

India Studies in Business and Economics

Ajay Kumar Dubey
Aparajita Biswas *Editors*

India and Africa's Partnership

A Vision for a New Future

 Springer

India Studies in Business and Economics

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Editors

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Foreword

India and Africa have been long-term allies in the drive for African independence in the middle of the past century. India's Africa policy emphasized decolonization and the achievement of African majority rule. Both opposed all forms of domination, particularly racial domination, in any part of Africa or Asia. The relationship has consolidated over the years not only in the political arena, but also in the social, cultural and economic relations.

Looking to intensify the economic relations, the government of India initiated the Focus Africa Programme, extended soft loan facilities through its Exim Bank and introduced debt-relief measures for African countries. The Confederation of Indian Industries and the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industries organized conclaves, conferences and programmes to increase India's economic footprint across Africa.

As a result of these efforts, India-Africa trade reached US\$68 billion in 2014 and is projected to surpass US\$75 billion in 2015. Yet the trade potential between the two regions is far greater, and its spread and composition can substantially diversify. India has also extended a duty-free tariff preferential scheme to the 34 least developed countries in Africa, which covers more than 90% of India's tariff lines and provides preferential market access for the exports of all least developed countries.

Indian investment in Africa now covers much of the continent, in different sectors, ranging from mining, telecommunications and information technology-enabled services to apparel, retail ventures, fisheries and food processing. Indian conglomerates have profitable projects in Africa and the total investment of Indian companies in Africa is estimated at more than US\$32 billion. In the other direction, African multinationals, particularly from South Africa, have ventured into India over the past decade, with a growing presence in infrastructure, breweries and financial services.

India and Africa have also been engaging on trade policy, with close coordination and synchronization on agricultural subsidy and pricing issues in the Doha Round of trade negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO), to ensure that the Doha Round is truly a "Development" Round.

I also welcome the growing cooperation via Africa's continental Institutions, the African Union and the African Development Bank. A substantial amount of the funds committed for capacity building in Africa are being channelled through the African Union in a Joint Action Plan involving shared decision making for allocation of resources. This co-equal multilateralism is an important feature of India's new model of engagement with Africa.

The achievements in economic cooperation in recent years have been considerable. A major landmark has been the India-Africa Forum summits, organized first in 2008 and again in 2011, which place development cooperation in a much broader context of overall relations between India and African countries. Development is seen not merely in economic terms but as a process that is sustainable only if located within a larger political, social and intellectual environment.

The third India-Africa Forum summit is scheduled to be held in New Delhi later this year in October. I look forward to the Forum, which will provide yet another great opportunity for realizing the potential for enhancing the cooperation between Africa and the Indian subcontinent.



Donald Kaberuka
President

African Development Bank

This book is the result of a research project, which was financially supported by the African Development Bank (AfDB). The findings and opinions expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect those of the AfDB and African Studies Association (ASA) India.

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACBF	Africa Capacity Building Foundation
AU	African Union
BRIC	Brazil, Russia, China and India
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CRISIL	Credit Rating and Information Services of India Ltd.
CSO	Civil Society Organization
E&P	Exploration and Production
EAC	East African Community
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FICCI	Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (initiative)
IBSA	India–Brazil–South Africa Dialogue Forum
ICAR	Indian Council of Agricultural Research
ICT	Information and communication technology
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IOCL	Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.
ITEC	Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme
JDZ	Joint Development Zone (Nigeria–São Tomé and Príncipe)
LDC	Least Developed Countries
LOC	Line Of Credit
LNG	Liquefied Natural Gas
MEA	Ministry of External Affairs
MT	Metric Ton
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa’s Development
NOC	National Oil Company
OAU/AU	Organization of African Unity/African Union
OEDC-DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development-Development Assistance Committee
OIL	Oil India Ltd.

ONGC	Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd.
OVL	ONGC Videsh Ltd.
PIO	Person of Indian Origin
PPP	Public–Private Partnership
PTA	Preferential Trade Agreement
REC	Regional Economic Community
RIL	Reliance Industries Limited
SACU	South African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SCAAP	Special Commonwealth Assistance for Africa Programme
SOE	State-Owned Enterprise
TCIL	Telecommunications Consultants India Ltd.
UMA	Arab Maghreb Union
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
VoIP	Voice over Internet Protocol

Editors and Contributors

About the Editors

Ajay Kumar Dubey is director of the UGC Centre for African Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi. He has more than two decades of post-graduate teaching and research experience. He has about nine published books to his credit along with several dozen research papers published in research journals of international repute. He is the editor-in-chief of three international research journals, *Africa Review* and *Diaspora Studies* (by Routledge, London) and *Insight on Africa* (by Sage Publications). He is currently the Secretary General of African Studies Association of India (ASA India), and President of Organization for Diaspora Initiatives (ODI International). His areas of interest include international relations, African affairs, diaspora studies, Indian migration, Indo-African relations, development issues and political science.

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Chapter 1

Introduction: A Long-Standing Relationship

Ajay Kumar Dubey and Aparajita Biswas

Contact between India and Africa dates back to ancient times, when Indian merchants were trading extensively with the Indian Ocean littorals in Africa. The period of European colonial expansion, which included the incorporation of the Indian subcontinent and large swathes of Africa into the British Empire, helped establish a large community of people of Indian origin in Africa, adding to a rich history of two-way traffic.

At the time of India's independence, only four sovereign states existed in Africa: Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia and South Africa, followed by what Samuel Huntington has referred to as the 'second and third wave of democratization', which witnessed a number of African countries break away from colonial rule. During the Cold War, President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana were critical to the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), propagated through the ideas of the Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. Historically, India–Africa relations were built upon the foundation of opposition to colonialism and, in South Africa, to racial discrimination. Convergence on economic issues emanating from common development challenges and the vision for a New International Economic Order pushed India closer to the continent. But domestic issues and the lack of economic and political power on both sides constrained proactive engagement.

India opened its economy in 1991 amid dynamic changes within the international system driven by political, economic and technological factors. The adoption of liberal economic policies had an immense impact on India's foreign policy, as well, forcing it to become more active and diversified. Elements of multilateralism have their roots in Nehru's time, a period when India perceived Africa as a single regional bloc, resulting in its adopting a uniform policy throughout the continent on the grounds of colonial and imperial opposition and non-alignment. Since 1991,

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economic interests have resulted in the adoption of a more pragmatic approach in policy towards Africa as a continent and African countries as nations (Dubey 1989).

Over the first decade of the twenty-first century, India–Africa cooperation has deepened, especially with India’s emergence as a bigger player in the global economy and the relative weight of its economy on the global economic and geopolitical scene. That cooperation was evident at the India–Africa Forum summits, at which India offered significant loans, grants and development assistance to intensify engagement with African countries.

India’s engagement with African countries differs fundamentally from that of western countries, particularly regarding aims, objectives and political discourse. India’s policy towards Africa is based on a mutually beneficial relationship, within the agenda of South–South cooperation.

1.1 Historical Goodwill and Evolving Vision for Future

Chapter by Ajay Dubey on ‘*India–Africa Relations: Historical Goodwill and Vision for Future*’ traces these historical relations up to evolving contemporary vision of the future through a historical perspective. It shows how historical goodwill and evolving vision for future, India and Africa have been linked for millennia by migration, trade and cultural exchange. Egypt and Ethiopia (Aksum) engaged in economic relations with historical India as far back as the first century A.D., and probably earlier. The first written account of that period comes from *The Periplus of the Erythrean Sea*, written towards the end of that century. Migrants from Africa to India and vice versa have moved on land or sea in pursuit of fortune, glory and faith from ancient times up to the present day. Movement across the Indian Ocean facilitated exchanges between Africa and the rest of the Indian Ocean region, a region of geopolitical significance throughout history.

The dawn of European colonial rule changed the relationship, regulating interactions and forcibly introducing class and racial hierarchies into what had been a freewheeling relationship. But colonialism also triggered the largest labour migrations across the Indian Ocean, moving vast populations from South Asia to East and South Africa to work as soldiers, labourers, traders and middlemen, with defined roles in colonial society. The Africanist Robert Gregory (1971) noted, “The period of European colonial expansion brought an end to this long-range trading system. On the other hand, the incorporation of both the Indian subcontinent and large swathes of Africa into the British Empire facilitated the establishment of substantial communities of people of Indian origin in Africa”.

Mohandas K. Gandhi, who would later become the father of Indian independence, was part of that movement. He accepted a position with an Indian law firm in Natal in 1893 and remained in South Africa until 1914, a period in which his leadership of the Indian community’s struggle for civil rights saw the first flowering of what would become his hallmark approach of *Satyagraha*, or non-violent resistance to tyranny. Gandhi’s philosophy, which he successfully put into practice

to achieve India's independence in 1947, inspired a startling number of African leaders—including Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Obafemi Awolowo of Nigeria, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia—in their own national liberation campaigns. Jomo Kenyatta wrote, “The architect of Indian independence with the weapon of non-violence, Gandhi has contributed to the quicker emancipation of many Asian and African countries from the subjection of the colonialism from Europe (Biswas 1992)”.

If Mahatma Gandhi laid the moral foundations for Indo-African relations, Jawaharlal Nehru gave the relationship its political structure during his long tenure as India's first prime minister (1947–1964). Nehru declared that Africa “though separated by the Indian Ocean from us [is] in a sense our next door neighbour” and that “in historical perspective, Indian interests are likely to be bound up more and more with the growth of Africa (Biswas 1992)”. Nehru left an indelible imprint on India–Africa relations since India's early post-independence years. He regarded the African liberation struggle as part of the Afro-Asian resurgence and offered support to the people of Africa who were struggling against discrimination and apartheid. Nehru adopted two policy initiatives to assure African national leaders that independent India stood by them. He made it clear that his government would like the Indians in Africa to give up their attitude of hesitation and join the mainstream of African liberation (Dubey 2010a, b). He also projected an image of non-alignment as a major thrust of India's interaction with the outside world. The corollary was to project the significance of South-South economic cooperation beyond the earlier colonial underpinnings.

India's Africa policy emphasized decolonization and the achievement of African majority rule. It opposed all forms of domination, particularly racial domination, in any part of Africa, as people of Indian origin were called upon to make a common cause with the indigenous African population without any claim to special status. And it built fresh bonds of economic cooperation with African countries.

Non-alignment, both as a policy principle and as a collective movement, has been a basic part of independent India's foreign policy. Together with China's Zhou Enlai, Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser, Ghana's Nkrumah, Indonesia's Sukarno, and Viet Nam's Ho Chi Minh, Nehru played a leading role in convening the first Asian-African Conference in April 1955, which brought representatives of 29 African and Asian countries to the Indonesian city of Bandung and gave rise to the NAM.

At that conference, Nehru made a moving speech about the African tragedy. He said, “We have passed resolutions about conditions in this or that country. But I think there is nothing more terrible than the infinite tragedy of Africans ever since the days when millions of Africans were carried away as galley slaves to America and elsewhere, half of them dying in the galleys... Even now the tragedy of Africa is greater than that of any other continent, whether it is racial or political. It is up to Asia to help Africa to the best of her ability because we are her sister continent (Nehru 1955)”.

However, early hopes of a more intensive Indo-African partnership were dashed when China and India came to blows over border disputes, and the Sino-Indian War of 1962 left China in possession of sections of the contested areas. The resulting scenario was a setback for India's standing among NAM nations (only Egypt and

Kenya stood firmly behind NAM). That led policy makers in New Delhi to adopt a less ambitious policy towards Africa, focusing instead on building their country's defence sector and securing its immediate neighbourhood. Even so, India continued to generously support national liberation movements in Africa financially and politically.

Political relations have since been marked by mutual understanding and support. During Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi's prime ministership, India accorded formal diplomatic recognition to South Africa's African National Congress in 1967 and Namibia's South West African People's Organization in 1985. India was willing to share its development experience and provide technical and medical skills, educational scholarships and other forms of aid under the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme, launched in 1964. In the initial years of India's independence—a time of poverty—India extended US\$ 3 billion in lines of credit to a number of Africa's infrastructural projects (Dubey 2010a, b).

It was against this background that India sought to re-engage [with Africa] in the twenty-first century, by redrawing our framework of cooperation and devising new parameters for an enhanced and enlarged relationship commensurate with our new role in a changing world (Tharoor 2014). Thus, although New Delhi publicly retained its ideological commitment to the principles of non-alignment and South-South struggle against the inequities of the global order, it introduced economic reforms in the 1990s and became more conscious of its growing need to secure supplies of food and energy, exploit new export markets, and attract foreign capital and technological know-how. TEAM-9 Initiative was launched in 2003 focus on hitherto neglected region of Francophone Africa (Dubey 2009). Those key factors led India to recast its Africa policy.

1.2 Contemporary India–Africa Ties

In its post-reform period, India initiated a proactive stance in its policy towards Africa. With the other Asian giant, China, India suddenly emerged as a major “competitor” in Africa, bidding for important resource and infrastructure projects, launching new lines of credit and tariff cuts, expanding its diplomatic network, and increasing its security stakes in the continent (Xavier 2010). The best exposition of India's Africa policy, one anchored on Afro-optimism (Venter 2014), was articulated by former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in his opening statement at the first India–Africa Forum Summit in New Delhi in April 2008: “Africa is our Mother Continent. The dynamics of geology may have led our lands to drift apart, but history, culture and the processes of post-colonial development have brought us together once again”. The key drivers in modern India–Africa relations are trade and investment.

1.2.1 Trade

Looking to intensify economic relations, the government of India initiated the Focus Africa Programme, extended soft loan facilities through its Exim Bank and introduced debt-relief measures for African countries. The Confederation of Indian Industries and the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industries organized conclaves, conferences and programmes in various places in India and Africa to increase India's economic footprint across Africa.

As a result of those efforts, India–Africa trade has grown sharply. Trade with African countries reached US\$68 billion in 2014 and is projected to reach more than US\$75 billion in 2015. Yet the estimated trade potential between the two regions is far greater, and its spread and composition have to be substantially diversified. Aparajita Biswas argues in Chap. 3 that trade has been highly motivating for both sides, but analysts warn India about locking in African countries as primary producers because the continent has short- and long-term problems that can ultimately become a heavy burden on public relations.

India has also extended a duty-free tariff preferential scheme to the 50 least developed countries—34 in Africa—in an attempt at increasing trade flows between India and Africa. The scheme covers 94 % of India's tariff lines and provides preferential market access to tariff lines for 92.5 % of the global exports of all least developed countries (PIB, Govt of India 2008).

India and Africa have also been engaging closely about trade policy, with close coordination and synchronization between India and African countries on agricultural subsidy and pricing issues in the Doha Round of trade negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO). India and African countries are coordinating with each other in the WTO to negotiate and to share information about common issues of interest. By participating in mutual platforms within the WTO, such as the G-20, G-33 and NAMA-11, India has been representing common interests of the least developed countries.

1.2.2 Investment

Another indication of warming India–Africa relations in recent years are the increasing Indian investment in Africa, now covering much of the African continent, in different sectors. Chris Alden and Raj Verma argue in Chap. 4 that the driving forces underlying India's investments in Africa are economic relations and foreign policy, in turn driven by economic motives or imperatives (or both).

Today, Indian multinational companies have considerable investments in sectors ranging from mining, telecommunications and information technology (IT)-enabled services to apparel, retail ventures, fisheries and food processing. Indian conglomerates such as Tata and Kirolaskar, pharmaceutical companies such as Cipla and automobile companies such as Mahindra and Mahindra all have profitable

projects in Africa. The total investment of Indian companies in Africa is estimated at more than US\$32 billion. In the other direction, African multinationals, particularly from South Africa, have ventured into India over the past decade. Their presence is seen in infrastructure, breweries and financial and insurance services.

Indian private sector success in Africa is illustrated by Vedanta Resources and its copper operations in Zambia, where the company bought a majority shareholding in Konkola, one of Africa's largest integrated copper producers, in 2004. Vedanta's investments were a major factor behind the revival of the Zambian copper industry. Pharmaceutical companies such as Ranbaxy and Cipla have not only been supplying low-cost generics to the markets but also setting up production facilities in Africa. In fact, the cost competitiveness of the Indian pharmaceutical giants has resulted in the emergence of counterfeits, a cause for concern for both suppliers and consumers.

Those moves have been supported by a gradual expansion of Indian financial institutions across Africa, spearheaded by the operations of three state-owned banks: Bank of Baroda, State Bank of India and Bank of India. Exim Bank of India also has been providing many concessions directed towards infrastructure development in African countries.

1.2.3 Economic Diplomacy

India has gradually emerged from being an aid recipient to becoming an important aid donor. In Chap. 6, Ian Taylor links this evolution to India's rapid economic growth after 1990 and further ties it to India's global ambitions. Major landmarks in India's economic diplomacy have been the India–Africa Forum summits, organized first in 2008 and again in 2011, which place development cooperation in a much broader context of overall relations between India and African countries. Development is seen not merely in economic terms but as a process that is sustainable only if located within a larger political, social and intellectual environment (Gregory 1971).

India's engagement with Africa has become multilayered, focused first, at the pan-African level, through growing ties with the African Union and other pan-African institutions; second, at the African regional level, through the regional economic communities; and third, with all African countries through bilateral political and economic relations (Kumar and Nair 2009).

At both summits, India committed billions of dollars in soft loans and aid and agreed on areas of cooperation, from human resources and institutional capacity building, agricultural productivity and food security to information and communications technology. African countries have great interest in tapping into India's know-how in those sectors. However, Taylor argues that domestic engagement regarding Indian aid is minimal and has not yet entered the public consciousness. It is not transparent no public debate is going on concerning India's foreign policy.

In its development cooperation, India has initiated the idea of a multitier cooperative partnership based on mutually beneficial interdependence rather than a

patron-client relationship (as observed in relationships between the former colonial powers and African nations). For its investment, India engaged pan-African institutions, especially the African Union, to determine priority sectors in selecting projects. A substantial amount of the funds committed for capacity building in Africa is being channelled through the African Union in a Joint Action Plan involving shared decision making to address the allocation of resources. This co-equal multilateralism is an important feature of India's new model of engagement with Africa (Tharoor 2014).

The 2011 Summit in Ethiopia, which adopted the Addis Ababa Declaration, sought a key place for Africa in global economic decision making: "We urge major economies to work together and enhance microeconomic policy coordination. In this context, we acknowledge the G-20 process as an important forum for international economic cooperation and request fair representation of Africa in the evolving architecture of decision making in the global economic system (MEA 2011)."

India has been particularly close to South Africa in coordinating positions on international issues of global interest, a process accentuated with the founding of IBSA—the India–Brazil–South Africa Dialogue Forum—a gathering of three large, developing countries to promote South-South cooperation. IBSA has negotiated successfully in the Doha Round and at other trade talks, and representatives of the three countries meet regularly, although progress has been insufficient on concluding trilateral trade agreements among themselves. Still, IBSA has set up its own cooperation fund and has launched projects in Equatorial Guinea. The need for individual country branding of aid projects, though, may still limit the possibilities for IBSA development projects.

In other forums, India has not only supported inclusion of South Africa in the BRIC grouping but also played a significant role in initiating discussion of the matter in Track II forums. The New Development Bank is the first step towards creating an institutional set-up that will cater to the concerns of the developing world. Two of the bank's core areas are addressing infrastructure gaps and promoting more sustainable development.

1.2.4 Energy

Energy has also been driving economic relations between India and the African continent, reinvigorating India's engagement in the twenty-first century. Aparajita Biswas observes in Chap. 5 that, although West Asia remains the geographical centre of gravity of the global oil industry, accounting for one-third of global oil production, countries in Asia also depend on new hydrocarbon-exporting states in Africa, Central Asia and Latin America. The point is that a global shift has occurred in the geography of oil and gas production towards the developing world, especially Africa. Similarly, a shift has occurred away from the international oil companies—such as BP, Chevron, ExxonMobil, Shell and Total—as the holders of oil reserves and the main producers of oil towards national oil companies, such as Aramco

(Saudi Arabia), Petronas (Malaysia) and Petrobras (Brazil). Today, national oil companies control about 77 % of the world's oil reserves.

Africa is the new frontier of oil politics, and India's low oil and gas reserves have placed Africa in a key position on India's energy calculus. Africa already buys 17 % of India's crude oil imports, with Nigeria accounting for a major share (EIA 2014).

The Indian public sector has been leading the way for investments in oil and gas in South Africa, with ONGC Videsh largely directing investments in Sudan, Libya, Egypt and Côte d'Ivoire. The private sector has followed suit, with Reliance Industries and Essar Oil the most prominent.

However, one of the toughest challenges faced by the continent's oil-producing nations has been to channel oil wealth into meaningful economic structural transformation. While pursuing opportunities in hydrocarbons, countries cannot be attain a sustainable partnership in the energy sector by engaging only that sector. African countries lack the capacity and resources to develop the hydropower, wind energy and bio-energy sectors. Private investors and multilateral institutions can provide financial support and policy expertise to assist countries to develop capacity and design policy. And academic and research institutions can grant additional support through research and development.

1.2.5 Diasporas

Diasporas are the greatest offshore assets of developing countries, proving a strategic resource for development in human and financial capital. An estimated 3 million people in the Indian diaspora are spread across the African continent, supporting the growth and development of African nations. Indian diasporic presence is most prominent in South Africa and Mauritius. Indians in South Africa, Kenya and Ethiopia occupy key roles in business, politics, bureaucracy, academia and health care. In Mauritius, people of Indian origin account for 68 % of the population, leading and representing the government since independence.

Ajay Dubey in Chap. 7 underscores the emergence of diasporic networks after 1990 as a crucial resource for policy makers and businesspeople in India and Africa. A challenge for India lies in establishing sustainable and productive links with its diaspora in the larger context of promoting bilateral relations with African countries.

The most important aspect in the progress of the India–Africa relationship is its transition from a linear or single-dimension relationship to a multidimensional one. The India–Africa Forum Summits have provided a roadmap to strengthen relations and affirmed the importance of South–South cooperation as an instrument to supplement existing international efforts that will lead to tangible benefits for developing countries.

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Chapter 2

India–Africa Relations: Historical Goodwill and a Vision for the Future

Ajay Kumar Dubey

India and Africa shared a multidimensional relationship since ancient times. The geographical proximity and an easily navigable Indian Ocean brought the people of the two regions nearer to each other. During colonial times, soon after the conquest of Africa and for restructuring African economy, the free and voluntary relations of the past gave way to colonial needs and preferences. The relations between India and sovereign states of Africa were formally established when both sides gained independence. While the earlier pattern of their relationship was moulded in the colonial frame, it was considered by the leadership of newly independent states as highly inadequate to meet their developmental aspirations as reflected in their quest for South–South Cooperation. The new relationship is being developed on partnership model. As Indian connection is old, multidimensional and with strong historic ties, India enjoys tremendous goodwill in the continent.

This chapter examines the historical relations between India and African countries as a resource for accelerating developmental cooperation under globalization. It will try to examine the strength and uniqueness of the historical foundation for the current Indo–African partnership in the twenty-first century.

2.1 Overview of Historical Relations

2.1.1 *Pre-colonial Contacts*

India's pre-colonial ties with Africa have received little attention. It links with Pharaonic, Greek-ruled, Roman-ruled and Islamic Egypt, from the tenth to fourteenth century, extended to neighbouring African lands along the Red Sea. Modern history lays testimony to the fact that enterprising Indian merchants were looking

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for trade routes across the ocean and they set sail across the Arabian sea to the West in the quest to find lucrative markets and to explore new frontiers. In the process they played an influential role in the history of the African countries with whom they came in touch. People from both sides became part of the Indian Ocean ‘circuit of trade’ (Ali Sadiq 1987a, b).

Indian sea merchants from the Gulf of Kutch in the Western coast of India sailed for East Africa in their very seaworthy dhows, using the alternating sea winds for navigation. The North-East monsoon winds brought these merchant sailors across the Indian Ocean from December to March. After trading and bartering, they returned to East Africa during June and September, using the reverse South-East winds. They sailed regularly to the Zanj coast (Zanj Coast: Zanzibar), as it was called in those times, to obtain incense, palm oil, myrrh, gold, copper, spices, ivory, rhino horn and wild animal skins. They sold cloth, metal implements, foodstuff like wheat, rice and jaggery, besides porcelain and glassware (Sheriff 2010).

Trade was assisted by favourable sea winds and the development of a suitable marine technology. India’s skills in harnessing winds and currents of Indian Ocean are traced by scholars in several historical sources. It includes references in Vedas where mention is made of growth of trade and shipping during the Maurayan period, in the dialogue of Budhha during the fifth century BC and in ancient Tamil writings in the context of West Asia and Africa (Ali Sadiq 1987a, b).

Periplus of Erythrean Sea, a merchants’ sailor guide, written towards the end of the first century AD is a major source for tracing the early history of East Africa and Red Sea coast. It throws light on ancient India’s sea-faring culture and maritime activity. It paints a vivid picture of the thriving trade between India and the Western Indian Ocean region, which covered an area extending from the Somali Horn along the African coast of the Red Sea route to Egypt, and other African littoral countries. The importance of the *Periplus* lies in the information that India’s trading contacts were confined not only to Egypt and coastal states but also to northern Somalia, ancient land of Punt, kingdom of Kush (Sudan) and Axum.

Indian Ocean system had influence on the hinterland states in Central–Southern Africa, more specifically Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and the interiors of Tanzania (Ali Sadiq 1987a, b). Arab chronicler, Al’Masudi, who had travelled in 915 AD to Persia, India and China, recorded that central African producers of gold and ivory were sending their goods eastward in exchange for cotton and other goods from India and Arabia (Ali Sadiq 1987a, b).

More concrete evidence of the Indian presence in Africa begins to appear during the Islamic age. The Venetian traveller Marco Polo (1254–1324 AD) had words of praise for the Gujarati and Saurashtrian merchants on Africa’s east coast whom he considered as the best and most honourable to be found in the world (Polo and Masefield 2009). Vasco de Gama touched East Africa on his historic voyage to India. He reached Malindi in 1497 AD and found Indian merchants in Mozambique, Kilwa and Mombasa. The use of Indian system of weights and measures and of Indian *Cowries* as currency, pointed to the fact that Indians were playing a key role in this area. Not only did Indian Ocean trade brought economic benefits, it also contributed to the development of internal links in the African

continent even before the advent of Europeans (Jeevanjee 1912). By seventeenth century, the nature of Indian Ocean trade underwent a radical change due to demand for captives who could be sold as slaves (Ali Sadiq 1987a, b). Though the major slave dealers were Arabs, locals Indians used to finance these activities. With the advent of European colonial powers in India and Africa, the trade pattern underwent a significant change as Indo–African relations entered a new era of ‘colonialism’ (Carter 2006).

2.1.2 *Contacts During Colonial Times*

2.1.2.1 **Movement of People**

Constant movement of people is one of the most important features of Indo–African relations. This movement of people was not one-sided. As people from India went to Africa in different capacities, similarly African people also came to India.

Indians in Africa

Trading links facilitated the movement of people. There was a significant presence of Indian traders in Africa during ancient and mediaeval times. The slave trade from the seventeenth century further added to their number. The Indian slaves constituted more than half of all slaves arriving at the Cape in the seventeenth centuries (Ali Sadiq 1987a, b). The French colonized western Indian Ocean islands in the eighteenth century (Reunion in 1664, Mauritius in 1718) and started recruiting Indian slaves for Mauritius and Reunion.¹ By the turn of the nineteenth century, some 20,000 Indian slaves constituted 13 % of the slave population of these islands (Lal 2006). There were also migrations of domestic help, soldiers and seamen to these western Indian Ocean territories. From the 1720s, domestic help, soldiers and seamen were recruited from India for the Mascarenes. Mauritius and Reunion recruited Indian masons, carpenters, blacksmiths and *lascars*. Eventually, Indian slaves population became economically stable. Indian tailors, cobblers and jewelers opened shops. Some overseas Indians workers themselves became owner of slave and land in these islands during the eighteenth century (Carter 2006). Indian workers here frequently married Indian women who had arrived as slaves (Carter 2006).

After abolition of slavery, indentured labour system was introduced to replace freed slaves in the plantation economies. Importation of the ‘indentured labourers’ into Africa took place under British Government which was a key player in the global indenture scheme (Northrup 1995). Each time demands were made for

¹Indentured labour system came into existence in 1834 first in British colonies, after abolition of Slavery (1833).

labour by different colonial governments, be it for the agricultural or mining sector or railway construction, the request would invariably be for the ‘coolie’—either Indians or Chinese, also referred collectively as the ‘Asiatics’ (Tinker 1977). This preference had as much to do with the colonial possession of the British Empire and its relations with the territories of supply. The first ship of the Indian indentured labour was sent to Mauritius in 1834. In the 1850s, the British in Natal realized the potential for the cultivation of sugar in the region. They had already experienced the success of Indian indentured labour in a number of tropical territories, such as Jamaica, Trinidad and Mauritius and therefore had a well-established system to tap into (Freud 1995). In East Africa, the British brought in indentured labourers from India in 1860 to construct the railway lines between Mombassa and Kampala and to work in sugar plantation. Along with the indentured workers, there were ‘free passenger’ Indians who went on their own as entrepreneurs and merchants. These were merchants by occupation from Gujarat, largely Muslims and some Hindus. The descendents of these merchants contribute significant share in local GDP of their host countries even today.

Africans in India

Compared to Indian migration to African territories, African presence in India is miniscule. References of African presence are available in Indian records from the thirteenth century onwards. During Muslim rule in India, African slaves were imported as domestic workers as well as soldiers. These Islamized Africans were able to contribute to development in different parts of India—Bengal, Gujarat and Deccan. Many of them were absorbed in Hindu, Christian or tribal set-up. Malik Amber (1549–1626)—a slave, rose to the position of a Regent in Deccan region (Eaton 2005, Chap. 5).

These Africans are known as Siddis. The first Siddis arrived in India in 628 AD at the Bharuch port. Several others followed with the first Arab Islamic invasions of the subcontinent in 712 AD (Pandya and Rawal 2002). The latter group of Siddis served with Muhammad bin Qasim’s army. They were called Zanjis. Siddis, in mediaeval India, were concentrated on the West Coast—between Bombay and Goa. They dominated this part of India from the times of Mughals till the arrival of European powers. Siddis are, now, found in Gujarat, Karnataka and Hyderabad (Jayasuriya et al. 2003).

Besides Siddis, a different kind of African community sprang from the abolitionist campaign of the nineteenth century. Liberated from ships on seas and freed on the Asian mainland, they were channelled to three different places—Bombay, Pune and Nasik (Ali Sadiq 1987a, b). They were known as ‘Bombay African’, and ‘Nasik Boys’. They identified themselves with European culture, ideas and manners and they differed from local Siddis, who assimilated the local culture and religion (Jayasuriya and Pankhurst 2003).

2.1.2.2 Indian National Congress (INC) and Africa

The political connections between India and Africa during colonial period were through M.K. Gandhi, Indian National Congress, Indian diasporas and the presence of the same British colonial rule in many African countries. The interest and connections of Indian nationalist leaders in Africa date back to 1890 when INC opposed deployment of Indian soldiers in Sudan and Ethiopia as they were not fighting for the cause of India. Gandhi returned to India from South Africa in 1914 and became a key person in Indian freedom struggle. Gandhi became the leader of colonized people first in South Africa. He started the first political formation in South Africa by establishing the Indian Natal Congress in 1894. The Indian National Congress (INC) inspired African leaders to take up their fight for liberation from colonial rule. In 1928, at the annual Calcutta session of INC, the Indian struggle for freedom was officially linked with world struggle against imperialism and colonialism. It was decided to set up an overseas department to establish contact with political formations and leaders in Africa (AICC Calcutta Session 1928). INC was looked upon as a role model to gain independence. It overtly supported African nationalist leaders. Under Gandhi and later under Nehru, it opposed racist policies of British Government in African countries. Indian National Congress' Working Committee, popularly known as CWC, was repeatedly passed resolution on the discrimination prevailing in the Union of South Africa and Kenya. In 1934, it tendered its sympathies to the Abyssinians.² In 1937, it called for an embargo against Zanzibar³ and it welcomed Wafdist⁴ delegation from Egypt to attend the Congress Working Committee meeting in 1939.

Jawaharlal Nehru was the main architect of INC policy towards Africa. He visited Brussels Congress of Oppressed Nationalities in 1927 where he met leaders from North Africa as well as from Sub-Saharan Africa like Leopold Senghor. In his speech there, he pointed out that independence of India would affect the position of all other countries under colonial rule. He said that India was kinglypin of one worldwide joint movement for liberation. He realized there that “the struggle for freedom was a common one against the thing that was imperialism; and joint deliberation, and where possible, joint action was desirable” (Nehru 1936). At Conference of Peace and Empire in London in 1928, he said, “we think of India, China and other countries, but we are too often apt to forget Africa and people of India want you to keep them in mind. After all though the people of India would welcome the help and sympathy of all progressive people, they are today, perhaps

²The Abyssinia Crisis was a crisis during the interwar period originating in the ‘Walwal incident.’ This incident resulted from the ongoing conflict between the Kingdom of Italy and the Empire of Ethiopia, (then commonly known as “Abyssinia” in Europe). Its effects were to undermine the credibility of the League of Nations and to encourage Fascist Italy to ally itself with Nazi Germany.

³India imposed trade embargo against Zanzibar because of its inhuman treatment to Indian settlers.

⁴Wafdist means the Member of Wafd Party. Wafd was a nationalist liberal political party in Egypt. It was founded in 1919 and was instrumental in the development of the 1923s Constitution.

strong enough to fight their own battle, whilst that may not be true of some people of Africa. Therefore the people of Africa desire our special attention” (Nehru 1976). While passing through Rome in 1936, he rejected requests for a meeting by Italian dictator, Benito Mussolini, as Italians had invaded Abyssinia (now Ethiopia). Back home, he organized nationwide demonstration to denounce his aggression and, in his presidential address of the INC said, “...we have watched also with admiration the brave fight of Ethiopians for their freedom against heavy odds... It is one of the first effective checks by African people on advancing imperialism”. During World War II 5,000 Indian soldiers lost their lives in the decisive battle of Karon against Italians. Indian soldiers under Subhedar Rachipal Ram of 6th Rajputana Rifles captured Acqua Col on the heights of Karon. The latter surrendered after 5 years of grim guerrilla warfare and the heroic liberation campaign of 1941.

India under Nehru, therefore since 1928, linked its own freedom struggle with African struggle against imperialism and colonialism and it looked at African decolonization as the continuation of its own struggle. It was politically, strategically and morally committed to support the liberation struggles of Africa. In a broadcast to the nation on 7 September 1946, Nehru said,

We believe that peace and freedom are indivisible and denial of freedom must endanger peace elsewhere and lead to conflict and war. We are particularly interested in emancipation of colonial and dependent countries and peoples and in recognition of the theory and practice of equal opportunity for all races. (Nehru 1946–1961)

2.1.2.3 Gandhi as a Link in the Liberation of Africa and India

Mahatma Gandhi played an important role in connecting India and Africa. His philosophy appealed to people across the world, especially to African leaders. Gandhi had gone to South Africa as a professional lawyer in 1893 (Guha 2013). He suffered racial discrimination in South Africa and spent the next 21 years fighting racial discrimination in the country. It was there that he invented his concept of *satyagraha*—a non-violent way of protesting against injustices, the civil disobedience and mass mobilization. His experience in South Africa shaped his political ideology in the later years. In turn “he had a profound impact on the history of the continent, with his work in South Africa preparing the way for his more important work in his homeland” (Guha 2013). By 1919, he became popular as ‘*Mahatma*’ Gandhi. Gandhian technique of mass movement impressed colonial peoples all over the world. In later years, Gandhi was visited by many African leaders, in their search for inspiration and guidance in their own struggles for self-determination (Guha 2013). They had seen that civil disobedience, non-cooperation movement, negotiation, constitutional conferences, boycott of foreign goods (*swadeshi*) and peaceful agitations under Gandhi, yielded effective results. Therefore, the strategy and style adopted by Gandhi became a model for African nationalists. In many cases they adopted the nomenclature of “Congress” to identify their respective parties (Hodgekin 1956). O. Awalowo of Nigeria, J. Nyrere of Tanzania and

K. Nkrumah of Ghana were convinced of the suitability of Gandhian strategy of liberation and they tactfully used the strategy developed in India to fight their own war of independence. Across the continent, African leaders began to share views of the Indian National Congress under Gandhi, claiming the right to equality, the right to political participation and the right to protest. Ceasley Hayford, the founding father of Ghanaian nationalism, established West African Congress on the model of India (Huttenback 1966).

2.1.2.4 Struggles of Indian Diaspora in Africa: Connections with India

The Indian diaspora under the leadership of M.K. Gandhi established Natal Indian Congress in 1894 to fight against British discriminatory policies in South Africa. Similar political organizations were established by the Indian diaspora in other parts of South Africa like Transval Indian Congress (1903) and South African Indian Congress (1920). Later, Gandhi became the link between them and INC. The leaders of these Indian political formations in South Africa were in constant touch with political leaders of INC and other leftist formation in India. INC had sent several delegations in early twentieth century to African countries to inspect and report on mistreatment and discrimination of indentured labour. They established contact with their leaders and were in constant touch with them later on. Pressure by this group within INC led to the discontinuation of the indentured labour system. Nehru exhorted them to join hands with Black African leaders in their fight against injustice. They were advised to keep native African interest above their interest and not to seek any special privilege over them. This made African leaders feel very comfortable with leaders of Indian diaspora and India's support and connections with Indian diaspora in Africa. The advice of Gandhi and Nehru were respected by these leaders, who in many of their respective host countries, started fight against colonial rule even before native African. South Africa, Kenya and Mauritius saw Indian diaspora getting inspired and exhorted by Gandhi, Nehru and INC and initiating freedom struggles against the colonial powers. This left a long legacy of India's and Indian diaspora's involvement in early phase of African struggle against colonial rule.

2.1.2.5 British Colonial Governments in India and Africa: Connections and Legacies

A large number of African territories were under British colonial rule. Most of them were colonized by the British long after colonization of India. Many of these African territories were conquered by using troops from India having substantial Indian soldiers. A good number of these Indian soldiers settled down there and married locals. Many colonial administrators moved from India to these newly acquired territories and transferred Indian administrative and legal system over

there. There was constant exchange between Indian colonial government and African colonial governments in these countries. Therefore, one finds common legacies of administrative structure, laws, institutions, colonial architecture, Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence and governance norms. Like at the time of conquest of African territories, during both World Wars, large numbers of Indian soldiers were taken on long-term basis in these territories. A good number of them never returned. They retired in Africa, married local Africans and settled there for good, such as in Kenya and Sudan. Though their number was significant but they got submerged into African ethnic group and form part of 'lost Indian diaspora'. These colonial connectivity left strong common legacies in many areas. Even today people in both regions are surprised by commonality of these long lasting, administrative, legal, juridical and diasporic legacies.

2.2 Indo–African Relations Under Nehru and the Rest of the Cold War Period

Soon after the second World War, in 1947, India became independent. On the other hand most of the Sub-Saharan African countries got their independence from late 1950s to mid 1960s. As first colonial country to become independent soon after the War, India was historically placed under fully committed leadership of Nehru to carry forward the movement of liberation and struggle against racial discrimination in Africa. Till African countries joined the rank of free countries, India strongly took their cause to all international forums such as the UN and Commonwealth. Nehru put the full weight of independent India behind these unfinished tasks. Decolonization and end of racial discrimination in Africa became the rallying point of Indo–African relations. The world was divided between Cold War camps. Indian did not want to join any camp as a camp follower. Nehru, therefore, realized the need for Afro-Asian solidarity and their assertion in world order as a third independent group. India could not have followed independent policies domestically and globally if it was to be a camp follower or remain isolated. Therefore, there was a need to push for the liberation of countries in Africa. Since they were not independent territories, India used the channel of Afro-Asian Solidarity Organisations and other such political formations in African countries. This allowed Indian leaders to rear up and pair up with the future leadership of African countries.

Multidimensional Relations India's relation with Africa during the Cold War period could be analysed under five major strands—(i) fight against racism, (ii) support to liberation struggles, (iii) Afro-Asian assertion culminating into Non-Alignment Movement (NAM), (iv) policy of active dissociation with Indian diaspora, and (v) economic diplomacy along with security and peacebuilding under South–South cooperation.

2.2.1 India's Role Against Racist Regime of South Africa

Racial Discrimination policy of South African Government was of deep concern to Gandhi, Nehru and INC. As soon as Nehru became interim PM of India in 1946, South Africa witnessed the launch of passive resistance movement in June 1946 to protest against the '*Ghetto Act*' which was enacted to segregate the residential area of South African population on racial lines. Nehru approached the United Nations to oppose the racial segregation and discrimination through the '*Ghetto Act*'. India moved resolution to denounce and intervene in South Africa under article 10 and 14 of UN Charter. India recalled its High commissioner from South Africa. It broke its economic link with South Africa. At this time, South Africa's share in global trade of India was 4.5 %. All other African countries share put together, were lesser than this. India restored its diplomatic ties with South Africa only when Apartheid was dismantled and South Africa established democratic government in 1994. The Franco-Mexican Resolution in the General Assembly of UN supported by India on this issue is a historic one. The resolution expressed, in no uncertain terms, the world opinion and the reaction of United Nations to the denial of human rights and fundamental freedom in South Africa. It called for 'treatment of Indians in South Africa to be in conformity with international obligation and Charter of the UN'. It became a guiding precedent for the United Nations on the question involving denial of human rights and fundamental freedom (Foreign Affairs Report 1946). Nehru constantly drew attention to the broader issues of racism in South Africa and beyond. On the eve of the formation of his interim government, in a message to Indians in South Africa he wrote, "the struggle in South Africa is ... not merely of Indian issue...It concerns ultimately the Africans, who have suffered so much by racial discrimination and suppression". Though India has initially raised the issue of discrimination of Indians in South Africa, soon India broadened the scope of its UN resolution to include all discriminated under Apartheid system.

Indian position on discrimination of Indians in South Africa emerged during the nineteenth century but independent India soon merged this issue of 'discrimination of Indians' by opposing racialism as such in South Africa. The Indian President explained this shift in his presidential address to Indian parliament, "The question is no longer merely one of Indian in South Africa; it has already assumed greater and wider significance. It is a question of racial domination and racial tolerance. It is a question of African more than that Indians in South Africa" (Lok Sabha 1952). Between 1946 and 1962, the UN General Assembly passed 26 Resolutions which were activated by India and directed against racial discrimination in South Africa. In 1962 UN general assembly called for diplomatic and economic sanction against racist regime of South Africa. The UN declared Apartheid 'a Crime Against Humanity' which 'might endanger international peace and security'. India played a key role in the formation of A Special Committee Against Apartheid set up by UN General Assembly and offered all sorts of assistance to this Committee. On 5 October 1976, a special session of UN Committee Against apartheid was convened in New York to pay a special tribute to India for its crusade against Apartheid. It

was for the first time during 12 years of this Committee's existence that it honoured a member state. Delegates coming from across the world appreciated India for its principled stand against Apartheid during the last 30 years. Ambassador Leslie O. Harriman of Nigeria, the chairman of the Special Committee said on the occasion:

We, in this Special Committee, owe particular appreciation to India for its consistent cooperation. When this Committee began its work on 2 April 1963, the very first document before it was a letter from India offering full cooperation. When this Committee appealed in 1964 for assistance to political prisoners, the very first contribution came from India. We found a response from India for every request we made in the cause of South Africa. (UN General Assembly 1976)

India not only played a crusading role in the UN but in the Commonwealth as well. India joined Tanzania and other African members in stating that it was not possible for them to be part of the Commonwealth if the South African racist regime remained a member of the organization. Nehru said in the Commonwealth meeting, "The Apartheid policy of suppression, separation and segregations is officially declared policy of government there. It becomes a question practically speaking of whether a number of other countries should continue in the Commonwealth". As a result of all these pressures South Africa was expelled from the Commonwealth. Indian diplomatic and economic boycott of South African regime continued till 1994 when South Africa became a democratic state under the presidency of Nelson Mandela, at which point India resumed its tradelink and diplomatic contact.

2.2.2 Indian Support to Liberation Struggles in Africa

Indian support to liberation struggles in Africa during the Nehru period was influenced by Indian's own strategy and experience of freedom struggle. The national interests of a nascent India reinforced its ideological commitment to support freedom struggles in Africa. However, the Indian positions on the African strategy for their freedom struggles, the external support for the same and extent to which Indian state could involve itself in these struggles, were determined by India's own experience to peaceful, non-violent path of struggle, Nehru's world view and sensitivity towards West, and by the limited capacity and vulnerability of the newborn Indian state. Moreover, India under Nehru, wanted to clearly distinguish its support to African liberation struggles in contrast to support that Communist countries were giving through bilateral approach and from the Western countries which were protecting their White Settler Diasporas in the decolonization process. The extent of Indian support to freedom struggles in Africa during the Cold War kept evolving as India grew economically and its national interest too kept changing in short and long term. But what remained constant was the Indian desire to be a proactive, special and non-controversial supporter of African

liberation struggles, at times with mixed responses of African countries and their leaders.

Ideologically, India felt that the Africans should follow a peaceful constitutional path for their freedom struggles as India had done. The Indian preference for non-violence antagonized many African leaders. India itself had made exception from this when it decolonized Portuguese controlled Indian territories by force after its independence. India's refusal to recognize the provisional government of Algeria and its moderate stand on the Congo crisis, its insistence on peaceful decolonization and the Anglo-centric view about colonial withdrawal from Africa displeased both conservative Monrovia and militant Casablanca groups of African countries.⁵ It brought differences into the open (Dubey 1990). Moreover, post-Bandung years witnessed that the Chinese militancy and advocacy for armed struggle had more appeal to Africans (Quoted in Kimche 1973) than the Indian pacifism. Chinese spread the propaganda that India had "gone over to the camp of imperialists" (Dubey 1990, p. 271).

The changed circumstances and the urgency of the mid-1960s, along with India's commitment against racial discrimination and colonial holdings, found its expression in a stronger stand on the Rhodesian issues. India had considered Rhodesia as a non-self governing territory. But on 7 May 1965, India became the first country in the world to break off its diplomatic relations with Rhodesia and was one of the first to impose total embargo after the proclamation of Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). The decision to break off diplomatic relations was taken five months before even the declaration of UDI, when the Ian Smith regime ordered elections based on restricted franchise indicating a positive development towards proclamation of UDI (Ali Sadiq 1987a, b, p. 62). India made a false start in Rhodesia by extending its support to party led by Joshua Nkomo and not to party led by Robert Mugabe which came to power after independence in 1980 (Dubey 2010). India not only took corrective action as soon as Mugabe came to power at the conclusion of Lancaster House conference but in order to avoid controversy like this and that of its initial support to FLNA in Angola, decided to support and recognize the groups accepted by Organisation for African Unity (OAU) as legitimate representatives (Dubey 2010).

Indian position in involving itself with African struggles during initial year of Indian independence was seen by African countries as soft. Aba Saheb Pant was sent to Nairobi as an Indian High Commissioner to East Africa even when Kenya was a colony. His home became contact point of all leaders of freedom fighters in East Africa. The British colonial government became so alarmed by his popularity that British Government forced Nehru to recall Pant from East Africa (Gopal 1984a, b).

⁵The Casablanca Group was an organization of African states (Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Mali and Morocco) led by Kwame Nkrumah, leading proponent of Pan-Africanism. The Brazzaville Group was made up of 20 African nations, including Nigeria, Ethiopia, Liberia and Sierra Leone. In general terms, it favoured a less formal confederation of newly independent African states and a more voluntary approach to participation in cultural and economic exchange (and less socialism) than did the Casablanca Group.

