

Edited by Eliezer Ben-Rafael & Yitzhak Sternberg
with Judit Bokser Liwerant & Yosef Gorny

Transnationalism

Diasporas and the advent
of a new (dis)order



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Transnationalism

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PREFACE

This book is about the recent developments of societies associated with the notion of transnationalism. This consists of studies focusing on specific cases as well as on the comparison of major cases. Jews, with all the contemporary variety of their developments make up a paradigmatic space of cases, but Muslims, Africans, Hispanics, Chinese and others attract today the attention by their variegated, far-reaching and often intermingling impacts on the largest spectrum of societies. In front of all these, the contributors to this volume ask themselves how far transnational diasporas, and transnationalism more generally, are bringing about more incoherence and discrepancies within and among social orders. Are societies and globe becoming irremediably chaotic and erratic?

The contributors to this volume attempt to add to our present-day theoretical and empirical knowledge and to conceptualize and systematize the essence of the changes that we witness and experience. Hence, this book presents a bunch of approaches delving into the diversity of intellectual and scientific interests that transnationalism awakes. It then plunges into the diversity of the empirical reality to pursue with a comparative study.

The thread that binds together the different contributions is the aspiration to propose new answers to the apprehending of “what is new in our world, societies and life with transnationalism”.

This volume stems from an international workshop that was held in Tel-Aviv in September 2007 with the participation of leading scholars in the field. The organizers benefited from the support of the Tel-Aviv University, the Faculty of Social Sciences, the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, the Institute for Latin American History and Culture at the Tel-Aviv University, the Cymbalista Jewish Heritage Center, the Beit Berl Academic College, the Yad Tabenkin Center for Kibbutz Research, the Klal Yisrael Project, and last but not least, the Embassy of France in Israel. We wish also to express gratitude to Professor Judit Bokser Liwerant of UNAM, Mexico, and Professor Yosef Gorny, of Tel-Aviv University for their association with our enterprise.

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INTRODUCTION

DEBATING TRANSNATIONALISM

Eliezer Ben-Rafael and Yitzhak Sternberg

Transnationalism is now the topic of an increasing corpus of literature in the social sciences that attempts to capture its singularity, from either a synchronic or diachronic perspective. The profusion of transnational diasporas—which are factors of fluidity in social orders and represent confrontations between contingencies and basic sociocultural drives—has created a difference from the past. It is against this backdrop that this book aspires to rummage into the fundamental issues of the nature, scope and overall significance of this difference.

The notion of transnationalism basically relates to distinct types of activities and communities that illustrate transnational interests and allegiances. This transnational characteristic differs from what is usually meant by “international” and which designates activities setting in contact official bodies—states, universities, associations or parties—belonging to different states. While by “transnational” one also understands relations that run across states and societies, this term focuses on people and groups and do not necessarily refer to official bodies. It conveys, at the difference from “international”, an association with a condition of dispersal in different states and societies of social entities and actors that share an allegiance to some common attributes.

The accelerated pace of globalization and the increasing flows of migration in our present-day era have given impulse to the diffusion of this kind of allegiance that is definitely on the rise in many places—in scope, intensity and frequency. Growing segments of the populations and sectors of activity, especially in Western countries, illustrate this kind of allegiance; in this sense, they bring about what can be described as “transnationalization” and which is not necessarily even and similar everywhere.

Under this angle, however, the notion of transnationalism also receives an additional significance that refers to the impacts transnational entities may have by their very presence. We think here, of course, firstly, of the meanings that membership in such entities may imply for

individuals and make them different from other people around. Secondly, we also ask here how far and in what ways the fact that individuals—which may be numerous and increasing in number—belong to transnational entities affect people, groups or organizations that do not. In this respect, it may be hypothesized, transnational entities might be factors of changes in and of the social order. The notion of transnationalism should then apply as a general societal condition where transnationalization reaches a degree where transnational entities are effective agents of micro and macro changes.

This notion of transnationalism should be especially relevant where a diversity of transnational entities pressurizes society in very different directions. Such entities may, indeed, respond to different types even when one circumscribes the discussion to social entities. Regarding their sociological characteristics, they may include linguistic groups, religious communities, regional populations or nomadic people. Some stem from migration and migrants' retention of relations with homelands—real or virtual—; others may be the outcome of changes in inter-state borders that divide a culturally homogeneous population.

The major focus of the discussion of transnationalism, the common feature of transnational diasporas, is their anchorage in allegiances that imply a reference to a common narrative and plight where the very fact of dispersal is granted a special ideological significance—positive or negative. We think here of the narrative of slavery in the sub-Saharan African diaspora, the concept of “exile” characteristic of traditional Judaism, the notion of “oversea Chinese” throughout the Chinese diaspora. While these notions represent negative perceptions of the dispersal, in other cases, dispersal may be perceived as accomplishment. This is the case, for instance, of “pilgrims” who left their countries of origin to discover new “promised lands”, the notion of “new world” that depicted for decades the dispersion of Europeans over the seas, or the positive meanings attached to the dispersion of Catholic missionaries and missions. Though, in all these examples, diasporas remain characterized by a founding fact of transstate shift of location accounting for sociocultural distinctiveness *vis-à-vis* environment and some loyalty (not necessarily overwhelming) to a real, symbolic or mythic “origin”, center, or “homeland” situated elsewhere.

To delve into this multifaceted phenomenon requires confronting complex issues. It involves not less than questioning the relations between nation, ethnicity and global developments in this world of ours that has, in one way or another, embraced modernity. Ernest Renan

(1996/1882), to remember, defined a nation as a “spiritual principle” asserted by citizens of a country, based on shared memories and the cult of a glorious past. However, in today’s constantly changing modern world, where very different nations and nationalisms have multiplied, original formulations of nation and its *desiratum* “nationalism” have not remained intact. Modernity, said Max Weber, and Eisenstadt in his following, emerges when the legitimacy of the social order ceases to be taken for granted and becomes an existential problématique (Eisenstadt 2001). And indeed, it is now legitimate to speak out on behalf of individual and group goals and interests and not only of the society as a whole. This is the context of processes that have come up to globalization the details of which contain a diversity of aspects one of the foremost of which consisting of transnational diasporas activated by intense, continually reconstructed networks that defy some state’s reticence toward sociocultural pluralism.

Volens nolens, contemporary societies are thus becoming increasingly multicultural. This evolution is by no means painless and smooth. It confronts a rise of popularity of racist and nationalistic chauvinism in some segments of the veteran population whenever economic downturns occur, which may find an echo in diaspora communities’ renewed interest in their original homelands. Obstacles and antagonisms encountered in their new society may bring migrant groups stereotyped in negative terms by large segments of the local population to envisage “returning” as a possible course. This interest, in quieter times, need not be too commanding. By and large, modern diasporas do not actually expect to return to original homelands, though they often have strong connections with the people there and harbor nationalistic longings at a distance.

These developments also extend governments’ responsibility for nationals in the outside, bringing in new kinds of contacts with governments of new homelands. Original homelands’ governments may be able to capitalize politically on their diasporas and act in the new homelands as factors of multiculturalization. By this we mean sponsoring the creation of cultural centers and launching programs of activity which contribute to those nationals’ crystallization as a community, and intervening, at the level of government-to-government relations, on behalf of their welfare. For the diasporans themselves, in terms of emotions and aspects of their identity, this may strengthen their self-confidence and power *vis-à-vis* their environment. In other words, the notion of transnational diaspora no longer describes just the very fact

of dispersion, but points out to a structured whole where components interact despite their dispersion. It designates a transglobal unit consisting of all articulated communities—usually called, they too, “diasporas”—sharing a same common anchorage in a real or virtual original homeland. One would thus speak of “transnational diaspora” to describe the “Jewish world”, but of “diaspora” when thinking of “American Jews”. Which, however, should not prevent using the word diaspora for transnational diaspora wherever the context of the elocution leaves no room for ambiguity.

It is as such that transnational diasporas boost the internal diversity of contemporary societies—whether they encounter hostility and discrimination or, on the contrary, hospitality and goodwill, on the side of veterans. All in all, they contribute to new lines of mutual resemblance among settings: in Paris, London, New York, and many other metropolitan cities, one finds today—though in different variants—Chinatowns, Muslim neighborhoods, Jewish institutions, and African areas. This very diversity enabled by multiculturalism has become a salient factor of the similarity of multicultural settings.

This multiculturalism is primarily expressed in the formation of diasporan communities where soon appear a press, centers of learning, places of worship, clubs, restaurants and political parties. In all these, languages of origin retain some importance as means of communication as well as markers of belongingness, thereby contributing to characteristic patterns of bilingualism or multilingualism. While language singles out and symbolizes the singularity of groups, their development is also favored, in many places, by the structures of the welfare state which grants benefits to residents, independent of their civil status (Soysal 1994; Bauböck 1994, 1998). These circumstances weaken the urge among immigrants to engage in thorough acculturation, let alone assimilation. At the level of the individual, this kind of experience means nothing less than ‘dual homeness;’ that is, having two ‘homes’—the original homeland and the new one the respective importance of which in the mind of diasporans may vary from individual to individual or from milieu to milieu. It is against this backdrop, that the notion of ‘hostland’ used by many a researcher of diasporas in reference to diasporans’ new settings does not seem appropriate at least where diasporans are granted or are on the way to be granted citizenship and, in one way or another, experience acculturation to, and insertion in, their new environment. Hence, to the opposition “homeland”—“hostland” that is used in many studies—including in this volume

as can be seen in the following—, we prefer speaking of “original” and “new” homelands. We ourselves will use, in most cases, the notion of “homeland” alone for “original homeland” where the sense is obvious, and will not refrain from using “hostland” when appropriate—that is, where immigrants are best described as only “on the way to insertion” in their new society.

Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004) suggest here that sociocultural heterogeneity and transnational ties are not incompatible with some degree of societal stability, provided the concept of society is no longer equated with a closed concept of nation-state. They argue that the lives of increasing numbers of individuals can no longer be understood by looking only at what goes on within state boundaries. The incorporation of individuals into nation-states and maintaining transnational connections are not contradictory. Migrant incorporation into a hostland and connections to a homeland or to dispersed networks of family, compatriots, or people who share a religious or an ethnic identity can occur simultaneously and be mutually reinforcing.

This assessment stands behind an emerging body of research which studies variations in transnational practices across groups. The assimilationist paradigm is now the object of much criticism (Glick Schiller 1999, Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc 1994, Glick Schiller, Basch and Szanton Blanc 1995) on the basis of emphasis on networks that stretch between a sending community and its migrants (Grasmuck and Pessar 1991, Levitt 2001, Smith 1986, Kyle 2000), and the determination of the conditions under which migrants maintain homeland identities (Morawska 2003, Levitt 2001, Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc 1994). These studies reveal that significant numbers of migrants may engage in regular economic and political transnational practices (Portes, Haller and Guarnizo 2002, Guarnizo, Portes and Haller 2003) and that many more engage in occasional transnational activities. That sending and receiving states continue to play simultaneously a critical role in migrants’ lives has also received substantial confirmation (Goldring 2002). Moreover, research on the second generation has shown that transnational migration is not an ephemeral phenomenon (Glick Schiller and Fouron 2003), which points out that the nation-state container view of society does not adequately capture the complex interconnectedness of contemporary reality.

The reality of transnational diasporas is anything but stable and permanent, and a major reason for this lies in the fact that they basically represent the interaction between drives embedded in culture and

varying circumstances some of which depending at all on external uncontrolled foci of reference. Of the two forces, many researchers prefer to emphasize contingency. For instance, the cases studied in the collection edited by Covers and Vermeulen (1997) illustrate groups where ethnic and diasporic identities are principally influenced by political and ecological contexts. Accordingly, national politics and social configurations play a determinant role in collective identification, people's firmness in retaining visible markers, and keeping up to collective boundaries. In a same vein, Tsing (2000) criticizes the view that our world can be represented as a new era. While the international scene has undergone striking transformations over recent decades, it seems unlikely that a single new logic of transformation is being produced. Similarly, Sökefeld (2006) assesses that diaspora communities are instances of mobilization processes rather than collectives engendered by immanent notions of belonging. Drawing on constructivist concepts, he sees the diaspora as a mode of cultural production. Anthias (1998) as well contends that the formation of diasporas do not really go beyond well-known paradigms that set circumstances in opposition to primordial bonding and emphasize the homogenization of social segments. As a whole, these researchers follow Anderson's (1983) imagined-community perspective. Within this perspective, however, Tsing agrees that one cannot conclude that diasporas are fictitious and unreal. Imagined communities are real as far as they are imagined as real, taken as real and consequently affect behaviors and social life. Yet, in Tsing's eyes, sentiments of belonging, attachment to a home and ideas of a place of origin do not constitute the 'substance' from which diasporas are made, but the codes in terms of which a diaspora is imagined. In a word, Tsing suggests defining diasporas as imagined transnational communities.

Tsing's approach contradicts many conceptualizations of diaspora that refer to a shared identity as a significant element (Cohen 1997, Safran 1991, Tölölyan 1996). Though, Tsing's definition still combines an 'objective' and a 'subjective' criterion, both of which must be fulfilled so that a given collectivity may be categorized as diaspora. The dispersal of migrants from a certain country does not necessarily engender an imagination of community, but they may become a diaspora. Putting then the imagination of community at the center of a definition of diaspora leads to consider community in a way that conflates the first and the second categories of meaning of diaspora distinguished by Steven Vertovec (1997), namely the notion of diaspora as both a

social form and a kind of consciousness. Which comes down to assert that there can be no diaspora community without a consciousness of diaspora, without an idea of shared identity, of common belonging to that group.

One may add here that the reference to an imagination of identity does not presuppose that specific ideas of identity are actually shared within the community. To the contrary, such ideas may well be bitterly disputed among diasporans. Yet, such disputes about the precise formulation of an identity help to affirm the idea that there is agreement at least about the very existence of a common identity, however understood. The same identities may be formulated differently by different people, and be the objects of varying degrees of identification.

This approach that encompasses the insights of different perspectives does not contradict Tarrow's (1998) insistence on the social mobilization dimension, nor Anthias' (1998) focusing on the fluidity of the social processes underlying diaspora formation. As an objection to the contingency-first perspective, one may however remember that, with ethnicity in mind, Weber (1978) already spoke of customs as important components of community formation as well as feelings of belonging and bonds forged by a common religion, a collective history, a language and, possibly, biological characteristics. It is the combination of such subjective and objective aspects that accounts for the development of social groups—which also includes today transnational diasporas.

Moreover, the formulations of collective identity may also vary among people considering themselves members of the same community, which leads us to contemplate, beyond the essentialist/situationist argument, the usefulness of a structuralist approach in a Levi-Straussian vein (Levi-Strauss 1961, 1977). One may indeed see aspects of identity as revolving around basic dilemmas—rather than definite assertions—giving way to varying assessments. It is from this angle that one then best understands the interaction of contingencies and primordial aspects: according to the modalities of this interaction, depending on the nature of contingencies, different formulations of the collective identity may emerge from the space of potential responses. Such an identity stems from the space of possibilities implied by the identity's deep structures and the options they outline.

These debates are the backdrop of the discussion that follows in Part I under the title "Perspectives," and which presents major approaches to transnationalism. This part opens with a chapter by Shmuel N. Eisenstadt who integrates the discussion of transnational

diasporas in the framework of civilizational analysis. He sees the phenomenon as expressing the growing contemporary predominance of globalization at a time when democratization is concomitantly progressing throughout the world. These processes tend to dissociate major domains of social activity and forward the weakening of social boundaries through a multiplication of transstate networks and new identities. This reality is propitious to the resurgence of religious sensibilities and their privatization. Political centers continue to be major agencies of resource distribution, but their power is harmed for the benefit of global actors and new collectivities. Local, regional, ethnic, religious, even fundamentalist claims are raised that focus on dispersed arenas pushing centers toward “multicultural” and “postmodern” directions. Many of these actors are active on the international scene contributing to the development of a “New World Disorder.” New virtual communities emerge which share ambivalent attitudes towards Western modernity, and also seek to appropriate the global scene.

Stéphane Dufoix focuses on the discussion of the very notion of “diaspora,” a Greek word meaning “dispersion” associated with Jewish history as the equivalent of the Hebrew “*galut*” imbued with messianism and aspirations to Return. “Diaspora” remained confined to the religious realm until the first half of the nineteenth century. Secular Zionism endorsed the “negation of exile” but it did not take much time, after the creation of Israel, to witness the emergence of a new notion—*tfutsot*—which refers not to exile but to the dispersed existence of the Jewish community. It designates the existence of a specific relationship between the Jewish State and Jews living outside Israel. A similar development has taken place among Africans outside Africa. Emigration projects were repeated throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The first uses of “diaspora” were made in 1910 and systematic elaborations appeared from 1965 onward. “Diaspora” provided Black people with a name for themselves. Some authors did draw analogies with the Jewish case and even developed notions very close to Jewish formulations. Finally, and beyond the essential differences between the Jewish and African cases, one speaks of people who see themselves as dispersed cultural nations at the same time characterized by de-territorialization and territorialization. Similar to the case of Israel, following independence most new states in Africa designed policies aiming at establishing links with people who had left the country.

Against this background, William Safran analyzes the issue of diaspora consciousness which, in his eyes and in one way or another,

consists of a primordial reflection of ethnicity. Which does not gainsay that instrumental and environmental factors are of negligible significance here, nor that migrants may get rid of their diaspora identity. Safran also emphasizes the importance of the new homeland's own traditions of multiculturalism and tolerance of diversity. On the other hand, he also acknowledges the role of a geographical center for a diaspora in order to maintain itself as a distinct entity. Diaspora is part of a transnational and transpolitical ethnoscape from which people may move out, whether consciously or not. The more individuals exit their ethnoscape, the more they undermine the very continuity of the diaspora which then tends to be reduced to the status of a myth. Moreover, diaspora properly so called, Safran argues, implies polycentrism: at least the homeland and the diaspora are bound by cross-polity relations and exchange. Not all diaspora political activities relate to the homeland, however. Diaspora implies cultural reproduction which is a two-way street with a reciprocal impact on both the diaspora and the homeland. These issues are illustrated by reference to numerous cases, and especially the Jewish diaspora and its relation to Israel.

Yitzhak Sternberg suggests a long-term diachronic comparative outlook on contemporary immigration and transnationalism and, from this angle, deals with the issue of this immigration's newness and distinctiveness. He acknowledges that nowadays the scope, intensity and frequency of immigrants' transnational activities are greater than in previous times. However, it is also important to keep in mind features of past immigrations, which have played important roles in major macro socio-historical transformations and in the molding of our world, that are relatively absent in contemporary immigration. Past migration has indeed built new societies and states which are now among leading players in the international scene. Another transformation that was manifest in some immigrant societies is the appearance of a new collective identity replacing the previous one. That process was also sometimes bound to the emergence of local "nativist" identities and ideologies. From these considerations of possible connections between immigration and such socio-historical transformations, a typology is drawn out that may throw light on contemporary immigration and transnationalism as a space of diachronic and synchronic cases that may be compared to each other.

Using a different kind of comparative approach, Robin Cohen reviews the various uses of the idea of home and homeland in diaspora studies. He finds support for three notions of diaspora—solid, ductile, and

liquid. The “solid” diaspora is marked by myths of a common origin often territorialized—the “old country” or the “promised land”—both romantic and powerful. In some cases, the myth has given way to a more “ductile” notion of homeland, which can be displaced. Furthermore, virtual, deterritorialized, “liquid” homes can be constructed through cultural links and by the substitution of sacred monuments, rivers, icons, and shrines for home, as in the case of diaspora religions. Cohen then notes that, rather than a complete process of erasure, conditions in the natal homeland may become so hostile in some cases (and the relatively benign conditions in parts of the diaspora so attractive) that the recovery of homeland has been deferred indefinitely and displaced by newer centers of religious, cultural and economic achievements.

Michel Wieviorka focuses on these issues from the viewpoint of new homelands and the issue of integration. Nowadays, he says, the perspective on integration is weakened, while the subject and interactions are gaining in importance. This is a consequence of economic globalization which has witnessed a crisis in many nation-states. The nation can no longer be the sole or principal source of identification of individuals in an era where the domination of international financial and commercial capital encounters the rise of individualism and the affirmation of the personal subject. Both France’s republican model and the United Kingdom’s multiculturalist model are undergoing severe crises, while no integration model is capable of accounting for the diversity of social, cultural or political developments. The political authorities remain powerless, prisoners of their ideological rigidity, while migration takes on multiple forms. Cultural identities, whether they originate in immigration or come from another source, are always liable to cross paths with one another, and merge together. There is no unique scenario of migratory phenomena and what is at issue varies from one country to another.

Yet there is still room to consider basic differences between societies absorbing immigrants and hosting diasporas—and societies in general—which do not necessarily disappear in this era of enhanced globalization with its tendency to strengthen convergence between societies. As an illustration of this persistence of macro differences, Ephraim Yuchtman-Yaar and Yasmin Alkalay’s chapter considers, on the basis of a cross-national analysis, the impacts of different prevailing religions—Catholic, Muslim and Protestant—on value orientations of members of these societies. Among other findings, Protestant-majority societies

tend to have the lowest levels of religiosity, the highest scores of political involvement by citizens, and the strongest post-materialist interests. Overall, Protestants embrace modern-liberal values to a larger extent than Catholics and Muslims. Catholic-majority societies stand somewhere in between this pole, while the Muslim societies are the most distant from the Protestant group for their higher level of religiosity and lower levels of political involvement and post-materialist interests. They are clearly more conservative than the Protestant- and Catholic-majority societies. Overall, then, societies dominated by these three religions represent different cultural groups. Pursuing from there, it also appears that minorities, in societies where a different religion from theirs prevails, tend to depart from their coreligionist majorities at the same time as they remain somehow at a distance from the value orientations exhibited by members of their societies who share the prevalent creed.

Such differences in dominant cultures thus imprint themselves on transnational groups or diasporas but not necessarily to the extent of erasing differentiations between them and their environments. These issues are also at the center of David Thelen's preoccupations as a historian with present-day global reality. In the 1960s, nation-states were the self-evident focus for historians but the widening spread across national borders of institutions—from multinational corporations to unprecedented migrations—have unleashed processes of hybridization and creolization. The global reach of corporations has also battered people's capacity to take control over their lives within their nation states. These changes, in turn, spark resistance in many forms, including new notions of nationhood like "Black nationalism," Nation of Islam, Queer Nation, as well as transnational sort-of nationalisms like Hispanic and Latino. As some people construct borderlands between cultures, others invoke nation states or national cultures to try and prevent such mixing or creolization. What matters is not to define what a nation state (or a diaspora) could or should be—or what transnational should mean—but how people experience and construct nation, state, or diaspora as they go about their lives. The exciting possibilities for exploration contained in the prefix "trans," draws attention to movement across, over, or through nations. Diasporas are obviously great examples because they point to the circularity, continuity, and multidirectionality of movements of people.

It is at this point that Tobie Nathan's chapter proposes, in a psycho-social perspective, to delve into the major present-day notion of

identity, which figures in all the social sciences. Identity, a self-evident category, nevertheless seems impossible to define, enmeshed as it is in inextricable ideological networks. One might prefer in its place the concept of belonging or membership. From this perspective, it would be easy to describe multiple, unstable identities subject to change within a lifespan. However, identity, in the common sense, is not like a passport photo: it possesses considerable power. Once asserted, it incites enthusiasm, shakes the world, and captures minds. In order to account for transnationalism, we need the concept of identity as a psychological concept, a notion that slips from our grasp as soon as we attempt to define it. It must be considered first and foremost as a project, the projection of one's being into a becoming, that simultaneously involves naming practices, attachments, and therapies. Present-day sociologists and political scientists use these notions to speak of "transnations" or of "long-distance nationalism." Inspired by such terminology, one may speak of "long-distance attachments" that dynamically reveal their existence through complex psychological processes. The internal compulsion that guarantees identity sometimes results from the action of invisible, non-human, beings such as spirits, ancestors, or gods. At the close of this discussion, we may come to think that the interesting question isn't "who am I?" but rather "to whom do I belong?"—"to whom" meaning "to which invisible non-human being."

On a sociological ground and taking a macro perspective, Michel S. Laguerre emphasizes then that the novelty of our time resides in the centrality of the diaspora-homeland relationship and the consequent expansion of the nation's responsibility beyond the state's territorial jurisdiction. These relations are bound to each other in the forming of a larger unit that can be seen as a transglobal network nation. This chapter suggests identifying and analyzing some of the production mechanisms of this transglobal network nation. In this perspective, the homeland and diaspora are seen as architectural units of a much larger societal reality, where the rationale of their trajectories is tied up with the logic of the ensemble, outside of which their itineraries cannot be unveiled. The argument is that relations among diasporic sites, and between each diasporic site and the homeland, constitute the transnational spatial arena in which each unit choreographs its activities. Hence, when we study the diaspora and its homeland, the ultimate goal cannot be simply to understand the functioning of each or the relations binding them, but ought to provide a new interpretation of the ensemble. The space of diasporic interaction is not only local, national, and

regional; it is also global. In this light, one may venture to say that the trajectory of the diaspora impacts both the homeland and new homelands. It sets the receiving state a new agenda, and extends the nature of the sending state itself.

From these texts we come out with a notion of “diaspora” that refers to a condition where individuals feel they are members or quasi-members of a given society (the “hostland” in the author’s words) but are still bound to the society from which they originate (the “homeland”). The hostland, to be sure, may be seen over time as a homeland as diasporans get emotionally committed to it and identify with its symbols and culture. Though, even then, people constitute a transnational diaspora as far as they still see themselves as connected with their land of origin and/or fellow-diasporans elsewhere.

The theoretical texts of Part I provide a variety of fruitful angles of discussion for the phenomenon of transnationalism. These texts, when seen as a whole, lead to the conclusion that transnationalism is definitely multidimensional. To demonstrate this empirically it suffices to focus on one single case of diaspora and delve into the variety of models that it is able to illustrate. Hence, Part II presents a series of studies that focus on the Jewish diaspora which is probably the most longstanding one. The Jews, indeed, exemplified the notion of diaspora long before the notion itself existed, which justifies viewing them as a paradigmatic space of cases. It is our suggestion that the studies of these cases may yield some guidance for the investigation of other diasporas and their own inner variations.

Sergio DellaPergola opens this part by overviewing the migration movements of Jews in recent decades. He shows the correlation of these movements with socioeconomic and political fluctuations in countries of origin as well as with practical and legal possibilities of leaving. On the other hand, the attractiveness of given target countries rather than others is clearly shown as depending on standards of living and structures of opportunities. Jewish emigrants, moreover, are also responsive to the assistance Israeli and international agencies promise them. In addition, more than a few emigrate to Israel for cultural responses to Jewish identity.

It is in the light of this picture that Yosef Gorny states where and how, according to him, the Jewish diaspora remains unique. Over the last two hundred years the Jewish diaspora, he contends, went through two opposite processes: one which defined its uniqueness, and the other which negated this uniqueness. Moreover, today one observes the

growing integration of Jews into host societies taking place concomitantly with the growing “Israelization” of Jews in their national state. A kind of multiculturalization of the Jews worldwide. The development of pluralism in the Western world where one finds the Jewish diaspora outside Israel may however lead to the strengthening of ties between Israel and the diaspora. Over the past 150 years, the most important movements which had an impact on Jewish history were in fact essentially modernist and at the image of parallel developments outside the Jewish world—the liberal Reform movement, the socialist Bund, and nationalist Zionism. Today and in a similar vein, the Jewish diaspora has become an expression of the diasporism developing on the ground of the revival of ethnic cultures. Yet, the singularity of Jewry remains quite intact up to now and concerns the principle of the unity of peoplehood and religion. This uniqueness was enforced by the Shoah, that is now a primordial landmark of the Jewish experience. The significance of this experience is still prolonged by the awareness throughout the Jewish world of the endangered existence of the State of Israel.

Following suit, Allon Gal focuses on the major contemporary Jewish diaspora—US Jewry. Compared to many other Jewish communities in the world, this case has distinctively enjoyed equality and ample opportunity for group development. On the other hand, it has always shown concern for Eretz Yisrael (Palestine), which was constant feature of the community life. The Jewish interest was not only motivated by anti-Semitism in America, but also by the Protestant majority’s interest in the Holy Land which encourages Jewish religious-traditional interest in Eretz Yisrael. Furthermore, America’s religious pluralism that prevails in culture and society encompasses an ethnic dimension that favors, in the Jewish case, preoccupation for the revival of the virtual homeland.

Larissa I. Remennick deals with this other case of major Jewish diaspora that has entered the spotlight in recent decades, namely the Former Soviet Union (FSU) Jewish diaspora. This diaspora illustrates a very different perspective from any other Jewry. This diaspora was created in the following of the exodus of most Jews with the collapse of Eastern European communism. Wherever they settled, FSU Jews were driven by a velleity of community building while, as a rule, in Israel, the US, Germany and other places, these immigrants definitely manifest appropriate capability for successful insertion. Despite the success, these Jews continue to show preference for fellow-ethnics in

networking, and a continued interest in Russian culture. Some individuals opt for a transnational lifestyle, splitting their time and interests between Moscow, New York, and Jerusalem—though it is also undeniable that the young express greater interest than their parents for the mainstream peer culture. As a support to Remennick's analysis, an appendix by Marina Niznik provides an overview of the uses of the Russian language in today's Israel. Her description may serve as an illustration of general interest concerning the possible uses of original languages by diasporans.

Julius H. Schoeps is also interested in Russian Jews but in Germany where he follows their relations with the old-timer Jewish community that enthusiastically welcomed the "Russians" at the beginning of the 1990s but had later to confess that the interests of the two sides diverge. Russian Jews are reluctant to join congregations and are also reticent to identify as "German Jews." On the other hand, they attach great importance to the retention of their Russian culture and language. The debates reveal that Germany's Russian-speaking Jews are divided between allegiance to the local Jewish community and to their own diaspora—the Russian-speaking Jews now dispersed all over the world. Behind this divergence there is the fact that many FSU Jews and veterans are opposed in their identity references—the former emphasize the importance of ethnic descent and the experience of anti-Semitism; the latter, Jewish traditions and the remembrance of the Shoah.

Still another kind of Jewish diaspora consists of Israeli emigrants to the US or other Western countries. Moshe Shokeid inquires about the nature of Jewish identity as manifested by "native" Israelis who departed from their homeland for America. His observations reveal the absence of any Israeli communal organizations but at the same time, he observes that most of Israelis' close friends are Israeli themselves. These relations and the very-much-Israel cultural life of the group nurtures the experience of *communitas*. At the same time, coming mostly from a secular background, they express an inability to integrate the network of Jewish-American congregations and adapt to American Jewishness. On the other hand, American Jews seem to resent the newcomers from Israel. They view emigrant Israelis as having abandoned the country that American Jews are loyally supporting politically and financially, and which they see as a major symbol of Jewish achievement.

Uzi Rebhun adds colors of his own to this picture. Emigration from Israel is voluntary and individualistic. Driving factors involve economic and mobility opportunities; push factors the security situation and the

burden of military service in Israel. Many Israeli emigrants still have relatives and friends in Israel with whom they maintain contact, as well as professional or economic ties. They are generally well educated and insert themselves in the middle-class quite easily. While adapting to American life, they continue to speak Hebrew at home, give their newborns Israeli names, and identify themselves as Israelis. They likewise strengthen their observance of the Jewish holidays as well as other religious and ethnic rituals. Children tend, however, to weaken their identification as Israelis, though, they remain part of their community and tend to perpetuate some typical cultural patterns.

Latin-America Jewry is again different. Haim Avni considers examples of Jewish colonies in Argentina and Jewish neighborhoods in Bolivia. He focuses, in Argentina, on Hirsch's Jewish Colonization Association and the colonies it created at the turn of the twentieth century. Later on, in a few La Paz neighborhoods, one could also observe a strong concentration of several thousands Jews who had escaped the Nazis. This model of homogeneous-insular Jewish areas in modern settings also exists in New York, Montreal and other cities. In many respects, they are reminiscent of "Chinatowns" and other "ghetto" phenomena. Judit Bokser Liwerant widens this discussion of Latin-America Jewry assessing that the community building in this part of the world followed the typical Jewish pattern implying a strong awareness of being part of a broader worldwide peoplehood. Argentinean and Mexican Jewries epitomize initiatives that gave birth to a strong local life, connected and interacting with the Jewish transnational space. Local environments and societal surroundings caused more than a few singularities to emerge in these communities, but the importance of Jewish transnationalism remained unquestioned. Unlike US Jewry, however, these communities were dominated by a secularized and politicized Jewishness where Zionism and the State of Israel were central axes. Though, Israel's modifying image in the international arena set new challenges concerning the Jewish State's role as a source of identity. Within the Jewish communities of the region, growing concern developed regarding the ways in which these changes could affect their own self-presentations.

In this context, Gabriel Sheffer proposes a set of theoretical assessments which, in his view, systemize the analysis of the Jewish diaspora. His approach—the transstate approach—contends that because of their inherent ethnonational identities and rooted connections to a real or imagined country of origin, ethnonational diasporas cannot be viewed

as “pure” transnational entities. Decisions about the future in host countries consist of a complex mix of emotional and rational considerations. Tensions that might develop between diasporans and the state may strengthen the involvement of the homeland in “its” diasporan communities. At the same time, most state-linked ethno-national diasporas are interested in cooperation with host societies and governments. In this vein, diasporas serve as bridges between friendly segments in their host societies, on the one hand, and their homelands and international actors, on the other. It is Sheffer’s contention that this profile applies to Jews as well as to a number of other diasporas.

These contributions confirm, as a whole, that the Jewish diaspora constitutes a dynamic heterogeneous space of cases. They confirm that people can belong concomitantly to several transnational diasporas. Thus, Israeli Jews in the US share an allegiance to the Israeli diaspora as well as to the Jewish diaspora; Russian-speaking Jews in Germany to the Jewish diaspora, the Russian-Jewish diaspora and the Russian (or Russian-speaking) diaspora. The more general interest of this space of cases resides, in our eyes, in its emphasizing several important features. Among others, the easiness of large-scale migration, the creation of transnational sub-diasporas within diasporas according to specific origins or religious currents, possibilities of conflicts between sub-diasporas, the generation of transnational diasporan organizations, the varying intensity of references to the country considered as homeland. In all these intermingle the easiness of transnational communication and ongoing personal and institutional contacts, the availability of community building facilities and the desire of people—widely accounted for by cultural codes and religious motives—to create a home that pertains at the same time to their present-day environment and to their virtual worldwide community. In all these, one may add, Jews are not confined to *ghettoes* or the *mellahs* as in the pre-modern past anymore; there are not faced either with a too high social price for sticking to their ethnic identity, in terms of “integration” in society; they fully implement, instead, on a voluntary basis and through a wide variance of models, the principle of dual-homeness.

Under the title “Worldwide Dynamics”, Part III of this book then turns to a variety of aspects involving diverse transnational diasporas which often encounter each other in different places. As an introduction to this part, Miriam Ben-Rafael and Eliezer Ben-Rafael’s chapter addresses that diversity as it is expressed in a typical setting—the capital of both Belgium and Europe, Brussels. This chapter, actually,

elaborates on the very essence of contemporary multiculturalism, using linguistic-landscape methodology for investigating the praxis of dual homeness. The city is an area of official bilingualism in a country deeply divided between French and Flemish speakers, who impose their respective language wherever they are a majority outside the region of Brussels. The research shows how far, even in Brussels, unequal power relations leave imprints throughout the city. At the same time, the linguistic landscape also visualizes the roles imparted to English in both French and Flemish areas as resulting from globalization processes. However complex this reality, its complexity is further amplified by the presence of additional and highly significant ethnocultural divisions. Neighborhoods inhabited by Arabs, Africans, Asians and Turks illustrate the importance in these neighborhoods of languages of origin and markers demonstrating these groups' aspirations to stick to their distinctiveness at the same time as they insert themselves in the game of power opposing French and Flemish speakers in the city as a whole. One learns from these findings that acculturation to the dominant culture and endorsement of its central symbols may be concomitant with the desire for and actual retention of distinctiveness and cultural and linguistic continuity.

Of all contemporary transnational diasporas—and this is shown as well by the investigation of Brussels' linguistic landscape—the Muslims who settle in non-Muslim countries are certainly among the most salient. Nina Clara Tiesler opens the discussion of this case by warning that concepts like 'diaspora' or communities of 'transnational character' do not accord with the phrasings of traditional Islamic theology. By means of a discourse analysis, this chapter demonstrates that the promotion of 'Muslim identity' in fact lies mainly with non-Muslim scholars and the educated Muslim middle-classes. It is with the second generation that Muslims get acquainted with identity discourses. Initially, the religionization of discourses about Muslims was imported from the outside, to construct unity. Today, one of the most debated questions among European Muslims concerns the definition of Muslim subjectivity. These discussions not only focus on international matters and problems of migration, but are also on Muslims' experience within the European context. They involve people who have been educated in institutions of higher learning who have also been educated religiously and they forge new Islamic-European concepts in responses to dominant discourses. Apparent in those responses is the transformation of traditional religion into modern religion. While younger generations, in so

far as they are actively committed to being Muslims, often promote a 'return to the true essence' of Islam, the definition of what constitutes that true essence is subject to plurality. These are topics of disputes between those who speak of the Europeanization of Islam and those who lean rather to the Islamization of Europeans of Muslim background. An appendix to Tiesler's chapter is provided by Roland Goetschel's description of the relations between Jews and Muslims in France. This appendix shows—and it is by no means a situation that concerns only Jews and Muslims in France—how far diasporans can constitute not only conflictual actors *vis-à-vis* target societies, but also *vis-à-vis* each other.

It is not only Islam that faces new challenges in a world marked by globalization, multiculturalism and transnationalism. This is also the case of the Catholic world community which has always been supranational but which, in our contemporary era, is facing new challenges and dilemmas. The essential difference between Muslims and Catholics in the frame of this discussion of transnationalism is that while Islam defines its believers an *Umma*, i.e. a Nation endowed with a collective this-worldly divine mission, the Catholic Church, in these modern times at least, defines its members as believers whose collective mission is expressed but through loyalty to a set of commands and individual practices. Though, when one remembers John-Paul II's world pilgrimages and mass meetings, one cannot avoid associating these missions and gatherings—and the regular pilgrimages of tens of thousands of believers from all over the world to Rome—to the notion of transnational diaspora, however singular the kind of diaspora illustrated.

Danièle Hervieu-Léger delves into the dilemmas met by Roman Catholicism in this era of transnationalism and her question is: how might Roman Catholicism fit into today's interconnected universe? At the theological level, the Catholic vision of the world is rooted in a universalist project—a utopian vision of a religious community spreading worldwide. Proselytizing may be directed towards adult individuals capable of responding personally to the Church's teaching or towards the extension of the community by including new groups. For the uncompromising strain of Catholicism, the truth is substantial, positive, and handed down from above, once and for all. That being the case, the autonomy of the political world and the critical tendency of modern science are both intolerable. But the Church has retained its ambition to influence societies. The utopian vision of a global Catholicism has been renewed in the form of an active Catholic "globalism" which

actually represents a change in its own nature. However, this does not help preventing internal secularization in Catholicism together with a decline of authority. As a reflection of this evolution, one witnesses the Church's gradual recognition of the merits of other religions and of general humanist values. New theological positions and pastoral arrangements are accepted which redefine relations between the Church and the world. The church is now open to styles of subjectivization of belief and individualized practices emancipated from normative codes. The link between believing and belonging is becoming increasingly loose, and above all, there is the decline of the parish civilization. The new patterns endorse the "fluidity" of individual religious paths and ongoing discussions on the make-up of the community. They are voluntary, individual, optional, modular.

At the same time, in Eastern and Central Europe, a different kind of diaspora is crystallizing in the aftermath of European Communism's collapse. Rogers Brubaker elaborates on what he calls "accidental diasporas," namely diasporas that emerge as a result of the establishment of new states and/or changes in borders between states without necessarily involving migration. In that respect, he draws a comparison across time and space, focusing on the transborder homeland nationalisms of Weimar Germany and post-Soviet Russia. Both involve claims to monitor the condition, support the welfare, and protect the rights and interests of external ethnonational kin—persons who are seen as "belonging" to the state in some way, despite being residents and citizens of other states. There are superficially striking parallels between the target populations as well—the ethnic Germans stranded in an array of nationalizing successor states after the First World War, and the ethnic Russians (and other Russian speakers) similarly stranded after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Yet while noting these and other parallels, the chapter focuses on key differences between the two cases, and between their broader—interwar and contemporary—contexts.

Transnationalism and multiculturalism are, however, phenomena with stratificational significance: thanks to their human and cultural capital, certain groups succeed better than others in their new settings and enjoy better dispositions as well from the veteran population. Victor Azarya discusses here a special category of groups which, in the conditions created by globalization, succeed to draw benefits from their very marginality. Globalization, he maintains, produces two opposite effects which nevertheless influence and reinforce each other: on the one hand there is a growing homogenization of societies and their

integration into the world arena, and on the other hand a continued quest for local identities and idiosyncrasies. Globalization, which tends to create a more unified world, generates in its midst niches of marginal groups. Some of these groups, however, are marginal because of the very important role they play in globalization. Hence, for instance, immigrant workers, many of them illegal migrants, are very marginal populations in the societies where they are employed. Though, they are an axis of globalization and possibly its strongest expression. A similar interrelationship between globalization and marginality consists of the area of tourism. International tourism's incessant search for going 'beyond the beaten track' leads to a preservation of marginal groups, traditions and identities, as the people holding those marginal cultures and traditions realize that they can put them into a newly profitable use. Marking boundaries and assessing affiliation and identity would then not only be emphasized for expressive reasons of developing a sense of pride, value, strength, and solidarity but would also receive strong encouragement for very instrumental reasons of daily survival. This reconstruction of marginality, it is to note, strengthens collective identities at both the transnational and sub-national levels, more than at the national one.

Such benefits, however, are not always available. Richard Münch focuses on questions related to the USA, and criticizes the American model of multiculturalism and the inequality it generates. Several attributes have made up the integrative power of the American type of civil society: the emphasis on individual achievement on the basis of equal opportunity, cross-cutting membership in social groups, a large plurality of voluntary associations and a high level of civic self-organization. These factors, however, have also produced a considerable amount of exclusion of people unable to 'make it'. The resulting strain can then be made responsible for inclinations to turn to illegitimate forms of achievement and the radicalization of struggles for equal opportunity. These disintegrative tendencies tend to make the shift of pluralism into multiculturalism, a chaotic process where an internally divided core of the former WASP community get to face a collection of diasporas. Attention now focuses on sociocultural aspects and tends to disregard inequality—especially in terms of race and class. The effect of this constellation is continued marginalization and relative exclusion along those lines. These features of disintegration are inherent in the American model of a societal community focusing on individualized inclusion and civic self-organization.

In the “collection of diasporas” that Münch discusses also figure Asian diasporas. Among the latter are to be noted the situations illustrated by migrant workers in the Gulf countries where out of the 12.5 million foreigners, there were in 2004 about 3.3 million Indians, 1.7 million Pakistanis, about 0.7 million of people from Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka each. This means that the percentage of Asians in the foreign populations varies from almost 70 percent in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to over 90 percent in Oman (Kapiszewski 2006). Though, Asian diasporas can also be found in many other areas where they are no of less interest. The Indian diaspora, as shown by Ajaya Kumar Sahoo, originates from a country, India, that is unique for the magnitude of its diversity in languages, regions, religions and sects. This diversity is also reflected in its diasporic communities. Indian diasporic communities are indeed formed on the basis of linguistic or regional identities. Global organizations preserve and promote the identities and cultures of Indians, transnationally uniting India and the global Indian diaspora. The past decade has witnessed a new dynamism in the relations of diasporic communities—with their motherland and with each other. This chapter shows the development of this trend among the Gujarati diaspora. Gujaratis, it is shown, are successful not only in business, which is their first love, but also in professional fields such as technology, science, medicine, and business management. They illustrate the internal dynamics of transnational networks. Similarly, other regional diasporic communities retain transnational relations while participating in religious, cultural or political frameworks.

In their chapter, Brenda S.A. Yeoh and Natalie Yap reflect on a Chinese diaspora community—women who migrated from China to Singapore. The basic drive of migration, in this case like in many others, is to find jobs for adults and educational opportunities for the young. Many migrants who completed their studies in Singapore remain there, but do not cut themselves off from China and do not exclude either the possibility of returning there in the future. Women are often the “lead migrants” in this group. They come over alone but in view of their families’ welfare, i.e. as a household strategy. Once they find jobs, they make arrangements for their husbands and children to come. This transnational family is highly mutable and opportunity-driven, strongly marked by pragmatism. Gender discrimination is mainly resented by Chinese women on the side of the state bureaucracy and regulations. Many women do not find work that accords with their qualifications, especially when they have children and must take care of them; it is

then often the case that they bring over their mothers or other relatives for this purpose. Interestingly enough, Chinese women value employment, not only because of economic necessity but also of the Chinese ideology of work as a norm of womanhood. Transplanting such an ideology into the context of Singapore necessitates, however, considerable reworking of ways to juggle home and work, as well as coming to terms with gender-biased local policies.

These considerations bring us to Alejandro Portes, Cristina Escobar and Alexandria Walton Radford's work about transnational organizations and development in Latin America. All over the continent, countries and local communities are sources of migrants to the developed world. In return, these countries rely on immigrant organizations pursuing diverse projects. Hence, immigrant communities turn into increasingly visible actors in the politics of their hometowns and homelands. The authors' systematic survey of immigrant organizations covers Colombian, Dominican, and Mexican immigrant groups in the East Coast of the United States. These immigrants share a common language and culture but differ regarding the contexts of their emigration and reception in the hostland. Though, transnational civic, philanthropic, cultural, and political activities focusing on places of origin are common among them and affect the development of home localities and regions.

Links between diasporas and homelands are also illustrated by Africans. This issue which was already referred to in Dufoux's chapter, is elaborated, at the ideological level, by Benjamin Neuberger who thoroughly analyzes "Black Zionism." From its earliest stage, the ideology of "return to Africa" was inspired by an affinity to Jewish Zionism. In fact, even long before, like for Jews, a praxis of return existed similarly moved by an aspiration to salvation and longing for an "African homeland." An aspiration that always drew pride in African civilization and rejected assimilation outside the continent. The aspiration was not turned only to the realization of self-determination and liberty, but also to the conquest of Black statehood and power. The idea emerged in religious discourse in the US, Brazil and the Caribbeans and spoke of 'Return to the Promised Land'. This Black Zionism was understood as an antithesis to White racism and while only few Blacks effectively returned to Africa from America, movements of return animated the African diaspora throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

At this point, and in view of the discussion of the notion of transnational community that opened these pages, Maria N. Yelenevskaya and Larisa Fialkova turn to a category of individuals—ex-Soviet

scientists—who, while sharing traits attached to that concept, crosscut ethnocultural groups. These scientists tend to form a transnational community of their own, crosscutting the—Jewish and Christian—Russian-speaking diasporas to which they also belong, independently from their professional interests. These scientists left their countries of origin that were parts of the USSR, for numerous new places in the 1990s. Restructuring policies, crackdowns of educational institutions and general economic instability had been the context that explains why a large number of researchers decided to leave their countries once borders were opened by the dislocation of the Soviet Union. The study indicates that émigré researchers involved in diasporic activities are not necessarily loyal to Russia, and that only a few plan to return to the old country. This does not prevent them from trying to obtain the best of both worlds, and to weave and maintain networks cemented by the common knowledge of Russian, personal friendships and professional interests. This kind of transnational community, it appears, is decentralized and has not built up any formal organizations to speak on its behalf. It remains that these scientists maintain transnational connections with fellow expatriate colleagues, and heavily rely on informal networks. Researchers act as insiders familiar with subtleties of the group's culture, and at the same time adopt patterns that bring them closer to the host society—an integration strategy that allows individuals, like any other kind of transnational community, to gain a foothold in two worlds.

As illustrated by the Jewish experience and substantiated by the various examples stemming from most varied horizons, transnationalism is revealed in a medley of paths of development. The inescapable question that arises then is whether transnational diasporas, the engine, so to speak, of transnationalism, make up at all to a same space of discussion and can be compared so as to yield general theoretical statements. Part IV—“Comparing and Concluding”—attempts to answer this query. It consists of Eliezer Ben-Rafael's comparison of four major cases of contemporary transnational diasporas: Muslims, Africans, Chinese and Hispanics. The analysis clearly shows different syndromes. This is true regarding the stratificational dimension—some are reduced to lower strata, while others climb the social ladder; some aspire to assimilate to the environment, and others tend to remain distinct. Most importantly, not every transnational diaspora shares equally conflicting images of its plight. On the other hand, all tend to build communities, and more often than not, around religious institutions—with a variety of structures, organizations, political organs and movements spreading

from mosques and temples. All transnational diasporas, moreover, develop means of communication, media and patterns of cultural production. In brief, the comparative analysis evinces both divergences and convergences. The roads to insertion differ considerably. Globalization as such and insertion in target societies tend to erode cultural idiosyncrasies but the singularities that are still retained warrant the possibilities of transnational connectedness. “Transnationalism” captures the ways in which such communities create a civil society that challenges nation-states but creates opportunities for mutual breeding of religious beliefs and cultural practices. Transnational migrants come to illustrate particular incarnations of globalizing cultures.

These conclusions and reflections, as elaborated in the epilogue, lead to perspectives that are now being debated by social scholars who aspire to capture our societal and global realities within new prisms. We think of the notions of chaos, on the one hand, and of gestalt, on the other. The word *chaos* derives from the Greek *Χάος* and typically refers to unpredictability: the antithesis of law and order, it designated unrestrictedness, both creative and destructive. However, when it concerns an outlook on the social world, this notion of chaos, we contend, does not necessarily mean orderlessness—at least when juxtaposed with *gestalt*. This latter notion draws on observations of visual perception raised to the level of general principles. The overriding theme of the theory is that elements, possibly arranged randomly, come to be perceived as a configuration (*gestalt*, in German). Patterns then take precedence over individual elements and are seen as illustrating properties that are not inherent in the elements themselves. Focusing on the social world, a tendency toward chaos, or the “edge of chaos” (see Urry 2005), may be perceived theoretically as appearing, among other aspects, when the order of things and the principles of interpretation do not come up to a consensus; in other words, when, at given respects, no substantial common denominator of values unifies the parties involved. Though, once given aspects of this reality become recurrent, and thus familiar to actors, the perception of the disorder may leave room for a notion of configuration in the mind of participants as they get used to the respective locations of the various “objects” making up the social scene. The diverse and intrinsically incoherent “contributions” to the totality may then be perceived by actors as “one whole,” that is, as a *gestalt*—even when the presence of each element is minimally related to the presence of others. In this sense, *gestalt* and chaos are not mutually exclusive, and may be seen as two conjunctive tendencies of a same reality.

PART ONE
PERSPECTIVES

CHAPTER ONE

NEW TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNITIES AND NETWORKS: GLOBALIZATION CHANGES IN CIVILIZATIONAL FRAMEWORKS

Shmuel N. Eisenstadt

INTRODUCTION

One of the most important phenomena in the contemporary global scene has been the development of transnational communities and networks, which are mostly but not only religious and/or ethnic associations. Within this framework, the diasporic communities and networks that simultaneously make up new types of minorities are of central significance.

A number of such communities and networks that stand out are: the Muslim ones, especially in Europe and in the U.S.; the Chinese and possibly Indian and Korean diasporas in East Asia, in the U.S., and also in Europe; as well as the Jewish communities, especially in Europe. The new types of minorities are best illustrated by the Russian ones in some of the former Soviet Republics, especially in the Baltic, and in Central and East Asia; and also the Hungarian and Moldavian ones in the former East European Communist states.

“Diasporic” communities such as “overseas” Chinese or Indian communities have existed for long periods of history. Similarly, transnational or transimperial religions have a long history, such as Catholicism, “Orthodox” forms of Christianity and of Buddhism, Hinduism (to a smaller extent), and of course, Judaism. But in the contemporary scene, under the impact of extensive movements of migration attendant on processes of globalization, not only a large number of such diasporic networks, communities and organizations have developed, but they also all entail far-reaching transformations of constitution of public spheres and collective identities, and of new inter-civilizational relations. Such developments signal a new global order.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL FORMATIONS—BEYOND THE
NATIONAL AND REVOLUTIONARY STATES

The background for all these developments has been the far-reaching changes and transformations in the classical modern nation and revolutionary states, which found their apogee in the period after the Second World War. More specifically, it was in the period between the end of the Second World War and the mid-1960s (until the Vietnam War and the anti-war movement) that the vision of modernity as embodied in the nation and revolutionary states attained its apogee. These models epitomized, as it were, the full maturation of the original program of modernity. In the Western nation states, growing participation of all citizens in the political arenas was attained. Additionally, the development of a new social economic program came about which culminated in the establishment of new forms of regulated capitalism, of “social markets”, and of different types of welfare state. At the same time, the major communist states—the Soviet Union and later on also China—were presented by their leaders as the major alternative to the capitalist pluralistic model. But, whatever the differences between the ideological parameters of these societies, they were set very much within the framework of the original “Western” cultural and political program. They seemingly started to mature and stabilize, becoming more and more industrialized and developing patterns which paralleled those of capitalist countries, upholding the basic tenets of the convergence theory of industrial societies.

The epitome of these developments was the bipolar international system of the period of the Cold War. This was characterized by very intensive rivalry between the two superpowers—the U.S. and the Soviet Union—waging a continuous struggle about geopolitical and ideological hegemony. In this period, attendant on the world-wide processes of de-colonization and the establishment of numerous new states in Asia and Africa, states were shaped after these two models—the “Western”, in principle pluralistic, and the model of the revolutionary (Communist) mode epitomized by the Soviet Union and later China. During this period, the contestation between these models and their carriers—interwoven as they were, of course, with various often “older” geopolitical rivalries—constituted a major, possibly *the* major and certainly the most distinctive component of the international scene. The former imperial-territorial contestations were transformed into new global, ideological, political and economic ones, seemingly no longer

connected with colonial and imperial territorial expansion of the “older” types. After the Second World War, the ideological rivalry and contestations between these two camps—on the one hand the pluralistic and capitalist epitomized by the U.S. and in different modes by Western Europe, and on the other hand, the communist one—encompassed the entire world. Both superpowers attempted to establish regimes that would belong to their respective camps and to undermine the regimes close to their “enemy”. The various new states were closely allied to the hegemonic powers—the U.S. and the Soviet Union—which continually attempted to foster and subordinate their respective satellites, even if these satellites countered the basic ideologies of their patron states, as was the case of many of the authoritarian regimes supported by the US.

This situation epitomizing the apogee of the classical age of modernity, as represented above all by different nation and revolutionary states, started to change. This occurred slowly at first, and then with much more intensity from about the last two or three decades of the twentieth century. This was closely connected to the development of several processes, first in the West and then throughout the world.

The most important of these processes were far-reaching transformations closely connected with the development of new technologies and the formations of new patterns of political economy, moving in the direction of knowledge and information society. This was compounded by the growing predominance of continually developing processes of globalization of financial capitalism, seeming disconnected from national economies and from the “real” economies of production, and the concomitant far-reaching changes and shifts in the crystallization of overall social formations, of class and status relations. Additionally important were the continual tendencies throughout the world of democratization as manifest in the growing quest of many sectors for greater participation in the political arenas of their respective societies and on the international scene.

The common core of these processes was the growing dissociation of major social, economic, political, family, and gender roles from broader frameworks, especially from the hegemonic formations of the nation and revolutionary states and the class-relations predominant within them. This includes continual diversification of major social roles and formations; the weakening of relatively closed boundaries of these formations, their growing permeability and their concomitant diversification; the development of multiple networks and clusters which

cut across many organizations and political boundaries; the growing dissociations between political centers and the major social and cultural collectivities; the concomitant weakening of the cultural orientations which were often perceived as the bases of legitimation of these formations; and the development of nuclei of new cultural and social identities which transcend the existing political and cultural boundaries.

One of the most important institutional changes in this period has been the development of various semi-liminal structural enclaves, within which new cultural orientations and new modes of search for meaning (often couched in transcendental terms) tend to be developed and upheld, partially as counter-cultures and partially as components of new alternative cultures. These enclaves, in which some people may participate fully, but most in a more transitory fashion, may serve in some situations as reservoirs of revolutionary activities and groups. On the whole, they tend to serve as loci or starting points of far-reaching changes in roles and cultural orientations.

Concomitantly taking place has been the continual decomposition of the relatively compact image of the “civilized man”, the styles of life and of life worlds which were connected with the strong programs of modernity. Emerging at this time were new definitions of various arenas of life and the crystallization of a multiplicity of semantic-ideological connections between public and private arenas, work and culture, occupation and residence. There has been a blurring or recombination of these arenas, giving rise to a growing pluralization and heterogenization of such images and representations, and of new patterns of syncretization between different cultural traditions—as aptly analyzed by Ulf Hannerz (1996, 1999).

CULTURAL TRANSFORMATIONS AND CHANGES IN THE RELIGIOUS SPHERE

These structural changes became very closely interwoven in processes of continual feedback, with far-reaching cultural transformations, which developed from the 1960s, first of all in Western societies and then beyond them. The new cultural trends which started during the late 1980s and 1990s entailed a far-reaching critique of the central aspects of the cultural program of the Enlightenment, especially as it was promulgated and institutionalized as the hegemonic discourse of the classical period of modernity. There was a growing tendency towards distinction and dissociation between *Zweckrationalität* and *Wertrationalität*;

to the recognition of a great multiplicity of different *Wertorientierungen*—and the closely related development of post-materialist and later multicultural orientations. Closely related was the weakening of the hitherto predominant grand narratives of modernity, with their strong emphasis on the inevitable progress. The belief in the existence of any common criteria—especially those of liberty, freedom, or progress—according to which different societies, particularly contemporary ones, can be compared or evaluated, was questioned or denied.

Concomitantly, far-reaching changes appeared in the place of religion in the contemporary era, giving rise to a new constellation of the major components of religious experience and organizations. This constellation was characterized by the paradoxical combination of, on the one hand, growing privatization of religious orientations and sensibilities; the weakening of official religious institutions, and of institutionalized religion. On the other hand, we see the “resurgence” of religious components, orientations and sensibilities, as well as their movement, transformation and transposition into the centers of national and international political activity. These then become an important central yet autonomous component in the constitution of collective identities. Religious identity and ideologies, which were in the classical model of the nation-state delegated or confined to private or secondary spheres, have become transposed into the public political and cultural arenas. Religion has indeed acquired a prominent, in some cases possibly central, role in the contemporary national and international public scenes. Within most religions, there also developed a growing emphasis on their inherent authentic universalisms as being independent of or distinct from, even if interwoven with, the universal orientations of the cultural programs of modernity as promulgated in the program of the Enlightenment and as embodied in the nation or revolutionary state.

Such transposition did not however entail a simple return of some traditional religious institutional forms, but rather a far-reaching reconstitution of the religious component in the overall cultural and institutional formations. Paradoxically enough, this was connected on the contemporary scene, especially in Western and Central Europe, with the decline of the “traditional” religious institutions and organizations and a growing multiplicity of new “informal” types of religion.

These changes in the religious arena were closely connected with internal developments within all the major religions, including in their relations to the major political formations in the social arenas. In all the major religions, there were attempts to reformulate the relations between

different dimensions of religion—the cosmological-transcendental dimension and the institutional-organizational one, as well as the structure of authority and the individual religious sensibilities and orientations. Concomitantly, there was a resurgence of transstate transnational religious organizations and a shift in the relations between religious groups and organizations with different political and “secular” institutions.

TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE MODEL OF THE NATION AND REVOLUTIONARY STATE

All these developments entailed a de-charimatization and weakening of the centrality of the hitherto predominant models of the nation or revolutionary state and class-relations. While the political centers of the nation and revolutionary states continue to constitute the major agencies of the distribution of resources as well as very strong and important actors in the major international arenas, the control of the nation state over its own economic and political affairs was reduced. This occurred despite the continual strengthening of the “technocratic”, “rational” secular policies in various arenas. In this reality, global, and above all financial, actors are becoming very powerful. The nation and revolutionary states also lost some of their—never total—monopoly on internal and international violence to many local and international groups of separatists or terrorists. The nation-states or the concerted activities of nation states have been unable to control the continual reoccurrence of such violence. They also lost, as we shall see later in greater detail, their centrality and semi-monopoly over the constitution of the international playgrounds and of the rules that regulate them. Above all, the ideological and symbolic centrality of the nation and revolutionary states, perceived as the major bearers of the cultural program of modernity, as the basic frameworks of collective identity, and as the major regulator of the various secondary identities, has become weakened. It is certainly no longer closely connected with a distinct cultural and civilizing program.

These transformations of the premises of the nation-states entailed, to use Saskia Sassen’s (2006) felicitous expression, the reconstitution of the relations between territory, authority and rights; the decoupling of the basic components of the classical nation state—citizenship, patterns of entitlement, the constitution of public spaces, and modes of political participation.

Concomitantly, these processes entailed the development of new types of collective identity grounded in smaller continually reconstituted “local” settings, on the one hand, and in transstate frameworks, on the other hand. We see the concomitant development of new political transnational or transstate frameworks and organizations—the most far-reaching being the European Union—as well as the reconfiguration of the relation between primordial and/or sacred (religious) as against civil components in the constitution of collective identities. Such developments entail new modes of exclusion and inclusion.

TRANSFORMATIONS OF MOVEMENTS AND SYMBOLS OF PROTEST

Most indicative of the transformations of the political, social and cultural order analyzed above was the development of new movements and ideologies of protest, first in the West and then throughout the world from the 1960s on. Indeed, movements and symbols of protest continued to play a very central role in the political and cultural arenas—as they did in the constitution and development of modern states. The most important among these movements were the new student and anti-(Vietnam) movements of the late 1960s — the famous “movements of 1968.” Movements and orientations of this kind went beyond the “classical” model of the nation state and of the “classical” or liberal, national and socialist movements. They developed in two seemingly opposite but in fact often overlapping or cross-cutting directions. On the one hand, there was the development of various “post-modern,” “post-materialist” movements, such as the women’s, ecological, and anti-globalization movements. On the other hand, there were many movements promoting highly ideological and often assertive and aggressive particularistic local, regional, ethnic cultural autonomous movements. Various religious-fundamentalist and religious-communal movements appeared as well—many of which burgeoned among different sectors dispossessed by processes of globalization.

The themes promulgated by these movements entailed far-reaching transformations of the orientations and themes of protest and of the revolutionary imaginaire that were constitutive of the development of the modern social order and above all indeed of the modern and revolutionary states (Eisenstadt 2006). These transformations have often been presented or perceived as the harbingers of the changes of the contemporary cultural and institutional scene, and possibly of the exhaustion of the entire program of modernity as well.

“Classical” movements—especially the socialist and national ones—focused above all on the constitution and possible transformations of the socio-political centers, boundaries of the state, or of the boundaries of major macro-collectivities. In contrast, the new movements of protest were oriented to what one scholar has defined as the extension of the systemic range of social life and participation, manifested in demands for growing participation in work places, different communal orientations, citizen movements, and the like. Perhaps the initial simplest manifestation of change in these orientations has been the shift from the emphasis on the increase in the standard of life, which was so characteristic of the 1950s as the epitome of continuous technological-economic progress, to that of “quality of life.” This transformation has been designated in the 1970s as one from materialist to post-materialist values. In Habermas’ (1981) words these movements moved from focusing on problems of distributions to emphasis on “grammar of life”.

The common core of the distinctive characteristics of these new movements, attesting to their difference from the “classical” ones, can be described by four developments. Firstly, the transfer of the central focus of protest orientations from the centers of the nation and revolutionary states and from the major modes of constitution of “national” and revolutionary collectivities as the charismatic bearers of the vision of modernity into various diversified arenas of which the by now transformed nation state was only one. Secondly, the concomitant weakening of the “classical” revolutionary *imaginaire* as a major component of protest. Thirdly, the development of new institutional frameworks in which these options were exercised, and fourthly, the development of new visions of inter-civilizational relations (Eisenstadt 2006).

Closely related to these processes has been the transformation of the utopian, especially transcendental orientations whether of the totalistic “Jacobin” utopian ones that were characteristic of many of the revolutionary movements, or the more static utopian visions which promulgated a flight from various constraints of modern society. The focus of the transcendental utopian orientations shifted from the centers of the nation state and overall political-national collectivities to more heterogeneous or dispersed arenas, to different “authentic” forms of life-worlds, often in various “multicultural” and “post-modern” directions.

One central aspect of these movements is the growing emphasis, especially within those which developed among sectors dispossessed by

processes of globalization, on the politics of identity and on the constitution of new religious, ethnic and local collectivities. Such movements often promulgate in narrow particularistic terms, a strongly exclusivist cultural identity.

THE RECONSTITUTION OF COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES

Among the most important repercussions of all these developments are the very strong tendencies towards the redefinition of boundaries of collectivities, and of new ways of combining “local” and global, transnational or transstate components, in the processes of constitution of these collectivities. Most hitherto “subdued” identities—ethnic, local, regional and religious—have indeed acquired a new prominent and in some cases possibly central role on the contemporary national and international public scenes. They have moved, albeit naturally, in a highly reconstructed way, into the centers of their respective societies and into the international arenas. In this process, these identities claim their own autonomous places in the central symbolic and institutional spaces. Be it in educational programs or in public communications and media, they pose far-reaching claims to the redefinition of citizenship and the rights and entitlements connected with it.

Indeed, these new collective identities have been promulgated above all by various “new” social movements. Quite often, in their new settings, and especially in the diasporic ones, such identities contested the hegemony of the older homogenizing programs of the nation and revolutionary states. In many of these settings, we see the local and the transnational orientations, often couched in universalistic transstate themes, such as new European orientations, or those rooted in the great religions (such as in Islam, Buddhism, and in different branches of Christianity) (Juergensmeyer 2003).

Closely related is the development by new social sectors of the less ideologically homogeneous interpretations of modern national identity and of modernity. Such interpretations were framed in different terms from those of the Enlightenment, redefining modernity in terms of their own distinct Greek or Turkish, Islamic, Indian or Chinese models in urban or regional settings. Many of these movements tend also to be active on the international scene, developing direct connections with transnational frameworks and organizations such as, for instance, the European Union. In parallel, the various religious, especially

fundamentalist movements—Muslim, Protestant, Jewish—have become very active on the international scene and they influence the activities of their—and other—states in international affairs and the interrelations between them.

In the discourse attendant on these developments—above all in the West, but spreading very quickly beyond it, a strong emphasis on multiculturalism developed as a possible supplement or substitute to that of the hegemony of the homogeneous modern nation-state model and as possibly displacing it.

These movements and social activities also promulgated far-reaching claims with respect to the redefinition of citizenship and of rights and entitlements connected to it. The common denominator of many of these new movements and settings is that they do not see themselves as bound by the strong homogenizing cultural premises of the classical model of nation-state. Such is the case especially when referring to the places allotted to them in the public spheres. Yet, it is not that these movements or groups do not want to be “domiciled” in their respective countries. Indeed, becoming domiciled is part of their struggle, but they want to do so on new terms rather than in accordance with the classical models of assimilation. They want to be recognized in the public spheres, in the constitution of the civil society in relation to the state as culturally distinct groups promulgating their collective identities, and not to confine them only to the private sphere. They do indeed make claims for the reconstruction of the symbols of collective identity promulgated in their respective states, as illustrated among others for instance in the new debate about laïcité in France.

CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENAS AND IN THE CONSTITUTION OF HEGEMONIES

The processes analyzed above constituted the background for the development of the new transnational, including diasporic, networks and communities. Indeed many of the processes—especially the reconstitution of patterns of identity—had their roots in the diasporas or at least the various diasporic communities were among the settings in which the kernels of these processes and tendencies developed. But the continual development of these communities and networks and their impact on the constitution of the contemporary scene went far beyond these kernels. The full importance of the new transnational communi-

ties and networks in the overall contemporary scene can be understood only in the context of the changes of the international scene and processes of globalization. Five important changes can be identified. The first and most important in the international arena is the continual disintegration of the “Westphalian” international order. Second is the disappearance of the bipolar order of the “Cold War”. Third is the continuous shifts in the relative hegemonic standing of different centers of modernity manifested in shifts from European and U.S. ones, moving to East Asia and then back to the U.S.—and then possibly again to China and India. Fourth is the concomitant growing competitions or contestations between such centers about their presumed hegemonic standing and the intensification of the contestations between different sectors and societies about their place in the international order. All changes contributed greatly to the “New World Disorder” (Jowitt 1993). And finally, fifth, the increasing destabilization of many state structures—above all, but not only, in the different peripheries.

The development of such disorder was intensified by the demise of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of the salience of the ideological confrontation between Communism and the West. On the international scene, with the U.S. as the only remaining superpower, these developments gave rise to greater autonomy of many regional and transstate frameworks. Within these frameworks, arose new combinations of geopolitical, cultural and ideological conflicts and struggles over their relations, standing and hegemony, including indeed those between major existing and emerging global powers—the U.S., the European Union, post-Soviet Russia and China.

In parallel, new actors became prominent in the international scene, such as the United Nations, as well as various regional agencies, such as the European Union. A plethora of new legal institutions developed, such as the International Court, as well as multiple new professional, legal, economic and regulatory (such as those of accountants’) international networks. On the international economic scene it was the new international financial agencies—the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund—created after the Second World War and in many ways controlled by the U.S.—that became very prominent. Such agencies often pursued American interests and ideologies but at the same time developed as relatively independent actors and regulators of the international economic trends which ultimately would also challenge the interest of the U.S. Concomitantly, there was the development of new international NGOs, associations, movements and political actors

which acted beyond the scope of any single nation state and even beyond the more formal international agencies. These bodies focused on the constitution of new institutional spaces, on access to international agencies and arenas, and on influencing their policies and those of the various states. Some actors promulgating these developments present them as constituting arenas of new international civil society which transcends existing political boundaries. Often there was competition between these agencies and promulgating actors which claimed autonomous legitimization and participation in spreading the new rules of the game in international arenas. Such forces have indeed become influential in the constitution of these rules. The power of these agencies was limited and the implementation of their recommendations depended above all on agreement of and cooperation between the respective states and to a large extent on the stronger or hegemonic ones. Yet, they became very important actors in the international scene, with distinctive, separate and often contesting agendas. Concomitantly, while many of the older actors—especially states—continued to play a very important role in the international arenas, and some of them, indeed, as Michael Mann (1997) has shown, increased their power, they were no longer the major rule-setters in the international arenas. They competed with one another and with the new actors not only about their respective interests, but also about their ability to participate in the setting of such ground rules.

One of the most important developments that resulted from the combined changes in the international arena and from the processes of globalization was the new and rather paradoxical situations with respect to the hegemony in the international system.

On the one hand, after the fall of the Soviet Union, the U.S. remained the only super-power—especially in economic and military terms. But on the other hand, at the same time, the hegemonic standing of the U.S. was challenged by various states, movements and social sectors, and weakened by the opposition to various unilateral policies promulgated by the U.S. This is recognized above all with respect to the Second Iraq War, as well as by the economic growth of Russia, China, India, Brazil, and the independent states in the international arena. Beyond this, a new historical situation developed in which the hegemony was challenged in the name of the principles promulgated by it and in the name of which it legitimized its hegemony. The semi-imperial hegemony of the U.S. was resented or rejected not only by other states or agencies, but challenged in the name of the very principles set down

by it—and by institutions like the UN or World Trade. The origins of such bodies were created by the U.S. and structured according to the premises expounded by it. In other words, the hegemony lost the monopoly of its own legitimization, of the legitimization of the new global order, and of the rule-setting within it.

THE BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF CONTEMPORARY GLOBALIZATION

The latter changes in the international scene were closely related, indeed interwoven, with the new processes of globalization that developed in this period. The most distinctive characteristic of the processes of contemporary globalization in comparison with the “earlier” ones have not just been the extent of the global flow of different (especially economic) resources and the concomitant development of new forms of global capital and economic formations, to which we have already referred above. Indeed, the global flows of especially economic resources that developed in this period were not necessarily greater in comparison to some in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Rather, the specific characteristics of contemporary globalization have been first the fact that the new forms of international capitalism have become predominant—putting out other “older” ones based to a large extent on “Fordist” assumptions. Second were worldwide processes of migrations and attendant on them the combination on the one hand of continual movements of hitherto non-hegemonic, secondary or peripheral societies and social sectors into the centers of the respective national and international systems. Such processes often bypassed both the existing national as well as transstate institutions. On the other hand, there was the continual growth of discrepancies and inequalities between various central and peripheral sectors within societies and between them.

Of special importance in this context are first the combination of discrepancies between those social sectors which were incorporated into the hegemonic financial and “high tech” economic frameworks and those which were left out. In this framework, there is also the closely connected far-reaching dislocation of many of the latter sectors, suffering decline in their standard of living and giving rise among them to acute feelings of dislocation and of dispossession. Most visible among such dislocated or dispossessed groups were not necessarily—and certainly not only—those from the lowest economic echelons—poor peasants, or urban lumpen-proletariat, important as they were in those

situations. Rather, most prominent among such dislocated sectors were first, groups from the middle or lower echelons of the more traditional sectors, hitherto embedded in relatively stable, even if not very affluent, social and economic frameworks or niches and cultural frameworks. These groups were transferred into mostly lower echelons of new urban centers. Second, in this category were the various highly mobile, “modern” educated groups—professionals, graduates of modern universities and the like who were denied autonomous access to the new political centers or participation in them.

Of central importance in this context is the fact that many of the inequalities and dislocations that developed attendant on these processes of globalization both within different states and between them coalesced with religious, ethnic or cultural divisions. Moreover, there was a continually growing mutual impingement throughout the world of different societies, civilizations, and of social sectors of “peripheral” societies attesting to “the power of small numbers”, to follow Arjun Appadurai’s (2006) felicitous expression. They constituted one of the most volatile elements in the global scene, which added a highly inflammatory component to the contemporary scene.

Indeed it was the various diasporas that constituted one of the most important arenas, possibly the most important one, and in which these constellations of movement, dislocation, and penetration by “periphetal” societies into different hegemonic centers has developed. In this way, diasporas provide the momentum for new transformations in the constitution of the basic formations of the contemporary scene.

The most important of these transformations has been the development of various types of *virtual* religious, ethnic and civilizational trans-territorial or transstate collectivities in the constitution of which the new media played a very important role. In these collectivities, there usually developed orientations towards some “home” base and beyond it. There was also the concomitant denial of the various local traditions and promulgation of new universalistic translocal identities, carried above all by numerous translocal networks. These networks connected directly identical “ideological” religions and ethnic communities, without the mediation of the “home” centers—indeed of any territorial center. They entailed new conceptions of basically decentralized authority, participation and accountability.

Within these new virtual communities and networks that developed, we see intensified highly transformed “reactions” to the processes of globalization, especially opposed to the hegemonic claims of the diffe-

rent, often competing centers of globalization. Above all, such opposition is expressed in anti-American forms. Among such actors, of special importance are the multiple paradoxical “global” anti- or counter-globalization movements, challenging some of the basic premises of the hegemonic global tendencies and attempting to create alternative patterns of globalization (see for example Kiely 2005). Moreover, such actors give rise to new international relations, and to a new civilizational scene. Together with other actors, the latter often present themselves as kernels of new international civil society which gives rise to new civilizational formations and ideologies.

Intercivilizational “anti-globalization” or anti-hegemonic tendencies combined with an ambivalent attitude towards the cosmopolitan centers of globalization developed in most historical cases of globalization—be it in the Hellenistic, Roman, Chinese Confucian, Hinduistic or classical Islamic. This is also apparent in early modern centers, although, on the contemporary scene they become intensified and transformed. First, they were spread throughout the world primarily by the media. Second, they became highly politicized, often promulgating fierce contestations formulated in highly political ideologies and terms. Third, they entailed a continual reconstitution of collective identities and contestations between them in the new global context. And fourth, they promulgated reinterpretations and appropriations of modernity, and new relations between modernity and the West.

These various “anti-global” movements became closely interwoven with “new” ones which, as we have seen, developed from about the mid-1960s, first in the West and then expanding throughout the world. These movements were the carriers of the transformed orientations and themes of protest and of the revolutionary *imaginaire*. Such transformations have often been presented or perceived as the harbingers of far-reaching changes of the contemporary cultural and institutional scene and possibly also of the exhaustion of the entire program of modernity. The common denominator of these movements is their ambivalent attitude towards the West and especially towards the enlightenment components of the program of modernity.

The crucial differences between, on the one hand, the major “classical” national movements and, on the other hand, the new contemporary communal, religious arenas—above all the fundamentalist movements—is with respect to their attitude to the premises of the cultural and political program of modernity and to the West. Truly enough, they constitute a part of a set of much wider developments which have

been taking place throughout the world since the nineteenth century. We see this in Muslim, Indian and Buddhist societies where there are contestations between different earlier reformist and traditional religious movements that developed throughout non-Western societies. But within these virtual communities and the anti-globalization movements, the confrontation with the West does not take the form of seeking to become incorporated into the modern hegemonic civilization in its terms. Rather, they seek to appropriate the new international global scene and modernity for themselves, for their traditions or “civilizations,” as they are continually reconstituted under the impact of their continual encounter with the West. These contemporary movements—which burgeoned to a very large extent in the new virtual communities and networks—indeed promulgate a markedly confrontational attitude towards the West and towards what is conceived as Western. They attempt to appropriate modernity and the global system on their own non-Western, often anti-Western, terms. Yet, to a large extent, they formulate such terms within the discourse of modernity.

The latter movements and societies entail the radical decoupling of modernity from Westernization. That is, they take away from the “West” (from the original Western “Enlightenment”—and even Romantic programs) the monopoly of modernity. They define modernity in their own terms, espousing new “civilizational” visions.

In these movements, the highly confrontational attitude towards the West and to what is conceived as Western is closely connected with attempts to radically decouple modernity from Westernization and from the monopoly of the West over modernity. Moreover, it is an attempt to redefine, appropriate, and reinstitutionalize the terms of their own religious traditions grounded in their respective Axial religions rather than in those of the European Enlightenment. Nonetheless, they are greatly influenced by the latter and especially by the universalistic and participatory traditions of the Great Revolutions (Eisenstadt 2006).

These new civilizational orientations and the discourse around them have developed throughout the world. It has been taken up by other actors, among them various political actors (regions, states) as well as different associations and organizations such as the European Union or different local and regional collective organizations in Islamic or Confucian societies. We see the development of the debate about Asian values, as well as the attempts of different societies to forge their own constitutive modernities, such as the case of India. All of this entails

contested reactions to the seemingly uncontested hegemony of American cultural and “neoliberal” economic premises.

These transformations became tied to the increasing confrontations in many societies, both in local and global scenes and arenas, and with political, military and economic struggles and conflicts. Such confrontations may indeed become very violent and can become of central importance in connection with movements of independence of different regional contestations. This is noted in what Münkler (2003) has defined as non-symmetric wars, in contrast with the symmetric wars between nation-states in the framework of the Westphalian order. Of special importance is the multiplication, extension, and intensification of aggressive terrorist movements which became closely interwoven with international and inter-civilizational contestations and encounters. Already in the first period of the post (Second) World War era, a central component of the international scene was the growth of revolutionary and terrorist groups. This component became even more central after being interwoven with the crystallization of new international and intercivilizational orientations, as well as new patterns of inter-civilizational relations.

Thus, the new transworld communities and networks constituted not only a new organizational or structural element on the contemporary scene, but also one of the foci of the reconstitution of collective identities, of political activities, of modes of interlinking between them through multiple transglobal networks, and of new civilizational visions of great civilizational transformations.

CHAPTER TWO

DECONSTRUCTING AND RECONSTRUCTING “DIASPORA”: A STUDY IN SOCIO-HISTORICAL SEMANTICS

Stéphane Dufoix

As some feminist activists put it, the word “diaspora” may sound feminine. We can assume that this kind of statement would not have been possible some twenty years ago, and that it has to do with the recent changes in the value of this term. For a long time the symbol of a curse—and still the case for some groups of people—it has also become the symbol of a new way of living in the world regardless of frontiers and distance, of a new form of identity more fragmented than monolithic. For a long time a religious word, its use has been secularized during the twentieth century and never stopped expanding, encompassing more and more populations, more and more situations, going as far as to encompass the whole of humanity in the phrase “the human diaspora”, which describes the historical movement of humans from Africa into the rest of the world (Crawford 2006).

This expansion of the semantic horizon of the word, its existence as a common noun as well as an academic concept and as a political tool of cohesion, led to endless discussions about its real boundaries, about who shall and shall not belong. Very often, these arguments have only complicated matters and all the more driven the academy away from analyzing the conditions of possibility for such a semantic journey. Our chapter aims at averting our gaze from the present to plunge into the past of “diaspora”. In this respect, we inscribe this study—and the bigger project still in progress of a socio-historical study of the uses of “diaspora” from 3rd century B.C. until now—in the recent tradition of works trying more to understand the evolution of the term and to make this evolution the precise object of the analysis than to provide a definition of the concept (Baumann 1998, P. Cohen 1999, Edwards 2001, Krings 2003, Moya 2004, Brubaker 2005, R. Cohen 2006, Dufoix 2007, Mishra 2006). Such a perspective requires a very particular kind of scholarly analysis, one that combines historical depth and socio-logical vision to provide a complex presentation of how debates and

quarrels about the meaning of “diaspora” and of other words—such as “galuth” and “tftuzot” in the Jewish case—expressing the relationship between a people and a land in spite of distance, have contributed to a semantic and socio-political complexification that current visions of “diaspora” often fail to see.

Our goal in this chapter will be twofold. First, we shall try to dissipate two widely-diffused mistakes about the origins and meaning of “diaspora”, often considered (1) to have primarily been used in the Ancient Greek context of colonization; and (2) to be indiscriminately linked to the Hebrew word “galuth” (exile, captivity). Second, after briefly sketching the historical evolution of the word, insisting on how meanings pile up rather than merely succeed each other, we shall show, relying on the Jewish and Black/African cases, how important it may be to pay attention to this cohabitation of meanings.

THE FALSE ORIGINS OF “DIASPORA”

Even a quick glance at the growing academic production on diasporas since thirty years shows that the questions of the origins of the word usually give way to one etymologic and two contextual considerations: “diaspora” is a Greek word coined after the Greek verb “diaspeiro” and its meaning is “dispersion, scattering”; “diaspora” has mostly been associated with Jewish history and is the translation or the equivalent of the Hebrew word “galuth”; at last, “diaspora” also belonged to the Greek lexicon of colonization. While no one can deny the truth of the former affirmation, the latter two present serious problems.

On the one hand, contrary to what Robin Cohen could write from 1995 onwards in his yet excellent works (R. Cohen 1995: 6, 1996: 507, 1997: IX and 83, 2006: 40), “diaspora” was never used during the Antiquity to describe Greek colonization and settlement abroad. The most usual Greek word for these phenomena was “apoikia” meaning life abroad (Casevitz 1985: 120–121). Yet, this statement is repeated from text to text, usually relying on Cohen (for instance, Shuval 2000: 42, Reis 2004: 44, Bordes-Benayoun and Schnapper 2006: 20). It encompasses a positive vision of “diaspora”, and sometimes even “the original use of the term by the Greeks connotes a triumphalist migration/colonization (*speiro*=to sow; and *dia*=over) from the point of view of the colonizer/occupier” (Chandramohan 2001: 145). This assumption allows scholars to state that the occurrences in the Septuagint are later than

the “original” meaning of “diaspora”, this original meaning being related to voluntary migrations. Adam McKeown writes that “until recently, the idea of diaspora has been intimately linked to the history of the Jews” before adding in a footnote, relying on Robin Cohen: “the word *diaspora* can be traced back still earlier, to a Greek word used to describe the sowing of seeds, and then applied to Greek colonization in the Mediterranean” (McKeown 1999: 308). The nature of “diaspora” becomes Greek and not Jewish any more: “Given that ‘diaspora’ is a Greek word, it has naturally been used since antiquity to refer to the many migrations of the Greek people.” (Chander 2001: 1020).

This exaggerated Greekness of the word also appears when scholars do exactly the opposite and, instead of granting it with an “original” positive meaning, they give it a negative but non-Jewish flavor. In this respect, the use of “diaspora” is falsely attributed to Greek authors like Herodotus or, more often, Thucydides. For instance, the affirmation by Rainer Münz and Rainer Ohliger, according to which “the Greek term *diaspora*, meaning dispersion, was first used in ancient Greece to characterize the exile of the Aegean population after the Peloponnesian War” (Münz and Ohliger 2003: 3) is twice wrong. Not only “diaspora” first appears in the Greek translation—called the Septuagint Bible—of the Hebraic Bible in the 3rd century B.C., but it is a neologism coined by the translators.¹ It stems from the Greek verb *diaspeiro* the use of which is certified in the Greek language from at least the 5th century B.C. If “dispersion” is undoubtedly one of its meanings, it’s not the only one and the word does not carry any particular negative connotation. We can read it in the works of Herodotus, Sophocles, Plato or Isocrates—to mention but a few—with the meaning of “cast”, “squander”, “distribute” or “diffuse”.

Herodotus:

Cambyses received in all kindness the gifts of the Libyans; but he seized what came from Cyrene and, displeased, I think, because it was so little—for

¹ We don’t have enough room here to elaborate neither upon the circumstances of this translation nor on the particularities of the Greek text as compared to the Massoretic Hebrew text. On these points see notably Dorival, Harl and Munnich 1988, Dogniez and Harl 2001, Harl 2001. Yet, it can be noticed that, if the text of the Septuagint is quite famous for its verbal creations, especially semantic neologisms, there are not many word creations such as in the case of “diaspora” (see Votaw 1900, Bickerman 1959, Orlinski 1989).

the Cyrenaeans had sent five hundred silver minae—*cast* it with his own hands among his army (Herodotus, *History*: III(13).

Sophocles:

Orestes: Spare all superfluous words, and inform me neither of our mother's wickedness, nor how Aegisthus drains the wealth of our father's house—what part he pours on the ground and what he *squanders* at random. (Sophocles, *Elektra*: 1287–1291).

Plato:

Then there is no pursuit of the administrators of a state that belongs to a woman because she is a woman or to a man because he is a man. But the natural capacities are *distributed* alike among both creatures, and women naturally share in all pursuits and men in all—yet for all the woman is weaker than the man (Plato, *Republic*: 455e).

Isocrates:

and you will also induce many of the other satraps to throw off the King's power if you promise them “freedom” and *scatter broadcast* over Asia that word which, when sown among the Hellenes, has broken up both our empire and that of the Lacedaemonians (Isocrates, *Philippus*, 5.104).

Moreover, the citation from Thucydides is not correct, for the author of *The Peloponnesian War* never uses “diaspora”. The episode of the deportation of the people of Aegina has become the proof of a Greek pre-Septuagint use of “diaspora”. It has been mentioned for the first time—or so it seems—by Gérard Chaliand and Jean-Pierre Rageau in their 1991 *French Atlas of Diasporas* (Chaliand and Rageau 1995: XI note 1) and since then repeated in various academic texts (Tölölyan 1996: 10, Chander 2001: 1020–1021). This information reverberates even in the writings of scholars who otherwise pay great attention to the historicization of the idea of “diaspora” and to the meaning of words (for instance Stratton 2000: 140). If most translations of *The Peloponnesian War* indeed use words meaning “to scatter” or “to disperse”, the original Greek verb was not even “diaspeiro”, but rather the verb “speiro” at the passive aorist tense: “The territory of Thyrea is on the frontier of Argolis and Laconia, reaching down to the sea. Those of the Aeginetans who did not settle here were *scattered* over the rest of Hellas” (Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*: 2.27).

On the other hand, establishing a link between the Greek word “diaspora” and the very complicated Hebrew notion of “galuth” (Rawidowicz 1986: 96–117) is not *per se* illegitimate at all since, as we later show, they indeed share a common history. But this history is not the one usually told. Most academic writings considering this link—

and one has to acknowledge that it is not the majority of them and that this interest in the Hebrew word seems to be fairly recent—describe both words as inextricably associated and mingled without any further precision, thus alluding to their equivalence and indiscrimination (Sheffer 2003: 9, Anteby-Yemini and Berthomière 2005: 9, Bruneau 2005: 80, Bordes-Benayoun and Schnapper 2008: 42). Scholars assume that “diaspora” is the Greek translation of “galuth” in contradiction with all evidence. It even goes further since “galuth” sometimes becomes the equivalent of “diaspora”, thus suggesting implicitly that the latter predates the former (Chandramohan 2001: 145). “Galuth” can then be understood as merely being “the Hebrew word for diaspora” (Bolaffi 2003: 73). The very meaning of “galuth” is often misunderstood. Bryan Cheyette thus distinguishes between “golah” and “galuth” along exactly the same lines (voluntary vs involuntary migration) as others distinguish between “diaspora” and “galuth” (Marienstrass 1989): “The Hebrew root for exile or diaspora has two distinct connotations. *Golah* implies residence in a foreign country (where the migrant is in charge of his or her destiny), whereas *galuth* denotes a tragic sense of displacement (where the migrant is essentially the passive object of an impersonal history)” (Cheyette 2003: 45). Unfortunately, this interpretation does not stand the test of linguistic and semantic reality.

To dissipate confusions, we now have to turn to the text of the Septuagint. Relying on former studies specifically devoted to the term “diaspora” (Arowele 1977, van Unnik 1993, Tromp 1998, Lust 1999, Gruen 2002: 232–252) or on short notations as well as on personal work on the Greek text with the help of the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae*, of the *Strong’s Exhaustive Concordance of the Bible* (Strong 1890) and of the *Gesenius’ Hebrew-Chaldee Lexicon to the Old Testament* (Gesenius 1990), it is possible to have a more precise idea of the original meaning of “diaspora” as compared to words belonging to the same Hebrew root *glh* (gimel-lamed-he) such as “galah”, “golah” and “galuth”.

“Diaspora” appears thirteen times in the Septuagint: twice in the Deuteronomy (28:25 and 30:4), once in Nehemiah (1:9), once in Judith (5:19), twice in the Psalms (138/139 and 146/147:2), once in Isaiah (49:6), twice in Jeremiah (15:7 and 41/34:17), once in Daniel (12:2), once in Maccabees 2 (1:27), and twice in Solomon’s Psalms (8:28 and 9:2). As can be seen from Table 2.1, the Greek “diaspora” does not translate one single Hebrew term but at least five of them, among which *glh* words are absent. “Diaspora” never translated “galah”, “golah” or “galuth” (Davies 1983: 130, Gruen 2002: 342). The latter

two come from the former: “galah” is a verb, the primitive sense of which, according to Gesenius, is “to be naked” and “to make naked”, thus encompassing meanings such as “denude” and “reveal” in the sense of “showing what was previously hidden”, hence its Greek translation by the verb “apokalupto”. It is only by extension that “golah” and “galuth” came to mean “exile”, “captivity” and to describe the people concerned by this condition. The land is made naked by exile and the war prisoners are uncovered and revealed by their captivity. If we follow Donald Gowan, *glh* was not a common denomination for “exile” until the redaction of the Book of Amos in which it occurs 13 times, his interpretation being that subsequent uses of *glh* would be inspired by Amos (Gowan 1975). Almost all occurrences of either “golah” or “galuth” refer to Babylon as the place of exile during part of the 6th century B.C. after deportation from the Land. The Greek translation of “golah” and “galuth” quite understandably comprises terms related to captivity or to life abroad. The former are rather negative, such as “metoikesia” (deportation), or “aikhmalosia” (war captivity) or “eksoikismos” (expulsion) whereas the latter describe life away from the land without any necessary negative connotation: “apoiikia” (life abroad), or “paroikia” (residence abroad).

The confrontation of the “golah-galuth” and “diaspora” occurrences shows that these terms do not belong to the same lexicon at all. The former usually refer to the actual and historical exile suffered by the Jewish people in Babylon, while the latter never refers to the Babylonian times. While “diaspora” undoubtedly refers to some Jewish dispersion, it is not an actual but a potential dispersion. “Diaspora” is the word of the curse with which God threatens the Jews if they do not respect the divine commandments. All the occurrences belong to what Johannes Tromp calls “Deuteronomistic theology” (Tromp 1998: 20). God is the one who disperses but God is also the one who gathers the dispersed. While “galuth” belongs to the realm of men—men are exiled by other men—, “diaspora” belongs to the realm of the divine.

“Diaspora” thus possesses a purely religious and biblical meaning, which explains why the term does not appear in non-biblical Jewish literature of the time and why it is also almost absent from non-religious ancient Greek texts. It seems that the only three occurrences are to be found in Plutarchus. We can find it once in his *Lives*, about the scattering of Solon’s ashes on Salamis: “The story that his body was burned and his ashes *scattered* on the island of Salamis is strange enough to be altogether incredible and fabulous (Plutarch, *Lives*: 32.4)”. The two

Table 2.1 Greek Translations of galah-galuth-golah and Hebrew Words Translated in the Septuagint

<i>Hebrew Terms</i>	<i>Greek Terms</i>
galah (Strong Number 1540)	apokaluptô (reveal)
galuth (Strong Number 1546)	aikhmalôsia (war captivity)
golah (Strong Number 1473)	metoikesia (deportation)
	paroikia (residence abroad)
	apoikia (emigration—life abroad)
	eksoikismos (expulsion)
za'avah (Strong Number 2189)	
nadach (Strong Number 5080)	diaspora
natsar (Strong Number 5341)	
zarah (Strong Number 2232)	
naphats (Strong Number 5310)	

occurrences in Plutarchus' *Morals* are related to Epicurus' theory of atoms. This instance is quite interesting for it displays a rather unknown meaning of “diaspora” in which “dispersion” is not only associated to dissemination but also to annihilation. Dispersion results in annihilation: “And again subjoining the cause, to wit, the compressions and *disseminations* of the atoms, and having alleged their commixtures and conjunctions with others when the wine comes to be mingled in the body, he adds this conclusion... (Plutarchus, *Adversus Colotem*, 1110a)”. The idea is even more eloquently expressed in the second excerpt since the dissolution of the soul is dispersion into atoms and emptiness. “Now, while Epicurus would have this [the dissolution of the soul] to be a separation into atoms and void, he doth but further cut off all hope of immortality (Plutarchus, *Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum*, 1105a)”.

“Diaspora” has thus been so far associated both with a Hebrew word to which it was not originally connected and to a historical process that it actually never helped describing. These two operations resulted in the cohabitation, within the semantic horizon of “diaspora”, of a Greek historically positive experience and of a Jewish historically negative experience. This situation precludes any precise understanding of the historicity of the distinction between “galuth” and “diaspora” and of their ulterior rapprochement. Outside the world of Biblical studies,

only few social scientists have mentioned at least one of the three elements we have made central to our point: distinction between “galuth” and “diaspora”; absence of “diaspora” from the Greek lexicon and absence of any neither positive nor negative connotation of the verb “diaspeiro”, unlike “diaspora” (Baumann 2000, Krings 2003: 138–139).

How then can we explain why “diaspora” was attributed false origins? A first reason certainly resides in the frequent lack of knowledge in Greek and Hebrew that makes it difficult to engage into linguistic and semantic considerations and thus compels scholars to rely on previous works without being able to challenge their conclusions. Yet, it can also be noticed that this obliteration of the real origins of “diaspora” is not the prerogative of the non-Greek and/or non-Hebrew-speaking scholars since we can read the following in the “Diaspora” entry written in 1931 by Russian Jewish historian Simon Dubnow for the *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*:

Diaspora is a Greek term for a nation or part of a nation separated from its own state or territory and dispersed among other nations but preserving its national culture. In a sense Magna Graecia constituted a Greek diaspora in the ancient Roman Empire, and a typical case of diaspora is presented by the Armenians, many of whom have voluntarily lived outside their small national territory for centuries. Generally, however, the term is used with reference to those parts of the Jewish people residing outside Palestine. It was used at first to describe the sections of Jewry scattered in the ancient Greco-Roman world and later to designate Jewish dispersion throughout the world in the 2500 years since the Babylonian captivity. Diaspora has its equivalents in the Hebrew words *galuth* (exile) and *golah* (the exiled), which, since the Babylonian captivity, have been used to describe the dispersion of Jewry. (Dubnow 1931: 126–127)²

Therefore, exactly as it was important for Dubnow to support the word “diaspora” and to take it out of the specific Jewish framework because this confirmed his vision of the way it was possible for a scattered people to maintain its culture without having to strive for the creation of a state (see below), we may suppose that the insistence on a suppos-

² The “Diaspora” entry written by Dubnow is interesting in other respects. First, this entry was removed from the 1968 edition of the *Encyclopedia* until a new entry was written in 2001 by Robin Cohen (Cohen 2001). Second, it constituted an important starting point for an extended and non-religious use of the word in the social sciences, notably through Robert Park who explicitly quoted Dubnow’s entry in 1939 (Park 1939: 28). On the importance of this importation of “diaspora” through Dubnow, see Dufoix 2008a.

edly positive and purely Greek use of “diaspora” allowed more easily the “opening” of the term and its constitution as a concept. As far as the confusion of “galuth” and “diaspora” is concerned, the explanation is even easier, since the discrimination between both ideas—past Babylonian exile and threat of dispersion by God—eventually found an end in Jewish history itself after the destruction of the Second Temple by the Romans in 70 A.D.³ This dramatic event that marks the disappearance of a Jewish political center—especially after the failure of the Bar Kochba revolt in 135 A.D.—and the progressive emigration of most Jews of Palestine was interpreted by rabbinic thought as the divine punishment promised by the Deuteronomy, the main agent of the destruction of the Temple being not Rome but God himself, Rome only being the instrument of God’s wrath against the Jews (Hadas-Lebel 1990). The curse resulted in a real exile of the Jewish population and the two realms of both “diaspora” and “galuth” were suddenly confounded. Furthermore, whereas Greek had become the language of the Jews during the Hellenistic period, the Academy of Sages founded by Rabbi Johanan ben Zaccai in 69 A.D. decreed the necessity to return to Hebrew. The word “diaspora” therefore gradually disappeared from Jewish thought and the meaning of “galuth” expanded. It not only referred to historical exile as it used to; it also absorbed the Septuagint meaning of “diaspora” to become the very linguistic symbol of Jewish post-70 A.D. condition—loss and nakedness of the land, actual exile imposed by God.

FOUR MEANINGS OF DIASPORA IN JEWISH EXPERIENCE

If constructing “diaspora” as an object of study implies remaining constantly conscious of the translation questions pertaining to the issue of “exile” (Wettstein 2002: 1 and 47–59), it also makes it necessary to provide a complex history not of the word *per se* but of its uses. Before turning to the various meanings associated in the Jewish historical experience to the words “galuth”, “diaspora” and “*tfutzot*”, it seems important to provide a short vision of the semantic evolution of the word.

³ We do not have room here to elaborate on this, but the question whether Jews of the Greco-Roman period considered themselves as being in “galuth” or in “diaspora” has been widely debated. For a good survey of these debates see Scott 1997.

Though a neologism, “diaspora” was a common—indefinite—noun in the Septuagint. It can even be considered as a hapax—a category containing but one example—since as we noticed it was not used to refer to any other case until the rise of Christianity. In the religious confrontation between Christianity and Judaism that lasted several centuries after the destruction of the Temple and constructed the very definition of both religious entities (Boyarin and Boyarin 1993, D. Boyarin 2004, Yuval 2006), “diaspora” was first taken up in the New Testament and by the Fathers of the Church as a word describing the dispersed condition of Christians and of the Church itself until they abandoned it, describing the Christian sojourn on earth as “paroikia”, thus leaving “diaspora” and its negative connotation to the Jews dispersed by God as a punishment for their sins (Arowele 1977, van Unnik 1993). For centuries, “diaspora” was a religious proper noun, irreducible to the Jews since it had been used for Christians but yet belonging to a limited category of populations. After a quasi-disappearance that lasted more than one thousand years, “diaspora” was resuscitated within the sphere of Protestantism, and more especially among the Unity of the Moravian Brothers, the members of which used the term to refer either to a traveling mission of evangelization or to a Protestant minority community in a Catholic land (de Schweinitz 1859, Langton 1956, Rohrig 1991). As a reaction, Catholics picked up “diaspora” too as the name of their minorities in Protestant lands (Rohrig 1993).

“Diaspora” remained a limited, proper noun, most usually confined to the religious realm with three possible variants—Jewish, Protestant and Catholic—until the first half of the twentieth century. From this time, and even more deeply from the 1930s, its meaning and scope were affected by the importation of the term into the social sciences within descriptions of three different processes: secularization—i.e. the extension to non-religious meanings; trivialization—i.e. the widening of the spectrum of relevant cases; and formalization—i.e. the establishment of criteria allowing the shift from a definite to an indefinite category with its subtypes, from *the* diaspora to *a* diaspora, identified as a particular population type (the Palestinian, Tamil, German diaspora etc.) or sub-type (religious, cultural, trade diasporas, etc.). The word actually became what the French sociologist Jean-Claude Passeron (Passeron 1990) names a “semi-proper noun”, i.e. a semi-rigid category, more open than a proper noun but also less indefinite than a common noun, as shows the transformation of a word into a concept in social sciences. From the late 1980s onwards, the word made its entry into

the vocabulary of politics and of the media according to an even wider process of generalization and a concomitant process of polysemization that permitted its use without precaution and paved the way to its unlimited extension and loose definition as an ethnic, religious and/or cultural population living outside its homeland on the territory of one or more resident/host states.

The various processes indicated above are graphically summarized in Table 2.2. As can be seen, the evolution represented here is not a linear, but a stratified one. While it is indeed possible to point out to shifts from one period to another, it is only because new meanings

Table 2.2 “Diaspora”: From the 3rd Century B.C. to the Present

<i>3rd century B.C.</i>	<i>From 1st century C.E. to mid twentieth c.</i>	<i>From the 1930s to the late 1980s</i>	<i>From the late 1980s</i>
Common noun—hapax – Coined as a neologism in the Greek translation of the Hebrew Bible (Septuagint)	Common noun—hapax Proper noun – Disappears from later Greek translations of the Bible – In Hebrew, “galuth” combines historical and eschatological meanings – Specific Christian meaning in the New Testament (“scattered children of God”) but soon abandoned due to its association with the Jews – Mid 18th century, used by Graf Zinzendorf to describe the condition of Protestants forming small islands surrounded by believers from another faith	Common noun—hapax Proper noun Semi proper-noun (concept) – Progressive use for non-religious populations – Used first as a loose category in human and social sciences (Simon Dubnow, Robert E. Park, Arnold Toynbee...) – Emergence from the 1950s of the expressions “black diaspora” and “african diaspora” that become widely used in the USA from the 1960s in the context of the birth of Black Studies – First formalized definitions in political science (John Armstrong, Gabriel Sheffer)	Common noun—hapax Proper noun Semi proper-noun (concept) Common noun – As a result of the emergence of new academico-political movements focused on de-centering social sciences “diaspora” becomes a keyword to study the post-modern world – Opposition by Stuart Hall and Paul Gilroy between centered and non-centered diasporas – Quest for definitions or non-definitions (Safran, Clifford, Cohen) – Wider use in the media – Elective affinity with new issues: Internet, globalization. – The word used by governments to manage relationship with their nationals abroad

appear and not because old ones disappear. In fact, there is no real cumulative logic in the history of the word “diaspora”. The various meanings and uses do not replace one another. Instead, they superpose themselves and coexist simultaneously. That is precisely what has given “diaspora” so much power in the last two decades. It is only by paying the greatest attention to this dimension that we can enter the complexity of debates about the meaning of “diaspora”. A short survey of this stratification of meanings in the Jewish case will show that four different conceptions can be underlined.

As Isaiah Gafni brilliantly demonstrates, after the destruction of the Second Temple, the Jews have interpreted “galuth” in various ways, among them notably as a punishment, as a blessing or as a universal Mission (Gafni 1997: 19–40). The first two reactions to the catastrophe were epitomized by the emergence of two antagonist notions within rabbinic literature: the notion of *Histalkut-ha-Shekhinah*, according to which the presence of God had abandoned the Jews, and the opposed notion of *Shekhinta ba-galutha* which, as early as the second century, emphasized the fact that God was suffering with its people and that the *Shekhinah* was exiled too (Cohen 1982). Their coexistence within Jewish thought can also be understood as an internal and fundamental tension in the conception of “galuth”. “Galuth” is both and at the same time a malediction and a blessing. We can say that “galuth” is a “malelection” for the curse fallen upon them was seen as being precisely the sign of their election as the chosen people. Being dispersed was also a promise: the promise that God who had scattered them for their sins would also gather the dispersed at the end of times. The end of galuth, i.e. the return of the *Shekhinah* and of the Jews to the Land, had to be interpreted as an eschatological horizon (Zeitlin 1943).

This vision is summarized in several oaths that the Talmud and rabbinic literature wanted the Jews in Galuth to respect. If one of these oaths concerned nations on the territory of which they dwelled, adjuring them not to overly oppress the Jews, the three others had to be obeyed by Jews themselves in order to comply to the divine message: they would not “ascend the wall”, i.e. go back to the Land and practice *aliyah* before time; not “force the end” and try to hasten the end of times and the return of the *Shekhinah* to the Land; and not rebel against the nations among which they lived (Ravitzky 1996: 211–234). This is the price of exile and the price of election as well, the very condition of redemption. Alphabetically, the two conditions are very close. The Hebrew word for redemption, “*geulah*”, shares the same *glh*

root as “golah”. The first two Chassidic admorim of Gur, Rabbi Yitzhak Meir Alter (1799–1866) and Rabbi Yéhouda Leib Alter (1847–1905) have taught about this proximity between both words (Safran 2001, Patterson 2005: 113), a proximity even more important symbolically when the spelling is modified. If “geulah” is not spelled gimel-aleph-lamed-he but gimel-aleph-vav-lamed-he, which does not modify the pronunciation, then the only difference between “golah” and “geulah” is the letter alef that represents unity and has a gematria—a method of exegesis in which letters possess numerical values—value of one. Redemption is thus intimately associated with exile and is accessible through the attainment of unity and the ultimate return of God.

Though secularized visions of the Land emerged within Jewish thought before the end of the nineteenth century, for instance in the eighteenth century writings of Moses Mendelsohn (Eisen 1986) and though some rabbis such as Zvi Hirsch Kalischer and Judah Alkalai had during the nineteenth century defended the idea that redemption also depended on human action and on Jews’ return to the Land of Yisrael, the religious eschatological vision of “galuth” was prominent among Jews until the end of the nineteenth century when the rise of Zionism came to challenge it (Frankel 2002). The birth of the Hovevei Zion movement, the writings of Moses Hess, Leo Pinsker, Theodor Herzl and Ahad Ha-am represent a complete denial of one dimension of the religious conception of “galuth”. “Galuth” is an exile that expects return, but the time of the return is understood differently (Raz-Kratotzkin 2007b). In Zionism, the return only depends on human action, on migration to the Land and on the creation of a national state. The notion of “shlilat ha-galuth” (negation of exile) is absolutely central in Zionism for it embodies the necessity to move away from the curse and the dereliction of exile. As we can read it in Herzl’s *The Jewish State*: “I think the Jews will always have sufficient enemies, such as every nation has. But once fixed in their own land, it will no longer be possible for them to scatter all over the world. The Diaspora cannot be reborn, unless the civilization of the whole earth should collapse; and such a consummation could be feared by none but foolish men (Herzl 1989: 154).” Negation of exile found one of its main advocates with Aaron David Gordon who wrote the following in 1920: “We are a parasitic people. We have no roots in the soil; there is no ground beneath our feet. [...] We in ourselves are almost nonexistent, so of course we are nothing in the eyes of other peoples either (quoted in Sternhell 1998: 48).”

The Zionist political movement was paralleled by the emergence in the 1920s and 1930s of the Zionist historiography, later to be self-proclaimed as “the Jerusalem school” of Jewish history. It comprised such names as Yehezkel Kaufmann, Ben Zion Dinur and Yitzhak Baer, who insisted both on the uniqueness of Jewish history and on the compulsory rejection of “galuth” to preserve the existence of Jews as a nation by promoting the return to the Land and the creation of a national state (Shmueli 1986; also see Raz-Krakovitzkin 2007a: 76–80). We find the strongest opposition to the eschatological vision of “galuth” in Yitzhak Baer’s *Galuth*, written in German in 1939:

For the Galuth is the abolition of God’s order. God gave to every nation its place, and to the Jews he gave Palestine. The Galuth means that the Jews have left their natural place. But everything that leaves its natural place loses thereby its natural support until it returns. The dispersion of Israel among the nations is unnatural. Since the Jews manifest a national unity, even in a higher sense than the other nations, it is necessary that they return to a state of actual unity. Nor is it in accord with the order of nature that one nation should be enslaved by the others, for God made each nation for itself. Thus, by natural law, the Galuth cannot last forever. (Baer 1947: 118–119)

We read from this excerpt that the “negation of exile” did not necessarily imply the total refusal of any religious dimension. On the contrary, the Zionist mission was often imbued with messianism and biblical references: the creation of the state was interpreted as the fulfillment of the divine promise, of the mission of Israel, and as the continuation, after almost two millennia of suspension, of the Maccabean state. This is the reason why there could exist a religious Zionism in which “galuth” was denied; the *aliya* to Israel and the creation of a state considered as a way to ensure a rapprochement between the Jewish people and their God, and to hasten the completion of the realm of God (Don-Yehiya 1992). This Zionist conception of “galuth” became successful with the creation of the state of Israel sixty years ago and was at the heart of the founding of a real national theology (Greilsammer 1998, Raz-Krakovitzkin 2007a).

Though harshly conflicting with each other, eschatological and political visions of “galuth” shared a definition of it as an exile expecting return. But, at the same time when Zionist and Orthodox Jews would quarrel about the temporality of return, a new conception of “galuth” was emerging, in which “galuth” did not refer to exile as such but rather to the dispersed existence of the Jewish community. This

conception was defended by the Russian Jewish historian Simon Dubnow in various texts written to mark his opposition to Zionism and, more especially, to Ahad Ha-am's idea of a spiritual center—and not a national state—to be created in Palestine. As early as 1897, in his "The Jewish State and the Jewish Problem", Ahad Ha-am had summarized the issue at stake as such: "Judaism is, therefore, in a quandry: It can no longer tolerate the *Galuth* form which it had to take on, in obedience to its will-to-live, when it was exiled from its own country; but, without that form, its life is in danger." (Ahad Ha-am 1997: 267) His solution of the formation in Palestine of a spiritual center presented the particularity to refuse both the eschatological and the political visions of "galuth" since from this spiritual center of the nation, "the spirit of Judaism will radiate to the great circumference (Ibid.; on Ahad Ha-am, see Zipperstein 1993a, Weinberg 1996: 217–291).

Dubnow, too, refused both the eschatological and the political visions of "galuth", yet he estimated that Ahad Ha-am's answer was ambiguous. In his 1909 article entitled "The Affirmation of the diaspora" (Dubnow 1958: 182–191), which is a reply to Ahad Ha-am's 1909 "The Negation of the Diaspora" (Ahad Ha-am 1997: 270–277), he underlined that one could not at the same time negate and affirm "galuth". According to him, the Emancipation movement in Europe had resulted in the denationalization of the Jews and led to a crisis of Judaism that could only find a solution in a new synthesis proclaiming "cultural autonomy", i.e. the development of community institutions allowing for collective cultural autonomy while at the same time not precluding the individual political participation to the states Jews lived in. The emphasis is not put on the expectation of return any more, but on the cultural, "spiritual", link existing between Jews. Affirming the non-territorial nature of the Jewish nation allows Dubnow to draw a new picture of Jewishness, as it appears in his 1898 article "The Jews as a Spiritual (Cultural-Historical) Nationality in the Midst of Political Nations":

What are the demands of the Jews in the dispersion? The Jews as inhabitants of Europe since ancient times demand equal political and civic rights; as members of a historic nationality united by a common culture, they demand as much autonomy as is appropriate for any nationality that strives to develop freely. If these two demands are satisfied, the patriotism of the Jews in all the different countries will be beyond doubt. The Jew who lives a life of peace and quiet in his fatherland, can well be an English, French, or German patriot and can, at the same time, be a true

and devoted son of the Jewish nationality, which, though dispersed, is held together by national ties. (Dubnow 1958: 109)

We can find in Jewish historical experience one more meaning of “Diaspora”. The word can also refer to the existence of a specific relationship between the State and the Jews living outside Israel who have refused the possibility to “ascend to”, i.e. immigrate to Israel. The recognition of this special bond gives birth to a new vision of the link between Jews and the Land of Yisrael. This new vision considers Jewish membership that extends beyond national membership, and accepts the possibility for Jews not to return to Israel. It grounds its materialization in the lexical change from “galuth” to “tftuzot” after 1948 to refer to Jews living outside Israel. Since the new state had been established, it had become impossible to consider these Jews who did not want to make *aliya* as living in “galuth”. The birth of the “tftuzot” was the birth of a “historical state-linked diaspora” to use Gabriel Sheffer’s expression (Sheffer 2002: 334). Nevertheless, once again, the emergence of this new pattern resulted from conflicts between the Zionist vision of “galuth” having to end with the gathering of all Jews within the state of Israel and the vision of Jewish groups, especially in America, who claimed that Jewishness did not necessarily imply taking advantage of the 1950 Law of Return, make *aliya* to Israel and obtain Israeli citizenship.

The opposition between both visions was so irreconcilable that Jacob Blaustein, a leader of the American Jewish Committee, and David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s PM, negotiated in 1950 an agreement according to which both parties accepted not to interfere in each other’s internal affairs. It seems like the Israeli state did not really respect the agreement. One example may suffice. In 1958, at the World Ideological Conference gathering Jewish leaders in Jerusalem, David Ben-Gurion declared that “[...] the galuth in which Jews lived, in which they still live, is in my eyes pitiful, poor, wretched, tenuous—and nothing to be proud of. On the contrary, we must negate it absolutely (quoted in Eisen 1986: 119).” A few years later, the speech delivered by Ben-Gurion on 28 December 1960 before the World Zionist Congress fostered angry attacks on American Jewry. While the general tone of the speech was rather moderate, insisting on the necessary interdependence between Israel and the Diaspora, there were several passages in which the Israeli Prime Minister bluntly stated that American Jewry was on the edge of extinction through assimilation and considered it “the elementary duty of those who inscribe the name of Zion on their banner” to “have a personal bond with Israel—if only by a visit from

time to time” (Ben-Gurion 1961: 53). He also renewed his critics about the Diaspora by magnifying the fundamental alliance between religion and politics through the question of redemption. The “messianic vision of redemption for the Jewish people and all mankind [...] is the soul of prophetic Jewry” and this vision depends “on the redemption of Israel, which will assume two forms: The ingathering of the exiles and the creation of an ideal nation, as Isaiah, the son of Amots, prophesied (ibid: 52). ” Quite logically, this insistence on redemption prompted the disqualification of those Jews outside Israel who stuck to the three oaths:

A large part of the laws cannot be observed in the Diaspora, and since the day when the Jewish State was established and the gates of Israel were flung open to every Jew who wanted to come, every religious Jew has daily violated the precepts of Judaism and the Torah of Israel by remaining in the Diaspora. Whoever dwells outside the land of Israel is considered to have no God, the sages said. (Ibid: 53)

Needless to say such statements entailed many reactions, from religious and non-religious, Zionist and non-Zionist Jews alike.⁴ Orthodox Jews

Table 2.3 Decomposition of “Jewish Diaspora” according to the relation to origin

Galuth=Exile Expectation of Return Focus on Time	Galuth=Community Need of Connection Focus on Space
<i>Eschatological horizon</i>	<i>Transstate connection</i>
Religious level. The return to the Land is associated with the end of times. The return is divinely decided.	Cultural level. No focus on return. The spiritual nationality of Jews does not need a Land.
<i>Historical horizon</i>	<i>Centroperipheral connection</i>
Political level. Zionism claims the necessity to negate “galuth” and the obligation of “return” to a Jewish state.	State level. “Tfutzot” becomes the name of Jews living outside Israel irrespective of their actual citizenship.

⁴ Three different critical points of views are displayed in Handlin, Himmelfarb and Shulman 1961.

reproached Ben-Gurion for his miscomprehension of Jewish theology while those who defended the possibility of being, for instance, an American and a Jew, such as the leaders of the American Council for Judaism, charged him with imposing an ethnic and national definition of Jewishness.⁵ Therefore, at this particular moment, the three patterns we have so far examined were engaged in the debate about the potential formation of a new one. This new possibility was only achieved from 1967 on in the political international context of the Six Day War when the fear of a new Holocaust rose (Eisen 1986: 120, Novick 2000: 148–150), a few years after American Jewish leaders and intellectuals rediscovered the Holocaust, from the 1950s and even more deeply from 1963 on (Staub 1999). The four patterns identified are summarized in Table 2.3.

THE FOUR PATTERNS AND THE BLACK/AFRICAN DIASPORA

The current frequent statement that consists in opposing the “Jewish diaspora” and the “African diaspora”—or the “Black Diaspora”—prevents most scholars from seeing that three different logics have been at play in the relationship between Jews and Blacks as far as the allegiance to origin is concerned: a logic of analogy (Blacks are like Jews), a logic of substitution (Blacks are the true Jews) and a logic of inversion (Blacks are the exact opposite of Jews). Far from automatically succeeding to each other, these logics have often coexisted (Dufoix 2008b). They stem from the particular history of Black/African experience outside Africa, in which four main historical phenomena are superposed: the deportation from the African continent to the New World, the evangelization of slaves and former slaves, the emergence and evolution of Zionism, and eventually the rise of academic-political movements advocating the shift from a monolithic vision of identity to a decentered and fragmented conception of the production and existence of identities.

In the Biblical vision transmitted to slaves and former slaves by Methodist and Moravian evangelists, Egypt was the place of bondage and Ethiopia, as a generic name given to Africa, was the place of liberation. In the nineteenth century, this vision of Ethiopia was sym-

⁵ Very recently, the ACJ denounced recent trends in Reform Judaism that defended the necessity for Jews to return to the Land. (Brownfeld 2008)

bolized by the Psalm 68:31 that read: "Princes shall come out of Egypt; Ethiopia shall soon stretch out her hands unto God." The rather obscure text of this psalm was often interpreted among Blacks in the New World as a promise of redemption for Africa as a whole. Some of them saw it as an eschatological promise (Poole 1992). For instance, in 1829, Robert Young wrote in his *Ethiopian Manifesto*:

So at this time, we particularly recommend to you, degraded sons of Africa, to submit with fortitude to your present state of suffering, relying in yourselves, from the justice of a God, that the time is at hand, when, with but the power of words and the divine will of our God, the vile shackles of slavery shall be broken asunder from you, and no man known who shall dare to own or proclaim you as his bondsman. We say it, and assert it as though by an oracle given and delivered to you from on high. (Young 1829, reproduced in Moses 1996: 66).

The exile of Black people in foreign land was expected to cease at the end of times, when God decides it.

The intellectual movement known as "ethiopianism" was yet not limited to this eschatological orientation (Fredrickson 1995: 61–80). Contrary to the Jewish case, the development of a political vision in which human action and return to Africa played a fundamental role did not conflict with the religious eschatological pattern. Both rather mingled, as it clearly appears from 1830 David Walker's *An Appeal in Four Articles*:

It is expected that all coloured men, women and children, [...] of every nation, language and tongue under heaven, will try to procure a copy of this Appeal and read it, or get some one to read it to them, for it is designed more particularly for them. Let them remember, that though our cruel oppressors and murderers, may (if possible) treat us more cruel, as Pharoah did the children of Israel, yet the God of the Etheopeans, has been pleased to hear our moans in consequence of oppression; and the day of our redemption from abject wretchedness draweth near, when we shall be enabled, in the most extended sense of the word, to stretch forth our hands to the LORD our GOD, but there must be a willingness on our part, for GOD to do these things for us, for we may be assured that he will not take us by the hairs of our head against our will and desire, and drag us from our very, mean, low and abject condition. (Walker 1830, reproduced in Moses 1996: 70).

In fact, Protestantism and human return to Africa had been associated in a non-eschatological yet messianic conception of the future of Black people that pervaded the first returns to Africa, especially the one organized from Nova Scotia in 1792. The "return" belonged to history

and belonged to this world. Emigration projects to “Ethiopia”, understood as both whole Africa and the place of redemption, were repeated through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, towards Sierra Leone, Liberia—created in 1822, independent since 1847—or Haiti, which was the first “black nation” gaining independence in 1804 (Abasiattai 1992, Dixon 2000). The emigration of Blacks to a real or symbolic Africa was an idea defended by such important Black personalities as the American Martin Delany and the Liberian Edward Blyden. It constituted a fundamental, but actually not fulfilled, issue within the Black cause until the late nineteenth century when it was reactivated by the birth of Zionism, the importance of which was particularly acclaimed by Blyden:

I have taken—and do take—the deepest possible interest in the current history of the Jews—especially in that marvellous movement called Zionism. The question, in some of its aspects, is similar to that which at this moment agitates thousands of the descendants of Africa in America, anxious to return to the land of their fathers. It has been for many years my privilege and my duty to study the question from the African stand point. And as the history of the African race—their enslavement, persecution, proscription, and sufferings—closely resembles that of the Jews, I have been led also by a natural process of thought and by a fellow feeling to study the great question now uppermost in the minds of thousands, if not millions, of Jews. (Blyden 1898: 210–211)

Zionism thus fueled Black emigrationism but the latter never knew any tangible and continuous materialization until the three waves of Rastafari emigration to Ethiopia where Emperor Haile Selassie had given lands for the settlement of members of the Ethiopian World Federation in the mid-1950s (Bonacci 2008). The most famous attempt at repatriating Black people to Africa had been the Jamaican Marcus Mosiah Garvey’s project in the early twentieth century (Cronon 1955). The development of his *Universal Negro Improvement Association* (UNIA) (founded in 1914) and the launching of a Black shipping company (*The Black Star Line*) had been very carefully observed by Yiddish-American newspapers which did not hesitate seeing in Garvey a “Black Moses” or a “Black Messiah”. Pro-Zionist newspapers such as the *Tageblatt* or the *Morgen Journal* considered Garvey’s movement as tantamount to Zionism. The UNIA anthem was described as “the Negro Hatikvah”, i.e. the equivalent of the Zionist anthem. These newspapers would go so far as claiming that Garvey’s objective was to “take his people out of the Galuth” (Diner 1977: 76).

Neither the analogy between Blacks and Jews constructed by Blyden, nor the substitution of Jews by Blacks as it was designed by some of Garvey's followers, like Arnold Ford and other "Black Jews", incited them to use the word "diaspora" in connection to Black people. The first uses emerged during the 1910s. Until now, scholars agreed that the first written occurrences of the expressions "African diaspora," "black diaspora," and the use of "diaspora" to describe the situation of blacks living outside Africa, dated from 1965 (Irele 1965, Shepper-son 1966).⁶ In fact, they had been used before, though in small numbers, to explicitly make the analogy between Jewish history and black history, or to note the existence of discrimination that both groups faced in the countries where they lived. This was the case in a 1916 book *American Civilization and the Negro*, in which the African-American thinker and doctor Charles Victor Roman raised the question of the future of Black people in Africa and the American South:

The Negro is not going to leave here for two reasons: In the first place *this is his home*, and in the second place *there is nowhere to go*. [Author's italics] He is not going back to Africa any more than the white man is going back to Europe or the Jew is going back to Palestine. Palestine may be rehabilitated and Europe be Americanized, but the Jew will not lose his worldwide citizenship, nor America fail of her geographical destination as the garden-spot of the world. The Negro will do his part to carry the light of civilization to the dark corners of the world, especially to Africa; dark, mysterious, inscrutable Africa; the puzzle of the past and the riddle of the future; the imperturbable mother of civilizations and peoples. The slave-trade was the diaspora of the African, and the children of this alienation have become a permanent part of the citizenry of the American republic. (Roman 1921: 194–195)

Soon afterward, in 1917, the analogy was drawn on the Jewish side. A Yiddish newspaper, *The Jewish Daily Forward*, made the connection between the race riots that erupted in East St. Louis, Illinois, on May 28, and the Kishinev pogrom in 1903, during which more than fifty Jews had been killed:

Kishinev and St. Louis—the same soil, the same people. It is a distance of four and a half thousand miles between these two cities and yet they are so close and so similar to each other... Actually twin sisters, which

⁶ This article had originally been presented as an oral communication to the International Congress of African History held at Dar-es-Salaam in September 1965.

could easily be mistaken for each other. Four and a half thousand miles apart, but the same events in both... The same brutality, the same wildness, the same human beasts... The situation of the Negroes in America is very comparable to the situation of the Jews... in Russia. The Negro diaspora, the special laws, the decrees, the pogroms and also the Negro complaints, the Negro hopes, are very similar to those which we Jews... lived through (*The Forward*, 28 July 1917, quoted in Diner 1977: 76).

But those two occurrences hardly spelled the formula's success. It would not be until the 1950s and 1960s that its usage would become common among English-speaking historians of Africa, like Basil Davidson, and also and especially among French scholars and intellectuals, like the French ethnologist and great Haiti specialist Alfred Métraux (Métraux 1951: 21) and the French psychiatrist and writer Frantz Fanon who wrote in his 1961 book, *The Wretched of the Earth*, about "the Negro diaspora, that is, that tens of millions of blacks spread over the American continents" (Fanon 1961: 148).

From the late 1960s, academic and non-academic publications started to multiply within the African-American community that used "diaspora" to refer to Black people residing outside Africa. This use was characterized by its looseness and by the absence of any real reflection about its origins and its Jewish flavour. "Diaspora" provided Black people with a name for themselves. This name was at the same time a reminder of their historical tragedy and a positive way to recover a sense of unity by emphasizing the connection and the return—spiritual and intellectual if not physical—to Africa (Dufoix 2006). This emphasis established the continuities between the African origin and the Black people living outside Africa.

From the mid-1970s, this vision was challenged by the development of Cultural Studies in the United Kingdom and the importance some scholars (like Stuart Hall) paid to the re-elaboration of "Black culture" abroad. Though Hall's ideas were already expressed during the mid-1970s—for instance in a conference entitled "Africa is alive and well and lives in the Diaspora" given at the UNESCO in 1975—they were more formally displayed only from the late 1980s onwards. His cultural vision of "Blackness" led him to consider "Africa" as constantly re-interpreted and re-elaborated outside Africa. Instead of postulating some kind of "African essence" or "purity", he insists on the importance of the cultural production of "Africa" in the Caribbean, even if this production results in the search for African origins of the Caribbean

culture. Yet, his main concern is the reason why this cultural production is useful:

This is not primarily because we are connected to our African past and heritage by an unbreakable chain across which some singular African culture has flowed unchanged down the generations, but because of how we have gone about producing ‘Africa’ again, within the Caribbean narrative. At every juncture—think of Garveyism, Hibbert, Rastafarianism, the new urban popular culture—it has been a matter of interpreting ‘Africa’, rereading ‘Africa’, of what ‘Africa’ could mean to us now, after diaspora (Hall 1999: 12–13).

In this respect, the word “diaspora” changes meaning one more time. While it referred to direct connection to Africa in the African-American vocabulary of the 1970s in which it encompassed the centrality of Africa and the desire to search for the Africanness that had survived among the descendents of slaves in spite of distance, it became for Hall the symbol of “life” as opposed to “survival”, of “decentering” as opposed to “centering”, of “heterogeneity” as opposed to “homogeneity”:

The ‘New World’ presence—America, Terra Incognita—is therefore itself the beginning of diaspora, of diversity, of hybridity and difference, what makes Afro-Caribbean people already people of a diaspora. I use this term here metaphorically, not literally: diaspora does not refer us to those scattered tribes whose identity can only be secured in relation to some sacred homeland to which they must at all costs return, even if it means pushing other people into the sea. This is the old, the imperialising, the hegemonizing, form of ‘ethnicity’. [...] The diaspora experience as I intend it here is defined, not by essence or purity, but by the recognition of a necessary heterogeneity and diversity; by a conception of ‘identity’ which lives with and through, not despite, difference; by *hybridity*. Diaspora identities are those which are constantly producing and reproducing themselves anew, through transformation and difference. (Hall 1990: 235)

Paul Gilroy, a follower of Hall in British Cultural Studies shares the same view. He also insists on the fact that “diaspora” does not necessarily imply static and fixed conceptions of identity, and proposes the idea of the “changing same”, borrowed from the Black-American poet Leroi Jones. The “changing same” is tantamount neither to essence nor to absence of unity:

Neither squeamish nationalist essentialism nor lazy, premature post-modernism—the supposedly strategic variety of essentialism—is a useful key to the untidy workings of creolized, syncretized, hybridized and impure cultural forms [...] (Gilroy 1994: 211).

Yet, as far as the relationship between “Jewish” and “African” diasporas is concerned, Gilroy’s view is somewhat different. In particular, he grants more importance to the historical mingling between both than to a frontal opposition between them.

It is often forgotten that the term ‘diaspora’ comes into the vocabulary and the practice of pan-Africanist policies from Jewish thought. It is used in the Bible but begins to acquire something like its looser contemporary usage during the late nineteenth century—the period which saw the birth of modern Zionism and of the forms of black nationalism which share many of its aspirations and some of its rhetoric (Gilroy 1993: 205).

It seems that his vision of the “Black diaspora” joins Hall’s emphasis on the constant re-elaborations of Africa—even if they focus on “return” to Africa—and does not oppose it to the “Jewish diaspora” understood as being tantamount to the Zionist project.

While Gilroy sees the historical diversity of the construction of Blackness and Africanity, he tends—like most authors—not to see the historical diversity of Jewish construction of Jewishness and the Jewish Land. His “Jewish diaspora” is reducible to Zionism and therefore does not catch the complexity of the uses of such terms as “galuth”, “diaspora” and “tftzot”. In fact, Gilroy does not ignore this diversity, as can be demonstrated from an excerpt of his 1994 article on diaspora: “[...] diaspora has had a variety of different resonances in Jewish cultures inside and outside of Europe, both before and after the founding of the state of Israel.” (Gilroy 1994: 208, Gilroy 2004: 124). Still, he does never capitalize on it. One can only be struck by the complete absence, in Gilroy’s work, of Simon Dubnow, whose conception of the “diaspora” is astonishingly similar to his, also insisting on trans-stateness, creativity, cultural dimension, non-territorial nationalism, and the greater importance of link than return. The accent on the same kind of themes was also visible in the texts of one of Gilroy’s most famous predecessors: W.E.B DuBois. DuBois in 1897, in an article entitled “The Conservation of Races”, wrote long before he coined the phrase “double consciousness”, evoking a vision of identity very close to Dubnow’s:

We are Americans, not only by birth and by citizenship, but by our political ideals, our language, our religion. Farther than that, our Americanism does not go. At that point, we are Negroes, members of a vast historic race that from the very dawn of creation has slept, but half awakening in the dark forests of its African fatherland. We are the first

fruits of this new nation, the harbinger of that black tomorrow which is yet destined to soften the whiteness of the Teutonic today (DuBois 1996: 44).

Following their access to independence, most new states in Africa have designed and implemented policies aiming at establishing links with people who had left the country in the past and with their descendents. While these programs and institutions sometimes defined the return of the "expatriates" as one of their goals, they rather aspired to build bridges between the new-born states and the peoples living abroad.

The most interesting dimension of this "community-building in spite of distance" has certainly been the recent efforts displayed by the African Union (AU) to include the "African Diaspora" into its official framework.⁷ From 2003 onwards, two separate but connected processes have taken place, one being linked to the decision to officially include the "African Diaspora" into the AU, the other being the launching of consultations in order to provide a definition of the "African Diaspora". On February 3, 2003, AU representatives gathered in Addis Ababa for a summit of Heads of States and Governments. They voted the inclusion into the Constitutive Act of the African Union (Article 3) of a new paragraph (q) stating that "[the objectives of the Union shall be to] invite and encourage the full participation of the African Diaspora as an important part of our Continent, in the building of the African Union." This wish to strengthen relations was supported by the creation of a new institution, the Diaspora African Forum (DAF) which held its first meeting in Accra (February 26–29) in 2004 and gathered more than 300 participants. The DAF has since then been granted the status of a diplomatic mission in Accra by the Ghanaian Government.

Abdulaye Wade, the President of Senegal, proposed at this epoch that the "African Diaspora" is officially granted the status of the "sixth region of Africa". This idea was championed by the First Meeting of Intellectuals of Africa and the Diaspora held in Dakar in October 2004. Initiated even before the Dakar meeting, this reflection resulted in formulations highlighting first the necessity to go beyond geography, citizenship, race and culture, and second to accept the "fluidity" of identity in some kind of reminiscence of Hall and Gilroy's conceptualizations:

⁷ There are only few academic texts dealing with this question. For a recent study, see Nnaemeka 2007.

- 1) Africa, whose construction is currently on the agenda, transcends geographical borders as well as cultural or racial barriers: it extends from both sides of the Sahara; it is white and black, Arab and African, continental and insular; it is a cultural meeting point where successive strata of cultures of Eurasian origin intermingle with indigenous cultures born in the Continent of Africa. [...]
- 2) The concept of identity fluidity has now become imperative; it is informed by President Abdoulaye Wade's proposal that the African Diaspora should be made the sixth region of the African Union, and be fully incorporated in the reborn Pan-African movement, [...]. (First meeting 2004: 7)

Later on, the Committee of Experts convened by the Commission of the African Union in April 2005 adopted a definition that eventually became the official AU definition of the Diaspora: "The African Diaspora are peoples of African descent and heritage living outside the continent, irrespective of their citizenship and who remain committed to contribute to the development of the continent and the building of the African Union." (African Union 2005: 6). At times, this "fluid" vision of the "diaspora" was challenged. For instance, during the First meeting of African intellectuals of Africa and the Diaspora, the late South-African anthropologist Archie Mafeje claimed that:

It is fair to admit that there is a black nationalism that goes beyond the borders of the African continent. But our argument is that not all blacks in the so-called diaspora are allied with the Africans in general. Alliances are made on political and ideological grounds. Therefore, progressive Africans cannot embrace them all and simply because they are black or of African origin (Mafeje 2004: 4).

Yet, this large-encompassing conception of the "diaspora" was at the heart of the Regional Consultative Conferences held in 2007 in New York (June 22–23) for North America, in Bridgetown, Barbados (August 27–29) for the Caribbean, in Paris (September 11–12) for Europe, in Addis Ababa (October 15–16) for Africa. All these meetings were aimed at discussing the implementation of the transformation of the Diaspora into the "sixth African region". These conferences, in turn, led to the creation of an international committee of experts in the prospect of a World Summit of the African Union and the African Diaspora to be held in South Africa during the first half of 2008.⁸ This

⁸ Let's only note that this regional vision of diasporas is not limited to Africa. In June 2003, on Greece's initiative, 60 representatives of 28 countries' "diasporas" met at the European Diasporas summit in Thessaloniki to see "how Europe can strengthen

Table 2.4 Decomposition of “Black Diaspora” or “African Diaspora”: relation to origin

Exile Return Time	Community Connection Space
<i>Eschatological horizon</i>	<i>Transstate connection</i>
Ethiopia as the place of redemption. Messianic vision of times.	“Black” or “African diaspora” as a site of cultural production of the relation- ship to Africa
<i>Historical horizon</i>	<i>Centroperipheral connection</i>
“Africas” to which Africans should return : Liberia, Sierra Leone, Haiti, Ethiopia ...	African Diaspora as the Sixth Region of Africa

project is undoubtedly the African equivalent of the Jewish *tfutzot* in so far as it brings together a non-legal vision of belonging and yet the explicit connection to a political entity. The four entries of Table 2.4 have now been filled up.

I remind here, in the form of a general conclusion, the debates of the international symposium held in Tel Aviv in September 2007 which have once again made it clear that there is no real consensus as far as the boundaries of the concept of “diaspora” are concerned, and also that such harsh disputes about which populations may legitimately be awarded that label quite often obscure other issues at stake, and among them the incredible contemporary efficiency gathered by such an ancient word. Focusing on the Jewish origin of the term is perfectly legitimate as long as the real meanings of “diaspora” and “galuth” are taken into account and not, as is often the case, reduced to a Zionist vision of it, in which “galuth” is to end through actual return and state-building, thus setting aside religious as well as cultural visions of the dispersion. In the same way, academic refusal to acknowledge the legitimacy of such expressions as “African diaspora” or “Black diaspora” on the ground of inadequacy to the original concept, fear of its semantic dilution or mere “postmodern” stance only precludes any serious consideration

its connections with its diasporas.” Though much publicized at the time, this initiative seems to have been short lived.

and investigation of the common features between these two experiences of collective structuration in spite of distance, as well as their cross-identifications and cross-repulsions. Engaging into this task first involves taking a distance from any personal definition of what a “diaspora” is or should be in order to be able to deconstruct the name or the concept and go beyond the illusions it displays, and second, make the uses of the word the real object of the study, thus reconstructing its history by highlighting the conditions of its current inflation and polysemization.

CHAPTER THREE

THE DIASPORA AND THE HOMELAND: RECIPROCITIES, TRANSFORMATIONS, AND ROLE REVERSALS

William Safran

Diaspora consciousness is a primordial reflection of ethnicity. This does not mean that kinship is the only element of diaspora identity, for there are also instrumental and environmental factors, which limit the ability of migrants to get rid of their diaspora identity. These factors include the social, cultural and political contexts of the hostland, such as its tradition of multiculturalism and its tolerance of diversity.

In order for diaspora to have meaning in terms of identity and to connote a consciousness that is not merely one of minority status or of “otherness,” there must be a continuing awareness of an exterior place as a geographical center, even if it is no more than symbolic (Smith 1986: 28). The identity of a “diasporan,” properly self-labeled as such, is in most cases an ethnonational and/or religious one,¹ and based on his orientation toward an anterior homeland, whether primary or secondary.

TRANSNATIONALISM AND POLYCENTRISM

Diaspora is part of a transnational and transpolitical ethnoscape. This ethnoscape may be newly created—hence one may speak of new or potential diasporas, such as the Cuban, Hmong, or Palestinian (Van Hear 1998, Sheffer and Roth-Toledano 2006); conversely, people may move out of that ethnoscape individually, whether consciously or not, thus becoming “former” members of diasporas. If enough individuals do so, the critical mass of a diaspora will be reduced and its institutional support undermined, so that it will disappear. This applies to diaspora

¹ Some diasporas, to be sure, especially in the twentieth century, have originated as communities of political expatriates, refugees from oppressive homelands such as Bolshevik Russia, Nazi Germany, fascist Spain, Castro’s Cuba; but in their hostlands they constitute ethnic or religious minorities.

communities that have dissolved completely into their hostland societies and whose descendants have little if any memory of their provenance, such as the original German settlers in the Hanse city of Bergen, the descendants of Dutch settlers in New Amsterdam and of the Huguenots in Berlin, and the progeny of selected Jewish communities, among them the *Juifs du Pape* in Provence and the Jews of Kaifeng. Conversely, there may be categoric ethnoreligious groups that, although still identifying as a diaspora, had been so integrated into the hostland society that their connection with an ancestral homeland is a purely imaginary one, whether or not their dispersion from it is a myth. The example provided by Bordes-Benayoun and Schnapper (2006: 85–90, 180) is that of the *Israélites* in France, who had been so perfectly integrated into French society that diasporic identity, and *a fortiori* any notion of return, had become irrelevant. Unforeseen events, namely the advent of Hitler and the Holocaust, had “rediasporized” the French *Israélites* (Safran 1983) and the German *Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens*. In recent years, the German government and parts of the German elite have become officially philosemitic; French governments have tried to atone for the Vichy regime, and Jews have reached high positions in all walks of life. Yet the remarks by President Chirac on 14 July 2004, in which he criticized attacks against people because of their origins, spoke of “*nos compatriotes juifs, musulmans ou autres, même tout simplement parfois des Français,*” although made in good faith (and uttered by a consistent opponent of anti-Semitism), suggests that the Jews remain “a people apart” in France (as do Muslims). This explains why Jews in enlightened hostlands have been turning toward “Zion”—in the French case, by frequent visits to Israel, and in the German case, in the retention of the Israeli passports of returnees from Israel.

Diaspora properly so called implies polycentrism—the notion of at least two centers of ethnonational culture: the homeland and the diaspora. This applies not only to Jews, but also to Sikhs, Armenians, Ukrainians, and other ethnonations a significant proportion of whose members live in diaspora.

The maintenance or development of diaspora identity depends on the context of the hostland. Yet diaspora cannot be merely “where it’s at” (Gilroy 1994). It cannot mean just any subculture, and it must be transnational. Transnationalism means transactions, both for those who remain in diaspora and for the ethnic kin in the homeland. In short, there can be no transnationalism without cross-polity references of one sort or another. At first, there is deterritorialization or exterritorializa-

tion, and then reterritorialization, both often enough incomplete. According to Glick-Schiller, Basch, and Szanton (1992), transnationalism refers to the maintenance of social fields across political borders. But not all who engage in such maintenance—Glick-Schiller et al. call them “transmigrants”—are ipso facto members of diasporas (for example, research scientists or the officials of multinational corporations); rather, a diasporan must be more specifically oriented toward either the homeland or to some other place where fellow diasporans reside. Diaspora, then, is space-related, most often between hostland and homeland, or between several hostlands. The problem is that it is not always clear to what extent the positions of homeland and hostland have been confounded. Is the homeland of an American Jew Israel or Poland; of a Birobidzhan resident, Moscow; of a West Indian in London, Jamaica or West Africa?

Which is the more genuine “home”—the ancestral homeland or the hostland? The Bene Israel of India have a mythical homeland of origin; a concrete homeland, India, where they were born and accepted “with gracious hospitality”; and Israel, which is their idealized fatherland to which they have returned, to which they were at first welcomed with some reluctance, and in which they are still in diaspora insofar as that condition represents “a social form in which they organize as a community and spin family and ethnic ties tighter and tighter” (Weil 2005: 95–98), and whence they often return to their place of birth. In that case, one can be in diaspora after one has returned to the homeland.

DIASPORA INVOLVEMENTS WITH THE HOMELAND

Diasporas have played an important role in efforts at creating or restoring the political independence of their homeland, as in the cases of Poland, Ireland, Israel, Palestine, Armenia, and Khalistan. Theodor Herzl wrote *Der Judenstaat* in Vienna and began to take practical steps toward the reestablishment of a Jewish state from his base in that city, and Chaim Weizmann continued these efforts from England. Eamon de Valera, a native of New York, took part in the Easter Rebellion and escaped execution because he was an American citizen, and back in the United States, raised funds for Irish independence. It was with the help of the Czech diaspora in the United States that Tomas Masaryk influenced Woodrow Wilson to work for the creation of a Czechoslovak state. Jagjit Singh Chauhan, from his base in London, began his

campaign to set up an independent Sikh state in northern India; announced the formation of a Khalistan government-in-exile (with himself as president); and issued symbolic passports and postage stamps of the Republic of Khalistan. This has led one scholar to argue, rather hyperbolically, that the homeland is a pure invention of the diaspora (Axel 2001). But the Chinese diaspora did not create China and the Indian diaspora did not create India. At the same time, it should be noted that attempts by diasporas may not always succeed. Moreover, a diasporan who has been instrumental in efforts to reestablish homeland independence may thereafter discontinue his or her involvement with the homeland. What the examples do suggest is that the idea of the *politically independent* homeland was often fostered in diaspora.

In any case, diaspora relations with the homeland (whether primary or secondary) are a given. Such relations, however, are uneven; they can be placed on the following continuum:

- a vague memory or awareness of homeland descent;
- an open avowal of such descent;
- a continuing interest in events in the homeland;
- the retention of selected ethnosymbols of the homeland;
- the commemoration of events in the homeland, whether glorious or tragic;
- identification with the homeland in terms of religion and/or language. This is now easier because of the ease of global communication, especially via internet connections. Among the examples are Armenian.com, Sikhchic.com, konpondu.net (for Basques), and numerous Jewish and Israeli websites in several languages, which are used both to report on homeland events and to construct a community that takes shape beyond the imagination.
- visiting the country;
- investing in the country's economy;
- providing political support to the homeland, and lobbying on its behalf with hostland decision-makers;
- sending young people to study in the homeland;
- perpetuating aspects of homeland customs and culture. This applies to all diasporas, especially those of the first generation. The Indian diaspora in the United States and the United Kingdom has been able to maintain many homeland social patterns; the Jewish diaspora, lacking an orderly continuity, has adapted in a serial fashion, as it

- moved from a primary diaspora (e.g., Eastern Europe or North Africa) to a secondary diaspora (e.g., North America or Western Europe).
- retaining homeland citizenship. In some cases, such citizenship is retained as a matter of course for several generations, e.g., Japan and Switzerland; in other cases, there is a putative maintenance of citizenship implied by laws of return and/or the near-automatic grant of citizenship to ethnic kin living in diaspora, e.g., Jews, Armenians, *Volksdeutsche*, Slovaks, Ukrainians, Estonians, and most recently, to people of Indian origin;
 - benefiting from diaspora-homeland connections funded by the homeland, e.g., cultural emissaries from Israel, Hungarian social-security benefits extended to Magyars in Romania, and imams sent to France from the Middle East;
 - voting in homeland elections;
 - serving in the homeland's military;
 - marriage with homeland citizens, which is common among diaspora Indians, Sikhs, and Turks;
 - the transfer of the coffins of the departed for burial in the homeland, e.g., Orthodox Jews, Chinese, and Thais (Bordes-Benayoun and Schnapper 2006: 143);
 - returning to the homeland.

Not all diaspora political activities related to the homeland are necessarily performed at the behest of the latter, and some may not even be welcomed by it, such as Irish gun-running; the assassination of Turks by Kurdish expatriates in Europe; pro-Ustashe activities of Croats in the United States and West Germany against the Tito regime (Hockenos 2003: 21, 72f); and selected activities by the Jewish lobby in a number of Western diasporas.

THE ISRAEL-DIASPORA LINKAGE

Most Israelis believe in a continuing Israel-diaspora connection. According to a recent poll conducted in Israel, 60 percent of respondents stated that they had interactions with Jews in the diaspora; and while acknowledging their differences vis-à-vis the latter, a majority of Israelis expect such interactions to persist. More than half would accept diaspora criticism of Israel on particular issues, with over 70 percent saying that

Israel should take into consideration the opinions of the diaspora on matters of relationships between religion and state, such as the question of “Who is a Jew” and the Law of Return. Furthermore, nearly half of the respondents believed that Israel should be concerned with the problems of diaspora Jews, in particular those in need. A crucial element of the diaspora-homeland relationship is the concept of transpolitical nationhood, which is based on the thesis of a common original homeland. This is exemplified by the Jewish concept of *Klal Yisrael*, which embraces the Jews of Israel and the diaspora. The concept is not unique; it is paralleled by the Sikh notion of *Khalsa Panth* or *Khalistan*. One scholar (Shani 2006) speaks of three “interrelated master narratives”: those which (1) identify the Sikhs as followers of a universal religion; (2) identify them as a nation; and (3) deal with the overseas Sikh diaspora as a component of the Sikh nation, a component that is in part the consequence of forced deterritorialization. The territorial orientation is approximate: just as the origins of Judaism and of the Hebrew nation were outside the current borders of Israel, so the birthplace of Guru Nanak, the founder of the Sikh religion, was outside the borders of East Punjab. And neither Jewish nor Sikh nationalists necessarily lay physical claim to these areas (*ibid.*, 8). There is one important difference: The idea of *Klal Yisrael* as a delocalized “transnation” on the model of Khalistan is acceptable neither to secular Israelis, who see it as an attack on their sovereignty, nor to adherents of classical Reform Judaism, for whom the Jews are members of a denationalized religious community.

Not all diasporas are equally connected to the homeland; much depends on the physical distance from it. For example, the Tibetan diaspora in India and the Palestinian diaspora in Middle Eastern countries are more easily linked to their respective homelands than are diasporas in more distant hostlands. There is a factor that may be even more important—the political context of the hostland. Thus the Jewish diasporas in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom are better “connected” with Israel than is France, which is hampered by the Jacobin constraints regarding ethnic communities and by the relatively weak autonomy of its civil society. The same appears to be true of the Palestinian diaspora (Hanafi 2005: 229).

ROLE INVERSIONS AND ATTITUDE DISPLACEMENTS

The closer the relations between diaspora and homeland, the greater the impact of the former on the latter. That impact, which is more than merely financial, applies especially to diasporas whose population is as large as, or larger than, that of the homeland, whose diaspora is of relatively long duration, and whose weight is so significant that the homeland takes on the coloring of diasporas. This is particularly true of Israel.

Several decades ago Arnold Toynbee, the English historian, argued that the abnormal situation of the Jews in diaspora was such that their civilization survived only as a fossil. The restoration of an independent Jewish state was to reverse the fossilization process and create a “normal” condition for Jews. The State of Israel and its civilization are far from fossilized; but they are considered by many an anachronistic phenomenon: The belief that Jews should logically not have survived has been replaced by a growing conviction that Israel should not have been created. Before Hitler, the question was often asked whether Judaism was a legitimate religion; during the Holocaust, whether Jews had a right to live; but the contemporary “Jewish Question” is whether a Jewish state has a right to survive (Taub 2007).

In short, the Jew as the epitome of “otherness” has been replaced by Israel as the “other” among states. On the one hand, Israel is like other states: it has a government, an army, an economy, and the usual pathologies, such as corruption, criminality, poverty, and so on. On the other hand, its exceptionalism is often stressed by outsiders as well as by elements of its Jewish population. There is no doubt that, at least in democratic countries, the condition of Jews as “a people that dwells alone” has changed for the better: Jews in diasporas are gradually accepted as part of the political community in some hostlands (more fully in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, and more hesitantly elsewhere); at the same time, Israel often occupies a lone position in the community of nations and has become a pariah among *states*.

According to Jewish religious tradition, “*mi-tsiyon tetse torah*”—Zion is the primary source of Jewish culture for the diaspora. Today, however, traffic seems to be going mostly in the opposite direction. This is not surprising, because the diaspora has lasted much longer than the State of Israel. Apart from the now widespread Sephardi pronunciation of

Hebrew, diaspora Jewry has imported little from Israel beyond ethnoreligious symbols and objets d'art. In contrast, there have been many diaspora exports in language, political culture, and religion to Israel. The influence of diaspora language in contemporary Israel is particularly noticeable in the case of recent immigrants from Russia. The immigrants from the Czarist Empire a century ago spoke Yiddish but made strenuous efforts to replace that language, which had negative connotations for them, with Hebrew; but once Hebrew was well established, it was safe to disseminate Yiddish literature (albeit in Hebrew translation) in Israel, and even to present plays based on Yiddish diaspora culture.² The more recent immigrants continue to be committed to the Russian language and literature, which is "theirs," and which many of them consider superior to Hebrew and its literature (Niznik 2003: 360f). Their collateral diaspora identity is reflected in their maintaining their former citizenship. In sum, the dissolution of the diaspora, which had been projected by the early Zionists as a consequence of the establishment of a Jewish state, has not happened; on the contrary, the diaspora identities of many Jewish immigrants have been retained in Israel.

Diaspora implies cultural reproduction (Vertovec 2000, 2001). This process is a two-way street with a reciprocal impact on the diaspora and the homeland. It is exemplified, *inter alia*, by the impact of the Indian diaspora on homeland: the transfer of technology from the Silicon Valley to Bangalore; the influence of the American, British, and Canadian diasporas on a loosening caste system; the role of meritocracy; the growing importance of diaspora in Bollywood films; and the spread of U.S.-influenced condominium projects (Bose 2008, Radhakrishnan 2008). Over several generations, the Basque homeland in Spain adopted farming techniques that returnees had used in South America and the United States.³ Similar kinds of cultural exchanges can be found in the Sikh case. Many creative writings of diaspora Sikhs have become part of Punjabi literature (Tatla 1999: 81). Such cultural exchanges have led to pattern reversals: for example, while many African-Americans celebrate Kwanzaa, increasing numbers of bourgeois Africans celebrate Christmas. A more salient import by homelands from their diasporas

² E.g., the Dybbuk, Kuni Leml, and Ish Hasid Haya.

³ Returning Basques often name their new homes in the Basque Country after their times in diaspora, e.g., "The Californian," "Idaho," "Montevideo." (Gloria Totricagiëna Egurrola, personal communication).

are clearly ideas such as political independence and democracy and the institutional paraphernalia of modern states; and scientists trained in the United States and Western Europe returning to India and China bringing back with them ideas of class mobility to the former, and free speech in the latter. It is a moot question whether these are contributions specifically from the diaspora or, more generally, from the country in which Indians or Chinese have sojourned for a period of study.

The influence of the Jewish diaspora on Israel is even more significant. This applies above all to religion. The authority of the Babylonian Talmud is greater than that of the Jerusalem Talmud; the Jewish prayer books were created in large part in the diaspora; and the matrilineal basis of determining “Who is a Jew?” is of diaspora origin. Israel has inherited a vast collection of Responsa literature developed in the diaspora. Furthermore, varieties of Orthodoxy and non-Orthodoxy and the various local religious practices were brought to Israel from the diaspora. These developments occurred in diaspora in the absence of a homeland. The same applies to other imports associated with particular ethnic communities: the kosher cuisine of Eastern Europe, the *Kaffee-und-Kuchen* gatherings of the German-born bourgeoisie, and the cultural interests of the Russian intelligentsia—all of which filled a void in a homeland that was still in process of being created.

The interconnection between diaspora and homeland is manifested in national commemorative observances that reflect a common peoplehood. Thus, the Holocaust Memorial Day (*Yom Hashoah*) is observed in Israel, and Israel Independence Day is celebrated as a Jewish holiday in diaspora. Parallels elsewhere include the observance of Armenian Independence Day in diaspora; the celebration of *Cinco de Mayo*—the victory of the Mexican over the French army at the Battle of Puebla in 1862—by Chicanos in the United States; and the commemoration of the Amritsar massacre in the Sikh diaspora.

Both diaspora Jewry and Israel have instrumentalized the Shoah—and it is futile to argue whether this instrumentalization has come from the diaspora or Israel. In any case, it took place, not in order to “extort” money from Germany, but to buttress diaspora-Israel solidarity. It is interesting to note that whenever the existence of Israel appears to be threatened—as during the Six-Day and Yom Kippur Wars—there is a surge of Zionist sentiment in the diaspora and of a realization on the part of Israelis that the fates of the diaspora and Israel are intertwined.

