanish elite who had served under the Bourbons. The most prominent figures included Count François de Cabarrus (Finance), Don Gonzalo de O'Farril (War), Mariano Luis de Urquijo (Secretary of State), Miguel de Azanza (Foreign Affairs), and Don Manuel Romero (Justice).

Joseph proclaimed a series of reforms modeled on the French system. To stimulate economic growth, the new ruler liberalized the economy by abolishing seigneurial privileges, eliminating the guilds and the Mesta (the powerful shepherds' organization), and abolishing internal tariffs and royal monopolies. He also placed the land of suppressed monasteries on sale. Modeled after the French administration, Romero drew up a plan to replace the old provinces with 31 departments and appointed prefects to run them. Romero also produced a uniform legal system that

introduced a modern law code and established a new hierarchy of courts. Joseph tried to improve education and founded several *lycées* and a school for girls. His most concrete achievement, however, involved construction projects in Madrid, including a new water supply system, covered sewers, new buildings and public squares, and funding for cultural activities.

Joseph received support from the *afrancesados* (Frenchified). These collaborators, whose number is difficult to assess, included Spanish citizens from all walks of life, including military officers and bureaucrats who kept their positions and now served Joseph. The *afrancesados* were considered traitors by other Spaniards, however. For this reason, thousands of them escaped to France when Joseph's rule collapsed in 1813. The *afrancesados* consisted of two main groups. The majority were passive collaborators who sided with Joseph, not for ideological reasons but simply because they accepted French occupation and provided some service to the new regime. A second, much smaller group of true *afrancesados*, also known as *Josephinos*, included primarily top officials and intellectuals who viewed France as the center of enlightenment and liberal principles and sincerely believed that close cooperation with Napoleon was the only way to guarantee the modernization of Spain. The Napoleonic regime, they felt, could carry out the necessary reforms in an orderly manner. Among the hard-core ideological supporters of the French were Juan Antonio Llorente, the former Secretary of the Inquisition, who was in charge of reforming the Church on the basis of the French Concordat, and Francisco Amoros, who served as state counselor. The *afrancesados* also supported Joseph because they feared the violence and disorder associated with popular resistance to Napoleon. They believed that opposition to Napoleon was hopeless and would only plunge Spain into disastrous chaos. Ministers like Azanza, Urquijo, Cabarrus, and O'Farril, who initially opposed the French, became supporters of Joseph as a way to preserve law and order. Other *afrancesados*, including members of the propertied classes, regarded Napoleon as the guarantor of their property, as well as of stability. Finally, many *afrancesados* supported the French simply out of opportunism and hope for personal gain.

Despite the support of the *afrancesados* and his own efforts to build a national government, Joseph's effective rule was limited to Madrid and the surrounding area. He was unable to implement most of the reforms he had proclaimed. In a letter to Napoleon, Joseph acknowledged his limited power: "I have no real power beyond Madrid."[26] Besides the strong opposition to his rule, Joseph faced chronic fiscal difficulties.[27]

High military expenses, ineffective tax collection, and a war-disrupted economy caused insurmountable financial problems. The authorities launched a sale of confiscated Church and rebel holdings to pay the Bourbon debt and finance the Josephine reforms. Yet the sale was poorly managed and the notes that the government issued to be exchanged for the property began circulating as paper money and quickly lost much of their value. The French Imperial Treasury financed much of the military effort in Spain, but despite this help, the Spanish deficit kept mounting and, in January 1810, Napoleon complained to Berthier, "I cannot meet the enormous cost of Spain."[28]

Napoleon and the French generals who served in Spain also posed serious barriers to Joseph's authority. Napoleon resented Joseph's commitment to Spanish independence; he expected Joseph to fulfill French interests. To Count Roederer he wrote, "The King must be French. Spain must be French. It is for France that I conquered Spain."[29] Moreover, the Emperor had no confidence in Joseph's military skills. French generals in Spain also shared Napoleon's misgivings about Joseph's governmental and military capability and frequently ignored him.

In February 1810, Napoleon ordered that the northern Ebro provinces of Catalonia, Aragon, and Navarre be detached from Joseph's rule and administered by French commanders. By mid-1810, he had placed most of Spain under a military government and had limited Joseph's authority to New Castile, Avila, and Segovia. Commanders like Suchet, who governed Aragon, Valencia, and (after 1812) Catalonia, ignored Joseph's orders and largely ruled their provinces as independent viceroys. In return for provisions for his army, Suchet allowed the upper classes in Valencia to maintain their feudal jurisdictions, contrary to Joseph's policies.[30] French troops in Valencia even helped to collect feudal dues. The civil commissioners that Joseph sent to various provinces could operate only as subordinates of local generals. Having both military and civilian officials trying to govern and run Spain only increased the confusion and instability. Many generals squeezed the local population, enriching themselves while alienating Spanish citizens and compounding Joseph's difficulties. In April 1810, Joseph complained to his wife that the "provinces are given up to the discretion of the generals who tax them as they like, and are ordered not to attend to me."[31] Some of the civilian officials also ruled their provinces arbitrarily, causing additional misery and bitterness. In sum, the real power in much of occupied Spain was in the hands of military commanders and local officials who disobeyed and challenged Joseph's power.

GUERRILLA RESISTANCE

Aside from the Spanish regular armies, the French faced stiff resistance from numerous guerrilla bands, the *partidas*, which sprang up throughout the country as soon as Napoleon invaded Iberia.[32] The Spanish guerrilla struggle against Napoleonic domination constituted the first modern war of that kind. The guerrillas, more than anybody else, embodied the Spanish resolve to resist French rule and "became Napoleon's most deadly opponents in Iberia."[33] The mountainous terrain of the Peninsula was ideal for guerrilla warfare. They had been active since 1808 and were particularly significant in keeping the anti-French struggle alive in the years 1810–11, when regular troops suffered repeated defeats. One estimate put the number of guerrillas by the end of 1812 at 38,520, divided into 22 *partidas* throughout Spain.[34] They were either civilians or came from among military deserters. Socially, most of them originated from the peasantry although they also included students, clergymen, and an occasional noble. Opposition to French requisitions, taxes, and looting by soldiers was the main motivation behind guerrilla resistance.[35] Guerrillas were also stimulated to fight by the wish to defend the independence of their towns and provinces, their way of life, national sentiments, and the wish to defend their Church against the "Godless" French. Opposition by Spanish guerrillas also signified social protest against rural poverty and exploitation, as Italian General Caffarelli noted: "Properly speaking, it is the war of the poor against the rich."[36] The *juntas* and the Church encouraged guerrilla activity while the local population provided necessary support in the form of shelter, food, and intelligence. At times, though, the guerrillas also alienated their countrymen by preying on them or imposing heavy requisitions on villages. Both sides committed numerous atrocities in what became the most horrendous war of the Napoleonic period. Goya captured the horrors of that war in his famous etchings entitled "The Disasters of War." The rebels killed prisoners of war and mutilated the bodies of dead soldiers, while French soldiers sacked numerous cities and frequently executed civilians, tortured suspects, and raped women.

Guerrilla activities hurt the French in two principal ways. First, it was owing to the guerrillas that "the conquest of Spain required a much larger army than Napoleon had been able to deploy there."[37] They inflicted high casualties on the French, continuously intercepted mail, attacked French supply convoys, and harassed isolated posts. This obliged the French to allocate troops to pursue the guerrillas, escort messengers,

and guarantee highway safety, thereby dispersing French forces and diverting troops from fighting against the regular Spanish and British armies. Not surprisingly, guerrilla attacks demoralized French soldiers who were unaccustomed to this type of war. They were divided up into small units located in isolated places, which made them easy prey to guerrilla assaults. Secondly, the guerrillas helped to subvert Joseph's authority. They perpetrated acts of violence against supporters of the king and local officials who served the French, thereby intimidating them and undermining the effort to rally the population to the French ruler. They also encouraged many other people to resist the French by disobeying the law. The incessant guerrilla operations prevented French authorities from fulfilling their governmental duties and restoring normal life.

Yet the *partidas* were unable to liberate Spain on their own. Most importantly, they operated only locally and lacked coordination with guerrillas from other regions. Many of them were also poorly trained and ill equipped. For the most part, they were also too weak to face a sustained counter-offensive by the French army. And yet, as the *partidas* began to pattern their formation and organization after the regular army, they did more effectively challenge large French forces. In 1812–13, as the French strength in Spain was declining, the guerrillas scored several major successes. Among the guerrilla leaders, two stood out: Juan Martin Diez, also known as El Empecinado, was active in New Castile and led a substantial force that by the end of the war had reached 5000 men. The greatest guerrilla leader, however, was Francisco Espoz y Mina, who came from a well-to-do peasant family and battled the French primarily in Navarre, but also in the Basque provinces and in Aragon. The total number of men who fought under him reached an impressive 11,000. He blockaded important cities like Pamplona and Tudela and inflicted thousands of casualties on the French. Mina also ran a reasonably efficient administration in the areas he controlled, collecting customs, drafting men, and enforcing the law. In sum, the guerrillas played a highly important role in helping to defeat Napoleon in Spain.

THE *CORTES* OF CADIZ

The dominant position of the French in Spain in 1810 did not prevent the establishment of a Spanish legislature that opened in Cadiz in September 1810.[38] During most of the three-year existence of the *Cortes*, Cadiz itself was under French siege, cut off from the rest of Spain except

by the sea. The city withstood the siege, owing to the presence of a powerful English–Spanish–Portuguese contingent and to supplies that arrived by sea under the protection of the British fleet. Convening the *Cortes* constituted the first time in history that Spain was represented by a national assembly. The *Cortes* was a unicameral assembly, initially comprising 104 representatives: one-third clergy, one-sixth nobles, and the rest representatives of the Third Estate. The number of delegates would more than double in later months and years. Areas free of French rule elected their delegates while deputies for Spanish America and territories occupied by the French were chosen by a special committee.

The *Cortes* was sharply divided between conservatives (*serviles*) and liberals (*liberales*). The two camps were united in their opposition to French rule and they collaborated on the war effort. Their ideological differences became evident when they discussed their plans for the future of Spanish state and society. The liberals were influenced by the Enlightenment and French Revolutionary ideas and blamed the Old Regime for the humiliation Spain suffered in 1808. They insisted that the war must be followed by a profound transformation of Spain's laws and institutions. This included the elimination of the privileged society and the establishment of a constitutional monarchy, legal equality, a uniform fiscal structure, a centralized administration, and a free press. Economically, they supported the elimination of restrictions on internal trade and land purchase. In sum, they advocated the creation of a liberal economy and a society dominated by bourgeois interests and values.[39] The conservatives, on the other hand, wanted the *Cortes* to concentrate on the war effort and on expelling the French from Spain. They advocated only modest reforms and wished to preserve most of the old system.

The liberal delegates had the upper hand. Meeting in Cadiz, the most progressive city in Spain, favored them. The prosperous mercantile class of Cadiz had been exposed to Enlightenment ideas and backed the liberal deputies during the deliberations of the *Cortes*. In addition to possessing a majority in the *Cortes*, liberals were better organized than their rivals and had an articulate leadership who possessed a clear idea of the reforms they supported. Standing out among them were Augustin Arguelles, a lawyer from Asturias and a gifted orator; Munoz Torrero, a clergyman who taught at the University of Salamanca and presided over the commission that drafted the constitution; and Count Jose Toreno, a young aristocrat from Asturias and a historian of the Revolution. The organization of the *Cortes* also reflected a liberal victory; the representatives merged into a single assembly and were not divided by estate as in

the medieval *Cortes*. The strength of the liberals in the *Cortes* became clear very quickly when, on its first day, the *Cortes* approved the principles that national sovereignty rested in the *Cortes* and that the government would be divided into three branches. After bitter debates, the *Cortes* passed the proclamation of free speech, the abolition of censorship, and the revocation of seigneurial rights. To compensate the conservatives, the *Cortes* voted to preserve censorship in matters of religion and voted to indemnify the landlords. The *Cortes* also confirmed equal rights for Spain's citizens in the overseas colonies and outlawed oppression of the Indian population in America.

The most important legacy of the *Cortes* was the 384-article Constitution, which was ratified in January 1812 after five months of debate. The Constitution proclaimed the Spanish nation as the sovereign and transformed Spain into a constitutional monarchy, thereby breaking with the long absolutist tradition. A unicameral *Cortes* constituted the legislative branch, to be elected by universal manhood suffrage. Ministers were responsible to the Legislature. The Constitution established legal equality, progressive taxation, and primary education. Those changes meant the end of privileges, guilds, and the Mesta. Later, the *Cortes* revoked internal customs, torture, and the Inquisition. It established a uniform court system and made plans to create a new administrative structure. While the Constitution signified a victory for the liberals, it made an important concession to the Church by declaring that Catholicism was "the only true faith," and by prohibiting the practice of any other religion. Obviously, this reflected the considerable influence of the Catholic Church. The changes proclaimed by the *Cortes* aroused strong opposition. The abolition of the Inquisition by the *Cortes* in 1813 only added more fuel to the antagonism of the conservative elements. Many bishops disobeyed the *Cortes*' order to publicize the abolition of the Inquisition, and the provincial *juntas* refused to enforce the changes enacted by the *Cortes*.

The hope that the *Cortes* would be able to reorganize the army, reverse the tide of the war, and expel the French from Iberia remained unfulfilled. In 1810–11, while the *Cortes* debated the new laws and the Constitution, the Spanish armies remained poorly equipped and small. For the most part, they were unfit for any serious warfare. Adding to the difficulties of the regular army was the mistrust among the liberals in the *Cortes*, who feared that it would pose a threat to liberty and popular sovereignty.[40] Hence the liberals opposed the strengthening of the army, supporting instead the creation of a citizens' army. The Spanish

government in Cadiz also faced severe financial difficulties caused by its inability to collect taxes and a drastic decline of revenues from the rebelling Latin American colonies. Napoleon, on the other hand, dispatched major reinforcements into the Peninsula in an effort to end the fighting. By January 1812, French military control in Spain reached a peak; the only areas that were still free included Galicia, the hinterland of Alicante and Cartagena, the interior of Catalonia, and Cadiz.

THE COLLAPSE OF NAPOLEONIC SPAIN

Under such fiscal predicaments, the Spanish government became heavily dependent on British subsidies. Even more important was the military role the British army played in liberating Spain. Masséna's inability to expel the British from Portugal in 1811 proved highly significant since Wellington would play a decisive role in defeating the French in Spain in 1812–13. In early 1812 Wellington was ready to begin his offensive,[41] and in January and April he captured the two border fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz. Meanwhile, Napoleon pulled troops out of Spain for the Russian campaign, thereby weakening the French position in Iberia. This coincided with an expansion of the Anglo-Portuguese army. In July 1812, the British routed the army of Marshal Auguste Marmont in the Battle of Salamanca, and, on 12 August 1812, Wellington entered Madrid, which Joseph had abandoned. Madrid gave Wellington a hero's welcome. Shortly thereafter, Soult lifted the siege of Cadiz to avoid being isolated and withdrew from Andalusia, placing his troops under Joseph. The formidable French army, more than 100,000 soldiers strong, regained control of the Spanish capital in early November 1812. Another French army drove Wellington from Burgos and forced his Anglo-Portuguese army to withdraw to safety in Portugal yet again. Only Joseph's reluctance to pursue the retreating army saved Wellington.

As it turned out, however, the Allied forces suffered only a temporary setback. The French had evacuated Andalusia, Extremadura, and Asturias in 1812 and never recovered those regions. Guerrillas, stimulated by the Allied Army, intensified their campaigns in the northern regions of the Basque and Navarre. With the assistance of the British navy, guerrillas temporarily expelled the French from most of the Basque coast and occupied the northern port of Santander. In February 1813, Mina acquired siege weapons and forced the surrender of Tafalla, the most important fortification in Navarre, after Pamplona. In early 1813,

the French position in Spain grew weaker when the Emperor transferred more troops from Iberia to Germany. London sent fresh reinforcements to Wellington and, in October 1812, the *Cortes* appointed him as the chief commander of all the armies in Spain. Realizing his precarious position, Joseph left Madrid for France in March 1813, just as he had done in 1808. Thousands of frightened *afrancesados* accompanied him. Wellington's Anglo-Portuguese army moved across northern Spain to block Joseph's retreat. The final blow for Joseph came on 21 June 1813 at the Battle of Vitoria, where Wellington led his 80,000 men to a decisive victory over an outnumbered French army. Joseph escaped from the battlefield, leaving behind numerous state documents and his large art collection. At the end of June, Joseph crossed the Pyrenees into France with the rest of his army and numerous *afrancesados*. Napoleon appointed Soult as commander-in-chief of the French armies in Spain, but the latter could not prevent further losses by the French. Saragossa was liberated and Suchet evacuated Valencia and retreated north to Barcelona. Wellington captured San Sebastian and crossed to southern France in October 1813, a few days before Napoleon suffered his decisive defeat at Leipzig. Although the fighting would continue for a few more months, the war in Spain was essentially over.

In November 1813, Napoleon proposed to recognize Ferdinand as King of Spain and to withdraw all French forces from Spain if the British would do the same. Through this plan, the Emperor hoped to avoid a war on two fronts and to release more troops for the defense of his Empire. Ferdinand was eager to gain his freedom and, in December 1813, he signed a secret agreement with Napoleon at Valencay, accepting the Emperor's terms on the condition that the government in Madrid ratify the treaty. The Spanish Regency rejected the agreement, however. After being released in March 1814, Ferdinand returned to Spain and restored his reign.

THE AFTERMATH AND THE NAPOLEONIC LEGACY

At St. Helena, Napoleon acknowledged that the war in the Iberian peninsula marked the beginning of the end of his Empire.[42] Indeed, Napoleon's decision to intervene in Iberia was a fatal mistake. The Emperor expected to occupy Spain quickly. He underestimated, however, the extent of resistance his intervention and the removal of the Bourbons would arouse. In six years of fighting, Napoleon failed to bring the entire

Peninsula under his control, largely due to the stiff guerrilla resistance. The Napoleonic army also had to face regular Spanish armies and, in particular, Wellington's British–Portuguese army, which played a decisive role in expelling the French from Iberia. The incessant fighting and uncompromising opposition rendered impossible the rule of Joseph and the application of his reform policy in Spain. France suffered 300,000 casualties and spent huge resources on the Peninsular War.[43] In sum, the "Spanish ulcer" contributed considerably to Napoleon's downfall.

The struggle against Napoleon extracted a very costly price from Spain. After six years of war, fought in every corner of the country, Spain was exhausted and devastated. Many of the cities were sacked or bombarded and parts of the country were depopulated. Trade and industry were paralyzed. With shipments of American bullion halted and the economy in crisis, the government was able to cover barely half of its expenses. The Napoleonic years also precipitated the collapse of the Spanish Empire in Latin America and the rise of independent nations there.

The Napoleonic period witnessed the emergence of liberal ideas and politicians in Spain and attempts by both Joseph and the *afrancesados* and the Cadiz *Cortes* to transform state and society. The Cadiz liberal constitution, the first of its kind in Spanish history, broke with the past and would serve as a model for revolutionaries in nineteenth-century Europe. Yet the liberal experiment also aroused strong opposition from powerful forces, including the nobility, the Church, and the army, as well as from many within the rural population. Leaders of the reactionary *serviles*, who were hurt by liberal reforms, convinced Ferdinand VII to revoke the Constitution of 1812 and the other progressive changes enacted in Cadiz. Upon entering Madrid in May 1814, Ferdinand restored the absolutist monarchy and the power of the Church. He turned down the Constitution, declared null and void the rest of the *Cortes*' legislation, and imprisoned scores of liberal leaders. The Spanish monarch reestablished the Inquisition, invited the Jesuits back to Spain, restored seigneurial rights, and abolished free press. Reaction set in throughout post-Napoleonic Spain. And yet, only six years later, Spaniards were the first Europeans to rise in the name of liberal principles against their king's absolutism. Indeed, the Napoleonic years gave a boost to a secular and progressive camp that will challenge the absolutist and clerical camp in a long struggle over the future of Spain.

9

PORTUGAL

EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY PORTUGAL

By the beginning of the eighteenth century, Portugal had declined to a third-rate power. Its population numbered fewer than three million, mostly poor peasants burdened by feudal obligations. The nobility possessed much land and wielded considerable power along with the clergy, who numbered 200,000 and were among the most conservative in Europe. The ruling Braganza dynasty relied mostly on revenues from Brazilian gold and colonial trade and paid little attention to the development of the domestic economy. Portugal had very close economic and strategic relations with Britain. British merchants purchased much Brazilian cotton, while a treaty between the two countries, signed in 1703, granted Britain the right to use Portuguese ports.

In the second half of the eighteenth century, however, Portugal experienced a period of dynamic reforms launched by the enlightened Marquis of Pombal, chief minister of King Joseph I.[1] To strengthen the monarchy, he centralized the administration and taxation and weakened the nobility and the Church, the two main opponents of a powerful monarchy. He reduced the power of the Inquisition and, in 1759, confiscated the property of the influential Jesuits and expelled them from Portugal. Pombal then replaced Jesuit education with state-supported education. He also initiated the reconstruction of Lisbon following a devastating earthquake (1755) that killed 30,000 (20 percent) inhabitants. To encourage economic growth and diminish British control over Portuguese commerce, Pombal established powerful Portuguese trade companies. He also subsidized wool, silk, and cotton factories to end

Portugal's dependence on imported manufactures. To promote agricultural growth, he encouraged concentration of vineyards in the hands of a small group of wealthy landowners. These reforms favored the formation of a wealthy bourgeoisie but ruined many small traders and peasants, provoking popular discontent. Pombal's authoritarianism gained him many enemies and in 1777, Queen Dona Maria dismissed him.

FROM THE FRENCH REVOLUTION TO THE NAPOLEONIC INVASION

The Portuguese monarchy, just like its Spanish counterpart, watched the events in Revolutionary France with concern and tried to prevent revolutionary propaganda from penetrating its borders.[2] The authorities expanded censorship and restored the old powers of the Inquisition. In 1792, Dona Maria ceased to govern due to insanity, and her second son John, Prince of Brazil, began his rule, serving as Prince-Regent until his mother's death in 1816, when he became King John VI.[3] France sought to convince Portugal to remain neutral in its conflict with the First Coalition, but in 1793 Portugal signed anti-French accords with Spain and England. In September of that year, Portuguese troops joined Spain in its invasion into southern France. Following Spain's withdrawal from the First Coalition (June 1795), France demanded that Portugal break with England and become neutral, pay indemnity, and grant France commercial concessions. Portugal refused, however, due in part to English opposition, leading the French government to expel the Portuguese representative from Paris. Later, however, Portugal and France resumed negotiations and in August 1797 agreed to restore peace between them and establish Portuguese neutrality. The British strongly opposed the treaty and forced the court in Lisbon to reject it.

After the coup of Brumaire, Bonaparte, along with Spain, renewed pressure on Portugal to break its ties with England and ally with France. Such efforts characterized the Napoleonic policy vis-à-vis Portugal for the next decade. In October 1800, France and Spain signed the second Treaty of San Ildefonso, demanding that it abandon its alliance with Britain, close its harbors to British ships, and make territorial concessions to Spain.[4] These demands clearly carried with them the germs of war since Portugal was dependent on Britain and unable to accept these conditions. Indeed, Bonaparte was clearly determined to wage war against Portugal if it refused to break with Britain. For his part, Manuel de Godoy,

the Spanish prime minister, hoped to carve out for himself a principality in Portugal.

In May 1801, Spanish troops invaded Portugal, thereby initiating the brief "War of the Oranges," so named because Godoy sent the Spanish queen two orange boughs from Elvas. The Spanish conquered the border fortresses of Elvas and Juromenha and the town of Arronches, and the Portuguese requested peace. In September, Portugal had to accept the harsh Treaty of Madrid, which forced it to surrender border territory to Spain, grant France commercial concessions, pay a war indemnity, and close its harbors to British ships.

It appeared that the French had finally succeeded in breaching the Anglo-Portuguese alliance. Bonaparte sent a new ambassador to Lisbon, General Jean Lannes, who tried to increase French influence in Portugal and even demanded changes in the Portuguese government. The British representative, Robert Fitzgerald, tried his best to keep Portugal within Britain's sphere of influence. John, the Prince-Regent, responded with a policy of neutrality in an effort to preserve his country's independence. In 1803, when war resumed between England and France, he again declared Portugal's neutrality and closed his kingdom's ports to warships of both powers. Bonaparte rejected this policy and compelled the Portuguese authorities to grant him commercial concessions and pay a monthly contribution of one million *livres* over the next 16 months.[5] In October 1804, Spain again joined France in an anti-British alliance and France invited John to adhere to this alliance. The Portuguese ruler rejected the proposal and reaffirmed his country's neutrality.

THE FRENCH INVASIONS INTO PORTUGAL

Once Napoleon proclaimed the Continental Blockade, he refused to tolerate Portuguese commercial ties with the British any longer. In July 1807, he wrote to Talleyrand, "It is necessary to close all the ports of Portugal to England without delay. Tomorrow, you will inform the Portuguese ambassador that all ports of Portugal are to be closed to England and its merchandise confiscated by the 1st of September or I will declare war on Portugal."[6] In August, the French and the Spanish submitted an ultimatum to the Portuguese, ordering them to declare war on England, expel the British ambassador, arrest all Englishmen in Portugal, confiscate their merchandise, and close their ports to English shipping.[7] Portugal wavered. The Council of State remained unwilling to break

relations with the old ally. In addition, the Portuguese foreign minister, Antonio de Araujo, received a promise from the British government to evacuate the royal family to Brazil should the French invade Portugal. After protracted negotiations, the Council of State agreed to close the ports to Britain but refused to arrest British subjects or confiscate their property. John also rejected Napoleon's warning not to cooperate with France's enemies. Napoleon decided to intervene in Portugal. Besides aiming to ensure that Portugal remained closed to British trade, the Emperor viewed such a campaign as an opportunity to intervene in Spain. On 1 October 1807, the French and Spanish representatives left Lisbon and Napoleon and Godoy signed the Treaty of Fontainebleau, which partitioned Portugal into three parts: central Portugal to France, northern Portugal for the displaced King of Etruria (Tuscany), and southern Portugal for Godoy.

In mid-November 1807, a French force of 25,000 under General Junot began crossing the border from Spain into Portugal. It was the first of three Napoleonic invasions of that country. Britain was incapable of defending its ally, causing Prince John to depart for Brazil. Thousands of members of the Portuguese elite joined the royal house in exile. Before leaving, Prince John appointed a Regency Council to run Portugal and ordered it to collaborate with the French. Nonetheless, many Portuguese protested what they viewed as his abandonment of Portugal.

