International Political Economy Series

# The World Bank and Transferring Development

## Policy Movement through Technical Assistance

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International Political Economy Series

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# The World Bank and Transferring Development

## Policy Movement through Technical Assistance

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# Abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| AIIB | Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank |
| ANS | Air Navigation Services |
| CAS | Country Assistance Strategy |
| CDF | Comprehensive Development Framework |
| CEC | Commission of the European Communities |
| CIDA | Canadian International Development Agency |
| CLR | Completion and Learning Review |
| CPF | Country Partnership Framework |
| DPL | Development Policy Loan |
| EBRD | European Bank for Reconstruction and Development |
| EDI | Economic Development Institute |
| ERD | External Resources Division |
| ESW | Economic and Sector Work |
| EU | European Union |
| FIC | Flight Information Centre |
| GAD | Gender and Development |
| GDLN | Global Development Learning Network |
| GDN | Global Development Network |
| GFATM | Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria |
| GFC | Global Financial Crisis |
| IADB | Inter-American Development Bank |
| IBRD | International Bank for Reconstruction and Development |
| ICSID | International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes |
| ICT | Information and Communications Technology |
| IDA | International Development Association |
| IDF | Institutional Development Fund |

| | |
|---|---|
| IEG | Independent Evaluation Group (World Bank) |
| IFC | International Finance Corporation |
| ILO | International Labour Organisation |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| KBE | Knowledge-Based Economy |
| LPA | Latvian Privatisation Agency |
| MDGs | Millennium Development Goals |
| MIGA | Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency |
| NDB | New Development Bank |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| NLTA | Non-Lending Technical Assistance |
| OED | Operations Evaluation Department (World Bank) |
| OECD | Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development |
| OPEC | Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries |
| PLR | Performance and Learning Review |
| PPP | Pilot Privatisation Program |
| PRSP | Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper |
| RAS | Reimbursable Advisory Service |
| SAL | Structural Adjustment Loan |
| SCD | Systematic Country Diagnostic |
| SDGs | Sustainable Development Goals |
| SDR | Special Drawing Right |
| SECAL | Sectoral Adjustment Loan |
| SIDA | Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency |
| SPRITE | Social Policy Reform in Transition Economies |
| TAC | Technical Assistance Component |
| TAL | Technical Assistance Loan |
| TARTF | Technical Assistance Review Task Force (World Bank) |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children's Fund |
| UNSF | United Nations Special Fund |
| WAD | Women and Development |
| WBI | World Bank Institute |
| WID | Women in Development |
| WTO | World Trade Organisation |

CHAPTER 1

# Transferring Development

International development assistance remains controversial in the twenty first century. Broadly defined as the provision of finance, resources, and expertise to facilitate national development, libraries of works have critiqued its impact, strengths and weaknesses, and efficacy to the development of recipient countries. Emerging in both material and ideational forms (with the former providing loans, grants, and supplies and the latter transferring ideas, knowledge, and skills), many who review international development assistance highlight the significance and impact of its ideational forms, particularly its capacity to shape ways of thinking and behaving. Following this line of inquiry, the World Bank has often been recognised as a powerful source of ideational influence.

The World Bank is widely considered the world's leading development institution (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 59; Griffin 2006: 571; Broad 2007: 701; Weaver 2010: 112; Vetterlein 2012: 35), concerned with both project financing and intellectual output. While its impact as a financial lender has diminished over the past 2 decades, being overtaken by private investment, its ideational influence remains strong. A large part of its ideational strength derives from its capacity to coercively and persuasively shape the policy pursuits and institutional structures of its developing member countries, in turn affecting mainstream understandings of development assistance.

This book evaluates the World Bank's coercive and persuasive ideational impact by critiquing its provision of technical assistance. Defined as the transfer or adaptation of ideas, knowledge, practices, or skills to

 
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foster development (McMahon 1997: 2), the importance of technical assistance derives from its capacity to internalise in recipients particular ways of thinking about and responding to development (Smith 2008: 238). Less coercive than conditions attached to loans, while more hands-on than abstract research, technical assistance involves one actor attempting to shape the mindsets of one or more other actors.

It is here suggested that the more successful technical assistance activities of the World Bank derive from a more voluntary, and less coercive, policy transfer process. Regarding technical assistance as a tool of policy transfer ('a process in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions etc., in one time and/or place is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, and institutions in another time and/or place' (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996: 344)), the main contribution of the book is to identify that the success of policy transfer depends upon the recipient's perception of the validity of those policies, with perception being influenced by the ways in which those policies are presented, packaged, and transferred (Seabrooke 2007: 264; Broome and Seabrooke 2012: 6). Arguing that the process and perception of technical assistance are instrumental to the effective and ongoing transfer of policy options, the book's focus is not on *what* is said but *how* it is said.

The issue of importance here is that 'development' is a contested idea. What one actor regards as development may be (and often is) entirely different from another actor. For this book, the tension between coercion and voluntary consent becomes significant to recipients justifying the acceptance and adoption of highly contested development policy reforms. If, as Adler and Haas (1992: 371) contend, 'Policy coordination is, ultimately, based on consent and mutual expectations,' then the relational dynamics between actors involved in policy movement is important. As such, the book reveals that the more collaborative, voluntary, and consensual the provision of technical assistance, the better the success rates of policy transfer; the movement and adaptation of policy is most successful where there is collaborative design of projects and voluntary and consensual engagement. Synonymous policy packages have been presented to different countries, but those packages were received more or less favourably depending upon the way the policies were transferred. When attached to a conditional (and thus coercive) loan, recipients were often less receptive to the transferred policies. When devised in a more collaborative fashion, however, the policies were more readily accepted. Consequently, it is here argued that sustainable policy movement concerns not just the issues of technical soundness, but moreover the relational dynamics that surround the transmission of policy.

The World Bank (2008: 1) has recently recognised the importance of 'political economic factors' to the success of its development programs, but such a conceptualisation remains quite narrow:

> It is widely recognised within the international development agencies that understanding the political context of reform processes is important for engaging effectively in policy dialogue that promotes policy change. It is also recognised that a failure to anticipate political and institutional challenges is often a chief cause of unsuccessful policy reform processes.

Even though the World Bank (2008: 1) notes the importance of 'stakeholder influence and interests, and associated power relations' to cost-benefit understandings of whether policies are accepted, the institution has said very little about the importance of relational dynamics between itself and its member countries to the social construction and movement of development policy.

Drawing upon a combination of primary sources (loan agreements, implementation completion reports, and staff appraisal reports) and secondary sources (scholarly books and journal articles), this study concludes that the more voluntary and consensual the process of policy transfer, the greater the possibility of policy acceptance. In sum, the evidence reveals that the process and perception of policy transfer—for example, the presentation and packaging of policy options and the dynamics between technical assistance providers and recipients—are influential in facilitating the effective transference of policy reforms. The book therefore makes an analytical contribution to issues of importance in international development assistance, global governance, and public policy. It does so through a theoretical and empirical approach that offers a unique and comprehensive account of the ideational role played by a global governance actor that is largely missing from the literature.

There are three main fields of study on the World Bank: those that examine it as an organisation—institutional-level analyses, notably from constructivist discourse, that focus on how ideas circulate within international organisations (see Park 2005; Vetterlein 2007; Weaver 2007; Chwieroth 2008); those that analyse policy movement from the World Bank to recipient audiences—how ideas and practices move from the 'international' to the 'domestic' (see Teichman 2004; Smith 2008); and, those that review the on-the-ground impact of World Bank development assistance (see Babb 2005; Engel 2010a). The former and the latter fields are substantial and comprise the bulk of literature on the World Bank. In contrast, the movement of ideas and practices from the World Bank to recipients has received comparatively less attention. This study fits into this middle category.

In addition, much of the literature emphasises the institution's coercive influence. This can be readily identified in a plethora of works analysing its provision of conditional structural adjustment loans and credits between the 1980s and 2000s (Pender 2001: 398–400; Larmour 2002: 250–252; Barnett and Duvall 2005: 43; Peet 2009: 136–141). As such, scholarship is dominated by a view of the World Bank as a coercive actor compelling developing countries to accept and adopt prescribed development policies. While there is merit in such an argument, with evidence affirming the coercive nature of some of its activities, it overlooks the complexities of the situation. In practice, coercive development practices are prone to failure. In order to understand the complexity of international development assistance, one must also understand the role of non-coercive instruments used to persuade recipients to adopt particular policies. This book's critical point of enquiry enables it to tease out this complexity by analysing technical assistance as a tool of policy transfer.

This is not to argue, of course, that there is no academic literature on the persuasive side of World Bank development assistance. Since 2000, an increasing number of works have reviewed its non-coercive instruments. Such works, however, have typically been limited to particular types of services (i.e. online knowledge platforms) or narrow time periods [(i.e. 2000–2004) Stone 2000: 243–260; Goldman 2000; King 2002; Wilks 2002a, b; Broad 2006]. While several journal articles have recently analysed World Bank technical assistance (Wilson 2007; Smith 2008; Walker et al. 2008), there is yet to be a comprehensive book on the subject. *The World Bank and Transferring Development: Policy Movement through Technical Assistance* provides that book, drawing upon several decades and a broad range of technical assistance activities, critiquing the ways in which the World Bank attempts—both successfully and unsuccessfully—to persuasively socialise recipients in its developing member countries.

The study offers two useful extensions on current World Bank literature: the issue of technical assistance remains under-explored and conceptually there is value in drawing upon insights from policy studies when exploring the operationalisation of non-material influence. With international development assistance remaining a source of controversy in the twenty first century, be it through the 2016 launch of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) reaffirming the importance of global partnerships and capacity building (United Nations 2016) or the protectionist trends emerging from Brexit and the presidential appointment of Donald Trump undermining multilateral relationships, this books offers timely and valuable insights into the successes and failures of development policy movement from a global governance actor to its developing member countries.

## Development: A Constructed Idea

'Development' is one of the most debated concepts in the social sciences. Its controversy arises from it being a social construction, an interpretation of the betterment of human life. As Sachs (2010: xvi) contends, 'development is much more than just a socio-economic endeavour; it is a perception which models reality'. Not an absolute or universal truth, it consists of a series of normative positions that change over time, each reflecting particular worldviews that embody distinct time periods. A product of the Age of Enlightenment and linked to the Western philosophical tradition of modernity, its orthodoxy believes in perfectibility—the paths to the good life and the idealised society. Attuned to this are biological ideas of organic growth; an unstoppable, irreversible process whereby the infantile, backward, and incomplete become steadily more complex, mature, and fully formed (Hettne 1983: 250; Rist 2008: 27). The mainstream discourse, as a result, has been dominated by the view that the transition from a traditional agrarian society to a modern industrial society is natural, desirable, and inevitable. This, has been controversially claimed, requires more than material change; it needs an attitudinal shift engineered by external development experts (Escobar 2010: 145; Rist 2010: 23; Faille 2011: 218).

International development assistance aligns to the notion that development is a transition from one stage of being to the next. A relatively recent phenomenon, its nascent Golden Age arose after the Second World War through the establishment of the United Nations system. During this early period, development was premised upon a belief in the dignity of human life and the conviction that developed countries held a moral responsibility to assist the developing (Thérien 2002: 452–453). This altruistic rhetoric was overtaken in practice, however, by the ideological and geopolitical conflict of the Cold War. The newly independent former colonies of Western empires, now collectively known as the 'developing world', were torn between the dichotomy of liberal capitalist democracy and Soviet Marxism-Leninism (Payne and Phillips 2010: 56).

The foundations of Cold War development assistance were established in the Four Point Program put forth by American President Harry Truman in his January 1949 Inaugural Address. Preceded by the containment policies of the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, the latter of which saw the provision of US$13 billion over 4 years to assist postwar European reconstruction beginning in April 1948, the Four Point Program 'inaugurated the "development age"' (Rist 2008: 71). Truman (cited in Truman Library 2015) clearly articulates his Cold War mentality in his Inaugural Address:

> First, we will continue to give unfaltering support to the United Nations and related agencies, and we will continue to search for ways to strengthen their authority and increase their effectiveness … Second, we will continue our programs for world economic recovery … Third, we will strengthen freedom-loving nations against the dangers of aggression … Fourth, we must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas … [We] should make available to peace-loving peoples the benefits of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realise their aspirations for a better life.

Truman's program not only rallied liberal capitalist democracies ('freedom-loving nations') against Soviet Marxism-Leninism (the 'dangers of aggression'), but also argued for the provision of financial and technical assistance to enable developing countries to follow the path long trod by developed Western countries. From its earliest days, mainstream development assistance presumed guidance by the developed world.

Between the 1950s and 1970s, the Four Point Program was realised in modernisation theory. Drawing upon the intellectual legacies of sociologists Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, and Talcott Parsons (Harrison 1988: 1–7), the modernisation framework held to the presumption that development followed a common path for all; developing countries simply had further to travel along that path. To develop, political institutions, economic systems, social structures, and attitudes had to transition through a series of stages towards modernity. While today discredited in its original form, the mainstream discourse maintains the position that development entails becoming a mirror of what developed countries already are (Schuurman 2000: 8–10).

As championed by economic historian Walt Rostow in *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (1960), modernisation theory saw development as a linear process, whereby the developing world had only to follow chronological stages in order to advance from a 'traditional society' to a 'modern society'. This 'non-communist model' evolved from the Western desire to contain perceived Soviet expansionism during the Cold War (Alacevich 2009: 3). Rostow (1960: 4–11) outlines a five-stage process through which traditional agrarian societies, applying scientific innovation to agriculture (with technical assistance being imported by experts from developed countries), redirect society towards capitalist endeavours, until the newly modernised capitalist societies are focused upon mass consumption rather than upon production. The linear development path was a Western, pro-capitalist vision of progress (Chirot and Hall 1982: 81–82).

A range of sociologists and political scientists complement the Rostowian economic orthodoxy. Apter (1965) identifies democracy, good governance, and efficiency as key elements of political modernity, McClelland (1961) emphasises innovation and the personal striving for betterment, and Inkeles and Smith (1974) plot the psychological nature of the 'modern man', centring on individual autonomy, goal setting, and a faith in science and medicine. Modernisation theory thus prescribes economic, political, social, and psychological change. With dichotomies forming its base—traditional/modern, undeveloped/developed, infantile/mature—the theory holds that development requires mimicry of the developed. It therefore appeals to Gerschenkron's (1962: 6) oft-cited claim that mainstream development paradigms are 'dominated—consciously or unconsciously—by the grand Marxian generalisation according to which it is the history of advanced or established industrial countries which traces out the road of development for the more backward countries'.

While maintaining its discursive hegemony, modernisation theory has not been without its critics. Challenges have emerged from dependency theory, gender-based analyses, and post-development approaches. Under these competing frameworks, development has been constructed and understood in different ways.

Marxist-inspired dependency theory challenges the modernisation framework as suffering historical and geopolitical amnesia (see Frank 1967; dos Santos 1970; Amin 1974; Cardoso and Faletto 1979). Dependency theorists argue that patterns of development and underdevelopment, rather than isolated from global influences, are relative to the structural position of countries within the global capitalist system (Petras 1981: 151). Differing from being *un*developed, *under*development involves a situation of limited societal change whereby the 'periphery' develops along lines beneficial to surplus extraction by the 'core'. Drawing upon Leninist theories of imperialism, the *dependentistas* argue that countries in the periphery cannot become agents of their own development as they lack the 'resources to choose alternative ways of responding to the constraints impinging upon them from the international environment' (Kaufman et al. 1975: 304); the core exploitatively extracts surplus from the periphery, supplementing the development of the core at the expense of the underdevelopment of the periphery (Frank 1975: 441–442). A lack of development thus results not from domestic flaws (as Rostow claims), but rather from the unequal exchange relationship between the core and periphery (Love 1990: 145). In contrast to modernisation theory, dependency theorists broadly prescribe *dirigisme*, a reliance on state-owned enterprises and state planning and, in some extreme variants, anti-capitalist isolationism as an alternative approach to becoming developed.

Gender-based analyses are broadly divided into three categories: women in development (WID), women and development (WAD), gender and development (GAD). WID advances a liberal framework encouraging 'legal and administrative changes to ensure that women [are] better integrated into economic systems' (Rathgeber 1990: 490). As a reflection of the modernisation approach of the 1960s and 1970s, WID favours the legal incorporation of women into development (Pearson and Jackson 1998: 4). WAD emerged next from neo-Marxist feminist analyses in the late 1970s, a challenge to the WID/modernisation nexus. Rather than simply encouraging legal reform, WAD turns to 'the relationship between patriarchy, differing modes of production, and women's subordination and oppression' (Rathgeber 1990: 493); the 'paradigm stresses the distinctiveness of women's knowledge, women's work, and women's goals and responsibilities' (Connelly et al. 2000: 60), with attention focused upon the unequal gendered impact of modernisation (Griffin 2009: 119). GAD lastly adopts a more holistic approach than WID and WAD. Developed in the 1980s, it 'is not concerned with women per se but with the social construction of gender and the assignment of specific roles, responsibilities, and expectations to women and to men' (Rathgeber 1990: 494); the focus turns to the relationships between women and men, and the impact differing gender roles have on development. With each of the gender-based approaches focusing upon differing elements of development and advancing competing claims as to how development is to be achieved, the approaches all encourage the greater participation and empowerment of women, stressing the harm of gender exclusion to progressive societal change (Momsen 2004: 16).

Post-development approaches critique the concept of development itself. Comprised of an eclectic range of scholars, the post-development school holds that 'the "idea" of development [is] a political meta-narrative which [constitutes] a Western project of intervention and [reflects] the interests of its practitioners' (Payne and Phillips 2010: 138). Rather than calling for the reformation of development practice, it seeks 'to break from a concept and a set of practices that they consider dangerously misguided' (Rist 2008: 257). Post-development is therefore interested 'not in development alternatives but in alternatives to development' (Ziai 2004: 1046), for it claims 'not that the project of development was poorly implemented …, but that the assumptions and ideas that are core to development are problematic' (Matthews 2004: 375). Instead of prescribing what the mainstream modernisation framework has proffered, post-development approaches favour more pluralistic, grassroots movements to sustainably improve lives (Esteva and Prakash 1998: 288).

Notwithstanding that modernisation theory has been exhaustively critiqued, the mainstream discourse on development and development assistance remains framed as societal progress towards modernity. Development cannot be separated from Western political, economic, and social values, which have been institutionalised through such global governance actors as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Bank (Escobar 1988: 430–432, 1992: 21–23). While the mainstream discourse has evolved throughout the Bretton Woods, Washington Consensus, and post-Washington Consensus eras (with the development pendulum swinging from favouring state intervention to extolling market freedoms), there remains the rhetoric of a single path to development. Be it through economic growth, industrial expansion, or socio-political change, development today continues to involve transitioning to emulate the developed world.

It is for this reason—development being a constructed idea—that international development assistance remains the subject of critical discussion and controversy. It holds to particular understandings of what constitutes the improvement of developing countries, prescribing particular paths in order to realise those understandings. And, as the mainstream discourse has responded to challenges from alternative approaches, it has reshaped what it regards development to be and how it is to be achieved (Thomas-Slayter 2003: 12; Hinton and Groves 2004: 4).

Escobar (1988: 430–431) makes the persuasive case that the 'production and circulation of discourses is an integral component of the exercise of power … Development itself, as a discourse, has fulfilled this role admirably,' and continues by commenting that through the professionalisation of development ('a set of techniques and disciplinary practices through which the generation, diffusion, and validation of knowledge are organised, managed, and controlled') and the institutionalisation of development ('the establishment of an institutional field in which, and from which, discourses and techniques are produced, recorded, stabilised, modified, and put into operation') development-in-abstraction becomes development-in-practice. Yet, even in the presence of professionalisation and institutionalisation, legitimacy may not be conferred upon ideas and practices transmitted from the international to the domestic.

The point of the above narrative is to arrive at the following question: if development is whatever an actor says it is, how does that actor convince another actor to accept and adopt their way of thinking? Given that development is a constructed idea, instruments are needed to either coerce or persuade recipients that particular ideas and practices are legitimate. For the World Bank, technical assistance is one such instrument.

## The World Bank

An independent specialised agency of the United Nations, the World Bank, is made up of two organisations—the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA)—and is part of the World Bank Group, which includes the World Bank, International Finance Corporation (IFC), Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).

For the purposes of this study, the focus is upon the World Bank, with only occasional references to the larger World Bank Group. The common purpose of the IBRD and IDA is to raise living standards and alleviate poverty in their member countries, a goal pursued by a staff exceeding 10,000 posted to over 150 offices worldwide. As of March 2017, 189 member countries comprise the IBRD and the IDA 173. As the world's leading development institution, providing financial and technical assistance, publishing research, and leading global initiatives, the World Bank plays a large role in influencing the trajectories of its member countries, shaping the actions of other international organisations, and setting 'best practice' within mainstream development. As Payer (1982: 15) notes, 'Some call it the best, some call it the worst; but no one escapes its influence'.

The IBRD began operations on 25 June 1946. Born of the July 1944 Bretton Woods Conference (formally titled the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference) and initially intended to assist post-Second World War European reconstruction, the IBRD today aims to promote sustainable development and reduce poverty, lending to middle-income and credit-worthy low-income countries, raising its AAA-rated portfolio through global financial markets. Within the World Bank Group, the IBRD has been the largest source of financial and technical assistance. Cumulative IBRD lending from 1946 to 2010 totalled US$523.6 billion, disbursed via 5530 loans, with Mexico, Brazil, India, Indonesia, China, and Turkey being its main recipients (World Bank 2011). Interestingly, its *Articles of Agreement* are silent on technical assistance. The IBRD is not without guidelines, however. *Operational Policy Statements BP 8.40* and *OP 8.40* require that technical assistance must utilise research and policy work, complement loans, be clear in objective, coordinate with and encourage borrower participation, and build mechanisms to monitor progress (World Bank 2004a, b).

The IDA commenced activities on 24 September 1960. Its mandate is to promote economic development, increase productivity, and raise living standards in its member countries. The 'soft loan' affiliate provides credits (defined as long-term concessional loans with repayments stretched over 40 years) to its poorest member countries, primarily those from Sub-Saharan Africa. Subscriptions drawn from wealthier member countries finance its credits. This happens every 3 years. Second to the IBRD, it provides the largest volume of financial and technical assistance of the World Bank Group. Cumulative IDA lending from

1960 to 2010 totalled US$221.2 billion, disbursed via 4822 credits, the largest recipient being India (World Bank 2011).

The member countries of the World Bank are its stakeholders, represented by a Board of Governors, above which a Board of Executive Directors has policy oversight. Six members—the USA, Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and China—hold permanent representation on the Board of Executive Directors and two countries—Saudi Arabia and the Russian Federation—select their own representatives. The remaining member countries elect the other 17 Executive Directors. Proposals on financial and technical assistance submitted to the Board of Governors are also forwarded to the Executive Directors for consideration. As of March 2017, the USA controls a veto majority of voting power (16.43%). Japan follows next (7.1%), then China (4.59%), Germany (4.16%), and the United Kingdom and France (3.89% each). The member countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, in contrast, individually control less than 0.1%. As a result, decision-making is centralised under a small minority who determine outcomes for the majority, with one country alone—the USA—holding veto power over admitting new members and changing the institution's rules (Wade 2003: 80; Weaver 2007: 500; Babb 2009: 20). From the academic literature, the principal-agent model proposes that behavioural change within the World Bank derives from external actors (i.e. member countries), whereas constructivist discourse claims that internal factors (i.e. organisational cultures and norm/policy entrepreneurs) are more influential (Chwieroth 2008: 481–484).

The World Bank President, Vice Presidents, and senior management coordinate day-to-day operations, such staff being 'the primary conduit for relations with member states' (Broome and Seabrooke 2012: 7). The President is especially influential, with Kraske (1996: vii) remarking that they 'were not only the source of power in the institution; they were also the ones the staff looked to for signals that would indicate the Bank's primary mission and its operational priorities in a changing world'. The incumbent World Bank President, the twelfth, is Jim Yong Kim, who serves as the Chairperson of the Board of Executive Directors.

Analyses of the World Bank occur along a spectrum. Emerging from the Left and Right, there are those in favour of preserving the status quo, opposed by those who call for its abolition, divided by those in favour of reform. The latter offer the most diverse and valuable range of voices, for, as Griffin (2009: 20) remarks,

> I do not situate myself in opposition to the World Bank, nor do I dismiss the entirety of its work as flawed. Regardless of origins, there is something to be said for making do with the institutions we have, which are after all mechanisms of social interaction deriving specifically from social relationships and, therefore, potentially open to reconfiguration.

From the Left come criticisms of the World Bank as an imperialistic enterprise, an ideological Trojan horse whose activities privilege developed countries to the detriment of the developing. From the Right emerge the challenges that it is unresponsive to market forces, promoting inefficiencies through support for the public sector. This is not to suggest that the scholarly literature is entirely negative, but most stress that the World Bank is not ideologically neutral.

The following is a list of notable themes often visited by the literature: adjustment lending (Jeong 1997; Woods 2006); economic indicators (Clegg 2010); education (Bonal 2002); the environment (Rich 1994; Goldman 2005); faith-based organisations (Pallas 2005); gender (Griffin 2009); governance (Harrison 2004; Thomas 2007); its institutional history (Kapur et al. 1997; Alacevich 2009); the Internet (Wilks 2002a, b; Thompson 2008); knowledge management (King 2002); lending practices (Berkman 2008; Winters 2010); neoliberalism (George and Sabelli 1994; Caufield 1996; Engel 2010b); poverty (Ayres 1983); the United Nations (Babb 2009; Lavelle 2011); and the World Bank Presidents. As is suggested, there is an incredibly broad literature on the World Bank. In addition to constructivist reviews of organisational change (Park 2005; Vetterlein 2007; Chwieroth 2008) and political economy critiques (Babb 2005; Engel 2010a), institutional histories observe the World Bank over time (Mason and Asher 1973; Payer 1982; Kapur et al. 1997; Marshall 2008; Alacevich 2009), sector analyses review thematic issues such as agriculture, governance, finance, and gender (Harrison 2004; Goldman 2005; Griffin 2009), and relational studies consider the World Bank's interactions with donors, recipients, and development agencies (Woods 2006; Berkman 2008; Babb 2009). This book embeds itself within the current literature by offering an institutional history that observes several decades and a diverse array of development themes and analyses the importance of relational dynamics to technical assistance, a topic that has not received a comprehensive accounting.

One notable preoccupation of the literature is over what role the World Bank should serve. Some provide the argument that it is simply a financial institution, and should act no further than to confirm or deny loan applications. By taking into account issues beyond this limited mandate, it is exceeding its *Articles of Agreement*. Clemens and Kremer (2016: 53) provide the quintessential narrow interpretation: while noting its importance to influencing 'dramatic policy changes,' they conclude that the World Bank is well-positioned to facilitate 'Pareto-improving' changes between donor and recipient. There are many who oppose this view however, claiming that the World Bank has not gone far enough, that it has failed to offer adequate support to social issues, human rights, and environmental sustainability. These competing opinions cause a dilemma, for the World Bank cannot tread in any direction without receiving criticism. This tension is writ large in its attempt to construct development 'truths', or, more simply put, to legitimise particular development policy reforms. In line with these criticisms, let us turn to the literature on the World Bank as the Knowledge Bank and its Market for (or Monopoly of) Truth, a debate relevant to examining how ideas and practices move from the international to the domestic.

In his 1996 Board of Governors Address, then World Bank President James Wolfensohn introduced the Strategic Compact. In addition to emphasising the need for greater accountability, efficiency, integrity, and inclusivity, the Compact launched the Knowledge Bank paradigm. Wolfensohn (1996) envisions the paradigm as renewing the institution's legitimacy by converting its knowledge into a global commons whereby its expertise and experience would be shared with its member countries and other development agencies as a global public good. Incumbent President Jim Yong Kim recently updated the Knowledge Bank paradigm, calling for the World Bank to become a Solutions Bank. Unveiled in his 2012 Board of Governors Address, Kim reflects upon the Knowledge Bank and argues that 'it is time for us to write the next chapter in our evolution; it is time for us to become a "solutions" bank. We must listen, learn, and partner with countries and beneficiaries to build bottom-up solutions. This is how we will increase our relevance and our value in today's and tomorrow's global economy' (World Bank 2012a: 14). Over the past few decades, the World Bank has purposefully stressed the role of its ideational influence in shaping best practice development policies.

There are supporters and detractors of the Knowledge Bank paradigm. Those in favour hold that knowledge begets legitimacy, that technical expertise validates chosen development paths, and that the capable use of knowledge has transformed the World Bank from a development bank into the world's leading knowledge-based development institution. In contrast, those against argue that knowledge begets coercion, that the standardisation of development norms has further entrenched the ideational hegemony of globalisation, financial liberalisation, and market fundamentalism, and that the World Bank holds a monopoly on shaping its supply and demand (Kanbur and Vines 2000; Stiglitz 2000; Stone 2003; Goldman 2005; Dethier 2007).

The Knowledge Bank proponents advance one primary argument: the legitimacy of the World Bank derives from its promotion of development knowledge as a public good. Decades of research and data collation are central to this claim, with exhaustive information gathered on topics from macroeconomic management to village water supply (Wilks 2002b: 328; Goldman 2005: 101; St. Clair 2006: 77). Gilbert et al. (1999: F615) contend that the most important function performed by the institution is 'the promotion and dissemination of knowledge about the process of economic development and the policies best calculated to promote it'. With Morduch (2008: 378) regarding the Knowledge Bank paradigm as a 'natural turn' for the institution, its greatest strength is its vast reservoir of development knowledge analysed by an elite cadre of development economists. For the proponents, the World Bank is more than just a bank; it is a leading architect of the intellectual terrain of mainstream development and international development assistance.

The opponents of the Knowledge Bank arrive from more diverse positions. Two main criticisms emerge. The first is the World Bank's pursuit of a single vision of development—the projection of its orthodox paradigm—and the second is the disciplinary monopoly of those it employs—the internalisation of its orthodox paradigm.

The dogmatic pursuit of a singular interpretation of development has been criticised under the challenge that the creation and use of knowledge is not ideologically neutral. There are three elements to this challenge. First, the World Bank's orthodox paradigm—a broadly free market economic model—is hegemonic, ideologically selective, and unreflective (Standing 2000: 752). Second, the World Bank is the gatekeeper of its knowledge, commodifying what it lauds to be a global public good (Mehta 2001: 189–190). Enns (2015: 63) argues that the 'World Bank's recent interest in "multi-polar" knowledge may actually symbolise a discursal move rather than a new approach to knowledge' and that the World Bank limits 'the influence that alternative knowledges have in the organisation's mainstream development activities and initiatives in order to preserve a dominant knowledge discourse and particular policy agenda'. And, third, while it claims to be concerned with sustainability and poverty alleviation, its orthodox paradigm is so economistic that it ignores cultural sensitivities, gender roles, human rights, and other normative issues (Morduch 2008: 380).

The disciplinary monopoly of those it employs has been criticised as ingraining a narrow orthodoxy. Arguing that it rarely originates new ideas, the opponents contend that the World Bank favours economics above other disciplines (Rao and Woolcock 2007: 480). Coupled with its top-down knowledge hierarchy and the fact that it prefers in-house to independent research, the preferential treatment offered to economics restricts the policy options available to its member countries (Squire 2000: 116–117; Goldman 2005: 126–127). The opponents also argue that the elitist professionalism of those it employs leads to the casting aside of local knowledge, such knowledge being deemed inappropriate to the complex modelling required by the economics discipline (Woods 2006: 55 and 64). This is complicated further by the claim that its orthodox paradigm is based upon a consensus between itself and its primary audience—research institutes and elite universities—and not its developing member countries (Neu et al. 2002: 286; St. Clair 2006: 83).

Analyses of the Knowledge Bank paradigm thus illustrate the controversial role the World Bank plays in constructing, projecting, and legitimising particular development 'truths'. As Goldman (2005: xv) argues, 'one of [its] greatest accomplishments has been to make *its* worldview, *its* development framework, and *its* data sets the one that people around the world choose above others'. As such, the above narrative has identified the World Bank as possessing selective and contentious claims as to what development is and how it is to be achieved. This builds upon the earlier discussion that development itself is a constructed idea. Because of this, the World Bank needs tools and instruments to either coerce or persuade its recipients to accept and adopt its development policy frameworks. It is here that technical assistance comes to the forefront.

## Technical Assistance

'The World Bank has always sold ideas, not just loans' (Kramarz and Momani 2013: 409).

World Bank technical assistance is significant to academic analysis because it has consistently presented itself as scientific, tested, value-free, and thus legitimate (Smith 2008: 238). As the World Bank (2012b: 4 emphasis added) notes, 'Beyond providing *independent* and *objective* advice, the Bank is a one-stop-shop for development solutions'. Yet, these supposedly politically neutral truths—as all policy lessons from abroad—become tools to 'bias policy choice' (Robertson 1991: 55). Allegedly value-neutral policy lessons are grounded in battles over what are and are not legitimate policy options. For this book, therefore, the tension between coercion and voluntary consent in influencing recipients becomes important when justifying deeply political yet ostensibly value-free development policies. Given that 'development is fundamentally about changing how people conduct their lives, and the very claim to technical knowledge is itself a political act' (Cooper and Packard 1997: 18–19), technical assistance, as a microcosm of the claim that development and development assistance are socially constructed ideas, demands critical analysis.

Technical assistance has endured a slow conceptual evolution alongside the changing internal and external dynamics affecting the World Bank. Its form has changed along with its evolving mission, from ensuring the technical quality of lending operations to altering the economic and political structures of recipient countries. No single definition can, therefore, easily encapsulate its history. Arndt (2000: 138) remarks that technical assistance 'is a bit like poverty; difficult to define, but one knows when one sees it,' and Mason and Asher (1973: 295) conclude that 'technical assistance from the Bank Group is whatever the Bank says it is'. Despite these conceptual handicaps, a concise definition remains possible.

The 1991 World Bank Technical Assistance Review Task Force (TARTF) provides the seminal definition of technical assistance: the 'transfer or adaptation of ideas, knowledge, practices, technologies, or skills to foster economic development' (cited in McMahon 1997: 2). Whether provided as a component of a development program, as a stand-alone project, or as an advisory service (including consultancy work, feasibility and pre-investment studies, survey missions, training seminars, research publications, and online websites), the significance of technical assistance is found practically in its impact as a policy transfer tool and rhetorically as a legitimising agent justifying chosen development policies.

Therein resides the importance of technical assistance to critical discussion. As Smith (2008: 239) argues, technical assistance does not 'impose' (as per conditions attached to loans), but rather 'convinces' via implied technical legitimacy; it is a tool of persuasion. As technical assistance holds the potential to shape mindsets far beyond simple investment, as the transfer and adaptation of ideas, knowledge, practices, technologies, and skills can lead to the normative reconceptualisation of what constitutes development, as well as what paths should be followed, technical assistance demands thorough critical discussion. To use a cliché, consider the following: *Give a person a fish, they eat for an evening. Teach that person to fish, they eat for a lifetime*. World Bank technical assistance is the equivalent of this adage, but with added nuance. The World Bank does not simply teach people how to fish. It attempts to persuade and socialise them into using a particular rod, a particular reel, a particular line, and to cast into a particular pond to catch a particular fish.

## Structure of the Book

This book is divided into eight chapters and is structured to explore four pillars of World Bank technical assistance: technical assistance incorporated within lending operations, stand-alone technical assistance projects, survey missions, and training institutes. In exploring these pillars, the study relies heavily on archival sources, an approach adopted in order to effectively engage in sufficient breadth and depth with the subject matter, particularly given the largely under-researched nature of World Bank technical assistance. Two main reasons support this approach. First, internal documents are often quite candid about the successes and failures of World Bank operations. Such papers lack the 'polish' of highly publicised World Bank reports (e.g. the *Doing Business Reports* and *World Development Reports*), meaning that good insights can be gleaned from unfiltered staff comments. Second, a systematic analysis of a broad sweep of archival materials can allow for clear insights to be generated. Drawing upon World Bank loan documents, project completion reports, staff appraisal reports, working papers, press releases, and policy reports across several decades allows for detailed understandings to be generated by comparing documents from different time periods.

Following this introductory chapter, Chap. 2—*Policy Movement and Technical Assistance*—builds a framework of analysis to understand the tension between coercion and voluntary consent in international development assistance. It does so first by outlining and critiquing the policy transfer literature from policy studies. Drawing upon analyses of domestic and transnational policy transfer, the chapter establishes an understanding of the ways through which one actor can transfer policy to another actor. In order to strengthen the policy transfer framework, the chapter also presents material from the policy mobilities literature, a field that draws upon critical geography and constructivism to highlight the importance of social interaction and political conflict to the construction and movement of policy reforms. The chapter positions these two literatures within the fields of development, international development assistance, and global governance. Following this, the chapter turns to contextualising and conceptually framing technical assistance. In reviewing the academic and professional literature on technical assistance, it identifies the main debates and the evolution of these debates since the 1940s. The chapter analyses how the concept of technical assistance has changed over time and how new labels emerged to describe the phenomenon, including technical cooperation, institutional development, and capacity building. The chapter notably highlights the current dominant lens through which to understand technical assistance: as a tool of bargaining and engagement between two or more actors. The chapter concludes by positioning technical assistance within the policy transfer and mobilities literatures.

Chapter 3—*The World Bank*—provides an historical framing of the World Bank from 1946 to 2016. Before the book can critique technical assistance, it is necessary to signpost and analyse the major turning points in the institution's history. The chapter provides a reference point for the substantive analysis of technical assistance made between Chaps. 4 and 7. Three broad eras of development history divide the chapter: the Bretton Woods era, Washington Consensus era, and post-Washington Consensus era. Under these three eras, the mainstream understanding of and approach to development changed considerably. In order to illustrate these eras in terms of World Bank history, each era is divided into the presidencies of the World Bank. The Bretton Woods era (1940s–1970s) critiques the presidencies of Eugene Meyer, John Jay McCloy, Eugene Robert Black, George Woods, and Robert Strange McNamara. The Washington Consensus era (1980s and 1990s) reviews the presidencies of Alden Winship Clausen, Barber Conable, and Lewis Preston. And the post-Washington Consensus era (2000s to present) analyses the presidencies of James Wolfensohn, Paul Wolfowitz, Robert Zoellick, and Jim Yong Kim. The relevance of Chap. 3 is that it provides an historical frame of reference so that the proceeding chapters evaluating technical assistance can be easily positioned within the history of both international development assistance and the World Bank.

Chapter 4—*Technical Assistance Components*—offers the first substantive review of World Bank technical assistance, focusing upon its most prevalent form: technical assistance incorporated as components of lending operations. The chapter provides an overview of how technical assistance components (TACs) changed over time during the Bretton Woods, Washington Consensus, and post-Washington Consensus eras. It highlights rural and urban poverty projects during the 1970s, structural and sectoral adjustment loans during the 1980s, post-Soviet transition projects during the 1990s, and development policy loans (DPLs) during the 2000s and 2010s. Case examples from Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, East and Southeast Asia, and Central and Eastern Europe are used to identify what has led to success and failure, with TACs measured pursuant to the World Bank's 'satisfactory', 'moderate', and 'unsatisfactory' performance indicators.

Chapter 5—*Technical Assistance Loans*—complements Chap. 4 by providing a review of stand-alone technical assistance projects. They are distinguished from TACs for they are designed to solely deliver technical assistance, demonstrating a different relational dynamic between provider and recipient. The chapter begins with technical assistance projects approved during the 1960s and 1970s, provided to help draft national development programs and conduct surveys and studies of recipient countries. The chapter next turns to technical assistance loans (TALs), introduced in the 1980s as companions to structural and sectoral adjustment loans, and involved in raising human and institutional capacity to implement policy reforms. The chapter analyses non-lending technical assistance (NLTA) next, introduced in the 2000s to assist policy implementation, strengthen institutions, and facilitate knowledge exchange. It then concludes with reimbursable advisory services (RASs), a unique service whereby countries ineligible to receive World Bank loans can request fee-based technical assistance. This chapter complements the fourth by providing an account of how stand-alone projects evolved in content and delivery, with an analysis of the lessons learnt from their successes and failures over several decades.