This was seen by Africans as a weak support by Nehru. However, soon India became aggressive on this front. When the nationalists of Guinea Bissau set up a government in exile, India did not waste time to ponder over the legality of the newly set up government and granted it immediate recognition. Similarly, when the Angolan civil war was in progress and entire Angola was parceled among FLNA, MPLA and UNITA factions of nation splits, and even the OAU had not yet made up its mind on whom to recognize as legitimate representative of the Angolan people, the government of India announced its decision. (Dubey 1990).

On issue of Namibian liberation struggle, India worked aggressively in the United Nations. When the International Court of Justice deferred (1971) its decision on terminating South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia, Indian Minister of External Affairs asserted that, "it is a political question, which has to be dealt with by the conscience of mankind. It is incumbent on international community to close this ugly chapter in the history of international relations" (Dubey 1989). In 1982 India proposed a global meet on Namibia to force South Africa to free Namibia. It was adopted by 130-0 votes in UN. India accorded full diplomatic status to *South West Africa People's Organization* (SWAPO). India pledged to extend all possible diplomatic, military and material support stressing the need for greater political as well as more tangible 'material assistance' to SWAPO. The diplomatic recognition of SWAPO was in sharp contrast to earlier legalistic approach of India on issues of Algerian crisis, Mau Mau rebellion, etc. Both Indian Prime Minister V.P. Singh and opposition leader Rajiv Gandhi attended the independence celebration of Namibia in 1990 at Windhoek.

Besides providing diplomatic support for liberation struggles at different international forums like the UN, Commonwealth, NAM, etc., India started extending financial and material support to them. It was a new addition to India's earlier policies where it used to provide mainly diplomatic support. Though its own economic limitations did not enable India to provide meaningful material or financial support to liberation struggles, whatever these material and financial supports it provided were largely given through multilateral channels like bodies of Organisation of African Unity (OAU). In order to avoid controversy of India propping one or other faction during freedom struggle in any African country, Indian deliberately decided for this policy. It was in contrast to Soviet, Chinese or Western policies to support a particular faction to get a puppet regime in power. By 1969 India had spent around US\$1.2 million to assist African liberation movement. By 1977 this amount went up to US\$5 million (Ali 2004). The increase in this amount during this period demonstrates that India's commitment to African liberation was based on solid grounds not on the rhetoric or personal commitment of any particular leader. During 1977-78 it further allotted Rs. 31 million to add strength to its diplomatic moves on liberation movements. India provided African National Congress (ANC) and SWAPO with facilities to man their respective missions in New Delhi. Material and technical assistance were given to South African and Namibian liberation struggles. India also contributed to the UN Fund for Namibia, UN Institute for Namibia, UN Educational and Training Programme for South Africa. Indian External Affairs Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee pledged, at the

Foreign Ministers Conference of Commonwealth, that India would definitely consider any request for arms made by guerrillas fighting against White minority regime of South Africa. At Harare NAM Summit (1986), Action For Resisting Invasion, Colonialism and Apartheid (AFRICA) Fund which is better known as AFRICA Fund was established with a purpose to enable NAM to help all the victims of apartheid in South Africa, Namibia and in the frontline states. Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was chiefly responsible for the establishment of it. He was chosen as its chairman. It decided upon a plan of action in close consultation with Southern African Development Coordination Council (SADCC). The nine member group chaired by Rajiv Gandhi launched the Fund with an initial capital of US\$70 million. Indian contribution in this Fund was US\$40 million. This was an indication of the close watch India was keeping on African developments. This aggressive material support in the Indian stand was in sharp contrast to the position, which India took during the Nehru period (1947–1964). India's support to the African liberation did not change with the change of government in New Delhi. In fact, in subsequent years this support kept on intensifying (Dubey 1990).

2.2.3 *Afro-Asian Solidarity and NAM*

Afro-Asian Solidarity was seen as crucial factor by Nehru which was to enable newly emerging countries to decide their own course of development under Cold War rivalry. Afro-Asian Solidarity and Afro-Asian resurgence in international arena were to give India and Africa a third option of not being a camp follower of either of super power. In the 1950s, Bandung Conference (1955) and the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Conference of Cairo (AAPSC 1958) provided a platform to Indian and African leaders to understand each other's perceptions. Speaking at the Bandung Conference in April 1955, Jawaharlal Nehru declared: "There is nothing more terrible than the infinite tragedy of Africa in the past few 100 years" (Nehru 1955, p. 291). He added further that "the days when millions of Africans were carried away as galley slaves to America and elsewhere, half of them dying in the galleys... (p. 291)". He urged "... we must accept responsibility for it, all of us, even though we ourselves were not directly involved" (p. 291). He continued "... But unfortunately, in a different sense, even now the tragedy of Africa is greater than that of any other continent, whether it is racial or political. It is up to Asia to help Africa to the best of her ability because we are sister continents" (p. 291).

Indo–Chinese war of 1962 confirmed India's isolation in the Afro-Asian circles since very few African countries expressed their support to India and many were overtly unsupportive. This was due to aggressive armed and economic support of China to African freedom fighters. This was a short phase during which time India had pressing domestic priorities to overcome its military and economic vulnerability.

However, the Indian role through Asian Relations Conference (New Delhi), Bandung meet, several Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization meets, culminated into

first NAM Summit at Belgrade in 1961, where Abdul Nasser of Africa and Nehru played a crucial role. The summit formulated the rationale, strategy and action for members of NAM. Nehru was the main architect and philosopher behind the NAM at Belgrade. His rationalization, vision and utility of NAM were heard with rapt attention at this conference. His vision was an independent space for formal colonial countries away from Cold War rivalry framework. He championed Afro-Asian Solidarity and Afro-Asian Resurgence in international relations. He advocated horizontal cooperation among developing. This Summit marked the beginning of regular institutionalized solidarity meet between India–Africa and other third world countries.

The second NAM Conference was held in Cairo immediately after India–China war in 1964. Nehru was not alive by then. India without Nehru was reduced to insignificance in the Summit. The opinion of radical African countries and India was sharply divided. Krishna Menon harshly commented on Indian performance at Cairo Summit by saying “We became camp followers there...our personality did not make any impact on the conference or on the delegates” (Brecher 1968). In contrast to the speech of Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, who said: “First and foremost we believe in peace, in the settlement of all disputes with peaceful means,” Kwame Nkrumah, stressed that, “as long as oppressed classes exist there can be no such thing as peaceful coexistence between opposing ideologies” (Nkrumah 1964). In contrast to India’s view that Cold War was the root of all tensions, Africans identified colonialism as the root of all tensions.

Contrary to Indian view of non-alignment as ‘respect for peace and active coexistence among peoples and states’; President Ahmed Sekou Toure of Guinea held that non-alignment ‘perfectly expressed the wishes of states to free themselves from the domination of centuries’. The Cairo Summit did not agree with the Indian Prime Minister Shastri’s request to pass a resolution against use of force for settling territorial dispute or to introduce a proposal to send a mission to China to persuade from developing nuclear weapons (Heimsath and Singh 1971). Except Cyprus no other country gave any support to it and many thought it inappropriate even to introduce such a proposal.⁶

India’s isolation vis-à-vis China among African countries, inside NAM Summit, was clear. In content, it was a metamorphosis of Bandung (1955) spirit, if not of Belgrade (1961), where Indian and African leadership acted together. But what was more important and in contrast to Bandung—it was Africa which took place of pride at Cairo Summit and it was African delegates who set the tone for the Summit (Africa Research Bulletin 1964). Further it was a success of Chinese ‘combatant’ approach that succeeded in pushing ‘peaceful coexistence’ from first to the fourth position in the list of items on agenda. The Cairo Summit signalled India the increasing importance of African countries in NAM, the influence which China had

⁶Similarly when Jakarta preparatory meet for Algiers-Bandung type conference was being held, Egypt put the proposal that no dispute like the Sino-Indian should be considered as precondition for such a meet.

over them, isolation which India faced among African countries and the sorry state in which Indian diplomacy had come to (Pham 2011). It was more than the simple failure of Indian diplomacy. The task before India was to fix national diplomatic priorities. These policy goals had to be adopted with suitable approach in the changed context of the importance that Africa enjoyed under the changed circumstances.

It was in these given circumstances and imperatives that India set out reframing its Africa policy in the mid 1960s. India was searching for a new equation with the African countries. Its policy became selective. Viewing from retrospect, the first priority of Indian policy goals in Africa was to isolate China and Pakistan which had signed “Boundary Agreement”, with China being given Indian territory of Pakistani occupied Kashmir. The second priority was to arrest and then reverse the falling image and influence of India amongst Africans who enjoyed greater numerical strength in NAM and other Third World forums. The strategy adopted was to follow a selective approach in forging new connections and revitalizing older ones from African countries; and to win over reliable friends there. Further India decided that each Chinese move in Africa was to be countered economic diplomacy, visits by leaders, etc. In addition to this, all other leverages available to India for example, Sino-Soviet rift, Indian settlers in Africa, Indian experience as an ex-colonial country were to be used to promote Indian engagement with Africa. These were some of the main drivers which guided India’s Africa policy both for short and long-term engagement from mid-60s onwards.

2.2.4 South–South Interactions: Diplomacy, Economic Linkages and Peacekeeping

By the end of 1960 when the colonial question was largely resolved, NAM began to pay attention to economic matters. It was the first time at the Lusaka Conference of NAM (1970) that economic cooperation within the South–South received top priorities. The Lusaka Summit had laid added emphasis on economic cooperation among non-aligned countries. In the Summit, India played an active and positive role in highlighting the main politico-economic problems faced by the developing countries.

2.2.5 Indian Economic Diplomacy

The speech of Mrs. Gandhi in NAM Summit at Lusaka for the first time proposed South–South Cooperation through which India was to provide economic and technical assistance among developing nation to counter neocolonial policies perpetuated by the industrially advanced countries. She maintained that

... a realistic appraisal of our competence reveals the possibility of our working together to reduce our dependence on those who do not respect our sovereignty so that economic leverage for thinly disguised political purpose cannot be used against us. Neocolonialism has no sympathy with our efforts to achieve self-reliance. It seeks to perpetuate our position of disadvantage. (Ministry of External Affairs 1970, p. 191)

In fact, by early 1970s African countries started questioning the wisdom of dependent development. The increasing need of South–South Cooperation both in India and Africa, for their own separate reasons, got articulated in various conferences (Chhabra 1986). It was in Lusaka Summit of NAM that both Africans and Indians underlined the need for its implementation. The resolutions on Non-Alignment and Economic Progress were separated from 14 other resolutions of the conference which for the first time dealt with a working programme and preliminary negotiations among non-aligned nations. The host, President Kenneth Kaunda, in his opening address to the conference emphasized the need of economic unity (Africa Research Bulletin 1964). Julius Nyerere of Tanzania pointed to the disappointments among developing countries in developing through the ideas of developed countries. Nyerere stressed that, “for in seeking to overcome our poverty we each inevitably run the risk of being sucked into the orbit of one or other of the Great Powers” and “it is through these questions of trade and aid that our action in world affairs can be influenced, if not be controlled”. He, therefore, asked the Lusaka Conference to consider “the question of how we can strengthen Non-Alignment by economic cooperation” (Ali Shanti 1987a, b). Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi elaborated in details, at the same conference, the potential areas and logic behind South–South cooperation. She assured the conference that “if we decide and, I hope we shall, India will be glad to play her modest part” (Gandhi 1975, pp. 629–97).

Meanwhile, the damaging impact of the India–China war in 1962 on India’s foreign policy was subsequently reversed with India’s victory in Bangladesh war of 1971. Soon thereafter, India went on to consolidate and boost its image. With detonation of its first nuclear device in 1974 at Pokhran(Rajasthan), raised its international image in the matter of defence and global power politics. It was also an event to indicate India’s achievement in scientific and technological areas. With the decisive victory over Pakistan in 1971 India emerged as the ‘primary’ or ‘dominant’ power in the subcontinent. India also signed Indo–Soviet Friendship Treaty at this time without compromising its position as NAM member and successfully utilized it to check possible US alignment with Pakistan in 1971 war. All these developments in South Asia enabled Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to emerge as a popular leader at home who soon commanded a worldwide attention.

Like 1962, the 1971 developments in the subcontinent had a direct bearing on Indo–African relations. Many African leaders viewed that India had emerged as a regional power, which had not only been consistently sympathetic towards their aspirations, but they could turn to it for help and assistance. Indian diplomacy during this period changed its priorities. India’s major concern in Africa was to foster economic cooperation under the umbrella of South–South Cooperation. India utilized all its diplomatic strength at different international forums like UNO, NAM,

‘Group of 77’, etc., to promote and develop South–South Cooperation (Vhora and Mathews 1997). Explaining India’s new policy shift during 1970s the then Minister of External Affairs Mr. Swaran Singh said in Lok Sabha, on 25 April 1972,

...our heads of the Mission have also been told that they have to keep watch over the economic needs of the countries of their accreditation...they should work like commercial salesman on behalf of the private firm and they should not consider this work as inferior or below their dignity. (Ministry of External Affairs 1972, p. 90)

From the very beginning, India’s economic diplomacy, among the developing countries, was largely focused on African countries who responded well to Indian moves in this regard. Thus in the post-Nehru years, and throughout Indira Gandhi years the discussions and deliberation on the global issues—like the world peace, the colonial and racist policies of imperial powers and North–South relations—influenced not only India’s Africa policy but also that of the newly independent African countries towards India.

India soon gained its importance in NAM again. Since Lusaka Summit to New Delhi Summit (1983), the main running issues in all these summits were: (1) the changing concepts of NAM; (2) support to national liberation struggles which has been already discussed above and (3) the increasing emphasis on South–South economic cooperation.

2.2.6 Priorities of South–South Interactions Under NAM

The question related to the definition and purpose of NAM always surfaced in one way or other. To India, NAM as a movement, equidistant from super power’s rivalry, ‘was the main source of its power’ (Heimsath and Singh 1971, p. 61). In Cairo Summit (1964) ‘combative’, militant views were prevalent, however, India did not deter from its stand. In Lusaka Summit (1970) most of the militant leaders—Nkrumah from Ghana, Ben Bella from Algeria and Nasser from Egypt—were absent, who had vigorously advocated the case of militant struggles. With Lusaka Summit (1970) the appeal for armed struggle was waning. This Summit emphasized on peaceful and non-violent struggle as a method to unshackle the oppressed Black majority. The issue of defining NAM continued at Algiers Summit (1973). Cuba proposed that NAM being anti-colonial and anti-imperialist, Soviet Union was its natural ally. The controversy over the concept of natural ally became very sharp during Havana Summit (1979). In growing divergent position on the nature of NAM, India along with Nigeria helped the host delegation in preparing the final draft. Though it was a compromised draft, it underlined the importance of the unity of the movement. It was in New Delhi Summit and Harare Summit that this controversy was completely side-tracked. The main thrust and focus of Non-alignment shifted to and for the cause of economic cooperation. In Delhi Summit, South–South cooperation was the first item in Agenda as well as in the

Final Declaration. Since then, South–South Cooperation has been an important dimension of Indo–African relations.

2.2.6.1 Public Sector and Joint Venture Led Cooperation During Cold War

In 1964, India launched its Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme and Special Commonwealth African Assistance Plan (SCAAP). Under ITEC, India provided assistance under the following major heads—(1) Training fellowships in India (2) Deputation of Indian experts to undertake specific assignments, (3) project aid and (4) external assistance by way of techno-economic studies. The Indian economic initiatives in Africa were multi-pronged and a selective approach of friendship was adopted. During 1960s, India also extended its financial assistance to Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda and Ghana. The reasons behind following economic diplomacy were purely political. However, it itself proved beneficial in the long-run. India's economic relations with Africa became important part of its bilateral relations. Indian state enterprises, which were driving force of economic cooperation during this period, were given 'special guidelines' as to how to contrast their cooperation against multinational companies from the North. This relationship which was attempted to be different from North–South economic linkages gave India an edge over other external players in the continent.

Joint Ventures were also promoted through some reputed private sectors of India. These joint ventures form essential part of India's economic diplomacy. The adoption of joint ventures as a means of economic cooperation among developing countries by India dates back in 1958, when Birla Brothers initiated the setting up of a textile mill in Ethiopia. Since 1964 Government of India adopted a more positive stance towards joint ventures. In that year Indian industrialists Goodwill Mission that visited African countries reported that, "We must actively participate in setting up joint industrial ventures in as large a measure as possible" (Agarwal 1967, p. 353). By 1985, out of 44 Indian joint ventures in Africa 25 were in operation and 19 under implementation. The National Small Scale Industries Corporation of India had helped many African countries to set up organizations for small scale industries, e.g. Small Scale Industries Development Organization (SIDO) in Mauritius, Small Enterprise and Development Organization (SEDO) in Zimbabwe, and Small Industries Development Organization (SIDO) in Zambia. Indian joint ventures in Africa had been successful both in production as well as in project construction or implementation. In the production area, most of the firms were from the private sector, whereas in construction and project construction it was public sector enterprises like Rail India Technical and Engineering Services (RITES), Hindustan Machine Tools (HMT) and Metallurgy and Engineering Consultants (MECON).

2.2.6.2 Peacekeeping During Cold War Period

India extended its participation in UN peacekeeping mission ever since UN involved itself in conflict management situation in Africa. India's support in peacekeeping operations in Africa demonstrates its commitment at bringing peace and development to the continent (Gurirab 2000). India has participated in a number of these peacekeeping operations. It was involved in the United Nations operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ); Somalia (UNOSOM I, II); United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I, II, III) and Observer Mission (MONUA); and also in the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNAMEE), Democratic Republic of Congo.

2.2.7 *Nehru and Indian Diaspora Policy During Cold War*

There are over 3 million People of Indian Origin in Africa. They are spread in Anglophone, Lusophone, Francophone and North Africa. Indian settlers had joined the independence movement in various African countries. As a result, after the independence of the African countries, many African leaders were of Indian origin. This helped in maintaining goodwill of India throughout the continent. The principle of the 'paramountcy of the natives' doctrine has been an integral part of India's foreign policy towards Africa ever since India became independent in 1947. Indian residents in Africa had been advised consistently by the Government of India to share the aspirations of their African fellows and not to ask for special privileges that would identify them as minorities demanding special right over majority. After Indian independence, Indian settlers in Africa were also looking up to their motherland for help and support. But the foreign policy of India gave more importance to the ties between India and the African countries; hence the Indians in Africa were told specifically by Nehru that they were as dear to him as any African, so no special consideration was given to Indian diaspora (Gopal 1984a, b, pp. 353–362).

A shuttle change in India's policy about Indian settlers in Africa came when Mrs. Indira Gandhi visited African countries and described them as "Ambassadors of India". It was in contrast from Nehru's view which sounded outright dissociation of Indian settlers from India's policy considerations. The inclusion of 'Indian settlers' in Africa in the policy frame of India was more apparent in Kenya, when India initiated with the Government of Kenya a plan for formation of an Africa–India Development Association (Africendo) with the long-term objective of seeking integration of the Indian community (numbering about 150,000) in the economic life of Kenya (Gopal 1984a, b, p. 272). Though this plan could not translate into reality, it did show the inclusion of Indian settlers in the Indian policy from 1990.

2.3 India–Africa in Post-Cold War Period: A Vision to Establish Symbiotic Relations

2.3.1 Coping with Globalization: Common Challenges of India and Africa

With beginning of 1990s, Indian economy nosedived. India faced a very high fiscal deficit and dangerously low foreign exchange reserves. The crisis was triggered by the acute deterioration in the balance of payments. In order to cope up with the situation, India was forced into economic liberalization in 1991. It decided to abandon the model of mixed economy of earlier years. Indian Government decided to liberalize and privatize its economy. It started Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) under International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB). There was resistance by established interests to shift from state dominated economy to market-led economy. However, leaders across the political parties developed a consensus to go for market economy. At the same time India also took a ‘U’ turn on its Diaspora policy. In order to bypass the overbearing prescriptions of IMF/WB, India launched long-term Indian diaspora bonds fetching several billions US dollars. With this, India continued its economic reforms with its own sequencing and pace irrespective of IMF wisdom. By end of 1990s Indian economy was back to track with fast growth led by the private sectors.

At the same time due to end of Cold War, all African countries were forced to adopt monitored IMF/WB funded SAP. Most of them adopted market economy as driver of economic development. From a decade long negative growth of 1980s, Africa, as a region, started steadily growing by mid 1990s onward. Those countries having political consensus or political stability achieved positive growth by the turn of the century. It was in this century that Indian private sector moved in determined way to engage Africa.

2.3.2 Liberalized Economy and Linkages Between India and Africa

India has enhanced its scope of economic cooperation with Africa. It has taken several initiatives for aggressive economic cooperation with the African countries. It included —extending lines of credit to Preferential Trade Area (PTA) countries (since 1992); the creation of a revolving fund of Rs. 1 billion towards regional cooperation with Africa in 1996; a Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation between India and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1997; the Focus Africa Programme (2002); and TEAM 9 Initiative (US\$500 million) in 2003.

Coupled with it, India supported the vision of New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) initiative since its inception in 2001. It was another step indicative of its move to assist African countries in achieving its development goals.

India committed \$200 million to the NEPAD to increase economic interaction with Africa. The aim was to forge closer economic cooperation in the fields of mining, agro-processed products, motor vehicles, its spare parts and Information and Communication Technology (ICT). NEPAD offers large opportunity for India–Africa partnership.

Moreover, since mid-1990s organizations like the Confederation of Indian Industries (CII), The Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASSOCHAM), the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) and the Federation of Indian Exporters' Organisation (FIEO) identified Africa as an important frontier. These organizations launched programmes to promote economic and business cooperation. This included exchange of information, conducting one-to-one business meetings and organising activities like 'Made in India' shows across Africa (Beri 2003). These Indian chambers have also entered into joint business agreements with Mauritius, Kenya, Zambia, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, South Africa and Ethiopia.

2.3.3 Rapidly Growing India and the 'New Rush' to Africa

2.3.3.1 Trade

As a result of India's proactive policy in Africa—India's trade with Africa is expected to reach at \$100 billion by 2015 which stood at only US\$5 billion a decade ago and was over US\$60 billion in 2012. India's trade relations with Africa varied in terms of region and intensity over the years. By 2011 India has emerged as the fourth largest trading partner of Africa (Zuma 2013). The nature of trade between India and African countries also changed significantly. Till the early 1970s, Indo–African trade was mostly in traditional items like jute manufactures, textiles and clothing. Non-traditional items, viz., engineering goods, iron and steel and chemicals and allied products (including pharmaceuticals and cosmetics) gradually occupied lead position since the mid-1970s. India's imports from Africa consisted mainly of raw cotton; raw cashew nuts, non-ferrous metals (copper, zinc and lead); pearls, semi-precious stones; rock phosphate; and dyeing, tanning and colouring materials in 1970s and 1980s. However, after 1990s, hydrocarbon have become the major imported commodity from Africa, followed by metal products and chemical products. Africa's share in India's total trade has increased steadily and today Africa accounts for nearly 9 % of India's imports as compared to 3.5 % in 2005. India's largest trading partners are Nigeria, Angola, South Africa and Egypt.

2.3.3.2 Energy Resources in Indo–African Relations

Energy cooperation emerged as prominent area of partnership between India and Africa. It is one of the main drivers of the current partnership. At present India is the

sixth largest energy consumer in the world and projected to emerge as the fourth largest consumer after the United States, China and Japan (WTO and CII 013). India requires to expand its energy supply to sustain its growth levels in order to attain its developmental goals and especially to eradicate poverty.

Presently India imports 70 % of its oil from Middle East. It is seeking to diversify its energy sources, for which it is investing in energy assets outside. In this context Africa's energy potential is very significant for India. About 24 % of India's crude oil imports are sourced from Africa (including the North African countries) (Fee 2006). The Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Videsh Limited (OVL) has largest overseas investment over 3\$US billion invested in Sudan. It has also acquired stakes in Senegal, Ivory Coast, Libya, Egypt, Nigeria and Gabon. For its energy requirements India is willing to share with Africa its expertise in exploration, distribution, refining, storage and transportation. Indian investment in this sector should directly assist in the building up of a trained and skilled local workforce capable of efficiently running the assets. India is keen for increasing energy import from Africa. But major issue is as how India is going to reciprocate this by policy and acts which is qualitatively different from traditional buyers in Africa. India has proposed to support food security, human resource development, market access and anything that their 'collective' leadership at AU and Regional organization level request and which India can provide.

2.3.4 Peacekeeping: India in Africa

Peace is an elusive commodity in Africa which has witnessed scores of conflicts over the years (Beri 2003, p. 227). It is estimated that 18 Sub-Saharan African countries are directly or indirectly involved in conflicts; in 12 others, conflict can erupt at any moment (p. 227). India has participated in a number of these peace-keeping operations.

India extended its participation in UN peacekeeping mission even since UN involved itself in conflict management situation in Africa. India's support in peacekeeping operations in Africa demonstrates its commitment at bringing peace and development to the continent (Gurirab 2000). India has participated in a number of these peacekeeping operations. It was involved in the United Nations operations: in Congo (ONUC: 1960–1964); Angola (United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I, II, III: 1991–1995; Observer Mission (MONUA); in Mozambique (ONUMOZ: 1992–1993); Somalia (UNOSOM I, II: 1993–1994); Liberia (UNOMIL: 1993–1997); Rwanda (UNAMIR: 1993–1995); Sierra Leon (UNAMSIL: 1999–2000). Currently, India's Peacekeeping forces are active in Congo (MONUC/MONUSCO: since January 2005); Sudan (UNMIS/UNMISS: since April 2005); Ivory Coast (UNOCI: since April 2004); Liberia (UNMIL: since April 2007) (India and UN Peacekeeping, online). Currently (2014), there are around 7000 Indian peacekeepers in Africa.

India also responded to the call by the UN Secretary General for female personnel in field missions by sending its first full ‘Female Formed Police Unit’ for peacekeeping mission in Liberia. This unit also reached out to women and children, in addition to performing its normal peacekeeping function (Rao 2006). The professionalism and the social/community sensitivity of the Indian troops in African countries is well known. India’s role in UN peacekeeping in Africa has been much appreciated by the local population. In a conference in New Delhi, the Namibian Foreign Minister was quick to express appreciation of Indian response to the African hour of need (Gurirab 2000, pp. 384–385).

2.3.5 Security Issues in Indian Ocean: Africa-India Engagement

The Indian Ocean has become a key strategic arena in the twenty-first century. One reason for this is the growth of the Asian economies and their increased need for raw materials, including energy from the Middle East and Africa to provide for their economic growth. The changing geopolitical situation in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) in the last decades, has acted as a stimulus for the littoral nations to examine their presence and engagement in the sea.

In the mid-1990s, Indian foreign policy largely focused on improving its relations with its immediate neighbours like Bangladesh, China, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. It positioned itself as a regional power. This aspiration was fundamental to India’s support of the IOR-ARC regional grouping. Sheer membership of the IOR-ARC linked India to the large number of African Indian Ocean Rim states (Vines and Oruitemeka 2008). India, positioning itself through bilateral and tri-lateral efforts, has strengthened its relations along the African Indian Ocean Rim, notably with Mauritius, the Seychelles, Madagascar and coastal states such as Tanzania, Mozambique and Kenya.

The significance of the Indian Ocean to India’s economic development and security is immense. Most of India’s trade is by sea and nearly 89 % of its oil arrives by sea. Avoiding disruption in the sea lanes of communication in the Indian Ocean are vital for India’s economy. The Indian Navy has patrolled the Exclusive Economic Zone of Mauritius since 2003 (Berlin 2006, p. 72). India has similarly agreed on a defense cooperation with Seychelles through a Memorandum of Understanding drawn up in 2003 for India to patrol its territorial waters.

Piracy and counterterrorism also feature in India’s increasing naval interest in African part of Indian Ocean Rim. A significant percentage of India’s trade including oil and fertilizers passes through the Gulf of Aden. According to Indian Government figures, annual Indian imports through the Gulf of Aden route alone are valued at US\$50 billion while exports are pegged at US\$60 billion. Therefore, the safety and unhindered continuity of maritime trade through this route became a primary national concern since it directly impacts India’s economy (Gokhale 2011).

Moreover India's large sea-faring community who are embarked on-board both Indian and foreign flagged vessels, accounts for 6 % of the world's sea-farers (Indian Navy 2013). Piracy along the coast of Somalia has been a threat to shipping starting from second phase of Somali Civil War since early twenty-first century (Khan n.d.). In order to protect Indian ships and Indians employed in sea-faring duties, Indian Navy commenced anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden commencing from October 2008. A total of 1104 ships (139 Indian flagged and 965 foreign flagged from 50 different countries) have been escorted by Indian Navy ships through the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC). The Indian Navy has undertaken various initiatives to strengthen its anti-piracy efforts. Merchant ships are currently escorted along the entire length of (IRTC) that has been promulgated for use by all merchant vessels (Indian Navy n.d.).

Apart from bilateral initiatives, India supports and participates in multilateral forums for this purpose. Besides Indian Ocean Rim Association (IOR-ARC), India participated in the formation of 'Indian Ocean Naval Symposium' (IONS) which seeks to increase maritime cooperation among navies of the littoral states of the Indian Ocean Region by providing an open and inclusive forum for discussion of regionally relevant maritime issues. In the process, it endeavours to generate a flow of information between naval professionals that would lead to common understanding and possibly cooperative solutions. East African countries including—Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritria, France, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan and Tanzania—actively participate at this forum.

2.3.6 Redesigning Institutions of Global Governance: India and Africa

The twentieth century global power architecture had changed. New powers emerged and old powers lost their place of primacy in economic arena. The old structures of institutions of global governance have continued without evolution, adoption and recognition of new demographic and economic powers. Indian and African countries had been demanding the reorganization of institution of global management like UN and its Security Council, World Bank, IMF, WTO. India and African Union, both agree for restructuring of the UN Security Council and its enlargement for inclusion of legitimate representation of Indian and African countries. They agreed to mutually support each other's claim in the Council. India and South Africa, an African country, work for additional financial intuitions visualized through BRICS bank. They cooperate for assertion and recognition of emerging democratic powers through forum of IBSA. They coordinate their respective positions in trade negotiations and formation of climate control regimes. They work together to overcome their disadvantage as developing countries under globalization process. Both regions show their commitment and coordination in

getting their legitimate place in new global order which is monopolized by victors of Second World War.

2.3.7 India and Africa: New Partnership Model and Terms of Economic Engagement

India started its African policy that was request-based but soon realized that it needs to get into a more proactive engagement. Under new global rush to Africa, India wanted to retain its non-exploitative, non-dominating image within Africa. India differed from other external powers in Africa as it opted for the Banjul formula of African Union for cooperation with Africa, which gives collective bargaining strength to African countries. Banjul formula was based on a decision of the African Union Summit taken at the Gambian capital in July 2006. Under this formula, besides Chairs and Director Generals of Regional Economic Communities (REC), five founding members of the New Partnership of Africa's Development (NEPAD), the Chair and of the Heads of State and Government implementing committee of NEPAD, the Chair of the African Union, the past Chair of the AU and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission represent African countries on behalf of Africa. It is through this collective body, AU intends to set the terms of engagement for any major external partner of Africa. India is one of the rare and major partners who opted to submit itself to operationalize its engagement through Banjul formula of AU.

It is this group of African head of states selected by AU that participated in the India–Africa Forum Summit held in 2008 at New Delhi. India's expanding engagement with Africa was seen as a renewed approach with launching of the first India–Africa Forum Summit (IAFS). The Delhi Summit saw a series of activities that brought together business leaders, artists, academics, editors, journalists and civil society representatives, who articulated their hopes and plans for renewing this relationship. The collective endeavor was towards redefining and reinvigorating the decade-old partnership and historical and civilizational links between the African continent and India. The two documents adopted during the 2-day summit were 'the Delhi Declaration' and 'Framework for India–Africa Cooperation' with a view to preserve the unique, equitable partnership model which Indian wanted to retain with Africa. These documents covered just about every area of partnership ranging from agriculture, trade and infrastructure to energy, science and technology and cultural exchanges that have the potential to transform the lives of over two billion people who live in India and Africa, which can transform the nature of India–Africa relationship. India was looking to transform the relationship with Africa from one of immense political goodwill to a large functional economic partnership. Both India and Africa have young growing populations with requirement for education and employment as well as inclusive growth. The second IAFS Summit at Addis Ababa (2011) therefore, aimed at highlighting the common understanding of

international issues and to emphasize the desire of both regions to work together. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at the second Summit aptly described India as a partner in Africa's resurgence and announced US\$5 billion line of credit to the African continent. Apart from the developmental aid, the Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh also announced US\$700 million to build new institutions and training programmes and US\$300 million to establish the Ethiopia-Djibouti railway line. Capacity building has been at the core of India's engagement with Africa, so the PM announced the establishment of 80 new institutions at Pan-African level which include an India–Africa Integrated Textiles Cluster, India–Africa Centre for Medium Range Weather Forecasting and India–Africa Food Processing Cluster. In the education sector India offered a virtual university and 22,000 total scholarships for African students in the next 3 years. There is a large presence of African students in India who come through the scholarship programme of ICCR.

There is also proposal to set up an India–Africa University for Life and Earth Sciences. India has been getting a huge response from Africa in the field of education and training programmes. Indian Institute of Foreign Trade (IIFT) plan to set up an institute in Kampala and Uganda after getting a positive response from the IIFT at Dar-es-salaam, Tanzania. The Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme has been a success in African countries. This gave India reason to give 900 training slots to Africa which will give a total of 2500 training positions for the next 3 years. In addition to this India has also proposed to establish institutes for English language training, Information Technology, entrepreneurship development and vocational training. The current engagement shows that there is less control and more partnership as well as more people-centric, sustainable relationship.

2.4 Conclusion

Indo–African relations are very old and multidimensional. The relationship evolved by constant interaction and migration of people, trade and ideas. Both suffered colonial exploitations, subjugations and territorial fragmentations. Both contributed to each other in their fight against colonization and racial discriminations. Both borrowed from each other ideas, strategies and support to carry forward their freedom struggles. Both witnessed substantial migration of people to other region who occupied place of prominence in their host countries. India being the first colonial country to become independent and as a 'jewel in the crown', contributed significantly and in unmatched way to liberation and anti-racial struggles of African countries. It played a leading role to keep these countries as prime movers of NAM, giving them unique bargaining strength during Cold War period. India being a middle-level technological and knowledge power contributed in economic drive of South–South cooperation. During Cold War phase, it consciously introduced mandatory guidelines for its economic enterprises in Africa to preserve Indian goodwill. There were differences of opinion, clash of interests as happens in the

interactions of sovereign self-respecting nations but all of them were quickly and easily overcome due to mutual respect and goodwill that existed for India in Africa. Rising India was seen as a benign friendly power for African countries. Indian diplomatic and subsequently economic might had always been sensitive and proactive to promote Africa interest. The large Indian diaspora in Africa which is spread in Anglophone, Francophone, Lusophone and Arab Africa, gives it a unique opportunity to utilize the heritage resource for promoting bilateral relations.

The traditional goodwill and multidimensional relations were underutilized by both regions. Globalization, rising Indian economy, growing urge of Africa to diversify its economic linkages, provide new opportunity for two regions to strengthen their economic engagement. In order to retain its special appeal and goodwill in Africa, India is the only important power which accepted the Banjul formula of African Union, giving options to African countries to decide the term of engagements. India, being an aid recipient country in the recent past, made first major attempt as a donor partner to commit over US\$10 billion to Africa under Banjul formula. African countries have also responded positively to Indian new economic engagement initiative. When the emerging players and traditional powers are competing in accessing African resources, the competitive edge of India is its historical goodwill, multidimensional relations, large Indian diaspora along with its constant urge to adopt all possible strategy to retain this unique strength. However, the challenge is whether Multinationals of South, originating from India or by Indian diaspora, and operating in mineral resources, hydrocarbon, agriculture or other sectors of African economy will be helpful in preserving this goodwill?

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Chapter 3

Indian Investors Seeking Markets and Business Prospects

Aparajita Biswas

3.1 Introduction

Over the first decade of the twenty-first century, the scope of India–Africa economic cooperation widened rapidly, reflecting India’s emergence as an important player in the world economy and its substantial need for oil and other natural resources. That need was seen in the two India–Africa Forum summits of 2008 and 2011, in which India offered substantial loans, grants and development assistance in an attempt to “woo” African countries. India has undertaken initiatives to enhance its economic engagement with Africa on a mutually beneficial basis, mainly following the agenda of South–South cooperation.

India’s foreign policy directives have aimed to help revamp African services, infrastructure and nascent market mechanisms, ultimately to encourage the move from agriculture to industry. Its engagement has, to a degree, been built on its diaspora. India has also coupled economic vectors—highlighting technology transfer and partnerships—alongside aid and trade agreements. The Indian development assistance scheme of 2003, for example, related aid to trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), with Indian strategic interests and exports prioritized, given India’s resource crunch and Africa’s potential as a resource-rich continent.

This chapter reviews India’s promotion of economic ties through institutional frameworks and looks at recent bilateral trade trends, including some promising sectors for bilateral trade.

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3.2 Institutional Frameworks for Closer Ties

The Indian government's initiatives, including public forums, programmes, conclaves and India-Africa Forum summits, have helped lift its African trade and investment. The most important is the Focus Africa Programme, launched in 2002, initially targeting seven African countries.¹ The mandate was extended to 24 African nations to address economic and financial issues. Through this programme, the government provides financial assistance to trade promotion organizations, export promotion councils and apex chambers, as well as Indian missions. Since the programme started, many trade promotion councils and agencies have overseen advertising, exhibitions, trade fairs, seminars, workshops and the like.

India launched the Techno Economic Approach for Africa-India Movement (Team-9) in 2004, pledging \$500 million as concessional credit facilities to eight energy and resource-rich West African countries to help private Indian firms carry out development projects.² Under Team-9, \$280 million in projects have been approved against concessional lines of credit.

The Duty-Free Tariff Preference Scheme, announced by India in 2008, targets least developed countries (LDCs) (34 of 50 LDCs are in Africa). It provides duty-free access for 85 % of India's total tariff lines, to be implemented over 5 years, with a 20 % reduction every year. It also provides margins of preference for 9 % tariff lines, again over five years, with five equal cuts, and it has an exclusion list of 6 % for India's total lines, for which no tariff preference would be given. The duty-free access covers tariff lines that constitute 92.5 % of LDCs' global exports. By 2012, 21 African countries had signed up for the initiative.

The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) started negotiating with India for a trade agreement, and in 2006, former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced negotiations for a Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) with the bloc. The PTA was planned in two stages: limited tariff concessions would be given on selected items, followed by full trade access for African goods. Given the emerging focus on Africa and trade effectiveness, the Indian cabinet approved the draught framework for PTA with SACU in 2010.

The India-Africa Forum summits strengthen bilateral relations in a three-way policy framework at three levels: continental (AU), regional (regional economic communities, or RECs) and bilateral (individual countries). The summit was in New Delhi in April 2008, when the Delhi Declaration and the Framework for Cooperation were adopted. The framework became a blueprint, reflecting and guiding India's efforts to strengthen commercial ties with the continent. India committed nearly \$6 billion in new funds for economic engagement, with a significant portion for capacity building and human resource development (Box 3.1).

The second summit was in Addis Ababa in May 2011, when India announced support to develop a new Ethio-Djibouti railway line by offering \$300 million. In

¹Nigeria, South Africa, Mauritius, Ghana, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Kenya.

²Burkina Faso, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali and Senegal.

addition, the Indian prime minister announced new funding for further commitments—\$5.4 billion for Lines of Credit (LOCs) and \$700 million for new institutions and training programmes.³ The publicly owned Export-Import Bank of India (Exim Bank) extended \$10 million to the West African Development Bank, \$250 million to the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development, \$30 million to the African Export-Import Bank, \$25 million to the Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank and \$8 million to the Seychelles government.

Under the aegis of the Second Summit, the India–Africa Business Council was formed in March 2012, co-chaired by Sunil Bharti Mittal, Chairman of the Bharti Group and by Alhaji Aliko Dangote, President and Chief Executive of the Dangote Group. As a mechanism to strengthen economic ties, the council is mandated to look into economic and commercial issues that affect core sectors.⁴ India is now looking forward to the third summit in 2015.

Box 3.1 India–Africa Forum Summits

The impetus of the two India–Africa Forum Summits in 2008 and 2011 has strengthened cooperation. Both prioritized agricultural cooperation, which according to leaders on both sides offers great potential, given the strong complementarities between them. India’s move towards economic and technical cooperation in African agriculture since 2000 must also be seen against the backdrop of declining support from traditional donors.

Participants at the 2008 summit decided to strengthen cooperation in land development, water management, agricultural plantation, breeding technologies, food security and agro-processing machinery, while investing in combating agro-based diseases and engaging in experimental and demonstrative projects and training. Leaders at the 2011 summit agreed to develop scientific research for raising agricultural productivity and conserving the environment. The aim of the agreement was to ensure food security for their people and bring down the rising cost of food.

India focuses on building capacity and sharing experience, particularly in research and knowledge. Teams of farm experts from the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) have gone to Africa to acquire first-hand knowledge of how African countries explore ways of improving their agricultural practices. The capacity building programme provides scholarships to

³LOCs are essentially concessional loans with a variable grant element, overseen by Exim Bank, established in 1982 to finance, expedite and encourage India’s international trade.

⁴Such as agriculture (including agro-processing), manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, textiles, mining, petroleum and natural gas, information technology and enabled services, gems and jewellery, banking, financial services (including microfinance), energy and core infrastructure (including roads and railways).

75 students from African countries annually at agricultural universities in India. Moreover, former Prime Minister Singh proposed establishing new institutions in agriculture and rural development.

In December 2010, a memorandum of understanding for cooperation in agricultural research and education was signed by ICAR and the Department of Agricultural Research and Education and by the Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research. They agreed to exchange scientists, scholars, technologies and literature and to collaborate on research projects.

India also made a commitment to raise credit facilities for African agriculture. The largest line of credit approved by Exim Bank outside the Indian subcontinent is with Ethiopia (\$640 million) for its Tindaho Sugar Project, which is also expected to facilitate Indian investments. The Exim Bank also extended a line of credit of \$27 million to Senegal for the export of equipment for irrigation projects in 2006. At the 2011 summit, Prime Minister Singh announced a grant of \$160 million to Senegal for the second phase of the agricultural mechanization programme.

The Confederation of Indian Industry regularly organizes made in India shows and conclaves in Africa, encouraging Indian companies to display textiles, drugs and pharmaceuticals, food processing, machinery, tools, auto components and construction equipment.

3.3 India–Africa Trade

Trade flows are largely driven by economic complementarities between the two regions.

Although African exports to Asia do not exhibit significant product diversification, inter-sectoral complementarities between Africa and Asia exist. The rich resource endowment in Africa provides a natural comparative advantage in raw materials and resource-based products. China and India, by contrast, have a richer stock of skilled labour than Africa and thus have a comparative advantage in manufactured products. (Broadman 2007)

India's trade with Africa is rising rapidly in many sectors. With globalization and with its own economic liberalization starting in 1991, India has achieved quite high economic growth rates, which, coupled with a burgeoning population, and has led to multiple changes. Indian conglomerates, with Indian government support, have competed with Japan and the Republic of Korea for such African goods as minerals, metals, precious stones, alloys and chemicals, while exporting machinery, manufactured goods, electronics and medical supplies.

India's two-way trade with Africa jumped from \$5.3 billion in 2001 to \$63 billion in 2011, making it the continent's fourth-largest trading partner after the European Union, China and the United States (WTO and CII 2013). As of 2011,

African exports to India were heavily concentrated in energy resources and other commodities (87 %), whereas 98 % of Indian exports to African markets are value-added products (Ibid.).

The manufacturing prowess China, India and the Republic of Korea has led to price competition in industrial goods, infrastructure, and raw materials. African exports have risen from a mere \$4.5 billion in 2001 to \$67.8 billion in 2014, a figure that should keep increasing if India's demand for African minerals and fuels remain unabated and the prices for these minerals remains relatively stable (Fig. 3.1). That climb stems mainly from high commodity prices and rising volumes of agricultural goods. Further, India faces an energy deficit and, coupled with potential supply insecurity from other regions, Africa's role as a supplier of minerals and fuels may intensify in the short run. As of 2014, Africa supplied about one fifth of India's crude oil imports, up from close to zero in 2005.

Over 2000–2011 India's imports from Africa surged as a result of the demand for raw materials and oil, although imports have fallen sharply since 2011–2012. Crude oil and petroleum products from Africa account for two thirds of India's Africa-sourced imports. The high price of oil (at least until late 2014), which makes up half of the bilateral trade by value, has also shifted the balance between imports and exports, which was even in 2001–2005 but has since tilted in Africa's favour. However, a falling value of imports from Africa and a rising value of exports to Africa have narrowed the trade gap. Lower global oil prices could further reduce the trade gap between the two.

In 2014, Africa had a \$5.4 billion trade surplus with India (Exim databank), almost entirely resulting from exports of primary commodities (Nigeria's unrefined oil exports were a key contributor). With refining capacity in Africa still limited, Indian companies are keen to tap Africa as an export market for refined petroleum products and have already started exploring opportunities in some of the continent's key markets (such as Kenya and Mauritius) as bases for exporting elsewhere in Africa.




Fig. 3.1 India–Africa trade. *Source* Exim Bank

Africa's main imports are labour-intensive manufactured goods, mainly textile and garments. Its main exports to India are agricultural products, minerals, gemstones (especially diamonds), gold and petroleum products. In 2012–2013, India's major exports to Africa were refined mineral oils, vehicles and their components, pharmaceutical products, cereals and electronics (Exim Bank).

India has seen a far smaller rise in the exports to Africa than in flows in the other direction, predominantly in its resource-based and (often low-cost) technology sectors. Jewellery illustrates this missed opportunity: in 2008–2009, it constituted 13 % of the items exported by India to Africa, but it later fell to a mere 3.9 % (Department of Commerce, Government of India), in spite of India's prominent jewellery industry.

Trade statistics from 2012 show India's regions of trade interest, in decreasing order, as West Africa, Southern Africa, North Africa, East Africa and Central Africa. The pattern reflects Africa's mineral endowments, as well as the depth and size of markets with which India trades (Oil accounted for 84.6 % of total imports from West Africa, for example).

The most important trading partners for India are Nigeria and South Africa, followed by Angola (with oil and diamonds), then Egypt and Tanzania (Table 3.1). These top five accounted for 67.0 % of all Indian trade with Africa. Besides raw materials, gold has become a key import for India. For natural gas, fertilizers and chemicals, North Africa is likely to remain important until the promising natural gas industries of East and Southern Africa develop. For market depth, South Africa will remain crucial as a non-oil trading partner.