A day after the Prince-Regent left, Junot occupied Lisbon, a city of 200,000 inhabitants. In February 1808, Junot dissolved the Regency Council, declared the end of the Braganza dynasty, and established a new government comprised of French and Portuguese ministers subject to him. Junot also drafted a constitution proclaiming legal equality, religious toleration, and individual liberty. He dismantled the Portuguese national militia and the regular army and sent 6000 Portuguese soldiers to France. This "Portuguese Legion" later fought under Napoleon in Spain, Austria, and Russia. Junot also promised to foster education and launch economic growth through the construction of roads and canals and the improvement of agriculture and industry.

Most Portuguese opposed Junot's reforms, however. Nobles and clergy feared that they would undermine their privileges. Even officials who collaborated with Junot resented his actions, which they saw as a threat to Portuguese independence. The merchant class was naturally opposed to the Continental Blockade. Particularly aggravating was the brutality of the French occupying army, which plundered the country and levied heavy contributions. On his way to Lisbon, Junot had already met with

passive resistance in the form of deserted towns and the destruction of supplies essential for his troops. In December 1807, the first anti-French riots broke out in Lisbon, and in June 1808, stimulated by the eruption of the revolt in Spain, a more general uprising broke out. Oporto, where the merchant class was suffering from the Continental Blockade, led the way. An initial revolt in Oporto, led by army officers, failed, but a second uprising headed by Bishop Dom Antonio Jose de Castro, which enjoyed greater popular support, succeeded in expelling the French troops from the city. The French governor was arrested and a provisional *junta* under Bishop Castro was set up. Oporto's success encouraged other communities in northern Portugal, like Braga, Braganza, and Viana to rise up, expel the French, and establish local *juntas*. By the end of June, northern Portugal was free and the southern Algrave soon followed suit. The French controlled only a few urban areas, including Lisbon, Elvas, and Almeida, where they had large contingents.

In Oporto a supreme *junta* was established and the other insurgent *juntas* recognized its leadership and proclaimed their loyalty to the Prince-Regent. This obedience to a central authority contrasted with the Spanish revolt, where the provincial *juntas* showed no respect for the central *junta* in Madrid.[8] The Portuguese *juntas* began raising troops and the supreme *Junta* appealed to England for assistance. The British blockaded the Tagus River and called on the inhabitants of Lisbon to rebel against French rule. In August 1808, Sir Arthur Wellesley landed at Mondego Bay, in the center of Portugal, with almost 10,000 men and marched towards Lisbon. He was joined by Portuguese troops and defeated Junot's army at Vimeiro. Junot, demoralized and isolated, signed the Convention of Sintra, agreeing to evacuate Portugal.

With the elimination of French control over Portugal, the British now had a foothold in the Iberian peninsula. Public discontent in Portugal, stemming from social and political causes, remained widespread, however. French plundering only aggravated the condition of the rural masses who had endured much misery before the French invasion. Many Portuguese were indignant that the French troops, who had devastated their country, were allowed to be repatriated, unscathed. The absence of the Prince-Regent and his court also added to the instability. Attacks were made on suspected pro-French elements, including commanding officers, Jews, and foreign merchants.[9] In September 1808, the Regency Council was restored. The conservative Regency feared further disturbances and moved quickly to restore order. Seizing upon the disorder, it launched a policy of repression directed especially against liberals and

reformists, effectively eliminating progressive opposition to its rule and reasserting the old order.

Subsequently, after 1808, the Portuguese government became increasingly dependent on British political, military, and financial help. The Prince-Regent appointed the English general William Carr Beresford as commander-in-chief of the newly established Portuguese army, charging him with its reorganization. Beresford was a very experienced British officer who had commanded forces in wars in South Africa and South America and who served as viceroy in Portugal until 1814. Soon, Beresford became the most powerful figure in the country, effectively mobilizing Portuguese resources for the war effort. With the Portuguese minister of war, Dom Miguel Pereira Forjaz, Beresford introduced military conscription, commissioned new officers, set up a program of military training, and tightened army discipline. The new Portuguese army eventually numbered 30,000 men. Beresford played a crucial role in stabilizing the country but was also unscrupulous in aiding the Regency in its repressive policies. Indeed, the reorganization of the Portuguese army was intended not only to defend Portugal against Napoleon but also to secure the new authorities against internal opponents.

The British government subsidized the Portuguese military buildup. Its assistance proved insufficient, however. The Regency reformed the fiscal structure in an effort to increase revenues. It imposed an "Extraordinary Contribution for Defense" on the population, which amounted to a forced loan.[10] Prince-Regent John proposed additional fiscal reforms, including a stamp tax, sale of crown lands, and a lottery. The collection of rents from crown lands was also improved and proposals were submitted to increase land taxes and establish an income tax. The added revenues did not suffice to cover all the military expenses, however, and Portugal sank deeper into debt.

Meanwhile, the French launched a second invasion of Portugal. In March 1809, Marshal Jean Soult marched through Galicia into northern Portugal and occupied Oporto. In April, Wellesley returned to Lisbon and advanced on Oporto. Beresford attempted to outflank the French and cut off their retreat to Spain. The French were able to withdraw to Galicia but only after suffering heavy losses.

In the fall of 1809, after his victory over Austria, Napoleon considered another campaign to end the Peninsular War, occupy Portugal, and expel the British from Iberia. Clearly, as long as the British forces stayed in Portugal, Napoleon's control over the Peninsula remained insecure. Wellington, certain that another Napoleonic invasion of Portugal was

inevitable, proposed to defend the country by virtually transforming much of it into an armed camp. Unable to protect the entire border area, Wellington chose to fortify the hilly region around Torres Vedras, north of Lisbon, and so protect at least the Portuguese capital and the Tagus. It took 10,000 workers about a year to construct the impregnable Lines of Torres Vedras, which consisted of three fortified lines that extended 29 miles from the Tagus to the Atlantic Ocean.[11] These lines played a key role in defending Portugal when the final French onslaught began. With the support of the Portuguese War Ministry, Wellington also reinforced border fortresses, destroyed roads, and removed animals that could be used by the invaders. To deprive the French army of provisions, he imposed a "scorched earth" policy and ordered inhabitants of some areas to evacuate. This part of Wellington's strategy was controversial, causing several members of the Regency Council to demand, in vain, that he defend Portugal at the border in order to spare the heartland from war and destruction.

The French army began its third and largest invasion of Portugal in August 1810, a time when Napoleon had consolidated his control over most of Spain.[12] The Emperor appointed Marshal André Masséna to lead the army of Portugal. Masséna's 65,000 troops outnumbered Wellington's British–Portuguese army. Wellington obviously benefited from the reorganization of the Portuguese army and the militarization of the society carried out by Beresford. He also used the *ordenança*, a traditional provincial militia mobilized only during war and consisting of all men between the ages of 16 and 60. Masséna began the Portuguese campaign with the capture of the Spanish frontier fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo (July 1810) and its Portuguese counterpart, Almeida (1810).[13] He then advanced into Portugal and, in September, attacked Wellington's allied army at Bussaco, a disastrous decision that ended with the loss of 5000 Frenchmen.[14] Wellington then withdrew into position behind Torres Vedras. In mid-October, Masséna attacked the formidable Lines but was repulsed. He requested reinforcements from Napoleon but received none. A month later, he and his troops retreated to Santarem, where they languished for almost four months. Finally, in early March 1811, as supplies became scarce, a disheartened Masséna, who lost half of his army to combat, disease, and hunger, ordered his starving army to retreat to the Spanish border. Wellington pursued the retreating army and, in May, defeated Masséna at Fuentes de Onoro. Portugal was finally free of French occupation; the rest of the Peninsular War would be fought in Spain.

THE AFTERMATH AND THE NAPOLEONIC LEGACY

On 30 May 1814, France and Portugal signed a peace agreement. At the Congress of Vienna, Portugal received only a small amount of reparation that hardly compensated for the devastation caused by the long conflict on its territory. The Prince-Regent, who became John VI following the death of his mother in 1816, returned to Portugal from Brazil only in 1821.

Of all the countries occupied by Napoleon, Portugal stayed under French rule for the shortest amount of time. The failure of Napoleon to occupy Portugal for any length of time was significant for two reasons: first, it enabled Wellington to gain a foothold in Iberia and use Portugal as the base for his victorious assault on Spain in 1812–13. Second, Napoleon's inability to conquer Portugal demonstrated his incapacity to close Europe to British trade and contributed to the eventual failure of the Continental Blockade. Portugal, however, paid a heavy price for the failed Napoleonic ambitions. The French invasions, together with Wellington's "scorched earth" policy, destroyed considerable infrastructure and much productive land. Industrial exports declined and, more than ever, Portugal became a British economic colony. The extraordinary military expenses caused a large fiscal deficit that would persist long after 1814. The French invasions also resulted in a peculiar political situation in which the Portuguese king lived in Brazil and a British general was endowed with supreme authority in Portugal. Worst of all, the war's devastation caused the already small Portuguese population to decline from 3.2 million in 1807 to 2,875,000 in 1811.[15]

10

The Italian Peninsula

PRE-NAPOLEONIC ITALY

Prior to the Napoleonic invasion into northern Italy in 1796, the Italian Peninsula was divided into ten states: the Kingdom of Sardinia, including Piedmont; the Duchy of Milan (part of the Habsburg Empire); the republics of Venice, Genoa, and Lucca; the Papal State; the duchies of Modena and Parma; the Grand-Duchy of Tuscany; and the Kingdom of Naples, which included Sicily. These states differed substantially from each other. Various dynasties and social elites ruled over them, and they possessed different legal systems, economic structures, administrative institutions, currencies, and spoken dialects. Provincial and municipal rivalries and competition between city and country intensified the diversity.

In the second half of the eighteenth century, the gap widened between states that experienced enlightened reforms and states that failed to carry out such changes.[1] In Lombardy, Habsburg rulers Maria Theresa and Joseph II established a uniform land tax based on an accurate property survey, centralized the administration, liberalized the grain trade, reduced the power of the clergy, and broke the Milanese patricians' monopoly on power. These reforms created a more efficient machinery and encouraged agricultural growth. The reforms were strongly supported by important Milanese Enlightenment thinkers like Pietro Verri and Cesare Beccaria. In Tuscany, as well, Habsburg Grand Duke Peter Leopold implemented significant reforms. He eliminated internal tariffs, reduced ecclesiastical power, established a single land tax, and initiated reclamation of marshland. Yet opposition from nobles and the Church

limited the effectiveness of his reforms. In Piedmont, Venice, and the Papal State, conservative governments and ruling elites launched no such reforms. In Piedmont, the Savoyard dynasty established a strong absolutist government but rejected any enlightened reforms. The nobility served the Piedmontese monarch in return for protection of its privileges. Likewise, the Venetian ruling Patricians rejected any changes and that maritime republic continued its steady decline. Agriculture in those states remained backward, commerce declined, and opportunities for the emergence of a commercial bourgeoisie remained very limited. In the Kingdom of Naples, prominent Enlightenment thinkers such as Antonio Genovesi and Gaetano Filangieri advocated major reforms to revive Naples' economy and transform its society. Yet the Bourbon rulers were unwilling and unable to pursue any serious reform policy that would challenge the feudal system and the barons' power. Church power was reduced somewhat, although the clergy remained very influential. The conditions of southern peasants were the worst in Italy. In sum, the Italian Peninsula would have to wait for French rule to experience deeper transformations.

ITALY AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

Italians showed support and interest in the French Revolution. Enlightenment thinkers, disillusioned with the limited extent of change in their states, saw the French developments as proof that more radical reforms were feasible and necessary. Pietro Verri viewed the French Revolution as a safeguard against tyranny and proposed a constitutional project for his state, as did the Piedmontese Dalmazzo Francesco Vasco. In several Italian cities, political dissenters established secret societies that endorsed radical French ideas. The most prominent Italian revolutionary was Filippo Buonarroti, who participated in Babeuf's Conspiracy in Paris 1796. In several states, including Piedmont and the Papal State, radical societies conspired to topple their governments but were quickly suppressed. The Revolution also found popular support in the Italian countryside where agricultural commercialization, increasing poverty, and social tension were rising. In the early 1790s, discontented peasants in Piedmont and the Kingdom of Naples protested against the deterioration of their conditions and expressed the wish to "act like the French."[2]

Naturally, the Italian governments remained hostile to the French Revolution. The Papacy had broken off relations with France in 1791,

while Piedmont and the Kingdom of Naples joined the anti-French coalition the year after. France quickly conquered Savoy and Nice. Most Italian governments ceased their reform programs, launched repressive policies, and tightened censorship. Upon uncovering the revolutionary conspiracies, they executed, jailed, or deported the leaders. Clearly, Italian revolutionaries needed outside help to effect change.

THE REVOLUTIONARY TRIENNIUM (1796–9)

Conditions changed significantly after Napoleon Bonaparte crossed the Alps in April 1796. This marked the beginning of two decades (1796–1814) of French hegemony over the Italian Peninsula. The Directory viewed the Italian campaign primarily as "a financial operation" designed to alleviate the fiscal crisis in France.[3] Bonaparte imposed heavy taxes and war contributions on the Italian population and sent money and confiscated art works to Paris. The French army looted and lived off the occupied lands, thereby provoking considerable popular resentment.

Militarily, the Directory assigned the army of Italy a diversionary role in support of the French armies in Germany. However, Bonaparte's rapid victories over the Austrians upset the original plan and transformed northern Italy into the main front. In April 1796, Bonaparte defeated the Austro-Piedmontese armies, forcing Piedmont's ruler Victor Amadeus III to withdraw from the war. Bonaparte then occupied Milan and replaced the Austrian administration with a republican one. Soon, the French gained control of Verona, the Papal Legations of Bologna and Ferrara, and the Duchy of Modena. Pope Pius VI signed an armistice with Bonaparte. In July, the French began besieging Mantua and defeated several Austrian armies sent to lift the siege. On 2 February 1797, Mantua surrendered. Bonaparte then began marching on Vienna, forcing the Austrians to sign the Truce of Leoben (April 1797). The Italian campaign was over. In May, French troops entered Venice where the Senate had abdicated, and a new democratic republic was established. After long negotiations, France and Austria finally signed the Treaty of Campo Formio, officially ending the First Coalition (18 October). Austria recognized the Cisalpine Republic, which Napoleon had created in northern Italy. In return, Napoleon delivered Venice to the Austrians, a cynical act that marked the end of the centuries-old Venetian Republic and horrified Italian patriots.

Bonaparte's victories launched the "Revolutionary Triennium" (1796–9), the first phase of French rule in Italy and a period of transformation and lively debate. Italian Jacobins, calling themselves "patriots," formed popular societies that championed national independence and social reforms. Melchiore Gioia reflected the opinion of most "patriots" by stressing his support for forming an Italian republic, "one and indivisible." Only in a republic, insisted Gioia, could liberty and a democratic society flourish. The more radical "patriots" emphasized the need for social programs to benefit the popular classes. Those revolutionaries supported the new republican governments, which replaced the old regimes, and experimented with democratic systems. The French, however, closely controlled these "sister" republics, exerting fiscal pressure and interfering in their internal affairs. The French impositions and the fact that the new laws benefited mostly the propertied and educated classes provoked popular insurrections. When the anti-French offensive was renewed in 1799, this opposition would help to bring down the Italian republics.

The first republic that Bonaparte founded was the Cispadan Republic, south of the Po. It consisted of Bologna, Ferrara, Modena, and Reggio Emilia (April 1797). In July, Bonaparte merged it with the Cisalpine Republic he had formed in Milan. Soon, he added to the Cisalpine parts of the former Venetian Republic. The Cisalpine, the most important "sister" republic, lasted for 22 months and possessed a national flag, an army, and a population of 3.5 million. Its constitution, modeled on the French Constitution of 1795, established a Directory and a bicameral legislature. It created a uniform administration, dividing the State into 20 departments. Other provisions abrogated entails and enacted military conscription, free internal trade, and equality between male and female heirs. Its government also established freedom of religion, abolished religious orders, and confiscated Church land, selling it mostly to the well-to-do.

The independence of the Cisalpine Republic was largely nominal, however; the French were ultimately in control. Neither Bonaparte nor the Directory wished to see a powerful Italian state. They imposed territorial limits that denied the Cisalpine access to the sea. Genoa, which became a separate Ligurian Republic, was never incorporated into the Cisalpine Republic. A treaty with France forced the Cisalpine Republic to maintain a costly army and pay for the upkeep of 25,000 French troops, quickly amassing a huge deficit. The French continuously intervened in the Cisalpine's internal affairs. Bonaparte nominated the state's directors and legislators to ensure the moderates' control. Four coups by the

French purged radicals and opponents from the Cisalpinian legislature. Increasingly, the French established a more authoritarian system. In August 1798, French ambassador Charles-Joseph Trouvé proclaimed a new, less democratic constitution that increased the authority of the Directory. The latter suppressed journals and popular societies and arrested several "patriots." Under such precarious fiscal and political conditions, the Cisalpine authorities were unable to consolidate the new state.

Two other republics, the Roman and the Neapolitan, were created after Bonaparte left Italy in November 1797. The French occupied Rome and local revolutionaries proclaimed the Roman Republic (February 1798), forcing Pope Pius VI to leave Rome. The Roman Republic was essentially a French protectorate during its 18-month existence. A French commission decreed a constitution modeled on the 1795 French Constitution. The French commander nominated government officials and issued laws. The Republic enjoyed the support of professionals, some aristocrats, and Roman Jews, who received equal rights for the first time. The Roman legislature abolished entails, sold Church land, and imposed limits on bishops' incomes. Societies of Roman "patriots" had no influence over the government. Heavy impositions and plunder by French troops, along with ecclesiastical incitement, led to revolts in Rome and Umbria, which were quickly suppressed.

In November 1798, the Bourbon monarch Ferdinand IV of Naples ordered an invasion into the Roman Republic. General Championnet soon expelled the Neapolitans and proceeded to occupy Naples, forcing Ferdinand IV to flee to Sicily. On 22 January 1799, Neapolitan patriots proclaimed the Parthenopean Republic. Championnet nominated a provisional government whose actions required his approval. Some of its members were "patriots" who had returned from exile. The Neapolitan Republic lasted less than five months. It faced serious fiscal difficulties and popular opposition. The French government opposed its formation and soon replaced Championnet, who supported the Republic, with the more malleable General Macdonald. The only effective law of the Neapolitan government was the abolition of entails. An administrative reform ended up altering only the provinces' names. The authorities' greatest failure, however, was their inability to abolish feudalism quickly and decisively, thus arousing widespread resentment among the rural population. In March 1799, they did abolish feudal jurisdiction payments, tolls, and monopolies. The French confirmed the law only at the end of April, too late to prevent a peasant revolt.

In December 1798, the French also occupied the Kingdom of Piedmont, forcing its ruler, Charles Emmanuel IV, to abdicate. That state had been in deep crisis since its defeat in 1796. Economic hardship bred peasant unrest and brigandage, and French financial pressure and military plunder increased discontent. The authorities uncovered a conspiracy by "patriots" in favor of an independent republic, and the French ruthlessly suppressed a peasant uprising in Monferrato.

The creation of the Second Coalition in late 1798 signaled a counter-revolutionary offensive in various European countries. Nowhere was that assault more successful than in the Italian Peninsula. Between February and September 1799, foreign armies and popular insurgents expelled the French from Italy and overthrew the "sister" republics, except for Genoa, which resisted until June 1800. Popular opposition to the French had already begun after their invasion in 1796. The insurgents, mostly peasants and the urban poor, often instigated by clergy, reacted against French looting and repression. In May, Bonaparte ruthlessly suppressed revolts in the Lombard towns of Pavia and Binasco, executing many of the rebels and burning Binasco to the ground. In June 1796, towns in Romagna revolted and a bloody uprising erupted in Verona in April 1797. Opposition to the French and their republican allies culminated, however, in 1799.

The Cisalpine was the first republic to fall following the victory of General Suvorov over the French at Cassano d'Adda (April 1799). The Austrians established a new government in Milan. In May, General Suvorov conquered Piedmont. These victories provoked popular uprisings in northern and central Italy. Many Piedmontese peasants joined the Austrian army. In Tuscany, inhabitants of Arezzo, chanting "Viva Maria," destroyed republican symbols and attacked "Jacobins." In Sienna, insurgents killed many Jews. Revolts also spread to Lazio, Umbria, and the Marche. "Yet nowhere was the scale of violence of the counter-revolution greater than in the south."[4] In February 1799, Cardinal Fabrizio Ruffo headed an anti-republican army of thousands of peasants alienated by French plunder and, in particular, the failure of the Republic to abolish feudalism. In June, Ruffo's *Sanfedist* army entered Naples, which had been abandoned by the French. The republican leaders capitulated after Ruffo promised to allow them to leave for France, but Ferdinand IV, who had returned to Naples, reneged on this agreement and ordered the execution of 120 republican leaders. In September, the Roman Republic also collapsed following the French withdrawal. The Revolutionary Triennium came to a close.

THE NAPOLEONIC TRANSFORMATION OF ITALY, 1800–14

With the victory over the Austrians at Marengo, Bonaparte restored French domination over much of northern Italy. The Austrians recognized this reality at Lunéville. Marengo thus marked the beginning of the second phase of French rule over Italy, which lasted until Napoleon's fall in 1814. During the first decade of the nineteenth century, Napoleon gained control over the rest of Italy: Piedmont and Liguria (1800); Venetia and the Kingdom of Naples (1806); Tuscany (1807); the Papal Marche (1808); Rome, Lazio, and Umbria, as well as Parma and Piacenza (1808); and Trentino (1810). Only Sardinia and Sicily remained under their former rulers, who benefited from British protection.



Map 3 Italy, 1812

During this period, Napoleon reshaped the peninsula's boundaries and created new states and governments at will. This reorganization aimed at strengthening his control and assuring the success of the Continental Blockade. Ultimately, Napoleon consolidated the peninsula into three parts: the (northern) Italian Republic, later transformed into the Kingdom of Italy; the Kingdom of Naples; and the areas annexed to imperial France. A second significant characteristic of Napoleonic Italy was the formation of the centralized state.[5] The Napoleonic authorities launched the rationalization and centralization of the administrative, financial, judicial, and military structures, modeled on the French system. The new uniform legal, institutional, and economic organizations also enhanced the political unity of the peninsula.

The alliance between the Napoleonic state and the new elite of notables constituted the third important feature of Napoleonic Italy. The notables were an amalgam of the nobility and the wealthy bourgeoisie. As in France, landowners constituted the most significant element in this elite, although the commercial, professional, and educated classes were also part of the notability. Napoleon rallied this elite around him and secured their support through important benefits, appointment to high positions, sanctioning their purchase of Church land, guaranteeing the right of private property, and securing law and order. Naturally, part of the nobility opposed or remained lukewarm to Napoleon, resenting the loss of traditional privileges, the increase in tax burden, and the assault on the Church.

THE REPUBLIC AND THE KINGDOM OF ITALY (1802–14)

In January 1802, Napoleon established the Republic of Italy. An assembly of Italian notables gathered in Lyons and elected the First Consul as the Republic's president. In March 1805, after becoming Emperor, Napoleon transformed the Republic into the Kingdom of Italy (1805–14), with himself as its king.[6] Initially, the State consisted of Lombardy, the Novarese, and most of Emilia Romagna. In later years, Napoleon annexed to the Kingdom the Veneto and Istria (1806); the Marche, (1808); and Trentino, South Tyrol (1810). At its peak, the Kingdom covered an area of 89,600 square kilometers (35,000 square miles) and possessed 6.7 million inhabitants, about one-third of the peninsula's population. Both the Republic and the Kingdom were Napoleonic satellite states. Their system was based on the French model, they paid for the

upkeep of French troops on their territory, they provided Napoleon with soldiers, and they abided by the Continental Blockade.

Napoleon transformed the Republic and the Kingdom of Italy more deeply than any other part of the peninsula, possibly even of Europe. This was due to the relatively long duration of French domination, the cooperation of the local elites, and the reforms that the Habsburgs had implemented in pre-Napoleonic Lombardy. Napoleon's main accomplishment in northern Italy was the unification of these very diverse regions, formerly belonging to five different states, into a single centralized state, and the imposition of uniform and more efficient legal, administrative, and financial structures. The republican constitution launched the centralization process by creating a very powerful executive. Napoleon and his vice-president, Francesco Melzi d'Eril, had the final say on all internal policies, nominated top officials, and ran foreign policy. Seven ministers (of war, finance, treasury, interior, religion, justice, foreign relations) were responsible to them. In contrast, the legislature was divided into three bodies and had very limited power. The legislative body voted without discussion on laws prepared by a legislative council. An electoral body, consisting of three colleges of landowners, merchants, and the intelligentsia, elected the members of the legislative body. In other words, political participation was reserved for the propertied and educated classes.

Vice-President Melzi played a key role in running the Republic. A Milanese patrician, he held moderate liberal views, vehemently rejected Jacobinism, and staunchly defended the right of private property. His ultimate goal was an independent northern Italian state governed by a constitutional monarch. This aspiration, along with his demands for more autonomy in running the Republic, led to tension with Napoleon. When the Emperor set up the Kingdom in 1805, he appointed his faithful stepson, Eugène de Beauharnais, as his viceroy in Milan, and moved Melzi to a ceremonial post.

Napoleon's rule was highly authoritarian. In July 1805 he ordered Eugène: "Even if Milan is in flames, you must ask for orders to extinguish it; you must let Milan burn and wait for orders."[7] As King, Napoleon constituted the executive and initiated many laws. He introduced constitutional changes and established new political structures. The Viceroy and the seven ministers executed his orders and ran the daily government business. In July 1805, Napoleon dissolved the legislative body after it had opposed a new tax. He replaced it with a Council of State and, later, created a Senate as well. The former consulted him and discussed legislative projects, while

the Senate approved them. Neither body posed any challenge to Napoleon.

In 1802, Melzi established the Republic's central administration. He divided the Republic into 12 departments (24 during the Kingdom), with a uniform bureaucratic structure. The linchpin was the prefect, who ran the departments and constituted the necessary link between center and periphery.[8] Vice-prefects managed the smaller districts, while *podestá* and *sindaci* (mayors) ran the *comuni*. Under the Kingdom, the prefects' powers expanded while the *comuni* lost their autonomy. Greater centralization made the administration increasingly more efficient and dependable. An increasing number of administrators were selected on the basis of their competence and were gaining in experience and professionalism.[9] Administrative efficiency varied among departments, however, depending on the duration of French rule, the accessibility of a department's terrain to officials, the tradition of resistance, and the legacy of earlier reforms. The *comuni* frequently suffered from a shortage of qualified officials, and many local administrators fulfilled their duties inadequately due to favoritism and intimidation. All but one of the top officials in the Republic and Kingdom were Italian citizens. Melzi mostly nominated administrators of moderate views, while the Kingdom's authorities appointed some bureaucrats who had a radical past. Most officials originated from the ranks of landowners. Out of 52 prefects who served in the Republic and Kingdom, 30 were nobles and 22 came from the bourgeoisie,[10] evidence of the Napoleonic amalgamation efforts.