Chapter 6—*Survey Missions*—turns from the preceding content of Chaps. 4 and 5 to a more 'background' example of technical assistance: survey missions. To define, such missions include any World Bank activity involved in measuring the development status of a surveyed country. The importance of these missions is that they have consistently informed World Bank development strategies and lending schedules since the 1940s and have comprised an important dialogue between the IBRD, IDA, and their member countries. Starting with general survey missions introduced in 1949, the chapter evaluates how survey missions transformed across the decades, addressing Country Assistance Strategies (CASs) from the 1990s, the introduction of Economic and Sector Work (ESW) during the 2000s, and the 2014 launch of Country Partnership Frameworks (CPFs) and Systematic Country Diagnostics (SCDs) by incumbent President Jim Yong Kim. Survey missions are relevant to analyses of policy movement because the missions are used to raise recipient capacity and help the World Bank collaboratively plan and implement development programs, building dialogue and partnerships with recipient countries on how best to develop.

Chapter 7—*Training Institutes*—addresses another 'background' example of technical assistance: the courses of the Economic Development Institute (EDI) and World Bank Institute (WBI). The 'teaching and learning arm' of the World Bank, the institutes deliver training and instructional courses to a wide range of actors. The chapter provides an interesting and important analysis for it comments not only upon how the World Bank transfers ideas, knowledge, practices, and skills, but also how it directly trains individuals in governments, the private sector, and civil society to accept and adopt particular understandings of and approaches to development. The chapter also evaluates the online engagement of the World Bank e-Institute, an Internet-based companion to the WBI that delivers wholly online courses. In doing so, the chapter analyses changes in EDI and WBI curricula, pedagogy, and methodology in their attempts to socialise participants to accept particular policy frameworks.

Chapter 8—*Development Transferred?*—provides a summary of the book and conceptualises the relevance of the preceding four substantive chapters on World Bank technical assistance to international development assistance, global governance, and policy transfer processes in the twenty first century. As the World Bank (alongside the other major multilateral development banks) transitioned from a lender financing industrial and infrastructural projects to a policy entrepreneur shaping economic and political frameworks, efforts to secure the perceived legitimacy of its development policy reforms became much more important. What has worked? What has failed? What lessons have been (or can be) learnt from several decades of technical assistance? When we observe TACs, stand-alone projects, survey missions, and training institutes, which of the four core pillars are more or less capable in pursuing their respective mandates? The main takeaway from the book is that development cannot be coercively imposed; the sustainable movement of socially constructed ideas and practices from the international to the domestic cannot be forced. Transnational policy transfer foremost requires the consent of recipients, and that consent is more likely obtained in collaboration than through coercion. In this way, the final chapter not only summarises the conclusions of the book, but also highlights its utility and importance to the contemporary practice of international development assistance in the twenty first century. Its ambition is to shed light on the complex relationships between development donors and recipients in order to highlight possible future directions.

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CHAPTER 2

# Policy Movement and Technical Assistance

International development assistance is characterised by unequal power relations between donors and recipients. This is clear owing to the simple fact that those who can offer financial and technical assistance reside in an elevated structural position compared to those in receipt. The movement of development policy between involved parties is thus necessarily defined by inequality and in practice exhibits the tension between coercion and consent. This chapter explores these unequal power dynamics by, first, examining the policy transfer and policy mobilities literatures and, second, analysing technical assistance as a concept, as a debate, and as defined by the World Bank. In doing so, it offers an analytical framework for understanding the four pillars of World Bank technical assistance.

## Policy Movement

Drawing upon the work of Rose (1991, 1993), Dolowitz and Marsh (1996: 344) provide the seminal definition of policy transfer: 'a process in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions etc., in one time and/or place is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, and institutions in another time and/or place'. An important field of study 'because transfer is a common phenomena' (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996: 357) between national governments, international organisations, and special interest groups, the term is used to describe a wide variety of activities conducted by a broad range



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of actors, though all focusing upon the shaping of 'policy that addresses a particular policy issue/problem' (Dolowitz and Marsh 2012: 340). Put simply, transfer networks are significant social artefacts 'because without them other policies might be adopted' (Evans and Davies 1999: 376). While other public policy literatures analyse policy effects, the policy transfer model focuses on the policy process: the interaction between policy transfer agent and recipient (Bulmer et al. 2007: 14; Stone 2012: 487); the emphasis is on the processes through which policy travels.

The policy transfer literature asks several questions in studying policy movement (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000: 7–9): Why do actors engage in policy transfer? Who are the key actors involved? What is transferred? From where are lessons drawn? What are the different degrees of transfer? What restricts or facilitates the transfer process? How is it related to policy 'success' or 'failure'? These seven questions have together formed the basis of policy transfer research since the early 1990s. Significantly, Evans (2010b: 157) comments that policy transfer is 'best concerned with the study of discernible and remarkable features of contemporary policy change not otherwise explained'. This book regards World Bank technical assistance as a 'discernible' and 'remarkable' feature, it being a formal, institutionalised tool used to transfer policy from the international to the domestic.

Various motivations exist influencing policy transfer, including altering policy goals, structure, and intent, introducing policy instruments or administrative techniques, shaping institutions, transmitting ideology, influencing ideas and attitudes, and cautioning negative lessons (Bennett 1991: 43; Dolowitz and Marsh 1996: 350). In the context of these motivations, there exist differing degrees of transfer, including copying (when an actor adopts a complete program from elsewhere), emulation (when an actor alters a best practice program from elsewhere to fit local conditions), and hybridisation (when an actor combines elements of programs from multiple actors) (Rose 1991: 22; Dolowitz and Marsh 1996: 351). To provide examples, the UK has directly copied a working family tax credit system from an American earned income tax credit system and has hybridised welfare program designs from initiatives in Australia, the Netherlands, Canada, and the USA (Evans 2009: 246). Following Evans (2009: 246), copying is the rarest form of policy learning, emulation is more prevalent than copying, and hybridisation is the most common form, particularly within the machinations of global governance and transnational policy movement.

Elected officials, political parties, pressure groups, policy entrepreneurs, and supranational organisations are all policy transfer agents (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996: 345). Global governance actors delivering technical assistance are both policy entrepreneurs and supranational organisations. Policy entrepreneurs are actors able to build networks of contacts to broadcast their ideas and practices by virtue of their expertise on a given subject matter (to illustrate, 'economists are likely to know other economists working in universities, government, the private sector, non-profit institutions, and often in intergovernmental or international organisations' (Rose 1991: 15)), while supranational organisations—for example, the United Nations, IMF, and World Bank—are actors capable of spreading ideas, programs, and institutions between governments and non-state groups due to their specialisation and perceived legitimacy, with such movement occurring directly (through policy conditions attached to lending operations) and indirectly (through conferences and publications) (Rose 1993: 105; Dolowitz and Marsh 1996: 346; Dolowitz and Marsh 2000: 11; Stone 2004: 549). As Rose (1991: 5) concludes, 'In policymaking circles, experience has a unique status as a justification of effectiveness; it shows that a proposal is not just based upon "head in the clouds" speculation'.

Three processes distinguish policy transfer: direct coercive, indirect coercive, and voluntary transfer. Direct coercive transfer refers to instances 'when a government is compelled by another government to introduce constitutional, social, and political change against its will and the will of its people' (Evans 2009: 245). While rare between national governments (although there are examples of American regulators forcing European countries to implement American anti-cartel laws (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996: 348)), direct coercive transfer has been regularly identified in the activities of supranational organisations, notably as prescriptive conditions attached to IMF and World Bank loans; financial leverage used to compel policy change (Killick 1998: 10; Larmour 2002: 249; Marsh and Sharman 2009: 280). In this vein, Dolowitz and Marsh (1996: 348) advance that supranational organisations 'have played a crucial role in the spread of Western monetary policies to Third World countries. World Bank loans are much cheaper for these countries, but in return the IMF will stipulate certain economic policies that have to be implemented if the loan is to be granted'. While policy loan conditions are inherently coercive, the World Bank exercises capacity beyond direct coercive transfer, particularly since coercive development practices are either prone to failure or, at the very least, unlikely to be sustainable.

Indirect coercive transfer concerns situations where externalities compel actors to adopt new policies. To illustrate, when the 'international community defines a problem in a particular way, and even more when a common solution to that problem has been introduced by a number of nations, then nations not adopting this definition or solution will face increasing pressure to join the international "community" by implementing similar programs or policies' (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996: 349). Employing Ikenberry's (1990: 102) concept of 'bandwagoning', Evans (2009: 245) contends that 'indirect policy transfer can be identified when governments introduce institutional or policy changes due to a fear of falling behind neighbouring countries. For example, Japan's economic miracle in East Asia proved inspirational to neighbouring countries such as Singapore, South Korea, and Malaysia'. Even though indirect coercive transfer is applicable to many aspects of World Bank operations, particularly its normative influence on the issues of poverty, private sector-led growth, and sustainable development (Goldman 2005: 182–183; Blackmon 2008: 186–191), there remain elements of its activities that cannot be listed as indirectly coercive. The literature often regards global governance actors as 'predatory agents of policy transfer' (Evans 2010a: 19), which is accurate in some respects, but does not account for the full picture.

Voluntary transfer, linked to the idea of 'lesson-drawing' popularised by Rose (1991, 1993), refers to 'the notion that transfer is a voluntary process undertaken by civil servants and politicians seeking to emulate "best practice"' (Stone 2012: 485). Dolowitz and Marsh (1996: 346) contend that 'the primary catalyst of voluntary transfer is some form of dissatisfaction or problem with the status quo … Only when routines stop providing "solutions" is it necessary to search for lessons'. A somewhat 'benign view' of policy transfer (Stone 2012: 485), the literature identifies that 'British agents of lesson-drawing are more inclined to look towards North America, the [European Union], and certain parts of the Commonwealth for their lessons. This arises for reasons such as habits of mind, the "special relationship", the historical legacy of empire, or the ease of looking towards other English speaking countries' (Stone 1999: 57). While not disregarding the coercive potential of World Bank lending operations, technical assistance can often (although not always) be cautiously identified as an illustration of voluntary policy transfer, to the extent that such assistance is regularly presented and packaged persuasively as best practice solutions to development problems, often being directly requested or sought out by national governments.

The World Bank has the capacity for direct and indirect coercive transfer and voluntary transfer, depending upon the type of activity observed. While there is ample evidence to reinforce the view of the institution as exercising direct coercive transfer through the attachment of conditions upon loans and credits and as practising indirect coercive transfer via norm-setting leadership, technical assistance exhibits characteristics between coercion and voluntary consent; in practice, 'very few studies see coercion as a leading [transfer] mechanism' (Marsh and Sharman 2010: 35). Dolowitz and Marsh (2000: 11) comment that the presence of

> international consultants makes less clear the distinction between voluntary and coercive transfer. For example, while consultants may "force" a uniform model of market reform upon developing nations, if they are hired by a government, either as the agent of an international aid agency or "independently", such a situation clearly has elements of both voluntary and coercive transfer.

Technical assistance, of which consultation is one facet, reveals the complexity of policy movement (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000: 11). Stone (2004: 554) similarly comments that

> coercion is not the only (or even the favoured) approach of international organisations to promote "best practice" or adherence to international standards. Institutions such as the World Bank, the [World Trade Organisation], and the [IMF] have set up research departments or hold conferences and consultations to advocate the "scientific" validity of their objectives, and have engaged in various outreach activities, data-gathering, and monitoring to promote awareness and educate the public.

Such non-coercive instruments are designed to promote voluntary policy compliance through the guise of technical legitimacy (Stone 2012: 491). This point reinforces the main thesis of the book, the intertwined importance of technical process and recipient perception to the effective and ongoing transfer of policy. Subjective perception has been recognised (although not explored) by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996: 357)—a critical yet overlooked element in the movement of policy concerns the 'role subjective perception and judgments play in the definition of problems and solution'—and Rich (2004: 75)—'quite contrary to the predictions of some, the intentional efforts of experts appear to affect how they are viewed and how their work is received by policymaking audiences'. As one illustration, Park et al. (2014: 399) discuss the impact of different forms of communication to increasing the chances of successful policy transfer: 'communicative processes not only shape decision-makers' understanding of policies in other contexts, but also the ways in which they attempt to reconstruct those policies in a new location'. The Operations Evaluation Department (OED), the World Bank's independent evaluation group, similarly recognises that development assistance 'is inescapably political. The best technocratic designs can wither in infertile political soil' and that persuasion and consensus building are prerequisites to effective, sustainable policy transfer (World Bank OED 2005: 22). In this context, the constant tension between coercion and consent shapes policy outcomes.

Despite its analytical strengths in understanding the who, why, what, and from where of policy movement, there are limitations constraining the policy transfer literature, particular as it relates to global governance and transnational policy networks. In context, the majority of policy transfer research focuses upon interactions between liberal democratic governments, when one government coercively or voluntarily receives policy reforms from another government. While supranational organisations are often referenced in the literature, analyses of such organisations are largely presented in generalities as 'globalisation forces' (Parsons 1996: 234; Dolowitz and Marsh 2000: 6–7). The literature has a 'tendency towards "methodological nationalism",' despite the fact that the transnationalisation of policy results commonly occurs above the state level (Stone 2004: 549). As Stone (2012: 496) remarks, 'Policy transfer not only takes place in international domains but can also be considered one constitutive element of transnational governance … [It] can be said that important forces behind policy change, innovation, and reform originate from outside the state'. And yet the complex machinations of global governance remain under-theorised by much of the literature. This is problematic, for the international movement of ideas and practices 'does not always occur in a simple bilateral exchange between sovereign states but can be complemented and/or bypassed by transnational transfer networks. Few studies have addressed the key role of international organisations in policy transfer' (Stone 2004: 546). Even with Stone's (2004, 2012) exceptional work on transnational policy movement, Evans' (2009) analysis of policy networks, and Evans and Davies' (1999) study on multilevel policy transfer is the literature that would benefit from a more rigorous appraisal of the complexities of global governance, it being different from the mainstream focus on the transfer of policy lessons within and between federal and parliamentary systems. Although 'the locus of policy transfer activity has shifted away from its original government-centric emphasis to encompass multiple sites and actors' (Benson and Jordan 2011: 372), it is here maintained that 'policies are not internally coherent, stable "things" but must be understood as social processes' that 'are assembled in particular ways and for particular interests and purposes' (McCann and Ward 2013: 8).

The main critique of the transfer literature comes from the scholarship on policy mobilities. This alternative body of work draws upon critical geography and sociology to critique the more conservative and orthodox 'political science' policy transfer model advanced by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996, 2000, 2012). Adopting a post-positivist/constructivist lens, in contrast to the positivist/rationalist approach of the orthodox model, the mobilities literature synthesises the policy transfer framework, the mobilities approach in sociology (which deconstructs assumed 'spatial binaries like global/local or near/far and [emphasises] the importance of connections'), and the geographical conceptualisation of scale (which examines the hierarchy of divisions between the local, national, regional, and global, thereby disrupting 'common conceptualisations of states as territorially, politically, and socially bounded entities') (Temenos and McCann 2013: 345–246). Its main critique is that the policy transfer model has a 'tendency toward narrow typologies, [an] adherence to one or two scales, and [a] tendency to fall into a literalist trap of assuming that little happens to policies "along the way", or "in the telling" as they are moved from place to place' (McCann 2011: 111). In order to address the shortcomings of the political science model in understanding the machinations of global governance, this book supplements its analysis by drawing upon the policy mobilities literature.

The mobilities scholarship challenges the orthodox model through four main critiques, with the central contention being that the policy transfer literature 'black boxes' much of the dynamics and complexities involved in moving policies across space and time (McCann and Ward 2013: 6–8): too much focus is placed upon categorising the actors and institutions involved in policy transfer, and not enough is placed on the agency of policy actors; too much attention is directed to the national level, and not enough is directed to inter-local circulations within national contexts; too much emphasis is given to discrete territories, and not enough to the notion of scale as assembled relationally by interested actors; and, too much analysis assumes that actors are rational optimisers, and less on the structural conditions shaping options for actors.

In sum, the mobilities literature claims that the political science model downplays the social processes and political dimensions of policy movement (McCann and Ward 2012: 326; Temenos and McCann 2013: 346). Rather than simply identifying policy as transferred from points A to B, the mobilities scholarship regards policy transfer as a site of social interaction and conflict. This becomes apparent when recognising that the movement of policy through international development assistance involves national and sub-national governments, international organisations, academics, think tanks, for- and non-profit foundations, civil society, and the media all 'peddling reform' (Weller and Singleton 2006: 84–85); 'the number of actors involved in mobilising policies is much greater than might be first expected' (Temenos and McCann 2013: 348).

A 'rolling conversation rather than a coherent paradigm' (Peck 2011: 774), the policy mobilities literature addresses the 'ephemeral spaces of knowledge production and circulation, including the Internet and social media, conferences, mega-events, and sites of protest … These are sites of encounter, persuasion, and motivation' (Temenos and McCann 2013: 346). Constructing a relational understanding of governance and policy, the literature emphasises the importance of structural forces and actor agency in drawing together and reconfiguring policy options. 'There is no cloud of free-floating policies hovering in the ether, waiting to be selected on the basis of "perfect information",' McCann and Ward (2012: 327) argue, 'Rather, there are conditioning fields and institutions, existing pathways and trajectories, which structure the conditions under, and the economies within, which transfer agents operate'. Such structures are key given the increased global movement of policy products. As Temenos and McCann (2013: 344 original emphasis) advance,

> policy models do not exist everywhere in the same form. While they are familiar, they are strangely familiar: they are estranged from – partly foreign to – the context in which we encounter them, even as they are being actively embedded and made familiar, normal, or desirable by local politicians and policy actors. Furthermore, while traces of these popular strategies and models appear in many places at once and while they are always presented

> by their proponents as the best solutions to pressing problems, we should not assume that the policies themselves, or their proliferation, are somehow "natural" or teleological. They are not naturally or unproblematically good or "best", and what is important about them is not so much that they move around in some abstract sense but that *people move them around* for particular purposes. New planning and design strategies, economic development models, etc. are social products, built up from the ground over time and bearing the imprint of the interests involved in producing them.

Adopting the term 'mobilities' in the attempt to overcome the 'flatness' of the term 'transfer', the mobilities literature highlights 'the social and spatial complexity' of policy movement (McCann and Ward 2013: 9). Relational and power dynamics become important here, as Peck (2011: 791–792 original emphasis) outlines in-depth:

> What might be called the "objects" of policy transfer – policy ideas, innovations, technologies, and models – do not float freely in some unstructured universe, to be picked over selectively by a faceless elite of continuously learning policy-*makers*. Rather, the field of policy transfer is itself socially and institutionally constructed, being populated by a wide array of actors and institutions; it is sharply contoured and striated, in the form of shifting landscapes of conjunctural openings and preferred channels; it is structured by relatively enduring policy paradigms, which establish intersubjective frames of reference and institutionalised centres of authority; and, perhaps above all, it is saturated by power relations. These intensely contested and deeply constitutive contexts, which have their own histories and geographies, shape what is seen, and what *counts*, in terms of policy innovations, preferred models, and best practices. They also frame those narratives of "policy failure" that establish the premises and preconditions for policy experimentation, and which variously animate and constrain the search for new institutional fixes.

Policy movement is therefore argued to be inherently built upon social interaction, relational dynamics, and conflict, with the complexity of such movement complicated further by the interconnections between the international and domestic (Gotham 2014: 1173; Fisher 2014: 157).

With the main contribution of the mobilities literature being to better understand policy 'as dynamic, relational constructions that emerge, not from specific policymakers and places of invention, but rather from the articulation of these people and places with audiences and places elsewhere' (McCann 2013: 6–7), Baker et al. (2016: 461) divide the motivations of policy mobilities studies between conceptual commitments (to constructivist approaches, to policy as powerful and productive technologies, and to analyses of policy assemblage, mutation, inertia, and barriers) and methodological commitments (to qualitative investigations, to multi-sited case study analysis, and to empirically tracing policy pathways). Reiterating the major contestation of this book, Longhurst and McCann (2016: 111) comment that the

> policy mobilities approach understands policy to move among places through the work of a range of "policy actors", including politicians, bureaucrats, and activists. These actors engage in various forms of learning, comparison, translation, and education as they identify, package, and promote particular policy models through persuasive narratives about their capacities and effectiveness. Through this process, policy ideas and models are drawn from elsewhere or from global information "clearing houses" and reshaped to address particular definitions of local problems.

In contrast to the positivist/rationalist approach of the political science model, Peck and Theodore (2012: 23) contend that 'Policy designs, technologies, and frames are … complex and evolving social constructions rather than as concretely fixed objectives. In fact, these are very often the means and the media through which relations between distant policymaking sites are actively made and remade'. The mobilities literature thus highlights the social construction and relational dynamics of policy movement; it 'problematises politics of knowledge and practice' (Peck 2011: 775). This book draws upon the orthodox policy transfer model to understand and label the actors, motivations, degrees, and processes of policy movement, but supplements it by drawing upon the policy mobilities approach to conceptualise the socially constructed nature of that movement. Despite their ontological, epistemological, and methodological differences, both approaches offer important and complementary questions that together provide strong insights into policy movement.

## Technical Assistance

Technical assistance entered the lexicon of development assistance in the 1940s, following the creation of the United Nations system. American President Harry Truman's Four Point Program, outlined in his January

1949 Inaugural Address, gave the concept impetus, specifically the call for making 'available to peace-loving peoples the benefits of our store of technical knowledge' (Truman Library 2015); the 'whole United States effort in the field of technical assistance … culminated in the Point Four program' (Blelloch 1952: 52). The United Nations General Assembly approved the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance shortly thereafter in November 1949—'launched with great fanfare and a modest budget' (Wilson 2007: 183)—and was designed to support the appointment of technical experts to decolonising countries, the underlining purpose of which was to develop industrial and agricultural sectors and promote economic and political independence (Jolly et al. 2005: 40; Rist 2008: 88). Importantly, the inherent nature of technical assistance placed developed countries in a privileged position intellectually. From the 1940s onwards, the mainstream discourse held that the developing world had to adopt the ideas and practices of the developed (Escobar 1992: 224–225).

While technical assistance since the Second World War has undergone gradual conceptual changes, there are examples of its provision dating back centuries. Peter the Great contracted French engineers to build St. Petersburg during the seventeenth century, Japan sought assistance from the USA and Western Europe to industrialise during the Meiji Restoration, and the Western colonial powers sent survey missions to Africa, Asia, and Latin America during the nineteenth century (Johnston 1991: 155–159). As a more colourful historical example, the French Governor of Milan, Charles d'Amboise, commissioned Leonardo da Vinci in 1506 to conduct 'a feasibility study with regard to linking Milan to Lake Como by way of a navigable canal that would also provide the city with fresh water' (Strathern 2010: 374). It was not until the establishment of the United Nations system, however, that technical assistance became oriented towards development assistance, modernisation, and the transference of 'manpower aid' (to use the gendered terms of the era).

As a concept, technical assistance has evolved alongside the changing dynamics of development orthodoxy. From the Bretton Woods era of the developmental state (1940s–1970s), to the 'hardline' neoliberal era of the Washington Consensus (1980s and 1990s), to the current era of the post-Washington Consensus (2000s until today), technical assistance has constantly evolved (Wilson 2007: 184; Borda-Rodriguez and Johnson 2013: 344). Defining it is difficult, for it is heterogeneous and 'is not a "thing" or a commodity that can be reduced to a set of ingredients for a universal recipe prescribing "how to do it"' (Eade 2007: 632).

Various definitions of technical assistance abound. Defining the concept is contingent upon its historical and geographical contexts; it is a social construction (Walker et al. 2008: 529). One of the earliest and most cited definitions emerges from the Twelfth International Congress of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences held in Vienna in July 1962 (cited in Mathiasen 1968: 205):

> Technical assistance consists in the transmission of learning, knowledge, and techniques or material and human resources in order to help those who receive it to solve specific problems in a more suitable manner in keeping with their needs. It is an external contribution which assumes a very wide variety of forms: visits of experts and technicians, receiving fellowship holders, organising courses and seminars, exchanging or disseminating information or documents, and supplying material and equipment, and occasionally financial means.

At its simplest level, technical assistance refers to 'the provision of donor-funded personnel to supply missing skills and train local people' (Arndt 2000: 124). Such assistance necessarily involves the movement of ideas and practices from at least one actor to another. While this study acknowledges the 1962 definition, it supplements it with a simplified definition drafted by the 1991 World Bank TARTF: the 'transfer or adaptation of ideas, knowledge, practices, technologies, or skills to foster economic development' (cited in McMahon 1997: 2). The concept thus involves the movement of ideas and practices between locations and their socialisation and local adaptation.

Technical assistance exists as components in development loans, stand-alone projects, survey missions, training institutes, and related advisory services, including consultancy work, feasibility studies, research publications, and online databases. Also referred to as technical cooperation, capacity building, and human resource development, technical assistance draws ideas and practices from one context and copies, emulates, or synthesises them into another, shaping policy, transmitting ideology, and influencing mindsets with the aim of 'developing the capability of performing functions more effectively' (Sobis and de Vries 2009: 567). It has been broadly recognised that weak institutions and the inadequate capacity to analyse and formulate policy 'lie at the heart of the development problem' (Arndt 2000: 121). The critical issue here is: who decides what are valid ideas, knowledge, practices, technologies, and skills? Technical assistance is capable of socialising recipients into accepting and adopting common institutional and policy frameworks (Adler and Bernstein 2005: 313), making it a powerful tool in the movement of policy.

The technical assistance literature dates back to the 1950s, with consistent critiques evaluating approaches to its provision, legitimacy issues, donor/recipient relations, and success rates published in the decades since. The early 1950s literature focuses upon its practical and technical dimensions: how to transfer technical know-how from developed to developing countries and what technical content should be transferred, all of which occurred in the context of Cold War geopolitics (see Métraux 1951; Blelloch 1952; Martin 1952). Robb (2004: 22) highlights the geopolitical context by remarking that during the 1950s and 1960s 'institutional foundations and relations were laid for an aid system that focused more on Northern governments' foreign policies than reducing poverty'; bilateral development assistance was directed mainly to countries of strategic importance. In terms of technical know-how, technical assistance came 'to refer to skill transfers to foster modernisation' (Shaffer 2006: 644), with development largely understood as a technical process, of applying skills A, B, and C to problems X, Y, and Z. An optimistic (and perhaps naïve) understanding of development, technical assistance was expected to bring 'back "one hundred fold" the modest outlays required' (Higgins 1969: 34). The relational and power dynamics of technical assistance were downplayed in the early literature, ironic given the pervasiveness of Cold War geopolitics.

By the 1960s and 1970s, the literature had moved to question the optimism of the early 1950s, critiquing lessons learnt over two decades. Case study analyses often explored the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which arose as a merger between the United Nations Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance and the United Nations Special Fund (UNSF), and the widespread problems undermining bilateral and multilateral aid (see Wolfle 1965; Blasé 1968; Loomis 1968; Higgins 1969). Technical assistance evolved in response to these challenges, with the literature increasingly recognising the difficulties in 'transferring and absorbing knowledge across socio-cultural contexts' (Wilson 2007: 183). As Mathiasen (1968: 207) notes,

> Donors have learned the hard way that the cultural and value changes technical assistance seeks may prove evanescent unless they are institutionalised in the local setting. If no local institutions exist to which new concepts of change can be grafted, donors have sought to stimulate the growth of innovative institutions capable of keeping the change process reinvigorated. Donors also attach increasing importance to human resource development and emphasise education and training to create a fertile ground for sowing the seeds of change.

As the practice of technical assistance entered the 1960s and 1970s, the focus turned to 'changing the behaviour of individuals and institutions' (Loomis 1968: 1330). It was during this period that development agencies and the literature both came to recognise the importance of socialisation to the effective transfer of ideas and practices. Moreover, academic scholarship identified the significance of recipient perceptions: the 'effectiveness of our technical assistance effort is frequently reduced or nullified because of resistance to acceptance on the part of recipients' (Loomis 1968: 1335), particularly since individuals 'who are in some degree products of a paternalist colonial administration are frequently suspicious and resentful of foreign technicians' (Higgins 1969: 39). In this way, Loomis (1968: 1335) regards technical assistance as a person-to-person 'art form', with the 'motivations, interpersonal skills, and attitudes of technical assistance personnel and host personnel [being] equally crucial to effectiveness'. After 2 decades, the lesson emerged that successful transfer was more than just an issue of technical know-how.

During the 1980s and 1990s, technical assistance transformed fundamentally, becoming unrecognisable to previous decades as the dictates of the Washington Consensus encouraged institutional development to embed neoliberal policy reform (see Buyck 1991; Berg 1993). As mainstream development assistance shifted from project- to policy-based lending, epitomised by the introduction of IMF and World Bank structural and sectoral adjustment programs, technical assistance changed to institutionalise neoliberal economic practices. Such measures included privatisation, deregulation, and trade and financial liberalisation, as well as limiting government expenditures. Consequently, there was 'a move away from the provision of physical assets and hardware, and a trend to put the primary emphasis of assistance on increasing the knowledge, skills, and ability of people at various levels to be more effective in their work' (Franks 1999: 51). As an example, in order for the emergent neoliberal orthodoxy to be successfully embedded in a bureaucracy, recipients had to be trained to accept and adopt a neoliberal mentality and new institutions had to be established the ensure the long-term maintenance of neoliberal reforms.

Beyond the neoliberal turn, it was also during the 1980s and 1990s that both development agencies and the literature increasingly emphasised the importance of 'ownership' to successful technical assistance programs (Berg 1993: 246). The asymmetrical relationship between donor and recipient has consistently been identified as a significant obstacle affecting the successful movement of policy from one actor to another (Malik 2002: 35; Fukuda-Parr et al. 2002: 10–11; Singh 2002: 47; Watson and Khan 2010: 24). This asymmetry not only presented challenging relational and power dynamics, but also worsened the scepticism (and even hostility) directed by developing countries to neoliberal policy loans. For this reason, the 1990s literature ever more highlighted the importance of 'country ownership' to the design, delivery, and implementation of technical assistance.

Within current research, consistent interest has focused upon the practical implementation and ontological shortcomings of capacity-building initiatives (see Kaplan 2000; Denning 2002; Eade 2007; Girgis 2007; Wilson 2006; Smith 2008; Brinkerhoff 2010; Brinkerhoff and Morgan 2010; Morgan et al. 2010; Watson and Khan 2010); 'How and what knowledge for development is produced, who controls is, and how it is used have been focal points of much debate' (Borda-Rodriguez and Johnson 2013: 345). Since the early 2000s, the academic literature has reflected upon training and education at the individual, institutional, and societal levels, recognising that the transfer and adaptation of ideas, knowledge, practices, technologies, and skills involves multiple actors in unequal relationships (Fukuda-Parr et al. 2002: 9; Sobis and de Vries 2009: 568). The role of consultants as knowledge producers and brokers has received substantial attention, with a focus 'on the production and role of knowledge in development and on how expert knowledge is produced and reproduced for and by development agencies' (Borda-Rodriguez and Johnson 2013: 344), identifying and analysing the historical, relational, and power dynamics involved in the donor–consultant–recipient triangle.

The relational and power dynamics of technical assistance have come to the fore in current research. This is an appropriate turn, since development assistance 'is a manifestation of inequality … Being poor usually means being powerless; but the aid system is dominated by the interests of the powerful, as opposed to the powerless' (Robb 2004: 21). The transfer of ideas and practices from the international to the domestic concerns not just technical soundness, but also the power relations that surround the movement of knowledge. As a quick review of the literature: Morgan (2002: 8) notes that 'disparities in power and influence among the participants and the intrusion of non-development agendas [leads] to deforming and inverting key … relationships'; Cooke (2004: 607) remarks that the term 'technical assistance' helps development agencies represent themselves as 'technocratically neutral, with the words "assistance" or "cooperation" implying a non-existent parity of power between the technical helpers and helped'; Girgis (2007: 354–355) speaks about the influence of financial, knowledge, and experiential power in unbalancing relations between developed and developing countries, and that capacity building 'is about the exercise of power, because the practitioner requires power in order to undertake capacity-building work, which in turn is about change and transformation'; Baser and Morgan (2008: 20 and 31) comment on conflict, bargaining, and elite accommodation in building local capacity, remarking that 'capacity development is about altering the access of people to authority, resources, and opportunities. It privileges some groups and individuals and not others. Coalitions with power either inside or outside the organisation must, in some way, either directly support or tacitly accept these altered patterns and the implications for their own interests'; Brinkerhoff and Morgan (2010: 2) argue that 'capacity issues are intimately entwined with technical assistance policy and practice, and donor-country relations, which complicates sorting out content and process'; and, Borda-Rodriguez and Johnson (2013: 345) regard technical assistance not as 'knowledge transfer' ('a product or good that can simply be transferred') but as 'knowledge production' ('a process in which social relations and communication between actors play a central role'). This book builds upon recent discussions on the relational and power dynamics of technical assistance by recognising the importance of presentation and packaging to the effective transference of development policy.

In contrast to the coercive nature of loan conditionality, the World Bank presents and packages technical assistance as a value-free approach to development. Yet, technical assistance can never be value-neutral. As Shaffer (2006: 650) contends, 'who defines the purpose of technical assistance and capacity building, and who oversees how funding is used, can shape programs towards different ends'. Similarly, Smith (2008: 238), concluding that development agencies regard the development process as a mathematical problem requiring the application of the correct algebraic formula, argues that analyses of technical assistance

> as a medium for the exchange of knowledge reveals a distinct hierarchy of just what kind of knowledge is promoted and demoted. The process of providing technical assistance places the development consultant as the primary agent in setting up this hierarchy by conducting an inquiry that frames and defines a problem that is amenable to a tool kit of recommendations so that the institution/consultant can become the provider of solutions.

This is an important assertion, because technical knowledge is not found; it is constructed by professionals (Smith 2008: 238–239). Drawing upon evidence obtained in review of South Africa's relationship with the World Bank, Smith (2008: 249–250) outlines that while the World Bank 'failed attempts to establish policy advice through lending programs' (due to the country's 'anti-loan' position), the national government was far more receptive to policy products transferred through a voluntary and consensus-based technical assistance program, even though the normative outcomes were identical. Technical assistance therefore becomes a tool 'to exercise power at a distance' (Smith 2008: 250). In this way, World Bank technical assistance, premised upon dialogue, collaboration, and consent, came to 'dictate' less and build 'discourse' more (Smith 2008: 250). Given the inequities of power that exist between donors and recipients, technical assistance can be interpreted as a tool to improve the perception of the legitimacy of transferred policy options.

## World Bank Technical Assistance

Since the commencement of its lending operations in 1947, the World Bank has used technical assistance. This is curious given that no terms for its use are listed in the *Articles of Agreement* of the IBRD. Yet, as early as the *Third Annual Report to the Board of Governors, 1947–1948* (IBRD 1948: 18), it was argued that 'successful development depends in most cases just as much upon the provision of technical assistance from abroad as upon the availability of foreign capital'. Mason and Asher (1973: 5) further comment that although 'the *Articles of Agreement* of the Bank say nothing about technical assistance, the Bank soon discovered that, in applying for loans, its less developed member countries were not likely to present well-prepared project proposals without Bank assistance'. Inseparable from the institution's history, the World Bank classifies technical assistance in two main ways: 'hardware' and 'software'.

Prior to the mid-1970s, the World Bank mainly provided engineering-related hardware, or 'hard' technical assistance: feasibility studies, engineering design, and construction supervision in the sectors of agriculture, education, industry, infrastructure, telecommunications, transportation, and urbanisation. Under the label 'hardware', technical assistance includes the appointment of advisors and technicians to draft, shape, and then implement development plans (Higgins 1969: 48). As a hypothetical notion, hard technical assistance involves the assigning of engineers, first, to determine the feasibility of constructing a dam and, second, to supervise the construction of that dam (Walker et al. 2008: 529–530). As a real-world example, the IBRD *Railway Project* to Pakistan in 1952 contained provisions to send Pakistani technicians to railroad and diesel manufacturers in the USA for training in the repair and maintenance of diesel locomotives (Pakistan 1952: 5). An 'inexpensive seeding operation,' hard technical assistance produces 'a large impact for a relatively small cost' by ensuring the technical soundness of lending operations (Wharton 1958: 126). While somewhat affecting public policy (Morgan 2002: 1), hardware is aligned more towards loan feasibility than towards policy movement. It was not until the arrival of soft technical assistance that the transfer of policy became more apparent.

Symptomatic of the introduction of policy-based lending and the rise of the neoliberal Washington Consensus in the 1980s (Walker et al. 2008: 530), there arose institution-building software, or 'soft' technical assistance: policy studies, management support, and institution and human resource development in the financial, governance, legislative, regulatory, and trade sectors. Replacing engineers were bureaucrats, economists, and policy experts supervising the economic and political restructuring of developing countries; the locus shifted from building physical infrastructure to increasing human capital (Rose 2005: 60). To illustrate, Togo received the IDA *Structural Adjustment Loan Project (02)* in 1985. Accompanying the loan was the *Technical Assistance Project (03)*, designed to help the national government implement its adjustment program through financial management support, policy formulation, and state enterprise restructuring (1985: 10).

With the classification 'software' first officially noted in the *World Bank Annual Report 1984* (World Bank 1984: 64), the expansion of soft technical assistance saw a greater role for transferring and shaping policy in the recipient developing countries.

In a significant analysis of the IMF and World Bank, Woods (2006) introduces the concept of 'sympathetic interlocutors', an idea relevant to soft technical assistance. Woods (2006: 72) remarks that the

> Fund and Bank have significant bargaining leverage in the face of crises, which force governments to supplicate for assistance. But this does not give either institution the power to impose a Washington-prescribed medicine. Rather their mission has to begin by seeking out sympathetic policymakers or persuading existing leaders that specific reforms should be undertaken.

Woods (2006: 10) concludes that these 'sympathetic' national or subnational actors, capable of exercising power and authority to implement policy reforms, are necessary for the effective movement of policy from the IMF and World Bank to their developing member countries:

> The institutions can successfully deploy this power only where they find and work with sympathetic interlocutors who are both willing and able to embrace the priorities preferred by the institutions. Willing policymakers are produced by circumstances as well as ideology and training.

In this way, through institutional development, capacity building, and training, the World Bank employs soft technical assistance to both reshape domestic environments and find or create sympathetic interlocutors.

Broome (2015) and Broome and Seabrooke (2015) draw upon Woods' construct to understand the role of socialisation in the movement of policy from international organisations to recipient governments. Broome (2015: 149) contends that 'policymakers may be more sympathetic to the IMF's advice if they share a common framework of understanding with IMF staff based on similar experiences of professional training and policy socialisation,' and Broome and Seabrooke (2015: 961) conclude that the 'diffusion of global policy norms by [international organisations] often depends on domestic reformers who push for changes in their institutional environments'. Baser and Morgan (2008: 20) similarly conclude that for technical assistance to successfully transfer policy, 'Coalitions with power either inside or outside organisations must, in some way, either directly support or tacitly accept these altered patterns and their implications for their own interests'. However, Broome and Seabrooke (2015: 961–962) recognise that the 'concept of the sympathetic interlocutor is under-theorised in existing scholarship,' with it 'black boxing' the 'process through which national officials become sympathetic interlocutors for [international organisations]'. This book attempts to expose this 'black boxed' process by contending that soft technical assistance not only identifies sympathetic interlocutors but also creates them via training and socialisation.

In sum, while hardware ensures the technical quality of lending operations through feasibility studies and engineering and construction supervision, software furnishes recipients with the resources necessary to enact new policies through institutional development and capacity building. While hardware remains common today, soft technical assistance became relatively more prevalent in World Bank operations as a result of the neoliberal turn and the rise of the Washington Consensus during the 1980s. To illustrate, despite being far more difficult to use successfully (in terms of design, implementation, supervision, and outcome), software grew from being all but non-existent prior to the 1970s to account for 70% of the World Bank's technical assistance portfolio by 1990 (Wallace 1990: 27). Importantly, however, the shift from hard to soft technical assistance led to new difficulties affecting success rates. Of all policy-based technical assistance projects approved during the 1990s, only 65% were deemed successful (World Bank 2000: 116). In contrast, hardware projects during the same period achieved success rates 10% above that average. Institutional change and policy reform are far more difficult to pursue and achieve compared to engineering design, particularly since—even within one World Bank loan or project—some items may be successfully transferred while others are not transferred at all. As Arndt (2000: 122) concludes, 'Quantifying increases in institutional capacity is, by itself, exceedingly difficult. Disentangling the exact role of technical cooperation in generating the increase from other factors is next to impossible'.

