REFOUNDING POLITICAL GOVERNANCE

THE METAPHYSICS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

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The Metaphysics of Public Administration

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PREFACE

Since Montesquieu's (1952; 1689–1755) incisive differentiation of the principal forms of governance and their components, the rate at which different theories of governance have been proposed has exponentially grown until now when we have a plethora of different theories on the best way to govern, lead and/or manage. Anyone interested in this topic is confronted with the many conflicting schools of thought, from Weber's (1948; 1864–1920) theory of the "iron cage" to Wheatley's (1992) New-Age concept of leadership. This seeming maze of different theories can be seen merely as different perspectives on the overall embracing concept of governance which is, essentially, the holistic conception and explanation of differentiated purposive human systems—about paradigms and systems that have their inception in and are limited by, the human mind. The core challenge, then, is to put some order and rationale into the understanding of this "many-headed" concept of governance. We meet this challenge by mapping out a cognitive framework that is capable of embracing and ordering all the multitudinous differentiated conceptions of human governance experienced at the different levels of society.

In essence, this book reformulates the concept of organizational governance in terms of the metaphor of the human mind. The cognitive model of governance formulated can be used to explain how and why different modes of governance are embraced by the different organizations in different circumstances and why this is appropriate and necessary, how and why governance changes over time, and how it is important to institute processes of inquiry, dialogue and reflection in order to know and choose more consciously.

Essentially, we reformulate the principles and understanding of organizational governance as an outcome of a process of validating the veracity, realism and prognosticating value of the particular form of institutional archetyping that is based on the metaphor of the human mind. It does this in a three-step process:

- *First, formulating an expression of the immediate knowing* (or seeing, as in aesthetic appreciation) that the essence of an institution's decision-making processes can be explained in terms of the mind metaphor.

- *Secondly, the structure and dynamics of the mind metaphor are conceptualised and formulated* by a process of reasoning of why and how the philosophical concept of man can be taken as determining the structure and dynamics of the two principal personality typologies.

- *Thirdly, the true fit, merit and power of the mind metaphor in explaining organizations' governance is validated* by using the cognitive conceptual framework to analyse and prognosticate on the nature and dynamics of governance in the public administration of the political sphere in particular.

As a consequence of this scientifically-oriented process, the authors have arrived at a "yes," or a personal cognitive commitment, to the following key "truths" or "facts" about organizational governance.

- *The nature and dynamics of governance in organizations reflect the way humans think*—OR, the nature, dynamics and development of organizations can be reasonably known, intelligently understood and wisely developed by using the conceptual framework suggested by the metaphor of the mind.

- *The essence of human thinking results from a process of cognitive differentiation that is faithfully based on hierarchically structured trinities of abstraction* (as originally identified by the Greeks and carried forward by the Western scholastic philosophers), which express the different cognitive perspectives that one constructs to perceive, understand and know reality. The key heuristic insight contained within the metaphor of the mind, therefore, is to reinterpret Aquinas' (1952; c.1225–1274) trinity of abstraction (Lonergan, 1967) as a trinity of cognitive perspectives relevant to a particular aspect of governance. Essentially, the effect of this intellective insight is to transform Weber's (1949; 1962) *ideal types* into a newly created concept of a *trinity of menetypes* (numbered *ideal types* in an ordered set). The principles underpinning the concept of *menetypes* facilitate understanding and meaning because the conceptual framework of the mind metaphor can be seen to be based simply on this *trinity of menetypes*, repeated again and again. Therefore, even though the conceptual framework of governance might seem expansive, fluid and complex, it can be viewed simply as a hierarchically structured, interdependent pattern of cognitive perspectives arranged at each point of focus in the form of the basic *trinity of menetypes* applicable to that level of thinking.

- *The conceptual framework of the mind metaphor has great explanatory, heuristic and prognostic power* and can be used to guide the individual or group process of reaching judgments of fact, assessments of value and decisions of intent. This inherent power of the mind metaphor is validated by the comprehensive, structured and probing analysis conducted into the public administration within the US society. Although the discussion is principally focused at the level of theory and principles, it is clearly evident that the conceptual framework of the mind metaphor does provide a powerful means of analysing the authority, culture and participants within particular real-life organizations. This ability to integrate the analysis of governance over the range of levels of understanding is a key contributor to its explanatory and prognosticating powers.

As a consequence of using the mind metaphor to analyse governance in Western society, the key conclusion is that there has been a substantial shift or evolution in thinking from a managerialist mindset to the more abstract politicist mindset (which has alternately been described as postmodernism). This fundamental shift in mindset is pervasive and influences the perspectives taken at many levels in the human governance systems.

In particular, this analysis of governance in the US society focuses on the political sphere and concludes that: public administration is only a second-order political power and should eschew any delusions to political equality with the Government's political arm. Rather, the public administration should be encouraged to maintain and develop further its ethics of clarity, order and loyalty in assisting the Government of the day. Furthermore, public administrators should be developed to work in more abstract, political and interdependent systems of governance. This new, operational environment requires them to develop the capacity to think more politically and at more abstract levels, and to be able to coach others to develop their cognitive powers likewise.

This book is a companion book to *Refounding Corporate Governance: The Metaphysics of Corporate Leadership*, which has also been published in this 'Public Policy, Administration and Management' series.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

For how shall we know the source of (good governance) between men, if we do not begin by knowing mankind?

(Adaptation of Rousseau, 1952: 329)[1]

Abstract: An introduction is provided to the triadic metaphor of the mind, its depth and its breadth of applicability. A new concept of *menetypes* is introduced as being based on the triadic conception of human thinking, defined by three psychic levels of abstraction that are enveloped by a conception of the transcendent other. The methodology explains how the triadic conceptual framework gives birth to the *JEWAL Synthesis* theory of governance - JEWAL being an acronym to signify a synthesis of particular aspects of Eastern philosophical psychology, Western philosophy and depth psychology.

INTRODUCTION

Governance is taken as the conscious exercise of direction, regulation and control over a human system. At the simplest level there is the governance of the self, and from the earliest Greek times the oracles of society have urged people to "Know Thyself." But humans do not know themselves in isolation from others as, by themselves, they are very limited and unfulfilled.[2] So they join together in purposive groups or organizations that are about pursuing some good, however well articulated or ill-defined it might be. Such groups or organizations need good governance to thrive and to be satisfying enough to the individual members for them to remain within the group—and such governance is orchestrated through and by some members of the group providing leadership of some kind.[3] Neither the members of these groups nor the organizations govern themselves in isolation but rather they do so as members of a larger collection or society of people,[4] which itself must be subject to some form of governance. 'No society can subsist without a form of government. "The united strength of individuals," as Gravina well observes, "constitutes what we call the "body politic"' (Montesquieu, 1952: 3). Again there are some members of this body politic who take on positions of leadership or governing. The practice and understanding of governance at this highest level of society is much more obtuse, complex and intellectually challenging, as has been evidenced by the attention it has received in philosophical writings since the earliest of times.

Governance, therefore, needs to be understood and explained in the context of it being operative in some form at all three levels of the individual, the organization and society.[5] Moreover, there is interaction and influence between the different levels of governance, principally because it is people themselves who are involved in all three and are required to balance the often-conflicting demands of each.

This book is primarily focused on the middle level, concerning governance within organizations, which are composed of individuals who also need to exercise a degree of self-governance, but which operate within a particular society that lays down principles of overall societal governance. These societal principles determine and shape the form and dynamics of the governance that is exercised within the different organizations. And there are, indeed, a plethora of different types of organization and faces of organizational governance, so much so, that it has been said that 'there is no such thing as *the* theory of organizations. Rather there are many theories that attempt to explain and predict how organizations and the people in them will behave in varying occupational structures, cultures, and circumstances' (Shafritz and Ott, 1996: 4). That is, society's appreciation and understanding of organizations has become more differentiated and complex, and the dynamics of organizations have become more intricate and subtle.

Moreover, change is a fact of life and everywhere the pace of change seems to be accelerating. The social and economic worlds have been undergoing such tumultuous change that modern theory and understanding has largely proved inadequate in the multitude of individual and group mindsets and particular circumstances. This is especially true in the realm of management, which has been subjected to such a dizzying round of short-lived "latest fads" that

managers are now eschewing the lot just so they can get on and do the job required of them. As Micklethwait and Wooldridge (1996: 18-19) observed: 'The real problem with management theory is that it is pulling institutions and individuals in conflicting directions… These contradictions within forms reflect a deeper intellectual confusion at the heart of management theory, which has left it not so much a coherent discipline as a battleground between… radically opposed philosophies.'

Therefore, there may not be much mileage in canvassing the vast array of theories or recipes for good management—or good governance. Rather, like Montesquieu (1952),[6] we struggle to understand the spirit of governance in organizations. And the obvious common, core principle of organizations is that they are comprised of humans who think and act as though there is an organization, and therefore there is one—irrespective of whether or not there is a physical building, a formal organization chart, or an IT (Information Technology) network connecting all the members together. In essence, the nature, shape and dynamics of any organization are fabrications of the human mind and, in that sense, it looks and acts very much like a more complex, more capable and more power-oriented thinking human.[7]

As the key to any scientific understanding of phenomena is in the system of conceptual differentiation that is applied in observing and analysing the empirical data, this book searches for an understanding of governance in the structure and dynamics of human thinking or the philosophy of mind. As a consequence, it postulates a philosophy of mind which is used as the basis to view the framework of governance in terms of a metaphor of the mind. The metaphor of the mind is applicable at all three levels of the individual, the organization, and the society, which means that the interrelationships between these three different levels of thinking can be handled in a consistent and reinforcing manner within the one, overall comprehensive framework.

The key heuristic development in this book is the reformulation of the meaning and use of *ideal types*—which, though severely critiqued, have proved to be a useful tool in sociological theory since being introduced by Weber (1962).[8] However, their understanding and usage have been unduly limited and their basic conceptual development has essentially withered on the vine. The growth and realisation of their potential have been stunted because Weber (1947; 1962) did not spell out any underlying coherency in the conceptual framework of *ideal types*[9], and nobody since seems to have been able to understand it in such a way as to develop the notion and use of *ideal types*. An *ideal type*[10] is still regarded essentially as an isolated, theoretical, working hypothesis that describes a situation rather than explains it, and which is not intended to help predict or suggest what decisions/actions should follow as a consequence (Weber, 1962: 14). The concept of *ideal types* has never developed because the so-defined types always stand alone and no attempt has been made to incorporate an account of their associated dynamics and interactions. Put together in the way explained in this book, "types" can be more than just standalone, descriptive classification schemes; they can represent reality and can be used to inform what action should or should not be taken—and its likely consequences.

This book, therefore, develops a radically different approach—yet, it is essentially in keeping with the spirit of Weber's (1947; 1949; 1962; 1968; 1978a; 1978b) original thinking because the use of the metaphor of the mind provides an integrative explanatory focus on the underlying motivations of the individual participants.[11] As with Weber (1962), the underlying premise is that it is individuals who, ultimately, think, decide and act—even if they are heavily influenced by the organizational or societal thinking that they consciously or unconsciously take on board. Instead of proceeding to develop different *ideal types* for each observed reality, it is much more instructive to begin from the basic understanding that it is humans who think and it is they who, therefore, interpret and explain the reality that they encounter. Is there an identifiable pattern of thinking that can encompass the many and varied perspectives humans can experience? Can some sense be made of the structure and dynamics of such a pattern and can it be harnessed to understand the dynamics of human social action and interaction? Can current understandings of human dynamics be used to inform a metaphor of the mind that can enhance our understanding of governance? The three outcomes from tackling these questions essentially encapsulate the extent of the contribution of original thought proffered in this book, as it:

- Encapsulates and articulates a metaphor of the mind that expresses a philosophy of mind that can be seen to have its roots in late Neoplatonic philosophy, and is evident in the work of many Western philosophers/social scientists [including, in particular, Montesquieu (1952) and Weber (1962)] over

the centuries and also in the particular expression of Eastern philosophy that is captured in the personal typology called the Enneagram (Riso, 1987; Palmer, 1991).[12] In particular, this book explains how Jungian typology (Jung, 1971; von Franz and Hillman, 1971; Myers, 1980) is an underdeveloped expression of this Eastern philosophy of mind, and how it can be more usefully reformulated in such a way that it corresponds directly to the Enneagram typology—which is captured in the JEWAL Synthesis philosophy of mind (Chapter 2).

- Uses the metaphor of mind to develop a theory of governance to explain the dynamic pattern of interrelated rationalities governing motivation and behaviour at the individual, group and societal levels of authority. This theory of governance introduces the concept of *menetypes,*[13] which are a reformulation of *ideal types* into a "numbered", coherent, interrelated set of perspectives of a particular aspect of reality—The JEWAL Synthesis Theory of Governance (Chapter 3).

BASIC INSIGHTS

The basic insights on the philosophy of mind and human governance that are presented in this book are as follows:

- All human affairs and the experience of those affairs at each of the levels of the individual, the group and the society have their genesis and fulfilment in the human mind. In particular, an organization is such only because the participating individuals are able to think of it in such a way.

- Any view of reality is only ever a partial view and the power of that partial view in experiencing, understanding and knowing that particular reality is critically dependent on the cognitive framework employed by the individual.[14] This book is generated out of the mindset moulded by the metaphor of the mind, which is informed by the reworked philosophy of mind explained in Chapter 2.

  In particular, one is able to think of an organization or a society in the same way as one thinks of an individual, except that the thinking is at higher levels of abstraction.

- Humans have the capability or potential to think in any of all possible ways, as the limits of their potential to know are infinite (Proclus, 1963/15th Century: 149). However, if one tries to think of all perspectives at once, one would be pulled in all directions and so get nowhere—and would probably be overwhelmed.

  This principle of needing one phase of a trinity to dominate can be illustrated by imagining three people of about equal size and strength standing back to back with their arms interlocked. They would each be facing outwards in one of three different directions at roughly equidistant angles around a circle. If they all tried to move forward with the same force there would be no movement. One has to dominate for there to be movement and in that case there will be a secondary individual who is also moving partly forward (in an extreme case this could be in equality with the dominant individual), while the third will need to be repressed and essentially move backwards.

- Differentiation and choice is the key. Very early on in life, therefore, one chooses a particular perspective and, in so doing, other conflicting perspectives need to be consciously repressed. Through constant use over time (namely, because it works for the individual), this cognitive dynamic makes for the development of one's personality. Individuals also exercise this cognitive orienting in the development of their concept of an organization or society, and the result of this is their perceived culture.

- With each separate personality or culture found in individuals, organizations or society, comes a patterned set of perspectives, motivation and predictable ways of behaving. This is well captured in the explanatory dynamics of the Enneagram and Jungian typologies as understood in the terms of the insights provided by the philosophy of mind (Chapter 2).

The explanatory power of this system of cognitive differentiation has been captured in a conceptual framework of the metaphor of the mind. The key operative principle that informs the structure and dynamics of this metaphor of the mind (Chapter 2) is in the way Aquinas (1952/1225–1274) captures the structure of human thinking in terms of his trinity of abstraction (Lonergan, 1967: 39–43). The key insight is that human thinking can usefully be considered structured in a hierarchy of these three levels of abstraction in much the same way as the Neoplatonists (from the 3rd and 5th Centuries, respectively) Plotinus (1952/3rd Century) and Proclus (1963) did to explain the celestial sphere. The Enneagram typology (Riso, 1987; Palmer, 1991) captures this trinitarian hierarchy within the human psyche and expresses the differentiation between the three levels of abstraction in terms of individuals' different motivations

that are chosen to define their character/personality. For instance, at the broadest level of the three centres in the Enneagram's personality typology, the differentiation into the three levels of abstraction takes the following form.

- *Psychic Level #A*—the first level of abstract motivation capturing externally oriented, practical conation or expression of the human will, which is called the HEART Centre.

- *Psychic Level #B*—the second level of abstract motivation capturing internally oriented, imaginative thinking or the exercise of reason, which is called the HEAD Centre.

- *Psychic Level #C*—the third level of abstract motivation capturing the prescinded perspective of continual assessing and deciding according to the individual's value framework, which is called the GUT Centre.

- *Psychic Level #O*—the *other,* or remainder not contained within the three levels of differentiation defined above. This aspect of *other* encapsulates both the notion of the personal unconscious and the transcendent potential.

However, as well as being of use in explaining the structure and dynamics of the individual's differentiated motivations and therefore his/her personality, the trinity of abstraction can also be used to capture the nature of the individual's thinking about the objective world that he/she experiences. In simple terms, individuals interpret the external world of experience according to their own developed personal psychic cognitive framework and predilections (aptly explained using the personality typology).[15] Therefore, it is justifiable and useful to analyse the nature of the objective world in the terms of the differentiated structure of human thinking, namely, in the terms of the three levels of cognitive abstraction (which is further explained in Chapter 2).

Weber's (1949; 1962) theory of *ideal types* goes part way down this path of differentiating the objective world according to the way humans think about it. That is, 'Weber asserts that ideal types are syntheses of characteristic or significant features constructed on the basis of logical and meaningful compatibility, as opposed to general concepts that are syntheses of average or common features' (Hekman, 1983: 31). Of importance is the appreciation that these "syntheses" take place in the thinking human mind. Therefore, the way any such synthesis is carried out within the mind of the individual is determined by the way that he/she thinks. For instance, it could be directed in terms of assessing the concrete potential to achieve some desired good (*psychic level #A*), or be a reasoned analysis to determine the truth of the particular facts (*psychic level #B*), or be a value assessment on the reality in terms of whether it is good or bad, right or wrong, black or white or some shade in between (*psychic level #C*).

The subjective way in which the individual interprets the external reality can, therefore, be explained in terms of his/her personal motivations, which are captured in the trinities of abstraction that inform the Enneagram personality typology. In similar terms, then, the objective assessment (i.e. one that can be usefully shared) of the external reality can be expressed and explained within a framework of appropriately formed trinities of *ideal types*—that is three quite distinct (and somewhat opposing or in tension) syntheses of "characteristic or significant features." This resembles putting together a trinity of three different perspectives of the same reality that are formed by looking at an image in a hologram from three (3-D) perpendicularly separated viewpoints and then having an integrating system for reconciling and interpreting those quite distinct perspectives. Each of the three different viewpoints is defined by the position from which it is viewed and can, therefore, be numbered accordingly.

Menetype is a new word construction that brings together the words "mene," which means numbered, and "type," which echoes the meaning of *type* as conveyed in Weber's (1962) *ideal type*. *Menetype*, therefore, simply means "numbered type." The proposed concept of a trinity of *menetypes*, then, captures the experience of viewing the same reality from the three radically different (i.e. perpendicularly separated) perspectives that are defined by the differentiation into the three distinct levels of abstraction. As will be explained more fully later, Weber's (1962) *ideal types* of authority are actually such a trinity of three quite distinct perspectives on the reality of the power forces at play. The three types of authority—charismatic, rational-legal and traditional—are radically different and can be numbered according to which of the three levels of cognitive abstraction it is that explains the particular mindset at work in the authority dynamics. In this sense, they present an instructive example of a trinity of *menetypes* and will be so identified immediately below.

To say it another way, a trinity of *menetypes* is a trio of *ideal types* that are numbered in a particular way and brought together in the trinity in such a way that honours and expresses the interrelationship and interaction between them—the interrelationships that bring them together into a single unified whole that is the one reality which each of them is trying to express in its own way. This trinitarian relationship is well termed as 'unity-in-distinction' (Dodds, 1963: 300), which contains three different phases of thinking about the same reality. The particular way in which each of the three different *ideal types* is numbered (according to the trinity of abstraction) to form a trinity of *menetypes* is as follows (for those who, like the author, are more visual-oriented, understanding may be helped by reference to Fig. **1.1**).

Figure 1.1: The Trinity of Cognitive Abstractions   **Figure 1.2:** The Principal Trinity of the Intellect

- *Menetype #A*—the first level of cognitive abstraction, capturing the externally oriented, concrete perspective—encapsulated in Weber's (1962) notion of charismatic authority.

- *Menetype #B*—the second level of cognitive abstraction, capturing the internally oriented, imaginative perspective—encapsulated in Weber's (1962) notion of rational-legal authority.

- *Menetype # C*—the third level of cognitive abstraction, capturing the prescinded perspective that can be some kind of compromise between the dialogue of the other two perspectives, but can more gainfully lead to transcending the particular conflict and rising to a new level of understanding— encapsulated in Weber's (1962) notion of traditional authority.

- *Menetype #O*—the *other*, capturing all that has not been made conscious in the patterns of the three principal perspectives of the trinity, including that which is more than (or operating at higher or lower levels of abstraction than) that of the particular trinity—which essentially captures Weber's (1962) holistic-type notion of the rational belief in absolute value that goes beyond and encapsulates the other three types of authority.

The value-added of recognising the existence or manifestation of a hierarchy of such trinities of *menetypes* is that the human mind processes thinking about them in a particular way that can be defined and predicted. The principles and dynamics of the hierarchy of such trinities of abstraction are explored later, but the essential aspects can be summarised as follows.

- It is not possible to think at all three levels at once, as each perspective takes the thinking mind in an essentially different direction. There is normally, then, a focus on a particular cognitive orientation. Focus on a particular perspective or *menetype* cognitively defines the secondary *menetype* as the next highest level of abstraction (in the sequence #A–#B–#C–#A etc.) and the third *menetype* thinking is cognitively repressed.

- There is much meaning in the direction and movement of thinking between the three *menetypes*. In particular, there is the dynamic of cognitive reversion (going against the arrow in Fig. **1.1**) or evolutionary, inner-directed learning; the dynamic of cognitive procession (with the arrow) or revolutionary, externally directed learning; and the process of combining both dynamics.

  This is a key attribute of the trinity of *menetypes* and used throughout the book. The movement in a clockwise direction from the principal *menetype* of focus to its secondary supporting *menetype* involves a movement to a higher level of abstraction after being informed by the lower level. This movement is, therefore, one of progress and development and is defined as evolutionary.

  On the other hand, a movement in an anticlockwise direction involves a step back to a lower level of abstract thinking that had hitherto been repressed and, as a consequence, the actions resulting from this new mindset would likely be underdeveloped and clumsy. This movement is, therefore, retrograde unless it is part of an act of passive reflection, in which case there can be a revolutionary breakthrough in thinking that, paradoxically, takes the individual to a more expansive level of thinking.

- The trinity of *menetypes* is repeated at successive or different levels in a hierarchy of abstract thinking about natural and social phenomena. Of particular significance is the property that each of the *menetype* phases (i.e. all of the *menetype #A*s) at the different levels are imbued with a similar "spirit"—or set of like motivations and characteristics much the same as those that characterise and determine an individual's personality.[16] This is in the same vein that charismatic authority (Weber, 1930; 1962; 1968) can be explained in similar relatable terms when applied to the leadership of a society, the leadership of the Church, the leadership of capitalist enterprises and individual creative endeavour. The following organizational analysis draws heavily on this property of the trinity of *menetypes* (which is explained in more detail in terms of the Neoplatonic-like hierarchy of trinities at Chapter 2) when discussing the likely reactions of participants in particular organizational processes. This is the particular power of using the metaphor of the mind as it allows ready discussion across the different levels of thinking—in particular, when discussing individuals in organizations in societies. However, though these interrelationships and similarities across levels are familiar to the authors they may at first be a little challenging for the reader, and it is hoped that the necessary insights will come sooner rather than later.

- The outcome, manifestation and evolutionary change of phenomena and the way one thinks about them need to be understood holistically in terms of not only the conscious structure and dynamics of the trinities of abstraction, but also the unconscious other that is also operating in a similar but complementary manner.

To recapitulate, then, the concept of differentiating our thinking in terms of the three levels of abstraction is used to inform, on the one hand, an explanation of the individual's motivations and consequential personality and, on the other, the structure of explanation in analysing the objective reality that the individual experiences. In particular, in this book, a hierarchy formed by the repetition of these three levels of abstraction is used to analyse the world of human organization. The newly introduced tools of a *menetype* and a trinity of three interrelated *menetypes* represent three different perspectives of the objective reality that are defined and numbered according to the particular level of abstraction they represent. A different *phase* of thinking is used to capture an understanding of each of the different *menetypes* within a trinity, where a phase of thinking is thinking at a particular level of abstraction. That is, the inner subjective world of thinking is structured in terms of a trinity of *phases* of thinking which, in turn, interprets reality in terms of a similarly structured trinity of *menetypes*. So, in terms of Weber's (1949: 78) observation that an individual only "sees" what he/she is interested or educated to "see," an individual whose personality expresses a preference for a particular phase of thinking (i.e. *phase #A, #B*, or *#C, or their sub-sets*) is more likely to be attracted to and be influenced by an external reality that expresses and is explained in terms of the similarly "numbered" *menetype* (i.e. *menetype #A, #B* or *#C, or their sub-sets*). The focus of this book is essentially on the structure and dynamics of the external organizational world (defined in terms of *menetypes*) but there will be continual reference to the interpretation and reactions of the individual participants of organizational life.

MANIFESTATION IN THE "REAL" WORLD

It is worthwhile at this point to give an example of the use of this trinitarian structure to interpret some aspect of the real world of human organization. The spirit and dynamics of this trinity of ways of thinking have been effectively

captured in the recent literature by the analytic device of differentiating societal and organizational action into essentially three ways of manifesting; namely, in markets, hierarchies, or networks (Thompson, Frances, Levacic and Mitchell, 1991; Kooiman, 1993; Rhodes, 1997). The following short explanation of the essence and dynamics of this trinity of markets, hierarchies, and networks is intended to give a flavour of the differentiation of thinking that underscores the whole theory of governance expounded in this book. These three aspects of organization are quite general and play themselves out in all sectors of society. The following short explanation of the three social phenomena in terms of the properties of their particular phase in the trinity of *menetypes* should be read with reference to Fig. **1.1**. The discussion is structured to focus on the demonstration of the attributes that characterise the particular phenomena of the respective *menetype* orientations. For each of the societal manifestations below, there is first an explanation of the primary cognitive perspective, then an explanation of the secondary supporting aspect around the trinity, and lastly a reference to the depressed aspect that is necessary in order to give full influence to the predominant aspect.

Markets

This follows from a *menetype #A* thinking—essentially a doing, conation-oriented sub-system at the most basic level of the trinity—as it is dealing with the exogenous commodities that can be seen and handled by all. The need for buyers to desire commodities, or some different reality that they are willing to pay for, is well defined in the economics literature and is promoted by the marketing efforts of the business sector. In the extent that participants follow the role models defined by classical economics, there would be a perfect market. However, as well as all the other influences and considerations that can impact, individuals themselves can be of different psychological orientations (*phases #A, #B, #C*) and have different intentions. A number of variants of market outcomes therefore emerge.

In more sophisticated markets, participants group themselves into hierarchies to produce more and, in response to the concerns of the community at large, regulations are established to guide the markets. Thus, the *menetype #B* governance orientations of legal order and hierarchy can be developed in support of the primary *menetype #A* operation of the markets.[17] The markets have been notoriously unable to regulate themselves (and, in fact, often regard it as an irrelevance—they repress it) and so somebody else has to do it. It is, therefore, necessary that the legislature, as the other separate section of society, is required to formulate such regulations. The regulations so formed are ultimately a balance between the free but harsh competitiveness of the markets and the comforting, but restricting, policing of the regulations.

Collusion between players, cartels, or networks of buyers (and sellers) has always been frowned upon and actively discouraged or outlawed. Market economies actually establish a regulatory regime to repress and police such practices that are sustained by a *menetype #C* orientation.

Hierarchies (i.e. Formalised Hierarchies)

This is a *menetype #B*, legal-rational sub-system at the second level of abstraction, which involves a more sophisticated exchange interaction between participants. It is essentially dealing with endogenous variables and is needed to provide internal order and predictability. For instance, the mass production of widgets, once promised, is usually only undertaken to guarantee greater predictability than could be achieved through purchasing elsewhere in the marketplace. The roles for participants are defined through the formal rules and structure of the hierarchy and it is these and the loyalty for the institution that are of primary influence. The exercise of hierarchical authority as a secondary aspect (*menetype #C*) is only in support of this basic, rule/process-bound culture.

There has been widespread acknowledgement of how important the operation of informal networks is within bureaucracies. This is essentially a *menetype #C* secondary function of networks used to supplement the main rule-oriented culture. In more sophisticated hierarchies, the secondary aspect of authority and networks is strengthened by reforms such as flatter structures, "let the manager manage", the use of consultancies, and outsourcing. In this way, managers are required to go beyond the rules to allow more flexibility in exercising their authority (but still in keeping with the prevailing culture) and to network more with others to find better ways to deliver the products prescribed.

Essentially, the will of hierarchical bureaucracies has to be defined by higher authority. The focus is so much on getting the process right, that the urge to create new possibilities or objectives (*menetype #A* rationality) actually

needs to be repressed—that is, those in hierarchies do not overly question the rules or orders of what to do once they have been given by a legitimate authority. In addition, there has always been a constant cry from the private sector about the involvement of public-funded agencies in providing goods and services for sale in the market. This aspect (*menetype #A*) has been consciously repressed. In keeping with this attitude, most Western public administrations have been through periods of identifying those products and services of public agencies that can be traded on their exogenous value (price) in the marketplace. These activities have been seen as not having a place in public administration and, where there is adequate predictability in market supply, their provision has been gradually moved out into the market. Internal charging in both the private and public sector has been a bit of a fad but has not proved to be a long-term successful practice in hierarchies. Rather, it has been but a stepping stone to the provision of goods via the market when the predictability of their supply is not compromised—which is as it should be.

Networks

A *menetype #C*, traditional-type sub-system at the third level of abstraction, which clearly involves the most sophisticated and subtle interaction of participants. It is not only dealing with products and services but is also concerned with building long-term relationships that can be trusted to provide cooperation in a future endeavour. Networks are held together by participants' commitment to a common set of values and trust in each other as the basis of all interactions. The role of each of the participants (as the secondary *menetype #A* aspect) and the "rules" or mores of their interaction are known in a more subtle way and are deliberately not spelt out formally as within a hierarchy. What is shared in the relationships is often tacit but cumulative, and participants would need to be cognizant of the network's other members in using whatever knowledge is shared. One aspect of networks that has not been given much attention, at least in the public administration literature, is that it is essentially about the "goodies" and the "baddies". The "goodies" are ones that you can trust and the "baddies" not only cannot be trusted but also are probably colluding with the enemy and are out to get you. There is, therefore, a notion of conflict around networks, and they are actually a mechanism designed to help handle that conflict and increase the chances of survival and prosperity for the individual and/or the group.

In more developed and healthy networks, participants are able to coalesce and reach a consensus about "the good" they wish to achieve; that is, the collective will (*menetype #A*) of the group, which is the secondary aspect that takes expression in the marketplace, is developed to such a point that it can be well articulated and modified as circumstances dictate. In such a manner political parties, lobby groups and industry control groups can be formed around a core set of values that can be given expression in a countless number of ways in the marketplace (unlike the pure *menetype #A* entrepreneur who can get fixated on his/her particular well-developed vision).

However, formal rules within networks are always despised and repressed, as they seem to nullify the effort to build up a relationship of trust between individuals. With such formal rules that do exist, such as the Australian Liberal Party's rules on disclosure of pecuniary interests, there is always difficulty in enforcing them while trying to foster the bonds of trust that hold the network together. Another manifestation is the way semi-government market-oriented authorities, in particular, argue successfully to be released from the normal public service rules and regulations. In being distanced from the Minister they are created as part of the wider political network and prefer to act with a *menetype #A* entrepreneurial, secondary function and repress their hierarchical aspect (which is usually not true for regulatory authorities that are usually fashioned in a true hierarchical manner).

The ensuing explanation of governance in society and its organizations explores the implications of the interactions of the many interrelated levels of the differentiated perspectives that help one to understand the sociological dynamics of the human interactions. It should be emphasised that this is not the first time this type of approach to sociological analysis has been used.

For instance, Mooney (1947) used such an approach based on the hierarchy of trinities in his classic work, *The Principles of Organization*. It is contended that this present work is more richly informed by a greater understanding of the Neoplatonic foundations of the philosophy of mind that employs the trinitarian hierarchy. More recently, Handy (1978) also essentially captured the manifestation of this line of thinking in his *Gods of Management*. His understanding is traced back to the 19th-century philosopher Hamilton (1859), who grasped the significance of the trinitarian mode of analysis from that used by Aquinas (1952/1225–1274) and other Scholastic philosophers. Of course, seemingly like most other ideas, this thinking had its origins in Plato (1952/428–348 BC) and Aristotle (1952/384–322 BC) but was most clearly enunciated in the writings of the two Neoplatonists Plotinus (1952/205–

270) and Proclus (1963/410–485). This trinitarian structure of analysis has also been used intuitively by many other great thinkers over the intervening centuries. Weber (1930; 1962; 1968), in particular, could be said to have used such a conceptual framework to great effect to underpin and inform his employment of sociological analysis. Weber's (1962) trinity of the charismatic, rational-legal, and traditional "authority types" is well known, but the concept of three interrelated factors or aspects seems to be used to good effect in many other areas of his work. Hegel (1952/1770–1831) also framed much of his analysis and discussion in the trinitarian framework, as exemplified by the structuring of his analysis of the *Philosophy of Right* in terms of a hierarchy of trinities.

METHODOLOGY

All ordinary stories are alike but each extraordinary story is unique in its own way.[18]

This book began with a question with regards one author's observations on Cabinet budget decision-making processes in Australia while working as a senior public servant in the Commonwealth Department of Finance (which was responsible for coordinating the Government's budget processes). As part of his personal journey, he had become acquainted with the modern character typology known as the Enneagram, which provides an integrated, comprehensive and dynamic system of self-awareness and self-development. The main questions that arose for the author were in terms of:

- What is it about the Enneagram that imbues it with the power to explain and pattern the dynamics of the Cabinet decision-making process and the role adopted by each of the players?

- Principally, what is the secret of the power of the triadic arrangement that informs the Enneagram structure and interrelated dynamics?

- How can this key understanding be harnessed to improve both the governance system itself and the relative performance of each of the players in it? And, holistically,

- How can this understanding be extended to explain and improve other situations of social action that occur within both the public and private organizations that serve the modern society?

As a consequence of these primary questions, the research for this book pursued the core ideas in an ordered way through many psychological and philosophical writings. This did not comprise a literature search in the normal sense but rather an intense research activity to discover the true essence of human thinking. There has been no attempt in a formal sense to summarise, critique, or deconstruct any of the writings encountered—though this could be undertaken very easily.[19] Rather, it was all worked through and critiqued informally as we developed our understanding and thinking on the core psychological/philosophical principles. The progress of this intellectual search and development of our conceptual thinking is well documented in the many notebooks filled up along the way and presented in a digested form in the papers that were presented and/or published (as listed in the bibliography).

It is fair to say, however, that, towards the end of our lengthy intellectual pursuit, we found to our delight that most of the key ideas and principles of the philosophy of mind that we had developed along the way were essentially a mirror of the basic principles concerning the structure of all life that are explained in great detail in the works of the 3rd and 5th Century Neoplatonic philosophers Plotinus (1952) and Proclus (1963), respectively. Their works had a different focus, of course, but the parallels between the content of what is explained are easily drawn if it is appreciated that the detail of the essentially unknowable spiritual realm (of monads and angels) can be regarded largely as a projection of the deeper inner realities of the human psyche.

The significance of recounting this intellectual journey of the book is to make the point that the authors are informed by an intimate knowledge of the Enneagram typology in formulating the explanation of the synthesis of traits and characteristics that go into the recognition and definition of a trinity of *menetypes*. Likewise, exploring the scientific understanding of the three levels of abstraction and their manifestation in the world of human organization enhanced the authors' appreciation of the dynamics of the Enneagram personal typology. However, the principal influence is in terms of transforming the personal character typology into institutional archetyping but in such a way as to lend a certain "scientific truth" to the validity of the exercise.

The approach and conduct of the research are, therefore, characteristic of a typical cognitive journey in reaching a scientific discovery, a new policy formulation, or a personal commitment of knowing. As questions are posed, tackled and reflected upon, discoveries made and formulated, and options assessed, committed to and articulated in formal conference papers and journal articles, thinking is moved between the different levels of abstraction in the to-and-fro process of cognitive reversion and cognitive procession. However, the methodology of this research can be summarised in terms of the following three phases.

Phase 1: Identification and Focus

- Identification began with the immediate intuitive recognition (cognitive procession) of the reality or phenomenon that the main players in the Cabinet decision-making process played out their roles in a way that reflected the same patterns of behaviour expressed in the principal personality typologies.

- The phenomena associated with this connection between decision-making relationships and personality typologies were explored and articulated in a couple of formal papers. The personal conviction that these phenomena were important fuelled the spirit of inquiry that drove the study forward to determine the reasons why this metaphor of the human mind was such a powerful explanatory metaphor.

- The direction of further study was therefore focused on coming to an understanding of the nature and dynamics at both the personal and group levels of thinking. Such questioning drove the cognitive reversionary process of research to discover the essential meaning of the relationships and the universal principles that would underpin such institutional archetyping as identified in the Cabinet decision-making process.

Phase 2: Discovery and Understanding

- The initial questioning was in relation to what philosophical meaning could account for the intricacies and complexities of the Enneagram and Jungian typologies, and why it was that, although both typologies professed to portray the same psychic reality of the individual, there seemed to be a fundamental difference between their systems of personal differentiation. Many proponents/psychologists have conducted empirical research to document the linkages between the two typologies by correlating the personality profiles of individuals who had identified themselves in both personality typologies. However, there was an obvious unexplained mismatch that required a different approach to understand the differences in the driving principles of the two typologies.

- Therefore, the questioning stepped outside the "pop psychology" paradigm of personality typologies to a philosophical approach to search for the commonalities in the modes of thinking being represented. The questioning was aimed at an analysis of the philosophic/cognitive significance of the dualistic (eg conscious/unconscious) and triadic (eg body/soul/spirit) representation of man's thinking in the writings of a number of philosophers/psychologists through the ages since the time of the Neoplatonists. The insights gained through this phase of critical questioning and research contributed to a personal transformation in thinking to grasp a new synthesised conceptual framework that could unite the principles and meanings of the philosophical models of human thinking and the two personality typologies.

- There followed a confident personal judgment of the truth in the proposition that human knowing relies on cognitive differentiation according to Aquinas' trinity of abstractions—as conveyed for instance in the notions of concrete reality, abstract understanding, and prescinded universals. Secondly, there was a personal judgment that the Enneagram typology accorded with the application of this principle of trinitarian differentiation but that the Jungian typology was an incomplete expression which needed to be supplemented by additional cognitive perspectives. Further, it was assessed that all these essentially similar differentiations of human thinking were contained within the Neoplatonic view of the world as comprising hierarchically structured trinities of interdependent cognitive phases or perspectives of reality. Thirdly, it was logically reasoned that these systems of thinking embraced the more abstract human thinking in relation to organizational governance, but it was necessary to test the validity of this hypothesis with an analysis of the experience of particular types of organizations and comparing it with other scientifically established truths about organizational governance.

Phase 3: Validation and Commitment

- The reasonableness, applicability and usefulness of the mind metaphor as a conceptual framework for organizational governance were tested by analysis of the experience in organizations of each of the economic, political, and social spheres of a Western society; namely, the private corporation, the public administration, and the Church institution as they operate within the US capitalist democracy. The rationale and adequacy of the different forms of governance in each of these organizations have been questioned in the light of the governance principles embedded in the conceptual framework of the mind metaphor to prognosticate about the further development of the organizations. This book confines itself to an analysis of the public administration and the corporation and the Church will be discussed in a later work.

- Many insights and understandings were reached with regards the governance of these organizations and tested against the judgments of other commentators. There is, therefore, considerable reference to the corroborating evidence of other scholars in the use of the mind metaphor to establish both the facts and the prognoses for effective governance in the changing environment. The key insight was the need to transform Weber's (1962) *ideal types* into *menetypes* to provide for an ordered application of the cognitive conceptual framework to organizations. The approach with the use of the mind metaphor provides both for an appreciation of the whole and an understanding of the dynamics of the differentiated parts of organizational governance.

- After the rigorous testing of the conceptual framework, a "yes" can be said to the truth that the essence and dynamics of governance can, indeed, be reasonably expressed by the metaphor of the mind and to the veracity of its formulation in the proposed theory of governance. Thus, a confident "yes" can be given to the validity of institutional archetyping by means of the governance framework of the relevant *trinities of menetypes*, because the principles of the mind metaphor generate valid understandings, appropriate value assessments and practical intentions for action. This personal commitment to the "yes" is the basic reason for the conviction or authority of the writing in the body of this book and the conclusions reached.

Needless to say, there is no absolute certainty because one could never hope to capture all possible perspectives of organizational governance or the precise extent of their interrelationships, if for no other reasons than that they are multitudinous and continuously changing according to the particular situation. Perhaps the modern large computer will now do some justice to the modelling of the multitudinous, complex but ordered intricacies of organizational governance according to the algorithm contained within the developed theory of governance. However, this would still only be a limited replication of the power of the human mind because, as even the 5th century Neoplatonist Proclus (1963) reiterated so long ago, the power of the human mind is virtually infinite and contains the potential for all perspectives of thinking about everything. However, there is a practical need to focus one's cognitive power to address the particularities at hand and, therefore, only a fraction of the potential knowledge is brought to consciousness in the particular human mind, with the rest continuing to reside in the personal and collective unconscious. Just how this conscious content and pattern of thinking are brought to bear is captured in the conceptual framework of the mind metaphor, the power of which is underpinned by the following attributes.

- *It reflects the way humans actually think* and, therefore, it can inform about the different ways there are of perceiving the particular reality and enable the selection of the appropriate mindset for perception—in much the same way as the view through a hologram can be varied until lighting on the preferred one of the many perspectives of the one same reality.

- *It explains the rationale for different perspectives or mindsets* and how the different mindsets of groups or individuals result in different judgments, actions, and impact in the external concrete world. As a consequence, the mind metaphor can be used to define the appropriate questioning required to guide understanding and deliberation according to the different relevant perspectives.

- *It provides an integrated framework for individual and group decision making* and facilitates the conscious choice of the appropriate judgments, assessments or decisions required for the particular set of circumstances across the various phases of human activity.

The metaphor of the mind informs and propels a particular philosophy of governance (Chapter 4) which explains the processes and different viewpoints generated in the following analysis of governance in the US society. In terms of

the metaphor of mind,[20] this book's analysis of societal and political governance in the USA is an act of cognitive procession that flows almost involuntarily but informatively out of the authors' definitive "yes", at the highest cognitive level of knowing, that the philosophy of mind is indeed "true", "real" and "good." The flow of analysis is, therefore, more similar to an explanation in the light of the established theory of governance. Moreover, the way of cognitive procession also demands that the analysis should begin at the level of Western society, which influences and shapes the nature of the organizations that are formed within the nation's economic, political and social spheres—namely because higher-level abstract thinking drives the lower-order thinking.

This approach has been used in preference to conducting a truly empirical analysis in the way of cognitive reversion, where the analysis of basic information "from the field" on real-life governance is used to provide insights that can then contribute to the construction of a conceptual framework for the theory of governance. The reason for this is that the way of reversion used to establish the theory of governance in this book was through the fields of philosophy and psychology and, though this path of insights is not documented, the results in the form of the philosophic framework are explained and justified in Chapter 2.

As such, understandings, meanings and connections flow freely in the early explanation of real-life governance and put the authors in a cognitive position of confidence to critique the governance perspectives of others against those that emanate from the developed philosophy of mind. In a sense, then, the validity of the *JEWAL Synthesis* theory of governance which has been formulated in this book can be tested by judging the quality of this analysis and critique of the political governance theory in the USA (or in corporate governance theory elsewhere).

ENDNOTES

1   In this quote the words "good governance" replace the word "inequality" in Rousseau's (1952) original statement.

2   The basic principle in forming groups and society is much the same in that individuals give up their prerogatives of governing themselves to the group for their mutual benefit generally unachievable were they to remain as individuals. 'This is more than Consent, or Concord; it is a reall Unitie of them all, in one and the same Person, made by a Covenant of every man, in such manner, as if every man should say to every man, *I Authorise and give up my right of Governing my selfe, to this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorise all his Actions in like manner*. This done, the Multitude so united in one Person, is called a COMMON-WEALTH, in Latine CIVITAS' (Hobbes, 1968/1651: 227).

3   And if the group is to thrive it requires such leaders to know what is desired, how to achieve it and how to keep the group together towards the overall good. '"I say," said Socrates, "that over whatever a man may preside, he will, if he knows what he needs, and is able to provide it, to be a good president, whether he gave the direction of a chorus, a family, a city, or an army"' (Xenophon, 1996: 38).

4   'Every state is a community of some kind, and every community is established with a view to some good; for mankind always act in order to obtain that which they think good. But, if all communities aim at some good, the state or political community, which is the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims at good, in a greater degree than any other, and at the highest good' (Aristotle, 1952: 445).

5   That indeed, governance is to be understood as operative at all three levels of the society, the organization and the individual is essentially captured in the following Dictionary definition of governance: '1. The action or manner of governing; the fact that (a person, etc.) governs. b. Control ME. C. The state of being governed. 2. The office, function, or power of governing ME.; governing person or body – 1643. 3. Method of management, system or regulations – 1660. 4. Mode of living, behaviour, demeanour. b. Wise self-command –1600' (Oxford Dictionary, 1973: 874)

6   'I have not separated the political from the civil institutions, as I do not pretend to treat of laws, but of their spirit; and as this spirit consists in the various relations which the laws may bear to different objects, it is not so much my business to follow the natural order of laws as that of these relations and objects' (Montesquieu, 1952: 3).

7   '*Art* goes yet further, imitating that Rationall and most excellent worke of Nature, *Man.* For by Art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMON-WEALTH, or STATE, (in Latine CIVITAS) which is but an Artificial Man; though of greater stature and strength than the Naturall, for whose protection and defence it was intended; and in which, the *Soveraignty* is an Artificial *Soul*, as giving life and motion to the whole body' (Hobbes, 1968: 81).

8   Although he is credited with the introduction of the concept and term *ideal type*, 'Weber did not consider the ideal type to be a new conceptual method but, rather, an explication of existing practice… Ideal types were Weber's answer to the problem of an attempt to describe and define these non-individual, non-general, synthetic concepts which are commonly employed by social scientists…

'Weber asserts that ideal types are syntheses of characteristics or significant features constructed on the basis of logical and meaningful compatibility, as opposed to general concepts that are syntheses of average or common features…

'Ideal types are neither hypotheses nor descriptors of reality but "yardsticks" with which reality can be compared; they are neither historical reality nor "true reality," but purely limiting concepts or utopias; the purpose of ideal types is to provide a means of comparison with concrete reality in order to reveal the significance of that reality…

'In summary, Weber's theory offers a unified conceptual approach to analysis of both subjective mean and structural forms…

'Social scientists deal not with real actors but with ideal types who are puppets, not with the real social world but with a model of it' (Hekman, 1983: 8; 31; 32; 77; 93).

9   'Weber was fully aware of the shortcomings of his theory, which, moreover, he presented only in broad outline, without pursuing all its methodological implications. He has often been criticized for his failure to do so. The major part of the immense literature concerned with his work deals with his theory of knowledge, and in particular with the concept of the ideal type, often in an altogether negative manner. That in itself is an indirect recognition of the importance of the question he posed. He replied in advance to his future critics by inviting them to meditate on his propositions until they were in a position to offer something better' (Freund, 1972: 70).

'Alfred Schutz argues that because Weber fails to clarify what he means by "subjective meaning," his whole methodological approach, including his theory of ideal type, is not firmly grounded' (Hekman, 1983: 81).

10   An *ideal type is still regarded as* 'a one-sided emphasis and intensification of one or several aspects of a given event and represents a uniform mental structure. Weber is quite insistent on making clear that such an ideal type must be at least in the realm of probability and not merely possible. Thus, the construction of an ideal type can also be regarded as a working hypothesis, which, until its realistic worth has been proved by observation, may, like any other hypothesis, be of little analytic value. The ideal type, furthermore, is purely descriptive and should not be misused to explain the data it reveals; nor does it indicate what action can or should be taken. The ideal type is therefore primarily an instrument for classification, and as such useful for the systematic arrangement of several categories' (Secher's introduction in Weber, 1962: 14).

11   As observed in the introduction of Secher's translation of Weber (1962: 16):

'The importance of "understanding" lies for Weber in its strictly technical nature of providing a clue to the observation and theoretical interpretation of the subjective states of mind of individuals whose behavior is being studied. In other words "understanding" becomes a tool of sociological research which aims at providing more insight than can be had, even by the most precise statistical proof, and the high correlation between a given situation and a corresponding course of behavior. "Understanding" goes further by asking not only why an action has taken place but also why a certain "behavior pattern" continues to be followed. In this way the search for motivation is introduced as basic to any kind of sociological interpretation.'

12   The Enneagram is a very popular personality typology that has been traced back to Eastern origins (though contested in some quarters):

'The Enneagram is an ancient Sufi teaching that describes nine different personality types and their interrelationships. The teaching can help us to recognize our own type and how to cope with our issues; understand our work associates, lovers, family, and friends; and to appreciate the predisposition that each type has for higher human capacities such as empathy, omniscience, and love…The Enneagram is part of a teaching tradition that views personality preoccupations as teachers, or indicators of latent abilities that unfold during the development of higher consciousness… the complete Enneagram is one of the very few models of consciousness that addresses the relationship between personality and other levels of human capability. The power of the system lies in the fact that ordinary patterns of personality, those very habits of heart and mind that we tend to dismiss as merely neurotic, are seen as potential access points into higher states of awareness' (Palmer, 1991).

13   A cognitive *menetype* captures the essence of a particular perspective, or mode of thinking or knowing about reality. Mene (pronounced "meenie" with the second e sound shorter than the first) is the Aramaic word for

"numbered". This is the critical difference from an individual *ideal type*, as each *menetype* is always a numbered perspective of a trinity of related cognitive perspectives. *Menetype* is a new term coined by the author to avoid the limiting and negative connotations of the term *ideal type*, which has to come to be taken as not particularly related to reality. This new term is meant to reflect the fact that each *menetype* captures a particular perspective of reality but that the *menetype* (or a numbered *ideal type* within a trinity) never stands alone. *Menetypes* are formed in the mind and are always constructed within a set pattern of a trinity of perspectives. Each trinity of *menetypes* is connected in a hierarchical system of trinities or triadic unities as part of the process of knowing and understanding reality.

[14] 'In other words, the choice of object of investigation and the extent and depth to which this investigation attempts to penetrate into the infinite causal web, are determined by the evaluative ideas which dominate the investigator and his age. In the *method* of investigation, the guiding "point of view" is of great importance for the *construction* of the conceptual scheme which will be used in the investigation. In the mode of their *use*, however, the investigator is obviously bound by the norms of thought just as much here as elsewhere. For scientific truth is precisely what is *valid* for all who *seek* the truth' (Weber, 1949: 84).

The "point of view" or mindset informing this book is the Neoplatonic/Enneagram-like philosophy of mind explained in Chapter 2. The method and structure of the analysis in the book are also based on this trinitarian hierarchy of thinking and driven by the conceptual framework of the metaphor of the mind. The most critical observation in the paragraph above is the last sentence:

"For scientific truth is precisely what is *valid* for all who *seek* the truth"

The aim of this book is to so structure the analysis as to comply with Weber's (1949: 58) concept of scientific truth, namely: 'those arguments which appeal to our capacity and need for *analytically ordering* empirical reality in a manner which lays claim to *validity* as empirical truth.'

[15] 'The number and type of causes which have influenced any given event are always infinite and there is nothing in the things themselves to set some of them apart as alone meriting attention. A chaos of "existential judgments" about countless individual events would be the only result of a serious attempt to analyse reality "without presuppositions." And even this result is only seemingly possible, since every single perception discloses on closer examination an infinite number of constituent perceptions which can never be exhaustively expressed in a judgment. Order is brought into this chaos only on the condition that in every case only a *part* of concrete reality is interesting and *significant* to us, because only it is related to the *cultural values* with which we approach reality. Only certain sides of the infinitely complex concrete phenomenon, namely those to which we attribute a general *cultural significance*—are therefore worthwhile knowing. They alone are objects of causal explanation. And even this causal explanation evinces the same character; an *exhaustive* causal investigation of any concrete phenomena in its full reality is not only impossible—it is simply nonsense. We select only those causes to which are to be imputed in the individual case, the "essential" feature of an event' (Weber, 1949: 78).

The aim of the main text at this point is to explain how this limited appreciation of the world which is of any interest to us can be usefully differentiated into three distinct viewpoints that appreciate the presenting reality in three quite distinct ways, but nevertheless can be explained in terms that would be of interest to those in our particular cultural setting. The trinity of perspectives is, therefore, not trying to explain everything, or pretending to be everything but, rather, it reflects the human predilection to discriminate in particular ways—namely, through the cognitive device of the trinity of abstractions. The remainder of the infinite number of largely irrelevant perspectives is represented in *the other*, which is always associated with a particular trinity of abstraction (or *menetypes*).

[16] In essence, this expresses the Platonic aspect of the philosophy of the mind in that the higher principles infuse lower principles with their spirit though in a weaker reflection, as explained in great detail in the hierarchical construction of the world by Proclus (1963). So Plato (1952) might explain it in a way that starts off with three key transcendent Forms that emanate a few more transcendent Forms as a paler but still relatively pure Form, which then all influence and inspire a set of principles that guide the life of the society, the organization and, at the lowest level, the individual. Within such a Platonic (1952) construction it is easy to appreciate that the beliefs and mores at the society level will heavily influence and determine the nature and dynamics of the organization which both, in turn, influence the thinking and behaviour of the individual.

[17] These observations are in keeping with the characteristics that flow from thinking of these phenomena in terms of their differentiation into a trinity of *menetypes*. It is explained in the main text above and in more detail in Chapter 2, that when there is a primary *menetype* such as #A in this case, the secondary *menetype* in play is

menetype #B, with the other *menetype #C* being actively repressed. This pattern is highlighted in the many instances and examples discussed in this book, and to the extent that reality is seen to follow such a pattern of differentiation, the trinitarian construction is validated.

[18]   Apologies to Tolstoy (1954) for paraphrasing his famous opening line from Anna Karenina!

'All happy families are alike but an unhappy family is unhappy after its own fashion' (Tolstoy, 1954: 1).

[19]   An in-depth critique of Bernard Lonergan's works was informally pursued in response to the debate the authors engaged in with members of the Lonergan Society. As this critique was not germane to the main thesis it has not been formally written up except to the extent that it was incorporated into a couple of papers and personal letters. Threads of the argument appear later in Chapter 2 of this book as part of the explanation of the philosophy of mind.

[20]   The metaphor of the mind is an expression of the *JEWAL synthesis* philosophy of mind that is explained in Chapter 2 of the book. That Chapter explains that the mind can be thought of in terms of the way humans know; that is, in the way the mind knows by differentiating in a trinitarian hierarchy of abstract thinking about the subjective and objective reality.

In essence, the validity of the analysis of governance in the US society set out in this book rests upon the validity of this metaphor of the mind which is an expression of the *Jewel synthesis* philosophy of mind. Chapter 2, therefore, attempts to establish the validity of this philosophy of the mind by reference to the postulates of those Neoplatonic and scholastic philosophers from earlier days who developed cogent and coherent models/theories about the structure of thinking and knowing.

The JEWAL Synthesis Philosophy of Mind

We wish to suggest a structure for the salt of deoxyribose nucleic acid (DNA). This structure has novel features which are of considerable biological interest. (The opening sentence of the Nature article announcing Crick and Watson's discovery as quoted in Watson, 1968: 140.)

Abstract: The triadic structure of human knowing is introduced with reference to its historical roots, particularly as captured in Neo-Platonist philosophy. The hierarchical conception of the triadic structure of knowing and the significance of movements of development and regression within that hierarchy are explained. The comprehensive levels of the triadic formwork of human knowing are expounded and correlated to the well-known Enneagram typology.

INTRODUCTION

This book presents a basic structure of human knowing, which is seen to underpin and inform a sociological explanation of US society, corporations and constitutional government administration. Like DNA, the proposed structure of the way humans think (or the philosophy of mind) also has novel features, which are of considerable philosophical, psychological and sociological interest.

This Chapter develops the cognitive formwork from an understanding of the formulations of Aquinas (1952), Lonergan (1957; 1967), Jung (1971), Weber (1947; 1962), and the Enneagram (Riso, 1987; Palmer, 1991). The synthesis is new and goes beyond each of the sources to present a more systematic and useable *JEWAL Synthesis* Formwork[1]—and represents the key outcome of the authors' research. This new Formwork lines up so closely with the triadic differentiation of consciousness expostulated by the 3rd and 5th Century Neoplatonists Plotinus (1952) and Proclus (1963) that it could perhaps alternatively be called a quasi-Neoplatonic cognitive framework. From this Formwork, one can better understand how one knows and learns, how different people and groups think and react differently, and how different people subscribe to different theories of management and practice. Moreover, the Formwork helps explain the relationships between the differing intellectual perspectives and how a balanced approach can be developed so that individuals, or organizations, can choose to act in a more effective way.

The Formwork provides a rich, dynamic and powerful basis to understand and exploit the dynamics of human knowing—how humans govern their own and others' decisions and actions. Though the Formwork can be said to have ancient origins, the basic trinitarian dynamics can be seen to shine or glimmer through the works of later Western metaphysicians, philosophers, psychologists, sociologists and management gurus. Rather than track the Formwork backwards in the way it was unveiled during the course of the research, this section explains the Formwork calling on the ancient sources of wisdom first—for the principal reason that in these matters, at least, they seemed to exhibit much clearer sight, unencumbered as they were by the endlessly complicated baggage that weighs down the modern thinkers.

First, the Neoplatonic hierarchical structure of triadic unity is identified as a particularly pertinent and effective differentiation of reality. The dynamic structure and movement of this essentially ontological construction are explored mainly through the works of the 5th Century Neoplatonist Proclus (1963). The essential triadic nature of reality is captured, in essence, in the emanation from the unparticipated or the universal, to the participated as the middle term, and lastly to the participant.

Second, whereas the Neoplatonists developed their hierarchical construction of reality from a metaphysical viewpoint as emanations from the ultimate unity, later philosophers explained the differentiation of consciousness principally by working in the reverse direction. This intellectual reversion is captured in the understanding of Aquinas' three degrees of abstraction (Lonergan, 1967), which underscores a primary, secondary and tertiary differentiation of consciousness. The primary differentiation explains thinking and knowing in relation to the increasingly esoteric levels of the self, the group and the society. The secondary differentiation sees each of these

levels as a triadic unity of experience, intelligibility and rationality. These three hypostatic phases themselves can be seen as triadic unities at the tertiary level of differentiation. The consequential power of understanding in this particularly structured differentiation of consciousness is exemplified in an explanation of the cognitive dynamics behind the "modernists'" eternal pursuit of the "real", the "true" and the "good". It explains the same, but essentially different, natures of these human intellectual pursuits and, in so doing, leads on to an explanation of the structural characteristics of thinking and knowing within the JEWAL Synthesis Formwork. The new Formwork includes a more systematic and extensive differentiation of consciousness than has been used by philosophers in the past—but the genesis of it is to be found particularly in the works of Aquinas (1952; 1963).

Third, the Chapter explains the process of learning in terms of the cognitive procession through the layered levels of differentiated consciousness. The deeper nature of these cognitive processions is explored and a more fundamental understanding of the importance and consequences of psychic energy is presented. Of particular importance is the exploration of the phenomenon of immediate cognition or intellectual intuition—a concept that suggests that we can know with certainty in the instant. This section culminates in a suggestion that the holistic conceptual framework of thinking and knowing can be thought of in terms of a construction somewhat similar to that of the double helix of DNA.

Fourth, an explanation follows as to how this cognitive Formwork can be used to explain a character typology based on the differentiation of consciousness—one that finds expression in a typology commonly known as the Enneagram (Riso, 1987; Palmer, 1991). Further, an understanding of the true nature of character typologies in terms of the new cognitive Formwork suggests how Jung's (1971) typology is to be completed, to result in a one-for-onephilosophical correspondence with the Enneagram typology. Essentially, the JEWAL Synthesis Formwork is presented as a comprehensive framework in which to understand human governance and social action. The various theories of management and leadership, culture, and strategic and operational decision making are given more meaning and power as their interconnectedness can be understood within the terms of the new governance Formwork. More broadly, this section discusses the significance for the social sciences of achieving such a synthesis of ideas within this new Formwork—a synthesis between the Western developed philosophy, which runs through the work of Aquinas (1952), Lonergan (1957), Weber (1962) and Jung (1971), and the Eastern physio-psychological wisdom encapsulated in the Enneagram typology (Riso, 1987; Palmer, 1991).

THE DIFFERENTIATION OF "REALITY"

"How do we know?" is the central question to come to an understanding of the way the human mind works. From an understanding of how we know comes an understanding of the construction that can be made of the structure of the cognitive processes and the levels of consciousness. The task is to find the basic building block in its essential simplicity and reasonableness. This section focuses on explaining the basic structure and movements of the trinitarian-cum-holistic cognitive dynamics. A relatively fulsome explanation of the foundation of the triadic (or trinitarian) world is developed by calling mainly on the metaphysics of Proclus (1963; with commentary by Dodds, 1963), who essentially formalised much of the Plotinus (1952) structure of reality.

First, the late Neoplatonists are seen as quite important in the development of Western thought as they effectively Aristotelianised Plato 'by incorporating with the Platonic tradition all that was best in Aristotle' (Dodds, 1963: xiix). They were also recognised as providing the bridge in the development of thinking through Augustine (1952) in the 5th Century and Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (1920) in the 6th Century to Thomas Aquinas (1952) in the 13th Century and so lay the groundwork for the Enlightenment. As Armstrong (1940: 120) observed, 'Plotinus is not only the most vital connecting link in the history of European philosophy, as being the philosopher in whom the Hellenic tradition was in full development and maturity was brought into touch with the beginning of Christian philosophy. He is also one of the few ancient philosophers whom we can still honor though not uncritically, as a master, and not simply study as a historical curiosity.' Moreover, with regard to Proclus, 'Historians of the Middle Ages are beginning to realize his importance as one of the fountain-heads of that Neoplatonic tradition which, mingling unrecognized with the slow-moving waters of medieval thought, issued beyond them at last to re-fertilize the world at the Renaissance' (Dodds, 1963: xxvi).

Second, Proclus (1963) was very clear in postulating that all of reality starting from the Divine could be explained as comprising a continuous hierarchical structure of triadic relationships.

> This involves the assumption of a triadic structure of reality parallel to the triadic divisions of Prop 23 [which is the basic triad explained in this section]… The conception of the universe as penetrated by the same forces at successive levels is characteristic of Iamblichus, but the triadic formulation of this law is possibly Proclus's own (Dodds, 1963: 235–236).

> There is an unbroken continuity throughout from the highest to almost the lowest, from the One to the form in the body, if not to the matter. Every stage of being is necessary to the perfection of the whole and the higher stages are eternal both as a whole and in all their parts. Even the material universe is eternal as a whole (Armstrong, 1940: 112).

Third, each triad (or trinity) is essentially a 'unity-in-distinction' (Dodds, 1963: 300). Each of the three phases of a triad, particularly at the highest levels, is often referred to as a hypostasis implying a separate unity and existence, but it is quite clear that it is not seen alone but always in conjunction and association with the other two phases forming a unity. 'Thus all the intellectual Forms exist both in one another as a unity and also each apart in its distinctness… Thus all exist both together and severally. But if all are together in one being devoid of parts, they interpenetrate one another; and if they exist severally they are on the other hand distinct and unconfused; so that each exists by itself, yet all in all' (Proclus, 1963: 155; 173). That is, the basic dynamic is unambiguously that of a triad as shown in Fig. **2.1**.

Figure 2.1: The Basic Building Block of Triadic Unity

Fourth, Proclus (1963) developed his hierarchical structure of reality from a metaphysical perspective—that is, as an emanation downward from the highest reaches of Unity or Divinity. In this manner, the higher levels were seen as immanent as a cause in the lower. Therefore, the basic rationale of each Neoplatonic triad is the flow of causation from an unparticipated term to a participated or middle term and then on to participants.

As Proclus (1963) explains, 'The unparticipated, then, precedes the participated, and the participants. For, to express it shortly, the first is a unity prior to the many; the participated is within the many, and is yet not-one; while all that participates is not-one yet one… Accordingly all the classes… are bound together by the appropriate mean terms, and the first principles do not pass immediately into emanations wholly diverse from themselves; there are intermediate classes, having characters in common both with their causes and with their immediate effects. These immediate principles link the extreme terms in one unified structure; by community of nature susceptible of influence from their neighbors above, transcending without interval their neighbors below, they preserve an ordered sequence' (Proclus, 1963: 29; 119). This constitutes the basic triad of hypostatic phases as conceptualised in Fig. **2.1**. The outer circle in the diagram captures the 'hypostasis of a subordinate triad' (Dodds, 1963: 252), or a unity-in-being (or essence) that

holds the particular triad of differentiation. It reflects the movement *from the three to the four*—a movement from the symbol of perfection to that of wholeness, which came in for a lot of attention by Jung (1960; 1964b; 1969a; 1969b; 1970).

Figure 2.2: The Hierarchical Structure of Triadic Unity

Fifth, the hierarchical structure of these basic triads is as shown in Fig. **2.2.** 'The motives governing this development seem to have been (a) the recognition that reality is logically prior to thought, since the thinker, in order to think, must first exist; (b) the desire to arrange causes in an ontological order corresponding to their degree of universality; (c) the post-Plotinian theory that all intelligibles have a triadic structure, mirroring at every level the fundamental triad' (Dodds, 1963: 252–253).

Moreover, the nature of each of the phases of the triads is similar at each level of the hierarchy and mirrors the basic nature attributed to the corresponding phase (or hypostasis) of the highest Divine Trinity. This is a particular application of the general principle that 'all things are in all things, but in each after its own fashion' (Dodds, 1963: 254). There are connections within a particular triad and between successive triads:[2]

'Every original monad gives rise to two series, one consisting of substances complete in themselves, and one of irradiation which have their substantiality in something other than themselves… The latter are on such a level that they belong to their participants: for being incomplete they require a substrate for their existence. The former make the participants belong to them: for being complete they fill the participants with themselves… Accordingly those substances which are complete in themselves, while by their discrimination into a manifold they fall short of their original monad, are yet in some wise assimilated to it by their self-complete existence… But all procession advances through similars until it reaches the wholly dissimilar (prop. 28). Thus each of the original monads gives rise to two series' (Proclus, 1963: 62–63).

One series reflects the trinity defining new levels and the other reflects the immediate trinity of which the monad is a hypostatic phase.

Sixth, the Formwork is dynamic in that there is a procession (going with the arrows in the **Figures**) from the higher to the lower (often called an emanation) and a recession in reverse. As Proclus (1963: 37) explains: 'All procession is accomplished through a likeness of the secondary to the primary… and… All that proceeds from any principle reverts in respect of its being upon that from which it proceeds.'

The procession happens in the manner of cause and effect, whereas the reversion is akin to the process of questioning on the way things are to identify the underlying cause. 'For that which reverts endeavours to be conjoined in every part with every part of its cause, and desires to be in communion with it and be bound to it…

Every effect remains in its cause, proceeds from it, and reverts upon it… since all reversion seems to be the resolution of a principle into something from which its being divides it' (Proclus, 1963: 37–39). In this way, procession is akin to implementation or production, whereas reversion is akin to questioning and learning. For '[a]s likeness is the condition of procession, so also is it the condition of reversion: moreover, likeness is the condition of all knowledge… and knowledge is a kind of reversion' (Dodds, 1963: 219).

Moreover, this movement is continual and continuous; 'Procession and reversion together constitutes a single movement, the diastole–systole which is the life of the universe' (Dodds, 1963: 219).

Seventh, the movement (i.e. the procession and reversion) occurs both within a particular triad and between triads on adjacent levels in a particular manner. For instance, there is a connection to the supra-jacent level through the third or highest phase of the trinity or through similar phases of the trinity (i.e. between *phase #C* of the lower level and *phase #A* of the higher level or, say, from the *phase #B* of one level to the *phase #B* of an adjacent level). As Proclus (1963: 97; 99–101; 131) postulates:

> Every particular member of an order can participate the monad of the rank immediately supra-jacent in one of two ways: either through the universal of its own order, or through the particular member of the higher series which is co-ordinate with it in respect of its analogous relation to that series as a whole… through which its reversion upon the former can take place, advancing through similars to the dissimilar: for the one resembles it through their common particularity, and the other is closely bound to it as a member of the same series, while the universal of the supra-jacent series is unlike it in both these respects.
>
> The first members of any order have the form of their priors. For the highest classes in each order are conjoined with the supra-jacent principles because of their likeness to them and because of the continuity of procession in the universe… Therefore there will be likeness between the initial principles of the lower order and the last members of the higher [i.e. between *phase #C* of the lower order and *phase #A* of the higher order].

Eighth, each trinity is joined together as an integrated system or single unity where each phase can be reached from any other phase, which reflects both the trinitarian nature and the cyclical nature or periodicity of temporal reality. In particular, there is a reversion from the lowest to the highest both through the intermediate term and also directly (i.e. with the arrow from *phase #A* to *phase #C* in Fig. **2.1**).

> All that proceeds from any principle and reverts upon it has a cyclic activity. For if it reverts upon that principle whence it proceeds it links its end to the beginning, and the movement is one and continuous, originating from the unmoved and to the unmoved again returning. Thus all things proceed in a circuit, from their causes to their causes again. There are greater circuits and lesser, in that some revert upon their immediate priors, others upon their superior causes, even to the beginning of all things. For out of the beginning all things are, and towards it all revert.
>
> In any divine procession the end is assimilated to the beginning, maintaining by its reversion thither a circuit without beginning and without end… This reversion of the end upon the beginning makes the whole order one and determinate, convergent upon itself and by its convergence revealing unity in multiplicity (Proclus, 1963: 37; 129).

This particular property of reality is important because (as will be discussed in the next section) it is the principal cognitive dynamic validating the long-time controversial phenomenon of immediate cognition or intellectual intuition.

Ninth, at any one time, one of the phases of the trinity will predominate. Essentially, this is a consequence of the continual movement between the phases of a particular trinity and across adjacent levels of trinities. As identified above, Proclus (1963) explains that the three modes of a single trinity can be regarded as three aspects (or hypostases) of a single reality and/or three successive phases in the unfolding cosmos.

> All things are in all things, but in each according to its proper nature: For in Being there is life and intelligence; in Life, being and intelligence; in Intelligence, being and life; but each of these exists upon one level intellectually, upon another vitally, and on the third essentially… they are successive, not co-

ordinate, for each is predominate (though not to the exclusion of the others) at a certain stage… This may be expressed by saying that the triad is mirrored in each of its terms, so that while e.g. the first term has Being as its predominant character, it is at the same time Life and Intelligence *sub specie entitatis* (Proclus, 1963: 93; Dodds, 1963: 254).

As will be discussed in the next section, this particular dynamic property of reality is the principal cause to validate and formulate character differences between individuals.

In summary, the structure and dynamics of the new *JEWAL Synthesis Formwork* can be seen to be totally consistent and representative of the hierarchical, trinitarian structure of reality expounded by the Neoplatonists. The Formwork can therefore be characterised as a quasi-Neoplatonic interpretation of reality.

THE DIFFERENTIATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS

In this section, the structure and dynamics of human knowing and personal governance are explained by using the new Formwork as a lens into the writings of mainly Aquinas (1952) and Lonergan (1957; 1967).

The writings of Thomas Aquinas (1952) can be seen in one sense to build on the Neoplatonic metaphysical framework (albeit from a highly Christianised perspective) by reflecting more on the process of reversion particularly as it applies to the human intellect. The recent scholastic philosopher Bernard Lonergan (1957)—who claims to have reached up to the mind of Aquinas sufficiently to justify reinterpreting him—goes much further in this direction by focusing principally on the process of reversion to develop a whole thesis of how we know and how we know we know.[3] In so doing, Lonergan (1957) formulates in great detail, the three principal levels of knowing; namely, *phase #A* of experience, *phase #B* of intelligibility and *phase #C* of rationality. These three phases form the core trinitarian dynamic of personal knowing in the new Formwork of knowing. This principal focus on the process of reversion is adopted in this section to explain the structure and dynamics of knowing. It is contended that this explanation is essentially consistent with Aquinas (1952) but is developed to a much higher degree of differentiation than is done explicitly by Lonergan (1957).

First, in respect to human knowing, the term abstraction is used to explain what the Neoplatonists outlined as the process of reversion.

> The Philosopher says that "things are intelligible in proportion as they are separable from matter." Therefore, material things must be understood according as they are abstracted from matter and from material likenesses, namely, phantasms… Therefore we must say that our intellect understands material things by abstracting from the phantasms, and through material things thus considered we acquire some knowledge of immaterial things (Aquinas, 1952: 451–452 or *Summa Theologica* I, Q. 85, Art. 1).

> The human mind comes to know by abstracting a form from a material existent. The human mind only comes to know itself when it reflects on the processes of coming to know something else (Hall, 1992: 67).

In defining abstraction, Lonergan (1967: 39) suggested 'that by psychological account of abstraction we mean the elimination by the understanding of the intellectually irrelevant because it is understood to be irrelevant. That we submit, is the very point of the celebrated three degrees of abstraction.' To this definition should be added Reith's (1958: 24) assessment that 'As Gilson says "to abstract is not primarily to leave something out, but to take something in, and this is the reason why abstractions are knowledge." Thus in natural philosophy, the mind grasps what is intelligible in the world of physical reality. If abstraction were a mere prescinding from matter, it would be only negation.'

The core understanding of Aquinas's theory of abstraction (Lonergan, 1967), therefore, is that ***it postulates three degrees of abstraction within the dynamics of the human mind***. Aquinas is said to have meant that (as interpreted in Lonergan, 1967: 42):

'Conceptualization is the self-expression of an act of understanding…

- in so far as the understanding has its conditions all within the intelligible order, the expression abstracts from all that is sensible and imaginable, and so it is in the third degree;

- in so far as the understanding has conditions in the imaginable, but not in the empirical, order of sensible presentations, the abstraction is of the second degree; and

- in so far as the understanding has conditions within the empirical order of sensible presentations, the abstraction is of the first degree; but there is always some abstraction.'

This order used to describe Aquinas' three degrees of abstraction from the highest to the lowest, reflects the Neoplatonists procession from universals or the unparticipated to individual participants.[4] This order is now reversed to help better explain the process of abstraction as it operates in the human intellect. That is, the process of abstraction could essentially be explained as a process of reversion from the concrete reality in the participants to the universals contained in the unparticipated.

Through the lens of the new Formwork (but hotly contested by Lonergan's followers!), it could be argued that Lonergan (1957; 1967) uses this reversed order to help support the development of his three principle phases of knowing which are *to experience*, *to understand*, and *to judge*. That is, the first phase dealing with what one makes of the concrete world of the senses; the second phase dealing with the intelligible understanding or possible meanings of what has been experienced; and, the third phase dealing with the judgments and commitment to universals that express a fundamental truth of fact, or the cause behind the effect. Into Lonergan's (1957) very fulsome explanations of the dynamics of knowing through these three different phases can be seen the reality that all three are operating together, but at any one time one phase is predominant with the other two in supporting roles, to a greater or lesser degree.

As a consequence, a case can be made (as with the theory of *menetypes* explained earlier)—though Lonergan (1957) certainly did not say so—that the dynamics of these three principal phases of knowing can be explained as the operation of the three phases of a trinitarian dynamic as conceptualised in Fig. **2.3**, and then in more detail in Fig. **2.4**. That there is a hierarchy of such trinitarian dynamics within the intellectual act of knowing is merely a sequential application of Aquinas' three degrees of abstraction. Alternatively it can be substantiated by an extrapolation of the Neoplatonic triadic construction of reality (Proclus, 1963).

Figure 2.3: The Trinitarian Unity of Knowing in the Self

Figure 2.4: The Hierarchical Structure of Knowing in the Self

Second, from the dynamics of the quasi-Neoplatonic triadic framework of reality, each phase (or mode) of thinking can be accessed from any other phase of thinking. That there is abstraction (i.e. reversion) from *phase #A* to *#B* to *#C* is fully explained in great detail by Lonergan (1957) in the development of his Method. That there is implementation (i.e. procession) from *phase #C* to *#B* to *#A*, is explained by Lonergan (1971) in his later work in relation to the implementation and propagation of theological doctrines. The most contentious aspect of the dynamic is the validity of the movement directly between the highest and lowest degrees of abstraction (i.e. directly between *phases #A* and *#C*).

Such a movement going from the lowest level of experience direct to the highest degree of knowing definitively is termed immediate cognition or intellectual intuition. Lonergan (1957: 269) says emphatically that he has not identified with such a phenomenon and discounts its occurrence. It seems that most other later philosophers agree (Eco, 1988: 62). However, others (e.g. Hamilton, 1859: 46) argue that there is a phenomenon of intellectual intuition as seemingly suggested in the writings of Proclus (1963) and Aquinas (1952). For instance (in addition to the quotes at *Point Eight* in the previous section): 'since intuitive knowledge is the beginning and first cause of all knowledge… Now the human consciousness does enjoy intuitive thought but it does so intermittently' (Proclus, 1963: 23; Dodds, 1963: 233). What is meant here is that the human intellect can reach up a few levels of reversion

without working meticulously through each intervening level of intellect along the way as required by Lonergan. More specifically, Proclus (1963: 63) argues that 'either we see the product as pre-existent in the producer which is the cause… or we see the producer in the product… or else we contemplate each thing in its own station, neither in its cause nor in its resultant'.

In addition, this ability to move readily between the different modes of thinking shows up throughout the writing of Aquinas (1952; 1963) but particularly in his notion of the two different processes of abstraction; namely, abstraction and separation.

> So there are two abstractions of the intellect. One corresponds to the union of form and matter or accident and subject. This is the abstraction of form from sensible matter. The other corresponds to the union of whole and part; and to this corresponds the abstraction of the universal from the particular. This is the abstraction of a whole, in which we consider a nature absolutely, according to its essential character, in independence of all parts that do not belong to the species but are accident parts. But we do not find abstractions opposed to these, by which a part is abstracted from a whole or matter from form, because a part either cannot be abstracted from a whole by the intellect if it is one of the parts of matter in whose definition the whole is included; or it can even exist without the whole if it is one of the parts of the species; for instance, a line without a triangle, a letter without a syllable, or an element without a mixed body. But in the case of things that can exist separately, separation rather than abstraction obtains (Aquinas, 1963: 32).

The distinction of the two types of abstraction into that of abstraction or separation is drawn out well by Reith (1958: 21–29) mainly from Aquinas' Exposition of the Trinity of Boethius, Q. 5, Art. 3 (quoted above). Essentially, these are two separate cognitive processes or, as Aquinas (1963: 30) says, 'Accordingly, through its various operations, the intellect distinguishes one thing from another in different ways.' In essence, the two processes can be thought of as going in opposite directions; the first, which is truly called abstraction from sensitive going from the first degree of abstraction to the second and then onto the third. The second process, which is called separation, goes from the first degree of abstraction to the third, but resulting in a different rationality or judgment than that reached by the first process.

That is, the first process leads to the true and the second process leads to the real; or as Aquinas says, 'The first is that in which we abstract form from matter, and the second is that in which we abstract a whole from its parts' (Aquinas, 1963: 30).

In summary, the structure and process of human personal knowing can be differentiated into three principal phases, as explained by Aquinas and Lonergan in particular. However, that these three phases should be regarded as a 'unity-in-distinction' (Dodds, 1963: 300) which, is to say, as a triadic unity, or trinity, in the spirit of the Neoplatonic construction of reality, is the particular conscious innovation (or articulation) which is incorporated in the *JEWAL Synthesis* Formwork of this book.

Third, the structure and process of knowing can usefully be thought of as differentiated systematically to a much greater extent than that formally propounded by Lonergan (although he did make casual allusion to the other "sub-phases" now to be differentiated formally). In essence, the further differentiation is achieved by a successive application of Aquinas' three degrees of abstraction (Lonergan, 1967: 42)—which can alternatively be explained as reversions through successive trinities in line with the Neoplatonic construction of reality. Discussion of the particular phases brought out within the Formwork can be found within the writings of many philosophers and psychologists, but it has not yet been put together consciously in such a manner as proposed in the *JEWAL Synthesis* Formwork.

Essentially, the structure and dynamics of knowing can usefully be differentiated into primary, secondary and tertiary levels of abstraction, each of which can then be differentiated into a further three degrees of abstraction. Each grouping of three, at whatever level, operates as a trinitarian unity within a hierarchy of trinitarian unities, in keeping with the spirit of the Neoplatonic hierarchical triadic structure (Proclus, 1963).

The differentiated, integrated structure of knowing depicted in Fig. **2.5** consists essentially of the following primary, secondary, and tertiary intellectual levels of knowing (consciousness).

Figure 2.5: The Trinitarian Differentiation of Consciousness   **Figure 2.6:** The Personal Shadow

- The primary level, reflecting the intellectual operation at the subordinate phases of the self, the group, or the society. This primary level trinity of the intellect reflects a knowledge of the individual as concrete and tangibly experienced, that of a group requiring an imaginative assembling of the various data of experience in the spirit of Aquinas' (1952: 457) dictate: 'The intellect can indeed understand many things as one, but not as many; that is to say, by one but not by many intelligible species.' Thinking at the third level of the society is much more conceptual and subtle and is principally governed by identifying universals incorporated in the culture or the spirit of a society (or many groupings of people). In particular, Fig. **2.4** portrays the secondary and tertiary levels of *phase #A* of the Self only within this Primary Level of the Intellect.

- The secondary level (as applicable in particular within the "primary phase" of the individual) captures the three phases of personal knowing attributed above to Aquinas (1952) and Lonergan (1957); namely, experience (to sense), intelligibility (to understand), and rationality (to judge).

- The tertiary level is conceptualised by the further differentiation of each of these three secondary levels of personal knowing by a process of differentiating each phase at the secondary level into a further three degrees of abstraction. Others, including Aquinas, can certainly be understood as differentiating to this tertiary level but have not formally conceptualised it in the manner incorporated into the *JEWAL Synthesis* Formwork.

This section goes on to explain each of these "tertiary level sub-phases" within each of the "secondary level phases" beginning at the lowest level of experiencing through to the highest level of judgment (as shown in Fig. **2.4**). Then some substantiation of moving to this tertiary level of differentiation will be discussed at least for one of the phases at the secondary level (namely, there is a discussion below on the trinitarian nature of the tertiary level of the third phase of rationality).

Fourth, the first phase of the secondary level of knowing is the *phase #A* of experience (or sensate perception). This is the phase where one intellectually experiences or encounters the world. 'Sensation has a bodily basis and functionally it is linked to bodily movements' (Lonergan, 1957: 1182)—that is, what one takes in from one's senses and processes through common sense (being where the senses are brought together and integrated to form a phantasm), and is registered in one's conscious or unconscious psyche. This, in essence, is the raw data of reality—or, more pertinently, the individual's reality. We store these experiences away in our memory to be recalled with varying degrees of ease some time later. If one really thinks about it, the current instant passes very quickly and one is inevitably processing the data after the event. Then it is essentially the data of the memory that are being processed. Such data could be readily accessible or could be cast down into the unconscious.

This *phase #A* of experience can be further differentiated by applying Aquinas' three degrees of abstraction to obtain the following three sub-phases.

- *Extraversion (phase #A^A of thinking*, where sense impressions are continually updated and changed by reference to the senses; in fact, the person tends to find his/her identity in the external world. It seems similar in operation to Aquinas' concept of reproductive imagination (Brennan, 1941: 127), where the image of the object is reproduced as faithfully as possible. Jung (1971: paragraph 710) described extraversion as 'an outward-turning of libido… a positive movement towards the object.'

- *Introversion (phase #B^A of thinking)*, where the internal world is the principal point of reference, often independent from any external stimuli and new information or new concepts, which are only taken on through a fairly heavy filtering process. It would seem to involve a primary focus similar to that found in Aquinas' explanation of the operation of the creative imagination and memory powers (Brennan, 1941: 127–130). Jung (1971: paragraph 769) describes introversion as 'an inward-turning of *libido*…Interest does not move towards the object but withdraws from it into the subject.'

- *Apperception (phase #C^A of thinking)*,[5] which is the seeing of something more in reality beyond that which we can imagine as an extension of the concrete objects. 'The term was originally used as a way of emphasizing the distinction between a passive sensation and a mental content self-consciously "apperceived"… It became the major technical term used by German philosophers to express what they considered to be the two fundamental features of the human mind: the fact that mental experience is not composed of separate bits but forms a unity, and the fact that this unity involves a constructive activity of the mind itself rather than a passive reflection of external events. This usage is found in the highly influential philosophy of Immanuel Kant where a clear distinction is introduced between the empirically observed unity of experience and a *transcendental apperception,* a cognitive act, which makes this unity possible' (Gregory, 1987: 33). This would also seem similar to the operation of Aquinas' estimative power, which is termed 'cogitative power or particular reason' (Brennan, 1941: 133; 144).

Fifth, the second phase of the secondary level of knowing is the *phase #B* of Intelligibility (or Jung's intellectual perception). How one understands reality actually requires a continual processing of the raw data into the intellectual patterns or universal concepts at one's disposal to assimilate the data. When we strike a situation or raw data that do not fit into the conceptual models we currently hold, there is a tension—creating the energy of inquiry. If one goes with this energy, one poses questions that enable one to keep reassembling data until one gains an insight that enables one to see new connections and meaning of the data. One then develops new concepts or formulations to help make sense of the reality presenting itself. For instance, Edwards (1996:183–184) describes Paul Keating's (a recent Australian Prime Minister) insight into the workings of the economy:

> He had ideas about economics and economic policy, about what made the place tick, but…. He did not know how they fitted things together… economics had a language of its own, employed by a group of people new to him, a group of people he had not yet been able to handicap… [At the start] the task of coming to grips with understanding it seemed to him so great as to be much bigger than he had ever undertaken. But then…

> "You need a framework, you need experience, you need judgment. You get clever with age. Things are puzzling and confused; you see it all jumbled up and then one day it's like putting on a pair of glasses—they are all suddenly clear and bright and you can see the arrangement, how all the bits fit." That's the economy he's talking about.

Because of the limitations of language, it is difficult to formulate one's understanding exactly, and one may arrive at a few ways to describe the meaning of the data. This is the level where one makes sense of the world (or the level of perception as used by Jung, 1971; von Franz and Hillman, 1971) and where we instil a coherent order into the range of data acquired through the *phase #A* of experience.

This *phase #B* of understanding or intellectual perception can be further differentiated by applying Aquinas's three degrees of abstraction to obtain the following three sub-phases.

- *Sensation (phase #A^B of thinking)*, which takes the phantasm from the lower phases of sense experience and makes meaning of it in a concrete sense. It is grounded in reality in that the phantasm is the formation of the

perceptual image of the external reality. This is equivalent to Jung's (1971) function of sensation which is defined as 'the psychological function that mediates the perception of a physical stimulus—perception mediated by the sense organs and "body-senses" but as given meaning in the mind'.

- *Intuition (phase #B^B of thinking)*, which is the perception of something more imaginative in the objects than is presented by the senses, and which relies on a conceptual framework built up by prior insights into connections and totalities of things.

  'The intuitive function is represented in consciousness by an attitude of expectancy, by vision and penetration; but only from the subsequent result can it be established... how much was "read into" it... so intuition tries to apprehend the widest range of possibilities, since only through envisioning possibilities is intuition fully satisfied… In intuition a content presents itself whole and complete, without our being able to explain or discover how this content came into existence' (Jung, 1971: paragraphs 610; 612; 770). This can be seen as moving one step up into having the conditions of knowing in the imaginable.

  Aesthesis (phase #C^C of thinking), which is regarded as the perception of something more in reality— 'aesthetic perception requires a certain detachment which is lived by the body and its senses, but whose principle is found in the transcendental imagination as a capacity to create distance' (Dufrenne, 1973: 359). That is, it must be held at a distance beyond presence and imagination and become a spectacle to the mind. Dufrenne contends that sense perception provides the secondary support to aesthetic perception and that the operation of imagination (meaning intuition) 'is only a modest one' (Dufrenne, 1973: 360). This observation of essentially a primary, secondary and repressed third phase is picked up later as an example of the characteristic dynamic of the trinity of knowing.

  Jung (1971: paragraph 794) also captures this concept although he does not quite acknowledge it as a separate function. 'Abstract sensation is a differentiated perception, which might be termed "aesthetic" in so far as, obeying its own principle, it detaches itself from all contamination with the different elements in the perceived object and from all admixtures of thought and feeling, and thus attains a degree of purity beyond the reach of concrete sensation'.

Sixthly, the third phase of the secondary level of knowing is the *phase #C* of rationality. At the lower *phase #B* of intelligibility, there is an understanding but one is not necessarily committed to this as the real truth or the real solution to the situation. In the *phase #C* of rationality, one is looking to assess and personally say "yes" or "no" and so accept or reject a particular formulation as *the* explanation or *the* solution. Having formulated propositions in the *phase #B* of intelligibility, one then discerns, chooses, asserts and then assents or not that it is so. We might only agree with certain provisos, but we make a stand—we take a position on it in some way. This is the phase in which one takes an intellectual position against the world (which in the process of reasoning is, after taking account of all the variations of understanding, reached in the *phase #B* of intelligibility)—but only after checking the facts back to data caught in the *phase #C* of experience (even if one has to undertake more actions or experiments to acquire more relevant data). That is, all three phases are involved but the *phase #C* of rationality predominates.

If, within this *phase #C* of judgment, we merely affirm and choose the best alternative proposition available, we add to the store of knowledge that can be applied at a later date. If, however, we reflect intensely and canvass all the relevant questions, there may be another burst of insight to grasp the totality of the system of reality in one act of "reflective" understanding. Our viewpoint is, then, transformed and we, henceforth, see with new eyes. It is as if we have moved further up the *spiral of knowledge and understanding*.

This *phase #C* of judgment and decision can be further differentiated by applying Aquinas' three degrees of abstraction to obtain the following three sub-phases.[6]

- *Conation or "Willing the good" (phase #A^C of thinking)*, which has conditions in the empirical order because it is tied to the sensible by the necessity for it to be possible (i.e. the will desires to change the present reality into a different or better reality). 'The will is nothing but an inclination consequent upon the form understood…' (Aquinas, 1952: 468). It is the synthesis of, and commitment to, a realistic vision about the ends that could be rather than what is.[7] This is the function that keeps taking the present and attempts to create a new present by committing to a vision of the future that could be made present by human action. It is different from fantasy or dreaming, as willing is directly connected to present reality.

- *Reasoning or "Judging the true" (phase #B^C of thinking)*, which is one step removed in that it involves a process of reasoning. The process aims at a universal truth that is obtained by abstracting the relevant contingent realities to focus on the connections between the relevant parts; that is, 'the act of judgment is not merely synthesis but also positing synthesis. The issue, then, is not knowledge as true or false, but knowledge as known to be true or false…True knowing is similar, false knowing is dissimilar, to the known… Assent occurs when we judge a conception to be true' (Lonergan, 1967: 59–61).

  This is also equivalent to Jung's rational function of thinking which 'following its own laws, brings the contents of ideation into conceptual connection with one another (i.e. synthesis)… The term "thinking" should, in my view, be confined to the linking up of ideas by means of a concept, in other words, to an act of judgment, no matter whether this act is intentional or not… [it is] a rational function, because it arranges the contents of ideation under concepts in accordance with a rational norm of which I am conscious' (Jung, 1971: paragraphs 830–831).

- *Assessment or "Assessing the real" (phase #C^C of thinking)*, which is yet another step removed in grasping the essence or, some would say, the aesthetic message in the presenting reality. It is something beyond the power of our imagination to play with (as it plays with concepts), something beautiful and embracing that is hard to imagine or describe except by analogy—it is like true aesthetic assessment. This is essentially the equivalent of Lonergan's (1957) judgment of value or Jung's (1971) feeling function, which 'is primarily a process that takes place between the *ego* and a given content, a process, moreover, that imparts to the content a definite *value* in the sense of acceptance or rejection ("like" or "dislike")… feeling is a kind of judgment, differing from intellectual judgment in that its aim is not to establish conceptual relations but to set up a subjective criterion of acceptance or rejection. Feeling, like thinking is a rational function, since values in general are assigned according to the laws of reason, just as concepts in general are formed according to these laws. The more concrete it is, the more subjective is the value conferred upon them; but the more abstract it is, the more objective the value will be' (Jung, 1971: paragraphs 724–727).

  'Feeling is that in me which relates to a certain quality of the object through which the object manifests its intimacy… Feeling reveals being not only as reality but also as depth… Authentic feeling is a new immediacy… feeling has a noetic quality. It reveals a world' (Dufrenne, 1973: 376–378).

  That is, there is an assessment of the true essence of the object or reality. This function also encompasses saying "yes" or "no" to beliefs. Beliefs are readily accessible to the conscious and can be used in the instant to assess the present reality; for instance, whether something is good or bad, beautiful or ugly, holy or mundane, just or unjust. Some beliefs are perhaps *a priori* or otherwise established in early childhood years and are deeply held—they are usually changed only through dramatic experiences.