Homeland as Diaspora, Diaspora as Homeland

For American Jews, is the homeland Poland or Israel? Is the United States a homeland, or is it merely a better diaspora compared to the Eastern European country from which they or their parents have come? For Russian immigrants to Israel who go on to the United States, which is the homeland? For many who remain in Israel, especially those who could not easily adjust to the new country, who maintain Russian customs and cuisine, and whose social circle is largely confined to fellow Russian immigrants, Russia is the homeland and Israel is one of the countries of their dispersion, if not a way station to still another diaspora. The same is true of Ethiopian Jews who have come to Israel in the past two decades, for whom Ethiopia is the homeland just as it is for Ethiopian exiles, including non-Jewish ones, in the United States (Anteby-Yemini 2005: 299f). In both cases, there is a process of reproduction of homeland cultural patterns involving language, customs, cuisine, and social patterns based on Ethiopian roots and reflecting even African racial attitudes (to the extent that it is in Israel that they discover their *négritude*)—patterns of reproduction that are similar to those of non-Jewish Russian and Ethiopian expatriates living in other countries. Whether the diasporic character of these two communities remains or disappears depends on their success of integration, which in turn depends on the evolution of Israeli society as well as on developments in their countries of origin. Meanwhile, neither the Russian nor Ethiopian immigrants to Israel maintain solidaristic attitudes toward non-Jewish expatriates living in various diasporas. Before they settled in Israel, the Ethiopian Jews met the criteria of the ideal-type of diaspora I posited elsewhere (Safran 1991) even less than did European or North African Jews. For one thing, they did not claim that their ancestors had been dispersed from a “center,” nor did they have a myth of return. Conversely, it can be argued that they became partially “diasporized” after their immigration to Israel in response to discrimination in Israel.

Homeland, Diaspora, and Freedom

For many generations of diaspora Jews, the return to their homeland was seen not only as leading to the abolition of homelessness, but also as a move “from servitude to freedom” and a process of becoming, in the words of Israel’s national anthem, a “free people in our own land” (*lihyot am hofshi be-artzenu*). Having their own land meant not living in

ghettos, not being subjected to expulsions and pogroms, and being able to practice Judaism freely. But for many a Jew today, there is more religious pluralism in diaspora than in Israel, and he prefers his individual freedom in diaspora (*lihyot ish hofshi ba-tfutsot*). For some categories of residents in other homelands, too, it is *expatriation* that has meant freedom. For example, Indians in the diaspora (e.g., in the United Kingdom, the West Indies, and Guyana) have been freed from the Dalit and other low-caste taints obtaining in the homeland. For Sikhs, there has been more upward mobility and less social control (e.g., pressure to wear the turban) in diaspora than in Punjab; for Armenians, more political freedom in diaspora than in Armenia; for Tibetans, more political and religious freedom in diaspora than in Tibet. For women, emigration from Ireland to the United States and England has meant liberation from the oppression of a patriarchal Catholic society (Gray 2004); and it is well known that many Maghrebi women have regarded their diaspora in France as emancipation from the gender discrimination prevalent in their Muslim homelands. Women have not suffered a similar fate in Israel; on the contrary, the kibbutz was for many a welcome change from their traditional role as the virtuous and long-suffering wife, the *eshet hayil* of the Eastern European shtetl. However, there are increasing instances of Israeli expatriates and even more frequently, of Israelis studying abroad, marrying Gentiles, not only because they are following a growing trend among diaspora Jews, but also because they are freed from the constrictions of the rabbinical establishment that prevail in Israel.

“Living more freely in one’s homeland” is a characterization that did not, of course, apply to conditions under Nazi Germany, Stalinist Russia, or Maoist China, many of whose citizens fled to regain their liberties. A similar situation obtained in Poland between 1795 and 1918 and 1939–1944 and in Czechoslovakia after the Munich agreement of 1938. The notion of the diaspora as an arena of freedom compared to a repressive homeland is found today among Tibetans, who have seen their homeland subjected to a Sinification process, which the diaspora has been unable to resist. Although some Sikh leaders have insisted that only in Punjab can one live fully as Sikhs, in the eyes of others the diaspora provides more freedom than does the homeland. According to As Gurmat Singh Aulakh, a leader of the Sikh diaspora in the United States, “the Indian government’s true intention is to annihilate the Sikh religion . . . [At least] the Sikh diaspora is free. India can’t threaten them, torture them, or violate their dignity and rights.

They are the ones who will provide leadership to the [community of believers]” (quoted in Safran 2007: 35).

The Iraqi Kurds in Finland experienced a similar sense of freedom. Iraq is their homeland, but they had no great attachment to the Iraqi state because of their position as a persecuted minority there, and they felt more accepted and more comfortable in the Finnish diaspora, and, although hoping to be able to preserve elements of their homeland culture, “[they] wanted to get rid of their Iraqi citizenship as soon as possible” (Wahlbeck 1999: 111).

The Diaspora as Sanctuary

The foregoing suggests that the traditional view of diaspora as an undesirable condition has yielded in many cases to that of diasporas as lands of greater freedom than is found in the homeland. Yet while the people in the homelands listed above were subjugated, their culture suppressed, and their elites persecuted, they were not expelled and their lives were not threatened. This raises the question whether people may be more secure *as individuals* in the diaspora than in the homeland. In the years immediately following World War II, a number of Jews who had come to the German Federal Republic from abroad were “sitting on their suitcases” because they were not sure about their welcome. Today, many Israelis are keeping or renewing their European or American passports in order to have a safe *pied-à-terre* in the diaspora. Some native-born Israelis, claiming a sort of “right of return” because their parents were born in Poland, have even requested passports of that country as “insurance for their children’s future.”⁴ In 2006, more than 4,000 gave up their Israeli citizenship in order to become German citizens. Faced with a continuing threat to the existence of Israel, some consider the diaspora an ultimate demographic sanctuary and a guarantor of the survival of Jews as a community.

SOCIAL PATTERNS AND POLITICAL CULTURE

It has been said repeatedly that “one can take the Jew out of the *galut* (Exile) but one can’t take the *galut* out of the Jew.” Like all maxims, it

⁴ “Israeli Eager to Get Polish Passports,” *Deutsche Welle, Current Affairs* 28 November 2004.

contains a partial truth. From its earliest years, the *yishuv* perpetuated numerous elements of diaspora political and social patterns that originated in the European diaspora; these included the ideological divisions among Zionists, within the Orthodox community, and between them and secular elements; and institutions such as “ethnically” specific synagogues. Immigrants from Ethiopia have kept the authority of the *kesim* and continue to celebrate the festival of *Sigd*; and immigrants from Morocco have their annual *Mimouna*. Moroccan immigrants have maintained their identity in part by continuing contacts with Moroccan Jews in France and elsewhere, and many have retained their Moroccan citizenship (Bordes-Benayoun 2002a). To confirm their Jewish identities, diaspora Jews traditionally made pilgrimages to the Holy Land (contemporary versions of which are bar-mitzvahs at the Western Wall and “Birthright” tours); but nowadays Israelis, to reconnect them with the diaspora of their identities, make pilgrimages to the tombs of revered rabbis in Morocco and Eastern Europe and—in part to reconfirm the *raison d’être* of the State of Israel—undertake annual “Marches of the Living” to Auschwitz.

The “interethnic” rivalries that prevailed in the diaspora—between Litvaks and Galitzianers, *Ostjuden* and *Yekkes*—have been attenuated in Israel by means of the integrative pressure cooker; but new rivalries have arisen, such as between Ashkenazim and “Eastern communities” (*edot hamizrah*) and between religious and secular Israelis. This may be a consequence of the relocation and recomposition of the Jewish demographic mass rather than an import in the proper sense. This recomposition also applies to the Jewish diasporas of North America and Western Europe; and it applies as well to other diasporas consisting of diverse ethnoreligious subcommunities—for example, the different components of the growing Indian diaspora in the United States, who often feel more Indian than Kashmiri, Punjabi, or Bengali. And just as diaspora Jews have had to unite across subcommunity barriers to build a defense against anti-Semitism, so the members of the Indian diaspora have had to find a form of organizational unity not only across intra-Indian ethnoreligious differences, but also across intra-Asian ones (Dhingra 2008). They are united under an umbrella organization, the Association of Indians in America. At the same time, there are divisions based on India’s hierarchical class structure that overlap ethnoreligious ones. At the same time, the *Gesellschaft*-oriented social patterns and class distinctions based on economic status in Western hostlands are selectively adopted by the Indian diaspora and retransmitted to India.

The pioneers who came to Palestine a century ago had left their sedentary occupations behind and became downwardly mobile: they worked in the fields “to build [a country] and to be rebuilt by it.” The Jewish settlers in Palestine reversed the inverted socioeconomic pyramid, which had too many *Luftmenschen* but lacked a peasantry, and created a “normal” societal structure. Today, however, the typical Israeli wants to fit into an economy whose structure resembles that of the Jewish diaspora in postindustrial democracies. In short, the idealism of the kibbutz has yielded to the pragmatism of a competitive environment.

At the same time, Israel has also revived aspects of political culture of the Eastern European diaspora: a lax attitude toward the environment, tax evasion, the maintenance of bank accounts abroad, and shady financial dealings (Safran 2003). Such patterns of *incivisme* are usually arrested when Israel seems to be in grave danger, as during the Six-Day and Yom Kippur wars, but they reappear when more “normal” conditions return.

A well-known mode of Jewish accommodation to the diaspora was to avoid attracting unnecessary attention. In the view of Moses Mendelssohn, this meant being “a Jew at home and a German on the street,” or, in the view of Samson Raphael Hirsch, combining *torah*—Jewish religious observance—with *derekh eretz*—the acquisition of secular culture. Alain Finkielkraut, the French Jewish philosopher, has asserted that many Jews in France who are not religiously observant, and often ignorant of Jewish culture, have reversed that pattern: while unable or unwilling to be fully Jewish at home, they are Jews on the street (Finkielkraut 1980)—they openly assert their Jewish identity, sometimes in an ostentatious manner (a practice that is increasingly dangerous due to growing anti-Semitism). Conversely, secular Jews in Israel who take their Jewishness for granted—if they are not indifferent to it—tend to be more sensitive to that identity when they are abroad; and they attend synagogue more often in the diaspora than at home.

The above-mentioned anti-civic behavior of many diaspora Jews was associated with an anti-system ideology, which could in turn be attributed to their marginal status as critical intellectuals and members of a persecuted minority. This was particularly true in Eastern Europe, where whole hostland systems were unfriendly to Jews. As a perennial minority, diaspora Jews were at the mercy of the hostland society and of the changing moods of its ruler, and they had to be at their best behavior in order for their presence to be tolerated. Now that they have their own state, Jews, as Israelis, have freed themselves from dependence

on these changes of mood, at least in principle. But reality is not quite so simple. In the diasporas of Eastern and Central Europe, Jews were enjoined to be on their best behavior and warned not to make “*rishes*”⁵—that is, needless hostility—for if they did, “what will the *goyim* say?” Today, Israelis, especially those who must deal with the wider world, are worried about “what will the *international community* say,” which translates, especially among academicians on sabbatical abroad, to “what will my colleagues [in this or that department] say.” Israeli academicians, like those of other countries, are under pressure to convince their hosts that they are beyond nationalism and particularism by criticizing their homeland.⁶ Some of this behavior has taken the form of open anti-Zionism.⁷

The need of Israelis to propitiate “the world outside” can be explained at least in part by the smallness of the country and the claustrophobia that is associated with it, which is moderated by frequent contact with professionals abroad. Elsewhere (Safran 2003: 397) I have quoted A.B. Yehoshua’s statement that “the generic elements of Diaspora are in our blood”; but the hesitant *enracinement* of Israelis in their homeland might also be due to the relative recency of statehood and its perceived “conditional” character (Shem-Ur 1978: 95f). A bitter commentary on the Israelis’ insecurity about the fate of their homeland that made the rounds during the Six-Day War related to the question of who would be the last Israeli to “turn out the light” upon leaving the country.⁸ It is tempting to suggest that this reflects a degree of popular insecurity in a country whose independence is of relatively recent date. A question that needs to be examined is whether this attitude is more prevalent, or less, among sabras than immigrants, and among secular than religious Israelis.

In a recent book on post-Zionism (Silberstein 1999) there is a reference to a number of Israelis who challenge their country’s right to exist

⁵ *rish’ut* (wickedness).

⁶ A comparison may be made with the public criticism by German, Spanish, and Russian intellectuals of the oppressive regimes in Hitler Germany, Franco Spain, and Stalin’s Russia; but these came from expatriates, not actual homeland residents.

⁷ On Israelis’ “political correctness,” See Daniel Doron, “The Pathology of Israel’s Left,” *Jerusalem Post*, 19 December 2003.

⁸ During the Yom Kippur war, when the situation looked particularly alarming, I attended a party of professors and businessmen in Jerusalem, some of whom were speculating on “what would happen if they closed down the state” (“*k’sheyisgeru et hamedina*”).

because, as one post-Zionist put it, “the State of Israel was born in sin”⁹—which is the obverse of the traditional Orthodox Jews’ belief that the diaspora was born as a result of their sinfulness as a people. Such a position echoes that of many anti-Semites. It seems to be a form of collective self-hate not unlike the self-hate of individual Jews, such as Otto Weininger, an alienated Viennese Jew; and just as for Weininger the only way to purge his original guilt of being Jewish was to commit suicide, so the only way to purge the sin of creating Israel was for it to cease to be a Jewish state, that is, to commit collective political suicide.

FACTORS OF IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION: RELIGION IN DIASPORA
AND HOMELAND

Ethnic or Religious Identity?

In most countries of the diaspora, Jews were regarded as members of a religious community. In the pre-Hitler era there were few Jews self-identified as such (apart from the Bundists) who were openly secular, because in most European countries an “ethnic” labeling of Jews was unacceptable. Nowadays such identification presents no problem for American and Canadian Jews, and is becoming more common among French Jews (a development that has led to complaints about *communautarisme*). The fact that a large proportion of Israelis are secular should contribute to greater understanding across the diaspora-homeland divide; however, secular Jews in Israel identify primarily as Israelis, whereas secular diaspora Jews are largely self-identified as American, French, or English.

Religion and Language: Judaism without Hebrew, Hebrew without Judaism

The two used to be equally important in nation-building, and in many cases are still intimately related. In the old diaspora, Judaism and the Hebrew language were closely linked; in contemporary Jewry, however, that linkage has been weakened. We now see a gradual reversal of relationships: the diaspora is moving toward a Judaism without Hebrew, because the vast majority who adhere to Judaism have little if any flu-

⁹ Aharon Megged, “The Israeli Instinct for Self-Destruction,” *Musaf Haaretz* 10 June 1994, cited in Silberstein 1999: 114.

ency in that language; Israel, conversely, is moving toward a Hebrew without Judaism. Hebrew is a territorially-based national language spoken by all citizens of the country, including secular Jews and an increasing number of non-Jews. Indeed, a number of Israeli linguists make a point of insisting that the language spoken by the majority in their country is not Hebrew, but Israeli.¹⁰ That is still a minority position, and it is likely to remain one in the foreseeable future; for if Israeli identity were merely to be defined in terms of speaking a modernized Semitic language rather than as one intimately connected with Judaism, the *raison d'être* for the creation of Israel would disappear and with it, the links to the diaspora would be severed.

Religion and State

Most diaspora Jews—at any rate those of the United States, France, and Canada—are committed to the idea of separation of religion and state, but they are ambivalent about whether to advocate this for Israel. They would, however, like to export the idea of religious pluralism to Israel. For obvious reasons, the rabbinical establishment in that country is against it, but secular Israelis generally favor it. One political party, Shinui, has argued that “the attack that the Orthodox establishment has mounted against the Reform and Conservative streams [in the United States] distances the vast majority of diaspora Jewry from Israel and splits the Jewish people” (Sheffer and Roth-Toledano 2006: 64). The intolerance toward non-Orthodox Judaism makes it difficult for Israel to promote the idea of the “centrality of Israel” in Jewish life. The exigencies of coalition building, however, have made it difficult for political parties to go against the Orthodox establishment.

Israel is regarded as the *physical* center of the Jewish religion and the diaspora (*tfutsot*) as the periphery (Attias and Benbassa 1998: 266) in much the same way that India is the center of Hinduism, Armenia the center of Apostolic Christianity, the Punjab the center of Sikhism, and Lhasa the center of Tibetan Buddhism. However, most of the inhabitants of these homelands define their own identities primarily in national terms. According to a survey conducted in 1994,¹¹ belief in the future of Armenia is more important than being Christian; and while diaspora

¹⁰ Foremost among them are Ghil'ad Zukerman and Ruvik Rosenthal.

¹¹ *Armenia 2020 Survey*, Library of Congress Country Studies, [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy@field\(DOCID+am0037](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy@field(DOCID+am0037), accessed 15 April 2007.

Armenians see the church as a spiritual center, homeland Armenians regard it equally as a unifier of Armenians worldwide.

The majority of Jews in the diaspora and Israel are secular; yet both insist on the Jewish character of the State. Israel, like Armenia and the Punjab (and to a lesser extent India), has instrumentalized religion vis-à-vis the diaspora; conversely, the diaspora has instrumentalized homeland ethnosymbols to buttress a Jewish collective identity that is undermined by the weakening appeal of religion (Safran 2007: 35).

LOCATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF JEWISH PEOPLEHOOD

The goal of Zionists, and subsequently of the builders of Israel, had been to make the homeland the center of world Jewry. In order to concentrate the decision-making power of the Jewish nation in the hands of those living in the homeland—so the critics have argued—“Zionism disempowered Jews living outside the homeland” (Silberstein 1999: 20). But that did not happen: the earlier belief of some Israeli leaders that “Israel [was] solely authorized to speak in the name of the Jewish nation” (Beilin 2000: 62) was given up in a confrontation with American Jewish leaders who asserted a position of equality vis-à-vis Israel. Today there is a sense of mutual responsibility: on the one hand, Israel speaks out against global anti-Semitism; on the other hand, there are organizations in the diaspora that defend the rights of Jews in their respective hostlands as well as the existence of the State of Israel.

Another inversion of position had to do with politicized nationalism. Originally, the diaspora’s efforts at Jewish state building were counter-balanced by opposition. This was reflected in the position of the ultra-Orthodox rabbis, who regarded political Zionism as blasphemy, and that of secular and Reform Jews, who rejected the idea of a Jewish peoplehood and who were German or French patriots (Volkov 1990: 78–79). For these patriots, diaspora identity was attenuated to the point of disappearance. But that process was reversed in the wake of the Shoah, when the vast majority of diaspora Jews became converted, if not to Zionism in one form or another, at least to pro-Israelism. Conversely, in recent years, a homeland anti-Zionism has made its appearance. Whereas diaspora anti-Zionism reflected an attempt to adapt to the modern hostland without necessarily rejecting the notion of a Jewish people, some of the home-grown anti-Zionists also reject *Jewish*

peoplehood in favor of *Israeli* peoplehood—in an attempt to fit better into the Middle Eastern environment.

The idea of a better fit has led a journalist of *Haaretz*¹² to espouse an Israel that is not just a post-Zionist state but a post-Jewish one. Such an argument is a variant of the reasoning that prevailed in the “enlightened” diaspora of pre-Hitler Europe, a reasoning reflected in the hope of Hermann Cohen, the German-Jewish philosopher, for a merger between Judaism and Protestantism (Elon 2002: 208) and in the hope of Herzl to solve the “Jewish Problem” by an “honorable and voluntary” mass conversion of Jews to Christianity (Traverso 1995: 91)—until the Dreyfus Affair disabused him of that idea.

The new secular anti-Zionism exists alongside the old ultra-Orthodox anti-Zionism of the diaspora that had been reimported unaltered into Israel, i.e., that of the Neturei Karta, who continue to live in a sort of extraterritorial diaspora in that country. Despite the United Nations resolution of 1947 that provided for the creation of a specifically Jewish state; the legitimacy of Israel—above all as a Jewish state—is called into question not only by much of the international community, but by a minority of Jews within Israel as well. While diaspora Jews conceive with near unanimity of Israel as a Jewish state, and hence support the Law of Return, post-Zionist and extreme-left elements of Israel want the law to be rescinded. Curiously, although a growing number of sabra intellectuals are post-Zionist and have little use for a Jewish-tainted nationalism, it is precisely such nationalism (with its attendant militancy) that has been brought into Israel by Orthodox immigrants from Western diasporas. Unlike Jewish immigrants in a generic sense, who are welcomed for reasons of demographic replenishment, the ultra-Orthodox immigrants are not welcomed by those who do not want Israeli identity to be “contaminated.”

Conversely, a non-religious Jewish nationalism has been imported from Israel by those elements of the diaspora that wish to base their Jewish identity neither on religion nor on a Yiddish secular culture. This is possible for the Jewish diaspora in the United States and Canada, with their ethnopluralistic traditions, but not (yet) for that of France. The increasing Indian diaspora in North America represents

¹² Gideon Samet cited in Hazony (2000: 71–72).

a similar development. Since Indians hail from various parts of the homeland, speak a variety of languages and adhere to a variety of religions, the only kind of diaspora unity that is possible for them is that which is secular and based on the homeland ideal of multiculturalism.

A similar sort of role reversal can be observed among Africans and African-Americans. In a study of the attitudes of African diaspora, Gilroy (1993a: 87ff) noted a “tendency to ethnic absolutism,” which he criticizes as conservative, anti-modern, and Americanocentric. Apart from a few surviving ideologues of “*négritude*,” Africans who have not experienced slavery—a group that includes residents of Africa as well as recent African immigrants to the United States and Britain—are preoccupied less with race and more with quotidian, practical economic and political problems.

There are a number of developments that suggest a revalorization of diaspora:

(1) The yearning to return to the homeland (“*lashuv le-eretz avotenu*”) now has to contend with Israelis’ nostalgia for the old diaspora. This is reflected in the continuing importance of kinship connections; in Israelis’ travels abroad; and in voluntary expatriation to greener and calmer pastures, primarily in North America and Western Europe. It is also reflected in a more positive reevaluation of diaspora culture manifested, *inter alia*, by the establishment in 2003 of a Movement for Ashkenazi Identity (*Tnu’ah leZehut Ashkenazit*)—the embrace of a complementary (or “hyphenated”) identity analogous to that of many American Jews. Furthermore, it is attested by a revived interest in the Yiddish language. The fact that there are now chairs of Yiddish in Israeli universities suggests an interesting reversal of position: whereas in the diaspora Yiddish was the spoken medium and Hebrew was reserved for sacred and scholarly purposes, so now Hebrew is the daily language and Yiddish “has been placed in academia, making it high culture” (Weiner 2007).

(2) The question whether one can be an authentic Jew in diaspora now has to compete with the question whether one can be an authentic Jew in Israel—in other words, whether Israeli identity is still an overwhelmingly Jewish one.

(3) The former practice of blaming the diaspora for anti-Semitism—to escape from which Israel was founded—is now selectively being replaced by blaming Israel for the revival of anti-Semitism in the diaspora. In short: the creation of Israel as a *response* to traditional, theo-

logical and sociological anti-Semitism, usually identified with the political right, is now increasingly seen as a *cause* of modern ideological anti-Semitism, which is identified with the political left.

(4) There is a reverse image building: while the ideal vision of Israel as disseminated by the diaspora establishment is supported by most Jewish intellectuals (except the far Left), Israeli academicians often denigrate their own country when abroad (Troy 2003: 50), often in the name of universal human values. The proverbial guilt complex of the Jewish mother in *galut*—a derivation from the collective guilt of Jews for their own exile—is now replaced by that of Israeli ideologues who, while deploring Israel's nationalism, do not equally deplore that of other countries. The question of whether the homeland should exist in a political form or not is never, to my knowledge, posed by any other diaspora, or, for that matter, by citizens of the respective homeland.¹³ The long-enduring diaspora enthusiasm for Israel is now competing with growing criticism, disillusion, and the question: "is Israel good for the Jews?" (Judt 2003).

There is considerable variation in the views of diaspora Jews regarding Israel. Yet there is a continuing interdependence of diaspora and homeland: If the Jewish diaspora disappeared, Israel's only reliable support and ally would disappear, and the country's existence would be endangered. If Israel disappeared, a major focus—and in this secular age the most important focus—of Jewish identification would disappear, and the continuity of the Jewish diaspora would be undermined. The concern of Jewish kin in the diaspora with the fate of Israel reflects a degree of "tribalism." This tribalism benefits anti-tribalist Israeli academicians as well, including anti-Zionist ones, who are invited abroad as Israelis.

The role of religion in this exchange is ambiguous. An identification with Israel is more necessary for secular than for observant Jews, because the former no longer have religion as an operative focus. Conversely, many of those whose identitarian focus is Judaism have less need for

¹³ There is one exception: While most diaspora Sikhs want an independent Khalistan, some Punjabi Sikhs have given up interest in political independence but would content themselves with the Punjab as a non-sovereign home of the Sikh religion and culture (akin to the cultural Zionism of Ahad Ha'am). The opposition of a number of diasporas to their homeland is directed not to its existence but to its particular regime, e.g., Czarist Poland, Nazi Germany, or Stalinist Russia.

Israel as an anchor for their Jewishness—which explains why the ultra-Orthodox, both in the United States and Israel are anti-Zionist.

The place of formal religion in this is complex and to some extent contradictory. Many Jews lost their religious convictions as a result of the Holocaust; this loss has affected the authority of the rabbinate in the diaspora and Israel, except that in the latter, the position of the rabbinate is institutionalized and functions as a representative of the two major Jewish “ethnic” communities. This parallels the Armenian situation: the Armenian Apostolic Church had lost much of its authority after the genocide, but “it functioned as a marker of identity and as an arena for communal focus, made possible by the fact that the Arab states followed the Ottoman *millet* pattern and recognized the non-Arab peoples among them as defined by their religious character” (Tölölyan 2006).

There is an interesting change of attitude on the part of Christians regarding the return of the Jews to their homeland. Whereas for centuries it had been a central component of Christian doctrine that Jews were condemned to eternal wandering because of their rejection of Christ, a number of Christian sects now support Israel, albeit for their own agenda. The hostility of the ultra-Orthodox to a pre-Messianic Jewish state has not changed; however, we do not yet know of the implications for diaspora-Israel relations of the widespread belief that Menahem Mendl Schneerson, the late leader of the Habad movement, is the messiah.

THE QUESTION OF RETURN

A primary expression of the diaspora-homeland relationship is the notion of the right of ethnonational kinfolk to return, to which I referred earlier. This is reflected in laws of return, dual citizenship, and admission preferences based on kinship criteria. Israel’s Law of Return is the best known—and the most criticized; but similar provisions exist also in Germany, Armenia, Croatia, and other countries where encouragement to return is implied by the *jus sanguinis* basis of citizenship. Several homelands, such as Israel and Armenia, have welcomed returnees for demographic or economic reasons. After World War II, the Bonn Republic welcomed not only ethnic Germans residing abroad (*Auslandsdeutsche*), but also returning anti-Nazis and, for largely symbolic reasons, Jews as well. But this welcome is sometimes problematic. Some coun-

tries may not be eager to welcome returnees from hostlands whose political values are different from their own—e.g., from more democratic hostlands to authoritarian homelands. Conversely, members of diasporas might be prosecuted for their past misbehavior upon their return, such as Nazi war criminals hiding in South America or Russian “crony capitalists.” As a democracy, Israel is not worried about the importing of democratic ideas by returnees from the diaspora; but it is beginning to worry about an excessive number of educated immigrants who compete with natives for a limited number of positions. The welcome of other diasporas to their homelands may be less than cordial for other reasons: for example, the return of Greek and Italian expatriates who buy houses with money earned abroad may have a tightening effect on the housing market that is resented by native residents.

Some diasporans had to be allowed (if not always welcomed) back home on the wake of decolonization. This applied, *inter alia*, to the *rapatriés* who had never set foot in France, and the ancestors of some of whom had not originated in France, a situation that introduces the problem of labeling settlers in a colony of an imperial country as a “diaspora” of that country, especially if they were citizens of it.¹⁴

While the Law of Return has facilitated the immigration of diaspora Jews to Israel, the reverse process, the emigration of Israelis to the diaspora, has been equally important. Such a process has been useful for replenishing the diaspora, whose maintenance is needed to support the homeland. There is an analogous situation with respect to demographic replenishment of other diasporas, such as the Cuban, Armenian, Chinese, and Indian. A note of caution is in order, however: while some newcomers are true additions to the diaspora, others will join the ranks of a multitude of undifferentiated immigrants. Much depends on the existence, the institutionalization, and the density of an existing “core” diaspora. Thus *yordim* in places with established Jewish communities will provide an important infusion into them, while those who settle in small towns in “deepest” America will do little to contribute to the diaspora community, and hence to relations with the homeland.

¹⁴ During a debate in the House of Lords in the 1960s, certain categories of Chinese from Hong Kong, although not, strictly speaking, members of the British “diaspora,” were classified as “belongers,” including civil servants and wealthy individuals.

CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN QUESTIONS

Specific events have brought about a rearrangement of self-identification among both Israelis and Jews in the diaspora. Just before the Six-Day War—a situation that was to repeat itself during the Yom Kippur War—many Israelis felt almost as alone in the world as Jews had felt in the European diaspora during the Holocaust. After the Six-Day War, a triumphant Israel became the civil religion of American Jews, especially secular ones; but a few wars later, the United States became the dream of many insecure Israelis. Such attitude shifts are not confined to the Jewish diaspora. The war over Nagorno-Karabakh in February 1988 and the earthquake that devastated northern Armenia later that year generated a massive mobilization of the diaspora and led to significant aid and investment in the homeland. But a decade later, political problems in the homeland brought on a cycle of disillusion in the Armenian diaspora.

Diasporist attitudes among Israelis are never far below the surface; they are exemplified by a constant leaving and returning, a process noted in Israeli fiction, e.g., in S.J. Agnon's novels;¹⁵ in Israelis' leaving the kibbutz for Tel-Aviv, then leaving for America, then sending their sons to serve in the Israeli Army. That is why the distinction often made between a sabra and a (diaspora) Jew is never fully accurate. According to Akiva Orr (1994: 47–52), the former represents “the local nationalism of people born and bred in Israel,” which is based on identification with a land, a language, and loyalty to a country and is free of minority complexes, whereas the latter is based on religion (however attenuated), ethnicity, and memory of mostly unpleasant experiences. Orr argues that there is also a dividing line within the Jewish community in Israel, including immigrants, based on whether they received their primary and secondary education in Israel or in diaspora. Such a neat demarcation reflects a mixture of reality and wishful thinking: most sabras have parents or grandparents who grew up in the diaspora, many of whom have related their experiences to their Israeli offspring. Moreover, many native-born Israelis empathize with the condition of the diaspora as they are increasingly conscious of their minority status in a sea of Arabs.

¹⁵ E.g., *Oreah nata lalun* (A Guest for the Night).

A number of questions remain open: How do sojourns in diaspora hostlands affect homeland natives or residents? To what extent are their identities “contaminated” by diasporic attitudes? Are returnees from the Jewish and other diasporas to their respective homelands more nationalistic than native born citizens, or less so? Is the “long-distance nationalism” of members of the diaspora more hawkish or dovish than the nationalism of homeland natives? Are the former less nationalistic, because the diaspora context implies a primary identity oriented toward the hostland; or less so, because long-distance nationalism is more expressive than instrumental—i.e., is not associated with the concrete commitments and (often enough) sacrifices that national patriotism implies? These questions need to be answered by way of comparative analysis.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONTEMPORARY IMMIGRATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Yitzhak Sternberg

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I generally intend to emphasize that while acknowledging the theoretical merits of “transnationalism” as a comparative perspective on (contemporary) immigration, I would like to pay attention to what appear to be major theoretical limitations of this perspective, to which the relevant literature pays little or no attention.

The concept of transnationalism stands at the center of the attempt to portray the newness and uniqueness of contemporary immigration, when compared with past immigration or immigrations. Accordingly, it is also the focus of major theoretical debates and disputes among students of today’s immigration. In what follows, a discussion is presented of some of the major debates and disputes regarding transnationalism as such a comparative perspective.

However, this comparative perspective is quite narrow and not balanced enough. It tends to focus on the contemporary era, and on what is new in this era with regard to previous eras. And so, the whole comparative horizon is confined mainly to what is identified as new and distinct characteristics of the contemporary era. These characteristics and even the perspective’s disputes, that include a critique and specific limitations of the perspective, tend to over-emphasize the novelties of the present with regard to the past, of what is present today and was relatively absent in the past. Furthermore, the tendency of such a perspective is to seek in the past mainly characteristics resembling those manifested in the present era. However, if one wants to grasp and assess not only the *novelties* of the present era but also its *distinctiveness*, one should extend the comparative perspective to also include in it characteristics of the past that are relatively absent in the present (see Elias 1987).

Hence, I suggest to extend the comparative perspective. More specifically, I propose to focus on the connection between immigration

and major macro socio-historical transformations, and to include in the comparative perspective also, and perhaps even mainly, features that were manifested in past immigrations but are relatively absent in contemporary immigration. Furthermore, I also suggest a possible, though not necessarily an exhaustive, typology of the connections between immigration and major macro socio-historical transformations. The extended comparative perspective and this typology contribute to a more balanced view and assessment of the novelties and distinctiveness of contemporary immigration and transnationalism; of the type and scope of change represented by these novelties; of the merits of the transnationalism comparative perspective; and of limitations of the latter perspective while emphasizing in this respect limitations to which little or no attention was paid in the relevant literature.

TRANSNATIONALISM AS A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON (CONTEMPORARY) IMMIGRATION

The concept of transnationalism stands at the center of the attempt to portray the newness and uniqueness of contemporary immigration, when compared with past immigration or immigrations. It is thus also at the center of major theoretical debates and disputes among students of today's immigration. According to adherents of the most consistent variant that uses this concept, contemporary migration differs substantially from previous ones, and a proper understanding of it requires a new conceptualization and a new analytic framework—that of transnationalism (Glick Schiller et al. 1992:1).

The following words written by Nina Glick Schiller and her colleagues exemplify this view: “Our earlier conceptions of immigrant and migrant no longer suffice. The word immigrant evokes images of permanent rupture, of the uprooted, the abandonment of old patterns and the painful learning of a new language and culture. Now, a new kind of migrating population is emerging, composed of those whose networks, activities and patterns of life encompass both their host and home societies. Their lives cut across national boundaries and bring two societies into a single social field.” Hence, a new conceptualization, called transnationalism, is needed “in order to come to terms with the experience and consciousness of this new migrant population.” All in all, recent technological and social developments contribute to transnationalism defined by Glick Schiller and her colleagues as “the process

by which immigrants build social fields that link together their country of origin and their country of settlement.” They put forward a new term to portray these immigrants, namely the term “transmigrants” (Glick Schiller et al. 1992: 1).

Accordingly, transnationalism can be seen as a comparative perspective on (contemporary) immigration. Furthermore, this perspective stands at the center of debates and disputes among students of contemporary immigration. In what follows, a discussion is presented of some of the major debates and disputes with regard to transnationalism as such a comparative perspective.¹

Main Disputes

One of the major disputed issues concerns the kind of change, with regard to transnationalism, that is manifested in contemporary immigration when compared with past immigration or immigrations. Almost all students of contemporary immigration agree that transnationalism is not new and that it has a relatively long history. Furthermore, most observers also maintain that this phenomenon’s scope, frequency, and intensity are greater in today’s immigration than in the past, and that nowadays it has new and distinct characteristics. Some scholars, however, see contemporary immigration and immigrants’ transnationalism as distinguished qualitatively from past immigrations and manifestations of transnationalism, and hence as representing a radical break or discontinuity with the past that also requires a new analytic and conceptual framework. Whereas other scholars assess contemporary immigration and immigrants’ transnational activities as representing only a difference of scale with respect to the past.

The attempt to address this issue contributed to the “discovery” or “rediscovery” of previous cases of immigrants’ transnationalism and hence to the development of a comparative perspective focusing on

¹ The discussion of the main disputes, including both adherents and critics of the transnationalism perspective, is based on the following literature: Alba and Nee (1997), Ali-Ali et al. (2001), Basch et al. (1994), Brubaker (2001), (2005), Castels (2002), Faist (2000), Foner (2000), Glick Schiller et al. (1992), (1995), Guarnizo et al. (2003), Hannerz (1996), Kearney (1995), Kennedy and Roudometof (2002), Kivisto (2001), Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004), Lucassen (2002) (2004), Morawska (2001) (2003), Portes (1996) (1999), Portes et al. (1989), Portes et al. (1999), Smith (2003), Stack (1981), Vertovec (1999) (2000) (2001) (2003a) (2004), Waldinger and Fitzgerald (2004).

similarities and differences between present and past immigrants' transnational connections and experiences.

Among similar factors that influenced the development and maintenance of transnational practices that can be found also in the past, one can cite the following: (1) family relatives who remained in the home country. Thus, for example, in certain past cases, a high percentage of immigrants left behind wives and children too; (2) the aim of many immigrants was to return to the home country after spending a relatively short period in the host country; (3) home country governments saw the immigrants as an important economic and political asset of their country and therefore were actively involved in promoting and developing connections between the immigrants and their home country; (4) the fragility of the immigrants' economic situation in the host country, and in many cases in the home country too, serves as an incentive, among immigrants, to preserve and develop economic opportunities in both countries; (5) lack of acceptance of immigrants by dominant groups of the host society which hinders immigrants' integration into this society and tends to preserve their previous collective identity and culture, as well as to preserve or develop their connections with the home country; and (6) involvement in the home country's politics that persisted after immigrating to the host country.

Thus, the following activities and experiences, among others, attest to the existence of immigrant transnationalism also in past immigrations: the existence of what is called in the literature "transnational households"; an impressive correspondence between immigrants and people in the home country; money transfers by immigrants to the home country; organized aid by immigrants to communities in the home country; sending special "messengers" to home country communities; immigrants purchasing land and homes or making other economic investments in the home country; the existence of immigrants' newspapers in the host country that kept immigrants informed about major developments in their home country, which in many cases even tended to focus on and emphasize home country news and developments; a relatively high percentage of immigrants returning permanently to their home country; quite frequent visits of immigrants to the home country; immigrants' involvement in the politics of the home country, and involvement of home country governments in the lives of the immigrants in the host country.

However, there are also new or distinct features that scholars mention as characterizing contemporary transnational activities and experiences.

Among the new factors that currently influence the development and maintenance of transnational practices, one can list the following: (1) the recent increased pace of globalization whose essence may be depicted as significant growth in the interconnectedness or interdependence of various social groups and people, as well as people's increasing awareness to this phenomenon (Ben-Rafael and Sternberg 2001). Contemporary movements of people across the globe can be seen as a "global flow," one among others, that is influenced by this growing interconnectedness as well as contributing to enhancing it (Appadurai 1990). Hence, the existence of much greater possibilities and opportunities for transnational connections is endemic to the contemporary globalization process; (2) transport and communication technologies, that were not available previously, which facilitate enormously immigrants' practices of transnational connections. One can mention, among others, in this respect: jet planes; the greater availability of the telephone; fax; videos; cable television and the internet. Some of these technologies enable a person to engage in a simultaneous activity in several places; (3) developments in the global economy that influence the scope, directionality, and composition of contemporary immigration. One of the consequences of these economic developments is a new, large-scale immigration wave that is manifested by a sharp increase in the total number of immigrants all over the world in recent decades. Furthermore, the directionality of this huge flow of immigrants is from the world's poorer countries to the richer ones. As a result, in addition to traditional immigration-absorbing countries such as the USA and Canada, several European countries, for example, have also become immigrant-absorbing countries; (4) developments in the global economy that are manifested by a time/space compression and by possibilities of immediate money transfers that tend to significantly enhance opportunities for practicing and experiencing transnational connections; (5) a higher percentage than before of immigrants with significant amounts of wealth and/or high educational and professional skills that are able to exploit and use the new technologies; (6) greater tolerance toward ethnic pluralism in many host countries; (7) dual nationality or dual citizenship is now more common than before; (8) national identities now play a more prominent role than previously and this enhances immigrants' prospects of preserving national identities and therefore also of maintaining ties with their home country; and (9) such transnational connections are seen in a more favorable light today than during past immigrations.

Another major contested issue among students of contemporary immigration concerns the evaluation of the integration (or assimilation) processes of immigrants in the host societies. There are scholars who tend to emphasize, in this respect, that the main process experienced by immigrants is transnationalism which tends to hinder the integration or incorporation of immigrants into the host society. However, there is also a growing number of scholars who, while acknowledging the importance of transnational connections, nevertheless tend to emphasize integrative or assimilatory processes as the principal processes experienced by contemporary immigrants. In other words, these scholars argue that integration is much more prominent among contemporary immigrants than acknowledged by the most consistent proponents of the transnationalism perspective. This is especially so among members of the second and third generations of immigrants.

Furthermore, there are scholars who maintain that transnational connections are not only prevalent among, but also experienced very intensively by, the vast majority of contemporary immigrants. Others hold that research thus far and the illustrations mentioned do not provide enough evidence to support such a claim. Some even argue that only a relatively small minority of contemporary immigrants is engaged intensively and frequently in transnational activities.

In a comparison between and within immigrant groups several factors are mentioned as influencing the development, scope, frequency, and intensity of transnational activities. They include: (1) the distance between the home country and the host country. Some scholars even argue that the majority of the illustrations mentioned in the literature as attesting to the existence of transnationalism among contemporary immigrants are cases of a relative short distance between both countries; (2) the socio-economic and educational resources of the immigrants. It is argued that the richer or more professionally skilled the group is, the more intensive its members' transnational activities are. Here too, some scholars argue that the main body of evidence mentioned in the literature with respect to transnationalism does not relate to the majority of contemporary immigrants, who are unskilled and poor; (3) government policies and attitudes toward the immigrants both in the home country and in the host country. An important factor illustrating this point is, for example, the legal position in each country concerning dual nationality or dual citizenship; and (4) the type of relations that exist between both states, the host country and the home country. If the countries are in a severe conflict with each other, it will

have implications on the possibilities and opportunities of immigrants to engage in transnational activities between these countries.

Scholars also look differently at the involvement, commitment and feelings of immigrants experiencing transnationalism with regard to their host country and home country. Some see as endemic to transnationalism the situation that immigrants feel equally at home both in the country of origin, and in the country of settlement. Other scholars, however, point to the fact that the vast majority of practitioners of immigrant transnationalism do not spend equal time in both countries; they usually stay for far longer periods in one country than in the other.

Another dispute concerns the difference between present and past immigration in the composition of immigrants, and its implications on integration or on engagement in transnational activities. Thus, when the contemporary immigration wave is compared to the previous major wave it is argued that there is a significant difference between the two waves in the religious, ethnic and race composition of the immigrants. Hence, it is argued that the new immigration wave changes the religious, ethnic or race composition of host countries' populations. This, in turn, brings with it anti-immigrant reactions from part of the host society's population. Such reactions tend to hinder the integration or incorporation of immigrants into the host society. In other words, it tends to strengthen, among immigrants, transnational instead of integrative or assimilatory tendencies and practices. There are however scholars who tend to diminish the importance of that difference in the immigrants' composition in influencing immigrants' integration processes or transnational activities. These scholars argue that "nativism" or animosity toward new immigrants have a long history in the USA, for example, and were also manifested during previous major immigration waves. As a result, the difference between the two eras, in this respect, is not so big and may be overemphasized.

There is also an ongoing scholarly dispute about the implications of contemporary immigration and transnationalism on contemporary states. According to one view, contemporary transnationalism and other features and processes that are favorable to its enhanced scope and intensity tend to weaken states and their ability to execute independently desired policies, especially so in terms of immigrants' integration or incorporation into the host society. However, there are scholars who point out the continued strength of states and emphasize the important role played by state policies on influencing immigrants' entry to the state, and their opportunities to engage in transnational activities.

EXTENDING THE COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

As can be seen from the above, the major contours of transnationalism as a comparative perspective on (contemporary) immigration and the debate and disputes related to it, tend to focus mainly on immigrants' adaptation, namely on a continuum between transnationalism, at one end, and integration at the other. However, most scholars agree that they do not exclude each other, that immigrants' transnational activities and experiences are compatible with immigrants' integration or assimilation processes. Even the above-mentioned dispute over the implications for states is related, to a large extent, to this continuum. Many insights have been gained by this comparative perspective in understanding present and past immigrants' transnational activities; by exploring and identifying new and distinct characteristics of contemporary immigration and transnationalism; by analytic, conceptual and theoretical developments that emanated from these debates and disputes and especially so with regard to immigrants' adaptation, and more specifically contributing to more subtle and sophisticated understandings of transnationalism and integration or assimilation.

However, this comparative perspective is quite narrow and not balanced enough. It tends to focus on the contemporary era and on what is new in it with regard to previous eras. The whole comparative horizon is thus confined mainly to what are identified as new and distinct characteristics of the contemporary era. These characteristics and even the perspective's disputes, that include a critique and specific limitations of the perspective, tend to over-emphasize the novelties of the present with regard to the past, of what is present today and was relatively absent in the past. Furthermore, the tendency of such a perspective is to seek in the past mainly characteristics resembling those manifested in the contemporary era. However, if one wants to grasp and assess not only the *novelties* of the present era but also its *distinctiveness*, one should extend the comparative perspective to also encompass characteristics of the past that are relatively absent in the present. Such an extension of the comparative perspective may contribute to a more balanced and subtle understanding of the uniqueness and distinctiveness of the present era as well as of the type and scope of the changes or transformations that are related to the novelties of the present era.

For the above-mentioned reasons and since a major disputed issue with regard to transnationalism as a comparative perspective on (con-

temporary) immigration is the extent of change that the novelties of the contemporary era represent, I suggest to extend the comparative perspective. More specifically, I propose to focus on the connection between immigration and major macro socio-historical transformations and to include in the comparative perspective also, and perhaps even mainly, features that were manifested in past immigrations and are relatively absent in contemporary immigration. In what follows I suggest a possible, and not necessarily an exhaustive, typology of connections between immigration and major macro socio-historical transformations. The extended comparative perspective and this typology contribute to a more balanced view and assessment of the novelties and distinctiveness of contemporary immigration and transnationalism; of the type and scope of change represented by these novelties; of the merits of the transnationalism comparative perspective; and of limitations of the latter perspective.

Generally, the history of mankind teaches us that movements of people from one place to another had an immense transformative impact on people, social groups, and societies. It is worth mentioning, in that respect, that in the Bible one already finds awareness to the links between such movements and major macro socio-historical transformations. Thus, for example, the formation of a new religion, of the first monotheist religion in history, is linked to Abraham's departure from his place of residence to another place. And, generally, the comparative perspective of transnationalism does not pay enough attention to such major macro socio-historical transformations.

Immigration and Major Macro Socio-Historical Transformations: A Typology

In what follows I suggest a certain typology of such major transformations that, among others, exemplifies the limitation in this respect of the transnationalism analytic framework and comparative perspective. Furthermore, this typology can also serve for making comparisons between contemporary immigration and past immigrations with respect to these transformation types. In doing so the emphasis will be also, and perhaps principally, on what is relatively absent in contemporary immigration. In that respect it is worth mentioning that a comparative perspective that emphasized what is absent or lacking in a certain case, when compared with another, was manifested, among others, by Max Weber and Marc Bloch (see Weber 1949, Ringer 1997, Sewell 1967).

Moreover, in the connection between immigration and major macro socio-historical transformations, long-term consequences and impacts of migration are also considered.

Several general types of such major macro socio-historical transformations that are connected to migration can be distinguished, according to the main unit of analysis and/or migration type. These general types are presented according to the size of their main unit of analysis: the first unit of analysis is society or state; the second is civilizations; and the third is the globe or historical epochs.

(1) The first general type deals with transformations relating to a society or state. In this general type, several distinct major transformations that are connected to migration can be identified. (A) First, a formation of a new society or state. As an illustration, one can look at all the new societies and states that developed from what Louis Hartz (1964) called “fragments” of Europe, namely the USA [“The first new nation” according to Lipset (1964)], Latin American states and societies, Australia etc. (B) Furthermore, in certain “immigrant societies” the immigrants established new settlements—new villages, towns and cities. Note that the formation of new settlements should not be conflated with establishing new societies. Thus, for example, the new settlements established by Jews in Argentina (see Avni 1982) or by certain religious groups in North America (see Tartakower 1958) were not, *per se*, part of a project leading to a formation of a new society or state.

(C) Another transformation that is manifested in certain immigrant societies is the appearance of a new collective identity which is replacing the previous one: for example, the Puritans were transformed into Yankees. And although one can find certain seeds of the Yankee identity in the Puritans’ features, as indicated by the Dutch historian Johan Huizinga (1972), nevertheless, this is the appearance of a new collective identity. Such new collective identities can play, and indeed played, a major role in the formation of a new society or state.

(D) Moreover, of special importance in this respect is the appearance of a new “nativist” collective identity, exemplified by the Creole identity in Latin America. The concept of nativism can be used to describe a phenomenon that characterizes especially cases of immigration or immigrant societies; it is the phenomenon of emphasizing the importance or superiority of what is perceived as local, as against external (or “foreign”), culture and collective identity, that is chiefly manifested by local-born descendents of immigrants toward new immigrants.

It can also be expressed by a group of indigenous people toward newcomers.² Hence, in certain cases, the appearance of a new nativist identity means that a new collective identity develops within the diaspora that distinguishes between two diasporic groups. In Spanish America, for example, a distinction developed between two categories of Europeans: the Spaniards who arrived from Europe were called *chapetones* (or *gachupines*) and those born in Spanish America were called *criollos* (creoles) (see Keller 1908: 216–217). Furthermore, a tension and sometimes even a conflict develops between the “nativists” and the “immigrants,” in the form of intra-diasporic tension or conflict. The intra-diasporic conflict could lead to a conflict and even a war between the Creole nativists and the mother-country. Thus, for example, in Brazil a mini civil war broke in 1710–1711 between two groups of European origin, the Brazilian-born Creoles representing the landowners, and the Portugal-born immigrants representing commerce (Schwartz 1987). The second case can be exemplified by the wars of independence waged in Latin America by the Creoles against Spain (their mother-country). Here we see that a conflict can emerge within a diaspora, and that it can develop into a conflict between part of the diaspora and the mother-country.³ The host land becomes, for this part of the diaspora, the homeland (the native land) and a new society or state may be established.

(E) In all transformations of this general type mentioned so far, the migration can be either a long-distance movement of people (as in the case of all the illustrations given above), or a “borderland” (or a “frontier”) movement. However, there are transformations which are unique and characteristic to “frontier” movements. Here the classic example is the “frontier thesis” of the American historian Frederick Jackson Turner about the significance of the frontier in American history. The importance Turner attaches to the frontier and the movement westward on shaping the nature of American society is thus exemplified in his words: “... The existence of an area of free land, its continuous recession,

² On nativism, see: Sternberg (2004), Anderson (1991), Higham (1992), Jaret (1999), Keller (1908), Knobel (1996), Padgen (1987), Palmer (1982) (1986), Schwartz (1987), Ward (1964).

³ On diaspora as a concept and as a unique type of transnational community, see: Armstrong (1976), Brubaker (2005), Clifford (1994), Cohen (1995) (1996) (1997), Marienstras (1989), Safran (1991) (2004) (2005), Sheffer (1986) (1995) (2003), Skinner (1993), Smart (1987), Van Hear (1998).

and the advance of American settlement westward, explain American development... Moving westward, the frontier became more and more American... Thus the advance of the frontier has meant a steady movement away from the influence of Europe, a steady growth of independence on American lines" (Turner 1998: 31, 34). From a quite similar perspective, the Russian historian Vassily Kluchevsky (1960) maintained that the most important aspect in Russia's history is colonization and settlement: all other aspects stem from it. He therefore suggests a periodization of Russia's history according to the metaphors of "movement" and "parking." The transition to each successive period begins with a movement until parking occurs, while each parking represents a specific period in Russia's history. We do not have to completely agree with Turner or Kluchevsky,⁴ with respect to the weight that should be given to such "frontier" movements, in order to acknowledge their potential and actual transformative power.

(2) The second general type deals with transformations that relate to civilizations. Here, civilizations refer to distinct socio-cultural spaces that include diverse units such as states and societies. Hence, according to Johann Arnason (2001: 1910) civilizational analysis usually "deals with units of larger dimensions and longer duration than the single societies that they encompass" and it is from this angle that Arnold Toynbee (1965) considered civilizations as the central unit for socio-historical analysis. Fernand Braudel suggests that the long historical continuity of civilizations should be part of their definition. "Civilization is in fact the longest story of all" says Braudel (1994: 34). For Durkheim and Mauss (1971) "a civilization constitutes a kind of moral milieu encompassing a certain number of nations, each national culture being only a particular form of the whole." Moreover, according to Carroll Quigley (1979), only a society that has some "instrument of expansion" can become a civilization. This large-scale dimension of a civilization makes it "a family of societies" distinct from other such "families"—to use the words of Marcel Mauss.⁵

⁴ On some critical views on Turner's "frontier thesis" see: Hartz (1964), Hayes (1956), Pierson (1956).

⁵ On civilizations and civilizational analysis, see: Arnason (1988) (2001), Bagby (1958), Braudel (1980) (1994), Durkheim and Mauss (1971), Eisenstadt (1992) (2001), Huntington (1996), Kroeber (1963a) (1963b), Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952), Melko (1969), Melko and Scott (1987), Nelson (1981), Quigley (1979), Sanderson (1995), Sorokin (1947) (1963), Toynbee (1965).

When we consider civilizations as the main unit of analysis, it is possible to portray for illustrative purposes several major transformations that are connected to migration. (A) The first is that a possible consequence of immigration can be the destruction of civilizations. The destruction of Pre-Colombian civilizations as a consequence of the expansion of Europeans overseas can serve here as an example. (B) Furthermore, a formation of a family of similar societies (a civilization, in other words) is also connected, in many cases, to the movement of people, to migration. (C) Another type of transformation with respect to civilizations is exemplified by the claim made by many observers that the center of Western Civilization moved from Europe to the USA, and that what preconditioned such a development more specifically is the vast immigration from Europe to the USA. It can thus be argued that a possible long-term consequence of immigration is that a civilization's fragment becomes its center or at least one of its centers.

(D) Another consequence of immigration can be a massive religious conversion as manifested in the conversion to Christianity of Latin American indigenous populations. This may be seen as a semi-general transformation type that is very close by affinity to that of civilizations. According to Shmuel Eisenstadt, civilizations and religions are not identical. He maintains that "although in the history of humankind civilizations and religions were very closely interwoven—at the same time many religions have been only a part of the component or not necessarily the most central component of civilizations" (Eisenstadt 1992: 1). Yet, as Fernand Braudel argues, in many cases religion can be seen as one of the most important traits of civilizations. According to him, "Christianity is an essential reality in western life: it even marks atheists, whether they know it or not. Ethical rules, attitudes to life and death, the concept of work, the value of effort, the role of women and children—these may seem to have nothing to do with Christian feeling: yet all derive from it nevertheless" (Braudel 1994: 23).

(3) The third general type deals with transformations that relate to the globe or to historical epochs. (A) As to transformations relating to the whole globe, following Fernand Braudel (1978) one may say that the formation of the whole globe as one interdependent "economic world" (*Weltwirtschaft*) can be seen as a long-term consequence of European expansion overseas that also included massive immigration by Europeans to the non-European world. Furthermore, Braudel, while emphasizing the importance of the center of each such "economic world" of its own, argues that at a certain stage New York became the

center of the whole “economic world” of the globe. Its centrality was manifested in the far-reaching consequences for the whole world of the economic crisis that began in New York in 1929. Hence, a long-term consequence of immigration was not only the formation of the whole globe as one “economic world” but also the movement of the center of that “economic world” from Europe to another part of the globe.

(B) When the main unit of analysis is historical epochs, one can emphasize the connection between migration and the transformation to a new historical epoch in human history. Migration from the countryside to towns and cities can serve here as an illustration. That migration was an important and necessary factor in the appearance of a new historical epoch, of the industrial era according to one possible classification or periodization, or of capitalist society according to another.

Possible Contributions

The possible contributions of such an extension of the comparative perspective to apprehending contemporary immigration can be divided into two general types according to the level of analysis or abstraction. At the more general and abstract level of analysis, it contributes to a more balanced view of the novelties, type, and magnitude of change represented by contemporary immigration (1) by extending both the spatial and temporal dimensions of the comparative perspective; (2) by pointing to major consequences and impacts of immigration that were represented in the past and are almost absent in the contemporary scene. Hence, such an extended comparative perspective can be seen as supplementary to transnationalism as a comparative perspective on (contemporary) immigration, as a supplement to a perspective that tends to focus on the present and its novelties.

At the more concrete level of analysis I would like to give an example that testifies to possible contributions of the extended comparative perspective in this respect. This illustration relates to the implications of manifestations of nativism or the expression of anti-immigrant attitudes and sentiments on the development of immigrants’ transnational activities. As we have seen above, according to the transnationalism discourse, the expression of nativism tends to develop and strengthen among immigrants group solidarity and transnational connections: it serves as a unifying force of the transnational community or the diaspora, including the home country. However, as mentioned in the above typology, in certain cases the *long-term* consequences of immigration

can be the appearance within a certain part of the transnational community or diaspora of a “nativist” collective identity that, on the contrary, tends to split their unity and to increase intra-diasporic tensions between different parts of the diaspora. Sometimes they can also develop into tensions between the nativist part of the diaspora and the home country.

So in order to better understand the possible implications of nativism on the development of transnationalism, one has to take into account long-term consequences of immigration, and distinguish between two kinds of nativism. The first kind, which generally tends to enhance transnational connections and the unity of the transnational community or diaspora, is when nativism is manifested toward the immigrants not by members of their transnational community or diaspora. The second kind, that appears mainly in the long-run, which is detrimental to the unity of the transnational community or diaspora, is when nativism is manifested toward the immigrants by members of their transnational community or diaspora. This latter case also shows that transnational connections bring with them not only the blurring of cultural boundaries between groups and a mixture of identities and cultures, but they can also be manifested by the sharpening of distinctions between groups’ identities and cultures.

CONCLUSION

From the above typology and illustrations one can see that in transnationalism as a comparative perspective on (contemporary) immigration, the category of “past immigration” is depicted quite narrowly. This, in my opinion, is one of the major theoretical limitations of this perspective. Another theoretical limitation concerns the rather short temporal dimension of this perspective. It can be seen from the illustrations that one or even two generations is not enough historical time to assess adequately the consequences of immigration.

However, one of the merits of this perspective is the spatial extension of the analysis (beyond society or state), which nevertheless allows us to also include in the analysis the state, the nation (*transstate* or *transnational* communities, for example) as well as the globe (global networks, for example). In other words, it adds another supranational category (see Levine 2005) into the analysis while enabling the connection between the new category and already existing supranational categories.

However, also with respect to the spatial dimension, categories like civilizations or religions—that are also supranational categories—are relatively neglected, and no adequate analytic and theoretical connection is done with them. Hence, while the transnationalism comparative perspective on (contemporary) immigration has its merits, it should be supplemented by additional theoretical and comparative perspectives in order to achieve a better understanding of contemporary immigration and today's social world.

A supplementary and extended comparative perspective of that kind is suggested in this chapter, as well as a possible typology addressing the connection between immigration and major macro socio-historical transformations. Moreover, some possible contributions of such an extension of the comparative perspective to apprehending contemporary immigration are indicated.

CHAPTER FIVE

SOLID, DUCTILE AND LIQUID: CHANGING NOTIONS OF HOMELAND AND HOME IN DIASPORA STUDIES

Robin Cohen

Do we need a homeland in order to conceive of a diaspora? Even asking this question may have seemed absurd to the older generation of scholars and to those who pioneered the growth of diaspora studies in the 1990s. It was, in one sense, logically and etymologically impossible. A diaspora meant ‘dispersion’ and if people were dispersed, some point of origin—more concretely a homeland—was necessarily implied. One of the most influential statements marking the beginning of contemporary diaspora studies was Safran’s article in the opening issue of the then new journal, *Diaspora* (Safran 1991). Safran was strongly influenced by the underlying paradigmatic case of the Jewish diaspora, but correctly perceived that many other ethnic groups were experiencing analogous circumstances due perhaps to the difficult circumstances surrounding their departure from their places of origin and as a result their limited acceptance in their places of settlement.

Safran was, of course, not alone in recognizing the expanded use of the concept of diaspora, but he was crucial in seeking to give some social scientific contour to the new claims rather than allow a journalistic free-for-all to develop. The Jewish experience continued to influence Safran’s view of the vital importance of homeland in defining one of the essential characteristics of diaspora. For him, members of a diaspora retained a collective memory of ‘their original homeland’; they idealized their ‘ancestral home’, were committed to the restoration of ‘the original homeland’ and continued in various ways to ‘relate to that homeland’. He further maintained that the concept of a diaspora can be applied when members of an ‘expatriate minority community’ share several of the following features:

- They, or their ancestors, have been dispersed from an original ‘center’ to two or more foreign regions;
- they retain a collective memory, vision or myth about their *original homeland* including its location, history and achievements;

- they believe they are not—and perhaps can never be—fully accepted in their host societies and so remain partly separate;
- their *ancestral home is idealized* and it is thought that, when conditions are favourable, either they, or their descendants should return;
- they believe all members of the diaspora should be committed to the maintenance or restoration of the original homeland and to its safety and prosperity; and
- they continue in various ways to relate to that homeland.

SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST CRITIQUES OF DIASPORA

Though the emphasis on an original homeland may have been too strongly stated, a group of critics, who I will describe as ‘social constructionists’, argued that Safran, this author and others were holding back the full force of the concept.¹ Influenced by post-modernist readings, social constructionists sought to decompose two of the major building blocks previously delimiting and demarcating the diasporic idea, namely ‘homeland’ and ‘ethnic/religious community’. In the post-modern world, it was further argued, identities have become deterritorialized and affirmed in a flexible and situational way; accordingly, concepts of diaspora had to be radically reordered in response to this complexity. Showing scant respect for the etymology, history, limits, meaning and evolution of the concept of diaspora, they sought to deconstruct the two core building blocks of diaspora, home/homeland and ethnic/religious community.² The first target of their deconstruction, home/homeland, is considered in this chapter.

While a degree of decoupling of diaspora from homeland was signaled in my earlier work (Cohen 1997), this rupture had taken a more insistent turn in Avtar Brah (1996). ‘Home’ became increasingly vague,

¹ I have used the expression ‘social constructionist’ to signify a mode of reasoning, closely associated with post-modernism, which suggests that reality is determined by social interaction (or intersubjectivity), rather than by objectivity (the acceptance of a natural or material world) or by subjectivity (a world determined by individual perceptions). The perspective tends to favour voluntarism and collective human agency over structure, history and habituation.

² It might be worth recalling Marx’s crucial insight that ‘Men [read “people”] make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living’. See Marx 1959: 321.

even miasmatic. By contrast, her concept of diaspora ‘offers a critique of discourses of fixed origins, while taking account of a homing desire, which is not the same thing as a desire for “homeland”’. So, homeland had become a homing desire and soon home itself became transmuted into an essentially placeless, though admittedly lyrical, space. This is how Brah put it:

Where is home? On the one hand, ‘home’ is a mythic place of desire in the diasporic imagination. In this sense it is a place of no return, even if it is possible to visit the geographical territory that is seen as the place of ‘origin’. On the other hand, home is also the lived experience of a locality. Its sounds and smells, its heat and dust, balmy summer evenings, or the excitement of the first snowfall, shivering winter evenings, sombre grey skies in the middle of the day...all this, as mediated by the historically specific everyday of social relations (Brah 1996: 192).

Through this and similar interventions, ‘home’ became more and more generously interpreted to mean the place of origin, or the place of settlement, or a local, national or transnational place, or an imagined virtual community (linked, for example, through the internet), or a matrix of known experiences and intimate social relations (thus conforming to the popular expression that ‘home is where the heart is’).

Anthias upped the stakes further by criticizing a number of scholars for using what she described as ‘absolutist notions of “origin” and “true belonging”’.³ For her, diasporic discourse showed insufficient attention to internal divisions with ethnic communities or to the possibilities of selective cultural negotiations between communities:

...the lack of attention given to transethnic solidarities, such as those against racism, of class, of gender, of social movements, is deeply worrying from the perspective of the development of multiculturalism, and more inclusive notions of belonging. For a discourse of antiracism and social mobilization of a transethnic (as opposed to a transnational) character, cannot be easily accommodated, within the discourse of the diaspora, where it retains its dependence on ‘homeland’ and ‘origin’, however configured (Anthias 1998: 577).

³ Anthias 1998. She includes Robin Cohen’s *Global diasporas* in her charge, though I thought it was clear that I was arguing for a more complex notion of origin (see Chapters 3 on Africans and 6 on Sikhs). However, I concur that ‘belonging’ is not a given, but has to be established, mobilized and defended in social, cultural and political practices. My views are clarified at length in Cohen 1994, Chapters 1 and 7.

Two years later Soysal amplified the charge. Despite the fact that notions of diaspora were ‘venerated’, they inappropriately ‘privileg[ed] the nation-state model and nationally-defined formations when conversing about a global process such as immigration’.⁴ Post-war developments, she maintained:

...render diaspora untenable as an analytical and normative category, and direct our discussion to new formations of membership, claims-making and belonging—which either remain invisible to the conventional conceptions of diaspora, or are frequently deemed insignificant in the face of its normative weight... In this [erroneous] formulation, the primary orientation and attachment of diasporic populations is to their homelands and cultures; and their claims and citizenship practices arise from this home-bound ethnic-based orientation. (Soysal 2000: 2–3).

After her initial critique of diaspora, Soysal attended to her case of European citizenship, but she returned with a vengeance to her dislike of the concept of diaspora in a postscript, maintaining that the idea “suspends immigrant experience between host and home countries, native and foreign lands, home-bound desires and losses—thus obscuring the new topography and practices of citizenship, which are multi-connected, multi-referential and postnational (Soysal 2000: 13)”.

The crucial intent of these appraisals was to force a larger and larger wedge between ‘diaspora’ on the one hand, and ‘homeland’, ‘place’ and ‘ethnic community’ on the other. Clearly for some authors—of whom Anthias and Soysal are good representatives—diaspora was irredeemably flawed. It simply could not adequately address their own agendas by doing what they wanted—in Anthias’s case, it could not produce a platform for a transethnic, gender-sensitive, anti-racist movement while, in Soysal’s case, it could not provide a means of understanding post-national citizenship in Europe.

THE RESPONSE

One response to such critiques of diaspora might have been to regard them as inappropriate or misplaced as they reflected political agendas

⁴ Soysal 2000, pp. 1–2. Nearly all diaspora theorists had in fact pointed out that diaspora was a concept that long pre-dated the nation-state and that diasporic formations were constantly in tension with nation-states. See, for example, Cohen 1996: 507–20.

that had little to do with the history and meaning of the term, or the phenomena it sought to, and continues to, explain. Diaspora theorists made no claim to explain the full spectrum of immigrant experiences, did not see their task as creating a progressive anti-racist movement (desirable as that may be), and did not seek to describe patterns of sociality and citizenship unrelated to some degree of prior kinship or religious affiliation. In other words the concept of diaspora is not a magic bullet and cannot be used to slay all enemies.

A more mature response was to find some dialogical possibilities between established and newer diaspora scholars and their social constructionist critics. Tölölyan, the leading scholar of diaspora and editor of the journal *Diaspora*, led the way by picking a path carefully through the middle, though still insisting that an attachment to place remained important in understanding the concept:

Diasporists shaped by globalizing discourse describe genuine erosions of the link between a bounded place and a people, diagnose it as irresistible, and quickly affirm its contribution to a pluralistic, multicultural, hybrid world of which they approve. Diasporists like myself, who want to argue that attachment to place was indispensable to diasporic life and thought until very recently, and that despite its erosion it remains important today, must tread carefully in order to avoid the charge that we are either imitating discredited nationalist rhetoric about the link between land, people, and culture, or that we remain naïve about the global spaces that have opened up in the past several decades (Tölölyan 2005: 138–9).

Brubaker also insisted that, despite the dispersion of its meaning, there remained “three core elements that remain widely understood to be constitutive of diaspora” (Brubaker 2005: 5). These are *dispersion* (either traumatically or voluntarily and generally across state borders); *homeland orientation* (whether to a real or imagined homeland) and *boundary maintenance* (the processes whereby group solidarity is mobilized and retained, even accepting that there are counter processes of boundary erosion) (Brubaker 2005: 5–7).

Though the social constructionist position was clearly overstated, the effect of their intervention was to generate a re-questioning and a more sophisticated understanding of shifts in the homeland–diaspora relationship. In so doing three main versions of home/homeland emerged, which I designate *solid* (the unquestioned need for a homeland), *ductile* (an intermediate, more complex, idea of homeland) and *liquid* (a post-modernist rendition of virtual home).

SOLID HOMELAND

In general the idea of a homeland is imbued with an expressive charge and a sentimental pathos that seem to be almost universal. Motherland, fatherland, native land, natal land, *Heimat*, the ancestral land, the search for ‘roots’—all these similar notions invest homelands with ‘an emotional, almost reverential dimension’.⁵ Often, there is a complex interplay between the feminine and masculine versions of homeland. In the feminine rendition, the motherland is seen as a warm, cornucopian breast from which the people collectively suck their nourishment. One Kirgiz poet fancifully claimed that the relationship between homeland and human preceded birth itself: “Remember, even before your mother’s milk, you drank the milk of your homeland (Conner 1986: 17),” he wrote. Suggesting the same metaphor, the biblical Promised Land was said to be ‘flowing with milk and honey’.

In other interpretations, the nurturing white milk of the motherland is replaced by the blood of soldiers gallantly defending their fatherland. Their blood nourishes the soil, the soil defines their ethnogenesis. *Blut und Boden* (blood and soil) was Bismarck’s stirring call to the German nation, an evocation that was renewed by Hitler two generations later. Even in the wake of the post-1945 liberal-democratic constitutional settlement, the Germans were unusual in stressing a definition of citizenship and belonging—*jus sanguinis*, the law of blood—that emphasizes descent, rather than place of birth or long residence. Thus, third and fourth generation ‘ethnic Germans’ from the former Soviet Union, many of whom no longer spoke German, were accorded instant citizenship in preference to second-generation Turks who had been born and educated in Germany. Sometimes the images of motherland and fatherland are conflated. The androgynous British conceptions of homeland evoke the virile John Bull character exemplified in modern times by the indomitable wartime hero, Winston Churchill. They are also derived from the received history of Boudicca, Britannia, Queen Victoria and, perhaps more fancifully, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.

The solid idea of homeland has been given additional force in recent years by the recognition of the increasing role diasporas are playing in international politics and as agents of homeland development. Of

⁵ Conner 1986. See also Levy and Weingrod 2004.

course diasporas have been important in international politics for many years. Philhellenism, Zionism, Garveyism, Pan-Africanism, the attempts to create Khalistan and to remake Greater Armenia—all these are represented by the political vanguards of the diasporas as the only certain means to overcome their precarious and isolated existence in exile. Improvement schemes for homelands also were common in other diasporas. Although born in China, Sun Yixian (Sun Yat-sen) developed his political consciousness in Hong Kong and in the Chinese community in Hawaii. His Society for the Revival of China was a crucial instrument in the promotion of a modern Chinese nationalism. Without pronouncing on the justness or otherwise of their causes, in recent years we can note the destabilizing role of the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora in their support of the Tamil Tigers, the persistent efforts of the Kurdish diaspora to establish a Kurdish state and the success of the Croatian diaspora in helping to establish an independent Croatian state.

As the last examples indicate, what has changed is that the bipolar shape of international politics has disintegrated after the Cold War. States, NGOs, powerful corporations, networks and religions all compete for power and influence in a more complex, pluralist world. Within this lattice work of competing interests, diasporas have emerged as key players in the often precarious politics of their homeland states. The key finding of a recent collection of studies on diasporas in conflict is that they can be a force for stability ('peace-makers') as well as a force that amplifies and even creates conflict ('peace-wreckers'). As the editors remark: "Diasporic involvement in conflict still needs to be studied, but what can be said is that diasporas play 'significant and varied roles' in the whole range of activities in the conflict cycle (Smith and Stares 2007: 9)." Another recent boost to the solid idea of homeland is the enhanced role of diasporas as agents of development. Scholars of diasporas have always been aware that diasporic connections led to profound changes at points of origin. Failing agricultural pursuits were given a renewed lease of life, family and kin were supported in their old age and in poverty and sometimes more dramatic and far-reaching changes were initiated. While long recognized in the academic literature, only recently have these effects been recognized by development agencies, NGOs and richer countries seeking to target their development aid. The 'penny dropped' when development agencies noticed that 'remittances' (recorded money sent to home countries by migrants abroad) are a large and rapidly growing part of international financial flows. In 2005, some US\$188 billion was transferred to poor countries

and the sum was expected to grow by US\$11 billion in 2006, while total remittances to rich and poor countries amounted to US\$ 268 billion. These figures arise from a World Bank report, whose authors also point out that these sums only reflect officially-sanctioned transfers. They add that: “unrecorded flows through informal channels may add 50 percent or more to recorded flows. Including these unrecorded flows, the true size of remittances, is larger than foreign direct investment flows and more than twice as large as official aid received by developing countries (Mohapatra et al. 2007: 3)”.

Not only have they acknowledged that the existing volumes of funds transferred are immense, development agencies see channelling aid through diasporas as preferable to sending aid to governments in poor countries, some of which are ineffective at best and corrupt at worst. For practical purposes the ambiguities of home and homeland have been abolished as diaspora scholars have entered a new field of applied diaspora studies.

DUCTILE HOMELAND

Let me now turn to my intermediate category. Even in a case of the prototypical Jewish diaspora the solid idea of homeland seems to be weakening. Interestingly, William Safran, whose early work on the necessity of homeland has already been discussed, now adopts a more flexible (ductile) use of homeland. Partly on the basis of attitudinal surveys, Safran argues that in the case of Israel on the one hand, and European and American Jews on the other, the links between hostlands and homeland are becoming more tenuous (Safran 2005). Those in the Jewish diaspora experiencing a process of ‘dezionization’ include groups he designates as secularists, socialists, potential investors in Israel, non-orthodox believers, enlightened Western Jews, left-wing ideologues, academics and others disillusioned with the expressions of Israeli state power. The other side of the coin is that (despite intermittent bursts of anti-Semitism) life in the diaspora is sufficiently attractive and sufficiently emotionally and physically secure not to prompt an invariable identification with Israel.

Intriguingly, proto-Zionists have also promoted summer camps when, in safe rural US settings, virtual *aliya* (migration ‘up’ to Israel) can take place, complete with Israeli flags, Hebrew lessons, religious rituals, imitations of life on a kibbutz and access to other attractive aspects of

Israeli popular culture (*ibidem*). As Safran himself recognizes, the harder notion of homeland has now yielded to softer notions of a 'found home' in the diaspora and to a 'virtual home' in a summer camp—perhaps augmented by occasional visits to Israel rather than permanent settlement. I will add that the unexpected but considerable flow of Israelis to the USA and Europe (which attracts strong disapprobation by Zionists), has also fundamentally changed the relationship between the Jewish homeland and the Jewish diaspora (Gold 2002).

I would also like to draw attention to two other intriguing examples, both centered on Bombay. The first concerns the Sindhis, historically settled in the area currently defined as the southernmost province of Pakistan. Sind had a prior independent existence, but was governed by the British for a little over 100 years, from 1843–1947. The area is bisected by the navigable Indus river which debouches into what was once called 'the Sindhi Sea' (now the Arabian Sea); ancient Greek, Persian, Arab and Sindhis mariners were tied into far-reaching trade networks long before the arrival of the Europeans (Shah 1997). The province is strategically salient, with a long frontier with India and a key port connecting Sind to Central Asia and the wider Gulf and Indian Ocean business and trade networks.

Concentrating particularly on the case of Hindu Sindhis (most of whom accept the teaching of Guru Nanak, the first guru of Sikhism but remain within the Hindu camp), Falzon (2003) takes up their story. The first diasporic wave was generated at the beginning of the British occupation and constituted a classic trade diaspora but the second, and far more numerous, accompanied the grisly end of British rule and partition. The Hindu Sindhis found themselves in Muslim Pakistan and moved en masse to India, notably to Bombay and its satellite town, Ulhasnagar (redubbed Sindhunagar, because of the many Sindhis there). There were already strong administrative, educational and trade links with Bombay and exit to Bombay by sea was the safest course of action for the refugees.

India has been kind to the Sindhis, with the Bombay-based community at large being regarded as politically integrated and economically successful. The emblematic evidence of this success was the election of L.K. Advani to the deputy prime ministership of India and the prominence (sometimes notoriety) of the fabulously-wealthy Hinduja brothers. Like the Hinduja brothers who have spread their wings, many Indian Sindhis have moved on, settling in perhaps 100 further countries, sometime linked to the pioneer Sindhi traders. Do they constitute a

deterritorialized diaspora? Falzon argues that ‘the notion of a (distant) homeland is still central to the Hindu Sindhi’s diasporic imaginary’, but that the idea of recovering a homeland in historic Sind is generally and increasingly seen as a political impossibility. By contrast, the benefits of forming an economically successful transnational network centred on Bombay are apparent to all, except a few ‘cultural entrepreneurs’ who wistfully look to their lost homeland (*ibidem*). Some are even prepared to argue that partition in 1947 was a ‘blessing in disguise’, while one poet enthused:

Oh Sindhi! May God be with you
 May you spread happiness
 Wherever you find your people, call it home.
 Wherever you find Sindhis, call it your Sind (quoted in Falzon 2003: 662).

While the Sindhi population of Bombay remains substantial, the diasporic Sindhis often own second homes there and return to sample the remembered pleasures of the city, to see friends and relatives, to participate in the thriving marriage market for their sons and daughters and to handshake with new and old business partners. As Falzon explains, Bombay has become the ‘cultural heart’ of a deterritorialized diaspora:

Business reputation, personal narratives, indicators of wealth, virtue and a host of other aspects of the person and, more importantly, the family, are periodically transported to Bombay from every corner of the world, and through interaction in the city, re-exported to the various localities of the diaspora. The city’s five-star hotels, expensive restaurants and sari emporia provide an excellent opportunity for the type of conspicuous consumption for which Sindhis are stereotypically but hardly erroneously famous wherever they are located (Falzon 2003: 673).

Bombay (renamed Mumbai by nationalists) is, of course, a famously cosmopolitan city with famous diasporic intellectuals like Salman Rushdie who celebrate its diversity. The central characters in his novel *The Moor’s last sigh* are drawn from the city’s Cochin Jews and Portuguese Christians and the city has been home, or a point of transit, for many diasporic peoples. There is an Armenian church in Meadows street established in 1776. In 1864, Ewald notices, “more than half of the (probably under-reported) two thousand Africans in Bombay earned their living as sailors or in related maritime work (Ewald 2000).” Given this diversity, it is perhaps not therefore surprising to find a substantial

Zoroastrian community in Bombay—where they are known as Parsis. The Parsis became an established part of the landscape of the city as early as 1640, while the British East India Company conceded that their funeral practices (where vultures eat the dead) could be carried out at the Tower of Silence at Malabar Hill in 1673.

As Hinnells (2005) explains in his monumental study of the Zoroastrian diaspora, the Parsis in Bombay became the major cultural and religious center for the worldwide community from the eighteenth century onwards. He considers the cases of some eleven other Zoroastrian communities (in Hong Kong, East Africa, Britain, continental Europe, the USA, Canada and Australia) showing how endogamous norms, social mobility and late marriage have steadily reduced this ancient community to about 100,000 members. However, the main threat to the Zoroastrians has been manifested in their natal homeland, Iran (formerly Persia) where, since the revolution of 1979, emigration or conversion has reduced the community to about 22,000. Founded centuries ago, Zoroastrians had once succeeded to the throne of Persia, before being driven out by Muslim rule in 652 AD. While some holy relics remain, as Chakchak in Iran which is still a site for pilgrimage, the diaspora has become nearly entirely deterritorialized, with its main religious and cultural reference points anchored in Bombay.

LIQUID HOMES

This is a world of ‘liquid modernity’, says Zygmunt Bauman (2000: 13), where “we are witnessing the revenge of nomadism over the principles of territoriality and settlement”. The evocation of constant movement and liquidity recall Marx and Engels’s remark in the *Communist Manifesto* that ‘All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned’. The literary scholar, Marshall Berman, echoes this last quote. To be in our world, he says

...is to experience personal and social life as a maelstrom, to find one’s world and oneself in perpetual disintegration and renewal, trouble and anguish, ambiguity and contradiction: to be part of a universe in which all that is solid melts into air (Berman 1982: 345–6).

Do we wish to loosen the historical meanings of the notion of a diasporic home even further to encompass new forms of mobility and displacement and the construction of new identities and subjectivities?

I propose we adopt the expression ‘deterritorialized diaspora’ to encompass the lineaments of a number of unusual diasporic experiences. In these instances ethnic groups can be thought of as having lost their conventional territorial reference points, to have become in effect mobile and multi-located cultures with virtual or uncertain homes.

It is easy enough to think of some population groups that might qualify as travelling cultures on the grounds that they have always had a wandering character—the Tuaregs, Bedouins, San, Qashqa’i, Maasai and Berbers come readily to mind. However, if home has always been on the move, it is doubtful that the word ‘diaspora’ can add anything useful to the traditional use of the expression ‘nomad’, other than providing a novel label. A much more intriguing example is the case of the Roma (Gypsies), who have a narrative of ethnogenesis in India, but have lost any sustained connection with the Indian sub-continent. Treating the Roma as a diaspora provides a stimulating challenge.⁶ However, the most important case of a deterritorialized diaspora, with a liquid home, is that of Caribbean peoples.

The main population of the Caribbean has been both multiply displaced and continues its migratory traditions—from Africa, within the Caribbean archipelago and to far beyond the region. The earliest settled peoples of the Caribbean, the Caribs and Arawaks, generally failed to survive the glories of Western civilization—nearly all died from conquest, overwork and disease.⁷ Virtually all of those who settled in the Caribbean came from somewhere else—the African slaves from West Africa, the white European settlers, planters and administrators from Europe, Indians arriving as the indentured workers from India and the traders from the Middle East. Settler and immigrant societies are, normally, conceived of as points of arrival, not departure, and sites of a renewed collectivity, not of dissolution, emigration and dispersion.

⁶ I’m grateful to my colleague at Warwick, Paola Toninato, who has educated me on the salience of Romani literature in fostering a diasporic consciousness. Her forthcoming article on the theme is very helpful. There is a vast literature on the Roma/Gypsies; one good specialist collection is at the University of Leeds. See <http://www.leeds.ac.uk/library/spcoll/spprint/26600.htm>.

⁷ On a recent visit to the island (2007) I was pleased to learn that some 3,000 people in Dominica claim to be Caribs and have a small degree of territorial autonomy. Many of the claimants are of mixed heritage, but the cultural identification with Carib ways is none the less impressively strong.

Despite this, Caribbean peoples can be considered an exemplary case of a deterritorialized diaspora. This arises first from their common history of forcible dispersion through the slave trade—still shared by virtually all people of African descent, despite their subsequent liberation, settlement and citizenship in the various countries of the New World and beyond. Partly, this is a matter of visibility. Unlike (say) in the cases of Jews or Armenians, where superficial disappearance is possible in Europe and North America if exogamy occurs, in the case of those of African descent skin colour normally remains a marker for, two, three or more generations—despite exogamy. The deployment of skin colour in many societies as a signifier of status, power and opportunity, makes it impossible for any people of African descent to avoid racial stigmatization. As one black British writer graphically puts it, “our imaginations are conditioned by an enduring proximity to regimes of racial terror (Gilroy 1993: 103)”.

The most intellectually ambitious attempt to define a Caribbean fluid home is made by Paul Gilroy (1993) in *The black Atlantic*. He sees the consciousness of the African diaspora as being formed in a complex cultural and social intermingling between Africa, Europe and the Americas. However, this does not lead to cultural uniformity, but rather to recognition of ‘transnational and intercultural multiplicity’. Of course, some degree of unity must exist in the Atlantic Africans’ diasporic culture for it to be deemed a shared impulse and form of consciousness. This emergent culture is characterized as ‘the black Atlantic’, a truly liquid home.

True, an idea of Africa remained in the imaginary in both the francophone and Anglophone Caribbean. For intellectuals like Césaire (1956), the idea of return was subliminal, figurative and symbolic. In the English-speaking Caribbean the idea of a link with Africa spread beyond the intelligentsia to the masses—through the Garveyite and Rastafarian movements, but the idea of Africa was an invention, an Ethiopia of the mind that rarely translated into a real return movement or sustained association. The real links were not with Africa, but with other dispersed people of African origin. This was particularly true in popular culture—in music, literature, carnival, the visual and performing arts and language—where there was considerable cross-pollination of ideas, images and concepts over the waves and the air waves, exactly in conformity with the black Atlantic thesis. The frontiers of the region are beyond the Caribbean—in the consciousness of Caribbean people to be sure, but also in their social conduct, migration patterns and achievements in their places of settlement and sojourn.

If we reach back into the history of diasporas, we can find other forms of liquid home in the connections between religion and diaspora. Not only did ‘diaspora’ enter its conventional use in Jewish history via the Greek translation of the Bible, Baumann points out that in the first century AD Christians adopted the term, altering its ‘soteriological meaning according to Christian eschatology’. He continues:

The New Testament uses the noun *diaspora* and the verb *diaspeirein* three times each. Without going into detail on the complicated usages, the individual writers of the different Biblical stories and letters interpreted the early Church ‘as a pilgrim, sojourning and dispersed community, in the understanding that it is the eschatological people of God’. On earth Christians living in dispersion would function as a ‘seed’ to disseminate the message of Jesus. The Christians’ real home, however, was the ‘heavenly city Jerusalem’, the goal of Christian pilgrimage (Baumann 2000: 319).⁸

There are, indeed, a number of Christian communities who behaved precisely in conformity with the tradition Baumann describes. The Mennonites (sixteenth century Christian Anabaptists) are a case in point. Dispersal took place as a result of internal schisms (often over seemingly minor theological differences), in reaction to overt persecution, or as a response to attempts by states to bring religious communities into their tax regimes and place them under state authority. For those who believed only in the Kingdom of God, spreading the seed of Christianity to other parts of the world seemed the obvious thing to do. The Mennonites ended up largely in small rural communities, dispersing to 51 countries all over Africa, Europe and the Americas. A Mennonite theologian, Alain Epp Weaver, argues that there is (or perhaps should be) a close parallel between Christians and Jews. Both, he maintains, took erroneous turns in subordinating themselves to state power—for the Christians it was the Roman Emperor Constantine (280–337 AD) who established Christianity as a state religion, while for the Jews it was the creation of the state of Israel. By getting themselves entangled with temporal institutions Jews and Christians foolishly abandoned their spiritual missions. Both, Weaver (n.d.) argues, “are called to an exilic, diasporic faith which embodies an alternative politics amidst the Babylons of the world”.

⁸ The long quote within the block quote comes from a PhD thesis by Aiyenakun P.J. Arowele fully cited in Baumann’s article. I am grateful to Martin Baumann, Steven Vertovec and Stéphane Dufoix who in various ways have ‘put me right’ on the connections between religious communities and diaspora.

The fate of religious diasporas in global times is described, though rather briefly, by Ninian Smart (1987). The background to his argument is that, with the increased pace of connectivity, especially in respect of cheap long-distance travel, even rather poor religious communities can maintain contact with the principal epicentres of their religions: the Jews with Jerusalem and the Wailing Wall, the Catholics with Rome and Lourdes, the Hindus with Varanasi and the Ganges, the Sikhs with Amritsar and the Golden Temple, the Muslims with Mecca and the Kaaba, and so on. Contact often takes the form of pilgrimage to sites of religious significance—the fires of religious passion often being nurtured by long separation followed by ritualized forms of connectivity, such as the Hajj. The Hajj, the fifth pillar of Islam, is a source of inspiration and bonding for the Islamic world community, the *umma*. Those who are medically fit and can afford the journey are obliged to travel to Mecca at least once in their lives: about two million do so each year. Occasionally, the facilities are overwhelmed by the enthusiastic crowd. In 2006, 345 pilgrims on the Hajj lost their lives in a stampede near the three pillars where the devil appeared to Abraham and where they are enjoined to throw stones.

Christian pilgrimages have also experienced a massive revival with the reduced cost of international transport and greater accessibility (Cohen and Kennedy 2007). Perhaps the most famous example of this is the case of Lourdes, a small town in the French Pyrenees. Each year, millions of people travel to Lourdes.⁹ The town only has a permanent population of 15,000 but it has 270 hotels and is second nationally only to Paris in terms of the number of tourist beds available. As is often the case with places of pilgrimage, the religious aura surrounding Lourdes arose from the mysterious appearance of a religious figure. In this case a 14-year old girl is said to have seen the Virgin Mary 18 times in 1854. The water of Lourdes is thought to be blessed and many who are sick (some in wheelchairs or on hospital trolleys) come to the town in the hope of emulating the 66 officially-recognized miracle cures. Pilgrimages have also acquired new importance in other religions. Increasing numbers of Buddhists and Taoists are returning to Mount Tai in northeast China, where the shrines were vandalized by Maoist Red Guards but restored after 1976. Shinto priests hold at least 15 festivals each year to welcome pilgrims to Taisha, Japan.

⁹ See A.D. Smither 'The business of miracle working' *Independent* (London daily newspaper) 14 August, 2004.

CONCLUSION

If we review the various uses of the idea of home and homeland in diaspora studies we can find good historical and empirical support for all three notions—solid, ductile and liquid. The myths of a common origin are often territorialized, while highly romantic, yet powerful, myths of the ‘old country’ are avowed. The ‘promised land’ of the Jews flowed with milk and honey. The aged cedars and scent of mint on Mount Lebanon can be used to brush away the smell of the corpses produced in the recent civil wars and invasions. The impressive buildings of Zimbabwe stand as a testament to the notion that Africans once had superior civilizations and great empires: a direct refutation of their often low social status in the diaspora. The Assyrians in London and Chicago talk of their link to the great civilization in Mesopotamia, while their arch rivals, the Armenians, mount expensive archaeological expeditions to uncover *their* palaces and shrines.

We have also observed that in some cases homeland has given way to a more ductile notion of homeland, which can be displaced, as in the cases of the Sindhis and Parsis of Bombay or somewhat attenuated as in the case of dezionization. We also have noticed that virtual, deterritorialized, liquid homes can be constructed through cultural links, as in the Caribbean case, and through the substitution of sacred monuments, rivers, icons and shrines for home, as in the case of diaspora religions. It is perhaps important to stress that Africa does not disappear from the Caribbean imaginary, just as Sind and Persia are still remembered, however distantly, by Hindu Sindhis and Parsis. Rather than a complete process of erasure, the conditions in the natal homeland have become so hostile (and the relatively benign conditions in parts of the diaspora so attractive) that the recovery of homeland has been deferred indefinitely and displaced by newer centers of religious, cultural and economic achievement.

How then do we mediate between the three uses? One possible way of dealing with this escalation is to allow self-declaration to prevail. Home and homeland is what you say it is. Who are we to object? Another strategy is to follow the tactic adopted by the ancient Greek, Procrustes, who offered hospitality in his iron bed to passers-by. So that they would fit the bed precisely, he stretched short people and cut off the limbs of long people. By analogy, we could espouse an utterly rigid set of criteria to which all home/homelands would have to conform before we would allow them to lie on our conceptual bed. Rejecting

these two strategies, I have insisted on empirical and historical support for any notion of home/homeland. Largely unsupported post-modernist critiques have suggested that there is a one-way movement from solid notions of homeland to liquid notions of home. But, as I have argued, the intermediate category remains important and the solid versions of homeland are gaining increasing support as diasporas become mobilized to play an enhanced role in homeland and international politics and in economic and social development of their natal territories.

CHAPTER SIX

THE MISFORTUNES OF INTEGRATION

Michel Wieviorka

The construction of the social sciences began in the nineteenth century in Europe—mainly in France, the United Kingdom and Germany—and then spread to the United States and a few other countries at the end of the nineteenth century. During this time, the social sciences are always set in the framework of the nation-state. With the aim of opposing this sort of thinking about the nation-state, Ulrich Beck (2004) has referred to ‘methodological nationalism’, i.e. an approach making nations and states the main arena within which the analyses of society, of social action, problems or social facts must be constructed. The almost natural complement to ‘methodological nationalism’ is the recourse to the idea of ‘international’ relations between nations and their states. Classically, society is therefore inscribed in the framework of the nation and the state, more or less in close correspondence with them. In fact, the terms become almost interchangeable. France is perhaps an extreme case rather than a representative example of this correspondence which makes of it, as Dominique Schnapper says, the nation-state ‘par excellence’, a national society which conceives of itself as being highly integrated (Schnapper 1991).

TWO FUNDAMENTAL PERSPECTIVES

Yet, the society which the social thinkers of the classical era observed from the mid-nineteenth century was not a stable and harmonious whole. In their formation, the social sciences were confronted with the often impressive spectacle of the rise of industrialization, with its accompanying suffering and misery, and developed in societies undergoing profound transformations. As a result, sociologists were concerned about the transition from one type of society to another, from the country to the town, from agriculture to industry. They thought about the major risks for the unity of the social corpus which could ensue from this transition. Moreover, they were concerned by the breakdown

of social relations, by *anomie* according to the concept popularized by Emile Durkheim. They examined the implications of the transitions from mechanical solidarity to organic solidarity, from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft* and were concerned about the capacity of the institutions to deal with such rapid and considerable changes.

These were the circumstances in which sociological thinking began to grant an important place to the question of integration. This has been the case more specifically in the sociology based on Durkheim, and then the functionalists—the idea being to take the concept of integration and consider the processes by which a social, national, family group appropriated individuals in order to ensure its own cohesion. The sociology of integration starts with the group, the whole, the totality. This does not, however, mean that the individual is ignored. But it is patently obvious that its primary preoccupation is the unity or integration of the group. Its general orientation is ‘holistic’, to use Louis Dumont’s term. For example, it will study the capacity of society to ensure its integration by examining criteria such as the density of interaction amongst members of the group, or their adhesion to shared values.

Classical sociology is constructed in an intellectual sphere marked by the three major categories of society, the state and the nation. When it deals with the domain of integration, it examines three major registers which are those defined by Daniel Bell (1976) as the constituent elements of modernity: the social (the place of individuals and social classes or strata within society), the political and the institutions (and in particular the relation of each to the state), and the cultural (beginning with belonging to the nation). Since these three registers are conceived as corresponding to one another, the idea of integration refers not only to what is taking place in each but also to the ways in which they are articulated.

In the history of social thought, the Durkheimian concept of integration is often associated with that of socialization. In the work of Talcott Parsons, we find the idea that these two concepts refer to each other: integration will necessarily evoke the process of socialization of individuals (Parsons 1967). Socialization implies that those who benefit from it find their place in society, in the nation and in the institutions whose rules, norms or values they accept and acquire. It is good for society, since it provides it with order and homogeneity. Likewise, it is good for individuals who, thanks to it, find their place in society. This concept is never very far from that of reproduction,

since to socialize is to adapt individuals to the nation, to social life, to an established order; but it does not preclude thinking about change since individuals, once socialized, have learnt to confront constraints, to change and to act in a critical manner rather than remaining passive.

The sociology of integration has always been if not challenged, at least strained or counterbalanced by approaches which focus more on individuals or subjects, whether individual or collective. In the 1970s and 1980s various studies even theorized this remark by returning, with Raymond Boudon¹ in particular, to Schumpeter's concept of 'methodological individualism' which at the time contrasted with 'holistic' approaches like that of Louis Dumont. At the time, the suggestion was to think sociologically on the basis of actions of individuals. Furthermore, the point of view of the subject, as opposed to that of the system, society or the whole has always existed. Amongst the classical authors it is perhaps in German sociology that we find a more open approach with Max Weber and even more so, in my opinion, in Georg Simmel. Similarly, important trends of thought in the social sciences, particularly since George Herbert Mead, have long been interested primarily in interaction between individuals, at times distancing themselves considerably from any idea of social determinism.

The concept of the subject enables children, immigrants and disabled persons to be considered as independent actors of their lives. It enables the consideration of institutions by envisaging their capacity for change, for opening up to the subjectivity of those who work in them or who frequent them. It therefore takes us quite a long way from the idea of socialization.

True, as we have seen, socialization does not prevent us from thinking of the individual and individualization. But it is based on the idea of a process during which gradually individuals learn to become masters of themselves and of their lives as well as conforming to the demands of the social bond. The implication is that the child is not a subject in its entirety but a subject in the making, a future subject. Once the course of socialization has been completed, the child will be a subject in all senses of the term and worthy of having rights. Similarly, the immigrant, when he or she arrives in the so-called 'host' society, does not speak the language of the country, does not know its history, is

¹ The theme appears in Raymond Boudon as from the beginning of the 1970s, see for example Boudon (1973).

ignorant of its values and will only really become a subject when he or she has acquired what is assumed to comprise culture and society. The idea of socialization implies that at the outset, those who are not yet socialized are incomplete, immature, human beings. This image does indeed lead directly and often frequently to another: if they are incomplete and immature, they constitute a threat to society, a danger, a risk. They have to be controlled. They do not deserve the same rights as the others. The child and the immigrant are therefore delinquents in the making. When integration becomes the keyword of intellectuals or political authorities ordering the immigrants to conform thereto without offering them the means to do so or creating favourable conditions, it can then become an incantation—an ideology, the implementation of which is summed up in police repression.

The sociology of integration and socialization is thus less progressive than its advocates might realize; especially in times of rapid change and even more so in a context of crisis, it becomes a call for obedience and, to use Hannah Arendt's wonderful expression, a refusal to grant the 'right to have rights' to those who are not yet socialized or integrated and who will perhaps never be so. It gives no thought to the subjectivity of children, young people or immigrants, or to their capacity to give meaning to their acts themselves, to grasp their world, to act—it brings a sceptical or anxious look to bear on their inventiveness or their creativity.

It is true that frequently sociologists endeavour not to abandon one perspective for another and not to focus uniquely on individuals, the subject or interaction amongst individuals or, alternatively, to focus solely on society and integration. And it would be a simplification to reduce the existence of these two points of view to the image of absolute polarization without the slightest attempt at conciliation or articulation. But the distinction between the sociology which starts with society, the system, the whole and the structures and the sociology which takes as its starting point the individual, the subject or interactions is a fundamental divide within the social sciences.

THE CRISIS OF INTEGRATION

In the contemporary world, the perspective on integration is weakened, while the subject and interactions are gaining in importance. According to the most current interpretations, this is one of the most outstanding consequences or effects of economic globalization.

From an impressive number of books and articles we learn that globalization has been a major issue since the 1980s and, further still, since the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989) which marked the end of the Cold War. The phenomenon prevailed throughout the 1990s and, if we simplify things, it can be considered that the 9/11 attacks in 2001 inaugurated a new era in which with the ‘war against terrorism’—then the war in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq—there was a return of states and the challenging of the ‘all economic’ explanation. The return of states, or of the political and the geo-political, did not put an end to globalization but forced us to consider it in terms of its links—which are not uniquely or necessarily a question of opposition—with the existence and action of nation-states. But the fact does remain that since the 1970s we have been witnessing the crisis—it might be better to speak in terms of a change—in many of the integrated wholes formed by the nation-state and national society. This crisis affects the nation as well as the state and its institutions and society.

The crisis of the nation is political and cultural. The nation can no longer be the sole or principle source of identification of individuals to the extent that it was previously. Individuals are increasingly made up of multiple identities, many of which are likely to extend beyond the framework of the nation. In the past, the nation constituted, in the phrase well coined by Benedict Anderson (1991), an ‘imagined community’, the members of which, given its size, did not necessarily all know each other, but shared an imaginary and a symbolic world shaped, in particular, by printing and the press. Today, as Arjun Appadurai (1996) has demonstrated, there are new ‘imagined communities’ which exist at the global and no longer at the national level thanks in particular to the internet, and to present-day technologies of communication. Between the local level which is often very lively, and world level, the nation is merely one level amongst others. Especially considering that between it and the world there is now also a regional construction—as is the case with the European Union.

The same applies to the states and their institutions. The school, the legal system, the police and public services are also destabilized or challenged by globalization. The latter introduces into their midst hitherto unknown difficulties and demands which they are not accustomed to taking into consideration, while, at the same time, supranational institutions begin to take shape. This is true in matters of economic regulation, but also in the legal system, with international tribunals or the rules of a law which originate in major commercial

firms, the large consultants' offices, multinationals and not only in the more classical international agreements between states. It is in this context that NGOs have gained the immense importance which is theirs today on the world scene—particularly in matters of environment or humanitarian action. This development is best exemplified by altermondialist mobilization. The creation of regional spaces points out to the existence of bodies which preclude reducing everything to the idea of states and interstate relations.

Finally, in social affairs, strictly speaking, globalization has meant radical change. Globalization signifies the domination of financial and commercial capital bringing in its wake increased flexibility of labor, which firms hire and fire as a function of their interests alone, in line with global rationales. Consequently inequalities widen between the elites and non-elites. The former originate from financial milieus, or circles sufficiently close to them to identify with them; the latter originate from different backgrounds and, for whatever reasons, tend to ghettoized. Work ceases to be the best way to integrate since employment is becoming increasingly uncertain and unstable—individuals may well change employers and jobs several times in a lifetime.

These changes are accelerated by a phenomenon which they in fact exacerbate: the resistance of people to accepting the norms, rules and impersonal processes which increasingly govern their lives, manipulate their needs and impose the domination of money and of the market. Henceforth we witness the rise of individualism in the form of rational individual calculations—each endeavouring to get the most out of modernity, or to participate therein as much as possible, to gain access to money, to consumption, to employment. Individualism, moreover, is expressed in the importance of subjectivity and the affirmation of the personal subject. In this last respect, individuals wish to be recognized and respected, in control of their experience, make personal choices and construct their existence while constructing themselves. It is as if the social sciences are all carried away by the increase in momentum of individualism. Religion for example is increasingly analyzed not only as the reproduction of the faith of the parents and the group, and encompassing the totality of individual experience, but also as the object of choice of adhesion which anyone is free to make or not. A choice which, while conferring a meaning to one's live, does not extend to all its aspects. This is what Charles Taylor (2007) considers characteristic of present-day secularization. It is a question of *achievement* and not of *ascription*. Health has become a problem which concerns the sick and

the dying and not only the hospital, the medical institutions or the careers and the professional lives of doctors. School is the place where children must constitute themselves as subjects and not only be educated or socialized. This increasing assertion of the subject has an important consequence for the idea of integration which is less and less likely to be the core of departure of the analysis. To understand these changes and social functioning today one is to start with individuals, their rationality and their subjectivity, rather than with the system, society, structures or any other principle of totality. As a result, concepts like integration and socialization are challenged, and their use becomes ideological and repressive.

CRITIQUE OF 'MODELS OF INTEGRATION'

Since the 1980s, particularly in Europe, the concept of integration is increasingly associated with the idea of a model: some countries are described as having a 'model of integration' specific to them. It is then tempting to contrast two major sets of 'models': the so-called 'Republican' model of which France is said to be the best example as opposed to the multiculturalist models of which the United Kingdom is the example for reference.

The question of the integration of cultural differences was discussed ever since the beginning of the 1960s, in several developed countries, especially with respect to the impact and the meaning of various culturally loaded types of mobilization—such as regionalist movements or gender organizations. But as long as integration concerned these types of actor, defined mainly from within the society, there was no place for the idea of a general challenging of 'models of integration' as a whole. Thus, in France, as long as it was a question of Bretons, Occitans, even also of Jews becoming increasingly visible in the public sphere from this time on, breaking with previous images of these groups did not arouse the same passions or anxieties as when the matter of the 'Muslim headscarf' and the fears concerning Islam came onto the scene.

In its radical variants, the 'French-type' model is a construction which not only represses specific cultural identities in the private sphere, but tends to exert pressure on them to dissolve. In fact, the aim is not so much integration as a form of assimilation, pure and simple. On the other hand, in its extreme versions, the 'British' model, as for it, leads,

not to a well-tempered multiculturalism, but a destructive communitarianism because it manufactures violence and the negation of individuals in the name of the group. But on either side of the Channel, the prevailing climate is a moderate or reasonable conception; on one side, however, one finds a tolerant 'republicanism' and on the other, a liberal multiculturalism.

Occasionally, 'models' other than the French and the British are discussed. Thus there has been talk of a 'discriminatory' model in Germany in which '*Gastarbeiter*' are included in employment (and in fact treated relatively better socially than their counterparts in other countries) but excluded culturally, in civil and civic life, since their vocation is to return to their countries of origin. But this 'model' dates from the 1960s and today Germany has evolved considerably, if only by accepting the principle of *ius solis* since 2000.

Over and above the German experience, in fact two events have considerably weakened, and perhaps even shattered, the idea that one can reason in terms of models of integration. In July 2005, the terrorist attacks in London, which claimed many lives, gave rise to an in-depth examination of British multiculturalism. Contrary to the 9/11 event in the United States, the majority of the terrorists did not come from abroad but lived in Britain. They represented internal tensions which evolved in a context of freedom granted till then to all communities, including Muslims. Had London not become 'Londonistan' where preachers could advocate openly in their mosques the holy war against the West? Was the 'British model' of multiculturalist integration not guilty of having enabled and facilitated this extremist violence? In any event, this is what some French intellectuals and politicians proclaimed, boasting the merits of their republican model, the only one capable, assumedly, of avoiding such uncontrollable situations.

But three months later in the suburb of Clichy-sous-Bois in France, the death of two adolescents chased by the police triggered a series of riots which expanded in working-class suburbs throughout France for three weeks. Every night hundreds of cars, buses, school buildings and cultural centers were set on fire. While a few intellectuals mistakenly presented these acts of violence as 'ethnico-religious' (Alain Finkielkraut) or as the outcome of polygamy (Hélène Carrère d'Encausse), a fairly large consensus which owed a lot to the stands taken by social science researchers in the public sphere, saw therein a profound crisis in the 'republican model': the young rioters, the majority being of immigrant origin, had primarily come to express their anger at living in a country

which promised them liberty, equality and fraternity (according to the words of the republican motto which they could read on the front of public buildings) but which in fact led them to suffer racism, discrimination, social exclusion, widespread unemployment and ghettoization, relegated to deprived suburban areas. As a result, the 'French model' appeared to be no more viable than the 'British model'; it was a construction which was to a large extent ideological, mythical, and distant from the reality. A more complete comparison of the two experiences can only reinforce us in this conviction.

Thus, on the British side, how can we forget the spectacular riots which frequently shatter the major cities in England and on the French side, the wave of terrorism in the summer of 1995? How also can we refrain from mentioning the attacks in Madrid in March 2004 which in many respects resemble those in London and which, nevertheless, have not given rise to any comment on a 'Spanish model', a type which we would have great difficulty in describing.

All in all, let us say that today there is no theoretical model of integration capable of accounting for social, cultural or political developments or of being imposed in normative fashion. It is not only France and the United Kingdom which are challenged to question their capacity for integration and the principles which could guide their policies in this respect. For example, Sweden where in 1989 the French 'heads-carf problem' was reported with astonishment, and which has often been quoted as a laboratory of multiculturalism, is now reappraising the situation and speaking more in terms of conserving its national identity which is said to be threatened. The Netherlands where the '*allochtones*' or foreigners have unemployment rates four times higher than the nationals, is taking an impressive political and ideological turn. After the assassination of Pim Fortuyn, an extreme-right leader, then of the film director, Theo Van Gogh, this country is increasingly convinced that its tolerance and respect for diversity leads to difficulties, segregation, social exclusion and violence. The idea of integration emerges weakened from the difficulties encountered at the present time by those who would like to consider and implement it on the basis of any sort of model. These difficulties owe a great deal to the fact that the political authorities are confronting diversified migratory phenomena and an increase in cultural differences with formulas of an ideological rigidity which constitutes an obstacle to political action.

DIVERSITY OF MIGRATORY PHENOMENA

We have known for a long time that in matters of migration, not everything can be reduced to the sole scenario whereby individuals or groups leave one society, that of origin, arrive in another, 'host' society, settle with their traditions which gradually dissolve in two or three generations. But too frequently the understanding of immigration is reduced to this sole scenario, without acknowledging that in some countries cultural and religious differences may be maintained more than in others or may re-emerge in the third generation.

Apart from the classical scenario which does indeed exist and assumes considerable importance, several types of phenomena can be distinguished which will be dealt with here from three different angles: movements and mobility, cultural assertions linked to these movements, and political implications.

Transit

In some cases migration is a process of transit. Central European countries have often been places of transit from East to West, though today this is less the case: in the 1990s the Czech Republic was a country of transit (but it is now a country of immigration); Mexico provides a large cohort of migrants to the United States and also receives numerous migrants from other Central American countries on their way to the US; France receives numerous migrants from the Middle East who wish to transit on their way to Scandinavia or the United Kingdom.

For this type of migration, the idea of a policy of integration of any sort is irrelevant.

Nomadism

In other cases migrants are defined by their mobility plurinational spaces. This applies to populations constantly on the move between locations—whether or not along a permanent trail. These populations are involved in the trade of 'globalization from below' between Marseilles, Spain, North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, but also Bulgaria, Turkey and the Middle East (see Tarrius 2003). Others make return journeys between two points; still others are seasonal workers, or are part of a network. These actors primarily expect policies of tolerance;

they do not ask for inclusion in institutional schemes and have no interest in discussions about multiculturalism.

Diasporas

Originally, the term ‘diaspora’ was used for the Jews after the destruction of the second Temple of Jerusalem in 70 CE. Today the term, or the related expression ‘diasporic networks’, designates a vast set of phenomena in which a population presenting a cultural, historical and possibly religious unity is dispersed amongst several countries—including eventually one that may be considered as mother country such as Israel or Armenia. Scholars and media talk today of the Chinese, Palestinian, Sri-Lankan or Moroccan diaspora as emerging diasporas. Paul Gilroy (1993) also suggested the concept of a ‘Black Atlantic’ which, from the Caribbean to the United Kingdom and to the United States, but also to Latin America and the African continent, is said to present many of the features of a diaspora; or again, Eliezer Ben-Rafael et al. (2006) have presented the findings of a study on a new diaspora constituted by Jews from the former Soviet Union, some of whom have remained there and others have reached and settled in Israel, the United States, Germany and other countries.

A diaspora is always liable to constitute one or several communities focussing on its specific historic and cultural characteristics. The mere fact of belonging to a diaspora sets its demands in a space which is both political and geopolitical and which only partly corresponds to the national space of the country under consideration. When the American Jewish community undertakes an action in favour of the State of Israel or when Armenian communities put pressure on states where they live on behalf of the recognition of the 1915 genocide, they introduce onto the agenda of home and foreign politics requests which are specific to them. Their mobilization is not exactly the same as that of a group whose sole space of existence and action is that of a single nation-state.

Mixing (‘Métissage’)

Cultural identities, whether they originate in immigration or come from another source, are always liable to mingle and to mix with other identities. To describe these combinations, the social sciences have a rich vocabulary at their disposal—including cultural crossing, creolization and cultural hybridity. These phenomena created by encounters

of cultures represent withdrawing from multiculturalism which requires, as an institutional mechanism of legal and political recognition of identities, to deal with clearly defined minorities. If one wishes to encourage the mingling or interaction of cultures, one can only be opposed to encourage cultural differences.

This roughly outlined typology could be completed and elaborated in more details. However it already yields major aspects: there is no unique and simple scenario of migratory phenomena as there is no unique and simple assertion of cultural identities. Hence, there is not one single kind of political and institutional treatment of migratory phenomena or cultural identities.

Discussions of migration and integration are all the more complicated as one must also consider dimensions beyond the cultural ones—and in particular those of a social and economic nature. It is in this context that Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth (2003) discuss the relative importance in the configuration of multiculturalism of the redistribution of resources and recognition of cultural identities. Fraser, the American philosopher, considers that these two aspects are of a same importance, whereas Honneth, the German philosopher, grants primacy only to recognition. Their dialogue confirms that it does not suffice to differentiate, as we have just done, various types of migration and assertions of identity and that it is also appropriate to pay attention to the socio-economic dimensions of migratory phenomenon.

It is true that for the migrants, what is at issue varies considerably from one country to another. In some countries their social integration is encouraged while any cultural recognition is excluded and their participation in civic and civil life is similarly somewhat minimal. A particular case concerns undocumented workers which may be dealt with by official policies on the basis of two different policies. One kind of policy is to oppose illegal immigration by all means; another to adapt to the reality of illegal work. Thus, for example, in Spain in 2005 the government undertook a large-scale operation to regularize the immigrants' status. On the other hand, the theme of immigration may be stirred up, particularly in times of economic crisis and rise in unemployment, to set on migrants the blame for the difficulties of the time.

But here again, the context of the nation-state is not alone to be taken into consideration. Wherever migrants tend to maintain links with another society or other societies, economic implications may be considerable. For example, the '*remesas*' which are sent from the United

States to Mexico and other countries in Central America are a considerable proportion of their income and warrant the living of many families who have remained in the home country. The building of states like Israel or the Republic of Armenia has strongly benefited from diaspora contributions.

TRANSNATIONALISM IN DISCUSSION

The further one goes from ‘methodological nationalism’ and therefore from the framework of the nation-state in the consideration of migratory phenomena and cultural and religious differences, the more sensitive one is to the complexity of the real-life experiences of migrants. In the last resort, the researcher is to increasingly focus on migrants’ tendencies to deterritorialization, and finds him or herself moving to a perspective of transnationalism. But this perspective is itself subject to challenge. The most important argument consists of recognizing the plethora of possible forms of migratory trajectories. Such trajectories are not comprehensible without reference to the interventions of the states concerned and their social and employment policies as well as attitudes toward national identity. Such policies maintain a degree of hold over entries and exits of people and define inter-state relations which are decisive in these matters.

The discussion in this area that dates from the 1960s, came up to new perspectives in the 1990s. The concept of transnationalism, which is radically different from that of international relations, makes of migrants members of new communities—even of a ‘transnational civil society’ (Florini 2000). This notion defines the people as without genuine roots in any country, both in their country of origin and their host society. ‘Transnationalism’, it then might be contended, should involve the absence of loyalty with respect to any state.

The theoretical problem is not whether or not to accept this concept of transnationalism, but to evaluate its efficiency or concrete relevance. Seen from the viewpoint of the migrants, it implies a desire for mobility, much more than a concern for integration. Seen from the perspective of the states, it implies the capacity to manage flows of people, to enable their circulation, much more than defining any sort of integration policy.

The progress in the social sciences of this concept of transnationalism must therefore be linked, in some way, to the crisis of integration,

both in terms of its social reality and in the knowledge about these realities. Whether it be a question of the rise of cultural identities, the assertion of the personal subject, individuals, difficulties in the institutions, the crisis of the so-called 'models of integration', the diversity of the trajectories of the migrants or the realities of 'transnationalism', today the debate between the two classical perspectives of the social sciences is turning to the distinct disadvantage for the modes of thought which claim to represent integration. Those who valorise individual and collective subjectivity, the mobility of individuals, and emphasize a perspective of globalization rather than of states are gaining the upper hand.

Given the present state of the world and of the social sciences, it seems that the paradigm of integration is less and less adapted to deal with the major problems constituted by migratory phenomena or cultural differences.

CHAPTER SEVEN

VALUE-ORIENTATIONS IN CATHOLIC, MUSLIM AND PROTESTANT SOCIETIES

Ephraim Yuchtman-Yaar and Yasmin Alkalay

INTRODUCTION

This chapter explores the impact of three major monotheistic religions—Catholicism, Protestantism, and Islam—on value orientations of individual members of society. Our study was stimulated by the ongoing debate over the relationship between religion and secularism in the modern world in general, and between religion and democracy in particular (Wallis and Bruce 1992, Berger 1999, 2004; Diamond, Plattner, and Costopoulos 2005, Norris and Inglehart 2005). As noted by Pollack (2007), until just a few decades ago the common thesis in the social sciences, dating back to the great nineteenth-century thinkers in the field, was that modernization processes such as urbanization, industrialization, rising levels of affluence, cultural pluralization, and individualization would lead to a decline in the significance of religion. C. Wright Mills (1959: 32–33) expressed this view clearly and unequivocally: “Once the world was filled with the sacred—in thought, practice, and institutional form. After the Reformation and the Renaissance, the forces of modernization swept across the globe and secularization, a corollary historical process, loosened the dominance of the sacred. In due course, the sacred shall disappear altogether except, possibly, in the particular realm.”

More recently, however, the secularization thesis has been challenged and increasing numbers of scholars have argued that religion has not only retained its vitality under modern conditions but has generated new spiritual and social sources of strength (Berger 2004, Casanova 1994, 2007; Lilla 2007, Norris and Inglehart 2005, Stepan 2001). As succinctly put by Costopoulos (2005: x), “the old linear narrative of ‘modernization up, religion down’ is far too simple and does not begin to capture the complexity of religion’s varied circumstances in the contemporary world.”

Underlying this debate is the awareness that we live in an era during which religious devotion appears to be weakened in some places, such as Western Europe, while retaining or even gaining strength and adherents in other places, including the United States, Latin America, and the Islamic world (Berger 1999, Finke 1992, Stark and Finke 2000, Norris and Inglehart 2005). Furthermore, recent research has pointed to certain changes in the modes of expression of religiosity, such as the process of “privatization” of the religious sphere and the weakening of its institutional features. Similarly, growing attention has recently been given to the varieties of “New Age spirituality,” which offers nontraditional contents and new modes of expressing religious meaning (Roof 1993, Reeves 1998, Stark 2001, Hollinger 2004).

The general debate over the place of religion in modern society has been intimately related to the issue of the relationship between religion and democracy. This scholarly discourse has explored the basic question of whether the two systems are mutually hostile or hospitable (Stepan 2001, Filali-Ansary 1999, Berger 2004, Minkenberg 2007) as well as the bearing of specific religious doctrines on democracy. Not surprisingly, in view of the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in general, and in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks in particular, recently the relationship between democracy and Islam has been discussed considerably. Huntington’s (1993, 1996) argument that there is an inherent cultural clash between the democratic values held in Western Christianity and those held by the Muslim world (in his words, the West’s problem is “not Islamic Fundamentalism but Islam”) represents, in one way or another, a view shared by many (cf., Lewis 1991, 1993, 2003; Vatikiotis 1984, Kedourie 1994, Midlarsky 1998). In the same spirit, Costoupolos (2005: xi) wonders “whether a large part of the difficulty in which the Muslim world finds itself today may not be traceable to its unfortunate position poised between various forms of illiberal, command-based secularism, on the one hand, and powerful fundamentalist forces... on the other hand.” Following his account of the intellectual debate on Islam and democracy, Tamimi (2007: 55) sums up this controversy as follows: “It turns out that democracy, in as much as it entails free elections, accountability, and transparency, the rule of law and protection of fundamental human rights, is a forbidden fruit in the Islamic lands.”

However, the prevalent contention that Islam is inhospitable to democracy has been challenged on both conceptual and empirical grounds. Two main lines of argument have been raised against the

“clash of civilizations” thesis. First, critics of the Orientalist school such as Kabuli (1994), Esposito and Voll (1996), Norton (1995), and Brynen, Kornay and Noble (1995) maintain that the hard core of the Koran’s values and teachings is not incompatible with democracy and that radical Muslims should not be taken as representative of mainstream Muslim values. Second, the Muslim world is highly heterogeneous, with a large variety of religious teachings and interpretations that have generated large differences between Muslims who are radical or moderate, traditional or modern, conservative or liberal, hard-liners or revisionists (Norris and Inglehart 2005, Hunter 1998, Esposito 1997, Fuller 2002).

As noted by Eisenstadt (2002), the main argument of the critics of Orientalism has been that in its analyses of “Oriental” societies this scholarly approach has imposed concepts and categories rooted in the cultural program of modernization that developed in the West. According to his own systematic analysis of the roots of this debate (Eisenstadt 2002: 143), the research that was guided by “Orientalist” conceptions indeed “neglected many aspects of non-Western societies—especially those related to power contestations and the relations between power and culture, which are crucial for understanding their contours and dynamics.” Yet he suggests that “interestingly enough, the critics of ‘Orientalist’ scholarship did not take up the most important and potentially most constructive challenge opened up by the ‘Orientalist’ debate—namely, how to account for the internal dynamics of these non-European modern civilizations in their own terms, possibly also putting them in a comparative framework that would not bestow a privileged position on the Western experience” (ibid.).

Eisenstadt thus suggests that comparative research on the bearing of different religious traditions on contemporary society should be sensitive to the sociohistorical circumstances under which they have evolved (Minkenberg 2007, Jung 2004). Among other things, this implies that various concepts, such as democracy, may not have the same meaning in societies that have been historically influenced by different religious heritages.

Norris and Inglehart (2005) have made probably the most systematic effort to address this problem empirically on the basis of cross-national analysis of public opinion. Drawing on a wealth of empirical evidence on the relationship between religion and democracy in a large number of societies across the entire globe, the evidence from their comparative research in regard to Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis leads

the two scholars to the following conclusion: “. . . when political attitudes are compared (including evaluations of how well democracy works in practice, support for democratic ideals, and disapproval of strong leaders), far from a clash of values, there is minimal difference between the Muslim world and the West” (ibid., p. 154). Instead the findings show that the democratic clash is far more evident in other instances, such as the post-Communist states of Eastern Europe, which display much less support for democratic values than both Western and Islamic nations. It appears, however, that with respect to the social values of gender equality and sexual liberalization the Muslim societies are much less liberal than other societies, particularly the West. Similarly, Muslim societies tend to give greater weight to religious authorities than the West, though such a tendency is not unique to the Islamic world and can be found in other societies including many Catholic ones in Latin America.

RESEARCH GOALS

Notwithstanding the preceding discussion, this chapter addresses some relevant issues that have not been recognized or sufficiently dealt with in previous research on the value priorities of Western and Muslim societies. Specifically, we examine three such issues:

First, what are the levels of homogeneity of predominantly Catholic, Protestant, or Muslim societies with respect to value orientations? This question’s relevance stems from the prior observation that there are substantial cross-national differences among people belonging to the same religion. Consequently, as implied by Norris and Inglehart (2005), does it make sense to speak about Islam or any other religion as representing a distinctive religious culture? Take, for example, the case of Islam. Among the variety of rifts that this religion has experienced almost since its very beginning, one of the oldest and deepest is between Shia and Sunni. Where the two groups live together in the same country, as in Iraq or Lebanon, the historical antagonism between them has often caused severe violent conflict. Given this and related observations, is it justified, then, to conceive of all the societies under the hegemony of Islam as forming a distinctive “religious zone”? The same question applies, of course, to all other religions in the West or elsewhere.

Second, setting aside the issue of homogeneity, to what extent can the differences in value priorities among societies dominated by Catholicism, Protestantism, or Islam be attributed to the influence of the

hegemonic religion? This question is pertinent because the concept of religion represents a contextual or “higher order” variable whose effects must be demonstrated after taking into consideration the influences of either “lower order” variables such as individual characteristics, or other higher-order variables such as societal levels of industrialization and economic affluence (Yuchtman-Yaar and Alkalay 2007).

Third, given the distinction between members of a majority religion and of a minority religion (i.e., individuals living in societies where they constitute a religious minority), to what extent do the two groups differ from each other with respect to the value orientations in question? In other words, we wish to probe whether the impact of the three religions extends beyond their natural spheres of influence to the same degree. To the best of our knowledge this question has not been addressed in previous research.

Our attempt to explore these questions is based on a comparative analysis of value priorities in predominantly Catholic, Protestant, and Muslim societies. These societies have, of course, attracted much attention in recent years, particularly since Huntington’s provocative thesis of the “clash of civilizations.” The results that were obtained in the present study should be put in the context of the debate over this thesis.

METHODOLOGY

The empirical information for the study is based mostly on the data banks of the World Value Survey (WVS) and the European Value Survey (EVS), from which we selected all the countries where Catholics, Protestants, or Muslims constitute a clear majority of the population and for which all the relevant data for the empirical analysis was available. As seen in Appendix 7.I, the resulting sample consists of 39 countries of which 21 are Catholic, 9 Protestant, and 9 Muslim. For the purpose of the present analysis we excluded from the original list all the countries that were part of the former Communist bloc. Most of the WVS and EVS surveys were conducted in 2000, with a few done in 1995. This country-level classification by the dominant religion is used as the higher-order independent variable in the present study. Appendix 7.I also contains for each country the size of the majority religion as a percentage of the total population.

The dependent variables consist of a series of five measures of value orientations including religiosity, orientation to democracy, political

activism, postmaterialism, and socialization of children for independence (vs. obedience). A description of the questionnaire items constituting these measures and their scaling is given in Appendix 7.II. All five measures were extracted from a larger pool of items on the basis of exploratory factor analysis, which was performed separately in the three religious groups. We selected only those items that yielded the same structure of factors across these groups. For example, the measure of “religiosity” is based on three questionnaire items—the importance of religion and of God in one’s life and the importance of encouraging children to learn religious faith at home. These three items clustered together as a distinct factor within the Catholic, Protestant, and Muslim societies. The resemblance of the structure of such factors suggests that they have similar meaning for the respondents whether Catholics, Protestants, or Muslims. Finally, note that to enable comparability across the measures that represent the five factors they were transformed into a common scale, ranging from 0 (low score) to 100 (high score).

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

As a preliminary, it is worth noting the relatively large differences in the level of dominance of the three religions, as indicated by their share of the total population in the countries where they form the majority (see Appendix 7.I). Thus the average percentage of Muslims in the Islamic countries is 93.0%, while the comparable figures for the Catholic and Protestant countries are 84.1% and 74.9%, respectively. If we take these figures of “religious concentration” as measures of homogeneity, then the Muslim and Protestant societies appear to be religiously the most and least homogeneous, respectively.

It is beyond the scope of our study to discuss the historical circumstances as well as more recent processes that might have led to this reality as it appears by the end of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, we believe that these differences have some importance in themselves. In particular, we suggest that they may have, at least potentially, significant implications for the influence of these religious denominations on their followers as well as on the larger society. Accordingly, it seems reasonable to expect that, *ceteris paribus*, the influence of a given religion is stronger and more pervasive where its preeminence as the majority religion is unrivaled and unequivocal. In other words, in societies where a distinct religion commands a larger majority of the

population, it is more difficult to escape its grasp in the private and public spheres. We further suggest that this proposition applies mostly to societies in which religion is taken more seriously and plays a central role at the collective and individual levels.

However, given that the three religions under consideration are divided according to various doctrines, denominations, sects, and other forms of grouping, as noted earlier, it remains to be seen on empirical grounds if it is justified to characterize the societies where they represent the predominant religion as distinctively “Catholic,” “Protestant,” or “Muslim.”

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF VALUE ORIENTATIONS

To address the last question, we begin with an empirical analysis in which we compare between the value orientations that prevail in Catholic, Protestant, and Muslim societies, using the statistical model of “one-way analysis of variance.” This model allows us to estimate whether the differences among the three religious groups with respect to each of the five measures are significant to the extent that they can be regarded as distinct from each other. Table 7.1 presents the results of this analysis.

To begin with, the differences among the three religions are statistically significant with respect to all the dependent variables, and in most cases they are quite large in absolute terms as well. These results seem to support the view that the societies dominated by Catholicism, Protestantism, or Islam can be regarded as having different patterns of value priorities.

As to the nature of these differences, the figures in Table 7.1 reveal a generally clear and consistent pattern, with but a few exceptions that will be discussed below. Accordingly, it appears that majority-Protestant societies tend to have the lowest levels of religiosity and the highest levels of political activism and post-materialism. Correspondingly, they also tend to emphasize more than the other two groups the importance of teaching children the value of independence. However, with respect to the valuation of democracy, they are in second place after the Muslims, though the difference (69.44 vs. 67.23) is hardly noticeable. Overall, it appears that Protestants tend to embrace modern-liberal values to a larger extent than either Catholics or Muslims.

Table 7.1 Mean Scores of Value Orientations in Protestant, Catholic and Muslim Societies (Standard Deviations)*

	Protestant	Catholic	Muslim
Religiosity	61.24 (34.66)	67.31 (29.69)	91.05 (16.74)
Political Activism	42.17 (22.42)	26.35 (24.10)	15.54 (20.61)
Democratic Orientation	67.23 (19.15)	56.66 (20.78)	69.44 (20.25)
Post Materialism	47.17 (25.28)	45.25 (25.47)	32.27 (21.67)
Educating Children for Independence	66.38 (37.07)	44.59 (38.05)	54.77 (36.73)

* Unless otherwise noticed, all the differences between the means for each dependent variable are statistically significant.

With respect to most measures (four out of five), the Muslim societies appear to be most distant from the Protestant group, having the highest level of religiosity and the lowest levels of political activism, post-materialism, and socialization of children for independence. In these respects, then, the value syndrome of the Muslim-majority societies tends to be more traditional and conservative compared to the Protestant- and Catholic-majority societies. Note that the widest gap between the first and the two other groups pertains to the level of religiosity, with respective scores of 91, 67, and 61 for the Muslims, Catholics, and Protestants.

The findings on the measure of democratic orientation seem to be consistent with the prior results obtained by Norris and Inglehart (2005) according to which Muslims are not necessarily averse to the idea of democracy and, in fact, their pro-democratic attitudes are as strong as those of Western societies. Note that our own measure of democratic orientation is not identical to the measures used by Norris and Inglehart and that the sample used in our study only partially overlaps with theirs. At the same time, it cannot be ignored that on two of the measures typically associated with Western democracy—political activism and postmaterialism—the Muslims have the lowest scores. This finding may suggest that the overall meaning of democracy in the context of the Islamic world is not necessarily the same as in the other two religions,

particularly among the Protestants. In any event, these empirical results seem highly relevant to the ongoing debate on the relationship between religion and democracy in general, and between Islam and democracy in particular. Keeping in mind that the Muslims are characterized by a very high level of religiosity, it appears that there is no inherent contradiction between Islam and the idea of democracy, at least as it is understood in the societies that have been dominated by Islam.

As for the Catholic societies, Table 7.1 reveals that they represent a mixed group, located between the Protestants and the Muslims on the measures of religiosity, political activism, and post-materialism, while having the lowest scores on the measures of democratic orientation and the importance of socializing children for independence rather than obedience.

Overall, then, the preceding analysis suggests that the societies dominated by these three religions represent different cultural groups, at least in terms of the value-priorities under study. However, keeping in mind that the figures in Table 7.1 represent the average scores of the various countries constituting each of the three religious groups, it is worth comparing them with respect to the degree of variability of the dependent variables. This variability can be taken as a measure of homogeneity among the individuals constituting each of the three religious groups. As can be seen from the standard deviations presented in Table 7.1, it appears that with but one exception, the Protestants and the Muslims represent, respectively, the most heterogeneous and homogeneous group, with the Catholics located mostly in the middle, though closer to the Protestants. Note that the above mentioned exception applies to the measure of pro-democratic attitudes, regarding which the degree of variability is similar across the three groups.

However, taken as a whole, the foregoing results seem to suggest that the Muslim countries are characterized by a greater degree of isomorphism than the other two religious groups—a phenomenon that invokes Durkheim's concept of mechanical solidarity. In other words, it appears that Muslim-majority societies tend to share common values to a larger extent than their Protestant and Catholic parallels, at least in terms of the measures used in this study. This feature, along with the extremely high level of religious homogeneity within these societies, with an average of over 90% of the population being Muslims, and this group's high level of religiosity, may provide fertile ground for feelings of solidarity among the members of the world's Islamic community that transcend geographic or political borders.

MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS

Cross-national research has shown quite frequently that inter-societal differences in attitudes and behavior are due largely to the influences of various individual characteristics such as education, religiosity, age, gender, and so on rather than to “higher order” variables that represent collective properties. This observation implies that assessing the effects of variables measured at the higher-order level (in our case—type of religion) requires using an appropriate statistical model. We have used for this purpose the Hierarchical Linear Model (HLM), which is designed to estimate the effects of higher-order variables after controlling for the influences of individual characteristics, as discussed in detail by Bryk and Raudenbush (1992). Applying this model involves first a partition of the total of each dependent variable into the portion that is due to variance across individuals in the entire sample, and the portion derived from the variance across the societies represented in the sample, as shown in Table 7.2.

Table 7.2 Partition of Total Variance of Dependent Variables*

Dependent Variables	A	B	Total
Religiosity	51.2%	48.8%	100%
Political Activism	77.5%	22.5%	100%
Democratic Orientation	86.8%	13.2%	100%
Post Materialism	90.0%	10.0%	100%
Educating Children for Independence	85.9%	14.1%	100%

* A—Variance across individuals in the entire sample; B—Variance across 39 states

As Table 7.2 indicates, most of the total variance in all the dependent variables stems from the distributions of various individual characteristics across the countries constituting our sample. However, there are large differences in the size of these variances, ranging from 90% in the case of post-materialism to about 51% in regard to religiosity. It should be noted that the smaller the amount of variance that is due to individual-level attributes, the larger the room for independent effects of higher-order variables. Tables 7.3a–7.3e, which are based on the HLM models, reveal whether such effects are found when the higher-order variable is represented by type of religion. Note that in applying

these models, one of the religious groups is selected as a reference category (in this case, the Protestants), and the coefficients of the other two groups indicate the degree to which they differ from the reference category and the direction of this difference (see Appendix 7.III for the listing of individual level independent variables).

Table 7.3a Religiosity

	coefficient	P
Intercept (Prot.)	46.17	0.000
Catholics	2.43	0.524
Muslims	9.62	0.015
Individual Level Variables		
Age	0.11	0.000
Education	-0.74	0.000
Religious practice	0.36	0.000
Male	-3.96	0.000

Table 7.3b Political Activism

	coefficient	P
Intercept (Prot.)	30.51	0.000
Catholics	-9.68	0.002
Muslims	-16.12	0.000
Individual Level Variables		
Age	-0.10	0.000
Education	2.33	0.000
Religious practice	-0.04	0.000
Male	4.55	0.000

Table 7.3c Democratic Orientation

	coefficient	P
Intercept (Prot.)	59.59	0.000
Catholics	-5.92	0.014
Muslims	1.40	0.633
Individual Level Variables		
Age	0.08	0.000
Education	1.44	0.000
Religious practice	-0.01	0.105
Male	0.60	0.031

Table 7.3d Post-Materialism

	coefficient	P
Intercept (Prot.)	44.27	0.000
Catholics	-0.52	0.804
Muslims	-12.92	0.000
Individual Level Variables		
Age	-0.09	0.000
Education	1.88	0.000
Religious practice	-0.04	0.000
Male	1.12	0.002

Table 7.3e Educating Children for Independence vs. Obedience

	coefficient	P
Intercept (Prot.)	58.05	0.000
Catholics	-12.82	0.000
Muslims	-13.09	0.003
Individual Level Variables		
Age	-0.03	0.209
Education	2.25	0.000
Religious practice	-0.09	0.000
Male	-1.73	0.008

Beginning with Table 7.3a, the coefficients associated with the three religious groups (note that the Protestants represent the reference category) indicate that the level of religiosity in the Catholic group is not significantly different from that of the Protestant group. This result implies that the gap between the two groups, as observed in Table 7.1, disappears after controlling for individual characteristics. With regard to the Muslims, however, the gap vis-à-vis the Protestants is significant, and though it is not as large as before controlling for the individual-level variables, on average the religiosity level of Muslim-majority societies is almost 10 points higher than that of their Protestant counterparts.

As for the control variables, the results show that across the entire sample, the level of religiosity is higher among older people and, not

surprisingly, among those who tend to follow religious practice. Among males and the more highly educated, on the other hand, the level of religiosity is lower. This pattern of effects is repeated, with minor differences, in all the remaining analyses.

The coefficients in Table 7.3b reveal that in both Catholic and Muslim societies the levels of political activism are significantly lower than in Protestant societies, with the largest gap of -16.12 pertaining to the Muslim group. Note that the size of the differences is smaller than before controlling for individual characteristics, but the order is the same.

Turning to Table 7.3c, it can be seen that on the measure of democratic orientation, the Muslim and Protestant societies tend to be alike. This result is somewhat different from the one obtained before controlling for the individual-level attributes according to which the Muslims' score on this variable was higher than that of the Protestants. Table 7.3c also reveals that the Catholic societies tend to be on the whole less democratically oriented than either the Protestant or the Muslim ones. This pattern is practically identical to that of Table 7.1.

Table 7.3d reveals that with respect to levels of post-materialism, both Catholic and Protestant societies have a considerably higher score than the Muslim group, which lags behind by over 12 points.

Finally, the figures of Table 7.3e indicate that Catholic and Muslim societies are much less inclined than Protestant ones to emphasize the importance of educating children for independence rather than obedience. Note that this pattern differs from the results of Table 7.1, which show that the Catholics have the lowest score on this measure. In other words, after controlling for the individual-level variables, it appears that the contextual effects on this variable clearly distinguish between Protestantism on the one hand, and Islam as well as Catholicism on the other.

On the whole, the results presented in Tables 7.3a–7.3e indicate that all three religions have noticeable yet variable contextual influences on the societies in which they are predominant. Nevertheless, if we consider the dependent variables used in this study as measures of modern-liberal values, the Protestants appear on the whole on the upper level of this syndrome followed by the Catholics and the Muslims (see also Woodberry and Shah, 2004, Berger 2004).

CORELIGIONISTS AS MAJORITIES AND MINORITIES:
DOES IT MAKE A DIFFERENCE?

Due to a myriad of historical circumstances, including border modification, relocation, and voluntary or forced migration, a sizable portion of humankind resides in countries where it constitutes a religious minority. In relation to their countries of origin, such minorities are frequently conceived as diasporas. In the context of our chapter, this reality raises the following question: Does living in the diaspora make a difference with respect to the value priorities of religious minorities? More specifically, we wish to probe to what extent Catholic, Protestant, or Muslim minorities differ from their counterparts in countries where they represent the predominant majority.

Any attempt to address this question should keep in mind the variety and complexity of the factors and processes that may affect the potential influences of religious minorities and majorities on each other. The encounter between such groups may lead to quite different outcomes in terms of the closeness or distance in values, attitudes, and behavior. Furthermore, when assessing such encounters, attention must also be given to the potential effect of prior selection. That is, religious minorities in the diaspora do not necessarily represent the larger community from which they have emigrated. Notwithstanding these observations, it still seems relevant to find out the degree to which the value orientations of the minority groups under study tend to resemble the majority groups of the same religion.

To perform these comparisons we created a separate file containing the members of the minority and majority groups of each of the three religions. The religious identity of each individual was established on the basis of self-definition. Next we computed for each of the three minority groups the mean scores of the five dependent variables and compared them with the mean scores of their religiously equivalent majorities (see Table 7.4 below).

As the figures indicate, it appears that all three religious minorities depart to some extent and in different directions from their coreligionists' majorities. This finding should be of little surprise given the widespread distribution of these minorities across practically the entire globe and the myriad of factors affecting their past and present circumstances. For these reasons it seems impossible to interpret the gaps shown in Table 7.4 without giving attention to each specific minority according to its unique circumstances—a task that is beyond the scope of this

Table 7.4 Differences Between Coreligionists' Minorities and Majorities*

	Protestants	Catholics	Muslims
Religiosity	-13.8	-1.7	5.0
Political Activism	14.7	-12.3	-8.8
Democratic Orientation	12.5	-12	12.6
Post-Materialism	0.6	-0.7	-7.8
Education for independence	27.7	-23.3	4.9
<i>Absolute sum</i>	<i>69.3</i>	<i>50.0</i>	<i>39.1</i>

* Note: the figures are the results of subtracting the scores of the minorities from the scores of the majorities for each measure.

chapter. However, it still seems reasonable to utilize the results shown in Table 7.4 to assess the overall gap between each of the three religious minorities and their majority counterparts. For this purpose we computed the absolute sum of the differences between the relevant pairs, with the results shown in the bottom row of Table 7.4.

As can be seen, the size of dissimilarity between the two Muslim groups tends to be smaller than the comparable gaps among Catholics and Protestants, in order. This pattern is consistent with the results obtained regarding the level of homogeneity of the three religions in the societies where they constitute the predominant majority. In other words, Muslims and Protestants exhibit, respectively, the highest and lowest levels of homogeneity according to both criteria.

SUMMARY

The general conclusion emerging from the empirical results presented in this chapter is that religion in predominantly Catholic, Protestant, and Muslim societies is alive and doing well, as reflected, among other things, in the relatively high levels of religiosity in these societies, especially the Muslim ones. Furthermore, all three religions appear to have significant contextual effects on the value priorities of individual members of society, albeit to different degrees and directions. Overall, the value priorities of Protestant-majority societies tend to be more modern-liberal, whereas Muslim-majority societies tend to embrace more traditional-conservative values. Catholic societies represent a mixed group in this respect, though they tend to be closer to the Protestants.

A salient exception to these conclusions concerns the high regard for democracy in the Islamic societies, reaching the same level as that of the Protestants, though its meaning for the former is not clear given that Muslim-dominated societies are less favorable than Protestant ones to democratically-related values such as political involvement, post-materialism, and the socialization of children for independence.

The findings also reveal that except for the measure of democratic orientation, the Protestant societies tend to be the most heterogeneous of the three groups whereas the Muslim ones are the most homogeneous. Furthermore, the overall distance between the value priorities of Muslim minorities and Muslim majorities is smaller than the parallel distance among Catholics and Protestants. Keeping in mind that the level of religiosity in Muslim societies is far higher than in the two other groups, we may conclude that Islam appears to be the most viable of the three religions, representing a “community of believers” the solidarity of which is based on a high level of religiosity and shared sociopolitical values.

APPENDIX 7.I

COUNTRIES BY RELIGIOUS GROUPS, DEPENDANT
VARIABLES (MEANS AND SDS)¹

	<i>country</i>	<i>Dominant rel. in pop. (%)</i>
PROTESTANT	Denmark	95
	Finland	84
	Germany	62
	Iceland	86
	Netherlands	61
	New Zealand*	67
	South africa	73
	Sweden	87
USA	54	
CATHOLIC	Argentina	92
	Austria	74
	Belgium	75
	Brazil*	74
	Chile	70
	Colombia*	90
	Dominican Republic*	95
	El Salvador*	83
	France	83-88
	Ireland	88
	Italy	90
	Luxembourg	87
	Malta	98
	Mexico	77
	Peru	81
	Philippines	81
	Portugal	85
	Puerto Rico	85
	Spain	94
	Uruguay*	66
Venezuela	96	

Appendix 7.I (*cont.*)

	<i>country</i>	<i>Dominant rel. in pop. (%)</i>
MUSLIM	Algeria	99
	Bangladesh	83
	Egypt	90
	Indonesia	86
	Iran	98
	Jordan	92
	Morocco	99
	Pakistan	97
	Turkey	100

¹ The surveys were done in 2000, except of the countries marked with * where it was done in 1995.

APPENDIX 7.II

CONSTRUCTION OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES

1. *Religiosity*: This variable is constructed as an index made of 3 questionnaire items which measure the importance of religion and of God in one's life, and of encouraging religious faith in children.
2. *Political Activism*: An index comprised of the following items: readiness to sign political petitions, attending lawful demonstrations, participation in illegal acts of protest such as occupying government and public buildings.
3. *Democratic Orientation*: A 3-item index: Preference for a democratic political system, for a strong political leader, and evaluation of democracy's indecisiveness (note that the scales for the last two items were reversed).
4. *Post-Materialism*: an index reflecting the priorities given to "post materialist" over "materialist" values from a list containing 4 "materialist" and 4 "post-materialist" items. The 4 "materialist" items: maintaining law and order, fighting rising prices, enabling high levels of economic growth and having strong defense forces. The post materialist items: giving people more say in government decisions, making our cities more beautiful, protecting freedom of speech, and giving people more say in the workplace and the community.
5. *Preferred values for children*: Respondents were asked to choose from a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home, those which are especially important. The relevant qualities for our study were independence and obedience. Accordingly, a score of 2 was given to respondents who chose "independence" and didn't choose "obedience" and a score of 0 was given when obedience was preferred over independence. When neither quality was selected the assigned score was 1.

APPENDIX 7.III

INDIVIDUAL LEVEL INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Gender: coded 1 for males and 0 for females.

Age: natural scale.

Schooling: scale ranging from 1 (inadequately completed elementary education) to 8 (university degree)

Religious practice: scale ranging from 1 (never attends religious services) to 8 (more than once a week)

CHAPTER EIGHT

RETHINKING HISTORY FROM TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES

David Thelen

When I attended graduate school in Madison, Wisconsin, in the 1960s, nation-states were the self-evident focus for the discipline of history. Nation-states expressed people's identities, focused their dreams, arbitrated their differences, solved their problems, exercised their collective sovereignty, fought their wars. Modern professional historical scholarship grew up alongside the nation-state. Its mission was to document and explain the rise, reform, and fall of nation-states and national cultures. And professional history developed a civic mission to teach citizens to contain their experiences within nation-centered narratives.

Now, some 45 years later, I have a very different take on the practice of history and the work of nations. In particular, I question the assumption that history either can or should assume the centrality of nation-states. Part of the change comes from what I learned from interactions over the 1990s as editor of the *Journal of American History* with hundreds of historians who practiced the discipline outside the United States as we explored initiatives to try to internationalize the practice of history (Thelen 1992).

Part of my interest in internationalization came from engaging the intellectual, political, and cultural currents that were swirling through historical scholarship, challenges to master narratives like those of nation-states, challenges to the authority of the discipline and its methods. And stepping still further back, I recognize that this initiative to rethink history in transnational perspectives was part of larger historical challenges to the identity and authority of nation-states. The widening spread across national borders of institutions such as multinational corporations and CNN, of social movements such as feminism and environmentalism, and of unprecedented migrations of people have unleashed processes of hybridization and creolization as people shape new and multiple identities. The global reach of corporations and capitalism have also battered at the capacity of people to effectively

shape control over their lives within their nation-states. Even the concept of citizenship, once the unquestioned right of nation-states to bestow, has been shaken by movements that claim that people's civic rights belong to and should accompany them as human beings wherever they go, not be bestowed on them by nation-states (Barber 1995, Bender 2002, Greider 1997, Jameson and Miyoshi 1998, LaFeber 1999, Reich 1991).

These changes, in turn, sparked resistance in many forms, including new notions of nationhood like "black nationalism," Nation of Islam, Queer Nation, as well as transnational sort-of nationalisms like Hispanic and Latino. As some people construct borderlands between cultures—as migrants, in intermarriage or in languages like Spanglish—others invoke nation-states or national cultures to try to prevent such mixing or creolization.

In thinking about how to approach internationalization of history we began by following the prevailing thrust of the literature toward debating a priori assumptions and ideologies about what nation-states should be or do. We would debate definitions of concepts like nation, diaspora, global citizenship, homeland, hostland. Over time, however, we came increasingly to conclude that the worst approach was to assume or define the things to be questioned and investigated. What mattered was not to define what a nation-state (or a diaspora) could or should be—or what transnational should mean—but how people experienced and constructed nation, state or diaspora as they went about their lives. We wanted to explore the challenges and constructions individuals experienced when they crossed national borders or when they encountered the nation-state within their own borders (Thelen 1999a). We reached the same conclusion as participants in a recent *American Historical Review* forum on transnational possibilities for history: The most exciting point to begin to draw attention to and begin that study is with circuits and circulation—of people, ideas, institutions, as they encounter possibilities and constraints when they cross national borders and to assume that such circulation, such movement, is natural and frequent (AHR Conversation 2006).

Along the way we discovered the exciting possibilities for exploration contained in the prefix "trans," which draws attention to movement across, over, or through nations. As Aiwah Ong wrote: "Trans denotes both moving through space or across lines, as well as changing the nature of something. Besides suggesting new relations between nation-states and capital, transnationality also alludes to the *trans*versal, the

transactional, the *translational*, and the *transgressive* aspects of contemporary behavior and imagination” (Ong 1999: 4).

Movement and encounter, memories and anticipations, possibilities and constraints, these are the points we found most productive for observation from transnational perspective. Diasporas obviously are great examples because they point to the circularity, continuity, and multidirectionality of movements of people, as Donna Gabaccia has written, and we can approach them by starting with individuals, families and communities and leave open for investigation what they have to do with nation-states (Gabaccia 1999).

BORDERLANDS

The first transnational line of sight is to watch individuals meet their personal needs as they inhabit the borderlands between cultures. This study of how individuals and families have experienced and interpreted borderlands between the United States and Mexico—as migrant workers or artists or diplomats—has opened a paradigm for one of the most exciting themes of history repositioned in transnational terms. This consists of problematizing how individuals met everyday needs by creating distinctive spaces in circuits or circulations between nation-states and national cultures, incorporating, negotiating, transforming and rejecting expectations and demands of those speaking in the name or using the police powers of nation-states or national cultures. Gloria Anzaldúa memorably evoked this tension between individuality and culture: “As a Mestiza, I continually walk out of one culture and into another, because I am in all cultures at the same time... I am an act of kneading, of uniting and joining that not only has produced both a creature of darkness and a creature of light, but also a creature that questions the definitions of light and dark and gives them new meanings” (Anzaldúa 1987: 80, 81). Richard Rodriguez (2002) gives the title *Brown* to evoke with an image of color his recent exploration of (and case for) racial and cultural mixing. And Barack Obama’s candidacy for the presidency of the United States has brought the individual challenges of confronting and negotiating spaces between nations (and cultures and races) into sharp focus (Obama 1995).

But as individuals transgress borders, nation-states and cultures try to police borders to keep strangers from entering and members from

straying. The United States government struggles to control borderlands through policies governing immigration, citizenship, and trade, for example. In the spring of 2006 huge rallies—millions in Chicago, Los Angeles, and dozens of other cities—centered on a proposed law by which the nation-state would criminalize those stateless (i.e., undocumented) individuals who ignored the nation-state's immigration and citizenship laws. At a Los Angeles rally a person carried a sign that brought into plain view this tension between the state and individual. His sign asserted that his right to live with his family was stronger than the state's right to brand him and others as criminals and deport individuals who crossed borders "illegally": "Loving my family is not a felony" (*Chicago Tribune* May 1–2, 2006). President George Bush named and tried to police another borderland by insisting that the state has the right to eavesdrop on private e-mail exchanges between individuals in the United States and individuals who lived outside the United States.

Borderlands perspectives raise an important theoretical issue: Are cultures reservoirs or traditions into which individuals reach for pieces they then individualize to meet their personal everyday needs? That is, do people simply and freely use and discard bits and pieces of their surrounding cultures and nations to meet their individual needs on their personal terms? Or are cultures solid or essentialized wholes which individuals walk in and out of, experiencing on the terms of the culture? The answer is clearly both, of course, but the dichotomy challenges us to specify processes of how creolizing or hybridizing relate to essentializing processes of choosing among or being coerced between cultures (Bustamante 1992, Cancilini 1995, Martinez 1994, Saldivar J.D. 1997, Saldivar R. 2006).

Between individual and culture rests what Charles Cooley first identified as "primary groups," face to face relationships like those of families or neighbors or childhood playmates, sites where individuals negotiated between cultures and nations (Cooley 1909). From this perspective individuals sometimes in their intimate lives experienced nation-states and cultures as liberating and sometimes as coercive.

From a borderlands perspective individuals are larger than groups or cultures because they contain within themselves many possible identities and roles which, in turn, provide them access to traditions, debates, and resources of each possible identity. A woman could think of herself as a secretary, Methodist, Italian-American, vegetarian, lesbian, Chicagoan, alcoholic, Republican, American, not to mention a mother,

daughter, or sister—and each identity presents fluid and contested points of access to others who share any of those roles. As George Herbert Mead noted long ago, each role presents us with a chance to explore different aspects of our individuality (Strauss 1977).

INDIVIDUAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF NATIONS

The second line of sight is to step up close to see how individuals in their everyday experiences constructed their expectations for what nations and nation-states could be and do. Since one point of transnational perspectives is to problematize how individuals experience and frame the nation we need to attend to how they experience nation even when they never leave its borders. Listen to Victor Klemperer veer back and forth as he struggles to make sense in his diary of events that are unfolding in 1933 and he was trying to work out what “Germany” was coming to mean and how he felt about it. On March 30 he writes: “I feel shame more than fear, shame for Germany. I have truly always felt a German.” On April 3 later he writes “Everything I consider un-German, brutality, injustice, hypocrisy, mass suggestion to the point of intoxication, all of it flourishes here.” By April 25th he worries that “perhaps the current madness is indeed a typically German madness.” By July 13 he writes of the Nazis “this form is nowhere to be found in German history; it is absolutely un-German and consequently will not have any kind of long-term durations. But for the moment it is organized with German thoroughness and therefore unlikely to be removed in the foreseeable future” (Klemperer 1998: 9, 11, 15, 24–25). To watch and listen as Klemperer, a scholar of literature, tries to make sense of national German culture in what he sees and hears around him—as he records what the Nazis are doing and how people react—is to re-experience his challenges in trying to frame what German meant in everyday practice.

Scenes at the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, the most popular memory site in Washington, likewise illustrate the rich diversity of ways people intersect the nation as they experience relationships with those dear to them. Jan Scruggs, the veteran who led the campaign for the memorial, insisted that “there was no such thing as ‘the war in Vietnam.’ There had been many wars” (Scruggs and Swerdlow 1985). When individuals placed intimate items into cracks in an individual’s name carved on the memorial’s face they were often remembering that

individual in a different role from that of soldier for the nation—as son or lover, say—and were remembering a different time than war. How should we relate the national significance of the war as an historical event to each of the 58,132 individuals whose names are now on the memorial only because they all shared a common fate that ended their lives?

Since this book seeks to raise comparative perspectives on its issues I want to commend the suggestion of Nicholas Canny, a great historian of the British Empire, that instead of imposing comparisons on our subjects historians should listen to people make their own comparisons (Canny 1999). When people speak of their everyday lives we should attend to how and why they choose to compare their circumstances with those of the Roman Empire, say, rather than the Hapsburg or Ottoman or Aztec empires. When individuals frame their personal experiences as slavery, we should listen to whether they imagined Biblical accounts of the Israelites or accounts of Greek or Brazilian slavery, whether they associated chattel slavery with wage slavery. By making these comparisons people locate themselves in the world's history on their own terms. For the Nazis racial segregation in the United States provided a perfect model—as well as laws to copy—for how they wanted to segregate Jews in Germany.