The State's centralization and administrative uniformity were strengthened by the introduction of the French legal system. Napoleon ordered the translation of the French codes into Italian. They became the law of the land after 1806. The Civil Code reaffirmed legal equality, property rights, and civil marriage. The French court system was also imitated in the Kingdom: a justice of peace in every canton, a civil and criminal tribunal in every department, a court of cassation in Milan, and courts of appeal in Milan, Venice, Bologna, Brescia, and Ancona.

To maintain public order, the authorities instituted a regular police force.[11] The prefects were in charge of the police in their departments, and a Director General of police coordinated police activities throughout the state. The *gendarmerie* served as an elite corps of close to 2000 men, combating smuggling, desertion, and brigandage. During emergencies, the authorities also used regular troops and the National Guard. Yet despite progress in this area, a shortage of manpower remained a problem because of insufficient funds.[12]

The authorities also applied the principles of centralization and uniformity to education. In 1802, Melzi projected the establishment of elementary schools in each commune and secondary schools in each department, along with vocational institutions, universities, and two academies of fine art in Milan and Bologna. The Interior Ministry ran and controlled all levels of public education. The language of instruction was Italian. The authorities devoted much more attention and resources to the secondary school system than to elementary schools. The latter had to wait until 1812 before the government finally proclaimed an organic plan of their organization. While the number of elementary schools increased, many of them suffered from a shortage of money and qualified teachers. As for secondary schools, the *licei*, the government laid the foundation of a modern secular system; it established a uniform curriculum, assigned books, and appointed teachers. Three universities operated in Pavia, Bologna, and Padua with a total enrollment of 1172 students.[13]

The State's increased effectiveness was best illustrated in the financial and military areas. With growing efficiency, the government extracted rising sums of money and conscripted thousands of men annually. The largest yearly expenditure of public funds, normally comprising 50 percent of the budget, was allocated to the upkeep of 25,000 French troops in the Kingdom, and to an expanding Italian army.[14] Other major expenses included the construction and maintenance of roads and waterways, payment of the public debt, and administrative costs. The authorities liquidated the public debt by offering to creditors two types of bonds, one carrying 3.5 percent interest and the other one acceptable as payment for national property.

Direct and indirect taxes provided the bulk of state revenues; they were supplemented by customs, the lottery, and sale of national land. To pay for the increasing Napoleonic impositions, Finance Minister Giuseppe Prina launched reforms designed to augment taxes and reorganized financial administration and tax collection. Prina was the only minister to retain his post throughout the entire Napoleonic period. The Emperor clearly appreciated his efforts and wrote Eugène in 1805, "There is no person who is more essential than the finance minister; he is a hard worker who knows his profession."[15] To gain the landowners' support, Prina kept property taxes, the largest source of the state's income, at a relatively modest level. In return, he established a personal tax and increased indirect taxes, including salt, tobacco, and consumption duties. In 1807, Prina launched a property survey (*catasto*), thereby

erasing differences among taxpayers. The survey progressed rapidly although it was completed only after Napoleon's fall. Prina also tightened state control over taxation, creating a more orderly, uniform, and efficient tax collection. In March 1804, he established new guidelines for tax collectors, aimed at a timely and accurate levy. These new policies, along with an increase in the number of taxpayers, almost doubled state revenues from 1802 to 1811.

Yet the success of Prina's financial policies had a price. The increasing efficiency of tax collection meant a rising fiscal burden on the population. The lower classes bore a proportionately heavier share of this burden, due to the augmentation of indirect taxes. This growing tax pressure contributed to the population's increased hostility toward the Napoleonic State, and Prina became the Kingdom's most hated minister. He later paid with his life for his pro-Napoleonic devotion. Moreover, Napoleon's increasing demands led to rising deficits in the last years of the Kingdom.

In August 1802, the Republic had proclaimed a mandatory military draft, annually conscripting thousands of recruits between the ages of 20 and 25 for four years' service.[16] Conscripts could pay a substitute. Military conscription aroused widespread opposition, particularly among the rural population, who carried the lion's share of the draft. They were unaccustomed to military service and resisted, not out of national sentiments but because of their desire to protect their economic basis and traditional way of life. Napoleonic conscription became the principal bone of contention between the State and civil society. Conscripts dodged the draft, deserted, attacked draft officials, and even revolted, often with the support of their relatives and communities. The government reacted by tightening the draft machinery, dispatching the *gendarmerie*, and proclaiming harsher penalties. The conscription system enabled state officials to move into remote areas and compel citizens to acknowledge the State and obey its laws. Indeed, those policies reinforced the State's power. Despite popular resistance, the government drafted 155,000 men between 1802 and 1814, and expanded the Italian army to 70,000 men by 1812. Italians fought in Spain, Germany, and Russia, suffering enormous casualties. Military service also inspired national consciousness, bringing together citizens from different parts of Italy to serve in Italian units under an Italian banner. It encouraged officers and some rank and file to transcend their regional origins and begin thinking of themselves as part of the Italian nation.

Following the French Concordat (1801), Bonaparte instructed Melzi to reach a similar treaty with Pope Pius VII. The negotiations were long

and difficult. Melzi believed in the supremacy of the State over the Church, while Pius VII opposed any reduction of ecclesiastical power and the annexation of papal lands to the Italian Republic. The two sides finally signed a Concordat in September 1803. It was modeled after the French Concordat, proclaiming Catholicism as the state religion but confirming freedom of religion and authorizing the Republic to nominate bishops and the Pope to consecrate them. It also ratified the new owners of Church land. Bonaparte largely ignored the Concordat and persisted in strengthening the State vis-à-vis the Church. For example, the Emperor continued to confiscate and sell Church land and introduced civil marriage and divorce. Many clergymen remained hostile to Napoleon's rule and refused to collaborate with the State; some even incited disobedience.

The Napoleonic period also had a major impact on Italian Jews, who numbered about 30,000 at the end of the eighteenth century, half of them living in Rome. They lived in squalid ghettos and were subject to economic and legal restrictions. With the arrival of the French armies in the late 1790s, ghetto walls were shattered and Jews received equal rights. In the Republic and Kingdom of Italy, Jews left the ghettos, purchased land, acquired new occupations, entered public schools, and enrolled in the National Guard. Some rose to prominent positions in various municipalities and state administration.

Economically, the government created a national market by eliminating internal tariffs and promulgating a uniform commercial code, a single currency (the *lira*), and unified weights and measures. Communications were improved through extensive construction of roads and waterways, most notably the road over the transalpine Simplon Pass, completed in 1805. While military expenses burdened the treasury, much of the army's equipment was produced in the Kingdom, which encouraged local industry. At the same time, however, French imperial policy damaged the Kingdom's industry and commerce. Essentially, Napoleon wished to turn the Kingdom toward economic dependency on France. He ordered it to export raw silk exclusively to France and forbade the import of foreign industrial products into the Kingdom, except for French goods. In August 1810, the Emperor wrote Eugène, "Italy has France to thank for so much that she really should not mind if France acquired some commercial advantages there."[17] The Continental Blockade paralyzed the ports of Venice and Ancona and harmed maritime commerce, causing shortages of colonial goods. On the other hand, the elimination of British competition boosted wool and cotton industries. Moreover, the decline in

commerce helped to shift resources to the agrarian sector, thus encouraging agricultural expansion. Landowners also benefited from the creation of a larger market, a rise in the prices of grain, rice, and wine, and the continuing sale of Church property, most of which was purchased by the well-to-do.

While the propertied classes benefited from many of the Napoleonic policies, the conditions of the lower classes deteriorated in some important ways. They carried the main burden of conscription, experienced an increase in indirect taxes, and suffered from the ongoing agricultural commercialization. Yet the Napoleonic regime never faced the kind of massive popular revolt that broke out in southern Italy. Popular opposition was mostly limited to resistance to conscription or to brigands, who disrupted law and order but posed no threat to Napoleonic rule. In the summer of 1809, however, revolts broke out in the Veneto and in Emilia-Romagna. The disorder in the Veneto was affected by the Austrian invasion into northern Italy during the Franco-Austrian War. It represented a protest against the demands of the Napoleonic State and a desire to restore the Republic of Venice, reflecting traditional city–country hostility. Thousands of peasant rebels threatened urban centers like Vicenza and Treviso. The authorities restored order only in late 1809. Another widespread rural revolt broke out in several departments in Emilia-Romagna in protest against a new milling tax.[18] The brigand-led rebels, many of whom were deserters, attacked numerous towns, destroyed government property and documents, and briefly threatened Bologna. The authorities held firm and suppressed the revolt, inflicting heavy casualties on the rebels. Still, under the influence of the revolt, Prina decided to revoke the milling tax. Clearly, the revolts and the ongoing brigands' activity demonstrated the antagonism that rural Italy felt toward the rising taxes and conscription.

THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES (1806–14)

In southern Italy, the six-and-a-half years between the collapse of the Neapolitan Republic and the Napoleonic occupation in 1806 were marked by profound crisis. The Bourbon monarchy was in serious fiscal difficulties. The feudal system persisted and the privileged nobility continued to exploit the rural masses and oppose any reform. The court also alienated the rural masses by imposing a heavy tax burden.

In 1805, Naples signed a treaty of neutrality with France but, at the same time, joined the Third Coalition. After Austerlitz, Napoleon sought

to punish the Bourbons for their treachery. In December 1805, he announced that "The dynasty of Naples has ceased to reign."[19] In February 1806, Masséna occupied Naples, forcing Ferdinand IV and his queen, Marie Caroline, to flee to Sicily. The French rule in southern Italy lasted for nearly a decade (1806–14). Napoleon's older brother Joseph ruled over the Kingdom of Naples and its five million people for the first two years; when he moved on to Spain (May 1808), Joachim Murat, Napoleon's brother-in-law and one of his top generals, replaced him.[20] By occupying southern Italy, Napoleon aimed to consolidate his domination over the peninsula, assure the success of his Continental Blockade, and challenge British supremacy in the Mediterranean.

After easily defeating the Bourbon army, the French faced fierce popular resistance, the strongest such opposition they faced anywhere in Europe aside from Spain.[21] Requisitions and looting by the French army provoked rural resistance, which the French suppressed. In July 1806, British forces landed in Calabria and defeated the French at Maida, thereby encouraging a widespread revolt that drove the French out of Calabria. The French campaign to reoccupy that region led to a brutal war. Brigands – most famous among them was the legendary Fra Diavolo – led the revolt, while many clergymen incited the rebels. By February 1808, the French had regained control of Calabria, but brigandage persisted, fueled by military conscription and acute rural misery, and the authorities needed three more years to pacify the country. In this bloody conflict, some 20,000 French and many more Neapolitan citizens died.

Like its northern counterpart, the Kingdom of Naples remained a Napoleonic satellite. The southern Kingdom was required to pay for the upkeep of the French army in Naples, provide the Emperor with troops and ships, and implement the Continental Blockade. Napoleon also demanded advantages for French imports. On the other hand, Joseph, and even more so, Murat, exerted efforts to remain independent. Joseph appointed the Frenchmen Antoine Saliceti, Pierre Roederer, and Mathieu Dumas as ministers of police, finance, and war, respectively. Under Murat, however, the Neapolitan ministers Giuseppe Zurlo (interior), Francesco Ricciardi (justice), and Maurizio Di Gallo (foreign) wielded the greatest influence. A State Council, consisting principally of Neapolitan nobles and bourgeoisie, served as a consulting body. In 1811, Murat even tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to require his French officials to assume Neapolitan citizenship or face dismissal.

The Neapolitan rulers launched a broad reform policy designed to strengthen the central government. The French period "was one of

intensive administrative and juridical reforms and the speed with which the French administration set about dismantling the *Ancien Régime* state was remarkable."[22] Yet the reform program in the Kingdom of Naples was less successful than in northern Italy. A shorter French rule and the fact that the south was not as developed and ripe as the north to absorb the Napoleonic reforms, account for the gap between the two states. Even more important was the stronger opposition the Napoleonic regime faced from the southern elite and the masses. Both Joseph and Murat tried to win over the propertied and educated classes but had only limited success.[23] Finally, limited resources and a shortage of competent personnel also restricted the Neapolitan reform program.

The most significant reform in Naples was the abolition of feudalism. In August 1806, the government suppressed feudal jurisdiction without compensation, declared feudal fees on land redeemable, and transformed baronial land into private property, free of feudal restrictions. On 1 September 1806, it decreed the division of common lands between landlords and towns, ordering the latter to divide their share among local peasants. Two other reforms affecting the land regime stipulated the termination of entails and the sale of confiscated Church property. The abolition of feudal jurisdiction sought to weaken the power of the landed elite and strengthen the State. It was also designed to encourage land sale, spur agricultural development, create a substantial class of small and middle landowners, thereby generating a solid tax base, and reduce social tension. In 1810, Murat wrote Zurlo, "Without doubt, the greatest benefit of my reign will be the total abolition of feudalism."[24]

Despite these efforts, success of the reform was incomplete. Property division and the redemption of feudal fees aroused numerous disputes between feudatories and communities, requiring lengthy examinations of titles and deeds. A special Feudal Commission, set up in November 1807, operated until August 1810 and settled all the litigations submitted to it. However, the barons sought to prevent a prompt implementation of its decisions, and many were still outstanding a hundred years later. The Feudal Commission had no time to execute the complex reform of common lands partition, which remained mostly unsettled due to the landlords' obstructionism. Where small peasants did receive some land, they often lacked the means to cultivate it and so lost it to large landlords. In sum, while the barons lost their jurisdictional rights and tax prerogatives, they gained full ownership of their property and remained the ruling group. The landed bourgeoisie also benefited by becoming free of feudal jurisdiction and appropriating part of the common lands. Both

the former feudatories and the bourgeoisie also increased their possessions by acquiring much of the confiscated Church property. The peasants, on the other hand, gained little. While freed of feudal duties, most remained propertyless, and now without their communal rights as well, they were dependent on the landlords. Their misery remained a major problem in the south throughout the nineteenth century.

The abolition of feudalism in Naples formed the foundation for a uniform state administration. It eliminated the difference between the communities subject to the State and to the *feudi*, and established legal equality. Joseph built a central administration modeled on France, dividing his kingdom into 14 provinces run by intendants. On the communal level, the authorities set up councils of *decurioni* chosen from among proprietors and professionals, who elected mayors. Due to incompetent personnel, however, "the objective of establishing efficient communal administrations and expeditiously enforcing laws, regulations, and instructions issued by the ministers . . . was never reached."[25] The authorities instituted a court hierarchy based on the French model but were unable to find suitable judges for all the new positions. Murat proclaimed the Napoleonic codes, yet instituting entails and divorce was ignored by the local elite and had little effect in Naples.

The abolition of feudalism also paved the way for financial reforms. The authorities revoked tax privileges, hoping to increase tax revenues. The new government had inherited a huge public debt from the Bourbons of more than 130 million *ducati*. Military expenditures claimed almost 70 percent of the budget in 1812.[26] Rationalizing the tax system constituted an important part of the fiscal reforms. In August 1806, the new government replaced the numerous Bourbon direct taxes with a uniform property tax. In August 1809, Murat initiated a modern land assessment although its implementation began only shortly before the end of his reign. The authorities abolished some indirect taxes but preserved state monopolies over salt and tobacco. Confiscated Church land – the State suppressed 1300 monasteries – constituted another important source of income. As in other parts of the peninsula, the wealthy were the principal buyers of these lands. The increased public revenues enabled Murat to reduce the deficit and balance the budget by 1813,[27] but to accomplish this he had to curtail his reform programs.

The Continental Blockade harmed Naples' economy, particularly the agricultural sector, which relied heavily on exports. Maritime trade was virtually paralyzed. Murat was reluctant, therefore, to enforce the Continental Blockade, which provoked tension with Napoleon. Aside

from economic considerations, Murat wished to assert Naples' independence vis-à-vis France. Delays in introducing Code Napoleon into the Kingdom of Naples, and Murat's refusal to grant French products tariff exemption, increased the strained relations between the two.

Developing a Neapolitan army was another significant reform. Joseph introduced annual conscription in 1806 but met with difficulties due to the Calabrian revolt, and it was not strictly enforced. Joseph took part of the troops with him to Spain, leaving his successor with only a small army. Murat exerted great effort to enforce conscription and build up a national army. Eventually, his army stood at 32,000 men, many of whom were convicts. Murat viewed the army as more than a military tool, and "from the outset intended to turn the army into his principal political base in the Kingdom and sought to use it as an instrument by which to forge an *amalgame* between his own dynastic ambitions and the Neapolitan nationalism."[28] Murat succeeded in gaining the loyalty of many civilian and military supporters although the army never provided an adequate basis for the transition to a new political system. Building the Neapolitan army was very costly, however, hampering the implementation of various reforms. Conscription provoked much discontent and fed brigandage. In 1808, Neapolitan troops captured Capri from the British. The Neapolitan army fought in Spain, Germany, and Russia, suffering high casualties.

THE ANNEXED TERRITORIES

The third part of the peninsula consisted of the northern and central regions that Napoleon annexed directly to France: Piedmont (annexed in 1802); Liguria (1805); Tuscany (1808); Parma and Piacenza (1808); and Umbria and Lazio, including Rome (1809). The Napoleonic authorities introduced the French administrative, fiscal, and judicial systems to these lands in order to integrate them with France. They divided them into departments, largely headed by French prefects, established Code Napoleon, imposed French taxation, and conscripted their men. Napoleon faced no major revolts here although his taxation and conscription policies provoked popular hostility. Opposition also came from the clergy. The propertied classes largely supported the Napoleonic regime and were rewarded with government offices and integration into a larger market.

Piedmont was part of the Empire longer than any other Italian region.[29] Following their defeat at Marengo, the Austrians retreated from

Piedmont and Bonaparte reoccupied it. King Charles-Emmanuel IV abdicated in 1802 in favor of his brother, Victor-Emmaunel I, who stayed, however, in Sardinia under British protection until the end of the Napoleonic period. Bonaparte annexed Piedmont to France in September 1802. Its border with Lombardy and its wealth provided him with both strategic and economic incentives to do so. In neighboring Genoa, Napoleon restored the Ligurian Republic but then annexed it to France (June 1805) in order to gain close control of the port of Genoa. Napoleon divided Piedmont into six departments and Liguria into three more departments, appointing French prefects there. The traditional customs frontier between Piedmont and Liguria disappeared.

In Piedmont, Napoleon established all the French laws and institutions. The *gendarmerie*, police, and the army successfully fought many of the brigand bands. Subsequently, "there can be little doubt that the French had restored civil order in Piedmont by 1809, nor is it contestable that they made their rule effective."[30] This was crucial in order to rally the Piedmontese propertied classes to the regime. Piedmontese nobles and members of the bourgeoisie also benefited from opportunities to pursue military and administrative careers, and from the sale of confiscated Church land. At the same time, some aristocrats and many intellectuals resented the introduction of the French language into the new administration and their own loss of autonomy. Many also remained loyal to the House of Savoy. The Continental Blockade and French competition caused heavy losses and great dissatisfaction, especially among silk producers. To this must be added the lower class's discontent provoked by higher taxes and conscription.

Unlike Piedmont, Napoleon refrained from occupying Tuscany immediately after Marengo. Instead, he transformed Tuscany into the Kingdom of Etruria in 1801, and through an agreement with the Spanish Bourbons, Louis, the son-in-law of the Spanish king, became the ruler of the new kingdom. When Louis died in 1803, his wife Maria Luisa, the Spanish Infanta, became regent of Etruria. Under the new rule, Etruria became a bastion of reaction. It also maintained a neutral foreign policy, and Livorno, its prosperous port, remained open to British goods. In 1807, Napoleon ordered French troops into Livorno to destroy English merchandise. In December 1807, the Emperor removed Maria Luisa and annexed Tuscany to the French Empire (May 1808). In March 1809, Tuscany was placed under Napoleon's sister Elisa, already the ruler of Lucca and Piombino. In practice, however, Tuscany was ruled from Paris. It was divided into three departments. Since poverty fed banditry, which

was rampant in the countryside, the propertied classes responded favorably to the efforts of the new regime to restore order, and generally supported French rule. Yet the same groups also resented the blockade, which seriously hurt Livorno and the agricultural sector, which depended on export.[31] As usual, taxation and conscription aroused resistance by the lower classes.

The old Duchy of Parma and Piacenza were annexed, in all but name, to the French Empire in June 1805. Napoleon ordered the introduction of Code Napoleon there. In 1806, the rural population of the Piacentino, the mountain valleys between Parma and Genoa, revolted against French taxation and conscription, but the French ruthlessly suppressed it within a few weeks. The official annexation of Parma and Piacenza to the Empire came in 1808.

Developments in the Papal States followed a similar pattern. The Papacy was plagued by numerous problems. Its economy was backward and the treasury suffered from chronic deficits. Few pilgrims now made their way to Rome, which hurt public revenues. The powerful clergy, which constituted a high percentage of the State's population – 17,000 out of 1.5 million[32] – headed all the ministries and the provincial administrations and blocked badly needed reforms. The ruling patricians failed to develop their huge *latifundia*, while the bourgeoisie remained small and the urban and rural lower classes languished in poverty.

Despite the signing of the Concordat, relations between Napoleon and Pius VII gradually deteriorated. The Pope never approved of the loss of Bologna and Ferrara. He also opposed the organic articles in the Italian Concordat and the introduction of divorce and civil marriage into that state. Franco-Papal relations deteriorated further after the imperial coronation. Pius VII's neutrality during the War of the Third Coalition and his refusal to close his ports to British trade induced Napoleon to chip away at the papal territory. The French Emperor occupied Ancona and Civitavecchia in October 1805 and in May 1806, respectively. The Pope protested but Napoleon responded rather menacingly, "Your Holiness is the sovereign of Rome, but I am the Emperor and all my enemies have to be yours."

When the Pope persisted in his refusal to cooperate with Napoleon on the Continental Blockade, the Emperor ordered General Miollis to occupy Rome (February 1808). All cardinals not born in the papal territories were expelled. The Pope reacted by recalling his representative, Cardinal Caprara, from France. In May 1808, Napoleon annexed the papal Adriatic provinces of Urbino, Ancona, Macerata, and Camerino to

the Kingdom of Italy, aiming to close the Adriatic Sea to British shipping. In May 1809, Napoleon officially annexed the rest of the Papal States, including the city of Rome, to the French Empire, thereby terminating the Pope's temporal authority. Rome was to be "a free and imperial city, the second in the Empire." Napoleon's son would be given the title King of Rome. Pius VII retaliated by excommunicating Napoleon. In response, the Emperor exiled the Pope to Savona, near Genoa (June 1809), and later transferred him to Fontainebleau.

The Papal State then became an integral part of the French Empire, and its territory was divided into two departments: Tiber and Trasimene. General Miollis served as the Governor General, and French prefects ran both departments. Relations between the Napoleonic regime and the population were tense. Only a few Roman aristocrats assumed administrative positions, mostly at the local level. The clergy was hostile to the Concordat, Napoleon's treatment of the Pope, the dispersal of convents, and the dissolution of dioceses.[33] They obeyed Pius VII's orders to refrain from swearing allegiance to the new ruler or to obey his orders and respect the Concordat. Many noble and non-noble families alike had close personal and economic connections with the clergy and hence remained hostile to the regime. The rural population resisted conscription and many deserters joined brigands' bands. Prefects resorted to ruthless measures aimed at suppressing opposition. The Roman masses also opposed the entire world of the Enlightenment that the French tried to introduce. They refused to attend official celebrations or have their children baptized by clergy who collaborated with Napoleon. In sum, the Napoleonic regime remained very unpopular in central Italy.

THE COLLAPSE OF NAPOLEONIC RULE (1813–15)

The debacle in Russia weakened Napoleon's rule throughout Italy. The high number of Italian casualties – only 1000 soldiers returned from the original contingent of 27,000 sent by the Kingdom of Italy[34] – caused much discontent. The escalating financial and conscription pressures, the negative effects of the Continental Blockade, and the banishment of the Pope increased hostility toward the French. Brigand activity rose in the countryside. Advocates of independence formed secret societies, which benefited from British support and were designed to achieve those goals through conspiratorial activity.[35] One of the main such societies, the *adelfia* in northern Italy, had its origin among Jacobin elements and in the Society of the Rays, which dissolved in 1802. In the south, the

carbonari (charcoal burners) formed the largest secret society, consisting mainly of army officers, soldiers, and some bourgeois. These secret sects posed no concrete threat to the Napoleonic regime, however, nor were they able to bring about Italian unity and independence.

Meanwhile, the Kingdom of Italy came under attack by Allied forces.[36] In October 1813, after occupying Illyria, the Austrians invaded northern Italy, forcing Eugène to retreat from Venetia into Lombardy. Despite the growing unpopularity of his regime and the fact that the State's coffers were virtually empty, the Kingdom's administration continued to stand behind Eugène and resisted the Austrians until the very end. However, by early April 1814, Eugène had lost most of his territory. On 16 April, Eugène and the Austrian General Bellegarde signed the Treaty of Schiarino-Rizzino that allowed the French troops to return to France. This agreement ended any prospect that Eugène would be able to stay as the ruler of the Kingdom of Italy. Besides, such an idea was opposed by prominent Milanese senators, some of whom supported the return of Austrian rule, while others, known as "Pure Italians," wanted an independent state under an Italian ruler. Anti-French sentiment culminated on 20 April 1814 when a Milanese crowd, agitated by a group of nobles, lynched Prina, the hated Minister of Finance. Eugène left Italy shortly thereafter and the Austrians entered Milan and reestablished their rule over Lombardy and Venetia.

With the collapse of the Kingdom of Italy, Murat remained the only surviving Napoleonic ruler in Italy. In January 1814, he had joined the Austrians and the British in an attempt to save his Neapolitan throne, hoping to become the ruler of Italy. His position became precarious, however, at the Congress of Vienna, as the European powers supported the restoration of the Bourbons in Naples. Following Napoleon's flight from Elba, Murat declared war on the Austrians and led an army into central Italy. At Rimini, he issued his famous proclamation urging Italians to join his fight for Italian independence and unity (March 1815). His appeal fell flat, and in May 1815 he was defeated by the Austrians at Tolentino. He left for France and then Corsica. Meanwhile, the Bourbons returned to Naples. In October 1815, Murat, aiming to reoccupy his Kingdom, landed in Calabria but was captured by Bourbon forces and executed.