Seventh, in an attempt to develop some reader confidence in the validity of the "new way" of differentiating at the tertiary level, it will now be explained how the three sub-phases of *phase #C* of rationality can be regarded as a triadic unity or trinity. This will be done by showing how "willing the good," "judging the true" and "assessing the real" are essentially an expression at the same cognitive level of rationality, but with a different orientation, and how they are interdependent and operate together. This level of rational judgment is chosen to be exemplified principally because personal preferences at this level are the main determinants of the individual's motivation and personality.

Commitment of will (or decisions) and assessments of value about reality can be regarded as judgments or assents about different things that are made on the same level of rational consciousness as the judgments of objective truth. As Lonergan (1957: 612–613; emphasis added) acknowledges:

> For the decision itself is an act of willing. It possesses the internal alternatives of either consenting or refusing… The fundamental nature of decision is best revealed by comparing it with judgment. Decision, then, resembles judgment inasmuch as both select one member of a pair of contradictories; as judgment either affirms or denies, so decision either consents or refuses. Again, both decision and judgment (of fact) are concerned with actuality; but judgment is concerned to complete one's knowledge of an actuality that already exists; while decision is concerned to confer actuality upon a course of action that otherwise will not exist. Finally, ***both decision and judgment are rational***, both deal with objects apprehended by

insight, and both occur because of a reflective grasp of reasons. However, there is a radical difference between the rationality of judgment and the rationality of decision.

While it will be explained later how each of these three differently oriented assents (i.e. decision, judgment and assessment) differ on the level of rational consciousness, the important point here is that they are depicted as being essentially equivalent because all are rational—but there is still a difference. Though Lonergan (1957; 1971) clearly has the will as following the intellect or judgment of the true (which it sometimes does if the process of cognitive reversion is pursued at the level of rationality), and as being operative at a higher level,[8] Aquinas (1952) was more equivocal:

> Now the more simple and the more abstract a thing is, the nobler and higher it is in itself; and therefore the object of the intellect is higher than the object of the will. Therefore, since the proper nature of a power is in its order to its object, it follows that the intellect in itself and absolutely is higher and nobler than the will. But relatively and by comparison with something else, we find that the will is sometimes higher than the intellect, from the fact that the object of the will occurs in something higher than that in which occurs the object of the intellect…
>
> If, however, we take the intellect according to the common nature of its object and the will as a determinate power, then again the intellect is higher and nobler than the will, because under the notion of being and truth which the intellect apprehends is contained both the will itself, and its act, and its object. Thus the intellect understands the will, and its act, and its object, just as it understands other special things, as stone or wood, which are contained in the common notion of being and truth. But if we consider the will as the common nature of its object, which is good, and the intellect as a thing and a special power, then the intellect itself, and its act and its object, which is truth, each of which is some special good, are contained under the common notion of good. And in this way the will is higher than the intellect, and can move it. From this we can easily understand why these powers include one another in their acts, because the intellect understands that the will wills, and the will wills the intellect to understand. In the same way good is contained in truth, inasmuch as it is an understood truth, and truth in good, inasmuch as it is a desired good (Aquinas, 1952: 433–435; which is *Summa Theologica, I*, Q. 82, sections 3 & 4).

This certainly does not sound as if one sublates the other, unless both sublate each other. Rather it sounds as though Aquinas regarded the intellect and the will as though they were on the same level of consciousness.[9] Put in another way, 'Truth and good include one another; for truth is something good, otherwise it would not be desirable; and good is something true, otherwise it would not be intelligible' (Aquinas, 1952: 425; which is *Summa Theologica, I*, Q. 79, a. 11).

For Lonergan (1957), the judgment of value came between the act of reflective understanding and the decision of the will. Moreover, he essentially puts the assessment of value hand in glove with the decision of the will and, therefore, on the same level of consciousness (Lonergan, 1957: 598–601). By logic, therefore, judgment of value must be on the same level of rationality as the judgment of truth and the decision of the will. Lonergan (1971: 37) himself observes that 'judgments of value differ in content but not in structure from judgments of fact. They differ in content, for one can approve of what does not exist, and one can disapprove of what does. They do not differ in structure, inasmuch as in both there is the distinction between criterion and meaning… In both, the meaning is or claims to be independent of the subject: judgments of fact state or purport to state what is or is not so; judgments of value state or purport to state what is or is not truly good or really better.' It does seem to suggest that they could be regarded as being on an equivalent level of knowing.[10]

But are the judgment of value and the decision of the will separate and distinct? Firstly, there is some hint of separation in Lonergan's (1967: 141) early interpretation of Aquinas: 'The second [observation to inspire the concept of *verbum*] was that the analogy to the procession of the Holy Spirit lies in the act of love, not as within the will for that is *processio operationis*, but as grounded in a perfect inner word, a judgment of value.' In *Method*, Lonergan (1971: 37) concludes that: 'The judgment of value, then, is itself a reality in the moral order.' Lonergan (1957; 1971) does, however, tie the judgment of value closely to the concept of possibility and the good, which is really the object of the will. He, therefore, finds it difficult to separate the two notions and, to do so, it is necessary to check more closely what they are each about. As Aquinas (1952: 402; which is *Summa Theologica, I*, Q. 77, a. 3) says: 'A power as such is ordered to an act. Therefore we seek to know the nature of a power from the act to which it is ordered, and consequently the nature of a power is diversified, as the nature of the act is diversified.'

The act of will is about possibility, about the good that could be, about the ends to be achieved, and so the object does not exist except in the mind of the subject. It needs to be a feasible extension of actuality but there does not need to be a logical connection to any judgment of the true or of the real. Such judgments can inform the will by presenting it with an object that reflects the true and/or the real, but not create or control the will. 'The will is a rational power, since it is "in the reason," as is stated in the book of the *Soul*… the will is a rational appetite…which follows from an apprehended form. Consequently, in order that the will tend to anything, it is requisite, not that this be good in very truth, but that it be apprehended under the aspect of good. Therefore the Philosopher says that "the end is a good, or an apparent good"'(Aquinas, 1952: 655; which is *Summa Theologica*, *II*, Q. 8, a. 1). The will constructs the possible future essentially from reconstructing the reality that presents.

On the other hand, the judgment of value is more like the judgment of fact in that it appreciates what is. It is about actuality; about the reality that exists, not that which could be. To draw a further contrast, the judgment of value is better understood as aesthetic judgment and has beauty as its object more so than the good. Here aesthetic judgment and beauty take on the meaning explained by Dufrenne (1973: lxi, emphasis added):

> The beautiful designates the truth of the object when this truth is immediately sensuous and recognised, when the object imperiously announces the ontic perfection it enjoys. The beautiful is true made visible, **it sanctions what is felicitous before reflection does**. A locomotive is true for an engineer when it runs well, but it is beautiful for me when it expresses speed and power immediately and as if triumphantly. Because it expresses it in this way, it is aestheticized… The opposite of beautiful is not the ugly, as we have known since romanticism. The opposite of the beautiful is the abortive, in the case of a work that claims to be an aesthetic object, and the indifferent, in the case of an object which makes no such claim. An aesthetic object is imperfect because it does not succeed in being what it claims to be, because it does not realise its essence; and **it is in terms of what it aspires to be that it must be judged and that it judges itself**.

Dufrenne (1973) is seen here to separate the aspiring from the judgment of what it actually is. That judgment of value, of authenticity of true reality is of what exists, not what is aspired to (in the will)—to a judgment of what is, rather than what is intended. Judgments of value are then seen to be associated with depth, which is found in the world of feeling—not emotions, which belong to the lower levels of consciousness, but feelings in the way explained by both Dufrenne (1973) and Jung (1971).

> Feeling is knowledge (connaissance). Accordingly the emotion of fear is not to be confused with the feeling of the horrible… Feeling is knowledge—even if it be that peculiar spark of knowledge which unleashes the emotions and enters into a circle with them… Conversely, this knowledge is feeling, because it is not reflective and, above all because it presupposes a certain predisposition to receive the affective. Of course, by exercising our judgment, we could always deny ourselves such a knowledge and thus take refuge in the Stoic idea of objectivity… Aesthetic feeling is deep because the object reaches into everything that constitutes me. My past is imminent in the present of my contemplation and exists there as what I am—it is not the result of a history which would turn me into the final term of a causal consequence, but the seat of a duration in which I am conjoined myself. This past, which I am, gives a density to my being and penetrating quality to my glance (Dufrenne, 1973: 378; 404).

The depth of this judgment of the immediate was very familiar to Aristotle and Aquinas. In fact, their whole metaphysics is based on the ability to see the real as real, to know the essence and the first principles of necessity. However, Lonergan (1967: 72) concluded that 'only by reflection on the identity of act can one arrive at the difference of potency. And since reflection is not an identity, the Aristotelian theory of knowledge by identity is incomplete.' Lonergan is correct in saying that its identity is incomplete, but it is no less incomplete than the knowledge of objective truth (or the relationship between the parts)—they are both a partial knowing of reality but in quite different ways. Lonergan (1957) actually acknowledges this type of knowing identified by Aquinas (1952) but misses the profundity of such judgments and dismisses them as just "looking". He likens it to '"knowing" in the elementary sense in which kittens know the reality of milk' (Lonergan, 1957: 252). The paradox in Lonergan (1971: 290), however, is that he is prepared to use such "looking" at religious experience to establish his first set of categories in his fifth functionality (called Foundations). It seems obvious that he would not equate the deep "knowing" of religious experience as something that a cat or any other animal is capable of! These categories which

are based on just "looking" are then to be used to inform all the other functional specialties which must imply such "seeing" is capable of carrying a meaning of some depth. Though Lonergan (1971) wraps up this "looking" with the notion of conversion, it is essentially the same grasp of reality that is regarded as central by Aquinas (1952) and Dufrenne (1973).

Eighth, to put this notion of similarity and distinction more succinctly, willing, judging and assessing can essentially be regarded as rational personal positions in respect to the three essential aspects of the one reality.

- There is the judgment of what could be better than the reality that presents itself now. It is about interpreting in concrete terms what could be, and it is the image of the good that is created in the mind that provides the object for the will to act. This image of the good is, of necessity, closely linked to the current reality because it has actually to deal with that reality. This judgment of the will, then, is primarily oriented to the future but its object can be informed by the judgment of what is true or what is real—but it is not necessary to be so informed.

- There is the judgment of the true, being the judgment of the relationships between the parts. While there is a synthesis of concepts to know the true, the accidentals of the particular reality (e.g. the accidentals immanent in the immediate) do not necessarily figure significantly in the deliberation. The search is for enduring objective truths one step removed from the present reality, and so there is a concern that the facts at least can be shown to have held in the past. In this way, the judgment of the true is most oriented to the past from a linear viewpoint.

- There is the assessment of the real, being the judgment of the whole to know its essence. While there is a synthesis of all the reality that presents itself, the concepts of relationships between the parts do not figure directly in the deliberation. In that it is concerned with all that is there, the judgment of the real is most oriented to the present and attending to the particular reality at hand.

So the aspects are seen to be similar in structure but different in content and therefore they form a triadic unity or trinity on the same level of consciousness. Within each hypostatic sub-phase of willing, judging and assessing, the individual comes to a personal assent as to what is a persuasively good possibility, a reasonably objective truth, or a glaringly real presence, and each of these are judged against a different set of transcendent criteria. As has emerged in the above discussion, there is, however, a relationship between them as, though they operate independently and with a different orientation, each can be informed by the other. They are interdependent because, in essence, they are focused on the one reality, but in different ways. They do not stand alone and there is obviously something missing if any phase is purposely excluded. Moreover, they do form a coherent whole and not only are they all operative in each human being but it is also necessary for a full human life that all three phases need to find opportunities to be expressed. Indeed, if we are sufficiently self-conscious we are able to move consciously between each of these types of judgment as considered appropriate to the circumstances. Normally, however, each individual develops one of the three sub-phases of judging the world as a matter of course and as a consequence of the dynamics of the relationship (which will be explained further later), a second is less well developed but supportive, and the third sub-phase is normally well underutilised and underdeveloped. It then usually requires a conversion or personal transformation to bring this depressed third sub-phase into effective use. The relationship between the three sub-phases is, therefore, seen as analogous to the trinitarian relationship experienced between the three main phases of personal consciousness (which is *to experience*, *to understand* and *to judge*).

Ninth, there is always something more. Each trinity is a conceptual depiction of the conscious operation of the intellect at that particular level. However, there is always some greater understanding, some more developed judgment of fact, some more profound assessment of reality, some more insightful grasp of better possibilities that can be accessed from the transcendent, the other, the unconscious. This phenomenon of the transcendent (to the particular trinitarian level) is depicted by the encirclement of each trinity by a bigger unity (i.e. circle), which can be regarded as part of even broader levels of knowing in the adjacent trinity of which it is now part.

The hint of something more than, of access to some transcendental knowledge or understanding, is seen in the act of insight when one sees a new way of putting the facts together or understanding one's experience in a different way. What is essentially happening in the act of insight is that there is a tension set up between the phases of the principal trinity of personal knowing. That is, there is a divergence between the cognitive product at the level of experience and

the conceptual or mind maps we have at level two of understanding the experience. This psychic tension is fuelled by the continual questioning of the facts about the phantasm of experience until there is a flash of insight as a new way of making meaning of the facts suddenly appears in the mind. This insight can only come from somewhere else in the mind and this other place is termed the transcendent or the unconscious. 'The difference between invention and learning and use of science is that, in the first instance, phantasm has to produce the act of insight whereas, in subsequent instances, informed intellect guides the production of an appropriate phantasm, in other words, in the first instance, we are at the mercy of fortune, the sub-conscious, or a teacher's skill, for the emergence of the appropriate phantasm' (Lonergan, 1967: 29). The transcendent is also seen to be accessed at the level of experience or sensation (i.e. *phase #A*) when explaining the almost spiritual experience that can be associated with the sexual encounter.

This access to the transcendent is also illustrated by the mental flashes experienced in reflective understanding, and in Lonergan's (1957; 1971) reliance on the concept of love to explain the energising of the downward process through his levels of cognition. In addition, the visions of the future conjured up by the will as it goes about framing better possibilities to achieve the "good", seem to come out of some dialogue with the transcendent or the unconscious. Aquinas also attempts to grasp how the cognitional processes are informed by some transcendental infusion: 'Further as the will is related to willing well, so is the intellect related to right understanding. But the will cannot will well unless it is aided by grace, as Augustine says. Therefore neither is the intellect able to understand the truth, unless it is illuminated by divine light' (quoted in Hall, 1992: 62, note 52). The relation to the transcendent is also contained within Dufrenne's (1973) reliance on the notion of the *a priori*, both in assessing the real and in assessing value, in his explanation of aesthetic judgment.

This contact with the transcendent and/or the unconscious is hard to pin down or define precisely but can happen anywhere in the cognitive process. This incorporation of understanding or knowledge from beyond is the way the individual finds the wherewithal to move to higher levels of cognitive understanding and knowing. Any conceptual capture of the influence of the transcendent or the unconscious also has to carry the capacity to embrace an explanation of the phenomena addressed by Jung and other depth psychologists. This influence of the "other" needs therefore to be envisaged as enveloping and in touch with the whole process.

In summary of this section:

- there are primary, secondary and tertiary levels of consciousness which can be conceptualised as all being interconnected in the form of a hierarchy of triadic unities or trinities;

- there is a continuous forward and backward movement between the three hypostatic phases of each trinity and between adjacent trinities;

- there are also three quite different cognitive processes on the level of rational consciousness which can similarly be conceptualised as a trinity of hypostatic sub-phases with similar forward and backward movements between the sub-phases; and

- all the cognitive processes are enveloped in the transcendent morass of the unconscious and existence.

THE PROCESSIONS AND REVERSIONS OF KNOWING

Analogous to the dynamic nature of the Neoplatonic hierarchical triadic construction of reality (Proclus, 1963), the *JEWAL Synthesis* Formwork also captures the complex dynamism of knowing. Continual conscious and unconscious movements are acknowledged at and between all levels; that is, both within a trinity of a particular level and also across adjacent levels of trinities. This section sets out to shed some light on the significance of these movements and to capture the basic dynamics of human personal growth and development.

First, all movement within the Formwork represents the cognitive adoption of a different phase or orientation of knowing and there is a change in the shape of consciousness as a result of that movement. The cognitive movement is bringing to mind a different perspective of consciousness that is concerned with different aspects (and asks different questions) of reality. There are three basic movements, which are:

- the inner movement of reversion or transformation in which the individual tries to work it through from an effect to a personal knowing of the true cause (i.e. going against the arrow around a triad);

- the outer movement of procession or begetting in which the individual takes on a personal commitment or belief and makes something of it, which usually translates into some response or action in their external world (i.e. going with the arrow around a triad); and

- the movement between adjacent trinities, which can be either evolutionary or transformational.

'Procession is a passage from better to worse; reversion is a passage from worse to better… This is based on the Plotinian doctrine of the two fold activity of intelligibles, intrinsic and extrinsic' [11] (Dodds, 1963: 221; 234). The upwards and downwards movement between phases in different adjacent levels of trinities can, in turn, be regarded as a movement of reversion or procession in the more embracing triad (according to the rules of movement outlined earlier). In reaching an understanding of these basic movements it needs to be borne in mind that:

- no particular phase of knowing is operating alone but always in concert with other phases within the immediate trinity and, as a consequence, but to a less extent, all other phases at the different levels of knowing—'Every intelligence has simultaneous intellection of all things… All the intellectual Forms are both implicit each in other and severally existent… [however] all things are in all things, but in each after its own fashion' (Proclus, 1963: 149; 155; Dodds, 1963: 254);

- a movement then is merely a shift in cognitive focus or orientation to another phase of knowing (which would probably correspond to firing up a different set of neurons in the brain), where the second replaces the first as the predominant phase operative for the moment; and

- the mind carries out a large number of operations per second and it seems physiologically understandable that many phases of knowing could be accessed seemingly at the same time; however, from an observation of the effects from the earliest times, it has been acknowledged that one phase of knowing is called on to be predominant for a particular cognitive operation.

Second, the basic cognitive movement of reversion or inner discovery of the truth is an inward movement or questioning and reflection. 'Reversion may be said to restore to reality the value which was lost in the procession, without annihilating the individuality which procession creates' (Dodds, 1963: 221). It moves inward to adjust the mind patterns of consciousness to find the truth as it is ready to reveal itself to the individual's mind—'reversion generates the progressive perfection of the lower principle' (Dodds, 1963: 221).

Reversion is the way of questions, the way of inner psychic tension, of internal struggles which are in time rewarded with internal intellectual breakthroughs which have to come from the unconscious or the transcendent (i.e. from somewhere else in the sphere of the mind that has not yet been incorporated into the conscious, though it could be stimulated by further external input through experience). Lonergan explains these as insight, reflective understanding, and intellectual, moral and religious conversion. All of these transforming breakthroughs allegedly come as a result of following the direction of Lonergan's (1957; 1971) transcendent Method; namely, the clockwise movement of reversion around the trinities.

It takes a conscious effort to effect a cognitive reversion. Essentially, the will turns inwards to drive the inquiry creating the psychic tension and tilling the soil for a fertile revolution of the individual's understanding. This turning inward of the will is the reason why reversion is regarded as an inner movement.

Third, the cognitive dynamic of procession is also called begetting because it often involves creating something tangible and external out of the inner-held universal. It is, therefore, often termed a "downward" movement by the philosophers and is seen to flow much easier without the psychic tension associated with the "upward" movement or reversion. That is, the movement normally stems from a personal commitment to some particular truth, value or will at the level of rationality—no matter whether that personal commitment is formed by the path of reason or directly from the *phase #A* of experience. Lonergan (1971) explains procession in his *Method* as the process of formulating and propagating the theological doctrine, which has been affirmed at the willing *phase #A^C* of thinking—which is *phase #A* of the *level #C* of rationality.

A clear example is the way individuals make use of beliefs—even scientists are required to believe a lot of what already has been proved or what has commonly been accepted as true. Lonergan (1971) acknowledges that most of our knowledge of the objective true comes not from the cognitive reversionary evaluation of experience, insight, formulation, judgment and assent—but rather from belief.

> Finally, the judgments, by which he assents to truths of fact and of value, only rarely depend exclusively on his immanently generated knowledge, for such knowledge stands not by itself in some separate compartment but in symbiotic fusion with a far larger context of beliefs… but the accuracy of the whole is a matter not of knowledge but of belief, of the surveyors believing one another and the rest of us believing the surveyors… that belief plays as large a role in science as in most other areas of human activity…He learns from others, not solely by repeating the operations they have performed but, for the most part, by taking their word for the results (Lonergan, 1971: 42–44).

Once a belief in a truth has been established by a personal commitment to its truth at the individual's level of rationality, there is then the process of making sense of how to apply it in the present situation.[12]

In this process of procession, the will is directed outwards to work out ways of implementing the universals, which the individual has personally committed to. Even in the acquisition of knowledge the will is directed to creating the tension in the external world by the process of projection. The individual's unconscious is projected out onto external people and circumstances, and it can then happen that there is an intellectual or internal appropriation of what has been worked out on the outer.

Fourth, the individual's *phase #C* of rationality (or *phase #C^C* of thinking) can be reached from the lowest *phase #A* of experience (*phase #A^A* of thinking) by either the process of reversion or by procession—that is, by the hard way of Lonergan's scientific method or by the seemingly easier way of intellectual intuition (or immediate cognition), adoption of a belief or psychic projection. That this easier way involves the acquisition of immediate knowledge in a movement direct from the lowest level of experience to the highest level of rationality, is perhaps the most crucial but contentious attribute underpinning the validity of the trinitarian nature of the *JEWAL Synthesis* Formwork.

Intuition means 'a direct and immediate seeing of an object of thought which is currently present to the mind and is grasped by its individual reality' (Roland-Gosselin as quoted by Eco, 1988: 61). Eco (1988: 62) goes on to note the debate about whether Aquinas supported the notion of 'a type of knowledge in which the intellect is in direct and immediate contact with the sensible,' and concludes 'this does not exist' and lines up many philosophers who agree with this denial. Other philosophers (e.g. Hamilton, 1859: 46) consider that the phenomenon of intellectual intuition does exist and that its existence can be interpolated from the writings of the Neoplatonists (Plotinus, 1952; Proclus, 1963) and Aquinas (1952). For instance, Brennan (1941: 37) asserted in his explanation of *Thomistic Psychology*: 'It should also be pointed out that the passage from the first to the third degree of abstraction is immediate. Such a procedure is lawful for the reason that it does not violate any principle of mental continuity.' Dufrenne (1973), who analysed aesthetic judgment in depth, has no doubt! 'In other words, the represented object is discovered directly through appearance, which by itself says all' (Dufrenne, 1973: 360).

There are two clear instances of intellectual intuition or immediate cognition, which can be understood by applying the quasi-Neoplatonic rules for moving between the different levels of trinities (not forgetting that the movement from the lowest to the highest level of a trinity will always be accompanied by a much lesser presence of the operation of the other middle level).

One is the movement from the highest sub-phase of the *phase #A* of experience to the highest sub-phase of the *phase #C* of rationality—that is, from the lower level sub-phase of "apperception" direct to the much higher sub-phase of "assessing the real" or assessing the value. This is precisely the cognitive movement involved in aesthetic intuition or the immediate assessment of beauty as 'a lightning of the mind on a matter intelligently arranged' (Maritain's theory as quoted in Eco, 1988: 63). The affirmation of beauty is reached by an instantaneous internal analogical process with an immediate answer—the individual just knows. This process of knowing is a knowing of the whole in the particular [as acknowledged by Aquinas' (1963) process of abstraction that he calls separation], rather than a knowing of the parts by cause and effect. It is an immediate recognition and affirmation of reality as Dufrenne (1973: lxi) exclaims: 'The beautiful designates the truth of the object when this truth is immediately sensuous and recognised, when the object imperiously announces the ontic perfection it enjoys.'

Another is the movement from the lowest sub-phase of the *phase #A* of experience to the lowest sub-phase of the *phase #C* of rationality. That is, from the lower sub-phase of "extroversion" to the much higher sub-phase of "willing" with the "sensation" sub-phase of the *phase #B* of intelligibility in only a minor supportive role. This is

essentially the cognitive movement involved in the development of personal commitment to a vision by just looking and seeing the alternative potential reality—that is, where the individual can see a better arrangement of the present in all its concrete reality, and action can follow directly. To validate the integrity and feasibility of this vision, then, the individual is required to keep moving his/her thinking process around the higher *phase #C* of rationality to the other two sub-phases of "judging the true" to assess whether the facts in terms of the known causes and effects can deliver the new envisioned future. The process could then move on to the next sub-phase of rationality to assess whether that new future is actually of value in the context of the person's or group's criteria for a "real" existence. This could probably involve much oscillation around and back within the different phases of the trinity of experience, intelligibility and rationality as the envisioned future is tested out for its practicality and the vision actually changes to accommodate any revealed practical difficulties and value conflicts. Needless to say, many times individuals do not bother too much with the two follow-up cognitive processes as it is hard work, and so they are content to sell their ideas of sensible course of action, or a better future, after it appears to them and they say yes to it. This cognitive process of envisioning a potential future, or co-creation, is effectively that which is described by de Bono (1990: 290) as water logic in comparison with rock logic which is logical reasoning (or Lonergan's Method, 1957; 1971). In addition, other explanations of the dynamics of the will might add some light:

> Phenomenally, the act of willing appears precisely not as an occurrence caused by a different agent but as an initial act of the ego-centre itself (Pfander, 1967: 20).

> The phenomenon of the will, an altogether different mental capacity, whose chief characteristic, compared with the ability to think, is that it neither speaks in the voice of reflection nor does it use arguments but only imperatives, even when it is commanding nothing more than thought or, rather imagination (Arendt, 1978: 154).

> Will as the spring of action, that is, as a "power of spontaneously beginning a series of successive things or states"… First there is the apprehension of the end… the counsel (deliberation), about the means; and finally desire for the means. At each step, the apprehensive power precedes, and has primacy over, the appetitive movement (Arendt, 1978: 6; 117).

Fifth, the process of human learning and development can be seen as seemingly continual oscillations (or alternating circular motion) and interplay between the reversions and processions of knowing. The way of reversion is the personal quest for answers; the what, why and how of what is experienced. Children embark on this process often when they continually ask questions to get assistance in their efforts to work it out for themselves. As explained earlier, the largest contribution, however, to personal knowledge is through the process of procession or belief where there is a personal commitment to the knowledge acquired from others as value judgments, facts or procedures. In *Method*, Lonergan (1971: 45–47) sets out the steps of taking on the belief as an assent of the virtually unconditioned objective true:

- First step, is that the truth fact or proposition is actually articulated to the subject, i.e. that the subject experiences at level one.

- 'Second step, is a general judgment of value' and 'third step is a particular judgment of value', which are level-three judgments of value that this authority on this particular issue is worthy of belief—i.e. the subject is prepared to believe this time.

- 'Fourth step, is a decision to believe'—i.e. the subject exerts an act of the will that it is "good" to believe.

- Fifth step, is the act of believing. I, in my own mind, judge to be true the communicated judgment of fact or value. That is, the subject assents to a virtually unconditioned objective truth, 'not because of my own immanently generated knowledge… but because of the immanently generated knowledge of others.'

So this process clearly involves the first step in the *phase #A* of experience and then the next four steps at *phase #C* of rationality, with a hint of some influence by the transcendent at the second step. As an aside, it is interesting to note that the direction of movement through the three different orientations of judgment (i.e. assent of value, decision and assent of the true) is analogous to reversion within the *phase #C* of rationality. There is thus procession at the secondary level trinities of the intellect (i.e. from *phase #A* of experience to *phase #C* of rationality) and then a reversion on the tertiary level (i.e. through the sub-phases of *phase #C* of rationality). It is relevant to note that in Lonergan's five steps (as set out above) there is no mention of *phase #B* of intelligibility. That is, the knowledge is affirmed as true even before it is clearly understood by the individual. The knowledge is taken on faith and the

personal understanding is worked out later. That is, the assimilation of learnt truths or theorems is in large part accomplished by the act of cognitive procession taking on the universals first and then only later trying to find personal meaning in them.

What is gleaned from an understanding of the dynamics of procession and reversion, the rules for movement within the quasi-Neoplatonic Formwork and the clear preferences for modes of thinking (as discussed below), is that individuals will develop preferred learning styles. These styles can be identified and used to develop an effective learning/development strategy for a particular individual or group to encourage insights and quantum jumps in understanding and knowledge (in keeping with the quasi-Neoplatonic rules of the triadic movement). The results of the process of learning and knowledge acquisition would be shown conceptually within the Formwork as corresponding increases in the relevant circles of conscious knowing—that is, the quantum of consciousness developed by the individual would be increased.

Sixth, all phases of the trinities are equivalent but different. Philosophers have always been inclined to term those powers at the third degree of abstraction, or the third phase of the trinity, as being higher than those at the second or first degree/phase. However, all three phases of any trinity offer a particular perspective and downplay the perspectives offered by the other phases of the trinity. That each phase is representative of a "differentiation-in-unity," and that such differentiation can only be observed by their effects, it follows logically from the phenomenon of these differentiations that one phase can be seen to predominate at a particular time. Moreover, an individual develops a preference for a particular set of predominant phases and sub-phases across the hierarchical trinitarian Formwork.

Put in the light of Proclus' (1963) construction of reality, though each individual has the potential to know all things in all ways, 'no two intelligences have identical intuitions: otherwise they would be identical'. By reasoning, they are different 'in the point of view to which they relate their knowledge' (Proclus, 1963: 170; Dodds, 1963: 288). More explicitly, Proclus (1963: 149) argues as follows. 'Since, then, it must know all things or one or else all in one especial aspect, we shall conclude that the last is the truth: intellection embraces all things perpetually, and in all intelligences, but *in each it delimits all its objects by a particular character*. So that in the act of cognition and in the content known *there must be some one dominant aspect*, under which all things are simultaneously known and by which all are characterized for the knower' (emphasis added).

Aquinas also put forward this view when asserting that 'the possible intellect is the subject of intellectual habits… So, too, repeated acts cause a habit to grow' (Aquinas, 1952: 10; 19; which is *Summa Theologica, II*, Q. 50, Art. 4; Q. 53, Art. 3). This is the basis on which depth psychology (Jung, 1971) and theories of the brain (Edelman, 1992) suggest that individuals when young exhibit a preference for particular phases of knowing and with continual use they become "hard-wired" or strengthened psychologically and physiologically. As the individuals mature into adults, they have normally developed very definite patterns of motivation and character with pretty set responses to particular stimuli and a well-established learning style—though such patterns are always open to modification or transformation.

Going even further, the one preferred phase or sub-phase within each trinity of knowing powers then defines the secondary function as the one next in the direction of reversion (i.e. against the arrow in the **Figures**) and the third is little used. For instance, Dufrenne (1973: 345–361) describes how in reaching aesthetic judgment at the level of rationality, the *phase #B* of intelligibility is minimised while the *phase #A* of experience and reality is used very much as a secondary function to the aesthetic judgment. This phenomenon is explained in part by Aquinas' observations that the mind can only focus on one species at a time; 'but whatever things the intellect understands under different species, it does not understand at the same time' Aquinas (1952: 457 or *Summa Theologica, I*, Q. 85, Art. 4). In an empirical study of the development of new computer systems within banks, Lejeune and Roehl (1997) also observed this phenomenon of primary, secondary and minimal influence of the three levels in the same order as that suggested above, occurring in the patterns of strategy and behaviour of the participants in the IT process.

There has to be a deeper analysis of the processes of abstraction to explain precisely why the secondary function is the next highest degree of abstraction (with the highest being connected to the lowest). However, consistent empirical evidence, in particular, through the experience of the Enneagram (Riso, 1987; Palmer, 1991) suggests that it is a strong hypothesis.

Seventh, the combinations of preferences across different trinitarian levels of knowing also come with different preferences for the cognitive processes of reversion and procession. This in some part is determined by the quasi-Neoplatonic rules for movement within and between the trinitarian levels.

In particular, the necessity for movement between supra-jacent levels to be through similar phases or through the third phase of the lower and the bottom phase of the higher, means that there will be simpler movements where preferences have been established for similar phases of the trinities on each level. For instance, where preference is developed for *sub-phase #A* of each of the trinities of the intellect—viz. "extraversion," "sensation" and "willing"— there is a tendency to move mainly across the levels rather than within a particular level trinity. This means that possible futures might be envisioned, worked through in a sensate way on how to make them happen, and then implemented—all perhaps without too much questioning or reflecting on the reasoned logic of what is envisaged, or without too much thought as to whether it is morally or ethically right or wrong.

The effects of all these differences manifest in the cultivation by individuals of different personal motivations and character, and different learning styles—which will be explored in the next section.

Eighth, there is a conscious intellectual potency and power representing that part of the intellect or mind that has been used and developed so that it can be brought to act with intent. There is a complementary unconscious or shadow power representing that part of the full potential of an individual that has yet to be harnessed in a way that it can be developed and used in a meaningfully effective way.

Therefore, the depiction in Figs. **2.1–2.5** is a depiction of the ideal in the sense that all powers are represented as being equal. As explained above, an individual develops distinct preferences for one particular phase of the cognitive triads, and develops some intellectual powers while correspondingly diminishing others (that is, a primary power and a secondary power and a third that is considerably underdeveloped). Of psychological necessity, this imbalance leads to the development of a compensating personal shadow, which can be depicted for any particular level, as shown in Fig. **2.6**. The less consciously developed the particular power, the bigger is the compensating shadow. This compensating shadow often manifests itself in a person's behaviour as the person's "dark side," or as very primitive behaviour associated with this particular power—a subject that Jung (1964a; 1969a; 1969b; 1970; 1971) analyses at great depth in his writings.

Ninth, reversion and procession are essentially the cognitive processes used in the development of rational scientific knowledge and intuitive or 'absolute knowledge' (Capra, 1976: 36), respectively. These processes engage the conscious and unconscious intellectual powers or phases of knowing in different but complementary ways. In effect:

1. Reversion or the inner-directed movement is primarily a conscious act that calls upon the unconscious to respond to its inquiry and inform the conscious.

2. Procession, or the outer-directed movement, primarily involves the unconscious using the conscious to act out its unknown fantasy for its own purposes in the act of projection.

The effect of these processes operating on the conscious and the unconscious can be conceptualised as somewhat like a double-helix construction of trinities—similar in essence to the double helix structure of DNA (Watson, 1968), but different because the helix of the mind is incorporeal and as one. In one sense, the trinities of consciousness and unconsciousness can be thought of as forming the outer backbone of each helix, with weak psychic links connecting the two helixes through each phase of the triads. However, the helix is not linear (or cylindrically defined) as conceived for DNA, but something more complex, with the sizes of the backbones of the helices being complementary throughout. The helices run through the whole being of a person as defined by the full extent of the hierarchy of trinities within the *JEWAL Synthesis* Formwork of Reality. Development into a mature, effective person or group would require developing both a flexibility of mind to be able to move between the phases of knowing as required and a constructive dialogue between the helix of the conscious and that of the unconscious.

In summary, this section has attempted to capture some of the complexity in simplicity of the dynamic that can be represented within the new Formwork. To develop effective heuristic strategies for learning and development of individuals, groups and societies, one would also need to understand the way the character of individuals is formed—and some explanation of this is given in the Section 2.4.

THE CONCEPTUAL FORMWORK AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE

The insights presented in this section have been the driving force for the authors to go into a deeper discussion of Lonergan (1957; 1967; 1971) and Aquinas (1952) and so develop the connections discussed so far in this Chapter. This is the gold that can be brought forth from the mine of the scholastics and cognitional theorists. Acknowledging that there is no answer to everything, the potential usefulness of the synthesis explained in this section is substantial but limited mainly by an individual's ability to apply it—for, as has already been observed, no individual can think in all directions at once. However, a richer apprehension of past actions or in planning or preparing for future actions can be developed by accessing all phases of thinking by a systematic series of questions and/or reflections following the logic of the Formwork.

Even though the subject matter of this section is of fascinating intellectual interest to the authors, there is no attempt to develop a justification or argument for the insights articulated. Rather, the section has been included to give an indication of the potential power that can be unleashed by the synthesis of the old and the new, of the West and the East. As such, a wealth of knowledge suddenly becomes available to help understand and orchestrate human affairs more consciously. If the integrity of the Formwork so far presented is sound, there is a direct connection to the Jungian (Jung, 1971; Myers, 1980) and Enneagram (Riso, 1987; Palmer, 1991) typologies. Indeed, if the integrity of only the intellectual trinitarian phases of the Formwork is sound, the link is still made—albeit not as rich or convincing.

First, All constructions of metaphysics, philosophy, physical and social sciences, psychology, etc., are formulated by the human mind and offer different understandings of different aspects of the one same reality—that is, they reflect the complexity of the product of different modes of thinking. In grasping a philosophy of mind that captures the essence of this complexity of human thinking and knowing, one acquires a powerful tool of understanding and a means with which to exert a more conscious governance of human affairs. The *JEWAL Synthesis* Formwork has captured a universal understanding of the way we know (and also what we know)—it articulates the ancient scholastic understandings, incorporates the modern philosophical and psychological developments in understanding and cross-fertilises this with the Eastern-based reflections on human motivation and behaviour (Enneagram). This section attempts to capture the holistic nature of the "new" Formwork and give some hint of the way it can underpin and assist development in many areas of study.

The Formwork is grounded on the simple yet profound building block of a trinity of hypostatic phases that are differentiated but one.13 As developed most fully in the Neoplatonic writings of Plotinus (1952) and Proclus (1963), the whole human subjective and objective world can usefully be formulated in terms of an interrelated hierarchical trinitarian structure from the higher metaphysical appreciation of the human experience to the lowest objective thing. The scholastic philosophers concentrated mainly on the structure and movement emanating from the highest unity. However, this can be understood and looked at in reverse and, starting from the manifestation of reality in all participants, go on to capture a dynamic model within which to study the whole human experience. Bringing all this together would obviously require a separate paper or book to develop the hierarchical structure in its totality. However, a reasonable starting point in one of the broadest trinities of intelligible reality could be in terms of phase #A of the external objective world, phase #B of the internal subjective world, and phase #C of the spiritual transcendent world.

Just focusing on the subjective world of knowing (which is the topic of this book), the base triad of knowing was identified by Aquinas (1952: 452—in *Summa Theologica, I*, Q. 85, Art. 1) as:

- 'the sense, [which] is the act of the corporeal organ. And therefore the object of every sensitive power is a form as existing in corporeal matter.'

- 'the human intellect [which] holds a middle place, for it is not the act of an organ, yet it is a power of the soul which is the form of the body.'

- the transcendent, 'which is neither the act of a corporeal organ, nor in any way connected with corporeal matter; such is the angelic intellect, the object of whose knowing power is therefore a form subsiding apart from matter'.[14]

These three hypostatic phases constitute the base-level trinity of the soul as shown in Fig. **2.7**, within which the whole Formwork of the human experience can be contained.

Figure 2.7: The Trinitarian Differentiation of the Soul

Figure 2.8: The Trinitarian Hierarchy of Human Knowing—1ˢᵗ Viewing

Each of these three main basic levels of abstraction can be broken down into three more degrees of abstraction and then again into another further three degrees of abstraction. This is difficult to convey as by going up to the level of intellect that has been discussed in this Chapter, there are some 3^4 separately identified "grades of knowing powers" in an ascending order of abstraction. This hierarchy of knowing powers is sketched out and named in Fig. **2.8** (by following through only that hierarchy of powers that leads to the area of interest for this Chapter). The hierarchy of knowing powers is then represented in Fig. **2.9** to show more clearly the integrated hierarchical nature of the interrelationships. A third view of the same hierarchy is given in Fig. **2.10** to give a clearer picture of the individual trinitarian phases of the hierarchy. The three representations of the same hierarchy effectively demonstrate the different pictorial ways of conceptualising the detail of the trinitarian hierarchy. Although there is a symmetry and sameness about the different trinities of knowing powers, much work would be needed to flesh it all out in relation to the broad range of the current areas of human study.

Figure 2.9: The Trinitarian Hierarchy of Human Knowing—2nd Viewing

The main concern in this Chapter has been with the intellectual powers (and only in relation to the subject as an individual), and then only with the top two degrees of abstraction at that (as indicated within the hierarchy of the repeated trinities of knowing powers shown in Fig. **2.8** and contained in detail in Fig. **2.4**). It is important to appreciate that the hierarchical trinitarian construction means that these intellectual powers can be affected by the interaction or influence from any of the other powers at any of the other levels to varying degrees (or, in particular, by the lower emotional levels).[15]

The transcendent or spiritual knowing powers are, of course, difficult to grasp and usually regarded as beyond us. However, all the real metaphysical and mystical conjecture on the immaterial world comes about through the exercise

of these powers.[16] As Aquinas (1952: 452) says, 'therefore we must say that our intellect understands material things by abstracting from the phantasms, and through material things thus considered we acquire some knowledge of immaterial things, just as on the contrary, angels know material things through the immaterial.' It would seem that the Christian Trinity has been a vision of triadic reality beyond the basic abstractions from the material world.

Figure 2.10: The Trinitarian Hierarchy of Human Knowing—3rd Viewing

Second, the Jungian (Jung, 1971; von Franz and Hillman, 1971; Myers, 1980) functions and the determining attributes of the Enneagram (Riso, 1987; Palmer, 1991) are essentially an expression of the interaction of the trinities of cognitive powers in the *phase #C* of rationality and the *phase #B* of intelligibility. To be specific, the phases of understanding/knowing that are involved are (in reference to Fig. **2.4**):

- *Phase #C* of rationality or judgment sub-phases:
  - *#A*. will (or conation), *#B*. reasoning judgment, and *#C*. assessment (or feeling judgment);
- *Phase #B* of intelligibility or intellectual perception sub-phases:
  - *#A*. Sensation, *#B*. intuition, and *#C*. aesthesis.

Combining the three sub-phases of each of two cognitive levels with each other generates the nine (3 x 3) individual spaces of the Enneagram typology. The Jungian typology proposed only two sub-phases on each of the two levels of knowing (2 x 2) and, as such, can be seen as being an incomplete expression of the Enneagram.[17] In particular, Jung (1971) did not acknowledge the knowing power of the will (*phase #A^C* of thinking which is lowest orientation of the *phase #C* rationality) as a rational function (but only identified thinking and feeling). The earlier part of this Chapter provides substantial justification for the inclusion of the "will" but much more could be argued by drawing on Jung (1971) himself and also on Arendt (1978) and Weber (1949). Aesthetic perception (*phase #C^B* of thinking which is in *phase #B* intelligibility) is the "irrational function" which was not identified as a separate function by Jung (1971), but he did explain it (as quoted earlier) in such a way that it could be taken as separate. However, Jung (1971) accounted for the experience of aesthetic perception with a convoluted piece of logic that represented it as a combination of sensate perception and feeling judgment. Dufrenne (1973), on the other hand, gives a cogent explanation of the distinct power of aesthetic perception. A more fulsome justification and case of the necessity for including these two cognitive functions alongside the other more established functions will need to be taken up elsewhere.

Figure 2.11: Alignment of the Patterns of Thinking
[Jungian Type]—#Enneagram Space
(Arrows correspond to dynamics between Enneagram spaces.)

Third, as discussed earlier, each individual chooses and develops a particular degree of abstraction or sub-phase in both the *phase #B* of intelligibility (or perception) and the *phase #C* of rationality (or judgment). In each of these two phases in an individual there is formed a primary, secondary and minimally developed cognitive power. For instance, a typical wise scientist-type would have primarily developed their intuitive perception and rational thinking functions and, as a consequence, would have minimised the development of their capacity for sensate perception and willed action.

Figure 2.12: Aligning the Enneagram and Jung Typologies
#Enneagram Space—[Jungian Type]

The primary determinant of an individual's motivation and character is the preferred orientation in the *phase #C* of rationality. It is at this level that a "yes" (or even "yes" that it is *not* so) is said to what is good, true and real in that

particular individual's reality, and is personally committed to the higher cognitive position. An individual has essentially chosen one of those modes of rationalising reality to be his/her pre-eminent guide on the interpretation of life. This is manifested in the Enneagram typology (Riso, 1987; Palmer, 1991) by an individual's experienced preference as between the Head, Gut and Heart "centres".

The preferred orientation within the Phase of Intelligibility is the secondary determinant of an individual's motivation and character. As such, it defines in which of the three Enneagram spaces in the preferred "centre" that his/her motivation and character will be best described. Taking the two phases of rationality and intelligibility, each with three sub-phases of possible preference, means that there are nine possible options for each individual. In such a way, therefore, can the Enneagram's nine spaces be defined and this is set out clearly in different ways in **Figs. 2.11** and **2.12**.

The main characteristics and motivational preferences of each space on the Enneagram can be explained logically from a starting point of their preferred sub-phases of thinking and knowing as conceptualised in the *JEWAL Synthesis* Formwork. A full analytic explanation (i.e. working clockwise as in the *Method*) for each space would stand as some kind of validation of the authenticity of the Enneagram typology because the Enneagram typology itself has been built up from experience and seeing how it is (i.e. mainly in an anti-clockwise phenomenological-linked cognitive process of procession) over a long time.

The mapping of the preferences across the three degrees of abstraction of each of the two Phases of Rationality and Intelligibility (Fig. **2.4**) clearly shows the archetypal patterns associated with the three core preoccupations of human endeavour; namely, a pursuit of the desired good, the objective true, and the truly real. The powers of sense perception and an exercise of the will (or conation)—which, in combination, are associated with the Enneagram space of a *three*—are needed to identify and pursue the good. In the centre of the table in Fig. **2.13**, the necessary requisite intellectual powers that need to be exercised to arrive at a knowledge of the objective truth are intuitive perception and rational judgment (reasoning) [essentially, the requirements to pursue Lonergan's (1957; 1971) *Method*] which are those of the Enneagram space of a *five*. Likewise, the powers of aesthetic perception and aesthetic assessment (or feeling judgment), which are associated with the Enneagram space of a *one*, are needed to be able to recognise the truly real and be able to assess and articulate it (the archetypal art critic).

It has been argued since Neoplatonic philosophy/psychology (Plotinus, 1952; Proclus, 1963) that it is impossible for one individual to pursue an effective knowing of all three at once—that is, one human person would find it impossible to have a fully developed view of the "good," the "true", and the "real" at the same time. That is why it is necessary for organizations and societies to have processes in place so, as a group, they can come to a definition and assent to what is real, true and good for the group at large. That is to say, then, that a particular individual is likely to find it very difficult to come to grips with one (or perhaps two) of the three human goals, because they have repressed any thinking about it to give pre-eminence and life to one of the other goals. For instance, a person with the attributes of the *five* space [i.e. intuitive perception and rational judgment (reasoning)], who is best equipped to pursue knowledge of the objective truth, is least well equipped to exercise his/her will to identify and pursue the "good" for himself/herself or his/her group. That is precisely why many of the modern scientific breakthroughs largely ignore consideration of whether they are indeed for the good of man or society and are usually in advance of a developed viewpoint about the morality of what is discovered.

The *phase #A* of experience (i.e. the first degree of abstraction before the phases of intelligibility and rationality) defines the individual's preference as between Jung's (1971) extroversion and introversion, and covers his much analysed ability to perceive such abstruse phenomena as synchronicity. Preferences at this level seem to contain indicators of the likely preference in the way the individual moves through the phases of knowing. That is, whether there is a preference for the first or second process of abstraction (for reversion or recession), or whether the individual prefers to build up his/her view of reality from inner or outer resources. Without having developed an adequate analytical justification as yet, there is reason to believe that there is a connection between the preferences exercised at this level and the choice of the particular wing chosen in each Enneagram space. For instance, the more a person in a *five* space personally chooses introversion, the more likely it is that the individual would demonstrate a choice for a *six* wing; and a greater preference towards extroversion is likely to coincide with a choice for a *four* wing.

Figure 2.13: Identifying the Good, the True and the Real
[Jungian Type]—#Enneagram Space

Fourth, the vast amount of knowledge of cognitional processes will greatly inform the phenomenological and psychological understandings already expressed in the Enneagram (Riso, 1987; Palmer, 1991).[18] In addition, both the knowledge of cognitional processes and the Jungian analysis of the psychological types can enhance the methods for identifying a particular individual's preferences as expressed in a particular Enneagram space. The directions of growth expressed in the Enneagram can be better informed in terms of cognitional processes and Jungian psychology. In short, the cross-fertilisation of the knowledge and understanding of the three previously separate areas of study (viz., philosophy of mind, Jungian psychology and Enneagram typology) can lead to a very powerful analytic and predictive model of human endeavour. Nevertheless, the essential structure is trinitarian and the structure and dynamics of the Enneagram provide the sound phenomenological foundation upon which the other conceptual frameworks can be structured and understood.

Moreover, all the analysis that has been discussed as applying to the individual can legitimately be applied to groups or to societies. This is so because as was shown in the explanation of the Formwork, the group and society are

merely higher degrees of abstraction than the individual but still on the same primary level of cognitive activity. The complexities of how reality is played out across these three degrees of abstractive thinking (i.e. individual, group and society) are far from simple because there are so many different combinations of interaction between the preferred orientations of the individuals involved. However, it can be systematised to a useful extent by looking at the interaction of individual character preferences as against the character profiles (as per the Enneagram) defined in the roles that such individuals are required to fulfil within groups and in society. Such an approach is developed in some length in the next Chapter on the Theory of Governance that flows directly out of the application of the *JEWAL Synthesis* Formwork of Knowing. The theory of governance can be used to analyse and develop more holistic and integrated guidance for conscious action by social enterprises such as the self, groups, organizations, governments and nations, as has been done in the sociological analysis of the US society and organizations in the earlier part of the book.

In addition, the *JEWAL Synthesis* Formwork has been used by one author to conduct a final-year Master capstone subject on *Strategic Analysis and Decision-Making*. The heuristic power of using the Formwork was amply demonstrated by one small group of students who responded with a project that delivered a most penetrating and immediate analysis of organizational change. The study (Ransom, Reid and Ward, 1999) analysed the dynamics and consequences of the organizational transformation that was effected in Campbell Soups' take-over of Australia's most famous biscuit-maker, Arnotts. The most telling factor of the students' exercise was that the analysis was sufficiently informed to make insightful recommendations on where Arnotts should go to next.

Fifth, the dynamics of this simple hierarchy of interrelating trinities is somewhat complicated by the interaction with its complementary hierarchy of compensating shadow trinities. However, by concentrating on the dynamics of the hierarchy of the conscious trinities, heuristic processes can be identified and developed particularly for individuals and groups, and even for societies.

Different heuristic processes would be more or less effective depending on:

- the current state of the relative capacity of the conscious powers in any particular individual—including the set of hierarchical preferred phases of knowing of the individual, but particularly the preferences at the intellectual levels as captured by the typologies explained above;

- a definition of the combination of powers required for the role that the person is required to fill at the level of the group (the second degree of abstraction or *phase #B* of the intellect) or the society (third degree or *phase #C* of intelligence); and therefore,

- the strategy to move around the Formwork in an appropriate way so as to equip better the individual with the intellectual powers to cope. Some sense of the influence of the other powers at other levels would need to be taken into account.

Of central importance in assisting the formulation and articulation of heuristic processes is the conclusion that the Enneagram (Riso, 1987; Palmer, 1991) and modified Jungian (Jung, 1971; von Franz and Hillman, 1971) typologies are a valid and realistic expression of the structure of knowing. On this basis many of the heuristic processes have already been developed and explained in the context of the two typological analyses of personal development and learning strategies. These existing strategies can be enriched by incorporation of the Formwork's reflection on the dynamics of knowing and then also be applied to the dynamics of groups and societies in keeping with the levels of knowing explained above. The Enneagram is the container in which these seemingly diverse streams of knowledge and understanding can be brought together. It is suggested that, although it has been conventional wisdom that the Enneagram was developed by Eastern mystics, the integrity of its ordering of the diversity of human motivation can actually be underlined by Western metaphysical/philosophical/psychological theory. The processes to identify and test the individual's particular orientation can therefore combine experiential and rational analytic approaches. It is this enriched Enneagram typology that can be validated and formulated by the *JEWAL Synthesis* Formwork.

The details of this approach will have to be worked through elsewhere.

Sixth, it is also helpful to analyse the trends of the great social thinking in terms of the Formwork modes of knowing. For instance, it is helpful to view postmodernism as just another shift between different modes of personal

and collective thinking. In broad terms, the Enlightenment reflected a wholesale movement in thinking from the feudal *phase #C* traditional, in-the-moment-type inertia to the more adventuresome and inspirational *phase #A* entrepreneurial way of thinking—creating ideas and future possibilities that others could aspire to.

The development of modern thinking continued the "reversion-type" movement to eulogise the *phase #B* logical rationality and orderly progress along with the idea of the self. 'The marriage of the idea of the self and of civil authority propelled the political imagination of the Enlightenment and still characterizes the West today' (Racevskis, 1993: 5). 'Modernity's forward-looking thrust relates strongly to belief in progress and the power of human reason to produce freedom' (Lyon, 1994: 19). Weber (1930) described much of this movement and probable consequences very clearly, and the many deeper currents of thought that have been identified as carrying it along could be explained in terms of changes at particular levels of thinking. 'The bureaucratic official was for Weber the epitome of modernity' (Lyon, 1994: 31). Modern thinking has come under pressure because of its all-pervading reliance on reason and the search for the objective truth. 'The postmodern, then, refers above all to the exhaustion of modernity… Even the meta-narratives of modernity turn out to have limited shelf-life' (Lyon, 1994: 6; 55).

As discussed above, reason-oriented thinking is only "one-third" of the story and, as Camus (quoted in Racevskis, 1993: 84) observed, 'a day comes when ideology conflicts with psychology'. The other cognitive aspects that have been repressed to give reason to its dominance rise up in the unconscious or "the other" and begin to assert themselves in the conscious world. 'There are, then, two kinds of operations of knowledge—one conscious rational, visible but superficial, serving to promote official goals and programs; the other unconscious—unobtrusive but most influential, determining moral norms and legitimising epistemological principles and standards… It is precisely when rational intelligibility imposes itself as all-encompassing and self-sufficient that power strategies operating outside the limits of immediate comprehension are given free rein' (Racevskis, 1993: 60; 58). The identification of the social and cultural shift to a postmodern mindset is then capturing fragments of the continuing "reversionary" movement (i.e. clockwise around the **Figures** in this book) of collective knowing, onwards, to rely yet again on a *phase #C* predominance—namely, a preoccupation with endless political manoeuvring around shared values or personal subjective basic drives. In keeping with the dynamics of the Formwork, following are indicators of this broad movement from a *phase #B* Weltanschauung of reason to one centred around a *phase #C* feeling assessment of the particular reality in the moment.

- 'We are rediscovering something that Voltaire believed in profoundly; that the recourse to abstract systems and metaphysical explanations is the way to delusion and catastrophe; and that constant vigilance, critical attention, and skepticism are still the best weapons for confronting reality of the human condition' (Racevskis, 1993: 87). This encapsulates the move from a *phase #B* "head" orientation to a *phase #C* "gut" way of operating. This also encapsulates a recognition that 'knowledge of man, unlike the sciences of nature, is always linked, even in its most vague form, to ethics and politics' (Racevskis, 1993: 89).

- 'The late twentieth century is witness to unprecedented destruction of meaning' (Lyon, 1994: 16). The status of reason is being consciously repressed (or devalued) in order to focus on the discourse of the immediate and particular as presented in the current reality—'the migration from word to image'. 'By eschewing the idea that any standpoint, any universal principle exists by which our situation may be judged… Another possibility is that they simply talk past each other, drawing on different understandings of "reason"' (Lyon, 1994: 7; 79).

- There is a wholesale shift of focus from the universals of truth to the 'essence of reality' or Being (Racevskis, 1993: 10; 22). 'Heidegger shares Nietzsche's interest in "philosophy of difference", but goes beyond Nietzsche in declaring that Being, not truth, is what should concern philosophers… Rationality would be called into question and a new hedonism would flower' (Lyon, 1994: 9; 38). This shift to a focus on Being, or reality as existing, ushers in a new set of transcendental criteria of rationality concerned more with value and aesthetics (or beauty) of the present reality (Lyon, 1994: 83). First, the concern with values: 'it is always possible to distinguish between the just and unjust, the legitimate and the illegitimate, but this can be done from within a given tradition, with the help of standards that this tradition provides' (Mouffe as quoted in Racevskis, 1993: 86).

- Next, the greater concern with aesthetics (*phase #C*) is also emerging: 'The net critical effect of deconstruction is thus seen as a gratuitous, lucid strategy that reduces everything to a play of

signifiers, to a problem of textuality, or to a question of literature. It is viewed as an aesthetics parading as an ethics and its significance is therefore considered academic' (Racevskis, 1993: 18).

- The control and predictability of the modern project are fragmenting into multiplicity—'Indeterminacy thus becomes the principal subject of postmodern critique' (Racevskis, 1993: 131). As a consequence, the overriding requirement of modernity to "be reasonable" is giving way to a greater focus on appearances in the current reality and the need to "be authentic" (a key *phase #C* value), which brings with it a greater concern for ethical issues (Lyon, 1994: 78–82). 'The ascetic ideal, for example embodies both life-affirmation and life-denial. The ethical subject embodies both autonomy and subjection. Authenticity embodies both self-realization and self-deconstruction' (Racevskis, 1993: 59).

- The declining validity of using reason to legitimate power and the rising recognition of the direct use of power to gain advantage for particular interests. 'The accession to power of this post-modern reincarnation of the Prince signals the advent of a new order of things, in which it is no longer the truth of science or reason that is the goal but the reality of appearances… What is left is the infinite multiplicity of opinions. Power is nothing more than the fact of its exercise' (Racevskis, 1993: 99–100). Such a situation leaves the way open for a resurgence in totalitarianism (Racevskis, 1993: 107).

- 'Modernity started out to conquer the world in the name of Reason' (Lyon, 1994: 21). In a sense, there is a shift from the preoccupation of modernity with power over reality to an acceptance of that reality and a focus on the means of power over the players in that reality. 'We are all manipulated by power, like prisoners, yet colluding with our own incarceration in society… For Foucault, as for Nietzsche, the will to power is bound up with establishing any truth' (Lyon, 1994: 15; 75). However, 'Reason was incapable of guaranteeing the integrity of the Enlightenment project because it had no hold over the workings of power' (Racevskis, 1993: 66). In reaction, postmodernism in the words of Foucault 'might be seen as "discourses of power"' (Lyon, 1994: 15). There is, therefore, a consequential shift from accumulating scientific knowledge to developing its practical application in building wealth. 'While it is true that "most Americans now earn their living by working with knowledge"… the emphasis is placed on the professional competency and expertise to be claimed, not on the enrichment of one's soul' (Racevskis, 1993: 117). That is, the knowledge and the acquisition of knowledge is valued more for how it can be used rather than for its contribution to understanding and meaning for a particular system or process. In fact, there has also been an associated shift "back" to more interest in income from wealth accumulation (industrial conglomerates and increased community participation in share trading) rather than production.

- 'The one rationale that is still operative and helps maintain a semblance of legitimacy… is the notion of prosperity' (Racevskis, 1993: 117). The concept of prosperity is passing from the sense of security and belonging in the formal world of work and other institutions, to one based on consumerism, of indulgence in the moment; 'one reference point remains: consumption… If postmodernity means anything, it means the consumer society' (Lyon, 1994: 54; 68). 'The altered emphasis from the economic and functional to the cultural and aesthetic is clearly visible in urban areas… Shopping, no longer a necessary evil or a domestic chore, now exhibits itself as a leisure pursuit… Today's postmodern challenge returns the spotlight to the ideals, values and symbols of economic life, as they appear in the lives of consumers and in consumerism' (Lyon, 1994: 57; 74). That is, there has been a successive move through the "new-world" (asset) building of entrepreneurs through modern efficiency of production and thereon to consumerism.

- There is a move from the objective stance in seeing the individual as replaceable in a role within an institution to something more tribal—as a citizen (Lyon, 1994: 68) and particularly as part of a particular clan or group with 'established bonds, knots, pacts' (Racevskis, 1993: 23). The exercise of power in the interests of these particular groups then becomes the prevailing preoccupation of reality (Lyon, 1994: 66).

- The shift from the linear, controlled progress of evolutionary advancement (Lyon, 1994: 14) to the embrace of chaos and change as a more genuine and useful expression of reality. '"Postmodernism swims, even wallows, in the fragmentary and chaotic currents of change as if that's all there is." Ecstasy, enthusiasm and even emancipation are promised in the postmodern… So many postmoderns accept, and embrace, chaos' (Lyon, 1994: 75–76). Moreover, 'for the postmodern critics the task has been to turn the crisis in philosophy into a philosophy of crisis' (Racevskis, 1993: 9).

- There has been growing acceptance of phenomenology as a way of science and of the validity of discourse of particular individual experiences—which, in essence, replaces the search for the meaning

and the objective cause and effect playing out behind the experienced phenomena. There is also an associated refocusing on social justice as the discourses of the victims are allowed to be heard. 'Foucault's recommendation was that we "listen to the victims, not to the theoreticians"' (Racevskis, 1993: 28).

- The phenomenon of 'globalization, a process increasingly central to the analysis of postmodernity' (Lyon, 1994: 81), represents a shift in thinking from the group or organization to the society or the world. Moreover, 'the global and the local have never before interacted in such intense ways in routine, daily experience' (Lyon, 1994: 60). This brings with it a different way of respecting the individuality of the person, as he/she less concerned with his/her role in a particular institution and more concerned with defining his/her own individuality in this much bigger game.

- There has been a growing acceptance of the ways of the East as a necessary counterbalance to the Western Weltanschauung (Racevskis, 1993: 24). The expression of Western Christianity can be regarded as underpinning the modern project (Weber, 1930), whereas the likes of the Eastern Tao exhibit a much more *phase #C*-based spirituality.

The postmodern experience can, therefore, be seen as just another necessary phase to pass through on the way to even more sophisticated ways of operating. The ability of many to think in former "modern" ways remains, but mankind moves on and the collective thinking becomes more complex but seemingly more focused in a different direction or another phase of knowing. Rather than being the end of history as some academics (Fukuyama, 1992) are wont to suggest, it is merely Western societies' preparatory staging post for yet another dawning of a new era of transformational social movement. 'Postmodernism thus fits into a traditional pattern of renewal and continuity' (Racevskis, 1993: 133). Looking back at this period, the experience of postmodernism will undoubtedly seem like trying to revisit a bit of the dark ages where the love of knowledge and learning for its own "good" is being disparaged; but it is not likely to be of a long enough duration to be as distinguishable in time as the feudal ages. A new entrepreneurial era is already emerging. Moreover, what is required in this time of tumultuous change is to understand what is going on. 'Instead of attempting to control knowledge, a Foucaultian approach invites its practitioners to investigate the configuration and genealogy of different kinds of knowledge… "Teaching thus, is not the transmission of ready-made knowledge, it is rather the creation of a new condition of knowledge—the creation of an original learning disposition"' (Felman as quoted in Racevskis, 1993: 121–122). The expected future return to "modernity-reliant-on-reason", which is still to be developed but on new levels of knowing, will be quite different.

Lastly, what has been covered in this Chapter could easily take up a great tome or two to argue the validity of the proposed Formwork, its interpretation and its interrelationship with the Enneagram (Riso, 1987; Palmer, 1991) and Jungian (Jung, 1971; von Franz and Hillman, 1971; Myers, 1980) typologies. It is hoped, however, that sufficient argumentation and justification have been included to allow readers to appreciate the way that the *JEWAL Synthesis* Formwork provides a powerful framework of reality and of human knowing. This Chapter has highlighted the simple trinitarian base upon which to build the whole quasi-Neoplatonic Formwork through the systematic, hierarchical application of Aquinas' three degrees of abstraction. This foundation is built solidly on basic truths arrived at by both the West and the East and, as such, should provide a dynamic framework to help make better sense of the possible connections and interactions between the different sciences and other areas of human study.[19]

It certainly is not being suggested that the proposed Formwork provides all the answers. Rather, it merely provides a more powerful and useable dynamic cognitive framework and process with which to analyse and understand human social interactions. In such a way knowledge and understandings can be more systematised and interactive, which has always been a principal aim of most philosophers, sociologists and community leaders through the ages. An understanding of the reality of the Formwork helps appreciate the worldview espoused by the Neoplatonists (Plotinus, 1952; Proclus, 1963), Aquinas (1952; 1963) and others; namely, that individuals and even particular societies can ever only see a fraction of the total of reality at any time. It is like looking at life through a hologram and seeing the same reality in everything but from a large number of different perspectives. The Formwork provides a map if you like, so that the observer can consciously visit a number of key strategic vantage points in a systematic sequence. The result of such a conscious approach to life is the acquisition of a greater personal store of true knowledge and wisdom about the way things are, have been and could be in the future.

It is trusted that there has been enough discussion for readers to be able to appreciate the possible "good" that could be achieved by using the Formwork to suggest effective innovations in many areas of individual and group

development, and organizational and societal governance. Of particular importance is the development of the theory of governance in the next Chapter.

In conclusion, therefore, armed with a worldview informed by the Formwork, one might attempt a response to the three principal questions of knowing, along the following lines:

- *What does one do to know?* One steps systematically through cognitive processes to develop an ever-growing awareness of the true reality, an ever-growing body of knowledge of the objective true, and an ever-growing appreciation of the possibilities to achieve the good. Or, one is systematically dialoguing with the unconscious and acquiring insights into, and appreciation of, reality across the range of possible levels of abstraction or modes of thinking.

- *Why is doing that knowing?* Because it is developing a richer, more meaningful and more useful appreciation of reality through the many possible ways of living, seeing, understanding and knowing that reality. In effect, it is building a map of the way reality can be lived and known by that particular individual.

- *What does one know when one does it?* One knows one's own reality in many ways by exercising many, albeit limited, perspectives as though viewing reality through a three-dimensional hologram. In particular, one has a limited grasp of the truly real in its wholeness and beauty, the objective truth of reality as composed of parts and the real as it could be in its goodness—and an appreciation of just how limited that particular personal grasp of reality truly is.

This story on the philosophy of the mind will continue to unfold and promises to hold greater and greater significance for a more integrated study of social sciences in the future.

ENDNOTES

[1]   *JEWAL Synthesis* is an author-coined acronym, which stands for a synthesis of the spirit of the ideas of Carl Jung, the Enneagram, Max Weber, Saint Thomas Aquinas/Hannah Arendt, and Bernard Lonergan. It reflects the foundation sources of ideas that stimulated the authors to develop the philosophy of mind. However, the developed conceptual framework was later found to correspond precisely with the philosophy espoused by the late Neoplatonists, Plotinus (1952) and Proclus (1963) in particular.

[2]   Dodds (1963) and others (e.g. Lloyd, 1982) have expostulated on the details of the hierarchies as set out by Plotinus (1952), Proclus (1963) and Pseudo-Dionysius (1920), but they essentially focus on expositions from a metaphysical perspective.

[3]   This approach through reversion of the activities of the intellect, is similar to the approach adopted by Augustine (1952) as explained by O'Daly (1987: 2): '"Augustine can only think of the Trinity by contemplating it in the mirror of the self"… that Augustine elaborates the most characteristic feature of his philosophy of mind. For, although he shares with philosophers in the Stoic and Platonic traditions the assumptions that reality is ordered and that divine being and the human mind have particular places in that order, it is distinctive of Augustine's thought that he approaches psychological questions through an elucidation of man's perceptive and cognitive *activities*, independently of any *ontological* implications which the latter may have.'

[4]   An alternative explanation of the degrees of abstraction of knowledge is given by Brennan (1941: 36): 'The reference here is to the different levels of abstraction on which the human intellect operates in its analysis of reality. The principle involved is the degree of remotion from matter… Aquinas makes two important distinctions: first between sensible and intelligible matter; second, between individual and common matter… In the first degree of knowledge, intellect abstracts from individual sensible matter and considers only common sensible matter. Here we tear off the identification marks that distinguish singular objects among themselves… What intellect seeks to know on this level is the universe of sensible being.

'In the second degree of knowledge, intellect abstracts from both sensible matter and individual intelligible matter, considering only common intelligible matter… Matter is no longer viewed as a principle of sensible movement and change, but simply as a basis of extension or dimensional properties.

'In the third degree of knowledge, intellect abstracts from sensible and intelligible matter altogether. What is left for its consideration is nothing more or less than the substance or being of the thing under analysis. Now we are

ushered into the illimitable domain of metaphysics, whose object not only can be thought of without matter, but also can exist without matter. For, by this highest act of abstraction, intellect is exalted above the confines of space and time and isolated from all physical and mathematical context.'

[5]   Professor Baldwin says in his *Mental Development in the Child and the Race* (pp. 310–311), as quoted in Stewart (1909: 180—emphasis in original): 'The objects of the external world are very complex mental constructions. They are for the most part made by association… the motor contribution to each presented object is just beginning to be recognized in cases of disease called by a general term of *apraxia*, i.e. loss of the sense of use, function, utility, of objects. A knife is no longer recognized by these patients as a knife, because the patient does not know *how to use it*, or what its purpose is. The complex system of elements is still there to the eye, all together: the knife is a thing that looks, feels, &c., so and so. This is accomplished by the simple contiguous association of these elements, which has hardened into nervous habit. But the central link by which the object is made complete, by which, that is, these different elements were originally reproduced together, by being imitated together in a simple *act*, this has fallen away. So the *apperception*, the synthesis which made the whole complex content a thing for recognition and use, this is gone.'

[6]   The explanation of the three degrees of the *phase #C* of rationality as conation (judgments of the will), judgment (of reasoned judgments) and assessment (feeling judgments) seems to line up with that proffered by Hamilton (1859) as observed and refuted by Brennan (1941: 165): 'The word "conation"… was first given prominence by Sir William Hamilton in his well-known trichotomy of cognition, feeling and conation. The division is repeated in almost every non-Aristotelian textbook of psychology that has appeared since Hamilton's time. It is wrong on two scores: first, because it is redundant; second because it is unbalanced. The redundancy arises from a violation of the principle of the minimum, since feelings and conations are both appetitive phenomena. The lack of balance arises from the fact that, even on the assumption that feeling here means sensitive appetition, there should be a corresponding dichotomy of cognition into sensitive cognition and rational cognition.'

Brennan (1941) is wrong on both counts in his refutation of Hamilton (1859), mainly because he does not appreciate what is meant by feeling or judgments of value—he regards feeling as a 'low intensity' passion and experienced at the level of the senses. As explained in the text, feelings are intellectual judgments about reality made on the level of rationality and not about appetites, whereas conation is about rational appetites. In any event, the sensitive appetites that can be linked to emotions or passions can actually be regarded as a separate power as it manifests on quite another level of abstraction than the rational.

[7]   'Hence it is evident that as intellect is to reason, so is the will to the power of choice. But it has been shown above that it belongs to the same power both to understand and to the reason, even as it belongs to the same power to be at rest and be in movement. Therefore it belongs to the same power to will and to choose, and on this account the will and the free choice are not two powers, but one' (Aquinas, 1952: 440).

[8]   Immediately following the preceding quote in the text, Lonergan (1957: 613) goes on to differentiate: 'Judgment is an act of rational consciousness, but decision is an act of rational self-consciousness. The rationality of judgment emerges in the unfolding of the detached and disinterested desire to know in the process towards knowledge of the universe of being. But the rationality of decision emerges in the demand of the rationally conscious subject for consistency between his knowing and his deciding and doing.'

Essentially Lonergan (1957) is asserting that the rational act of the will or the decision to do, only comes after the rational judgment of the true, ostensibly when all the relevant questions have been asked to assent to the true facts about the nature and interrelationship of the parts. This may be the way that Lonergan (1957) prefers to think but it would mean that like many other people operating out of the Enneagram (Riso, 1987; Palmer, 1991) head centre, they prefer to keep thinking and defer any decision to act until they think they know enough about it. The problem is that if they are into too much compulsion, they never act because they never know enough. Most others do not need the comfort of knowing the factual truth about the cause and effect logic of the way it works before they make a decision to do something. Some, in fact, consciously eschew the whys and wherefores and as long as they think it will work they make a decision and act. It is the intention of the broader discussion in the text to bring this reality out more clearly.

[9]   Still again another way: 'The will and the intellect mutually include one another, for the intellect understands the will, and the will wills the intellect to understand. So, then, among things directed to the object of the will, are comprised also those that belong to the intellect, and conversely. And so in the order of things desirable, good stands as the universal, and the true as the particular; but in the order of intelligible things the converse is the case. From the fact, then, that the true is a kind of good, it follows that good is prior in the order of things desirable, but not that it is prior absolutely' (Aquinas, 1952: 97; which is *Summa Theologica, I*, Q. 16, a. 4).

'The good and the true which are the objects of the will and the intellect differ logically, but one is contained in the other, as we have said above; for the true is a certain good, and the good is a certain true. Therefore what pertains to the will falls under the intellect, and what pertains to the intellect can fall under the will' (Aquinas, 1952: 468; which is *Summa Theologica, I*, Q. 87, a. 4).

[10]   It would seem that "the real" and "the true" are associated with Aquinas' basic two principles in the operation of every corporeal substance: 'that which acts, and this is the substance itself; and that by which it acts, and this is the first form of the substance. Moreover, the first form of substance, as the principle by which it acts ultimately, is distinguished from the powers of a substance, as the principle by which it acts proximately"(Brennan, 1941: 61).

[11]   It should be noted that because these two references are separated by a number of pages, the order of correspondence between the two types does not line up—it is really that intrinsic refers to reversion.

[12]   A broad explanation of how this process of acting out a belief might be traced through the different phases of knowing is as follows (with reference to Fig. **2.4**). From the beliefs that are assented to in *phase #C* of rationality, there is a procession of knowing to the *phase #B* of intelligibility, which informs the *phase #A* of experience which then organizes the instructions to the body. In the case of judgments of fact, knowing probably moves from *sub-phase #B* of *phase #C* (of rationality) to *sub-phase #B* of *phase #B* (of intelligibility) to *sub-phase #B* of *phase #A* (of experience), then onto *sub-phase #A* of *phase #A* which is in contact with the will at *sub-phase #A* of *phase #C* and the body functional will at lower levels of cognition (in accordance with the rules of the trinity outlined earlier in the book).

[13]   An alternate explanation to the triadic unity or trinity is from Kant (1952: 475): 'It has been thought somewhat suspicious that my divisions in pure philosophy should almost always come out threefold. But it is due to the nature of the case. If a division is to be *a priori* it must be either analytic, according to the law of contradiction— and then there is always twofold (*quodlibet ens est aut A aut non A*)—or else it is *synthetic*. If it is to be derived in the latter case from *a priori* concepts (not, as in mathematics, from the *a priori* intuition corresponding to the concept), then to meet the requirements of synthetic unity in general, namely (1) a condition, (2) a conditioned, (3) the concept arising from the union of the conditioned with its condition, the division must of necessity be trichotomous.'

[14]   O'Daly (1987) identifies Augustine as seeing man being composed of body, soul which includes "mind" (*mens*), and spirit. This spirit can be equated to Aquinas' (1952; 1963) notion of the transcendent and is explained by O'Daly (1987: 59) as 'Spirit, on the other hand, is the "particular understanding" and "inmost intellect" of the soul (conf 4.20). Augustine observes that man is thus constituted of three elements, exterior, inner and inmost.' This expresses the trinity at Fig. **2.4** very well.

[15]   The action of these lower emotional levels is usually manifest in an unconscious but patterned way within the individual's psyche. It could be argued that the character typologies explain a lot about the individual's motivation and behaviour in terms of the manifestation of these patterned groups of emotions. The repressed unconscious emotions normally play out in a more or less intense way as neurotic compulsions (Horney, 1949; 1951; 1991) and are captured in terms of the patterned sets of the Enneagram typology (Riso, 1987; Palmer, 1991). One way to growth is through the self-recognition of when one's particular set of compulsions is actually in play and being experienced. It would be argued that these deeper-layered emotion sets can also be understood in the trinitarian hierarchies with the cross-fertilisation and interaction in keeping with the laws of movement within the trinitarian hierarchy. That is, a particular phase of thinking is more directly influenced by the emotions associated with the same phase but at a lower level of the individual's psyche.

[16]   'We must, therefore, say that in man there exists the image of God, both as regards the Divine Nature and as regards the Trinity of Persons; for also in God himself there is one Nature in Three Persons… as Augustine says, there is a great difference between the trinity within ourselves and the Divine Trinity. Therefore, as he there says: "We see, rather than believe, the trinity which is in ourselves; but we believe rather than see that God is Trinity… not to imply that the image of God came through the distinction of sex, but that the image of God is common to both sexes, since it is in the mind, wherein there is no distinction of sexes"' (Aquinas, 1952, 495–496; *Summa Theologica, I*, Q. 93, a. 5).

[17]   Most commonly, Jungian typology (Jung, 1971; von Franz and Hillman, 1971; Myers, 1980) has been discussed in terms of four main functions; namely, two rational (thinking and feeling) and two irrational (sensate and intuitive). It is these four that are expanded into nine spaces in the Enneagram (Riso, 1987; Palmer, 1991).

If one adds the Jungian coined psychic differentiations of extravert and introvert, which are on the first *level #A* of experience, Jung actually proposed a typology of eight (2^3), which is an incomplete expression of the fuller Enneagram typology of 27 (3^3) sub-spaces, which includes the three sub-spaces of each of the nine Enneagram spaces (Palmer, 1991: 49).

[18]   To date, in the history of the development of the Enneagram (Riso, 1987; Palmer, 1991), most of the explanation of how it works has focused on motivation and the influence of the emotions on the individual's behaviour. That is, it focuses more on highlighting the obsessive unconscious patterns of our character, rather than on the conscious cognitive dynamics. The philosophy of mind explained in this book is, therefore, complementary to all the existing explanations of the Enneagram and will help to illuminate further the practiced thinking, feeling and willing patterns of each of the spaces.

[19]   There are many scholars (Armstrong, 1940; 1952; Blumenthal and Markus, 1981; Blumenthal and Lloyd, 1982; O'Meara, 1982) who have traced the influence of Neoplatonist (Plotinus, 1952; Proclus, 1963) philosophy on Pseudo-Dionysius (1920), Aquinas (1952) and the Western scholastic philosophic tradition. There are also scholars (Knowles, 1958; Morewedge, 1992) who have traced the central influence of the Neoplatonists on the development of Islamic philosophy to the point of asserting that Islamic philosophy is essentially Neoplatonic.

That is, both Eastern and Western philosophy have the same Neoplatonic roots and both have retained much of this core thinking through their subsequent developments. To establish in a scholarly way that the substantive structural similarity between the two philosophies is, indeed, captured in the *JEWAL Synthesis* Formwork, would take yet another book to establish. It took continual vigilance to prevent the authors from dwelling too long on this aspect, but there was sufficient attention to catch a sense of the reality of their deep coincidence of truth.

The JEWAL Theory of Governance

Abstract: Governance is defined and expressed in terms of the espoused basic laws of *menetypes*, used to help understand cultural constructs within society. The basic triadic structure and the nature of the movement within that structure are important and are used to explain successful development in governance structures or their decline. The formwork explains how the central goal orientation of a governance structure defines particular strengths and limitations which, in turn, define the most effective approach to organizational learning within its governance structure.

INTRODUCTION

The validity of institutional archetyping is being established within the framework of the philosophy of mind. A theory of governance and a system of cognitive *menetypes* that can help explain the structure and dynamics of organization in the economic, social and political spheres of human activity come directly out of the *JEWAL Synthesis* philosophy of mind explained in the previous Chapter. What is expounded in this book does not represent a critique of the current political and management literature to find what is the best particular conceptual framework. Rather, it is more in keeping with the style of Montesquieu's (1952) *The Spirit of Laws* in that it is an *ab ovo* development of theory and comment as informed principally by the *JEWAL Synthesis philosophy of mind* and the "empirical" analysis of the US governance system in the later part of this book. It stands as a particular, coherent framework to explain the way humans construct their perspectives of reality and, in this sense, it is constantly referenced and compared with the current literature and thought on the issues being discussed.

What follows, in essence, expresses the reformulation and sublation of Weber's (1947; 1962) *ideal types* within the broader context of cognitive *menetyping*. The basic problem with *ideal types* has been that they are considered to stand alone as particular perceptions of exaggerated characteristics. Even though they have been used widely in descriptions, nobody really takes them seriously (as far as regarding them as part of a scientific explanation of reality). By putting elemental *ideal types* within a conceptual framework of the trinitarian hierarchy and explaining the dynamics of their interrelationships, their explanatory power is transformed and brought to life in a very powerful and practical way.

This transformation is effected and underpinned by perhaps what could be regarded as an underlying Western philosophy that is captured in the *JEWAL Synthesis* philosophy of mind, as explained in the previous Chapter. The introduction of the concept of a trinity of interrelated and numbered *ideal types* or *menetypes*, is the critical analytic addition that revitalises and transforms *ideal types* into cognitive psychotypes—specifically, by explaining how each of the *ideal types* are in each other and that there are particular dynamics between them. The following theory of governance explains how the basic interrelationship can be captured in terms of a triadic unity, or trinitarian relationship—a relationship that expresses a similarity in difference or a difference in similarity. Essentially, this also captures the same spirit of trinitarian thinking that seems to underlie both Montesquieu's (1952) and Weber's (1962) insights into governance and authority.

The point of the whole exercise is to help inform the individual's understanding and knowledge of the reality that presents in the expectation that the much richer grounds for our cognitive assessments help make for more appropriate or effective judgments, decisions and actions. Therefore, the worth of this book essentially rests upon the grounds of the credibility and utility of the analysis of social organizations as conducted in the later part. That is, does the theory and exposition of governance expounded herewith hold up and have any practical value? Are the reformulated perspectives on the ongoing management polemics of any help in understanding what is going on? Can the underlying philosophy of mind guide our thinking in such a way that we come up with more meaningful understandings? This Chapter, therefore, explores a proposed theory of governance, which comprises the four *Laws of Menetyping* derived principally from the *JEWAL Synthesis* philosophy of mind and informed by the above "empirical" evidence embodied in the analysis of governance in Western society. Any clarification of our understanding of governance must be a plus, as it does seem a very confused concept among both academics and practitioners alike.

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Governance is a key concept in terms of a sociological appreciation of human life. A generic understanding that is applicable at each level of the individual, the organization or company and society or nation is captured by de Geus (1997: 18—emphasis in original): '*Like all organisms, the living company exists primarily for its own survival and improvement; to fulfil its own potential and to become as great as it can be.*' One of the prime determinants of whether the unit will survive, l*et al*one prosper and fulfil its inherent potential, is the quality and adaptability of governance that it is able to exert on its being, its development and its processes of achievement. The prime importance of getting the governance right is also captured in the cornerstone of a successful company man in a company that is *Built to Last* (Collins and Porras, 1998): '*Be prepared to kill, revise or evolve an idea... but never give up on the company*' (Collins and Porras, 1998: 20—emphasis in the original). As is normally the case, however, both authors quoted above describe a particular, desirable mode of governance that makes for successful companies, but they do not present it in the context of the concept of organizational governance. In fact, the term corporate governance has been unduly constrained by many commentators to mean only the regulatory and administrative framework that defines the composition and operation of the corporate boards of public companies.

On the other hand, the term governance has been used much more loosely in the public administration literature; so much so that Rhodes (1997: 15) is given to conclude that 'It has too many meanings to be useful.' After canvassing many "definitions" or, more accurately, uses of the word governance, Rhodes (1997) then himself goes on to define it in terms of one particular mode of governance; namely, that of a *new* process of governing by policy networks. This seems an entirely unsatisfactory state of affairs! As acknowledged by Rhodes (1997: 46), 'even the most cursory inspection reveals that "governance" has several distinct meanings.' There is much talk in the literature (Dictionaries;[1] Senge, 1990; Campbell, Hollingsworth and Lindberg, 1991; Cadbury Report, 1992; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Schein, 1992; World Bank, 1992; Hilmer, 1993; Kooiman, 1993; Leftwich, 1993; 1994; Charkham, 1994; Williams and Young, 1994; Bosch, 1995; Fukuyama, 1995; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Rhodes, 1997) about particular modes of governance such as Rhodes' (1997) new form of government by policy networks, "good governance" by Leftwich (1993) and the World Bank (1992), Osborne and Gaebler's (1992) "new public management", corporate governance or Campbell, Hollingsworth and Lindberg's (1991) governance of industries and industry sectors. These really represent only "half-hearted" attempts in the particular circumstances at capturing what is really involved in the concept of governance.

What is required, therefore, is to capture and define the concept of governance in such a way that the many modes of governance encountered in reality can be positioned and analysed. This is done in the first instance by gathering some notion of the meaning of governance from the extant writings. However, this is only used as a backdrop for the real effort of going back to first principles and acknowledging that the starting point, rather, has to be in the way humans know and interact with reality. In particular, how do they utilise their cognitive powers to govern themselves, others and societies, and why do they need to do this?

From the writings, then, the concept of governance can be seen to include the following generic notions (leaving aside the specific modes).

- Applicable at each of the three levels of the individual, the group, organization or company and the society or nation.

- A system, pattern or structure of participants in such a way that they are a distinctive unit with some notion of a shared purpose.

- The rule, management, regulation, direction, control or leadership of the affairs or participants of such units.

- An acknowledgement of the autonomy and roles played by the individual participants or elements.

Governance, then, can be seen as the nature and dynamics of a catallactic system that allows power to be used by individuals and groups to reconcile competing ends to the benefit of all in some definable way.[2]

The nature and dynamics of this interacting catallactic system of persons can be more specifically determined by using the philosophy of mind to derive the "cognitively natural" *Four Laws of Menetyping*. These laws are then used to build up a comprehensive, dynamic system of cognitive *menetypes* to explain the many modes of governance

within our society. What is offered as way of "proof" for the Theory of Governance, incorporating these *Laws of Menetyping*, relies essentially on the following:

- the validity of the *JEWAL Synthesis philosophy of mind* as their source, which has been theoretically "proven" by the Neoplatonic philosophers (Plotinus, 1952; Proclus, 1963), perhaps the Scholastic philosophers through the ages (Aquinas, 1952), and empirically analysed through the Enneagram (Riso, 1987; Palmer, 1991) and Jungian (Jung, 1971; von Franz and Hillman, 1971; Myers, 1980) typologies;

- the repeated demonstration throughout the "empirical" analysis in the later part of this book, of their operation and applicability in the real world of governance; and

- that "it feels right", meaning that it is resonating with the way each human has the capacity to think.

THE FIRST LAW OF MENETYPING: GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE

> *In order to govern, human consciousness differentiates in an ordered architecture (or Formwork) of complexity, which is modelled on hierarchically ordered trinities of cognitive menetypes.*

There is a basic structure and dynamic to every trinity of *menetypes* in the hierarchy. This fundamental pattern is captured in the foundational trinity of cognitive *menetypes* that explains the essence and interrelationship of the three generic perspectives on reality (as depicted in Fig. **3.1**). Each trinity of *menetypes* captures a system of dynamic relationships, the nature of which will be explained by the following *Laws of Menetypes*. This trinity is the basic building block. The following three *menetypes* express the generic cognitive perspectives of reality (to be used in the analysis later in this book).

Figure 3.1: The Basic Trinity of Menetypes

- *Menetype #A (i.e. Mt #A)*[3]*:* this mode of thinking within the trinity is an expression of an intelligence of the concrete, sensible, external reality. It captures the outer dynamics and is focused towards making the present one's own—it is concerned with formulating and implementing concrete will to bring into being the sensible practicable "good." This always accords to the essence encapsulated in the bottom right hand circle of each trinity of interrelated *menetypes*.

- *Menetype #B (i.e. Mt #B):* this mode of thinking within the trinity is an expression of abstract thinking, one step removed, dealing with an imaginative construction of meaning or cause and effect and a striving for the "objective truth." It captures the inner perspective and uses what has been experienced or analysed in the past to establish the facts and how they are related to each other, basically in terms of cause and effect. This always accords to the essence encapsulated in the bottom left-hand circle of each trinity of interrelated *menetypes*.

- *Menetype #C (i.e. Mt #C):* this mode of thinking within the trinity is an expression of an intelligence that prescinds beyond the sensible and the imaginative to discern the true reality as it is. It is a balance between the inner and outer orientations and prescinds from both to capture the present as it is concerned in dealing with the "real." This always accords to the essence encapsulated in the top circle of each trinity of interrelated *menetypes*.

There is always a fourth pseudo-*menetype*, namely the other, which is represented by the enveloping circle around the basic trinity. Essentially, this signifies that this particular trinity of *menetypes* being differentiated and depicted, for now, has some connection and access to all other trinities and phases of thinking in some way. This phenomenon has variously been labelled the other, the personal unconscious, the collective unconscious, and/or it can be regarded as containing the next mode of thinking in the hierarchy that may be accessed by the right insight or cognitive movement. The main point is that, unlike *ideal types*, each *menetype* or even trinity of *menetypes* can never be completely isolated or stand alone from the other phases of thinking, as captured by Proclus (1963: 103): 'All things are in all things but in each according to its proper nature.'

There are three well-known trinities of *menetypes* that have shone out in the study of politics, administration and management.

- Montesquieu's (1952) three different types of government: namely, monarchic, republic and despotic; and his lower order trinity of power distribution in any government: namely, the executive, the judiciary and the legislative.

- Weber's (1947; 1962) three types of legitimate authority: namely, charismatic, rational-legal and traditional.

- Mooney's (1947) three principles of organization: namely, the coordinating, the functional and the scalar principles.

Each of these mentioned trinities encapsulates the same basic essence and associated principles of each of the *menetypes* in respective order as spelt out in the generic trinity of *menetypes*. This is principally why each of the examples of three have struck such a responsive chord in the minds of political and social scientists since—mainly because the trinities resonate the way humans structure thinking about reality. It will, therefore, be very helpful to understand the dynamics of each of these particular trinities and this will be best carried out after all the *Laws of Menetypes* are spelt out. Meanwhile, it is heuristically helpful to identify three other particular illustrations of how a trinity of *menetypes* can capture a differentiation of perspectives to assist the understanding of real phenomena. Therefore, the following three examples of a trinity of *menetypes* in action in society will be revisited for each of the *Four Laws of Menetypes* to provide some sort of validation—any formal proof of the *Laws* would have to be developed in detail from an application of the proposed philosophy of mind, which will have to wait for another time.

The first example is the trinity of *menetypes* that helps make sense of the fundamental differentiations in the way humans think about the basic hierarchical level of being, namely (as depicted in Fig. **3.2**—The trinity of the sense):[4]

- *Object (Mt #A)*: which is the concrete something out there that the senses have perceived in some way.

- *Subject (Mt #B):* which is oneself and, though one's senses can detect one's body, one needs to use imagination (or abstraction) to grasp what comprises the intellect that enables one to make sense of it all.

- *Media (Mt #C):* which has to prescind from both the subject and the object to mediate a definitive communication within and between them.

This book has been concerned mainly with the *Mt #A* level of the object in the discussion of governance in the real world. In the discussion of the governance of the self and the explanation of the philosophy of mind, the book

ventures into the *Mt #B* level of the subject as it analyses how one thinks and knows. This book does not really explore the philosophy of language, but that it is a valid, real perspective is attested to by the avid interest in this area of study [Wittgenstein (1953) being perhaps the most prominent and, in light of the discussion in the previous Chapter, it is significant that this *phase #C* aspect has been a central concern of the postmodern dialogue]. However, the significance of language and meaning is inherent in the particular differentiations of perspectives, as the different modes of thinking employ different uses and meaning of the same language. The significance of this aspect is made particularly poignant with the author as he struggles to convey what is clear and simple within the mind of his subject to a group of readers who are regarded as mere objects out there and who are all different.

Figure 3.2: The Trinity of the Sense   **Figure 3.3:** The Trinity of the Intellect

The second illustration is the trinity of *menetypes* that captures the basic way that one differentiates one's knowing at the hierarchical level of participation—which essentially underpins the cognitive validity of institutional archetyping (as shown in Fig. **3.3**—The trinity of the intellect):[5]

- *Individuals (Mt #A)*: which identifies and deals with the self and others as separate individuals to be dealt with on a one-to-one basis.

- *Groups (Mt #B)*: which identifies and thinks of a group of people as an individual. This requires a level of abstraction one removed and captures how one can think of an organization as a separate individual using the same associated system of *menetypes* as if thinking of an individual—except they are different because all the modes of thinking are on the higher level of abstraction of *Mt #B*.

- *Societies (Mt #C):* which identifies and thinks of big groups of people at an even higher level of abstraction that really prescinds from the notion of an actual individual. Again, one can think of a society in the same terms of cognitive *menetypes* as if one were thinking of another individual or organization—except they are different because all the modes of thinking occur on the highest level of abstraction of *Mt #C*.