We can free comparative history from its nation-centered preoccupation, from its distant line of sight, by listening to actors in the past define where they stand and what they see, where they look for framing their lives and choices. By shifting the authority for making comparisons from historians to original participants, we let participants tell us what was important about their experiences, how they experienced nation and state.

The transnational perspective of interrogating the once-presumed naturalness of nation-states, of assuming instead the fragility of nation-making, is clearly illustrated in events surrounding the Iraq War. A handful of American neo-conservative policywonks dreamed up the project of invading Iraq to show the world that the United States was a strong enough nation-state to defy the will of the rest of the world as expressed, for example, through the United Nations. Their unilateralist doctrine certainly was not the product of American public opinion which on the eve of the invasion blended into a worldwide phenomenon in which, as Jonathan Schell observed, for “the first time the people of the world expressed their clear and concerted will in regard to a pressing global issue.” On February 15, 2003, ten million

people rallied around the world to protest an American invasion that people feared was about to happen (and that did occur a month later). Ninety American cities passed official resolutions opposing an invasion. On the eve of the invasion 70% of Americans supported the German, French, Russian, Chinese, Canadian, Mexican and others' position that called on giving weapons inspectors more time to investigate whether Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, 53% said Bush had failed to make a case for war, and a clear majority thought the United States should not invade Iraq unless it received support from the UN (Schell 2003, Zakaris 2003).

This robust expression of democracy that clearly focused on transnational, not national, terms contrasts sharply with the hollowness and abstraction of the policymakers who took the United States to war. Everyone knew the United States was going to invade Iraq. But no one knew why. Officials floated a variety of possibilities—Saddam's tyranny, oil, Israel, Islamic fundamentalism, democracy in the Middle East, weapons of mass destruction. But what seems so strange, so surreal, then and now, is that none of these were what mattered. What mattered was that a small cabal within the United States wanted to invade Iraq and everyone else could guess why they really wanted to do it but were powerless to stop them. As *Time* magazine concluded: "Bush would like to have as much support as possible against Iraq, but in the end he requires only his own resolve" (Ratnesar 2003: 22). Americans did not need interests or reasons for war; they needed only resolve to fight, never mind why. The *Atlanta Constitution* captured the artificiality and fragility of national interest to this invasion in a cartoon in which Bush is talking with Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney. Bush tells them: "We need a larger list of countries that want the war so [turning to Rumsfeld] you're now officially the Republic of Don and [turning to Cheney] you're Cheneystan." And the hollowness of the claims for what constituted a nation were matched only by the subsequent difficulty of creating a legitimate or popular Iraqi nation-state.

Many scholars have illustrated how the project of inventing and constructing nations was a project of intellectual and political elites, particularly historians, and a new breed of leaders who wrapped their ambitions into the vision of making modern nations. History became even more intertwined with the nation-state as the nineteenth century wore on, responding first to romantic nationalism and later to the nation-centered thrust of professionalization. By questioning and

exploring just how individuals, leaders as well as ordinary folks, constructed and deployed their notions of nation and national culture we can map the vast range of uses to which people have put that concept. From my present perspective nations do not seem to be the fixed realities or givens, the natural, inevitable or popular projects I thought they were when I became an historian. Now they seem fragile, artificial, contested, and exquisitely contingent in what they can be and do (Thelen 1998).

COMPARATIVE HISTORICIZING OF WORK OF NATIONS

Instead of stepping up close to look at how individuals constructed and used the nation-state transnational perspectives could invite us to step back and look at how events in one nation seem to be part of larger historical patterns.

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries historians developed basic assumptions that still inform historiography for many scholars. Nation-states look and are powerful. They collect and distribute resources, including lives, money, and territory. They recruit and deploy troops to wage wars. They manage legal systems to punish crimes and adjudicate differences among citizens. They manage structures—elections and legislatures, for example—by which citizens expect their voices to be heard and translated into public policy. They regulate and discipline behavior by individuals and institutions. On the other hand, as we come to see them as increasingly contested and contingent, we can look for broader patterns in the ways they debate and perform these basic functions of nation-states and broader rises, falls, and shifts of emphasis and direction over time. We can trace shifts in popular faith in their very legitimacy, changing challenges, debates, and popular expectations for what they can and should be.

From this line of sight we could see how debates in one country parallel and overlap those in another, how similar expectations and debates for what a nation-state should be occur at the same time in different countries. The question of how much authority to assign national versus local governments rocks all three modern nations of North America in the 1860s and is settled only by civil war in the United States and Mexico. In the mid-nineteenth century armies advancing centralization in Italy likewise defeated forces of localism by military force. Similarly, in the 1930s people around the world seemed

to expect their nation-states to make unprecedented interventions into their political economies in part to overcome worldwide economic depressions. The unprecedented turning to national governments to solve problems occurs not only in the United States and Mexico but with different forms in Germany and Russia. Indeed, stepping further back, it looks as though the middle of the twentieth century, roughly from the 1930s to the 1960s, seems to be the time when people worldwide had their greatest faith that national governments could define and solve their problems, could win wars (with, say, atomic bombs), regulate race relations and other problems (as with, say, apartheid in South Africa), or could conquer disease.

Similarly, since the 1960s people around the world—reflected in the rise of New Left and New Right as well as the spread of economic and cultural globalism—have lost faith in powerful national governments to solve their problems. Popular allegiance to nation-states has declined as they have become more distant, fragile and abstract (Scott 1998). As a reflection of the widening gulf between citizens and the nation-state the percentage of Americans who told Gallup pollsters that they “trust Washington to do what is right all or most of the time” fell from 78% in 1964 to 19% by 1992 (Schneider 1992). Over the same period, Mexican scholars like Guilermo Bonfils Batalla questioned the authority of their nation-state by portraying that country as a product of a conflict between an imposed and artificial “imagined Mexico” over the genuine and powerful traditions and experiences of deeper and much older patterns of “Mexico Profundo” that antedated the nation-state by centuries (Batalla 1996).

The nation-centered isolation of historical practice has made it hard to see these larger patterns. Growing up in the nineteenth century to help people define their experiences in nation-centered terms, the history of the United States has been told as a set of unique stories: of a nation’s birth in a revolution against a European empire that had “settled” its lands as colonial outposts to advance commercial and religious agendas; of a moving frontier engagement with strange forms of nature, other empires, and Indian tribes; of massive nineteenth-century constitutional debates and ultimately civil war over whether power would be in local or national hands; of victory by forces of nationalism; of turn-of-the-century revolts to redistribute power from the privileged to the people; of a popular president in the 1930s who established a security net; of movements for democratization and empowerment that erupted in the 1960s; of a New Right movement

and its president in the 1980s who deregulated the economy and promoted free trade; and finally, in the 1990s, of a far-reaching debate about whether the nation's construction of itself as a melting pot any longer fits the national culture of its people. But those narratives of the United States of America also fit the United States of Mexico, *Estados Unidos Mexicanos*. The similarities have been hard to recognize in part because people experienced parallel processes and events differently in the two countries and in part because they used different formulations to make sense of those differences (Thelen 1999b).

From a transnational perspective it appears that older expectations for what nation-states can be and do—sites where popular sovereignty is constructed, debated over, exercised—are now being increasingly constructed and projected onto transnational bodies. Writers like Linda Bosniak (2000), Yasemin Soysal (1994), and Saskia Sassen (1996) have argued that people are experiencing the claiming of political rights and citizenship increasingly in transnational circuits or arenas and sometimes in direct opposition to nation-states and regardless of whether those claims are legally or formally tied to a nation-state.

Coming to see how the United States government, ostensibly committed to democracy, supported authoritarian one-party rule in Mexico Sergio Aguayo founded *Alianza Cívica* to rally human rights advocates from both sides of the border to challenge both nation-states to stop blocking movements for democracy (Aguayo 1999). The struggle over democracy and authoritarianism united citizens across borders even as the most important barriers to that democracy were the two nation-states.

Many citizens increasingly look abroad for encouragement, models, possibilities, resources, ideas, for like-minded people to join their struggles often against national policies, institutions, and cultures. Reflecting this growing transnational approach to problems, the number of NGOs—notice that they are creating and exercising citizenship in civic and public spaces that construct transnational alternatives both to the nation and the state—dedicated to human rights rose from 33 in 1953 to 168 in 1993, to women's rights from 10 in 1953 to 61 in 1993, and to environmental protection from 1 in 1953 to 90 in 1993 (Keck and Skikkink 1998).

A corollary of this movement to historicize expectations for the nation-state is to historicize the discovery of transnational perspectives. Transnational perspectives are not new either as lenses through which to look at the past or as phenomena people experienced in the past.

Forms change, to be sure, but people have constructed lives, ideas, products, social movements, artistic expressions across national borders for a long time. Karl Marx, after all, constructed “the workers of the world” as his subject. Since some kinds of globalization reach back a long time—think of 1492 as a familiar date—it’s important to explore how its forms and dynamics change over time. And events that look national to their participants have resonances abroad. American radicals traveled to Mexico or Nicaragua or the Soviet Union to find ideas, experiences or inspiration they lacked in the United States. The European revolutions of 1848 inspired women to gather in Seneca Falls, New York, in 1848 to form the first women’s rights program. Nineteenth century movements for abolition of slavery, women’s rights, temperance and prohibition, worker solidarity, or peace or twentieth century movements for environmental protection, civil rights and human rights were even more deeply transnational than corporations.

Viewing history from transnational perspectives may problematize assumptions about relations of historical practice to its audiences and thereby challenge history’s traditionally nation-centered civics and professional training. Since modern professional history was invented to try to get people to frame their experiences in nation-centered terms, to feel loyalty to the nation-state, recent developments have shaken this traditional civics for history. On one level regimes in over twenty nations—Germany, Chile, Peru, South Africa, Australia, Argentina, Canada, Uganda—over the past half-century have launched agonizing struggles by people to see their pasts differently, to come to terms with things they did in the past but now find evil or at least embarrassing (Minow 1998, Hayner 2002). At another level professional historians in countries as different as Mexico, Germany, South Africa, Australia and the United States have over the past generation challenged prevailing narratives and practices. As one reflection, the content of history textbooks for school classrooms have been the focus for major conflicts in many countries of the world. Indeed, a major challenge is precisely to explore what transnational practice of historians and other scholars will look like (Nash et al. 1997).

The chance to explore how professional history is practiced in other countries was the chance to interrogate the uniquely hard-driving, self-referential, individual-centered drive of American historical scholarship toward a certain kind of originality of fashion and content. In the United States, unlike even Britain, historical scholarship evolved its national focus partly to suppress local, antiquarian, and amateur

historical practices. On the other hand, collective practices in other parts of the world, whether aimed toward civic change or toward broader understanding of an issue in the past, challenge the individualism of American practice. The largest transformation as historians explore more transnational perspectives may be that the underlying cultures that sustain the discipline and practice of history in different countries, once an important contributor to the modern construction of nations, will themselves be changed.

CHAPTER NINE

ACROSS SPACE AND TIME: IDENTITY AND TRANSNATIONAL DIASPORAS

Tobie Nathan

“Diaspora” implies the notion of identity—as far as I am concerned, I would prefer to call this “thing” a nucleus. Indeed, in order to recognize that a people, located in a “homeland”, both real and mythical, can become dispersed through centuries of migration, one first needs to acknowledge its permanence. Discussions were in fact largely fueled by the acknowledgment or radical refusal of such permanence. One might be tempted to think that being a trained psychologist, I might have a more precise idea of the personal category referred to as ethnic identity, or belonging, or simply a person’s identity; in any event, that which guarantees his or her permanence in time.

Identity, a self-evident category, nevertheless seems impossible to define, enmeshed as it is in inextricable ideological networks: national identity, ethnic identity, biological identity, family identity, psychological identity, personal identity, idiosyncratic identity. Perhaps one might prefer in its place the concept of belonging or membership, allowing for the following statement: “I am a Frenchman, a chess player, an alumnus of the August Renoir High School, a member of the French Psychological Society, of the Bujumbura Rotary Club, and of the Association of Healers of Abomey” and so forth.

From this perspective, it would be easy to describe multiple, unstable identities subject to change within a lifespan, attributing equal value to each. If the first way of defining identity at the junction of institutional categories, in the manner of a descriptive sheet, is relevant to police work or to customs officials, the second way, pertaining to the multiplicity of belonging or membership, is similar to the journalist’s point of view, a chronicler of passing time. However, we all know this isn’t the way of the world. Identity, in common sense, is not like a passport photo: it possesses considerable power. We are all aware of the fact that identity issues, at once asserted, enthusiastic and frenzied, shake the world and capture minds. Identity, almost in the sense of the word’s

literal meaning, is *being what one is and nothing else*. Yet the question remains: who can claim to be whom or what he or she is and nothing else? When I question my Yoruba friend from Benin, Lucien Hounkpatin, whose family is from Porto Novo, “Are you Yoruba?”, his answer is: “I’m a crocodile”. And if I ask myself a similar question, I have to admit that, in this very restrictive sense, according to Jewish tradition, only God has an identity, He alone is what and who He is and nothing else, He who precisely introduces Himself to Moses in the following way: “I am who I am”¹ (or “I will be who I will be”) and whose name, the tetragrammaton, YHYH, is a conjugation of the verb “to be”.

Thus, we are faced with an aporia: in order to account for transnational diasporas, we need the concept of identity—a psychological concept. Yet this very notion of “identity” slips from our grasp as soon as we attempt to define it. In addition, today’s world has further confused the issue, as if the world were saying: it is impossible to consider identity, meaning permanence, simply as a kind of essential nature, as in “I am a crocodile.” It must be considered first and foremost as a plan or a project, in other words, the projection of one’s being into a becoming. “I am taking on this project—a life plan or a political project—that defines a destiny for me from which I can infer my past”. Looking at the world in action, such are the processes at stake.

I will develop my argument by addressing three dimensions that I will attempt to bring together: naming practices, attachments, and therapies. I will show that in order to determine people’s identities, it is much more reasonable to turn to the non-human beings characteristic of the worlds they come from than to rely on their own assertions. This approach will also shed light on surprising attachments of people who otherwise appear perfectly adjusted to modern society, namely their attachment to beings, things, rituals and forces typical of bygone worlds and times and yet which unexpectedly crop up again with the strength and passion of mysticism.

NAMES

Under the influence of popular psychology, circulated by the media, it seems natural, nowadays, to think that a person’s name is the result of

¹ *eyeh asher eyeh*, “I AM WHO I AM. Say this to the children of Israel, ‘I AM has sent me to you’” Exodus 3: 14.

his or her parents' fancy. Freud, for example, chose his children's names to honor his masters. Such was, one is tempted to think, his own idiosyncratic fancy (Anzieu 1975). Thus, he named one son Martin in honor of Charcot (whose first name was Jean-Martin), another son he named Ernst, in memory of Ernst Brücke, his master in neurology; he named his daughter Mathilda, after Joseph Breuer's wife. This type of practice is currently so widespread that it has become commonplace for mothers to suggest such and such a more or less exotic name for their future baby because they find it "pretty" or because "it sounds good" or because it sits well with the family name. Yet, working with African populations has taught me the extent to which the choice of a child's name is a complex project, a process in which what is at stake is, explicitly, the *construction* of a person.

My first surprise was the realization that in the societies from which the families I treated were from, a child wasn't *given* a name: rather the newborn baby's name had to be *discovered*. In other words, as the newcomer to a family, but also to a lineage, or even to a village, this new arrival already *has* an identity. He or she is a person, not a piece of clay or a "*tabula rasa*", even though at first, and for a few days (usually the first week), he or she is still a stranger. She will have to be identified, her name revealed and not "made up" according to the whims of this or that relative. In effect, these societies behave towards the newborn child as they would towards a visitor: "who is he? Why has he come to us?" Questions such as these primarily inform the naming process. But how does one find out the name of a visitor who can't speak, at least not in the language of his hosts? Well, most of these cultures posit that in the absence of an utterance from the visitor's mouth, the name can nevertheless be discovered by scrutinizing the baby's environment. Indeed, the newcomer's name has necessarily stamped itself in the course of events. What happened to the mother during the pregnancy? What happened in the immediate environment, in the family, in the village, ever since the child exhibited his or her wish to come into the world—in other words, since the first signs of the pregnancy? Hence some people are named "Much suffering", others "So many dead!"...others still "The undertaker has been very busy".

Consider, however, that such names don't merely identify an individual, they enfold the person and outline her destiny. A name of this sort is therefore also, above all else in fact, a *divination*. More so: it is able to divert and alter misfortunes foretold by events before and during the pregnancy. Indeed, such names are known to have protective

and deterrent powers. Most of the time, they aren't immediately comprehensible. For example, in Kikongo, the name *Mampassi* (literally: "hardship", "pain") refers to an implicit statement: "the pains of childbirth were in vain..." In other words: "what was the use of going through so much pain only to see the child shortly pass away?" The rationale is to indicate in the child's name that he is doomed, destined to die, that sorcerers (*Ndoki* in Kikongo or Lingala) will end up "eating" him.² But the reality of things is even more complex since making public the fact that the child will die because of the evil deeds of sorcerers is expected to deter those very sorcerers, unmasked by their victim's accusatory name, from approaching the child. It is as if making explicit someone's destiny could divert its course. This way of naming is therefore remarkably polysemic. Such is the naming tradition in matrilineal contexts, like that of the "Kongo", for example, though its practice is gradually disappearing. A person's name, here, isn't in any way an identification tool; it has a protective function for the individual and is all at once:

- (1) an acknowledgment of his or her essential nature,
- (2) and a kind of divination, one of whose main characteristics, as with any divination process, is that it is intelligible only once the predicted destiny has been accomplished,
- (3) a protective device against the dangers identified by the divination.

This is nothing new. Similar naming practices are already referred to in the Bible, regarding, for instance, Jacob's and also Joseph's children. Here is an example: "and Leah conceived and bore a son, and she named him Reuben, for she said, 'Because the Lord has seen my affliction, for now my husband will love me.'"³ The first part of Reuben's name is easy to comprehend: the Hebrew *reu* refers to the verb *ra'a*, "he saw". But the second part of the name requires an interpretation or commentary. Rashi for instance, a famous commentator of the text, writes that Reuben is the condensation of "Look (*Reu*) at the difference between my son (*ben*) and the son of my father-in-law." Because, unlike the son of her father-in-law (her husband), Leah's own son will love her. The name Reuben, according to this interpretation, is a reference to Leah's humiliation as Jacob's first wife, yet less beloved by her husband

² A clinical case of "cannibalistic sorcery" is reported in Nathan (2001).

³ Genesis 29:32.

than her younger sister Rachel, Jacob's second wife. The child's name should thus be understood as the condensation of an entire sentence and its meaning is liable to be uncovered by one who knows how to unravel it. Be that as it may, by indicating in her child's name the dangers that threaten him because of his mother's suffering, Leah all at once:

- (1) acknowledges, designates and compels her son,
- (2) predicts a certain destiny for him,
- (3) tries to protect him from the violence inherent to this destiny.

The very common name Habimana, in Rwanda and Burundi, which can be translated by "Thank God!" is also the abbreviation of an entire sentence that I was able to identify many times during my stay in Burundi and Rwanda. "Her mother was on such bad terms with her grandmother and he nevertheless managed to see the light of day... *habimana*, "Thank God!"

Here is an example of the way in which certain distortions of the naming process sometimes appear among these same populations once they have immigrated to France. A Congolese family who went through a series of ordeals after immigrating, culminating with the decision by child protection services to place their first child in foster care, had a second child three years later. To the amazed civil servant in charge of registering the newborn child's name, the father declared he wished to name his son: "Human Rights-Freedom". The hardship his family had experienced since his arrival in France, particularly during his wife's last pregnancy, had led him to conclude that such was his child's name, since social services had, in his opinion, neglected his rights and freedom. From a strictly cultural point of view, the father was applying a child-naming rule in keeping with the cultural practices of his group. Indeed, as we have already seen, the Bakongo name the child in reference to notable events during the pregnancy. Yet in this case, the father attempted to do so:

- (1) outside his group,
- (2) in a solitary manner,
- (3) and explicitly.

Let us dwell a few moments on this last point. Names chosen in this way, at once deterrent and protective, are generally kept secret—sometimes the person who carries the name itself doesn't know it. Indeed,

though these names do contain a message, the message is not addressed to the person's human environment but to the invisible beings surrounding him. Thus the implicit phrase in the name *Mampasi* given to a Congolese child is not directed towards other humans, but towards the *ndoki*, "sorcerers" in both Lingala and Kikongo, those sorcerers with two pairs of eyes, so as to divert them from the child. "Human Rights", in contrast, is a name addressed to social workers and civil servants who, at least in our present state of knowledge, are not supernatural beings.

The way in which, in African villages, severely disturbed children that, in the West, would be considered either psychotic or autistic, will guide us and help us moving forward in our thinking. In many African societies, the behavior of certain children unable to speak at age two, three, four,—sometimes even fifteen, or who never acquire speech—is considered intentional. My wording here is not entirely satisfactory: indeed, I'm not sure Africans would agree it accurately reflects their judgment, that they actively *consider* these children in this manner. However, according to my observations, in the presence of such children, in their interventions to change the course of things, they act *as if* they thought in such a way. It appears, therefore, that to them—or rather to their culture—, these children are not only badly disposed towards their families, cultural groups, probably towards all of mankind, and are not only mean persons, but what is more, is that they are united and organized in gangs. In Senegal, such children are referred to as *nit ku bon* (Zempleni and Rabain 1965),⁴ which literally means "bad person". A very well known example is found in Benin: the Yoruba refer to such children as *abiku*, from *abi*, "to be born" and *ku*, "to die". Thus they are referred to as "to be born and to die" which can also be interpreted as "dead-reborn" since such children are born, are loved by their parents and then die before the age of one, in order to make their mothers sad. It was observed that such children, if they are not protected according to very specific procedures, may suddenly pass away mysteriously. Elsewhere, for example among the Serer, such children are called "the child who comes and goes". Children of this nature are generally known to have a sharp and critical outlook towards their environment. Several stories report their thoughts about human beings:

⁴ Wolof proverb: *Nit ku bon jiko mat na moytu*—"A bad man must be avoided". A broader review of this theme in Nathan (2000).

Oh! Is the world of humans like this? I didn't expect it to be so rotten. I imagined the Earth very differently. I'm going back to where I came from! (Nathan and Hounkpatin 1998).

What is important here is to note that this type of conception informs “therapeutic” interventions applied to such children. Because the *abikus* form a group, and because they are badly disposed, or in the least, condescending towards humans, the rationale of the therapeutic intervention is therefore to separate the child suspected of being an *abiku* from his fellow *abikus*. One idea informing the treatment of children such as these is the giving of a specific name at birth if their nature has been identified early on, or the changing of their name if their nature is discovered later. For example, they may be given derogatory or even outright vulgar names in order to dissuade other *abiku* children from approaching them. Thus, a child may be given the name Ekudi, meaning “broken calabash on a garbage heap”. But giving him a very meaningful name can also influence an *abiku*'s character, in order to strengthen his will to resist the call of other *abikus*. For example, the name *Malomo*, meaning “not to leave”, may be chosen to give the child the strength and desire to resist the mermaids' song of his fellow *abikus*, to stay despite the enticement of his accomplices; or *Banjoko*, “remain seated and calm”. Hence, advice can be included in the child's name; another example is the name *Iledi*, “The earth is closed, blocked” implying that there is no point in trying to be buried.

Such names, typical of both naming and therapeutic practices, reveal the theory of identity active in these African societies, a theory which can be outlined as follows:

- (1) A person's identity is hidden. It is useless to search for it by way of objective categories, or in the person's own self-perception, or in the gaze or words of others. And if it were incumbent on us to conceptualize it, it should be defined as *this person's destined impact on the world*.
- (2) Identifying someone is a far cry from singling out an individual from within a classification; identifying someone always involves an act of divination.
- (3) Such an act is never without consequences. It may facilitate the expression of the person's destiny, or on the contrary, hinder it. This is why identifying facts or elements are hidden from common humans, sometimes even from the person's closest relatives.
- (4) Hence, the names that most accurately specify the person, those that are most proper to him or her, setting the person's destiny, are most of the time kept secret.

It also becomes clear why, in these cultures as in many others (such as in the Middle East and in India), changing a person's name is one of the most powerful therapeutic tools.

One last point: in such a context, the popular idea according to which a person's name influences that person and may even determine his or her actions is mistaken (don't name your son Napoleon, for example). Rather, the argument is that naming is an act of divination involving the dynamic complexity of any divination process, according to the triptych *prediction, prescription, protection*—three characteristics any divination process must include.

Considering the rationale inherent to naming practices in certain African societies, identity is far from being an essence or nature. A given individual's identity should be considered not as a set of facts about the person which may be collected thanks to a series of questions, but rather as the result of an investigation of changes in the state of the world. Such an identity, such an analysis of the world, must be read by seers whose enunciations will allow a person's destiny to be accomplished or on the contrary hinder its accomplishment or curb its course.

Hence, the naming process implies an entire group, its history but also perhaps above all an individual's path as it is being accomplished, what I will call his project—the projection of his being into a becoming.

To say of someone that his name is so and so, certainly isn't to take a stand on that person's specific essence, but it is always a prediction on the state of the world owing to that person's existence.

ILLNESSES, ENTITIES, IDENTITIES

Illness is sometimes an individual manifestation wherein a person's identity is revealed both to the person and to his or her family and friends. This is true more particularly of disorders classified in our regions as psychiatric and on which I would like to dwell for a moment.

Many cultures around the world consider that there are beings—we will call them "beings"—, non human beings, that are able to take over people's bodies, occupy their mental processes, and impose on them certain behaviors. The existence of such beings is well known, and they are presumed to be the cause of disorders affecting individuals as well as families, dwellings, and sometimes even entire villages.⁵ In Arabic

⁵ Such a definition is notably as valid to a researcher in biology as to an anthropologist.

Muslim traditions, they are referred to as *djinn* (plural: *jnun*). Their presence is detected through their effect on the world. In Morocco, people say that at noontime, the *jnun* throw stones onto the roofs of houses. Attracted by blood, they may be prone to follow a woman as she leaves the butcher shop; they may even hide in the drops of blood fallen from the paper in which the meat she has just bought is wrapped. They are able to go through walls, including very thick ones. Usually, they live in places uninhabited by humans: the foundations of abandoned houses, garbage dumps, water pipes, fallow fields, treetops, the bush. In Mali, not far from Bamako, I once met an elderly Bambara healer who lived in a small hamlet of a few houses in the middle of the bush. He claimed that he was the only person who could live there because the place was owned by spirits. Each time a family had tried to settle there, fires and other such catastrophic events had plagued the settlers forcing them to leave. It was an obvious fact that he only had been accepted by the true owners of the place. These beings are part of the “natural” world, so to speak, and their existence is confirmed by innumerable stories, testimonies, texts, memories. Their ecology is pretty well known and organizes the behavior of humans. Thus, it is advisable not to go out at noon. It is also best to avoid letting blood drop to the ground, or to step over or into a pool of blood. One must also be careful when pouring boiling oil down the drain, lest one should scorch the *jnun* who might be in the pipes. Hence the phrase *Destoor ya s’hab el ard* (“Pardon me, owners of the ground!”) uttered before pouring out the oil used for frying (see Nathan 1998). Such is the context in which it may happen that non-human beings cross paths with humans. The Malian healer with whom I got into a rather technical discussion on the ways of healing illnesses caused by the *jnun*, asked me how I managed with them in Paris, given the fact that, in his opinion “those big cities where people from all over live together, one on top of the other, they must be full of *devils!*” Thinking back on his remark, many years later, I’m now convinced he was right!

Hadra is a twenty-three-year-old student with a pretty face and an open smile. She wears an elegant wool suit. An alumna of the University of Rabat where she successfully completed a Masters in History, she is currently enrolled in a Masters program in Political Science in Paris. She looks frightened: she is recovering from yet another episode followed by a month-long stay in the hospital. She describes how she collapsed: she was at the University, talking with friends when she suddenly felt a tingling feeling in her fingertips and a warm feeling spread

throughout her body, an unpleasant warmth first in her head while her feet felt frozen. No, she couldn't remember what they had been talking about, except that it wasn't anything special, "the kind of things you talk about with girlfriends". Hadra isn't married. For some time now, people in her family have been wondering about the fact that she is still single, especially given the fact that her younger sister is already the mother of a charming two-year-old little girl. Hadra has consistently rejected the young men she has met at the university as well as the prospective spouses introduced to her by her parents. Before considering marriage, Hadra wants to finish school. This isn't the first time Hadra has collapsed in this way. When she was fourteen, she suffered from "episodes", almost on a monthly basis, a kind of convulsive episode from which she would awaken with no memory of what had happened. Epilepsy had been suspected. Later, the episodes stopped, as suddenly and mysteriously as they had appeared. At the time, the doctors had attributed her episodes to puberty. At age 18, Hadra had collapsed once again. It was during a birthday party for one of her friends. She had been dancing, spinning, singing at the top of her lungs...whirling around with delight. But then she collapsed and remained unconscious for hours. This time, her parents blamed their daughter's episode on exertion. She had just finished taking final exams for her high school diploma and had studied unreasonably. Six months ago, in Paris, in the courtyard of the University, she didn't know what to make of it, but the episodes had started again...repeatedly, to the point where the last one took place when she was alone, in the room she rented on the top floor of her building. She had subsequently traveled back to Morocco. This time, her mother took her to see Leila A'isha, the healer. The dark-skinned old woman, originally from the Southern part of the country, interrogated her shells. Then, directing a suspicious gaze towards Hadra, she asked:

- Didn't you dream about a man?
- Yes, admitted Hadra, I dreamt about a black man!

He had approached her and smelled her. Like a kind of animal...a bit like a dog. In the healer's mind, there was no doubt: a therapeutic intervention was urgently needed. The old woman set out to organize a *Lila* for Hadra, a therapeutic "night". On the designated afternoon, the men had all convened in the courtyard of the rich-looking house

located in a posh neighborhood in Casablanca: tall, black men with musical instruments, three-cord violins, tambourines and rattles. They sacrificed a good-sized sheep outside the house. At that moment, Hadra had not felt well, especially when the sacrificer had put some of the sacrificial animal's blood on her forehead. When night fell, the entire *Gnawa* troop had arrived: black musicians, *mluk* masters, psalmists, dancers, seers. The drums had begun their litany, endlessly repeating the same three-beat rhythm. Around midnight, members of the congregation, the healer's assistants, started to collapse into trance states (*tah bel hadra*). And when the musicians started their fifth series of rhythms, when they struck up the song of a certain dark-skinned *djinn* by the name of *Sidi Mimoun*, it was Hadra's turn to collapse into a trance. But this time, it was not just an "episode". She collapsed, how should we say... in an orderly way, miming in her suffering the gestures everyone recognized as those of the *djinn*, Sidi Mimoun, precisely. She spoke during her ritual episode, with a voice unlike her own. She sang also, melodies and words she had never known before. The old woman and her assistants immediately surrounded her, stroking and supporting her. There was no need for words: *the ritual had diagnosed her*. Hadra had been taken by a *djinn*, a *melk*, in other words, and literally, "an owner". Afterwards, things had gone back to normal, she had come back to Paris, and now the episodes had started again... The fact was her master needed care; her owner needed to be fed!

Now, let us step back a little. If someone (say a journalist or a researcher for example) had questioned Hadra before her *Lila*, she most likely would have answered:

- (1) that she was a young woman of her time and that her Moroccan nationality was secondary in the definition of her identity;
- (2) although she wasn't against religion, she wasn't really a believer and certainly not observant;
- (3) and that in any case, she didn't believe in the "evil eye" (*el ayn*), nor in spirits (*jnun*), nor in the devil (*shaytan*) all of which she viewed as popular beliefs typical of rural populations.

After the events briefly summarized above, Hadra now says things like: "up until then, I didn't believe in the existence of spirits, but now I do!" or "the *jnun* do exist, in fact they are even mentioned in the Koran",

or else: “even the Prophet met them...and converted a whole tribe!”...⁶

Thus we are led to conclude that Hadra’s “identity”—Moroccan certainly, but more precisely member of an ethnic group, of a tribe, and now of a congregation of possessed people—, was revealed solely through the manifestation of phenomena which we must admit as pathological in nature.

But the identity which is most interesting to the people around Hadra is much more that of the dark-skinned *djinn* than the young woman’s. And this is one of the most surprising paradoxes of identity: Hadra’s most intimate concern, troubling her almost to the point of obsession, is in fact the identity of another, of a demon, a spirit, recognizable only amidst a collective.

ONE OR TWO POSTMODERN CONCLUSIONS

We live in a world that has, in a very short time—say in the course of the past twenty years—, both considerably opened up and extraordinarily shrunk. The loss of sovereignty of nation-states, their impossibility to act alone on the international scene, but also the gradual erosion of the status of the very notion of nation-state (who today can seriously claim to be a nationalist?) has led to the appearance, or should I say the reappearance? or simply the revelation?—I’m not sure which is the right term to use here—of solidarities based on identities that have taken everyone by surprise: journalists, politicians, and researchers. These transformations have come about thanks to very perceptible vectors, namely the considerable development of means of communication and information. It has become easy to travel and to communicate, often almost in real time. So much so, that emigration is no longer quite the same as it was some time ago.

It is no longer possible to simply “assimilate” or “integrate” new arrivals considered severed from their group of origin. Indeed today’s immigrants stay in touch with their nucleus, thanks to the telephone which is now almost free; thanks to the web; they exchange videotapes, photographs, instant messages and webcam conversations with their relatives; they watch their national television channels thanks to satellite TV (I met several people who managed not to learn a word of French

⁶ Regarding possession by *jnun*, see Nathan (2005) and Crapanzano (1981).

after 20 years living in France). Obviously, such opportunities to maintain and preserve family and cultural ties spectacularly reinforce the awareness of belonging to a same people, despite physical distance. It is as though the world were establishing this vision of identity as a project.

Needless to say, such closeness now makes it possible to generalize to the entire world that which up until recently had been the exclusive specialty of certain peoples, diaspora experts, such as the Jews, the Chinese, the Yoruba of Benin and Nigeria or the Armenians. Let me remind you of the extraordinary story of the Man clan, studied by James Woody Watson, whose members claim to be descendants of one single ancestor who lived near Canton six centuries ago. Thousands among them have spread out across the planet, in England, Canada, the Netherlands, Belgium or Germany. Many no longer speak Chinese and have married spouses from the host country. Yet they are nonetheless carrying out a clan-type family “plan” or “project” (in the sense I mentioned earlier). Within this group, certain marriages are organized according to tradition and economic relations are constantly maintained beyond national borders. Some have returned to the original villages in China, where they are restoring cemeteries and building new temples to their ancestors in order to organize traditional rituals (Tambiah 2000). Other similar examples are well-documented gatherings around Yoruba and Ibo kings in Nigeria bringing together immigrants, sometimes millionaires, from Western countries of immigration.

Present-day sociologists and political scientists, aware of these phenomena, now speak of the existence of “transnations” or of “long distance nationalism”. And we are in effect witnessing political lobbying of international institutions in favor of group identities that are independent from given states.

Inspired by such terminology, I have described what I termed “long distance attachments” that dynamically reveal their existence through complex psychological processes observable only in the very specialized context of pathology and therapy. Such specific expertise has allowed me to describe in detail the mechanisms around which those identities resistant to distance in time and space are organized. Indeed, it is often illness—especially mental illness—that reminds the individual of his or her attachment to his or her nucleus. Because, when a man from West Africa, for example, presents symptoms of mental illness in Paris, it often happens that at the end of his treatment, he comes to the realization that he has been captured by the village ancestor who is forcing him,

through his illness, to return to his home village in order to perform certain rituals. Thus, the internal compulsion that guarantees identity often results from the action of invisible, non-human, beings: such as spirits, ancestors, or gods. Hence, at the close of this discussion on diasporas, I have come to think that the interesting question isn't "who am I?" but rather "to whom do I belong", "to whom", meaning "to which invisible non human being?"

CHAPTER TEN

THE TRANSGLOBAL NETWORK NATION: DIASPORA, HOMELAND, AND HOSTLAND

Michel S. Laguerre

The sociological literature on diaspora tends to specify its structural position in society in terms of its integration as an ethnic group, its interface with the hostland, its ability to maintain a distinct ethnic identity, and its multiple relations with the homeland for the purpose of strengthening national, familial, and social ties necessary for the preservation and survival of the community's culture and traditions. While the diaspora-diaspora relations may be acknowledged, this dimension seldom takes center stage in such a debate. *One may speak of a bias that is the diaspora-homeland focus, as the dominant frame of reference.* Such a scholarly literature also tends to locate the diaspora exclusively inside the hostland, downplay the diaspora-diaspora relationships, and oppose "diaspora" to "homeland" as either two distinct entities or poles of a continuum. The aim then becomes to study the relations between them, the circulation of people, goods, communications, and images from one to the other, the positive and negative aspects of the relationship, or simply the way one may impact the other.

Anthropological, sociological, and political science literatures use two prevalent frames of analysis, each of which is canvassed through a different theory, to unveil the parameters of the relationships between the diaspora and the hostland. *Assimilation theory* magnifies the distinction between diaspora and homeland while *transnationalism* emphasizes each as one pole of a continuum (Abramson 1980, Bourne 1964, Basch, Glick Schiller and Blanc 1994). Both approaches focus on a small portion of the problem and are concerned with the form and mode of inscription of the diaspora in the hostland. Less effort is expended to explain the new *matrix of transglobal network nation* that such diasporic dispersion has engendered.

The feeble energy employed to indicate the rise of an *expanded homeland society* with the concept of transnation, which has emerged from the transnationalism literature, has not yet led to conceptualizing the territorial

content or parameters of such a transnational social formation; however, one speaks of *transnational nation-state*, *transnational state*, *transnation*, or *transnation state* (Glick Schiller 1999, Tölölyan 2003, Laguerre 2006). These categories are meant to indicate the centrality of the diaspora-homeland relationship and to insinuate the nation's geographical expansion beyond the state's territorial jurisdiction, the de-territorialization and re-territorialization of the nation, and the transnational relations that feed and sustain the existence of both the homeland and the diaspora. Neither of these formulations—assimilation theory nor transnationalism—answers the question of the reconstitution of both the homeland and diaspora in the process of forming a larger unit, a transglobal network nation that transversally and reverberatedly remakes each unit and thus provides the rationale to understand their individual and differentiated behaviors.

This essay refocuses the object of study, which is to identify and analyze some of the production mechanisms of the transglobal network nation. In this perspective, the homeland and diaspora are seen as architectural units of a much larger societal reality, where the rationale of their trajectories is tied up with the logic of the ensemble, outside of which their itineraries cannot be unbiasedly unveiled.

In fact, I am trying to engage in some form of alternative thinking, or thinking “outside the box,” by relocating the “diaspora question” inside the global parameters of social relations carved by the multi-sites, which diasporic citizens have helped to create. I am arguing that relations among diasporic sites, and between each diasporic site and the homeland, constitute the *transnational spatial arena* in which each unit choreographs its activities.

When we study the diaspora and its homeland, the ultimate goal cannot be simply to understand the functioning of each or the relations between them, but ought to provide a new interpretation of the ensemble. A new *transglobal social formation* marked by geographical expansion, spatial fragmentation, and reterritorialization of the nation has resulted from this demographic dispersion; the homeland and its diverse diasporic sites constitute the visible signposts of the symbolic transnational borders of such spatial deployment.

TRANSGLOBAL NETWORK NATION

Since the end of the eighteenth century, the nation as an “imagined community (Anderson 1991)” has been constructed from the *top down*

with citizenship as the dividend shared by those eligible for membership. The nation is projected as such based on its pro-ascribed legal status reinforced by the legal instruments developed to make its members a “community of citizens (Schnapper 2003)” within the territorial borders of a state. The nation is further imagined as a “nation-state” to distinguish it from other such groupings based on ethnicity, religion, or kinship (Smith 1986).

In contrast, the transglobal network nation is constructed from the *bottom up* since it functions on the basis of network governance without a government. This reconstituted realm finds its permanence through the transnational institutions it creates, the transnational practices it nurtures, and the transnational infrastructures it establishes. The transglobal network nation emphasizes transnational relationships more so than territorial sovereignty, geographical dispersion more so than spatial contiguity, mobility more so than sedentariness, and transnationalist pursuits more so than nationalist orientations. It is a new form of *nationhood* that has liberated itself from the confinements of the nation-state, that is the sovereign exclusivism of the classic practices of the traditional nation burst out of the ashes of the French and American revolutions.

Dispersion through conquest, colonization, or emigration explodes and expands the nation. When this happens, one speaks of a bound state and an expanded and rebound nation in the sense that the parameters have been redrawn to include extra-territorial diasporic sites. The spaces that link diasporic sites to each other, and each diasporic site to the homeland, constitute the territorial parameters of the transglobal network nation. It is the dispersion and realignment that provide the expanded internal context in which residents of the transglobal network nation evolve, relate to each other, and develop plans for the wellbeing and sustainability of this aggregated social formation.

The transglobal network nation is characterized by its mobility and the mobility that it houses. Mobile places constitute the various units of its territorial identity as a mobile space. Diasporic sites are mobile places, through which their varying relations with the homeland turn it into a mobile place as well. In other words, mobility affects the deployment of each site.

Although they form a transglobal network nation, each diasporic site also paradoxically proclaims its autonomy and pursues an agenda commensurate with its orientation, which primarily benefits the place of residence. The network allows this to happen since nodes do not

need to be identical to be part of a network. In fact, most networks are made of nodes with distinct particularities. The transglobal network nation operates on the basis of the transnational infrastructures that sustain its border-crossing activities.

INFRASTRUCTURE OF THE TRANSGLOBAL NETWORK NATION

The concept of infrastructure reminds us that social interactions need a platform for the sustainability of their performance because social activities, in order to materialize, require physical templates, social institutions, channels of communication, means of transportation, and enduring networks. Therefore, any discussion of transglobal network nation must explain the nature of its infrastructure so as to identify its spatial parameters, its genuine identity, and its distinctness in relation to the nation-state. In other words, recognizing the infrastructure as a material support helps us navigate through the arduous terrain of the transglobal network nation's activities.

Infrastructure is not a monolithic construction, but has variable shapes to handle different processes. It can also have a changeable identity in the sense that a person can make it do anything, even if it might not have been created for that purpose. It can be flexible to the extent that it is not confined to a singular identity. Some infrastructures were developed for one purpose, but we make them do other things as well.

New infrastructures are established to sustain transnational processes that facilitate the permanent link of one site to another. Infrastructure, however, does not determine the forms these cross-border relations may take, but it can simply influence their shapes. There are also old infrastructures that bend to accommodate transnational relations. Such infrastructures might have been developed for bound national purposes, but lately have been used to meet transnational needs as well. In addition, there are *ad hoc infrastructures* created for the purpose of carrying out specific tasks, such as facilitating diasporic homeland associations, which are incorporated in the hostland but not in the homeland, to deliver goods. Sometimes their ephemeral nature impedes the smoothness of the transnational operations and needs to be fixed. One can think of the homeland association that encounters countless problems in the process of recuperating goods shipped from abroad to help a specific homeland community. This is an example of an incomplete transnational infrastructure, which is well developed in the hostland

but with no similar correspondence in the homeland. Such a problem could be avoided if the hometown associations were incorporated in both places. Then, the transnational infrastructure would have been complete and ready to serve its purpose.

Infrastructure gives a permanent, rooted, natural, and routine character to the process. It indicates that these ties are enduring, are processed through known channels, and the means they provide are reliable because of their presumed predictability. One can think of the technological infrastructure which makes available digital communication tools and transportation systems (rails, planes, ships) that materialize the linking of the units of the transglobal network nation to each other.

Infrastructure cannot be seen exclusively in terms of material equipment, because it also has a social component. Networks, institutions, and associations can also be seen as part of the deployment of the infrastructural matrix. The same organization may have its base in more than one country, attend to the needs of each, and develop genuine rapport with the people in each. The institutional basis is the channel through which transnational relations mold, transact, and sustain themselves. Existing diasporic associations that function in more than one country do the same; they provide the backbone for interaction among dispersed units, for the circulation of members inside the network, and for the sustainability of transnational processes. Social networks do the same as they are engines that provide contexts for aggregates to form and to relate to other aggregates. In this sense, social infrastructure may prove as important as physical infrastructure. Both are intrinsic to the functioning of the transglobal network nation as they sustain the transnational interactions by providing enduring support. Below, I discuss transnational infrastructure in terms of permanent transglobal platforms that facilitate cross-border interactional practices.

ENDURING TRANSGLOBAL PLATFORMS

What makes the connecting sites a transglobal network nation is the ability of the dispersed group to imagine the terrain as such (for example, Tel Aviv University projects itself on its web site as the biggest Jewish University in the Jewish world instead of just in Israel); the identity that these sites share (various governments depend on diaspora remittances to make up a chunk of the national budgets; Russians in the Balkan

states depend on Moscow for protection); and their abiding ties, whether symbolic, real, active, or dormant to the homeland (when the Korean student at Virginia Tech committed both homicide and suicide, the Korean government and the diaspora apologized, meaning the global group—not just a diasporic site—took responsibility for the misdeeds of one of its members). These platforms make the linkage operational and enduring. It is important to show how these platforms operate in real life. I will use three examples, the Catholic Church, the diasporic mass media, and multinational family organizations to describe how the transnational platform for each of these institutions functions.

With the mass migration of Caribbean and Latin American Catholics to the US, local congregations have expanded to encompass overseas members. They have become *transglobal congregations* because of the nature of the geographical or international composition of the membership. Transglobal congregations take three different forms. They can be homeland congregations whose members have departed abroad, come back occasionally to request ritual services, and financially support the Parish; they can be diasporic congregations that welcome new members from the homeland and that maintain ongoing projects there as well; or they can be sister-church congregations¹ that support each other by the common projects they undertake or by the financial aid one receives from the other.

These transnational platforms are sustained by overseas long-time members, who from time to time visit, request services (baptisms, wedding, funerals), and invite the local priests for visits they defray; new members welcomed from the homeland; homeland priests who may be appointed to serve diasporic congregations; development projects diasporic congregations or sister-church congregations may undertake in the homeland; and joint church activities, whose nature may change depending on circumstances.

The mass media have also developed global platforms that link their production, distribution, and content to both homeland and diaspora. Diasporic journalists, who may live in the diaspora or the homeland, produce texts for the network to consume as they inform about events in their places of residence for the network's benefit. While a newspaper may be produced in the diaspora, it is distributed in every place

¹ Like the sister-city phenomenon, one may also speak of “partnering” or “twinning”; see for example, Hefferan (2007).

where the group holds residence. The content of the newspaper reveals its global scope; it is not about one place, but about many sites. The content in terms of advertisement, for example, tailors to the taste and expectations of this dispersed global audience (ethnic TV programs) or to the readership (ethnic newspapers and Yellow Pages). While the headquarters of the newspaper is in one country, the branches of the operation are in most of the nodes (subsidiary bureaus, distribution centers), and events from all the nodes are covered for the consumption of the network.

The mass media gives each node a mirror through which it sees itself and the rest of the network's evolution by allowing the network to see what goes on in each node. In this global scenario of operation, the space of the transglobal network nation is covered in a sense that transforms even the homeland into one place in the network.

The multinational family organization that the diaspora establishes constitutes genuine and enduring ties among the sites. The extent to which members of a family have migrated to different places constitutes a transnational platform that further links and sustains the various sites. Searches for employment, family reunification, schooling, asylum, and marriage cause these displacements. Whatever the cause of the dispersion might be, once it occurs, the family links tie various sites together. These sustained platforms develop and serve as an infrastructure for the traffic of persons, materialization of communication, and circulation of goods. These transnational family linkages are also territorial ties; they are part and parcel of the transglobal network nation's spatial infrastructure.

The existence of *transglobal institutions*, which provide platforms for transnational relations, is real and can be seen within the infrastructure these entities establish, the clientele they develop, the multinational sites they occupy, and the transnational ties among sites they create and make possible. If that is the case, how then should one reconceptualize homeland-diaspora relations?

REFRAMING THE "DIASPORA AND HOMELAND RELATIONS" QUESTION

The literature on transnationalism has been ambivalent about the framing of the diaspora and homeland relationship as if it were obvious. The main bias has been to emphasize the relationship between a diasporic site, or the diaspora in general, and the homeland, to ignore

the diaspora-diaspora relationship, as we have said before, and to belittle the variable geometry of these ties. To understand the materiality of these relations, one must at least identify the units of analysis.

With the homeland and hostland, each diasporic site maintains specific types of relationships, which cannot always be generalized due to local conditions of culture, history, and traditions. These interactions take place in the context of the macro-relations of the hostland with the homeland. The homeland may draw specific resources from each site because it may maintain different relations with each. For example, one site may be seen as an ally of the policy of the local government, while another may be identified as an extension or an extraterritorial tentacle of the political opposition. The relations of the homeland government with the former will entail cooperation from both parties to nurture that good relationship, while the relations with the latter will mean curtailing their ability to undermine the homeland government.

As a consequence of the above, the homeland is very much involved in maintaining relations with its dispersed diaspora and in redesigning the architecture of diasporic site importance. In its relations with the diaspora, the homeland may upgrade the status of one site while downgrading the status of another. This form of transnational politics is undertaken to reward friends (one diasporic site) and neutralize enemies (another diasporic site). Such a practice or policy materializes in official invitations extended to people in one site but not another, and in one site's access to government officials in comparison to that experienced by another site. This redesigning scheme or shift is often seen with a change of government because those with prior access may find themselves without the same connections to the new government. Over time, the relations of the homeland with one site may reinforce, stabilize, or undermine its relations with another site.

The relationship between the homeland and a diasporic site is at times constrained by the relations of the homeland with another diasporic enclave. Similarly, it can be constrained because of the relationship between one diasporic site and another. For example, the homeland may engage in elevating the status of one site while neglecting the contribution of another for pure political ends. Likewise, a diasporic site may downplay its relationship with the homeland while it upgrades and strengthens its relations with another diasporic site. This sometimes happens when a diasporic site helps another site because the homeland, for diplomatic reasons, does not want to get publicly involved in the scheme of things.

These triangular relations among diasporic sites and the homeland should not be studied as binary ties, but rather as part of a matrix or network of relationships. *Therefore the behavior of each ought to be studied within the context of the transglobal network and not simply in the context of binary relationships.*

In reconsidering the relationship between the homeland and the diaspora, I propose that there is a global context to consider; there is a larger transnational space one must uncover as the nation's public sphere becomes global as a result of links between the homeland and various extraterritorial diasporic units.

The new object of study is the way in which this dispersed nation has reshaped the preexisting and newly created units through its expansion, and has recreated a new global societal formation that transcends existing national borders. I call this new societal formation a *transglobal network nation*. One may then speak of transnational blocs of settlements made up of differentiated units, such as the homeland and diverse diasporic enclaves that constitute a new form of *transglobal urbanism*.²

“PEOPLE IN TRANSIT”

The transglobal network nation has its residents anchored in various sites of the transnational group's arena. However, as these individuals consider themselves part of the same expanded nation, some circulate to live in other sites, visit overseas family members and friends, take advantage of a better educational system abroad, seek employment elsewhere, or engage in border-crossing business practices inside this global circuit. In a sense, they have reconstructed or redrawn the nation's boundaries and spatial content to include extraterritorial sites of diasporic enclaves.

In the context of the nation-state, citizenship allows a person to move from one place to another inside the sovereign territory. As the homeland becomes a node of a larger circuit of nodes, the meaning of internal mobility spatially reconfigures. The ability to see these external connections is intrinsic to the new claims of citizenship. Citizenship in a node, which is part of a global circuit, allows one to imagine the possibility of moving to another location, to develop strategies or plans to do so, or to effectively accomplish this goal. This is not simply an

² Compare with Smith (2001).

unfulfilled desire, but a determination to make it happen. In other words, why stay in one node if you can do better in another node in the same global circuit?

Another notion that reflects this new global reality is that of shared citizenship. In the nation-state context, citizenship is seen as a shared status and a bundle of rights and obligations that one shares with other compatriots. One is entitled to them, and others are expected to understand and acknowledge this. In the reconfiguration of transglobal network nation, “belonging” is believed to be shared with the diasporic tentacles, but not with any hostland that houses them. In other words, international immigration does not occur in a situation of unmediated circulation, but in a circulation that the hostland mediates. As a consequence of this, immigration to another site can be successful or aborted if the hostland does not grant permission for permanent residency.

The imagined transglobal network nation lacks the legal institutional mechanisms that could make the transnational circulation of its members operable. In this sense, the desire cannot always materialize into a palpable outcome. Hence, diasporization and the engendering of a new context, where the informal linkages between diaspora and homeland become stronger and more voluminous than the formal linkages between them, bring about a source of tension. Strong informal linkages have pressured the formal government agencies to take into consideration the existence of the diaspora in matters related to immigration, diplomatic and trade relations, and foreign policy in general.

Commenting on the “desertion” of a group of 13 Haitian soccer players, who were members of the official 2007 Haiti delegation participating in an international contest in South Korea (they later rejoined the group), a Haitian journalist, keen observer of the Haitian crisis, opined that most citizens of Haiti have become “des personnes en transit” (“people in transit”). He was referring to members of the diaspora who travel to Haiti to spend time with their families, to those in the homeland who make short trips abroad, and more particularly to the vast numbers of Haitians who plan to leave the island. For him, Haiti has become a “place of transit” until one reaches another greener shore. This includes not only those who have family abroad and who will someday emigrate to reunite with their families, but also those who are planning their careers for the US job market by opting to learn English instead of French in school, by saving money in order to meet US immigration requirements, or by training in professions which are in high demand in the US. The Haitian situation is not unique; one

witnesses similar trends in the rest of the Caribbean, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. In the journalist's view, the desertion of the soccer team at the Kennedy Airport reflects an endemic lack of loyalty and attachment to the motherland that seems characteristic of a large group of residents in countries in the Global South. The soccer players did not hold the country's reputation or the government's public embarrassment at stake, but rather, they saw an opportunity to live in another site of the transglobal network nation. Two views of the national question emerge: the logic of the nation-state upheld by the government and the logic of the transglobal network nation upheld by industrious citizens.

In this light, permanent residents of the transglobal nation can justly be seen as "people in transit" whether they reside in the homeland or a hostland. As homelander, they seek to resettle in a hostland site, and as hostlander, they long to visit or even, in some cases, to return to their homeland. Such longings may be purely wishful thinking, but the desire may be real.

The reconstitution of the nation has led to a new understanding of citizenship practices. Citizenship has been lifted from its national basis to reinsert itself into a transnational or global arena. Of course, the change of its spatial location has also changed its attributes. One may also venture to say that new attributes have been appropriated and added to the content of the old citizenship status (without necessarily the consent of the states involved).

A person in transit used to be part of a category assigned to an individual with a temporary status in a foreign country, meaning an immigrant who is not a permanent resident or who is allowed to stay in a country with the proviso that the person will eventually depart for his/her final destination (third country) or until he/she is able to return safely home. Both the receiving state and the individual agree that this is a provisional arrangement and the person is expected to move on to another country in due time.

In the transglobal network nation scheme, transit has acquired a new meaning and a new status in addition to what it implies inside the nation-state. A person in transit who is a permanent citizen of the transglobal network nation constructs his/her residence in the homeland as a steppingstone toward migrating and living elsewhere. As a consequence of the dire condition of poverty, lack of stability, war zones, and hopelessness, a large group of homeland citizens in Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, and the Middle East mostly consider

themselves to be persons in transit and actively prepare themselves to eventually emigrate to other countries, meaning other sites of their respective transglobal network nation.

Haiti, is a good example, where this form of practice has attained a new level and consequently effected the survival of the country. The signs of this new order are there for us to read: students who used to prepare themselves for careers in the country are now learning English to secure jobs in the United States or Canada; government officials and members of the elite routinely seek health care in Cuba, the US, or even the Dominican Republic instead of improving the local hospitals for the population's use; university students who depart to complete their studies abroad have no intention of returning to live in the homeland; government officials purchase homes in the US for their eventual retirement from work; business people invest their money in US banks instead of in local financial facilities; and diasporans occasionally return for a visit, but usually do not stay. *The local population has become transnationally mobile because of the transglobal network nation, which makes such cross-border movement imaginable and achievable.*

The new logic developed by the people is that the transglobal network nation is the new sphere or arena adopted by homeland and hostland diasporic residents. People feel that they should be able to join parents and relatives abroad and see the overseas tentacles of the homeland as part of the supranational nation. Thus they operate inside this larger context to strengthen linkages among family members, communal institutions, and political and business practitioners. This erosion of national citizenship constitutes a major challenge for national states in the Global South.

Instead of focusing on definitions, legalities, and national boundaries, I put the emphasis on the domain of practices. Clearly the official rhetoric of the state does not coincide with individual practices. The intent is to unveil the logic of practices in order to understand the state's basic transformations, which partly result from diasporization and the emergence of the transglobal network nation as a potent force in the expression of daily life. These transformations can be seen, for example, in the realm of governance.

FROM STATE-CENTRIC TO NETWORK GOVERNANCE

To explain and show how the homeland is embedded in the deployment of the transglobal network nation, I will focus on the issue of

governance.³ The role of the diaspora and homeland as differentiated units of the transglobal network nation can be seen through transformations in the homeland's governance. Previously, elected officials and government employees concerned themselves with the governance of the homeland as an independent state. Any influence from the outside was seen as interference in the country's national affairs and was often condemned in the name of territorial sovereignty and national security. With the existence of diasporas, which feed the coffers of the state, and with diasporic politicians intervening in state affairs, governance of the homeland has shifted from being exclusively state-centric to being network-centric. Several diasporic politicians who have returned home to serve in the parliament or in the presidential cabinet depend on diasporic resources to be successful government officials.

Similarly, the governance of any diasporic site used to be under the exclusive domain of ethnic politicians and grassroots leaders because the major concern was the enclave's smooth integration in the hostland. With diasporans interested in helping the homeland and participating in its political affairs, homeland politicians are now involved in the governance of the diasporic enclaves as well. They do so to prevent such sites from developing a hostile stance vis-a-vis the homeland government, to maintain good relations with these sites, to fundraise during electoral campaigns, and to use diasporic lobbyists to advance whatever agenda the government is pushing forward.

This new evolution has emerged because since the end of the Cold War hostlands do not require their diasporans to be exclusively loyal to their countries of adoption, and because efficient modern transportation facilities, information and communication technologies, and the rise of multinational families make it possible to move back and forth between hostland and homeland.⁴

The homeland's foreign policy has also become a matter of shared governance as the diaspora sometimes aids the state in the conduct of its diplomatic relations. For example, a state is constrained in what it can do beyond the formal arena of diplomatic relations. With the diaspora, the state is able to follow a two-track foreign policy strategy, handling the formal part and letting grassroots diasporic groups control some informal aspects. *In the case of an inter-state conflict, formal diplomacy*

³ On the concept of network governance, see for example, Newman (2005); Bogason and Musso (2006); Jones, Hesterly, and Borgatti (1997).

⁴ See the following informative, thoughtful and useful analyses by Shain (1999) and Sheffer (2003).

may provide the carrot while the diaspora delivers the stick. This is exactly what happened in Haiti's relations with the Dominican Republic in regard to handling the *braceros* and forcing repatriation of a large contingent of the Haitian Dominican diasporans during the second term of the Preval Administration. The Dominican government's strategy has been to reinforce its good relations with President Preval by inviting him to undertake formal visits to Santo Domingo with the usual rituals of signing treaties, without concentrating on solving the Haitian refugee problem. The Haitian government does not want to make a fuss about it in order to maintain the normalcy of relations between the two states. However, the diaspora has forcefully intervened to help what it considers one of the sites of the transglobal network nation by organizing teach-ins in Montreal, Paris, and Miami to decry the plight of compatriots in the Dominican Republic. The Haitian government does not object to these teach-ins because the diaspora mobilizes on its behalf, thereby liberating the government to continue its diplomatic work in the formal arena. In contrast, the Dominican government sees these public protests in North America and Europe as vast campaigns of denigration by the diaspora and its grassroots allies.

In Paris and Montreal, the diaspora invites sympathizers, delivers literature depicting the plight of Haitian immigrants in the Dominican Republic, and shows documentary films ("Le Prix du Sucre", "Les Enfants du Sucre", "L'Empire du Sucre", "Batey Zero", and "Sucre Noir") that force the Dominican diplomatic legations to readjust their strategies vis-à-vis this bad publicity in hostile environments. This in-your-face diasporic strategy, of course, raises the eyebrows of Dominican government officials because it could impact tourism in the country. The Haitian diaspora in Miami rehearsed this same kind of abrasive intervention and once again the Dominican diplomatic legation was unable to neutralize the protesters. It is obvious then that there is nothing either the Haitian or Dominican government can do successfully about this noisy segment of the diaspora, which waves the struggle for Haitian human rights in the Dominican Republic.

The issue of network governance gives us a glimpse into the imbrications of the homeland and the diaspora in the production of the transglobal network nation. Each contributes in its own way to the public expression and everyday life of the other, and both comprise the transnational space of interaction that distinguishes the transglobal network nation from the terrains of other social formations.

RECONFIGURING THE SPACE OF TRANSGLOBAL INTERACTION

The space of diasporic interaction is not only local, national, and regional; it is also global. This global dimension reverberates on aspects of social life, state institutions, and practices. In this light, one may venture to say that the trajectory of the diaspora impacts both the homeland and hostlands. It does so through the borders it blurs and the geographical dispersion out of which it emerges (Bordes-Benayoun 2002, Hovanessian 1998, Medam 1993). In the process, it imposes a new agenda on the receiving state, which is concerned with its social integration. Furthermore, the expansion of the nation from the territorial boundaries of the state also changes the nature of the sending state itself because it adds new complications to its operation.

Several conceptual schemes have been developed to spell out the territorial or spatial identity of the diaspora. One speaks of the diaspora as a marginal community appended to a nation-state; as an incomplete social formation that does not have all the institutions it needs, but that can be complete only if it is transformed into a nation-state; as an entity separate from the homeland; as an entity to be integrated with time in the hostland; and as a minoritized enclave that will never attain majority status. These conceptual schemes tend to focus on the trees without seeing the forest. Each provides a tunnel vision of the process and a biased frame of reference. From the standpoint of globalization theory rather than state or international relations theories, the diaspora is seen as the homeland and hostland expanded, remade, recalibrated, and rewired. In other words, in so doing, the diaspora transforms all the units that comprise the spatial geography of the transglobal network nation.

To formalize the linkages between the diaspora and the homeland and to make the transglobal network nation fully legally operational, there is an effort by some homeland governments to integrate the diaspora into their national spaces. President Aristide, for example, reconfigured the diaspora as the 10th Department of the Republic of Haiti since the homeland already has 9 territorial departments. Likewise, the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs once referred to the Chilean diaspora as forming “the 14th Region of Chile,” since the country is already divided into 13 territorial regions (Bolzman 2002). Other states like the Philippines, Croatia, and Italy have either allowed overseas voting, set aside a number of seats in parliament for diaspora representatives,

or debate the value of providing dual citizenship to diasporans who apply for such a status (Biscaro 2006). What one sees here is that the fate of the homeland intertwines with that of the diaspora. In fact, the diaspora in some countries of the Global South is so much involved in the homeland as a core component of its lifeblood that the homeland does not project its future without its diaspora. Therefore, in the study of diasporas, it is important to pay attention to the ebb and flow of the transglobal network nation even when one attempts to understand the mechanisms of operation of one of its local or transnational components.

PART TWO

JEWS AS A PARADIGMATIC SPACE OF CASES

CHAPTER ELEVEN

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION OF JEWS

Sergio DellaPergola

Transnational diasporas reflect the existence of personal and institutional networks among people who maintain social relations and collective identities across states' boundaries. Transnational identities and connections can emerge as a consequence of geographical mobility and of the evolving patterns of identification of individuals with their proximate or more distant social environment—in both spatial and ideational terms. As a necessary prerequisite to the assessment of transnational relations among contemporary Jewry, this chapter reviews some of the main quantitative and structural developments of Jewish migration over the last decades. This chapter, therefore, pays attention to what can be termed the systemic, *hard*, versus the individual, *soft*, aspects of transnational diasporas. Nonetheless, we should constantly be aware that the features described here at the aggregate level reflect a deeper layer of personal needs and community patterns whose discussion would better benefit from a qualitative approach.

From the standpoint of the environmental influences and in-depth change of the global Jewish experience, the consequences of international migration were no lesser than the other two founding events of the twentieth century: the Shoah and Israel's independence. The difficulties incurred, the world left behind in the communities of origin, and the creation of a new world in the lands of destination constituted formative steps in the lives of the many millions of individual actors involved. Beyond the personal experiences, the impact of international migration throughout the twentieth century permanently changed the demographic, cultural and socioeconomic profile of the global Jewish collective (see for example, Bachi 1977, DellaPergola 1998).¹

¹ Yearly data on Israel migrations are available from Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, Jerusalem.

Jewish migration has often been the subject of myths, hopes and fears. Examples are the assumption of a peculiar propensity of Jews to restlessness and rootlessness, as epitomized in the negative stereotype of *the wandering Jew*. In a research perspective, the challenge is developing a solid and comprehensive empirical foundation of descriptive data as a necessary basis to in-depth analysis. Determinants and consequences of migration volume, main directions, permanency and compositional characteristics need to be examined in an attempt to uncover causal mechanisms that can be compared with broader concepts in the study of human migrations. These observations need to be carried out at the three-fold level of individuals, communities, and the global collective. Also in need of study are the developments occurring in the institutional spheres that involve, affect, and sometimes direct the individual migrants and tie them together in more or less meaningful and permanent social networks.

Over time, pressures or advantages in the main countries of residence of Jews, and the competing opportunities offered by Israel and by the main Western countries as receiving areas, have generated integrated, coherent and to some extent predictable world Jewish migration patterns in the context of growing globalization and integration of world systems. In more recent years, one emerging trend calling for investigation is a growing preference for multi-localism in response to socioeconomic and cultural changes that can be observed both in the general global and Jewish contexts (DellaPergola 1986).

GLOBAL PATTERNS OF JEWISH MIGRATION

In historical perspective and in current practice, international migration has constituted one of the main formative mechanisms of the global Jewish experience. Between the second half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the 21st, roughly 10 million Jews moved from, to, and across countries and continents. This figure stands against a total Jewish population estimates at 10.5 million in 1900, 16.5 million in 1939, 11 million in 1945, and 13.1 million in 2007.

The very observation of the size and distribution over time of this imposing human flow provides important interpretative clues about its nature. Before we turn to that observation, we wish to introduce a somewhat provocative digression. Let us observe the patterns in Figure 11.1. The data represent a phenomenon characterized by a




Figure 11.1 Waterflow in the Jordan river—cubic meters per second, 10-1994 to 2-2003

continuous sequence of highs and lows. The rhythm of fluctuations is quite regular over time but the absolute strength of each wave is variable. Now and then, the intensity of the phenomenon reaches exceptionally high peaks. There seems to be some underlying systematic cause in the data reported in Figure 11.1, which indeed relate to the monthly water flow in the Jordan River measured in cubic meters per second between October 1994 and February 2003. Unfolding of the time series is obviously determined by rainfall seasonality that reflects the yearly variation of weather patterns. In turn, weather is determined by the configuration of the solar system and—indeed within significant margins of variability—is predetermined and predictable.

If we now look at Figure 11.2, we are impressed by its significant similarity with Figure 11.1. But Figure 11.2 is not related to the world of physics, geology or meteorology. It represents the total yearly volume of Jewish international migration between 1880 and 2002, shown both as original estimates, and as five-year averages. Unlike water flow, human migrations are not in the realm of predictable natural patterns but pertain to social circumstances which do not lend themselves to prescient forecasting. Yet, the cyclical patterns and the periodical emerging of major waves represent the history of modern Jewish migrations as a phenomenon apparently governed by stable and predictable rules—not unlike water flow in a river—that call for explanation. One important distinction is that, unlike the water flow which occurs within a fixed




Figure 11.2 World Jewish migrations, 1880–2002

physical constraint, international migration occurs in endless directions, from many different points to many other points.

The aggregate data in Figure 11.2 mask the fact that of the about four million Jewish migrants between 1881 and the eve of the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, most went from Eastern Europe to the United States, while of the about five million who migrated after 1948, a majority went to Israel from a large variety of countries of origin. Attention should be paid to the political and socioeconomic conditions that stimulated frequent geographical mobility of Jews over time. A hostile environment, fueled by old and new anti-Semitic prejudice and also by rapid Jewish population growth, periodically created highly unstable and risky conditions. For local Jewish populations, the response to these rapidly and negatively changing conditions was—when feasible—mass and non-selective emigration. The three major moments of mass migration during the twentieth century catch: (a) the movement of Jews from the Russian and Habsburg empires to the West, especially to the US at a time of nearly unrestricted mass migration before World War I peaking in 1905–6; (b) the establishment of the State of Israel, with the unrestricted opening of its gates to Jewish immigration actually followed by mass migration during the late 1940s and early 1950s,

peaking in 1949–51; and (c) the great exodus from the Former Soviet Union (FSU) since the last months of 1989, peaking in 1990–91 and continuing several years after. It is worth remembering that the last wave is not inferior in absolute numbers to the two preceding ones, although its impact occurs into a far more organized and better off societal context.

Looking at these major migration cycles, interspersed with minor ones over the whole period of nearly 120 years, neither a single major breaking point nor a pattern of gradual change can be detected, as might be expected, respectively, in the case of a sharp discontinuity in the world order, or in a context of gradual modernization, democratization, and gradual improvement of world society. What appears is rather a general pattern of *stable instability* or *unstable stability*. The major cyclical pattern does not seem to be due to mere chance, but appears rather to be the product of a complex array of detectable factors. Periodical conflicts between major powers and sharp discontinuities in economic development have tended to effect the world geo-political balance and the redistribution of areas of influence across the world system. The consequences of these global changes are eventually felt down at the level of regions, countries, provinces, communities, and individual choices. Especially when Jews fulfilled mediating roles in rigidly stratified societies—by ethnicity, by social class, or by political groups competing for the allocation of power—their position in society was deeply affected by major geopolitical changes. Whenever long-established mechanisms of interaction between Jews and other ethnoreligious, social, and political groups were gravely disrupted, substantial Jewish emigration followed.

None of these can be construed as determinism. Simplistic fascination with historical cycles should be avoided. Nonetheless several leading scholars have hypothesized the existence of economic swings and political cycles at the global level (see Kondrat'ev 1984, Kuznets 1958, Hopkins and Wallerstein 1996). Whether or not a relevant hypothesis for the study of modern Jewish migration, in fact the periodic re-emergence of the urgent need to out-migrate clearly testifies to the sensitivity—in fact the dependency—of local Jewish communities on a much broader and complex international thread of factors. Some of the events that generated high amounts of Jewish migration seem to have been occurring in a somewhat repetitive pattern. Of course, we cannot rule out that the same patterns of causation may also re-emerge

in the future, if and when similar disruptive processes will shake world or regional geopolitical systems, eventually reaching the lives of Jewish communities and individual Jews.

THE WORLD JEWISH MIGRATION SYSTEM

We have so far dealt with international migration at the highest level of aggregation. Within this broader total, Figure 11.3 displays an attempt to reconstruct the main flows of Jewish international migration between 1948 and 2002. The highly fragmented world Jewish geographical dispersion is simplified into four major blocs: two main sending areas—Eastern Europe and Islamic countries in Asia and Africa; and two receiving areas—the Western countries and Israel. The choice of countries of destination among Jewish migrants was clearly and consistently compatible with the rational preference for economically more developed, politically more secure, and culturally more compatible places. Thus, Jewish geography worldwide ostensibly shifted from locations in semi-peripheral and peripheral countries in Western Asia, North Africa, Eastern Europe, but also in Latin America and South Africa, towards more attractive and stable societies in North America, Western Europe, Oceania, but also in Israel. In the process, Jewish communities in Muslim countries virtually ceased to exist. The movement of Jews out of Slavic areas was quantitatively heavier, but it did not reach the full proportions of the exodus from Africa and Asia.

Since World War II, about 4.7 million Jews were involved in international migration: 1.9 million between 1948 and 1968; 1 million between 1969 and 1988; and 1.8 million between 1989 and 2002. Out of these 4.7 million Jewish migrants, 46% came from Eastern Europe, 30% from Asia and Africa, 14% from Israel, and 10% from Western countries.² Israel received 56% of the total, while 44% went to Western countries. Israel attracted 65% of all migrants from Eastern Europe, and 73% of those from Asia and Africa.

² These estimates do not include returning Israelis after prolonged period of stay abroad, nor immigrant citizens—children of Israelis born abroad. The increase of these types of migrants, especially since the 1970s, tends to reduce the negative gap between Israel migration flows to the West, and its reverse. All data on Israel migrations include as well Arab migrants who, however, constitute a comparatively small share of the total—lesser than the share of Arabs among Israel's total population.





Figure 11.3 World Jewish migration system: distribution of main flows by areas of origin and destination, number and total percent, 1948–2002



^a Since 1970 includes immigrant citizens (from West).

^b Since 1990, Asian regions of FSU included in Asia-Africa.

^c All emigration from Israel included here.

Source: DellaPergola (1998); Israel Central Bureau of Statistics; HIAS; and other sources.

Figure 11.4 Jewish international migration, by major areas of origin and destination, percent distribution, 1969–2002

Figure 11.4 shows the changing percent distribution of the six main flows of Jewish migration between 1969 and 2002, after the watershed of the June 1967 war (DellaPergola, Rebhun and Raicher 2000). Of these 2.8 million migrants, 55% came from Eastern Europe, 16% from Asia and Africa, 16% from Israel, and 13% from the aggregate of Western countries. Israel received 59% of the total, while 41% distributed across the major Western countries. Quantitatively the dominant flows of Jewish migration hence came from Eastern Europe, but the relative predominance periodically shifted between preferring Israel and the Western countries. The absolute volume of migration from Asia and Africa became quite modest, after the major migrations of the earlier periods. Migration from the West to Israel was consistently outnumbered by the symmetric flow from Israel to the West. The latter ranged all the time between 10% and 25% of the grand total of global Jewish migration.

Figure 11.5 reports the same data in terms of emigration rates per 1,000 Jews in the countries of origin. Between 1969 and 2002, the highest propensities of Jews to emigrate appeared in the numerically reduced communities in Asia and Africa (97 emigrants on average annually per 1000 Jews in the countries of origin), followed by Eastern Europe (51 emigrants per 1000 Jews), Israel (4 per 1000), and the Western countries (1 per 1000). Such regional ranking again clearly reflects the extent and intensity of environmental factors likely to stimulate or depress Jewish emigration propensities (see Figure 11.5). Of the six possible alternatives, the propensity to migrate from Asia and Africa to Israel was consistently the highest, and the propensity to migrate from the Western countries to Israel was consistently the lowest. With the demise of the Soviet Union, Jewish migration propensities from Eastern Europe to Israel emerged as second highest but the propensity to migrate from Eastern Europe to Western countries was continuously growing.

THE GLOBAL SYSTEM LOGIC OF JEWISH MIGRATION

In common wisdom, *aliyah* (the ascent to Zion) tends to be explained primarily on ideological grounds which would perceive the state of Israel as the main focus of global Jewish aspirations and an ideal target for geographical mobility. On the other hand, Israel's role as a major country of Jewish immigration might constitute, *prima facie*,




Figure 11.5 Jewish international migration, by major areas of origin and destination: yearly rates per 1000 Jewish population in countries of origin, 1969–2002

one—admittedly exceptional—component of a more pragmatic interpretation of Jewish migrations.

Detailed observation of the intensity of *aliyah*, country by country, confirms the dependency of immigration on the varying incidence of negative, or *push* factors in the countries of origin (see also DellaPergola 1989). This notion is confirmed by an analysis of the frequency of migration to Israel from 73 countries which reflect a wide cross-section of political regimes and economic standards of living (see Figure 11.6). *Aliyah* frequencies per 1000 Jews were computed for each country of origin in 2001. A strongly negative correlation (-0.66) prevailed between *aliyah* frequencies and a country's Index of Human Development (HDI)³ in 2000, expressed in the ranking of each country out of about 180 with available data. Countries whose *aliyah* propensities were above the expected average—expressed by gray dots in the graph—

³ A measure of a country's development, based on indicators of health, education, and income. See United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 2002*, New York.




Figure 11.6 Immigrants to Israel per 1000 Jews in countries of origin, 2001

point to especially negative effects of the socioeconomic, political, and physical environment. These include all the republics of the FSU. Part of this stronger than expected migration propensity may be an artifact of somewhat inflated numerators, which include non-Jewish immigrants, compared with denominators that only include core Jewish populations. Countries with lower than expected *aliyah* propensities comprise in particular the leading English-speaking societies (United States, Canada, Australia) whose high standards of living may deter *aliyah* decisions. Most countries in Latin America also display *aliyah* frequencies lower than might be postulated on grounds of mere societal development and HDI levels. The likely reason is the prevalence among most Jewish communities in Latin America of personal standards of living by far above the average standards of the total population.

Regarding emigration from Israel, in the long run the absolute number of Israeli emigrants has increased over time. However, once adjusted for the rapidly growing size of Israeli population, annual emigration rates were rather low (between 3 and 5 per 1,000 inhabitants), substantially stable, or even somewhat declining over time. Measured per

1000 Jews in the country of origin, the frequency of emigration from Israel is similar to the frequency of migration to Israel from various Western countries (Bachi 1977, Lamdany 1982). In 2001, the frequency of emigration was quite exactly positioned at the level expected for *aliyah* rates from a country having the same level of human development as Israel's. This shows quite persuasively the sensitivity of Jewish migration behaviors to a common set of stimulating factors, but also the normalization of Israel as a country with emigration patterns similar to those found in other societies.

It remains true and important that Jewish migration continues to incorporate ideological motives, especially when considering that all or most migration to Israel might find alternative countries of destination. However, the real determinant of migration intensity and timing is powerfully related to the general quality of life, as expressed by social, economic and political conditions in the countries of origin. Ideology is *necessary but not sufficient* to generate large-scale *aliyah*. Here again, the basic dependency of decisions taken within the Jewish collective upon a broader array of societal determinants seems to be clearly demonstrated.

IMMIGRATION, EMIGRATION AND RETURN MIGRATION

One long established characteristic of Jewish migration has been its comparatively high level of retention and permanency as compared to other international migrations. The rate of return of Jews from the United States at the peak of migration during the early twentieth century was the lowest of any ethnic group, and reached 5% versus a total average of over 30%. High rates of retention characterized non-Jewish migrants to the U.S. from Anglo-Saxon and Central European origins, for whom adaptation to the new English speaking context was obviously easier than for others. Among several Eastern European and Balkan's immigrant groups, the majority returned to the countries of origin. Uniqueness of the Jewish experience at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was clearly related to a lack of motivation or even impossibility to conceive a return from the U.S. to the socially hostile and economically unfavorable previous context.

Looking at the more recent experience of Israel as the main country of Jewish migration and absorption, immigrant retention rates have continued to be high in international comparison. For example, of




Figure 11.7 Immigration and emigration to and from Israel, 1947–2006

the about one million new immigrants from the FSU since 1990, only about 8% are estimated to have left Israel five years since their arrival (according to the Ministry of Immigration, 2005). Figure 11.7 shows the peaks and troughs of Jewish immigration to Israel, defined here as *aliyah*, or the total of new immigrants under the Law of Return, including Jewish and non-Jewish persons. Also displayed is the comparatively much smaller flow of emigration from Israel—which incorporates also the minority of non-Jewish emigrants.

The patterns of movement to and from Israel clearly were very different. Immigration outnumbered emigration nearly every year, with short exceptions in the 1950s and 1980s. Immigration waves reflected recurring crises in the different countries of origin which represented the sending societies in each period. Emigration rather reflected periodical and much less extreme variations evidently related to the health of Israeli society. The level of emigration from Israel (also known as *yeridah*) fundamentally reflects two factors specific to Israeli society. One is a certain amount of non-integration and re-migration among new arrivals, typical of any society characterized by large scale immigration. Emigration is thus somewhat counter-cyclical to immigration. The other main factor is negative trends periodically affecting the Israeli economy,

namely unemployment, inflation, reduced foreign investment. The overall ratio between total emigrants from Israel and total immigrants to Israel between 1948 and 2002 is evaluated at 23% (see Table 11.1, based on the data in Figure 11.3).

Table 11.1 Immigration to and Remigration, Germany, 1954–1999, and Israel, 1948–2002, (thousands)

Country	Population in 2000	Immigrants	Emigrants	% Ratio Imm/Pop	% Ratio Emig/Imm
Germany					
Total	82,282	31,334	22,344	38	71
<i>Ethnic Germans</i>		6,064	3,755	7	62
Others		25,271	18,589	31	74
Israel					
<i>Total</i>	6,369	2,912	657	46	23

Source: Münz, 2002; Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2007.

These data call for at least an attempt for a comparative approach. One interesting case in point is provided by data on the immigration of ethnic Germans (*Aussiedler*) to Germany since World War II (Münz, 2002). German law allowed for benefits to returning ethnic Germans, not unlike the Israeli Law of Return. Therefore entrance and exit of German ethnic migrants (as distinguished from the country's total migrants) in Germany provides a case comparable to the entrance and exit of Jewish migrants in Israel (who for our purposes represent the country's total migrants). Data-wise, however, there are significant differences in both the relative volume of such ethnic migrations in relation to the size of the absorbing society, and the ratio of ethnic emigrants to immigrants in each country.

Germany received a total of over 31 million immigrants between 1954 and 1999. Compared with Germany's total population in 2000, this gives the equivalent of 38%. Of these, 6 millions were ethnic Germans—the equivalent of 7% of the 2000 total population size. In comparison, Israel received close to 3 million immigrants between 1948 and 2002. These constituted 46% compared to Israel's total population of over 6 million in 2000. Clearly the demographic impact of immigration, and of ethnic immigration in particular, on the receiving

population was much higher in Israel than in Germany. As noted, a ratio of total emigrants to total immigrants of 23% obtains in Israel in 1948–2002. As against this, the ratio of ethnic Germans emigrating or re-migrating from Germany out of all of those who had previously immigrated was 62% in 1954–1999. Incidentally the ratio of other, non-ethnic German re-migrants to total immigrants was even higher and reached 74%. Israel's retention of its own ethnic immigration thus appears to have been significantly higher than that of Germany. It may be argued that the opportunities to return to the countries of origin of those who come to Israel were more limited than those of the migrants to Germany—which was true especially of Jewish immigration from Asia and Africa, and from the countries formerly part of the Soviet area of influence. On the other hand, Germany is a country with significantly higher standards of living than Israel and its economic retention power might have compensated for at least part of the difference. The at least provisional conclusion of this comparison is that Israel's hold capacity over its own immigration has been high in comparative terms, consistently with the high retention of Jewish international migration in the past.

COMPOSITIONAL SELECTIVITY OF MIGRANTS

The already mentioned systemic nature of Jewish migration has been associated with variable characteristics of migrants who from one country of origin had the option to chose among two or more countries of destination. Such compositional discrepancies had crucial effects on the absorption and mobility patterns of large groups of emigrants from North Africa and other Middle Eastern Countries who split between Israel and France or other Western destinations (DellaPergola 2007). Table 11.2 compares the characteristics of Jewish migrants from the FSU to Israel and to the United States during the peak migration period of the early 1990s.

Israel received a significantly younger population, essentially below 40, while migration to the U.S. included higher shares of the elderly. Israel absorbed a significantly higher proportion of new immigrants from the Asian Soviet Republics, while more from the European Republics went to the U.S. Regarding occupational composition, Israel also received a higher proportion of blue-collars, while more of the white collars went to the U.S. Propensities to migrate to Israel more than to

Table 11.2 Selected Characteristics of Migrants from the Former Soviet Union to Israel and the USA—1990–1995

Characteristics	Migrants		% Ratio Israel/USA ^a	Migrants ^b as % of J. pop. 89
	To Israel 1990–1995	To USA 1993–1995		
Age				
Total	100	100	100	56
0–20	28	24	115	98
21–40	31	27	114	75
41–64	27	32	86	41
65+	14	17	80	34
Republic of origin				
Total	100	100	100	56
In Europe	78	85	91	50
In Asia	22	15	148	83
Occupation before migration				
Total	100	100	100	
White-collar	75	79	95	
Blue-collar	25	21	120	

a. Percent ratio of percentages in two preceding columns.

b. Migrants include non-Jewish family members, base population does not.

Sources: Israel CBS; HIAS. Adapted from DellaPergola (1998).

the U.S. were also consistently related with propensities to emigrate at all from the FSU. These patterns faithfully replicate the trends of previous periods of large scale Jewish migration. The respective profiles of migrant flows from Asia-Africa to France vs. Israel in the late 1940s and early 1950s, or from the FSU to the U.S. vs. Israel in the 1960s and 1970s, regularly implied much higher absorption costs for Israel in comparison with the other receiving societies.

These differences can be related to different perceptions of migrants of the risks and opportunities involved with absorption in a free market—as typical of Western societies—vs. assisted absorption—as acted upon by Israel. In general those with a stronger self-perception of occupational autonomy may have been attracted by the greater returns promised, at least potentially, by societies more developed than Israel. At the same time, those with a more traditionally oriented outlook

in terms of their occupational skills but also in terms of their Jewish identity may have put greater premium in the cultural opportunities offered by a society that is Jewish in its majority vs. the alternative. These two lines of thought may not be mutually unrelated.

An additional and related aspect that emerges with growing emphasis in recent years is the “brain drain” of Israeli experts who find placement on markets abroad. Because of its limited population scale and good quality higher education system, Israel has professional training capabilities far above its market absorption capabilities. This lack of proportionality has no easy solution, unless a strategy is devised to develop in Israel initiatives able to absorb a larger amount of highly skilled personnel. Examples in this direction would include developing activities—such as schools and R&D facilities—that are oriented to the global market rather than the local market. These considerations illustrate, once more, the strong connections that exist between the peculiar observation of Jewish migrations and the broader forces of globalization.

CONSEQUENCES FOR WORLD JEWISH POPULATION DISTRIBUTION

The migration movements outlined so far produced extraordinary changes in the overall geographical configuration of the Jewish people.⁴ World Jewish population distribution after the *Shoah* changed drastically. Its share in the “old world”—Europe, Asia, and Africa—diminished between 1948 and 2007 from 44% to 12% of total Jewish population; in the “new world”—America and Oceania—it slightly went down from 50% to 47%; and in Israel it grew from 6% to 41% (see Table 11.3). Between 1948 and 2007, entire areas of Jewish presence were virtually wiped off, such as East Europe and the Balkans, the FSU in Europe and in Asia, and Muslim countries in Asia and Africa. Each of these areas lost 83% to 99% of its initial Jewish population. Areas with substantial but more moderate losses comprised Latin America and Southern Africa (–25–30%).

Areas with moderate increases included Western Europe and North America (+8–11%), while Oceania recorded a significant increase of almost three times of its initial Jewish population. Israel, however, remains unmatched with a Jewish population growth of over eight

⁴ On rationale and definitions in Jewish population research, see DellaPergola 2007.

Table 11.3 World Jewish Population by Major Regions, 1948–2007

Region	Number (thousands)			Percent			Percent change		
	1948	1970	2007	1948	1970	2007	1948– 1970	1970– 2007	1948– 2007
World total	11,500	12,662	13,155	100.0	100.0	100.0	+10	+4	+14
Israel	650	2,582	5,393	5.7	20.4	41.0	+297	+109	+730
Total Diaspora	10,850	10,080	7,762	94.3	79.6	59.0	-7	-23	-28
Europe, West ^a	1,035	1,119	1,149	9.0	8.9	8.7	+8	+3	+11
Europe, East and Balkan ^a	765	216	22	6.7	1.7	0.2	-72	-90	-97
Former USSR in Europe ^a	1,950	1,906	322	17.0	13.9	2.4	-2	-83	-83
Former USSR in Asia	350	262	20	3.0	3.1	0.2	-25	-92	-94
Other Asia	275	100	20	2.4	0.8	0.1	-64	-80	-93
North Africa ^b	595	83	4	5.2	0.6	0.0	-86	-94	-99
South Africa	105	124	73	0.9	1.0	0.6	+18	-42	-30
North America	5,215	5,686	5,649	45.3	45.0	42.9	+9	-1	+8
Latin America	520	514	392	4.5	4.1	3.0	-1	-24	-25
Oceania	40	70	111	0.3	0.5	0.8	+75	+59	+178

a Countries in East Europe that joined the European Union were included in Western Europe in 2007.

b Including Ethiopia.

Source: DellaPergola (2007).

times during the last 60 years. While these population estimates refer to the concept of a core Jewish population, not inclusive of non-Jewish relatives, and while there may be some room for alternative estimates, these revolutionary geographical shifts are a product of real trends and not an artifact of data quality and definitions. The result is a Jewish population considerably more concentrated than in the past, with over 80% residing in the two largest communities, in Israel and in the United States.

The logic of change in the respective patterns of resilience or shrinking of Jewish communities globally is illustrated in Figure 11.8 which displays changes in Jewish population size between 1980 and 2000 in

the 24 countries that had the largest Jewish populations in 1980—each above 30,000 Jews—according to the HDI at the initial date (DellaPergola, Rebhun, Tolts 2005; DellaPergola 2008). These 24 countries cover a broad cross-section of different regional situations. Besides Israel, four major regional groups are outlined: Asia and Africa, Latin America, FSU and Eastern Europe, and Western countries (including North America, Western Europe, and Australia). In Figure 11.8, each country is ranked on the horizontal axis from 1 to 24 reflecting the difference between low and high values of the HDI—as noted, a comprehensive index of life quality at the national level—and on the vertical axis from 1 to 24 reflecting the difference between rapid quantitative shrinking and rapid population growth.

In broad generalization, the points representing most of the 24 countries are outlined quite in proximity to the configuration's main trend shown by the interpolation line in Figure 11.8. This indicates a strong response of Jewish population trends—toward growth or diminution—depending on the more or less favorable conditions experienced in each country. There are however several exceptions. Countries whose negative pace of Jewish population change was worse than might have been predicted according to the HDI in 1980 include Ethiopia—one of the world's poorest countries—and all of the several FSU republics included in this analysis plus Romania. France and the United States, too, appear somewhat below their expected level of Jewish population growth or resilience. Jewish communities in both countries received in the past large inflows of Jewish immigrants, but recent Jewish population stagnation or decrease is due to growing assimilation and aging in the US, and to emigration in France, stimulated by unfriendly circumstances related to rapid growth of the Muslim population.

More significant deviations from the expected relationship between Jewish population growth and HDI levels appear in countries such as Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, and to some extent Iran, where societies are socioeconomically polarized and highly unequal. Under these circumstances, Jewish communities are quite segregated from the majority of society and may have been able to nurture a niche of high socioeconomic achievement in comparative, if not absolute, terms. In Israel, Germany and Australia, too, Jewish population growth was faster than expected according to the respective HDIs thanks to the peculiar contextual incentives present in each of these countries. These analyses show how Jewish population trends are extremely responsive to human development and life quality context. As a matter of fact,




Figure 11.8 Jewish population change, 1980-2000, by human development index in 1980

Jewish populations have become concentrated in the most developed and influential centers of the global societal system.

One important conclusion emerges for Israeli society and its role within world Jewry. Besides the indisputable role of culture and ideology, Israeli society competes on the global scene by virtue of its socioeconomic opportunities and its standards of human development. During the 1980s and 1990s, Israel's development and opportunities grew at a pace among the fastest in the world. This was consistent with a rising prominence, if not centrality, of Israel in the perceptions of the Jewish diaspora, and was eventually translated in fast population growth thanks to mass immigration. Population growth, in turn, significantly enhanced Israel's ability to further develop and strengthen on the global scene. But Israel needs to continue keeping the developmental pace of leading societies if it wants to preserve its contextual incentives and attractiveness vis-à-vis the Jewish diaspora, or the diaspora of former Israeli residents who now live in other countries. Cogent relationships demonstrably connected to the development of global society tie together the existence, growth and decline of Israel and of diaspora

communities, through international migration and through the more complex web of interpersonal relations at distance.

SOME LESSONS FROM THE PAST

Several lessons can be drawn from the experience of the more or less recent past concerning the determinants and consequences of Jewish migration. In turn, these migrations stand at the origin of the changing configuration of the Jewish global collective and of the peculiar interrelation between the Jewish core country and the Jewish diaspora.

Main Determinants of Jewish Migration

The intensity of pro-migration forces in response to the socioeconomic and political situation in the country of origin. These typically fluctuate over time and display variable intensities across space.

The actual possibility to leave the country of origin related to legal and other factors. This is highly determined by the variable legal systems and political circumstances of the countries at stake, the typical example being the policies followed by the Soviet Union between Israel's independence in 1948 and its own demise in 1991.

The positioning of countries in the framework of the global system and their attractiveness as possible countries of destination for migrants. This is related not only to the different countries' standards of living but also by what some geographers have defined "space awareness"—a perspective of available opportunities much influenced by cultural, ideological or esthetic considerations.

The actual availability of such alternative destinations for Jewish migration. This too is highly determined by different migration policies, the typical case being the greatly variable quotas adopted in the United States over time.

The extent of involvement and the nature of the assistance provided by Israeli and international agencies. The role may have been particularly significant in the competition between actors such as the Jewish Agency or the American HIAS.

The demographic, socioeconomic and sociocultural characteristics of the Jewish population. For a variety of factors accumulated over history, Jewish population profiles have been quite different from those of other populations, and in addition to the natural selective response

to migration opportunities as a function of personal sociodemographic characteristics, one should also pay attention to special culturally-determined responses due to one's own Jewish identity.

The quality of absorption and feedback by recent migrants. Provided there is sufficient bilateral communication, these feedbacks can substantively affect the volume and direction of further migration from and to the same countries.

From the point of view of sending and receiving countries, what counts is the number and characteristics of migrants who leave or stay for good (net migration balance).

Main Consequences of Jewish Migration

Changes in population size in receiving and sending countries. The effects are important not only regarding the aggregate totals in the sending and receiving countries, but also regarding the communal environments perceived by the migrants themselves in the different locations.

Changes in the characteristics of the migrants. These may occur in the course of the migration process itself, or before—if a certain predisposition mechanism is already at work, or soon after, mostly as a consequence of the market constraints of the receiving country.

Competition between new immigrants and veterans in the countries of destination. Israel is an important case—among others—of large scale Jewish migrations that have brought together communities originating from countries with highly different profiles with respect to occupational and cultural modernization. The nature of the different models of societal convergence or divergence between the different groups may have crucial consequences for their material and cultural integration in the long term.

Changes in the global configuration of the population considered. Attention is paid in particular to the respective weight and mutual relations between the core country of a given national or ethnic group and its diaspora. This phenomenon is of growing diffusion and relevance (Sheffer 2003), and of course is of significant centrality in the case of world Jewry.

Changes in the global and local institutional systems of the population considered. These may be affected by the relative size of the different communities involved globally, by the respective cultural and political contexts, by their respective leaderships, and by their ability to position

the different organizations and lobbying bodies which constitute the global institutional fabric of the collective being examined.

Changes in the positioning of countries in the framework of the global system. Changing population size and characteristics, stimulated by international migration can eventually significantly affect the pool of available human resources. One remarkable example is the substantial qualitative jump of Israel's economy following mass immigration of academically trained people from the FSU in the 1990s.

Changes in the mutual relationships between the population considered and other populations. Referring to the combined configuration of core state-diaspora—for example in the case of world Jewry—the modified structure that may emerge as a consequence of large scale international migration may affect the mutual relation of the given global national collective—for example a world Jewry with a comparatively heavier Israeli component—with other national collectives.

Establishment of a new basic configuration out of which new migrations will likely emerge. A migration system in fact operates as a series of successive iterations between an initial configuration and the opportunities of change that are inherent in it—through further international migration.

ISSUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Looking at prospective world Jewish migration, the traditional reservoirs in North Africa, the Near East, and Eastern Europe, namely the FSU, have become virtually emptied, mostly because of emigration itself but also because of the ageing and assimilation of those Jews who choose to remain. On the other hand, the traditional receiving areas of Jewish migration, the Western countries and Israel where nowadays most of world Jewry live, generally were characterized by rather low emigration propensities. This would suggest future stabilization of Jewish international migration, including *aliyah*, at low levels of mobility unlike most of the past experience (DellaPergola, Rebhun, Tolts 2000).

The problem with such an assumption is that it views the world-system as static according to its present configuration, unlike the accumulated historical experience in the long term. As noted, large scale Jewish migrations often reflected important transformations in the mutual economic and political relationships between nations and societies globally. It is reasonable to assume that changes in the world-system,

specifically regarding Israel's position within it and the development of peace and other political processes in the Middle East, will continue to affect the pace and direction of international migration in general, and of Jewish migration in particular. But to predict what those global changes could be is far beyond the scope of this chapter.⁵

Jewish migrations reviewed in this chapter show consistent patterns over time in several respects: large volume, frequent and extreme variations over time, clearly delimited preferences in terms of countries' origins and destination, rationally explainable dependency on—and response to—changing environmental circumstances, high retention of migrants in their new locations, sociodemographic selectivity across different migration flows. While several of these patterns can be expected to continue in the foreseeable future, a number of relatively new developments emerge which tend to become more central in future research on Jewish migration and transnationalism:

Greater attention should be devoted to the growing fluidity and indetermination of the identificational boundary between Jews and non-Jews, and the consequent presence of a growing share of non-Jewish household members among Jewish migrants. Different operational definitions of the populations investigated, such as the ethno-religious core, or the greatly enlarged concept of the Law of Return, may have a significant impact on the interpretation of the numbers and trends at stake.

More sophisticated multivariate criteria—vs. the simple dichotomy of “Jews and others”—should be incorporated for comparatively assessing group identities and identifications, and their relations to international migration and the reconstitution of stable migrant communities in the aftermath.

Evaluation should be developed of personal multiple identifications, including multiple citizenships, as a consequence of past migrations, and of their possible role in the chain development of further migrations.

Attention should be given to the growing phenomenon of multi-localism, i.e. the experience of persons who spend part of their time in different places developing meaningful economic and social networks in each of them. Understanding causes and consequences of multi-localism can help in the assessment of what might become a significant component of total migration in the future.

⁵ General global migration prospects are discussed in Zlotnik 1996.

A new evaluation should be developed of the emerging policy relations between core national countries and the respective diasporas. In the case of the mutual relations between the global Jewish collective, the Israeli state, and the Israeli migrant community abroad, this calls for in-depth revision of existing concepts and institutional arrangements (The Jewish People Policy Planning Institute 2005).

CHAPTER TWELVE

IS THE JEWISH TRANSNATIONAL DIASPORA STILL UNIQUE?

Yosef Gorny

The case of this chapter is the question: can the Jewish dispersion in the modern time be a unique prototype model of a transnational diaspora? In principle, the two terms—uniqueness and prototype—contradict each other. But in this case they are dealt with on two different though connected levels: one historical and the other political, which accomplished each other in changing times. The historical level is unique and the political one may serve as a universal prototype by organizational activities in various social, political, and educational aspects. The uniqueness of the Jewish Diaspora since the Middle Ages derives from its history: the world-wide dispersion of the Jewish people; the absence of a home state on one hand, and the mythical religious connection to the Holy Land and Jerusalem on the other; the multicultural way of life in different countries and parts of the world, even in religious ritual; the movement of the centers of economic and cultural life in the diaspora—from Babylon to Spain, to Eastern Europe and at last to the USA; the different political status in the countries they lived in, especially since the American and French revolutions; and beyond or above this, the spiritual and psychological collective myth of Exile and Redemption, supported by the mythos and ethos of Jewish solidarity.

Following Sheffer and Roth-Toledano's (2006) prototype, the Jewish diaspora in the last century might prove itself by its worldwide transnational activities. In this perspective, the Jewish diaspora represents a sheer model of transnational diasporas—a general model of the world diasporas. It is a transstate political entity. It was created by voluntary or forced migration. Its members reside permanently in the host-country. They share an explicit ethnic identity. Their members show a high level of coherence and solidarity. And transstate networks play an important role in the life of diasporas, especially in organizing political and economic support between the diasporas, as shown in the following.

Two features in this model don't fit the Jewish diaspora. One—that in the host-country diasporas do not look for individual but for communal forms of integration. This generalization is only partially true regarding the Jewish diaspora. The second generalization, that diaspora members maintain contacts and exchange with their homeland, was unique on different political stages: before the Zionist movement; during the building of the Jewish national society in Palestine in the first half of the twentieth century, and after the founding of the State of Israel.

Here lies the unique character of the Jewish transnational diaspora. In the last hundred and fifty years it has been divided between diverging or splitting tendencies on one hand, and converging or unifying forces on the other. Those two opposite directions among the world Jewish people began in the nineteenth century, continued in the twentieth and exist as well at the present time.

JEWISH DIASPORA: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE

The Nineteenth Century

In the nineteenth century, the dividing tendency included three political and cultural types. The first type was assimilation, which was a typical ideology of Jewish individuals—mostly intellectuals. Some were world-famous, such as Heinrich Heine, Karl Marx, Leon Trotsky, Rosa Luxemburg and others. Personal assimilation generally is not a uniquely Jewish phenomenon, but for the assimilating Jews it meant a denial of the existence of the Jewish collective ethnic entity.

The second type was the religious Reform movement in Germany, which started in the second decade of the nineteenth century. This movement principally and actually caused a very deep division in the Jewish religion, by changing the language of prayer from Hebrew to German and later on to English, in the USA. Forty years later, this Reform movement, at the Pittsburgh conference in 1885 declared, on the basis of universal humanitarian principles, that: “We consider ourselves no longer a nation, but a religious community, and therefore expect neither return to Palestine...nor the restoration of any of the laws concerning the Jewish state (Mendes-Flohr and Reinhartz 1995: 372)”. It should be emphasized that the Reform movement in Europe and the USA had a social and cultural character. It was a Jewish Western middle-class phenomenon, which was almost completely dif-

ferent by language and culture of life from the Jewish popular masses in Eastern Europe.

The third type was the Bund in Russia, where the majority of the Jewish people lived. The Bund was a Jewish socialist revolutionary party with a unique combination of two opposite ideologies—marxism and nationalism. Their socialism was revolutionary and their nationalism was cultural, meaning the Yiddish language and culture. On this ideological basis, they believed in building a Jewish cultural autonomy in a future socialist society in Russia after the proletarian revolution. This unique proletarian and national combination separated them completely from the majority of Jewish society: from its religious majority, from the Jewish middle-class and most of all from the Zionist movement, in particular the socialist-zionist groups. Principally and politically they divided the Jewish people in two language groups: the majority that spoke Yiddish, who were the “real” Jewish nation, and the minority who spoke German, French, English, Arabic and even Hebrew, who were culturally integrated and in a future process would be completely assimilated and severed from the Jewish nation. As for the future, they believed in the proletarian Yiddish-speaking alternative Jewish nation. It should be indicated that the Bund contradicted and strongly denounced the assimilation ideology.

In tandem, a uniting process was caused by political anti-Semitic afflictions, but directed by spiritual and ideological strivings. In 1840 and 1858, two dramatic anti-Semitic events shocked the Jewish post-emancipated elite in Western Europe, especially in France and Britain. The first case was the “blood libel” in Damascus, 1840, where a group of Jews were accused of murdering a Catholic monk. The reaction to this event was an open political intervention on behalf of the prisoners by elite Jewish personalities—Moses Montefiore from Britain, Adolph Crémieux from France, and the Orientalist Solomon Munk. Their intervention, with the assistance of the Jewish press in Western Europe, caused a general public protest there and forced Mohammed Ali, the ruler of Egypt and Syria, to release the prisoners. The second event, the Mortara Affair in 1858, related to the kidnapping of a six-year-old boy from his home in Bologna by the papal guard; he was never returned to his parents in spite of many appeals. It had an even stronger impact on the initiatives of Jewish solidarity.

The most important and far-reaching of them was the establishment of the “*Alliance Israélite Universelle*” in 1860, in France, expressing the traditional Jewish principle “All Jews are responsible for each other.”

Alliance was active in several fields: in political action against discrimination of Jews in several countries; in education—opening modern schools for Jewish children in the Ottoman Empire, and in supplying economic assistance for Jewish settlers in several countries, in Palestine as well, where an agriculture school was founded in 1870 in Mikveh Yisrael. Following this example, Jewish institutions similar to Alliance were founded in Britain and Austria.

The action for Jewish solidarity was also well expressed on the personal level, by Morris Hirsch from Vienna, who financed the Jewish agricultural settlements in Argentine, and Edmund de Rothschild from Paris who rescued the Jewish settlements in Palestine. This kind of Jewish solidarity activity had a historical tradition. But at the end of the nineteenth century, in face of modernity, its character went beyond traditional philanthropy, and was intended to solve the Jewish collective problem by helping Jews to integrate modern, liberal society by different means: equal citizenship, education, and various economic changes.

The most radical, important and organized effort to change the status of the Jewish people in wider society was expressed and performed by the Zionist movement in two stages. The first stage was the “Lovers of Zion” (“*Hibat Zion*”)—which was founded in Russia in 1882, and the second stage—the World Zionist Congress founded by Theodore Herzl in Basel in 1897. The two Zionist organizations, in spite of the political and cultural differences between them, had common ideological principles. The first was that the Jews scattered throughout the world, in spite of the variations in their existence, are one people. And as such they are entitled, like other peoples, to reside in their historical land. That meant returning to Eretz-Yisrael. It should be indicated that Zionism as an ideological and political movement was never supported by the majority of the Jewish people. On the contrary, it was always a minority. But among the modern world’s Jewish organizations—the Zionist organization was the biggest one. More than that, from the beginning it was oriented ideologically and politically towards the Jewish people as a whole—(“*Klal Yisrael*”). On the contrary, other modern movements and ideological rivals of Zionism like the Reform and Conservative denominations or the Socialist party, the ‘Bund’, represented the modern religious sector or the proletarian sector, respectively. All of them expressed not only the ideological, but also the sociological cleavages of the Jewish society: the Reform movement represented the

Western liberal middle-class, the Bund spoke on behalf of the so-called Jewish proletariat, and the Ultra-Orthodox denominations symbolized the religious popular masses.

In contrast, Zionism from its beginning had a *Klal Yisrael* ideology and policy. In the *Hibat Zion* movement, secular positivist intellectuals like *Ahad Ha'Am* and *Moshe Lilienblum* mixed with *Rabbi Samuel Mohilewer* in spite of the ideological and spiritual differences between them about the essence—religious or non-religious—of *Hibat Zion*. Cooperation between secular and religious people was more significant although not always ideal in the Zionist World Congress, from its beginning until the creation of the State of Israel.

Beyond that, Zionism was a common frame for Jews from Eastern and Western Europe, American and Russian Jews, Socialists and anti-Socialists, Ashkenazi and Sephardi Jews. All of them together composed the most multicultural organization among the Jewish people. Last but not least, it was a unique ethnic “Internationale”—struggling for a political goal inside Jewish society and in the global arena.

The Twentieth Century

The twentieth century was the most constructive and destructive period in the long history of the Jewish diaspora. The Jewish people at that time were at a crossroad where different and opposite tendencies clashed with each other: civil rights against anti-Semitism; national spirit opposite assimilation; the Holocaust of European Jewry on one hand, and the establishment of the State of Israel on the other. From the beginning of the century it was a period of emergency for the Jews: starting with the pogroms in Kishinev in 1903, continuing with mass emigration to the USA; then the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, that cut off Russia's Jews from world Jewry; through the rise of the Nazi regime in Germany in 1933; up to the Second World War with its tragic historical consequences.

In spite of the emergency situation, the splitting process in the Jewish society did not stop. In 1912, the ultra-orthodox denominations, faced with the Zionist “threat,” founded the “*Agudath Yisrael*” political party. It was no less anti-zionist than its ideological rival, the ‘Bund’, except for one principal difference: *Eretz Yisrael* for the Bund was the “dead land”, but for *Agudath Yisrael* it was the “holy land”. In any case, *Agudath Yisrael* was a political outsider in the Jewish public life.

Even during the Holocaust it initiated separate help efforts for the sake of the Jews in the ghettos, and even refused to cooperate in this case with other Jewish institutions. The “Agudah” had its own priorities for rescue—first of all the saving of holy persons, the Rabbis; they expressed it openly. Toward the end of the war they were ready to support the establishment of a Jewish state if it would fulfill several principal religious demands.

Another splitting organization was the American Council for Judaism, founded in 1942 by a group of prominent members of the Reform movement who were extreme opponents of Jewish nationalism. For them Zionism as a national ideology was very close to Fascism, even Nazism. They organized a strong political campaign in the USA after World War II against the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. The main difference between them and the Agudah was that—as extreme Reform Jews—Judaism was for them only a religion with a universal message. As for Agudath Yisrael, it maintained that Jews are a religious people who must await the Messiah to bring them back to their holy land.

On the opposite side, the unifying process gathered more and more strength. In 1906 the American Jewish Committee was founded. In 1914–5, when WWI began, the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee was founded. Both institutions were committed to assisting Jewish immigrants and refugees. It is significant for the total Jewish responsibility that in 1929 Louis Marshall, the head of the American Jewish Committee (AJC), a non-zionist organization, established together with Chaim Weizmann the Jewish Agency to help build the Jewish society in Palestine. In 1936, the World Jewish Congress was established to struggle against the new Fascist anti-Semitism initiated by German Nazism.

The most significant development occurred in the Reform movement: in 1937, at the Columbus Convention, it declared its support for building a Jewish national homeland. It was the most unique example to signify the character of the unifying process, which was caused by afflictions, but directed by ideological principles. In face of the coming Jewish tragedy, the Reform movement strongly demanded a solution for the Jewish refugee problem in democratic countries. But the meaning of the Columbus Declaration, before anyone could imagine the approaching Holocaust, was the solution not for the individual Jew but for the Jewish people.

A "UNIQUE NORMALIZATION"

The Holocaust changed the nature of the Jewish diaspora, and the founding of the State of Israel gave it a new historical and political status. As a consequence of the Holocaust Europe is no longer the biggest Jewish diaspora. The major centers of Jewish collective activity are now in the USA and Israel. The State of Israel created a new type of relations between Jewish transnational diasporas, which may be described as a combination of normal general attitude between diaspora and homeland on one hand, but also as a unique Jewish phenomenon in the context of history, religion, and present political status. It meant, paradoxically, a "unique normalization", as I have coined it.

To explain this paradoxical term, attention should be paid to the historical relations between the Jewish diaspora and its homeland. First of all, it must be indicated as the well-known historian Salo Baron pointed out, that during a period of three thousand years the Jewish diaspora built its homeland three times, namely, the exodus from Egypt in 1300 B.C., the return to Zion from the exile in Babylonia in 536 B.C., and lastly the Zionist return since the late nineteenth century. Each return shaped the society in the land by values brought from the diaspora: the monotheistic idea, the religious law, and the modern society in the last century.

Secondly, the Jewish diaspora lost its homeland in the second century A.D., after the destruction of its territorial political center. This destruction created the myth and the ethos of Exile (*galut*) and Redemption, which was interwoven in the religious belief and in popular tradition. That myth became a cardinal factor in Jewish history. It preserved the messianic drive; it provided a metaphysical reason for Jews' sufferings; it caused the collective alienation of the Jews from non-Jews; and it inspired the efforts of Zionism to build up a modern Jewish society in Palestine.

Thus "exilic" consciousness which was not always dependent on external conditions that united the Jewish people, was a substitute for the lack of land and territorial center. Instead, the Jews created a mythological center with various religious features and later, with secular utopian traits.

Lastly, in our epoch, is the tragedy of the Holocaust which became a national trauma, and which in the last generation is becoming more and more a symbol of the Jewish fate and one of the main factors

of Jewish unity in dispersion. In this aspect, the Holocaust memory and its rituals became a vital part of the Jewish “civil religion”, with a universal message.

The historical change for the Jewish diaspora occurred with the founding of the State of Israel. The state not only gave the Jewish people political sovereignty, but also made the diaspora’s existence in some aspects normal. Looking at the diaspora networks in our time, political and economic ties with motherlands, and growing ethnic consciousness, we may say that there is a direct and indirect mutual impact on Jewish and non-Jewish diasporas.

This new historical situation generated a unique tension for the Jewish people between two ideological and political trends: one which accepted the normality, and the other which emphasized the uniqueness, of Jewish existence. These two trends have been wrestling with each other since the foundation of the state and undoubtedly will continue for a long time.

Three Stages in Israel-Diaspora Relations

To understand this tension and its uniqueness, we have to follow it throughout its historical process. Three stages can be identified in this process. The first stage consists of the years 1948–1952—from statehood until the end of the mass immigration of 670,000 refugees who in three years doubled Israel’s Jewish population. During this period, in spite of the hardships of everyday life, a dispute about the future relations between diaspora and the State emerged. The debate concerned the character of the renewed Jewish normality.

It should be noted that it occurred at a time when the Jewish people had undergone two unique national experiences: namely the Holocaust and the struggle for statehood, each with its own unique national character. As a consequence of the Holocaust, the East European Jewish center with its unique national features disappeared. In its stead, the center of Jewish diaspora moved to the Western countries, where the Jews had already lost many of their national characteristic features.

Three schools of thought followed by political interests can be identified in this period. The first advocated general normalization, as in non-Jewish society. Among its proponents were the secular intellectuals whose basic premise was denial of the existence of the Jewish problem, as well as thinkers, mostly rabbis, who saw Jewish existence exclusively in the religious non-national sense.

The second approach can be defined as singular normalization. This approach stands for the replacement of the notion of exile by diaspora; it believed that the simultaneous existence of Jewish life in Israel and in the diaspora was a repetition of the conditions prevailing in the Second Temple period (536 BC–70 AD). At that time, a large Jewish diaspora existed outside the Land of Yisrael which kept strong ties with the motherland. This approach also argues that the condition of US Jews resembled that of other ethnic minorities in American society. Ideologically speaking, most advocates of this approach were affiliated with modern religious movements, such as the Reform and Conservatives, and included Zionist leaders, whose Jewish intellectual world was closely linked to Anglo-Saxon culture. The third school of thought, which may be called Jewish normalization encompassed such diverse elements as the remnant of anti-Zionist East European socialists; Zionists whose ideological background was shaped in Eastern Europe; and the political parties and national leadership in Israel. They shared the assumption that Jewish existence was primarily national and mainly secular, and had a profound esteem for Hebrew and Yiddish culture as the vehicle of the Jewish national ethos.

Though the differences between approaches were not always very clear; in actual fact, all three schools of thought agreed to see a crucial importance in the continuation of Jewish existence in the new reality. On the other hand, and at the public level, the dispute between approaches developed into political conflicts—between the Israeli leadership headed by Ben-Gurion, and the American Zionist leadership. The major conflict concerned three questions:

- a. Did the State of Israel represent the Jewish people in the world?—as the Israelis asserted.
- b. Did the Zionist movement represent diaspora Jewry *vis-à-vis* the State of Israel?—as the American Zionist leadership wanted.
- c. Was Jewish existence outside Israel “exilic” or “diasporic”?—This was the ideological conflict between “negators” and “approvers” of the diaspora.

Two contradictory assumptions underline this debate: one, that the future of the Jewish people should be in the State of Israel, and that the diaspora was to disappear gradually. The opposite assumption was that the existence of the diaspora was legitimated by historical experience. Furthermore, the existence of the diaspora was beneficial

for those who lived in the free Western world and for the safety of the Jewish state that had the support of the Western diasporas.

At this stage the controversy ended in a “traditional compromise”, which leaned more toward the ideologists of “Singular Normalization”. The existence of diaspora was legitimized *de facto*; the Western countries were declared as “non-exilic” diasporas. The State of Israel gave up the demand to represent world Jewry, and the Zionists were not recognized as representatives of the diaspora Jewry. On the other hand, for diaspora Jewry the State of Israel became a center of main concern, especially in the years of absorption of mass immigration, which was financed mainly by diaspora Jewry. But it should be underlined that at the same time open and hidden centrifugal trends were widening the gap between the prosperous Western diaspora and the troubled Israeli society.

The second stage (1967–1981) started with the Six-Day War and came to its end at the time of Lebanon War. The Six-Day War was a milestone in the history of the State of Israel and its relations with the diaspora. In those troubled days of May–June 1967, when Jewish families outside Israel sat glued to their television sets, fearful for the besieged state, suppressed emotions of national solidarity surfaced and inspired an unprecedented financial aid project. Millions eventually found an outlet in the outburst of relief and enthusiasm at Israel’s astounding victory. All these happenings combined to create the mythical experience which became an important part of the group identity of American and other diaspora Jewry.

The Six-Day War brought to an end the centrifugal trend in the diaspora *vis-à-vis* Israel that had appeared in the aftermath of the mass immigration of the late 1940s and early 1950s. Since 1967, Israel got recognized not only as a center of Jewish consensus but also as a national center. From then on, a kind of “civil religion” came into being, attracting believers and non-believers and setting the Jewish national entity—the State of Israel—as the focal point of their Jewish experience.

It is noteworthy that the change was also caused by growing tension between the Jewish and black communities in the USA. So the Arab threat toward Israel and the threat by black anti-Semitism toward American Jews inspired a sense of national solidarity. To sum up, the spontaneous emotional and conscious ideological reaction of diaspora Jewry was a profound expression of “Jewish normalization”. That

change had a significance that went beyond concern for co-religionists or brethren in distress. This was more than traditional Jewish solidarity. It meant the rise and shape of national feelings and conceptual thought, which emphasized the unique phenomenon of a people who, in spite of their dispersion and multi-cultural features, were one united nation.

The third period in the relations between Israel and the diaspora began in the 1980s. That stage was marked on the one hand by political and ideological controversies and on the other hand by a growing aspiration to national unity. The political tension was caused by the rise of a right-wing government in Israel in 1977, by the Lebanon War in 1982, and by the eruption of the Palestinian intifada in 1987. These events created a deep split between liberal and conservative minded Jews in the diaspora, similar to what happened in Israel. But what is more important in our context is the legitimacy given to open criticism of Israel by Jews—which was much less common in the past.

At the ideological-political level, a dispute flared up between the American-Jewish and Israeli leadership about the right of Soviet or ex-Soviet Jews who left their country to choose their target society. The Israeli government advocated immigration to Israel out of national interest, while the American leadership stood for the principle of individual free choice.

On the religious level, the dispute concerned the question of “who is a Jew” by the Israeli Law of Return, which gives every Jew the right to immigrate to Israel and to become automatically a full citizen. The problem was whether to define a Jew by the Orthodox, Conservative, or Reform law. This dispute concerned mainly people willing to convert to Judaism or individuals whose mother was not Jewish. These tensions highlighted the growing tendency among diaspora Jewry for more autonomy and less dependence on Israel. They also expressed the weakening of Israel’s status in the Jewish world.

CONCLUSION

To sum up these reflections, it should be indicated that over the past two hundred years the Jewish diaspora underwent two opposite processes: one that defined its uniqueness, and the other that gradually voided it. The question at the present is which of these two drives will determine the future of the Jewish diaspora. Moreover, to the

extent that at least a part of the Jewish people will be able to live on in generations to come, will it still retain some aspects of its present-day and past uniqueness?

The answer in my opinion, as a historian, is that the very uniqueness of the Jewish people has resided, for the last six decades, in that ongoing, and even sometimes growing, tension between Israel and the diaspora. This tension is but one example of the permanence of divergent tendencies that animate the Jewish world ever since its entrance in the modern era. In this respect, we are facing a new Jewish transnational paradox with a double meaning: on one hand, the growing integration of the Jews in the societies where they live and, on the other hand, the growing “Israelization” of the Jews in their national state.

This trend is accompanied by the multicultural revival in Israel and multi-religious expressions among diaspora Jewry, especially in North America: this diverging pluralism is encouraged by the discriminating politics of Israel’s Orthodox establishment toward the Reform and Conservative denominations. At the same time, there is in tandem a growing universal acknowledgment of ethnic cultures in the liberal societies in the Western world that may improve and fortify the ties between Israel and the diaspora.

It is worth noting at this point that the last two centuries have shown the impact of general manifestations of modernity on Jewish history: the Reform movement was a Jewish expression of liberalism; the Bund was an offshoot of Socialism, and Zionism was directly influenced by European national ideologies and politics. In a same vein, it may be expected that contemporary transnational diasporism that favors the revival and retention of ethnic cultures, is to encourage the Jewish diaspora to see itself, and to be seen, as a legitimate expression of this trend. This new global configuration should strengthen the link between the different Jewish diasporas and between them and Israel.

Will this Jewish version of transnationalism still be “unique” with regard to other diasporas? The answer to this question is difficult to be addressed and it can only be assumed that for those who will remain a part of the Jewish world—in the diaspora and in Israel—, the unity of peoplehood and religion will still make up a singular feature with respect to other diasporas. This feature stems from the unique historical experience of a people uprooted from homeland but keeping up a collective awareness and nourishing spiritual and ethnic feelings for that territorial symbol and home. This historical uniqueness is enforced by the tragedy of the Shoah, that, in spite of its being coined universally

as the Holocaust, was firstly a Jewish unique ordeal. Last but not least, also contributes to this uniqueness, the still ongoing all-Jewish preoccupation focused on the challenged existence of the State of Israel.

The Jewish diaspora is one case among others, but which still shares crucial features of its own.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

AMERICAN JEWRY'S 'SOCIAL ZION': CHANGES THROUGH TIME

Allon Gal

Compared to other Jewish dispersions, the American one has distinctively enjoyed equality and ample opportunity for group development. The embedded pluralism in most spheres of American life, notably the religious one, has made Jews in America feel at home and at the same time develop their traditions and communal qualities. Anti-Semitism has been historically weak in the United States, and the phenomenon of philo-Semitism has been noticeable.¹

Against this background, a certain interest in Eretz Yisrael (Palestine) on the part of Americans and American Jews has been a vivid feature of American history. The Jewish interest was keen not just because anti-Semitism, marginal as it typically was, always did exist in America, but also because Protestant appreciation of the People of the Book and related interest in the Holy Land, have subtly worked to encourage Jewish religious-traditional interest in Eretz Yisrael. Furthermore, intensive American religious pluralism has been expanded at times (notably after World War II) to encompass some ethnic dimensions that included, in the Jewish case, concern for the revival of the ancestors' homeland.²

In this unique setting, the interest of the American diaspora in Eretz Yisrael often acquired a beyond-strict-Jewish nationalist dimension, taking the form of a universal-mission-orientation. In other words, the hope prevailed that the renewed Jewish activity in the historic homeland would correspond to the factors that enabled the free Jewish development in the United States and that Zionism would be related

¹ This chapter is partly based on Gal (1989). For history of American Jewry see, e.g., the fine five volumes of Feingold, general ed. (1992); and Sachar (1992). For succinct discussions of American democracy see Silbey (1995) and Grimes (1995), and of diversity and pluralism Kammen (1997). For a comprehensive study of anti-Semitism see Dinnerstein (1994), and for a sketch of philo-Semitism see Rubinstein (2004).

² See specific studies sponsored by the America Holy Land Project, Institute of Contemporary Jewry, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem; and see e.g., Grose (1983).

to the best of American ideals, even contributing to and enriching the American social-spiritual fabric.³

This universalistic urge for a revived Jewish homeland of a new harmonious and humanistic society in pursuit of a peaceful international setting (a vision of A New Social Zion) was indeed a striking characteristic among American Jews of the diaspora, at least until the 1930s.

EARLY EXPRESSIONS

Sabato Morais, prime mover in the establishment of the Conservative movement's Jewish Theological Seminary and its president until his death (1887–1897), believed that the Jews would return to their ancestral homeland and become an inspiration of peace and truth to the whole world, as foretold by the prophets and taught by tradition. In a similar vein, Solomon Solis-Cohen, one of the founders of the Seminary, co-founder of the (third) Jewish Publication Society, conceived new Jewish Palestine as would-be meaningful for world redemption. "If in God's providence there shall come about the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine," he wrote, "It must be a model state" in terms of social justice, love for the neighbor and the stranger, freedom and peace. Henry P. Mendes, prominent leader of early Conservatism and acting president of the Seminary from the death of Morais to the appointment of Solomon Schechter in 1902, developed the case for a New Zion vision. By the "Restoration of Palestine to the Hebrews" he also meant the establishment of a central spiritual influence for the world at large; a house of prayer for all nations; a central world-university for knowledge and inspirations; and a world court of international arbitration to secure universal peace (Davis 1965: 268–273).

Some of the later twentieth century Conservative leaders, such as Solomon Schechter and Israel Friedlaender, were much less universalistic when compared with the aforementioned personalities. Perhaps because of the East European mass immigration in their times they were concerned primarily with preserving Judaism in the cultural-religious sense. Yet, active and creative within the above-sketched American

³ For Zionism see the two important consequent works of Urofsky (1975, 1978) and also Cohen (2003). The non-polarized American circumstances produced, for a historical period, the phenomenon of non-Zionism, roughly the Jewish alignment interested in the cultural and economic—not political—development of Jewish Palestine, see Kaufman (1991). For universal-mission-oriented American Zionism see Gal (1986).

parameters, they too desired to see the Jewish endeavor in Palestine as being universally meaningful and contributing toward the reign of the Kingdom of Heaven on earth (Gal 1989: 63).

Instructively, Reform personalities who adhered to Zionism, still stayed faithful to their movement's universalistic credo, and they now expressed their mission orientation in the Zionist context. Thus, already in the mid-1890s, Bernhard Felsenthal (1822–1908), a nation-wide famed Chicago-based rabbi, claimed that the mission of Israel could be best served if there were a Jewish center in Palestine. Later he wrote that the Jews who would live in Palestine would be in a far better position to pursue the Jewish role of being a light unto the nations. They could become a model nation in regard to moral and religious conduct of life, while in the exile there was hardly an opportunity to fulfill the prophetic mission. Israel's mission required a Jewish *Musterstaat*. Faithful to Reform doctrine, he combined it with the *Ahad Ha'am* motif, hoping that "from Israel's own country, as from a center, could go forth and would go forth a stream of ideas, benefiting adjacent countries in Asia and influencing largely other countries in Europe, in America, and in other parts of the world." (Meyer 1983: 55).

Gustav Gottheil (1827–1903), a renowned Reform rabbi, publicly supported Herzl's course, and especially his son and follower, Richard Gottheil (1862–1936), first president of the Federation of American Zionists (1898–1904), declared that in addition to Zionism's objective of creating conditions for Jewish national existence, it had another even nobler mission of contributing to the welfare of mankind (Gal 1986: 364–365). David Neumark, a member of the faculty of the Hebrew Union College from 1907 until his death in 1924, positively interpreted Zionism by a progressive religious conception of Judaism, which he forcefully claimed was crucial for the success of the Reform movement (Meyer 1983: 57).

Judah L. Magnes, the restive Reform rabbi and one of the most prominent intellectuals of American Zionists until World War I, stated after his immigration to Eretz Yisrael/Palestine:

Zionism, Palestine, in my opinion is not an end in itself... Palestine is one of the means, perhaps a chief means, but not the only means of making... the Jews everywhere fitter to perform their historic tasks in the great world... after this Return from Exile there might be produced men of spirit, ideas of truth and beauty, eternal forces that might help mankind along its painful way to salvation (Goren 1982: 208–212).

Max Heller (1860–1929), a Reform Zionist leader in the South, strongly believed that in a land free from anti-Jewish prejudices, Zionism could offer a living example of a God-consecrated world where community superseded the individual. “Humanity can not be saved by individual righteousness,” he consistently argued, but only the “righteousness of a social organism . . . will bring justice and salvation.” Jews, as a “Messiah-people” dwelling in a “Messiah-state,” would become “the social organism that shall redeem humanity and lead it thus united to the one God.” (Malone 1997: 110).

Reform rabbi Stephen S. Wise, one of the founders of the American Zionist movement (and president of the Zionist Organization of America in 1936–1938) constantly stressed the noble role of the Jews, namely: to bring comfort and light to the tortured world. Wise, who creatively worked out of the frame of the organized Reform movement, influentially instilled the idea of progressive Jewish Palestine as the best avenue for long-honored universalistic values (Urofsky 1982, *passim*).

Universalistic-mission orientation also was quite distinctive until the early 1930s among secular Zionists. In his both programmatic and inspiring 1906 article “The Ethics of Zionism”, the noted social-philosopher Horace Kallen concluded thus (in the leading journal at the time of American Zionists): “If it is the Jew’s right to survive, and Zionism asserts it is, it is his right by the vigor of his achievement and the effectiveness of his ideal, by his gifts to the world and his power for good in the world.” Many of Kallen’s later Zionist publications were also written in a similar compassionate-universalistic vein (Gal 1986: 368–369).

Louis D. Brandeis, who assumed American Zionist leadership upon the outbreak of World War I, and continued to exert tremendous influence on the movement and beyond until his death in 1941, was originally mission-oriented. He found that Jews eminently possessed those qualities for which American Progressives struggled—justice and intensive democracy—and concluded that Zionism was the best way to assure the Jews’ contribution toward a better world (Gal 1980).

A younger secular Zionist activist, Bernard Rosenblatt, also articulated a progressive ideology much in the social-mission vein. He, together with Kallen and Brandeis, composed the social-economic Pittsburgh Program, firmly adopted by the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA) in 1918; accordingly, the future Jewish state would be an enlightened model society (Urofsky 1975: 250–257).

As is well-known, Hadassah, the Women's Zionist Organization (founded in 1912), devoted itself mainly to the support of medical and health work in Eretz Yisrael. This practical course, however, was pursued in the light of certain social-philosophy, and a certain *mentalité*. Henrietta Szold, Hadassah founder, thoughtfully synthesized Ahad Ha'amism and mission-orientation. Once in Palestine, Szold's universalistic bent led her to the tiny *Ihud* group, which believed that a bi-national state would bring about a harmonious solution to the Jewish-Arab national conflict. Another American Zionist in the leadership of *Ihud* was Magnes. (Gal 2005).

Szold, the first national president of Hadassah (1912–21, 1923–26) was succeeded by Irmah Lindeim (1926–28), who also made *aliyah*, joining a Ha-Shomer Ha-Tzair radical movement's kibbutz. She passionately believed that ethical-collectivist life in Eretz Yisrael would serve the realization of decent, peaceful order in the Middle East and the world over (Lindheim 1962: 50–51 and *passim*).

CHANGES OF PERSPECTIVES FOLLOWING WORLD WAR I

Three factors gradually worked since the end of World War I to attenuate the universalistic element in American Zionists' and interested Non-Zionists' ideology. In the United States, anti-Semitism increased and stayed noticeable until the victory over Nazi Germany. In 1924 the immigration gates of the US were closed down with an anti-Semitic sting. Chauvinism and anti-Semitism in Europe and Nazism in Germany loomed to threaten Jewish existence. In 1929, the Arabs in Palestine conducted continuous murderous onslaughts against Jews.

The transformation of American Zionist and proto-Zionist ideology was gradual indeed, and quite allusive for a time. One of its earliest and indicative expressions was the mutation which the Zionist attitude of Brandeis underwent. Though one may find him commenting occasionally on anti-Semitism during the 1920s, it was in 1930 that he summed up the threatening processes in a clear-cut manner. In a long programmatic letter (in August 1930) to Robert Szold, his faithful partner in Zionist affairs, he described the new situation; the major motif of this historic message was not the 'old' universalistic mission but *national survivalism* (Brandeis 1978: 446–449).

As historian Naomi Cohen has analyzed in detail, the Palestinian Arabs' 1929 murderous attack on the Jewish community has transformed

more than few American Zionists and non-Zionists to adopt a more realistic and nationalistic stance (Cohen 1988). The case of Louis Brandeis, however, is especially instructive. Whereas previously the mission-oriented Brandeis conceived the Yishuv as a New Zion—as a model ‘City upon a Hill’—Brandeis of 1930 and on was thrilled by a new image: The Yishuv as a democratic-pioneering fortress strategically located on the top of a hill, defending itself against the assault of Middle East’s non-tolerant fundamentalists. Heroic and suffering Jewish Palestine, and the embattled pioneers caught his imagination and instilled in him a mixture of pride and concern. Though Brandeis never relinquished his support and hope for progressive Palestine, clearly, national survival—often associated with values such as courage, stamina and physical fitness—became a major element in his thinking (Gal 1987).

Obviously, neither Arab aggression nor British appeasement signs (culminated at the time by the Passfield White Paper) deterred him from conceiving the historic Jewish homeland as the real haven for the now deadly threatened European Jews. “The condition of the Jews in the Diaspora in 1930,” he stated, “—as compared with 1920 and 1914—has worsened to such a degree, that the belief of thinking Jews that the Jewish problem would be solved by growing enlightenment in the Diaspora must have been seriously shaken—if not shattered.” And he sharply concluded: “The anti-Semitic outbreaks in Europe, the closing of the doors to immigrants by practically all the new countries, the rise of anti-Semitism even in the new countries, remove the old alternatives from consideration. The question now presented largely is Palestine—or Despair?” (Brandeis 1978: 446–449).

For rabbi Solomon Goldman, a noted Conservative thinker and Zionist activist (ZOA’s president in 1938–40), the trigger for change was probably 1938 *kristallnacht*. Before the hideous Nazi pogrom (that heralded the Holocaust) he had published *Crisis and Decision* in which his addresses were amply colored by bright mission Zionism. But in 1940 he published a somber work entitled *Undefeated* where a grave survivalist motif permeated. While his previous book ended by equating the *halutzim* (pioneers) in Eretz Yisrael with the embodiment of a just society in an emerging just world—his later volume ended on a different note. The utopia was delayed now to the End of the Days, and the hard way toward it was the humanization of society. Preserving Jewish life and dignity came to be the final test of the humane quality of the long upward travel (Gal 1989: 63, 67–68, Weinstein 1973).

During the late 1930s and early 1940s a pair of eminent Zionists—Emanuel Neumann and Abba Hillel Silver—were preparing to assume the leadership of the American Zionist movement. Rabbi Silver, though a Reform Jew steeped in universalistic-mission tradition, was doubly traumatized in a way that weakened precisely that tradition: he happened to be in Germany when Hitler came to power; and he was later (in 1940) brutally alienated by the State Department when he tried to help Jewish refugees. Jewish self-reliance consequently came to be paramount in his ideology. The record of Neumann was relatively simpler as he professed sympathy with nationalist “Integral Zionism” where the mission rationale was ruled-out. According to both, however, the Zionist goal is defined and justified solely or mainly on the basis of internal Jewish needs. They served as ZOA presidents in 1945–47, and 1947–49, respectively (Gal 1986: 381–382, Gal 1989: 68–70).

Together with Neumann’s presidency in 1947, a new editor of *New Palestine* (the major ZOA publication), Ernest Barbarash, took over. Of Revisionist background, he titled his semi-autobiography “If I am Not for Myself . . .”, thus omitting the non-egoistic element from Hillel the Elder’s famous saying (The full maxim is: “If I am not for myself, who will be for me? But if I am only for myself, of what good am I?”). The new editor gradually reshaped the Zionist organ to be more survivalist in orientation. Undoubtedly, the impact of the Holocaust began to meaningfully sink in (Gal 1989: 69–70).

This change was felt, though to a weaker degree, also in Hadassah. Since the mid- 1930s the organization helped rescue and sustain Jewish youth, bringing them from Nazi Germany to Jewish Palestine. This endeavor undoubtedly sharply worked to deepen Hadassah’s nationalist factor. Since the early 1940s, however, the women’s organization espoused a more militant Zionism than in the years of Henrietta Szold’s and Irma Lindheim’s leadership. Under the presidencies of Tamar de Sola Pool (1939–43) and especially of Judith Epstein (1943–47) and Rose Halprin (1947–52), the organization shifted away from the bi-national political solution to Palestine in which it had evinced considerable interest. A Jewish state and its welfare had come then to absorb Hadassah’s philanthropic and humanistic pursuits.

THE SHOAH AND THE SURVIVALIST TURN

The systematic murder of Jews by the German police state and its collaborators during 1933–1945 deeply affected non-Zionist groups in

the United States. Thus, the B'nai B'rith mass order gradually accepted Zionism during the 1940s under the leadership of Henry Monsky (president from 1938 to 1947). In 1943 the order crucially cooperated with Silver in the American Jewish Conference that aligned the bulk of American Jewry behind the Zionist Biltmore Program that called for the establishment of a Jewish state upon the end of the World War. In this process, obviously, the survivalist strain was paramount. The Jewish state, in the survivalist ideology of B'nai B'rith, was conceived chiefly as a factor in the broader Jewish effort to perpetuate the Jewish people in the face of anti-Semitic genocidal brutality. To the members of B'nai B'rith, Eretz Yisrael was hardly more than a haven and a fortress. Frank Goldman, the president of the order in 1947–1953, determinedly continued its survivalist course (Moore 1981, Gal 1988a).

The United Jewish Appeal and the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds went through a similar survivalist-Zionist kind of transformation. A pivotal personality in this historic change was Joseph J. Schwartz. During 1940–1949, when Schwartz was the chairman of the European executive council of the American Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), he supervised relief and welfare programs involving over one million people. He worked to save Jews during the war, and when the great flight of Jews from East to West Europe began (about 1944) he again rendered help in many ways. He knew and keenly felt that Europe would not be a home for the refugees, and this came to be the essence of his “Zionization” process. Due to these circumstances, his Zionism was classically survivalist at its core (Gal 1989: 72–74, Kaufman 1991: 207–211).

In this vein, Joseph Schwartz later became even more deeply convinced that Palestine must be the home of the Displaced Persons. Conveying this message, he actively participated in the epoch-making national conference of the United Jewish Appeal (UJA) in Atlantic City in December 1945. People from the European camps who had gone through the hell of Nazi Europe also appeared before this conference. As Menahem Kaufman has concluded, the survivors' call for Jewish solidarity and for support for their yearnings to build a home in Palestine profoundly moved the conference's delegates, Zionists and non-Zionists alike. Then began the UJA's ever increasing pro-Zionist shift, conceiving of Israel as a haven for survival of the remnants of the tortured people. So the JDC, the UJA, and the Federations—all moved along a path very similar to that followed by Joseph Schwartz (Kaufman 1991, Gal 1989: 73–74).

Actually, the overwhelming majority of the American Jewish Community was in a similar mood, and it responded with unprecedented feats of fundraising. As Jonathan Woocher has observed, the UJA billed these as years of "survival" and of "destiny" and they were unlike any others that Jews had in modern collective memory. A combination of anxiety and exhilaration attended the rebirth of the Jewish state. Israel became the community's focus for the survivalist impulse, interwoven as it was with deep Jewish pride (Woocher 1986).

CONTINUITY OF THE MISSION MOTIVE

The historic transformation discussed in the last two sections raises the questions of whether the mission motive entirely vanished from American Zionist ideology and of whether it ever took any roots in the vigorously expanding pro-Zionist alignment. After all, the circumstances in America itself—those factors which gave birth to genuine universalistic mission-oriented Zionism—did not undergo any fundamental change during the years.

Now, first we should indicate that some of the veteran expounders of "missionism" adhered to their original attitude throughout and after World War II. Such were e.g. Horace Kallen and Bernard Rosenblatt (Gal 1989: 75). Also, the universalistic mission motif notably lived-on in Hadassah. Many members and leaders alike persistently hoped that the Jewish state would not provide a solution solely for survivalist problems but would convey some universal message. Early in 1948, in expectation of the establishment of Israel, *Hadassah Newsletter's* editorial stated:

[We] believe that the Jewish State will have a significant and worthy contribution to make to the progress of civilization, West and East. We consider that the Jewish State is dedicated to the ideals of justice, equality, security and peace. We believe that the Yishuv does and will continue to embody the best ideals of the Jewish and human traditions. (cited in Gal 1986: 373)

A year after the State of Israel had been proclaimed, the Hadassah editorial solemnly declared that the members of the organization "have given the divine experience to helping to create an instrument of human salvation," and it thus concluded:

This is our relationship to the Jews of Israel, a partnership in a common enterprise for the furtherance of human brotherhood. With them and through them we shall try to extend the frontier of the human spirit

beyond rigid geographical boundaries. We, Jews of America... dedicate ourselves to the extension of the democratic way of life, to every corner where exploitation and injustice still exist (ibid: 374).

The universalistic-mission rational also persisted in the two largest religious movements—the Conservative and the Reform ones. Louis Finkelstein, a longtime president and chancellor of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America (1940–1972), emphatically claimed in 1943 that the Zionist enterprise was justified in cosmic terms “as a means of communion with God and of service to mankind.” And in 1944 he again argued that Zionism is chiefly “indispensable to a reformation of world culture as well as one of the major expressions of the reformation itself.” The Jewish people is *am segulah*—a people appointed for special service to God and mankind—he heralded about two years after the Holocaust was known in America (Gal 1986: 377).

It is important to indicate that as for the Reform movement, its Zionization through the 1930s and 1940s occurred without relinquishing its mission idea. Thus, the Columbus Platform adopted by the Central Conference of American Rabbis (CCAR) in 1937, largely signifying the beginning of the pro-Zionist turn of Reform, included an explicit plank which reaffirmed the movement’s commitment to a universal mission. Typical of the whole process, Felix A. Levy (president of the CCAR during 1935–7), who led the change, effectively recommended Zionism due to its association with and service to the old grand mission idea. An enlightened Jewish Palestine, Levy inspiringly argued, would best help to spread the universal message all around the world. This argumentation was forcefully re-employed by him in the 1943 historic debate on the question, “Are Zionism and Reform Judaism Incompatible?” Levy’s thesis that Jewish Palestine can advance the Jewish people’s “mission to come nearer to God and brotherhood” prevailed. The universalistic mission motif in the Reform movement, then, did not vanish at all; rather, it co-existed through the 1940s and beyond, *along* the deepening commitment to Zionism and later to the State of Israel (Gal 1989: 80–82, Gal 1991: 10–21).

Generally speaking, the process since 1930 was the weakening of the mission motif. The two extreme expressions of the idea—the mission as a condition for, and the mission as in principle more important than the nationalist goal—have virtually disappeared. Yet the factor did not vanish into thin air. Rather, *a whole range of syntheses* of universalism and national particularity came to be the characteristic of Americans interested in Zion and Zionism. In these syntheses the typical case was the priority of the nationalist cause.

Perhaps the most instructive case is that of the ZOA, the conspicuously ideological organization in American Zionism and pro-Zionism ranks. Upon the proclamation of the State of Israel on May 14, 1948, the *New Palestine* published a comprehensive and festive editorial essay. Entitled "Long Live the Republic of Israel," the editorial sensitively reflected change and continuity in American Jewry's concern with Israel (*New Palestine* 1948).

The editorial *leitmotif* was undoubtedly survivalist—Israel had come into existence in order to fulfill Amos's prophecy: "On that day I will re-establish the fallen Tabernacle of David and they shall not any more be uprooted from their land." Indeed, offering a home for the persecuted people was, according to the *New Palestine*, the essence of the historic event:

Eighty generations and multiplied millions of Jewish martyrs have prayed for eighteen hundred long years for this miracle to become a reality. Now their spirit comes to life to hail the new Yishuv. A few short years ago six million of Europe's finest men and women were brutally slain because they were Jews. They were slain merely because they were descendants of the glorious prophets of Israel. They died because in an hour of need, there was no Jewish State to give them sanctuary. Today the spirit of these martyrs blesses the builders of the new Yishuv. And they warn us that never again shall Israel be without a homeland (in *New Palestine* 1948).

However, this survivalist justification was not an exclusive one; a clear mission strain ran all through the historical editorial. Support for the new state could be rendered by all Americans—gentiles and Jews alike—who shared a common heritage:

We American Zionists greet the undaunted defenders of the Yishuv. America was founded by men who loved the Hebrew Bible and whose love of liberty was nurtured by the words of the Jewish prophets. A Jew stood by the side of Columbus when he first saw the new World. Throughout its history, Jews have helped build America... We American Zionists know that Zionism is good Americanism. We know that the new Jewish State will promote the American ideals of freedom, peace and prosperity, because these concepts stem from the ancient Jewish concepts.

The editorial loftily declared that "In an age beset with turmoil and destruction, a Jewish State once again rises to afford a suffering humanity the old ever-needed Jewish message of hope, justice, freedom and peace to all men." And the continuation similarly stated: "We Americans have labored for Zionism. Today we are grateful to our government and the other nations of the world for their recognition of the new Jewish State. We know that the new Jewish State will be a benediction to all

mankind” (*New Palestine* 1948). On the whole then the ZOA’s ideological organ synthesized the survivalist and mission orientations, giving the primate to the survivalist factor. This pattern was soon reflected in the movement’s July 1948 national convention.

This 51st convention, peculiarly referred to the famous 21st convention when the ZOA, in the wake of the Balfour Declaration, had adopted, with a mission-like zeal the progressive Pittsburgh Program, which hardly encompassed the nationalist dimension (see above). Now in July 1948, some delegates observed that the historic program was missing in this gathering, which for the first time faced the independent Jewish state. Those delegates then accused the leadership of dragging the ZOA away from that grand commitment. The leadership—that is, Emanuel Neumann, Abba Hillel Silver, and Daniel Frisch (ZOA vice president and president after Neumann)—then avowed loyalty to the Pittsburgh Program. Consequently, the floor confirmed this decision with a “roaring approval”. It is obvious, however, that neither the old universal-mission orientation nor the progressive social ideals were at the hearts of the leadership or of most of the delegates. They first and foremost conceived and endeared the new state as a national Jewish phenomenon. The very existence of the Jewish state was the paramount event; and that the State of Israel’s survival by itself—stores benefit and progress for all (Gal 1989: 79).

For the ZOA of 1948, then, the social and humanistic tenets were no more the ultimate values attesting to the merit of the whole enterprise. Rather, the social-ethical values had now been integrated into the nationalist endeavor. However, the universalistic values, though now downgraded, *did prevail*. Concretely, they included chiefly the commitment to a democratic regime, pursuit of social justice, acceptance of a mixed economy, and adherence to peace-oriented policy. The “founding father” of AIPAC (the now famous pro-Israeli lobby) and a historic partner of Silver, Isaiah Kenen, adopted the succinct characterization of Israel, upon its tenth anniversary, as “humanistic, civilized, and devoted to peace” (Kenen 1981: 142).⁴

⁴ Kenen followed then historian Henry Steele Commager who drew a distinction between nationalism that was “malignant” and nationalism that was “benign”; while the nationalism of Israel was compassionate and constructive, the one of her neighboring foes took the form of “chauvinism, militarism, and territorial and cultural imperialism” (Kenen 1981: 142).

The values in the new synthesis, were often projected by rabbi Mordecai M. Kaplan, who gradually became a leading ideologue of American Zionism and philo-Israelism. This Reconstructionist rabbi was known for his stubborn rejection of the chosen-people concept, and by the same token he did not tend to see the Jewish state as the bearer of a message to the world. Kaplan's "vocation idea" meant that the Jewish people was expected to mold a society intimately linked with Jewish heritage and responsive to inner Jewish needs. Mordecai Kaplan first and foremost conceived Zionism as aspiring to the two Americanized classic goals—security for the Jews especially beyond the English-speaking countries; and revival of Judaism in the diaspora and Israel. These twin goals were at the core of his philosophy. At the same time, though, he did occasionally refer to Zionism as a "social instrument" influential beyond Jewry and Judaism; and he called American Zionists and Jewry to embrace "a purpose or meaning to Jewish life that is of universal import because of its idealistic, cosmic, spiritual or religious character." The development of Israel as a socially-conscious democracy was critical to his world-view; but he relegated the universalistic implications of an enlightened Israel to the bottom of his ideological agenda (Gal 1989: 79–80).

Significantly, even the non-Zionist organizations that came to be "Zionized" in a way *cum* survivalist rationale were faithful to basic democratic and socially sensitive values. Thus B'nai B'rith, which reshaped itself under the harsh impact of Nazism and the Holocaust, and conceived Israel chiefly as a "rescue state," also always envisioned the Jewish state as conspicuously democratic and enlightened.

The order was concerned with the problem of dual loyalty and tended to solve it by claiming (*à la* Kallen-Brandeis) that the Jewish state would fulfill the loftiest American ideals. The democratic idea was indeed at the core of these shared values. The publications of B'nai B'rith of the period of its Zionization were at the same time also obsessed with discussions of the democratic way of life and with expressions of loyalty to this American basic tenet. B'nai B'rith was a service organization; little wonder then that interwoven with the order of democratic commitment were humanistic and social motifs. To sum up, though this organization tended to perceive Israel as a huge sheltering enterprise, it also envisioned it as a democratic and a socially-conscious state (Gal 1988b).

Similarly to the B'nai B'rith case, the Federations' evolving kind of pro-Zionism also was significantly attuned beyond sheer survivalist

interest. Leaders of the Federations typically envisaged an Israel cherishing the core values of Judaism such as the dignity of man and *tzedakah*. And they saw the Jewish state as representing a consummation of America's own values of democracy and equal opportunity. Actually, the Federations' ideology was so steeped in American values ("Americanness" according to Jonathan Woocher) that it adopted the ideal of an American mission as a Jewish virtue to pursue. Thus, survivalist thinking in the prevalent civil religion of the Federations often implied that both American Jewry and Israel were committed to the advancement of a model society (Woocher 1986).

MEMORY AND FUTURE

During the 1960s the agonized consciousness of the Holocaust deeply and widely penetrated American Jewish life and thought. Consequently, the very survival of the State of Israel became a major, often decisive factor in American Jewry's conceiving of the Jewish rescue state. At the same time though, large parts of American Jewry embraced the Holocaust memory in a rather *Americanized* version that settled into the American post-World War II culture. In this version, Nazism and the Holocaust were perceived chiefly not as a barely anti-Semitic phenomenon, but rather as an attack on the Western civilization and its cherished values. Jews happened to be, though bestially designated, just one of the victims of Hitlerism. Accordingly, the decisive historical response to the Holocaust horrors is not the State of Israel in particular, but notably the adherence to the noble values presented in the American Constitution. Pluralism, tolerance, freedom, dignity of man—these are the basic answers to genocidal Nazism. It was roughly in this spirit that the United States officially erected the so impressive Holocaust Memorial Museum at the very heart of its capital (Sarna 2004: 258–282, 333–338; Berenbaum 1990a, Berenbaum 1990b, Young 1999).

American Jewry is of course a very diversified community, and its adoption of the Holocaust's memory and lessons is variegated as well. The concept that the State of Israel is the right historical answer to Nazism and its satanic effort to annihilate the Jewish people is quite typical indeed. Still, it would be fair to conclude that shades of the Americanized concept of the Holocaust are quite common among American Jews. This kind of attitudes helps American Jewry to, generally speaking, subtly adhere to some sort of a "Social Zion" vision in

which the very existence of the State of Israel is a nobly justified historic answer to Nazism and anti-Semitism, but not an exhaustive answer; it is being completed by a set of democratic-humanistic qualities beyond mere nationalistic survival (Rosenfeld 1997, Flanzbaum 1999).

At the root of American Jewry's full mobilization on behalf of Israel in the Six Day War was the fear that another Holocaust might happen; that the Holocaust remnant—the Jewish State—might perish. Yet, and significantly so, this solidarity was subtly interwoven with the belief that Israel has the ingredients that totally reject those vile tenets that made the Holocaust possible. American Jews perceived Israel much *a la Exodus* (Leon Uris's book and Otto Preminger's movie avidly read and watched by the bulk of American Jewry)—a democratic, pioneering, humane, and peace pursuing state (Whitfield 1996). When American Jews protested and demanded that America be more for the defense of Israel, they did so also *in the name of shared values*; they demanded that America be more true to itself, to its cherished ethos and related ethical commitments (Urofsky 1978, Shapiro 1992: 207, Davis 1992: 7–24). It is this synthesis—prominently exemplified in 1948 and very intensively so in May–June 1967—that has characterized American Jewry's basic attitude to Israel in the decades that have elapsed since then (Zeitiz 2000, Raider 2007).⁵

A quite typical liberal—pro-Social Zion—American Jewish concept of the Holocaust is found in Deborah Lipstadt criticism of Peter Novick's (2000) book:

Novick argues that because no contemporary act can be compared to the Holocaust, the Holocaust gives us an excuse not to act in other crises. But if not for America's "memory" of the Holocaust, this country would not have responded to the suffering of the Kosovo refugees. When President Clinton spoke of Kosovo he referred to the Holocaust. Reporters repeatedly draw analogies—some spurious—to it. We could have responded earlier, when Slobodan Milosevic first began his terrible activities. The Holocaust has not taught us enough. But it has taught us something. Letting tyrants wreak their havoc, unchecked, propels them to greater atrocities (Lipstadt 1999).

This kind of synthesis has been eminently performed by Elie Wiesel. In his 1960 *Dawn*, 1978 *A Jew Today*, and later works and addresses,

⁵ Although historian Zeitiz's in-depth analysis focuses on the 1967–1973 years, his discussion covers the subsequent period roughly up to the end of the twentieth century.

he powerfully presented the idea that the survival of the Jewish people and the State of Israel has become a primary moral obligation. At the same time, though, he eloquently envisioned Israel as embodying humanistic and progressive values. As sociologist Sylvia Barack-Fishman has informatively noted, a whole range of American Jewish writers—Saul Bellow among them—have worked within these conjoined parameters of nationalist survival and universalism (Fishman-Barack 1996: 280–281).

Israel at the beginning of the 21st century is perceived by American Jews as less inspired by pioneering and collective values than decades ago. And the Social Zion concept has undoubtedly dwindled as well. Yet, the belief that the embattled democratic Jewish State was engendered by universalistic values embodied by both the American dream and the best of Jewish civilization has become a lasting feature of American Jewry's vision of Israel.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

THE NEW RUSSIAN-JEWISH DIASPORA IN ISRAEL AND IN THE WEST: BETWEEN INTEGRATION AND TRANSNATIONALISM¹

Larissa I. Remennick

INTRODUCTION: TRANSNATIONAL IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES

The concept of *transnationalism*, described as an integral part of the globalization process, is becoming increasingly popular in social and political sciences (Glick Schiller et al. 1995, Guarnizo and Smith 1998, Portes et al. 1999, Faist 2000). Originally coined in international economics to describe flows of capital and labor across national borders in the second half of the twentieth century, this concept was later applied to the study of migrations and ethnic diasporas. The lens of transnationalism became increasingly useful for exploring such issues as immigrant economic integration, identity, citizenship and cultural retention.