THE AFTERMATH AND THE NAPOLEONIC LEGACY

The collapse of the Napoleonic regime paved the way for the restoration of most of the pre-Revolutionary Italian states. Napoleon had already

allowed Pius VII to return to Rome from Fontainebleau (January 1814) before his abdication. Shortly thereafter, the French administration left Rome and Florence, and the Austrians occupied Tuscany, Modena, and Parma. In May 1814, Victor Emmanuel I returned to Turin from Sardinia, restoring the Savoyard dynasty in Piedmont. As we saw, Ferdinand reestablished his rule in Naples. In the Congress of Vienna, the Allies ratified the restoration of these states under the old dynasties. The Congress also reestablished the Papal State in its pre-Napoleonic borders. The two former Republics of Venice and Genoa were never revived, however. The Congress upheld the incorporation of Venetia, along with Lombardy, into the Habsburg Empire, and annexed Liguria into Piedmont-Sardinia. In sum, the Allies eliminated the Napoleonic organization of Italy and redivided the peninsula into eight states. Austria was the principal beneficiary of the post-Napoleonic arrangement, restoring its hegemony in the peninsula. Aside from ruling over Lombardy and Venetia, the Habsburgs were related to the rulers of Tuscany, Parma, and Modena, and were the chief protectors of the Papacy. Their dominant position in the peninsula turned Austria into the chief opponent of Italian unification and independence.

Italians paid a high human price under Napoleonic rule. Hundreds of thousands of them were drafted and many died in battle. Conscription constituted the most important reason for the hostility Italians felt toward the Napoleonic regime. The growing discontent and opposition during the final years demonstrated the limits of the Napoleonic system. Fiscal demands, economic impositions, and political intervention from Paris had undercut the efforts of the two Napoleonic Italian states to solidify their reform programs. This was particularly true in the Kingdom of Naples, where efforts to strengthen state power and transform society were less successful than in the Kingdom of Italy. The Napoleonic regime in Naples failed to win the full support of the propertied classes, hence its ability to enforce its new laws remained inadequate. This weakness was particularly evident in the failure of the State to improve the conditions of the peasants through the abolition of feudalism. The barons lost feudal jurisdiction but remained the dominant class, in control over the peasants.

Nonetheless, the two decades of French rule left significant legacies in the Italian peninsula. The Napoleonic period laid the political, institutional, and ideological foundations for Italy's unification and independence. By consolidating the ten pre-Napoleonic states, at least temporarily, into only three units, and toppling the old dynasties, Napoleon advanced the cause of national unity and launched the Italian *Risorgimento.*

Although Italy remained territorially and politically divided, and although major differences continued to exist among its regions, the entire peninsula came under a unified code of law, common administrative organization, a single system of conscription, and a uniform tax structure, for the first time in many centuries. The Restoration's regimes paid lip service to traditional ideology, yet at the same time, they adopted the Napoleonic administrative and legal tools that helped to centralize their governments.[37] After 1815, Italians remained basically equal before the law, and the nobility and the clergy never regained the privileges and status they had possessed under the Old Regime. The establishment of a centralized government, including a central bureaucracy, unified legal and fiscal systems, a national market, and state control over the Church was particularly evident in northern Italy, which constituted one of the most successfully transformed areas in Napoleonic Europe. Moreover, northern Italy experienced a successful *amalgame* between the old nobility and the wealthy bourgeoisie, which created a new elite that would remain in power throughout the nineteenth century. In the long run, the Napoleonic State came to serve as a model for the rulers of united Italy, and Code Napoleon served as the basis of its legal system.

11

The Grand Duchy of Warsaw

EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY POLAND

In 1795 Poland ceased to exist as an independent state following the Third Partition of its territory by its three powerful neighbors, Russia, Prussia, and Austria. The first two partitions took place in 1772 and 1793. The Russian share, the largest of all, comprised most of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Ukraine, and several provinces east of the Bug River. Prussia acquired so-called Royal Prussia (West Prussia and Ermland), Great Poland (Mazovia, including Warsaw). Austria seized Galicia.

Prior to the partitions, Poland, with a population of 11 million, was one of the largest countries in Europe.[1] Aside from Poles, its multiethnic population included Lithuanians, Belorussians, Ukrainians, Germans, and Jews. The Polish nobility, the *szlachta*, constituted the dominant class, benefiting from various privileges. In comparison with other European nobilities, it comprised a large share of the population – 7 percent.[2] However, wide economic differences existed within the *szlachta*. The wealthiest group consisted of some 20 magnate families, most notably Czartoryski and Potocki, who possessed huge landholdings. Landlords who owned a village or two formed a larger section of the nobility, but more than half the Polish nobles possessed only tiny plots or were landless. Many lower nobles, seeking careers in the administration, army, and liberal professions, lived in the cities. Most landowners failed to improve their land and relied upon their peasants' labor for their income.

Below the *szlachta* stood a small class of burghers. Most Polish towns were small, representing only 17 percent of the total population. Warsaw, however, experienced rapid growth in the second half of the eighteenth century, reaching 200,000 inhabitants in 1795. At the bottom of Polish society stood the peasantry, who comprised about three-fourths of the people. About two-thirds of these peasants worked on land belonging to the nobility while the rest cultivated Church and crown property. Under the onerous feudal system, peasants had no freedom of movement and owed their landlords a variety of seigneurial fees and labor obligations.

The Polish nobility monopolized the political structure.[3] Only nobles sat in the Polish diet, or *Sejm*. They elected the kings and staffed the top positions. While other European states were moving toward absolutist monarchies, the Polish upper class used its command to weaken the Polish monarchs and increase its own power. Polish rulers possessed virtually no bureaucracy, suffered from insufficient revenues, and had only a small army. The Polish State was further crippled by the notorious unanimity rule, known as the *liberum veto*, which gave each member of the *Sejm* the right to veto any decision, preventing the passage of virtually any legislation. The impotence of this *szlachta* state enabled Russia, Prussia, and Austria to intervene in its affairs, and invade and partition it. A belated attempt to strengthen the State through the Constitution of 1791 failed to save Poland, as did a national insurrection in 1794 led by Tadeuzs Kościuszko, who had fought in the American Revolution.

POLISH NATIONALISM DURING THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND THE CONSULATE

Following the elimination of Poland's independence, Polish *émigrés* scattered throughout Europe. Revolutionary Paris drew many of these exiles who hoped that France would help restore Polish independence. After all, France was fighting against two of Poland's occupiers, Austria and Prussia. In Paris, Polish exiles formed two rival organizations, the Agency and the Deputation, both claiming to represent the Polish nation. The Agency, led by Franciszek Barss, an envoy of Kościuszko in France, viewed itself as Poland's diplomatic representative, advocating moderate liberal ideas. The Deputation, on the other hand, headed by the radical priest Franciszek Dmochowski, advocated radical republican principles, including freedom for the peasants, and viewed an uprising as the way to regain Polish independence. Kościuszko, who had been made an honorary citizen of France in 1793, also settled in Paris.

Hoping to gain French support for the restoration of their homeland's independence, Polish *émigrés* organized legions to fight for the French Republic.[4] The main figure behind these battalions was General Henryk Dabrowski, who had fought in the insurrection of 1794. In early 1797, Dabrowski organized thousands of Polish soldiers to fight with Bonaparte against Austria in northern Italy. Many of them had served in the Austrian army and had been captured by France or had deserted from the Habsburg army. In April 1797, 6000 Polish legionnaires marched with the French army toward Vienna, hoping to liberate Galicia from Austria. Contrary to Polish expectations, however, Bonaparte never raised the question of Poland in his negotiations with Austria. In the final analysis, Poles interested the French general only as recruits for his army.

This disappointment notwithstanding, thousands of Polish troops remained in Italy to help France conquer Rome and Naples, and later fought against the Second Coalition. Joseph Wybicki, a Polish writer and politician, was inspired by the Polish troops in Italy to compose what would become the Polish anthem, which opened with the line "Poland is not yet dead." In 1800, Poles fought with distinction at Marengo and Hohenlinden. Once again, however, Poland was not even mentioned in the peace of Lunéville. In 1803, Bonaparte dispatched thousands of Polish legionnaires to suppress the revolt in Santo Domingo, where most perished of yellow fever.

FROM THE THIRD COALITION TO TILSIT

Although the Polish legions did not realize their hopes of liberating their homeland, they demonstrated that the Polish national spirit was alive. Hopes of restoring their national independence continued to stimulate thousands of Poles to fight under Napoleon when war resumed in 1803. Within the European context, however, "Polish affairs were completely subordinate to the rivalry between Napoleon and the Coalition."[5] Shortly after his victories over Prussia, Napoleon invaded Prussian Poland. The Emperor invited Dabrowski and Wybicki to appeal to the Polish people to revolt but made no commitment to support Polish independence. He feared that such a promise would provoke Austria to rejoin the war and would intensify the fighting resolve of Tsar Alexander I, who opposed the restoration of a Polish state. Napoleon wanted Kościuszko to endorse such a Polish revolt as well. The old Polish hero mistrusted Napoleon, however, and posed unacceptable demands, including the

establishment of an independent Poland within its old borders and the emancipation of the Polish peasants.[6]

Wybicki and Dabrowski called on their countrymen to rise up. Many Poles, especially among the urban population and the petty gentry in western Poland, supported the proclamation and welcomed the French. The peasants hoped to be freed from feudalism. An insurrection quickly liberated western Poland from Prussian rule. In early November 1806, Marshal Davout seized Poznan and soon Dabrowski entered the city. He ordered conscription and assembled an army of 30,000 men.

On 2 January 1807, Napoleon triumphantly entered Warsaw. Since many Polish nobles possessed land in Russian- and Austrian-ruled provinces, most nobles in the capital initially remained lukewarm toward the French. They were also suspicious of radical French slogans and reform plans. Many still hoped that the Russians would restore the Polish kingdom. Aware of the enormous power of the Polish nobility, Napoleon intended to acquire its support rather than rely solely on the masses. Indeed, rallying the Polish nobility around his rule was a major characteristic of the Napoleonic government in Poland. The decision of Prince Joseph Poniatowski, the nephew of the last Polish king, to support Napoleon convinced the Polish nobility to side with the French. For the time being, the Emperor delayed his decision on the establishment of a Polish state. He did set up a provisional government, however, to organize the war effort and run the Polish areas conquered from Prussia. All seven members, except Wybicki, were influential aristocrats and opposed the peasants' demands to abolish feudalism.

Meanwhile, the war against Russia continued. Thousands of Polish troops fought with France at Eylau and Friedlander. Soon, Napoleon and Alexander I signed the Treaty of Tilsit, which included the formation of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw in Prussian Poland. Frederick Augustus, King of Saxony, and an ally of Napoleon, was appointed ruler of the new Polish state. The Russian Tsar, concerned about the existence of an independent Polish entity next to his border, received Bialystok as a compensation. By creating the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, Napoleon achieved two goals: he punished Prussia, drastically reducing its power and territory, and he paid a debt to the Poles for their military assistance.

THE GRAND DUCHY OF WARSAW (1807–13)

The Grand Duchy spread over an area of 104,000 square kilometers (40,600 square miles) with a population of nearly 2.6 million.[7] Following

the Franco-Austrian war of 1809, in which the Duchy participated, the Habsburgs were forced to cede western Galicia and Cracow to the Duchy of Warsaw, thereby increasing its territory to 151,000 square kilometers (75,000 square miles) and its population to 4.3 million. In 1810 the Duchy consisted of a majority of Poles (79 percent) and minorities of Jews (7 percent), Germans (6 percent), Lithuanians (4 percent) and Ukranians (4 percent).[8]

Nonetheless, Tilsit left nationalist Poles disappointed. The Duchy's borders were artificial, its ruler was a foreigner, most of the old Polish State remained outside its boundaries, it was landlocked, and the name Poland failed to appear on the map. Moreover, it was a French satellite and, as such, had to abide by the Continental Blockade, contribute soldiers to the *Grande Armée*, and have no diplomatic relations with other states. Only France had a resident diplomat in Warsaw who possessed the power to intervene in Polish affairs. These shortcomings notwithstanding, the Duchy of Warsaw did keep Polish national hopes alive: the Duchy's administration was run by Poles; its official language was Polish; it raised a Polish army; and the Duchy included Warsaw, the capital and largest Polish city, and Cracow, Poland's historical capital.

In July 1807, Napoleon proclaimed an 89-article constitution for the Duchy. It was modeled after the French Constitution of 1799 but preserved certain traditional Polish parliamentary rules, most notably the division of deputies into nobles and non-nobles. It introduced Code Napoleon, abolished serfdom, and proclaimed legal equality but contained no explicit guarantees of free speech or press. It declared Roman Catholicism as the state religion but also established freedom of religion. The charter also guaranteed Polish as the official language. Contrary to the old Polish constitution, the Napoleonic Constitution created a powerful executive and a weak legislature. It endowed the new ruler, Frederick Augustus, with broad executive authority, including the initiation of legislation, convening the *Sejm*, appointing judges, and running foreign policy. In reality, however, Frederick Augustus was totally dependent upon Napoleon, who ran the Duchy's foreign policy. Besides, Frederick Augustus showed little interest in his new state, which he visited only four times in six years.

The nobility dominated the State's ruling institutions. Frederick Augustus nominated a seven-member Council of Ministers, all nobles. All the ministers had played important political roles in previous years, hence they did not owe their status to Frederick Augustus. They enjoyed broad authority, and the king's absence from the Duchy only increased

their autonomy. Three of them kept their positions throughout the Duchy's existence: the justice minister, Feliks Lubienski; the war minister, Joseph Poniatowski; and the Secretary of State, Stanislaw Breza. A *szlachta*-dominated Council of State, which comprised ministers and other officials, drew up royal decrees and legislative drafts, managed state properties, received a yearly accounting from each ministry, and divided taxes among the departments. The Council also served as a court of appeal.

The Legislative Assembly, the *Sejm*, was a bicameral body consisting of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Senate members were appointed for life by the king, who chose them exclusively from the nobility. The Senate's main function was supervision of the electoral system and citizens' political rights. The nobility also dominated the Chamber of Deputies, which consisted of 100 representatives (after 1809, 166 members) chosen for nine years. Sixty of them represented the nobility and 40 were commoners. Suffrage was based on property qualifications, which limited the number of voters to about 3 percent of the male population, mostly nobles and wealthy burghers. The king convened the *Sejm* for a mere 15 days every two years. It had only modest power and was limited to voting on fiscal legislation and amendments of civil and criminal law.

The French exercised considerable influence over the Duchy. For the first year, Napoleon left an occupying army in the Duchy under Marshal Davout, who had supreme command over the Polish armed forces and great authority over the government. The French ambassador (there were four in six years) intervened frequently in Polish domestic affairs. He sat on the Council of Ministers and supervised issues like censorship and French economic interests.

The Duchy's administration, organized according to the French pattern, was centralized, highly structured, and staffed by Poles. The Duchy was divided into six departments that were subdivided into 60 districts (after 1809, ten and 100, respectively). Appointed prefects ran the departments while sub-prefects headed the districts. Departmental and district councils, whose members were chosen by the ruler, played an advisory role. Appointed mayors headed the large cities. The administration of the rural communities remained under the nobility's control. The authorities also established a Directorate of National Education to run the school system. Hundreds of new primary and secondary schools were established and many new teachers were certified. In 1814, 50,000 pupils attended those schools.[9]

The Constitution established a judicial branch modeled after the French system. It was headed by Justice Minister Lubienski, a shrewd politician who was responsible for the modernization of the judicial structure. The judicial system was standardized, legal qualifications were increased, and new courts were set up. The new court hierarchy ranged from justices of the peace to the Supreme Court. Justices of the peace were elected while the king appointed the other judges mostly from the nobility or its nominees. Lubienski commissioned the translation of Code Napoleon into Polish and it entered into effect in May 1808. He also opened a new school of law.

The Constitution and Code Napoleon met with resistance. The Church opposed divorce and civil marriage. More crucial, however, was the stiff resistance mounted by the landed nobility to the elimination of the feudal system. Article IV of the Constitution abolished serfdom and established legal equality. Code Napoleon formally abolished the lords' control over their former serfs. Yet while the peasants were free to move, they did not gain ownership of the land they cultivated and thus remained totally dependent on their landlords. A new decree of 21 December 1807 stripped them of the traditional right to work and live on their landlord's land.[10] Peasants who left their villages had to relinquish all claims to their land, livestock, tools, and crops. The property rights guaranteed by Code Napoleon enabled landowners to force their peasants to sign new and more demanding contracts. Disobedient peasants could be evicted within a year after the edict's proclamation. In practice, few peasants left their lands; they continued to live at the mercy of the landowners, perform onerous duties, most notably the *robot* (traditionally, the labor obligations on a landowner's property), and pay higher rents. In the words of Christopher Blackburn, "Polish landowners successfully worked through the Napoleonic constitution and legal code to rescind virtually all established peasant rights and legal protection, thus creating a new modern serfdom which would last well into the nineteenth century."[11] In fact, the continuation of control over the peasants underscored, more than any other element, the powerful position of the Polish *szlachta*. Napoleon needed the nobles' support in order to ensure his control over the Duchy. The Polish nobility recognized Napoleon's supreme power and, in return, were entrusted with political authority and the power to preserve their traditional control over the peasants. Ultimately, the persistence of seigneurial obligations and legal inequality in the countryside signified the principal contradiction of the Napoleonic reform policies in the Duchy of Warsaw.

Many landless lower nobles lived in the cities and found employment in the new bureaucracy. Warsaw, in particular, became an important commercial center. The Duchy included two other major cities: Cracow (24,000 inhabitants) and Poznan (18,000). Most other towns were very small, not much bigger than a large village. The Napoleonic reforms did offer some opportunities to members of the emerging middle class by opening positions for them in the bureaucracy and the legal profession. The formation of the Polish army also meant profits for military contractors. But while wealthy burghers received voting rights, the nobility dominated social and political life, and the infant bourgeoisie had to follow its leadership.

Jews comprised a sizeable percentage of the Duchy's urban population. In 1810, 300,000 Jews lived in the Duchy, constituting its largest minority. Most earned a living from trade, innkeeping, or finance. The hopes of Polish Jews to become equal citizens remained unfulfilled. A decree in October 1808 suspended Jewish voting rights for ten years on the grounds that "Jews were not fully integrated into society." They were barred from living on certain streets in Warsaw, holding official posts, or buying estates. Jews were subject to special taxes, including a fee on kosher meat. In 1812, the authorities barred Jews from selling alcohol and owning inns. Some Jews were exempt from those restrictions, owing to their wealth, education, or patriotic service. All of these anti-Jewish measures clearly violated the Constitution and Code Napoleon yet the persistent discrimination clearly reflected a long and deep hostility against Jews in Polish society.

As with other satellite states, Napoleon imposed heavy military and financial burdens on the Duchy of Warsaw. Supplying conscripts and money were important parts of the Polish nobility's obligations to Napoleon in return for his recognition of their authority. The Duchy provided France with more military support than any other satellite state.[12] Indeed, the army constituted an extremely important institution in the Duchy since, after all, war had played an important role in its creation and expansion, and for many Poles military service and patriotism went hand in hand. The war minister, Poniatowski, participated in many Napoleonic campaigns and was the only foreigner to be appointed Marshal of France by Napoleon. Under the Constitution, the Duchy was committed to maintaining an army of 30,000 men. In 1809, the armed forces were doubled, and – in 1812 – their number rose to more than 100,000 soldiers. Poniatowski introduced military reforms based on the French model, most notably annual conscription, which drafted men

between the ages of 20 and 25 for six years. Despite the Duchy's brief duration, it raised nearly 200,000 men. Poles fought in Spain, Russia, and Germany, suffering enormous casualties.

Maintaining such a large army consumed two-thirds of the Duchy's budget.[13] The Polish population also supported Napoleon's military needs by constructing fortresses and paying for the French army in the Duchy. Requisitions by the *Grande Armée* further exacerbated the military burden on the Duchy. Napoleon also granted Polish estates worth 20 million francs to French generals and dignitaries for their outstanding service.[14] These tax-exempt donations, taken from crown lands, diminished the State's revenues. The Duchy also became heavily indebted to France through the Bayonne Convention (May 1808). In 1807, Napoleon appropriated Prussian crown lands in the Duchy, insisting that the Duchy would have to buy them from him. The French then overestimated the property value, assessing them at 43 million francs. At Bayonne, Napoleon consented to surrender these properties to the Poles for 20 million francs, payable in three installments beginning in 1809. To meet the Duchy's fiscal obligations, the authorities introduced new taxes, most notably the personal tax, and increased existing taxes. The poor economy led to shortfalls in tax collection, however, and the Duchy continued to suffer from chronic financial difficulties until its collapse.

Like other states, the Duchy of Warsaw had to abide by the Continental System – despite its adverse effect on the Polish economy.[15] Most importantly, it closed off the lucrative British market to Poland's principal export, grain, causing a major fall in cereal prices, depreciation of property values, and losses to landowners. Local markets were poor and inadequate to offset the losses of international trade.[16] Consequently, the development of agriculture, by far the most important branch of the Polish economy, was halted. Rural regions suffered from the devastation of war, requisitions by crossing armies, and a crop failure in 1811. Many peasants died or migrated, causing some regions to become depopulated. Preferential tariffs on imported French and Saxon goods hurt the development of local manufacturing. On the other hand, orders by the military helped the textile industry.

The Duchy of Warsaw participated in the Franco-Austrian War of 1809. In April 1809, an Austrian army of 30,000 men under Archduke Ferdinand invaded the Duchy from Galicia. In the Battle of Raszyn, the Polish army suffered heavy losses and was forced to withdraw from Warsaw. Soon thereafter, Poniatowski launched a successful offensive into undefended Galicia, quickly occupied parts of it, was welcomed as

a liberator by the population, and set up a provisional government. Archduke Ferdinand was forced to withdraw from Warsaw in order to defend Galicia. Meanwhile, the Russian Tsar, concerned about the Polish successes, sent an army into Galicia to prevent further Polish gains. Poniatowski found himself in a difficult situation, but the campaign was decided when Napoleon defeated the Austrians at Wagram. The Austrian army then retreated and Poniatowski occupied Cracow. In the Treaty of Schönbrunn, the Austrians ceded western Galicia to the Duchy of Warsaw. The 1809 war was the first time since the Partitions that a Polish army had liberated Polish lands. Russia was compensated with the district of Tarnopol in eastern Galicia. Napoleon also assured Alexander I that he would not restore the Polish state to its old boundaries.

Meanwhile, tensions were rising between France and Russia. The Polish question contributed to the deteriorating relationship between Alexander I and Napoleon. The Tsar feared that the Duchy would develop into an independent Polish state and would claim the Polish territories seized by Russia. It became apparent that a Franco-Russian war was inevitable when Russia withdrew from the Continental Blockade. With the assistance of his ally, Prince Adam Czartoryski, the Tsar tried to win over the Poles by promising to restore Poland in its old borders, but under his rule. Poniatowski mistrusted the Russians, however, and remained loyal to Napoleon.

Meanwhile, Napoleon prepared the *Grande Armée* for the Russian campaign. To spur enthusiasm in the Duchy he convoked a special session of the *Sejm*, declaring his support for the establishment of the Kingdom of Poland. Many Poles viewed a war against Russia as a war of liberation and were ready to fight. Napoleon's splendid declaration proved meaningless, however. The real power remained in the hands of French ambassador de Pradt, and the Emperor remained uncommitted and vague concerning the future of an independent Poland. He feared that such a state would alienate Austria and Prussia, whose support he needed against Russia. Moreover, Napoleon's grandiose proclamation differed greatly from the harsh economic reality of the Duchy, which was plundered by the *Grande Armée* in 1812. The Duchy's treasury was empty as a result of military expenses and the need to support the Napoleonic army.

With nearly 100,000 Polish soldiers participating in the Russian campaign, the Duchy's contingent was the largest among Napoleon's allies. Poniatowski commanded the Polish Corps, 37,000 men strong. Poles fought with distinction in the battles of Smolensk and Borodino and entered Moscow with Napoleon. Polish casualties in the Russian campaign

amounted to a staggering 90,000 men. Of Poniatowski's force, only a few hundred survived.

Despite their high casualties in the Russian campaign, Polish troops continued to fight under Napoleon. Poniatowski himself led the reserves of the Duchy's army into the Battle of Leipzig. Severely wounded, the Polish marshal galloped his horse into the River Elster in an attempt to cross, but drowned. Poles also fought for Napoleon at Waterloo.

THE AFTERMATH AND THE NAPOLEONIC LEGACY

In February 1813, the Russians crossed the border into the Duchy and forced its Polish government to evacuate the capital. Alexander I established a Provisional Supreme Council, and the Duchy continued to exist as a Russian protectorate for the next two years. The future of Poland became one of the most controversial issues at the Congress of Vienna. The main question was whether the Tsar would be allowed to rule over the entire Duchy, thus depriving Austria and Prussia of their former Polish lands. An Anglo-Austrian coalition, supported by France, opposed Russia on this question and even threatened a new war. Finally, however, the powers reached a compromise: Alexander I received most of the Duchy of Warsaw, which became the Kingdom of Poland; Prussia settled for the western regions, including Danzig; and Austria retained Galicia. Cracow became a free city under the joint protectorate of the three powers. The Congress also acknowledged the existence of a Polish nation, stipulating that Poles would have national representation and institutions, albeit subject to the approval of the three powers.

The Duchy of Warsaw extended Napoleonic imperial power all the way to the Russian border. The Emperor drew important advantages from the Duchy, primarily in the form of the huge number of Polish conscripts who served in his army. The Duchy's authorities also abided by the Continental Blockade, despite the losses to Polish agriculture, and let Napoleon grant Polish estates to his generals. In return, Napoleon recognized the political hegemony of the *szlachta* and allowed it to maintain its seigneurial practices even though they contradicted Code Napoleon and the Duchy's Constitution. The nobility was able to increase its power over the peasants and preserve the old system for much of the nineteenth century. In reality, Napoleon had little choice in light of the considerable power the Polish nobility wielded. Indeed, the Duchy of Warsaw represents a prime example of the limits and contradictions of the Napoleonic

reform policy and of the Emperor's inability to transform the society in the face of stiff opposition by the local ruling class.

Despite those limits, the Napoleonic rule in the Duchy of Warsaw provided stimulation for political, judicial, and administrative modernization. Napoleon introduced a modern constitution, judicial uniformity, a conscripted army, and a centralized bureaucracy, institutions that were nonexistent under the old Polish state. Those institutions largely continued during the new Kingdom of Poland.[17] The new Constitution of 1815 was based on the Duchy's constitution. It guaranteed personal freedom and property rights and established a strong executive. The *Sejm* and the Council of State survived as well. The Napoleonic legal system, including Code Napoleon, and the administrative structure remained largely intact during the new Kingdom. The Duchy also opened positions to nonnobles, thus giving some encouragement to the urban Polish middle class, and began the process of grounding the social hierarchy in private property.