It is important to understand that all humans can think at any of these three levels of abstraction, namely, about individuals, groups or societies as though they are distinct living entities with human characteristics. That is, this trinity of *menetypes* can contribute to a knowing of each of the object, subject and language in turn. On the one hand, one can analyse an object, the actions of an individual, a group or a society. On the other hand, one can think of oneself as part of and one with, an individual, a group or a society. Grasping the reality of this particular trinity of differentiated perspectives is critical in understanding and using the hierarchy of trinities of *menetypes*. Such insight enables one to understand how if one chooses to focus one's mode of thinking on the level of the individual (*Mt #A*),

then it directly affects one's capacity to think in the other modes (i.e. on the levels of *Mt #B* and *Mt #C*). One cannot think on all three levels at once (as explained by the *JEWAL Synthesis* philosophy of mind) and the nature of the interrelationships between the different modes of thinking is explained in the *Laws of Menetyping*.

The third illustration is the trinity of *menetypes* that grasps the principal differentiation of thinking in which one can make sense of the hierarchical level of exchange—which has been used as the basic differentiation for our analysis of the US society (as depicted in **Fig. 3.4**—The trinity of human exchange):[6]

Figure 3.4: The Trinity of Human Exchange   **Figure 3.5:** The Governance Shadow

- *Economic— Market (Mt #A):* which captures the external, objective nature of the exchange of concrete facts and commodities. It is dealing with the exogenous commodities, which can be seen and handled by all, and the benefits to all participants can be made quite explicit. Therefore, this market or economic level of exchange can be subject to contract. The role called on to be filled by sellers and buyers is well defined in the economics literature and proselytised *ad nauseam* by the business sector. To the extent that participants follow the role models defined by classical economics, there would be a perfect market (such as the share market or the fruit markets).

- *Associative—Hierarchical (Mt #B):* which captures the more abstract and sophisticated forms of interaction between humans, where they form into groups in specific ways for yet to be achieved but specifiable ends. It is essentially dealing with endogenous variables and is needed to provide internal order and predictability. That some hierarchy should emerge when people associate to process something is essential if the appropriate movement is to occur. Everybody is different and there needs to be some choice of what is the best way. The actual substance of interactions is not always concrete and requires some degree of imaginative or abstract thinking on the part of the participant to know what he/she is doing and to explain what he/she is part of. The primary influence usually involves loyalty to a higher order concept of something such as the self, an organization, or the nation. Objectives and rules are devised and shared in an explicit way but still with much room for imaginative interpretation. The benefits are not always concrete but often can be expressed for the moment in some way. For instance, the mass production of widgets, once promised, is usually only undertaken to guarantee greater predictability than could be achieved through purchasing elsewhere in the marketplace.

- *Political—Network (Mt #C):* which is an even more subtle form of association between individuals where they enter some form of protracted process of rather nebulous nature for no necessary specific goal but just in case or just because it is right. It is not only dealing with products and services but is also concerned with building long-term relationships that can be trusted to provide cooperation in some endeavour in the future. There might be codes of behaviour but they are implicit – all

participants instinctively know them but they are rarely made explicit. Out of these rather loose associations is expected to come some benefit at some time, at a yet unknown cost. Networks are held together by commitment to a common set of values and trust in each other as the basis of all interactions. The role of each of the participants (as the secondary *Mt #A* aspect) and the "rules" or norms of their interaction are known in a more subtle way and are deliberately not spelt out formally as happens in a hierarchy. That which is shared in the relationships is often tacit but is cumulative, and participants would have to be cognizant of other members of the network in using whatever knowledge is shared. One aspect of networks that has not been given much attention, at least in the public administration literature, is that it is really about the "goodies" and the "baddies"—the goodies are ones that you can trust and the baddies not only cannot be trusted but also are probably out to do you in. There is, therefore, the notion of conflict around networks and they are actually a mechanism designed to help handle that conflict and increase the chances of survival and prosperity for the individual and/or the group.

This trinity of catallactic *menetypes* of markets, hierarchies and networks has actually been identified in more recent writings (Campbell, Hollingsworth and Lindberg, 1991; Thompson *et al*, 1991; Jorgensen, 1993; Rhodes, 1997). The dynamics of this particular trinity of exchange, particularly as it impacts on the organizations (i.e. *Mt #B* in the hierarchical level of participation) in the public sector, are explored later as all are in operation in some appropriate way. There is also discussion in another place on the observation that society's understanding of the private multinational corporation has really moved up to a societal level orientation.

THE SECOND LAW OF MENETYPING: GOVERNANCE PROCESSIONS

In the dynamics of knowing, preferences are developed in the way of shifting the focus of attention between the particular three menetypes of a trinity and between the different hierarchical levels of menetypes.

Namely,

- the way of procession, which is externally oriented (and depicted as moving anticlockwise around the trinity);

- the way of reversion, which is internally oriented (moving clockwise around the trinity); or,

- the way of transformation, or the movement between the hierarchies, which proceeds either sequentially through the highest *menetype* in the lower trinity and the lowest of the higher trinity, or by quantum jumps along the same mene-line (eg between two *Mt #A* phases in adjacent trinities in the hierarchy).

First, these three movements follow from the processions at work within the individual's differentiated consciousness as explained in the *JEWAL Synthesis* philosophy of the mind. The implications of the ability for the processions to be in either direction means that any aspect of a trinity of governance perspectives can be reached from any of the other two aspects. The ability to move between hierarchical levels means that all *menetypes* are interconnected in some way, whether it is in a weaker or stronger way. However, there is significance and there are consequences in the direction of motion in any change between the aspects of the trinity. Any group of individuals who develop a way of being together effectively will usually settle into a pretty clear preference of governance patterns. Therefore, in any mature grouping, any movement from one aspect of the trinity to another will involve a felt change, which could be experienced as negative or as positive. Putting it another way, individuals within the group will know when there is a shift in governance patterns and it will also probably be noticed by those external individuals who are in contact in some way with the group. Moreover, these processions between the different aspects can go on *between* the levels of collective consciousness (such as between the hierarchical levels of being, participation and exchange outlined above) as well as *within* any of the hierarchical levels (such as between the individual, the group and society in the level of participation).

Second, the clockwise reversion (*#A–#B–#C–#A*) is the way of questioning within the group, the way of intellectual tension or internal struggle, which can be rewarded with intellectual breakthroughs coming from outside the existing

group consciousness (represented by the regions outside the trinity but within the whole as depicted in the **Figures**). This cognitive reversion is analogous with the scientific process and involves a critical reflection on experience, the consecutive acquisition of insights into the meaning of the way things happen, and then a reflective understanding of the best way of proceeding (Lonergan, 1957). Although significant breakthroughs or insights are achieved, this process of reversion would normally be associated with evolutionary progress of society. This was captured by Weber (1930) in his observations of the development of Western civilisation from traditional authority through charismatic leadership through to bureaucratic authority. He saw this bureaucratic authority as the ultimate, but progress can go on and the next step could be something in keeping with the communitarian society envisaged by Etzioni (1995).

Third, the anticlockwise procession (*#A–#C–#B–#A*) seems to be the easier path—where enlightenment seems to come from the outside or is emanative from the transcendent or the other. This is analogous to the guided learning by the child and involves believing what is taught and learning from experience. There does not have to be much inner tension as there is a straightforward acquiescence to yes, this is the way; or yes, it is right to believe and act accordingly. For instance, when an individual takes on a new role within the group, he/she accepts the definition of the role and sets about learning how to carry it out. This is the way one adopts beliefs by hearing or seeing, and believing—provided, of course, that one has already decided (by the first mentioned psychic reversion) that this particular authority should be believed. A more equitable combination of the two involves an oscillation usually pivoted around the base *menetype Mt #A*. For instance, rather than merely accepting beliefs on the bonafides of the witness, they are consciously put to the test by asking the questions that take one in the direction of reversion and reasoning it out logically. This is allowing oneself to consider it from different, perhaps incomparable, perspectives in the same consideration, just to test out which seems more right.

Fourth, a much less common and much more dramatic/traumatic experience is the movement of thinking between adjacent trinities in the hierarchy. The higher levels in the hierarchy can be accessed in the course of either of the two movements (procession and reversion) around the trinity (explained above). In the process of reversion (clockwise), the movement is sequential through each mode of the trinity before going to the next highest level (i.e. from the *Mt #C* of the lower level to the *Mt #A* of the higher level). For instance, when an individual decides what specific action to take (i.e. *Mt #C^A*), a thinking individual strives to access an understanding of the "good" or the will of the organization (i.e. *Mt #A^B*) in which he/she operates. He/she would not normally strive to access an understanding of the "good" or the will of the society (i.e. *Mt #A^C*) in the same action but he/she could address the appropriate questions sequentially.[7] Reflection or cognitive procession prepares the individual for a possible experience of immediate intuition, where knowing at the higher levels is accessed without the accompanying effort of cognitive processes of logic. For instance, the deep meditation of mystics allows them to access quite higher levels of spiritual knowing (which are higher again than the knowing of the intellect as can be understood in the context of the *JEWAL Synthesis* philosophy of mind).

Finally, the manifestation and significance of this *Second Law of Governance Processions* is illustrated by elaborating on the examples set out in the previous sections. However, it has to be acknowledged that the task of succinctly isolating and drawing out the dynamics from the hurly-burly of real life becomes a little more challenging and, consequently, requires perhaps a little more effort by the reader.

- *The Trinity of Being Menetypes: Object, Subject and Media*

    Reversion (or clockwise movement around the trinity) is the way of evolution, the inner striving, bit by bit, for truth of fact. A search for the knowledge of the way the things in the external world fit together in terms of cause and effect, to make sense of the objective world in a logical way to the mind. It is relevant to this *Second Law of Menetyping* that, in the emergence of modern science over the past few centuries, there has first been the development of the physical sciences (dealing with the object), then the human sciences dealing with the subject (particularly psychology), and then the emergence of the philosophy of language or linguistics.

    Procession (or anticlockwise around the trinity) is mainly the process of learning from the external world, principally by projecting from our "other" (or unconscious)[8] things that we do not consciously know onto something or somebody out there, but then appropriate it for ourselves. Others usually help us to appropriate and understand it and one is prepared to believe as it resonates within one. The most obvious example is the way adults teach young children language. First, there is the object. Next, the

parent repeats the name of the object (teaching the child the new language) and then gets the child to assimilate it within his/her knowledge by making him/her speak the name (which is reinforced by an experience of the object to use the different media or sense of touch etc).

A combination of procession and reversion is employed as a basic cognitive tool when one first sees the reality as a whole (procession) and then looks more discerningly to break that reality up in some way to know it in more detail (reversion). In this case, listening to an unknown foreign language might be a useful example. One hears the totality of what is said and probably makes some kind of assessment of its nature (perhaps a request for help, or an expletive). One next goes through what was said word by word to construct a string of meanings in one's own language, which can then be looked at in its entirety to get the gist. One may then go on to analyse it again bit by bit to clarify the detail of what was said in the first place, and so on.

- *The Trinity of Participation Menetypes: Individual, Group, Society*

The way of evolution is the way of reversion. All new knowledge evolves through the scientific community by first being "discovered" by an individual, next it is shared and tested by a reasonably defined group of scientists of the same discipline, and then it percolates up into the wider community.

The way of dissemination is the way of procession. Societal norms are taught by what is held up in the society for reward or punishment (such as sporting prowess). This is reinforced within the culture of many social groupings including work, family and religion, and then it is further reinforced by the personal teaching of those close to the individual.

Fashions within a society are constantly evolving through a process of discovery, the selling of the idea to the industry, and then promotion of the product to the wider society. The response comes back from the society through sales or polls to be interpreted by the groups in the industry who then discourage or encourage individuals, and so on. There is a constant flux as fashions come and go. In contrast, the culture of a society is much more in keeping with the principles of the type of society it is, and is built up and disseminated over a much more protracted cycle of reversion and procession.

- *The Trinity of Exchange Menetypes: Markets, Hierarchies and Networks*

The long-term evolution of the nature of commerce can be understood in terms of reversion. At first, trade was carried on by individuals or small groups with a primary focus on market transactions in physical goods. This focus on the market was the driving force through the industrial revolution. Following the emergence of mass production, the focus shifted more to the hierarchy level of operation and the theory of the firm evolved. The focus was on what was required for the firm to prosper even if this meant switching markets. Then followed the development of the big conglomerates and multinationals, where executive thinking requires a much greater focus on the operation of effective networks to coordinate autonomous divisions or foreign-based subsidiaries.

The effective selling of a corporate plan is a relevant example of procession. First, in the executive's presentation is a focus on the place of the organization in the wider market economy, including the global market and what opportunities there are over the coming years. Next, there is a focus on direct competitors and probably the need for "best practice"—setting out just how the firm needs to operate much better as a group. Then it comes down to what the individual needs to do to pull his/her weight to help make it all work. To instil corporate ownership of a plan, the development of a corporate plan would best include the individuals in the developmental process of reversion first, which would then be an aid to its effective dissemination.

An organization that puts an effort into online corporate planning and leadership will have a continual process of developing the vision/plan, promulgating it, redeveloping and re-promulgating, and so on, so that a continual rhythmic flux between action and reflection is maintained.

THE THIRD LAW OF MENETYPING: GOVERNANCE ORIENTATION

To differentiate a particular perspective of knowing, human consciousness chooses to focus within the trinity on a primary menetype, which then specifies the secondary menetype that is able to support it (namely, the next highest level of abstraction in the trinity), with the third menetype being actively suppressed.

First, it is obvious from experience of the world that there are different modes of governance in operation in different societies, different organizations and companies, and different individuals. This *Third Law of Menetyping* states all these different modes of governance can be explained by a particular set of preferences within each of the trinities of governance perspectives.

Second, this *Law* means that within any trinity of governance perspectives there are a primary aspect and a secondary aspect, with the tertiary aspect being largely repressed. This is shown in Fig. **3.5** where *Mt #B* is depicted as being primary, which then defines *Mt #C* as secondary and *Mt #A* is largely repressed. This means that this particular trinity would take on the character of the *Mt #B*. This develops what can be referred to as the shadow. In this way there can be regarded as being the personal shadow, the group shadow or the societal shadow [i.e. Jung's (1960; 1964b; 1969a) collective shadow is further differentiated into the group and societal levels as discussed earlier].

Third, the members of the group will become particularly proficient in operating in the manner called for by the primary preferences. Those members who cannot develop proficiency will either move on, or be moved on, or stay and become dissatisfied and dysfunctional (and become largely sidestepped). On the other hand, members of the group will not develop the skills and ability to operate in the aspects of the *menetype* perspectives that are repressed. If they are ever called on to perform in such a manner, their execution will likely be clumsy and undeveloped and guidance or coaching will probably be necessary.

Fourth, longer-term successful members will become comfortable in operating within the established governance regime. If they have a good grasp of the operation of the authority and culture trinities, then usually they are able to work through any tensions between their role and personal orientation. However, when either of the culture or authority trinities goes through transition, then unless they are part of the group actually orchestrating the change, life could be very uncomfortable.

Finally, the manifestations and significance of this *Third Law of Governance* Orientation is illustrated by elaborating on the examples set out in the previous section.

- *The Trinity of Being Menetypes: Object, Subject and Media*

  In the scientific process, which is a mature way of looking at objects, there is a primary focus on the objective world out there. In support, the individual is required to interpret the facts to the cognitive world of knowledge within the subject. If the individual's interpretation does not fit there is tension and the subject's cognitive world of knowledge is adjusted or even transformed. This, however, normally takes place within the constraints of existing language which is taken as given. In the scientific world, this would be described as sticking within the existing paradigms. It is only after some adjustment to the internal cognitive world of knowledge that the individual might revert to developing the language so as to better express the new knowledge.

  A primary focus on the subject is illustrated by the practice of the mystic. The mystic eschews the external world of objects but rather acknowledges and focuses on the inadequacy of the existing language to express his/her ecstatic experiences. His/her secondary focus is then on developing a better way of expressing the ineffable, usually by developing imagery and poetry.

  The philosophy of linguistics promoted by Wittgenstein (1953) has a primary focus on the role of language in knowing. Though not having read much at all in this field, the expectation of this Third Law of Menetyping is that the philosophy of linguistics would look for secondary support from the use and influence of language in the external world of knowledge, and largely ignore the internal processes of human knowing—perhaps even needing to disparage them to make its point.

- *The Trinity of Participation Menetypes: Individual, Group and Society*

  The politicians who are out for their own glory are focused principally on causes that advance their own careers. They also pay due heed to developing their place in their particular political party and constituency (at the group level) as it is crucial to their advancement. What is repressed in the scheme of things, though, is the sense of what is really best for society (i.e. their national spirit) because it may conflict with their ambitions. Opinion polls are more important than national leadership.

The "company man" who is focused primarily at the group or organizational level, is renowned for the neglect of their own personal needs (health, family, time, etc.). In his drive to further the good of his company, he is obliged to look to its place in society and think at that level as he sees the organization as a player rather than himself and that there really is a societal world out there to which the company has to adapt in order to do well.

The "statesman" struts around the world stage with a focus primarily at the level of society. It is more important (and evident) that the statesmen look to enhance their own individual place in the scheme of things, rather than advancing the status of their particular political party or institution. That is, they are leaders of nations rather than of particular parties.

- *The Trinity of Exchange Menetypes: Markets, Hierarchies and Networks*

The private sector economy has a primary focus on commercial markets. In support, the companies employ hierarchies (even if it is only one boss and the rest workers) to organize production and distribution (etc.) to the market. By and large, common sentiment eschews the use of networks or collusion in commercial dealings and actually enacts laws to prohibit them. Moreover, the existence and importance of political-type networks within and between organizations are largely downplayed or even ignored.

The public sector organization has a principal focus on the level of hierarchies, principally in being a good organization and doing what is required of it by the outside political masters. Bureaucratic loyalty is pre-eminent but, secondarily, a healthy understanding of the dictates and processes of the associated political networks is also encouraged as important. Commercial practices have, by and large, been actively repressed as manifested in the longstanding guidelines that public bureaucracies should not put themselves in competition in the marketplace with private sector firms.

In the political sphere, networks are the main focus and most important. The secondary effort of political parties is to sell their program to the marketplace of the electorate. Programs need to be concrete, articulated plans that will impact on the real external world that the voter lives and survives in. What is clearly evident in the operation of political networks is the distaste, and sometimes neglect, of attached hierarchies, which politicians often find more useful to attack publicly rather than to nurture and support. Moreover, the use of bureaucratic rules in networks is anathema in political parties as witnessed by the much-loathed and often internally destructive, financial disclosure laws that some governments have felt pressured to introduce.

THE FOURTH LAW OF MENETYPING: GOVERNANCE LEARNING

> ***An individual, group or organization learns by the creation of new understandings and knowledge that manifest as a result of the dynamic tension between any of the three menetypes of a trinity.***

First, the way of learning is the way of questions, reflection and dialogue. Dialogue between the perspectives of the different *menetypes* and the grappling with particular questions are key determinants of the learning process. Different questions focus on different *menetypes* and the movement between them, as identified in the *JEWAL Synthesis* philosophy of mind. Essentially, the particular questions, dialogue or reflection determines the type of movement around the trinity, which in turn determines the type of learning that is experienced. As explained in the *Law of Governance Procession* above, the clockwise reversion around the trinity (*#A–#B–#C–#A*) is the way of inner tension and evolution of knowledge, whereas the anticlockwise procession (*#A–#C–#B–#A*) is the way of implementation and action, and reflection and learning from those outside the group.

Second, a group can often tussle with other ways of doing things that are more in keeping with governance preferences other than its own. However, if it decides to adopt such particular practices, it will normally adopt them in such a way that it retains its essential orientation of governance preferences. If this process of learning is handled effectively, the group will work through the tension of addressing the questions about better ways of doing things and gain insights of how to do its core business better while retaining its essential character. That is, the group consciousness is enlarged by learning what it had not appreciated earlier. This could be represented in the trinity of *menetype* diagrams by an expansion of the relevant circles and a corresponding reduction in the unconscious ("other") space around the three spheres of collective consciousness. If such a process actually leads to the group pursuing a change in culture, authority regime or significant personnel, then there will be a different governance structure and a 'different ball game'—there will be a need to learn completely new ways rather than enriching the old.

Third, it can be seen that each of the cognitive processions has different ramifications. It was pointed out in the *Law of Governance Orientation* that the group chooses one particular aspect of the trinity over the others and, in so doing, actually chooses a secondary perspective in support. Therefore, the reversion movement (clockwise around the trinity) can be seen as a self-help step to the secondary function of the trinity, where the group has already developed a significant expertise in operating. This would seem a fruitful and natural evolution—to take on more of the good practices of the secondary aspect of the trinity—and it is likely to do it well. The procession movement (anticlockwise), however, involves the group moving to an aspect that has hitherto been consciously repressed. The members of the group would all be unpractised, clumsy and perhaps inept at handling such an orientation. That is why the second procession can only come about by the group looking elsewhere and seeing that the "grass might be greener". It actually needs to come to believe that it is better and have a wish to make it on its own. Implementing such a change is hard work and involves close direction and support—perhaps even from external consultants. In many cases such a change is so difficult for individuals that the ruling group often changes the staff by replacement rather than by educating the former staff.

Fourth, it is a fine call as to whether the group should change any of its governance perspectives or whether to retain, but enrich, the current orientation. Organizations that continue to operate basically in the same mindset can become stuck in a rut or in a blissful state of groupthink. Moreover, changed circumstances do call for different responses that often may not be available with any of its particular setting of governance preferences. The successful, long-thriving companies and organizations establish processes that are capable of adapting on a temporary basis to different governance perspectives and making it legitimate to do so. This is often so demanding for the individuals involved, however, that it really only works effectively over time when the individuals have adopted the sort of attitude of loyalty as advocated in the book *Built to Last* (Collins and Porras, 1998) and quoted above. In the current climate of corporate and public administrative turmoil, much of such loyalty has been severely eroded.

Finally, to illustrate this *Law* is a bit more complex because it involves movement and interaction within and between differing levels in the hierarchy of trinities. To keep it simplified and not too onerous, the Trinities of Being, Participation and Exchange *Menetypes* are taken together in this example of a high-flying private sector entrepreneur going to work in a stable, long-standing public sector bureaucracy.

It is reasonable to characterise the person who prefers to operate in the market environment as *Mt #A* cognitive orientation with an outlook at the individual level (as the entrepreneur has probably acted with autonomy in dealing individually with big clients). In the marketplace it is all happening and quickly, and so the entrepreneur's focus is out there on the external world around him/her (i.e. *Mt #A* in all three trinities). On the other hand, most of the bureaucrats could be characterised as *Mt #B* cognitive orientation. They prefer operating in a hierarchy, think at the group level in terms of the good of the organization (as prescribed in rules and norms of behaviour), and would be more introspective (focus in on the subject) and keen to build themselves a sound, logical mental framework to help them process their work methodically (i.e. *Mt #B* in all three trinities).

In entering a bureaucracy, the entrepreneur would obviously experience personal tension in the new workplace, but how will he/she learn to operate effectively? According to the *JEWAL Synthesis* philosophy of mind, he/she can never really become a *Mt #B* person but, as it is his/her secondary aspect, he/she has a reasonable chance of developing some proficiency in the new way of approaching things. The hardest path of learning, perhaps, is the way of reversion—the way of internal questioning. Noticing that these other bureaucrats operate differently, the entrepreneur needs to ask why? How? This requires a movement from observing them as objects to working it out in relation to his/her own way of operating—a shift to the subject mode of thinking. "How do I operate? What is different in the way I approach things compared with them? Can I really persuade them to my way of thinking?"

Grappling with such questions, the breakthrough might come that these other bureaucrats are, in fact, talking a different language. "They don't mean what I would mean when they say something. What do they mean when they talk about the need to do it this way? Why are they so obsessed with rules? Who's pulling the strings here anyway? Why do they like checking things all the time? Why don't they just do it?" The entrepreneur could process through such internal questioning by exerting personal discipline and it would be very tortuous and time-consuming, but gradually insights would emerge. Bit by bit, the entrepreneur would learn that he/she is different and how he/she is different, and perhaps learn how to cope with that difference. It would, however, always be a struggle while the entrepreneur's Weltanschauung (Weber, 1947; 1968; 1978a) remains basically the same.

Formal and on-the-job training is the way of procession and teaches knowledge and know-how. Essentially, the entrepreneur is informed about the place of the organization in the scheme of things; the importance of involving the right people in decisions and following proper process and why; the importance of accountability and the need for rules; the importance of language and being measured in how proposals are handled; and the way to be more reticent and take time to work things out for oneself before initiating anything. What is actually required is that the entrepreneur needs to get to a personal position where he/she is able to say to himself/herself, "yes, this is a different game I'm in. These are the critical facts and these are the principal drivers. Yes, I believe in them and will try to respond to them." Properly done, this sort of training is useful and helps put things in perspective, but is less than effective if the person does not develop an appreciation that he/she is actually different and why.

The other way of learning by procession is through active meditation. Having recognised the tension and done some working out of why there are differences of views, the entrepreneur can take himself/herself away with the Gestalt question of what is it all about? In an active meditation sequence the entrepreneur can actually imagine he/she is the Minister and then let his/her inner voice inform him/her of how he/she would act as the Minister—and let it run. It is a letting go of the conscious control of the problem and allowing the unconscious to inform the conscious. It is similar to the experience of grappling with a difficult problem then giving it a rest, only to find the answer pops up unexpectedly while doing something else. This sort of process can lead to a transformation of the person's Weltanschauung. A person's consciousness and worldview get bigger by incorporating a different way of thinking at the rational level. However, transformation only occurs if the ground is fertile through inner tension, brought about by the process of reversion or perhaps some external traumatic event.

In this simplified example, it is easy to suggest that all three learning processes should occur and that there should be some dialogue between them. It would be more effective if they were embarked on consciously and there were to be a supportive mentor to help. The essential point is the new person involved needs to learn how to deal effectively with the different set of *menetypes* and this is difficult to achieve. But if achieved, the person would broaden his/her consciousness and perspective, and enhance his/her capabilities. Whether that is what is required for the actual role to be performed is another question to be addressed.

ENDNOTES

[1]   The *Shorter Oxford Dictionary* defines "governance" as: 'The action or manner of governing: the fact that (a person etc) governs; control; The state of being governed. The office, function or power of governing; governing person or body. Method of management or system of regulations. Mode of living, behaviour, demeanour; wise self-command.'

[2]   From Hayek (1991: 298–299): 'Since the name "catallactics" has long ago been suggested for the science which deals with the market order and has more recently been revived, it would seem appropriate to adopt a corresponding term for the market order itself. The term "catallactics" was derived from the Greek verb *katakkattein* (or *kaatakkassein*) which meant, significantly, not only "to exchange" but also "to admit into the community" and "to change from enemy into friend". From it the adjective "catallactic" has been derived to serve in the place of "economic" to describe the kind of phenomena with which the science of catallactics deals. The ancient Greeks knew neither this term nor had a corresponding noun; if they had formed one it would probably have been *katallaxia*. From this we can form an English term *catallaxy* which we shall use to describe the order brought about by the mutual adjustment of many individual economies in a market. A catallaxy is, thus, the special kind of spontaneous order produced by the market through people acting within the rules of the law of property, tort and contract.'

It can be seen that in applying it just to the economic market, Hayek (1991) has hijacked the term for a more narrow use than was originally intended by the wider meaning accorded to it by the Greeks. In particular, in Hayek's (1991) own quoting of the original Greek meaning of the word "catallactic", the meaning "to exchange" could be taken to refer predominantly to markets, "to admit into the community" could be taken to refer to hierarchies (or clubs) and "to change from enemy into friend" could be taken to refer to networks. Thus the term "catallactic" is more appropriately used for the science of governance, as defined in this book.

[3]   The use of the shorthand *Mt #A* to stand for *menetype #A* has been used in this section to test out the usefulness and psychological impact of using such a notation of symbols to help differentiate between the many phases, first within a trinity and then across successive levels in the hierarchy.

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⁴   'A subject–object dichotomy is acknowledged in most Western philosophical traditions, but emphasized especially in Continental philosophy, beginning with Kant, and carrying through idealist thought in Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer. It is also prominent in intentionalist philosophy, in the empirical psychology of Brentano, the object theory of Meinong, Ernst Malley (1879–1944), and Twardowski, and the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl. Subject–object dichotomy is denied by certain mysticisms, renounced as the philosophical fiction of duality, of which Cartesian mind–body dualism is a particular instance, and criticized by mystics as a confusion that prevents mind from recognizing its essential oneness with this world, thereby contributing to unnecessary intellectual and moral dilemmas' (Audi, 1999: 886).

To argue that this subject–object dichotomy is better regarded as an object–subject–media trinity of *menetypes* would take a scholarly effort as substantial (or perhaps more so) as that undertaken to reinterpret the politics–administration dichotomy. Consequently, this is a task for another time.

⁵   For some related thoughts of Aquinas on individual, group and society, see Note 25 above.

⁶   Even Montesquieu (1952: 61) acknowledges this basic cognitive reality when he observes that 'the life of governments is like that of man'. This is essentially a combination of the notions that society and the organizations within it are so because humans have thought it to be so and act accordingly, and the psychic reality from depth psychology that the inner and outer are one (Jung, 1960).

⁷   As Aquinas (1952: 301) is quoted above as concluding: 'From this it is evident that many things, in so far as they are distinct, cannot be understood at the same time; but in so far as they are joined under one intelligible aspect, they can be understood together.'

⁸   The notion of *a priori* encapsulates this notion that certain (fundamental) knowledge is already resident in the unconscious of the human psyche and available for involuntary use or to be made conscious through some catalytic cognitive action.

'A PRIORI is a term applied to statements to reflect the status of our knowledge of their truth (or falsehood). It means literally "from what comes before", where the answer to "before what?" is understood to be "experience." Loosely, one may speak of knowing some truth "a priori" where it is possible to infer the truth without having to experience the state of affairs in virtue of which it is true, but in strict philosophical usage, an a priori truth must be knowable independently of *all* experience' (Gregory, 1987: 36).

This concept of *a priori* could be interpreted as knowledge revealed to us which then either cannot be, or does not need to be, substantiated through experience. Then there is another class of ideas that occur seemingly serendipitously to the mind (independent of a substantiating experience) but then can later be substantiated by an appropriate experience and associated logic. The question would then be "where did this idea first come from before the experience?"—and the answer would be "from the unconscious," which perhaps called upon an awareness of a previous experience, but not necessarily.

Another more recognisable phenomenon in keeping with this notion of knowledge springing from the unconscious, is the ramifications of "falling in love." In this case, there is a projection of an unconscious contra-sexual image onto the partner and then one knows all sorts of things about the other—most of which do not stand up to the test of experience and prove to be false knowledge. Nevertheless, during the experience, the knowing seems real and the individual is moved to act upon that knowledge. To test its validity, the individual would have to move consciously into other mindsets (through questions and dialogue) to ascertain the veracity of their "romantic knowledge."

To summarise, both the *a priori* knowledge and the "romantic knowledge" could loosely be called beliefs, because there is a "yes" said at the *menetype #C* level of assessment and the individual is committed to the belief that his/her particular knowledge is so. As a consequence, the individual's understandings and actions are influenced and driven accordingly.

Validation in the Literature

Abstract: Three key examples are provided on how historical philosophical thinkers explained governance in terms of the triadic structure. The essence of the triadic structure is found in Montesquieu's (1952/1748) forms of government differentiated as monarchical, republic and despotic rule and his explanation of governance structures in terms of the executive, judiciary and legislative powers. The triadic spirit is also found in Weber's (1947) depiction of charismatic, bureaucratic and traditional expressions of authority. The third example is found in Mooney's (1947) explanation of organization as comprising the operation of coordinative, functional and scalar principles.

INTRODUCTION

A brief commentary follows on each of the trinities of menetypes from the writings of Montesquieu (1952), Weber (1962) and Mooney (1947). Comments are succinct and to the point of validating their representation as a trinity of perspectives that follow the above Four Laws of Menetypes. However, the treatment of the examples is not exhaustive and there is, of course, still some interpretive work left to be done by any readers with the interest. [1]

MONTESQUIEU'S TRINITY OF GOVERNMENTS

Montesquieu's Trinity of Governments comprises the monarchy, republic and despotic expressions of government as depicted in Fig. **4.1**.

- **Monarchical rule** is driven by the principle of honour, which is in the eyes of the beholder or external, therefore, its nature is consistent with that of *Mt #A* governance orientation. Everybody in a monarchy is into external appearances. As Montesquieu (1952: 11) says, 'in well-regulated monarchies, they are almost all good subjects, and very few good men.'

  Monarchic rule eschews the capriciousness of despotic rule as it could degrade the honour in the throne, which needs to be maintained at all costs. So as not to get the hands too dirty in any demeaning way, the monarch develops the secondary aspect of a republican-type organization with laws and processes—and the aristocracy is the "halfway-house" institution to achieve that: 'an elective monarchy, like that of Rome, necessarily supposes a powerful aristocratic body to support it' (Montesquieu, 1952: 77).

  Montesquieu (1952) identifies the monarchy as being corrupted if the power of the nobles becomes arbitrary (i.e. there is a procession seemingly backwards into their undeveloped inferior despotic *menetype*), but is enhanced if they observe the laws (i.e. if there is a forward-striving reversion towards their secondary republic *menetype*).

- The **republic rule** has a focus on self-discipline of the citizen, 'as in a country of liberty, every man who is supposed a free agent ought to be his own governor' (Montesquieu 1952: 71). The driving principle is virtue, which is 'the love of one's country, that is the love of equality' (Montesquieu, 1952: xxii). *(The virtue can also be categorised as loyalty.)* Equality means equality before the law. The nature of this rule, therefore, is focused inwards on the subject and is consistent with that of *Mt #B* governance orientation. As Montesquieu (1952: 9) says, 'a popular government, where the person entrusted with the execution of the laws is sensible of his being subject to their direction.' That is, the need for, and acceptance of, the rule of law is internalised in every citizen.

  The republic rule eschews the "prima donna", monarchical-type as everybody is equal before the law. What is helpful though is some sort of boss in the executive role actually to get things done, rather than forever deliberating. Elected officials are, therefore, invested with much power in their actual person while they hold office (and even more power in their person during time of war), but there are always set periods after which they can actually be voted out.

  Montesquieu (1952) identifies two possible movements away from democracy, namely, the slackening of the efforts to maintain equality leading to aristocracy or monarchy (i.e. a corruption of the principle resulting in a movement by procession backwards into their inferior phase), and the pushing of the

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spirit of equality to extremes, 'which leads to despotic power, as the latter is completed by conquest' (Montesquieu, 1952: 51).

- Life under the **despotic rule** is serendipitous and dependent on the whim of the boss. The driving principle is identified as fear (but viewed from the perspective of the despot it is more about the principal; of power—the power of might and right and fear is a consequence), fear of survival with the despot being the protector, and then fear of the arbitrary power of the despot's whim in the moment. As Montesquieu (1952: 12) says, despotic rule 'is directed by no rule, and its own caprices are subversive of all others.' That is, despotic power prescinds from all honour and virtue or the law. This is consistent with the *Mt #C* governance orientation.

The despotic rulers eschew laws and bureaucracies that are a threat to their personal whims and a potential concentration of power in others. Despots looking for themselves and their family to survive in the long term strive to impress something more than human to their standing, some greater respect so that they could feel safer if they thought they had some subjects whose loyalty went beyond who happened to have the power at the moment.

Montesquieu (1952) adopts a very negative attitude to despotic rule—any movement towards despotic power is seen as dangerous. He values little the possible necessity that a society may look to such a strong leader for protection. A modern and less emotive term for despot is an autocrat or "boss" (the latter being used particularly when we cross over to look at the phenomenon in organizations).

Montesquieu (1952: 77) observes that 'a state may alter in two different ways, either by the amendment or by the corruption of the constitution. If it has preserved its principles and the constitution changes, this is owing to amendment; if upon changing the constitution its principles are lost, this is because it has been corrupted.' The former is consistent with evolutionary development of reversion to the secondary *menetype* and the latter is consistent with the depredating procession to the repressed inferior *menetype*.

Figure 4.1: Montesquieu's Trinity of Government Types   **Figure 4.2:** Montesquieu's Trinity of Government Powers

MONTESQUIEU'S TRINITY OF POWERS

Montesquieu's Trinity of Powers comprises executive, judiciary and legislative powers as depicted in Fig. **4.2**).

- The driving principle of **the executive** is action in the external world. In particular, the executive 'makes peace or war, sends or receives embassies, establishes the public security, and provides against invasions… [that is], the execution of that general will [of the state]' (Montesquieu 1952: 69–70). This is consistent with a *Mt #A* orientation, which is echoed in Montesquieu (1952: 72), 'The executive power ought to be in the hands of a monarch'—which also exemplifies the *Mt #A* orientation.

'If the executive were to have a part in the legislature by the power of resolving, liberty would be lost' (Montesquieu, 1952: 73). That is, it should not meddle in its repressed *Mt #C* perspective. Rather, the link is through the negative power of rejection! However, the army, which (as Defence) is perhaps the biggest bureaucracy of all, should be in support of the executive. That is, the executive should be given the secondary support of the *Mt #B* perspective.

- The driving principle of **the judiciary** is equality before the law, which involves punishing criminals and determining disputes that arise between individuals (Montesquieu, 1952: 69). This is consistent with the *Mt #B* orientation in also being consistent with the key principle of the republic—'The judges ought likewise to be of the same rank as the accused or, in other words, his peers' (Montesquieu, 1952: 71).

  Montesquieu identifies the social calamity at some time in ancient Rome of giving the judiciary role to the knights or "nobility" who were also part of the executive in collecting taxes. On the other hand, it stands as a fact of experience that, in interpreting the laws, the judiciary are also in some sense making law and so they need to be cognizant of the political will contained in the laws. Moreover, 'liberty is in perfection when criminal laws derive each punishment for the particular nature of the crime' (Montesquieu, 1952: 85) and, when out of kilter, this should be the area of influence of the judiciary.

- The power to resolve is identified as the driving principle of **the legislature**, to deliberate on the options to capture the will of the state, to enact temporary and perpetual laws or abrogate those that have already been enacted (Montesquieu, 1952: 69–70). The principle is power, and political consent is the means to exercise it. This is consistent with the essence of *Mt #C* spirit.

  Montesquieu's suggestion is for a two-sided legislature (one for making laws and the other for moderating between the former body and the executive. This is actually in keeping with the two main aspects of the power focus of the *Mt #C* orientation—namely, the power of might and the power of compromise (the third type is the power of right or ideological righteousness). We saw how when the power of might and right is the driving force of a nation and vested in one person, despotic rule ensues.

  It is corrupting for the legislature to have any judiciary power (Montesquieu, 1952: 70)—that is, they need to repress their activity in *Mt #B* operations. However, the legislature should express the will of the state, meaning it is to define what the executive should implement. In this sense, the executive (*Mt #A*) is a "servant" in support of the legislature.

- Montesquieu's recommendation for the famous and much-used principle of separation of powers is the admission, on the one hand, that all three powers are of equal importance and necessity; but, on the other hand, that it is inappropriate and too difficult for one unit (person, group or nation) to be responsible for all of them together. In fact, as Montesquieu acknowledges, if all three powers in a trinity acted together, 'these three powers should naturally form a state of repose or inaction' (Montesquieu, 1952: 74). A system and process needs to be established to move smoothly between them so 'they are forced to move, but still in concert' (Montesquieu, 1952: 74). In the need to devise such a system lies the heuristic value of seeing the dynamic of three powers as captured in the trinity of *menetypes*.

WEBER'S TRINITY OF AUTHORITY

Weber's Trinity of Authority consists of charismatic, bureaucratic and traditional expressions of authority as depicted in Fig. **4.3**.

- 'In the case of **charismatic authority**, it is the charismatically qualified leader as such who is obeyed by virtue of personal trust in him and his revelation (or vision), his heroism or his exemplary qualities so far as they fall within the scope of the individual's belief in his charisma… In its pure form charismatic authority may be said to exist only in the process of originating' (Weber, 1947: 328; 364, emphasis added). The principle of charismatic authority is in "the doing" (i.e. the executive action), or with the leader being seen by followers to be able to create something they "want" which others cannot—i.e. the leader captures an expression of the followers' (often unconscious) will to construct a better reality from the present. Its nature is outcomes oriented and what is required to convince followers is 'a "sign" or proof' (Weber, 1947: 359)—i.e. it is achievement or respect in the external world that makes for a charismatic leader. Originally, the meaning of charismatic had largely been

restricted to reflect the influence of divinity: 'Hereditary monarchy is a conspicuous illustration' (Weber, 1947: 366), but its generic character manifests in other contexts. For example, entrepreneurs succeed because many people are inspired to have confidence and hope in their ability to be able to succeed in building their vision and, therefore, become followers in the sense of joining with them directly or lending them large amounts of resources.

'[T]he only basis of legitimacy for it is personal charisma… What is despised, so long as the genuinely charismatic type is adhered to, is the traditional or everyday economizing' (Weber, 1947: 362). That is, the *Mt #C* orientation is repressed and, in fact, charismatic or entrepreneurial leadership is seen as the way out of the "rut" where they are stuck in the traditional way of doing things—which needs to be left behind in the new world being built by the charismatic vision. Psychologically, this repression of the ability to think at the highest levels of cognitive abstraction (i.e. *Mt #C*) manifests in "an undeveloped" projection of these unconscious qualities of greatness (in the form of a sort of divine power) onto other concrete individuals, and then being prepared to live it out by becoming followers.

'It is not impossible, as in the case of Napoleon, for the strictest type of bureaucracy to issue directly from a charismatic movement' (Weber, 1947: 383). In addition, Weber (1947: 363–386) argues that, in time, charismatic authority inevitably becomes 'routinized'. That is, charismatic authority needs to take on as a secondary function some of the rational, logical structures of the *Mt #B* phase in order to develop practical processes of executing the plans of the leader and setting the mechanisms for leadership succession. According to Weber (1947), charismatic power can be either traditionalised or bureaucratised. To the extent it becomes traditionalised there could be a usurpation of real power by the leading group, and the adoption of autocratic powers has often led to ugly results (such as the degradation to autocratic rule in many cults). However, to the extent that it is legalised and striving for order and security (Weber, 1947: 370–371), a positive evolution can unfold—much along the lines of the development of the aristocracy as explained by Montesquieu (1952). This is echoed in Weber's (1947) observation that 'its original peculiarities are apt to be retained in the charismatic standards of honour attendant on the social status acquired by heredity of the holding of office' (Weber, 1947: 369). In Weber's examples of the 'routinization' of charismatic authority, such as the elections of Popes, Bishops and kings, the essence of the charismatic projection by the willing followers and their expectations that the leaders are capable of "delivering the goods" is maintained. If those expectations are not met, the charismatic leader is likely to be abandoned or killed off.

- 'In the case of **legal authority**, obedience is owed to the legally established impersonal order. It extends to the persons exercising the authority of office under it only by virtue of the formal legality of their commands and only within the scope of authority of the office' (Weber, 1947: 328, emphasis added). The guiding principle of the *Mt #B* phase of rational-legal authority is thus the same internalised commitment of each individual to Montesquieu's (1952) "virtue" or love of equality before the law. 'The organization of offices follows the principle of hierarchy' (Weber, 1947: 331) and bureaucracy is the *ideal type* of the *Mt #B* phase.

  The manifestation of legal-rational authority or bureaucratic authority, eschews the charismatic or personalised authority. 'For republics… striking victories may be dangerous in that they put the victorious general in a favourable position for making charismatic claims' (Weber, 1947: 382). Rather, the bureaucracy institutes 'the dominance of a spirit of formalistic impersonality' (Weber, 1947: 340). In fact, bureaucratisation is seen as an evolutionary development from charismatic transformation (*Mt #A*) such as from capitalism or from aristocratic-type societies by 'a levelling of social classes and this can be shown historically to be the normal tendency' (Weber, 1947: 340). In this way it has to turn its back on the charismatic mode to stabilise the bureaucratic authority.

  A well-developed bureaucracy, on the other hand, looks to instituting more traditional-oriented constraints. The recognised significance of instituting a culture of consistency engenders the pressure to do it always the way it has been done in the past (i.e. a touch of the traditional), and the importance of the informal networks by which many decisions get support are clear manifestations of this healthy move towards the *Mt #C* phase. Weber himself acknowledges, 'thus at the top of the bureaucratic organization, there is necessarily an element which is at least not purely bureaucratic' (Weber, 1947: 335) and, as has been discussed above, this element in the modern corporation (as well as the public bureaucracy) is of a political/network type character (i.e. *Mt #C*).

- In **traditional authority**, 'obedience is not owed to enacted rules, but to the person who occupies a position of authority by tradition or who has been chosen for such a position on a traditional basis…

But here the obligation of obedience is not based on the impersonal order, but is a matter of personal loyalty within the area of accustomed obligations' (Weber, 1947: 341; 328). Acknowledging that one of the most traditional means for choosing a person to obey is through a contest of power or of arms, then this traditional authority is equivalent to Montesquieu's (1952) despotic, or autocratic, authority. The key principle is the possession of power (and the fear of that power), and its direct and personal exercise by the leader, chief or autocrat. Moreover, 'the obligations of the obedience on the basis of personal loyalty are essentially unlimited… which is free of specific rules' (Weber, 1947: 342). Within the context of this unspecified limit to the use of the autocrat's power, 'the principles of substantive ethical common sense, of justice or of utilitarian expediency' (Weber, 1947: 388), become important and of ongoing concern (and these are precisely the preoccupations of the *Mt #C* phase). Trust is the binding force and therefore structures are 'patrimonial' and rife with nepotism. Lack of trust is the separation principle and results very much in an "us and them" type mentality.

To make this autocratic use of personal power work, there is a turning away from bureaucratic practices and any rules. 'Traditionalism places serious obstacles in the way of formally rational regulations… There is a principle which is derived from the arbitrary power of the political chief; namely, that in the presence of the chief himself the jurisdiction of any court (i.e. 'the laws') is suspended… [and] Rational technical training as a basic qualification for office is scarcely to be found at all among household officials or the favourites of a chief' (Weber, 1947: 356; 344–345). Moreover, 'it is impossible in the pure type of traditional authority for law or administrative rules to be deliberately created by legislation' (Weber, 1947: 342).

Rather, 'what is new is thus claimed… to have become known through the wisdom of the promulgator' (Weber, 1947: 342), or, in other words, there is a supporting expression of the entrepreneurial (*Mt #A*) mode. This tendency is also manifest in the way the autocrat searches for some more lasting justification for his/her power base beyond the mere force of arms. Therefore, Weber (1947) identifies something of the charismatic element in the various expressions of 'enlightened despotism' (claim of extraordinary wisdom), 'gerontocracy' (claim of wisdom from age), 'patriarchilism' (special place by inheritance), and 'patrimonialism' (claim of personal powers) (Weber, 1947: 346 ff). For instance, an element of the charismatic (or divine) responsibility is injected into the patrimonial system through the concept of 'an oikos maintained by the chief where needs are met on a liturgical basis wholly or primarily in kind in the form of contributions of goods and compulsory services' (Weber, 1947: 354).

- Moreover, Weber is noted for his observations of the evolution of legitimate authority from the traditional (*Mt #C*) through the charismatic (*Mt #A*) revolutionary transformation to the epitome of social organization in the form of bureaucratic authority (*Mt #B*). 'In traditionally stereotyped periods, charisma is the greatest revolutionary force' (Weber, 1947: 363), and the charismatic authority inevitably becomes routinized (Weber, 1947: 373ff) and often "flowers" to the point of becoming 'the purely bureaucratic type of administrative organization… that is…from a purely technical point of view, capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is in this sense formally the most rational known means of carrying out imperative control over human beings' (Weber, 1947: 337). This reflects Weber's (1947; 1948; 1978b) personal bias and orientation towards the bureaucratic (*Mt #B*) mode which is "obviously pre-eminent" and the mode towards which all things gravitate (or evolve towards). This personal bias seems to prevent him from conceiving the further development of the bureaucratic authority into an even more complex arrangement that shifts its principal driving force "back to the future" in re-entering anew in the traditional (*Mt #C*) phase (such as the current moves to globalisation and postmodernism). There seems, however, to be some inkling in his observation, 'It was only after rational technical bureaucracy had come to be finally and irrevocably supreme that a need has been felt, particularly in relation to parliaments, for solidarity of the highest collegial bodies under monocratic direction through a prime minister. With this latest development the general tendency of monocracy, and hence bureaucracy, in the organization of administration has become definitely victorious' (Weber, 1947: 403).

- Weber (1947: 382ff) clearly acknowledges that these *ideal types* rarely appear alone but rather in combinations, and he explores many of these combinations. However, Weber (1947) does not differentiate sufficiently to identify any particular pattern in the way they tend to appear in combination, other than the general direction of evolution which is identified as clockwise around the *menetype* trinity.

- Another interesting aspect to be picked up later is Weber's (1947: 405) passing observation that 'The constitutional separation of powers is a specifically unstable structure.' Essentially, Weber (1947:

406) fears the lack of an obvious "pre-eminent power" to settle potential power struggles such as in passing the Budget. Somewhat contradictory, however, he also concludes that 'Hence in the functioning of the political system the separation of powers is generally favourable to the formal rationalization of economic activity' (Weber, 1947: 406). This actually seems to be in keeping with Montesquieu's (1952) point that the separation of powers stimulates movement and is conducive to the democratic principle of equality before the law—in this particular case, meaning the law in the economic sphere.

Figure 4.3: Weber's Trinity of Legitimate Authority **Figure 4.4:** Mooney's Trinity of Organization

MOONEY'S TRINITY OF ORGANIZATION

Mooney's trinity of organization comprises the operation of coordinative, functional, and Scalar principles as depicted in Fig. **4.4**.

- The **Coordinative Principle** captures the executive aspect or the "doing" aspect, which is 'the guttural equivalent of "Heave ho!"' (Mooney, 1947: 5). It is outcomes-oriented with a primary focus on the purposes or objectives of the organization. This is captured in the acknowledgement 'that the strength of an organization is determined by its spirit, that the spirit must be determined by the purpose and the means necessary to its attainment' (Mooney, 1947: 13). This spirit is in keeping with the notion of spirit held up for followers in the charismatic, monarchic, or executive (i.e. *Mt #A*) phases. For instance, 'concerning the first, or coordinating principle, Catholic doctrine rests this authority in God, by whom it is mediately delegated to the pope… This authority is represented in one absolute head' (Mooney, 1947: 102). This is charismatic, divine authority to lead, for the Pope to act in an "infallible way"—that is, followers necessarily believe in the extraordinary powers of the leader, powers that they as ordinary mortals do not consciously acknowledge.

  Within the coordinative principle, 'when we consider *the procedure necessary to attain the objective*, we encounter the secondary meaning of the word' (Mooney, 1947: 11). The secondary function of procedure equates with organizing the processes into specific parts within some kind of hierarchical structure—thereby acknowledging the secondary support of this *Mt #B* phase.

  When discussing the discipline needed to institute the 'organized efficiency' (i.e. the *Mt #A* mode supported by the *Mt #B* mode), Mooney (1947) refers to self-discipline of the leadership authority. 'The commander of a battleship is subjected to a greater degree of discipline than a bluejacket. Even the pope must every year wash the feet of a beggar and must go to confession twice a week' (Mooney, 1947: 13). This emphatically represses the arbitrary caprice of the autocratic authority (i.e. *Mt #C*).

- The **Functional Principle** means 'the distinction between kinds of duties… Strictly speaking, the word "function" means the act of performance or execution' (Mooney, 1947: 25). Thus the principle is

about order, about the breaking up of the process into parts and putting them logically together so that everything flows smoothly and efficiently during the implementation of the will of the authority. This is equivalent to the principle of the *Mt #B* mode of hierarchy and ordered bureaucracy. 'Reason and evidence combine to prove the exactitude in the specification of tasks' (Mooney, 1947: 30), and one could go on to include the same exactitude of rules and procedures found in such *Mt #B* bureaucracies.

In his discussion of the functional principle, Mooney (1947) focuses on the elaboration of line and particularly staff duties. The line organization is the means of conveying the duties and orders from the highest authority to the lower authorities in the course of implementing proper policy or orders. The explanation focuses on the support requirement of the line to command. This relies on the notion of the individual concerned to take personal autocratic authority to interpret and apply the rules and carry out the duties as specified. It is constrained but nevertheless the person in office dictates to all those beneath. In addition, the staff is regarded as 'purely an auxiliary (or secondary) service… which is something to support or lean on' (Mooney, 1947: 35). A key requirement for effective staff functioning is to network in order to uncover information and to test out reaction to various options. In formulating advice on the current situation vis-à-vis the rules and processes, staff would canvas the views of other line authorities, specialists and other interested parties. In fact, as Mooney (1947: 29) acknowledges, 'How often do we hear it said of organized institutions of every kind, that they are all "shot through with politics."' Thus it is that the *Mt #C* network/political mode is regarded as a secondary support to the function principle (*Mt #B*).

On the other hand, the vision or purpose (*Mt #A*) is seemingly taken as a given—it is, by and large, provided to the functional principle from the coordinating function. Too much focus on the ends rather than the means is discouraged. As little discretion as possible should be left even to the extent of the 'exact definition of duties… and this must begin at the top. Without it there will be friction even at the top, and under these conditions it is futile to look for harmony down the line' (Mooney, 1947: 30). That is, any entrepreneurial or visionary leadership (*Mt #A*) should be discouraged if ordered efficiency is to be achieved.

- The **Scalar Principle** is about authority or about the distribution and exercise of power within the organization. The organization of authority that is described is essentially the hierarchical authority (Mooney, 1947: 14), but the discussion focuses on the nature of the authority of the leadership and the delegated power—that is, how much power does each level of authority have and how is it exercised 'according to degrees of authority and corresponding responsibility' (Mooney, 1947: 14). The point is made 'that whenever we find an organization even of two people, related as superior and subordinate, we have the scalar principle. This chain constitutes the universal process of coordination, through which the supreme coordinating authority becomes effective throughout the entire structure' (Mooney, 1947: 15). That is, this is equivalent to the principle of authority power (*Mt #C*).

   An important support for the scalar principle is the personal quality and gifts of the leader, 'But the qualities of leadership involve more than capacities of the organizer; they demand psychic qualities of the leader. This phase of leadership is as vital as the spirit of coordination itself… Although the leader always influences the group, he must, in order to justify his leadership, be satisfactory to the group' (Mooney, 1947: 16). That is, there must be followers and they must see something in the leader to instil confidence of being able to achieve. This reflects that the charismatic or executive principle (*Mt #A*) is embraced as secondary support for the scalar principle (*Mt #C*).

   In his discussion of delegation, Mooney (1947: 19) emphasises the point 'that there is one thing he cannot delegate, namely, his own authority and the responsibility it involves.' That is, the person delegating cannot use the specified duties of the position below to excuse himself/herself from the responsibility of his/her assigned authority. In other words, the effective operation of authority requires personal responsibility and downplays the role of specified rules and duties of those in the hierarchy. The way to distinguish what to do 'can never be answered by mere rules of procedure [*i.e. Mt #B*]. The real solution must be found in principles that are superior to all rules… what here is meant is a real coordination of spirit, based on the common knowledge of the common purpose [*i.e. Mt #A*] and ingrained through the doctrine of organization' (Mooney, 1947: 22)

- Further to his three principles of organization, Mooney (1947), like Montesquieu (1952) before him, further subdivides each principle in terms of another trinity of principles. Because it deals essentially with organization with its underlying mode of hierarchy (i.e. *Mt #B*), his key axis of differentiation is in the *Mt #B* functional principle. The lower order principle outlined in the functional principle is

explained as the determinative (*Mt #C*), the applicative (*Mt #A*), and the interpretive (*Mt #B*), which he actually equates (Mooney, 1947: 26) with the legislative, the executive and the judicial functions explained in Montesquieu's trinity above.

- Mooney (1947) also readily acknowledges that the principles of organization never act in isolation and, throughout his explanations of each principle, he always includes the interaction with, and cross influence of, the other principles. In particular, 'The frequent presence of all three primary functions in the same job indicates how much less we may expect to find these functions completely separated in the general structure of the organization… The truth is that the ideal of organized efficiency is not the complete segregation, but the integrated correlation of the three primary functions' (Mooney, 1947: 27–28). There is some differentiation of the degree of interaction and reliance of one principle on the support of another, and this has been identified as supporting the dynamics of the trinities of *menetypes* outlined above. There is still some obfuscation, however, because the focus on illustrating that each of the principles is acting in each other prevents a deeper analysis of the differentiation to identify the patterns of secondary and tertiary support between the principles.

- Given his recognition of the deep level of interaction and mutual support of all these principles in any situation, it would be reasonable to assume that Mooney (1947) would not have Weber's (1947) concerns about the dangers of the constitutional separation of powers. He would likely see that any such conflicts are overcome by the appeal to a higher principle for resolution, 'the strength of an organization is determined by its spirit' (Mooney, 1947: 13). For instance, an organization in a capitalist democracy would use the associated principles of freedom of enterprise and equality before the law to help resolve conflicts at the lower levels of the organizational leadership.

SUMMARY

In conclusion on the observations in the above examples:

- On the one hand, each of the Montesquieu (1952), Weber (1947), and Mooney (1947) trinities is different because it explains from perspectives focused on different levels/aspects of societal reality. On the other hand, all the trinities are basically the same because they capture the same fundamental trinity of principles arranged in the same numbered order and exhibiting the same dynamics of interrelationship. That is, they exhibit the same difference in similarity, or similarity in difference, as captured in the basic trinities of *menetypes*.

- Moreover, there is an obvious hierarchy within the examples and a reflection of this is captured below in the hierarchy of US governance. While the trinities of Montesquieu (1952) and Weber (1947; 1962) essentially reappear in explaining the model of US governance, another more useful and embracing expression of the principles of governance is employed instead of the particular one used by Mooney (1947). The main point to appreciate, however, is that each phase of each trinity captures essentially the same basic principle of dynamic interrelationship that is captured by the same numbered mode in the other trinities. As Mooney (1947: 80) observed, 'The principles of organization are universal, but the manner of their application must always be determined by the given problem.'

ENDNOTES

1   As Montesquieu (1952: 84) was wont to say in applying his three forms of government, 'I should be glad to inquire into the distribution of the three powers, in all the moderate governments we are acquainted with, in order to calculate the degrees of liberty which each may enjoy. But we must not always exhaust a subject, so as to leave no work at all for the reader. My business is not to make people read, but to make them think.'

Governance in Society

Abstract: The triadic framework is used to explain how American society, for example, is understood in terms of its economic activity, its social activity and its political activity. Then, on the more detailed level of triadic thinking, the economic sphere is explained in terms of consumption activity, production activity and market exchange that define the nature of that activity. The social sphere is explained within the triadic formwork by living standards, associative arrangements and the community's aesthetic life. The third political sphere is explained essentially in terms of Montesquieu's (1952/1748) powers of the executive, the judiciary and the legislature.

INTRODUCTION

A society and the organizations within it are so because people believe or cognitively accept that they are so.[1] In essence, the organization is not a concrete reality in the same way as one of its buildings or one of its employees. It is an abstract concept or belief, which has been called an institutional fact (Searle, 1995: 2ff), relative to the concrete knowledge that one is real and that one's workmate is also real. That is, an organization is an organization because we think it to be so, but an individual human is real whether we choose to think about it or not, or whether we necessarily believe it or not. When individuals participate together in an organization or society, they are thinking and interacting in a language that is at a higher level of abstraction than they would do if they met socially. That is, the individuals are thinking and speaking of organizations or groups as though they are a single entity with personal characteristics.[2] Moreover, they will tend to think and speak of the organizations out of particular mindsets that reflect some kind of inner beliefs or implicit assumptions. For instance, 'practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist' (Keynes, 1936: 383–384). The particular ideas that these practical men do pick up on, in preference to other ideas, have something to do with the inner developed cognitive preferences of the individual as is explained throughout this book.

Our belief or implicit assumption about an organization is qualitatively different from our belief about a society. For an organization, one could point to the legal contracts, sight and list all the buildings and physical resources, identify all the people and their respective roles, and then imagine the sorts of relationships that exist between all these facts and the potential capability of their collective creative, knowledge and political power. The notion of society, however, is really yet another level up beyond our imaginative faculty and is often difficult to grasp or articulate. One is usually content to grasp more at universals or the totality of the belief, such as the concept of a nation-state, and complement it with a secondary understanding of what it means to be an individual citizen.

It is also worth noting at this stage that, while thinking at the level of society represents the highest level of abstraction in the intellect, there is a whole higher level of the spirit of man. The workings of the spirit sphere of the mind are at a higher level of abstract thinking than that usually associated with the intellect or rational mind (Chapter 2)—that is, the spiritual machinations (or *phase #C*) of the soul are prescinded or beyond the concrete body (*phase #A*) and thinking intellect (*phase #B*). It is for this reason that our spiritual beliefs, that are formed and operate at the highest level of abstract thinking, have the power to influence and frame the individuals' thinking about their approach and understanding of society, the group and the individual. In these terms it can be seen how astute and correct Weber (1930) was to focus on the way man's changing spiritual values helped frame the development of the modern capitalist society. After the same manner, an individual's thinking at the higher level of abstraction in which society is treated as a single entity, in its turn, affects the individual's way of thinking at the organizational and personal levels.[3]

'An institutional fact cannot exist in isolation but only in a set of systematic relations to other facts' (Searle, 1995: 35). That is, each individual has these particular sets of beliefs and knowledge operating at three levels of abstraction: namely, what it is to be an individual, a group, or a society. These sets of understandings that comprise our knowing in terms of an individual, or a group, or the society have been defined as *menetypes*—i.e. "numbered" *ideal types* or groupings of like, mutually supportive information. In this case, there are three interrelated *menetypes*, and conceptually they can be represented as a trinity of *menetypes* (Fig. **1.1** in Chapter 1). That is, the trinity of

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menetypes grasps three different perspectives or three phases of thinking based on the three different levels of abstraction. Considered in this context (in keeping with the metaphor of the mind), it can be seen that our thinking about the individual influences, and is influenced by, our thinking about the organization and the society the individual is part of and vice versa. Our thinking about these three aspects is interrelated but differentiated, differentiated but interdependent. This is what is meant when it is said that man is a social animal. It means that one is able to, and moreover cognitively looks to, think on these three levels of abstraction and to think of oneself as an individual, as a member of a group and as a member of society. However, it is cognitively impossible to think simultaneously in terms of each perspective equally, but rather one of the three levels of thinking is given predominance at one particular time.[4]

The modes of thinking in terms of the individual, the group and society constitute the core, central differentiation in the cognitive framework of the intellect. There are three insights that can be interpolated from this key trinity of *menetypes* and their associated cognitive dynamics.

- One's commitment to a particular concept of society flows readily and involuntarily into framing one's conceptions of how an organization should be and then how one personally should be[5] (in keeping with the concept of cognitive procession explained in Chapter 1 and as depicted by going with the arrows in Fig. **1.2**). It does not work so easily going in reverse (i.e. going against the arrow in Fig. **1.2**), where one has to labour under cognitive tension to question what is this so-called organization one is experiencing in the light of one's focus on the individuals who make up that organization, and so on to conceive of the truth of the society in light of one's knowledge of the individuals and organizations of which it is comprised.

- No individual can think at all three levels at once. There is an irreconcilable cognitive tension when trying to inform a line of thinking with the three countervailing perspectives of being simultaneously an individual, a member of an organization and a member of a society. For instance, what one needs to do to survive as an individual may be in conflict with the loyalties owed as a member of an organization or with the responsibilities of being a good citizen (i.e. when one either emigrates or sacrifices one's needs in subjugation to the needs of the state). One, therefore, chooses to accord an importance in thinking at one particular level of the individual, the group or the society, and that determines how important one holds thinking at the other two levels—namely, the next highest level is secondary and the lower level is consciously repressed. For instance, the so-called "company man" is an archetypal conception in which it is imagined the individual is focused entirely on the "good" of the organization and, therefore, thinking principally at the level of the group (as opposed to his/her own personal advancement). Consequently, it is relatively easy for such a person to see what the organization needs to be doing as a good corporate citizen but he/she is not so prepared to focus on what he/she should be doing to be a balanced, healthy individual himself/herself (because he/she tends to repress the thinking of himself/herself as an individual human with his/her own personal/individual needs and aspirations).

- There are similar subsets of cognitive trinities supporting each of the three levels of abstractive thinking. Essentially, one tends to think of the individual, the organization and the society as though they were a unit or a real individual. One is inclined to say that the organization did this or that the nation did that, and even personal characteristics are attributed to them, such as referring to the organization as being tough, or inward-looking or irresponsible. This is a natural outcome of the similarity of cognitive explanatory patterns used to categorise in one's mind the notion of another individual, an organization or a society, albeit at increasing levels of generality accorded to the higher levels of abstracted thinking. ***The implication of this is that the explanatory patterns of the Enneagram and Jungian typologies used to explain the motivation and thinking of individuals, can legitimately and usefully be adapted to explain the way one thinks about the dynamics of organizations and societies.***[6]

This book is principally about the dynamics of organizations. As identified above, how one understands the nature of these organizations is determined by the nature of the society they find themselves in.[7] This follows, in principle, from the cognitive law of procession that decisions and beliefs adopted at the higher levels of abstraction (namely, society) flow down automatically to inform and shape the thinking and actions at the lower levels (namely, the thinking and action about groups and, then, as individuals). Therefore, it is necessary to discuss the nature of society before analysing the dynamics of particular organizations.

Moreover, this discussion of society and organizations will focus mainly on the experience of the Western industrialised society, particularly that of the United States. This is for three main reasons.

- As merely outside observers of the US society, we will be excused for the seemingly generalised, simplistic approach and any accusations of not seeing the trees for the wood—purposely phrased, as it is important to stick to the key driving principles and not to get too distracted by the detail.

- Most of the management, sociological and political literature covered refers to the United States and so can be used as a source of examples to illustrate the key concepts.

- The US experience provides a clearer example of the interplay of the key cognitive insights and concepts at work.

Needless to say, however, the analytic framework and concepts can be used to explain the dynamics of the society and life of any other country, and some reference will also be made to the experience in Australia and in the United Kingdom.

In general, individuals begin to frame their views on the society in which they live at quite a young age. It is essentially something beyond them and is broadly taken as given. The way individuals frame their "knowledge" about how their society operates is through a process of experiential learning and adaptation (i.e. through seeing and realising or acceding to what is or is not, what is right or wrong, what is valued or not, etc.) and by accepting what they are told by their significant elders or peers. Cognitively, this process essentially involves seeing and experiencing at the *phase #A* of knowing and adopting the knowledge transmitted about society into the intellect at the *menetype level #C* of knowing (i.e. going with the arrow in Figs. **1.1** and **1.2** in Chapter 1). This is the cognitive process of belief and involves very little questioning or intellectual processing by the individuals—any of the "why" type questioning is usually met with rationalisations to justify why it is so; and that is that!

In the life of young individuals, therefore, the notions of society are formed unconsciously in the main. They are not an issue, and thinking about them is actually repressed in going about their day-to-day living as individuals, focused on surviving and thriving at the *menetype #A* level of the individual. Any conscious thinking about the nature of their society is largely irrelevant. Of more immediate relevance is what role they are required to play in their immediate groups—which involves the secondary thinking at the *menetype #B* level—such as the family, their peer group, their school, sports teams, etc.

Problems arise, of course, when the individual migrates from one society to another at an advanced age, particularly when the essential characters of the societies are different. It is very difficult to change the belief system at such a high level of abstraction that constitutes the individual's thinking about society. It is not quite as dramatic as changing one's religious/spiritual beliefs (which are formed at an even higher level of cognitive abstraction), but it is still much more difficult than, say, changing groups (including even perhaps the family). The different ways that the individual could adjust would take some explaining but an understanding flows directly out of the cognitive dynamics of the philosophy of mind (Chapter 2).

In what way, then, do individuals structure their thinking about their society? One's thinking about society has been most usefully considered to comprise three interrelated sectors of activity, namely, the economic, the social and the political.[8]

The notion of the **economic life** (*menetype #A*) of a society captures the concrete material aspects of the communal experience. It is about those aspects of the social catallactic[9] system that can be externalised and concretised to allow a *materialistic* exchange between different parties. Essentially, it captures the external expression of the "consumer wants" in the market of exchange of goods and services and anything else that can be formulated in an external manifestation—such as patents on particular knowledge or process. The measure of performance in this *menetype* is external success; for instance, the show of great production, consumption or wealth—the more, the better. It is about the individual and collective will to act, to co-create or to fabricate a new reality; achievement is the driving motivation and it is continuous and never ending. No single achievement is ever enough as there is always another possible achievement in sight. As a result, production and consumption are taken well beyond the level of basic needs. 'He saw deeply into the role of work that it continued long after they had become rich' (Tocqueville, 1966/1835: lxxvii).

The **social life** (*menetype #B*) is less tangible and comprises more the imaginative framework of the desired way of personal life, civic life and aesthetic fulfilment.[10] Essentially it captures the inner life of a society that goes to make up what is called its culture. It is about the associations of life that are valued and fostered within the social catallactic system; for instance, whether to have insular households or extended families or neighbourhoods, how personal and neighbourhood security is to be provided, the mix of voluntary and professional association, and the regard for aesthetic pursuits. The concern in this *menetype* is the degree to which citizens have an inner sense of belonging and security within the group (as opposed to danger from outside foes). Loyalty and ordered living are the driving motivators and there is constant peer pressure on each another to live a life that supports the ordered life of the whole group.

The **political life** (*menetype #C*) of a society is the least tangible, most abstract form of exchange in the social catallactic system. It is characterised by an endless and largely indeterminate myriad of interlocking webs of personal and group alliances. These alliances are not formalised or even imagined as something that could be formalised in a concrete, unchanging way (noting the historic experience of the convenience factor in the adherence to particular treaties). The manifestations of the political system such as the promises, the policies, the spending programs, and the edicts and laws that emanate continuously are certainly visible and tangible—for the moment anyway! However, though there are many claims, nobody can really get a detailed grip on how such decisions have come about—sometimes not even the players themselves really know. It is characterised by a trading in power that can be assembled in a particular situation. The overall concern in this *menetype* is the level of trust that is assessed or "felt" to exist throughout the catallactic system. The degree of personal satisfaction of the individual is influenced by the degree of power that he/she "feels" he/she can bring to bear. Personal, group, and national survival are high priorities in exercising the political catallaxy, and it is here where the values of the society have greatest conscious impact in the making of decisions.

These three *menetypes* of the social catallactic system are taken to contain an explanation of all conscious social action within the society, as interpreted in terms of the inherent pattern of these *menetypes* themselves. In so doing, they therefore comprise a trinity of interrelated *menetypes* as depicted in Fig. **5.1**. As a consequence of acknowledging the economic, social and political spheres as a trinity of *menetypes*, some key insights follow.

Figure 5.1: The Cognitive Trinity of Society Life   **Figure 5.2:** The Cognitive Shadow of Capitalism

Insight 1

First, society as a whole will hold up a collective focus on one of the three sectors as a priority, which then determines the lesser order of the other two sectors. For instance, in the feudal times after the collapse of the Roman Empire, the focus was on the stratification or politicisation of their societal life—that is, who was aligned with

whom and who is going to provide for one's safety and physical security. In keeping with the dynamics of the trinity of *menetypes*, because the prominence was given to the political and manorial alignments, the social life of the population at large (with its institutional serfdom) was subservient to the class system of rights and privileges. This subjugation of the vast majority of the population was accepted as a legitimate state of affairs and even promoted by the Church of the day as in keeping with the divine state of affairs. The enlightenment was the breaking out of this traditional politically oriented mindset into the more entrepreneurial doing, give-it-a-go mindset that led to the industrial revolution. The advent of the modern capitalist era encapsulated the shift of the society's collective focus from political alignments to economic alignments—from the question of "who ruled" to the different question of "for what purpose did they rule". "It's the economy, stupid!" as some modern-day politicians would say. This represents an evolutionary (it is explained above how this is regarded as an advancement in the maturity of thinking) movement around the trinity from *menetype #C* to *menetype #A*. This movement only occurs after much internal tension (rather than external tension as suggested by Marx, 1952)[11] and painful repositioning of the thinking.

This focus on the economic sphere (*menetype #A*) was no more evident than in the United States. It was evident back in Tocqueville's time, 'The ethos he saw in America was an economic ethos… Because Americans all aim at the same prizes, the diversities of personality are levelled out' (Introduction to Tocqueville, 1966: lxxvii). Moreover, this observation was also supported by Charles A. Beard (as quoted in Miller, 1969: 274) 'in his famous book maintaining that economic determinism was behind the drafting of the American Constitution.' It was even more evident through the time of the great capitalists and is clearly evident today.[12] For instance, material success is highly valued and even the measure of the success of the Government is in large part assessed by its success with the domestic economy. And who can argue about the power wielded by the great multinational corporations of today.[13] This focus on the economic sphere has a number of implications.

- The other social and political spheres are then made subordinate to the economic sector in the minds of the citizens and in the practices and institutions they create.[14] Tocqueville (1966: lvi) was pointed but insightful when he observed, '"men only undertake to direct the fortunes of the state when they doubt their capacity to manage their private affairs." It was a shrewdly expressed half-truth—that in a democracy where the prestige lies with the economic action, those who can, do, those who can't, govern.' While these comments were made at a time when the USA was only a fledgling capitalist democracy, it is still true even today in the world of more sophisticated politics of parties and powerful lobby groups that greater esteem and remuneration is accorded the captains of industry than to the power wielders of politics.

  This is saying that when thinking is focused on the economy as *menetype #A*, then society represses (in keeping with the dynamics of the trinity) the importance of *menetype #C* which is the political aspect. For instance, there is constant pressure for the Government to maintain the laissez-faire approach to business and exert as little power as possible in regulating commerce. Moreover, it is obvious that the Government and society (through the press) of today are preoccupied with the state of the economy and the almost divine status given to economic growth. The Government works for the betterment of the economy rather than the reverse. For instance, the Government puts a lot of effort into gathering and circulating economic statistics, much more so than for social or political statistics. Much of the superstructure provided by the Government is for the facilitation of commerce, aiding the producers, workers and consumers to participate in the economy which is controlled by the private sector (for instance, higher education is pressured to become more and more vocationally oriented). The Government sector is actually quite large but often it is only providing those services and products which are not as readily forthcoming from the private sector, and if perchance there is a so-called market for a more concrete voluntary exchange, then there is a predilection for the Government to give way to the economic imperatives (i.e. privatising, user charging and outsourcing, etc). Even family life is subjugated to the needs of the economic life, as families in the USA are much more atomistic and mobile units with much weaker ties to the extended family than is the case in other cultures.

- In keeping with the dynamics of the *menetype* trinity, a focus on the economic sphere actually means a deliberate suppression of the political sphere and a harnessing of the social sphere as a secondary support to economic life. 'What strikes every traveller in this country… is the spectacle of a society proceeding all alone without guide or support by the single fact of concourse of individual wills. It is useless to torment the spirit seeking for the government; it is nowhere to be perceived, and the truth is that it does not, so to speak, exist' (Tocqueville, 1966: xlix). This comment is in keeping with the still

current, almost religious dogma that small government is best and that the Government should keep its nose out of the private sector (unless, of course, it is called upon to help). 'Nothing in American business attitudes is so iniquitous as government interference in the *internal* affairs of the corporation. The safeguards here, both in law and custom are great' (Galbraith, 1967: 77). There is, therefore, a predilection for individuals to focus their collective thinking more consciously on matters dealing with economic life and to repress thinking through political (or philosophical) issues. This emphasis on the economic and the diminution of the government life can be conceptualised as depicted in Fig. **5.2**, which captures the psychic understanding that the repression pushes this sphere of thinking down into the unconscious—and, as a consequence, people come to view politics and politicians with great cynicism (and in quite an unproductive way). This perhaps explains, in part, why the Presidential race has needed to evolve into such a glitzy, sales-oriented, showman-like affair so as to reach the nation's repressed political consciousness (i.e. the world of the collective unconscious, emotions and unarticulated social values). It also explains, in part, why the public administration apparatus has not really been allowed to develop (as has occurred in the English and Australian "Westminster" systems). 'The United States has never and does not now have a genuine civil service, in the fundamental sense of a reliable civil-service career, or of an independent bureaucracy effectively above political party pressure… Neither professional party politicians, nor professional bureaucrats are now at the executive centres of decision' (Mills, 1956: 239; 241). The subjugation of the public administration by continuously importing its leaders from outside (being usually from the market sector), has ensured that the "public good" which the public administration holds to serve is principally held to mean "the economic or corporate good". Or 'what is good for the United States is good for the General Motors Corporation and vice versa' (Charles Wilson's much-used quote as taken from Mills, 1956: 285).

- This spirit of the *menetype #A* economic sphere of the national psyche becomes imbued in the collective (or society-level) thinking of citizens and influences their thinking on the other levels of abstraction. This means that the material success that is captured as a high priority in the collective psyche colours the individual's thinking in the other political and social spheres. For instance, it is the President and the Executive arm of government that is held in highest esteem and treated almost like monarchy (which is after the *menetype #A* spirit). The *menetype #A* spirit is an achievement, expansionist motivation that drives an enormous amount of activity to "do something", to achieve one goal after another, and then to go looking for yet another goal to strive for. Corporations will keep getting bigger and keep competing with others for greater renown (in terms of size, market share, profit or any other tangible manifestation of success). It was correct to observe that 'for him, the distinctive feature of the modern capitalism is that it is the "first mode of production to guarantee" long-term economic growth' (Habermas, as quoted in Burns, 1974: 134). That is, all energies of the *menetype #A* spirit go into material achievement, there will be persistent efforts until success is achieved, and there will never be enough achievement.

  The early entrepreneurial capitalists were the archetypal encapsulation of what the *menetype #A* success and achievement orientation is all about. It was under their watch that the companies cum corporations, as the main institution of the market economy, underwent their spectacular growth spurt in the latter 19th and early 20th centuries (Berle and Means, 1991/1933; Galbraith, 1967). Given that the corporations are nurtured in the collective *menetype #A* spirit, it is no wonder that they have grown to be the largest and most influential presence of the "American way" throughout the world.

Insight 2

Secondly, it means that the particular *menetype* emphasised at this highest level of thinking also influences the thinking and operations at the lower levels of collective and personal thinking (in keeping with the cognitive laws of the trinitarian hierarchy). For instance:

- The big corporations started under the capitalists, and the majority of these corporations are still being ruled in the *menetype #A* spirit, with the all-powerful executive chairman being relied upon to lead the corporation into the next promised land—and, if they fail, they are jettisoned to the corporate grave (Galbraith, 1967: 96–97) in the same way that the failed monarchs (also *menetype #A*) of the past were put to death for the good of the country.
- The priority given to enhancing and protecting the living conditions of those who have been successful in the economic sphere at the expense of those who have not made it. Even social welfare

when it is regarded in the light of the "winners" having to give charity to the "losers" is in keeping with the *menetype #A* spirit.

- The manifestation of the relative choice for economic freedom ahead of social equality and political fraternity mirrors the collective choice for the *menetype #A* spirit of the economic life. Freedom (as it also expresses the spirit of the *menetype #A*) and, particularly, economic freedom is made a high value—and the measure of achievement of this freedom is the availability of opportunities for everybody to make the same success and reap the same rewards as others have done and are doing. Freedom takes pre-eminence over equality (a *menetype #B* value), which in the face of economic freedom is held down to equality of opportunity and equality before the law. Even the practice of equality before the law is compromised by the clear experience of the wealthy being more equal (because they can afford the better lawyers and the longer trials). Under this collective regime the ideal of fraternity (a *menetype #C* value) or close-knit community is devalued and repressed, and the so-called individual (economic) freedom turns into individualism and very isolated, insular, atomistic social lives for the citizens. 'The greatest enemy of the human spirit he found in what he called "individualism", by which he meant the separation and loneliness of men in a mass society, without a principle of social authority to serve as a cement between them' (Tocqueville, 1966: lxxx). Such a "social authority" would be the ideal of fraternity or social networks.

Insight 3

Thirdly, it demonstrates that the evolutionary path of progress for societies is towards an increasing differentiation of reality by a process of collective cognitive reversion (going clockwise against the arrows in all **Figures**).[15] That is, there is a development from a focus, say, on the political sphere to a focus on the economic sphere and then onto the social sphere. Going in the reverse direction is the way of revolution, with a regression in the quality of life of the society.

For instance, the experience of the Western civilisation in moving from feudal times to modern capitalism as described earlier is a move in this direction of evolution. As for the US experience, the early days would have been marked by a focus on the social order as the religious groups that had emigrated sought to survive and hold their group together and true to the faith. 'The framers of these penal codes (i.e. in Connecticut) were especially concerned with the maintenance of good behaviour and sound mores in society… in America one may say that the local community was organized before the county, the county before the state, and the state before the union' (Tocqueville, 1966: 35; 37). Then through the War of Independence and the establishment of the nation the focus would clearly have shifted to the political sphere. But, by deliberate design of the founding fathers, the political life was held to a minimum and this focus of the new country shifted quickly to the economic sphere, and that was essentially where Tocqueville found it a mere 50 years later.

To repeat, the purpose of a cursory analysis of the dynamics of the level of society is to frame the influence that this higher abstract thinking has on the lower levels of thinking regarding the nature and dynamics of organizations (and below that of the life of the individual as a separate individual). The following chapters are aimed at explaining the dynamics of organizations, principally the private corporation, the public administrative agency, and the not-for-profit organization. Each of these units "lives" in a different sector of society, namely in the economic, the political and the social spheres, respectively, which are the first-order trisection of society described above. It is, therefore, useful to consider in more detail the internal fabric of the way that individuals have structured their thinking of these three spheres of a society to help locate the individual agencies in the collective psyche. What follows now is the application of the trinitarian concept of *menetypes* to the next lower level of abstract thinking about society and its component parts that can be thought of as distinct but all interacting as a whole—that is, "unity-in-distinction" (Dodds, 1963: 300). A system of superscripts has been employed to distinguish the lower level of abstraction from the higher, eg *menetype #A^B* represents the lower-level *menetype #A* perspective within the higher-level abstract *menetype #B* perspective. It is written in this order because the orientation of the lower level is more immediate and relevant to the particular situation but is affected from on high by the influential higher levels of abstract thinking. The logic of lettering would follow by reflecting the higher relevant levels as successive superscripts: *menetype # $(C^A)^B$* would represent the *menetype #C* orientation at the lowest level within the *menetype #A* orientation of the intermediate level, which was within the *menetype #B* orientation of the highest level.

The key, then, to establishing the context for the organizational analysis is to break down the thinking gradually within a consistent framework by moving from the broader more abstract notion of society through a trinitarian hierarchy of perspectives until each of the organizations to be studied is positioned (within the human's cognitive framework). What is contended in pursuing such an approach is that each aspect of society can be thought of as comprising three differentiated "spirits" of operation, and this trinitarian pattern can be usefully repeated to build up a comprehensive explanation of the essential operations of society, and the role of human organization within the US society in particular.

ECONOMIC SPHERE (Menetype #A)

The individual's thinking on the economic sphere of a society can be framed in terms of the following *sub-menetype* trinity (as depicted in the lower right-hand sphere of Fig. **5.3**).[16]

- **Consumption** (*menetype #A^A*), which captures the concrete, external aspects of the economic sphere— it is where the actual product ends up. The consumer is real and identifiable, and the things exchanged to and from the consumer are real, tangible, identifiable entities. Essentially, if the consumer cannot physically acquire the product or service, meaning that if the consumer cannot acknowledge that he/she actually has it, then it does not form part of the economic sphere. This aspect is the raison d'être of the economic system and captures the principal reason that the economic sphere itself takes on the *menetype #A* characteristics.

- **Production** (*menetype #B^A*), which comprises the systems that organize the acquired raw materials into the "imaginative" processes that fabricate, offer and deliver finished products to the consumers. The system of processes used ranges from the simple one-person "back-yard" effort up to the large, modern, multinational corporation. It is well-documented (Berle and Means, 1991/1933; Galbraith, 1967) how the vast bulk of the production of goods and services is now concentrated under the control of the large corporations. This is a secondary supportive role to the process of making the products available for consumption.

- **Market Exchange** (*menetype #C^A*), which is the event that sets some value on what is being transferred; in particular, what it costs the consumer to acquire the product from the producers, such that an exchange can actually happen. The value or price is arrived at in many different ways, but the bottom line is that each of the parties reaches agreement and commitment to effect the change and each trusts the other to deliver that which is agreed. If consumption (i.e. *menetype #A^A*) is the primary aspect of the economic sphere, then market exchange is the cognitively repressed (as *menetype #C^A*) aspect—or Adam Smith's (1952/1776) "invisible hand" as it is well known. Economists, in general, have failed to realise and expound that the basic underlying mechanism of market exchange is essentially one of power dynamics.[17] As observed by Burns (1974: 168), 'The third obstacle to traditional economic solutions lies in the inability of traditional economics to understand the sources of power in society.' The notion of rational economic man is therefore largely seen as irrelevant in the aspect of market exchange, though it might be seen to operate through the repressed *menetype #B* aspect of the market mentality (i.e. *menetype #B^C* of the *menetype #A* economic sphere)—in which case it is likely to be an undeveloped and primitive expression of what economists would have us believe as rational economic man.

That these three aspects can be analysed as a trinity of interrelated *menetypes* gives some interesting insights of the dynamics of the economic sphere.

- Consumers embody the wellspring of desire and exercise the will to acquire that desire. If the consumer does not look for or does not want the product there is no market exchange. That is, consumption (or *menetype #A^A*) is predominant in the economic sphere. This comes back to the well-understood but sometimes ignored truths of the power of knowing your market to appreciate what the potential consumers desire, and the power of advertising to help stimulate and influence the consumers' desires. It is all about an activation of the consumer's will by conscious or unconscious means. But it means that the consumer has to envision a better reality than the present if his/her will is to be activated to acquire the product. There is nothing objectively rational about what a person can

envision or desire—in fact, the scope is only bounded by the need for the possibility of that desire being made concrete, or realisable.

- Neither does the spirit of the market exchange embody any notion of objective rationality [in the sense of Weber's (1962) legal-rational approach]—that is, it does not fit the mould of the rational economic man. This *menetype #C^A* is the place of subjective personal or group value within the higher economic sphere, and though value—or Jung's (1971) feeling function as opposed to emotion—may be arrived at rationally (i.e. for conscious reasons) it is not arrived at by objective logic (as implied in the notion of the rational economic man).[18] Values are internal to the individual or group but manifest in external actions. This spirit would be in agreement with Oscar Wilde's (Bartlett, 1968: 839) scorn of the cynic who knows the price of everything, and the value of nothing. Although true values and feeling are determined rationally (i.e. personal decisions through conscious reasoning) by people mature in the *phase #C* spirit, they are normally termed irrational in the economics discipline, mainly because there is some live cognitive connection of the *phase #C* spirit to the influence of the lower level emotions.[19] Essentially, the spirit of the *menetype #C* is the "right" (as decided by the person with the power) exercise of power and so it is relative power that really matters in the market exchange sphere. Money is the most obvious and brute expression of power and hence the preoccupation of economists with the role of price in the marketplace. However, individuals' personal response to external power is not linear, and so what economists are really measuring in the marketplace is the spread of individual tolerances to the imposition of external price power. Intuitively, the same analysis could be applied to the citizen's response to an increasing autocratic political power—that is, one by one (or two by two) they drop out of civil support as the flaunting of power escalates. The dynamics of power interactions should be the focus of the economists' study of the market, rather than some notion of a logical economic man.

- The only real area of rationally objective, logical behaviour is in the production sphere (*menetype #B^A*), which is clearly exhibited in the operation of the large corporations. Here there is a focus on planning, efficient processes, order and control desirably in all aspects of their operations, and a hierarchical structure and mentality are favoured to bring this about. Moreover, Galbraith (1967: 198ff) goes to great lengths to explain how the large corporations put a high priority on stable, predictable prices (so they can plan logically with confidence), and use their oligopolistic power in the markets to achieve them.

Much, of course, could be done with this analysis to rework the understanding in the field of economics. This, however, is beyond the scope of this book, which must stick to the task of analysing the principles of organization and management. In summary, therefore, the main points to note and take into the following analysis are that the corporation is framed in terms of a *type #B* spirit operating in the *menetype #A* economic sphere of the *type #A* oriented US culture which, in turn, has a very important influence on the actual thinking and behaviour of the corporation (as opposed to say a public service agency). The other aspect to note is that a mature corporation gets to be well-steeped in the *type #B* spirit of hierarchy, planning, efficiency and control and, to do so, is in danger of repressing its orientation and sensitivity to the *type #A* spirit—which just happens to be that spirit which is encapsulated in the potential consumers of its products!

Again, the overall point is that no individual or group can think simultaneously in the spirit of all three *menetypes* to the same degree—there has to be some focus and priority given to one of the three to ensure movement. However, this book will be concerned with how processes can be set up to at least make sure some attention is being given to thinking in the spirit of the other cognitive spheres, and that they potentially can have some voice. In this way, they can be heard at the times when the situation demands that their thinking should come to the fore, and if they have been exercised a bit then their thinking and recommendations have a chance of being more mature and worthwhile than otherwise might be the case (if they are neglected).

SOCIAL SPHERE (Menetype #B)

The individual's thinking in terms of the social sphere of a society can be framed in terms of the following *sub-menetype* trinity (as depicted in the lower left-hand sphere of Fig. **5.3**).

- ***Living Standards*** (*menetype #A^B* of society), which encapsulates the concrete, external aspects of the social fabric. This aspect incorporates the physical attributes of one's personal and communal existence, such as the developed environment, the mode of dwellings and the urban infrastructure. It also encapsulates how personal and communal resources are allocated as might be picked, say, in a household activity/spending survey. How do the citizens spend their time and resources in work, education and leisure pursuits?

- ***Associative Arrangements*** (*menetype #B^B* of society), which capture the societal links in families, neighbourhoods and local communities as a broader body of people. Religious associations have tended to be the most important of these but it includes any associations that go to support the inner life of the society. Voluntary associations and the not-for-profit organizations (which are to be analysed in this book) form out of this social spirit. It is all about fostering a sense of belonging and loyalty among the citizens on the basis of equal rights (or otherwise) to live and partake of society.

- ***Aesthetic Life*** (*menetype #C^B* of society), which captures the more intangible aspects of society such as the mores and values of the society in an artistic or tasteful way (meaning that some assessment on society is conveyed in artistic form). Not only is this spirit expressive of what is real about the way society is operating and where it is putting its focus, but it can be a force encouraging commitment of the collective to move in another direction. It has the power to enjoin and hold up the perspectives of the standards of living and associative patterns to transcend them to form a higher level of culture.

How these perspectives are played out determines the perceived culture of the society. In this light there are some useful insights to be drawn about the dynamics of this lower-level trinity of *menetypes*.

- It is one of the properties of the hierarchy of *menetypes* that the basic *menetype #A* of any trinity should define the notion of "the good" aspired to by the spirit of the next lower trinity of *menetypes* in the hierarchy. In this case, the US collective conception is that the aspiration of their living standards should be defined in terms of individual material affluence: 'a family's standard of living becomes an index of its achievement' (Galbraith, 1967: 38). This concept of individual material affluence then defines "the good" that is strived for throughout the entire *menetype #A* economic sphere—i.e. individual material affluence is the star in the sky and the measure of success achieved by the economic system, or 'that social progress is identical with a rising standard of living has the aspect of a faith' (Galbraith, 1967: 164). This aspect should be noted to inform an understanding of the later analysis of the private corporation.

- Too much of a focus on material living standards (*menetype #A^B* or *type #A* at the ground level) results, according to the dynamics of the cognitive trinity, in a conscious repression of the value of aesthetic life (*menetype #C^B* or *type #C* at the ground level)—arts and philosophy are devalued.[20] This seems to have been the experience in the United States, where there does not seem to be a lot of social encouragement for individuals to pursue the aesthetic life—particularly at the expense of their work life or material success. For those who do wish to pursue an aesthetic life, it is often much tougher and less remunerative than normal pursuits. This is changing to a certain extent in the so-called postmodern age, where societal thinking has shifted to a more amenable attitude towards aesthetic reality. This aspect together with the above-mentioned tension between the predisposition, or spirit, of a particular individual and that of the group or the society are issues that will be taken up later.

- US history has seen a strong presence of voluntary associations, but in recent years it has been reported to be on the wane (as it has also in Australia) as the society achieves material success and seems to pursue it even more vigorously. In *menetype* terms this is bad news and is going in the wrong direction for collective psychic health. In recognition of this there has been a call from some academics (eg Etzioni, 1995) for people to build more community links, and unless this happens individuals will suffer the consequences.

Finally, it is important to note for the upcoming analysis of the not-for-profit organizations that essentially they are imbued with a *menetype #B^B* spirit within a primary *menetype* of the same ilk (i.e. the *menetype #B* social sphere). This coincidence of the two *phase #B* spirits is mutually reinforcing but the overall psychic importance is dampened by the fact that at each level in the American psyche, they are only in a secondary supporting role behind the *menetype #A* economic sphere and the *menetype #A^B* living standards. Nevertheless, the mutual reinforcement means that the not-for-profit organizations are doubly endowed with the spirit of loyalty and efficient service to their community of members, and should actually doubly *eschew* the *menetype #A* spirit of the economic sphere.

Figure 5.3: The Trinitarian Hierarchy of Society

POLITICAL SPHERE (Menetype #C)

The nature and dynamics of the individual's thinking on the political sphere have been well expounded by Montesquieu (1952) and comprise the following *sub-menetype* trinity (as depicted in the top sphere of Fig. **5.3**).