Some authors argue that transnationalism may actually be a new name for an old phenomenon, in the sense that most big immigration waves of the past were typified by ethnocultural retention and contacts with co-ethnics abroad (Van Hear 1998, Guarnizo and Smith 1998). Indeed, historic studies of ethnic diasporas show that immigrants never fully severed their links with the homeland. Yet, due to technical and financial limitations of the time, for most migrants these links remained mainly in the sentimental and cultural realm, and were seldom expressed in active shuttle movement or communication across borders. Economic ties with countries of origin were typically limited to monetary remittances to family members. Although up to one-quarter of transatlantic migrants of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries eventually

¹ This chapter is partly based on the research project funded by the Israel Science Foundation "Russian Jews and Jewish migrations in transnational perspective" (grant No 899/00 in Social Sciences). The book resulting from this comparative study is titled *Russian Jews on Three Continents: Identity, Integration, and Conflict* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2007).

returned to their homelands, the decision to repatriate was in fact another critical and irreversible choice to be made. Hence, for the majority of historic migrants, resettlement was an irreversible process always involving a dichotomy: stay or emigrate, or else stay or return (Jacobson 1995, Van Hear 1998).

In the late twentieth century efficient and relatively cheap means of communication and transportation (time- and space-compressing technologies) made this old dichotomy largely irrelevant. As Castells (1996) has pointed out in his book *The Rise of the Network Society*, new technologies have virtually created new patterns of social relations, or at least strongly reinforced pre-existing tendencies. They allowed numerous diasporic immigrants to live in two or more countries at a time, via maintaining close physical and social links with their places of origin. Transnational activities and lifestyles became widely spread, embracing large numbers of people and playing a significant role in economy, politics and social life of both sending and receiving countries. Guarnizo and Smith (1998) have introduced a useful distinction between *the two types of transnationalism*—‘*from above*’ and ‘*from below*’. The former refers to institutionalized economic and political activities of multinational corporations and organizations such as the UN, Amnesty International or Greenpeace, which set in motion large-scale global exchange of financial and human capital. On the other hand, the increasing role in these networks belongs to ordinary migrants—grassroots agents of transnationalism who run small businesses in their home countries, organize exchange of material (e.g., ethnic food) and cultural (e.g., tours of folk artists) goods within the diaspora, pay regular visits to their birthplace, receive co-ethnic guests, and so on.

Migration experience in the context of global society, where constant exchange of people, products and ideas is reinforced by transnational media networks, has attained a whole new quality. The full-time loyalty to one country and one culture is no longer self-evident: people may actually divide their physical pastime, effort and identity between several societies. Citizenship and political participation are also becoming bi-focal or even multi-focal, since some sending countries allow their expatriates to remain citizens, vote in national elections and establish political movements. In this context, international migrants are becoming *transmigrants*, developing economic activities, enjoying cultural life and keeping dense informal networks not only with their home country, but also with other national branches of their diaspora. The split of

economic, social and political loyalties among migrants, and gradual attenuation of loyalty to the nation-state as such, is seen as problematic by some receiving countries (Guarnizo and Smith 1998).

Most transnational networks in business, politics, communications and culture organize along ethnic lines, i.e. include members of the same ethnic community spread between different locales on the map. Common language and cultural heritage are the key cementing factors for the transnational diasporas (Jacobson 1995, Van Hear 1998). In most cases, transnationals become bi-lingual and bi-cultural, but different communities may exhibit various extents of cultural separatism versus integration in the host society. Specific expressions and forms of transnational living vary by the host country and ethnic group and are closely intertwined with the issues of multiculturalism (Joppke and Lukes 1999). Over time, many immigrant groups develop cultural hybridism—the mix of the elements of their ethnic language and lifestyles with those adopted from the host culture. Most common expression of this trend is the formation of hybrid immigrant lingoes—Mexican English, Algerian French, Turkish German, etc. (Glick Schiller et al. 1995, Guarnizo and Smith 1998, Van Hear 1998).

While much of the current writings on transnationalism are concerned with long-distance economic activities and financial flows across the borders, the focus of this chapter is on its socio-cultural dimension and implications for immigrant identity and integration. It stems from a theoretical perspective regarding the assimilation process as non-linear and segmented, whereby seemingly assimilated second and third generations may come to reclaim their ethnic roots (Portes and Min 1993, Alba and Nee 1997). In psychosocial terms, immigrant/transnational identity and personality become increasingly ‘elastic,’ if not ‘fluid,’ being constantly shaped and re-shaped by multiple influences of different societies migrants actually live in. Transnationals of today experience the increasing difficulty answering the question, ‘What are you? Where do you belong?’ In that sense, transmigrant identity emerges as epitome of postmodern identity (Giddens 1991, Guarnizo and Smith 1998).

However, the transnational lifestyle has its underside. While for many immigrants it may be a blessing, enabling them to enjoy the best of two (or more) worlds, for some others it virtually means living in the limbo, or in the state of permanent uprooting. As I will show below, in some cases transnationalism is conducive to social and cultural alienation from the host society and poor chances for integration and success.

RUSSIAN JEWISH IMMIGRANTS OF THE 1990s:
PATHWAYS TO TRANSNATIONALISM

Most recent studies of transnationalism focused on the immigrants who moved from the economically disadvantaged countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America to the West, mainly the US, Canada and Western Europe (Smith and Guarnizo 1998, Portes et al. 1999, Faist 2000). In this chapter, I am trying to apply this concept to another stream of the late-twentieth century migrations: those from the socialist Eastern Europe to Western or Westernized countries. Although during the 1990s several ethnic groups were involved in mass emigration from the former Soviet Union (FSU)—Germans, Armenians, Greeks, as well as Russians and other Slavs—Soviet Jews formed the bulk of the émigrés. An estimated 1.6 million of former Soviet citizens of Jewish ancestry left the deteriorating USSR and its successor states after 1987, drastically depleting their aging Jewish communities, as well as the sending countries' human capital. Jews were the single most educated ethnic group among all Soviet nations, with over 60% having post-secondary education and mostly professional or white-collar occupations (Tolts 2004, Remennick 2007). Over 60% of these émigrés moved to Israel, the rest are scattered between the US and Canada (25%), Germany (12%), Australia and other Western countries (the remaining 3%). In the early 1990s, Israeli social anthropologist Fran Markowitz (1995) suggested that Russian Jews in the FSU and abroad were developing transnational ties. Yet, few researchers tried to explore these tendencies in more concrete terms and in specific host countries (Remennick 2002, Darieva 2004, Morawska 2004, Ben-Rafael et al. 2006). This chapter is an attempt at comparative analysis of diasporic and transnational trends among Russian Jews who live in the four main host countries of post-communist migrations. To contextualize my analysis, I will start from the general socio-economic portrait of this migration wave to Israel, Europe and North America.

THE ISRAELI CONTEXT

Israel is a country of 'ethnic return migration' whose very *raison d'être* is offering shelter and a symbolic home to scattered groups of diasporic Jews. About 950,000 Soviet Jews arrived in Israel after 1989 (CBS 2006), increasing the Israeli Jewish population by 20%. The total number of

Russian-speakers (since the 1970s) has exceeded one million; this ‘critical mass’ of same-origin immigrants has made a significant impact on Israeli society, economy and politics. By virtue of its size and timing, the Great Russian *Aliyah*² of the 1990s carried all the necessary conditions for the development of transnational tendencies. To begin with, Israeli Law of Return does not impose any eligibility criteria (e.g., age and health status) for Jewish immigrants, and, therefore, *aliyah* in the 1990s was a mass, unselected family movement across borders. Younger families immigrated together, or in chain, along with their parents and other relatives. As a result, the advanced age structure of Soviet Jewry has been ‘transplanted’ to Israel: middle-aged and elderly immigrants comprise a high percentage of the total (about 40% are over age 45 and 15% over 65, vs. 30% and 11%, respectively, in the Israeli Jewish population) (CBS 2006). Older immigrants are more prone to ethnic and cultural retention and have a lower potential for occupational, social and cultural integration.

Second, due to intense assimilation and intermarriage among Soviet Jews, about one-third of the immigrants are partly Jewish or non-Jewish (i.e., spouses and children of immigrants recognized by the state as entitled to immigrate).³ After seven decades of atheist indoctrination in the USSR, over 90% are non-religious; their Jewish identity is tenuous and mainly ethnic. Non-Jewish and assimilated immigrants are less likely to develop strong Israeli identity and may have lower motivation for studying Hebrew, mandatory military service, and general assimilation in the host society. It is important to bear in mind that the latest immigration wave from the FSU was set in motion mainly by ‘push factors’ (economic crisis, political instability, growing nationalism and antisemitism in post-socialist countries). Positive identification with Judaism, Zionism and other Israeli values among last-wave emigrants was rather weak. For many of them, Israel was a less desirable destination than America or other Western countries, which introduced strict refugee quotas for Soviet citizens in the late 1980s. Thus, for most,

² *Aliyah* is a Hebrew word for repatriation of Jews to Israel, literally meaning ‘ascent’ to historic homeland and to Jerusalem as the Jewish capital. Jewish repatriates are called in Hebrew *Olim*, or ‘ascending.’ These ideologically loaded terms signify the national Zionist aspirations.

³ By Jewish Talmudic law (*Halacha*), only a child of a Jewish mother is a Jew, regardless of father’s descent. Yet, by the Law of Return, children and grandchildren of Jews on any side, and their immediate families, have a right for Israeli citizenship.

making *aliyah* was a pragmatic rather than ideological choice. In this sense, the mental state of Russian immigrants of the 1990s is markedly different from that of the smaller Zionist *aliyah* from the USSR of the 1970s (some 130,000), which had opted for Israel in a period when all Western countries welcomed Jewish refugees (Remennick 2007: 36).

Third, the Russian language and Russian-Soviet culture play the crucial role in the formation of Russian-Jewish ethnicity and the Israeli Russian community. In fact, it is the main common ground for the otherwise diverse groups of former Soviet immigrants, including Jews of various ethnic origins (European and Asian) coming from the whole array of places and social backgrounds. Across the multi-ethnic USSR, the Russian language was dominant as both official and everyday language for most urban residents, especially for educated professionals and white-collar workers. In the last Soviet census of 1989, 95% of Jews named Russian as their mother tongue, compared to 30–60% among other non-Russians. Soviet Jews counted in their ranks many prominent writers, poets, journalists, actors, theater and film directors, media and show business people, i.e. they belonged to the core of Russian *intelligentsia* and took active part in the very creation of Russian-Soviet culture of the twentieth century. While in surveys and ethnographic studies most Russian Jewish immigrants reveal that they have no sentiment for their former homelands as such, they often miss the Russian language and rich cultural life that draws on it (Remennick 2007: 363, Fialkova and Yelenevskaya 2007: 239). In interviews, many would repeat the phrase of the renowned Russian Jewish émigré poet Joseph Brodsky: “*Wherever I live, my homeland is the Russian language.*”

Last but not least, the post-communist wave of emigration caused a split and broad dispersal of families and social groups across the globe; as a result, many Israeli Russians have extensive networks of relatives and friends in North America and in Europe, thus forming a transnational social space. In addition, 6–8% of immigrants of the 1990s wave (i.e. 60–80 thousand) subsequently left Israel, either returning to the FSU or moving to the West (Tolts 2004). These Russian Jews with Israeli experience usually keep ties with their kin and friends remaining in Israel, come to visit, and some have property there. As more Russian immigrants can afford long-distance phone calls and periodic air trips to these destinations (let alone on-line connections), these networks are becoming more dense and sustainable. This further facilitates travel,

social and business activities of the immigrants in the post-Soviet states and elsewhere.

Next, let me briefly outline the resettlement context of former Soviet Jews in the West (for more see Ben-Rafael et al. 2006 and Remennick 2007). To begin with, both USA and Germany opened their doors to the Jews as *refugees* fleeing discrimination and anti-semitism. In both countries, Jewish newcomers were entitled for a more or less generous welfare aid package (subsidized housing and health care, old-age benefits, social insurance—SSI, etc.) and their initial adjustment was managed by the local Jewish communities. Additional channels of legal entry to the US (used by Jews and non-Jews alike) have been job visas for professionals, marriage to American citizens, and winning in the Green Card Lottery. By contrast, Canada granted ‘landed immigrant’ status to former Soviet citizens (direct applicants from the FSU and re-migrants from Israel) based on its universal ‘point system’ (whereby applicants gain score based on their education, occupation, age, and language proficiency rather than ethnicity or religion) and made no distinction between them and other migrants. The analysis of the socio-demographic profile and economic adjustment of the Jewish immigrants from USSR/FSU between 1970 and 2000 (Cohen 2007) suggests that émigrés who were younger, more educated and had better adjustment potential for Western economies typically left for North America, while their older counterparts endowed with fewer marketable skills opted for Israel (and Germany, I can add). As a result of this self-selection, Russian Jews in the US (and to a lesser extent in Canada) have experienced better earnings and upward economic mobility than their co-ethnics in Israel and Germany.

An additional predicament in Israel was its small and saturated skilled labor market, while in Germany barriers to immigrants’ professional employment included bureaucratic regulation of public sector jobs, high unemployment rates among both Germans and immigrants, and requirements of German language proficiency (Remennick 2007: 313, Ben-Rafael et al. 2006: 93).

In Canada, the main ‘bottle neck’ has been the need for local licensure for most ‘regulated occupations’ in education, human services, and engineering, which effectively banned re-entry to professional practice for many immigrants (Remennick 2007: 279). The comparative context of economic and social integration in the four main receiving countries is summarized in Table 14.1.

Table 14.1 Macro-Characteristics of Post-Soviet Jewish Immigration in Main Host Countries

<i>Characteristics</i>	<i>Israel</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>USA</i>	<i>Canada</i>
Official framing of Jewish immigration	Ethnic return, Zionist nation building	Religious refugee, paying historic dues to Soviet Jewry	Religious refugee, saving from anti-semitism	Independent economic migrants & small number of refugees
Access to citizenship	Immediate for the Jews	Pending 6–8 years of residence	Pending 5 year residence and exam	Pending 3 year residence and exam
<i>Size of the Soviet Jewish group among:</i>	Large (1.1 mln among 5.8 mln Jews)	Small in general	Small in general	Very small
* general population	* 14%	* 0.05	* 0.05	* 0.025
** Jewish population	** 20%	** 85% of JG, 100% in some towns	** 13% (700,000 in 5.9 million)	** 10% (80,000 among 800,000)
Resettlement package & welfare aid	Modest, short-term but comprehensive, incl. occupational adjustment & health care	Generous and long-term, incl. housing & health care	Refugee rights: short-term for working age, life-long for seniors	None: economic self-reliance, welfare like all Canadians
Access to skilled occupations	Licensure needed for regulated occupations; labor market small but dynamic & flexible	Foreign credentials seldom accepted; labor market regulated & unionized	Licensure required for few occupations; labor market large, liberal & flexible	Barriers to foreign credentials; public sector unionized & regulated
Host expectations toward immigrants	Rapid assimilation in the Jewish mainstream	No specific expectations	Participation in Jewish life, economic self-reliance	Economic self-reliance
Economic success in 10–15 years	Moderate; Occupational downgrading, but middle-class lifestyle	Low by local standards: high unemployment and reliance on welfare	High income & rapid access to middle-class & prosperity	Moderate: occupational downgrading
Political power	High: large size, voting rights, political parties	Low: small group of non-voters	Moderate, as part of U.S. Jewry	Moderate, as part of Canadian Jewry

MECHANISMS OF SOCIAL INTEGRATION IN THE HOST COUNTRIES

In my earlier writings (Remennick 2003a, 2007: 69), I reflected on the specific venues and measurable expressions of the integration process under conditions of mass influx of same-origin immigrants, especially when it is framed as 'return' or 'ethnically privileged' migration (which is mostly the case with Russian Jews). Available Israeli and Western research on former Soviet immigrants points at the central role of (1) employment in the mainstream economy (rather than in the ethnic sector) in par with one's skills and training; (2) inclusion of the 'old-timers' in migrants' personal social networks; and (3) the hegemonic majority's attitudes towards the immigrant groups in question. More open and inclusive disposition of the hosts is conducive to mutual tolerance and greater participation of the newcomers in the host social institutions. Successful integration usually emerges in a form of biculturalism, based on bilingualism. Integrative strategy implies a double cultural competence, flexibility and an effective situational switch between the two cultures (Berry 1990, Nauck 2001). Immigrants' ability to integrate in the new society hinges on the human capital they are endowed with (education, professional and linguistic skills), as well as the amount of social support (from both personal and institutional sources) available to them during the initial difficult years of re-adjustment. On the individual level, age and control of the host languages are of paramount importance: younger migrants are usually prone to faster social learning and greater adaptability, while better language command improves the chances for successful employment, networking with the locals, and an easier shift to mainstream cultural products (Remennick 2004, Fialkova and Yelenevskaya 2007: 239).

Employment in par with one's skills and qualifications has been shown to be the major gateway for the newcomers to both economic well-being and gradual social insertion in the mainstream. Multiple structural and cultural barriers experienced by the immigrants on professional labor markets (proving foreign credentials, skill incompatibility, blocked access to public sector jobs, etc.) resulted in occupational downgrading of former professionals in all receiving countries. In the wealthy German welfare state this meant chronic dependence on social aid, and in all the other countries the need to seek re-training and new paths to economic survival. For younger and more dynamic immigrants this meant taking a fresh start (often for the better!) but for middle-aged professionals, especially men, the inability to get back to their original line of work

meant severe damage to self-esteem and further estrangement from the host society. Across the post-Soviet Jewish diaspora, the share of professionals who could regain their original occupations probably lies between 15% in Germany and 30% in the U.S. and Israel. Occupational adjustment was especially hard for members of humanistic and culturally-dependent occupations (highly prestigious in the FSU but often useless in the West) who could not make a living as educators or journalists in their new cultural milieu. Sometimes they found an outlet for their talents in various educational and cultural ventures targeting Russian immigrant youth (e.g. after-school Russian language and art classes). At the other end of the scale were computing and internet specialists, whose skills were easily convertible and universally demanded (Remennick 2003b).

Significant numbers of the dropouts from the mainstream labor market found shelter in the ethnic economic sector, giving a strong push to the mushrooming of Russian groceries, car dealerships, garages, travel agencies, book/music/video stores, and other small businesses forming together the thriving “Russian Street” of New York, Tel Aviv, Berlin, and Toronto. The share of self-employed among former Soviet immigrants is hard to measure due to different legal definitions in the four countries, but the estimates vary between 8% in Israel and 35% in some US cities (Light and Isralowitz 1997). Some members of the free professions (e.g., lawyers, accountants, physicians and dentists) who managed to obtain local licenses opened their offices catering mainly for the Russian-speaking clientele. Yet the majority of former professionals and current ‘no ones’ had to toil in manual or semi-skilled labor force in industry and services, hardly making ends meet. The older segment of educated Russian Jews had to rely on their pre-migration reputation and achievements as a basis for identity and self-esteem; thus all former “senior engineers” and “chief constructors” dwelled on their solid past rather than shaky present and unclear future. A minority of well-adjusted bicultural and bilingual immigrants is found mainly in mainstream organizations and companies.

The workplace is also the meeting ground between the immigrants and their local peers, giving rise to new social relationships and personal friendships that over time may transcend the boundaries of the ethnic community. Gradual inclusion of members of the hegemonic majority into immigrants’ personal networks is a potent signifier of the ongoing integration. Given their limited contact with the mainstream institutions and low proficiency in the host languages, the expansion of immigrants’

social networks has been slow in all the four countries. Personal narratives collected in my fieldwork (Remennick 2007) largely point to the explicit co-ethnic preference in private/informal communications manifested by Russian-speakers in all the major hubs of immigrant life. Between 65% and 85% of adult immigrants state in interviews that most or all of their personal friends, dates and potential spouses are other Russian immigrants. The tendency of many immigrants, especially older ones, to settle in Russian residential enclaves (such as Bat-Yam in Israel, sections of Brooklyn in New York, Charlottenburg in Berlin or North Bathurst area in Toronto) additionally hampers their chances to befriend native neighbors. The ability to bridge the social gap to the majority is stronger among 'return migrants' in Israel than among Russian Jews living in the West, probably due to immigrant origins of most Israelis, remnants of Zionist solidarity, and informal interpersonal style typical for locals. Few adult Russian immigrants in other countries could say that they count non-immigrant Americans, Canadians or Germans among their personal friends, although this tendency is usually stronger among younger immigrants. Similar findings on co-ethnic social preferences and "distancing from others" among Russian Jews in diaspora communities have been found in a comparative study by Ben-Rafael et al. (2006: 191).

The co-ethnic social preferences of Russian Jews reflect their feelings of cultural superiority over other immigrants, and often the old-timers too, drawing on the proverbial cultural legacy of Russian literature, philosophy, and the arts. Many educated Soviet Jews (especially intellectuals) are embittered by the lack of appreciation of their finesse by the host society. Without actually knowing much about the mainstream cultural life (due to the language barrier and social alienation), they often judge the local media and cultural scene as inferior and unworthy of the attempt to learn it better. This sense of cultural superiority is especially typical for Russian Jews in Israel (Lissak and Leshem 1995, Fialkova and Yelenevskaya 2007: 89). To ensure cultural continuity, these immigrants have established thriving ethnic cultural and educational institutions, such as Russian libraries, amateur drama, literary and music societies, after-school enrichment activities for the children, multiple printed and electronic media channels in Russian. Although over time these Russian-language institutions incorporate more local elements (e.g., drama groups stage not only Russian classics but also local plays or perform in the host language), their style, management, and membership remain largely Russian (Ben-Rafael et al. 2006: 109).

Some unique forms of cultural production dating back to the Soviet times—amateur song festivals (KSP), humor contests between student teams (KVN), and brain-ring games (*Chto-Gde-Kogda*)—have all found their way into the lives of Russian cultural diasporas in Israel and in the West.

The split Russian-Jewish identity of the immigrants plays out in paradoxical ways in different national contexts of their new homelands. While former Soviet Jews in Israel often underscore their secular Russian-based cultural identity and typically have little interest in Jewish religious life, in Western countries they often re-discover their Jewishness and willingly partake in the social networks and cultural events sponsored by the established local Jewry. This reflects both the need for support and services offered by the Jewish community to the newcomers and the search for their own place in the multicultural mosaic of the host countries. Mass migrations and the settling of minority groups made both North America and Western Europe playgrounds of identities and ‘identity politics’. This is especially evident in the US context, where many Russian Jews chose to be affiliated with social institutions of ‘cultural Judaism’—Reform synagogues, Jewish cultural societies or political groups that support Israel. Thus, in the American sample of the comparative study among Russian Jewish immigrants, most respondents reported their similar involvement in Russian and Jewish cultural life, with ‘American cultural involvement’ significantly lagging behind (Ben-Rafael et al. 2006: 151).

The last component of my model, which sets the tone for the integration process, is the feedback received by the immigrant community from the hegemonic majority. It would be fair to say that even in Israel, where every fifth Jew today speaks Russian, the Hebrew mainstream is largely indifferent to the life of the so-called ‘Russian Street’ and not really interested in its alleged cultural riches. Although most Israeli Jews give a lip service to the contributions of the Russian *Aliyah* to Israeli economy and society, fewer Israelis express personal interest in befriending Russian immigrants, learning Russian or visiting Russian cultural events (Leshem 1998, Remennick 2003a). The ongoing process of cultural production in Russian (new books, literary almanacs, etc.) goes unnoticed by the Hebrew-speaking educated public, even where translations are offered. Although explicit institutional discrimination of Russian immigrants is uncommon, negative attitudes towards their professional competence (e.g. as doctors or educators) and their alleged ‘Soviet mentality’ often

lead to practices of exclusion and stifled promotion (Remennick 2007: 153). In the US and Canada, Russian Jews try to build their primary social networks within the established Jewish communities and are often perceived by the mainstream as an integral part of it. In Germany, the position of 'New Russian Jews' vis-à-vis local Jewry, other immigrants, and the native German majority is still contested and vague. In all host countries, the Russian component of their dual social identity associate these immigrants in the negative media discourse on 'Russian mafia,' 'Russian ethnic violence,' and 'Russian sex workers' (Darieva 2004, Ben-Rafael et al. 2006: 261). These general trends do not undermine multiple personal stories of warm welcome and generous aid that the newcomers had received from Israelis, Americans, and Germans, Jewish or not, during their initial harsh years of resettlement (Fialkova and Yelenevskaya 2007: 89).

Although former Soviet immigrants are prone to social apathy and mistrust of any establishment, their political participation in the host countries usually increases with receiving citizenship and full voting rights. In Israel, their immediate access to citizenship and high demographic weight in the electorate led to rapid ethnic mobilization for lobbying of the mutual interests and the formation of "Russian" parties (Al-Haj 2002). In the Western countries, where they comprise a small minority, Russian immigrants have a weaker sense of political power and seldom participate in the mainstream democratic institutions. Yet, they are usually quite active in both local and national elections, voting for candidates whose policies they deem as beneficial for immigrants. They often manifest poor understanding of the local political scene, and their choices are strongly influenced by the local Russian media and their immigrant friends (Ben-Rafael et al. 2006: 261). With other variables kept constant, former Soviets typically lean towards conservative, republican, and right-wing politicians, whom they construe as consistent, reliable, and fighting with crime, terrorism, ethnic conflict, and declining morals (Kliger 2004). Despite their dislike of formal organizations, over time most Russian immigrant communities have built their own voluntary associations catering for their cultural and social needs, providing self-help and legal advice, and, more rarely, expressing a specific political agenda (e.g., *Russian Jews of America for Israel* recently formed in New York). Yet, the share of Russian-speakers who actively participate in any community organization remains insignificant, the way it was in the mid-1980s when Fran Markowitz

conducted her research in Brooklyn. They still prefer the grapevine of informal social connections as a tool for solving their problems and meeting personal goals, remaining a “community in spite of itself” (Markowitz 1993).

Given the diversity of Russian immigrant experiences, it is hard to draw a universal bottom line as to the extent of social integration of former Soviets in Israel and in the West. On the macro-level, the first post-Soviet immigrant generation has manifested faster upward mobility than most other minorities, often entering local middle class in a matter of 5–10 years. In a cross-country comparison, Russian-Jewish immigrants in the US probably achieved the highest and fastest socio-economic mobility in comparison to both other US minorities and Russian-speakers in other countries (Chiswick and Wenz 2004). It is estimated that in terms of average annual income, Russian Jews in the US recently surpassed Indian immigrants—another highly educated and dynamic minority—and became Number One. As a community, Russian Jews on all three continents display socio-cultural continuity verging on self-isolation coupled with successful instrumental insertion into Western economies and lifestyles. A significant fraction of Russian-speakers became in fact bilingual and can effectively function in both cultural domains—old and new.

THE EMERGING TRANSNATIONALISM ‘FROM BELOW’

Reflecting their firm roots in the Russian language and culture, former Soviet immigrants dispersed between three continents are gradually weaving the web of a transnational community spanning all Soviet successor states and their new homelands. As opposed to the Soviet times when émigrés had to burn all the bridges to their past, Russia, Ukraine, and other newly independent states now construed their co-ethnics abroad as a valuable economic and political resource. Significant shares of ex-Soviet immigrants (estimated at 25% in Israel and 60% in Germany) keep their Russian, Ukrainian, and other former Soviet passports, and some have residential property in their former homelands. Fortified by time and space compressing technologies—modern communications, easy travel, and omnipotent internet—Russian speaking immigrants can stay in touch with their friends and relatives in the FSU and other branches of the post-Soviet diaspora, run joint businesses with their compatriots, and vote in their national elections. Global Russian

press and TV networks (represented by the *RTVi* channel in New York, *Europe Express* newspaper in Berlin, and *Inostranetz* (Foreigner) magazine in Moscow) further reinforce the interest in the former homelands and the life of the 'Russian Street' in other countries. Celebrities of the Russian theater, music, and show business regularly tour the main Russian hubs of Israel, Europe, and America, becoming household icons in Haifa and Los Angeles, Munich and Toronto. *KVN* and *Chto-Gde-Kogda* teams from Kiev, Jerusalem, and San Francisco come to Moscow for their league contests, broadcast by the Russian satellite TV networks, in at least twenty countries. Thus, the human links in the Russian speaking global community are both physical (enacted in visits and activities transcending national borders) and virtual (multiple internet contacts via Russian websites, featuring dating, file sharing, topical forums, intellectual games, and more). So far, most transnational ties among former Soviets living in different countries have emerged from below, i.e. as individual initiative rather than institutional effort, and it embraces mainly social and cultural rather than economic or political domains. One can envision further expansion of economic and institutional forms of Russian transnationalism with the growing prosperity and investment capacity of the former Soviets abroad, pending political stability and predictable financial environment in the FSU (Remennick 2002).

The extent of transnational involvement of former Soviet immigrants with co-ethnics in former homelands and in other countries differs, being most prominent in Israel and Germany and much weaker in the US and Canada. This is partly explained by geographic proximity: Israel and Germany are only 4–6 hour flight away from the major urban centers of the European FSU, with available night bus rides between, say Munich and Lviv in West Ukraine, while transatlantic flights such as New York—Kiev are much longer and costlier. Yet, besides mere distances and travel costs, immigrants in Europe and Israel are more motivated to keep diasporic ties than are their counterparts in North America. This reflects limited economic mobility and poor social integration of Russian Jews in Israel and in Germany compelling them to seek economic opportunities, social support and intellectual stimulation in their ties with co-ethnics across the world. While co-ethnic transnational interests of 'Russians' living in Germany and Israel are mainly directed towards Russia and other FSU countries, Russian-Jewish Americans (and to a lesser extent Canadians) are more inclined to invest their time and dollars in Israel. This reflects both pro-Israeli

orientations of the mainstream American and Canadian Jewry, to which they strive to belong, and tangible human ties to Israel, as many 'New Americans' have relatives and friends living there (Ben-Rafael et al. 2006: 301). Due to novelty and paucity of research on the global Russian-Jewish diaspora, there is little data to describe transnational orientations of these immigrants in a comparative context. Below I offer two case studies of transnational orientations among former Soviets in Israel and in the US.

Israel

Transnational tendencies surface in more than one aspect of Israeli Russians' lifestyle. To begin with, personal contacts between them and their co-ethnics in the FSU and in other branches of Russian Jewish diaspora are rather intense. Below I report some findings of the national face-to-face survey among Russian Israelis aged 18 and over conducted in 2001 (Remennick 2002, 2003a); the sample included over 800 respondents (age mean 46) whose overall profile reflected the adult ex-Soviet population. More than a half (53%) had higher education; 26% were working in their original occupation in Israel. About one half of all respondents reported on regularly keeping in touch with their relatives and 25% with friends staying in the FSU; another 23% and 43%, respectively, described these contacts as 'periodic.' As for the relatives and friends living in the West, 25% and 31%, respectively, described their contacts with them as regular or periodic. Among those who maintained intense contact with their friends and relatives in the West, about 41% also had intense communication networks in the FSU. This means that a subgroup of immigrants are especially active in transnational exchange with their co-ethnics.

Cross-tabulations and cluster analysis have shown that these individuals are typified by a number of features: they usually come from the largest cities of the FSU (often from Moscow and St. Petersburg); are highly educated, have better command of both English and Hebrew, have higher than average income, and work in their pre-emigration profession. Thus, the most advanced and successful part of the immigrants, comprising about 18–20% of the sample, seemed to be most prone to grassroot transnationalism. Another group of immigrants with strong ties both with their home cities in the FSU (where they often spend hot summer months) and co-ethnics in the West were retired immigrants

not bound to a workplace in Israel and hence able to spend time abroad. Finally, immigrants who were ethnically non-Jewish and had close relatives remaining in the FSU also manifested multiple physical and emotional ties to their places of origin (Remennick 2002).

As for the means of communication within the diaspora, Russian immigrants look rather old-fashioned: telephone calls were mentioned by 90%, followed by regular mail (35%) and e-mail (12%). About half call their relatives and friends in the FSU, US, Germany and other diaspora countries at least once a month. Regular trips to Western countries to visit friends and families have been mentioned by 3%, visits every few years by 12%, one or two visits after immigration by 34%. In the subgroup of respondents most prone to transnational networking, annual visits to friends in different Western countries were reported by 15% of respondents, and visits every few years by 48%.

Similar frequency typifies visits to the home places in the FSU (2.2% annual or more frequent; 9% a few times after emigration; 15% once after emigration). Nearly half of the respondents said that they wished to visit their home cities, but could not do so, mainly for financial reasons. About 10% of the immigrants (especially those from Moscow and St. Petersburg) still have apartments and/or country cottages in the FSU and return there for several months every year to escape the hot Israeli summer. Typically, these activities start after the initial resettlement period is over, i.e. two-four years after arrival, and reach their peak after five-seven years in Israel. It is too early to know if transnational trends have reached saturation: their intensity may level off, grow or fall along with the increasing length of stay of 'Russians' in Israel.

Russian television, watched via cable or satellite in 95% of Russian-speaking homes, plays a special role in the formation of transnational consciousness among Russian immigrants. Being permanently exposed to the information flow from their home country—watching daily news, talk shows, cultural programs, old and new movies, following all the turns and twists of dynamic Russian politics—creates the effect of mental presence, sympathy and virtual participation in the 'post-Soviet space.' Fifty-seven percent of my respondents said they closely follow the developments in Russia and other countries which belong today to the Confederation of Independent States (CIS), and another 32% get updated every now and then. Since many immigrants, especially older ones, do not understand Hebrew well enough to watch local channels, they are sometimes more updated on Russian news than on

Israeli ones. For some, this creates a weird situation of physically living in one country while mentally belonging to another one.

Economic links and business exchange with co-ethnics abroad were less impressive than personal exchange, but not negligible. Given permanent economic troubles in most CIS countries, it is understandable that over two-thirds of respondents, who have close relatives there, send them money several times a year or more often. About 7% said they have been involved in commercial ventures or joint projects with FSU countries or with Western countries, usually via co-ethnic partners there. Another 12% said that if the socio-economic situation in the FSU improved and allowed for more cooperation, they would be willing to engage in such projects. About 25% of respondents (usually holders of Russian or Ukrainian passports) participated in national elections in these countries, voting in the embassies. Overall, Russian immigrants in Israel can be described as significantly involved in the lives of the former homelands and co-ethnics in other countries.

USA

There is no available survey data on transnational behaviors among former Soviets living in the US. The recent comparative research project on Russian Jewish immigrants in Israel, Germany and the US (Ben-Rafael et al. 2006) centered on the issues of identity transformation and community building within the host countries and did not include questions on transnational orientations. The only qualitative study I could find was conducted by Morawska (2004); it offered comparative analysis of assimilation and transnationalism among Polish and Russian Jewish immigrants in Philadelphia who arrived during the last 20 years, but no later than 1995. The Polish 'colony' of the city numbers about 12,000, while the Russian Jewish population is much more spread out and is in the range of 30–35,000 immigrants. Each sample included 30 informants (15 women and 15 men) recruited by snowballing and interviewed in their homes in their native language. A majority of the Russian sample was middle aged and older; over 80% had higher education; most of those still working were in managerial and professional occupations and had higher than average income. The author found a high degree of assimilation among Russian Jews into American middle class, expressed in their economic success, good working knowledge of English, high naturalization rate (80%), respect

of American civic and political values, and pride in educational and occupational success of their children. By contrast, Polish immigrants were assimilating via what Morawska calls an ethnic-adhesive path, i.e. working mainly within their co-ethnic economy and identifying as Poles rather than Americans; 90% kept Polish passports regardless of naturalization in the US, and many expressed the hope of eventual return to their homeland. For both immigrant communities, the primary social circles have been co-ethnic, with an addition of some American Jewish friends for the younger Russian informants. Explaining this pattern, both Russian Jews and Poles referred to a familiar argument of sharing a common frame of mind with their own kind, while having little in common with native Americans. Many older informants from the FSU stressed their satisfaction in rediscovering their Jewishness, albeit in a new American framing. Coming from the former Socialist block with its forced collectivism, both Poles and Russian Jews shunned away from formal organizations and expressed their social engagements via personal networks and informal exchange of information and support.

In relation to the transnational engagements with their homelands, Morawska found striking differences between the two immigrant groups. The Poles manifested strong commitments to Poland, made a point of maintaining the Polish language and traditions at home, were closely updated on the current events in Poland, made regular remittances to their families and friends, traveled to Poland at least once a year, and received guests from Poland in their homes. In contrast, few Russian Jews pursued any of these activities regularly. While the majority of the Poles, regardless of age and socioeconomic status, said that their true emotional and spiritual home is Poland, none of the former Soviets said the same about Russia or Ukraine. Despite their active engagement with all things Russian while living in America (attending cultural venues, shopping in Russian groceries or having parties in Russian restaurants), none of that had to do with their nostalgia for Russia itself, but with habit and convenience of socializing in their native language. The economic activities and lifestyles of the Russian Jews were strongly oriented towards success and integration in their new homeland—America; few informants visited the FSU more than once after emigration and none felt obliged to Russia in any way, let alone wished to return there. If they had any nostalgia at all, it was about their youth and friends they left behind rather than the country itself. Most informants did not express any serious interest or attachment to Israel, except for those few who

had close relatives living there; yet many informants supported Israel by making regular donations to the Jewish charities.

In her analysis, Morawska explains this ‘America-centered ethnic-path adaptation’ for the former Soviets by the “group’s outcast minority status in the home country,” with the ensuing lack of positive sentiment or obligations to Russia and its people. She also notes that for a large part of former Soviets (especially émigrés of the 1970s) their reasons for emigration were civic-political, while most Poles emigrated in search of better economic fortunes. The reception of the two groups in the US was also rather different: while Soviet Jews were supported by their wealthy American co-religionists, the Poles had to adapt by themselves and had a much harder time gaining a new foothold. Finally, upward socioeconomic mobility experienced in the US by most Russian Jews and/or their children reinforced their positive identification with their new home and pride in being American. Other factors that discouraged transnational engagements of the former Soviets include the migration of full families and having few significant others still living in Russia or Ukraine. Finally, the newly acquired sense of security and opportunity in America (that is achievable neither in Russia nor in Israel) reinforced inwardly oriented rather than external interests and pursuits (Morawska 2004).

While generally agreeing with Morawska’s findings and explanations, I would like to add a few observations of my own. Indeed, transnational interests and activities of the former Soviets are often defined by whether or not they have significant others living outside America—in Russia, Israel or elsewhere. While many extended families immigrated to the US together, many others could not exit at the same time or preferred other countries, and as a result quite a number of families are scattered between different countries and the FSU itself. This is especially true of mixed or non-Jewish families that moved to the US via work or study visas and whose residence there gradually turned from temporary to permanent. Many of them had not intended to stay in the US to begin with, and hence kept their apartments, summer homes, and other property in the big Russian cities. Their parents, siblings and friends are still living in the FSU, creating many reasons to travel there. Those having this current human link to the former Soviet countries travel there quite often, and support their relatives by direct remittances, expensive gifts, and inviting them for prolonged periods to their American homes (Remennick 2007: 236).

TRANSNATIONALISM AND THE INTEGRATION PROCESS

After describing the expressions of transnationalism and cultural separatism among Russian immigrants, let me turn now to the implications of these tendencies for the process of their integration in the host countries. The Israeli case is most interesting in this respect, due to the special place of the Russian-speaking community and its dense transnational involvements. Does reliance on co-ethnic networks, within and outside Israel, serve as a source of empowerment, attenuating their dependency on the host society? Or, conversely, does the lack of successful integration into the host society compel Russian immigrants to turn to local and global co-ethnic networks in search of security, meaning and self-actualization they lack? Probably both assertions are true to some extent: transnationalism and cultural separatism feed on each other, or, rather, comprise two sides of the same coin.

Indeed, linguistic and cultural self-reliance of the immigrants became possible due to the mere size of the Russian community, comprising some 20% of the Jewish population nationally and in some towns (e.g., Ashdod, Haifa) reaching 30% of the local population and more. The above-mentioned educational strength of Russian Jews and their sense of cultural superiority further enhance these isolationist trends. Yet, linguistic and cultural arrogance make severe disservice to Russian immigrants, discouraging them from learning more about the ways of their new homeland, understanding its social dynamics and political life, and becoming, gradually, full-fledged citizens. On the other hand, blatant cultural proselytism of the Israeli institutions and strong pressure on the immigrants to switch to Hebrew has been counterproductive, only enhancing silent resistance (Lissak and Leshem 1995, Leshem 1998).

Low involvement with the host culture may affect the lives of Russian Israelis in a dual way. On one hand, the availability of co-ethnic cultural life, social and economic networks (e.g., shopping in Russian stores, using services provided by co-ethnics and staying in touch with their former homes) comprise an important safety net during the initial resettlement period, strongly ameliorating the adjustment process and improving immigrants' mental health. Over 60% of respondents in the survey, and over 95% in age group 60+, said that the existence of the thriving Russian subculture is the main advantage of life in Israel, compared to other migrant destinations. In my other recent study among Russian immigrant women, who often carried a triple burden

as breadwinners and family caretakers for the young and for the old, reliance on co-ethnic networks has emerged as an important source of social support (Remennick 2005). In yet another study, the accounts of immigrant engineers pointed to the significant role of their co-ethnic colleagues as peer support group in the difficult process of re-adjustment in the new, and often unfriendly, professional environment (Remennick 2003a). Similar stories of reliance on co-ethnic social support were told by Russian immigrant doctors and teachers (Remennick 2007: 80, 85). Regardless of their actual career success in Israel, co-ethnic networking within and outside Israel enables immigrants to transplant their old identity to the new soil, which is an important asset at the face of many losses they have to cope with. For instance, a senior Russian physician remains a respected specialist in the eyes of other Russians, even if he failed to get local license or is unemployed. Since profession is very central to personal identity of most members of former Soviet *intelligentsia*, their social status among the co-ethnics helps many educated immigrants to keep their self-respect in the face of unfriendly economic environment.

However, there is a price to be paid for the luxury of keeping one's old identity in a new country. The tendency of Russian immigrants to 'ghettoization' (Lissak and Leshem 1995) may hinder their occupational success and social accommodation, as well as heighten cultural conflict between the newcomers and the host society. Since one million of Russian-speakers in a country of six million Jews (and 1.2 million Arabs) present a 'critical mass,' the expansion of Russian subculture and its apparent resistance to assimilation are perceived by Israeli institutions and the broad public as a potential threat to the fragile national unity.⁴ In the country of immigrants founded only 60 years ago, surrounded by hostile neighbors and still striving at nation building, the group that fails to comply with this cause may come to be seen as a 'fifth column.' Former Soviets, in turn, are disappointed to see that they have 'traded' one type of ideological pressure (Socialism) for another (Zionism). They try to escape any obliging tenets and to focus on their private lives:

⁴ This unity is increasingly challenged by the tension (and at times open conflict) between the religious and the secular, the political right and left, and Jews coming from Europe/America versus those from Arab countries. Ever deepening 'tribalization' of the Israeli society puts under question the very notion of the 'mainstream.' Yet, some pillars of the Israeli identity (including Zionism, Jewish tradition and military service) still comprise a common denominator for most old-timers, and loyalty to them is expected of all newcomers.

professional and economic mobility, well-being of the children, and other personal issues. In everyday life, this implicit conflict between the hosts and the newcomers is expressed in mutual negative stereotyping, immigrants' social isolation, their discrimination on the job market, and in other forms (Leshem 1998, Remennick 2003a).

Thus, in the unique context of Israeli society, cultural retention among Russian immigrants (significantly enhanced by new transnational opportunities) implies, in fact, cultural isolation from the mainstream. To be sure, explicit or implicit exclusion of immigrants by the mainstream is common in many receiving countries. Yet, in our case, Russian speakers themselves contributed to this exclusion coming in response to their apparent reluctance to cross the bridge to the host society. Israel differs from other countries receiving immigrants not only in that it grants them full citizenship right upon arrival, but also in the strong expectation of their loyalty to the national causes. Immigrants who move to Israel for pragmatic rather than ideological reasons and show little national sentiment are a disappointment. The above-said is true at least for the first generation of adult migrants, although not solely. The trend to cultural retention and keeping transnational links with the co-ethnics seems to transcend age groups of Russian Israelis. Young people, who immigrated at high school age and above, are almost as determined to remain 'Russians' as are their parents. Although they master Hebrew rather quickly and, generally, do well at school and in college, their informal social networks remain mainly co-ethnic. Among my 2001 survey of subjects under 25, 82% have defined themselves as Russian Israelis and described their personal circle of communication as mainly or solely Russian. Although young immigrants' interest in Russia, and actual social ties with their former homeland, are usually weaker than in previous generations, they still display some of the transnational tendencies discussed above. The future will show whether these trends will fade or thrive in the second generation of Russian Israelis (Remennick 2007: 138).

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Readers can legitimately ask: how long would the global 'Russian Street' outside Russia last in its current forms? No one can pretend to know the answer, but it apparently has to do with the social and cultural dispositions of the young immigrants—the 1.5 and 2nd generation.

Will children of Russian-speaking families enact their ethnicity in a practical or purely symbolic way, like descendants of Armenian refugees in the US (Bakalian 1992), who gradually drifted from *being* to *feeling* Armenian? Will they still speak Russian between themselves and with their own children another 15–20 years down the road? Current literature on immigrant ethnicity suggests that processes of integration and assimilation of subsequent migrant generations are hard to predict (Faist 2000). Few contemporary scholars endorse the linear model of assimilation that was popular in the 1970s and 1980s, especially in light of the apparent revival of ethnicity and fortification of ethnic diasporas in all pluralist modern societies. The available research on the incorporation of young Russian Jewish immigrants in Israel, the US, and Germany points to a combination of good instrumental integration in the host country's institutions with a definite preference for co-ethnics in informal social networking and continued interest in Russian cultural products (Zeltser-Zubida 2000, Ben-Rafael et al. 2006). Many immigrant children manifest social mimicry at the outset seeking acceptance by their local peers, only to discover later their unique cultural baggage as an asset. It is not uncommon for the young immigrants who grew up in large American cities or in Israeli kibbutzim to suddenly rediscover Russian literature and cinema, or travel to the cities in the FSU their parents came from. Some will eventually opt for a transnational lifestyle, splitting their time and interests between Moscow, New York, and Jerusalem. Influenced by the core values espoused by their parents and co-ethnic milieu, many young Russian Jews of today feel alienation from their local peers. Yet, among children born to Russian immigrants abroad the gravity center of interests and values clearly shifts towards the mainstream peer culture, despite conscientious efforts of the parents to preserve their Russian-ness (e.g., by sending them to Russian kindergartens, hiring Russian teachers, etc.). It goes without saying that the extent of cultural continuity among young Russian immigrants depends on their parents' background and attitudes towards host societies, as well as their own educational and occupational mobility and experiences with local peers. The bottom line is that the thriving cultural and economic life on the 'Russian Street' will surely persist during the lifespan of the current adult generation of former Soviets, and will perhaps linger for several decades among their children. I would not dare to make a longer forecast, but 50 years seem quite enough for a follow-up study of one of the most diverse, energetic, and upwardly mobile ethnic diasporas of today's world.

APPENDIX
THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE IN ISRAEL

Marina Niznik

More than a million Russian-speaking newcomers to Israel very soon learned to turn their numbers into political power, and to secure a government policy relatively favorable to the needs of their community. It is interesting to note that the Russian-speaking immigrants had no tradition of organized community activity in their country of origin. Despite this, within two decades they formed highly complex and diversified formal and informal institutions, both at local and national levels (Friedgut 2007).

The Russian community in Israel is anything but homogenous. But among the few things its members have in common is their hesitant attitude towards the local culture, a certain cultural arrogance and the almost total lack of “melting intentions” (Niznik 2003). The former Soviet immigrants perceive themselves as the bearers of European culture in Israel. This is one reason, among others, for the fact that “Little Russia” (which includes Russian media, theaters, internet and other societal services) has become a salient phenomenon in Israeli societal life. I may characterize this “Little Russia” as follows:

(1) The *Gesher* (Bridge) Theater is one of the brightest and most famous examples of Russian cultural success in Israel. It was established by a group of immigrant artists in 1991 under the artistic management and direction of Yevgenii Arie. *Gesher*, however, is unique not only because it is popular both with Russian- and Hebrew-speaking audiences, but because of its attempt to span the gap between the two cultures. The actors perform in both Hebrew and Russian, and the playwrights are both Russian and Israeli.

(2) The Russian media in Israel include a Russian Israeli TV channel, Channel 9, whose broadcasting started in 2003. Interestingly, Channel 9 provides Hebrew subtitles to many programs, thereby addressing not only Russian-speaking Israelis, but also Hebrew speakers. This new channel is a success story, and since it started to broadcast has doubled its rating (Adoni, Caspi and Cohen 2006). In Israel one can also watch Russian TV channels that broadcast from Russia. Thus, for example,

the channel RTVI (Russian International channel broadcasting outside Russia) also has an Israeli section which broadcasts news and talk-shows targeting mainly an Israeli audience. In Israel one can also watch three additional Russian-language TV channels: ORT, RTR, NTV Mir broadcasting from Russia.

(3) The *Vesti* newspaper, an Israeli newspaper in Russian, is the third most popular newspaper in Israel after *Yediot Aharonot* and *Ma'ariv* (two Hebrew newspapers), with a circulation of over 55,000 for its weekend edition (BBC News 2005). Israeli Russian media include two radio channels: *Reka* radio and the newer, privately owned, *Perwoye* radio which began broadcasting in 2002. Russian internet has flourished in the past ten years, generally in the form of various news and cultural sites. There are also numerous Russian-language youth sites that constantly appear and disappear.

(4) The majority of those who came to Israel before the age of 12 have a high level of Hebrew proficiency and, in some cases, only a slight accent reveals their Russian origin. These people have a real choice between “being a Russian” or “being an Israeli.” In fact they have not two, but three choices—the third one is to function in both spheres. According to the Mutagim survey (2005) those who come to Israel as adolescents keep reading in Russian (83.4%), listening to Russian music, and watching Russian TV (52%). The situation changes dramatically with regard to those who immigrated in their early childhood. They tend to watch Hebrew TV and read in Hebrew, and listen mostly to English-language music (Niznik 2004).

(5) Many youngsters spend their time in the various Russian coffee-houses and pubs. These gathering places serve not only for socializing, but also for meeting various Russian celebrities. Russian-speakers’ disco clubs constitute an integral part of young peoples’ lives. Russian music at these discos is not dominant, and the main difference from other discos in Israel is the atmosphere.

(6) Ten thousand students currently attend Russian classes in junior-high and high-schools. About 95% of them were born in the former Soviet Union. Though most of them come from Russian-speaking families, there are substantial differences in their command of Russian. Numerous factors determine their Russian proficiency: the country of origin and date of immigration, family language practices, milieu, and practice of various domains of Russian culture. Few students of Russian who attend Russian classes in Israel speak normative Russian fluently. Many recent immigrants come from republics outside Russia itself, mainly from the Ukraine, where local languages have become

the legitimate languages after these countries gained independence. Moreover, those students who have lived in Israel for some years tend to lose the full command of the language. Hence, for the vast majority of the student population, Russian is not a native language in the full sense of the word, though it is not a foreign language either. It is what can be called a *heritage language* (Fishman 1992).

(7) In practical terms, and as shown by research (Kagan and Dillon 2001, Niznik 2004) heritage-language learners of Russian are, on the main, orally proficient, including native-like pronunciation, and possess an adequate vocabulary only for family and community needs. Though, the “Russian” community in Israel views the acquisition of Russian in Israeli high-schools as a very important issue. Russian-speaking members of the Knesset recognize its practical as well as symbolic value. As one man, they oppose any attempt of cutbacks in schools’ Russian learning program.

(8) The world of Russian literature in Israel is small but vibrant. Hundreds of new books are published in Russian each year, and tens of thousands of copies are sold in dozens of Russian bookstores throughout the country. There is also a new generation of writers who immigrated to Israel at a relatively young age and write in Hebrew. Yet most Russian-Israeli literature is still written in Russian, far from the eyes of Hebrew readers. “There are a lot of Russian writers living here who receive prizes, praises and have amazing things written about them, but the Israeli public doesn’t know them,” said author and cultural critic Anna Isakova, who came to Israel from Lithuania in 1971. “I remember in 1994, out of 23 nominees for the Russian Booker Prize, 4 lived in Israel. In Israel, it went unnoticed. I remember because I wanted to write about it but couldn’t—because I was one of them” (Cited by London Sappir 2007).

I may conclude in the following words:

Their language was anything but the language of Bunin, Rachmaninov, Diaghilev and Remizov. There were plenty of words and expressions typical of the Southern provinces of Russia, talks and borrowing . . . , especially for those things and concepts for which there is no equivalent in Russian.

This was written by the Russian writer Nina Berberova about “White” Russian immigrants in Paris in the 1920s (Berberova 1997: 3). At another time, another immigration, another country, another century, we see a similar phenomenon. *Nikayon* [cleanup], *kupat-cholim* [policlinic-Heb.], *kartisia* [ticket card—Heb.] and *pastrama* [smoked chicken—Heb.] were adopted by Russian speakers and have become part of their *Hebrush*.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

RUSSIAN-SPEAKING JEWS AND GERMANY'S LOCAL JEWRY

Julius H. Schoeps

One of the most surprising items of news in the late twentieth century was that the Jewish population in re-unified Germany had become the third largest in Europe, following the communities in France and Great Britain. Nearly sixty years after the Holocaust and World War II it became clear that Adolf Hitler's sinister dream to make Europe *Judenrein* had failed, not only on the Old Continent, but also in Germany itself. In the context of a unifying Europe, intellectuals like Diana Pinto are now even attributing to German Jewry a "key role" in continental Jewish stabilization. Media celebrate the reconstruction of organized Jewish life, and some of them look forward to "new relations" between Jews and non-Jews in Germany. But what is a dream, what is an objective target, and what is the reality? These pages consider these questions by looking at demographic facts, political conditions, and inner tendencies.

First of all, the demographic data are impressive: about 200,000 Jews from the Former Soviet Union (FSU), including their non-Jewish relatives, have arrived in Germany since the beginning of the 1990s. About 90,000 of them have become members of the local Jewish communities. Some veterans might have expected that more newcomers join the Jewish communities, but in any case, Russian-speakers now consist of almost 90 percent of the community, and form its "backbone." Ironic observers speak of a "kind of Russification," but this is already a question of interpretation. It is important to bear in mind the composition of modern German Jewry, and to identify subgroups that play their own roles.

In the now dominant group, we encounter immigrants from all imaginable parts of the FSU. In fact, this group is responsible for the demographic survival of German Jewry, irrespective of their unfavorable demographic structure—with an average age far above the local one. Russian Jews are considered a more or less elitist group. Thanks to their sophistication and high levels of qualification, they are not in danger

of total social downgrading—despite a shocking unemployment rate of about 40 percent, and an even higher rate of Russian Jews dependent on social welfare. Furthermore, Russian Jews rank as a group that is highly motivated to integrate into German society, at least in the labor market and in the educational field—far more than, for example, the Turkish community. Russian Jews are considered hardworking, mostly secular, achievement-oriented people who intensively seek a successful future. Despite the fact that nearly half of the immigrants have joined Jewish communities, almost all previous studies confirm that the group has an eminently secular character.

Beside the “Russians” we find about 20,000 Jewish community members whose families decided to stay in the country of the Nazis immediately after 1945. That minority of German-speaking Jews contains another minority: descendants of German Jewish families who lived in Germany prior to 1933. Finally, there are a few hundred Israelis in the Jewish communities, some of whom are living permanently in Germany. Some of them have assumed leadership in the communities or in other organizations like the Central Welfare Board of Jews in Germany.

Due to the new membership composition in most Jewish communities in Germany, nobody is questioning that future developments will be strongly shaped by Jews from the FSU and—possibly—their descendants. At this point I am not focusing on that group of Russian Jews who have achieved great success in their professional fields in Germany—among them writers, scholars and musicians—but are more or less disconnected from the Jewish communities. Such outstanding personalities are quoted in radio programs or news items, and of course they are also perceived as *Jews in Germany*.

The group on which I focus here has deliberately decided to join a local Jewish community, for whatever reason. In general, the communities enthusiastically welcomed them in the early 1990s. The original notions about the Russian Jewish newcomers were very vague, and there were of course some unrealistic and partly romantic ideas as well. Today we know that the established German Jewry underestimated the cultural, ideological, religious and even mental differences between veteran community members and those who had left behind a communist regime and were seeking a new beginning in Central Europe.

The Jewish leaders in Germany expected that Russian Jews would undertake gradual, but sustainable steps of assimilation into the Jewish communities. Now, though, more than fifteen years after immigration began, it is clear that Russian Jews’ interests differ significantly from

those who joined the communities 30 or 40 years before. Scientific studies, as well as reports from the local communities, have reached such a conclusion. As early as 1997, the West German sociologist Alphons Silbermann conducted a comprehensive survey of the Jewish community of Cologne. It showed that Russian Jews expressed remarkably less interest in religious issues than did the veteran members. Silbermann's results were confirmed by Judith Kessler who in 2002 conducted a comprehensive survey of Berlin's Jewish community.

Admittedly, there is also a small share of Russian Jewish immigrants who have turned to Orthodox Judaism; more state their attachment to Liberal and Reform Judaisms. But the majority of the Russian Jews in Germany, about 60 percent—do *not* identify with any of the Jewish “congregations” at all: they do not prefer Orthodoxy, nor Masorti Judaism, nor the Reform version. They just don't know, and that vagueness irritates the veterans.

At the beginning of the Russian Jewish immigration those results were quite unsurprising, especially when we take into account that many migrants had lived through decades of communist rule that kept them distant from religious issues and Jewish community life. Specific educational programs were therefore developed, especially by the Central Welfare Board of Jews in Germany (ZWSt), to support Russian Jews in their efforts to learn more about Jewish religion and tradition. Results have been meager, however.

The general big number of “secular” Russian Jews—like those in Israel and the United States as well—is not the crucial point. Many network activities of Russian Jews include some Jewish traditions, but do not claim to be defined as a Jewish community.¹ The focus here is on Russian Jews who have ambitions to take the lead in the (originally) German Jewish communities. Many veterans perceive a problem when people who define themselves as secular are involved in determining what is important or unimportant in a *religious* community. Without doubt this is one of the crucial conflict-lines now found in many local Jewish communities in Germany, and it affects all of the subgroups there—Russian-speaking and German-speaking members, converted non-Jews, and Israelis.

How is the new constellation perceived by the non-Russian Jews? At least some of the German-speaking “veterans” have become concerned

¹ For several forms of Russian Jewish self-organizing without any religious intentions see: Ben-Rafael et al. (2006).

that “their” Jewish communities might now turn into *Russian-speaking cultural clubs*. And admittedly, when a non-Russian phones the Jewish community’s service center in a city like Berlin and gets answers only in Russian—a certain problem in feeling “at home” is inevitable.

However, each local community has its own story, and we also find examples of close cooperation between “Russians” and “Germans.” A real success story is that of the Liberal Jewish Community in Hanover, capital of Lower Saxony in West Germany. This community originally emerged from a split with the local orthodox “*Einheitsgemeinde*” in Hanover, beginning with a few hundred enthusiasts. Ten years later, veterans and newcomers, women and men, elderly and younger members are working together smoothly. The spectrum ranges from regular services to educational programs, Hebrew courses, a youth center, groups for arts and sports, and encounter groups. The work of the Liberals has been so successful that in 2006, the community hosted the annual meeting of the European branch of the *World Union for Progressive Judaism* in Hanover.

In contrast to this, Berlin’s Jewish community has become a rather discouraging example of “*Kulturkampf*,” a “clash of civilizations” at the local Jewish micro-level. Although a kind of “Russian-German list” was recruited for several community board elections, the cooperation did not work at all. For many veterans, it was a new experience to see that community elections were influenced by Russian (Jewish) print media, which are generally successful in Berlin. Many “German” veterans do not understand the “connecting link” to inner Jewish issues. They feel that something is intervening “from outside” which has very little to do with their original community life, with the liberal German Jewish traditions dating back to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and definitely nothing to do with their understanding of Central European and German culture.

On the other side there is an ongoing debate among Russian Jews in Germany about how they feel in the new country—as Jews and as Russians—and where they can find their specific place in the new environment. Thus, in the *Jevrejskaja Gazeta*, the leading Russian Jewish monthly in Germany, psychologist Igor Ladyzhenskij raised the question whether some of the community conflicts are rooted in problems the Russian Jews brought with them from the FSU. Citing current troubles in community board elections and the parallel disputes among the Russian Jews, Ladyzhenskij commented:

What are the reasons to become jealous? When one person becomes a leader of the Jewish community and the other does not (...) Very often rational behavior is replaced by irrational behavior (...) Further complaints grow like a carcinoma (*Jevrejskaja Gazeta*, May 2004).

Ladyzhenskij argues that some of the Russian conflict strategies could have been quite successful in Soviet society, but cannot work in Germany or elsewhere. However, this author didn't answer the question as to what the newcomers are fighting for. What is clear is that—in many Jewish communities—veterans and Russian Jewish immigrants have not yet found a common denominator. In the following I outline four significant problems that make a desirable unification quite difficult.

First Problem: the Battle over Language

One of the relatively “soft” problems in the communities is the ongoing debate whether community journals should be published in German or in Russian. It is self-evident that the immigrants are forced—and are generally willing and motivated—to acquire fluent German for daily life. But interestingly, in some Jewish communities they insist on speaking Russian, perhaps because they are the majority, for cultural reasons, or just for comfort. In a few communities, Russian Jews are even demanding a Russian-speaking rabbi.

Second Problem: Different Cultures of Remembrance

Former Soviet Jews often define their Jewishness by ethnic descent or by experiences with persecution and anti-Semitism in Soviet times, while Western-born Jews usually refer to aspects of Jewish tradition, culture and religion. Russian Jews remember very well that it was the Soviet Army which took the main burden of defeating Nazi Germany in World War II, whereas many of the German-speaking Jews remember that many of their ancestors were killed in the camps of Buchenwald, Auschwitz or Riga. The priorities of remembrance therefore remain different: Russian Jews celebrate May 9th, the day of Nazi Germany's capitulation. German-speaking Jews are more connected to January 27th, the date of Auschwitz liberation.

Some of the original West German Jews were also prejudiced towards the Russian Army that not only defeated Hitler, but showed threatening during the Cold War era. The Russian Jews, in turn, might have

problems in understanding why German Jews did not put up stronger resistance against the Nazi regime in the 1930s.

Third Problem: The Social Gap

German-speaking Jews, especially those who grew up in Western Germany, are usually well established in society: many are doctors, lawyers, entrepreneurs, artists or scholars. They participated in the economic boom of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, and their income exceeds the German average. Russian Jewish immigrants have been less successful in upward mobility, many remain in low-income groups or depend on unemployment benefits or social welfare. From a historical point of view, this is not a totally new situation. As early as the 1920s, the rich, wealthy German Jewish communities received a considerable number of underprivileged Eastern European Jews, although the majority of them preferred to extend their migration and to settle in the United States.

Fourth Problem: The Treatment of Non-Halachic Jews

Arguably the biggest bone of contention is the question of immigrant Jews who are not Jewish by matrilineal origin. Many Russian Jews find it hard to understand why people with “only” Jewish fathers do not receive full membership and cannot receive all services of the synagogue community.² It is worthwhile discussing whether the Russians are making a utopian request or not. On the one hand, they rightly argue that anti-Semites in the FSU—and many other places throughout the world—do not differentiate between Halachic and non-Halachic Jews. On the other hand, they are well informed on some liberal Jewish communities in the West—such as the community in Stockholm—which already accept people with “only” Jewish fathers as equal community members. Why should they hesitate to demand the same for German Jewish communities? More than 3,600 members have left the Jewish communities during the past fifteen years, and it is not exclusionary that a considerable number of those “dropouts” strongly disagreed with the communities’ treatment of non-Halachic Russian Jews.

² The conflict on full Jewish community membership for Russian immigrants with “only” a Jewish father in Germany has its equivalent in Israel: with the conflict on whether non-Halachic Jews should be granted the right for a Jewish marriage and a Jewish burial—or not.

Some disappointed Russian Jewish immigrants have threatened to join churches, others have decided to join the ultra-orthodox Chabad movement. Russian-speaking rabbis of Chabad are very successful among Jewish immigrants in Germany—Berlin, Potsdam, Dresden and Düsseldorf. This is evidence that a common language and direct down-to-earth contacts can attract Russian Jews even to Jewish ultra-Orthodoxy.

Finally, there is a group of Russian Jews who stand “somewhere in the middle.” While they are members of Jewish communities, their personal commitment is directed to Russian cultural centers, educational institutions, or other clubs where Russian-speaking immigrants meet among themselves.

We do not have reliable data on correlations between age, gender or education, and Russian Jewish commitment to Jewish communities. Reports underline that the elderly and less successful tend to join communities—in quest for practical support and welfare—whereas the younger and professionally successful show little interest in Jewish social and religious frameworks. Though, obviously, the future of Germany's Jewish communities depends above all on Russian Jewish youth who, as a rule, attend German high-schools and the university. This generation will not face considerable integration problems in Germany. A far more delicate question is whether Germany's young Russian Jews will, indeed, remain committed to Jewishness, or will “disappear in the “crowd”.

IN SEARCH OF A NEW IDENTITY

Many European Jews have developed a kind of “dual allegiance” over recent decades, as Jews, and as respected members of the nations they belong to. The Russian Jews in Germany, however, are far from that self-perception: according to a survey of the Moses Mendelssohn Center, only 11% of them identify with Germany as “their” country. This is another major difference between them and native-born Jews, who of course feel burdened by the historical shadows of Germany but have succeeded in the job market, established vital relationships with non-Jewish Germans, and enjoy participation in German politics, culture and public debates.

Well-meaning observers argue that many of those Russian Jews who have not yet managed to integrate into German society feel alienated from German society and German Jewish communities, alike. According to them, the complicated socioeconomic situation also hampers a

stronger commitment to religious life. A distinct “inferiority complex,” however, has not been discovered. On the contrary, some immigrants proudly refer to the valuable combination of Russian culture and Jewish tradition. For example, Michael Rumer-Sarajew, the second chief-editor of the *Jevrejskaja Gazeta*, stated:

The marriage between Jewish intellectual obsession and Russian spiritual nature has become—in its best variations—a unit of enormous power and speciality. And this unit, which was created in the second half of the nineteenth century and has continued until today, has impacted on all spheres of social and cultural life in contemporary Russia. The same unit is also accompanying the ongoing migration of Russian Jewry. It can also stimulate and enrich the spiritual life, the science and the culture of the new home lands (Rumer-Sarajew 2005: 188).

It is to note here that some younger Russian Jews have already risen to the public scene in a variety of areas such as the young writers Lena Gorelik and Wladimir Kaminer, the young politician Sergej Lagodinsky, who has just founded a caucus of Jewish members inside the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), and the artist Küff Kaufman, who now heads the Jewish community in Leipzig.

OPTIONS FOR FUTURE JEWISH COMMUNITY LIFE IN GERMANY

While the main trends characteristic of Germany’s contemporary Jewry appear somehow chaotic, they in fact reflect a new structuration that is in need of more decades to crystallize. Some commentators like Pavel Polian, a social geographer, draw here pessimistic scenarios. Polian predicts a drastic decline in Jewish community membership in the coming decades that would eventually lead to a drawback to the situation prevailing at the end of the 1980s. This decline should be caused by the Jewish unfavorable demographic structure, a large number of “dropouts” from community organizations and members’ general weak Jewish commitment.

It is true that “Russians” are disappointed by German Jewish leadership; and conversely among the “Germans,” many are scared of a “Russian takeover” of the institutions of German Jewry. On the other hand, it may also be expected that in the long-run at least some young Russian Jews making up a new generation without cultural, ideological or religious reservations will be ready, somehow in the future, to shoulder the burden of the Jewish communities. Those youngsters will find partners on the German Jewish side.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

ISRAELI AND AMERICAN JEWS: KINSMEN APART

Moshe Shokeid

The survival of the Jewish people for the last two millennia has been a continuing source of theological, historical, sociological and literary conjecture. This enigma is even more acute in our era, when the old forces that maintained this unique social existence of a minority dispersed among many nations and surrounded by a hostile majority have all but disappeared. The major connecting bond of Jews around the globe—their practice of the Jewish religion—has weakened enormously among large segments of the Jewish people. Undoubtedly for many contemporary Jews, Zionism as a national ideology has come to replace the old tribal theology and its impact on personal and communal life. Thus, secular Israelis, who stopped adhering to most tenets of Judaism long ago, consider themselves Jewish by their putative genealogy, their Israel citizenship, the fact that Hebrew is their mother tongue, their service in the Israeli Army, etc. The intention of my chapter is to examine the consequences of Israeli secularism when for various reasons its adherents are driven out of their homeland back to the diaspora. Can they again identify with the credo, the practices and the symbols of those people who were unsympathetically designated as those “Diaspora Jews” from whom their forefathers disassociated themselves when they boarded the immigrant ships to Palestine?

My query about the relationship between Israeli immigrants and American Jews seems to suggest that these are two clearly demarcated homogeneous societies. However, research into the process of acculturation and assimilation of American Jews has resulted in an extensive body of empirical evidence that has demonstrated the demarcation among various Jewish groups that vary greatly regarding their commitment to the tenets and symbols of Judaism. Recent studies have frequently considered the question: “How Jewish are American Jews?” (Horowitz 2002). But, from the point of view of the Israeli expatriates I studied, judging by their discourse, American Jews, not including the enclaves

of Ultra-Orthodox communities in Queens and Brooklyn, seemed to represent a clearly defined cultural and social entity.

However, the inquiry regarding the nature of Jewish identity as manifested by “native” Israelis who departed from their homeland, epitomizes one particular case of ethnic cultural survival or decline in contemporary modern society. The issue relevant to the wider scene of ethnicity in daily life has been raised by social scientists in Europe and the United States in particular. To mention only two leading figures in that field, Gans (1979) who made a lasting mark on the subject with his thesis of “symbolic ethnicity” as a means of continuity of some vestiges of ethnic identity among the third and later generations of immigrant societies, and more recently Waters (1990) who investigated ethnic options in American life. In this context, we cannot ignore the impact of the pace of immigration. Thus, the continuing flow of immigrants from the same country of origin (or from a shared cultural background), but who arrive in a series of separate waves of immigration, are also prone to reveal different levels of familiarity with and different types of commitment to their homeland. A comparison between veterans and newcomers might reveal wide gaps regarding their ties with the new country and its society, and with their culture of origin.

OBSERVING “YORDIM” IN NEW YORK

My involvement with the issue of the relationships between Israelis and American Jews emerged during ethnographic work I undertook among Israeli immigrants in the US, who for many years were derogatorily nicknamed “Yordim” (those who go down) by their compatriots in Israel. For two years (from 1982 to 1984) I lived with my family in Kew Gardens, a neighborhood in the Borough of Queens that was inhabited by many Israeli emigrants and that was in close proximity to other neighborhoods with large concentrations of Israelis. During that period, I mainly associated with other Israelis. My children attended a school together with Israeli children from the neighboring apartment buildings. I participated in social and cultural activities that attracted other Israelis such as, parties, lectures and shows performed by popular Israeli artists as well as public events where visiting prominent Israeli scholars and politicians spoke. I regularly employed Israelis to provide services such as car repairs, health care, travel arrangements, etc. To this day we maintain close relationships with a few families with whom

we became friendly at that time. My conclusions emphasized in particular three major aspects of my compatriots' lives in New York: the relationships of Yordim among themselves, their quest to maintain some contact with Judaism and their relationships with American Jews (Shokeid 1988).

As opposed to popular stereotypes that portray Israelis' "tribal habits" of clustering together, my observations revealed the absence of any Israeli communal organizations. Although their close friends were usually Israelis, they seemed generally to resent "other Israelis," whom they considered to represent the typical "ugly Israeli." I interpreted this phenomenon as evidence of the stigma Yordim have suffered for many years, being considered traitors by their brethren in Israel. I posited that resentment and the abusive references directed towards other Yordim corroborated Goffman's theory regarding the behavior of stigmatized people who tend to internalize attitudes directed towards them by mainstream society. In Goffman's terms, the stigmatized individual may exhibit identity ambivalence when he comes face to face with his own kind behaving in a stereotyped manner (Goffman 1963: 131).

Although most of their close friends were Israelis they had known previously in Israel or with whom they had become acquainted in New York at work, at school, etc., they also had the opportunity to meet their local compatriots at larger gatherings of Israelis, at public events that represented what one could describe as manifestations of Israeli culture. In this domain I particularly included celebrations, concerts and specific events that engaged the participants in communal singing of Israeli folk songs. During my sojourn in New York, I did more singing in one year than I had in all my previous life combined.

On these occasions, in the company of strangers whom they met by chance, but who had shared their experiences in youth movements, military service and hikes around the Israeli countryside, these expatriate Israelis ecstatically engaged in a display of emotion that seemed to symbolize a return home for one evening. Engrossed in the poetry and music of these familiar songs, they revisited the cherished sites of their homeland, from the Sea of Galilee to the hills of Jerusalem to the Negev desert. I defined this activity, in Clifford Geertz's (1973: 112) terms, as a type of "cultural performance." I also observed this kind of behavior at other events, such as visits of popular Israeli politicians and other celebrities, theatrical shows and various kinds of entertainments put on by Israeli artists that represented texts and events that I depicted in Geertz's terms as moments of "sentimental education"

(1973: 449). Absorbing these cultural sensations nurtured the expatriate Israelis' experience of *communitas* (Turner 1969) and gratified a yearning to express their national identity.

My inquiry about the culture indulged in by the Israelis away from home has naturally probed their involvement with Jewish tradition. However, as I soon observed, the immigrants, coming mostly from a secular background, expressed an inability to integrate into the network of Jewish communal and national organizations of all shades available to them in New York. For the most part raised in Israel during the first three decades since statehood, they felt little sympathy for Jewish diaspora existence. Moreover, before immigrating to the United States, they were almost totally unaware that their American Jewish brethren, who seemed to be secular in their everyday demeanor, were actually "religious" in Israeli terms. They ultimately discovered that a viable Jewish identity in the US was cultivated and confirmed by membership in a synagogue community, whether Ultra Orthodox on the "Right" or Reform on the "Left" (Cohen 1998, Cohen and Eisen 1998).

It is common knowledge that secular Israelis have been educated to view the 2000 years of Jewish history as a tragic saga, chiefly due to Jewish theology and its custodians, the rabbis. The latter ensured the preservation of the Torah and the performances of the 613 *mitzvot* (commandments) of Judaism while waiting for the arrival of the Messiah, who would herald the days of redemption. Not surprisingly, I myself never interrogated my parents about their life in Lithuania and Poland prior to their immigration to Palestine, and I have no substantial knowledge about the place they came from. I do not intend in the framework of this chapter to raise the debate about the Yishuv's (pre-State Israeli society's) restrained response to the Holocaust or its later latent resentment of the survivors. However, these attitudes might have been fostered by the prevalent feelings that the victims were partially responsible for their fate by virtue of remaining in the diaspora and behaving like powerless *golah* (diaspora) Jews. A telling evidence of secular Zionists' 'sentimental education' is the work of Haim Nahman Bialik, the national poet, whose dramatic poem "The City of Carnage" is taught in Israeli high schools. This poem commemorates the 1903 Kishinev pogrom and has left a lasting negative impression on Israelis' minds and consciousness regarding Jewish social and cultural life in the Eastern European diaspora (Gluzman 2007).

I retell this story, which is all too familiar to anybody involved with life in Israel, because it seems so relevant to the response of the Yordim

to Jewish life in America. Secular Israelis have been taught to identify the history of life in the diaspora with a strong commitment to the Jewish religion and its “archaic” regimen of daily rituals and taboos. The generation of Israelis whom I met in New York could not reconcile themselves to the alien dimension of “Jewishness” as an addition to or a substitute for their perception of personal and national identity. Therefore, they chose not to involve themselves in the many available Jewish institutions in the vicinity of Kew Gardens, Forest Hills, Flushing and Rego Park and other Queens communities having a high concentration of expatriate Israelis.

During my stay in New York, I regularly attended weekly lectures delivered by the teachers of the Hassidic Chabad movement, whose aim it is to proselytize among Israeli immigrants. At that time, the attendees were mostly Israeli newcomers of Sephardic extraction. I attributed the apparently strange attraction of the Chabad movement for Sephardic men and women, as opposed to a lack of interest in this movement on the part of individuals of Eastern European extraction, to the Sephardic community’s closer ties with Jewish tradition back home in Israel (Shokeid 1995b). I also assumed that the venerated persona of the Chabad leader, Rabbi Menachem Schneerson, corresponded to the position of charismatic leaders in Middle Eastern Jewish religious life.

In addition, I considered other constraints that might prevent the Israeli residents of Queens from becoming members of Jewish institutions. Worshippers in Israel are not generally expected to pay an annual membership fee to attend synagogue services, although they might do so in order to secure a seat during the High Holidays. In America, however, paying an annual membership fee is obligatory for participants. In addition, the majority of the Israelis I observed had not acknowledged the finality of their immigration to America. They frequently claimed that they were “stuck” (*nitkanu*) by circumstance and would return to Israel when conditions allowed. But paying membership fees to a synagogue obliged the Israeli individual to admit the finality of his or her *yerida* (emigration from Israel) and the permanency of his or her residence in the US.

No doubt some of the premises and social consequences of the emigration of Israelis to the US have changed since my observations during the early 1980s. In particular, the stigma of *yerida* has lost many of its derogatory implications. Successful Yordim are publicly welcomed on their visits to Israel (for example, the case of such magnates as

Mr. Tshuva, who owns the Plaza Hotel in New York). The fact that celebrated artists and professionals have gained international recognition now seems to be a source of pride for their Israeli brethren. Instead of the previously widespread condemnation of all Yordim and their depiction by ex-Prime Minister Rabin as “the leftovers of weaklings” (*nefolet shel nemushot*), the current attitude seems to be that Israelis’ success in foreign lands is evidence of the educational and scientific achievements of Israeli society. Moreover, globalization has resulted in a tolerant attitude towards individuals or groups who leave home in search of opportunities abroad. The term “Yored” is no longer extensively used in the media or in everyday parlance. However, considering all this, the behavior of Israeli emigrants has not changed much regarding their relationship with American Jews.

Despite the fact that a minority of secular Israelis have joined American Jewish institutional frameworks (especially those who have married American spouses), my observations from the 1980s have not been contradicted in later years. My recent meetings with Israeli men and women living in the US have revealed the same response regarding their inability to integrate into the communal lifestyle of American Jews. They do not join synagogues and generally prefer to send their children to non-denominational public schools. They tend to believe that they can preserve their children’s ties with their ethnic roots through prolonged visits to Israel. But, in my 1988 ethnography, I already asserted that their inability to develop their own communal institutions and their unwillingness to join American Jewish organizations would probably result in the widespread assimilation of second- and third-generation Israeli immigrants into American mainstream society, with little prospect of their preserving a viable Israeli or Jewish identity.

OBSERVING AMERICAN JEWS IN NEW YORK

The reluctance of the Israeli emigrants to join the American Jewish community is echoed by the other side of the equation. Through my contact with American Jews while holding a visiting teaching position at Queens College, I observed that they seemed to resent the newcomers from Israel. They viewed emigrant Israelis as having abandoned the country that American Jews have loyally supported politically and financially and have perceived as a major symbol of modern Jewish national achievement. Moreover, those uninvited Israelis seemed to be

far removed from the most elementary codes of behavior associated with American Jewish identity. They avoided synagogue affiliation and other traditions that had maintained Jewish life in the US for generations. The stereotype of the “typical Israeli” also gained them the reputation for behaving arrogantly and abrasively. Thus, I observed that, instead of a kind of a reciprocal bonding taking place among Israeli emigrants and American Jews, their social and cultural engagement was doomed to failure.

My subsequent work in New York, however, has brought me closer to the culture and habits of American Jewish communal life. Intermittently since 1989, I have conducted research at CBST (Congregation Beth Simchat Torah), the gay and lesbian synagogue in Greenwich Village that serves hundreds of men and women from a wide area around the city (Shokeid 1995a). I was fascinated to observe the impetus of gay men and women to return to the institutions and traditions of their youth, even though they were rejected by its official custodians. From an Israeli perspective, most of these congregants seemed to be secular in their life-style. Many among them were also active in non-Jewish gay organizations. Although they apparently had sufficient social support and affirmation for their American and gay identities, they nevertheless also wished to publicly acknowledge their Jewish identity. In order to give expression to this identity, they shared with other American Jews the need to join a synagogue congregation. Except for minor changes in ritual and on occasion the political content of the sermons, the liturgy and ritual at CBST basically resembled an ordinary Reform or Conservative synagogue.

Although an opportunity to join CBST offers a comfortable social environment for Israeli gay male and female newcomers to New York, very few Israelis have joined the synagogue as regular congregants. Israeli gay men in particular, having satisfied their curiosity after a first visit, have rarely returned for a second one. They expressed surprise at gay people’s apparent need to join an institution based on a theology that condemns homosexuality. As was observed among other Yordim, their search for gay life in New York and their desire to express their Israeli identity did not include the need to become involved in a Jewish institutional framework.

Fifteen years later, early in 2004 and for many months thereafter, I often attended services at the Stanton Street Synagogue in the Lower East Side. A Modern Orthodox synagogue, it offered an Orthodox service that also catered for its members’ liberal tendencies. The congregants

included a few old-timers who had stayed on in the Lower East Side, once the hub of New York Jewish life, whereas the majority of Jews had moved out to the suburbs. In recent years, however, an urban gentrification process has taken place in that part of town, and younger families have become attracted to the area who represent an educated, professional, upper-middle-class population. The congregation was now composed of a mixture of elderly immigrants from pre-war Europe, a few Holocaust survivors and a growing influx of second- and third-generation men and women born and raised in New York or elsewhere in the US. The younger congregants had a deep respect for the history of the synagogue and its founders, who had arrived in the US nearly a hundred years earlier from Brzezan, a *shtetl* (Jewish town) in Galicia. They treated the older congregants with empathy and affection. They honored them for the stamina that had enabled them to start a new life either as hopeful immigrants or as Holocaust survivors. Actually, the congregants at Stanton were not homogeneous in their religious beliefs and observance and were not directly related to the founders who had come from Brzezan. Nevertheless, they considered them their ethnic and spiritual forebears.

Again, the Israeli visitor was intrigued and moved to observe the dedication of a population of men and women of all ages, coming from different walks of life, who were disposed to invest their time, energy and money in a communal project. They rescued from destruction the modest synagogue structure that had been built in 1913 by poor immigrants from Eastern Europe. However, the synagogue was not only a space restricted to religious observation, but also a community project that had developed in the midst of a mega metropolitan city. Residing in close proximity to one another, the congregants met regularly and developed the habit of inviting one another to their homes for Friday dinner and Saturday lunch. A process of organizational development took place here, similar to that which I had observed at the gay synagogue. In both instances, the congregants had assured the success of their project by appointing dynamic rabbis, Rabbi Sharon Kleinbaum at CBST and Rabbi Joseph Pollak at Stanton. These personages represented a kind of rabbi unknown to most secular Israelis, who expect all rabbis to be of the Orthodox (and unsympathetic) variety. Thus, secular Israelis found it implausible that a rabbi could be a liberal-minded cultural, social and spiritual leader.

During my stay, the Stanton congregants started to renovate the shabby-looking synagogue building, including the dilapidated basement

(used as the teaching area—the Beth Midrash) and the run-down sanctuary with its leaking roof. They had applied for state and city grants towards the preservation of a historical landmark, but also generously contributed a similar sum from their own pockets. They hoped their synagogue would become an attraction for tourists visiting the old neighborhood in nostalgic search of the vanished world of the Jewish Lower East Side. I could not imagine Jewish citizens in Israel or Israelis from a similar social background residing in New York investing a comparable amount of personal resources in any kind of voluntary communal project. Moreover, it would be highly unlikely to find secular educated Israelis of Eastern European extraction relating nostalgically to the life of their forefathers in the *Shtetls* of Eastern Europe.

In sociological terms, I would define the congregations I observed in New York as communities of memory (Halbwachs 1992, Boyarin 1992, Zerubavel 1996). Their text of memories naturally included the Jewish religion and its traditions, the painful history of the nation, which was most clearly illuminated by the tragedy of the Holocaust, life in pre-Holocaust East European *Shtetls*, the immigration to America, and finally on arrival, the early years of settlement in the Lower East Side. (These elements appeared more strongly visible and representative of other American Jewish institutions at the Stanton Street synagogue.)

POSTSCRIPT: COMMUNITIES APART

As I began summing up my observations, I could not avoid contemplating what would have happened if my parents and grandparents had made the trip, early in the twentieth century, to New York rather than to Jaffa in the Holy Land. Would I have joined a synagogue community from among the choice available today to American Jews? But now, in spite of my respect and affection toward the congregants I met at both synagogues, who indeed had a similar family background to my own, I nevertheless concluded that, had I decided to stay on in New York, I could not have become a loyal congregant of either of them. We doubtless had stemmed from the same Eastern European Jewish ethnic stock and its cultural heritage. Moreover, I enjoyed a similar social, economic, educational and professional status to that of my American Jewish friends and colleagues. However, although I appreciate and possibly envy the type of communal life they developed, my ‘sentimental education’ as a secular Israeli would have prevented me

from joining in their project beyond my temporary role as a professional observer.

Israelis are loyal and supportive comrades in wartime and in other difficult situations. Particularly striking these days is the phenomenon of the post-military-service Israeli backpackers on their extended journey to the Far East or South America, who often seek one another's company en route. It has become a sort of living tradition that these young men and women congregate in remote exotic locations that have become so popular among Israelis (Noy and Cohen 2005). They risk their lives and their personal freedom serving their country for a few years as soldiers in the regular army and later as civilians in the reserves. But as was suggested long ago, they have lost the incentive to develop voluntary communal associations in daily life. The first generations of Zionists successfully developed communal life, especially in the *kibbutzim* and *moshavim* (small-holders' cooperatives). Local Jewish political parties and other voluntary organizations provided a long list of instrumental, social and cultural services. But the transition to statehood completely changed this dimension of civil voluntarism in Israeli communal life (Eisenstadt 1972).

The Israeli government and its municipal agencies have taken over the responsibility for providing most services, including religious ones. The Ministry of Religion and the municipal authorities provide a wide spectrum of *sherutey dat* (religious services), construct and maintain the upkeep of synagogues and ritual baths, appoint and pay the salaries of rabbis and other religious functionaries at the local and national level. I also observed such a lack of initiative in building and joining voluntary local and national communal organizations among the Yordim residing in New York (notwithstanding Israeli citizens' charitable contributions to needy populations or their participation in political activities, such as Peace Now, Women in Black, etc).

American Jews, in contrast, discovered a social culture in their new country that strongly promoted active participation in voluntary associations. As succinctly observed in the early nineteenth century by Tocqueville in his seminal *Democracy in America*:

Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions, constantly form associations. They have not only commercial and manufacturing companies, in which all take part, but associations of a thousand other kinds—religious, moral, serious, futile, general or restricted, enormous or diminutive (Tocqueville 1956: 198).

No doubt, they arrived in America with a long tradition of Jewish communal self-government (Katz 1961) and settled close to their compatriots from the old country who had arrived earlier. The Stanton Street Synagogue exemplifies this phenomenon. It still bears the name of its founders—Anshei Brzezan, the people (*anshei* in Hebrew)—who came from Brzezan (a *Shtetl* in the eastern part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire). Like all other American ethnic and religious groups, American Jews cannot rely on Federal, State or City agencies to support and satisfy their communal social and cultural needs. American synagogues—whether Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, or Reconstructionist—as well as most other Jewish social, economic, and spiritual institutions are by and large financed by the Jewish participants themselves or by Jewish philanthropic foundations.

When it was suggested to me to contribute an article (defined as a scholarly *drasha*—sermon) to the 2006 Sukkot holiday issue of the *Forward*, I responded hesitantly. This honored veteran publication, that was launched in 1897 as a Yiddish-language daily newspaper, seemed to me to be “too Jewish,” in view of my credentials as a Jew, as displayed in my daily habits and intellectual interests. However, I succumbed to temptation and submitted a piece (October 10, 2006) under the title “Are Secular Israelis Jewish?”

Few observers would deny that the divide between religious and secular populations (*datiim vehilonim*) is probably the most acute social and cultural division in Israeli society. But, in spite of marked differences in lifestyle and bitter political animosity between these two sectors, there are nevertheless powerful connecting threads in daily life that compel them to cooperate and share basic resources and existential conditions. To mention only a few, there is the common Hebrew language, the governmental coalitions that always include religious parties, similar habits and demeanor in daily life and the dangers resulting from the volatile security situation. But what are the threads connecting secular Israelis with American Jews? Actually, I assume that the gap might widen even further in the future, when the growing distance from the first generations of immigrants who departed about the same time to the US and Palestine will erase the dim memories, still echoed in Israel, of the forefathers who left the *Shtetl* with the same historical and cultural baggage.

The Law of Return has opened the gates of Israel to “lost” or recently discovered tribes who have little connection with the history of mainstream

Judaism, but who preserve some rituals bearing a resemblance to Jewish religious practice. Although they are considered eligible to enter Israel as potential citizens, they must undergo conversion in cases where there are some gaps in their putative Jewish genealogy. The recent newcomers from Ethiopia are a good example of the above. Before and after their arrival in Israel they have been obliged to undergo intensive courses in Judaism, while their children are exclusively enrolled in religious schools by the absorbing agencies. From the perspective of Judaism as an ideology, a tradition and a way of life, American Jews who build synagogues and maintain a lively Jewish communal existence are far more legitimate candidates to enter Israel and gain citizenship than the Israeli natives, the secular Sabras.

The plethora of experiences shared by secular Israelis, their literal and literary communal texts of memories are by and large very different from those of American Jews. When they travel to distant places or migrate to other countries such as the US, they take along with them a collection of Hebrew songs, but no longer carry the books, rituals and traditions that have preserved Jewish life for many generations in the diaspora. Except for a small minority of Israelis who for unexplained personal or social reasons choose to join the society of “repenters” who return to a religious life (*chozrim betshuva*), for the majority of secular Israelis there is no way back to traditional Judaism, even on a much more limited scale. The enigma of rabbi Uri Zohar, the quintessential Israeli Sabra, gifted film director, actor, and popular vulgar comedian, who left a leading role in the bohemian Tel Aviv artistic milieu to join an Ultra Orthodox movement in Jerusalem is symbolic of the high wall separating the “religious” from the “secular” in Israel. It needed an eccentric maverick like Uri Zohar to climb the wall and cross the line back to Orthodoxy and “Jewishness” in the traditional sense of the term.

The issue we tackled in this chapter has its parallels in the broader field of ethnic studies. Economic, social, and geographical mobility have undermined the stability of ethnic groups in modern societies (Giddens 1991, Appadurai 1996). It holds true that as ethnic groups lose their social effectiveness, individuals can evoke ethnicity in increasingly idiosyncratic ways (Buckser 1999). As Fischer (1986: 196) suggested, ethnicity is a deeply rooted emotional component of identity that is often transmitted less through cognitive language or learning than through processes analogous to the dreams and transference of psychoanalytic encounters. No doubt, there is a sort of instinctive response of delighted

surprise when Italians, Irishmen or Swedes accidentally discover that their neighbor on a train or plane is of the same ancestry. In the same way, Israelis have a fleeting sense of affinity when they encounter Jews from other countries. But, is that acknowledgment sufficient for the development of a deeper relationship in contemporary society? Would Gans' theory of "symbolic ethnicity" prove effective in the Israeli case? Should the third generation of Israeli extraction feel an urge to begin searching for its ethnic roots?

I end with the last sentence in my *Forward* Sukkot article: "For the next generation of secular Israelis, however, a new dialogue and notion of affinity between them and their brethren in the Jewish Diaspora needs to be developed". Ending on such a hopeful note seemed more appropriate to a holiday sermon than would a harsh sociological prognosis.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

THE ISRAELI JEWISH DIASPORA IN THE UNITED STATES: SOCIO-CULTURAL MOBILITY AND ATTACHMENT TO HOMELAND¹

Uzi Rebhun

INTRODUCTION

At the end of 2005, the population of the state of Israel was estimated at 6.9 million (CBS 2006). This figure reflects the number of permanent inhabitants according to the Central Bureau of Statistics' definition. Approximately three-fourths of the Israeli population were Jews, and the rest being mainly Muslims, Christians, and Druse.

In addition to the inhabitants present in the country, there is a large Israeli community which resides permanently abroad. Since the foundation of the state and until the end of 2005, some 910,000 inhabitants emigrated who have not returned to the country (CBS 2006). This conglomerate includes people who left the country recently as tourists, for family gatherings, or business and intend to return shortly; students, diplomats, and state officials as well as academicians on sabbaticals whose stay abroad is limited to an often known and defined period; as well as people who emigrated, and those who passed away abroad. This figure includes non-Jewish Israeli emigrants. Given all these sub-groups, we estimate the number of Israeli Jews who live permanently abroad at roughly half-a-million people (Sicron 2004). Slightly more than half of them reside in the United States (Paltiel 1986, Sicron 2004) with other large Israeli communities in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and France (Gold 2002).

Emigration from Israel is voluntary and individualistic (Goldscheider 2002). The rate of emigration, relative to the size of the total population,

¹ This chapter is dedicated to the memory of a beloved and dear nephew, Daniel Shiran (<http://www.danielshiran.co.il>). Daniel was born in Israel, graduated from the prestigious "Hareali" high school in Haifa, and after continuous efforts raised his medical profile and volunteered for his military service to the combat unit "Golani". Daniel was killed in a battle on August 4, 2006 during the Second Lebanon War.

is modest and stands at a medium or even low level as compared to other Western countries (Sicron 2004). Counter migration, either to the country of origin or to a third destination, is one of the explanations for emigration from Israel. Pull factors involved in out-migration include economic opportunities, possibilities for professional mobility, and an improved standard of living; push factors include the security situation and the burden of military service as well as family considerations such as the desire to join relatives (Lamdani 1983, Sobel 1986). Trends in the interplay between these factors may explain the temporal fluctuations in the amount of emigration from Israel. Overall, we witness a decline in the rate of emigration over time (DellaPergola 2004).

Many Israeli emigrants have relatives and friends in Israel with whom they maintain contact, as well as professional or economic ties. They visit Israel frequently, are constantly updated about political and social developments in their home country, and even after a relatively long absence describe their residence abroad as temporary (Kimhi 1990, Lev-Ari 2001). The Israeli establishment, and, accordingly, also the organized American Jewish community, have over time changed their longstanding somewhat antagonistic attitude towards Israeli emigrants to a more constructive perception in an attempt to link them more strongly to Israel, to get assistance from the more successful elements among them for various economic and political needs, and to expose their offspring already born abroad to Israel (Gold 2002, 2004). Perhaps the success of this new approach is to be seen in public and political discussions dealing with the possibility of granting Israelis abroad the right to vote in Israeli elections.

Past research suggests that Israeli immigrants in the United States are a positive selective group whose educational attainments and socio-economic status are higher than those of the average origin society as well as that of non-Hispanic white Americans or other immigrant groups to the United States (Cohen 1996). Most Israeli immigrants arrive with education already acquired in Israel and many go on with advanced studies in the United States (Rosenthal 1989, Rosenthal and Auerbach 1992, Toren 1976). Accordingly, they are often able to get high incomes and reside in middle-upper class neighborhoods. However, not all Israeli Americans are successful and a relatively large number tend to concentrate in trade and sales jobs (Cohen 1989). High socio-economic status as well as young age at immigration or long duration in the United States are positively associated with cultural assimilation including proficiency in English (Lev-Ari 2001, Rosenthal and Auerbach 1992, Bozorgmehr, Der-Martirosian and Sabagh 1996).

Israelis abroad maintain a strong attachment to their homeland. Among other things this is reflected in their preference to speak Hebrew at home, to give their newborns Israeli names, in their desire to return to Israel, and in their prolonged self-identification as Israelis. They likewise strengthen their observance of Jewish holidays and other rituals suggesting a conscious effort to ensure their Israeli identity. Nevertheless, only a small proportion of their children consider themselves as Israelis (Rosenthal and Auerbach 1992). A long stay abroad creates distance and gaps, leading to a feeling of dis-belonging to Israeli society (Gold 2002).

The studies reviewed above used census or survey data pertaining to a single year. A few of them presented retrospective questions on characteristics prior to immigration and current characteristics thus allowing changes between origin and destination to be traced. The nature of these data, however, does not allow an in-depth analysis of gradual trends measured prospectively along different points of time. The present study partly overcomes this lacuna by using three successive U.S. censuses from 1980, 1990 and 2000 to follow the social and cultural integration of cohorts of Israeli Jewish immigrants over a period of twenty years. A complementary source of data is the 2000/01 National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS) which enables examining the extent of connection Israelis in the United States feel to their homeland, and its evolution over time.

In the next section I review the literature on immigration adaptation and Diasporism. I then explain the method used to identify Israeli Jews in the American censuses. This is followed by a presentation of immigrant characteristics. At the heart of the chapter are two sections that analyze, respectively, the social and cultural mobility of Israeli immigrants as manifested in English language proficiency, citizenship, and educational attainment; and the relationships between length of stay in the United States and attachment to Israel. The Discussion evaluates the empirical findings within a broad theoretical framework of the boundaries of the collective and provides some remarks on the future of the Israeli Diaspora in America.

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The present study stands at the crossroads between two independent yet strongly complementary areas of international migration and diaspora studies. Due to large-scale labor and other types of international

movements, ethnonational diasporas are growing elements in many Western countries including the United States. From a structural perspective, immigrants seek successful absorption into and similarity with the native-born population in paramount individual characteristics which would enhance their economic well-being and determine consumption and quality-of-life.

A key element in becoming an American is language (Katz and Stern 2006); acquisition of English proficiency enables better interaction between immigrants and the host population. It expands accessibility to education and job training and determines success in job allocation. Moreover, it is positively associated with mobility in the labor market and higher earnings. The relationships between language skills and social and economic adjustment have been demonstrated in a large number of studies in the United States including, among others, Chiswick and Miller (1992). It should be noted that the desire of contemporary immigrants to maintain close ties with family and friends who stayed behind, and, using modern technology to continue to participate in the social and political life in the homeland, may deter their linguistic assimilation (Kritz and Gurak 2005).

English language proficiency is also important for acquiring U.S. citizenship which, along with language, enhances the chance for finding good employment. Citizenship probably facilitates the process of getting a mortgage for purchasing a home and more generally it strengthens feelings of social security and permanence in the new country. This feeling of being an integral part of American society can further strengthen the mutual readiness of immigrants and natives for different kinds of informal social ties which can eventually result in marital assimilation. Under U.S. immigration law, naturalized citizens have the right to bring in close family members. Not less important for the incorporation of immigrants into American society is the benefit of citizenship for participating in the various spheres of federal, state and municipal elections, hence increasing their political influence (Kritz and Gurak 2005).

Educational attainment plays an important role in the assimilation of immigrants and their descendants. Improvement in education is a major avenue toward broader occupational opportunities out of ethnic niches and is associated with higher wages (Alba and Nee 2003, Lieberson 1980, Lieberson and Waters 1988). In light of the economic restructuring in the second half of the twentieth century there are

today more occupational opportunities geared toward high levels of schooling (Massey 1999). Education also broadens horizons and may expose immigrants to the norms, values and cultural traditions of the host population (Morgan 2005). The host country might give priority in granting citizenship to immigrants with high human capital whose potential to contribute to society and economy is relatively great. Perhaps more than citizenship and language, the achievement of parity in educational attainment may take generations due to low initial levels of education and the necessity to overcome barriers erected by the host society which limit access to opportunities (Alba and Nee 2003, Hirschman 2005). Overall, each of the three factors—English proficiency, citizenship and educational attainment—is an independent determinant of immigration adjustment but they are also strongly interconnected. Likewise, all three factors have intergenerational implications for the advancement of offspring.

From a cultural perspective, in recent years members of minority groups are experiencing ethnic revival and are strengthening their communal activities; this includes the expansion of political and financial ties with their homeland. Host countries do not demand full cultural assimilation, and are today more open and sympathetic towards close mutual relationships between ethnic minorities and their countries of origin (Sheffer 2001).

The number of diaspora groups and their activities have recently been on the rise disseminating the culture of their countries of origin and advancing their political and economic interests (Shain 1999). Ethnic diasporas maintain strong sentimental and material (financial) links with their origin countries which are enhanced under times of unrest overseas (Jacobson 1995, Sheffer 1986). These strong relations are based on the psychological-symbolic components of their ethno-national identity. This perception of the diaspora-homeland relationship can be seen as part of a broad argument positing the persistence of ethnocultural cohesion among white Americans (Greeley 1974, Novak 1972) as against the assimilation and symbolic-ethnicity approaches (Gordon 1964, Alba 1990, Gans 1979).

With these theoretical considerations in mind, the present investigation is aimed at tracing social and cultural changes among a growing diaspora group of Israeli immigrants in the United States, and examining how key elements of integration into the host country influence their ties with the homeland.

IDENTIFYING ISRAELI-JEWS IN THE U.S. CENSUS

Pinpointing our target population of Israeli Jews in the U.S. census encounters two major obstacles. First, because of the separation between church and state in the American Constitution, which prevents any inquiry into matters of creed, we cannot distinguish among those who indicated Israeli as their ancestry between Jewish Israelis and Israelis who are not Jewish; likewise, the question on place of birth also does not permit distinction, among those born in Israel, according to religious allegiance. Second, given that Israel is a country of immigration, some Israelis might have been born elsewhere, moved to Israel, and only later emigrated to the United States; this group would have indicated in the census a place other than Israel as their country of birth. To overcome these obstacles we adopt an algorithm developed by Cohen and Haberfeld (1997) which relies on the simultaneous use of three variables available in the U.S. censuses namely, country of birth, ancestry, and language spoken at home.

We thus distinguish between people born in Israel and people born elsewhere. Of the native-born Israelis, one group of Jews are people who speak Hebrew or Yiddish at home and whose ancestry is different from Arab, Palestinian or Armenian. We also defined as Jews those who do not speak Hebrew or Yiddish but do not speak Arabic or Armenian at home either, and their ancestry is other than Arab, Palestinian or Armenian. There were a few respondents who indicated Palestine (not Israel) as their country of birth and these were classified as Jews if they spoke Hebrew, Yiddish or any language other than Arabic or Armenian at home, and at the same time reported their ancestry to be Israeli or other.

The algorithm for foreign-born, namely for those not born in Israel, assumes that those who speak Hebrew at home arrived in the United States from Israel, or at least spent some time there, and are thus regarded as Israeli-Jews. Also included in our population of foreign-born immigrants are those who speak a language other than Hebrew at home, but reported Israeli as their ancestry. As Cohen and Haberfeld (1997) suggest, among this group there might be some people who speak Arabic at home who are most likely Jews from North African or Asian countries who first immigrated to Israel and subsequently moved to the United States.

This is the broadest definition that could be applied to the census material in order to identify Israeli Jews. Nevertheless, it misses those

foreign-born who immigrated to Israel and after spending some time there moved to the United States and who speak neither Hebrew nor Yiddish at home and did not report Israeli to be their ancestry. Similarly, this approach does not cover American immigrants to Israel who came back to the U.S. Although Cohen and Haberfeld provide a method to estimate the number of these foreign-born Israelis it is not useful for tracing changes in social and cultural characteristics. The sample from all three U.S. censuses comprises 2,896 Israeli Jews aged 18+. In this group, 712 appear in the 1980 census, 974 in the 1990 census, and 1,183 in the 2000 census.

I also make use of data from the 2000/01 NJPS (Kotler-Berkowitz et al. 2003).² For the purpose of the present analysis, I defined Jews as those who reported their current religion to be Jewish, or people with no religion who also consider themselves Jewish. Among this sample, Israelis were those who were born in Israel, lived there five years ago, or indicated Israel as their last country of residence. Application of the above criteria resulted in a sample of 90 respondents. Data were weighted to account for their differential selection probability.

IMMIGRATION CHARACTERISTICS

For those Israeli-Jews who could be identified in the U.S. censuses, I examined their areas of birth and the changes in the origin composition from one census to the other. Obviously, the later census includes those who did not emigrate from the United States as well as new arrivals. Within any inter-censal period, which lasts ten years, there might have been Israelis who immigrated to the United States and already returned to Israel or moved to a third country without being documented in two successive censuses.

² The 2000/1 NJPS, conducted by RoperASW, was a random sample of telephone numbers attained using RDD procedure in all 50 states, as well as the District of Columbia. The U.S. was divided into seven strata according to an early estimate of Jewish population distribution. To achieve greater sampling efficiency, strata with higher estimated levels of Jewish density were over-sampled as compared to strata with lower estimated levels of Jewish density, and the differences among strata in the chance of being called were adjusted by a weighting process. A series of screening questions was introduced to verify any current or past connection to Judaism. If only one person qualified as a Jewish adult, that person was assigned the full interview; in households with two or more adult Jews, the interviewed person was randomly selected. The complete sample represents Jews as well as non-Jews of Jewish background (Kotler-Berkowitz et al. 2003).

The findings in Table 17.1 show that the majority of Israeli Jews in the United States were born in Israel. Over time, their relative proportion has increased from slightly less than two-thirds in 1980 to three-fourths in 2000 of all Israeli-Jewish immigrants. This change is not surprising given the increase in the proportion of native-born among the total Jewish population in Israel (from 57% in 1983 to 64% in 2000) (CBS 2000). A significant increase in the percentage of native-born Israelis in the United States took place during the decade from 1980 to 1990, and thereafter it has somewhat moderated. This change in the composition of Israeli immigrants by origin, whether born in Israel or elsewhere, is most likely associated with the large influx of Soviet immigrants to Israel over the 1990s which, as in almost any migration more generally, is followed by some return migration or movement to a third destination.

Table 17.1 Area of Origin of Israeli Jews in the United States, 1980–2000 (%)

Areas of Origin	1980	1990	2000
<i>Total</i>	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(712)	(974)	(1,183)
Israeli-born	65.6	72.5	75.3
Foreign-born	34.4	27.5	24.8
<i>Thereof:</i>	100.0	100.0	100.0
West Europe	20.0	25.2	18.4
East and Central Europe	50.6	35.5	46.1
Asia	14.3	11.9	15.4
North Africa	9.8	7.5	3.4
Latin America	–	5.8	5.1
Oceania	–	2.9	3.8
Other	5.3	11.2	7.8

Indeed, a look at the areas of origin of Israeli Jews who were not born in Israel shows that between 1980 and 1990 the proportion of those born in Central or Eastern Europe declined from 50% to 35.5%, but over the next decade this trend reversed, and their proportion increased again to almost half (46.1%) of the total Israeli Jews in the United States not born in Israel. Over time, also the proportion of Israelis born in

North Africa, in countries such as Morocco, Tunisia, Libya or Egypt, declined from 9.8% in 1980 to only 3.4% in 2000, while the proportion of those born in Asia remained almost unchanged. The increase of those who originated in Latin America and Oceania can be explained by the fact that these Jews began to gather in Israel only from the late 1960s (DellaPergola 1986, DellaPergola, Rebhun, and Raicher 2000) and typically it takes a few years until new immigrants decide to leave and search for another country.

Table 17.2 presents the distribution of the Israeli Jewish immigrants by period of arrival in the United States. For each census, the single largest group is that which immigrated since the previous census. This attests to the increase in the size of immigration of Israeli Jews to the United States over time, as well as some return migration or movement to a third country on the part of earlier immigrants. Nevertheless, while in each of the first two censuses approximately half of the Israelis had arrived in the United States during the recent inter-censal period, this was true for less than one-third of the Israelis in 2000. Thus, with the progression of time, the proportion of Israelis in the United States who live there for many years has grown. This fact might have important implications on their acculturation to the host society, the institutional infrastructure of the groups, the nature of social networks, and the attachment to Israel.

Table 17.2 Period of Arrival in the US: Israeli Jews in the Censuses (%)

Immigration	1980	1990	2000
<i>Total</i>	100.0	100.0	100.0
Before 1950	17.0	5.1	2.6
1950–1959	12.0	10.7	8.6
1960–1970	24.1	16.3	13.3
1971–1980	56.9	21.8	18.7
1981–1990	–	46.1	25.7
1991–2000	–	–	31.2

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL MOBILITY

A Cohort Follow-up

Attention is now directed to several social and cultural characteristics which are central for evaluating processes of integration into a host

society and socio-economic success. The usage of three consecutive censuses, along with the classification of the population by period of immigration, allow an approach of cohort follow-up providing insights both into the direction and pace of immigrants' adaptation. Obviously, a census might include people who do not necessarily intend to stay permanently in the United States and the data do not give any clue who among the Israelis plans to return to Israel or migrate elsewhere. In order to minimize any bias that might derive from including people who will eventually not stay, I limited the analysis only to those Israelis who, in 1980 had been in the United States for six years or more.

First I examine language skills. The findings for 1980 show that young Israelis have a better knowledge of English than do older Israelis (Table 17.3, Part A), despite the fact that data not shown here suggest that older Israelis have resided a longer time in the United States. Thus, we may explain the differences in language skills by such factors as age at immigration, exposure to English in country of origin, and perhaps differences in opportunities for learning English in U.S. schools and/or in the workplace (mainly as self-employed in ethnic niches versus employees in large corporations).

A follow-up of those who in 1980 were in the youngest age group (20–29) shows a steady and significant improvement over time: from 80.2% in 1980 who spoke English very well or only English, to 83.1% in 1990 and to as high as 92.3% in 2000. An increase in the proportion of Israelis with fluent English was observed also in the next age groups but only for the first period of 1980 to 1990; thereafter, the proportion declined somewhat. Although this requires further investigation, we can hypothesize that there might have been some selective re-migration that was drawn from that segment which was more successful in the United States as reflected by their language skills. These Israelis, many of whom earned an advanced academic degree in the United States or were employed in the high-tech industry, could more easily find a job in Israel to maintain their high social and economic status. By contrast, for those engaged in blue-collar or service work, the return to Israel would more likely cause them economic and social hardship. Another explanation for the decline between 1990 and 2000 in English fluency among older age groups is a possible change in gender ratio because of longer longevity of women as compared to men; it is possible that women in general, and immigrant women in particular, tend to participate less in the labor market and thus will also be less fluent in English, affecting the overall level of the older age groups. This

Table 17.3 Fluency in English, Citizenship, and Educational Attainment among Israeli Jewish Immigrants in the United States: Cohort Follow-Up (Census %)

Age	1980 6+ years in U.S.	1990 16+ years in U.S.	2000 26+ years in U.S.
A. Fluent English Speech ^a			
20–29	80.2	–	–
30–39	75.2	83.1	–
40–49	57.3	80.2	92.3
50–59	69.2	86.5	78.6
60–69	–	66.7	80.0
70–79	–	–	58.7
B. U.S. Citizenship ^a			
20–29	67.3	–	–
30–39	74.3	88.0	–
40–49	82.0	87.9	98.7
50–59	94.2	91.0	93.7
60–69	–	91.7	95.0
70–79	–	–	97.8
C. Mean Schooling Level ^b			
20–29	13.7	–	–
30–39	14.0	13.8	–
40–49	13.6	14.0	14.3
50–59	11.2	14.1	14.1
60–69	–	12.0	13.3
70–79	–	–	12.1

a) Percentages

b) Code of education values: none or preschool=0; grades 1–4=2.5; grades 5–8=6.5; grade 9=9; grade 10=10; grade 11=11; grade 12=12; 1–3 years in college=14; 4+ years in college=16.

explanation is also applicable to the trends that have characterized the oldest age group in 1980, namely 50 to 59.

Another important, perhaps paramount, trajectory for incorporation into a new society is citizenship. Because of the rights attached to this status it can attest, more than any other characteristic, to the intended permanency of settlement. Neither the U.S. nor Israel restrict dual citizenship and we assume that most Israelis who are granted U.S. citizenship keep their Israeli citizenship as well. In 1980, approximately

two-thirds of the Israelis in the youngest age group (20–29) had U.S. citizenship and the rate gradually increased to 88% in 1990 when they belonged to the age bracket 30–39, and further to almost 99% in 2000 as they reached the ages of 40 to 49 (Table 17.3, Part B). Thus, largely in accordance with previous research on immigrant adaptation, these trends are associated with prolonged stay in the new country.

Almost without exception, since 1980 each age cohort has experienced an increase in the rate of citizenship. The most salient increase characterized those groups with initial low levels of citizenship, namely the two youngest age groups in 1980. Many Israeli immigrants acquired U.S. citizenship during the early stages of their stay in the country, as reflected in the significant increase between 1980 and 1990, after which the increase was more modest. Likewise, while at the starting point there were some substantial differences between the age groups, by 2000, when all Israeli immigrants in our study, regardless of age, had already been in the United States for 25 years or more, the differences had almost disappeared, and all the cohorts had levels of citizenship reaching well into the 90%. After such a long time, it is likely that many of those who for one reason or another did not receive citizenship would have returned to Israel.

The third indicator that we examine is education using a measure of mean schooling level (Table 17.3, Part C). The findings suggest that Israelis in the United States largely follow a trajectory of social success, and as time elapses, their educational scores rise. For example, while in 1980 the mean schooling level of the 20–29 age group was 13.7, by the year 2000 when they were already at the ages of 40 to 49 their educational score had increased to 14.3. That the youngest age group in 1980 already had a relatively high score serves as evidence that many of the immigrants acquired their post-secondary education already in Israel. Yet, the increase among the oldest age group (50–59) of about one year of schooling, from 11.2 in 1980 to 12.1 in 2000, unless it is biased towards selective survivorship,³ reflects the exploitation of older immigrants, some of whom by 2000 were already retired, of free time to acquire formal education; at this stage of their life, this is probably not aimed at improving economic opportunities or professional mobil-

³ Studies have suggested that mortality is lower at higher educational attainment levels; thus, it incrementally could raise average educational attainment independent of age (Sorlie, Backlund and Keller 1995).

ity but mainly exposes them to local social and cultural environment and might strengthen their language skills and, depending on area of studies, also their knowledge of American history and society whether general or Jewish.

It should be noted that the educational attainment of Israelis in the United States is higher than that of their Israeli Jewish counterparts at origin: the mean level of all Israeli immigrants in the United States was 12.3 in 1980, 13.4 in 1990, and 13.7 in 2000; on this same scale, the parallel figures for Jews in Israel was 8.5 in the 1972 Israeli census, 10.1 in the 1983 census, and 11.2 in the most recent census of 1995. Likewise, the achievements of Israeli immigrants are impressive in comparison to the total American population with respective rates in the three U.S. censuses of 9.7, 10.2 and 10.6.

COMPARISONS BETWEEN IMMIGRATION WAVES

The census data also enable us to compare between similar age groups that belong to different waves of immigration. Such a comparison entails different times of birth, different socialization in the country of origin, and different experience in the host country as factors associated with absorption in the United States. The comparison is limited to the two youngest age groups of 20–29 and 30–39. We focus on those who, at the time of each census, had been in the United States for six years or more, and we look at those Israelis who arrived over a similar length of interval, namely ten years.

The findings in Table 17.4 show that later waves of immigration are more competent than earlier immigrants regarding the two younger strata. While in 2000, 92% of Israelis who had arrived in the United States between 1985 and 1994 spoke English fluently, this was true for only 83% of Israelis in 1990 who had arrived between 1975 and 1984, and significantly less among those in 1980 who had arrived between 1965 and 1974. That later immigrants have higher qualifications is more clearly shown in their educational attainment with respective scores of 14.4, 13.9 and 12.7. Obviously, some of the immigrants moved to the United States as children and received their education in the new country.

The rates of citizenship were found to be somewhat inconsistent both by period of immigration and age group. For example, among those aged 20 to 29, the rate with U.S. citizenship was especially high in 2000

Table 17.4 Fluency in English, Citizenship, and Educational Attainment among Israeli Jewish Immigrants in the United States—A Comparison of Three Immigration Waves

Age	1980 (Arrived 1965–1974)	1990 (Arrived 1975–1984)	2000 (Arrived 1985–1994)
<i>A. Fluent English Speech^a</i>			
20–29	68.0	83.8	92.0
30–39	60.0	79.6	78.3
<i>B. U.S. Citizenship^a</i>			
20–29	44.0	40.5	52.0
30–39	52.0	48.2	45.8
<i>C. Mean Schooling Level^b</i>			
20–29	12.7	13.9	14.4
30–39	13.3	13.4	13.9

a) See note (a) to Table 17.3

b) See note (b) to Table 17.3

among those immigrants who had arrived from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s and the lowest rate was found among their counterparts in 1990 who arrived between the mid-1970s and mid-1980s. Likewise, while for the two early waves the rate of citizenship was higher among the group aged 30–39, for the immigrants in the 2000 census the highest rate was found among those aged 20–29. We attach these somewhat confused findings to possible differences in the number of years in the United States within the wide interval of ten years; to differences in occupational attainment of new immigrants and accordingly demand for specific qualifications in the labor market; and perhaps also changes in policy and criteria for citizenship on the part of the immigration and naturalization authorities.

ATTACHMENT TO ISRAEL

I use data from the 2000/01 NJPS in an attempt to examine the relationship between time in the United States and attachment to Israel. I focus on three indicators which are available from this survey, namely




Figure 17.1 Connection to Israel, by Period of Immigration

level of emotional attachment to Israel, familiarity with the social and political situation in Israel, and self-perception as Israeli.⁴ Consistently along these indicators, the findings show that Israelis with longer duration in the United States are less connected to Israel (Figure 17.1). This is mostly salient in the familiarity and self identity indicators: while 92% of those who moved to the United States over the previous decade reported very good acquaintance with the situation in Israel, this was true for less than 70% among those who left Israel before 1990; and parallel figures for considering oneself Israeli are 89% and 63%, respectively.

Since the relation to Israel could have been determined by factors other than length of stay in the U.S., I have used the three indicators above to construct a weighted index of Israeliness. The index adds the values for each indicator namely, 0 or 1, weighted by its relative

⁴ The first two indicators were dichotomously classified between those reporting “very” versus “somewhat, “not very”, or “not at all”; for “consider self to be Israeli”, I distinguished between those reporting “yes” and those who either did not consider themselves to be Israelis or see themselves as both Israeli and American.

scarcity which is $1-P$ where P is the proportion of respondents in the total Israeli sample who claimed connection to Israel through the respective variable. Thus, the scarcer the relation, the greater its weight. The Israeliness score ranges from a minimum of 0.68 to a maximum of 2.35 suggesting that none of the Israelis received a score of zero in all three indicators, but also that none scored one across all indicators. We regress the Israeliness score on major socio-demographic factors including age, gender, marital status, education, occupation, U.S. citizenship and tenure in the U.S. The continuous nature of the dependent variable is appropriate for ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression.

The findings in Table 17.5 show that, when all other things are equal, tenure has a significant negative effect on the Israeliness score. According to the unstandardized coefficient every year in the United States reduces the Israeliness score by almost two percent (.017). Another important and expected finding is the negative relationship between U.S. citizenship and the score of Israeliness. Other factors also had a statistically significant effect on Israeliness: being married and educational attainment negatively associate with a high score of Israeliness, while older age, female, and high status occupations encourage stronger relations with Israel. The latter correlation that contrasts with the data that concern higher education may possibly be explained partly as reflecting work-related interests. Overall, after adjustment for degrees of freedom, 22.5% of the Israeliness score variations are statistically explained by means of the socio-demographic variables, U.S. citizenship and length of stay in the U.S.

DISCUSSION

The present study used two different independent sets of data, that of the U.S. censuses and that from a national survey of the American Jewish population, to examine complementary processes of acculturation into the new society and the continuation of the relationship with the homeland, among Israelis in the United States. The samples of the censuses do not necessarily comprise of the same respondents as does the survey; likewise, each of the data sets provides insights into a different dimension of the processes involved in immigration. Nevertheless, our findings are fairly convincing in pointing out that with the prolongation of time Israeli Jewish immigrants integrate successfully into American

Table 17.5 Unstandardized OLS Coefficients for Regression of Israeliness Score on Socio-Demographic Characteristics, Citizenship, and Length of Stay in the U.S.: Israeli Jews in 2000^a

Independent variables	Unstandardized Coefficient	Standard Error	Significance
Age (18+)	.008	.000	.000
Gender (female)	.042	.005	.000
Marital status (married)	-.209	.005	.000
Baccalaureate degree or higher	-.063	.006	.000
Professional/Management	.144	.006	.000
U.S. Citizenship	-.062	.008	.000
Length of stay in the U.S. (in years)	-.017	.000	.000
Constant	2.011	—	—
R-Squared (adj.)	22.5%	—	—

a) Reference categories are: education—some college or less; occupation—clerical/service/blue collar

society as seen in changes in their English proficiency, rates of U.S. citizenship, and educational attainment. At the same time, each of the individual characteristics of citizenship and education as well as length of stay in the United States has an independent and negative effect on a score of Israeliness.

Social and cultural characteristics are important intervening obstacles between time-related adaptation at destination and connection with origin. The gradual nature of this process corresponds closely with Alba and Nee's typology of the assimilation of immigrants into mainstream American society (Alba and Nee 2003). In the first stage, recent immigrants *shift* and expand the boundary of the collective to include them as components of Israeli society. Over time this boundary *blurs* as the social profile of the Israelis abroad becomes more distinct from that of their counterparts in the homeland and more resembles that of the host society. This may further lead to boundary *crossing* as they become distant from their country of origin. This stage is anticipated to enhance among second-generation descendants resembling the classical version of individual-level assimilation.

From a structural point of view, assimilation tendencies of Israeli Jews target the American social mainstream. From an identificational

perspective this process is oriented toward ethnic networks and milieus—Israeli and partly American Jewish (Gold 2004). Thus, while their link to Israel weakens over time Israeli Jews in the U.S. remain part of a distinct visible community according to language, residential preferences, and various origin-specific cultural behaviors.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

“MAJORITY SOCIETIES” IN JEWISH DIASPORAS: LATIN AMERICAN EXPERIENCES

Haim Avni

JEWISH “MAJORITY SOCIETIES”

In a short and concise article published some twenty five years ago, Jacob Katz dealt with some of the issues which are of our concern in this book. “*Jewish Diasporas: Minority Position and Majority Aspirations*,” is the title that he gave to his enlightening remarks (Katz 1982). Katz used the term *position*, and not the more frequently used term *status* because status, in his eyes, suggests a legal and fixed condition, whereas the history of the Jewish diasporas runs through periods and places where Jews enjoyed very different plights. The Jews were nonetheless, classified as a minority, and this was due to certain sociological characteristics such as their preference for endogamy, concentration in certain economic spheres and manifested social and religious cohesion. During the greater part of Jewish Diaspora history, legal restrictions were added to these socio-economic traits. These dominated vital aspects of their life, such as occupations, social mobility, and religion that tended in most cases to lend Jewish existence the mark of social inferiority. This brought Max Weber to the notion of *pariah*.

Katz does not accept *pariah* as a valid description of the Jewish position even for the pre-modern periods, although he interprets *pariah* as *caste*, and not in its pejorative meaning. According to Katz, “caste” implies the *acceptance* on the part of its members of their position as a completely separate group from the rest of the society, along with their position of inferiority, and that has never been the case with the Jews who never accepted their under-privileged position as part of a predetermined scheme. The Jewish reaction to the realities of their *Minority Positions* were their Majority Aspirations which were, according to Katz, deeply anchored in their *Messianism* especially in times of deprivation.

Katz's article emphasizes the spiritual-ideological aspects of the history of the Jewish diaspora, but in many of his other works the author dealt thoroughly with its sociological and inner-political issues. The Jewish autonomous existence within the non-Jewish host-societies, known as *kehilot*, were the dominant phenomenon in all Jewish diasporas until the second half of the eighteenth century. In some of them, particularly in the Muslim world, this situation continued throughout the nineteenth century. In all cases, however, the Jews lived in what I suggest to call "Jewish Majority Societies." Surrounded by their host-societies, they formed an "island" of Jewish existence; we can therefore qualify that situation as "Insular Jewish Majority Societies."

Regardless of whether their self-rule was recognized officially by the authorities of their host-societies or not, the Jews regarded themselves as members of their own group and shared common truths about right and wrong, good and evil, things permitted and prohibited. These values were based on laws and traditions the validity of which was accepted by all. Socially they aspired to gain the esteem of their fellow Jews. It was the public opinion of the "Jewish street" which counted. When some outstanding individual found favor with the rulers of the host-society, it enhanced his esteem within the Jewish community and it was this recognition which mattered to him. In sum, wherever we find that the values accepted by the Jews stem from the Jewish tradition, their social aspirations are centered within the Jewish community, and the host-society is regarded by them as an "outer world." In such cases, we are facing an *Insular Jewish Majority Society*.

During very long periods of the Jewish history this situation was accepted also by the surrounding non-Jewish societies: it suited their own views regarding the Jews as a people set apart. In the Spanish-Portuguese world, the term "nation" used by the Jews to describe themselves was frequently applied to them also by their neighbors. The Jews thus enjoyed a full right and legitimacy to be *different*, although not *equal*.

The processes of modernism and of "emancipation" undermined this reality. The Enlightenment (*Haskala*), introduced to the Jewish societies a new appreciation of the values of their surrounding neighbors. These values included not only literary and linguistic elements but also habits and fashions, and they caught the imagination and the respect of many Jewish intellectuals and even simple people. This process almost always preceded the political events within the host-societies which enabled the creation of the legislation by which the Jews were recognized as equal citizens. The abandonment of the Insular Jewish Majority Society was

then regarded both by them and by their neighbors as a pre-requisite for the new legal status, or, at least, as a due “payment” for it, once it had been achieved.

That was not the case in the vast Russian Empire, in several eastern provinces of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and in most parts of the Muslim world. Jewish Majority Societies prevailed even where they lost their legal autonomous status, maintaining their communal cohesion through voluntary associations. But, by the later part of the nineteenth century, these regions became the source of the massive Jewish emigration which, by the fourth decade of the twentieth century, changed the map of the Jewish Diaspora. The waves of Jewish migration were actually composed of individual “drops” of migrants, who, endowed with the rare capacity to plan, decide and execute their decision, abandoned their homes and went overseas to build for themselves a new and better existence. This atomizing process was the most extreme contradiction to the Insular Jewish Majority realities. The emigrants who abandoned the “old home,” found themselves in *Jewish Minority Societies*. These were based entirely on the capacities of the immigrants to form associations in order to provide for what they felt were their indispensable needs. Even when they settled in “Jewish neighborhoods,” they were still part of their new larger society, merged among non-Jews. While not necessarily socializing with them, they could not escape the impact of their culture, habits, way of life and values. This was the explicit demand made to them by the receiving host-societies as well as by certain Jewish organizations which were established in order to help the newcomers and who regarded their integration in the general society as an indispensable requirement in order to avoid any harm to their own already acquired position of equality.

Yet there were cases in which Jewish immigrants did not fall in line with these general processes. In this chapter we will look at two such cases from the Jewish Latin-American experience. They were caused by two different prevailing conditions: *physical isolation* and an utter *estrangement*. These cases might provide the bases of paradigms for understanding other “insular majority societies,” both Jewish and non-Jewish.

JEWISH INSULAR MAJORITY SOCIETIES ON THE ARGENTINE PAMPAS

Baron Maurice de Hirsch established the Jewish Colonization Association (JCA) in 1891 as an instrument for his plan to save the Russian

Jews in view of a renewed wave of legal persecutions by the Russian authorities. Through his contacts with the Russian Government, he became convinced that there was no other solution than emigration and he donated the then-enormous sum of 50,000,000 Francs (the equivalent of 2,000,000 English Pounds or 10,000,000 US Dollars) to carry out his program. According to one estimation, this one donation surpassed by 10,000,000 Francs the total investments of Baron Edmond de Rothschild in Palestine during the eighteen years, from 1882 to 1900 (Margalith 1957).¹ For Baron de Hirsch, Argentina seemed to be the most appropriate destination for the hundreds of thousands of Russian Jews who were expected to settle there in large blocs of Jewish colonies. By 1913, twenty two years after the initiation of JCA's work in Argentina, and seventeen years after the death of its founder, the Association possessed 545,000 hectares in the Provinces of Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, Entre Rios and the National Territory La Pampa. The huge blocs of land, several tens of thousands of hectares each, were called "colonies". Thus, for instance "Colonia Mosesville" in the Santa Fe Province was the name for 110,866 hectares on which were established seven "groups", each of them comprising of several small villages or "lines" of isolated farms (Jewish Colonization Association 1914). On that year, and for many more to come, much of the land owned by the JCA remained as a reserve, kept for further settlement. But those parts of its belongings which had been settled were occupied exclusively by Jews. Non-Jews who lived on some parts of the land prior to its acquisition were tenants whose contracts with the owners expired before the land came into the possession of the JCA. The presence of non-Jews in these vast extensions of land was thus extremely small. It was not before the early 1920s, some thirty years after the first Jewish settlers arrived at the JCA's colonies, that non-Jews became an important minority within the population of the "colony". They served as agricultural workers living on the farms or dwelt in the small urban nuclei which developed mostly in close vicinity to the railway stations on JCA's lands. The geographical conditions in Argentina thus provided the basic circumstances for the establishment of Insular Jewish Majority Societies (Avni 1983).

The origin and social background of the settlers were another component of this situation. Baron de Hirsch planned to find among the

¹ Ahad Ha-Am estimated Baron Rothschild's contributions to be 40 million Francs.

Russian Jews experienced farmers who could serve as the pioneering element in his colonization project. They were to organize themselves in autonomous groups of fifty families each and, lead by their elected delegates, they would undertake the practical aspects of their settlement. JCA's directors would provide them with advice and funds but the delegates of each group would have the authority to divide the land, build the houses, purchase the livestock etc. The Baron believed that he had found in the Jewish agricultural colonies in the Russian provinces of Bessarabia, Kherson and Ekaterinoslav the appropriate candidates to serve as *exemplary farmers* (*Musterwirte*) to his other, less experienced settlers. In the southern provinces of "New Russia" (which was conquered from Turkey), the Czars encouraged the establishment of Jewish settlements during the early nineteenth century. But by the end of the century, due to the legal persecutions and the successive sub-division of their original plots of land, the impoverished Jewish farmers were looking forward to solve their plight through emigration. They thus seemed to respond to the Baron's scheme. In addition to their professional skills, they came from Insular Jewish Majority Societies and were believed to be inclined towards cooperative undertakings (Avni 1973: 189–193).

Shortly before his death, in April 1896, the Baron had to face the fact that his plan and calculations, particularly those referring to the *Musterwirte* from Russia, were utterly unrealistic. Several hundreds of Jewish families, organized in nine groups, had indeed settled by then in the large colony Lucienville in the province of Entre Rios. Yet their selection—by David Feinberg, the dynamic director of JCA's branch in St. Petersburg—and the processes involved in their departure for Argentina lasted much longer than expected. Instead of short procedures and an accelerated rhythm of their transfer, more than two years had elapsed from the time of their approval as settlers in the summer of 1892 and their arrival in the Argentinean winter and spring of 1894. In the interim, many had lost much of what they had possessed and another year passed until most of them could expect their first crops.

But even more important than the delay in their settlement were the agricultural differences between Russia and Entre Rios. While in Kherson the most affluent Jewish farmers cultivated only 33 hectares, and all the others owned much less land, in Lucienville each homestead consisted of 75 hectares in the beginning and later 100 hectares and more. Besides the different professional skills which this difference implied, its impact on the social structure of the settlement was

even more decisive. In Russia, Novo Poltavka, a typical Jewish colony consisted of a village with more than 250 homesteads and some 1,370 inhabitants (JCA 1906); in Argentina, a village of even 50 homesteads would imply a tremendous distance between the dwellings and the fields, and the walking to and from the day's work would be impossible. Even small villages of 24 families each, had to be disbanded when the amount of land available to the farmers was increased. The more appropriate system of colonization was then the settlement in clusters of four farms each, with the four houses located near each other on the extreme edges of the individually-owned fields. The impact of these realities on the Jewish social and religious life in the colonies was quite sever, but not devastating. It diminished its intensity but did not disrupt it (Avni 1973: 213–17, 273–85).

The failure of the utopian system of settlement did not avoid the continuation of the colonization project. The JCA repeated the scheme of autonomous group settlement only in one other case—at the large “Baron de Hirsch” “colony” (more than 110,000 hectares) in the province of Buenos Aires. A group of prosperous Jewish farmers from the province of Kherson in Russia reached an agreement with the JCA directors in Paris according to which they would settle in that colony on their own account and pay the JCA only for the land which they will put at their disposal. But before long they had to recognize that their funds were exhausted and that they had to turn to the JCA for help, and become just another ordinary colony under its aegis (Avni 1991). During the first years of the twentieth century two more groups were organized in Russia and settled in the Mosesville area. Thereafter the JCA stopped the recruitment of its settlers abroad and started to select them from among the immigrants who arrived in Argentina on their own. The population of the Jewish colonies in Argentina was thus quite diversified from the point of view of their itinerary from their “old home” to JCA's colonies on the Argentine Pampas. Yet, they all came from the Czarist Empire where they were excluded from the national society by special anti-Jewish laws, and where the pattern of Insular Jewish Majority Societies prevailed. The group which David Feinberg had selected from among the Jewish farmers in Novo Poltavka, brought with them to the colony Lucienville in Entre Rios a copy of the minute book of the Khevera Kadisha,—the “Holy Society”, the burial association. It contained the regulations and bylaws which governed the life of the Insular Majority Society in that Russian Jewish colony and the settlers in Lucienville were supposed to abide by them also in

their new home. A Torah scroll was also given to them, and according to the statement on the first page of the minute book, it had been written by a scribe in Jerusalem. We do not know whether the settlers from Novo Poltavka actually adhered to the regulations and bylaws of the communal minute book, but at least at the outset Lucienville was conceived by them to be a direct continuation of what has been their original village: an Insular Jewish Majority Society (Avni 1973: 296). Most of the other settlers in JCA's colonies did not enjoy the coherence which characterized the groups in Lucienville; but once accepted for settlement as farmers, or even arriving on their own as agricultural workers they found themselves in the Insular Jewish Majority Societies which had emerged in them.

A crucial element in the Insular Jewish Majority Societies in the colonies was the authority exercised by the JCA administration. Each farmer was bound by a detailed contract which he signed upon receiving his house, land, instruments, livestock and financial subsidies. He received all this in the form of a loan to be paid in twenty installments during twenty-five years. Until the full debt was paid, the farmer possessed only a "Promise of Sale", which could be abolished without any compensation if he did not comply with all his obligations. The authority of the administrators and their haughty attitude toward the settlers was much resented by them. The sense of being dependent on the good or bad whims of the director in charge, engendered suspicions of corruption and feelings of estrangement. Yet the system also allowed the imposition of benign demands on behalf of the whole community. One such request was that all settlers contribute annually to the maintenance of Jewish education, even if an individual family did not have children at school. The thirty pesos—equivalent to 6–8 days' salary for an agricultural worker at harvest time—was added by the administration to the annual payments otherwise required of the farmers. The faculty to levy such a tax was quite unique in modern Insular Jewish Majority Societies (Avni 1985: 33–34).

Religious services and education were two basic needs of the settlers that cemented all Jewish Majority Societies. Modest synagogues were established in each colony soon after the arrival of the settlers. They were later enlarged. Education was also provided for the children almost immediately after they entered their houses. The settlers employed some of their most learned fellows as *melamdin*—religious teachers. But the JCA intervened in this domain. Upon the insistence of the directors of the enterprise in Buenos Aires, the Baron decided to establish day

schools in which the official state curriculum would be taught, along with Hebrew or religious studies. Jewish teachers were then recruited from among the Spanish-speaking personnel of the Alliance Israelite Universelle's schools in Spanish Morocco and Turkey. They were brought to the colonies and appointed to teach the official curriculum and serve as directors of the schools. Jewish studies were entrusted to locally selected instructors. The JCA intended to educate the children of the colonists to become good traditional farmers, good "modernized" Jews and good patriotic Argentineans. This educational autonomy resulted from the scarcity and even lack of government schools in the provinces where the colonies were established. The schools were built at central points in the vast colonies at a distance which the children could cover daily on horseback from their parents' farms. At its peak in 1917, JCA's educational network in the colonies consisted of 66 schools and this undoubtedly distinguished the Jewish colonies from other rural settlements in Argentina. But by 1920, when the Provinces could assume the responsibility for maintaining the schools, the JCA donated all its schools to the local authorities and limited its activities in the area of education to support a network of complementary Jewish schools, in which only the "Hebrew" studies were taught (Avni 1985: 29–49).

Farming and marketing the products implied another kind of need: the necessity to dispose of sufficient credits for buying seeds and for paying the hired workers during the harvest. Retailers and representatives of large dealers in cereals were ready to advance the required funds at exorbitant profits. This was the impulse for the creation, in 1900, of the *Primera Sociedad Agrícola Israelita* (The First Jewish Agricultural Society) as a cooperative association for the purchase of goods and marketing of products. It was founded in Lucienville on the initiative of some leaders of the settlers with the quiet support of the local JCA administrator, who was not sure, in the beginning, as to the reaction of his superiors in Buenos Aires to this independent enterprise. But, after some hesitation, the Central Council of the JCA in Paris and the directors in the Argentine capital recognized the importance of the cooperative and provided it with credit so that it could help the farmers to finance cultivation and harvest. In turn JCA's local Administrator had to be one of the society's directors and thus be able to collect more easily the annual payments due by the settlers to the Association. The *Primera Sociedad Agrícola Israelita* was not only the first Jewish farmers' cooperative, but also the first agrarian cooperative in Argentina. Soon afterwards, other cooperatives were established in most of the other Jewish colonies

and before long *Fraternidad Agraria* (a nation-wide federation of Jewish cooperatives) was created. The cooperatives became one of the most important institutions in the Insular Jewish Majority Societies of the JCA colonies (Avni 1973: 287, Hojman 1961).

The prevailing language in the cooperatives—including all major domains of daily life—were conducted in Yiddish. In spite of the large distances which separated the farms from each other and most of them from the railway stations and other small urban centers, social and cultural events were quite frequent and attracted large attendances. Political disputes of all kinds, including Argentinean political campaigns, were maintained in Yiddish, although with time Spanish took an increasing share. In 1910 when the Argentine Republic celebrated the hundredth anniversary of the revolt against the Spanish rule, Alberto Gerchunoff, the young Jewish writer who grew up in the colony Clara in entre Rios, immortalized Jewish life in the large regions of Jewish settlement with the publication of *Los Gauchos Judíos*. The epic short tales included in this literary work were serialized in *La Nación*, one of the most important newspapers of Buenos Aires. They depicted traditional Jewish life in the colony, but although Gerchunoff's intent was to emphasize the process of Jewish integration and even assimilation, the realities of geographic isolation and only occasional contacts with members of the host society were the picture he drew. The "heroes" were new "gauchos"—adapted, but still Jewish gauchos (Gerchunoff 1975).

The apologetic approach of Gerchunoff regarding the "isolationism" of the Jewish settlers reflected the gap which existed between the expectations of the Argentinean society of the immigration and the reality which the masses of immigrants created in their country. Two basic understandings underlined these expectations: one was embodied in the slogan "*Gobernar es Poblar*"—to govern means to populate, and the other was "*Crisol de las Razas*", the Argentinean equivalent of the United States' "Melting Pot". The first expressed the desire to increase the population, particularly in the almost empty territories in the north and in the south of this huge country; the second reflected the expectation that immigrants would assimilate as soon as possible into the host society. According to the principle of *Jus soli*, which is the dominant criteria for acquiring Argentinean nationality, the children of immigrants born in Argentina were automatically counted as nationals. The explicit demand of the host society was that they should be educated as such and "blend in" with other Argentineans. With these assumptions, being different was only tolerated, and in principle would be limited to the

first generation of immigrants. But contrary to these expectations the large masses of immigrants who swamped the country concentrated mostly in the large cities, and first and foremost in Buenos Aires, creating there a social and cultural reality of a pluralistic and multi-lingual society. Those who settled like the Jews—in vast blocs of land—were too isolated from the host-society to be able to mix with them.

In 1909 the JCA was confronted with a major nationalistic attack on its schools and implicitly also on its entire work in Argentina. Ernesto A. Bavio, an inspector of the Federal *Consejo Nacional de Educación*—the National Council of Education—and ex-general director of the Entre Ríos provincial school system, published in the official organ of the council his impressions from a recent visit which he had paid to some schools in that Province. He claimed to have also visited the Jewish schools. What he found there was, according to him, a disaster and a national shame. The basic national curriculum, which according to the law had to be taught in Spanish was either taught in Hebrew or not taught at all. His testimony extremely contradicted the reality prevailing at the schools and even more so JCA's educational policy. Nevertheless, JCA's attempts to defend itself were in vain. The attack also continued in further issues of the same journal. The reconciling and hesitant reply of M. Cohen, JCA's director of the schools in the colony Clara, were of no avail. Ernesto Bavio's accusations were incorporated by the Argentine writer Ricardo Rojas in his époque-making book *La Restauración Nacionalista*, published in the same year 1909. Rojas did not change this part of text even in a 1922 edition, when he served as the dean of the Humanities Faculty at the University of Buenos Aires. His stance immortalized the image of the Jewish education in the agricultural colonies of the JCA as the proto-type of the incursion of foreign education in Argentina. At that time, the JCA school system had already been disbanded, but the accusations against it continued to serve the cause of Argentinean anti-Semites (Rojas 1971, Avni 1985: 36–42).

Yet, it was not anti-Semitism or the lack of legitimacy which dissolved the Insular Jewish Majority Societies in the agricultural settlements in Argentina. Many of the younger generation abandoned rural life and moved into professional, commercial and industrial occupations in the more hospitable urban centers. Non-Jewish settlers replaced the Jewish owners on many farms after the full debt to the JCA had been paid and it was possible to dispose of the land. Long after the Jewish settlers had adopted the language, secular way of life, and many of the

Argentinean habits and customs—the physical, geographical isolation also ended. The Jewish farmers who remained in the colonies formed now—like the rest of Argentinean Jews—Jewish Minority Societies. Yet the impact of the Insular Jewish Majority Societies' experience on Argentinean Jewry was larger and more lasting than its demographic size would suggest. At its peak in 1925 the Jewish population of JCA's colonies was estimated to have reached 20,500 persons, some 12.6% of the 162,300 Jews who, according to a careful calculation, lived at that time in the Argentine Republic. But a large number of JCA's settlers abandoned the colonies after having spent there a considerable number of years and their farms were given by the JCA to other Jewish colonists. The data which the JCA published in its annual reports did not reflect this constant change. We are therefore allowed to suggest that the number of Argentinean Jews who at that time experienced life in an Insular Jewish Majority Society was even considerably larger than one eighth of the Jewish population. This includes of course those of the younger generation who grew up in the colonies and then left their homes in order to study at high schools and universities (Avni 1983: 537, DellaPergola 1987: 85–133).

ESTRANGEMENT IN LA PAZ, BOLIVIA

The most effective means of rescue for German and Austrian Jews in the late 1930s was to obtain entry visas into any of the countries in the New World. Bolivia, the land-blocked republic was considered least suitable for Central European immigrants. In 1935, when James G. McDonald, the high commissioner for refugees (Jewish and Others) who arrived from Germany, toured the Latin American countries in search of openings for immigrants, he did not bother to visit Bolivia. At that time it was entangled in a bloody war with Paraguay regarding a territorial dispute over the Chaco (Avni 1987). Three years later, the war had ended and Bolivia was ruled by Germán Busch, an ambitious colonel who sincerely believed that Bolivia could benefit from the crisis in Europe by attracting agricultural settlers for vast and empty areas close to the border with Paraguay, and in other parts of the country. Although Jews were initially excluded from this policy, more benign attitudes toward them soon arose.

The department in charge of immigrant affairs in Bolivia was transferred in 1938 from the Ministry of Agriculture to the Ministry

of Foreign Relations. By the end of that year it became evident that the regulations regarding selection of the immigrants were not being adhered to by Bolivia's representatives in Central Europe. Hundreds of urban refugees began to gather in the capital, La Paz. In 1939, the tide became a torrent, but on May 23, 1939, the scandal exploded. It was soon evident that corruption was prevalent throughout the system of providing visas for immigration. Among the beneficiaries were honorary consuls, full consuls, shipping companies, travel agencies in many places in Europe and in Buenos Aires and not least, high officials in the Foreign Ministry, as well as all sorts of intermediaries and lawyers in La Paz. The Bolivian press reported the scandal with brutally anti-Semitic articles, telling of the sums the refugees were paying for entry permits. A general outcry arose to halt this immigration, but nevertheless, the Bolivian government accepted the validity of the permits even though they had been issued illegally. Moreover, the process of allowing Jews into the country, despite the irregularities, continued even after President Germán Busch had committed suicide, and his successors in 1940 and 1941—General Carlos Quintanilla and General Enrique Peñaranda—came to power. Only in 1942 did the Bolivian Congress pass an explicitly anti-Jewish law. It is estimated that by then Bolivia had rescued some 10,000 Jews by granting them entry permits. With these Bolivian visas, the refugees could receive the necessary transit visas. Many of them, finding the transit countries more hospitable, did not arrive in Bolivia. Many others used La Paz, Santa Cruz and other Bolivian towns only as a temporary station, from which they soon joined relatives in Argentina or Chile. Yet thousands of refugees remained in Bolivia, the majority of them in La Paz (Avni 1994, Knudson 1970).

There, as in the other Bolivian cities, they created virtual Insular Jewish Majority Societies. In October 1942 an official census of the inhabitants of La Paz was taken. It found 2,964 declared Jews. Some more Jews may have been included among the 1,193 who reported that they were "indifferent to religion," and others may have included themselves in the categories of "other Christians" (*Censo Demográfico de la ciudad de La Paz, 15 de Octubre de 1942*). Their legal position was extremely precarious: They were foreign immigrants who stayed in the capital although even their illegal entry permits stated that they were supposed to be residing in rural settlements as colonists. The ethnic composition of Bolivia made it difficult to appear as a regular Bolivian national. Of the 3,066,915 inhabitants of the country in 1932, only 14.6% were defined as "white"—almost all of them of Spanish colonial

ancestry. One of the most typical Indo-American countries, Bolivia was also one of the least countries of immigration. The Jewish immigrants were clearly recognizable as foreigners.

And different they were. They ignored the local languages—Spanish, Quechua and Aymara—and the habits and mores of the country. The mentality of the ruling “white” stratum of the Bolivians had little or nothing in common with their background. The Jews shared the mentality and outlook of the Germans and Austrians, and therefore considered themselves “civilized” and superior to the Bolivians. The mutual estrangement of the host society and the immigrants formed the external and internal “shells” within which was formed the Insular Jewish Majority Society.

Leo Spitzer was born in La Paz in September 1939, shortly after his parents arrived from Vienna. He describes in his retrospective research *Hotel Bolivia* the cultural shock which the immigrants suffered upon their first encounter with Bolivia: the city of La Paz, the thin air of the Cordillera, and the Indians. A photograph of him as a child, standing on the threshold of his family home with his sister and their Indian nanny in her traditional cloths, speaks volumes of their lives there. Other photos from his family album, which he skillfully analyzes in his study, provide many more details in this respect (Spitzer 1998). The cultural detachment from the Bolivian environment intensified the German-Austrian “baggage” that the refugees brought with them, and increased the perceived value of their Jewish heritage. Though the creation of an Austrian Club or a German Society was impossible, because all German organizations that existed in Bolivia were ruled by the Nazi embassy. Hence, Jews had to focus on their own organizations.

In January 1935, almost four years before the avalanche of central European Jews began, a small group of Yiddish speakers from Eastern Europe founded the *Círculo Israelita*, the Jewish Circle. It was intended to be a comprehensive Jewish organization, serving its members’ social and religious needs. When the first German-speaking refugees arrived, the *Círculo* created a committee whose task was to help the newcomers financially and provide moral support. Early in 1939, as the numbers of the new immigrants increased, the task was taken over by Dr. Moritz Hochschild, a German Jewish mining magnate, who was one of the three “tin-barons” of Bolivia. He approached the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (AJDC) in New York and convinced it to create, with his help, the *Sociedad de Protección a los Inmigrantes Israelitas*—*SOPRO* (Society for the Protection of Jewish Immigrants) to

which he contributed modestly and which was dominated by his representatives. It replaced the *Círculo Israelita's* committee, and before long the AJDC received complaints about systematic discrimination against non-German Jews. Whether these accusations were substantiated or not, the German-speaking immigrants felt certain that their welfare needs were adequately addressed by this organization (AJDC Archives, Waszkis 2001).

The religious and educational needs of the immigrants were served by the *Comunidad Israelita de Bolivia*, the German-speaking communal organization. Established in 1939, it began its religious services in small rented apartments, but by May 1941 had inaugurated its own temple. The School, inaugurated in 1940, was small with only three classes. It was intended to preserve German Jewish traditions as well as provide the children with an appropriate level of general studies. It received official recognition a year later, and became the *Escuela Boliviano-Israelita* (Bolivian Jewish School). It was required to be open to other Bolivians as well, as long as they accepted to study Hebrew, the Jewish religion and Jewish history. Very few non-Jews of the time opted for this education, and so the school remained an important ingredient of the Insular Jewish Majority Society. The *Juedische Kulturgemeinschaft* was another such institution. It provided a wide range of social and literary entertainment, and later on established a suburban recreation ground. The Jewish sports club Maccabi, set up branches in Cochabamba, Oruro and Santa Cruz. The Zionist Federation and WIZO completed the set of voluntary frameworks through which the immigrants and their children might feel at home while remaining estranged from the host society. The weekly newspaper, *Juedische Rundschau* served as a forum and reflected all the activities of the organizations, as did the German language *Rundschau vom Illimani* for the general, non-Jewish aspects of immigrant life (Asociación Filantrópica Israelita 1943, *Círculo Israelita* 1987).

The Insular Jewish Majority Society in La Paz ended by the late 1940s, almost a decade after its first inception. The chronic political instability and the lack of wider economic and cultural horizons moved many of the Bolivian German-speaking Jews—as well as other immigrants—to seek more promising countries. Leo Spitzer's family, for example, took the opportunity to go on to live in the United States. Others went south to Argentina and Uruguay. All but the few who immigrated to Israel soon became members of Jewish Minority Societies. The Jews who remained in Bolivia, both *Ost-Jüden* and *West-Jüden*, lost much

of their sense of estrangement and became acculturated to the Bolivian environment. Their reduced numbers led to the amalgamation of the *Circulo* and the *Comunidad*. The institution continued, inter alia, to maintain the *Colegio Boliviano-Israelita*, which became a prestigious high school. Scarcely any Jewish children continued to be among its students. Nevertheless, on Bolivian festivals, the *Colegio's* students marched in patriotic parades carrying a huge Jewish-Israeli banner.

CONCLUSION

The cases reviewed here are not necessarily the only circumstances in which an Insular Jewish Majority Society might exist. Such a society can be found today in New York, Montreal and some other cities where ultra-orthodox Jews live along the lines which they believe that their ancestors throughout the ages have traced for them. This phenomenon of Voluntary Jewish Majority Societies might be a pattern of association and existence also in non-Jewish neighborhoods. The case of the Bolivian German Jews might perhaps illuminate cases of other utterly estranged societies like "China Towns" or other "ghetto" phenomena, not necessarily of immigrants, in North America or in other regions.

The case of the Jewish settlers in the JCA colonies might also provide a paradigm for the study of other, non-Jewish communities. In close proximity to the Jewish colonies in Enre Rios were colonies of Russian-German settlers who came from the interior of Russia almost at the same time as Baron de Hirsch's colonists. They too attracted the nationalistic wrath of Ernesto Bavio in his reports in 1909. He claimed that in their schools all the studies were in German and that the maps of Germany and not of Argentina were to be found in their classes. These settlers, together with the Welsh settlers in the southern territories of Argentina and Mennonite settlers in Paraguay and in Canada, could be analyzed on the same basis as the Insular Jewish Majority Societies. A systematic comparison between them and the Jewish cases might reveal some traces of the particularity of contemporary Jewish history.

CHAPTER NINETEEN

LATIN AMERICAN JEWS: A TRANSNATIONAL DIASPORA

Judit Bokser Liverant

A CONCEPTUAL INTRODUCTION

The concept of transnationalism has acquired multiple meanings according to diverse theoretical approaches and their specific focus on the variables of space and time. Both the transcendence and transformation of borders as well as the temporal dimension have elicited a debate that seeks to clarify if the current expressions of transnationalism are related to new contemporary dynamics and/or if historical precedents or analogues can be traced. Transnationalism has thus become, as many contemporary social concepts, a contested one.

Aware of this concept's multidimensional nature, it is our aim to underscore its contributions both to the analysis of ongoing changes and as of yet uncertain developments, as well as to the understanding of past trends with a fresh perspective. The concept's concurrent relevance to the past and to the present can appear to be enhanced by our perception of bordered and bounded social and communal units as transnationally constituted spaces interacting with one another.

Transnationalism refers indeed to the new conditions derived from the changes brought about by the processes of globalization. Time and space seems to cease having the same influence on the way in which social relations, identities and institutions are structured (Waters 1995, Scholte 1998). It involves the de-territorialization of economic, social, cultural and political relations; they depend neither on distance nor on borders, and lack similar influence on the final shaping of institutions and social relations (Giddens 1994). Social interaction may be organized and structured with the global dimension on the horizon. The role of countries and borders between states become diffuse, porous and permeable and global connections are intensified by virtue of the fact that they are shared with great velocity in multiple places.

Amidst this multidimensional and multifaceted global arena, transnationalism stresses that flows of interactions and relationships continue

to be developed notwithstanding the presence of international borders with all the laws, regulations and national narratives they represent. It points to new and complex patterns of interaction and network building; of social groups and collective identities, underscoring the complex dynamics of encounters and articulations that transcend national frontiers (Khagram and Levitt 2008).

While its essential connection with globalization processes has been stressed, one may also discover the fertility of the concept for new readings of past conditions and experiences, mainly associated to migratory flows of diaspora communities. It is precisely this characteristic that has shaped the historical Jewish condition worldwide and specifically in Latin America, defining and redefining its contemporary profile. In this sense, and following Vertovec (1999), transnationalism may provide a conceptual tool that allows us to make use of its implications for social morphology as expressed in the changing character of social/communal formations. Thus, we must trace both the common and the singular, the shared and the specific of the different processes built through continuity and ruptures.