Even more significant was the stimulus the Napoleonic period gave to Polish nationalism. Despite its limits and short duration, the Duchy signified the revival of the Polish state and a reversal of the Partitions. The Polish army, the establishment of an administration staffed with Poles, the use of Polish as the official language, and the appearance of various national symbols in the Duchy all became a reality, strengthening Polish national sentiment. The preservation of the Polish army was the most significant factor that helped to maintain Polish nationalism. In sum, "the greatest legacy of the Napoleonic period was that it once again returned the Polish question to a central position in international affairs, while simultaneously reawakening hopes of the rebirth of a Polish state."[18]

12

The Illyrian Provinces

THE LAND AND ITS PEOPLE

Napoleon established the Illyrian Provinces after signing the Treaty of Schönbrunn with Austria (October 1809). Located on the eastern shores of the Adriatic Sea, the Illyrian Provinces extended over 55,000 square kilometers (21,500 square miles) and were named after the old Roman province of Illyricum. Previously they had belonged to various states: southern Carinthia and Carniola had been ruled by the Habsburg dynasty since the fourteenth century; Trieste, an active and ethnically diverse city, had belonged to the Habsburgs since 1382 and was the most important port of the Austrian Empire; Istria and Dalmatia had been a part of the Venetian Empire from the year 1000 until Campo Formio, when they were delivered by Napoleon to the Austrian Empire, along with Venice. Following the Treaty of Pressburg (1805), however, Napoleon transferred Istria and Dalmatia to the Kingdom of Italy. Ragusa (Dubrovnik), on the other hand, was an independent and prosperous Republican city-state that had managed to preserve its independence until the French occupied it in 1808. The Illyrian Provinces also included Croatia, south of the River Sava, and part of Tyrol, added in 1810. The main cities included the ports of Trieste and Ragusa, and Laibach (Ljubljana), which served as the capital.

The Illyrian Provinces were an artificial creation of Napoleon, consisting of regions that had little in common. In fact, the classical name Illyria was chosen by the French in order to provide a common denominator to otherwise heterogeneous provinces with little sense of collective

consciousness. Illyria was neither an independent state nor a satellite state, but just a minor appendage of the French Empire[1] formed for economic and military reasons.[2] Most importantly, the Emperor formed the Illyrian Provinces in order to tighten the Continental Blockade and close the Adriatic ports to British commerce. By 1809, his Italian satellite states controlled the western coast of the Adriatic Sea, and through the creation of the Illyrian Provinces Napoleon hoped to dislodge the British by turning the Adriatic Sea into a French lake. The creation of Illyria was also designed to secure a trade route with the Levant and guarantee the importation of cotton from the eastern Mediterranean for the French textile industry. Militarily, the Illyrian Provinces aimed at weakening the Austrian Empire; it cut Austria off from the sea and created a buffer zone against an Austrian invasion into the Kingdom of Italy.

The poverty and heterogeneity of the Illyrian Provinces created an inhospitable environment for the implementation of Napoleonic reforms and the establishment of a coherent and effective government. Geographically, it was rather distant from the rest of the Empire. Topographically, much of the country was mountainous, not easily accessible to officials. As much as one-third of the Illyrian land was uncultivable. The population of the Illyrian Provinces comprised 1.5 million people of diverse nationalities: Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Italians, and Germans. Five different languages were used in the new entity: Slovene, Serbo-Croatian, Italian, German, and French. Religiously, most Illyrians were Catholic while Greek Orthodox constituted a substantial 20 percent minority. Various legal systems coexisted in Illyria, including Austrian, Venetian, and Roman, as well as many local customs and practices. Socially, most of the population consisted of poor peasants subject to their lords, while a mercantile class was concentrated in the coastal cities.

THE NAPOLEONIC REFORMS

In December 1809, Napoleon established a General Government, consisting exclusively of French officials, to run the Illyrian Provinces. The Emperor himself was the supreme authority in the new entity and appointed the top officials. Highest among them was the Governor-General, who signed laws, appointed government administrators, supervised the civil and judicial officials, and was the commander of the military and police forces. The first Governor-General was Marshal Auguste-Frederic Marmont, Duc de Raguse, a veteran career officer who

had served as governor of Dalmatia since 1806. Marmont held broad powers and hoped that the Illyrian Provinces would maintain a degree of autonomy and that his position would resemble that of Eugène, the Viceroy of the Kingdom of Italy. These aspirations evaporated in April 1811 when Napoleon created a more centralized, French-like government in Illyria and Marmont resigned. His successor was another military officer, General Count Henri-Gratien Bertrand, who served until early 1813 when he was replaced by a third veteran, General Andoche Junot, who stayed in power only briefly due to poor health. He was replaced by Joseph Fouché, the former minister of police and the only civilian Governor-General. Aside from the Governor-General, the Illyrian government also included the Intendant-General of Finances, who was the chief of the civil administration and the Commissioner-General of Justice. Luc-Jacques Dauchy, an experienced bureaucrat, served as the Intendant-General of Finances under Marmont. He was replaced by André-Christophe Count Chabrol, who stood out by virtue of his hard work and dedication. While Bertrand concentrated on military affairs, Chabrol ran civilian matters and soon became the most influential official in Illyria.

Initially, the authorities established a provisional organization dividing Illyria into ten provinces, each retaining the old structure. Napoleon appointed intendants to run these provinces but their powers and duties were not clearly defined, which caused confusion.[3] Fifteen months later, on 15 April 1811, Napoleon proclaimed a comprehensive organic decree establishing a permanent governing system in Illyria, most notably setting up a modern central bureaucracy and integrating Illyria into the French empire. It reorganized the Illyrian Provinces and established "a uniform system of administration, finances, and justice based largely upon the institutions then in effect in France."[4] The decree established six civilian provinces, as well as a seventh, the Province of Military Croatia. The civilian provinces were divided into districts and, for judicial purposes, into cantons. Intendants, who had authority similar to French prefects, ran the provinces with the help of a council and reported to the Intendant-General. All but one of the Illyrian Intendants were French citizens, selected from the ranks of the *auditeurs* of the *Conseil d'État*. Sub-delegates, mostly Illyrians, managed the districts. The 1811 decree also established a uniform municipal administration subject to the central government. The Emperor appointed the mayors of the major cities. Cities with revenues greater than 10,000 francs had to submit their budgets to the Emperor for approval, and the Intendant-General supervised municipal

finances. In sum, the new administrative hierarchy extended from the Emperor to the Illyrian mayors, establishing direct French rule over the Illyrian departments.

The 1811 decree also replaced the previous diverse judicial system with a uniform organization based on the French model. The Commissioner-General of Justice was in charge of reorganizing and supervising judicial affairs. Code Napoleon took effect in January 1812. The Illyrian territory was divided into 96 cantons, each with a justice of the peace. The rest of the judicial hierarchy consisted of 11 Tribunals of First Instance and a supreme court, comprising top government officials and presided over by the Governor-General. Marmont also created a local police force, a National Guard, and a *gendarmerie* to combat the endemic banditry and smuggling, hunt down deserters, and defend against English raids.

Implementation of the new system in the Illyrian Provinces, however, ran into major difficulties. The authorities' attempts to establish uniform and efficient administrative and judicial structures remained largely unsuccessful. The new entity was too heterogenous and its provinces were not advanced enough to absorb the French system. Moreover, French rule was too brief to implement the new organizations successfully, no matter how hard the French officials tried. Other factors also accounted for the failure: the ignorance of intendants regarding local conditions, culture, and languages; a shortage of qualified personnel; and the fact that most local functionaries understood no French and were ignorant of the French law. Efforts by the authorities to establish law and order were hampered, as well. The *gendarmerie* and communal police remained understaffed and unable to wipe out banditry and smuggling.

The Napoleonic authorities also failed to eradicate the feudal regime in Illyria.[5] Napoleon had no intention of introducing radical social and economic changes, fearful of alienating the landowning class. Initially, the provisional government introduced small changes, such as the abolition of the *corvée* in civil Croatia and some private tolls. The 1811 decree stipulated that feudal dues could be redeemed and allowed labor services to be converted into payments in cash and in kind. However, the peasants pressed for complete freedom and refused to redeem their feudal obligations.[6] Yet their hopes that the French would abolish their feudal obligations remained unfulfilled; feudal fees remained high in many parts of Illyria, causing peasants to leave Carinthia and Carniola.

Chronic deficits and inadequate revenues posed the most serious obstacle to implementation of the reforms. Rising military costs left inadequate funds for other branches of the government. The Illyrian government spent well

over 50 percent of its budget on the military; in 1812, military and naval expenses rose to 9.9 million francs out of a budget of 13.5 million.[7] To overcome the fiscal crisis, Napoleon brought expenditures under the control of the French ministries and reorganized the fiscal structure. The authorities replaced the diverse financial system with a uniform tax administration modeled on France. The chief financial administrators were the Intendant-General of Finances and the Treasurer-General. The Illyrian authorities centralized tax collection and adopted the French direct taxes, including property tax. Lacking a land survey, tax rolls were based on information supplied by landowners and needed to be approved by the Intendant. Indirect taxes included salt and tobacco monopolies and a stamp duty. The government also drew some income by selling confiscated colonial merchandise.

Despite government efforts, "Illyria's revenues never sufficed for the expenses of the General Government,"[8] and deficits remained the rule under Napoleon. The Continental Blockade hurt the economy considerably, thereby hampering the ability of Illyrian citizens to pay taxes. The Illyrian population resented the imposition of new taxes, which were higher than under the Austrians, and the efforts of the authorities to collect them efficiently. Property tax rolls were based on inaccurate estimates and lacked uniformity, thereby causing discontent and provoking protests by landowners. Many Illyrians, especially in poor Dalmatia, resented the personal tax and refused to pay it. Consequently, tax collection was slow and subject to delays. Tax personnel were inadequate and, at times, incompetent and dishonest. To assure the collection of taxes, the authorities sometimes used troops, as happened in June 1812 in the coastal islands of Dalmatia,[9] which naturally increased the regime's unpopularity. Indirect taxes never provided as much income as the French had hoped. The prices of salt and tobacco rose but revenues did not increase by much. Revenues were also hurt by the smuggling of salt. In addition, Illyria suffered from a chronic shortage of coins and the government failed to establish a stable currency.

Naturally, insufficient revenues hindered the implementation of reforms. No other area was as affected by the lack of funds as education.[10] In July 1810, the General Government proclaimed an ambitious education reform program, aiming to establish a uniform school system in Illyria. It ordered the opening of elementary schools for boys in every commune and for girls in every canton and fixed a curriculum to be taught in the local language by lay teachers. Communes were charged with financing elementary education. The secondary school system was

to consist of 25 two-year *gymnases* and nine *lyceés*, where instruction was to be offered in French, Italian, and German, paid for by the parents. For higher education, the decree formed two central schools in Laibach and Zara. Implementing the plan, however, was impossible. Offering instruction in French, German, and Italian certainly limited the number of students. In fact, the 1811 decree scaled down the number of *lyceés* to only two, plus a secondary school in each province, all to be organized according to the French system. The 1811 decree made no mention of primary education, which remained sub-par due to a lack of teachers, inadequate buildings, and the almost nonexistence of textbooks in the Slovene language. Most importantly, both the State and the communes lacked the resources to support elementary education, and so much of the original policy had to be abandoned.

Conscription aroused the strongest anti-French feelings in Illyria.[11] Initially, the army of Illyria, which had been established before conscription entered into effect, consisted of the Franco-Italian Army of Dalmatia, and at its peak stood at 28,562 men. The Governor-General was the chief commander. Conscription was first ordered in 1810, and the 1811 decree introduced the French system into Illyria. The Emperor established an annual quota and the Illyrian government divided it among the departments and communes. A drawing among eligible draftees determined who served in the army. In November 1810, the Emperor ordered the conscription of 18,000 soldiers, but during the next three years authorities called up only 3000 men each year. While the number of draftees was not very high, resistance to conscription among Illyrians, who were unaccustomed to it and had no incentive to fight for Napoleon, was widespread. As usual, conscription fell mostly on peasants, many of whom evaded the draft by fleeing to the Austrian Empire or to coastal islands. Members of the urban middle class joined the National Guard rather than the army, and sons of nobles found "legal" ways to evade service altogether. The Jews of Trieste also petitioned Napoleon to allow Jewish recruits to find replacements. Anti-draft riots broke out in various communities and police were attacked. Hundreds of soldiers deserted and many joined bands of brigands. The authorities sent *gendarmes* and the National Guard to search for deserters and imposed stiff penalties, including the placement of troops in the homes of conscription evaders, and in some instances even death. The authorities also required communes to replace their own draft dodgers. The government also tried to develop an Illyrian naval force to help challenge the British in the Adriatic Sea. In 1810, Marmont conscripted over 500 sailors. Naval service was as unpopular,

however, as service on land. The construction of ships at Trieste also ran into difficulties and none had been completed by the time the regime collapsed.

The decree of 1811 also established a military government for the province of Military Croatia. The French inherited this region from the Habsburgs, who had organized Military Croatia as a buffer against the Ottoman Empire in the 1530s. Marmont admired the Austrian system and convinced the Emperor to retain it. He reorganized the regiments in that region, incorporated them into the army of Illyria, and appointed French and Italian officers as their commanders. The French armed 6000 Croatians in that area and kept the border reasonably quiet. Illyrian and Croatian units fought in Russia and in the battle of Leipzig, but when the Austrians invaded Croatia in 1813, the Croatian forces failed to resist.

Efforts by the Illyrian government to control the Catholic Church, the largest denomination in Illyria, and the introduction of the Concordat stimulated considerable antagonism among the powerful clergy and many parishioners in Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slovenia.[12] Marmont failed to heed the warnings of Italian officials not to introduce the Concordat into Dalmatia, where attempts to introduce such a policy before 1809 had been strongly resented. Trying to transform the clergy into loyal servants of the State was an important part of the government's centralization policies. Marmont exerted much effort in introducing French ecclesiastical policies into Illyria and eliminating the influence of the Austrian Church. The General Government closed religious orders and confiscated Church property, sometimes converting it into military barracks. Marmont also abolished the tithe, which he viewed as incompatible with the new land tax. The Emperor nominated new bishops and the clergy were required to take an oath of loyalty to the new regime. The 1811 decree formally turned the clergy into officials of the State, which paid their salaries. These policies, along with the introduction of civil marriage, the imprisonment of the Pope, and the elevation of the Orthodox Church to an equal status with Catholicism, further antagonized the Catholic clergy. The outstanding clerical opponent of French religious policy was the Franciscan friar Dorotich, who fled the country and waged an underground war from Bosnia and Albania until 1813.[13] Improvement in the status of the Orthodox Church, including the creation of a bishopric, failed to overcome its hostility to the Napoleonic secularization policy in Illyria. The approximately 2500 Illyrian Jews, who benefited from the French proclamation of their civic equality and the lifting of the old restrictions on them, were more supportive.

Aside from failing to implement much of their reform policy, the Illyrian authorities were also unsuccessful in enforcing the Continental Blockade and preventing the smuggling of British goods, which was, after all, the main reason for the formation of the Illyrian Provinces.[14] Before 1809, the British used the ports of Trieste and Fiume to ship goods into the Austrian Empire. The Illyrian government now required merchants to declare any English merchandise at their disposal and punished those who provided false statements. Undeclared English products were seized and burnt publicly, while colonial merchandise was auctioned off. It was impossible, however, to close Illyria to British goods altogether, particularly in southern Dalmatia and Ragusa. The rugged coastline, dotted with numerous small islands, as well as the inadequate number of customs personnel, many of whom were easily corrupted, facilitated smuggling. British naval supremacy in the Adriatic Sea posed another major obstacle to the prevention of smuggling. To sustain their control of the Adriatic, the British established a military base and commercial outlet on the island of Lissa, off the Dalmatian coast, which the French were unable to dislodge. Not surprisingly, the blockade had an adverse effect on the local economy. Maritime commerce declined drastically and Illyrian ships remained idle. The population in Illyrian ports took an active part in the smuggling activities, making it still more difficult for the State to combat them. Indeed, for many people smuggling was their only source of living during these times of economic hardship. In the words of Bundy, "smuggling and contrabanding took on the aspects of a national industry."[15] Although local industry was protected from British competition, it too declined due to the overall economic crisis and a fall in exports. Factories closed and iron mining dropped. In sum, the blockade imposed sacrifices on Illyria beyond its capacity to bear. Paradoxically, then, "The Continental System, creator of Illyria, was also its grave digger."[16]

THE AFTERMATH AND THE NAPOLEONIC LEGACY

By 1813, Napoleon realized that Illyria was of little value to him and, in negotiations with Metternich that year, offered it to Austria in return for Vienna's neutrality. The negotiations failed, however. Napoleon recalled Fouché and ordered him to prepare Illyria for an Austrian attack. Eugène was in charge of the defense of the Illyrian Provinces. In August 1813 Austrian troops invaded Illyria, provoking anti-French insurrections in Croatia and other provinces. Numerous civil servants defected or left

their posts. In late September the Austrians entered Laibach. The General Government withdrew to Trieste and then to Parma. The Congress of Vienna confirmed the return of the Illyrian Provinces to the Habsburg Empire.

Few Illyrians regretted the collapse of the Napoleonic regime. There was only a small Francophile camp in Illyria, comprising some intellectuals and officials, and possibly the tiny, newly emancipated Jewish community. Otherwise, the financial burdens, the Continental Blockade, conscription, and the treatment of the Church provoked widespread alienation from the Napoleonic regime among Illyrians. The formation of the Illyrian Provinces was essentially opportunistic and it failed to achieve its main goal of blocking the entry of British goods. The reform policies barely got beyond the planning and proclamation stages because the region did not possess the necessary structural preconditions. Many of the reform policies were simply inapplicable to many areas. The French faced economic, political, and cultural obstacles that could not be overcome in the brief period they ruled over these diverse regions.

Still, French rule left a few traces that deserve to be mentioned. Napoleonic authorities initiated the construction of important public works, including highways, bridges, and dockyards, and the draining of marshes. Most important was the construction of a highway, known as *Route Napoléon*, from Laibach to Ragusa. Despite the failure to apply much of the educational reform policy, the foundations were laid for secondary education, and the use of Slovene and Serbo-Croatian in primary schools was recognized for the first time. Finally, the Napoleonic period was the first time that Slovenes, Croats, and some Serbs were unified into one political unit outside the Austrian and Ottoman Empires; in this sense, the Napoleonic period may have provided some stimulus to the notion of South Slav unity.[17] In fact, a movement of intellectuals, advocating unity and a common language and known as the Illyrian Movement, operated during the Restoration period.

13

The Collapse of the Napoleonic Empire

At the end of 1810, following the annexation of the Hansa cities and the Duchy of Oldenburg, the Napoleonic Empire reached its territorial peak. It spread over an area of 750,000 km^2 (293,000 square miles) and had 44 million inhabitants. In March 1811, Marie Louise gave birth to an heir. The dynasty appeared secure. Yet beneath the apparent stability lay signs of weakness. Conscription and financial pressures continued to arouse resentment and increase Napoleon's unpopularity. Similarly, the Continental Blockade stimulated much opposition and continued to be defied. The occupation of Rome, and particularly the banishment of Pope Pius VII in 1809, earned Napoleon the bitter hostility of devout Catholics throughout Europe. In France, too, there were signs of fatigue with the ongoing demands of war, and an overall crisis was looming.[1] Budget deficits and tax increases caused discontent, and a recession in 1810–11 hurt industry. The Continental Blockade continued to hurt French ports considerably[2] and caused a shortage of raw material from the colonies, which harmed industrialists. Grain shortages provoked bread riots and misery spread through many parts. French Catholics shared the anger other faithful believers felt about Napoleon's treatment of the Pope. Napoleon was losing support among the notables, his main pillar of support, although opposition was mute.

Internationally, the war in Iberia continued unabated and the "Spanish ulcer" persisted in bleeding Napoleon's army. The French position deteriorated when Marshal Masséna failed to occupy Portugal and dislodge

the British from that country. On another front, the problematic alliance between Napoleon and Tsar Alexander I was about to crumble.

THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN, 1812

Relations between Alexander I and Napoleon had remained uneasy ever since the Treaty of Tilsit. The central source of tension was the Duchy of Warsaw. It was a French satellite on the Russian border, which the Tsar viewed as threatening to Russia's security.[3] In 1809, during the Franco-Austrian war, Prince Poniatowski had sought to raise a Polish revolt, not only in Austria but also in Russian Poland. The expansion of the Duchy of Warsaw in the Treaty of Schönbrunn heightened Alexander I's suspicion that Napoleon planned to incorporate Russian Poland into the Duchy and restore an independent Polish kingdom. Alexander I was also bitter that Napoleon had not given him a free hand to expand at the expense of the Ottoman Empire and had failed to support him in his attempts to occupy the Danubian Principalities (present-day Romania). The annexation to France of Oldenburg, which had dynastic ties to the Romanovs, was another of the Tsar's grievances.

Napoleon's main dissatisfaction with Russia was its failure to enforce the Continental Blockade. While Alexander I declared war on Britain, Napoleon suspected that he never pursued the blockade rigorously enough. The blockade harmed the economic interests of Russia, reducing its exports and contributing to an increasing budget deficit. Russia also wanted to develop its commerce with neutral countries, which Napoleon opposed. Alexander I came under pressure by a powerful lobby in his court that opposed the blockade, and in mid-1810, began loosening the enforcement of the blockade by refusing to confiscate neutral ships. The final break between Russia and France came on 31 December 1810 when the Tsar officially withdrew from the Continental Blockade.

Both sides began preparing for war and seeking allies. Prussia and Austria pledged to contribute 20,000 and 30,000 soldiers, respectively, to Napoleon. The Swedish king, Prince Bernadotte, sided with Russia in return for the latter's promise to assist Sweden in annexing Norway, ruled then by Denmark. Russia also ended its war with Turkey (Peace of Bucharest, May 1812) and concluded an alliance with Britain.

Napoleon prepared for an invasion into Russia, aiming to force the Tsar to negotiate his return to the blockade. The invading *Grande Armée*

numbered more than 600,000 troops, the largest force ever assembled in Europe up to that point. It was a European army,[4] for aside from French troops, it consisted of various nationalities including Germans, Dutch, Belgians, Italians, Swiss, and Poles. In June 1812, the *Grande Armée* crossed the Niemen River, which bordered the Duchy of Warsaw and Russia.[5] The Russian army avoided a confrontation. It feared the numerical advantage of the Napoleonic army and kept retreating eastward, forcing Napoleon to march deep into Russia. Advancing into Russia, Napoleon lost numerous soldiers to summer heat, disease, hunger, and desertion. Many of the horses died as well. In mid-August Napoleon occupied Smolensk, 400 miles into Russia. He then made the fatal mistake of continuing his march on Moscow. His supply lines became longer and convoys had to be escorted all the way. On 7 September, Napoleon met the main Russian army under General Kutuzov at the battle of Borodino, outside Moscow. It was a bloody battle that left about 75,000 casualties altogether – 45,000 Russians and about 30,000 French. Both sides claimed victory but the battle proved to be indecisive. A week later the French reached Moscow but found it deserted. Within a few hours of their arrival, the city mysteriously began to burn, probably set afire by Russians on orders from Count Feodor Rostopchin, the governor of Moscow. The fire spread swiftly and within a week three-quarters of the city had burnt to the ground, making it impossible for the soldiers to find shelter. Napoleon remained in the ruined Russian capital for five weeks, hoping that Alexander would negotiate a truce with him, but the Tsar never responded to his messages. Meanwhile, cold weather began setting in and the conditions of the troops, who suffered from exposure and scarce supplies, rapidly deteriorated. On 19 October, Napoleon ordered his troops to withdraw from Moscow. It was a disastrous retreat. The *Grande Armée* was constantly harassed by Kutuzov's Cossacks, and the cold weather caused enormous suffering for the beleaguered troops. The wounded and exhausted froze to death. Food and clothing were in short supply and discipline broke down. By the time Napoleon reached Smolensk, only 50,000 – half of his troops who had left Moscow – survived. The Napoleonic army faced another major obstacle when, in late November, it reached the Berezina River, which ironically thawed, thereby preventing the troops from easily crossing on ice. Subject to Russian attacks, thousands of soldiers drowned or were unable to cross the river. On 18 December, the last remnants of the *Grande Armée* crossed the Niemen River back to Poland. Only 100,000 of the 600,000 troops survived the Russian campaign; 400,000 died and 100,000 were captured.[6]

Launching the Russian campaign was a disastrous miscalculation of Napoleon's strength and of Russia's ability to withstand his assault. Despite the huge army that he assembled, the Emperor lacked the resources to conquer the vast Russian territory, much less to hold it. His supply lines were hopelessly long and Russia was too exhausted to sustain his large army, particularly during the retreat from Moscow. Napoleon's plan to win a decisive battle or two and thus force the Tsar to sign a truce and return to the Continental Blockade never materialized. When the Tsar refused to negotiate, Napoleon had no choice but to retreat. The fiasco was compounded by the fact that the majority of the troops lost were Napoleon's best soldiers. The Russian debacle marked the beginning of the end of Napoleon's imperial domination.

THE FINAL CAMPAIGNS, 1813–14

It would be 15 more months before the allied armies entered Paris, forcing Napoleon's abdication. It is indeed surprising that the French were able to hold off their enemies for so long. In December 1812, Napoleon rushed to Paris, aiming to raise a new army. Besides, there had been an attempted coup against his government led by General Claude Malet. The well-oiled conscription apparatus enabled him to raise fresh conscripts and, together with the National Guard and troops he withdrew from Spain, the Emperor created a new army to fight in central Europe. In addition, he still had the loyalty of the rulers of his satellite states, including the Kingdom of Italy and the Confederation of the Rhine, who contributed fresh troops to his army.

Napoleon's past military successes were facilitated by the fact that his enemies were never fully united against him, and he fought against them one at a time. This scenario changed in 1813 when, for the first time, the European powers united and decisively defeated the Emperor, whose resources and trained manpower were nearing exhaustion. After forcing Napoleon to evacuate its territory, Russia decided to continue the war and expel Napoleon from central Europe. Alexander I believed that this was the only way to guarantee his country's security. His goal was to build an anti-French coalition. The Russians invaded Poland and occupied Warsaw. In late February Russia and Prussia signed an alliance at Kalisch. It promised Prussia the territorial and financial strength that it had before 1806. For Alexander I, the Treaty of Kalisch meant the "irrevocable decision to carry the war into Germany."[7]

In May 1813, Napoleon beat the Russians and the Prussians at the battles of Lützen and Bautzen, forcing them to retreat beyond the Oder River. Austrian Chancellor Metternich, meanwhile, assumed the role of mediator, renouncing the Austrian alliance with France.[8] His main goal was to ensure that central Europe would be free from French and Russian domination. He proposed an armistice to negotiate peace terms. Both sides needed a respite and accepted the proposal, using the time to reinforce their armies. The truce lasted until 10 August. In mid-June, Britain signed the Treaty of Reichenbach with Russia and Prussia, guaranteeing them generous war subsidies in return for the promised restoration of Hanover. In late June, Metternich met Napoleon in Dresden, trying to convince the Emperor to agree to make territorial concessions and make peace, but Napoleon refused Metternich's terms, vaguely offering Illyria to Austria in return for its neutrality. A day later, Austria agreed to join the Allies if Napoleon did not accept peace terms, namely the dissolution of the Duchy of Warsaw, the return of Illyria to Austria, the evacuation from Prussian fortresses, and the renunciation of the Hanseatic cities. France refused to accept those terms and, on 12 August, Austria joined the coalition of Russia, Prussia, Britain, and Sweden.