Table 3.1 India–Africa top trading partners 2013–2014
(Values in million dollars)

Country	Exports	Imports	Total trade	Balance
Nigeria	2,668	14,098	16,766	–11,430
South Africa	5,074	6,075	11,150	–1,001
Angola	536	5,992	6,528	–5,456
Egypt	2,562	2,389	4,951	223
Tanzania	3,401	724	4,125	2,676
Kenya	3,882	127	4,009	3,776
Algeria	1,070	1,930	3,000	–861
Mozambique	1,257	293	1,550	964
Sudan	863	436	1,299	427
Morocco	386	879	1,265	–494
Mauritius	1,000	21	1,021	979
Ethiopia	817	28	845	789
Libya	287	452	739	–164
Zambia	377	243	620	134
Madagascar	239	53	292	186

Source Exim Bank

The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) is India's largest trading region in Africa because of India's imports. But the Southern African Development Community (SADC) is the main export region. All four African regions examined in this document saw growth in trade with India over 2011–2012. EAC saw the greatest growth (25.5 %), followed closely by SACU (16.4 %) and COMESA (15.7 %), whereas SADC's growth in trade (0.6 %) was insignificant (Van 2013). The shares of India's total trade with Africa accounted for by COMESA, SADC, SACU and the EAC were all higher in 2014 than in 1999 (Table 3.1), which indicates that India's trade with Africa is increasingly conducted with countries from eastern and southern Africa.

Trade has been highly motivating for both sides, but analysts warn India against locking into African countries as primary producers, which can ultimately become a public relations headache. Indeed, significant problems and imbalances exist. As Indian goods reach Africa, they sometimes put pressure on domestic producers through competition in domestic and world markets, given African nations' positions in textiles and apparel. India's strength in textile manufacturing creates an occupational hazard for rural and low-income communities across the continent, communities which are dependent on the small scale textile cottage industries. Trade-induced competition can spur improvement, but it can also inflict unemployment and other social costs.

Investment often precedes trade in minerals and resources, suggesting that India will face greater competition from resource-rich African countries such as the Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan and those in Francophone West Africa. Overall, however, India-Africa trade and FDI can lead to favourable bilateral relations, and India's fast-growing commerce presents a major development opportunity for the continent. In recent years, business networks and production chains have encouraged intermediate goods and components, making trade free, easier and networked. Such global chains have let India and Africa increase the diversity and volume of both exports and imports.

For analysts such as Broadman (2007), India is on the vanguard of integration for African countries across the continent and in the global marketplace, but India and Africa need to aggregate items of mutual benefit. Despite the priority given to extractive industries in trade (and even more so in investment), India has tried to make trade non-discriminatory with technology transfer, employment generation and lesser threats to local producers, alongside aid for governmental and tax reforms, elements that are particularly important for analysing the net welfare implications of India-Africa trade (Broadman 2007).

India's economic growth is creating a growth surge for African commodities, but the constraints blocking trickle-down effects must be eased. Further Indian efforts to reduce tariffs on African goods must be encouraged, given that African nations have taken steps to liberalize their trade regimes. High tariffs on yarn and textiles, for example, raise production costs for African apparel producers. Other problems arise

from the complex network of trade agreements of which African nations are part and whose complexity impedes trade and investment efforts of countries such as India and China.

Beyond all this, business in Africa is constrained by capital markets, infrastructure problems (often, poor power and telecommunications availability) and inadequate information about market opportunities in a country. India has the capacity to trade more with African firms in agriculture, commodities, pharmaceuticals and telecommunications, which can provide immense opportunities for the continent to move from excessive reliance on primary commodities to labour-intensive light manufactured goods.

3.4 Promising Sectors

3.4.1 *Agriculture*

Agriculture is a central pillar of India–Africa trade, including the wider, cooperative relationship. India’s agricultural imports from Africa were \$1.56 billion in 2014. More than one half of those imports by value was in cashew nuts, mainly raw, from West, East and Southern Africa for processing in India—a trend that has intensified in recent years as Sub-Saharan Africa’s domestic processing has declined. Wood was the next biggest import in 2014, at \$2.19 million, most for industrial and domestic construction. India also imports large quantities of Africa’s traditional cash crops of cocoa, coffee, tea and cotton, even though India itself is a leading producer of these items, particularly tea and cotton. That fact reflects the surge in Indian tea consumption and the expansion of its textile industry in recent years.

A wave of investment in African cashew facilities is set to upgrade Africa’s processing. In early 2012, the Singapore-based commodities trader, Olam, opened a 30,000-metric-ton (MT)-a-year processor in Bouaké, in northern Côte d’Ivoire, followed by two facilities in Korhogo and Bondoukou that year. Added to its new processors in Nigeria and Ghana, the company has increased its African processing capacity to 125,000 MT a year.

Africa used to be a major global food exporter, but following the decline in many export sectors in the 1990s, the continent has come to rely on food imports to meet domestic demand. This is especially true for grains, with an estimated 20.8 million MT imported in 2011–2012 against domestic production of 103 million MT. Dependence on imports is acute for wheat (grown in few countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, and a staple of urban diets) and rice (with the population preferring aromatic varieties from Thailand and Viet Nam over cheaper US imports). This is putting enormous strain on African import budgets and increasing the risk of regional supply shortages, especially given the uncertainty over India’s

export regime, which periodically experiences embargos, which cut off Indian supplies to international—and thus African—markets.

African governments appreciate the huge risks and costs associated with their food import bills. Nigeria, which imported 3.9 million MT of grain in 2011–2012, launched a programme to dramatically boost domestic production of maize, wheat, rice and sugar, with the aim of self-sufficiency by 2015. However, that target was hugely optimistic, and the country (as well as the wider region) will remain dependent on food imports from South and Southeast Asia for the foreseeable future.

Many projects in Africa to set up plantations that produce food for export to Asia (notably China) have met strong domestic opposition, particularly over the sensitive issue of land rights (Box 3.2), and that opposition has cut the chances of Sub-Saharan Africa becoming a major supplier of food to the Asian continent. India is therefore set to remain a key player in Sub-Saharan Africa's food security, rather than the other way around. Still, Sub-Saharan Africa has huge potential to expand its non-grain agricultural exports to India (as domestic consumption in the latter continues to surge), notably by exporting high-quality strains of Kenyan tea and Ethiopian and Ugandan coffee, and a variety of horticultural goods from East Africa.

Box 3.2 Selling the future?

Some African countries are offering land on lease for up to 99 years to foreign farmers (countries include the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Rwanda and Uganda). Land that until very recently seemed of little outside interest is now being sought by international investors. The land lease programmes have attracted farmers from India that are migrating to those countries and starting to farm there. Helped by the liberalization of FDI, Indian companies are capitalizing on these opportunities.

A leading Indian investor in African agriculture is Karuturi Agro Products, a subsidiary of Karuturi Global (one of the world's largest producers of cut roses). The company has acquired 100,000 ha of land in the Jikao and Itang districts of the Gambela region in Ethiopia for growing palm, cereal and pulses. Karuturi has also acquired farmland in Kenya to grow sugar cane, palm oil, rice and vegetables. Another firm, Ruchi Soya Industries, acquired a 25-year lease for soya bean processing on 3000 ha in Ethiopia's Gambela and Benishangul-Gumuz regions.

At \$6.34 billion in 2014, India's agricultural exports to Africa were about twice the size of its agricultural imports, with textiles accounting for 28 % of the total (almost entirely cotton fabrics and yarn, in stark contrast to its imports, which were

entirely cotton lint, reflecting the weakness of Africa's textile industry). Approximately 25 % of India's cotton exports to Africa goes to Egypt's textile industry and a further 12 % to manufacturers in Senegal and Mauritius. About 16 % is exported to Benin and Togo, which act as entrepôts, trading Indian cotton and other commodities to the largest West African economies, notably Nigeria, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire, as well as to landlocked countries.

The other key agricultural export to Africa is food, notably rice, sugar, meat and fish. However, official trade data fail to capture the true scale of the trade in Indian foodstuffs into and across Africa because large volumes pass unrecorded through informal trade networks spanning the Indian Ocean (Exim Bank). This is especially so for rice, the key staple of Africa's population, whose consumption has risen dramatically over the past decade, requiring an estimated 10 million MT of imports each year, or some 20 % of the world's rice imports. India vies with Thailand as the world's largest rice exporter, with annual exports ranging from 4.8 million MT in 2011 to an estimated 18 million MT in 2013–2014 (Economic Times 2014). Of that amount, official data indicate that 1.3 million MT went to Africa, about 13 % of the continent's rice imports. However, the true volume of Indian rice traded and consumed in Africa is likely to be much higher because India's single largest rice export market is the United Arab Emirates (856,000 MT in 2011), which trades rice from across the world to North and East Africa (Eco Bank 2013).

Among the vast informal trade networks, the most developed are run by Somali traders in Nairobi's Eastleigh neighbourhood. They deal in vast volumes of rice, sugar, foodstuffs and consumer goods for East and Central Africa. These networks operate outside the global banking system, using a complex web of Hawala lenders, local traders and businessmen, with most operating in cash, thereby dominating East Africa's cash-and-carry business (Eco Bank 2013).

Indian rice is re-exported throughout the region, passing through trade corridors in South Sudan, Kenya and Tanzania into Central and Southern Africa. Large volumes of sugar also pass through these networks, although India's sugar exports have fluctuated wildly as a result of the periodic imposition of export bans in response to poor harvests. Sugar exports to Africa have ranged from as low as \$872 million in 2002 to a peak of \$2.3 billion in 2011 before falling again.

3.4.2 Pharmaceuticals

Pharmaceuticals are one of the main Indian exports to Africa, at 11.1 % of the total. Indeed, Indian pharmaceutical companies are the largest providers of generic medicine worldwide—the Indian government's refusal to recognize certain big pharmaceutical patents allows firms to produce generic drugs at super-low costs. Those low-cost generic drugs are perfect for markets in developing countries, which require health care services that are as cost competitive as possible to maximize the

percentage of their populations that can afford the drugs. India ranks very high among developing countries on technology, quality and cost-effective manufacturing, having undergone a long period of consolidated expansion since the Indian economy was liberalized in 1991.

India's pharmaceutical industry is poised to play a still bigger role in Africa. By 2016, pharmaceutical spending in Africa is expected to reach \$30 billion, resulting from the double burden of communicable and rising noncommunicable diseases and of the greater availability (and costs) of modern health care services. In Africa, multinational companies are the major players in pharmaceuticals, including Novartis, Abbott, Sanofi-Aventis, Pfizer and GSK, which have been on the continent for years. Asian manufacturers also have a broadening presence: India accounted for 17.7 % of pharmaceutical imports in Africa in 2011 (up from 8.5 % in 2002) and China for 4.1 % (up from about 2.0 % in 2002) (Pharmabiz 2013).

Although pharmaceutical companies such as Aspen, Adcock Ingram and CiplaMedpro (all South African) have been leaders in domestic markets, they have to compete on price with Asian generic manufacturers and cannot access the therapy areas most in demand. Domestic manufacturers have also struggled to meet standards for good manufacturing practices and to ensure high-quality production; therefore few companies have World Health Organization "prequalification status". For that reason, nongovernment organizations (NGOs), which have historically been prime procurers of medicines on the continent, have refused to buy essential medicines (such as anti-infectives) from domestic manufacturers, preferring Asian manufacturers based in, for example, India, which are more cost competitive than western manufacturers.

According to Pharmacil, India's pharmaceutical exports in 2012–2013, totalled some \$14.7 billion, registering growth of 11 %, with 55 % of exports heading to highly regulated western markets. Indian drug makers export to 220 countries in all, with formulations accounting for 56 % of the total, bulk drugs for 42 %, and herbals and ayurveda for 2 %. India's biggest customer is the United States, which accounts for 22 % of pharmaceutical exports, followed by Africa with 16 % and the Commonwealth of Independent States with 8 %. The government has set a target of \$25 billion for pharmaceutical exports by 2016.

In developing economies, India is improving access to life-saving medicines, having cut the cost of HIV treatment from \$12,000 a year to \$400 a year in 2004 (MCI and MEA and FICCI, Government of India (2014)). The three Indian firms with the biggest presence in Africa are Ranbaxy, Cipla and Dr. Reddy's (Box 3.3).

Box 3.3 Africa's three biggest Indian pharmaceutical firms

India's largest pharmaceutical company—Ranbaxy Laboratories—was the first to set up base in Africa, in 1977. Since then, other big Indian players have followed and some important drugs are nearly entirely supplied by Indian multinationals. Ranbaxy's sales in Africa grew by 23 % during 2011, to \$189 million, with sales in Nigeria reaching \$26 million. Now South

Africa's fifth-largest pharmaceutical company, the firm opened a \$30 million manufacturing facility—its second—west of Johannesburg in 2010.

Ranbaxy launched nine new products last year, including Valaciclovir and Imipenem+Cilastatin. It has completed upgrading its plant in South Africa and has received approval from the Medicines Control Council (MCC) for a manufacturing facility in Roodepoort, South Africa. With five subsidiaries, five representative offices, and a workforce of nearly 1000, Ranbaxy's distribution network caters to 44 of Africa's countries.

CiplaMedpro South Africa—a subsidiary of the Indian firm Cipla—recorded a 28 % increase in revenue in the six months ended 30 June 2012 to R1,080 billion (\$123 million). It is the third-biggest pharmaceutical firm in the country. It has made large investments across the continent, including a joint venture with the Ugandan government and the Ugandan pharmaceutical manufacturer Quality Chemical Industries, for a new \$32 billion plant that will produce anti-retroviral and anti-malarial drugs.

Dr. Reddy's has also made impressive progress. After entering the continent through a subsidiary, the firm entered the market directly in 2004. It is now the 18th biggest generic-drugs company in South Africa by market value (African Business Magazine 2012).

Indian manufacturers have gained market share primarily through competitive prices and targeting different markets in the generic-drug arena. The manufacturers differ in five areas: mode of entry, countries, use of local talent, target payers and brand image. Indian manufacturers primarily sell medicines through NGOs and government tenders in regulated markets. For example, leading Indian players such as Cipla, Ranbaxy, the Serum Institute, and Dr Reddy's have strong market presence, particularly in East Africa. In these predominantly Anglophone markets, Indian companies have a reputation for integrating local talent into their operations and for the quality of their medicines, with many having WHO prequalification. Best known for selling affordable HIV medicines in Africa, they are rapidly broadening their medicine range across therapy areas.

3.4.3 Technology and Communications

According to Jean Pierre O. Ezin, a top African Union (AU) official, Africa wants India to help it strengthen its human capital in science and technology so that the 54-nation continent can develop indigenous technology instead of buying it from other countries. As part of designing its science policy, the continent is using a roadmap to sensitize AU states to push science as a tool for economic growth and

development. India can contribute not only in transferring technology but also in sharing technical knowledge (India Africa Connect n.d.).

The foundation of cooperation in science and technology was laid during the 2008 India–Africa Forum Summit, when Prime Minister Singh pledged substantial support for Africa, including an Africa-India Science and Technology Initiative as a central component of regional development and integration. The Department of Science and Technology, in partnership with the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), has broadly outlined the contours of collaborative engagements with the AU, including strengthening three science and technology institutions in Africa, transferring appropriate technology and providing C.V. Raman Fellowships. Of the \$700 million pledged at the 2011 summit (see Box 3.1), \$185 million was allotted solely to science and technology (India Africa Connect n.d.).

The aim is to develop science and technology linkages with institutions in African nations and to enhance capacity building and development of human resources in research and development. In 2011, India committed itself to promoting higher education institutes in four sectors in four different countries—information, communication and technology in Ghana; planning and administration in Burundi; foreign trade in Uganda; and an India–Africa institute for diamonds in Botswana, the biggest producer of diamonds on the continent (India Africa Connect n.d.).

The India–Africa Science and Technology Ministers Conference and Tech Expo was held in New Delhi in March 2012. India agreed to strengthen three regional institutions in Africa—the Institute Pasteur of Tunisia, Tunis; the Institute of Mathematics and Physical Sciences of Benin; and the School of Science and Technology of Masuku in Gabon—by developing institutional and academic linkages, training African researchers and exchanging technological know-how (MEA E&SA Division n.d.).

The Pan African e-Network, the first continental initiative of India in Africa, was launched in 2008 and fully funded by the Indian government in the amount of some \$87.8 million. The network has three components: tele-education, telemedicine and VVIP connectivity. Forty-eight countries in Africa can access the network. Similarly, efforts were made to establish the India–Africa Technology Partnership Programme, India–Africa Food Processing Business Incubation Centres, India–Africa Information Technology Centre and several IT centres (MEA E&SA Division n.d.).

Communications and media offer several opportunities to explore. India has more than 90,000 newspapers and 700 satellite channels—of which more than 80 are news channels. It is the biggest newspaper market in the world, with more than 100 million copies sold each day (Business Standard 2013). African media are among the fastest growing industries but have yet to command financing required to unlock their potential. India can cooperate in this promising sector.

India has learned several lessons about the challenges the media face—such as financial stability, technological adaptation, freedom of expression, ethics and leadership and learning skills—and can pass them on to its African counterparts. Roukaya Kasenally, Director of Programmes and Knowledge Management at AMI to IANS, stated the following:

There are one billion people in this (African) continent, so just imagine the market size and the capacity of Indian companies in those areas to provide services and infrastructure for the media. I think the idea is to understand how do we get those (Indian) companies into this new energy and how do we trickle it down to our people. I also think it is all about how do we understand the partnership and how do we craft the partnership and how do we make it much more a partnership of equals. So the point is how can we, through the media, help tell our stories through the new form of partnership and how to create an alternative understanding of the continent (Business Standard November 2013).

The media are thriving in Africa, and India's involvement in this booming sector could go beyond trade. According to Kasenally, "The media then becomes important for projecting the African renaissance through its own voice, different from a western perspective. In this context, Indian media organizations, in addition to investing, can help tell the story of Africa's development".

3.4.4 *Other Emerging Sectors*

Although infrastructure has often been seen as 'China's domain' in Africa, some suggest that this might not be entirely true. Indian involvement contributes to Africa's development through, for example, terrestrial, cable and satellite television; mobile coverage; broadband cable and wireless broadband.

Dr. Aditya Dev Sood, author of 'Emerging Economy Report,' stated that Indian corporations have an extraordinary opportunity to capitalize on the new infrastructure generated in certain parts of Africa by Chinese companies.

Anyone who has lived in both India and China will agree that the Chinese have been far more successful at creating mass urban and cross-country infrastructure. On the other hand, just having quality infrastructure is not enough for Africa—the continent needs jobs, and that is something Indian service sector companies can provide (South African Regional Poverty Network 2008).

Exports to and investments in the automotive industry are also gaining traction. Tata Motors is present in Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire. In the former, it offers a range of commercial vehicles; in the latter, it has more than 50 % of market share in the medium and heavy bus segment (WTO and CII 2013). Tata Motors also has a commercial-vehicle assembly plant in South Africa (Table 3.2).

Tourism accounts for 50 % of African service exports and, with hospitality, holds immense potential for exports to India. The Tata group has investments in hospitality in South Africa and Zambia.

Table 3.2 Selected indian companies in african sectors

Name of the company	Sector	Country	Projects and investment
Angelique international limited	Power, transmission, distribution, agriculture, irrigation, textiles, steel etc.	Mali, Sudan and Chad	1. Tractor assembly plant in Mali 2. Transmission line project in Sudan; and 3. Cotton textile mill in Chad
Coppice technologies private limited	Education	Senegal	1. Centre of excellence in dakar 2. Regional universityhubs in government run universities 3. Teacher training institutes 4. Computer labs in government run primary and secondary schools across senegal
Escorts limited	Tractors	Ghana, Madagascar, Burkina Faso, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Benin, Tanzania, Togo, Angola and others	Exported more than 5000 tractors to 21 African countries
Godrej consumer products limited	Consumer goods	Nigeria, South Africa, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe, D.R. Congo, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Cameroon, Ghana and Malawi	Operates through acquisition of 1. The darling group mouldings, South Africa. The market leader in hair extension products and a pioneer of the category in the region 2. Rapidol (Pty) Ltd., South Africa. Ethnic hair colour brands like 'Inecto' and 'Soflene' in ten countries 3. Kinky Group, South Africa. kinky offers a variety of hair products 4. Tura, Nigeria. Nigeria's leading beauty company
HCL info systems limited	ICT	Botswana, Nigeria, Lagos and others	1. Pan African e-Network project 2. Computerization of schools 3. Training labs for Nigerian Army College of Logistics (NACOL)

(continued)

Table 3.2 (continued)

Name of the company	Sector	Country	Projects and investment
Incorp Afro-Aslan consultants	ICT, agriculture, waste management, solar power and medical tourism	Ghana, Sudan, Kenya and other countries	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Set up an assembly plant for tractors in Ghana 2. About 100 garbage trucks to Ghana 3. Generated employment for more than 10,000 people
Jyoti structures limited	Power	Namibia	Construction of transmission line
Kalpataru power transmission Ltd.	Power	Zambia	Installation of 330 kV overhead transmission line
Kirloskar brothers limited	Pumps	Senegal, Sierra Leone, Mali, Niger, Benin, Nigeria, Sudan, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda, Dr Congo, Angola, Zimbabwe and others	Supply of pumps, accessories, complete installation and commissioning for a total value of US\$ 27 million to irrigate 65,000 ha of farmland in Senegal
Mohan energy corporation private limited	Energy	Sudan, Mozambique, Zambia, Ghana	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4. Self Help Electrification Project-Ghana 1. National Electricity Corporation (NEC) Sudan awarded the 220 kV Khartoum main ring project to MEC in 2004 which envisaged construction of 200 km 220 kV Transmission line along with 3 substations. The project included crossing of 3 km wide Nile River 2. Rural electrification project in zambezia province of mozambique 3. Solar electrification at primary school in zambia 4. Self help electrification Project-Ghana
National Institute of Information Technology (NIIT)	ICT	Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal Libya, Sudan, Botswana, South Africa, Rwanda, Namibia, South Africa, Botswana, Mozambique and Zimbabwe	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Hole in the Wall (HiWEL) project 2. Providing ICT training In many African countries 3. Senegal, NIIT is part of the Pan African e-network project

(continued)

Table 3.2 (continued)

Name of the company	Sector	Country	Projects and investment
Overseas infrastructure alliance (India) private limited	Infrastructure	Mozambique	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The construction of 480 km of 33 kV lines 2. This installation of 73 Nos. of 33/0.4 kV distribution transformer centres for the reticulation of electricity to the areas 3. The construction of 279 km of low voltage network connecting the new customers to the distribution transformers 4. The connection of 4,360 new customers
Ranbaxy laboratories limited	Pharmaceuticals	Nigeria, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Senegal, Zimbabwe, Zambia and South Africa	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Set up manufacturing plant in Nigeria 2. South Africa is the largest market—sale more than US\$55 million in 2008
RITES Limited	Engineering, consultancy and management	Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Zambia, Zimbabwe etc.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. In railways, RITES has undertaken feasibility studies, detailed engineering, project management consultancy, technical assistance and management support services 2. RITES is the nominated agency of the Indian Railways to export locomotives, rolling stock and railway technology
Shapoorji Pallonji and Company Limited	Construction of landmark structures	Mauritius, Ghana	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Mauritius IT Park, EBENE City and LE PAILLES Convention Centre in Mauritius 2. Monumental Seat of Government and Villa Complex in Accra, Ghana

(continued)

Table 3.2 (continued)

Name of the company	Sector	Country	Projects and investment
Skipper Electricals India Limited	Electricals	Nigeria, Niger, Lagos, Ghana etc.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Construction of 11 and 33 kV lines and substations 2. Mobile test van 3. Solar grids and solar street lights Metering projects funded by World Bank
Sonalika International Tractors Limited	Tractors	Mozambique, Uganda, Senegal, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Zimbabwe, Zambia. Malawi, Kenya, South Africa, Benin, Congo, Cameroon, Algeria, Gambia, Madagascar, Mauritius, Niger, Sudan etc.	Exp Export of tractors
SSP private limited	Dairy processing industry, food and fruit processing industry, chemical processing industry, herbal extraction plants, gelatin processing plants	Nigeria, Ethiopia, Chad, Tanzania, Kenya, Libya, South Africa etc.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Gelatine powder processing plant, alexandria, Egypt 2. Salt refinery, free town, Sierra Leone 3. Salt refinery, Owinza, Tanzania 4. Honey processing plant, Nekalla, Ethiopia 5. Combined tomato and mango processing plant, n'djamena, chad 6. Fruit Juice Processing Plant, Lagos, Nigeria 7. Salt refinery, Bab Ezzouar, Algeria 8. Evaporator for Coffee Processing, South Africa 9. Milk processing plant, Libya 10. Salt refinery, Mombasa, Kenya 11. Salt refinery, Tanzania
Tata communications limited	Telecom	South Africa, Kenya, Morocco	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Second largest fixed line telecom provider in South Africa 2. Leading investor in three undersea cable systems that connect South Africa with Europe, Middle East and Asia including India

(continued)

Table 3.2 (continued)

Name of the company	Sector	Country	Projects and investment
Tata motors limited	Automobiles	Senegal, ivory coast	1. Tata Motors is present In Senegal with entire range of commercial vehicles which Includes pick-up trucks, medium and heavy trucks and buses 2. Currently Tata Motors enjoys 50 % plus market share in the medium and heavy bus segment in Ivory Coast
VA Tech Wabag limited	Drinking water and wastewater plant planning, installation and operational management	Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Namibia, South Africa. Sudan	Completed multiple water treatment plants across the African countries of operations
WAPCOS Limited	Consultancy-water, power and Infrastructure	Mozambique, Ethiopia, Sudan and Nigeria	1. Consultancy Services for Development of Awareness and Hygiene Education In Mozambique 2. Feasibility study and Detail Design of Kesem Bolhama Sugar Development project In Ethiopia 3. Consultancy services were provided for state level Urban infrastructure programme in Sudan

Source "Indian Success Stories in Africa", CII

3.5 Conclusions

India's engagement with Africa began thanks to historical linkages and was pushed by political and economic interests. But it has since expanded into a multidimensional and, as India's interests move beyond the extractive indicates, more sustainable partnership. The increasing involvement in the agricultural, pharmaceutical and technological sectors is not merely profit-driven—it also contributes to African development.

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Chapter 4

India's Pursuit of Investment Opportunities in Africa

Chris Alden and Raj Verma

4.1 Introduction

India's long-standing involvement in African affairs has only recently shifted to the pursuit of economic interests (the economic-diplomacy angle of this switch is discussed further in Chap. 5). Operating under the shadow of media frenzy over China's decade-long economic thrust into the continent, the Indian presence has gone relatively unnoticed outside sectoral engagements in some African countries. And yet in many respects the Indian position on Africa is characterized by a diversity and depth that set it apart from other emerging (and even traditional) powers engaged in continental affairs. From global multinational Tata to hundreds of thousands of small and medium-sized enterprises, the foundational dimensions of Indian interests in Africa argue for a stronger representation in economic affairs commensurate with this broad-based position.

Transforming India's considerable asset into more assertive economic engagement—predicated on mobilizing its robust capital investment and experience—is one of the greatest challenges facing India-Africa relations. The Indian government and private corporates understand the potential in developing coherent, activist involvement in Africa. Indeed, at the annual India-Africa Conclaves and India-Africa Forums, the promulgation of notions that economic ties should

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encompass areas such as technology transfers that are “appropriate, affordable, and adaptable” is one reflection of this thinking.¹

Yet Indian investors’ record of engagement has been uneven, reflecting an unexpected complexity of dealing in Africa due to poor governance, institutional and legal bottlenecks, absence of bilateral trade agreements, small market size, and lack of knowledge of local regulatory conditions (among other things). This information asymmetry (Box 4.1) in turn has had an impact on Indian investment—choices, direction and success. For their part, African actors have exhibited agency in using their local knowledge as a means of extracting resources from Indian firms seeking to invest in local markets. While these factors have not brought Indian FDI into Africa to a halt, it has still served to limit its full realization and scope.

Box 4.1 Information asymmetry

According to Stigler (1961), a key component of decisions to invest is information. This provides the requisite data to allow for an effective assessment of risk and opportunity. For investors entering new markets, a particular difficulty is the relative dearth of knowledge that they have during a transaction vis-à-vis the other party (usually local firms). This information asymmetry can lead to adverse selection, exacerbated by moral hazard incumbent in the support provided, for example, by policy banks with a mandate to support politically directed investment, as Africans attempt to maximize their gains in an otherwise asymmetrical power relationship with external actors (Brown and Harman 2013).

While much of the contemporary work on African agency focuses on its utility to personal and regime survival, less examined are the sub-national institutional expressions and non-state dimensions of agency (Williams 2013). The promotion of economic gains through the manipulation of information needed for effective business negotiations by external investors, whether driven by personal gain or other purposes, is a meaningful aspect of African agency in the investment sphere. For instance, the necessity to have joint ventures with local partners, usually involving local political figures of one kind or another, introduces opportunities for local actors to exploit networks and knowledge to their advantage. These legal (as well as informal) requirements are subject to enforcement by sub-national institutions such as customs agencies or even labour ministries, which can impede the progress of

¹See India-Africa Connect events for details on India-Africa Conclaves. www.indiaafricaconnect.in/index.php?param=category/india-africa-conclave/120 (Accessed 3 January 2013). For general accounts of India-Africa relations see Eriksen et al. (2012) ‘India in Africa: implications for Norwegian foreign and development policy’, NUPI Report, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo 2012; FantuCheru and Cyril Obi, eds., *The Rise of China and India in Africa* (London: Zed 2010); Emma Mawdsley and Gerrad McCann (ed.) *India in Africa: Changing geographies of power*, (Cape Town: Pambazuka Press); MakumiMwagiru and AparajitaBiswas, eds., *East Africa-India Security Relations* (Nairobi: IDIS/PIRASA).

an investment for non-compliance. The accompanying costs to an investor, having taken the decision to shift capital towards a given project, can mount as local agents use their capacity to withhold information to extract further concessions. Indian investment in Africa demonstrates the problems of information asymmetries, manifested at times as a form of African agency contributing to weak decision making and even sub-optimal outcomes, given difficulties experienced by some Indian firms in some sectors.

This chapter examines several themes, by section: Indian investment in Africa's natural resources, in its oil specifically, and in its market-seeking and infrastructure sectors. It then looks at the scope for Public–Private Partnerships (PPPs) to foster Indian investment and the role of the Indian diaspora in Africa in attracting such investment. It concludes with a quick look at challenges facing Indian investment in Africa.

4.2 Indian Investment in Africa's Resource Sector

Statistics on Indian investment in Africa are unclear, with some putting it at \$14.1 billion in 2011, others at over \$35 billion (CII/WTO 2013). The primary drivers of that investment were state-supported private companies whose focus has been on investing in agriculture, oil, and telecommunications (Baynton-Glen 2012). Much of Indian investment runs in parallel to its growing trade with the continent, which stood at \$70 billion in 2012–2015, with an overlap between top investment destinations and top trading destinations in Africa (Nayyar; KPMG 2014). The 10 top trading partners are also the leading recipients of Indian investment: Mauritius, Sudan, Egypt, Nigeria, Liberia, Kenya, Libya, South Africa, Mozambique, and Tanzania (Baynton-Glen 2012).

That 70 % of Indian investment in Africa goes to the Indian Ocean island of Mauritius distorts overall figures on Indian FDI in Africa (much in the same way that the Bahamas does with Chinese FDI to Central America and the Caribbean) (Eriksen et al. 2012). The incentives put in place by the financial services industry in Mauritius provide an attractive site for Indian capital, some of which is “round-tripping” back to the sub-continent. This creates a statistical anomaly that causes analysts to overestimate the importance of Mauritius for Africa's financial activity and that acts to inflate the overall volume of Indian investment to the continent. With Mauritius removed, Mozambique is the leading destination, at 7 % in 2014, primarily reflecting energy investment (EXIM Bank 2014). Following are Egypt, Nigeria, Liberia, Kenya, Libya and South Africa, with diverse investments.

The bulk of Indian FDI is directed to acquiring existing businesses or to making “brownfield” investments, which readily employ locals and procure supplies locally (CII/WTO 2013). The risks of investment into Africa are well recognized by Indian

companies and financiers, but in recent years these conventional concerns (mentioned above) have generally been offset by the high returns. Indian firms are targeting regions like East Africa, expected to lead continental growth rates in the coming decades (Sudhakaran 2012). The Zambian government's ability to float its first Eurobond in 2012, which was over-subscribed and raised \$750 million, was a sign of how better local conditions have improved the investment outlook (African Review of Business and Technology 2012). Yet the onset of resource nationalism by the newly elected Zambian government of Michael Sata in 2013–2014 marked continuing agency problems for Indian investors.

The domestic drivers of Indian investment are important for the pattern and depth of Indian FDI in Africa. The government's decision to lift restrictions on the export of capital by Indian firms in May 2003 allowed capital-rich Indian firms to invest 100 % of their value and thus become global players. (Coupled to this was the decision by the Department for Industrial Policy and Promotion to make Africa a "preferred" investment destination.) The resulting Indian investment boom, which saw investment surge by 400 % in a year (CII/WTO 2013, p. 65), involved major acquisitions such as Mittal's \$33.38 billion purchase of Luxembourg-listed steel manufacture Arcelor in 2006. FDI stock in Africa was still, though, relatively limited at \$14.1 billion, representing only 22.5 % of total Indian external FDI in 2011 (CII/WTO 2013, p. 49). According to some analysts, the paucity of bilateral investment agreements between New Delhi and African governments is inhibiting further growth (CII/WTO 2013, p. 66).

Mining prospects in Africa represent huge opportunities for a commodity-hungry nation like India. Some examples: in terms of global reserves, the DRC has around 40 % of the cobalt, South Africa around 90 % of the platinum, and Guinea around 30 % of the bauxite (and some of the largest iron ore deposits). Mining's potential is, particularly, alluring as many areas have yet to be thoroughly surveyed, which might point to more reserves (African Business 2012).

Indian SOEs, as well as private conglomerates and medium-scale enterprises, are active in African mining. For instance, Tata Steel has a 75 % share in Tata Steel Côte d'Ivoire and a 35 % share in Australian company Riversdale Mining's Benga and Tete coal exploration licences in Mozambique. The Essar group's mining business, Essar Minerals, is focused on the exploration and geological mapping of five coal blocks in the provinces of Niassa and Tete in Mozambique. Two subsidiaries of the OP Jindal group are in mining in South Africa and Mozambique. DharniSampda, a medium-scale private enterprise, has operations in Côte d'Ivoire and mining interests in that country and in Niger and Sierra Leone (Campbell 2011a). Box 4.2 looks at an SOE and a private conglomerate from India engaged in African mining.

Box 4.2 Two Indian firms in African mining
Coal India Ltd. (CIL) in Mozambique and South Africa

Set up in 1975 as an SOE, CIL is the single largest coal producer in the world. It was conferred *Maharatna*² or “mega jewel” recognition by the Indian government in April 2011. With domestic coal demand far outstripping domestic production, CIL is looking overseas to acquire foreign sources.

CIL has formed a wholly owned subsidiary, Coal India Africana Limitada (CIAL) in Mozambique. CIAL, after drilling four boreholes in Mozambique, has hit coal in all of them. CIAL has enlisted Tribeni Minerals Mozambique Private Ltd. to conduct mining operations and plans to invest \$80 million for exploring the 205 km² block, which is estimated to hold 1 billion tonnes of reserves. According to an executive from CIAL, the quality of the coal will be analyzed and exploration and production will be in stages, with production expected to start in 2016. Once the amount of reserves is ascertained, CIL plans to offload 15 % of its holding in CIAL to an entity nominated by the authorities in Mozambique. CIL intends to export the mined coal to India (Sengupta 2012).

The company is also planning to expand operations in, primarily, South Africa; CIL and South Africa's Department of Trade and Industry struck an agreement in early 2014 to explore coal prospects (Odendaal 2014).

Vedanta in Zambia

Vedanta is a major private mining conglomerate in India, listed on the London Stock Exchange, with interests domestically and in three Southern African countries. It has revenues of more than \$6 billion, on which metric it is India's largest non-ferrous metals and mining company.

Vedanta bought Zambia's Konkola mine from Anglo-American, the South African mining conglomerate, in 2004 for \$261 million. It owns 79.4 % of Konkola (with the Zambian government holding the rest), with mines and a tailings and smelter plant (Williams 2011). As the largest foreign investor and the largest employer in Zambia, Konkola is emblematic of the government's new positive attitude to foreign investment in Zambia (Hill 2013). However, in the wake of falling copper prices in the last few years and what executives characterize as underperformance, production and profits have fallen in Vedanta's Zambian operations. Vedanta is now using feedstock from neighbouring mines to improve production at one smelter.

One response to reduce costs was a cost-cutting plan that included laying off more than 1500 people by March 2014—staunchly opposed by the Zambian government. In November 2013, Zambia revoked the work permit

²Maharatna is a privileged status conferred by Government of India (GOI) to select SOEs in order to empower them to expand their operations and emerge as global giants.

of the chief executive of Vedanta's Zambian business, Konkola Copper Mines (KCM), even though in June 2013, Konkola had already reversed a decision to fire 2000 workers after holding talks with the government and trades unions (Reuters 2013). The late President Michael Sata threatened to revoke KCM's licence if it proceeded with the layoffs. Although Vedanta's executive apologized for publicly criticizing the Zambian government, relations have worsened (Ratcliffe 2014).

NKC Independent Economists (a South Africa-based political and economic research company), cut Zambia's political risk rating because of the actions against Konkola (Hill 2013). In October 2013, credit-ratings agency Fitch downgraded Zambia's credit rating to B from B-plus owing to crumbling government finances and expectations that the deficit would remain high (Mfula 2013). Despite these problems, Vedanta has reiterated its full commitment to KCM's success. According to Rahul Sharma, Director of Corporate Strategy at Vedanta, a new business plan drawn up by the Zambian government and Vedanta underlines Zambia's position as one of Africa's preferred investment destination (Lusaka Times 2014).

Although Indian mining companies have a growing presence in Africa, especially in coal and copper, most of their operations remain relatively small, and none can yet be considered a leader in Africa. Most (apart from CIL) (Banktrack 2011) lack access to capital from the West or from Indian state-owned banks, usually expanding operations by reinvesting their own profits. Still, their African prospects appear broadly positive (Mthembu-Salter 2011). Their main risks are political, as seen with Vedanta in Zambia (see Box 4.2).

Africa's desire for development is well understood by India and Indians. According to South African analyst Frank van Rooyen, "India's approach is very different to China's. India looks towards Africa as a partner in securing energy and industrial resources. But India seeks—genuinely—to add value. It seeks long-term, mutually beneficial relationships. India sees itself as helping to uplift the peoples of Africa (Campbell 2011b)". Indian Commerce and Industry Minister Anand Sharma adds: "We took a conscious decision, as part of our partnership with the continent of Africa, (aimed at) the empowerment of people and capacity building, (and at) value addition, to set up, in many places, diamond cutting and polishing centres, so there is local value addition and job creation (Campbell 2011b)". Reflecting such underlying attitudes perhaps, an Indian Africa Diamond Institute is to be set up in Botswana by the Indian Diamond Institute Surat, and an Apex Planning Organisation for the Southern African Development Community coal industry is to be established in Mozambique by CIL and India's Central Mine Planning and Design Institute (Campbell 2001a).

4.3 Indian SOE Investments in Oil

Indian SOEs operate in a range of sectors in Africa, but predominantly in natural resources, especially oil and gas. Behind this focus is India's long-standing energy deficit and its desire to diversify sources from the Middle East, from where it sources 60–70 % of its oil. Although oil production in India increased over 2001–2013, consumption has risen much faster. India is the world's fourth-largest energy consumer and the country's consumption continues growing strongly, pushing up oil imports. In 2013, India overtook Japan as the world's third-largest crude oil importer.

Indian National Oil Companies (NOCs) face stiff competition in Africa for assets from, particularly, Chinese and Western oil companies. India is represented in Africa predominantly by three NOCs: ONGC Videsh Ltd. (OVL), the overseas arm of the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. (ONGC); Oil India Ltd. (OIL); and Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (IOCL) (Table 4.1). Indian NOCs have traditionally been active mainly in North and West Africa, and only recently ventured into Mozambique after huge gas reserves were discovered there.

India's global expansion is led by OVL, part of ONGC, one of the largest Asian oil and gas exploration and production (E&P) corporations in the world and operating in the offshore segment of E&P. It is ranked 424 in the Fortune Global 500 list of the world's largest corporations for 2014 (Fortune n.d.). ONGC is a *maharatna* and receives considerably support and privileges from the national government.

OIL is responsible for onshore oil and gas E&P. In a 2005 survey from Credit Rating and Information Services of India Ltd. (CRISIL) (Aiyar 2005) OIL operates abroad in E&P activities in a joint venture with IOCL. OIL and IOCL have incorporated Ind-OIL Overseas Ltd, a Special Purpose Vehicle to acquire E&P assets abroad and increase E&P operations (Business Monitor International 2012).

IOCL occupies an equivalent status, seen as the national flagship oil corporation of India and is India's largest, partially publicly listed company by sales. It is ranked 96 in the Fortune Global 500 list of the world's largest corporations for 2014 (Fortune n.d.). Although it has operations encompassing the entire oil and gas industry, it operates mainly midstream and downstream. In recent years it has diversified its interests and ventured into E&P, domestically and abroad.

Table 4.1 E&P activities of Indian NOCs in Africa

Indian NOCs	Countries of operation in Africa	Oil blocks acquired	Oil producing blocks	Oil blocks relinquished	Oil blocks in exploration phase
ONGC (OVL)	Libya, Nigeria, Sudan, South Sudan	14	5 (Sudan and South Sudan)	2 (Libya), 3 (Nigeria)	4 (Libya)
OIL and IOCL (Joint venture)	Libya, Nigeria, Gabon	7	0	2 (Libya)	3 (Libya), 1 (Nigeria), 1 (Gabon)

Source Compiled from OVL, OIL, and IOCL

OVL, OIL and IOCL have not fared well in acquiring oil blocks. They have relinquished most of those they acquired either because of poor commercial prospects, their inability to meet contractual agreements, or because the blocks are still in the exploratory phase. Indian firms were outbid by Chinese NOCs in Angola and failed to acquire assets in Angola and Ghana. In Nigeria and the Joint Development Zone (JDZ) with São Tomé and Príncipe, the oil blocks have not been commercially viable and OVL relinquished the blocks. OVL also relinquished two oil blocks in Libya. The only silver lining for OVL in Africa is the oil-producing blocks in Sudan and South Sudan, but even there oil production has decreased in the last 2 years with shutdowns having a heavy impact on OVL's overseas oil production. OIL and IOCL combined have acquired seven oil blocks and the majority of the oil blocks have been acquired by farm-in offer, that is, they did not bid for the block.

The fault lies partly with the Indians: the two NOCs have little experience in oil abroad. OIL is the smallest upstream NOC in India and IOCL specializes downstream. Africa's largest oil fields are offshore which require technical and operational skills lacking amongst Indian NOCs.³ Lacking the financial muscle and/or technical requirements of its foreign competitors, neither OVL, RIL nor Essar Oil (whether individually or in a joint venture with any other oil company) bid for or sought to acquire these oil blocks or asked to be included in the farming offer.

Indian NOCs including the private sector have been comprehensively beaten in the quest for oil resources by the other leading emerging economy, China. Chinese NOCs have greater market capitalization and receive greater economic, political, and diplomatic support. China has foreign exchange reserves of around \$3 trillion and the China Investment Corporation (the sovereign wealth fund owned by the Chinese government) has \$300 billion at its disposal—\$100 billion for NOCs, \$100 billion for agriculture, and \$100 billion for infrastructure—which is larger than India's foreign exchange reserves (around \$250–280 billion). Chinese NOCs also receive financial support from Exim Bank, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, and state banks. India's Exim Bank cannot match China Exim Bank's soft loans or LOCs.

4.4 Indian Investments in Africa's Market-Seeking and Infrastructure Sectors

The African continent has grown at an average of 5 % in the last 5 years. Its middle class is estimated to have risen to 330 million (defined by the African Development Bank as having daily spending of \$2–20). Africa is the fastest growing continent in the world with more than half of its countries growing faster than 5 % (African

³Interviews with IOCL Executives on September 29 2012 and October 1 2012 in New Delhi, India. The officials want to remain anonymous.

Development Bank 2014). Nine of the world's 15 fastest-growing economies are in Africa. Africa is expected to have 19 of the 30 fastest-growing economies in the world until 2019, with 46 countries growing at more than 4 % (African Development Bank 2014). Since 2004, GDP per capita has risen by 30 %. Most African countries will have reached middle-income status and many of these countries will have middle-class majorities by 2025 (African Development Bank 2014). Twenty-six of Africa's 55 countries had become middle income by 2014.

All these trends make Africa's market increasingly interesting to Indian manufacturers and service providers. The market for Indian manufacturing goods—from textiles and pharmaceuticals to light machinery and transport vehicles like trucks and inexpensive cars—has burgeoned. India-Africa trade is expected to climb to \$90 billion by 2015 (Business Today 2013). According to a Deloitte report “Construction trends in Africa”, 322 infrastructure projects were underway in 2013, worth \$223 billion, 38 % of them in Southern Africa.

The Indian private sector, unlike its counterpart in China, has played a crucial part in expanding the country's economic interests in Africa. The role played by India's leading industrial groups, with Exim Bank, has been crucial in promoting a more activist form of economy diplomacy towards Africa. Spurred by the opportunities on offer in relatively untrammelled African markets, private firms have made real inroads into the continent in a short period.

The impact of Indian private and public firms is evident in the market-seeking and infrastructure sectors like telecommunications, financial services, food processing, infrastructure, information technology, health and pharmaceuticals, and tourism. Private companies—often with government support—spearheaded India's entry into Africa, including Tata (Box 4.3), Kirloskar Brothers Ltd. (KBL), Ranbaxy Laboratories, Karuturi Global, Mahindra and Mahindra, Fortis, Vedanta, BhartiAirtel Communications, Essar Group, Ashok Leyland, Larson and Toubro, NIIT Technologies, Escort, and Apollo Hospitals.

Box 4.3 Tata Africa Holdings

The Tata Group is India's best-known global brand, inside and outside the country (The Hindu 2012) and the 11th most reputable brand globally (Tata Motors n.d.). It has operations in more than 80 countries and has been operating in Africa since opening a subsidiary in Zambia in 1977. It has a presence in over 11 African countries with investments above \$145 million.

Tata Africa Holdings has entered into joint ventures and partnerships with African companies, developing local resources and talent. It employs over 1500 people. It has offices in around a dozen African countries (Tata Africa n.d.). As of 2013, Tata Group received 2.3 % of its revenue from Africa and aimed to expand its operations into 20 countries and grow its business in Africa by 30 % a year by increasing its presence in automotive, mining, infrastructure, and hospitality (Raj 2013).

Tata Africa Holdings has projects improving the quality of life of the communities in which it operates. Community initiatives focus on three areas—education and skills development, entrepreneurship and health. Tata Group is also involved in educational initiatives. Tata Africa has disbursed over 10 million South African rand towards scholarships at local universities (Tata Africa n.d.).

Tata companies in Africa address social needs such as health care (Mbanjwa 2012). Employees take part in the Africa volunteer for Operation Smile missions, which provide free of cost reconstructive surgeries for cleft lips, cleft palates, and other facial deformities in children. Tata Africa Holdings is involved in fund-raising for the Cancer Association of South Africa, and fundraising and volunteering for the Stop Hunger Now campaign (Tata Africa n.d.).

Tata Africa Holdings works with the South African government to foster entrepreneurial spirit and leadership development through the Tata Top Ten competition, and Tata Africa Holdings sponsors the All Africa Business Leader Awards. Some Tata companies have their own corporate responsibility initiatives (Tata Africa n.d.).

Investment in Africa by private Indian companies is put at \$5 billion (Naidu 2011). KBL's manufacturing and assembly operations in South Africa, Kenya and Egypt cover three of the continent's regional markets, generating local employment and imparting technical knowledge. KBL has acquired 90 % shares of South Africa-based Braybar Pumps Ltd. through a wholly owned subsidiary and has a presence in ten other African countries (The Hindu 2010). It wants to increase its footprint in the larger economies of west and central Africa (African Review 2013).