- ***The Executive*** (*menetype #A^C* of society), or the President in the case of the United States, which encapsulates the most concrete aspect of the political sphere.[21] This is the arm of Government that expresses and carries out the will of the Government. It is about envisioning a better present (or creating the policy options), about devising the implementation of policy, and about doing—but not the deciding or committing on Government policy unless delegated by the legislature to do so. To the extent that the President rises above this operational level to encapsulate the vision and direction of

the whole country, he/she, in one sense, can then encapsulate the "Good" at the next level up—beyond this level of society (i.e. it is more closely akin to the spiritual!) This is, essentially, the higher level of thinking that aspirants attempt to encapsulate when running for election to office—the "vision thing". John Kennedy is perhaps the President who was most successful in holding onto this higher collective thinking while in office (eg the vision to put the first man on the moon)[22]—at least in retrospect, that is. Administrative agencies are set up beneath this authority to support the implementation, but it is the Office of the President that is responsible. As it is about expressing the society's will, the Executive needs to conceive and promote creative, acceptable solutions to the society's desires or problems— and this is achieved by sponsoring spending programs that are directed towards areas of priority. In essence, this is the same spirit as principally enshrined in the monarchies of previous ages that were required to deliver prosperity and perhaps expansion. To fail to achieve this is death. Like all *menetype #A* spirits, it is imbued with some measure of charisma, which means that citizens must be able to project their wish-fulfilment (or often unconscious desires) and inner-valued ideals onto the particular incumbent.

- *The Judiciary* (*menetype #B^C* of society), which is responsible for enforcing the laws and norms that are established by the people's government. This is the sphere of law and order, and maintenance of civic harmony. Equality before and loyalty to the law are high qualities practised in this sphere. While the pursuit of truth is really in keeping with the spirit of this *menetype #B*, it does not seem to be always the case in practice. This spirit is in keeping with the countries (i.e. European) where the judge is responsible principally to inquire after the truth. The US practice is more in keeping with a competitive encounter to determine innocence or guilt—which is more in keeping with a *menetype #A* spirit. This is probably as a result of the all-influencing dominance of the primary *type #A* spirit of the American psyche, which is about competing and winning in the marketplace. As a consequence, the power of the Judiciary is diminished in terms of its core spirit of equality and truth, with greater power being handed to the creative and practical (i.e. *type #A*) lawyers (which really represents the repressed/inferior aspect of the Judiciary *menetype #C^B*)

- *The Legislature* (*menetype #C^C* of society), which is responsible for capturing and processing the debate on the society's issues to be resolved. It is the ultimate sphere of political actions, being a *lower-level menetype #C* in the *menetype #C* sphere of political life. It is primarily about power, the exercise of it, the compromise with it, and the rights in determining it. This is also the place of values, of collective values, and so it quite readily bends to serve the value that the society holds most dearly—namely, in the US case, the economic imperative (as expressed in a *phase #A* mentality). National security is also a natural high priority for it is important to this mentality to protect the survival of the country and the group. If the individual has a character that is personally oriented to *phase #C* thinking, then he/she will also have very strong self-preservation instincts.

The following are some useful insights that can be observed in the dynamics of this particular trinity of *lower-level menetypes*.

- It is perhaps easier in this case to grasp how a trinity of *menetypes* encapsulates three quite different ways of exercising power among people.[23] In this case it captures three different ways in which political power is exercised. By political power, is meant power that derives from the decision by the one person or group (because of this personal balancing of relative costs and benefits) to accede to another the authority to decide and commit on their behalf. The rationale is about power for power's sake and not necessarily because it is objectively or logically better, but it is a commitment made for now in recognition and assessment of the existing exigencies. Political power (*menetype #C*) is power expressed in the particular individuals themselves, rather than in the idea or vision (*menetype #A*) as in the case of a charismatic leader, or in the process (*menetype #B*) which is normally expressed as a bureaucrat filling a position in the hierarchy.

- Each of these political powers is of equal validity and importance for the healthy operation of the political sphere of a society, but different societies choose to give prominence to a different power. If the powers were to be in perfect balance they would nullify one another and there would be stalemate—there would be no net movement. Therefore, one phase of the political power cycle has to take the lead and it should be the most appropriate for the circumstances. Needs change from time to time and so it is important that a system exists to allow the other phases of political power to be called into prominence, when appropriate.

- Montesquieu's (1952) well-known concept of the separation of powers focuses on the key to understanding how to govern the dynamics between the three equally important power relationships expressed in the trinity of *menetypes*. Each of the three powers captures a different perspective of the totality of political power, and so they each need to be able to operate for the health of the whole polity of the society. Montesquieu (1952) explains how, in the governments of earlier times, all three powers were often found vested in the one person. Even with the wisdom of Solomon, it would be humanly impossible for one individual to be able to carry out the thinking and functioning demanded by each of the three perspectives effectively, particularly in the modern, more complex society. The individual might be great in some areas but there will be some aspect(s) in which the person's thinking is undeveloped and primitive in execution, which could, perhaps, lead to calamities. By separating the powers and putting them in the hands of different players, not only is despotism avoided, but also each perspective is given a chance to develop its thinking and reactions, so when the time comes to be heard or it is appropriate for it to take the centre stage, it can do so much more maturely than otherwise might be the case. That is, the people involved have trained their thinking in the ways of the particular perspective (of the three) that their role is meant to represent, and so they are capable of making rational decisions or recommendations—which can then be stood up against the suggestions of the other mature perspectives and the ultimate decision can be taken that is most appropriate for the circumstances. The US experience of practising the separation of powers in its polity has clearly demonstrated the success of this approach.

Finally, it is important to note for the upcoming analysis that public administration does not yet appear in the collective psyche. That is, the public administration is located at an even lower level in the cognitive hierarchy of thinking about the distribution of political power within a society. In particular, it comes under and in support of the Executive, which is the expression of the President in this case. In broad terms, the role of public administration is to be the medium through which the political authority delivers its favour and disfavour to the society as the public. Its impact or acknowledged importance in the collective psyche of the society is correspondingly the lesser. Moreover, the nature of a public agency is essentially a *menetype #$(B^A)^C$*, which is two levels down the hierarchy in support of the Executive which is a *menetype #A^C* policy entrepreneurial spirit serving a political sphere which has a different spirit again (i.e. *menetype #C*). Even more than that, this primary political sphere holds the least priority in the American collective psyche of how it runs its society. Right up front, this makes for a clear expectation of a diminished role for public administration and minimal power in the conduct of the nation's affairs. This has definitely been the case in the US experience, as observed by Mills (1956: 237), 'The civilian government of the United States never has had and does not now have a genuine bureaucracy.' Although the size of the public sector has definitely increased since that time, the basic nature has remained essentially the same: in essence, it is less than. However, to the extent that the President rises above the society level of thinking by being the charismatic and almost spiritual leader of the nation, the importance of at least some parts of the public administration will be lifted with him/her (such as the positions of Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of State).

Because of this interplay of the spirit of different *menetypes*, it can also be appreciated that the motivation and driving force of public administration could get much more muddled and diffused than that of the private corporation. Moreover, it does not enjoy, and should not enjoy, the autonomy that is accorded the private corporation because it has a lower (more subservient) status in the schema of people's thinking about the service to the nation. With respect to the national psyche, the private corporation is regarded almost, in one sense, on the same level of thinking and psychic appreciation as the Executive power—and the public agencies are left to try and catch the crumbs that fall from their table.

The only thing that US public administration has going for it is that, in serving the Executive, it is at least serving in support of the psychically most popularly respected player in the political sphere (which is in keeping with the national predisposition to the general *menetype #A* charismatic spirit). It, therefore, makes sense in terms of the disposition of the collective psyche for the Government to bring in leaders from the economic sphere to lead the public sector agencies—but more of this later.

SUMMARY

In summary, this cursory explanation of the structure of the US society in terms of the metaphor of the mind is meant to have achieved three developments in understanding.

- Cultivate an appreciation that the society is the way it is because individuals have organized their higher modes of thinking to understand and know in that particular way. That this is achieved unconsciously in the main still does not belittle the fact that individuals adapt to thinking about different sets of beliefs and values if they are born in different countries—their thinking is just directed differently.

- Provide some sense of the dynamics inherent in the trinity of *menetypes* by focusing on some of the parallels that can be drawn with the evolution of society. Were this a social science text, these parallels might have been explored and explained in much more detail—in much the same way as Weber (1930; 1948; 1978a; 1978b) in his many societal level studies [particularly the way he (1930) focused on how the higher level conceptual/spiritual thinking of humans influenced their spiritual and societal beliefs and habits]. However, in this case, it is just meant to add some legitimacy and/or credibility to the philosophical framework that will be used mainly to analyse the management in organizations.

- Establish the nature of thinking at the societal level that influences heavily how individuals think about the organizations they come into contact with. People in different societies regard their organizations in different ways and as a consequence act differently. For instance, in many Asian countries, the focus at societal level is on the political sphere (*menetype #C*) rather than the economic sphere as it is in much of the West. As a consequence, and particularly with different religions, the way individuals in Asia view their organizations is fundamentally different to the way individuals experience organizations in the USA. This will be explored in more detail later in the book.

Imbued with the understanding that the American psyche is oriented predominantly towards the *menetype #A* economic sphere of the society, we will now look at governance in the political sphere only, and then predominantly at the role of the US public administration within that sphere. The modus operandi of the other two spheres, namely the economic and social spheres is explored in detail in other papers by the authors (Cutting and Kouzmin, 2000a; 2000b; 2001a; 2001b; 2001c; 2001d).

ENDNOTES

1   'Aristotle adopted Plato's famous principle, "the state is the soul writ large," and "the soul is the state writ small." In our contemporary context, we would say that a culture sets the conditions for developing the character of its people, or a culture is the people writ large… Plato and Aristotle were both aware of this mutual relation between particular souls and their social order. Plato's famous maxim that the state is the soul writ large also implies that the soul is the state writ small. The social order does not necessarily determine the character of its members, but it certainly does set the conditions and disposes them to behave in socially approved and disapproved ways' (Flanagan, 1997: 202; 211).

   'First, organizations are cognitive systems; organizational members generally internalise these systems and thus unknowingly become unconscious thinkers. But organizational thinking may even become conscious and systematic when it is articulated with fundamentalist overtones. This kind of thinking is characteristic of "theorists" who articulate the cognitive system inherent in a particular type of organization as a normative cognitive system in general' (Ramos, 1981: 44)

   In general, individuals accept or believe in the identity of the organization—that is, they internalise the systems and think of them as entities but at the higher level of abstract thinking that is applicable to their thinking about groups. This is automatic and in that sense unconscious, and so they play their part according to the dictates of what they believe the systems are requiring them to do.

   As Boulding (1993: 188) observed, 'Another important artefact consists of organizations—families, corporations, churches, states, professional societies, and so on. These exist primarily as images in peoples' heads, though they may be embodied in part in buildings, homes, or in documents, charters, though even these are important mainly as symbols and evidence of the existence of the organization in the minds of people. The 49th parallel is quite invisible from outer space and exists only in the minds of humans as a boundary… Similarly, a corporation exists only in the minds of humans in a common belief in its existence, the evidence of which may also be embodied in charters and legal documents, shares of stock, bonds and so on. A share of stock is not the paper it is written on, but is a belief in the minds of the right people that governs their images of the future and their behaviour and decisions.'

2   'The problem, however, with the current type of unidimensional organizational theory and practice is that it assumes that administrative behavior is identical to human nature. This erroneous assumption is sometimes made in crude terms. For instance, in one typical behavioural textbook one reads that "the organization is believed to

have, on a large scale, all the qualities of an individual" (Rush…). Under the pressures of the market system it is not surprising that the average individual is confused about both the nature of humanness and personal actualization' (Ramos, 1981: 125).

Even though such analysts as Ramos (1981) argue against the logicality or simplicity of regarding organizations as individuals, they have not been able to alter the fact that people keep thinking of organizations as single entities with particular (albeit complex) characteristics which are explained in ways that could be attributed to human characteristics. Ramos (1981: 170ff) goes onto to advocate "an endurance-centred" organization, which is explained in the same terms as an endurance-centred individual as follows: 'Moreover production is also a moral issue because of its impact upon nature at large. Indeed nature is not inert material; it is a living system… "Endurance is retention through time of an achievement of value. What endures is identity of pattern self-inherited. Endurance requires favourable environment. The whole science revolves round the question of enduring organisms" (Whitehead…). This citation sets the scenario for the elucidation of the parochialisms characteristic of extant organizational theory' (Ramos, 1981: 171).

This is the foundation for Ramos' (1981) call for organizational theory to move on to a concern for value and ethics, to be considered by a different human mindset as will be explained in the course of this book. What is required, though, is a conception that is not one-dimensional either in respect to the individual or in respect to the organization—and such a more complex adequate model is developed in this book.

3   Miller (1969: 275) quotes the historian Edward P. Cheney as saying, 'These great changes [the Protestant Reformation, the American Revolution, and the development of parliamentary government] seem to have come about with a certain inevitableness; there seems to have been an independent trend of events, some inexorable necessity controlling the progress of human affairs.' The "inexorable necessity" driving human affairs has been termed as the collective unconscious and is the thinking of individuals at the level of society, albeit in an unconscious way for the vast majority.

4   Aquinas (1952) discusses this point in terms that when talking about, say, a lot of people who are of course different, the human mind does not immediately think of the separate individuals but thinks of them as a collective of one species, understood to be one intelligible entity.

'From this it is evident that many things, in so far as they are distinct, cannot be understood at the same time; but in so far as they are joined under one intelligible aspect, they can be understood together. Now everything is actually intelligible according as its likeness is in the intellect. All things, then, which can be known by one intelligible species, are known as one intelligible thing, and therefore are understood simultaneously. But things known by various intelligible species are apprehended as different intelligible things… The intellect can, indeed, understand many things as one, but not as many; that is to say, by one but not by many intelligible species… Therefore it is impossible for one and the same intellect to be perfected at the same time by different intelligible species so as actually to understand different things…

'But a man is the master of a free subject by directing him either towards his proper welfare, or to the common good… first, man is naturally a social animal, and so in the state of innocence he would have led a social life. Now a social life cannot exist among a number of people unless under the headship of one to look after the common good; for many, as such, seek many things, but one attends only to one…

'It is impossible for one man's will to be directed at the same time to diverse things, as to so many last ends… Therefore, just as of all men there is naturally one last end, so the will of an individual must be fixed on one last end' (Aquinas, 1952: 301; 457; 513; 613).

5   'It is Max Weber's contention that although social science is value-neutral, values embraced by a society are themselves criteria which indicate what issues are relevant to a particular form of human associated life during a certain historical period… The so-called science of organization, as we now know it, is entrapped within the unchallenged assumptions derived from and reflective of the market-centered economy… As Adam Smith acknowledges, the market society necessarily transforms the individual into a job holder: "Where the division of labor has been once established," he says "every man lives by exchanging, or becomes in some measure a merchant, and the society itself grows to be what is properly a commercial society" (Smith…)' (Ramos, 1981: 24–25; 73; 89).

This is put the other way around by Worthy, as quoted in Sutton (1993: 8), 'Governance… is concerned largely, though… not exclusively, with relating the corporation to the institutional environment within which it functions.'

That institutional environment is the society, and institutions will have different cognitive orientations in different societies.

6   As noted in the main text above, this is an important point concerning the construction and content of this book— namely, that the explanation and descriptions of the particular *menetype* synthesis of patterns, characteristics and

dynamics substantially inform the nature, characteristics and dynamics exhibited in the different spaces of the Enneagram (Riso, 1987; Palmer, 1991) and Jungian (Jung, 1971; von Franz and Hillman, 1971; Myers, 1980) typologies.

[7]   As Gordy (1993: 101) notes, 'Corporate legitimacy cannot be abstracted from its context, from its interrelationships with politics, economic developments, cultural milieu, etc.'

This is acknowledged in this book, as the organization is placed in its political, economic and social milieu but is thereby differentiated in the way it operates.

[8]   This is a very common and accepted differentiation. For example, just to mention a couple, it was referred to in Burnham (1941: 74) and Galbraith (1967: 49).

[9]   From Hayek (1991: 298-–299): 'Since the name "catallactics" has long ago been suggested for the science which deals with the market order and has more recently been revived, it would seem appropriate to adopt a corresponding term for the market order itself. The term "catallactics" was derived from the Greek verb *katakkattein* (or *kaatakkassein*) which meant, significantly, not only "to exchange" but also "to admit into the community" and "to change from enemy into friend". From it the adjective "catallactic" has been derived to serve in the place of "economic" to describe the kind of phenomena with which the science of catallactics deals. The ancient Greeks knew neither this term nor had a corresponding noun; if they had formed one it would probably have been *katallaxia*. From this we can form an English term *catallaxy* which we shall use to describe the order brought about by the mutual adjustment of many individual economies in a market. A catallaxy is, thus, the special kind of spontaneous order produced by the market through people acting within the rules of the law of property, tort and contract.'

It can be seen that in applying it just to the economic market, Hayek (1991) has hijacked the term for a more narrow use than was originally intended by the wider meaning accorded to it by the Greeks. In particular, in Hayek's (1991) own quoting of the original Greek meaning of the word "catallactic", the meaning "to exchange" could be taken to refer predominantly to markets, "to admit into the community" could be taken to refer to hierarchies (or clubs), and "to change from enemy into friend" could be taken to refer to networks. Thus the term "catallactic" is more appropriately used for the science of governance, as defined in this book.

[10]   The scope of the social life is well captured in the introduction to Tocqueville (1966: lxx): 'Here he is concerned mainly with the egalitarian principle and how it has worked itself out in America in the industrial society, in the philosophy, history, and literature of the new civilization, in its work and leisure, its family relations, its public image and its sense of privacy, its moral codes and religion, its life purposes, its personal alienation and social cohesion.'

[11]   Birnbaum's (1953: 125–141) analysis of the conflicting interpretations of Marx (1952) and Weber (1930) on the rise of capitalism, concluded that '(Marx's) explicit emphasis in his depiction of the rise of capitalist society rested heavily on elements of compulsion and external pressure.'

This is not consistent with the direction of human thinking required to move from a focus on the political sphere as required in the feudal system to one focused on the economic sphere as required in capitalism. Weber's (1930) assessment, that it was the result of the changing spiritual outlook and, therefore, more internally generated, is much more in line with the direction of development suggested by cognitive evolution. That is, the spiritual thinking of the individual operates at a higher level again to that of the intellect, and so that any change in religious beliefs or spiritual commitments at that level flows down automatically into the way individuals think about their society, organizations, and themselves.

[12]   As observed by others, 'it would be difficult to deny that Western systems of rewards, recognition, status and values have been dominated by business for at least the past century' (Sutton, 1993: 6).

Moreover, Ramos (1981) is more specific as quoted above and also: 'Today the market tends to become the shaping force of society at large, and the peculiar type of organization which meets its requirements has assumed the character of a paradigm for organizing human existence at large. In such circumstances the market patterns of thinking and language tend to become equivalent to patterns of thinking and language at large; this is the environment of cognitive politics' (Ramos, 1981: 81).

[13]   'Growing numbers of analysts pose that our association with a corporation is becoming more important even than our identification with a particular nation-state—that, in time, the multinational corporation will eclipse the nation-state altogether' (Sutton, 1993: 6).

[14]   Habermas (1993: 45) puts it slightly differently, 'But in liberal capitalism, there occurs a peculiar transfer of socially integrative tasks to the separate, unpolitical steering system of the market in such a way that the elements of tradition that are effective (at first for the middle class) for legitimation (rational – natural law, utilitarianism) become dependent on an ideology that is itself built into the economic basis.'

[15] 'Einstein, for instance, seems to avoid indulging in sheer scientism. It is no accident that he claimed "it is… theory [not method, A. G. R.] which decides what can be observed." This statement is significantly quoted by W. Heisenberg in an essay in which he tries to conciliate Copernicus, Galileo, Newton, and physical science in general with the classical tradition. He sees the historical trajectory of physical science not as radically discontinuous with the classical tradition, but as a "history of concepts" (Heisenberg…), an increasing differentiation of the knowledge of stable structures of reality' (Ramos, 1981: 40).

[16] They are all really *menetypes* but pitched at different levels of abstraction—in similar fashion to the way *ideal types* are applied to an infinite spread of situations, but all *menetypes* are connected in a definable way through the hierarchical structure of trinities. However, a system of superscripts as explained in the text and the prefix *sub-* will be used when necessary to maintain some clarity about which level of the social collective hierarchy is being discussed.

[17] As acknowledged by Mason (1993: 142–143), 'Economists have been inclined to think of market power which they conceive, and sometimes try to measure, in terms of a departure from its opposite, an impersonal, and hence powerless, purely competitive market. But all the markets that have ever existed inevitably contain certain buyers and sellers with some degree of market power.'

In fact, from the view of these aspects as a trinity of *menetypes*, Smith's (1952/1776) "invisible hand" can be interpreted to mean that the conscious aspects of this *sub-menetype #C* aspect are actually repressed in the economic sphere! That is, the mechanics of exchange happen in the collective unconscious or in other words the actual mechanics are not consciously recognised.

[18] It is useful here to use Jungian typology (Jung, 1971; von Franz and Hillman, 1971; Myers, 1980) to differentiate between "feeling" and "emotion" and also between "rational" and "logical." "Feeling" is taken as a cognitive phenomenon happening at the higher conscious level of personal assessment and commitment, and is exercised by assessing against a consciously held set of values. "Emotion" is a much lower-level cognitive experience, which is in the form of seeming involuntary experience of inner sensation caused by the confluence of the inner and outer situations. In a sense, "feeling" is a conscious act whereas "emotion" is essentially unconscious or irrational, although we can certainly become and are conscious of them.

With that understanding, Jung (1971) defines the act of "feeling" as a "rational" function alongside the "thinking" function as opposed to the irrational functions such as sensation and intuition, which are more or less spontaneous, automatic and seemingly autonomous. So both feeling and thinking functions are "rational" in the sense that they are made consciously at the "rational" cognitive level, or the level of personal assessment and commitment (as explained in Chapter 2). As opposed to this, "logical" is the cognitive process of reversion, which is a conscious movement of thinking through the relation of what is perceived to the individual's held concepts, or the judgment of the true relations of the parts to one another within the paradigms defined by previously exercised commitments to certain truths and beliefs. In this sense, the thinking function is logical but the feeling function is not, but it is rational because it involves the act of cognitive procession, which consciously assesses what is "seen" against the individual's higher criteria of value. Perhaps it can be said that the thinking function is "logical" while the feeling function is "analogical, but both are "rational."

[19] This is where the authors are clearly calling on their knowledge of the patterns of the Enneagram personal typology. In Enneagram terms (Riso, 1987; Palmer, 1991), it is the individuals who would identify as being in the "gut" centre who operate out of the *phase #C* mindset (as pointed out in Chapter 2) that are being discussed here in the main text. For this book, the nature and dynamics of the Enneagram have to be taken as understood, as background knowledge already established by extensive field research and reasoned (though mainly analogical rather than logical reasoning) decisions by many others. As explained earlier, there is an extensive cross-fertilisation within the authors' understanding between the knowledge of the Enneagram (Riso, 1987; Palmer, 1991) and that of Neoplatonic (Plotinus, 1952; Proclus, 1963) and Scholastic philosophy (Aquinas, 1952).

[20] For instance, this disregard for the aesthetic life is couched in the meaning of the adage that. "only when living standards have reached a certain threshold level can a society think about aesthetic achievement"—which is ludicrous when it is considered that earlier civilisations left lastingly impressive examples of their artistic life while operating at a much lower level in the standard of their living conditions. Moreover, the undeveloped, crass approach to the arts by the successful *type #A* capitalistic entrepreneurs is exhibited in the exorbitantly high prices paid for works of art (such as the high price paid for van Gogh's *Irises* by Australia's Alan Bond), but would they personally sit for long stretches of time valuing the aesthetic beauty of what they have acquired—but more importantly, they don't really need to own the piece of art to appreciate it. In fact, they cannot really "own" the beautiful reality of the piece of art by just paying money for the physical thing. In reality, they are more likely to be buying esteem in the eyes of their peers and hopefully a remunerative investment, rather than an aesthetic experience.

[21] Following is some further explanation of why the Executive typifies and enacts the *type #A* orientation. Firstly, it encapsulates the most simple and concrete expression of political authority. Executive authority resides in the one

person of the President, rather than in the hierarchy and procedures that form the court system (*type #B*), or in the more complex and subtle interacting network of alliances and power negotiation that characterises the Legislature (*type #C*). The concrete aspect is embodied in the role of the President to implement the Government's program, and his/her performance is measured by the concrete, visible changes on the ground. Secondly, the role is defined as expressing the will of Government, which translates into proposing policy or envisioning and articulating the possibilities of a better reality—the creative policy that will fix things up; namely, co-creativity which is a key characteristic of *phase #A* thinking. In essence, it is the expression of group will or conation through the simple conduit of one person's decision. Thirdly, it allows for the expression of the charismatic aspect of Government, which means that it allows the society's individuals to project all their hopes and dreams onto the President in Office. This encapsulates the outer focus on appearances and articulated expectations that go hand-in-hand with the inner projection of the individual's power (repressed *type #C*) onto the President to do and bring about that which the individual feels unable to do himself/herself. This charismatic aspect of the President's role is often expressed at a higher level than the other two aspects discussed, particularly when the President is able to capture and articulate the "good" of the society, which strikes a chord with the inner hopes and aspirations of the people in the society—the "vision thing."

[22]   John Kennedy epitomised the visionary, conative spirit of the *menetype #A* orientation when he remarked along the lines: "Some people see what is and say why, I see what could be and say, why not" (some speech of unknown date and source but it resonated with, and was remembered by, one of the authors).

[23]   Political power is structured the way it is in the USA because that is essentially the way it was organized to a greater or lesser extent in the minds of the individuals who participated in the drafting of the Constitution, with the final details of the structure and processes coming after much debate and compromise. Such *menetypes* or cognitive constructions were available to the level of thinking at that time because there had been much debate about political systems and democracy in the preceding era (eg Montesquieu, 1952). What is in place now is there because the trinity of *menetypes* was able to be differentiated back then and people since have likewise seen the simple truth and usefulness of continuing this particular trinity of *menetypes* as an accepted way of human organization in the political sphere of its society.

Public Administration and Constitutional Power

Abstract: This is the core chapter on the separation of powers within the constitutional governance structure of the United States and how public administration fits within that structure. The triad of political powers is identified together with the triad of jurisdictions in terms of the local, state and national government. The subordinate role of public administration within the executive power of government is explained in contrast to the assertions in the Blacksburg Manifesto (Wamsley, 1990a). The public administration's role in defining the public interest is explained, where the public interest is defined in terms of the "good" to which American society is consciously aspiring.

INTRODUCTION

The focus is now on analysing the status, role and importance of The Public Administration[1] in the dynamics of the national governance of a capitalist republic, namely, the United States. This topic is particularly ripe for analysis within this book because the US governance system is constitutionally founded on the trinity of governance *menetypes* encapsulated within Montesquieu's (1952) doctrine of the separation of powers; namely, the executive, judicial and legislative powers (as explained earlier in relation to the top sphere in Fig. **5.3**). There would seem to be some validity and integrity in pursuing an analysis of the USA's constitutional governance within the same cognitive framework and logic upon which it was founded.[2] The inner and outer are one, or 'what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature?' (Hamilton, Madison and Jay, 1952: 163).[3]

The essential task of the following analysis is to critique the call to arms and claims for pre-eminence of The Public Administration as argued in the so-called "Blacksburg Manifesto" (Wamsley *et al*, 1990: 35; 43; 47—italics in original).

> *We must therefore refocus the American dialogue from questions about the nature and role of "government" to questions about the nature and role of "public administration." This would be a subtle but crucial shift in the American dialogue from questions of "whether" there should be a role for The Public Administration to questions of "what form?" that role should take…*

> *The Public Administration needs to assert, but also to be granted, its propriety and legitimacy as an institution. It should assert the value of the Agency Perspective in effective functioning of the political system, the value and legitimacy of the Public Administrator as an actor in the governing process, and the distinctiveness and worth of his or her role—competence directed to the maintenance of: the Agency Perspective, the broadest possible understanding of public interest, and the constitutional governance process…*

> *It is time for us to advance the proposition that the popular will does not reside solely in elected officials but in a constitutional order that envisions a remarkable variety of legitimate titles to participate in governance. The Public Administration, created by statutes based on this constitutional order, holds one of these titles.* Its role, therefore, is not to cower before a sovereign legislative assembly or a sovereign elected executive. Our tradition and our constitution know no such sovereign. Rather, the task of The Public Administration is to share in governing wisely and well the constitutional order that the framers of the Constitution intended as an expression of the will of the people who alone are sovereign.

In testing the validity of such ambitious (or seemingly pretentious!) claims for public administration, the following analysis traverses, in an ordered fashion, the many perspectives as suggested by the hierarchical structure of *menetype* trinities. Essentially the analysis explains the following three key questions.

1) What is the appropriate authority or power status of The Public Administration in the constitutional governance of the United States?

2) What is the role of The Public Administration in the decision-making process of government, and is there really a politics–administration dichotomy?

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3)   What substance is there in the claim of public administration as a vocation?

In analysing the status and role of The Public Administration in the constitutional governance of the United States, there is a focus on the following questions.

- First, what is meant by the constitutional separation of powers within the US governance structure?[4]

- Second, what is the proper placement of The Public Administration in the national governance of the United States?

- Third, what is meant by the notion of the "public interest", and what role is assigned to The Public Administration?

WHAT IS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS?

Montesquieu's (1952) doctrine of the separation of powers refers to the *menetype* trinity of the executive, judiciary and legislative powers of the political sphere of society (as explained above and depicted in Fig. **6.1**).[5] At the outset it is important to acknowledge that the rationale for the separation of powers is not only for its negative, restraining check on the exercise of power, which is achieved principally through a balance between the powers and the introduction of the necessary checks and balances. Rather, right from its early development by the English [even before the time of Montesquieu's (1952) more elegant and fulsome exposition of the doctrine], there was a positive constructive aspect that made for better political processes.[6] 'It is worth reminding those who criticize the separation of powers for preventing governmental effectiveness that its first advocates urged the separation of "legislative" and "executive" functions on the grounds of efficiency' (Gwyn, 1965: 33). This positive aspect was also reflected in the Federalists' argument for the Constitution, 'Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good government… A feeble Executive implies a feeble execution of the government' (Hamilton, Madison and Jay, 1952: 210).[7]

That is, the doctrine of the separation of powers was a natural development of political thinking about good government in that it sought a differentiation of these three powers as existing in their own right while being exercised together within any national government. The next task, which was articulated so effectively by Montesquieu (1952), was to define how such a differentiation of the executive, judicial and legislative powers should best be handled in the structure and dynamics of national government. The framing of the US Constitution itself was overall a positive constructive act that was intended to facilitate and encourage the flourishing of a new and developing nation. The clear identification of the legislative, executive and judicial powers (Constitution, 1952: 11ff) and the application of Montesquieu's (1952) doctrine of the separation of powers were intended to develop the most progressive and productive governance system while holding in check any particular preponderance of any of the powers to dominate to the exclusion of the others by effecting a balance between them.[8] Moreover, by endowing them with their own separate power basis and the requirement and processes to interact, the Constitution effectively established the need and the means for an ongoing dialogue between the three primary governance powers.[9] This is an important prerequisite for democratic and conscious governance.

The constructive aspect can also be seen in terms of the spirit of democracy, which underpinned the birth of the new country. Representative democracy means that although there is the rule of the people, there is necessarily an authority structure. The necessity for this governance structure was established earlier in this book within the context of the discussion on Michels' (1962) Iron Law of Oligarchy (Section 4.1). Democracy means that the overall governance structure allows for the legitimate participation of all individuals and groups in the political dialogue, but within an ordered, structured hierarchy of authority that allows the nation as an entity to move forward constructively. In modern rhetoric it is called pluralistic but not all voices are equal—there is an accepted hierarchy.[10] This structure of societal dialogue in the political sphere is best understood in analysing the interplay of the three powers in terms of the trinity of cognitive *menetypes* that they are (with reference to Fig. **6.1**).

Interpreting the US constitutional definition of the separation of the three powers in terms of its genesis as the trinity of cognitive *menetypes* allows the following observations.

Figure 6.1: The Trinity of Political Powers   **Figure 6.2:** The Trinity of Jurisdictional Power

- It is not required for there to be a distinct and unrelated separation into the three *ideal types* of legislative, judicial and executive power. This understanding stands in direct contrast to much of the long-standing criticisms of the continuing relevance of the separation of the three powers because of their lack of purity in practice.[11] That there should be an interdependent and appropriate sharing of powers is justified in the *Federalist Papers*, particularly #47 (Hamilton, Madison and Jay, 1952: 154), which argued that in respect to Montesquieu (1952), both 'the example in his eye… On the slightest view of the British Constitution, we must perceive that the legislative, executive and judiciary departments are by no means separate and distinct from each other… and… he [Montesquieu] did not mean that these departments ought to have no *partial agency* in, or *control* over, the acts of each other.' Each institution represents a predominance of one particular power but also includes some measure of the others, and there is a specific interrelationship and interdependence between them.[12] In line with the dynamics of the trinity of *menetypes*, one of the other powers is used in a secondary, supportive role and the other much less so but rather providing more of a check on the primary power of the institution.[13]

  For instance, the legislative power relies principally on the executive power to provide national leadership and to exercise the national will to deliver the government programs and to use the resources that are enacted in the financial legislation.[14] There is some attempt for Congress to exert direct influence over the executive's program delivery through the review process of its committee structure. There is not the same oversight over the activities of the courts, and it usually takes some *ad hoc* event or breakdown of law and order for the legislative to focus its attention on the activities of the courts. In addition, there is a direct role constitutionally prescribed for the direct involvement of the legislative power in the selection of the President, and it is the President who nominates the Supreme Court judges. But Congress maintains limited involvement in both through the requirement for it to ratify the President's nominations both for the judges and for the top Executive team.

- In one sense, each of the powers is equally important to the governance of society, but different. In another sense, as evident in the natural (cognitive) order of human thinking, there is acceptance of a hierarchical order—the higher levels of abstract thinking are intuitively regarded as superior to the lower orders.[15] Hence it is pertinent that 'In the republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates' (Hamilton, Madison and Jay, 1952: 163) and the President is always subject to the law. Executive orders cannot contravene the law as enacted or interpreted by the courts. In other words, the whole nation is under the rule of law as enacted by the legislature and interpreted by the courts. That the legislative function actually predominates is also manifest (in extrapolating the analysis in the preceding point) in the way society normally refers to the Government as only including the legislative and executive (which is secondary) components, while acknowledgement of the other judicial department as an arm of good government is usually repressed (in keeping with the dynamics of the cognitive trinity). That is, the courts would normally be considered as a negative restraint on the excesses of the Government, and the Executive administrative action is regarded as the

more vital secondary support to delivering government programs. That is, the Executive is the lowest level of the trinity of powers in an ontological sense, but it is playing a secondary role in the society's focus on Government action.[16]

What is also important is that each of these three aspects of governance are given power in their own right, together with the proper authority and processes to act and develop their thinking and action. It is readily apparent that the exercise of these three powers singly independent of the other two would mean three different forms of Government that would be inclined to go in different directions.[17] That is, they are quite distinctive powers that are radically different from each other but together make the whole of the authority needed for effective governance.[18] Moreover, though they are differentiated powers, they are not mutually exclusive and there is provision for them to interact and influence one another in either a secondary or marginal way.[19] The most constructive aspect of the Constitution, therefore, is that it makes these three powers co-dependent on one another and virtually requires them to sustain a dialogue—this structure and mechanisms are often referred to negatively as "checks and balances", but what the Constitution has instituted with the system of governance is a mutual respect and an inclination or necessity for *political dialogue*.

This interactive arrangement is exactly analogous to the cognitive dynamics required for personal consciousness as explained in the trinitarian theory of mind outlined in this book. That is, the US constitution established a firm basis for conscious governance in the same way as modern depth psychology advocates an ongoing dialogue between the aspects of the conscious and unconscious mind (or between the many different cognitive perspectives of the individual) as a necessity to journey towards conscious living. In other words, effective governance requires an effective authority structure or an effective oligarchy (as explained earlier) to journey forward in a conscious way.[20] The US republic is, therefore, seen to be ordered along the natural lines determined by human thinking in that the more abstract decision making is ascendant over the more concrete and there is a real interconnection and interaction between them in the way as prescribed by the trinity of *menetypes*.[21] In this way, US constitutional governance can be recognised as the most holistic, efficacious and harmonious structure and dynamics for conscious governance[22]—in that it both consciously acknowledges the existence and nature of political power and has built into the framework the capability to be self-reflexive;[23] US national governance is, therefore, able to develop and mature to the level of complexity necessary to handle the affairs of modern government in a positive, constructive way.[24] In fact, it was destined to become strong and positive, as it was based in the practical arrangements of defining institutions (*menetype #A*) but kept aspiring to the highest intellectual expression (*menetype #B*) of governance through the concept of the separation of national powers. This left open the definition of, or the call to, the spiritual regime (*menetype #C*), but the core of the Christian religion was reflected (unconsciously) within the trinity of separated powers.[25]

In the US capitalist system the power of the Executive is enhanced by the overall societal focus on the economic sphere and its cognitive flow-through effect in promoting a predisposition to the *menetype #A* stream.[26] Normally, the President is regarded as the person who is going to deliver the government program to create a better society. If, in fact, the person of the President is actually able to encapsulate in a vital leadership way the national spirit and the "good" of society, then the President becomes symbolically elevated, as the people's level of thinking rises to the *menetype #A* level above the usual thinking of national governance.[27] In these cases the President is said to represent the "public interest" and, thereby, has the moral authority to articulate and carry forward the national agenda,[28] which is more the case for some Presidents than others—moreover, this state of affairs normally only holds for the first couple of years of their terms while everybody's expectations remain high (or while the people are projecting their dreams for the "good society" onto the Presidential incumbent). However, the Executive power as encapsulated in the doing or in the administrative delivery of the government program, remains down at the bottom of the hierarchy of cognitive importance in this primary trinity of governance.[29] That is, the President as CEO of The Public Administration is the lowest ranking in the hierarchical trinity of primary powers in US constitutional governance.[30]

- Surrounding the three powers and in the overlapping middle is the *Other* (Fig. **6.1**)—or the public, who is both the transcendent power that owns and legitimates the system of governance and, at the same time, includes the recipients of the fruit from the hierarchy of governance. That is, within the authority sphere of governance there is no direct articulation of the people's will in terms of individual clients who could argue for the services and "good" desired by the individual members of the society—but only as a transcendent collective, which is as would be expected in a representative

democracy.[31] The power of the people as encapsulated in their collective desire to provide for the "good" of the society or the so-called "public interest" is articulated in the first instance in the Constitution (1952). The Constitution (1952) essentially establishes a system of governance to interpret and deliver the "public interest," and embodies the esoteric essence, which all participants in the political sphere swear allegiance to uphold (down to the schoolchildren through their allegiance to the flag).[32] The Constitution (1952: 11–21) defines the governance system 'to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.'

This "good" of the people infuses and inspires thinking in the same manner in all departments of the governance structure—but there is still that hierarchy in the way people regard the validity in its interpretation. Most importantly, the laws of the land are required to be in accordance with the Constitution and then each of the institutions in the hierarchy of governance are required to act in accordance with the "public interest" as articulated in the Constitution and within the powers granted them through the Constitution—or implied in the logic of the hierarchy expressed in the Constitution. This implied hierarchy is most naturally (cognitively) expressed by an extension of the same thinking that underscores the breakup of powers within the Constitution—namely, the trinitarian hierarchy of *menetypes*.

There is, therefore, a call for ongoing interaction between all levels of the governance hierarchy and the people,[33] with the opportunity for the specific actions at each of the levels to be influenced by an influx of insight from the *Other*, which helps inform them about what the "public interest" would suggest in this instance. In this sense, "public interest" is an amorphous concept essentially contained within the collective unconscious of society, and which can be interpreted by any level of governance.

However, any interpretation of the "public interest" needs to have cognisance for the already extant conscious commitment to what the "public interest" might mean in particular circumstances—and it is this conscious commitment to the meaning of the "public interest" that is hierarchically organized in accordance with the accepted structure of governance. That is, the consciously articulated interpretation of the legislature is pre-eminent and that of the Executive's administration arm is much lower and subservient to the interpretation of those above it in the governance hierarchy.

What happens with the magisterial or demagogic Presidents is that they have grasped some insight on the "public interest" that resonates with the collective unconscious, and they are then charged with the task of deliberating upon and presenting a legislative program so that this particular aspect of the "public interest" can be consciously articulated by the legislature—the highest accepted governance power in the land. [34] Once the "public interest" has been consciously articulated at this level through enacted legislation, the articulated principles flow down in a manner explained as collective cognitive procession (i.e. anti-clockwise around the trinities) to inform and imbue the lower levels of governance with the principles of action—action that is in accord with the "public interest".

WHAT IS THE RELATIVE STATUS OF THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION?

The legislative, judicial and executive powers represent the primary or first-order authority within the governance hierarchical structure. All other institutions or bodies participating in the governance structure are, in some way, subservient to the power and will of the Congress, the Supreme Court and the Executive.

The Public Administration is defined as comprising all those bodies that derive their existence or ongoing financial sustenance through some act(s) of the legislature as opposed to relying on the personal patronage of a particular political office. That is, The Public Administration comprises those organizations where the vast majority of officers are subject to bureaucratic appointment rather than to political appointment or the appointment of loyal followers. The primary role of The Public Administration is to carry out the will of the Government, and so it is placed conceptually in the service of the Executive—that is, to be principally responsive to the Executive's practical interpretation of the consciously articulated (i.e. officially enacted and recorded) "public interest" rather than directly to the judicial and legislative powers. However, it is recalled that there is not a complete and distinct separation of powers and so it is accepted that The Public Administration will be responsive to the other two powers as well as the Executive, and that some elements of public administration would come directly under the Courts or the Legislature.

This makes The Public Administration clearly ***a second-order participant*** in the governance authority of the nation.[35] It is clearly subservient and in no way an equal player with the Congress, the Supreme Court or the

Executive.[36] It is required primarily to carry out the will of the people as consciously articulated by the interpretation of the three primary powers, which means in accord with its enabling legislation, the law of the land, any relevant Executive Orders and in keeping with the program of action as formally and legitimately approved by the Executive, particularly as captured by the President's acknowledged mandate.[37] Being so far down the governance hierarchy, The Public Administration is therefore beholden, and subject, to influence by many players, particularly all the superior governance powers in the political sphere and especially in its relationship with the Executive.[38] Its relationship within the Executive can be defined principally in terms of its authority relationship to the Executive Office of the President, the authority and power of its political appointees, the political power of its constituency, and the interest and priority accorded to its activities by the Congress as opposed to the President.

Given its second-order status, it is not correct for The Public Administration to assert that its role 'is not to cower before a sovereign legislative assembly or a sovereign elected executive. Our tradition and our constitution know no such sovereign. Rather the task of The Public Administration is to share in governing wisely and well the *constitutional order* that the framers of the Constitution intended as an expression of the will of the people who alone are sovereign' (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990: 47). The legislative assembly and the Executive may not be lone sovereigns, but the Constitution certainly accorded them the pre-eminent responsibility and authority to represent the sovereign will of the people and interpret and deliver the "public interest". There is a first-grade contest of political power and then there is the second-grade curtain raiser in which The Public Administration plays.[39] What Wamsley *et al.* (1990) are trying to interpret and articulate is the maturing of the US governance mind that is expressed in the natural cognitive phenomenon of a further differentiation of powers—namely, an emergence of the second-order powers both among themselves and as more autonomous from the primary trinity from whence their powers are derived. Therefore, it is not appropriate to say that they 'share in governing' with the first-grade teams, but rather The Public Administration "assists in governing". They are more like an instrument through which other institutions operate.[40] Government decision making is constitutionally vested at the level of the three primary governance powers, and the role of The Public Administration is to assist the Government develop policy and then help by implementing the formally approved policy or program. However, as we go on to fill out the detail of such a role, it is patently clear that The Public Administration is subservient and cannot be considered an equal partner in governing, no matter how much disparagement is heaped upon the so-called "overhead theory of democracy".[41]

An analysis of the role of The Public Administration therefore needs to be conducted within the second-order governance trinity elaborating on the contributors to the executive power sphere (Fig. **6.3**), which comprises the Executive Office of the President, The Public Administration, and the Cabinet Ministers and political appointees.[42] The following observations can be made.


Figure 6.3: The Trinity of Executive Power   **Figure 6.4:** The Trinity of Society Interests

Observation 1

- The primary focus in this trinity of executive will is accorded to the Executive Office of the President, which has grown over time in accordance with its ascendant role. The President relies on this Office to maintain the primary links with the other primary governance institutions and also to play the adjudicating role in resolving or (better still) transcending any significant conflicts between the political appointees (*menetype #A[A]* of political governance) and the entrenched bureaucracies (*menetype #B[B]* of political governance)—and to do so in the context of the political milieu defined by the involvement of Congress and powerful constituencies. How much they actually become involved with particular public administrative agencies is determined by the nature of the issue and its relative priority within the President's purview.

  The Cabinet Ministers and political appointees to the agencies are there to give expression to the President's public or ideological agenda in a secondary, supporting role to the Executive Office of the President. '"Although legally the appointee of and answerable to the President, it is now generally conceded that the typical cabinet officer's immediate supervisor is one or more members of the White House staff." This reduces access of secretaries to the president and weakens their political effectiveness' (Nachmias and Rosenbloom, 1980: 52). Where they are not playing as supportive a role as would be needed there is likely to be a compensating increase in the power and influence of the primary power of the Executive Office, as was the case in the rise to power of the National Security Advisor.[43] The support provided by these Ministers and political appointees is in terms of developing new policy and new ways of executing the Government's will in particular policy areas and situations. In this sense they are the executive or entrepreneurial arm of the Executive and, to succeed in this role, they need to develop the belief in others that they do indeed have the personal capacity to develop the right answers for the President—and that the answers should then be followed. In developing and delivering their new policy initiatives they will look to their agencies as the management resource to work through the most efficacious way to implement the new or changed program.

  Essentially, The Public Administration can be explained as the *menetype #B[A]* of political governance, or the management of the Government's will within the Executive.[44] This particular *type #B* orientation defines the essential character and order of things that takes hold in the workings of the public bureaucracies.[45] In keeping with their *phase #B* spirit, the principal source of authority for The Public Administration is written law and the accumulation of past endorsed government policies and processes. Within the trinity of executive will (Fig. **6.3**), it is readily apparent that The Public Administration is the most devalued aspect (in keeping with the primary elevation of the Executive Office of the President). It is regarded in practice as the least powerful, least relevant, least important etc and is given the least amount of conscious focused energy by the Government and society, and therefore less attention is devoted to its development—but rather much more attention seems to be given to its denigration.[46]

  To appreciate more fully the true position of The Public Administration in the governance hierarchy, it is necessary to acknowledge the key dynamics of each level as follows. At the primary level of the US capitalist society, the political sphere is actually the repressed counterpart to the primary focus on the economic sphere.[47] At the secondary level of the separated powers of Government within this repressed political sphere, the role of the executive will of the Government is principally seen as a secondary support to the primary role of the legislature.[48] At the tertiary level of this supporting executive action (of the executive arm), The Public Administration is seen as the repressed aspect of the primary political power positioning of the President's Office. This adds up to a very low status for The Public Administration in the collective consciousness of each of the general society, the governance institutions of the political sphere, and even its immediate partners in the governance hierarchy.[49]

  Putting it another way, the general attitude adds up to a mindset that believes more or less that The Public Administration should be rarely seen and only heard when it is spoken to in the conduct of the business of Government. More explicitly, it should only respond when spoken to in the policy development process and it should do as it is told without complaint in program implementation! That is, it should be faithfully responsive to the political interpretation of the objectives or "public interest" for which the governance hierarchy is striving. As the US governance system has developed and become more consciously aware, this disposition to ignore The Public Administration has matured into a certain tolerance to listen to the Public Administrators.[50] Certainly, the rhetoric and processes give the impression that The Public Administration has been accorded some real involvement in the political process. The calls for efficient government, due process and responsiveness are the signals to

pay some attention to The Public Administration. However, the areas where it remains neglected and unattended are the areas where The Public Administration builds up power of its own (in much the same way as in the unconscious of the personal psyche) and, given that it is an exercise essentially by the politically unconscious aspects of the governance system, the exercise of such unchecked bureaucratic power is seen to be (and probably is) negative.[51]

In fact, the status and role of The Public Administration is so repressed in the collective thinking about US governance that it could be termed the second-order unconscious mind of US Government,[52] which is in the collective shadow of the conscious political mind[53]—and the conscious political mind quite clearly comprises the first-order governance team of the Congress and the Executive. In this sense, The Public Administration is essentially like the hidden part of the iceberg, which is much larger than the top, but is essentially seen to follow the lead of the floating top section (but can seem vice versa to wishful thinkers). The political dialogue between the superior political institutions and The Public Administration could, therefore, be described as the dialogue between the collective conscious and unconscious of the US political governance structure—a process that is regarded as healthy in an individual and is enthusiastically encouraged as the path to psychic health by depth psychologists such as Jung (1960; 1964a; 1964b; 1969a; 1971).

From the perspective of The Public Administration, it is primarily concerned with carrying out its formally prescribed role and working logically towards realisation of the objectives set for it by proper authority. It has a secondary, supporting mindset of political responsiveness.[54] This means, in the first instance, being responsive to the office of the President, and particularly to any Executive Orders.[55] If the President has a strong public agenda or personal interest in the particular area then this is likely to be the most influential determinant of political responsiveness for the public agency (providing the executive orders do not contravene extant legislation or the law).

If, however, there is not a visible commitment to a particular agenda by the President, then the political influence can be exerted through the commitment of the higher *menetype #C* political orientation, namely, the Congress through its committee structure.[56] Should the Agency's constituency have political power to influence either the interest of the President or that of the Congress, then the Agency is prepared to incorporate consideration of these interests in its secondary level of influence. In sum, the Agency does spend time and energy to come to terms with the political dynamics, and it can be understood in terms of forestalling and reacting to what could effectively be passed into law or official commands, if the time and resources warranted such an effort. That is, in a healthy public administrative agency, politics is ever only a secondary power in influencing its interpretation of the primary fully endorsed riding instructions from Government.[57]

The role of The Public Administration can then be seen as quite different to that of private sector middle-order management (which is also *menetype #B* of corporate governance). Though they both have the same core *phase #B* spirit and are both there to support the implementation of the programs of public or private entrepreneur (i.e. as a *menetype #B^C* management orientation in support of the *menetype #A^C* entrepreneurial orientation), the mindsets and dynamics are radically different.[58] The public sector management is a repressed aspect of the action, which is more focused on the politics of the situation and serving an executive (or government entrepreneur) that has only a secondary supporting role in the political sphere.[59] On the other hand, the private sector management has been regarded as a secondary support to an entrepreneurial mindset that has primacy in the economic sphere.[60] These different governance dynamics have resulted in much more attention, energy and importance being devoted to the private sector management, and it has been seen to be much more dynamic as a consequence. Moreover, because the public agencies are required to develop consciously their secondary focus on political responsiveness, the natural ordering of governance of their political environment reinforces the cognitive core of their bureaucratic behaviour, and that is why they are regarded as the more truly bureaucratic. But more of this later.

Observation 2

- In keeping with a lower-level *menetype #B* spirit, The Public Administration takes its program of outcomes from outside itself and is not in the business of creating its own objectives or vision[61]—these are given by higher-order participants in the governance, though the agencies might go through internal planning sessions to clarify and express objectively what those objectives mean for them. Such a set of objectives is transmitted from the more superior governance institutions, primarily in the

form of written enabling legislation, laws and formal orders. These objectives are meant to be re-interpreted into more effective forms of expression and implementation by the political appointees to the agency (in the same way that the national Government as a whole is led into new agendas by the President). Any new agendas not deemed to be in keeping with the extant, recorded authority of the Government would need to be processed back through the President's Office and Congress before the agency is able to take it into account.

The Public Administration is therefore seen to be, potentially at least, directly responsive to the President's power by being answerable to the Executive or Government commitment. Theoretically, if the President wanted the agency to adapt to a clearly different agenda then, with enough time and/or political energy, the President could orchestrate the necessary appointments (throughout even the permanent bureaucracy) and agency guidelines to make the required changes in program delivery—even in the face of opposition of others in the governance structure.[62] The problem, however, is that often the legislation needs to be amended or it is not of sufficiently high priority to the President's overall program or the political cost is just too high because of the high interest of other players in positions of power within the governance structure.[63]

The Public Administration is directly responsive to the influence of the courts through its common *menetype #B* connection. The most obvious and direct influence is through the written court orders but there is also a natural predilection as part of good administration for the agency to take into account an anticipation of the way the court would respond to any particular questionable intentions—principally, will it stand up in a court of law? And the *menetype #B* oriented bureaucrats would have a better natural feel for that than most.[64]

The Public Administration is responsive to the Congress principally through its primary responsibility to act in accordance with enabling legislation. It is not regarded as proper that Congress should issue directions or play a direct role in its administrative processes, but it has a proper role of review to test the efficacy of its legislated policy and that public administration is in accord with that policy.[65] Theoretically, perhaps, The Public Administration should be responsive to Congress through the mediation of the President's Office, which could influence the development of draft legislation and also the quality and quantity of evidence given to Congressional committees if it wanted to. However, where the personal or political interest of the President is not high, the public agency's secondary nose for politics encourages it to interact consciously and meaningfully with Congress (as the higher level *menetype #C* office),[66] which is appropriate and is consistent with its bureaucratic mindset.[67]

The Public Administration is naturally (or cognitively) most suspicious and least responsive to the new Minister and political appointees who are installed to lead them in new and better ways. There is a natural resistance within the agency hierarchy to individuals with new entrepreneurial ideas that cut across the established order.[68] The agency would prefer to direct more of its energy into trying to induct the new appointees in the agency's established way of viewing the world and doing things, rather than have to respond to the seeming whims and idiosyncrasies of the externally appointed leaders. More often than not, the bigger and more established agencies tend to succeed.[69] 'John Ehrlichman, Nixon's chief domestic advisor, expressed it with less elegance: "We see them [cabinet members] at the annual White House Christmas party: they go off and marry the natives"' (Nachmias and Rosenbloom, 1980: 93).

Observation 3

- It is to be noted that the client has still not appeared explicitly on the scene of governance authority. The agency's responsiveness to clients' needs is seen to be moulded principally through the eyes or interpretation of the political hierarchy above them. From the agency's leadership perspective, the clients' needs are still imbedded in the distilled interpretation of the "public interest" by the governance hierarchy (Fig. **6.3**). The conscious acknowledgement and articulation of the "public interest" is still through the particular interpretation of the authority hierarchy of the political sphere but each of the governance participants is susceptible to a renewed appreciation of the "public interest" as inspired insights break through from the *Other* (or the society's collective unconscious).[70]

  That is, the "public interest" is a concept of a transcendent knowing for the US governance structure (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990: 40–41)[71]—it is enveloped in the *Other*, or resident in the collective unconscious as a teleological concept of the "good," and it is for the governance hierarchy to give

conscious expression to those aspects deemed appropriate at the moment. Perhaps this can be explained from a different perspective by reference back to the principal trinity of the intellect (individual, group and society, see Fig. **1.2**), which can be reconfigured in terms of the particular "good" for which each of them is striving. This can be conceptualised as the trinity of teleological interests of society, which includes the three *menetypes* of the private interest, the common interest and the "public interest" (Fig. **6.4**). It can be appreciated that this is indeed a trinity of *menetypes* if it is understood that, first, the private interest encompasses the specific individual creation and acquisition of concrete consumer goods and services; secondly, the common interest infers the joint pursuit by groups of people of a specific cause or meaning, which can be expressed clearly enough to be understood and used to attract members to join in the group processes; and, thirdly, the "public interest" is an even more abstract term connoting some emergent notion of the "good" which is constantly being redefined in the society's dialogue—but there are always the glimpses of something to continue striving for as a national effort.[72]

In a capitalist society, the focus is squarely on pursuing the private interests, with a secondary focus on the organizing with others to enhance the provision of goods, services and satisfaction to the individual. In a pure democracy, the principal focus is on the pursuit of common interests, with a secondary focus on clarifying and delivering some agreed notion of the "public interest." In a capitalist democracy, the situation is more complex and there is an ongoing tension, which finds expression in a focus of the governance structure around the more nebulous "public interest" in preference to any overt kowtowing to individual or group interests (at least in theory). Each agency in The Public Administration, then, is formed around a particular set of common interests as defined by the enabling legislation, which means that they have a natural (cognitive) secondary focus on grasping and defining their actions in terms of the "public interest."[73] They have a natural inclination to eschew giving any priority to the particular private interests of individuals (clients). To repeat, it is only right and proper for agencies in The Public Administration to focus more on the "public interest" as interpreted by the governance hierarchy above them than on the particular needs of the individual clients that they serve.[74] This dynamic has been captured by the notion that The Public Administration needs to develop and adhere to its particular Agency Perspective (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990; Wamsley, 1990b).[75]

In settling on a workable conception of the "public interest," therefore, The Public Administration naturally (cognitively) has a greater orientation up the hierarchy of governance rather than downwards to the needs of individual clients. This is entirely appropriate, as the nation and its Constitution were set up for the collective national good rather than to further any particular individual's welfare as might have been the case in more primitive groups. Indeed, in terms of the trinity of the teleological interests of society (i.e. private interests, common interests and the "public interest" as depicted in Fig. **6.4**), it is obvious that if there is a primary focus on the needs of the individual client, then the societal public good is naturally (cognitively) prone to be repressed and ignored. As nowhere near sufficient resources are available to satisfy everybody's individual desires, an impoverished society and anarchy would likely follow.[76]

Moreover, in grasping the concept of the "public interest" different mindsets focus on it differently, particularly at the highest level of societal thinking. Such a differential is grasped in Glendon Schubert's analysis (quoted in McSwite, 1996) of three major schools of public interest thought;[77] namely, idealism, rationalism and realism—three diverging perspectives that form a trinity of *menetype*s capturing the essential nature of the "public interest" (Fig. **6.5**). It is reasonable to say from this analysis, that the orientation of The Public Administration has been principally towards the rationalistic (*menetype #B*) view of the "public interest," which was certainly in line with the rest of society during the managerialist age. However, in this new age of politicism, the societal conception of the "public interest" has moved on to the realist (*menetype #C*) view, which, to assert its supremacy, naturally depreciates the rationalistic view. The Public Administrators now are confronted with a choice between staying with their natural inclination towards the rationalist perspective and seemingly becoming increasingly irrelevant as a consequence, or going with the flow and entering more into the realist or political mindset of defining the "public interest." This would indeed be a sell-out of the soul of public administration and a significant step towards a feudal-like attachment of administration to the many different political interests. This would also result in a further fracturing of The Public Administration rather than the integration as exhorted in the Blacksburg Manifesto (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990).

Figure 6.5: Essential Nature of the Public Interest   **Figure 6.6:** PA's Authority on the Public Interest

WHAT IS THE MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE "PUBLIC INTEREST"?

The notion of the "public interest" is to political governance what the concept of consciousness is to personal psyche (or the cognitive hierarchy of human knowing).

- Both are transcendent concepts that have proved difficult over time to define or grasp.[78]

- Both contain a conception of the "good" to which the whole governance system (societal or personal) is consciously aspiring—it is "good" to be operating in the "public interest" and it is "good" for individuals to be operating consciously.

- Both encapsulate multiple perspectives that mirror the different mindsets exercised in the hierarchy of political governance[79] or the cognitive hierarchy of personal knowing and, as such, are inherently paradoxical and problematic notions subject to continual internal tensions.

- Both incorporate notions of change and evolution over time, as they grow more complex through the assimilation of more and more of the different perspectives.

To analyse the role played by the "public interest," it is useful to differentiate among the principal determinants of The Public Administration's conception of the "public interest."[80] In developing its concept of the "public interest," The Public Administration is influenced principally by the Constitution and its valid interpretation to date by higher authority; secondly, by the agency's enabling legislation and the relevant enacted law; and thirdly, by responsiveness to the Government's intent, which is articulated by the politics of the day—principally from the President's Office and from Congress (Fig. **6.6**).[81]

The most abstract formulation of the "public interest" is via the Constitution and the accumulation of authoritative interpretation of it by higher political authority. The Constitution (1952) provides a summary of the aspirations of the society and an outline of the moral fabric and political governance structure to which The Public Administration is required to respond in interpreting the "public interest"—or the particular objectives to be met by its programs. It locates the Public Administration's interpretation of the "public interest" as subservient to all of the three first-order governance institutions (i.e. legislative, judicial and executive power) and, in that sense, it can be a very complex, paradoxical milieu from which The Public Administration is required to eke out its conception of the "public interest" and operate in good faith.[82] The accumulation of authorised interpretations of the Constitution encapsulates its highest "good" and, in essence, it is therefore required to serve the nation before it serves its individual clients—or it can only become client focused clearly in keeping with its primary responsibility of working towards the

"public interest" as defined by the Constitution and its political superiors.[83] It is not free to pursue its own agenda or its own conception of the "public interest" to the exclusion of the other players.

The working guidelines (or next level of abstraction down) of the "public interest" are captured in the enabling legislation and relevant laws. This is the expression of the "public interest" that The Public Administration most naturally and readily responds to—it is in many ways regarded as its raison d'être. A great bulk of the intellectual effort of the agency's authority hierarchy is spent in organizing itself and its processes to meet the letter and spirit of this legislation. The notion of "due process" captures the logic of administrative thinking that is firmly based in a sound (logical and defensible) interpretation and application of such legislation. Moreover, the enabling legislation is also used as the key measuring stick to assess the agency's performance.

The most concrete and immediate expression of the "public interest" is the day-by-day exercise of political will by the Government of the day. [84] The Government's current intent and will are expressed by the political players with an interest in the agency's activities. As discussed above, this is principally explicit in the agenda pursued by the Executive Office of the President, the political appointees to the agency, and the relevant Congressional committees. These sources exert urgent pressure in real time on The Public Administration to adopt their particular interpretation of what should be done in the public interest. To the degree that The Public Administration responds or not it is regarded as being responsive or not, and there is always the temptation to yield to the most threatening or rewarding voice. If The Public Administration were to respond unquestioningly to such voices then it would be regarded as essentially a political office—merely an extension of the political leader for the time.[85]

In relation to the discussion to date, it can be seen that the primary focus of The Public Administration is on its enabling authority and the formal expression of the law (*menetype #B^A* of political governance)—which is developed over time into the Agency Perspective as explained above. The secondary concern is for the broader and more esoteric concept of the "public interest" that is embodied in the Constitution and its authoritative interpretation. The well-grounded and effectively operating public administrative agencies would therefore necessarily have a dampened focus or energy for the lower concrete level of real-time responsiveness to other governance institutions (although this may not always be the case as the focus of attention will move around to the other perspectives in keeping with the nature and dynamics of such a trinity of *menetypes*). That is, the primary focus of The Public Administration is generally in keeping with its principal *menetype #B^A* political governance orientation, which means that its primary authority is the formally established and articulated official commitment of the Government—not the individual personal interpretations of the prominent governance players from day to day.[86] This thereby gives The Public Administration the role of being a custodian over the due process that brings to the Government's mind the policy options necessary to continue delivering consistency of Government policy over time[87]—in the same way as the courts have the role of custodian of a consistent but evolving interpretation of the law over time. In other words, The Public Administration could be regarded as a relentless (and unappreciated) champion for the *continuity of good governance* (according to the Constitution).

With such a primary focus on the *menetype #B* orientation of formal authority (or *menetype #B^A* of political governance), which involves building upon, and responding in accord with, its particular Agency Perspective, The Public Administration will naturally (cognitively) be circumspect about any new entrepreneurial changes unless the new initiatives are underpinned by authoritative decree (Presidential Orders). There is therefore an inherent defensiveness in dealing with the other players in the governance hierarchy of the political sphere. Political responsiveness to its individual political leaders is naturally (or cognitively) a much lower priority than the processes of ordered, formal governance. Put another way, on the one hand, the enabling legislation and associated laws encapsulate an articulation of the common good that is to come from the organizing of its day-to-day administrative efforts. On the other hand, the specific Government intent from its political superiors is more often than not about satisfying the private interests of particular interest groups.

This not only places a special responsibility on the Public Administrator, it makes for the tension-packed, paradox-filled experience that is the lot of the top public administrators. In fact, it serves to heighten The Public Administration's overall sense of neglect and low status accorded by the system to The Public Administration.[88] That is, externally the importance of The Public Administration is downplayed and, internally, there is a reticence about being drawn into the political team. This is the principal rationale (and why it makes good sense) to provide Public Administrators with permanent tenure.[89]

SUMMARY

In summary, the principal conclusions from the above analysis of the relative status of The Public Administration in the constitutional governance of the United States are:

- *The constitutional structure of governance in the US republic is ordered in keeping with the natural cognitive structure of human thinking and provided with the institutional processes for a dialogue between the separate powers. In this way, it can be recognised as the most conscious form of governance that provides for encouraging, efficacious and harmonious dynamics. Within this hierarchical structure of governance, primacy of authority is given in order to the Congress, Supreme Court and the Executive, but they are all required to consult with one another, check one another, and assist one another as appropriate.*

- *The Public Administration is a second-order governance authority and, moreover, it is accorded a naturally (cognitively) repressed status in the collective psyche of the society, the political sphere, and also within its own level of the governance hierarchy. In its spirit of management and good order (menetype #B-oriented governance), The Public Administration has a primary focus on the authority and objectives transmitted formally from the primary level of political authority, and much less priority for responding to the day-to-day initiatives (and exercise of political will) of its current political superiors.*

- *The "public interest" is the transcendent concept of the "good" that holds the aspirations for the governance hierarchy of the political sphere. When articulated by the highest legislative authority, the "public interest" infuses and informs all future conscious action of the lower parts of the governance hierarchy. Moreover, it is "good" to be acting in concert with the "public interest" in the same way as it is "good" for individuals to be acting consciously. The Public Administration has a role as custodian of the accumulated official interpretations of the "public interest" by the primary governance authorities and it is its task to recall it to the Government's mind as appropriate during their ongoing dialogue.*

ENDNOTES

[1]   This phrase was used specifically in the Blacksburg Manifesto (Wamsley *et al*, 1990: 34) to promote its cause. 'Our focus is on the *functions* of government agencies and not on how they might be organized. Thus we speak of "The Public Administration" as an institution of government rather than of bureaucracy as an organizational form.' It remains to be seen as to whether this concept of being an institution remains a valid claim in the context of the following analysis.

[2]   As opposed to the thinking of Woll (1963: 18), who contends that 'the *premises* of the constitutional system are no longer valid today. This is a further reason to support the view that present bureaucratic power does not fit neatly into the pattern of limited government established by the Constitution of 1789'.

     This book goes on to argue that Woll (1963) is wrong on both counts—the basis of the Constitution is still as sound today as it was when it was constructed because its premises about human nature still stand (humans have not basically changed but only matured), and public administration has fitted in all along—it's just that its importance is naturally suppressed and it is only through the process of greater differentiation and complexity in the understanding and practice of governance over time that public administration has been required to stand more apart and on its own feet.

[3]   Put in another way: 'Human beings have a remarkable capacity for social construction or perception. We create our selves, communities, organizations, institutions, and reify them—endow them with varying "realities" and meanings. This creates ontological and epistemological problems for us as we seek to understand our various social constructs. People's sense of being, their concepts of truth and reality and how they can know them, vary sharply and widely. Consider the implications for public administration' (Wamsley, 1996: 390).

[4]   'For many founders, it seemed self-evident that the U.S. Constitution was the practical implementation of the separation of powers theory. "Our Government," Edward Livingston of New York told the House of Representatives in 1798, "is founded on the establishment of the principles which constitute the difference between a free Constitution and a despotic power; a distribution of the legislative, Executive, and Judiciary powers into several hands… strongly marked, decisively pronounced"' (Powell, 1987: 27).

[5]   'The theory of the separation of powers consists of two major elements. First, it holds that power can be conceived as powers, i.e., as a few distinct categories defined according to general functions… In the evolution of

the theory, there were debates on what exactly these categories were. But by the time the theory had come to America, it was accepted on all sides—working mostly from Montesquieu's design—that there were three basic powers: a legislative power, meaning a power to make laws; a judicial power, meaning a power to apply penalties (criminal or civil) and to have a role in applying law (including constitutional law); and an executive power, meaning in a strict sense a power to execute or carry out laws and, more broadly, a discretionary power to act in behalf of the nation, especially in crisis or foreign affairs, when laws either could not apply or when they might conflict with the national interest… It is not too much to say that the dispute over whether to recognize the executive power in this broader sense—meaning an admission of its existence, of its importance for any government worthy of the name, and of the need for its being exercised effectively—was the central question in the debate over the Constitution…

Second, the allocation of power according to the principle of the separation of power promotes efficiency, at least in one respect. Because these functions are different in character, their effective performance demands different qualities. Each institution can be structured to carry out its own function in an effective way. Thus the executive power can be housed in an institution headed by one individual in order to be able to act quickly and secretly, while the legislative power can be placed in an institution that provides for broad representation and ensures deliberation' (Ceasar, 1994: 93).

[6]   'The theoretical concept of separation of powers is often equated today with that of checks and balances (as in the opinion of Justice Brandeis quoted above), and indeed on occasion Americans in the founding era also combined or confused them. In the origins, in eighteenth-century political science, and in the minds of most founders, however, the two ideas are quite distinct… Mixed government Theorists were unconcerned about concentrating power as long as the interests of the different estates were in balance; separation of power Theorists did not object to the domination of government by a single social class as long as different persons wielded the functionally distinct governmental powers' (Powell, 1987: 26).

'Separation of powers was originally a republican doctrine that Locke and Montesquieu rationalized, neutralized, and cleansed of its partisan animus. But to do so they reinterpreted the English Constitution rather than abstracted from it… The other argument for separation of powers, less obvious in *The Federalist* but implied by Hamilton's mention of the "regular" distribution of power *(Federalist 48)*, is the separation makes the powers work better' (Mansfield, 1994: 9; 10).

Moreover, politics is a natural and constructive component of a healthy society. The separation of powers is a core principle that determines the shape of the political process and any society should wish to effect the most constructive processes possible to resolve the inevitable social tensions. 'I must begin by noting that politics as a social process must be accorded ultimate respect; the political process is the means by which society heals its collective problems, the problems caused by the limits of the consciousness of its citizens… Society, rather than having its development carried forward by individuals, must attempt to heal itself. Politics is this healing process. Politics, then, is above all the process by which societies come to terms with eruptions of unconscious energy… eruptions that occur because the symbolic analogues of the society have become inappropriate to its pattern of development… Politics is a power game, a game based on the pulling and hauling of interested parties' attempts to dominate. Hence, by its very nature, cannot be rational in the way that participation can be in principle… Politics is society struggling to settle itself through structured disruption. Politics is a collective process, a process that deals in the irrational… Politics is the process by which a society relates to its unconscious. Politics therefore has a certain transcendent quality of its own that is unique to it. It is the process through which a society lives out its collective destiny' (White, 1990: 235–236).

That is, politics is a process of dialogue and ordered exercise of power to aspire to the greater public good, which, of course, can never be attained because humans and human constructions are by necessity limited and limiting—they can never be perfect.

[7]   'Indeed, Madison defends the form of separation of powers under the Constitution not simply in terms of checks and balances, but for the purpose of separating the executive from the legislative as a means of obtaining stable, energetic and competent government, and also for establishing justice within a "wholly popular" regime' (Marshall, 1994: 28).

'For much of this century, many political scientists, legal scholars, and journalists have taken for granted that the eighteenth-century principles underlying the constitutional separation of powers are incompatible with the governing demands of the twentieth century. They view "government inefficiency" as the inevitable cost of the Founding Fathers' "passion" for dividing power… these critics assert that the American political system is ill-suited to foster good administration. But this view mischaracterizes the actual principles of American constitutionalism. A careful re-examination of the origins and the classic elaboration of the American separation of powers doctrine demonstrates that constitutional structure embodies a dual commitment to ensuring effective governance as well as to protecting liberty…

In that discussion of the three branches *(Federalist Papers #47–51)*, Publius abstracts from the qualities of executive, legislative, and judicial power in order to concentrate on the branches' mutual checking capacities. It is in later

Papers that Publius develops the "positive intention" of the tripartite system: "to contribute 'energy' and 'stability,' so as to constitute a 'good' or 'useful' government rather than merely a safe one"' (Korn, 1996: 14, 19).

'As Justice Robert Jackson would later put it, "While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a *workable* government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity"' (Heclo, 1994: 132).

'This characteristic of inefficiency, it is worth noting, is the central criticism made by adherents of the doctrine of the modern presidency. They argue that the Constitution leads to policy stalemate and deadlock, preventing majorities from having their way. Interestingly, this criticism was almost never heard until this century. Earlier critics attacked the Constitutional plan on the grounds that it provided the federal government not with too little, but with too much, capacity for action. It was the Founders themselves, not their contemporary critics, who worried about how to make the government energetic enough.

This brings us to the other point, which is that not all instances of mixing and sharing of power were included as checks. Granting the president a role in the legislative process was, as noted, intended to endow the government as a whole with a greater capacity for the effective exercise of power' (Ceaser, 1994: 96–97).

[8] This is not to stay that it did, or could be expected to, operate smoothly and maturely from the start. Like a child born with the power to think and then brought up in an environment that encourages the development of its power to think, decide and act, the new US governance system had to crawl before it could walk, and walk before it could run. Woodrow Wilson (1966/1887), himself, recognised this and actually defined three stages of state evolution (Rohr, 1984: 39–40). The main point, however, is that the US constitutional governance system was effectively provided with the structure and dynamics to think collectively, decide, act and then reflect on all that, and learn—as would a self-interested individual. Learning organizations might have only arrived on the scene recently (or more correctly only named and discussed recently), whereas an effective earning constitutional governance system has been around in the United States since 1789.

[9] The necessity and value of effective and constructive dialogue between all the different political perspectives has long been regarded as a necessary virtue for good government. For instance, Bagehot 'concluded the introduction to his second edition by observing that the English constitution and the American constitution provide two leading forms of "government by discussion" (Bagehot…). Government by discussion was, for Bagehot, a necessary condition for the development of a first-rate political community' (Ostrom, 1989: 67).

In particular, Marshall (1994: 41) notes of the US Constitution: 'By comparison, the Madisonian design compels negotiation and compromise, the very feature most despised by its critics.'

'The very idea of modern "checks and balances" suggests, as Woodrow Wilson animadverts, a mechanistic, Newtonian vision of power balancing power. In Montesquieu's schema, liberty is thus secured not by a judgment over these competing claims but by their maintenance in perpetual tension' (Marshall, 1994: 27).

[10] In other words, 'Constitutional government in the United States subsumes the democratic process… thus the Constitution was actually concerned with limiting *governments* (both national and state) as well as with limiting the direct power of the *people*' (Woll, 1963: 21).

[11] In fact, it seems that it was never intended that they should be distinct and mutually exclusive: 'The problem with using the theory to interpret the Constitution, as James Jackson of Georgia replied to Lee in 1789, is that the framers had so thoroughly *rejected* the object of the threefold functional analysis—to keep in separate hands the different powers. "Are the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial powers kept separate and distinct? No, Mr. Chairman, they are blended… in all the possible forms they are capable of receiving." The actual Constitution—as opposed to the imaginary one Theoreticians like Lee had conjured up out of their own ideas—was one long repudiation of the separation of powers theory' (Powell, 1987: 28).

Which correctly identifies the secondary fact about the powers being blended to a degree, but overlooks the primary fact that each of the three primary institutions of Legislature, Executive and Judiciary is allocated the bulk of the respective power with the other two institutions only being accorded a secondary or tertiary role for that particular power.

Goodnow (according to Waldo, 1984a: 106) used the impracticability of a pure division of the three powers into different institutions as a basis to argue for the validity of the separation of politics and administration as a better tool to inform the structure and working of government.

'The second most influential treatment of the separation of powers by an American student of public administration is that of W. F. Willoughby. His *The Government of Modern States*, though formally a text on comparative government, best presents his distinctive viewpoint.

He finds the American threefold division of powers as unsatisfactory as did Goodnow: "Examination will show that it cannot stand the test of scientific analysis…"

The threefold scheme is at once too subtle, and lacking insubtlety. It is too subtle because it posits three equal powers when, broadly speaking, government is a process of two parts: "If the work involved in the administration of any service or enterprise is subject to analysis certain important distinctions appear. The first of these is that between the function of direction, supervision and control, on the one hand, and execution on the other…"

Third, the details of the argument must not obscure important points of agreement with Goodnow: Willoughby as well as Goodnow is preoccupied with a dichotomy between politics and administration, and Goodnow as well as Willoughby recognizes a function of "administration" apart from and in addition to the "executive" proper' (Waldo, 1984a: 109; 111).

This book provides a scientific or philosophic analysis of the structural separation of powers and analyses the deeper nature of control and execution, and between politics and administration. Further, there is a deeper analysis of Willoughby's (Waldo, 1984a) initial differentiation between the "administration" and the "executive" and its proper relationship.

[12]   'The Constitution, on the other hand, does not completely separate the powers of the three branches of government, but rather blends them so that each branch will be able to check the other branches by interfering with their functions' (Woll, 1963: 13).

However, it is more a matter of reality that the powers cannot be completely separated but need to interact and support one another in different ways as the circumstances change—*and so it is within a trinity of menetypes.*

'Publius argued that a "partial mixture" of the three governmental powers would provide the "necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of others." In contrast, a pure separation of powers system—the kind demanded by the Anti-Federalists—would provide no protective weapons to enable members of each branch to check potential abuses of members in the other branches. Without a mixture of powers within each branch, Publius warned, constitutional provisions expressly prohibiting the encroachment of one branch on another would prove nothing more than "parchment barriers"' (Korn, 1996: 17).

[13]   'In 1960, in what became an influential text on the American presidency, Richard Neustadt wrote, "The constitutional convention of 1787 is supposed to have created a government of 'separated powers.' It did nothing of the sort. Rather, it created a government of separated institutions *sharing* powers." Dozens, perhaps hundreds, of times since Neustadt's book was written, students of American political institutions have cited Neustadt's formulation with approval… Despite the views of Neustadt and his intellectual progeny, the Framers very much believed in a formal separation of powers, or functions, of government and expressly designed each of the governing institutions to carry out effectively the category of powers assigned to it' (Bessette and Schmitt, 1994: 47–48).

Both of these two perspectives on the nature of the separation of powers are subsumed in the conceptual understanding explained in this book.

[14]   However, there is only indirect influence. 'The Court argued that, apart from impeachment, the president is "responsible not to the Congress but to the people" and that "once Congress makes its choice in enacting legislation, its participation ends. Congress can thereafter control the execution of its enactment only indirectly—by passing new legislation." The Court went on to quote the sweeping language of the 1935 *Humphrey's Executor* case to the effect the "the fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the three general departments of government entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of the others, has often been stressed and is hardly open to serious question"' (Heclo, 1994: 141).

[15]   Which means that the legislative or *menetype #C* power is regarded as superior to the judicial or *menetype #B* power, which is, in turn, regarded as superior to (and mediating with) the executive power (*menetype #A*).

'From its origins, justice William Paterson wrote in 1795, the Congress was "the general, supreme and controlling council of the nation, the centre of union, the centre of force, and the sum of the political system." Like the British Parliament, Congress's powers were coextensive with the nation's needs. "To determine what their powers were," Paterson wrote, "we must inquire what powers they exercised"' (Powell, 1987: 35).

To ensure that Congress remains the supreme power, it alone has been accorded the power of the purse. 'Based primarily on its power to appropriate funds and its unique status as a representative body, Congress with good reason calls itself the "First Branch of Government." The power of the purse, James Madison noted in Federalist 58, represents the "most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure." Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution places this weapon squarely in the hands of Congress' (Fisher, 1978: 166).

[16]   This order or precedence of the powers has been echoed by many scholars. 'Many persons consider the three branches to be equal, but the Constitution clearly gives the Congress the central power if it chooses to exercise it. Nevertheless, in recent decades the President has overshadowed Congress, and the courts are a distant third as

holders of power. Each branch has powers of its own and checks over the other two branches… Nevertheless, the branches retain considerable independence. The classic description of the operation of the separate branches in that they provide *checks and balances*.' (Max Skidmore and Marshall Carter Wanke, as quoted in Merry, 1980: 219).

'The balance of the American Constitution is a balance between the stronger—which in most circumstances is the legislative—and the weaker departments, and more fundamentally, is a balance between the dependence on the people and the auxiliary precautions, the chief one of which is the separation of powers' (Wilson, 1994: 83).

'Of course, the Capitol was built on the heights of what was then known as Jenkins' Hill. This gave the Congress a pre-eminent position within the federal district's core, reflecting no doubt its high, public responsibility of passing laws for the republic as a whole. Yet counterbalancing this was the decision made soon thereafter to locate the buildings housing the departments of war, state, and the treasury on the grounds reserved for the executive's mansion. Congress was placed on a pedestal, but the weight of government's day-to-day business was adjoined to the presidency' (Bessette and Schmitt, 1994: 61–62).

[17] This type of relationship between the different aspects of governance power is a reflection of a broader perspective on human affairs as captured by Marshall (1994: 24): 'But within the broad philosophical tradition defending the idea of transhistorical principles against those who deny them, one may discern three modes of reasoning through which political things are perceived: science, practical reason and aesthetics. According to whichever mode is selected as primary, human affairs will appear under profoundly altered lights… Corresponding to the three modes of perception are, indeed, three philosophical traditions adhering to the idea of a transhistorical principle of right; and each of these traditions in turn traces a radically different path to constitutional government.'

This is the truth that this book has explored. There are three philosophical traditions which are captured by the metaphor of the mind at the broadest level (as alluded to in the earlier discussion of democracy).

[18] 'The Constitution's purpose was to make "the government of the United States a complete government with all the powers within itself for the general purposes"' (Powell, 1987: 35).

[19] For instance, the legislature has been deemed to have the power implied in the Constitution, to investigate the executive administrative function: 'The court announced in 1927 that a legislative body "cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change…" Investigation is a prerequisite for intelligent lawmaking' (Fisher, 1978: 139). The legislature would regard the Executive as its secondary support to implement its legislation and so would be looking to influence its operations.

On the other hand, the Executive has been deemed to have the power implied in the Constitution to withhold information for the purpose of confidentiality '"to the extent this interest relates to the effective discharge of a President's powers, it is constitutionally based." These implied powers meet head-on whenever Congress, in an attempt to carry out its investigative function, is denied information by a president who invokes the executive privilege' (Fisher, 1978: 139).

[20] 'I shall begin with an assumption (which requires no proof because it is beyond argument) that all human groups up to and including the nation-state itself are oligarchically ruled. Although the rhetoric of course differs, this assumption includes the political entity called the United States of America. The people do not rule, either directly or through their elected "representatives." There is, therefore, no valid reason for calling the United States a "democracy"; it is not now, was not in the past, and shows no likelihood of becoming, a true democratic polity—however one defines democracy (more than 200 definitions exist)… As for the United States, it seems clear beyond doubt that we have always had an elitist form of actual government, however much the popular wisdom is to the contrary… "Great family wealth, as well as corporate wealth," a careful study by Professor Philip Birch concludes, "has long exercised more influence in American government than has been generally realized. In fact, if anything, that is an understatement… It would be more accurate to say that, regardless of changing form, America has almost always been dominated by some kind of wealth." In other words, those who formally rule take their signals and commands, not from the electorate as a body, but from a small group of men (plus a few women). This group will be called the Establishment' (Miller, 1987: 2).

More importantly, Woodrow Wilson (as quoted in Rohr, 1984) identified the necessity for modern States to be self-conscious: 'In his notes, Wilson distinguishes between the constitution of a before and after "the modern time" which he calls "the regime of liberalism." The older constitutions were concerned "only with make-up and method." Modern constitutions add "an authoritative body of limitations or a grant of power from without." The modern constitutional state is "a self-conscious, adult, self-regulated (democratic) State," with the following characteristics' (Rohr, 1984: 37).

But as noted above, even a State cannot be adult as soon as it is born and needs to mature through all of its nourishment, nurturing and experiences provided, of course, that it is equipped with the collective cognitive wherewithal to be reflexive.

[21]   An understanding of the hierarchy of powers in terms of the degree of abstraction in their decision-making is contained in the thinking around the original development of the Constitution as encapsulated by Madison in *Federalist 48* when discussing the encroachment of powers: 'The legislative department derives a superiority in our governments from other circumstances. Its constitutional powers at once being more extensive, and less susceptible of precise limits, it can, with the greater facility, mask, under complicated and indirect measures, the encroachments which it makes on the co-ordinate departments. It is not infrequently a question of real nicety in legislative bodies, whether the operation of a particular measure will, or will not extend beyond the legislative sphere. On the other side, the executive power being restrained within a narrower compass, and being more simple in its nature; and judiciary being described by landmarks, still less uncertain, projects of usurpation by either of these departments would immediately betray and defeat themselves' (Hamilton, Madison and Jay, 1952: 157).

That they are interrelated and interconnected means or process of dialogue and decision-making between different perspectives about the ends or "public interest" and not a statement on the particular ends, is captured by Marshall (1994: 17): 'The American Constitution's text shows separation of powers, along with federalism, to be the document's "central organizing principle." Yet the chief author of that text, James Madison, designates this separation as an "invention of prudence," an "auxiliary precaution," thus not a principle but a means for achieving the Constitution's end of justice. For a century and more, however, since the writings of Woodrow Wilson, critics of this "invention" have seen it rather as a barrier than as a means to achieving this end. In this respect, whereas Madison had sought to join the means with the end, the critics would separate the two.'

That the Constitution and the construction of the separation of powers is in accord with the natural cognitive dynamics of human thinking means that it keys in with the human psyche in much the same way as the myths do. 'Constitutional mysticism or mythology comes in many guises. The foundation, or basic, myth has four features. First, the myth sees the United States as being born by a political immaculate conception, pure and untrammelled. This is the creation myth. Nothing constitutionally significant is considered to have occurred prior to 1787—not even the Declaration of Independence or the Articles of Confederation. In significant respects, the formal constitution as written is a counterrevolution to the principles of the Declaration. Second, the myth views the constitution as a set of immutable truths revealed—some think by divine inspiration—to the framers. Among other things, this means that the constitution is—or as Attorney General Edwin Meese would have it, should be— the same today as it was in 1789, when the government began operations. Third, those "truths" serve to limit government on behalf of individual liberty and also allow the people to rule. This is the idea of popular sovereignty. Finally, the foundation myth stoutly rejects any suggestion that the constitution is inadequate and needs change. Some view it as a perfect instrument, good for all times and all circumstances…

Or, as Supreme Court Justice William Johnson wrote in 1823, "In the Constitution of the United States – the most wonderful instrument ever drawn by the hand of man—there is a comprehension and precision that is unparalleled; and I can truly say after spending my life studying it, I still daily find in it some new excellence' (Miller, 1987: 33; 35).

This book argues the inherent truth in the spirit of these myths—but not necessarily the literal truth of them.

[22]   This is also similar for the dynamics of the trinity of the nation's jurisdictional powers (as depicted in Fig. **6.2**). The national, state and local governments are separate and independent to a degree but there is an accepted hierarchy in which the lower gives way to the higher, and the state governments play a mediating role between the national and local levels. There is widespread acceptance that where programs are being delivered to the citizens, government action is best delivered at local level unless there is a good reason not to. And the reason not to is usually related to the issues of equality, efficiency (which are mediating, *menetype #B* issues) or capacity/power to act (*menetype #C*). So there is a constant tension between operating at the level of principle in a capitalist, democratic nation and the principle of subsidiarity or effective delegation to local levels (particularly in national programs), which still has great natural persuasive power—namely because this is equivalent to acting at the executive jurisdictional level of society.

'The constitution utilizes both the concept of *federalism-division of power* between the national and state governments—and *separation of powers*—the checks and balances existing among the three branches of the national government. In reality, the term *shared* powers is more accurate. Power is neither completely divided nor complete separated. Both the national and the state governments have some powers in common, such as taxation, road construction, and education. And within the national government, overlap exists among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, even though they are independent of each other' (quoted from Charles W. Dunn, *American Democracy Debated: An Introduction to American Government*, in Merry, 1980: 203–204).

[23]   Self-reflexive means becoming aware and conscious of itself as the political processes of a nation and this can only happen through some kind of hierarchy as discussed earlier in this book. It is an understanding also echoed by Fred Thayer as reported by White (1990: 188; 224): 'In the latest version of his [Thayer's] analysis, hierarchy is a metaphor for a form of consciousness characteristic of the entire era of civilization, in that it probably, in his view, began to develop when the human race ceased hunting and gathering as its main form of food-generating

activity. It is obvious how this critique confronts (and affronts) the conservative image of social life, where central emphasis is placed on the creation and maintenance of stable hierarchical institutions. His critique of liberalism—as liberal capitalism—is somewhat more subtle. Put in sketch form, his argument is that liberal capitalism is a direct reflection of hierarchical consciousness… Authority in the sense of unilaterally asserted, legitimate power-based action, is essential to these conditions and hence to the process of creating and maintaining consciousness… That is, society must have an ego, and a typical persona, if the socialization process on which the ego development depends is to occur. Legitimacy, of course, entails authority. The values that characterize a particular society must be embodied in institutions, and it is in the nature of institutions that they are invested with authority.'

'As James Russell Lowell observed in 1888, "After our Constitution got fairly into working order it really seemed as if we had invented a machine that would go of itself, and this begot a faith in our luck which even the civil war itself but momentarily disturbed"' (Miller, 1987: 150).

[24] 'Leaving aside for the moment how accurate these labels might be, they all miss the most important and least commented upon feature about our separation of powers system; its durability. With the basic constitutional design of separated powers still in place after 200 years, durability is something we simply take for granted…

How has the separation of powers design managed to be so durable? Not perhaps, because of any unique wisdom or virtue inherent in the American people. The Founders' mixed view of human nature seems to have gotten it about right: people are bad enough not to be trusted with power but virtuous enough to govern themselves within properly designed constitutional institutions for allocating power…

To say that developments in the separation of powers have been ad hoc, experimental and event-driven is not to suggest that things have just happened without rhyme or reason. The president's growing prominence as policy leader is directly connected to the increasingly complex demands on government that have come in the wake of rapid economic, technological, and social changes. These demands strained Congress's ability to legislate in sufficient detail. Bureaucracy grew in Washington, as it did in the states and in other developed countries; and the president as head of the executive bureaucracy became a focal point for policy management' (Heclo, 1994: 132; 133; 136–137).

At the end of a discussion of the effect that the vast technological change experienced up until now might have on the views of the framers of the Constitution back in 1787, Westin (1987: 198–199) concluded: 'To sum up, separation of powers and the checks and balances system that reinforces it are alive and well in the computer age. The executive has not blown the other two branches away. Nor has the information technology dissolved the interbranch conflicts intended by the framers'.

The interpretations of this book suggest that it is in error to argue as some have done that 'the *premises* of the constitutional system are no longer valid today' (Woll, 1963: 18), or that it 'uniformly failed to provide an adequate basis for an effective, stable political system' (Vile, 1967: 2). In fact, it has always had its detractors, even in the early days, as identified by Waldo (1984a: 104–105): 'Generally speaking, students of administration have been hostile to the tripartite separation of powers. In this they have not been alone; their hostility must be viewed against the background of almost complete lack of sympathy for the principle by American reformism and political science. This lack of sympathy became more widespread decade by decade between the Civil War and the First Great War. It found its justification in the unhealthy condition of our government and politics.' But the US governance system was still in adolescence at that time. Nevertheless, the nation had been born with the right governance framework of collective thinking for a successful development of its governance system.

The unequivocal support for the doctrine also stands in contrast to the long-standing criticisms of the three powers because of their lack of purity, as reported by Waldo (1984a: 106): 'The separation of powers, Goodnow finds, is both a good and a bad thing. More precisely, distinction and division of functions is good, separation of powers is bad… We soon learn, however, in considering Montesquieu, that though "the recognition of separate powers or functions of government" is good, "the existence of separate governmental authorities, to each of which one of the powers of government was to be entrusted," is bad, at least if it is followed very far. The unworkability of this "corollary" to the separation of powers, the "separation of authorities," is conclusively proved, Goodnow feels, by American experience. In fact, "no political organization, based on the general theory of a differentiation of governmental functions, has ever been established which assigns the functions of expressing the will of the state exclusively to any one of the organs for which it makes provision."'