Fighting resumed and Napoleon defeated the Allies at the Battle of Dresden (late August 1813), but this was his last victory on German soil. In the meantime, other French generals suffered a series of reverses. In early October, Bavaria, Napoleon's long-time ally, abandoned France and joined the Coalition in return for a promise that it would be able to keep the lands it had received during the reorganization of Germany. The two armies finally met in the decisive Battle of Leipzig, also known as the Battle of the Nations, which lasted for three days (16–18 October). An Allied victory compelled Napoleon to withdraw beyond the Rhine, forcing France back to its former frontiers. Württemberg, Baden, and the rest of Napoleon's German allies joined his enemies. Westphalia was overrun by the Allies. In November, a provisional independent government was established in the Netherlands.

At the same time, Napoleon also suffered a major setback in Spain. Joseph, whom Napoleon had appointed as commander of the armies in Spain, lacked experience and military talent and did not suit this position. Moreover, Napoleon weakened the French forces in Iberia by withdrawing some of them to Russia and in 1813 to his campaign in Germany. Meanwhile, the Spanish guerillas intensified their resistance and Wellington, now the chief general of the Allied forces in Spain, prepared to invade Spain from Portugal one more time. In June, the British

commander scored a decisive victory against the French at Vitoria, forcing Joseph and many of his Spanish supporters to withdraw to France. The Napoleonic rule in Spain essentially came to an end, and Wellington was now free to invade southern France.

In Italy, too, the position of the French deteriorated at the end of 1813.[9] In August and September 1813, the Austrians conquered Illyria and then invaded the Kingdom of Italy, forcing Eugène to retreat to a line of defense on the Adige River and then to Mincio. In January 1814, Murat, hoping to receive the crown of Italy from Austria, defected to the Allies. Eugène, however, stayed loyal to Napoleon and continued to defend his Kingdom, despite attempts by the Austrians to persuade him to defect.

In November 1813, the Allies submitted a peace plan to Napoleon that offered him France within its "natural frontiers" of the Alps and the Rhine. He refused the offer; the Allies and France prepared for war. General Blücher crossed the Rhine, Schwarzenberg advanced through Switzerland, and Bernadotte invaded France from the Netherlands. Wellington had already crossed the Pyrenees into southern France. Napoleon managed to fight a few brilliant defensive campaigns but his situation was desperate. In late March, Tsar Alexander and King Frederick William triumphantly entered Paris. Napoleon retired to Fontainebleau and, after finding that his marshals refused to resume the fighting, abdicated on 6 April 1814. Ten days later, Eugène and the Austrian commander Bellegarde signed the Treaty of Schiarino-Rizzino, essentially ending Napoleonic rule in Italy.

FROM ELBA TO ST. HELENA

Upon Napoleon's abdication, the younger brother of Louis XVI rose to the throne as Louis XVIII. In the Treaty of Paris (May 1814), the Allies treated France benevolently, allowing it to retain the borders it held on 1 November 1792. Napoleon himself was sent to the island of Elba, off the coast of Italy, where he was given sovereignty. He created a court, redecorated several palaces, and for several months ran the island's administration with a small budget. At the same time, he kept in touch with events in France, hoping for an opportunity to return. In late February 1815, Napoleon decided to set sail for France after hearing about the growing discontent with Louis XVIII and the news that the Allies were at odds with each other at the Congress of Vienna. Napoleon landed in southern

France on 1 March and made his way northward. The Bourbons expected the country to rise against the former Emperor, but instead, he encountered no opposition all the way to Paris, thereby forcing Louis XVIII to flee to Belgium. Napoleon proclaimed the restoration of his Empire. Thus began the Hundred Days, which lasted until Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo in June 1815.

In an effort to gain the support of groups that had formerly opposed his government, Napoleon adopted a new liberal face. He introduced universal suffrage and declared a new constitution, which the liberal Benjamin Constant had drafted. The new document established freedom of the press and retained a two-chamber parliament.

News of Napoleon's escape from Elba shocked Europe's capitals. The Allies rejected Napoleon's peace declarations and mobilized their forces to defeat him yet again. Napoleon conscripted a new army, and in mid-June he crossed the Belgian border, seeking to meet Blücher's Prussian army and Wellington's army of British, Belgians, Dutch, and Germans. Initially, he forced Blücher's retreat and then turned to attack Wellington's forces near Waterloo, south of Brussels. The battle appeared deadlocked for a while, but the return of Blücher to the battlefield assured Napoleon's defeat in what was to be his last battle. Four days later Napoleon abdicated again and surrendered to the British, hoping to end his days in Britain or the United States. Instead, the British exiled Napoleon to the tiny remote island of St. Helena in the South Atlantic, where he died in May 1821.

Conclusion: The Legacy of Napoleon

This study has attempted to demonstrate that to comprehend the Napoleonic policies, we must study them within a European context. As was recently pointed out, "Napoleon is a European figure, as much as or even more than a part of French history."[1] Secondly, this volume has emphasized Napoleon's role as a modernizer, a harbinger of change in Europe. During the Napoleonic period, Europe made the transition from the *ancien régime* into the modern period.

Creating a French Empire and establishing French hegemony over Europe constituted Napoleon's most important and consistent objectives. Achieving these goals obviously signified that Napoleon himself would become the dominant leader on the Continent. To accomplish these goals, Napoleon launched numerous military campaigns, occupied many countries, and incessantly reshaped the map of Europe. He expanded the borders of France, abolished old states, and formed new satellite kingdoms. Increasing and diminishing borders of allies and foes whenever he deemed that French interests dictated these changes, he reorganized the territorial structure of foreign countries. Napoleon toppled old dynasties, replacing them with new governments, headed mostly by his relatives. Naturally, Napoleon expected the new rulers to serve French interests loyally, and he showed no hesitation in removing those who disobeyed his policies, as was proved by the case of his brother Louis, King of Holland. Reorganizing the maps of Germany and the Italian Peninsula constituted the two most important territorial transformations that Napoleon launched. Through the formation of the Duchy of Warsaw on Polish land seized by Prussia, Napoleon undid in part the Polish Partitions and extended his influence into eastern Europe. By creating the Illyrian Provinces he extended his domination to the Balkans, next to the Ottoman border. Ultimately, the Napoleonic Empire stretched from Madrid to Warsaw and from Hamburg to Naples.

In order to maintain his *Grande Armée* and sustain European expansion, Napoleon needed to exploit the human and economic resources of his subject states, since France alone could not support his vast imperial enterprise. He recruited hundreds of thousands of European troops into his army, imposed high taxes, and requisitioned considerable quantities of supplies throughout occupied Europe. He tried to establish France's economic supremacy by forcing European states to grant French industry and commerce special favors. To win his economic war against Britain, his fiercest enemy, Napoleon coerced the rest of Europe to join the Continental Blockade, his most significant policy after 1806.

Yet Napoleon was not merely a conqueror and an exploiting dictator. Indeed, it was Napoleon's reform policies that left the greatest impact on the Continent. The uniqueness of the Napoleonic Empire lies more in his reform programs than in his exploitation and harsh domination. In France itself, Napoleon consolidated many of the Revolutionary changes, giving them 15 additional years of life beyond the Revolutionary decade, which was crucial in making it impossible for the restored Bourbons to turn the clock back. On a European level, "he also managed to disseminate the Revolution through a policy of expansionism that the revolutionaries could not have conceived, and to bring the French administrative model to places where it would never have otherwise gone."[2] To be sure, his reforms were tightly linked with his imperial exploitation of occupied Europe.[3] His renovations aimed at strengthening his domination over Europe and increasing his ability to exploit its resources. Napoleon and his representatives in his satellite states overhauled the areas of military conscription and finance in order to draft soldiers and collect taxes more efficiently. He formed a professional bureaucracy in order to carry out those policies and introduced a uniform legal code that all citizens had to obey. Napoleon's allies in Germany initiated changes in order to strengthen their governments, integrate the new territories they had recently acquired, improve their ability to raise the military quotas they owed Napoleon, and raise the taxes needed to pay for them. The reforms were modeled on the French system and were designed to integrate Europe and facilitate Napoleon's domination over the Continent. The Emperor was confident that France possessed the best laws and institutions and that Europe would be improved by imitating the French example. French officials looked with disdain at the subject populations, viewing themselves as the sole representatives of civilization. Obviously, this attitude provided them with the justification to impose their policy of "Frenchification" and spread French

culture, language, laws, and ways of running government. Ultimately, they wanted to create Europe in their own image.

Napoleon's most successful reform was the creation of the modern central state. The Napoleonic State possessed a central, uniform bureaucracy of professional and salaried administrators whose appointments were based, at least in principle, on skill and talent rather than on birth and family connection. This meant the opening of administrative, judicial, and military posts to non-nobles who demonstrated competence. The modernity of the new Napoleonic State was also marked by the unprecedented, broad array of areas that it controlled: finances, conscription, police, education, ecclesiastical affairs, justice, and welfare. Uniformity, efficiency, and direct and equal treatment of all citizens, without the mediation of corporate bodies, were the official goals of the new administration. New constitutions based on the French example provided coherent political and legal systems for the satellite states. State bureaucrats were ordered to collect data and supply detailed information about the conditions of their regions to the government, thereby providing the State with more power and giving rise to official statistics. Financial reforms revoked fiscal exemptions and created uniform and equitable taxation and efficient tax collection by state officials, who replaced the private tax farmers of the Old Regime. Property tax became the principal source of state revenue, and in France, the Netherlands, and the Kingdom of Italy, the authorities launched land surveys aimed at accurate and fair tax assessment. Annual conscription systems became the norm throughout the Empire and provided the basis for the creation of national armies. Competent military service, rather than birth privilege, was rewarded with promotion. The authorities expanded the police and *gendarmerie* to ensure internal security and stability and combat brigandage, desertion, and smuggling. Code Napoleon, arguably Napoleon's most influential and durable legacy, which proclaimed legal equality and guaranteed property rights, was introduced in various satellite states along with the jury system, a uniform court hierarchy, and due judicial process. A generation of legal experts, whose entire experience was based on the new Napoleonic Code, was formed and continued to serve after 1815. The Code constituted the basis of the legal system in numerous countries in Europe and outside the Continent long after Napoleon's fall from power. The States subsidized a system of secondary schools along the lines of the French *lycées*, aiming to train young men to become skilled and faithful bureaucrats. The authorities introduced uniform curricula, books, and examinations, and published a set of rules

for hiring teachers. The Napoleonic central state and the above-mentioned institutions and tools remained models for future European governments to imitate long after the collapse of the Napoleonic Empire.

The growing power and effectiveness of the State significantly changed the relations between State and civil society. The Napoleonic State became more intrusive and authoritarian, gaining more control over its citizens' lives than the *ancien régime* had ever conceived of. State officials and police personnel frequently penetrated the most remote corners of the country and forced citizens to obey the law and acknowledge the State's existence, thereby creating tension and arousing resistance to its policies. The Napoleonic State tolerated no criticism or challenge, and through the establishment of censorship and a network of spies, it stifled any form of opposition and free speech. The authoritarian structure that Napoleon set up in France was extended to his subject states. Clearly, under those conditions, political participation was nonexistent and depoliticization was rife.

The lower classes paid a heavy price under the Napoleonic regime. They carried the main burden of the military draft and, with the rise of indirect taxes in many states, bore a high tax burden. They were unaccustomed to the new demands of the Napoleonic regime and to the efficiency with which the State carried out its tasks. Many also distrusted the State because of its secular nature. The conflict between State and civil society was reflected most clearly in the realm of conscription, "which became the battleground, the ultimate contest of wills between individuals and local communities on the one hand and a distant impersonal state on the other."[4] Conscription officials and the *gendarmerie* reached distant villages in search of draft dodgers and deserters and tried to force resentful citizens to accept an increasingly coercive system that took them away from their families and farms for many years. While thousands of recruits evaded the draft or deserted annually, the State ultimately won this battle and turned conscription into a routine the population learnt to accept.

The successful consolidation of state power required the authorities to bring under control powerful forces like the Church and the nobility, as well as corporate bodies and free cities. The Napoleonic Empire was particularly successful in undermining Church power, thus contributing to the long-term secularization of European societies. Napoleon reconciled with the Church through the Concordat but never yielded state supremacy over the Church. The Concordat and the Organic Articles confirmed state control over the Church and became the law of the land

in France and in occupied countries, where the clergy was forced to accept it. The Republic of Italy signed its own Concordat while in Spain Joseph abolished the Inquisition. Throughout Napoleonic Europe, states dispersed monasteries and confiscated Church property, which they sold primarily to wealthy proprietors. In Germany ecclesiastical principalities lost their independence and were annexed to larger states. The authorities appropriated welfare and birth, death, and marriage registration, functions that had belonged to the Church for centuries. Moreover, Napoleon and other rulers expected the clergy to serve their political objectives by preaching obedience to the regime to their flocks. Secularization was also enhanced by the establishment of freedom of religion, state control over education, and the introduction of civil marriage and divorce. In the Italian and German states, Jews were emancipated, although for the most part they did not become fully equal. In sum, under the Napoleonic Empire, the Church lost much property and its pre-Revolutionary privileged position, which it would never regain.

The Napoleonic authorities also reduced the power of the nobility by breaking their monopoly on administrative and military positions and by abolishing their tax exemptions and seigneurial jurisdiction. The loss of noble power was most marked in Germany, where hundreds of imperial knights lost their tiny principalities forever. Yet the decline in the nobility's power had its limits since they were able to keep their property and local influence. They remained the dominant class in much of Europe; many of the ministers and high officials continued to come from their ranks. Officially, the authorities abolished the feudal system, but in practice the nobility was sufficiently powerful to preserve its seigneurial privileges and prevent the full emancipation of the peasants. In the Duchy of Warsaw, the Kingdom of Naples, and various German states, peasants remained landless and had to redeem the seigneurial fees, which they were unable to do, and hence they remained dependent on the landlords. In Poland and Naples the nobility even increased its power over the peasants, who remained without the traditional seigneurial defenses. The persistence of the seigneurial regime in those countries contradicted Code Napoleon and constituted the greatest failure of the Napoleonic reform policy.

While the nobility and the clergy lost power and privileges, the bourgeoisie made progress in many parts of the Empire. In states like the Rhineland and the Kingdom of Italy, a new elite of notables, consisting of old nobles and members of the bourgeoisie, emerged, replacing the exclusive rule of the nobility. This class of property owners, entrepreneurs,

professionals, and educated citizens was the main beneficiary of the establishment of legal equality and the opening of high bureaucratic posts to skill and talent. In France, the Rhineland, Holland, and the Kingdom of Italy, the governments appointed them to top offices in the administration and the military. They also profited from the sale of Church land and the elimination of restrictions on the purchase of property, and from the guarantee of property rights in Code Napoleon. Providing this class with these advantages was compatible with Napoleon's policy of rallying the propertied classes to his support. They were the mainstay of the Napoleonic regime and were rewarded for their collaboration. In sum, the Napoleonic regime advanced the position of the middle classes and provided an impetus to social mobility on the basis of wealth, education, and merit, criteria that remained dominant in modern Europe.

Another important Napoleonic legacy that favored the propertied groups was the establishment of national markets. The Napoleonic governments revoked internal tariffs and proclaimed a single commercial code, uniform weights and measures, and a national currency. They also constructed roads and canals, which facilitated communication and shipping, and took steps to ensure safety on the highways.

Napoleon never supported national goals of independence or unification in any state included in his Empire. Nonetheless, "French rule did, however unwittingly, assist the development of the nation state in nineteenth century Europe."[5] Indeed, Napoleon introduced structural changes that encouraged the rise of national ideology. The creation of administrative and legal uniformity, economic unity, and the territorial reorganization in various parts of Europe helped to stimulate national aspirations. Service in the national armies under a national banner, together with soldiers from other regions, also helped soldiers to transcend provincial loyalties and develop national consciousness. The reorganization of Germany, where the number of states was reduced from more than 300 to less than 40, and of Italy, where Napoleon consolidated ten pre-Revolutionary states into three parts, provided momentum toward unification and stimulated national sentiment. The formation of the Duchy of Warsaw helped to encourage Polish nationalism, while the struggles against the invasions by the French army in Spain, Portugal, and Germany in 1813 helped to spread anti-French patriotism, to a certain degree.

The extensive impact of the Napoleonic reform policies on Europe notwithstanding, it is important to emphasize that his legacy on the Continent was uneven. The intensity and depth of the reform programs, as well as their application, varied greatly among the subject states.

In terms of the effect of the Napoleonic reforms, Europe was divided into three parts: the "inner empire," where reforms had a major impact and were implemented effectively, the "outer empire," where application of the reforms was inadequate and left few institutional traces, and the "intermediate states," which carried out the reform policies with limited degrees of success.[6] A fourth part of Europe, most notably Russia and the Ottoman Balkan countries, was never occupied by Napoleon and remained completely outside the realm of his reforms. These differences were not surprising given the wide diversity of conditions that prevailed in the various countries at the time of Napoleon's arrival, the differences in the duration of Napoleonic rule, and the degree of resistance the French faced. In the Low Countries, Western Germany, and Northern Italy, which comprised the "inner empire," the Napoleonic years continued to be applied and leave their mark, while the administrators who grew up on the Napoleonic experiment continued to function there. This was not the case in the "outer Empire." The Papal regions annexed to France and the Illyrian Provinces lacked the preconditions, such as a developed economy, a strong urban middle class, and a tradition of effective reforms, to implement successfully the Napoleonic reforms. Massive resistance in Spain played a major role in limiting the effect of the Napoleonic reform policies in that country. Opposition by the nobility in the Grand Duchy of Warsaw and the Kingdom of Naples, "two intermediary states," prevented a meaningful emancipation of the peasants and restricted the impact of the Napoleonic reform policies there. Moreover, whenever faced with stiff opposition to the implementation of his reforms by local elites, Napoleon chose to make concessions and ignore the lack of application of his policies, as long they recognized his supreme position and provided him with the resources he needed for his campaigns.

In 1815, the victorious Allies wiped out much of Napoleon's territorial organization in Europe and deposed his governments, restoring many of the old dynasties. Yet they retained what was probably his most significant territorial legacy, namely the reorganization of Germany. The Congress of Vienna accepted the reduction of more than 300 pre-Napoleonic German states to fewer than 40, a structure that persisted until the 1860s. Gone forever were the hundreds of small, anachronistic, ecclesiastical, and imperial principalities and scores of free cities, all of which were integrated into larger states. The Congress of Vienna also never revived the Holy Roman Empire. In the Italian Peninsula, the Allies restored all but two – the Republics of Venice and Genoa – of the ten pre-Revolutionary

states and their rulers. However, most of those states, including the Papacy, remained weak and dependent on foreign help for their survival and would disappear when Italy was united 45 years later. In this sense, one could say that Napoleon had a better sense of future development than his conservative successors, although he, like them, rejected the idea of Italian unity.

The legacy of the Napoleonic reform policy was also clear internally, as many Restoration governments retained certain Napoleonic reforms.[7] While the restored rulers viewed Napoleon as a usurper and expressed nostalgia for the *ancien régime,* they were pragmatic enough to keep the Napoleonic structures for raising taxes, recruiting soldiers, maintaining law and order, and dealing with the Church, once they recognized how much more effective they were than the Old Regime. Indeed, Napoleon's victories and hegemony over Europe proved the supremacy of the French State and sent a clear signal to European rulers that modernization of state apparatus based on the French model was indispensable if they wanted to survive and play a role in the international arena. A number of governments maintained the departmental administrative division and the position of the prefect, although they gave it a different title. They also kept the tax system and police structures created by Napoleon. Most European monarchs did not challenge legal equality and did not revive tax exemptions. The Bourbons entirely retained the centralized administrative-judicial structures in France. The Austrian Emperor Francis I kept the fiscal and administrative structures built by Napoleon in northern Italy, as did many other Italian rulers. Ferdinand refused to return to the Spanish Church its property that had been sold. Likewise, in the second half of the nineteenth century, European governments, such as the Italian Kingdom, continued to imitate the Napoleonic model of a central state in their effort to establish a powerful centralized government. In sum, an understanding of the Napoleonic legacy is essential for the comprehension of nineteenth-century European state and society.

Notes

INTRODUCTION

1. Charles Esdaile, *The Wars of Napoleon* (New York, 1995), ix; Philip Dwyer, "Preface," *Napoleon and Europe*, ed. Philip Dwyer (London, 2001), ix.
2. Michael Broers, *Europe under Napoleon, 1799–1815* (London, 1996), 3.
3. An exception to the Franco-centric bibliography in English prior to the last decade is Owen Connelly, *Napoleon's Satellite Kingdoms* (New York, 1965). Connelly discusses the developments in five satellite kingdoms: Italy, Naples, Holland, Westphalia, and Spain. Two other important works that appeared before 1990, which explore the internal developments in two countries during the Napoleonic period, are Gabriel Lovett, *Napoleon and the Birth of Modern Spain* (New York, 1965) and Simon Schama, *Patriots and Liberators: Revolution in the Netherlands, 1780–1813* (London, 1977).
4. Stuart Woolf, *Napoleon's Integration of Europe* (London and New York, 1991), 8–13.
5. Geoffrey Ellis, "The Nature of Napoleonic Imperialism," *Napoleon and Europe*, ed. Philip Dwyer (London, 2001), 102–5; Broers, *Europe under Napoleon*, passim.

1 THE FORMATION OF THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE

1. Geoffrey Ellis, "The Nature of Napoleonic Imperialism," *Napoleon and Europe*, ed. Philip Dwyer (London, 2001), 105.
2. Martyn Lyons, *Napoleon Bonaparte and the Legacy of the French Revolution* (New York, 1994), 43.
3. Ellis, "The Nature," 104–5.
4. On the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars and international relations, see Tim Blanning, *The French Revolutionary Wars, 1787–1802* (London, 1996); David Chandler, *The Campaigns of Napoleon: the Mind and Method of History's Greatest Soldier* (London, 1966); Owen Connelly, *Blundering to Glory: Napoleon's Military*

Campaigns (Wilmington, DE, 1987); J. R. Elting, *Swords Around a Throne: Napoleon's Grande Armée* (New York, 1988); Charles Esdaile, *The Wars of Napoleon* (London, 1995); Georges Lefebvre, *Napoleon*, 2 vols (Eng. trans., London, 1969); Gunther Rothenberg, *The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon* (London, 1977); Alan Schom, *Napoleon Bonaparte* (New York, 1997); Paul Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848* (Oxford, 1994), 100–516.

5. The chapter does not discuss the Iberian campaign, which is covered in detail in the chapter on Spain.
6. Tim Blanning, *The Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars* (New York, 1986).
7. Blanning, *The French Revolutionary Wars*, 179; Schroeder, *The Transformation*, 172.
8. Esdaile, *The Wars*, 14; see also Lefebvre, *Napoleon*, I, 175.
9. Schroeder, *The Transformation*, 284.
10. Brendan Simms, *The Impact of Napoleon: Prussian High Politics, Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Executive, 1797–1806* (Cambridge, 1997), 159–303.
11. Schroeder, *The Transformation*, 320–3; Lefebvre, *Napoleon*, I, 274–5.
12. Gunther Rothenberg, *Napoleon's Great Adversaries: The Archduke Charles and the Austrian Army, 1792–1814* (Bloomington, IN, 1982).
13. Gunther Eyck, *Loyal Rebels, Andreas Hofer and the Tyrolean Uprising of 1809* (New York, 1986); Lee Harford, "Napoleon and the Subjugation of the Tyrol," *CRE*, 1989, 704–11.
14. Cited in Schom, *Napoleon*, 491.
15. Robert Epstein, *Napoleon's Last Victory and the Emergence of Modern War* (Kansas, 1994); Frederick Schneid, *Napoleon's Italian Campaigns, 1805–1815* (Westport, CN, 2002), 59–100.
16. Enno Kraehe, *Metternich's German Policy, I: The Contest with Napoleon, 1799–1814* (Princeton, NJ, 1963), 122–4.

2 THE JANUS FACE OF NAPOLEON'S RULE: REFORM AND EXPLOITATION

1. Stuart Woolf, *Napoleon's Integration* of *Europe* (London, 1991), 8–13.
2. Stuart Woolf, "French Civilization and Ethnicity in the Napoleonic Empire," *Past and Present*, 124 (1989), 106.
3. Napoleon I, *Correspondance de Napoléon I publiée par l'ordre de l'empereur Napoléon III*, 32 vols (Paris, 1858–70), 15 November 1807, vol. 16, no. 13361, 166–7.
4. Geoffrey Ellis, "The Nature of Napoleonic Imperialism," *Napoleon and Europe*, ed. Philip Dwyer (London, 2001), 104–6.
5. Woolf, *Napoleon's Integration*; Philip Dwyer, "Introduction," *Napoleon and Europe* (London, 2001), 8.
6. Ellis, "The Nature," 102–5.
7. John Davis, *Conflict and Control: Law and Order in Nineteenth-Century Italy* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ, 1988), 23.
8. Woolf, *Napoleon's Integration*, 87–90.
9. Michael Broers, "Policing the Empire: Napoleon and the Pacification of Europe," *Napoleon and Europe*, ed. Philip Dwyer (London, 2001), 153–68.

10. Woolf, *Napoleon's Integration*, 199–206.
11. Michael Broers, *Europe under Napoleon, 1799–1815* (London, 1996), 99, passim, map, 181; id., "Napoleon, Charlemagne, and Lotharingia: Acculturation and the Boundaries of Napoleonic Europe," *The Historical Journal*, 44, 1 (2001), 135–54.
12. Broers, *Europe under Napoleon*, passim.
13. Ellis, "The Nature," 103.
14. Ibid., 104.
15. On resistance to the Napoleonic regime in Europe, see Broers, *Europe under Napoleon*, 101–25; Charles Esdaile, "Popular Resistance to the Napoleonic Empire," *Napoleon and Europe*, ed. Philip Dwyer (London, 2001), 136–52; Woolf, *Napoleon's Integration*, 226–37.
16. Georges Lefebvre, *Napoleon*, 2 vols (Eng. trans., London, 1969 and 1974), II, 209.
17. Woolf, *Napoleon's Integration*, 156–65.
18. Charles Esdaile, *The Wars of Napoleon* (London, 1995), 99.
19. Louis Bergeron, *France under Napoleon* (Princeton, NJ, 1981), 40.
20. D. M. G. Sutherland, *France, 1789–1815: Revolution and Counter Revolution* (New York and Oxford, 1986), 413.
21. Jacques Godechot, *Les institutions de la France sous la Révolution et l'Empire* (Paris, 1968), 655.
22. Eli Heckscher, *The Continental System: An Economic Interpretation* (1922; reprinted Gloucester, MA, 1964), 295–302; Woolf, *Napoleon's Integration*, 146–9.
23. *Correspondance de Napoléon*, 23 August 1810, vol. 21, no. 16824, 60–1.
24. Helmut Berding, *Napoleonische Herrschafts und Geselschaftspolitik in Königreich Westfalen, 1807–1813* (Göttingen, 1973), 148; Woolf, *Napoleon's Integration*, 182–4; Broers, *Europe under Napoleon*, 94–5; Geoffrey Ellis, *Napoleon* (London and New York, 1997), 137–9.
25. Woolf, *Napoleon's Integration*, 183–4.
26. Esdaile, *The Wars*, 103.
27. Paul Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848* (Oxford, 1994), 308.
28. Heckscher, *The Continental System*, 245.
29. François Crouzet, "Wars, Blockade and the Economic Change in Europe, 1792–1815," *Journal of Economic History*, 24 (1964), 572.
30. Lefebvre, *Napoleon*, II, 120–1.
31. Roger Dufraisse, "Blocus Continental," *Dictionnaire Napoléon*, ed. Jean Tulard (Paris, 1987), 232; Heckscher, *The Continental System*, 228–9.