From the broader literature, several prominent issues affect the provision of technical assistance (Wallace 1990: 27–28; McMahon 1997: 4–5; Arndt 2000: 130; Hilderbrand 2002: 20; Sobis and de Vries 2009: 569): it is often donor-driven, with little recipient input; objectives, and consultant terms-of-reference often lack clarity; short-term support goals (measurable) often receive precedence over longer-term institutional development goals (indeterminate); the sensitive nature of economic policy and financial prescriptions often lead to conflict between the public and private sectors and civil society; training programs are often insufficient, too complex, and interim; an overreliance on temporarily appointed expatriate advisors often leads to mistrust and antagonism, as even low-ranking expats receive salaries several times higher than local officials; and technical assistance can lead to 'knowledge dependence', whereby extending the scope of public sector activity can move it beyond local capacity. These issues reveal problems common to hard and soft technical assistance, problems arising even before considering the ideological assumptions behind the transferred ideas, knowledge, practices, and skills. They concern the tension between recipient needs and donor desires. Notably, however, even failed projects can still communicate new ways of thinking about development. Despite pervasive success rate problems, technical assistance remains ubiquitous within the field of international development assistance (Borda-Rodriguez and Johnson 2013: 343). One reason for its continued use has been 'a succession of makeovers and newly defined measures to reassess, reform, and rehabilitate its operation' (Walker et al. 2008: 531). The adoption of a more voluntary, persuasive, and collaborative approach by the World Bank is an expression of such a makeover, particularly the recognised importance of 'country ownership and motivation [as] the single greatest determinants to technical assistance effectiveness' (Morgan 2002: 8); the 'level of technical assistance seems to be less important for a successful [policy] reform than the overall fragmentation of aid flows and the ways in which technical assistance is delivered' (De Janvry and Dethier 2012: 24).

## Summary

The policy transfer and mobilities literatures have contributed to the academic discussion by analysing how policy is constructed and moved between actors and across locales. The role of global governance actors has been notably reviewed in the coercive and voluntary transfer of policy products. There have been significant commentaries, both brief and long, on the World Bank's role as a policy transfer agent. Many of these commentaries have linked the development institution with directly and indirectly coercive practices, particularly in terms of the prescriptive imposition of conditions upon loans and its normative influence on development orthodoxy (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996: 348, 356; Larmour 2002: 259–250; Evans 2009: 245; Marsh and Sharman 2009: 272; Stone 2010: 271). In contrast, a smaller (though no less influential) body of research has highlighted its non-coercive instruments, including consultancy work, research, and online platforms (King 2002: 322; Wilks 2002: 42; Stone 2004: 554; Evans and Barakat 2012: 561; Stone 2012: 491).

Technical assistance—classified as either hardware or software—resides in the grey area between coercive and voluntary transfer. Despite its portrayal as non-prescriptive, collaborative, and value-free, it cannot be regarded as an example of purely voluntary transfer, just as it cannot be said to be entirely coercive. Technical assistance is not entirely coercive for it is often voluntarily requested by recipients and can be rejected; there are no punitive enforceability mechanisms comparable to adjustment loans. Yet, it has not been wholly voluntary either, given the unequal power relations and knowledge hierarchies that exist between the World Bank and its developing member countries (Smith 2008: 238). When considering the four pillars of World Bank technical assistance, the tension between coercion and consent becomes a decisive factor for whether recipients regard the transferred policy as legitimate.

In this regard, the policy transfer model is useful in understanding and labelling the actors involved and the motivations, degrees, and processes of policy movement, while the mobilities literature offers insights into conceptualising the socially constructed nature of that movement, notably the 'fuzziness' of policy lessons, choices, and pathways. Both literatures combine to draw insights into the movement of policy from the international to the domestic, exploring the operationalisation of non-material influence in global governance, with the former recognising the 'who, why, what, and from where' and the latter conceiving policy movement as a site of social interaction and conflict. In this way, the process and relational dynamics of technical assistance affect the success of policy transfer. Advisory services cannot be neatly divided into technical and political components, for both are mutually reinforcing. Understanding the social and political relations and conflicts involved in the movement of policy becomes important when recognising the significance of how policy is presented, packaged, and transferred; the mechanisms, methods, and approaches used to grant legitimacy to that which is a social construction.

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CHAPTER 3

# The World Bank

The World Bank is the world's leading international development institution. Yet, it has not always held this position, with the past several decades witnessing its expansion of financial commitments and intellectual output. This chapter provides an historical framing of the World Bank from 1946 to 2016, studying 70 years to signpost the major turning points in its progression from a conservative investment bank into a pervasive development institution, becoming a lender of finance, an articulator of development policy, and an inducer of ideas and practices (Pereira 2016: 2). The chapter divides World Bank history into the Bretton Woods era (1940s–1970s), Washington Consensus era (1980s and 1990s), and post-Washington Consensus era (2000s and 2010s), concluding with where the institution today stands in the aftermath of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) under the reformist leadership of incumbent President Jim Yong Kim.

Patterns of renewal and change have characterised the World Bank's history, with fluctuating institutional (internal) and relational (external) forces moulding its meta-paradigm (Dethier 2009: 3–4). Its institutional growth, ideological adjustments, and even controversies have been triggered by crises in the world economy, shifting intellectual movements in academic and policy circles, and the reformation of its organisational structure. As former World Bank Vice President and General Counsel Ibrahim Shihata (1995: 1) comments, '*tempora mutantur, et nos mutamur in illis*' ('time changes, and we change with it'). During the early 1970s, poverty-based lending was introduced to tackle the inadequacies



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of the infrastructure-based decades of the 1950s and 1960s. With the 1979 Oil Shock, 1982 Debt Crisis, and collapse of the Bretton Woods system, neoliberal financial adjustment replaced poverty alleviation. By the 1990s, good governance arose to temper this market-centric agenda. After the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the post-Washington Consensus came to be, and, since the GFC, energies have been fixed on ending extreme poverty and promoting shared prosperity.

There are two main literatures analysing organisational behaviour and normative change in international organisations. The rationalist principal-agent model, advanced by Nielson and Tierney (2003, 2005), predicts behavioural and institutional change by analysing how divergences and convergences of interests between agents (the World Bank) and principals (its member countries) may lead the agent to behave in ways contrary to the intentions of the principal; it focuses upon the role of external relationships in affecting institutional change. In contrast, the constructivist norm entrepreneur model (see Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 2001) analyses the interplay of norm dynamics in global governance. Defining norms as 'a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity' (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891), norms have a three-stage life cycle: norm emergence, norm cascade, and norm internalisation. The first stage—norm emergence—requires the presence of norm entrepreneurs to convince a critical mass of actors to embrace new normative positions. Chwieroth (2008b: 17) draws upon this model to understand normative change within international organisations. Given that the 'success of norm entrepreneurs often depends on their possession of a sufficient amount of discursive influence within an organisation that enables them to outperform advocates of alternative views' (Chwieroth 2008b: 17), senior management holds the capacity to institutionalise new norms. In this vein, the World Bank Presidents are 'the ones the staff looked to for signals that would indicate the Bank's primary mission and its operational priorities in a changing world' (Kraske 1996: vii) and the Chief Economists 'shape what research is done and by whom, what evidence is accepted, [and] what conclusions are drawn' (Wade 2002: 206).

Both the principal-agent and norm entrepreneur models have utility in understanding organisational behaviour and normative change. But, even though Nielson et al. (2006) attempt to bridge 'the rationalist-constructivist divide,' they are ontologically, epistemologically, and methodologically distinct. Nonetheless, both must be recognised as the leading literatures on organisational change in the study of global governance. With that caveat in place, this chapter follows the history of the World Bank from 1946 to 2016 by analysing the impact of both its external relationships (especially those with its member countries) and its internal leadership (notably the World Bank Presidents and Chief Economists).

## The Bretton Woods Era

At the invitation of American President Franklin Roosevelt, the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference met from 1 to 22 July 1944. Commonly referred to as the Bretton Woods Conference, over 700 delegates from 44 countries met at the Mount Washington Hotel in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in the USA. While a diverse range of countries attended the conference (including representatives from the Soviet Union, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Western and Northern Europe), the USA and the UK dominated proceedings. The conference's purpose was to negotiate the post-Second World War international economic order and formalise what would become known as the Bretton Woods institutions: the IMF and IBRD (the *Articles of Agreement* of which became active in December 1945). A time marked by American hegemony, Western liberal ideals, the Keynesian intellectual revolution, and the rise of international organisations, a time shaped by decolonisation and the fears imbued by the Great Depression, Second World War, and crystallising Cold War antagonisms, what became known as the Bretton Woods era took to the world stage.

The main motivation for the conference was to ensure that the beggar-thy-neighbour policies of the Inter-War Years (1919–1939) were avoided after the Second World War, such policies seen as culpable for the Great Depression. Criticising floated exchange rates as unstable and detrimental to global trade, the chosen alternative was a regime of fixed but adjustable exchange rates, a gold standard linked to the American dollar, trade liberalisation, and Keynesian welfare and full national employment policies (Pilling 1986: 142–143; Biersteker 1993: 17–18). The regime revealed an uncharacteristic willingness by the USA to assume a global leadership role, unusual given its dissociation from the League of Nations (Peet 2003: 38; Helleiner 2006: 944). In de facto practice, the gold standard became the dollar standard, as international reserves were determined by the balance-of-payments deficit of the USA. This meant the ongoing financial security of the USA, provided the regime remained stable, and vice versa (Mastanduno 2009: 129). Analogous to what Scottish philosopher Thomas Carlyle described of Britain in the nineteenth century, the USA became the global 'constable' (Bruner 2003: 637). This was significant, for more than any other member country, the USA would come to shape the World Bank's twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

The intellectual architects of the IMF and IBRD at the conference were John Maynard Keynes—of the British delegation and appointed Advisor to the Treasury—and Harry Dexter White—of the American delegation and Assistant Secretary to the Treasury. While privately respecting each other, the intellectual conflict between Keynes and White became synonymous with the power struggle between the two countries burdened with implementing the post-war international economic order: the UK and USA (Helleiner 1994: 33–35). Despite a consensus over the conference's objectives, national interest clashes triggered divergences in method (Gowan 1999: 16–17; Peet 2003: 32). Keynes was acutely aware of Britain's deteriorated economy and rampant post-war unemployment, relegating his delegation to the position of debtor. In contrast, White, whom Boughton (2001: 219) describes as 'the most important US government economist of the twentieth century,' was more interested in expanding the largely unscathed American economy by resuscitating global trade and finance, leaving his delegation in the position of creditor (Helleiner 1994: 33–35; Skidelsky 2000: 182). To ensure the ambitions of the conference, the IMF was to uphold the stable exchange rate regime and the IBRD was to aid European post-war reconstruction.

For all the years of planning, the idea of an international bank focused upon reconstruction and development was an afterthought, as competing plans for the IMF dominated the conference. Luis Machado (IBRD Executive Director, 1946–1948) and Ansel Luxford (IBRD Assistant General Counsel, 1946–1951), both of whom were active at Bretton Woods, comment as much. Machado (1961: 3) recalls that 'at the time of the conference the delegates attending were much more interested in what became the [IMF] than in the Bank' and Luxford (1961: 6) recollects that it was more difficult to convince the delegates to agree on the IMF than on the IBRD, and that is 'why the Charter says you couldn't belong to the Bank unless you belong to the Fund'. Proposed by White, who argued that an international reconstruction bank would ensure post-war cooperation, Keynes brought the idea to fruition (Skidelsky 2000: 244; Thomas 2007: 731). Keynes recommended several amendments to White's proposal, including that capital markets should fund IBRD assets rather than subscriptions and that its mandate should broaden to include both project and general purpose loans.

Underpinning negotiations at the conference, and later defining the Bretton Woods era, was the Keynesian advocacy of government intervention to manage demand. In *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money*, Keynes (1936: 380) argues that 'provided the state intervened to manage the level of demand, the process of perfect and imperfect competition would by and large take care of what was produced, in what way and on what scale, as well as how the value of the final product would be distributed'; government intervention was necessary to correct market imperfections (Best 2004: 387–388; Woods 2006: 20–21). Favoured by both Keynes and White, Keynesianism focused upon how to boost an economy out of a prolonged slump, the need for investment in that process, and the centrality of the public sector to economic growth. In this way, development was an economic problem, requiring external agents to solve domestic problems through the transfer of Western ideas, practices, and technologies, guided by an active state (Somjee 1991: 6; Hettne 1995: 39). In fact, it was during the Bretton Woods era that the achievement of the Keynesian welfare state was regarded as the overarching goal of technical assistance (Blelloch 1952: 49).

The IBRD emerged from the Bretton Woods Conference imbued with Keynesian ideals, advocating state intervention to manage development and economic growth (Berger and Beeson 1988: 488; Rich 1994: 63). Project lending capable of quantifiable returns on investment defined development assistance during this period, with the principal state-led growth sectors being industry, infrastructure, and manufacturing, the former of which was seen as 'the main hope of most poor countries trying to increase their level of income' (Chenery 1955: 40).

### *Eugene Meyer (June 1946–December 1946)*

From 8 to 18 March 1946, the IMF and IBRD Boards of Governors met in Savannah, Georgia, in the USA for their inaugural annual meeting. Taking place 3 months prior to the IBRD opening its doors on 25 June, the meeting sought to select a site for the IBRD headquarters, decide the roles and responsibilities of the Executive Directors, and appoint its first president. Seventy-year-old Eugene Meyer, who boasted a public service career in the USA dating back to the First World War, a respected reputation on Wall Street (he led the successful banking house Eugene Meyer & Co.), and ownership of the *Washington Post*, was the nominee chosen. On 18 June 1946, he became the first IBRD President, supervising a staff of 25.

Meyer laid the procedural and administrative foundations of the IBRD, built its credibility on Wall Street, and articulated its mission, which was then based on post-war reconstruction. More relevant to technical assistance, he formed the Research Department and hired Leonard Rist, a French banker, as a Director. Its mandate was to gather data on loans, guarantees, country conditions, and capital availability. From 1947 to 1953, influential economist Paul Rosentein-Rodan served as an Assistant Director. Rosenstein-Rodan shaped the early investment focused mindset of the IBRD and its emphasis on industrial and infrastructural projects, as he had preceded Walt Rostow in arguing the need for a 'big push' to kick-start industrialisation (Rosenstein-Rodan 1943). From the outset, the IBRD supported the mainstream modernisation framework.

The appointment of Rist reinforced a bias against economics. Despite the influence of Rosenstein-Rodan, former bankers controlled the IBRD. Rist (1961: 5) had by his own admission a very limited understanding of economics and was in part selected for that reason: 'I personally could only claim some use of economics for banking purposes. [Meyer] said that was exactly what he wanted'. The IBRD saw itself as an investment bank, authorised to approve or deny loan requests; economics was unnecessary to this end. Hard technical assistance echoed this investment bank persona, with such assistance being used to ensure loan feasibility.

Meyer tended his resignation on 4 December 1946, feeling that he had 'responsibility without authority' (Mason and Asher 1973: 46). This was a precarious time for the institution; 'the Bank was at its absolutely lowest ebb. It was almost on the rocks. It had no reputation. It was regarded by the British as almost a dead issue' (Sommers 1961: 25). After three uncertain months, John Jay McCloy became the second IBRD President.

### *John Jay McCloy (March 1947–June 1949)*

Appointed on 28 February 1947, McCloy was a leading American lawyer (counsel to Chase National Bank), respected by and respectful of the Wall Street banking fraternity, and had served as the Assistant

Secretary of War in the USA during the Second World War. Joining him were Robert Garner (previously Vice President and Director of General Foods) as the Chief Operating Officer and Eugene Black (formerly Senior Vice President at Chase National Bank) as the Chief Financial Officer. Akin to the appointment of Rist, the McCloy-Garner-Black troika signalled to Wall Street that bankers, and not economists, were in control of the IBRD.

The McCloy presidency oversaw the institution grant its first loans, some 20 in total. Five Western European countries received reconstruction loans, while development loans to Latin America and India targeted agriculture, communications, industry, and infrastructure. McCloy (1949: 552) held a clear vision for the IBRD's immediate future: the provision of 'foreign financing required to carry out long-term projects which will increase the agricultural and industrial output of its member nations'. Its start of lending coincided with the launch of the Marshall Plan, through which the USA provided US$13 billion over 4 years to aid European reconstruction. Given its limited capital and personnel, the IBRD could not compete with the Marshall Plan. It consequently made 'steps towards a policy of development lending' (Cope 1961: 3), which was difficult, for development was 'unknown terrain' (Alacevich 2009: 228).

On 18 May 1949, an IBRD press release announced that McCloy had tended his resignation. A second press release soon followed, stating that he had remained in office only to assist European reconstruction, and that he would leave development assistance to his successors (Kapur et al. 1997: 11). Many commentators have alternatively suggested that his posting to the more illustrious position of American High Commission for Germany may have been the stronger motivating factor (Mason and Asher 1973: 60).

### *Eugene Robert Black (July 1949–December 1962)*

An era of substantial growth for the Bretton Woods institution followed the appointment of Eugene Robert Black in July 1949. Formerly of the McCloy-Garner-Black troika, his presidency oversaw the creation of the IDA (the 'soft loan' affiliate offering interest-free loans to its least-developed member countries), IFC (the 'private sector' affiliate offering financial and technical assistance to private enterprises), and EDI (a training institute for government officials), as well as the commencement of general survey missions designed to investigate the developmental potential of surveyed member countries. As a result, the World Bank transitioned gradually from an investment bank into a development bank, discarding the conservative Meyer/McCloy mindset and entering the field of development economics. Recognising that the institution he took control of in 1949 could not contend with the development concerns facing its member countries, Black rapidly grew its financial, logistical, and intellectual parameters and obtained its AAA financial rating.

A 'charming autocrat', the greatest strength of Black, as compared with his technocratic predecessors and the 'bludgeoning approach' of his successor George Woods, was his ability to be likable (Kapur et al. 1997: 11). Using his cultivated charisma as a 'Southern Gentleman' from Atlanta, Georgia in the USA, and not stricken by the issues impeding Meyer (plagued by leadership squabbles) and McCloy (who viewed the IBRD as temporary), Black imprinted his personality upon the institution, which became affectionately known by staffers as 'Black's Bank' (Kraske 1996: 92–93). In pursuing his agenda, Black saw the potential of the World Bank as a development bank. This was clear during his 1950 Annual Meeting Address, in which he held that the issues of development, poverty, and ill health were 'the most powerful single force shaping the course of history in our time' (IBRD 1950: 9). The modernisation framework became the vehicle for 'improving' developing countries. As he argued in 1956, development 'destroys old attitudes towards life and work, even as it creates materials for a better life' (IBRD 1956: 9); the old had to make way for the new.

Black preferred utility to amount when it came to lending operations. It was less important how much was committed, provided it was effective. Nonetheless, annual IBRD lending increased steadily, from US$166 million approved through 12 loans in 1950 to US$882 million through 28 loans in 1962. By the time Woods succeeded Black in 1963, the IBRD had approved US$6.9 billion via 349 loans since commencing lending operations (IBRD 1963a: 13); 'Black felt strongly that member governments should regard the World Bank as the only bank to which they would turn to for advice on development programming and long-term loans for "sound" projects' (Mason and Asher 1973: 499). The IBRD addressed agriculture, education, industry, and infrastructure, regarding growth as synonymous with development. These were 'safe' investments with measurable results and low risk of political repercussions (Gordon 1969: 232; Mason and Asher 1973: 459).

Yet, contextualised as part of the early Cold War era, antagonisms between the capitalist and Soviet blocs extended to IBRD rhetoric. Black (1952: 402) did not mask his prejudices when arguing that global stability

> depends on what advances can be achieved in other areas which are still free from Soviet Communist domination but are not yet the full beneficiaries of twentieth century progress. The free world will not remain free if the hunger of millions of human beings for progress is neglected. Instead, it will go on being vulnerable to encroachments from without and to disputes within … The [IBRD] has been at work throughout the free world making loans to increase production and raise living standards.

Prioritising state planning, infrastructural investment, industrialisation, economy-wide policy frameworks, project analyses, and a regional turn from Latin America in the 1950s to India and Pakistan in the 1960s (Stern and Ferreira 1997: 528), 'Black's Bank' became unlike that of the Meyer and McCloy years.

### *George David Woods (June 1963–March 1968)*

George David Woods succeeded Black on 1 January 1963. While only in office for a single five-year term, he added much to broadening the conceptual parameters of World Bank development assistance, expanding the volume and scope of its financial and technical assistance. As he commented at the 1964 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 'If the Bank is to go on being a dynamic agent of economic progress, it must adapt itself to the changing development environment and respond to the changing needs of its membership. The Bank, no less than its members, must continue to grow' (cited in Selassie 1984: 42).

Nominated by American President John F. Kennedy in 1962, Woods came from a respected career as a New York investment banker, specialising in corporate finance, financial planning, and debt and equity. Although coming from experiences similar to Black, he faced an entirely different intellectual and geopolitical climate and had a starkly different personality, affecting his ability to lead. Black was the charismatic 'Southern Gentleman'. Woods was aggressive, argumentative, and combative; he was 'unpolished, criticised staff harshly and publicly, and argued with, rather than pacified, his Executive Board' (Kapur et al. 1997: 385).

Despite his flaws, the broader developmental climate of the Woods presidency was more conducive to change than that of the Black era. Woods was able to direct greater attention towards agricultural production because the mainstream discourse was more receptive to new ideas. He also added to the World Bank Group by establishing the ICSID in October 1966. He additionally set about innovatively reshaping the Bretton Woods institution along lines he saw as the ideal development model, a mark emerging from his experience with debt and equity on Wall Street. He argued that developing countries suffered three main economic problems (IBRD 1963b: 9–10; Kraske 1996: 134): a commodity problem, or poor export performance; debt problem, or heavy debt burdens; and, a policy problem, or a lack of capacity to formulate effective development policies.

Supported by economist Irving Friedman, who served as Economic Advisor to the President, Woods secured the World Bank as a development bank. He broadened its mandate, improved its dialogue with its developing member countries, deemed country performance the most important criteria for lending, and relied heavily on economists (some 200 economics PhDs were recruited into the Economics Department) (World Bank 2010a: 5). The growth in economic staff was influential to the 1970s emergence of soft technical assistance, which needed economists for policy reform and institution and human resource development. As IBRD economist William Gilmartin (1985: 8) recalls, when 'Woods became president, it was his idea that the Bank should be a leader in development in a broader sense, that is, in the sense of analysing critical development problems and policies in the particular countries and giving Bank assistance in the context of these problems'.

The 1960s were not a favourable period for much of the developing world. Many countries faced shortages of external finance, lagging food production, sluggish agricultural output, slow growth in export earnings, rising levels of debt service payments, balance-of-payments crises, and political instability. Consequently, Woods extended the operations of the IDA, for he held that the IBRD was not ideally suited to assisting its poorest member countries. The volume of IBRD, IDA, and IFC lending rose substantially, nearly doubling in five years. In 1963, the three agencies approved US$717 million through 48 projects. By 1967, this had risen to US$1.3 billion disbursed via 80 loans, credits, and grants in that year. The World Bank focused upon agriculture, education, infrastructure, transportation, telecommunications, and water supply, while the IFC invested in textiles, manufacturing, tourism, and development finance companies. Latin America became the main recipient of IBRD loans and East Asia received the bulk of IDA credits. Andrew Karmarck (1985: 7), who was Director of the IBRD Economics Department from 1965 to 1971, recalled that the 'idea of thinking in terms of billions of dollars a year came from [Woods], and when it first came forth, it was regarded with horror'.

### *Robert Strange McNamara (April 1968–June 1981)*

> 'I have always regarded the World Bank as something more than a Bank, as a Development Agency,' World Bank President Robert McNamara (IBRD 1968: 9).

The 13-year presidency of Robert Strange McNamara was a profound period for the World Bank. Under his leadership, it evolved from a development bank into a development institution, moving beyond investing in projects to shaping development theory and practice through a combination of finance and research. As Clark (1981: 169) remarks,

> The problem as [McNamara] saw it was to create in the Bank a critical mass of power, both financial and technical, sufficient to accelerate the rate of development in the poor countries to a high but sustainable level. [He] was fully aware that about four-fifths of the resources for development must be provided by the developing country itself, and of the remaining fifth only a small proportion could come from the World Bank. But he was determined to use that small contribution to make the maximum impact on the development strategy of the country. And since he was determined that the Bank would operate in nearly every developing country, its overall influence could be immense, certainly far greater than any other development agency.

Compared to the cautious conservatism of his predecessors, McNamara advanced a far more socially conscious development agenda and expanded lending operations to an amount that was 'disconcertingly novel and risky' (Goldman 2005: 68). While Woods committed US$6.6 billion through 416 World Bank and IFC projects between 1963 and 1968, McNamara approved US$13.5 billion via 820 projects between 1968 and 1973, addressing education, illiteracy, malnutrition, population planning, tourism, and urbanisation. By the end of his presidency, US$78 billion had been committed through 2449 IBRD and IDA loans and credits.

McNamara came from the most unique and controversial backgrounds of the first five presidents. He arrived at the World Bank after seven years as the American Secretary of Defence, serving under both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, and was closely involved in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the Vietnam War. His relationships with the American Congress and Democratic Party assisted his success as president, for he was able to sway congressional support (Stern 1994: 32–33). Prior to government service, he was an innovative CEO of the Ford Motor Company. Viewed as the 'Whiz Kid' for his intelligence and work ethic, he had a reputation as 'a problem-solver and a trouble-shooter' (Economic and Political Weekly 1968: 1202).

More so than any president before him, McNamara skilfully used speeches to signal shifts in the institution. During his famous 'Nairobi Speech', presented to the World Bank Board of Governors in Nairobi, Kenya, on 24 September 1973, he drew the distinction between relative poverty ('some countries are less affluent than other countries') and absolute poverty. Cautioning his audience of the danger posed by the latter, he defined absolute poverty as 'a condition of life so degraded by disease, illiteracy, malnutrition, and squalor as to deny its victims basic human necessities … A condition of life so limited as to prevent realisation of the potential of the genes with which one is born; a condition of life so degrading as to insult human dignity' (World Bank 1973: 16). Recognising that the 'development jeopardy [was] greatest for those that are the poorest' (World Bank 1974: 5), McNamara adopted a basic human needs approach and moved 'poverty up front, from the rear of the bus' (Kapur et al. 1997: 215). Poverty alleviation became the institution's mission for the remainder of his presidency, a turn requiring a far more interventionist and policy-minded approach.

The turn towards poverty-based lending led to 'political factors' pervading World Bank development assistance (Payer 1982: 316). Building infrastructure and industry was 'safe', as repayments could be predicted, societal benefits quantified, and political fallout would be minimal. Absolute poverty, however, targeted the alleged needs of those millions living in horrendous conditions. The institution was making normative judgments about how to 'improve' societies. While the status quo of lending operations styled in the 1950s and 1960s remained, poverty-based lending totalled a quarter of World Bank financial assistance during the McNamara years (Birdsall and Londono 1997: 33). Yet, due to the complexity of poverty, these 'social projects' were 'harder to develop, more subject to delays, and more susceptible to failure' (Crane and Finkle 1981: 516). The institution had moved from cautious conservatism to a riskier, yet more innovative, approach to development assistance: redistributive growth and poverty alleviation. This shift was secured by the institutionalisation of a permanent research body.

As part of a substantial reorganisation launched in 1972, the Vice Presidency for Development Policy was created, under which all research was coordinated. First led by famed Keynesian development economist Hollis Chenery, who was appointed the World Bank's first Chief Economist, it became the cornerstone of the institution's publication of academic research (Ayres 1983: 27). Chenery joined the World Bank in 1970 after a distinguished academic career, serving as Professor of Economics at Harvard and Stanford Universities during the 1950s and 1960s. A pioneer in development economics, his academic work included the study of development patterns, the use of a two-gap model, and multi-sectoral analysis. During his tenure as a Chief Economist, he became McNamara's confidant and helped secure the World Bank as a development institution by being, in the words of Demuth (1985: 11), the 'empire builder' of its research program. Barend de Vries (1986: 11), who worked for the World Bank as an economic and policy advisor from 1955 to 1984, notes the influence of Chenery in operationalising World Bank development research:

> [Much] of the research program under Hollis Chenery had an impact on development economics. All one had to do is look at the outline and literature of the courses on development economics at Harvard University or some of the books that have come out in recent years on development economics … The Bank is now the principal source of development literature and was, under Chenery, the principal centre on development economics.

Chenery linked state-led income distribution to poverty alleviation in World Bank development assistance. Stressing the need to reconcile economic growth with social equality, the IBRD published *Redistribution with Growth* (Chenery et al. 1974). Its main author, Chenery merged poverty alleviation, economic growth, and income distribution, providing 'an intellectual rationale for the approach that the Bank was already taking to poverty—through "Bankable" or production-oriented poverty lending' (Kapur et al. 1997: 233). To contextualise World Bank research during this period, of 113 research studies published between 1974 and 1980, which were designed to support lending operations, 43 analysed state-led income redistribution. This, however, would provide to be short-lived, as the neoliberal turn was about to take hold of the institution.

## The Washington Consensus Era

Pressured by rising instability in the 1960s, the Bretton Woods monetary regime collapsed in the early 1970s. This instability arose from a steady deterioration of the American dollar against gold. At the Bretton Woods Conference, the USA was the only country capable of exercising the role of creditor guaranteeing global liquidity; the stability of the American dollar was vital to the regime. By the 1960s, the USA was unable to maintain the ongoing stability of its currency. The collapse resulted from an internal crisis known as the Triffin Dilemma, a term coined by economist Robert Triffin in the influential *Gold and the Dollar Crisis* (1960). As American dollars flooded global markets (via the Marshall Plan, the acquisition of foreign goods, and defencing spending), a steady deterioration occurred, leading the USA to become unable to honour its commitments, undermining the stability of the fixed exchange rate system (Subbachi 2008: 349). The monetary regime ended on 15 August 1971, when American President Richard Nixon closed the 'gold window', meaning that the dollar would no longer be convertible into gold, and was followed by the floating of the currency, spurred by the belief that this would resolve its balance-of-payments problems (Gowa 1983: 13). An external deficit of US$30 billion, the contraction of the American economy, and the coming onset of a currency crisis influenced this decision.

The 1973 and 1979 Oil Shocks exacerbated global economic instability, culminating in the 1982 Debt Crisis. The oil shocks were steep price hikes in the cost of petroleum. The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), responding to a commodity boom, raised the price of petroleum threefold in 1973 to stabilise their deficits. This led to inflationary pressures and recessions in petroleum importing countries (Howse 2002: 101). While the mid-1970s saw a return to relative normalcy, a second threefold increase occurred in 1979, largely driven by the overthrow of the Shah of Iran by the Ayatollah Khomeini, which led to further inflationary pressures that did not settle until petroleum prices returned to their real value in 1986 (Mosley et al. 1991: 6). The oil shocks added to the instability already created by the collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary regime, triggered investor panic, and led to the 1982 Debt Crisis.

The correlation between the oil shocks and 1982 Debt Crisis concerns OPEC recycling petrodollar surpluses in Western financial institutions. As global wealth shifted from petroleum importing to exporting nations, these banks, capitalising on the glut of petrodollars, provided large loans to developing countries. This took place without oversight or scrutiny due to the abundant liquidity of petroleum exporters (Strange 1986: 18; Mosley et al. 1991: 6). At the same time, the Nixon administration liberated private banks from constraints on international lending in the attempt to distance the American economy from the turbulence affecting global markets (Gowan 1999: 22–26). This led developing countries to accrue unserviceable levels of debt.

During the mid-1970s, the situation was unchallenged. To fight inflationary pressures caused by the 1979 Oil Shock, however, developed countries (specifically the USA and UK) raised interest rates. Bank loans abruptly jumped from an average of 0.8% in the 1970s to 11% in 1982 (Helleiner 1994: 175; O'Brien and Williams 2004: 270). Private banks no longer deemed developing countries viable and lending ceased. In 1982, the shared debt of the developing world exceeded US$837 billion. Following an historic announcement by the Mexican government in August 1982 that it lacked the liquidity to honour its existing debts, the Debt Crisis began, spilling over to Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. The breaking point of the untenable build-up of debt since the first oil shock, coupled with the end of the fixed exchange rate system, petroleum price spikes, stagflation, and recession, economies stagnated, leading to pervasive political and social unrest. As the world economy faced its most 'depressing set of conditions … since the 1930s' (IFC 1983: 13), what followed was the 'lost decade for development'.

In parallel to the deterioration of the Bretton Woods monetary regime, the rising forces of monetarism and neoclassical economics were eroding the Keynesian consensus. In contrast to Keynesian economics, monetarists, and neoclassicists (today broadly labelled 'neoliberals') called for floated exchange rates, the abandonment of monetary controls, unfettered market transactions, and capital account liberalisation. Keynes advocated state intervention to correct market failures; monetarists and neoclassicists regarded the state as responsible for those failures.

The Keynesian orthodoxy did not retreat simply because of mounting pressure from neoliberals, however. It resulted from the unravelling of the gold standard and the devaluation of the American dollar. Pereira (1995: 219) comments that the 'slowdown of the world economy and the acceleration of inflation rates in the 1970s gave rise to stagflation. The Keynesian consensus broke down and an opportunity emerged for the rise of a New Right intellectually well equipped for fighting the state'. Given the inability of developed countries to stabilise the world economy, the neoliberal paradigm was readily embraced for it appeared to offer a simple solution. This paradigm shift occurred so rapidly that neoliberal economist Robert Lucas was able to confidently assert in 1980 that 'One cannot find good, under-forty economists who identify their work as Keynesian. Indeed, people even take offence if referred to as Keynesians. At research seminars, people don't take Keynesian theorising seriously anymore; the audience starts to whisper and giggle to one another' (cited in Chwieroth 2008a: 140).

While maintaining the Keynesian assumption that development is mainly an economic issue, neoliberalism concludes that economic growth can only result from 'free markets, free trade, free capital mobility, and limited government' (Islam and Chowdbury 2000: 7). Harvey (2007: 22–23), a leading commentator and critic of neoliberalism, offers the following definition, broadening the concept beyond simple economics:

> Neoliberalism is a theory of political economic practices proposing that human well-being can best be advanced by the maximisation of entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework characterised by private property rights, individual liberty, unencumbered markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices … State interventions in markets (once created) must be kept to a bare minimum because the state cannot possibly possess enough information to second-guess market signals (prices) and because powerful interests will inevitably distort and bias state interventions (particularly in democracies) for their own benefit.

Government intervention, neoliberals argue, is the reason why countries are not developing. What is required is the unfettered free market. The term Washington Consensus typified this mentality, becoming the new modernisation framework. The only path to development was one based on free markets.

The close ideological alignment of the US Treasury Department IMF, and World Bank during the 1980s led economist John Williamson to coin 'Washington Consensus'. Named for the close proximity of their respective headquarters in Washington, DC, the term came to encompass the intellectual consensus and one-size-fits-all mentality of neoliberalism. In due course, it referred not only to these institutions, but also universities, think tanks, and media outlets aligned to new consensus (Marangos 2009: 350). Babb (2013: 269) regards the Washington Consensus as a transnational policy paradigm, emerging through a grouping of political and intellectual forces, legitimised by economic scholarship, institutionalised in national governments by policymakers, and enforced (both coercively and persuasively) by global governance actors. Since developing countries were financially dependent upon the IMF and World Bank after the cessation of private lending following the 1979 Oil Shock, the Bretton Woods institutions, which had been purging Keynesian economists from their ranks, were able to coercively disseminate neoliberal policy reforms via conditional policy-based loans. State-led poverty alleviation and redistribution programs were discarded in favour of building free market mechanisms; 'getting the prices right' was more important than reducing inequality (Biersteker 1990: 482).

Viewing the world economy as 'fixable', with the pendulum swinging from the state to the free market, the Washington Consensus originally included the following ten axiomatic generalisations (Williamson 1990: 7): fiscal discipline; the reorientation of public expenditures towards neglected sectors, including health, education, and infrastructure; tax reform; financial liberalisation; trade liberalisation; floated exchange rates; the abolition of barriers to foreign direct investment; privatisation; deregulation; and, secure property rights. Just as the Rostowian modernisation framework proposes five stages of development, the Washington Consensus declares the above neoliberal prescriptions as universal prerequisites to economic growth. By the 1990s, the Washington Consensus had become so pervasive that it had redefined the parameters of development. To adopt Thomas Friedman's (2000: 105) famous phrase, the consensus became a 'Golden Straitjacket'; economic growth required relinquishing control of economies to the unfettered free market.

### *Alden Winship Clausen (June 1981–June 1986)*

In July 1981, Alden Winship ('Tom') Clausen became the sixth World Bank President. He is remembered for his advocacy of neoliberal structural adjustment. With the replacement of McNamara by Clausen (and the ousting of Chenery in favour of neoliberal Chief Economist Anne Krueger, who actively removed all traces of Keynesianism from the World Bank: 80% of the Research Department resigned and she built an 'intelligence system' to identify dissonant staff views (Stein 2008: 37)), the World Bank began to prescribe neoliberal reforms through policy-based lending. Whereas project-based loans—the norm from the 1950s to the 1970s—addressed temporary issues (i.e. the construction of a dam), policy-based loans enacted policy reforms aimed at the supposed root causes of economic problems (Mosley et al. 1991: 65–66). Structural adjustment loans (SALs) and sectoral adjustment loans (SECALs) became the two most visible and controversial types of policy-based operations provided by the World Bank. Although introduced by McNamara in 1980, SALs and SECALs came to embody the Clausen presidency, accounting for 25% of IBRD financial assistance and 50% of loans to heavily indebted countries by the close of the decade. These conditional loans prescribed privatisation, deregulation, tariff cutting, exchange rate adjustment, currency devaluation, trade liberalisation, and capital account liberalisation, with soft technical assistance provided to support institutional and human resource development and policy reform. In doing so, Clausen reverted the World Bank 'from a development institution with an almost missionary zeal [under McNamara], to an institution which is much more bureaucratic' (Rajagopalan 1993: 32).

Facing the world economy in its worst downturn since the 1930s, Clausen saw neoliberal adjustment as the only means to restoring global economic growth. The problems facing developing countries could only be solved by removing subsidies, liberalising trade, limiting public expenditures, privatising public enterprises, and promoting market competition (Clausen 1984: 322; Gibbon 1992: 198). Correcting an economy-in-crisis was now a precursor to growth and a means to improving lives. In contrast, McNamara wanted to improve people's lives as a means to achieving equitable growth. As recorded in a 1985 interview on the need for neoliberal adjustment, Clausen (cited in Novicki 1985: 15), who lacked McNamara's *joie de vivre*, bluntly said,

> [You've] got to know where you're bleeding before you know where to put the band aid, or, if you're bleeding bad enough, then you can't use a band aid, you've got to use a tourniquet or, in some cases, an amputation. It's utopian to think of adjustments without some pain, but it's a short-term pain to take some medicine in order to have a long-term cure.

McNamara's social conscience and poverty focus was lost, replaced by trickle-down neoliberal economics: the 'neoliberal perspective that dominated the 1980s considered that growth was all that really mattered for welfare outcomes, and that poverty and inequality would take care of themselves' (Dethier 2009: 4).

The Clausen presidency was vulnerable to political pressure from the USA. The dogmatic commitment to neoliberalism of the conservative government of American President Ronald Reagan pressured the World Bank to embrace the neoliberal turn. This was significant because the institution had lost support from the American Congress and Treasury Department as conservatism swept the Reagan era. Clausen had to contend with hostility from the USA, meaning that he had to 'sell' the World Bank to Congress. He was nominated as president because, as 'an eminent commercial banker, [Clausen] would be inclined to look for solutions in market-oriented development strategies …; he would once again take his cues from the financial markets rather than from the demands of developing countries' (Kraske 1996: 222); his market-centric mentality aligned with Reagan's neoliberal manifesto (Babb 2009: 82). Just as Reagan remarked at the 1983 World Bank Board of Governors Meetings that 'millions of individuals making their own decisions in the marketplace will always allocate resources better than any centralised government planning process', Clausen commented at the same meeting that 'protectionism spreads like a cancer, destroying the very tissues of global commerce, which for 3 decades have been the sustaining force of Third World development' (World Bank 1983: 19). Both leaders emphasised the alleged panacea of the free market.