[25] 'The significance of this omission is captured in the observations of Burns (1965: 239–241): 'A nation may be said to exist only when most of its people share some common set of beliefs, expectations, symbols and ultimate values that together make up a national purpose… There must be some transcendental purpose that gives meaning to their everyday activities, and this purpose can be found in religion or government or—usually—in some combination thereof. The purposes may be manifold and even mutually contradictory…But if a society is to realize its *national* purpose, there must also be some institution through which social change can be directed and related to that purpose. In other nations the Church or the Crown or some economic estate might serve this

purpose; in the United States the national government is the only institution possessing either the power or the mandate to legitimize the national purpose and to attempt to realize it. And considering the pluralistic forces in Congress and working through it and the restricted political role of the judiciary today, the American Presidency has been the institution best equipped to serve as formulator and symbol of the national purpose.'

The call to the spiritual may not be reflected in the Constitution but its legitimacy as a natural extension is displayed in the way it is included in oaths and in that the banknotes carry the assertion "In God we trust." Over time, prominent people have called directly on the spiritual beliefs as the newly inaugurated (2001) President Bush did by referring to the Christian bible story of the "good neighbour" and repeating a spiritual metaphor from earlier times: 'After the Declaration of Independence was signed, Virginia statesman John Page wrote to Thomas Jefferson: "We know the Race is not to the swift nor the Battle to the Strong. Do you not think an Angel rides in the Whirlwind and directs this Storm?"… This work continues. This story goes on. And an angel still rides in the whirlwind and directs this storm. God bless you all. God bless America' (Bush, 2001: 8).

This call upon the spiritual is tantamount to a call for the nation to move on to something better and the something better that is stressed in President Bush's inauguration address is the call to the responsibility of neighbourliness: 'What you do is as important as anything government does. I ask you to seek a common good beyond your comfort; to defend needed reforms against easy attacks; to serve your nation beginning with your neighbour. I ask you to be citizens' (Bush, 2001: 8).

This call to the spirit of neighbourliness or to look after your own is consistent with the movement of society to politicism or postmodernism. The managerialist notion of being able to devise a government program to fix any problem is giving way to the more political notions of personal justice and looking after your own.

[26] This observation has been explained earlier in the book, but is also exemplified in the words of President Coolidge (1925) as quoted in Waldo (1984b: 228): "The business of America is business."

[27] 'The framers assumed that the people would be primarily represented in the congress and that the president would principally be an executing rather than policy-making officer. The president would represent the people but be more than merely responsive. He would rise above volatile public opinion and serve the larger public interest. The presidency envisioned by the founders derived its authority from the Constitution. The modern presidency of Woodrow Wilson and his successors has its power and authority conferred by the people. The personal power of the presidency became "the engine for enlightened administration"' (Lane, 1996: 230).

'In summary, the Founding generation's view of executive power was more complex than is usually recognized. In spite of America's struggle with the crown, even the most whiggish among them retained an appreciation for the fact that at times a strong executive capacity was needed if a government was to be effective. The real issue, then, was not whether a strong or a weak executive was to be preferred but, rather, when and how the executive's great potential was to be utilized. Was a powerful executive needed more or less often, and would the decision to employ that power rest, under a constitution, largely with the legislature or with the executive itself?… Like Patrick Henry in the Virginia ratifying convention, Publius noted quite pointedly in *Federalist 6:* "Every man the least conversant in Roman history, knows how often that republic was obliged to take refuge in the absolute power of a single man under the formidable title of dictator." In short, the real issue for the Founders was not whether this potentially fearsome aspect of government could be avoided, but, instead, how it might best be called on, put to use, and, when necessary, regulated or checked' (Bessette and Schmitt, 1994: 54–55).

'Finally, the doctrine of the modern presidency, formulated by Woodrow Wilson and supported by most progressives, sought directly to counter the weak presidency that had become the accepted norm and to make the presidency and presidential leadership the "centre of action" in the American political system. This doctrine was supported by Democratic party liberals and large parts of the academic community from Wilson's day up until the end of the 1960s. It survives in a few quarters today… [however]… If we wish to develop a sound doctrine to defend a strong, but still limited, presidency, there is no better place to begin than with the Constitution. The theoretical understanding on which the Constitution is based offers the fullest account in American political thought of the character of the powers of government and the best guide for determining the basic division of authority between the president and Congress' (Ceaser, 1994: 90; 111).

'By contrast, developments after 1932 institutionalized the presidency as the focal point of the national government leadership, no matter who held the office and whether or not there was a national crisis. By mid-century, the president's "legislative program" was expected to set the main agenda for Congress and the nation each year. Executive agency proposals for legislation, testimonies to Congress, and comments on pending legislation had to be "cleared" through the president's Office of Management and Budget staff. After 1981 their proposed regulations had to be cleared as well' (Heclo, 1994: 138).

'Herman Finer, an emotional believer in the American chief executive, who once characterized the presidency as "the incarnation of the American people in a sacrament resembling that in which the wafer and the wine are seen to be the body and blood of Christ" and also as "belong(ing) rightfully to the offspring of a titan and Minerva husbanded by Mars"' (Lane, 1996: 253).

Weber (1978b: 231; 247) also identified this elevated aspect of the role of the Presidency as the charismatic aspect of US governance power: 'The power of charisma, by contrast, depends on beliefs in revelation and heroism, on emotional convictions about the importance and value of a religious, ethical, artistic, scientific, political or other manifestation, on heroism, whether ascetic or military, or judicial wisdom or magical or other favours. Such belief revolutionises men "from within" and seeks to shape things and organizations in accordance with its revolutionary will…

'But even in highly bureaucratised structures as the North American parties, as the last Presidential campaign showed, the charismatic type of leadership occasionally comes to the fore again in times of great excitement. If there is a "hero" available, he seeks to break the domination of the party machine by imposing plebiscitary forms of designation, and in some cases by transforming the whole machinery of nomination. Whenever charisma gains the ascendancy in this way, it naturally runs up against the resistance of the normally dominant apparatus of the professional politicians, especially the bosses who organize leadership and finance and keep the party functioning and whose creatures the candidates usually are.'

[28]   'As Daniel Patrick Moynihan once put it, "America is the hope of the world, and for that time given him, the president is the hope of America…" because "the President is the literal embodiment of American mass democracy and… the symbol of pervasive egalitarianism which from the beginning has characterized the emergent forces of the American democratic ideal." Moreover, in this view, "There is virtually no limit to what the President can do if he does it for democratic ends and by democratic means." Although somewhat extreme, this outlook nevertheless represents a central strand of American thought concerning the presidency…

'At the broadest level, "What the nation has been beguiled into believing ever since 1960 is surely the politics of evangelism: the faith that individual men are cast to be messiahs, the conviction that Presidential incantations can be substituted for concrete programs, the belief that what matters is not so much the state of the nation as the inspiration-quotient of its people." This is the essence of style over substance, with which every American should now be familiar' (Nachmias and Rosenbloom, 1980: 69–70; 73).

[29]   'Although presidents themselves have contributed to the cult of the presidency, in more candid moments many have spoken of the frustrations and limitations of their office. None of them compares with Truman for graphic clarity: "They talk about the power of the President, they talk about how I can just push a button to get things done. Why, I spend most of the time kissing somebody's ass." Indeed, many observers—even while embracing the textbook model—have argued that the president's powers are too limited' (Nachmias and Rosenbloom, 1980: 74).

[30]   'The argument becomes very complicated when the position of chief executive is examined. He has, of course, purely executive duties, such as commanding the army and seeing the laws are "duly enforced"; but he has also been made administrator-in-chief by Congress.

"The chief executive has been given the general status and powers of an administrator-in-chief… we have in effect the same person holding two offices. As administrator-in-chief the person holding the office of chief executive plays the dominant role in the work of the administrative branch. In doing so, however, he does not do so in virtue of any inherent powers as chief executive, but merely because the legislative branch, in which final authority in respect to the organization and work of the administrative branch is vested, has, as a matter of policy, made of this officer one to serve in this capacity"' (Waldo, 1984a: 110–111).

Waldo's (1984a) discussion of Willoughby's interpretation grapples with the inherent hierarchy of the three powers but gives too much independent standing to the supremacy of the Congress rather than the acknowledgement that it is, in fact, a trinity of autonomous powers.

[31]   It is in this sense as a transcendent collective that the people can be regarded as sovereign (rather than the simple desires and opinions of many individuals). 'On the issue of separation of powers within the federal government, the legislative is not supreme because the people are. The object of choice of the sovereign people is not a group of legislators who will carry out their will. What the people have chosen is a constitutional order that balances the powers they have delegated to three equal branches… Herbert Storing captures the spirit of the Federalists' argument when he describes their handiwork as "a balance of constitutional orders or powers… requiring only the impulse of popular consent to breathe life into it." This breath of popular consent is the taproot of the democratic character of the regime. It allows James Wilson to say of the government created by the Constitution: "In its principle it is purely democratical"' (Rohr, 1990a: 75; 77–78).

[32]   In this sense, the Constitution can be said to embody not only the authority structures of power within the community but also the people themselves as a collective and as the nation as a whole. 'In *Federalist 78*, Publius… goes on to argue that not only is the Constitution superior to a statute, but it is in a sense superior to the people themselves' (Rohr, 1990a: 79).

'Whereas in a popular government the people are sovereign, nonetheless "the aim of every political Constitution is or ought to be first to obtain for rulers, men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue the

common good of society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous, whilst they continue to hold their public trust"' (Marshall, 1994: 28–29).

'As the United States commemorates the 200th anniversary of its only constitutional convention, most Americans view the formal constitution with awe and reverence. They unthinkingly take part in the eulogies of 1987, which resemble the celebrations in 1976 when the declaration of Independence had its 200th anniversary. To the extent that people believe—as many say they do—that what was written in 1787 has an enduring significance and that the views of the men who drafted the formal constitution should be determined for present-day constitutional interpretations—again, as many believe—the United States may be said to be a hagiocracy, ruled (if those views are accurate—which they emphatically are not) by a gaggle of men long dead' (Miller, 1987: 31–32).

Miller (1987) assigns a wrong interpretation to make his point but the fact is clear that there is a view held by many that the Constitution contains some enduring truth and that it is as applicable today as it was back then and that this truth should be held in awe in much the same manner (but on a lesser scale) as the truths of the great religions are held in awe and reverence.

[33] This is analogous to the call in the new age of depth psychology that individuals who want to journey to wholeness need to dialogue with the *Other*—meaning the unconscious. It is not contended that the unconscious has any direct role in the hierarchy of conscious cognitive authority, but that better conscious decisions will result from the richer perspective gained from the infusion of the other perspectives repressed in the unconscious. Giving voice to the other perspectives in the unconscious would also minimise the dangers of an uprising of the otherwise unheard voices and thus avoid cognitive anarchy.

[34] 'A presidency temporarily empowered by intense mass popular support acting in behalf of a generally accepted and simplified purpose can, with great difficulty, bribe, cajole, and coerce a real measure of joint action. The long-drawn out battle for conversion and the debacle of orderly reconversion underline the difficulty of attaining, and the transitory nature of, popularly based emergency power. Only in crises are the powers of the Executive nearly adequate to impose a common plan of action on the executive branch, l*et al*one the economy…

'The balance of power between executive and legislature is constantly subject to the shifts of public and group support. The latent tendency of the American Congress is to follow the age-old parliamentary precedents and try to reduce the President to the role of constitutional monarch. Against this threat and to secure his own initiative, the President's resources are primarily demagogic, with the weaknesses and strengths that dependence on mass popular appeal implies' (Long, 1966: 48; 55).

But the complexities of modern government necessitate that the President takes the lead as though he/she has a popular mandate, although the eventual legislation might be totally different to that submitted if the President is in a weak or unpopular position. 'Since the president's constitutional powers over the legislature are so unimpressive, how has the president come to be considered the chief legislator? It is much because of the initiative for legislation, which once rested with the legislature, has now shifted to the executive. Congress expects the president to submit a legislative package. As one irate member of the House told an official in the Eisenhower administration, "Don't expect us to start from scratch on what you people want. That's not the way we do things here. You draft the bills and we work them over." Furthermore, the legislature has tended to delegate power to the president subject to a "legislative veto."… the roles of initiator and reactor have been almost entirely reversed' (Nachmias and Rosenbloom, 1980: 77–78).

[35] 'The Public Administration neither comprises nor heads any branch of government but is subordinate to all three of them. Like Congress, president, and courts, the Public Administration makes its distinctive contribution in a manner consistent with its peculiar place, which is one of subordination' (Rohr, 1990a: 80).

The assertions that the public administration is equivalent to a fourth or fifth arm of Government is admirable in striving for differentiation but they lack adequate discrimination between the relative hierarchical positioning. For instance, 'the initial constitutional problem that has been raised concerning bureaucratic power is its tendency to tip the balance between coordinate branches of *government*. It was noted that the administrative branch adds a fourth dimension to the constitutional system of separation of powers, a dimension which is not controlled within its framework' (Woll, 1963: 25). This is an observation seemingly based on the interpretation of a few highlighted instances and reflects more the age of managerialism rather than any real shifts in the constitutional fundamentals.

Long (as quoted in Kaufman, 1990: 489) also shows such a lack of discrimination: 'The theory of our constitution needs to recognize and understand the working and potential of our great fourth branch of government [the bureaucracy], taking a rightful place beside President, Congress, and Courts.' The underlying theory of the Constitution does recognise the role of the bureaucracy but as subordinate to, not equal to the other three great powers.

The identification of five branches of government (Merry, 1980 and before him W. F. Willoughby as referred to by Waldo, 1984a: 109) recognises that the degree of differentiation needs to go further but does not really address

the natural hierarchy that is imbedded in the constitutional theory. Waldo (1984a: 111) debunks somewhat both this notion and the concept of the politics–administration dichotomy. Based on the Theory of Mind used in this book, there is a differentiation of three at the primary level and then nine at the secondary level with each primary power differentiated into three further powers, and so on.

The height of managerialism as it applied to US governance is captured in the assertion of Woll (1963: 3–4): 'the increasing power of the bureaucracy has reduced in many instances the influence of the main executive bodies of societies. Bureaucracy cannot be dismissed as simply part of the "executive branch" of government controlled by the President or the Cabinet. In the United States the growth of a vast administrative branch has introduced an important new political force into the governmental system, a force which might well become dominant if it is not controlled.'

These assertions about the importance of a fourth arm neglect the understanding that if it is considered to have gone too far, an agency can be nobbled (or just disbanded) either by determined personnel action or legislative action to change the administrative arrangements. In the end, agencies cannot control their own enabling legislation or leadership selection.

³⁶ The position of the Public Administrator is subservient to the ministers or secretaries of state which are also subservient to the three primary powers: 'Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Supreme Court, distinguished between the two types of duties for the Secretary: ministerial and discretionary. One duty (as a public ministerial officer of the United States) extended to the United States or to its citizens. Here Congress, operating through statutes, could direct the secretary to carry out certain activities. The second duty (as an executive official and adviser) was to the president alone. A secretary of state, performing as an officer of the United States, was bound to obey the laws: "He acts, in this respect, as has been very properly stated at the bar, under the authority of law, and not by the instructions of the President. It is a ministerial act which the law enjoins on a particular officer for a particular purpose"' (Fisher, 1987: 137).

In fact, the position of the Public Administrator is even more subservient: 'Political appointments in the departments are made with an eye for controlling the career bureaucracy. A senior adviser in Lyndon Johnson's administration remarked that the separation of power between the Congress and the president was not as great "as between a president and those people like subcabinet and bureau officials who become locked into their own special subsystems of self-interested policy concerns." Presidents enter office with deep suspicions about the loyalty and motivations of civil servants' (Fisher, 1987: 146).

Moreover, 'Regulatory commissions are subject to the control of Congress, the president, and the courts. They have been described as "stepchildren whose custody is contested by both Congress and the executive, but without very much affection from either one." The struggle for influence has been largely defensive, "with each elected branch seeking to prevent the other from exercising active control, but with neither consistently wanting to do so itself"' (Fisher, 1987: 166).

'In creating the three branches of government, the Constitution did not give one branch exclusive control over the bureaucracy. It vested substantial controlling powers in Congress, which can create, reorganize, and terminate administrative agencies and regulate their conduct through its power of appropriation. The Senate must give its consent to major administrative appointments. But the Constitution also vested the executive power, the commander-in-chief power, and other authority and duties in the President. Thus in effect the Constitution made the two political branches competitors for exerting dominion over the executive branch. But the judiciary was not left out. Constitutional amendments, particularly the Bill of Rights, require that the national bureaucracy observe civil liberties, subject to the monitoring eye of the courts' (quoted from Louis Koenig's *Toward a Democracy: A Brief Introduction to American Government* in Merry, 1980: 209).

Although it is difficult to find this sentiment of the subservience of The Public Administration clearly in the Blacksburg Manifesto itself (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990), one of the authors is clear elsewhere: 'in *To Run a Constitution*, Rohr performs a detailed objective analysis of the constitutional legitimacy of the administrative state as a prelude to a normative theory of public administration in a constitutional context. Rohr sees the agencies of government as subordinate to the three branches of government but simultaneously able to balance the various interests expressed there. Public administrators, key actors in this pluralistic balancing act, are to uphold the Constitution—to use "their discretionary power in order to maintain the constitutional balance of powers in support of individual rights"' (Denhardt, 1990: 57).

This quote also contains observational support for two other key conclusions about public administration in governance that are brought out later in this book; firstly, the public administration is a custodian of the Government's memory of its past interpretations of the public interest as contained in the Constitution or their enabling legislation, general law and past government policy. Secondly, because of the second-order position of The Public Administration, it is necessarily (cognitively) pluralistic in its manifestation (in much the same way as middle management in any widely distributed private sector corporation can almost seem to be made up of separate autonomous units). According to the JEWAL Synthesis philosophy of mind, only the first-order (or highest level of abstraction #C) authorities really exhibit anything like unitary command.

What then is meant by: 'As John Rohr has shown us, the word *administration* most likely did not appear in the Constitution because the Founding Fathers assumed it to be so fundamental it needed no more mention than did oxygen' (Wamsley and Wolf, 1996: 12)? It certainly did not mean that it was a fundamental assumption that *administration* was equivalent to the three primary powers that were mentioned. Rather, it was because the Constitution outlined the primary-order powers that embraced the principle of the trinitarian hierarchy of powers and chose not to go into detail about the more numerous second-order powers, which though exhibiting a certain autonomy in carrying out their responsibility were clearly subservient and malleable.

There is, nevertheless, a history of temptation to put The Public Administration as equivalent to the primary three powers as noted by Kaufman (1990: 489): 'That some of the literature of public administration tacitly harboured such an assumption—that is, an assumption that bureaucrats are and ought to be constitutionally coordinate with elected officials—was pointed out nearly four decades ago by Dwight Waldo.' Kaufman (1990: 491–493) goes on to observe that this struggle about the role and standing of public administration vis-à-vis the elected Government persists. 'If this struggle [between public servants and elected officials] materializes as I have postulated, the outcome is uncertain… But one thing is certain. If this outline of the future resembles even vaguely the course of events, the cleavages in the public administration community, dimly perceived in 1956, should soon appear sharply and unmistakably… The actual division will not be a neat, clean split. Some members of the professional public administration community will remain committed to executive leadership doctrines, while many political scientists will subscribe to the campaign for increased bureaucratic independence.'

Some have had it both ways: 'It is difficult to grasp the concept that the bureaucracy is not subordinate to one or more of the three initial branches of American government. But the fact is the three primary branches have necessarily supported the creation of semiautonomous bureaucracy as an instrument to enable our government to meet the challenges it has faced' (Woll, 1963: 174). But this is clearly consciously delegated power that can be retrieved or strangled by reducing the allocation of resources as testified to by the fact that: 'With the exception of the initial executive departments, administrative agencies were created long after the Constitution was written' (Fisher, 1987: 176).

[37]   However, it is often considered that popular mandates for the Executive are hard to come by. 'An idealized picture of the British parliamentary system as a Platonic form to be realized or approximated has exerted a baneful fascination on the field. The majority party with a mandate at the polls and a firmly seated leadership in the Cabinet seems to solve adequately the problem of the supply of power necessary to permit administration to concentrate on the fulfilment of accepted objectives. It is commonplace that the American party system provides neither a mandate for a platform nor a mandate for leadership' (Long, 1966: 44–45).

This assessment may not hold so much for the more modern Presidencies such as Reagan who came to office with a clear mandate for smaller government, which he proceeded to implement quite successfully.

[38]   'The waxing and waning of the presidency is much discussed, but one salient aspect of the relative strength or weakness of the federal executive—the relationship of the president and the administrative establishment of government—is seldom considered and analysed. That relationship was critical in the ascent of the presidency to dominance in the U.S. political system. Further, and more recently, a remarkable shift in that relationship has created a new "problem" of the presidency and has again significantly altered the political landscape.

'The basic position of the refounding of the public administration is that the genius of American politics can succeed only with responsive and effective administration within the context of democratic governance. Historically, that very formula was pursued and largely achieved from the late 19th century through the 1960s when the presidency and the public administration found common cause together. The recent weakening, if not breaking, of the bond between the two institutions in the latter part of the 20th century has had profound implications for the governance process in the United States. Even more recently, the rapid evolutionary pace of both political development and managerial doctrine raises new issues and questions about the nature of the relationship between presidential politics and public administration' (Lane, 1996: 225–226).

With maturity and increasing complexity comes the consensual agreement to differentiate governance powers further. In the Constitution there was the differentiation of the three primary powers. More recently, the secondary powers in the form of The Public Administration are being differentiated. Lane (1996) is also actually reporting the phenomenon of the passage from the managerialist age to the politicist age, but though he rues the passing of the glory days of managerialism for the public administration, there is no real comprehension of why the new order of politicism and depreciation of public administration has arisen, although there is a later acknowledgement of a 'politicized presidency' which is termed the 'postmodern presidency' (Lane, 1996: 234ff).

[39]   Sometimes commentators are blinded by the size of the agencies and the power of particular personalities in public administration, such as Woll (1963: 26): 'for the administrative arm of government is deeply involved in the formulation of public policy and is not in many instances controlled in any meaningful way by the elected organs of government.' The main point is the political institutions could control them if they wanted to, as Woll (1963: 51) himself goes on to assert: 'First, with respect to the organization of bureaucracy, Congress retains

primary power. It may create and destroy agencies, and it determines where they are to be located, in the executive branch and outside it.... Congress has the power of appropriation, and in this way too it is able to exercise a great deal of control over the administrative arm… Congress has the power to define exactly what the agency may or may not do, that is, its general jurisdiction.'

[40] 'The public administrator should not see him- or herself "as an agent acting on behalf of others, yet doing so in a vigorous and thoughtful manner", but rather should see him- or herself as an agent *through which* others are allowed to act. The difference may seem subtle, but it is critical. Public administrators, if they are to be the agents of governmental change, must cast themselves not in the role of governmental parents who act "on behalf of others," or as "stewards" who act for others, but as "instruments" through which the public acts for itself. This view of administrators as instruments is reminiscent of that suggested by Stivers, in which active citizens and administrators interact through dialogue to develop public policies' (Little, 1996: 347–348).

This concept of being an instrument is here conceived in the political sense, which does seem inappropriate, but it does not have to be that way. What is meant is that it is time for governance thinking to be differentiated further to recognise the autonomous legitimacy of the power for The Public Administration to act within government. As an autonomous power centre, albeit quite secondary and lower, The Public Administration is required to participate in the government's dialogue and interpret the decisions and actions that it should take in keeping with the purpose of the whole. The metaphor of the mind is probably still better.

'This traditional doctrine of administration is integrated, hierarchical, legalistic, and it requires obedience to political direction. In this system of administrative responsiveness, the bureaucracy is a monolithic tool that is predictable, reliable and obedient. It operates in a vertical hierarchy with authority and decisions coming down from the top through delegation and with responsibility moving up the hierarchy from the lower to higher official' (Thompson's views interpreted by Lane, 1996: 228–229).

Although Lane (1996) scoffs at this interpretation of public administration, it is largely realistic except that it is neither "integrated" nor "monolithic" but is a tool and it should exhibit the other characteristics mentioned—in an appropriate way, of course. For instance, the following view of Finer (1966) is a bit narrow, because even though it is based on the understanding of subservience it neglects the inherent autonomy in diversity of The Public Administration.

'Are the servants of the public to decide their own course, or is their course of action to be decided by a body outside themselves? My answer is that the servants of the public are not to decide their own course; they are to be responsible to the elected representatives of the public, and these are to determine the course of action of the public servants to the most minute degree that is technically feasible. Both of these propositions are important: the main proposition of responsibility, as well as the limitation and auxiliary institutions implied in the phrase "that is technically feasible."… I again insist upon subservience, for I still am of the belief with Rousseau that the people can be unwise but cannot be wrong' (Finer, 1966: 249; 255).

Finer's (1966) principal question here is answered in the course of this section of the book in terms of the JEWAL theory of governance.

[41] 'When merged with the CEO concept of executive direction, this traditional doctrine is a powerful normative theory that satisfies the need for establishing political control over the bureaucratic administrative establishment. Overhead democracy is linked tightly to a dichotomy of politics and administration, together providing a powerful argument for responsiveness. As Pfiffner notes (quoted in Lane, 1996: 229): "Without this chain of legitimacy, the democratic linkage between the electorate and the government would become unacceptably attenuated." Overhead democracy is also a simplistic myth—a fact that was clear to Redford and many subsequent analysts, but a fact that does not diminish its significance as a component of political and administrative values.

[42] 'Finally, there have been some formal treatments of the separation of powers. Prominently in view here is Henry J. Merry's *Five-Branch Government: The Full Measure of Constitutional Checks and Balances*. In Merry's opinion, the present reality of powers and procedures in the national government is best grasped by viewing the executive-administrative complex not as one branch (as the argument of the President's Committee had it) or as divided between executive and administrative parts (as Willoughby argued), but as consisting of three parts: a presidential part, centred in the Executive Office; the rank and file of "continuing" civil servants; and in between these a force or layer of changing political appointees' (Waldo, 1984a: xliii).

[43] 'Although presidential advisers are traditionally immune from congressional questioning, greater congressional oversight is invited when presidential staff, including the national security adviser, assume operational responsibilities and compete with the duties of departmental and agency officials. Recent national security advisers, including Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, have been especially prominent in competing with the secretary of state, producing what Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, called a "mini-state Department"' (Fisher, 1987: 152).

44   The *menetype #B* approach is about the analysis of cause and effect in an objective, logical way so that logical process can be devised to get from a group of inputs to the desired output and outcome. This is essentially what Wilson (1966/1887: 29; 31) was advocating. 'The object of administrative study is to rescue executive methods from the confusion and costliness of empirical experiment and set them upon foundations laid deep in stable principle… Most important to be observed is the truth already so much and so fortunately insisted upon by our civil-service reformers; namely, that administration lies outside the proper sphere of *politics*… Public administration is detailed and systematic execution of public law… The broad plans of governmental action are not administrative; the detailed execution of such plans is administrative.'

'In the early development of modern public administration and the modern presidency, management as a public sector value system merged with the values of neutral competence and executive direction. This merger found its expression in the doctrine of scientific management' (Lane, 1996: 227). This was the pure *menetype #B* period.

'The agencies engaged in public administration have an ambiguous status. They are certainly not "a fourth branch of government," as some have proposed. They are part of the executive branch, but they depend on Congress for their existence and for their functions, appropriations, staff, and procedures. And they are subject to judicial nay-saying when they stray beyond constitutional and statutory limits, as those limits are perceived by the courts. They are parts of a whole, but the whole is not just the executive branch but the government itself and, if you will permit, the State. That is to say, the best of them derive much of their tradition from the premises of democracy, the higher authority of major institutions of the State, and the obligation to pursue the public interest. They socialize their staff members according to such State-based premises, which by definition are other-regarding rather than self-regarding' (Fesler, 1990: 88–89).

45   'For instance, the high point mentioned here coincided with the growing tide of the managerial revolution as identified by Burnham (1941): By the late 1930s, public administration reached its high point in political influence and academic orthodoxy with the report of the President's Committee on Administrative Management (1937) and Luther Gulick and Lyndal Urwick's (1937) *Papers on the Science of Administration.* These approaches, based on rationalism and efficiency, developed principles of administration and complemented the other branches of classical theory as they were midway between Max Weber's macro, societal level analysis of bureaucracy and Frederick W. Taylor's micro, particularistic focus on work tasks' (Rabin and Bowman, 1984: 4).

The scientific approach in public administrative practice was still going strong up to Robert McNamara's days and his calculating, methodical approach to the conduct of the Vietnam War. This *menetype #B* spirit was particularly encapsulated in Herbert Simon's (1947) concept of limited rationality, which characterised the pattern of bureaucratic socialised performance in terms of individuals' physical dexterity and skills (*sub-menetype #A*), their hard intellectual knowledge relevant to the decision at hand (*sub-menetype #B*) and their values and conception of purpose which influence them (*sub-menetype #C*) (Simon, 1947: 40–41). The Public Administration as a second-order power has very limited rationality with the most crucial determinant of its behaviour—namely, its values and purpose (*menetype #C*)—essentially being defined by others higher up in the governance hierarchy.

46   'On the other hand, there is a widespread conviction that what governments do is inefficient and often corrupt. A common stereo-type of the bureaucrat is an over-bearing, lazy, tax-eater. Stemming from the *laisser-faire* doctrine and the frontier tradition, this attitude is one that must constantly be taken into account by public administrators working with public problems. It poses problems not generally shared by private administrators' (Simon, Thompson and Smithburg, 1991: 11).

'Yet as the election of Ronald Reagan illustrates, the anti-public-administration bias is alive and well. When campaigning for the presidency, Reagan successfully revived and mobilized the nation's resentment against cloying public bureaucracy by promising to remove government from the backs of people. Once in office, President Reagan has systematically attempted to make it difficult for the professional public administrators to influence national policy' (Stever, 1988: 5).

'Most treatments of bureaucracy are highly critical, to put it mildly. Attacks are made from several disciplinary camps, using weaponry fashioned from numerous concepts, theories, and paradigms… Bureaucracy's reputation in the halls of academe, then, is quite bad—at least in the minds of many. It is castigated by economists, sociologists, psychologists, political scientists, and many of our own scholars in public administration and public policy. Bureaucrats are portrayed as poor performers as well as budget maximizers; ants and megalops as well as empire builders; and merciless oppressors of their own kind as well as their clients… Another relatively new theme is the damage being sustained by American bureaucracy from attacks on the public service. Many authors are pointing out how attacking bureaucracy and demeaning public servants tends to drive good people out of government and make it more difficult to attract the best of young talent' (Goodsell, 1994: 13; 19; 22).

This poor view and disparagement of public administration is despite the fact of 'the relatively good performance of American bureaucracy… That success is normal in American public administration is substantiated, moreover, by quantifiable evidence obtained from measures of bureaucratic performance having nothing to do with citizen

perceptions, such as on-time measures, error rates, external observation of transactions, and productivity data' (Goodsell, 1994: 166).

If the poor perception of public administrators is not based on factual evidence or substance, then it must be cognitively generated or a product of the way people think, as explained in this book. It is because of this fact that it can be termed 'the great falsehood about American government' (Goodsell, 1994: 165ff) and can be used as a weapon in the fight between political parties at the higher level of power (who should have been mature enough to have a more conscious appreciation of the good performance of The Public Administration), as identified by Wamsley (1996: 397): 'This means it became contested ground in partisan warfare—the object of control by all, trusted by none.'

Moreover, the nature of the denigration has changed over time with the shift from entrepreneurialism to managerialism to politicism: 'The old deflation was characterised by ad hominem attacks, near comical misjudgments about the motives of public bureaucrats, and a zealous condemnation of socialism. The intellectual center for opposition to America's growing public bureaucracy was ironically the London School of Economics, where men like Ludwig von Mises and Frederick Hayek equated public administration with totalitarianism… More complex than the old deflation, the new deflation can best be understood as a series of arguments resting on four pillar-like perspectives: 1) the superiority of a free market, 2) neoconservative organization theory, 3) concern over centralization of the federal system, 4) scepticism about policy implementation and administration… Considered collectively, the above four tenets of the new deflation have had a decisive impact on expectations for public administration in the post-Progressive era. They have supplanted the Progressive optimism about the possibilities for the civil service. Whereas the Progressives sought to legitimate the judgment of the civil servant, the new deflation undermines the basis for this judgment. By bringing the civil servant down to the level of various particularized interests, the new deflation condemns the civil servant to bargaining. More specifically, it makes bargaining the sine qua non of public administration' (Stever, 1988: 137–141).

The concept of bargaining is very political and interest based (*menetype #C*), which depreciates the worth of objectivity and logic rationality (*menetype #B*).

[47] This aspect of US society has been evident for a long time. Tocqueville (1966: lvi) was pointed but insightful when he observed, 'men only undertake to direct the fortunes of the state when they doubt their capacity to manage their private affairs'. Weber (1948: 110) also observed this disposition of the American people to devalue the political sphere: 'That as a "professional" politician the boss is socially despised does not worry him… Scarcely fifteen years ago, when American workers were asked why they allowed themselves to be governed by politicians whom they admitted they despised, the answer was: "We prefer having people in office whom we can spit upon, rather than a case of officials who spit upon us, as is the case with you." This was the old point of American "democracy."'

[48] Goodnow proceeds to consider each in more detail. '"The function of politics" has to do primarily with the expression of the state will, secondarily with the execution of that will… "In other words, practical political necessity makes impossible the consideration of the function of politics apart from that of administration. Politics must have a certain control over administration…" As regards the executive function, there can be no question: it must "of necessity be subordinated to the functions of politics"' (Waldo, 1984a: 107).

What Goodnow and Waldo omit to focus on here is the aspect of the creation or formation of the state will, or new policy program, which is then expressed formally by the legislature.

[49] '"Bureaucracy" is of course a principal *bête noire* in popular and academic culture' (Goodsell, 1990b: 107).

"The message society gives to public servants is ambivalent. On the one hand, public service is the highest aspiration a citizen can have; on the other hand, bureaucracy (read The Public Administration) is the problem, not the solution' (Lynn and Wildavsky, 1990: xix).

'The facts are not at issue. What is at issue is the legitimating myths of our system… One of the axioms of modern Western-style democracies is that the authority of officials springs from the will of the people expressed through the elections. Every appointed officer holds office and acquires legitimate authority ultimately by action of elected officials; that is true even of members of the Supreme Court' (Kaufman, 1990: 488–489).

'The second reason for our difficulty with theory lies in the distinctive American political context—its lack of a positive conception of the state, its constitutional design of separate institutions that must share power if governance is to occur, and the apparent need of contemporary politicians to use public administration as a scapegoat for systemic problems that they either cannot understand or refuse to confront responsibly… Politicians, citizens, and public administrators themselves have found it necessary or expedient to declare that administration is distinct from and subordinate to politics and involves "mere management" or execution of policies developed in other institutions of government with greater perceived legitimacy' (Wamsley, 1996: 354).

It is not that they have greater legitimacy, as all are legitimate parts of the whole, but rather the politicians have a societally acknowledged position of greater or primary power as captured by: 'On the one hand, American culture

has manifested an entrenched bias against government bureaucracy or public administration. On the other hand, it has embraced goals that entail the use of large-scale, nation-wide (even worldwide) public bureaucracies: e.g., a technical military, a man on the moon, a nationwide transportation system, regulation of interstate commerce, and control of organized crime. Put differently, the nation has stubbornly clung to the primitive vision of a country characterized by unlimited opportunity and independent action while at the same time demanding government programs that entail large-scale coordination, control, and regulation' (Stever, 1988: 4).

⁵⁰ 'The last two decades have not been kind to the public service… all have combined to cast a deepening shadow on the administrative state. Once widely regarded, if not with favor, at least with tolerance, it now occupies the status of necessary evil—generally excepting provisions for the common defense—has been placed on a strict reducing diet. And although many public servants may be truly heroes to their clients, as a group, bureaucrats have fallen on hard times' (Stivers, 1990: 246).

⁵¹ This was essentially the subject of the renowned Friedrich–Finer debate (1966): 'In short, these various drawbacks of political control can be remedied. They can be highly improved, and it is therefore unnecessary to proceed along the line definitely approved by Professor Friedrich of more administrative policy making. As a democrat, I should incline to the belief that the remedying of these drawbacks is precisely our task for the future. The legitimate conclusion from the analysis of the relationship between Parliament and administration is not that the administration should be given its head, but on the contrary that legislative bodies should be improved. Conceding the growing power of officials we may discover the remedy in the improvement of the quality of political parties and elections, if our minds are ready to explore' (Finer, 1966: 256).

⁵² The first-order unconscious mind would be the Supreme Court, which is said not to make policy but only to adjudicate over it, which is similar to the theoretical role of The Public Administration in only administering policy and not setting it. However, in reality, as has been acknowledged over the years by those inside and outside the courts, they are continuously developing policy within their specific decisions and ensuring its adherence by the well-recognised principle of precedence.

This symmetry between the "collective shadow-like" roles of both the Court (first-order) and The Public Administration (second-order) has also been observed by others, such as Waldo (1990: 76–77): 'A not so obvious but very relevant point is that it is proper to think of the judicial organs and apparatus as constitutionally and functionally specialized instruments of public administration. The task or role of the public administrator is to interpret and apply the law. The task or role of the judicial organ is to interpret and apply the law. There are of course modal differences, and at the extremes—say an undercover police officer and a justice of the Supreme Court—differences that are great indeed. But not just logic supports the view that courts are administrative organs. Plainly, courts historically have been organs of governmental administration, often important to and sometimes central to the governmental process. Plainly, they are now organs of administration and increasingly, centres of administrative activity.'

The fact is that both the Court and The Public Administration encapsulate the *phase #B* mindset (in different ways) and therefore hold similar places in the society's collective psyche, except that the Court is principally at the first-order level of governance and The Public Administration at the second-order level.

⁵³ And this is the basic reason in psychological terms on a collective level why The Public Administration is essentially made the scapegoat for everything that is bad about US government. Such a process of scapegoating is regarded by depth psychologists as a natural step for the personal development of individuals and so it would be for the collective of a society—particularly when there is not an apparent external enemy to use as a scapegoat. So it is that the lot of The Public Administration has worsened since the final days of the Cold War. What is required now is for the society or the governance system to become conscious of its propensity to project onto The Public Administration and, hopefully, show some responsibility in owning the shadow of the governance system. However, such a hope has proved in vain in the past and there is not much reason to doubt it will be any different in the future—principally because it is dealing with the dynamics of the human psyche.

It is also the core of the answer to Goodsell's (1994: 167–168; 170) essential question: 'If American bureaucracy turns out not to be a societal curse after all, but actually a valuable asset of our nation, why then do we tend to regard it so falsely? Why does such a chasm separate the reality of bureaucratic performance and our abstract images of it? How can such a great falsehood live on, year after year and decade after decade, especially when the gap between belief and reality is not just a few degrees of disagreement but a nearly inverse contradiction? …One might argue that, generically, public bureaucracy does not "fit" American culture; the obverse of this point is that the great falsehood about American government fits it perfectly.'

⁵⁴ 'By suggesting a theory of Public Administration that combines constitutional subordination and autonomy, I hope to preserve the enduring insight of the venerable dichotomy without succumbing to its naïve view of administration as apolitical. Administration is political; but, like the judiciary, it has its own style of politics and its distinctive functions within the constitutional order' (Rohr, 1990a: 82).

This secondary focus of The Public Administration on politics is not so much about promoting its own political agenda nor about its own personal politics, but rather it is objectively aware of, and engages with, the political nature of others' actions. To do this, it needs to differentiate and accept the politically oriented motivation as different from the logical objective rationality in decision making.

[55]   This notion is embodied in an understanding of the one provision of the Constitution that refers directly to The Public Administration: 'The only provision to call departments executive says that the President "may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices." This is sometimes said to give the President administrative power, but it may suggest a general lack of such authority… The constitutional stipulation of an obligation to give an opinion to the President upon request, suggests that the department heads are not simply the President's men and may have general responsibility to Congress' (Merry, 1980: 32).

'Jackson asserted the president's authority to control the executive branch. The president could press his views on a cabinet officer and, if need be, proceed to the extreme of dismissal in order to obtain compliance. Jackson argued: "Upon [the president] has been devolved by the Constitution and the suffrages of the American people the duty of superintending the operation of the executive Departments of the government and seeing that the laws are faithfully executed"' (Ceasar, 1994: 106).

'By contrast, developments after 1932 institutionalized the presidency as the focal point of national government leadership, no matter who held the office and whether or not there was a national crisis. By mid-century, the president's "legislative program" was expected to set the main agenda for Congress and the nation each year. Executive agency proposals for legislation, testimonies to Congress, and comments on pending legislation had to be "cleared" through the president's Office of Management and Budget staff. After 1981 their proposed regulations had to be cleared as well. Overarching these particular developments was a growing aura, a seeming awesomeness that surrounded the presidency' (Heclo, 1994: 138).

Sometimes the control is more subtle: 'Presidents have met with the heads of independent commissions to describe administration goals and seek the commission's support. In one such meeting Lyndon Johnson summed up the curious relationship between the president and the commissions with this tantalizing sentence, suggesting that the commissions are agents carrying out presidential duties: "I want to convey my deep sense of reliance upon you and your agencies in discharging the responsibilities which have been thrust upon me."' (Fisher, 1987: 179).

The degree of intervention and control by the President has changed considerably and today is much more subtle and complex, and some would say much more political or postmodern.

'In public administration, command and obedience were understood as necessary derivatives of overhead democracy and presidential leadership. In today's managerial revolution, the "basic social relation" in the workplace is being radically altered as employees are empowered with the discretion to make production and service delivery decisions. The postmodern economic and organizational paradigm is now "characterized by information processing, flexible specialization, and informed cooperation"… Because the evolved American presidency lacks the resources and capability to manage effectively the nationwide governmental establishment, a new model of leadership is required… President Nixon and his successors have insisted on command and control in terms of obedience to political directives and adherence to political ideology. But neither version of the control doctrine is in harmony with the newest developments in management theory and practice' (Lane, 1996: 244-245; 248).

[56]   'In many ways, the bureaucracies have benefited from this rivalry by playing the two elected branches one against the other. If one stands in the way of what they want, they invoke the assistance of the other. In my opinion, they tend to be more responsive to Congress than to the President because Congress can do more to and for them most of the time, and because members of Congress and their staffs maintain steadier contact with the agencies under their jurisdiction' (Kaufman, 1990: 490).

However, many observers have unjustifiably exaggerated the degree of executive/operational control exerted by Congress. 'In a 1992 report called *Beyond Distrust: Building Bridges Between Congress and the Executive*, a panel of the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) concluded, among other things, that charges of excessive congressional "micromanagement" of the executive branch were largely unfounded. What makes the study interesting is that most members of the panel had experience in both branches of government. Moreover, most went into the process feeling more negative about detailed congressional intervention into executive branch operations than they felt at the end' (Malbin, 1994: 228–229).

[57]   Wamsley *et al.* (1990: 48–49) capture the same dynamic: 'Much has also been written about making the bureaucrat responsive and responsible. The Public Administrator must indeed act responsibly, and this means being responsive to constitutionally and legally valid orders that are specific… The responsiveness of the Public Administrator to either elected official or clients should not, however, be "seismographic" nor that of a "hired lackey," nor even that of a "faithful servant," for it must be more in order to be responsible in the highest sense of

the word… if his or her responsiveness is that of a trustee of that special perspective shaped by the agency's point of view, a public interest perspective and fidelity to the constitutional heritage.'

58 Weber (1948: 82) also noted that the dynamics of governance in the political sphere are distinctly different from those in the economic sphere: 'The direction of capitalist enterprises, despite far-reaching analogies, follows quite different laws than those of political administration.'

The differences also underpin the argument whether the theories of organization which have been developed in relation to private enterprises are equally applicable to the public sector. 'The "Brookings group" has expressed the most vigorous objection to considering organization *per se* a field of inquiry. "Questions of sound organization," write Lewis Meriam and L. F. Schmeckebier, "cannot be successfully divorced from questions pertaining to the fundamental policy of government. The establishment of fundamental policy, moreover, frequently involves an arbitration or reconciliation of the interests or points of view conflicting elements of the body politic. Since organization is undertaken to give effect to policy, questions of policy must be considered together with questions of organization".

A. C. Millspaugh similarly finds that: "An administrative organization established without reference to the form and philosophy of the government in which it operates would be shortsighted and unrealistic. Administrative organization should bear its fair share of the burdens of democratic government… Administration alone is inadequate as a social force; it attains its maximum power only when it lends its strength to the larger structure of government"' (Waldo, 1984a: 167).

59 'Woodrow Wilson of all people, would agree that administration may be modelled after scientific principles of management, but that in reality their operation will always be molded by politics. If there is to be a discipline of public administration, its starting point must be, as Wilson suggested, the values of American government. The crisis in American public administration is ultimately a problem of political theory; a theory of administration is a theory of politics' (Rabin and Bowman, 1984: 8)—or a theory of governance!

60 With the move to the age of politicism, the mid-level management structure of the private sector could now be said to be much more akin to the public sector management. That is, they are both *sub-menetype #B* in service of *sub-menetype #C* politically oriented leadership of the executive action in both the private and the public sectors. As such, the middle management institutions in both sectors are being devalued and downplayed—and, moreover, downsized with great enthusiasm. But their principal beliefs at the higher levels are still quite different.

61 Rather, as already noted above, everybody now looks to the President to set the overall policy vision or agenda. There is a greater call for leadership [*menetype #A* at the higher level]. Moreover, 'The Presidency is in a strong position to provide the "teleological sense of purpose" that is essential to administration. The presidency serves as the primary "highlighter" of major national concerns. Administration will be effective if that role is coupled with presidential attention "to the establishment and maintenance of reliable processes through which [other] issues can be handled"' (Lane, 1996: 251).

62 This is perhaps well exhibited by the experience of the Reagan Presidency: 'Some observers think President Reagan was so successful in imprinting his policy preferences on the bureaucracies that they will bear his stamp for many years to come' (Kaufman, 1990: 486).

'The Reagan administration was noted for its attempt to micromanage the public service by establishing political control over administrative activities and by sharply curtailing the discretion of subordinate public officials. The method of choice was political infiltration of the administrative establishment. This pattern of political management has left its mark even in academic treatises on the presidency' (Lane, 1996: 246).

'A particularly egregarious effort to control the federal bureaucracy was undertaken by President Richard Nixon. He assumed from the start of his presidency that all government agencies were controlled by the Democrats, and thus were attempting at every turn not only to resist his policies but to subvert his rule. His efforts to control the bureaucracy were so vehement that they should perhaps be referred to by the word "repress," rather than restrict' (Goodsell, 1994: 172).

'Intervention by presidential aides in agency rule making and adjudication is a subject of serious concern. These OMB and White House efforts may seem like reasonable initiatives to "coordinate" the activities of the executive branch and carry out the president's program' (Fisher, 1987: 145).

63 'Even when the president has the *power* to control the decision of a departmental head, such intervention may be inexpedient and of doubtful propriety. While it is theoretically correct that departmental heads shall discharge their administrative duties in such manner as the president may direct, it was conceded by Attorney General Edward Bates that it is "quite impossible for the president to assume the actual direction of the multifarious business of the departments"' (Fisher, 1987: 143).

Moreover, '[a]lthough the executive power is vested in the president, "it by no means follows, that every officer in every branch of that department is under exclusive direction of the president." It would be an "alarming

doctrine," said the Court, that Congress could not impose upon any executive officer any duty it thinks proper, "which is not repugnant to any rights secured and protected by the constitution; and in such cases, the duty and responsibility grow out of and are subject to the control of the law, and not to the direction of the president"' (Fisher, 1987: 137).

[64]   'The judiciary is another important participant in the administrative process, reviewing agency decisions to see that they conform to legislative intent, satisfy standards of procedural fairness, and meet the test of constitutionality. Courts are routinely criticized for intervening so deeply in the administrative process that they usurp the policy-making functions of Congress and the agencies' (Fisher, 1987: 75).

'A normative theory of Public Administration that is grounded in constitutional principle must not collapse into managerial utilitarianism. The courts must be considered serious competitors for the favourable exercise of administrative discretion. This is because the overwhelming majority of claims of individual rights begin and end in administrative agencies. It is not enough for public administrators to obey court orders; they should also take seriously the judicial values that are revealed in court opinions. They should learn to think like judges as well as legislators and executives, because they are all three of these. In a regime of separation of powers, administrators must do the work of statesmen' (Rohr, 1990a: 83).

It is not really a matter of being statesmen, because that implies some sort of superiority, but rather the fact of being affected by the principles of all three first-order political institutions is a consequence of the lower position of Public Administrators in the cognitive hierarchy. Those bodies even lower in the governance hierarchy are subject to an even greater array of competing principles, as will be explained later. However, for now, it is sufficient to appreciate that the spirit of The Public Administration is, and needs to be, very similar to the spirit of the courts, but subordinate.

[65]   'In a study basically sympathetic to congressional supervision of agencies, Frank Neuman and Harry Keaton concluded: "One point seems obvious. Congress goes too far if it spends so much time supervising that not enough time is left to legislating." This attitude presumes that supervision and legislation are distinct duties, whereas it is impossible to legislate intelligently and effectively without close supervision. Only through regular feed back from administrators can laws be perfected. How much time to allocate for supervision is a judgment solely for Congress' (Fisher, 1987: 75–76).

'In matters of national significance, requiring calm deliberation, adequate information, and detachment from influence of the people, the Senate was to fill the obvious deficiencies of the House (see *Federalist 63*). With respect to the legislative branch, then, democracy was to function directly only in the shaping of policy where the direct and immediate interests of constituents were involved. In matters of national concern requiring information in depth, and where some continuity of policy was necessary, the Senate was to exercise the leading role… Although the direct influence of the people was to be curbed by the Senate, it should not be forgotten that Madison noted in *Federalist 51* that "a dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions"'(Woll, 1963: 22).

[66]   'Many agencies are creatures of Congress and relatively independent of both presidential and judicial control; in these cases Congress and its particular committees involved feel no compelling need to oppose bureaucratic interests, but rather there is a definite tendency to establish a mutually satisfactory *modus vivendi.* The fact that Congress has delegated a substantial amount of its power to the bureaucracy by itself reflects both the necessities of modern democracy and the lack of fear of the bureaucracy. Admittedly, there exists a common and generally unchallenged assumption that the typical congressman is highly suspicious of the "bureaucrat"' (Woll, 1963: 20), but the congressman is also convinced that they are superior and can rein in The Public Administration if necessary!

[67]   'It is clear that the American system of politics does not generate enough power at any focal point of leadership to provide the conditions for an even partially successful divorce of politics from administration. Subordinates cannot depend on the formal chain of command to deliver enough political power to permit them to do their jobs. Accordingly they must supplement the resources available through the hierarchy with those they can muster on their own, or accept the consequences in frustration' (Long, 1966: 44).

[68]   This resistance is reflected most starkly in the opposition towards politically appointed agency heads. 'Some experts in governmental administration simply proclaim flatly, on the basis of their personal knowledge that bureau chiefs are independent power centers. One bureau chief said, "We don't need the Department. We are perfectly able and willing to take care of ourselves." An expert in administration wrote that "department heads may be said to be faced with a chronic state of mutiny in their bureaus." And Richard E. Neustadt, in his assessment of the presidential office, put it this way: "Like our government structure as a whole, the executive establishment consists of separated institutions sharing powers. The President heads one of these; Cabinet officers, agency administrators, and military commanders head others. Below the departmental level, virtually independent bureau chiefs head many more"' (Kaufman, 1981: 3).

⁶⁹ 'Cronin compellingly documents the increasing tension, conflict, and adversarial relationships that developed between the "presidentialists" in the executive office of the presidency and the "departmentalists" in the agencies and bureaus of the federal government' (Lane, 1996: 232).

'As Theodore Sorenson, President Kennedy's principal domestic aide put it: "Each department has its own clientele and point of view, its own experts and bureaucratic interests, its own relations with the Congress and certain sub-committees, its own statutory authority, objectives, and standards of success. No cabinet member is free to ignore all this without impairing the morale and efficiency of his department, his standing therein, and his relations with the powerful interest groups and Congressmen who consider it partly their own"' (Nachmias and Rosenbloom, 1980: 93).

⁷⁰ This is a process that is not well understood or explained in the literature but rather it is sensed: 'As indicated, I am portraying the public interest as not merely a means of internalising certain values in the minds of participants in policy making, but also as a means of externalising certain values via the public bureaucracy. In short, the public interest is not only a verbal symbol but also an institutional force; public interest discourse becomes, in Flathman's language, public interest politics' (Goodsell, 1990b: 107).

⁷¹ The "public interest" is the term used to capture a very abstract concept (very much at the *menetype #C* level). 'The simple fact is that the public interest is an ideal. It is for administrators what objectivity is for scholars—something to be strived for, even if imperfectly achieved, something not to be spurned because performance falls short of the goal. If there is not a public interest then we must denounce the idea of ideals. The public interest is not something you pick up in your hands. It is not something whose height and breadth and weight can be measured. If it is illusory, so are justice, liberty, and integrity. If these and other ideal values cannot be absolutes but must be reconciled when in conflict in concrete cases, it is the public official's responsibility to seek the balance among them that most nearly approaches the public interest so far as he can perceive it' (Fesler, 1990: 91).

⁷² Glendon Schubert's article of 1957 apparently put a bit of a damper on the regard for the "public interest," but the comments as reported by Goodsell (1990b: 97–98) can be seen as an observation of a trinity of *menetypes* in the same vein as those just described in terms of the private interest, the common interest, and the public interest, as follows.

'Schubert divided writers on the public interest into three categories.

"Proponents of Administrative Rationalism" are characterized as positivists who believe the public interest is what the legislature says it is. The task of administration then becomes efficient implementation of this will [*this is, in effect, the menetype #C view of the public interest as defined by the political process, which is in keeping with the USA's constitutional governance*]...

Schubert's second group is the "Advocates of Administrative Platonism." They are depicted as "social engineers" who mystically speak of professionalism, empathy, and conscience, but are in effect exhorting: Be clever!," "Be wise!," "Be good!," and even "Be God!" [*which is the public entrepreneur pursuing his/her own private interest to make a better world in his/her own image*]…

The third category is the "Administrative Realists," who define the public interest in terms of process [*which is the true spirit of the public administration in accepting the definition of public interest that comes out of due process and that also has respect for the common interest as a synthesis of the community, political and agency process*]' (Goodsell, 1990b: 98, with embellishments).

This is, in effect, a natural grouping of different approaches to the "public interest" that might manifest individually in different circumstances but actually comprise a whole, but differentiated, way of interpreting the "public interest." The understanding conveyed by this observation actually legitimises the concept of the "public interest" rather than as a conception to be ridiculed as suggested by Schubert (in Goodsell, 1990b)—obviously in his apparent ignorance that there are a number of legitimate ways of viewing the "public interest".

⁷³ It is, therefore, dysfunctional in the US governance framework for The Public Administration to focus on defining and fulfilling the "public interest" as its primary concern—as was being suggested by the New Public Administrationists who were being exhorted to pursue public interest values independent of the political formulation of the common interest. 'The New Public Administrationists, notably departing from the neutrality presumption of the public administration formula, advocated personal commitment on the part of administrators to the goals of social equity; and frequently spoke of the strategy of client-centred administration, that is, of facing "outward" toward the poor and disadvantaged rather than "upward" in the formal authority hierarchy' (Waldo, 1984a: xxxvii).

⁷⁴ However, this is not a clear-cut science of relationships as echoed in Friedrich's (1966: 222) observations: 'it should be clear without further argument that there must be some agreement between such a responsible agent and his principal concerning the action in hand or at least the end to be achieved. When one considers the complexity of modern governmental activities, it is at once evident that such agreement can only be partial and

incomplete, no matter who is involved. Once the electorate and legislative assemblies are seen, not through the smoke screen of traditional prejudice, but as they are, it is evident that such principals cannot effectively bring about the responsible conduct of public affairs, unless elaborate techniques make explicit what purposes and activities are involved in all the many different phases of public policy. It is at this point that the decisive importance of policy determination becomes important.'

[75] 'The Public Administration is also self-consciously derived from, and focused upon, what we shall call an Agency Perspective. By agencies we mean those institutions that have grown up in the executive branches at all levels and that are instruments of action in pursuit of the public interest. A better understanding of the distinctiveness of The Public Administration must be built upon a greater appreciation of the institutional histories of agencies—their histories in a broad contextual sense—the history of an agency's political economy.

'We feel this is appropriate and necessary because many of these *agencies are repositories of, and their staffs are trustees of, specialized knowledge, historical experience, time tested wisdom, and most importantly, some degree of consensus as to the public interest relevant to a particular societal function...*

'The distinctive Agency Perspective is one that deserves greater legitimacy than it has received from our political culture. The very nature of the role the Agency plays in governance leads it inevitably to develop a distinctive perspective on the public interest. The Public Administration which rests upon the Agency Perspective as a foundation thus has an historic, covenantal, organic, and constitutional legitimacy that needs illumination. Many agencies at all levels of our political system have been with us from our genesis as a nation; some are even suggested in the text of the Constitution' (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990: 36–39).

'The same point is made but expressed somewhat differently by Long (1966: 51): 'To whom is one loyal—unit, section, branch, division, bureau, department, administration, government, country, people, world history, or what? Administrative analysis frequently assumes that organizational identification should occur in such a way as to merge primary organizational loyalty in a larger synthesis. The good of the part is to give way to the reasoned good of the whole.'

[76] 'Furthermore, unbridled pluralism has an inescapably centrifugal effect on the structure and fabric of government. Each agency which has effective interest group support from the outside seeks autonomy to operate in its own realm; if left alone the administration responding to this drive would become a congeries of self-sufficient fiefdoms, each going its own way alone. The result would be a form of anarchy. Many administrative reformers who have recognized reality in pluralism have also recognized its limitations and dangers. The principal counteractive force against anarchy was to be the chief executive, himself elective and responsible to the whole people' (Mosher, 1982: 96).

[77] 'In his essay, Goodsell first reviews the history of the idea, concluding that it has been in a state of virtual eclipse since the publication of Glendon Schubert's critique of it in his book, *The Public Interest*. Schubert found in his analysis three major schools of public interest thought: rationalism, idealism, and realism. Rationalism holds that the public interest is defined through a form of reasoned political discourse in the legislative process; idealism sees it as a transcendent moral good discovered by the mind-work of a modern day approximation of Platonic philosopher kings; realists see the public interest as the result of the interplay of power-wielding interest groups in the policy-making process. Schubert's unqualified conclusion is that none of these schools of thought produces a viable public interest theory and that those interested in effective government should abandon the whole project of philosophising about this hopelessly vacuous idea' (McSwite, 1996: 202).

The trick is, of course, that the philosophising about the "public interest" should include the effect of all three different perspectives interacting with the structure and dynamics of a trinity of *menetypes* explaining the variation in the expression of public interest. McSwite's (1996) conclusion that 'We agree that within the modernist mind-set the public interest is a hollow concept. But we strongly disagree with the apparently pessimistic assessment of post-modernism and argue that there is just as much potential for renewing the idea of the public interest within current postmodern conditions as there is threat to it' (McSwite, 1996: 216).

It was considered a hollow concept in the dying days of the modernist era because thinking had already moved on to essentially the realist perspective (*menetype #C*) and this is the viewpoint that is being picked up as relevant now in the postmodern or politicist age: 'Most obviously, there would be no capital T Truth as a central reference point. Instead, all the parties to a situation would be seen as holding multiple, partial, and momentary truths. These truths would have to be put together in a tentative pattern through a group process grounded in authentic communication' (McSwite, 1996: 219).

That is, Queen *menetype #B* positive rationalism is dead, long live King *menetype #C* realism!

[78] That the "public interest" is a notion at a particularly high level of abstraction can be appreciated by the following description, which just happens to sound a little like religion and its ability to influence the thinking of all, particularly Marx's criticism of religion as the "opium of the masses".

'In the same volume Stephen Bailey comments on a paradoxical aspect to public interest. While on the one hand public officials utter the phrase with great ease to justify what they wish to do, on the other hand its symbolism requires them to provide a reasoned basis for their aims in the first place. Thus, although the public interest may be "balm for the official conscience" and "one of society's most effective analgesics," to be used for this rationalizing function "public servants must be able to give it a rational content anchored in widely shared value assumptions". As a consequence, Bailey concludes that the public interest is no less than "the central concept of a civilized polity. Its genius lies not in its clarity but in its perverse and persistent moral intrusion upon the internal and external discourse of rules and ruled alike"' (Goodsell, 1990b: 100).

[79] This notion of the public interest being composed of the many perspectives of the different participants in the governance hierarchy was also expressed by Wamsley *et al.* (1990: 39–40): 'The "public interest" has, of course, long been derided, particularly by social scientists, as a meaningless concept at best, a mask for arrogant despotism at worst… It is therefore a concrete, living, behavioural reality in spite of our problems in defining its specific content… the "public interest" refers to a combination of several habits of mind in making decisions and making policy: attempting to deal with the *multiple* ramifications of an issue rather than a select few; seeking to incorporate the *long-range* view into deliberations, to balance a natural tendency toward excessive concern with short-term results; considering *competing* demands and requirements of affected individuals and groups, not one position; proceeding equipped with *more* knowledge and information rather than less; and recognizing that to say that the "public interest" is problematic is not to say it is meaningless.'

[80] This runs counter to the exhortation of the Blacksburg Manifesto as summarised by Stivers (1996: 268): 'It is elements like these that evoke reactions like Cooper's and Kaufman's, which charge the Refounding Project with being antidemocratic; at moments the Manifesto does sound as if it has moved beyond lauding the public administration for making the trains run on time (bad enough, in that politics appears irrelevant) to praising it for having special competence to define the content of the public interest in particular situations (worse, in that administrative expertise expands from technical skill to political judgment).'

Stivers (1996) then goes on to argue that it is not quite so clear-cut and selects quotes from the Manifesto (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990) that suggest a call to Public Administrators to move from a rationalist conception (*menetype #B*) of the public interest to a more pluralistic realist view (*menetype #C*). The key question is whether it is appropriate and helpful for The Public Administration to abandon its roots or home ground completely.

[81] This trinity of *menetypes* is essentially the same as that captured by Cobb and Elder as reported by Goodsell (1990b: 103, with embellishments).

'The public interest is obviously a *political* symbol. Cobb and Elder classify political symbols in three categories:

(1) Community, or symbols that invoke feelings about the entire polity (eg, democracy, constitution)

[*—namely, menetype #C interpretation of the constitution by the highest authority*];

(2) Regime, a less general type that specifies accepted rules of governance (such as due process, majority rule)

[*—namely, menetype #B Agency Perspective embracing enabling legislation and relevant law*];

(3) Situational, a still more specific category that refers to political actors or policy issues (Ronald Reagan, gun control)

[*—namely, menetype #A responsiveness to the Government's intent*].

Within this typology, the "public interest" would probably be classified in the second category.'

However, public interest is classified in all three categories (as testified by other authors quoted in this book), and it is this lack of appreciation of the nature of the differentiation that has clouded the true nature of the public interest as a very abstract but real concept.

This trinity of *menetypes* is also reflected in the categorisation in a 1957 article by Frank Sorauf as also reported by Goodsell (1990b: 98–99): 'He defines several approaches to defining *public* interest and then concludes that because of the term's imprecision it is useless for purposes of scientific analysis. Yet, at the conclusion of his piece, Sorauf admits that the notion serves positive functions of intellectual rationality. These functions are four—unifying, legitimating, delegating, and representing.'

From the descriptions that Goodsell goes on to give of these four terms it is suggested that they line up with the trinity as follows:

- "Unifying" concerns the whole by welding majorities because so many can subscribe—it captures the whole of the trinity in the outer circle and, in one way, is representative of the nation.

- "Legitimating" is something undeniably true that shines through and legitimises policy outcomes in the same way the law does—it captures the *menetype #B* aspect as encapsulated in definite legislation and articulated policy.

- "Delegating" concerns delegating executive will to act in accordance with the actors' interpretation of the public interest—it captures the *menetype #A* aspect as being the most concrete expression in action.

- "Representing" concerns the 'unorganized and unrepresented (or underrepresented) interests in politics… that may be overlooked in the pressure of political combat' (Goodsell, 1990b: 98–99)—it captures the *menetype #C* political processing of the public interest.

This is to say that the trinity of *menetypes* discussed in the main text is founded on a way of differentiating the different perspectives that is in keeping with other analyses of the public interest. Moreover, what is argued is that, in general, the principal focus of the public administrator is on the "legitimating" or "regime" aspects of the "public interest" listed above, and it should be that the least important in determining his/her concept of the "public interest" is the doing of his/her own thing or his/her superior's thing in the "delegating" and "situational" aspects, as described above.

[82] 'The fact is that in the American system of government there is no cohesive majority and hence no possibility that one group will represent the "will of the people," whatever that term may mean. Bureaucratic organization is but a reflection of the pattern of American government' (Woll, 1963: 58).

'The attachment of American constitution makers to the separation of powers and to checks and balances has several implications. First, control of programs is not given entirely to any one branch of government. Second, with a divided leadership, there can be no simple hierarchy with well-defined, superior-subordinate roles. For example, the control of bureaucrats is not the sole responsibility of the President; he must share it with the legislature and the judiciary… Third, bureaucrats in charge of particular programs may receive conflicting demands from competing superiors. A House committee, a Senate committee, or the President may issue contrasting directives. Each potential superior may have his spokesman within an agency. Multiple loyalties within a department can upset the department head's control over his own agency at the same time they inhibit clear control by either the President or one house of the Congress' (quoted from Ira Sharkansky and Donald Van Meter, *Policy and Politics in American Governments*, in Merry, 1980: 218–219).

[83] This reliance by The Public Administration on the interpretation of the "public interest" by the political system above it is the principal reason why the nature and esteem of public administration differs between different governance regimes (say as between monarchy, democracy and despotic), as has been long recognised (Montesquieu, 1952). The Public Administration in a capitalist democracy would be regarded with much lower esteem and awe than The Public Administration serving a powerful monarch. However, because the actual functions carried out by The Public Administration are determined more by the mindset of a bureaucracy operating in the political sphere, there is a temptation to say the business of public administration would be similar in different governance regimes. 'Without comparative studies in government we cannot rid ourselves of the misconception that administration stands upon an essentially different basis in a democratic state from that on which it stands in a non-democratic state… Monarchies and democracies, radically different as they are in other respects, have in reality much the same business to look to… it is necessary to see that for all governments alike the legitimate ends of administration are the same' (Wilson, 1966/1887: 37).

This is only true in the more prosaic aspects of public administration but not in terms of the substantive aspects; for instance, the attitude to policy development, and the intensity and consequences of The Public Administration's dealings with the Legislative arm, would both be very different between a democracy and a monarchy. Much of the difference comes down to the way the Public Administrator is required to interpret the public interest, which can vary considerably in different governance regimes. For instance, in a monarchy the main focus of The Public Administration would be on the Government's (read Monarch's) desire or intent, which encourages a completely different mindset of service than does the republican focus on the legislature of formal commitment of government. And Wilson (1966/1887: 40–41) goes on to acknowledge as much in his pointing out the different character of administration in imperial Germany, and his observation that 'Like principles of civil liberty are everywhere fostering like methods of government.' Otherwise why would he instinctively advocate that 'Our own politics must be the touchstone for all theories. The principles on which to base a science of administration for America must be principles which have democratic policy very much at heart' (Wilson, 1966/1887: 39)?

[84] This should be taken to mean responsiveness to the substantive aspect of Government intent (and not the daily whims of politicians) as has always been understood: 'Steady, hearty allegiance to the policy of the government they serve will constitute good behaviour. That *policy* will have no taint of officialism about it. It will not be the creation of permanent officials, but of statesmen whose responsibility to public opinion will be direct and inevitable. Bureaucracy can exist only where the whole service of the state is removed from the common life of the people, its chiefs as well as its rank and file. Its motives, its objects, its policy, its standards, must be bureaucratic' (Wilson, 1966/1887: 35–36).

That is, the type of responsiveness to Government intent is wrapped in the justification for the advocates of the politics–administration dichotomy and encapsulates the notion of formal stable policy rather than reacting in the moment to the vagaries of public opinion.

[85]   This need for The Public Administration to be able to maintain a respectable distance and difference defined by adherence to formally approved Government policy has been intuitively advocated from early times, as concluded by Wilson (1966/1887: 40) 'The question for us is, how shall our series of governments within governments be so administered that it shall always be to the interest of the public officer to serve, not his superior alone but the community also, with the best efforts of his talents and the soberest service of his conscience?' And furthermore, Wilson (1966/1887: 29) was a keen advocate of the politics–administration dichotomy that was meant to deliver administration such a respectable independence from the day-to-day whims of political influence.

[86]   Wamsley *et al.* (1990: 47) express the same sentiment: 'As a critical first point, we need to remind ourselves that the Public Administrator takes an oath to uphold the Constitution of the United States—not the whims of the powerful… what is important is that the Public Administrator acts in a professional manner in the sense of a concern for the development of competence and standards, an orientation toward service, and a set of values that regards the broadest possible definition of the public interest as a real although problematic trust, and above all, which holds the maintenance of the constitutional order as a fundamental duty.'

[87]   This is very much in the nature of clarification rather than derivation of the public interest as suggested by some writers: 'Finally, Downs assigns a leadership function to the public official in regard to defining the public interest…. The key to such leadership, according to Downs, is the notion of the public interest: "only because a government official has developed, however cynically, some concept of the public interest independent of current public opinion will he be able to make such judgments"' (Goodsell, 1990b: 101).

The public administrator can, therefore, interpret the public interest, sometimes extrapolate in consistency with his/her delegated authority and, other times, suggest a particular development of conception to political authority, but he/she does not lead in the sense that he/she has the real power to determine the public interest in the same way that the legislature or executive can. He/she can only lead in the sense of suggesting ideas that other more powerful decision-makers are willing to pick up on—and this will only happen if the public administrator takes into account the political views of the more powerful others when suggesting a particular formulation of the "public interest."

[88]   'It is ironic that in this difficult and often absurd situation, the civil service continues to be a conspicuously vital part of liberal government. If past trends continue, the civil service will become more vital. The tragedy is that without adequate role models the public administrator must struggle on two fronts. On the one hand, there is the exigency of performing day-to-day tasks that result in the production of vital services for liberal society. On the other hand, the civil servant must act without readily understanding the meaning of this action. As the pressure to act increases, anomie is the likely result unless meaning for this action can also be discovered or created' (Stever, 1988: 98).

[89]   This is similar to the sentiment expressed by Wamsley *et al.* (1990: 48): 'As a trustee the Public Administrator must strive to look beyond both the political pressures of the day and a degrading self-image of mere instrumentalism. He or she should strive for a role that is "critically conscious": purposive in pursuit of the public interest and in maintaining the democratic governance process but disciplined by the rule of law and constitutional tradition of limited government; and conscious of the need at times to prudently accommodate powerful forces that may represent a temporary retreat from, or pause in, pursuit of the broadest possible definition of the public interest. Progress toward both the agency perspective and the broader public interest may not always be steady or forward.'

Public Administration and Government Decision Making

Abstract: A key insight is that the dichotomy of policy and administration is really a trichotomy of entrepreneurship, administration and politics. Public administration operates as a bridge between government and the public in the process of policy development and delivery. Rather than being the core of modern government, public administration is the faithful servant. Public administration has been significantly affected by the transition from the societal, managerialist to politicist orientation and needs to effect an appropriate adjustment.

INTRODUCTION

In analysing the role and dynamics of The Public Administration in Government decision making within the constitutional governance of the United States, there will be a focus principally on the following questions.

- First, is there a dichotomy between politics and administration or between policy and administration?[1]

- Second, is there any validity in the notion of The Public Administration and the claim to be 'the core of modern government [which]…may have to play the role of balance wheel in the constitutional order'? (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990: 36; 49)

- Third, what is the appropriate stance of The Public Administration in response to the competing demands of its stakeholders; in particular, is the role of the presidential political appointees legitimate and what value should be accorded to the move for active citizenship?

IS THERE A POLITICS–ADMINISTRATION DICHOTOMY?

There has been much debate and equivocation over many years about the existence and nature of a politics−administration dichotomy, but clarifying the interrelationship has proved to be perdurable, yet intractable (Waldo, 1984b: 219ff).[2]

This issue can be resolved only by moving outside the paradigm[3] that has informed the study of public administration and governance in the United States since Wilson's (1966/1887) first big step in the modern phase of this discipline. The simple fact is that there is no dichotomy—rather, it is more like a trichotomy.[4] The politics–administration dichotomy should be really re-thought of as the politics–administration–entrepreneurship trichotomy. This will be explained in detail, but it can be thought simplistically in terms of:[5]

- Politics as the collective commitment to the public will and has to do with the 3-Rs (responsiveness, representativeness and responsibility)—principally via the mechanism of *legislation and formal policy*, or **politics**;

- Public administration as the orderly execution of the Government policy expressing the public will and has to do with the 3-Es (economy, efficiency and effectiveness)—principally via the mechanism of *bureaucratic processes*, or **management**; and

- Public entrepreneurship as the envisioning (or realising the potential of) the public will and has to do with VCI (vision, creativity and initiative)—principally via the mechanism of *new policy initiatives or proposals*, or **leadership**.

These three aspects actually respond to the 'quest for three values in the conduct to the public business: representativeness, politically neutral competence, and executive leadership' (Kaufman, 1990: 483).[6] It is very pertinent that it has been the aspect of public entrepreneurship or leadership (by new policy) that has not been incorporated adequately in the study of Public Administration. In the early days it was included in the concept of politics, which then issued policy for the Executive or Administration to implement.[7] The other extreme is found in the recent *Reinventing Government* initiatives, which try to advocate entrepreneurship as a core responsibility of The Public Administration (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). The key insight is that public entrepreneurship has not been adequately differentiated and so has continued to muddy the essence of the differentiation between politics and

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administration by embellishing one or the other at different times or perhaps both of them together (at which point the analysts are likely to throw their hands in the air and say it is all one big mess and too hard to sort out). That this aspect of entrepreneurship or leadership has not been adequately differentiated and given its proper worth is understandable when it is acknowledged that this trichotomy is in fact a **trinity of governance** *menetypes* (Fig. **7.1**).


Figure 7.1: The Governance Trichotomy   **Figure 7.2:** The Trinity of Political Studies

The major focus in the study of Public Administration is on **bureaucratic** organization and the **management** of Government programs, and so there is a natural secondary interest in the **political** dynamics impacting on any particular agency, but there is a natural (cognitive) repression of the particular aspect of **entrepreneurship**.[8] The development of new policy is often regarded as only a secondary aspect of politics (which it is!), but, sometimes, by calling it policy, it effectively makes new policy (or decisions on new objectives or new ways) stand for politics itself (Thayer, 1984: 264). In this way, The Public Administration is said to be usurping political power when it is really only exercising the entrepreneurial or executive power.[9]

Put in another way, public entrepreneurship has been neglected in the study of Public Administration in the same way that public administration has been neglected in the study of Political Science.[10] Both are the *repressed shadow* of the main game in their respective field.[11] In the same vein, it can be observed that politics is the repressed aspect in the preoccupation with, and development of, Utopias, which is evidenced by the common criticism of them all as being politically naïve—within the context of the current politics. This development of Utopias is not yet a study in its own right but there has been much thought and energy given to it over the years, particularly in the fields of philosophy and social science (Mannheim, 1936; Conway, 1992). Some have even gone so far as to say that the new political ideas of future generations are heavily influenced by the ideas propagated under the umbrella of Utopias— after all, it is reaching out for a better world in light of what is not working well in the present (except the vision may not always be practicable). Putting these observations together, it is readily apparent that the three areas of study actually are interrelated as a trinity of *menetypes*, with the ascending order of abstraction being the studies of Utopian will, public administration rationality and political science (or commitments), as depicted in Fig. **7.2**.[12]

Carrying out a "Waldo-type" (1984a) review of the literature on public administration would not help to establish the analytic veracity and appropriateness of the proposed trichotomy as opposed to the dichotomy. Seemingly, all that such a review would reveal is the inadequacy and growing lack of usefulness of the dichotomy construction and perhaps reach the same amazing conclusion that Rainey (1990: 173) did but after more than a 100 years of study: 'The relation of the political to the administrative is thus very complex and dynamic, but we have only begun to analyze it.' A more penetrating analysis might conclude with Waldo (1990: 73): 'Have we made progress in closing the gap, in repairing what is often referred to as the politics–administration dichotomy? Opinions on this vary; some

may deny that there has been a troublesome cleft in our public world. While much excellent work has been done in the intervening decades, the cleft remains a prominent feature of our institutional and intellectual world.'[13] Rather, it is more productive to analyse the dynamics of the governance processes from the new perspective encapsulated in the trinitarian hierarchy of *menetypes*.

It is curious why there should have been only a dichotomy in the first place, let alone that it should have been retained for so long, particularly given the high prominence accorded to the separation of three—not two—powers in US constitutional governance.[14] Wamsley *et al.* (1990: 42–43) actually do hint at some deeper meaning of the politics–administration dichotomy by grasping at a differentiation of understanding the dichotomy at three different levels of abstraction.[15] This book goes one step further than Wamsley *et al.* (1990) in that it explains how the differentiation into three levels of abstraction is actually more pertinent within the trichotomy—rather than in the levels of observation of the dichotomy—while assuming the elements of the dichotomy/trichotomy are all at the same level, as effectively done in the analysis by Wamsley *et al.* (1990).

It is better to start, therefore, with a deeper analysis of government administration in terms of the nature of policy formulation and program implementation[16] in the context of the political governance framework, and it is likewise better to start at the most general level (acknowledging that the dynamics are just as applicable to the lower-level trinities of *menetypes*). The political dynamic can be thought of in terms of the most relevant players at the three levels of government operations; namely, the elected Government (comprising policy developed by the constitutionally separated three powers but usually thought of as Congress and the President), The Public Administration (comprising organizations), and the general public (regarded as a collective of individuals).[17] That these three aspects can be analysed in terms of a trinity of *menetypes* of Government in Action (as depicted in Fig. **7.3**) is appreciated from the logic of their interactions and the nature of their internal dynamics.[18]

Figure 7.3: The Trinity of Government in Action

The nature of policy development and administration can then be understood in terms of the movement around the trinity of *menetypes* respectively from the lowest to higher levels of abstraction (in a clockwise direction) in the process of collective cognitive reversion, and then in the opposite direction (anticlockwise) from the highest to the lowest in the process of collective cognitive procession.[19] The missing third aspect can then be deduced from the logic of the dynamics.

- Policy development can seem to be a very complex process, but the key dynamic can be grasped by focusing on the processes involved in the legislation drafted by The Public Administration for submission to Congress.[20] The key dynamic is analogous to the process of scientific knowing for individuals and involves a three-stage process. The first stage involves the empirical analysis by the public administrator (*menetype #B*) examining critically the data of reality about the needs of the relevant section of the public (*menetype #A*). This examination will be conducted within the conceptual framework of the "public interest" as determined by the assimilation of the enabling legislation in the context of the Constitution and all prior policy determinations of Government—i.e. the mindset of the Agency Perspective (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990: 36ff). If this examination of the relevant empirical data is carried out with an inquiring mind and with the "right" (or most appropriate) questions defined by the Government agency, then insights or new ways of relating the data and new logical connections will break through into the collective consciousness of the agency. Some specific new options for the policy or program will then be formulated and proposed. The second stage involves the consideration of such options for change by the higher deliberating authority (say the (sub-)committee of Congress), which will critically examine the proposals in light of its perception of the relevant empirical data. That is, a prescinded view (*menetype #C*) is taken of the logically derived options (*menetype #B*) for making better sense of the experience of the individual (potential) clients (*menetype #A*). A rational selection will be made for the best option. The third stage is for the Government to say "yes" to the particular option that best encapsulates its concept of the "public interest", and to articulate a clear formulation of the decision and a collective commitment of energies to fulfil its intent.

- Administration or program implementation involves the reverse process and essentially takes place in three stages also. The first stage involves The Public Administration focusing on the substance of the policy articulated by higher authority and determining its meaning. In a sense this is realigning the Agency Perspective with the requirements of fitting in the new policy and so it still makes a logical coherent framework. The second stage involves The Public Administration then looking afresh at its client group from this new mindset or Agency Perspective (*menetype #B* looking at *menetype #A* in light of the illumination received from *menetype #C*), and formulating precisely what steps need to be taken to implement the policy. The third stage is actual implementation by action within the field of experience of the individual clients (*menetype #A*).

- What is missing, obviously, is the determination of what the new policy is meant to be about, or what the Government's particular agenda is![21] This involves the proposed outcome, or the alternate reality that the policy is trying to create.[22] This co-creative effort is driven by the political Executive appointees, and The Public Administration is there to assist with suggestions and analysis. Decisions on new policy are the prerogative of the Government in the form of the legislative agenda proposed by the Executive and decided upon by Congress (while acknowledging that much decision making has, of necessity, been delegated).[23] Members of the Government (*menetype #C*) look directly at the situation in the electorate (*menetype #A*) as informed directly by their experience and the direct lobbying of the interest groups and reach an assessment that it is not right and something needs to be done. There is an envisioning of an alternate reality that could be better—from whatever set of criteria of value that is employed (but which is normally that which could be said to have been approved by the electorate). The third stage then is to say "yes" to the desirability of the alternate reality and make a collective commitment to bring it about. But as yet there is not the knowledge or understanding of how to deliver the alternate reality and so it is that the Government requests the necessary policy development and understanding of what is required to bring these desirable outcomes about.

This last aspect of public entrepreneurship, or the Government just looking and seeing that something needs to be done, is the simplest of the three generic processes explained above and encapsulates a focus on the concrete reality—even if it involves envisioning a different concrete reality. This identification of issues and proposals for new policy normally comes out of the program taken to the electorate and perhaps clearly endorsed to form the President's mandate, and it is the starting point for more involved analysis. In effect, public entrepreneurship is an expression of the executive will of the Government, which is principally invested in the Executive arm. The practice of political appointees in The Public Administration is an expression of this need to institutionalise the public entrepreneurship of Government in fostering the creativity of particular individuals. This is very much in keeping with the *menetype #A* spirit.

Policy implementation or administration is about examining the parts and their interrelationships and dealing with specific structures and processes that are believed necessary to transform specific policy formulations and resources

into specific actions to deliver specific benefits to individuals or groups. As such, policy implementation or administration is seen to be at a higher level of abstraction (as group is to individual). This is clearly seen as the core role of The Public Administration and is steeped in the *menetype #B* spirit.

Policy commitment, which is labouring to encapsulate an acceptable synthesis between the vision, the constraints of administration, and political realities, is a more abstract process yet again. Though The Public Administration can do the preparatory work under the rubric of policy development, it is the processes of politics that set the ultimate policy. This is because the Government needs to remove itself (prescind) from the actual situation and the associated logical arguments to formulate a policy that withstands assessment from a higher set of criteria and yet can have the desired effects when implemented. This application of a higher set of criteria or assessment by collective values is the political process in action. That is, the political process is there to decide among competing options on the basis of a set of values emanating from and endorsed by the people (as encapsulated in the notion of the "public interest"), and the end results or outcomes of such a political process are policies. The resultant policies can be more or less specific but they do incorporate the distillation of a complex set of considerations. It is not really important whether the ultimate decision is taken in the agencies, Executive Office, or Congress, because that usually only reflects the degree of significance of the politics involved—but the ultimate resting place of the important core of policy commitment is the legislature. Policy commitment and politics are thus very much in keeping with the *menetype #C* spirit.

This analysis suggests, then, that the politics–administration–entrepreneurship trichotomy is in reality a trinity of *menetypes* about governance decision-making processes as depicted in Fig. **7.1**.[24] That is, it is not so much a division of a class into three mutually exclusive subclasses (as in a trichotomy), but a differentiation into three interrelated and interdependent subclasses. However, each of these subclasses can be clearly distinguished and they are indeed trimetrically opposed. The relationship is much more like a trichroism, or even more precisely, a trinity.[25] All of these processes are manifest together in all arms of Government, but to varying degrees. What is apparent from this analysis of governance is that each process will be predominant in the institution oriented to its particular spirit—that is, politics will be predominant in the legislature, administration will be predominant in the courts at the primary level of governance and The Public Administration at the secondary level, and public entrepreneurship will tend to be predominant in the Executive branch, which is taken to include the political appointees to the agencies at the secondary level.

Moreover, the analysis of governance also informs on the way in which the less important processes will be manifest in the different institutions of Government. For instance, in The Public Administration, politics is a secondary support as good administration requires a clear choice between available options and therefore is inclined to work and help the process of politics to get clear authority or power.[26] The Public Administrator is required to develop sound judgment on the degree of politics involved and whether it is a matter for administrative discretion or whether it is significant enough to refer the matter to elected officials. Public entrepreneurship is actively discouraged in The Public Administration and though there is widespread acknowledgement that it makes policy decisions, these are normally in keeping with its secondary function of choosing between obvious alternatives within clear political parameters. However, there is not the setting of substantive new objectives or directions. When an agency does actually try autonomously to take on the role of public entrepreneur, it can likely be in an undeveloped negative sort of way,[27] where say the agency is captured by its constituency and has a downward focus to provide for wishes of individuals or groups, rather than being guided by the spirit of the agency's legislation and the interpretation of the "public interest" coming down from its political superiors. However, this negative behaviour can be analysed within the system of governance, and remedies can be suggested.

From an appreciation that the politics–administration–entrepreneurship trichotomy is actually a trinity of *menetypes* about the Government decision-making process, a number of observations can be made about the role of The Public Administration.

- The Public Administration is a legitimate key player in the Government decision-making process and provides a kind of second-order authority pivot between the first-order authority of the Government and its public clients (as individuals, they are the lowest level of authority but paradoxically as a collective of citizens or electors, they are the highest).[28] It provides the analytic logical rationality to policy development and the logical rationality to policy implementation. This spirit of objective logical rationality is its *raison d'être* and can only be subverted or transformed to the detriment of the

overall efficacy of good government. In a sense, The Public Administration has a role of intellectual leadership (*menetype #B*), essentially from behind as a second-order power within the Government decision-making process. It effects its influence by bringing to bear its analytic, scientific judgment of the way society works (or the part of it that is relevant)[29]—but, be that as it may, the policy direction and major decisions are made by others. Moreover, in the spirit of its scientific-oriented viewpoint (*menetype #B*), it is a custodian of the past history of the Government's interpretation of the "public interest" and policy development, and it is its responsibility to bring that knowledge and understanding to bear as appropriate in the decision-making process. That knowledge is brought to bear in the aid of progress towards an ever better society as articulated by the governance process.[30] Also inherent in this spirit is an ethos of sound objective management to deliver objectives and outcomes set for it by the political process.[31] In a very real sense, then, there is agreement with Wamsley *et al.* (1990: 36) in that administration can be taken to mean management within a political hierarchy and, because 'administration is an inextricable part of both governance and politics,' the dynamics thereby provide for a real flowering of bureaucratic behaviour, which is radically different from management in support of the economic sphere's entrepreneur.

Moreover, it is legitimate within the trinitarian spirit of US Constitutional governance for The Public Administration to exercise its secondary function and participate in a restrained way in politics and political decision making (commonly called administrative discretion)—as long as it does remain only of secondary import and is not practised to such an extent as to undermine the objective, logical rationality of the agency (i.e. the Agency Perspective).[32] That is, agencies can legitimately set policy within the normal course of their decision making as long as it is within the spirit of the objectives embedded in the Government commitments made by their political superiors[33]—over time, the administrative viewpoint of the agency must maintain its overall predominance over the political viewpoint. In fact, it is a necessity of the governance process that Public Administrators interpret the meaning of the more abstract policy determined by Government over time and, in that way, are said to set the policy within the existing framework of administration. The Public Administrators are not equipped to transform that administrative framework radically on their own initiative.[34] That is the challenge of their political superiors, if it is warranted.

- It is very much in keeping with the structure of US Constitutional governance which, left to itself, The Public Administration would naturally repress public entrepreneurship to the point of exhibiting all the narrow negative aspects of rigid bureaucracies. There is some logic, therefore, in keeping with the spirit of separation and balance of governance powers, for each new Administration to move in its cadre of political appointees at the top of the Federal bureaucracies.[35] This is a sensible way to compensate for The Public Administration's natural disinclination to encourage entrepreneurship. This is then in the original *Federalist 10* spirit (Hamilton, Madison and Jay, 1952: 49ff) of setting one faction (or viewpoint) against another not only to keep one another in check but also to allow for the possibility of transcending to a higher-order solution that takes account of both perspectives. If the political appointees take on a primary role of the public entrepreneur then there would understandably be great resistance and cynicism from the agency. The appointee would then have to win the confidence of the agency for it to become a willing follower if he/she were actually to make a difference by leading it in a new direction. The other alternative could be that the political appointees maintain a principal orientation towards the political, which would make for a more harmonious fit with the agency, on the one hand, and the political superiors, on the other, but it then subjugates the entrepreneurial spirit to a subordinate role which may mean that no clear new vision is articulated. In other words, they are likely to just muddle through. Whatever the particular stance adopted and whatever the circumstances and issues, the system would still look to the political appointees to take the lead if new objectives and/or direction is needed for the agency.

In considering the role and contribution of this public entrepreneurship, it is important to keep in mind that in the US capitalist society the entrepreneurial spirit is manifested mainly in the private economic sector. Not only is the political sphere somewhat suppressed, the public entrepreneurship is only a secondary aspect of power and would normally run into huge hurdles of entrenched interests, which would drag the entrepreneurship back into the mire of politics. Within this milieu, it is, therefore, understandably difficult for the President, in the first place, and the political appointees, in the second order, to maintain a sufficient momentum for their entrepreneurial zeal. But, having said that, it is still a reality of the dynamics of Government decision making that the Cabinet members and other political appointees are required to carry and exhibit the mantle of Public Entrepreneur.

- • Another insight coming from this new perspective is that Simon's (1947) fact–value dichotomy is just another slant on a particular aspect of the politics–administration dichotomy.[36] In particular, the reverse order of naming the fact–value dichotomy suggests that the focus is on the process of cognitive reversion or policy decision making, rather than on the process of cognitive procession or policy implementation (it is remembered that administration encapsulates both policy advice and policy implementation). That is, the fact–value dichotomy encapsulates the higher aspirations of the policy development and policy commitment processes or the higher aspirations of the efforts of Public Administrators and politicians, respectively. Policy advice from The Public Administration is all about knowledge of the facts and their interrelationship and should aspire to the high values of the scientific method, namely, the objective truth of fact. The art of politics is about making assessments between different options and choosing against the criteria of a particular set of values.[37] Each political party encapsulates a different set of values and, once elected, it is expected to exhibit the articulated set of values in its decision making.

It is then a small step to appreciate that Simon's (1947) fact–value dichotomy is actually better seen as the possibility–fact–value trichotomy and that, moreover, it captures the trinity of *menetypes* about policy formulation and decision making (as depicted in Fig. **7.4**).[38] First, the potential new realities, or possibilities, have to be envisioned and they have to be practical (or able to be related to their secondary aspect of fact). Secondly, the means to achieve the new proposals and check out existing policy have to be established by ascertaining the facts and their interrelationships but, in doing this, attention has to be kept on the value set and intentions of the decision-makers (i.e. values as secondary aspect). Thirdly, the political decision-makers choose the best option according to their criteria of value and then commit to a specific policy, while keeping in mind the potential reality they are trying to co-create (i.e. the new reality or potential as secondary aspect).

Figure 7.4: Trinity of Policy Decision-making   **Figure 7.5:** The Trinity of Policy Implementation

Appreciation of this trinitarian relationship in policy formulation (or cognitive reversion) begs the question of what would be the supplementary trinitarian relationship for policy implementation. Such a trichotomy would address the need for effective policy to express a commitment to "the real," or be appropriate; sound policy design to express the logic of "the true," or be efficient; and sensitive policy delivery to express the will to "the good," or be effective (the fact that it is required to make a difference means that the service needs to be attentive or client oriented). This thinking can be construed as a commitment–process–effect trichotomy, which can be better regarded as the trinity of policy implementation (as depicted in Fig. **7.5**).

This perhaps captures the key dynamic of The Public Administration and is the key framework to analyse administrative action—on how Government programs are implemented or administered. First, good policy should express a clear Government commitment that can be readily understood and embraced by the implementers. If the spirit of the commitment is grasped and owned by the Public Administrators, there will be energy to make the necessary implementation decisions and to do so in a

way that is aligned with the purpose of the policy. Secondly, sound policy implementation requires an ordered process that logically connects the purpose of the policy commitment to specific actions in the real world of the public. Moreover, the policy needs to be objective so as only to discriminate for the potential beneficiaries in line with the purpose and specification of the policy commitment. This logic once again validates the need for the Public Administrator to make what could be called policy decisions—but they are only to be made in the spirit of the Government's articulated commitment. Thirdly, good policy implementation means that it is well received and in the manner intended by the Government decision-makers. It follows that the service to the clients has to be respectful of them as individuals and sensitive to their particular personal position, and then the program products need to be tailored as far as the inherent policy flexibility allows—because the overriding terms of the Government commitment is the determining factor. That is, it is more important for program delivery to be infused by the flow-down effect of the terms of the Government's commitment rather than the bottom-up responsiveness to the clients' particular needs.[39]

IS THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION THE CORE OF MODERN GOVERNMENT?