It is our contention that transnationalism may be seen both as a key concept for approaching the historical development of Latin American Jewish ethnonational diasporas and their present changing condition. Jewish life in Latin America has been related, from its inception, to external centers and it is precisely this connection that has marked its character.

Following Sheffer (1986) and Safran (1991), one of the main characteristics of diasporas as social formations is the triadic relationship between globally dispersed yet collectively self-identified ethnic groups; the present territorial states and contexts where such groups reside; and the homeland states and contexts their forebears arrived from. Homeland(s), in this case—and its interaction with exile both in its sociological and theological meaning—must be analyzed in the light of its changing referents. Contemporary Jewish history lies behind the unique dialectic between place/home of origin and the spiritual and ideological elected place of residence/home. Taking these factors into consideration, it can be asserted that Latin American Jews have been marked by the unique features of transnationalism.

While conditions in their place of origin marked the migratory flows to the region framed by an expanding and changing Jewish world of solidarity and support, for Latin American Jews the Zionist idea and the State of Israel would determine their organizational profile and

inner dynamics both as an axis for institutional development and as a referent for identity. Its development as a diaspora was historically associated simultaneously to a new transnational center as well as to parallel relations with the Jewish world which marked frontiers and fluxes of interactions and asymmetries.

Globalization processes today allow for new patterns of interaction. If we look at transnationalism as a current expression of ethnicity, ethnic diasporas—which Tölölyan refers to as “exemplary communities of the transnational moment”—and specifically the Jewish Diaspora, become paradigmatic. The markers that define the latter’s transnational links have evolved, concurrently expressing and shaping the overlapping domains of Jewish life, its local, regional and global interactions and the plurality of collective realities.

A TRANSNATIONAL TRAJECTORY

Transnational conditions marked the experience of Latin American Jews from its very beginnings. The founding immigration and colonization waves as well as their future development were signed by a constant process of being attached to different shifting and overlapping external Jewish centers, both real and imaginary, concrete and symbolic. Latin American Jews shaped their communal life, built their associational and institutional profile and their collective consciousness as part of a broader feeling of peoplehood and a sense of belonging that expressed itself as well through global political interactions. A sustained yet changing transnational condition shows the singular dynamics of contemporary Jewish history in the region.

Initial relations with external centers of Jewish life were tinted by complex dynamics that marked simultaneously strong transnational solidarity connections and a dependent or peripheral character of new communities in the making (Senkman 2008, Bokser Liwerant 2008). This twofold characteristic of transnational interaction was sustained through successive redefinitions and changing formulations.

Historical conditions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries compelled the organized Jewish world to look for new places of residence and thus both colonization and immigration led collective efforts to channel Jewish life into Latin America. The Argentine and Mexican cases epitomize initiatives that produced strong local communal life while remaining connected and interacting with the transnational

space, understood as territory and as social domain. The Jewish Colonization Association (JCA) of the Baron Maurice Hirsch in Argentina and international Jewish organizations in combination with the North American Jewish community of Texas, in the Mexican case, acted as external centers that fostered and supported Jewish life in these two Latin American countries (Avni 1991, Bokser Liwerant 1991). Moreover, in the Mexican case, even the diverse diagnostics suggesting limited migratory flows were the product of transnational Jewish organizations that were supporting and coordinating shared efforts to help channeling Jewish emigration from the Ottoman Empire's diverse areas at the turn of the nineteenth century and from Eastern Europe during the first decades of the twentieth century.¹

While the Argentine reality was clearly shaped at this phase by rules externally defined, Mexican Jewish communal life followed its own contested patterns. Differences in perceptions and representations of the future of both communities were reflected both in communal structures as well as in the realm of education where the dynamics of integration and isolation were discussed.

In both cases by keeping the transnational moment at bay while at the same time interacting with it, local environments and societal surroundings were called to play a central role in defining the character of the new Jewish communities. Host societies offered different frameworks of normative search after homogeneity and tolerance towards ethnic minorities which influenced the processes of integration. While in Euro-America, multi-ethnic societies with a *de facto* tolerance towards minorities counterbalanced the primordial, territorial, and religiously homogeneous profile that the state aspired to achieve, in Indo-America, the conception of national identity was based on an ethnic-religious cultural model—*mestizaje*—defined by fusion, assimilation and the complete merging of Spanish-Catholic and indigenous populations. As a resource for identity-building and national integration, this model became a central criterion for evaluating the full incorporation of minorities.²

¹ Since late nineteenth century Mexico has been explored recurrently by several world Jewish organizations as a place for colonization projects as well as for immigration. Both options were discarded and the latter became, as defined by the Texan rabbi Zigelonka, a *fait accompli* in need of Jewish world support.

² Significant differences exist between Indo-America, with countries such as Mexico, Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia, among others, where limited immigration emphasized the indigenous highly hierarchical composition of their populations, and Euro-America, with countries such as Argentina and Uruguay, that attracted mass immigration in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In both categories we may distinguish further

Both Argentina's liberalism and Mexican *mestizaje* involved differing and common national homogeneous scenarios. Generally speaking, Latin America's distinctive search of national identities, amidst its inner differentiation, rejected diversity as a menace and a risk to its recurrent aspiration towards homogeneity, understood as synonym of national integration and thus interpreted as part of its essential and recurrent quest to enter Modernity. The way Jews perceived and internalized this goal became part of a complex interplay between narratives and reality, between self-adscription and their social representation.

Transnationalism meant for Jewish life in the region both external and internal conditions linked in the definition of a shared destiny of a people. Collective life was seen as a group enterprise oriented by diverse external centers and their divergent expectations regarding the models to be developed. Substantive ambivalences and tensions accompanied these relations, due mainly to objective conditions and behavioral consequences of a pattern of solidarity and cohesion built on unequal terms of exchange (Schenkolewski-Kroll 1988, Bokser Liwerant 1991, Senkman 2008).

In these as in later contested relations, one may underscore parallel processes regarding the connection of Latin America as a region to external centers. Its distinctively modern character was built through a permanent connection, though contested and ambivalent, to Western centers. Through diverse historical phases and as part of the West, modernity became a referent. The cultural program of modernity, which entailed 'promissory notes' that sought to define in new terms the meaning of human agency and its role in building social and political orders, acted permanently as a critical orientation vis-à-vis the center(s) (Eisenstadt 2000, Wittrock 2000). Its principles of freedom, equality and individual autonomy as substratum for association and community belongings, reflexivity as the basis for tolerance and pluralism and the centrality of public spaces for citizenship building confronted Latin Americans with common and distinctive ways of becoming modern. Thus, the subsequent and alternative Western centers acted as a project to follow and to contest. Approaching it through the lens of *multiple modernities* may allow a better understanding of ambivalences, and conflicts (Eisenstadt 2000). Shifting centers—and global foci of

differentiation between, for example, the homogeneous mestizo Chile and Colombia as opposed to Brazil, Cuba and some Caribbean areas where the complex multiracial societies have a pronounced Afro American element (Eisenstadt 1998).

identity need to be recognized: Spain and Portugal in the foundational encounter defined by asymmetry; France and England, later, as the Imperial balance of power changed; the United States, and the still current tensions and ambivalences.

Latin American Jewish life followed as well ulterior pattern of autonomous development nourished by new relations with external centers. Thus, the Eastern European immigration of the first decades of the twentieth century gave birth to the Jewish *kehilot* in the region as replicas of original experiences overseas. With diverse degrees of intensity, regions and countries of origin were the defining organizational criteria. While the Sephardic world in Latin America developed communities on the basis of different countries of origin, reflecting the fragmented character of this complex ethnic group that was textured by different sub-groups,³ Eastern European Jews as hegemonic community builders established the old/new communal structures. Contrary to what happened in the United States, the collective overshadowed the individual. In the United States the process of nation-building implied the incorporation of separate components into a collective higher order, while the right to self-fulfillment saw normative support as part of the national ethos. Tolerant of diversity, American society promoted individual gratification (Sarna 1997, 2004).

In Latin America, a highly differentiated evolutionary process of building communal structures both reflected and shaped collective Jewish life. This structural dimension acquired a significant centrality in terms of an institutional system that provided stability and a sense of continuity to the experience of social interaction. Therefore, Jews found in communal endeavors spaces to be Jewish and to differentially integrate into their societies—to transmit, create, redefine, ‘imagine’ continuity and develop new traits. Founded by secularists, but seeking to answer communal and religious needs, communities were forged in the cast of European modern diaspora nationalism emphasizing its inner ideological struggles, organized political parties and social and cultural movements (Bokser Liwerant 1991). The dominant pattern was a continuous trend toward secularization and politicization

³ Sephardim from Turkey and the Balkan countries, Middle Eastern Jews from Aleppo, Damascus, Lebanon and Palestine, North Africans from Morocco and Egypt and small groups of Sephardim from Italy and other countries in Europe (Bejarano 2005).

inspired by a plural transnational cultural baggage. Varying ideological, cultural and political currents flowed energetically in the Jewish street: from communist to Zionist; from Yiddishist to Bundist; from liberal to assimilationist and from there to orthodoxy; also from highly structured organizational options to non-affiliated and individual definitions. This gave way to an imported and original rich 'Jewish street'. As in the Old Home both prophecy and politics intertwined (Frankel 1981).

The communal domain, while prompting continuity, became the basic framework for the permanent struggle between world visions, convictions, strategies and instrumental needs. World Jewish developments directly influenced and gradually turned the Zionist idea and the State of Israel into central axes around which communal life developed and identity was built.

This phase of transnational links and political interactions brought into the forefront both the feeling and objective reality of a renewed transnational shared mission and commitment to a new ideological, political and cultural-spiritual center. It also represented a new chapter in solidarity efforts as well as ambiguities surrounding the true meaning of this evolving relationship between an ideological, political and public center and Latin American Jewish communities. It expressed the inherent tension between the idea of a national project for renewing Jewish national life in a Jewish Homeland while acting as a spur to foster Jewish life in the new circumstances of the Diaspora. Historically, the wide range of problems Zionism sought to address deeply marked these inner tensions. Its global goals of generating an overall *aggiornamento* in Judaism led to the coexistence of both the denial of a diasporic condition and the aspiration of renewal of Jewish life as a whole (Vital 1978, Almog 1982). Nowhere Jews created a communal public space with a proto-state structure so diversified as in Latin America.

The links thus between the center and Jewish communities would develop distant from a one-fold uncontested dynamics. The emergence of a dominant interpretation for those links in terms of bonds that connected one-directionally a periphery to a center was acutely manifest inside the organized Zionist movement. While an overall disenchantment with the diaspora condition was among the main causes for the emergence of Zionism in Europe, in the new communities Zionism committed itself both ideologically and institutionally to guarantee a new Jewish life. As any ideology in the process of being absorbed by other cultural and symbolic frames of reference, Zionism acquired novel

sociological meanings without necessarily redefining or rephrasing its contents. Its organizational functionality was altered and, beyond its recognized goals, it fulfilled diverse new needs.

From the perspective of new communities in the making, divergent visions on the functionality of the center—the state in the making and the new established State of Israel—for Jewish continuity implied both ideological proposals and practical imperatives. It was certainly the cultural renaissance diagnosis—mediated by a political center—that first thought of the polyvalent functions of the center for Jewish life (Zipperstein 1993, Schweid 1984). Thus, from its inception, Zionism in Latin America had to confront its final goal with contextual constraints, oscillating between its ultimate purpose(s) and the changing margins of a new map of dispersion and the requirements that emerged from it.

Moreover, Latin American distinctiveness and specificity were never fully understood by the center. The region was alternatively seen as an undefined and not a clearly visible part of the West or as part of peripheric regions (Goldstein 1991, Bokser Liwerant 1991). Initially Latin American Jews were seen as a substitute for vanishing European Jewry and were therefore identified as a source for aliyah. Testimonies of the first Zionist shlikhim to Latin America reflect a shared perception of a *sui generis* ethnonational diaspora, temporary in its time span, called to play a central role in the changing Jewish dispersion, and as a bridge between a vanishing old world and the one to be built in Palestine. Latin America was also seen as a fruitful terrain for political activities, aimed to gain support for the Jewish State in the making. Zionist sectors invigorated the center with both the “national home” and “refuge” qualities that simultaneously nourished and reinforced their own diaspora profile. *Vis-à-vis* the new community, the Zionist idea and the state offered functionality as a necessary element for Jewish continuity in a new society. The discrepancies around the changing boundaries of Jewish dispersion coexisted with specific strategies aimed to recreate, to lead and even to strengthen life in the diaspora, even without being explicitly recognized. For Zionism, hegemony building meant institutional insertion while incorporating non- and anti-Zionist contents. Limitations in some of its organizational endeavors were counterbalanced by its ability to head the central communal institutions which acted as channels for the development of links with the global Jewish world (Bokser Liwerant 1991). Thus, by conquering the communities, this model extended throughout the organizational arch that linked Jewish life both to world Jewry and to the center. In Mexico

as in Argentina central institutions played an active role in cultivating the spirit of peoplehood, of transnational links mediated and even tensely coordinated with the transnational Zionist world. (Senkman 2008, Schenkolewski-Kroll 1988, Schenkolewski-Kroll 1993: 191–202, Goldstein 1991, Bokser Liwerant 1991).

Through its successive phases, Zionism found itself caught between two different perspectives: on one hand, Israel's expectations of massive immigration from the diaspora were high, and on the other hand, by equating Zionist identity with Jewish continuity, its involvement in Jewish life in the diaspora was validated. At this level an interesting paradox was revealed: the awareness of the centrality of the State of Israel did not cause the Zionist dream 'to come true', but in fact perpetuated activities and obligations in the life of the community. In accordance with Gideon Shimoni's conceptual differentiation, a 'substantive centrality' of Zionism and Israel developed in Latin America and in time became circumstantial (Shimoni 1987). A secular diaspora nationalism was conceived as the central dimension of Jewish identity, both regarding its contents as well as its institutional spaces and mechanisms.

For a transnational center aimed to set itself as a focus to legitimately influence Jewish life outside its borders and to become the domain through which the Latin American Jewish world would commit to developing a shared existential substratum, an interconnected transnational identity was essential. The educational domain would play a vital role in the diffusion of shared visions regarding the importance of a national home for Jewish life. Jewish educational networks developed as a replica of the different ideological and political currents that were created overseas, thus acquiring the profile of a transnational cultural realm. Theoretical and practical struggles nourished the process of inner differentiation, which would express itself maturely when the material resources of the new communities enabled it. Thus, in the educational arena, Zionists found a privileged terrain on which to build continuity, as did other ideological and social currents. Moreover, due to the vitality that the diverse ideological streams reached, education became a central foundation determining their continuity. It was the domain to transmit, create, and project a cultural profile and for displaying Jewish collective life while negotiating the challenges of incorporation and integration.

Seen from a historical perspective, the one center model went through different changes that affected the dependent and even peripheric perception of Latin American communities amidst the transnational scenario of Zionist interactions. An important change took place starting

in the late 1960s, as a result of the Six Day War heralding in relations based on increased mutual links and legitimization. Through solidarity with Israel, Latin American Jewish communities expressed an implicit message regarding the legitimacy of their own existence. Solidarity meant responsibility and, consequently, legitimized the Diaspora's separate existence. The Jewish State, unwittingly, legitimized the diaspora by attaching great importance to its support. The centrality of the State of Israel was evidently instrumental in legitimizing the Diaspora's sense of solidarity and concurrently the energy invested in reinforcing its member communities.

However, insofar as the State of Israel continued to propose *aliyah* as the central criteria to evaluate the success and limitations of the Zionist movement after the war, it confronted Zionists with new venues for expressing their diverse goals. After 1967, *aliyah* offered both the possibility of converting the Jewish ferment into a permanent phenomenon and of returning its own specific profile to the Zionist idea. Paradoxically, for the organized movement, the absence of massive immigration demanded the reinforcement of its activities, thereby justifying its permanence as a polyvalent realm of transnationalism.

Congruent with the institutional differentiation and functional specialization in the transnational dimension, Latin American communities tended to reinforce the one center model and to redefine the channels through which the links with Israel would be established. Thus, the predominant role of mediator that organized Zionism historically had played by involving other institutions in the communities' central relationship with Israel, was questioned.

Latin America Jewry indeed represents a paradigmatic case where the national circumstances and the international changing scenarios affected the dynamics between centrality, dependency and interdependency; between cooperation and autonomy, resources and weakness. Israel's modifying image in the international arena set new challenges concerning its role as a source of identity and legitimacy and simultaneously confronted the region with new tasks. The way in which these tasks were undertaken defined the alternating relevance of the public and the private spheres as terrains for expressing transnational ties and legitimacy of collective life. Indeed, progressively, Israel's international perception transited from hero to pariah. Within the Jewish communities of the region a growing concern developed regarding the ways in which the change in Israel's image could affect their own. Therefore, the need to engage in the building up of the former became not only a

constant demand from the center, but also a common pressing concern. Limitations to create the appropriate institutional tools and divergent interests have been addressed time and time again. Contested visions as well as difficulties to find in the public sphere a domain for collective visibility of the transnational condition acted in complex ways. The impact of external constraints regarding the public manifestation of difference and the collective nature of Jewish life were certainly a strong deterrent.

The public sphere is the result of an encounter of discourses and interpretations, a space for hermeneutics, a mosaic of dominant and subordinate vocabularies. Consequently, the one-center model had to face its own public limitations. This development has been complex: while part of the Jewish world started to experience emerging legitimacy of ethnic assertiveness, reinforcing cultural terms of collective identities and minimizing Israel as a focus—Latin American Jewish communities were further exposed to the impact of changing conditions and international realignment of the State of Israel.

In the Mexican case, a watershed event was the official vote in favor of the equation Zionism=Racism. The attack on the legitimacy of Israel as well as the local Jewish community's limited margin of action emphasized the lack of legitimacy of the latter's transnational links to world Jewry. Intertwined with the conflictive bilateral relations between Mexico and its Northern neighbor, American Jewry represented and articulated the transnational nature of the Jewish world by leading a tourist boycott that resulted in the questioning of national loyalties. Ulterior efforts by the Mexican government to explain its vote to Israel and to the USA led to a further enhancement of the perception of a local Jewish community alienated from the national agenda and interests by virtue of the incompatibility of its external links.

It is worth to stress that while American Jews expressed solidarity and offered visibility to a local community unable to express its political demands, interactions between both communities were asymmetric, thus showing a central-periphery dynamics (Bokser Liwerant 1997).

NEW TRANSNATIONAL PATTERNS IN TIMES OF GLOBALIZATION

Oscillating between normative rejection and *de facto*-recognition of their external global Jewish ties among the diverse national claims to homogeneity—with either highly assimilationist contents or an enclave

character—Jews developed their collective life attached to the Jewish world.

The legacy of the transnational dimension was called to play a further role amidst the changing scenarios of globalization. Globalization processes have brought new realities to the region. They have engendered economic, social, political and cultural changes, as well as interdependence and influence between and among them. Globalization has also projected its contradictory character, as it expresses intentionality and reflexivity and simultaneously, an unintended path towards new developments. Thus, novel spatial interactions have modified their influence on the final shaping of institutions, social relations and identities (Giddens 1994, Waters 1995, Albrow 1996, Held et al. 1999).

The presence and strength of transnational, supranational or global actors and institutions have radically transformed nation states, their powers, functions, spaces and territories. It seems clear at this stage that, far from what some hurried estimates (Ohmae 1990, Fukuyama 1992), states not only do not disappear but continue to be actors with a decisive influence in many fields at both national and international levels. They are even considered among the most active forces either committed to or actively resisting globalization. Nonetheless, their sovereign status weakens in various fields, among others, in their relations with communities and identities that go beyond national borders thus reestablishing links between the local, the national and the regional.

As a result of increasingly intense cross-border interaction, diverse groups, communities and/or classes adopt identities and loyalties over and above national sentiments. Such is the case with new social movements, members of the corporate elite, epistemic communities, and certainly migratory waves, diasporas and ethnic groups. At the same time, globalization has encouraged and strengthened local, ethnic and indigenous identities. Global spaces give a new density to the close and specific, the characteristic and particular, and encourage the building of collective identities on institutional bases, spaces and frameworks that are radically different from those known by social theory. New identities have emerged and primordial ones gained renewed importance.

Amidst these changes, previous transnational interactions have acquired new visibility and new ones have emerged. For Latin American societies, globalization and transnationalism as well as local factors such as democratic pluralism and identity politics also have enhanced the apparent contradictory processes of assimilation of diasporas and ethnicization (Appadurai 1990). The region has witnessed the develop-

ment and legitimate expression of a new transnational consciousness—a “diaspora consciousness”—marked by multiple identifications as well as an awareness of decentralized attachments, and of diaspora as a category of social practice, a project, a claim, a revision of home-identity-movement-return (Shohat 2006, Clifford 1997). Amidst progressive processes of migration and “diasporization”, the assertiveness of ethnonational communities has been enhanced. Differing from the past—when the Latin American liberal credo or the *mestizaje* ideology of ethnic fusion aimed to integrate the heterogeneous population on an individual basis and barred the expression of collective identities and transnational ties—nowadays, the prevailing concepts of national identity have been redefined to include multiple identities. Political changes have allowed cultural diversity to open an ongoing discussion on the very nexus between culture, society and politics from which minority groups have gained legitimacy and transnational ties have ceased to be seen as a threat to the idea of national integration. Thus, diverse expressions of identity politics and multiculturalism both shed light on the transfrontier ties of the Jewish world and on the revitalization of Jewish life and its expression in the public (national and transnational) spheres.

Certainly, they are part of complex processes that are far from being linear. Thus in Mexico, while the discourse and myth of revolutionary nationalism has lost ground, cultural complexity has gained space. The idea of many cultures takes distance from the recurrent search for an essentialist “soul” or national character and may be seen rather in terms of configuring and reconfiguring the national as a legitimizing myth (Menéndez Carrión 2001, Lomnitz 1992). However, one has to take into account that the claim for recognition coming from local or primordial identities may precisely borrow essentialism from its previous national level and reinforce its excluding message on different grounds.

In Mexico, the new regime that resulted from political alternation in the 2000 elections has promoted an open public relationship with the Jewish community, one which has been defined precisely in terms of religious affiliation and socio-economic profile rather than in terms of the previous broad understanding of ethnonational ethnicity. Simultaneously, the Jewish community is openly perceived as part of a Jewish transnational world whose networks and potential support were clearly recognized during the process of rapprochement with Mexico’s Northern neighbor. This process clearly came into being during the negotiation towards the Free Trade Agreement in the late 1980s and

has intensified since then, thus overcoming the past cultural stigma of dual loyalty. It points to the growing diversification of centers of references among which Israel though still central, has to compete in new terms for influence.

In Argentina changes have also brought a shift in the paradigm of transnational identity: local Jewry is distancing itself from the one center-linked Diaspora to a focus that encompasses both civic commonalities and transnational links. This development produced valorization of cultural differences conjunctively with a renewed concern with integration into society and the public arena (Senkman 2008). However, one can't dismiss the centrality that the bombing of the communal building AMIA in Buenos Aires brought to the forefront a mixture of old and new expressions of anti-Semitism. The attack may be well defined as a watershed, representing what both researchers and Jewish leaders have coined since 2000 "the new anti-Semitism", implying the direct identification between Jewish communities, individuals and Israel, which are perceived as a single evil entity. Thus, anti-Semitism has become interchangeable with anti-Zionism and also the conflict of the Middle East transcended the territorial regionality and became global. The impact on the Argentine Jewish community became simultaneously an impact on the general society intertwining the claims for truth and justice as a shared demand against impunity.

The contradictory nature of these trends opened the region to new forms of material and symbolic transnationalism. Societies and communities underwent radical changes. Global trends have also a relevant influence on restructuring cultural life in the region in terms of a local, national and global dynamics. This has led, for example, to a gradual redefinition of the role played by national culture, which has stopped referring to symbolic processes that set the boundaries and hierarchies between the "inside" and the "outside" and has rather transformed into a wide horizon/market of shared cultural goods. The flow of technologically transmitted information and images, of postmodern ideas and globalization have recently dismantled the *delimitative function* of culture. Jewish cultural life too has been undergoing the general process of dismantling and transformation of what George Yudice defines as traditional "behavioral genres" that kept the social world "in its place" during the past few years. The new signs of Jewish cultural change show that, far from fulfilling a delimitative task vis-à-vis the more general culture, they instead push cultural expressions and

identity towards integration with the general milieu. Such a process of proximity and coexistence sets itself as opposed to what took place in previous years, when Jewish interaction with the general local culture's public spaces was feared to generate assimilation.⁴

While some communities maintain a more traditional profile, in countries such as Argentina and Brazil the new cultural dynamics are accompanying the experimentation of new modes of "Jewish Off—culture" in civil society, thus reproducing a global tendency. Thus, Buenos Aires has been the setting for new activities that attract crowds outside the communal institutional circuit. The YOK project, organized in a set of meetings, is the Argentinean version of the United States' JEWELRY.⁵ Interesting also is the network building and transnational character of the North American JOINT team that designed these events with advertising techniques led by media professionals and technicians in order to create a cultural product branded as alternative Judaism, which is supposedly trying to get rid of labels that relate it to traditional Jewish religious and cultural communal institutions, in an operation that might be defined as "de-branding". This initiative comprises a privatization of consumption of cultural goods that parallels a "light" conception of identity: "being as Jewish as one wants to or feels to be" as expressed by its followers' posture of rejection of all kinds of Jewish norms and/or of any deepening of Judaism's religious and ethnic cultural heritage.

Moreover, in recent years new forms of Jewish cultural and religious social models, successfully fostered by Chabad among the young in centers such as Beit Chabad El Lazo, have emerged from this lay cultural trend; even when embodying a basically religious character, this initiative includes activities ranging from the concept of a "homey" space with its magic, to more common attractive consumption goods, designed in accordance with marketing principles targeted for young university students and related to Jewish traditions and religion. The success of the local adaptation in Argentina of the Lubavitch movement's Chabad

⁴ This analysis is part of a report on cultural changes in Latin America prepared by the author for the Jewish People Public Policy Institute in Jerusalem in 2007. I thank Leonardo Senkman for his contribution on the new trends in Argentine.

⁵ More similar to a media happening than to a traditional Jewish cultural event, YOK gathers middle class adult Jews and professionals in a theatre located in the area called Caballito, where they listen to renowned local intellectuals speaking of non-controversial Jewish cultural topics.

Houses in the United States expresses a common demand for spiritual goods of the alternative young people's counter-culture as well as the transnational character of a substantive part of cultural alternatives that circulate in the Jewish world. It equally represents an alternative option to the culture of drugs, to oriental philosophies and to the growing political character of university life since the most recent wave of democratization in Argentina and Brazil. The Lubavitch Chabad's "missionary" calling to conquer the streets in order to "go where Jews are, and not just wait for them to come", has generated novel Jewish symbolic cultural trends both in Argentina and Brazil.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Transnationalism comprises both radical symbolic and material changes. The recurrent failures of diverse modernization processes in Latin America that have been followed by economic crises, political instability, and high levels of insecurity have increasingly exposed the region to migration waves and to transnational experiences. The reality of shrinking Jewish communities reveal a general demographic profile that unveil ongoing regional trends. In the past 30 years, the number of Jews in Latin America dropped from 514,000 in the 1970s to the current 394,000 (DellaPergola 2006, 2008). In Argentina, demographic decline became a central trend of the Jewish community. Following DellaPergola's studies already three decades ago, the estimate of the Jewish population was revised downward, from half a million to only 310,000. Towards the 1980s, the Jewish population's shrinkage continued reaching 280,000 members. Today, the core population of Jews in Argentina numbers slightly over 180,000.

In Mexico, Jewish population has shown a more stable demographic profile, due to more traditional socio-demographic patterns and the influx of Jews from other parts of the continent. Mexican Jews number today 40,000 to 45,000.⁶

⁶ In Brazil, DellaPergola estimated 96,200 in 2007. Its enlarged Jewish population (including non-Jewish members of Jewish households) was assessed at 132,191 in 1980 and 117,296 in 1991, assuming it could have exceeded 120,000 in 2000. In the last years, however, this trend has stabilized and even shows a slight increase. Uruguay and Venezuela experienced significant Jewish emigration in recent years. Based on recent studies, he considers the Jewish population estimate for Uruguay was downwardly revised to 17,900 in 2007. The estimate for Venezuela was reduced to 14,500, reflecting ongoing concerns in that community. El Salvador, Ecuador, Peru

Amidst a new map of dispersion and reconfiguration of Jewish life worldwide, as part of the current global migration waves in the region, but adding their own experience and perspective, Latin American Jews moved and are moving to different transnational locations. New centers of destination such as the United States, Canada and Europe, mostly Spain, compete and coexist with *alyiah* to Israel. Thus, previously unknown individual, family and communal models have developed, reflecting those imported from home while giving birth to new expressions of Jewish life and Jewish identities. The migratory movements, directed to diverse places, both intra regional at first, and gradually regional gave birth to a new migratory dynamics affecting mainly second and third generations thus widening the parameters of the original triad of diaspora.

The case of recently established Latin American communities in the United States points to migration intertwined with translocal experiences characterized by the establishment and reconstitution of communal life according to previous original patterns but searching in turn for venues of incorporation into the adopted environments and/or of a constant commuting between the homeland and the elected new place of residence.

One has certainly to remember the original migration/exile of close to 10,000 Cuban Jews to Miami. It was followed, decades later, by the emigration/exile of the Jewish communities of the Southern Cone as a result of the military dictatorships, extended repression and anti-Semitism. Argentine Jews faced the traumatic disruption of exile and the challenge of redefining their new territorial-national identity.

Other communities as well, such as the Colombian or Venezuelan have faced in different ways and rhythms the experience of migration and transnationalism associated to violence and political and economic upheavals with a clear tone of translocalism. Miami, Los Angeles, San Diego, but also New York and Washington became the scenario to a new transnational Latin American Jewish Diaspora.

If we focus our analysis on the Mexican case, though demographically stable, the Jewish community has shown a migratory pattern of recreating communal life in new milieus and the resulting translocalism represents new dimensions of transnationalism. In the familiar case of the both stable and fluid, Mexico-San Diego connection, we discover

and Paraguay have also experienced a significant decrease in their Jewish population over this period of time.

different networks through which customs, identities and communal patterns are built, transported and transformed (Basch, Wiltshire and Toney 1990).⁷ We may thus widen the concept of commuting to a wider realm in which narratives, ideas and interpersonal spaces and roots are developed redefining the boundaries between homeland and place of residence. One may adventure the concept of “secondary-diaspora” to point to the inter-generational differences and common traits.

New waves and intra-Jewish encounters have given it diverse shapes as a result of the encounter between migratory movements and microcosmos situations in the Jewish world itself: South African Jewish immigration; Russian, Iranian, Israeli or Canadian. Impacting these encounters are the new immigrants’ insertion and integration into the American Jewish community.

On one level, the newcomers seek to strengthen their relationship with the Jewish world; on the other, a significantly old-new dynamics has developed: the affirmation of their Mexican-Jewish belonging as part of the Latino world. Simultaneously, it opens the door to links to the US Latino world. Although the degree of sense of belonging to the latter varies from one Jewish Latin-American group to the other, in the case of Mexicans one has to take into account that immigrants of Mexican descent in the US comprise more than 60% of the Latino population as well as the geographical proximity between the US and Mexico.

At the same time, new interactions have resulted between ethnicity, religion and national belonging. For the San Diego Mexican Jewish community—which is constituted by different temporal waves—organizational patterns constitute a replica of their former setting; original models were transplanted and also recreated and rebuilt in the new context. Thus, the inner sectorial differences that historically marked the Mexican Jewish community tended to be blurred. Being Ashkenazi, or Sephardic or Mizrahi has been subsumed under a national Mexican/Jewish identity. One may argue that the size of the new community has acted as a limitation to inner differentiation. However recently though and due mainly to religious motives, a separate Orthodox Oriental community—Beth Tora Bet Eliahu—has been founded, providing an

⁷ The current estimation for the Mexican Jewish community in San Diego approaches 600 families. Regarding the total population of Latin American Jews in the United States, which has a central pole of concentration in the Greater Miami area, the differing estimations point to 25,000 to 30,000 families.

alternative to the otherwise Conservative hegemony. This community brings together 80 families and is headed by an Argentine rabbi. It would seem that what previously was a transnational circuit of predominantly Conservative rabbis from Buenos Aires has now spread to Orthodoxy as well.⁸ The current offer of religious leadership and the importance of such leadership to religious development can't be underestimated.

Different moments both identity-cultural and geographical-regional of the transnational world can be traced. In the 1960s the Conservative movement began its spread from North to South America. It provided the first model of a religious institution not brought over from Europe but 'imported' from the United States. As the Conservative movement adjusted to local conditions, the synagogue began to play a more prominent role both in community life and in society in general. The Conservative movement has mobilized thousands of otherwise non-affiliated Jews, bringing them to active participation in Jewish institutions and religious life. One proof of the relevance of religious leadership for the development of religious movements and streams may be found in the success of the *Conservative Seminario Rabínico Latinoamericano* in Argentina in preparing rabbinical personnel that serves throughout Latin America and beyond.

In recent years, in tandem with changing trends in Jewish life around the world, orthodox groups have formed new religious congregations and supply rabbinical leadership. The spread of the *Chabad* movement today and the establishment of *Chabad* centers, both in the large, well-established communities as well as in smaller ones are striking. More than seventy rabbis are currently working in close to fifty institutions.⁹ There is a very important trend towards religious observance and *haredization*.¹⁰ The extreme religious factions and the strategies

⁸ It is worth to note that the actual Orthodox Argentine rabbi in San Diego was preceded by an Argentine Conservative figure who headed the first migratory wave from Mexico to San Diego.

⁹ While in Mexico the presence of Chabad is marginal at best, there are more than fifty synagogues, study houses, *kollelim* and *yeshivot*, more than thirty of which were established in the last twenty five years. Fourteen of the twenty four existing *kollelim* belong to the Syrian *halabi* community. In Brazil—where the Jewish community was built mainly on pillars of liberal Judaism and secularity and influenced by Brazilian society with its syncretism components—fifteen orthodox synagogues, three *yeshivot*, two *kollelim*, and five religious schools were established in the last fifteen years.

¹⁰ In the last six years the 'very observant' grew from 4.3% to 7% while the observant grew from 6.7% to 17%, a growth of almost 300%. Traditionalists, who are still the majority of the Mexican Jewish population, dropped from 76.8% to 62%. These

of self-segregation point to general processes and tendencies that are developing and shaping a diversified space of identities.

The interplay between the historical ethnonational components of identity and the new religious flows show a differential behavior throughout the region. South American communities paradigmatically epitomize how *Chabad* grew out of socio-economic and cultural changing conditions. Religious developments responded both to the need for reconstitution of the social fabric and the communal structures as well as to cultural and spiritual transformations. Religion identification comes across as an anchor to strengthen a sense of belonging, and as both a social framework and a moral code expressing unresolved expectations by the prevailing patterns of organized communal life. New terrains of intimate and private spheres, as expressed in code of spirituality, are interacting with the public dimension.

In Mexico, despite the fact that communal loyalties and the prevailing structural density and norms are still powerful in shaping identity, Orthodoxy and the *Shas* option seem to be a religious-ideological justification for the claim of a sustained enclave nature of Jewish life. Certainly these modes of interaction also refer to diverse external centers. Therefore there is place to question if such revival of religion is only directed from the local community, or is it better characterized as joining the local community with a transnational community of believers under one superior authority usually located in the U.S. or in Israel. Thus, while these new trends compete with the one-center model, one cannot disregard the way religion has gained a central place in Israeli society.

Transnationalism gains still a wider dimension both complex and problematic when seen from the non-symmetric nature of the Latino-Jewish-American trilogy of encounters/interactions. We are alluding to the relations of the newcomers inside the Jewish world, as bearers of a peripheral identity *vis-a-vis* the central Jewish world, mainly the Anglo-Saxon. Phrased by one of our interviewed: "I oscillate in my identification with Mexican Jews as if they were part of my own world, on one hand and my gardener's world, on the other".

The essential interplay between difference facing the Hispanic migratory world and Otherness *vis-à-vis* Jews as the central Other partly

trends, when specifically analyzed among the population below 40 years of age, the figures for very observant grow from 7% to 12%; observant from 17% to 20% and traditionalist fall from 62% to 59% (CCIM; 2006).

reflects previous experiences of Latin American Jews and partly marks new challenges. The presence of a growing Hispanic population and its impact on questions of domestic identity and international relations present a challenge for the Jewish community. The Hispanic community in the United States is approaching a critical mass open to diverse and significant importance to the Jewish community “in regard to its relationship with the changing face of broader US society as well as how this new face of America relates to Jews, to Jewish community and to Israel” (JPPPI 2006: 59). Hispanic communities constitute the largest minority group; they have increased by 61% since 1990, numbering today more than 45 millions and it is estimated they will comprise 25% of the US population by the year 2020. This trend is even more significant when compared with the growth of the total US population and the shrinking of US Jewish population, both of whom are aging (*ibid*). The comparative population profile—levels of education, national presence and cultural and political patterns—points to a contrasting development that requires communal policies to build alliances underscoring convergences. Both Hispanic Americans and undocumented immigrants have increased their visibility and their capability of influencing particular/national agendas.

Thus, the developing view that Latin American Jews may play an important role in building transcultural connections in the framework of the Latino-Jewish-Americans trilogy must be analyzed in the light of socio-economic stratification. Latin American Jews are gradually starting to develop a not always explicit role as potential bridge builders. Diverse efforts and narratives have emerged emphasizing parallelisms between both Hispanics and Jews in general in terms of common past, common challenges, and common interests and shared commitments to values of inclusion and pluralism. Moreover, the sense of connectedness and responsibility that Latino immigrants retain towards their place of origin has been compared to the relationship that American Jews have developed towards Israel as their spiritual home (Siegel 2006).

For Mexican Jewish immigrants, the complex awareness of convergences and divergences with the Jewish world, from one side, and with the Latino non-Jewish world, from the other, has been recurrently referred to as part of a new transnational consciousness in a world where population movements and identification challenges cross diverse ethnic and national groups while material conditions, group bonds and motives play an important role. Both organizational and individual behaviors point to differences in the scope and meaning of crossing

the border as well as to the central component of remittances in one case, vis-à-vis the channeling of support for the State of Israel, in the other. The interplay between the concepts of homeland still resembles and projects old-new meanings.

While for Jews the Northern Mexican border has acted as a facilitator for exploring conditions and analyzing opportunities even in time of crisis, for Hispanic workers and undocumented immigrants it has acted as a challenging barrier. Borders can create reasons to cross them, and may act both as barriers and opportunities. Kearney describes how *Mixtecs* from Oaxaca move to the North, looking after a higher standard of living, risking life and liberty when crossing illegally. The border area ambitiously becomes both a region where culture, society and different levels of development intersect, as well as a zone in which space, capital and meaning are disputed (Kearney 1995, Glick Schiller et al. 1995). It certainly points to the dynamics of inequality and marginality that lays behind these new migratory movements and to the form in which transnational and translocal experiences may become a way to empowerment (Kennedy and Roudometof 2002).

Thus, we need to take into account not only the symbolic but also the political and economic dimensions as recently analyzed in studies on US-Mexican borders, where the complex interactions between underdevelopment, globalization and transnationalism call into question the traditional equivalence between territorial bonds and sense of belonging shaped by transnationalism.

Therefore the trilogy of the times of transnationalism we referred to carries strong discrepancies. An example is the struggle over language as a realm in which to build new hegemonies versus the integrative approach of the similar. The view of language as a tool to achieve a sense of self-worth among Hispanics has become the central focus in Gloria Anzaldúa's *Borderlands/La frontera* (1987: 59): "Until I take pride in my language I cannot take pride in myself". Now, 63.7% of Latinos and only 18.9% of Jews "strongly support" bilingual education. The importance of the Spanish language in the diaspora as a central tool for identity building and maintenance can be seen in the fact that 74.5% of all the Hispanics speak well Spanish and another 12% pretty well. But it is certainly important to underscore that these numbers mainly reflect first generations and there are still unknown developments concerning generational differences of integration.

Cultures are certainly contested domains and intercultural encounters point to the always complex logic of inclusion/exclusion of the

Other(s). Based on Sander Gilman's notion of Jewish frontiers, useful in understanding the components of transnational central alterity/and peripheral–marginal alterity (Gilman 2003) Senkman underscores that the transnational experience of diaspora in southern Latin America together with the process of nationalization in Argentina brought about the construction of a *sui generis* collective identity for Jews made up of two somewhat incongruent components: On one hand, Jews developed a peripheral identity in the margins but on the other, they were perceived (by local Argentines) as 'overseas others' whose alterity derived from Central European countries regardless of the fact that they arrived as poor immigrants from Russia, Rumania, Poland or elsewhere.

Drawing comparative insights on encounters in different times and spaces leads certainly to diversified scenarios. Transnationalism thus may extend its conceptual utility to historical changes. A conceptual full circle may be drawn when applying the concept of transnationalism to the analysis of the Latin American Jewish experience. Its capacity to differentially encompass past and present trends widens its explanatory potential. The original attachment of Jewish life in the region to external centers has been redefined and reshaped through diverse models of interaction while new types have emerged.

Thus, the Jewish world and Latin America as an integral part have always required an approach to communal life and society that is not automatically equated or reduced to the boundaries of a single nation-state. In this sense the current literature on migration and specifically on transnational migration has underestimated the originality-exceptionality of the Jewish case (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2008).

The current questioning of the methodological nationalism that has constrained social theory thus limiting the study of social processes to national societies and states leads us to new outlooks both on current and emerging phenomena (Beck 2000). The focus on the cross-national-frontier realm accounts for a world of multiple identities in which transnational social fields are constructed as places where to dwell and build varied senses of belonging. It sheds light on the permanent structural transnational interactions ethnonational diaspora communities maintain and on the groups that migrate and the relationship they maintain with those who didn't move. The latter, as recently conceptualized, also underscores that immigrants' incorporation into a new state and the permanence and further cultivation of transnational attachments and commitments are not mutually exclusive (Moraswka 2003).

As we direct our attention to the transnational border area it reflects diverse identity building processes. In the case of Mexican immigrants and undocumented workers, new cross identities emerge. While accepted in their new place as workers but still aliens, they simultaneously carry the rejection of permanent residence in their homeland due to economic necessity. Paradigmatic of this twofold situation, alien migrants construct a new identity out of the *bricolage* of their transnational existence. As an ethnic awareness, which, as stated, is the supremely appropriate form for collective identity to take in the age of transnationalism, it arises as an alternative to nationalist consciousness and as a tool to anchor not space but collective identity in those border areas—Anzalduas' Frontera—where political boundaries of territory and identity are ambiguous.

Jewish Mexican immigration to the North is evidently still in need of in depth research. The transnational character of these immigrants and their ethnonational diaspora identity involve the pluralization of homeland(s) and complex dynamics implying original, symbolic or ideological concepts of homeland and attitudes toward new places of residence.¹¹ Ultimately, sources of national identity allow to alternatively negotiating the markers of this identity vis-à-vis the Jewish American and the global world and the Latin American/Hispanic one. Porosity of borders—not only territorial—and primordial identity revivals draw diversified transnational scenarios.

The interplay between identities simultaneously at local, regional and global levels pose indeed deep challenges to the reconstitution of communal life still partly anchored in territorial grounds and partly open to new options, searching for new arrangements required to provide a substratum for identity building related to the increased diversification of referents of collective identification.

¹¹ Guarnizo, Portes and Haller (2003) argue that the main difficulty with the conceptualization in the field of transnationalism as so far has developed lies in the fact that its empirical base relies almost exclusively on case studies.

CHAPTER TWENTY

A REEXAMINATION OF THE MAIN THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF DIASPORAS AND THEIR APPLICABILITY TO THE JEWISH DIASPORA

Gabriel Sheffer

INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS

It is widely known and recognized that at the beginning of the 21st century both the general diasporic phenomenon and specific diasporas are far from vanishing. Quite the contrary, the numbers and varieties of diasporas and diasporans (that is, members of diaspora entities) are growing.

By the same token, as a result of current more favorable cultural, social, political and economic processes occurring in various democratic and democratizing states, it seems that diasporas' and diasporans' influence and impact on their homelands (countries of origin), hostlands (countries where they permanently reside), regional organizations (such as the European Union) and the general international system are rather expanding all over the world. Hence, notwithstanding some negative reactions, mainly generated by hostlands' governments and various social groups in various host countries, including in some "liberal" democracies and societies, diasporas' and diasporans' various capabilities and influence will only continue to be enhanced.

This does not mean, however, that diasporic individuals and entities are totally free to develop and behave in their hostlands strictly according to their own or their homelands' inclinations and interests. Like other none-diasporic minorities existing in diasporas' hostlands, they are under a range of pressures originating in various relevant environments and institutions. As a result of such processes that eventually affect the "quadrangular relationships" between diasporas and diasporans,¹ on the one hand, and homelands, hostlands and other actors, on the other hand, there is a continuous need to reevaluate the past, present

¹ On this issue which is part of a definition of diasporas, see Sheffer (1986).

and future situation of the entire phenomenon in tandem with the theoretical approaches to this vastly significant phenomenon.

Some politicians and academics have realized that, as a result of past and current developments, diasporas constitute a highly intricate phenomenon; moreover, that this phenomenon is becoming even more complicated and that therefore the challenges facing the various existing and emerging diasporas and their homelands and hostlands are mounting. Consequently, there is a growing need for their explanation.

Yet, the prevalent view and position revealed by the general public, by most politicians, and by academics with more theoretical and analytical studies of diasporas, is that all dispersed migrants, actual diasporas and other cross-states human networks are lumped together as one uniform phenomenon.

This habit makes it difficult to understand the different basic natures and behaviors of these entities, and no less difficult to assess the challenges facing them.² This is particularly evident in the academic literature that has been written based on what is known as the “transnational” theoretical approach,³ an approach which will be discussed later in this chapter in comparison with the approach that I call the “transstate” ethnonational-religious diasporic phenomenon which I have helped develop.⁴

Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to present a critical reexamination of what I regard as the two main theoretical and analytical approaches to the study of “transnational communities” and “transstate diasporas.” More specifically, the purpose is to reexamine these approaches’ comparative relevance and contribution to a better understanding of the general and specific people’s dispersal phenomena, and their possible application to the Jewish diasporas. This chapter will reconsider

² Here I must refute what Rogers Brubaker (2005) has commented on one aspect of my and other researchers’ theoretical arguments. In all my many publications on this subject I have never lumped together all dispersed persons. Quite the contrary, I was among the few scholars in this field that have always argued about the fact that the general phenomenon and each diaspora are utterly heterogeneous, and suggested the differentiation between various types of diasporas and diasporans. In fact, this is one of the arguments in this chapter too.

³ On the concept of transnationalism in general and on its applications to diasporas in particular see, for example, Smith (1986); Glick Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton (1992), (1995); Clifford (1994); Lie (1995); Anthias (1998); Vertovec and Cohen (1999); Tambiah (2000); Morawska (2001); Waldinger and Fitzgerald, (2004); Vertovec (2005); Brubaker (2005).

⁴ For this distinction see Miles and Sheffer (1998). On the “transstate” approach see, for example, Brazier and Mannur (2003); Sheffer and Roth-Toledano (2006).

these approaches by discussing their theoretical, analytical, empirical and practical aspects.

In this vein, and as part of these introductory comments, the following are relatively brief distinctive characterizations of these two categories: essentially, the first category—the transnational one—consists of large groups, some of which, but certainly not all members of these entities, regard themselves as forming coherent diasporas. Actually, not all persons who regard themselves or are regarded by others as forming such diasporas, are of the same ethnonational origin and migrants or descendants of migrants. Rather, many of them have in common some other characteristics that in their own perception and in the eyes of outsiders—such as the general publics in their hostlands and worldwide, politicians and analysts—determine their belonging to such entities, which are usually ill defined. Thus, they may have in common religious beliefs and affiliations with certain churches or sects, or the same regional geographical background, or the same language, or even shared ideological beliefs, but not the same ethnonational background. Hence, respectively, groups such as the “Muslim”, “Buddhist”, “Catholic”, “African”, “Latino”, “Arab”, “Francophone”, “Chinese”, probably also the “Greens” and in the past the “Communists” worldwide, can be included in this category. Here it should be noted that these groups are included in this category mainly on the basis of the subjective views of their members and outside observers. My point is that it is important that other dispersed groups should not be included in this category.

Furthermore, a broadly accepted, but a quite problematic, and by now also a contested popular view, which has been held by writers in the field of the study of dispersed “others” and migrants of various types, has been that most of the lumped together dispersed Muslims, Arabs, Latinos, Chinese, Indians, Irish, Jews and many others are members of transnational, or multicultural, or hybrid or borderless globalized entities. However and among other things, by lumping together all such individual persons, their families and their wider social groups, and by stressing the multiplicity and hybridity of their identities and sense of belonging, this view has to a large degree opposed and challenged the significance of these individuals’ and groups’ specific ethnonational identities, their modes of identification and their connections to their old or new countries and societies of origin. According to post-modernist, post-colonial, globalist, transnationalist and hybridist writers and practitioners, such factors characterize and should be applied also to members of the Jewish diasporas. This chapter contests this latter view.

Observations of actual developments and academic studies have pointed out the numerous aspects of diaspora experience—identities, organization, patterns of behavior and ethnonational activities. Moreover, this field also includes “positive” economic roles in hostlands and homelands, as well as political support across boundaries. At the same time, one also acknowledges eventual “negative” involvements in terrorism and criminal activities on behalf of homelands. Against this backdrop, the main argument of this chapter is that great significance should be attributed to ethnonational identities, the background and the connections between various dispersed persons and entities and their actual or perceived ethnonational homelands.

PRELIMINARY DISTINCTIONS

There is an essential need to realize and repeat here that the vastly and rapidly growing numbers as well as the growing variety of dispersed persons and entities further contribute to the vast complexity of both the diasporic and the transnational entities phenomena. Consequently, ancient and historical diasporas, such as the Greek, Armenian and Jewish diasporas, as well as modern and incipient diasporas, such as the Italian and Polish modern diasporas and the Russian and Palestinian incipient diasporas, have both certain similar and different characteristics to what are now regarded as transnational communities or “transnational diasporas,” including, for example, the above mentioned Muslim, African, Asian, Latino, Green and Catholic entities.⁵ Basically speaking, despite certain similarities between the perceived and widely stated meanings of the terms “diaspora” and “transnational communities,” as well as between such concrete entities, there are also certain inherent actual differences between them, between the terms that are used to characterize each of these groups, and the various usages of these terms by politicians, media persons and academic researchers.

In view of the complexity and variety of dispersed groups, very clear distinctions should be made between the veteran/historical, modern and incipient entities. For example, such distinctions should be made between the worldwide general historical Muslim religious dispersal and

⁵ I am using the term “entities” because in the case of these dispersals the term “communities” is quite problematic. Among other things, this is connected to the question of the non-existent borders of these entities. On the borders issue see again, for example, Brubaker (2005).

the various newer Muslim or more accurately Arab ethnonational-religious entities, whose cores mostly maintain their original ethnonational identity and close relations with their actual or imagined homelands. A very similar distinction should be made, for example, between what is called the “Latino Diaspora” and the various South American entities that maintain their ethnonational identities and intensive connections with their perceived and actual homelands.

One of the main differences between those two types of entities is related to the fact that while not all members of the various transnational entities have migrated from their country of origin (this observation applies, for example, to the Muslims, the Marxists in the past and to the Greens these days), all members of diasporas are migrants themselves or descendants of migrants who permanently reside in hostlands.

It is important to note that despite the tremendous increase in their numbers in hostlands, which is created either by various types of migration or by demographic growth, and their greater inclination to separately organize and maintain various ties with their countries of origin, the common tendency of the general public, politicians, media persons and researchers is still to lump together and to treat all transnational entities and actual diasporas as belonging to the same homogeneous category and specific entities. For example, many observers have not paid adequate attention to the fact that not all “others” in hostlands actually constitute organized diasporas. In fact, those others fall into the following sub-categories: tourists; refugees and asylum-seekers; legal and illegal non-organized newly arrived migrants; irredentist groups; members of various transnational entities; and ethnonational diasporans.

Furthermore, clear distinctions should be made between the various types of transnational entities—among others, cultural, religious, ideological and professional entities. On the other hand, as mentioned above, distinctions should be made between various types of diasporas: historical (some of them started already in the ancient period), modern (started in the seventeenth century) and incipient (those who started after world war II and are still organizing).

A further distinction is between state-linked (that is, diasporas’ links with “their” nation-states in their countries of imagined or actual origin) and stateless (that is, links with an ethnonational entity in the country of origin that is not controlled by the same ethnonational group) diasporas. Thus, for example, in accordance with these categorizations, while the Jewish Diaspora should be typified as a historical-state-linked

diaspora, the dispersed Palestinians should be typified as a modern-stateless diaspora.

Furthermore, it should be strongly emphasized again that specific diasporas and transnational entities are very far from being homogeneous communities. Thus, a critical distinction should be made between core and peripheral members of such entities. Core members are all those who emotionally and cognitively cling to the common identity characterizing their entire group, who regard themselves and are regarded as members of such entities, and who, whenever it is needed, publicly identify with the entire ethnonational entity and the country of origin. Peripheral members are those persons who have been fully or partly integrated (but not fully assimilated) into their host countries' culture, society, politics etc., but still maintain their "original" ethnonational identity, even if this identity has become hybridized. These persons also maintain some contacts with their organized groups of brethren in the hostland and with some individuals, organizations and groups in their country of origin. Totally and finally assimilated persons in their hostland societies should not be considered as members of such entities.

As can be pretty easily seen and understood, all these distinctions are stemming from and connected to the very fundamental differences among the members of these entities' assorted identities. This issue will be further dealt with below.

In short, when discussing the nature and main issues facing diasporas and transnational entities at the beginning of the 21st century, one should avoid generalizations and make very careful and clear distinctions between the origins, nature and patterns of behavior of the various types of such entities. As mentioned above, in fact, all human dispersals exhibit characteristics of their identities that partly fit both theoretical approaches and hence there is a need for a "theoretical synthesis approach" to this major question concerning the composition of these entities.

A MORE DETAILED THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

The growing numbers of organized and organizing dispersals and dispersed groups of individual persons and their growing importance in various walks of life in their hostlands, countries of origin and regional and international systems, have attracted the attention of observers

and researchers and have led to a vast proliferation of the literature concerning various aspects of the phenomena. It is not surprising that as a result of this development various interpretations, theories and models have emerged and have been discussed. Nevertheless, again as mentioned above, despite the existence of such multiple interpretations and definitions, essentially there are two main theoretical schools/approaches to the study of diasporas and transnational entities. Now I will elaborate a little bit more on the different meanings of each of these two approaches.

Briefly and generally speaking, for many observers and analysts transnationalism means streams of people, ideas, goods and capital that extend across the borders of national territories and nation-states in ways which are opposed to nationality and nationalism as major, or even the only, sources of identity, identification, economic structures and political arrangements. Most adherents to this approach view all such groups as entirely constructed and imagined entities,⁶ which are espousing imagined deterritorialized identities that are strongly influenced by postmodern, globalized, glocalized and hybridizing environments and processes. The main argument of this school/approach is that dispersed persons who fit that characterization do not maintain actual and perceptual ties with their countries of origins and they exist as totally independent or highly autonomous entities that constitute parts of the new global, globalizing and glocalizing environments. Membership in such entities is conceptually imagined, entirely self-selected and self-determined by each member or by small groups of these entities.

The second approach—the transstate approach—contends that because of their inherent ethnonational identities, their voluntary or forced migration, but nevertheless deeply rooted connections to real or imagined countries of origin, most ethnonational diasporas, including some entities that are called, for example, the Muslim, African, Asian, Latino diasporas, cannot be viewed as “pure” transnational entities. Further to the rather brief but vital clarifications of the two different theoretical approaches to transnational entities and diasporas that have been suggested above, the following are more detailed characterizations of the two phenomena.

⁶ This is of course in line with Benedict Anderson’s approach. Anderson (1991, 1994).

First let me deal with transnationalism. Actually, most adherents to the transnational approach, which has been the more popular approach when dealing with these entities, regard and portray all present-day dispersed persons permanently residing out of their countries of origin as transnational entities (see for example, Tölölyan 1991, 1996; Safran 1991, Vertovec 1997, Butler 2001, Brubaker 2005, Schnapper 2005). They strongly argue that like other existing nations and ethnic groups such diasporas are, to use Benedict Anderson's famous term, "imagined communities" (Anderson 1991, 1994). They also argue that essentially transnational diasporism is an utterly modern phenomenon. This approach is strongly influenced by post-modern epistemological trends, as well as by various actual aspects of globalization, such as current ease of movement from one country to another, migration, modern communication, individualization and spreading hybrid cultures.

The main specific arguments of the transnational approach are pretty well known and therefore the following is not an exhaustive list of their definitions and characterizations, but only the very significant elements. Essentially, the adherents to this approach argue that membership in these entities is based on utterly subjective feelings and decisions of individuals, who, especially when they do not have noticeable physical markers, can relatively easily change their affiliations and loyalties up to the stage of full assimilation into their hostlands' societies; that the main glue binding together these persons, and hence also their entities, is cultural elements; that these entities are constantly changing and therefore both the entities' borders and their history are not so significant; that their social boundaries are very far from being clearly drowned, fixed and stable; that most of these entities and their members who permanently reside in certain hostlands experience continuous processes of cultural hybridization (Werbner 2002a), that cause substantive heterogeneity in the entity at large, and also in smaller sub-groups residing in the same country, region or city; that consequently they tend to either assimilate or fully integrate into their host societies; that memories of their historical and more recent ancestors, or of their "original homelands," are not very significant for their existence; and that the possibility of their return to their homelands is almost inconceivable.

Adherents to this transnationalist approach also argue that the current processes of globalization and glocalization constantly influence and cause major changes in the identity and identification of diasporans. As perceived from the specific viewpoints of the entities' various leaders and members, these changes are either "positive" or "negative."

Thus, on the one hand, globalization processes diminish the numbers of such cohesive entities and make their cultural and social boundaries even less defined and more porous. But on the other hand, due to current sophisticated means of communication, such processes increase the number of members in such entities and enhance their solidarity and connections to their “communities,” or rather to their entities. As mentioned above, one of the main entities that are supposed to fit this characterization is the “Muslim Diaspora.” But there are serious doubts concerning the inclusion in this category of, for example, the “Arab” and “Latino” diasporas.

Generally, it seems that in fact there is a certain decline in the acceptance and application of the transnational approach, and that more scholars are moving again to the other approach—the transstate diasporic theoretical approach (see for example, Braziel and Mannur 2003).

Without any attempt to generalize or to claim that these are utterly homogeneous entities, adherents to this approach argue that a clear distinction should be made between the two types of entities, and that as far as their age, the collective and personal identity of their members, their borders, their organization and their patterns of behavior are concerned, diasporas constitute a perennial phenomena (Smith 1986, Sheffer 1986). This means that although over the centuries certain historical diasporas, which still exist today, such as the Chinese, Indian, Jewish and Armenian, have changed somewhat, in fact these are ancient entities that have overcome many actual as well as more abstract acute threats to their identity and thus to their organized existence. They have survived planned and actual attempts to totally annihilate or assimilate their members—this has been certainly the case of the Jewish and Armenian diasporas. From a different but connected perspective it also means that their members are capable of surviving as distinct groups in today’s globalized post-modern world in which there have emerged some expectations that ethnic minorities and diasporas will totally disappear either through total assimilation or “return” movements to their homelands. This portrayal also applies to modern and incipient stateless and state-linked diasporas, such as Basque, Palestinian, Polish and even some Scandinavian reawakening diasporas in the US.

Furthermore, according to this second approach, the cores of such diasporas are more united and demonstrate higher degrees of cohesion and solidarity than what are regarded as the “transnational diasporas”. This is the case because of a number of factors: the first and foremost

factor is that the identity of many of their members is more built-in and inherent because it is a complex and changing integrative combination of primordial, psychological and instrumental factors (Kellas 1991, Sheffer and Roth-Toledano 2006); there is no tremendous gap between their identity and identification, namely, these days at the beginning of the 21st century such diasporans are not so shy or reluctant to publicly identify as belonging to these entities. Actually, it is becoming even fashionable to do so and behave accordingly; in comparison to the purported transnational entities, diasporans are more widely and better organized; their connections with their real or perceived original homelands are more inherent, constant and intensive; their involvement in their homelands' cultural, social, political and economic affairs, and in the affairs of various hostlands where their brethrens reside, is significant; on various occasions they are involved in conflicts in or pertaining to their homelands and to other states that host their brethrens; and some members of such diasporas consider a return, or they actually return, to their homelands. All these factors apply, for example, to the Irish, Turks, and even Japanese, and of course the Jews (Sheffer and Roth-Toledano 2006).

The most significant feature that determines the similarity between these transstate entities is that their core members as well as some peripheral members of each of these diasporas are of the same ethnonational origin. According to their ethnonational background, own awareness and self-definition, according to the perception of relevant external observers, and according to the fact that their identification with it is either not questionable or not objectionable by the societies and politicians in their host countries, these are persons that very clearly belong, to a certain clear diasporic entity. Here it should be re-emphasized that this applies not only to first generation diaspora members, but also to later generations of historical, modern and incipient diasporas, whether these are state-linked or stateless.

As a result of the growing realization that perceptually and also actually such two types of diasporas exist and therefore distinctions should be made between them, and because of the current extreme complexity of the transstate diasporic phenomenon, it is vital to expand existing short and comprehensive definitions by providing longer profiles of these entities.⁷

⁷ For a profile of these diasporas, see Sheffer and Roth-Toledano (2006, chapter 2).

THE PROFILE OF TRANSSTATE ETHNONATIONAL DIASPORAS:
APPLICATION TO JEWS

The elaborate profile that is presented below deals, among other things, with the questions of the emergence of such diasporic entities, their members' basic identity, their ties across borders, organizational aspects, etc. In accordance with the main purpose of this chapter, in this context I will examine the possibility of applying this profile to the Jewish diaspora.

Essentially and specifically, the profile deals with socio-political formations that are psychologically, conceptually, perceptually and actually united by the same ethnonational, cultural, religious and ideological background factors of their members, who permanently reside as minorities in one or a number of hostlands; with the emergence of such groups as a result of voluntary or forced migration, or as a result of both types of migration from one ethnonational state, or a country of origin, to one or more host countries; with the attempts to create communal solidarity and maintain it; with the solidarity that is an important basis for their cultural, social, political and economic cohesion and activities; with the maintenance of regular contacts with their homelands, whether these are independent states or parts of states controlled by other ethnic groups, and with other parts of the same entity; with the entities' centers and boundaries; with the networks that permit and encourage multiple exchanges of money, remittances, political and diplomatic joint activities for or together with their homelands and other segments of the entities; with the organization of activities in the cultural, social, economic and political spheres; with the fact that these activities create a potential for friction with both homelands and host countries, friction which is related to highly complex patterns of divided, dual or ambiguous loyalty; with the variety of strategies for coping with complex situations, including various degrees of integration (learning to operate within the hostland, but maintaining cultural separation), acculturation (blending into the hostland culture and society), communalism (maintaining themselves as a separate entity), corporatism (having representative organizations which are recognized by the hostlands' governments and social-political systems), autonomism (acting primarily in accordance with their cultural, social, political and economic background and interests) and isolation (going it alone). I will argue that most members of such entities choose a combined communalist and autonomist strategy, typically following the applicable rules of both homeland and hostland.

Following is the ethnonational diasporas profile that I have developed and presented in some of my previous publications, and its application to the Jewish diaspora: *Ethnonational transstate diasporas are formed as a result of both voluntary and imposed migration to one or various host countries.* Until recently the most accepted view of diasporas was that these have been a result of expulsion or extremely hostile political and social situations in their countries of origin. However, this is not true concerning all historical, modern and incipient ethnonational diasporas. Most diasporas, including the Armenian, Indian and Chinese diasporas, and of course also the Jewish diaspora, were created only partly as a result of expulsion and extremely hostile situations in their countries of origin, and to a great extent as a result of voluntary decisions to migrate that were and are connected to factors such as personal economic interest, family and ancestral conditions, cultural perspectives and intentions, and other similar factors.

Moreover, contrary to a widely held view, except for serving as a basis for assessments of whether first generation migrants would return to their countries of origin, and of the nature of their initial contacts with their kinfolk back in the homeland, identifying the reasons for migration from homelands is not crucial for the understanding of the emergence and nature of such diasporas, of their organization and of their behavior in host countries. This is especially true regarding the economic background of such migrants prior to their emigration from their homelands. That is, understanding diasporas and their behavior does not depend on whether at the time of migration from their homelands migrants are rich or poor. This is the case since upon their arrival in host countries both richer and poorer migrants confront, except for their economic resources, similar perceptual and psychological problems and face similar dilemmas regarding whether they are going to stay foot or seek another hostland or return to their homeland. This has been the case, for example, with Russian Jews who migrated to Europe, the US and Canada (Remennick 2007).

Only after arriving in the host country, and in view of the prevailing political and economic conditions there, most migrants make the critical decisions about whether to permanently settle in a host country and join an existing diaspora, or help to establish one. Surveys and polls have shown that upon their arrival in host countries only few migrants are emotionally or cognitively in a position to firmly decide whether they intend to permanently live away from their homelands, and whether they wish to maintain connections with them (Krau 1991). Thus, for example, upon arrival in host countries in

the Middle East or the West, only few Palestinians, who have recently emigrated from Israel or from the Palestinian Authority, have been ready to affirm that they had left forever, that they intended to assimilate or fully integrate into their host societies. These findings explain why, among other matters, the issue of the Palestinians' "right of return" has such an important place in the recurrent peace negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis (Van Hear 1998: 200). Similarly, various studies have shown that only few Jews, Filipinos, and Koreans, who voluntarily migrated to the US, were unequivocal about their permanent settlement there (Magnifico 1988, Gold and Phillips 1997). Furthermore, only relatively few migrants or refugees who voluntarily decided to leave their homelands out of ideological and political reasons, are driven by an a-priori intention to settle, integrate or assimilate into their host societies, on the one hand, or to join and organize diasporic entities, on the other. The Germans who left their fatherland for the US after the failure of the 1848 revolutions, and the Chinese scientists who left mainland China because they had been seeking free environments to conduct their research, provide good examples of this pattern.

The fourth feature of the profile concerns the permanent settlement of ethnic migrants in host countries. Thus, *occasionally migrants leave their homelands heading to a certain host country but actually stay there only temporarily, moving on to other host countries because of local restrictions on their permanent settlement, or because of cultural, economic, political and social difficulties there. In extreme cases they may move to third or fourth host countries, or even return to their countries of origin.* Namely, there may occur secondary or tertiary migrations of the same individuals and families. Recently this was the case with some Russian Jews who, during the last days of the Soviet Union, were permitted to immigrate only to Israel. These Russian Jews regarded Israel as an interim refuge. In fact, their intended final destinations were rather the US, Canada and Australia (Remennick 2007). Other East European migrants, such as Russians, Poles and Ukrainians, constitute other cases in point. Generally, they were heading West, but when they realized that local conditions for example in Germany, France and Britain were difficult, they too continued their agonizing journey to the US, Canada, Latin America, Australia and South Africa.

Only when migrants reach welcoming host countries, where they intend to permanently reside, they begin to consider assimilation, integration, or joining and establishing diasporic entities. Pinpointing this junction in the personal and collective history of migrants is almost critical not only for the proper

understanding of the development of particular diasporas. This is also a crucial element for distinguishing between various types of transient migrants and diasporans. The difference is that those who a-priori do not intend to settle in a certain host country, those who later consider it unfriendly and therefore migrate to another host country, or those who are determined to return to their homelands would not be interested in joining or establishing diaspora communities. These migrants do not face the dilemmas concerning assimilation vs. creating new or joining existing diasporic communities. For them the issue is when to return to their homelands. Such patterns occurred during the large waves of migration at the end of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century. Nevertheless, as is well known, these migrations resulted in the establishment of various contemporary diasporas, such as Greek, Italian and Irish to name only a few diasporas.

Large groups of migrants who established new societies in host countries that eventually gained independence and became nation-states are not included in the ethnonational diasporic category. This is the case notwithstanding the fact that members of such groups may still feel some cultural affinity with their old homeland, show sympathy toward it, and maintain cultural ties with it. The main reasons for excluding these groups from this category is that they either constructed or adopted new identities in their new countries of residence, and consequently their absolute loyalty lies with the new societies and states that they had formed. This amounts to the fact that these individuals and groups regard those countries and states as their exclusive homelands. Thus, although Americans, Australians and New Zealanders of Anglo-Saxon origin have maintained some emotional and cultural connections with England, and French Canadians maintained similar ties with France, yet from every perspective it is extremely difficult to regard these Americans, Australians and New Zealanders as a British diaspora, or these Quebecois as a French diaspora.

Hence, *ethnonational diasporas are those entities that remain minorities in their host countries, and thus are potentially faced with possible expulsion, or with social, political and economic hardships and alienation.* Those who know the history of the Jewish people are fully aware that this characteristic befit very well the Jewish Diaspora. There are, however, some borderline cases, such as the Chinese in Taiwan. Though these Chinese form the majority in that island, they are embroiled in questions concerning their identity, the centrality of Mainland China, their wish for independent sovereignty in Taiwan and consequently their relations with Mainland China. As

the animated debates and political and diplomatic clashes in the late 1990s between Mainland China and Taiwan have shown, these unresolved questions are of clear political nature and the answers to them have interesting theoretical and significant actual political implications for both China and Taiwan.

The readiness and capability of migrants to maintain their ethnonational identity in their host countries and to publicly identify with their communities and homelands are two additional crucial features of the present comprehensive profile of the ethnonational diasporas. While most observers stress the structural, the social and the political environmental impacts on migrants' capability to maintain their identity in their host countries (Gold 1992: 4–14), here the emphasis is on migrants' capability and readiness to take tough decisions that subsequently influence their behavior in their host countries. Hence, *the critical formative stage in the creation of diasporas occurs only after migrants overcome the initial shocks involved in migrating out of their homelands*. Only afterwards they begin to cope with the overwhelming problems involved in permanently settling in host countries—encountering the new cultures prevailing there, confronting the daunting tasks of finding permanent jobs and of renting or buying suitable housing, establishing social relations, and finding adequate and sympathetic support systems. For example, this was the case with many East European Jews who immigrated especially to the US at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries.

When migrants end the initial adjustments and solve the immediate problems involved in permanently settling down in host countries, they face the main dilemma in their new lives: whether to opt for eventual assimilation or maintain their ethnonational identity and integrate into their host countries. In addition to the need to solve this vital personal and group strategic dilemma, this phase requires tactical decisions, especially in view of the migrants' expectations regarding better cultural, economic and political opportunities. These expectations impact their decisions regarding assimilation or full or partial integration. These dilemmas and questions are aggravated when migrants become involved in mixed marriages, or when the receiving societies offer very tempting incentives and rewards, especially if the migrants are ready to give up their old ethnonational identity and undertake the problematic process of intensive integration that eventually may lead to assimilation. At that stage another issue usually arises: how will host societies and governments react to the migrants' inclination to assimilate and integrate?

In some host countries, especially non-democratic states that restrict the arrival and the prolonged sojourn of migrants and guest workers, all the above-mentioned dilemmas and issues are irrelevant. For example, the Korean, Filipino and especially Palestinian guest workers in Kuwait have not been permitted to integrate, certainly not to assimilate, into the Kuwaiti host society. And of course neither were they allowed establishing permanent diasporic entities there. In fact, they were kept at bay as second-class residents (Brand 1998: 107–148, Lesch 1994). Therefore it seems that these guest workers were exempted from dealing with those dilemmas involved in the establishment of organized diasporas. This, however, was not the end of their tribulations. Like the Yemenites in Saudi Arabia and the Egyptians in Iraq, during the Gulf War most Palestinians were expelled from Kuwait and experienced new hardships of adjustment in their old homelands (Van Hear 1993, 1998: 199–202). In certain host countries, the social and political environments may prove to be so hostile that even when there are no formal constraints, migrants find it extremely difficult to entertain the idea of assimilation and integration into the host societies, or of establishing organized diasporas. In any event, the decisions that migrants make at this stage of their residence in their host countries are of crucial consequences for them, for their kin in their countries of origin, and for the host societies and governments.

During the initial period after their arrival in host countries, most decisions concerning the migrants' future strategy and patterns of behavior are taken by individuals or by small groups—nuclear families, extended families, fraternities and associations. This means that these migrants, and their families and associations should be regarded as active social actors. Once again, if one examines the establishment of the Jewish entity in various hostlands and particularly in the US, one can see that this observation fully applies to this ethnonational diaspora.

Migrants base their decisions about their future in their host countries on a complex mix of emotional and rational considerations. This is connected to the observation that their primordial and psychological/symbolic identity compounded by instrumental considerations strongly influence most of their decisions in their host countries. These individual and collective decisions to maintain ethnonational identities are not sufficient for the establishment, revival or maintenance of diasporas. These must be followed by equally critical specific decisions concerning membership in diasporic organizations or, when these do not exist, by decisions to assist in establishing and then operating them. Intensive efforts in this

sphere are essential. Without such organizations, diasporas can neither exist nor thrive in what are basically hostile environments.

Hence, *organization is probably the most vital aspect distinguishing between the various types of transient migrants that stay for shorter or longer periods in host countries and of transnational entities, on the one hand, and incipient and established ethnonational diasporas, on the other.* Yet, usually only certain core segments of each of the ethnonational migrant groups actually become members of such organizations and establishments, or deeply involved in their operation. Because of the new relative tolerance shown toward migrants mainly in Western democratic host countries and in some democratizing states, in certain cases assimilation and substantial integration occur eventually and cause severe demographic losses to incipient as well as to established diasporas and consequently also to the deterioration and even disappearance of their organizations. There is no question that the Jewish diaspora is one of the most organized diasporas. The number of organizations in each of the countries of the Jewish dispersal is pretty substantial. These organizations are active on local and state levels. Nevertheless, now most of all the other established diasporas are also pretty well organized.

As soon as diasporic communal organizations are formed, or as soon as migrants join existing diasporic organizations, they face the need to make additional collective choices. At these junctures, *these persons must decide about the main strategy that they will pursue vis-à-vis their host societies and governments, homelands, other dispersed segments of the same nations and international organizations.* Members of the Jewish Diaspora faced the need for making such decisions before the establishment of the State of Israel. Later, after the establishment of the state, they faced and are still facing such decisions during the various junctures of the development of the state and particularly at various junctures of Israel's relations with the Arab states and the Palestinians in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and in their diasporic hostlands in the Middle East and elsewhere.

The menu of available strategies is large, ranging from assimilation through various modes of accommodation and integration to separation and, in the case of stateless diasporas, to support secession in homelands. More specifically, this spectrum includes the following strategies: assimilation, integration, acculturation, communalism, corporatism, isolation, autonomism, secession, separation and irredentism (Iwanska 1981, Smith 1986, Weiner 1991, Sheffer and Roth-Toledano 2006). Memories about their uprooting from homelands, initial hardships in their new host countries, the need to make critical decisions

about settling there, the compelling necessity to decide whether to refrain from total assimilation, and the efforts migrants invest in establishing and running communal organizations, all result in the rise of solidarity among members of these groups. In other words, *diaspora solidarity is not solely based on ties to homelands, it emerges in host countries and to an extent reflects the diasporans' condition and needs there.*

Based on such solidarity, a degree of cohesion emerges within such groups. Such cohesion is part of the behavior of members of the diasporas' core and of members who have not fully integrated into the hostlands. Again, solidarity and group cohesion are founded on the primordial, cultural and instrumental elements in their personal and collective identities. To ensure the survival, continuity and prosperity of diasporas, these sentiments must overcome generational, class, educational, social and ideological differences and gaps that almost always exist within these groups. Otherwise such diasporas would disintegrate and ultimately dissipate. Without a degree of solidarity and cohesion, their domestic and transstate activities would be almost impossible. Furthermore, identity and solidarity serve as the twin bases for maintaining and promoting constant contacts among the diasporas' elites and grassroots activists. These relations are of major social, political, economic and cultural significance for the diasporas, their host countries, homelands and other interested actors. As many difficult situations that faced the Jewish Diaspora have shown, during such critical situations as the pogroms in Russia in the nineteenth century and the Holocaust, on the one hand, and the establishment of Israel, on the other hand, in the twentieth century, the solidarity of the core and some peripheries have increased considerably and served as the basis for concerted activities by Jewish entities in countries that were not directly involved in these developments.

The traits mentioned in the previous paragraph constitute also the foundations on which diasporas organize, and later implement their strategies and perform their collective activities. A major purpose of these activities is to create and promote the ability and readiness of diaspora members to preserve a continuous interest in their homelands and in constant cultural, economic and political exchanges with them.

The establishment of diaspora organizations and membership in these organizations create the potential for dual authority and consequently also for dual, divided or ambiguous loyalty vis-à-vis host countries as well as toward the homeland. Development of such loyalties may result in conflicts between diasporas and their host societies and governments. The Jewish diaspora

experienced such feelings and hostile reactions especially, of course, after the establishment of the State of Israel.

To avoid undesirable conflicts between diasporas' norms and the norms and laws set by host governments or by dominant groups in those host countries, most state-linked diasporas accept the basic rules of the game prevailing in their host countries. Because of its highly problematic history on most occasions, the Jewish Diaspora is behaving according to this pattern. In this case it is connected to its desire to prevent and avoid clashes with the host country's society and government and to enable some of its members to integrate into the host society without too many problems. At certain periods in diasporas' development, however, actual or alleged dual or divided loyalty, which is generated by dual authority patterns, may create tensions and conflicts between social and political groups in host countries and diasporas. Despite its attempts, the Jewish Diaspora has also experienced such developments. This has been, for example, the situation in most Arab countries after the establishment of Israel and before most of the Jews fled or emigrated from these states.

Under certain circumstances, such tensions lead to homelands' intervention in host countries on behalf of their diasporas, or to homelands' direct intervention in the affairs of "their" diasporas. Israel has tried to do so directly and indirectly, for example with some of the Arab countries and with the Soviet Union before its collapse.

Communal cohesion and solidarity, recurrent problems facing diasporic entities in their host countries, diaspora members' wish to support their homelands, pressures originating in homelands to provide such support, and the sheer bureaucratic logic of diaspora organizations, all may cause *diasporas to become engaged in a wide range of cultural, social, political and economic activities. Diasporas' activities are intended to provide certain basic needs that no other social or political organization can, or wish, to furnish.* There is no great deal of necessity to elaborate on this subject in regard to the case of the Jewish Diaspora in most of their host countries. Numerous Jewish organizations are very active in all these spheres. This applies both to the core members and their organizations as well as to many peripheral Jews and their own organizations on the local, host states and national levels.

Yet, since most members of organized diasporas are citizens of their host countries and enjoy certain citizens' rights there, in certain cases their organizations only complement the services provided by host governments. Once again this too applies to certain Jewish entities in the diaspora especially in host countries where the core group is small

and the peripheral individual persons and families form the majority of the Jews living in such countries. To some extent this applies to the Jewish entity in Britain today (JPR 2000).

Consequently, diasporic organizations function on a number of levels—those of the local diaspora communities, on host countries' societies and governments, and on the transstate level. In this context, of particular practical importance and, therefore, also of particular theoretical and analytical interest, are diasporas' exchanges with their homelands. By the nature of their existence as transstate formations, in addition to activities aimed at sustaining the diaspora communities themselves, exchanges with homelands, and the help that diasporas extend to them, constitute an essential element in these communities' functions.

The conduct of such exchanges is facilitated by the existence of elaborate, sometimes labyrinthine, intrastate and transstate networks. These networks expedite the transfer of significant resources to homelands, to other segments of the same diaspora and to other interested and involved states and organizations outside the host countries. The creation and regular operation of such networks are critical in the lifecycle of all diasporas.

Because of their importance and large range of goals and functions, *these transstate networks may also become a source of trouble for diasporas.* Thus, those networks may cause clashes with various segments in host societies, including other diasporas, and may deeply disturb host governments. For these mechanisms may be regarded as the most blatant expressions of diasporas' dual, ambiguous, or divided loyalties. In extreme cases, the existence of such networks may be perceived as a clear indication that these ethnic communities constitute fifth columns in host countries. This was the case, for example, with members of the German diaspora in the Middle East, including Palestine, and the US, who, on the eve of World War II, joined the Nazi Party and provided the Nazi regime with intelligence and other services. A similar perception was applied to the Israeli Arabs who, in the 1950s, were regarded by the public and authorities as potentially collaborating with Israel's enemies.

However, some of these transstate networks are far from serving only the legitimate and peaceful interests of diasporas and their homelands. In certain cases these nets transfer clandestine information and illegal materials. It is therefore understandable why usually host governments become extremely suspicious of these networks and their operators, for these may indeed serve as conduits of resources for illegal activities, such as international terrorism, for the supply of weapons and for money transfers to combative ethnic groups. The existence of these networks

may also provoke clashes with international organizations such as the UN or Interpol.

As a result of the combination of the above characteristics, *diasporas are predisposed to become locked in conflicts with their homelands, host countries and other international actors.* The likelihood of such conflicts is closely related not only to economic competition with other groups in host countries, or to absolute and relative economic and political deprivation (Gurr 1993). These are frequently caused by cultural subjective factors related to diaspora members' identity and identification. These conflicts are also related to the complex patterns of divided and dual authority and loyalty.

Tensions and clashes involving diasporas and other domestic and international actors win attention in the media and in political circles, and therefore cause damage and grief to all sides. Basically, however, *most state-linked ethnonational diasporas are interested in cooperation with host societies and governments.*

In this vein, *diasporas are capable of significant contributions to host societies' culture and economic well-being. They can serve as bridges between friendly segments in their host societies, on the one side, and their homelands and international actors, on the other.* In short, exchanges through these networks may spur significant cultural, economic, scientific and political benefits to all parties involved (Shain 1999).

CONCLUSION

One of the two main arguments of this chapter has been that despite the proliferation of analytical and theoretical studies of diasporas, there are two very basic approaches to this phenomenon. One is known as the transnational approach. This approach has various nuances and has been and still is quite a popular approach to the field. Yet, it seems that recently it is somehow losing its popularity, while more students of the phenomenon turn to the other approach which I have termed the transstate approach.

As can be seen in the analysis above, this does not mean that I argue that there are no transnational diasporas. There are certainly such diasporas—for example, the Catholic, Muslim, Green and some other such entities. However, those should be clearly distinguished from the ethnonational transstate entities. Essentially, the latter are diasporas whose members are of the same ethnonational origin, and that, first

and foremost, their identity is based on such inherent fundamental factors.

The second principal argument of this chapter is that the Jewish Diaspora belongs to the transstate category of diasporas. Like in certain other cases, in the Jewish case the religious factor should be added to the general characterization of the entity. However, the entity exists because of its inherent ethnonational identity. It is true that culturally and socially some or even many of the Jewish Diaspora's peripheral members may have become more fully integrated into their hostlands and therefore hybridized, but still they maintain their basic Jewish ethnonational-religious identity. Moreover, and once again despite certain changes occurring especially among the younger Jewish generations concerning their identification with their host countries, most Jews maintain certain ties with their homeland—Eretz Yisrael. They may have criticism of the state, they may even have become alienated from the State of Israel, but fundamentally because of their “synthetic identity”, Eretz Yisrael is still an important element in their memories, perceptions and activities.

Finally, since the Jewish Diaspora has become a “normal” diaspora exhibiting many similarities to other ethnonational diasporas, despite some pessimistic predictions about its disappearance in the not too far future, like many other current diasporas in the same category, this ancient entity will survive and its core and some of its peripheries will exist in the foreseeable future.

PART THREE
WORLDWIDE DYNAMICS

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

THE LINGUISTIC LANDSCAPE OF TRANSNATIONALISM: THE DIVIDED HEART OF EUROPE

Miriam Ben-Rafael and Eliezer Ben-Rafael

TRANSNATIONALISM AND LINGUISTIC LANDSCAPE

As discussed in several chapters here, the notion of transnational diaspora is bound to the concept of globalization (Appadurai 2002). According to this view, one can see our present-day global reality as characterized by flows of resources of many kinds, and especially by worldwide waves of migration. What is unprecedented today with respect to these waves of migration is that they take place in a world of direct communication throughout the world, cheap and rapid means of international transport, and real-time omnipresent media coverage. In this context, a transnational diaspora refers to immigrant groups which, unlike the situation in the past, tend to insert themselves into new societies (“hostlands”) without disengaging emotionally, culturally, or even socially from their societies of origin (“homelands”)—or from fellow-diasporans settled elsewhere. Also taking advantage of the opportunities offered by welfare states and democratic regimes, these immigrants are able to build communities where original linguistic and cultural elements can be retained and used (Tambiah 2001). In tandem, these immigrants acquire the local language and norms with the aim of inserting themselves in society. The resulting twofold allegiance can then be described as “dual homeness” to indicate that people are able to live with two societal foci simultaneously and feel belongingness *vis-à-vis* both of them.

A closer scrutiny of these notions however, cannot but unveil a basic difficulty, at least at the semantic level. The notions of “homeland” and “hostland,” indeed hint at essentially distinct kinds of approaches to the countries involved. The feelings for a homeland signify a priori an unconditional commitment. This connotation does not exist with respect to the term “hostland,” that hints at a much more instrumental attitude. On the other hand, this basic differentiation tends to be

confused when one speaks at the same time of “dual homeness,” which equalizes people’s approach to both types of country. This difficulty is hardly underlined in the literature of the field, where a wide agreement presents the model of diaspora as a major factor of multiculturalism in many contemporary societies. As a corollary, it is then emphasized that in such settings, it is more and more difficult to speak of immigrants’ “integration,” into society as this notion inevitably raises nowadays the question of “integration into what?” The notion of “insertion” seems more appropriate by making do with asking more neutrally about the processes and patterns by which groups become permanent components of social settings. Which, however, is not to gainsay that groups which get inserted in new societies without “disappearing” may still undergo major cultural changes (Ben-Rafael 2003). And, indeed, the resulting merging of symbols and cultural patterns from disparate sources is clearly obvious in those “little Italy,” “Chinatown,” “Jerusalem” or “Istanbul” neighborhoods which, more than ghettos, concretize that duality of homeness (see Glick Schiller et al. 1992).

Among markers of that duality, linguistic elements often come first. They include typical keywords, expressions or greetings. In groups strongly oriented toward retaining their culture and language—like the Amish communities in Philadelphia (Kraybill and Nolt 2004), for instance—whole registers, or even a full-fledged vernacular, might remain in use for generations. One may also find, in some communities, cultural centers, temples or churches, and parochial schools, as well as newspapers, magazines, radio stations or TV broadcastings. These efforts do not stop the influence of the environment at the gate of the community: original languages used by members get often overloaded with borrowings from the hostland language, eventually creating kinds of inter-languages (Jacobson 1998, 2001; M. Ben-Rafael 2001, 2004; M. Ben-Rafael and Schmid 2007, Myers-Scotton 1993, 2002). Anyway, the pervasive presence of the official language all around renders rather hopeless voluntary attempts to prevent a shift to the national language among the young, even in the intimacy of the family circle. Such processes bring the borrowing principle to work the other way round as the local language integrates—among fellow-members or relatives—markers borrowed from the original language (Ben-Rafael 2002).

It is in this context that we propose here, as a strategy for investigating the praxis of dual homeness, to delve into this kind of linguistic activity associated with the notion of linguistic landscape—LL. This notion refers to all linguistic objects that mark the public space. It includes all written elements—LL items—found outside private homes—from road

signs to names of streets, shops or schools (Landry and Bourhis 1997, Ben-Rafael et al. 2006a). These items are written but their terseness and straightforwardness brings them close to spoken language, though unlike the latter, they do not automatically or instantly change with audiences. As such, they respond to Durkheim's notion of "social fact" which actors encounter in social reality, at first at least, independently from their individual will and motivations (Durkheim 1964).

These social facts—and not only in the realm of LL—which a diaspora encounters in its new environment cause it to experience unavoidably, cultural and social transformations even when it resists with all its power disregarding its particularism. The influence of the environment may also lead groups to change markers and invent new ones. By this, they still remain "different" from other people around while also getting "different" from what they were on arrival, not only as a reflection of their adjusting to this environment but also by altering the ways in which they present themselves as a distinct sociocultural entity. They are also expected to develop new commitments to people who are now fellow-nationals of theirs, and see in their nation-state a significant demarcation that includes them.

For Landry and Bourhis (1997) and others—like Spolsky and Cooper (1991) as reported by Ben Rafael et al. (2006)—LL "functions as both an informational and symbolic marker, communicating the relative power and status of linguistic communities in a given territory." Landry and Bourhis emphasize the role of LL in language maintenance in the case of Canada for example; Spolsky and Cooper maintain that LL may be strongly influenced by political regimes, as in the case of Jerusalem. One has also underlined the fact, that however *chaotic* the appearance of the general scenery of a specific place's linguistic landscape, it nevertheless remains perceived by the passer-by as a structured space, i.e. as a *gestalt*.

From a sociology-of-language perspective, such a *gestalt* may be seen as generated by given structuration principles—we think here of actors' presentation of self, rational expectations from potential clients, power relations between groups of actors and collective identity (Ben-Rafael 2008). Among these principles, we view the principle of collective identity as being of special relevance in the present context. According to this principle, some LL items may signal, among other meanings, a particular *a priori* relation between the signified (institution or agency) designated by these items and a given group of social actors. This principle, it may be contended, should be salient in LL in these spaces where given groups tend not only to concentrate but also to attach importance to their

allegiance to cultures of origin and homelands. Hence, one should be able to learn about the nature of groups' relation to both present-day environments (hostlands) and countries of origin (homeland) through the molding of such spaces' LL (see Ben-Rafael et al. 2006).

This gestalt, however, may also be given shape by additional forces and motivations. We think for instance, of the power relations between stronger actors who wish to impose given norms to weaker ones, the ways LL actors who wish to promote their goods and adjust their linguistic strategies to the reactions of their clients, at least as far as they can tell about these potential reactions, and last but not least by LL actors' wish to present themselves as embodying status and value, entitled to consideration and respect.

It is in this context that the research presented here aspires to investigate how, and how far, globalization that engendered, together with democracy, a setting that is best described as a form of multiculturalism, expresses itself in a metropolitan urban space—Brussels—that is a major focus of attraction for transnational diasporas from all over the world (Verlot and Delrue 2004, Van Mensel and Mettewie 2008). This was the researchers' primary interest: we wanted to focus on the basic issue of the extent that transnationalism does contribute to the LL of such a metropolitan city representing this major change of our era, that consists of the multiplication of transnational diasporas.

This case is even more interesting, since as we also know that in Belgium, and Brussels in particular, ethnolinguistic entities confront each other on the ground of deep-rooted antagonisms that preceded globalization. With globalization, moreover, English, like in many other countries, was called in to play its part as a *lingua franca* in metropolitan areas where globalization is at its highest. Furthermore, all the more interesting is the case of Brussels as this city is also the declared capital of the European Union, hosting its major institutions, as well as the site of the headquarters of NATO. Hence, the original interest of our investigation of transnationalism and multiculturalism in LL is coupled with this other question of how far these phenomena interfere, at least at this level, with pre-globalization conflicts, as well as with the general development of globalization that imparts new world parts to the English language.

BRUSSELS AS A FOCUS OF MULTIPLE CONTRADICTIONS

In actual fact, Brussels is the capital of four political entities at the same time. It is the European Union's capital which hosts the major European

institutions—the European Commission and Europe’s Parliament—in addition to hosting NATO headquarters. It is also, of course, the capital of Belgium and, as such, the site of the King’s Palace, the National Parliament and governmental ministries—among other national institutions. Beyond this status, Brussels also plays two more crucial roles in Belgium’s structure as a state. That state is a federation divided into three autonomous regions that possess their own regional institutions: the Flemish-speaking region (6 million people) in the North of the country, the French-speaking region (3 million people) in the South, and the bilingual French-Flemish region of Brussels and its surroundings (1 million people, three quarters of whom are francophones) in the central part of the country. While the exact contents of these linguistic definitions are here a matter of permanent dispute, the city of Brussels is, of course, the capital of this part of Belgium which is referred to as “Brussels and its surroundings.” Though, seeing that it is spoken of a bilingual area, Brussels has also been adopted by the institutions of the Flemish region as its capital.

For both symbolic and communicative purposes, each of these attributes implies different linguistic codes or approaches toward linguistic codes. Hence, to be the capital of Europe (25 countries are now members or candidates for membership in the EU) and the site of international bodies requests to give some presence to the wide diversity of languages accepted as official European languages—from English, of course, to Polish or Italian. A pertinent factor here is the thousands of individuals from all over Europe who work here—many as “eurocrats”—in various European agencies and settle there with their families for several years.

To be the capital of Belgium implies French-Flemish bilingualism since both languages are official in this region (Mettewie and Janssens 2007). As the capital of the Flemish region, however, Brussels should also reveal some preferential approach to Flemish which should at least be evinced in quarters or neighborhoods of Brussels with a Flemish majority.

On the top of all these, Brussels is also one of the Western metropolitan cities which, in this era of globalization, are targets for present-day worldwide migratory movements (De Shutter 2001, Janssens 2001). Regarding Belgium as a whole, nearly 10% of the country’s population originates from the outside, some who immigrated from Southern Europe—mostly since the fall of the USSR, from the Muslim world—especially Morocco and Turkey, and sub-Saharan Africa—principally

from the former Belgian colonies of Congo, Rwanda and Burundi. Close to 80% of these migrants concentrate in Brussels where they constitute almost 30% of the population. At the same time, and in the same context, one should also single out the special status of English which, independently from its relative power among Brussels' eurocrats, has gained a strong presence in many areas of Belgians' cultural, social, and media activity. The more important the role of English as for the majority of the Belgian population, the Flemish, there is a kind of taboo against the use of the other international language that might be at their disposal—French (Witte and Van Velthoten 1998).

Research on language attitudes in Brussels and in Belgium has revealed the linguistic tensions taking place, especially between the French and Flemish communities (Mettewie 2004, Persoons 1988). Secondary-school students, for instance, share rather negative attitudes toward the “other” linguistic community and its language. Both sides, in contrast, share positive attitudes towards English (Dewaele 2005, Housen et al. 2000). English is popular as a vehicle of youth culture, and also because it is a neutral lingua franca between the two linguistic communities, and implies no concession to the other language community. As such, English is a language that overcomes the linguistic tensions that dominate the Belgian society (Mettewie and Janssens 2007, O'Donnell and Toebosh 2008).

In this multilingual reality, however, some languages do decline quicker than others. Polish, for instance, tends to be abandoned by its community in the second generation, while Turkish seems to be more efficiently transferred to the young. On the other hand, some small linguistic niches seem to survive with tenacity: this is the case, for instance, of Aramean, a language spoken by Christian Kurds originating from the Eastern border of Turkey-Kurdistan who immigrated to Brussels in the 1980s.

THE RESEARCH SETTING

It is within this complex linguistic reality that the present research aspires to investigate Brussels' LL. In view of the segmentation of Brussels' urban space, the research was conducted in fifteen different neighborhoods. Though some of them were found to present the same LL features and were therefore analyzed together, we were left with

nine different LL profiles discussed comparatively in the following—see Figure 21.1.

The researchers walked around these different areas, and photographed shops, public buildings, road and street signs, offices and so on. They further categorized and analyzed those pictures according to linguistic criteria, i.e. the languages used in naming the different sites, the order between languages, the writing styles and the alphabetical signs utilized. In this chapter, we do not address the differentiation of LL items according to the area of activity and kinds of services that they represent. Naturally, in downtown, governmental, or residential areas, one finds different kinds of shops and agencies: groceries can be more easily found in a residential neighborhood than garage services, and department stores in downtown than in ministerial areas. This being the case, the question which remains inescapable for LL study concerns the nature of the linguistic symbols that structure the public space in the different places, and the general look they grant to this space. It is this aspect that we want to tackle here and it explains why we chose to focus here only on the languages used in LL items, independent of the services and kinds of institutions they represent. Accordingly, the following tables show the share of the diverse languages found in each of the neighborhoods investigated and Figure 21.2 explains the abbreviations used for designating these languages, and specifies the lingual models encountered in investigating the various neighborhoods.

1. The quarter of European institutions
2. The city's two downtown centers
3. Two French-speaking residential neighborhoods
4. Two Flemish-speaking residential neighborhoods
5. The center of one nearby Flemish-speaking town
6. Two Arab-populated areas
7. One African neighborhood
8. One Asian neighborhood
9. One Turkish neighborhood

Figure 21.1 The different areas investigated

<i>Monolingual</i>		<i>Bilingual</i>		<i>Trilingual</i>	
Fr	French	Fr-Ar	French+Arabic	Fr/E/S	French+English+Spanish
Fl	Flemish	Fr/A	French+Asian	Fr/T/E	French+Turkish+English
E	English	Fr/E	French+English	Fr/T/Fl	French+Turkish+Flemish
I	Italian	Fr/Fl	French+Flemish	Fr/Fl/E	French+Flemish+English
A	Asian la. ¹	Fr/G	French+German	A/E/Fr	Asian.+English+French
G	German	Fr/I	French+Italian	A/E/Fl	Asian+English+Flemish
S	Spanish	Fr/T	French+Turkish		
La	Latin	Fr/S	French+Spanish		
Ar	Arabic	E-Ar	English+Arabic	<i>Plurilingual</i>	
T	Turkish	A/E	English+Asian.	Fr/E/ Fl/S	French+English+Flemish+ Spanish
*	Marker ²	Fl/E	Flemish+English	Fr/E/ Fl/T	French+English+Flemish+ Turkish

¹ Chinese, Japanese or Thai; ² Linguistic or non-linguistic added to a language or standing by its own

Figure 21.2 Models of LL items according to number of languages used

THE DATA

The European Quarter

The researchers started their investigation in the quarter of the European Union's institutions. It is a quite dark area, with huge impersonal buildings where one also finds various privately-owned solid agencies, banking institutions, and offices of commercial boards. Few shops and few LL items at all. Despite the limited number of items, a dispersion of models was found here. Half of the items were unilingual, most of them in French, and a substantial number in English. Only a small number shows Flemish alone. Regarding bilingual patterns, the French-Flemish items are the most numerous, while in second place come the French-English pattern. A small minority are trilingual or more (Table 21.1).

Table 21.1 The European quarter (N=25) (%)

Fr	Fl	E	Fr/Fl	Fr/E	Fr/Fl/E	Fr/Fl/E/G	Total
28	4	20	24	12	4	8	100

One would have expected in this area a stronger representation of plurilingualism to symbolize the European construction. This symbolization appears only on two items which are both physically very salient, and use French, Flemish, English and German to indicate (1) an open-air exhibition dedicated to “How Brussels has become the capital of Europe,” and (2) the site of the Parliament of Europe. Besides these two items, what in fact is mainly found is the strong presence of French, coupled with a significant occurrence of Flemish and English.

When compared to other areas in Brussels, one finds here a relatively stronger presence of Flemish rather than other European languages. This underlines that in this area, attention is given to ensuring some status to Flemish while Europe’s multilingualism is confined to a marginal part—besides the role of English. All in all, and as far as LL may say, it seems that the fact that this city is EU’s capital is here of secondary importance.

Downtown Brussels

The second stage of the research led the researchers to Brussels’ central areas. The city has two areas considered as the most central, and they are physically separate. The one, between the Northern and Southern parts of the city, consists of the prestigious Place Louise and surroundings—the first 100 meters of the Avenue Louise, and Boulevard de la Toison d’Or up to the Porte de Namur. The second area is in the Northern part of the city and spreads from the Northern railway station to the well-known Grand-Place and the Stock Exchange (“La Bourse”). This area is less exclusive than the first one, but the researchers did not find genuine contrasts between them regarding their respective LLs. Hence, the data are presented together in Table 21.2.

In both areas, numerous boutiques and department stores are named after international firms—French, Italian, American, German or English. In many cases, the names of the firms stand alone as names of the place, but in other examples, they are sustained by a subtext that may be in various languages or carry some markers. “Longchamps” appears with a drawing of a horse; a well-known French firm with the addition—“Paris”—somewhere on the window-pane. In both areas, one also finds small streets with a large variety of restaurants with their specific signs.

In Table 21.2, we see the dominant role of French and English, and that, in fact, English gets even the first place with respect to the number of items where it appears (about 50%) with French coming

a short distance behind (about 45%). Among unilingual items, English holds clearly the lead. Flemish is outdistanced *vis-à-vis* both English and French. It has a relative importance only when joining French in bilingual LL items. The more paradoxical this result is that Flemish, we must remember, is not only the language of the majority of Belgium, but is one of the two languages of Brussels' official bilingualism. An additional point to indicate at this point that refers to these central areas is the fact that Italian is also present, in the context of the prestige and importance of Italian restaurants.

Table 21.2 Brussels' Downtown Areas (confounded) (N=141) (%)

Fr	Fl	E	I	Fr/Fl	Fr/E	Fl/E	Fr/A	Fr/Fl/E/G	Total
29	3	44	4	10	6	1	1	2	100

French-Speaking Neighborhoods

Turning now to Brussels' French-speaking residential neighborhoods, the researchers walked through two different areas ("La Bascule" and Uccle) which exhibited a similar pattern consisting of a strongly prevailing use of French. The same was found later by the researchers when they investigated a nearby francophone town (Waterloo) which is municipally independent from Brussels but which, in fact, constitutes a suburb of the capital (a boulevard of about 15 km links the La Bascule area to Waterloo). Hence, Table 21.3 presents an integration of the three sites investigated under this title of francophone residential neighborhoods.

One sees here that French alone accounts for nearly half of the items, while English alone comes in second for more than one quarter of the items. Another non-negligible group is made of bilingual French-English items. All other formulae are marginal, and Flemish is almost absent from the scene. We have, it is true, a presence (10%) of other languages—Italian or Spanish—but it concerns mainly restaurants and cafés.

Table 21.3 Francophone Neighborhoods (La Bascule, Uccle and Waterloo) (N=210) (%)

Fr	E	S	Fr/Fl	Fr/E	E/Fl	Fr/S	Fr/Fl/E	Total
46	28	1	6	14	1	1	3	100

Flemish Areas

Flemish neighborhoods were next. Following the example of the francophone neighborhoods, the researchers initially thought that they would not find major differences between the small Flemish quarters like Linkenbeck and Saint Pieters-de-Leuw which are a part of Brussels' space, and more important nearby Flemish towns like Leuven. The data, however, showed different pictures (Tables 21.4a and 21.4b).

In the two Flemish quarters, the official language is Flemish but because they belong to Brussels' space, French should, in principle, also be present on LL items as it is recognized that French-speaking inhabitants may count here a substantial contingent of the population. What one sees here (Table 21.4a) is that Flemish takes the lead for unilingual items, while the Flemish-French bilingual model accounts for nearly half of the items. English, in contrast, is almost absent, possibly because of the provincial character of these quarters, in the city's periphery. A reflection of the linguistic tensions in the area: on the two street signs of the areas photographed, one sees anti-French graffiti as well as scribble of French inscriptions.

When it comes to Leuven (Table 21.4b), a town that fully belongs to the Flemish area, despite its closeness to Brussels, Flemish is definitely the leading unilingual model (nearly half of the items) followed by English (more than a third). French is almost completely absent from this town's LL, which clearly shows the significance of the French-Flemish divide in Belgium.

Table 21.4a Flemish Quarters of Brussels (N=29) (%)

Fr	Fl	E	I	Fl/Fr	Fr/Fl/E	Total
4	31	7	3	48	7	100

Table 21.4b A Flemish Town near Brussels (N=76) (%)

Fr	Fl	E	I	A	Fl/Fr	Fr/E	Fl/E	Total
7	43	36	3	1	2	1	7	100

The Arab-Muslim Neighborhoods

From there the researchers went to look to a further, relatively new, segment of the "heart of Europe," i.e. the Arab-Muslim population.

This segment too can be traced on the geo-linguistic map of Brussels. Here, the researchers investigated two different neighborhoods: one, Chaussée de Gand, which lies a few kilometers from the central area, and another, Boulevard Lemonier, midway between the city's two central areas. The data are presented together since no essential difference was found between the two areas investigated.

The findings of Table 21.5 show that French holds the lead regarding unilingual models, which is not detached from the fact that for numerous North Africans, French was the language of the French colonizer and was well known before they settled in Belgium. On the other hand, the leading model in both neighborhoods consists of French-Arabic bilingualism (nearly half of all items). Moreover, even among the unilingual French items, many carry Arabic markers such as Arabic names (“*Chez Hussein*”) or Muslim notions (Halal) in French. We have here also a presence of English jointly with Arabic, and in fact even—in a few cases—with other languages. Flemish, in contrast, has only a weak presence here, which may be related to francophone pressure on this “bilingual” territory where francophones are the vast majority all around.

Table 21.5 Arab Neighborhoods in Brussels (N=51) (%)

Fr	E	Ar	Fr/FI	Fr/E	Fr-Ar	E-Ar	Fr/E/FI/S	Total
27	2	6	6	2	43	12	2	100

The Sub-Saharan (African) Quarter

Another segment which is a part of the city and is not of negligible interest is the African quarter. This quarter is situated on the edge of one of Brussels' busiest areas, La Porte de Namur, less than a kilometer from the prestigious Place Louise.

Table 21.6 The African Neighborhood (N=78) (%)

Fr	Fr*	*	E	E*	Fr/FI	Fr/E	Fr/E*	FI/E	Fr/E/ FI	Fr/E/ FI*	Tot
27	36	3	6	5	4	10	5	1	2	1	100

The overwhelming majority of the Africans in Brussels, it should be recalled, originate from francophone countries. It is no wonder then that French dominates LL unambiguously. Of no less interest is the extent to which—through that widespread presence of French—one

also observes the importance of African markers. Some of them are linguistic, like African names, the word Africa itself, or associated notions in the names of shops. Others are graphic decorations of LL items like a palm tree, the sun, an African boat, drawings of black women, maps or drums. Still others are figurines, posters or photos. These markers are indicated by (*) in Table 21.6. Markers may also be used to indicate the nature and origin of goods offered—Congo, Burundi and the like—or the specialty of the shop such as *hairstyling for African women*. All in all, we find about half of the items bearing African markers—principally with French—while on the other hand Flemish is at its weakest here.

The Asian Quarter

Another quarter is populated by Asian businesses—Chinese, Vietnamese, Thai and Japanese. It is situated at the very center of Brussels—in front of the Stock Exchange, in a small street linking two centers of touristic and commercial interest (rue Sainte Catherine). This street is itself a touristic attraction as it offers several dozen Asian restaurants and shops over some two hundred meters.

Table 21.7 The Asian Quarter (St Catherine) (N=22) (%)

Fr	Fl	E	A	A/E	A/Fr	Fr/Fl	A/E/Fr	A/E/Fl	Fr/Fl/E	Total
5	14	14	9	18	9	9	14	4	4	100

This street, more than any other neighborhood in Brussels, attests to the predominance of English (nearly 60%) (Table 21.7). On the other hand, there is also a strong presence of Asian languages here (about half of LL items). These languages appear jointly or separately, while French takes only third place, alone, in conjunction with the former, or with Flemish (about 40% in total). Flemish in fact appears through a variety of models in a good third of the items.

The Turkish Neighborhood

Finally, the researchers walked through the Turkish neighborhood which is also close to downtown. As shown in Table 21.8, in contrast to the former neighborhood, French again holds here the lead with a large majority of items, many of which also carry Turkish markers. Many others combine French and Turkish. Turkish alone holds the

third rank, while some English items also appear, attached to Turkish markers. Flemish, on the other hand, is almost non-existent here while the Turkish-community dimension appears to be of the strongest importance—by the use of Turkish or of markers.

Table 21.8 The Turkish Quarter (N=89) (%)

Fr	Fr*	*	E	E*	T	Fr/T	Fr/Fl	Fr/ T/E	Fr/T/ Fl	Fr/E/ Fl/T	Fr/I	Total
8	20	2	8	3	10	37	6	2	2	1	1	100

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS: PREVAILING PATTERNS

Table 21.9 summarizes our findings by comparing the neighborhoods and areas investigated. These findings are relevant to, and throw some light on, the discussion of the four aspects considered at the start of this chapter, namely the ethnonational linguistic quarrel that divides Belgium and, primarily, the country's capital, Brussels; the impacts, at least on its LL, of this city's status as the heart of Europe; the influence of globalization on Brussels as a metropolitan urban space; the impact—at least as far as LL can say—of the settling of transnational diasporas in this space. At this point, moreover, we can also try to consider how the latter aspect—which was at the center of the researchers' interest from the onset—interacts with the other ones, i.e. the Belgian linguistic quarrel, Brussels' evolving as the capital of the European Union, and its exposure to globalization.

Table 21.9 The Uses of Languages in LL Items in Brussels Compared (%)*

Neighborhoods or quarters	French	Flemish	English	Ls of origin and/or markers
European Union	76 (28)	40 (4)	44 (20)	8 (-) ¹
Downtown	48 (29)	16 (3)	53 (44)	(-) ²
French residential	70 (46)	10 (-)	46 (28)	(-) ²
Flemish resident.	59 (4)	86 (31)	14 (7)	(-) ²
Flemish town	10 (7)	52 (43)	44 (36)	(-) ²
Arab	80 (27)	2 (-)	6 (2)	61 (6) ³

Table 21.9 (*cont.*)

Neighborhoods or quarters	French	Flemish	English	Ls of origin and/or markers
African	85 (27)	8 (–)	30 (6)	50 (3) ⁴
Asian	41 (5)	31 (14)	54 (14)	54 (9) ⁵
Turkish	77 (8)	9 (–)	14 (8)	77 (12) ⁶

* The numbers in the columns indicate the percentages seen in the previous tables aggregating the total number of uses of given languages in the LL items of the given neighborhoods or areas—including the number of times that they are used alone and in combination with other languages. The numbers in brackets indicate the number of LL items where these languages appear alone.

Notes

¹ Percentage of use of an additional language (German) on EU institutions

² A few languages appear here as isolated examples (mainly Italian), amounting to less than 1%

³ All cases refer here to Arabic

⁴ All cases refer here to markers under the form of names, symbols, figures, or explicit reference to Africans

⁵ All cases refer here to the use of Chinese, Japanese, Thai or Vietnamese

⁶ All cases refer here to Turkish and/or markers whether in French or under a non-linguistic form

Regarding the linguistic quarrel, what this research found and confirms is that despite the official bilingual status of Brussels, French has clearly imposed itself as the privileged language. This clearly appears when comparing the French residential neighborhoods to the Flemish ones and one sees how far French is relatively more present in Flemish areas than the other way round, which is still amplified in downtown areas. This is best explained by the overall position of strength of the French-speaking population in the city as a whole. French, however, is clearly confined to the margins in the Flemish town investigated outside the borders of Brussels itself. Hence, this research confirms the reality of power relations between the contending parties, and the acuity of the conflict. One area where these power relations receive a distinct expression is the quarter of the European Union institutions. Table 21.9 shows here how far Flemish is reduced to a secondary role, even though one does find a substantial number of LL items with Flemish (especially when added to French) denoting a willingness to avoid an over-polarized situation.

What is quite obvious in the latter respect, is that by no means can one maintain that the plurilingualism of the European Union has an impact on the special quarter allocated to its institutions, let alone on the city's LL as a whole. Besides a small role imparted to German on a couple of LL items, one finds negligible propensity to allow, let alone to encourage, a linguistic variety that would relate to and symbolize Europe's diversity as a framework of life for the residents of its capital. Brussels, seemingly, is too absorbed in its own inner linguistic problems.

However, these problems do have consequences on the ways Brussels endeavors globalization and its linguistic influence. English, indeed, enjoys here special status and its penetration is strongly visible in LL. Downtown Brussels, it was shown, positions the language in first place, even before French: it is the language with the highest rate of participation in LL items there, both as a whole and in unilingual items. Even in French-speaking residential neighborhoods, English's presence is strong—although behind French. This position is comparable to its role in the Flemish town and it weakens only in Brussels' Flemish quarters where French seems to take over, to a certain degree, the role of the non-local language. All in all, what does appear here is the fact that French-speaking people here who control a language with relatively wide diffusion world-wide—French—are still perceived by LL actors as responsive to the appeal of English, and that the same is true of Flemish-speakers outside the capital. In either case, globalization as expressed in LL through the use of English is a component of the evolution of this setting, its local ethnonational linguistic quarrel notwithstanding. And maybe under the pressure of this quarrel: as shown by the data, English functions as a “neutral” code in both French and Flemish areas, and this perhaps encourages both populations to use it without paying the “price” of addressing the “other” in its language, or imposing on it the use of one's own.

However complex this reality, what does not simplify it is the phenomenon that this research has evinced and which takes on multiple facets and singular forms; namely, the phenomenon of multiculturalism. It appears, and this is evinced as a whole by Table 21.9, that Brussels is a city segmented by additional divisions. This research focused on four such segments and showed the importance of languages of origin and markers regarding each of them. Arabs, Africans, Asians and Turks exhibit, each group in its own quarter or neighborhood, an abundance of signs that demonstrate its singularity and assumes its velleity to stick to this distinctiveness. Beyond this point, one also sees that as far as

LL can tell, LLs referring to three out of four populations tend to ally ethnic languages and markers to French, to the detriment of English and mainly of Flemish. The Asian quarter is an exception here, which can be explained by the fact that, more than the other neighborhoods, it consists of a street of restaurants and typical Eastern Asian businesses turned toward tourism, at the very center of the city. Firstly, this explains the stronger presence here of English. In the same context, one may also hypothesize that the status awarded to Flemish in this neighborhood is possibly accounted for by tendencies to maximizing benefits—by refusing to disregard the potential attraction that Asian restaurants, groceries and art galleries may have for Flemish passers-by.

As for the three other neighborhoods—Arab, African and Turkish—it seems that one sees here a pattern which allies the expression of particularism and the velleity of retaining it with a concomitant endorsement of the dominance of French as the language of the stronger party on the wider scene of the city of Brussels. This pattern should account for the poor scores of Flemish in these neighborhoods' LLs. In addition, the fact that English is not doing as well here as elsewhere in the city may relate to the fact that it is spoken by population groups which—more than the Asians—are widely characterized by lower levels of income and educational attainment. This means in practical terms that English is here much less known—and seemingly less appealing—than in many other neighborhoods of Brussels. People who enjoy less human capital risk enjoying less freedom for acquiring cultural and linguistic resources and thereby remain more aloof than others from the mainstreams of social exchange.

It is also revealed here that each diaspora may illustrate a profile of its own according to the circumstances and resources available to its members. The more general rule that one learns from these findings is that acculturation to the dominant culture and endorsement of its central symbols may be concomitant with velleities for, and actual, retention of distinctiveness and cultural and linguistic continuity.

These analyses of the four cases of diaspora considered against the background of Belgium's ethnonational linguistic quarrel, Brussels' status as the European Union's capital, and the city's exposure to globalization also illustrate how diasporas can impact on basic and structural aspects of their hostland. In our cases, we have seen that while one case of diaspora appears as more or less balanced *vis-à-vis* the Belgian linguistic quarrel, in the context of its resources and mobility perspectives, the other three cases definitely strengthen the party of the stronger, the francophones, at least at the level of the city and its surroundings.

As such these diasporas constitute actors which have an influence on the wider local, even the national, scene—even if this importance is not directly linked to their practical and specific interests.

On the other hand, another aspect that comes to mind when considering the data of this investigation concerns the dissociation of the possible impacts of such actors on the establishment of a multicultural setting, on the one hand, and their role in globalization, on the other. These diasporas, indeed, implement a new multicultural reality in Brussels by the very fact that they build up communities on the ground of symbolic materials of their own. On the other hand, some of them are forces of reticence that slow down the expansion of other aspects of globalization, and especially the expansion of English in Belgian society. What explains this discrepancy between two dimensions of globalization is the mode of insertion of diasporas in the setting—whether at middle range, higher levels, or lower levels. Hence, while the ethnonational linguistic quarrel tends to strengthen cultural-linguistic globalization in the form of the expansion of English, the multiplicity of diasporas may result in some slackening of this expansion in certain layers of the social reality.

In conclusion, and this seems to merit further theoretization, it appears that in a conflictual multicultural society like Belgium, collective identity is of primary importance in LL; that power may come up as both to impose some patterns and to prevent the appearance of others, both from groups directly involved in these relations and from others which are not involved but are influenced by those who are; and finally that globalization, as conveyed by English, is a factor that plays a major role in conflictual multiculturalism, even where it is not the first language of any group in presence.

More generally, the sociological analysis of LL offers the opportunity of outlining how well-known principles of social life mold together a specific social scene of major importance. What happens here cannot be entirely foreign to what happens in other arenas, and in this respect, LL is but one more example of the making of social reality under diverse, uncoordinated and possibly incongruent principles. It is a perspective that may be helpful in seeking some “regulating mechanisms” that might exist in this set of numberless items, beyond its appearance as a jungle of jumbled items. An approach which by focusing on the potential variations of LL configurations, wishes simply to account for LL’s constituting, after all, a quite “ordered—and not so unusual—disorder.”

CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

MUSLIM TRANSNATIONALISM AND DIASPORA IN EUROPE: MIGRANT EXPERIENCE AND THEORETICAL REFLECTION

Nina Clara Tiesler

Across academic literature, at least within the social and political sciences, Muslim populations in Europe are increasingly being described as *diasporas* and/or as communities and groupings of “transnational character.”¹ These are concepts which do not occur in traditional Islamic theological or legal debates, yet they are also becoming more common as self-perception *among* Muslims, as well as in politicized discourses *about* Muslims. Against the background of interview samples and field experience among “transnational” Muslim people, this chapter describes discursive tendencies on the topic of “Muslim transnationalism” and diaspora (nowadays used in senses detached from religious relevance)² within social science, and examines the contributions of two leading Muslim authors who position the situation of Muslim minorities by means of the language of that discourse.

The observation that this meta-language differs from the self-perception of the subjects concerned may appear trivial at first. It does not

¹ The original train of thought of this chapter had been developed as early as 2004, and thus was able to benefit from scholarly discussion in very diverse academic contexts, among them the panel on Transnational Religions (organized by Ramon Sarró) at the Luso-Afro-Brazilian Social Science Congress (Coimbra, Portugal, 2004), the conference on the Role of Social Sciences Part I at the Heinrich-Böll-Foundation (Berlin 2004), and later in a session of the postgraduate/postdoctoral colloquium on contemporary Critical Theory supervised by Detlev Claussen (University of Hanover). I want to express my deep gratitude to those participants who provided inspiring comments, as well as to the editors of this volume, Eliezer Ben-Rafael and Yitzhak Sternberg for their kind invitation and patience. While writing this chapter and trying to respond to the theme of their book, it helped a lot that the main arguments and parts of the text had formed a journal article which was recently published in German (Tiesler 2007a), and had received further comments.

² On the proliferation of the term “diaspora,” see Baumann (2000): “The semantic broadening of ‘diaspora,’ both in terms of relating it to any dispersed group of people and to conceptualize a certain type of consciousness, have made it one of the most fashionable terms in academic discourse of the late 20th century.” (Baumann 2000: 325).

at all point to a “Muslim particularity,” but rather to the weight that educational middle-classes (here: the educated and educating) in general have in processes of the construction of collective subjectivity (Hroch 1978, Siems 2007). Instead, what makes this dynamic interesting is the fact that here representatives of a new generation of European-Muslim intellectuals³ are analyzing the new social conditions and experiences of a culturally and ethnolinguistical heterogenic religious minority not through conventional Islamic-theological and legal categories, but through a secular discourse language and its conceptual creations of transnationality and diasporicity.⁴

Such reflections spread and echo rapidly in virtual and public discourses, of course including Muslim discourses.⁵ Interestingly, an opposite tendency (from secular to religionized terms) can be observed in “non-Muslim” discourses. Public debate and some contributions in social and political sciences (which up until the early 1980s had explicitly distanced themselves from questions of religion) and which recently are more concerned with topics related to Muslims in Europe, are partly inclining towards a “culturalization,” “religionization” and “Islamicization” of their categories and debates. Socio-economic and political aspects, gender, religion and culture are rarely differentiated when it comes to Islam and Muslims.

Muslims and their cultural attitudes, eventual socio-political engagement and social mobility, are hardly ever discussed in a comparative and non-normative context, i.e. compared in relation to similarities rather than contrasts with non-Muslim minority and majority groups of the same age, gender, class, migratory and/or educational backgrounds. In terms of analysis, this deficiency often leads to a disproportionate “Islamicization” of the subject (Muslims), and strengthening of the

³ Mandaville (2003: 130f) describes developments within Muslim intellectual activity in Europe, with particular regard to those thinkers and activists concerned with the politics of Islamic identity and community in Europe. Through the reconciliation of day-to-day realities of European life with religious principles, their work is appealing to the “second generation” of Muslims who were born and raised in Europe. Many of them are highly educated and seek to fashion a critical and sophisticated idiom of Islam.

⁴ As one characteristic of what he conceptualizes as “new” Muslim transnational networks in Europe, Nielsen (2003) highlights forms of interaction with realities and institutions external to the Islamic world. Academic institutions in Europe surely belong to this category.

⁵ This dynamic of academic discourse languages being transmitted more rapidly to public debates and adopted by the media, certainly increased with new communication technologies, but its roots lie in the aftermath of 1968 (Claussen 2000b), when more academics became journalists, and journalism started requiring a broader academic education.

Islamicization of public (and academic) discourses:⁶ in short, nearly everything and anything these Muslims do, think, affirm or negate appears as deriving from their Muslim-ness, i.e. as an Islamic particularity, which may in fact not be the case at all. Economic and social aspects, class, gender and educational background, the impact of particular experiences in a specific historic context (e.g. social mobility or social exclusion in a European society) as well as similarities and continuities with non-Muslims or people of similar migratory experience are therefore often overlooked. In this general discursive context a strong attachment to Islam is often wrongly presented as opposed/apart/alien to the dominant culture or to active Western citizenship.

Within comparative studies of religion, there is widespread consensus on the notion that the observation of religions and the formation of theories of religious history impact on cultural processes⁷ as well as a growing “awareness of discursive structures where Comparative Studies of Religion encounters its subject matter” (Seiwert 2003). The same is overwhelmingly valid for social science disciplines, and the motivation of this chapter is to demonstrate how dominant discourses can influence the development process of their research subject.

DISCOURSES ON MUSLIMS IN EUROPE

Although immigrants, postcolonial people (Sayyid 2006: 1–10), and later refugees from predominantly Islamic societies had been moving and settling in European countries since the end of World War II, prior to the mid-1980s their religious affiliation only attracted the attention of a few sociologists of religion and church representatives (Nielsen 1992: 2). To a far greater extent than the presence of people who represent other non-Christian religions (such as Hindus and Sikhs), Muslims in Europe have further featured in nearly all discourses and social-science research perspectives dealing with migration throughout the past 30 years. Most scholars who had initiated their research on Islam and Muslims before September 11, seem to be aware of the imperative of self-critical reflection *in* academia regarding the consequences of this

⁶ This is elaborated in Tiesler (2006: 124–172). See also Allievi 2006.

⁷ Nehring (2005: 46) recognizes this awareness already in Wilfred Cantwell Smith, whose significance in postcolonial cultural debate he discusses by critically confronting Smith’s concept of a ‘world theology’ with the self-positioning as a discipline of comparative study of religions.

turning-point *for* academic research. Political and public discourses, as well as the situation of Muslim minorities who are the subject of our discussions have changed (most visible in urban contexts).

While the turning point(s) of 1989 (end of the Cold War, the Rushdie Affair, the first French Headscarf Affair) and global political events in the early 1990s (“Religious Revival,” Bosnia, Saddam in Kuwait) caused new research interests in a previously rather marginal field, there is no doubting the fact that September 11 and the new historical context marked by the “War on Terror” brought a massive explosion of public and academic interest in phenomena seen as related to Islam. The monitoring of Muslims and their community life, especially in minority contexts, is now frequently officially announced as of “prime interest” by politicians, in the media and by intelligence services. Noticeably more research funds regarding the subject “Muslims” are channeled to academia. This does not necessarily mean that the sudden increase of research activity has led to an explosion of scientific knowledge about the subject in question, as far as it concerns the *experience of Muslims* in contemporary societies in this specific historical context, or insight into *lived Islam* and *Muslim community life*. Rather, the entanglement of political interests under the heading of “security” with the increase of research interest and possibilities, often leads to a mutual production of a hegemonic language which tends to determine the research questions in dominant discourses.⁸

The notion of “radicalization” is only one example of this dynamic, wherein academic reflection at the “meta-level” often tends to lose connection to its fundamental ground: field experience and empirical data. The distance to the subjective experience of the individuals and collectives in question becomes obvious when new tendencies towards

⁸ In his revealing essay, “With Us or Against Us: The Rhetoric of the War on Terror”, Yahya Birt offers an analysis of this rhetoric to see what it seeks to persuade Muslims to do, what its unspoken premises are, and which categories it uses to mobilize Muslim sentiment: “After 9/11, there has been a shift in the cultural representations of Muslims towards more direct political themes and the use of terrorist violence. In particular, there has been the emergence of a shared political rhetoric, particularly between Washington and London that is central to the ‘war on terror’”. Birt distinguishes between a crude form of rhetoric in the “war on terror”, which is summarized as “Islam *versus* the West” or “the clash of civilizations”, and which, because it generally serves to antagonize Muslims, is not commonly used, on the one hand, and a sophisticated form of the “war on terror” rhetoric on the other: “The sophisticated form argues that while suffering is found everywhere and is constant, only Muslims are highly likely to be involved in terrorism. [...] This sophisticated argument [...] replaces the crude form of ‘Islam *versus* the West’ with the more sophisticated form ‘Islamism *versus* Americanism’” (Birt, download 02/2007: <www.yahyabirt.com/?p=57>).

Islamic piety, the engagement of Islamic NGO's in developing countries, social movements of Muslims and the strengthening of public Islam in Western societies, new urban youth subcultures, the emergence of identity discourses which promote and are witness to a global "awakening of Muslim subjectivity" (Vakil and Sayyid 2006), or political responses and mobilization among Muslims against discrimination—are all easily interpreted as "evidence" for a general trend which will justify the framing of research on Muslims (and, in the worst case, the production of its results) under the hegemonic concept of "radicalization."

Within this context, the attribute "transnational" has partly changed connotations as well. While critical academic transnational approaches contributed to the insight that international migrants and their communities are no longer to be seen as "anomalies, but as representative of an increasingly globalized world" (Al-Ali and Koser 2002: 3), the rhetoric of the "War on Terror" tends to revive a negative connotation of transnationalism (now suggesting a threat) when it comes to Muslims.

However, with particular regard to the scholars who already contributed to the field before September 11, empirical social science and Islamic studies provide today a wide range of studies on the topic of Muslims in Europe.⁹

During the 1980s and 1990s, the main concern of scholarly work on Islam and Muslims in Europe was with the institutionalization of Islam. The aim was to understand the place that Muslims, and thus Islam, were obtaining, in the public space of Western societies, including the legal status of Islam (e.g. Shadid and Van Koningsveld 1991, 1996, 2002; Metcalf 1996). Apart from an ongoing interest in "religious change", Islamic education and the role of social agents (e.g. women, youth, artists), another line of inquiry has been developed quite recently: it is influenced by new topics in the study of social and cultural phenomena, namely theoretical developments in transnational and diaspora studies. In interpreting migration and globalization issues, these theories have also been applied to Muslims and Islam. Groundbreaking works are by

⁹ While Gerholm and Lithmann 1988 and Nielsen 1992 constitute the first comprehensive survey texts on Muslims in Europe which contain contributions by scholars of disciplines explicitly concerned with religion, it seems most appropriate to mention (here in chronological order) a selection of discursively influential works which deal with the situation of Muslims 'in the West' and which feature, along with Islamic Studies experts, largely scholars from the social and political sciences (sociologists, anthropologists etc.): Shadid and Van Koningsfeld 1991; 1996a; 1996b; 2002, F. Dassetto 1995, Abulmaham 1995, Kepel 1996, Metcalf 1996, Nonnemann et al 1996, Vertovec and Peach 1996, Vertovec and Rogers 1998, Rath et al. 2001, Hunter 2003.

Mandaville (2001), Roy (2004), Allievi and Nielsen (2003), Grillo (2004) and Bowen (2004). Such perspectives try to map out the dimensions in contemporary Islam and Muslim people in Europe that cross the borders of the nation-states and citizenships.

Transnational Islamic movements, such as the Tablighi Jamaat, the networks of Muslim migrants, and the day-to-day construction of the *umma* (Global Islamic Community) are just three examples that reveal how pertinent is the metaphor of transnationalism for interpreting contemporary Islam, and how it is lived and featured by Muslims in Europe. Importantly, these works mostly suggest a distinction between *Transnational Islam* (including schools of thought, networks, and discourses that explicitly refer to global Islam and Islam as a system and religion) on one hand, and the day-to-day experience and practice of people who are Muslims and who happen to have migration experience in their family history, on the other (e.g. Al-Ali 2002, Salih 2002, Bryceson and Vuorela 2002). Naturally, and probably needless to say, the quite diverse transnational links, experiences and practices of the latter cannot necessarily be seen as a kind of “Muslim particularity” and even less as specific “Islamic practice.” Proposals that contribute to the question of what transnationalism actually means for the people who live it, are mainly based on ethnographic research provided by social and cultural anthropologists.

MUSLIM TRANSNATIONALISM AND DIASPORA: BRIEF IMPRESSIONS FROM THE FIELD

Over the last 15 years, approximately, scholars of migration who endeavored to study minorities defined by religion, culture or ethnicity more often than not felt moved by the dominant discourses to frame their line of research within the respective current concepts of the day. In Europe, one of these since the 1990s was “The Self and the Other”; soon after followed by the so-called “religious revival,” and, increasingly from the late 1990s on, ethnicity, diaspora, “collective identities” and transnationalism. Inspired by theory-determining discussions on the concepts of diaspora, transnationalism, and constructions of collective identities, after the first conversations¹⁰ conducted in the field I soon

¹⁰ The conversations focused primarily on the appropriateness of the diaspora concept for Islam and later on ‘concepts of space and belonging’ of Muslims in Europe, with particular attention to the Portuguese case. They were held as part of

began to doubt whether the daily life experience of my conversation partners really was that of a member of, say, a *diaspora* or *transnational community*. This was in addition to the fact that only very few of my original conversation partners used such concepts to refer to themselves or expressed their subjective experiences by means of the categories of an academic discourse language.

Among the determinants of their daily life and their reflections on it, there was little or nothing recognizable of the “forms of consciousness” nowadays described as diasporic¹¹ or transnational—unless one applied a particularly wide definition of those concepts, which allowed for a nearly arbitrary selection of decisive criteria. The outcome depended highly on the interviewee’s level of education: less Islamic community leaders and more educated middle-classes were of course familiar with such non-Arab and non-Islamic concepts, although they—just like non-Muslim academics—often received them with varying connotations. For reasons sometimes similar, sometimes very different, most of them promptly declined to apply diaspora or transnationalism to “Islam” or their communities.

The reasons given by various Muslim conversation partners had to do for example with the universality principle of Islam, according to which, in contemporary understanding, the *umma* constitutes the transnational community *par excellence* and *avant la lettre* anyway.¹² With

two research undertakings (doctoral dissertation 1999–2003 at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences of Hanover University and post-doctoral research project 2004–07 at the Institute of Social Science of Lisbon University), with Muslims of both sexes, different ages, origins and (initially also) standards of education in Germany, Britain and Portugal. Following the first experiences, the group of conversation partners was limited to the educated middle-classes. This included university students, community leaders, project managers, authors and journalists. I am deeply indebted to all conversation partners for their openness, answers—and as many questions. For insights into those studies see Tiesler 2006 and 2006a.

¹¹ As for a definition of a “Diaspora consciousness” see e.g. Clifford (1994): “Diaspora consciousness is entirely a product of cultures and histories in collision and dialogue. [...] Diasporic subjects are, thus, distinct versions of modern, transnational, intercultural experience” (Clifford 1994: 319). Phil Cohen states ironically: “Diaspora is one of the buzzwords of the postmodern age; it has the virtue of sounding exotic while rolling sibilantly off the English tongue; it whispers the promise of hidden depths of meaning yet assimilates them to the shape of a wave breaking gently on native shores. [...] It offers a desirable feminine ending, and much versatility” (P. Cohen 1998: 3). For a general introduction see R. Cohen (1997).

¹² The traditional transnational character of most so-called world religions which were (and are) expanding at a global level is only one example which inspires valid questions about “what is new?” in current transnational migration, and why international migration today leads academic reflection to the invention of the term “transnational”. On this issue see Al-Ali and Koser (2002: 1–8). On the relation

regard to day-to-day experiences of the people in question, the example of Portuguese Muslim families who (like many),¹³ maintain (family) ties between Mozambique, Portugal and the UK by traveling, communicating, and sometimes trading across borders in postcolonial contexts, suggests understanding transnational horizons as a type of social capital resource, and transnational links and practices (while they are markers of a family's biography)¹⁴ as a normality in daily life. In a discussion with young people of this particular group of Portuguese Muslims (who can be seen as representatives of *Public Islam* in Portugal)¹⁵ on their attitudes toward mobility and their self-understanding in comparison to other young people in Lisbon (who lack migration experience in their family histories), a female university student remarked revealingly:

Of course we happen to be somehow 'transnational', maybe a bit more than most other young Portuguese people, but not necessarily more than those (non-Muslims, NCT) whose parents also came from the colonies or went to France or elsewhere in Europe to work. We are also not the only ones who are interested in international politics or humanitarian aid and against the Iraq War. Somehow we became transnational, but it wasn't on purpose.... (Field Diary, 14 May 2007)¹⁶

The relevance of this remark lies in the interviewee's approach to her own "transnationality" which is seen as an advantage and normality, and is in no way opposed to—or contesting—her sense of national belonging, the latter being clearly Portuguese (by birth, nationality and socialization) despite differences from the "majority population" in terms of migration history (postcolonial people who came from

Religions-Nation states-contemporary civil societies, see Rudolph and Piscatori 1997. Written in the late 1990s, the authors focus on the dilution of state sovereignty by examining how the crossing of state boundaries by religious movements led back to the formation of transnational civil society.

¹³ See, for example the works in Bryceson and Vuorela 2002.

¹⁴ Above and beyond all differences in migration experience (positive/negative, adventurous/traumatic pro-active/forced, etc.), the experience and its consequences (among them: the development of transnational practices) as such are marking migrants' family histories. For those who actually migrated (the so-called first generation), emigration means a rupture (without being necessarily and/or entirely positive or negative) in their biographies, and this marker is normally transmitted through their narratives to the following generations, while transnational links and practices become a normal procedure in daily life.

¹⁵ On (the role of) this group of Portuguese Muslims of Indian origin, see Tiesler 2001.

¹⁶ Tiesler, research project *Muslim Youth in Portugal. Religion and Culture, Mobility and Citizenship*, Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon, funded by FCT. See <http://www.ics.ul.pt/instituto/?ln=p&mm=3&linha=5&ctmid=1&mnid=1> .

Mozambique), religious affiliation (Islam) and ethnicity (Indian origin). Her remark translates a kind of common sense of this group of young Portuguese Muslims, whose parents had already been Portuguese nationals under colonial rule in Mozambique, and perceived themselves not as immigrants but, along with other Portuguese people (non-Muslims and not ethnically marked), as “retornados” (returnees).¹⁷ In a quantitative survey in 2006, 89% of these young Muslims strongly agreed with the notion of feeling at home in Portugal (in comparison to 88% of non-Muslim young Portuguese people).¹⁸ It makes once again clear that people of transnational horizons, practice and experience are unlikely to be “disembodied subjects orchestrating their lives in an unbounded and ungrounded ‘space of flows’,” but rather are social actors who “set boundaries and ground identities” (Smith 2002: xiv).

Here, the remark of the university student introduces and supports the main argument of this chapter, namely that an academic discourse language (here: the term “transnationalism”) provides and/or suggests tools and labels for self-reflection and identity constructions to middle-class people. Such terms are partially adopted and become self-descriptions, while in this type of pendulum of swing dynamic between social research and the *field*, the *academia* (in my humble impression) in its production of discursive trends runs the risk of overestimating the relevance of—and consciousness about—such elements in the constant formation process of hybrid collective subjectivity.

Somehow set apart from daily life experiences, regarding the notion of *diaspora*, most of the religiously educated interviewees of the “first

¹⁷ On shifting constructions of the category Muslim and Muslim identities in Portuguese contexts see Vakil 2003 and 2003a.

¹⁸ Participating in this survey were 245 young (transition to adulthood) Lisbon people (Muslims and non-Muslims) of middle class background. It was undertaken between November 2005 and March 2006 in the context of a joint project conducted by David Cairns (Institute of Social Sciences at the University of Lisbon) and the author of *Attitudes Toward Mobility Among Young Lisbon People* (Cairns and Tiesler 2006, “Little Difference? Young Muslims in the Context of Portuguese Youth”, *ICS-UL*, Working Paper No. 8 (WP 8–2006), @: <http://www.ics.ul.pt/publicacoes/workingpapers/index.htm>). The quantitative data material contributed to the broader project of the author on Young Muslims in Portugal (see footnote 16) which is mainly based on qualitative data material. One of its results elicits that these young Muslims have broader international horizons and a higher geographical mobility with regard to short stays abroad (in terms of language skills, contacts, travel and temporary stays abroad for educational purposes) than young people without migration experience in their family biographies, while neither the Muslim, nor the non-Muslim sample showed future plans or a readiness to leave Portugal for longer periods for professional purposes, despite the rather unfortunate situation at the Portuguese labor market.

generation” appeared hesitant to draw parallels between the history of Judaism and that of globally dispersed Muslims, when debating it from a theological and/or legal point of view. Mostly, the *diaspora* topic led the conversation to Islamic legal history, to the issue of the minority situation for which there exists no authoritative concept in Islamic theory or law, but has examples in history and respective diverse Islamic legal opinions (well documented is the early example of Al-Andalus after the *reconquista*).¹⁹

THE ABSENCE OF A DIASPORIC SITUATION IN THEORY

Seemingly untouched by social reality, in which nearly one-third of all Muslims nowadays live in such a situation, outside the “House of Islam” in a strict sense, the minority situation far away from the Muslim core countries (i.e. the permanent residence of Muslims under non-Islamic legislation) is still being stigmatized from some normative-Sunni viewpoints in conservative circles. A *diasporic* situation is seen as problematic and accepted only as temporary, with arguments that result in part from problematic entanglements of theology and historical experience (Duran 1990).

It is not as though this stigmatization, this gap in legislation or orientation would have convinced anyone who had immigrated to Europe in search of better living conditions to “return” to their country of origin (or that of their parents). The absence of a model within Islamic law for a “good Muslim life” in the midst of late-capitalist and (post-?) secularized dominant societies seems to play no essential role for the majority of the Muslims concerned. The issue that lies at the root of the problem complex, the so-called “bipartition of the world” into the antagonistic zones of a “House of Islam” and a “House of War/of Unbelief” (which is generally meant to include Europe) is being dismissed as mediævally outdated—or else new parameters of allocation are being determined, whereby Europe (or parts thereof) may be considered part of the “House of Islam”, for instance on the grounds of the quality of constitutionally guaranteed freedom of religion (Shadid and van Koningsveld 1996).

The quality of freedom of religion—i.e. the prerequisite for a “good Muslim life” in the minority situation—is being assessed differently

¹⁹ On the issue of the minority situation under non-Islamic law, on historical examples as well as new perspectives see Duran 1984 and 1990; Fierro 2000, Lewis 1993, Shadid and Van Koningsveld 1996, Tiesler 1999, Miller 2000.

by different Muslims in different countries: one only has to consider the French verdict on the veil, which in 2003 led to its ban in public schools. Conflicts like this, which in ignorance of the highly specific, current socio-historical context of their development are being shifted into simple explanation patterns of a renewed “Islam—vs.—the West” dichotomy, then lead partly to emancipative solidarity and identity politics, at times also to isolationist policies. The isolationist positions are then in turn ideologically supported by the old bipartition of the world, and the entanglements of Islamic-legal desiderata and historical experience (from the Crusades to more recent colonial history) extend into present times. Such positions are marginal, yet capable of huge media impact.

The fact that Europe as a location of permanent residence so far could not be framed affirmatively in Islamic categories, that established Islamic concepts were unable to grasp the reality of twenty million immigrants, postcolonial people, refugees and citizens who position themselves as Muslims or are being classified as such by others due to their ethnic origins, both opens up and demands room for new concepts. New conditions and experiences of living require new answers to new questions. The respective discussions do not focus only on the situation of international relations and migration, but in our case are based on experiences within the European context. Mandaville describes Europe as a “unique context for the reassessment of theories, beliefs and tradition, while increased transnationalism enables these new reformulations to travel the world” (Mandaville 2003: 140–141). Such discussions do not mark the beginning of the young history of the New Islamic Presence²⁰ in Europe, but have grown along with second

²⁰ In order to create a conceptual framework for the effects of a multi-faceted migration phenomenon, i.e. the increasing visibility of Islam in contemporary Europe, Tomas Gerholm and Yngve Georg Lithman in 1988 introduced the concept of a *New Islamic Presence* (NIP). Astonishingly, this concept—unlike the contributions in the book by the same name, which meanwhile is being considered a classic in the field—has rarely been taken up. I use the term in order to summarize the historically young and extremely heterogenic phenomenon of a constantly growing number of Muslim citizens, refugees and immigrants and their manifold cultural, social and political forms of expression in those countries which in the days of the East-West conflict of systems were perceived on the Western side as *free Europe*. The composition of the term already indicates that this phenomenon, which only became numerically relevant in the 1950s, gained visibility as a result of the oil crisis from the mid 1970s onwards and has been perceived as socially relevant since the 1980s, does not constitute the first and only Islamic presence in Europe. The NIP is distinguished on the one hand from *Traditional Islamic Presence* (TIP) in Southern Europe (of which, outside of Turkey, the average citizen had been aware prior to the war in Bosnia only in association with holiday trips, e.g. to Cyprus), and on the other hand from *Historic Islamic Presence* (HIP) on the Iberian

generations born and raised here and which did not regard their stay on this continent as temporary.

THE THESIS OF A PENDULUM OF SWING DYNAMIC BETWEEN ACADEMIES
AND COMMUNITIES

As mentioned above, several new research contributions by academics interpret certain actions of globally dispersed Muslims as well as diverse Islamic groups, schools of thought and international networks through the concepts of transnationality or transnational communities (e.g. Mandaville 2001 and 2003, Werbner 2002, Allievi and Nielsen 2003, Vertovec 2003, Roy 2004, Grillo 2004 and Bowen 2004). The quality and the radius of relations between globally dispersed Muslims, their links to (previous) countries of origin and further countries, their travels (with commodities), occasionally trade and the flow of currencies, the participation in international discourses and communication via the virtual sphere certainly suggest their transnational character. Others have discussed the definition of a “Muslim Diaspora” (Saint-Blancat 1995, Samers 2003) among other things as an “anti-nation” (Sayyid 2002). However, as soon as the external labels “diaspora” and “transnationality” are being discussed in regard to their possible quality as self-label, the following question arises:

This chapter suggests that we are dealing here with a discourse which distances itself from its material context (i.e. the experience of the interviewees) and is subsequently carried by scholars to the “concerned” subjects—out of the academies into the communities. Hence the thesis it poses for discussion is the following. The key part in the promotion of “transnational” or “diasporic” forms of consciousness lies with the (mainly non-Muslim) scholars and the educated Muslim middle-classes. Where “diaspora” and “transnationality” are employed as self-description, it is through the proclamation and spreading of such a self-definition by Muslim protagonists who themselves are members of European academia.²¹

peninsula. The latter, the 800 years of *Al-Andalus*, belongs to the history of the Middle Ages. It is considered historically closed, as it did not leave any Muslim population behind after the Christian reconquest. On the updated reading of the concept against the background of current research, see Tiesler 2000 and 2001.

²¹ Martin Baumann, whose theoretically well-informed works on the proliferation of the Diaspora-term are based on field experience among Hindu minorities in Europe and the Caribbean, called attention to this dynamic as early as 2000. In his words: “Referring in parallel to the growing usage and esteem of ‘diaspora’ in the academia, intellectuals, representatives, spokesmen and spokeswomen of the thus renamed

The simple “Yes” in reply to the question above acquires significance when we examine what is historically specific about this process, i.e. its social conditions. While the influence of international relations and events should not be underestimated, these conditions are found in Europe. This is often overlooked in public discourse on Muslims, when “Islam” is viewed as something remote and exotically foreign and its protagonists in Europe are mistakenly perceived as reproducers of some obscure tradition that has been imported and continued here intact and unaffected (Salih 2001). Further, it is essential to readjust the focus from systems (here: Islam, Islamic legal history)—which featured neither fresh ideas on transnationality nor the notion of diaspora or its semantically reinvented conceptualizations—to the agents who are changing historical traditions and systems (Krämer 2000). As is usually the case in processes of social change and/or the analysis thereof, these agents are the *educational* middle classes,²² in this case: the academy and those European Muslims who are active within it and within their communities. Thus it becomes possible to trace behind the simple “Yes,” by means of this example, the consequences which the supply of a secular discourse language may have on community politics.

NEW ISLAMIC PRESENCE, NEW DISCOURSES

The historically specific situation, i.e. the history of the development of New Islamic Presence in Europe, can only be outlined briefly here by means of a few key dates. Since the end of World War II, de-colonialization, labor migration, educational purposes, forced migration and flight from regions of poverty and crisis have brought about an increasing number of immigrants from predominantly Islamic

diaspora people and communities started to adopt the notion as a self-description. The term gained currency among the urban, well-educated elite, which itself often formed an aspiring part of university life. The diaspora term earned acceptance and circulation, be it to construct a unity of an actually heterogeneous group of people; be it to emphasize one’s claim for representation; be it to call for a retightening of bonds with one’s former home culture or country; or be it to serve as an indictment of power relations, past and present being the cause for a group’s precarious, socially marginalized situation.” (Baumann 2000: 323).

²² The term “educational middle classes” (“*edukatorische Mittelschichten*”) was coined by Detlev Claussen (2000a), and refers to those educated middle classes that are involved in teaching and training, i.e. teachers in all school types and lecturers in higher education. On the key role of middle classes in processes of social change and the formation of large-scale collective forms of consciousness, see among others Hroch (1978).

societies into European nation states. Within the current borders of the European Union live approximately twenty million people who are being counted as Muslims on the grounds of their religious beliefs, their social-political statements or often simply their geographic or family origins. The numbers of German, French, British etc. citizens of Muslim faith as well as the share of the *second* and *third generations* are constantly increasing.

In the early days, the initially mostly male immigrants—whose stay was wrongly estimated as temporary by themselves and from outside—were not perceived as Muslims—but in their economic function (e.g. “guest workers”), legal status (e.g. refugees) and, above all, in national categories (Turks, Pakistanis, etc.). For one, they did not display any publicly visible signs of religiousness (Kettani 1996: 14f). And second, public and academic interest in post-war and post-colonial Europe did not exactly throw itself at religion. Questions addressing religion were unfashionable, though this would not be permanent (Nielsen 1992, Pollock 1997). Only when looking back at the 1980s, when the religiosity of the new members of society and their affiliation to Islam became more visible and, in response to the dominant European pattern for religious minorities, were organized as hierarchically structured associations, we can speak of a New Islamic Presence in Europe. At the same time, within European social sciences—and there we have the agents—a corresponding discourse evolved, a loose discourse group which then began, in dialogue with American colleagues, to concentrate on “Muslims in Europe” and “Islam in the West.”

Since the 1979 revolution in Iran, Islam had returned to the political agenda, and at the very latest with the end of the *short century* (1914–1991, Hobsbawm) and the Cold War, religiously defined, modern political movements started appearing in the most diverse regions of the world—from the awakening of the American “Bible Belt” under Reagan, i.e. the Protestant religious right in the USA, through the FIS in Algeria to the extremist “*Comunione e Liberazione*” movement from Catholic quarters in Italy (Kepel 1991). The first French veil controversy (which attracted huge media interest) in 1989 and the Rushdie affair which got transported far beyond British borders (when Islamic congregation leaders in Bradford staged their public protest against the *Satanic Verses* with a burning of books, and Khomeini pronounced his momentous “death fatwa” against the novelist Salman Rushdie) in the same year marked the turning point in the young history of the New Islamic Presence in Europe (Tiesler 2006: 93f). Along with this

general trend, from that moment on there was also a growing tendency to interpret the problems of migrants who had arrived from traditional, predominantly Islamic societies determined by agriculture in religious terms, although these problems—which had become apparent in modern European cities in the days of economic stagnation—actually had little to do with Islam (Antes 1997: 9–15).

At roughly the same time, the children of the first immigrants from predominantly Muslim societies reached university age. Here they grew up with Postcolonial and Cultural Studies and—crucially—in the midst of identity discourses that had been imported with some delay from the USA (Siems 2007, Tiesler 2006a). With the formation of European-Muslim middle classes that had passed through local education systems, the amount of contributions by academics and intellectuals of Muslim background on the topic of “Muslims in Europe” increased, as did debates within Islam which—partly in dialogue with, partly in definition against and opposition to, the academic and religious authorities in the (parents’) countries of origin—reflected on the experiences of emigration and minority.

PROTAGONISTS OF ISLAMIC MODERNITIES

In view of the current situation of Muslim minorities on the one hand and outdated, no longer adequate, Islamic teaching perspectives on the other, the following has been established: new social conditions open up both the opportunity and the necessity of new concepts. In the context of the development of such new Muslim-European concepts, it is impossible to ignore secular discourse language, seeing as their authors have been educated in the institutions that impart such intellectual tools. Most of them, however, have also been educated religiously and are active within their communities. Thus the objective of the study²³ on which this chapter is based was to position identity-political, Islam-theological and legal concepts, which have been developed in Europe and refer to the European area, at paying particular attention to academics, authors, and intellectuals who shape current Muslim discourses in Europe.

²³ The title of the doctoral thesis project already mentioned above is: *Heimat und Fremdheit seit 1989. Zur Neuen Islamischen Präsenz und der Entwicklungsgeschichte islamischer Konzepte im europäischen Kontext* (accepted as PhD thesis by the Faculty for Arts and Social Sciences of Hanover University on 17 February 2004). Meanwhile published as Tiesler 2006.

Central to the analysis are works by two Muslim intellectuals who were raised in Europe and who teach and research at arts and social science faculties: Tariq Ramadan (Switzerland, UK) and Salman Bobby Sayyid (UK). While Ramadan's "concepts of space and belonging" have meanwhile become influential in the communities and their politics beyond the francophone context, indeed beyond Europe, especially among active young Muslims, Sayyid is an essential contributor to the formulation of a British-Muslim discourse in which postcolonial studies and left-wing critique interweave with Islamic concepts.

Tariq Ramadan is probably the best-known European-Muslim author today. The grandson of Hasan al-Banna²⁴ and son of the Egyptian exile Said Ramadan (both considered "giants of the re-Islamization movements," *Q-News*, 312, 1999) committed himself initially as a teacher in Switzerland and later as an activist for development aid in the *Third World*. Approximately 15 years ago, the Swiss national began appearing on the stages of Muslim activities in Europe and the USA, and he acts as a consultant in EU commissions concerned with the New Islamic Presence. For Ramadan, the key to the successful integration of Muslims in Europe lies in the acquisition of both secular *and* Islamic education and primarily in their faith, Islam, the source texts of which ought to be interpreted within the current socio-historical context. Certainly Ramadan, who gained his PhD on Nietzsche in Fribourg, co-supervised by Reinhard Schulze (Berne), and has also studied Islamic law at Al-Azhar University in Cairo, is qualified for such an undertaking and, indeed, given his family history, practically pre-selected—some would say predestined—for it. Ramadan has accomplished this interpretation, and successfully at that, as the wide dissemination of *To be a European Muslim* in both Muslim and non-Muslim circles confirms. One might consider him as a pioneering thinker and activist of a contemporary, "Europe-compatible" *Islamization of Muslims in Europe*—thus positioning

²⁴ Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949) was an Egyptian politician and founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. This movement was referred to by Muslims as *reform Islamic* in the sense that it provides a Muslim retort to Western modernity. It was formed between 1928 and 1932 under the British colonial rule in Egypt and succeeded in gaining a foothold in all Arab countries, in various, partly radical forms and rather liberal interpretation of al-Banna's texts. The Muslim Brothers are considered as the basic unit of political Islam (Kepel 2002), and al-Banna as the pioneering thinker of Islamic revival movements (re-Islamization movements). Later Islamic thinkers such as Khomeini (Iran), A.A. Maudoodi (Pakistan; also transcribed 'Mawdoodi' and 'Maududi' in some sources) and especially Sayyid Qutb (Egypt) referred to his writings. Al-Banna was assassinated in 1949 for conspiracy in the context of the assassination of the Egyptian Prime Minister Nuqrashi Pasha.

him well in the family tradition of the protagonists of re-Islamization movements.

Tariq Ramadan is the most important go-between of a *new international movement* of Muslim activists who refer to democracy and human rights and strive towards an understanding with the secular middle-classes (Kepel 2002: 429). He is a charismatic speaker and preacher, whose lectures and speeches are currently in high demand not only at academic conferences, in expert forums of European politics and at inter-religious dialogue talks but also, continuously since the early/mid 1990s, in combination with spiritual tasks, at the French “New Young Muslims” movements (such as the *Union des Jeunes Musulmans, UJM*). At the core these movements call for the formulation of an “Islamic identity” *in reliance on the community*, (Kepel 1996: 325) a notion that goes back to the Muslim Brothers and whose principal initiators and advocates among French Muslim youth—by now beyond the Rhône-Alpes region—have been Tariq Ramadan and, initially, his brother Hani (Imam of the Islamic congregation of Geneva).²⁵

Unlike Ramadan, Salman Bobby Sayyid is not a preacher and does not argue theologically in any context known to me.²⁶ He is not only a brilliant academic, but also a Muslim networker—as evident, among others, from his engagement in the discussion forum of London’s Muslim Institute. Yet his works never stray from the terrain of a pointed, critical language versed in political and social science which bears testimony to a philosophical education and level of thought normally exceeding that of dominant Western discourses. He does not leave this terrain even when his texts are published e.g. in the virtual “reading room” of *Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh*.²⁷

Tariq Ramadan departs from the customary language of Islamic clerics and intellectuals. Still, he adapts to the respective target groups,

²⁵ At present Tariq Ramadan is *Senior Research Fellow* at the European Studies Centre of St Anthony’s College at Oxford University as well as at Doshida University (Kyoto, Japan) and at the Lokahi Foundation, London. He is a visiting professor at Erasmus University, having previously taught Islamic Studies at Fribourg University. Further, he is president of the European *think tank* “European Muslim Network” (EMN). Ramadan has authored several books, including *To be a European Muslim. A Study of Islamic Sources in the European Context*, Leicester 1999; *Globalisation. Muslim Resistances*, Lyon 2003; *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam*, Oxford 2004; *In the Footsteps of the Prophet, Lessons from the Life of Muhammad*, Oxford 2007.