### *Barber Conable (July 1986–August 1991)*

Seventh World Bank President Barber Conable, while not abandoning Clausen's neoliberal project, sought to merge the free market with environmental sustainability, gender inclusion, and poverty alleviation (Hall 2007: 155). A former Republican Congressperson (and thus a suitable candidate for Reagan's administration), Conable, was without Wall Street experience and 'knew nothing about the World Bank' (Kraske 1996: 248). Yet, he arrived with the talents of a politician, namely the inherent ability to compromise and accommodate (Potter 1993: 17; Shihata 1994: 39–40). Such manoeuvrability was important because the negative consequences of structural adjustment lending had come to polarise the development community. While proponents praised the potential long-term benefits, many more condemned its short-term impact. The central criticism was simple: the harmful social costs of neoliberal adjustment outweighed the alleged benefits derived from currency devaluations, high interest rates, and reduced social safety nets (Logan and Mengisteab 1993: 1; Summers and Pritchett 1993: 388); the free market made the poor more vulnerable. Conable consequently sought to balance structural adjustment with a diluted version of McNamara's poverty alleviating mission. And so, after half a decade of 'argument and persuasion' by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), International Labor Organisation (ILO), and similar agencies, the World Bank recognised that adjustment lending worsened poverty in many countries (Gibbon 1992: 203). This realisation was the basis of UNICEF's *Adjustment with a Human Face* (1987) that 'raised the development community's consciousness about the need to cushion the poor from the fiscal cutbacks under [neoliberal] adjustment' (Zuckerman 1991: 247).

Conable oversaw the restoration of poverty alleviation to the mission of the World Bank. In advancing the need to take into consideration the 'human face' of adjustment, Conable went so far as to reintroduce the importance of the state. The *World Development Report 1991*: The Challenge of Development promotes the utility of governance institutions and democracy to development (World Bank 1991). The report had a profound impact on the renaissance of the state (Sandbrook 1995: 281) and preceded the advocacy for 'good governance'. Yet, this rededication meant the coupling of poverty to neoliberalism. Conable (1988: 754–55) consistently argued that only by integrating the two could 'sustained growth' occur. Poverty relief became the companion to neoliberal adjustment, and vice versa. As Conable said during his 1990 Annual Meeting Address, 'economic growth is the cornerstone of successful development and poverty reduction … The precondition for restoring growth in many countries is structural adjustment' (World Bank 1990: 15).

While comparatively more progressive than his predecessor, Conable, was criticised by staff members for a 1987 reorganisation. An 'austerity' reorganisation, it sought to streamline (reduce budget expenditures), restructure (reduce personnel), and redefine the institutional design of the World Bank (Kraske 1996: 242; Phillips 2009: 46). By making it more efficient and cost-effective, Conable envisioned the institution as less bureaucratic and faster reacting, being better equipped to handle the modern (read: neoliberal) complexities of economic development. As Edward Jaycox (1995: 1), the leading architect of the reorganisation, explains,

> By the time we got to the Eighties, a reorganisation was overdue and most people felt that was the case … [Lending] had become not very creative and very costly. Although there was a lot of process innovation that was attempted …, we found the cost of doing business was going up very rapidly.

Severe condemnation of the reorganisation emerged from contemporaries of Conable and Jaycox, under the allegation that it undermined the functional stability of World Bank operations (Phillips 2009: 48). In later interviews, Ernest Stern, Visvanathan Rajagopalan, and Willi Wapenhans, all of whom worked for the World Bank during the Conable years, voiced their hostility, rebuking it as 'not thought through' (Stern 1995: 6), 'one of the worst things to befall this institution since its inception' (Rajagopalan 1993: 16), and 'a traumatic experience' (Wapenhans 1993: 66). In contrast to the claims of Conable and Jaycox, the above voices concluded that the reorganisation undermined the institution through the dismissal of hundreds to talented staff members. The point being, while the World Bank was suffering international outcry over the negative impact of neoliberal structural adjustment, the reorganisation severely depressed staff morale.

### *Lewis Thompson Preston (September 1991–May 1995)*

The Fourth United Nations Development Decade (1991–2000) and its 'market-centred strategy' (United Nations 1992: 97) began with two events affecting the World Bank. The first was the global price volatility caused by the Gulf Crisis (1990–1991), which undermined growth in developing countries by destabilising petroleum prices, diminishing investor confidence, constraining world economic growth, and slowing down global trade expansion. East Asia was the only exception, which sustained strong regional growth rates. The second event was the dissolution of the Soviet Union, followed by the integration of the former Soviet bloc into the world economy through their transition from command- to market-based economies. The IMF and World Bank supported the economic and political transition of these countries towards a reliance on market forces. The previously insulated Soviet strongholds of Central and Eastern Europe were now open, ensuring that there was no alternative to neoliberal globalisation (Gamble 2005: 369; Dodge 2006: 460).

Into this turbulent global environment entered Lewis Thompson Preston, the eighth World Bank President. From September 1991 to May 1995, renowned commercial banker Preston, one of the leading Wall Street bankers of his time, capably led the Bretton Woods institution. He set forth a client-oriented vision, argued that loan applications should take into consideration social justice records, supported the transition of the former Soviet Union, welcomed the newly democratic South Africa, and was challenged by the '50 Years is Enough' campaign which called for the dismantling of the World Bank (see Danaher 1994). In response, Preston said the World Bank needed to be flexible, cost-conscious, efficient, and 'forever learning' (World Bank 1994a: 14–15). At the centre of his agenda was sustainable poverty alleviation. Announced as the mission of the institution in May 1992, poverty was deemed the root of all problems facing developing countries. To achieve this mission, the World Bank reformed its institutional and organisational structures, altered its lending program, and stated the need for a strong private sector to drive growth and create jobs.

Adjustment lending remained prominent during the Preston years, despite severe criticism. To illustrate, the *World Bank Annual Report 1992* concludes that 'structural adjustment is a necessary … condition for transition to sustainable growth' (World Bank 1992b: 68–69). Significantly, however, as a response to the negative social impact of SALs and SECALs, policy-based loans increasingly included provisions to preserve social safety nets. In perspective, while only 5% of adjustment loans between 1984 and 1986 addressed social issues, this figure rose to 50% during the Preston presidency (World Bank 1993: 38). SALs to Argentina (1993), Peru (1992), Sierra Leone (1993), Vietnam (1994), and Zimbabwe (1992) prescribed trade and financial liberalisation, deregulation, budget deficit reduction, and private sector-led growth, while also proposing initiatives to mitigate the social impact of adjustment on the poor. Building upon the Conable presidency, Preston strove to walk the difficult line between neoliberal adjustment and poverty alleviation.

The Preston presidency also re-evaluated the role of the state in development. At the same time as arguing the importance of 'getting the prices right', it endorsed 'getting the politics right'. While Conable brought good governance to the institution in the late 1980s, it was only during the 1990s that it became a fixture of World Bank development assistance. Criticisms of structural adjustment and the success of the state in the 'East Asian Miracle' contributed to the acceptance of good governance (Peet and Hartwick 1999: 56–57; Stiglitz and Squire 2000: 387). Within 12 months of Preston's appointment, governance had come to include accountability, transparency, efficiency, legal frameworks, institutions, and public sector reform. Following *Governance and Development* (1992a), its first official review of good governance, the Bretton Woods institution published *Governance: The World Bank's Experience* (1994b), which argues that growth cannot occur without adequate governance institutions (World Bank 1992a, 1994b). Controversially, the World Bank began advocating the necessity of participatory politics, political pluralism, and (most divisively) democracy to successful development. An illustrative example of technical assistance supporting good governance is the US$20 million *Modernisation of the State Technical Assistance Project* (1994a) to Ecuador: it sought to provide 'efficiency, sustainability, and transparency to the Government's public sector reform efforts,' while reorienting 'the role of the state from one based on large-scale intervention in the market to a model that relies on the private sector as the main actor in the pursuit of social and economic development' (Ecuador 1994: 3). Soft technical assistance became influential to the transfer of policy recommendations on political liberalisation, as finance alone was argued to be incapable of making governance accountable.

## The Post-Washington Consensus Era

The Washington Consensus saw an increasingly vocal backlash against market fundamentalism during the late 1980s and 1990s. The backlash came not only from political leaders, academics, and social movements in developing countries, but also from senior officials in the Washington-based institutions. Critics held that the adverse social costs of neoliberal adjustment, including mass unemployment and collapsed social safety nets, outweighed the alleged benefits gained from deregulation, privatisation, and liberalisation. A strong argument emerged for tempering the consensus by balancing free market principles with selective state intervention, good governance, efficient regulatory institutions, and targeted poverty reduction. This paradigm shift (or, more accurately, augmentation)—the soon-to-be-called 'post-Washington Consensus'—attempted to revitalise the troubled neoliberal orthodoxy (Öniş and Şenses 2005: 265; Montiel 2007: 120).

While serving as World Bank Chief Economist, Nobel Prize laureate Joseph Stiglitz introduced the post-Washington Consensus during two public lectures held in 1998: the World Institute for Development Economics Research Annual Lecture in Helsinki and the Prebisch Lecture at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in Geneva. He disparaged the policy triumvirate of privatisation, deregulation, and trade liberalisation underscoring the Washington Consensus as dogma; an end rather than a means to achieve economic growth (Perales 2004: 414). Stiglitz additionally rebuked the simplicity of the consensus, notably its certainty of free market perfectibility. To illustrate, the world economy has increasingly faced national, regional, and global financial crises since the beginning of the neoliberal era. Recognising this, Stiglitz (1999: 1509) comments that 'If there is a single accident on a road, one is likely to look for a cause in the driver, his car, or the weather. But if there are hundreds of accidents at the same bend of the road, then questions need to be raised concerning the construction of the road itself'; the Washington Consensus led to systemic instability. Proponents of the post-Washington Consensus thus re-evaluate the relationship between the state and the market, particularly the importance of governance institutions to the regulation of national economies (Fine 2001: 139; Perales 2004: 414; Purdy 2004: 15; Montiel 2007: 120–121). Several prominent academics, including Stanley Fischer (then Deputy Managing Director of the IMF), Paul Davidson, Ravi Kanbur, Paul Krugman, and Dani Rodrik, joined Stiglitz in promoting the new consensus (Purdy 2004: 15–16; Öniş and Şenses 2005: 274). However, as Davidson (2004: 591–592) concedes, the proposed recommendations were 'plumbing' reforms that did not profoundly restructure the system.

It was at this time that divisions emerged between the Bretton Woods institutions, with the IMF and World Bank publicly disagreeing over the efficacy of neoliberal reforms and the Washington Consensus. Although the IMF was reluctant to change, the World Bank slowly integrated the post-Washington Consensus into its lending and research portfolios. During the 2000s, it applied its energies to strengthening judicial systems and banking regulations, combating government corruption, and decentralising state power to sub-national levels (Santiso 2001: 829; Cameron 2004: 97). Because of this, Williamson (2005: 200–201), who originally coined the term 'Washington Consensus', concludes that given the ideological conflict between the US Treasury Department, IMF, and World Bank on issues such as fiscal policy, capital account liberalisation, and income redistribution, the Washington Consensus can no longer be argued to exist in its original form.

### *James Wolfensohn (June 1995–May 2005)*

Australian-born James Wolfensohn replaced Preston in June 1995, beginning a decade-long tenure. Chosen at a time when the World Bank faced its most severe criticisms, Wolfensohn (1998: 59) allowed that 'there is general agreement that the Washington Consensus is dated'. Selected by American President Bill Clinton and dubbed the 'Renaissance Banker', philanthropist and investment banker Wolfensohn embarked on an extensive program of institutional and ideological reform. Labelled the 'Strategic Compact' (a US$250 million, 30 month reorganisation begun in 1997), he renewed the poverty alleviation focus, advocated the greater inclusion and empowerment of weaker member countries, and redefined the institution as the Knowledge Bank, or a development knowledge hub oriented towards building knowledge reserves to empower people and encourage their greater participation in development (Pender 2001: 402–404; Weaver 2010: 119–120). Reminiscent of McNamara's social activism, the rhetoric was very different from the neoliberal adjustment era of the 1980s. Wolfensohn sought to remove the World Bank's technocratic and economistic reputation and make it more 'human-oriented' (Wolfensohn 2010: 270). Supported by Chief Economist Stiglitz, his intent was to resuscitate the public image and legitimacy of the institution as it entered the twenty-first century, and soon after released a new mission statement in January 1999: *Our Dream is a World Free of Poverty*.

The Wolfensohn presidency laid three legacies for the future of the World Bank: a focus upon the 'cancer of corruption', the Knowledge Bank paradigm, and the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF).

With good governance remaining central to the tempered neoliberal agenda of the World Bank, Wolfensohn expanded the concept to combat government corruption. Stressing the need for public sector efficiency and transparency, Wolfensohn (1996: 10) said that if the Strategic Compact 'is to succeed, we must tackle the issues of economic and financial efficiency. But we also need to address transparency, accountability, and institutional capacity. And let's not mince words: we need to deal with the cancer of corruption'. As a prelude to the post-Washington Consensus that would later emerge after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the World Bank began to associate accountable governance with neoliberal development, to the conclusion that well-governed countries free from corruption grow faster (Winters 2010: 425–426). This created a public relations dilemma. Wolfensohn's rhetoric of the World Bank as an impartial 'understanding outsider', rhetoric arising from the pursuit of greater inclusivity, was at odds with it now becoming a 'demanding advocate' damning inappropriate government behaviour (Mallaby 2005: 180–181).

Nine months prior to the collapse of the Thai baht in July 1997, Wolfensohn introduced the Knowledge Bank paradigm. Chief Economist Stiglitz (1998: 26) supported the turn, concluding that the World Bank 'had a distinct advantage in gathering information and producing knowledge about successful … practices and policies'. While not the first to assert the benefit of World Bank knowledge, with President Preston arguing in 1993 that 'Knowledge and ideas are critical to development. We need reliable data to inform us about how we are doing and analysis to determine which policies succeed' (cited in Parker 2000: 233), Wolfensohn was responsible for institutionalising the new approach. As the Knowledge Bank, the institution sought to (re)legitimise its ideas and practices, a position reinforced by the *1998 World Development Report*: Knowledge for Development, which drafted a practical framework under which to pursue the knowledge-based approach (World Bank 1998). The new paradigm was thus a claim by the World Bank that it was *the* global knowledge hub for development (McFarlane 2006: 291).

The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis was a period of emergency affecting the East and Southeast Asian regions. It began as a crisis ruining currencies (with the Thai baht first to collapse), real estate values, and stock prices, but soon spread to become a region-wide epidemic, increasing poverty levels, worsening social issues, and even leading to ethnic violence. For the World Bank, the crisis was a high and low point. It was a high point because its committed annual lending portfolio reached a five-decade peak, only later surpassed during the 2008 GFC. Structural adjustment lending doubled and then tripled during the crisis, from U$5 billion per year in 1997, to US$11 billion in 1998, to US$15 billion in 1999 (World Bank 2008: 5). As a low point, however, the institution received harsh criticism for its failure in predicting the outbreak of the crisis, the perceived mismanagement of its handling, and allegations that a reliance on neoliberal austerity measures exacerbated its severity. While Wolfensohn (2006: 84) deflected some criticism by turning against the IMF in questioning the efficacy of capital account liberalisation, criticisms remained.

Several months prior to his second term appointment, Wolfensohn publicly introduced the CDF on 24 January 1999 in Abidjan, Côte D'Ivoire. In his words, the CDF 'highlights a more inclusive picture of development. We cannot adopt a system in which the macroeconomic and financial are considered apart from the structural, social, and human aspects, and vice versa' (World Bank 2005: 132). An attempt to distance the World Bank from its response to the Asian Crisis, the CDF called for development agencies to move beyond individual projects and adopt a holistic approach encouraging popular participation in development programs to improve the effectiveness of financial and technical assistance. A turn against the conditionality approach that had persisted since the 1980s, it was the culmination of what Wolfensohn had been striving towards since introducing the Strategic Compact in 1996 (Pender 2001: 407; Mallaby 2005: 236; Pereira 2016: 12). Bolstered by the Knowledge Bank paradigm, good governance, and the post-Washington Consensus, the World Bank entered a period of institutional and ideological renewal, seeking to gain renewed support from many of its developing member countries.

Indicative of the turn towards the CDF, the World Bank replaced SALs and SECALs with DPLs in August 2004. Designed to disburse emergency finance rapidly, DPLs guide institutional and policy actions, improve investment climates, create employment opportunities, strengthen governance sectors, build social safety nets, and develop climate change frameworks (World Bank 2009a: 2; 2009c: 9). In contrast to adjustment lending, DPLs are concerned with enhancing the predictability of donor funding and with strengthening country ownership of development programs by promoting greater collaboration and transparency (known as 'good practice principles of conditionality') between the World Bank and its member countries (World Bank 2007: 1).

Common measures incorporated within DPLs include: maintaining macroeconomic stability; reducing debt burdens; enhancing investment climates; reducing costs to businesses; building competitive and sound banking systems; improving public finance management and disclosure; strengthening transparency, accountability, and anti-corruption laws; increasing the efficiency and reducing the costs of health services; improving public services for the poor; and, reducing social security imbalances. The conclusion of 2 years of consultation with governments, community and civil society groups, private sector representatives, and academics, development policy lending epitomised the practical pursuit of the CDF, recognising the interconnections between the political, economic, and social aspects of development.

### *Paul Wolfowitz (June 2005–June 2007)*

Following Wolfensohn's departure in May 2005, neo-conservative hawk and hardline American unilateralist Paul Wolfowitz next occupied the presidency. Prior to his appointment, he served as US Deputy Secretary of Defence from June 2001 to June 2005 under President George W. Bush. Given the controversy of the 2003 Iraq War and his prominent role in it, his selection was received with scepticism that turned into condemnation. Commentators ranging from newspapers to academics began attacking his posting as an undisguised attempt by the USA to monopolise control of the World Bank (Abbasi 2005: 744; Tricarico 2005: 97–98). His controversial presidency and bland leadership were to be short-lived however.

Serving from June 2005 to June 2007, Wolfowitz did little to introduce a new face to the World Bank. The so-called 'good governance banker', he focused upon corruption, accountability, free trade, private sector growth, and poverty alleviation (Einhorn 2006: 17; Thomas 2007: 729); he kept to the base Wolfensohn had laid. Though fortifying the CDF and mainstream development discourse, he did not introduce anything original during his term. Because of this lack of creativity, he acquired the reputation of being a 'no frills' president.

The brevity of his tenure was the result of two scandals marring his leadership (Thomas 2007: 720; Lebovic and Voeten 2009: 82). First, there were accusations that the World Bank was becoming too political and acting outside of its mandate of neutrality, including withholding US$1 billion in financial assistance based upon suspicions of recipient government corruption; the withheld funds were intended for countries that opposed the USA. Second, there were strong allegations of unethical conduct, including an inappropriate relationship between Wolfowitz and the Senior Communications Officer for the Middle East and North Africa Regional Office, Shaha Ali Riza. In addition to breaching Codes of Conduct by not disclosing the personal relationship, Wolfowitz granted Riza a salary increase grossly in excess of her position. Due to these widely publicised scandals, he did not last a full term. For such a brief interlude, mired by questions of unethical behaviour and lacking an original mission, his presidency was a stopgap in World Bank history.

### *Robert Zoellick (July 2007–June 2012)*

Robert Zoellick succeeded Wolfowitz in July 2007. While not the neoconservative that Wolfowitz was, and thus presenting a friendlier public image, he remained an advocate for market-led globalisation. Stressing the importance of sustainable development and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), Zoellick (2008: 10–11) holds that the World Bank should act as a free market catalyst, supplementing the private sector, targeting the poorest countries, and building knowledge as a global public good. Illustrating his free market beliefs, while serving as American Trade Representative from 2001 to 2004, he not only secured a dozen free trade agreements, but also said that 'global trade liberalisation was vital to counter terrorism' (cited in Tujan et al. 2004: 63). When discussing solutions to the 2007 Global Food Crisis, Zoellick (2011) argued that the 'answer is not to prosecute or block markets, but to use them better'. Similarly, although written several years prior to his World Bank appointment, he wrote a *Foreign Affairs* article in which he calls for the World Bank to become a better agent for financial market globalisation (Zoellick 2000: 73).

Importantly, however, Zoellick (2007: 3; 2008: 3–4) qualifies his free market and free trade enthusiasm by advocating an 'inclusive and sustainable globalisation' that listens to the voices of the poor. Calling for the 'democratisation of development' (World Bank 2011: 6), he lists open information and knowledge sharing as central to the future of the World Bank. This included the online launch of the Open Data initiative and website that houses freely accessible comprehensive data sets of national, regional, and global development indicators. A timely change for the institution, such commentary culminated in April 2010, when Zoellick declared the 'end of the Third World' in a speech before the Woodrow Wilson Centre for International Scholars; in the current multipolar world order characterised by global cooperation and multilateralism, the 'outdated categorisations of First and Third Worlds, donor and supplicant, leader and led, no longer fit' (Zoellick 2010). It was an attempt to dismantle obsolete dichotomies that limited the conceptual parameters of development. Many commentators regard his declaration as one of the most influential by a World Bank President since McNamara's famous 1973 Nairobi Speech (Wade 2011: 348).

The 2008 GFC, the most severe financial crisis afflicting the world economy since the Great Depression, had its roots in the USA (the 'crisis bore a "Made in the USA" label' (Stiglitz 2010: 1)) and destabilised both developed and developing countries. World Bank (2009c: 12–13) data concludes that as a result of the crisis 53 million more people were to live in extreme poverty, 20 million people were to lose their jobs, and global output shrunk for the first time in 60 years. In this context, in which the majority of Western media and academia were fixated on addressing declines in developed countries, Zoellick argued that it would be an 'error of historic proportions' to neglect the developing world (cited in Dombey and MacKenzie 2008).

The immediate origins of the crisis were found in the American subprime mortgage market in 2007. The toxicity of the market led to a financial crisis in early 2008, with investment banks and mortgage lenders becoming unsustainably leveraged (Sachs 2008a). With the bankruptcy of such financial juggernauts as Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the system went into freefall. From the financial crisis sprang social problems, including mass unemployment and sudden poverty spikes, which led to a humanitarian crisis.

Beyond its immediate origins, the subprime mortgage crisis only exposed the risk-laden environment of the unregulated global investment market. An outcome of the decades-long neoliberal unfettering of financial systems, Stiglitz (2010: 6) lays the blame on a web of culprits, from gambling financial institutions taking excessive risks, to waylaid ratings agencies incorrectly accrediting loans, to toothless regulators incapable of stabilising the perilous situation. Sachs (2008a) links the crisis to the sharp decline in American interest rates following the September 2001 terror attacks, a condition the Federal Reserve maintained, encouraging banks to become highly illiquid, and thereby intensifying inflationary pressures. What emerged was an extremely fragile, highly leveraged, and integrated global financial system without effective risk control or protection for consumers. Because of this, Sachs (2008b) concludes that 'the international financial system is broken'.

The GFC induced a short-lived ideological crisis for neoliberalism. In the words of Wolf (2009), 'Another ideological god has failed. The assumptions that ruled policy and politics over three decades suddenly look as outdated as revolutionary socialism'. Major crises in the world economy often produce a new 'common sense'. From the Asian Financial Crisis came the post-Washington Consensus. Since the GFC, similar talk has furthered the backlash against market-centricisim. Former IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn (2011) said at George Washington University in April 2011 that, 'Before the crisis, we thought we knew how to manage economies pretty well … This all came crashing down with the crisis. The Washington Consensus is now behind us'. Zoellick (2009: 5) offers a similar sentiment: 'The old order is gone. We should not waste our time and tears lamenting it. Today we must build anew. Today we can put in place the foundations for a "New Normal" of growth and responsible globalisation'. The post-GFC rhetoric moved towards a more responsible balance between the state and free market (Deeg and O'Sullivan 2009: 732; Rogers 2010: 11).

Drafted in late 2008, the Zoellick presidency's GFC response focused upon three main objectives: protecting the most vulnerable, maintaining long-term infrastructure programs, and sustaining the potential for private sector-led growth and employment creation. It pursued these objectives via the largest disbursement of loans and credits in its history. Annual lending rose from US$24.7 billion in 2008, to US$47 billion in 2009, to US$58.5 billion in 2010 (World Bank 2010b: 5–6). DPLs provided the majority of financial and technical assistance, with supporting measures designed to stabilise economies, while ensuring equitable growth, preserving social safety nets, and strengthening financial, banking, and private sector regulation. Technical assistance reinforced these measures through survey missions, training, consultation, and capacity-building initiatives.

### *Jim Yong Kim (July 2012–Present)*

Jim Yong Kim became the twelfth World Bank President on 1 July 2012. Born in Seoul, South Korea, before moving to the USA in his youth, he is unique from earlier presidents. Appointed by American President Barack Obama, noted physician and anthropologist Kim is the first non-Caucasian president and has prior development experience. The preceding 11 presidents have all been white Americans (with the exception of Wolfensohn, who is a white Australian) and have held positions of privileged leadership in American financial and political establishments. Clausen was an investment banker, Conable a politician, and McNamara, Wolfowitz, and Zoellick were senior officials in presidential administrations. As Weisbrot notes, there is 'just no comparison between [Kim] and any of the prior World Bank presidents … The others were political insiders; they spent most of their lives getting rich or becoming politically powerful, or worse. Kim, by contrast, has spent most of his life trying to improve the lives of poor people' (cited in CEPR 2012).

On 11 October 2012, Kim stood before his Board of Governors and called for the reformation of the World Bank into a 'Solutions Bank'. Building upon Wolfensohn's Knowledge Bank paradigm and Zoellick's Open Data initiative, Kim argues that the World Bank has to 'seek answers beyond [its] walls,' be honest about its successes and failures, and apply 'evidence-based, non-ideological solutions to development challenges' (World Bank 2012: 11–12). Rebuking the Washington Consensus, he contends that the World Bank has to become more flexible, collaborative, and inclusive in order to strengthen the effectiveness of its financial and technical assistance and maintain its legitimacy as an institution; 'it is time for us to write the next chapter in our evolution: it is time for us to become a "solutions" bank. We must listen, learn, and partner with countries and beneficiaries to build bottom-up solutions. This is how we will increase our relevance and our value in today's and tomorrow's global economy' (World Bank 2012: 14). The basis of this new approach has been the pursuit of two goals: reducing extreme poverty globally to 3% by 2030 and promoting income growth among the bottom 40% of people. To overcome poverty and inequality and to become more collaborative and inclusive, it has to adopt its 'new strategic identity' as the Solutions Bank.

To ground his reformist rhetoric in a practical agenda, Kim continues in his address by outlining four 'early actions' that would speed the process of institutional and ideological change (World Bank 2012: 12–13).

First,

> We'll be establishing a clear and measurable bottom line. This will force us to take a hard look at everything we do and push us to be as effective as possible. The World Bank Group's mission is to end poverty and build shared prosperity.

Turning away from measurable outputs and towards measurable outcomes, Kim (2013) announced a clear and measurable bottom line in June 2013: the reduction of extreme poverty globally to 3% by 2030 and the promotion of income growth among the bottom 40% of people. The bottom line of poverty alleviation and building shared prosperity has become the defining mission of the Kim presidency.

Second,

> We've strengthened out implementation and results. To do so we will change incentive structures to reward implementers and "fixers": people who produce results for clients on the ground. It should not take two years for a project to evolve from concept to implementation. We want to be held accountable not for process but for results.

The second early action was translated into an institutional reorganisation. Launched in October 2013 and pursued throughout 2014, the reorganisation was intended to streamline procedures, simplify processes, establish new oversight facilities, reduce administrative costs, and cut down preparation time for lending operations. While receiving significant criticism from staff (Lowrey 2014), its intent was to make the World Bank more agile and innovative, break down internal 'silos', and double its annual lending commitments.

Third,

> We will rapidly improve our ability to provide our clients with integrated solutions for maximum impact. Better synergies will reinforce our comparative advantage as the only global development institution that can credibly support the public and private sectors; provide access to exceptional knowledge resources; and offer risk insurance to energise investment.

The third early action reveals Kim's optimism that the World Bank holds the potential to retain its position as the leading international development institution, provided it became more collaborative and inclusive in its approach to lending and research. This is an extension of Wolfensohn's Knowledge Bank paradigm.

Fourth,

> We need to continue investing in data and analytic tools, building on the success of the Open Data initiative. Data are crucial to setting priorities, making sound policy, and tracking results. Yet many countries have weak statistical capacity, and lack reliable and updated economic and poverty data.

The final early action makes a clear connection between Zoellick's Open Data initiative and the Solutions Bank approach, suggesting that the proposed changes are built upon existing structures and experiences.

The Wolfensohn and Zoellick presidencies sought to improve the effectiveness and perception of the World Bank by adopting a more collaborative and inclusive approach to development assistance while maintaining an emphasis on market- and private sector-led growth. While 'scholars generally find the World Bank to be on the right side of the ideological spectrum, promoting a development ideology of free markets, privatisation, private capital flows, and economic growth as development' (Joshi and O'Dell 2013: 251), it moves back and forth along the right side of the spectrum as new leaders and ideas come to shape the institution. Since the 1980s, there has been tension between a harder neoliberal focus on economic policy reform and the rollback of the state and a softer market-centric focus emphasising social welfare. The incumbent Kim presidency and its Solutions Bank approach can be regarded as an amalgam of the McNamara, Wolfensohn, and Zoellick presidencies in that all encouraged relatively greater egalitarianism. Kim has gone further than his immediate predecessors, however, in pursuing greater equality of outcomes (similar to McNamara) rather than an equality of opportunities (as was stressed by Wolfensohn and Zoellick). Kim's presidency, which was renewed for a second term in September 2016 to begin on 1 July 2017 (confirmed by former American President Obama in the attempt to prevent incumbent President Donald Trump from appointing his own candidate), is distinguished by its emphasis on inclusive and shared development outcomes.

## Summary

The World Bank has experienced a remarkable evolution over the past several decades. At first arising with uncertainty from the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference, it has grown to be ranked among the most active, involved, and pervasive actors in the field international development assistance. Throughout the Bretton Woods, Washington Consensus, and post-Washington Consensus eras, a combination of internal and external forces have shaped its understanding of and approach to development. While some voices condemn its practices and others praise its qualities, it can rightly be said that the institution exercises significant influence over the direction of the mainstream development discourse. This chapter has charted the major moments of change in the institution's history, so that critical analysis can now turn to the four core pillars of World Bank technical assistance: TACs, stand-alone projects, survey missions, and training institutes.

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CHAPTER 4

# Technical Assistance Components

TACs—pre-investment support, institutional development, and capacity-building initiatives included within lending operations—constitute the largest percentage of advisory services provided by the World Bank. In contrast to the other three technical assistance pillars, TACs are unique in that they are bundled together with IBRD loans and IDA credits. This means that recipients are not able to request the technical assistance apart from the larger lending operation, thereby unbalancing the relational dynamic between the World Bank and recipients. Importantly, however, there are no enforceability mechanisms requiring recipients to accept the advisory services, with evidence revealing that developing countries have rejected TACs while still receiving the loan or credit. Despite this rider, TACs have been part of World Bank history since the 1940s. A permanent fixture of it lending operations, President McCloy (1949: 554) recognised very early on that 'more than money' is needed 'to translate … projects into reality'.

This chapter is divided into several sections. The first and second sections—*Formative Years: 1940s–1960s* and *Rural and Urban Poverty*—examine the Bretton Woods era and analyse 'hard' TACs provided during the McCloy, Black, and Woods presidencies before turning to the importance of poverty-based lending to the advent of 'soft' TACs during the McNamara years. Sections three through five—*Structural and Sectoral Adjustment*, *Economies in Transition*, and *Economies in Crisis*—next evaluate the Washington Consensus era, with a focus on the significance of neoliberal structural and sectoral adjustment lending to changes



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in technical assistance, as well as an account of TACs supporting post-Soviet transition and crisis responses during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. The final section—*Development Policy Lending*—explores the post-Washington Consensus era through an analysis of TACs incorporated within DPLs and a close review of the World Bank's response to the 2008 GFC. The chapter examines the key actors involved in drafting and implementing TACs, what is transferred, from where ideas and practices are drawn, and, most importantly, the measures used to ensure the successful transmission of development policy. In doing so, the presented evidence demonstrates changes in the quality and transmission methods of TACs since the 1940s, providing lessons drawn from stories of success and failure.

As a methodological aside, TACs have received little scholarly attention and are often only briefly addressed in IBRD and IDA documents. The World Bank (1975b: 67; 1992: 96) has recognised this several times, with annual reports repeatedly commenting on the difficulty of identifying and evaluating TACs. As a result, analysis is occasionally limited to generalities due to the brevity of available information. In addition, success and failure are measured pursuant to the World Bank's project evaluations, rated as 'highly satisfactory', 'satisfactory', or 'unsatisfactory'.

## Formative Years: 1940s–1960s

During the early decades of World Bank lending operations, hard technical assistance reinforced the Rostowian modernisation outlook that development meant state-led infrastructural and industrial growth. TACs were used in this context to ensure the technical quality of loans and credits, as opposed to shaping policy. As such, they were limited in that they tackled temporary concerns and not systemic problems (Wharton 1958: 123). Even so, the IBRD (1948: 16–17; 1949: 9) recognised the potential of technical assistance in supporting loan implementation from the outset, with its 1948 priorities including the provision of technical assistance and the analysis of development and its position in 1949 that the main constraint upon its lending operations was not a lack of capital but well prepared and planned projects. Pre-investment studies and preparatory analyses quickly came to underpin its lending portfolio, seen as tools to strengthen project success rates.

In 1949, the IBRD Department of Technical Assistance and Liaison listed five types of technical assistance: advisory services, technical information dissemination, demonstration projects, pilot projects, and training. Serving a support role to improve success rates, technical assistance embodied the definition of hardware. As an example, the 1948 Chilean *Agricultural Machinery Project* financed the construction and installation of several hydroelectric plants, including replacing the Copiapo Diesel Electric Plant, constructing the Los Holles and Los Cipreses Hydroelectric Plants, and importing construction equipment. Working alongside the Chilean State Railways Authority and *Corporación de Fomento de la Producción* (Production Development Corporation), TACs in the loan consisted of engineering, geological, and geophysical surveys to determine the feasibility of the project and amount of financing required to construct the hydroelectric plants (Chile 1953: 13). Besides stating that the Production Development Corporation was forthcoming in its relationship ('acting in full accordance with the consultation provisions of the Loan Agreements' (Chile 1953: 15)), the TACs did not reveal substantial relational dynamics given their unobtrusive nature, simply ensuring that the project was financially feasible.

Due to administrative and budgetary constraints, the IBRD was unable to service the increasing demand for technical assistance through its own personnel during this period. In 1950, the institution employed a slim operating staff of 392—executives, administrators, loan officers, economists, and miscellaneous employees—to serve its 49 member countries. There thus emerged a reliance upon external consultants, notably individuals educated in developed countries, to deliver its advisory services; 'while the Bank cannot undertake to furnish technical assistance from its own staff on any large scale, it can help its member nations to select and procure the necessary private technicians' (IBRD 1947: 14). The provision of technical assistance has always involved multiple actors within one project transferring ideas and practices from the international to the domestic, a trend maintained today. To illustrate, the *Railway Project* (1952a) to Pakistan included arrangements to send Pakistani technicians to railroad and diesel engine manufacturers in the USA for training in the repair and maintenance of diesel locomotives to improve the North Eastern and East Bengal Railway lines in east Pakistan and to construct a natural gas transmission line from Sui to Sukkur in central Pakistan and Hyderabad to Karachi in southern Pakistan (Pakistan 1952b: 5–6).

The Black presidency instigated the first major organisational overhaul of the IBRD in 1952, started because 'the old organisation began to crack at the seams' (Stevenson 1961: 8). As part of the reorganisation, the Technical Operations Department was created, responsible for loan applications, cost-benefit analyses, and feasibility studies (Lejeune 1985: 3). These activities reinforced the hardware-orientation of TACs. Richard Demuth (1961: 54), who was then Director of the IBRD Technical Assistance and Liaison Staff, recalls that

> We started in this technical assistance field as the result of a realisation that although we were being very careful to see that our money was used effectively for priority projects, all the care that we were using in connection with our money wasn't going to have very much effect on the development of the country if they were using the resources released by our loan and all the other resources for silly projects, wasting the money. Basically we weren't a bank just in terms of wanting to lend money and get repaid with interest, but we were interested in the effects of our operations on the development of the country … In part this was also due to the fact that in order to determine the priorities of projects presented for Bank financing, we had to look at the whole program of a country to determine whether a power project or another project had priority … And we realised that very few of those countries had effective programs.

Hard technical assistance became pervasive in IBRD loans and IDA credits as a result. At the same time, beyond ensuring the technical quality of lending operations, TACs became tools to determine the developmental priorities of member countries, thereby leading the organisations to make normative judgments about the developmental trajectories of those countries. Such positions were reiterated in successive *Policies and Operations Handbooks* (World Bank 1957: 17; 1960: 8–9; 1963: 7), all of which outline that technical assistance was to be used not only to assist loan implementation, but also to help recipient governments define their developmental priorities. While not explicitly transferring policy, and although technical assistance was 'focused primarily on what recipient countries need in order to apply for and effectively use loans and credits from the Bank and what the Bank needs in order to make its loans and credits intelligently' (Blough 1968: 176), the institution was clearly involved in constructing what development was in the context of its member countries and how it was to be pursued.

Outside of the World Bank, technical assistance was conceptualised along similar lines. The 1962 Twelfth International Congress of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences defined technical assistance as the 'transmission of learning, knowledge, and techniques or materials and human resources in order to help those who receive it to solve specific problems in a more suitable manner in keeping with their needs' (cited in Mathiasen 1968: 205). Within mainstream practice, technical assistance was a problem-solving tool targeting specific issues. While argued to serve the needs of recipients, it determined the suitability of the ideas and practices needed to solve perceived problems, thus suggesting the legitimacy (or illegitimacy) of particular approaches. As such, TACs reflected the Cold War modernisation assumption that 'the performance of poor countries could be significantly improved by helping their citizens absorb the technologies and skills developed in the West' (Paul 1983: 13); development entailed adopting 'modern' Western ideas and practices.

A series of *Kawasaki Projects* to Japan (1956a, 1958a, 1960) during the 1950s and 1960s illustrate the World Bank's modernisation assumptions. Working with the national government, which was under the leadership of Liberal Democratic Prime Ministers Nobusuke Kishi and Hayato Ikeda, the IBRD projects were designed to 'expand and modernise' the Japanese iron and steel industries through financial and technical assistance to the Kawasaki Steel Corporation. TACs embedded in the loans included surveys of the market prospects of Japan's steel industry and US$1.3 million for consultant recruitment from an American Company—the Republic Steel Corporation located in Cleveland, Ohio—for instruction on plant operations, staff training, and production supervision over several years (Japan 1956b: 8; 1958b: 5); the modernisation of the Japanese iron and steel industries required the absorption of Western ideas and practices.

By the end of the formative decades, hard technical assistance had come under criticism. External to the IBRD and IDA, Mathiasen (1968: 207) makes the comment that technical assistance providers must recognise the importance of institutionalising foreign norms in local settings if requisite 'cultural and value changes' are to be successful in 'sowing the seeds of change'. Internal to the World Bank, the institution subjected its technical assistance portfolio to a 1970 review which contended that TACs should be provided in accordance with priorities determined by recipients (IBRD/IDA 1970: 2). In response to these critiques, institution building and human resource development entered its advisory services, beginning a gradual transition towards soft technical assistance. This turn would be secured by the introduction of poverty-based lending during the McNamara presidency.

## Rural and Urban Poverty

The introduction of poverty-based lending by President McNamara in the early 1970s signalled a large shift in the approach of the World Bank, affecting its capacity to successfully transfer policy. The institution broadened its focus from industrial and infrastructural growth to include the more fluid and less precise concepts of absolute poverty and basic human needs. TACs evolved in response, becoming more aligned to software and exhibiting a greater focus on institution building. They became a tool to grow 'strong national institutions to promote development' (World Bank 1974: 58) and 'contribute to the adoption of national economic policies and the building of local institutions' (IBRD/IDA 1970: 22); TACs took on a catalytic role in building institutional capacity (Ayres 1983: 54). For this reason, Collins and Lappe (1979: 855) concluded at the end of the 1970s that the World Bank 'is not simply a provider of development loans. Over the past few years, it has become a major force in shaping the economic policies of various countries'. In addition, TACs came to cost significantly more. To illustrate, at the same time that poverty-based lending came to total a quarter of all World Bank financial assistance (Birdsall and Londono 1997: 33), TACs annually increased from US$87.4 million in 1973 to US$359 million in 1979 (IBRD/IDA 1973: 63; World Bank 1979: 107). Yet, due to the complex nature of poverty, these risky yet innovative 'social projects', with their focus on poverty alleviation and redistributive growth, were 'harder to develop, more subject to delays, and more susceptible to failure' (Crane and Finkle 1981: 516). The different dynamics involved in poverty-based lending led to new challenges emerging in the successful provision of technical assistance.