To decide in what sense The Public Administration might claim to be the 'core of modern government' and a 'balance wheel in the constitutional order' (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990: 36; 39),[40] there needs to be a closer examination of the nature of public administration in the USA's constitutional governance. To achieve this, it is proposed to look at: (a) the basic nature of The Public Administration mindset; (b) the flow-on consequences of being only a second-line power in the governance structure; and (c) the significance of having been relegated to the collective shadow of political life. Such an analysis also assists in assessing the proper nature and descriptor of the study of public administration.

- It has already been established that The Public Administration has a primary orientation to the objectively rational analytic *menetype #B* mindset.[41] This is essentially the bureaucratic *ideal type* with all the attributes that have been well-documented by and since Weber (1962; 1978a).[42] The principal characteristics of decision making are order, logic and efficiency. In the *ideal type*, the public entrepreneurship is squashed and in preference there is a responsive, but inquisitive and logical cause and effect policy analysis of the empirical data vis-à-vis the stated politically desired outcomes. The ideal bureaucrat is content giving advice to others to make the key policy decisions about change and new directions. In implementation, his/her preference is to follow written and authoritative policy and guidelines and to adhere to processes that are designed to be efficient in delivering the output. There is an implicit assumption that the expected good outcomes will flow directly from good process that delivers the defined outputs efficiently. Much has been written on the core or ideal behaviour of bureaucracy or The Public Administration.

    So, is this bureaucratic spirit the core of the political sphere as 'Carl Friedrich noted a half-century ago?' (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990: 36). Obviously, the answer is a resounding NO[43]—nobody would want Weber's (1947) "iron cage" as the central core of representative government. The core spirit or hub of the political sphere's governance structure, then, is predominant in the legislative branch (*menetype #C*), which is taken to exemplify the desirable democratically representative behaviour. The legislative branch is the dynamic hub from which everything emanates to other parts of the political governance structure, and to which all aspects eventually return. On the practical side, it is very difficult to envisage that the Congress or the President's Office would be looking to The Public Administration to be a broker in sorting through their political differences—or, even more unimaginable, that the two first-order political powers would look to bureaucratic values to find a compromise solution. Any transcendent solution that comes about from the tension between the legislative and executive powers would, of course, embrace in a positive way some constructive aspects of public administration.

    Through all such interaction of first-order powers, The Public Administration can only hope that its objective, logical analytic advice gets heard and is taken into consideration. In this sense, the descriptor of The Public Administration as a balance wheel gets much closer. It is certainly not the main spring, but as a secondary balance wheel it can keep knocking against the main political power spring to raise issues and bring perspectives to mind. In that way, The Public Administration can promote ordered and good government but, given its secondary status, it does not have the power to regulate the dynamics of politics. It is clearly subservient and does not have the political power to 'play the role of balance wheel… to favor whichever participant in the constitutional process needs their help at a given time in history to preserve the purposes of the Constitution itself' (Wamsley *et al.*,

1990: 49). In reality, it is the first-order governance power of the courts that is needed to preserve the purposes of the Constitution.[44] Though it does indeed have some autonomy of action, The Public Administration cannot afford to play one political power off against the other for too long at the risk of losing its integrity to become just another political player—and a weak and subservient one at that. Rather, it should seek to maintain its core integrity and continue to provide accurate, comprehensive and objective advice to all political players. After all, as has been observed above, public administration adjusts to the political governance system that it finds itself in,[45] not vice versa, and if the political players manage to change the system with the consent of the people then so be it, and The Public Administration is obliged to follow and adjust accordingly.

However, as observed earlier, it is the medium of the public administration that stands between the Government and the public as clients. The Public Administration is a key player and certainly the biggest presence in executing the will of Government. In this sense of administering policy, as opposed to formulating policy, The Public Administration could be said to express the core spirit of how government programs should be delivered, namely, to implement the stated policy with objective efficiency and no favouritism on any grounds other than that expressed in the Government's policy. But this is only half the game of modern government, and the people would much prefer the Government to be doing the right things to fix their problems (with appropriate policy formulation), rather than doing the wrong things efficiently (with ordered policy implementation).

What happens, then, when the degree of abstraction in thinking is elevated to focus on the level of the society (as opposed to its political sphere)? Of those three much-prized and sought after ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity, it is the ideal of equality that is the most important motivator of the *menetype #B* bureaucratic behaviour. Equality is the rationale that justifies a system of merit advancement up the hierarchy and that primary loyalty of all true bureaucrats is to the agency, its rules, and processes—or the notion of organization (*menetype #B*) that is bigger than any of the particular individuals. The spirit of equality also underpins their objective impersonal approach to the delivery of government programs to clients—all clients are taken at face value as equally eligible, and only objective tests are permitted to differentiate those who might meet the criteria intended by the higher authorities in setting the policies. The Public Administrators do not have the power or authority to extend the parameters of the Government program to particular individuals and/or groups beyond that intended by the legislature, no matter how much they talk to the citizens and ascertain their problems and needs (contrary to what is seemingly implied by Stivers' (1996: 260ff) concept of active citizenship).

The most pertinent cognitive fact is that equality is also the principal motivator of true democracy as eulogised by the social sphere of society.[46] The Supreme Court carries the responsibility to deliver equality at the first-order level of political power in delivering justice (the principal *menetype #C* political product) equally to all. The Public Administration is responsible on the second-order level of delivering the Government's interpretation of the "public interest" equitably to all those deemed subject to Government programs. To the Public Administrator, everybody should be treated as equal and his or her individual claims assessed without fear or favour. It is delivering political goods and services, which are principally about social justice through some redistribution of society's resources as inferred by the Government's interpretation of the "public interest." The Public Administration has a key role, therefore, to help maintain the democratic core value of "equality" in Government programs and, in so doing, guard against the political justice being unduly for "just us," or the Government's political colleagues. In this sense, it could be said to act as a 'balance wheel' between the Government and the public, who as a "democratic people" believe that a sense of equality should be maintained throughout society.

In its limited capacity then (as a second-order governance power), The Public Administration could be regarded as a custodian of the spirit of democratic equality in Government action and (as formally approved) the means to foster the stability and continuity of good governance.[47] This is an important and vital role within the structure of representative democratic governance.

All the foregoing expose of the bureaucratic spirit needs to be tempered with the understanding that the natural secondary orientation of The Public Administration is to the political mindset—and this tendency is accentuated by the fact that the bureaucracies are operating in the political sphere where the legislative or political power is, in the final analysis, the dominant power (all *menetype #C*).[48] Moreover, with the whole shift of society to the politicist age, this shift to the political is magnified greatly.[49] In other words, the informal political networking of the Public Administrators is real and

necessary to supplement the effective working of the core *menetype #B* bureaucratic behaviour.[50] This means there are always temptations for the Public Administrator to abandon the motivation of equality and embrace the spirit of fraternity (or political mateship) and look after the needs of political colleagues to the exclusion of others, or to abandon adherence to the Agency Perspective in order to ingratiate oneself to the whims of the political superiors of the day.[51]

The experience is normally between the two extremes depicted as the Weberian (1978a) *ideal type* of the bureaucrat (pure *menetype #B*) on the one hand and, on the other, the obsequious satrap sent forth by the powerful feudal-type lord or despot (pure *menetype #C*). The temptations are the highest for the higher super-grades of The Public Administration, principally because of the many agencies and the fragmentation of power above and around them. It, therefore, makes it even more necessary for them to be involved in political alliances.[52] But one thing remains critical for good governance and that is for Public Administrators to remain firmly grounded in their bureaucratic mindset or Agency Perspective and only allow themselves to lean towards the political outlook[53]—not sell out entirely to the new value set. What has to be acknowledged from an understanding of natural evolution of social systems from the cognitive laws of reversion is that, looking back from some future date, the politicisation of The Public Administration could actually be seen as just another necessary phase in its life cycle as it adapts and matures to handle an even more complex, abstract world of action. What would be more destructive to The Public Administration would be to try and move in the opposite direction and take up the Public Entrepreneur mindset, which was basically the agenda of change suggested by Osborne and Gaebler (1992).[54]

What would be worthwhile analysing for particular agencies is just where they have struck the balance on the continuum between the bureaucratic and political mindsets. Of course, as the agencies pick up more and more on the political mindset, there is a corresponding inclination to pick up the public entrepreneurship to support the political stance, but they will not become too practised at it unless they move wholeheartedly into the political mindset.

- This book argues the cognitive fact that The Public Administration is a second-level governance power and nothing can change that. Its power can be increased by a fundamental change in the political psyche of society but it will always be beholden to a more primary unified power. For instance, its position would be substantially enhanced under a pure democracy or a monarchy.[55] This essentially means that it is wishful dreaming, and actually distorting, to yearn for The Public Administration to be the fourth arm of Government, as an equal power to the Legislative and Executive branches. The Public Administration has a subservient role in the system and, basically, has to make the most of it.[56]

However, there is a more important associated cognitive reality that prevents The Public Administration becoming a united pre-eminent power in the US governance regime. In essence, according to the ancient laws of cognitive procession,[57] that which flows from a unitary superior source is necessarily a manifold and is less in power than that which is its cause. The plethora of agencies generated by the first-order governance powers have no way to come together except in terms of reversion back into the unitary power; where there is, for instance, an exercise of legislative or executive power that is applicable to the entire Public Administration. At the first-order level, the players are fewer but with more power. The nation is the primal unitary power as expressed in the Constitution. The primary political power is the Government with the ultimate say being accorded to Congress, which has attributes of a unitary power in that it is a power unto itself in deciding what it will do. The unitary power of Congress is perhaps well expressed when it is required to come together in an overwhelming majority to override a Presidential veto or to approve an amendment to the Constitution. The fact that a similar majority of the states are also required to approve the amendment means that there is an even higher unitary power above them—namely the nation (which can actually be seen to manifest itself in the person of the President in times of leadership in national crises).

These same laws of cognitive procession also express the reality that every manifold that is issued forth then in some way participates the unity from whence it originated.[58] That is, by the cognitive laws of the way human thought constructs an understanding of social systems and the way they work, every political governance body, including The Public Administration, participates in the policy-making power of the legislative body from whence they emanate. That is, the Constitution is set up in such a way that power will naturally flow down and out of the governance hierarchy to empower particular agencies in the appropriate way.[59] Moreover, as the system of governance matures, there is naturally more differentiation of the parts, which then are allowed to become more autonomous as an

extension of the main game. It is natural and legitimate, then, for The Public Administration to make policy decisions, but it is the particular governance structure encountered by the agency that determines the degree to which it makes the decisions versus the requirement to pass them back up the line with its insights and suggestions (collective cognitive reversion) for further consideration.[60] Moreover, the nature of the decisions made by the mainstream Public Administrator would be much more rationally or objectively based in keeping with his/her *menetype #B* thinking, whereas the decisions of politicians in the legislature would be more political or value-based judgments—which is why politicians are not natural cost minimisers but Public Administrators are more inclined that way.

In sum, The Public Administration is, and will always be, manifold and pluralistic, and in no way can it realistically be referred to as a coherent institution.[61] The constitutional governance system generated by the concept of the separation of powers underscores and legitimises this plurality of minor autonomous power centres.[62] Unfortunately, therefore, "The Public Administration" has to remain "public administration" and Public Administrators have to remain humble public servants. That is, the focus of debate should stay on the role of "government" and not be substituted by the role of "public administration" (contrary to the suggestion of Wamsley *et al.*, 1990: 35), as public administration gets its authority from the Government. It is not a matter of going direct to the people to legitimise any authority that may have been delegated to public administrators but, rather, it is a matter of continual clarification and accountability so there is trust in public administration first by the politicians, who are ultimately responsible, and then, through the politicians, the public.[63] Public administrators should not be trying to win over the public in its own right because it is contrary to the system of US constitutional governance to cultivate its own constituency.[64]

- Moreover, not only are agencies separated and manifold, they are essentially neglected by the primary powers except if something goes wrong or they are needed to assist in effecting some purpose of the primary powers. That is, they are certainly not nurtured for their own sake, like say the economy. The primary powers, particularly the legislature, are more inclined to respond to concerns from their transcendent authority—meaning the public or, more crassly, perhaps, their constituency—than to any expressions of concern, or cries of crisis, from the public agencies.

Public administrators are always regarded as the lesser, or the ones first to be excluded in important "political" discussions. The practice of Congressional committee hearings is valuable and can be looked on effectively as the ongoing dialogue between the collective political conscious and its unconscious (which for an individual is meant to be very psychically healthy and therefore should be similarly so for the collective process). For most legislators, however, the actual goings on in the public agencies would likely be a bit of a mystery or, more to the point, they are just plainly not interested in them. However, the consequences of the actions of public agencies are very apparent—particularly when their public brings it to their notice. Unless it is related to an issue of political concern, therefore, there is normally very little interest in the actions of public administrators—i.e. not much concern whether the multitude of actions is done well or not. There is just the assumption that everything happens automatically to deliver their policies and programs.

What, then, is the principal implication of the public administration being the second-order power, which is regarded as though it is effectively in the shadow of the first-order powers. Essentially, it means that the efforts of public administrators will never be truly appreciated for the worth they are.[65] This is a humbling experience at best and a demoralising one at worst if the situation is not acknowledged and dealt with consciously.[66] This experience of not being respected for one's contribution makes it even more necessary to cultivate the value of loyalty among public administrators. This is where it is important for the collective psychic health of public administrators that they foster loyalty to the higher ideal of the "public interest" as expressed through their particular Agency Perspective, rather than encouraging any undue responsiveness or obeisance to transient political superiors of the time. What is continually encouraged, therefore, is loyalty to the Constitution, then to the Government as expressed in formal legislation and properly approved policy, and then to the agency itself and its leaders. Pride in the agency needs to be inculcated through a keen appreciation of the agency's purpose and contribution to the public good—i.e. there needs to be some belief in the system. This requires continual self-development at the group and individual level—the emergence of the concepts of learning organizations and life-long personal learning are, therefore, very positive and important.

The main sources of any power that public administrators have in the system are essentially[67] (a) legislatively endowed power granted to them from above; (b) control over resources previously

appropriated to them and the legislatively endowed budget granted to them from above; and (c) their collective and personal knowledge, which can be used to provide pertinent policy advice and implement policy effectively and efficiently. The most obvious way for public administrators to develop their competitive advantage is in the aspect of personal and collective knowledge—all other sources of power are dependent on others and are, therefore, relatively more transient than that which rests upon what they can make their own as inherent and unique. Confidence in public administration comes from a belief or trust that it can help or do the job,[68] and if this is not so then there is no point giving it power or resources, or even letting it keep what it already has. This principal focus on knowledge acquisition—knowledge of the true facts and how it all fits together and works in an orderly manner—is a key attribute of the *menetype #B* motivation of the true bureaucrat.

To public administrators falls the role of intellectual leadership within the political governance structure. The Supreme Court provides intellectual national leadership through its intricate knowledge of the "public interest" in respect to justice as delivered through the law, precedents and social norms at the first-order level of governance power in the political sphere. The public administration agencies (necessarily manifold) mirror this intellectual leadership at the second-order level of political governance power through their knowledge of:

- the accumulated constitutional interpretation of the "public interest" of goods and services;

- the history of associated legislation and government policy; and

- the reasoned conclusions about client problems, needs, and the practical processes required to fill those needs.

Put in another way, public administrators would do well to know the governance structure of society, the context and content of the developed political discernment of the "social good," and the interrelationships between the different social forces that sustain society. In other words, they need, at least, to have a greater understanding of the governance system and a greater store of hard knowledge than anybody else in the governance structure, or else they might find themselves more and more regarded as unnecessary in the political processes.[69]

In short, the public administrators need to be needed for what they know and can do, and they had better be humble about it at the same time!

Considering this analysis in its totality, there are some useful observations that can be made about the study of public administration vis-à-vis political science and the other social sciences. First, the "stuff" of administration (as coined by Waldo, 1984a: 200) is clearly oriented to the scientific mindset (*menetype #B*),[70] much more so than political science. That is, the approach and methods used in the practice of public administration are clearly methical and scientific as opposed to the practice of politics, which is more of an art in the exercise of the right judgment in the right situation (*menetype #C*) that actually eschews the scientific. Moreover, where politics does involve the practice of public entrepreneurship (*menetype #A*) and does define the shape of program delivery, there can be a useful scientific study of the different processes that could lead to the desired output and outcome. As a consequence, the cause of public administration would be enhanced if the study of it was actually classified as a social science and was given to the study of its parts and the cause and effect relationship between those parts (Wamsley's (1996: 360) concept of a public philosophy).

Secondly, administration and politics can be differentiated as explained above and, therefore, so can their study. Moreover, it is cognitively natural that the study of politics should ignore the "stuff" of public administration as being trivial and unimportant and comprised of things that should happen automatically.[71] On the other hand, the study of public administration needs to be informed about the facts and dynamics of politics as it is practised, particularly in its own governance orientation—but less interested in the other possible governance structures or utopias as studied in political science.[72] An important rationale for keeping them separate is that politics is studied from the perspective of the first-order level of governance power, whereas public administration is of the second-order. It is somewhat different from the relationship between the study of economics and the study of management.[73]

Moreover, being of the second order, the study of public administration is much more pluralistic and needs to take into account the multitude of other knowledge that is required to serve the many different Agency Perspectives. The study of public administration as a separate discipline should be more akin to studying the philosophy of science and is therefore more useful in terms of bringing it all together or

a rounding out of the specific knowledge needed for the particular focus of an agency—more like an interdisciplinary field than a specialised discipline.[74] It would be, therefore, more appropriate as a graduate diploma, Masters or some such, that is able to teach people how to manage the knowledge and skills learnt in the other basic degrees and to put it all together into processes that are made to fit the governmental output desired.[75] It is similar to the way that management develops the understanding and skills that enable various disciplines to be melded tighter in an orderly, productive manner. The only way that the studies of public administration and politics can be brought together is at a transcendent level that incorporates both, and that, as has been suggested by others, is the study of governance in the broad sense of the term and not just governance as public administration (Wamsley, 1996).

Thirdly, the study of the physical sciences never really took off as a science until the physical sciences started developing an understanding of the basic structures. Before the Copernican Revolution (Kuhn, 1957; 1970), the study of science was regarded more as a branch of philosophy, but the natural sciences developed out of the growing understanding of the basic structure of things and the relationships of cause and effect between them. So it goes with the social sciences, which have yet to really develop an adequate understanding of the basic structures involved, though there have been many attempts to do so. All social structures come out of human thinking and are understood by human thinking, and it is only when the social sciences finally own a suitable robust structure of analysis and explanation that their credibility will flower.[76] Intuitively, therefore, it is contended that some consideration should be given to the merits of the structure of thinking and analysis developed and used in this book, as to whether it is sufficiently robust to build the foundational structures of a science of governance.[77]

HOW DO PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS RELATE TO OTHER STAKEHOLDERS?

The following discussion of public agency dynamics in relation to its stakeholders is necessarily summary and brief. Only the essential elements of the framework can be outlined at this point in time, but it may be appreciated that it provides an analytic framework to study the nature and dynamics of any particular agency or agencies in a rigorous, scientific manner. What is important and the key to the future development of a scientific approach is an understanding of the generic nature of the interrelationships between the different stakeholders. It would be evident from discussions above that the detail of the framework of agency stakeholders will differ between governance regimes, and the following explanation is specifically in relation to the US constitutional governance system.

The formal structures and relationships developed by an agency are largely an external manifestation of its Agency Perspective, which is largely the outcome of the interaction between the implicit assumptions contained in the agency's culture and its surrounding political milieu. In effect, there is an ongoing interplay between the agency's understandings and assumptions about the "public interest" as it has been interpreted within its field of relevance; the agency's chosen focus in terms of the politics–administration–entrepreneurship trinity; and the agency's perception of the relative importance of particular stakeholders at particular points in time. The range of agency stakeholders can be analysed in terms of the following trinity of *menetype* trinities (as depicted in Fig. **7.6**):[78]

- *External Stakeholders,* which comprise:
  (a) the agency's clients, or consumers of government goods, services or largesse;
  (b) the resource suppliers, of which the most important has been the budget decision-makers; and
  (c) the political constituencies, which could be particularly prominent if powerful lobby groups were in play.

- *Internal Stakeholders,* which comprise:
  (a) the public administration staff who deliver the program;
  (b) the (principally middle-to-senior) managers that give form and structure to the processes of program delivery; and
  (c) the agency executive management which principally comprises the political appointees but would also include the most senior career public administrators.

- *Political Authority Stakeholders*, which comprise the first-order group of governance powers of:

(a)   the executive or more particularly the Office of the President;

(b)   the judiciary or relevant courts; and

(c)   the legislature or more particularly the particular congressional committees.

Just which aspect of the stakeholder framework the agency chooses, or is required to focus on, would determine the essential dynamics of its behaviour. This would be determined in large part by the dynamics of the so-called iron triangle between the external interest groups, the internal top public administrators, and the authority legislative committee.[79] For instance, the caricature of the politics–administration dichotomy would suggest that the administrative agency is assumed to have a primary focus on the *menetype #B* internal stakeholders who are responsible for administration. Their energy would go mainly into designing and managing the structures and processes of policy formulation and program delivery. Such an orientation would define a secondary focus on the political authority stakeholders (*menetype #C*), but when the importance of this aspect was enhanced (either through circumstances or the general shift from managerialism to politicism), the boundaries between politics and administration would become very blurred indeed, and every administrative act could be seen to contain some element of politics.


Figure 7.6: The Trinitarian Hierarchy of Public Agency Stakeholders

In keeping with this book's analysis of the exhortations of the Blacksburg Manifesto (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990), the stakeholder framework is now used to provide further exploration of the following.

- What are the implications of the societal shift from the managerialist age to the politicist age?

- What could the response of the public administration be to such a shift?

- What are the ramifications of responding to a greater call for participation and 'more direct linkages with the people, in order to win their trust' (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990: 43)?

Managerialism to Politicism.[80]

In the age of managerialism, the agency focus was squarely on improving administration, meaning a focus of the internal stakeholders and their dynamics. This predominant focus on the *menetype #B* bureaucratic spirit was accompanied by a preoccupation with scientific methodology and in promoting the study of administration as a science. In association with this spirit there was a secondary focus on the dialogue with the political authority stakeholders, particularly in terms of legislation and formal written policy guidelines, which meant an intense interaction with the legislature. The ability to focus on external stakeholders was therefore greatly dampened except where there was pressure coming through the political stakeholders. The principal focus at this time was on program design and securing the necessary budgetary resources but, even then, agencies were more receptive to the outcome of the orderly political processes that decided the budget allocations. The influence of lobby groups was more in relation to the pressures on the political authority and would have been dampened somewhat by the strong, bureaucratically scientific approach of the agencies. And it would be reasonable to presume that any focus on the demands of clients would have run a poor last in capturing agency attention.

The advent of politicism has seen a shift in focus more towards the *menetype #C* perspective of political authority.[81] This has been manifest in agencies by the enhancement of the power of political appointees and their political networks[82]—contemporaneously with a breakdown in bureaucratic hierarchies through such "management" initiatives as de-layering and outsourcing. The importance of objective integrity has been downplayed and the value of political responsiveness and connections has been enhanced.[83] The orientation of policy formulation has shifted from a reliance on specific objective analysis more to the satisfaction of particular political interests. Where political authority had not been delegated to the agency, this would have resulted in an increased level of oversight and intervention principally by the legislature but also by the executive branch. Where the political authority had been delegated, this would manifest in the shift from politically impartial administration and adjudication of external interests (in keeping with the spirit of the legislation) to a more partisan bolstering of the power of the agency executive. With the shifting of the predominant focus to the dynamics of the political authority has come the diminution of an administrative approach and a greater focus on "participation" of the external stakeholders (*menetype #A* as secondary support to *menetype #C* political authority). As a result, particular political constituencies have become even more influential in the political process and even clients are being given more regard. The importance of a rational allocation of resources has diminished in favour of such practices as user charging and intra-agency pricing, purchaser–provider splits, and outsourcing, which put a greater focus on one's particular political power in the allocation of resources (in a more sophisticated re-run of the feudal mentality).

What this actually means for true public administrators is that, at best, they are being encouraged to play politics[84] and, at worst, they are being asked to look backwards into their repressed dynamic of public entrepreneurship, such as in *Reinventing Government* (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992).[85] This is guaranteed to modify and possibly distort the administrative integrity of the Agency Perspective and particularly the prevailing of the "public interest." As such, this shift to politicism presents a great challenge to public administrators; a challenge that has given birth to the likes of the Blacksburg Manifesto (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990). The challenge for The Public Administration is to hang onto its soul and *raison d'être*, and to maintain its objective integrity and acceptable ways of operating in the increasingly political environment.

Public Administrators' Response to the Challenge

Public administrators cannot stop the evolution of collective thought to the politicist age. Neither should they sit on the wall and just watch it all happen but, rather, they need to understand the transition and manage their role in the

new governance world.[86] How then should they respond to the challenge that this presents to the integrity and usefulness of their objective and logical managerial perspective? These core ways have been regarded as increasingly irrelevant as information and knowledge abounds and is so easy to come by. What is more important now for society's leaders is the application of that information and knowledge to solving the particular political problems of the moment. As a consequence, there has been a diminution of the relevance, value and usefulness of the objective methodological approach of the public administrators. Rather than focus on the need to develop logical processes, the attitude is more to experiment by trying something and then, if it does not work, to try something else. It is similar to the mentality of governmental experimentation that Wilson (1966/1887)[87] pointed towards to justify the need to build a discipline of public administration.

To promote the thought of referring to the business of "government" as the business of "public administration" is tantamount to saying that public administration is political and it has joined the fray of politics rather than holding out against it. This stance is enhanced by the call 'to share in governing wisely' more or less as an equal and to forge 'more direct links with the people' (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990: 47; 43). The public administration is part of the process of governance, but a less powerful aspect that, in the end, can only propose while the more powerful political institutions dispose. Its true role is loyal adviser and faithful instrument in implementing the government programs in the absence of politicians. The best service that public administration could provide in this age of politicism is still to be true to the spirit of US constitutional governance and adhere to the role of public administrator that has been given it—to develop within this role and not to try and become an unelected politician as seemingly suggested by Wamsley *et al.* (1990: 47).

- There is agreement with, and support for, much of the other advice and exhortation in the Blacksburg Manifesto (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990) on how public administrators should respond to the challenge of the emergence of the politicist age where they are, indeed, in danger of losing relevance, power and perceived usefulness. Namely, by: Focusing their conception of the "public interest" as much as possible on the *menetype #C* orientation (as explained above) of the broadest understanding of the Constitution as contained in official Government interpretation (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990: 41–43).

- Subscribing to their own particular Agency Perspective and fostering its clearer articulation in light of the developing governmental conception of the "public interest" (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990: 38ff).

- Fostering the acquisition of factual knowledge on constitutional governance processes, government policy and vision, competing policy views and their relative merits, the management of government programs, including assessment of existing and proposed processes and their impact on the client group, and an understanding of the political views of the various decision-makers. Knowledge and competence are the foundation stones of the public administrators' usefulness and influence (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990: 41–42).

- Combining all the above to stand firm as helpful advisers and faithful managers, to voice the justifiable facts of the situation and proposed solutions objectively (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990: 35), and then to act in accordance with legitimate government policy without the intervention of their own personal politics.

Public administrators must remain grounded in their *menetype #B* spirit of intellectual leadership and be recognised by the Government as the source of knowledgeable and competent advice, and not as would-be usurpers of political authority or a "Clayton's politician." They should work to win or maintain the begrudging respect of the Government for their steadfast competence and, through it, the nation. This challenging role of the public administration can be likened to the constructive role of the personal unconscious as it continues to dialogue with the conscious mind and uncovers all that it needs to know to make sound decisions in the many different circumstances that life hands out. It is not for the public administrator to envision and promote a better world or to take on the moral responsibility for its delivery but, rather, to assist the elected Government develop the options and means that could be used to deliver the political ends proposed.[88] It is necessary that public administrators develop their political astuteness though not for their own politics but, rather, to be more sensitive and wise to the advice that is required. To do this, they clearly need to understand more about the US system of governance and its development, and their role in it. They also need to develop their appreciation of how the other governance players are thinking and how they can best influence this thinking in their role of intellectual leadership.[89] In simple terms, the main role of the public administrator is to edify and clarify so that Government can make better decisions, and better choices can be made in the delivery of government programs.

Ramifications of Participation

The concept of active citizenship or participation was a late inclusion in the Blacksburg Manifesto (Wamsley, 1990a: 27; Wamsley *et al.*, 1990: 51, Note 1) and it had the unfortunate effect of making the proposed public administration look more like a new political force than an institution grounded in its rationalistic soul. The intent of introducing this concept was framed in terms that 'the quest for such a normative theory of American public administration must include an examination of the nature of the relationship between administrative practice and the ultimate source of values in a democratic polity; that is, the people. We want to argue that active citizens are a necessary ingredient in the normative justification sought by the Manifesto' (Stivers, 1990: 247).[90]

So where do citizens fit into an understanding of the US constitutional governance system? First, there is a look at the fundamentals of citizen participation; second, at their proper role in policy formulation; and third, at their involvement in program implementation.

First, to explain the concept of active citizenship or participation, Stivers (1990: 249) draws on the original democratic model of the ancient Greek state.[91] As explained earlier, the ancient Greek experience could be regarded as an example of true democracy, which means that the focus of society was firmly grounded in the social sphere (*menetype #B* orientation as depicted in Fig. **5.1**), and the dynamics of the political sphere (*menetype #C*) were only a secondary support to the concept of citizenship (not vice versa). However, the world moved on to higher levels of abstract thinking about the way society should operate best. It first evolved to shift the focus to the more highly abstract political sphere[92] and, as explained above, the US society is now focused most on the economic sphere (*menetype #A* but at a much higher level of sophistication or abstract thinking).

Stivers' (1990) call to active citizenship in the spirit of Aristotle (1952) could, therefore, be explained in terms of trying to shift the focus of society at large from the economic sphere (*menetype #A*) to the social sphere (*menetype #B*).[93] This would represent a natural and constructive evolutionary development in societal thinking but it would involve a huge transformation in societal consciousness that would have to come from a movement among the people, not from some intellectual notion of a revitalising and repositioning of public administration just because it was considered a good thing to do.

In any event, public administration operates in the political sphere and so this notion of shifting societal thinking to operate in the social sphere of active citizenship or democratic equality of voice is, in a sense, coming out of the public administration's unconscious thinking (or largely repressed social sphere thinking for somebody focused on the political sphere). However, there is some cognitive access or empathy by public administrators through the common thread of *menetype #B* thinking (which allows the connection across different levels of abstraction in the hierarchy of *menetypes*). The fact that this notion comes out of the repressed psyche of public administration is evidenced by the rather awkward or crude formulation of the method of citizen inclusion as a 'knowledge community' (Stivers, 1990: 257).[94] This might appear very appealing to public administrators as it is their main game but there would have to be a question of its appropriateness/adequacy as a means of equitable inclusion, particularly where many people are still illiterate (despite much schooling), many more would be computer illiterate, and even more would just not be interested enough to get involved in a knowledge community—given that over 50 per cent do not even vote in the national political elections! In short, only a minority would be drawn to participate in such a "knowledge community", and that would leave the concept of active citizenship comprising, perhaps, the individual public agencies heading a small but articulate and powerful knowledge group of citizens who are trying to bring about political change.

Second, it is for consideration just how citizens are included in the process of policy formulation, which seems to be the principal rationale in encouraging active citizenship. For activity in the political sphere, the answer is obvious but seems to be ignored by Stivers (1990). Politicians engage with the citizens as voters (*menetype #C* mindset dialoguing with *menetype #A* mindset) more so than as clients or beneficiaries of government largesse (though voters are often moved by such motivation).[95] This political dialogue, lobbying and electioneering is vigorous and continuous, and not only during times of elections. There are ample opportunities for articulate citizens (who would probably form the backbone of any ongoing "knowledge community") to input in some way to the political process—and they do, such is the strength of the great democracy. However, the point is that the dynamics of this

interaction are necessarily political in nature and about power and favour—and politicians are more inclined to listen to their own or to those who can help their cause. That is basically what politics is about, and citizen participation, which is ostensibly a political process, is best handled by the political process of the politicians rather than by public administrators—both from a practical and from a cognitive perspective. That is not to say that public administrators should not participate in the ongoing political dialogue with politicians and citizens. Indeed, they should, but not of their own volition to make their own autonomous decisions independent of the politicians' interpretation. Rather, they should participate in the dialogue with an objective mindset and interpret what is said in light of the prevailing understanding of the governance system's articulation of what constitutes the "public interest."[96]

For public administrators, the notion of citizens' views is both the transcendent and the shadow in their unconscious. As a transcendent notion it is embodied in the concept of the "public interest," which they must reach up to through the interpretation of the elected officials in the Government. That interpretation of the "public interest" by the politicians is heavily influenced by their direct engagement with citizens and groups to assess the public opinion, which is the output of active citizenship. In terms of the repressed perspective, if public administrators were to look back on their interested citizens (i.e. *menetype #B* mindset looking at their *menetype #A* external stakeholders), their interpretations would necessarily be crude and banal, as they would be called to focus on the particular needs of clients and interest groups. The grave inherent danger of encouraging public administrators in the practice of citizen participation is that they will be encouraged into the public entrepreneurial mindset which would be dysfunctional, not only for the orderly functioning of the public administration but also for the orderly functioning of US constitutional governance. To avoid this corruption of their understanding of the "public interest" and their role, public administrators would be required to engage with the citizens in a way that supports their role in the governance structure; namely, in an ordered, objective and logical way as part of a process of clarifying the facts and interrelationships of the situation.

Third, in terms of program implementation, there is naturally more scope for direct engagement with citizens as clients and interested parties. In the process of program implementation, the eyes of the public administrators are directed downwards, cognitively speaking, towards their external stakeholders. They are obliged to engage with these external stakeholders in a way that is guided by the letter and spirit of their enabling legislation, government policy and Agency Perspective. In this way, citizens should be treated with equal respect and listened to, but the power of public administrators to do things to help is circumscribed by the policy dictates from the political institutions above them.[97] Sometimes these policy dictates are very tight (as in social security assistance) and sometimes they are very broad (such as national security), but public administrators are only ever operating with delegated power. They cannot draw power directly from the people, as do the politicians—otherwise, it would be an aberration to the governance system, which would be corrected in time but perhaps with a lot of pain and disfigurement along the way.[98]

Bringing this discussion on participation together, then, public administrators can only engage constructively with citizens if they do so in keeping with the role and mindset as required in the US system of constitutional governance.[99] After all, all things are in all things but only in proper order, and there is a proper order in the way public administrators should engage the citizens' views, which is clearly not to take on and champion autonomously the political causes of disaffected or inarticulate groups.[100] Moreover, it is not the public administrators' role so much to inform and educate the public as it is to inform and educate themselves and the Government so that they are better able to improve the appropriateness, quality and efficacy of their decision making and actions.

SUMMARY

In summary, the principal conclusions from the above analysis of the role of the public administration in Government decision-making within the constitutional governance of the United States are:

- *The politics–administration dichotomy should really be thought of as the politics–administration–entrepreneurship trichotomy (or, really, a trinity), and the trinities of policy decision making and policy implementation flow naturally from this new understanding. Moreover, within this new framework, it can be reasoned that the public administration has a vital role in US constitutional governance, and that it is legitimate for public administrators to make policy decisions within the*

spirit of the Government's articulated commitment. Moreover, the practice of each new President of installing political appointees to agencies is a positive characteristic of US constitutional governance as a way of injecting into public administration the otherwise repressed governance aspect of public entrepreneurship.

- *It is effectively "three strikes and you're downgraded" for the public administration. First, as having adopted a menetype #B mindset, public administrators are naturally followers rather than leaders, advisers rather entrepreneurs, and thinkers rather than manipulators. Second, as being a natural second-order governance power, public administration is manifold and pluralistic and less powerful as a consequence. Thirdly, as being the natural shadow of the USA's conscious governance power, public administrators are never appreciated for the contribution they make. As a consequence, public administrators need to build their power around being needed for their knowledge and know-how and, as such, should embrace initiatives such as the learning organization and life-long personal learning. To bolster their position in the governance structure, public administrators should persist in the efforts to establish the study of public administration as a reputable social science.*

- *In the societal shift from managerialism to politicism, public administration is faced with the challenge of remaining true to its core managerialist values, which are being increasingly devalued and sidelined. It is incumbent upon public administrators to be courageous against the tide of societal thinking and hold true to the highest interpretations of the "public interest," the spirit of their enabling legislation and their Agency Perspective, as exhorted in the Blacksburg Manifesto (Wamsley et al., 1990). Moreover, public administrators should be wary of those new concepts, such as citizen participation, that threaten to distract them from their principal role of providing objective and factual advice and decision making, both for policy formulation and for the management of government programs.*

ENDNOTES

[1]   In simple terms, 'The policy–administration dichotomy merely reflects the "upstairs–downstairs" phenomenon of hierarchy, the superior–subordinate form of organization dominant since the dawn of civilization… "Policy" and "administration" are the job descriptions of *any* superior–subordinate relationship' (Thayer, 1984: 264; 267).

'It has long been customary to distinguish between policy-making and policy execution. Frank J. Goodnow, in his well-known work, *Politics and Administration*, undertook to build an almost absolute distinction upon this functional difference. "There are, then, in all governmental systems two primary or ultimate functions of government, viz. the expression of the will of the state and the execution of that will. There are also in all states separate organs, each of which is mainly busied with the discharge of one of these functions. These functions, are, respectively, Politics and Administration." But while the distinction has a great deal of value as a relative matter of emphasis, it cannot any longer be accepted in this absolute form. Admittedly, this misleading distinction has become a fetish, a stereotype in the minds of theorists and practitioners alike. The result has been a great deal of confusion and argument… Public policy, to put it flatly, is a continuous process, the formation of which is inseparable from its execution. Public policy is being formed as it is being executed, and it is likewise being executed as it is being formed' (Friedrich, 1966: 224–225).

'Classical politics/administration ideation was a way of thinking about public administration that dovetailed neatly into the Progressive movement and benefited from the antipathy that the Progressive reformers directed against political machines and their accompanying corruption. Throwing their energies behind political reform, leading Progressive intellectuals such as Woodrow Wilson and Frank Goodnow sought to show that professional public administration was compatible with Progressive ends. The genius of Wilson and Goodnow was that they effectively attached professional public administration to the Progressive reform movement. In so doing, the implication was that Progressive reform would be incomplete without professional public administration. Paul Van Riper points out that this linkage itself was a genuine feat given the widespread scepticism during the Progressive era about civil service reform and professional public administration' (Stever, 1988: 38–39).

'The first is that, either as a description of the facts or a scheme of reform, any simple division of government into politics-and-administration is inadequate… The convention of early self-aware public administration that a distinction could be made between politics and administration, a workable, pragmatic distinction if not a strict and principled one, was increasingly questioned in the 1930s, and was ostensibly abandoned by nearly all by mid-century. Since this distinction had been the foundation, or at least an important part of the foundation, on which scientific-professional claims for public administration had been erected, a problem of the first order was presented… How to relate fact and value, how to separate and to combine the *is* and the *ought*, certainly poses problems for us, but certainty is not only our problem. We are bound to keep working at the problem; it is fundamental to our enterprise. This was covertly or implicitly the case always; it is overtly and the case with

politics and administration seen not as two realms but as a continuum. It is disheartening to see the problem in its wide scope and intractable nature. But also in a sense a relief: We cannot be charged with a rare stupidity of incompetence… Centrally, what is the problematic here is the nature and roles of politics and administration. *In essence, we can neither live with or without the distinction, realistically separate the two nor find an agreed, proper joining.* Western history, our Constitutional structure, our political experience, and our institutional development combine to present us with a problem that cannot be solved in any definitive sense… Third, we seem to be on the way to a more adequate philosophy of the powers and functions of government, their nature and interrelation' (Waldo, 1984a: 121; xvii; xlvii; lv).

This book can be seen in some sense as being in the spirit of the predicted endeavour.

2   'It is plain that the related politics/administration and decision/execution distinctions must be accepted as permanent parts of the complicated field of forces in which the study and practice of public administration take place. If our thesis is valid that history has presented us with a dichotomy between politics and administration, then presumably the distinction is deeply grounded indeed. In any case, the related distinctions have a commonsense logic, a general acceptance, and a pragmatic usefulness. They are pervasive in our language and institutions. They cannot be discarded' (Waldo, 1984a: 106).

Waldo's (1984a) theory of their place in history is merely a reflection of their deep (but as yet, incompletely formed) roots in the human way of thinking about governance.

'The debate over the relation between politics and administration is as old as the academic field of public administration in the United States. Yet it has never been adequately resolved (Levine and Waldo…). An emphasis on the distinction earlier in the century has given way to the overwhelming violence that politics and administration are not separate. Yet vestiges of the distinction remain… The relation of the political to the administrative is thus very complex and dynamic, but we have only begun to analyze it' (Rainey, 1990: 173).

Or 'the problem of reconciling bureaucracy and democracy—the distinction between administration and politics—that Woodrow Wilson examined nearly 100 years ago, is very much alive. In a word, the reason that the ideas, with their ambiguities and contradictions, in "The Study of Administration" are still discussed is that each of the positions he articulated forms a part of the larger truth about American government' (Rabin and Bowman, 1984: 7).

'Scholars of public administration have debunked the politics–administration dichotomy but have never found a suitable replacement for it as a normative foundation. There has been little to fulfil that function but neutral competence—scientific management or administration committed to carrying out the "given" ends by the most efficient means' (Wamsley *et al.*, 1992: 60–61) or '"Whatever directions public administration takes in the period ahead it must, implicitly or explicitly, "go back to Wilson" in one sense. It cannot avoid dealing in some fashion with the problem that he addressed: The respective natures of politics and administration and the relationship between the two' (Waldo, 1984b: 232).

And the counter view, '"Correctness" as applied to [ethical] imperatives has meaning only in terms of subjective human values. "Correctness" as applied to factual propositions means objective, empirical truth… Recognition of this distinction in meanings of "correctness" would lend clarity to the distinction that is commonly made in the literature of political science between "policy questions" and "administrative questions"… Yet, neither in Goodnow's study nor in any of the innumerable discussions that have followed it have any clear-cut criteria or marks of identification been suggested that would enable one to recognize a "policy question" on sight, or to distinguish it from an "administrative question." Apparently, it has been assumed that the distinction is self-evident—so self-evident as hardly to require discussion' (Simon, 1947: 53–54).

There is a core of truth in Simon's (1947) position that will be taken up later, but the last word is from John Rohr as quoted in Thayer (1984: 263–264): 'the Wilsonian dichotomy has been attacked so incessantly and so effectively that I do not believe it is an exaggeration to say that no serious student of public administration accepts it today… despite the persuasive case academics have made to establish the political character of administration, the old Wilsonian world view still appears to be the prevailing ideology among practicing bureaucrats.'

3   It is as Einstein has been quoted as saying that "You can't solve a problem with the same consciousness that created it" (Wheatley, 1992: 3).

In other words, 'The articulation of an alternative paradigm is, however, a necessary condition before a scientific revolution can occur. Scientific revolutions require a choice among alternative paradigms. If Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions is valid, we can anticipate a resolution only if an alternate paradigm is available. If a new paradigm is to succeed, it must offer a formulation that is able to resolve some of the persisting anomalies and to provide an explanation that takes account of more extended intellectual horizons. A new paradigm, thus, might also be expected to open new frontiers of research… I shall advance the book that the sense of crisis that has pervaded the field of public administration over the last generation has been evoked by the insufficiency of the

paradigm inherent in the traditional theory of public administration. Simon's challenge will be viewed as a challenge to the traditional theory of public administration based on a number of anomalies inherent in that tradition… I agree with Waldo's conclusion that the resolution of the crisis cannot be attained by a choice between the traditional theory of administration and Simon's theory of organization' (Ostrom, 1989: 13–15).

4   The dichotomy represents the best thinking available in the formative stages of a new discipline. However, in much the same way that Jung's contemporaneous differentiation of psychological types into two groups of two was good for the time but incomplete (explained later in Chapter 8), the differentiation of the governance process into two separate but complementary parts was good for a time but has not been adequate to handle the development of analysis since then. Basically there is inadequate differentiation and the process should be seen as three parts rather than just two. It is also very telling that the same *phase #A* orientation of the co-creative will was the one omitted from Jungian typology and the politics–administration dichotomy—perhaps it was a sign of the times or perhaps it has just been progress in the complexity and degree of differentiation in thinking since that time.

5   The descriptions of the 3-Rs and the 3-Es are taken from Wamsley (1996: 355): 'The "scientific" quest for the 3-Es (economy, efficiency, effectiveness)—for increased output—is not simply misguided because it puts primary emphasis on the wrong values for public administration in a democracy, where the prior concerns should be responsiveness, representativeness, and responsibility. It is *wrong* because it is dangerously incomplete without normative grounding… The 3-Es are measures of the efficacy of means given agreed-upon or specified ends, but they do not provide a satisfactory measure of the *appropriateness* of either the means or the ends. Such a measure of appropriateness is important for all government but essential for a democratic constitutional republic. Without it such a government has no raison d'être.'

Here, Wamsley (1996) either mixes the roles of public administration and politics or it is a call for public administrators to shift from the managerial paradigm (*menetype #B*) to the politicist paradigm (*menetype #C*). What is missing in Wamsley's (1996) discussion is the public entrepreneurial perspective which is concerned with creating and defining policy options; namely, vision, creativity and initiative.

6   Kaufman (1990: 483) then actually goes on to pick up the nature of the shifting focus around the three aspects in much the way described by the dynamics of a trinity of *menetypes*. 'Although all three values are always pursued in the ordering of our government, one or another has usually been emphasized more heavily than the others in different periods (and one could add different parts of government), with the result that different institutions have been strengthened at different times.'

7   For instance, '"The broad plans of governmental action are not administrative," Wilson writes; "the detailed execution of such plans is administrative"' (Doig, 1984: 177). But there is no differentiation in the dreaming up or formulation of those plans, and their deliberation and approval as formal policy.

This lack of differentiation is also clearly evident in the accepted practice of earlier times that policy should be developed in Congress and the President is there to help the Congress carry out its program. The above-discussed emergence of the modern presidency saw a differentiation between the policy creation function increasingly assumed by the President and the deliberation on policy proposals retained by Congress. 'It is important to recall that in the early part of this century the presidency was given new coordinating chores, not to enhance presidential power but to help Congress get on with its work. For example, Congress had traditionally produced a federal budget by summing up the separate budgets negotiated individually with each executive bureau… It may be difficult to believe today, but the orienting idea in those days was that, by helping the president prepare and execute a unified executive branch budget, a professional budget staff would enhance the power of Congress, not the presidency, to effect its will' (Heclo, 1994: 137).

A big part of the problem has been: 'In a nutshell, "value," "policy," "objective," "goal," and "end" have identical meanings in organizational life. Individuals often equating "values" and "objectives." "Values" are perceived as ideal states of affairs which both individuals and organizations should seek to attain' (Thayer, 1984: 268).

However, there needs to be some differentiation in what is meant or how these ideas are used. For instance, there is the conceiving of the policy or objective, the analysis of it and the decision or commitment to it—each operation capable of being performed in a different institution. "Value" applies to the hard options in the here and now that are used in making choices or commitments to particular things, whereas objectives, goals and ends are ideas or possibilities about the future that have been conjured up for consideration. If they have run the gamut of deliberation and debate and are approved then they become concrete policy that is here and now and encapsulates an expression of the decision-makers' values. The "New Deal" had to be conceived and articulated first by the President and his team, before it could be deliberated on by Congress.

The emergence of a differentiated public entrepreneur type was also assisted by the employment of the business analogy because it almost transferred the entrepreneurial activity from politics to administration, or at least made it a function of both. 'There are two tendencies in American public administration (as L. D. White has often observed): that toward the professional, non-political executive (city-manager type) and that toward the non-

professional political executive (presidential type). Back of these two tendencies is a welter of varied and conflicting ideas. It seems clear that the generalizations that fit one of these types of executive need not necessarily fit the other. There is patently no fixed relationship between the vote-getting ability and administrative ability, and less between vote-getting and professional training for administration… By the first decade of this century, administration-is-business had become a creed, a shibboleth, and there was little serious criticism of the notion until the decade of the Great Depression. The business example was accepted in academic political science; and the corporate analogy was used to promote the spread of city-manager charters. The desirability of business-in-government even received repeated sanctions by Presidents… Moreover, the progressive and humanitarian purposes of the reformers and administrative students must not be forgotten. They thought of government as an instrument for achieving community purposes, for securing more security and equality… The contribution of business… was used to deprecate separation and balance of powers. It was used to aggrandize the chief executive. It was used to justify hierarchy, to support the principle of appointment, and to lend weight to the budget argument' (Waldo, 1984a: 35–36; 38–39).

But still the concept of the public entrepreneur was not differentiated out of the politics–administration dichotomy. But it is now seen more a virtue in administration as captured by Doig (1984: 187): 'Despite the hopes of Woodrow Wilson, then, those who lead the public authority must think of matters political as well as matters administrative. Indeed, especially for those executives whose agencies seek new program initiatives, they might more accurately be called "policy entrepreneurs" than "managerial experts," if the latter phrase implies a devotion to programming and budgeting, output measurement, and the hardware lore of management science. This entrepreneurial role, which is central to the viability of many public authorities, requires that their top officials…'

[8] This predisposition for the rational, managerial mindset to repress the entrepreneurial viewpoint is exhibited quite starkly in the following exposition on entrepreneurialism by Stever (1988: 91–93; 97–99):

'In an ideal, fully rational world, entrepreneurialism would not be possible or necessary. However, entrepreneurialism is a behavioral phenomenon that emerges in a less than an ideal world. In principle, legislatures communicate their intentions to civil servants in clearly defined legislative mandates. However, in practice, legislative mandates are often vague and confusing leaving administrative agencies and individual administrators with minimal guidance for the shaping of programmatic objectives… It is ironic that the civil servants should think of embracing their traditional nemesis, the opportunistic entrepreneur. The entrepreneur has been the role model of private sector administration since the country's founding. Furthermore, the entrepreneur has become the symbolic antithesis of public sector administration. Whereas the bureaucrat conservatively clings to the rules and to the civil service tenure for security from the market, the entrepreneur admirably chooses adventure and innovation.

Harlan Cleveland has been one of the leading exponents of this ideal for the civil service. Though Cleveland does not use the word "entrepreneur," the public administrator emerges from his thinking as a modern hero— individually confronting the new complexities and technologies of contemporary life… The effect of Cleveland's conclusion is to throw the contemporary civil servant back onto his own personal judgment as to what is in the public interest. Since there are no collective norms, the civil servant is also responsible for individually developing meaning for his own action. Hence, in entrepreneur-like fashion, the civil servant ventures out into uncharted waters armed with little more than his own individual energy, wit, and judgment…

The entrepreneur is a time-honored figure within American folklore, and this ideal continues to be resuscitated. However, it is unreasonable to expect that by following this ideal the civil servant can be considered as legitimate. This ideal has limited utility for public administration. Even classical liberal theory declined to give the entrepreneur authority over public policy. Under classical theory, the businessman puts aside his acquisitive instincts when joining the civil service. Furthermore, the initiative of the entrepreneur must always be balanced by careful planning and careful implementation in both the public and private sectors.'

[9] What is exactly going on has been muddied for a long time because of a lack of adequate differentiation in analysis. At the beginnings of the modern study of administration, Wilson (1966/1887: 16–17) intuitively explained it simply the way it was: 'Administration is the most obvious part of government; it is government in action; it is the executive, the operative, the most visible side of government, and is of course as old as government itself.'

In the analysis of public administration, such decisions in keeping with executive action came to be regarded as public servants making policy, and that was regarded as bad. Moreover, the notion of executive action was so played down that analysts and observers no longer even wanted to consider Public Administration as part of the Executive itself. In fact, Wilson (1966/1887: 25) acknowledges such a tendency from earlier times where there was a suppression of the executive creative power in favour of a focus on politics: 'The English race, consequently, has long and successfully studied the art of curbing executive power to the constant neglect of the art of perfecting executive methods… English and American political history has been a history, not of administrative development, but of legislative oversight—not of progress in governmental organization, but of advance in law-making and political criticism.'

The politics–administration dichotomy certainly did not help to encourage acknowledgement of executive leadership but entrepreneurial leadership certainly happened over the years, particularly at the time of the new deal (and in Reagan's time as noted earlier). In recent times the notion that 'Power has been aptly defined as "participation in making of decisions"' (Lasswell and Kaplan, as quoted by Woll, 1963: 4), lacks all differentiation in terms of whether the power is entrepreneurial, administrative or political; but more of this later.

[10]   Waldo (1990: 74) perceptively concluded from his analysis that, 'Public administration in the United States was brought to self-awareness by political scientists and in political science departments. But a sense of estrangement, both on the part of public administrationists and of their disciplinary colleagues has since developed… The word *estrangement* is perhaps too mild to characterize the relationship of public administration to other fields of political science. Woodrow Wilson's lament in 1887 that administration was "put aside as a 'practical detail' which clerks could arrange after doctors had agreed on principles" seems not greatly changed in some quarters today. In the perception of most political scientists down to this day, I judge, public administration concerns the lower things of government, details for lesser minds… It is interesting to note that a political scientist, describing his graduate education in the early 1970s, documented the low esteem of public administration.'

This attitude follows the logic of the dynamics of the trinity as surely as night follows day and is analogous to the human attitude to the mechanics of typing once it is learnt—the processes are ingrained and automatic, and are taken as given. Therefore, there does not need any attention to be paid to them unless something goes awry. In fact, any attention to these automatic functions can actually mess up the thinking and execution of the operations. And so it is with public administration or politicians and political scientists—it just happens and does not bear thinking about.

Wamsley *et al.* (1992: 60–61) also came to much the same conclusion in acknowledging that the neglect of public administration somehow related to such a concept of an "automatic state": 'American political scientists, who pride themselves on being part of an intellectual tradition reaching back to Plato and Aristotle, have had amazingly little to say about the phenomenon that was the central concern of those political philosophers. Perhaps this is because modern political science came into being just as pluralism became the dominant conception of the American political system. Thus, political science was, to use Lowi's harsh verb, "corrupted" by pluralism's intellectual weakness. Political science embraced "the myth of the automatic society granted us by an all-encompassing, ideally self-correcting, providentially automatic political process." An automatic process may invite description and analysis of *politics* but it does not encourage the study of how politics is related to *governance*—after all, there is no need for governance in the automatic society… The political system is on autopilot.'

As will be explained later in this book, this flowering of pluralism and seemingly automatic society is a direct result of the enabling power of the Constitution's creation of conscious governance.

[11]   That is, the study of Public Administration has a preoccupation on *menetype #B* activity and so the energy given to any reflection on the entrepreneurial *menetype #A* activity is repressed. Likewise, the study of Political Science is focused on *menetype #C* political activity and so represses any attention of the *menetype #B* activity of public administration.

[12]   The trinitarian order of these studies is evidenced by the conclusions of Hill (1992: 44) in which he identifies and describes the secondary supporting preoccupation of public administration and political science as follows. 'Perhaps public administration's most important potential affinity with public bureaucracy has to do with the discipline's basic orientation. Whereas political science often has been society-oriented and has considered the state to be epiphenomenal, public administration usually has been state-centered and has considered the state to be autonomous.'

That is, political science has an eye out for other political systems or potential utopias in respect to its own, while public administration stays focused in a secondary manner on the different manifestations of its own political system without venturing into speculation about creating potential utopias.

From this understanding of the interrelationship of the three fields of study it can be interpolated that the study of public administration is in the spirit of scientific method (i.e. *menetype #B* orientation) but it is not a science because it cannot reach inviolable truths. It can employ sciences to ascertain the truth of the facts but, being in the political sphere, the truths that it is required to search out are truths of reality and its value, which are decided by politics, not public administration. On the other hand, political science is more a science but only in the terms that it is actually reaching certitudes or commitments to the belief in a particular reality in the same way that the natural sciences express a commitment to a belief in a particular fact. However, it does not follow the scientific method to reach such certitudes or commitments but rather follows the method of analogy, which is more associated with philosophy than the sciences.

It is contended in this book that only a field of study that includes all the above three studies could truly be called scientific—and philosophic at the same time—in that all the aspects could be analysed in the framework of their interrelationship to each other. That is, contrary to what some of the earlier public administration academics

would contend, the dynamics of administration differ between the different political regimes and vice versa. *Such a new field of study could just be termed "Governance".*

[13]   It is interesting and telling the way Waldo (1990) finishes off his paper looking at the cleft between politics and public administration (or Political Science and the study of Public Administration), because he actually brings in the missing aspect of entrepreneurial or Utopian will: 'If one searches for a term to designate a human collectivity in which politics and administration are well integrated, two of the terms considered certainly would be *totalitarian* and *utopian.* Patently, we are not currently in risk for totalitarianism or within sight of utopia. But if and as we seek to move toward the latter, we must be aware of the former' (Waldo, 1990: 82).

Indeed, we must be aware of all aspects because totalitarianism is some potential despot's idea of utopia or, put simply, his/her vision of a better world.

[14]   There are some who have come near to suggesting a trichotomy such as the following: 'treats the same general issue in a different fashion, suggesting three approaches to public administration theory: the "managerial," the "political," and the "legal." Each approach corresponds to a particular branch of government and each carries a distinctive set of values. Rosenbloom argues that in the modern administrative state, these three sets of values have permeated the administrative agencies of government, placing administrators in the unenviable position of having to balance the various interests represented by the three approaches' (Denhardt, 1990: 45).

[15]   'First we need to recognize that at the highest level, speaking descriptively and conceptually, there is no dichotomy [*this represents the attitude of political science operating at the highest level of abstraction #C*]…

at a less abstract level of behaviour and action, there is, and always has been, if not a dichotomy, at least a considerable distinction [*this represents the attitude of public administration operating at the menetype #B second level of abstraction—the separation seems less distinct the more public administration employs its secondary supporting aspect of political thinking type #C*]…

Finally, at a third level of meaning, we feel we should acknowledge, elucidate, and extend the distinction between politics and administration [*this represents the attitude of the menetype #A executive will inherent in the practitioner who decides exactly what could be done in the situation and also in the designs of utopia which seek to replace one encountered reality with another more desirable one*]' (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990: 42–43, with embellishments).

[16]   The concepts of policy formulation and policy implementation are essentially the same two aspects of public administration that were recognised as far back as Wilson (1966/1887: 16): 'It is the object of administrative study to discover, first, what government can properly and successfully do, and secondly, how it can do these proper things with the utmost possible efficiency and at the least possible cost either of money or energy.'

'Therefore, to Wilson the division of responsibilities between the public and the bureaucracy was one of concern over goals at one level and means at another. This did not mean that the career administrator was denied the right to exercise discretion and judgment, but it did mean that judgment decisions should be confined to selecting the best means to achieve the ends prescribed by the public. The bulk of the education, training, and experience of the "ideal" administrator would be directed toward acquiring technical proficiency rather than a familiarity with philosophy and value systems...This makes administration impartial. It separates it from politics and substantive policy-making. It keeps it professional, encourages dispatch, minimizes friction, and ensures impartiality and efficiency' (Morrow, 1984: 252)

It also essentially reflects the differentiation made by Thayer (1984: 264): 'I make a distinction between "politics" (the theory and practice of winning elections) and "policy" (what winners do while in office). While some point to *empirical* evidence that "policy making is political," those in government must argue on *normative* grounds. Presidents may appear to make policy decisions for partisan advantage, and career administrators may appear to make policy decisions, but neither presidents nor careerists will admit they do what they are not supposed to. The important distinction, then, is between *policy* (and policymakers) and *administration* (and administrators).'

[17]   This trinity has been conceived by some as the "cozy triangles" of a particular Congressional (sub-) committee, an agency, and an interest group (Nachmias and Rosenbloom, 1980: 54) but this is clearly a lower level and more a particular manifestation of the more general trinity being considered here.

[18]   The Government is focused on the level of assessment and commitment to the shape and quality of society and encapsulates the highest level of abstraction in the policy of the Government. The Public Administration is focused at the level of organization and processes to deliver specified Government policy and programs, or to provide advice on how they could be changed. As such, it is at the lower *level #B* of abstraction. The general public captures a collection of individuals who are both electors of the Government and clients of Government programs and, as such, encapsulates the lowest level of abstraction in the concrete desires of individuals both for a piece of the Government pie and also the type and size of pie that is to be cut up.

That these three aspects comprise a trinity of *menetypes* can also be appreciated from the nature of the dynamics. For instance, the focus of the Government is on reaching its decisions, secondly on the public in terms both of voting constituency and of the impact of its proposed policies on individuals or groups of individuals. As discussed above, the attitude of the Government is along the lines that its policies and programs will be automatically delivered by the administration seemingly on autopilot. Taking the further example of the general public, their major focus will be on their own welfare as individuals and as members of the society that the system is helping to create. Their secondary focus is on the delivery of the programs, on how the Government is actually geared to provide for them at the moment in its existing programs, which are being delivered by The Public Administration, and they have very little concern for the detail of how the Government goes about deliberating or reaching its decisions to change such programs—their main concern is the impact of those decisions on their programs. The words of the decisions do nothing in themselves but they do act on the public as though speaking to their unconscious in sparking their dreams and wishes (i.e. the public effectively represses the Government and its internal processes into their collective unconscious and it is to their collective unconscious that new policies are marketed as the answers to their hidden desires). But in the end, the Government is usually judged by the public not on how well it reached its decisions, but more on the concrete results delivered to the individuals through The Public Administration.

[19]   These two (soon to be differentiated into three) processes are complementary and though acting different ways for different results they could be going more or less simultaneously in real time and intermingled in the actions of the individual or group. It operates a bit like the time-sharing dynamic of a computer, in which a number of quite different operations can seemingly be progressed simultaneously. This is both a characteristic of the dynamics of the trinity of *menetypes* and observable in practice. 'Vague and contradictory policies are hard to implement. Implementation is in many ways a slippery subject. Differences among implementation scholars have sometimes been grouped into "top–down" or "bottom–up" approaches, but in reality disagreements have a variety of dimensions. Where implementation starts or ends is not even settled. While implementation is commonly referred to as a stage, boundaries are not clear… Policy continually evolves instead of being initially established and thereafter perhaps reformulated' (Ingram, 1990: 463–464).

[20]   'The President's Committee on Administrative Management estimated in 1937 that at least two-thirds of all public bills passed by Congress emanated directly from the administrative branch. Various observers since that period have indicated that the bulk of public legislation passed by Congress does not originate there, but rather in the particular administrative agency or agencies concerned with the legislation… Planning, which is executive in character, may lead directly to administrative legislation' (Woll, 1963: 8; 11).

[21]   This is the development of the "teleological sense of purpose" (Lane, 1996: 251) or vision of the way things could be different, which (as discussed above) is increasingly incumbent on the President to create and include in an integrated and coherent policy agenda.

This entrepreneurial function was often seen as completely missing in The Public Administration of former times. 'The old bureaucracies were not deemed capable of changing their ways, l*et al*one inventing new approaches. The permanent government, as it came to be called, was not admired more by democrats than Republicans, or more by liberals than conservatives' (Kaufman, 1990: 486). Since those times, it has been acknowledged that Public Administrators "make policy" (which is meant to mean they play politics but really only means they make decisions) and some even advocate The Public Administration should be a separate fourth arm of government, politically equivalent to the Executive and Legislative institutions.

It is interesting to note that the entrepreneurial function is also absent from Waldo's (1984b: 231) triad of 'politics, law, and management [which] would provide a framework that could accommodate what are regarded as innovations in the study and practice of public administration, indicated by such terms as management science, policy studies (or analysis), and implementation.'

The concept of "innovations" itself is connected with the entrepreneurial spirit and it is not differentiated in Waldo's (1984b) triad—in fact, the law and management can essentially be regarded as expressions of the same spirit at different levels of abstraction and that is why the courts have developed a huge bureaucracy and why management likes to follow rules, precedents and good order.

[22]   In personal philosophy as expounded from earliest times, it is contended that this particular step has to occur first—there is first the seeing of the whole before studying the interrelationships between its parts. Or to put it another way, first there needs to be an appreciation of what is to be done before working out how to do it.

[23]   'It is a fact of life in the civil service that one must be judicious about the enforcement of government policy, particularly when enforcement infringes on the interests of powerful institutions in the environment. Most agency policy is created and modified by its assessment of the power of these vested interests in the environment. Furthermore, even the most powerful administrative agency does not have the power to create or preserve public policy in the face of environmental opposition' (Stever, 1988: 106–107).

[24]   This trichotomy is essentially encapsulated in Kaufman's formulation of the three values underpinning public governance as follows: 'Underlying the prediction was the argument that the design of our government was strongly influenced by the quest for three values in the conduct of the public business: representativeness, politically neutral competence, and executive leadership. Although these three values are always pursued in the ordering of our government, one or another has usually been emphasized more heavily than the others in different periods, with the result that different institutions have been strengthened at different times' (Kaufman, 1990: 483).

Moreover, as noted above, Kaufman's description of the dynamics involved in the experience of these three values could be taken to resemble the dynamics of a trinity of *menetypes*!

[25]   This type of trinitarian relationship would actually satisfy the major criticism that Waldo had against the politics–administration dichotomy which went along the following lines: 'either as a description of the facts or a scheme of reform, any simple division of government into politics–administration is inadequate. As a description of fact it is inadequate because the governing process is a "seamless web of discretion and action." Concerning "politics–administration," as a scheme of reform it is inadequate because it bears the same defect as the tripartite scheme it was designed to replace: it carries the idea of division of dissimilarity, of antagonism… doubt has arisen about both the possibility and the desirability of making a sharp separation of power or division of function between the deciding and the executing agencies of government' (Waldo, 1984a: 121; 200).

In the trinity all is one and one is all. The other point to make, again, is that it is erroneous to take discretion as synonymous with politics, when it is just the act of making a decision, which may by nature be action in terms of any one of executive (or entrepreneurial), management (little discretion) or politics. Not only Waldo (1984a) lacked this differentiation, it has been a common oversight.

[26]   'The bureaucracy under the American political system has a large share of responsibility for the public promotion of policy and even more in organizing the political basis for its survival and growth. It is generally recognized that the agencies have a special competence in the technical aspects of their fields which of necessity gives them a rightful policy initiative. In addition, they have or develop a shrewd understanding of the politically feasible in the group structure within which they work. Above all, in the eyes of their supporters and their enemies they represent the institutionalized embodiment of policy, an enduring organization actually or potentially capable of mobilizing power behind policy… Agencies and bureaus more or less perforce are in the business of building, maintaining, and increasing their political support. They lead and in large part are led by the diverse groups whose influence sustains them' (Long, 1966: 45–46).

[27]   This is most clearly demonstrated in the way the public administrators feel they need to create a sense of crisis to get political agreement to some new way or some new funding. In the main, it can be seen as essentially primitive, undeveloped entrepreneurial behaviour that is dysfunctional within the governance system. 'Agency-specific crisis rhetoric is an integral part of budget hearings at all levels of public administration. Congressmen, state legislators, and councilmen have been barraged by this rhetoric for so long that they can make allowances for it and place it in the context of their own vision of the public interest. Crisis rhetoric is seldom sufficient in itself to alter incremental budgeting practices… However, in the past two decades, there are signs that this expected, and now traditional crisis rhetoric has spread beyond the immediate confines of budget hearings. Administrators at all levels of the system are not above using the media to leak information to extend their crisis rhetoric to an initiated public. When this occurs, it is no longer crisis rhetoric directed at an informed legislator but rather it is crisis engineering that attempts to mobilize the fears of the public for agency advantage… One cannot deny that Western democracies are crisis-ridden. However, the intent of crisis engineering is to heighten the sensitivity to these crises while opportunistically portraying the civil service as the possessor of the only possible solution. The self-serving solution distorts the real intent of the entrepreneur behind the rhetoric. Furthermore, given the fragmentation of post-Progressive public administration, there is little guarantee that an increase in power or size will solve the crisis' (Stever, 1988: 94–96).

[28]   This supports the conclusion/assertion of Wamsley *et al.* (1990: 49) that, in essence, 'the Public Administrators may have to play the role of balance wheel in the constitutional order, using their statutory powers and professional expertise to favor whichever participant in the constitutional process needs their help at a given time in history to preserve the purposes of the Constitutions itself.' Except that the Public Administrators are only second-order balance wheels and, as such, they can only suggest rather than decide. The first-order balance wheels in the form of the Supreme Court can decide. This is an important difference that is not entirely brought out in the Blacksburg Manifesto (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990).

Or 'Let me put it simply. Administration is an integral, interactive, and subordinated part of the government, a part of the whole. As such, it cannot be understood apart from government. Understanding government is the task of political science. It follows that the study of public administration is a part of the larger political science enterprise' (Fesler, 1990: 94).

[29]   This conclusion is comparable with the conclusion by Wamsley *et al.* (1990: 50) that 'The Public Administrator should thus be both an analyst and an educator but *not* a philosopher-king or mandarin.'

That is, they should not assume the position of deciding for or committing the Government beyond the scope of their existing brief. However, they could be more than analyst and educator in that they can be regarded as eminent intellectuals certainly to be always heard, but not necessarily heeded—because considerations other than knowledge, logic and reason might be more important. Above all, the Public Administrators should be reliable to give a true account of the facts of the situation and be ready to provide a judgment on the options that are likely to work or not—that is, they should be looked to as experts on the cause and effect implicit in policies and policy proposals. That means that the continuing long-term education of Public Administrators is important, as suggested by Wamsley *et al.* (1990: 50). However, it is not for them to educate the citizens at large unless it is part of a specific government intent—it is probably more important for the Public Administrators to learn from the people than vice versa so it is part of their knowledge base. Rather, their knowledge is to inform their advice in the decision-making process and their actions in implementation, but all dialogue helps.

³⁰   In a sense it is much like Weber's (1948: 137–138) distinction between science and art: 'Scientific work is chained to the course of progress; Whereas in the realm of art there is no progress in the same sense.' Like art, there does not need to be progress within politics, rather it is the spirit of survival and maintenance of power. Progress is more the product of public entrepreneurship ably assisted by the knowledge and expertise of The Public Administration.

'Every scientific "fulfilment" raises new "questions"; it asks to be "surpassed" and outdated. Whoever wishes to serve science has to resign himself to this fact. Scientific works certainly can last as "gratifications" because of their artistic quality, or they may remain important as a means of training. Yet they will be surpassed scientifically—let that be repeated—for it is our common fate and, more, our common goal. We cannot work without hoping that others will advance further than we have… In principle, this progress goes on *ad infinitum.* And with this we come to inquire into the *meaning* of science. For, after all, it is not self-evident that something subordinate to such a law is sensible and meaningful in itself. Why does one engage in doing something that in reality never comes, and never can come, to an end?.. Scientific progress is a fraction, the most important fraction, of the process of intellectualisation which we have been undergoing for thousands of years and which nowadays is usually judged in such an extremely negative way' (Weber, 1948: 138–139).

And so it is with the Public Administration's continual pursuit of ever better ways of clarifying and satisfying the public interest. Each policy developed can be, and is expected to be, surpassed. It will go on *ad infinitum*, interrupted only by political catastrophes in terms of a change of governance.

³¹   It is in this limited sense only that The Public Administration might perhaps be regarded as a trustee (as suggested by Wamsley *et al.*, 1990: 48) in that it is a trustee of the accumulation of Government commitment to deliver a certain measure of the public interest in respect to this group of individuals. However, The Public Administration must constantly be ready to give back to Government processes that information and knowledge that it has been accumulating. Trustee, however, implies legal title and control over something, and The Public Administration certainly has no control over the decisions and actions of the first-team of political powers but rather, it is that The Public Administration needs to take heed of its deliberation and positions on the "public interest." Perhaps to use the term trustee is misleading as it implies that The Public Administration is a first-order player when it is really but a principal adviser to Government. Rather, the Public Administrator is more like a custodian or keeper of the record, much like the custodian of an art collection who is required to collect the pieces as they become available and keep them in good order, exhibit them for enjoyment of people as appropriate, and take on new pieces of art that are provided by any of the benefactors.

³²   However, public administrators' involvement in politics should not be allowed to overshadow their main task of administering and assisting the Government. The Refounding Project (Wamsley and Wolf, 1996) is therefore doing The Public Administration a disservice when it seeks to foster the concept that government equates with public administration and entreats the Public Administrator to enter the field of politics—where he/she is encouraged to engage with the citizens like, or in competition with, the politicians in the formulation of policy. For instance, 'In my view, *Refounding Public Administration* calls for a conceptual scheme and practice in which politics and administration are in contested relationship (and because the relationship is a continuing contest, and politics *is* contest, politics has the edge). The legitimate desire to provide moral and theoretical support to beleaguered bureaucrats should not be permitted to obscure this need by stressing the merits of system steerage so much that the democratic possibilities of politics are excluded. Politics cannot depend solely on legislative accountability; it also requires a strong form of citizenship in order not to be overwhelmed by the administrative tendency toward self-aggrandizement… Not surprisingly, administrators tend to view active citizens with, at best, mixed feelings. Yet administrative governance, if it is to be governance rather than management, must embrace the otherness, the openness, of the disruptive political impulse, that is, of active citizenship' (Stivers, 1996: 262).

On the contrary, it is argued above that such a move to the political cultivation of a citizen-based constituency would lead to greater rather than lesser aggrandisement.

³³   'Administration begins where the legislature says it shall begin. It begins where the administrator begins, and the legislature decides that. Administration may include the making of rules and policy which *looks* like legislation or

politics. But its essence is that the administrator, elected or appointed (and most usually in the modern states the latter), cannot himself determine the range or object of that policy. He has authority, but it is a conditioned, derived authority. Thus, in the governmental process in general, there are agencies which are concerned with making and executing policy, and there is a descending narrowing latitude of discretion in the making of policy. The latitude is greatest where electorate meets legislative; it then tapers down through a descending line of hierarchy until the discretion left to the messenger and the charwoman and the minor manipulative grades is almost nil' (Finer, 1966: 262).

However, this needs to be kept in perspective in the context of the real power invested in some agencies. Control over vast resources and people means real power in any governance system. 'We all know that bureaucracies possess significant power to determine the content of government policies. We all know that their political resources are substantial—information, constituency support, decision-making authority, access to the communication media, control of the speed and distribution of services, connections with key political officers and staffs, and so on—and that they therefore are already independent participants and bargainers in the process of governing. The facts are not at issue' (Kaufman, 1990: 488).

34   'On the one hand, the bureaucracies and their allies have a great many impressive resources… They are well organised, politically active, politically sophisticated, and well financed. Public service unions are now a major part of the labor movement… On the other hand, civil servants are not a unified bloc. They are immensely varied collection of occupations, ranging from highly trained professionals and technicians to relatively unskilled labor' (Kaufman, 1990: 491). Moreover, the agencies are on about different agendas with different political power groups. They are a very fragmented lot, an aspect that will be dealt with later.

Or, more basically, the orientation of public administration does not consider whether it should be involved, or whether it should be doing something or not, it is just required to implement the policy in the best way it can. It is the same with Weber's (1948: 144–145) example: 'Consider jurisprudence. It establishes what is valid according to the rules of juristic thought, which is partly bound by logically compelling and partly by conventionally given schemata. Juridical thought holds when certain rules and certain methods of interpretation are recognized as binding. Whether there should be law and whether one should establish just these rules—such questions jurisprudence does not answer. It can only state: If one wishes this result, according to the norms of our legal thought, this legal rule is the appropriate means of attaining it.'

35   This positive sentiment runs counter to the negative way many others have viewed the practice. 'R. Fulton Cutting reflected the still dominant sentiment in 1900 when he opined, "The real crime committed against society by the spoils system is moral, not economic. It poisons our institutions at the fountainhead, corrupting the electorate and creating a political conscience antagonistic to morals"' (Waldo, 1984a: 29).

This book is viewing the glass as half-full, whereas it is usually seen as half-empty, with this practice being seen as an indulgent exercise of patronage, or a "spoils system," that is a negative in respect to the quality of government. Expressing it another way: 'What does this spoils system, the turning over of federal offices to the following of the victorious candidate, mean for the party formations of today? It means that quite unprincipled parties oppose one another; they are purely organizations of job hunters drafting their changing platforms according to the chances of vote-grabbing, changing their colors to a degree which, despite all analogies, is not yet to be found elsewhere… In America, the spoils system, supported in this fashion, has been technically possible because American culture with its youth could afford purely dilettante management… This connection, in turn, is the basis for the fact that the system is gradually dying out. America can no longer be governed only by dilettantes… The spoils system will thus gradually recede into the background and the nature of party leadership is then likely to be transformed also—but as yet, we do not know in what way' (Weber, 1948: 108–111). Weber was slightly wrong on this one, principally because he saw the negative aspects as predominant rather than the positive aspects.

Moreover, the practice of the Presidents appointing their own to the top positions in The Public Administration has been a part of the US governance system from the start: 'The nature of the membership of the elite group in the federal service during the early period has been the object of much scholarly attention, and the evidence with regard to it is quite substantial. Perhaps the most reliable source is the statistical comparison made by Sidney H. Aronson of appointments by John Adams, Jefferson, and Jackson of persons to the elite positions… Finally, they indicate that the principle and practice of tenure in office did not apply at the top level, particularly when there was a change in party control of the Presidency. Of 87 elite members appointed by Adams 60 (more than two thirds) were original appointments—i.e. were not hold overs or reappointments from the previous administration. In the case of Jefferson, 73 of 92 elite members (nearly four fifths) were original appointments; for Jackson, 95 of 108 were original appointments—nearly nine tenths. The expectancy of job continuity of elite officeholders was, on the average, no greater than it is for the political executives today. Obviously there is a long precedent for the American practice of wholesale turnover of administrative leadership during political transitions' (Mosher, 1982: 62).

36   '"[P]olicy" and "administration" are not the only analogue of superior–subordinate. Herbert Simon concluded that the distinction between "legislators" and "administrators" echoed his elaborate distinction between "values"

and "facts." *Value* questions are *policy* questions, but *facts* are associated with *administration*' (Thayer, 1984: 267).

It is also similar to the 'distinction between ethics and administrative theory—a distinction that I am sure is about as convincing as the distinction between policy and administration' (Rohr, 1990b: 97)—or Simon's value and fact.

It is interesting that Wamsley *et al.* (1990: 42) observed in relation to the long-continuing debate on the politics–administration dichotomy, that 'we must acknowledge that public administration theory detoured sharply into an intellectual cul-de-sac when some of us followed Herbert Simon's attempt to establish a fact–value dichotomy.'

It would have been thought that this fact–value dichotomy should actually have enhanced the understanding of the politics–administration dichotomy, particularly in the way it captured the cognitive process of reversion in the policy development process. In particular, the criterion of truth in fact is a prerequisite for sound policy development and the criterion of an agreed value set is the guide to deciding on good policy that warrants one's commitment. Values are synonymous with politics and fact with administration. The mere realisation that Simon (1947) actually reversed the order in naming the fact–value dichotomy should have hinted at the deeper level of its meaning and significance. Rather than talk about politics followed by the administration of the policy, Simon (1947) talked about the establishment of the facts by The Public Administration before the politics made a choice about the value of the different policy options. That is, it looked more to the process of policy formation rather than to policy implementation. Policy implementation is the primary understanding given to the meaning of administration and because Simon's dichotomy did not make this aspect of governance the principal focus (a focus which was important for The Public Administration), it was regarded, in hindsight, as a diversion. In summary, there were only two ways of thinking being captured and that fact and value were just expressions of the higher aspirations of administration and politics as they went about deciding what needed to be done. That is, these two dichotomies were synonymous and both captured only the *menetype #B* and *menetype #C* perspectives, respectively.

Of more significance to the current argument: both dichotomies failed to take into account the public entrepreneurial or *menetype #A* perspective. Waldo (1984a: xviii) was more insightful and reflective: 'The rigor and force of Simon's work are impressive, and the question why the enterprise of self-aware public administration did not reconstitute itself on this new basis is an important question. It is also a question difficult to answer. Part of the answer may be found in a judgment that the new formulation is too rigid and mechanical, unrealistic when applied in a governmental context; that it merely substitutes one dichotomy for another ("Simon's fault"). Part of the answer may be in a judgment that public administrationists were unable to understand or unwilling to apply the new formulation; that they were too traditional in outlook and too busy with "chores" to make the necessary effort ("Public administration's fault"). While, to be sure, *Administrative Behavior* has had an osmotic effect in public administration, it has not led to a reconstruction of the enterprise. For my part, while I judge there is an element of truth in both of the above reasons I believe that the nature of the problem is such that it *cannot be solved*—acceptably, workably—given our constitutional system, our constitutional history, and our democratic ideology. All we can hope for is piecemeal solutions, temporary agreements.'

It can be solved, and this book proffers a workable, useful solution but perhaps not a completely satisfactory one as it does not and cannot, elevate the status of The Public Administration within the US constitutional system of governance.

[37]   In earlier times, this distinction between facts and values was used to explain the objective stance of a science master by Weber (1978b: 69): 'the question whether, in the academic context, the teachers practical value-judgments (whether based on ethical standards, cultural ideals or some other kind of "world view") ought or ought not to be "acknowledged". This question cannot be discussed in scientific terms, since it is itself entirely dependent on practical value judgments and so irresoluble. Even if we only mention the extremes, two positions have been represented: (a) the view that, while it is quite correct to distinguish between, on the one hand, logically demonstrable or empirically observable facts and, on the other, the value-judgments which are derived from practical standards, ethical standards or world views, nevertheless, in spite of (or perhaps even just because of) this, both categories of problem come within the scope of academic teaching; (b) the view that, even if this distinction could *not* be carried through with complete logical consistency, nevertheless it is desirable as far as possible to keep all practical value-questions in the background in one's teaching.'

This advice is indeed of relevance to public administrators. View (b) is essentially that proffered in classical public administration theory and as Weber regards it as unacceptable for his science masters, it too is unacceptable and unrealistic for public administrators. The other path, of clarifying when one is proffering a fact or where one is promoting a value, is the more productive way: 'View (a) seems to me to be acceptable (even from the point of view of its possible adherents) if and only if the academic teacher imposes on himself the unconditional obligation of rigorously making clear to his audience, and above all to himself, in each individual case (even at the risk of making his lectures boring), which of his statements on that occasion is an assertion of

fact, either logically demonstrable or empirically observable, and which a practical value-judgment. To do this certainly seems to me to be a straightforward requirement of intellectual integrity, once the distinction between the two domains is conceded; in this case it is the absolute minimum that is required' (Weber, 1978b: 70).

Public Administrators are likewise called to be clear about which are facts and which are value-judgments but, even more, they should be clear about whether the particular value-judgments are those legitimately articulated by the governance process or whether they are personal value-judgments—and public administrators are encouraged to favour the former over the latter.

It is interesting to note again that there is no mention by Weber (1978b) of the entrepreneurial worldview for much the same reasons as to why there is no mention in public administration theory in respect to the politics–administration dichotomy. He does, however, bring it into his later discussion on rule making: 'This ideal "rule" would then include a precept on the matter, which would include the "norm" according to which Crusoe "would have to" behave if he wished to adhere strictly to the ideal of "purposive" action. It may therefore be treated, on the one hand, as an evaluative standard—not, of course, a standard of "moral" evaluation, but of "teleological" evaluation, which purposive "action" presupposes as an "ideal"' (Weber, 1978b: 104).

It is this teleological aspect of policy, or public entrepreneurship, that the Public Administrator also has to be clear about, particularly as to whether it can be objectively taken as legitimately articulated by the governance processes or whether it is a personal vision.

The distinction between value and facts is perhaps much clearer in the private sector organizations which have the full impact of *menetype #A* economic thinking at the societal level, and are encouraged actually to suppress value in favour of fact: 'The market is blind to the intrinsic ends of things and considers things and the individuals themselves, converted into the labor force, as "facts," to wit, as factors of production. In consequence, contemporary disciplines such as economics, which take for granted the market-centered society, have to be value-free, and exclusively concerned with "fact." Implied in these disciplines is the claim that values are simply aspects of human subjectivity. They are, at best, to be considered as exogenous or secondary qualities of things, not as their properties Thus they cannot be the object of cognitive assessment. From the analytic viewpoint cognitive and normative statements then become mutually exclusive. It is of interest to note that such a dichotomization is reflected in the research interests within even the leading departments of social science in universities in this country today' (Ramos, 1981: 36).

Yet they are seen as more of a partnership and hard to separate (just as it is hard to separate politics and administration to some) in the study of public administration. That is why Simon's (1947) fact–value dichotomy might have been looked upon as a diversion in the field of public administration but treated as real in the economic sphere, which, of course, was the underpinning mindset of Simon's (1947) analysis: 'The identification of rationality as calculability is taken for granted by both Simonists and anti-Simonists… As explained elsewhere in this book, classically, the concept of rationality had always had ethical overtones, and to call man (or a society) rational was to recognize his allegiance to an objective standard of values above any economizing imperatives. But Simon writes as though economizing were the sole criterion of rationality. There is not a single instance in his book in which he explicitly indicates the boundaries within which his concept is valid. Had Simon specified that his view was only valid in the world of pure economic pursuits his position would be more accurate' (Ramos, 1981: 106).

[38]   The potential–fact–value trichotomy can be re-expressed as the ends–means–choice trichotomy because each reflects essentially the same trio of mindsets; namely *menetypes #A, #B,* and *#C*, respectively. Simon (1947) did pick up on the third aspect of ends, potential or vision in his "means–end" relationship but he failed to marry it together with his "value–fact" dichotomy (as expressed in the observation that the order of "means–end" should be intuitively reversed if it is to line up with the understanding of "fact–value"), although he did recognise they were about different things. 'The significance of the "means–end" relationship now becomes clearer. It is clear that the "means–end" distinction does not correspond to the distinction between fact and value. What then is the connection between the two sets of terms? Simply this: A means–end chain is a series of anticipations that connect a value with the situations realizing it, and these situations, in turn, with the behaviours that produce them. Any element in this chain may be either "means" or "end" depending on whether its connection with the value end of the chain, or its connection with the behavior end of the chain, is in question… It was found that means and ends do not completely correspond to facts and values, respectively, but that there is some connection between the two sets of terms' (Simon, 1947: 74; 77). He almost connects them together but does not go quite far enough.

With an appreciation of the trinitarian nature of policy formulation there is some advice that is readily available to those in the process and can be gleaned from the advice given by Lonergan (1957) in respect to this process within an individual on his/her cognitive journey to knowing. Namely, the policy initiators (*menetype #A*) should be attentive, the policy advisers (*menetype #B*) should be critical (or diligent questioners) and the policy decision-makers (*menetype #C*) should be reasonable (taking account of everything in its proper perspective). Or, put in another way, the policy initiators are driven by the pursuit of "the good," the policy advisers by a pursuit of "the true", and the policy decision-makers by a pursuit of "the real".

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[39]   It is with this understanding in mind that one should issue a caution about taking the following advice of Wamsley *et al.* (1990: 43) too far: 'The Public Administration's assertion of legitimacy will need to be founded on more direct linkages with the people, in order to win their trust.'

The clients should be treated with respect and concern in program delivery but the only reason for direct linkages to be formed is to solicit empirical data to assist in policy advice and program design. The clients should trust the Public Administrators' integrity and loyalty to the Government's formal intent rather than to trust them personally (through direct contact) to give them what they need!

[40]   This claim was repeated and discussed in a later article by Wamsley (1996: 352): 'On the first page of Waldo's (1952) article I have underlined in red one of those insights for which he is justly famous. It reads, "If administration is indeed 'the core of modern government,' then a theory of democracy in the twentieth century must embrace administration" (p. 81). This book and this chapter are premised on Waldo's insight inverted and altered a bit: *Administration is the "core of modern government," and theorizing about American public administration, its practice and praxis* in the 21st century, needs normative grounding in a public philosophy drawn from values of the Constitution, the philosophy of pragmatism, and democratic theory.'

[41]   Such a *menetype #B* mindset thinks in similar logical terms (though not literally the same) to that encapsulated in the administrative principles that were debunked by Simon (1947: 20–36). They are not tied to hard and fast principles as portrayed by Simon (1947) but it is characteristic of the logical, methodical and objective process of their thinking. As Waldo (1984a: xlviii) acknowledged, 'It was clear that the principles did not answer questions: how could they, when different principles gave different answers? But it was clear that these principles gave important clues as to what to look for and some help in judging what was found'—or, in other words, the principles gave some guidance an how to think like an ideal public administrator (*menetype #B*).

Something else of their spirit is also captured by Waldo (1984a: 192): 'EFFICIENCY: THE "GOOD" OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. One of the most careful treatments of "efficiency" is by Luther Gulick in his essay on "Science, Values and Public Administration."

"In the science of administration," he announces, "whether public or private, the basic 'good' is efficiency. The fundamental objective of the science of administration is the accomplishment of the work in hand with the least expenditure of man-power and materials. Efficiency is thus axiom number one in the value scale of administration." However: "This brings administration into apparent conflict with certain elements of the value scale of politics, whether we use that term in its scientific or in its popular sense…"'

Efficiency is about logical order, objective and true connections between cause and effect and exemplifies the core spirit of *menetype #B* thinking.

[42]   Weber (1947: 330ff) went through the characteristics of the bureaucratic organization in great detail which was neatly summarised by among others Georgiou (1975: 291ff) with the Yates "model" of administrative efficiency as spelled out by Wamsley *et al.* (1992: 62) being an updated version to take account of the politics–administration and Simon's (1947) fact–value dichotomies which had come into currency. But they are not repeated here as most people have a pretty good understanding of what comprises bureaucratic behaviour—both good and bad.

[43]   Rather than describing The Public Administration as the heart of the government, Waldo (1984b: 229) quotes White as describing it as 'the heart of the problem of modern government'.

The core here is taken to mean where the essence or seed of the whole resides, and the seed of the US political system is not formed and grown in The Public Administration. Rather The Public Administration is more like the base of an iceberg, which is big and present but essentially unseen—an extension of the visible portion of the iceberg that is fashioned in its likeness and moves with it. Thus The Public Administration is like the unconscious of the political system that is fashioned by the nature and shape of the conscious aspect, or visible portion of the political system that is called the legislative and executive powers of government.

[44]   'The Supreme Court's decision about the content of the rules prevails because of the definition of a rule, given to all of us alike. It is the basis of Alexander Hamilton's statement in the *Federalist Paper No. 78* that judges have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely "judgment"—an argument that Hamilton thought sufficient to support judicial review' (Easterbrook, 1987: 177).

The legislature enshrines the force of power, the executive executes the will to achieve the good, and the Court expresses the judgment of the truth. In a similar vein, the role of The Public Administration is to judge and express the objective truth at the second order of government policy-making and as such, it too has "neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment"—hopefully wise judgment and counsel.

'The power of judicial review, then, is not properly understood as an artificial power added to the natural power of the courts for purposes of self-defense. It is "deducible… from the general theory of a limited constitution," which constitution "attempts to set bounds to the legislative direction." The right of judicial review is therefore

not limited to guarding the judicial power against encroachment, or even to guarding the separation of powers, but rather extends to guarding the Constitution in all of its parts that is the foundation of security for the individual and his rights' (Wilson, 1994: 82–83).

⁴⁵   For instance, 'Wilson looked in two directions. One was toward Europe where, travellers reported and his professors had emphasized, public affairs were administered with a competence that put our slattern democratic administration to shame. But I think Wilson was largely mistaken in his belief that there was a "science" that could be transferred—freed of its autocratic airs or not. European administrative techniques were intimately related to European history, class systems, and educational institutions. Above all they had relationships to different constitutional and legal systems. Of course some things could be, and were, roughly copied. But most of what Wilson saw as "science" he misconstrued' (Waldo, 1984b: 228).

⁴⁶   Another example: 'Perhaps the most concise, simplest, most widely accepted definitions of democracy were those implicit in the Gettysburg address of Abraham Lincoln. Our nation was one "conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are equal." And our Civil War was to ensure the survival of government "of the people, by the people, for the people." Clearly the one phrase of the triad which is distinctive for democracy is the second one, "by the people." The first would apply to government of any stripe and the third to any of paternalistic flavor' (Mosher, 1982: 4).

That is, the democracy conceived by the *menetype #A* mindset (in liberty) has only a secondary focus on equality (*menetype #B*) and, therefore, it is acceptable that government "by the people" does not have to mean the participative democracy as practiced by the ancient Greeks, but rather representative democracy where all the citizens theoretically have equal opportunity to input and influence the governance process. Moreover, Government action is also important alongside its policy and it is, therefore, crucial that the spirit of equality (*menetype #B*) forms the core value of The Public Administration, which is charged with the implementation of the Government's program. In this sense, the US governance system firstly supports the individual, entrepreneurial spirit of liberty manifested as capitalism, and only secondly the democratic spirit of equality.

⁴⁷   That is, it is seemingly more important for The Public Administration to be objective, efficient and equally respectful than it is for it to be representative of the general public. That it may need to be representative to be able to treat everybody equitably and to formulate the most effective and efficient means to deliver a wide range of Government programs, is only a secondary quality associated more to its secondary supporting political outlook (*menetype #C*).