²⁶ Since 2003, Sayyid has been researching ‘race’, ethnicity and postcolonialism as a Research Fellow at the University of Leeds, where he is now director of the Centre of Ethnicity and Racism Studies.

²⁷ See: www.jamaat-e-islami.org.

and this has earned him nicknames such as “Janus face” and “Trojan horse of Islam” in press articles and features, but also comparisons with Martin Luther and the Latin American liberation theologians of the 1980s. These labels have by now become self-propelling and are rarely absent from any of the numerous articles on and by him that can be found in the internet.

PRIME TIME FOR CONCEPTS OF SPACE AND BELONGING

The core of their works can only be introduced very briefly here.²⁸ Particularly interesting in regard to the above thesis are the starting points of their considerations and the types of concepts they have developed. Tariq Ramadan has been concentrating since the early 1990s on the gap in the Islamic law system described earlier. According to him, it is about time Europe was defined as a location of Muslim life (Ramadan 1999: 145). Conditions of living are good in Europe, he claims, and this standard has nothing to do with the minority status. Rather, he argues, his own safety cannot be guaranteed in a so-called Muslim country, at least not on the grounds of Muslims being in the majority there. Ramadan closes the gap by drafting a new space, a new “house/territory” on the basis of the old bipartition of the world: the “space of testimony,” of which Europe is clearly an integral part.

Essentially, Tariq Ramadan’s work *To be a European Muslim* constitutes the more and more widely accepted attempt at an Islamic-legal regimentation and Islamic-theological conceptualization of the minority situation, thus putting an end to the stigmatization of Muslims in that situation. Ramadan rejects a transfer of *diaspora* terminology that draws on the Jewish example, arguing among other things that the concept of *Umma* knows no exclusion.²⁹ The basis of the argument he uses, however, is not the classic model of Hellenic Judaism, whereby all Jews live in diaspora, but rather that of a modern Zionist ideology

²⁸ In November 2004, Ramadan published his book *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam* (Oxford), where he does not only consider the experience of Muslims in Europe but also the situation of Muslim women in the USA. It appears that this book is going to achieve a similar success as its predecessor *To be a European Muslim*. While *To be a European Muslim* could so far be seen as Tariq Ramadan’s major work, the work by Sayyid selected for comparison here is the article mentioned above, due to its *diaspora* topic. The text considered as Sayyid’s major work is the volume *A Fundamental Fear. Eurocentrism and The Emergence of Islamism*, London 1997, which was republished in 2004.

²⁹ The conversation on the applicability of the *diaspora* term to Muslim minorities took place in Lisbon on 23 October 2000.

which sought to promote immigration into the newly founded state of Israel by means of the concept of the “New Jew,” but in consequence stigmatized the diaspora Jews (Zuckermann 1997).

When there is talk of *Muslim diaspora* on the Muslim side, it is usually associated with social-demographic, ethnic or political references. At any rate it does not refer to Islamic Studies or conceptual debate.³⁰ Thus Sayyid’s concept of a Muslim diaspora is not a theological one. He bases his considerations on contemporary interpretations of the *Umma* on the one hand and on the peak of the theoretical debates concerning the seemingly endless semantic extensions of the “diaspora” term on the other. Reviewing the literature on the promotion of the *Umma* as *place of belonging* we can state summarily: the *Umma* is being styled as the “imagined community” (Anderson) *par excellence*, as the *very nation*. Sayyid recognizes the contrary and describes the *Umma* as a non-national phenomenon, which simultaneously undermines and transcends the logic of the nation:

The assertion of Muslim subjectivity presents a serious challenge to the idea of the nation. [...] Islam interrupts the logic of the nation by highlighting the problem of integration—i.e. how to include various populations within the boundaries of a nation, and at the same time it focuses on the problem of their loyalties to an edifice larger than the nation. (Sayyid 2002: 2)

Using the intellectual tools of modern theory of the nation, Salman Bobby Sayyid argues against prevailing approaches. On his way to grasping Muslim subjectivity conceptually as *anti-nation* by means of the *Muslim diaspora* category, he declares unmistakably: the *Umma* is not a nation. He sets out with the claim that “nation” defines “home,” whereas diaspora describes the state of homelessness. It follows that in the nation the national subjects and territory overlap, while in diaspora they do not. According to Sayyid a diaspora is not the opposite, the “Other,” within a nation; rather, the existence of a diaspora prevents its unanimity, the unity of a nation. This constitutes the anti-national character of diaspora.

Neither, says Sayyid, is the *Umma* an economic or trade association, nor is it a civilization or linguistic community, and it certainly does not make up a shared way of life. In his endeavor to conceptualize a

³⁰ The fate of the Palestinians is only rarely discussed by means of the diaspora category—and where this is done at all, it is from a political perspective, not one of religious history.

Muslim diaspora, he proceeds from two ascertainments: First, from the assumption that a form of Muslim subjectivity or respective debates are currently found in all Muslim communities worldwide. And second, the following question poses itself:

There are still some practices which are uniform among Muslims (e.g. all Muslims pray in the direction of Mecca), however, it is difficult to conclude [...] that which constitutes the unity of the Umma is its uniform way of life. If the Umma is not a nation, a common market or a civilization—is it anything at all? Does not the difficulty of identifying the Umma suggest that the idea of a Muslim subjectivity is nothing more than a chimera? If Muslim identity is so fragmentary, how can we conceptualize it? One way might be to think in terms of a Muslim diaspora (Sayyid 2002: 6).

As different (or even opposed)³¹ as the works of Ramadan and Sayyid may be from each other, at the core they are committed to very similar questions, which the identity politician Ramadan once put into words as follows: “Where are we? Who are we? Which identity? Which belonging?” (Ramadan 1999: viii). These questions and reflections to that effect do not mark the beginning of the history of the New Islamic Presence in Europe; rather, they have received increased attention only since the late 1980s/early 1990s: thus it is a second generation of Muslim intellectuals that is confronted with them. While Ramadan is seeking solutions that would allow young Europeans of Muslim background to become more Islamic without having to be less European, Sayyid understands especially the last question (how to conceptualize a Muslim subjectivity) more as a challenge to academic instances.³²

Ramadan’s and Sayyid’s concepts can be formulated summarily by the term *Concepts of Space and Belonging*. The new relevance of such *Questions of Space and Belonging* became particularly evident with the formation of educated middle-classes. It has also become tangible since the 1980s within the European majority societies—as we can observe

³¹ Sayyid explicitly rejects the idea of a specified European Islam and doubts that Europe forms a particular place/reference of belonging among Muslims, by favoring a universal perspective and highlighting the importance of local and national contexts. See his keynote address “Answering the Muslim Question: Euro-Islam and European Dreams” at the MEL-conference on “Muslims in Portugal. Societal and transnational experiences”, held in Lisbon at ICS-UL, 29th of November 2007: www.mel-net.ics.ul.pt. At this occasion, Tariq Ramadan, who was chairman of the panel discussion, remarked that his concepts refer to European Muslims and do not define a “European Islam” (a vague notion originally coined by Bassam Tibi).

³² B.S. Sayyid, “European Silences—Muslim Voices”, in: <http://cgem.unn.ac.uk/eumuslim/volume1/bobby.htm>, downloaded 2 August 2003.

in the debates concerning national and cultural “identities” (Claussen 2000b: 19f). One might summarize laconically: Muslim intellectuals are asking these questions not because an Imam imported from Turkey or their grandmother from Afghanistan confronts them with them, but because these questions are continuously voiced in academic, public and political discourses in Europe.

As mentioned, the discursive context in which the works by the European academics Ramadan and Sayyid were written appears decisive in supporting the thesis of a pendulum of swing dynamic between social science research and community politics. Since the end of the *short century*, the dominant discourses mentioned above, from identity constructions, via diaspora to transnationality, by means of which, among other things, power relations between majorities and minorities are negotiated and also approaches for the examination of Muslims were identified, have been pointing at three trends.

The first may be found in the harmoniously wrapped yet aggressive continuation of the “cultural turn,” which increasingly extends even beyond the realms of cultural studies, political and social sciences. To be exact, we are dealing here with a culturalization of social issues. The politics of majorities and minorities indicate a boom of religious-cultural definitions from both inside and outside, which are often reduced to mere categories of descent.³³ Traditions are turned into argument and explanation pattern, a “return to tradition” is being promoted, whereby it is overlooked that this usually means returning to something that had not existed in that form before.

As a second trend we can consider the conceptual renewals of “spatialization,” which arise in the wake of the rediscovery of (national) spaces, as well as the “collective memories” which are designated as its counterpart on the individual-psychological level (Werz 2004). This increased focus on the relevance of space, which Michel Foucault, among others, anticipated at the end of the *short century* (“The present epoch will perhaps be above all the epoch of space”) is often dealt with in vague terms as a “phenomenon of globalization,” but it only makes sense when considered together with the religious revival. The third trend is probably the most decisive one among the interwoven trends: the search for—and attributions of—“collective identities.” Since the end

³³ A valid example for this may be the attempts of the Economic community EU, in part assisted by expert commissions, to define a ‘European cultural identity’. Such attempts evidently aimed at a constitutional determination of Europe as ‘Christian’. Cf. Siems 2007.

of the Cold War, the familiar categories of collective identity—such as people, nation, group, class—have rapidly gained mobility. They pose a universe of open questions for those social scientists who study the phenomena of social agents and movements in which the search for a historical purpose in post-material conditions appears to gravitate to the center of attention, especially for the middle classes.

I take the liberty of borrowing Detlev Claussen's concept, which explains the verbal container that is "identity" (when applied to collectives) as a religion of daily life (Claussen 2000a, 2000b). This is a religion of daily life which provides uncomplicated and unifying answers to current social questions of purpose and sense, such as "*Who are we? Where do we come from? Who is to blame?*" in accordance with the requirements of an everyday mentality which is unwilling to dwell at length on problems difficult to solve. Academic discourse languages are influential because nowadays they are rapidly conveyed to the public. Yet they are of course inevitably of short duration—as is illustrated in the case of "collective identities," where already new perspectives that deal with, for example, social movements in the "post-identity" era are arriving from the USA (Laraña et al. 1994). Nonetheless, it is apparently very difficult for the Western and non-Western middle classes to give up the search for and proclamation of cultural, national and religious "collective identities."

A shared core we can recognize in all those trends, those central questions regarding ethnicity, diaspora, transnationality, the discussion of and search for "collective identity," the "Self" and the "Other" may be summarized as follows: in every case, social constructions of *space* and *belonging* are being negotiated. That is the background against which both the works by Ramadan and Sayyid and the politics of recognition within the communities may be understood.

CONCLUSION

With the coming of age of the second generation—mostly European citizens who have gone through European education systems—the share of educated (proto-) middle classes increased. The children of the first labor migrants and ex-colonial settlers (Sayyid 2006: 1–10) reached university age shortly before or after 1989, i.e. in a period when the topic of "Islam" experienced an upswing in public and academic discourses. There they grew up with identity discourses which gained

increasing popularity in European social science after 1989 and have appeared central ever since. Heterogeneity had been the fundamental characteristic of the NIP—until the identity discourses fell on fertile ground in European discourses on migration and British postcolonial studies.

New social conditions open up both the possibility and the necessity of new concepts. One of the most fiercely debated questions in the context of (European) Muslim discussions at least since the early 1990s is the quest for the definition of Muslim subjectivity, i.e. a collective understanding of “Muslimness” (Sayyid 2002). The corresponding discussions do not only focus on the situation of international relations and migration, but are based in our case on the experience within the European context. They do not mark the beginning of the young history of the New Islamic Presence in Europe, but have grown along with a second generation which did not regard its stay as temporary but rather was born and raised here. In the context of the development of such new European-Muslim concepts, it is impossible to ignore the secular discourse that was learned by authors who had been educated in these very institutions that impart such intellectual tools. Most of them, however, have also been educated religiously and are active within their communities.

Since talk of a “European identity” has become hugely popular, the representatives of Muslim interests have also become identity politicians. Muslim-European concepts can be read as responses to both dominant discourses and new experiences. In the integration of current discourse languages into such concepts and community politics, the transformation of traditional religion into modern religion becomes apparent. As “traditional” we can define here ritualistic religious practice as well as religious knowledge that are passed down orally, without a reflective examination of the text which had been accessible only to the elites. The key to this transformation lies in secular education. A generation which has passed through the European education systems is developing its own perspective on its religion. Equipped with different tools and access to scripture, this generation also enters into a different, namely often challenging, relation to traditional religious authorities. The religious personnel, initially imported from the countries of origin, have been unable to answer the questions of young Muslims which arose in a new context. The places of the old community leaders are soon to be taken (and in some places already have been) by a young generation—a generation that was raised in Europe and feel at home here.

Younger generations, in so far as they are actively committed to being Muslims, often promote a “return to the true essence” of Islam. The definition of what constitutes that true essence is subject to the plurality principle—and it generally takes a different shape in Europe than for instance in Algeria, Saudi Arabia or Afghanistan. Even if talk of a “return to true Islam” is particularly widespread precisely among young European Muslims, in practice this means a “return” to something that had not existed in that form before—if nothing else, because those social conditions within which this religiousness evolves and is formulated had not been there before. As diverse as the new Muslim perspectives and everyday practices may be, they are different from those of the grandparents’ generation. Transnational conditions, secular education, new communication technologies and organization forms, the socialization into as well as experiences of exclusion from European societies and the integration of new discourse languages in Muslim debate all point to two broad tendencies: to the *Europeanization of Muslim cultures* on the one hand and the *Islamization of Europeans* of Muslim background on the other. They can only be understood in the light of the European context, which since the end of the Cold War has seen a fixation in public and social-science debates on traditions and religious attributions, including the promotion of “transnationalism” and “diasporas” and their respective forms of consciousness and identity politics.

APPENDIX
JEWS AND MUSLIMS IN CONTEMPORARY FRANCE

Roland Goetschel

The major French Jewish institution is the Consistory for Religious Activities that was established by Napoleon in 1808. The second important framework is the Unified Jewish Social Fund (FSJU) in charge of social and educational issues. The institutional innovation after World War II was the Representative Council of the Jewish Institutions of France (CRIF) which would provide Jews with a political representation vis-a-vis the state. With the arrival of tens of thousands of Jews from North Africa in the 1960s and 1970s, the community grew to about 500,000 people. Sixty percent live in Paris and surroundings.

The arrival of Muslims is more recent. Before 1914, there were a hundred thousand Muslims in France, and the Great Mosque of Paris was inaugurated in 1926 in homage to the thousands of Muslim soldiers who died for France during the Great War. Today, following the decolonization process, the population of (mostly Maghreb) Muslims in France is approximately four million people. Initially, that immigration was primarily male but it was supplemented by a female immigration related to the existing laws on family regrouping.

This Muslim population was to undergo periods of crisis and unrest. In autumn 1983, for instance, urban unrest “for equality and against racism” started in Marseilles, with a minor confrontation of youngsters with the police, and it developed as it crossed France. Its peak was a 100,000 people march in Paris. The socialist government, taken by surprise by the success of the march, and afraid of an autonomous social movement of the second-generation youth, granted the march institutional recognition. Another major event, violent strikes broke out in Talbot-Poissy industry at the end of December 1983 and early January 1984 in protest against the firing of several thousand workers, mostly North Africans. These events expanded to other factories and created a climate of genuine societal crisis.

Not long before, the tension between Muslims and Jews had increased and anti-Jewish incidents had created an uneasy climate aggravated by the terrorist attack against the synagogue on Copernic street (3 October

1980) that set in motion large-scale demonstrations against anti-Semitism. Ten years later, a similarly momentous effect was created by the desecration of the historical Jewish cemetery of Carpentras (May 1990). For several years, protests and demonstrations brought together not only Jews but also many groups and figures from a variety of political and organizational horizons. Over the years, however, as shown by the demonstration on 7 April 2002 against the growing number of anti-Jewish acts of violence, far fewer non-Jewish organizations joined the movement.

In the meantime, principally under the impulse of Muslim groups, anti-racism gained some impetus with the creation of “SOS racism”. This movement emanated from the Socialist party and also had Jewish components like the Union of Jewish Students of France.

These developments did not bring about drastic changes and could not prevent the anti-Semitic wave of 2000–2004 that was also fueled by increased tension in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (the Second Intifada) when Israel was the focus of mounting criticism in France and Western Europe. The Jewish institutions themselves came under heavy pressure. The heads of the CRIF, for instance, claimed their identification with the “peace camp” in Israel and sympathy for the PLO’s “moderate stream”. In tandem, the Chief Rabbinate became increasingly identified with ultra-orthodox Judaism, emphasizing, in its action, charity and voluntary services. During these years, followers of the CRIF stigmatized the Rabbinate as “ayatollahs”.

These years were also years of growth for radical Islamism, as illustrated by several terrorist attacks which revived the debates on Muslims’ integration in mainstream society. Those who could be described as fundamental Muslims consist of a very small group only, out of a population where the prevailing norm is the practice of a popular and milder form of Islam. This population, however, has a quite intensive public and community life marked by a multiplicity of associations. In 1996 there were 1,500 Muslim associations in France.

However, manifestations of anti-Semitism are frequently observed in Muslim circles. They are fueled by Muslims’ identification with the Palestinian cause and the anti-Israeli attitude of the Middle-Eastern public at large. On the other hand, there are the economic and social difficulties of French Muslims and the widespread perception that Jews in France belong to the “wealthy”. These difficulties were spectacularly expressed in the riots of October–November 2005. During 21 nights, 9,131 vehicles were set on fire in France, 2921 arrests were carried out,

and 56 police officers were wounded. The damage totaled 200 million euros. Violence broke out primarily in the country's most underprivileged regions, marked by high rates of unemployment and delinquency, far from downtown areas and tourist districts. During this crisis, the manifestations of hate against Jews were numberless.

Some observers maintain that this anti-Semitism is rooted in more remote history, at the period of North Africa's colonization. It is worth remembering that, relatively to Muslims, Jews enjoyed then more than a few privileges at that time. The most important of those privileges was the fact that, particularly in Algeria and since the Crémieux decree of 1870, Jews were declared French citizens. Muslims, as for them, remained subjected to the status of "natives". Algerian Muslims thus suddenly found themselves in a position of inferiority compared with Jews, causing a fracture between the communities. Still nowadays, on the soil of France, more than a few Muslims tend to consider that, as in the past, they were victims of injustice far more than the Jews were.

One should also bear in mind, however, that over the last years of the first decade of this century, we have witnessed the creation of new frameworks like the French Jewish-Muslim Friendship Society (May 2003), and the organization of pilgrimages to Auschwitz-Birkenau with figures of the Muslim population. Such developments are encouraged by the emergence of new institutions in the Jewish community like the "Foundation for the Memory of Holocaust" that could well set the tone for new relations of Jews with national institutions and with some of the organizations at work among Muslims. The Foundation, indeed, is a quasi-official agency, partly managed by senior civil servants. The memory of the Holocaust is thus "nationalized" and tends to become a landmark of the French experience as a whole, to which Muslims may also participate. Such a development may indeed encounter the aspirations of a moderate lay Islam—notwithstanding the influence of transnational forces acting for the mobilization of Muslims on an anti-Israeli and anti-American line.

Yet it is only in the very long run that these developments will erase the imprints of the 2005 riots and daily manifestations of anti-Semitism. As Alain Finkielkraut emphasized in an interview to the Israeli daily *Haaretz*, in France one would like to reduce these riots to their social dimension, to regard them as a revolt of young people against discrimination and unemployment. The problem, says Finkielkraut, is that the majority of these young people have a Muslim identity while other immigrants in difficult situations—Chinese, Vietnamese or

Portuguese—did not take part in the riots. It is thus clear, in his opinion, that the riots had an ethnic-religious character that was also turned, somehow, against the secularism of the French Republic. The republic, he contends, is the French version of Europe and the present-day inheritor of colonialism. In other words, it is a hatred with delayed-action, a retrospective hatred. A version of Islam that instead of dealing with its problems in an era of globalization and multiculturalism, seeks an external culprit. Here, according to him, is the link to the Jews.

CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE

ROMAN CATHOLICISM AND THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBALIZATION

Danièle Hervieu-Léger

The term globalization refers not only to the opening up of economies to the world market, but also to the processes of rolling back frontiers and developing crossborder traffic, which are transforming our planet into a single, integrated, interconnected universe. How might Roman Catholicism fit into this increasingly interrelated and unified world? In attempting to answer this question, we shall take as a starting point the following paradox. On the one hand Roman Catholicism presents itself as a *world institution*: it is established in the most far-flung corners of the earth and organized on a scale that reflects its worldwide mission. On the other hand, globalization is producing a culture of autonomous units—against which the Roman system has fought unrelentingly for two centuries—which is increasingly removed from the integrated universe envisaged by Catholicism.

ROMAN CATHOLICISM, A “RELIGIOUS WORLD” AT LOGGERHEADS WITH THE IDEALS OF THE MODERN WORLD

At the theological level, the Catholic vision for the world is rooted in the universalist project, which is common to all Christian denominations and central to Christianity itself. Implicit in the founding principle of Christianity, namely that the possibility of salvation is extended to all mankind, irrespective of gender, race, nationality or social standing, is the utopian vision that the religious community will spread worldwide, as mankind heeds the call to conversion. To take the Gospel to the ends of the earth and make disciples of all men is the supreme missionary imperative and Christian duty. Baptism makes every believer responsible for passing on the good news he himself has received and this spiritual mission is inseparable from the witness required of the community into which he has been baptised. The quality of a community’s religious life is revealed both by the rectitude of its beliefs and practice and to

an even greater extent by its capacity to expand. Indeed its missionary commitment is the quintessential mark of its Christian character.

Throughout history different Christian denominations have understood and acted upon this missionary imperative in different ways. As the classic typology drawn up by Max Weber and Ernst Troeltsch shows, the action taken depends on the prevailing conception of the way in which new converts are to be incorporated into the community. In the case of the “sect”, proselytizing measures are directed towards adult individuals who are capable of responding personally to its teaching by converting and committing themselves to a full Christian life. The missionary perspective of the “church” on the other hand calls for the extension of the community. The church seeks the greatest possible inclusion of groups, families and generations, who are gradually educated in the faith within its fold.

These two expansion strategies correspond to different ecclesiologies which reflect different conceptions of the relationship between Christian institutions and their cultural and political environment. Whereas the “sect” prefers retirement, avoids contact with the surrounding world and manifestly refuses to come to terms with profane values, the “church” chooses to enter into a relationship with worldly culture and to connect (in various ways) with the civil authorities.

With its two distinctive features: a particular sense of mission and a (sometimes controversial) relationship with worldly culture and politics, Roman Catholicism may be regarded as an almost perfect embodiment of the “church” type. It should moreover be borne in mind that the establishment in this world of an ecclesiastical empire, in which the mission to place all peoples under Christ’s law can be fully realized, has been a perennial ambition of the Roman Church. It is not without paradox and conflict, given that the church must abide by the evangelical imperative to distinguish between the spiritual and the political spheres.

This is where the church enters into an intractable conflict with the founding logic of modernity, which fundamentally questions the fitness of religion to serve as a common frame of reference worldwide. For more than two centuries this quarrel has been the essential feature of the relationship between Catholicism and the modern world. It pits two irreconcilable worlds against each other: on the one side there is a universe governed by scientific and technical rationality, in which the assertion of individual and institutional autonomy undermines the theological and political foundations of the social order and leads inexorably to the consignment of religion to the private sphere; on the

other there is the Roman system, which affirms the organic unity of religion, morality and the social order, with the aim of countering the “individualizing” threat posed by the Reformation and then of resisting the new order arising from the French Revolution. This agenda is evident in the “besieged fortress” strategy adopted by the uncompromising Catholicism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

What is at stake in this confrontation between two world views, two values systems and two irreconcilable sets of standards is the monopoly on truth, which is vital to the very survival of the ecclesiastical institution. For the uncompromising strain of Catholicism—the one whose relationship with the world was formalized in the Syllabus of 1864—the truth is substantial, positive and has been handed down from above once and for all. That being the case, the autonomy of the political world implicit in the principles of 1789 and the critical tendency of modern science are both equally intolerable. Faith presupposes absolute submission to the legitimate authority (the Magisterium), which guarantees the permanence of truth. Throughout the nineteenth century and up until the second Vatican Council, increasing centralization and the strengthening of the hierarchical character of the ecclesiastical institution went hand in hand with the war waged by the Roman church against liberalism, and what it saw as its perverse and deadly offspring: socialism and atheistic communism.

In many respects this (oversimplified) description of the relationship between Catholicism and the modern world may now seem outdated. The theological and political concept of a world governed by religion has not survived the modern revolution or the overthrow of sovereignty it entailed. Once it is acknowledged that the law no longer has a transcendent origin but proceeds from the collective will of the people, the church’s claim that it is entitled to intervene directly in civic affairs by virtue of its monopoly on truth loses all legitimacy. Nowadays there is no country in which the power of Christian princes is consecrated by the Church.

But it is easy to show, without offering a long list of examples, that the church has retained its ambition to influence the way societies are governed, albeit in new and more indirect ways, whether in the capacity of moral Magisterium, conferred upon it by its possession of this very truth, or of agency responsible for man’s salvation, as laid down in its divinely instituted constitution. The preservation of Catholic universalism, in whatever theological terms the latter is formulated, always involves the affirmation of the Roman church’s ultimate capacity to make men participants in the reconciliation of Heaven and earth,

which it presents as the key to their reconciliation with each other. Despite the increasingly secular character of the modern world, in which religion is steadily being stripped of its capacity to set standards and rules for social life and individual morality, the utopian vision of a global Catholicism offering all societies the foundations of an authentically human way of living together has been continuously renewed. In part, this renewal has been (and continues to be) encouraged by the frustrations and contradictions arising from the rapid modernization of the world, which are at odds with the promise held out by modernity.¹ Leaving aside the acceptance of autonomies in the world imposed by a definitively secular cultural and political environment, this vision remains the model for an active Catholic globalism, which was fleshed out in the “New Evangelization”, developed by Jean-Paul II and has been fully embraced by his successor.

From this standpoint, there is still substantial antimony between Catholicism, which continues to present itself as a world religion, and contemporary globalized culture, which takes the modern idea of individual autonomies to the extreme. If the triumph of the neoliberal market economy in all areas of human concourse (including those involving intangible goods, such as art or culture) is taken to be the central principle of contemporary globalization, it is possible to regard the latter as the exact opposite *par excellence* of Catholic globalism, which remains to this day rooted in the radical rejection of modern liberalism that has underpinned relations between the church and the world for more than 150 years.² It might be added that the recent denunciation by the papacy of the errors (sins) of globalization—its inhumanity and lack of pity for the weak—could signal the final act of a preordained scenario: the irresistible drive by this globalized culture that will finally eliminate any prospect of realizing the Catholic utopia of a religiously unified world, a prospect which the process of mod-

¹ It should be noted that progressive front-line Catholic movements, which are developing a very vigorous critique of the false promises and the human and ecological consequences of globalization, occupy a prominent place in the wide range of alterglobalization associations and in the antiglobalization forums. Often inspired by liberation theology, their rejection of neoliberal globalization is rooted—whatever their critical distance from the authorities—in the antiliberalism that represented the starting point for Catholic intransigence, which gained ground in the second half of the nineteenth Century. See note 2.

² On the question of Catholic antiliberalism, the reader should refer to the seminal works of E. Poulat, particularly *Eglise contre bourgeoisie. Introduction au devenir du catholicisme actuel*, Paris, Casterman, 1977.

ernization and secularization has steadily divested of political, social and cultural plausibility.

FROM CONFRONTATION TO INTERNAL SECULARIZATION: TOWARDS A
NEW STAGE IN RELATIONS BETWEEN CATHOLICISM AND THE
GLOBALIZED CULTURE OF THE INDIVIDUAL

But is the dynamic of relations between Catholicism and its modern, global, environment bound to be reduced to no more than a confrontation, in which the Church seems likely to lose out once and for all? Things are not actually that simple. For a more accurate assessment it is necessary to bear in mind that this confrontation is changing the nature of Catholicism itself. The resulting recompositions are gradually giving rise to a new form of Catholicism, which is capable of entering into a new dialogue with the world around it. The shift by Catholicism into modernity, which continues up until the present period of globalization, can be observed on three levels:

In the first place we might consider the new conditions imposed by the modernization of society, not only on the way the Catholic institution operates in the world, but also (by way of consequence) on its internal organization and its own definition of its mission.

A second approach might focus on the internal conflicts that arise when the Church comes into contact with modernity, prompting the emergence of contrasting ideas and strategies for dealing with the latter. The internal dynamics of these conflicts, the debates, initiatives, repressive backlashes and compromises they bring about, are the essential features of the modernizing process, which has still to run its course—even after Vatican II—and whose outcome is still uncertain.

A third way of identifying the progress of the modernizing ideas now being proclaimed within the Catholic domain might consist in following the transformation of religious mentalities. With changes in the conditions of life for individuals, social groups and the social body as a whole, there is a corresponding change in the aspirations, expectations and experiences ministered to by the Church. The clash of the Church with modernity, and its attack on the modernizing trend, which it associates with cultural and symbolic disruption, is also to be seen in the shifts and reworkings of religiosity, which the Church must address if it is to direct and make use of them.

These different tendencies come together in the move towards *internal secularization* in Catholicism, whereby the declining authority of the religious system is—according to the definition given by F.A. Isambert (1976)—gradually accepted and judged to be legitimate within the religious group itself. From this standpoint secularization covers not only the decline or, in some areas, disappearance of religious authority, but also the relinquishment by religion itself of part of its authority in the name of the values and message it claims to be propagating (and not simply as a result of external pressure). As of then, he says, the movement does not merely consist in adapting religions to new conditions, conferring legitimacy on the new place made for them in society; it also calls into question their specific mode of operation within a changing cultural universe.

This “rationalization of the religious domain” received striking confirmation in the measures to deritualize the liturgy and demythologize the scriptures, which were officially legitimized at the second Vatican Council. The move towards internal secularization, which might also be described as “consensual secularization”, is accompanied by a gradual recognition of the merits of other religions or of the humanist values underlying different declarations of human rights. This dual recognition is a sign that a pluralism making for a positive assessment of religion has been accepted, at least to some extent. At the same time modernization within Catholicism involves, at the deepest level, the adoption of new theological positions and pastoral arrangements, which radically redefine relations between the church and the world and thereby explode the myth—which both Catholic and lay intransigentism have worked to maintain—that Catholicism and modernity are doomed to out-and-out confrontation with no possibility of interrelation. The church has, so to speak, been hijacked by modernity.

INDIVIDUALISM AND MOBILITY IN WORLDWIDE CATHOLICISM: FROM THE PRACTISING BELIEVER TO THE PILGRIM

The most recent instance of Catholicism’s shift into modernity is the invasion of the Catholic scene by styles of religiosity given to subjectivization of belief and individualized change in practice. All studies of religious developments in Western Europe and North America in the past twenty years have tended to concur on the importance of this development, which is key to the present condition of globalized

religion. Today's believers, are increasingly emancipated from normative codes established by institutions and feel free to cobble together smaller systems of signification to give meaning to their experience. They are just as free in defining the ties they are prepared to maintain with particular religious faiths, without necessarily feeling bound by the spiritual and moral obligations normally associated with adherence to their traditions. The link between believing and belonging is clearly becoming increasingly loose, as the British sociologist G. Davie (1994) has shown. More than this, the ways in which these believers demonstrate their adherence—insofar as it requires to be demonstrated—tend to be at variance with the canonical forms prescribed by the institutions themselves. Beliefs break down or reemerge according to the expectations, aspirations, dispositions and interests of the individuals that profess them. In much the same way practices are abandoned here and taken up elsewhere. This tendency is now an established part of the contemporary religious scene, cutting across different faiths and different countries' religious, political and cultural belief systems. Idealtypically at least, it reflects the key features of globalized religiosity, confirming as it does (here as in other fields) that the individual has finally come of age, that interaction has primacy over commitment, and that networked sociability has triumphed. This cultural mutation is clearly at work in contemporary Catholicism, whatever the difficulty the religious authorities might have in appreciating its scale and implications.

The contemporary revolution in religiosity, particularly apparent in Christianity, marks the furthest point in the decline of parish civilization, which has been the mainstay of the Catholic system since the Council of Trent (Lambert 1985). The parish civilization model—which provides for general religious administration of the territory, organization of the calendar (through the liturgical cycles), exclusive clerical authority (the “parson” figure) and transmission of religious identity from one generation to the next—has provided observers of Catholicism with a stable yardstick by which to assess the losses suffered by religion following the onset of modernity. While the work of historians has severely dented the idea that this model of religious civilization was fully and consistently realized in the premodern world, the description of the Catholic parish system provides sociologists with an almost perfect illustration of Weber's “church” type, a natural community into which people are born and which tends to be coextensive with the society and territory with which it is inextricably associated. At the same time it has helped make the practising Catholic (who goes to mass every Sunday, receives the sacraments at different

stages in life and sees that the faith is passed on to his children) the central figure in any description of the religious scene. The figure of the practising Catholic epitomized the firm association of belief with church membership, the enduring existence of territorial communities, the collective observance of compulsory practices defined by the institution, and the regularity of normal religious life, which was in step with the rhythms of normal everyday life. It was thus possible to represent the religious scene as a system of concentric circles ordered around this central core of “regular” worshippers.

This depiction of the Catholic scene, featuring groups of believers endowed with a strong sense of religious identity and identified in social terms as “communities”, has obviously not lost all relevance to present-day conditions. But its limitations become abundantly clear when we attempt to apply it to a religious scene dominated by the “fluidity” of individual religious paths and by ongoing discussions on changes in the make-up of the community.

If we are to attempt to give an account of this situation, in which religious identity is inherited less and less, new beliefs are disseminated and new practices are invented, the stock figure of the pilgrim is of help in two ways (Hervieu-Léger 2001). First of all it refers us back in a metaphorical sense to the plastic religiosity that cuts across all confessional boundaries and is now making its influence felt at the heart of Catholicism. Second, it corresponds in a real sense to a rapidly expanding form of Catholic sociability characterized by mobility and temporary association. In the first sense, it is illustrative of the modern religious condition, whose salient feature is that each individual must work out the meanings of his own existence on the basis of the diversity of situations he has experienced. “Pilgrim religiosity” thus designates the individual’s attempt to interpret this succession of disparate experiences as a meaningful path, knowing that other encounters and experiences may yet turn it in new directions. Its main features are the fluidity of the beliefs it develops and the uncertainty of the communal affiliations it might give rise to.

But the reference to pilgrim religiosity is not simply a metaphorical way of referring to contemporary mobility in matters of belief. It also enables us (in its second non-metaphorical sense) to follow the concrete emergence of “pilgrim practices”, now rapidly expanding, which point to completely new forms of religious sociability. These practices, which are voluntary, individual (even if they are conducted in a group), mobile, optional, modular and exceptional, are established in a different context

from that of the traditional forms of institutional religious practice, which for their part are collective, compulsory, standardized, ordinary and occur within stable local communities.

Large-scale assemblies (of which the World Youth Days inaugurated by John-Paul II are the prototype) have been very successful, particularly with young people. Renewal of the old pilgrimages (of which the success of the Compostelle routes is the shining example) reveals in vivo the remarkable development of a “Catholic pilgrim habitus” characterised by individual freedom of choice, mobility and intermittent exchange. In this connection consideration should also be given to the increasing number of Catholic-inspired religious networks that bring together people with spiritual affinities. They offer resource centres where individuals may come at a given stage in their journey to find a favorable environment in which to recount and share experiences. The success of communal places, whether old (the monasteries) or new (the “new communities” inspired by the charismatic movement), which take in a steady flow of individuals for stays of varying duration, is a part of this large-scale renewal of contemporary Catholic sociability. Networked interaction between these places (both real and virtual) is frequent and intense. Pilgrims move from one place to another and surf the websites that all these communities are eager to develop. This new form of communication is helping to redefine the pastoral and missionary practice of the institution itself. The Catholic Church has entered *volens nolens* into the age of globalized religion.

TIME, SPACE, AND TRUTH:

THREE CHALLENGES FACING THE CATHOLIC INSTITUTION

The whole problem lies in identifying the challenges to the Roman system posed by the steady incorporation of contemporary forms of globalized religiosity into the Catholic domain and in determining whether the institutional framework of Catholicism can resist it.

The Challenge of Time

The first challenge posed to an institution with little experience of managing the mobility and precarity of beliefs and practices has to do with the organization of time for religious purposes. Control of the timetable and calendar has traditionally been a key element in Catholic management of the religious sphere. The emphasis on compulsory

observance introduced a very powerful means of regulating the religious life of the believer, smoothing over, as it were, any digressions in his personal spiritual life. In addition, formal stipulation of the periods of time to be devoted to collective religious observance in the form of worship served to bring order to community life as a whole, punctuating it with short liturgical events such as Sunday mass and longer holiday periods. In this sense religious socialization based on the way individuals spend their time plays an essential role in institutionalizing their affiliation to the Catholic faith. Religion becomes the central feature of the everyday life of the faithful by virtue of its prescriptions on the way their time is to be organized. However, the “pilgrim religiosity” impacting upon the contemporary landscape of Catholicism necessarily eludes any such organization. Its underlying spiritual condition is uncertain and dynamic, closely dependent on the individuals’ specific feelings and experiences. It is not likely to comply with a predetermined time framework and may manifest itself in activities that represents a departure from everyday concerns, pilgrimage (a special one-off event, even if it is repeated several times) being a prime example.

Faced with this invasion by pilgrim religiosity, the Catholic institution is going to great lengths to adjust its time-management system. Pastoral arrangements for young people, which more and more often involve events that will cause individual paths to coalesce, offer many examples of such adjustments in all dioceses. But it is necessary to do more than balance supply and demand, even if the problem is sometimes described in these terms: “Young people stay away from Sunday mass on a massive scale but appreciate large festive gatherings; let us give them what they want if that is the way of introducing them to the ‘ecclesiastical experience’...” The new approach is bringing about a more fundamental change. In addition to the attempt to find practical ways of reaching young people, we are seeing the gradual introduction of a new religious time system. This system decouples religious life from the rhythms of everyday life and associates it with exceptional experiences, in which freedom from mundane concerns enables the individual to reach a level of personal fulfilment beyond what is normally possible. As in art, sport and travel (activities with which it has many affinities), religion tends to be seen (and to see itself) as offering situations that might recreate a sense of “ourself” that transcends our normal fragmented experience. This change from a religion of everyday time to one of “special occasions” does not simply represent a practical change in the rhythms of Catholic sociability, it pinpoints

(and induces) a fundamental change in the way the Church manifests its presence in the world.

The Challenge of Space

This religion of “special occasions” is also a religion of “special places”, which points to the change in the relationship between Catholicism and place. It has been said that pilgrim religiosity is marked by mobility and circulation. It reflects the individualized “fluidity” of beliefs, which in turn reflects the uprooted condition of the modern individual, freed (at least in the formal sense) from the burden of affiliations (local, family, religious, professional and even national) that had been a constitutive part of the individual throughout the centuries when sense of identity remained stable. The prevalence of demands for proof of identity, which currently interests sociologists as much as politicians, is the reverse side of this breakdown in affiliation to the community, which served to transmit collective codes of meaning and thereby provide the individual with the means of organizing his life.

A phenomenon experienced in all areas of life, mobility was very soon identified by observers of Catholicism (both internal and external) as a significant factor in the dissolution of parish civilization. In Europe the dechristianizing effect of rural-urban drift and the complex pastoral implications of professional and family mobility were highlighted at a very early stage. More recently we have had a detailed account of the consequences of seasonal migration, which have drastically changed the conditions of Sunday worship (emptying the churches or temporarily overfilling them). The effects of these accelerated migratory movements, which have been upsetting the geographical context of pastoral work for a long time, have now been eclipsed by the move towards delocalization of affiliations, which affects not only practical conditions of religious observance but also the way individuals view religious integration. This delocalization is accompanied by a tendency to attach particular value to certain “special places”, which offer believers a chance to summon up an “imaginary of uprootedness”, while extending their freedom to come and go, choosing places where they “feel at home”. The modern believer is not content to demand subjective authenticity of his spiritual path, he also demands the freedom to choose his community (if he feels the need for one) so that he might find the most favorable conditions (in a setting that suits him) in which to share his personal experience with that of other believers.

It will be observed quite rightly that this phenomenon is not entirely new and that there have long been “parishes of affinities”, notably in big cities, where individuals (intellectuals in particular) have chosen to meet without regard to the original purpose of the venue. The Church itself, noting the increasing inadequacy of the parish structure, has endeavoured through the specialized Catholic Action movements to meet people within the professional environments in which their real lives are led. This trend has indeed called into question the purely local form of organization of religious life, which, by bringing together the most diverse believers on the most simple basis of their place of residence, seeks to assert the universality of the Church itself. It is an acknowledgement that the affiliations generating the strongest sense of social solidarity have shifted from the local village community to the workplace.

But the contemporary phenomenon of delocalization of sociability is different both in scope and nature. Mobility is not merely a fact of modern life, with which the Church must come to terms, it is something demanded by believers to ensure the free play of individual affinities. The flourishing of religious sociability in networks, of which the so-called “new” charismatic communities—springing up in the 1970s, first in the USA and Europe, then across the worldwide Catholic communion—are an essential component, is seriously disrupting the geographical basis of religious affiliation, which has been one of the most important aspects of Catholic organization. We know how the reintegration of these communities into the system of parishes and dioceses was brought about at the cost of hard-won compromises: only in this way could the ecclesiastical authorities bring these largely self-regulating groups back within its sphere of control. To that end the Church revived institutional and legal instruments originally devised to deal with the recurrent problem of controlling religious orders and congregations, which had likewise been in the habit of ignoring the territorial arrangements of the religious authority. Most of the time the “new communities” realized that it was in their interest to accept the authority, or at least the arbitration, of the local bishop in order to maintain their own stability and gain religious legitimacy.

But the logic of affinities (which emphasizes the importance of “spiritual families”, made up of people who elect to be together) has not by any means been fully reconciled with the logic of territories, which is still the organizing principle of ecclesiastical control. The problem is all the more complicated in that the local parishes themselves, which

are seeing a fall in numbers of the faithful and are often deprived of traditional clerical supervision owing to shortage of ordained priests, are themselves forced to operate on a voluntary basis. The logic of affinities (social, ideological and cultural) consequently prevails in the parishes as well, even though it should in principle be alien to them. The ecclesiastical authorities are faced with a growth in networked sociability, which encourages the formation of spiritual interest groups and is currently assuming transnational dimensions. They are confronted, in a number of contexts, with lobbying practices, with which they are often unequipped to deal. In this sense the crisis in religious geography is a major source of disruption, undermining as it does the very principle underlying the exercise of power in Catholicism.

The Challenge of Truth

But it is necessary to go a step further and recognize that the disruption of the religious authority, reflected in the changes in the way the Catholic Church regulates time and space, originates upstream in a change in the regime of truth of belief, itself inseparable from a Catholic religiosity in tune with contemporary cultural globalization. The latter goes hand in hand, as we have already said, with the advent of a religious individualism that makes the individual believer responsible for the symbolic ordering of his experience, an area in which the codes of meaning prescribed by the religious institution are increasingly redundant. From this standpoint, the salient feature of religious modernity is indeed that, in a society of individuals, the institutional instruments used to validate belief and ensure compliance with the standard beliefs and practices laid down by the competent authorities are, to a greater or lesser extent, inevitably doomed to disqualification.

But the individualization of belief specific to ultra-modern societies still does not rule out any kind of reference to a shared truth within a past, present or future community. On the contrary, we observe that at the very moment when people become set in their individual spiritual paths, there is a corresponding increase in their need to assert the unique quality of their experience and to discuss it with others in communities based on strong spiritual affinities. Here again, contemporary Catholic sociability tends to fall within the general pattern of globalization: on the one hand there is a worldwide expansion and differentiation of the networks that serve to link up individuals, on the other there is an increase in the assertion of identity, associated with a powerful sense of

affiliation to a community, in which individuals are able to rediscover their personal identity through their local ties.

In this way the comparative weakening of the institutional regime of truth of religious belief encourages the emergence of two concurrent and inseparable regimes of validation of belief.

- The first is the regime of mutual validation of belief. It is necessary, most notably in the context of festive gatherings, meetings based on affinities and “pilgrim” forms of conviviality as referred to above, to run the whole gamut of intersubjective recognition games based on the “what makes sense to you also makes sense to me” principle. The right to spiritual search takes precedence over assertion of a common truth. The concern to share experiences prevails over the demand for religious conformity.
- The second is the regime of communal validation of belief within small groups of “integral” believers (converted or born-again), for whom the consistency of the beliefs and behaviour expected of their members is an attestation of the truth that unites them.

So, on the one hand, there is a flexible, not very restrictive sociability based on mutual recognition of the unique character of individual paths, on the other there is an intensive sociability, the preserve of virtuosi, who opt for precisely defined values and standards; here a “soft” regime of freely traded truth, there a “hard” regime of exclusively shared truth. The rise of the first leads to the crystallization of the second, while the hardening of the second legitimises the affirmation of the first.

Caught between the pincers of these two emerging regimes of belief validation—making their presence felt at the same time—the Catholic authorities are doing what they can to reconcile two contradictory imperatives.

- On the one hand they must succeed in sustaining a minimum theological and ethical consensus, capable of absorbing the wide range of increasingly individualized trajectories of religious identity. The Roman system must acknowledge that its capacity to impose norms, even on those of the faithful that remain deeply attached to it, has been greatly weakened. This trend has been reflected in matters of policy for some time. Its consequences can now be seen in moral prescriptions and even religious truths. The institution is attempting to adapt

to this situation by projecting the image of a Church that “proposes but does not impose”.³

- But at the same time it is important to maintain a regime of shared truth that is sufficient to prevent the Church from being overwhelmed by the incursions of small communal groups who are willing to provide the faithful—distressed by the absence or loss of common reference points—with the security offered by an all-inclusive “body of truth”. The complex discussions that have been underway for some years between the institution and the “neo-traditional” groups, which claim to have a monopoly on the authentic definition of Catholic identity, based on their own interpretation of tradition, are a good illustration of this state of affairs.

In either case the Church’s regulatory agencies are in a delicate position. The Church cannot renounce its mission to authenticate Catholic belief but it also knows that it is increasingly incapable of imposing all-encompassing prescriptions from above. And so it often appears to be casting about for a middle way between blunt assertion of the ultimate authority of the Magisterium and a certain willingness to be showered with individual constructions of meaning, decked out as appropriate with the trappings of charismatic inspiration. This trial-and-error approach provides a general illustration of the way the Roman church is being forced to adapt to contemporary conditions of globalized religion and of the difficulty it is experiencing—faced with the temptation to close in on itself and the impossibility of accepting the triumph of religious individualism—in finding a place for itself in the modern scheme of things.

³ A reference to the title of a letter by the French bishops: *Proposer la foi dans la société actuelle. Lettre aux catholiques de France*. Paris, Cerf, 1996

CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR

ACCIDENTAL DIASPORAS AND EXTERNAL “HOMELANDS” IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: PAST AND PRESENT¹

Rogers Brubaker

“Diaspora” has enjoyed a spectacular career recently in the social sciences and humanities (Clifford 1994, Safran 1991, Tölölyan 1991, Lie 1995, Cohen 1997). Yet as the term has proliferated, its meaning has become less and less clear. At a minimum, the term involves some notion of dispersion in space and some reference to an actual or imagined homeland, from which the diaspora has become separated, yet towards which it remains oriented in some way—emotionally, imaginatively, or politically. All diasporas, understood in this way, involve a triadic nexus linking diaspora, homeland, and host country or countries (Sheffer 1986). But this nexus can assume many different forms.

In most contemporary discussions, the term “diaspora”, together with kindred terms such as “globalization”, “transnationalism”, and “identity” (especially when this last is understood as fractured, fragmented, multiple, fluid, and so on) evokes the image of a post-modern, uprooted, mobile, deterritorialized world. It suggests, moreover, a post-national world, a world in which the nation-state is no longer an appropriate category of analysis.

The accidental diasporas I address in this chapter belong to a very different world. Far from being post-national, this world might better be characterized as post-multinational. It came into being through the disintegration of previously multinational political structures: the breakup of the Habsburg, Romanov, and Ottoman Empires after the First World War, and of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia at the end of the Cold War. These great reconfigurations of political space along national lines represented the apotheosis, not the repudiation, of the principle of the nation-state. They marked the

¹ An early version of this chapter was published online by the Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, in *Political Science Series* no. 71, 10.2000 (www.ihs.ac.t/publications/pol/pw).

triumph, not the transcendence, of the idea that national and state boundaries should coincide.² In these post-multinational settings, the nexus linking diaspora, homeland, and host country is intensely conflictual, and potentially explosive, in part because of the way in which the “homeland” can become involved. I analyze in this chapter the way in which two “homelands”—Weimar Germany and post-Soviet Russia—have made far-reaching claims to monitor the condition, support the welfare, and protect the rights and interests of “their” respective diasporas—the ethnic Germans who were scattered across Eastern Europe in the interwar period, and the ethnic Russians who are scattered across Soviet successor states today. In the burgeoning discussion of diasporas today, Germans and Russians would be among the last groups to spring to mind. In so far as Germany figures at all in the discussion, it is as a *host* country for labor diasporas, not as a homeland. Germans and Russians exemplify a very different kind of diaspora than that on which recent discussion has focused. They are what I have called in my title “accidental diasporas”.

Let me explain what I mean by this term by contrasting accidental diasporas and the more familiar labor diasporas that have been at the center of much recent discussion. First, labor migrant diasporas are constituted by the movement of people across borders, accidental diasporas by the movement of borders across people. Second, migrant diasporas form gradually through countless individual migration trajectories, while accidental diasporas crystallize suddenly following a dramatic—and often traumatic—reconfiguration of political space. Third, labor migrant diasporas are constituted through the voluntary actions of those who comprise them, while accidental diasporas come into being without the participation, and often against the will, of their members. Fourth, labor migrant diasporas tend to be territorially dispersed, and to lack deep roots in their host countries, while accidental diasporas tend to be more concentrated and territorially rooted. Finally, labor migrant diasporas typically remain for some time citizens of their

² The disintegration of the Soviet Union is often casually included in enumerations of phenomena purporting to show a trend towards the weakening or even the “transcendence” of the nation-state. The reverse is more nearly the case. The Soviet Union was itself an attempt—a failed attempt, but an attempt nonetheless—to “transcend” the nation-state by constructing an expressly multinational state, a state populated by dozens of major—and officially recognized—nationalities. Seen from this perspective, the breakup of the Soviet Union involved a move *back to*, rather than *beyond*, the nation-state. The same could be said of the breakup of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

home countries, while members of accidental diasporas are citizens of the countries in which they live.³

Of course the contrast between labor migrant diasporas and accidental diasporas is not as sharp in reality as I have drawn it here. Some labor migrations generate new forms of territorial concentration in host countries, while some accidental diasporas—or at least some parts of such diasporas—are territorially dispersed. Some labor migrants have acquired citizenship of their host countries, while some members of accidental diasporas—including most Russians and other Russian speakers in Estonia and Latvia—have not.

Moreover—and this is a point I want to dwell on for a moment—most accidental diasporas, like labor diasporas, have been shaped to some extent by migration. But the migration in question occurred long ago. The German *Drang nach Osten*, for example, began in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, as peasant settlements spread eastward beyond the zone of consolidated German settlement, creating a pattern of mixed settlement in the German-Slav borderlands that was to last until the middle of the twentieth century. Later, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, German colonists were invited to settle in many areas of the Habsburg and Russian empires—notably in Hungary, Transylvania, parts of the former Yugoslavia, and the Volga region of Russia. But even the last of these colonists had been settled for a century and a half by the time their world was turned upside down by the collapse of the great multinational empires. Needless to say, they did not see themselves as “immigrants”.

Russians, too, had been moving outward for centuries—mainly eastward and southward—from the original core area of Russian settlement in what is today northwestern Russia. This migration, to be sure, continued under the Soviet regime, and was in part sponsored by the regime (Kolstoe 1995). So *some* of those who found themselves abruptly transformed, by the collapse of the Soviet state, from privileged citizens of a great power into precariously situated minorities in

³ There are obviously other kinds of diasporas than the two forms I've contrasted here. Besides the archetypal Jewish diaspora one might mention the classical trading diasporas and their modern-day successors, sometimes known as middleman minorities (Edna Bonacich 1973); the “mobilized diasporas” conceptualized by John Armstrong (1970); and the diasporas constituted by the slave trade and by other forms of unfree labor within colonial empires. And of course many other distinctions could be drawn. I have focused on one particular contrast—and have drawn the contrast as sharply as possible—in order to highlight the distinctiveness of the diasporas I address in this chapter.

precariously existing states had themselves migrated from Russia to one of the non-Russian republics. Yet most belonged to families that had settled permanently—or what they thought was permanently—in the non-Russian republics; in many cases their families had resided there over several generations. And even those who had themselves migrated from Soviet core to periphery had not crossed state borders; rather, they had moved *within* the territory of the Soviet state. This migration was not only legally and politically defined as internal migration, but was psychologically experienced as such. As a result, these migrants too did not think of themselves as “immigrants”.

Thus both Germans and Russians were involved in long and gradual processes of outward dispersion from original core areas of settlement. But unlike labor migrant diasporas, they crystallized as diasporas through the sudden, traumatic movement of borders across people as multinational empires shattered into would-be nation-states. This radical redrawing of the political map, at the beginning of the short twentieth century (Hobsbawm 1994) and again at its end, was intended to resolve national conflicts. But as we now know all too well, in both periods it simply reframed and in some cases aggravated such conflicts. The very process of satisfying some national claims generated new ones, largely because almost all of the would-be nation-states that emerged from the rubble of empire contained large and alienated national minorities, many of whom felt themselves to “belong” by ethnocultural nationality, though not by legal citizenship, to a “homeland” state from which they were separated by new—or newly significant—state borders.

Speaking schematically, we can say that the nationalization of previously multinational political space generated three interlocking forms of nationalism—all quite distinct from the state-seeking nationalisms on which the literature on nationalist politics has focused. The first is what I call the “nationalizing” nationalism of newly independent (or newly reconfigured) states. This involves claims made in the name of a “core nation” or nationality, defined in ethnocultural terms, and sharply distinguished from the citizenry as a whole. The core nation is understood as the legitimate “owner” of the state, and the state is conceived as the state *of* and *for* the core nation. Yet despite having “its own” state, the core nation is represented as being in a weak or embattled cultural, economic, or demographic position within the state. This is seen as a legacy of discrimination against the nation before it attained independence. This putative discrimination, in turn, is held to justify the “remedial” or “compensatory” project of using state power

to promote the specific interests of the core nation. Examples of such nationalizing states include Poland, Romania, and to a lesser extent Czechoslovakia in the interwar period; and Estonia, Latvia, Kazakhstan, Slovakia, Croatia, and of course Serbia today (Brubaker 1996).

Directly challenging these "nationalizing" nationalisms are the transborder nationalisms of what I call "external national homelands". Homeland nationalisms are oriented to putative ethnonational kin who are residents and citizens of other states. They assert states' right—indeed their obligation—to monitor the condition, promote the welfare, support the activities and institutions, and protect the interests of "their" ethnonational kin in other states. (I place scare quotes around "their" in order to highlight the problematic quality of that seemingly innocent possessive pronoun.) Such claims are typically made, and typically have greatest force and resonance, when the ethnonational kin in question are seen as threatened by the nationalizing policies and practices of the state in which they live. Homeland nationalisms thus arise in direct opposition to and in dynamic interaction with nationalizing nationalisms. Examples of homeland nationalism include Weimar Germany (and, in a very different mode, Nazi Germany), as well as Hungary and Bulgaria, in the interwar period; and (again in sharply differing ways) Russia and Hungary today, as well as Serbia during the early (Croatian) phase of the wars of the Yugoslav succession.

Although analytically distinct, homeland and nationalizing nationalisms are not mutually exclusive. Serbia was a brutally nationalizing state *vis-à-vis* Albanians in Kosovo and an external national homeland *vis-à-vis* Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Croatia, in turn, was an almost equally brutal nationalizing state *vis-à-vis* Serbs in the Krajina region of Croatia and an external national homeland *vis-à-vis* Croats in the quasi-state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Romania is a nationalizing state *vis-à-vis* Hungarians, a homeland *vis-à-vis* Romanians in Moldova. Russia today is a homeland for transborder Russians, but it is also (potentially) a nationalizing state *vis-à-vis* non-Russian minorities in Russia. Interwar Germany was of course not only an external national homeland for transborder Germans, but a murderously nationalizing state *vis-à-vis* Jews.

The third characteristic form of post-multinational nationalism is the minority nationalism of the accidental diasporas themselves. Minority nationalist stances involve a self-understanding in specifically "national" rather than merely "ethnic" terms, a demand for state recognition of their distinct ethnocultural nationality, and the assertion of certain

collective, nationality-based cultural or political rights. This specifically national, rather than merely ethnic, mode of self-understanding, and the political stance that goes along with it, again distinguished “accidental”, post-multinational diasporas from the diasporic formations most widely discussed today. Salient examples include Germans in many Eastern European countries in the interwar period and Hungarian and (in a more problematic sense) Russian minorities today.⁴

There is considerable variation not only *between* these forms of nationalism but *within* each form. For example, the explicit, self-conscious nationalizing policies of Estonia differ markedly from the milder and subtler nationalizing policies and practices characteristic of post-independence Ukraine, and from the non declared but in practice strongly nationalizing practices of Kazakhstan; and all of these differ from the violently homogenizing nationalizing policies and practices of Serbia and Croatia. Or, to take another example, the well organized, well-financed minority nationalism of Hungarians in Romania today differs markedly from the generally passive, disorganized stance of Russians in most Soviet successor states. Finally, the culturally oriented, carefully modulated homeland nationalism of post-communist Hungary, oriented to Hungarian minorities in neighboring states, differs dramatically from the aggressive, destabilizing homeland nationalism of Serbia in the context of the breakup of Yugoslavia. There is of course striking variation on lower levels of aggregation as well—variation, for example, among and even within differently situated Hungarian minority communities in Romania, Slovakia, Serbia, and Ukraine. And there has been great variation over time in Serbian homeland nationalism, Estonian nationalizing nationalism, and so on. As I’ve argued elsewhere, these forms of nationalism should not be conceived as fixed forms or as “forces” varying only in intensity, but rather as variably configured, dynamically changing interactive “fields”, as arenas of struggle between differentiated and competing “stances” (Brubaker 1996). Yet despite this heterogeneity and variation at all levels of aggregation, these three forms of nationalism—nationalizing nationalism, homeland nationalism, and minority nation-

⁴ Like homeland nationalisms, minority nationalisms arise in direct opposition to and in dynamic interaction with nationalizing nationalisms. But minorities are not necessarily aligned with the external national homelands that claim to speak in their name. Hungarian minority politicians in Romania, for example, protested against the “Basic Treaty” signed in 1996 between Hungary and Romania; while Hungarian officials claimed that the treaty would help protect the rights of ethnic Hungarians in Romania, many minority Hungarians contested this and argued that they were “sold out” by a government unsympathetic to their claims for autonomy and collective rights.

alism—are defined in dynamic interaction with one another and directly engendered by the incomplete nationalization of previously multinational political space. For purposes of comparative analysis, this warrants thinking in terms of a single dynamically interactive field of post-multinational nationalisms.

Nationalizing policies, cross-border homeland nationalism, and autonomist minority nationalism are of course not the *only* forms of nationalism that flourished in interwar Central and Eastern Europe or that flourish today. There are a few state-seeking nationalisms—in Kosovo and Chechnya today, for example. There have been instances of traditional “greatpower” nationalism. There have been many instances of defensive, protective, populist nationalism, seeking to protect the national economy, language, mores, or cultural patrimony against putative threats from outside. The bearers of such alleged threats are diverse but can include foreign capital, transnational organizations, today for example the International Monetary Fund (IMF), immigrants, powerful foreign cultural influences, and so on. Although related to the nationalizing nationalisms sketched above, such “defensive nationalisms” are analytically distinct from them, for they do not presuppose ethnonational heterogeneity but are found also in ethnically relatively homogeneous countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Hungary today.

However, these other forms of nationalism stand analytically apart from the first three, though they are often intertwined with them in practice. Unlike the first three forms I identified, these additional forms are neither defined in mutual interaction with one another nor directly engendered by the incomplete nationalization of previously multinational political space. For my purposes, the relevant field for comparative analysis is constituted by the dynamically interacting set of nationalizing, homeland, and minority nationalisms.⁵ I attempt here a comparison across time and space, focusing on transborder homeland nationalisms, the least well explored of these three interlocking forms of

⁵ This field offers rich and largely untapped possibilities for comparative analysis, and one can obviously cut into it analytically in many different ways, at many different levels of aggregation, and using many different strategies of comparative analysis. I present one such cut here, at an extreme macro level of aggregation. In other work in the same broad field, I've been working at lower levels of aggregation, most recently in an ethnographic mode, and at a micro-interactionist level of analysis; so I am certainly not claiming any privileged status for the kind of extreme macro perspective I offer here.

nationalism. In the interwar period, the transborder homeland nationalisms of Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria collided explosively with the nationalizing nationalisms of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania, giving rise to tensions and crises that were closely bound up with the outbreak of the Second World War.

Seemingly analogous collisions threaten the stability and security of the region today. In some cases they have already led to war. The interplay between the nationalizing nationalism of Croatia and the homeland nationalism of Serbia (along with the minority nationalism of Croatia's borderland Serbs) led to the breakup of Yugoslavia. Similarly, the interplay between the nationalizing nationalism of Azerbaijan and the homeland nationalism of Armenia (initially sparked by the minority nationalism of Karabakh Armenians) led to the war over Nagorno-Karabakh. And of course the recent war over Kosovo was part of the clash between the nationalizing nationalism of Serbia and the minority nationalism of Kosovo Albanians, whose weapons, for the most part, flowed over the border from the neighboring external national homeland of Albania after the near-complete breakdown of state authority there in 1997. Elsewhere too this fault line remains unstable. The nationalizing nationalisms of Romania and Slovakia, *vis-a-vis* their Hungarian minorities, have clashed, though not violently, with the homeland nationalism of Hungary. The nationalizing nationalism of Bulgaria *vis-a-vis* its Turkish minority faces the potential homeland nationalism of neighboring Turkey.

The most important, and seemingly most dangerous, clash along this fault line today is between the nationalizing nationalisms of Soviet successor states and the homeland nationalism of Russia. Serious tensions have already been generated by this clash. The nationalizing policies and politics of Estonia and Latvia, especially their restrictive citizenship policies towards their large Russian minorities, have met with harsh Russian condemnations of "apartheid" and "ethnic cleansing". Chronic tensions between Ukraine and Russia over Russian-dominated Crimea flared up in 1994 when the Crimean Russian leadership declared itself virtually independent of central Ukrainian authority and sought closer ties to Russia. Tensions between Kazakhstan and Russia, too, have increased over the hardening nationalizing policies of the Kazakh regime in the Russian-dominated north. And a limited war broke out in Moldova in summer 1992 between the then strongly nationalizing Moldovan state and the secessionist, Russian-led "Dniester Republic", backed by the Russian 14th army.

Yet despite these tensions, I want to argue that the clash between Russian homeland nationalism and the nationalizing nationalisms of Soviet successor states is less explosive and less dangerous than one might think. I develop this argument by way of a comparison between interwar and contemporary homeland nationalisms, focusing on Weimar Germany and post Soviet Russia.

This is a large and unruly comparison. From a methodological point of view, such a comparison—across large stretches of space, time, and context—cannot pretend to be “controlled”.⁶ The two cases differ in any number of ways that might plausibly be linked to the kind of nationalism that interests me. Comparative analysis here affords no surefire method of causal attribution or hypothesis-testing. I compare for the frankly exploratory and preliminary purpose of mapping out a field of investigation and suggesting certain lines of analysis, not for the more conventional purpose of ascertaining the cause of a particular outcome or otherwise testing a hypothesis.

Moreover, the *kind* of comparative analysis I undertake is not the classic kind that Charles Tilly calls “variation-finding” comparison. It is rather what Tilly (1984: 83) calls “individualizing” or what I would call “configurational” comparison. My main concern is not with specific differences in outcome—though there are differences in outcome that interest me. It is rather to specify the distinctiveness of the overall configuration of homeland nationalist claims and practices in the interwar period and the present, using Weimar Germany and post-Soviet Russia as examples. Towards the end of the chapter, I make some arguments linking these distinctive configurations to differences in outcome—but I present these as preliminary, speculative lines of interpretation, not as testable propositions.

If comparison isn't of the variation-explaining, hypothesis-testing sort, why do it? What is the point of such “small-N”, exploratory, individualizing comparison? This is a large and controversial issue, and I don't want to dwell on it here. I present here a substantive, not a methodological argument. But I want to signal in telegraphic fashion how one might make the case for this type of comparative analysis—not, to be sure, as the *only* legitimate type of comparative analysis, but as *one* legitimate type among others.

⁶ In particular, such comparisons cannot claim to be based on John Stuart Mill's “method of difference”. I agree with the criticisms of attempts to use this method advanced, among others, by Lieberson 1991.

I would argue, first, that it is valuable in itself to characterize in rich fashion the individual distinctiveness of important historical configurations. This, I take it, is a crucial part of Weber's epistemological stance. Second, comparative analysis—in which we “think” one case against and by means of another, is an indispensable means of sharpening such characterizations of individual distinctiveness. This holds regardless of whether the comparison is fully “controlled”. Again, I take this to be a fundamental Weberian point. Third, such individualizing comparison may suggest lines of analysis for explanatory, variation finding comparison. Finally, such preliminary individualizing comparison may help us avoid premature, inadequately framed variation-finding comparison. As Tilly put it, we have to “get the history right” before generalizing, if only in order to have any confidence in the soundness of our generalizations (Tilly 1984: 79).

WEIMAR HOMELAND NATIONALISM

Let me turn now to the comparative argument itself (Brubaker 1996). Weimar homeland nationalism built on a model established in Bismarckian and Wilhelmine Germany. Its roots, of course, go further back, reflecting the longstanding incongruence and tension between the imagined community of the nation and the organizational reality of the state in German history. But it was the exclusion of millions of Germans, especially eight million Austro-Germans, from the Prussian-dominated “*kleindeutsch*” nation-state founded in 1871 that first created the possibility of homeland nationalism. This possibility was actualized a few decades later when nationalist pressure groups like the German School Association and the Pan-German League began urging state support for transborder Germans, whose long-privileged position in the Habsburg and Romanov empires was eroding under the challenge of non-German national movements. But movements in late Bismarckian and Wilhelmine Germany to support transborder Germans remained politically weak; the state remained basically indifferent to Germans outside the Reich.

This changed sharply after the First World War, for two reasons. First, the status of ethnic Germans outside Germany changed drastically. The status reversal was perhaps most drastic for the former Reich Germans in the territories ceded to Poland, but it was dramatic for other Germans too, transformed from the *Staatsvolk* or state-bearing nation of the Habsburg Empire or from privileged status group in the

Romanov Empire to beleaguered minorities within the much smaller and highly nationalist states of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Romania, Yugoslavia, and the Baltics.

Secondly, the Weimar Republic—its basic territorial and institutional parameters deeply contested and lacking legitimacy—could not claim to adequately “embody” the German nation, and therefore could not “contain” nationalism within the institutional and territorial frame of the state—something that the geopolitically prestigious, “successful” Bismarckian and Wilhelmine state had done remarkably well. In Weimar, the category “nation” was detached from the frame of the weak and weakly legitimate state, and again identified with an allegedly robust, state-transcending, ethnocultural nation or *Volk*.⁷ In these new circumstances, homeland nationalism flourished in Weimar civil society. Scores of new *Deutschtum*—or “Germandom”—oriented associations and organizations sprang up, while churches, schools, and other associations organized activities in support of co-nationals abroad.

Civil society homeland nationalism had already existed, though on a much smaller scale, before the war. What was new in Weimar was continuous, high-level state activity on behalf of transborder Germans. Its core was covert financial support for Germans and German organizations abroad, mainly for schools, newspapers, churches, charitable organizations, social and cultural activities, and economic enterprises. This covert financial support was linked to wider foreign policy aims, but in differentiated fashion, as can be seen by comparing Poland and Czechoslovakia, the two most important “targets” of Weimar homeland nationalism.

In both states, Germans comprised territorially concentrated, borderland minority communities, unexpectedly and unwillingly transformed into national minorities, and considering themselves second-class citizens of 3rd-class states. Yet there were three key differences between these cases.

⁷ To anticipate: post-Soviet Russia doesn’t adequately “contain” “the nation” either—but “nation” is not as central a category as it was in Weimar Germany. Nationhood was strongly institutionalized for *non*-Russians, but, paradoxically, weakly institutionalized for Russians. This was true in the Czarist Empire, and it remained true in the Soviet Union (the main difference between the two was that non-Russian nationhood and nationality were much more strongly institutionalized in the Soviet Union than in the Czarist Empire.) This lack of strong institutionalization of the category “Russian” may help explain the political passivity of Russians in Soviet successor states so far. On this passivity, see Melvin 1995; on post-Soviet Russian passivity more generally, see also McDaniel 1997.

First, Germans of Western Poland had been citizens of Germany until 1919; Germans of Bohemia and Moravia had been citizens of the Habsburg Empire, and had never in modern times been united with Reich Germans in a single state. Second, there was a mass exodus of Germans from Western Poland to Germany after the war, but no large migration of Sudeten Germans. Third, Germany harbored territorial claims against Poland but not against Czechoslovakia. Reflecting these contextual differences, Weimar policies towards transborder Germans in these two neighboring states differed sharply.

Towards Germans in Poland, Weimar policies sought above all to curb large-scale resettlement; this was linked to the longer-term strategic aim of sustaining future revisionist claims. After all, if the mass exodus could not be stemmed, and if no Germans remained in the territories ceded to Poland, it would be more difficult to make future claims for border revision. Toward Germans in Czechoslovakia, Weimar policy was governed neither by any overriding immediate imperatives nor by clear long-term strategic aims. Yet Weimar support for Germans in Czechoslovakia was not wholly innocent of political design. In a number of ways, Weimar Germany used the question of the status of Sudeten Germans to gain diplomatic leverage in pursuit of other foreign policy aims—especially to promote the interpenetration of the German and Czechoslovak economies as part of a broader aspiration for German economic hegemony in East Central Europe and the Balkans.

The final aspect of Weimar homeland nationalism that I want to signal is that the public side of homeland nationalism was muted—somewhat surprisingly, given the vigor of civil society homeland nationalism and the elaborate program of covert support for German minorities abroad. In post-Soviet Russia, by contrast, homeland nationalism has a much higher profile in public discourse—a point I return to below.

At certain political conjunctures, official homeland nationalist rhetoric did become more salient in Weimar Germany. But even after Germany joined the League of Nations—a step it justified in part by arguing that League membership would give Germany an ideal platform from which to defend the rights of German minorities abroad—Foreign Minister Stresemann was quite cautious about pressing issues connected with transborder Germans, and was much more concerned with other, more classically statist aims.

Weimar homeland nationalism can be characterized in summary as a complex web of political stances, cultural idioms, organizational networks, and transborder social relations. As a *political* phenomenon,

homeland nationalism involved a set of "moves" in both domestic and international political arenas. In the domestic arena, these moves were intertwined with party competition; in the interstate arena, they were bound up with—and generally subordinate to—Germany's efforts to recover sovereignty, revise the Treaty of Versailles, and re-establish its position as a Great Power and regional hegemon. Because of this intertwining, Weimar homeland nationalism cannot be understood solely in terms of its own "internal" logic; it cannot be analyzed as an "autonomous" domain of politics.

As a *cultural* phenomenon, Weimar homeland nationalism involved the development and widespread use of a set of idioms of identification with, and responsibility for, transborder Germans. These idioms represented transborder Germans as full members of the German national community or *Volk*. In this discourse, "nation" and "*Volk*" were detached from the frame of the state and redefined in ethnocultural terms. Externally, this granted membership in the nation to transborder Germans; internally, and more fatefully, it denied membership to German Jews. This new *Volk*-oriented discourse of nationhood was articulated and propagated by journalists, publicists, scholars, emigrés from transborder German communities, and activists in German-dom-oriented associations and organizations. These idioms were then appropriated and used by politicians and state officials as well, though to a limited extent, in fragmentary fashion, and without the anti-statist implications of consistently *Volk*-oriented discourse.

As an *organizational* phenomenon, Weimar homeland nationalism involved a network of state agencies, state-controlled (though nominally private) organizations, and voluntary associations. This network provided an extensive array of organized sites for the development of German-dom-oriented expertise and activities. The leading personnel in these organizations and associations were well connected with one another, partly through overlapping memberships and interlocking directorates, partly through joint participation in a variety of meetings on the affairs of transborder Germans. Together, they constituted an organized "public", a structured, differentiated space of communication, discussion, and debate.

As a *social-relational* phenomenon, finally, Weimar homeland nationalism involved a dense network of cross-border relations and resource flows. These not only linked transborder Germans to Weimar Germany but, perhaps more importantly, contributed to detaching them from the states in which they lived. This restructuring of social networks and

relations was most important in the case of the Sudeten Germans. Their networks and relations had long been framed by the Habsburg state but were substantially restructured after its collapse. One aspect of this involved the weakening of Sudeten Germans traditional ties with Vienna and the strengthening of ties with Berlin and Germany. This, in turn, encouraged the Sudeten German elite to look to Germany for solutions to their problems rather than to seek to resolve them within the Czechoslovak state.

The vicissitudes of homeland nationalism after the Nazi seizure of power cannot be addressed here. It is worth noting in passing, however, that the Nazis appropriated the political, cultural, organizational, and social-relational legacy of Weimar homeland nationalism: the calculated deployment of homeland nationalist stances in domestic and international arenas; the *völkisch* idioms of identification with and responsibility for transborder Germans; the network of agencies, organizations, and associations concerned with co-nationals abroad; and the web of cross-border ties and resource flows. In this sense, one can speak of continuity between Weimar and Nazi homeland nationalism. And there was in fact no abrupt break in the early years of the new regime. Indeed, homeland nationalist themes at first receded from public view as the regime focused on internal consolidation, pursued an initially cautious line in foreign policy, and discouraged the press from focusing on the problems of the German minority in Poland in the wake of the German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact of 1934.

Yet the Weimar legacy was radically transformed in the context of the aggressive Nazi foreign policy of the late 1930s (and further transformed in the context of imperialist war and German occupation in the East). The cautious diplomatic use of homeland nationalist themes in Weimar gave way to the blustering fulminations of Hitler in the months preceding the Munich agreement. The *völkisch* discourse of identification with and responsibility for transborder Germans was redefined by the Nazi commitment to establishing a *grossdeutsches* Reich incorporating the entire area of consolidated German settlement. Germanism-oriented associations were ruthlessly *gleichgeschaltet*, subordinated to the state and party apparatus, and the “traditionalist” homeland nationalist leaders, committed to the integrity and autonomy of German minority communities, were displaced by others who did not hesitate to subordinate the concerns of transborder minorities to the imperatives of Reich foreign policy. The web of cross-border ties, finally, permitted Hitler to use the Sudeten Germans, in 1938, as a fifth column in his plan to destroy the Czechoslovak state.

HOMELAND NATIONALISM IN CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA

I turn now to contemporary Russia. Just as the collapse of the Willhemine, Habsburg, and Romanov empires stranded millions of Germans, so the disintegration of the Soviet Union stranded millions of Russians—indeed far more Russians, some 25 million in all—in an array of successor states. These successor states, like those of the interwar period, are nationalizing states, established as the states of and for particular ethnocultural nations. The new Russian minorities, like Germans in the interwar period, are represented in Russian media and public life as threatened by the nationalizing policies and practices of the successor states. Like Weimar Germany, post-Soviet Russia has suffered what can be construed as a “humiliating” loss not only of territory but of its status as a Great Power. As in Weimar, this has created an opening for political entrepreneurs with a variety of remedial, compensatory, or restorationist political agendas.

There are many further parallels between Weimar Germany and post-Soviet Russia that bear at least indirectly on homeland nationalism, including deep economic crisis, a new and fragile democratic regime, and geopolitical and economic preponderance *vis-à-vis* neighboring states. These parallels are so superficially striking that they have led some journalists and commentators to speak of “Weimar Russia”.

I want to distance myself from this notion, seductive though it is. My comparison of transborder homeland nationalism in Weimar Germany and contemporary Russia does not rest on a belief that these are fundamentally or deeply similar cases. They are *comparable* cases in so far as both belong to the broader universe of post-multinational nationalisms that I sketched above. But precisely their comparability permits me to highlight fundamental differences between the cases, and between the broader interwar and contemporary contexts in which they are situated.

I want to explore three differences in the forms—and formative contexts—of homeland nationalism in the two settings. The first concerns the greater visibility of official Russian homeland nationalism, the second the weakness of civil society homeland nationalism in Russia, and the third the ambiguity of the population targeted by Russian homeland nationalism.

Official Weimar homeland nationalism transpired primarily behind the scenes. Our knowledge of it comes mainly from administrative archives, not from the records of public speech. The homeland nationalism of Weimar civil society was public and visible, but that of the state was largely covert.

Russia, by contrast, has been anything but reticent; its official homeland nationalism has been conspicuously visible. There is no doubt an important covert dimension as well, but that's another issue; what I want to underscore here is the public and visible dimension of official Russian homeland nationalism, a dimension largely lacking from official Weimar homeland nationalism. Public pronouncements on the right, and the obligation, to protect Russians in the near abroad have become a staple of official Russian discourse, figuring prominently in accounts of Russian foreign policy priorities.

Demonstrative rhetoric has been complemented by an official, public codification of the “fundamental guidelines” of Russian policy *vis-à-vis* “compatriots” in the near abroad, outlining a series of thirty-nine governmental measures. Although the Weimar government adopted a number of similar measures, it did not—and could not—admit to maintaining direct contacts with transborder ethnic Germans, funding their organizations, supporting their economic life, or underwriting their German-language press and educational institutions. This suggests two key differences in the international context of homeland nationalism between the interwar period and the present.

The first difference is normative and institutional. The principle of territorial sovereignty was far more robust in the interwar period. Today, the exclusive claims of the nation-state to internal sovereignty have weakened through the growth of a complex web of cross-border jurisdictions in various policy domains, while transborder concern about the rights of minorities—like transborder concern for human rights is widely seen as more legitimate.⁸ The second salient difference is geopolitical. Russian military, political, and economic preponderance *vis-à-vis* neighboring states is much greater than that of Weimar Germany *vis-à-vis* East Central Europe. This enables Russia to adopt an assertive stance on Russian minorities abroad, while at the same time the weakening of models of sovereignty and the new international legitimacy of transborder concerns with minorities enable it to frame its tough talk in newly legitimate idioms of human and minority rights.

This suggests a further contextual difference. Weimar foreign policy consistently, albeit peacefully, sought changes in territorial borders. Russia, on the other hand—perhaps precisely because of its overwhelming

⁸ On international institutionalized legitimacy in the context of an emergent “world polity”, see Meyer 1987. On the institutionalized international legitimacy of human rights discourse, see Soysal 1994.

dominance in the region—is not necessarily committed to territorial revision. It's true that the present borders of the Russian Federation are universally seen as arbitrary, as lacking any historical sanction or normative dignity; yet they are not universally regarded as in urgent need of revision. Territorial revision is indeed pushed by certain political entrepreneurs, who claim to find intolerable the existence of Ukraine as a separate state or the fact that six million Russians live under Kazakh rule. But border revision lacks the fundamental, unquestioned status it had in Weimar Germany. Why? I think this reflects on the one hand a decline in the "material" significance of territory—a partial "de-territorialization" and economization of power, and, on the other hand, in seeming opposition to this, the institutional reification and "sacralization" of existing territorial frontiers in international discourse and international organizations (Rosecrance 1986). The former makes border changes less necessary; the latter makes them more difficult.

By comparison with the interwar period, borders have become more "inviolable", but they have also become more insignificant. This dual development makes territorial revisionism a costly, "inefficient", and, it could be argued, ultimately unnecessary way to augment state power, even for many of those whose agendas are commonly labeled "neo-imperialist".⁹ On a more speculative note, I suggest there may be a connection between the ubiquitous corruption in post-Soviet Russia and the weakness of classical territorial revisionism. Because it is so ridden with corruption in every domain and at every level, the Russian state may be simply incapable of acting in the coherently statist manner posited by realist international relations theory. Michael Mann has cautioned against overestimating the coherence of putatively unitary states (Mann 1993). But if this caution applies, say, to late nineteenth century Germany, how much more forcefully it would apply to contemporary Russia. There is no coherent state in Russia today. In these circumstances, why should state elites in any sector, including the military, pursue changes in territorial borders? Doesn't it make more sense for them to "live and let live", to simply take their cut of whatever deal happens their way?

⁹ Drawing on Michael Doyle's definition of empire, Ronald Suny argues against conflating an "imperial project" proper, involving the establishment (or re-establishment) of full sovereignty by a center over a distinct and subordinate periphery, with "Great Power hegemony", involving a relation of domination between separate states, and suggests that the latter is more likely in the case of post-Soviet Russia. See Doyle 1995: 193–4.

If the official homeland nationalism of post-Soviet Russia has been more public and visible than that of Weimar Germany, civil society homeland nationalism has been much less visible in the Russian case. This is the second difference I want to underscore. Reportage and commentary on Russians outside Russia has figured prominently in the Russian press. But the core of civil society homeland nationalism in Weimar Germany—the dense and vigorous network of associations concerned with co-ethnics abroad—has no counterpart in post-Soviet Russia. This reflects of course the general weakness of civil society in Soviet successor states. It also reflects the fact that civil society homeland nationalism in Weimar Germany could build, ideologically and organizationally, on an established pre-war tradition of concern for Germanism abroad. Needless to say, there was no comparable tradition of concern for Russians outside Russia in the Soviet era.

The last difference concerns the much greater ambiguity of the population targeted by Russian homeland nationalism. Weimar homeland nationalism was addressed unambiguously to persons who were German by ethnocultural nationality but not by citizenship.¹⁰ In Russia, by contrast, there is no agreement about how to define the persons in need of Russian “protection”. Five terms have been widely used to identify the relevant population. Most clearly paralleling Weimar homeland nationalism are claims to protect *russkie*, that is Russians by ethnocultural nationality. The second term, *rossiiane*, also ordinarily translated as “Russians”, in principle construes Russianness in territorial rather than ethnocultural terms, but in practice serves more as a “politically correct” substitute for *russkie* (politically correct because it acknowledges the multiethnic population of Russia). The third widely used term is *russkoiazychnye*, or Russian-speakers. This term is more expansive, including not only Russians by ethnocultural nationality but others accustomed to living and working in a Russophone environment who might, for this reason, identify politically with Russians in Soviet successor states and join them, for example, in resisting programs of linguistic nationalization.

The fourth term, *sotechestvenniki*, means compatriots, that is people who share a common fatherland (*otechestvo*). In the post-Soviet context, however, this original, clearly political meaning has been overlaid by a

¹⁰ In practice, to be sure, it was not always evident precisely who belonged to this population, especially in regions (such as Upper Silesia or parts of East Prussia) of fluid ethnocultural identity. In principle, however, everyone agreed that German claims concerned the *Grenz- und Auslandsdeutsche* of Central and Eastern Europe, and that these borderland and foreign Germans were defined by their ethnocultural nationality.

melange of criteria based on some combination of descent, ethnicity, past citizenship, and spiritual-cultural orientation. This incongruous blend of legal, ethnographic, and identitarian notions has become the term of choice in official documents, perhaps precisely because of its ambiguity.

The final term is *grazhdane* (citizens). The protection of citizens residing in other states, it would seem, is completely distinct from homeland nationalism, oriented to protecting *noncitizen* co-nationals. Yet the distinction is not so clear-cut in the post-Soviet context. *Grazhdane* is often used metaphorically, as a synonym of *sootchestvenniki*, or compatriots (Kolstoe 1995: 261); it is also used, again metaphorically, in connection with the claim that Russia has responsibility for all former Soviet citizens. Moreover, Russia has sought to convert co-nationals into fellow citizens. It has sought to conclude agreements on dual citizenship with other successor states. Failing that, it has begun to grant citizenship on application to individual petitioners from the near abroad, even to those who possess the citizenship of another successor state. Doing so on a large scale would strengthen Russia's jurisdictional claims in the near abroad and provide a convenient pretext for intervention.

The shifting and ambiguous vocabulary of homeland claims enables Russia to play in multiple registers, and to advance multiple and only partly overlapping jurisdictional claims in the near abroad. Through a kind of division of semantic labor, *russkie* provides cultural resonance and emotional power (and is therefore most useful in the context of domestic political competition), while *rossiiane*, *russkoiazychnye*, and *sootchestvenniki* (terms entirely foreign to everyday speech, and lacking—with the partial exception of the last—any kind of cultural resonance and emotional power) designate a broader target population and can therefore be used in international context and in official documents to expand Russia's jurisdictional claims in the near abroad (and to represent those claims as transcending a narrow ethnic interest in protecting ethnic Russians). An expansive politics of citizenship, finally, enables Russia to combine the traditional (and from the point of view of international law more legitimate) rhetoric of protecting citizens in other states with homeland nationalist claims to protect noncitizen co-nationals. This opportunistic use of multiple idioms is further evinced in the somewhat incongruous marriage of a vocabulary of human rights to that of homeland nationalism, as in the frequent claim that Russia must protect the human rights of (ethnic) Russians in the near abroad.

CONCLUSION

Weimar homeland nationalism, I suggested above, was a complex web of political stances, cultural idioms, organizational networks, and transborder social relations. Russian homeland nationalism can also be regarded in this way. As a *political* phenomenon, homeland nationalism has been more salient, in both domestic and interstate contexts, in post-Soviet Russia than in Weimar Germany. Pronouncements on homeland nationalist themes have been more central to both governmental and oppositional political discourse, and to domestic political competition, than was the case in Weimar Germany. Like Weimar homeland nationalism, Russian homeland nationalism is doubly “intertwined”—both with domestic political competition and with efforts to consolidate Russian hegemony in the near abroad. In both domestic and interstate contexts, homeland nationalist stances have been deployed instrumentally, as a calculated means to other ends. But again as in Weimar, this instrumental exploitation of homeland nationalist stances has occurred against the background of taken-for-granted shared understandings concerning the plight of Russians in the near abroad and the obligation of the Russian state to do something on their behalf.

The dual embeddedness of homeland nationalism, as a political phenomenon, in wider domestic and interstate political contexts, means that it lacks its own autonomous logic and dynamic. As a political phenomenon, homeland nationalism is a set of moves, a set of stances, a family of related discursive claims—but the “game” in which these moves are activated, in which they pay off, or fail to pay off, is not any autonomous game of homeland politics, but rather the wider domestic and interstate “games”. The “value” or appropriateness of a homeland stance or move depends on the rules of the game and the resources possessed by competing players. In general, the greater international legitimacy and institutionalization of cross-border concern with minorities makes homeland nationalist “moves”—claims to support transborder minorities—more appropriate and useful as political “moves” than they were in the interwar period.

As a *cultural idiom*, Russian homeland nationalism has been much more uncertain, ambiguous, and fluctuating than its Weimar counterpart. Weimar homeland nationalist discourse could build on the *grossdeutsch*, pre-unification tradition of the mid-nineteenth century and on the tradition of concern for Germans in the Habsburg and Romanov territories that developed in the late Bismarckian and Wilhelmine eras. Because

of the lack of a comparable tradition in Russia, homeland nationalist discourse has had to be assembled by "bricolage" from various available and legitimate cultural "scraps". Lacking indigenous roots, it has had to be cobbled together from a variety of discursive traditions: from "classical" homeland nationalism, from the legal rhetoric of diplomatic protection of citizens in other states, from human rights discourse, from the vocabulary of great power politics, from the rhetoric of post-imperial responsibility. As a result, the discourse has been multivocal and opportunistic, playing on multiple registers, and lacking consistency. The ambiguous and partly incongruous vocabulary for identifying the targets of homeland nationalist claims is but one indicator of this. As an *organizational* phenomenon, Russian homeland nationalism lacks the strong associational base in civil society that characterized Weimar homeland nationalism; the network of organizations concerned with Russians in the near abroad is therefore much more state-centered.

As a *social-relational* phenomenon, finally, Russian homeland nationalism, like its Weimar counterpart, involves the cultivation and maintenance of cross-border relations and the provision of a flow of cross-border resources. The process of organizing resource flows and reconstituting networks and relations disrupted by the breakup of the Soviet Union is still incipient; and too little is known at present to make substantive claims about it. In the long run, however, the political disposition of Russian and Russophone minorities in the successor states—in particular, the degree to which and manner in which they look to Russia for solutions to their problems, rather than work them out within the frame of the successor states—will be significantly shaped by these relations and resource flows, and on the degrees and forms of integration with Russia (and of detachment from successor state contexts) that they generate.

In comparing Weimar Germany and post Soviet Russia, I've at the same time been making a broader comparison between the contexts and forms of homeland nationalism in the interwar period and the post-communist present. I want to come back to this broader comparison in conclusion.

The inter-state system, I think, can "handle" the cross-border claims of homeland nationalism in a manner that simply wasn't available in the interwar period. Then, the model of state sovereignty was much more robust. Precisely for this reason, borders were not sacralized and reified to the extent they are now. Because sovereignty was more absolute, it was more urgent, more compelling, to "get the borders

right". Because the principle of *cuius regio eius natio* was so entrenched, it was assumed that states could do whatever they wanted to nationalize their territories. It was seen as a grievous problem if minorities were "misclassified", assigned, as it were, to the "wrong" state. Now, when minorities are seen as being in "the wrong state", this usually means the wrong status, the wrong condition, not the wrong side of the territorial border.

I am deliberately over stating this point. It's easy to think of exceptions and countervailing tendencies. But I do think that the logic of inter-state relations and of what John Meyer has called the "world polity" does make it possible to accommodate homeland nationalism today in a way that was not possible in the interwar period. This does not make me an optimist about Russia or the former Soviet Union. Far from it. But among the many grave problems facing the region, it seems to me, the danger of an aggressive Russian homeland nationalism is not as great as one might think.

CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE

MARGINALITY RECONSTRUCTED: SUB-NATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL IDENTITIES IN THE WAKE OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND TOURISM

Victor Azarya

GLOBALIZATION AND MARGINALITY

In the studies of globalization that have burst with force into the social sciences literature in recent years, the focus of attention is steadily moving from the unifying and standardizing effects of the process (the ‘McDonaldization’ syndrome [Ritzer 2000]) to the persistence of diversity, disjuncture, inequality and marginality within the global system (Appadurai 1990, Hobsbawm 2000, Robertson 2002, Chase-Dunn 2002, Grant and Short 2002a, Preyer and Bös 2002). There is growing realization that globalization produces two opposite effects which nevertheless influence and reinforce each other: on the one hand the growing homogenization of societies and their integration into the world arena, on the other hand the continued quest for local identities and idiosyncrasies (Entrena 2002: 221, Castles and Davidson 2000: 6). Several scholars have attempted to account for the process whereby local units have adopted both global trends and influences, and have striven to be incorporated in an integrated whole. But, in the process they have also modified those effects by giving them a distinct local touch more in tune with local cultural traditions or socio-economic constraints. There has also been greater acceptance of local idiosyncrasies within the global system, a greater global valorization of particular identities (Pieterse 2000: 102).

Terms such as ‘glocalization’ or ‘hybridization’ have been suggested in this regard to explain the seemingly complex and contradictory phenomena experienced in the local units and various peripheries facing the global trends (Pieterse 2000, Robertson 2002, Grant and Short 2002: 197–199, Kincheloe 2002: 166–169). In the discussion of McDonaldization, the point has been made that eating in McDonalds is a status symbol in many Asian countries, a display of affluence, modernity

and global incorporation. Within the United States, however, it is, on the contrary, associated with lack of distinction and quality (Kincheloe 2002: 2). Also, the example of the proliferation of ethnic cuisines in the West has been given to show that influences of globalization flow not only from the global to the local but also from the local to the global (Grant and Short 2002: 12, Robertson 2002: 34).

It has also been claimed that the global trends have affected different groups very differentially. Some groups have been left relatively less affected by the influences of globalization or have been specifically excluded from or marginalized within the new global whole (Hoogvelt 1997, Grant and Short 2002). The exclusion and marginalization affect both the populations of the postindustrial societies themselves and the relations between those societies and the more peripheral post-colonial societies. Within postindustrial countries, Hoogvelt draws attention to 'two thirds societies' where one third of the adult citizens are marginalized by long-term unemployment (Hoogvelt 1997). As for the differences between countries, Hoogvelt's study shows how most African countries are virtually excluded from global development, are assigned a marginal role within the global system and attention in them is directed mainly to the containment of anarchy. It is further stressed that the gap between the richest and poorest one-fiftieth portions of the world's population was twice as big in the 1990s than what it was 30 years earlier. While global per capita income tripled over the period of 1960 to 1994, more than a hundred countries had by the end of the century per capita incomes that were lower than what they had in the 1980s and some in the 1960s and 1970s (Stalker 2000).

Whatever the reasons and the dynamics involved, the brief discussion above shows quite clearly that globalization which was supposed to create a more unified and integrated world paradoxically generates in its midst important niches of marginal groups and identities. But here an important analytical distinction has to be added: Some of those marginal groups are not simply remnants from a previous past as yet less affected by new trends, nor groups specifically excluded from, disenfranchised or discriminated against in the new global whole or being pushed to its margins because they do not play an active role in it. On the contrary, some marginal groups are marginal *because* of the important role they play in globalization. Not only are they the results of the same socio-economic or cultural forces that lead to a tightening of global ties and interdependence, they actually lubricate those forces, help them grow

and expand. They help push forward the trends of globalization which also affects them and still adds to their marginality.

One such example comes from international labor migration which is a major component of globalization. Its size has risen greatly and it has created serious tensions in the host societies to which it is directed. Mass media are full of debates on the consequences of the exploding numbers of migrants and depict a world full of people on the move, using every opportunity to come to the prosperous centers of the global economy (Bös 2002, Castles and Davidson 2000). This is happening not because of any liberalization of immigration controls, but because of growing labor supply pressures, rising income inequalities within and across nations and the revolution in the information, communication and transportation technologies, all brought about by globalization itself (Sengenberger 2000). Air transportation costs per mile in 1990, for example, were less than 20% of their 1930 level and a three minute telephone conversation between London and New York fell from US \$300 to just \$1! (Stalker 2000). However, this easiness to move also has a cultural dimension. While the fundamental cause of international labor migration remains the income gap between one country and another, what makes a potential migrant actually move is his being exposed to the hitherto undreamed of alternatives of life in another country, perhaps through stories heard from fellow migrants, or through a vision of that country received through the media (soap operas for example) or the distribution of Western consumer products in his home country that contribute to a sense of belonging to a global consumer culture (Stalker 2000). Globalization thus reduces not only the financial but also the emotional costs of moving (Stalker 2000).

Still, those foreign workers, many of them illegal migrants, are very marginal populations in the societies to which they move in search of employment. They are despised, disliked, often actively discriminated against in the host society. They occupy the lowest ladders of social status. The recent trends of privatization have led to a decline in the state-directed social protection systems. Moreover, labor institutions that have evolved to meet national needs are often inadequate to provide protection and security to a globally mobile labor force (Sengenberger 2000, Castles and Davidson 2000). The fact that many foreign workers are not citizens of the host country and may not even be legally residing there further reduces the social protection on which they could rely. They often lack political rights or even basic human rights. They

can be deported, incarcerated, fired, paid minimal wages without any social benefits and may even be physically abused. They usually live in separate communities, with very little social services under very substandard housing conditions but would generally not dare complain either because they are not aware of their rights or because they do not actually have any and fear that visibility might lead to their deportation, incarceration or other counter measures against them. These groups, however, also provide the essential low wage labor force and great labor mobility that the global capitalist system depends on in its insatiable expansion. In the dual labor market that characterizes the contemporary capitalist economies, employers need people who are willing to work long hours, under unpleasant conditions, for low wages and whom they can lay off easily and reemploying them as required thus giving their business operative flexibility (Stalker 2000). The country's nationals are no longer willing to work under such difficult and precarious conditions, even preferring to live off welfare benefits if they are unemployed. Foreign workers, by contrast, and especially those without work or residency permits, are less choosy in the works they get, since even those precarious conditions constitute a significant rise in wages compared to what they can expect in their home country and they would not want to protest too much for fear of being deported.

In other words, the growth of this marginal group is closely linked to the socio-economic processes of globalization. They help globalization grow and expand but are also affected by it. Their growth derives to a large extent from the greater geographical mobility that globalization creates, shortening travel distances, great opening of communication and transportation networks, instant propagation of news and of the perception (even if false) that job opportunities are readily available throughout the globe. Their marginality is also a direct consequence of the same trends of globalization, as those job opportunities would be available only if those people would be ready to work and live under much worse conditions than the local populations. Foreign workers are thus an outcome of globalization, but they also enable the global economy to grow, thus leading to still greater flows of international migration.

The paradoxical relationship between marginality and globalization manifested in the international labor migration is well covered in the recent social science literature (see for example Bös 2002). By comparison, much less attention has been paid to a similar interrelationship between globalization and marginality that is manifested in another

type of international travel, that which takes place for purposes of tourism (Azarya 2004).

International tourism, undoubtedly, is another phenomenon intricately related to globalization. It feeds on the 'space-time contraction' that is an essential feature of globalization. It relies on the quicker and cheaper means of communication and transportation and on the higher disposable income and longer vacations earned by employees in the Western industrial world. Tourism also further contributes to globalization by accelerating the diffusion of goods, services and ideas across long distances and national boundaries.

Tourism is the world's largest and fastest growing industry. It is the largest employer in the world and accounts for the largest export earnings (Wood 1997, Tisdell 2001). However, as it grows, international tourism is also increasingly attracted to the 'different'. Just as the number of pleasure travelers and of the related industries that provide them services (hotels, restaurants, airlines, car-rentals, the photo industry, etc.) rise in gigantic proportions, a relatively larger proportion of them are directed to faraway places. As distances shrink, travel times shorten, disposable income and leisure time rise in the West, accessibility to more remote places grows. At the same time, curiosity for the 'other', for the 'different' grows perhaps as a reaction to the standardizing and unifying effects of globalization. Boredom sets in at the core of the global village (Van den Berghe 1980). The same processes that create the global village, i.e. the mechanisms that shorten distances, propagate similarity and produce an ever growing undistinguished mass also generate a quest for those dwindling refuges of difference (Elliott 2001, Mowforth and Munt 1998, Crick 1989, Azarya 2004).

Thus, international tourism's incessant search for going 'beyond the beaten track' inadvertently leads to a preservation of marginal groups, traditions and identities, as the people holding those marginal cultures and traditions realize that they can put them into a newly profitable use, though in a somewhat modified form, as we shall see below. In other words, marginality is again propped up by the very forces and dynamics of globalization.

Examples of such commercially profitable exhibits of marginality abound in the third world, such as among the Maasai in Kenya or the tribes of Borneo in Indonesia and Malaysia, but also in the marginal corners of the first world itself, such as among American Indians in the United States and Canada or among Maori in New Zealand. Tourists increasingly flock to attend tribal initiation ceremonies of native groups,

observe the dances, hear the songs, buy the handcrafts of those people, photograph those people in their colorful dresses, witness them go on fishing expeditions or draw blood from their cattle (see, for example, Bruner and Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1994).

It should immediately be stressed that such exhibits are not necessarily fake shows (on the question of authenticity see Cohen 1988). On the contrary, such 'shows' provide added incentive to successive generations of Maasai, Maori and others to remember those traditions, practice them, and pass them on to their children. The exhibits, even if economically motivated, help the conservation of those traditions and strengthen the collective identity of the people involved. Yet, some subtle modifications do occur in those traditions as they are being conserved. For example, they are increasingly redesigned to be visually compact so that they fit the frame of the camera, since for the tourists, whatever cannot be 'captured' by a photo has no durable value. Such exhibits are also shortened in time. Ceremonies that used to take days or weeks are condensed into a few hours in order to fit the tourists' tight time schedule.

In any case, what is exhibited in these cases is indeed marginality. Those people, cultures, lifestyles arouse curiosity *because* they are different from the ordinary, from the familiar, as seen by Westerners. They attract attention and are put to commercial use because they are marginal from the vantage point of Western centrality. In many cases they are marginal even within the states that make use of them for tourism. They do not represent the current centers of Kenyan, Indonesian or Australian societies, but rather spheres and groups that have remained in, or were pushed to the margins even within those societies.

This is not to say, of course, that all that is commercially exploited for the sake of tourism is marginal as far as those states are concerned. The Great Wall of China, the Pyramids of Egypt, the temple complex of Angkor Wat in Cambodia, the Chartres Cathedral in France do attract great tourist curiosity not because they are marginal within those societies but, on the contrary, because they are cultural icons representing the center of those societies. The visitors to them are awed by them and consider them highest specimens of national or human civilization.

What we do say, though, is that in addition to the continued attraction to central icons of regional or human civilization, there is recently a perceptible *relative* rise in the tourist attraction to the marginal, even within those societies, whether the Maasai in Kenya, inhabitants of

the Borneo jungle in Indonesia, the Aborigines in Australia, tribes of the Amazon basin in South America or hill tribes in Thailand. This attraction to the marginal is put to commercial use by the respective states and by those people themselves who see in it an opportunity for greater incorporation within the global system. While being displayed for commercial use, marginality is also reconstructed, reformulated, perhaps slightly modified and paradoxically reinforced as a means of incorporation in the global system and in response to the needs, demands and opportunities created by globalization.

How then does all that affect identity at the sub-national, national and transnational level? My tentative proposition here and the punchline of this chapter is that the paradoxical processes of intermingling marginality and globalization discussed above tend to reinforce identities at both the sub-national and the transnational levels more than at the national level. Pieterse (2000) put forward a similar proposition, though without linking it to marginality, when he suggested that globalization can mean the reinforcement of both supranational and sub-national regionalism. I would like to examine the specific role of marginality within globalization in this respect and analyze it with the help of examples from international labor migration and tourism discussed above.

INTERNATIONAL LABOR MIGRATION

The workers who are increasingly mobile around the globe in search for better job opportunities, as both cause and effect of globalization, generally tend to look for kin in the host societies, hoping to receive crucial tips from them on how to adjust to the new place, especially in finding accommodation and first work opportunities, or to be protected from the law enforcement agents of the host country if such need arises. They also look for a more familiar environment that would alleviate the loneliness and alienation felt in this new hostile environment. Hence labor migrants tend to congregate in communities of similar ethnic, regional or religious background and develop close ties among themselves. Such ties have led to the formation of strong sub-national bonds and identities, based on religion, ethnicity, country or region of origin, all sub-national in respect to the proclaimed national boundaries of the host society. This fact has been well established and has given rise to a very rich literature of sociological analysis (as a comprehensive

literature review is far beyond the scope of this chapter; I would refer the reader just to the work of Saskia Sassen 2000, which is also directly related to globalization).

In their search for people of common background, migrant workers may have had to enlarge the circles of identity with which they would affiliate if their immediate family ties or tribal/village affiliation would not be sufficiently strong or large to provide them the protection they need. Hence, they would find it easier to identify as Yoruba, rather than as a member of one of the many branches of Yoruba—if they live in England or Germany. Similarly they would feel stronger as Ghanians rather than as Ashanti, Fanti or as belonging just to a small village near Cape Coast if they live in Manchester or Amsterdam, as Mexicans and not Maya if they have moved to the United States, perhaps as North Africans rather than Berbers if they live in France. The boundaries of affiliation and identity would expand substantially both for instrumental reasons of daily survival in the host country and for the expressive reasons of developing a sense of pride, value, strength, and solidarity that will help them fight the humiliations incurred in their daily life. In many cases the identities may be ‘national’ in their home country but would still be ‘sub-national’ within the host country, such as Pakistanis in England, Moroccans in France, Turks in Germany, Albanians in Italy, etc. They might also remain sub-national both in their home and host countries, such as Sikhs or Tamils in England, Wolof or Ibo in France or Germany, Cantonese in Malaysia, etc. Indeed such immigrant communities may develop into vocal proponents of sub-national identities and interests both in their host countries *and* in their perceived homeland. As Pieterse puts it,

... the migration movements which make up demographic globalization can engender absentee patriotism and long-distance nationalism, as in the political affinities of Irish, Jewish and Palestinian diasporas and émigré or exiled Sikhs in Toronto, Tamils in London, Kurds in Germany, Tibetans in India (Pieterse 2000: 102).

Such transnational communities spreading across national boundaries of a number of host communities and referring to a homeland that cuts across a number of countries of origin is quite a common current phenomenon reinforced by international migration, though not limited only to labor migration (they often include students and political exiles as well). Many people thus belong at various levels to more than one society and the very essence of ‘national’ citizenship is put into question (Castles and Davidson 2000). A ‘diasporic’ consciousness is, by

contrast, reinforced as migrant minorities identify with people of the same perceived ethnic origin whatever country they inhabit (Castles and Davidson 2000).

In the examples given above we have seen that boundaries of primordial affiliation may expand with migration but still remain 'sub-national' within the host society while being either sub-national or national within the home society. In fact, the sub-national character of identity within the host society defines the relationship with that society, with regard to how loyal they are, how integrated they are, and indeed how marginal they are. However, the same circumstances, instrumental as well as expressive, may also give rise to transnational identities that may strengthen at the expense of national ones. At least three modes of such transnational identity development should be noted here.

First of all, some of the new identities that are strengthened, while being sub-national within the host society, may take transnational aspects vis-à-vis their home country. Kurds from Turkey, Iran, Syria and Iraq who live in Germany may combine in stressing their Kurdish identity that transcends those national state boundaries. Andean Indians from Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador may create a single community in the Netherlands and may be indistinguishable while playing Andean music on the streets of Amsterdam. This also further stresses the relativity of the terms, sub-nationality, nationality or transnationality as to whether the reference is to the host or the home country, both affecting the people in question in different ways.

Secondly, while labor migrants do create the local communities that strengthen sub-national identities within the host societies, they also encounter and adopt cultural elements of the host country and of other migrants coming from very different cultures. Their transnational identity is strengthened through natural cross-cultural diffusion. They familiarize themselves with similar aspects of life which are, in fact, a mixture of rich diversity but are packaged together. They dress similarly and eat similar food. They learn how to speak the same language even if it is only a second language. They come to see of themselves as 'citizens of the world', at relative ease within different cultures and rapidly adapting to changes in them, all of them transcending not only their original sub-national culture but also the national culture of the host society. They become familiar and comfortable with a transnational environment. They become part of the expanding "McWorld".

This identification with transnational units is not, however, always accompanied by a cultural identification with Western values and codes of behavior. It can also take an 'anti-Western' form, Islamic

fundamentalist for example. This is what Barber (2000) meant by 'Jihad versus McWorld'. As Lechner puts it,

...fundamentalism itself has become a global category, part of the global repertoire of collective action available to discontented groups, but also a symbol in a global discourse about the shape of the world. For liberal westerners concerned about further 'progressive' change, fundamentalism is the global 'other', that which 'we' are not; for those taking issue with the meaning and structure of the current, Western-inspired global culture, fundamentalism becomes a most radical form of resistance, a symbolic vehicle (Lechner 2000: 339).

Powerful anti-Western transnational identities can develop among foreign workers, reflecting perhaps the sense of alienation they feel in the Western world, or the difficulties, frustrations, sense of humiliation and rejection they feel in their attempt to adapt to their new country (Castles and Davidson 2000). I would suggest that the more marginal those groups of international migrants feel within globalization, the greater likelihood that they would be drawn into such *alternative* transnational identities, which under certain circumstances take on a more activist militant path, as seen in Islamic fundamentalism. While Jihad appears to be resolutely opposed to McWorld, in reality it feeds on it and makes use of the infrastructure that it has created. As Barber writes, "Jihad not only revolts against but abets McWorld while McWorld not only imperils but re-creates and reinforces Jihad" (Barber 2000: 22). And more importantly for our purpose, both McWorld and Jihad make war on the sovereign nation-state (Barber 2000) and as such undermine national identity in favor of a transnational one. Conflicts transcend national boundaries and take on more universal politico-cultural forms. The nation state is significantly weakened as a source of identity (Hoogvelt 1997, Stalker 2000), though it certainly does not disappear, as we see its coming to force during international sports competitions.

INTERNATIONAL TOURISM

In discussing the transnational and sub-national identities affected by international tourism, we first have to carefully distinguish between the Western tourists and those local people who become tourism exhibits themselves. For Western tourists, transnational identity develops for the same reasons of cross-cultural diffusion that we discussed earlier regard-

ing labor migrants, and without the ambivalence that may derive from marginality within globalization. Western tourists are *not* marginal in the international tourism scene. They come to observe the marginality of others. In so doing, they encounter new cultures, societies, landscapes. They enlarge their horizons, they touch and familiarize themselves with new worlds, even if quite superficially. They 'capture' it in the photos and the souvenirs that they bring home. The more and farther they travel, the more they leave their daily routine and get used to experience the different. Hence they too, even more than the international labor migrants, feel like 'citizens of the world', equally at home at variable and quickly changing environments. Moreover, they experience this encounter with the 'different' from a position of superiority and hence feel more enriched and powerful as a result of it, with no ambivalence deriving from frustration and humiliation.

Finally, to protect themselves from any potential danger of overexposure to the unknown, the Western tourists also make sure that some items of their own culture, food, news, air conditioned vehicles and hotel rooms, be present wherever they go, sent ahead of time so that they could retire to the comfort of the familiar whenever they feel like it during their journey. The transmission of those items of Western comfort to the farthest reaches of the earth, and their use by travelers from different origins and by the locals further adds to the sense of transnational identity felt by our intrepid voyagers.

By contrast, neither national nor sub-national identities seem to be strengthened among the Western tourists during their voyage. It is true that some tourists in tours organized in their home country will refer to their own nationalities or ethnicities as part of the group dynamics among themselves during the tour. Popular songs from home may be sung during the long bus rides or some tourists may try to teach the locals their own songs and dances just as they supposedly learn those of the locals. We do have also evidence that some young backpackers, such as Israelis in India for example, may look for each other for support and may create closely knit groups of travelers (for just one example, out of a rapidly growing literature, see Maoz 2004). However, by and large these are the exceptions rather than the rule. The Western tourist does look for the 'different', for the exotic, in his voyage. Hence his/her main interest is to touch the 'other' rather than reassert his/her particular identity. This is, in fact, a principal distinction that separates contemporary tourism from pilgrimage, a topic of great interest which, however, remains beyond the scope of this chapter. On the whole,

therefore, for the Western tourists themselves, international tourism in the context of globalization, reinforces transnational identities much more than national or sub-national ones.

Looking now at the local people who become the objects of the Western tourist attraction, it is interesting to note that the exhibition of local cultures and traditions for commercial purposes led to an emphasis of sub-national ethnic identities in contradiction to the states' attempt to build up new national identities and repress ethnic identities regarded as harmful to national integration. What was exhibited in the Maasai dances in Kenya or Tanzania was Maasai ethnic identity and not Kenyan or Tanzanian identity. Similarly it was Balinese and not Indonesian identity, Zulu and not South African identity, Navajo or Cherokee and not American (nor even North American Indian) identities that were stressed in similar shows, with the blessing of the respective national governments. Apparently, when enticed by the commercial benefits that ensued from those exhibits, the Third World governments were ready to bend their rules and to counteract their tendency not to give saliency to sub-national identities lest they would challenge the fragile larger nationality. As for the United States and similar governments in Canada, Australia and New Zealand their tolerance and even encouragement for the show of sub-national identity among their native populations is probably a mixture of ideological commitment to cultural diversity and an attempt to appease their guilty conscience for the injustices committed toward those peoples in the past.

In any event, the cultures and identities displayed in these cases to the tourists represent peripheral, marginal cultures and identities even within those countries. They are not part of the core national culture and sense of identity of those countries, the way the Great Wall is for China, the Notre Dame Cathedral is for France or the Acropolis is for Greece. There are other examples, of course, such as the Pyramids in Egypt, where it is more difficult to determine whether the major tourist attractions are an integral part of the core of current national identity or a relic from a past in which today's nation takes pride in even though it is not really its own. However, even if not directly representing present-time Egyptians it would be difficult to claim that the Pyramids or the antiquities of Luxor are peripheral in Egypt the way the Maasai are in Kenya, the hill tribes are in Thailand and the forest dwellers of Sarawak are in Malaysia. Also, the Pyramids of Egypt, even if they do not represent the present-day Egyptians, are not related to any present sub-national group who might threaten the Egyptian national identity.

The tribesmen of Sarawak in Malaysia are, and so are the Maasai in Kenya or the Hindu Balinese in a predominantly Muslim Indonesia and still the respective governments of Indonesia, Malaysia and Kenya strongly encourage the commercial exhibition of those sub-national identities through their respective cultural artifacts.

Under certain circumstances, the strengthening of such sub-national identities for economic profit in the wake of globalization may go a long way in its fragmentation and may reach quite small units, counteracting some opposite tendencies of ethnic enlargement that we have seen in the case of international labor migration. In a recent paper titled "Ethnicity Inc.: On Indigeneity, Urbanity and the Incorporation of Identity" Jean and John Comaroff (2007) showed brilliantly how ethnic specificity is used for economic profit in the case of North American Indians and how ethnic units of no more than a few dozen people try to establish their separate corporate identity as that would give them statutory rights on land, internal autonomy and the ability to open profitable businesses, above all casinos, unhindered by US legal restrictions, and then build ethnic heritage museums with the money earned from the casinos. No glitzy pleasure cruise to the Alaskan shore would be complete without a visit to the camps of American Indian tribes of the Pacific Northwest who number a few thousands where the visitors would attend a display of the Indians' totems, their fishing or hunting techniques, their colorful headgears, their songs and dances. "Ethnicity Incorporated" is no doubt in play here, but so is "marginality incorporated", as the marginality of those groups is at the core of the attraction felt toward their separate identity. Sub-national ethnicity is commoditized for gain as part of globalization, but so is marginality, both reinforcing each other.

Finally, let us revisit the issues of incorporation and transnational identity. As we have already stressed, those people who are keen on exhibiting their marginality to the tourists for economic profit do that, paradoxically, as a means of incorporation in the global economy. Even though most of the payments by the tourists remain in the hands of middlemen, from airlines and hotel chains to tour operators, bus drivers, park administrators, various government offices, etc., the little that trickles down to the local people who exhibit themselves and their lifestyle is still large enough for them to make a huge difference in their lives. Some of this money is invested in traditional ways, buying more cattle, a new wife, more ostentatious jewelry, etc. but more of it is spent on sending children to school or on buying land, diversifying agricultural

production, owning means of transport, opening small scale businesses where various items could be sold, from daily necessities (soap, batteries, mirrors, house utensils) to souvenir items that would be sold to the next tourists. Some of the more successful of these entrepreneurs build enterprises of more substantial proportions. They start giving wages to employees, open bank accounts, obtain credit to develop their businesses. In short, they increasingly encounter and adopt practices and opportunities of the external world. They also open themselves culturally to the exterior, not only to their national exterior but even beyond. They learn a few words in various foreign languages used by tourists, they or their children learn how to read and write, get more formal education, learn Western skills needed by the tourism industry, from cooking Western food, serving in Western hotels to driving and repairing cars, busses or other equipment. With their earnings they also buy, and develop a taste for Western consumption items, above all the ubiquitous TV set that puts them into direct contact with the world at large, even skipping to a certain extent the national stage and linking directly to Western soap operas or World soccer championships that are avidly followed in every village.

I would *not* go as far as to say that all these developments create among them a substantial transnational identity skipping over the national identity. They develop greater familiarity with the world at large but I do not think they see themselves as 'citizens of the world' unless they physically emigrate. On the contrary, these people know that to continue to profit from tourism they cannot distance themselves too much from their traditions that set them apart from others. They readopt their traditions, though perhaps restructuring them a bit and cutting a few corners to accommodate the needs of the tourists or because they know that the tourists would not recognize the difference anyway.

A very striking example of such re-adoption of tradition for the purpose of economic incorporation is the renewed propagation of 'long neck' spiral necklaces among Khayan women belonging to the Karen people in the hills of Thailand bordering Myanmar. The Khayan women, one of the Karen tribes, many of whom are refugees from persecutions in Myanmar, used, in the past, to wear 24 spirals of metal necklaces that would prolong their neck and give them a giraffe-kind allure, with the head seemingly perched far above the body. By the mid-twentieth century, though, this tradition was waning as more and more women refused to wear this highly uncomfortable contraption. With the intensification of the civil war in Myanmar in the 1970s and

1980s and the bloody suppression of the Karen uprising, those people increasingly sought refuge across the border in Thailand but also lost in the process much of their traditional livelihood. At the same time word spread out among Westerners that the women of some of those people wore long necklaces that deformed their body. Some tour operators and the Karen government in exile were quick to put this to commercial use and organized tourist groups to visit the villages of long-necked women. Each Khayan woman was offered a set price for wearing those necklaces and agreeing to be observed and photographed by tourists. Those who did not wear the necklaces got no money. Lo and behold, an increasing number of women whose families had long abandoned this tradition started wearing those necklaces again and even had their daughters wear them. The long-necked women became the chief providers of their family and some of them opened businesses selling other souvenir items and even investing in the mass production of necklaces that were now in great demand by locals and tourists alike. Women with long necks became perceptibly richer and more influential than those without and even buying those necklaces now necessitated a substantial capital that not every woman could afford.

I have gone into some length in describing this incredible tale of the long necked women in the Thai hills as it captures in a nutshell the paradox of how marginality and incorporation reinforce each other by means of the global tourism industry. Sub-national ethnicity is stressed in this process but so is marginality, reconstructed and reinvented to serve its incorporation-related purpose.

In conclusion, we have witnessed here intricate layers of multiple paradoxes. Globalization, despite its standardizing and unifying effect, reproduces in its midst niches of marginality that are both outcomes of the process but also help it grow and expand further. Looking at the examples of international labor migration and international tourism, I attempted to show not only how these paradoxes come about but also what effect they had on identity. I hope to have shown that this reconstruction of marginality for the purpose of incorporation strengthens identity at both the transnational and the sub-national level, more than at the national one. It is not all symmetric, of course. In some cases transnational identities appear to be strengthened most. In other cases sub-national identities are the ones most strengthened. But on the whole, the sub-national and transnational appear to have found a curious coexistence with each other at the expense of the national identity.

CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX

CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM PLURALISM TO MULTICULTURALISM AND FRAGMENTATION INTO DIASPORAS

Richard Münch

Individual achievement on the basis of equal opportunity, cross-cutting membership in social groups, a great plurality of voluntary associations and a comparatively high level of civic self-organization have made up the integrative power of the American type of civil society. Talcott Parsons coined the term “societal community” in order to focus on that associational infrastructure, which helps to integrate a society. Its very nature is pluralism of memberships and individualism in the conduct of life. According to Robert K. Merton the pervasive emphasis on individual achievement as a means of social inclusion has always produced a considerable amount of relative exclusion of people who do not achieve as compared to their aspirations and to relevant reference groups. The corresponding strain can be made responsible for two typical tendencies of disintegration characterizing the American societal community: the inclination to compensate for relative exclusion from legitimate achievement with illegitimate forms of achievement and the radicalization of struggles for equal opportunity. This is the reverse side of the strong emphasis on individual achievement on the market instead of collective sharing of collectively produced wealth in a strongly organized and redistributing welfare state. A propensity for comparatively high rates of delinquency, which can only be turned down by high rates of imprisonment—and a propensity for intensive struggles for group rights are the corresponding features of disintegration. Pluralism turns to multiculturalism. Civil society disintegrates into a weakened and internally divided core of the former WASP community and a collection of diasporas. Social structure, interest organization and culture combine to turn attention away from class inequality and toward inequality in terms of race, ethnicity and gender especially. The effect of this constellation is continued marginalization and relative exclusion along class lines and across race, ethnicity and gender in

spite of intensified struggles for equality. These features of disintegration are inherent in the American model of a societal community focusing on individualized inclusion and on civic self-organization and cannot be attributed to the temporary decline of social capital only. Tackling successfully with this kind of disintegration would need a change in the direction of closer cooperation of state authorities with social entrepreneurs and voluntary associations in order to re-vitalize support and guide civic self-organization. It would also call for the re-vitalization of cross-cutting group memberships (Münch 2001: 223–249).

TRANSNATIONALIZATION, MULTICULTURALISM AND THE FLOURISHING OF DIASPORAS

Transnationalization, multiculturalism and the flourishing of diasporas are part of a major change of social integration, away from the nation state model of social integration characterized by strong internal integration and weak external integration. Strong internal integration was based on the following features:

- territorial rule
- centralized bureaucracy
- dominant culture with dominant language
- comprehensive social security of the welfare state and decommodification of the individual's living standard
- making the individual's living standard largely independent of market achievement.

This has been the legitimate nation state model constituted by the increasing establishment of a kind of world polity as coined by John Meyer and his Stanford research group (Meyer et al. 1997). A major element of this model is respecting and providing for equal civil, political and social rights in T.H. Marshall's (1964) terms. There is an internal dynamics of expanding such rights and a dialectics of producing new problems of inclusion in granting equal rights by building institutions assumed to implement that program. In the transnational context, historically established institutions of social integration and political representation show their exclusionary effects. Most important factors are the configuration of associations making up civil society and political parties organizing political representation. They have exclusionary effects

within the national situation. Yet there are also external exclusionary effects to the effect that strong internal national solidarity is accompanied by weak external international solidarity. With the strengthening of transnational institutions and networks and a kind of world polity, new forms of inequality and failed granting of rights are put on the agenda demonstrating the exclusionary effects of the nation state model of social integration. The traditional class-related debate on equality is being replaced with the debate on granting rights to people who do not consider themselves represented by the established institutions of social integration. This refers to both the national and transnational situation. New groups, that have been in a peripheral situation in the national and the transnational situation so far, claim rights on their own.

In this new transnational context, nation states are forced to respect the different cultural background of their citizens setting closer limits to assimilation, for example in terms of presenting cultural diversity in school curricula and providing for bilingual education at school. They are also obliged to grant rights to residents reserved so far to citizens only (Soysal 1994, Joppke 1999). And they are forced to promote free trade and open their borders for enhancing the chances of developing and newly industrialized countries to take part in the globalized production of wealth.

Within the national context, the respecting of minority rights has become radicalized in the movement of multiculturalism. In this process minorities are encouraged to organize, just to find a respected position in the fiercely contested field of political discourse. In the new context, the organization of minorities is transnationalized more easily. Their network across the world becomes much stronger than before thus making a minority eventually a diaspora. The question is then how far this new unit provides for social integration and how it is related to nation state integration. The recent decline of the multicultural movement can be interpreted as a revitalization of liberal and conservative notions of nation state social integration as well as a response to the failing success of cultural diversification programs helping to overcome inequalities between the national majority and minorities. It has been, for example, questioned whether bilingual education at school helps to improve the chances of achievement of minority juveniles in their country of residence. Here, integration into the national society is still the frame of reference.

Apparently, a new balance has to be found between national and transnational integration. In this respect, the pluralistic model of the

United States stands out in comparative terms. However, this model has especially been challenged by the multicultural movement. Here we have to keep in mind that inequality within the nation state is the legitimating basis of multiculturalism. We have to emphasize the social dimension of multiculturalism as a challenge to social integration. The discussion started in Canada and has spread throughout the world in the 1980s. Problems of social inclusion and identity have been framed in a new way. It is a change away from class issues and social rights to ethnic, religious and language issues and cultural rights. This change is due to shifts in intellectual debates and is therefore a social construction, a new framing of the situation. But these debates also reflect real social change that has taken the modern universalistic program of social integration to its limits. Granting individual rights and its institutional embodiment in the established associational and political structure of society is no longer sufficient to provide for encompassing social inclusion. The limits of the integrative capacity of the modern program of social inclusion can be observed in societies which differ in their institutional embodiment of that program. This institutional arrangement has, however, an impact on the way and the features in which those limits show up.

From a *functionalist point of view* the established institutions of social inclusion (associations, parties, social partnerships, voluntarism, pluralism, corporatism, etatism) are losing integrative capacity. They suffer from deficiencies of social integration. From a *constructivist point of view* matters of social integration are defined in a new way so that we see deficiencies that have not been discovered before. From an *institutionalist point of view* we have to address this change of social integration as precipitating from the increasing development of a world polity that is constructing the nation state in a new way. In this perspective, postmodern nation states only gain legitimacy before the world public as far as they respect cultural rights of minorities that allow them to maintain secondary collective identities (Koenig 2005). Thus, diasporas are created as legitimate communities by the discourse of the world polity. But there is also historical institutionalism explaining social change—like spreading multiculturalism—as generally framed by the established national institutions. For our topic, this means that change is shaped by the structure of associations and parties and their collaboration with governmental bodies. The limits of established institutions facing multicultural claims show themselves in different ways in different nation states.

In *France*, class organizations (trade unions, employer federations), political parties and governmental concertation of interests have failed to include the citizens from Northern Africa thus turning suburbs into milieus of militant rebellion.

In *Germany*, the corporatist collaboration of trade unions, employer federations and Christian churches with the government, which grants those associations rights of administering welfare in public responsibility, has produced the problem of including insiders at the cost of producing outsiders who are not part of the establishment of acknowledged structures.

But what about the *American* institutional embodiment of social integration? Its mission has always been openness to accommodate for a great plurality of cultural backgrounds: It should therefore be the paradigmatic case of social integration that achieves in maximizing external openness and internal pluralization of cultural life while maintaining internal social integration. Nevertheless, in the United States multiculturalist claims to group rights have particularly radicalized in the 1980s. Certainly, these claims have provoked the liberal response of sticking to the universalist program of social integration by granting individual rights, but also more conservative responses of making adherence to the dominant culture obligatory including such features as mastering the English language and the citizen's loyalty to the nation ranking above any primordial group membership.

Talcott Parsons has coined the term *societal community* to describe the American type of civil society as an evolutionary achievement that may be the paradigm of developing civil society everywhere in the world. Why has this model nevertheless been challenged since the 1980s? In my view, two processes have worked together leading to this challenge: on the one hand, the global challenge of liberal individualism in the context of a changing world polity; on the other hand, the declining capacity of the associational structure to provide for comprehensive social integration. In order to understand and explain this weakening of social integration we have to scrutinize the characteristic structure of the American societal community. We have to understand its particular mode of social integration and why this mode of integration has reached its limits.

THE HISTORICAL FORMATION OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETAL COMMUNITY

If we start from the first settlers in the early seventeenth century, we will clearly recognize that white Anglo-Saxon Protestants were the founders

of the American societal community (Tocqueville 1945: Vol. I: 26–45, Berthoff 1971: 3–20, Daniels 1990). They form its very core up until today. In Parsons's eyes, however, it was of crucial importance for the inclusive power of this societal community that the so-called WASP community opened itself to an ever growing extent to immigrants from all over the world. In this way, a racially, ethnically and religiously pluralistic societal community emerged without there being any correspondence between racial, ethnic and religious membership and the territorial settlement structure—such as, for instance, in the English and French speaking parts of Canada (Lipset and Marks 2000: 126–137). In 2000, the population of 282,125 million people was composed of 69.4% Non-Hispanic Whites, 12.7% Blacks, 3.8% Asians, 11.6% Hispanics and 2.5% other races. For 2050, the projection is 50.1% Non-Hispanic Whites, 14.6% Blacks, 8.0% Asians, 24.4% Hispanics and 5.3% other races (U.S. Census Bureau 2004). In a metropolitan area such as Los Angeles, Whites no longer represent the majority. People of different color, ethnic and national origin, religion and language share one and the same place and the related functional memberships in associations, parties, schools, universities, bodies or companies. At most, ascriptive memberships and functional memberships have remained disentangled. Cooperation in various functional associations has made it possible to foster a civic virtue going beyond ascriptive group memberships as the crucial resource of social integration (Kallen 1956, Gordon 1964).

The anchoring of civil rights in the Constitution and the formation of an independent jurisdiction—especially in the hands of the Supreme Court as the guardian of the Constitution—has played an essential role in the taming of forces producing the exclusion of minorities. The Supreme Court's jurisdiction has successively put an end—at least in formal and legal terms—to race discrimination in a series of pioneering verdicts; in this way, it has released membership in the societal community as citizenship essentially from ascriptive features and has ensured equality in the practicing of fundamental civic, political and social rights (Gunther and Dowling 1970: 400–466, 816–978; Karst 1989, Legonsky 1987, Neumann 1996, Joppke 1999, Rubio-Marín 2000). All Americans of different racial, ethnic, national or religious group membership share the same rights and thus form a group transcending societal community on the basis of citizenship in the sense of T.H. Marshall (1964). Individual rights make a plurality of groups into a nation of individuals, who are brought together by their individual search for personal happiness, as Thomas Jefferson

pointedly put it in the Declaration of Independence of 1776. Since the settlers learned that they will be more successful in the pursuit of their individual happiness, when they unite for different purposes and support each other, they laid the foundation stone for a society, which takes its cohesive strength from a variety of purpose-bound associations formed by people with various cross-cutting group memberships (Tocqueville 1945: Vol. 1: 106–110, Tiryakian 1975, Almond and Verba 1963, Immerfall 1997, Kalberg 1997).

Simultaneously, the War of Independence advanced the basic understanding of community as a matter of individual citizens, who settle their matters themselves and only delegate those tasks to the government, which they cannot cope with; yet the government's exercise of power has to be controlled in a system of checks and balances (Baylin 1967, McDonald 1985, Pangle 1988, Ackerman 1991). This means that close limits were set to an intervention of government in society, above all to the intervention for the purpose of social integration such as through social legislation and redistribution via progressive taxes. Basically, the integration of society was meant to be a matter of the citizens' self-organization. The inclusion of people in the participation in societal solidarity, in economic wealth, in the political exercise of power and in culture has, therefore, first and foremost been a matter of making use of rights by the individual, supported by a jurisdiction tailored to it and by voluntary associations (Abraham 1977, Lofgren 1987, Nelson 1988, Joppke 1999). In this way, the access to common solidarity, income, power and prestige was separated from ascriptive features.

In Parsons's terms, a societal community independent of particular groups developed while, at the same time, there was a differentiation of economy, polity and culture from ascriptive particular group memberships; and the access to wealth, power and prestige was put on the universalistic basis of achievement (Parsons 1971: 87–114). In order to attain affluence, achievements have to be attained that are demanded by the economy; votes have to be gained in order to exercise political power; and it is necessary to realize generally acknowledged values in order to gain prestige. Inclusion in the societal community and inclusion in the societal functional systems of economy, polity and culture production (education, science, arts, media, film) have been individualized to a very large extent and have been freed from ascriptive group memberships. Alongside the influx of immigrants this development has involved extremely tough competition for the substantial realization of formal rights to inclusion resulting in a relatively strong vertical

differentiation of achievement, above all as regards to participation in affluence (Nelson 1995, Keister 2000). In as far as this unequal achievement is attained on the basis of equal opportunities and fairness, it is considered legitimate and is not questioned. Doubts in the legitimacy of unequal achievement will, however, rise to the extent that people believe that there are no equal opportunities.

The relatively high inequality of results makes the pressure on the production of equal opportunities even stronger. The crucial tools to exercise such pressure are the associations of particular groups working against discrimination and making use, above all, of jurisdiction, for their purposes. This constellation has triggered a development since the 1970s, which has resulted in an increased splitting into group particularisms and the decline of group transcending civic virtue. In this context, two hotly debated phenomena of American society converge: the replacement of individualistic pluralism based on individual rights by collectivistic multiculturalism based on group rights on the one hand, and the decline of group transcending civic virtue on the other hand. In the following sections, we will try to answer the question as to how far these phenomena can be considered specifically problematical developments of the genuinely American model of the societal community.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETAL COMMUNITY

With his theoretical model of the societal community as an evolutionary achievement of modernity, Talcott Parsons supplied a still useful contribution to understanding the specific integration mechanism of modern societies, from the national level through to world society (Parsons 1971: 12–26). For him, the American societal community had gone much farther than any other society when it comes to abandoning ascriptive features (Parsons 1971: 86–121). In a world of open borders, it may still be considered a model for a way of social integration that works without having to rely on strong primordial ties determined by common origin. The development of such a societal community is linked with specific conditions and is prone to specific risks of splitting up into a collection of diasporas, into group particularism and the loss of group transcending common sense. Such risks can be avoided only in as far as the specific terms of effective working of this kind of societal community can be revitalized: the sufficient release of the individual

from ascriptive group membership through his or her inclusion in cross-cutting, group transcending networks (Parsons 1967a: 254–258; 1971: 12–14; 1977: 385–389).

The still most important factor aiming at the dismantling of ascriptive solidarity and the construction of cross-cutting, group transcending networks is economic achievement. The more prospects the market offers for achievement, the more members of thus far disadvantaged minorities will get access to the broad middle class (Parsons 1971: 106–114). The middle class's multi-ethnic composition provides the necessary social-structural foundation of a group transcending societal community. The economically active members of the middle class form the broad reservoir for the participation in purpose-bound, ethnically indifferent voluntary associations. An essential prerequisite for the multi-ethnic composition of voluntary associations are multi-ethnic neighborhoods, which, in their turn, develop in the wake of society's economical mobilization (Parsons 1977: 389–395). Ethnically homogeneous neighborhoods have emerged in areas where particularly strong waves of immigration have led to the settlement of migrants within a short period of time. To the extent that internal mobility exceeds ethnic immigration, there is the chance of a rising disentanglement of ethnic networks and an entanglement of multi-ethnic networks. In reality, this condition for the promotion of cross-cutting, group transcending voluntary associations and the resulting solidarity is very differently pronounced, and it is to be found least where ethnically one-sided immigration took place over a long period of time such as immigration from Cuba and Mexico to Florida, Texas and Southern California.

The first voluntary association to encourage the union of a larger number of ethnic groups in local communities is the religious community. Parsons underlines, for instance, that membership in the Catholic Church has created a common bond between Irish, Italian and Polish people. Similarly, the Jewish religion has brought together people of most different ethnic and national origins (Parsons 1967a: 265–275). The pluralism of religious communities developed very early from the internal differentiation of Protestantism into different denominations and has kept on growing. It embraces almost any imaginable religion today and offers an essential chance to practicing common features across ethnical differences. Nevertheless, the ethnic homogeneity of neighborhoods counteracts this religious union of different ethnic groups. This feature of association proves again the crucial importance of economic growth and economic mobility, since they facilitate a broadening of the middle

class and, consequently, the emergence of multi-ethnic neighborhoods composed of economically mobile people. On this basis, multi-ethnic religious communities and, beyond such communities, other voluntary associations aiming at the most different purposes may form.

The institutionalization of English as a binding common language has quite certainly been helpful to support understanding beyond different groups (Parsons 1971: 88–90). English has made its way relatively easily, since each one of the groups immigrating after the first English settlers arrived with a language that united a very small minority only and would not have allowed an understanding across this group's boundaries. Meanwhile, however, the share of Spanish speaking people has grown so much in Florida, Texas and Southern California that the continued factual rule and legitimate validity of English as the official language provides a serious problem.

It is only on this social-structural and cultural basis (broad middle class, broad opportunities of economic achievement, high mobility, disentanglement of ethnic networks, multi-ethnic voluntary associations, common language) that certain factors can confirm the American nation's group transcending solidarity in a complementary way: rituals of union such as the annual Independence Day celebrations on July 4 and other events, when the nation either celebrates or mourns as a whole—such as after 9/11/2001—, and assembles around the national flag and the national anthem. Without a social-structural and cultural basis, however, such symbols would be meaningless and ineffective (Bellah 1970, Bloch 1985, Mulford 1996, Rombes 1996, Heideking 2000).

INTEGRATION PROBLEMS:

EXCLUSION AND THE RADICALIZATION OF CONFLICTS

When we ask about the reasons for the trends toward a withdrawal from the societal community of the nation to the solidarity of racial and ethnic (as well as gender) groups, which has strengthened since the 1970s, and toward demanding group rights of access to income, power and prestige against the backdrop of the above outlined conditions for developing a group transcending societal community with a corresponding civic virtue, an explanation might be explored in terms of the theory of anomie and the theory of relative deprivation.

In his essay on ethnicity, Parsons assumes that a trend toward “anomic social disorganization” will arise under the terms of rapid social change,

and that a consequence of this development is a strengthened turn to primordial group memberships and group identities as an essential type of response (Parsons 1977: 393). In this context, Parsons implicitly applies Durkheim's theory of anomie. Durkheim argued that the rise in the suicide rate that he observed under the conditions of both economic downturn and economic upswing can be attributed to the growing discrepancy between people's wishes and the level of their satisfaction, which implies a growing level of frustration (Durkheim 1952: book 2, ch. 5). We can also speak of an increasing relative deprivation in the relationship between wishes and their satisfaction.

In our context, we might understand relative exclusion as a specific form of relative deprivation with the two dimensions of in-group and out-group comparison between the level of aspirations and the level of their satisfaction. Accordingly the perception of disadvantages as regards the access to income, power and prestige if compared to one's own aspirations and if compared to groups that are better off, will become virulent then. It will involve reactions of adaptation on the part of those citizens who feel subjectively disadvantaged, as much as mobility takes place in fact, but does not go as far as expected by them. The civil rights movement for the inclusion of Afro-Americans spread in the 1960s, especially since the first contours of a Black middle class began to emerge, which saw itself discriminated in its access to schools, universities and positions in economy, administration, politics and the media. Serving as an avant-garde for its entire group, it took the lead and called for a whole series of legendary protest marches (Parsons 1967a: 275–279). At that time, the United States was in a period of general economic upswing and societal as well as cultural mobilization, which found its symbolic expression in John F. Kennedy's presidency.

Nevertheless, the Afro-Americans did not benefit from the general upswing to the extent that their previous disadvantages—in regards to their access to income, power and prestige—could have been balanced completely. In his essay on the inclusion of Afro-Americans, Parsons established that they did not profit from economic growth and the rising mobility to the same degree as other groups. Accordingly, by the mid-1960s, the Afro-Americans represented 20% of the poor population, which means that 50% of them were stricken by poverty (Parsons 1967a: 276 based on Pettigrew 1964). As compared to the chances offered by economic growth and as compared to the White citizens, an above-average proportion of the Afro-Americans lived in poverty. This resulted in the classical constellation of anomie and

exclusion. According to Durkheim (1952: book 2, ch. 5), needs are far ahead of the means available for their satisfaction, not only in periods of economic downturn, but also of economic upswing. Consequently, he established that frustrations grow, which result in an augmented suicide rate. Principally, however, they can also explode in other forms such as rising aggression toward others, delinquency, rebellion or the withdrawal from societal life. Robert K. Merton (1968a/1949; 1968b/1949) extended Durkheim's theory of anomie in the sense that he established a basic tension between the culturally binding value of unlimited economic achievement and the limited and especially unequal access to the means required for achievement resulting from the social structure of American society. Merton's theory of anomie was generalized by Agnew (1992) laying emphasis on non-realization of aims. For our analysis Merton's approach is however still relevant because of its focus on structural features of the American society in international comparison. Most recently, the theory of anomie has gained new significance (e.g. Bernburg 2002, Featherstone and Deflem 2003, Messner and Rosenfeld 2007).

The program of Affirmative Action introduced by President Lyndon B. Johnson was meant to remove the existing inequality of opportunity more and more. Affirmative Action became the essential tool in the production of equal opportunities. The program triggered a unique increase in the inclusion of previously disadvantaged groups. It is undeniable that all groups disadvantaged before (racial and ethnic minorities and women) have increased their share in schools, universities, better jobs, and administrative and political positions. Nevertheless, discrimination is complained about everywhere. The reason for this paradoxical effect is relative exclusion. The shares in income, power and prestige have grown less than desired, and there is quite a number of people who see themselves disadvantaged in regard to other better off groups (Whites, Asians) (Smith 2001, Moffit and Gottschalk 2001).

As a result, Affirmative Action did not reduce the pressure of inclusion resulting from relative exclusion but rather strengthened it. Consequently, the demands made to inclusion radicalized increasingly. This process went through three stages. The first stage concerned support to disadvantaged individuals by training measures in order to improve their competitiveness and thus their chances for a successful career at school, college and university, and in occupational life. The more it was recognized that the realization of this program assists, above all, those who are active and who would succeed even without

any outside support, but does not cover those who are inactive, the louder and more efficient became (on the second stage) the demands for a compensation of historically evolved discrimination through the establishment of quota for minorities as regards their admission to schools, universities, authorities and jobs, and their access to public contracting. Since expectations are being disappointed very frequently in this process, too, and discrimination still exists, relative exclusion has in no way been removed. As a consequence it has been noted that the culture marked by White and Anglo-Saxon Protestants necessarily forces citizens of a different cultural background into a position of inferiority. Therefore (on the third stage), it appears legitimate to urge for a proportional representation of the different cultures in the curricula of schools, colleges and universities—if necessary in their own languages (Young 1990, Kymlicka 1995). The semantics of equal opportunity has become radicalized in this way and tends toward a change in the established cultural paradigm from pluralistic individualism to group-based multiculturalism.

Critics of this movement of multiculturalism aiming at the establishment of group rights fear that the American societal community might run the risk of disintegrating into group particularism as a result (Schlesinger 1992, Schmidt 1997, Glazer 1997). In this way, a program aiming at the improvement of the individual's equal opportunities has been transformed into a program striving for equality of results for groups by securing group rights. This development has ensured that conflicts on participation are carried out more than ever before as struggles for group rights and less as struggles for the improvement of individual opportunities on the basis of universalistic criteria of rewarding achievements. In this context, membership in a certain racial or ethnic group has gained growing significance (Smelser and Alexander 1999, Joppke 1999). The loosening of ethnic solidarities through their intersection with networks across groups and the corresponding solidarities has been replaced with a revitalization of racial and ethnic solidarities on all sides: On the side of the minorities just as well as on that of the White majority. The militancy of radical racial and ethnic minority associations corresponds to the militancy of the religious right, which is essentially a matter of White, Protestant middle-class milieus (Wuthnow 1988: 173–214, Scatamburlo 1998). A broad variety of different conflicts is thus given a racial or ethnic touch, which results in the accumulation of racial and ethnic conflicts. Consequently, the conflict-reducing effect of the intersection of memberships and conflicts

has weakened so that we can certainly speak of trends of disintegration into group particularism. This trend also results in a weakening of group-transcending civic virtue. A greater part of voluntary commitment is absorbed by particularistic racial and ethnic associations in this racially and ethnically heated situation. The group transcending associations then lack of this commitment. Growing racial and ethnic solidarity goes hand in hand with a corresponding shrinking of solidarity across racial and ethnic groups. This process of mobilizing particularistic solidarities has attained such prevalence that other questions regarding the removal of disadvantages are also following the struggle for group quota. This goes, above all, for the competition for status achievement between both sexes.

Studies on media coverage of inequality, poverty, welfare and Affirmative Action clearly display an overrepresentation of Black underachievement, poverty, living on welfare and need of Affirmative Action compared to the real facts (Gandy, Kopp, Hands, Frazer and Phillips 1997; Gilens 1999, Clawson and Trice 2000, Swain 2001, Shaw and Shapiro 2002). It is also revealed that 63 percent of people who think that most welfare recipients are Black attribute their fate to lack of effort and 26 percent only to circumstances beyond their control; 40 percent of those who think that most welfare recipients are White attribute their fate to lack of effort and 50 percent to circumstances beyond their control (Gilens 1999: 140, table 6.1).

The overrepresentation of racial and ethnic as well as gender inequality and poverty is reflected by the tendency toward replacing class issues with issues of race, ethnicity and gender in politics. Lobbyism has largely moved away from class organizations to racial, ethnic and gender organizations. There is empirical evidence of reduced White class voting in presidential elections in areas with a large Black population. One study confirms this correlation but denies that there is an increase of participation in presidential elections from 1936 to 1992 (Weakliem 1997). Another study shows a considerable increase of the race cleavage, a modest increase of the gender cleavage, a slightly decreasing religious cleavage and a stable class cleavage with a slight increase in cleavage in general in presidential elections from 1960 to 1992 (Brooks and Manza 1997; see also Edsall and Edsall 1991, Giles and Hertz 1994, Huckfeldt and Kohfeldt 1989, Olzak, Shanahan and West 1994; Waters 1994).

CAUSES OF THE RACIALIZATION, ETHNICIZATION AND GENDERIZATION
OF STRUGGLES FOR EQUALITY

The trend toward the racialization, ethnicization and genderization of struggles for equality can look back upon a long tradition. Since the underclass has always been largely covered by Blacks and Hispanic immigrants, and since a strongly expanding economy facilitated individual rise to middle class positions during ever new flows of immigration so that the underclass has continually been refilled with new immigrants, the necessary structural foundation for a continually operating and powerful workers' movement did not exist. No homogeneous working class could form, which would reproduce itself over several generations. The interests of the workforce differentiated, instead, according to activity and company membership and were consequently represented by a growing number of specialized "bread and butter" trade unions. On this basis, the latter's policy was geared toward raising the incomes of their specific clientele, but not toward ensuring solidarity among the entire working class and reaching a collective improvement of their situation through basic societal reforms in the sense of participation in decisions and comprehensive social security (Lipset 1979/1963: 170–204, Petracca 1992, Lipset and Marks 2000: 85–124).

As a result, the American trade unions have produced a rather high rate of strikes as compared to their international counterparts (Haller 1997: 395). Nevertheless, these strikes have always aimed at accomplishing the specific interests of a certain group of the workforce. Therefore, the necessary prerequisites for an efficient inclusion of the weakest in the participation in wealth, power and prestige are lacking already from the organizational viewpoint. There is doubtlessly a good organization of interests of groups of the workforce boasting a particularly demanded profile of capacities, but there is no inclusion of those groups of the workforce that lack any specifically demanded profile of capacities.

Therefore, the trade unions' power of inclusion does not cover those who perform weakly. Consequently, they have no access to participation in wealth, power and prestige. In 1953, the workforce's level of organization in trade unions amounted to 32.5% on average. Until 2001, it dropped to a mere 13.5% (Loeffelholz 1998: 553, based on Statistical Abstracts of the United States; U.S. Census Bureau 2002: 411, table 628). It should be noted that this decline was even mitigated by a strongly increased degree of organization in the public sector (from 11.6% to 37.4%). The trade unions did not succeed in organizing the

growing employment of women and the service sector (featuring a high proportion of women). Moreover, they lost ground in the classical industrial sector, too, since companies closed down production plants where the workforce was organized in trade unions and, instead, set up new production plants without any involvement of the trade unions. Beyond trade unions there has never been successful enduring working class political representation by a socialist or social democratic party. Efforts of this kind undertaken between 1900 and 1940 failed. It is, however, a well established fact that working class representation by political parties and unions and participation in government is positively correlated with higher taxes and social transfer as well as negatively correlated with Gini coefficients after taxes and relative poverty (Lipset and Marks 2000: 285).

Immigration, frequent changes in employment and a high geographical mobility make the workforce's organization in trade unions and political parties difficult (Lipset and Marks 2000: 125–166). Added to this is racial and ethnic differentiation, which counteracts the uniform organization of the workforce (Davis 1986). In this way, we can establish that the underclass's lacking inclusion in the societal community—across ethnic groups and sexes—is caused both by the current trend toward the racialization, ethnicization and genderization of the struggle for equality and by the historically grown fragmentation of the workforce. The solidarity of the American societal community ends at the borderline, which separates well organized groups from badly organized ones.

Two factors support crucially the trend toward the dominance of the struggle for racial, ethnic and gender-related equality: the organization of employees' interests in trade unions on the one hand, and the formation of racially and ethnically homogeneous neighborhoods on the other. Since trade unions are unable to organize the entire workforce, and since the prevailing pattern of individual achievement only allows for the inclusion of upwardly mobile people in networks—including neighborhoods—that reach beyond racial and ethnic boundaries, racially and/or ethnically homogeneous neighborhoods have emerged as relatively closed underclass milieus without an inclusion in the rest of society. This affects particularly the 22.7% Afro-Americans and 21.4% Hispanics living below the poverty line (Proctor and Dalaker 2002: 3). Empirical studies demonstrate that economic segregation of Whites, Blacks and Hispanics has increased steadily since the 1970s (South and Crowder 1998; Bayer, McMillan and Rueben 2002). We have more clearly segregated neighborhoods according to income classes today

than in earlier times. There is also evidence of widely persisting racial and ethnic segregation of neighborhoods. Whites, Blacks, Hispanics, Asians and Pacific Islanders still tend to live in racially and ethnically homogenous neighborhoods. A slight decline in Black/White segregation has occurred, but no decline can be registered in Hispanic/White or Asian/White segregation. Segregation remains highest in the central cities, but it is still also high in the suburbs (Lewis Mumford Center 2001; cf. Massey and Fischer 1999, Massey 2001). The slight decline of Black/White segregation can be attributed to the Black middle class people moving out of the inner city ghettos. They settle, however, in white neighborhoods below their own income level (Alba, Logan and Stults 2000; Crowder 2001). Not being really included in the white middle class they have left the inner city ghettos all the more in poverty and hopelessness because they are lacking there as positive models of achievement. This may explain their increased pessimism as regards future Black achievement (Hochschild 1995: 85–87).

For racial and ethnic groups facing the new waves of immigration, the homogeneous neighborhoods serve as a gathering place for current immigrants. This applies, above all, to Hispanics arriving from Central America and the Caribbean countries. Their visibility, in turn, contributes to the fact that the thematization of inequality in racial and ethnic terms appears necessary, appropriate and justified. As we have seen, this racialization and ethnicization—just like the genderization—of the struggles for equality involves all the more the exclusion of the underclass, from which certain racial and ethnic groups (Afro-Americans and Hispanics) suffer to a greater extent, and which is being rather increased than reduced. It is also a matter of fact that the 7.8% of Non-Hispanic Whites living below the poverty line amounted to a number of 15,271,000 in 2001, which is clearly higher than the 8,136,000 Afro-Americans and the 7,997,000 Hispanics (Proctor and Dalaker 2002: 3, Table 1). This clearly shows that inequality and poverty are first and foremost a problem of class structure and secondarily only a problem of racial and ethnic differentiation. It must also be taken into account here that income (along with language and immigration status) explains a considerable part of racial and ethnic segregation (Bayer, McMillan and Rueben 2002).

Contrary to the inclusion of European immigrants by the Protestant and Catholic churches forming a bond between Protestant Anglo-Saxons, Swedes, Norwegians and Germans or between Catholic Irish, Italians and Polish, neither Blacks nor Hispanics nor Asians and Pacific

Islanders are being included in a cross-cutting way by religious communities. Their membership in churches is as clearly segregated as their neighborhoods. There is therefore no inclusionary effect of church membership, which would reach beyond racial, ethnic and—because of economic segregation—also beyond class boundaries. There is also a clear stratification of memberships in voluntary associations and volunteering according to race and ethnicity as well as according to class. The number of group memberships ranges from 1.19 among people with only elementary school education to 10.50 among people with a graduate degree (Ladd 1999: 58, fig. 3.15).

If we take into account that both educational level and income are much higher in the suburbs than in the inner cities, we see the specific weakness of social integration by way of civic self-organization. It works pretty well in the suburban middle class, particularly White and Protestant neighborhoods, but not at all in the low education, low income neighborhoods of the inner city. This is all the more true, if we recognize that a greater part of volunteering remains within the boundaries of suburban communities. Calls for voluntary work are predominantly addressed to people within the boundaries of race, ethnicity and class. Church membership has a positive effect of increasing volunteer work for Blacks (cf. Musick, Wilson and Bynum Jr. 2000).

What we can derive essentially from the outlined segregation of the population according to income, education, race and ethnicity is the lack of a comprehensive and broad middle class with ties across educational, income, racial and ethnic groups. What we see is far more a fragmented middle class composed of mutually exclusive groups. There is not one comprehensive middle class, but rather a number of segregated middle classes. A comprehensive and broad middle class is however the fundamental requirement for the integrative power of a societal community, which relies much more on civic self-organization than on state-run integration measures.

What has to be taken into account is the historical rooting of voluntary association and volunteering in the original WASP-middle class community in the small New England town. With the growth of metropolitan areas, large suburban areas with highly fluctuating neighborhood memberships, including religious communities and other voluntary associations as well as immigration from areas with much less developed traditions of civic self-organization, the WASP small town middle class community with long-term stable neighborhoods is

no longer representative of the United States. Robert Putnam's (2000) observation of declining civic commitment can therefore largely be explained by the changing structure of population and settlement. This explanation is supported by the fact that membership in voluntary associations and civic volunteering is still largely a matter of the White Anglo-Saxon and Protestant middle class. Civic self-organization was an effective means of social integration in the WASP community, but it is less effective in large metropolitan areas with highly fluctuating neighborhood memberships and not at all in the inner city ghettos.

REASONS FOR THE ETHNICIZATION AND GENDERIZATION OF THE STRUGGLES FOR EQUALITY

In this context, it is interesting to note that we have explained the specific inclusion deficits of the American societal community exclusively by structural reasons up to this point of our analysis: fragmented organization of the employees' interests, increased organization of ethnic and gender-related interest groups and an increasing overruling of the discourse on class- and stratum-specific inequality by the discourse about ethnic and gender-related inequality. So far, it was not necessary for us to take recourse to cultural reasons. The question arises as to what role must be ascribed to such reasons. Since culture and social structure enter into a symbiotic relationship in a long-term historical development process, our search should be devoted to those cultural values and images of society that correspond with the social structure and organization of interests described so far. This search brings us to the idea of the self-organization of the civil society including the corresponding individualism and liberalism (Hartz 1955, Elias 1999).