Other Indian firms like Karuturi Global, through its subsidiary Karuturi Agro Products, has become a major foreign presence in Ethiopia and Kenya, while smaller companies like McLeod Russel and Ruchi Soya Industries have taken out leases on land in Ethiopia (Eriksen et al. 2012). Airtel Africa, a subsidiary of BhartiAirtel India, operates in 16 countries in Africa, providing mobile and data services to some 50 million customers. BhartiAirtel (Box 4.4) paid \$10.7 billion to buy Zain Telecommunications in 2010. It is set to invest \$125 million in Gabon and provide ICT training to 10,000 young people from 2013 to 2015 (NDTV 2013). It has also held discussions around investing \$100 million in Rwanda in collaboration foreign firms like IBM and Ericsson, set up and manage world-class facilities there (Ventures 2012).

Box 4.4 Bharti Airtel

Established in 1995, BhartiAirtel Ltd. is a leading global telecommunications company with operations in 20 countries across Asia and Africa. Headquartered in New Delhi, it is among the top four mobile service

providers globally for subscribers—over 275 million of them (BhartiAirtel 2014). It operates in 17 countries across Africa through its subsidiary Airtel Africa. It operates a GSM network in all countries, providing 2G or 3G. In March 2010, Bharti struck a deal worth \$9 billion to buy the Kuwaiti firm's mobile operations in 15 African countries (India's second-biggest overseas acquisition after Tata Steel's \$13 billion purchase of Corus in 2007).

Airtel Africa has, however, experienced difficulties in Africa on costs and timelines, and has yet to turn a profit, for three reasons. First, the company underestimated the level of complexity and set unrealistically aggressive targets (Goyal 2014). According to its chairman, speaking in 2013, "Infrastructure is weak and the cost of inputs is higher because inputs need to be imported as nothing is locally produced. Manpower is much more expensive because skill sets are limited. People who are skilled go out to Europe". Lower incomes also present a challenge (Tele-net 2013). Second, Zain Telecommunications (bought in 2010) had made little infrastructure investment in Africa compelling Airtel to invest more than it had budgeted. Third, Airtel has found it hard to centralize operations, as it managed to do so well in India. At the start of 2014, Fitch reduced BhartiAirtel's outlook to negative from stable, citing risks involved in African operations (Goyal 2014).

Airtel's expansion in Africa has been good for Africans. Some experts argue that Airtel could bring down telecoms operating costs in Africa by as much as 70 %. Airtel has also generated jobs in Kenya: Spanco, an Airtel vendor, employed 1000-plus people within a year. IBM has assembled a top-notch global team to manage Airtel's business and is planning to build talent supply through training and tapping into the African diaspora (Goyal 2014).

Airtel has invested \$125 million in Gabon and \$100 million in Rwanda over three years on commercial and social programmes to reinforce its business and generate both direct and indirect jobs (Business Standard 2013). It has also developed a programme focused on sports and vocational training in Gabon and Rwanda (Ibid.).

The sharp growth of such private companies in Africa has taken place largely under the leadership of the Confederation of Indian Industries (CII), Exim Bank; and captains of major Indian companies.

The main aim of Exim Bank is to promote and provide entry to entrepreneurs to Africa and encourage them to bid for projects. It also finances Indian companies investing in Africa or those Indian companies selling in Africa, either through buyers' credit or through investment finance.

The bank is trying to promote all forms of business in Africa based on the request of the host country and projects they had submitted to the Indian government. Reflecting this, 52 % of Exim Bank's credits were allocated to Africa, with

45 % to infrastructure and 22.4 % agriculture, for a total of \$4.2 billion by 2011 (Baynton–Glen 2012, p. 6). The Bank has also granted LOCs to African banks, such as the \$100 million provided to the Nigerian Exim Bank in 2011 to promote Indian businesses in Africa (Rajanikanth 2011). A memorandum of understanding was signed between the Exim Bank and the African Development Bank in November 2009 to expand the co-financing partnership (African Development Bank Group. n.d.).

The annual India-Africa Conclaves convened by the CII and Exim Bank have brought together these Indian players and African counterparts, aiming to encourage Indian exporters to access African countries and increase their presence there. A measure of success is increasing participation (CII Africa Enclave 2014): that by African Heads of State from only one at the first in 2005 to seven at the ninth in March 2013, by Indian delegates from 473 to 622, by African delegates from 266 to 893, and by African countries from 17 to 45. Another mark of success is the number of MOUs signed and the value of the projects discussed, rising from 178 (worth \$6 billion) to 477 (worth \$68 billion), between the first and ninth Conclaves (CII-Exim Bank). Over 500 delegates from 45 African countries took part in the 10th India-Africa conclave in 2014, discussing 549 projects worth about \$85.37 billion and conducting some 1000 business-to-business meetings.

The SOEs generally work closely with Indian private firms in sectors that draw heavy support from Exim Bank through its LOC programme. Indian SOEs like Indian Telecom Industries, Rail India Technical and Economic Services (Rites), Konkan Railways, Bank of Baroda and others, along with private companies, are involved in large construction projects (exemplified in Box 4.5).

Box 4.5

Rites and Itron International Ltd. are two of India's largest state-owned infrastructure and engineering companies, and have secured contracts to build rail networks and the leasing of locomotives in Sudan, Tanzania, Kenya, and Mozambique in the last few years.

Itron International Ltd. received a concession for the rehabilitation of the 600 km Beira railway system in Mozambique, which was completed in February 2010. A \$31 million contract was awarded to Itron International by the Ethiopian government for the construction of 120 km of roads.

Rites was appointed as consultant for the Adama-Asela road construction project undertaken by a Chinese company in Ethiopia and, subsequently, awarded a contract for a railway rehabilitation project in Huila Province in Angola.

Also in Ethiopia, KEC International was awarded a contract worth \$40 million for building a 132 kV power project. Kamani Engineering Corp. received a contract of \$11 million for constructing a transmission line between Zambia and Namibia, and the private Kalapaaru Power Transmission

Ltd. has secured major contracts to build power transmission sites. Finally, Fouress Engineering India Ltd. is managing a power plant in Uganda (Naidu 2011).

Alongside these growing developments is the gradual expansion of Indian financial institutions across Africa (Box 4.6).

Box 4.6 India's African banking expansion

The Bank of Baroda, State Bank of India and Bank of India—the three state-owned banks—have increased their operations in Africa. Bank of Baroda has 45 branches in eight countries. In Zambia it has a joint venture, Indo Zambia Bank.

Bank of India is in Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia. State Bank of India has operations in Angola, Egypt, Nigeria, and Mauritius. Its subsidiary, State Bank of India Mauritius, has established itself as a major player in Mauritius. Canara Bank opened its first branch in Johannesburg in 2014 and plans to open branches in Durban, Cape Town, Pretoria, and other parts of South Africa. It has received approval from banking regulators in Tanzania to establish a subsidiary in Dar es Salaam and is working to open branches and an international centre in Abuja. India's largest private sector lender, ICICI Bank, plans to open branches in Mauritius and South Africa (Business Today 2013).

India claims that it has an edge over other developing countries in education, ICT, and tailor-made technology for small and medium-sized enterprises, borne out by specific experience. Under the aegis of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), beyond providing financial aid and extended LOCs, it plays a role in African development by transferring technology and skills. In Uganda for instance, Indian technology led to nearly three times more electricity generated than planned at the Karuma project. Another sector where Africa can benefit is health care and pharmaceuticals, areas in which Indian state and private firms are recognized international players (Chap. 2).

4.5 Scope of PPPs, and Beyond

Discussions on PPPs are framed in part by the evolving debates on aid architecture conducted by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)-Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and by a series of UN-sponsored conferences on the least developed countries. The 4th High Level

Summit held in Busan, Republic of Korea, in late 2011 reiterated the shift towards recognizing the role of private firms and capital working with states and multilateral institutions for public goods like infrastructure. Notably, the Busan Summit—which failed to get the governments of India and China to formally adhere to the OECD-DAC process—nonetheless endorsed trilateral cooperation and a greater role for the private sector in development (OECD-DAC Declaration 2011).

Echoing much of this position, the UN's Least Developed Countries Conference held that year produced the Istanbul Plan of Action, calling for PPP that would bring together market-oriented approaches to work with the state. Civil society organizations—including African and Indian participants—were highly critical of provisions contained within the declaration, believing that the commitments made by developed countries were weak and that the overall approach traded away a people-centric form of development for one aimed principally at fulfilling narrower commercial interests (Social Watch 2011).

Indian and African officials are, by way of contrast, enthusiastic about the potential that PPPs hold for aligning their own trade and investment policy to the development strategies of African countries. Participants at the first India-Africa Forum Summit in 2008 recognized this potential and endorsed this approach as part of the cooperation strategy that was formalized through the promulgation of an India-AU Framework agreement (African Union 2008). For African governments in particular, overcoming the dearth of infrastructure has been a key priority since the fomentation of the Lagos Plan of Action in 1980. Africa needs an estimated \$93 billion a year for infrastructure development and faces a massive funding gap of about \$45 billion. For instance, the entire installed generation capacity of Sub-Saharan African countries, excluding South Africa, is only 28 GW and 25 % of that capacity is unavailable because of aging plants and poor maintenance. A mere 29 % of Sub-Saharan Africa's population has access to electricity, and African manufacturing enterprises experience power outages on average 56 days a year (Exim Bank 2013).

The NEPAD/AU built on the notion of prioritizing infrastructure development as a key to fostering sustainable development, underscoring the centrality of breaking down barriers to economic integration through a continent-wide infrastructure development programme (NEPAD Secretariat n.d.). Its Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa reinforces the need for African states and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to have a central role in any partnership arrangements on this (Commonwealth Business Council 2013, pp. 11–13). To give an example, according to one authoritative study, if Africa continues to grow at its current rate of nearly 6 % from 2013 to 2043, it will require continental levels of power generation to rise from the current 125 to 700 GW by 2040; transport volumes will rise by up to eight times current levels (Commonwealth Business Council 2013, p. 15). And while African governments' interest in PPPs grows for economic and social infrastructure, this constitutes only 4 % of all infrastructure projects (Deloitte on Africa 2013).

The formalized participation of the five key African RECs⁴ from the outset of the Forum Summit process brings the RECs—the focus of major infrastructure projects on the continent that involve PPPs—directly into top-level decision making. The impact of this involvement is evident in the practical focus on particular issues that involve PPPs, such as ensuring smooth flows of credit to regional infrastructure projects and provision for greater support to build African capacity in the regulatory environment for investment promotion and protection (India-Africa Summit 2011).

Indian assistance can be important. Exim Bank has already provided many concessional LOCs for infrastructure development in Africa, mainly in power, road and rail projects. As of September 2010, around \$1.4 billion of LOCs to Africa had a direct infrastructure focus.

Still, they face obstacles. On the Indian side, institutional and legal bottlenecks have led to delays in releasing sanctioned LOCs and in monitoring projects supported by LOCs. Greater transparency in selecting LOC projects has also caused delays, as has synchronizing different LOC projects that have received funding from multiple sources.

On the African side, it is imperative to improve governance, strengthen basic market institutions, introduce and deepen competition, improve the business environment, and remove bottlenecks. This is achievable through, for example, bilateral investment treaties, streamlining investment laws, identifying priority sectors for increasing investment and access to capital and enhancing productivity to ensure that Africa moves to a sustainable investment-led development model (CII/WTO 2013).

Creating or improving on investment-promotion agencies and chambers of commerce in Africa to promote and facilitate inflow of foreign investment, coupled with enhancing their performance as one-stop shops for investment-related activities that cooperate more closely with India's Exim Bank, would be useful for facilitating investment in Africa. Such relationships would enhance knowledge about potential areas for investment, upcoming projects, prospective investment partners, and sector-specific procedures and rules, as well as investor incentives (Exim Bank 2013). Linked to this should be institutional mechanisms to ensure that India's assistance becomes more effective. India could benefit from the expertise of traditional donors on project impact analysis and best practices to improve quality of delivery and introduce mechanisms for better assessment of Indian project assistance. Trilateral cooperation with traditional DAC partners and emerging partners from the South could hold important insights and skills that complement the prevailing technical assistance and development programmes in Africa (CII/WTO 2013).

⁴These are the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Eastern and Southern African States (COMESA) and the East African Community (EAC). The Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) has been effectively moribund for more than a decade.

4.6 The Diaspora—Overrated for Investment

The Indian diaspora is a feature of relations with Africa that sets India apart from other emerging powers, a product of economic requirements and changing colonial policies under the British Empire. (This topic is taken up further in Chap. 6)

After independence and years of disengagement, starting with the election of the BharatiyaJanata Party (BJP) in 1996 Indian governments began gradually reengaging with overseas Indian communities. Recognition of the crucial role that overseas Chinese played in the part of China’s rapid economic development has been influential in shaping the new Indian policy. In 2004, the government established the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs and with it the launching of an annual PravasiBharatiya Divas convention aimed at acknowledging and leveraging the talent and financial acumen knowledge of Indian communities abroad (Large 2013).

For Africa, the significance of the South African Indian community weighs particularly heavily in the relationship: it has the largest number of overseas Indians on the continent at 1.3 million, the biggest “Indian city” outside India (Durban), a strong historical linkage between the governing African National Congress (ANC) and India’s Congress Party, coupled with South Africa’s status as the leading African economy and its representation in key global bodies like the G20 and more recently BRICS (The Times of India 2011; Smith 2012). Moreover, South Africans of Indian origin are economically among the wealthiest diaspora communities and are well represented in all walks of life (Alves 2007).

With its well-regarded legal environment, robust financial sector, and developed (if somewhat dated) infrastructure, South Africa has attracted some leading Indian corporate investments, including the Tata Group (see above), Mahindra and Mahindra, Reliance Communications, Ranbaxy Pharmaceuticals, and Cipla (Davis 2012). Bilateral trade reached \$14 billion in 2012, making South Africa the largest export destination for Indian merchandise trade in Africa (CII/WTO 2013), while Indian investment in South Africa is estimated to have exceeded \$6 billion in that period (Davis 2012). A CEOs’ forum, chaired by Ratan Tata and Patrice Motsepe (of Business Unity South Africa), regularly meets senior figures of South African business and within the ruling party (including those of Indian origin) as active participants (Alves 2007). Most recently, the rise of the Gupta family—minor economic players in India but significant in South Africa—as investors with close personal links to the South African presidency illustrates both the positive effects and cautionary concerns that deeper engagement can produce, such as “Guptagate” (Mail and Guardian 2013).

Beyond South Africa, the other region with a large community of overseas Indians is East Africa. Uganda demonstrates the unhappy experience of the Indian community where increasing government-led persecution ultimately resulted in the expulsion of all “Asians” in 1972 and confiscation of their property (Twaddle 1976).

Yet while much is made of the Indian diaspora in East and Southern Africa, the fastest-growing trade and investment in Africa by India is not linked to the diaspora but is in countries with few ties, like Ethiopia and Sierra Leone. Some analysts, including Alex Vines, believe that the significance of the diaspora in the current investment push may be overstated:

Indians investing in Africa are not associating themselves with Indian Africans so much. Indian businesses are not necessarily looking for partners of Asian descent on the continent. They are just looking for good business partners. (Cited in Sherelle 2012)

The socio-political conditions in a given African country can vary considerably and, as a consequence, the degree to which local Indian communities are seen to be either well-integrated into the society or as operating outside the mainstream. Partnering with local Indian diaspora may inadvertently draw Indian companies into local narratives of identity and consequently, subject them to local biases. Furthermore, like other partners, Indian diaspora are fully capable of exploiting their superior information on local conditions in a given country for personal gain and consequently to the disadvantage of their Indian partners. Indeed, in many respects, the common exposure to British institutions and practices is probably a more significant indicator than the actual legacy of migration by nationals from India.

4.7 Conclusions—Challenges

The challenges faced by Indians seeking to invest in the African markets are manifold and familiar ones. According to a survey of Indian exporters and investors conducted by the Indian Chamber of Commerce in 2012–2013, these obstacles include the poor business environment, the absence of bilateral investment agreements, the limited capital resources, and what at this stage still remains a relatively small market (CII/WTO 2013). While larger Indian multinationals have the requisite resources to conduct the necessary background research and presumably offset the worst of these concerns, in fact the evidence presented above suggests that even they are not immune to difficulties. The capacity of some of India's largest state and private firms to acquire commercially viable blocks in the oil sector or to manage profitable ventures in large-scale mining illustrates how investors still face significant obstacles to fully realize commercial success (beyond information asymmetries).

The Indian government should take steps to ensure that the private sector plays an increasing role in the growth and development in Africa under the aegis of South-South dialogue and in a symbiotic partnership, through tighter cooperation between CII, Exim Bank, and private firms.

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Chapter 5

The Importance of Africa in India's Energy Security

Aparajita Biswas

5.1 Introduction

The period since the early 1990s has witnessed unprecedented economic growth in India, fuelled by economic liberalization and an aggressive export-driven policy. It has also been marked by a shift in India's foreign policy, including its approach towards Africa. The new approach was pragmatic, with elements of realist thought driving policymakers, contrasting with the older, more idealistically driven, foreign relations. Economically, India now perceives Africa as a market for its manufactured goods and a source of energy, diplomatically a potential international ally.

As seen in Chaps. 2 and 3, a major economic factor driving India's engagement is its interest in Africa's energy. As of 2014, about 15 % of India's crude oil and petroleum imports was from Africa, notably crude oil from Nigeria and Angola and natural gas from Egypt and Algeria. The continent is expected to contribute roughly one-quarter of the growth in the world's petroleum and liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies from 2013 to 2015 (World Energy Outlook 2013), giving India enormous potential to increase its crude oil imports.

Global oil demand will continue to grow by more than one-third to 2035 with China, India and West Asia accounting for 60 % of the increase, and for global energy demand the developing world more widely accounting for 87 % of the growth by 2030 (IEA 2012). As there is a close empirical link between economic growth and energy demand, India's share of world energy consumption will continue to rise. Their growing energy demand has also had consequences for the world economy, with a shift in the centre of demand of the global oil market shifting from the Trans-Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific.

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The spatial distribution among reserves, production and consumption of oil across the world is uneven. As of 2013, West Asia accounted for more than 53 % of the world proven oil reserves, with 81 % concentrated in members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). While this region has dominated world oil production, it consumes less than 9 % of the global total. Countries like the United States (US), China and India accounted for 13.5, 4.9 and 1 % of global oil production, respectively, while they consumed 20.8, 11.3 and 3.8 % of global consumption.

There has been a shift away from the Western oil majors—such as BP, Chevron, Exxon Mobil, Shell and Total—as the holders of oil reserves and the main producers of oil towards national oil companies, such as Saudi Aramco, Petronas (Malaysia) and Petrobras (Brazil). According to a Brookings study in 2007, national oil companies controlled about 77 % of the world's oil reserves, and of the top 20 oil-producing companies, 14 were NOCs (or newly privatized NOCs), a number that is expected to increase with the growing activity of NOCs in new and prospective oil reserves (Jaffe and Soligo 2007; Brookings 2013).

This chapter examines India–Africa energy ties, with an overview of India's anxieties over energy security, the role Africa can play in soothing those, and the emergence of Asian powers like India and China and their subsequent impact on global hydrocarbon demand. It emphasizes two elements of supply diversification that affect India's foreign policy the most: where the oil is coming from and the acquisition of upstream assets. For Africa, though it is well endowed with hydrocarbon resources, its nations are under-resourced in the capacity and skills to exploit them, especially south of the Sahara.

5.2 India's Energy Security Issues

India will reach its maximum oil demand after 2020, and is expected to become the world's third largest consumer of energy after the US and China by 2030, surpassing Japan and Russia (IEA). Further, with its economy expected to grow at 6.3 % in 2015 and 6.6 % in 2016 (IMF 2015), this projected growth is likely to bring with it greater demand for energy.

Over the next 40 years, India will probably deplete its reserves of coal—the primary source of its current energy needs. Coal had 51 %, oil and gas 46 %, of India's primary commercial energy sources a decade or so ago (IEP Report, Planning Commission 2006). The remaining 3 % came from hydropower, nuclear and wind energy (Planning Commission 2009). The nature of this energy basket has only been subject to minor changes since the release of the document. India relies heavily on coal for electricity generation, and oil and natural gas for other commercial uses. In 2012/2013, about 79 % of India's crude oil imports went into producing petrol, diesel, kerosene and cooking gas, mainly for domestic

consumption. India's dependence on imported oil (it has few proven reserves), which is already greater as a share of oil consumed than that of the US and China, is expected to rise further, rendering it more vulnerable to increasing global competition for hydrocarbons.

Coal reserves as of April 2014 were put at around 301.56 billion tonnes (Geological Survey of India). Oil reserves amounted to 5.61 billion barrels—a meagre 0.34 % of total global reserves. The majority of India's oil reserves are either offshore around Mumbai or in Assam. India's continued economic success hinges on obtaining reliable and cost-effective energy supplies; increasingly, those supplies depend on national and foreign delivery chains that are creaking and feared unreliable (Jackson 2006).

Consumption of natural gas grew from 0.7 BCM in 1970/1971 to 51.3 BCM in 2010/2011. It is used for energy (69 %) and non-energy (31 %) purposes. The biggest use of natural gas is in power generation (46 %) followed by fertilizers.

Imports are climbing steeply, reaching \$490 billion in 2012–2013. In spite of a significant decline in our import bill to \$450 billion in 2013–2014, of which nearly a third—\$164 billion—consisted of oil and gas imports. As of 2014, the trade deficit stood at \$135.5 billion, dominated by oil imports. By 2030, 90 % of India's oil and gas will have to be imported (IEP Report, Planning Commission 2006).

This import dependence has intensified concerns that without reliable, affordable energy India will be unable to sustain high economic growth. The scenario is complicated by a raft of factors: its major oil suppliers are in unstable regions in West Asia and Africa; oil prices are high, spurring higher gas prices; geopolitical uncertainty stokes fears of possible supply disruptions and oil price volatility; slow market reform has kept down investment in the domestic energy sector; and few or no energy alternatives exist—India's nuclear power programme, for example, and attempts at large-scale hydropower generation have regularly fallen behind schedule (Madan 2006; Brookings 2013).

These trends and patterns underline India's need to diversify its sources of supply—but surprisingly India does not have a concrete policy on energy security, despite growing necessity for one, a view reflected by the strategic community and professionals in the field. Energy security has been defined by India's political leadership the capacity to “supply lifeline energy to all our citizens as well as meet their effective demand for safe and convenient energy... at affordable cost” (Planning Commission 2006). The same perspective has found voice time and again among India's senior political leadership (Carl et al. 2008). It was only in August 2006 that an Integrated Energy Policy report (IEP Report) was published, which looked at enhancing India's energy security in a holistic and sustainable manner, while creating a policy advisory document for the Indian government.

As stated in the Planning Commission report, the objectives of India's external policy and oil security are threefold: establish a comprehensive policy to include total deregulation of overseas E&P business and empower Indian firms to compete with international oil companies, with provision of fiscal and tax benefits (Box 5.1);

define a mechanism to leverage India's "buyer power" to obtain quality E&P projects abroad; and have a focused approach for E&P projects and build strong relations in focus countries with considerable hydrocarbon endowment, like Russia, Iraq, Iran and North African countries (The first and second aspects are also touched on in Chap. 3).

Box 5.1 Getting Indian firms into the oil business

The IEP report promoted several reforms in the hydrocarbon sector. These include the participation of the private sector, both Indian and foreign, in upstream (E&P) and downstream activities. The report also prescribed a multi-pronged strategy to ensure future oil supplies from overseas oil and gas properties.

One of the thrust areas was to create financially robust, strong, and flexible oil companies capable of aggressive import policies and overseas investment. The Indian government not only deregulated the hydrocarbon industry, it also empowered the Public Sector Undertakings (PSU) oil companies to acquire stakes in foreign oilfields. It has allowed state-owned OVL to invest up to \$75 million in overseas oil and natural gas E&P projects. Increasingly, large private companies—especially those with strong political leverage, such as Reliance, Tata, and Essar—have been playing a greater role in defining the domestic energy agenda, while proving critical in planning and running international projects.

ONGC and its export arm OVL received support from the Indian government in overseas investments and acquisitions in oil-rich countries. ONGC was encouraged to look for income and rent upstream. The urgency for such an external push was prompted by high energy and commodity prices. OVL was created in 1989 itself to pursue "equity oil"¹ investments, but only in the period following the IEP Report has the company established itself across the global landscape. Since then, overseas activities of the Indian oil companies became very visible. ONGC announced investments in offshore gas fields in Vietnam, as well as energy projects in Algeria, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Libya, Syria and Venezuela.

OVL also became active in Africa. Its investments in Sudan's oil sector alone are worth an estimated \$250 billion, though production was shut owing to conflict between Sudan and South Sudan.

¹Equity oil refers to the proportion of production that a concession owner has the legal and contractual right to retain in a concession owned jointly with other actors, including NOCs, MNOCs, national and state governments.

5.3 Africa's Oil Scenario

African oil is high quality, and, with many new discoveries outside conflict zones, is open for foreign participation. The continent is seeing a hydrocarbon boom attracting major external interests and financial investments, emerging as an important player in the global industry. Recent discoveries have transformed perceptions of Sub-Saharan Africa's (SSA) hydrocarbon resources, with the traditional West and Central African suppliers joined by new East and Southern African suppliers (WEO 2014).

5.3.1 Africa's Growing Reserves and Production

That most countries are trying to diversify their oil dependence from West Asia (owing to regional volatility and instability) has led to growing attention to African energy supplies. Africa's proven oil reserves have grown by nearly 120 % since 1980, from 57 billion barrels in 1980 to 131 billion barrels in 2013, with seemingly more in offshore Africa (US EIA and WEO 2014). It is proven that natural gas reserves have grown from 210 trillion cubic feet (tcf) in 1980 to 514 tcf in 2013. These figures have been boosted by recent discoveries of sizeable natural gas reserves in Mozambique and Tanzania.

For a number of years, North Africa has been the principal producers of hydrocarbons in Africa with Libya host to the continent's largest reserves of oil. Algeria is also a major producer of crude oil, and houses the continent's third largest reserves of oil. Since the 1990s, Egypt's gas production has increased fivefold. There are also some smaller gas-producing states in the north, including Tunisia, Morocco and Mauritania. However, recent trends have confirmed the greater role in hydrocarbon production of SSA nations, such as Nigeria and Angola (Table 5.1).

Hydrocarbon production and related activities in SSA have traditionally been carried in the Gulf of Guinea across the Niger and Congo Delta Basins across West Africa. With global demand consistently increasing post 1990 simultaneously with global oil prices (up until a recent crash in oil prices as of January 2015), a number of contemporary hydrocarbon supply hubs have emerged in SSA. These include the East African Rift Basin which has brought prospects of oil production to Ethiopia, DRC, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda; the East African Coastal off Mozambique and Tanzania including Madagascar and Seychelles, the West African Transform Margin stretching from Mauritania to the Niger Delta and the West Coast Pre-Salt along the Central African coastline including Gabon, Congo, Angola and Namibia (Africa Energy Outlook 2014). A recent crash in global oil prices has resulted in a slowdown in investment into the exploration and development of newer oil blocks due to the capital nature of global hydrocarbon markets.

Table 5.1 India's oil imports from Africa—US\$ million

Country	2009–2010	2010–2011	2011–2012	2012–2013	2013–2014
Nigeria	7166	10,536	13,779	11,200	13,510
Angola	4236	5089	6547	7088	5935
Egypt	1213	983	2231	1738	1869
Gabon	99	211	79	735	790
Libya	613	961		1687	427
Sudan	436	565	367	71	371
Algeria	936	1704	1871	227	323
E Guinea	269		205	519	299
Cameroon	120	117	496	403	239
Guinea	201	76	134	497	107
Congo-Brazzaville	420	478	208	407	
Chad				107	
Cote d'Ivoire	47		141		
DRC	132				
Total—Africa	15,888	20,720	26,058	24,679	23,870
Total—world	77,506	92,651	134,154	144,519	143,638
Percentage share of Africa in India's oil imports (%)	20.4	22.3	19.4	17.07	16.6
Percentage share—SSA in Africa (%)	82.7	82.4	84.3	84.6	91.2

Source Export Import Data Bank, Government of India, Ministry Of Commerce

SSA produced nearly 8.5 million bbl/d of crude oil in 2013 (International Energy Statistics, US Energy Information Administration), which was about 7 % of global oil production, a figure that has been growing continuously every year. Nigeria has been the top liquid fuel producer in the SSA region, followed by Angola. Together they made up 75 % of total liquid fuels produced in SSA in 2012. Both these nations are expected to double their production by 2020.

Sudan, which started exporting oil 3 years ago, was producing 186,000 barrels a day until South Sudan stopped oil production due to instability in the region. The partition has had huge consequences—from a peak of nearly 288,000 bpd on average in 2004, production fell to below 125,000 bpd by June 2011, 1 month before South Sudan's independence from Sudan. Further, oil production across South Sudanese facilities have not been producing consistent output since its independence due to political and economic disagreements with the North since 2012, and political instability and civil conflict within South since 2013 forcing a number of oil companies to reconsider their investments (Sudan Tribune 2014).

Moreover, Africa is seeing continued growth in the hydrocarbon sector, with East Africa emerging as a new source of gas and oil. Large oil discoveries around Uganda's Lake Albert in 2006 and subsequent gas discoveries offshore Mozambique have dramatically altered perceptions of East Africa. Uganda looks set to become

one of the five largest oil producers on the continent, with its Lake Albert oilfields potentially capable of producing 200,000–350,000 barrels per day (bpd). Uganda's oil prospects are getting brighter after the recent discovery of an additional one billion barrels of oil, pushing the figures of commercially viable deposits to at least 3.5 billion barrels. Mozambique is expected to become the second largest exporter of LNG by 2025, as the country steps up production from 10 million tonnes per annum (Mtpa) in 2017 to an envisaged 50 Mtpa (Africa Energy Outlook 2014).

In March 2012, Kenya had finally discovered oil after many years of exploration. The news of fresh discoveries in Kenya has boosted onshore exploration, though commercial viability is yet to be established. Meanwhile, there are hopes that both oil and gas could be discovered in Ethiopia in commercially viable quantities (Control Risks). Although progress towards commercial development of hydrocarbon resources in Kenya has been modest, the country plays a vital role in the region as an oil transit hub, particularly for oil products coming into the region.

The region is a magnet for investment where competition for influence is fierce between European, the U.S., Chinese, Indian and other Asian interests. Most oil-producing countries in Africa are open to foreign investment for exploration and production because they lack money, technology, skill and experts in these areas. Moreover, predominantly the North African nations have efficiently nationalised their oil industries. On the other hand, a majority of the oil exploration and production in SSA has been carried out by private multinationals or other state-owned entities of foreign nations. This is primarily due to the fact that the African nations, especially SSA, lack the necessary capacity, infrastructure and skill required to sustainably exploit their hydrocarbon wealth.

Most of the oil-rich African countries have been keen on developing oil production at a fast speed and invite foreign MNCs to invest in the oilfields as they lack funds of their own.

As of 2013, there are about 500 oil companies that participate in explorations and development of African oilfields. Because of their investment, total African oil production is set to rise by 91 % between 2002 and 2025, from 8.6 to 16.4 million barrels per day according to the estimation of US Department of Energy. Assis Malaquias in 2013 suggested that foreign investors are attracted by very competitive terms and conditions, as a result of liberal fiscal policies, offered by African governments (Malaquias 2013).

Coupled with it, Multinational Oil Companies (MNOCs) have been making huge investments, with the “super” corporations like Exxon Mobil, Royal Dutch Shell, BP-Amoco-Arco and Chevron-Texaco operating across the continent in conjunction with state oil corporations—in Nigeria's case, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, in Angola's case—Sociedade Nacional de Combustíveis de Angola and Sonangol, and GNPC in Sudan, SSA.

Africa's estimated oil reserves of 131 billion barrels are small compared with those in the Gulf, standing at 793.1 billion barrels as of 2014. However, the quality of its crude—the kind found in the Gulf of Guinea is light and sweet, i.e. viscous and low in sulphur—makes it financially attractive as it is easier and cheaper to refine than more sulphurous Venezuelan or West Asian oil. Moreover, most of these

reserves are offshore, ensuring lower operation costs and better transportation considering the immense challenges in operating transnational oil and gas pipelines. In Nigeria, all new discoveries and production are offshore, as are Angola's oil and gas reserves. By 2020, some 95 % of oil production in SSA will be offshore, with around 85 % of this from Nigeria and Angola.

The Gulf of Guinea has a large amount of hydrocarbon energy resources. Eleven African nations share its continental shelf.² Among these, Nigeria, Gabon and Cameroon are major petroleum producers. With a reserve estimated at 49.4 billion barrels and proven natural gas reserve at 195.0 trillion cubic feet (TCF), this area is likely to become the world's leading deep-water offshore production centre. Moreover, the geographical position of the Gulf of Guinea is an important advantage for oil supply looking towards North America.

Hydrocarbon production and related activities in SSA have traditionally been carried out in the Gulf of Guinea across the Niger and Congo Delta Basins across West Africa. With global demand consistently increasing after 1990 and simultaneously with global oil prices (up until the late 2014 slide in prices), contemporary hydrocarbon supply hubs have emerged across the region.

5.3.2 Destinations for African Oil—But a Still-Small Share for India

Robust demand from, especially, India and China over the past decade, fuelled by their strong economic growth, has started to change Africa's export profile. Only 12 % of Africa's oil was shipped to China and 6 % to India in 2007, shares rising by 2013 to 20 and 9 % (Fig. 4.1). In India's import basket, Africa accounted for 16.6 % of all oil imports. (And as discussed in Chap. 2, oil contributes hugely to Africa's total export receipts: in 2011, 58 % of them by value belonged to the category "mineral fuels, oils and distillation products").

India's major African oil suppliers include Nigeria, Angola, Egypt, Gabon, Libya, Sudan, Algeria, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, Guinea and Congo-Brazzaville, with West Africa, North Africa then Central Africa representing India's major partners in the sector.

As of 2013–2014, the African continent accounted for 16.6 % of India's total oil import bill, with SSA accounting for 91.2 % of total oil imports from Africa. The period from 2000 to 2008 witnessed a steady increase in oil imports from Africa, and simultaneously oil prices were also on the rise.

During the subsequent period between 2008 and 2009, international oil prices had crashed, followed by a dramatic increase up until 2012 when the oil market by and large stabilized. Increases in the oil import bill from 2010 to 2012 can be

²Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Benin, Togo, Nigeria, Cameroon, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Democratic Republic of Congo and São Tomé and Príncipe.

interpreted through the lens of rising international oil prices along with greater domestic demand.

Further, India's oil imports from Africa have represented a decreasing share in relation to its total oil imports post 2010. This could be attributed to a number of factors, however, that in itself would require a dedicated research study. India's oil import bill is expected to reduce further as a result of a crash in oil prices in January 2015 and a consensus among forecasting agencies on the future stabilization of oil prices at approximately \$60–65 per barrel (significantly less than the \$100–120 from 2011 to 2014).

Additionally, the gradual decreased economic sanctions on Iran and the progress towards a framework nuclear agreement between the US and Iran would also have an impact on India's oil imports from SSA. However, even to analyze the nature of such an impact would also require an independent research study of its own.

In spite of these factors, Africa has emerged as a crucial region for oil supply diversification due to the fragile nature of hydrocarbon supply chains in West Asia, India's traditional oil supplier. The government is acutely aware of the critical situation which could come about due to uncontrollable events such as conflict situations and oil embargos which could cause a serious disruption to supply chains (IEP Report, Planning Commission 2006).

5.3.3 Investment in Africa

Africa is a magnet for investment where competition for influence is fierce between European, the US, Chinese, Indian, and other Asian interests (Biswas 2009). Most oil-producing countries in Africa are open to foreign investment for E&P because they lack the financing, technology and skills, and because only the North African nations have nationalized their oil industries. Most of the oil E&P in SSA is carried out by private multinationals or other state-owned entities of foreign nations.

About 500 oil companies participate in E&P of African oilfields. Because of their investment, total African oil production is set to nearly double between 2013 and 2025, from 8.6 to 16.4 million barrels per day (International Energy Statistics, US Energy Information Administration). Malaquias (2013) suggested that foreign investors are attracted by very competitive terms, given the liberal fiscal policies of African governments.

Oil MNCs have been making huge investments, with the majors like BP, Chevron, Exxon Mobil, Shell and Totaloperating in Nigeria, Angola, Algeria, Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Chad. In all these places they operate mostly in partnership with state oil corporations—the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation; Sociedad Nacional de Combustveis de Angola and Sonangol; and Ghana National Petroleum Corporation in Sudan.

Highly competitive and strongly supported by the state, Chinese multinationals like the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China National Offshore

Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and Sinopec are on an acquisition drive that is capturing key resources and market share across Africa.

FDI inflows to SSA are concentrated in extractive industries, such as oil, gas and mining (UNCTAD 2013). As of 2012, six oil-producing countries—Nigeria, Algeria, Chad, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea and Sudan—accounted for about 48 % of inflows to the region (Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for Development). Investment inflows to the region expanded by 4 % from \$54.8 billion in 2012 to \$57 billion in 2013. The source of these inflows includes Asian FDI, which accounts for 10 % of the global FDI stock.

India and its private extensions have also been diversifying their procedure in acquiring oil resources through the acquisition of stakes in equity oil, making Indian enterprises internationally more competitive. Through the participation in the exploration and production process of overseas oilfields, India is looking to respond to the challenges of market fluctuations, as well as domestic stagnation in production.

OVL has been the most active public sector company in Africa. The company has in total five exploration projects in Africa—one in Libya, two in Nigeria, one in Egypt and one in Joint Development Zone: Nigeria–Sao Tome and Principe (ONGC Videsh Limited 2013). There are also two producing projects which are in Sudan, however, these projects have not yielded returns since 2012 due to persistent conflict and bilateral disagreements on critical issues between Sudan and South Sudan. The company has identified main countries of interest—Angola, Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone (Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Government of India 2011).

The other public sector companies in Africa are Oil India Limited (OIL), Bharat Petroleum (BP) and Hindustan Petroleum (HP). OIL has interests in three blocks in Libya, two in Egypt and one in Nigeria (Deccan Herald 2011). BP has interests in a block in Mozambique and HP has interests in two Egyptian blocks.³

The Indian Private Sector has also been looking to move into the oil and gas sector in Africa. Reliance Industries Limited (RIL), India’s largest private sector player in the energy sector made its first major overseas acquisition through buying a majority stake and management control of Gulf Africa Petroleum Corporation (GAPCO) in 2007. GAPCO operates in East and Central Africa and has its headquarters in Mauritius (The Indian Express 2007). Another private sector company, Essar Energy Overseas Limited has a 50 % stake in the Kenya Petroleum Refineries Limited in 2009. Both RIL and Essar have been bidding to acquire assets of British Petroleum in Zambia, Malawi, Botswana, Namibia and Tanzania (Barman 2010).

Paradoxically, oil-exporting African nations suffer from severe energy deficits, because their energy resources are underused or exported in crude form, and

³See for more information, Bloomberg Business Week, Bharat Petroresources Limited: Private Company Information, <http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/snap-shot.asp/privcapId=37091690>, accessed on 04 November 2013.

sometimes even wasted due to various factors. These include pilferage along national and transnational pipelines, oil spills around offshore wells and a lack of strong regulatory framework in the oil sector of a majority of African nations.

Additionally, the energy-related risks of instability in African oil-producing nations have proved to be a significant deterrent to economic engagement through the energy sector. The conflict in the Niger Delta has intensified post 2010, with the militaries of Niger and Chad securing positions in Nigeria's north due to the inability of the Nigerian security forces to maintain peace and stability in the region. Further, the security of offshore assets has come under question due to a recent surge in piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. Libya's internal security mechanisms have broken down, with civil strife rampaging the country since 2011.

5.4 The Twenty-First Century Scramble for Africa

NOC's and MNOC's from across the world are competing to secure stakes in oilfields and blocks in SSA—a market traditionally dominated by the US, UK, French and other European player. Since 2000, US MNOCs have been aggressively seeking new oilfields in Africa systematically filling the vacuum left by the divestment of the UK and French corporations. This divestment has been observed to be systematic and consistent and can be attributed to a number of significant factors—development of national oil industries in African countries, increasing operating costs of colonial investment in the post-colonial era, and the greater economic viability of Russian natural gas to supply European demand.

US MNOCs Exxon Mobil and Chevron have led the larger investment, a number of smaller companies such as ConocoPhillips and Marathon have also been pumping investment. In 2002, Chevron Texaco announced that it was planning on investing 20 billion USD in African oil. Additionally, Exxon Mobil announced its intention to invest 15 billion USD in Angola over the next 5 years, and further invest another 25 billion USD across the continent over the next 10 years.

Further, US MNOC investment has steadily expanded their presence across the continent, as planned and projected in the beginning of the twenty-first century. Exxon Mobil have acquired assets in Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, Madagascar, Nigeria, South Africa and Tanzania. The company has been conducting its most expansive operations in Nigeria, where it is involved in the exploration and production of crude oil, the manufacturing of petroleum products and the transportation and sale of crude oil and petroleum products. Most of the company's assets are in deep-water territory including several offshore fields (EIA).

However, with the coming of the twenty-first century and the increasing economic weight of the Asia-Pacific countries, there has been a shift in the geopolitical centre of the global oil market from the West and the East, especially due to immense energy consumption of China and India. This has also led to a prevailing view within the Indian strategic community that the traditional geopolitical rivalry

has been reflected in the global oil market as well, with Chinese corporations actively working towards marginalizing India's influence in Africa.

Increasingly, Chinese firms have outbid OVL. For instance, in Nigeria in 2005, while OVL outbid CNOOC and acquired Nigeria's Akpo Field (OPL-246) off South Atlantic Petroleum Ltd., the Indian government thwarted OVL's acquisition of the block, on the grounds of high political risk. The block was ultimately acquired by CNOOC. OVL also faces operational, human resource and financial obstacles (Box 5.2).

However, a deeper analysis into the phenomena indicates a clear distinction between Chinese national interest and China's NOC's and their corporate interests. Further, due to the unique relationship between Chinese NOC's and their government has empowered the NOC's to compete aggressively across the continent's oil sector against not only Indian NOC's, but also other national NOC's and MNOC's. Additionally, majority of prospective oil blocks are acquired through multinational conglomerates working together in a partnership according to principles of equity.

Box 5.2 Room for improvement at OVL

At present, OVL's operations do not much enhance India's energy security in spite of comprehensive policy advisory mechanisms in this particular sector. OVL's unimpressive technical competence, especially in the international arena, puts severe limits on its ability to acquire and manage promising acreage abroad. Most of OVL's staff come from ONGC, which has a poor performance record even in India, where it has been the main upstream player since the 1960s. ONGC also has little expertise in offshore exploration and virtually negligible experience in deep-water projects.

So, in the present era of fiercely competitive bidding for promising prospects, it is doubtful that OVL has the technical competence to assess the risk-reward scenarios well enough to put it in an advantageous situation. If it tries to stretch too far too quickly, it will assume extremely high financial risk; indeed, many of the exploration blocks acquired by OVL are in the "very high risk" category.

International oil companies and African NOCs have shown a slight preference for Chinese NOCs as partners, as they offer a more complete investment package with strong financial backing and a comprehensive strategy. For example, in Ghana in 2010, Ghana National Petroleum Corporation opted for the Chinese NOC in Kosmos Energy stake in the Jubilee oilfields instead of India's OVL. Kosmos' Jubilee discovery in 2007 was the company's first major discovery and one of West Africa's largest discoveries of the last two decades (Ghana-Oil and Gas Development). This was largely because in September 2010 China Exim Bank lent Ghana \$10.4 billion for infrastructure projects, and the China Development Bank

provided a separate \$3 billion loan for the development of the country's oil and gas sector.

Moreover, the Indian government gives little financial autonomy to OVL, which must go through a lengthy approval process. OVL is empowered to invest on its own only in projects costing less than \$75 million, or far smaller than Chinese companies' threshold. Beyond the political, economic and diplomatic influences of the Chinese government, cash-rich Chinese companies like CNPC, CNOOC and Sinopec, have bid aggressively, offering better overall financial packages. By bidding higher, these companies are willing to accept lower rates of return, a price that China has so far been ready to pay for securing equity oil.

Chinese NOCs also have greater access to cheap capital than Indian companies, borrowing at 0–1 % domestically, against 10–11 % for Indian state and private firms. Although finance is available at 3–4 % on the international market for very large sums, Indian companies cannot tap it owing to currency fluctuations and difficulties in providing collateral guarantees from banks, parent companies or sovereign guarantees.

Further, China is heavily active in Africa's power sector, which attracts its largest share of international financing from China itself. China is involved in various intergovernmental schemes that are looking to install an additional 6000 MW of hydropower capacity in Nigeria, Sudan, Zambia, Ghana, Mozambique, Guinea and Ghana. China's Sino Hydro Corporation is building hydroelectric dams and wind farms worth an estimated \$3 billion in Ethiopia and Kenya. China and its corporations have already assisted in the establishment of more than 5000 MW of hydropower distributed across a number of projects spread across SSA.

Another Chinese company, Yingli Solar in association with the international football federation, FIFA, has successfully provided photovoltaic power to 20 football training centres across Africa as of 2014. The Chinese government has also pledged to build 100 clean technology projects on the continent (Dwinger 2010). Such investments and development aid have had a considerable effect on African nations, especially among the political and business classes. China's proactive strategy in the sector could be emulated to a degree by Indian policymakers. Finally, India's capacity-building pales in comparison to China's, lacking both its financial and physical footprints.

The quest for energy security has been an influential factor driving India's moves into the African hydrocarbon sector. Given its major dependence on imported oil and its urge to diversify its oil supply sources, the country's foreign policymakers have been compelled to adopt a proactive policy towards Africa, while nurturing its relations with major oil-producing African nations. Like China, India enjoys the advantage of engaging with comparatively new oil-producing nations, which offer wide investment opportunities, but with limited competition.

Although FDI in African nations are led by India's private sector, government-driven capacity-building programmes extending LOCs and various concessions have supported a strong Indian presence in infrastructure building

(roads, railways, dams, power plants, etc.), pipeline projects, education and healthcare in Africa. At the same time, India's FDI in Africa has also increased considerably.

5.5 Conclusion

It is disturbing that in spite of a commodity and natural resource boom, most of the oil-rich African countries suffer from poor development, entrenched authoritarianism, political instability and violence. The prosperous sectors of the economy have no links with other sectors. Moreover, some of the countries in Africa with the highest income inequality are oil producers, such as Gabon, Nigeria, Angola and Equatorial Guinea. Although fuel subsidies bring with it its own inefficiencies and losses to the economy, countries like Nigeria, where 70 % of the population lives below the poverty line, many locals see fuel subsidies as the only benefit of living in an oil-rich nation. Steps taken to diversify these economies have yielded only mixed results.

In many countries, energy has been recognized as an essential tool to combat poverty. African institutions, especially AfDB, have a crucial role, and to this end put together its energy sector policy. This has a dual objective of supporting regional member countries in their energy initiatives and assisting them to sustainably develop their energy sectors.

Of course, securing these objectives is not the sole responsibility of one institution or programme. External actors have opportunities, especially due to the size and timescale of infrastructure projects and their requirement for different financiers, including those in the private sector—often PPPs—as well as bilateral and multilateral partners. In many African countries, Asian countries can play an important role (see earlier and subsequent chapter). Refining, for example, is ripe with opportunity. India can play an important role as it is quickly emerging as a refinery hub with capacity well exceeding demand.