⁴⁸   'A strictly managerial approach to governance is not sufficient in the American political environment. A credible linkage to democratic politics is necessary. In Herbert Storing's last essay, he identified "the bedrock of principle from which all else derives in American politics" as "popular opinion and scientific management," noting further that the "articulation of these principles and their relation to one another is the whole substance of American politics"… Responsiveness is an essential tenet of democratic governance. The value premise relies on the fundamental assumption that government is the servant, not the master, of the people. The principal problem of governmental administration in a democratic context is assuring the responsiveness of the administrative process to popular control. This is difficult in a government of separation of powers, webs of interlocking relationships, weaknesses of hierarchy, and representation of powerful interest groups. As Norton Long observed years ago: "The unanswered question of American government—'who is boss'—constantly plagues administration"' (Lane, 1996: 228).

It is the governance system that defines "who is boss," or who has the power to decide for whom and, as discussed above, in the US governance system it is, in the end, the legislature that is pre-eminent, with the President sometimes rising above the pack of primary powers to lead the way.

⁴⁹   This represents a critical challenge to the integrity of The Public Administration. There is not enough capacity in this book to explore this very important issue but much of the reform agenda over the past decade or so could be viewed as having shifted. The Public Administration has shifted from the bureaucratic mindset towards the political mindset. In some cases, it could be shown to have gone too far—which then brings with it a backlash within the agency against the valuable bureaucratic values of equality and objectivity. The group that becomes too responsive to the political masters becomes a feudal fiefdom where, indeed, justice is for "just us" and friends—and will contribute to the general breakdown in the democratic fabric of equality and fairness. Politicism, in the end, leads to feudal-type tribalism and the so-called communitarianism becomes the survival of the fittest—or the most able or powerful groups. It may just be that is where the whole of US society is headed, in line with the earlier conclusions, in respect of the corporate sector. If this happens, as seems likely, the hopes of public administration as a vocation will fade to give way to armies of mercenary administrators who gravitate to where the rewards are greatest.

⁵⁰   Another manifestation of this secondary mindset of the Public Administrator is the importance of ethics and values (*menetype #C* thinking) in public administration theory and practice. 'The abundance of literature on public administration ethics is perhaps the best indication of the vitality and intellectual interest in the field…

What I found most surprising in the article was the response to the authors' query "on which topics were included in the school's coverage of ethics… The most frequent topic mentioned was discussion of values, including values clarification." This was surprising because in reviewing the academic journals for this report, I noticed values clarification was rarely mentioned' (Rohr, 1990b: 98; 109). It might be that theory was lagging practice in the area of values clarification.

[51]   Stever (1988) suggests that the new consensus—which he calls the "new deflation"—is that public administrators have, in fact, given way to this temptation and essentially become political, looking after particular interests to the extent that they eschew the objectively rational mindset of administration. 'Considered collectively, the above four tenets of the new deflation have had a decisive impact on expectations for public administration in the post-Progressive era. They have supplanted the Progressive optimism about the possibilities for the civil service. Whereas the Progressives sought to legitimate the judgment of the civil servant, the new deflation undermines the basis for this judgment. By bringing the civil servant down to the level of various particularized interests, the new deflation condemns the civil servant to bargaining. More specifically, it makes bargaining the sine qua non of public administration. As this occurs, it is increasingly difficult for the civil servant to re-establish a set of professional credentials as an advocate for the general public interest… In effect, the new deflation is not only deterministic but anti-Progressive as well. It does not seek to legitimate the judgment of the civil servant, nor does it envision that public administration can become a credible profession, with public service as its central value… the new deflation has already undermined the development of public administration as a profession and offers a critique of what the new deflation has produced, a "marginal state." The marginal state is a product of the new deflation's scepticism about public administration. The marginal state blurs the boundary between legitimate agencies of public administration and the private sector… Second, the structure and values of the marginal state are hostile to the values of a professional, public-oriented civil service… Furthermore, as the marginal state continues to grow, the professional civil servant must adapt to the skill requirements of the margin, not vice versa' (Stever, 1988: 141–142; 146).

[52]   The reality of politics and the core issue of power at the top echelon of the agencies was also observed by Long (1966: 43): 'The budgeting of power is a basic subject matter of a realistic science of administration. It may be urged that for all but the top hierarchy of the administrative structure the question of power is irrelevant. Legislative authority and administrative orders suffice. Power adequate to the function to be performed flows down the chain of command.'

[53]   There needs to be passionate devotion to clarifying the objective facts of the situation or policy issue to uncover the true dynamics that can be used to frame policy. In a sense, Public Administrators have to keep on the blinkers, as Weber (1948) suggested for the passionate scientists. 'In our time, the internal situation, in contrast to the organization of science as a vocation, is first of all conditioned by the fact that science has entered a phase of specialization previously unknown and that this will forever remain the case… All work that overlaps neighbouring fields, such as we occasionally undertake and which the sociologists must necessarily undertake again and again, is burdened with the resigned realization that at best one provides the specialist with useful questions upon which he would not so easily hit from his own specialized point of view. One's own work must inevitably remain highly imperfect. Only by strict specialization can the scientific worker become fully conscious, for once and perhaps never again in his lifetime, that he has achieved something that will endure. A really definitive and good accomplishment is today always a specialized accomplishment. And whoever lacks the capacity to put on blinders, so to speak, and to come up with the idea that the fate of his soul depends upon whether or not he makes the correct conjecture at this passage of this manuscript may as well stay away from science. He will never have what one may call the "personal experience" of science' (Weber, 1948: 134–135).

A Public Administrator might feel that his career hangs in the balance over the correct conjecture for a particular policy, but would he/she go so far as to think that the fate of his/her soul hangs in the balance. Perhaps, such is the passion that a Public Administrator should feel about his/her contribution if he/she could go so far as to call it a vocation.

[54]   It is interesting but not germane to this analysis of the Blacksburg Manifesto (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990) to look at the Osborne and Gaebler (1992) agenda within the context of the governance framework explained in this book. Basically, while the public management reforms of the Westminster system in the United Kingdom and Australia encouraged movement of the public administration mindset in the constructive direction of cognitive reversion, the "Reinventing Government" agenda tried to take The Public Administration in the opposite, more destructive direction. Essentially, it was destructive because it tried to take the public administration mindset into its collective shadow, where it really did not have a conscious understanding of how to act or what was required. Moreover, it caused a dysfunction in the governance structure because the Legislatures still remained essentially political and there was, therefore, no effective connecting point between them.

Their agenda was summed up thus: 'What we are describing is nothing less than a shift in the basic model of governance used in America… Suddenly there is less money for *government*—for "doing" things, delivering services. But there is more demand for *governance*—for "leading" society, convincing its various interest groups to embrace common goals' (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992: 321; 34—emphasis in original).

Osborne and Gaebler (1992) do not define governance, as such, but convey some notion that it is broad and encompassing. However, like Rhodes (1997), they come down to using it to describe the one mode of governance they consider most desirable. Whereas Rhodes (1997: 46–47) prescribes a predominantly network orientation, Osborne and Gaebler (1992) prescribe a primary market orientation of governance with a secondary orientation towards networks: 'Most of what we have discussed in this book could be summed up under the rubric of market-oriented government… Markets are impersonal. Markets are unforgiving… To complement the efficiency and effectiveness of market mechanisms, we need the warmth and caring of families and neighborhoods and communities' (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992: 309).

Their 'intention is to bash bureaucracies' (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992: xviii) and they see that 'even the most politicized environment will give way' (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992: 325). That is, they see the need to repress hierarchies and politics (that is, networks) to be replaced by a primary market and secondary network orientations of community governance. Therefore, though they use a melange of private and public sector management fads, the end product is inherently dysfunctional (as suggested by the terms of the *JEWAL Synthesis* Theory of Governance and as judged by many other observers of public administration). It would be extremely difficult to achieve such a governance setting, l*et al*one make it successful and sustainable.

Essentially, what Osborne and Gaebler (1992) prescribe is summarised as follows.

- Governments to shift from taxes to earnings, which shifts the value set of how they operate from a network to a market orientation. While it is clear that many public services and assets could be privatised, there needs to be a more holistic analysis as to whether all such transfers are for the overall benefit of society;

- Government leaders to become entrepreneurial capitalists in the commercial market (as opposed to the marketplace of the electorate). They will do this by using their network skills to broker deals with public assets in the commercial marketplace. This is quite possible but could lead to a situation of collusion and favours for big business—a system that was frowned on in earlier times; and

- public services to become more competitive and customer-focused, which essentially makes for a *phase #B* hierarchy with a secondary *phase #A* market orientation. This would be inherently unstable, as the hierarchies would, in effect, have two masters—the Government on the one hand, and their customers on the other. In the end, if such services have real customers willing to pay, then they should be considered for privatisation (subject to considerations of any consequential inequities).

In choosing to make such a dramatic change in governance, they would be choosing to leave a set of values behind. Although Osborne and Gaebler (1992) make only fleeting reference through their discussion, there are some very important societal values to be sacrificed in a wholesale and indiscriminate shift to a market-oriented approach. These are listed in the Appendices (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992: 347–348) as stability, immunity to favouritism, equity, prevention of discrimination, prevention of exploitation, and promotion of social cohesion. The best Osborne and Gaebler (1992) can offer to counter the loss of these safeguards of equality and inclusiveness (*menetype #B*) is to suggest the development of a network of family, friends and neighbours—presumably to help pick up the pieces of the casualties from markets.

It would seem they have built and justified such a distorted view of the world largely by redefining the notion of equity. 'Finally, we believe deeply in equity—in equal opportunity for all Americans' (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992: xix). In one short sentence, they have transformed the notion of justice for the less well off to the market mantra of "equal opportunity to compete". From there, it is easy to focus on the winners and success in the market place—how some well-formulated deals can seem profitable. However, the large number of commercial bankruptcies each year bear testimony that not all market deals are so profitable.

In summary, the inherent contradictions in their overall scheme are no more evident than in their first example, when they apply the direct opposite principles as a way to fix up the US health sector (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992: 312–314). They describe a US health system that is essentially market driven (which was similar to that which their advocated principles would have suggested) and they point out the consequential failures. What they recommended as a remedy was the German system, which exhibits an inherently rule-bound and hierarchy orientation of governance (which essentially is a suggestion to move in the opposite direction to that prescribed in the rest of the book). That is, in this example, they are advocating a sensible evolution of a system in the cognitive reversionary direction, which is the logically opposite direction to their professed thesis of making government more market oriented.

[55] For instance, in a monarchy, the executive and public administration seem more important than the legislature. 'In Germany, until now, the decisive conditions of political management have been in essence as follows: First, the parliaments have been impotent. The result has been that no man with the qualities of a leader would enter Parliament permanently… To this must be added the tremendous importance of the trained expert officialdom in Germany. This factor determined the impotence of Parliament. Our officialdom was second to none in the world. This importance of the officialdom was accompanied by the fact that the officials claimed not only official positions but also cabinet positions for themselves' (Weber, 1948: 111).

⁵⁶ 'The constitutional principle of the separation of powers, reported the [President's] Committee, places "in the President, and the President alone, the whole executive power of the Government of the United States." However, "the responsibility of the President for 'the executive Power' is impaired through the multiplicity and confusion of agencies which render effective action impossible." Particularly is the principle of separation of powers impaired by the "new and headless 'fourth branch' of the Government." These independent establishments "do violence to the basic theory of the American Constitution that there should be three major branches of the Government and only three"' (Waldo, 1984a: 114).

However, one of the sources of power for The Public Administration to influence from below is corporate memory, but it still has to share this power of precedent knowledge with others: 'Curiously, the Presidency seems least attentive to institutional history, in contrast to much of our current scholarship. The neglect is a result, I suspect, of the other branches' continuity of membership and, therefore, of memory. Memory is an asset of "the permanent government," which comprises most members of Congress, some long-serving congressional staff aides, many members of congressional staff agencies, judges, civil servants, and military officers. (Beyond the State, there are Washington law firms, interest groups, think tanks, and some individual lobbyists and consultants who also have long memories.) In sharp contrast is the temporary incumbency of the President, the White House staff, and members of the Cabinet and subcabinet' (Fesler, 1990: 88).

⁵⁷ The philosophy of mind, which informs the metaphor of the mind, that has been developed in this book has its roots in the Neoplatonic constructions of the world as expressed by Proclus (1963) and Plotinus (1952), but (as explained elsewhere) it has been carried forward and expressed in modern philosophy and psychology. In looking through Proclus' (1963) *Elements of Theology* to draw a few of the more pertinent laws, we were reminded of how relevant most of it was and how much this was a holistic interconnected concept of reality and, in particular, of governance of social systems. Nevertheless, the following few quotes may help give a taste of the depth and meaning of the cognitive framework (with comments in bold added to original).

'PROP. 21. *Every order has its beginning in a monad and proceeds to a manifold co-ordinate therewith; and the manifold in any order may be carried back to the single monad.*

…From this it is apparent that in the nature of body unity and plurality coexist in such a manner that the one Nature has the many natures dependent from it, and, conversely, these are derived from one Nature, that of the whole…

PROP. 24. *All that participates is inferior to the participated, and this latter to the unparticipated.*

…The unparticipated [*menetype #C*] then, precedes the participated [*menetype #B*], and these the participants [*menetype #A*]. For to express it shortly, the first is a unity prior to the many; the participated is within the many, and is one yet not-one; while all that participates is not-one yet one…

PROP. 25. *Whatever is complete* [i.e. Constitutional primary-level power] *proceeds to generate those things which it is capable of producing, imitating in its turn the one originative principle of the universe.*

PROP. 26. *Every productive cause produces the next and all subsequent principles while itself remaining steadfast.*

[Or the Congress and the Executive delegate some of their power to make policy, rather than changing their basic nature, to make the lower-level policy decisions needed in the administration of their programs.]

PROP. 32. *All reversion is accomplished through a likeness of the reverting terms to the goal of reversion.*

PROP. 34. *Everything whose nature it is to revert reverts upon that from which it derived the procession of its own substance.*

[That is, the point of engagement for public administration returning to the Congress should be in terms of its enabling legislation—whether changes are required or new legislation enacted.]

PROP. 35. *Every effect remains in its cause, proceeds from it, and reverts upon it.*

[That is, part of the power of the legislature to make policy is passed on through the enabling legislation to the public administration, but then it is brought back to the legislature through a review of the performance against the legislated program.]

PROP. 37. *In all that is generated by reversion the first terms* [*menetype #A*] *are less perfect than the second* [*menetype #B*]*, and these than the next order* [*menetype #C*]*; and the last are the most perfect* [the transcendent or the conception of the national Constitution].

[That is, policy developed at the coalface in dealing with clients is the least discriminating or in keeping with the espoused collective values but that formulated by the legislature is the most in tune with the collective public interest.]

PROP. 61. *Every power is greater if it be undivided, less if it be divided.*

[The first-order political powers such as the Legislature can be brought together as one such as the Government on one level, or each of the Congress, Supreme Court and the Executive on the next level. The second-order powers such as public administration are manifest and divided.]

PROP. 62. *Every manifold which is nearer to the One has fewer members than those more remote, but it is greater in power.*

[That is, the first-order political governance powers are greater than the second-order powers.]

PROP. 64. *Every original monad gives rise to two series, one consisting of substances complete in themselves, and one of irradiations which have their substantiality in something other than themselves.*

[This is one of the key propositions determining the hierarchical structure of the trinities in that there is a trinity within a trinity. For instance, there is an internal second-order working trinity of Congress which would include both houses and there is an external first-order trinity of powers, of which the Congress is part with the Executive and the Legislative.]

PROP. 66. *Every existent is related to every other either as a whole or as a part or by identity or by difference.*

[That is, the whole governance structure is interrelated and interdependent—it is a structure of trinities not trichotomies.]

PROP. 71. *All those characters which in the originative causes have higher and more universal rank become in the resultant beings, through the irradiations which proceed from them, a kind of substratum for the gifts of the more specific principles; and which the irradiations of the superior principles thus serve as a basis, the characters which proceed from secondary principles are founded upon them: there is thus an order of precedence in participation, and successive rays strike downwards upon the same recipient, the more universal causes affecting it first, and the more specific supplementing those by the bestowal of their own gifts upon the participants.*

[That is, public agencies created by the principles embodied in the enabling legislation issued by the Congress should encapsulate those principles in their Agency Perspective and be trusted to act accordingly, including to make measured policy decisions influenced as appropriate by the higher principles.]

PROP. 83. *All that is capable of self-knowledge is capable of every form of self-reversion.*

[The US constitutional governance is set up through the separation and balance of powers, to be capable of self-knowledge and is therefore capable of every form of self-reversion—that is, all substantial problems can be solved within the established governance structure by a process of collective self-reflexion.]

PROP. 103. *All things are in all things, but in each according to its proper nature…*

[That is, it is a continuous whole and there can be no talk of *ideal types*, dichotomies or trichotomies, it is all one but the proper nature is focused and has a predominance of some aspect and thus can be differentiated but not parted.]'

Proclus (1963: 25; 29; 31; 37; 39; 41; 59; 61; 63; 67; 77; 103).

[58] The Public Administration is pluralistic but participates with the main players in the dialogue that helps define and articulate the "public interest," and that then formulates the policy to achieve it. There is, therefore, general agreement with the following Manifesto sentiment. 'The Public Administration should be neither monolithic nor homogeneous. It must assume a rich diversity of perspectives born of differentiation and specialization and ought to welcome constructive criticism from within and without. Differing perspectives ought to be granted a legitimacy, that is, they ought not to be judged as *ipso facto* self-serving, but as part of the constitutional heritage of robust public dialogue. In this respect, the Public Administration is an analogue to the pluralism of the larger political process with all the attendant assets and liabilities plus one: the opportunity and the moral obligation to strive explicitly to achieve the broadest possible public interest, something theories of pluralism trust to an invisible hand. Thus the conflict among the differing perspectives of The Public Administration is a valuable part of the creative tension so essential to a healthy American dialogue' (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990: 46).

[59] 'As the Hebrews put it "Every small matter they shall judge" (administration), "but every great matter they shall bring to thee" (policymaker). Wilson distinguishing "statesman" from "technical official," and "general plans" from "special means," forthrightly asserted that "public administration" is detailed and systematic execution of public law. The distinction *was not* in the thought and action of one individual ("will and answering Deed")… The distinction *was* in the different functions of two occupations' (Thayer, 1984: 267)—but it was the will of the government expressed in policy and the answering deed of its implementation.

'It should be carefully noted, however, that the very criterion of constitutionalism that subjects administration to the law also states unequivocally that administration is "not necessarily energized and commissioned by the laws in respect to all its acts." Here we find the basis for Wilson's insistence that administration has a life of its own independent of legislative enactments. This is the foundation of Wilson's "high profile" administration discussed below… Actually, "the administrative power is considerably wider and much more inclusive" than executive power. It includes, in addition to "the duty of executing positive law, those duties of provident protection and wise cooperation and assistance which, though nowadays generally explicitly enjoined by enactment, would be— as they have always been—part of the State's normal and essential function, whether enjoined or not." Thus administration has a life of its own, independent of statutory enactment' (Rohr, 1984: 38; 40).

The Public Administration can, indeed, be regarded as many autonomous units (in the same way as the lesser perspectives of thinking in the human mind), but it needs to be clearly understood they are not auto-poietic in the strict sense as they are in existence only through an act of legislation (or Executive order), rather than independent of it, and are normally sustained by appropriations from higher authority—that is, they are ultimately subservient in some way, either to a lesser or greater extent. Moreover, such flowering of seemingly autonomous units, or those who can act more with a will of their own, is a natural consequence of the maturation of the US constitutional governance system—in the same way that individuals, with age and maturity, learn to think in different ways independent of their main way of engaging and operating in the world.

An understanding of the US constitutional governance in the terms of the explained hierarchical trinity of *menetypes* (*JEWAL Synthesis* philosophy of mind) allows one to transcend the contradiction identified by Waldo (1984b: 223): 'Consider: there is wide agreement that it is impossible for an administrator to be policy neutral; the impossibility is thought to have been empirically demonstrated at length, conclusively. But it is widely believed that there is no constitutional-legal rationale for the policy role of administrators; that (as it is sometimes put) when told by their superiors "Jump!" all the administrator can do is ask "How high?" In short, to be policy neutral is impossible, but to be policy engaged is contrary to the letter and spirit of the governmental system.'

For it is as Wilson (1966/1887) has been attributed with arguing: 'that the study of administration and the study of the proper distribution of constitutional authority are inextricably linked' (Foster, 1984: 286).

From a historical perspective, 'Institutions in government are centers of power. There are three power centers expressly established in American national government by the Constitution: Congress, the Presidency, and the Supreme Court. But, in the nearly two centuries since the Philadelphia convention, several other power centers have evolved through extraconstitutional or nonconstitutional means. These institutions have developed in good part to meet certain needs that the formal, named institutions could not or would not fulfil… The federal bureaucracy is another power center. Although the Constitution in retrospect, seems to hint at this institution by reference to executive departments, its emergence as a center of power together with its vast size are certainly beyond the scope envisioned by the framers' (quoted from Milton A. Krasner, Stephen G. Chaberski, and D. Kelly Jones, *American Government: Structure and Process*, in Merry, 1980: 209–210).

As an aside, this book argues that the Federal bureaucracy is more a manifold of institutions and that its development was cognitively within the scope envisioned by the framers of the Constitution.

[60] This point is echoed by Goodsell (1994: 167): 'While bureaucracies obviously possess political power—they could not do their jobs without it—this power is by no means unrestrained. Indeed, one could argue that, because of the peculiarities of our constitutional separation of powers and hyperpluralistic political system, American bureaucracies tend to be excessively restricted in what they can do. Study after study shows that the bureaucrats are constrained from every direction and subject to innumerable counterchecks. Despite this, they attempt to respond to new directions received from elected officials and stand ready to advocate whatever new cause is elevated by the political process to the governmental agenda. In short, American bureaucracy is of American politics and not above it, exactly as a democracy requires.'

[61] An institution is defined as an organization or establishment founded for a specific purpose and the purposes for creating agencies are manifold and varied. The only true connection is through the subservience of all to their creators, as they all basically exist through the courtesy of legislative power. That is, their point of coming together is under a higher, more unitary power in the concept of governance, as some academics have offered on previous occasions. Although a system of like organizations can be referred to as an institution, the differences of basic purpose seem more pertinent than the similarities of the embracing subservience of their roles, and so it could only be referred to, at best, as a rather loosely held together institution (with a little "i"). However, it is more like a set of institutions (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990: 36)—or institutions within an estate, or class of citizens within the second-order power structure of society. In the feudal days, administration was actually carried out within the "estates" for their own purposes (Weber, 1948: 81), but now it is more that those providing the administration are grouped together in an estate which is of only second-order importance in the societal political power structure, and much lower in terms of the overall society's regard. Moreover, given the need for their psychic health, each of the agencies should be doing what it can to foster and identify with its particular Agency Perspective, and so it may actually be nugatory to refer to The Public Administration as an institution. And

finally, as we head deeper and deeper into the age of politicism, any lingering hopes of The Public Administration as a coherent institution, will surely fade.

In sum, this book disagrees with the implication that The Public Administration could be regarded as an integrated institution exhibiting coherence and emergence although, in hindsight, there seems to be a defusing of this inference from the original Blacksburg Manifesto (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990): 'The original Blacksburg project participants labelled themselves, and were labelled by others, as institutionalists or neo-institutionalists. Some who have interacted with us have clearly misinterpreted what institutionalism means. Several of the original project members grow increasingly restive with that label or would no longer be willing to accept it' (Wamsley and Wolf, 1996: 28).

However, not everybody read it in that way: 'The Blacksburg Manifesto describes public administration as centered on the executive branch but including any portion of any branch to the extent that it is charged with execution of the laws. What they have defined as the Public Administration is, in terms of the *brain* metaphor, a composite of *separate* viable systems, not a *unified* viable system. There is no single viable system that can be identified as either Bureaucracy or the Public Administration' (Little, 1996: 339).

It is contended that the conceptual framework used in this book is essentially in terms of a more sophisticated brain metaphor and while we agree there is no unified institution that could be called The Public Administration, there is essentially a unified governance system of which the public administration forms part, albeit a secondary, subordinate part.

[62] 'Fragmentation of power remains the primary feature of our governmental institutions… All the original checks and balances laid out in the Constitution remain in force. The *unwritten constitution*—traditions, laws, procedures that have developed around the Constitution—has added countless more' (quoted from CRM books, *American Government Today*, in Merry, 1980: 201–202).

'What the separation of powers does is to assure that the power of government is placed in several hands, each with a distinctive constituency. The probability is high that the several constituencies represented will not share the same values or priorities, and that conflict will result over all but the most innocuous questions. Although many people in government belong to the same political party, the fact that they are associated with different institutions and respond to distinctive constituencies leads them to disagree with each other… Separation of powers in effect assures internal conflict among both majority and minority officeholders in the national government, and encourages attempts at temporary alliances between like-minded elements across party lines' (quoted from Kenneth M. Dolbeare and Murray J. Edelman, *American Politics: Policies, Power and Change,* in Merry, 1980: 203).

[63] As discussed above in relation to the work of Goodsell (1994), who argues that the evidence is there to support the view that the public administration does a necessary and worthwhile job and that, overall, it does it well. In the end, therefore, there is a call to collective consciousness, first for those within the system and then the general public. That this is difficult and will only ever be partially successful while the same governance structures are maintained, is evidenced by the degree of difficulty for any individual to come to terms with his/her shadow— wholeness and perfection only exist in the transcendent. Nevertheless, the system and those in it can certainly become more conscious and so there is a certain truth in the following:

'Despite these trouble signs, there are those such as John M. Gaus who stubbornly cling to the traditional model. Gaus argues that the American citizenry has no choice but to honor the professional claims of the civil servant: "we suffer too little realization that a healthy and satisfactory life for the individual can be obtained only through varied and extensive political arrangements and that these arrangements are largely administrative in nature." One of the first comprehensive prescriptions for a professional civil service was Anderson and Gaus' *Research in Public Administration.* It stressed that the "confused citizen" needs the clarification that competent professionals can bring to public affairs' (Stever, 1988: 90).

[64] Wamsley *et al.* (1990: 46) seem to confuse the relationship between the public administration and the public. 'The Public Administration was, is, and ought to be: a solemn agreement between the Public Administrator and the citizens he or she serves.'

They go on to put this in the context of the Constitution where it belongs but fail to differentiate sufficiently between, on the one hand, the citizens as the nation and the "public interest" embodied in the Constitution and the system of governance and, on the other hand, the citizens as individual clients to whom the government directs its services. These two notions of citizens are cognitive poles apart and cannot be joined to infer that public administrators should go direct to win the citizens' trust and favour. In this more abstract sense of the collective called citizens, public administrators are obliged by the system of constitutional governance to work through the elected politicians. Public administrators are not called on in the US constitutional governance system to be representatives in any sense (as suggested by Wamsley *et al.*, 1990: 46); nor do they personally need to win the trust of the people, except to the extent that they will deliver the Government's program. It was, is and will

always be a subservient part of the Government—a second-order political governance power created by an act of the first-order level of governance power.

[65] 'As for the United States, the presence of bureaucracy provides ongoing fuel for Americans' habitual suspicion of government and corresponding commitment to market capitalism. In our business-oriented culture, bureaucracy stands as the antithesis of a self-reliant, free, and entrepreneurial America. Here it is the target of jokes, yes—but also plain disdain. One might argue that, generically, public bureaucracy does not "fit" American culture well; the obverse of this point is that the great falsehood about American government fits it perfectly…

'Let me add a postscript addressed not to public administrators or my colleagues in the field but to everyone who experiences public bureaucracy, namely, all of us. As a traditional bête noire in our society, bureaucracy is often thought of as some kind of alien force. It is imagined as a "they" that opposes us and hence is apart from us' (Goodsell, 1994: 169–170; 183)—*that is, public administration is regarded as a scapegoat onto which the collective shadow is projected.*

[66] 'Waldo is pessimistic about the resolution of this identity crisis—this failure to know what we are (subject matter) or how we should proceed (methods). Indeed, he concludes there is no solution to the problem at the level at which it was originally posed… Waldo's proposal for a short-term solution pending a longer-term solution of the identity crisis is as follows: *"What I propose is that we try to act as a profession without actually being one and perhaps even without the hope or intention of becoming one in any strict sense."* Waldo then goes on to observe, "Frankly, it took some courage to say that, as it is patently open to ridicule." Waldo's advice is indeed open to ridicule. It is the advice of a friend who at a time of overwhelming tragedy counsels that one should concentrate on keeping a stiff upper lip' (Ostrom, 1989: 9–10).

What this book concludes is that public administrators will have to keep a "stiff upper lip" for the foreseeable future, but they can help raise the consciousness first in themselves, then in the politicians and finally in the public by shifting their thinking to embrace an appropriate holistic governance framework to define the meaning of what they do—a governance framework much as that which is explained in this book.

[67] Long's (1966: 42–43) summation should also be kept in mind: 'The life blood of administration is power… The budgeting of power is a basic subject matter of a realistic science of administration. It may be argued that for all but the top hierarchy of the administrative structure the question of power is irrelevant. Legislative authority and administrative orders suffice. Power adequate to the function to be performed flows down the chain of command. Neither statute nor executive order, however, confers more than legal authority to act. Whether Congress or President can impart the substance of power as well as the form depends upon the line-up of forces in a particular case… The real mandate contained in an Executive order varies with the political strength of the group demand embodied in it, and in the context of other group demands.'

[68] Perhaps the grounds for the perceived competence and usefulness of public administrators (and therefore the basis of the others' confidence in them) can be seen to be based on (A) technical competence, (B) loyalty to the governance system or key players, and (C) intellectual wisdom. To the degree that these three competencies do actually form a trinity of *menetypes* as intuitively, it seems the case then the public administrators cannot possibly excel in all three aspects together. Their performance will, therefore, always seem to be lacking to someone at some particular point in time. For instance, if in fact the public administrators do aspire to intellectual leadership, then they would of necessity need to build up their technical competence in support, but they might not value loyalty as much as they might otherwise, particularly loyalty to individual politicians in the government. Rather, they would then be committed to the broader perspective of the "public interest" as advocated by the Blacksburg Manifesto (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990). Further development of thinking within the context of this particular trinity of *menetypes* would offer some better understanding of the way ahead for public administration.

[69] For it is as Long (1966: 57) concludes: 'Attempts to solve administrative problems in isolation from the structure of power and purpose in the polity are bound to prove illusory.'

Therefore, 'We are now in a position to attempt to summarize or categorize the expertise of the administrator. He must have… the qualities of personality which enable him to "win friends and influence people, "and—particularly—intelligence. He must, in the second place be educated… Third… he must "know something," be a "wise" man. A public administrator "should have a knowledge of the place of the public service in its relationship with basic economic and social forces and some realization of the potentialities of government as a means of meeting human needs"' (Waldo, 1984a: 97).

These attributes can be read back into the trinity of competency *menetypes* mentioned earlier. There is, therefore, strong support for Wamsley's (1996: 360) concept of a "public philosophy" which we take to be another way of describing the societal governance framework developed in this book.

In fact, if the public administrator could assimilate such a robust conception of US constitutional governance, then Goodsell's (1990a: 504) hope outlined below might finally eventuate: 'What is needed from public administration, then, in such a society? A readiness to teach ongoing lessons of governance, I submit. I would,

moreover, submit that public administration possesses a capacity to instruct society with respect to both the substantive knowledge and normative ideals of governance. In the realm of substance, such teaching will add to our collective understanding of intricate policy interconnectedness among the hard lessons of past governing experience, the long-term implications of present social trends, and the full range of available public policy options. In normative terms, this teacher will remind us of the need to accept duties as well as demand rights; sacrifice immediate self-interest to the extent necessary for a viable public order; concern ourselves with all the effects of proposed policy on others; and defend the interests of future generations, as well as our own.'

70   'If and to the extent that politics, the realm of values, choice and chance, could be seen as excluded from administration, administration could function "objectively." Such ideas must be seen in the context of the times. The politics–administration dichotomy fitted nicely with a conception of science increasingly "hard" in its exclusion of values, and with general societal movement toward specialization and professionalism. With politics limited to its proper sphere, sifting values and setting goals, the study of administration might aspire to be a science of means, and the practice of administration a profession devoted to putting ends and means together' (Waldo, 1984b: 221).

Waldo (1984b), here, is capturing the core or essence of public administration purified from its secondary support of politics. Given the ends, public administrators logically and orderly analyse the cause and effect relationships at play to determine objectively the means required to bring about the ends demanded.

In this way, 'The answer of positivism to the problem of the basis of decision is that "science," "facts," "measurement" answer questions of "What to do?" It asserts that what is objective can and should "determine," that the imperative of "the facts" should be substituted for chance and will. This common viewpoint of public administration is well illustrated in the following quotation: "The scientific approach is merely the application of common sense procedure to human problems. It involves securing all obtainable facts, associating or correlating them so as to determine what they mean, and deducing the logical course of procedure therefrom. In other words, solve administrative problems by getting the facts and acting in accordance therewith." The faith that "answers" result from a scientific observation of "the facts" is illustrated on a different plane by the recorded beliefs of those who favored the establishment of the United States Tariff Commission' (Waldo, 1984a: 81).

This exhibits the pure *menetype #B* dynamics of thinking, and it is obvious to appreciate that this is inadequate for public administrators of today. It definitely needs to be supplemented by a large dose of other perspectives—however, the core means of thinking in an objective scientific deterministic type of way still needs to be retained and built upon. This is clearly illustrated in the frame of mind advocated for public administrators by Wamsley (1996: 364): 'The challenges are daunting, but they are also exciting. They were captured in an aphorism of Martin Landau's that every public policy is an hypothesis, every public program is an experiment under the worst possible conditions. One could extend the aphorism further by adding that the hypothesis (the policy) was developed as a result of a struggle among persons holding different paradigms, ideologies, perspectives, and interests. The winners are determined to prove the hypothesis is correct; the losers equally intent on proving it wrong.'

So what are needed are public administrators as wise, knowing and tolerant practical scientists of human affairs!

71   'There is a complaint that political science wants to expel public administration and a proposal, in the nature of a preemptive strike, that public administration should secede from political science. Political science departments exclude or disdain public administration, I understand, because it is practical in focus, out of phase with the behavioural, quantitative, and other regnant modes of the mother discipline, and often disconcerting to the balance of a department because it attracts too many students, some of them career motivated, and if it is not central, it is thought to be dispensable' (Fesler, 1990: 93).

'One finds little reference to them in the writings of the great political thinkers, and this perhaps reflects the general lack of concern they felt about administration. In much of this writing, there seems to have been an implicit assumption that administration is the obedient and willing pawn of whoever controls it; the primary issue then is the locus and the effectiveness of such control' (Mosher, 1982: 6).

72   This is asserted clearly by Long (1966: 54), 'a realistic science of administration will teach administrative behaviour appropriate to the existing political system.'

Hill (1992: 44) also echoes these different orientations of the studies of public administration and politics. 'Perhaps public administration's most important potential affinity with public bureaucracy has to do with the discipline's basic orientation. Whereas political science often has been society-oriented and has considered the state to be epiphenomenal, public administration usually has been state-centred and has considered the state to be autonomous.'

Wamsley (1996: 387) offers a deeper understanding: 'As Murray Edelman has said: "Politics is for most of us a passing parade of abstract symbols, yet a parade which our experience teaches us to be a benevolent or malevolent force that can be close to omnipotent. Though they may strive to be 'objective,' students of

organizations and public administration cannot escape having their views shaped by the powerful emotions that derive from such deep psychic investments."'

[73] But it is different because the order is reversionary, going from a focus on the economy (*menetype #A*) to a study of micro-economics or management (*menetype #B*), and so it is a natural cognitive procession for economists to study management but not vice versa. As a consequence, the study of management has less of a focus on economics, which it takes as a given—this is in contrast to the study of administration, which includes the study of the political dynamics to which it is subservient.

[74] 'We therefore have had difficulty understanding that public administration is *not* a traditional discipline, and that to make it one would risk destroying its worth and relevance, not to mention its excitement and challenge. We have not understood that the theoretical needs of an interdisciplinary field that serves a sociopolitical practice are much different, and the potential for explanatory theory are much more limited… It is critically important that we recognize our misfounding and misgrounding because we are *not* a traditional or typical academic discipline of the social science variety… The contrast between our field and a traditional discipline… means that the shape of knowledge development in public administration is more like an *inverted* pyramid or array of smaller inverted pyramids, the bases of which overlap at the top. An applied interdisciplinary field is different from a discipline in other ways. It has an inescapable symbiotic relationship with practitioners of a profession (or would-be profession) from which it cannot distance itself' (Wamsley, 1996: 354; 363).

As such, all that was said earlier in the book about the need for educating private sector managers in a new, experiential learning about learning way also applies to the educational needs of the public administrators.

[75] This is similar to the thought that Waldo (1984b: 231) had in respect to the legal profession: 'In this connection I have noted with interest the creation of a Masters Degree in Legal Studies for "non-legal professionals" who need the legal knowledge for effective performance. A complementary masters Degree in Management studies for "legal professionals" would be appropriate, but I do not expect to witness it.' (Keeping in mind that public administration is the second-order cognitive equivalent of the Court.)

A sign of the development in public administration education from the managerialist era to the politicist era is the emergence of phenomenology as a valid academic perspective. Phenomenology equates with the mainstream postmodern viewpoint, and the transition from the *menetype #B* to the *menetype #C* mindset is captured by Waldo (1984a: xxxviii): 'I judge that logical positivism has become less fashionable for a number of reasons. These include criticism from within the philosophic movement itself, and the rise of new movements, especially "ordinary language philosophy," more or less in the same part of the philosophic spectrum. But of greater significance may be the reception of some philosophic impulses from the continent. The most important of these are labelled with the term *phenomenology—*though one must look beyond this broad, protean term itself for specificity. Though phenomenology, in its various interpretations, now enjoys considerable popularity it hardly has carried all before it. The philosophic field in which the enterprise of social science is now carried on is one of considerable complexity, even confusion; and I make no confident predictions as to future directions.'

This book has continually explained how the understanding and theory related to public administration (and society) have continued to move from the managerialist viewpoint to that of politicism.

[76] 'But psychic investment is only the basis for the *intensity* of our differing views of organizations and public administration. What is the basis for the *difference*? Why do some of us see these phenomena so negatively and others so positively? The answer lies in our views of nature and of human nature: Serious theorizing about public administration must therefore start with these matters. Consider, if you will, the following notes concerning my views on nature, human nature, and its relevance to organizations, and therefore to public administration' (Wamsley, 1996: 387–388).

Putting all this into an integrated coherent form is what this book is about.

[77] Though there has been no attempt at a comprehensive substantiation, there is a sense that the hierarchically trinitarian structure of reality outlined in this book is basically similar to the conceptual understanding that underpinned Weber's (1930; 1947; 1948; 1949; 1962; 1968; 1978a; 1978b) thinking, as suggested in part by the following appraisal.

'What particularly disturbed Weber's audience was his argument that modern life consists of a number of orders or spheres—the economic, political, aesthetic, erotic, ethical, scientific among them—each of which is governed by its own immanent, distinctive principles. One had to choose between them, and within, these dissonant spheres, or hold them in tension: they could be reconciled or transcended. Thus the requirements of science—of which dispassionate self-clarity is paramount—are different from those of politics, where engaged partisanship is mandatory. In a world bereft of one overarching purpose, modern life is fractured, a mosaic of paradoxes, dilemmas, unintended consequences' (Baehr, 1992: 142).

That he did not quite get to formulate or articulate an overall conceptual structure that captured the interrelationships can be understood in terms that essentially he followed an empirical or reversionary approach,

which worked from experience (*menetype #A*) to understanding and formulation (*menetype #B*) to judgments (*menetype #C*) about particular situations. 'Now, we political economists have a pedantic custom, which I should like to follow, of always beginning with the external conditions' (Weber, 1948: 129). He did go on and reflect on his methods and come up with, for instance, the *ideal types* of legitimate power (Weber, 1962).

Given that Weber (1947; 1962) came out with the concept of *ideal types* that are essentially taken to stand alone in their pure form but are mixed in real life in an unspecified way, it is not clear that Weber actually came to a conceptual appreciation of the nature of the interrelationships between them—only the fact that they were interrelated in some way.

Weber's (1947; 1962) insightfulness is captured by Georgiou (1975: 297): 'Having placed bureaucracy within this context of ideal types of legitimate authority and their corresponding administrative arrangements, it is clear that Weber's interest did not lie in determining what elements contributed to organizational efficiency. His object in constructing the ideal type was to apprehend the distinctive characteristics of the administrative apparatus of legal rational authority, as compared with those of traditional and charismatic authority.'

The *menetypes* developed in this book are the natural successors to Weber's (1947; 1962) *ideal types*! Friedrich (1952: 28) actually lambasts the integrity and usefulness of *ideal types* principally because they are: 'mental constructs which are neither derived by a process of deductive ratiocination from higher concepts, nor built up from empirical data by relevant inference, nor demonstrably developed as working hypotheses from such data. The profound methodological confusion associated with the notion of *ideal type* seriously affects Weber's (1947; 1962) discussion of "bureaucracy," since bureaucracy is supposed to be one of these nebulous entities.'

While not attempting to defend Weber's (1947; 1962) *ideal types* against these criticisms, it is worth noting that:

- *menetypes* are mental constructs but so are all forms of human organization;

- *menetypes* are phenomenological by nature and are therefore developed principally by analogy to a limited number of ideal but repeatable forms; and

- *menetypes* are put together in a trinity to present three different perspectives of the whole and the ramifications of their combination as it occurs in reality, thereby avoiding the overly one-sided emphasis that emerged with the use of Weber's *ideal types* as separate and distinct entities.

Moreover, the analytic and heuristic power of the *menetypes* is magnified by the associated power of using the dynamics of the mind as the metaphor, but in a much more sophisticated way than that employed by Little (1996: 331-333).

[78] Simon (1947: 16–17) identified 'three kinds of participants… entrepreneurs, employees, and customers. Entrepreneurs are distinguished by the fact that their decisions ultimately control the activities of employees; employees by the fact that they contribute their (undifferentiated) time and efforts to the organization in return for wages; customers by the fact that they contribute money to the organization in return for its products.'

In a less developed way, Simon's (1947) entrepreneurs (taking its meaning from earlier days) stand for the authority stakeholders (*menetype #C*), employees equate to the internal stakeholders (*menetype #B*) and customers encapsulate the external stakeholders (*menetype #A*). Simon's (1947) essential preoccupation is with the internal stakeholders (consistent with the flourishing managerialist age), with a secondary interest in authority and very little mention of the customers—entirely in keeping with the dynamics of Simon's thinking in terms of the trinity of *menetypes*.

The spirit of the trinity is also captured in the title of one of the sections by Caiden (1990: 230): "One Discipline or Three? Economics, Management, Politics." Economics is concerned with the external stakeholders, management with the internal, and politics with the authority stakeholders!

[79] The interesting fact is that the iron triangle is normally between the political aspects (*sub-menetype #C*) of each of the external, internal and authority stakeholders, and as each of these can be thought of in terms of a trinity of *menetypes*, there is always one participant who holds the upper hand for the moment and skews policy development and delivery accordingly. This phenomenon is well identified by Nachmias and Rosenbloom (1980: 54–57). 'In theory, congressional power over administrative agencies is formidable… Although triangles exist, they are not necessarily equilateral. Often the relationship between congressional committee and agency is turned upside down and the committee ends up doing the bidding of the agency… It has been forcefully argued that agencies become "captured" or heavily influenced by interest groups and so lose their autonomy to non-government bodies… In cases where the participants are in harmony, the interest group may gain a de facto veto over the top political appointments to administrative agencies. This is characteristic of regulatory commissions.'

[80] This is also synonymous to the move from objective scientific rationalism to realism embracing the fragmented and multifaceted nature of reality. It is a move from the capital T Truth to the 'multiple, partial, and momentary truths' (McSwite, 1996: 219)—or capital R Reality! In other words, it is a move from a *menetype #B* worldview

focused on the facts of Truth to *menetype #C* worldview focused on the values of the Real. Put in another way, the move can be seen as follows: 'It would, in short, mean moving to a process-based communitarian approach to governance, where the connection of people to the community was relationship rather than an ideologically distorted deference to the ideals of Truth and good and to some inadequate actualisations of them that the members of the community were required to believe' (McSwite, 1996: 222). This was clearly evident to Waldo (1984a: lii) when he observes the demise of the term "efficiency."

Or again in using McSwite's (1996: 210ff) terms, much earlier we had the transition from the Man of Vision to the Man of Reason and now it is the turn for the Man of Practicality.

With the move from managerialism to politicism, it is indeed a big cultural change that the Western World is going through as discussed earlier in the book and grasped at by Waldo (1990: 81): 'In the essay that gave me the title for this piece, Gaus expressed the opinion that we are in a period of discontinuity and transition comparable to the ones that came with the decline of the city-state and feudalism. In this opinion, of course, he has much—and varied—company. If it is a correct opinion, then dealing with it better than we have in our part of the intellectual-institutional field will surely play a part in finding our way forward. It will not be easy. It requires time and effort, as well as luck and—if Gaus is right—a touch of genius.'

[81]   'The Nixon/Carter/Reagan formula for governance was a model characterized as "administrative presidency" by Richard Nathan and as "political administration" by Donald Devine. This model is presidentially centered and adversarial to the permanent bureaucracy, viewing the chief executive not only as dominant but as virtually the only legitimate source of political and administrative authority… A Devine protégé, Michael Sanera, demonstrates the shift from management to politicisation when he states that "success in public-sector management is not dependent on good business management of existing government operations, but rather on managing the President's political philosophy and values…" The administrative institution that had been an important resource and support for strengthening the presidency was cast aside in favor of older and less sophisticated notions of political partisanship and unhesitating responsiveness… The result has been a politicised presidency, as characterized by Terry Moe, that valued political support, strategy, and trade-offs above efficiency and effectiveness. What presidents began to demand was a system that responded to their requirements as political leaders—"responsive competence" rather than neutral competence… At the same time, recent presidents have insisted on a new kind of public service, with the subjugation of the values of merit, competence, and professionalization in order to increase responsiveness to a presidency that now exists in the environment of postmodernity' (Lane, 1996: 233–234; 238).

[82]   'The extent of the penetration of political appointees has been amply documented over the past 20 years. The proliferation of layers has accompanied the increasing politicisation of the operating agencies of government. Clearly by the standards of evolving managerial theory, the presidency must change its approach. The focus of presidential activity needs to change from political management and control to a concept of leadership as it is coming to be understood in the postmodern era' (Lane, 1996: 247).

It seems that the feudal world that Long toyed with is indeed making a substantial return: 'To deny that power is derived exclusively from superiors in the hierarchy is to assert that subordinates stand in a feudal relation in which to a degree they fend for themselves and acquire support peculiarly their own. A structure of interests friendly or hostile, vague and general or compact and well-defined, encloses each significant center of administrative discretion' (Long, 1966: 44).

[83]   This pressure comes in fits and starts according to the particular pressures of the time. 'From the perspective of the presidency, frustration continued to build over the fact that the administrative establishment was a separate institution within the political system. It was not the president's alone. The presidential reaction to this frustration was, in the context of the separation of powers, a growing suspicion and hostility, followed by specific attempts to manage, control, and subjugate what was perceived to be a threat to presidential rule. Thus, Nixon and his followers became adversaries of the administrative establishment. They abandoned management values in favor of political responsiveness, representing a transition from "technical Management" to "political management"' (Lane, 1996: 232).

[84]   'The answer to these critics is a democratic answer in a democratic polity. The times demand that the presidency and the public administration abandon Finer; abandon overhead democracy; abandon the false promises of control, hierarchy, and authoritarianism; let go of dependence on direction from the top. As public administrators build alliances with citizens, legislatures, customers, suppliers, and employees, the public administration becomes more than an instrumental function of enforcing the law or operating according to rule. Rather, it becomes a function of carrying out the will of the people as expressed in a complex mix of election results, law and regulation, customer preference, professionalism, and direct interaction with the citizenry' (Lane, 1996: 254).

That is, public administrators are being called to embrace the role of the politician (*menetype #C*) and eschew the role of the bureaucrat (*menetype #B*), which is tantamount to selling their soul for a bit of power in the governance system.

'From a different perspective, however, the texts of the project can be read as, collectively, an encounter with politics and an effort to rethink administration in its light: not to reconcile public administration to a given set of political dynamics… but to 're-found" (re-conceive, re-birth) public administration in a manner that shows how administration can be, not the be-all and end-all of governance, but still legitimately "political." In at least this respect, I shall suggest, refounding public administration is fundamentally different from "reinventing government"' (Stivers, 1996: 261).

For an individual it is a transformation of consciousness to move his/her thinking from the *menetype #B* objectively rational mindset to the *menetype #C* political reality perspective, and it is, indeed, described as a "rebirth," or "being born again." So Stivers (1990; 1996) is really talking about leaving the old behind. However, it is accepted in the depth psychology understanding of personality typologies that the individual never really moves from his/her original ingrained consciousness—once a *menetype #B* thinker, always a *menetype #B* thinker, but there are many shades to any particular colour! What happens through the transformation of consciousness is that the individual assimilates the thinking of the other perspective and so his/her consciousness is expanded and he/she begins thinking at a higher level of abstraction. It could be argued that it is so for the collective and that the public administrators as a collective will never move away from the *menetype #B* bureaucratic mindset (in which their institutions were born in the Constitution and have grown up with), but that such initiatives as the Refounding Project (Wamsley and Wolf, 1996) will help expand their minds so that they are able to operate much better in what is now a politicist, postmodern world.

[85] 'But the Refounding Project and "reinventing government" depart from the Finer perspective in quite different directions, even though they are charged with the same crime, if crime it be. "Reinventing government" is content to waive the issue of accountability almost entirely, in favor of results, thereby vitiating the political impulse in the tension between politics and administration. Thus, for all its talk of creativity and inventiveness and its public-spirited rhetoric, "reinventing government" serves the interests of administrative stability, professional control, and budget cutting. Political values are seen as hindrances to entrepreneurialism. "Reinventing government" aims, in fact, to get it right: to meet goals, to attain maximum cost-effectiveness, to satisfy the customer' (Stivers, 1996: 275).

It can be appreciated, therefore, that "reinventing government" encourages a move from the managerial (*menetype #B*) to the entrepreneurial (*menetype #A*) mindset and, as such, is inherently dysfunctional. In contrast, the Refounding Project (Wamsley and Wolf, 1996) encourages a move from the managerial (*menetype #B*) to the political (*menetype #C*) mindset and is, therefore, inherently evolutionary and constructive for public administration—*but the question is whether it is appropriate and constructive for the US governance system as a whole to lose its only objective, rational perspective just to serve the power interests of public administrators?*

[86] 'Indeed, its identity as a modernist institution has instilled in public administrators a deeply and sincerely felt responsibility for regulation of the democratic project and an almost religious devotion to the task of maintaining a secure equilibrium of the status quo as "safe" haven for democracy. To act responsibly, according to modernist principles, however, administrators must also be willing to endure the distrust and enmity of citizens whose resentment of bureaucracy is legendary. A modernist identity assigns administrators the dubious and often unrewarding task of regulating society for "its own good."…

'Whatever is happening in postmodernism, it is clearly not a time for public administrators to watch as bystanders, casually adjusting their work routines to whatever comes along. We are being presented with the historic opportunity to participate in epochal change. We cannot simply use our antiquated sense of social responsibility as a shield against this potential. Remaining on the sidelines as the social critic and watchdog regulator affects the ability of both public administration and the society it serves to change meaningfully in accordance with these times. Indeed, to continue to see ourselves as mere observers, rather than participants, makes the emerging American and global culture seem unnecessarily threatening to the very existence of public administration' (Dennard, 1996: 295).

This sums up the dilemma, but Dennard (1996) is a bit too quick to denigrate the value of the objectively rational bureaucratic perspective in this new postmodern world and, indeed, there may be some value in doing as Waldo was quoted above (from Ostrom, 1989: 9-10) as saying—just keep a "stiff upper lip" and work on becoming more knowing and developing the wise counsel.

[87] 'The object of administrative study is to rescue executive methods from the confusion and costliness of empirical experiment and set them upon foundations laid deep in stable principle' (Wilson, 1966/1887: 29). The stable principle is the eternal truths that are sought and formulated through the scientific method and the logically objective approach of public administration.

[88] There is still some truth and applicability in the words of Finer (1966: 275): 'Contemporary devices to secure closer cooperation of officials with public legislatures are properly auxiliaries to and not substitutes for political control of public officials through exertion of the sovereign authority of the public. Thus, political responsibility is the major concern of those who work for healthy relationships between the officials and the public, and moral responsibility, although a valuable conception and institutional form, is minor and subsidiary.'

89 In simple terms, this is similar challenge to the education identified for the private sector management; namely, learning how humans think and learn so that they can learn how to help others to learn and raise the levels of abstract thinking in government. The metaphor of the mind used in this book would be particularly powerful and useful in this regard (and is more sophisticated than that used by Little (1996: 330ff)).

90 It could be argued that the injection of this concept of citizen involvement has turned a normative theory of public administration into a normative theory of politics. This shift would have been encouraged and abetted by the suggestion to change the terms of the dialogue to treat "public administration" and "government" as one and the same thing. Such inadequate differentiation leads to inadequate theories. Moreover, it could actually be argued that normative theories about norms or standards are political in spirit (i.e. about values and whether the standards are good or bad, relevant or not etc., which are inherently *menetype #C* assessments) and, as such, are not consistent with the core managerialist spirit of public administration. On the other hand, introducing a little bit of the political perspective into public administration is a good thing, unless it is taken too far. There is value in the concept that: 'Critical to the successful creation of this dialogue is "agential leadership," a form of administrative leadership that is primarily oriented toward creating and guiding policy dialogue. These agential leaders are different from traditional administrative leaders because they are *normatively grounded*, which is to say, guided and even controlled by values that are generally shared because they reflect a common interest. The presence of the value framework and its embodiment in the agential leader forms the context for policy dialogue that—it is promised—will render that dialogue *nonideological* ' (McSwite, 1996: 204).

This is an appropriate development if the value framework is adopted objectively from the formal governance process and so is legitimately part of the Agency Perspective, but it is not so appropriate if it goes too far as did the "New Public Administration" and define its own value set that encapsulated its own perspective of what the "public interest" should be. That is, the value framework should be developed as a secondary support to the public administrators' objective thinking and not as a primary guide that they would wish to defend in a political way. This reiterates the earlier criticism that the Blacksburg Manifesto (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990) could be read as a call to politicise public administration—or at least that some of the concepts employed allow the Manifesto to be used that way as has occurred with Stivers' (1990; 1996) idea of citizen participation. That this is the wrong path to take is illustrated by taking it to its logical conclusion when the first-order political institutions flex their more powerful political muscles and turn these now more political agencies into mere extensions of their political offices (in much the same manner as the localised administrations in the feudal times).

91 'Since I have said that the ideas of active citizenship appear to be at odds with our traditions and current arrangements, a brief sketch of this concept is in order. The notion originates in Aristotle's idea that the citizen is a member of the state. Although the characteristics of membership vary with the nature of the state, the mark of this form of citizenship is "participation in giving judgment and in holding office." The citizen takes his [sic] turn ruling and being ruled. Distinctive to the act of ruling is *phronesis*, or the exercise of practical wisdom, an essential ingredient of citizen virtue. Thus, the polity that enables citizens to practice *phronesis* for the good of all is the best form of government' (Stivers, 1990: 249–250).

In actuality, democratic capitalism achieves the harnessing of this practical wisdom in a different way.

92 'Sheldon Wolin has suggested that the loss of an operative political community took place as long ago as the shift from the civic intimacy of the Greek city-state to the abstract symbols of authority upon which the Roman Empire depended to bind its citizens together, symbols that would evoke the state's power despite its members' physical dispersion' (Stivers, 1990: 255).

This captures the shift from the civic intimacy of belonging and being loyal to a group (*menetype #B*) to the political or authority sphere (*menetype #C*) of activity. It is always hard to go back to previous psychological states and so societal thinking moved on to ever higher levels of abstraction, broken only by the major catastrophic breakdowns through the ages.

93 The shift from the economic to the social sphere is also advocated by Ramos (1981: 135–136), in his concept of the multicentric society and a focus on the citizen: 'Therefore, the post-industrial society envisioned by the para-economic paradigm can only come into being as a result of confrontive endeavours on the part of actors whose personal project is to resist the intrinsic trends of the market-centered society… The multi-centric society is a deliberate undertaking. It implies design and implementation of a new kind of state empowered to formulate and enforce allocative policies supportive not only of market-centered pursuits, but of social settings suited for personal actualisation, convivial relationships, and community activities of citizens as well. Such a society also requires the initiatives of citizens, who are stepping out of the market-centered society at their own responsibility and risk…

'One fundamental topic of the new science of organizations is what I call the law of requisite adequacy… Specifically, the law of requisite adequacy states that a variety of social systems is an essential qualification of any society which is responsive to its members' basic needs of actualization, and that each of these social systems prescribes design requisites of their own.'

94   That it might be coming out of the repressed collective psyche or "no-go" cognitive area of public administration is reflected in Wilson's view of active citizenship as reported by Cooper (1984: 301): 'Citizens are those who elect others to engage in the business of governing in the public interest, and otherwise are assured of protection from undue interference in their lives by either the state or their fellow citizens. Wilson stood in this tradition. Deeply concerned for social order and efficient administration in the face of corrupt municipal machines, he was inclined to buffer the governing process from popular interests and emotions through the election of representative political actors. He did not want the people to be "meddlesome" by becoming directly involved in government and, of course, similar preferences for a limited role of the citizenry and a reliance on representation have been articulated at length by scholars such as Schumpeter, Berelson, and Lipset, to name only a few examples.

95   'Thus passivity overtakes us, and according to Walzer, "if the citizen is a passive figure, there is no political community." However, as he rightly asserts, there *is* a political community; *some* citizens are actively engaged in influencing public policy. It is just that *most* citizens live like aliens within it, and finding themselves alienated from the political process, they easily take refuge in pluralism. Citizenship is one role among many roles for the pluralists; the inability to make citizenship a significant one leads to a fragmented commitment to a number of others. By turning to our private interests we feel less frustrated with the failure of our public role' (Cooper, 1984: 302).

More pertinent, perhaps, is that (as explained above), the predominant US societal value of individual freedom and endeavour in the economic sphere encourages the pursuit of the private interests at the expense of citizenship. In particular relation to Stivers' proposal for public administrators to foster and lead active citizenship, it is not appropriate that there be a separate 'political community' (in Cooper's (1984) terms) being formed around public administrators.

96   'The agency perspective thus acts as a "city" within which to practice active citizenship, as administrative discretion grounded in the accountability that develops out of face-to-face interaction and dialogue, and situated by agency memory and contextual insight, expands the public space to include those the Founders left out so long ago' (Stivers, 1990: 264).

This starts off well and grounds the public administrators' mindset in the Agency Perspective (properly developed) when engaging in the dialogue with citizens. Furthermore, "active citizenship" is all very fine while it holds essentially to "active listening" but is dysfunctional from a whole-of-governance, system perspective, when it takes upon itself a political objective such as 'to include those the Founders left out so long ago'. This is tantamount to cultivating their own constituency rather than assisting the Government to identify and develop an appropriate articulation of the "public interest."

97   'Bureaucrats treat the individual as an impersonal object within the context of rules, such as those defining eligibility for benefits or banned behavior. The official does not consider the "whole person" but limits attention to that narrow and abstract slice of the client which is of programmatic relevance. Hence bureaucratic behavior toward clients is characterized by remoteness and manipulation. The client is neither respected citizen nor valued customer, but "territorial underdog" to be controlled and restricted. In extreme cases, Heiner Flohr writes, bureaucracy could even be harmful to your health' (Goodsell, 1994: 18).

This is obviously bringing out the downside of the bureaucratic approach but, as explained in this book, every approach has a downside, every cognitive stance that encompasses choice and action has a shadow. For instance, an alternative to the above-described bureaucratic approach is for the public administrators to regard the "whole person" and decide whether he/she is worthy of assistance or condemnation. It is readily apparent that any decision could be justified and made on such criteria as how he/she looked or behaved, who he/she mixed with, who he/she voted for, whether he/she thinks the right things, and the list could go on. In short, the public administrator would be asked to make strictly political decisions—who should get what and when—or judicial decisions—who is worthy of condemnation and when. Feudal anarchy would likely rule the day! The impracticality of taking this notion of treating the "whole person" to its logical conclusion is demonstrated by the following "Don Quixote-like" image of public administrators riding off on their own to fix up all the social problems of the world.

'This necessarily assumes that administrators must be able to make judgments within their systems of constraints about what action best maintains these relationships and which therefore maintains the ability of the nation to evolve, change, and realize its most aspirational dreams of a democratic society. The conditions that call for administrative action and expertise—poverty, drug abuse, crime, unemployment—are also very real. But so are the citizens caught up in these realities, and real also are the processes of development and social evolution they carry with them. If public administration continues to see citizens only as problems to solve or unsavoury realities to endure, they cannot connect to those human relationships that have the capacity to heal these despairing realities. They can only regulate them. Democracy and the responsible citizenship it engenders simply cannot be realized through undemocratic relationships. Insisting that they can creates a "real" world where no one really wants to be, but to which we are bound for the lack of imagination and courage' (Dennard, 1996: 314–315).

First, it is not for the public administration to make judgments on the nation's aspirational dreams, it is for the elected politicians. The particular social ills mentioned require political solutions rather than administrative solutions (as acknowledged in the quote), and there is a whole first-order trinity of powers to deliberate on the appropriate responses to them and it is the role of the public administration to be like Sanchez and carry the weapons and follow his leader into whatever action is deemed necessary. And, like Sanchez, the public administrator will need to endure the scorn and derision for carrying out some of those actions, but also like Sanchez, to those who stand back and look at the whole story, he/she is required to carry the mantle of intellectual superiority or leadership. This is particularly so for those social problems that are most manifest in the social sphere (*menetype #B*), so that by their sympathetic "democratic/equality" way of thinking (bureaucrat as *menetype #B*), the public administrators are particularly well placed and equipped cognitively to analyse and advise on potential solutions to such social problems.

Or the same point is made by Maranto (1993: 18): 'The politics–administration dichotomy was meant to preserve political direction while enhancing government integrity and expertise. Yet an important part of the crusade, particularly on the local level where most of the public sector existed, was a direct attack on parties. "Once admit that it is proper to turn out an efficient Republican clerk in order to replace him with an efficient Democratic clerk, or vice versa, " wrote Theodore Roosevelt in 1890, "and the inevitable next step is to consider solely Republicanism or Democracy, and not efficiency, in making the appointment." Reformer and academic Andrew White charged that cities were being governed under the "evil theory" that the city was a "political body." Instead the city should be considered a corporation where "party political names and duties" were "utterly out of place."'

[98]   That they could clearly be a political force is recognised by Barth (1996: 182–183): 'a very different kind of citizen involvement occurs when the citizens' goal is to not only listen and comment, but to obtain the power to influence decisions… These groups obviously are not a part of the government establishment—they are there to change the structure of power in the political process itself… The message to the citizens affiliated with SCI was clear: As public administrators we will work with you because we fear you, but we will not give the public appearance that we are in partnership with you, or see that you get any credit for forcing the bureaucracy to respond… To re-establish constructive relationships, public administrators must see such citizens as partners, where the issue is not "power over" but "power-with"—working together to solve problems.'

This is the kind of effective power that Stivers (1996) and the Refounding Project (Wamsley and Wolf, 1996) want to claim for the glory of the public administration, and the partnership with citizens seems to be to the exclusion of elected politicians. 'The administrative state needs active citizens because it needs a viable democratic politics if it is to remain a state rather than to continue to harden into a mere management mechanism' (Stivers, 1996: 263).

[99]   Somewhat like the spirit of citizen involvement given by Friedrich (1966: 238): 'the great pressure of legislative work has made it increasingly difficult for parliamentarians to attend to such matters. Moreover, a citizen, no matter how competent or well informed, would be handicapped if his views were patently different from those of the representatives, whether for political or technical reasons. It is evident that in these and similar situations the citizen has become more and more accustomed to turn directly to the administrator. Some far-sighted administrators, like M. L. Wilson, Undersecretary of Agriculture, have made persistent efforts to secure such citizen-participation. Actually, referenda have been held to ascertain what would be the reaction of large groups of affected citizens to a proposed policy. On December 10 1938, the United States Department of Agriculture held a referendum to determine AAA crop control. Other consultations have been held on a more limited scale on potatoes, milk, and the like.'

The methods used now might be more modern but the same objective spirit should be retained.

[100]   Such as advocated also by the New Public Administration movement: 'This approach remains academically strong. The "New PA" movement of the 1970s identified underprivileged citizens having no "representatives" in bureaucracy, then set out to combine them with "new administrators" as a new group in the pluralist struggles. The operation and theoretical problems of this pluralist doctrine lay somewhat dormant for years, but they have emerged with a vengeance. I cite only two' (Thayer, 1984: 271).

Public Administration as a Vocation

Abstract: The worthwhile pursuit of public administration as a vocation is discussed in terms of the Blacksburg Manifesto's (Wamsley, 1990a) call to arms and Weber's (1947) ethics of personal behaviour for public administrators. The question of who is more likely to be called to a vocation of public administration is addressed. Finally, just how the public administration can go about cultivating a true sense of administrative service is discussed.

INTRODUCTION

In analysing the role and dynamics of the individual and his/her role in public administration within the constitutional governance of the United States, there will be a focus principally on the following questions:

(i)   Is public administration of sufficient value to warrant being a worthy vocation for someone?

(ii) What type of individual character is involved with those who have a true calling to public administration?

(iii) What are the types of roles that cultivate public administration as a vocation?

IS PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION A WORTHY CAUSE?

'Science is meaningless because it gives no answer to our question, the only question important for us: "What shall we do and how shall we live?"' (Tolstoy as quoted in Weber, 1948: 143). Weber acknowledged the correctness of this statement but then went on to establish that science was indeed useful and so was a worthwhile vocation. Public administration does not answer the question either, but it also may be useful and therefore a worthy vocation for somebody, after the same spirit as *Science as a Vocation* (Weber, 1948: 129–156).

In calling for the Refounding of public administration, Wamsley *et al.* (1990) concentrate mainly on devising means to enhance the legitimacy and authority of public administration rather than why they should be (other than claiming that it has been there from the start but never really realised).[1] Wamsley *et al.* (1990: 47) claim that 'The Public Administration is to share in governing wisely and well the *constitutional order* that the framers of the Constitution intended as an expression of the will of the people who alone are sovereign.' This suggests they do not share now but they should, and they further suggest that public administrators should share power as equals to the legislature and the executive (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990: 47), because, indeed, they are just as (even more so it is implied) representative as the elected politicians and political appointees (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990: 46–47).

The Blacksburg Manifesto (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990) therefore is more than a call to arms; it is a call for public administrators to enter more deeply into the political fray.[2] They wish the dialogue to be changed from 'questions about the nature and role of "government" to questions about the nature and role of "public administration"' (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990: 35), so as to build up a constituency by 'more direct linkages with the people, in order to win their trust' (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990: 43).[3] Public administrators wish to become protectors of the Constitution by becoming the equally powerful 'balancing wheel' (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990: 49) between the two constitutionally endowed political powers. Having seemingly failed at being hailed as managers in the age of the managerialist, when conditions were so much more propitious for their cause, public administrators are now being called upon to become political in the age of politicism. In other words, the public administration is being asked to seek its worth in becoming something it is not[4]—namely, a political institution and, moreover, one at a higher station in life than it currently is (i.e. first-order equal rather than second-order subservient). This is perhaps being a little tough on the Blacksburg Manifesto because it does recognise 'the captaincy of our political institutions' (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990: 45). However, the emphasis is placed on gaining authority and claiming legitimate power to compete politically and, in this sense, is looking for the worth of public administration in the wrong places. Wamsley *et al.* (1990) do, however, hint at the worth of public administration in talking of public administration as being the navigator, 'to bring to bear knowledge, reason, and moral judgment on both our problems and the design of the future' (Wamsley

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et al., 1990: 44–45) but, here again, it is a mixture of navigation and captaining (moral judgments). The Public Administration talks of being a "trustee" of the "public interest" (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990: 48), whereas it is only the custodian of the interpretations and commitments of the political institutions—essentially, it does not decide and, if it does so in the course of exercising its delegated power, the decisions can always be modified by the first-order governance powers if they so wish.[5]

There is a hint of the way ahead in the notion mentioned above of the public administration as the custodian of the "public interest," and the accumulation of official government interpretation and commitments of policy and resources to particular programs. This is somewhat similar to the role of scientists in their field as they record and carry forward the insights and discoveries of their eminent colleagues to form an authoritative consolidated body of shared knowledge about the facts of things and their interrelationships. Therefore, it is telling to focus on the presuppositions of public administration in the same way that Weber (1948) focused on the presuppositions of science. At their core, they are remarkably similar because they are both motivated by a *menetype #B* view of the world—but they just happen to have a focus on a different aspect of the factual truth of the world. Essentially there is a presupposition that (quoting and paraphrasing from Weber, 1948: 143–145).

- 'the roles of logic and method are valid; these are the general foundations of (the public administrators') orientation in the world;'

- 'what is yielded by (administrative) work is important in the sense that it is "worth being known"' (an assessment that needs to be confirmed within the governance system); and that

- there is value in the governance process for the objective view of facts and policy analysis free from the personal passions, sympathies and politics of the proponents.[6]

The same question then arises as it did for Weber in respect of Science; namely, what value does this objectively logical knowledge of facts have for a government that 'does not care to know facts as such and to whom only the practical (political) standpoint matters?' (Weber, 1948: 147). Political decisions are about what and whose public interest is to be The same question then arises as it did for Weber in respect of Science; namely, what value does this objectively logical knowledge of facts have for a government that 'does not care to know facts as such and to whom only the practical (political) standpoint matters?' (Weber, 1948: 147). Political decisions are about what and whose public interest is to be served with the limited resources available. Public administrative 'pleading is meaningless in principle because the various value spheres of the world stand in irreconcilable conflict with each other'[7] (Weber, 1948: 147). However, just as it is in the life of an individual, it is important that the Government recognises the 'inconvenient facts' (Weber, 1948: 147) that public administrators are able to uncover and articulate. This is particularly so when it is acknowledged that the political process and the politicians (*menetype #C*) naturally suppress this particular view of the world (*menetype #B*). In the same way that Weber (1948: 147) sees this "pointing to the facts" of the situation as being the high 'moral achievement' of the scientific discipline, it has also been long regarded as a high-value-added aspect of public administration (usually expressed in terms of "frank and fearless advice").

The objective factual view was highly prized during the managerialist age when the highly rationalistic processes defined by the many forms of programme budgeting, zero-based budgeting, and the like, were introduced. Just because the political decision-making process overvalued such scientific decision-making approaches and came to grief because of it (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990: 38), there is no reason "to chuck out the baby with the bath water." Though it is reasonable that political decision making should abandon such processes for something more appropriate and effective (particularly in this age of politicism where the emphasis has shifted from fact to value), it is not necessary for public administration to abandon its managerialist-type heartland for politics. Actually, it is more important than ever for the public administrator to be ready to keep injecting this objective, logical viewpoint of the factual reality of the world—mainly because nobody else will and the political decision-making process will be the poorer without it.

It should be understood in this context that just as in the case of the scientific academic, public administrators are not trying to sell the Government 'a *Weltanschauung* or a code of conduct' (Weber, 1948: 150). Public administrators are not naturally meant to be leaders or demagogues within the US governance system. Rather the public administrator is more like the courageous person of Plato's cave who is willing to make the intellectual effort and

turn around and bear the bright light of seeing things clearly, and then attempting to help others to see more clearly than one would if they kept looking at the shadows on the wall (Weber, 1948: 140). This is in keeping with the spirit of intellectual leadership as observed earlier, and intellectual leadership does not mean selling ideas and programs but helping others to see their own ideas more clearly.

Therefore, if the public administrator is 'competent in our pursuit [which must be presupposed here] we can force the (Government), or at least we can help (them), to give (themselves) an *account of the ultimate meaning of (their) own conduct.* This appears to me as not so trifling a thing to do, even for one's own (Agency Perspective). Again I am tempted to say of a (public administrator) who succeeds in this: (he or she) stands in the service of "moral" forces; (he or she) fulfils the duty of bringing about self-clarification and a sense of responsibility'[8] (Weber, 1948: 152, parentheses added). This is an achievement to be highly valued by society and, perhaps, to be worthy of a vocation, but really these are 'value judgments about which nothing can be said in the lecture-room' (Weber, 1948: 152), or in this book. It is for the individual to judge whether it is a calling for him/her, and some typical responses are considered soon.

For now, the point is that a key worth of the public administration is to help bring about the self-clarification that would challenge the Government in its 'ethic of responsibility.'[9] In clarifying what is meant by the Government's intentions, the public administration continually promotes objectivity in Government decision making and so allows the politicians no excuse for avoiding their responsibility for the consequences of their decisions. In this sense there is a complementary set of ethics that is required to be present in good decision making or good governance; namely, (with reference to Weber's (1978b: 212–213) classification of the personal qualities required for *Politics as a Vocation*):

- The ethic of intent or ultimate ends (*menetype #A*), which is about the urge for prestige and a calling to those with a vocation of leadership and the practice of entrepreneurship—which is more at home in the Executive;

- The ethic of clarity or objectivity (*menetype #B*), which is about the urge for order and a calling to those with a vocation of administration and the practice of management—which is more at home in the Courts at the first-order level of governance and public administration at the second-order;

- The ethic of commitment and responsibility (*menetype #C*), which is about the urge for power and a calling to those with a vocation of politics and the practice of power in decision-making—which is more at home in the Legislature.

These aspects of political ethics comprise a trinity of *menetypes* (as depicted in Fig. **8.1**) and need to be present in a balanced way to promote sound decision making.[10] As such, it would be rare to find them exhibited equally in the behaviour of one person or at the same time in group decision making. One of them becomes predominant and the other ethics have to be compromised to a greater or lesser extent. In Government decision making it is the public administration that is required to follow the ethic of clarity to promote objectivity in decision making and to ensure that politicians know what they are likely to be held responsible for in making that decision. If the public administration fails to provide this perspective, then nobody else is likely to and the decision-making process is deficient as a result.[11]

Public administrators, then, have a real calling to contribute meaningfully to good governance by embracing the ethic of clarity, and working hard and continuously to promote:

- clarity in defining the logical necessity, or otherwise, of the Government's entrepreneurial ideas and analysing the likely consequences of the particular decision and the alternative options available;

- clarity in calculating and implementing, in an efficient manner, the means required to achieve the ends as decided by proper authority; and

- clarity in assessing the effects of government decisions, processes and actions.

It is for the politicians to decide unless that power has been delegated, and it is for public administration to provide the clarity, first to itself (which goes to forming the Agency Perspective),[12] secondly to the politicians and ultimately, through them (or on their behalf), to the public. The concept and practices of accountability are,

therefore, a big part of fulfilling the obligations of clarity and it is incumbent on public administrators to be ever ready to be called to account, to explain and clarify the rationale of particular decisions or actions—unless specifically prevented by appropriate political power. If all the political decision-makers are aware of the likely consequences of their decisions and the alternative options that could be canvassed, then the public administrator has done his/her job, and a valuable job it is—but it is not one of decision-making power, unless delegated by those empowered to make decisions for the Government and the nation. It is in this context of delegated decision-making that the public administrator would do well to have cultivated the ethic of responsibility as his/her secondary cognitive commitment, and to leave the ethic of intent to the public entrepreneurs.[13] Such a personal commitment or vocation is worthy, though seemingly little appreciated (principally because it is in the collective shadow). If 'Politics is a strong and slow boring of hard boards' (Weber, 1948: 128), then public administration is a never-ending and arduous task of digging large holes in hard soil, only to have them filled in and then be required to dig them out again![14]

Furthermore, it is well to appreciate that like science, which as a vocation is organized into many special disciplines, public administration, too, is organized into many endeavours with different purposes and foci, and they are called agencies and sub-agencies.[15] Therefore, to pursue public administration as a vocation involves subscribing to their particular Agency Perspective for the time. In essence, this is a way that has been developed to clarify what the Government is doing and intends doing, in the same way that scientists adopt or believe the authenticated works of those that have gone before them. Loyalty to the vocation of public administration therefore involves, in the first instance, loyalty to a particular agency and its purposes, or to its Agency Perspective. As explained above, public administration is at the second-order level of governance and is, therefore, very pluralistic. Different agencies have different agendas—some may even be in competition. It is, therefore, difficult for public administrators to extend their personal commitment to a particular Agency Perspective to some bigger conglomerate of agencies, because the bigger set of institutions involves entering the world of competing values, or politics. However, public administrators can carry their personal commitment to the ethic of clarity to work in another agency focused on a different purpose and subject matter.[16] Those public administrators that have a true calling are committed to helping decision-makers clarify what they are doing and, as such, are providing a service not a threat. It is, therefore, sensible in the interests of good governance to grant such policy and program illuminators some security of tenure so they can keep the light shining for all involved without fear of being switched off at the mains.


Figure 8.1: The Trinity of Political Ethics

WHO IS LIKELY TO HAVE A TRUE CALLING TO PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION?

Those who have a true calling to public administration may have a certain pattern of character traits. There are many people employed in the public sector but clearly not all have, or could be expected to have, a calling[17]— to some it is merely a way perhaps to power or prestige, whereas for others it is just a job, a way to earn money so they can enjoy doing other things.

A vocation to public administration is essentially a call to the *menetype #B* spirit of objective rationality and ethic of clarity as explained above. It is tantamount to a commitment to a life of inquiry and formulation, to a life of thinking about how it all works and thereby clarifying it for oneself and for others. It is obvious that people who prefer thinking and operating that way (i.e. have a preferred personal cognitive orientation to a *menetype #B*) would naturally find such a vocation attractive and comfortable. For such individuals, there would be an inner resonance with most things about the purpose, style and role of public administration in the governance scheme of things.

For those, then, with an essentially *phase #B* cognitive orientation and personality (i.e. head-type people in the Enneagram typology—Riso, 1987; Palmer, 1991),[18] there is a natural vocation to all that public administration has to offer. These types of people build up their personal inner world by taking on as their personal beliefs, the dogmas, concepts and ideas from those authoritative sources that can be trusted. They then continually test what they experience or analyse against the logic of their conceptual framework, and are only prepared to modify their cognitive framework when it is logically convincing or underwritten by sufficient authority. There is, therefore, a readiness to subscribe to the Agency Perspective (because it is coming from a verifiable authority) and all the authoritative interpretations of the "public interest" in the terms of the Constitution, relevant legislation and Government policy. Such individuals are naturally more ready to let others make decisions and take responsibility for them, and they eschew both the limelight and any desire to stand out and be different from their colleagues. They enjoy more the thinking and making sense of it all, and it is a natural reaction to be continually testing what they experience within the logical framework defined by the Agency Perspective and associated authority. They are continually testing the empirical data against their well-established objectively factual way of thinking. They would enjoy the security of well-defined hierarchical structures and processes, the safety of belonging to a group that has some power in the external world (as a compensation for their own lack of a personal striving for power), and the convenience of having somebody else take on the role of entrepreneur and carrying their repressed experience of the ethic of intent. In effect, they project their repressed desire of success and prestige onto the agency as an entity and onto the public entrepreneurs whom they allow to set their agenda. They would naturally have a tendency to be loyal to the agency and their superiors who carry the authority of the agency for them. However, there is usually an authority issue bubbling away (with its nature being determined by the state of the individual's psychic health) and should their superiors betray their ready trust, these individuals are likely to move their loyalty up a notch or two to focus on higher levels of governance such as the Government or even the Constitution. Alternatively, they could rebel and stand up for the integrity of the organization, or just leave—which would be a bit of a death experience for them—much like leaving home. Be that as it may, they have a real inner commitment to public policy and all that the *menetype #B* democratic way stands for.

For those with an essentially *phase #C* cognitive orientation or personality (i.e. gut-type individuals in the Enneagram typology), there is more of a romantic attraction to the something that is missing in their conscious psyche. That is, they wistfully think they should be into objective logical thinking and the ethic of clarity, though they have repressed it from their conscious thinking for some time. They never really quite make it, but they like talking about it and being surrounded by it. For them, it is a bit like falling in love and allowing the partner to live out that part of your life while you carry on your conscious life doing what you naturally want to do anyway. These types of individuals have a natural inclination to exercise their personal power as opposed to trusting the word of some external authority. They are, however, readily influenced by others who personally have the power to do things, or to do things to them. Rather than build firm structures on the inside, they build firm dependable structures around them. Therefore, if they were to be attracted to public administration, they would probably be motivated by notions of fighting for justice and there would be a conscious joining with an agency that seems to have the power to move and shake things. Once into public administration, they would be attracted to the sources of real power in decision making and would more easily slip into the action and political aspects of public administration's operations rather than be content in seeking to make things clear for others to decide. The ethic of clarity and objective thinking is actually repressed in their personality, but they would be able to preach the mantra for others to

uphold and so use the notion to gain leverage over others, but eschew it for themselves. While such personalities might find a career in the public service attractive, particularly if they manage continually to enjoin the action, they do not have a vocation to public administration—but rather would be a constant challenge to those that do.

For those operating out of an essentially *phase #A* cognitive orientation or personality (i.e. heart-type people in the Enneagram typology), there is more of a call to personal achievement through working in public administration. There is the attraction to the political vision or significant development project that is carried by the agency, of working in areas close to a respected public office holder or on a path to such a role, and there could be the attraction to prospects of career advancement to a higher office with prestige or status. These are the public entrepreneurs who identify with the agency or Government vision and strive to make others believe that they can deliver on it. They want to stand out and take the lead in organizing the bureaucracy and resources to achieve particular projects. They would have difficulty with strict hierarchical authority and following set rules/procedures because they would always want to do it in a new and better way (like reinventing the wheel), and receive acknowledgement and respect from others for having done so. They would thrive in the Osborne and Gaebler (1992) entrepreneurial *Reinventing Government* where they are steering not rowing. Though they might find a career in public administration attractive (but only if they can continually be involved in exciting development projects or responsible for introducing new ways), they do not have a true vocation to public administration, but rather would constantly annoy/frustrate those that do.

However, just because many might not have what could be called a true vocation to public administration, it does not mean that they would not fit in, be useful and/or get some enjoyment from it. For instance, the *phase #C* politically oriented individual could help with the dialogue with external political institutions and help the agency make sense of the political games that are in play. The *phase #A* entrepreneurally oriented individual would be effective in interpreting the vision in the Government's agenda and working through with the agency on what changes are needed to deliver the new agenda in its programs. He/she would also be very effective and enjoy assisting in the new development projects. Nevertheless, both of these types who do not have a penchant for the real stuff of public administration, are more likely to move around and move in and out of a number of public administration agencies. Nevertheless, modern government is very complex and, like any large organization, it needs a good mix of people to help make it work.

Where those without a true vocation for public administration do rise to the challenge of working with a different mindset, a constructive and creative symbiosis is likely to result, and everybody will benefit. However, if the individual does not have the maturity or inner strength to adjust, the psychic tension usually builds up and something has to give and, more often than not, it is the individual who moves on. But sometimes (particularly if he/she is at a high level) it can be the agency's effectiveness that suffers. Then again, not all agencies would be formed in the *menetype #B* mould and, whether by design or serendipity of circumstances and occupants, the organizational culture could be something different—which would mean that it would then be more attractive to those individuals with other than *phase #B* oriented characters.

Perhaps, in light of this discussion, it may not be appropriate or useful to refer to a "calling" or a vocation to public administration but rather just to be happy to cultivate the sense of a career. On the one hand, if agencies were filled only with those individuals with a true calling to public administration, Weber's (1947) much dreaded "iron cage" would be sure to follow, with rigidity setting in and political responsiveness and public service being severely dampened. In fact, these agencies would likely live up to and exceed the worst reputations of bureaucracies. At the other extreme, where agencies were filled with others not so endowed with the *menetype #B* spirit, there would likely be some serious dysfunction—either they could become much more like just another political office which deals in favours, or they could become just an opportunistic entrepreneurial grandstander independent from political influence. It seems that a balance is more desirable. However, public administration would certainly be more stable and true if the core of the team of public administrators consisted of those who could embrace the *menetype #B* administrative spirit and associated Agency Perspective.

HOW CAN THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION CULTIVATE A SENSE OF VOCATION?

There may be something about the type of roles in public administration that helps cultivate public administration as a vocation. A vocation is a calling to something and it is taken as understood that it is to some higher and better

principle that is able to inspire one to concomitant actions. That is, a calling is to a higher cognitive orientation rather than a lower. For instance, the call to the priesthood is a call to the spiritual dimension of mind rather than a call to good works—the latter hopefully follows from the former, but it is the spiritual realm to which the new priest is enjoined, not the banal. Neither is it the organization or the Church to which the priest is called but that is the mere vehicle to serve a higher cause. The priest is loyal to the Church but has a vocation for the Divine. Similarly, the public administrator's calling is not to a political cause nor to the agency to which she or he can be loyal, but to the higher principle which has been explained as the ethic of clarity around the Government's pursuit of the "public interest" that is encapsulated in its particular governance structure.

A vocation, then, is a calling to a life of cognitive reversion, a call to work back towards the high unitary first principles at the highest levels of personal thinking.[19] In particular, the vocation to public administration is a calling at the societal level of thinking to the first principles of governance of the individual's particular state/nation or, in this case, to the first principles of US constitutional governance. It is a call to the highest principle, which can only be achieved by working towards it through the lower things such as Government policy, enabling legislation, and ultimately the Constitution, as expressing the will of the people.[20] The binding unitary principle is actually embodied in the notion of the "public interest" or the will of the people for a better life for themselves. The mission of public administrators is continually to give clarity to the concept of the "public interest" as approved and formally committed to by the governance process. This is saying that the calling or vocation to public administration will be fostered by the continual necessity for individuals to strive inwardly to understand and come to grips with the Agency Perspective and the higher principles of the particular governance system in which they find themselves.

The state of continual cognitive reversion is the state of continual inquiry, thinking and learning, and is the natural way of cognitive life for the *menetype #B* spirit.[21] It is a call for individuals to move up the cognitive spiral to think in even higher levels of abstraction (as explained earlier in terms of managers in the private sector).[22] This spirit needs to be cultivated at the organizational level, therefore, and this is achieved through hierarchies of authority constantly nurturing the Agency Perspective of the higher principles (namely the "public interest") and only making adjustments where proved necessary and appropriate. It is also important that individuals inculcate the Agency Perspective and take on a belief in the higher principles so that it cognitively influences how they form their actions. That is, there needs to be a bit of religion. This is helped by dogma, structure and rituals to persuade individuals to take on the set of beliefs about a particular type of governance that this agency experiences in this particular Government in this particular constitutional governance structure.

However, it is a second-order religion in that the individual is not being asked to take on beliefs that would change his/her life (at the personal spiritual level, which is higher than the personal level of intellect). It is more at the organizational second level and the societal third level of the intellect, which are much more malleable, but less influential, in the personal psyche. This is why it seems possible that types other than those with *phase #B* character orientation, are actually able to subscribe to the Agency Perspective, though there would be cognitive tension with their personal orientation at the less abstract level of the individual. It may be, however, that the Agency Perspective takes on a cultural orientation other than the true administrative *phase #B* spirit. Therefore, as a second-order religion, there is not such a tight cognitive hold on the individual's thinking but it would be enough to inspire correct action, particularly if it is also fired with the zeal of national pride.

The true calling to public administration is then both attracted and fostered by the policy development process rather than by the activity of policy implementation. It would be difficult for those who continue to serve at the coalface of service delivery to cultivate and sustain a true vocation to public administration. There could be a blind belief in the "system" but it would be difficult to cultivate a true conscious commitment to a life of illuminating Government policy when there is not an opportunity or encouragement actually to cogitate upon it. The need to participate in policy development processes should be an important consideration in the planning of the careers of those most likely to be the future agency managers.[23] Such potential high fliers should be continually tested on working through policy issues in the light of the Agency Perspective and higher system of governance so that they can come to grips with them, by continually striving to understand and make sense of the different situations that they might face. It is a life of continual learning, of grappling with that which they experience in light of how the high principles would apply. Therefore, the processes that encourage and assist the practice of inquiry and dialogue are very important. Bureaucratic and committee life is therefore not so much a tedious and time-wasting burden, but more a necessary

constructive device to encourage the inquiry and dialogue that helps individuals and the group/agency itself to reach a higher level of understanding and resolution. People with a tendency for streamlined decision-making and executive action is a fine and sensible thing but such a lone maverick style is not only anathema to the true spirit of public administration, it is not conducive to continual learning unless the individual is then held to review and explain his/her experience—which, of course, would be looked upon as bureaucratic interference. It is, therefore, sensible that where independent action is required, those most imbued with the Agency Perspective should be the ones trusted to go it alone on the belief that they will deliver.

In the sense of cultivating the vocation of public administration, of fostering a belief among individuals in the Agency Perspective, and of contributing constructively to the governance process, it is, therefore, important for agencies to get their policy development processes right. If they do this, then all else will follow, as sure as night follows day, and they can trust that what has to be done is done in keeping with the spirit and meaning of the Agency Perspective and ruling policy regime. To be effective and constructive, the policy development process has to be focused upwards on the proper political authority and to address continually what needs to done in the understanding of what the Government meant or has in mind in this particular area or policy issue. The people's will or "public interest" as embodied in the highest level is not to be had in responding uncritically to the desires of lobby groups or needy clients. In essence, such desires have to be tested on their relative merits against all the other competing claims for Government assistance, and the governance system that helps make those decisions appropriately and efficiently needs to keep the public administrators' minds focused upwards on a continual quest to take on board the governance system's interpretation of the "public interest".

To foster the vocation and true spirit of public administration, the primary importance of the ethic of clarity and objectivity (or intellectual leadership) needs to be continually fostered along with the secondary importance of the ethic of responsibility—particularly when the public administrator is concerned. It would actually be nugatory for public administrators to focus on beating their own drum and demanding respect from the public and political system (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990: 38–39). It would also undermine their adherence to the ethic of clarity to overrate the significance of that political authority to make decisions that have been delegated to them by the indulgence or administrative necessity of those political institutions that have been constitutionally vested with such power. What needs to be fostered is the pride of public administrators in their role of intellectual leadership, which can only be given integrity, standing and influence on others by getting on with it and continually pursuing the ethic of clarity.[24] Public administrators need continually to earn their trust and standing, not simply to proclaim it.

SUMMARY

The principal conclusions from the above analysis of the individual and his/her role in public administration within the constitutional governance of the United States areas follows.

- *Public administration as a vocation means a calling to the ethic of objective clarity, which is expressed in a continual intellectual effort to help the Government clarify the development of its thinking on the "public interest"—a role which is an important and critical component of good governance in a constitutional democracy.*

- *It is the phase #B personality, given to objective thinking and the continual search for the factual truth, which is most in sympathy with such a vocation to public administration, or a calling to pursue the unrestricted desire to clarify—but a belief in the Agency Perspective needs to be engendered in all public administrators.*

- *The vocation and true spirit of public administration need to be fostered, then, by instituting policy development processes that encourage inquiry and dialogue in the pursuit of clarifying Government policy to further the "public interest."*

CONCLUSIONS ON US PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

It is very difficult to even think in terms of coming up with a "magic bullet" that would lift the public administration up to the esteemed heights in US governance to which the Blacksburg Manifesto (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990) and the Refounding Project (Wamsley and Wolf, 1996) aspire. There may, however, be some steps that can be taken to

improve the lot of public administrators or, at least, to help foster their positive contribution within a hostile environment. It is in this spirit of tentativeness that some suggestions have been developed out of the analysis above. It is not intended that the suggestions should solve all their problems but, rather, that they should help public administrators to move with the times and remain relevant without losing their soul or raison d'être in the process. They still have a vital (or perhaps even more vital) role to play in contributing to US constitutional governance in the emerging politicist age but, because they are being seen differently, public administrators need to adjust the way they themselves contribute and are regarded. In crass terms, they still need to have the heart of the faithful feudal squire but need to adopt more of the guile and wisdom of the political knight in the way they go about doing their business—which means that at more times than previously they might have to fill in for the knight and fight the Government's cause without the associated trappings and accolades that go with a successful knight of the nation.

First, public administrators as individuals can develop their competence in differing ways to be able to contribute constructively to US constitutional governance through the present age of politicism. They need to:

- Ensure a basic technical knowledge relevant to their Agency's area of focus, competence in using the latest technology, and an appreciation of the many sources from which particular knowledge can be tapped;

- Commit to a process of continual personal learning, which involves securing the attention of an appropriate mentor, participating in appropriate formal educational activities, and working at an understanding of the particular Agency Perspective; and

- Develop wisdom and trust by understanding the processes of personal and group learning, participating in relevant and useful networks both internal and external to the agency, and gaining an appreciation of US constitutional governance and the particular roles of their agency and themselves.