Far more than the European idea of welfare, which is guaranteed mainly by the state or by the state in conjunction with large associations, the idea of civic self-organization relies on the specific integrative strength of civic associations (Tocqueville 1945: 486–496, Bellah et al. 1985, Wuthnow 1991, 1995, 1996). This belief in civic self-organization is linked with the idea of individualism, according to which the individual will at best find his or her luck when he or she takes his/her life into his/her own hands. Simultaneously, this idea starts from the fact that independent individuals associate spontaneously to their own

benefit and thus produce, at the same time, a common benefit reaching beyond each individual (collective goods). The credo of liberalism tells us that society as a whole will raise its overall benefit for all by supporting the activities of each single individual.

Civic self-organization, individualism and liberalism form the central values of the American society. Tocqueville (1945: Vol. II: 121–124) summarized this credo in the doctrine of well understood self-interest. As Robert Wuthnow put it, Americans behave according to the principle of “Caring for Others and Helping Ourselves” (Wuthnow 1991: 121–187). The conversion of this doctrine into the organization of society is reflected by the afore-outlined form of civic self-organization. It favors the spontaneous association of well organized interests of active citizens. It promotes purpose-minded associations, which pay off immediately, as well as associations based on special criteria with clearly visible limits. Associations beyond particular group limits, in contrast, cannot form spontaneously. It is not recognizable for whom they involve direct benefits. The fragmentation of the workforce’s organization and the dominance of racial and ethnic organizations have their cultural foundation of legitimation in this transfer of the idea of civic self-organization into people’s associational behavior. The doctrine of individualism supports this behavioral pattern. The individual that should take his/her fate in his/her own hands will always turn to the next, most visible association in order to receive the support necessary for self-realization. Since the benefits of other, farther reaching associations are not immediately visible, he/she will therefore most likely join a trade union working directly for the specific employees’ interests or a racial or ethnic association. Liberalism offers the basic legitimation to this pattern of association in as far as it teaches that the society draws the greatest benefit from the spontaneous association of independent individuals.

What should, however, not be ignored in this context is the American culture of entrepreneurship, which is also at work in the field of mobilizing people for public interests. Moral entrepreneurs engage in the founding of a myriad of public interest groups, which are lobbying for special purposes. Because of their purpose-minded character they have, however, not been strong enough to push the prevalence of racial, ethnic and gender-oriented politics to the background.

CONCLUSIONS: WHERE DO SOLUTIONS HAVE TO START?

The symbiosis between the cultural ideas of civic self-organization, individualism and liberalism, and the social structure of the intersection of class and stratum-specific differentiation with racial, ethnic and gender-related differentiation, as well as the intersection of the fragmented organization of the workforce with the racial, ethnic and gender-related organization of interests has substantially consolidated the established racialization, ethnicization and genderization of the struggles for equality. All this resulted in an exclusion of the weakly performing underclass across racial and ethnic groups and genders. Civil society has disintegrated. It has changed from pluralism to multiculturalism. Its core is divided into the adherents of liberalism and the Christian right. It is further fragmented into a collection of diasporas. A solution to this specifically American integration problem can only be carried out in the framework of the given conditions in terms of culture, social structure and organization. First of all, it is necessary to acknowledge that the integrative strength of civic self-organization meets its limits. This means that, in fact, the state—in cooperation with voluntary associations—would have to play a more active integrative role than before.

Just as the European welfare states have to give more latitude to civic self-organization in order to live up to the increased variety of problems, yet without losing control of the cooperation with the extended spectrum of associations, the American state would have to take over control more strictly (on the levels of the Federation, the individual states and the communities), without restricting the variety of associations and the civic self-organization of society. This has occurred in fact in the meantime in the form of stricter police measures of social control resulting in a successful reduction of the crime rate and more safety in cities. Consequently, lacking social integration has to be compensated for by expensive control measures limiting freedom. The strengthening of the state's commitment to social programs in cooperation with social entrepreneurs and voluntary associations would create some relieve on the part of the control measures. The starting point for this is the cooperation of local governments with social entrepreneurs and voluntary associations in civic renewal programs (Skocpol 1998, Skocpol and Fiorina 1999, Sirianni and Friedland 2001). This concerns a form of state commitment that is compatible with the idea of civic self-organization. It does not require a basic change of paradigm in

society's cultural program and has, therefore, good chances for a farther-reaching realization. To do so, the targeted promotion of networks, associations and initiatives in general, and of social programs for the inclusion of the underclass in particular, has to reach beyond racial, ethnic and gender-related borderlines. A reduction of the inclusion deficits will only be attained if measures are adopted aiming at a racial, ethnic and gender-related disintegration and de-socialization and, at the same time, a strengthening of cross-cutting and group transcending solidarity and identity (Schneider 1968, Parsons 1977: 390–393).

CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN

ISSUES OF IDENTITY IN THE INDIAN DIASPORA: A TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE¹

Ajaya Kumar Sahoo

INTRODUCTION

One of the most striking features, which have taken the attention of most of the academicians today in this age of globalization, is the “transnational movement of people” and the “intensification in the creation of diverse diaspora populations in many locations, who are engaged in complex interpersonal and intercultural relationships with both their host societies and their societies of origin” (Tambiah 2000: 163). In the earlier period people moved either because of the social and economic conditions of the home country or because of the attractive images of a destination that offered greater socioeconomic opportunities. But the process of globalization and improvements in communication technology further provided impetus for individuals to migrate. Economic reasons no longer hold strong. Linkages between sending and receiving countries are established through sharing the news and information of both home and host countries, which Anny Misa Hefi (1997: 1) says, “sustain[s] the flow of migration”. The people who are now on the move are labor migrants (both documented and undocumented), highly qualified specialists, entrepreneurs, refugees and asylum seekers, or the household members of previous migrants (Brah 1996: 178).

When we use the term “migration,” it is not immediately clear what is meant? Traditionally, the term has been associated with some notion of permanent settlement, or at least long-term sojourn. In reality, it is a subcategory of a more general concept of “movement,” embracing a wide variety of types and forms of human mobility, each capable of metamorphosing into something else through a set of processes that are

¹ An earlier version of this chapter was published in *Perspectives on Global Development and Technology*, 2006, 5 (1/2): 81–98.

increasingly institutionally driven. Of course, migration itself is not a singular experience; it takes place under a multitude of conditions and circumstances, for different reasons—economic, political, personal—in vastly varied contexts.

In 1990, the International Organization for Migration estimated that there were over 80 million migrants who had moved out of the country of their origin. Among them 30 million were said to be irregular migrants and another 15 million were refugees or asylum seekers. By 1992, the number of migrants increased to 100 million, of which 20 million were refugees and asylum seekers (Castles and Miller 1993). The United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs Population Division (<http://www.un.org/esa/population/unpop.htm>) in July 2002, estimated that there were 185 million people living for 12 months or more outside their country of birth or citizenship. A majority of them are international migrants who are potential immigrants in countries of their destination and who often converge into diasporic communities. In the earlier period, immigrants from Indian subcontinent made their homes as far away as in British, French, and Dutch colonies. They created “little India” wherever they landed. Today, they have formed extensive networks with the members of their community—familial, economic, and political networks—around the globe, including the motherland, India.

THE INDIAN DIASPORA

Indians have migrated to different parts of the world at different periods of time. In terms of sheer numbers, they make the third largest group, next only to the British and the Chinese. The people of Indian origin, with nearly 20 million diasporans settled in 70 countries (Ministry 2001), constitute more than 40 percent of the population in Fiji, Mauritius, Trinidad, Guyana, and Surinam. They are smaller minorities in Malaysia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Uganda, UK, USA, and Canada (Bhat 2003).

There are broadly four patterns of Indian emigration evidenced from literature on Indian diasporas. They are as follows: a) Pre-colonial migration; b) Colonial migration that began in the 1830s to the British, French and Dutch colonies; c) Post-colonial migration to the industrially developed countries; and d) Recent migration to West Asia.

PRE-COLONIAL MIGRATION

In the Indian context, emigration has been a continuous process since pre-colonial times when its purposes were for trade and the propagation of religion. As far as historical and archival data are concerned, Indian emigration goes back to the first century AD when Indian princes, priests, poets, and artisans migrated to Southeast Asian countries. Among the distinguished names of this period, Angkor Wat, Lara Djonggrang, and Borobudur stand testimony (Suryanarayan 2003). The early emigration from India owed its origins to the Buddhist missionaries, when the Hindu kingdoms of medieval Southeast Asia attracted labor and craftsmen from India during the sixteenth century. The trade contacts slowly developed, and thereby small colonies established themselves in East Africa and Southeast Asia. Also during this period, merchants from Gujarat, Bengal, and Tamil Nadu settled in the great port cities of Southeast Asia, such as Malacca, Acheh, Ternate, and Tidor. They gradually assimilated with the local people (Suryanarayan 2003).

COLONIAL MIGRATION

It was only in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in the wake of European imperialist expansion, that further conditions for emigration of large numbers of Indians to different parts of the world were created. New plantations and industrial and commercial ventures in European colonies created the need for large supplies of labor; and with the abolition of slavery in the British, French, and Dutch colonies, respectively, in 1834, 1846, and 1873, there were severe shortages of laborers to work in the sugar, tea, coffee, cocoa, and rubber plantations in the colonies. Looking for alternative sources of labor, aside from the African ex-slaves and European immigrants, the colonial government imported Indians under the designation of "indentured labor." The emigration of indentured labor started during the late eighteenth century and continued up to the early twentieth century. Thousands of Indians emigrated to South and East Africa, Mauritius, Fiji, and the Caribbean under this system. Calcutta and Madras were the chief points of embarkment, and the major districts for recruiting labor included Tamil and Telugu populations and the districts of Bhojpuri region of Eastern U.P. and Northern Bihar (Daniels 1989, Mayer 1973, Laxmi Narayan 2005).

Approximately 1.3 million Indians crossed the oceans under contracts of indenture. Various factors pushed Indian migrants into seeking employment under indenture. The first was the poor condition that prevailed at that time in India because of the killing of the Indian village and cottage industry, thus resulting in extreme poverty and unemployment. The West, on the other hand, was becoming affluent because of industrial development. Second, all colonial masters found Indians skillful, hardworking, and useful, as a result of which the British, the French, the Dutch, and the Portuguese all took Indian skilled labor for development of plantations and the agricultural economies of their territories. Upon their arrival in the colonies, the immigrants were assigned to plantations to which they were “bound” for five or more years. They lived there in isolated and insulated conditions. Although they were promised fair wages and a return voyage to India in exchange for a predetermined number of years spent working in the colonies, poverty and the desire to build a new life ensured that very few of these indentured laborers ever returned to India (Bhat 2002).

Emigration to Sri Lanka, Burma, and Malaya presents a marked difference in contrast to the African and Caribbean countries. All the emigrants to Sri Lanka and Malaya were from the southern parts of India; these southern Indians were recruited by the headman known as the “Kangani.” The Indians worked on the tea, coffee, and rubber plantations. During the period 1852 and 1937, 1.5 million Indians went to Ceylon, 2 million to Malaya, and 2.5 million to Burma. After 1920, the Kangani emigration (totaling around 6 million) gradually gave way to individual or unrecruited, free migration due to the fall in demand for Indian labor.

POST-COLONIAL MIGRATION

The post WWII scenario has changed the whole international migration process by affecting every migrant country, and India was not far behind in this process. During this period migration was directed towards developed countries, and the migrants mostly constituted talented professionals, skilled laborers, entrepreneurs from the peripheral colonial and underdeveloped countries besides *Anglo-Indians*. This post-war migration was totally different from the earlier migration of indentured, kangani, and other forms of labor migration. During this period, large-scale migration of Indians took place to the developed countries such as the UK, USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

Table 27.1 Migration During Indentured Period

Country	Period of migration	Total Number
Guyana	1838–1917	238,909
Trinidad & Tobago	1845–1917	143,939
Guadeloupe	1854–1885	42,326
Jamaica	1845–1917	38,959
Suriname	1872–1916	34,000
Martinique	1854–1889	25,509
French Guiana	1854–1889	12,165
St. Lucia	1858–1895	4,354
Grenada	1856–1885	3,200
St. Vincent	1861–1880	2,472
Fiji	1879–1916	60,537
Mauritius	1834–1912	453,063
South Africa	1860–1911	152,184
Myanmar	1852–1937	2.5 Million
Malaysia	1852–1937	2 Million

Source: Clarke et al. (1990:9); Ministry (2001)

Indians from parts of the world other than India, especially from the former colonies (diasporas), also started entering these countries. Two factors were involved: a) Africanization policies and b) Ethnic violence in which Indians from former colonies expressed their interest to immigrate to these new lands:

- a) In 1972, Uganda's dictator Idi Amin ordered 75,000 Ugandan Asians out of the nation. Most of these people were of Indian origin and were successful traders, bankers, and administrators or laborers. Around 27,000 immigrated to the United Kingdom, while another 6,100 went to Canada. Some even immigrated to India despite never having lived there previously.
- b) The second factor centers on the case of Fiji. By the 1970s, native Fijians had lost their majority to people of Indian origin—mostly descendants of farm workers brought in by the British as indentured

labor. In 1987, the first Indian-backed coalition was elected to government, raising tension between the ethnic Indian and ethnic Fijian populations. Subsequent events have ensured ethnic Fijian political dominance. Many Indo-Fijians have left the country of their birth; some came to India, others to New Zealand and Australia.

Table 27.2 Voluntary Migration to Developed Nations

Country	Population by 1980	Population in 2001
USA	815,000	1,678,765
UK	790,000	1,200,000
Canada	250,000	851,000
Netherlands	103,000	217,000
France	42,000	65,000
Germany	32,000	35,000
New Zealand	30,000	55,000

Source: Report of the HLC (Ministry 2001)

In contrast to the ex-indentured populations, Indian immigrants in the industrially developed countries today have been able to maintain extensive ties with India because of their comparative affluence. Marriage arrangements, kinship networks, religious affiliations keep many immigrants well linked to their places of origin, since a large number of Indians are still first-generation migrants. Another factor that has enabled overseas Indians to maintain ties with their homeland is the flow of their remittances and investments, a topic that will be discussed later.

RECENT MIGRATION TO WEST ASIA

Recent migration of Indians to the West Asian countries is basically oriented to labor and servicing occupations on a contract basis. The year 1973 experienced the beginning of the rapidly increasing demand for expatriate labor in oil-exporting countries of the Gulf and North Africa, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, and Libya. These countries adopted a development strategy revolving around the building up of infrastructure and, in turn, created a demand for labor in unskilled manual work, especially

in the construction sector. At the termination of the first phase of infrastructural projects and with the new emphasis on industrialization in the Middle East, there has been a significant change in the structure of labor demand. Between 1975 and 1980, one million skilled workers had been imported to manage and operate this new infrastructure.

Table 27.3 Migration to West Asia and Gulf

Country	Population by 1980	Population in 2001
Bahrain	110,000	130,000
Kuwait	150,000	295,000
Libya	36,000	12,400
Oman	280,000	312,000
Saudi Arabia	700,000	1,500,000
U.A.E.	500,000	950,000
Qatar	80,000	131,000

Source: Report of the HLC (Ministry 2001)

Indians have migrated to different parts of the world at different periods of time. They migrated to British, French, and Dutch colonies during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as *indentured* and *kangani* laborers, and today they constitute the *Old Diaspora*. They also migrated to industrially developed countries of Europe and North America during the post-colonial era as skilled workers and professionals and thus constitute the *New Diaspora*. Between these two forms of emigrants, the latter—the *New Diaspora*—continues to have close contact with the families and relatives back home. Indians today have been successful in forming their local, international, formal, and informal networks by contacting with their kith and kin around the globe. Their networks are channeled through various mechanisms, such as regular communications over telephone, visits and correspondence, remittances, the Internet, and sending and receiving videos on family events and other celebrations.

OLD AND NEW INDIAN DIASPORAS

Any analysis of the Indian diaspora cannot ignore the distinction between the colonial emigrants during the colonial period and those during the post-colonial period; respectively, the two may be termed

as the *Old Diaspora* and the *New Diaspora* (see Bhat 2003). Not only do these groups vary in the contexts of their emigration and destinations but also in their socioeconomic backgrounds and the degree of their interaction with the motherland. While the New Diaspora has retained a vibrant relationship with family and community in India, the majority of the Old Diaspora has lost contact with the motherland. In the course of their long journey by ship to distant destinations, the unknown co-passengers became “jahaji bhai” (literally meaning “ship brother[s],” a brotherly affinity owing to traveling together). The Indian diaspora communities formed during the colonial era were totally denied access even to their own folk attached to different plantations, under a new system of slavery called “indenture labor” invented by the British colonialists, let alone any access to the then-existing means of transportation and communication to engage with the motherland. The post-colonial emigrants on the other hand not only enjoyed the advantage of being professionally trained, middle class, Anglophone Indians, but also earned an adequate income that could facilitate visits and frequent communication with their place of origin. The recent advancement in technologies of travel, transport, communication, information, and Internet has contributed immensely to the growth of transnational networks and virtual communities. With the shrinking of space and time, there is revival of the local in a global context.

ISSUES OF IDENTITY IN THE DIASPORA

The question of diasporic identity is an important issue today in the global context. Immigrants often face the problem of identity at the initial stage of their settlement in the host society because of their minority status. Martin Baumann (2001) provides instances of how the members of the host society generally value Hindus and their religious practices as alien. He points out that Europeans treat Hindus and their religious practices as “alien, foreign, exotic, being only a tolerated, but not really [an] accepted part of European culture” (Baumann 2001: 59). However, the immigrants, through their religious and cultural symbols, negotiate this identity in the course of time.

Identity can be defined under two headings: identity relating to a group, and identity relating to an individual. The former clearly emphasizes the objective attributes and behavior by which a human is recognized as an individual within a collective context, whereas the

latter emphasizes how one sees the world from a particular position and relative to what aspects or how one experiences self-hood. Though these two types of identity are distinct, it might be claimed that an individual develops a sense of identity (second type) through social practices and that social practices are tied to the fact of identity (first type).

Diasporic Indians have been able to construct their identities since their physical displacement from the homeland. They share among themselves and with the next generations not only the history of their dispersion but also the history of the people in general, including myths, legends, and traditions that constitute an integral part of their contemporary identity. Living in a diaspora brings one into an identity conflict because identity discourses are still understood in terms of loyalty to nations and nation-states. Among the several criteria through which Indians fortified their identity in the host societies, important are language, religion, dress, food, cuisine, cinema, and so on. Aditya Raj (2004) gives an excellent example of how Indian identity can be measured in the diasporic context. He cites three cases:

...a cab driver in London, the President of a Caribbean Republic, and a computer engineer in the Silicon Valley: three persons, three different spatial locations, in three different nation states. Yet a curious emotional cord to a shared geographical space binds them. All three are persons of Indian origin, members of the Indian diaspora, spread worldwide (Aditya Raj 2004).

Language forms an important aspect in the formation of ethnic identity in the diaspora. The maintenance of language in the diaspora is now an important issue among most of the diasporic groups, as it not only provides a forum to bind the community together, but also attaches them to their homeland and thereby their culture, tradition, and value system. Diasporic Indians in this sense have retained much of their language through publishing newspapers, journals, novels, literacy anthologies, and stage plays in their regional vernaculars. We may mention here that vernacular education is now a part of the school curriculum in most of the countries wherever sizeable numbers of Indians have settled (see Logan 1989, Furtado 1996, Gibbs 1998, Santhiram 1992).

The identity of Indians in the diaspora is also reflected in the cultural traditions of India. One such form of cultural tradition is the "Indian classical dance." Major Indian dance forms such as Kuchupudi, Odissi, Bharatnatyam, and Kathak are successfully transplanted in the Indian diasporas and are well maintained by renowned performers.

The classical dance forms are so popular now that, besides dancers of Indian origin, non-Indians are also attracted to the form and many have also become famous in this field. Renowned non-Indian classical dancers in the diasporas include, for instance, Sharon Lowen in Odissi, Janaki Patrik in Kathak, and the late Nala Najan in Bharatnatyam.

Religion is another identity marker that helps Indians to preserve their individual self-awareness and group cohesion (Rayaprol 1997: 16). The reconstruction of religion in a diasporic context occurs in two ways. First, religion attaches itself to culture, and second, it becomes identified with ethnicity. Thus, under global conditions religion may manifest both as a cultural *particularism* identified with particular ethnic groups and as a global universal, forming the locus of a set of beliefs and practices (Beyer 1994: 67). According to Williams (1998), immigrants are more religious when they enter into a new land than they were previously because religion outside the home territory provides important identity markers that help to perpetuate and preserve individual self-awareness and cohesion in the group. Religion, apart from its spiritual dimensions, acts as a major force in binding immigrants together and at the same time sacralizes one's self-identity.

Like all ethnic groups, Indians in the diaspora define themselves partly by their cuisine. They remain emotionally attached to the Indian food, clothes, and music. As Lessinger (1995: 32) points out, such things provide "a powerful reminder of 'home' and become even more intensely important to immigrants as the visible signs of ethnic identity." Further they continue to connect with the homeland through the construction of Indian restaurants, spice shops, movie stores, and other such initiatives in the urban areas wherever the Indian density is high. Today, for example, one can easily locate an Indian restaurant in any cosmopolitan city of the world.

Indian cinema is another cultural premise that shapes and reflects the Indian identity in the diaspora (see Gillespie 1995). Bollywood films such as *Kuch Kuch Hota Hai*, *Dilwale Dulhania Le Jayenge*, and *Kabhie Khushie Kabhie Gham*, are some of the blockbusters that have widely circulated in the Indian diaspora and thus have gained popularity. Similarly, films made by NRIs in Hollywood, such as *Bend It Like Beckham* and *Monsoon Wedding*, depict the story of the Indians in the diaspora. The following section will address further the issues of identity from a transnational perspective with an illustration of the Gujarati Diaspora. This particular community has been selected because of its global presence and wider networks.

GUJARATI DIASPORA

Gujarat, the state, is situated on the west coast of India. It is bounded by the Arabian Sea in the west, the state of Rajasthan in the north and northeast, Madhya Pradesh in the east, and Maharashtra on the south and southeast. The state at present comprises 25 districts, sub-divided into 226 talukas, having 18,618 villages and 242 towns. Gujarat has a geographical area of 1.96 lakh sq kms and accounts for 6.19 percent of the total area of the country. According to the provisional results of Population Census 2001, the population of Gujarat as of March 1, 2001, stood at 5.06 crore (Census of India 2001).

Although the merchants from Gujarat have been involved in overseas trade for almost a millennia in spices, ivory, and textiles, especially in East Africa, significant migration of Gujaratis occurred during the end of the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth century, particularly to East Africa, the Middle East, and later to other destinations in the West. The nineteenth century industrialization has significantly affected the socioeconomic fabric of Gujarat. Traditional caste occupations began to be abandoned in favor of more lucrative alternatives. People from all backgrounds started to move away from their state to nearby towns and cities. Many of them crossed national boundaries also. Moreover, the pressure to emigrate was also fueled by the conditions in Gujarat itself. A plague struck in 1899–1902 and again in 1916–18, an influenza epidemic raged in 1918–1919, and there was famine in 1899–1900. There were also the perennial problems of land shortage and employment, exacerbated by the decline of local textile industry (Ballard 1996: 179–80). Coincidentally, around the same time many economic and commercial opportunities opened up in East African countries, new cities were built up along with the railway in areas such as Nairobi, Nakuru, and Kisumu in Kenya, and Kampala, Jinja, and Tororo in Uganda. As a result, many Gujaratis migrated to Uganda, Fiji, Zambia, Kenya, Malawi, and Zanzibar.

With the opening up of global economies, Gujaratis have made remarkable presence in the USA, UK, UAE, Canada, and other countries. Many Gujaratis moved to the United States at the turn of the twentieth century. Today, Patidars form the largest group among the Gujaratis in the diaspora. They are identified by the popular surname Patel, followed by the Lohanas of Saurashtra origin, commonly referred to as Banias. In many countries, such as the U.S.A., the U.K., Canada, and the Caribbean, where the Gujaratis have made a name, they are

generally regarded as the most affluent and successful South Asian settlers. They are not only in business, which is their first love, but also in professional fields such as technology, science, medicine, and business management. Today, Gujaratis constitute one of the prominent Indian diasporic communities in the world. If we look at the history of their dispersal, there are significant Gujarati communities settled in approximately 150 countries. According to P.K. Pujari, secretary in the Department of Non-Resident Gujaratis, there could be 2.5 crore Gujaratis in foreign countries, though unofficial estimates put the figure of 4 crore (*India Times*, June 20, 2000). Although their numbers vary from one country to another, they have significant numbers in most of the African countries, such as Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and South Africa. They have also settled in most parts of Europe and North America.

Table 27.4 Gujarati Population Around the World by 2000

Bangladesh 67,000	Kenya 134,900	Malawi 36,100
Myanmar 36,100	Uganda 225,700	United States 150,000
Iran 29,900	Madagascar 55,200	Malaysia 22,300
Tanzania 249,100	Zambia 18,400	United Kingdom 500,000

Source: World Evangelization Research Centre; www.sil.org/ethnologue/ www.littleindia.com/

TRANSNATIONAL NETWORKS

The relation that the Gujaratis maintained with the countries of their origin has not only been a matter of memories; it has also been an ongoing and continuous relationship. These transnational relations can be broadly divided into two categories, which are the micro and macro linkages. The micro level transnational linkages among the Gujaratis can be analyzed from two perspectives: first, the ties between the Gujaratis in India with their relatives in other parts of the world, and second, the contacts between the Gujaratis living all over the world and their relatives back home. With the improvements in communication and the emergence of new virtual communities, the ongoing relationship between the Gujaratis living outside Gujarat and their relatives back home becomes easier. In contrast to the ex-indentured immigrants, Gujarati immigrants in the contemporary period have been able to

maintain extensive ties at both social and economic levels (see Patel and Rutten 2004, Ballard 2003). The second type of transnational linkages, the macro level linkage, is manifested at the institutional, organizational, and associational levels between the diaspora and the homeland as well as among the diasporic community members from different countries. A detailed discussion of the micro and macro level networks of Gujaratis is presented below.

CULTURE

Gujarat has a rich tradition of folklore and folk culture, which traced back to the mythology of Lord Krishna. “Dhandhya,” for instance, which is a folk dance, is popular among the Gujarati youths in India and abroad. Similarly, another dance form is “Bhangra”; though it is a Punjabi dance, Gujaratis perform it both in Gujarat and in most parts of the Gujarati diasporas. There are some special occasions on which these cultural programs are performed. For instance, during “Navaratri”—a nine-night religious ceremony to worship Goddess Durga—the Dhandhya dance is a major attraction and people from all backgrounds dance together. The Gujarati associations in the diaspora have preserved this culture of Gujarat over a significant period of time despite several odds.

RELIGION

Gujarat is known for the origin and development of two major sects among the Hindus: the followers of Swaminarayan and the followers of Vallabhacharya. A large proportion of Hindu emigrants from Gujarat have been involved in one or the other of these groups (Ballard 1996: 165–66).

The followers of Swaminarayan come under the Swaminarayan Sampradaya sect. The founder of this sect was Lord Shree Swaminarayan. Devotees are drawn from a wide range of castes, such as Kanbis, Suthars, Rajputs, and Lohans. The sect has already made inroads in the worldwide Gujarati diaspora. The followers of Swaminarayan have divided into four main subsects, which are Brahmacharis, Sadhus, Palas, and the Satsangis. During the 1960s–70s many of the Satsangis moved to East Africa and Great Britain. They maintain regular contact with various organizations in India. Often the Sadhus and spiritual leaders

from Gujarat visit the diasporas to promote the culture and spirituality of Lord Shree Swaminarayan. In order to retain the religious practice and to guide the younger generation, Lord Swaminarayan followers established hotels and schools, hospitals, and medical camps. They also provided aid in times of natural calamities and organized international festivals to preserve, protect, and promote Gujarati culture, interfaith harmony, and universal brotherhood.

Conversely, the followers of Vallabhacharya, known as “Prajapatis,” are believed to be the worshipers of Lord Shiva and have Vedic roots. Although the Prajapatis formed their community as early as the sixth century, their community came into the limelight only during the nineteenth century and the early part of twentieth century. The Prajapatis, those who emigrated to East Africa and other parts of the world during this period, were initially employed as carpenters, masons, and construction supervisors and later advanced to become clerical workers, as well as skilled and manual workers; the process resulted in the growth of community organizations that focused on retaining close contact with Gujarat. The Prajapatis have a strong sense of belonging to their community, which they call “Prajapati Samaj.” Through this Prajapati Samaj, they preserve their customs and traditions over generations. Presently, there are about 2.8 million Prajapatis in the world, and they interact with each other through newsletters and other modes of communication, including the Internet.

POLITICS

Although the Gujaratis have been living in most parts of the world for the past 150 years, only recently have they begun to interact closely with each other and with the motherland at the political level. For instance, the government of Gujarat, in order to facilitate this relationship, established the Non-Resident Gujarati Foundation (NRG) in 1998, with the following objectives:

- 1) To help and care for Non-Resident Gujaratis on their short trip to India, in their investment matters, on establishing industries in Gujarat
- 2) To establish effective communication between NRGs and the foundation
- 3) To preserve the cultural heritage, e.g., to send experts for musical concerts and dance performances

- 4) To preserve the language
- 5) To maintain social ties, e.g., matrimonial services
- 6) To create unity among the Gujarati families in different parts of the world
- 7) To identify NRGs who have gained special achievement in their respective fields and recognize them with awards.

The government is maintaining close contacts with Gujaratis living abroad not for just commercial reasons but to establish a closer rapport with them so that they can remain in touch with their social and cultural heritage. The government has launched many schemes for NRGs to establish better communication in addition to promoting their investment in the home state. For instance, the World Gujarat meeting held at Vadodara on January 4, 1999 attracted NRGs from many parts of the world, such as Uganda, New Zealand, the United States, the United Kingdom, UAE, Australia, and South Africa. The main purpose of that meeting was to establish, notwithstanding the name and fame acquired on foreign shores, a sociocultural connection as distinct from a financial tie-up with the homeland. Similarly, in January 2004, the Vishwa Gujarati Parivaar Mahotsav organized. The aim of the festival was not only to create a platform to bring the Non-Resident Gujaratis together but also to make it a regular forum for long-term interaction between the state and the NRGs.

ROLE OF INTERNET

The world-wide networks of online media allow much easier access, relatively at less cost, and above all, offer interactive opportunity to the dispersed people around the world. For example, the diasporic Gujarati websites are creating global directories of individuals, community associations, and business organizations owned by members of the diasporas. The online media help the users to reconstitute pre-migration relationships, at least in cyberspace, as well as create “*virtual communities*” with “*communal identities*.”

Two of the Gujarati World Wide Websites and their objectives are listed as:

- 1) “Kemchoo.com”—The aim of this site is to bring all the Gujaratis together and give them the feel of the rich culture and tradition. For all those who are out of touch with the culture/tradition or are

away from home, the site provides them a virtual home. The site focuses on Gujaratis around the world and provides the services to the people of Gujarat.

- 2) “Evishwajuarati.net”—The idea is to provide a platform for the Gujarati diaspora to interact with each other and link their lives, strengthen their shared heritage, deal with the problems of living in foreign countries, conduct business together and maintain stronger links with Gujarat. The sites focus broadly on four categories: a roundup of events pertaining to Gujarat and Gujaratis worldwide, the Samaj’s formidable network spanning continents, culture and interaction, and a Gujarat fact file.

Today we can find Gujaratis scattered in almost all countries of the world, along with their diversity and distinctiveness. This distinctiveness could be found in the form of language and culture that are considered as the inseparable parts of socialization among the overseas Gujaratis. Despite the influence of the Western culture the succeeding generations of Gujaratis have retained their traditional way of life. Further, the development of communication and transportation technology has made it possible for the evolvement of cohesiveness among the Gujaratis by bridging the gap between Gujarat and the diaspora. The Gujarati migrants can now easily sustain transnational linkages with a diasporic consciousness. These transnational linkages further act as a significant means for facilitating the multiple bridges among Gujarati diaspora and the homeland.

CONCLUSION

The illustration of the Gujarati Diaspora in this chapter shows the internal dynamics of transnational networks as well as the underlying linkages with the homeland. Similarly, other regional diasporic communities also have transnational relations in a global scale and simultaneously maintain their identity in the host society through participation in religious, cultural, political associations and organizations. Today the Indian diasporic organizations such as the Global Organization of People of Indian Origin (GOPIO), World Punjabi Organization (WPO), World Telugu Federation (WTF), and Viswa Gujarati Samaj (VGS) are collaborating with Indian governments to engage in raising awareness about regional integration and for sustainable development.

This has brought together policymakers, NGOs, and academicians to discuss how to motivate the Indian diaspora to create strategic resources for India's development.

During the last few years, the Indian government has been fully involved in harnessing the Indian diaspora's talent, commitment, and resources. In September 2000, for instance, the Prime Minister of India set up the High Level Committee (HLC) on Indian Diaspora to look after the issues of the Indian diaspora. The Committee was formed under the chairmanship of Dr. L.M. Singhvi, a member of Parliament and former High Commissioner of India to the U.K.; Shri J.C. Sharma, Secretary (NRI & PV) in the Ministry of External Affairs, was the Member Secretary. In January 2003, the government held a Home Coming meeting (Pravasi Bharatiya Divas [PVD]) to encourage the Indian diaspora's involvement and support in the country's development. As illustrated in this chapter, India is in a position to potentially benefit rather substantially from so many successful diasporans around the world who maintain an undeniably strong identity with their ancestral homeland.

CHAPTER TWENTY-EIGHT

NEGOTIATING GENDER IDEOLOGIES AND IDENTITIES: PRC CHINESE WOMEN AS TRANSNATIONAL MIGRANTS IN GLOBAL-CITY SINGAPORE¹

Brenda S.A. Yeoh and Natalie Yap

GENDERING TRANSNATIONAL ELITES

Current theorizations of “transnational elites” or “the transnational capitalist class” tend to subsume men and women under “genderless” (assumed ‘male’) categories (see Yeoh and Willis 2005 for a discussion), failing to recognize that “skills are embodied in gendered human beings who move through gender-selective and gender-discriminatory labor markets, both in the countries of origin and in the countries of destination” (Raghuram 2000: 432). This is symptomatic of the larger problem of equating globalization processes primarily with formal-sector economic processes and giving insufficient weight to salience of other sites such as households and communities in the production of globalized spaces (Nagar, Lawson, McDowell and Hanson 2002, Pratt and Yeoh 2003). Further, in the context of Asia, given the longstanding construction of the West as “the source of skilled migratory flows” and “in counterpoint, the non-west as the origin of unskilled migrants”, the non-Western woman as a member of the “transnational elite” is often considered in anomalous terms (Yeoh and Willis 2005: 212).

As part of the endeavor to “unthink globalization” (Beaverstock 1996: 424) and illustrate the embodied, gendered, and raced character of transnational skilled migration, we focus here on the negotiation of gender ideologies and identities among women from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) who have migrated to Singapore either as professionals or dependents of professional spouses. The women were

¹ This chapter was first presented at a Symposium on Labour, Migration and Economic Restructuring in the Asia-Pacific, The University of Western Australia, 15–16 March 2007. I am grateful to the symposium organizers and participants for their helpful comments. Developed from an initial draft by the two authors, this chapter is in memory of Natalie’s passing away and in an attempt to fulfil her desire to share her work with a wider audience.

attracted by the city-state's openness towards international talent. In moving across national boundaries in response to the opportunities offered by globalization, they also move in and out of the range of regulation by territorially and culturally specific "regimes of power and knowledge" (Nonini 2002). As women working and living in transnational space between different gender regimes, their migration accounts² offer us the opportunity to explore the way different bases for hybridized forms of identification between "home" and "host" are negotiated. We examine these negotiations in terms of the women's perspectives on their migration decisions, immigration policies of the host country, as well as their encounters and experiences within the spheres of work, childcare and public space in Singapore. This is first preceded by a brief account of the broader socio-political context that frames PRC professional migration from China to Singapore.

FROM CHINA TO SINGAPORE

Prior to Deng Xiaoping's implementation of the "open door policy" in 1978, the People's Republic of China had little interaction with the world beyond its shores, particularly during the Cultural Revolution from 1967 to 1976. Having inherited a technologically backward and economically poor country, Deng Xiaoping, as a leading figure advocating reform, designed his directives towards *gaige kaifang* ("reforms and opening up to the outside world") when he assumed leadership (Tang 1996: 21). Apart from economic reforms, the open door policy encouraged personnel exchange, such as those sent by the Chinese government to study and be trained in Western and Japanese institutions and firms. Even though there were no formal changes to exit controls, it has been suggested that by the turn of the decade restrictive controls

² These migration accounts were derived from in-depth semi-structured interviews with 33 PRC women who hold employment passes (category Q1 and above), or dependent's passes. The interviewees were located through snowballing, keeping in mind the need to achieve a balance in terms of the major parameters such as gender (27 PRC men in the professional class were also interviewed but their accounts are not the focus of this chapter), marital status (11 singles, 12 married without children and 10 married with children), migration status (a mix of lead migrants and accompanying spouses) and occupation (the sample included academics, research scientists, engineers, computer analysts, financial information analysts, and business managers). The interviews were conducted in the language the interviewee was most comfortable with, which was Mandarin in most instances (a few were conducted in English). Interviews were taped, transcribed, and when necessary, translated into English.

were loosened to some extent in line with the open door policy (Liu and Norcliffé 1996). By 1985, a law had been passed by the Chinese government to grant citizens the right to leave the country, albeit with certain restrictions (Liu and Norcliffé 1996: 313). This wave of migrants moving out of China since 1978—and in substantial numbers from the mid-1990s—has been termed *xin yimin* or “new migrants” (Nyiri 2004). While individuals who leave the PRC were once regarded as “traitors” within state narratives, such mobility is now encouraged for certain groups as a strategy to tap business potential inherent in the development of diasporic networks (Nyiri 2004). Substantial numbers of Chinese skilled migrants have since gone to countries such as the United States,³ Canada,⁴ Australia, European countries⁵ and high growth countries in Asia such as Japan and Singapore.

As part of its strategies to compete for a place in the top league of global cities, Singapore has transformed itself into an attractive potential destination for many skilled migrants through a range of policies aimed at producing the “Talent Capital of the New Economy.” The push to attract “foreign talent” hit a strong note in 1997 when the then Prime Minister of Singapore, Goh Chok Tong, focused much of his National Day rally speech entitled “Global City, Best Home” on the need to gather international talent to make Singapore a cosmopolitan city (Goh 1997). This theme has been a major preoccupation among the governing elite and policy makers, recurring as recently as in Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s 2006 National Day rally speech during which the Prime Minister made clear that promoting the immigration of the

³ PRC Chinese constitute one of the major sources of skilled professionals going to the United States (see Ong et al. 1992, Skeldon 1994a, Cheng and Yang 1998; cf. Skeldon 1997). The absolute annual number of Chinese immigrants increased from 14,421 in 1977 to 56,426 in 2001, while the number of skilled workers from China who entered the U.S. in 2002–2003 under the H-1B visa program was 17,000 with almost half going into computer-related occupations (Skeldon 1994b). Out of more than 320,000 students who went for overseas education from the late 1970s to the late 1990s, nearly half of them headed to the United States (Larmer 2000: 12). In 2002–2003, there were 64,757 students from China enrolled in US degree-granting institutions (Skeldon 2004).

⁴ In the case of Canada, China has become the principal source of immigrants from 1998. Canada is a popular destination for student migrants (Skeldon 1994b, 1996).

⁵ There has been substantial growth in recent years in the number of Chinese skilled workers (particularly health workers) and students entering Northern Europe. In the UK, for example, the number of Chinese students enrolled in British institutions of higher learning increased by 71 percent between 2000 and 2001 to reach 18,000. They are also the largest group, out of a total of 143,000 foreign students, in the UK (Laczko 2003).

skilled and talented is a necessary strategy crucial to Singapore's long-term growth and prosperity.⁶ Many directives geared towards attracting and retaining foreign talent have already been put in place, ranging from permanent residency and personalized employment passes to the branding of the city as a creative and cosmopolitan "Global City of the Arts." In 2006, skilled workers and professionals accounted for about 90,000 (or 13.4 percent) of Singapore's total non-resident population. Apart from Malaysians, the majority were from China and India, the two main non-traditional source countries targeted for skilled workers (Yeoh 2007).⁷

In general, the movement of professional Chinese migrants is conditioned by "job opportunities, work conditions and cultural milieu" (Cheng and Katz 1998: 76). These new migrants—what Chan (1997: 206) calls "the Chinese transilient... the new middle class, the transnational Chinese bourgeoisie"—tend to be young, aged between early twenties and early forties. A number of them come in pursuit of higher education and remain to work after they have graduated, while others come directly to take up employment positions in organizations and institutions. Singapore may or may not be their first destination since leaving China. Singapore may not be the final destination either. Neither is return to China a certainty. As the term "transnational migrant" implies, they do not necessarily wish to return to China. Nevertheless, they neither cut themselves off completely from China nor exclude the possibility of returning. Instead, mobilities are "neither unidirectional nor final" but characterized by "[m]ultiple, circular, and return migrations, rather than a single great journey from one sedentary space to another" (Lie 1995: 304).

MIGRATION DECISIONS: IS GENDER OUT OF THE EQUATION?

It has been argued in the literature on split-household transnational family formation that "at their core, families assume transnational

⁶ While Singaporeans have voiced fears that too heavy a reliance on "foreign talent" will increase competition for jobs, space, and limited resources to the detriment of citizens, and that foreigners will not integrate well or be loyal to their adopted country, the governing elite has in response stressed the argument that foreign talent are crucial to develop the economy for the benefit of all, including Singaporeans. Singaporeans are instead encouraged to change their mindset towards global talent and to welcome them as co-workers, residents and new citizens whenever possible (Goh 2000: 39).

⁷ Other major groups of skilled expatriates in Singapore include the Japanese, Taiwanese and Hong Kongers.

morphologies as a coherent strategy to pursue specific projects, to maximize benefits while minimizing risks, with the strategic intent to aspire to better futures” (Yeoh, Huang and Lam 2005: 312). The more commonly observed transnational division of labor among geographically-split households of professional and skilled migrants involves the male breadwinner working abroad (or commuting between places as a “frequent flyer”) while his wife and children remain in the home country.⁸ Another variant, also involving a male breadwinner, is the phenomenon of the “astronaut” husband. This term was first used to describe Hong Kong businessmen and professionals who sought to relocate their families in “safe havens” such as the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand in the run-up to the return of the British colony to China in 1997 while they returned to work or managed businesses in Hong Kong for months at a time (Skeldon 1994a). In much of the literature on elite transnational households, men are the prime movers in migration while women play subordinate or supporting roles.

In our study of PRC skilled migrants in Singapore, however, women feature regularly alongside men as what may be called “lead migrants” and “independent migrants”. Among the “lead migrants”—that is, those who take the lead in coming to Singapore first to be followed later by their spouse (and children)—there were five married women without children and three married women with children. Among the “independent migrants”, there were two married women with no children who migrated to Singapore, leaving behind their husbands in China alongside 12 single women. PRC women who feature as lead or independent migrants are hence as visible in the sample as those (11 altogether) who came to Singapore as accompanying wives of husbands who played lead roles in the migration process.

As with other studies of mobilities among single women (Willis and Yeoh 2003), single PRC women operating as independent migrants appear to have much freedom to go overseas. Most referred to their parents’ unreserved support, if not encouragement to venture overseas, as well as Singapore’s “good name” as a desirable place where their daughters can be put on track to a brighter future through foreign education and/or work in Singapore. A minority like Xiaoting and

⁸ As an example of work in this vein, see Yeoh and Willis (2004) which focuses on the interpretations and negotiations of fatherhood among Singaporean men who have ventured into China as economic migrants, leaving behind their wives and children in Singapore.

Huiru (both business management trainees in their twenties) said that while their parents had to overcome initial anxieties regarding the absence of their children in the context of China's one-child policy, they did not have serious difficulties in obtaining parents' support for their first trip overseas. What somewhat went against the grain of current migration research (Yeoh and Willis 2005) is the degree of freedom married women, with or without children, had with respect to independent migration. Most did not consider that being a wife and/or mother presented any major problem for them to leave China independently and in fact said that their husbands had no objections to their leaving and instead supported them. For example, when Peiqun (a graduate student in her thirties who became a research assistant) came to Singapore, she left her husband and six-year-old daughter in China, sending for them only after she found a job in Singapore. She did not face any objections from her husband; she said, "[m]y husband . . . is quite easy-going. He said that if I am willing, just go." Although she found the arrangement emotionally difficult initially, she eventually overcame the pangs of separation, as did her daughter ("she is tough and so she didn't really mind [my absence]").

Similarly, Shirley (a systems analyst in her thirties) had the support of her husband when she decided to move to Singapore and believed that she would get used to being apart:

I think he doesn't mind [our separation]... Because I wanted [to come to Singapore], he supported [me]... I think you get used to it [the separation].

As the household strategies approach (Chant and Radcliffe 1992) points out, migration decisions are often tied to the needs and politics within the family-household. In the current context, when "China is on the move" and many PRC Chinese are keen to venture overseas, allowing any member of the family-household—male or female—to migrate first is a significant household strategy which can pave the way for other family members to eventually leave China. Allowing women to play the role of independent and/or lead migrant constitutes an important strategy especially in cases where the opportunities to go overseas have yet to materialize for their husbands. Once the women settle into their jobs and establish their immigration status in Singapore, they can then make arrangements for their husbands and children to come. For Xiaoling (a research assistant in her thirties), for example, her desire to obtain a foreign degree brought her to Singapore where

she embarked on a masters degree in engineering with her husband's full backing. After about a year, her husband deliberately looked for a job in Singapore and managed to find a position in a private company in the host city.

The male interviewees made similar points about the decision to find work in Singapore first, to pave the way for their wives and children. Hence, whether overseas opportunities are open to the husband or the wife, the strategy is to seize them first to allow one member of the household to step out. Families are brought over only when circumstances are suitable. If the situation falls short of expectations, the migrating partner—either the husband or wife—can return to China where the home base continues to operate. Who plays the role of lead migrant is often dependent on the pragmatic question as to who has the better overseas offer. In Xuting's (a purchasing manager in her thirties) case, both husband and wife have taken turns playing lead migrant. In Xuting's case, her husband went to Australia alone to study before she joined him over a year later. Xuting made sure her husband prepared the way before she joined him in Australia:

At that time, all the Chinese wanted to go abroad. It was also not possible for the two of us to go [to Australia] together... So I let my husband go and see how it was. I thought he should go out and build some foundation first before I arrived.

When in Australia, Xuting got a job based in Singapore. She came to Singapore from Australia as an independent migrant and her husband joined her about two years later. It was only upon settling in Singapore and stabilising her career that Xuting suggested that her husband join her:

Later on, I feel that Singapore is not bad because there are many job openings. I asked him to come over. Because I was already here, Singapore gave him a longer visa, a six-month Social Visit Pass. That's why it was easy for him to find a job.

The transnational family formation emerging from these accounts is one which is highly mutable, opportunity-driven and much less tied to gendered positions within the family-household: essentially, whether male or female, the lead migrant seizes the opportunity to venture overseas and test the grounds before the follower migrant follows suit. While sequential migration within the family is certainly not new, what is distinctive about the migration patterns observed here is the prevalence of pragmatism over patriarchy in decision-making. Unlike other more

conservative forms of Asian transnational families where men are the prime movers and which essentially preserves the gendered household division of labor despite being stretched across a transnational stage, sequential overseas migration as practised by these PRC migrants is somewhat “gender-blind”, governed by who has better offers abroad and can pave the way for the follower. This is exemplified in the words of Xuting when she speaks of her husband’s willingness to be separated from her:

[PRC] Chinese couples are not like Singaporean couples where the ‘wife would follow/obey what the husband says’ [*fu chang fu sui*]. China was not like that. Even now, it is not like that. The husbands have the spirit of sacrifice. They know that they have to sacrifice today if they want a better tomorrow. Many of my friends are like that too.

There are hence few gender identity barriers to overseas migration for the PRC family-household. Instead, transnational migration and dispersal remains “often a rational family decision to preserve the family, a resourceful and resilient way of strengthening it: families split in order to be together translocally” (Chan 1997: 195).

SINGAPORE’S IMMIGRATION POLICIES: IS GENDER BACK IN THE EQUATION?

From the interviewees’ perspective, household decisions regarding out-migration are governed by pragmatic rather than gender considerations. However, this perspective shifts considerably when interviewees discussed their experiences in regard to the point of immigration into the host country.

State immigration policies are often underwritten by gender ideologies which naturalize the implementation of certain policies as well as the failure to legislate others. As Yuval-Davis (1997: 24) has argued, “[w]omen have tended to be differentially regulated to men in nationality, immigration and refugee legislation, often being constructed as dependent on their family men and expected to follow them and live where they do.” For interviewees who arrived in Singapore before 1998, only men were allowed to sponsor their wives on dependent’s passes. The gender-biased nature of Singapore’s immigration policies came as a shock. Liyin (a research fellow in her thirties) came to work in Singapore, bringing her two daughters but leaving her husband in Sydney. After several applications, she finally managed to get a dependent’s

pass for her husband. Although she was successful in her application, she felt that it was given as a concession:

I feel strongly discriminated... [as a] woman in Singapore. I don't have an equal chance to obtain a dependent's pass [for her husband] compared to my male colleagues. It is astonishing!... In principle, I am not able to sponsor my husband on a dependent's pass. But in the end they actually gave it to me...

Gender neutrality in this respect only came into effect from September 1, 1998 when employment pass holders (P or Q1 categories) regardless of gender became eligible for dependent's passes for their spouses and unmarried children under 21. However, some interviewees who entered Singapore even after September 1998 felt that the immigration regulations were still far from gender neutral. Xuting, for example, felt that the "shadow" of gender discrimination continued to linger on when her application for a dependent's pass for her husband was rejected. She added that she finally understood why people had been telling her that Singapore was a traditional society when her desire to let her daughter take on her family name was disallowed:

At the time when I got my employment pass, I wanted to apply for a dependent's pass for my husband. But it was rejected... Then my elder daughter was born. In China... a daughter can take on either parent's surname... I wanted her to take on my surname... but it was not allowed... unless the child is illegitimate. That's when I got to understand this point [about Singapore being a traditional society]... My husband told me, 'as a woman here, you have no status at all'.

Beyond the issuing of dependent's passes, interviewees also encountered what they perceived as gender-biased regulations in relation to the granting of permanent residency and Singapore citizenship. Until 1999,⁹ only a male employment pass holder applying for permanent residency could include his wife and unmarried children below 21 years of age in his application. A female applicant could only include her unmarried children below 21 while her husband has to apply for

⁹ According to the Ministry of Manpower (email dated 5 April 2007), following then Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong's 1997 National Day rally speech in which he mentioned: "If the foreign husband of a Singapore girl can contribute to Singapore, or if the wife is successful enough to support her foreign husband, we will welcome the husband and incorporate him into our society", the government revised its policy guidelines in 1999 to enable married female employment pass holders who obtained permanent residency status to sponsor their husbands for permanent residency as long as the family has the means to support itself.

permanent residency based on his own merits. Shirley who encountered this regulation complained:

There seems to be some gender discrimination. A man's wife can get permanent residency if he gets it. But not for woman, her husband cannot [when she gets it]... He has to apply himself... The society [is] still quite traditional.

This traditional stance seems to also condition applications for Singapore citizenship as well. While nothing in the written rules of citizenship application appears discriminatory against migrant women, some interviewees felt that actual experience pointed differently. Xuting, whose entire family had taken on board Singapore citizenship at the time of interview, felt that her experience in applying for Singapore citizenship was subject to unwritten gender rules.¹⁰ Even though she was eligible to apply for citizenship before her husband was, she was advised to wait until he qualified. She was told that her chances would be greater and the processing would be faster:

The official told me that it is best that I apply for the citizenship together with my husband. It would be easier and faster. At that time, they encourage men to apply for citizenship. For ladies who apply independently without their husbands, it would be more troublesome. It would take a lot of time and it needs a minister to look through it... So I waited for another three months for my husband so that he can apply for us.

Migration as a boundary-crossing process is thus negotiated between different “regimes of power and knowledge” and is hence caught in the contradictions between gender-neutral, family-based migration decisions on the one hand and gender-biased immigration policies governing entry into host society on the other. PRC women refusing to be pigeonholed as “dependent” in the migration process as well as families wishing to suspend gender considerations in order to use migration in strategic ways, may still encounter a less-than-level playing field when negotiating entry into the host nation.

¹⁰ Part of the reason why interviewees continued to perceive the immigration regulations as gender-biased despite changes to remove discriminatory clauses relates to the lack of transparency in the application process for permanent residency or citizenship. In January 1999, a point system including six criteria—type of work pass, duration of stay in Singapore, academic qualification, basic monthly salary, age and family ties in Singapore—was introduced in order to render the application process for permanent residency more comprehensive. However, how each criterion is weighted vis-à-vis the others is not revealed and no reason is ever offered for approval or rejection. This renders the system open to charges of a lack of transparency, which is a common complaint among interviewees.

BALANCING WORK AND FAMILY

Work and Deskilling

It has been argued that the “current generation of [PRC] Chinese women grew up believing that working outside the home is the only way of life. They regard working as the prime and only indicator of gender equality” (Zhou 2000: 449). Nine in ten urban women in China are engaged in paid work and for the remaining ten percent who do not work, their low educational attainment stands out as the main reason (Bauer et al. 1992).¹¹ For urban Chinese women to be unemployed and homebound would thus not only contradict social norms, but would be tantamount to having low educational status (Zhou 2000: 449).

For the lead and independent migrants among our interviewees, migration is clearly tied to career prospects and/or in pursuit of work opportunities and is hence entirely consistent with their notions of women’s status and identity as professionals. Among the 11 interviewees who first entered Singapore as dependents, an immigration category uncoupled from employment, negotiations over the issue of work is central to gender identities. The term dependent or trailing spouse evokes an image of the “expatriate wife”—one who can choose against having gainful employment, and by virtue of being an expatriate, can enjoy the overseas stint while the husband is on an overseas posting. Contrary to this image, all 11 interviewees except two had found employment at the time of interview. Of the two remaining, one was studying English on a full-time basis while the other was a homemaker with a highly active social life, revolving around her neighbors and church activities.¹² All 11 belonged to dual-career households before they came to Singapore and are highly qualified in educational terms: two have Masters degrees, seven hold basic degrees and two have certificates equivalent to polytechnic diplomas in Singapore. Most had their jobs back in China kept for them for roughly a year when they went to join their husbands in Singapore. Thus, should they fail to secure a job in Singapore, returning to their positions in China provided a safety net.

¹¹ It is estimated that 75 to 80 percent of all Chinese women work, making up 38.7 per cent of China’s total labor force (Moktan and Subramaniam 1998).

¹² In this exception, the interviewee came close to resembling the typical “expatriate wife”. Her husband is an academic in senior management at one of Singapore’s universities and she has no financial need for engaging in gainful employment. Nonetheless, the interviewee makes clear that given a choice she would have preferred to work but is constrained by the necessity to give priority to caring for her two sons.

All the interviewees were clearly aware that a dependent's pass would not disqualify them from seeking employment.¹³ Engaging in paid work is a major preoccupation as they adjust to life in Singapore, and in fact being educated and without work is as good as losing much of their self-worth and status, particularly when they already perceive women's status in Singapore not to be comparable to that in China. Xiaojie (a research fellow in her thirties) explains a viewpoint shared by many interviewees:

When you talk about China, it is different from Singapore. From the perspective of women, Chinese women tend to have gainful employment. In fact, a woman's work and her status in society are of a higher standing than that in Singapore... there are too many housewives here. It is impossible for us to stay at home since we studied so much.

In addition to maintaining social status within and outside the home, employment is also important for a sense of financial independence and hence, gender equality, as Mrs Zhao (a Chinese teacher in her thirties) points out:

We [PRC women] want to be independent when we come to Singapore... At least when you have the money you feel that you are supporting yourself. This is important for equality with the men... In China, we emphasize gender equality. If both husband and wife have the same qualifications, the income will be about the same. In Singapore, men and women are paid differently... The family burden is equal for both [in China]... In Singapore it is more like the opposite. Men are responsible for the matters outside the home and women are responsible for matters within the home... I find it hard to accept [that] over here the husband gives you the money. You feel dependent on your husband.

The interviewees also suggest that being an unemployed wife leads only to boredom and frustration that could strain marital relationships, indicating that "women do not strictly belong to the home." Liuting (a stock broker in her thirties) who came to Singapore with her husband from Holland where he had studied for his doctorate explains:

The best solution is to go to work... It is the same in Singapore [as in Holland]. When I go to work, I am very interested in what I do... The people [at work] are nice. I feel very happy being with them... If I do not see a single person the whole day, when he [my husband] comes

¹³ Those holding a dependent's pass can apply for a Letter of Consent from the Ministry of Manpower in order to take on formal employment in Singapore.

home at night, he may find me a burden because I will vent all my frustrations on him.

While employment is obviously crucial to the interviewees, the jobs the women take on in Singapore may not be ideal. Several were only able to find work which did not do justice to their qualifications. Despite having a certificate in accounting equivalent to a polytechnic diploma, Mrs Zhao could not find an accounting-related job because her qualifications were not recognized in Singapore. Instead, she works as a Chinese language teacher. Armed with a degree in the German language, Connie (a clerical officer in her forties) gave up her job in China as a translator as well as a place in a German university to further her studies and a job opening in Germany, in order to accompany her husband in London and later Singapore. She has no avenue to use her language abilities in her current job but considers it worthwhile for the sake of her family:

Sometimes... I do think maybe I have given up too much in what I should do. [Then] I think, if I concentrate too much on my work, then I would have lost my family. That's why it's not too hard for me.

Likewise, Liuting gave up a university research position in China to join her husband abroad. With a Master's degree in history, her skills have not been put to good use since she worked as a travel agent in Holland and later as a stockbroker in Singapore. Although she finds it a pity to quit her job in China, she gives priority to her role as a wife and hopefully a mother later:

Yes. It was really a waste [to quit my research job]... When [we as] a family were separated in two places... we both felt very depressed. Just before I went to Holland... I got pregnant... I felt that due to various sources of stress, I had a miscarriage. That was not very good. Then I thought, is work or family more important? I had to make a choice. At that point, I chose to go to Holland although when I was in China the job I had was... a very good job.

PRC women as transnational migrants hence negotiate gender ideologies around notions of work drawn from both home and host societies. Whether lead or follower migrants, paid work outside the home appears highly valued among urban Chinese women for the financial independence it confers and as an emblem of womanhood and status. In actively resisting what they saw as depressed status among Singaporean women among whom "there are too many housewives," some have taken on "deskilled" jobs as a means of compromise.

Childcare

In transplanting the ideology of paid employment as an indispensable part of womanhood from home to host context, PRC women encounter a number of barriers. Apart from deskilling in the arena of work discussed above, childcare presents another major challenge for those with children. Many felt that while employment in China did not pose any conflict between working and family lives, choosing to work appears to be ridden with considerable difficulties not experienced in China.

In China, childcare facilities with operating hours tailored to the working hours of parents and within walking distance of the home or workplace are readily available. State enterprises and large collectives with women employees are required by the Chinese government to provide for childcare facilities coupled with breaks for breastfeeding (Adams and Winston 1980, Bauer et al. 1992). Regulations stipulating maternity leave provisions and the way in which work is assigned to pregnant and breast-feeding female employees are in place to ensure that women can manage both work and family (Croll 1995). The system supports the inner workings of dual-income households with young children. As for older children, attending full day schools is the norm, thereby reducing the need for additional care during the day when parents are at work. In situations when children are not brought to childcare centers, the grandparents will usually extend their help to care for these children whose parents are working (Zhou 2000). As such, women in China have little difficulty managing work and family.

Coming to Singapore takes the interviewees out of such a support system and into an urban environment with few bridging facilities between the public and the private spheres. Even though childcare facilities are available in Singapore, they are not always near the place of residence and work, they are also expensive and inadequate especially in terms of the care for infants and young toddlers (Yeoh and Huang 1995; *The Straits Times*, September 26, 2000). Children usually attend school only for half a day, requiring care when they are home during the other half. Women in Singapore are expected to juggle productive and reproductive roles with little help in terms of state provision of bridging facilities.

Given the failure of the Singapore state in bridging employment and family concerns, several interviewees find themselves depending

on transnational family support networks. Drawing on a practice that affirms Pessar's (1999: 548) argument that "household members often develop economic strategies that transcend national labour markets and pursue social reproduction strategies that may similarly stretch across national divides," some PRC migrant families in Singapore resort to transnational childcare arrangements. One variant of these arrangements is to import childcare assistance in the form of flying in their parents(-in-law) from China on a long-term social visit pass. Unfamiliar with the childcare facilities in Singapore the women are unsure as to whether foreign domestic workers (commonly used in Singapore as surrogate care for children and the elderly) could be trusted. Weiqing (a researcher in her thirties), for example, who was pregnant at the time of the interview, intended to fly in her mother to care for the newborn. Another variant is to return home for childbirth and confinement and consider leaving their children with grandparents back in China. In the case of Liuting (pregnant at the time of interview), when her mother's application for a visa was unsuccessful, she had to change plans and return to her mother's home in China to have her baby, while leaving her husband in Singapore. Leaving the children in the care of grandparents back in China while the parents ventured overseas is also an option, usually until the situation overseas stabilizes. Torn between her role as wife and mother, Xiaowan (a librarian in her thirties) decided to join her husband in Singapore, leaving her two-year-old daughter with her parents for eight months before bringing her over.

In cases where transnational childcare arrangements are unavailable, some interviewees have localized their options, but not without considerable struggle. Mrs Gu (currently a part-time Chinese teacher in a language school but about to give up work altogether, in her thirties), for example, gave up her research job in economics in a premier Chinese institution and brought her daughter to join her husband in Singapore. She took up a job as a Chinese teacher in a language center with short working hours so that she could care for her daughter. Recently, a newborn son was added to the family. Without the benefit of a state system of childcare support or access to a transnational care network, she felt her stress levels mounting. This was further exacerbated by her husband's frequent business trips away from home. In the end, she felt that she had little choice but to resort to the "Singaporean solution" of employing a foreign domestic worker and also give up work:

I really liked writing those economic papers... My position and salary [in China] were very good... I felt a great sense of achievement. I feel that it was a great pity [to give up that job]. But I had no choice. Ultimately, it was for the sake of the family. [I took the job as a teacher] because of the family. If I were to look for another job in an office, I would not have the time to take care of my daughter... The workload in China is lighter. In addition, your relatives and friends can help you. Over here, that would not happen. You are all alone... When the second baby came along, I was very stressed because the two children... need me. I will have to give up work altogether. The sacrifice is painful but I let it be painful... I do not feel safe leaving my children with a maid. But, now that we have children we have no choice but to employ a maid.

The inadequacies of state childcare provision in Singapore pose a major challenge to PRC women migrants used to a Chinese system where the productive and reproductive spheres are more structurally bridged. In this context, several have resorted to transnational childcare strategies to resist relegation to the home. In cases where both state and transnational family networks fail, however, the women have little choice but to redefine their gender identities, giving in to re-domestication and/or resorting to paid domestic services from other migrant women also present in the globalizing city.

THE 'SEXUALIZED OTHER' IN THE PUBLIC IMAGINATION

As argued elsewhere, migrant women are often rendered "out of place" in the material spaces of the global city (Yeoh 2006). The presence of PRC women migrants in large numbers in Singapore, in particular, has inspired considerable anxieties within Singaporean society, usually centered on the construction of these women as the "sexualized other." The "China girl" is seen to be dangerous and predatory, not only because she is different (that is, "more beautiful", "more alluring") but also because she is ethnically and culturally proximate to the nation's Chinese majority, thus positioning her as a potential rival to the Singapore Chinese woman.¹⁴

¹⁴ Espiritu (1999: 634) argued that Asian professional women in the United States suffer more sexual harassment than their Western counterparts because they tend to be portrayed as politically passive, sexually exotic and submissive due to racialized ascriptions. Here, we observed that the politics at work are not just calibrated according to difference but also sameness as well.

Media portrayals often refer to the “China girl” as *xiao long nu*, literally meaning “little dragon maiden” but carrying a derogatory meaning.¹⁵ Yinghui (a financial information analyst in her thirties) explained:

The term does not refer to the female descendants of the dragon [a symbol for China]... ‘*Xiao long nu*’ is what Singaporeans would use to refer to Chinese females who came here to work as prostitutes... Later on, as long as a female is from China, she is referred to as ‘*xiao long nu*’... At one time, there was a Beijing lady who was married to a Singaporean and they had a legal battle. She was also referred to as *xiao long nu*.

Indeed, it has been suggested that China brides have a bad reputation among Singaporeans since the media’s coverage of the divorce battle between Mrs Shi Fang (mentioned by Yinghui above) and her Singaporean husband from 1995 to 1998. China brides have since been stigmatized as gold-diggers or schemers who use marriage as a stepping stone to obtain permanent residence or citizenship (*The Sunday Times*, August 31, 2000).

A number of the interviewees related their frustrations at being framed as the sexualized other out to prey on Singapore men:

When we speak, the first thing they [Singaporean men] ask is whether you are a *Shanghai mei* [a female from Shanghai]. You understand what it subtly means right? Maybe they can have a ‘business arrangement’ with you... [They think] you are cheap. ‘Do you want to earn some money from me or can I take advantage of you (Yinghui).

I stayed [in this place] for over four years. They [the people from the market] all know me. They still ask, ‘you married a local here? You migrated here?’... When you buy something, they always say, ‘you Chinese are like this and like that. From this I can tell that you are from China’. Maybe they don’t mean anything... but when you hear it you feel quite uncomfortable. They still differentiate you (Xiaojie).

I think Singaporeans have certain perceptions about [the] China girl. ...something I don’t really feel fair about [is that] I know that there are some wrongdoings [that] have been done in the past. Some China girls maybe did something wrong... [But] people have this perception that, ‘oh, you come from China’... They will think that you come here, your purpose, your aim [is] to marry a Singaporean guy and get a PR, stay

¹⁵ As noted by Jiu Dan (female PRC author) in her novel (based on her experiences as a student in Singapore), Singaporeans label China-born women who are students by day and lounge hostesses by night as *xiao long nu*. Often, these China-born women are “seen as homewreckers who compete with Singapore women for their husbands and boyfriends because they are interested in getting money and permanent residency here” (*The Sunday Times*, June 10, 2001; June 17, 2001).

here and be a housewife and not work. I mean like ‘*tai tai*’ [woman of leisure] (Xiaoting, a business management trainee in her twenties).

As Haijie (a source analyst in her thirties) puts it, the conflation of “China girl” with prostitute or promiscuous woman is so strong that “[t]hey would not think you are a professional.”

Resisting the pervasive nature of sexualized othering has meant that interviewees have had to grapple with the sexual overtures of Singaporean men in some instances but also to confront them (as in the case of Yanchun, a software engineer in her twenties), or become immune to them (as in the case of Mrs Gu):

At first I could not understand or accept it... I felt very sorry for myself. But in the end, I can stand in front of the person and stare at him and see how he reacts. The start of the conversation [the Singaporean man] will say, ‘all of you come from China right?’ I will always be quiet. Then he will say, ‘why did you come here, China’s not so good?’ And then... ‘which nightclub are you in?’... It is a routine question. I am used to it already. I simply stare back and after a while, they turn tail and get lost (Yanchun).

People would ask, ‘You came from China? Did you marry someone here?’ Nine out of ten people say that. I feel very unhappy... Then there is this, ‘Isn’t Singapore good?’... I find it revolting... No matter where I go... as long as I speak and they could tell we are Chinese Nationals, they would become like this. Everybody talks about this topic, including the times when I take a taxi... I have already gotten used to it and [become] numb (Mrs Gu).

CONCLUSION

By highlighting the trans migratory experience of PRC women moving from China to Singapore, this chapter shows that individual life trajectories are shaped not only by one consistent set of gender ideologies but the gender (and sexual) dynamics of two or more overlapping “regimes of power and knowledge” traversed by migrants in their journeys across space. Whether “lead” migrants in their own right, or “trailing spouses”, many value employment in Singapore, not simply because of economic necessity but also because the Chinese ideology of work (even if it means “deskilled” work) is a definitive norm of womanhood. The transplantation of such an ideology into the context of Singapore has necessitated considerable reworking of new ways to juggle home and work, as well as coming to terms with (and resisting when pos-

sible) what are perceived to be gender-biased immigration policies as well as stereotypical images of PRC women as “predatory, morally loose and materialistic.” Strategies to cope with the gender and sexual politics which shape migration trajectories are thus highly variegated; they are neither completely rooted in ideologies of the home country, nor entirely fashioned from new experiences in the host country, but somewhere in between.

CHAPTER TWENTY-NINE

IMMIGRANT TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY¹

Alejandro Portes, Cristina Escobar and Alexandria Walton Radford

The webpage *www.conexioncolombia.com* designates a public/private partnership in the Republic of Colombia which aims at diffusing information about the country among its immigrants all over the world and at channeling their contributions to established charities and philanthropic initiatives throughout the nation. “With a simple click,” says *Conexion Colombia’s* attractive brochure, “any person in the world can donate and contribute to the country’s development. Connect yourself now!” According to the young, dynamic executive director of the organization, Diana Sanchez-Rey, its webpage is visited by thousands of Colombians all over the world every day, looking for news and stories about their country and leaving their own statement. In her words:

Mostly the older, better-off migrants in Europe and the U.S. for whom nostalgia weighs heavier...but also the younger professionals who have left recently and feel an obligation toward the country that educated them.²

Not two miles away from the plush offices of *Conexion Colombia*, Sor Irene of the Vicentine Sisters of Charity operates a refuge for the homeless of Bogotá, the “inhabitants of the street”, mostly mentally disturbed and retarded persons or drug addicts. Every night, Sor Irene and her brave helpers roam the dangerous neighborhood surrounding the convent in search of the inhabitants of the street. The refuge not only offers them shelter, food, and clothing, but rehabilitation in the form of counseling and occupational therapy. All the equipment for learning new work skills—from manufacturing and selling paper made

¹ This chapter is a new version of a paper that appeared in *International Migration Review*, 41(1) pp. 242–81 (2007). The editors wish to thank IMR for the authorization to use this material.

² Field interview conducted by the senior author in Bogotá, Colombia, March 15, 2005. Personal names are fictitious.

from recycled waste to baking and selling bread—has been acquired through donations from Colombians abroad.³

In the same convent lives Sor Isabel, a vigorous middle-aged nun, who helped create fifteen years ago an asylum and school for orphans in the city of Tunja. The funds for buying the land for the asylum and building the dormitories and the school were provided, in large part, by the Foundation of the Divine Child (*Fundación del Divino Niño*), a charity established by a Colombian priest, a journalist born in Tunja, and a network of immigrant volunteers in New York and New Jersey. The computers for the school were donated by IBM through the good offices of the Foundation.⁴

The examples could be multiplied. All over the hemisphere, countries and local communities that are sources of migrants to the developed world have come to rely on the solidarity of these persons and on their sense of obligation with those left behind, not only for the survival of families but also for the implementation of a whole array of philanthropic and civic projects. By now, it is well-known that the level of remittances sent by immigrants in the advanced countries to their respective nations easily surpasses the foreign aid that these nations receive and even match their hard currency earnings from exports. The amount of remittances in 2004 was estimated at 2 to 3 billion dollars for Guatemala and El Salvador each, 5 billion for Colombia, and a staggering 16 billion for Mexico. Continent-wide, the remittances reached 23 billion (Latin American Report 2003, Cortina and de la Garza 2004).

Less well-known is the wide variety of collective organizations among immigrants pursuing a number of diverse projects in their respective countries and communities of origin, as well as the initiatives undertaken by these communities and even nation states to motivate and channel the material contributions of their expatriates. Rising migration from the global South to the global North has become acknowledged as one of the trademarks of the contemporary capitalist world economy and of its relentless process of integration (Zolberg 1989, Castles 2004, Portes and DeWind 2004). Less well-recognized, until recently, is that this massive displacement is not one-way, but that it plays back, with rising force, becoming an important factor in the development of send-

³ Field interview in Bogotá, Colombia, March 16, 2005. Personal names are fictitious.

⁴ Field interview in Bogotá, Colombia, March 16, 2005. Personal names are fictitious.

ing nations and regions. By the same token, immigrant communities turn into an unexpected, but increasingly visible actor in the politics of their home towns and countries (Vertovec 2004, Levitt and Glick-Schiller 2004).

“Transnationalism” is the name with which these activities and their effects have been baptized in the recent sociological literature (Portes et al. 2002, Guarnizo et al. 2003). While there have been some dissenting voices concerning the novelty and importance of the phenomenon (e.g. Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004), the weight of the empirical evidence provides strong proof of the novel character of these practices and of their structural importance for sending regions and for immigrant communities themselves (Smith 2003, Vertovec 2004). Most of this evidence, however, comes from case studies of specific communities or from surveys of immigrants (Levitt 2001, Kyle 2000, Guarnizo et al. 2003, Portes 2003). So far, there have been few systematic studies of *organizations* involved in the transnational field, their origins and effects.⁵

This study aims at making a contribution toward filling this knowledge gap with a systematic survey of immigrant organizations among three Latin American-origin immigrant groups in the East Coast of the United States. The data gathered in the course of the survey allows us to gain better understanding of the forces creating and sustaining these organizations and to test several preliminary hypotheses about the effects of contexts of exit and modes of incorporation in receiving countries on the character of immigrant transnationalism. The principal focus of this study is on the implications of the phenomenon for local and national development in sending countries. Hence, interviews with leaders of organizations in the United States were supplemented with visits and interviews with government officials, community activists, and counterpart organizations in each nation of origin.

This double-perspective provides a far more comprehensive understanding of the social and political dynamics at play and of the different forces impinging on the phenomenon. The brochure of *Conexión Colombia*, one of the organizations identified and studied in the course of the project, illustrates well some of these dynamics:

⁵ An exception is the detailed study of Mexican hometown associations by Manuel Orozco. The study is based on interviews with 100 such associations and field visits to more than 20 communities in Mexico receiving assistance from these groups (see Orozco 2003).

... to provide emotional, useful, and up-to-date information so that Colombians abroad remain in contact with their country. For that reason, the webpage of *Conexión Colombia* has become the corner of nostalgia (sic) where it is possible to see the goals in the local futbol tournament, listen to the latest music, travel through the most beautiful areas of our geography, and locate the closest Colombian restaurants the world over.⁶

RESEARCH DESIGN

Building the Data Base

The first challenge confronted by the study was building an inventory of organizations created by the target immigrant groups in their respective areas of concentration. Fortunately, there are several circumstances that make possible a near complete enumeration, especially of organizations with transnational ties. First, the consulates of the respective countries generally maintain lists of these organizations as part of their efforts to keep in touch and influence their communities abroad; second, umbrella confederations based on nationality or pan-ethnicity (*i.e.* “Hispanic”) make it their business to identify and bring together the relevant organizations, thereby increasing their visibility and power; third, leaders of organizations are generally interested in advertising their goals and achievements as a means to attract both new members and donations. Organizations are *not* individuals and, unlike the latter, most seek public exposure, with leaders generally willing to grant interviews and provide detailed information. Because of these circumstances, the research team was able to build a database of transnational organizations in the principal areas of concentration of each national group which include all but the most fleeting and smaller associations.

Selected Nationalities

Colombians, Dominicans, and Mexicans were the groups selected for study. While these immigrant nationalities share a common language and culture, they are very different in contexts of exit and reception. Colombians are a relatively recent inflow, now exceeding one million persons and concentrated in New York City and Miami.⁷ Colombians

⁶ Materials gathered during field interview. See also the website of the organization www.conexioncolombia.com.

⁷ The U.S. Census count for 2000 is less than half of this figure. Based on figures from the Colombian government and independent calculations from various specialists,

tend to be urban in origin and to have higher levels of education than other Latin immigrants. Their departure has been motivated by growing violence and deteriorating economic and political conditions in their country. Thus, while the majority of Colombians are legal immigrants, there is a growing number of political asylees. Phenotypically, Colombian immigrants are mostly white or light mestizo and thus tend to escape the worst forms of discrimination experienced by non-white groups in American society (Guarnizo et al. 1999, Escobar 2004).

Dominicans have been arriving in New York City and in smaller cities along the New York-Boston corridor since the 1960s. They now comprise over one million and represent the largest immigrant group in New York City (Itzigsohn et al. 1999).⁸ New York is second only to the capital city of Santo Domingo in the size of its Dominican population. This is mostly a working-class migration, but with a sizable component of middle-class professionals and entrepreneurs. Motivations for departure are mostly economic since the country of origin is at peace, and there is a dense traffic between the island and New York for family and political reasons. All major Dominican parties have representatives in New York and in cities along the New York-Boston corridor, especially in Providence. The current president of the country, Leonel Fernandez, was himself born and educated in New York City. The Dominican Republic is predominantly a mulatto country, with a white upper-class crust that does not emigrate. Dominican migrants are mostly phenotypically black or mulatto. In America, they are generally regarded as part of the black population and are discriminated accordingly (Portes and Guarnizo 1991, Grasmuck and Pessar 1991).

Mexicans are, by far, the largest immigrant group in the United States, numbering over 10 million persons and representing, by itself, close to one-third of the foreign-born population of the United States.⁹ Historically, and at present, Mexico has effectively functioned as the principal manual labor reservoir for its powerful northern neighbor.

we believe that this is a serious underestimate based on failure to count unauthorized immigrants and potential asylees. We report the Census estimate in Table 29.1.

⁸ The U.S. Census puts the number of Dominicans at less than 800,000 in 2000. However, estimates from the Dominican government and specialized research centers indicate that the number of immigrants, including the unauthorized, easily exceeds the million mark. See Table 29.1.

⁹ The U.S. Census puts the resident Mexican population in 2000 at 9 million. The Mexican government, on the other hand, estimates it at 12 million based on the latest Mexican census. We opt for an intermediate estimate which, based on the U.S. census likely undercount, appears conservative.

The end of the Bracero program in 1964 led to the criminalization of this labor inflow and to the rapid growth of the category of illegal or unauthorized immigrants among the U.S. Mexican population. As is well-known, Mexican immigration has traditionally concentrated in the Southwest, and, secondarily in the Midwest. Its principal areas of urban/metropolitan concentration are in Los Angeles, San Diego, Houston, Dallas, and Chicago. More recently, the flow has moved steadily east in search of stable agricultural and urban employment in agriculture and services. As a consequence, the Mexican-origin population of states such as Georgia tripled during the last intercensal period (1990–2000) and it went from insignificance in New York City in the 1980s to an estimated 250,000 persons in 2000 (Massey et al. 2002, U.S. Bureau of the Census 2001).

Phenotypically, Mexican immigrants are identifiable by their darker skin and mestizo or indigenous features. This trait, added to their low average levels of education and frequently illegal status, has led to pervasive discrimination against them both by the U.S. government and by American society at large. In the Southwest and Midwest, Mexicans have been traditionally confined to impoverished and isolated neighborhoods, called *barrios* and, like blacks elsewhere, treated as an inferior caste. In response to these conditions, Mexican-American ethnic politics has pivoted around struggles to overcome discrimination and to gain a measure of dignity and economic advancement for members of this minority. In contrast, Mexican transnational organizations, created by first generation rural immigrants, have aimed primarily at improving material and political conditions in their places of origin (Goldring 2002, Smith 2005).

Table 29.1 Colombian, Dominican, and Mexican Immigration: Characteristics (by Countries of Origin)

Characteristics	<i>Colombia</i>	<i>Dominican Republic</i>	<i>Mexico</i>
Population (in millions) ¹⁰	43.0	8.5	97.5
GDP per capita (\$)	2254	1862	4574
Gini Index of Inequality	.57	.47	.47
Income Share of Top Quintile (%)	60.9	53.3	60.2

¹⁰ Ca. 2000.

Table 29.1 (*cont.*)

Characteristics	<i>Colombia</i>	<i>Dominican Republic</i>	<i>Mexico</i>
Income Share of Bottom Quintile (%)	3.0	5.1	5.4
Average Years of Education ¹¹	8.6	8.2	8.6
Open Unemployment (%) ²	19.8	13.8	3.7
Informal Employment (%) ²	46.3	44.0	44.1
Households below Poverty Line (%)	45.0	32.0	43.0
Capital City	Bogotá	Santo Domingo	Mexico D.R.
Political Situation	Democracy+ civil wars	Democracy+ no insurgencies	Democracy+ localized rebellions
<i>Immigrants in the U.S.</i>			
Number ¹²	470,684	764,945	9,177,487
Percent of U.S. Hispanic Population	1.3	2.1	58.5
Legal Immigrants, 2001	16,730	21,313	206,426
Percent of total Legal Immigration	1.6	2.0	19.4
Rank in total Legal Immigration	16	14	1
Professional Specialty Occup. (%)	16.1	9.4	4.7

¹¹ Urban areas; economically active population (ages 25–59).

¹² U.S. census figures. Estimates from sending country governments put resident Colombian and Dominican populations in the U.S. at over 1 million each and the Mexican population at over 12 million.

Source: International Labor Organizations. 2003. *General Labor Statistics*
Economic Commission for Latin American and Caribbean. 2002. *Indicadores de Desarrollo Social*

World Bank. 2003. *World Bank Indicators Database*

U.S. Bureau of the Census. 2003. *Public Use Microdata, 2000 Census*.

Office of Immigration Statistics; Department of Homeland Security, *2002 Annual Report*

United Nations, *World Urbanization Prospects*, 2001 Revision, ST/ESA/SER/A.216 New York: 2002, Table A-2

Table 29.1 (*cont.*)

Characteristics	<i>Colombia</i>	<i>Dominican Republic</i>	<i>Mexico</i>
High School Graduates (%)	72.0	48.1	29.7
College Graduates (%)	21.8	9.5	4.2
Median Household Income (\$)	43,242	34,311	36,004
Types of Immigration	Mostly legal; increasing numbers of unauthorized immigrants and political asylees	Legal and unauthorized	Mostly unauthorized, but sizable number of legal immigrants
Principal Cities of Destination	Miami (15.8%) New York (12.3%)	New York (45.9%) Bergen-Passaic (5.9%)	Los Angeles (16.0%) Chicago (5.3%) Houston (4.8%)
Characteristics of settled U.S. Population	Mostly first generation	Mostly first generation with rising second generation	Mostly second generation and higher

Table 29.1 presents a summary of the characteristics of the three selected immigrant groups and of their countries of origin. Their cultural similarities and systematic structural differences provide a suitable background for analyzing the forms that transnational activities can take and their potential impact in sending countries and communities. As indicated previously, data collection on these organizations focused on their principal areas of concentration in the U.S. East Coast as follows:

Colombians: New York, New Jersey suburbs, and Miami

Dominicans: New York, New Jersey suburbs, Boston, and Providence, R.I.

Mexicans: New York, New Jersey suburbs, New England, Philadelphia, and North Carolina

FIELDWORK

For each target nationality, we selected the thirty principal organizations identified in the process of building the inventory and interviewed their leaders. For budget reasons, the study was limited to the East Coast of the United States. This is not a serious limitation in the case of Colombians and Dominicans since their principal areas of concentration are known to be located in the East, but it means that Mexican organizations interviewed for the study represent mainly a recently established population, since the larger and much older Mexican immigrant concentrations are located in the cities of the West. The Mexican organizations included in the survey may be defined as representative of the early associational efforts of this population in its new areas of settlement and, as such, are likely to be different in size, age, and goals from those identified and studied in the West (c.f. Goldring 2002, Roberts et al. 1999).

The one-and-a-half hour face-to-face interview with immigrant leaders gathered information on the origins of the organizations, their members, and the leaders themselves. These interviews were supplemented by meetings with consular officials and other informants knowledgeable about each immigrant community, as well as several visits to sending countries. During these visits, the project team established contact with government departments assigned responsibility for their respective immigrant populations; with private entities pursuing relationships with these populations; and with recipients of donations and assistance from the civic and philanthropic groups interviewed in the United States.

The Institute of Mexicans Abroad (IME in its Spanish acronym) and the Program *Colombia Nos Une* (Colombia Brings Us Together) established by the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Relations are examples of official initiatives in this field. *Conexion Colombia* provides an illustration of a powerful private initiative supplementing official efforts. By contacting local municipalities, established philanthropies, and religious orders, the research team was able to ascertain, on the ground, the existence and effects of the civic/philanthropic projects organized by immigrants abroad. While the aggregate impact of such efforts is difficult to quantify, their undeniable existence and the attention paid to them by government agencies and large private institutions in each sending country offer *prima facie* evidence of their importance.

THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

Definition

The concept of transnationalism was coined in the early 1990s by an enterprising group of social anthropologists to refer to the “multi-stranded” activities created by immigrants across national borders (Basch et al. 1994, Glick Schiller 1999a, Glick Schiller and Fouron 1999). The flurry of case studies that followed documented the many forms that these activities could take and advanced the notion that immigrant assimilation, as conventionally defined, was a thing of the past. Instead of a gradual process of acculturation and integration into the host society, as described by classical assimilation theory, transnationalism evoked the imagery of a permanent back-and-forth movement in which migrants lived simultaneously in two or more societies and cultures, tying them together into “deterritorialized” communities (Basch et al. 1994).

The excessive claims of this literature led more scientifically-oriented students of immigration to reject the concept altogether and stay within the framework of conventional assimilation theory. Apart from the broad pronouncements to which it led, the concept of transnationalism had the additional difficulty of having been applied in the past to a number of disparate phenomena, thus obscuring and confusing its meaning. Thus, as early as 1916, a public intellectual, Randolph Bourne, used the term in his oft-quoted essay, “Transnational America”, to precisely deplore the process of immigrant assimilation that, in his view, “create hordes of men and women without a spiritual country, cultural outlaws without taste, without standards but those of the mob... they become the flotsam of American life,” (Bourne 1916: 90–91).

Despite these difficulties and seeing heuristic value in the concept as applied to contemporary immigrants, another group of social scientists set out to define it more rigorously so that it could be empirically measured (Portes et al. 1999, Guarnizo et al. 2003). These researchers adopted a definition of transnationalism as the grassroots activities conducted across national borders by actors in civil society, independent of and sometimes in opposition to official directives and rules. Thus defined, transnationalism encompassed, among others, the efforts of activists in different countries concerned with such matters as the environment, human and labor rights, and political democracy (Evans 2000, Keck and Sikkink 1998). Immigrant transnationalism is a subset

of this universe, defined by regular activities across national borders conducted by the foreign-born as part of their daily lives abroad.

This definition sought to distinguish *regular* involvement in such activities from the occasional sending of a remittance or a once-in-a-while trip to the home country, things that immigrants have always done and which, by themselves, do not justify the coining of a new term. The novel element at present, which the concept of transnationalism seeks to capture, is the frequent and durable participation of immigrants in the economic, political, and cultural life of their countries which require regular and frequent contact across national borders. Such contacts are made possible by innovations in transportation and communications technology unavailable to earlier generations of migrants (Levitt 2001, Guarnizo 2003). By extension, transnational organizations are those whose goals and activities are partially or totally located in countries other than where their members reside.

Thus defined, transnationalism is not assumed *a priori* to be a characteristic of all immigrants, nor inimical to their assimilation. These are questions to be answered by empirical research. Earlier characterizations of all immigrants as “transmigrants” and of transnationalism as an alternative to assimilation were based on extrapolation from case studies. The methodology of these studies sampled on the dependent variable by focusing on transnational entrepreneurs or political activists, to the exclusion of other immigrants not involved in these actions (Portes 2003).

The more restricted definition of the concept adopted by more recent studies aims at investigating the actual extent of the phenomenon among different groups of immigrants and was accompanied by a typology that seeks to distinguish between the *international* activities conducted by governments and other nationally-based institutions; the *multinational* initiatives of U.N. agencies, global churches, and corporate actors operating in multiple countries; and the *transnational* world of grassroots enterprises and initiatives undertaken by actors in civil society, immigrants included. The purpose of this typology is to delimit and differentiate clearly the scope of the latter concept from other phenomena also anchored in cross-border interactions but conducted by more institutionalized and far more powerful actors. Absent this distinction, the concept of transnationalism becomes a catch-all devoid of any heuristic value.

Involvement of National States

This typology does additional service by highlighting the possible interactions and mutual influence of the three types of cross-border activities distinguished above. It turns out that governments—in particular those of sending nations—have not remained indifferent to the presence and initiatives of their expatriates and have increasingly sought to influence them. Reasons for governments' involvement are easy to understand: the rising volume of immigrant remittances; the investments of expatriates in housing, land, and businesses at home; and their cross-border civic and philanthropic activities. Taken together, these activities have grown to gain “structural” importance for the development of local communities and even nations (Guarnizo 2003, Vertovec 2004).

Sending country governments have responded by passing laws allowing migrants to retain their nationality even if they naturalize abroad. Those who remain citizens of their home country have become able to vote and even to run for office while living in another country. Consulates have been instructed to take a more proactive stance toward immigrant communities and have started to provide a number of services to their co-nationals, including legal representation, health assistance, identification cards, and English and home country language training (Escobar 2003, 2004; Smith 2003, Itzigsohn et al. 1999).

Through these various initiatives, governments are seeking to preserve the loyalty of their expatriates and to increase and channel their remittances, investments, and charitable contributions. The significance of these official initiatives may be seen in the fact that almost every sending country government has undertaken them: from Mexico to Turkey; from Colombia to Eritrea; and from the Dominican Republic to the Philippines (Portes 2003). In terms of the three-part typology outlined above, this means that the *international* activities undertaken by diplomats and government officials of these countries become increasingly oriented toward promoting and guiding the *transnational* initiatives of their emigrant communities.

The flurry of such official programs have fostered the impression that immigrant transnationalism is nothing but a reflection and a response to these initiatives. Nothing could be farther from the truth: all empirical evidence indicates that economic, political, and socio-cultural activities linking expatriate communities with their countries of origin emerged by initiative of the immigrants themselves, with governments jumping

onto the bandwagon only when their importance and economic potential became evident (Landolt 2001, Guarnizo et al. 1999, Smith 2005). Still the increasingly active presence of sending country governments in the transnational field cannot but have a bearing on the form and the goals adopted by these grassroots initiatives. Depending on the reach and the material resources committed by governments and the purposes for which they are used, immigrant organizations may come to accept and toe the official line, remain independent of it, or actively resist it as unwanted interference. We will return to these varying interactions between international and transnational activities below.

Controversies and Hypotheses

Waldinger and Fitzgerald (2004) have charged that there is really nothing new about the concept of transnationalism. Immigrants have always engaged with their countries and communities of origin and abundant examples of what today is called transnationalism may be found in the literature on European immigrants to America by the turn of the twentieth century. Indeed, multiple historical instances of grassroots cross-border activities exist. Yet, until the concept of transnationalism was coined and refined, the common character and significance of this phenomenon remained obscure. For instance, the theoretical linkage between Russian or Polish émigré political activism and the trading activities of the Chinese diaspora could not have been seen because there was no theoretical lens that connected them and pointed to their convergence.

In this sense, Waldinger and Fitzgerald step into what Merton (1968: Ch. 1) long ago identified as the “fallacy of adumbration” which consists of negating the value of a scientific discovery by pointing to earlier instances of it.

Robert Smith brings home the point by noting that:

If transnational life existed in the past, but was not seen as such, then the transnational lens does the new analytical work of providing a way of seeing what was there that could not be seen before (Smith 2003: 725).

In line with Smith’s statement, the concept has given rise to a fertile research literature and to the formulation of subsidiary ideas and hypotheses that did not exist before in the field of immigration. Some of these hypotheses concern individual participation in transnational enterprises and activities and others deal with the character of these

organizations. The single quantitative survey conducted in this field so far, the Comparative Immigrant Entrepreneurship Project (CIEP), discovered that education was positively associated with participation in transnational activities—economic, political, and cultural—and so were occupational status and marital status. Married men were far more likely to take part, while years of residence abroad actually *increased* the probability of transnationalism (Portes et al. 2002, Guarnizo et al. 2003).

Results from the CIEP study indicate that, contrary to the conventional assimilation story, the maintenance and cultivation of ties with the home nation do not decline with time since immigration, nor are they the preserve of marginal sectors within immigrant communities. To the contrary, these activities are more common among better-established, better-educated, and wealthier migrants. The reason seems to be that these are the persons with the wherewithal to involve themselves in frequently complex and demanding cross-border ventures, something that is commonly beyond the reach of more recent, and poorer, arrivals. In light of these findings, we hypothesize that assimilation to the host country and participation in transnational activities are not necessarily at odds with each other, as assumed earlier by both schools (Guarnizo et al. 2003, Portes et al. 2002, Portes 2003).

The CIEP study also found significant differences in transnational participation depending on contexts of exit and reception of different immigrant groups: those coming from rural areas, whether immigrants or refugees, tend to form non-political hometown civic committees in support of the localities left behind; immigrants from more urban origins commonly become involved in the politics and the cultural life of their countries as a whole, especially if political parties, churches, and cultural institutions there seek to maintain an active presence among their expatriates (Itzigsohn and Saucedo 2002, Guarnizo et al. 2003). Programs initiated by home country governments also can play a significant role, especially if they go beyond symbolic appeals and provide real help for their migrants abroad. In such cases, the direction and goals adopted by grassroots transnational activities can be heavily influenced by official directives (Escobar 2003, Smith 2003). Based on these results, we hypothesize that differences in the socio-political context of exit and in the character of involvement of sending country governments will have significant influences in the form and activities of organizations created by different immigrant groups.

Lastly, contexts of reception can also affect the onset of these activities, depending on the level of discrimination meted on the newcomers.

For example, when for reasons of low human capital or racial stereotypes, an immigrant group finds itself discriminated against, there is every reason to expect that it will band together and adopt a defensive stance toward the host country, appealing to symbols of cultural pride brought from home. When these conditions are absent, transnational initiatives may become more individualized and organizations, when they exist, may adopt “middle class” forms recognizable and acceptable by mainstream society. “Lions clubs”, “Kiwanis Clubs”, “Charitable Ladies Associations” are examples of this alternative mode of transnationalism. This third hypothesis based on prior empirical results is examined with the others, on the basis of data from the new study.

RESULTS

Origins, Types, and Structure of Transnational Organizations

The Global Foundation for Democracy and Development (FUNGLODE in its Spanish acronym) is a private non-governmental organization set up by Lionel Fernandez, president of the Dominican Republic, prior to his re-election. The Foundation has established a “strategic alliance” with the Institute of Dominican Studies at the City University of New York as a means to hold a number of conferences, appoint joint task forces, and explore other avenues to give Dominicans in the U.S. a greater voice in the affairs of their country. This type of activity operates at a high level of formalization and, in terms of our typology, may be more properly termed “international” than “transnational”. The latter element is present, however, because of the large number of Dominican immigrants taking part in this alliance and because its founder, Fernandez, got the idea while growing up, as an immigrant, in New York.¹³

At the other extreme of formalization is the Cañafisteros of Bani Foundation of Boston, a grassroots association created by Dominican immigrants in New England to help their hometown and province (Bani). A counterpart committee in the town receives and distributes the regular donations in money and kind. So far, the Cañafistero migrants have bought an ambulance and funeral car for their town, provided uniforms for the local baseball team, bought an electrical generator for

¹³ Field interviews conducted by the research team in New York and in the Dominican Republic in 2004.

the clinic, acquired various kinds of medical and school equipment, and created a fund to give \$100 a month to needy families in Cañafistol. They have literally transformed the town, which has grown increasingly reliant on the loyalty and generosity of their migrants for a number of needs unattended by the national government.¹⁴

Table 29.2¹⁵ A Profile of Immigrant Transnational Organizations

Variable	<i>Values</i>	%
National Origin:	Colombian	36.0
	Dominican	35.0
	Mexican	29.0
Location:	New York/New Jersey	54.0
	Miami	20.2
	Philadelphia	4.5
	Other	21.3
Organization Type:	Civic	40.4
	Hometown Committee	18.0
	Social Agency	12.4
	Cultural	7.9
	Political	6.7
	Professional	4.6
	Religious	3.4
	Educational	2.2
	Sports	2.2
	Economic	2.2
Scope of Projects in Country of Origin:	Local	26.0
	Regional	13.0
	National	61.0

¹⁴ Field interviews, 2004.

¹⁵ Source: Comparative Immigrant Transnational Organization Project (CIOP).

Table 29.2 (*cont.*)

Variable	<i>Values</i>	%
Focus of Activity in Country of Origin: ¹⁶	Education/Schools	53.9
	Health	40.4
	Children/Old People	30.3
	Church	13.5
	Political Parties	7.9
Legal Status	Non-profit Organization	45.0
	Informal/Other	55.0
Frequency of Civic Events Sponsored by Organization:	Occasionally	24.4
	Yearly	36.6
	Several Times a Year	26.8
	Once a Month or More	12.2
Frequency of Festivals Sponsored by Organization	Occasionally	19.0
	Yearly	52.4
	Several Times a Year	28.6
Sources of Funds: ¹⁷	Members' Dues	59.0
	Private Companies	60.3
	Churches	12.8
	Foundations	9.2
	Home Country Government	9.1
	Home Country Political Parties	2.6
N = 90		

These contrasting Dominican examples serve well to introduce our data for they highlight the notable range of transnational activities, even among migrants from the same small country. Table 29.2 presents an initial profile of our sample of immigrant organizations. The predominant type are those that define themselves as "civic" entities

¹⁶ Percentages do not add up to 100 because organizations may be engaged in multiple projects.

¹⁷ Percentages do not add up to 100 because organizations may receive multiple sources of funds.

pursuing an agenda of national scope. Examples appear in Table 29.3 which include such migrant-created organizations as the Colombian Lions Club of Miami and the Association of Dominican Provinces of New York. The Mexican example is regional in scope and consists of an association of migrants in North Carolina who emerged under the sponsorship of the government of their home state, Guanajuato.

Second in importance are hometown committees whose scope of action is primarily local. Table 29.3 provides examples, including the previously mentioned Cañafisteros of Boston and a strong New York-based set of well-organized committees formed by Mexicans from Xochihuehuetlan, a town in the municipality of Guerrero. Next are social agencies that provide health, educational, and other services to immigrants in the United States, but which are also engaged in projects in their home country. These are commonly better funded organizations since their budget includes monies for social services provided by U.S. municipal, county, and state governments.

Transnational political organizations represent a small minority of the sample, and they are not represented at all among Mexican immigrants whose focus of interest is primarily their home communities. Among Dominicans, however, political party representation is quite important. As seen in Table 29.3, the Dominican Revolutionary Party of New York (PRD) claims 23,000 affiliates in the metropolitan area and the Dominican Liberation Party (PLD) of Massachusetts, 1,500. While these figures are probably exaggerated, they signal the significance of party politics for this specific immigrant group.

Table 29.3 Examples of Transnational Organizations

Type	Name	Nationality	Location	Number of Members
Civic:	Miami Colombian Lions Club	Colombian	Miami	32
	Association of Dominican Provinces	Dominican	New York/ New Jersey	48
	Casa Guanajuato	Mexican	Carrboro, North Carolina	26
Hometown Committee:	Fundacion Quimbaya	Colombian	New York/ New Jersey	28
	Cañafisteros de Bani en Boston	Dominican	Boston	25
	San Miguel Comitipla (Xochihuehuetlan, Guerrero)	Mexican	New York/ New Jersey	260

Table 29.3 (*cont.*)

Type	Name	Nationality	Location	Number of Members
Social Agency:	Las Americas Community Center	Colombian	Miami	95
	Mirabal Sisters Child and Family Care Network	Dominican	New York/ New Jersey	20
	Mexican House of New Jersey—Development Corporation	Mexican	New Jersey	20
Religious:	Committee of the Divine Child	Colombian	New York/ New Jersey	11
	Dominican Sunday	Dominican	New York/ New Jersey	9
Political:	Colombian-American Political Action Committee	Colombian	Miami	25
	Revolutionary Dominican Party (PRD)	Dominican	New York/ New Jersey	23,000
	Dominican Liberation Party (PLD)	Dominican	Boston	1,500

Source: Comparative Immigrant Transnational Organization Project (CIOP)

Table 29.4 Quantitative Characteristics of Immigrant Organizations

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Colombian</i>	<i>Dominican</i>	<i>Mexican</i>	<i>Total</i>
Mean Number of Members	44	939	69	356
Median Number of Members	25	34	23	26
Mean Number of Occasional Members	65	1061	144	492
Median Number of Occasional Members	23	20	25	20
Mean Monetary Funds	\$24,056	\$695,737	\$24,470	\$247,493
Median Monetary Funds	\$20,000	\$24,000	\$5,000	\$20,000
Monthly Expenses:				
No Expenses, %	46.7	10.0	60.0	37.7
Less than \$1,000, %	33.3	23.3	20.0	25.9
Less than \$5,000, %	16.7	43.3	16.0	24.8
\$5,000 or more, %	3.3	23.4	4.0	10.6

Table 29.4 (*cont.*)

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Colombian</i>	<i>Dominican</i>	<i>Mexican</i>	<i>Total</i>
Salaried Employees:				
None, %	87.1	70.0	82.6	79.8
Less than 5, %	12.9	3.3	17.4	10.7
Less than 10, %	0.0	16.7	0.0	6.0
10 or more, %	0.0	10.0	0.0	3.5
N	31	30	29	90

Source: Comparative Immigrant Transnational Organizations Project (CIOP)

Table 29.2 shows that most of these organizations operate informally, although 45 percent have registered their status as formal, non-profit entities. Regardless of status, the prime philanthropic concerns of the majority of these groups pertain to education and health in their home communities and countries, followed by care of children and the elderly. The data reveal vast differences in the resources available to organizations to implement these initiatives, ranging from a few thousand dollars to close to a million. As mentioned previously, social agencies are the better funded organizations and they are also most common in our sample of Dominican organizations. This accounts for the very sizable differences in average monetary resources among organizations of the three nationalities, as shown in Table 29.4.

The fact that these differences are due to only a few well-funded organizations becomes evident when we examine the *median* of financial resources, rather than the mean. The median is influenced by frequencies and not extreme values and hence differences among nationalities in this indicator become much smaller. Still, Dominican organizations remain the best funded, with Mexican ones trailing far behind. The same story repeats itself when we consider monthly budgets or number of salaried employees. Four-fifths of immigrant transnational organizations do not have paid staff, but 25 percent of Dominican ones employ five salaried workers or more. No organization among the other two nationalities is in this category.

By and large these are organizations of volunteers with an average of 35 regular members. This number is inflated upwards to almost 1,000 among Dominicans. In this case, it is not social agencies but political

party affiliates which are the outliers. The fact that political party organizations are few in number is reflected in the median which discounts extreme values. Differences in membership size become much smaller, though Dominican organizations still preserve some advantage. Like figures on monetary resources, the data on membership (both regular and occasional) indicate wide dispersal, with organizations ranging from a handful of committed activists to hundreds of members.

Membership Characteristics

We asked leaders of each selected organization to report on characteristics of their regular members. These data are important because they bear on opposite hypotheses concerning determinants of transnationalism. As seen previously, an orthodox assimilation perspective would regard such activities as proper of more recent immigrants who have not yet severed their ties with their home countries and cultures and who are keener to assist those left behind. As time passes, these ties should weaken so that, when immigrants become more settled, better able to speak English, and more comfortable in their new environments they should gradually abandon active involvement in their home countries (Alba and Nee 2003, Gordon 1964, Warner and Srole 1945). To the contrary, results from the CIEP study summarized above, indicate that it is older, better educated, and more established immigrants who are more prone to participate in these ventures. The explanation is that these are the individuals with the information, the security, and resources of time and money to dedicate to these initiatives (Portes et al. 2002, Guarnizo et al. 2003).

The organizations included in the present project have an estimated membership of 9,040 immigrants or 32,040 if affiliates to the Dominican Revolutionary Party of New York are counted. Table 29.5 presents relevant data on their average socio-demographic characteristics. Results consistently support the hypothesis that transnational organizations are backed by older, better-educated, and better established immigrants. About half of regular organization members are 40 years of age or more and have at least a college degree or more, in contrast with a fifth or less who are under 30 or have less than a high school education. The only exception are Mexican organizations who attracted a larger proportion of young people and who have as many poorly educated as well-educated members. This result is in line with the well-known

young age and low average human capital of the Mexican immigrant population as a whole (Cornelius 1998, Lopez and Stanton-Salazar 2001, Massey et al. 2002).

The figures on occupational status tell a similar story with professionals and business owners doubling the proportion of manual laborers among organization members. Again, the exception are Mexican associations where the proportion of high- and low-status participants is about the same. However, the figures that most decisively contradict the orthodox assimilation hypothesis pertain to knowledge of English, legal status, and length of U.S. residence. As shown in Table 29.5, about 60 percent of immigrants actively supporting transnational organizations speak English well or very well, as opposed to just 12 percent who speak it poorly. The pattern is clear among all nationalities, Mexicans included.

Similarly, close to 70 percent of members of these organizations have lived in the United States for 10 years or more and half are already U.S. citizens. Only one-tenth are relatively recent arrivals, or are in the country without a legal visa. A partial exception is again Mexican organizations which draw about one-fourth of their regular members from immigrants without papers, but even among them naturalized U.S. citizens outnumber the *indocumentados*.

From these data, we conclude that the motivation to engage in civic, philanthropic, political, and other activities in the home country among Latin American immigrants is primarily found among better-educated, higher-status members of the respective communities and among those with longer periods of U.S. residence and secure legal status. Apparently, the process at play is one where recent immigrants concentrate in carving a niche in the host country rather than concern themselves with collective organization. These initiatives emerge and start influencing the home localities and countries of origin only after the initial stages of adaptation have been successfully completed. Since half of the participants in these organizations are already U.S. citizens and 70 percent have been in the country for ten years or more, we conclude that assimilation and transnationalism are not at odds, but can actually occur simultaneously. Even Mexican organizations do not contradict this conclusion since, while many members of their *Clubes de Oriundos* (hometown committees) are still undocumented, the vast majority of participants have been in the United States for a significant amount of time.

Table 29.5 Characteristics of Members of Transnational Organizations

	<i>Colombian</i>	<i>Dominican</i>	<i>Mexican</i>	<i>Total</i>
Age:				
30 years or less, %	12.1	11.1	24.8	15.2
40 years or more, %	53.2	53.8	33.6	48.3
Education:				
Less than high school, %	7.4	29.7	28.7	20.9
College degree or more, %	52.3	50.5	27.0	45.7
Occupation:				
Manual laborer, %	18.0	26.4	40.1	26.6
Professional/Business owner, %	49.8	61.5	36.0	50.3
Knowledge of English:				
Very little, %	11.9	18.7	5.0	12.4
Well or very well, %	64.2	49.7	60.9	58.5
Legal status:				
Does not have entry visa, %	6.3	3.5	27.9	10.7
U.S. citizen, %	56.3	48.5	38.4	49.1
Length of U.S. Residence:				
Less than 5 years, %	10.1	5.8	10.4	8.7
Ten years or more, %	68.9	66.8	69.5	69.3
Average Trips to Home Country for Organizational Matters:				
Never or rarely, %	6.7	3.6	30.0	11.5
At least three trips a year, %	40.0	35.7	20.0	33.3

Source: Comparative Immigrant Transnational Organizations Project (CIOP).

Determinants of Organizational Characteristics

It is possible with the data at hand to investigate further the characteristics and origins of transnational organizations. This analysis bears directly on hypotheses concerning the effects of contexts of exit and incorporation on the emergence of these organizations. The dependent variables for this analysis are type of organization, whether or not it

has achieved formal status, the causes of its creation, the sources of its funds, and the scope of its action. We use as predictors the nationality of the organizations and as controls the size of their membership and the financial resources and characteristics of members—age, education, visa status, and length of U.S. residence. With the exception of nationality, which stands as a proxy for the characteristics of origin and reception of each immigrant group, no implication of causality is made for results involving these control variables.

Table 29.6 presents results of a multinomial logistic regression of type of organization and of a binomial logistic regression of whether the organization is formally incorporated as a non-profit or operates informally. Only the three main types of organizations—civic/cultural, hometown committees, and social service agencies—are included. These regressions are nested, with the first model including characteristics of the organization—location, national origin, size of membership (logged), and size of financial resources (logged); the second equation adds the characteristics of members. Only coefficients significant at the .10 level or lower are presented. With a sample size of just 90 cases, coefficients at this level of significance can be reasonably interpreted as important.

Civic/cultural organizations, by far the main type, are not well accounted for by this set of predictors. National origins do not have a significant effect, and neither does geographic location or the characteristics of members. These results indicate that civic/cultural organizations are the normative form of immigrant transnationalism and that they emerge *regardless* of the origins of the group, how it is received, or where it happens to concentrate. The single significant result is the logarithm of membership size which shows that, relative to other types of organizations such as social service agencies or branches of political parties, civic/cultural entities tend to be smaller.

On the other hand, findings reinforce the conclusion that hometown committees are the normative form of transnationalism among Mexican migrants. Relative to the reference category (Dominicans), the odds of an organization being a hometown committee are forty-six-to-one if it happens to be Mexican. The fact that these committees are mostly the creation of immigrants of modest origins is reflected in the negative effect of higher education: the higher the proportion of college graduates among members, the less likely the probability that a transnational organization will be a hometown committee.

Table 29.6 Characteristics Defining Principal Transnational Organizations

Predictors	Civic/ Cultural ¹⁸		Hometown Committees ¹		Soc Service Agencies ¹		Formal Non-Profits ¹⁹	
	I	II	I	I	II	I ²⁰	II	II
<i>Nationality:</i> ²¹								
Colombian	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mexican	-	-	3.83** (2.8)	4.49* (2.3)	4.10** (2.6)	7.51* (2.1)	-2.26** (3.2)	-4.07*** (3.5)
<i>Characteristics Organizations</i>								
Financial Resources	-	-	-	-	1.25** (3/0)	2.24* (2.0)	-	-
Number of Members	-	-.635* (2.2)	-	-	-.738# (1.8)	-1.48# (1.9)	-	-
<i>Members</i>								
-20 years								-.027* (2.2)
+40 years								-
-high school								-
+graduates					-.071* (2.3)			-
No visa								.052* (2.5)
Constant	2.10	3.94	-3.77	-1.01	-10.92	-24.36	1.60	2.05
N	89		89		89		89	
Pseudo R ²	.234***	.450***	.234***	.450***	.234***	.450***	.124*	.257**

¹⁸ Multinomial logistic coefficients. Z-ratios in parentheses. Coefficients not significant at the .10 level are excluded.

¹⁹ Binomial logistic coefficients. Z-ratios in parentheses. Coefficients not significant at the .10 level are excluded.

²⁰ Maximum likelihood iterations did not converge due to limited degrees of freedom.

²¹ "Dominican" is the reference category.

Table 29.7 Origins and Scope of Transnational Organizations

Predictors	Group of Friends		Gov Sponsorship		Natural Disasters		Nationwide	
	I	II	I	II	I	II ²²	I	II
Nationality: ²³								
Colombian	–	–	–	–	24.778**		–	–
					(2.7)			
Mexican	–	–	22.901***	45.036**	–		–	–
			(7.2)	(3.3)				
Characteristics of Members:								
+ 40 years		–	–	.279#				.126#
				(1.7)				(1.7)
+graduates		–	–	–				.033*
								(2.5)
+10 years. resid		.034*						–
		(2.1)						
Constant	.409	–.193	18.343	59.493	–34.633		–.717	–4.77
N	89		89				89	
Pseudo R ²	.293***	.530***	.293***	.530***	.293***		.068	.316***

Social service agencies are also significantly less common among Colombian and Dominican immigrants, relative to Mexicans. The odds of a social service agency engaging in transnational activities among Mexicans in the first model is sixty-to-one relative to the reference nationality. On the other hand, the fact that these are the best financially endowed organizations is reflected in the positive and significant coefficient of financial resources. This is not a causal effect, but a direct reflection of the fact that these organizations are more likely to receive funds from the cities and states where they are located.

The likelihood of a transnational organization becoming formal non-profit rather than operating informally is also affected by national origin. Reflecting their grassroots character and their creation by migrants of

²² Maximum likelihood iterations did not converge due to limited cases.

²³ “Dominican” is the reference category.

more modest background, Mexican associations tend to operate informally, their net odds of achieving formal status relative to those created by Dominicans being less than one in ten. With nationality controlled, organizations with a higher proportion of younger members and those without papers tend to operate more formally. This unexpected result is explained, in part, as a consequence of the formal character of social service agencies attending these needier populations and, in part, as a residual effect after controlling for Mexican origin—the largest source of younger and undocumented immigrants.

Other useful information can be gleaned from additional regressions on reasons why each organization was created and on its scope of action in the respective home country. The relevant data come from multinomial regressions of the first variable and a binomial regression of scope of action with “nationwide” coded 1; and “local” coded 0. Results are presented in Table 29.7. Transnational associations initiated by “groups of friends” are undifferentiated by nationality and most other collective and individual characteristics. This reflects the fact that such spontaneous efforts are found among *all* types of immigrants, regardless of national origins, age, or education and that the organizations thus created are not significantly smaller or poorer than those stemming from more institutional sources. The only other noteworthy result is that immigrants with longer periods of U.S. residence tend to be less common among members of these organizations, as shown by the model in Column II. This is arguably a consequence of the preference of established immigrants for more formal and more institutionalized initiatives.

As the prior descriptive results have indicated, organizations created by the initiative of sending country governments tend to be exceptional, but those that emerged this way are concentrated in just one national group. As Table 29.7 shows, Mexican organizations are far more likely to be in this category. The corresponding coefficient is very strong, making the corresponding odds of a Mexican transnational organization being created by government initiative far higher than among Dominicans (the reference category).²⁴ This result reflects the proactive stance of the Mexican government relative to its large expatriate population, a topic to be discussed in greater detail in the following section.

²⁴ The corresponding odds are higher than what would be credible, this being a result of limited number of cases and the consequent difficulty of the maximum likelihood iterative routine to estimate the models. For this reason, results should be interpreted with caution as preliminary figures.

Organizations created in response to natural disasters are significantly more common among Colombians. The corresponding coefficient is again quite strong indicating a higher probability for Colombian organizations to have emerged this way. This result reflects the more urban origins of Colombians and their more individualistic patterns of settlement which may require the prodding of major national or regional emergencies to galvanize them into collective action (Guarnizo and Diaz 1999).²⁵

Lastly, Table 29.7 answers the question of what factors are associated with transnational activism of a national scope, as opposed to an exclusively local or regional one. The binomial model in Column II indicates that national scope of action is primarily associated with a college-educated and older membership. Organizations that bring together younger immigrants and those of more modest origins tend to focus primarily on local issues. Mexican organizations are overrepresented among those with a low-education membership, so that this result is essentially a re-statement of their dominance among hometown committees.

Overall these results reveal patterned differences among immigrant communities in the types of organizations that they create, their motivations for doing so, and their intended scope of action. These patterns correspond well to known differences in the human capital composition of these immigrant flows and in their contexts of exit and incorporation: A clear divide emerges from these results in the forms of transnationalism adopted by Mexican immigrants—focused on the welfare of mostly rural communities and with a heavy dose of governmental intervention—and those of Dominicans and Colombians, organizations which tend to be broader in scope, more formalized, and more often created by spontaneous grassroots initiative in response to disasters and other national emergencies. The net impact of these different forms of transnationalism on the home countries is examined next.

IMPACT ON SENDING NATIONS

As mentioned above, our project complemented the survey of transnational organizations in the United States with visits to each of the sending countries in order to assess, on the ground, the effect of this

²⁵ The possibility cannot be ruled out, however, that a greater relative frequency of such emergencies in Colombia in recent years may also (partially) account for this result.

form of activism. This part of the study was qualitative, but the balance of the interviews left no doubt as to the significance, actual and potential, of transnational initiatives. Since it is impossible to present, in detail, the information obtained from these interviews, we summarize next the results obtained in each country and illustrate them with representative examples.

Colombians

As mentioned previously, the principal initiative in this field by the Colombian state is the program *Colombia Nos Une*, established in the Foreign Affairs Ministry in 2003 with direct support from the current president of the Republic, Alvaro Uribe. The program has organized a series of seminars about international migration in Colombia, sponsored an empirical study of remittances, and brought together Colombian consular personnel in the United States and Europe to explore ways of taking a more proactive stance toward the respective expatriate communities. Budget limitations have prevented this program from offering actual assistance to immigrants or contacting their members directly. The latter role has been assumed by the privately-sponsored *Conexion Colombia* (CC) which uses its webpage and slick advertising material to solicit contributions from expatriates and channel them to selected philanthropies in the country.

Neither *Colombia Nos Une* nor *Conexion Colombia* have so far provided a major channel linking immigrant organizations to their home country; instead this approach has mainly focused on reaching expatriates individually through such means as internet sites. In this context, transnational immigrant organizations have established their own direct lines of communication with charities, asylums, and churches in Colombia. As the best educated and more urban of the three groups studied, Colombians have created forms of transnationalism similar to well-known philanthropic institutions in the developed world. These are exemplified by the emergence of Lions and Kiwanis clubs in the United States whose leaders travel to Colombia to establish formal agreements for programmatic assistance with local charities.

Thus, the Colombian Lions of Miami and New York have donated equipment, supplies, and money to orphanages in the towns of Quindío and Valle and provided direct assistance in the wake of natural disasters in these regions through their counterpart clubs in cities like Armenia and Cali. The Kiwanis Club of Miami has done likewise, supporting,

among others, an asylum and school for handicapped children in the city of Calarcá, Department of Quindío.

Religious ties are exemplified by the projects of the Vicentine Sisters of Charity in Bogotá and their vital connection with a New Jersey parish. A final moving case is that of a group of Colombian immigrants in New York and New Jersey who helped create, consistently support, and frequently visit a school and refuge for handicapped children in their hometown of La Tebaida, Quindío. The director of the school had this to say about the “Sons of Tebaida” in New York:

They have been here twenty years and have been helping us since we started. First, they gave us a donation of 900,000 pesos which was a lot of money at that time. We did a lot with that money. Afterwards, the Sons have supported many programs: lunch for the children, electric fans, and many other things. The floor and roof of this building were built with another donation. I send them letters telling them what we need. Sometimes I send three a year. I’m always asking because I also feel that they are part of us and we’re part of them.²⁶

In line with our expectations, Colombian transnationalism exemplifies the form adopted by this phenomenon among relatively educated, urban immigrants whose philanthropic activities are either conducted individually or through secular and religious organizations familiar and compatible with those of the developed world. They emerge through grassroots efforts, often in response to emergencies or dire poverty in places of origin.

Dominicans

Like Colombia, the Dominican state has enacted legislation granting its emigrants the right to nationalize abroad without losing their Dominican citizenship and the right to vote in national elections. Political parties and associations involved in political activities have been most visible and most successful at attracting a large number of migrants. This emphasis of Dominican immigrants’ organizations is shaped, in part, by the heavy influence of political parties in the home country and, in part, by the political nature of the early waves of Dominican migration. Even if subsequent migration took place for economic reasons, the political character of early arrivals have continued to

²⁶ Field interviews conducted by the research team in New York and Colombia, 2004.

shape the associative development of this collectivity (Escobar 2006). Leonel Fernández, re-elected to the presidency, has given priority to the development of relations with the expatriate community, appointing a Secretary of Dominicans Abroad and designing a program (to be implemented) to better integrate them into the social and political life of the country.²⁷

Immigrant initiatives in this field have taken two forms: emergency assistance following natural disasters and hometown civic associations. The largest Dominican agency in New York, *Alianza Dominicana*, is primarily concerned with providing social services to immigrants, but it has also been active in offering assistance to municipalities and provinces in the wake of emergencies. The river flooding of the town of Jimaní in 2004, where upwards of 700 persons lost their lives, was the most recent occasion for *Alianza's* charitable activities in the island. Local churches are commonly used as conduits of this assistance in order to avoid official corruption.

Grassroots hometown associations created by expatriates have adopted forms and goals quite similar to those found among Colombians. A prominent example is the previously mentioned *Cañafisteros de Bani* in Boston which has created its own representative group in the town and provided it with all kinds of equipment, supplies, and assistance programs for the poor and elderly. A parallel example is the Association of Jimanenses of Massachusetts (*ASOJIMA*), which has also given their town an ambulance, a funeral car, a clinic, school supplies and generous financial assistance after the 2004 flood. Support for women's groups fighting for women's rights and against domestic violence in cities of the interior have come from churches in New York and from immigrant agencies such as the *Hermanas Mirabal Family and Child Care Network* of the Bronx.

Mexicans

The case of Mexican immigrant transnationalism is different from the others in several key respects. Not only is the Mexican immigrant population larger than all other Latin American groups combined, but it is predominantly rural in origin. Traditional loyalties to local birth places translate into a proliferation of hometown civic associations far more numerous and durable than those created by other immigrant

²⁷ Field interviews in the Dominican Republic, 2004.

groups. An example of the difference is that while Colombian and Dominican associations depend on raffles, dances, and similar events for fundraising, Mexican immigrants commonly contribute regularly to their associations as a continuation of their traditional duties (*cargos*) to their hometown.

Equally important is the strong and proactive presence of the state in the transnational field. As noted previously, this is an instance where the *international* activities of government interact with the *transnational* initiatives of immigrants. Several Mexican states, starting with the well-studied case of Zacatecas (Goldring 2002, Gonzalez Gutierrez 1999) have moved to create federations of their hometown committees and promote new ones. The governor of Zacatecas, mayors, and legislators travel frequently to Los Angeles to build ties with leaders of the immigrant federations who, in turn, visit the state regularly. Zacatecas has been a strong supporter of the *dos-por-uno* (now *tres-por-uno*) program in which each dollar donated by immigrant organizations for public works in Mexico is matched by contributions of the Mexican federal and state governments (Smith 2003, Goldring 2002).

Other migration states, such as Jalisco and Michoacan, have adopted the Zacatecan model and promoted the creation of federations in centers of Mexican migration such as Los Angeles, Chicago, and Houston during the 1990s. The example has been followed more recently (in most cases with the help of the Mexican consulates and the states' government) by migrants from non-traditional migration states. In the East Coast, where the Mexican immigrant population comes predominantly from Puebla, community organizations received strong support from the New York Consulate and from the state government during the 1990s to establish Casa Puebla. Since 1994, the State of Guanajuato has supported the establishment of 45 Casas Guanajuato in fourteen states of the union, including five recently created in the East Coast (Escobar 2006).

Still more important has been the Mexican federal presence in this field. This has taken the form of matching programs for immigrant contributions, most recently the *tres-por-uno* launched in 2002; the creation of *plazas comunitarias* in a number of U.S. cities that provide library services, information, and language training (in English and Spanish) for Mexicans; the strengthening of legal defense programs for immigrants through 45 consulates in the U.S. and Canada; and the creation of "health windows" in several of these consulates providing basic medical services. The creation of IME (Institute of Mexicans Abroad, in its

Spanish acronym) represents the culmination of these efforts. IME is housed in the Federal Secretariat of Foreign Relations and includes a Consultative Council of 105 representatives of immigrant organizations in the United States and Canada, elected in the 45 consular districts, plus delegates of each of the 32 states of the Mexican Union (Gonzalez Gutierrez 2005, Escobar 2006).

While this system of representation is new and a number of problems remain to be solved, it clearly signals the commitment of the Mexican government to establish an active presence among its huge expatriate population. The state seeks to demonstrate, with concrete actions, its interest in the immigrants' welfare and, by the same token, stimulate their loyalty and their contributions. Together with the activities of the Mexican state governments, this proactive stance is transforming the character of immigrant transnationalism, from a grassroots phenomenon to one guided and supported by the international policies and programs of the home state. Following well-established political practice in Mexico, government officials are thus seeking to incorporate immigrants and their organizations into state-sponsored structures. In this vein, current president Vicente Fox speaks of his mandate as a government for *todos los mejicanos* (for all Mexicans) regardless of where they happen to reside.

Mexican transnationalism is thus quite distinct and the differences can be traced back to the immigrants' contexts of exit and incorporation. A mostly rural and frequently indigenous labor flow, these immigrants' low human capital prevents them from joining more middle-class forms of organization. No "Lions" or "Kiwanis" clubs can be expected to emerge from migrants of such modest origins occupying positions at the bottom of the American labor market. Instead, traditional loyalties and duties are activated to bring immigrants together and sustain vibrant ties with their places of origin. In some cases, such ties are so strong that immigrants seem to have never really left the places they came from. Even unauthorized immigrants think nothing of leading a hometown committee and dedicating many hours and hard-earned dollars to it (Smith 2005, Roberts et al. 1999).

A relevant example is the town of San Miguel Comitipla, State of Guerrero, whose hometown committee in New York/New Jersey was included in our sample. In a subsequent visit to Mexico, members to the research team traveled to Guerrero to visit the town and the surrounding area and interview its authorities. The first concrete result of immigrant transnational assistance was the impressive kiosk built in the

central plaza; then the town church was repaired and redecorated; and later a big clock was bought for its tower. Most of these projects were accomplished with migrant monetary contributions and local voluntary labor, following long-standing indigenous tradition. The more ambitious current project is the expansion of the plaza to make room for the annual festivities. It is expected to cost about U.S. \$80,000 and, with a roof added, \$260,000. Migrants from the center of Xochihuehuetlan, the municipality to which the town of San Miguel belongs, have also carried out their own projects. The municipal president of Xochihuehuetlan, described the beginnings of this transnational collaboration:

More or less in 1985, works began that benefited our town... They were of a religious character to improve the sanctuary of San Diego de Alcalá, which is the most respected patron saint around here; then we bought street lights for the avenue leading to it... the avenue where the procession takes place. Today and with the help of the migrants in the U.S., public works are very advanced: the church is in good shape, redecorated and with gold leaf in the altars... now we are looking at rebuilding the school with support from the municipality, which I preside, and the people that we have in the U.S. with whom we always have good relations.²⁸

CONCLUSION

This study has sought to present an account of the phenomenon of immigrant transnationalism as it takes place *on the ground*; that is, in the daily experience of migrants and their home country counterparts. We find that, while by no means universal, transnational civic, philanthropic, cultural, and political activities are common among immigrants in the United States and, on the aggregate, they possess sufficient weight to affect the development prospects of localities and regions and to attract the attention of sending governments. Initiators and leaders of these activities tend to be older and better-established migrants with above-average levels of education. This finding, which supports those from prior quantitative studies based on the CIEP surveys, indicate that home loyalties and nostalgia endure and, hence, that such activities can be expected to continue as immigrant communities mature. Whatever else it may be, transnationalism is not a phenomenon associated with recency of arrival and destined to disappear as part of an inexorable process of assimilation (Guarnizo et al. 2003).

²⁸ Field interview conducted by the research team in Mexico, 2005.

Once this is said, however, the major finding of the study is the very different forms that these activities take across immigrant nationalities. The proposition that contexts of exit and reception determine the origin, strength, and character of transnational organizations is amply supported by our results. However, they go well beyond this assertion to document, in detail, the forms that these initiatives take among the three nationalities under study. To summarize, Colombian transnationalism includes a number of hometown committees but, by and large, it is a “middle class” phenomenon spearheaded by immigrant Lions and Kiwanis clubs, professional associations, and Catholic philanthropies in the United States. Dominican organizations also include hometown committees and professional associations, but their defining profile is political, marked by the strong presence of Dominican parties in major areas of immigrant settlement and by the politically well-connected nature of social service agencies in this community. Lastly, the hometown committee is the norm among Mexican immigrants who have created hundreds of these organizations, supported them with regular contributions and voluntary work and generated, in the process, durable and important developmental effects in their sending localities. The bonds linking the hometown with their people abroad is much stronger in the case of these rural, frequently indigenous migrants. They tend to create “transnational communities” in the full sense of term (Levitt 2001).

National differences are apparent in both qualitative and multivariate regression results where they are resilient predictors of the origin and type of transnational organizations, as well as of their scope of action. These differences reflect, in part, the entrance of sending country governments in the transnational field and the policies that they have implemented so far. All governments have shown growing interest in their expatriate communities and all have legislated concessions and programs designed to renew their loyalties and make them feel part of a common imagined national community (Smith 2005). But then the differences begin. Colombian and Dominican state efforts seldom transcend the realm of the symbolic. Both governments seem too weak and too poor to implement large-scale programs providing concrete benefits to their expatriates or re-organizing and giving new direction to their transnational initiatives. In this situation, the main impulse from the sending country for the continuation and expansion of these activities comes from other actors—a private sector corporate partnership in the case of Colombia and the foreign affairs departments of political parties in the case of the Dominican Republic.

The Mexican experience is different for it features a much stronger and more proactive presence of the state which, at both the national and regional levels seeks to incorporate and guide the already strong links between a large immigrant population and their places of origin. Since the Mexican federal and state governments have no authority over their citizens living in the United States, they have sought to induce their participation in official programs by providing a series of benefits that go beyond those of a purely symbolic character. The result is the progressive incorporation of many hometown committees and federations into officially designed structures although, as noted before, others remain independent of these plans.

If transnational organizations and activism can be so different among three immigrant nationalities sharing the same historical roots and language, we can expect that such variations will be magnified among immigrants from other lands, religions, and cultures. It is impossible, with the data at hand, to construct an exhaustive typology of immigrant transnational organizations precisely because the study of the phenomenon is still in its infancy. What seems clear from the existing evidence is that the manifold activities of immigrants and their home country counterparts hold the potential for aggregating into an important feature of contemporary processes of globalization running opposite to the “multinational” logic of corporate capitalism. The latter exacerbates inequalities among nations and remains largely indifferent to the plight of inhabitants of the Global South. To the contrary, the activities of hometown committees and other immigrant organizations vigorously seek to alleviate them. As a young Salvadoran sociologist trenchantly put it, “Migration and remittances are the true adjustment programs of the poor in these countries (Ramos 2002)”.

The dialectics by which people driven from their countries by poverty, violence, and lack of opportunities turn around and seek to reverse these conditions by using the resources acquired abroad needs to be further investigated. They offer the promise of at least slowing down the partition of the world into the increasingly rich and the desperately poor that capitalist globalization has done precious little to reduce. In this context, the migrating poor have had no alternative but to take matters into their own hands, seeking a better future for themselves and those left behind.

CHAPTER THIRTY

BLACK ZIONISM—THE RETURN TO AFRICA IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

Benjamin Neuberger

Oh I'm bound to go to Africa,
I'm bound to go there soon.
I'm bound to go to Africa,
To wear those golden shoes.
(Traditional song adopted as hymn, ca. 1900, by Southern Negroes who
followed Bishop Henry Turner)¹
(Jenkins 1975: 8)

THE IDEA OF BLACK ZIONISM

The ideology of a “return to Africa” from the African diaspora was called Black Zionism in the first half of the twentieth century, indicating an affinity with Jewish Zionism. Sundquist defines Afro-Zionism as “a mode of pan-Africanism that took its inspiration in significant part from modern Zionism’s goal of restoring the Jewish State...by repopulating the land of Palestine” (Sundquist 2005: 120). As in the Jewish case, in the African-American case, too, a praxis of return existed for centuries, well before the development of a well-thought-out ideology. As in the Jewish case, Black Zionism was a reaction to persecution, racism, degradation and discrimination, particularly a reaction to slavery. Black Zionism was the Black reaction to the race theories of Gobineau, Carlyle and Robert Knox. Again as in Jewish Zionism, Black Zionism reflects profound disappointment with emancipation, with the results of the American Civil War, with Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation. After a short period of hope for the achievement of equality and human dignity, Reconstruction in the American South was

¹ To avoid anachronism in this chapter, I do use the terms “Negro” and “Black,” which were prevalent in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and routinely used by African Americans at the time.

followed by segregation, disenfranchisement, the rise of the Ku Klux Klan, and lynchings, all of which lasted till the 1960s. Black Zionist ideology contained a variety of ingredients—the idea of salvation, a claim for racial unity, longing for the “African homeland,” pride in African civilization, the rejection of assimilation, and “return to the roots,” and the aspiration not only for self-determination and liberty, but also for Black statehood and power.

The idea of salvation was grounded in religious or quasi-religious longing. It was deeply imbedded in slave songs not only in the U.S., but also in Brazil and the Caribbean Islands. The slaves saw themselves in bondage and exile, and hoped for deliverance, for a return to their beloved Africa. Africa was frequently identified with heaven, a heaven that could be reached only after death. There was widespread belief in the return of the soul to Africa. Belief in return was very intense, as was reflected in numerous slave songs.

Lord I want to cross over into
camp ground
Oh, when I get to heaven, I'll walk
all about.
There's nobody there for to turn me out
Go down, Moses,
way down in Egypt's land
tell ol' Pharaoh,
to let my people go (Geiss 1974: 28).

Religious longing was for the Promised Land, for Zion and Canaan, and for the Jordan River—the Atlantic Ocean—which had to be crossed.

Unity of race is another basic Black Zionist idea. As Jewish Zionism first had to establish the idea that Jews are a nation, one nation, and that the Jewish Question is a “national problem,” in Black Zionist ideology, too, the starting point was that all Blacks are unified by race. Africans in Africa and Africans in Mississippi and Alabama, Jamaica and Cuba, in England and France are all one Black Nation. Pan-Negroism and pan-Africanism were the names given to this idea, which gained ground in the early twentieth century.

Already in 1919, W.E.B. Du Bois, the Black American Harvard sociologist who for decades was the leading intellectual of Black cultural nationalism, asserted that the problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line. The Zionist-inspired solution to this was the idea of a return to Africa. Indeed, a deep emotional and intellectual connection to Africa is part of Black Zionism. Edward W. Blyden, who was born on the Caribbean island of St. Thomas, was the “father” of

Black nationalism, and became Liberia's secretary of state in 1864. He described his links to Africa in the following words:

Africa! There is no heart beating under a covering of sable hue, which does not throb with emotion at the sound of this word. To the exile from these shores labouring under the burning, though congenial, sun of South America, or shivering under the influence of Northern snows, it brings comfort, consolation and hope. It tells him of a country, a home given to him by that Almighty Being... (Blyden 1856)

The writer Richard Wright formulated it differently: "One does not react to Africa as Africa is... one reacts to Africa as one is, as one lives one's reaction to Africa in one's life." Blyden and Wright formulated their attachment to Africa in similar words, but this still leaves open the question whether one should "return" to Africa, or not. Blyden did, Wright did not.

Africa is often depicted—both in Black Nationalism and in Black Zionism—as a Garden of Eden, a place where man is at harmony with nature. Three poems by American poets Countee Cullen (1903–1946) and Langston Hughes (1902–1967), and by the Haitian Jacques Roumain reflect this theme:

What is Africa to me:
Copper sun or scarlet sea,
Jungle star or jungle track,
Strong bronzed men, or regal Black
Women from whose loins I sprang
When the birds of Eden sang?
One three centuries removed
From the scenes his fathers loved.
Spicy grove, cinnamon tree,
What is Africa to me?

.....
(Countee Cullen, "Heritage" in Jenkins 1975: 24)

.....
It's the long road to Guinea
No bright welcome will be made for you
In the dark land of dark men:
Under a smoky sky pierced by the cry of birds
Around the eye of the river
the eyelashes of the trees open on decaying light
There, there awaits you beside the water a quiet village
And the hut of your fathers, and the hard ancestral stone
where your head will rest at last.

(Jacques Roumain, "Guinea") (in Jenkins 1975: 45)

.....

I built my hut near the Congo and it lulled me to sleep.

.....

I've known rivers:

Ancient, dusky rivers.

My soul has grown deep like the rivers.

(Langston Hughes, "The Negro Speaks of Rivers," in *Crisis*, June 1921, in Hughes 1959: 4)

Another basic feature of Black Zionism is pride in the achievements of African civilization—a reaction to white racism, which saw Africa as “primitive,” without history, culture or heritage:

When Europe was inhabited by a race of cannibals, a race of savages, naked men, heathens and pagans, Africa was peopled with a race of cultured Black men, who were masters in art, science and literature; men who were cultured and refined; men, who, it is said, were like the gods (Garvey 1967 Vol. I: 77).

This, thought I, is the work of my African progenitors... Feelings came over me far different from those which I have felt when looking at the mighty works of European genius. I felt that I had a peculiar “heritage in the Great Pyramid” built (by)... the enterprising sons of Ham, from whom I am descended. The blood seemed to flow faster through my veins. I seemed to hear the echo of those illustrious Africans. I seemed to feel the impulse from those stirring characters who sent civilization into Greece... I felt lifted out of the commonplace grandeur of modern times; and, could my voice have reached every African in the world, I would have earnestly addressed him...

“Retake your fame!” (Blyden 1873: 55)

As in the Jewish case, the Black Zionists rejected national assimilation to the host nations. They propagated a return to the roots, to their African culture. They thought not only about political liberation, but also about cultural-psychological liberation. In rejecting assimilation, they opted for Black liberation. Blyden mocks all those who want to vanish as Blacks:

... ‘Let us do away with the sentiment of Race. Let us do away with our African personality and be lost, if possible, in another Race’. This is as wise or as philosophical as to say, let us do away with gravitation, with heat and cold and sunshine and rain. Of course the Race in which these persons would be absorbed is the dominant race, before which, in cringing self-surrender and ignoble self-suppression they lie in prostrate admiration.

(Blyden, in *Sierra Leone Weekly News*, 27 May 1893; in Esedebe 1982: 36).

And indeed, the Zionists cultivated Black or African folklore, poetry, sculpture, arts and dance, and hailed the “African” values of spontaneity, harmony, nature, simplicity, and closeness to the soil. Countee Cullen and Langston Hughes of the 1920s Harlem Renaissance, also known as Black Literary Renaissance or New Negro Movement, were outstanding examples of this cultural Zionism, which wanted to see a New Black Man who is free from all imposed and self-inflicted sense of inferiority. While touring Africa in 1891, another Black Zionist, Bishop Henry Turner said that Africa was “full of proud-walking sons,” and that “what the Black Man had in Africa was his manhood” (in Jenkins 1975: 99). Blyden himself admonished his fellow-Blacks, urging them to “honor and love your Race. Be yourselves . . . If you are not yourself, if you surrender your personality you have nothing left to give the world” (*A Voice from Bleeding Africa*, in Jenkins 1975: 39).

Race was central: Black Zionism was based on Black identity, Black unity, Black solidarity, Black pride, and an aspiration for Black revival. It was seen as an antithesis to white racism, Black slavery, Black degradation, and Black oppression. It strove for the equality of the Black race in a worldwide sense. In most cases it was not racism that strove for Black superiority and for hostility towards Whites. It was, in Sartre’s classical phrase, “an antiracist racism.” In this, too, there are striking similarities to Jewish Zionism, which wanted to create a new and strong Jewish nation in its historic homeland.

The notion of homecoming is central to Black Zionism, as it was to Jewish Zionism. Without the aspiration to return to the homeland, there is no Zionism. By way of caution we should mention that not all return to Africa was Zionist-inspired. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries white European abolitionists (like the British abolitionist Granville Sharp) and even “enlightened” racists (like the white men of the American Society for Colonizing the Free People of Color) advocated the resettlement of freed slaves in Africa as a human solution to the “Negro problem.” Again, we notice a striking similarity to Jewish Zionism, which was often supported by anti-Semites who wanted to encourage a Jewish exodus from Europe.

The motif of return has been evident ever since the slaves were taken to the New World. The metaphors—Egypt, Exodus, Moses, Promised Land—were all borrowed from the Old Testament. A few examples will suffice to illustrate this:

I asked my Lord, shall I ever be the one
(I asked my Lord) shall I ever be the one,

shall I ever be the one,
 (I asked my Lord I be),
 To go sailin', sailin', sailin', sailin',
 Gwine over to the Promised Land?
 (*Slave Song*, in Jenkins 1975: 34)

America to which our fathers were carried by violence, where we lived and still live by sufferance as unwelcome strangers, is not the rock whence we were hewn. Our residence there was and is transitional, like that of the Hebrews in Egypt, or Babylon, looking to an exodus. That exodus may never come for all; but the feeling and aspiration on the part of the exile must ever be towards the Fatherland, as the Jew, wherever he is, looks to Palestine, and in the depths of his soul continually exclaims, "If I forget thee I Jerusalem, let me right hand forget her cunning." (Blyden, in Drachler 1975: 56)

We know where we're going, we know where we're from,
 We're leaving Babylon, we're going to our fatherland.
 Exodus, movement of Jah people,²
 Movement of Jah people.
 Send us another Brother Moses gonna cross the Red Sea...
 Jah come to break down oppression, rule equality,
 Wipe away transgression, set the captives free.
 (Bob Marley, *Exodus*, 1977: in Sundquist 2005: 127)

Black Zionism aimed to put an end to the suffering and oppression in exile by achieving Black self-determination, Black government and Black power in a liberated homeland. Excerpts from Blyden's and Garvey's writings speak for themselves:

...If Europe is for the Europeans, then Africa shall be for the Black peoples of the world. We say it; we mean it...The other races have countries of their own and it is time for the four hundred million Negroes to claim Africa for themselves. (Garvey, in Cronon 1955: 65)

...Wake up Ethiopia! Wake up Africa! Let us work towards the one glorious end of a free, redeemed and mighty nation. Let Africa be a bright star among the constellations. (Garvey 1967, Vol. I: 5–6)

The Negroes of the world say, we are striving towards Africa to make her the big Black republic. (Garvey, in Jenkins 1975: 89)

Reacting to Booker Washington's integrationist book *The Story of the Negro*, which advocates the gradual integration of Blacks into American society through professional advancement, Garvey asks:

² Jah = Yahweh, from Eli-jah.

Where is the Black man's Government? Where is his King and his kingdom? Where is his President, his country, and his ambassador, his army, his navy, his men of big affairs? (Garvey 1967, Vol. II: 126)

Blyden, who greatly emphasized the importance of culture and roots, did not hide his view that Black Zionism was also about power and politics:

So long as we remain thus divided, we may expect impositions. So long as we live simply by the sufferance of the nations, we must expect to be subject to their caprices. . . . We must build up negro states; we must establish and maintain the various institutions; we must make and administer laws, erect and preserve churches, and support the worship of God; we must have governments; we must have legislation of our own; we must build ships and navigate them; we must ply the trades, instruct the schools, control the press, and thus aid in shaping the opinions and guiding the destinies of mankind (Blyden "Liberia's Offering," 1862: in Esedebe 1982: 40).

THE PRAXIS OF RETURN

Very few Blacks did return to Africa from the Americas, but throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries there were movements of return. The returnees came not only from North America (Canada and the U.S.), but also from the Caribbeans (St. Thomas, Jamaica, Barbados, Cuba) and South America (Guyana, Brazil). They were known in West Africa by their countries of origin—Americans, Cubans, Brazilians. The best-known projects of return were to Sierra Leone (and its capital Freetown, the Town of the Free), which was a British colony until the 1960s, and Liberia (the so-called Land of the Free), which became independent in 1847. The "homecoming" to Sierra Leone started in 1786, and to Liberia in 1787. Between 1817 and 1857, approximately 13,000 African Americans made their home in Liberia. Monrovia, the capital of Liberia, is named after the American president James Monroe. Both projects were strongly supported by Whites—the British government and colonial authorities, in the case of Sierra Leone, and the American Colonization Society, a mix of white philanthropists and racists, in the case of Liberia. While the Americo—Americans came mostly from the U.S., the Sierra Leonians came from captured slave ships on the high seas, and from Nova Scotia in Canada—many of them were Maroons from Jamaica. Many other groups did also support the Black cause—e.g. a group from Jamaica, which settled in today's

Cameroon in 1842 and founded the colony of Victoria; a group from St. Kitts, which landed in Guinea in 1855; and groups of Afro-Cubans and Afro-Brazilians, which reached Nigeria (Lagos), Dahomey (today's Benin), and Togo in the nineteenth century (Geiss 1974: 24).

Paul Cuffee (1759–1817), an early Black Zionist and Quaker, born to a Black father and an American-Indian mother, propagated a return to Africa in the early nineteenth century. In 1815 he led a group of 40 Blacks from Boston, New York and Philadelphia to Sierra Leone (Esedebe 1982: 9–10, Geiss 1974: 84). Another early Zionist and Harvard-trained Black physician, Martin Delany (1812–1885), was deeply influenced by Nat Turner's slave revolt in 1831. He came to the conclusion that Blacks must be proud of their race, but could do so only if they were free in their African homeland. In 1854 he founded the National Emigration Convention in Ohio; and in 1859 he led the Niger Valley Exploration Party, and signed agreements with the chiefs of Abeokuta, allowing the foundation of colonies by returnees. His legacy was ideological rather than practical, since the Abeokuta agreements were never put into practice. His Zionist writings, however, were strong and forceful.

Our policy must be...Africa for the African race and Black men to rule over them (Geiss 1974: 65).

I had only one object in view—the moral, social and political elevation of ourselves and the regeneration of Africa (Jenkins 1975: 93).

Africa is our fatherland and we are its legitimate descendants...Africa, to become regenerated, must have a national character, and her position among the existing nations of the earth will depend mainly upon the high standard she may gain compared with them in all her relations, morally, religiously, politically and commercially...I have determined to leave to my children the inheritance of a country, the possession of territorial domain, the blessings of a national education, and the indisputable rights of self-government, that they may not succeed to the servility and degradation bequeathed to us by our fathers (Jenkins 1975: 165).

As in Jewish Zionism, not all Zionists actually returned to Africa. Some simply did not make it, and others propagated Zionism while remaining in "exile." Alexander Crummell, a missionary, propagated a "return to the land of our fathers" (Jenkins 1975: 97) and went to Liberia in 1855. Together with Blyden, he founded the Liberia College of Social Sciences and Humanities in Monrovia, but he returned to the U.S. in 1873. An additional important figure is Bishop Henry McNeal Turner, who was profoundly disappointed that the American Constitution did

not protect the American Blacks. He called the constitution a “dirty rag.” From 1890 onwards, he arranged for ships to bring African Americans to Liberia, and personally made the trip in 1891. Three years later, in 1894, he founded the International Migration Society. Turner was also one of the organizers of the 1893 Chicago Congress on Africa. More important in the Zionist context is the foundation of a Black-only Zionist Church, the African Methodist Episcopal Church, which aimed to disentangle the movement of return from white patronage and philanthropy. It played a crucial role in the Zionist Garveyite mass-movement in the first half of the twentieth century. Turner regarded Africa as a “land of true wisdom, full of proud walking sons of Nature”. For him, return to Africa was also a return to “nature” and “manhood” (Jenkins 1975: 99). Another colorful Zionist is Chief Alfred Sam, an African-born native of the Gold Coast (today’s Ghana), who migrated to the U.S. in 1911. He introduced himself as an Ashanti Chief and founded the Akim Trading Company in Oklahoma in 1913. The idea behind the company was to export rubber and palm oil from Africa to the U.S. and bring Blacks from the U.S. to Africa, so that ships would be usefully employed on both routes. Chief Sam’s ideas were a mixture of business and politics.

Our plan is to establish a government in which our race will be supreme. When our colony is established and the people of our race see that we are successful this boat will be crowded on every trip she makes to Africa. (Jenkins 1975: 105).

Chief Sam stressed the economic dimension of return. His “economic Pan-Africanism” was to lead to the development of an Africa ruled by a Black government (Stein 1986: 110).

Other leading Zionists are the intellectual Edward W. Blyden (1832–1912) from St. Thomas, and the Jamaica-born agitator Marcus Garvey. Blyden was born in Charlotte-Amalie, the capital of the Danish-ruled island in 1832, well before slavery was abolished there in 1848. As a youth he went to America to study at the Rutgers Theological Seminary. He was not admitted because of his skin color, which led to his disgust with racist America, and his return (in 1850) to West Africa, where he built a splendid career, combining education, administration, diplomacy and politics. He served, amongst others, as head of a secondary school, professor of Classics and Islamic studies at Liberia College, president of Liberia College, and director of Islamic education in Sierra Leone. In addition, he also was Liberia’s consul for education in the U.S., his

task being “to invite Negroes back to the Fatherland” (Neuberger 1985: 152), special envoy in Paris, ambassador in the U.K., secretary of the interior, secretary of state and candidate for the presidency.

All major ideas of twentieth century Black and African nationalism—Garvey’s Black Zionism, Senghor’s and Césaire’s Négritude, Nkrumah’s African Personality and Padmore’s Pan-Africanism—had their roots in Blyden’s late nineteenth century writings. His Zionism represented a personal, ideological, intellectual and emotional reaction to slavery, racism, discrimination and exploitation of Blacks by Whites. His nationalism and Zionism called for Black solidarity and authenticity, for a Black African culture based on music, art, and poetry—essentially, for a return to the roots. Blyden was not opposed to progress; he objected to blind imitation and assimilation:

The African must advance by methods of his own...he must show that we are able to go alone, to curve our own way (Blyden, in Lynch 1970: 151).

The most prominent Black Zionist of the 1920s and 1930s is Marcus Garvey (1887–1940). Born in Jamaica and descendent of the Maroons (runaway slaves who had rebelled against slaveholders in the hills of Jamaica), he lacked any formal education, but became leader of an American mass movement that attracted millions of followers. He coined the phrase Black Zionism. In 1912–1914 he collaborated in London with the Egyptian-African Duse Muhammed Ali in publishing the *African Times and Orient Review*. Later on, he founded his organizational base in the U.S., the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), whose aims were as follows:

- to establish a universal confraternity among the race
- to promote the spirit of race pride and love
- to reclaim the fallen of the race
- to administer and assist the needy
- to assist in civilizing the backward tribes of Africa
- to strengthen the imperialism of independent African states
- to establish commissaries or agencies in the principal countries of the world for the protection of all Negroes, irrespective of nationality
- to promote a conscientious Christian worship among the native tribes of Africa
- to establish universities, colleges and secondary schools for the further education and culture of the boys and girls of the race

- to conduct a worldwide commercial and industrial intercourse (Garvey, in Stein 1986: 30)

Garvey's goals were far-reaching: return to Africa by a Black shipping line (the Black Star Line), liberation of Africa from white, colonial rule, and establishment of a Black Empire to represent Black Power and Black Independence. In fact, he established an "African Republic" (in New York), and an African government in exile, and an army, the Universal African Legion, which would reconquer Africa (Kinfe 2003: 106–107).³ He was also active in establishing a Black-only church, the African Orthodox Church.

UNIA's anthem—the "Negro Hatikvah" (Sundquist 2005: 126)—reflects its aims and explains its appeal to millions of American Blacks in the American South and in the slums of the North:

I

Ethiopia, thou land of our fathers,
 Thou land where the gods loved to be,
 As storm cloud at night suddenly gathers
 Our armies come rushing to thee.
 We must in the fight be victorious
 When swords are thrust outward to gleam.
 For us will the vict'ry be glorious
 When led by the red, Black and green.

CHORUS

Advance, advance to victory,
 Let Africa be free;
 Advance to meet the foe
 With the might
 Of the red, the Black and the green.

II

Ethiopia, the tyrant's falling,
 Who smote thee upon thy knees,
 And thy children are lustily callin
 From over the distant seas.
 Jehovah, the Great One has heard us,
 Has noted our sighs and our tears,
 With His spirit of Love he has stirred us
 To be One through the coming years.

CHORUS

Advance, advance, etc.

³ The intention to build an army was declared, but never realized.

III

O Jehovah, though God of ages
 Grant unto our sons that lead
 The wisdom Thou gave to Thy Sages
 When Israel was sore in need.
 Thy voice thro' the dim past has spoken,
 Ethiopia shall stretch forth her hand
 By thee shall all fetters be broken,
 And Heav'n bless our dear Motherland.

CHORUS

Advance, advance, etc. (Garvey 1970: 31–32).

Garvey's Zionism was militant:

We are striking homewards towards Africa to make her the big Black republic. And in the making of Africa a big Black republic, what is the barrier? The barrier is the white man; and we say to the white man who now dominates Africa that it is to his interest to clear out of Africa now, because we are coming not as in the time of Father Abraham, 200,000 strong, but we are coming 400,000,000 strong, and we mean to retake every square inch of the 12,000,000 square miles of African territory belonging to us by right Divine... We are out to get what has belonged to us politically, socially, economically, and in every way. And what 15,000,000 of us cannot get we will call in 400,000,000 to help us get (Garvey, September 1920: in Jenkins 1975: 89)

Garvey was in fact a right-wing Black Zionist. The emphasis he put on race was not merely defensive, compensatory and egalitarian. He spoke of Black superiority and purity, and hated lighter skinned coloreds of "mixed" race. Garvey spoke of "African fundamentalism." For him God is Black, Jesus is Black. He supported capitalism, but thought business ought to be Black. He also thanked white racists for having "lynched race pride into the Negroes" (Stein 1986: 154). Some of his opponents even called his racial messages, populism and demagoguery "Black fascism."

The Garveyites were not only active in America. UNIA also had branches in West Africa. The Lagos branch was founded and headed by the Jamaican Amos Shackleford (1887–1954), who had "returned" to Africa in 1913 and became a leading businessman, intellectual and politician. He was vice-president of the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), and leading member of NCNC, the Nigerian Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (Falola 2004: 60).

After World War II, anticolonial nationalism expanded rapidly all over Africa.

In 1957 the Gold Coast (today's Ghana) became the first British colony to gain independence—to be followed by Guinea, the first French colony to claim its sovereignty. Over the course of the following decade, most other British and French colonies and protectorates, and Belgian-ruled Congo, Rwanda and Burundi, and Italian Somalia followed suit. It did not happen the Garveyist way. No Afro-American army “liberated” Africa. Decolonization was a result of internal changes in Africa and in the Western colonial countries, in which Black Zionism hardly played a role. Nevertheless, the 1950s saw leading Black Zionists return to Africa. Nkrumah's Ghana attracted major Black Zionist leaders. William E.B. Du Bois, though already in his nineties, settled in Ghana in 1961 to become the editor of the planned *Encyclopedia Africana*, but his death at the age of 95 put an end to the project. Three major pan-African leaders from the Caribbeans—George Padmore from Jamaica (author of *Pan-Africanism or Communism*), Ras Makonnen from British Guyana, and Frantz Fanon, the world-famous psychoanalyst and radical nationalist ideologue from Martinique—became Nkrumah's advisors on nation-building and international affairs. The African scholar Ali Mazrui saw Du Bois' and Padmore's death “as citizens of Ghana . . . as a Back to Africa event of unique symbolism” (Mazrui 1975: 234). Later on, the American Black Power leader Stokely Carmichael settled in Sekou Touré's Guinea. Carmichael later changed his name to Kwame Touré. Another Black Zionist group that settled in Liberia in the 1960s, and later in Israel, are the Black Hebrews, who consider Israel as part of Africa, and the Suez Canal as an artificial barrier of little significance.