India and a number of African nations face similar challenges in the long term, driven by the requirement of ensuring stable, sustainable and competitive energy markets. India's engagement with African nations in the energy sector should additionally be perceived through South–South Cooperation frameworks, with the principle of mutual benefit driving cooperation initiatives in the sector. India has built its own capacities and has achieved a degree of self-sufficiency in developing resources—an experience in which it can pass on to Africa.

Mineral-rich African nations have to reorient its FDI as most of it is concentrated in extractive industries, and due to weak cross-sectional linkages, it generates virtually no trickledown. In spite of the gradual emergence of a dynamic and corporate-driven middle class, the high growth of many African countries has not led to meaningful economic structural transformation, with still-unimpressive job creation and poverty reduction, often exacerbated by non-transparent financial governance.

It is extremely challenging for developing nations to avoid showcasing symptoms of the “Resource Curse”. Lack of stable governance structures and governing institutions in post-Colonial Africa has further contributed to this. The establishment of a corporate-politico nexus in the governments of resource-rich African countries has been a by-product of the syndrome. Rising commodity prices from 2000 to 2010 spurred the spread of what has also come to be known as the “Dutch Disease”.

However, an observed dip in commodity prices post 2010 has adversely affected the influence of this corporate-politico nexus. Greater manufacturing output, high growth rates in the services sectors and projected expansions in the telecommunications sectors are positive indications for the economic diversification of these countries. In spite of the crash in the commodity markets, Africa continues to represent one of the world's fastest growing regions. Advances and improvements in the sectors of energy, infrastructure, education, healthcare, telecommunication supported by reforms in government, business and media, all various aspects of the engagement between India and Africa, have the potential to redirect resources and generated wealth into the holistic and sustainable development of the continent.

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Chapter 6

India's Economic Diplomacy in Africa

Ian Taylor

Haté (2008, p. 3) states that “Africa is still a relatively small part of India’s foreign policy, far less significant in commercial or political terms than the Middle East or Southeast Asia. But as India cultivates its global role, this is an area where it can position itself as a leader, a supplier of investment, and an aid donor”. This fits with another analysis, that “Since India lacks the foreign reserves to match the cheque-book diplomacy of China, it is futile to imagine that economic munificence alone can give New Delhi traction in Africa. If credit lines and infrastructure construction become the sole pillars of India’s strategy in Africa, it will end up second best forever *vis-à-vis* China” (Times of India 24 May 2011).

The question here is whether India is a “scrambler or a development partner?” (Corkin and Naidu 2008). While Indian academics forcefully assert that it is a true partnership (Sharma 2007, for example), the answer remains very much open, particularly when current Indo–Africa linkages “spans the corporate globalisation era started from the late 1980s to the present day [which] became the prime engine driving India–Africa relations with big Indian companies and their investment in Africa” (Paul 2014, p. 184). This chapter aims to shed further light on the debate, reviewing some of the implications of the growing role of economic diplomacy in Indo–African relations. Economic diplomacy is here understood as the deployment of various economic tools to achieve policy goals. This includes trade and investment, developmental assistance, bilateral agreements etc.

6.1 Moving Beyond Idealism

In light of much current Indian rhetoric about its relations with Africa, the struggle for Indian independence inspired African nationalism and is a powerful legacy with resonance today, even if only at state level. However, while Gandhi may have set

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down the moralistic underpinnings for Indo–African relations, it was Jawaharlal Nehru who provided a political framework, with a strong element of South–South solidarity infusing India’s early post-colonial foreign policies (Kapur 2002).

Officially, Indian foreign policy roots itself in Nehruvian inclinations for multilateralism and South–South solidarity (Agrawal 2007, p. 7). According to some commentators, this has stimulated India’s long-held interest in UN peacekeeping (Chiriyankandath 2004, p. 200) and Indian peacekeepers have been involved in over 40 UN peacekeeping missions (Hansel and Möller 2014), many in Africa. New Delhi is enthusiastic in its support of the UN system which often stands in contrast to much Western practice (Reddy and Ulgiati 2015). Using its leverage, New Delhi has at times sought to open up a certain amount of political space within multilateral institutions where developing countries might cooperate (*ibid.*) and as part of this strategy, has underwritten the financial costs necessary for such cooperation (Hurrell and Narlikar 2006, p. 7). Motives for such efforts come from the fact that “[T]he Indian economy is becoming highly reliant on foreign markets for its survival and growth...India’s growth in its exports of goods, services, and people create a big stake for India in sustaining open markets globally. Multilateralism is being seen as an important means for India’s economic management, especially in dealing with major powers” (Ollapally and Rajagopalan 2012, p. 98).

Some of India’s political interest in Africa is aimed at strengthening bonds with countries in the expectation that diplomatic benefits will accrue. This tactic paid off in 2006 when the chair of the Council of Ministers of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) threw the weight of the 15-member subregional group behind India’s bid to be a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council.

As part of its general commitment to multilateralism, India has long emphasized both a cooperative new world order and the mutuality of Southern interests in combating global inequality. This resonates in many quarters in Africa, confirmed by Jean Ping, then chairperson of the AUC, who stated that “Africa is paying special attention to developing relations with emerging powers of the South. Our common aim is to promote multilateralism as a paradigm in international relations”, said at the plenary of the second Africa–India Forum Summit (Times of India, 24 May 2011) and has at times enabled New Delhi to project itself as the spokesperson of the global south (Narayan 2005, p. 2), a role that India often (even if only implicitly) competes for with China (Ford 2006). In emphasizing the claimed mutual interests behind Indo–African ties, the Indian government has asserted that “India’s contemporary Africa policy is aligned to a confluence of interests around justice in the global order levelled at increasing the leverage and influence of their respective global positions and promoting a new international order” (quoted in Naidu 2007, p. 2).

The mutual desire by both India and the AU to reform the UN Security Council and secure permanent representation has been a consistent theme in recent Indo–African relations. This is not only linked to the demand to secure their “rightful places” in world affairs, but also in the case of India, would alleviate the inferiority that India feels vis-à-vis China. India’s diplomatic strategy cannot be said to be

grounded in an idealism predicated purely on South–South solidarity, and contemporary India's foreign policy is more pragmatic than previous incarnations.

Although New Delhi continues an interest in non-alignment and notions of South–South solidarity, its focus is very much on national interests, particularly economic, as seen in the fact that during the 1990s India was shutting diplomatic missions in Africa as an economic measure; today it has 33 embassies, high commissions, and consulate-generals across the continent. India's MEA has increased its diplomatic initiative by establishing three joint secretariats to manage relations with the continent: East and Southern Africa Division; Western Africa Division; and West Asia and North Africa Division (which covers the African countries of Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, and Tunisia alongside the Middle East). India has also copied China's Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) (Taylor 2011) in developing its own India–Africa summit (see Chap. 2), which has the status of a joint secretariat within the MEA.

6.2 Altruism or Hard-Nosed Pragmatism?

The experience of a country such as India operating in Africa and seeking out some sort of “partnership” potentially holds more for the continent in terms of demonstration effects and learning (Norbrook and van Valen 2011, pp. 23–24). Certainly, the type of capacity building programmes and technical expertise offered by India as part of its economic diplomacy holds out great potential for African recipients, as well as furthering Indian diplomatic ambitions.

India prefers not to talk in terms of aid, but rather development cooperation under the rubric of South–South solidarity. Like China, India seeks to cast such engagement as being based on a relationship of mutual benefit. The supposed sharing of best practices is often broadcast as a central *raison d'être*. Certainly, the capacity building projects and other technical assistance may help legitimise India's self-identification as a “partner” advancing the principles of South–South fraternity. This resonates with a long-held trope in Indian diplomacy, traceable back to Nehru. Furthermore, in contrast to much conventional aid, which is driven by the exigencies of the (now massive) Western aid industry, Indian assistance tends to be more demand-driven and suited to local conditions and requests. Bespoke programmes delivered at the instigation of recipient governments have less an impression of charity and more of mutual support.

Yet positives should not be simply and naively assumed by either side. Controlling and managing Indo–Africa relations is crucial for the continent if it is to benefit from the opportunities that an increased Indian attention to Africa affords. Thus far, it is true that Indian actors have largely avoided the sorts of criticism from rights groups and the West that China has endured.

A key issue is how can (or will) African leaders seek to lever the newfound Indian interest in Africa so that Africa's place in global trade networks becomes

more proactive and beneficial to the continent's citizens? To date, trade policy has been a crucial and important element of the two summit meetings, which operates alongside New Delhi's commitment to both multilateralism and South–South solidarity. This is also reflected in India coordinating closely with leading African countries on the Doha Round of negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO) and in Indian membership of the India, Brazil and South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA), formed in 2003 (Taylor 2009). Both IBSA and the Africa–India Forum were established with New Delhi's involvement owing to "India's aim to change the world's perception of India—from being a recipient to being a donor—in order to boost its global political standing. Moreover, it was a realization that political ties have lagged behind the growing economic ties between India and certain African countries" (Kragelund 2011, p. 596).

In 2003, the Indian government announced it would no longer receive foreign aid except from a select few (Germany, Japan, Russia, UK and US), and it repaid \$1.6 billion to 14 bilateral donors while increasing its own aid to other countries (Sinha 2010, p. 77). As a result, it has been termed an "emerging" donor, but it may be more useful to use the appellation "non-DAC" donor (Kragelund 2011, p. 555), given that parts of Africa and other areas have now been receiving Indian aid for over half a century. India is particularly keen on expanding its aid to Africa. In 2012/13, African countries received 7 % (\$43 million) of India's technical cooperation budget, up from 4 % the previous year. New Delhi often stresses its willingness to share lessons with Africa from its own development.

Thus 2003 might be thought of as a watershed year in India's aid/economic diplomacy history, for it was then that India terminated the foreign aid programmes (except five) and announced the launch of its own aid programme: the India Development Initiative. It was around these developments that consultations about establishing an Indian aid agency took place, to be somewhat unsatisfactorily resolved a few years later (see below).

India's emergence as an aid donor is obviously linked to the country's rapid economic growth: "Development aid, or rather, a shift from mostly being an aid recipient to also being a donor [is] perceived...as a means to acquire more international political leverage and ultimately obtain a seat in (an enlarged) UNSC" (Kragelund 2011, pp. 594–595). This has not occurred without some controversy, with critics arguing that New Delhi has used its foreign aid as an instrument to gain access to overseas markets for its goods and services, pave the way for Indian investment abroad, and secure access to natural resources (e.g. Agrawal 2007; Kragelund 2008). In India itself there is widespread criticism among Indian policy makers of short-term projects that "rapidly unravel following the ending of the 3- or 5-year funding cycle" (Price 2011, p. 6).

Growth in Indo–African linkages provides a possible alternative model to African leaders, many of whom are frustrated by the lack of economic progress in their countries, despite following Western advice regarding market liberalization. The role that a strong public sector played in India's growth and the continued utilization of state power along mercantilist lines is particularly of interest and in turn the issue of whether or not Asian-style developmental states are a possibility in

Africa has occupied the minds of a large amount of African academics and policy makers. The expanded Indian presence in Africa has opened up space for Africans to rethink development policy and provided alternatives to the advice proffered by the IMF and World Bank. Indeed, the Indian experience continues to inspire many policy makers, who regard it as perhaps more relevant to their own development aspirations than those encapsulated in the Washington Consensus.

Yet emerging economies' "aid programmes are driven by vital national interests (e.g. energy security) and commercial considerations (e.g. market penetration). *This is no different from the way in which traditional donors worked in the past*" (Rampa et al. 2012, p. 251, emphasis added).

As seen in earlier chapters, Indian–African trade has grown rapidly in the last few years. African imports from India grew at an annualised rate of 23.1 % between 2005 and 2011, (comparable to 25.6 % from China) (Krishnan 2013). In 2000, Indo–African trade was worth \$3.39 billion (Majumdar 2009); by 2015 India–Africa trade is projected to reach \$90 billion (Confederation of Indian Industry/WTO 2013). To facilitate burgeoning commercial ties, New Delhi has pursued an active set of policies centred on economic diplomacy, often along three avenues (Box 6.1). The motives are no doubt informed both by Indian commitment to multilateralism and the notion of South–South solidarity, as well as by more pragmatic impulses aimed at furthering Indian business interests.

Box 6.1 Three channels for conducting economic diplomacy

India rolls out its aid and economic diplomacy essentially through three main channels:

- technical cooperation, which includes capacity building programmes and skills-based knowledge transfers:

The technical cooperation programmes are discussed in-depth below. Through them, LOCs are offered on concessional terms on the condition that beneficiaries import Indian-made equipment, technology, projects, goods and services. All this is to be on delayed credit terms and should make up a minimum of three-quarters of the contract's total worth. At best tied aid, these LOCs are much more accurately described as instruments of trade rather than development assistance. The vast majority of LOCs underwritten by New Delhi are extended to African states.

Grant assistance projects are primarily in-kind relief and are targeted mostly at neighbouring countries (chiefly Afghanistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka). They are often related to humanitarian relief. Large infrastructure projects, mostly in Bhutan, Bangladesh, and Nepal, also fall under grants programmes, containing a strong geopolitical element to such assistance and often targeted quite openly to rival regional challengers such as China and Pakistan.

As an aside, at the inaugural India–Africa Summit in 2008 the vast majority of new Indian commitments were for technical assistance, whereas at the second Summit in 2011 LOCs were New Delhi’s focus.

India’s economic diplomacy is strongly oriented to capacity building in Africa as an element of its foreign aid. This can be seen as both altruistic in nature, aligned to the ideas associated with South–South cooperation and pragmatic, in the sense that greater capacity in Africa, particularly in the areas covered by the institutions’ remit, may provide improved commercial opportunities for Indian investors. The second goal is more aimed at public diplomacy and the manifest display of India in Africa as a “partner” in development, one offering suitable levels of skills and technology. This public diplomacy neatly complements the wider goal of proffering India to Africa as a new and trustworthy diplomatic collaborator.

India was, for example, the first Asian country (in 2005) to become a full-member of the Africa Capacity Building Foundation after guaranteeing \$1 million to it to build capacity for sustainable development and poverty alleviation in Africa. In all, 19 training institutes were to be set up across Africa by India, part of a commitment given at the first India–Africa Forum summit in 2008. However, as the information on the four pioneering Indian capacity building projects shows, New Delhi has been incredibly slow in delivering. This contrasts unfavourably with the rapid provision of pledges by the Chinese. Whoever is at fault—India’s notorious bureaucracy or African government’s lack of capacity—the situation needs to be sorted out fast.

In 2009, India cancelled some of the debts owed to New Delhi by countries under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative and rationalized commercial debts. The total debt written off by New Delhi is, however, paltry at about \$37 million, so it was largely symbolic (German Development Institute 2009). India is also a donor to the World Food Programme Donor, although its contributions are meagre (a little over \$1 million in 2014). Pakistan, Guinea, Sierra Leone and Guatemala, among others, have all contributed more (World Food Programme 2014).

India’s emphasis for its aid has gradually shifted from the political side (aid via the UN, the OAU/AU, and the Non-Aligned Movement to support African anti-colonial struggles) to development aid (McCormick 2008). New Delhi has deployed some development aid in an attempt to counter Chinese activities, but also to help open up of new market opportunities and reinforce India’s prestige (Yadav 2014). Similarly, “India’s reform towards economic liberalization, privatization and globalization of the country’s foreign policy became also increasingly influenced by geo-economic considerations” (German Development Institute 2009, p. 1).

Unlike the West and China, India mostly funds projects in Africa directly rather than supplying grants (Agrawal 2007), a non-transferable method of aid that is arguably open neither to abuse nor conditions (Jobelius 2007, p. 3). Indeed, Indian assistance generally does not offer up to predatory African regimes an option to avoid governance reform (ibid: 5). Some analysts aver that emanating from the

world's largest democracy, aid from New Delhi reinforces good governance and accountability when there is political space to do so (Vines and Sidiropoulos 2008). This may be true, although we should be aware that India has “attached more weight to solidarity with fellow developing countries and the defence of its own national security interests without a reference to ideology at the operational level” (Mohan 2007). In other words, outright democracy promotion is not yet embedded in India's foreign policy, largely because of adherence to Nehruvian notions of state sovereignty, which does, however, appear to be changing slightly (Price 2011, pp. 19–20).

6.3 Using LOCs

State-owned Exim Bank has been a major agent of Indian financial support to Africa. For instance, the bank has lent money to the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) to be used to acquire capital goods from India (Beri 2003) and has financed Ethiopian sugar production, agricultural development in Botswana and rural electrification and water provision in Ghana (Chaturvedi and Mohanty 2007, p. 65). Such schemes make up around 30 % of total Indian aid to Sub-Saharan Africa (Agrawal 2007, p. 7). Exim Bank generally extends credit to governments, parastatal organizations, commercial banks, financial institutions and regional development banks to facilitate the export of commercial products on deferred payment terms using concessional interest.

Exim Bank also has a Focus Africa Programme, through which the financing of exports to ECOWAS states was facilitated (Beri 2005, p. 387). These credit lines are not aid per se, as their purpose is not development but the advancement of Indian trade and investment opportunities and are, rather, “state-supported export credits” (Sinha 2010).

6.4 Levering Its Expertise in Technical Assistance

Exim Bank was a driver behind the \$1 billion Pan-African e-Network (PAENP—Box 6.2). The e-Network is a good example of India's expertise in technical assistance, which makes up about 60 % of Indian aid (Agrawal 2007, p. 7). Ethiopia's Black Lion Hospital in Addis Ababa has been linked to the Care Hospital in Hyderabad. This is one of the initial pilot projects and a concrete example of collaboration facilitated by PAENP. Antenatal consultations take place at the Black Lion teaching hospital, where ultrasound images are taken which can be seen simultaneously by doctors in Addis and at the Care Hospital. The networking allows doctors in both Ethiopia and India to see each other and confer about the patient. After its initial piloting, the next stage is to link a total of 20 hospitals round Ethiopia into the network. Health workers in rural centres will then be able to access advice. Currently, the Tele-Education Centre at Addis Ababa

University and the Tele-Medicine Centre at the Black Lion Hospital are in operation and to date, 83 Ethiopian students have enrolled for six different programmes being offered by India (Ministry of External Affairs 2014).

Box 6.2 PAENP

The Project was announced during the inaugural session of the Pan-African Parliament in 2004 and the Union Cabinet approved the budget of Rs. 542.90 crores (US\$ 125 million) on 5th July, 2007. The Pan-African e-Network project basic objective is to assist in capacity building through imparting education to 10,000 students in Africa over a 5-year period in various disciplines. Additionally, tele-medicine services by way of on line medical consultation to medical practitioners will be provided. The Ministry of External Affairs has been designated as the nodal ministry, with Telecommunications Consultants India Ltd. (TCIL), the implementing agency. TCIL is a state-owned engineering and consultancy company under the rubric of the Department of Telecommunications (DOT), Ministry of Communications and Information Technology. Established in 1978, TCIL provides consultancy services to developing countries around the world and has a presence in almost 45 countries, mainly in the Middle East and Africa.

The Network was officially launched on February 26, 2009. Under PAENP, New Delhi has set up a fibre-optic network to deliver satellite connectivity, tele-medicine and tele-education to African countries. The project aims to create significant linkages for tele-education and tele-medicine, Internet, video-conferencing and VoIP services, utilizing the facilities and expertise of some of the best universities and hospitals in India. The receiving centres are fully equipped and funded by India, and local staff is trained by Indian experts. The project is also equipped to support e-governance, e-commerce, infotainment, resource mapping and meteorological and other services in participating African countries, besides providing secure connectivity among and between African Heads of State, through a highly secure closed satellite network. The project was initially signed with 48 participating countries; it has now been commissioned in 47 of these. Indeed, only a few African countries have not signed up to PAENP (namely, Angola, South Africa, Equatorial Guinea, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia).

Under the tele-medicine component, patient end locations have already been set up in the 12 Indian Super Specialty Hospitals, namely, All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS), New Delhi; Amrita Institute of Medical Sciences, Kochi; Apollo Hospitals, Chennai; CARE Hospital, Hyderabad; Escorts Heart Institute and Research Centre, New Delhi; Fortis Hospital, Noida; NarayanaHrudayalya, Bangalore; Sri Ramchandra Medical Centre, Chennai; Moolchand Hospital, New Delhi; HCG, Bangalore; Dr BalaBhaiNanavati Hospital, Mumbai; Sanjay Gandhi Institute of Medical

Sciences, Lucknow. These 12 Indian hospitals have been connected to 48 medical locations/hospitals in Africa.

Tele-education teaching centres have already been set up in five Indian universities, namely: Amity University in Noida, Uttar Pradesh; Indira Gandhi National Open University, New Delhi; Birla Institute of Technology and Science, Rajasthan; the University of Delhi; and the University of Madras, with 47 Learning Centres established in African countries. As capacity building is an important element of India's economic diplomacy, PAENP provides for various measures, including training for three Technical personnel from each country for 6 days in Tele-education, Tele-medicine and Networking and on the job training to designated engineers and technicians by the respective countries at the various learning centres, medical centres and universities. This training is aimed at software, hardware, multimedia operations, medical equipment and operations and management. Furthermore, two workshops and seminars on capacity building are budgeted for in the first year, with two representatives from each country visiting India. Board and lodging, local hospitality and transportation is paid for by New Delhi.

In January 2014, a one-day Conference of Ambassadors and High Commissioners from Africa met at the Indira Gandhi National Open University to focus on potential areas for educational collaboration. The conference was conducted by the Pan-African e-Networking project, supported by the Ministry of External Affairs. New Delhi committed to "explore the possibilities of educational collaboration in African and Gulf Countries in the areas of teaching-learning, research, training focusing on open and distance education" (Times of India, 27 January 2011).

New Delhi has also committed itself to 400 new scholarships for African graduates and 500 more training positions under the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme (ITEC). ITEC was originally launched in 1964 with the objective of sharing Indian knowledge and skills with other developing countries as part of Nehru's outreach to the post-colonial world. A total of 2,500 ITEC training positions every year are now available. Studying in India is increasingly attractive to Africans; over 10,400 students from seven African countries now study in India, making up about 13 % of the entire foreign student population (Mohanty 2014).

The programme and its corollary, the Special Commonwealth Assistance for Africa Programme (SCAAP), cover training, both civilian and defence; feasibility studies and consultancy projects; the worldwide deputation of Indian experts; study tours; equipment donations; and aid for disaster relief. In 2013–2014, India offered over 10,000 scholarship slots under the ITEC/SCAAP programme, with 47 training institutions across India operating more than 280 training courses in diverse subjects ranging from information technology, public administration to election management, small and medium enterprises, rural development and others (Business

Standard (New Delhi), October 22, 2014). The main African beneficiaries of ITEC (Ethiopia aside) are Commonwealth nations, perhaps reflecting the resilience of shared imperialist histories in modern international relations.

An important public relations success with regard to Indian technical assistance has been the activities of the “Barefoot College”, or Social Work and Research Centre in Rajasthan (though the Indian public seems to concern itself little about aid initiatives—Box 6.3). The policy of the College is to take rural poor women and train them to become professionals without requiring them to read or write. Since 2004, the Barefoot College has trained over 140 women from 21 African countries as solar energy engineers (Daily Nation, Nairobi, 24 May 2011), with women coming from isolated villages in Benin, Cameroon, Malawi, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Zambia, among others. The College receives funding from diverse sources: the African energy programme saw the solar equipment funded by UNDP, while airfares and 6-month training fees for women coming from Africa were paid for by the MEA. Although the project is non-governmental, the involvement of the Indian state grants New Delhi presence and prestige in a widely seen and effective aid programme.

Box 6.3 Little domestic discourse among the public

Indian domestic engagement over development assistance is minimal and has not yet entered the country’s public consciousness, probably part of the historical reality that India’s foreign policy has traditionally been somewhat cloistered from public debate (Mawdsley 2014). When such engagement is debated publicly, it has typically been critical, highlighting the alleged contradiction in disbursing large volumes of overseas aid from a society with mass poverty and where per capita domestic social spending remains one of the lowest in the world. Unlike India’s space projects, aircraft carriers, and Antarctic programme aid to others cannot be easily defended through appeals to national glory. But as said there is minimal public discussion on aid, in stark contrast to the robust and at times rancorous debate that accompanies domestic development policies.

This lack of public debate is incongruous given that aid from India to developing countries has long been an essential element of New Delhi’s foreign policy. Indian aid has traditionally been grounded inside a wider narrative about India’s own development trajectory; it was principally dispensed to strengthen the recipient state’s own development energies.

6.5 How Much Does India Spend on Aid?

As there is no central agency managing disbursements of Indian development assistance, it is difficult to ascertain exactly how much India gives. In 2006, it was suggested that New Delhi’s development assistance programmes were at an annual

level of over \$350 million (Khanna and Mohan 2006), while in 2009 “according to the various existing sources India’s annual financial volume for development cooperation is currently estimated as being in between half a billion and one billion \$” (German Development Institute 2009, p. 2). At the Africa–India Forum Summit in May 2011, it was announced that \$5 billion aid for the next 3 years would be made available to Africa, with an additional \$700 million for establishing new institutions and training programmes (Times of India, 24 May 2011).

However, there are still no accurate or even amalgamated estimates of India’s overseas aid—a somewhat remarkable state of affairs. The Ministry of External Affairs and the Ministry of Finance deliberately do not document Indian aid. The Ministry of External Affairs annual reports contain disbursements such as technical and economic cooperation, but as not all Indian aid goes through recognizable channels or are clearly demarcated in budget lines, figures do not reveal much. The best that can be done is through carefully calculating annual budgetary allocations to aid-related undertakings: grants, payments to multilateral bodies and international financial institutions, direct loans, and subventions to support preferential bilateral loans, usually mediated credit lines via the Exam Bank.

The *Annual Report, 2012–2013* claims that “Technical and Economic Cooperation” consumes 33 % of the MEA’s budget. But none of this is broken down or explained. What the “Loans and Advances to Foreign Governments” (19 % of total budget) or “Special Diplomatic Expenditure” (12 %) is anyone’s guess. A key problem is that “India...does not adhere to any standard definition of development assistance. What the country calls ‘overseas development assistance’ is often a mixed bag of project assistance, purchase subsidies, lines of credit, travel costs, and technical training costs incurred by the Indian government. The absence of comprehensive definitions, measurements, and accounting methods suggests that India poorly manages its development assistance and has no strong strategic purpose for it” (Agrawal 2007, p. 5).

6.6 Coherence, Capacity and Self-evaluation

Indian economic involvement in Africa is not controlled by New Delhi, but by Indian corporate actors. Such activity is thus less influenced by normative concerns. And so it is imperative for African states to recognize that while Indian official policy towards Africa talks the rhetoric of solidarity, Indian corporations generally only pursue the bottom line. A feature of current Indian policy towards Africa is that “rather than concentrating on state-led development assistance, the Indian government has acted as an enabler for its private sector” (Price 2011, p. 9). This remains the policy, though it has potential downsides. New Delhi’s ability to direct Indian engagements in Africa is, as is the case with Beijing’s surveillance of Chinese actors on the continent, unreliable. New Delhi has to strike a balance between its diplomatic South–South rhetoric and the commercial needs of the Indian private sector. This will remain difficult as long as India’s diplomatic

expertise remains hidebound: the MEA has about 750 diplomats—a fraction of China’s 6,000—strong diplomatic corps (Los Angeles Times, 25 May 2011).

A big problem for New Delhi is the nature of the MEA. Economic diplomacy has quite different objectives from “traditional” diplomacy and there is an urgent need for a change in the mentality of most of India’s diplomats, who have been trained in a particular—Indian—version of outdated diplomacy. The Ministry (as with all other branches of India’s government) is infamous for its bureaucratic rigidity, as well as the status-obsessed nature of many of its diplomats. According to one study on India’s bureaucracy, “the system takes immense care over minute details” and is characterized by “over-insured job security, rigid bureaucracy, encouragement of generalists and slow implementation of laws and decisions” (Joshi and Kumar 2011, p. 18). The *effective* retraining of MEA diplomats is crucial and acquainting them with the various facets of economic diplomacy has to be central to Indian foreign policy efforts broadly and specifically vis-à-vis Africa. Whether this is impossible in the short term, given the entrenched groupthink that operates within the MEA, is a big question. This is unfortunate given that India is a middle-income nation and New Delhi’s experience in how to navigate a post-colonial environment is arguably of more relevance to African states than any policy advice emanating from Western capitals.

Perhaps in response to problems associated with its economic diplomacy, in January 2012, the Ministry of External Affairs made a major decision by establishing the Development Partnership Administration (DPA). This was linked to the idea of an India Development Initiative, back in 2003. Subsequently, in 2007–2008, a suggestion was put forward to create a new agency, to be called the India International Development Cooperation Agency. This agency was supposed to consolidate all Indian activities relating to aid and developmental assistance, which heretofore had been widely dispersed across a confusing variety of ministries and government agencies. However, the plan never took off, falling victim to infighting and rivalry between the Ministry of External Affairs and the Ministry of Finance over the location of the projected agency. With additional resources and prestige no doubt accruing to such an agency, the stakes were high and the plan died.

The DPA then was established as a compromise, charged with overseeing India’s aid through the stages of concept, launch, execution, completion, monitoring, evaluation and impact assessment. Currently headed by P.S. Raghavan, additional secretary in the MEA, the DPA’s remit is to coordinate and increase the efficiency of the implementation of New Delhi’s external economic assistance programmes. DPA has been mandated to establish procedures for the handling of Indian aid projects and seeks to streamline and upgrade capacity building programmes under ITEC. According to the MEA, the “DPA functions in close coordination with the concerned Territorial Divisions of the Ministry, which continue to be the principal interlocutors with partner countries on the selection of projects to be undertaken. The responsibility for implementation and execution of the projects rests with DPA” (Ministry of External Affairs 2013, p. 121). Yet, as noted, the DPA falls short of the original plan which was to establish an autonomous Development Cooperation Agency, similar to most other donors. It might be argued that the

DPA's hosting within the MEA speaks to the idea of economic diplomacy being a key tool to globally project New Delhi's soft power, the practical effect may be less than optimal.

Indeed, while the DPA may be seen as a step forward in overcoming the fragmented approach to Indian aid which prevailed earlier, the ability of this new body to navigate (and prevail over) India's notorious bureaucratic systems remains to be seen. Historically, if other countries are anything to go by, unless the aid body is autonomous and independent of other budget lines, bureaucratic in-fighting over authority and direction will dictate the pace. While it is early days, the fact that in February 2014, the DPA comprised only 20 officials (including professionals from other countries) spoke volumes. With no separate existence and a tenuous history, the DPA is unlikely to be an attractive location for civil servants intent on building their careers.

However, there needs to be much more demanding certification and evaluation of the efficacy of Indian assistance, both for the recipient country *and* for India. The rhetoric of mutual benefit and South–South solidarity requires appropriate analysis and evaluation. This may be conducted either by Indian actors (preferably independent of the state) or even by external peer reviewers.

Thus an urgent and bare minimum is the provision of accurate and consistent data on New Delhi's assistance programmes. Without this, evaluation and analysis of Indian economic diplomacy is confined to speculation. For a start, a basic definition of what precisely constitutes Indian aid would be helpful, even if this does not exactly echo the OECD DAC demarcations. Integral to this is to establish credible institutional structures and procedures to systematize trustworthy data on Indian assistance, which would feed into the evaluations.

Accountability has not been a high priority, and it is only now that the idea of setting up structures to determine and scrutinize the efficiency of its economic diplomacy is gathering momentum. The formation of the DPA is a good move forward, but its lamentable staff numbers must be raised.

6.7 Conclusions—Opportunities for Africa

Increased Indian activity in Africa *may* offer up opportunities for African heads of state to negotiate a better deal with external actors. Much will depend on African agency. African governments *could* use the opportunity of an increased Indian corporate presence in Africa as sources of appropriate technology, skills and advice for economic development. Given that New Delhi generally prefers the roll-out of practical projects rather than ideological posturing, this is a possibility. Equally, capacity building programmes do have potential for aiding some Africans if graduates are subsequently supported and nurtured on their return to society. As ever, it remains a priority for African elites to “accelerate efforts at getting [their] own house in order and to implement the policies, institutions, and trade-enabling physical infrastructure that will be the critical foundations” that will lay positive

foundations (Corkin and Naidu 2008, p. 115). They will also need to sweep aside poor governance, corruption, and any dependency mentality.

It is up to Africans to negotiate with Indian actors to ensure that the benefits accrued from Indo–African ties are evenly shared and that Indian interest in the continent, alongside others, may help serve as a catalyst for economic revitalization. India may play a helpful role here, but how this plays out very much depends on the political leadership in each African country.

For Indian policy to be a success, policy makers need to be highly sensitive to developments on the ground. Thus far, New Delhi has largely avoided the negative attention that has beset China’s relations with the continent. This places India at an advantage but should not induce complacency. Diplomats must work hard with other Indian actors—both public and private—to ensure that reputation-wise, India remains relatively well-regarded. Here, in-depth knowledge of the host African countries and their political cultures, and of the risks involved, is essential, underlining the need to strengthen capacity at the MEA.

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Chapter 7

The Indian Diaspora as a Heritage Resource in Indo–African Relations

Ajay Kumar Dubey

7.1 The Importance of the Indian Diaspora in Africa

Out of 25 million people comprising the Indian Diaspora, around 3 millions are located on the African continent. People of Indian Origin (PIO) in Africa live in Anglophone, Francophone, Lusophone and Arabic-African countries, the outcome of past migration to almost all former colonial powers' territories in Africa. Geographically, they are concentrated on the Eastern coast of the African continent and in the Indian Ocean countries, but they are spread in Central, West and Northern Africa as well. They emigrated during ancient times as traders, during colonial times as domestic slaves, indentured workers (in huge number), free travellers, businessmen and construction workers. Following the independence of India, a good number of Indians moved to Africa as high-skilled professionals, business entrepreneurs and, in some cases, as wagedworkers. Most of them were economically and professionally successful in their new location. They occupy disproportionately high economic, professional and, in some countries, political positions. In some cases, the Indian Diaspora was very welcomed and integrated smoothly, like in Mauritius, which is the only country outside of India where People of Indian Origin are in political power since 1968. The integration did not go as well in other countries such as in Uganda when the entire Indian community was expelled in 1972. In some parts of Africa, the Indian Diaspora has been largely integrated in the local community, like in the Seychelles, in Sudan, in the Isle of the Reunion, or in Mozambique; in other areas, it retains sharp social distinctiveness, like in Eastern and Southern Africa. The Diaspora is well connected to the

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homeland, India, as can be seen in some countries of East Africa, in Sudan and in Mauritius; in other parts of the continent, like South Africa, the connection was lost for historical reasons. An early wave of the Indian Diaspora was composed of soldiers that were sent to Africa during the First and the Second World Wars and settled there. Intermarriage and other forms of assimilation made them a lost Diaspora for India. Successful assimilation policies of colonial powers like France and Portugal created yet another relationship with the subcontinent where the Indian Diaspora retains weak connections to India. In other words, the Indian Diaspora in Africa is varied in terms of its size and time of settling, with a varied degree of emotional and cultural attachment to India.

To understand the importance and relevance of the Indian Diaspora in Indo–African relations in the past, the present and the future, we need to conceptually understand whom a migrant population constitutes of and when it becomes a Diaspora. How important are Diasporas in bilateral relations? Is the Diaspora an asset or a liability for international relations? And, finally, what have been the position and the role of the Indian Diaspora in bilateral relations between India and African countries, and what role and value does the Indian Diaspora have in the emerging Indo–African partnership? These are some of the questions this chapter will address and evaluate.

7.2 Concepts of Diaspora

The word Diaspora is derived from the Greek words *dia* (‘through’ or ‘over’) and *speiro* (‘dispersal’ or ‘to sow’) and is a complex and contested word—understandably so—given its special historical association with the dispersions of the Jewish people. According to Prof. Brij V. Lal, the word has been used to carry connotations of violence, catastrophe, alienation, loss, exile and return. As is known, words and concepts do not remain static; they evolve in time and their meaning changes in response to historical, cultural and social developments (2006). Globalization, in common knowledge, is a phenomenon of the late twentieth century, but some people include the first phase of the European expansion in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in its definition as well.

In the earlier days, only Jewish, Greek or Armenian groups were considered and referred to as ‘Diasporas’. In recent time, however, a plethora of literature on Diasporas has used varied approaches in defining the term (Diaspora). Each of these definitions emphasizes some features, and then adopts inductive or deductive approaches to systematize the concept.

Under globalization, borders have become porous; economic opportunities, in a rapidly shrinking world, have encouraged people to migrate to distant lands. On this backdrop, understanding the Diasporas needs to take into account critical factors of globalization, new meanings of citizenship and changes in the configuration of international relations.

In defining the term ‘Diaspora’, William Safran (1991) suggests that of a people who have been dispersed from a “specific ‘centre’” to two or more places; continues to hold a ‘collective memory, vision, or myth’ about the original homeland; continues to believe that the original homeland is its ideal, true “home and dreams of returning to it; believes that it should remain committed to the maintenance or restoration of the original homeland; sustains a strong ethno-communal bond based on that ongoing relationship with the homeland; and maintains a troubled relationship with the wider society, believing that it can never be fully accepted and causing it to remain “partly alienated and insulated’ from it.

Shain defines the Diaspora as “a people with common national origin which resides outside a claimed or an independent home territory. Its elements regard themselves or are regarded by others as members or potential members of their country of origin (claimed or already existing), a status held regardless of their geographical location and citizen status outside their home country” (1995).

Building on these concepts, Robin Cohen distinguishes between victim, labour, imperial and trade Diasporas. Though in agreement with Safran’s criteria, he suggests that, in addition to the foregoing, the dispersal may have been an “expansion“ in search of trade or economic opportunities. Moreover, he argues, diasporic communities continue to hold “a sense of empathy and solidarity with co-ethnic members in other countries of settlement“ and “the possibility of a distinctive creative, enriching life in host countries with a tolerance for pluralism“ (Cohen 1997).

Michele Reis distinguishes between classical (Jewish and Armenian, among others), modern (slave and colonial), and contemporary Diasporas. She puts forth the argument that contemporary Diasporas are the product of a postcolonial, globalized world, characterized by “fragmentation and dislocation,” ongoing transnational communication, and an implication that “dispersal to overseas territories need not imply a decisive break with the homeland nor is the uprooting of the diasporic group considered permanent” (Reis 2004).

Gabriel Sheffer, on the other hand, explains that a Diaspora is “social-political formations, created as a result of either voluntary or forced migration, whose members regard themselves as of the same ethno-national origin and who permanently, reside as minorities in one or several host countries” (2003). Rogers Brubaker prefers to limit the term Diaspora to the “idiom, stance and claim” of those who choose to emphasize, often for political reasons, their difference from the mainstream (2005).

According to Rima Berns-McGown, people who are diasporic have settled, or been resettled, outside the place they once considered home; balance a connection to the adoptive state with a connection to that original homeland, “mythic” or real; and, within the adopted country, balance a community connection with a connection to the wider society (2008).

In a recent edited work, which is a more relevant formulation for international relations, David Carment and David Bercuson, maintain that members of a

Diaspora may include ethnic migrants, first-, second-, or even third-generation immigrants, as well as expatriates, students, guest workers and refugees. The term reflects the rise of truly transnational populations, people who can be thought of as almost literally living in two places, playing an active role in two communities simultaneously (Carment and Bercuson 2008, p. 5). Furthermore they argue that “today’s Diasporas” differ from previous generations of “ethnic migrants” because late twentieth century telecommunication advances and cheap travel allow for “a new type of ‘hyper-connectivity’ between Diasporas and their home communities” (p. 5).

However, all these definitions are not adequate to cover the phenomenon of ‘Diaspora’ as all diasporic populations do not share Safran’s or Cohen’s criteria. Not sharing a common myth of return or the lack of a strong agreement on a homeland does not make immigrant populations less diasporic.

On this count, the term Diaspora, according to, Vertovec celebrates a culturally creative, socially dynamic, and often romantic meaning (2005). To justify this, he provides example of one Indian Diaspora website that states: “The Diaspora is very special to India. Residing in distant lands, its members have succeeded spectacularly in their chosen professions by dint of their single-minded dedication and hard work” (Government of India 2001).

Conceptually another Diaspora issue, from the perspective of international relations, is whether any overseas community or a settler community of a particular origin, having emotional attachment to the homeland, automatically becomes a Diaspora community. Is a settler population with its aspiration and its memory the sole entity based on which one decides whether it is a Diaspora or not? Or are there other actors whose acknowledgement, and policies, like that of the country of origin of the settler community, that matters in making a settler community into a Diaspora? Can a migrant community, which is disassociated and disowned by its country of origin, be called Diaspora or is it merely a settler community of a particular origin? When India, during its post-independence period under Prime Minister Nehru, actively dissociated with PIOs across the world, did Indian settlers or overseas Indians conceptually belong to the category of ‘Indian Diaspora’ or were they just an Indian settler community? In the same vein, when does a diasporic community cease to be a Diaspora? This is crucial to understand the linking and mobilizing potential of a settler community as a diasporic community. Have Africans, who came to India as soldiers during Muslim rule in India and settled and were assimilated as Siddis of India, ceased to be an African Diaspora? Do African slaves who migrated to the Caribbean’s and trans Atlantic regions from different parts of Africa cease to be a Diaspora when none of them now know from which of the 54 African states they come, as there is no identifiable country of origin? From an international relations perspective on the Diaspora, the answer is yes. Any connection with the homeland and any interest in them from their homeland are not possible. If there is no identifiable country of origin, they are merely a migrant settler community and not a Diaspora.

7.3 The Diaspora as a Heritage Resource

Diasporas play an increasingly significant role in the economic development and the nation building of home and host countries. This is attributed to a number of factors, including accessibility to economic resources, greater mobility, affordability in communication and travel and availability of a large number of expatriate professionals and entrepreneurs who have skills and experience to offer and receive (Vertovec 2005).

Economically, the main contribution of the Diaspora in the development of home countries is workers' remittances, followed by hometown associations and charities that directly affect the nation building, poverty reduction and capacity building. Remittances have attracted the attention of the governments of migrant-sending and receiving countries, international agencies and academia. Similarly, Diasporas have been able to mobilize economic, diplomatic and technical supports from home countries to develop their host countries. The role of the Indian and the French Diasporas in Mauritius to mobilize the support of India and of the European Union to obtain aid for Mauritius is apparent.

Diasporas play a role in brain gain and brain drain between home and host countries. Innovative national and international programs for “tapping the Diaspora” [are put] in place so that home countries can access expatriate expertise, knowledge and experience (Vertovec 2005). The Diasporas' contributions to disaster relief efforts are also a significant economic gain for the homeland.

Diasporas can also play a nation-wrecking role also the homeland. Diasporic groups have played major roles in fomenting and supporting conflict in places as diverse as Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Kashmir, Israel and Palestine. Financial support may flow from various components of a same Diaspora to support insurrectionist groups or, on the contrary, the particular government that is making efforts to eradicate them (Vertovec 2005).

From a political point of view, Diasporas can act as a mediator and promote the political dialogue between host countries and the homeland. Diasporas are considered and treated as a vote bank for certain countries. In a globalized world, some Diaspora members enjoy multiple citizenships with some of them being given the right to vote. Italy, for example, has a third chamber of parliament for its Diaspora. Many politicians aim to negotiate and solicit the votes of the Diaspora. In some countries, Diasporas are considered as a crucial factor during national elections.

The role of the Indian Diaspora in Indo–African relations is to be understood in light of the above debates over the nature of Diaspora, its political and economic contributions to the homeland and the host countries.

7.3.1 The Indian Diaspora in Africa: A Heritage and Strategic Resource

In order to call itself a Diaspora, a community should have aspirations to link and interact with the mother country and possess a network to protect its interests. The mother country's capacity to stand up for its Diaspora in a crisis situation and the position of the homeland on the global political scene are also crucial for a Diaspora to surface and become active. In the contemporary international relations, Diasporas are recognized as an international force. Increasingly, host countries are realizing that a second identity of their citizens are not a threat to the loyalty to their homeland. The Indian Diaspora, in the last decade of the twentieth century, has increasingly begun to acquire a distinct global identity and has developed a spoke and wheel relationship with India as well as a web relationship among themselves cutting across countries, at regional and global levels. The challenge for India is to adopt different approaches and link itself with different components of the Indian Diaspora to strengthen bilateral relations with different countries. It has to establish institutional connections with the Indian Diaspora.

There are three major causes to India's increased interest in its Diaspora: (i) after independence, India had a closed economy which discouraged foreign contributions, businesses, or investment; in 1991, when the Indian Government liberalized the economy, the Indian Diaspora became a very useful agent of trade, investment and technology; (ii) Indian foreign policy became aware of the worth of its Diaspora in industrialized countries for public diplomacy, lobbying and people-to-people connections, particularly in the United States; (iii) globalization made the Diaspora a secular social resource for development, a move away from its parochial fissiparous role.

After the Indian independence, a policy of active dissociation with the Indian Diaspora was put in place that lasted till the early 1990s. India's re-engagement with its Diaspora really took off only after 1991 when the Indian economy faced an unprecedented crisis arising from the depletion of its foreign exchange reserves. If India intended to develop economically and remain competitive in a globalizing world, it had to aggressively pull in foreign direct investments and promote the use of new technologies. It was in this context of larger policy shifts that India re-engaged with its Diaspora in the 1990s. Within the last decade of the twentieth century, the Indian Government showed significant interest in its Diaspora and went as far as formulating a number of Diaspora policies.

The new Diaspora policy of India is 'proactive association', contrasting its previous 'active dissociation' policy with its Diaspora. However it is largely directed to affluent Indians. It needs to fine-tune its policy instrument to further target different dormant but high potential Diaspora resources, for example in Africa, to leverage their connections to India.

The Diaspora has multiple roles. Depending on the domestic positioning of the Diaspora in a country or depending on bilateral or global power relations, a Diaspora community could play different roles as a heritage resource or as a

strategic resource or both. Its role can also vary on the basis of policies in place in the home country. The Indian Diaspora policy was initially predominantly directed to its Diaspora in developed countries, especially to the non-resident Indians. The policy seeks Diaspora deposits to allow India's central banks to manage a foreign exchange crisis. It succeeded as it obtained a strong response from a cash rich Diaspora in North America. Having overcome this crisis, Indian policy shifted to target its Diaspora in the West, North America and the rest of the world, including in Africa, for direct investment to accelerate its economic reform and development. Data showed that the share of diasporic FDI in total FDI during 1991–2003 stood at around 4.18 % (Economic Editor's Conference 2004). These were again largely coming from North America and Western countries. It was a poor response when compared to China, where overseas investment through the Chinese Diaspora had reached over 62 % of FDI during 1980s. Having realized the limitation of the Diaspora's role on this count, the Indian Government launched an initiative focusing on Diaspora philanthropy and brain gain. This was again directed at developed countries and the new Indian Diaspora (recent migrants) who recently moved out of India as high-skilled professionals. However, its implementation meant routing money through government controlled channels established specifically for this purpose, which was largely unpopular and received a limited response. By the second decade of the twenty-first century, India had already implemented its economic reform and transitioned from an aid recipient to an aid giving country. The country had by then developed global ambitions and needs to reach out globally. It was in this light that the Indian Diaspora has emerged as a strategic resource. Around 60 % of the 25 million Indians composing the Diasporas are old Diaspora. Most of the Indian Diaspora in Africa is old Diaspora. In its quest to reach out globally for market access, industrial resources, trade and, most importantly, people-to-people connectivity, the Indian Diaspora emerges as a potential strategic resource for these objectives. It can serve as a promoter of bilateral economic, diplomatic and strategic relations between its home and host countries. India's Diaspora in Africa, as discussed earlier, is located in many countries of Africa. Its role and potential as heritage resource varies depending on domestic positioning, changing global configuration of international relations and the evolving Diaspora policies of India. As Africa is not a country but consists of 54 countries with different colonial legacies, different types of governments, economic policies, diplomatic determinants and diversity management policies, any examination of the role of the Indian Diaspora in Africa in emerging Indo–African partnership needs to take into account (i) experiences of the Diaspora's engagement of the past, and (ii) a segmented analysis on the present Diaspora to understand its positioning and potential role for the future, discussed in more depth in the next subsections.