The World Bank published *The Assault on World Poverty: Problems in Rural Development, Education, and Health* in 1975, which analysed the causes of rural poverty and prescribed remedies. A seminal publication that defined the institution's new approach to poverty alleviation, it detailed not only the introduction of 'new style projects' (designed to benefit large numbers of the rural poor, comprehensively approach small-scale agriculture, and be of low cost), but also the changing role of technical assistance (World Bank 1975a). In addition to the growing sophistication of hardware, soft technical assistance came to include 'training to overcome manpower constraints, attention to public sector organisations, and research and information gathering to provide more adequate understanding and guidelines' (World Bank 1975a: 13–14). *The Assault on World Poverty* listed training, public sector reform, and overcoming policy constraints as the new objectives of TACs.

IBRD loans and IDA credits to Bangladesh, Burundi, Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia, Mauritania, Sudan, and Zaire during the 1970s all included TACs containing provisions for institution building and supervision, and studies to assist government ministries plan responses to rural and urban poverty and pursue redistributive economic growth. The lending operations focused upon basic human needs, employment, housing, irrigation, livestock, roads, utilities, and water supply, and addressed the institutional, personnel, and policy constraints preventing responses to these issues (World Bank 1974: 53; World Bank 1975b: 67; World Bank World Bank 1977: 73; World Bank 1979: 88). Technical assistance was becoming more sophisticated and interventionist, moving beyond 'safe' activities and towards more multifaceted and complex problems. The following paragraphs analyse three poverty-based loans and credits to Bangladesh, Colombia, and Mauritania to demonstrate the changing relational dynamics of TACs during the McNamara presidency.

The 1976 *Agricultural and Rural Training Project* to Bangladesh, a US$12 million IDA credit, sought to tackle the shortages of trained persons in government agencies involved in delivering field services, agricultural techniques, and communications systems to rural areas. With 90% of 75 million Bangladeshis living in rural areas, the IDA reasoned that increases in agricultural production would not only strengthen basic needs access but also create new employment opportunities. Drawing lessons from its experiences in South Asian countries and surveys of the national economy, as well as the need to adjust its project to align with bilateral and multilateral loans from the UNDP, the Government of Japan, and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the IDA identified one main obstacle to increasing productivity and employment: the poorly functioning institutions governing rural production. The project addressed this by constructing and furnishing new and expanded training institutes (graduate institutes and agricultural training institutes to reach an additional 2000 students) and in-service training for currently employed trainers, particularly mid-level technicians (Bangladesh 1976a: 14–15). Working alongside the National Committee on Rural Training (an inter-ministerial body established by the Ministry of Planning to integrate rural training policies), TACs included expert assistance for planning rural training systems, measures to strengthen the teaching and research programs of the Bangladesh Agricultural University, and project monitoring and evaluating activities (Bangladesh 1976b: 18–19). Rated 'satisfactory' by the IDA, the success of the TACs derived from the national government's support, which was secured by making it directly responsible for deciding the consulting architects for possible employment under the project (Bangladesh 1976b: 15).

The *Integrated Rural Development Project*, a US$52 million IBRD loan approved to Colombia in 1976, also addressed rural poverty, but did so by funding the intensification of farm production on land holdings less than 20 ha in three regions suffering serious rural poverty in the Andean highlands. As outlined in the *Staff Project Report*, the 'objective of the project would be to raise living standards in selected rural areas by increasing the productivity, output, and incomes of farm families and by improving social services and facilities available to rural communities' (Colombia 1976: iv). It was delivered in partnership with the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and Inter-American Development Bank (IADB). TACs offered advisory services to build and link farming operations, training courses to government officials and farmers, and a market intelligence system executed by the UNDP to better produce and sell agricultural goods. The main lesson learnt from the project was that 'integrated rural development projects, although complex, can work, provided that they receive political support at the highest level, and that they are executed under strong project coordination with consensus among principal agencies that are institutionally well developed' (Colombia 1987: 17). Additionally, and in relation to its TACs, the domestic agencies involved in facilitating training and advisory services with 'the most widespread representation in the countryside … were among the best performers with a strong consensus on the purpose of the project' (Colombia 1987: iv). With the project rated 'satisfactory' and having led to increases in rural income, the loan demonstrated the importance of relational dynamics and collaboration in early examples of software.

The IDA approved the *Integrated Rural and Urban Poverty Project* to Mauritania in 1979 at a cost of US$8 million. The North African country joined the IBRD in 1960, following independence from French colonial rule. At the time, the population was largely comprised of poor nomadic herdspersons. Over the next 2 decades, the country suffered debilitating problems, including severe reductions in revenue earned from iron ore (then comprising 80% of export earnings), an annual food deficit of 70,000 tonnes of grain, a series of droughts, violent conflict with the former Spanish Sahara, and shrinking rural and expanding urban sectors (Mauritania 1979: 2–5). The short-term objectives of the IDA credit were therefore to contribute to rural and urban poverty alleviation via creating employment opportunities and increasing food production. The project consisted of three components that delivered financial and technical assistance to the industrial (for building small and medium enterprises), artisan (for restoring and expanding the production of knotted carpets and training weavers), and agricultural (for new village irrigation schemes) sectors. In partnership with the Mauritanian Bank for Development and Commerce, it also offered consultant services to study the feasibility of establishing a gypsum plaster-brick industry to replace the far more expensive importation of cement. While the project objectives were 'to a large degree accomplished,' there were several failures, including the insufficient accomplishment of an institution-building initiative deriving from poor knowledge of domestic contexts. Despite the failings of the credit, the *Project Completion Report* concludes that the various technical assistance teams involved in the project effectively and efficiently achieved their goals by building a clear and transparent relationship with the national government (Mauritania 1991: 8–9).

At the end of the Bretton Woods era, early lessons emerge concerning the success and failure of technical assistance. During the formative decades, hardware TACs were largely devoid of relational dynamics because they were uncontroversial; 'bricks-and-mortar' surveys of industrial and infrastructural sectors. In contrast, with the introduction of 'riskier' poverty-based lending, new challenging dynamics entered the equation. While the above loans and credits approved during the 1970s were far less controversial compared to what would later come with neoliberal adjustment, the more interventionist actions of poverty-based lending required positive domestic support from national governments and implementing agencies, often gained by building collaborative partnerships. The rural and urban poverty decade of the 1970s revealed much more about TACs than the World Bank's formative years. Not only did the reviewed projects illustrate the greater involvement of multiple actors (both domestic and international), but also the importance of relationships with recipients when developing and implementing multifaceted and divisive programs. Thus, even at this early stage in World Bank history, the policy movement concerned not just issues of technical soundness, but also the social and political relations that surround the packaging, presentation, and transmission of policy.

## Structural and Sectoral Adjustment

Following the 1979 Oil Shock, which led to the introduction of structural adjustment lending, TACs rapidly expanded. While poverty-based lending saw TACs grow to total US$359 million in annual commitments in 1979, this figure rose to US$534 million in 1980, US$979 million in 1981, and US$1.15 billion in 1982 (World Bank 1979: 107; 1982: 44). The increase in TACs during the early 1980s resulted from the launch of neoliberal adjustment programs and the role played by soft technical assistance in institution building, human resource development, and macroeconomic management. With the turn towards software, Hürni (1980: 117) remarks that the World Bank was able to influence 'national economic policies on macroeconomic and microeconomic levels'. While hardware remained as surveys, studies, and project preparation support for 'tangible' agricultural, industrial, and infrastructural projects, software soon dominated its advisory portfolio. By 1990, soft technical assistance comprised 70% of all IBRD and IDA advisory services, with annual outlays for TACs reaching US$1.8 billion in 1991 (Wallace 1990: 27; World Bank 1991: 93–94).

Importantly, soft technical assistance became a powerful tool to legitimise and entrench often unpopular neoliberal reforms. While SALs and SECALs were typified by 'policy conditionality' (or the provision of finance subject to the performance of prescribed actions), soft technical assistance was defined by 'policy dialogue' (or an intellectual exchange between the World Bank and its developing member countries) (Cassen 1994: 58). The latter was a more inclusive and collaborative relationship, for whereas 'conditionality' led to coerced outcomes, 'dialogue' instead persuaded and normalised the legitimacy of prescribed policy. Despite the rhetoric, however, the World Bank remained in a superior position to determine the contents of that dialogue. By determining its contents, it could decide what elements were significant to recipient audiences. Similarly, given the prescriptive nature of financial adjustment lending, soft technical assistance linked to policy-based loans, no matter how persuasive, were inherently coercive to some degree (Smith 2008: 239).

During the 1980s, the IBRD and IDA approved 191 adjustment projects in 64 countries for US$27 billion, totalling 17% of World Bank lending (World Bank 2001: viii). Between 1980 and 2000, the financial volume of SALs and SECALs was similar (SALs: US$44.4 billion and SECALs: US$42.5 billion), whereas SECALs dwarfed SALs during the 1980s (SALs totalled US$9.65 billion and SECALs totalled US$17.4 billion) (World Bank 2001: 8). Several objectives underpinned adjustment lending: stabilising macroeconomic environments, promoting economic growth, improving efficiency in resource allocation, and strengthening institutions and building capacity (Jayarajah and Branson 1995: 1). While SALs 'support reforms that promote growth, efficient use of resources, and sustainable balance of payments over the medium and long term,' SECALs 'support policy changes and institutional reforms in a specific sector' (World Bank 2001: 8).

Used as a mechanism to support adjustment lending, TACs were incorporated to raise the success rates of program implementation. Given that SALs and SECALs prescribed neoliberal reforms, the World Bank concluded that it was necessary for the public sector to institutionalise a market-centric mentality. TACs were thus used to build financial and personnel management systems, develop inter-institutional relationships (for example, between ministries of trade and commerce), improve organisational structures, and implement regulations and procedures (Paul 1990: 27; Buyck 1991: 5). During the Conable presidency, a large percentage of TACs directed resources towards drafting legislative and institutional frameworks to restructure and/or privatise state companies, monitoring privatisation procedures, and hiring consultants to oversee divestiture (Kikeri 1990: 20; World Bank 1990: 69; Shihata 1991: 223). Yet, the significance of software components lay not only in attempting to improve program success rates, but also in the implicit legitimisation of neoliberal reforms by designing market-friendly institutional structures and changing mindsets via training.

TACs notably focused upon institutional development, defined by Israel (1987: 1) and Buyck (1991: 5) as the reform of public sector institutions to utilise human and financial resources more effectively and efficiently. As Lamb (1987: ix) recommends in the World Bank working paper *Managing Economic Policy Change: Institutional Dimensions*, technical assistance should be used to 'institutionalise national expertise'. In practice, this meant that TACs came to not only offer neoliberal 'thought-training', but also established rules, routines, and procedures to replicate neoliberal models. To illustrate further, the World Bank discussion paper *Institutional Development and Technical Assistance in*

*Macroeconomic Policy Formulation: A Case Study of Togo* regards technical assistance as a catalyst for macroeconomic policy change, arguing that it internalises required analytical capabilities and management techniques, to the end that it 'crystallises thinking' for recipients on how to solve problems (Kjellstrom and d'Almeida 1987: 36).

While software became the main type of technical assistance provided by the World Bank during the 1980s, TACs approved under Clausen and Conable saw declining success rates (World Bank 1988: 78):

> [The] effective utilisation, absorption, and sustainability of technical assistance were hampered by the fact that (a) it was often seen as being imposed by donors rather than as being a response to local demand; (b) some technical assistance projects were overdesigned, reflecting an unrealistic assessment of borrowers' needs; (c) resources and efforts were often dissipated because of lack of coordination among donors; (d) although the cost of foreign technical assistance was high compared with prevailing local salary levels, its results – except in the provision of engineering services – were not always tangible and were rarely long lasting; and (e) the shift from 'hard' technical assistance (for project design and construction) to 'soft' technical assistance (for institutional development and project-related training) was increasing the number of problems related to implementation and monitoring.

By the late 1980s, technical assistance came under intense scrutiny due to consistently poor success rates. Responding to calls from donors and recipients, the institution undertook reviews of its technical assistance portfolio in 1988 and 1991, with the TARTF established to carry out the 1991 review (designed to 'assess the institution's role and performance in delivering technical assistance [and] to recommend steps to improve the effectiveness of the Bank's technical assistance activities' (World Bank 1993a: iv)). The reviews concluded that software was inherently incapable of consistently realising high success rates given the difficulties in managing and implementing institutional development and policy reform. In order for soft technical assistance to be effective, the World Bank (1993a: vi) concludes that borrower perception must change to recognise the need for policy reform; borrower commitments to initiate policy reform must be secured; borrower willingness to commit human and financial resources must be cultivated; and, borrower ownership of project design and delivery is necessary to secure commitments. At the same time, Buyck (1991: 21) completed a widely cited internal audit and published *The Bank's Use of Technical Assistance for Institutional Development*, finding software to lack pragmatism and adaptability. Despite these negative critiques, TACs continued to grow into the 1990s (rising from US$1.8 billion in 1991 to US$2.2 billion in 1994), with the World Bank 'taking an increasingly active role in providing technical assistance in areas of policy reform, institutional development, and capacity-building upstream of normal lending operations' (World Bank 1993b: 92), focusing upon trade and financial liberalisation, privatisation, and deregulation; staples of the Washington Consensus.

Given that soft technical assistance is more prone to failure than hardware, as institutional and behavioural change is more difficult to achieve compared to preparing a project review, it is important to examine what made soft TACs so unsuccessful during the 1980s. The following paragraphs analyse three SECALs approved between 1986 and 1988, all of which not only demonstrate the neoliberal mentality underpinning policy-based loans, but also the relational dynamics at play in the transfer of policy through TACs. Two of the SECALs were provided to Argentina—the *Agricultural Sector Loan Project* (1986) and *Trade Policy Loan Project 02* (1988a, b)—and one to Indonesia—the *Urban and Water Supply Sector Adjustment Loan* (1987a, b).

The Argentine *Agricultural Sector Loan Project*, a US$350 million IBRD SECAL, was drafted to support gains in agricultural production and exports through liberalising policy reforms aimed at reducing export taxes on agricultural products, restricting public spending to limit the fiscal deficit, and ending tariffs and regulations on agricultural imports. It worked within the national government's Agricultural Development Program, and partnered with the Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries, National Institute of Agricultural Technology, National Bank of Argentina, National Grain Board, and National Meat Board (Argentina 1986: 12–13). Supporting an IMF-standby arrangement of emergency funding authorised in 1984, the loan aimed to open the agricultural sector to global markets, the perceived remedy to Argentina's fiscal and industrial decline since the mid-1960s. TACs included sector studies (hardware) and institutional support (software). Focusing upon the latter, the institutional support included training for participating government bodies on trade liberalisation and deregulation. After the project closed in 1989, the IBRD concluded the performance of the SECAL and its TACs as 'unsatisfactory', with borrower performance listed as 'highly unsatisfactory'.

Three problems emerged, all of which are relevant to this study (Argentina 1991: v–viii). First, the national leadership received strong criticism from farmer groups given that the policy reform reducing export tax rates severely gutted the farming economy; the national leadership were thus reluctant to pursue the institutional support program. Second, Argentina's request for the SECAL was motivated primarily by the need for emergency financial support, and not the structural reform package; the recipient requested the loan for the money, not for the policy reforms. Third, the institutional support package was largely directed to the Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries, but should have been directed to the Ministry of Economy, it being the government department most directly affected by the reform schedule. The failings of the SECAL thus led the IBRD to conclude that 'politically-sensitive operations' require the 'unequivocal support of Government, lending agencies, and important personalities' (Argentina 1991: viii); the failure of policy transfer derived from a lack of political support.

Remaining with Argentina, the *Trade Policy Loan Project 02* (1988a) provides another failed TAC example, although its performance indicators rate the overall loan as 'satisfactory'. A US$300 million IBRD SECAL, it sought to further 'integrate Argentina into the world economy' through neoliberal policy reforms requiring import protection reductions, export deregulation, and limiting industrial investment incentives, thereby reducing government intrusion in the market (Argentina 1988b: iii). A robust technical assistance program was planned. Drafted TACs were designed to 'strengthen the Government's capacity for the administrative control of the industrial promotion regime' (Argentina 1988b: 70), ensuring that trade liberalisation could be effectively performed by relevant government departments. In this context, the TACs were divided into consultant support and training. The former was planned to involve the recruitment of (i) external auditors to support the Argentine Tax Revenue Service audit firms benefiting from the policy reform schedule and (ii) technicians to design and implement a joint computer information system linking the Secretariat of Industry and Foreign Trade, Secretariat of Finance, and Tax Revenue Service. The latter was to involve the appointment of a consultancy firm to train 22 new accountants and auditors and three new industrial engineers within the Secretariat of Industry and Foreign Trade (Argentina 1988b: 70–71). While this was the intent behind the TACs, the planning phase never eventuated into the final delivery phase. In fact, the national government never reached the point of awarding consultant contracts. This was because the government opted to not use any proceeds from the SECAL to finance technical assistance. Instead, it preferred to use the full tranche of the loan for purposes other than consultancy and training (Argentina 1994: 22). While this may appear to undercut an analysis of technical assistance, it does reveal significant insights into TACs in practice, particularly in light of the 1986 agricultural SECAL to Argentina whereby the national government was more interested in receiving financial resources than pursuing the recommended policy agenda. In this situation, the political dynamics of transnational policy transfer become apparent.

The US$270 million *Urban and Water Supply Sector Adjustment Loan* (1987a) to Indonesia offers a different set of complications emerging from an otherwise 'satisfactory' SECAL. Designed to support the national government's urban sector investment and maintenance program, it included measures to improve public sector institutions, improve local resource mobilisation, and decentralise urban infrastructure planning, financing, and implementation to local governments (Indonesia 1987b: 1). In contrast to the two Argentine loans, the Indonesian SECAL did not face political obstacles. Problems arose, however, because of the policy transfer process itself. As part of the loan, technical assistance was incorporated to deliver 80 personnel years of foreign and 135 personnel years of local consultants to support a property tax improvement program and the formulation of sector policy guidelines (Indonesia 1987b: 14). The problems relate to the TACs, specifically that the SECAL was initially conceived to provide budgetary support to stabilise the economy, but evolved mid loan to implement substantial structural reforms of the urban and water supply sectors (Indonesia 1992: 26). The TACs became ineffective as a result, as the IBRD spent a 'disproportionate amount of supervision time' (Indonesia 1992: 28) in selecting consultants, which limited the available resources necessary to deliver the SECAL; the transfer process did not result in 'meaningful attempts to institutionalise' (Indonesia 1992: 28) the policy reforms, as too much time was spent arranging consultants.

## Economies in Transition

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 created an opportunity for the World Bank. Working alongside the United Nations, IMF, and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the

IBRD supported the wholesale neoliberal reform of an entire region. The market transition of Central and Eastern Europe became representative of the attempt to broaden the mainstream development discourse to include both economic and political liberalisation. As President Preston remarked in 1992, 'helping countries of the former Soviet Union to achieve economic transition is … as great a challenge as any the Bank has faced in its history' (World Bank 1992: 18). Technical assistance became vital to this end, as the transfer and adaptation of ideas, practices, and skills were central to transition. In the words of Evans and Barakat (2012: 542), transition states 'are living laboratories for the study and practice of policy transfer'.

Transition assistance was not new to the World Bank in 1991. It had been active in the privatisation of state enterprises and the introduction of market mechanisms into the command economies of Algeria, China, Hungary, Laos, Poland, and Yugoslavia during the 1980s (Lee and Nellis 1990). As early as 1983, it published *Economic Reform in Socialist Countries: The Experiences of China, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia*, which discusses market transition and economic policy reform in socialist countries (Knight 1983). Yet, prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it had not embarked upon such an ambitious program of liberalisation.

Conceptually, transition involved the removal of legal restrictions on the private sector, including economic and political reform (Milanovic 1998: 3). While the economic reforms were reminiscent of what the World Bank had prescribed through SALs and SECALs during the 1980s, the sponsorship of accountable, transparent, and efficient governance institutions was new. In a policy research working paper, Dhanji and Milanovic (1991: 4) outline the institution's position: the 'most openly ideological interest in privatisation is the belief that economies based on private property are better at establishing democratic political institutions and preserving individual freedoms than economies where the productive apparatus is socially owned'. The *World Development Report 1996: From Plan to Market* reiterates this view, emphasising the necessity of neoliberal policy reform, liberalisation, stabilisation, growth, and property rights to economic transition, while the rule of law and 'better and slimmer' government was required for political transition (World Bank 1996: 7–8). Notably, the report had little to say about 'people'. In fact, it called for the extensive rollback of social safety nets to unfetter the free market (World Bank 1996: 80).

Privatisation was central to transition. Specifically, the World Bank advocated rapid and mass privatisation. It argued that privatisation should 'occur quickly, taking advantage of limited reform "windows", and that new private owners would restructure the enterprises and provide adequate corporate governance' (World Bank 2004a: vii) and governments 'should not wait for the completion of all legislation to begin selling enterprises' (World Bank 1993b: 41). Such statements reveal the World Bank's neoliberal optimism, particularly its faith in the private sector; transition needed to occur quickly as a form of 'shock therapy', pursuant to the dictates of the Washington Consensus. Then World Bank Chief Economist Lawrence Summers confidently asserted the following in 1991: 'Spread the truth—the laws of economics are like the laws of engineering. One set of laws works everywhere' (cited in Rose 2009: 2). Consequently, both Smith (1999: 23) and Nikolić (2006: 87) likened post-Soviet transition to Latin American structural adjustment in the 1980s, both regions being on the margins of the world economy and dependent upon global institutions.

In context, the IBRD was a minor player in post-Soviet transition compared to the Commission of the European Communities (CEC). To illustrate, while the IMF, World Bank, and EBRD cumulatively provided US$68.6 million in technical assistance to the former Soviet bloc in 1992, the CEC loaned US$2.15 billion (Goyal 1994: 149–150). Nonetheless, its transition assistance provides important lessons about TACs. The three Baltic States—Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia—provide particularly good illustrations (Bazbauers 2012). In contrast to the above-mentioned SECALs to Argentina and Indonesia, World Bank assistance to the Baltic States reveals much more about the transnational movement of policy, particularly of the voluntary policy transfer approach whereby recipients consensually accept neoliberal loan conditions because they want to copy, emulate, or synthesise policy lessons. The proceeding paragraphs review IBRD support to Latvia during its post-Soviet transition period (1991–1998), with the majority of the analysed loans being rated 'highly satisfactory'. This outcome was starkly different compared to the earlier SECALs of the 1980s.

After achieving independence from Soviet control in 1991, Latvia began a program of rapid economic and political reform. It revived the political institutions built in the 1930s that were discarded under Soviet rule and began its transition from a command- to a market-based economy (Meleshevich 2007: 168; King and McNabb 2015: 23–24).

Its economic transition was neoliberal, favouring mass privatisation. Successive governments throughout the 1990s (including the Popular Front of Latvia, Latvian Way, and Latvian Farmers' Union, all of which were either right-centrist or liberal conservative political parties) saw 'political consensus strongly [favouring] development of a market economy. Despite changes in government, no major readjustments of economic policies have taken place' (Lainela 2000: 205). The neoliberal model adopted was supported and shaped by mainstream Western macroeconomists (Jeffrey Sachs, Stanley Fischer, and Lawrence Summers), supranational organisations (the IMF, World Bank, and EBRD), Western European governments, and Latvian politicians and policymakers (including Einars Repŝe, who was President of the Bank of Latvia from 1991 to 2001) (Åslund 2007: 31). There was clear political consensus on how post-Soviet transition should play out.

Following investigative and exploratory missions sent to the Baltic States in early 1992, Latvia received its first World Bank loan: the *Rehabilitation Loan Project* (Latvia 1992). In the midst of economic and political upheavals, the country was suffering debilitating financial and trade distortions and substantial declines in agricultural and industrial output. The loan sought to stabilise the economy, financing key sectors in decline through US$45 million, while building mechanisms to foster greater market reliance. TACs included consultant services, training, and equipment relevant to market transition (Latvia 1995: 11). Given the limited contact of the IBRD with Latvia, and despite being prepared in close collaboration with the IMF, the loan was based upon abstract economic modelling and anecdotal evidence from ostensibly similar countries, rather than a detailed understanding of the domestic Latvian context. An example of hybridisation, the reform schedule was drawn from multiple countries other than Latvia. For the IBRD, as Åslund (2007: 31) notes, 'the Latin American experience with macroeconomic stabilisation in the 1980s showed them the way'. The approach was effective, however, given the strong political commitment to transition by President Anatolijs Gorbunov's Popular Front of Latvia party, demonstrating reliance 'to a great extent on Bank advice … [and] continued with the reform program despite internal pressures to ease the impact of transition' (Latvia 1995: 10). This was illustrated in that the loan did not contain conditionality. Since the national government was so receptive to the proposed reform schedule and was reliant on IBRD expertise, there was no issue of non-compliance; the reform program was 'practically irreversible' (Latvia 1995: ii).

Latvia next received two loans in 1994: the *Agricultural Development Project* and *Enterprise & Financial Sector Assistance Project*. Requested by the Latvian Farmers' Union party, one loan targeted agricultural reform and the other banking sector reform. Both were similar in their neoliberal overtones. The former project sought to 'help newly-emerged private farmers and to enhance ongoing privatisation of agriculture' (Latvia 1993: 16), while the latter sought to transfer control of the banking system to private entrepreneurs by reorganising, privatising, or liquidating state-controlled financial and banking institutions (Latvia 2000a: 2). Working with the Agriculture and Finance Ministries, and co-financed by Denmark, Sweden, and a European Union (EU) grant, the loans labelled 'market access' as their main objective, with the intent to guide mass privatisation initiatives and reduce government involvement in business activities. Importantly, both loans emphasised the importance of technical assistance to transition, with TACs improving project management capacity, building institutional and human resource capacity, and designing and executing privatisation transactions (Latvia 1994b: 18; 1998: v). The *Enterprise & Financial Sector Assistance Project* was unique in establishing a Pilot Privatisation Program (PPP) with the Latvian Privatisation Agency (LPA). The PPP offered seminars on voucher privatisation and investment fund development, planned and executed privatisation transactions, trained core staff from the LPA, disseminated privatisation know-how to state company managers, local consultants, and government staff, and documented and standardised procedures for future privatisations (Latvia 1994b: 18). An example of voluntary policy transfer, the IBRD credited the success of its TACs to the following: 'Ownership of a project by the borrower is an essential element for successful outcome' (Latvia 1998: 12).

The *Liepaja Environment Project*, *Jelgava District Heating Rehabilitation Project*, and *Municipal Services Development Project* next addressed national and sub-national utilities. Devised and based on Latvia's first CAS (a five-year plan drafted by the World Bank following an in-depth review of the recipient's development potential), the loans targeted the following 'priority areas': private sector growth (including legal and regulatory frameworks supportive of rapid privatisation), the efficient management of public infrastructure (including measures to ensure energy efficiency), and improved and sustainable social services (including pension and health service reform) (Latvia 1994a: 11). Significant because the IBRD drew lessons from the Latvian context, as opposed to from other countries, the three utilities loans respectively addressed environmental (coastal water and wastewater) management, heating services privatisation, and decentralisation and municipality accountability. The three loans were delivered in partnership with Nordic countries and institutions: the governments of Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, and SIDA, Danish Environmental Protection Agency, and Nordic Environment Finance Corporation. Relevant to the policy transfer process was the approach taken by the IBRD. As an example, one key lesson learnt from the *Liepaja Environment Project* (Latvia 2000b: 32) was that

> cooperatively planned and implemented projects that are based on mutual trust … can “change the way” the cooperating parties “think” about environment and development issues. This change in thinking … allowed the project to transfer new ideas and approaches to planning and management as well as provide support for physical investments.

Illustrating the ‘role subjective perception and judgments play in the definition of problems and solution’ (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996: 357), the focus upon ‘cooperation’ and ‘mutual trust’ helped legitimise the ideas and practices transferred by the IBRD to government agencies.

In December 1996, the IBRD approved Latvia’s first SAL. It was designed to resuscitate the economy following the 1995 Latvian Banking Crisis, which saw the banking system lose 40% of its assets and liabilities, and depositors an estimated US$800 million. The crisis arose from poor regulation and accounting, excessive taxation, inadequate legal infrastructure, weak managerial skills, and pervasive corruption (Fleming et al. 1996: 26); a consequence of rapid transition. The SAL included measures to support the maintenance of macroeconomic stability by limiting the fiscal deficit, support an agenda of structural reforms for efficiency and growth, support an extensive program of banking sector privatisation, promote fiscal discipline in banks and private enterprises; and, reform public sector resource management by rationalising expenditure decisions.

Stated as ‘fully consistent’ with Latvia’s 1994 CAS, the approach taken by the SAL was very similar to what would later follow in the World Bank’s response to the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, particularly the liquidation of banking institutions, greater fiscal discipline, and further privatisations (Latvia 1999: 2, 4–7). TACs involved the mobilisation of resources 'necessary to adopt and implement the reforms and also continue [the IBRD's] dialogue with the Government' (Latvia 1996: 5). Another example of voluntary policy transfer, despite the project being a conditional adjustment loan and linked to an IMF-standby arrangement, the Latvian national government readily accepted the proposed reform schedule. An important lesson learnt by the SAL is outlined in its *Implementation Completion Report* (Latvia 1999: 10):

> Ambitious but realistic reform targets can be an important stimulus to action – in each sector included in the [SAL], targets were established which challenged the Government to act boldly across a broad front. Particularly in privatisation, energy, public sector reform, and social insurance, promises were far-reaching and thorough. In total, they comprised a very large work program for any Government to achieve. Nonetheless, despite relatively minor delays, the Government has achieved all of its major goals. The lesson here is that the setting of less ambitious targets, even if they might have had a greater likelihood of early attainment, would probably have led to less progress in the end.

The SAL, despite being an 'ambitious' project, was readily agreed to by the Latvian government and succeeded in further entrenching the neoliberal reforms of the preceding transition years.

The relationship between the World Bank and Latvia during the post-Soviet transition period reveals much about transnational policy transfer. First, multiple actors are involved, including various government ministries, the World Bank, IMF, and co-financiers (both governments and institutions). Second, soft TACs (in the form of consultancy services and training) introduce policy arrangements, draft legislative proposals, and establish project management bodies. Third, policy lessons are pieced together from both the domestic context and external examples. The above seven Latvian loans are all examples of voluntary policy transfer, as the engagement between the Baltic state and development institution was collaborative and consensual. In fact, the government repeatedly deferred to the expertise of the World Bank in setting policy reform. Such a receptive approach was beneficial, particularly since the IBRD drafted many of its loans not based upon the Latvian context. Even after publishing the 1994 CAS, it drew lessons from other countries. Thus, in asking the question of how the transfer process is related to policy success and failure, Latvia's post-Soviet experiences reveal much depends upon recipient perceptions of transfer agents (such perceptions either conferring or undermining legitimacy) and the political willingness of recipients to abide by the reforms.

## Economies in Crisis

The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis was a high and low point for the World Bank. It was a high point because its annual lending operations reached a five-decade peak and a low point for its response received widespread criticism. Turning to the main recipients of IBRD assistance during the crisis—South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia—valuable insights into TACs incorporated within loans aiming to reform entire economies are revealed. What makes the Asian Crisis significant is that the three countries, given their dire situation, had little option but to accept the conditions attached to the loan schedules approved by the IBRD, which worked as a secondary actor to the main response led by the IMF. The dynamics between lender and recipient were heavily skewed towards the former, affecting the movement of policy.

The IBRD approved several large loans to South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia. Korea received the largest loan at US$3 billion, while total lending to the three countries exceeded US$11 billion between 1997 and 1999. Drafted as part of an IMF-led multilateral crisis response, the loans targeted the same major sectors: corporate, economic, and financial reform. Given the severity of the neoliberal austerity measures prescribed by the loans approved in late 1997 and mid-1998, measures which increased domestic instability by worsening unemployment levels and collapsing social safety nets, a second tranche of loans included substantial safeguards to mitigate both the social impact of the crisis and the responses to the crisis (Gragnolati 2001: 20). The performance of the IBRD projects was rated either 'satisfactory' or 'unsatisfactory' by the OED (the independent evaluation arm of the World Bank), with performance ratings affected by the level of government commitment to the prescribed reform schedules.

The initial response of the IBRD took place between late 1997 and mid-1998. South Korea received the *Economic Reconstruction Loan* (1997), Thailand the *Finance Companies Restructuring Loan* (1997), and Indonesia the *Policy Reform Support Loan Project* (1998). The loans were designed to provide balance-of-payments assistance, liberalise recipient economies through deregulation, ease foreign capital flows, and restructure, privatise, or foreclose failing banking institutions. TACs aided these neoliberal ends through training, surveys, and institutional support to build administrative capacity, strengthen corporate governance, end restrictions on foreign ownership of commercial banks, and legalise lay-offs under mergers and acquisitions (Indonesia 1998: iv; Korea 1999a: 7–9; Thailand 2006: 31); technical assistance was used to ensure the neo-liberal reforms were implemented. Importantly, the IMF set the overall reform agenda, so that 'the Bank inherited some features of a reform program that might have benefited in design … from Bank expertise had the Bank been more involved at the outset' (Korea 1999a: 13). Despite this, the IBRD advanced the conditional reforms, using the crisis as a means to compel structural change. Not only were TACs used to 'mitigate the risk to the loan' by providing 'credibility to government decisions regarding both the resolution of the closed finance companies and the policy framework for strengthening the remaining finance companies' (Thailand 1997: 23), but 'the Bank [used] urgent liquidity needs to secure commitment to an indicative outline of reforms' (Korea 1999b: 16). The crisis was used as a means to further liberalise the three economies. The problem here is that the programs lacked widespread political support, with the greater concern of the governments placed on the need for liquidity.

After the initial response, the IBRD introduced social impact measures into its loans. Between mid-1998 and 2000, a new round of loans sought to mitigate the social impact of the initial response. This was pointedly recognised in a review of the Indonesian reform program, whereby it was stated that 'in a major crisis, Bank management and top technical specialists should give priority to resolving issues that arise in the context of Bank assistance addressing the crisis' (Indonesia 2003: 28). During this period, Indonesia received the *Social Safety Net Adjustment Loan Project* in 1999, Korea received two SALs in 1998, and Thailand received the *Social Investment Project* in 1998 and two *Economic and Financial Adjustment Loans* in 1998 and 1999. While no less stringent than the earlier neoliberal projects, these loans afforded a greater focus upon social safety nets to cushion the poor and vulnerable. As outlined in Indonesia's interim CAS, its 1999 loan pursued the objectives of ensuring short-term economic stabilisation, building institutional foundations for sustainable growth, and reinforcing the social safety net to protect the poor and maintain public expenditure investments in human capital (Indonesia 1999: 2–3).

Within this new round of loans, TACs included capacity-building programs to strengthen a newly established Company Reorganisation

Office in the Ministry of Justice (Thailand 1998: 16), funds for consultants, small equipment purchases, and the preparation and delivery of training and instructional materials (Thailand 1998: 27), an institution-building strategy to create a Fair Trade Commission (Korea 1998a: 19), and mechanisms to improve poverty monitoring and targeting, the unemployment insurance system, and the pension system (Korea 1998b: 31). Despite the loans being more 'socially conscious', recipient governments remained reluctant to implement the harsh and unpopular reforms. As a result, the Korean loans revealed both that TACs 'can be critical to implementing components of the reform program and helps broaden the base of the dialogue to include the technocrats who will actually implement the program' (Korea 2000: 13) and, in 'policy areas where commitment to reform was weaker, the Bank found it more difficult to assist the relevant agencies with sufficient [technical assistance]' (Korea 1999b: 16). The IBRD resultantly used the crisis as a way to 'sell' prescribed reforms: 'the Bank learned the importance of maximising negotiating results during brief windows of opportunity when crises are most acute and when countries are most inclined to commit to reforms' (Korea 1999b: 17). Having said that, the Korean loans did not see a long-term commitment by the government. The World Bank thus concluded that unpopular reforms require 'a core of people in the country involved in preparing and articulating the reforms (if there is true government ownership of the program), who have come to understand the economic logic behind the reforms and become a force for reform within the country' (Thailand 1999: v); the need for sympathetic interlocutors.

In sum, the Washington Consensus era revealed the relational dynamics involved in soft TACs. Given the unpopularity of austere neoliberal reforms, local support was crucial to effective policy transfer; the success of sustainable and long-term policy movement through TACs is determined foremost by the level of government commitment. Be the loans addressing sectoral reform, market transition, or crisis response, how receptive the recipients are to proposed policy reforms affects policy transfer. While the examples provided in the above paragraphs also outline TACs as failing due to technical shortcomings, it was the relational dynamics that held the most resounding impact, in which the tension between coercion and consent affects the policy process and the interactions between technical assistance provider and recipient. This is a lesson that becomes clear with the World Bank's transition to the post-Washington Consensus era and the introduction of 'good practice principles of conditionality' under DPLs.

## Developing Policy Lending

President Wolfensohn unveiled the CDF in January 1999 in an attempt to distance the institution from the Washington Consensus and coercive adjustment lending. The World Bank (2003: 5) explicitly states that after 'a decade and a half of structural adjustment, there seemed to be too few positive and sustainable results, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa'. What followed was a turn towards the post-Washington Consensus (as defined by then Chief Economist Joseph Stiglitz) and the CDF, which called for a more balanced approach that integrated the economic, financial, social, and human dimensions of development (Pender 2001: 407; Vetterlein 2012: 42). In addition to aligning the World Bank with the MDGs and a stronger focus upon poverty alleviation, the centrepiece of the CDF was country-led partnerships and country ownership of development programs. The country-led approach derived from the institution's acknowledgement of previous project mismanagement (World Bank 2003: 4). While a notable departure from the approach of SALs and SECALs, the turn towards 'ownership', as Pereira (2016: 12) argues, 'served to hide the transformation and expansion of the conditionalities, designed to internalise doctrines and prescriptions through creative adaptation to local circumstances'. Put simply, it was seen to further embed neoliberal reforms while avoiding the more coercive aspects of adjustment conditionality.

An extension of the CDF, development policy lending replaced adjustment lending in 2004. A new form of policy-based lending, DPLs have come to define the World Bank. Between 2004 and 2012, over 430 DPLs were approved, constituting roughly 30% of IBRD and IDA lending (World Bank 2009: 1; 2013: 5). In response to the 2008 GFC, DPLs were the main lending instrument used by the institution. In contrast to investment loans, the principal features of DPLs include (World Bank 2009: 4): quick-disbursing budget financing for actual and anticipated financing needs; a sound macroeconomic policy framework for each operation; a program of policy and institutional reforms anchored on a country's development strategy; blending policy advice with financing; and, disbursing quickly, usually in one tranche.

While conditions remain attached to DPLs, their number per loan has reduced. Whereas policy-based loans during the 1990s saw over 30 conditions per project, just over ten were applied to each DPL in 2005 (World Bank 2006: 17). The reason for this reduction is the following: the 'World Bank has incorporated the lesson from the experience with structural adjustment that conditionality based on ex-ante commitments or ex-post results does not work and has now moved towards an approach anchored in country ownership of development programs and goals' (World Bank 2009: 4–5). As the World Bank (2004b: 4) notes, 'Ownership implies that the government can build and maintain an adequate coalition of political support for the program,' with IBRD and IDA policy dialogue and analytic work used to help build coalitions. In addition to ownership, DPLs are governed by five 'good practice principles of conditionality' (World Bank 2009: 45–46): reinforce government ownership of loans and credits; harmonise and align projects with country priorities; customise projects to country circumstances and government priorities; target critical aspects of country reforms; and, use progress reviews to ensure transparency and predictability of projects. Distancing its approach from the SALs and SECALs of the Washington Consensus era, DPLs—as the institutional expression of the CDF—emphasise 'ownership' as a means to legitimise reforms.

Development policy lending embodied the response of the World Bank to the 2008 GFC. Just as adjustment lending formed its response to the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, DPLs defined its 2008–2012 crisis response. DPLs annually averaged US$21 billion in 2009 and 2010, up from US$6.7 billion in the previous 3 years. In contrast to the SALs of the Asian Crisis, the loans and credits approved during the GFC were designed to stabilise economies while ensuring inclusive growth and the preservation of social safety nets. There was also evidence of measures to strengthen financial, banking, and private sector regulation. TACs reinforced these measures through surveys, training, consultation, oversight, and capacity-building initiatives. The coming paragraphs outline the institution's crisis response through development policy lending to Europe and Central Asia, East and Southeast Asia, and Latin America.