BLACK ZIONISM AND ZIONISM

The term Black Zionism is not fortuitous. It reflects the impact of Jewish Zionism on Black Zionism. The Jewish Question was compared to the Negro Question, the Jewish diaspora to the African diaspora, persecution of Jews to persecution of Blacks. These analogies eventually led to the pursuit of similar solutions—Jewish Zionism and Black Zionism. This raises the obvious question as to what Black Zionism had to say about Jewish Zionism.

From an early age Blyden became interested in the Jewish situation. He grew up on so-called Jew Hill, and amongst Jews, in Danish St. Thomas. He learned Hebrew, and in 1866 even visited Palestine.

An account of this trip was published in *From West Africa to Palestine*. Later on, he wrote a booklet *On the Jewish Question* (1898). In his writings he referred to Palestine as the Land of Israel, and to the period of independence and glory of the Jewish people as a period of “wonderful prosperity as a Jewish nation in Canaan” (Blyden 1873: 121). He spoke about the return of the Jews to their historic homeland.

... there is one subject however upon which there seems to be remarkable unanimity among the principal sects—Jews, Christians and Muslims—with regard to the final destiny of Jerusalem: that is to be the scene of latter day glories, that the Jews are to be restored to the Land of their Fathers and the Messiah to “be enthroned” (Blyden 1873: 199).

A year after the First Zionist Congress, he wrote:

... there is hardly a man in the civilized world—Christian, Mohamedan or Jew—who does not recognize the claim and the right of the Jew to the Holy Land and there are few who, if conditions were favorable, would not be glad to see them return in a body and take their place in the Land of their Fathers as a great, leading secular power (Blyden 1898: 8).

For Blyden, Herzl was “a new Moses, dedicated to the liberation of his oppressed people.” When Herzl died in 1904, Blyden held a eulogy in Monrovia for the man who strove “for the repatriation of the Jews to the ancient homeland” (Blyden, in Holden 1966: 784). He clearly saw Zionism as a model for the African diaspora.

I have taken and do take the deepest possible interest in the current history of the Jews, especially in that marvelous movement called Zionism. The question in some of its aspects is similar to that which at this moment agitates thousands of descendants of Africa in America anxious to return to the Land of their Fathers (Blyden 1898: 7).

As noted before, Garvey was in a sense a fascist Black Zionist—just as there were, especially in the 1920s, fascist Jewish Zionists. Indeed, his hatred of Whites also implied hatred of Jews. What interests us in the context of this chapter, however, is the analogy between both kinds of Zionism, Black and Jewish. For Garvey “Africa is for the Africans (which includes Afro-Americans, B.N.) like Palestine (is) for the Jews.” He aimed to establish “another (Black, B.N.) Palestine in Africa.” His reference to Zionism also had an instrumental character: He thought that “the recognition of the Jew may help the Negro to force his argument for his free state.”

Du Bois's Black Zionism was more cultural, less power-oriented. Sundquist calls it "a model of race-based diasporic consciousness" (Sundquist 2005: 123). Nevertheless, his analogy is not very different from Garvey's. At the First Pan-African Conference (in fact, Pan-Black Conference, B.N.) in 1919, he exclaimed:

...the African movement means to us what the Zionist movement must mean to the Jews, the centralization of race effort and the recognition of the racial fount (Du Bois, *Crisis*, February 1919: 166).

His Zionism was deeply moral. It was less the actual return to Africa than the aspiration for dignity, equality, roots and opposition to assimilation. As to Jewish Zionism, its moral dimension had become even more self-evident to him after the Holocaust.

...(the) theoretical demand for a Zion now became a necessity for more than a million displaced and homeless Jews. There was actually no other place on earth for them to go (*Chicago Star*, 1948).

...the Jew wandering through Europe has for two thousand years been fighting for a place (*ibid.*).

The million Jewish survivors of the Holocaust had a human right to go to the Jewish homeland

where there is room for them, where there is work for them to do, where what Jews have already done is for the advantage, not simply of the Jews but of the Arabs (*ibid.*).

Du Bois even accused the British of being at least partly responsible for the Holocaust because they closed the gates of Palestine for the Jews who wanted to escape from Nazi Europe, although for the Jews Palestine was "the country of their origin." For Du Bois, Jewish migration to Palestine/Israel is not "colonial" settlement of a foreign land. It is, on the contrary, a return: The Jews simply "go back to Zion and refund a state which they have lost" (*ibid.*).

The similarities of Jewish and Black Zionism are indeed striking, although Jewish Zionism was a success story while Black Zionism was a failure in the sense that there was no massive exodus from the diaspora.

Both Zionisms defined the Jewish problem and the Negro question as national or racial questions. For Du Bois

the problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line—the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia, in Africa, in America and the islands of the seas (Du Bois 1903: 13).

The similarity between Jewish and Black Zionist terminology is indeed striking: diaspora, exile, historic homeland, return, persecution, statehood, cultural roots, new man. The Zionist idea of “normalization,” so central in Socialist Zionism, also emerges in Black Zionism.

‘Black cops, Black customs men, Black pilots, Black guys refuelling the plane, Black managers of airports, Black, Black, Black, man,’ said an American. But you know, you get this funny feeling too. You’ve been so long indoctrinated that these jobs, well they’re so skillful that no Black guy can do them. You honestly feel Christ! what’s a Black guy doing around that plane? It’s all gotten so far inside you that you too, just for a moment, wonder if they’re really competent. How about that? You hear yourself thinking that, and by God you laugh, and I remember laughing, why of course they’re competent, I’m home! It’s *them* that runs it all, it’s *us*! How can you explain that to anybody who has never felt the discrimination of the United States? You are just so happy, and man, you just want to shout, hell, Black can do it... Black guys *do* it (Jenkins 1975: 141–142)!

Black Zionists, well aware that not all Blacks would return to the homeland, talked about the significant contribution a rebuilt Africa would make to the identity, pride and security of those who stayed behind in exile. Indeed, while Black America inspired African nationalism until the Second World War, in the 1950s and 1960s, many Blacks in the diaspora took deep pride in the African struggle for independence.

There are also similarities between the pan-African and the Zionist conferences and congresses—between the 1942 Zionist Biltmore Conference (where a clear demand for a Jewish state was voiced for the first time) and the 1945 Manchester Pan-African Congress (where Black leaders of Africa, together with American Blacks such as Du Bois, Padmore, Makonnen and Amy Garvey, called for the first time for self-determination and complete independence). In fact, a major slogan of the Manchester Conference was “Down with anti-Semitism.”

The Black Zionist dream of a new Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali or Zimbabwe—all African kingdoms—was not very different from the Zionist dream of a new Judea. On the Black Zionist right wing, Garvey’s dream of a Black army that would conquer Africa was similar to dreams of the Jewish Zionist right wing. So was the readiness of both Jewish and Black right-wing Zionists to enlist the support of their worst enemies, who in fact wanted to get rid of both Jews and Blacks. Just as Jabotinsky negotiated with the Ukrainian nationalist and anti-Semite Petliura, Garvey established contacts with the Ku Klux Klan.

Another interesting similarity is the importance both movements attached to culture. Black Zionists saw the establishment of a reputable university—the returnees' Fourah Bay College in Sierra Leone was founded in 1827—as crucially important. A similar act of spiritual, intellectual and emotional revival was the foundation in 1925 of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

From almost any perspective, it is not only justifiable, but almost unavoidable, to speak about Black Zionism and its similarity to Jewish Zionism. Further research on Black Zionism and its relationship to Jewish Zionism may help to heal the deepening rift that has developed between Blacks and Jews in the last decades.

CHAPTER THIRTY-ONE

THE CASE OF EX-SOVIET SCIENTISTS

Maria N. Yelenevskaya and Larisa Fialkova¹

An American university is a place where
Russian professors teach Chinese,
Japanese and Indian students.
(From the folklore of Russians abroad)

INTRODUCTION

The goal of this chapter is to study specific features of the professional reintegration of immigrant scientists from the countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU) trained in the humanities and the social sciences. The international composition of many research projects, international authorship of numerous scientific publications, international associations of researchers in specific fields, global exchange of scientific knowledge at conferences and on the web, and even the de facto adoption of English as the lingua franca of science—all these testify that science as a field of human activity has been deeply affected by globalization (Halfmann 2005, Schott 1993). At the same time, advances in science and technology remain important markers of individual countries' international prestige and give them a competitive economic edge. It is widely acknowledged today that education ranks among the vital commodities in contemporary knowledge-based societies. In the competition for skilled workers, some countries, primarily the USA, have turned into importers of a highly qualified labor-force while others have had to reconcile themselves to the role of exporters. The Soviet Union could not be placed in either group for one simple reason: the borders were “locked” and only a limited number of dissidents and the Russian Jewish émigrés of the 1970s made it to academic institutions in the West. The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union moved the FSU into the ranks of exporter-countries.

¹ The research reported here is a joint project. The authors alternate priority of authorship in their publications.

An evaluation of the numbers of unassimilated Russian speakers who emigrated in the 1990s and currently reside in 110 countries worldwide ranges from 3 to 9 million (*Rossiiskaia Nauchnaia Diaspora* 2000: 16). While in the last years of Perestroika and in the early 1990s the majority of émigrés represented what is known as “return migration” and headed to Israel, Germany, Finland and Greece, in the mid- and late 1990s the deepening crisis of the Russian economy triggered an increase in labor migration (Pushkareva 1996: 64, *Rossiiskaia Nauchnaia Diaspora* 2000: 16). Emigration in that period was perceived as a survival strategy. According to the Russian psychologist Khrustaleva, “If countries of the West had lifted their ethnic preferences in immigrant-receiving policies, members of all ethnic groups inhabiting the FSU would have gone there” (Khrustaleva 1999). A considerable number of émigrés belonging to both categories held academic degrees.

In 1992 the Russian Ministry of the Interior introduced a new entry in the statistical surveys of emigration to register people previously employed in science and education (Zharenova et al. 2002: 11). At about the same time the term “scientific diaspora” emerged in Russian sociological literature. Definitions of this phenomenon differ primarily along the lines of inclusive/exclusive approaches. For example, Dezhina and Egerev, who have both done important work in the field of the sociology of science, restrict the notion of the Russian scientific diaspora to émigrés who work in academic positions and maintain contacts with colleagues in Russia. They exclude researchers who have assimilated, and have severed all ties with Russia and fellow-émigrés. They explicitly omit those who maintain connections with ex-compatriots living outside Russia but refuse to have anything to do with their “former Fatherland” (Dezhina 2002, Egerev 2002). We regard such a definition as weak in that it does not take into account the polycentric nature of contemporary diasporas. A more inclusive definition of the Russian scientific diaspora can be found in Zharenova et al.:

The Russian scientific diaspora is a community of Russian-speaking scientists² who emigrated from the FSU and continue research activities abroad. They cope with similar integration problems and as a result seek to maintain relations with each other, as well as with colleagues, friends and relatives living in the Fatherland (Zharenova et al. 2002: 36).

² The Russian concept of a scientist is not limited to people specializing in natural and life sciences, but also includes researchers in social sciences and humanities.

Our other objection to Dezhina and Egerev's analyses is related to their bypassing ethnic migration in estimating the dimensions of scientific diaspora. Egerev claims that, contrary to labor migrants, the majority of ethnic migrants had to change their occupation and did not succeed in joining the ranks of Western academics. Importantly, he makes this conclusion on the basis of ethnic Germans, who resided primarily in rural areas and small towns so had fewer chances of pursuing a scientific career in the USSR than did other ethnic groups, for example, Russians, Ukrainians, or Jews. On the other hand, he ignores other returning diasporas and Jewish emigration to the USA, Canada, and so on (Egerev 2002). The fact that the number of labor migrants working in Western academia considerably exceeds the corresponding number of ethnic migrants is not surprising. Ethnic migration consists of people of various age groups, including large numbers of retirees and people approaching retirement age. The professional composition of ethnic migration waves is often unfavorable for the labor market of receiving countries. In most cases they start job hunting as migrants, which ipso facto puts them into a weak position. Labor migrants, by contrast, leave the donor country only after signing a contract. The difficulties in personal integration encountered by members of the two groups are similar (see Egerev 2004, Ilarionova 2005), but their professional re-integration has very different patterns. We agree with Zharenova and her colleagues that although the structural patterns of ethnic and labor migrations differ, ethnic emigration is still a typical case of brain drain (Zharenova et al. 2002: 14–15).

Restructuring of the research and educational institutions, drastic reductions in research funding, as well as plummeting salaries and general economic instability triggered two trends in post-Soviet Russian science: a large number of researchers left their jobs, opting for more lucrative occupations, and thousands of others decided to leave the country. Reliable statistics as to the size of the latter group do not exist. Guesstimates quoted in the literature range between 30,000 (Ivanitskii 2003, Egerev 2004, Zharenova 2006) and 15,000–20,000 people employed on a regular basis, and twice as many working on short-term contracts and shuttling between home and employer countries (Saltykov 2003).³

³ These numbers cover only those who maintain at least some type of connections with their fatherland. One of the leading Russian researchers investigating Russian

The “brain drain” was one of the most politicized issues of the public discourse in the first decade of post-Soviet Russia. It became a hot topic among sociologists of science, but also among politicians, researchers in other fields, and journalists.⁴ According to Dezhina, emigration of scientists is projected onto the state’s security and its prestige among other nations. As a result the concept of “brain drain” came to be associated with such terms as “national security,” “technological drain,” and “stealing of ideas.” The outflow of talent seemed to cause more concern than its waste within the country (Dezhina 2002). To give just one example, here is a quote from an article published on the website of the *National Software Development Alliance*, that bears the ironic name of *Silicon Taiga*:

Russia’s losses from the “brain drain” and the outflow of know-how have already exceeded \$1 trillion. At the same time every ruble invested in our education system is more valuable than any currency. Conceptually our education remains the best in the world, but funds are not channeled in this direction, primarily because of the actions of the government and the State *Duma*.⁵ In the light of forecasts for the future of postindustrial society this situation creates a palpable threat to the national security (Shalmanov 2003).

The figure of the losses due to the emigration of scientists has been countered by more moderate estimates; and other voices claim that post-Soviet Russia is subject to the general trends in migration and that in the contemporary world researchers are now the most frequently migrating professionals.⁶ Some even believe that the export of scientists contributes to the expansion of Russia’s prestige and power:

émigré scientists, I. Dezhina claims that obtaining reliable statistics for this group is an elusive goal because the situation changes constantly; to keep track of all individuals is next to impossible (Dezhina 2002, Dezhina 2002a).

⁴ While we were writing this chapter, several articles appeared on the Internet discussing the brain drain from Israel. Their authors reported on a conference dedicated to this problem and expressed concern that academia in the USA and in European countries was more attractive for Israeli academics. A scientific career abroad promises better conditions of work, including funding opportunities, infrastructure and equipment, as well as better quality of life. The two groups that were cited as being particularly active in seeking study and employment opportunities outside Israel were academics of East-European origin and young people between 20 and 30 years of age. Special concern was expressed about emigration intentions of the latter group.

⁵ State *Duma* is the name of the parliament in Russia.

⁶ Even the newspaper *Pravda* in an editorial titled *Scientists’ Emigration: Damages to Russian Economy Amount to \$30 billion* had to acknowledge that “international brainpower migration is an objective and natural process.” Yet it cautioned that Russia was losing

From the geopolitical point of view the more [researchers] leave, the better. Without a single shot, Russian culture has spread throughout the world. Today, in almost all countries of the world there are Russian communities (Ivanitskii 2003).

This triumphant vision of Russians invading Western scientific institutions, spiced with the metaphor emphasizing the lack of violence, chimes well with the folklore of Russians living abroad but does not reflect the true state of affairs. The majority of émigré researchers are employed on temporary contracts which include social benefits only partially or not at all. They do not cover sabbatical rights. In other cases, the contract does not entitle immigrant researchers to submit research proposals for grants as principal investigators, nor provide funding for participation in conferences.

MATERIAL AND METHOD

Our study is based on over 15 years of participant observation, as we are immigrants of the 1990s ourselves. In the last eight years our joint research has focused on various problems of the integration of Russian-speaking Israelis and incipient diasporas of ex-Soviets (Fialkova 2005, Fialkova and Yelenevskaya 2005, 2007; Yelenevskaya 2005). Analytical work and numerous informal discussions with colleagues at national and international conferences triggered reflections on the careers of immigrant researchers and specific features of their professional reintegration. Methodologically, our study can be classified as autoethnography in terms of Chang's (2008) definition. He introduced this term for cultural studies by anthropologists of their "own people," in which the researcher is a full insider by virtue of being "native," possessing an intimate familiarity with, or achieving full membership of, the group being studied (cited in Ellis and Bochner 2000: 739). We believe that when autoethnography is not limited to narcissism and self-indulgence, it has healthy elements of estrangement from an "othering" of the self. It involves personalized accounts in which researchers draw on their own personal experiences to enlarge their understanding of a particular discipline or culture (Holt 2003: 2). As immigrants who had

either experienced and successful specialists or young promising research assistants, leaving a serious gap in research institutes and academia (*Pravda*, 7 December, 2005)

to confront all the problems of professional reintegration, we consider ourselves members of the group under study.

We chose to focus our study of the scientific diaspora on researchers in the humanities and social sciences employed in academia in tenured and temporary positions, including post-doctoral positions and PhD students. Furthermore, we limited our enquiry to those who are engaged in immigration studies and who left the FSU in the late 1980s and during the 1990s. Our choice of this group was guided by the fact that researchers investigating immigrant communities are both subjects and objects of immigration, and thus present a unique case of self-reflection.

Following up on our previous projects, we originally intended to conduct in-depth interviews with colleagues in different countries. To our regret, the first candidates we turned to refused to participate. Although we guaranteed anonymity, they admitted that they were afraid to risk their careers in revealing some sensitive issues of integration into Western academia.⁷ This failure made us change our research strategy and we compiled a short online questionnaire in Russian; but in the cover letter we noted that we could send it also in English or in Latin transliteration as the latter is a frequent practice among Russophones on the Internet. Our questionnaire is the following:⁸

- Did you have an opportunity/need for additional studies/retraining?
- Do you work in the same field/subfield in which you specialized before immigration?
- Are you a tenured/temporary employee?
- How did you make your way to Western publications?
- Do you publish in Russian? If you do, is this in Russia or the West? If you don't, how do you explain it?

⁷ A similar experience is reported by Dezhina, who conducted interviews among émigré academics in the USA working at MIT and the National Institute of Health at Harvard. She reports that most of her subjects were reluctant to participate in the study, but during the interviews it became clear that the situation in Russian science and the change it caused in their career had occupied their thoughts. Dezhina also noticed that the younger scientists were more ready to assimilate and accept their new country of residence, while researchers who had experience of work in academia before and after emigration were emotional and nostalgic, and displayed ambivalent attitudes to the organization of science in both the old and the new country (Dezhina 2002).

⁸ We are deeply grateful to our respondents for the ideas they generously shared with us.

- Do you participate in conferences in the FSU, or in meetings organized by immigrant researchers?
- Do you participate in joint research and publishing projects with your colleagues in the FSU and/or with other immigrant researchers? If you do, what sort of projects are they?
- What brought you to immigration studies?
- If we have forgotten to ask some important questions, please write about the issues you find relevant to our enquiry.

We deliberately compiled the questionnaire in such a way that respondents had a choice of answering very briefly or in detail. We realized that in answering the questionnaire our colleagues might feel that they were giving away some ideas that could be useful in their own research, so we tried to make our questions non-invasive in order not to scare off potential respondents. Each researcher we approached was addressed personally. First we wrote to those we knew personally or by correspondence. We also studied information about the authors in relevant book series, journals and conference proceedings. Some of our respondents suggested names of other colleagues who met our criteria.⁹ Altogether we sent out 39 questionnaires: 17 to researchers in Israel and the rest to colleagues in 12 other countries (Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, Germany, the UK, Hungary, Japan, The Netherlands, Sweden, the USA). Unfortunately, we failed to make contacts in Belgium and Great Britain. Twenty colleagues filled in the questionnaire (11 of them are Israelis; one answered by phone). Two addressees replied that they did not suit our study, and one wrote that she had abandoned her successful career in the West and returned to her home country for personal reasons. Notably, nine did their academic studies partially or fully after emigrating. Six of them expressed doubt as to whether their experience would be of interest to us, but agreed to participate; two others belonging to the same category refused to participate. Three respondents answered in English; one response was written in a combination of English and transliterated Russian when it described a recent project in Russia. Three respondents apologized for not using Russian. One respondent used transliteration throughout; one

⁹ We are grateful to Dr. Natalia Kosmarskaia, deputy editor-in-chief of the journal *Diasporas* for providing us with some names. We are also indebted to the respondents who did the same, but so as not to disclose their identity, we do not name them here.

switched to English when naming research themes and project titles. All the rest answered in Russian.

Several of our respondents made comments on the questionnaire. One of these, whose answers were primarily “yes” and “no,” remarked that this terseness was triggered by the phrasing of the questions. One Israeli respondent commented that the term “immigrant” did not apply to him because he viewed himself as a repatriate. He emphasized that he was aware of the discussion about the use of the terms “immigrant” and “repatriate” in Israel, but insisted on the ideological importance of the use of the term “oleh” (Hebrew for “repatriate to Israel”). He was the only Israeli researcher to dwell on this terminological controversy.

Besides analyzing questionnaires, we studied materials of the Russian electronic media on the subject of brain drain and monitored web-sites on which Russian-speaking researchers exchange professional and informal information.

HUMAN RESOURCES IN HUMANITIES: ASSET OR WASTE?

Alarmism in the Russian public discourse about the “brain drain” focused on researchers in science and technology, while social scientists and specialists in humanities remained largely outside the purview. Although this group is completely unquantified, sociological literature shows that the number of researchers in humanities and social sciences is markedly smaller than that in other fields. The difference is particularly visible in labor migration. Zharenova et al. observe that researchers in these fields cannot be employed without retraining of some sort, or refresher courses, which makes their employment uneconomical for receiving countries (Zharenova et al. 2002: 18–19, 37). Our questionnaires, however, do not confirm that this is a valid argument. Only one respondent (in Sweden) holding a degree in teaching English and German as foreign languages, had to complete university studies in the same field again and found a position as a university instructor after graduation. Later this respondent studied to become a teacher of Russian to expand career options. Two respondents (in Israel) chose to switch fields completely. One was trained in the USSR as an engineer, the other as a mathematician, and both of them completed MA and PhD programs in psychology after immigration.

Two respondents (in Hungary and Finland) mentioned taking refresher courses, and one of them added that she uses every oppor-

tunity to attend such courses. One respondent (in Israel) mentioned courses in Judaic studies taken both in Israel and in England. Note that Judaism was not part of the Soviet university curricula. Three respondents mentioned courses in the language of the receiving country and one took computer courses. In fact, like all new immigrants, Israeli respondents had an opportunity to study Hebrew upon immigration, but only few chose to mention this. We can presume that our respondents from other countries also had to learn or improve the language of their country of residence, whether through official channels or privately. The other respondents, holders of Soviet university degrees, managed to re-enter academia without retraining.

We believe that an important reason why few immigrant researchers in humanities and social sciences re-entered academia is the general devaluation of these fields in the contemporary world. The connection between knowledge in the humanities and national security and economic prosperity is still considered remote, and is largely underestimated by politicians. As the Israeli historian Fania Oz-Salzberger (2007) remarked, the connection is there, but we haven't yet learned to trace and measure it.¹⁰ Ironically, after years of neglecting the importance of humanities, Russia is currently at the forefront of countries in which the prestige of the humanities and social sciences has increased dramatically thanks to the demand for experts in economics, law, sociology, international relations, political science and psychology. At the same time interest in history, philosophy, ethnography and anthropology is as low as ever. Young people clearly demonstrate a pragmatic approach to choosing their future profession. As Yurevich justly observes, socio-economic crises tend to trigger fast development in these fields because they are more adaptive and less dependent on production processes than technology and engineering (Yurevich 2004: 3). Social sciences are "cheap" for the state since they do not require major investments in equipment. Of special importance for the current situation in Russia is the existence of a cult of politics, which dominates social life and accounts for the high demand for experts in the above fields. This recent change in the prestige of scientific fields has affected career strategies among the young generation. Faculties of humanities and social sciences

¹⁰ Here and further dates following web addresses indicate when the sites were accessed.

are in great demand and the number of graduates and PhD students in these fields has doubled (Yurevich 2004: 7, 10).¹¹

The few authors writing about immigrant researchers in the humanities admit that their professional integration is much harder than that of their peers in mathematics, technology, and natural sciences. Some of the reasons for this have been identified by Kheimets and Epstein 2001, Epshtein and Uritskii 2002, Epshtein 2007, Remennick 2007, Zharenova 2006. They are incompatibility of skills, differing academic cultures, and immigrants' weak proficiency in the language of the host country and in English. We would like to add to this list distrust of the Soviet social sciences and humanities by Western academics as overwhelmingly saturated by ideology, and hence largely useless. Consequently, the demand for them in the West is much lower than that for mathematicians and natural scientists. Incompatibility of skills can mostly be explained by the fact that during the Cold War, humanities in the USSR became self-sufficient. While admitting that the lack of contacts with Western colleagues was a disadvantage, some believe today that this triggered independent thought and the emergence of several scientific schools, such as the Tartu school of semiotics (see Frumkina 2007).

The situation with the ideological suppression of scientists was more complex than it is often presented today. In the last decades of Soviet power, despite attempts of the partocracy to censor publications and research on specific topics, so as to limit access to Western information sources and contacts with Western colleagues, the complete isolation of science could no longer be achieved, although non-conformist researchers had to display a fighting spirit. To cite just a few examples, we would mention the Tartu school of semiotics, headed by Y. Lotman, the Levada center for sociological research, and the ethnolinguistic school headed by Nikita Tolstoy. Unfortunately, many independent thinkers were not allowed to travel outside the Soviet Union. Their work, as well as research conducted by their students and followers, were not published in the West, or were discovered after a considerable

¹¹ According to the research conducted at the Central European University in Budapest by Molodikova, the forecasts for students in humanities and social sciences from CIS and Baltic States, predicting that only about 18–22% of the graduates would return home, proved wrong. The actual numbers are 76.4% in all fields surveyed (Molodikova 2006: 46). These data are relevant to our essay because this university provides education only in humanities and social sciences, and economics is its most “technical” faculty.

delay. While articles in mathematics and natural sciences published in the leading Soviet journals were usually supplied with abstracts or summaries in English, this was not practiced in humanities. Nobody was expected to write in English, because publications were meant for domestic readership only. Among our respondents who started their academic career in the USSR only one had publications in the West before immigration:

I started publishing in international journals in English back in Moscow, taking serious risks by sending my articles abroad and bypassing Soviet bureaucracy. Over time, I perfected the art of writing up my research and publishing it, which was the key to my “career success...”

Note that few researchers possessed the appropriate writing skill in English, nor was publishing in the West a part of the professional outlook of researchers in humanities. Many had limited access even to Western journals that were kept in the major Soviet libraries and consequently were often unaware of the leading Western journals in their fields. On the other hand, everybody was aware of the ranking of domestic publications according to their prestige, with the leading Moscow journals heading the list.¹² Anyone who published abroad required courage, and was at great risk of being regarded as a dissident. This act, just as with fiction, was dubbed *tamizdat* (Russian slang for publications abroad), which was hardly better than the notorious label of *samizdat* (Russian slang for “self-publication”). Trying to use official channels could kill the publication because of the necessity to present it to state expert committees, which could reject it on allegedly ideological grounds. As a result, just as the Soviet scientists were unfamiliar with many studies conducted in the West, the bulk of research done in Soviet humanities and social sciences remained unknown to Western colleagues. In fact, two parallel systems of knowledge emerged and had few opportunities to meet.

This isolation also created complications when émigré researchers applied for jobs in the West. As already mentioned, their publications were primarily in Russian or in languages of national republics, such as Ukrainian, Armenian, Georgian, and so on, so their merit could be

¹² Even today our colleagues in Ukraine complain that their English publications in internationally acclaimed journals are ignored as prerequisites for academic promotion.

evaluated either by fellow immigrants of previous emigration waves or by the few who had acquired Russian as a foreign language.

One other aspect is that besides incompatibility of skills, émigré researchers are often confronted with incompatibility of fields of interest in various academic communities. A case in point concerns, for instance, specialists in areas like the folklore of various ethnicities in the USSR, the social geography of Siberia, or the linguistics of Volga Germans, who emigrated to the West and who could hardly find outlets for their high professional skills and knowledge.

Finally, there is a dearth of available positions in humanities as a whole. Unfortunately, it is well known that departments of humanities and social sciences are usually the first to fall victim to financial cuts. Those who managed to enter the academia of a new country often suffered a lowering of status (see, e.g., Dezhina 2002a). The majority are employed on temporary contracts with few or no social benefits. As noted above, the contract does not entitle an immigrant researcher to submit research proposals for grants as an independent party and does not provide funding for participation in international conferences.

Even our tiny sample showed a tendency to temporary employment. Four of the respondents are tenured (two of them received all their degrees before emigration), two are on the tenure track, and nine have temporary contracts. In the latter group three Israeli respondents are employed through the KAMEA program, especially created for immigrant scientists. Sixty percent of the funding is provided by the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption, the rest being paid from the university budget. In the 1990s, when 13,000 scientists immigrated to Israel from the FSU, the government launched a program for their professional re-integration that presupposed three-year employment in academia or R&D companies (known in the immigrant community as the Shapiro program). Criteria for acceptance were holding an MA with publications or a PhD. The next stage, the GILADI program, was competitive and required post-immigration publications. In the end, 500 researchers in all fields were selected as participants in the KAMEA program. Applicants' CVs were scrutinized in the way similar to that practiced for tenure-track academics. The program allows promotion opportunities, with the position of Senior Research Fellow, corresponding to Associate Professor, being the highest rank. Although KAMEA was meant for the long-term employment of the best immigrant researchers, the contract has to be renewed annually, and every year "Russian" members of the Knesset have to fight for its

funding.¹³ In addition, unlike faculty members, KAMEA fellows, including those who teach full-time and do research, have no sabbatical rights and no differential component of the salary, computed on the basis of publication record, teaching-load and administrative responsibilities. KAMEA fellows are not entitled to hold administrative positions and are not paid for supervising doctoral students. In principle, they can be transferred to permanent academic positions with the same amount of funding still coming from the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption. If the KAMEA program closes down, however, the universities will become solely responsible for financing immigrant researchers' work. Given the repeated threats to close the program down, such transfers are extremely rare. Termination of the program would mean automatic firing of KAMEA fellows. The ambivalence of the KAMEA fellows' situation was reflected in answers to our questionnaires: one respondent referred to the contract as permanent, another as temporary, while the third avoided using any of these categories. Yet despite their insecurity, KAMEA fellows are entitled to submit research proposals for grants as chief researchers and are provided with funding for participation in international conferences. Like other temporary employees, researchers on the Shapiro and GILADI programs do not receive these benefits, which reduces their competitiveness. Work conditions of temporarily employed academics do not differ for immigrants and their peers among veteran Israelis; but while the former are hired only if they have a substantial scientific record, the majority of the latter are at the beginning of their research career.

IMMIGRANT RESEARCHERS' STRATEGIES

Now we would like to discuss strategies that immigrant researchers choose to advance in the academic world of their new country of residence. First of all, some specialists in the humanities and social sciences

¹³ The relevance of immigrant scientists' career prospects for the Russian-speaking community is obvious in numerous publications covering the fate of the listed programs in the press. See, e.g. news and discussion items on the Russian-Israeli Internet sites, *Vestnik Izraelia* (Russian for "Israel Herald"), *IsraMir* (Russian for "IsraWorld"), *Sed'moi Kanal* (Russian for "Channel Seven"), *Strana* (Russian for "The Country"). The latest article in the press devoted to battles around KAMEA, which turned into an issue in the political struggle for the influence of the community, was authored by the chairperson of the Scientists' Forum, Leonid Dinevich and appeared in the leading paper *Vesti* (Dinevich 2007).

extended their previous research interests to the study of immigrants. We quote four of our respondents from Canada, Finland, and Israel:

- I investigated language contacts specializing in German “insular” dialectology and came to be interested in the development of a mother tongue in the foreign language environment. This is why Russian spoken abroad seemed to be a worthy subject for investigation. This entailed research into sociolinguistics, language policies, and so on.
- I moved to immigration studies from conversation analysis which I conducted already in the 1990s when there were no publications in this field in Russia.
- I study immigrants from the FSU and Ethiopia only in the context of comparative analysis of different groups.
- I began to collect oral testimony on the history of Jews in Russia in the 1930s. While searching for respondents I realized that many of them were immigrants. The rest is history.

In some cases, people changed direction of research due to necessity. One of our respondents (in Israel) said that she had to expand into immigration studies because her main field hardly interested anybody in her new academic environment. Two other respondents (in Japan and Israel) pointed out that they had taken up immigration studies on the advice of colleagues. It was suggested to both of them that they choose a niche where they would have a clear priority over others, and both are deeply grateful for this advice.

Epshtein observes that for many immigrant researchers, the study of their own diasporal communities, as well as the country of origin, is objectively simpler and more accessible than other subjects requiring substantial proficiency in the languages of their new countries of residence, knowledge of history and understanding of other peoples’ cultural codes (Epshtein 2007: 444). The political scientist Garry P. Freeman gives this tendency a different explanation. He believes that émigrés take up immigration studies not so much to choose an easier path but to oppose discrimination:

Although I know no reliable data, simple observation suggests that many migration scholars are themselves first- or second-generation migrants. Human curiosity seems naturally to turn it upon itself. The history of social science is marked by attempts of scholars belonging to oppressed or marginal groups to draw attention to their plight. Women’s studies are dominated by women, minority studies by minorities, etc. Migrant scholars bring with them special insight and commitment and deserve credit for much of the field’s growth. (Freeman 2005: 115)

Although on the whole we believe there is truth in both of these observations, we see yet another emancipatory factor here. To investigate different aspects of immigration is a way to sort out your own experiences and sometimes overcome the trauma of acculturation. This theme dominates and is the most emotional part of the questionnaire where respondents give extensive answers; accordingly, we decided to quote them at length (Germany, Israel, USA). In some answers several factors discussed earlier merge, with the last respondent summarizing all of them:

- Russian speech abroad grated on my ears, and Russian culture, or rather one of its most massive manifestations, the Kazakh version,¹⁴ grated on my eyes. It was interesting for me to watch how “simple” Russian would evolve in the German environment. After all, didn’t Yiddish form on the basis of German? Soon it became clear to me that the Russian language abroad is heterogeneous. Naturally, self-monitoring was an exciting experience.
- [It was] professional curiosity coupled with personal experience.
- I think that for me it is a perfect conjunction of my academic and personal interests.
- I think it was the desire to make sense of and digest one of the most important events in my life.
- Once I wrote a course project in the third year of studies. And this is how it went on. I guess I wanted to sort it out for myself. Add to it that I used to deal with immigrants in my job, so I had data available [for research].
- Only part of my research is on immigrants so I am not an “*emigrantolog*” (Russian for “expert in immigration studies”). But of course it’s trying to understand your own experiences and also to address injustices that were inflicted on immigrants and that—although unavoidable—still need redressing.
- Immigration problems are my problems. My parents have become factory workers. Their Hebrew is non-existent, and their Soviet degrees are worth nothing. Their social status plummeted, and Soviet-like, obsessive fear has become overwhelming in the new country. All of this is *my life and the life of my parents in Israel*. Why not write about things close to you, things that hurt? It is easy for me to write about immigrants, it is easy not to write something ridiculous. It is *easy* to spot interesting details. (...) My command of Russian and my immigrant origin are my “relative advantages” and it’s a shame not to utilize them. (highlighting by the respondent).

¹⁴ Large numbers of ethnic Germans emigrated from Kazakhstan where this ethnic group had been exiled by Stalin.

Among personal motives triggering researchers' interest in immigration studies is observation of their own children who are brought up in mixed bilingual families. A Swedish researcher (female) cites it as her only reason: "My own children brought me to this topic. I began to study their language." Another respondent from Finland (male) listed it along with two more reasons:¹⁵ "...bilingualism of my children and language interference in their speech enabled me to collect rich material in the first years of their life when they were acquiring Russian and Finnish."

Another motive encouraging people in the humanities to research their own communities is that, consciously or unconsciously, they are interested in the maintenance of their native language and culture, which are the essence of their professional activities and interests. Moreover, they feel their research makes their own group more visible to the mainstream society and empowers it, as is clear from the above quotations and from the fact that we are writing this essay.

The next strategy concerns the dilemma of parallel knowledge-systems mentioned earlier. Among the first questions immigrant researchers ask themselves is in which language to write papers, what literature to quote, and where to publish. Regarding the language, the choice is among English as the *lingua franca* of science, the language of the country of residence such as Hebrew, German, Greek, Finnish, etc., and the language of the old country, be it Russian, Ukrainian, Armenian, and so on. We know from our informal discussions with colleagues that many of them had difficulty to begin writing papers in English. Among our respondents only one (in Finland) mentioned language complications; "Publications in the West are difficult for me primarily due to my poor command of academic English. My conversational English is pretty good but I have difficulty producing science in English; learning stylistic peculiarities of this register is hard for me. I studied German at school and learned English on my own, back in the USSR/Russia." Only three of our respondents (in Israel and the Netherlands) have no publications in Russian. Importantly, two of them emigrated as teenagers. One answered the questionnaire in English and, as we know, has not learned formal writing in Russian; the other answered in Russian

¹⁵ These reasons were a discovery of a rich collection of immigrant newspapers that had not been previously researched and his emerging interest in the language of recent immigrant families, in which one spouse is an Ingermanland Finn and the other is Russian.

and is clearly oriented to Russian culture. His comment “I don’t have Russian publications yet” suggests that he does not exclude this as an option for the future. Six respondents (in Israel and the USA) have few publications in Russian but their reasons are different:

- The object of my research—comparative analysis of various socio-cultural groups in Israel—is not directly connected to Russia.
- I think my target audience is still Western academics.
- Publications in Russian are not prestigious and do not contribute to your promotion at all.
- Up until recently, I did not write in Russian on professional matters. But lately I have been getting back to contributing to the Russian professional discourse. (Thank God, I can do what I want, having reached the top of the academic ladder—as Russian publications get you no credit in academia, of course.)

Indeed, publications in the FSU in Russian have little value, if any, for promotion, and other local languages still less, especially at the early stages of a career in a new country. Probably this is why immigrant researchers desperate to increase the number of publications in English sometimes publish in their country of origin in that language. This violates local conventions, and a publisher’s agreement may be considered a sign of good will.¹⁶

The majority of our respondents (12) publish in English, and/or in the language of the country of residence and in Russian. When émigré researchers begin to publish in a language other than Russian, they have to take into account the readers’ cultural background and shared knowledge. In the humanities and social sciences the context is extremely important and the proportions of explicitly and implicitly expressed information differ significantly (Leontovich 2005: 25–26). Sometimes it takes a newcomer considerable time to grasp that articles may be rejected not because of insufficient novelty of information but because the author failed to give a sufficient explanation of information extremely familiar to him/her but unknown to Western readers. As time goes on, some researchers discover a partial loss of professional vocabulary in their mother tongue and find it difficult to express themselves and write papers in the native language (this is another reason why some émigrés publish in Russia in English).

¹⁶ See, e.g., articles by Halbershtadt-Komar 2006, Tartakovsky 2006, Fialkova and Yelenevskaya 2001, Yelenevskaya and Fialkova 2000.

There is also an inner conflict for at least some people. Publications in the West are more prestigious for the researchers' reputation, but the readership may be more valuable to the authors in the old country. This is particularly true for experts in Slavic studies. To illustrate this we quote our respondents in Finland and Japan:

- First of all, it is important for me to address the Russian reader and influence him, because very few foreign journals reach Russia, and Russian studies in the West remain virtually unknown in Russia. Secondly, living abroad and participating in Western scientific discourse one begins to see things differently. One acquires stereoscopic "scientific vision" and as far as I understand, this is interesting to Russian publishers. Then, after all, I feel I represent Russian science, so it is articles and books in Russian that are psychologically important for me. Finally, articles in Russian are absolutely essential for me for the sake of retaining and perfecting my style in academic Russian. This is extremely important for my work with foreigners.
- I try to publish primarily in Russian, because my most valuable readers, my strictest critics, and my main reviewers are my compatriots, both in Russia and in the West. Tomorrow, I'll submit an article that'll come out in Helsinki, not long ago I sent an article to Berlin, and naturally, I publish about three articles annually in Tokyo.
- Well, of course, it is not simple. It is not just "two worlds and two systems;" it is "many worlds and many systems." The style of scientific articles is obviously different, not to mention the content. There are good and weak publications both here and there. It is impossible to translate everything from Russian into English, because it is a different mentality, but it would be useful to write some reviews "in the opposite direction," so that the English-language world could learn about the Russian-language world. Some devotees of science do this.

The next pitfall is the bibliography. A plethora of names of Russian and Soviet researchers unfamiliar to editors and reviewers often annoys them; and like any other researcher, an immigrant has to demonstrate familiarity with the Western literature. We know that some colleagues avoid citing Russian sources not because they consider them irrelevant, but because they are afraid that their abundance will hinder acceptance. But even those who are prepared to refer to the Russian literature often find that libraries in their new academic "homes" lack Russian books and journals, mirroring the situation with Western literature in the Soviet Union and post-Soviet countries. This complaint is a response to one of our questions (from Israel): "I seldom refer to Russian sources: it is difficult to get hold of them here."

As our experience and responses quoted above indicate, different researchers cope with these dilemmas differently and their strategies may change in the course of their new careers. Some colleagues, even those who are initially oriented exclusively to Western readership, make a gradual return to the “old country” and resume publishing in Russian, in Russia, sometimes after an interval of over 10 years. We have also seen an increase in citations of Russian sources in the work of immigrant researchers published in the West in the last couple of years. Another change we have noticed is that immigrant researchers contribute to the expansion of Russian book collections in the libraries of their academic institutions, bridging the gap between the two parallel knowledge systems created as long ago as the Cold War era. Notably, a publishing house with two offices, one in Jerusalem and one in Moscow, and which makes an important contribution to the promotion of the work by immigrant researchers and writers, is called *Gesharim* (Hebrew for “bridges”) and “*Mosty Kul'tury*” (Russian for “bridges between cultures”).

RUSSIAN SCIENTISTS ABROAD: A MONOCENTRIC OR A POLYCENTRIC DIASPORA?

All who write about immigration of scientists from the FSU agree that we are witnessing the emergence of a Russian scientific diaspora. Following Smith and Guarnizo (1998) and Remennick (2007: 159), we distinguish two types of forces mobilizing transnationalism of the Russian scientific diaspora, “from above” and “from below.”

Transnationalism “from above” is manifested in activities sponsored by institutions in Russia and successor states. In the Soviet period, contacts with émigrés were prohibited and few academics would risk their careers to maintain connections with their former friends and colleagues residing in the West. Only in the late 1980s were old ties restored, with hesitant approval by the authorities. Shlapentokh wittily refers to this phenomenon as “reunion with emigration” (Shlapentokh 1990: 247–248). The shift in relations with émigré scientists and new patterns of collaboration are discussed by Russian sociologists of science (see, e.g., Borisov 2002, Egerev 2002). While until recently Russia tried to court only émigré mathematicians and natural scientist, recently the policy has changed and manifold attempts have been made to involve émigré scientists in joint projects. For example, the Russian Foundation

for Basic Research sponsors projects in various fields of science and encourages participation of diasporans. In 2006 the *World Congress of Compatriots Living Abroad* held in St. Petersburg included in its resolution a proposal to create the International Association of Scientists Living Abroad, which would be affiliated with the Russian Academy of Sciences.

Another move was made in 2007 when a presidential decree proclaimed the *Russian Language Year* (Decree 1488, 29 December 2007). The strategic goal of this project is to rejuvenate interest in learning Russian and about Russian culture worldwide. It also aims at promoting a positive image of Russia at home and throughout the world. In this attempt to revive the credibility of Russian as a means of communication outside the country's borders, the upper echelons of power hope to expand the influence of Russian culture and view this as a crucial political, economic and social target. One may speculate that Russia is likely to take a closer look at active émigré researchers in humanities and try to tap this human resource in order to pursue her new culture-related goals.

Despite the grand names given to the organizations and forums founded to attract the émigré intelligentsia, and despite the publicity around the diaspora, institutional efforts to maintain ties with émigré researchers are not systematic and not always successful. Yet they influence the policies of publishing houses, journals, academic institutions and conference organizers. Since the late 1990s, several books by émigré researchers about the life of former Soviets abroad have been published in Moscow and St. Petersburg. Their authors include, Alec Epshtein and M.A. Fedorchenko (eds.) 2000; Eliezer Feldman 2003; Moshe Kenigshtein (ed.) 2007; Zeev (Vladimir) Khanin 2004; Ekaterina Protassova 2004; Yuri Slezkine 2005, and others, including ourselves. Publishing activities of the émigré researchers are seen in the donor country as "transfer of diasporic cultural capital" (Zharenova et al. 2002: 96). At the same time, Russian researchers investigate expatriates residing in different countries and publish studies about them. The first to be mentioned here are the books about communities of ex-Soviets in Boston by Galina Komarova (2002) and in Germany by Nelly Khrustaleva (2001). Besides publishing, émigré researchers frequently participate in international and national conferences held in the FSU. Some give lecture courses, supervise students and organize seminars. In addition, émigré researchers organize conferences in their countries of residence, inviting their colleagues from the FSU and immigrants from

other countries. In Israel, for example, Bar-Ilan University has twice hosted the conference on *Russian-speaking Jewry in Global Perspective: Power, Politics and Community*, and the University of Haifa was the venue of two conferences—on *The Russian Language Abroad*, and on *Anti-Semitism and Philo-Semitism in Modern Russia and Eastern Europe*. Not only the initiators, but most of the participants of these and many other meetings were Soviet-trained researchers residing in various countries, and the dominant language of presentations was Russian. Most of our respondents are actively involved in joint activities with their former compatriots: 11 wrote that they participate in conferences held in the FSU, 15 do so in conferences organized by émigré researchers outside the FSU, and 13 in joint projects with FSU researchers. As we have shown, not all the diasporic activities are linked to the countries of the FSU. At first sight, a sabbatical spent by an Israeli researcher in Italy has nothing to do with the diaspora, unless we take into account that the invitation was initiated by his former fellow student from a Soviet university, currently living in Italy. The important aspect of all these activities is reliance on informal professional networks. Four of our respondents (in Finland, Israel, Japan, USA) mentioned receiving professional help from other émigré researchers; it included finding a job, arranging for publications, and invitations to conferences.¹⁷ The theme of solidarity with colleagues and compatriots often arises in informal conversations. There are counter-examples as well. Answering the question about publications in the West, one of our respondents (in Germany) remarked, “I would say I have not succeeded yet. It is sad to admit, but partially it’s due to my colleagues—compatriots. I am afraid they tend to be unjustifiably jealous about emergence of new names on the scientific market.” Some of the network ties were established before emigration but others were created in subsequent years.

Transnationalism “from below” seems to work much better than “from above.” Soviet-trained researchers have created numerous non-commercial websites which provide information about research grants, post-doc positions, the latest publications in specific fields, and so on. In the early 1990s, when the immigration of scientists was still a novelty, researchers advised each other on how to write a CV, a research proposal, a grant application, and so on. These websites also serve as

¹⁷ See information about similar acts of solidarity in Dezhina 2002a, Ilarionova 2005.

discussion forums in which participants pose professional questions, discuss social and economic problems, give each other useful tips about academic cultures outside Russia and their survival codes, and just chat about anything.

In between institutionally-sponsored and informal transnational activities there is a gray area in which contacts are initiated by individuals but cannot be maintained without the state's silent approval or its indifference. Some émigrés, for example, write theses and are granted degrees in Russia, others supervise graduate and post-graduate students at Russian universities.¹⁸

It is difficult to say to what extent Russia will be able to influence the evolution of the scientific diaspora. First, there are possible complications in the relations between the Russian scientific community and the scientific diaspora. As Russia expands its involvement in the international community, émigré scientists are increasingly seen as competitors. As a result, the attitude to them is prevalently pragmatic (Dezhina 2002). In addition, as long as people communicate informally on a one-to-one basis things run smoothly, but as soon as collectives start to negotiate joint ventures the partnership invariably ends in quarrels and mutual recriminations (Egerev 2002a). Reservations are voiced outside Russia as well such as by the founding father of Soviet sociology, Vladimir Shlapentokh, who resides in the USA.

CONCLUSIONS

The term diaspora has become fuzzy, with neither a generally accepted definition nor universal criteria. Émigré researchers involved in diasporic activities are not always loyal to Russia, and few of them plan to return to the old country. Some are motivated by promoting the culture of the new country in their publications and conference presentations in the FSU. This does not prevent them, however, from trying to obtain the best from both worlds and to maintain informal networks cemented by the common language, personal friendships and common professional background.

¹⁸ While writing this essay we came across an advertisement in a supplement to the largest Russian-language newspaper in Israel *Vesti*. It was placed by the Moscow Open Law School which advertised permanent positions for Israeli citizens who received their academic degrees in the USSR (*Kaznachei*, 2007, 8 November: 19).

Despite terminological controversies, the material presented in this chapter confirms that ex-Soviet researchers interacting professionally can be viewed as a scientific diaspora. Various publications, internet resources created by scientists, responses to our online questionnaire, as well as our participant observations indicate that the Russian scientific diaspora is non-centralized. In the absence of formal organizations supporting them at home or in host countries, Russian immigrant scientists maintain transnational connections with fellow expatriate colleagues, and primarily rely on informal networks.

When the study of immigrants is the monopoly of scientific communities of receiving countries, it is shaped as the study of "*the other*." When immigrant groups are investigated by their members the perspective changes, and it is the host society that emerges as *the other*, viewed and assessed by newcomers. An important feature of the studies conducted by immigrants is dialectic positioning: researchers act as insiders familiar with subtleties of culture that influence behavior and discourse of the group, and at the same time they adopt the strategy of estrangement which de-automates their perception and brings them closer to the view of the host society. The choice of immigration studies as a scientific niche can also be seen as an integration strategy that allows one to gain a foothold in both worlds.

Of special interest are members of the one-and-a-half generation who take up immigration studies as their subject. They do it not because of the inadequate proficiency in the language of the receiving society or lack of knowledge about it generally. Some of them may be oriented by their scientific advisors, but others are guided by the interest in the culture of their origin. Their position is intermediate, because their knowledge of the country of origin is limited, but the new society is more accessible to them with its history and cultural codes.

PART FOUR

COMPARING AND CONCLUDING

CHAPTER THIRTY-TWO

MULTIPLE TRANSNATIONALISMS: MUSLIMS, AFRICANS, CHINESE AND HISPANICS

Eliezer Ben-Rafael

FROM ETHNICITY TO NATIONALISM

As shown in the all-above, transnational diasporas represent a genuine transformation of societies that goes far beyond migration. It takes place where previous changes have already asserted the centrality of ethnic diversity. This diversity and political impacts, concomitantly with globalization processes, are the direct context of the emergence of contemporary diasporas which trace out a perspective of their own to the evolution of ethnic groups. Among the definitions of an ethnic group, the most quoted is Schermershorn's (1970) which sees in it an entity—smaller than society—in which members share real or putative common ancestry, memories, and focus on common symbols. As adds Eriksen (1993), an ethnic group implies an awareness of kind and cultural singularity. When it aspires to include society at large, ethnicity comes to equal nationalism which, by elaborating on shared legacies justifies claims to a nation-state. In turn, in a nation-state, individuals' relation to the collective implies the quality of citizenship requesting compliance with new all-societal norms and duties—i.e. civility—on an assumedly universalistic basis. This fruition comes up to relativizing the weight of the primordialism of the founding collective in the prevailing image of the nation-state (Nikolas 1999).

It is from these two aspects—the nation's stemming from ethnicity and its representing universalistic duties and privileges—that has developed a “modernist-versus-ethnicist” argument. “Modernists” equate the nation-state mainly with a “community of citizens” (Schnapper 2003/1994); “ethnicists” underline that the nation-state remains the expression of primordial commitments binding “the People”. Gellner (1983, 1994, 1996, 1997), the “modernist”, defines nationalism as participation in a culture which is “co-extensive” with a sustainable political unit (see also Anderson 1991 and Hobsbawm 1992). Nationalism was generated

by secular culture in the wake of industrialization, and warrants the nation's coherence (Gellner 1983, Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). It is a product of "engineering" that substitutes kinship and religion as loci of loyalty (Anderson 1991).

"Ethnicists" like Hutchinson (1994) and Smith (1986, 1994, 1995, 1996) speak of myths of origin and a sense of history that forge identity. Nations and ethnic communities are units of human history stemming from primordial affinities. Nation-building is never a total break with past cultures, and religion, as a rule, is a founding element of nationalism. Shafer (1972) points out to the role of national churches in England and Sweden—and one may add the Russian and Greek Orthodox churches. A war of religions, to remember, engendered the Netherlands and was the first case of "national liberation war." In all these, religion was an ingredient of nationalism that left strong imprints on its evolution.

In the context of this argument, Brubaker (1992, 1998) considers the cases of France and Germany as demonstrating that universal and primordial aspects may be variously involved in the development of different nationalisms. France, he says, is a good example where civic nationalism growing out from the operation of the state and its institutions achieves a primary importance. Germany, as for it, is a case where national sentiments—the feeling of *Volk*—preceded the emergence of the state which was both a purely political process and an ethnocultural one. It is Nikolas' (1999) point here that political-national and cultural-primordial aspects are also complementary, and are found in any dominant culture.

By "dominant culture" we mean the set of ideas, symbols and values diffused, as the basis of their legitimacy, by the center and those actors who are in control of the political power—even when they are not representative of a majority. A dominant culture outlines "the cultural historical personality and actual ambitions of the national society" (Ben-Rafael 2002) and as such necessarily emphasizes the homogeneity of the social body. It is however a fact—and here we return to the start of the present discussion—that contrary to the expectations of many commentators, nationalism and the dominant cultures stemming from it have often been unable to prevent the emergence of new, or the re-emergence of old, particularistic allegiances from within the national collective. Ethnicity has become a prominent feature of social reality and has concretized in diverse forms of ethnocultural distinctiveness.

The explanations are numerous. It is evinced that an enduring correlation often develops between ethnic groups and class divisions in the context of discrimination, lack of human capital or else that contribute to groups' retention of awareness of kind (Van den Berghe 1967, 1970; Bonacich 1973). Smith (1986) remarks that ethnicity persists more strongly among lower classes less exposed to acculturation than among socially mobile groups (Lal 1983). This is not to gainsay that socially successful groups may also retain strong ethnic allegiances which tend to show that ethnicity is a kind of ground-rule of the human experience, always re-emerging in different circumstances. This approach—which we called “ethnicist” previously, when it concerned the sources of nationalism—is backed by Geertz (1963) on the ground of the overwhelming collective commitment people often profess. Circumstantialists—another word for modernists—like Gellner (1983) or Anderson (1991)—would see here developments bound to social benefits generated by the “invention” of traditions and collective identities.

In any case, wherever ethnicity persists, it constitutes a reflexive project of identity-building, bound to self-actualization and empowerment (Giddens 1991), which may achieve centrality even where nationalism is an important component of the dominant culture.

COLLECTIVE IDENTITY AND IDENTIFICATION

As Dahrendorf (1959), indeed, taught years ago, it is only when people effectively refer to themselves as part of a given collective that they constitute a “real” group and not just a statistical category. The notion of collective identity (Ben-Rafael 2002) indicates therefore a self-definition of an individual as a member of—and committed to—a given category of people, with whom s/he believes that s/he shares some cultural singularity—at the exclusion of “others”. Because of the subjective nature of the collective identity, however, one can hardly expect that this notion is understood in the same terms by different members of the same group, or that they themselves must always view this identity in the same terms.

The unavoidable question is then: When are different formulations of collective identity to be considered as versions of the same collective identity, and when are they indicative of a split into different identities? One may propose in this respect and following the very definition of a collective identity that members would define themselves as one

group to the extent that (1) their formulations of the collective identity, indistinct from their specific terms, require commitment to—more or less—the same people; (2) people elaborate on the singularity of the group by drawing, at least partially, from the same “store” of myths and symbols that make the group as a whole a contrastive entity *vis-à-vis* its environment; and (3) they feel closer, in some respect, to their fellow members than to “others” regarding their group’s “affairs”. In the following of these specifications, we propose to speak of all formulations qualifying for the status of “versions of a same identity” as an “identity space” which can be organized and structured, from an analytical point of view, according to the relative closeness or similarity to each other of the various formulations found among members. Which might bring about clusters of formulations expressing the basic convergent/divergent trends characteristic of the collective-identity space under consideration.

A distinct notion, however, should be introduced at this point that is often confused with the notion of “identity”—i.e. the notion of “identification.” While identity responds to the substantive question of “in what terms individuals see themselves as members of a given collective,” identification responds to the question—“how far does this identity matter to them at all?” While the identity draws from understandings and perceptions of contents, identification with the identity, so to speak, draws from the extent these understandings and perceptions are present in individuals’ mind. This latter aspect, we think, is especially influenced by circumstances. Hence, for instance, and as already mentioned, social inequality or discrimination may heighten the sense of belonging to one’s group. Another factor may consist of the pressure exerted on groups by the dominant culture—whether or not in the sense of assimilation into the mainstream of society. Individuals, milieus and groups may show stronger or weaker tendencies than others to retain their solidarity or to go from acculturation to assimilation (Glazer and Moynihan 1963). Acculturation points out to individuals’ abandonment of many original symbols and norms at the benefit of the dominant culture’s. This process, that, to some extent, is quite inescapable for any group of newcomers, means cultural and social transformation and its becoming different from what it was on arrival, through its acquiring and using new languages, notions of civility and other patterns prevailing in diverse areas of life. Assimilation, as for it, refers to this process when it also implies not only the adoption of

new identities but also detachment from the original ones (see Gordon 1964, Dubnow 1958, Olzak et al. 1994).

INSERTION, DEMOCRACY AND TRANSNATIONAL DIASPORAS

In fact, many groups acculturate to their environment but resist the temptation of assimilation—even where dominant cultures provide them with opportunities to “disappear.” One factor accounting for this evolution is that societies themselves undergo changes of their own stemming from their regime’s structures. These structures, especially in democracy, allow for free access to media, public campaigning, or political organization and permit groups to raise claims to the center, even when they do not accord with the *credo* of the dominant culture. Ruling parties can hardly prevent the political mobilization of ethnic groups, when it occurs, in the context of the endemic political competition of leaders to each other for support in any possible constituency. In this, a democratic regime is a fertile ground for ethnic politicians able to articulate identity politics to build up power of their own (Calhoun ed. 1994). The more ethnic constituencies do effectively represent significant actors in the game of political bargaining, the shorter the way for their open recognition as legitimate participants by the national elite. Groups—or segments of them—may thereby gain a cooptation of leaders to political or public-service positions, budget support for community institutions or symbolic concessions in the national arena. In brief, an institutionalization of pluralism that substantiates the notion of multiculturalism.

Such a development makes the notion of “integration” quite outdated as it inevitably raises the question of “integration into what or among whom?” The notion of “insertion” appears, in many cases, as more appropriate as it just asks, more neutrally, about how groups become components of social settings, leaving open the different options that one effectively finds in the empirical reality. Insertion may imply that a group assimilates to given milieus but it does not exclude that it locates itself among other groups and retains its distinctiveness.

Yet, all other factors being equal, the insertion in the political process should rather foster the ethnics’ identification with the society as a whole, weaken their eventual feelings of alienation, and contribute to the blurring of their social boundaries. It remains, however, that the very fact that politics may be a source of profits and may, as for it, instill a

feeling of power inciting leaders to amplify their capacity of building ethnic power. Hence, if receiving more from society may anchor ethnics more solidly in the national citizenry, the very effectiveness of political mobilization may drive them to intensify their ethnic mobilization—if not fuel radicalization. As assessed by Huntington's (2005) analysis of contemporary America, empowered actors may be even tempted to strive for the setting's responsiveness not only to their specific demands but also for their right to imprint their own views and aspirations on the social order as a whole. Controversies upon essential principles of the "desirable" society may then result in exigencies that other actors would find outrageous. What is commonly referred to as "the right to difference" may thus be only the starting point of a conflict which, in the long run, could challenge the dominant culture and some of its basic codes. In this, multiculturalism definitely exemplifies what Beck (1992) describes as "risk society."

In the backdrop of contemporary globalization, multiculturalism may also be the starting point of more transformations, resulting from the spread of what is now called "transnational diasporas." Our era is one in which the worldwide interconnectedness of individuals, organizations, collectives, and societies transcends the guidance of national bodies (see Bauman 1998, Albrow 1996, Beck 2000, Robertson 1992). Luhmann (1990) goes so far as to speak of systemic aspects of a "world society." Globalization, as outlined by Appadurai (1990, 1996), refers, in this respect, to the multiplication of global "flows" of crucial resources like financial capital, people, ideas and ideals, media, and technological knowledge. These flows may yield different configurations in various spaces but of particular significance is the fact that the prosperous West has become a pole of attraction for the less privileged populations outside its boundaries (the "Rest").

Immigration is also now much easier than in the past thanks to the development of cheap and rapid means of transport, worldwide communications, and global media coverage in real-time. These conditions encourage the emigration of all those who feel they could "do better" elsewhere (Soysal 1994, 2000). The transnational diasporas that emerge share in common the aspiration to insert themselves into new societies without disengaging emotionally, culturally, or even socially from their societies of origin or from people of the same origins who settled elsewhere. They create a structured space of exchange where the retention of original languages and symbols remain valuable and useful. In tan-

dem, they are by no means ready to disregard the possibilities offered to them—if any—to become part of their new environments. Moreover, since the Western societies that receive most of these immigrants are democratic welfare states where newcomers are entitled *a priori* to a package of rights (Soysal 2000), they do not feel too pressurized, from this perspective as well, to give up all their cultural markers.

Transnational diasporas, however, are not homogeneous entities either. In order to get jobs, adjust to their environments, and have their children pave their way toward a gratifying future, members of these diasporas must learn the legitimate language and prevailing customs. Which does not hinder their propensity to settle in quarters inhabited by people of the same background as theirs, where they find mixtures of the new and the familiar easing their transition. Hence, as in older cases of ethnicity, transnational diasporas witness the continuing use of previous symbols and linguistic elements. Though, the conditions of interconnectedness with the original homeland or fellow-diasporans elsewhere explain that for contemporary diasporas, this stage may last far longer than for former ethnic groups.

The profitability of identity politics in democracies for sociocultural groups serves as an example for new groups and spares them years of adaptation (Taylor 1994). In this, these diasporas actually participate in the transformation of society at the same time as society mold their own development. These dialectics give support to the circumstantialist hypothesis according to which, in final analysis, opportunity structures explain the retentionism of transnational diasporas. Yet, it may be contended as well that the easiness shown by diasporas to crystallize as particular entities can by no means be explained only by the advantages such crystallization may provide—at least, and it is not rare, where discrimination is bound to the exhibition of markers. Moreover, Tambiah (2001) shows that even after achieving economic and educational integration, diaspora communities may well still be striving to retain social and cultural distinctiveness—and not just for the sake of ambitious diasporan leaders. Diaspora populations, he indicates, often deeply aspire to maintain a dual perspective on their existential circumstances.

In many instances, moreover, this condition affects inter-state relations. Countries that are sensitive to their international status are prevented from closing themselves off to given categories of immigrants while, on the other hand, governments of original homelands may seek to

retain a "patronizing" role over their citizens living abroad (Ben-Rafael 2002). While some countries may see emigrants as "deserters", more often than not original homelands show commitment to their expatriate nationals (Verdery 1996). This makes it easier for diasporans to build up communities which simultaneously exhibit markers of their "belonging here" and of their allegiance to a legacy stemming from elsewhere—as indicated by popular naming of neighborhoods like "Little Italy" or "Chinatown."

Transnational diasporas challenge thereby central aspects of the project of nation-state building that has long stood at the heart of Western dominant cultures. They create a reality best described nowadays by the notion of "transnationalism."

TRANSNATIONALISM AS TWOFOLD TRANSFORMATION

Only a few decades ago the Western powers were still diffusing their languages throughout the world. This linguistic expansion was, however, countered by decolonization that saw velleities of former colonized peoples to crystallize cultures and languages of their own. Globalization that followed soon, opened then the West to numberless languages carried to them by immigrants from the former colonies—the non-West or "Rest"—that rose up against them earlier. The multiplication of diasporas and their languages in Western countries brought to an ironical edge the spread of Western influence over the world as they came up to challenge dominant cultures to grant legitimacy, on their own territories, to cultures that they themselves drove to transformation. Western dominant cultures must now compromise with the settling of new groups within their borders which can in no way pretend, as the popular French joke has it, that "*nos ancêtres les Gaulois étaient grands et blonds* (Ha 2003)."

Groups which evolve in settings more permissive of multiculturalism find it easier to relate to its dominant culture—even if they do not accept some of its premises. "Liberal multiculturalism" may designate that sort of multiculturalism, where the rules of the game are flexible and accommodate with stable insertion patterns of sociocultural groups. This kind of formula allows some limited autonomy *vis-à-vis* the center on condition of groups' accepting more or less willingly the essentials of the dominant culture. In contrast, the notion of "conflictual multiculturalism" may designate situations where the insertion of the group

is obstructed by its disowning some of the dominant culture's central tenets. Unbridgeable differences of perspectives between some parties in the group and incumbents risk then to grow into far-reaching societal crises (Huntington 2005).

Beyond these different processes, and in any case, a space of community life within new homelands which is also a space of transnational exchange with original homelands strengthens the multicultural character of new homelands. The contrast that a diaspora illustrates *vis-à-vis* its environment and its role in the multiculturalization of societies attenuates, however, over the years as a result of exposure to local influences. This, in turn, digs and deepens a parallel diversification throughout the transnational diaspora itself where each community comes to use different languages in most areas of social life, adapt to different customs and political cultures or adopt family models prevailing in their respective settings. Diasporas which, as a rule, tend to represent everywhere different interculturalities simultaneously referring to both original homelands and new homelands, concretize a principle of twofold sociocultural heterogeneity: both in given settings and in transnational diasporas.

The amplitude of these phenomena today represents a genuine makeover of our notion of "one world." It allows individuals and groups to fine-tune their commitment to their country of origin and their attachment to membership in their new society. Which is also bound to the possibility that diaspora communities experience internal conflicts (Sheffer 2002). Diaspora-original homeland relations may get fraught with tensions as collective commitments are open fields cutting across societal boundaries. At the same time, such commitments may also challenge, locally, in various and varying ways dominant cultures and national identities.

This state of affairs brings some scholars somewhat hurriedly to proclaim the "end of nationalism". What is seemingly more accurate to say is that nationalism must now primarily adapt to the fact that the national society which it refers to comprehends a diversity of groups sharing interests and velleities of their own that do not easily amalgamate. Though, it is also to concede that these groups coexist in a same environment, are to adjust to each other and are exposed to the influence of a same dominant culture. This active coexistence creates unavoidably a family resemblance of a sort among them, and between them and the dominant culture. To the extent that a group still aspires to forge its individuality, it culls symbols not only from its

singular legacies, but also from the cultural “material” that it finds in its new setting.

Numerous analysts speak in these respect of “hybridization.” This notion is used by Jan Nederveen Pieterse (2000) to emphasize the diversification of objective collective boundaries and the formation of new in-between categories. This notion, however, attracts numerous critics, such as Jonathan Friedman (2000), who are reluctant of the “objectivist” approach toward the definition of collective entities. Without bringing this argument to a close, it is our own view that “hybridization” is not most appropriate in the present context at least because it is associated with the fact that in Nature hybrid beings are sterile. This sterility stands in contrast with language and culture contacts which, in society, constitute most often a factor of renewal and development. Hence, we prefer the notion of “breeding” that offers insight as to the significance of the contemporary amplitude of cultural and linguistic borrowings as the expression of the frequent undeniable flexibility of collective boundaries in multicultural settings. A flexibility that invites permanent definitions and re-definitions of identities, making the very debate about them a characteristic feature of nowadays intellectual life. Yet however blurred and notwithstanding their varying definitions, social boundaries are not necessarily doomed to non-existence. They still often designate an unquestionable reality: Jewish or Muslim communities may exist even where, because of the transformations which they undergo incessantly, it becomes hazardous to define who is a Jew and who is a Muslim.

It is in the context of these considerations that following the case studies presented in the preceding chapters, we now pursue with a comparative analysis of four major contemporary cases of transnational diasporas—Muslims, Africans, Chinese and Hispanics. This analysis focuses on the social, cultural and political context of groups’ insertion and collective identification, the building of communities, the formulation of collective identities and the ways groups locate themselves between original and new homelands. Not all variables considered in our elaboration can be equally discussed in each instance, since the literature of the field is far from coherent and systematic, and hardly yields equivalent information regarding every case. We think, however, that one may grasp the essentials of the developments pertaining to these very different cases, in view of comparing them meaningfully.

MUSLIMS IN WESTERN EUROPE

The Context

Muslims are visible minorities in many non-Muslim countries. In Western Europe Islam has become a second or third religion—in 2003, Muslims were about 7% in France, 6% in the Netherlands, 5% in Denmark, around 4% in Switzerland, Austria, Sweden and Germany (*The Economist*, 3 April 2003). In every country, one finds different components of the Muslim world (see Table 32.1) but as a rule, they are over-proportionately represented in deprived social layers, since many of them arrived as blue-collar workers and became a part of the working class. In one sweeping sentence, one may characterize the Muslim population in Europe by a frequent underprivileged condition bound to relative isolation and strong cultural retentionism.

The approaches toward them of Western governments greatly vary as well as the migrants origins. In Britain, all Commonwealth citizens—Bangladesh, India, Pakistan or parts of Africa—enjoy civil voting rights as soon as they arrive. Their children are British if they are born in Britain. In Germany, by contrast, citizenship is granted only grudgingly, which is not too different from the Netherlands. Though, in the Netherlands, in contrast to Germany, ethnic politics and multiculturalist claims are widely legitimate (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2001). As for France, Bowen (2004) emphasizes the assimilationist attempts made by officials to impose regulations on Islamic customs in the public sphere. In the context of the republican ideology of “*laïcité*,” people are not expected to display religious affiliation in public. This ideology motivated, for example, the Authorities to ban from schools, in the early 2000s, headscarves worn by Muslim girls, which caused an acute dispute with the representatives of the Muslim community.

Community Building

The heart of present-day Muslim communities in Europe—Paris, London, Berlin or Milan—is the mosque which is a hive of activities, ranging from aid for lodging and health care programs to educational and political frameworks (Schmidt 2005). While a Great Mosque of Paris was built as early as 1922, in recognition of North African *tirailleurs* fallen in the Great War, the large influx of North Africans in France in the 1970s and 1980s multiplied the number of mosques and made Islam the second largest religion—like in other European

Table 32.1 Origins of European Muslim Communities*

Western European Country	Origins of major Muslim communities
Austria	Turkey
Belgium and Spain	Morocco
Denmark	Turkey, Pakistan, Morocco, Bosnia, Kosovo, Croatia
France	Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey
Germany	Turkey, Bosnia, Kosovo
Italy	Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, South Asia, Albania, Mid-East
The Netherlands	Surinam, Indonesia, Somalia, Turkey, Morocco
Sweden	Turkey, Bosnia, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Syria
Switzerland	Turkey, former Yugoslavia, Albania
The United Kingdom	East Africa, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia

* BBC: 23 December 2005

countries. This new population can hardly be described as “observant believers” but more than two thirds observe at least the Ramadan fast.

Like other European governments, the French allows families of immigrants to stay in the country and children born in France, receive citizenship automatically. In tandem, after years of hesitation, the government sustains now the activity of an official “*Conseil Français du Culte Musulman*” (CFCM). This body is elected by French citizens of Muslim lineage—mostly originating from Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco—on the basis of affiliation to mosques. Numerous Muslim organizations are linked to the CFCM, the principal of which is the *Union des Organisations Islamiques de France* (UOIF) ideologically close to the Muslim Brothers trend.

The UOIF controls over 200 mosques throughout France and is linked to youth movements, clubs for women, circles of Islamic studies and more. It is involved in all-European and world networks and publishes books, boosts frameworks attached to the retention of Arabic and Islamic legacies, and holds mass gatherings attended by tens of

thousands. Slogans and banners hoisted at these “happenings” create a genuine sense of world diaspora.

While Muslim diasporans do not blur the distinctions among themselves along specific origins, the major features that unifies the bulk of Muslim populations are the loyalty to Islamic symbols and the feeling of persistent social discrimination. These two features fuel each other and together bring no few youngsters to enlist in radical groups. The *Comité des Musulmans de France* (CMF) dominated by Tariq Ramadan, a leader of intellectual stature, is such a group. On the one hand, it preaches involvement in society by joining civil organizations and participating in elections; on the other hand, it defends Islamist ambitions to influence the state in the sense of Islamic law. On the margins of the CMF gravitate groups attracted by violence and inspired by Algerian Sallafism. One of these, based in Algeria, even identifies with Al-Qaida.

In Germany, where most Muslims are Turks—a large number of them Kurds—the largest organization is the DITIB, an arm of the Turkish government (*The Economist* 8/8 2002). Since Turkey is a secular state, the DITIB’s main concern is to encourage Turks in Germany to continue to think of themselves as Turks. It sustains a Turkish-language press and television station as well as a German edition of the Turkish paper *Hürriyet*. Yet one also finds here an Islamist faction—the *Milli Gorus* numbering 27,500—that combats integration into Western societies as treason under Islam. Other fundamentalist groups operate in Islamic Cultural Centers scattered all over West Europe, the most extremist of which is the *Caliphate State* (banned in Germany in 2005).

It remains that the plight of Muslims may vary according to places and origins. In Britain, for example, the most segregated of all are the Bangladeshis, many of whom overcrowd a single borough, Tower Hamlets in East London. Next come the Pakistanis, followed by Indians, with the Caribbean population enjoying a relatively better plight. Common to all, however, is the importance of the mosque as the heart of the community (see Al-Azmeh 1996, Tibi 2002).

Collective Identity

When speaking of Muslims’ collective identity in this first decade of the 21st century, one is led to ask about fundamentalism and its influence. At the heart of Islam, one finds an urge to “conquer” the world (*jihad*) on behalf of the “true faith.” Though, ever since the earliest days, Islamic scholars interpreted this article of faith in terms of preoccupation with

the *Umma* (“the nation of believers”) and its discursive interaction with other cultures. This dilemma regarding the way in which the Holy Writings should be construed is still today a source of debate in Muslim diasporas. Kramer (1996) is convinced that Islam and fundamentalism have more than ever become intimately linked. He reminds that the Oxford Dictionary defines fundamentalism as the “strict maintenance of ancient or fundamental doctrines of any religion, especially Islam.” This formula acknowledges that fundamentalism in Islam is more influential than in other faiths. Fundamentalist Muslims, for all their “diversity,” orbit around the idea that Islam must have power in this world. If Muslims, it is believed, returned to the original rigor of Islam, they would restore its power. This empowerment of Islam is God’s plan for mankind and it is to be pursued by all means.

This idea has crystallized into an ideology which underwent reshuffling over time. Sayyid Jamal al-Din “*al-Afghani*” (1838–1897), a Persian, was one of the first to call for Islam’s mobilization against Western “imperialism,” including by means of violence; Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949), an Egyptian, founded the *Society of the Muslim Brethren*, the first fundamentalist movement in Islam; the *Devotees of Islam* appeared in Iran, under the leadership of Navvab Safavi (1923–1956). These groups were implicated in assassinations and worked at forging Islam into an ideology of resentment. They favored alliances with nationalists and for the sake of power, Shi’a Iranian fundamentalists, for instance, were ready to lay bridges over the historical conflict with Sunni Islam. Fundamentalists of all allegiances, moreover, acted across frontiers, feeling, as assessed by Mawlana Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi (1903–1979) the founder of the *Jama’at-i Islami* in India and Pakistan, and Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), an Egyptian leader of the *Muslim Brothers*, that Islam was under assault, and redemption could not wait for a bloodless revolution. Sudan’s Hasan al-Turabi (born in 1932), who received a doctorate at the Sorbonne, became the *maître* of contemporary “Islamism” and associated himself with the fundamentalist rulers of Sudan (since 1989). His teaching was taken over by a Tunisian, Rashid al-Ghannushi (born in 1941). At the same time, the Lebanese Shi’i Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah (born in 1936) was also becoming a prominent figure as an oracle of Hezbollah. All these bring Galston (2003) to ask himself whether the commitment of European Muslims to their faith is compatible with democracy. Though, many a Muslim leader is versed in secular discourse about class conflict and social deprivation, referring

to Muslims as the “dispossessed”, and speaks of social reforms rather than religious revolution.

Some researchers (Almond et al. 2003) emphasize that radical Islam is of limited appeal and unable to overcome most existing governments in the Muslim world itself. It remains that it has gained major political assets in the Middle-East and elsewhere, and its organizations and media proliferate. This, in turn, arouses reactions of quite a few intellectuals. Munir Shafiq, for example, a Christian Jordanian who converted to Islam, advocates (through *ijtihad*, i.e. reinterpretation) an abandonment of violence and the endorsement of pluralism. This orientation has been popular in the Muslim diaspora in places where a significant number of youngsters and women are attracted by Western culture, its philosophical individualism and feminist trends.

However, in general, collective commitment signifies for Western Europe’s Muslims, as it does for Muslims everywhere, participating in one way or another in Islam’s rituals, being sensitive to all-Muslim or all-Arab causes, and displaying understanding for extremists.

Between Original and New Homelands

The idea of Islam being the “truth” is bound to a strong sensitivity to its status in the eyes of non-Muslims and to a tendency to see a lack of consideration on their side as “unjust ill-treatment”. Hence, Ismael Hossein-Zadeh (2005) interprets the tensions between the Muslim World and the West as the outcome of the latter’s disrespect and hatred of Islam. The accusations encompass as well many Middle-Eastern governments which are viewed as “servants of imperialist powers.” This conflictual approach is recurrent in works by authors sympathetic to Muslim fundamentalism (see, for instance, Antoun 2001).

Though, Kepel (2000) emphasizes that Muslims undergo a kind of dialectical development. It was in the 1970s, he reminds, that a self-appointed “vanguard of the *umma*” emerged in the Muslim world, conquered university campuses and swarmed into Islamic society and diaspora. In Europe, however, Islamism was to split between extremists, and those who speak for democracy. For Salih (2004) as well, European Islam undergoes adaptation through identity tensions. She recalls the *Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organization*, established in 1996, aiming at the development of a European Muslim Identity by educational programs. Muslim intellectuals try, in this spirit, to reconcile Islam and Western culture by advocating a multicultural project that

would avoid direct confrontation with democracy. Muslims should retrieve an “authentic” identity afar from “too extreme” Westernization and retain allegiance to original cultures.

Common to all factions is the aspiration to endow Muslims a status of recognized minority. Though, this horizon is far from satisfying all believers. Many tend to contest the relegation of the Islamic identity to a secondary sphere, which in their understanding is hardly reconcilable with their basic credo. Islamists, like Tariq Ramadan, tend then to ally themselves with the anti-globalization left on the basis of a “universal” political agenda, claiming for Muslims a worldwide status of victim of the West. This posture blurs the distinction of Islamism from non-Muslim leftists but behind it remains the commitment of militants to a purely Islamist transnational agenda. An agenda that is sustained by the dispersion of spiritual and organizational leaders throughout the Muslim world and diaspora. Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, of Egypt’s Muslim Brethren, lives in Qatar and serves as the Supreme Mufti for the Palestinian Hamas; Sheikh Ibn Qatada, a Palestinian-Jordanian lives in London, and is mufti for elements of the Algerian GIA. An Egyptian and former Afghan volunteer, Sheikh Abu Hamza, is one of Algeria’s Islamist underground chief international propagandists. These links substantiate the notion of *umma* (Schmidt 2005); they update the principle according to which Islam as a community is not confined to national borders.

It remains that, as shown by Bowen (2004), most Muslims living in France subscribe to an “Islam of France” rather than an “Islam in France.” For some, “Islam of France” connotes an Islam of piety, with weak emphasis on rituals. For others, it inspires rethinking Islam in a European context. To the degree that they seek acceptance by the non-Muslim majority, they tend to accommodate demands of the environment. Many, however, want to also retain loyalty to Islam’s customary requirements and are not ready to prevent from themselves displaying their singularity as requested by traditions and membership in the global *umma*.

It is true that *umma* which refers to the Muslim world as a whole, does not constitute their only reference when speaking of their “homes.” This rather abstract concept receives different meanings according to countries of origin. It is to those countries that diasporans return to visit relatives (or where they send money to), and it is also to these countries’ daily actuality that they pay special attention from the dis-

tance. While it is on behalf of Islam that these groups develop claims from new homelands, it is to their Islamic original countries that they refer as genuine homelands.

Table 32.2 A Schematic View of the Muslim Diaspora in Europe

	Convergence	Divergence
Contexts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Visible low-status minorities • Attempts to control Islam • Democracy limits constraints 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commonwealth citizens enjoy civil rights in UK: more bargaining power than in France and Germany
Community-building	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Communities around mosques • Institutionalized representation • European and world networks • Feelings of discrimination • Solidarity with Islamism 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In everywhere, different groups of origin predominate among Muslims • Plight of groups varies according to origin and country of settlement
Identity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participation in Islam's rituals • Feelings for all-Muslim causes • Difficulty to relegate Islamic identities to the private sphere 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fundamentalism fuels debates • Influence of the consumption culture, individualism and feminism
New—original homelands	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sensitivity to Islam's status • Basic claims vis-à-vis society • Transnational references • Relations with original homelands 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some speak of a multicultural project • Many subscribe to a notion of local-European Islam
General impact	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An active segment conveys conflictual attitudes toward the social order and raises claims regarding Muslim and Arab causes 	

All these are heuristically summarized in Table 32.2 which outlines features that are seemingly more relevant to the numerous Muslims who belong to underprivileged layers and tend to be less concerned with prospects of assimilation outside their communities than socially mobile elements. Those who climb up the social ladder of social mobility have a better chance to form a Muslim bourgeoisie or enter new milieus where secular patterns of life prevail.

THE AFRICAN DIASPORA

Context

In its broadest sense, the African diaspora includes populations of old formation. However, the sociological significance of “Africanness” or “Blackness” also implies subjective aspects based on cultural, social and political considerations. The criterion of “Who is Black?” varies from place to place and from epoch to epoch. In Southern US, the one-drop rule designating as “Black” any person of a single drop of “Black blood” prevailed for many years. This hypodescent rule sharply contrasts with Brazil, where only 6% of the population is considered Black despite the fact that a third of the country’s gene pool is of sub-Saharan origin. Many Latino immigrants are shocked to discover they have become Blacks on US soil. The Spanish language contains about a dozen words to denote the various possible blends—among them *prieto*, *criollo*, *blanquito*, *mulato*, *moreno*, *trigueño*, *mestizo*, *jabao* or *marrano*—none of them possessing the denotation that “Black” has in English, French, or Dutch. While, moreover, the French, Dutch, and British distinguish between Black and colored; in the US, one has long made do with a simple dichotomous color differentiation (Davis 2001).

One can hardly innovate here in the context of the immense literature focusing on Black ghettos’ poverty cultures and the impacts of dominant cultures. The classic differentiation is Pierre Van den Berghe’s (1967, 1970) which contrasts the sharp differentiation between Blacks and Whites in the US—and even more so in Apartheid South Africa—and the far more nuanced attitude toward different degrees of “Blackness” prevailing in Latin America. However, these works and their distinctions that are explained by differing conditions of life as well as basic orientations of dominant cultures have long since been outdated by political, economic and cultural developments, especially in democratic regimes. Which is not to deny that up to the first decade

of the 21st century, African populations in Western countries are still overproportionately marked by underprivileged conditions and social marginality.

The founding act of the modern African diaspora was the transfer—not to say the kidnapping—of Africans as slaves. Between 1500 and the end of the nineteenth century, approximately four million African slaves were transported to islands in the Indian Ocean, about eight million were shipped to Mediterranean countries, and about eleven million to the New World (Pétre-Grenouilleau 2004). According to the country which they reached, Africans learned and used English, Spanish, Portuguese, French or Arabic. Sexual relations of White men with Black women brought about a large number of people of mixed ascendancy while children born in captivity were often freed from slavery, and allowed to form communities in the social margins. With the gradual freeing of Africans from slavery—an early landmark of which in the West was the endorsement by the British Parliament of the Slavery Abolition Act of 1833—, non-Whites were to illustrate new patterns of insertion in their various societies. But a few choose the return to Africa, and most were to form lower-status strata in cities or towns. Some individuals could reach channels of social mobility while no few succeeded to break through in sport or music. Over time, where citizenship was granted, Black communities also learned to draw power from the rules of democratic regimes. Black constituencies have been often able to successfully combat racial discrimination, pushing their leaders toward the national political arena. In recent decades, it is to add, new waves of African immigrants arrive in the West directly from Africa and by their own will, leaving independent original homelands in view of opportunities promising a better life for their families. Between these newcomers and the veteran African populations, however, relations do not always develop in harmony (Stoller 2002).

All these make the definition of the contemporary African diaspora a complex task. The African Union which groups Africa's independent states has attempted to formulate an authoritative formulation. It came up with the assessment that this diaspora includes only these "People of African origin living outside the continent, and who are willing to contribute to the development of the continent and the building of the African Union." In other words, only those individuals who are both of African origin and committed to Africa belong to the African diaspora. This definition bypasses the question of the "Africanness" of non-Black populations—Arabs or Berbers—who are not racially Black.

Though, the working assumption that can be read between the lines sees the notion of African diaspora applying but to individuals of sub-Saharan African origin who see in “Africanness” a ground of common endeavor. This leaves out not only non-Black Africans but also Black populations with no allegiance to the sub-Saharan continent—such as Black Indians or aboriginal Australian populations.

This notion of African diaspora is strengthened by references to socioeconomic difficulties which, as a rule, are the lot of African communities in the diaspora (Green ed. 1997)—from Venezuela where *Mestizos* overcrowd miserable *barrios*, to Los Angeles where they are often confined to racially class-segregated neighborhoods, and to Paris where they are but a few to live in areas with a White majority.

Community Building

This African diaspora is by no means amorphous. It did not take long after emancipation from slavery for Africans to set up organizations to speak on their behalf. The earliest institution was the church. Starting in the early 1790s with AME, AME Zion and other churches, the Black church became the focal point of the community. Black preachers formed congregations within existing denominations or outside them, and sponsored the creation of schools in response to the barring of Black children from public education. Not later than 1830, an American Society of Free Persons of Color was founded, with the aim of providing assistance to the needy.

Throughout the African diaspora—principally in the US—have soon also appeared political organizations fighting discrimination. One such endeavor was the *Niagara Movement* founded in 1905 by Afro-American intellectual and public figures, led by W.E.B. Du Bois, John Hope, and William Monroe Trotter. They first met on the Canadian side of the Niagara River because no restaurants or hotels would house a meeting of Black people on the American side. The Springfield Race Riots in 1908 encouraged Afro-Americans to adhere to large civil rights organizations. The most important of these was the *National Association for the Advancement of Colored People* (NAACP) created in 1910; for decades it played a determinant role in the fight for equality (Altman 2000, Salzman ed. 1996).

While many Jews involved themselves in the movement and its leadership, in its early years, the NAACP concentrated on appealing to courts to overturn Jim Crow regulations, organizing mass protest,

and attacking the racist semi-legal Ku Klux Klan. In 1920, the movement had about 90,000 members and challenged “White primacy” in the South. A major victory was the Supreme Court’s decision (1955) that banned segregation in state elementary schools. Over the years more militant organizations appeared—such as the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). Spectacular actions like the March on Washington on August 28, 1963, were finally to bring to an end institutionalized racial discrimination in the US.

A very different case of African diaspora consists of the Caribbeans in France (the *Antillais*) (Beriss 2004). Since World War II, these islands are administered as overseas departments of France and their inhabitants are French citizens who have thus access to public jobs. Since the 1970s, increasing numbers of migrants from these islands have come over to live in France. Though French by right, they are hardly accepted socially while the Antillais themselves tend to evince some cultural distinctiveness from mainland French people. Hence, the *Eloge* theater group aspires to present the Antilles to France’s population and by this to also build up a sense of Antillais identity; the *Centre d’Entre-aide et d’Etude des Antillais, Guyanais et Reunionnais* strives for the recognition of cultural difference on behalf of *creolité*. These projects encounter mixed feelings in republican France where assimilation into French values is taken as an obvious imperative applying to any immigrant.

With the weakest community building, Brazil illustrates still another model in the context of a tolerant dominant culture. This country has the largest population of African origin outside of Africa with 6.21% Blacks and 38.45% of mixed-race. This is partly accounted by the fact that for much of Brazil’s history, there were many more White males than females and inter-racial relationships were common. Another reason for cultural order, is that in this non-elitistic Catholic society, the race barrier is of no theological significance and, in principle at least, Black people are entitled to salvation just like Whites. Anyway, today 86% of Brazilians can trace at least 10% of their genes to African slaves. Mostly Catholic, Afro-Brazilians are also millions to follow African cults—like Candomblé. Because this society is characterized by an absence of sharply defined racial groups, one recognizes more than a dozen racial categories combining skin, hair, and eye color. Parents, children and siblings are often categorized into different racial types. Which does not prevent the fact that the main form of community where one finds non-White people is the economically underprivileged

favela, the poverty neighborhood, where Africans and people of mixed ascendancy live together.

African diasporas are still different in Canada or Great Britain, but like in the US, France or Brazil, there too, and despite the wide variety of circumstances, Africans and people of mixed ascendancy are relatively numerous to concentrate in low-class communities of their own.

Collective Identity

One of the earliest expressions of African cultural singularity has consisted of musical styles, the best examples being jazz and negro spirituals in Southern US which became hallmarks of contemporary America's musical culture and later, of the West as a whole (Clark Hine and McLeod 1999). Another, less acknowledged, expression of Africans' singularity consists of religious practices. Clarke's collection (1998) shows how these practices developed into a worldwide religion which can be observed in Latin America and the Caribbeans as well as in Los Angeles. These practices convey a diversity of syncretisms. Beliefs such as those associated with Yoruba are the print of a way of life associating dozens of gods. Worship of these gods is bound to a number of cults which do not exclude each other. Hence, the cult of Candomblé in Brazil is tolerant of the Christian divinity. Reconstructionist aspects add up with the articulation of an American Nation of Islam or the adoption of Jamaican Rastafarian practices. Some African congregations in the US hold their service in African languages while Indian and European elements penetrate ancestor worship, divination, and spirit possession.

These manifestations of singularity are articulated in the realm of arts. Price and Price (1999), who explored Maroon arts in Suriname, map the routes taken by wooden paddles to shops for tourists, sometimes up to galleries and museums in New York and France. Until now, say the researchers, Maroon life remains permeated with their singular art but its artistic production tends to be specialized, and become closely bound up with the external social context for which it is intended. All these also pertain to the elaboration of collective identities. They assert the value of the cultures in which Africans recognize themselves. Davies and Mazrui's collection (1999) shows the strong desire of Africans to emphasize their distinction in the face of non-Africans, and assess positive self-appreciations. This is one manner to draw from one's legacies

a dignity that is often denied in other domains by the environment. Whether this interpretation is correct, Africans find in their traditions the “material” for assembling a cultural individuality of their own and linking themselves to outer circles.

This production, so to speak, of cultural resources may fuel the generation of political organizations turned to struggles over participation in society. These aspects strengthen each other’s influences on the collective commitment of Africans as members of groups that are both in confrontation—real or presumed—with “others”, and retain cherished values. Both aspects yield a spectrum of attitudes vis-à-vis new and original homelands.

Between New and Original Homelands

Many contemporary African figures, it is true, insist on their belonging to their present-day country and reduce to negligible significance their distant origin on the African continent. This is especially the case for people of mixed ascendancy in societies where the “one drop” rule is ignored or does not function anymore. Non-Whites can be found in such countries in government, parliament, and in the highest ranks of the military. Hence, to be of African origin does not always mean adhering to an African-diasporan identity.

On the other hand, it is no less true that among the various institutions and political organizations that aspire to speak on behalf of the African diaspora, one observes a recurrent velleity to refer to an all-African transnational diaspora and a clearly conflictual and vindictive frame of mind anchored in the memory of slavery as a foundational concept (Clark Hine and McLeod eds. 1999). A blaming finger is pointed against dominant cultures, justifying transnational connections among African communities, and between them and the African continent.

Clarke Kamari (2004) shows this process of “transnationalization” at the level of the individual community and how it relates to cultural and religious aspects. Hence, the Oyotunji Village, South Carolina, was founded in the mid-1960s by individuals adhering to Black nationalism, and the leader, King (Adefunmi) found it appropriate to establish there a Yoruban *orisha voodoo* cult under the guidance of Nigerian and Afro-Cuban practitioners. This cult is propagated to many communities by means of the internet as well as old-fashion pilgrimages to Africa, and the circulation of ritual objects. These activities feedback to Africa itself where diasporic influences alter religious practices.

On a broader scope, militants and leaders attempt to set up all-African diaspora movements allying political action and revivalism. The Uhuru Movement, for instance, consists of a cluster of organizations—including the African People’s Socialist Party (APSP)—fighting for the “liberation” of Africa and Africans both “at home and abroad.” The founder of the movement, Omali Yeshitela, is convinced that Africans are impoverished everywhere to the benefit of the “parasitic White world.” A former American civil rights activist, he defines his goal as “promoting freedom for African people worldwide.” He was jailed for civil disobedience in 1966 for two and a half years, and ever since his liberation, aspires to make the Uhuru a mass organization under the slogan “Self-determination is democracy.” Omali Yeshitela also contends that Blacks are in a position to lead the world out of its “crisis” and he conveys his message to leaders of African states. Claiming reparations for 500 years of colonialism and slavery, his movement is bound to forward world-African solidarity and struggle for “social justice for the African community.” African Internationalism—we would say transnational diasporism—envisions a globe in which an African diaspora united to Africa guides the “future of humanity.” This commitment to the “liberation of Africans” that goes conjunctively with a radically stand *vis-à-vis* the West is echoed in a pamphlet by Penny Hess, the chairwoman of the African People’s Solidarity Committee—“Overturning the Culture of Violence”—, where the author reiterates the responsibility of the White for slavery, genocide, lynching and assumedly “ongoing attacks on African people.” Hess blames the entire White society as enjoying high living standards on the back of oppressed Africans. One characteristic attitude of this political camp is its opposition to the election of Barack Obama to US presidency who, in its view, is an instrument of the oppressive establishment despite his partial African ascendancy (<http://omaliyeshitela.org>. October 25, 2008).

Not everywhere, however, does this radical militancy prevail among Africans. A very different Africanism, for instance, characterizes the Ethiopians and Eritreans in Canada who arrived there not as slaves but as refugees from countries torn apart by civil unrest (Matsuoka and Sorenson 2001). These people remain strongly attached to their original homeland exemplifying what Matsuoka and Sorenson call “long-distance nationalism.” The authors describe feelings of exile in communities deeply divided into Eritreans, Oromo and others quarrelling over original homeland politics. The “Oromo”—i.e. the Amhara

and Tigray—claim that they were oppressed by the “Abyssinians” and wish the creation of a state of their own—or at least the recognition of their leading role in Ethiopia. Educated Oromo exiles, especially, invest considerable effort into furthering the cause of independence, and they are backed by the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Oromo Studies Association (OSA).

Table 32.3 A Schematic View of the African Diaspora

	Convergence	Divergence
Contexts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Diaspora started as slave transfers • Socioeconomic difficulties • Poverty cultures 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recent voluntary waves of immigrants
Community building	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Diverse models of organizations • Community services • African cults 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • US: congregations • France: emphasis on cultural distinction • Brazil: variety of racial categories
Identity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Art expressions of singularity • Religious syncretism • Feelings of rejection 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Different kinds and degrees of politicization • Different aspirations <i>vis-à-vis</i> society
New—original homelands	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reference to Africa • Conflictual “transnationalization” relating to Africanist cultural and religious aspects • African Internationalism 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Different attitudes toward original and new homelands, Africa as continent or specific countries • “Long-distance nationalism”
General impact	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tendencies to have racial lines differentiating classes or subclasses • Mix of low-class, original cultures and new influences 	

Matsuoka and Sorenson (2001) also cite the case of the Amhara who were dominant for decades until the 1990s. Politicized Amhara are bitterly opposed to the new rulers in Ethiopia itself who are primarily Tigray. In Amhara belief, the new government permitted the dismantling of Ethiopia through the secession of Eritrea. Absorption in these conflicts, which are transnational but refer to a specific original homeland rather than to Africa as a whole, drives the protagonists away from the Pan-Africanism of radical organizations.

This trait seems quite characteristic of Africans who settled in the West in the post-colonial era and do not relate to the past of slavery. We find support to this interpretation in the novel by Cyril Orji (1999) narrating the life of Chinedu, a Nigerian young Igbo man who accepts an opportunity to study in the US. He initially intends to return home after his studies but he receives a job in Chicago and brings over his Nigerian bride. Orji describes the dilemmas of the family, their cultural ambivalence and, above all, their problem of loyalty between new and original homelands. Interestingly enough, Black Americans do not figure prominently in the novel, probably because they are of secondary relevance in the heroes' insertion in American society. The novel focuses on how social identities, national citizenships, and cultural cosmologies are made and unmade in the Nigerian migration experience. Table 32.3 summarizes heuristically this analysis.

THE CHINESE DIASPORA

Context

The Chinese diaspora is again very different from the other cases. It is present in both the Eastern and Western hemispheres and its inner variety across countries and nations significantly contributes to the diversity of contemporary transnationalism. "Overseas Chinese" as they are often called, are people of Chinese ancestry living outside either the People's Republic of China or Taiwan. Poston et al. (1994) estimate that in 1990, this population numbered about 37 million in 136 countries. Before 1850, the so-called *Huashang* (trader) wave of immigrants set up businesses in many Asian countries; the second wave, the *Huagong* (coolie) wave—until the late 1920s—reached North America and Australia and consisted mainly of peasants looking for opportunities of blue-collar jobs. The *Huaqiao* (sojourner) migration that started in the second decade of the 1900s primarily includes professionals seeking suitable positions. Additionally, the *Huayi* (Chinese descent) migration since the 1950s refers to well-to-do people who already lived outside China—in Southeast Asia for the most part—and migrated from there to Western Europe or America. According to Poston et al. (1994), in the early 1990s, 88% of the Chinese diaspora resided in 32 Asian countries; 9% in 32 countries of the American continents; 2% in 25 European countries; 1% in 14 countries of Oceania, and a fraction of one percent in 33 countries of Africa. Moreover, of the 37 million overseas Chi-

nese, two-thirds lived in four countries: 7.3 million in Indonesia (20%), 6 million (16%) in Thailand, 5.7 million (15%) in Hong-Kong (which is now a part of the People's Republic of China), and 5.5 million (15%) in Malaysia. In recent years, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the USA are the preferred target-countries of Chinese migrants.

The plight of these communities has not always been enviable. Tan (2003) expands on the discrimination against Chinese in Australia where, both at school and in the community, Chinese have long felt positioned as 'different' from White people. Stereotypes of the 'Chinese race' depicted them as 'inferior' to the White, 'dirty' and 'morally depraved'. Chinese were seen as a threat to White Australia. Children of other migrant groups, such as Greeks and Italians, experienced similar problems but these were experienced by Chinese-Australians more intensely due to their physical visibility. During WWII, Chinese-Australians were frequently confused with the Japanese enemy. Chinese-Australians felt forced to become as 'Australian' (read: White) as possible by obliterating all visible aspects of their Chinese appearance. Many changed their eating habits, spoke only English, even converted to Christianity (Fung 1999).

In recent decades, however, the context of Chinese immigration in the West has changed. Lo and Wang (1997) show that the Chinese who make up 3% of the Canadian population are now the fastest growing ethnic group. In 1996, Chinese immigrants accounted for more than 10% of the immigrants in Canada, and over 20% of all immigrants who settled in metropolitan areas. This is accounted for by Canada's relatively liberal policies in matters of immigration. Its popularity as a target for immigrants appealed primarily to middle-class people from Hong-Kong at the hour that Britain conceded the island to China (1984). This migration also influenced Taiwanese people, while the Tiananmen drama in 1989 was another factor that increased Chinese immigration.

As a rule, Chinese immigrants are successful all around the world (Gomez and Hsin Huang 2004). This is often explained as the expression of culture-determined willingness to work hard, readiness for a frugal life, and inclination to rational thinking. Several analysts speak more of contingency, and structures of opportunities. At any rate, focusing on Los Angeles, Painter et al. (2004) show that Chinese homeownership rates are, on average, 18 points higher than those of native White rates. Among the Chinese themselves, there is a great diversity among subgroups with respect to likelihood of their owning

a home. It was also found that there is little difference between these subgroups with respect to education and income. In brief, Chinese tend in many places—thanks to their human capital—to find their way to the middle-class or low-middle class despite the frequent reticence of social environments. Though, in the context of the immense diversity of this diaspora over the world (Ma and Cartier eds. 2004), commentators tend to doubt the validity of the very notion of “Chinese diaspora.” Yet, community processes do not confirm this view.

Community Building

Despite the diversity, indeed, a common feature of many sites where Chinese immigrants settled is their building community structures. Lo and Wang (1997) detail, for instance, that in Toronto Chinese tend to settle in areas where their fellow ethnics are already prevalent—i.e. “Chinatowns”. People of urbanite backgrounds who are also more affluent and educated—Hong-Kongese and Taiwanese—are proportionately more numerous in Chinatowns situated in more expensive areas, while less privileged people—mainland and Vietnamese Chinese—concentrate in older neighborhoods.

Canada’s multicultural character encourages this population’s commitment to the preservation of its heritage (Nagata 2005), which is sustained from the inside by religious congregations, including Christian churches that attract many Chinese immigrants. Toronto’s first Chinese congregation, founded in 1905, was Presbyterian while by 1923, about 10% of the Chinese were estimated to be Christian, and by the 1940s, about 30%—which concerned the middle class especially. At the same time, independent or multi-denominational Chinese churches also multiplied. These churches promote both assimilation of Chinese immigrants to Canadian lifestyle and allow the retention of familistic and ethnic allegiances. This development, however, does not preclude that a growing number of immigrants from mainland China turn to Mandarin services and show eagerness to get closer to Buddhism.

One important cleavage in the Chinese population is the polarization of references to mainland China or to Taiwan as the “original homeland”. In Toronto, some congregations, for instance, gather supporters of Taiwan while others refer to mainland China. That this cleavage does not create a genuine break is shown, however, by the fact that code-switching between Mandarin in public domains and

other Chinese languages in the private area, is also quite common. In brief, one common universal trait of Chinese diasporans is that they simultaneously illustrate strong collective markers and a high degree of symbolic fluidity.

Nagata (2005) notes that in Malaysia the newer congregations are products of changes in education and social class. Younger Chinese of all language and regional backgrounds move into fashionable Pentecostal churches. Areas or languages of origin within China play only a negligible role in these innovative frameworks. In Singapore where the Chinese are a majority of the population, many of them Christian converts—the 2000 census reveals that 16.5% of the Chinese declared themselves Christian while 54% identified as Buddhist, and 11% as Taoists. In parallel, four languages are taught in schools with English and Mandarin in the lead—leaving out many dialects of subgroups which mainly survive only in the family and the clan.

In Indonesia, most Chinese also develop congregations such as the Chinese branch of the Dutch Reformed Church. Chinese religious conversion does not however preclude concomitant attachment to regional or dialect origins. On the other hand, one also observes—and the case of Indonesian Chinese is by no means unique in the Chinese diaspora—that the youth learns Mandarin rather than regional dialects. All in all, few churches are now homogeneous and this diaspora appears to lack formal unified institutions. As a result, information about welfare facilities, social affairs, ethnopolitical activity or business interests are circulated through various informal networks. These networks may be grounded at the same time in sub-ethnicity, language and social milieus.

Collective Identity

Research (see Ma and Cartier eds. 2004) shows that it is not easy to point out to Chinese diasporic identities. Zhuojun (2000) who focuses on middle-class Chinese teenagers in America, shows that ethnic identities among them are clearly bicultural and hyphenated—i.e. termed as Chinese-American—while among parents, Chinese allegiance is more emphasized than Americanness. Though, youngsters also exhibit partial and selective cultural affinity to Chineseness. About 20% of Chinese teenagers investigated in Chicago reported some ethnic affinity with the notions of “Chinese” or “Asian,” but only about 9% of them saw themselves as “very Chinese” or “mainly Chinese.”

When it comes to perceptions of the singularity of the group, Cheung (2004) emphasizes the role of Confucianism as a philosophy of life focusing on hard work, respect for learning, social harmony and family solidarity. These values encourage the Chinese to grant importance to this-worldly achievements and relate to an economic culture that is quite universal throughout the Chinese diaspora. Family and enterprise make up one focus of life while networking beyond the family relies upon trust relations between partners and personal obligations. Another sacred value is the respect for—if not obsession with—education. Education, in Chinese eyes, is a tool of spiritual enhancement, social mobility and improving living standards.

Chinese diasporans also convey outlooks that reflect their immigrant endeavor. Shen's (1999) analysis of autobiographical texts in Australia (late nineteenth century) reveals a tendency of Chinese immigrants to present themselves as pioneers, equal to their European counterparts. They saw their relationship with the White as of business partners sharing the same political rights and power. They saw themselves involved in cultivating Australia, and in building a new nation. Possibly in view of assessing their status as a part of mainstream society, Chinese in Australia also rejected any association with the aborigine people that they described as “cannibals”. This, however, does not mean that those Chinese felt Australian “only.” The central values, the models of selfhood and even the forms of their narratives were typically Chinese and notably Confucian. In fact, it is in retaining their Chineseness that they felt they managed to “make it.” Confucianism, they were—and possibly still are—convinced, was the essential ingredient of culture that made them what they became.

Tan (2003), however, gets back to the heterogeneization taking place in Chinese diasporic communities and sees it as the imprint of the different experiences undergone in different contexts. Minghuan Li (2004) reminds the different statuses that one finds throughout this diaspora—from the *Huaqiao* who live outside China for some time but who still possess the Chinese citizenship to the *Huayi* who are Chinese descendants who were born and have grown up outside China. These differences combine, as shown by Fung (1999), with the wide range of approaches illustrated by diverse milieus throughout the Chinese diaspora and expressed in public discourse, the Chinese press, and patterns of behavior. At one end, “assimilated” elements have ceased to call themselves “Chinese” at all, and share no commitment to “Chineseness” anymore. After generations outside China, they aspire

to distance themselves from the Chinese community. At the opposite end, many Chinese diasporans assert their closeness to their community and identify with customs and legacies. These are the people who sustain lobbies and community organizations, and who participate in educational, cultural or religious institutions. Some even emphasize that they are “overseas Chinese” and that this denomination means “away from home”. Throughout the Chinese diaspora, however, the largest number exhibit restricted allegiance to “traditional” Chinese culture, speaking of it in terms of a heritage that primarily concerns parents and grandparents but which, for themselves, is but a general reference for their hyphenated identity.

Between New and Original Homelands

Chinese, as a rule, draw pride from the achievements of China and Taiwan. Many are tempted every year to “return” to China, which, however, does not go without difficulties. Louie (2000) tells about returnees who were never able to bridge the gap between them and local people. A specific group who came from Canada to Hong-Kong (Ley and Kobayashi 2005) illustrates this syndrome. These returnees who were marked by the liberal values acquired in Canada did not feel at ease in Hong-Kong where they came, actually, to emphasize their “Canadianness.” A significant number contemplated going back, disappointed by the difficulties, the lack of local relevance of their skills or the fall of their standard of living.

However, the feeling of belonging to something common may survive even though the original homeland may not be the place where one feels most “at home.” This observation confirms the assessment of the twofold heterogeneization implied by transnationalism, namely within society, on the one hand, and within the diaspora, on the other. Many Chinese regard their new homeland as their “home,” have become part of it, and are more familiar with the local culture than with the Chinese culture. In various ways, their links with their present-day society are much stronger than their links with China.

This reversal of allegiances does not gainsay concomitant interest in values, patterns and symbols associated with “Chineseness” and in China’s or Taiwan’s affairs. Numerous Chinese diasporans see themselves as “patriotic overseas Chinese” and discuss with passion Chinese politics—which is often depicted as “long-distance nationalism”. A number of overseas Chinese are even involved in political associations

and follow from the close developments in China and the Chinese world.

International agencies have quite successfully institutionalized these allegiances—especially among youngsters. Louie (2000) focuses, in this respect, on the annual youth festival that is held in China for overseas Chinese and displays cultural and historical values. Chinese Americans see in this experience a contribution to the formation of their twofold identity. Similar intentions stand behind the summer Overseas Chinese Youth Language Training and Study Tour to the Republic of China (Taiwan) (Wu 2005). This gathering is a vehicle for the Nationalists to propagate their message to Chinese diasporans. About one thousand students of Chinese ancestry from all over the world can, in the frame of this initiative, enjoy a short course of Mandarin and learn about the Chinese culture. Two government-affiliated organizations, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission (OCAC) and the China Youth Corps (CYC), sponsor and administer the program.

All these efforts, whether by the People's Republic of China or the Republic of China (Taiwan), contribute to strengthen the “something Chinese” that is the “glue” of the Chinese diaspora. Participants in both programs come from all continents. Their reactions with respect to the political substratum of these programs are mixed and many remain neutral or indifferent on the China-Taiwan reunification issue after they return home. Most participants, however, believe that they were helped to better understand the Chinese culture and to assert their Chinese identity. They feel they are shown “what it is to be Chinese.” Most students are apolitical from the onset and remain so after they come back but this negligible political outcome contrasts with the success in reinforcing the participants' allegiance to Chinese culture. For some it was a genuine watershed period in their identity formation. What they learned primarily was that they were Chinese diasporans pertaining to different countries who share a reference to Chineseness. These experiences reveal to participants that Chinese ethnics are not just a subcategory of Americans, Canadians or Brazilians but that they also belong to a world of their own.

All these are concomitant with the fact that significant lines of division develop among diaspora communities and, more importantly, between them and the original homelands. One such line concerns religious allegiances. In China itself, religion has been pushed aside for decades by the establishment which officially rejects traditional Chinese cults. In the diaspora, in contrast, a Chinese community is most often character-

ized by the centrality of Buddhism and/or Christian congregations. Nagata (2005) who followed this phenomenon in Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and Canada, sees the sources of this tendency in Chinese culture itself, i.e. its openness and multiple facets. According to place and time, the Chinese, she says, have espoused Confucian, Marxist, capitalist, atheist, Buddhist, and Christian cultures, and have absorbed customs and languages from as many nations as they reached.

Table 32.4 A Schematic View of the Chinese Diaspora

	Convergence	Divergence
Contexts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “Overseas Chinese”: East and West • Resent discrimination • High readiness to adapt • Strong mobility 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Large cultural diversity over the world • From resisting exclusion to participations in nation-building in different countries
Community building	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Building up community settings • Cultural and religious institutions • Intense social activities • Many youngsters learn Mandarin 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Distinct inner divisions • Different religious allegiances
Identity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hyphenation of identity • Chineseness difficult to define • Confucian culture: emphasize education, spiritual enhancement and mobility • Restricted allegiance to traditions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Changes over generations and according to places • Wide range of approaches between “assimilation” to retentionism
New—original homelands	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Many accept definition as ‘overseas Chinese’ • Show interest in original homeland • Diaspora supports China interests 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Problems of returnees • Divisions within and between diasporas, also between them and original homelands
General impact	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A dimension of a multi-religious diaspora carrying a “different” socially successful culture. A diaspora that both supports and conflicts with original homelands, and resents eventual local discrimination. 	

This permeability does not prevent Chinese diasporas from keeping to their transnationalism and permanent relation with China or Taiwan (Cheung 2004). Communities are built activated by associations and religious institutions and which retain cultural and linguistic markers. This process sets down the ground for stable relations with the state and it also establishes the basis of transnational solidarity: the Chinese in the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia were able to collect an enormous amount of money to extend help to China when it confronted an acute financial crisis in 1998–2001. This campaign acted as a factor of transnational unity and transcended sub-ethnic and religious cleavages—and even beyond the China-Taiwan dispute of allegiances. The all above is heuristically summarized in Table 32.4.

THE HISPANIC DIASPORA

Context

Hispanic (or Latino) diasporans can be found in a variety of countries—the UK or the Carribeans—, but most settled in the USA. In fact, they constitute the largest US minority group (Huntington 2005): in 2004, they accounted for about 14% of the country's population—41.3 million people—and their rate of growth is the highest (3.6% per year on average) among all groups. Approximately 50% live in California and Texas. Not counting Puerto Rico—which is a territorial possession of the US—New Mexico is the state with the highest proportion of Hispanics—43% of the population—while the figure is 35% in both California and Texas. The Hispanic population of Los Angeles County alone numbers over 4.6 million.

This population stems from a diversity of sources. Nearly two-thirds—64%—are of Mexican or Mexican-American ancestry. Hispanics with Puerto Rican background follow with 10%, and then those with Cuban, Salvadoran and Dominican origins—about 3% each. Furthermore, most Hispanics of Mexican origin are concentrated in the Southwestern states—California, Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico. Most Hispanics established in Florida, are of Cuban origin; those living in New York and New Jersey are mostly Puerto Ricans (Ramirez 2004).

Latinos, moreover, are also heterogeneous regarding racial composition. While in the US, Hispanics are often treated as a group separate from Whites, Afro-Americans or Asians, they actually include people

who might belong, racially, to any of these categories. Many also identify as *mestizo* (mixed European and Amerindian ancestry). Others who identify as “Hispanics” are of unmixed Native American ancestry (originating principally from Bolivia, Guatemala, Peru or Mexico); still others originating from the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, Venezuela or Colombia, are of African descent, be it mulatto (mixed European and African), zambo (mixed Amerindian and African), triracial (specifically European, African, and Amerindian) or unmixed African. In addition, Hispanics of unmixed European ancestry, primarily come from Argentina and Uruguay. Likewise, a percentage of Hispanics originates from the Middle East, or East Asia: no few Hispanics are Colombians, Ecuadorians, and Mexicans of Lebanese ancestry; some Cubans, Puerto Ricans and Panamanians are of Chinese ancestry; some Chileans are of German ancestry and Peruvians may be of Japanese origin.

The condition that many Hispanics experience in their new society is anything but enviable. Crowding into apartment complexes and trailer parks in Southern towns, many Hispanics find jobs in chicken and textile factories. Blue-collar Hispanics from the border states are eager to find employment in rural communities, even though they know they may encounter the hostility of White supremacists from among the local population (Yeoman 2000). Many immigrants arrive undocumented and live in fear of deportation. As a rule, White people are most often reluctant to live in their vicinity (in one poll, 79% of White North Carolinians stated that their “neighbors” would oppose living among Hispanics).

A Catholic population perceived by Protestants as endangering their majority status, Hispanics tend to concentrate among themselves, which highlights their cultural and linguistic particularism—even though they also absorb many elements of the prevailing culture. Many use their original vernaculars among themselves and with their children, and challenge the status of English in the areas where they outnumber non-Hispanics. Hence, Huntington (2005) sees in Hispanics, more than in any other group, a genuine threat to the American identity. They question, he contends, the very common cultural denominator that has always warranted the viability of American pluralism.

Vicissitudes are also the lot of Hispanics in other diasporas. Haitians, for instance, who arrived in Guadalupe in the mid-1970s found jobs as cane cutters in the midst of a bitter struggle between plantation owners and local laborers over unionization in the declining sugar industry. Haitians were used there as strike breakers by owners, which unleashed

a wave of violence (including lynch) by Gaudalupeans. Although the violence was quenched, the episode left an enduring image of Haitians as outsiders. Though, here like in the US, immigrants are ready to stand the hardship because the conditions in their original homelands are still much worse. One testimony among others, Catanese (1999) describes the deep poverty of Haitian rural population following the widespread deforestation of the countryside. Similarly, Quesada (1999) shows that violence, social disruption, and polarization thrust Central America—particularly Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala—leaving the vast majority in harsh poverty.

Hence, for a large number of Hispanics, especially in the United States, the new country remains a land of promise regardless of their widespread perception of its government as a supporter of reactionary regimes at home.

Community Building

Hispanics as a whole share several common features that set them in contrast with their environment. Their first language is Spanish, at least at the first generation, and as such they are the target audience for Spanish-speaking TV channels like *Univision* and *Telemundo*, and target readership of newspapers such as the Spanish *El Nuevo Herald* (in Greater Miami) or a magazine like *Vida Latina* (Southern US). The US is actually home to giant commercial broadcasting networks and Latino-oriented periodicals with circulations numbering in the millions. Moreover, a Latino Public Broadcasting funds educational and cultural programs that are distributed to television stations throughout the US (El Nasser 2003).

Latino communities are also socially and politically well crystallized—whether as all-Hispanic or according to specific origins. Cubans, especially (Eckstein and Barberia 2002) who arrived between 1959 and 1979 differ from other Latino groups as many came over with resources and established themselves in the low-middle or middle classes. They were able to set up an exemplary network of organizations and leadership of their own. Politically powerful, economically successful, and efficient, these organizations are influential in Florida at the local and state levels.

For Hispanics of other origins, the tendency to amalgamate is generally stronger and partly focuses on religious institutions. According to the Pew Charitable Trusts (2003), Catholicism unites 70% of the

Hispanics—with a quarter Evangelical or Pentecostal. Davis et al. (2002) indicate the importance of organizations like the *Comunidades de Reflexion Eclesial en la Diaspora* (CRECED) (Committee of Religious Thought in the Diaspora) in Miami, the National Catholic Council for Latino Ministry, or the Academy of US Latino Theologians (ACHTUS). These institutions are not only concerned by religious matters but by Latino diaspora secular problems as well—poverty, lodging or delinquency. Diocesan programs and Episcopal meetings take place regularly around these issues.

Moreover, Hispanic Catholic communities celebrate original homelands' patron saints, dedicate them festivals and services, and show readiness for forms of syncretism with African or Native American cults. One example out of many is *Santería* that is popular with Cubans and Puerto Ricans and which consists of a cult referring to old African figures in the form of Catholic saints. A similar example is Guadalupe among Mexicans which is centered on the devotion to *Our Lady of Guadalupe* allying the Catholic cult of Virgin Mary with the Aztec goddess Tonantzin.

As shown by Sommers (1991), Hispanics tend to evolve as a united public at the same time as each component of this public wishes to preserve a cultural distinctiveness. On the basis of a generic sense of *hispanidad*, entrepreneurs and militants attach themselves to the crystallization of a pan-diasporan solidarity. Fiestas and carnivals are sponsored which appeal to the Hispanic public as a whole. In 1972 was created *La Luz* as “the first national, pictorial monthly magazine ever to be published in the US for this country's Hispanics.” *Agenda*, a bimonthly Latino publication was created under the auspices of the National Council of La Raza, and was dedicated to the “growing ferment for unity at the grass-roots level.” The 1980s were to be proclaimed the “Decade of the Latino” and was marked by numerous manifestations. These add up to large-scale celebrations one of which was the fifth centenary of Columbus's arrival in the Americas and another the silver anniversary of the Mexican-American Cultural Center (MACC).

Hispanic communities in the US are also active in politics. They may be divided—with many Cubans and Colombians favoring conservative politicians and Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Dominicans leaning more towards the Democrats—but among all groups one finds sympathizers for organizations speaking on behalf of a Hispanic lobby and pushing candidates of their own to positions of power.

Collective Identity

The notion of *Latinismo* is now used to single out actions intended to advance Latino identification. In this work of identity building, the use of music has an important role. Latinismo is essentially a pan-diasporan label comparable to pan-Slavism or pan-Arabism. It points to a conglomerate entity which in itself assumedly constitutes a distinct “nation”. Over the past several decades, leaders have increasingly sought to mobilize this “Latino community” and by extension to define “Latino” culture and identity. Pan-Latin Americanism, it is true, dates back to the early nineteenth century and Simon Bolivar’s dreams of a continental confederation. In today parlance, the denominator of Latin-Americans is assumed to include traits contrasting with US’ prevailing values: “human warmth, spontaneity, spiritual orientation” that are contrasted with “cold, materialistic” Anglo-Americanhood. Latinos, moreover, are viewed under this angle as sharing a heritage of *mestizaje* indicating fusion of Spanish, Indian, and African values, again opposed to the racially polarized US society. Not to mention that Hispanics are mostly Catholic and not Protestant and that their *lingua franca* is Spanish and not English. *Hispanidad* that encompasses all forms of allegiance to Latin-American cultures is, in this manner, granted a most pervasive power even among those Hispanics who are not fluent in their original language.

However, pan-diasporism also implies tensions between different nationalisms fueled by the fact that the Spanish or Portuguese conquest was experienced differently in various territories, and encountered as well different local customs and practices. Even language is spoken in different variants; popular music is not the same in Puerto Rico, Mexico, Cuba or El Salvador; the Virgin of Guadalupe has Mexican Indian facial traits; Guatemalans celebrate on the 20th of October, the anniversary of a revolution; Mexicans celebrate on the 5th of May, the defeat of the French.

This disparity favors the emergence of conciliatory patterns: the fiesta has become a popular venue for enacting Latinismo and simultaneously displaying cultural singularities. Where, like in San Francisco, Mexican culture widely prevail among Latinos, fiestas are organized around one of the Mexican *fiestas patrias* (patriotic holidays) under the auspices of the *Comité Cívico Patriótico Mexicano* (Mexican Civic and Patriotic Committee) which remains a bastion of *mexicanidad*. On the other hand, the celebration of *Cinco de Mayo*, once a secondary fiesta patria, has

become the Bay Area's largest essentially Latino celebration. It reflects an ideological development by its gradual becoming the festival of the Chicano Movement and a strategy of cultural revitalization. In the background, there is also the fact that Hispanics often share a common experience of adversity in the US (US Census Bureau 2004).

Between Original and New Homelands

Duany (2000) questions at this point and through the example of Puerto Ricans, the nature of the ongoing relation with original homelands. This Hispanic group is the oldest on US mainland. By 1997, an estimated 3.1 million Puerto Ricans lived in the US, compared to 3.7 million on the Island. In general, Puerto Ricans see no contradiction between their Puerto Rican national identity and their US citizenship. Intellectuals posit that the Puerto Rican identity is anchored in language, a reference to a distinct territorial-historical origin, and a profusion of symbols—including a national tradition in literature and visual arts. Most importantly, the large majority of Puerto Ricans see themselves distinct from other Americans as well as from other Latin Americans insofar as they are both a part of the Latin population and US citizens. Their outstanding privilege as Latinos is their unrestricted right of entry into US mainland. This special status brings many Puerto Ricans, on the Island as well as in the US, to disregard the old Puerto Rican nationalism of an Antonio Pedreira who, in his theory of *Insularismo* (“insularism”) (1934) attacked the colonial status of the Island. Actually, the challenge to contemporary Puerto Rican thinking on national identity is the attitude to adopt *vis-à-vis* the Puerto Rican US diaspora. Many Puerto Ricans living abroad—especially those born and raised in the US—do not use the “national” language anymore. They are not interested either in island's political and economic affairs. It is even doubtful that many still share with islanders a common sense of history or a psychological make-up. This is known to islanders who acknowledge that *Nuyoricans* are now inserted in US culture.

Nicholasa Mohr, a Puerto Rican author born in New York, deconstructs this line of argument. She argues that the separation between island and mainland transcends the use of Spanish or English. The Nuyoric experience, she claims, has produced evidence that migration does not lead to full assimilation into US' dominant culture. Even Protestantism—which is embraced by no few Puerto Ricans in the US—can no longer be portrayed as a means of imperialism, nor

as antagonistic to popular culture. The bidirectional flow of people unsettles the antinomy between the island and the mainland and reinforces mixed identities on both sides.

The back-and-forth movement has actually redrawn the contours of Puerto Rican identity in many sites of cultural production, including literature, popular music, the visual arts, and theater. The emergence of *salsa* music as a product of the incessant shuttle of performers and styles between Puerto Rico and New York City—the so-called *cuchifrito* (fried food) circuit—is one example. Another is the artistic community linking New York to San Juan through a network of galleries.

To this assessment of the case, one is still to add that Puerto Ricans who live on the mainland are not less concerned than other Hispanics with the crystallization of Hispanidad as a new horizon. This horizon both locates people in their environment and allows them to refer themselves to their country of origin. This, however, may be problematic when it comes to Puerto Ricans who reside in the US while the island's link to this country draws *a priori* a distinction between their country of origin and the rest of Latin America. Yet, it seems that the development of an Latino pan-diasporism in the US is not imprinting itself on Puerto Ricans' awareness of kind to a lesser extent than on Mexican or Columbian immigrants. This influence should but bring them to re-assess and re-appraise the fact that the island is a part of Latin America, notwithstanding its tendency to underline its singularity. Puerto Ricans living on the English-speaking mainland actually tend to experience a kind of "threefold homeness" which cannot fail to influence how individuals look back at their country of origin as well as at their country of residence, leaving them with the dilemma of defining to themselves which "home" is more "homeness".

The general issue of pan-diasporism versus diasporism concerns not only Puerto Ricans. Hispanics as a whole illustrate how far transnationalism may bring about complex questions of identity which are not always limited to community building and relations to new versus original homelands. Societal circumstances and cultural codes may indeed intermingle to produce additional circles of reference contributing still more complexity to the identity choices facing contemporary individuals. Table 32.5 summarizes here these analyses heuristically.

Table 32.5 A Schematic View of the Hispanic Diaspora

	Convergence	Divergence
Contexts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hybrid Retention 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some cases: low class acculturation including protest • Other cases: middle-class segments
Community building	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cultural and political frameworks • Relative structuration • Churches • Importance of folklore and festivals 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Many non-certified immigrants • Isolation from environment versus moving closer to other groups
Identity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Importance of language • Popular Catholicism 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pan-Hispanic versus specific origin • Some tendency for converting to Protestantism • Insistence on ethical codes versus alienation
New—original homeland	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong relations with countries of origin and contests over belonging 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Differential relations to original homelands • Differential relations to new homelands
General impact	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Heterogeneity of the transnational diaspora together with pan-diasporism • Presence of Latin values and culture • Factor of multiculturalization joining force with others 	

THE MEANINGS OF TRANSNATIONALISM

To conclude these analyses, the four cases of transnational diaspora were followed here mainly in these settings where they are particularly salient. In each of these settings, these diasporas encountered different dominant cultures—a more pluralistic in the US or in Canada; a more assimilationist one in France and a more supple in Latin America. The diasporas also found different configurations of opportunities in different societies, though one may point out to general tendencies characterizing them across countries, with respect to socioeconomic insertions. Muslims tend to join the working-class and so does the African diaspora. The Chinese diaspora started from the bottom, but no few of its members have illustrated upward social mobility. Hispanics are more divided

into different patterns according to specific countries of origin. In these different contexts, a gradation appeared among cases regarding their retentionist propensity: Chinese diasporans show strong velleities to acculturate to the environment—and for some even to Christianize and assimilate—and mild cultural retentionism. They seem to be less protest oriented toward their environments than Hispanics, Muslims and Africans, which is not unrelated to differential class achievements. On the other hand, Muslims and to a lesser extent Hispanics, show stronger velleities to retain their distinctiveness from their respective environments. Africans, as for them, are less determined in this respect, even though they draw from their stratificational condition and—for many of them—the legacy of the slavery experience, strong conflictual images about their plight in society.

All the groups build communities of their own. In Western Europe, Muslims assert their presence firstly by the edification of mosques from which operates a diversity of agencies and institutions. Some of these all-Muslim organizations are strongly political and aim at imprinting their mark on the development of societies. Africans make up a diversified diaspora. In the US, churches have for long been the focus of community activities that include political movements which, in turn, sponsored the development of media and transnational relations. The radicalization of some organizations was not to be followed by masses everywhere while the issue of race was bound to very different processes in Latin America where they offered everything but a polarized White-versus-Black image. At the same time, the Chinese who also express their particularisms in temples, political parties, associations and networks, are eager to assess their rapprochement to mainstream society by allegiances to religious affiliations. This, however, does not preclude, in some milieus, showing interest for Mandarin and the Chinese culture. Hispanics in the US as well crystallize as a distinct segment of society exhibiting numerous linguistic, cultural and social markers. Numerous outlets and media target this population where, as a rule, the *mestizo* predominates and boundaries between different Latin origins do not prevent pan-diasporism.

These processes are bound to the formulation of collective identities. Muslims who remain close to traditions see in their faith and its exigencies the essentials of their singularity as a collective and the ground of solidarity. Further on, moderate Muslims who aspire to an interpretation of Islam congruent with insertion in a democratic and secular society, stand opposed to Islamists advocating radical politics.

Among Africans as well, collective identities may be formulated in variously conflictual terms. Though, except for Afro-Islam and Afro-Christian syncretisms, these approaches are not drawn from orientations toward religion. African self-awareness rather focuses on poverty and the experience of discrimination. In contrast, Chinese collective-identity formation is experienced in relation to Confucian-Buddhist culture rather than a religion, a family of languages and interest in original homelands. Religion is, in the diaspora, much more *en vogue* than in China but the religious principle itself is pluralistic. Hispanics' elaborations of collective identities are marked by dilemmas involving attitudes toward countries of origin, the present-day environment and setting, and pan-diasporism. Divided according to specific origins, they share the Spanish language and, for most, Catholicism—often in a Latin American syncretic vein. They feel distinct from White Americans, relatively close to Latinos as a whole and at the same time, very much representative of different national cultures of origin. In sum, this analysis shows that, notwithstanding their inner processes of differentiation, the collective identities of Muslims are strongly marked by a relation to a faith. Hispanics' identities are also marked by religious allegiance but the relative importance of language and the cultural values that stem from it seem not less important. On the other hand, Africans' identities are more substantiated by reference to conditions of life and conflictual approaches. The Chinese stand in-between as their velleity of inserting themselves in society does not preclude references to their cultural singularity—however they define it.

Major differences also come out in the ways diasporas stand between new and original homelands. As a rule, diasporas refer their cultural singularity to their origins, though not in the same ways. Muslims express their allegiance to original homelands in a variety of practical ways. For many of them, these countries constitute segments of the "Muslim world". As for many Africans, while no few of them show no interest in the reference to Africa, for others this reference is the lever of Africanism striving for revolutionary change in world's interracial relations. As for the Chinese, one has, on the one hand, those who definitely sustain lobbies on behalf of China or Taiwan, and on the other, the many who also aspire to be firmly recognized as Americans or Australians. Probably the largest number feel a desire to enhance their understanding of Chinese culture, and at the same time, they may exhibit only limited allegiance to Chineseness. Hispanics, unlike the Chinese, tend to evince the importance of their link to original homelands which

here too is associated with religious particularism. Yet, pan-diasporism tends to forward a new image of the specific original homelands that emphasizes their pertaining to Latin America as a whole.

Table 32.6 Convergences and Divergences Between Diasporas

Dimensions	Convergences	Divergences			
		Muslims	Africans	Chinese	Hispanics
Context	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Immigration • Start from bottom 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Major segments in low-status 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Start as slaves • Culture of poverty 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mobility • High aspirations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Wide segment of poor
Community building	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Religious/cultural inst. • Neighborhoods • Politics 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mosques as foci • Politicization and variance of tendencies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Churches • African cults 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Emphasis on networks • Differentiations acc. to status and origins 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Catholicism • Syncretism • Folklore and festivals
Identity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Diasporan identity • original culture/languages secondary • Hybridization 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Islamism as a binding beyond origins • Claims vis-à-vis society 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Religious syncretism • Protest ideolog • Assertion of African culture 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Confucian culture • Some convert to Christianity • Loose identity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Retention of specific identities • Pan-diasporism
Original—new homeland	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transnational diasporas relating to both original and new homelands 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong relations with outside centers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Aspiration to participation with African transnationalism 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interest in Chinese affairs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Retentionism in narrower and wider senses

The bottom line of these comparative analyses is that some of the syndromes considered are better defined by the notion of “liberal multiculturalism” while others respond rather to the notion of “conflictual multiculturalism.” To the first belong the Chinese and the Hispanic cases which are characterized by (1) aspirations on the side of diasporans—and which are not opposed by dominant cultures—to express their particularisms in community life, (2) specific interests in the national public arena, (3) transnational links, (4) an absence of general claims regarding the social order itself. In the second category, conflictual multiculturalism, we may include Muslims and Africans—or more accurately, minority sub-groups in these entities—which articulate in addition, conflictual views of the social order and claims of

societal change. While Muslim fundamentalists ground this attitude in a religious faith, African radicals hang it on legacies of victims and ideological worldviews.

Table 32.6 draws out the lines of convergence and divergence found among the cases considered in those respects. However loose and imprecise this table, it still substantiates our discussion of the question that we are now led to confront, namely, whether we may see a new phase in present-day societal reality as far as transnational diasporas impact on it.

Cultural and religious pluralism in Western countries is not new. What our comparisons of different cases shows, however, is that pluralism is now amplified by the link to transnational diasporas. A pluralism that is achieving an ever-stronger presence and imposes—everywhere in different terms—a reassessment of the social configuration of social settings as well as of the relations of new and original homelands.

The ways the different diasporas insert themselves in societies and participate to new configurations differ considerably, partly as a function of the political culture of each country, and partly due to the groups' own particular cultures and other characteristics. Globalization as such and the insertion in target societies tend to erode groups' particularisms. Though, the singularities that are retained—even when altered by local influences—provide bridges warranting transnational connectedness and are significant enough to assess the actuality of global virtual communities. The notion of *transnationalism* captures the ways in which such communities challenge nation-states without preventing—and even actually favouring—the breeding of religious beliefs and cultural horizons stemming from the migration experience. However, while transnational migrants come to illustrate particular incarnations of globalizing cultures and global religions, in turn, by the very channels that link them to original homelands and diasporas, they send them back what makes them now singular *vis-à-vis* them. On the other hand, transnational diasporas challenge new homelands' cultures to manage their insertion and adjust to their presence—not only as new residents but also as carriers of a culture of their own.

That transnationalism is bound to diasporas' experience of dual homeness (and in some cases, as mentioned, threefold homeness) and favours the sociocultural heterogeneization of both new homelands and diasporan entities exhaust, by no means, all the societal significance of this notion. Actually, transnationalism also may imprint itself in several manners on settings, diasporans and non-diasporans confounded,

where diasporas constitute important components of the population. Hence, that diasporans live in two spheres and refer at the same time to their present social reality and to another distant setting, might be consequential on the way they relate to their *hic and nunc* environment. We think here of such major dimensions of societal relationship as commitment to the society, identification with the national ideology or simply, civility. Moreover, that these people who experience dual homelessness belong to different diasporas indicates that they do not refer to the same second home, and that, in this respect, they may make up, if using a strong word, a kind of cultural, political or social cacophony that might, in turn, be detrimental to the coherence of the social fabrics. All these, finally, cannot remain without rebound effect on non-diasporans who live together with diasporans and are most plausibly affected by the latter's behaving, feeling and discoursing.

The investigation of these impacts requires, of course, studies of its own. What we may say, however, on the basis of the all above is that transnationalism implies multiculturalism and that different kinds of multiculturalism represent different social costs. These costs may remain relatively low where it is spoken of absorbing groups carrying legacies devoid of wide and ambitious perspectives. Though, even then, societal changes may still include new social configurations, alterations in the assessments conveyed by the dominant culture or new kinds of international relations. Such changes, to be sure, may bring about confusion and incoherence throughout the setting. Social costs would be much higher where it is spoken of groups carrying cultural or religious universalistic allegiances ambitioning to mould their environment along their own visions. Their insertion in society should inevitably carry tensions and conflicts, and arouse debates about the social order. We have seen, related to the Muslim diaspora, that the eventual presence of fundamentalist elements may bring about the development of what we called conflictual multiculturalism. A kind of development that reminds the emergence of African radical movements in the US and which, on second thought, might well be relevant to other transnational diasporas where religion or/and deep feelings of anomie may awake risks of societal polarization and radicalization.

The notion of transnationalism refers to the dynamics of these new realities; it designates not just the very diversity of sociocultural actors—which we understand as multiculturalism; it also refers to the very nature and kinds of issues that run across societies where transnational diasporas have become significant actors. It singles out that

unpredictability has become a prevailing societal rule, which, when stated in this manner, brings to mind the idea of *chaos*. This concept that conveys both creative and destructive associations stands at the opposite of order. Though, and notwithstanding the paradox that this represents, when it comes to social reality, inherent chaos may surface as “configuration”, i.e. *gestalt*. This latter concept underlines that, even randomly arranged elements are perceived as a configuration when they appear to actors recurrently and their very juxtaposition comes to characterize given situations. This means that, in social reality, chaos which points out to the lack of consensus and uniformity attached to the order of things may still be perceived and understood as familiar *gestalt* by actors. The intrinsically incoherent “contributions” to the totality may even then be grasped as forming “one whole”. In this sense, *gestalt* and chaos may be seen as two sides of a same reality.

These potential dynamics also pertain to transnationalism and, as proposed in the epilogue, justify widening our sociological and historical perspective.

EPILOGUE

CHAOS AND GESTALT

Eliezer Ben-Rafael and Yitzhak Sternberg

To conclude our multifaceted treatment of transnationalism, we may now point out to the basic convergence evinced by the very definition of this notion. This notion focuses on a condition where, in some ways and at varying degrees, people are involved in activities and allegiances which run across state boundaries. This condition impacts on both individuals who see themselves affiliated to a transnational diaspora and others who do not but live among many others who do. This condition does alter the essence of social endeavors, nay even of “society” at large. For diasporans, their actual society is one home among at least two—even though, it may well be the primary one; for non-diasporans who are members of the same setting, their society is now to entertain special relations with original (and varied) homelands of fellow-citizens but which are *a priori* foreign to them. These traits are but a few among many more concrete and precise: we think here especially of the significance of this condition for people’s—diasporans’ and non-diasporans’ alike—commitment to, and identification with, the national society and the commands of civility that it requests. These issues still require comprehensive elaboration but their reminding explicits what we mean here by alteration of the social endeavor in the following of the multiplication of transnational diasporas and the spreading of transnationalism as a societal condition.

On the other hand, we may also speak of basic divergences. We have seen that a transnational diaspora can be generated by migration of people sharing cultural and religious particularisms, or by changes of state borders. Some diasporas are united by a reference to a center or a central institution, a homeland from which they emigrated or a virtual homeland that came into being after immigration. Such groups respond to the notion of transnational diaspora as far as their members are interconnected through transnational networks. Such groups, however, represent the widest sociocultural diversity. Diaspora solidarity, indeed, emerges from most varied patterns intermingling

primordial—national, pan-national, cultural, linguistic, religious or other—bonds and contingent—political, economic, internal or international—factors. These forms of diaspora solidarity combine with a not less wide spectrum of attitudes toward the new homeland, and may mean very different things accordingly both among groups within the same individual societies and among communities throughout the different worldwide diasporas.

All in all, the chapters of this volume concur with the growing tendency among analysts of the contemporary social scene to describe our world as fragile, disorganized, fluid, unstable, unpredictable, and lacking directionality. Transnationalism, we have seen, is certainly of an important contribution of its own to the growing and uncoordinated pace of change that characterizes contemporary societies. Change, it is true, has always been understood by scholars as endemic to modernity and as a feature that distinguishes this era from previous times. However, present-day observers assess that the pace of change has been unprecedented since the last decades. Zygmunt Bauman (2000) goes as far as to use the term “liquid modernity” to characterize our time. A notion that Antony Bryant (2007) clarifies as follows:

The idea of liquid modernity as defined by Bauman is that it sets itself no objective, draws no finishing line, assigns the quality of permanence solely to the state of transience. Time flows; but it no longer marches on to any destination...in our current phase of modernity the key characteristic is not simply of sweeping things away, but doing so continuously and obsessively; change is constant and iterative...The word ‘liquidity’ evokes the idea of flow, constant movement, of change...The movement is itself the objective, there is no other (Bryant 2007: 127–128).

Our social world is becoming increasingly complex under the simultaneous effect of accelerated technological transformations and the amplification of globalization and its escalating interconnectedness across the globe and budding global flows of ideas and material resources, and above all, wide-scope immigration and the multiplication of diasporas (see Urry 2005). The resulting incoherence of the images one may perceive of the world scene as well as of individual settings accounts for growing scholarly trends asking for novel theoretical and conceptual outlooks. We think here of the emergence of a school of thought labeled “chaos and complexity theory” (McLennan 2003) which was gratified a special issue of *Theory, Culture & Society* (vol. 22; October 2005). One of the major contributions to the volume is an article entitled “The complexity turn,” by John Urry where he contends:

Complexity theory would argue against the thesis that ‘phenomena’ can remain bounded, that social causes produce social consequences. Causes are always overflowing, tipping from domain to domain and especially flowing within and across the supposedly distinct physical and social domains. For complexity, the emergent properties are irreducible, interdependent and mobile... The complexity sciences thus elaborate how there is order *and* disorder within all physical and social phenomena... Complex systems are thus seen as being ‘on the edge of chaos’... [and] Chaos is not complete anarchic randomness but there is an ‘orderly disorder’ present within such systems... Chaos and order are to be seen as interconnected as large-scale systems move in and through time-space... for the social and cultural sciences, complexity analyses bring out how there is order *and* disorder within this various systems. In particular, we can see how the global order is a complex world, unpredictable and irreversible, disorderly but not anarchic (Urry 2005: 12).

However new this approach, it is notable that images of the modern era as “constant flux” are already found in the writings of early scholars of modernity. In fact, sociology, as a discipline, consisted of an early flow of reflections on transformations related to the evolving and development of modernity. One line of reflection has always emphasized the far-reaching and “frantic” transformations characterizing the evolution and development of the modern era, and tended to focus on images of fluidity, movement, disorder, and instability. Another line of reflection focused on the immeasurable material, technological and scientific productivity unleashed by modernity and spoke in terms of development, directionality and progress. Sometimes these two attitudes were found in the writings of the same author, as in the case of Karl Marx who, long before Bauman and others, depicted modern capitalism as a condition where:

All fixed, fast frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify... All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned... (cited in Bryant 2007: 127).

At another respect, Marx uses the term “constant flux” to describe the uniqueness of classes in American society in the mid-nineteenth century. Because of the high rate of social mobility, Marx argued, classes in the USA “...have not yet become fixed but continually change and interchange their elements in constant flux” (cited in Erikson and Goldthorpe 1991: 29). It was Marx’s conviction that disorder is endemic to capitalism and the modern era. In capitalism, he contended, one finds side by side elements of order, in the individual factory or enterprise,

and disorder, on the market and the whole social formation doomed to experience unavoidable crises. Which, however, did not deter Marx from attempting to provide a systematic and scientific theory of social development.

This dichotomy of outlooks was manifest in sociology ever since its inception, and is inherent in the sociological tradition—and not only with respect to economic aspects. Fluidity, disorder, unpredictability or indeterminacy receive support from acknowledging the existence of non-economic contradictory tendencies within modernity. Eisenstadt (2005) speaks of the constructive and destructive forces of modernity, and other scholars talk about the “traumas” of modernity (see Alexander et al. 2004, Wittrock 2001). These elaborations contribute, even if but indirectly, to viewing the social world as unpredictable. Against this backdrop, the new trend of “chaos and complexity theory” can be considered an offspring of this sociological tradition.

This discussion, however, rephrases the issue of the pertinence of formulating a systematic and coherent theory concerning the directionality of societal developments. Scholars whose images of the social are framed exclusively in terms of fluidity, disorder, complexity, and chaos tend to negate the validity of long-term perspectives. Other scholars—though quite rare these days—still tend to offer long-term linear theories and conceptualizations. Thus, scholars, like Leila Green (2001), are still prone to speak of social determinism through a focus on the social impact of technological developments. Somewhere in between, Boudon (2005) uses the concept of “program” to emphasize that however unpredictable society’s future, some inherited aspects like the anchorage of the value of individualism are irreversible. In a similar vein, Eisenstadt speaks of programs of modernity combining a global developmental view and the assertion of variations under the title of “multiple modernities” (Eisenstadt 2001a). Similarly, Norbert Elias also endorses a long-run perspective using concepts such as “figurations” and “momentum” and leaving wide room to unpredictability. Moreover, he proposed a solution to what seemed to him a false polarity between ‘inevitability’ and ‘indeterminacy’ in sequences of social development. As Stephen Menell comments:

Elias proposed that we think of such development as a continuum of changes, or figurational flow. Within this flow, we can identify a sequence of figurations, which we can label A, B, C, D; these are not static, discontinuous stages of development, but points inserted in a flow—various

figurations of people, each figuration flowing from the previous one as the development takes its course from A to D (Mennell 1992: 30).

In Elias' own words:

Retrospective study will often clearly show not only that the figuration is a necessary precondition for D, and likewise B for C and A for B, but also why this is so. Yet, looking into the future, from whatever point in the figurational flow, we are usually able to establish only that the figuration at B is one possible transformation of A, and similarly C for B and D for C. In other words, in studying the flow of figurations there are two possible perspectives on the connection between one figuration chosen from the continuing flow and another, later figuration. From the viewpoint of the earlier figuration, the earlier one is usually a necessary condition for the formation of the later (cited in *ibid.*).

Elias exemplified this approach in his analyses of "civilizing processes". As Mennell observes: "Civilizing processes can be taken as a test-case of 'cultural' processes that build momentum and direction, but remain historically contingent and are in no way 'inevitable'" (Mennell 1992: 36). The concept of momentum implies a direction of movement and the option of using a long-term outlook on social processes and development.

In sum, scholars perceive the social world as manifesting contradictions, tensions and fluctuations as well as solid elements. The word *chaos*, that typically refers to unpredictability, is applicable wherever different forces create a lack of coherence and dissensus regarding the social order, and basic uncertainty as to its further development. The opposite of law and order, it designates unrestrictiveness, both creative and destructive. However, when it comes to an outlook on the social world, this notion of chaos, does not necessarily mean orderlessness. At least, not when juxtaposed with *gestalt*. This notion proposed by socio-psychological research on perception formulated in terms of generalizing principles focuses on the possibility that elements, even when arranged in a purely random manner may come to be viewed by individuals as a configuration (*gestalt*, in German) (Sternberg, R. 2006, Scholl 2001). These elements may then be deemed as pertaining to a general comprehensive picture where each one is defined in its relation to others. The patterns which, in according to their observers, link those elements to one another, structure the general picture which appears as one whole. An addition of elements which, when perceived as one set, achieves as such primacy over any of its particular components,

and which is seen as characterized by properties that do not singularize any of its constitutive elements themselves.

This concept of *gestalt* may seem antithetical to chaos, defined as it is, by orderlessness, and, when it comes to social reality, by the absence of common values and consensus among actors. In a way, though, *gestalt* and chaos may still be reconciled when it comes to social actuality. Once, indeed, given aspects of this reality—even where no inherent and common denominator links them together—appear conjunctively and recurrently, actors tend to become familiar to their conjunctive presence, as facets of the “regular”, i.e. “normal”, environment. This in itself makes them constitutive parts of a set, even when those elements share no other aspect in common and the actors themselves eventually interpret the set they form in other terms using different criteria of appreciation. This is a notion of *gestalt* that seems, in its principle, to come quite close to the approaches to chaos applied by physicists and mathematicians (Gleick 1987). One example out of many: the linguistic landscape of the present-day megapolis is made up of signs on shops, institutions and public billboards that represent most diverse, incoherent and often cacophonous sets of items which, nonetheless, are perceived by passers-by as “characteristic” and “familiar” and as composing their “environment” (Ben-Rafael 2008).

Globalization represents a kind of social, societal and global condition where chaos and *gestalt* interfere and crystallize new lines of reality, and where “orderlessness” and structuration are, more than ever, inseparable. We are living in an age in which enriching cultural and social diversity and societal risks are inextricably tied up by transnationalism.

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

YASMIN ALKALAY works in the Computers Center, Faculty of Social Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Israel. Main interest: statistical analyses.

HAIM AVNI is Professor Emeritus, The Avraham Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. Main interest: Jews of Latin America, Spain and Portugal.

VICTOR AZARYA is Professor Emeritus, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. Main interests: ethnicity; religious, nomadic and pastoral communities.

ELIEZER BEN-RAFAEL is Professor Emeritus, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Tel Aviv University, Israel and Co-Director of the Klal Yisrael Project. Main interests: Israeli society; ethnicity; globalization; sociology of language.

MIRIAM BEN-RAFAEL is a Researcher in sociolinguistics, Israel. Main interests: sociology of language; French in Israel and the penetration of English in French.

JUDIT BOKSER LIWERANT is Professor and Director of the Graduate School of Political and Social Sciences at UNAM, Mexico. Main interests: sociological theory; Latin American Jews and Jewish history.

ROGERS BRUBAKER is Professor, Department of Sociology, University of California at Los Angeles, USA. Main interests: immigration; citizenship; nationalism; ethnicity.

ROBIN COHEN is Professorial Fellow, Department of International Development, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford, UK. Main interests: globalization; ethnicity; transnationalism; diasporas; cosmopolitanism; creolization.

SERGIO DELLA PERGOLA is Professor, The Avraham Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. Main interests: demography and sociology of the Jews.

STÉPHANE DUFOIX is Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Paris at Nanterre, France. Main interests: globalization; diasporas; French society.

SHMUEL N. EISENSTADT is Professor Emeritus, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. Main interests: theory, comparative sociology; civilizational analysis; social change.

CRISTINA ESCOBAR is a Researcher, Center of Migration and Development (CMD), Princeton University, USA. Main interests: immigration and transnationalism.

LARISA FIALKOVA is Senior Lecturer, Department of Hebrew and Comparative Literature, University of Haifa, Israel. Main interests: Russian literature; transnational Russian communities and diasporas.

ALLON GAL is Professor Emeritus, Department of Jewish History, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel. Main interest: North American Jews.

ROLAND GOETSCHÉL is Professor Emeritus and Past Director, Centre of Jewish Studies, University of Paris-Sorbonne, France. Main interests: Judaism and West European Jews.

YOSEF GORNY is Professor Emeritus, Jewish History Department, Tel Aviv University, and Co-Director of the Klal Yisrael Project. Main interests: modern Jewish history, Israeli history.

DANIÈLE HERVIEU-LÉGER is Professor (Directeur d'études) and President, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), Paris, France. Main interests: sociology of religion; modernity.

MICHEL S. LAGUERRE is Professor and Director, Berkeley Center for Globalization and Information Technology, University of California at

Berkeley, USA. Main interests: theory; globalization; multiculturalism; transnationalism and diasporas.

RICHARD MÜNCH is Professor, Department of Sociology II, University of Bamberg, Germany. Main interests: theory; globalization and transnationalism.

TOBIE NATHAN is Professor, Department of Psychology, University of Paris at Vincennes, France. Main interests: clinic and pathological psychology.

BENYAMIN NEUBERGER is Professor, Department of Social Sciences, The Open University, Israel. Main interests: Israeli society; Africa; democracy.

MARINA NIZNIK is an Instructor, Russian Language, The Cummings Center for Russian & Eastern European Studies, Tel Aviv University, Israel. Main interest: Russian-Speaking Jews in Israel.

ALEJANDRO PORTES is Director of the Center of Migration and Development (CMD) and Professor, Department of Sociology, Princeton University, USA. Main interests: international immigration and transnationalism.

UZI REBHUN is Senior Lecturer, The Avraham Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Main interests: demography and Jewish sociology.

LARISSA I. REMENNICK is Professor, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Bar-Ilan University, Israel. Main interests: immigration; transnationalism; Russian Jews.

WILLIAM SAFRAN is Professor Emeritus, Department of Political Science, University of Colorado at Boulder, USA. Main interests: collective identities; diaspora theory.

AJAYA KUMAR SAHOO is a Lecturer, Centre for Study of Indian Diaspora, University of Hyderabad, India. Main interests: transnationalism; diasporas; Indian Diaspora.

JULIUS H. SCHOEPS is Professor and President, Moses Mendelssohn Center for European-Jewish Studies, University of Potsdam, Germany. Main interest: Jews in Germany.

GABRIEL SHEFFER is Professor Emeritus, Department of Political Science, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. Main interests: diaspora theory; ethnonational diasporas; Israeli society.

MOSHE SHOKEID is Professor Emeritus, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Tel Aviv University, Israel. Main interests: anthropology; ethnicity; migration and immigration; social minorities; sexuality and Gay life.

YITZHAK STERNBERG is a Researcher, The Open University, Israel. Main interests: theory; Israeli society; nativism.

DAVID THELEN is Distinguished Professor Emeritus, Department of History, Indiana University at Bloomington, USA. He was Editor of the *Journal of American History* 1985–1999. Main interests: American history; theory.

NINA CLARA TIESLER is a Researcher, Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon, Portugal. Main interest: Muslims in Europe.

ALEXANDRIA WALTON RADFORD is a Researcher, Center of Migration and Development (CMD), Princeton University, USA. Main interests: international immigration and transnationalism.

MICHEL WIEVIORKA is President of the International Sociological Association (ISA); Professor (Directeur d'études), Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), Paris; and Director of the Centre for Sociological Analysis and Intervention (CADIS), Paris, France. Main interests: social movements; terrorism; violence; racism.

NATALIE YAP was a Researcher, National University of Singapore, Singapore. Main interests: Southeast Asian and Chinese diasporas.

MARIA N. YELENEVSKAYA is Senior Teaching Fellow, Department of Humanities and Arts, Technion-Israel Institute of Technology, Israel. Main interest: transnational Russian communities.

BRENDA S.A. YEOH is Professor and Head, Southeast Asian Studies Programme, National University of Singapore, Singapore. Main interests: Southeast Asian and Chinese diasporas.

EPHRAIM YUCHTMAN-YAAR is Professor Emeritus, Department of Sociology and Anthropology; and Director of the Evens Program in conflict Resolution and Mediation, Tel Aviv University, Israel. Main interests: industrial sociology; political sociology; social values; survey research.

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