7.3.2 *The Indian Diaspora in Africa: Historical Engagements with India*

With the abolition of slavery in the British, French and Dutch colonies, there was a severe shortage of labourers working in sugar, tea, and coffee, cocoa, rice and rubber plantations in the colonies. India and China became the alternative sources of labour supply. A migration wave of labourers came from these countries. Simultaneously, businessmen and entrepreneurs also migrated from these countries to different colonies. Thus, by and large, there were two streams of Indian emigrants to the colonies: recruited indentured labourers and small entrepreneurs and traders.

The indenture system was an unscrupulous way of labour recruitment—by fraud and by force—and the treatment of the labourers, both during the long journey and in plantations, is best described as a ‘new system of slavery’. Some legislative acts across Africa were passed to improve the situation and to quiet the opposition, but with little success. Despite the voices raised by freedom fighters in India against the indenture system, the practice was unabated from 1834 till 1920. In fact, Gopal Krishna Gokhale, the most critical among the members of the Imperial Legislative Assembly of India, stated that the ‘worst feature’ of the indenture system was that plantation labour was placed under a special law, never explained to labourers before they left the country. This law was written in a language that they do not understand and which imposed on them a criminal liability for the most trivial breaches of their contracts (Bhat 2003).

The Congress Party of India had set up an overseas department in 1929 and a slender contact was established with the local Congress organizations in East and Southern Africa. Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru took over foreign relations when an interim nationalist government was formed on 2 September 1946. Nehru represented the left wing of the Congress. He differed with the conservative wing whose demand was confined only to the improvement of the lot of overseas Indians. Nehru believed in cooperation between Indians and Africans, but until the late 1940s, his sympathy and worry were also confined only to the Indians in South Africa. This contrasted with his general policy of Indian support to the combined struggle of Indian settlers and Africans in which the African cause was deemed to be paramount.

When Nehru was appointed the Secretary of All India Congress Committee (AICC) in 1927, an organization of Indian National Congress (INC), he prepared a paper, “A foreign Policy of India” for the AICC. In this paper, for the first time, he categorically outlined the policy of the INC regarding Indian settlers in other colonial countries, the role India wanted them to play in their country of adoption and the kind of support they could expect from India (Dubey 2000). Nehru suggested at one place:

An Indian who goes to other countries must co-operate with people of that country and win for himself a position by friendship and service. The Indians should co-operate with Africans and help them, as far as possible and not claim a special position for themselves. (Dubey 2000)

The Indian Government under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru, even since independence, took the care not to align itself exclusively with the Indian’s cause.

In fact, Nehru gave a speech in 1957, which shows the attitude of the Indian Government towards the Indian Diaspora. He advised that Indians abroad should always give primary considerations to the interests of the people of those countries; they should never allow themselves to be placed in a position of exploiting the people of those countries. In fact, he said that

If you cannot be, and if you are not, friendly to the people of that country, comeback to India and do not spoil the fair name of India. (Nehru 1976)

The Indian Government was faced with the problem of building bridges of friendship with the African nationalist leadership, which was fighting for independence from the colonial rule. Indians in Africa were, therefore, advised to identify themselves with the country of their residence and work in harmony with the majority of the African population to win independence for African territories.

Thus, with independence, the close ties that Indian leaders had established with overseas Indians became strained as India distanced itself from the Diaspora. Post-colonial India's Diaspora policy believed that it is in the best interest of overseas Indians to integrate themselves into their host countries. To that, the goal of national self-reliance led Indian policy makers towards the framework of a closed economy, which did not value links with Indian mercantile communities overseas.

Following decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s, as the newly independent dominions of Africa actively pursued the policy of Africanization, conditions became rather unfavourable for Indian communities, sometimes forcing them to emigrate.

Indeed, the situation in African countries like Kenya and Uganda deteriorated to such an extent in the late 1960s that Indians migrated and sought asylum in large numbers. Yet, the Government of India continued its policy of non-interference, taking no effective steps to help Indians in Kenya and insisting that they were legally the responsibility of either Kenya or Britain. In 1972, when Uganda's Idi Amin expelled Indians from the country, the Indian Government continued its policy of non-involvement, not offering any effective help. Though, an opposite view was that the Indian people themselves were not willing to go back to India, fearing entrapment into the vicious grip of poverty and unemployment.

From the very early days of independence, the issue of citizenship of Indians in East Africa remained vital. It has even led to a misunderstanding between Indians and native people. Their loyalty to their country of adoption was also questioned. According to the British Government's decision, after 1948, Indians were either British subjects or British Protected persons.

7.4 The Indian Diaspora Engagement in Africa: Post-independence India

After India's independence, the Government of India was not in a position to secure full justice for Indian settlers in Africa and Nehru had other priorities, such as the mobilization of Afro-Asian countries to keep them away from cold war rivalry.

Thus, the issue of PIOs was not emphasized in Africa. Nehru's policy of exhorting Indians to identify themselves with Africans in East Africa was not based only on his ideological commitment, but was also a practical measure for them.

The Indo–Chinese war of 1962 and the isolation of Indians in Africa changed Indian priorities. Securing diplomatic support via China and Pakistan in Africa became the most important consideration for India. Subsequently, India also emerged as a country having the third largest skilled and trained manpower. Promoting its economic and security interests became paramount. The concept of South–South cooperation suited India, enabling it to sell its manufactured and value added goods in Africa. Under these circumstances, the issues of the PIO's in Africa were ignored.

During the post-colonial period of Africa, India by its experience realized that expectation of dual loyalty and inclusion of the PIOs in the policy framework neither helped it in securing investments from settled Indians nor did it please the African governments that had to deal with the PIOs according to domestic imperatives and pressures. Even the PIOs, after their experience in Zanzibar, Uganda, Kenya, Zambia and other countries, realized that Indian support for their protection was going to be limited because India's own capacity to support in the hour of crisis was limited.

During the late 1950s, the Indians of East Africa were considered hurdles to the consolidation of Indo–African relations. By the second half of the 1960s, there was increasing realization that Indians in Africa, whatever passport they might hold, should not be excluded from India's Africa policy. This also suited the Indian economic diplomacy in Africa and other developing countries as Indian settlers in East Africa had the required capital as well as the will to promote Indian economic initiatives in African countries.

However, following the Indio-China war of 1962, when Indian isolation was exposed in Africa, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, in her capacity as Congress Party official delegate, toured African countries in 1964. She repeatedly emphasized that Indians settled in Africa must identify themselves completely with the African people and make their fullest contribution to the societies in which they live. However as seen by her tour program in Africa, besides her official engagement, she made it a point not to miss meeting the Indians.

Mrs. Gandhi also described Indian settlers as 'Ambassadors of India' in Africa. This shows a subtle departure from Nehru's policy with Indian settlers now becoming a useful instrument for generating goodwill for India. Their position as Ambassadors of India implied that they were no more excluded from the policy considerations of India. These shifts became more noticeable in many areas when Mrs. Gandhi became the Prime Minister of India. However, the need and the initiative to engage Indian Diaspora in Africa varied according to the priorities of the various components of the Indian Diaspora in African countries. It is necessary to divide the different profiles and issues of the engagement of the Indian Diaspora in Africa in order to examine the potential role of each in the emerging Indo–African partnership.

7.5 Indians in Southern and Central Africa

Indian settlers in Anglophone Africa tried to preserve their Indian cultural, especially with regard to their religion, rituals, festivals, customs and food habits. On the other hand, they have integrated well in most countries from an economic standpoint. The British policy of indirect rule and non-interference in cultural life helped Indians in this regard. For example, in the Central African region, PIOs are in small number, but are affluent economically while being marginal politically and secluded culturally. However, within the region there are variations in regard to their status, role and challenges. In Southern African countries, the issue of identity of the Indians was preserved. They retained their own tradition and culture and were able to economically integrate their host countries without losing their social and cultural identity.

In South Africa, the situation of the Indian Diaspora is similar to that of other Anglophone countries like Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi. The integration of Indian settlers in the South African society has not been possible so far because of Indians' specific and distinct characteristics that differentiate them from the rest of the population, especially in regards to religion, customs, habits, professional status and higher educational achievements. Many black Africans see South African Indians with great suspicion, believing that they have benefitted from Apartheid and do not want to integrate. The Indians in South Africa have significantly contributed to the South African economy. They are among South Africa's highly successful businessmen, professionals, civil servants, academics, corporate managers and even politicians. Politically, they remained active. They played an important role in the anti-apartheid struggle and acquired political positions after the 1994 elections in South Africa. The potential role that the Indian Diaspora in the region can play in the promotion of Indo–African relations is very high.

The Asiatic Land Tenure Act, also known as Ghetto Act, became law in June 1946. It was directed against Indians confining them to specified areas. On September 3rd, when the United Nation General Assembly session started, the Indian representative, Chagla articulated Indian concerns in the United Nations sub-committee. It condemned South Africa's "discriminatory treatment of Asiatic in general" as a denial of human rights. The Ghetto Act impaired friendly relations between India and South Africa. The Franco-Mexican resolution (as a consequence of Indian resolution), calling for the treatment of Indians in South Africa to be in conformity with international obligations and the Charter of the United Nations, was passed by the General Assembly.

Once India raised the issue of South African Indian settlers in front of the UN Assembly on the basis of the violation of human rights clause, it extended support to all groups and communities subjected to racial discrimination in South Africa because of the provisions of non-racial treatment. Further, the policy of supporting Indian settlers alone was in contrast to Nehru's policy of advising Indian settlers in other parts of Africa, where he counselled loyalty to the African cause and advised Indian settlers to integrate African communities and support their aspirations and not to seek special position or privilege for themselves. Subsequently, the Group

Area Act of 1950 formally institutionalized the apartheid policy affecting Indians as well as black Africans.

India started associating the discrimination of blacks and the discrimination of Indians. The Indian President, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, explained the position to the Indian Parliament in 1952. In his address, he said,

The question is no longer merely one of Indians of South Africa; it had already assumed a greater and wider significance. It is a question of racial domination and racial intolerance. It is a question of Africans more than that of Indians in South Africa. (Gupta 1978)

India mobilized 12 other countries and raised the question of racial conflict in South Africa resulting from the Apartheid policy and succeeded in getting a UN commission appointed to study the racial situation in South Africa. From then onward, the issue of Indians in South Africa was merged with the larger issue of Apartheid in South Africa, which involved both Indians as well as black Africans. Indian policy then worked for the establishment of a majority rule in South Africa and the merging of the Indian settlers' cause with that of black Africans.

Nehru recommended the termination of the trade agreement and the severing of diplomatic ties with South Africa, during his interim Prime Ministership in March 1946. Lord Wavell, the Indian viceroy, applied his counsel immediately. This strong step was taken when India, though free in its foreign relations, was not free from internal pressures. The stakes were high. Indians needed economic support from all quarters at the time of independence but this decision deprived India of 5 % of its global trade from (1946–1994). More than 1.2 million PIOs live in South Africa. During the anti-Apartheid struggle, the Indian Diaspora merged its political future and political formations with that of the ANC (African National Congress). India always advised PIOs in South Africa to be part of ANC's struggle against Apartheid. PIO boycotted tri-cameral parliament in 1984 in which Indians were allotted a separate chamber in parliament besides one each for Blacks and Whites. India opened its diplomatic office and resumed its economic ties with South Africa only in 1994, when Apartheid regime formally came to an end. The strong support of India to anti-Apartheid movement and involvement and leadership of Indian Diaspora in ANC was highly appreciated by new democratic government that came to power in 1994. As a result, Nelson Mandela gave a disproportionately large percentage of the ministerial positions to Indian Diaspora.

In other countries of Southern Africa, Indians were very small in number and they did not strive for a special position as PIOs did in East Africa or South Africa. Apa B Pant, the Indian High Commissioner to East Africa, and his successor Indian High Commissioner, Nirmaljit Singh, exhorted PIOs from the very beginning to fight along black African nationalists. In Zimbabwe, in the struggle against White rule, Indian settlers fought along Africans in dismantling the racist regime. Their relation with Africans was one of trust. There had been inter-African riots but hardly ever were Indian settlers targeted or the issue. But by and large, Indian communities remained in active in economic areas and have done well in these two countries.

7.6 Indians in East Africa

A substantial number of Indian traders have travelled to East Africa since ancient times and some chose to settle across the Eastern coast of Africa. Kilwa was a very important port, which had a good number of Indian traders. In fact, the Swahili language, which is spoken in East Africa, has a substantial numbers of words that are derived from Gujarati and other Indian languages. The bulk of PIOs who were brought to the hinterlands of East Africa during the colonial period were railway construction workers. Most of them came from Punjab. Lions and wild animals in the dense forest of East Africa killed many of them while they were laying railway lines. A substantial number of Gujarati traders again came during the colonial period as free citizens. The presence of the PIOs in the hinterlands facilitated Gujarati businessmen and enabled retail traders to spread their business to the interior of East Africa. They were known as *Dukawallas* and they owned most of the corner shops in the region. Since the colonizers brought them in and they became visibly rich, they were seen as exploiters by the African population.

The PIOs in East Africa have been a successful community since colonial times. They maintained their identity and kept themselves socially aloof from the native population. As early as 1920, they asserted their political rights just like in India under leaders like Jeevanji who wanted the PIOs to be linked to India's freedom fight. Their struggle made the colonial government announce the policy of the "primacy of natives" thereby preventing the PIOs from claiming any kind of political power sharing under the subsequent decolonization plan. The British colonial government used this occasion and incident to widen the gap between Africans and the PIOs.

Under free India, Nehru as PM tried to counteract this. Apa Saheb was entrusted with the task of exhorting the PIOs to join the freedom struggle of African people and accept the leadership of the black community without reservations or special demands. He sent two prominent lawyers to defend Kenyatta in his trial under the Mau Mau rebellion. After the Kenyan independence, in 1967, the Government of Kenyatta started the Kenyanization of the economy when all non-citizens, largely Indians, were given restrictive work and residence permits which allowed them to trade only in restricted areas and items. Though it was a purely internal policy measure of the Kenyan Government, India advised Indians in Kenya to surrender British passports and request local citizenship. Indian diplomats tried to mobilize the PIOs in favour of this move but not many PIO responded to it positively. The PIOs were not willing to migrate to England because of social insecurity and the risk of a cultural divide between them and children brought up in a Western society. The option of returning to India and being caught in the vicious trap of poverty and unemployment was out of question. Partly, Indian policies did not allow them to forget their old links, appealing to them thrice in 2 years for financial help for defense fund to contain China and Pakistan. A large number of visitors from India—religious leaders, fund collectors for charity and politicians—kept coming and made contacts with the PIOs. All this strengthened the feelings of mutual

dependence. But when Indian settlers underwent a crisis, their homeland, India, did not react in the same way. The Indian Parliament discussed the issue of Kenyanization at length and Mrs. Indira Gandhi intervened in the debate to assure that the Government was monitoring the situation.

The Indian Minister of Foreign Affairs, BR Bhagat, was sent to Nairobi carrying a personal message of Mrs. Indira Gandhi to Kenyatta. Bhagat, upon his return to India, admitted in front of Parliament that rampant rumors circulated in Kenya about India's supposed intention to interfere with the internal affairs of Kenya. Bhagat had an appointment with President Kenyatta but the latter cancelled the appointment when Bhagat reached Nairobi, obviously under pressure. Bhagat met with the Vice-President and other officials, but came back to India without delivering Mrs. Gandhi's letter to Kenyatta. India suspected British hand as Britain was propagating the tale that India wanted to interfere in Kenya's internal affairs. The public opinion was outraged in India as well as in Nairobi. The *Times of India* wrote: "But if the implication is that President Kenyatta fell into a trap laid for him by a third party, it does little credit to his political acumen" (*Times of India* 1963, 26 March).

The *Daily Nation* (Nairobi), justifying the cancellation of the appointment, criticized the decision of Bhagat not to hand over the message for Kenyatta to somebody else. The then Indian High Commissioner, Prem Bhatia, narrated the incident in his book later in these words. "My opposition made no difference. I was informed that [the] move was based on [a] political decision and that it had already been announced as a government commitment. In the event I had no alternative but to prepare myself to make the best of a bad job" (Bhatia 1973). Nevertheless the Government of Kenya extended the permit to non-citizens for a longer period varying from one to 2 years with prospect of renewal.

The Indian Government had started economic initiatives at bilateral level to bring Indian settlers in Kenya within the policy framework of India. It proposed to establish an Africa-India Development Corporation with Kenyan PIOs and Indian capital. Its aim was to seek integration of the Indian community in the economic life of Kenya, thus fortifying the foundation of a multiracial society. Though in the end it could not materialize, for reasons other than the disinterest of India, it did show that the Indian policy for the PIOs in Africa was gradually changing.

Uganda was another country in East Africa where India's policy on Indian settlers obtained some response. When Idi Amin came to power in January 1971 in Uganda, he wanted to put the entire Ugandan economy in the hands of Ugandans of African origin. He said that the 80,000 Asians in Uganda were sabotaging the economy and encouraging corruption and, therefore, there was no room for them in Uganda. All PIOs who were Kenyan citizens or British and Indian passport holders had to leave the country within 90 days (before November 8th 1972). Amin called the expulsion of the PIOs as part of the war of liberation. The Indian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs said in Parliament, "We are in touch with the Ugandan authorities and I can assure the house that we shall do everything we can to protect the interest of Indians there." The Indian president, while in Lusaka, denounced the expulsion and stated: "The happenings in Uganda have put a heavy cloud of doubt and uncertainty over the minds of many people of Indian origin in several countries

of Africa” (Africa Diary 1972, pp. 4–10). Though the public opinion was distressed in India, it refuted strongly and ridiculed Amin’s allegation that India was planning to invade Uganda along with Tanzania and Zambia. However, India made it clear that it was going to support any international move, which would persuade Amin to extend the expulsion deadline. India did not take the tougher line because Indian move against a purely racial issue would have been interpreted as Indian interference in Africa. The Indian support to Afro-Asian solidarity was another constraint. The main consideration of India in not taking a tougher line on the issue seemed to be that there was nothing to be gained by using strong words if they could not be backed by meaningful action in Uganda. Furthermore, any show of strong sentiment may have triggered an anti-Asian sentiment. The expulsion happened and India stood watching without much response.

The Ugandan crisis made India realize that the leadership and political system of African states varied considerably from country to country and Indian support to Afro-Asian solidarity had to be qualified by larger national interests. These expulsions brought home another point to India. Despite India’s consistent support to African decolonization and Afro-Asian solidarity, none of the African countries, howsoever friendly to India and opposed to Idi Amin’s action, offered to accommodate expelled Indians even in small numbers as a gesture of sympathy towards India. As far as India was concerned, it was never its policy to debar the entry of PIOs if they wanted to resettle in India. In this case also once Britain agreed to take responsibility of its subjects, the Government of India made special provisions and gave incentives for Asians to resettle in India with their saving and assets. Despite such an offer, almost all of them opted not to return to India and took up the offer to move to Britain or Canada. The restraint exercised by India, however, succeeded in getting Amin to agree to pay compensation for business and properties of Indian passport holders, which was not granted to Indians in other African countries.

7.7 Indians in Francophone Africa

There are around one million PIOs in Francophone Africa and the bulk of them live on the islands of Mauritius, the Reunion, Madagascar, the Seychelles and the Comoros. There are other countries in Francophone Africa where a smaller number of PIOs are present like Benin, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Chad, Senegal, Mali, Djibouti and Algeria. The Reunion Island, which is a French Department and not an independent country, also hosts a good number of PIOs. The identity of most of the PIOs of the region, except in Mauritius, got diluted because of the assimilation policy followed by the French except in Mauritius where Indians were in large majority. Under the policy of assimilation, the subject population was to be fully acculturated in the mainstream French culture in terms of language, religion, dress, manners, etc. In consequence, the original cultural identity of PIOs, Africans or Chinese was substantially diluted. Only racial features, and in many cases religion for Indians, remained the main distinguishing factor. A small, rich Gujarati trader

population maintained its links to India and retained Indian culture. It was because of the language barrier and lesser interaction with the Government and socio-cultural organization of India that PIOs from Francophone Africa did not benefit in large measure of Indian policy supports. Even the current Indian Diaspora policy is tailor-made for the Anglophone Indian Diaspora and all its instruments and criteria of issuing PIO Card and Overseas Indian Citizenship are irrelevant for assimilated and deliberately undocumented descendants of indentured workers in Francophone regions of Africa.

Madagascar has around 20,000 PIOs. They are mostly Gujaratis who arrived as traders around 1900. The majority of them run merchant shops. This merchant community maintains relatively strong Indian identity. They maintain a very low social profile while controlling over 50 % of the economy in spite of being a minority of 20,000 people in a country of 20 million inhabitants. Comparatively, the Seychelles have a larger PIO population (307,000 or 7 % of population). They have a large number of indentured PIOs who came from South India. Most of them have been assimilated into the French culture. The Isle of the Reunion has a large indentured Diaspora, but it also welcomed some families from French territories in India (like Pondicherry) who came at the time of the Indian independence. This group, despite being from French Indian territories, was strongly influenced by the Indian culture. There are around 220,000 PIOs on the island. A large number of them came as slaves, artisans or indentured workers during colonial times. In recent times, a revival of the Indian religions can be noted among Tamil communities, which form the bulk of the PIOs. A large number of temples and *Ashrams* are visible; the “double practice” of religion, meaning the simultaneous observation of Hindu and Catholic rites by the same family, is also common. There are a number of associations of PIOs who promote Indian dance, music, painting, literature food, etc., albeit language remains a major barrier.

Mauritius is also a Francophone country. It is the only country in the world where the PIOs are in majority (68 % of the population). It has PIO led Government since independence. If India is the mother country of the PIOs, Mauritius is treated as PIO capital. Previously a French territory, it was captured by the British in the nineteenth century. Under the Treaty of Capitulation, Britain agreed to maintain French customs and laws even during British colonial rule. When the British annexed Mauritius in 1810, Indians working there formed 10 % of the slave population (Benedict 1961, p. 17). A large number of indentured workers from India came to Mauritius from 1834 onwards to replace the slave labours in sugarcane fields. Indian merchants also came during the nineteenth century and maintained their links with India. Today there are around 700,000 PIOs in a population of 1.2 million. Despite having been more than one and half century under French rule, PIOs could maintain major traits of Indian culture and still keep a strong sense of Indian cultural identity. Though the Bhojpuri language, dress and cuisine are getting diluted very fast in the younger generations, Mauritius remains one of the few countries where Indianness and its manifestations are celebrated with pride and confidence. The PIOs are not a monolithic lot in Mauritius as they are divided along language (Bhojpuri and Non-Bhojpuri), religion (Hindu-Muslims)

and caste lines. They have been able to retain political control since 1968 when universal adult suffrage was introduced. Mauritius was the first country where Indian Prime Minister Nehru appointed the first ever High Commissioner of India in 1946. Mahatma Gandhi had visited Mauritius in 1902 on his way back to India from South Africa. He met the PIO community leaders and advised them to educate their children and to take an active part in politics. He had deputed Manilal Doctor¹ to organize and politically prepare the PIOs. Successive Indian governments, after the independence of Mauritius, maintained very close relations with Mauritius. Mauritius benefitted from substantial financial and diplomatic support from India. India had also kept close watch on the democratic set up of Mauritius because in the past threats had been made to usurp the political power of PIOs by non-democratic means.

7.8 Indians in Lusophone Africa

Lusophone Sub-Saharan Africa covers 4 % of the African population in which there are meaningful numbers of Indian Diaspora but the numerical strength of PIO is substantial in Mozambique. Portuguese colonial administration ruled their colonies as extension of their empire. Like Francophone Africa in Lusophone Africa also colour was not an issue in assimilation policy. The Portuguese, during the colonial period, were mostly involved in solving problems back home. They could not give attention to the colonies under their rule. The British trained Africans to eventually have self-government and French trained them to be Frenchmen. The Portuguese treated them as bad father who believes that children never grow. The British had the long-range aim of creating African countries within the Commonwealth; the French ambition was to make their African territories a part of France. The Portuguese on the other hand made no long-term arrangements as they were convinced that without them Africans will not be able to govern themselves.

There are around 20,000 Indians in Mozambique (Government of India 2001). Indians in Mozambique form the sixth largest Indian Diaspora community in Africa. The Indians migrated from Goa, Daman and Diu and from some other parts of Gujarat (Portuguese call it as Northern Province) to Mozambique and from Mozambique to Lisbon (Portugal). Some of them settled down in Mozambique and some in Portugal. This happened during the Portuguese colonial period in the nineteenth century as these provinces of India and the country of Mozambique were under Portuguese rule and shared a similar colonial experience. However, a substantial number of Indian traders were already living in Mozambique when the

¹ManilalMaganlal Doctor (28 July 1881–1888 January 1956) was an Indian-born, London educated lawyer and politician, who travelled to numerous countries of the British Empire, including Fiji, Mauritius and Aden, providing legal assistance to the local ethnic Indian population. He met Gandhi, who asked him to go to Mauritius, where he represented Indo-Mauritians in court and edited a newspaper, *The Hindustani*. Later he shifted to Fiji.

Portuguese came to establish their trade and subsequently colonize Mozambique. India's links with Mozambique reach back over half a millennium. Indian Muslims traders from South India's Malabar region followed the trade routes of the Indian Ocean along the Eastern coast of Africa; Vasco da Gama also found Hindu traders in Mozambique when he paid the first visit to Portuguese ports there in 1498. Indian Gujarati merchants on Mozambique employed on their boats small numbers of Africans. The Indian Diaspora contributed to the Mozambique society long before the colonial period, especially in the economic sphere. Indians migrated to these countries when trade and commerce started across the Indian Ocean region. PIOs from Goa were very rich compared to the indigenous Mozambican people and undertook tasks that the whites would not do in East Africa in general and in Mozambique in particular. The Goans have greater participation in Mozambican politics as compared to the Gujaratis. The Gujaratis are more business oriented. Economically, Indians are well off compared to the indigenous people. Some of them are eminent industrials, politicians, bureaucrats and journalists.

7.8.1 Contextualizing India's Diaspora Policy in Africa

The Indian Diaspora policy in Africa is a subset of the Indian global policy that aims to engage its Diaspora for developing and growing bilateral relations. Since there is no specific Indian Diaspora policy for Africa, an analysis of new global policies of India for its Diaspora will help contextualize its relevance and utility for the Indian Diaspora as a heritage resource for Indo-African engagement. After discussing the dimensions of the Indo-African engagement, policies and issues for different segments of the Indian Diaspora in Africa, it is now necessary to understand the basic nature, strength and weakness of the Indian Diaspora policy in general to understand its relevance and impact in Africa (Dubey 2008).

Under Nehru, India's Diaspora policy was not to extend any diplomatic, political support to people of Indian origin who had become citizens of other countries. This happened despite the opposition of congress leaders like Srinivas Shastri, Kunjru and others who wanted the Indian Congress and Government to have proactive Diaspora policies. They argued that during the colonial period PIOs migrated under colonial occupation for colonial purposes, were taken to non-British colonial territories and were made residents. They argued against Nehru's Diaspora policy formulation. Nehru, on the other hand, wanted to contrast Indian Diaspora policy vis-à-vis the European countries' policies towards their white settlers in different parts of the world. But white settlers were from colonizing countries; they settled with all the extraordinary privileges of land and practiced dominant control over natives under racist policies in South Africa, Rhodesia and many other territories. But a more important reason for Nehru to dissociate from Indians overseas was the nascent and unsecured nation states of development countries where the bulk of Indians overseas were settled. The task of commanding loyalty of citizens with largely legal arguments was a difficult task during the process of nation building.

Any external overture or loyalty was going to inhibit such a process at least in its initial stage. PIOs had settled as ‘hireling’ of colonial powers, grew economically over a period of time as compared to the natives and any overture to woo them or to connect with them was going to be seen by natives as betrayal. On the other hand, the competing groups or the natives were free to undermine and infringe the legitimate rights and claims of the ‘abandoned’ Indian overseas. Indians overseas in several African countries were discriminated even by several India friendly countries taking advantages of the Indian Diaspora policy of ‘active dissociation’. The only exception to these policies was the South African Indian community which, because of Gandhi’s association with the communities, obtained support even during Nehru’s rule. The important point to make is that the Indian Diaspora which felt abandoned and let down by India during the crisis, was skeptical and very cautious towards an aggressive Indian Diaspora policy that had been initiated shortly before and wanted to rope them in as heritage resource for bilateral relations.

But all through the Nehru period, and later on, Indian diasporic policy extended its support to cultural and cultural urges of Indians overseas. Nehru kept this area as the sole but important positive component of the Indian Diaspora policy. The Indian cultural centers and Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) activities catered to these needs. Soon during post Nehru era, India started realizing the need to change its Diaspora policy. In fact in the aftermath of the Indo-China war of 1962, Nehru appealed and sent a distress call to Indian overseas for their help in Africa and other places saying that ‘Indian overseas have double loyalty, one to their countries of adoption and another to their mother country’. Mrs. Gandhi during her foreign trips to Africa made it a point to visit Indian community settlements. But it is only by early 1990s, after the advent of globalization, that many of the old rules of foreign policies and international relations changed. Diasporic networks emerged as an important resource to bring countries together. It helped mobilize human and capital resources. Even many developing countries became more confident and willing to engage diasporic resources both as a host and mother country. Countries like China had successfully utilized their Diaspora as a resource during the 1980s (Smart and Hsu 2004). Developing countries realized the importance of the Diasporas. The changing and enabling international scenario became useful to a near collapsing Indian economic situation in the early 1990s for leveraging Indian diasporic resources. The Indian Diaspora under the changed international and domestic situation needed to be urgently and seriously engaged. The BJP Government changed the Indian Diaspora policy, both at state and civil society levels, to effect a U-turn by formulating the proactive Diaspora policy. BJP had no historical baggage like Congress party loyalty to stick to the Nehru model of Diaspora engagement.

What followed was the LM Singhvi Committee Report on the Indian Diaspora appointed by the Government of India. Foreign policy instruments were introduced such as the PBD (*Pravasi Bhartiya Diwas* meaning Indian Diaspora Day), PIO Card, Bharat Samman, Overseas Indian Citizenship, and a separate overseas Indian division within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Dubey 2011). The economic crisis

was over, Diaspora supported it by subscribing to India Resurgent Bonds- a long-term debt bonds. A new Ministry of Overseas Indians was established. It launched many new policy schemes for diasporic workers, PIO university, mini PBD, dual citizenship, an increased number of Indian cultural centers, and officers in Indian missions for PIO issues, etc. It mobilized massive and swift airlift for Diaspora under distress when the Western countries and United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) attacked Libya (MIOA 2012). The capability and changed policy of India were visible.

Under globalization, Diasporic networks have emerged as a major player in international relations. Successful and well-organized Diasporas not only have spoken and wheel relationship with India, but have well-developed and powerful web relationship among themselves. Nevertheless, the Indian Government sees strong Diasporic networks among Indians as exceedingly demanding. Instead of discouraging their global emergence and global networking efforts, India's Diaspora policy should support initiatives in their favour and should support their active operations. This is currently missing from the Diaspora policy operation. The Indian Diaspora policy has still not developed instruments and initiatives to treat Indian Diaspora as a strategic resource for its diplomatic and bilateral relations (Kapur 2003). The president of Seychelles in his visits to India again presents the Indian Diaspora as an asset for increasing bilateral economic engagement. When the President of South Africa, J. Zuma, paid his first state visit to India he was accompanied by a large number of Indian CEOs and asked India to use them for increasing bilateral economic engagement with South Africa (Government of India 2010). But there are hardly any instrument and provisions to use the Indian Diaspora for such purposes. Moreover, the turf war between the Ministry of Overseas Indians and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs makes it difficult to utilize and include the Diaspora effectively in foreign policy objectives (Dubey 2008).

7.9 Conclusion

In any future vision of an emerging Indo–African partnership, the Indian Diaspora is going to be an important resource and facilitator. The Diaspora is not only an important developmental and diplomatic consideration of India but also for Africa. The African Union has set up at apex level an eminent leaders-led team to link with African Diasporas for developmental and diplomatic purposes under ‘Strategic Plan 2009–2012’ (AU Commission 2009). It has asked India within the framework of the 2008 Plan of Action of the India Africa Forum Summit (IAFS) to transfer Indian expertise in harnessing its diasporic resources to African countries. African countries in turn are engaged in creating ministries, policies and linkages with the Diasporas in their countries at individual level (ADB 2011). They appreciate the importance of Diasporas as a heritage and strategic resource for development and bilateral cooperation. They no more see an economic initiative on Diasporas by the home countries, especially from former colonial countries, as imperialistic or with

neocolonial intent. They, too, appreciate that diasporic loyalty is not at the cost of citizenship loyalty. A countries' own Diasporas abroad as well other countries' Diasporas within their borders are important resources for development and bilateral cooperation. The Indian Diaspora policy under Nehru had convinced African leaders that India did not use its diasporic links in Africa at the cost of Africans, not during colonial rule and not after independence. They fully appreciate that the new proactive Diaspora policy of India was largely targeting its affluent Diaspora in North America. They are asking for an extension of the Indian Diaspora policies, especially the one that promotes bilateral economic linkages through additional diasporic resource routes. However, the Indian Diaspora policies, divided under two ministries, has not designed specific policies and appropriate instruments to suit old and diverse Indian Diasporas in Africa to utilize them as a heritage and strategic resource (Dubey 2008). When India started its Diaspora policy change, African leaders were not ready; now that African leaders and Indian Diaspora members in Africa are ready to be engaged India is still stuck in pro-North American Diaspora policies. Will the new Indian Government under BJP take a lead in correcting and prioritizing its Diaspora policy? We need to wait and see.

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Chapter 8

Conclusion

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India–Africa relations have evolved dynamically and continuously over the years, having exhibited both change and continuity. During the colonial period they were focused on liberation and the fight against colonialism from the perspective of solidarity among colonized people across the world. Soon after India’s independence Indo–African interaction focused on the liberation of African countries. Only in the post-Cold War era, with the emergence of both India and a large number of African countries as liberal global economies, have relations truly developed dynamically and rapidly.

8.1 Tradition, History and Diaspora

It is significant to note that the historical connections of trade and movement of people predates the respective regional colonial history. The migration of Indian traders to Eastern and Southern Africa has been testified by numerous historical and testimonial records. The colonization of India and Africa led to large migration of Indians to Sub-Saharan Africa as indentured workers were transported to replace slave labour. This group was joined by a parallel migration of free citizens from India, a community of predominantly traders and businessmen.

Another significant foundation of contemporary Indo–African history was the significant role of Mahatma Gandhi in the South African liberation movement. He returned to India in 1915, after the sowing the seeds of peaceful protest against oppression and discrimination in South Africa, bringing these newly invented tools of agitation to successfully mobilize the Indian masses towards freedom. Gandhi’s

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contributions to the South African liberation movement and his learnings from South Africa led to similar ethos and understanding of freedom struggles in both regions.

Jawaharlal Nehru was another very prominent figure in India's history with Africa. Since the 1927 Congress of Oppressed Nationalities at Brussels, where leaders from across Africa and Asia were present, he linked the Indian freedom struggle with that of African countries. This continued even after India's independence, with Nehru leading the initiative to launch the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) providing a third option for global policy alignment and at the level of bilateral relations, Nehru strongly supported and promoted the cause of African liberation from colonial rule. This ideological support continued and still continues to be extended.

However, there is certain criticism levelled against his policies directed towards the Indian Diaspora in Africa, with the view that his policies encouraged the Diaspora to dissociate from the Indian state and actively support and participate in the liberation and freedom movement of their host countries. The British Empire's British *Nationality Act of 1948*, which gave the Diaspora a single choice regarding their nationality; and the Indian *Citizenship Act of 1955*, which states that Indians are not entitled to dual citizenship further distanced the Indian state from its Diaspora across the African continent. With regards to integrating the Diaspora into the Indian political and economic mainstream, the first step can be identified as the formation of a 'Special Cell' within the Ministry of Finance in 1986, dealing with Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from the Diaspora.

This was a very significant in unlocking the potential of the Indian Diaspora as a heritage resource in India-Africa relations. In contemporary international relations, Diasporas have become significant actors of global affairs particularly due to their unique ability to create alternative channels for transnational relations. These ties can either be constructively or destructively utilized, a factor dependent on the orientation and interests of Diaspora groups.

During the initial phase following India's independence, national level policy was not directed towards reintegrating its Diaspora into the political and economic mainframe. A reversal in these set of policies initiated during Indira Gandhi's leadership and continued successively. Within the current scope of India-Africa relations and under a new national regime under Narendra Modi's leadership, there seems to be a political desire towards the economic integration of this incredible cultural heritage resource, especially considering the prominence of the Indian Diaspora in African economies, with an established presence across various sectors ranging from mining to telecommunication.

Globalisation has resulted in the emergence of diasporic networks as actors in international relations. However, India's policy towards its Diaspora continues to be limited in its operation, with a lack of effective mechanisms to provide incentives and instruments to actively support and strengthen diasporic activity across the African continent.

8.2 Economics: Contemporary Driver of India–Africa Engagement

With the end of the Cold War and the advent of globalization creating dynamic changes within the global economy, liberalization and privatization were geared to make economies more connected at the global level. The private sector and the market gained greater prominence within both India and African countries. The agents of India–Africa engagement during this phase shifted towards the private sector. From an ideological primacy, engagement began to factor more pragmatic considerations focussing on issues such as business and market access, private sector investment, energy security and economic diplomacy. In the new era of the twenty-first century, India–Africa relations have been envisioned to move forward in a symbiotic manner, whilst retaining and building on the traditional goodwill and trust. At the same time, India’s engagement with Africa has become multi-layered, and can be analyzed at three different levels: pan-African, regional and national level.

Engagement at the pan-African level has resulted in the institutionalization of the Africa-India Forum Summit, which has experienced tangible progress between the first and the second editions in areas of economic cooperation, cooperation in social development and capacity building, and cooperation in science, technology, research and development. Nonetheless, proactive measures still need to be taken to ensure the long-term success of the summit. The summit allows India to advance its strategic interest at the continental level through deepening engagement through multi-sectoral cooperation.

Further, the government has also initiated a number of programmes and initiatives with the objective of boosting trade and investment with African countries. Some of the prominent programmes are the ‘Focus Africa’ programme, the TEAM-9 initiative and the pan-African e-Network. The ‘Focus Africa’ programme and the TEAM-9 initiative are both geared towards intensifying economic engagement between India and identified target African countries. India has also utilized its mechanisms included in its ITEC programme.

At the regional level, India has successfully positioned itself as a strong dialogue partner of COMESA, ECOWAS, SADC, EAC and ECCAS—the various Regional Economic Communities (REC’s), and has been implementing sub-regional and national programmes through the framework of these various REC’s. At the national level, India has been spreading its footprint through the establishment of bilateral relations, having extended its diplomatic presence across 27 African countries. However, Africa is a continent of 54 sovereign states, and India is diplomatically stretched thin across the continent.

Contemporary engagement between India and Africa has been driven by India’s booming economy, with the growing appetite of its public and private sector enterprises. The twenty-first century has not only witnessed the emergence of the Indian economy, but also the emergence of a number African markets which have been growing significantly. The role of Indian conglomerates, with and without the support of the Indian government, has also been increasing. This has resulted in a

competitive economic environment, with the presence of both traditional and contemporary global economic powers providing markets for African goods and goods and services for African markets.

This period has also witnessed a rapid increase in trade between India and African countries. Nigeria, South Africa, Angola, Egypt and Kenya constitute India's major trading partners in Africa. It is important to note that Nigeria and Angola are primarily regional oil suppliers to India, while Egypt is its primary gas supplier. With regard to this particular observation, South Africa, Kenya and Tanzania emerge as India's major trade partners outside the energy sector. Trends indicate that India's main imports consist of mineral resources, precious and semi-precious metals and gemstones, agricultural raw material and timber; whereas India's main exports consist of refined petroleum products, jewellery, textile products and other manufactured goods, agricultural products, pharmaceuticals and processed foods. This indicates a trend towards the exchange of raw materials for value added products, which has created some cause for concern.

Further trade has been restricted and constrained due to the nature of capital markets and underdeveloped infrastructure, power and telecommunication sectors in African countries. Nevertheless, India's rapidly growing commerce does present a major development opportunity for African countries through the expansion of business networks and production chains into Africa.

Today, Indian multinational companies have considerable investments in sectors ranging from energy, mining, infrastructure, agriculture, pharmaceuticals, telecommunications, retail, to food processing. For India, energy has especially emerged as a sector of considerable significance in India–African engagement.

The energy security issue has been gaining increasing significance in India due to a number of factors, primarily India's heavy hydrocarbon dependency. India, in addition to diversifying oil sources, is also diversifying its procedure in the acquisition oil resources through the purchase of stakes in equity oil, making Indian enterprises internationally more competitive. Through participation in the production process of overseas oil fields, India is looking to respond to the challenges of market fluctuations, as well as domestic stagnation in production.

Traditionally, India has been mostly pursuing economic cooperation in the oil sector with Sub-Saharan Africa's petro-giant, Nigeria. Traditionally, Nigeria has featured prominently in India's energy security agenda, accounting for 8 % of India's total crude oil import as of 2013, behind only Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Venezuela. However, with diversification in both source and stake having been pursued, India has looked to strengthen energy cooperation with more countries across the African continent. In this regard, the critical opening up of the relatively fresh and new East African hydrocarbon frontier presents new options for India and its industrialists to enter these less competitive energy markets. The East African shoreline running south from Somalia and the area around the Great African Rift Valley have been identified by geologists as the regional hydrocarbon hotspots, and the region has already begun to attract foreign investment in this sector.

ONGC Videsh, the overseas branch of the Oil and Natural Gas Company (ONGC), has been the most active public sector company in Africa, receiving

support from the Indian government in overseas investments and acquisitions across Africa. OVL itself was created with the mission to pursue equity investments. The company has in total five exploration projects in Africa—one in Libya, two in Nigeria, one in Egypt and one in the Joint Development Zone: Nigeria-Sao Tome Principe. There are also two producing projects which are in South Sudan (one of them is the Greater Nile project). However, these wells have not been producing since 2012 due to lack of consensus between Sudan and South Sudan on the issue of oil transit and other border management troubles.

The Indian private sector has also been moving into the oil and gas sector in Africa. Reliance Industries Limited (RIL) and Essar have been leading the way amongst India's private players. RIL, one of the largest Indian private sector players in the energy sector made its first major overseas acquisition in 2007. Both RIL and Essar have been looking to expand their presence into Zambia, Malawi, Botswana, Namibia and Tanzania.

In spite of an expansion of both the public and private sectors into the African energy markets, the experience if Indian National Oil Companies (NOCs) in the acquisition of equity oil has been challenging. The majority of the projects have been relinquished due to poor commercial prospects, regional instability, or the inability to meet contractual agreements. Competition from other players in the market, including Chinese entities, backed by stronger financial support has added to the difficulty.

In the mining sector, India has established itself with the activities of Coal India Limited (CIL) in Mozambique and South Africa and Vedanta in Zambia. Indian mining companies have also been increasing their presence in Africa's mining industry, and future prospects appear positive with the sector opening up across Sub-Saharan Africa.

Cooperation in the field of agriculture has also been a central pillar of the India–Africa relationship, a main feature of cooperation in this sector has been India's focus on capacity building and the sharing of experience. African countries have been offering agricultural land on lease to foreign players, attracting significant attention from Indian agriculturalists. Kasturi Agro Products and Ruchi Soya Industries have capitalized on such opportunities.

India also emerged as a significant destination for agricultural exports from Africa, as a result of its strong agro-processing industry. Trends indicate towards the large-scale export of agricultural products, predominantly cash crops like cashews, cocoa, coffee, tea and cotton. These raw materials are processed and represent a significant portion of India's exports to Africa. Additionally, food represents a significant agricultural export into Africa, notably rice, sugar, meat and fish, reflecting the importance of India for the food security of African countries.

It is important to note that Indian institutes have looked into programmes aimed at improving agricultural practises, as well as providing scholarships to African students. The Indian Council of Agricultural Research and the Department of Agricultural Research have taken on a significant role in the sector, leading the way for other Indian institutes. Further, India has also extended Lines of Credit (LoC) to African agricultural sectors.

Healthcare and pharmaceutical sectors have also been gaining increasing importance in India's engagements with African countries. The African continent represents an extremely large and growing market for pharmaceutical drugs, a problem magnified due to the lack of widespread availability of modern healthcare services. American and European multinationals such as Pfizer, Novartis and Abbot have traditionally dominated this market but for the Asian manufacturers, particularly India, having increased their presence across the continent, representing a more cost-competitive option than Western manufacturers.

With India's developed expertise in healthcare, it is clear that the Indian pharmaceutical sector is poised to play an even more significant role in African countries. The most prominent Indian pharmaceutical firms in Africa are Ranbaxy, Cipla and Dr. Reddy's, having established their presence across the continent since 1977, when Ranbaxy first set up base in Africa.

Another sector of contemporary significance is technology and communications, a sector which holds a great deal of promise for future interactions between African countries and India. As part of Africa's science policy, the continent has been looking to push science as a tool for economic growth and development. India has been looking to positively contribute through both the transfer of technology and the sharing of technical knowledge. To this end, the India–Africa Forum Summit has laid the foundation for cooperation in Science and Technology. The Pan-African e-Network represents a unique product of technical cooperation between India and Africa at a multilateral pan-African level.

The Pan-African e-Network stands out because of its unique nature of being a symbol of development cooperation in the information age. The project has synergised Africa's core development issues with India's core strengths in its IT industry and human resource base. The project also allows for a stronger platform for India to project its soft power across the continent.

However, this project has been facing significant challenges not only with regards to its implementation, but also its utility and efficiency of the offered electronic services. Nonetheless, this project does represent a significant first step towards the implementation of contemporary and innovative modes of engagement. In this light, India's edge over other developing countries in the sectors of education, information and technology for small and medium enterprises could have a potentially significant impact on the development of Africa through technology transfers and its contribution to human capital formation.

This phase of expansion and intensification of economic linkages has been accompanied by a gradual expansion of Indian financial institutions across Africa, led by the activity of three state-owned banks: Bank of Baroda, State Bank of India and Bank of India. With certain estimates predicting a 15 % annual growth of the retail banking sector in the sub-Saharan Africa, this expansion could potentially further support the expansion of India's footprint across other sectors of economic engagement.

8.3 Towards a Vision for the Future

A more contemporary vision for an India–Africa partnership visualizes faster growth by free economy and public–private partnership at the domestic level. The Indian experience of agricultural development, human resource management and its success in the implementation of public–private partnerships in infrastructure projects is relevant when taking African development challenges into consideration.