3 FRANCE

1. Martyn Lyons, *France under the Directory* (Cambridge, 1975).
2. Jacques Godechot, *Les institutions de la France sous la Révolution et l'Empire* (Paris, 1968), 558–70.
3. Isser Woloch, *Napoleon and His Collaborators: The Making of a Dictatorship* (New York, 2001), 120–55.
4. Martyn Lyons, *Napoleon Bonaparte and the Legacy of the French Revolution* (New York, 1994), 67.

5. Claude Langlois, "Un Plébiscite de l'an VIII: documents d'une falsification," an English translation, *Napoleon and His Times: Selected Interpretations*, ed. Frank Kafker and James Laux (Florida, 1989), 63.
6. Godechot, *Les institutions*, 557.
7. Woloch, *Napoleon and His Collaborators*, 94–6.
8. Jean Tulard, *Napoléon ou le Myth du Sauveur* (Paris, 1987), 165.
9. Louis Bergeron, *France under Napoleon* (Princeton, NJ, 1981), 88–97.
10. Jacques Godechot, *The Counter-Revolution: Doctrine and Action, 1789–1804* (Princeton, NJ, 1971), 364.
11. D. M. G. Sutherland, *The Chouans: The Social Origins of Popular Counter-revolution in Upper Brittany* (Oxford, 1982).
12. D. M. G. Sutherland, *France, 1789–1815: Revolution and Counter-Revolution* (London, 1985), 349–50.
13. Isser Woloch, "The Napoleonic Regime and French Society," *Napoleon and Europe*, ed. Philip Dwyer (London, 2001), 69.
14. Louis Bergeron and Guy Chaussinand-Nogaret, "*Les Masses de Granit": cent mille notables du 1er Empire* (Paris, 1979).
15. Tulard, *Napoleon*, 243.
16. Sutherland, *France, 1789–1815*, 389. On the old nobility, see Geoffrey Ellis, *Napoleon* (London and New York, 1997), 141–51.
17. Bergeron, *France*, 64; Claude Ducourtial-Rey, "Legion d'Honneur," *Dictionnaire Napoléon*, ed. Jean Tulard (Paris, 1987), 1054–61.
18. Lyons, *Napoleon Bonaparte*, 172.
19. Tulard, *Napoléon*, 330.
20. Ibid., 331.
21. Lyons, *Napoleon Bonaparte*, 172.
22. John McManners, *The French Revolution and the Church* (New York, 1969).
23. William Doyle, *The Oxford History of the French Revolution* (Oxford, 1990), 144.
24. Quote from Bonaparte is from Lyons, *Napoleon Bonaparte*, 82. Tulard, *Napoleon*, 138.
25. For the text of the Concordat, see E. E. Hay, *Revolution and Papacy* (Notre Dame, IN, 1966), 298–300. On the Concordat, *ibid.*, 139–54; Owen Chadwick, *The Popes and European Revolution* (Oxford, 1981), 487–90; Margaret O'Dwyer, *The Papacy in the Age of Napoleon and the Restoration: Pius VII, 1800–1823* (New York, 1985); Lyons, *Napoleon Bonaparte*, 77–93.
26. Woloch, *Napoleon and His Collaborators*, 52. On prefects, see id., *The New Regime, Transformations of the French Civic Order, 1789–1820s* (New York and London, 1994), 54–9; Bergeron, *France*, 23–31, 56–60; A. E. Whitcomb, "Napoleon's Prefects," *American Historical Review*, 79 (1974), 1089–1118.
27. Godechot, *Les institutions*, 589.
28. Michael Sibalis, "The Napoleonic Police State", *Napoleon and Europe*, ed. Philip Dwyer (London, 2001), 79.
29. Eric Arnold, *Fouché, Napoleon, and the General Police* (Washington, 1979); Sibalis, "The Napoleonic Police," 79–94; Alan Schom, *Napoleon Bonaparte* (New York, 1997), 251–72.
30. A. Cabanis, *La presse sous le Consulat et l'Empire* (Paris, 1975); Robert Holtman, *Napoleonic Propaganda* (Baton Rouge, LA, 1950), 44–81.
31. Lyons, *Napoleon Bonaparte*, 121.
32. Holtman, *Napoleonic Propaganda*, 44–5; Cabanis, *La presse*, 66.

33. Godechot, *Les institutions*, 614–24; Ellis, *Napoleon*, 73–6.
34. Cited in Robert Holtman, *The Napoleonic Revolution* (Baton Rouge, LA, 1967), 88.
35. Lyons, *Napoleon Bonaparte*, 94.
36. Tulard, *Napoléon*, 242.
37. Godechot, *Les institutions*, 693.
38. Bernard Schwartz (ed.), *The Code Napoleon and the Common-Law World* (New York, 1956), 139–61.
39. Stuart Woolf, *Napoleon's Integration of Europe* (London, 1991), 106–7.
40. Godechot, *Les institutions*, 693.
41. Alan Forrest, *Conscripts and Deserters: The Army and French Society during the Revolution and Empire* (New York and Oxford, 1989); Isser Woloch, "Napoleonic Conscription: State Power and Civil Society," *Past and Present*, 111 (1986), 101–29; id., *The New Regime*, 380–426.
42. Woloch, *The New Regime*, 412.
43. Forrest, *Conscripts*, 187–218; Woloch, "Napoleonic Conscription," 118–22.
44. Alan Forrest, *Soldiers of the French Revolution* (Durham and London, 1990), 83.
45. Forrest, *Conscripts*, 237.
46. Lyons, *France under the Directory*, 167–71; Godechot, *Les institutions*, 506–15.
47. Bergeron, *France*, 38.
48. Doyle, *The Oxford History*, 324.
49. Marcel Marion, *Histoire financière de la France depuis 1715, IV: 1797–1818. La fin de la Révolution, le Consulat et l'Empire, la liberation du territoire* (Paris, 1925), 324–5.
50. Bergeron, *France*, 38.
51. Marion, *Histoire financière*, 307–12.
52. Bergeron, *France*, 39.
53. Godechot, *Les institutions*, 640–2.
54. Ellis, *Napoleon*, 70.
55. Ibid., 71–3; Marion, *Histoire financière*, 206–12.
56. Quoted in Holtman, *The Napoleonic Revolution*, 142.
57. Bergeron, *France*, 32–3.
58. Woloch, *The New Regime*, 177.
59. Ibid., 191–207; Lyons, *France under the Directory*, 87–95.
60. Godechot, *Les institutions*, 734.
61. Lyons, *Napoleon Bonaparte*, 107.
62. Ellis, *Napoleon*, 173.
63. Holtman, *The Napoleonic Revolution*, 148.
64. Robert Alexander, " 'No, Minister': French Restoration Rejection of Authoritarianism," *Napoleon's Legacy*, ed. David Laven and Lucy Riall (Oxford and New York, 2000), 30.

4 THE NETHERLANDS

1. Jonathan Israel, *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall, 1477–1806* (Oxford, 1995), 998–1012.
2. Wayne te Brake, "Provincial Histories and National Revolution in the Dutch Republic," *The Dutch Republic in the Eighteenth Century: Decline, Enlightenment,*

and Revolution, ed. Margaret Jacob and Winjnand Mijnhardt (Ithaca, NY, and London, 1992), 86.

3. Jan Schulte Nordholt, *The Dutch Republic and American Independence* (Chapel Hill and London, 1982), 155.
4. Leonard Leeb, *The Ideological Origins of the Batavian Revolution: History and Politics in the Dutch Republic, 1747–1800* (The Hague, 1973), 155–60.
5. Robert Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution: A Political History of Europe and America, 1760–1800* (Princeton, NJ, 1964), II, 180.
6. Simon Schama, *Patriots and Liberators* (New York, 1977), 261–63; H. Daalder, "Dutch Jews in a Segmented Society," *Acta Historiae Neerlandicae: Studies on the History of the Netherlands* (The Hague, 1978), 178–80.
7. J. C. H. Blom and E. Lambers, *History of the Low Countries* (New York and Oxford, 1999), 278–9.
8. Schama, *Patriots*, 364.
9. Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, 1124.
10. Simon Schama, "The Exigencies of War and the Politics of Taxation in the Netherlands, 1795–1810," *War and Economic Development: Essays in Memory of David Joslin*, ed. J. M. Winter (Cambridge, 1975), 118.
11. Schama, *Patriots*, 457.
12. Ibid., 473.
13. E. H. Kossman, *The Low Countries, 1780–1940* (Oxford, 1978), 94.
14. Schama, *Patriots*, 504–12.
15. R. Kain and E. Baignet, *The Cadastral Map in the Service of the State: A History of Property Mapping* (Chicago, IL, 1992), 32–6.
16. Schama, *Patriots*, 485–610; Owen Connelly, *Napoleon's Satellite Kingdoms* (New York, 1965), 127–75.
17. Schama, *Patriots*, 466.
18. Connelly, *Napoleon's Satellite*, 153.
19. Schama, *Patriots*, 491.
20. Ibid., 524.
21. Simon Schama, "Schools and Politics in the Netherlands, 1796–1814," *The Historical Journal*, 13 (1970), 589.
22. Connelly, *Napoleon's Satellite*, 165.
23. Schama, *Patriots*, 577–81.
24. Ibid., 560–1.
25. Eli Hecksher, *The Continental System: An Economic Interpretation* (London and New York, 1922), 178.
26. *Correspondance de Napoléon*, 32 vols (Paris, 1858–70), 12 October 1808, no. 14374, vol. 17, 548.
27. Ibid., 17 July 1809, no. 15548, vol. 19, 261.
28. Gordon Bond, "Louis Bonaparte and the Collapse of the Kingdom of Holland," *CRE Proceedings*, vol. 3 (Gainsville, FL, 1974), 143.
29. Schama, *Patriots*, 599.
30. Ibid., 617.
31. Schama, "The Exigencies," 128.
32. Gerlof Homan, "The Restoration of the House of Orange–Nassau in the Netherlands 1813," vol. 19, *CRE Proceedings* (Tallahassee, FL, 1989), 405–10.
33. Schama, *Patriots*, 647.

5 BELGIUM

1. E. H. Kossman, *The Low Countries, 1780–1940* (Oxford, 1978), 48.
2. Walter Davis, *Joseph II: An Imperial Reformer for the Austrian Netherlands* (The Hague, 1974).
3. Ibid., 236–77; Janet Polasky, *Revolution in Brussels, 1787–1793* (Brussels, 1987), 35–129.
4. Suzanne Tassier, *L'histoire de la Belgique sous l'occupation française en 1792 et 1793* (Brussels, 1933); Polasky, *Revolution in Brussels*, 214–62.
5. Polasky, *Revolution in Brussels*, 242; Robert Devleeshouwer, "Le cas de la Belgique," *Occupants, Occupés, 1792–1815*, Colloque de Bruxelles, 29 and 30 January 1968 (Brussels, 1969), 47–8.
6. Georges Dumont, *Histoire de la Belgique* (Paris, 1977), 325.
7. Devleeshouwer, "Le cas," 53–4.
8. Henri Pirenne, *Histoire de Belgique* (Brussels, 1926), VI, 92–3.
9. Kossman, *The Low Countries*, 77.
10. Pirenne, *Histoire*, VI, 190.
11. Kossman, *The Low Countries*, 80–1.
12. Ibid., 78–9; Devleeshouwer, "Le cas," 58.
13. Ivan Delatte, *La vente des biens nationaux dans le département de Jemappes* (Brussels, 1938), 79.
14. P. Lebrun, *L'industrie de la laine à Verviers pendant le XVIII et le debut du XIX siècle* (Liége, 1948); Pirenne, *Histoire*, VI, 173–7; Devleeshouwer, "Le cas," 62–3.
15. Kossman, *The Low Countries*, 80.
16. Fred Stevens, "Belgique," *Dictionnaire Napoléon*, ed. Jean Tulard (Paris, 1987), 185.
17. K. Veraghtert, "The Antwerp Port, 1790–1814," *The Interactions of Amsterdam and Antwerp with the Baltic Region, 1400–1800*, ed. Wiert Jan Wieringa (Leiden, 1983), 195.
18. Devleeshouwer, "Le cas," 61.
19. Roger Darquenne, *La conscription dans le département de Jemappes (1798–1813)* (Mons, 1970), 176.
20. Ibid., 375.
21. Pirenne, *Histoire*, VI, 206.
22. J. C. H. Blom and E. Lamberts, *History of the Low Countries* (New York, 1999), 296.

6 GERMANY

1. On pre-Revolutionary Germany, see James Sheehan, *German History, 1770–1866* (Oxford, 1993), 12–143. On the final decades of the Holy Roman Empire, John Gagliardo, *Reich and Nation: The Holy Roman Empire as Idea and Reality, 1763–1806* (Bloomington and London, 1980).
2. Jacques Godechot, *La Grande Nation* (Paris, 1956), I, 176–82; G. P. Gooch, *Germany and the French Revolution* (London, 1920), 39.
3. Brendan Simms, *The Struggle for Mastery in Germany, 1779–1850* (New York, 1998), 68.

4. Tim Blanning, *Reform and Revolution in Mainz, 1743–1803* (Cambridge, 1974), 272.
5. Tim Blanning, *The French Revolutionary Wars, 1787–1802* (London, 1996), 179.
6. Ibid., 259. On Germany's territorial reorganization, see Gagliardo, *Reich and Nation*, part IV; Sheehan, *German History*, 235–50.
7. Herbert Fisher, *Studies in Napoleonic Statesmanship: Germany*, reprint (New York, 1968), 48–66.
8. Simms, *The Struggle*, 64–6.
9. Thomas Nipperdey, *Germany from Napoleon to Bismarck, 1800–1860* (Princeton, NJ, 1996), 19.
10. Michael Rowe, "Between Empire and Home Town: Napoleonic Rule on the Rhine, 1799–1814," *The Historical Journal*, 42, 3 (1999), 643; Nipperdey, *Germany from Napoleon*, 9, 63.
11. Sheehan, *German History*, 256.
12. Blanning, *Reform and Revolution*, 267–302; Walter Grab, "La réaction de la population de Rhenanie face à l'occupation par les armées revolutionaires françaises, 1792–1799," *Occupants, Occupés, 1792–1815* (Brussels, 1969), 126–9.
13. Tim Blanning, *The French Revolution in Germany: Occupation and Resistance in the Rhineland, 1792–1802* (Oxford, 1983), 83–134.
14. Jeffry Diefendorf, *Businessmen and Politics in the Rhineland, 1789–1834* (Princeton, NJ, 1980), 84–133.
15. Ibid., 106.
16. Rowe, "Between Empire," 643–74.
17. Blanning, *The French Revolution*, 138.
18. Rowe, "Between Empire," 667.
19. Ibid., 663.
20. Jean Vidalenc, "Les départements hanséatiques et l'administration Napoléonienne," *Francia* I (1973), 414–50; Fisher, *Studies*, 333–49.
21. Vidalenc, "Les départements," 433.
22. Roger Dufraisse, "Confédération du Rhin," *Dictionnaire Napoléon*, ed. Jean Tulard (Paris, 1987), 461.
23. Eberhard Weis, "Napoleon und der Rheinbund," *Deutschland und Italiens im Zeitalter Napoleons Deutsch–Italienisches Historikertreffen in Mainz 29 Mai–1 Juni 1975* (Wiesbaden, 1979), 79; Michael Rowe, "Napoleon and State Formation in Central Europe," *Napoleon and Europe*, ed. Philip Dwyer (London, 2001), 210–11.
24. Elizabeth Fehrenbach, *Vom Ancien Regime zum Wiener Kongress* (Munich, 1993), 79–91; Hans Schmitt, "Germany without Prussia: a Closer Look at the Confederation of the Rhine," *German Studies Review*, 6 (1983), 9–39; Nipperdey, *Germany from Napoleon*, 54–64; Sheehan, *German History*, 259–74.
25. Simms, *The Struggle*, 84.
26. Schmitt, "Germany without Prussia," 33.
27. Charles Schmidt, *Le Grand Duché de Berg (1806–1813)* (Paris, 1905); Fisher, *Studies*, 173–223; Roger Dufraisse, "Berg," *Dictionnaire Napoléon*, ed. Jean Tulard (Paris, 1987), 196–200.
28. Fisher, *Studies*, 196.
29. Schmidt, *Le Grand Duché*, 184.

30. Eli Hecksher, *The Continental System: An Economic Interpretation* (London and New York, 1922), 311–16; Michael Broers, *Europe under Napoleon, 1799–1815* (London, 1996), 224–5. Fisher, *Studies*, 206–9.
31. Hecksher, *The Continental System*, 314.
32. Diefendorf, *Businessmen and Politics*, 158–9.
33. Walter Grab, *Heinrcih Heine als politischer Dichter* (Heidelberg, 1982), 18–19.
34. Helmut Berding, *Napoleonische Herschafts- und Gesellschafts Politik* (Göttingen, 1973); Owen Connelly, *Napoleon's Satellite Kingdoms* (New York, 1965), 176–222; Fisher, *Studies*, 224–311.
35. *Correspondance de Napoléon*, 15 November 1807, no. 13361, vol. 16, 166–7.
36. Jean Tulard, "Simeon e l'organization du Royaume de Westphalie (1807–1813)," *Francia*, I (1973), 557–68.
37. Helmut Berding, "Die Emanzipation der Juden im Königreich Westfalen (1807–1813)," *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, 23 (1983), 39.
38. Berding, *Napoleonische Herrschafts*, 74.
39. Tulard, "Simeon," 565.
40. Fisher, *Studies*, 295.
41. Connelly, *Napoleon's Satellite*, 193.
42. Berding, *Napoleonische Herrschafts*, 17.
43. Connelly, *Napoleon's Satellite*, 208.
44. Fisher, *Studies*, 318.
45. On the Bavarian reforms, see Eberhard Weis, "Die Begründung des modernen bayerischen Staates unter König Max I (1799–1825)," ed. Max Spindler, *Handbuch der bayerischen Geschichte*, IV, *Das Neue Bayern 1800–1970* (Munich, 1974), 38–60; Allen Cronenberg, "Montgelas and the Reorganization of Napoleonic Bavaria," *CRE*, XIX (Tallahassee, FL, 1989), 712–19.
46. Lloyd Lee, *The Politics of Harmony: Civil Service, Liberalism and Social Reform in Baden, 1800–1850* (Newark, NJ, 1980), 17–39.
47. Weis, "Die Begründung," 41.
48. David Sorkin, *The Transformation of German Jewry, 1780–1840* (Oxford, 1987), 35.
49. Nipperdey, *Germany from Napoleon*, 60.
50. Sheehan, *German History*, 271.
51. Barbara Anderson, "State-Building and Bureaucracy in Early-Nineteenth-Century Nassau," *Central European History* (1991), 222–47.
52. Simms, *The Struggle*, 75.
53. Nipperdey, *Germany from Napoleon*, 41–2.
54. Rowe, "Napoleon and State Formation," 222.
55. Tulard, "Simeon," 568.
56. Daniel Klang, "Bavaria and the War of Liberation, 1813–1814," *French Historical Studies*, 4 (1965) 22–41.
57. Nipperdey, *Germany from Napoleon*, 1.
58. Simms, *The Struggle*, 88.

7 SWITZERLAND

1. Ariane Meautis, *Le Club Helvétique de Paris (1790–1791) et la diffusion des idées révolutionnaires en Suisse* (Neuchâtel, 1969).

2. Edouard Guillon, *Napoléon et la Suisse, 1803–1815* (Paris and Lausanne, 1910), 24.
3. E. Bonjour, H. S. Offler, and G. R. Potter, *A Short History of Switzerland* (Oxford, 1952), 219.
4. Wilhelm Oechsli, *A History of Switzerland, 1499–1914* (Cambridge, 1922), 318.
5. Johannes Dierauer, *Histoire de la Confédération Suisse*, vol. I, *1798–1813* (Lausanne, 1918), 39–62.
6. Ibid., 5–12; Ernest Gagliardi, *Histoire de la Suisse* (Lausanne, 1925), 28–32.
7. Dierauer, *Histoire*, 160–1.
8. Guillon, *Napoléon et la Suisse*, 77.
9. J. Suratteau, "Occupation, occupants et occupés en Suisse de 1792 à 1814," *Occupants, Occupés, 1792–1815*, Colloque de Bruxelles, 29–30 January 1968 (Brussels, 1969), 179–80.
10. *Correspondance de Napoléon*, letter to General Berthier, 8 September 1803, no. 6314, vol. 8, 29.
11. Ibid., 23 September 1803, no. 6339, 46.
12. Oeschli, *History*, 348.
13. Suratteau, "Occupation, occupants," 180.
14. Gagliardi, *Histoire de la Suisse*, 63.
15. Ibid., 65–6.
16. Ibid. 69; Dierauer, *Histoire*, 262–4; 268–70.
17. Guillon, *Napoléon et la Suisse*, 243–58.
18. Lionel Gossman, *Basel in the Age of Burckhardt* (Chicago and London, 2000), 51–2.
19. Guillon, *Napoléon et la Suisse*, 255.
20. Gagliardi, *Histoire de la Suisse*, 81.

8 SPAIN

1. Richard Herr, *The Eighteenth Century in Spain* (Princeton, NJ, 1958), 3–153; Anthony Hull, *Charles III and the Revival of Spain* (Washington, 1981).
2. John Lynch, *Bourbon Spain, 1700–1808* (Oxford, 1989), 208–14.
3. Herr, *The Eighteenth Century*, 29.
4. Ibid., 239–336.
5. Douglas Hilt, *The Troubled Trinity: Godoy and the Spanish Monarchs* (Tuscaloosa, Alabama, and London, 1987).
6. John Lawrence Tone, "The Peninsular War," *Napoleon and Europe*, ed. Philip Dwyer (London, 2001), 227.
7. Charles Esdaile, *The Spanish Army in the Peninsular War* (Manchester and New York, 1988), 46–56.
8. Lynch, *Bourbon Spain*, 410–11.
9. Hilt, *The Troubled Trinity*, 181.
10. Gabriel Lovett, *Napoleon and the Birth of Modern Spain*, 2 vols (New York, 1965), I, 89.
11. John Lawrence Tone, *The Fatal Knot: The Guerrilla War in Navarre and the Defeat of Napoleon in Spain* (Chapel Hill and London, 1994), 50.
12. Ibid., 149.
13. Lovett, *Napoleon and the Birth*, I, 152.

14. Ibid., 169.
15. *The Confidential Correspondence of Napoleon Bonaparte with his Brother Joseph* (New York, 1856), I, 334.
16. Michael Broers, *Europe under Napoleon, 1799–1815* (London, 1996), 155.
17. Lovett, *Napoleon and the Birth*, I, 229–30.
18. Broers, *Europe under Napoleon*, 154–5.
19. *Mémoires et correspondance politique et militaire du Roi Joseph*, ed. A. Du Casse (Paris, 1854), IV, 421.
20. Michael Glover, *Legacy of Glory: The Bonaparte Kingdom of Spain, 1808–1813* (New York, 1971), 57–80.
21. Esdaile, *The Spanish Army*, 115.
22. David Gates, *The Spanish Ulcer: A History of the Peninsular War* (New York, London, 1986), 124–8.
23. On Joseph's rule in Spain, see Lovett, *Napoleon and the Birth*, II, 491–553; Owen Connelly, *Napoleon's Satellite Kingdoms* (New York, 1965), 223–63, and his *The Gentle Bonaparte: A Biography of Joseph, Napoleon's Elder Brother* (New York, 1968), 133–46, 168–218.
24. *Mémoires et correspondance*, VII, 330–1.
25. Lovett, *Napoleon and the Birth*, II, 511.
26. *The Confidential Correspondence*, I, 50.
27. Connelly, *Napoleon's Satellite*, 241–4; Glover, *Legacy of Glory*, 99.
28. *The Confidential Correspondence*, II, 102.
29. Lovett, *Napoleon and the Birth*, I, 203.
30. Broers, *Europe under Napoleon*, 210.
31. *The Confidential Correspondence*, II, 111.
32. Tone, *The Fatal Knot*; Lovett, *Napoleon and the Birth*, II, 666–721; Charles Esdaile, "Heroes or Villains? The Spanish Guerrillas in the Peninsular War," *History Today*, 38 (1988), 29–35.
33. Tone, "The Peninsular War," 235.
34. Esdaile, *The Spanish Army*, 161.
35. Tone, *The Fatal Knot*, 147–66.
36. Raymond Carr, *Spain 1808–1939* (Oxford, 1966), 109.
37. Esdaile, *The Spanish Army*, 161.
38. Lovett, *Napoleon and the Birth*, I, 370–8; II, 449–90; Carr, *Spain*, 92–101.
39. Carr, *Spain*, 99.
40. Esdaile, *The Spanish Army*, 168–70.
41. Charles Esdaile, *The Duke of Wellington and the Command of the Spanish Army, 1812–1814* (New York, 1990).
42. Emmanuel de Las Cases, *Memorial de Saint-Helene*, 2 vols (Paris, 1823), I, 609–10.
43. Tone, "The Peninsular War," 225.

9 PORTUGAL

1. Kenneth Maxwell, *Pombal, Paradox of the Enlightenment* (Cambridge, 1995).
2. Francisco de la Fuente, "The French Revolution and its Impact on Portugal," *CRE* (Tallahassee, FL, 1989), 194–200.