Europe and Central Asia received several sizeable DPLs: Bulgaria (2009), Croatia (2010), Hungary (2009a), Kazakhstan (2010a), Latvia (2010a), and Poland (2009a). Predominantly receiving 'satisfactory' performance ratings, the projects addressed not only the financial and social impacts of the GFC, but also the oncoming Eurozone Crisis. The DPLs were consistent in 'responding to adverse effects of global crisis' (Croatia 2009: v) by introducing legally binding rules to reduce fiscal deficits, enhancing institutional capacity for education assessments, promoting productive employment opportunities, strengthening social sector services, and drafting bank regulation and resolution frameworks (Bulgaria 2009b: 4; Croatia 2009: v; Hungary 2009b: ii; Kazakhstan 2010b: v). In pursuing these objectives, TACs included measures to create inter-ministerial task forces to evaluate social welfare programs (Bulgaria 2009b: 47), establish public procurement reporting and information systems (Kazakhstan 2010b: 54), design and implement institutional structures for more exact monitoring and impact evaluations as part of budget allocation processes (Poland 2009b: 42), and provide ongoing studies and reviews: poverty and social impact analyses, labour market adjustment reviews, social sector spending studies, and health, education, social protection, and public administration updates (Latvia 2010b: 52). While technical issues affected the TACs, notably including that some countries (especially Latvia and Hungary) had 'graduated' from IBRD lending in preceding years so up-to-date information was lacking (Hungary 2009b: 34), broader political lessons were learnt. Take the Polish DPL, a US$1.3 billion loan and the only project to receive a 'highly satisfactory' rating. Collaborating with the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, Ministry of Health, Ministry of National Education, and the Prime Minister's Office, the success of the TACs derived from a 'Bank-Borrower partnership rooted in a country-specific reform agenda … The concentration of critically important reform steps facilitate political ownership of the program and make the process easier for the authorities to initiate and implement. The Poland program responded to [the] government's own priorities and commitments' (Poland 2011: 24).

Five significant DPLs were approved for East and Southeast Asia: Indonesia (2009a, 2012a), the Philippines (2009, 2011), and Thailand (2010a). Totalling US$6 billion and individually larger than the SALs committed in response to the Asian Financial Crisis, their aims were to mitigate the political, economic, and poverty risks deriving from global financial volatility by bolstering public finance governance, monitoring, transparency, and accountability, enhancing public sector skills and performance, improving the quality of social and poverty protection services, and building institutional capacity in social protection initiatives and welfare services (Indonesia 2009b: 41; Philippines 2009: 6–12; Thailand 2010b: vi; Philippines 2011: v; Indonesia 2012b: 46).

TACs designed and implemented reforms pursuant to the above aims, trained key personnel, and conducted crisis impact surveys. Focusing upon the DPLs to Thailand (2010) and Indonesia (2012a), the importance of donor/recipient dynamics emerge. While the Indonesian project had short-term success, with the lesson learnt that the 'sustainability of results in such emergency operations depends on post-crisis continued reform efforts' (Indonesia 2012b: 44), the reform agenda became lax once the crisis abated. In contrast, the Thai DPL saw both short- and long-term success because, due to the level of collaboration between the World Bank and national government, the borrower subsequently asked 'for technical assistance to complete some aspects of its forward looking reform agenda beyond the already completed policy actions' (Thailand 2014: 21); success derived from trust built through collaborative planning.

Three crisis response DPLs to Latin America are notable: Brazil (2010), Colombia (2010), and Mexico (2009a). Totalling US$2.5 billion, the loans reflected the post-Washington Consensus balance between market-led growth and social protection. The Brazilian DPL supported policy actions strengthening fiscal consolidation, improving business registration processes, increasing the quality and efficiency of basic education systems, and broadening access to health services to disadvantaged areas (Brazil 2009: vi), while the Colombian and Mexican loans targeted inclusive, equitable, and efficient social protection systems (Colombia 2010: 16) and regulated yet competitive financial, employment, and trade mechanisms (Mexico 2009b: ii). TACs addressed capacity and institution building and policy and legislative reform, with the Colombian DPL seeing the World Bank offer 'technical inputs in the form of seminars, policy notes, short technical briefs, as well as direct comments and suggestions for the technical aspects of some of the regulation and policy design' (Colombia 2011: 15). Unique from earlier lending operations discussed in this chapter, all three projects considered the importance of coalition building and the political economy of reform to the successul transfer of reform strategies. Despite 'using the global crisis as an opportunity' (Mexico 2009b: 1) to advance reforms and even though the 'intensity of the crisis helped convice the various stakeholders of the critical importance of the reforms' (Mexico 2011: 5), the DPLs secured government commitment by emphasising the need for 'country ownership' (Mexico 2011: 5) and 'client ownership' (Brazil 2011: 19). This point was clear in the Mexican DPL: 'One of the lessons that can be drawn from this operation is that considering the interests and political strengths of various stakeholders and groups in the reform process may help in tailoring successful reforms and provide more realistic expectations of reform outcomes' (Mexico 2011: 20). The three development policy operations clearly illustrate the relational dynamics of policy transfer.

Compared with the Washington Consensus era, which saw greater rates of failure due to prescriptive and onerous conditions, a lack of consensus between donor and recipient, and coercion (with the exception of Latvia, whose policy transfer success derived from an ideological commitment to neoliberal reform), the success of DPLs during the post-Washington Consensus era sprang from their different relational dynamics. While the neoliberal agenda remains (albeit tempered by poverty alleviation and social welfare), the above DPLs were far more capable in transferring policy due to their collaborative engagement with recipients. TACs illustrated this by emphasising the 'political ownership' of advisory programs and reforms schedules.

## Summary

Technical assistance incorporated as components in lending operations are unique in that they are but one aspect of a larger loan or credit. From the outset, this upsets the relational dynamics between donor and recipient as the TACs cannot be requested by recipients without also receiving the complete project. While the Bretton Woods era was quite unexceptional in that hardware TACs involved uncontroversial activities (for instance, the training for railroad engineers), the advent of software, institutional development, and capacity building led to great change. Throughout the Washington Consensus era, TACs became devices to embed neoliberal reforms in recipients via drafting legislation, training government officials, and establishing institutions designed to propagate neoliberal policy. This period, however, demonstrated poor success rates as recipients were prescriptively (and thus coercively) compelled to implement the reforms. The post-Washington Consensus era saw radical change in this regard, as development policy lending and the focus upon collaborative programs and the 'good practice principles of conditionality' pursued greater efforts at equitable dialogue between donor and recipient. While the World Bank remains in an elevated position due to its financial resources (which many countries desperately need) and expertise (gained over decades in the field), the post-Washington

Consensus era appears to have identified a simple conclusion: the manner in which policy is packaged and presented affects the receptivity of recipients to said policy, with the larger lending operation being decisively influential in determining the receptivity of recipients to the technical assistance.

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CHAPTER 5

# Technical Assistance Loans

Stand-alone technical assistance projects comprise the second largest portion of advisory services provided by the World Bank. Defined as loans, credits, or grants designed to solely provide technical assistance, the main differences between stand-alone projects and TACs concern the relational dynamics of policy transfer, the purposes for which projects are offered, and the reasons why recipients request the assistance. First, given that stand-alone projects are not incorporated within a larger program, the ideas and practices transferred are not generally affected by conditionality. Second, stand-alone projects are typically not used to strengthen the effectiveness of lending operations, but rather to address specific capacity issues. Lastly, recipients are usually more involved in project drafting and implementation compared to TACs. While there are instances of overlap between stand-alone projects and TACs, the transfer process is altered due to their unique relational dynamics and qualities.

This chapter is structured into four sections. The first section—-*Technical Assistance Projects*—critiques stand-alone projects approved during the Bretton Woods era. During these early decades, technical assistance projects conformed to the hard technical assistance mould, similar to TACs provided between the 1940s and 1970s. Advisory services focused upon surveys and studies of recipient countries, as well as the drafting of national development plans. The second section—*Technical Assistance Loans*—evaluates TALs approved during the Washington Consensus era. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, TALs were used to build capacity and institutions to better implement and



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maintain neoliberal policy reforms, and were often provided to complement SALs and SECALs. The third section—*Non-Lending Technical Assistance*—reviews reformatted versions of stand-alone projects labelled NLTA delivered during the post-Washington Consensus era. While resembling TALs, they supported CDF initiatives in advocating greater country ownership of development programs. The final section—*Reimbursable Advisory Services*—turns to a unique example introduced in the 1970s, which was significantly scaled up during the late 2000s: stand-alone projects provided under a fee-based program to member countries ineligible to receive World Bank financial assistance. The chapter thus investigates the differing dynamics involved in stand-alone projects compared to TACs, analysing lessons learnt over several decades.

## Technical Assistance Projects

Stand-alone technical assistance projects first emerged during the late 1950s, with the IBRD delivering projects financed by the UNSF. As a result of an institutional reorganisation pursued by President Black in 1952, the IBRD founded the Technical Assistance and Liaison Staff department. Under Director Richard Demuth, the department coordinated technical assistance and advisory activities between the World Bank and other development agencies, as well as between the IBRD and IDA after 1960. In 1959, the IBRD began to operate as executing agency for technical assistance projects bankrolled by the UNSF. The collaboration between the IBRD and United Nations saw the following sample of hardware projects approved between the late 1950s and early 1960s (IBRD 1959: 16–17; IBRD 1960: 115; IBRD 1961: 14–15): electric power development and transportation surveys in Argentina; a study to improve access to Georgetown Harbour in British Guiana; a survey of rural power and irrigation possibilities in Guatemala; a study into the merits of constructing a dam for electric power generation, navigation, flood control, and rural irrigation in Nigeria; a series of natural resource, power, and highway surveys in Peru; minerals surveys in Suriname; and, a study of the silting problem affecting the Port of Bangkok in Thailand. While many within the IBRD and UNSF predicted tension between the two institutions, the contrary arose. Both acted in a cooperative, complementary manner (Demuth 1961: 22).

In January 1966, the UNSF merged with the United Nations Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance following a resolution adopted by the General Assembly in November 1965. Renamed the UNDP, it became the technical assistance arm of the United Nations. World Bank Presidents Woods and McNamara strengthened the relationship with the UNDP, continuing to function as an executor of UNDP-funded projects. Mason and Asher (1973: 308–309) note the UNDP/World Bank relationship 'was in part a response to requests for studies too small to be considered by the UNDP, in part a response to requests that were believed to be too urgent to await processing and approval under the procedures of the UNDP at that time, and in part a way of keeping in bounds a Bank surplus that was mounting at an almost embarrassing rate'. The World Bank *Policies and Operations Handbook* (1974: 68) details the practical aspects of the inter-institutional relationship:

> The UNDP finances the foreign exchange costs of pre-investment studies on a grant basis, but usually does not itself carry them out. Instead, it makes use of the United Nations and the specialised agencies to administer studies for which it provides financing. A request that the [World] Bank serve as Executing Agency may originate from the UNDP or with the country applying for UNDP assistance. Normally, the Bank's willingness to serve as Executing Agency depends upon the role it thinks it could usefully play in the country concerned and upon the availability within the Bank of the knowledge and technical competence required for organisation and supervision of the study. When the Bank does serve as Executing Agency, it helps to draw up the Project Documents for the study, negotiates the terms of reference with the government and the UNDP, employs the consultants, supervises the field work, and reviews the consultants' report.

To offer an example, the 1973 *Aviation Project* to Afghanistan was a US$2.5 million UNDP-financed stand-alone project executed by the IDA. It involved four technical assistance activities (Afghanistan 1973b: 6–7): (i) designing, constructing, and equipping a flight information centre in Kabul to monitor aircraft over Afghan airspace, including communications and recording equipment for air and ground services; (ii) training to ensure the efficient operation of a new Flight Information Centre (FIC) under the new Air Navigation Services (ANS) division, covering management, air traffic control, and maintenance; (iii) drafting economic and engineering feasibility studies for a proposed airport to serve the Kabul area; and, (iv) organising engineering and consulting services. The most significant part of the project was the IDA's establishment of the ANS and FIC, both of which were requested by the national government. Relevant to these two new agencies, the project built administrative capacity, employed foreign consultants (given the absence of local consultants with expertise in the field) to create modern commercial and management accounting systems, and trained air traffic controllers and instructors in using a flight control simulator over a one-year period (Afghanistan 1973a: 8–9). An overall satisfactorily rated project, its success derived from the recipient's constant commitment, given that the national government initiated the program.

By December 1973, the World Bank had executed 154 UNDP projects of which 69 had led to US$1.4 billion in IBRD and IDA loans and credits (World Bank 1974: 68). Despite this, the UNDP then remained the 'largest multilateral source of technical and pre-investment assistance in the world' (United Nations 1970: 337).

Beyond operating as executing agency for the UNDP, the IBRD and IDA began delivering their own technical assistance projects during the late 1960s following increasing requests from member countries to receive advisory services separate from normal lending operations. Emerging first during the presidency of George Woods, before becoming a central pillar of the advisory services approved under Robert McNamara, stand-alone projects were designed for a variety of purposes. As outlined in the World Bank *Policies and Operations Handbook* (1974: 66), and while first noting the 'integral' role played by TACs in lending operations (including identifying and preparing projects, analysing economies, formulating development policies, and establishing effective development institutions), it comments that

> the Bank has provided, either on request or on its own initiative, a variety of assistance to member countries not immediately connected with loan operations. This assistance has been confined to fields where, because of its character as a development finance institution and the operational experience of its staff, the Bank could be considered to have particular qualification or particular reasons for providing help, especially in cases where its assistance might be expected to facilitate new capital investment in high-priority projects.

The introduction of stand-alone projects not only illustrates the expansion of advisory services provided by the IBRD and IDA, but also signals that the World Bank recognised its potential as a fount of ideas and practices, focusing upon how to transfer its development norms from the international sphere to the domestic audiences.

Three factors are relevant to technical assistance projects during the Bretton Woods era. First, stand-alone projects were relatively inexpensive, usually costing only a few million dollars. The low cost stemmed from what was financed: studies, consultant recruitment, and equipment procurement. Second, consultancy firms were used extensively to deliver services. During the 1960s and 1970s, World Bank staff numbers were small compared to later decades (despite personnel levels increasing from 1400 in 1968 to 2400 in 1979), meaning that consultants were necessary to conduct studies and run training programs. Third, the projects displayed traits of both hardware and software, providing sector studies ('an analysis of the whole or part of a sector of the economy, e.g., transport or power, with a view to drawing up a coordinated investment program for that sector and identifying projects within it'), feasibility studies ('determines whether projects which have already been identified are technically feasible and economically justified'), and administrative capacity-building initiatives (World Bank 1974: 67). By 1976, between normal lending operations (and their TACs) and stand-alone technical assistance projects, the World Bank rapidly surpassed the UNDP to provide 'about 50% of *all* multilateral development assistance (technical assistance included)' (Galli 1976: 10 original emphasis).

An indicative IDA stand-alone project was the *Technical Assistance and Engineering Credit for Highways Project* to South Korea. Approved in July 1968, the US$3.5 million credit saw support for highway infrastructure development and administrative capacity growth. It came at a time when the Korean economy was being reoriented from agricultural to industrial production under the regime of Park Chung-hee, which led the primary mode of transportation—the train rail network—to become overwhelmed. The national government and IDA both agreed that improved transportation capacity and road networks were crucial. The project arose from a comprehensive study of the Korean transportation system conducted by the IDA in 1965, which listed changes to highway administration, planning, construction, and maintenance (Korea 1968:1). While the Korean government asked for feasibility studies of 2200 km of national highway, the IDA determined that half the length would be suitable given financial and administrative constraints.

Run by consultants (including the French firm BCEOM, Netherlands Engineering Consultants, and American company Amman and Whitney

International), six parts comprised the credit (Korea 1968: 2–7). First, a highway organisation study with a 12-month schedule, reviewing existing highway administration and formulating recommendations for the reorganisation of the national administration for public roads. It focused upon central, provincial, and local government organisations, and included advice on establishing new organisations and staffing, equipment, and installation costs; second, a transport coordination study with a 12-month schedule, analysing the existing responsibilities of ministries and agencies involved in formulating transport policy, leading to legislative proposals; third, technical assistance over 12 months to reorganise the national administration for public roads pursuant to the above two studies; fourth, a highway feasibility study with a 15-month schedule, studying 1160 km of road, with a focus upon highways linking Seoul to Kangnung (250 km), Samchok to Kangnung to Sokcho (148 km), Pohang to Pusan to Yosu (380 km), Suncheon to Kwangju (95 km), and Mokpo to Kwangju to Daejon (288 km); fifth, engineering services with an 18-month schedule, implementing the engineering recommendations of the above study, with advice on how to implement additional highway improvements; and, sixth, a 3-year training program involving overseas training of Korean personnel in the national administration of roads in both academic and practical settings, with consultancy firms used to deliver the training seminars, select candidates, and supervise programs.

With elements of both hardware and software, the Korean project was conceived and delivered as a series of surveys on how to strengthen transportation infrastructure. In packaging and presenting the project, not only were consultants jointly selected by the IDA and national government, but the consultant contracts were negotiated directly between the selected firms and Korean leadership, ensuring government control over the process (Korea 1968: 8). Given the largely uncontroversial nature of the project, and the direct focus on infrastructure and administration, the project received complete support from the recipient.

Similar to the Korean example, the IDA also approved a series of three highway projects to the Democratic Republic of Congo (then called the Republic of Zaire) in 1969 (US$6 million), 1972 (US$19 million), and 1975 (US$26 million). Again, while small credits compared to normal lending operations, the technical assistance projects sought to strengthen the national highway system. Jointly delivered by the IDA and UNDP, the institutions used consultants to carry out highway rehabilitation work and improve highway administration. The three projects originated from the recommendations of a World Bank Economic Mission that visited the country from February to March of 1968. The mission concluded that the country had endured serious infrastructural problems and administrative deficiencies since achieving independence in 1960, difficulties largely deriving from the sudden departure of expatriate advisors. The mission argued that poorly maintained highways weakened the political, economic, and administrative stability of the country (Congo 1969: 2–6). The IDA projects therefore guided the managerial and operational reform of the national highway administration, purchased emergency supplies of spare parts, vehicles, materials, and equipment, and began programs of priority maintenance and rehabilitation work. Their objectives were to stabilise country administration, improve the flow of domestic trade, increase productivity, and achieve savings in vehicle operating costs. A short synopsis of the three stand-alone projects is provided below.

The *Technical Assistance Highway Maintenance Project* (Congo 1969: 7–9) financed consultant services to improve highway administration, the procurement of spare parts, vehicles, materials, and maintenance equipment, and the performance of a limited number of emergency maintenance and rehabilitation works by Belgian consultancy firm Research and Development.

The *Technical Assistance Highway Maintenance Project (02)* (Congo 1972: 11–14) oversaw staff placement and training for operating the newly created Bureau of Roads, a division within the Ministry of Public Works, including the appointment of 45 foreign experts (from an American, Belgian, and French joint venture named Zaire-Routes) to oversee laboratory-style training and temporarily fill executive-level positions for 3 years. It also supervised the procurement of maintenance and other auxiliary equipment, including bulldozers, cars, flat trucks, fuel tankers, tippers, and mobile workshops, the rehabilitation of 1900 km of high-priority roads in six provinces: Bas Zaire, Haut Zaire, Kasai Occidental, Kasai Oriental, Kivu, and Shaba, and conducted feasibility (600 km) and engineering (400 km) studies for road construction and reconstruction, performed by CIDA.

The *Technical Assistance Highway Maintenance Project (03)* (Congo 1975: 12–15) delivered a diverse array of hardware and software services, including the placement of 24 foreign experts for 3 years within the Bureau of Roads, the organisation of two pilot highway maintenance schemes, designed to serve as training grounds for local staff within the Bureau of Roads, the establishment of a country-wide logistic support system for highway maintenance, in part involving the improvement and extension of existing workshops, stores, and office buildings in Kinshasa, Mbandaka, Kisangani, Bukavu, Kananga, and Lubumbashi, the rehabilitation of 600 km of gravel road, specifically the Kabinda-Kindu road spanning from Eastern Kasai to Kivu serving as a major agricultural artery, including engineering and supervision from French consultants BCEOM/SCET, feasibility studies of 1700 km of roads; and a comprehensive traffic survey.

To draw lessons from the above projects, and in line with stand-alone projects of the era, the Congolese government directly requested the joint help of the IDA and UNDP, exemplifying voluntary policy transfer. All three projects saw satisfactory performance ratings, with the successful pursuit of the projects secured by the simple fact that the national government already intended to perform the actions contained in the credits. As one example, the establishment of the Bureau of Roads was planned well in advance of the second technical assistance project. Comparable to TACs provided during the 1960s and 1970s, the above stand-alone projects to Korea and the Congo saw few problems affecting the relational dynamics between donor and recipient due to their uncontroversial nature.

The above case examples saw technical assistance directed towards highway development and administration. One final study of a series of broader technical assistance projects approved to Bangladesh between 1973 and 1978 reveals more about policy transfer dynamics. The *Technical Assistance Project* (1973a) and *Technical Assistance Project (02)* (1976) focused on agriculture, fishing, and forestry, while the *Technical Assistance Project (03)* (1978a) addressed public administration and legislative frameworks. The projects were all designed to improve the capacity of government ministries—Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry, Flood Control and Water Resources, Local Government and Rural Development, and Planning and Finance—to deliver a pipeline of future development programs through studies, consultant recruitment, and training.

The first and second projects, small US$4 million and US$7.5 million IDA credits, focused on two fields the IDA argued as necessary to improve food production: agriculture and water. Both projects were cogs in a larger 5-year UNDP development program, and financed feasibility studies and training. The projects (Bangladesh 1973b: 4; 1976: 9; 1983: 7–11) directed assistance to establish effective planning cells within development ministries, especially the Ministry of Planning; improving the managerial capacity of public corporations; and surveying inland water transport, high-yield rice varieties, and import control systems.

While both projects were rated ‘satisfactory’, they suffered shortcomings. On the one hand, support for the projects derived from the national government already intending to establish planning cells within development ministries, reinforcing suggestions made by the IDA (Bangladesh 1976: 6). On the other hand, there were failings of institution building and training, with the second project failing to achieve some of its primary goals (including the pursuit of a food grain storage training program) due to the national government being reluctant to utilise finances for training (Bangladesh 1983: 14–19). Even in early examples of stand-alone projects, policy transfer depended upon both technical and political factors.

The third technical assistance project, a larger US$10 million IDA credit, offered support for pre-investment planning, feasibility and engineering studies, consultant services, and project preparation training, including 39 subprojects focused on public administration development, vocational training preparation, and surveys and studies on agriculture, the environment, transportation, and energy and power (Bangladesh 1986: 20–72). It was implemented given that ‘Bangladesh’s limited absorptive capacity at every stage of the project cycle remains a key constraint on the country’s efforts to achieve a satisfactory rate of economic development’ (Bangladesh 1978b: 10). Compared to the two earlier projects, the 1978 credit saw improved performance due to increased collaboration between the IDA, national government, and foreign consultant companies (Bangladesh 1986: iv). The improved performance derived from two administrative changes that had political ramifications. First, overall coordinating responsibility for project implementation was delegated to the External Resources Division (ERD) of the Ministry of Finance (Bangladesh 1986: 2). Second, the ERD Project Coordinator was responsible for assisting and reviewing the preparation of terms-of-references for implementing agencies, as well as providing broader management and oversight for the project (Bangladesh 1986: 3). With the recipient being delegated greater responsibility in project execution, the manner in which the credit was packaged and presented affected the government’s reaction to the transfer process.

The above case studies reveal a fusion of hardware and software in early stand-alone projects. This meant that technical assistance was being increasingly used to ensure the creation of the *right sort* of institutions and the provision of the *right sort* of training. The projects were teaching officials to accept particular ideas and practices, while establishing structures to maintain them after the projects concluded. The main lesson learnt was that while technical assistance was largely understood as a technical issue, there was an indication of the relational dynamics of policy transfer through the need to improve administrative processes by engaging more closely with recipients, a lesson that would become central to neoliberal TALs during the Washington Consensus era.

## Technical Assistance Loans

The World Bank introduced TALs to support the transfer and implementation of neoliberal policy reforms during the early 1980s. Compared to the stand-alone projects of the 1960s and 1970s, the goals of TALs offered during the Washington Consensus era were to (World Bank 1985: 51):

> strengthen local institutions concerned with (i) designing and adopting policies, strategies, and institutional approaches promoting further development in a sector or in the economy as a whole, or (ii) preparing, implementing, or operating specific investments, or to carry out … tasks related to the preparation, implementation, or operation of investments.

Institutional development became an oft-repeated objective, with early TALs emerging under the label 'Public Sector Management Adjustment Projects'. Such TALs to Argentina and Brazil in 1986 used measures to strengthen economic ministries, improve macroeconomic analysis, develop training programs, improve customs systems, develop information systems, improve government asset control, and increase export competitiveness. Broadly, institutional development initiatives targeted the following (World Bank 1980: 4): financial systems, including accounting, auditing, and financial planning; technical and economic planning; management methods, including monitoring and evaluation; maintenance systems; organisational change; staff recruitment and personnel training; and, interagency coordination. While hard technical assistance remained as project preparation support, software became comparatively more sophisticated and entrenched in the rubric of development services offered by the IBRD and IDA. This trend continued into the 1990s, although TALs covered only a small percentage of financial disbursements: US$203 million in 1990, relative to US$4 billion in SALs and SECALs and US$14.2 billion in investment loans.

Building institutions became so central to the World Bank that it established the Institutional Development Fund (IDF) in July 1992. Recommended by the 1991 TARTF and approved by President Preston, it aimed at filling ‘gaps in the Bank’s set of instruments for financing technical assistance for institutional development work associated with policy reform, country management programs, poverty reduction programs, public sector management, private sector development, and environment management’ (World Bank 1994: 68). With per project financing varying from US$50,000 to US$500,000, the IDF approved 345 grants to 108 countries between July 1992 and December 1996 (World Bank 1980: 127).

TALs developed an enduring relationship with SALs and SECALs, with both project types typically approved on the same day and drafted to explicitly complement the other. Put simply, adjustment programs regularly were conceived with the recognition that a separate TAL would serve particular functions in the transfer of neoliberal policy. Despite the importance of these projects to SALs and SECALs, TALs suffered poor implementation success rates, building upon broader implementation problems affecting adjustment programs more generally (see Caufield 1980; Peet 2009). Several reasons for the failings of TALs exist, but most relate to difficulties in pursuing, achieving, and quantifying successful institutional growth. To illustrate, the OED concludes that the main reasons for consistently poor results in building and strengthening national institutions—all of which relate to technical factors—include (Weaving 1990: 2): poorly conceived institutional development strategies; poorly designed technical assistance projects; unclear or vague project objectives; inadequate project supervision; uneven consultant performance; poorly designed training programs; and failure to appreciate the limited absorptive capacity of recipients.

The OED reviewed 19 TALs to Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Niger, Rwanda, and Senegal, finding only three projects that received a ‘satisfactory’ rating (Weaving 1990: 2). With the World Bank then providing 10% of all technical assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa, this was a disappointing result. Given such poor performance, lessons drawn from successful TALs found a combination of technical (i.e. improving the quality of studies, supervision, and financing) and relational (i.e. the need to secure borrower commitment and coordination through building 'common goals') dynamics relevant to better performance; 'Since these projects see behavioural changes in societies, cultures, and institutions, for such projects the Bank needs to analyse behavioural issues much more systematically than it does now' (Weaving 1990: 3).

Weaving (1990: 3) additionally made important, yet critical, connections between TALs, SALs, and SECALs:

> The Bank's practice of linking technical assistance with adjustment loans does not necessarily serve the long-term goals of institutional development. First, the design of the [technical assistance] project often suffers because of the rush to get the structural or sectoral adjustment operation to the Board for approval. Second, the borrower may accept the [technical assistance] because the country needs the resources of the adjustment loan, yet subsequently provide reluctant to implement the institutional reforms to be developed by the [technical assistance] operation.

The author continues, however, by outlining that there may be success in coupling TALs with SALs and SECALs, but that success is contingent upon the following: 'real progress on the institutional front will depend on the development of autonomous, freestanding [technical assistance] operations, planned according to the time requirements of institutional reform, and developed within the framework of a long-term institutional development strategy' (Weaving 1990: 3). Given this point, TALs may more capably achieve their mandate the more divorced they are from adjustment programs, even though both may share identical normative goals. This suggests that the dynamics involved in how closely or distantly TALs are related to SALs and SECALs impacts success rates; how they are packaged, presented, and transferred is relevant to effective policy movement.

The remainder of this section is divided into two parts. The first half analyses TALs paired with SALs during the 1980s, evaluating their interplay. The second turns to privatisation TALs approved in the 1990s.

Of 30 approved TALs in 1984 and 1985, totalling US$247 million, eight supported SALs and 19 aided institutional development measures (World Bank 1984: 64; World Bank 1985: 70). As former Vice President and IBRD General Counsel Ibrahim Shihata (1991: 224) comments, 'among the areas targeted by TALs are the strengthening of regulatory institutions and practices, the training of inspectors and auditors, and the establishment of legal and institutional frameworks for the restructuring of financial intermediaries'. TALs ensured the implementation of SAL conditions by adapting institutional and policy frameworks.

To better understand the relationship between SALs and TALs, as well as the unique dynamics materialising between the World Bank and recipient governments, let us turn to three SALs and their companion TALs to Malawi (1983a), Togo (1985a), and Uruguay (1989a). The three adjustment projects—one IBRD loan and two IDA credits—were designed to support the economic recovery of their countries, including provisions to diversify the export base, encourage efficient import substitution, and build policymaking capabilities (Malawi 1983b: i), expand the production of export crops, improve macroeconomic management, and restructure, privatise, or close government-owned enterprises (Togo 1985b: i), and liberalise interest and exchange rates, reduce public expenditure deficits, and strengthen prudential regulation of banking systems (Uruguay 1989b: i). All of the above were staples of Washington Consensus era reforms.

In order to effectively pursue the three adjustment projects, the IBRD and IDA submitted companion TALs. As outlined in the Togolese SAL (Togo 1985c: 6),

> The progress in implementing the first phase of the structural adjustment program has been made possible with the help of two technical assistance projects financed by the [IDA]. Indeed, in the case of Togo where technical and managerial skills remain in short supply, the implementation of numerous and far-reaching structural adjustment measures will continue to require technical assistance in several areas, including preparation and execution of institutional reforms, and training of local staff. Thus, [*Technical Assistance Project (03)*] has been prepared concurrently with the second phase of the structural adjustment program as an implementation tool to help carry out the reforms.

The Malawian TAL, a three-year US$1.5 million credit, accompanied its SAL by financing (Malawi 1983c: 32): (i) an economist, training, and office supplies delivered to the newly established Energy Unit within the national government's Economic Planning Division; (ii) vehicles, operating expenses, and consulting services for a pilot fuelwood savings program in the national Tobacco Research Authority; (iii) consultant services for a power tariff study; (iv) studies examining the deregulation of industrial commodities prices; (iv) a financial controller and financial analyst seconded to the Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation; (v) consultant support, equipment, and in-service training for the Debt Management Unit of the Ministry of Finance; and, (vi) miscellaneous surveys required during the implementation of the adjustment program.

The *Project Completion Report* of the TAL found that while the Government of Malawi fully supported the structural adjustment program and its primary goals, the institution-building aspects of the TAL suffered numerous shortcomings. Notably, major problems emerged per those aspects not closely linked to the SAL (Malawi 1990: iii). An OED Evaluation Study presented at a seminar in Lilongwe, the capital city of Malawi, in April 1988 outlines the following problems undermining the TAL (Malawi 1990: 7–8): a lack of sufficient government coordinating capacity; difficulties in the government's system of personnel management; unsolved issues of to what extent foreign donors should make use of local consultants; competition and non-coordination among foreign donors; difficulties in reacting fast and flexibly as needs arose; insufficient planning and supervision of the individual technical assistance subprojects; and the high cost of technical assistance subprojects led the recipient to be strongly reluctant to use finances for technical assistance purposes. In addition to the above technical and coordinating problems undermining the TAL, two strong concerns emerged over the relational dynamics of the project. Not only did the 'blueprint approach' adopted by the IDA undermine the relevance and acceptance of the project by the national government (whereby the TAL was not tailored to the country context, but rather copy-and-pasted from other past experiences), there was also little engagement by the national government in the drafting of the TAL (Malawi 1990: 16).

The Togolese TAL, a US$6.2 million IDA credit, supported its companion adjustment program by targeting the following four areas through consultants and studies lasting from a few weeks to 2 years (Togo 1985c: 11–19): first, macroeconomic and financial management, including the appointment of an investment programmer to the Ministry of Planning and Industry; second, agricultural sector planning and policy formulation, involving the selection of a planning and coordination advisor in the Ministry of Rural Development to define sector strategy, train staff on project identification methodologies, and strengthen communication links between departments; third, state enterprise restructuring and management, financing a state enterprise restructuring advisor for 2 years to review diagnostic data and studies, an economic and financial analyst for 2 years to guide analytical studies of enterprises not already examined, and a financial management advisor for 2 years to establish a management information system and train staff; and, fourth, tourism promotion policy and reorganisation for the High Commission for Tourism, undertaking institutional reforms, a tourism promotional plan, and various human resources improvements.

While the TAL was rated 'satisfactory', there were a number of implementation problems. Even though Togo had shown support for policy-based technical assistance from the World Bank since the late 1970s, that support was highly contingent upon the 'transition of local counterpart personnel … to ensure lasting effects in Togo, and to justify the high cost involved' (Togo 1985c: 7). In this context, two lessons were identified. First, '"ownership" is … the principal condition for the success of both SAL-supported policy reform programs and the technical assistance/capacity-building elements of these programs' (Togo 1995: 16). Certain aspects of the TAL received considerable government support because of the strong leadership of the minister in charge of State Enterprises, who held confidence in the benefits of privatisation, while other aspects failed to be institutionalised and socialised because of a lack of commitment by the government. Second, and this point is also relevant to the above project to Malawi, 'strong linkages between adjustment lending and technical assistance could have both a positive and a negative impact on the capacity-building element of [technical assistance] projects' (Togo 1995: 17). Simply put, the nature of the SAL, the conditions prescribed, and the involvement of the national government in the adjustment process have notable spill-over effects on the companion TAL, even with aspects that are not directly related to the SAL.

The Uruguayan TAL, a US$6.5 million IBRD loan, financed studies designed to provide frameworks for future reforms, as well as training and equipment needed for their implementation. The studies addressed social security finances and administration, financial sector reform, Central Bank supervision, tax administration, and public investment planning (Uruguay 1989b: 2–3). Compared with the above TALs to Malawi and Togo, the TAL to Uruguay was clearly linked to its SAL. Despite meeting some of its objectives, the sustainability of the TAL was deemed unlikely and both the IBRD and borrower's performance was rated 'poor'. In addition to listing technical issues (including extant administrative constraints, poor monitoring, and limited mid-term reviews), the major shortfalls of the institution-building initiatives derived from 'unfavourable political circumstances in advancing adjustment reforms. This was manifested … in the government's inability to obtain opposition legislators' support for rationalising the social security system' (Uruguay 1996: 10).

Common lessons emerge from the performance of the above three TALs. The projects were designed to help recipients complete their national adjustment programs by increasing public sector efficiency, strengthening economic and financial planning institutions, abolishing labour market regulations, drafting legislation to liberalise exchange rates and foreign trade, and training personnel. Unlike SAL conditionalities, the TALs supported institutional development and capacity building intended to reorient the focus of recipient governments along market-friendly lines, not by coercion but by persuaded consent, to ensure their successful neoliberal adaptation. Nonetheless, the failings of the three TALs congregate around the lack of country ownership of the technical assistance programs. There was poor awareness of recipient needs and a greater focus upon enforcing SAL prescriptions. The TALs were presented and packaged as simply extensions of the SALs, thereby undermining their usefulness in transferring policy.

Whereas the 1980s were characterised by TALs supporting SALs and SECALs, the 1990s saw the expansion of stand-alone projects to address broader neoliberal reform initiatives. In particular, TALs increasingly addressed private sector development and the privatisation of state-owned enterprises. The following paragraphs analyse several privatisation TALs, some ancillary to SALs but most stand-alone: Côte d'Ivoire (1992a), Peru (1992a), the Republic of Congo (1995), Mexico (1995a), Croatia (1996a), and Gabon (1997a). The projects share similar goals, largely relating to alleviating the chronic administrative and financial burdens affecting the public sector, a result of untenable public debt, fiscal disequilibria, and poor performance. Consistent lessons were learnt from projects approved under both the Preston and Wolfensohn presidencies, and reveal trends from the later years of the Washington Consensus era. The six TALs, while oscillating between 'satisfactory' and 'unsatisfactory' ratings, present common conclusions.

While relatively small projects costing between US$5 and US$30 million, the TALs pursued common objectives: Côte d'Ivoire (1992b: 2): '… assist in reducing Government holdings and alleviating the recurrent administrative and financial burden of public enterprises'; Peru (1992b: 2): '… assist the Government in the preparation and implementation of its privatisation program and related sectoral policy, legal, and regulatory reforms'; Congo (1995: 3): '… further the capacity of [the] Government to prepare and implement the second phase of its [privatisation] reform program'; Mexico (1995b: 4): '… develop a sound legal and regulatory framework in support of privatisation … and provide support to the privatisation preparation process'; Croatia (1996b: 4): '… support the Government of Croatia's program of [privatisation] reforms by financing studies and advisory services to help design and implement reforms'; and, Gabon (1997b: 4): '… establish a competitive regulatory and more favourable business environment … and transfer productive assets and commercial activities to the private sector'.

In pursuing the above objectives, the TALs contained a number of consistent components, repeatedly using consultant services to draft privatisation legislation, carry out privatisation processes, conduct studies, and deliver training programs to officials. Unique additions, compared to the TALs of the 1980s, were measures to interact with civil society and 'educate' news media outlets to better disseminate information on privatisation. A short summary of each project is provided below.

The Côte d'Ivoirian TAL (1992b: 2–3 and 18) was a three-year project financing general institutional support to the government privatisation committee (the *Cellule Technique du Comité de Privatisation*) in the sale of 71 state-owned enterprises worth US$800 million and 400 person-months of consulting services for the preparation and implementation of privatisation and technical advice, as well as training on sales strategy, valuation, financial engineering, and related legal issues.

Complementing a SAL, the Peruvian TAL (1992b: 3) financed the appointment of fixed-term consultants for 3 years in the Commission for Promotion of Private Investment's technical secretariat, consulting services to promote domestic and international private investment and to develop information and reorientation programs to assist laid-off public servants, and drafting sectoral policy and regulatory reforms relevant to privatisation.

The TAL to the Republic of Congo (1995: 3–4) involved preparing pro-competition regulatory frameworks, advising the national government on the sale of public enterprises in the petroleum, transportation, and telecommunications sectors, liquidating 57 non-viable public companies, and sponsoring a public information campaign to inform stakeholders and the public of the benefits and implications of transitioning to a market-based economy.

Project activities in the Mexican TAL (1995b: 4) included hiring consultants to assist in the analysis and development of strategic options, policies, and regulations, as well as directly participating in the privatisation process and financing training programs and equipment procurement.

A SECAL companion, the Croatian TAL (1996b: 4) financed consultant services to support the Ministry of Privatisation prepare its privatisation program through logistical support for voucher distribution, preparing regulatory frameworks, and designing and coordinating a public awareness campaign.

The Gabonese TAL (1997b: 4–5) delivered several subprojects agreed to with the national government, including finance to support the creation of an appropriate regulatory framework and implement laws conducive to attracting private investment, employing consultants to privatise public companies in the telecommunications, water, power, palm oil, rubber, and cement sectors, and establishing and operating a communication information unit to engage with civil society on proposed reforms, notably involving building media campaigns and training journalists to more capably report on economic and governance issues.

In providing the TALs, common lessons were found in both successful and unsuccessful projects (Peru 1998: 16–17; Congo 2000: 8–9; Côte d'Ivoire 2000: 14–15; Croatia 2000: 10; Mexico 2003: 26; Gabon 2005: 15–16): a high level of commitment is required to implement multi-dimensional programs, with both technical issues and political considerations affecting project success rates; the complexity of privatisation, particularly when an entire sector is being restructured, requires consultation with a broad range of stakeholders to achieve consensus over proposed reforms; interlinkages between privatisation and private sector growth makes the sale of public enterprises more politically palatable, particularly if broad support is demonstrated for one but not the other; privatisation programs should be implemented rapidly during periods of crisis, because post-crisis periods reveal greater difficulty in securing reforms once politics-as-usual returns; expectations and timeframes must be carefully managed, so that unrealistic goals are not set; people from the private sector should be given key roles in the privatisation process, including the appointment of people from the private sector in government departments guiding privatisation; attention must be paid to public relations, otherwise resistance may impede rapid privatisation; constant communication with the public is required, as results do not 'speak for themselves'; and participatory processes are more likely to garner long-term support and commitment, even in circumstances where the political environment is not favourable to privatisation reforms.