At this point, it is worthy to note that in spite of the priority given to India’s public sector in Africa, the private sector has been identified as the primary driver of economic relations, playing a crucial role in the expansion of the country’s economic profile in African countries and across the African continent. The leading industrial conglomerates such as Tata, Mahindra, Reliance Communications, BhartiAirtel, Ranbaxy, Cipla have also played a significant role in India’s economic diplomacy directed towards Africa and its countries.

Further, their efforts towards Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) manifests itself as a significant force in establishing relations between the agents of Indian engagement and African people and communities, additionally serving as a tool to strengthen India’s public diplomacy directed towards the masses in African countries.

Alongside the intensifying of economic relations, India’s economic diplomacy towards the region has been gaining greater prominence post-2000. This has translated into international policy alignment at the WTO and UN on critical issues related to development, and a renewed approach towards development cooperation and capacity building.

India’s development cooperation and capacity building in Africa has been working to strengthen the capacities in areas determined by continental needs and aspirations. It is a partnership which is carefully detailed for creating learning and skills development for the long-term human development of Africa. India looks to integrate positively into the African economies, with the objective of establishing mutually beneficial and sustainable bilateral and multilateral relations. If trade and investment represents the right arm of economic relations, development cooperation and capacity building should represent the second arm, working in synergy with each other.

Most African countries lack the technology, infrastructure, human resource skills and technical abilities that are needed to convert their natural endowment into sustainable growth and development. India and its economic institutions could play a potentially significant role in this regard. Currently, the Indian state and its private institutions are not only providing financial aid and assistance, but are also engaging themselves on the ground through the implementation of infrastructure and development projects.

However, there is a need to consider the importance of implementing accurate data provision mechanisms on the various initiatives and programmes. There is also a need to make certain that credible institutional structures and procedure are established to facilitate the systematization of data on India’s development aid and

assistance. Currently, the capacity of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) has not been matching the upward disbursement of economic diplomacy by New Delhi, an issue which requires attention in the years to come and an issue that could be potentially tackled through the deeper economic, political and social integration of the Indian Diaspora located across the continent.

India's economic diplomacy has been primarily directed through three major channels: technical cooperation including capacity building programmes and knowledge transfers; lines of credit; and grants. At the first Africa–India Forum Summit 2008, a majority of proposals and programmes were targeting technical cooperation. At the following edition in 2011, greater priority was accorded to increasing LoCs and grants.

As highlighted by Ian Taylor, India prefers not to talk in terms of aid, but rather development cooperation under the rubric of South-South solidarity. India seeks to cast such engagement as being based on a relationship of mutual benefits. Development cooperation and capacity building assist in legitimizing India's self-identification as a 'partner' advancing the principles of South-South fraternity. This is a view which has been resonating within the Indian diplomatic community since the time of Nehru's leadership.

8.4 The African Development Bank, India and Africa

International development cooperation is traditionally viewed through the perspective of North–South relations. According to the dominant development discourse, the developed 'North' possesses the capital resources, technical skills and infrastructures which the developing 'South' lacks. However, with the strengthening of discourse suggesting the failure of the North–South dialogue at a number of international fora, South–South development cooperation is a concept receiving greater attention as developing countries gain increasing weight in the global political economy.

Practises in the disbursement of international Development Assistance (IDA) have emphasized on the role of international financial institutions in the economic development of African countries, the World Bank leading the way. The African Development Bank Group (AfDB) was formed in 1964 with a mandate 'to contribute to the economic development and social progress of its regional members' and was widely expected to function as a gateway for IDA flowing into the African continent. India became a non-regional member of this group in 1982, though its engagements with the AfDB have been limited in nature, a point discussed subsequently in the next sub-section.

International financial institutions have a significant role in the development of African countries, as mentioned in the previous section. First, they provide financing in the form of both loans and grants. Second, they support governments and legislators efforts to design policies to achieve specific socio-economic targets. Third, they encourage the development and dissemination of more internationally

accepted standards and codes in economic, financial and business activities. Fourth, they develop human resources, providing training and education to achieve the enshrined objectives of their engagement.

Established in 1964, the African Development Bank Group (AfDB) is an international financial institution established with the overarching objective to spur sustainable economic development and social progress in its Regional Member Countries (RMCs) through positioning itself as a 'local' financial provider to African governments and private institutions investing in the RMCs. The primary functions of the AfDB include providing loans, lines of credits and grants towards projects aiming towards contributing to socio-economic development of the continent and its countries as well as an assistant in the formulation of development policies of RMCs.

However, the AfDB has not been able to perform to expectations due to a number of factors, and competition from other institutions and agencies posing the greatest challenge. The American Congressional Research Service has predicted that 'the future effectiveness of the AfDB largely rests on its ability to delineate its role in a crowded aid field', a space crowded by large multilateral donors such as the UN and the World Bank, regional donors such as the EU and the GCC, nations and national economic and financial institutions and emerging multilateral donors such as the BRICS with their New Development Bank (NDB).

The emergence of a number of strong institutions and agencies capable of partnering African countries in their development initiatives has limited not only the effectiveness of the AfDB in implementing its programmes, but also in its effectiveness in positioning itself as a gateway for incoming IDA into Africa, but that does not go so far to render the institution helpless and in limbo. In a dynamic international political economy, the AfDB could work in closer coordination with these new and emerging players in the sector of development cooperation, in this particular case with India and its allied institutions.

The signing of a MoU related to the co-financing activities between the EXIM Bank, the AfDB and the African Development Fund (ADF) in November 2009 has facilitated the channelizing of EXIM finance directed towards African countries. However, it is evident that there is sufficient scope for expanding engagement between the two parties.

That being said even India faces its own unique challenges in establishing its own footprint in Africa, and strengthening its partnership and engagement with the AfDB could benefit both parties in achieving not only the political and economic objectives driving India-Africa relations, but also provide an immense contribution to the economic and social progress of Africa.

8.5 Concluding Remarks

Indian engagement in Africa has a rich tradition and history, but only in the twenty-first century has India looked to strength and expand relations across all sectors, with a particular focus on building economic linkages quantitatively and qualitatively different from those of the past. Indian engagements in capacity building and human resource development of African countries through a collective negotiating mechanism of the African Union and the Africa–India Forum Summits have appeared extremely attractive and distinct in blue print.

However, there is limited research looking into how these projects and processes are impacting different sections of African society and lifestyle. Monitoring and impact assessment needs to be carried out professionally to make course correction and improve the tricky economic interactions between India and African countries. This process involves targeting not only the perception of the government but of the people, the private sector institutions and civil society.

Further, economic competition across African markets has limited the spread of India's footprint. The major national players that have traditionally dominated African markets were the traditional powerhouses of US, UK, France and the economic powerhouses of Japan and South Korea. The economic unfolding of a large section of what was traditionally the 'developing' world has greatly increased competition, with China, India and Brazil institutions leading the way amongst the new groups of economic producers in the global supply chain.

In this era of aggressive engagement, India appears to be shadowed in spite of the special charm provided by its historical relations and traditional goodwill. Further, relatively limited analytical and comparative research focusing on India's current and prospective engagement with African countries has unfortunately contributed to a very limited Indian world view with regards to the African continent and its countries.

A focus on South–South cooperation as the ideology driving the strengthening and expanding of bilateral relations have been encouraged in academic and policy debates in both India and Africa, and it is extremely significant towards building a long-term vision for the future. In this context, the relations between African countries and emerging powers, including India, also represents a tool to articulate and demand the restructuring of archaic institutions so as to rewrite the rules and regulations of global governance, in an attempt to ensure a more promising and prosperous global environment.

Appendix A

First Africa–India Forum Summit 2008, New Delhi

Africa–India Framework for Enhanced Cooperation

The Heads of State and Government and Heads of Delegation of Africa, representing the Continent, the African Union and its Institutions along with the Prime Minister of the Republic of India, recognizing the rich history of Africa–India relationship and noting with satisfaction the existing close, deep and multi-layered relations between the two sides and realizing the need to give a new dimension to this cooperation, have decided to adopt this Framework for Cooperation between Africa and India.

The two parties agree to cooperate in the areas enumerated herein.

1. Economic Cooperation

As a conducive and supportive international economic environment is important for Africa and India in their quest for a mutually beneficial economic development, the two parties hereby recognize the need to foster such environment by reinforcing efforts to promote between them, trade and industry, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), development of Small and Medium-scale Enterprises (SMEs) and Africa's regional integration. In this regard, the two parties have agreed to cooperate in the following areas:

i. Agriculture

Africa and India agree that agricultural development is an effective approach to ensure food security, eradicating poverty and improve peoples' livelihood, and agree to strengthen Africa and India cooperation in this sector in order to improve the food security of Africa and to increase its exports to world markets. They emphasize sustainable development of agricultural and animal resources with effective support for scientific research for conservation of land and environment. The cooperation will focus on the following areas:

- Capacity building and sharing of experience in policy analysis and planning relating to agriculture sector;
- Cooperation in water resource management and irrigation practices, agro-infrastructure development, transfer of applied agricultural technology and skills transfer

- Cooperation to combat agro-based diseases;
- Capacity building/training for increasing the capacity of small land holder African food producers to comply with the required quality and safety standards, including extension activity and agricultural credit policies;
- Sharing experiences and information on appropriate storage and processing technologies and jointly promoting the uptake of African and Indian developed technologies for diversification and value addition in relations to food and agricultural products.
- Sharing of expertise and information between commodity boards of Africa and India with a view to learning from each other's experiences in farm mechanization, postharvest technology, organic farming, policy and regulatory frameworks and setting up of cross-border commodity exchange boards;
- Enhancing market opportunities for African value-added agricultural products;
- Cooperation in livestock management, breeding technologies, meat processing, dairy industry development, fisheries and aquaculture, including exchange and transfer of applied technology;
- Establishing linkages between agriculture and industrial development in order to support and nurture agro-processing industries; and
- Enhancing cooperation between agricultural training centres and relevant research institutes.

ii. Trade, Industry and Investment

Africa and India recognize the need to expand the two-way trade, greater market access and investment facilitation and decide to take the following steps:

- Technical assistance and capacity building in trade negotiations, dispute settlement and implementation of different agreements under WTO, as well as in enhancing competitiveness in the world economy;
- Strengthening linkages of enterprises on both sides with a view to developing global markets for products and services available on both sides;
- Maximizing the benefits of trade liberalization through improved market access for products of export interest to African countries and India, including striving to provide duty-free and quota-free market access for African products;
- Promoting and facilitating enhanced trade cooperation between the two sides, including through value addition/processing;
- Organization of business delegations and participation in trade fairs and exhibitions;
- Preparation of a Joint Strategy and Action Plan for mapping of resources and opportunities for entrepreneurship development and facilitation aimed at mutual growth;
- Developing and implementing projects for information dissemination regarding entrepreneurship opportunities on both sides, business-to-business contacts, such as through business conclaves and upgrading of trade facilitation through commercial missions of both sides; and
- Enhancing corporate governance and social responsibility.

iii. Small and Medium-Scale Enterprises (SMEs)

Africa and India recognize that for a sustainable and successful industrial policy, development of micro-, small- and medium-scale enterprises is necessary as the first step towards industrialization in African countries. With that objective in focus, the following steps will be taken:

- Capacity building through Entrepreneurship Development Programmes;
- Capacity building on policy formulation and institutional framework development for the SMEs;
- Promotion of Joint Ventures between business enterprises of Africa and India;
- Training in Africa and India for upgrading of skills in the areas of conventional and hi-tech training; and
- Promoting the export of SME products, including projects on turnkey basis.

iv. Finance

Recognizing the importance of the financial sector, cooperation in the following areas is decided:

- Sharing of experiences and capacity building on policy and regulatory frameworks in the financial sector including the microfinance sector;
- Sharing of experiences in mobilization of domestic savings;
- Capacity building in development of automated trading systems for stock exchange and development of cross-border stock exchanges, such as Pan-African stock exchanges; and
- Mobilization of financial resources to fund the various projects envisaged in the areas of cooperation.

v. Regional Integration

Recognizing the importance of regional cooperation and economic integration in development endeavours, Africa and India decide as follows:

- Provision of financial support to mutually agreed integration programmes carried out by the African Union and the RECs, especially those of inter-regional and continental importance;
- Promotion and support for regional and inter-regional projects, including infrastructural development; and
- Provision of technical assistance to support the establishment of the financial institutions of the African Union.

2. Political Cooperation

Bearing in mind that peace, security and development are inseparable as there can be no lasting development without peace and recognizing the need for closer cooperation in the field of governance structures and civil society, India resolves to support Africa in meeting her objectives of sustainable development, prosperity and peace through the following steps:

i. Peace and Security

- Cross-fertilization of the experiences of the AU and India in peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction efforts taking into account the AU’s Policy Framework for Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD);
- Cooperation in undertaking lessons-learned exercises and sharing of experiences regarding the role of women in peacekeeping operations;
- Cooperation in developing and implementing training of trainers towards enhancing the civilian component of peacekeeping operations;
- Technical assistance and capacity building to tackle the challenge of money laundering and terrorist financing;
- Cooperation in duplication of the Female Formed Police Unit;
- Cooperation in developing and implementing a Training of Trainers Programme towards effective policing and police support as part of peacekeeping operations;
- Sharing of experiences and information to enhance capacity to fight international terrorism, including through the African Centre on the Study and Research on Terrorism.
- Cooperation in combating drug trafficking, as well as trafficking in women and children; and
- Technical assistance and capacity building in disaster management and humanitarian intervention.

ii. Civil Society and Good Governance

- Cross-fertilization of ideas on decentralization of governance and building capacity of local governments through administrative reforms and enhancing public participation in local and central government;
- Establishing a platform to initiate, deepen and maintain cooperation in civil establishments and training institutes in Africa and India on various relevant issues;
- Create a joint platform for discussion of global political and economic issues with a view to reinforcing South–South positions that will enable Africa and India to have greater leverage in the international fora;
- Cross-fertilization and sharing of experiences on public service reforms and human rights regimes with a view to strengthening mutual competences in these areas;
- Sharing of experiences on strategies for deepening democratization at the local level, management of ethnic diversity and wealth distribution in a democratic context and the professionalisation of the public services;
- Exchange of expertise and sharing of experiences on the conduct of elections in vast and complex terrains
- Sharing experiences in harnessing resources from Diaspora;
- Helping to strengthen the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights;
- Interaction of legal experts/lawyers through Bar Associations; and

- Cooperation in legal research methodology and in emerging international legal issues, such as the mechanisms, processes and regulatory frameworks that support outsourcing.

3. Science, Technology, Research and Development

i. Science and Technology

- Developing robust networks among leading institutes for Science and Technology for collaborative research and development;
- Sharing experiences in technology transfer and development of appropriate technology;
- Sharing experiences in capacity building for strengthening the role of science and technology;
- Cooperation in setting quality standards and recognition awards in science, technology and innovation; and
- Cooperation in management of intellectual property, including indigenous knowledge.

ii. Information and Communication Technology (ICT)

Recognizing that Information Technology is emerging as one of the major vehicles of economic growth and has become fundamental part of infrastructure and improvement of myriad sectors of socio-economic activities, Africa and India agree to take the following steps:

- Cooperate closely to ensure quick and effective implementation and roll out of the Pan-African E-Network Project being funded by India. The project will be a major step forward in removing the digital divide, ensure connectivity of all African countries and provide much needed telemedicine and tele-education to the masses of African countries;
- Cooperate in the implementation of the digital solidarity mechanism developed within the framework of NEPAD.
- Cooperation in capacity building in devising model legal and policy frameworks for ICT, such as on e-Commerce, e-Governance, e-Health, etc.;
- Cooperation and information sharing among ICT regulatory bodies;
- Development of Information and Communication Technology tools and applications aimed at improving public administration at different levels of government, taxation management, public financing and delivery of public services;
- Promotion of cooperation in the range of non-material knowledge-based human resources such as technology, organization, information, education and skills development;
- Cooperation in setting up Community Information Centres using IT to accelerate socio-economic development, with a view to providing rural connectivity and bridging the digital divides; and

4. Cooperation in Social Development and Capacity Building

i. Education

Africa and India recognize that human resource development is vital to achieve the socio-economic development goals of Africa and universal mass education is a key factor in this endeavour. To achieve universal education with special emphasis on quality and gender equality, Africa and India will collaborate in the following areas:

- Sharing experiences and building capacity for educational policy planning and administration through the effective utilization of financial and statistical information on education;
- Increasing the scholarships available for Africa from the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programmes with focus on science, technology and information technology-related courses;
- Sharing of experiences and best practices in “Mid-day Meal Programme”;
- Collaboration in the development and production of teaching and learning materials, including equipment for teaching science and technology and textbooks, especially for universities;
- Collaboration in designing and implementation of Open and Distance Education/Learning Programmes with attendant capacity building for personnel required, such as teachers and ICT technicians;
- Establishing programmes for exchange of students and staff through twinning leading African and Indian Universities;
- Cooperation in equipping scientific laboratories and training workshops for Technical and Vocational Education; and
- Cooperation in establishing programmes in capacity building and entrepreneurship for youth through ICT.

ii. Health

Africa and India acknowledge that upgrading and streamlining healthcare systems and increasing access to health care for the people of Africa and India is a critical issue and agree to increase cooperation in the field of health promotion and healthcare systems through the following areas of cooperation:

- Sharing experiences, information and expertise on traditional systems of medicine within recognized intellectual property regime
- Training and capacity building for health professionals and physicians;
- Sharing experience and information on healthcare systems development and community health programmes;
- Linking the centres of excellence in the health sector, such as research and training institutes, etc.;
- Focus on cooperation in devising and implementing programmes for enhancing universal access to adequate medical services, including developing the tele-medicine infrastructure and technology to enable patients to receive quality health services, such as medical diagnostic and other services to which they

would not ordinarily have access due to distance and/or limitation in the availability of specialists;

- Strengthen the indigenous manufacturing capacities and to make available affordable and quality pharmaceutical products, especially essential medicines. This may also include exchange of technical experts and collaborative efforts;
- Enhance cooperation in controlling HIV/AIDS, TB, Malaria and other communicable diseases;
- Cooperation in combating the proliferation and dumping of counterfeit medicines;
- Local production of oral rehydration therapy.

iii. Water and Sanitation

In both Africa and India, many communities lack access to adequate and safe drinking water, as well as basic sanitation resulting in prevalence of diseases related to poor hygiene and environmental sanitation. In order to achieve the MDGs and the Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development and Plan of Action, efforts have to be doubled particularly during 2008, the International Year of Sanitation. In this connection, cooperation could focus on sharing experiences and promoting programmes in the following areas:

- Development of sanitation infrastructure, particularly in urban and suburban settings;
- Urban development, in particular, combating the mushrooming of slums and shanty towns;
- Waste management; and
- Putting in place appropriate framework for water quality control and water treatment.

iv. Culture and Sports

Recognizing the need to enhance mutual understanding and friendship between different nations and ethnic groups and achieving common prosperity and progress of mankind, as well as underlining the importance of cultural exchanges and cooperation, Africa and India resolve to enhance cultural relations between the two sides. To this end, focus will be given to the following areas:

- Encourage people-to-people contacts and exchanges to deepen the traditional friendship between the two sides;
- Strengthen contacts among young people through encouraging and supporting exchange of students among schools and universities;
- Encourage the visit of Professors under the bilateral cultural exchange programmes at prestigious universities in Africa and India and encourage creating/maintaining chair of African/Indian studies;
- Encourage bilateral cultural exchange programmes of performing art troupes and art exhibitions;

- Foster closer linkages in the film industry sector and encourage holding of film festivals, as well as increase interaction and cooperation for the film industry of Africa and India; and
- Cooperation in the area of sports.

v. Poverty Eradication

A significant percentage of the population in Africa and India live below the poverty line and many of the working poor lack social protection. Unemployment and underemployment, particularly for the youth, resulting in internal and external migration are contributing to unplanned rapid urbanization. These are serious issues for both Africa and India and both can cooperate to resolve these problems in the following areas:

- Strengthening cooperation in the framework of the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs);
- Cooperation in the implementation of poverty alleviation strategies;
- Sharing experiences in employment creation and business management;
- Development of social security systems; and
- Sharing of best practices in development of credit unions, especially in rural settings.

5. Tourism

As a significant industry that provides economic benefits and promotes friendship and sociocultural understanding among nations, Africa and India hereby resolve to continue to promote the growth of tourism, as well as expand people-to-people exchanges in their two regions to further promote understanding, trust and cooperation between their peoples. To this end, focus will be given to the following areas:

- Promotion of close interaction between relevant authorities in Africa and India to facilitate coherence of policies and initiatives related to tourism development;
- Adoption of appropriate measures to prevent all threats to tourism, which may have direct impact on tourism;
- Strengthening of partnership with the private sector especially travel agencies, hotels, airlines and other tourism related establishments, as well as the media, with a view to advancing tourism development between the two regions; and
- Promotion of general tourism and offering joint tourism packages, including ecotourism, to utilize the geographical diversity of the two sides.

6. Infrastructures, Energy and Environment

Recognizing that energy and infrastructure is fundamental to the economic growth of developing countries and acknowledging that infrastructural development and environmental sustainability are some of the priority areas of NEPAD, Africa and India agree to place energy, infrastructure and environmental sustainability as one of the key areas of cooperation and commit ourselves to the following areas:

- Development of public–private partnerships in infrastructure development;
- Cooperation in the development of transport and telecommunications networks;
- Cooperation in the field of exploration and exploitation of natural resources, as well as value addition;
- Creation of enabling environment for investment and development of renewable and non-renewable energy sources;
- Cooperation and capacity building in best practices and adaptation on the impact of climate change and desertification;
- Exchange of experiences on recent advances on alternative energy sources and sustainable land management;
- Development of cooperation in fibre-optic cables construction around and within Africa for broadband access network specifically for landlocked countries; and
- Technical cooperation for Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).

7. Media and Communication

Africa and India agree that closer linkages and cooperation in the field of media and communications will generate greater synergy in their relationship, enhance a South–South communication culture, enable more systematic use of their shared cultural and social heritage and also improve the process of economic development in Africa and India. In this regard, they have decided to focus cooperation efforts in the following areas:

- Cooperate to promote common South–South strategies on flow of information in media;
- Enhance linkages among news agencies; and
- Enhance training in human resource development, corporate communications and modern technology in media developments.

Without prejudice to India’s ongoing and future programmes at the bilateral, REC and other levels, we agree to develop jointly, within a period of 1 year, a joint plan of action at a continental level and an appropriate follow-up mechanism to implement our Framework for Cooperation.

Done at Delhi this ninth day of April, 2008.

A.1 First Africa–India Forum Summit 2008 Delhi Declaration, April 09, 2008

1. We, the Heads of State and Government and Heads of Delegation of Africa, representing the Continent, the African Union and its Institutions along with the Prime Minister of the Republic of India, have met today in New Delhi, India, to consolidate the process of deliberations and discussions with a view to

redefining and reinvigorating the decades-old partnership and historical and civilizational links between the African continent and India.

2. We recognize that Africa and India have undergone enormous positive changes, in particular over the last two-and-a-half decades, and that Africa and India have historically been close allies in the struggle for independence, equality, human rights, freedom and democracy. We are neighbours across the Indian Ocean. We note that there has been significant positive transformation of the political, economic and social environment in Africa and the strengthening of democracy, particularly with the adoption of the Constitutive Act and the establishment of the African Union with its institutions, such as the Pan-African Parliament, the Economic, Social and Cultural Council, the African Court on Human and People's Rights as well as its programme the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the Peace and Security Council. During this period, the Indian economy has evolved into a more mature and fast growing economic mode and Indian democracy has further strengthened. We have, therefore, decided to build upon these positive achievements with a view to helping each other to become more self-reliant, economically vibrant, at peace with ourselves and the world and to work together to strengthen our close partnership.
3. Bearing in mind that African countries and India have enjoyed close, cooperative and multi-sectoral partnership encompassing political, security related, economic, science and technology, human resource development, social, cultural and other areas of mutual interest, we have adopted today a Framework for Cooperation which will further strengthen our partnership in all these and other areas for our mutual benefit.
4. This partnership will be based on the fundamental principles of equality, mutual respect, and understanding between our peoples for our mutual benefit. It will also be guided by the following principles: respect for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity of state and commitment to deepen the process of African integration; collective action and cooperation for the common good of our states and peoples; dialogue among our civilizations to promote a culture of peace, tolerance and respect for religious, cultural, linguistic and racial diversities as well as gender equality with the view to strengthening the trust and understanding between our peoples; the positive development of intra-regional/sub-regional integration by complementing and building upon existing/sub-regional initiatives in Africa; recognition of diversity between and within regions, including different social and economic systems and levels of development; and further consolidation and development of plural democracy.
5. The international community is today addressing a series of critical issues such as environmental degradation, including climate change and desertification, multilateral trade negotiations, reform and democratization of international institutions, particularly the United Nations and the Bretton Woods Institutions, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the fight against terrorism, combating illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons, non-proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, the fight against drugs and

most importantly, promotion of pluralism and democracy, the pursuit of sustainable development underpinned by social justice, eradication of hunger, poverty as well as combating diseases. Africa and India reiterate their intention to ensure that in all these matters, the interests of developing countries are kept uppermost and the socio-economic developmental requirements of our countries are guaranteed.

6. We recognize that climate change is a global challenge but one that will be particularly severe for developing countries given their vulnerabilities, inadequate means and limited capacities to adapt to its effects. We reaffirm that development is the best form of adaptation and that the foremost priority for developing countries is to ensure accelerated social and economic development. We note that sustainable development is essential to enable effective adaptation. We stress the importance for adaptation to be adequately financed through additional resources and not from funds meant for development.
7. We note with regret the lack of demonstrable progress by developed countries on Green House Gas (GHG) reduction commitments in the first commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol. We emphasize the need for equitable and fair burden sharing in mitigation which must take into account historical emissions. In this regard, we take note of the proposal of the Prime Minister of India on convergence of per-capita emissions of developing and developed countries.
8. We urge the international community to give real and immediate effect to commitments on climate change, especially in the areas of technology transfer, financing and capacity building. There is also need for a closer look at the Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) regime to ensure cost-effective transfer of appropriate and advanced clean technologies to developing countries.
9. We are determined to participate effectively in the negotiations under the Bali Action Plan towards comprehensively addressing climate change in accordance with the provisions and principles of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), in particular the key principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.
10. We take note of the state of play in the World Trade Organization (WTO)-Doha round of trade negotiations. We reiterate the importance of the development dimension of the Round and welcome the strengthened engagement, solidarity and cooperation among developing countries in that process. Agriculture remains the key to the conclusion of this round. We are convinced that any acceptable agreement must adequately protect the livelihood, food security and rural development concerns of developing countries. Any outcome must also bring about significant and effective reductions in trade-distorting domestic support and subsidies provided by the developed countries. There are equally important issues also to be addressed on Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) services and rules. We are convinced that the process to be adopted to reach convergence in the WTO negotiations requires focus on content and not artificial timelines. The promise of a development round must be fully realized.
11. We also reaffirm our commitment to providing meaningful market access to the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). We call upon the members of WTO to

- implement duty-free and quota-free market access for all products originating from the LDCs and to take additional measures to provide effective market access to them through simplified and transparent Rules of Origin.
12. We attach priority to providing trade related technical assistance and capacity building to LDCs to help mitigate the effect of their marginalization in the present globalized trade structure and enable them to maximize the benefits resulting from the multilateral trade liberalization process. We are committed to helping LDCs achieve the goal of securing effective market access through transparent and predictable rules of the multilateral trading system.
 13. We agree on the urgent need to reform the international financial architecture, especially the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), to reflect the changing global situation. In this context, we emphasize the need for the effective voice and participation of developing countries, including in the quotas and voting rights in the IFIs. This would enhance the IFIs' accountability, legitimacy, credibility and effectiveness.
 14. We are committed to multilateralism and to strengthening the democratic structure of the United Nations.
 15. We reaffirm our commitment to further strengthen Africa–India cooperation at the United Nations, the G77 and in other multilateral fora with a view to addressing issues of common concern. There is need for urgent and comprehensive reform of the United Nations to enable it to more effectively deal with the challenges of today's world. We share the view that the United Nations should function in a more transparent, efficient and effective manner, and that the composition of its central organs must reflect contemporary realities. In particular, the expansion of the UN Security Council, in both permanent and non-permanent categories of membership, is central to the process of UN reform.
 16. India notes the common African position and the aspirations of the African countries to get their rightful place in an expanded UN Security Council as new permanent members with full rights as contained in the Ezulwini Consensus. Africa takes note of India's position and its aspirations to become a permanent member with full rights in an expanded UN Security Council. We note the active and constructive engagement of both sides in the process of the reform of the United Nations. We agree to further strengthen cooperation between our two sides towards early realization of a genuine reform of the United Nations and its working methods, particularly revitalizing and enhancing the role of the General Assembly and reform and expansion of the Security Council.
 17. We believe that the security of all nations would be enhanced by the global, non-discriminatory and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. We renew our commitment to the consensus attained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to Disarmament whereby it was agreed that the first priority in disarmament negotiations is to be accorded to nuclear disarmament. We call for the negotiation of specific steps that would reduce and finally eliminate nuclear weapons, thereby leading to a world free

from all weapons of mass destruction as envisaged in the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan of 1988 and the Africa Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (the Pelindaba Treaty) of 1995, as well as other relevant African and Indian regional initiatives.

18. We unequivocally condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. An act of terrorism anywhere is a threat to the entire international community. We recognize the need to further strengthen international cooperation to combat global terrorism and for compliance of member states with all international terrorism conventions and related protocols, and the Security Council resolutions on counterterrorism. We also agree to make concerted efforts towards expeditious finalization of a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism at the UN.
19. We affirm that cooperation between Africa and India has been, from its inception, a useful example of South–South cooperation. It has been our endeavour at this Summit to devise ways and means of enhancing this South–South partnership, taking into account the new capabilities that have emerged in Africa and India. Bearing this in mind, we have drawn up and adopted a Framework for Cooperation that would provide the avenue for further and dynamic development of the Africa–India partnership. African Leaders deeply appreciate the initiatives that have been announced at this Summit by the Prime Minister of the Republic of India, H.E. Dr. Manmohan Singh, that would provide an input for the implementation of this Framework for Cooperation. We have agreed that Africa and India will strengthen not only their bilateral linkages, but that India will also progressively strengthen its partnership with the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities of Africa.
20. We have also agreed that in addition to high-level political exchanges between us in the bilateral, regional and multilateral contexts, Africa and India must meet every 3 years. We have accordingly, agreed that the next Africa–India Summit will be held in 2011 in Africa.
21. Without prejudice to India’s ongoing and future programmes at the bilateral, REC and other levels, we agree to develop jointly, within a period of 1 year, a joint plan of action at a continental level and an appropriate follow-up mechanism to implement our Framework for Cooperation.
22. We, the Heads of State and Government and Heads of Delegation that are representing Africa at this Summit would like to take this opportunity to thank the Government and people of India and, in particular, their Excellencies the President and Prime Minister of India for hosting this Forum Summit and for the warm reception and hospitality extended to us. This Forum Summit has further cemented the age-old relationship between Africa and India, a relationship that has been of mutual benefit and is based on mutual trust, equality and solidarity.
23. The Prime Minister of India, on behalf of the Government and people of India, takes this opportunity to thank the participating Heads of State and Government

and other Heads of Delegation from Africa for accepting the invitation to attend this Africa–India Forum Summit and for their most productive and useful suggestions to strengthen and reinvigorate the Africa–India partnership.

Issued at New Delhi on 9 April 2008.

A.2 Plan of Action of the Framework for Cooperation of the India–Africa Forum Summit

Introduction

In order to deepen the India–Africa strategic partnership to promote sustainable development, and to implement the outcomes of the First India–Africa Forum Summit, the two sides have jointly developed this Plan of Action, with a view to implementing the thematic areas that are contained in the Framework for Cooperation. The Plan of Action is established for a period of 4 years and will be subjected to review, adaptation and enhancement during and after that period.

1. Economic Cooperation

i. Agriculture

To enhance agricultural education, science and research, India will provide 25 Ph. D. and 50 Masters' scholarships per annum for 4 years to African students in agriculture in Indian Universities/Institutions. The scholarships will cover different disciplines in agriculture. In order to ensure equitable distribution, the AU Commission will coordinate the process of selecting the prospective candidates in conjunction with the Government of India and its embassies in Africa.

India will also provide:

- Customized short-term trainings related to transferable skills focusing on training of trainers who will transfer expertise to stakeholders at national level;
- Targeted visits of Indian professionals for field demonstrations based on mutually agreed objectives and mission with beneficiary stakeholders;
- On-the-spot consultations and in-country trainings;
- Provision of essential hardware and software in field demonstrations; and
- Exchange of literature, seed and planting materials, as well as sharing of best practices in agriculture.

The areas to be covered under this programme will endeavour to include management of livestock and fisheries; management of commodity boards; irrigation and water conservation; and capacity building in the area of agro-processing.

ii. Trade, Industry and Investment

The two sides recognize the need to expand two-way trade, greater market access and investment facilitation and agree to the following:

- India will establish an India–Africa Institute of Foreign Trade based on the model of the Indian Institute of Foreign Trade. The institute will provide professional education in the field of International trade and management including studies pertaining to the public and private sectors in Africa. In addition, the Indian Institute of Foreign Trade (IIFT) will provide customized capacity-building programmes on international trade and business over a 4-year period through the existing bilateral arrangements. This will provide capacity building as the process for the establishment of an India–Africa Institute of Foreign Trade is pursued.
- India will also establish an India–Africa Diamond Institute on the model of the Indian Diamond Institute in an African country. The Institute will help to develop African capacities and skills in processing, polishing and grading raw diamonds.
- India’s Duty-Free and Tariff Preference (DFTP) Scheme for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in Africa, which has been widely welcomed and which allows access for African goods and services to the growing Indian market, will be continued. Information sharing on the DFTP scheme has been carried out through various fora and will be enhanced under this Plan of Action.
- To enhance private sector interaction and building of entrepreneurship and business-to-business linkages, the following initiatives will be undertaken:
 - Preparation of an India–Africa Business Guide to highlight opportunities on both sides for trade and investment, through the Chambers of Commerce of the two sides;
 - Organization of Business Councils or meetings at the Regional level between Indian and African economic operators, in order to examine business opportunities offered by both economies; and
 - Upgrading industrial supply-side capacities and enhancing competitiveness; and exchange of best practices between African and Indian Investment Promotion Agencies.

iii. Small- and Medium-Scale Enterprises (SMEs)

Small- and Medium-Scale Enterprises are at the core of economic development through the private sectors of Africa and India. They contribute to exports, transfer of technology, employment generation, development of regional trade and entrepreneurship. In this respect and to promote the development of capacities and support transfer of technology, the following actions will be undertaken:

- India will establish ten (10) vocational training centres in Africa through the National Small Industries Corporation. Thereafter, it will support existing vocational training institutions in Africa.
- India will offer generous Lines of Credit on concessional terms to a large number of African countries; undertake programmes for development of

capacity building in Africa and support the Chambers of Commerce in India to hold India–Africa Annual Conclave and other similar initiatives.

- Programmes to provide enabling infrastructure and conducive operating environment for SMEs and Small and Medium-Scale Industries (SMIs) in Africa will be created as well as joint ventures between African and Indian SMEs including the development of business guides for the establishment of SMEs in Africa and India as a means of youth employment.

iv. Finance

- Recognizing that finance is critical to the implementation of the Plan of Action, India announced at IAFS 2008 that it will provide about 5.4 billion United States Dollars in Lines of Credit to African countries and institutions over the 5-year period. A separate provision of 500 million USD to develop capacities in Africa, of which nearly half is committed to this continental level Joint Plan of Action is envisaged.

These financial provisions will support the integration of Africa through:

- Provision of regional infrastructure among other programmes;
- Provision of support for capacity building and development of Pan-African Stock Exchanges;
- Consultations between African Ministers of Finance and Economic Development and their Indian counterparts to share experiences; and
- Sharing of experiences on the mobilization of domestic savings and the strengthening of microfinance institutions in Africa

v. Regional Integration

- Regional integration is an important objective for Africa and various efforts to harmonize the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) through the promotion of integrated projects are ongoing. India has subsisting engagements with many of the RECs and has developed an implementation process for this purpose. Consequently, India agrees to consider financial support to mutually agreed integration programmes carried out by the African Union and the RECs, especially those of inter-regional and continental importance. India will provide a line of credit of USD 300 million to support regional integrational infrastructure projects through the AU.

2. Political Cooperation

Bearing in mind that peace, security and development are interlinked, the two sides agree to:

i. Peace and Security

- Enhance the capacity of African Governments, institutions and various stakeholders in the implementation of UN Resolution 1325 on women's role in the peace process;

- Cooperate in efforts to combat illicit drug trafficking and abuse, as well as small arms and light weapons; and
- Cooperate in developing and implementing training of trainers towards enhancing the civilian component of peacekeeping operations.

ii. Civil Society and Good Governance

- Strengthen the African Court on Human and People’s Rights through sharing best practices, capacity building of the court and provision of equipment and the mobilization of resources for the activities of the court;
- Promote the interaction of legal experts/lawyers through the Bar Associations, and cooperation in legal research methodology and on emerging international legal issues and regulatory framework that support outsourcing; and
- Exchange experiences on best practices, research and human resources within the framework of decentralization and local governance alongside the conference of Ministers of Public Services and Administration and ECOSSOC.

3. Science, Technology, Research and Development

i. Science and Technology

Conscious of the fact that science, technology, research and development are fundamentals and major catalysts for socio-economic activities, the two sides agree to the following:

- Proposals for enhancement of research, development and scientific exchanges involving programmes and events to discuss issues of policy transfer of technology mechanisms through the institutional strengthening of three institutions and capacity building will be undertaken;
- India–Africa Science and Technology Conference will be organized to plan an agenda;
- India will support institutional strengthening in areas of mutual interest;
- India will provide training in areas like HIV, TB and Malaria;
- India will support Africa for its research and development efforts through specific fellowships named after CV Raman which will be implemented bilaterally. These will cover medium term and long-term support for researchers and post doctoral fellows; and
- Consideration will be given to the proposal for the training of journalists in scientific journalism.

ii. Information and Communication Technology (ICT)

Recognizing the contribution made by Information Technology to the economic development of Africa and India:

- Both sides welcome the establishment of the Pan-African E-Network Project which supports the developmental goals of African countries in the education,

health and communication sectors. Both sides agree to the early completion and implementation of this important project.

- India will establish an India–Africa Institute of Information Technology which would bridge the gap between academia and industry, and serve as a think-tank for the professional development of IT and provide capacity building and education for the growth of IT in Africa.

India will support the African Union’s initiative in this sector and support capacity building to this end through the ITEC programme. Africa’s desire to have India participate in the implementation of the interconnection of all African capital cities with broadband network by 2012 and work with Africa to build continental and national e-strategies including the development of all e-applications would be jointly developed by both sides.

4. Cooperation in Social Development and Capacity Building

Recognizing the importance of human capacity enhancement in the attainment of socio-development objectives, the two sides agree to the following:

i. Education

- India will establish an India–Africa Institute of Education Planning and Administration, which will provide academic and professional guidance to agencies and institutions engaged in educational planning and administration in Africa.
- India will consider collaborative development of high-quality open source Overseas Development Learning training materials for teachers and various categories of school managers.
- India will develop training workshops on local and low-cost production of educational materials;
- India will assist in the development of TVET programmes aligned with labour market demands for both formal and informal economies, and global economic trends.

ii. Health

- India will organize an India–Africa workshop on traditional medicine to highlight the commonalities in approach and sharing of experience.
- Both sides will strengthen public and private sectors collaboration in the areas of pharmaceutical production and procurement in Africa and India in the framework of pharmaceutical manufacturing plan for Africa;
- Both sides will support collaboration in research and development in traditional medicine and practices in Africa and India;
- Both sides agree to share experiences, specialized expertise and best practices in healthcare systems development and community health programmes;
- India will collaborate with Africa in training and continuing education for health professionals; the Pan-African e-network telemedicine component supports

CME and the training of health professionals in various sectors already part of ongoing bilateral and regional programmes.

iii. Water and Sanitation

- India will organize seven training programmes in specialized areas by reputed training/research/academic institutions in India. Up to 50 participants per course will be invited through the African Union.
- India will also support African institutions and initiatives in the field of integrated water management through proposals to be mutually decided.
- India will fully support Africa in attaining the MDGs in the areas of water and sanitation.

iv. Culture and Sports

- Africa and India will endeavour to jointly:
 - Promote film and TV cultural programme exchanges;
 - Organize joint international training for trainers in the field of cultural goods protection and cultural industries;
 - Jointly study the establishment of regional laboratories for doping control in Africa and India;
 - Organize joint international trainings of trainers in the field of sports management and development, including sports medical care; and
 - Organize youth cultural and sports festivals through events like Africa–India Week and by tapping the talent of the large African student presence in India through the Indian Council for Cultural Relations

v. Poverty Eradication

- Support for the goal of poverty eradication through the following specific programmes will be undertaken:
 - Organization of seminars/exhibitions across Africa, including through public/private partnerships;
 - Construction of prototype low-cost houses in five African countries, one per region
 - Exchange of cost-sharing experiences in the construction of demonstration houses in 5 African countries, one per region.
- Both sides agree to share best practices in the development of credit unions, especially in rural settings
- Promotion of microfinance projects in Africa.

5. Tourism

Recognizing that tourism provides economic benefits and promotes friendship and socio-economic understanding among nations, the two sides agree as follows:

- India will sponsor a study towards the harmonization of policies and norms in the tourism sector in cooperation with relevant institutions in Africa;
- Both sides will strengthen partnership with the private sector especially travel agencies, hotels, airlines and other tourism related establishments, as well as the media, with a view to advancing tourism development between the two regions; and
- Both sides will promote general tourism and offering joint tourism packages, including eco-tourism, to utilize the geographical diversity of the two sides.

6. Infrastructure, Energy and Environment

Recognizing that infrastructure, energy and environment are fundamental to the economic growth of developing countries, the two sides agree as follows:

- Training programmes for up to 50 African participants (annually) at the National Institute for Training of Highway Engineers (NITHE) will be provided by India.

1. Energy

- Note that India has actively engaged with Africa through the India Africa Hydrocarbon Conferences and welcomes India's commitment to work with Africa to process its resources including by establishing refineries in some countries.
- Define together with the RECs, the regional power pools and national governments concrete projects in the field of hydropower, wind and bioenergy in African countries, which have high potential; and
- Cooperation to explore renewable sources of energy in Africa.

2. Transport

a. Maritime Transport

- Develop and promote mutual assistance and cooperation in the area of maritime safety and security, prevention and protection of the main environment and port users;
- Work for the creation of regional coastguard networks (North, West, Central, East and South) and surveillance facilities;
- Develop Africa's training in the area of maritime and harbour administration; and
- Collaborate and exchange information in the area of maritime transport, harbor management, safety, security and preventing, controlling and combating pollution, particularly through training, exchange of skills and knowledge programmes;

In all these areas more specific proposals will be developed by experts from the two sides.

b. Air Transport

- Coordination of the respective external air transport policies; and
- Identification and development of hubs for air bridge to support airlines operations between the two regions and beyond.

The African side will provide a concept note on these in order to create a dialogue between African and Indian authorities.

c. Land Transport

- Status Quo Assessment of the Trans African Highway (TAH) Network; and
- Development of a road safety strategy for the African continent.

The African side will develop and provide India with concept notes on both projects.

3. Environment

- Elaboration of specific programmes to combat desertification and climate change which constitute major challenges for the international community; and
- Sharing of experiences on projects for carbon development mechanisms.

TERI's MOU with ECA and support to the Africa Climate Policy Centre is also recognized. The Indian initiative to have an African section at the Delhi Sustainable Development Summit annually organized by TERI in February in New Delhi initiated since 2009 will be utilized to foster closer engagement among the environmental policymakers in India and Africa.

7. Media and Communication

Bearing in mind that closer linkage in the field of media and communication will generate greater synergy in their relationship, the two sides agree to:

- Cooperate in human resource training in the area of modern corporate communications using modern technology (ICT) and the development of language skills; and
- Provide assistance in the production of documentary videos, which are effective in disseminating information on specific missions or interventions.

Other programmes in this area could be undertaken through existing ITEC programmes and through the Public Diplomacy Division in India. These would be discussed between the African Union Commission and the Permanent Mission of India to the AU.

Similarly, an exchange of media delegations, editors' conferences and training of media persons will form part of the initiatives that India is taking in Africa. These will be undertaken regionally and bilaterally.

8. With respect to the institutions to be established in Africa, namely, India–Africa Institute of Foreign Trade; India–Africa Diamond Institute; India–Africa Institute of Information Technology; India–Africa Institute of Education Planning and Administration; Pan-African Stock Exchange and India–Africa Vocational

Training Centres, the host countries undertake to facilitate their establishment and sustenance including:

- Land for the Institutions;
- Building infrastructure;
- Budgetary provision for recurring costs;
- Governance structures for administration and running of the Institutions; and
- Business plan for future development and sustainability.

On its part India will establish and equip the institutions and maintain them for a period of 3 years.

Appendix B

Second Africa–India Forum Summit 2011, Addis Ababa

Africa–India Framework for Enhanced Cooperation

The Heads of State and Government and Heads of Delegations of Africa, representing the Continent, the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), along with the Prime Minister of the Republic of India, noting with satisfaction the progress made in the implementation of the Africa–India Framework of Cooperation and its Plan of Action of March 2010, and agreeing to give additional substance to the partnership and to widen its scope, decide to adopt this Framework for Enhanced Cooperation between Africa and India.

Africa and India agree to continue their cooperation in the areas enumerated below:

1. Economic Cooperation

Africa and India reiterate the mutual desire to expand economic cooperation and trade and investment linkages between them. Recognizing that trade and investment between Africa and India have increased, both Africa and India agree to take further measures to continue to create a positive ambience for such enhanced flows. Africa has also effectively utilized concessional financial flows from India to Africa for supporting the development of its infrastructure, industry and services. Both sides agree to further expand cooperation and sharing of experiences to increase trade, investment and financial flows between India and Africa as they provide a common paradigm of cooperation in the true spirit of South–South engagement.

i. Agriculture

Africa and India reaffirm their commitment to cooperate for increasing agricultural output and achieving the Millennium Development Goal of halving the proportion of people who suffer from hunger and malnutrition by 2015. They emphasize the importance of harnessing the latest scientific research for raising productivity and for the conservation of land and the environment in order to ensure food security for their people and to bring down the currently rising cost of food prices so as to make food affordable for all. In this respect, they agree to collaborate in the

implementation of the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP).

ii. Trade, Industry and Investment

Africa and India recognize that enhanced trade and economic linkages would further contribute to sustainable growth and economic development in both Africa and India and welcome the contribution by India to build value addition and processing facilities in Africa.

Africa values private investment and financial flows on a concessional basis, which have been received from India and wishes to enhance their usage for building its infrastructure and enhancing the capacity of Africa to increase its exports. The value addition provided by Indian investment in Africa contributes to Africa's exports to third countries and to the development of intra-Africa trade. Both Africa and India will continue to work together to take these initiatives further.

Africa has also welcomed the Duty Free Tariff Preference Scheme for Africa's LDCs unilaterally announced by India at the time of the first India–Africa Forum Summit in 2008. It has significantly contributed to the ability of African countries to access the growing Indian market and contributed to the creation of complementarity in their export baskets. Africa and India will together endeavour to increase awareness and usage of this Scheme.