3. Janet Ladner, "John VI of Portugal: Contemporary of Napoleon and Wellington," *CRE,* vol. 19 (Tallahassee, FL, 1989), 869–81.
4. H. V. Livermore, *A New History of Portugal* (Cambridge, 1966), 247.
5. Maurice Borel, "La mission diplomatique du général Lannes en Portugal (1801–1804)," in *Revue des deux-mondes* (1911), 662–8.
6. *Corréspondance de Napoléon*, 19 July 1807, no. 12928, vol. 15, 433.
7. Livermore, *A New History*, 249.
8. Ibid., 158.
9. Antonio Pedro Vicente, "The Counter-Revolution in Spain and Portugal," *CRE* (Tallahassee, FL, 1989), 521.
10. Donald Horward, "Wellington as a Strategist, 1808–1814," *Wellington Studies in the Military and Political Career of the First Duke of Wellington*, ed. Norman Nash (Manchester, 1990), 101.
11. Ibid., 97–8.
12. Donald Horward, "Logistics and Strategy in the Peninsula: a Case Study, 1810–1811," *CRE* (Charleston, SC, 1999), 355–63; *The French Campaign in Portugal, 1810–1811: An Account by Jean Jacques Pelet*, ed. Donald Horward (Minneapolis, MN, 1973).
13. Donald Horward, *Napoleon and Iberia: The Twin Sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, 1810* (Tallahassee, FL, 1984).
14. Donald Horward, *The Battle of Bussaco: Masséna vs. Wellington* (Tallahassee, FL, 1965).
15. Michael Broers, *Europe under Napoleon, 1799–1815* (London, 1996), 217.

10 THE ITALIAN PENINSULA

Note: A different version of this chapter appeared in *Italy in the Nineteenth Century, 1796–1900*, ed. John Davis (Oxford, 2000), 25–53.

1. Stuart Woolf, *A History of Italy, 1700–1860: The Social Constraints of Political Change* (London, 1979), 63–151; Gregory Hanlon, *Early Modern Italy, 1550–1800* (New York, 2000), 340–66.
2. Woolf, *A History of Italy*, 159.
3. Carlo Zaghi, *L'Italia di Napoleone dalla Cisalpina al Regno* (Turin, 1986), 37.
4. John Davis, "1799: The 'Sanfede' and the Crisis of the 'ancien regime' in Southern Italy," *Society and Politics in the Age of the Risorgimento: Essays in Honour of Denis Mack Smith*, ed. John Davis and Paul Ginsborg (Cambridge, 1991), 1; Anna Maria Rao, *La repubblica napoletana del* 1799 (Rome, 1997).
5. John Davis, *Conflict and Control: Law and Order in Nineteenth-Century Italy* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ, 1988), 22–3.
6. Zaghi, *L'Italia di Napoleone*, 294–443; Owen Connelly, *Napoleon's Satellite Kingdoms* (New York, 1965), 19–57; Alain Pillepich, *Milan Capitale Napoléonienne, 1800–1814* (Paris, 2001).
7. Quoted in Zaghi, *L'Italia di Napoleone*, 361.
8. Livio Antonielli, *I prefetti dell'Italia napoleonica* (Bologna, 1983).
9. Carlo Capra, *L'età rivoluzionaria e napoleonica in Italia, 1796–1815* (Turin, 1978), 242.

10. Zaghi, *L'Italia di Napoleone*, 330.
11. Steven Hughes, *Crime, Disorder and the Risorgimento: The Politics of Policing in Bologna* (Cambridge, 1994), 20–1.
12. Davis, *Conflict and Control*, 133.
13. Zaghi, *L'Italia di Napoleone*, 412.
14. Alexander Grab, "The Politics of Finance in Napoleonic Italy (1802–1814)," *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 3 (2) (1998) 127–43.
15. *Correspondance de Napoléon*, 7 June 1805, no. 8852, vol. 10, 490.
16. Alexander Grab, "Army, State and Society: Conscription and Desertion in Napoleonic Italy (1802–1814)," *The Journal of Modern History*, 67 (March 1995), 25–54.
17. *Correspondance de Napoléon*, 23 August 1810, no. 16824, vol. 21, 60–1.
18. Alexander Grab, "State Power, Brigandage and Rural Resistance in Napoleonic Italy," *European History Quarterly*, 25 (January 1995), 39–70.
19. Pasquale Villani, "Il decennio francese," *Storia del Mezzogiorno*, ed. G. Galasso (Rome, 1986), 580.
20. Connelly, *Napoleon's Satellite*, 58–126; Angela Valente, *Gioacchino Murat e l'Italia meridionale*, a reprint (Turin, 1976).
21. Milton Finley, *The Most Monstrous of Wars: The Napoleonic Guerilla War in Southern Italy, 1806–1811* (Columbia, SC, 1994).
22. John Davis, "The Napoleonic Era in Southern Italy: An Ambiguous Legacy?" *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 80 (1991) *Lectures and Memoires*, 134.
23. Ibid., 147.
24. Valente, *Gioacchino Murat*, 278.
25. Villani, "Il decennio," 599.
26. Ibid., 630.
27. Valente, *Giaocchino Murat*, 295.
28. John Davis, "The Neapolitan Army During the *decennio francese*," *Rivista italiana di studi napoleonici*, 25 (1988), 169.
29. Michael Broers, *Napoleonic Imperialism and the Savoyard Monarchy, 1773–1821: State Building in Piedmont* (Lewiston and New York, 1997), 165–471.
30. Ibid., 404.
31. Michael Broers, *Europe under Napoleon, 1799–1815* (London, 1996), 205–6.
32. Jacques Godechot, "Rome et les états pontificaux," *Dictionnaire Napoléon*, ed. Jean Tulard (Paris, 1987), 1474.
33. Michael Broers, *The Politics of Religion in Napoleonic Italy: The War against God, 1801–1814* (London and New York, 2002), 146–74.
34. Franco Della Peruta, "War and Society in Napoleonic Italy," *Society and Politics in the Age of the Risorgimento*, ed. John Davis and Paul Ginsborg (Cambridge, 1991), 48.
35. John Rath, *The Fall of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Italy (1814)* (New York, 1941), 37–43; Woolf, *A History of Italy*, 219–24.
36. George Nafziger and Marco Gioannini, *The Defense of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Northern Italy, 1813–1814* (Westport, CT and London, 2002).
37. Marco Meriggi, "State and Society in Post-Napoleonic Italy," *Napoleon's Legacy*, ed. David Laven and Lucy Riall (Oxford and New York, 2000), 52.

11 THE GRAND DUCHY OF WARSAW

1. On eighteenth-century Poland see, Piotr Wandycz, *The Lands of Partitioned Poland, 1795–1918* (Seattle and London, 1974), 3–23.
2. Jerzy Jedlicki, "Bilan social du Duché de Varsovie," *Acta Poloniae Historica*, 14 (1966), 93–5; Christopher Blackburn, *Napoleon and the Szlachta* (Boulder, CO, 1998), 6.
3. Blackburn, *Napoleon and the Szlachta*, 8–13.
4. Simon Askenazy, *Napoléon et la Pologne* (1925); Monica Haman, "The Polish Legions in Italy, 1797–1801," *L'Europa scopre Napoleone, 1793–1804*, ed. Vittorio Scotti Douglas (Alessandria, 1999), II, 673–80.
5. Norman Davies, *God's Playground: A History of Poland*, 2 vols (New York, 1982), II, 296.
6. J. Holland, "Napoleon and Poland," *The Cambridge History of Poland from Augustus II to Pilsudski* (Cambridge, 1951), 213.
7. On the Duchy of Warsaw, Blackburn, *Napoleon and the Szlachta*; John Stanley, "A Political and Social History of the Duchy of Warsaw 1807–1813" (PhD dissertation, University of Toronto, 1979); Wandycz, *The Lands*, 43–64; M. Handelsman, "The Duchy of Warsaw," *The Cambridge History of Poland from Augustus II to Pilsudski* (Cambridge, 1951), 236–56.
8. Wandycz, *The Lands*, 43.
9. Handelsman, "The Duchy," 241.
10. Wandycz, *The Lands*, 46–7; Blackburn, *Napoleon and the Szlachta*, 91.
11. Blackburn, *Napoleon and the Szlachta*, 129.
12. Michael Broers, *Europe under Napoleon, 1799–1815* (London, 1996), 93. On the Polish army under Napoleon, see M. Kuriel, "Polish Military Effort in the Napoleonic Wars," *The Cambridge History*, 228–35; Rene Bielecki, "L'effort militaire polonais, 1806–1815," *Revue de l'institut Napoléon*, 132 (1976), 147–64.
13. Handelsman, "The Duchy," 243.
14. Monika Senkowska-Gluck, "Le Duché de Varsovie," *Occupants, occupés, 1792–1815* (Brussels, 1969), 400.
15. Barbara Grochulska, "L'économie polonaise et le renversement de la conjoncture (1805–1815)," *Revue d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine*, 17 (1970), 624.
16. Blackburn, *Napoleon and the Szlachta*, 72.
17. Andrzej Nieuwazny, "The Polish Kingdom (1815–1830): Continuity or Change?" *Napoleon's Legacy*, ed. David Laven and Lucy Riall (Oxford and New York, 2000), 121.
18. Ibid., 124.

12 THE ILLYRIAN PROVINCES

1. Frank Bundy, *The Administration of the Illyrian Provinces of the French Empire, 1809–1813* (New York and London, 1987), 19.
2. Melitta Pivec-Stele, *La vie économique des Provinces Illyriennes (1809–1813)* (Paris, 1930), 10–13; Philip Adler, "The Illyrian Provinces of France: Economic Aspects," *CRE*, 19 (Tallahassee, 1990), 931–8.

3. Bundy, *The Administration*, 49.
4. Ibid., 15.
5. Ibid., 110–13.
6. Georges Lefebvre, *Napoleon*, 2 vols (Eng. trans., London 1969 and 1974), II, 229.
7. Pievec-Stele, *La vie économique*, 251.
8. Bundy, *The Administration*, 287.
9. Michael Broers, *Europe under Napoleon, 1799–1815* (London, 1996), 220.
10. Leopoldina Plut-Pregelj, "The Illyrian Provinces: The South Slavs and the French Revolution," *CRE* 19 (Tallahassee, FL, 1989), 602–8; Bundy, *The Administration*, 158–92; Monika Senkowska Gluck, "Pouvoir et Société en Illyrie Napoléonienne," *Revue de l'Institut Napoléon*, 113 (1980), 72–5.
11. On conscription and the armed forces, Bundy, *The Administration*, 408–38; Senkowska Gluck, "Pouvoir et Société," 63–6.
12. Bundy, *The Administration*, 122–57.
13. Broers, *Europe under Napoleon*, 220.
14. Pivec-Stele, *La vie économique*, 130–6; 210–20.
15. Bundy, *The Administration*, 348.
16. Pivec-Stelle, *La vie économique*, 338.
17. Paul Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848* (Oxford, 1994), 383.

13 THE COLLAPSE OF THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE

1. Charles Esdaile, *The Wars of Napoleon* (London, 1995), 246–52; Jean Tulard, *Napoléon ou le Myth du Sauveur* (Paris, 1987; Eng. trans., London, 1987), 377–81.
2. Georges Lefebvre, *Napoleon* (Eng. trans., London, 1969, 1974), II, 178.
3. Paul Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848* (Oxford, 1994), 416–18.
4. Owen Connelly, *Blundering to Glory: Napoleon's Military Campaigns* (Wilmington, DE, 1988), 159.
5. On the Russian campaign, Alan Palmer, *Napoleon in Russia* (London, 1967); David Chandler, *The Campaigns of Napoleon: The Mind and Method of History's Greatest Soldier* (New York, 1966); Connelly, *Blundering*, 157–82; Alan Schom, *Napoleon Bonaparte* (New York, 1977), 583–616; 628–44.
6. Lefebvre, *Napoleon*, II, 317; Connelly, *Blundering*, 179.
7. Enno Kraehe, *Metternich's German Policy*, (Princeton, NJ, 1963), I, 157.
8. Schroeder, *The Transformation*, 459–76.
9. George Nafziger and Marco Gioannini, *The Defense of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Northern Italy, 1813–1814* (Westport, CT, 2002).

CONCLUSION: THE LEGACY OF NAPOLEON

1. Michael Broers, *Europe under Napoleon, 1799–1815* (London, 1996), 4.
2. Philip Dwyer (ed.), "Introduction," *Napoleon and Europe* (London, 2001), 2.

3. Michael Rowe, "Napoleon and State Formation in Central Europe," *Napoleon and Europe*, ed. Dwyer (London, 2001), 211; John Lawrence Tone, "The Peninsular War," *Napoleon and Europe*, ed. Dwyer, 229.
4. Isser Woloch, "Napoleonic Conscription," *Past and Present*, 111 (1986), 101.
5. Martyn Lyons, *Napoleon Bonaparte and the Legacy of the French Revolution* (New York, 1994), 258.
6. Broers, *Europe under Napoleon*, 266–7.
7. David Laven and Lucy Riall (ed.), *Napoleon's Legacy: Problems of Government in Restoration Europe* (Oxford and New York, 2000).

Selected Bibliography

The *Proceedings of the Consortium on Revolutionary Europe, 1750–1850* is abbreviated as *CRE*.

WORKS OF REFERENCE

Chandler, David, *Dictionary of the Napoleonic Wars* (London, 1979).

Connelly, Owen (ed.), *Historical Dictionary of Napoleonic France, 1799–1815* (Westport, CT, 1985).

Emsley, Clive, *The Longman Companion to Napoleonic Europe* (London and New York, 1993).

Tulard, Jean (ed.), *Dictionnaire Napoléon* (Paris, 1987).

GENERAL WORKS ON NAPOLEONIC EUROPE

Broers, Michael, *Europe under Napoleon, 1799–1815* (London, 1996).

Connelly, Owen, *Napoleon's Satellite Kingdoms* (New York, 1965).

Crouzet, François, "Wars, Blockade and Economic Change in Europe, 1792–1815," *Journal of Economic History*, 24 (1964).

Dwyer, Philip (ed.), *Napoleon and Europe* (London, 2001).

Ellis, Geoffrey, *The Napoleonic Empire* (London, 1991).

Ellis, Geoffrey, "The Nature of Napoleonic Imperialism," *Napoleon and Europe*, ed. Philip Dwyer (London, 2001).

Esdaile, Charles, *The Wars of Napoleon* (London, 1995).

Geyl, Peter, *Napoleon: For and Against* (Eng. trans., London, 1949).

Heckscher, Eli, *The Continental System: An Economic Interpretation* (1922; reprinted Gloucester, MA, 1964).

Laven, David and Lucy Riall (ed.), *Napoleon's Legacy: Problems of Government in Restoration Europe* (Oxford and New York, 2000).

Lefebvre, Georges, *Napoleon*, 2 vols (Eng. transl., London, 1969 and 1974).

Markham, Felix, *Napoleon* (London, 1963).
Occupants Occupés, 1792–1815 Colloque de Bruxelles, 29–30 January 1968 (Brussels, 1969).
Schom, Alan, *Napoleon Bonaparte* (New York, 1997).
Schroeder, Paul, *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848* (Oxford, 1994).
Tulard, Jean, *Napoleon: The Myth of the Saviour* (Eng. transl., London, 1984).
Woolf, Stuart, "French Civilization and Ethnicity in the Napoleonic Empire," *Past and Present*, 124 (1989).
Woolf, Stuart, *Napoleon's Integration of Europe* (London, 1991).

THE NAPOLEONIC CAMPAIGNS: GENERAL WORKS

Blanning, Tim, *The Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars* (London, 1986).
Blanning, Tim, *The French Revolutionary Wars, 1787–1802* (London, 1996).
Chandler, David, *The Campaigns of Napoleon: The Mind and Method of History's Greatest Soldier* (New York, 1966).
Connelly, Owen, *Blundering to Glory: Napoleon's Military Campaigns* (Wilmington, DE, 1987).
Elting, John, *Swords around a Throne: Napoleon's* Grande Armée (New York, 1988).
Gates, David, *The Napoleonic Wars, 1803–1815* (London, 1997).
Glover, M., *Warfare in the Age of Bonaparte* (London, 1980).
Jeffrey, G., *Tactics and Grand Tactics of the Napoleonic Wars* (New York, 1982).
Lynn, John, "Towards an Army of Honour: the Moral Evolution of the French Army, 1789–1815," *French Historical Studies*, 16 (1989).
Rothenberg, Gunther, *The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon* (London, 1977).

NAPOLEONIC FRANCE

Arnold, Eric, *Fouché, Napoleon and the General Police* (Washington, DC, 1979).
Bergeron, Louis, *France under Napoleon* (Princeton, NJ, 1981).
Collins, I., *Napoleon and his Parliaments, 1800–1815* (London, 1979).
Ellis, Geoffrey, *Napoleon* (London and New York, 1997).
Ellis, Geoffrey, *Napoleon's Continental Blockade: The Case of Alsace* (Oxford, 1981).
Forrest, Alan, *Conscripts and Deserters: The Army and French Society during the Revolution and Empire* (Oxford, 1989).
Furet, François, *Revolutionary France, 1770–1870* (Oxford, 1988).
Godechot, Jacques, *Les institutions de la France sous la révolution et l'empire* (Paris, 1968).
Godechot, Jacques, *The Counter-Revolution: Doctrine and Action, 1789–1804* (Princeton, NJ, 1971).
Holtman, Robert, *Napoleonic Propaganda* (Baton Rouge, LA, 1950).
Holtman, Robert, *The Napoleonic Revolution* (Baton Rouge, LA and London, 1967).
Lyons, Martyn, *Napoleon Bonaparte and the Legacy of the French Revolution* (New York, 1994).

Sibalis, Michael, "The Napoleonic Police State," *Napoleon and Europe*, ed. Philip Dwyer (London, 2001).
Sutherland, D. M. G., *France, 1789–1815: Revolution and Counter Revolution* (New York and London, Oxford, 1986).
Whitcomb, E. A., "Napoleon's Prefects," *American Historical Review*, 79 (1974).
Whitcomb, E. A., *Napoleon's Diplomatic Service* (Durham, NC, 1979).
Woloch, Isser, "Napoleonic Conscription: State Power and Civil Society," *Past and Present*, 111 (1986).
Woloch, Isser, *The New Regime Transformations of the French Civic Order, 1789–1820s* (New York and London, 1994).
Woloch, Isser, *Napoleon and his Collaborators: The Making of a Dictatorship* (New York, 2001).

GERMANY

Anderson, Barbara, "State-Building and Bureaucracy in Early-Nineteenth-Century Nassau," *Central European History*, 24 (1991).
Blanning, Tim, *The French Revolution in Germany: Occupation and Resistance in the Rhineland, 1792–1802* (Oxford, 1983).
Cronenberg, Allen, "Montgelas and the Reorganization of Napoleonic Bavaria," *CRE*, 19 (Tallahassee, FL, 1990).
Diefendorf, Jeffry, *Businessmen and Politics in the Rhineland, 1789–1834* (Princeton, NJ, 1980).
Eyck, Gunther, *Loyal Rebels, Andreas Hofer, and the Tyrolean Uprising of 1809* (New York, 1986).
Fisher, Herbert, *Studies in Napoleonic Statesmanship: Germany* (First published Oxford, 1903; New York, 1968).
Gagliardo, John, *Reich and Nation: The Holy Roman Empire as Idea and Reality, 1763–1806* (Bloomington, IN, 1980).
Gooch, G. P., *Germany and the French Revolution* (London, 1920).
Klang, Dan, "Bavaria and the War of Liberation, 1813–1814," *French Historical Studies*, 4 (1965).
Kraehe, Enno, *Metternich's German Policy*, 2 vols (Princeton, NJ, 1963 and 1983).
Lamar, Glenn, *Jerome Bonaparte: The War Years, 1800–1815* (Westport, CN, 2000).
Lee, Lloyd, *The Politics of Harmony: Civil Service, Liberalism and Social Reform in Baden, 1800–1850* (Newark, NJ, 1980).
Nipperdey, Thomas, *Germany from Napoleon to Bismarck, 1800–1860* (Princeton, NJ, 1996).
Rowe, Michael, "Between Empire and Home Town: Napoleonic Rule on the Rhine, 1799–1814," *The Historical Journal*, 423 (1999).
Rowe, Michael, "Napoleon and State Formation in Central Europe," *Napoleon and Europe*, ed. Philip Dwyer (London, 2001).
Schmitt, Hans, "Germany without Prussia: a Closer Look at the Confederation of the Rhine," *German Studies Review*, 6 (1983).
Sheehan, James, *German History, 1770–1866* (Oxford, 1993).

Simms, Brendan, *The Impact of Napoleon: Prussian High Politics, Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Executive*, 1797–1806 (Cambridge, 1997).
Simms, Brendan, *The Struggle for Mastery in Germany, 1779–1850* (New York, 1998).

THE ITALIAN PENINSULA

Broers, Michael, "Italy and the Modern State: the Experience of Napoleonic Rule," in *The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture*, vol. III: *The Transformation of Political Culture, 1789–1848*, ed. F. Furet and M. Ozouf (Oxford, 1989).
Broers, Michael, *Napoleonic Imperialism and the Savoyard Monarchy, 1773–1821: State Building in Piedmont* (Lewiston, 1997).
Broers, Michael, *The Politics of Religion in Napoleonic Italy: The War against God, 1801–1814* (London, 2002).
Chadwick, Owen, *The Popes and the European Revolutions* (Oxford, 1979).
Davis, John, *Conflict and Control: Law and Order in Nineteenth-Century Italy* (Atlantic Highland, NJ, 1988).
Davis, John, "The Impact of French Rule on the Kingdom of Naples, 1806–1815," *Ricerche Storiche*, 20 (1990).
Finley, Milton, *The Most Monstrous of Wars: The Napoleonic Guerilla War in Southern Italy, 1806–1811* (Columbia, SC, 1994).
Grab, Alexander, "Army, State and Society: Conscription and Desertion in Napoleonic Italy (1802–1814)," *Journal of Modern History*, 67 (1995).
Grab, Alexander, "State Power, Brigandage and Rural Resistance in Napoleonic Italy," *European History Quarterly*, 25 (1995).
Grab, Alexander, "The Politics of Finance in Napoleonic Italy (1802–1814)," *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 3 (1998), 127–43.
Hales, E. E. Y., *Napoleon and the Pope* (London, 1962).
Peruta, Franco Della, "War and Society in Napoleonic Italy: The Armies of the Kingdom of Italy at Home and Abroad," *Society and Politics in Italy in the Age of the Risorgimento*, ed. John Davis and Paul Ginsborg (Cambridge, 1991).
Rath, John, *The Fall of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Italy (1814)* (New York, 1941).
Schneid, Frederick, *Napoleon's Italian Campaigns, 1805–1815* (Westport, CT, 2002).
Woolf, Stuart, *A History of Italy, 1700–1860: The Social Constraints of Political Change* (London, 1979).

THE NETHERLANDS

Kossman, E. H., "The Crisis of the Dutch State, 1780–1813: Nationalism, Feudalism, Unitarism," *Britain and the Netherlands*, ed. J. S. Bromely and E. H. Kossman, vol. IV (The Hague, 1971).
Kossman, E. H., *The Low Countries, 1780–1940* (Oxford, 1978).
Schama, Simon, "The Exigencies of War and the Politics of Taxation in the Netherlands, 1795–1810," *War and Economic Development Essays in Memory of David Joslin*, ed. J. M. Winter (Cambridge, 1975).

Schama, Simon, *Patriots and Liberators: Revolution in the Netherlands, 1780–1813* (London, 1977).

SPAIN

Carr, Raymond, *Spain, 1808–1939* (Oxford, 1966).
Connelly, Owen, *The Gentle Bonaparte: A Biography of Joseph, Napoleon's Elder Brother* (New York, 1968).
Esdaile, Charles, "Heroes or Villains? The Spanish Guerrillas and the Peninsular War," *History Today*, 38 (1988).
Esdaile, Charles, *The Spanish Army in the Peninsular War* (Manchester and New York, 1988).
Esdaile, Charles, "War and Politics in Spain, 1808–1814," *The Historical Journal*, 31 (1988).
Esdaile, Charles, *The Duke of Wellington and the Command of the Spanish Army, 1812–1814* (New York, 1990).
Gates, David, *The Spanish Ulcer: A History of the Peninsular War* (New York and London, 1986).
Glover, Michael, *Legacy of Glory: The Bonaparte Kingdom of Spain, 1808–1813* (New York, 1971).
Hamnett, B., "Spanish Constitutional Theory and Political Reality: Liberalism, Traditionalism and the Spanish *Cortes*, 1810–1814," *Journal of Modern History*, 50 (1977).
Hilt, Douglas, *The Troubled Trinity: Godoy and the Spanish Monarchs* (Tuscaloosa, Alabama and London, 1987).
Lovett, Gabriel, *Napoleon and the Birth of Modern Spain*, 2 vols (New York, 1965).
Tone, John Lawrence, *The Fatal Knot: The Guerrilla War in Navarre and the Defeat of Napoleon in Spain* (Chapel Hill and London, 1994).
Tone, John Lawrence, "The Peninsular War," *Napoleon and Europe*, ed. Philip Dwyer (London, 2001).

PORTUGAL

Fuente, Francisco de la, "The French Revolution and its Impact on Portugal," *CRE* (Tallahassee, FL, 1990).
Horward, Donald (ed.), *The French Campaign in Portugal, 1810–1811: An Account by Jean Jacques Pelet* (Minneapolis, MN, 1973).
Horward, Donald, "Wellington and the Defense of Portugal," *International History Review*, 11 (1989).
Horward, Donald, "Wellington as a Strategist, 1808–1814," *Wellington Studies in the Military and Political Career of the First Duke of Wellington*, ed. Norman Nash (Manchester, 1990).
Horward, Donald, "Logistics and Strategy in the Peninsula: a Case Study, 1810–1811," *CRE* (Charleston, SC, 1999).
Livermore, H., *A New History of Portugal* (Cambridge, 1966).
Maxwell, Kenneth, *Pombal, Paradox of the Enlightenment* (Cambridge, 1995).

ILLYRIA

Adler, Philip, "The Illyrian Provinces of France: Economic Aspects," *CRE* (Tallahassee, FL, 1990).
Bundy, Frank, *The Administration of the Illyrian Provinces of the French Empire, 1809–1813* (New York and London, 1987).

SWITZERLAND

Oechsli, Wilhelm, *A History of Switzerland, 1499–1914* (Cambridge, 1922).
Suratteau, Jean, "Occupation, occupants et occupés en Suisse de 1792 à 1814," *Occupants, Occupés, 1792–1815*, Colloque de Bruxelles, 29–30 January 1968 (Brussels, 1969).

THE GRAND DUCHY OF WARSAW

Blackburn, Christopher, *Napoleon and the Szlachta* (Boulder, CO, 1998).
Davies, Norman, *God's Playground: A History of Poland*, 2 vols (New York, 1982).
Handelsman, M., "The Duchy of Warsaw," *The Cambridge History of Poland from Augustus II to Pilsudski* (Cambridge, 1951).
Holland, J., "Napoleon and Poland," *The Cambridge History of Poland from Augustus II to Pilsudski* (Cambridge, 1951).
Wandycz, Piotr, *The Lands of Partitioned Poland, 1795–1918* (Seattle, 1974).

Index