Building upon the evidence offered in a review of TALs paired with SALs during the 1980s, the privatisation TALs of the 1990s demonstrate the IBRD and IDA displaying a greater awareness of the impact political and social considerations make in transferring policy. What is interesting in the above cases is that both technical and relational dynamics were subsumed into common lessons. In presenting, packaging, and transferring privatisation reforms, the six TALs emphasised the importance of country ownership, participatory process, stakeholder engagement, and public communication to successful policy movement. The World Bank thus attempted to 'sell' privatisation to government officials, news media, and civil society, while concurrently building structures to secure the acceptance and adaptation of policy reforms. This demonstrates significant changes in the passage of policy from the international to the domestic in the Washington Consensus era, affirming that the technical merits of a project are routinely affected by the relational dynamics between donor and recipient, as well as between governments and citizens, particularly on controversial issues.

## Non-Lending Technical Assistance

ESW and NLTA were technical assistance labels introduced in the late 1990s, conceived to support lending operations and frame country development strategies by creating, sharing, and applying knowledge through analytical and advisory services. Between 700 and 1000 ESW and NLTA products were approved annually throughout the 2000s; 601 ESW and 207 NLTA products were delivered in 2006 alone, with their annual costs doubling between the Wolfensohn and Wolfowitz presidencies. The rebranding of technical and advisory services into ESW and NLTA supported the attempt by Wolfensohn to reorient the World Bank from a conditionality bank into a Knowledge Bank, evolving alongside the introduction of the CDF in 1999 and the 2004 launch of DPLs.

Leaving ESW aside until the next chapter, NLTA draw upon lessons learnt in the 1980s and 1990s, and are voiced in the language of ownership, participation, and inclusion. As Eade (2007: 632) comments, the 'World Bank (now-recast as the Global Knowledge Bank) … [has] adopted the language of capacity building and participation, relating this to the neoliberal agenda of rolling back the state, privatising public services (the marketisation of social welfare), good governance, and democratisation'. This rebranding saw stand-alone projects become mechanisms through which to transform the persona of the World Bank. Adopting a more voluntary approach to policy transfer, similar to TACs embedded in DPLs, NLTA build dialogue and partnerships to foster collaborative engagement with recipients. Yet, while contending to 'empower' recipients, the IBRD and IDA continued to advance their broadly neoliberal agendas.

NLTA complement ESW. While the latter is designed to 'inform lending, inform government policy, build client capacity, stimulate public debate, and influence the development community …, [the] objectives of [NLTA] are to assist in policy implementation, strengthen institutions, and facilitate knowledge exchange' (World Bank IEG 2008b: xiii). More practical than ESW, NLTA is defined by being: '(i) aimed at enabling an external client to implement reforms to strengthen its institutions; (ii) free-standing; and, (iii) linked to a [World] Bank unit accountable for the service provided' (World Bank 2005c: 15) and often take the form of workshops and conferences (as vehicles to share international best practice, exchange knowledge, and build consensus), technical advice (as practical assistance to support recipients implement policies, programs, or projects), and technical notes (as written practical guides to help execute policies, programs, or projects). In this context, the main difference between NLTA and ESW is that the latter aims to generate original analytical content, while the former seeks to disseminate or apply existing knowledge (World Bank 2005b: 14). Importantly characterised by its 'free-standing' quality, meaning that it is clearly separate from other lending operations, success rates in NLTA are measured by the following indicators: whether the policy was implemented, whether institutions were built to increase domestic capacity, and whether knowledge exchange led to new frameworks being learnt and adapted to local circumstances.

A 2008 Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) brief outlines the factors leading to effective NLTA and what recipients want from NLTA (World Bank IEG 2008a: 2–3). In regard to NLTA efficacy, the brief comments that (i) the lower the government starting capacity, the lower the NLTA effectiveness; (ii) the greater the government receptivity, the greater the effectiveness; (iii) the lower the NLTA technical quality, the lower the effectiveness; and, (iv) the closer the collaboration with recipients, the greater the effectiveness. Importantly, while the brief found that 'whether the client specifically requested the [technical assistance] did not matter for effectiveness …, client buy-in was still important' (World Bank IEG 2008a: 3). Put simply, the 'Bank needs to ensure there is genuine interest or to engender such interest' (World Bank IEG 2008a: 3); this fits the mould of finding or creating sympathetic interlocutors.

Turning to what recipients want from NLTA, the IEG brief continues: IBRD member countries indicate a strong preference for non-lending services over lending services, particularly middle-income countries where financing from the IBRD is less important than advice; IBRD and IDA member countries find World Bank NLTA more useful than that from other institutions; and IBRD and IDA member countries regard greater World Bank presence in NLTA to be of benefit, not simply limited to providing technical assistance, but also to later follow-up and long-term interactions (World Bank IEG 2008a: 3). The brief is thus explicit in outlining the importance of relational dynamics to the effectiveness of NLTA.

To illustrate the nature and qualities of NLTA, let us consider a project to the Kingdom of Lesotho: the *HIV and AIDS Capacity Building and Technical Assistance Project* (2004a), a US$5 million IDA grant that received an overall 'satisfactory' rating. Lesotho ranks among the worst-affected countries by the HIV/AIDS epidemic. At the time of project approval, it was estimated that 330,000 adults of a 2.2 million population suffered the virus. Beginning in 2000, the national government adopted a multi-sectoral National HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan and a National AIDS Policy Framework, the objectives of both being to control the spread of the virus and mitigate its impact on individuals, families, communities, and the nation (Lesotho 2004b: 6). Between 2002 and 2004, the government sought assistance from a variety of external sources to support its reform program. The NLTA project arose in this context as 'a technical assistance grant with a medium-term focus (4 years) to finance services, training, and goods in support of implementation of HIV/AIDS interventions' (Lesotho 2004b: 8), with financial support drawn from the not-for-profit organisation Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (GFATM). The goal of the grant was to increase the capacity of government and non-government institutions responsible for the national response to the epidemic; 'It was clear that additional finance resources from the World Bank to directly support HIV interventions were not what was most needed, but that what was necessary was targeted support that could facilitate the effective utilisation of GFATM resources as well as leverage additional external financing' (Lesotho 2009: 3).

To this end, the NLTA contained four subprojects addressing capacity (Lesotho 2004b: 9–10). *Support to the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning*: this subproject financed technical and advisory services to strengthen the capacity of the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning's Coordination Office so it could perform oversight roles under the GFATM agreement. *Support to the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare*: this subproject was divided into two subcomponents: assistance to the central Ministry of Health and Social Welfare to execute responsibilities, including establishing a new HIV/AIDS Directorate, procuring equipment and training for the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit, and support leadership within the ministry; and, enable the National Drugs and Supplies Organisation to conduct procurements using international competitive bidding, strengthen inventory management and security, expand warehouse capacity, and guide the creation of a logistics system. *Support to Secretariat of the National AIDS Program*: this subproject financed consultant services to generate and manage funding proposals, conduct regular training activities, and develop community-based monitoring capacity. *Support for civil society and private sector capacity development*: this subproject supported capacity building to enable civil society and faith-based organisations, traditional institutions, and communities to develop proposals, as well as coordinating the formal and informal private sector to implement HIV/AIDS activities.

In line with the goal of building the capacity of government and non-governmental actors, the project found that a range of HIV/AIDS initiatives had been 'scaled up' as a result of its activities: extended prevention activities among youth through peer education; greater capacity in communities to respond to HIV; broadened access to full spectrum of HIV care; expansion of Prevention to Mother to Child Transmission activities to 18 health services; new training programs on HIV and human rights to mitigate the impact of infection on people living with the virus; and, widened support to national and local government structures (Lesotho 2009: 16). In addition, specific to each of the subprojects listed above, the capacity of government ministries saw causal increases in the procurement and distribution of health sector goods, as well as improved administrative arrangements (Lesotho 2009: 20–21). As such, the project was rated ‘satisfactory’ in achieving its objectives and its national developmental impact was listed as ‘substantial’; this was a very strong outcome for the IDA grant.

The success of the Lesotho project was recorded as deriving from six lessons learnt (Lesotho 2009: 26–27). First, using established country-led systems led to an increase in the performance, indicating the value of building on and using existing within-country systems. Second, the effective management of technical assistance is crucial to sustained results in countries with human resource capacity constraints, while avoiding ‘dependence’ on technical assistance. Third, streamlining institutional arrangements and the roles of various subprojects at the design stage beneficially avoids implementation delays. Fourth, building successful partnerships at the early project preparation and appraisal stages encourages the successful implementation of the project, as strong partnerships at the design and delivery stages can lead to long-term support. Fifth, sustainable human resources retention requires long-term planning and country ownership of the project, meaning that it is not enough to simply build capacity but rather it is necessary to empower those staff trained to maintain future support for reforms after the project ends. And, sixth, creating an enabling environment for long-term civil society development, particularly on major health care concerns, can lead to longer community and nation-wide support for policy change.

Outlining intertwined technical and relational dynamics as relevant to the success of the project, the IDA concludes that the NLTA grant ‘has clearly demonstrated that the technical assistance approach can achieve a lot with very little financing and what the Bank can do in a country like Lesotho with capacity challenges to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of donor financing’ (Lesotho 2009: 27), closing with the claim that the project could serve as inspiration for other priority development areas including climate change.

The Lesotho NLTA project was not the only one to draw such lessons in review of its subject matter. IBRD and IDA NLTA projects approved to Haiti (2005), Kosovo (2005), Nigeria (2005), the Slovak Republic (2005), Cameroon (2008), and the Solomon Islands (2008a) share similar conclusions, outlining common lessons: Haiti (2010: 24): ‘Overall, Bank operations, especially the capacity-building initiatives, would benefit from sound social and conflict analysis of the stakeholders, dynamics, interests, and trends’; Kosovo (2013: 25): ‘Even short extensions could produce substantial gains if they are introduced when conditions are favourable. The last extension took place at almost the end of 2011. At that time it was clear that government commitment became stronger, the political situation in Kosovo more amenable to implement the project decisively, the (national government and Bank) teams more enthusiastic to achieve results'; Nigeria (2012: 28): 'Political economy considerations have to be understood and taken into account when designing and implementing integrated financial management information systems. Supporters of legacy systems and existing business processes … [and] actors with "private interests" are likely to work actively against the new systems'; Slovak Republic (2009: 22): 'Small projects, small interest. The amount of the loan for the … project was probably adequate for the actual tasks, but not enough to catch and hold the interest of ministers once the project champions had moved on'; Cameroon (2011: 24): 'Political commitment and ownership of the borrower matter'; and, Solomon Islands (2008b: 8): '[Government] commitment to develop its ability to analyse and effectively use [technical assistance] is … critical'.

In sum, World Bank NLTA continued many of the trends and built upon many of the lessons learnt during the Washington Consensus era. While the rebranding of stand-alone projects as NLTA may appear trifling, there emerged significant differences to mention. In the first instance, as part of the post-Washington Consensus, CDF, and DPLs, NLTA projects evinced greater interest in country ownership, empowerment, and capacity building than previous decades, demonstrating that recipient perceptions of projects are important. In the second instance, the IBRD and IDA were less overtly 'free market' in their approach, drawing lessons from relevant sources and scaling back their ideological drive, although a neoliberal mentality remained.

## Reimbursable Advisory Services

Immediately prior to the 1973 Oil Shock, a new form of stand-alone project emerged: reimbursable technical assistance. Initially provided to first- and second tier petroleum exporting countries (Saudi Arabia and Kuwait of the former and Iran and Venezuela of the latter), this reimbursable service was offered to petroleum exporters that did not require financial assistance due to high per capita incomes and vast petrodollar surpluses. The service was 'reimbursable' because the recipients paid directly for the assistance provided, rather than being financed through a debt-based loan or credit. During the 1970s, reimbursable technical assistance projects focused on staff training, national institution building, sector planning, and the preparation of national accounts and long-term economic goals (World Bank 1978: 180). In directly paying for the assistance, recipients clearly and expressly requested the advisory product; the recipient was the main party instigating the assistance.

Saudi Arabia consistently received the largest portion of reimbursable technical assistance, annually receiving over 90% of all reimbursable services during the 1970s and 1980s. Willi Wapenhans (1993: 23–24), the former World Bank Vice President of Europe, Middle East, and North Africa Region, recalls that

> a technical assistance program was wanted for Saudi Arabia; but since the country was rich it had to be on a reimbursable basis and without any lending. Management obviously thought that I might be the person to persuade the Saudis that the Bank had useful expertise to offer to which they could have access at cost. We would, however, employ our normal policies, practices, and criteria, including those of open bidding, transparency in decision-making, and the application of strictly objective decision-making criteria. This latter stricture was aimed at curbing open and concealed forms of collusion and corruption. So I was launched into an association that later spread beyond Saudi Arabia to other parts of the Middle East and lasted to this day. I went to Saudi Arabia for the first time in the spring of 1973 to develop and agree to a technical assistance program on a reimbursable basis helpful to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Outlining the issues addressed by the Saudi technical assistance program, Wapenhans (1993: 25) continues:

> While we developed the program, and we initiated a lot of work for Saudi Arabia, the oil crisis hit at the end of'73 and the beginning of'74. Balance of payment surpluses began to mount. Saudi Arabia had to demonstrate that it could, without too much waste, put some of the growing surpluses to use for its own people. We accelerated work on the Bahrain causeway and other transportation projects. We designed a crash program for education and human resources development. Urban housing and modern concepts of its construction were introduced. We developed blueprints for infrastructure for the pilgrimages to Mecca and Medina, including at the airport in Jeddah where there is a separate staging area for pilgrims, as well as for providing water supply, sanitation, and shelter for the pilgrims in Mecca.

Finally, and demonstrating the importance of relational dynamics to effective technical assistance programs, particularly of the need to have on-the-ground supporters of reforms, Wapehans (1993: 26) concludes that

> The political effects of our contacts were not negligible. Through our work we were in touch with Hisham Nazir, the Minister of Planning, Sheikh Aba Alkhail, the State Minister of Finance, and Sheikh Yamani, the Oil Minister. This trilogy of native-born Saudis was increasingly replacing expatriates as the Royal Family's principal advisors and managers of national affairs … From the earliest days a very strong supporter of the Bank's role was Sheikh Mohammad Aba Alkhail. Shortly after we started our cooperation he became Minister of Finance. He is still Minister of Finance today, a high degree of continuity. Aba Alkhail became a real friend of the World Bank. This relationship had become mutually beneficial in many ways.

Although a relatively small financial expenditure compared to other services, reimbursable projects steadily rose from US$3.2 million in 1977 to US$5.8 million in 1981 (World Bank 1977: 164; World Bank 1981: 200). By the early 1990s, reimbursable projects had come to focus upon macroeconomic analysis, privatisation, labour markets, and policy advice on export promotion, as well as sectoral studies on health, power, tourism, and sewerage (World Bank 1993: 144). While a rarely discussed aspect of World Bank development assistance, reimbursable services are significant given the unique relationship between donor and recipient under a fee-payment structure.

An ongoing service throughout the 1990s and 2000s, reimbursable technical assistance was rebranded as RASs in the late 2000s. With the exception of a few projects approved to Sub-Saharan Africa (Equatorial Guinea and Gabon), Latin America (Brazil), and the Middle East and North Africa (Oman and Bahrain), RASs have mostly been directed to member countries in Europe and Central Asia.

RASs are offered on request by clients, including national and sub-national governments, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), multilateral institutions, and commercial entities. Over 30 RAS agreements have been signed with member countries in Europe and Central Asia in recent years, including Albania, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, and the Russian Federation (World Bank 2015: 4). Provided to middle- and high-income countries ineligible to receive loans or credits, RAS programs include the provision of policy advice, analytical and diagnostic work, donor coordination, impact evaluations, program implementation support, knowledge sharing, and training, which are reimbursed by the recipient for the costs involved in delivering the services (World Bank 2015: 2). To illustrate, a RAS agreement signed with Latvia in 2014 outlined a four-stage repayment schedule, under which 215,745 EUR would be paid within 10 business days of signing the contract, followed by 300,000 EUR, 283,440 EUR, and 283,440 EUR after the submission by the IBRD of timetabled deliverables, including inception papers, operational manuals, policy papers, summary reports, workshops, and conferences (Goldstein 2014: 2). Importantly, RAS activities denote the voluntary nature of recipients entering into an agreement to receive policy expertise. As the World Bank (2015: 5 emphasis added) notes, the 'Bank partners with clients in an expanded relationship beyond the standard contractual agreements that can be offered by the private sector. Because of this distinction, the Bank does not bid on advisory services but rather engages with client countries as a *development partner*'. Such comments allude to RAS products as not being prescriptive, but rather a collaborative dialogue and partnership with 'clients'.

The vulnerabilities exposed by the 2008 GFC led countries in Europe and Central Asia to request RASs, as the crisis threatened the sustainability of their economic growth, poverty reduction schemes, and stability and competitiveness. To illustrate the rise in demand, such fee-based servicesincreased from US$0.3 million in 2000 to US$30.8 million in 2011, with a sudden spike from US$10 to US$20 million in 2008 (World Bank 2012: 2). While sparked by recipient concerns, RAS programs remain voluntary activities given the absence of prescriptive conditions. Consider the following IBRD projects in the paragraphs below.

The Czech Republic received a financial reporting program designed to support the national government's development of 'a sustainable regulatory and institutional framework that strengthens the application of the EU *acquis communautaire* in corporate financial reporting' (World Bank 2015: 13). Pursued between 2010 and 2013, the RAS involved knowledge-exchange events with audit regulators, the design and implementation of training materials, oversight tools and auditing guides, professional and management-level training sessions, and the publication of updated accounting and auditing codes and standards reports.

The Russian Federation received an investment climate program between December 2012 and June 2014 designed to support government policy reforms in select investment climate areas (World Bank 2015: 80–81). Subprojects within the program included organising workshops to discuss utilities, construction, and property registration reform, running conferences on how to build favourable investment climates, and the drafting of reports and recommendations on how to improve the investment climate through policy changes to customs and tax administration.

Hungary received a RAS program approved in 2015 addressing the issue of social inclusion. Two components divided the project: (i) targeting and monitoring for results on social inclusion and (ii) the development of a local framework for the implementation of a national social inclusion strategy (Goldstein 2015: 6–7). Included were the preparation of methodology and indicator studies for mapping marginalised communities, several weeks of expert support for data analysis, the drafting of a study outlining international and local practices for the inclusion of disadvantaged groups, and the development of a planning and implementation handbook for policy experts.

While it is too early to comment on the performance indicator ratings of the above RAS programs, an initial conclusion can be derived from the character of these activities. The three programs reveal RASs to be more closely aligned to voluntary policy transfer than coercive transfer. While RASs could be regarded (at least in part) as indirect coercive transfer, notably in reference to the World Bank setting best practice standards that countries are recommended to follow, reimbursable services favour a more consensual, collaborative, and voluntary illustration of development policy transfer. In fact, drawing upon its own experiences, the World Bank (2015: 6) concludes that policy transfer through technical assistance is best achieved through collaboration, reinforcing the position of this book that relational dynamics affect perceptions of legitimacy.

## Summary

Emerging as either stand-alone projects during the Bretton Woods era, TALs during the 1980s and 1990s, NLTA during the post-Washington Consensus era, or reimbursable products over several decades, technical assistance projects reveal differing relational dynamics between the World Bank and recipients compared to TACs. Whereas the previous chapter outlined how the larger lending operation may undermine the incorporated components, technical assistance projects are typically isolated from loans or credits (with the exception of TALs supporting SALs and SECALs). This means that the interaction surrounding the project concerns more the ideas and practices transferred, and less recipient needs for financial assistance. From the evidence collated, it is clear that as time progressed both the IBRD and IDA recognised that the manner of engagement with recipients was just as important (and perhaps, in certain instances, more so) than the technical merits of the program. Given that technical assistance projects are foremost concerned with the transfer and adaptation of ideas, practices, technologies, knowledge, and skills, engagement with recipients becomes central given that the World Bank needs sympathetic interlocutors to ensure the successful transmission of policy products from the international to the domestic. Again, and building upon lessons learnt in review of TACs, the manner in which technical assistance is presented, packaged, and transferred shapes its ability to convince recipients to accept and adopt its ideas and practices.

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CHAPTER 6

# Survey Missions

Survey missions are a more background yet pervasive pillar of World Bank technical assistance. Defined as activities involved in assessing the development status of a surveyed country, such missions offer suggestions and recommendations for future development programs. Their significance is that they have consistently informed World Bank development strategies and lending schedules since the 1940s, and have comprised a crucial mechanism in formal dialogues between the institution and its member countries. Survey missions are relevant to questions of policy movement for they produce 'actionable recommendations': 'A robust test of the quality or usefulness of a task is its ability to generate consistent and actionable recommendations with a foothold in the country's institutional reality and its capacity to implement recommendations' (World Bank IEG 2013: 39). As a technical assistance pillar, survey missions may not directly implement reforms, change institutions, or train personnel, but are pivotal in constructing collective development understandings between the World Bank and its member countries. Survey missions therefore relate to both knowledge 'creation' and 'sharing'. As Stone (2000: 243) remarks,

> The significance of knowledge is that it informs, enables, and empowers those who possess it and the institutions that are the embodiment of it. Knowledge creation is usually regarded as a good thing for its own sake, but one that may also have unanticipated benefits. Knowledge sharing is viewed as an important route for grappling with complex problems faced



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> by societies and economies of both the developed and developing world. The expansion of state capacities and responsibilities, the rapidity of technological and communications advances, the forces of globalisation, the pressing need for reform, adjustment, and greater uncertainty over policy choices calls forth a requirement for informed decision making. The pace of change creates a dynamic not only for information and analysis but also for intelligent criticism and alternative ideas that is often provided by research.

As an example of 'outreach activities, data-gathering, and monitoring to promote awareness and education in the public,' survey missions confer upon the World Bank the capacity to become an 'institutional junction for epistemic communities' (Stone 2004: 554). Defined by Haas (1992: 3) as 'a network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area,' epistemic communities are capable of stimulating 'policy transfer inducing changes in state interests' (Dunlop 2010: 52) through their perceived legitimacy as collectives of specialists producing expert knowledge on a given subject matter; 'Epistemic communities are less a "new" international actor or unit of analysis than they are a vehicle for the development of insightful theoretical premises about the creation of collective interpretation and choice' (Adler and Haas 1992: 368).

This chapter is divided into five sections—*General Survey Missions, Country Economic Memoranda, Country Assistance Strategies, Economic and Sector Work*, and *Country Partnership Frameworks*—and examines the evolution of World Bank survey missions from 1949 to 2016. Moving beyond an 'orthodox' appraisal of policy transfer, the chapter reveals how the movement of policy products from the international to the domestic does not always require direct intervention or supervision; a more 'hands-off' situation.

As an important aside, it is not possible to quantify survey mission success and failure in the same way as TACs and stand-alone projects. This is because there is great difficulty in establishing causal connections between the processes of researching and drafting survey reports and substantive policy change in recipient countries. The chapter thus focuses more upon how changes in approach to survey missions altered their effectiveness, as opposed to an appraisal of their substantive impact.

## General Survey Missions

Introduced in 1949, general survey missions investigated the problems and potential of a surveyed country, at the end of which the national government received a report ranging from one to several hundred pages compiling the data collected and proposing a lending schedule. As the *1952 IBRD Annual Report* outlines (IBRD 1952: 10):

> The Bank's technical assistance program is the outgrowth of its conviction that external financing, from whatever quarter, will be of most value in countries that are already making the best possible use of their own resources. The principal way in which the Bank has endeavoured to help member countries to achieve this objective has been through the general survey mission – a group of experts specially organised to make an intensive firsthand study of a country's resources and formulate recommendations designed to serve as the basis of a long-term development program.

The missions arose from the view that IBRD loans could only be effective alongside functional development plans; a means to ensure loan efficacy (Blough 1968: 176; Kraske 1996: 89). Organised during the 1950s and 1960s, their importance was twofold. First, they were highly visible, demonstrating the World Bank to be a source of advice and expertise. Second, they led the institution to acquire a wealth of data on national development. As Moore (1960: 81) notes, the 'reports of these missions comprise the largest single collection of information extant on the problems and characteristics of underdeveloped economies'. Escobar (1988: 431–432) provides a more critical appraisal, commenting on the first general survey mission to Colombia in 1949:

> Development planning was the major technique in which processes of professionalization and institutionalisation converged … The planner and the economist played a special role in the new world of development. But planning was not just the application of a theoretical knowledge; it was the instrument through which economics became useful, linked in a very direct fashion to policy and the state. The development economist was the expert par excellence called upon to produce the most basic truths about development.

In context, the IBRD was not the only multilateral institution undertaking survey missions during this period. Following a resolution by the United Nations Economic and Social Council, the first United Nations Mission of Technical Assistance arrived in the Republic of Haiti in October 1948. Preceding the IBRD's first 1949 general survey mission, the United Nations mission analysed the internal management of Haiti (including its political instability and debt burden) and waning productivity of its agricultural and industrial sectors (Amrith and Sluga 2008: 261).

On 20 June 1949, 4 weeks into the Black presidency, it was announced that Colombia was to receive the IBRD's first general survey mission. Labelled a 'comprehensive economic survey mission', it lasted from 11 July to 5 November 1949 and saw a close interaction between IBRD delegates and Colombian advisors and experts (Escobar 1988: 428). Lauchlan Currie, a distinguished economist and Administrative Assistant to American Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, led the mission, overseeing a team of researchers from the IBRD, IMF, World Health Organisation, and Food and Agriculture Organisation whom specialised in agriculture, health and welfare, infrastructure, transportation, foreign exchange, national accounts, and banking and economics. The mission's terms of reference 'were very simple yet very broad. They were, in essence, to formulate a development program designed to raise the standard of living of the Colombian people' (Colombia 1950b: ix). The mission report submitted to the national government regarded itself not as 'a complete blueprint for action,' but a 'working paper, designed to assist the Government and people of Colombia to frame for themselves a sound, balanced, adequately detailed program of economic development' (Colombia 1950b: 4–5). It addressed ways to improve health standards, reduce illiteracy and improve education, support balanced diets and adequate low-cost housing, and improve energy availability (Colombia 1950a: 614).

The Colombian mission was a significant moment for the IBRD. Escobar (1988: 429) remarks that

> One of the features most emphasised in the approach was its comprehensive and integrated character. Its comprehensive nature demanded interventions in all social and economic aspects of importance; careful planning, organisation, and allocation of resources, on the other hand, ensured the integrated character of the program and its successful implementation. The report (supplemented with ten technical appendices "of interest to specialists") also furnished a detailed set of prescriptions including goals

> and quantifiable targets, investment needs by sector, design criteria, methodologies, and so on. In short, it constituted a radically new approach to the management of the social and economic affairs of a country.

Yet the Colombian mission provided its recommendations under a strictly technical view. Development was something to be planned and could be achieved by the correct application of resources and investment. There was no discussion of political or social dynamics affecting development. While later survey missions were conducted 'at the invitation of', 'in consultation with', or 'at the request of' national governments, the missions approved during the Black and Woods presidencies were designed to address supposed technical faults.

With the apparent success of the well-received Colombian mission, 22 other countries received general survey missions by the early 1960s. Notarised under 'Services to Member Countries' in the IBRD's administrative budget, their cost rose from US$131,449 in 1956 to US$481,866 in 1962 (IBRD 1957: 56; IBRD 1962: 49–50).

The composition of survey teams reveals much about the biases of the World Bank. Surveys commissioned during the 1950s included experts in agriculture, communications, health, industry, mineral resources, power, social services, and transportation, while missions to Kenya, Kuwait, Morocco, Spain, and the Territory of Papua and New Guinea during the early 1960s focused upon agriculture, education, and market forces. Moore (1960: 82), commenting on survey missions as legitimising particular ideas and practices, argues that

> The missions themselves are nominally independent of the Bank. The Bank, however, reviews the reports prior to publication and presumably uses them in the course of developing its loan policies. In turn, the missions reflect some of the attitudes of the Bank, if for no other reason than that employees of the Bank are frequently included on the mission staffs. The reports of the missions cannot be fully understood without some brief allusion to some important issues on which the Bank has taken a strong position … [The] allocation of loans by the Bank reveals a reference for specific kinds of projects, to a degree that indicates definite ideas as to how economic development "ought" to proceed … The Bank obviously believes that investments in [the agricultural, industrial, mining, and power] sectors should have precedence … It is clear from this that the Bank regards these kinds of investments as the key to economic development.

In line with an emphasis upon IBRD ideas and practices, a number of broad recommendations emerge from missions to Guatemala (1951: 293–294), Chile (1952: 54–55), and British Guiana (1953: 26–29): (i) the 'problem of timing' needs to be considered for successful economic planning; (ii) changes in 'traditional, static outlooks' are best facilitated by 'real and widespread improvements' in infrastructure, energy provision, and private sector entrepreneurship; (iii) a 'high degree of selectivity' is required of survey missions with limited resources and personnel; (iv) new institutional bodies may need to be created in order to pursue development programs; and (v) new research techniques need to be considered to raise agricultural and industrial productivity.

Following these recommendations, an internal IBRD evaluation identifies criticisms undermining survey mission success (IBRD 1956: 283–286): (i) insufficient attention to institutional factors, with the missions tending to focus on increasing outputs in productive sectors without considering institutional impediments; (ii) lack of realism, meaning that many survey reports were overly optimistic and do not take sufficiently into account the economic, political, and social context of the surveyed country; and (iii) failure to develop a theory of economic growth, making it difficult for recipient governments to garner a clear understanding of the mission's conception of development.

Responding to these criticisms, the IBRD evaluation offers the following suggestions (IBRD 1956: 403–405): (i) surveys should focus upon singular development problems, rather than multiple problems; (ii) surveys should adhere to common organisational approaches applied to all missions; and (iii) surveys should adopt uniform procedures in relation to investment programs.

As per the above recommendations, criticisms, and suggestions, relational dynamics were largely ignored by the missions. While the team to Ethiopia in 1954 did comment that there were 'misunderstandings about and distrust of lending for projects outside of agriculture' and that important 'social, technical, and economic factors hamper the development of a transition-bound country like Ethiopia' (Ethiopia 1954: 10 and 13), relational dynamics were downplayed to the efficacy of the missions themselves. Nonetheless, the missions of the 1950s and 1960s saw positive reception from government officials. In Chile (1952: iv), the 'President of the Republic showed keen interest in the work of the mission throughout its stay, and at all times ministers and government officials were most helpful'. In British Guiana (1953: 25), the mission 'formulated its recommended 5-year program in close collaboration with the government staff and was thus able to take full account of all current projects and activities of the government, including projects under preliminary study as well as those in an advanced stage of preparation. Whether or not a decision had been taken, the government urged the mission to give an independent evaluation of all projects'. And, in Libya (1960: vii), the mission 'members travelled extensively in the three provinces, visited all the important development projects and had many discussions with ministers and officials of the federal and provincial governments, with the National Bank of Libya, with private bankers, businessmen and farmers, and with representatives of the foreign aid agencies. The Mission Chief had the honour of being received by His Majesty the King on two occasions'. One lesson to emerge from the general survey missions relates to the level of access the survey teams had to government officials and staff. Greater collaboration typically led to greater access to information, thereby providing a better account of the developmental standing of the country.

A final comment very relevant to this study was identified by the 1956 internal IBRD evaluation. A major shortcoming of general survey missions was the lack of sufficient editing of mission reports (IBRD 1956: 405):

> Since most of the deficiencies of the surveys are due to a lack of rigorous editing, steps must be taken to strengthen this vital aspect of the missions' work. One possibility would be to include in the mission a person carefully chosen for [their] ability who would be assigned exclusively to editing, the assignment to consist not merely in putting together the material prepared by individual experts but also in deciding what should go in and what should stay out of the survey … The fact, however, that one member of the mission would be responsible for the manner in which the survey was organised and written should ensure better results.

The ability to convey information is as important as the information itself. This reinforces the view that the way in which policy is packaged and presented affects its perception by recipients.

## Country Economic Memoranda

Country economic memoranda were introduced by the McNamara presidency in the mid-1970s. In contrast to the earlier general survey missions, the memoranda were not designed to draft future development programs. They were conceived simply to review the developmental standing of a surveyed country. They nonetheless became an important mechanism in projecting the World Bank's ideas and practices. As Goldman (2005: 52) comments, 'In no small part because of the World Bank's metamorphosis during the 1970s and early 1980s, development power/knowledge writ large became common sense'. Similarly, Clark (1981: 169), reflecting upon the impetus for change, remarks that the 'problem as [McNamara] saw it was to create in the Bank a critical mass of power, both financial and technical, sufficient to accelerate the rate of development in the poorest countries to a high but sustainable level'. This 'critical mass of power' led to the 1972 reorganisation, which created the Vice Presidency for Development Policy that became the cornerstone of the World Bank's research. McNamara appointed Hollis Chenery as its first Vice President, transforming the institution into the world's 'principal centre on development economics' (de Vries 1986: 11).

Under Chenery, the country economic memoranda were introduced. Replacing the general survey missions of the Black and Woods presidencies, the memoranda formed a policy dialogue between the World Bank and its member countries (Westebbe 1988: 22). Between 1973 and 1982, 60 countries received detailed surveys of their economies through the memoranda, which used data and statistics to convince recipients that particular growth sectors needed 'improvement'. The memoranda were, however, not the only survey-based reports introduced during this time. There also came Current Economic Position papers and World Bank Atlases, which played a large role in extending the intellectual influence of the IBRD and IDA. Focusing on the atlases, these were broad in scope, analysing at-a-glance average annual population, production, and growth rates. In addition to providing a compendium of country data, the atlases charted fluctuations in the world economy. Through the memoranda, economic position papers, and atlases, the World Bank compiled a vast pool of data on its member countries, becoming a leading source of development statistics.

A review of nine memoranda published between 1976 and 1979—Iran (1976), Turkey (1976), Cyprus (1976), Morocco (1977), Sri Lanka (1977), the Philippines (1977), Nepal (1978), and Somalia (1979)—provide insights into the era, with the reports being uniform in format, structure, and content. They are divided in 'recent economic trends', 'balance of payments', and immediate and medium-term 'prospects', as well as specific sections on narrow economic policy issues related to public sector finances, money and credit, prices and wages, interest rates, investment and savings, and non-traditional exports. In terms of format and structure, document sizes range from 47 pages (the Iranian memorandum) to 163 pages (the Somali memorandum), but are consistent in that the majority of the documents list statistical data. Sixty of ninety-seven pages comprising the Nepalese memorandum is a statistical appendix, covering trends on population growth, employment rates, foreign capital flows, and budgetary expenditures, to name but a few. While not designed to advise lending operations, the memoranda offered detailed appraisals of entire economies.

Country economic memoranda became more influential during the presidencies of Alden Clausen and Barber Conable in the 1980s. They became tools to measure the neoliberal adjustment of developing countries. In keeping with the trends of the 1970s however, the 1980s memoranda remained geared towards evaluating economies, as opposed to proposing development programs.

Following the departure of McNamara in 1981, Chenery resigned in August 1982. Anne Krueger replaced him as World Bank Chief Economist, and subsequently transformed the institution's research program to be more aligned with practical policy actions (Krueger 1986: 1–2; de Vries 1986: 12; Stern 1995: 49). Under her supervision, the World Bank upheld the country economic memoranda and established two academic journals in 1986: the *World Bank Economic Review* and *World Bank Research Observer*. While Chenery focused on social issues, income distribution, and unemployment, Krueger turned instead towards neoliberal stabilisation and adjustment (Caufield 1996: 114–115; Yusuf 2009: 24–26); Krueger's research program abandoned the state in favour of market-led growth. The mainstream discourse was changing, and the World Bank was playing a leading role in its legitimisation, making common sense of new development 'truths'. Clausen iterated this point in 1983, regarding the institution as a 'knowledgeable bank' (World Bank 1983: 21).

The World Bank began publishing research papers encouraging neoliberal reform, attempting to legitimise the necessity of trade and financial liberalisation, privatisation, and deregulation—a few of the core tenets of the Washington Consensus. As illustrative examples, *Peru:*

*The Management and Sale of State-Owned Enterprises* (World Bank 1982), *Decentralisation in Developing Countries: A Review of Recent Experience* (Ozgediz 1983), *Managing State-Owned Enterprises* (Rondinelli et al. 1983), and *Managing the Public Service in Developing Countries: Issues and Prospects* (Shirley 1983) conclude that public sector privatisation was critical to national development. The neoliberal World Bank attempted to popularise market sector reform.

Krueger supervised the publication of country economic memoranda, with 48 countries—then close to a third of the World Bank's membership—receiving investigative missions between 1982 and 1986. Each mission called for institutional strengthening conducive to neoliberal adjustment. The memoranda used data and statistics to demonstrate the necessity of neoliberal policy reform.

On average, the memoranda published during the 1980s were longer than those of the McNamara years. Averaging 140 pages, one of the longer reports—a 1983 Brazilian memorandum—exceeded 350 pages. The reports were increasing in length, a point reflected in providing a more detailed review of a narrower field. Using the 1983 Brazilian memorandum as an example, the research team was comprised of 11 delegates specialising in macroeconomics, fiscal and monetary analysis, trade policy analysis, and public enterprise finances (Brazil 1983). In line with the composition of the team, the extensive report addresses the macroeconomic features of the economy, public sector expenditures (fiscal operations, credit subsidies, and procurement), and labour market growth and wage policy. Reflecting the neoliberal turn, it advocates structural adjustment and the unfettering of market forces in the economy (Brazil 1983: xxii–xxvi).

By the close of the decade, the memoranda had evolved to mirror changes in the World Bank's lending operations. While an overarching focus on structural and sectoral adjustment remained, as well as the liberalisation and deregulation of economies, the need to mitigate the social impact of adjustment entered the reports. Country economic memoranda assessing Honduras (1987), Costa Rica (1988), Laos (1988), and Bolivia (1989) between 1987 and 1989 illustrate the altered approach. Not only does the Laotian report appraise state enterprise reform, macroeconomic policies for structural adjustment, and policy and investment issues related to sectoral adjustment, but a section reviews the 'social impact of the adjustment program' (Laos 1988: 72), which addresses pricing reforms, income and infrastructure growth, and welfare programs. Similarly, the Bolivian report includes an in-depth section on 'alleviating the social costs of adjustment' (Bolivia 1989: 77–87), recommending changes to the Emergency Social Fund, the then government channelling mechanism designed to distribute resources to the poorest and most vulnerable.

In sum, the country economic memoranda were less a 'practical' report and more a research paper. They nonetheless contributed to building a discourse surrounding development and how it was both to be understood and pursued. It would not, however, be until the introduction of the CASs in the 1990s that survey missions once again became attuned to practical implementation.

## Country Assistance Strategies

CASs were introduced in August 1990, with the first strategy contained within a memorandum from President Conable on a development project to China. A few years later, Burkina Faso received the first free-standing CAS in 1994. At the same time, CASs became the primary strategy document for review by senior management and the Boards of Governors and Executive Directors. As the World Bank IEG (2014: 19) outlines, the 'country model is the World Bank Group's primary means of engagement in client countries, and [CASs] provide the framework for country engagement'. Emphasising the importance of tailoring 'development services around each country's needs and development goals' (World Bank 2009a: 4), a CAS 'is the vehicle for signalling the Bank Group's priorities to the government and other in-country stakeholders, the Bank Group's shareholders, Bank Group staffs, and other development partners' (World Bank IEG 2014: 19). In contrast to the country economic memoranda of the late 1970s and 1980s, CASs were a renaissance of the general survey missions of the 1950s and 1960s; not simply a device to monitor the development status of a surveyed country, but also a tool to inform IBRD and IDA lending schedules. Assessing the development challenges, priorities, and potential of a surveyed country, CASs led to the drafting of comprehensive programs of lending and non-lending activities (World Bank 2008: 61–62).

The 2012 World Bank Operational Manual provides the latest definition of CASs, building upon earlier definitions from policy documents released in 1996, 1998, and 2005 (World Bank 2012: 1):

> The Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) identifies the key areas in which Bank Group support can best assist a country in achieving sustainable development and poverty reduction. It is the central tool with which Management and the Board review and guide the Bank Group's support for the country's development programs. Oriented towards results and based on systematic Bank Group collaboration, it is prepared in consultation with country authorities, development partners, and other stakeholders as appropriate.