In the Action Plan of the Framework of Cooperation of IAFS-I, several initiatives were taken to build African capacities so that African human resources could join the process of industrialization and development of the services sector. Africa and India propose to continue to develop more such initiatives so that the growing young population of Africa finds suitable training and integration into the increasing economic opportunities in Africa.

Support to the legal and regulatory environment for public–private partnerships, particularly in infrastructure, operationalization of bilateral agreements on investment promotion and protection between India and African Countries and support to the development of capacities in the Chambers of Commerce in Africa, would be among the new priorities to be pursued.

African countries have found the India–Africa Project Partnership Conclaves to be useful vehicles for bringing Indian and African entrepreneurs and decision makers together. These would be continued.

iii. Small and Medium Enterprises

As Africa moves towards more rapid industrialization, there is a growing recognition that small, medium and micro enterprises offer significant avenues for supporting industrialization, generating employment and enhancing local capacities. Institutional support for the development of SMEs in Africa will be provided through the vocational training centres offered by India and the linkages between SMEs on both sides through the Conclaves and other activities by Chambers of Commerce and Industry. Africa and India will continue to work together on such initiatives, particularly to support the creation of entrepreneurship development and

business incubators in Africa. It is the common endeavour of both that in the capacity building initiatives to be undertaken in the future, support to the private sector would be an integral part of the new efforts.

iv. Finance

One of the salient features of the first Africa–India Forum Summit and its Action Plan was the commitment by India for new financial flows to assist African countries in the true spirit of South–South Cooperation. Besides the grants for establishing capacity-building institutions in Africa, there was an important commitment for concessional lines of credit to support the economic development of African countries and for regional integration. These have been augmented by significant private sector flows through FDI into Africa. Both Africa and India will work together to enhance the efficacy and spread of these financial flows so that the common objectives are fully met. India remains committed to supporting Africa with concessional lines of credit and suitable grants for mutually beneficial projects. Greater efforts will be made to utilize these flows for regional integration projects.

There would be an increasing focus to enhance engagement between African and Indian financial institutions and an encouragement for closer relationship between commercial banks in Africa and India. Encouragement will be provided to the opening of branches of Indian banks in Africa and African banks in India to participate in the growing matrix of financial flows between Africa and India.

v. Regional Integration

Africa and India reiterate the importance of the Regional Economic Communities in Africa and their contribution to economic integration within themselves and in Africa. India has an important engagement with the Regional Economic Communities of Africa as part of its multi-tiered cooperation. Both Africa and India recall the first ever meeting of India with the African RECs held in November 2010. In recognition of this, both Africa and India agree to build capacities for effectively carrying out the implementation of the integration agenda among the Regional Economic Communities, including in providing financial support to regional integration projects and capacity-building programmes among the RECs.

2. Political Operation

Africa and India are conscious of the important role they play in the world and agree to intensify political cooperation. Their common endeavour will be to continue to strive for peace and security as such harmonious policies will allow the fructification of the enhanced agenda of cooperation currently agreed upon. In this respect, the African Union would consider, as soon as possible, the establishment of an office in New Delhi, India, as recognition of the close partnership that exists between Africa and India.

i. Peace and Security

Peace and Security are essential to progress and sustainable development, which are common goals for Africa and India. Both Africa and India will continue their close cooperation, including through regular consultations at the United Nations, at the African Union and in New Delhi. Both will work towards an early operationalization of the African Standby Force through special training programmes.

ii. Civil Society and Governance

Africa and India recognize the importance of democratic governance and of promoting and protecting human rights. They also recognize the importance of decentralization, the promotion of local government and the need to strengthen the institutions of parliamentary democracy and elections. They agree to enhance cooperation by sharing of experiences and capacity building, where necessary, among Election Commissions, the institutions of parliamentary democracy and media organizations. They also agree to cooperate in the strengthening of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights through sharing of best practices and capacity building of the court. Africa and India will also encourage interaction of legal experts/lawyers through the Bar Associations. They will also exchange experiences on best practices, research and human resources within the framework of decentralization and local governance alongside the Conference of Ministers of Public Services and Administration and ECOSOCC.

3. Cooperation in Science, Technology, Research and Development

The development of science and technology and research capacities is an integral part of the process of development. Africa greatly values the progress made by India in its scientific and technological development and believes that it can engage with India in these sectors, especially knowledge and technology transfer for mutual benefit. Africa and India are convinced that harnessing the knowledge economy can make hunger and want things of the past. They agree to intensify cooperation in the following areas:

i. Science and Technology

Africa welcomes the establishment of the Special Agricultural Scholarship Scheme and the Special Science and Technology Fellowship Scheme (CV Raman Fellowships) under the provisions of IAFS-I and looks forward to continuing this engagement to build scientific and technological human resource in Africa, including through the Pan-African University for which Africa has requested India, to be the Lead Partner in the Life and Earth Sciences segment. Management of natural disasters, combating desertification and support to scientific institutions in Africa would continue. Initiatives to enhance linkages between scientific institutions in Africa and India would be undertaken and training on health related issues like HIV, TB and Malaria will be explored. The African–Indian Science and Technology Conference will also be organized.

ii. Information and Communication Technology

Africa has immense regard and admiration for the strides made by India in the development of its information and communications technology. The contribution of the Government of India towards developing the infrastructure and the resourcefulness of the private sector and India’s scientific and technological manpower in allowing this sector to make important contributions to the growth of GDP in India, are well recognized in Africa. Africa and India recognize the importance of an early introduction of information and communication technologies as key enablers of capacity building for youth and for poverty eradication and accelerated growth. Africa recognizes the important contribution made by the Pan-African E-Network Project to African countries in achieving these objectives and both Africa and India commit themselves to taking the lessons of the implementation and efficacy of the Pan-African E-Network Project further, so that the digital divide can be bridged and the socio-economic benefits of ICT can be harnessed for their mutual objectives.

4. Cooperation in Social Development and Capacity Building

Africa and India both recognize the importance of capacity building, particularly as both are young societies and want to translate the demographic dividend into effective growth. The successful utilization of the ITEC programme offered by India has been a manifestation of the South–South Cooperation that effectively exists between Africa and India. The enhancement of scholarships and training positions under the ITEC programme, as well as the creation of new courses for training of African nationals in specified areas, all emerge from the Action Plan of the Framework of Cooperation of IAFS-I. Africa and India would endeavour to continue to take these important initiatives forward together. India is committed to their enhancement.

Africa has been appreciative of the 21 new capacity-building institutions which India is in the process of establishing in Africa in diverse sectors. These will greatly assist African human resource development for the development of industries and the service sector to contribute to growth. Both India and Africa will continue to strive to have an early conclusion of the implementation of the process to establish these new institutions in close collaboration between the Indian implementing agencies, the host governments and the African Union. They will make efforts to have effective governance strategies and business plans for these institutions to make them sustainable. India remains committed to further enhancement of this approach of building African capacities in Africa.

Pan-Africa E-Network Project: Africa and India have both recognized the successful implementation of this visionary project. It has added capacity and value in the critical fields of education and health care in African countries. Its fulsome utilization will remain one of the major objectives of the Framework of Enhanced Cooperation and efforts will be made to enhance its utilization, widen its scope and increase its success rate so that the true objectives of assisting Africa in meeting its millennium development goals on education and health could be achieved.

Africa and India will continue to work together to increase exchanges in education, health, water and sanitation, culture and sports and poverty eradication through innovative new programmes as well as commit themselves to effective implementation of programmes agreed upon earlier in the Action Plan for the Framework of Cooperation. Special care would be taken to encourage greater investment in some of these sectors as well as to increase financial flows from the government sector to achieve these objectives. India is committed to continue with increasing number of scholarships both for undergraduate and postgraduate studies including in specialized areas like agriculture, science and technology and other priorities listed in this Framework for Enhanced Cooperation.

5. Cooperation in Health, Culture and Sports

(a) Health

In the area of health, Africa and India reiterate their conviction that the promotion of health is critical in the development of the human capital necessary to drive socio-economic growth. They look forward to the outputs and recommendations of the India–Africa workshop on Traditional medicine to be held in India and undertake to implement the outcome. They reaffirm their commitment to enhance collaboration in the application of advancement in science, technology, research and development to training in the area of HIV, TB and Malaria; the provision of basic medical services in rural areas, the deployment of Telecoms and ICTs in support of telemedicine and e-health applications; strengthening of public–private sector collaboration in the areas of pharmaceutical and procurement in Africa and India in the framework of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Plan for Africa, the fight against counterfeit medicines.

They also undertake to pursue dialogue on intellectual property rights and access to medicines; research and development in traditional medicine and practices in Africa and India; sharing of experiences, specialized expertise and best practices in healthcare systems development and community health programmes; support for Africa’s Campaign on Accelerated Reduction of Maternal Mortality in Africa (CARMMA); and training and continuing education for health professionals;

(b) Culture

Noting the role that Culture can play in the development and integration of their societies, specifically through the use of creative and cultural industries, Africa and India agree to collaborate in the development of cultural policies and will undertake the following: Exchange of experiences in the area of the development of creative industries and cultural goods so as to increase the contribution of culture to the development of their nations and collaborate in the organization of international training for trainers in the field of cultural goods protection.

(c) Sports

Considering the paramount role that sports can play in the development and integration of their societies, specifically through the use of sports as a tool for

development and desirous to advocate for well-designed sports and play programmes, as powerful tools for fostering health, child and individual development, teaching positive values and life skills, strengthening education and improving health and well being; Africa and India agree to collaborate in the development of sports policies; exchange of experiences in the area of the development of sports and the training of trainers in the field of qualified sports personnel;

5. Cooperation in Tourism

Africa and India are deeply conscious of their age-old ties at the people-to-people level. As neighbours across the Indian Ocean, Africa and India are in favour of providing greater connectivity between the countries of Africa and India and to increase the level of popular exchanges. Tourism and connectivity remain important areas which could provide economic benefits and also contribute to enhance mutual understanding. Africa and India therefore, agree to strengthen partnership with the private sector especially, travel agencies, hotels, airlines and other tourism related establishments, as well as the media, and take other necessary steps that will enable harmonization of policies and norms in tourism with a view to advancing tourism development between the two sides.

6. Cooperation in Infrastructure, Energy and Environment

Africa and India, fully cognizant of the immense requirements of dealing with issues pertaining to infrastructure, energy and environment, reiterate their commitment to focus on these areas, particularly in the context of sustainable development as important areas of cooperation. They dedicate themselves to fulfilling programmes established under the Action Plan and to look at enhanced engagement in areas such as the continental NEPAD-identified infrastructure projects and PIDA, particularly with regard to increasing financial flows to these sectors. This will provide a better environment for greater investment in these sectors. They agree to work closely together in the interest of developing countries to set an appropriate international agenda to benefit the development of both Africa and India. Efforts will be made to give more attention to new areas like new and renewable energies through training programmes and capacity building as well as in sustainable environmental practices. The concessional credit flows from India would be channelled in a wider manner into infrastructure projects. They agree to cooperate in the area of environment, including desertification and support for Africa's Great Green Wall project.

7. Cooperation in the Area of Media and Communications

The successful implementation of the decisions of the first Africa–India Forum Summit emanating from the Framework Cooperation and its Action Plan have brought qualitative change into the existing relationship between Africa and India. The depth and diversity of the relationship has significantly altered and the traditional engagement has successfully moved towards a modern functional partnership. However, there remains an uneven recognition of this, particularly in

the public mind which requires to be addressed. At the same time, Africa needs greater opportunities to bring its own media and communications to an independent growth path in recognition of its multicultural and multi-ethnic identities.

Africa and India therefore agree to promote a larger number of visits between African and Indian editors and journalists, academicians, scholars and civil society representatives, so that closer interaction envisaged in this Framework for Enhanced Cooperation can be suitably disseminated. In this respect, consideration will be given to the training of African media personnel with a view to capacity building and improving their skills.

Without prejudice to India's ongoing and future programmes at the bilateral, REC and other levels, it is agreed to jointly revise, within a period of 6 months, the Joint Plan of Action to fully reflect the Africa–India Framework for Enhanced Cooperation. This Joint Plan of Action will also incorporate a follow-up mechanism which will ensure the effective implementation of programmes and activities agreed in the Plan.

Done at Addis Ababa, this 25 May 2011.

B.1 Second Africa–India Forum Summit 2011 Addis Ababa Declaration, 25 May 2011

- We, the Heads of State and Government and Heads of Delegation representing the Continent of Africa, the African Union (AU) and its Institutions, and the Prime Minister of the Republic of India, have met in Addis Ababa, Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, from 24 to 25 May 2011, to continue our dialogue, deepen our friendship and enhance our cooperation, under the theme: Enhancing Partnership: Shared Vision.
- We recall the Delhi Declaration adopted during our First Summit in New Delhi in April 2008 and the Framework of Cooperation and the associated Plan agreed upon thereafter as providing a concrete foundation for the consolidation of our strategic partnership and also reviewed the progress made in this regard since the First Summit. We also recall that Africa and India have been fraternal partners and allies in the struggle for independence and achievement of self-determination. We reaffirm that our partnership remains based on the fundamental principles of equality, mutual respect, mutual benefit and the historical understanding amongst our peoples.
- We further agree that this partnership will continue to be guided by the principles of respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of States; commitment to deepen the process of African integration, dialogue among our civilizations to promote a culture of peace, tolerance and respect for religious, cultural and human rights, as well as gender equality, with a view to strengthening the trust and understanding between our peoples; recognition of diversity

and levels of development between and within regions; collective action and cooperation for the common good of our States and peoples and our desire to nurture harmonious development in our plural, multicultural and multi-ethnic societies through the consolidation and development of our plural democracy.

- We welcome the continuing transformation of the political, economic and social environment in Africa. Economic growth in Africa has revived to levels that existed before the financial crisis and many African counties are progressing rapidly, opening greater avenues for economic cooperation. Similarly, India's economy continues to develop into one of the world's growth nodes and has withstood the impact of the global recession well. Both Africa and India have young, dynamic populations with great expectations, drive and initiative. We recognize that their aspirations and vigour provide a concrete basis for expanding the frontiers of this partnership as an agenda for development. Africa and India therefore, have today a good platform to expand our partnership for development on the basis of these fundamentals.
- We have thus decided to enhance our partnership with new initiatives for the mutual benefit of Africa and India. In recent years, this has included substantial financial flows from India to Africa in terms of grants, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and concessional loans that continue to contribute to capacity building in the socio-economic sectors, particularly in the human resource development, the development of the private sector, increasing support to infrastructure, agriculture and SMEs, leading to a substantial expansion of Indian investment in Africa and of trade between Africa and India. We agree, to build upon this by assisting each other to achieve inclusive growth, socio-economic development and self-reliance. Areas for such cooperation will include sharing strategies for sustainable development, poverty alleviation, healthcare and universal education, and sharing appropriate technologies. These new avenues for cooperation will enable us to add strategic depth to our partnership.
- Our partnership enhances our ability to work together and address the global challenges of our times. In addressing these challenges, Africa and India continue to reiterate their intention to ensure that the interests of developing counties are safeguarded and that socio-economic development requirements of our various counties are guaranteed.
- We urge the developed counties to take ambitious actions to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and also provide adequate financing and transfer of technology to support developing counties efforts to effectively address the impact of climate change. We reaffirm the importance of reaching an agreement on a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol as an indispensable step to preserve the integrity of the international climate change regime. We stress the importance of the Bali Action Plan of 2007 worked out under the aegis of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in this regard. We notice the positive aspects of the Cancun Conference Climate Change negotiations in December 2010 and appeal to the developed counties to operationalize all the institutional arrangements included in the Cancun decisions. We express our firm commitment to a balanced outcome from the climate

change negotiations which are commensurate with the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities on the basis of respective capabilities, in the process of COP17 which will be held in Durban, South Africa.

- We take note of the African common position on Climate Change and support efforts towards combating drought and desertification in Africa, as well as support for Africa's Great Green Wall Project.
- We affirm the critical importance of South–South cooperation as an instrument that can effectively supplement existing international efforts and lead to tangible and real benefits for developing countries. We stress that South–South Cooperation should be a supplement to North–South Cooperation and not a substitute for it. We recognize that significant diversity prevails among individual countries in Africa, about thirty three (33) of which are listed among the Least Developed Countries. Collectively, these countries confront some of the most persistent, pervasive and complex development challenges. Accordingly, we will explore new and innovative ways to supplement the mainstream effort to assist these developing countries and look for out-of-the-box solutions.
- We remain concerned with the recurrent trend of increasing global crisis that are of economic nature, such as the global food, energy and financial crisis. While recognizing the current economic recovery, we are still concerned with its sustainability. We underline the importance of supporting stable, long-term capital flows to developing countries to stimulate investment, especially in infrastructure. This will help enhance global demand, thus securing the long-term sustainability of the recovery and address developmental imbalances.
- We urge major economies to work together and enhance macroeconomic policy coordination. In this context, we acknowledge the G20 process as an important forum for international economic cooperation, and request fair representation of Africa in the evolving architecture of decision-making process in the global economic system.
- We reiterate the importance of the UN Millennium Declaration and the need to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). We reaffirm our commitment to achieving the MDGs by 2015, including through technical cooperation and financial support. Sustainable development models and unique paths of development in developing countries should be respected, including by guaranteeing the policy space of developing countries. We urge that aid commitments for developing countries must be fulfilled and that development assistance should not be reduced. We urge the developed countries to fulfill their obligations of achieving the target of 0.7 % GNI as Official Development Assistance (ODA) to developing countries. We also support African economic programmes within the context of Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), and Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP).
- We underscore the need for a comprehensive and balanced outcome of the Doha Round, in a manner that gives weight to its mandate as a “development round”, based on progress already made. We reiterate the need for continuing solidarity between developing countries in this regard. We affirm the importance of

ensuring that an acceptable agreement adequately protects the concerns of developing countries with regard to livelihood, food security and rural development. Equally, concerns need to be addressed on Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) services and rules. We urge all parties to oppose all forms of protectionism and trade-distorting domestic support. We remain concerned that no significant progress has been achieved in key issues of interest to developing countries including India and those of Africa and therefore call, once more, on key players in the Doha Round to give priority to resolving all issues of critical concern to developing countries, especially regarding negotiation on agriculture.

- We affirm our commitment to multilateralism and to strengthening the democratic structure of the United Nations (UN) to increase the participation of developing countries in decision-making processes. We emphasize the need for enhanced Africa–India cooperation at the UN, the G-77 and other multilateral fora, to foster common purpose in addressing areas of mutual concern. In the context of issues relating to international peace and security, we commend efforts made by the African Union Peace and Security Council in maintaining peace in Africa. Africa recalls, with appreciation, India's principled support to and continuing involvement with UN peacekeeping operations, especially in the African continent, India appreciates the role of African countries in maintaining peace and security in the Continent and their participation in peacekeeping missions in other parts of the world. It also commends Africa on its development of the African Standby Force, which will enhance the continent's capacity to maintain peace and security.
- We take note of UN Security Council resolutions 1970 and 1973 on Libya and stress that efforts to implement them should be within the spirit and letter of those resolutions. In this regard, we call for an immediate cessation of all hostilities in Libya and urge the parties in the conflict to strive towards a political solution through peaceful means and dialogue. We express support for the African Union High-Level Ad Hoc Committee initiative and the African Union roadmap for the peaceful and consensual resolution of the conflict.
- Based on the strong partnership between Africa and India on international issues relating to peace and security, Africa welcomes India's election to a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council for the years 2011–2012. India expresses its appreciation for the support of African States in this election in October 2010. The African members of the UN Security Council and India affirm their commitment to coordinate closely during India's tenure in the Council.
- In this context, we underscore the imperative of urgent and comprehensive reform of the UN system. We share the view that the UN should function in a transparent, efficient and effective manner and that the composition of its central organs must reflect contemporary realities. The expansion of the UN Security Council, in permanent and non-permanent categories of membership, with increased participation of developing countries in both categories, is central to the process of reform and for enhancing the credibility of the United Nations.

- India notes the common African position and the aspirations of the African countries to get their rightful place in an expanded UN Security Council as new permanent members with full rights as contained in the Ezulwini Consensus. Africa takes note of India's position and its aspirations to become a permanent member with full rights in an expanded UN Security Council. We emphasize the need for Member States to exert utmost effort on the United Nations Security Council reform during the current session of the United Nations General Assembly.
- We recognize that the security of all nations would be enhanced by a global, non-discriminatory and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. We reaffirm our commitment to the consensus in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on Disarmament, which accorded priority to nuclear disarmament. We also express support for an International Convention Prohibiting the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Nuclear Weapons, leading to their destruction. We call for negotiating specific steps to reduce and finally eliminate nuclear weapons, leading to a world free from all weapons of mass destruction as envisaged in the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan of 1988. We also look forward to the commencement of negotiations on the Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons and Other Nuclear Explosive Devices in the Conference on Disarmament.
- We welcome the entry into force in July 2009, of the Africa Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (the Pelindaba Treaty) of 1995 and the efforts towards the operationalization of the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (ACNE) in November 2010, which, among others, will promote the peaceful application of nuclear energy and technology within Member States.
- We stress the importance of addressing the threat posed by illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons through full implementation of the UN Programme of Action on SALWs and welcome the African Union's efforts towards that end.
- We unequivocally condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. An act of terrorism anywhere is a threat to the entire international community. We recognize the need to further strengthen international cooperation to combat global terrorism and for compliance of all member states with all international terrorism conventions and related protocols and UN Security Council resolutions on counterterrorism. We call on all States to cooperate with each other in prosecuting, extraditing and rendering legal assistance with regard to acts of international terrorism. In this connection, we deplore the tragic losses arising from terrorist attacks and call for the active prosecution of the authors of such crimes and their accomplices, and urge that they be brought to justice expeditiously. We further call on all countries to ensure that acts of cross-border terrorism do not occur, and that their territories are not made a base for terrorists. We strongly condemn kidnapping and hostage taking as well as the demands for ransom and political concessions by terrorist groups. We express serious concern at the increase in such incidents. Taking note of the African position on the

condemnation of the payment of ransom to terrorist groups, we call for the urgent need to address this issue. We also agree to work to expeditiously finalize and adopt, a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism at the UN. We underscore the need to strengthen the implementation of AU mechanisms to prevent and combat terrorism.

- We further stress the importance of addressing the threat posed by piracy off the Coast of Somalia and suffering caused by taking of hostages, and call on all States to cooperate in combating and eradicating the menace of piracy. In this context, Africa welcomes India's support to efforts to safeguard shipping in the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean from piracy.
- We also pledge to work to eradicate drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings, especially women and children, organized crime and money laundering. In this regard, we call on all States to ratify and implement all relevant International Instruments relating to these crimes.
- We have reviewed, with satisfaction, the progress made in the implementation of the Africa–India Framework of Cooperation and note in this regard, the 4-year Plan of Action adopted in March 2010. Work is moving apace on the various elements of this Plan of Action, including the establishment of 21 capacity building institutions in various countries of Africa. India is committed to substantially contribute to building African capacities through supporting education and capacity-building institutions and in enhancing value addition and processing of raw materials in Africa. Africa appreciates the Duty Free Tariff Preference Scheme offered by India and believes it has the potential to increase African exports to India.
- We stress that cooperation between Africa and India, as emerging from the First Africa–India Forum Summit, has been a true manifestation of South–South Cooperation. Our Endeavour to find new ways of energizing our partnership by taking into account the emerging capabilities in Africa and India has found sustenance in the implementation of the Action Plan of our Framework of Cooperation. We deeply appreciate the implementation of the initiatives that Africa and India took since the first India–Africa Forum Summit in April 2008, in New Delhi. We also laud the further initiatives that have been announced by the Prime Minister of India at the Second Africa–India Forum Summit in Addis Ababa in May 2011. India, on the other hand, welcomes the new spirit of association that has facilitated these initiatives.
- Our Agreement that Africa and India will go beyond bilateral linkages to strengthen partnerships with the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities of Africa, have borne fruit. The level of interaction between India and the African Union has increased manifold, particularly with the implementation of new AIFS initiatives after the success of the Pan-African E-Network Project. The relationships with the Regional Economic Communities have also been strengthened and India's initiative to invite Africa's Regional Economic Communities for a meeting in November 2010 was appreciated. The multi-tiered functional engagement which India has with Africa is a model for multilateral engagements around the world.

- We also welcome the positive results of efforts to promote trade and investment, human resource development and infrastructure development in Africa. We commit ourselves to involving the private sector and civil society in Africa and India to widen the scope of our partnership.
- We note with satisfaction that Trade Ministers from African countries and India met on 21 May, 2011 in Addis Ababa and take note of the Joint Statement issued by the Trade Ministers and lend our support to the ideas enunciated therein as indicators of our future cooperation. We appreciate that the Ministers had an in-depth discussion on the economic engagement between Africa and India, including the Duty Free Tariff Preference Scheme of India, cluster development initiatives and the identification of priority sectors of partnership. We also note with satisfaction the initiatives taken by the Trade Ministers in the establishment of Trade and Investment linkages between India and Africa and welcome the constitution of the India–Africa Business Council as well as the constitution of the annual India–Africa Trade Ministers’ Dialogue. We acknowledge the common platform shared by India and Africa in the WTO Doha Round and reiterate the core principles of Special and Differential (S&D) Treatment and obtaining more preferential treatment for all LDCs.
- We recognize that this Second Africa–India Forum Summit will help to realize our common vision of a self-reliant and economically vibrant Africa and India. We are committed to work together towards a peaceful and more egalitarian international order, where the voices of Africa and India can be heard to pursue their desire for inclusive development, both internationally and domestically. Africa is determined to partner in India’s economic resurgence as India is committed to be a close partner in Africa’s renaissance.
- We agree to add further substance to our Framework of Cooperation and to broaden exchanges to cover all facets of our relationship. We adopt, in this context, the Africa–India Framework for Enhanced Cooperation to supplement the existing Framework. We agree to institutionalize this Summit process. Accordingly, we agree that the next India–Africa Forum Summit will be held in 2014 in India.
- The Prime Minister of India expresses his appreciation to the African Union Commission for hosting the Summit and to the Government and people of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia for the hospitality extended to his delegation and to all participating leaders. The African leaders also express their appreciation to the Prime Minister of India for his participation.

Appendix C

Lines of Credit to Africa

Table C.1 List of Operational EXIM Bank LOC's

Borrower	Amount of credit (USD mn)	Purpose	Tenor	Terminal dates for utilization		Amount available for utilization (USD mn)
				Opening of L/C	Disbursement	
Central Bank of Djibouti, Djibouti	10.00	General purpose	Upto 10 years	13.01.2007	31.12.2008	–
Banque Ouest Africaine De Development (West African Development Bank)	10.00 (equivalent Euros)	General purpose	Upto 7 years	30.09.2011	31.03.2012	10.00 (equivalent Euros)
Government of Sudan	50.00	General purpose	Upto 11 years	30.06.2008	30.06.2008	0.12
Government of Angola	40.00	Railway rehabilitation	Upto 20 years	23.09.2006	22.09.2008	–
Government of Mozambique	20.00	General purpose	Upto 20 years	24.01.2008	24.07.2008	0.02
Government of Lesotho	5.00	General purpose	Upto 15 years	31.01.2007	31.07.2007	0.02
Government of Senegal	17.87	Supply of buses and spares from India	Upto 20 years	08.02.2007	08.08.2007	–
Government of Djibouti	14.00	Cement plant	Upto 10 years	–	@	–
Government of Cote d'Ivoire	26.80	Project for renewal of urban transport system in Abidjan and for agricultural projects in the field of vegetable oil extraction, fruits and vegetable chips production, production of cocoa, coffee, etc.	Upto 20 years	–	@	–

(continued)

Table C.1 (continued)

Borrower	Amount of credit (USD mn)	Purpose	Tenor	Terminal dates for utilization		Amount available for utilization (USD mn)
				Opening of L/C	Disbursement	
Government of Mali	27.00	Rural electrification and setting up of agro-machinery and tractor assembly plant in mali	Upto 20 years	–	@	–
Government of Ghana	27.00	Rural electrification, agriculture, communication and transportation projects	Upto 20 years		@	0.04
Government of Ghana	60.00	Rural electrification project and construction of presidential office	Upto 20 years		@	–
Government of D.R. Congo	33.50	Setting up a cement factory in D.R. Congo, acquisition of buses and acquisition of equipments for MIBA (US\$2 mn)	Upto 20 years		@	–
Government of Chad	50.00	Setting up of cotton yam plant, steel billet plant and rolling mill, plant for assembly of agricultural equipment and bicycle plant	Upto 20 years	–	@	–
Government of Senegal and Mali (combined)	27.70	Acquisition of railway coaches and locomotives from India	Upto 20 years		@	0.03
Government of Burkina Faso	30.00	Agricultural projects including acquisition of tractors, harvesters, agricultural processing equipment and construction of national post office	Upto 20 years	–	@	0.58
Government of Gambia	6.70	Tractor assembly plant project	Upto 20 years		@	–

(continued)

Table C.1 (continued)

Borrower	Amount of credit (USD mn)	Purpose	Tenor	Terminal dates for utilization		Amount available for utilization (USD mn)
				Opening of L/C	Disbursement	
Government of Sudan	350.00	Project for setting up 4 × 125 MW Kosti combined cycle power plant in Sudan	Upto 12 years	–	@	–
Government of Sudan	41.90	SINGA-GEDARIF transmission and substation project	Upto 13 years		@	0.03
Government of Senegal	27.00	Irrigation project	Upto 20 years	–	@	–
Government of Niger	17.00	Acquisition of buses, trucks, tractors, motor pumps and flour mills	Upto 20 years		@	–
Government of Ethiopia	65.00	Energy transmission and distribution project	Upto 20 years		@	–
ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID)	250.00	Public sector projects	Upto 20 years		@	18.25
Government of Seychelles	8.00	General purpose	Upto 8 years	24.04.2013	24.04.2013	0.44
Government of Mozambique	20.00	Gaza electrification project	Upto 20 years		@	0.05
Government of Guinea Bissau	25.00	Electricity project, mango juice and tomato paste processing unit and purchase of tractors and water pumps for development of the agricultural sector	Upto 20 years		@	0.16
Government of Senegal	11.00	Women poverty alleviation programme and acquisition of vehicles from India	Upto 20 years		@	–

(continued)

Table C.1 (continued)

Borrower	Amount of credit (USD mn)	Purpose	Tenor	Terminal dates for utilization		Amount available for utilization (USD mn)
				Opening of L/C	Disbursement	
Government of Sudan	48.00	(i) Supply of agricultural inputs for the Sudanese Agricultural Bank, (ii) Technical and laboratory equipment to higher educational institutions, (iii) Scientific equipments for ministry of science and technology, (iv) Solar electrification and (v) Meeting requirement of Sudan Railways	Upto 20 years		@	0.90
Government of Djibouti	10.00	Cement plant project	Upto 10 years		@	–
Government of Mali	30.00	Electricity transmission and distribution project from Cote d'Ivoire to mali	Upto 20 years	–	@	–
Government of Senegal	10.00	IT training projects	Upto 20 years		@	–
Government of Sudan	52.00	Singa-Gadarif transmission line extension to Galabat, micro-industrial projects and development of livestock production and services	Upto 12 years		@	14.56
Government of Mali	45.00	Electricity transmission and distribution project from Cote d'Ivoire to mali	Upto 20 years		@	–
Government of Ethiopia	122.00	Development of sugar industry	Upto 20 years		@	–
Government of Rwanda	20.00	Power projects	Upto 20 years		@	–
Government of Gabon	14.50	Housing project	Upto 12 years		@	–

(continued)

Table C.1 (continued)

Borrower	Amount of credit (USD mn)	Purpose	Tenor	Terminal dates for utilization		Amount available for utilization (USD mn)
				Opening of L/C	Disbursement	
African Export Import Bank (AfreximBank)	30.00	General purpose	Upto 5 years	21.09.2013	21.03. 2014	30.00
Government of Malawi	30.00	Supply of irrigation, storage, tobacco threshing plant and one village-one project in Malawi	Upto 20 years		@	–
Government of Mozambique	20.00	Transfer of water drilling technology and equipment	Upto 20 years		@	–
Government of Cote d'Ivoire	25.50	(I) Mahatma Gandhi IT and biotechnology park, (ii) Fisheries processing plant and (iii) Coconut fibre processing plant	Upto 20 years		@	20.00
Government of Gambia	10.00	Construction of national assembly building complex	Upto 20 years		@	–
Government of Ghana	25.00	Track materials, tools and equipment, procurement of high capacity mineral wagons and spares, Procurement of covered wagons, Spares of low capacity mineral wagons, flat trucks/buses, and Foundry materials, Communication and Technology (ICT) and Good Governance project, and Agro-Processing Plant	Upto 20 years		@	5.00
Government of Senegal	25.00	Rural electrification project and fishing industry development project	Upto 20 years		@	–

(continued)

Table C.1 (continued)

Borrower	Amount of credit (USD mn)	Purpose	Tenor	Terminal dates for utilization		Amount available for utilization (USD mn)
				Opening of L/C	Disbursement	
Government of Niger	20.00	(a) Rehabilitation of six power stations (b) Purchase of three power transformers (c) Rehabilitation as well as erection of power lines between various places in Niger	Upto 20 years		@	–
Government of Central African Republic	29.50	Setting up a modern dry process cement plant of 400 TPD capacity and procurement of 100 buses for internal transport	Upto 20 years		@	–
Government of Madagascar	25.00	Project for rice productivity and project for fertilizer production	Upto 20 years		@	–
Government of Sierra Leone	15.00	Procurement of tractors and connected implements, harvesters, rice threshers, rice mills, maize shellers and pesticide soarat equipment	Upto 20 years		@	0.26
Government of Mozambique	25.00	To finance IT Park Project which will comprise construction of building and (a) incubator facility, (b) research and learning centre and (c) technology park and administrative facility	Upto 20 years		@	–
Government of Ethiopia	166.23	Development of sugar industry	Upto 20 years		@	–
Government of Sudan	25.00	Eldeum sugar project at White Nile State	Upto 20 years		@	–
Government of Burkina Faso	25.00	Rural electrification	Upto 20 years		@	–

(continued)

Table C.1 (continued)

Borrower	Amount of credit (USD mn)	Purpose	Tenor	Terminal dates for utilization		Amount available for utilization (USD mn)
				Opening of L/C	Disbursement	
Government of Cameroon	37.65	Maize farm plantation projects and rice farm plantation projects	Upto 20 years		@	0.19
Government of Mozambique	30.00	Rural electrification projects in the provinces of Gaza, Zambezia and Nampula in Mozambique	Upto 20 years		@	–
Government of Tanzania	40.00	Export of tractors, pumps and equipments from India to Tanzania	Upto 20 years		@	–
Government of Eritrea	20.00	Multipurpose agricultural projects and educational projects	Upto 15 years		@	–
Government of D.R. Congo	25.00	Installation of hand pumps and submersible pumps	Upto 20 years		@	0.01
Government of Mali	36.00	Completion of Mali-Ivory Coast interconnection link for integrating the national power grids of both the countries	Upto 20 years		@	–
Government of Mali	15.00	Agriculture and food processing projects	Upto 20 years		@	–
Government of Benin	15.00	Purchase of railway equipment (US \$10.25 mn), agricultural equipment (US \$4.25 mn) and feasibility study for setting up a cyber city in Benin (US \$0.50 mn)	Upto 20 years		@	0.07
Government of Cote d'Ivoire	30.00	Electricity interconnection project between Cote d'Ivoire and Mali	Upto 20 years		@	–
Government of Zambia	50.00	Itezhi-Tezhi Hydro power project	Upto 20 years		@	20.97
Government of Rwanda	60.00	Power projects	Upto 20 years		@	–

(continued)

Table C.1 (continued)

Borrower	Amount of credit (USD mn)	Purpose	Tenor	Terminal dates for utilization		Amount available for utilization (USD mn)
				Opening of L/C	Disbursement	
Government of Mauritania	21.80	Potable water project and milk processing plant	Upto 20 years		@	5.60
Government of Sierra Leone	30.00	Rehabilitation of existing facilities and addition of new infrastructure to supply potable water	Upto 20 years		@	–
Government of Lesotho	4.70	Vocational training centre for empowerment of youth and women	Upto 15 years		@	0.66
Government of Senegal	5.00	Supply of medical equipments, furniture and other accessories to 4 hospitals	Upto 20 years		@	–
Government of Cote d'Ivoire	30.00	Rice production programme	Upto 20 years		@	0.77
Government of Ghana	21.72	Improved fish harvesting and fish processing project and waste management equipment and management support project	Upto 20 years		@	2.63
Government of Mozambique	25.00	Rural electrification project of Cabo Delgado, Manica and Niassa Provinces	Upto 20 years		@	–
Government of Angola	15.00	Setting up a textile project (cotton ginning and spinning)	Upto 15 years		@	–
Government of Angola	30.00	Setting up an industrial park	Upto 15 years		@	–
Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank (PTA Bank)	25.00	General purpose	Upto 5 years	24.08.2013	24.2.2014	25.00
Government of D.R. Congo	42.00	Execution of Kakobola hydroelectric power project	Upto 20 years		@	0.31

(continued)

Table C.1 (continued)

Borrower	Amount of credit (USD mn)	Purpose	Tenor	Terminal dates for utilization		Amount available for utilization (USD mn)
				Opening of L/C	Disbursement	
Government of Kenya	61.60	Power transmission lines	Upto 20 years		@	–
ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID)	100.00	Public sector projects	Upto 20 years		@	60.31
Indo-Zambia Bank	5.00	General purpose	Upto 5 years		@	5.00
Government of Ethiopia	213.31	Sugar industry rehabilitation in Ethiopia	Upto 20 years		@	3.63
Government of Mauritius	48.50	Supply of offshore patrol vessel	Upto 10 years		@	–
Government of Malawi	50.00	Cotton processing facilities (US\$ 20 mn), green belt initiative (US \$15 mn) one village one product (OVOP) (US\$ 15 mn)	Upto 20 years		@	0.08
Government of Ethiopia	91.00	Sugar projects	Upto 20 years		@	–
Government of Mozambique	20.00	Enhancing productivity of rice–wheat–maize cultivation	Upto 20 years		@	–
Government of Tanzania	36.56	Financing the purchase of 723 vehicles	Upto 20 years		@	–
Government of Swaziland	20.00	Setting up of an information technology park in Swaziland	Upto 10 years		@	–
Government of Senegal	27.50	Financing the rural electrification project	Upto 20 years		@	3.01
Government of Burundi	80.00	Financing the Kabu hydroelectric project in Burundi	Upto 20 years		@	0.26
Government of D.R. Congo	168.00	Financing Ketende hydroelectric project in the D.R. Congo	Upto 20 years		@	0.05
ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID)	150.00	Export of goods and services and project exports	Upto 20 years		@	150.00

(continued)

Table C.1 (continued)

Borrower	Amount of credit (USD mn)	Purpose	Tenor	Terminal dates for utilization		Amount available for utilization (USD mn)
				Opening of L/C	Disbursement	
Government of Maldives	40.00	Construction of 500 housing units in the Maldives	Upto 20 years		@	0.02
Government of Mozambique	13.00	Financing a solar photo voltaic module manufacturing plant in Mozambique	Upto 20 years		@	-
Government of Togo	15.00	Rural electrification project in Togo	Upto 20 years		@	0.04
Nigerian Exim Bank	20.00	General purpose	Upto 5 years		@	20.00
Government of Republic of Congo	70.00	Rural electrification project in Republic of Congo	Upto 20 years		@	0.53
Government of Mali	100.00	Financing a power transmission project connecting Bamako and Sikasso via Bougouni in Mali.	Upto 20 years		@	100.00
Government of Togo	13.10	Financing farming and cultivation of rice, maize and sorghum in Togo	Upto 20 years		@	0.11
Government of Central African Republic	20.00	Financing a mining project in Central African Republic	Upto 20 years		@	-
Government of Central African Republic	39.69	Financial two hydroelectric projects in Central African Republic	Upto 20 years		@	39.69
Government of Zambia	50.00	For prefabricated health posts in Zambia	Upto 20 years		@	-
Government of Ethiopia	47.00	Development of sugar industry	Upto 20 years		@	15.19
Government of Chad	18.08	For financing pharmaceutical manufacturing plant in Chad	Upto 20 years	To be made effective		18.08
Government of Benin	15.00	For financing tractor assembly plant and farm equipment manufacturing unit in Benin	Upto 20 years		@	0.05

(continued)

Table C.1 (continued)

Borrower	Amount of credit (USD mn)	Purpose	Tenor	Terminal dates for utilization		Amount available for utilization (USD mn)
				Opening of L/C	Disbursement	
Government of Cameroon	42.00	For financing Cassava plantation project in Cameroon	Upto 20 years		@	42.00
Government of Mozambique	250.00	For improving the quality of power supply in Mozambique	Upto 20 years		@	136.46
Government of Swaziland	37.90	For agriculture development and mechanization of agriculture in Swaziland	Upto 20 years		@	1.09
Government of Tanzania	178.13	For augmentation of water supply schemes of Dar es Salaam and Chalinzi regions in Tanzania	Upto 20 years		@	73.87
Government of Gambia	16.88	For construction of national assembly building complex in Gambia	Upto 20 years		@	0.20
Government of Malawi	76.50	For (a) development of irrigation network under greenbelt initiative; (b) setting up of refined sugar processing equipment in Salima under greenbelt initiative; and (c) development of fuel storage facilities in Malawi.	Upto 20 years		@	0.01
Government of Ghana	35.00	For financing a sugar plant project in Ghana	Upto 20 years		@	–
Government of Senegal	19.00	Fisheries development project	Upto 20 years		@	19.00
Government of Seychelles	10.00	Import of goods and services from India for specific projects funded by development bank of seychelles (DBS)			@	10.00

(continued)

Table C.1 (continued)

Borrower	Amount of credit (USD mn)	Purpose	Tenor	Terminal dates for utilization		Amount available for utilization (USD mn)
				Opening of L/C	Disbursement	
Government of Burkina Faso	22.50	For financing a low-cost housing and economical buildings' project in Burkina Faso	Upto 20 years		@	21.42
Government of Comoros	41.60	For installation of an 18 MW power Project in Moroni, the capital city of Comoros	Upto 20 years		@	41.60
Government of Ethiopia	300.00	Ethio-Djibouti rail line project	Upto 20 years		@	299.59
Government of Zimbabwe	28.60	Upgradation of Dekapumping station and river water intake system in Zimbabwe	Upto 20 years		@	0.03
Government of Mozambique	19.72	Rural drinking water project extension	Upto 20 years		@	-
Government of Mozambique	149.72	Rehabilitation of Road between Tica, Buzi and Nova Sofala in Mozambique	Upto 20 years		@	145.79
Government of Mozambique	47.00	Construction of 1200 houses in Mozambique	Upto 20 years		@	18.14
Government of Sudan	125.00	Mashkour sugar project (IInd tranche of US \$150 mn)	Upto 20 years		@	0.02
Government of Benin	42.61	Upgradation of water supply schemes in 69 villages in Benin	Upto 20 years		@	40.22
Government of Liberia	144.00	Power transmission and distribution project [out of which an amount not exceeding USD 1.75 million is earmarked for preparation of the Detailed Project Report (DPR)]	Upto 22 years		@	142.65
Government of Niger	34.54	Solar electrification of 30 villages and solar photovoltaic system of 5 MW	Upto 22 years		@	32.64

(continued)

Table C.1 (continued)

Borrower	Amount of credit (USD mn)	Purpose	Tenor	Terminal dates for utilization		Amount available for utilization (USD mn)
				Opening of L/C	Disbursement	
Government of Rwanda	120.05	(i) Export targeted modern irrigated agricultural project (USD 60.22 million); and (ii) Extension of export targeted modern irrigated agricultural project (USD 59.83 million)	Upto 20 years		@	111.65
Government of Senegal	41.96	Setting up a modern abattoir, meat processing, cold storage, rendering and tannery plant and market place in Senegal	Upto 20 years		@	41.96
Government of Gabon	67.19	Rehabilitation and upgradation of the broadcasting facilities	Upto 8 years	To be made effective		67.19
Government of Burundi	4.22	Farm mechanization	Upto 20 years	To be made effective		4.22
Government of Burundi	0.17	Preparation of detailed project report for an integrated food processing complex in Burundi	Upto 20 years	To be made effective		0.17
Government of Mauritius	46.00	Purchase of specialized equipment and vehicles	Upto 10 years		@	24.00
Government of Republic of Congo	89.90	Development of transportation system	Upto 20 years		@	89.90
Government of Niger	25.00	Potable water for semi-urban and rural communities	Upto 22 years		@	0.52
Government of Mauritius	18.00	To finance the supply of specialized equipments	Upto 10 years		@	-

(continued)

Table C.1 (continued)

Borrower	Amount of credit (USD mn)	Purpose	Tenor	Terminal dates for utilization		Amount available for utilization (USD mn)
				Opening of L/C	Disbursement	
Government of Nigeria	100.00	(i) Supply and commissioning of transmission lines; (ii) 132/33 kV substation, solar mini grid electrification and solar street lighting in the state of Kaduna; and (iii) construction of gas-based power plant in the cross river state	Upto 10 years		@	100.00
Government of Togo	30.00	Rural electrification project to cover 150 localities	Upto 20 years		@	30.00
Government of Togo	52.00	Setting up of 161 KV power transmission line	Upto 20 years		@	52.00
Government of D.R. Congo	82.00	Completion of Katende hydroelectric project	Upto 20 years		@	0.03
Government of Senegal	62.95	Rice self-sufficiency programme in the Republic of Senegal	Upto 20 years		@	60.85
Government of Gambia	22.50	Electrification expansion project	Upto 20 years		@	22.50
Government of Gambia	22.50	Replacement of asbestos water pipes with UPVC pipes project	Upto 20 years		@	22.50
Government of Republic of Congo	55.00	Setting up a greenfield 600 tpd rotary kiln cement plant project	Upto 20 years	To be made effective		55.00
Government of Djibouti	15.13	Ali Sabieh cement project, Djibouti	Upto 10 years		@	15.13
Government of D.R. Congo	34.50	Development of power distribution project in Bandundu Province	Upto 20 years	To be made effective		34.50
Government of D.R. Congo	109.94	Transmission and distribution project in Kasai province	Upto 20 years	To be made effective		109.94

Table C.2 List of EXIM bank LOC's on standby

Borrower	Purpose	Credit amount (USD mn)
Government of Cape Verde	Technology park project	5
Government of Ghana	Procurement of 12 units of D 155 bulldozers including spare parts for Ghana's national agriculture field creation project	5
Government of Guinea	Strengthening of health system	35
Government of Sierra Leone	Irrigation development in Tomabum, Sierra Leone	30
Government of Sierra Leone	Expansion of the ongoing projects for rehabilitation of existing potable water facilities in four communities in Sierra Leone	15
Government of Mauritania	Solar diesel hybrid rural electricity project	65.68
Government of Burkina Faso	Hydroelectric power plant and transmission network project in Burkina Faso	184
Government of Ghana	Sugarcane development and irrigation project	24.54
Government of Ghana	Strengthening of agriculture mechanization services centres	150
Government of Ghana	Rehabilitation and upgradation of potable water system in Yendi, Ghana	30
Government of Tanzania	Extension of lake victoria pipeline to Tabora, Igunga and Nzega	268.35
Government of Senegal	Acquisition of buses	26
Government of Gambia	Expansion of Banjul Port	92
Government of Kenya	Agriculture mechanization project	100
Government of Zimbabwe	Renovation/upgradation of bulawayo thermal power plant	87

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