Second, public sector agencies can develop their relevance and effectiveness in the more political environment by promoting, in particular, involvement, clarity and consistency throughout their activities. They need to:

- Develop a clear formulation and articulation of their Agency Perspective, sound and efficient real-time information systems that register, digest and regurgitate formal interpretations of the "public interest" and associated policies, and clear lines of two-way communication to relevant political power centres;

- Encourage staff cultivation of appropriate networks (to be fostered as a performance measure) that build trust among the participants, encourage staff involvement in formal processes of policy dialogue to a degree of building some "cognitive slack" within the agency, and cultivate processes that encourage reflection on the developing formulation of the "public interest" and associated policies; and

- Institute processes that challenge staff to adhere to and build upon the ethics of objectivity, clarity and consistency, to grow personally and continually broaden their worldview, that allow agency staff to reflect on their thinking about the "public interest" and their role in its fulfilment (including an assessment of the state of their relationships with important stakeholders), and that build partnerships with educational institutions with a view to enhancing the cognitive capability of the agency and its staff.

Third, public administration professional bodies can also improve the lot and standing of public administrators by facilitating a broader dialogue and education of public administrators and by promoting the role of intellectual leadership. They need to:

- Promote the knowledge and formal education levels of public administrators, the continuing education of individuals both within and beyond their particular agencies, and the ethics of public administration, particularly the ethics of objectivity, clarity and integrity;

- Develop mechanisms that educate public administrators about the importance of networks and the skills needed to participate, that foster the partnership between public administrators and academics, and that formulate ways of developing group thinking about group learning; and

- Promote an articulation of the US governance system and the value of the contribution of public administrators, the development of formal tertiary education programs that provide on-site,

experienced-based, reflective learning challenges for public administrators, and the development of methods to enable public administrators to have ready access to the US governance system's authoritative interpretation of the "public interest" as it develops.

Much more thought and discussion would be needed with regards the relative importance of the above suggestions and which of the three levels of individual, agency, or government-wide efforts should take precedence to help public administrators survive and thrive in the new politicist age—the gut feeling, in accordance with the spirit of the age, is that it is time for the government-wide efforts to be stepped up and provide some leadership to all public administrators (as was appropriately encouraged by Wamsley *et al.*, (1990)).

ENDNOTES

1   However, they do claim a 'distinctiveness and worth' to the role of public administrator and express it in terms of 'competence directed to the maintenance of: the Agency Perspective, the broadest possible understanding of public interest, and the constitutional governance process' (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990: 43). This sounds more like the means rather than the rationale of why it is worthy, and this is particularly so for the Agency Perspective; it begs the question of why the Agency Perspective is worthwhile? The three aspects seem similar to the considerations that public administrators should have in mind when coming to an understanding of the public interest. Moreover, the constitutional governance process is certainly seen as worthy, but what has been called into question (and devalued) has been the importance of public administration to that process.

2   In a way, the Blacksburg Manifesto (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990) can be regarded as a re-run of the Friedrich–Finer (1966) debate with the Refounding Project (Wamsley and Wolf, 1996) plumping with Friedrich (1966) for public administrators to move to the political, as acknowledged by Stivers (1996: 275–276): 'Without public-spirited bureaucrats, accountability to the people is doomed. In following Friedrich's lead, however, the Refounding Project inherits and perpetuates the downside of this perspective, which is its propensity to romanticize the commitment of public administrators to a public interest that *they* are held responsible for defining in practice. Thus, as I have argued in this chapter, by stressing the public administrator's special capacity to define the public interest, the Refounding Project has given administrative prerogative too free a rein, and thereby made itself vulnerable to the same criticisms as have been lodged against "reinventing government" though the political dynamics of the two are worlds apart… What our perspective needs (I still want to argue) is active citizens, in order to attain an understanding of accountability that neither relies on hierarchical administrative management paradigm, canonizes administrative judgment, nor translates accountability into "customer satisfaction." By giving up the hope of getting it right, the Refounding Project has taken an entirely new path, one that opens onto democratic vistas for public administration. With active citizens, we could move further in that direction.'

Presumably, with the backing of an adequate citizen constituency, the public administrators would have sufficient legitimacy to press their own conception of the "public interest". They would no longer need, then, to "romanticise" their commitment to a public interest, but rather they would have earned a *political* commitment and responsibility to their conception of the public interest.

3   They are quite clear that they should appropriate the successes of American government to press their claims: 'Most lamentably, The Public Administration has been too timid in pressing its rightful claims to legitimacy of which the Agency Perspective is the basic foundation, and too hesitant about building the sense of trust among citizens that would justify such claims… This means, in essence, that the Public Administration may have to play the role of balance wheel in the constitutional order, using their statutory powers and professional expertise to favor whichever participant in the constitutional process needs their help at a given time in history to preserve the purposes of the Constitutions itself' (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990: 38; 49).

This casts the picture of the powerful protector of the Constitution in the political power battles of the less competent but Constitutionally more powerfully endowed participants!

4   This is a little like the lawyer becoming a crook in order to beat them at their own game and to try to persuade them to stop their pilfering ways.

5   Wamsley *et al.* (1990: 44) do get particularly close when they refer to the public administration as 'a cooling, containing, and directing foil to the capitalist market-place,' which gives a hint of the feminine-like shadow of governance in the US society, if directing is taken to mean directing on behalf and at the request of Government—which comprises the political institutions.

To round out this concept of the worth of public administration as touted by the Blacksburg Manifesto (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990), it can be brought together by an assessment of Wamsley's (1990a: 20, with embellishments) summary that 'the Manifesto and its extended ideas are a "Minnowbrook I with institutional grounding." That is to say we hold important the same values as those often attributed to the so-called New Public Administration of the Minnowbrook Perspective (Marini, 1971):

- a commitment to greater social equity [*which is a menetype #B value of democracy*];

- a concern for wider participation [*which is a menetype #C value of political representation*];

- a desire to move values and norms to a central position in theory and practice [*which is a move from the menetype #B objective, rational to the menetype #C political value assessment*];

- a concern for the relationship between knowledge and action [*which is a deeper menetype #B understanding of the cause and effect of policy*];

- a critical outlook towards the shortcomings of pluralism and those of logical positivism and empiricism [*which is a recognition that the menetype #B scientific analysis is only part of the story and needs to be supplemented by other perspectives*].'

That is, Minnowbrook I (Marini, 1971) and the Blacksburg Manifesto (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990) are both urging a substantial shift from the *menetype #B head* of the scientific, objective analytic approach of public administrators to the *menetype #C gut* approach of politics. This is fine if it just builds up the secondary cognitive powers of the public administrators, but it would have a negative impact on governance if there was a complete transformation of attitude from the *menetype #B* perspective to the *menetype #C* perspective.

⁶   As Weber (1948: 146) attested: 'I am ready to prove from the works of our historians that whenever the man of science introduces his personal value judgment, a full understanding of the facts *ceases*.'

The same has been held in respect of public administrators but it is certainly not what is being argued in the Blacksburg Manifesto (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990).

⁷   Although throughout his works Weber discusses social phenomena in terms of such "value spheres of the world" he does not set out a cohesive conceptual framework of these spheres anywhere in his works. He goes on here to refer to 'the elder Mill, whose philosophy I will not praise otherwise, was on this point right when he said: If one proceeds from pure experience, one arrives at polytheism. This is shallow in formulation and sounds paradoxical, and yet there is truth in it' (Weber, 1948: 147). The value spheres with each of their higher aspirations are essentially the system of hierarchical trinities as presented in the philosophy of mind contained in this book. Another book might show how it is in fact consistent with the conceptual framework used intuitively by Weber (and Hegel for that matter).

⁸   Weber (1948: 152) goes on to say something very pertinent to the Blacksburg Manifesto (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990): 'And I believe he will be the more able to accomplish this, the more conscientiously he avoids the desire personally to impose upon or suggest to his audience his own stand.'

⁹   That the ethic of responsibility defines the vocation of a politician is the subject of Weber's (1948: 77–128) *Politics as a Vocation*. This is explained in terms of the *ethos* of politics as being a "cause." 'What calling can politics fulfil quite independently of its goals within the total ethical economy of human conduct—which is, so to speak, the ethical locus where politics is at home? Here, to be sure, ultimate *Weltanschauungen* clash, world views among which in the end one has to make a choice' (Weber, 1948: 117). It is in having made the choice that one holds oneself responsible for making that choice, and to live true to politics as a vocation is to be true to the ethic of responsibility. The politician needs to respond to the accumulation of power in the political system with a sense of responsibility and doggedness to use the power appropriately and in such a way that it is conserved and not spent quickly (Weber, 1948: 115).

'Well, first of all the career of politics grants a feeling of power… The "strength" of a political "personality" means, in the first place, the possession of these qualities of passion, responsibility, and proportion. Therefore, daily and hourly, the politician inwardly has to overcome a quite trivial and all-too-human enemy; a quite vulgar vanity, the deadly enemy of all matter-of-fact devotion to a cause, and of all distance, in this case, of distance towards one's self… For ultimately there are only two kinds of deadly sins in the field of politics: lack of objectivity and—often but not always identical with it—irresponsibility. Vanity, the need personally to stand in the foreground as clearly as possible, strongly tempts the politician to commit one of both these sins… The ethic of ultimate ends apparently must go to pieces on the problem of justification of means by ends. .. If one makes any concessions at all to the principle that the end justifies the means, it is not possible to bring an ethic of ultimate ends and an ethic of responsibility under one roof or to decree ethically which end should justify the means… Whoever wants to engage in politics at all, and especially in politics as a vocation, has to realize these ethical paradoxes. He must know that he is responsible for what may become of himself under the impact of these paradoxes… If, however, one chases after the ultimate good in a war of beliefs, following a pure ethic of absolute ends, then the goals may be damaged and discredited for generations, because responsibility for *consequences* is lacking, and two diabolical forces which enter the play remain unknown to the actor… However, it is immensely moving when a mature man—no matter whether old or young in years—is aware of a responsibility for the consequences of his conduct and really feels such responsibility with heart and soul. He then acts by following an ethic of responsibility and somewhere he reaches the point where he says: "here I stand; I can do no other." That is something genuinely human and moving. And every one of us who is not spiritually dead must realize the

possibility of finding himself at some time in that position. In so far as this is true, an ethic of ultimate ends and an ethic of responsibility are not absolute contrasts but rather supplements, which only in unison constitute a genuine man—a man who *can* have the "calling for politics"' (Weber, 1948: 115; 116; 122; 125; 127).

In this sense, the public administrator supplements the responsibility of the politician by continually promoting objectivity in the decision making and clarifying the means that are necessary to achieve the ends that are desired.

[10]   Again, it is similar to the trinity identified by Kaufman (1990: 483): 'Underlying the prediction was the argument that the design of our government was strongly influenced by the quest for three values in the conduct of the public business: representativeness [*menetype #C politics*], politically neutral competence [*menetype #B administration*], and executive leadership [*menetype #A entrepreneur*].'

And as observed earlier, the dynamics and interaction of these three values in the governance system can be explained in terms of a very similar trinity of *menetypes*.

That such a balanced provision of perspectives is seen to be contributing to sound decision making is encapsulated in the acknowledged value of the separation of powers: 'As a whole, separation of powers creates "responsible" government in a sense now familiar but new with Madison and Hamilton (*Federalist* 63, 70) of responsible *for* rather than responsive *to*. Government with separation of powers is derived from the people but also separated from the people, responsible for the people *because* it is at a distance from them. There, government can serve the people without being servile, and the people can hold it to account without preventing it from governing. In sum, whereas separation of powers in the American constitution was above all an achievement of political science as understood and improved by the Framers, today's political science is yet ready to abandon it in favor of some more seemingly progressive proposal… But it is not easy to take account of the immutable truths of politics without relying on the fashion and fancies of political science' (Mansfield, 1994: 13–15).

[11]   Wamsley *et al.* (1990) do have some reference of the importance and value of the ethic of clarity to public administration, though there is understandably (given the context and purpose) more emphasis given to clarifying 'the realities of administrative practices so that citizens can understand them, and ultimately acknowledge the legitimacy of administrative authority' (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990: 39). Be that as it may, the actions and purposes of Government do need clarification for the public to promote good governance further, rather than the fortunes or power of public administration per se. Wamsley *et al.* (1990: 34; 37; 41; 44; 50; 47) do make reference to the need for "self-conscious administration," enacting 'some kind of consensus over specific aspects of public policy,' the need for 'informed efforts essential *to the search for* the public interest,' 'efforts to bring to bear knowledge, reason, and moral judgment on both our problems,' 'administrators must be able to give reasons for what they do,' and that 'what is important is that the Public Administrator acts in a professional manner in the sense of a concern for the development of competence and standards, an orientation towards service, and a set of values that regards the broadest possible definition of the public interest as a real although problematic trust, and, above all, which holds the maintenances of the constitutional order as a fundamental duty.'

This book would argue that it is not the duty of public administrators to maintain constitutional order because that implies power and decision-making authority they do not have. They can help and they do that principally by clarifying what is involved and pointing out where particular initiatives might undermine constitutional order, but it is ultimately for others to decide what is to be done. Wamsley *et al.* (1990: 50) perhaps come closest when they observe that 'The Public Administrator should thus be both an analyst and an educator but *not* a philosopher-king or mandarin.'

[12]   'Just as the field of policy analysis institutionalizes the search for policy logic, the field of planning institutionalises the consideration of the long view ahead. Similarly, the field of program evaluation institutionalizes the view back while the field of management information systems does so for the current situation. Without the public administration, government would indeed proceed blindly and unconcernedly; with it, it can act knowledgeably, responsibly, and in the public interest' (Goodsell, 1990b: 110).

Each of these fields of administrative activity is about the striving for clarity so that the government is not acting 'blindly and unconcernedly.' Moreover, these fields of administrative endeavour can together be grouped into a trinity of *menetypes* according to whether they are clarifying the present (*menetype #C*), the past (*menetype #B*), or the future (*menetype #A*). From the knowledge of their dynamics as different perspectives of a trinity, management can then consider wisely how best to integrate them into the agency's endeavour. For instance, those agencies more focused on responding to current political crises would put most energies into effective and timely information systems and not worry too much about the orderly analysis of the events of yesterday. They are also likely to put energy as a secondary focus into contingency planning to have options ready in case they are needed to respond to today's political crisis.

[13]   The importance of the way public administrators exercise their discretion in decision making has been well recognised. 'I argued that the way a bureaucrat uses discretion is the central ethical problem for the career civil servant. This is because through administrative discretion a career civil servant participates in governing a democratic society without being directly accountable to the electorate. As far as I can recall, no reviewer

questioned that point… I am prepared to assert that a consensus has settled around the proposition that the responsible use of administrative discretion is the central ethical problem for the career civil service' (Rohr, 1990b: 119).

It has been pointed out in this book that it is really only a secondary ethical problem for the career civil service. The central ethical problem is around the striving for clarity and objectivity.

[14] Which is essentially a more mundane version of the metaphor used by Wamsley and Wolf (1996: 23; 34): 'Finding and maintaining some kind of coherence while accommodating, and indeed being urged to foster emergence sounds to many like some sort of cruelty joke designed for public administration by Sisyphus… For those unfamiliar with Sisyphus, he was condemned by the gods to roll a huge rock up a hill—only to watch it roll down again—for eternity. One of my puckish colleagues has proposed that he be made the "patron saint" of public administration.' (Which is a very insightful and meaningful suggestion!)

[15] 'Developing public administration as a polity profession has proven to be an elusive goal… Doubts about the applicability of existing professional models began to surface during the 1930s and continue to surface. It became apparent that serious dysfunctions occur when the traditional and the technical models are applied to public administration. The first major dysfunction observed was that public administration embraced too many disciplines and thus was too amorphous to unify by the standards of the traditional and technical models' (Stever, 1988: 35–36).

As observed above, public administration is more like an interdisciplinary field (Wamsley, 1996: 354; 363) and is essentially manifold and pluralistic.

[16] This highlights why it might actually be misleading to explain the notion of vocation as being 'in the service of a "cause"' (Wamsley *et al.*, 1990: 49), because the obvious, immediate "cause" can keep changing as the Government redefines the "public interest". Perhaps the "cause" could be thought of as the personal pursuit of clarity, but it is certainly not a "cause" to be defined in political terms by the public administrators themselves—such as was allegedly attempted by the New Public Administration. Rather those people with a true vocation to public administration heed an inner and outer call to the unrestricted desire to clarify.

[17] There are people of all types employed in the public service in much the same mix as in the general population: 'Our misleading stereotypes of bureaucracy extend to human beings who staff them. Roughly 20 million Americans work for government. We all recognize that this huge slice of the population does not consist solely of lazy bums, incompetents, or the psychologically malformed. These Americans are very similar to the population as a whole in many respects, although racial minorities are found among them in greater numbers and in higher positions than in private employment. With respect to political opinions, the bureaucrats seem to tip slightly towards the liberal side but they are hardly radicals. Nor are they inherently arrogant, rulebound, or conservative in their conduct toward clients, or for that matter alienated, fearful, or psychologically warped from working in a hierarchy' (Goodsell, 1994: 167).

Even more confidently could one accept that there is a good mix of different cognitive profiles amongst the many public administrators.

[18] The Enneagram (Riso, 1987; Palmer, 1991) is a personal character typology, which has a wide following and is explained in many books and workshops. It is explained in this book as three centres (heart, head and gut) which form a trinity of *menetypes* (*menetypes #A*, *#B*, and *#C*, respectively), and then each centre is explained in terms of a second-order level of trinities of *menetypes*. This forms nine spaces, each with a different pattern of thinking and behaviour that are linked together in keeping with the spirit of hierarchically ordered trinities of *menetypes*.

[19] It is to be noted here that the vocation to public administration is a calling to the highest levels of the intellect, which is lower than the spiritual sphere of the mind. The call is, therefore, not anywhere near as strong or pervasive of the person as the religious call. For instance, Weber (1930) described the mighty changes wrought by the protestant ethic, which operated at the spiritual level but infused the intellects of generations with a similar spirit that translated at that lower level to the work ethic. The public administration ethic only operates at the level of the intellect and then is not even the whole intellect—as there are the ethics of responsibility and intent, which are operating in different directions. The calling to public administration is then more a second-order and lower-level vocation relative to the calling to the religious vocation and therefore not as inspirational. The public administration vocation might inspire the individual to become an "agency person" (similar to the "company man" described earlier in relation to the private corporation), but would not necessarily move that person to choose a particular lifestyle or marriage partner, as happens with the religious calling. Moreover, it is not a calling that would inspire the public administrator to change the world or even his/her country, only to make it clearer for more objective decisions to be made by others. It almost hardly warrants being called a vocation but more an obsession just to make things more objective and clear.

[20] There are echoes of Finer (1966) in this acknowledgement that the calling of the public administrator is a calling to an organization, a system or a society—not to an individual person per se, but rather to the position in the

agency, system or society that he/she represents. 'But just as surely there is no responsibility unless there is an obligation to someone else; no one is interested in a question of responsibility as a relationship between a man and a science, but as it involves a problem of duty—and the problem of duty is an interpersonal, not a personal, matter. Responsibility in the sense of an interpersonal, externally sanctioned duty is, then, the dominant consideration for public administration' (Finer, 1966: 269).

[21] 'Surely another key component of process must be discourse—not debate nor argument, but discourse—grounded in a shared problem, concern, or goal and made meaningful through its clarity, authenticity, and absence of manipulation' (Wamsley and Wolf, 1996: 32).

It is contended that debate and argument are also valid forms of discourse, particularly in the politicised environment and way of doing things of today. Some might say that if there are no differences and debate there is little opportunity for creativity or transcending the problem to find an inclusive solution. The challenge is to orchestrate and direct that discourse to reach effective clarification and to be of effective assistance to the decision-making process.

[22] 'In other words, as long as public administrators see and define their world in terms of separate and distinct organizations, attempts to overlay coordination and integration strategies will be superficial and ineffective. He suggests that public administrators must begin to think in terms of a "transorganizational management" perspective that places emphasis on the development and operation of interactive and collective systems… the point is that simply imposing a transorganization structure over a hierarchical culture will likely be ineffective' (Barth, 1996: 189; 191).

The only "transorganizational structure" that can effectively be incorporated to inspire the public administrator is a proper understanding of the US governance system itself, and much has already been said about that.

[23] This is contrasted to the career paths of those tagged most likely in the private corporations who are given positions where they can test their entrepreneurial mettle and their ability to deliver.

[24] Of some relevance might be the conclusions of Stever (1988) about the potential for public administrators to add value to the public dialogue—principally, this book would suggest that this would be through the promotion of clarity of thinking and the facts, rather than through promotion of specific answers or ways ahead.

'Public administration can become a public-oriented profession in the post-Progressive era provided its theory and its practice acknowledge the crucial role that the civil servant can play in enhancing public culture. *The legitimacy of the civil servant depends upon how intelligently the profession understands its limits and its strengths in contributing to public culture.* A legitimate, public-oriented profession should have confidence that the services and goods that it delivers have a positive effect upon the public good' (Stever, 1988: 178).

That is, they need to have a well-developed understanding of the governance system's articulation of the "public interest."

Governance in the Westminster System

Abstract: A comparative study is provided of the way the triadic governance structure manifests in the Westminster system of government. The process of cabinet decision making is explained in terms of the roles of the spending Minister, the ever-rational Treasurer and the Prime Minister as central arbitrator of policy. An explanation is provided as to how the effectiveness of the cabinet decision-making process is determined, largely by the relationship between the key players.

INTRODUCTION

This book has looked at the structure of society as a whole and then analysed the nature of organizations as they were manifest in political sphere of the United States. This Chapter provides a comparative perspective on the political sphere by presenting some analysis of the Government decision-making processes in the Australian and British Westminster governance systems (but not going to the extent of explaining the fundamental reasons of why they are different to the US governance system).[1] This analysis is not really meant to substitute for a more detailed analysis (that unfortunately will have to wait for another time), but it might add some small contribution to the understanding being developed and assist with some sense of wholeness and completion to the analysis of organizations in this book.

Having some grasp of the rich pattern of interaction within the hierarchy of trinities, Weber (1948; 1978a; 1978b) was able to talk about the individual's value orientation, the individual's social action, the systems of social organization, the types of economic activity, and the different types of authority governance; all in terms of which particular rationality of the three was predominant at a particular time and place. It is within the framework of these trinitarian hierarchies that we now look at the system of governance that has developed in Australia (and to a greater and lesser extent in other countries based on the Westminster system). The story does not, however, end with these broad generalisations, but generally it is really only the beginning. The phenomenon of the three rationalities appearing and interacting with one another operates on many different levels of the hierarchies as understood by the *menetype* framework described above—there are actually patterns *within* patterns at the different levels of national, organizational, and personal activity.

It is difficult to encapsulate what "good" governance means, as it is really in the eyes of the beholder—and from the viewpoint of each rationality (affective/charismatic, purposive/rational, or traditional) one would come up with a different answer. In a liberal democracy, perhaps, one could argue that the concept of good governance should incorporate all three perspectives. Good governance does, however, depend critically on the effectiveness of the Executive Government's decision-making process. There are no clear-cut answers to the complex problems of today's modern, democratic society (Dror 1971; 1980a; 1980b; 1983; 1987). Further, the Government's decision-making processes need constantly to strike a balance between competing priorities: for example, the short-term and the long-term; the good of the Government party and the good of the nation; the encouragement of the rich and talented and the support of the poor; consumption and investment; expansion of the government sector or the encouragement of the private sector; and micro-reform and macro-reform agendas.

Because of the opportunity cost of doing one thing rather than something else, the actions of government are likely to benefit some and disadvantage others, even if it is only indirectly through higher taxes or greater regulatory restrictions. What then defines the most appropriate action that government should take in any particular circumstance? As Weber (as quoted in Breiner, 1996: 2) himself acknowledges, it is a matter of judgment. It is contended here that, over time, it is important to the quality of judgments made that the process of decision making provides the maximum flexibility to choose those policies and actions that are most appropriate to the circumstances.

All governments take actions that influence the way the world should be in accordance with their political, economic and social agendas. Government uses a process of policy formulation to decide which specific actions should be

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taken to further the "public interest." Yet, even within the bounds of a government's philosophical constraints, there are no clear answers, and conflicts continually arise. Intuitively speaking, from an appreciation of Weber's (1962) *ideal types*, it is contended that the unfolding of government action over time is more likely to be appropriate if the process of reaching a decision …

- first, brings out a consideration of the issues from the perspective of all three rationalities;

- second, has some effective and acceptable way of deciding which is the most appropriate action in the particular circumstance; and

- third, has the inbuilt impetus to turn decisions into coherent action.

The potential quality of government decisions, therefore, rests on how effectively the decision-making process allows *different* perspectives to be taken into account in reaching the final decision. To the extent that decisions are guided solely by the prevailing ideology of the time, there would be little confidence that chosen actions would be appropriate to the situation or problem at hand. To the extent that the decision-making process allows a broader perspective to inform the consideration of the problem, and the options, the more likely that the eventual decision will reflect an appropriate respect for political survival, justice, rational order and entrepreneurial development of the social fabric.

To rely on any one perspective of rationality (which may be reflected in the prevailing ideology of the time) in all circumstances would lead to inappropriate answers and actions in many situations. For instance, the three-year election cycle heightens the instinct for self-survival which finds its strongest expression in the traditional type of authority— and the temptation to indulge in actions of largesse for particular groups (or "pork-barrelling") increases the closer a government gets to an election. However, to the extent that such an orientation guides the Government's decisions over its full term, or that it determines all decisions leading up to an election, effective governance would be undermined.

What needs to be constantly put before those in the decision-making process is an appreciation from the three points of view, and then it is a matter of mature judgment to choose which particular perspective is most appropriate and useful for the particular situation at hand. This is all the more difficult when stakeholders have the same rationality perspective or are cowed by the dominance of the prevailing personality or rationality. Such situations that generate blind spots have been described in terms of "groupthink" (Janis and Mann, 1977; 1983) or rampant economistic ideology (Kouzmin and Korac-Kakabadse, 1997; Kouzmin, Leivesley and Korac-Kakabadse, 1997).

A balanced process is, therefore, one in which all the different perspectives are brought to bear to see and understand the problem, discuss the options and to come to a judgment on the best action for the particular circumstances: this would truly be a process of learning. Therefore, in one way, the effectiveness of government decision-making processes is largely dependent on the effectiveness of its processes as a *learning system* (Senge, 1990). Government decision-making processes, over time, need to be an effective learning system for the people involved both as individuals and as a group. The Cabinet decision-making process is the key way that this is brought about in the Westminster system of government.

DYNAMICS OF THE CABINET DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

Decision-making within government is, of course, complex, involving many actors within the Executive, Parliament, the bureaucracy and interest groups that have access to the main participants. However, in most instances, the process can be seen to follow a well-established dynamic that calls forth a pattern of behaviour and contribution from the various participants. The fundamental dynamic of the process used to reach important policy decisions in the Westminster system of executive government, involves the intense interaction of three main role actors; namely, the particular Spending Minister, the Treasurer/Minister for Finance and the Prime Minister. Each of these principal players can be seen to take on the mantle of a particular rationality in his/her contribution to the process. He/she does take on other rationalities or roles in different places or situations but, in the Cabinet decision-making process, each plays his/her given part according to the particular rationality that is required for his/her role.

To illustrate this more clearly, it is useful to focus on the budget process because it requires an intense interaction of people and ideas to choose between a broad range of competing policy alternatives. Government is required to reach

a balance on many competing priorities, including the overriding requirement to deliver a publicly accountable policy program that deals adequately with the most important problems seen to be facing society—but to do so within the constraints of the limited resources available to it. The process, therefore, has to be more than just putting together all the bids to do a few new things. A good budget is well crafted and is more than merely the sum of its parts. It has to have an internal integrity and a "chemistry" that conveys a government in action in a way that fits the needs of the time. It requires a process that melds a number of good politicians into a team that is capable of something better—something transformed and superseding its parts.


Figure 9.1: The Trinity of Cabinet Political Power

The three central players in the main policy process have a relationship to each other that can best be described by the dynamic interplay of Weber's (1962) three types of rationality, as depicted in Fig. **9.1**. This interaction is reflected for each particular portfolio, with other ministers joining in support of either the particular Spending Minister or the Treasurer/Minister for Finance, as they consider appropriate.

- *The Spending Minister as the "Entrepreneur,"* takes on the mantle associated with Weber's (1962) charismatic authority (*phase #A* thinking). The entrepreneur tries to instil a belief in other Cabinet members that he/she has the right answers and that all should subscribe to the policy program. These government entrepreneurs are, of necessity, focused on heightening the Government's standing by winning support and resources to respond to perceived problems in their area of concern. They hold to the ethics of responsibility in the broad sense, and their influence is dependent upon the confidence they engender in others that they, personally, have the correct answer. This is the nature of the political process and there is much value in it—but a counter-force is definitely required.

- *The Treasurer/Minister for Finance performs the role of the Government Guardian or "Devil's Advocate"* (defined as one who indicates shortcomings so as to cause discussion). In this role, actors adopt the rationality associated with Weber's (1962) legal-rational authority (*phase #B* thinking). They will continually point to the rules of the process, particularly the mantra of the bottom line of fiscal constraint. Past Cabinet decisions on the fiscal strategy; on procedural guidelines; programs settings; and government policy are quoted as carrying the force of law. They hold more to the ethics of intention, and their influence on the ultimate decision depends on the logic and relevance of their argument.

- **The Prime Minister performs the role of "God Father" or Arbitrator** by trying to pull all the threads together into a coherent whole. In so doing, the Prime Minister adopts the perspective of the rationality associated with Weber's (1948) traditional authority (*phase #C* thinking). The main concern is with the survival, prosperity and order of the group, which is the nation on one level and the Government, itself, on a different level. What has to be done "has to be done" and, because there is a comfort with both the ethics of intention (means) and of responsibility (ends), he/she is well placed to choose between competing options. The Prime Minister exercises his/her authority in a traditional way that is given respect by all members of Cabinet. No important decision is taken unless he/she personally agrees or agrees to allow it; otherwise his/her position is diminished and, if repeated too often, he/she usually does not survive. He/she relies on personal authority by demanding personal allegiance, with all the personal bestowals of reward and sanction that entails.

Most significantly, this dynamic decision-making model is stable, healthy and productive. It is a coherent whole and, to the extent that each player is in a healthy position and an active participant, there is a better chance that over time the most appropriate mix of responses will be taken to address the nation's many problems. For this process to deliver an appropriate, balanced outcome, each of the players essentially needs to be *true to his/her role* and hold respect for each other.

Why is this dynamic of the "three rationalities" so important? What makes it so effective? Mainly because it comprises a trinity of *menetype*s capturing a process that combines the three patterns of rationality into a holistic system that is capable of accessing the full range of rationalities and human qualities—to be drawn on as appropriate. Separately, the players lack balance and are inadequate to be able to respond appropriately to many situations. However, together, such a team and process can strike a balance almost like the "true" person that Weber (1978b: 224) claims can have the vocation of politics.

It is useful and instructive to consider, in more detail, the particular perspectives that each of the three players brings to bear on the Cabinet decision-making process. The basic contention of this book is that an empathetic understanding of the energy orientation of the three different types (or roles) can be grasped from an understanding of Weber's (1962) *ideal types* of authority and the Enneagram (Riso, 1987; Palmer, 1991).

First, there is the Government's "**Entrepreneur**" [Weber's (1962) *menetype #A* charismatic rationality]. That they are often referred to as Spending Ministers captures a lot of their essence. They are the entrepreneurs of the Government, forever testing the community to identify the key issues and problems, and then finding solutions for them. They are the Government's connection with the people, either through the party backbenchers or direct. These ministers are outwardly focused and, in the end, are trying to win the "hearts" of their constituency to instil a belief that government is doing a good job. A "pen picture" of this "charismatic" *menetype #A* oriented role, as it manifests in the Cabinet decision-making process, would incorporate the following:

- Acquisition of basic information from his/her constituency by trying to see the world through its eyes.

- Constant interaction with all significant players and a high priority on maintaining personal relationships. Others must come to believe in his/her personal competence and this takes a lot of footwork to instil such a belief in others.

- More emphasis on action and less on reflection, but he/she does put together a coherent vision of what is and what should be—then he/she sets about getting there.

- An acceptance of the ethics of responsibility in the sense that there is focus on the "ends" rather than the "means" and a readiness to be answerable or to take credit for the consequences of actions.

- Information gathering from as many sources as possible and, through this process, a particular vision of the issues and problems comes together and becomes a guiding light for future action.

- A responsibility to deliver his/her government's vision (which he/she has helped to build) and a willingness to use all means possible to succeed.

- A level of influence and authority in the process that is based on the belief of others in the Ministers' personal ability to win acclaim for the Government (in handling their particular portfolio of interests).

- A need to be seen to act when confronted by an acknowledged problem in order to claim credit for the predicted consequences of his/her action.

- An accountability for achievement rather than subscribing to the system of review agencies which mainly focus on process (or means). His/her ultimate test is that others acknowledge that he/she has achieved worthwhile things in his/her portfolios.

These observations of the patterns exhibited by the charismatic type need to be digested to try and grasp a sense of the basic underlying motivational pattern. In Weber's (1962) terms, an empathetic understanding is required. One needs to almost put oneself into the ministers' shoes to gain an appreciation of how they are likely to act in the context of the Cabinet decision-making process. The same is also true in trying to grasp the basic understanding of the other two *menetypes*.

Second, there is the Government's "***Guardian***" [Weber's (1962) *menetype #B* legal rationality]. In Australian government, it is principally the Minister for Finance who plays the role of the Government's guardian or "devil's advocate". This is the conservative voice of the Government, who tests all new proposals against the status quo, the law and the government's own policies and guidelines. He/she is the Government's anchor and connection with the "rational" view of reality. This rationality is inwardly focused and tests all proposals against a logical analysis of the causal links between specific actions of government and their anticipated effect in the "real" world. A picture of the *menetype #B* legal-rational role, as it manifests in the Cabinet decision-making process, would incorporate the following:

- A concept of "good" governance based on order that flows from laws and rules and a form of behaviour that is very controlled and predictable.

- An unrestricted desire to clarify with a method of inquiry that is objective and analytic, with a preference for facts, information and logical analysis.

- A dialogue with the world that is usually conducted through the written medium—commonly dubbed the "ivory tower" approach. Prevailing ideologies or ways of processing information are very influential, as all communication must be soundly based.

- An attitude of reflection because there are no clear-cut answers and all policy ideas need to be weighed and tested for their validity.

- An understanding that is built incrementally in a most logical manner. New ideas are tested against the individual's present intellectual constructs and new ideas are only added if they fit. The intellectual construction of reality is usually built upon the many policy instruments of technical rationality (Denhardt and Denhardt, 1979).

- A sense of responsibility to do what is asked for by rules or by recognised authority. Decisions are guided by the ethic of objective clarity and order—as long as he/she does the right thing and follows the right procedures, the right ends will logically follow.

- A source of power and influence that is primarily based upon two inherent traits; namely, unquestioned loyalty, which is manifested in the accepted role as custodians of the rules and edicts of the government of the day, and the desire to clarify through the persuasive logic of analysis of the causal links between government action and its perceived impact in the real world.

- A generally reactive orientation (in response to the initiatives of the entrepreneurs) and preference to operate within processing systems that have clearly laid down guidelines and expectations—which decision-makers work hard to establish and control so as to keep good order.

- An accountability for proper processes, actions which accord with the rules of the system and the rightful orders of all those in authority. The system is paramount and proper processes must be followed.

Third, there is the Government's ***Arbitrator or "Godfather"*** [Weber's (1962) *menetype #C* traditional rationality]. The purpose of this role, which is filled by the Prime Minister, is to generate movement to help harness the intrinsic power of effort and energy needed to act upon the vision and connectedness that the two continual above-mentioned protagonists provide. All deliberations of proposals and their alternatives are constantly being filtered through his/her keen survival instinct, which includes the need for bestowal of appropriate rewards and penalties. His/her personal possession of power and influence in a situation is essential though he/she will try to reach decisions in a way that all the other players will accept the outcome. A picture of the *menetype* #C traditional authority role, as it manifests in the Cabinet decision-making process, would incorporate the following:

- A commitment to the ethic of responsibility and a concern for survivability and prosperity—that is, it is important for the body to survive against all possible threats (for both the nation and the Government or ruling "family" itself).

- A method of inquiry that is very instinctual and grounded. There is an empathy with other players and an ability to grasp the reality of the world. There is also an ability to transcend means and ends to see what action fits.

- A dialogue with the rest of the world that is straight to the point and focused on the reality of the present situation. There are constant attempts to negotiate by way of mediation and maintenance of harmony in the group.

- An equal level of comfort in the world of interaction and the world of reflection and a capability of bringing the two together—which assists in an understanding of the perspectives of the other two types of rationality.

- An understanding that is instinctual; his/her knowing comes from the depths of his/her being and often seems unshakeable once he/she has made up his/her mind.

- An accumulation of personal power and influence accorded to him/her in the situation of leadership. He/she relies on traditional respect and loyalty accorded to the actual individual legitimately holding the position of leader.

- A personal strength to stand firm in a situation and take control of it. There is a sense of greater personal autonomy and freedom to act than would be evident in the other players and so there would be no compulsion to act if it were not appropriate.

- A comfort in being accountable to oneself that he/she is doing the right thing and a trust in his/her own instincts to inform when one's actions or the effects of one's actions are falling outside the expectations of the ruled.

Much more elaboration and development of the arguments would, of course, be helpful to establish the validity of using the hierarchical framework of *menetype*s to analyse the Cabinet decision-making process. For instance, it can be used to gain an appreciation of the main aspects that contribute to an effective decision making process and how the individual and collective contributions can be improved. It would also be helpful to grasp an appreciation of the direction and meaning of developments occurring in political and administrative processes, and which developments might be more beneficial than others.

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CABINET DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

It is not argued that all three rationalities should be applied at the same time to form some kind of *melange* or lowest common denominator, because there is very little in common between the three except, perhaps, the understanding that something has to be done. Nor is a simple prescriptive approach being suggested (Downs, 1967). Rather, each rationality must have an equal opportunity to act and be heard, but different situations can call for different approaches. It may very well be appropriate for one particular rationality to be dominant for a particular situation. For instance, in times of fiscal constraint the *menetype #B* legal rationality of the Treasurer/Minister for Finance will predominate for a time. However, if that predominance persists to the exclusion of the other rationalities then, in time, the direction of government action will became distorted and unbalanced. The task, as analyst, is to perceive and understand what is happening and to make some judgments as to whether it is the most appropriate balance in the circumstances—or whether the balance perhaps should be adjusted.

A feel for how such analysis might develop is conveyed by looking at the experience of different situations when one of the actions (or rationalities) tends to dominate (as illustrated by strong and weak lines of relationship in Fig. **9.2**).

(1) *The dictatorial approach*, where decisions are largely made by the Prime Minister in isolation, and the primary source of advice and influence is the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. Observers say that the Australian Fraser Ministry (1975–1983) fell pretty much into this pattern of power. While it very well may have been appropriate in the early tumultuous years of his Prime Ministership, it certainly was not appropriate in the later years, and allegedly contributed to the demise of his Government.

(2) *The "Scrooge" approach* (or the dictum of constraint), where the influence of the Treasurer/Minister for Finance is predominant. This is appropriate in times where the need for fiscal constraint is paramount, such as in the recent past and in the mid-1980s under the Hawke Labor Government (1983–1992) (after the Treasurer's "banana republic" statement) (Edwards, 1996).

(3) *The profligate approach*, where the spending ministers are paramount and un-checked. This normally results in tremendous change; much of it worthwhile in its own right but, usually, achieved at a great cost. The Whitlam era (1972–1975) was seen to be an example of this balance of power.

(4) *The economic-rationalist approach*, where the spending minister's advice is predominant but where advice is coloured heavily by the rational thinking of the so-called "Finance" line. In this pattern of power, each of the minister's programs is usually well-founded and responsible and looks to the public as though many individual policies are "hard-nosed". However, it is difficult to pull policy together in a fiscally responsible way. The later years of the Keating Labor Government coming out of the recession, showed many of the characteristics of this pattern of power (Edwards, 1996).

(5) *The dialectic approach*, where the spending ministers and the Treasurer/Minister for Finance are combatants with the Prime Minister as the referee and judge. The positions taken to Cabinet are usually polarised and quite often there is much debate about the lowest level of appreciation—about the facts and understanding of what is happening. There is less-informed debate about the relative merits of particular options. It works in a fashion but does not foster an effective learning process and the quality of debate does not mature too readily. This is a pattern that appears regularly in Cabinet processes, particularly when the ethic of evaluation and assessment is weak. The early to middle years of the Hawke Labor Government (after they had culled the Fraser Government's programs) had many characteristics of this pattern.

(6) *The balanced learning approach*, where all players are talking and listening to one another and, more importantly, trying to understand one another—that is, there is effective communication and transference of meaning. This seems to happen spasmodically in particular policy areas but there is not a readily obvious period of time that one could point to a good example of this pattern of governance. To the extent that there has been an emphasis on the ethic of evaluation, interdepartmental committees and reviews, the system has been trying to approach this pattern of power. However, the wide-spread low regard for, and disparagement of, interdepartmental committees (and even evaluation) indicates that this interactive, cooperative approach has not embraced all the players (it has only been a side-show while the main game goes on elsewhere). When everybody respects and listens to each other, the potential for learning and improving the quality of dialogue is strong. Such a pattern of power would prepare a government well for crisis but may not necessarily be at all appropriate in times of actual crisis (Kouzmin, Jarman and Rosenthal, 1995).

In reality, over time, the balance of power shifts between all these patterns of power—and that is how it should be. Different circumstances call forth different responses and this can operate at any level of government. It would be tempting to contend that a "healthy" decision-making process is one that accords with the balanced learning approach (the last of those categories listed above), but this is too simple and is, moreover, not always appropriate. It is argued that an understanding of the implications of this range of power dynamics would help leaders in choosing that power configuration which is most appropriate to the challengers of the moment.

For instance, in times of crisis, it may be that the dictatorial or the profligate approaches might actually be more appropriate depending on the crisis. However, it is contended that a "healthy" decision-making process would, over the long term, have the capability to look like the balanced learning approach (Kouzmin and Leivesley, 1997).

Given that the fundamental structure of Cabinet decision making in the Westminster system appears to be effective, what then is required to make it work and continue to improve on its effectiveness? As only a preliminary foray into this area, the focus is on three important issues.

- *The Capacity for Players to Play Out Their Roles and Contribute Effectively to the Process.* This first requires an ordered and well-understood process of interaction. Cabinet Committees, Cabinet guidelines and the physical ordering of Cabinet business are very important in this regard. For instance, the introduction of the Expenditure Review Committee, and associated process, has been seen as a very significant contribution to an effective decision-making process in the setting of the

Budget. It clearly acknowledges the important role of the three main players and brings them together in an intense, interactive way to distil the most appropriate formulation for the setting of the Budget. It is a question, though, whether the other Cabinet sub-committees allow the three rationalities to bring each of their perspectives to bear on policy development—are all the propositions properly tested with an analysis from the different perspectives? For instance, it has often been questioned whether there is adequate debate from all perspectives in the Revenue Committee.

The other significant requirement to allow each to play his/her role is that players themselves accept and acknowledge their role and that they accept and respect the role of the other players. For instance, in the Budget process, it would be helpful if everybody acknowledged and respected the role of Finance as the "devil's advocate". It is clearly not its role to initiate policy but, rather, to bring to the notice of Cabin*et al*l the important aspects (positive and negative) that have been omitted from the Spending Minister's proposals. This would include the identification of other viable options that have not been adequately addressed by the Spending Minister.

Finance's role is also to make clear the logical links between cause (as the Government's action) and effect (as the likely impact or outcome) in the "real" world. This is usually in stark contrast to the approach by the Spending Minister, who tries to sell a package that would deliver a belief in the community that he/she has actually delivered solutions to problems. In an effective decision-making system, the communication between all players would be such that Finance has ready access to sufficient information for that portfolio to be able to give a creditable account from its point of view.

- *Role Compatibility for Ministers and Institutional Archetyping.* For the Cabinet decision-making process, ministers would be more comfortable in their roles if their personal orientations were in synergy with the requirements of their roles. Where they are not in synergy, there will be a tension which could result in an in-effective process of debate, thereby putting at risk the choice of the most effective policy response. How this tension is played out is very important, not only for the efficacy of the individual concerned but also for the effectiveness of the process. Such potential consequences should be taken into account when appointing ministers, even senior bureaucrats. There is something in Breiner's (1996: 17) interpretation of Weber when he says 'that prudence therefore will dictate that politically responsible actors must be found within the confines of the logic of domination rather than in opposition to it'.

For instance, where the Minister for Finance is personally operating out of a rational, legal motivation there is synergy and the Government's policy initiatives are likely to be given an appropriate degree of scrutiny before decisions are made—and the bureaucrats in the Department of Finance will clearly empathise with him/her. If, however, the Minister for Finance is operating personally out of the charismatic motivation then there is likely to be discomfort and some tension. It is not just a matter of learning different subject matter, but what is called for is a completely different way of thinking and acting. There would also likely to be tensions in the minister's dealing with finance officers—initially, they would seem to be talking different languages. At the basic level, for example, the Minister would prefer oral briefings, whereas finance officers prefer to provide well-written briefs. Such a Minister would also desire to win every policy battle (and only raise a matter if he/she thought he/she could do so), rather than being content in simply raising the questions. Finance bureaucrats would also be likely to raise and argue savings proposals as though they were new policy initiatives. In so doing, they would likely become attached to the particular savings proposals and so make it easier for the Spending Minister to defend his/her programs and initiatives.

If, on the other hand, the Minister for Finance were personally operating out of the traditionalist motivation, he/she would more likely be inclined to reach political judgment on the various proposals and be less inclined to run the rational arguments within Cabinet itself. Such a course of action truncates Cabinet debate and may prevent Cabinet from being as fully informed as it might otherwise be before making decisions. Needless to say, bureaucrats within the Department of Finance would get a little frustrated with such a minister.

Analysing the Cabinet decision-making process in terms of a trinity of *menetypes* is essentially about the roles that ministers are called upon to play as members of Cabinet in the policy development and selling process. There are, of course, other roles that ministers are required to fulfil. Headley (1974) describes these as their management role and their role as members of the Parliamentary party. The performance of ministers in these different roles (from an ontological perspective) can also be understood from a hermeneutic perspective. For instance, a minister who personally operates out of a traditionalist orientation (of motivation) will feel much more comfortable in the hurly-burly of party life. However, though such a minister might do well in gathering back-room support for particular

**Figure 9.2:** Patterns of Power in Cabinet Decision Making

Figure 9.3: The Trinitarian Hierarchy of Personal Governance—for Government Minister

policies, he/she may not be so adept in selling the message to the constituency or managing a large bureaucratic agency. In summary, unless the minister is well-rounded and has a higher capacity on the scale of self-awareness, he or she will be more comfortable in one role rather than another—it may be a question of which role is the most important at the time.

- *Avenues for Further Development in Governance.* The trinity of *menetypes* is not only a coherent whole but also contains a sense of direction for growth and development. Weber (1930; 1947; 1978a) himself spent much time observing the direction of development. He observed that many societies went from a well-entrenched traditional authority to break out with a revolutionary charismatic movement, which then evolved to a more stable, legal-rational authority. While Weber (1947; 1978a; 1978b) would see the development of this rational, bureaucratic state as some ultimate state to be achieved, there are natural forces within individuals and collectives that can lead towards a newer expression of traditional authority (such as to be found in democratic socialism and the more recent environmentalist movements).

The path of cognitive reversion (going clockwise in the **Figures**) suggests that, though this may actually be more difficult to achieve, it may be a more positive development (in a democracy) than giving in to the tide of economic rationalism (Kouzmin and Korac-Kakabadse, 1997). What the logic of the cognitive framework suggests is that: first, each political player should be strong and confident in his/her own role in the process. For instance, Finance should acknowledge and be proud of its important role as the "devil's advocate" (which in strict terms is not all negative but often opens up the policy debate to disclose hidden traps or better alternatives).

Second, each political player should develop some of the good characteristics of one of the other rationalities, particularly going against the arrows. For instance, the Spending Ministers need to take on more of the fiscally responsible and logically rational aspects normally exhibited by the rationalists in Finance. They still need to maintain their essential orientation of achievement and promotion of new policies as an answer to social problems, but they also need to take much greater cognisance of the cost and objective assessment about how the policy will work. On the other hand, Finance should not only continue conducting rigorous analysis and proffering alternative options, it should also be reaching assessments on the relative merits between the alternate options (that is, normally associated with the Prime Ministerial role in the decision-making process). Finance's involvement in evaluations is actually extending beyond the mere asking of questions or suggesting alternative ways of solving the problems to reach judgments on which of the possible options offers the best chance at social justice and coherence.

On the other hand, it would not be too successful if any of the political players chose to start thinking in the reverse direction of cognitive procession and took on too many characteristics of their hitherto repressed rationality. For instance, it would be deleterious to the whole process if Finance took on responsibility for promoting and successfully achieving new policy initiatives for solutions to what it considered to be the significant political problems. Finance can readily identify areas where government policies are not working or it can proffer workable alternative solutions (Finance is strong on identifying the means required to achieve any particular impact). However, the process would become very unbalanced if Finance were seen to be in direct competition as an initiator of policies. It would be destructive to supplant the notion of Finance as the "devil's advocate" with the notion of Finance as the "policy consultant" in competition with Spending Ministers.

THE ROLE OF A MINISTER

Ministers in the Westminster system have to fill a number of roles in relation to their electorate, their party, their Cabinet, their constituency, their departments and the public. The personal governance demands of these roles are different and they are worked out differently by different Ministers (with different personal preferences). This is a complex subject as it really involves analysing the interplay between the expectations of roles and the characteristics of individuals carrying out those roles. However, it may be enough to demonstrate the congruence and potential of using the conceptual framework of this book to explain the challenges in the role of a Minister.

Cabinet Ministers as a group are called on to have a primary focus on the political network aspect of the governance trinity, with the market-oriented role of selling the Government's programs as a strong secondary role. The hierarchical or *phase #B* legal- rational approach is actively repressed. It is not so important for Ministers to be seen to be providing efficient services as it is for them to be providing acceptable solutions—that is, workable solutions to the problems which they are required to identify correctly as being of concern to the community. This is most reliably done through trusted networks that would then support the answers coming out of the consultative process. The objective, logical analysis of policy issues is of less value in formulating and gaining political acceptance of their policy positions, but it is very useful in justifying them to all and sundry—and that is why such a legal-rationalistic body such as Treasury or the Department of Finance is needed in the Government's policy-making process.

The orientations, therefore, to the *phase #C* aspects of the authority trinity (networks) and participants (markets) are the primary and secondary aspects in the role of Ministers. They need to accumulate and exercise political power to get acceptance for their programs and they need to be seen as Ministers of decision and action in the market place of public opinion. How they do it within the culture of their department is largely hidden and regarded as irrelevant to the essential perception of their effectiveness—which is rated on their perceived power within the Government and their capacity for "right" decisions and actions.

These perspectives can be translated into an analysis of the different psychic pressures on Ministers by means of the governance Formwork expansion of Fig. **9.3**. First, as an individual, the role he/she has to be seen to play is that of

an astute political animal or a *phase #C* network. If her/his own personal character orientation is a *phase #C* (perhaps like Paul Keating or Newt Gingrich), then the emerging decisions and actions of the Minister as an individual are also likely to be predominantly *phase #C*. However, if he/she is more oriented to say a *phase #A* character (perhaps like Bob Hawke or Bill Clinton) or a *phase #B* character (perhaps like John Howard or George Bush-senior), then there will be a *tension* and his/her resulting personal decisions and actions are inevitably going to be more of a mixture. The primary aspect of this trinity of the will is likely to be on the decision/action aspect, which would then require some repression of the Minister's real personality.

Secondly, as a member of a number of groups, the main roles are seen to be the external orientation—being the Government's proselytiser or *phase #A* market manipulator with the internal orientation being as a Minister of the Crown, involving legal responsibilities, responsibility for a Department, and accountability to Parliament. This particular role used to be treated as a *phase #B* administrator who took personal responsibility for administrative actions of his/her department but, more correctly (and in keeping more with its origins), has come to be regarded as a *phase #C* network connector—who primarily needs to build effective, cooperative relations with people holding power both within his/her department and within Parliament. For the Minister to try and play a primary role of *phase #A* charismatic leader of his/her departmental executive would be dysfunctional (it is enough for the department's belief in the Minister's answers to be of secondary importance to the Minister's main political-type role). The third aspect of this group-level trinity relates to the Minister's role in Cabinet (and his/her own party), which would obviously be a *phase #C* network role. The focus in this group trinity, overall, is likely to be on his/her role as Cabinet Minister, which means he/she will necessarily repress his/her role as "chief administrator" of his/her department.

Thirdly, as a member of the broader society, the Minister is likely to have chosen a vocation as a politician (*phase #C*) or a saviour (*phase #A*). As a citizen, he/she would more likely have chosen to be in a group exercising power (*phase #C*) or evangelists for a brave new world (*phase #A*). In choosing his/her identity (the third aspect of the trinity) or the way he/she would like to be regarded by the populace, he/she is more likely to choose that which speaks of his/her inner aspirations/motivations. For instance, the political boss (Paul Keating) who exercises power well to bring justice to the land (Mabo), the charismatic leader (Bob Hawke) who has led the nation to the promised land (where no child shall live in poverty), or the dependable captain (John Howard) who runs a "good ship".

Fourthly, a Cabinet Minister who puts a primary focus on the trinity of the individual is more likely to be regarded as an opportunist who does not appear to have the nation's interests at heart (because that level of abstract thinking is repressed). The more normal is to choose primary importance for the group trinity which would mean that the national concerns figure as a secondary focus in his/her scheme of thinking and his/her private life would be put a poor last. Those that choose a primary focus on the level of the society trinity tend to become the crusaders who run the risk of coming unstuck in the party room unless they are seen to have such broad popular support that they are able to deliver power to the group.

Of interest in this cursory analysis is, by and large, the absence of the hierarchy *phase #B* bureaucratic orientation. How wise is it then to regard Ministers as responsible for the administrative actions of their departments when such actions actually capture so little of their attention? The separation of the bureaucratic delivery agencies would, therefore, seem a constructive development so that Ministers can concentrate on using their networks (including the chiefs of the delivery agencies) to assist the Government develop a sound policy program. Analysing the possible evolution of Ministerial roles or the shift in personal governance required in moving from opposition spokesperson to government minister would also be interesting to pursue, perhaps at another time.

DEVELOPMENTS IN WESTMINSTER PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

There have now been several decades of ongoing reforms in the public administrations of both the UK and Australia, with Australia tending to follow the UK, and the paths of reform have been similar. This section presents a brief analysis of some aspects of the management reforms in the UK public administration and the following two sections discuss developments in Australia.

A cursory analysis of the reforms in the UK public administration is presented by going through the list of central government changes identified by Rhodes (1997: 87–111).

As a prelude, the predominant structure of public administration in *the* so-called Westminster system could be best described as having placed a premium on stability and dependability—*phase #B* rationality. This has resulted in the seeming primacy of a hierarchical public service over the secondary *phase #C* authority or political network orientation. This was characterised in the "Yes, Minister" perception of the way Government was run. The aim of the early reforms such as the Financial Management Initiative or Improvement Program was to shift the overall balance from the *menetype #B* bureaucratic orientation to the *menetype #C* political orientation and render greater power to Ministers to be able to change things (in the spirit of their secondary *menetype #A* entrepreneurial style).

Introducing the Minimalist State

To move effectively from *phase #B* bureaucratic overall orientation to having *phase #C* politics in charge, it was necessary to start repressing the hierarchical bureaucratic presence. The most effective way to do this was to cut its size and to eliminate functions. Everything had been put up for question because, in the new politicist world order, the management presence is consciously minimised. Privatisation of essentially commercial operations was realistic. However, the ideology that said markets were good and hierarchies were bad led to some indiscriminate downsizing.

The whole move to de-layer the public service and remove middle managers was an attempt to strengthen the secondary network aspect of bureaucracies. While this could be seen as an evolutionary development in hierarchy governance, the increase in flexibility to respond more appropriately in changing circumstances does come with some loss of corporate tradition and history. The seeming dissatisfaction and destructive outcome from downsizing have resulted from the way many agencies went about it. For instance, while they went about trying to bolster network governance, which works predominantly on the principle of trust, that trust was being eroded by the indiscriminate lay-offs that occurred. What resulted in many cases was an undue concentration of power at the top and a greater shift away from the hierarchical values of order and predictability.

Reasserting Political Authority

To foster "can do" Ministers, it was necessary not only to undermine the hierarchical structure but also there had to be an actual greater focus on the participant sphere (*menetype #A* as the secondary aspect of the trinity) and the roles of the individuals. This was carried out by diminishing the standing of public servants through such methods as reconfiguration of remuneration packages and methods of appointment while extolling the primacy of Ministerial leadership.

Extending Regulation and Audit

Following the divestment of public ownership of the *phase #A* "market" products to purify the public service, 'the Government substituted regulation for ownership and so multiplied the watchdogs of the new private sector monopolies' (Rhodes, 1997: 91). Though regulatory agencies would have to be, by nature, hierarchy oriented, they were small and many and their chiefs were politically appointed. Control of these many semi-government authorities and commissions was now essentially by political networks, and so the overall shift was towards much broader and influential political networking within the remaining public service.

Management and Structural Reform

As observed above, managerialism was really a change that also was primarily aimed at enhancing the secondary political network influence of the public service while maintaining its fundamental hierarchy orientation (*menetype #B*). As observed by Rhodes (1997: 94), 'In short, there was some change, but not a lot, and it depended on whether FMI was a useful means to political ends'.

One of the key reforms was the new concept of "managing for results". Hierarchies focus predominantly on process and this was an attempt to take cognisance of the results of the processes put in place *vis-à-vis* the results desired by the Government. This did not mean that the public service was meant to determine its own ends or to identify and satisfy its own market demand—which would have been an essentially *menetype #A* market orientation. Rather, it was aimed at a clearer articulation of Government's decisions and intentions. It was in the vein of sharpening the political orders and guidelines to the public service agencies. What was required was for the hierarchies to keep adjusting their processes until they got the results desired by the Government—given that these were realistic in the

first place. This was not a shift in governance, as such, but a strengthening of the hierarchy's secondary governance orientation of being influenced by the political network. Moreover, the Ministers were also being encouraged to develop their secondary orientation of better articulating the Government's entrepreneurial program.

Agentification

This reform was more radical. The dependability and predictability of hierarchies are commendable for service delivery of public goods. They were less helpful in their assistance to the development of the Government's public policy products to satisfy the demands in the marketplace of public opinion. The hiving off of the service delivery agencies had a three-fold effect. First, the nature of the roles of the new delivery agency heads was shifted more towards the political orientation by the ease with which they could be appointed and dismissed but, more importantly, because they were now required to operate within the ever widening political network of interested parties. Whereas before they might have been well hidden and protected within the bigger bureaucracy, they were now in the open and more vulnerable to political pressure.

Secondly, it altered the accountability of the Minister for the operations of the agency to accountability (of the service deliverers) to the Minister. This enabled the Minister to enhance his/her secondary *menetype #A* entrepreneurial role (or product sales to the electoral market) with less risk to government if it did not work (because the Minister could always point to the inadequacies of the service delivery agency and then propose a new solution). Thirdly, it allowed the remaining core policy development agencies to be refashioned to support the political process of policy development. The politicisation of the Departmental executive positions followed automatically.

In general, these reforms would seem to be essentially beneficial to the positive, evolutionary development of the governance regime. They can be seen to bolster the core orientations for decision making and action. True public goods are, in fact, best delivered by efficient hierarchies to the specifications set by the political process.

Rhodes (1997) reports that, again, in this round of reforms, the opportunity was taken to minimise the hierarchy's scope and activities even further. Some aberrations were likely to result when this course was pursued as a matter of course. For instance, in Australia, the dismantling of the Commonwealth Employment Service and the introduction of the Job Network has met with some turmoil in its implementation. Contracts were being negotiated with private sector job search agencies that were financially based on results—that is, they were more in the vein of buying job and training placements for the unemployed from the private sector's market shelf.

In one sense, the arrangements could be viewed as the government agency having a pool of readily available natural resources in the form of unemployed persons. It then tried to set about entering into commercial deals to process these resources for sale to firms ready "to pay" for job-ready labour. The sub-contracting of the processing and marketing of these natural resources was to agencies in the marketplace that *had* to make a profit. The profits to the Government through this enterprise came from reduced social security payments when the person became employed, so there was always some notional processing cost where it became uneconomic to bother processing an unemployed person. To the extent then that the unemployed person was notionally prepared to pay for the service in the hope of getting employment, and that the firm was willing to pay a price for the service of being provided with potential workers, a pseudo-market (*menetype #A*) arrangement had been created. Leaving aside the policy question of whether the market can be used to fix market failure, these arrangements would have called for the public service to shift from a *menetype #B* hierarchy orientation to menetype #A market orientation. This was something that the mentality of the public service had previously repressed, and so the initial steps were bound to be clumsy.

In another sense, the arrangement could be viewed as the government agency having the power position over the unemployed and entering into network arrangements with job-placement agencies to process these persons. To succeed, the job placement agencies needed to cultivate network relationships with potential employers and training agencies to get them to take on these unemployed people when they might not otherwise be prepared to come and "buy" workers off the shelf. To the extent that unemployed persons lack the personal will or optimism to use the Job Network service, the arrangements rely more and more on the exercise of Government power and the manipulation of its networks. This would be tantamount to the transforming of the governance of job-assistance services to the unemployed from a *menetype #B* hierarchy, process orientation to a *menetype #C* network, political orientation with a strong secondary flavour of *menetype #A* market orientation.

In summary, then, these new Job Networks could, at worst, be regarded as trying to establish a form of governance that relies primarily on *menetype #A* market orientation with a *menetype #C* network orientation in support. This arrangement is inherently dysfunctional and courts failure. At best, the arrangement would degenerate to relying predominantly on a network orientation with the market orientation in support. If such a scheme had been implemented with intention, it might have had a chance of being seen to work effectively. However, because of the predominant focus on market arrangements, it should be regarded more as a clumsy step backwards rather than an evolutionary development of governance.

Market Testing

The efforts under this banner were to expunge fully, from the public service, the production of those products and services that were freely available in the market. This would be a sound move in cases where market supply is as dependable, predictable and flexible as was available when produced in the public sector. While this is clearly the case for many of the inputs to the public service, one needs to be more discerning when it comes to the case for providing IT and personnel services. Although these services are clearly bountiful and readily available in the private sector, agencies should be allowed to take a longer-term view of what would be lost in outsourcing these key aspects of communication and culture to the private sector.

The assertion that the public service should behave like the private sector is wrong and destructive in governance terms. The day-to-day operation of the private sector requires a primary *menetype #A* market orientation with a strong *menetype #B* secondary role, whereas public administration calls for a primary *menetype #B* orientation with a *menetype #C* political, network supporting orientation. If, in fact, government service should best be operated with a market-oriented form of governance then it should be cut loose to be where it belongs. It is nugatory to try and keep your cake and eat it too.

The Citizens' Charter

The operation of a primary hierarchy orientation represses market-oriented considerations and any conception of having to satisfy markets. Therefore, it is beneficial for the Government to define explicitly its instructions to the public service in terms of the performance standards that it is meant to achieve, in something akin to the Citizens' Charter. This allows the hierarchy not only to maintain its fundamental orientation but also to improve the efficacy of processes to deliver the specified public services or products to community expectations. To carry it further, however, by the introduction of such mechanisms as vouchers of health or education services, would be destructive of the present basic nature of the public good being provided. The clear choice, then, should be between provision in the private sector with its market-oriented governance regime, or continued provision in the public sector with a primary hierarchy orientation, taking account of all that that would entail. It has always to be understood that a choice for one primary governance orientation is a choice against having the other orientation as predominant.

Democratising the Public Sector

'Wright […] uses the phrase "democratise the public sector" to refer to consultations through public inquiries, equal opportunities, decentralization of decision-making and co-determination' (quoted in Rhodes, 1997: 98). These moves are, in essence, giving a higher focus in hierarchical systems to the *menetype #A* participant orientation, which is the naturally repressed aspect of a hierarchy. This would not happen naturally in a hierarchy and can only be brought into play by the imposition of processes on the hierarchy. However, these moves can only go so far before having a deleterious effect on the overall performance of the hierarchy. For instance, there is some truth in the adage that man cannot serve two masters. If the hierarchy pays too much attention to its interpretation of public concern and inquiry, it could neglect its primary task to do the will of the Government and, furthermore, actually usurp the role of the political process in interpreting the will of the community. The mantra requiring a "focus on the customer" is in this vein. If it means treating people with respect and in the spirit of the public service, as defined by the political process, then that is a productive development. This sort of development really requires clear guidance from executive Government as to what standards of service are required, and just how far, and under what constraints, the public service should broaden its understanding of political responsiveness.

Transforming the Culture

'The core values to be preserved are: "an impartial, apolitical public service and its tradition of propriety, non-politicisation and selection and promotion on merit"' (Sir Richard Butler, the Head of the UK Civil Service, as

quoted in Rhodes, 1997: 99). These are all *menetype #B* hierarchy culture aspects which cannot be preserved if the primary governance orientation is actually changed (to *menetype #C* network orientation perhaps in the core policy departments and to *menetype #A* market orientation for internal commercial units). The core civil service values would also be diminished to the extent that mechanisms and processes are introduced to bolster the secondary political network orientation (such as flatter structures and outsourcing). There is no correct judgment as to where the ultimate balance should fall, and it depends on the circumstances of the situation. But the thing to be clear about is that you cannot have it all ways. In reality, to get a bit more of another flavour, you need to give up some of the current flavour, unless there is a transformation to a higher level of consciousness.

At a given level of consciousness, that is, a more balanced distribution of the collective governance, psychic energy can only be generated by transferring the energy or focus from one orientation to the other. This tends to work in a productive way if moving in a clockwise direction around the governance trinity (from *menetype #B* to *menetype #C*) but clumsily (or in a more primitive manner) if moving in an anti-clockwise direction (from *menetype #B* to *menetype #A*). Even at a higher level of consciousness (where more of each of the aspects of the governance trinity is taken into account), there will still be one governance orientation favoured over the others, as nobody can be all things to all people all of the time!

DEVELOPMENTS IN AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Some cursory observations about a number of topical issues in public policy and public administration might illustrate two particular aspects of the dynamics of the hierarchical framework of trinities:

- there is a movement, over time, between the three rationalities, and it is quite common for one predominant rationality to yield to another. This is not a bad thing in itself because no one rationality is better than any other, only different; and

- the development of any of the players (individuals or organizations) in the dynamic is often enhanced by taking on characteristics of the adjacent rationality (going clockwise around the **Figures**), but often retarded by taking on characteristics of the other rationality.

The Financial Management Improvement Program

Over the 1980's and 1990's, many countries have embarked upon what have been termed Financial Management Improvement reform programs (FMIP), and Australia has been regarded as one of the leaders (Dixon and Kouzmin, 1994a; 1994b; Dixon, Kouzmin and Korac-Kakabadse, 1996; Howard, 1990). The reforms have been described as essentially designed to focus more on outputs and outcomes rather than inputs, and to put more control and responsibility for policy decisions in the hands of ministers. In simple terms, the reforms were intended to bring about a shift in focus from processes to the Government's defined outcomes/outputs—or a shift from Weber's (1948) ethic of intention (ends/means) to the ethic of responsibility (political commitment). This can also be seen as a shift from a *Weltanschauung* based primarily on Weber's (1947; 1962) legal rationality to one based more on the traditional rationality with a strong secondary orientation to the vision or ultimate ends to which the Government is committed.

In the Australian context, this could be seen in essence as a reaction of the incoming Labor government, in 1983, to its perception of the public sector as a powerful opponent to its policy program (a perception that came out of Labor's previous experience in government between 1972–1975. The public service in its traditional role had been seen as steeped in rational, legal rationality. It had been cast in the conservative, cautious role always resistant to the ministers' bright new ideas, and it was left to Cabinet (and often the Treasury) to decide what was best. Over the years, however, the heads of departments became quite powerful and influential in their own right (as mandarins) and were seen to be unduly influencing the formulation of policy—they were setting and holding policy directions and, thereby, assuming the position of ministers. In essence, the "mandarins" were attempting to fill the roles of both loyal guardian and policy entrepreneur (legal-rational profiles coloured by charismatic rationality) (Campbell and Halligan, 1992; Hyslop, 1993). However, by their nature and being grounded more in legal rationality, the mandarins were more focused on means and less flexible on the issue of the Government's commitment to specific ends. This was seen as destructive to the aspirations of the incoming government, so change was required.

The reforms could, therefore, be seen as taking back from the public service the reins of the entrepreneur or charismatic leader of policy development and making the ministers' ethic of responsibility predominant in the

decision-making process. In so doing, these reforms made the top echelons of the public service much more subservient to this ethic of responsibility, and there was a great expansion of the policy formulation capability of line departments. Moreover, this more highly developed capability of policy formulation was more upwardly focused to serve the agendas of a particular minister. This entrepreneurial capability was generally built up alongside, but often feeding off, the traditional legal-rational bureaucracy (Dixon, Kouzmin and Korac-Kakabadse, 1996). The bureaucracy was then able to concentrate on what it did best within its ethics of intention or concentration on means—that is, the delivery of programs as required by the rules and legislation set down by the Government. This shift in entrepreneurial power *back* to ministers allowed the much more fulsome inter-play of the three rationalities at Cabinet level (as described above).

That the Australian Department of Finance (the "devil's advocate" extraordinaire) should have been responsible for leading the implementation of these reforms is ironic and worth closer scrutiny. Here was an organization that adhered strongly to the ethics of intention as a basic value to sustain its very existence in the decision-making process, now being required to preach the ethics of responsibility for outcomes. It was being asked to take on, and proselytise, the mantra (or rationality) of the spending ministers and their agencies. It is, therefore, no surprise that the core supply divisions rebelled and ignored the new rhetoric. The Department of Finance, itself, came to be looked on as schizophrenic, as it eulogised agencies (through the FMIP rhetoric) to take on an outcome focus, only then to criticise proposals in Cabinet for not paying sufficient attention to the logical and causal links at play. In one sense, Finance was trying to train and encourage agencies to be good entrepreneurial policy advisers to the Government so the agencies could then be even more worthy opponents in policy battles of the Cabinet room. One consequence was that many actors became confused about the real role of Finance. In the context of this book, it would be more consistent with Finance's role for it to be assessing how well agencies are doing in their resource management, rather than promoting one particular management philosophy or another; that is, if Finance stayed more in line with the attributes of legal rationality rather than charismatic rationality.

To repeat, however, the resource management reform process did improve the policy-making capability of government and brought the real power fulcrum of this decision-making process back to the level of Cabinet. In so doing, the reforms have enhanced the decision-making system as a *learning process* for political leaders. It has built into the processes of Executive Government a mechanism to educate political leaders. This is consistent with Weber's (1948) idea that the vocational politician was nurtured and educated within the political system, as observed by Breiner (1996: 17). Having the learning process *in-built* is in contrast to the process envisioned by Dror (1987; 1991), who saw such learning capacity as being established in an external "School for Rulers" for political governance.

The Policy/Administration Split

As has been explained, much of the upper echelons of the central offices of agencies have been refocused to support the entrepreneurial activity of their particular minister. While this activity can usefully feed off the more bureaucratically organized delivery of programs, it can actually be seen as detrimental to the orderly and efficient delivery of programs. The entrepreneurial activity focuses on initiative and constant change to create the impression of achievement. Program delivery requires bureaucratic stability and efficiency to ensure consistency of action. In terms of the dynamic of three rationalities, the entrepreneur or policy development is improved by rubbing shoulders with, and taking on some of, the characteristics of the bureaucratic program deliverers, but *not vice versa*.

Put another way, policy development is probably enhanced by keeping the policy and administration functions *together*—program delivery is improved by *separating* them. It is, therefore, more consistent with the recent focus on the quality of service delivery that government is looking more and more at breaking off the program delivery parts into separate agencies. This movement has been the basis of the *Next Steps Program* in the UK (Ives, 1994). The most notable recent example in Australia is the formation of Centrelink, the new coordinated service delivery agency (or one-stop shop) formed out of the administrative arms of the Departments of Social Security and Employment, Education and Training.

This move was much overdue in Australia because the aforementioned reforms had moved the attention of ministers so much onto policy promotion that they had little time or inclination to attend to the improvement of actual service

delivery processes. It has been observed above that the primary orientation of the ministers towards their political networks means that they automatically repress any concern for the orderly administration of their department. Yet, community standards demanded an improvement in service delivery and it was natural for the ministers to key into this vision and to deliver the separate administration agency, which could then be held responsible (rather than the minister who preferred to concentrate on other, more rewarding, pursuits).

There is, however, a caution and a necessary benefit of the old policy–administration dichotomy that should be retained. The entrepreneurial activities of ministers are much improved by their association and interaction with the service delivery bureaucracies. This suggests that ministers or their departmental support staff should be active members of the boards established to oversee any such independent delivery agencies. In such a capacity, the line departments could take on the role of "devil's advocates" in their stance towards the delivery of programs. They could, therefore, provide a balance in the service delivery process and keep themselves informed at the same time.

Contracting Out

Government services range from the delivery of cash benefits (to those deemed eligible) through to the provision of those goods and services, which are also being supplied by the private sector. In the latter case, it is quite evident that the adoption of commercial practices in the delivery of government services would be quite consistent with the way in which such services are delivered to the public (Dixon, Kouzmin and Korac-Kakabadse, 1996). However, the case is nowhere near as strong in the former case.

On the one hand, contracting out and open competition on a price basis between potential suppliers is essentially consistent with an entrepreneurial or charismatic rationality. Each of the potential suppliers is trying to convince the agency that they have the competence to be trusted to deliver the services required. In this sense, contracting out is very much in keeping with the spirit of the enhanced entrepreneurial role of ministers and the output/outcome orientation espoused in the new resource-management regime.

On the other hand, however, the service delivery associated with the payment of personal cash benefits to eligible persons is expected to have certain characteristics. It is meant to be delivered in an even-handed, dispassionate manner according to strict guidelines and rules that are evenly applied to everybody. Moreover, it is to be delivered as efficiently and as low a cost to the public purse as possible. It is meant to be reliable and consistent and to be a system that everybody can depend on—there should be few surprises in the decisions that are taken by the system. The organization best equipped to provide this type of service is a bureaucratic one, based on the *menetype #B* legal-rational authority. As such, contracting out in this environment would be very hard for the organization to handle and may well be destructive of the very attributes that the public requires of such organizations.

In between these two extremes there is a range of situations where contracting out may or may not be appropriate. The long-term benefit of using contracting out is very much determined by the culture of the individual organization. For instance, the use of consultants in policy development would be very consistent with the new emerging entrepreneurial culture of the core of the line agencies supporting ministers. However, for those service delivery agencies that are strongly bureaucratic, it may be most cost effective in the long term to drive efficiencies *in the agency itself* and use contracting out very sparingly.

In summary, contracting out is not a panacea for the efficient delivery of government services. Sometimes it is appropriate but many times it is not. The long-term interests of the agency and the Government should always be brought into the consideration. Sometimes it might just be the better solution to do the "hard yards", to eke out more efficiencies *within* the current bureaucratic service delivery structure (Hilmer and Donaldson, 1996).

The "Politicisation" of the Public Service

A further corollary of the enhancement of ministers' political control and entrepreneurial role, and the consequential split between policy development and administration, is that the remaining line departments have taken on an even more policy-entrepreneurial orientation. This necessitates that the upper echelons take on an even more supportive role in promoting the ministers' programs—in fact, this subservient supportive role becomes overwhelmingly

predominant once the responsibility for actual program delivery is removed. This calls for a different brand of agency head (a chief executive officer to the board of ministers). This also calls for a different allegiance and closer relationship between agency heads and ministers. It is no wonder, then, that the temptation (and perhaps need) to politicise the upper echelons of the public service is becoming almost irresistible.

The line departments are called on to become more and more like the Government's in-built "consultancy" firm rather than the old, bureaucratic service-delivery agency. This calls for innovative and flexible ways of organizing themselves to provide the best advice to their particular minister. This provides a strong argument to break down the service-wide application of public service employment roles and allows departments to do their own thing. They need to be much more adaptable to the political and entrepreneurial needs of the moment.

It would be wise, however, if the now more upwardly focused agencies did retain some aspects of bureaucratic order and rational approaches to policy development. This is why it is important to retain core policy-development agencies rather than to collapse them into one large ministerial office (or to outsource to consultancies or lobby groups). The minister's office should be kept separate to support the minister in formulating and articulating his/her vision and to retain links into the political network that operates very much within traditional rationality.

A corollary of these trends is the need for central agencies, and particularly Finance, to strengthen their traditional role and contribution to the process, because the ability of the line agency heads to play "devil's advocate" to their ministers' new ideas is not what it used to be. Maintaining the effectiveness of the Executive Government policy decision-making process, therefore, requires Finance to take on an even more emphatic role as the "devil's advocate". Finance will be better able to concentrate on such a role in the policy-development process because line departments, themselves, will be taking on a more critical "devil's advocate" role in respect to program delivery by the independent service delivery agencies. The recent closure of the state offices of the Department of Finance and their withdrawal from the regions, where the service delivery of all the Government's programs essentially takes place, is very much in keeping with this trend of events. However, recent action that expanded Finance to include the delivery of the Government's administrative services would seem to be a nugatory step in that it will tend to undermine and compromise Finance's core role as the "devil's advocate" to government policy.

THE "POLITICISATION" OF THE AUSTRALIAN DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE

In the short space of a few years, the governance orientation of the Australian Department of Finance in Canberra seemed to have been transmuted from the Government's revered "devil's advocate" to a political tool and a look-alike spending department. Moreover, it has been priding itself on being a trendsetter in new entrepreneurial public administrative practices and provision of services. This dramatic change has not been what could be called a productive development in the overall scheme of things but, rather, a consciously imposed change in the orientation of governance. The end result of the changes may very well be a less effective organization and a less than satisfactory Cabinet decision-making process.

The Department of Finance was established with the charter principally to coordinate and assist in the Government's control of, and accountability for, expenditure. Until the mid-1990s, Finance established a successful governance structure that contributed positively to Cabinet decision making as explained above. Finance was basically a *menetype #B* hierarchical organization through and through—it operated like the archetypal financial watchdog in the bureaucratic, management, efficiency-oriented mode.

Within the authority sphere (Fig. **9.4**), Finance emphasised the management, rule-bound and ordered hierarchical form of authority—there was no room for entrepreneurial prima donnas. The culture sub-trinity had a heavy emphasis on the basic truth of objective, rational thinking and on the value of pursuing the basic logic of cause and effect of all decisions (*menetype #B* orientation)—that is, decisions made with sound reasoning lead to good results. There was no room for individual judgments that some policy should be supported just because it benefited a particular group in society—the main issue for Finance was whether the promised effect followed logically from the proposed policy and its relative priority within the Governments explicit policy agenda. Moreover, the primary aspect of its internal governance was its hierarchy or the *menetype #B* legalistic culture. The experience of the

Department in the participant's sub-trinity was, again, a coherence in that the role and actual leadership was overwhelmingly of the *phase #B* orientation. All in all, the organization was seen to be a very rational, conservative and even stolid group—some would say recidivists or "anal-retentives".

This was during a time when Finance was carrying the flag of the FMIP which, with its encouragement for the public service to focus on results and clients, seemed to be anything but a *menetype #B* orientation. It was no wonder, then, that there was general disdain for the program within Finance itself and tension over competing messages being received by others external to Finance. With the Budget supply officers still doing their devil's advocate work, many of the staff of the spending agency were a little cynical about Finance's motives with the Program. Nevertheless, throughout this period, Finance assiduously held on to its core business and essentially retained its *phase #B* orientations all round.


Figure 9.4: The Trinitarian Hierarchy of Organization

However, the department acquired new leadership with different personal orientations and a different political situation. There was an initial period of healthy internal debate about the role and direction of Finance and a greater emphasis started to be put on evaluating the proposed outcomes of Government initiatives—that is, Finance was calling on itself to sharpen the secondary network aspect to aid its discernment of political intentions. The focus of contestability of its advice was drawing attention to its perhaps unduly repressed *menetype #A* market orientation. This seemed to be a helpful development and most staff participated in the search for new compatible processes to enrich their core role. Due recognition of political realities and the need to reach compromises in formulating workable policies were encouraged. But, basically, the devil's advocate orientation was maintained, *albeit* with a growing number of aberrations along the way. There was a touch of relief felt in the spending agencies at the changed arrangements but, also, a little concern that Finance's response could no longer always be predicted.

Then, with new leadership again, things started to accelerate and move in two directions at once. There was a definite shift in the authority trinity from a management perspective (with a heavy dose of the secondary *menetype #C* political orientation) to a more political orientation with now the entrepreneurial style building up to be the strong secondary aspect. What had been normal, good bureaucratic process within the Department started going by the board and it became more and more picking up on what the leadership's thinking on matters was. Formal hierarchies gave way to in-groups. Rational debate over cause and effects of new policy started to give way to policy causes, and it became more important to win the Cabinet debate rather than merely inform it. There was a heavy emphasis on downsizing as a crude attempt to answer the call to be seen to be efficient and there was an ongoing purging of those who did not fit the new governance orientations—who, of course, were those who had excelled under the former bureaucratic management order. Many of these now former Finance staff were unsettled by having to take on a more political profile and were completely perplexed by the growing entrepreneurial activity, such as commercial practices, outsourcing, and the introduction of accrual accounting.

The shift to the more politicised culture was exacerbated by an overt introduction of the entrepreneurial private sector practices as a strong secondary aspect. There was a belief brought in by the new leadership that the private-sector way of operating was better and Finance was going to be the leader going down this path as it rushed headlong into outsourcing its functions—even the primary role as the Government's "devil's advocate" had been suggested as a possibility for outsourcing. The absorption of the Department of Administrative Services into a new bigger department accelerated this accentuation of its secondary entrepreneurial spending minister-type orientation. Many of the staff could not cope and most have been seen as ill-fitting and been moved on. Very few of the former middle-to-senior management team survived the transition.

The end result has been a dramatic change. Not only have the culture and authority trinities been re-oriented to the *menetype #C* political, traditional rationality but the overall primary perspective seems to have been moved from the culture trinity (hierarchy) to the authority trinity (networks) perspective. Finance is now being touted as the leader in private sector practices with many of its functions outsourced. It has introduced accrual accounting and a new system of processing Budget figures to Cabinet. As just another player in the service provision "game", and one open to episodes of fraud like everybody else, it has lost much of its high ground to proselytise on sound management practices. It has, instead, chosen to lead by example which, of course, may be actually by good example or bad, and it may be followed or it may not. But it has lost a lot of the power of integrity to admonish and require others to do better.

Because of this deliberate shift in its governance structure, Finance might, indeed, be regarded as being in a dysfunctional state. It seems that the Department is not sure what it is meant to be doing, as it is still required to coordinate the Cabinet's Budget processes and nobody else has the capacity to step forward to take the devil's advocate role in Cabinet decision making (though the Treasury is undoubtedly trying to bridge the gap). It is now going through about its fourth re-organization in as many years and, according to reports, there is low morale among most of the remaining staff. Competition has replaced cooperation between the different areas of the department. The number and structure of the SES (Senior Executive Service) leadership team has kept changing until it is difficult to see a clear rationale in the way the department is being managed. Perhaps a clear demonstration that things are not going so well is when the Deputy Secretary can be summarily dismissed over the weekend with no rational cause and effect being offered publicly—an occurrence unthinkable in the former rational bureaucratic order.

Perhaps the most important consequence of this change in the Finance governance structure is the erosion of its ability to serve the Cabinet decision-making process. Not so much in the physical coordination of Budget business

(although even the difficulties in this area have been the subject of discussion in the press over recent times), but more in Finance's core role of providing frank and fearless advice on the rationale and full implications of the other spending ministers' new policy proposals. The critical importance of this role in making for good Cabinet decision making has been explored earlier. It has also been observed how the Cabinet decision-making process turns a blind eye when it comes to the logical, rational objective perspective. It relies on somebody like Finance to play the role of the devil's advocate in policy debate—not necessarily to win the debate but to inform and enrich the decisions actually taken. This was being done effectively when Finance's governance orientations of the *menetype #B* managerialist orientation were in keeping with its role. However, now that Finance's individual orientation has changed there will be an ongoing tension in how it actually services Cabinet in this devil's advocate type role.

Finance has, indeed, increased its influence in governmental administrative matters such as accrual accounting processes and so-called commercial practices, but its role in Government policy development has seemingly been diminished. The quality of the Government decision making, however, is the loser, as policy decisions will inevitably be less well informed and inadequately debated. As argued earlier, Finance would have been best not only to maintain its *menetype #B* rational, management orientations but also to enrich them further by enhancing its secondary aspect of *menetype #C* political discernment, particularly with regard to spending agency performance. Moving entirely to a more political governance orientation is going too far in terms of effectiveness in the Cabinet decision-making role, and deliberately enhancing the *menetype #A* entrepreneurial orientation is exacerbating the dysfunction further.

ENDNOTE

[1] This material is essentially based on the first author's analyses done in the earlier part of the PhD study at a time when the proposed theory of governance was still being thought through and developed (Cutting, 2000; Cutting and Kouzmin, 1997a; 1997b; 1998; 1999).

CHAPTER 10

Conclusion

Abstract: The metaphor of the mind, as expressed in the *JEWAL Synthesis* formwork of knowing, brings together the wisdom of Eastern philosophical psychology, Western philosophical tradition and depth psychology. The book's discussion establishes that the structure of human thinking can be usefully understood as founded on three degrees of abstraction - namely, the concrete, the imaginative and the prescinded. Secondly, the cognitive movements within and between the triads of abstract thinking explain the process of human motivation, interaction and growth through learning. Thirdly, the triadic-structured metaphor of the mind helps give new meaning to a number of long-standing polemics in relation to public administration, to present an insightful analysis of governance in modern, Western society.

INTRODUCTION

This book has delivered intellectual produce essentially on three levels:

(i)   the philosophical level, by explaining the structure of human thinking;

(ii)   the scientific level, in proffering a theory of governance; and

(iii)   the empirical level, by reframing some of the key management polemics and interpreting the changes taking place in society and its organizations.

These levels are listed above in descending order of weight given to them in the course of the research effort and, indeed, in descending order of abstraction and importance to the human study of social action and organization. The following summary of the conclusion attempts to capture, as succinctly as possible, the essential achievements and offerings of the book in its study of human organization and management.

THE STRUCTURE OF HUMAN THINKING

(1)   First, the most important "discovery" of the book is that the structure of human thinking is founded on the practice of differentiating into the three basic degrees of abstraction, viz: the concrete, the imaginative and the prescinded—and the hierarchical repetition of this differentiation at increasingly abstract levels of thinking.

(2)   Second, the cognitive movements within and between the trinities of abstract thinking explain the processes of human motivation, interaction, and learning and growth. Further, it has been explained how the human mind thinks in terms of the individual, the group and the society as different objective realities but after the same principle of unity—it regards them essentially as though they were separate human individuals endowed with a similar set of characteristics which, indeed, they are in terms of each being a creation of the human mind (for instance, we do not know other individuals as they truly are, but only as we perceive and interpret them).

(3)   Third, the structure and dynamics of thinking have been captured in a conceptual framework called the *JEWAL Synthesis* Formwork of Knowing (or the *JEWAL Synthesis* philosophy of mind), which informs the metaphor of the mind to analyse organizational governance. The essential contributions of this study to the clarity of articulation of this fundamental knowledge which was first coherently expounded by the ancient Neoplatonic philosophers (Plotinus, 1952; Proclus, 1963), are the full expression of the hierarchical and dynamic trinitarian arrangements, its application and exposition in terms of the structure of knowing, and the comprehensive pictorial representation of its structure and interactive dynamics. Unlocking the secrets and grasping an understanding of this fundamental philosophical structure of knowing unleashes an explanatory power that drives the remainder of this book.

(4)   In conclusion, the metaphor of the mind (as expressed in the *JEWAL Synthesis* Formwork of knowing) captures, in one vessel, the wisdom of both the Eastern philosophical psychology (as expressed in the form of the Enneagram) and the Western (essentially scholastic) philosophical tradition and depth psychology.

THE THEORY OF GOVERNANCE

(1) First, it has been explained that organizations and societies are so because human minds think it is so and organizations seem different because human minds think it is so in a particular way that is explained by their cognitive orientation. An individual's concept of an organization is the outcome of a set of automatic cognitive acts processing out of a set of beliefs about society and human nature that are well indoctrinated into the way each individual mind thinks. Consequently, the structure of governance units can, and has been, explained in much the same terms as the structure of thinking.

(2) Second, the usefulness of institutional archetyping has been validated and given meaning in terms of the natural way people think. In essence, the human mind not only thinks in terms of the individual, the group or the society as separate autonomous individuals (though different, of course, in their levels of complexity), but also endows them with the same sort of structure and dynamics that the human mind knows—which, therefore, infuses the coherent groups with life-like human characteristics. Institutional archetyping is comfortable thinking, which provides meaning and enables the necessary articulation to initiate, order and implement social action in a coherent and effective way. However, there are many perspectives and ways of seeing reality; in particular, there are many ways of conceiving organization and this has been captured in a conceptual framework of governance that flows from the framework of principles about the way humans think.

(3) Third, the structure and dynamics of governance at each of the individual, group and societal levels of action have been captured in the development of *JEWAL Synthesis* Theory of Governance, which emanates from and retains the essential framework of the philosophy of mind—but is more manifold as a natural consequence of the procession of thought. The theory of governance merely articulates the concrete expression of human thinking about the external, real world of human interaction. In particular, the theory explains the way organizations are structured in terms of the authority sphere, the way they operate in terms of the culture sphere, the particular manner in which individuals participate in its life, and the ways that the organization can learn and grow.

(4) In conclusion, the *JEWAL Synthesis* Theory of Governance serves as a bridge between the inner machinations of the human mind and the external ramifications of human participation and interaction in the real, concrete world.

GOVERNANCE OF ORGANIZATIONS

(1) First, the understanding and explanation of governance in real world organizations emanate from and reflect the theory of governance and the higher principles in the philosophy of mind. Given that the level of thinking (or abstraction) about actual organizations is at the third level removed from the higher principles of unified thought, its structure is seen to be in a much more manifold form but still reflecting in part (and only in part), the whole of the human capacity to govern and think. Organizations operating in different societal spheres and settings are, therefore, different but their structure and dynamics flow logically from the whole that comprises the higher principles embedded and captured in the developed theory of governance and philosophy of mind.

(2) Second, it has been explained how society can be understood in terms of the operation and interaction of the economic, social and political spheres. Organizations operating in each of these spheres of societal activity are imbued with the spirit of that sphere (in the context of the nation as a whole) and, therefore, adopt different goals, processes and actions, which are explainable within the holistic conceptual framework of the theory of governance. The relative importance of these different organizations, the way they interact and their essential modus operandi can be explained in terms of the particular orientation that the collective thinking has adopted—that is, the collective thinking about society, the spheres of activity within the society, the organizations and the orientation of the individuals themselves. While this book has focused predominantly on explaining the influence of forces in the political sphere, none of the organization forms is intrinsically more meritorious than any of the other organization forms, but the particular orientation of the collective thinking means that some aspects are valued over others for that particular time. In particular, it has been pointed out that in the US society, predominance and importance has been accorded to the economic sphere, the private-sector corporation, and individual achievement and economic success (essentially all those of *menetype #A* orientation).

(3) Third, since the manifestation in the real world of each collective or individual mindset is differentiated and selected from the whole potential Formwork to deliver a particularly desired reality, it is necessarily deficient in some respects—this is a natural consequence of human thinking and action. At first such deficiencies are tolerated or rejected anyway but, over time, such deficiencies cause psychic and social unease which grows in the collective desire to make good and restore that which is missing. The individual and collective mind is, therefore, necessarily dynamic and always looking to complete itself—to move to higher levels of abstraction and complexity in an attempt to embrace as much of the whole as possible and minimise the deficiencies. This defines and drives human change and (perhaps) progress. This book has identified and explained the latest big societal shift from managerialism to politicism (or from *menetype #B* modernism to *menetype #C* postmodernism), which is finding expression in all the various spheres of society, principally because it is being inspired and occurring in the minds of most individuals. The ramifications of this gigantic cultural shift in collective thinking has been analysed for the various spheres and their principal organizations in the US society; in particular, for the public administration in this book, and the US private corporation and the Catholic Church, in detail, elsewhere.

(4) In conclusion, the theory of governance has helped give new meaning to a number of long-standing management polemics and has made greater sense of the developments in different US organizations. Most importantly, the analysis has been able to provide some concrete pointers and suggestions on how organizations and individuals can handle themselves and thrive in the emerging new politicist age.

FINALE

The metaphor of the mind, as informed by the *JEWAL Synthesis* Formworks of knowing and governance, is presented as a real step forward in the power of human thinking about social organization. In effect, it is a synthesis of Eastern and Western philosophy and psychology and is necessarily complex because it is required to be capable of explaining so much. By naming and understanding the way humans think, it provides an opportunity to harness its cognitive power for analysis of the societal and group movements in this fast-changing world. In particular, the book has concluded that the Western World is effectively headed "back to the future;" namely, it is entering into a politicist age akin to the feudal times, but this time at a much more sophisticated, complex and challenging level of abstract thinking and decision making.

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