Normally 'prepared every 4 years for each country in which the Bank has a planned or ongoing program; its timing is aligned with country conditions (e.g. [poverty reduction strategy] preparation, election cycles)' (World Bank 2012: 1), CASs remained the main instrument used to inform IBRD and IDA lending throughout the 1990s and 2000s. To illustrate, between 2005 and 2009, 193 CASs were drafted, 45% of which were prepared jointly with the IFC, the 'private sector arm' of the World Bank Group (World Bank 2009b: 61–62). In 2014, CASs were disbanded and replaced by CPFs and SCDs. Given that the next section of this chapter focuses on ESW during the 2000s, this section will limit its analysis to CASs approved up until the early 2000s.

Burkina Faso received the first stand-alone CAS in 1994. The document submitted to World Bank President Preston for review divided its analysis into sections on recent economic and social development, the external environment, and development policies and the World Bank's strategy, as well as detailed annexes outlining IDA lending program information, key economic and exposure indicators, and a status update on current World Bank Group operations. In line with CASs released during the 1990s, the CAS states its goal as helping 'Burkina to achieve its objective of sustainable economic growth with equity and poverty reduction,' with that goal pursued through measures to create a policy and regulatory environment supportive of the private sector and assisting the national government manage its public resources more effectively' (Burkina Faso 1994: 11–12). It proposed the following IDA lending program for 1994–1998: adjustment lending (a SAL and an agricultural SECAL) and hybrid and/or investment operations (Human resource development projects addressing health and nutrition, population growth and AIDS, and higher education and technical education; private sector production services focusing on irrigation and mining; infrastructure projects building urban areas and transportation and energy services; and, environmental preservation projects targeting agricultural production).

In surveying the country and drafting the CAS, the mission team identified the following lessons (Burkina Faso 1994: 16–17). First, CASs are important to 'pressing, encouraging, and seeking to contribute information to the increasingly intense debate over the role of the state, its priorities for action, [and] its policies and incentives for an emerging (formal) private sector'. Second, CASs need to acknowledge 'the contours and impact of the international and regional context within which this debate and necessary actions occur'. And, third, CASs should align to 'a broadly-consultative participatory process [to ensure] lasting actions'.

Madagascar (1994), Mexico (1994), and Niger (1994) received CASs soon after Burkina Faso. These CASs reinforced the focus of the Burkina CAS—the 'redefinition of the role of the state' (Madagascar 1994: 7) and the promotion of private sector- and export-led growth (Niger 1994: 11)—while maintaining that CASs need to align with existing national government approaches and development trajectories. This latter point reinforces with the view that CASs start 'from the country's vision of its development goals [and should be a] country-owned and—led strategy process' (World Bank 2012: 1). As the 1994 Mexican CAS outlines, the 'Government's principal development objective continues to be restoring sustainable, private sector-led economic growth while also aggressively combatting poverty,' and so the 'Bank's strategy … is aimed at supporting equitable, sustainable development' by focusing on growth, poverty reduction, human resource development, environmental sustainability, and regional economic integration (Mexico 1994: 9).

These early free-standing CASs highlight the technical and political-economic dimensions of development. The reports discuss less, however, the relational dynamics between the World Bank and recipient national governments in drafting the documents. The only comment raised in the above four CASs was in the Mexican report: 'And so too did the nature of the Bank-Government relationship, especially the recent 8 years of experience during which the Bank and the Government have been in close agreement on many policy questions, have been able to dialogue constructively on areas where they do not agree, and have maintained productive, collegial working relations' (Mexico 1994: 9). While downplayed during the first round of strategies to countries, relational dynamics would become important to later CASs.

The World Bank introduced new procedures for CASs in 1997. The changes derived from experiences gained since 1994, notably that it was now producing its second round of 4-year strategies for its member countries. As the 1997 Cambodian CAS notes, 'In designing our country assistance strategy, we have drawn on the lessons learnt since the first CAS' (Cambodia 1997: 12). While the mainstream development discourse had not evolved greatly between 1994 and 1997, with CASs acknowledging the need to maintain macroeconomic stability (Cambodia 1997: 4), boost private sector entrepreneurship (El Salvador 1997: 5), and promote foreign investment in growth sectors (Madagascar 1997: 10), an emphasis on country-led development strategies remained: the 'current assistance strategy does not propose a major change but rather adjustments in line with the evolving vision and priorities of the Government' (El Salvador 1997: 16).

Compared to the 1994 CASs, the 1997 strategies were better structured and formatted documents. The reports now included detailed and clearly arranged 'Country Assistance Objectives'. Taking the Cambodian CAS, its objectives were divided into supporting macroeconomic stability and economic reform, enhancing rural sectors and natural resource management, supporting critical infrastructure rehabilitation, improving human resources and reducing poverty, and strengthening institutional capacity (Cambodia 1997: 15–19). For each of these objectives, clearly stated and conceived development projects were listed, including the proposed timeframe for project approval and financial disbursement. The 1997 strategies also laid greater weight on non-lending services, with Cambodian CAS (1997: 19–20) attributing a third of its planned administrative resources to analytical work, use of the EDI to increase institutional capacity, and aid coordination activities, and the El Salvadoran CAS (1997: 17) dividing attention between analytical work, integrating the activities of the World Bank Group, and developing impact and progress benchmarks.

The importance of collaborative and participatory processes was institutionalised in CAS procedures in the late 1990s. The 1997 El Salvadoran CAS clearly outlines several innovations and new emphases (El Salvador 1997: iii): CAS preparation involved intensive consultative and participatory processes with the national government; CAS preparation involved initiating a process of dialogue with NGOs and other stakeholders; and CAS preparation involved introducing a thematic framework linked to the national government's vision.

The primary motivation behind fostering such collaborative and participatory processes was to improve the quality of CASs by improving World Bank understanding by 'tapping' into local knowledge, increasing transparency and public understanding of World Bank/government partnerships, and enhancing stakeholder engagement to bolster the implementation of CAS recommendations and lending schedules (Boyd 1999: 2). On a more practical level, recommendations for participatory CASs included (Boyd 1999: 4) having a supportive country team with strong leadership, ensuring commitment to and understanding of participatory approaches to CASs, setting up joint World Bank/government task forces to decide responsibilities over participation, deciding who will be responsible for coordinating local-level elements of participatory CASs, ensuring a balance of gender, age, religious, and geographical representation in participants, and starting the process early to allow for far-reaching discussion and debate with civil society.

CASs repeatedly recognised and emphasised the need for participatory processes to strategy development, with the central impetus behind collaboration and participation being the capacity to achieve consensus on development goals. CASs to Cambodia and Madagascar reveal the revised approach: 'At the inception of the current CAS process, a discussion paper was extensively discussed in Cambodia with the Government, and at the Government's encouragement, with donors and non-governmental stakeholders. These meetings provided valuable feedback that is reflected in the current CAS' (Cambodia 1997: 4) and 'The Bank's assistance strategy has its roots in intensive country dialogue carried out in close collaboration with the IMF and other donors over the past 2 years. The dialogue has helped build consensus for reform and develop commitment to a comprehensive anti-poverty strategy at the core of the Malagasy leadership' (Madagascar 1997: 10). Similarly, an El Salvadoran CAS (1997: 19) comments at length that

> The CAS is based on extensive consultations with the Government, initiated in June 1996, through a half-day brainstorming meeting, chaired by the President of El Salvador, and including the Cabinet, the Bank CAS Team, and an [IADB] team. This initial session focused on a wide and open discussion of the country's development challenges, Government priorities, and the broad themes to be addressed in the CAS. Additional meetings were held between Bank staff and line agencies to agree on Bank and Government priorities. In late October, the Finance Minister participated in a two-day brainstorming meeting with the El Salvador Country Team to discuss in greater detail the Government's vision and development agenda, and the way in which the Bank Group could help

> meet the country's development challenges. This was followed in early December by a three-day workshop in Washington focusing on the links between the social agenda and the vision of competitiveness for all. The workshop was attended by the Minister of Finance …, the Minister of Agriculture, key Government officials, and representatives from USAID, [the German Technical Cooperation Agency], and [IADB].

Emerging from the drive for collaboration, participation, and partnerships was the turn towards engaging with non-governmental actors. In particular, engaging with civil society and NGOs was seen as a means to facilitate broader acceptance of CAS recommendations (Boyd 1999: 4); the presentation and packaging of the CAS became as important as its technical dimensions. The 1997 El Salvadoran CAS provides thorough detail of its engagement with NGOs (El Salvador 1997: Annex C). The World Bank team organised several dialogue sessions with NGOs, with 60 organisations invited to participate in 5 half-day thematic sessions on the CAS. Over 30 NGOs attended. Prior to the sessions, NGOs voiced the following concerns: the World Bank did not provide sufficient background documentation prior to the sessions; most of the reports and documents made available were not in Spanish; questions asked whether there would be follow-up after the sessions, or just 'business-as-usual'; the term 'consultation' was deemed derogatory, being regarded as just a formality; and more lead time was requested, so that documentation could be more thoroughly reviewed.

Acknowledging these concerns, the World Bank reviewed its approach to running the five sessions by integrating stronger participatory mechanisms throughout the half-day seminars with NGOs. The first session discussed the process of dialogue and the methodology that would be used. The second session covered poverty, local and community development, and gender issues—the 'session was lively and interesting'. The third session addressed agriculture, natural resources, and rural development, with a consensus emerging from the NGOs that rural poverty was a priority but the national government did not appear to have a clear strategy. The fourth session covered public sector modernisation and private sector competition, with labour movement NGOs criticising the lack of transparency over privatisation. And, the final plenary session focused on discussing ways to maintain dialogue with NGOs after the CAS was submitted to the national government.

From the five sessions, the below lessons emerged regarding building consensus on CAS recommendations: it is a mistake to focus on the CAS and not the process of drafting the strategy; dialogue has to be a continuous process, not a one-off session; CASs should not be restricted to certain actors, as restriction runs contrary to transparency and collaboration; and it is very difficult to organise a dialogue and consultation without a World Bank field presence in the country.

By 2001, most member countries eligible for World Bank financial assistance had received two CASs. This meant that not only had the World Bank improved its capacity to undertake CAS surveys, but it could draw lessons learnt from previous CASs on the same country. The institution maintained its approach to building strategies based upon country-led agendas (the 'strategy builds not only on the Government's poverty reduction strategy, but also on the Bank's past programs and extensive analytical work undertaken on poverty in India' (India 2001: i)) and the focus on consultation and participation remained (the 'strategy underpinning the CAS was developed in consultation with the country's leadership, senior policymakers, and donors' (Djibouti 2001: 14)). The main change during this period, and reinforcing the recently introduced CDF, the 2001 round of CASs incorporated more stringent results-based matrices, with Sri Lanka receiving the first results-based CAS in April 2003. The new result-based CASs included results matrices, monitoring arrangements, and completion reports to analyse the outcomes of CAS programs (World Bank 2009a: 30–31; World Bank IEG 2015: 1–2).

Nonetheless, CASs continued to be undermined by a variety of problems (Shyamsundar et al. 2001: 42–42). First, CASs impose time and resource constraints on country officials: 'need to change the incentives facing regional department staff to enable them to take the time to work on the CAS in particular and mainstreaming in general'. Second, CASs suffer from inconsistent analyses: 'It will be easier to influence the CAS if a consistent message is presented. This should obviously not be at the cost of country-specific issues, and would require building the intellectual underpinnings to support the message'. Third, CASs success is determined by the level of support garnered by participatory processes: 'stakeholder support … is likely to become increasingly important for the CAS as the CAS becomes a participatory process'.

With the main recurrent problem affecting the efficacy of CASs being a lack of practical translation on-the-ground, the main recommendations provided from an independent study by the World Bank IEG was to further include stakeholders in the CAS process and 'promote a more open discussion of these analyses, even if it may not always be politically expedient' (World Bank IEG 2014: 20–21). The manner in which the CAS is conducted impacts the overall usefulness of the final strategy as an agenda for practical action.

## Economic and Sector Work

ESW entered the lexicon of World Bank technical assistance in the early 2000s, emerging as a means to reorient the development institution towards becoming a 'global knowledge bank' (World Bank 2015: 36). ESW includes 'reports for [CASs] and overall policy dialogue, country advisory and regional reports that provide advice on special topics, and less formal products such as policy notes, workshops, and conferences' (World Bank 2004b: 100). The World Bank (2015: 36) outlines its utility to policy movement:

> The data provide a starting point for policy and strategic discussions with borrowers and help enhance a country's capacity and knowledge. Studies and analytical reports help the Bank support clients to plan and implement effective development programs and projects. ESW underpins the Bank's policy dialogue with clients, its development of country strategies, and its formulation and implementation of lending programs and operations. ESW is also used as an instrument for building institutional capacity, especially when it is undertaken in partnership with local institutions.

ESW is thus designed to raise recipient capacity and help the World Bank plan and implement development programs, with an emphasis on 'country ownership, participatory processes, partnerships, and capacity building' (World Bank 2004b: 100), thereby drawing linkages to both the Knowledge Bank paradigm and CDF. Emphasising the view that 'knowledge is the key to development effectiveness and the driver of a successful development institution' (World Bank 2009b: 19), ESW consistently iterates the importance of country-led knowledge creation and the need for collaboration between the World Bank, other development agencies, and developing countries, with nearly half of 489 ESW products delivered in 2008 resulting from collaborative partnerships (World Bank 2008: 62).

The Open Knowledge Repository, the main online portal containing World Bank research, listed 21,796 ESW publications—books, serials, and reports—freely accessible as of September 2016, with subcollections including core diagnostic reports (on accounting and auditing, corporate governance, environmental sustainability, and poverty), sector and thematic studies (including city strategies, commodities studies, gender assessments, energy studies, and health sector reviews), other ESW reports (miscellaneous and pre-2003 ESW reports), and

SCDs (reports analysing key challenges and opportunities in case study countries) (World Bank 2016b). ESW has become a pervasive pillar of technical assistance and has contributed to transforming the World Bank into a one-stop shop for expert development knowledge.

On a conceptual level, ESW can be regarded as 'hands-off' technical assistance. Rather than having the IBRD or IDA formalise lending operations with recipients, ESW portrays itself as value-neutral knowledge sharing. As Stone (2004: 554–555) comments, the new knowledge sharing strategy presents the World Bank 'as an agent of learning and a prompt for lesson-drawing'; a value-neutral agent of voluntary policy transfer and a source of knowledge that governments, the private sector, and civil society can engage with if they choose. In this way, ESW builds a discourse whereby recipients exercise their own agency in drawing policy lessons. Yet, the 'consequences of brokering research are not neutral. Institutional and individual interests are served through activity that goes beyond the mechanical sharing of information' (Stone 2009: 313). Given the dynamic nature of knowledge production (Smith 2008: 238), ESW maintains a hierarchical structure of knowledge networks leading the World Bank to retain a superior position in the production of policy work.

A World Bank IEG (2008: 49–57) evaluation of ESW and NLTA between 2000 and 2006 identifies four dimensions of the technical assistance in relation to their strengths and weaknesses, drawing conclusions from interviews and surveys with a range of stakeholders in countries receiving ESW and NLTA products. First, technical quality: ESW and NLTA have largely been regarded as 'high quality' products by recipients, with their legitimacy deriving from the World Bank's 'reputation for technical expertise'. However, recipients have criticised ESW as being too 'neoliberal', reports being too technical for practical application, and documents conveying a one-size-fits-all message. Second, partnership with clients: the strength of partnerships affects the 'extent to which the various ESW and [NLTA] objectives were met. This implies that the perception of partnership in production is correlated with the perception of effects of ESW and [NLTA]'. While the IEG found that the actual nature of the partnership was irrelevant to ESW and NLTA success, what 'is important is working closely with clients to ensure that they are part of the process and that they assume ownership of the task, which entails close collaboration from task initiation to the formulation of conclusions and recommendations'. Third, origination (relevance): the IEG uncovered that whether ESW and NLTA 'originates with the client (demand driven) or with the Bank (supply driven) … did not make a significant difference to the extent to which the various ESW and [NLTA] objectives have been met'. What was important was 'that ESW and [NLTA] did not always have to be demand driven to have effects' but there needed to be 'genuine client interest in the task'. And, fourth, dissemination: the IEG details that ESW dissemination and the perception of dissemination were not important for recipients. What was important was 'sustained follow-up beyond dissemination,' meaning that dialogue was maintained even after the release of materials.

In sum, reputational factors and relational dynamics are important to the successful creation and dissemination of ESW products. The remainder of this section analyses three examples of ESW: poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs), Doing Business Reports, and online engagement.

### *Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers*

PRSPs were introduced in 1999 as a joint-venture between the World Bank and IMF as 'a new framework to enhance domestic accountability for poverty reduction reform efforts' (World Bank 2016c). As Craig and Porter (2003: 53) remark, PRSPS 'are best seen as part of a "Third World" re-morphing of neoliberal approaches, a new convergence in which governments and agencies of various stripes in both liberal OECD and developing countries are focusing on optimising economic, juridical, and social governance in order to create ideal conditions for international finance and investment'. In practice, PRSPs were used to inform results-based CASs produced for IDA-eligible countries, with poverty reduction support operations (later becoming a sub-set of DPLs) introduced in 2001 to support the implementation of PRSPs. Linked to the CDF and intended as a country-led program, PRSPs were advanced to provide 'the guiding framework for aligning external development assistance' (World Bank 2000: 32). After several years, the IMF and World Bank (2005: 67–72) drew the following lessons: PRSPs are best support by clear goals and targets; PRSPs are most suitable as mutual accountability frameworks between governments and donors; and they are useful to sustaining domestic participation, thereby enabling greater accountability and transparency.

Despite the rhetoric however, PRSPs suffered a range of criticisms from academia, with the main criticisms being that PRSPs create 'virtual realities' divorced from the 'actual realities' of developing countries, ignoring elite capture of financing behind a technocratic façade (Dijkstra 2005: 462) and donors overlooking institutional shortcomings and failing 'to consider the immanent problems and dangers of social engineering in recipient countries' (Lazarus 2008: 1219). Put simply, PRSPs are divorced from the reality of developing countries, becoming a rhetorical tool to guide technocratic decisions as opposed to a reflection on extant conditions.

### *Doing Business Reports*

President Wolfensohn launched the Doing Business Project in 2002. The first Doing Business Reports were published in 2004. Since then, the project has produced annual examinations of small- and medium-enterprises in 183 countries, measuring the costs to private firms of business regulations. The objective in doing so, the *Doing Business Report 2004* outlines, is to motivate reform through country benchmarking, to update the design of reforms, to supplement global initiatives on development effectiveness, and to inform theory on regulatory economics (World Bank 2004a); the reports advocate business climate liberalisation. By 2007, the Doing Business Project had grown to include not only annual thematic reports, but regional and country-specific reports; one report published for nearly every member of the World Bank annually.

Between 2004 and 2007, the Doing Business Reports held that government regulation was an impediment to private sector growth. Advising practical action via global and regional lessons, the reports were clear in their titles: *Understanding Regulation* (2004a), *Removing Obstacles to Growth* (2005), *Creating Jobs* (2006), and *How to Reform* (2007); they sought to disseminate best practices for deregulation and private sector growth. Common policy and legislative reforms recommended in the reports include (Lyons and Msoka 2010): reducing business costs and policy-related risks; improving justice systems to increase trust; ensuring property rights and contract enforcement; implementing liberal trade and investment rules; simplifying customs procedures; reducing government intervention in labour markets; improving government accountability and transparency; and, simplifying procedures, laws, and regulations governing the registration, licensing, transferring, and closing of a private business or firm.

Carroll (2012: 380) regards the Doing Business Reports as part of the World Bank's 'deep marketisation'; the post-Washington Consensus attempt to simultaneously increase the role of the private sector while shifting the function of the state to cultivate and facilitate better 'access to finance' for private enterprise. This turn was not without criticism. The Doing Business Project came under opposition from trade unions in developed and developing countries whom condemned the advocacy of labour market deregulation (Bakvis 2009a: 435; 2009b: 321) and from academia challenging the 'naïve' assumption that business climate liberalisation would lead to significant gains for the poor (Lyons and Msoka 2010: 1092). The detractors questioned the wisdom of allowing the free market and private sector to be the principal vehicles for development.

### *Online Engagement*

The computerisation of the World Bank began in the 1970s, with the purchase of several Burroughs 5500 computers. This would increase to include personal computers by the early 1980s, introduced to assist the collation of lending operation data (Buck and West 2001: 5 and 23). It was not until the early 1990s, however, that the World Bank began to integrate online engagement into its technical assistance activities, when the 'World Wide Web began to have a serious impact in the world at large' (Buck and West 2001: 100). ESW was given a significant boost by the integration of Internet-based platforms. As Evans (2009: 256) puts it, the

> advent of the Internet has … provided a unique opportunity for policy entrepreneurs, knowledge institutions, and think-tanks to sell their expertise to governmental organisations throughout the world. The Internet has exposed a hitherto private realm of policy-oriented learning: transnational networks of epistemic communities operating in a system of global governance.

For the World Bank, engagement with information and communication technologies (ICTs) and the Virtual World has allowed it to mediate 'the continuing legitimacy of its position within developmental discourse' (Thompson 2004: 106). Online engagement has afforded the institution the opportunity to reinforce its ideas and practices by positioning itself as *the* producer, customiser, and connector of development knowledge via online networks (World Bank 2011: v). This affirms both the 'hands-off' approach of ESW and the World Bank's position in the knowledge hierarchy.

Not only has the World Bank increasingly used online services to disseminate knowledge, but online engagement became central to the creation of so-called knowledge-based economies (KBEs). KBEs are based on investing in a country's technological infrastructure and knowledge base, regarding the growth potential of that country as relative to its ability to adapt and use ideas, and not its exploitation of raw materials or cheap labour. During the 2000s, the IDA began delivering e-projects, a new line of TALs that—as in the examples of the *eRwanda Project* (2006) and *eBenin Project* (2010)—were designed to improve access to lower cost and better quality ICT services, as well as develop e-government capacity. In addition, the *World Development Report 2016: Digital Dividends* focuses on the Internet and development, contending that online platforms create new market opportunities, lower transaction costs, and improve accountability (World Bank 2016d). Taking Lithuania as a case study, the World Bank (2003) published the lengthy and detailed *Lithuania: Aiming for a Knowledge Economy*, which charted the country's turn towards becoming a KBE. Observing the interplay between the national government, the business, education, and research communities, and civil society, the report recommends that the Lithuanian strategy should incorporate 'inclusiveness and partnerships' (between actors in society), 'networking' (joint action towards goals), and 'changing mindsets' (rethinking the role of knowledge in the economy). The report concludes that this would lead to greater productivity, innovation, competitiveness, and growth. Engagement with the 'knowledge-based world' is thus argued to be central to economic growth and development in the twenty first century.

The Global Development Network (GDN), Global Development Learning Network (GDLN), and Global Development Gateway are prime examples of the World Bank's online knowledge-sharing initiatives. The issue of importance here is that while the World Bank 'presents itself as an agent of learning and a prompt for lesson-drawing,' it 'does not simply "diffuse" knowledge; it also helps create new organisations—like the GDN or other policy partnerships—to synthesise and tailor such knowledge into products and "best practice" that is then marketed and advocated' (Stone 2004: 554–555); it builds epistemic communities.

Launched in December 1999 as a global network operating to provide new perspectives on the challenges of development, the GDN was established by the World Bank in association with the United

Nations, the governments of Japan, Germany, and Switzerland, and several regional development agencies. Designed to promote knowledge as a global public good, it built regional research capacity, produced policy research on a global scale, promoted local knowledge creation, sponsored multidisciplinary research, and supported knowledge sharing amongst policymakers, academia, and civil society; 'Through the GDN, the World Bank gives one representation of its new incarnation as the "Knowledge Bank"' (Johnson and Stone 2000: 24). In addition, it established and supported several global knowledge outreach initiatives, including the programs of the WBI, GDLN, Global Development Gateway, and African Virtual University.

The GDLN is a global partnership established by the World Bank in June 2000 between 130 agencies in 80 countries, using ICTs to disseminate development knowledge, methods, and techniques. Operating through courses, seminars, video conferences, online services, and interactive learning portals, it has established regional centres capable of distributing knowledge and information constructed along World Bank lines (Jennings and Roberts 2004). Its partnerships have completed over 1000 learning sessions per year, since its creation and its primary focuses are climate change, labour migration, microfinance, gender equality, and HIV/AIDS.

Comparable to the GDN and GDLN, the Global Development Gateway became one of the 'main knowledge sharing initiatives' (Kalseth and Cummings 2001: 169) of the World Bank after its establishment in 1999. King (2002: 321) similarly argues that, 'for some outside analysts, [the Gateway] is *the* knowledge project of the Knowledge Bank'. Its objectives are to improve aid effectiveness and strengthen governance functions by increasing transparency. A non-profit organisation delivering information solutions to governments, aid workers and students, the Gateway focuses on governance accountability and knowledge generation and networking.

The GDN, GDLN, and Gateway have received common criticisms, including insufficient independence from the World Bank, lacking effective consultation and communication tools (Kalseth and Cummings 2001: 169), and are 'heavy-handed, top-down, and centrally-driven' (Angelescu and Squire 2006: 21). Put simply, they remain 'closely linked to the World Bank at both operational and strategic levels' (Wilks 2004), meaning that the knowledge shared reflects the World Bank's meta-narrative. This final point is significant, because those who control network and communicative systems 'are both contributing to a definition of the reader of their text and establishing parameters for readers' actions' (Woolgar 1991: 69). Thompson (2004: 104) relates this contention in the following way: 'If developmental discourse is an important topic for study because of the unequal power relations it embodies, then the power relations surrounding the development and use of ICT in developmental contexts can be seen as an important element of such discourse'. While not downplaying the impact of the 'digital divide' ('In adopting a techno-development paradigm, the World Bank has exposed and reinforced new problems associated with modern development practices in the twenty first century: greater inclusiveness becomes possible as communication is more decentralised, immediate and accessible, while exclusion is reinforced because engagement is contingent upon capable infrastructure and the ability to interact with that infrastructure' (Bazbauers 2015: 331)), the World Bank's online engagement, as a microcosm for broader ESW activities, reveals an attempt to rhetorically project visions of collaboration, participation, and voluntary choices, while also deliberately building likeminded communities of individuals in relation to specific policy issues. In this way, the significance of online engagement (and ESW more broadly) as 'hands-off' technical assistance is that it attempts to build common understandings while not 'standing over the shoulders' of recipients.

## Country Partnership Frameworks

In October 2012, President Kim called for the overhaul of the World Bank into a 'Solutions Bank', moving beyond Wolfensohn's Knowledge Bank paradigm, and outlined the new mission of the IBRD and IDA as the 'twin goals' of reducing extreme poverty globally to 3% by 2030 and promoting income growth among the bottom 40% of people. This reformation has seen significant changes to the World Bank's structure and led to the introduction of CPFs and SCDs, the most recent forms of survey missions.

CPFs replaced CASs on 1 July 2014 as the principal instrument for country engagement and dialogue. Akin to CASs, CPFs identify 'the key objectives and development results through which the [World Bank] intends to support a member country in its efforts to end extreme poverty and boost shared prosperity in a sustainable manner. It is the central tool that guides the [World Bank's] support for the member country's development program' (World Bank 2014c: 2).

The Kim presidency introduced CPFs to support the shift 'to a solutions culture,' with the World Bank concluding that CASs were too 'transaction-focused' (not focused enough on strategic engagement), too 'spread' in their activities (not focused on 'significant development impacts'), and not prioritising 'outcomes' (World Bank 2014b: 2–3). Responding to these shortcomings, CPFs are designed to 'operationalise' the new Solutions Bank strategy and the 'twin goals' of poverty alleviation and shared prosperity (World Bank 2014b: 5), which is clearly illustrated in the following CPFs: Cabo Verde (2014: 1)—the country partnership framework (CPF) is 'guided by the … two strategic goals of reducing poverty and boosting shared prosperity … Through support to private sector development, in particular to the tourism sector, the [World Bank] program will boost shared prosperity'; Paraguay (2014: 23)—the 'proposed [World Bank] engagement in Paraguay consists of a portfolio of financial, knowledge and convening services focused on promoting shared prosperity and reducing poverty in a developmentally sustainable manner'; Romania (2014: 18)—the aim of the CPF 'is to reduce poverty in Romania and foster sustainable income growth for the bottom 40 of the population' via a program creating a '21st century government', 'growth and job creation', and 'social inclusion'; and, Uganda (2016: 17)—the CPF 'will assist Uganda to address its national priorities with a focus on ending extreme poverty and promoting shared prosperity in a sustainable manner'. Designed to cover 4-year periods, and indicating expected lending volume and possible instruments for engagement, the above CPFs reveal two trends. First, there is a strong pro-poor and social inclusion drive behind the CPF process. Second, there is a maintained importance on private sector-led growth. As such, the CPFs are not a radical departure from survey missions of the 2000s, but there are notable changes.

The CPF process is divided into four stages of country engagement (World Bank 2014a: 1–2; 2014b: 8–9): the SCD (provides the analytic underpinnings for the country strategy via in-country research), the CPF (outlines the World Bank's country strategy, including proposed future lending programs), the Performance and Learning Review [(PLR) periodically updates, monitors the implementation, and learns from the findings of the CPF necessary to make on-the-ground adjustments], and the Completion and Learning Review [(CLR) reviews the completed CPF to inform the next CPF].

The SCD is central to building a CPF. SCDs inform the 'strategic dialogue between the World Bank Group and its clients about priority areas for … engagement' (World Bank 2014c: 3). Put simply, this first stage in the process of country engagement accrues information to inform the CPF. Conducted in consultation with national authorities, the private sector, civil society, and other stakeholders, SCDs present 'a systematic assessment of the constraints a country has to address and the opportunities it can embrace to accelerate progress towards the goals of ending extreme poverty and promoting shared prosperity in a sustainable way' (World Bank 2014c: 3). For fiscal year 2017, the World Bank plans to complete 33 SCDs, the majority of which will be carried out in Sub-Saharan Africa. This is in addition to the few dozen SCDs completed in 2014 and 2015.

Notably, while CPFs are drafted to align with country-led priorities, thereby maintaining a 'country-driven model' (World Bank 2014b: 7), SCDs 'reflect the views' of the World Bank (World Bank 2014b: 6), meaning that the process involved in developing SCDs must be favourably received by recipients in order for the process to be accepted as legitimate. Put another way, while the CPF is designed to reflect 'the priorities of the country's own development program,' the process is heavily informed by the 'priorities identified in the SCD and the [World Bank's] comparative advantages' (World Bank 2014c: 4). It follows that the acceptance of the SCD and CPF by recipients becomes contingent on the manner in which the surveys are conducted.

Ingrained in the CPF process is the importance of consultation and partnerships between the World Bank and its member countries. As per the *World Bank Group Directive: Country Engagement*, the SCD, CPF, and PLR 'are developed in close collaboration with the government, usually through several ministries and agencies at various levels … [The World Bank also] engages through consultations with the private sector, civil society, and other stakeholders' (World Bank 2014c: 5). Under this directive, the IBRD and IDA have determined that more effective survey missions are conducted in partnership with recipients, so as both to develop the most comprehensive account of the country and to generate internal support for the proposed lending schedule. To illustrate, the 2015 Albanian CPF outlines the importance of pursuing a 4-year development program through 'championship', or by focusing on areas that 'have both high impact and strong government champions' (Albanian 2015: 17–18), affirming the need for sympathetic interlocutors. Similarly, a SCD to Belize (2016: 7) details the consultations undertaken in developing the diagnostic report:

> The team has also conducted internal consultations with the SCD core team, including expertise from the IFC and MIGA, and with Global Practice colleagues. These consultations took the form of brainstorming meetings to collect feedback and inputs on the definition and diagnostic of the most binding constraints to growth and proposed areas of focus to boost shared prosperity and reduce extreme poverty in Belize. This SCD has drawn on existing material, new analyses commissioned for the purposes of this systematic effort to understand the main sources of growth and prosperity in the country, and crucially in consultations in country with a varied group of interlocutors. Throughout the consultations, there was a broad consensus on the diagnosis of the challenges faced by Belize and the priorities identified in this report. Above all, there was overwhelming recognition of the need to improve the quality of education and skills in the country given its spill-over effects on competitiveness, growth, and crime and violence.

Illustrating the importance of consultation and partnerships, the World Bank has run a number of online consultation events to strengthen the CPF process. As one example, it held an online consultation on SCDs with 29 participants from governments, NGOs, consultancy firms, private companies, and civil society from Afghanistan, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, France, India, Laos, Moldova, Nigeria, Rwanda, Tanzania, Tunisia, the USA, and Venezuela between 15 March and 30 April 2016. The respondents were asked the following questions on SCDs and the CPF process (World Bank 2016a: 1–2): Are the principles of and issues covered in the SCD sufficient to capture countries' progress on sustainable poverty reduction and shared prosperity? Does the current SCD process allow for sufficient engagement with in-country stakeholders? What should ideally be the areas of the SCD consultation? Is there anything that would make the SCD more useful? Feedback from respondents included suggestions to revise the CPF process to include a broader base of stakeholder participation (particularly women, youth, marginalised, and indigenous people) and improve the outreach of consultation activities (World Bank 2016a: 1–2). While it is still very early to conclude the lasting impact of such online consultations, the nature of the online engagement demonstrates an increasing turn towards inviting partnership to secure better receptivity to the country strategy process.

## Summary

The history of World Bank survey missions as a technical assistance pillar reveals important features distinct from TACs and stand-alone projects. The main difference is that survey missions are examples of 'hands-off' technical assistance; they do not directly implement reforms, change institutions, or train personnel in the same way that the other technical assistance pillars do, but instead are influential in 'creating' and 'sharing' knowledge. As an instrument of policy transfer, survey missions become devices to either join existing or build new epistemic communities around leading development policy issues. It is in this significant point that survey missions, akin to TACs and stand-alone projects, need to be observed in the terms of the relational dynamics between the World Bank and its recipient countries. In order to build communities of like-minded individuals, or, even more narrowly, to locate and inform sympathetic interlocutors, the manner in which missions are conducted influences the reception of that mission's understandings by developing countries.

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CHAPTER 7

# Training Institutes

Similar to survey missions, training institutes are a more background and often overlooked technical assistance activity in the socialisation of World Bank development policy norms. This chapter explores the impact of the World Bank's under-explored 'teaching and learning arm': the EDI and WBI. The institutes run courses, provide facilities, and publish research intended to instruct others on how to think about development. The EDI was launched in 1955 and remained active until 1999, when it was replaced by the WBI. Emphasising the pedagogical principles of practical learning, global networks, and collaborative partnerships, their audience base reveals their influence. In 1956, the EDI delivered two courses to a few dozen people. In 2005, the WBI offered over one thousand learning products to 110,000 government officials, private sector agents, and educators, adopting a training-the-trainers approach geared towards building the capacity of graduates to teach others what they have learnt. And still they have received relatively little scholarly attention, being overlooked, reduced to a footnote, or mixed in with other advisory services of the World Bank. As a unique form of engagement between the institution and the recipients of its development assistance activities, the EDI and WBI have operated quietly in the background attempting to persuasively habitualise and naturalise participants into accepting selective understandings of and approaches to development, with the relational dynamics of that engagement affecting normative socialisation.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section—*International Training Institutes*—offers a brief review of recent



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literature on international training institutes as instruments used to socialise participants into accepting particular policies. The second and third sections—*Economic Development Institute* and *World Bank Institute*—analyse the evolution of the World Bank's two training institutes from 1955 to 2015. In doing so, the chapter analyses changes in curricula, pedagogy, and methodology. Affirming the assertion that '"knowledge transferred" is not necessarily "knowledge taken"' (Riggirozzi 2006: 211), the value here is to observe the ways in which the World Bank trains others to accept its ideas and practices. This is more than just policy movement; it is the practical embedding of policy norms in individual policymaker mindsets.

As an important sidenote, the Kim presidency recently reformed the WBI and its online arm—the World Bank e-Institute—through the launch of the Open Learning Campus in 2016. The Campus' activities are divided between initiatives building 'communities of practice' (connecting experts and peers globally) and delivering online e-courses via the WBa Academy (virtually facilitated and self-paced online courses), as well as uploading podcasts, videos, webinars, infographics, mobile apps, and games (World Bank 2016). At the time of writing this chapter, the Campus had only completed a few learning activities with little information available to be analysed. The chapter thus limits its attention to reviewing the EDI, WBI, and World Bank e-Institute from 1955 to 2015.

## International Training Institutes

As a 'knowledgeable institution', the World Bank's niche in the 'knowledge space' is divided into abstract and routinised knowledge (Chioda et al. 2013: 8). Abstract knowledge includes research and ESW associated with lending operations that draw attention to new policy norms. The EDI and WBI, on the other hand, produce routinised knowledge—or well-established and easily codified knowledge—capable of direct implementation and amendment into practice. By socialising participants through training programs, the institutes seek to shape the identity and contexts of individuals within development practice. Whereas loans and research call attention to normative issues, training programs are designed to habitualise and naturalise participants into accepting new norms; 'training does more than simply transfer technical knowledge; it actively socialises people to value certain things above others' (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 905).

Training also contributes to norm localisation, defined by Acharya (2004: 241) as 'a complex process and outcome by which norm-takers build congruence between transnational norms … and local beliefs and practices'. What is provided through training is socialised through the processes of 'framing' (whereby old local norms are linked to new foreign norms) and 'grafting' (whereby new foreign norms are institutionalised via attachments to old local norms) (Acharya 2004: 243–244). These dynamic processes are promoted by the EDI and WBI as teaching staff draw normative connections to member country contexts. This is the difference between 'norm emergence' through lending and research (which often takes on an abstract level of norm activity) and 'norm cascade' through the EDI and WBI (which socialise and routinise new norms in the context of participant countries) (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). In this way, the World Bank 'does not simply "diffuse" knowledge; it also helps to create new organisations … to synthesise and tailor such knowledge into products and "best practice" that is then marketed and advocated' (Stone 2004: 554).

In the 2010 *New Political Economy* article 'The Joint Vienna Institute' (JVI), Broome (2010: 609) considers the following question: 'How does the intellectual role played by international training organisations fit into the contemporary architecture of global governance?' (Broome 2010: 609). Observing the JVI—a cooperative venture established in 1992 to provide policy-oriented training to officials from former Soviet states in their transition towards market-based economies—as operating quietly in the background of global governance, Broome (2010: 610) comments that the 'activities of international training organisations like the JVI are important to investigate because they have tended to operate "below the radar" of recent global governance scholarship, yet they play an important intermediate role in facilitating the individual-level socialisation of national actors'. This chapter applies Broome's question to the activities of the EDI and WBI.

Broome distinguishes between global governance actors (like the IMF and World Bank) and international training organisations (like the JVI, EDI, and WBI). According to Broome (2010: 611), global governance actors utilise norm diffusion and policy compliance (through, as an example, loan conditionality) to set policy goals in recipient countries at the *institutional* level. In contrast, international training organisations are oriented towards *individual*-level intellectual socialisation through policy learning. Complementing the global governance scholarship critiquing the institutional-level structural adjustment of national economies, the value-added importance of international training organisations to critical analysis rests on their role in the 'intellectual socialisation of national policymakers into a common cognitive framework for thinking about' a range of development issues (Broome 2010: 611). Broome and Seabrooke (2015: 956 and 960) similarly comment that 'an under-explored dimension of contemporary forms of transnational administration is the shift towards training as a mechanism of socialisation, which aims to foster emulation and a shared policy language among a community of actors,' arguing that training both socialises participants 'into particular ways of thinking about policy' and helps identify and develop 'sympathetic interlocutors' in national contexts. As Broome (2010: 622–623) attests,

> unlike the large lending institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF, policymakers do not simply turn to the JVI in times of economic distress when they are in need of emergency financing. Rather, the demand among policymakers and other national officials for the JVI's training services has continued to remain high, long after many of their countries have largely ceased to depend on external financing … It is therefore important to investigate how global governance institutions operate beyond the short-term horizons of specific IMF or World Bank reform programmes in order to gain greater analytical purchase on long-term processes of intellectual socialisation and institutional change. Rather than an immediate result from the application of policy conditionality within a formal loan agreement, institutional change over a long-term horizon is more likely to be consolidated via increased social interaction between national and international policy elites, which can facilitate the steady reconfiguration of actors' material incentives through the gradual acceptance of new cognitive frameworks and normative standards for policy behaviour.

Moving beyond analyses of prescriptive policy packages altering institutional structures through conditional loan disbursements, the activities of the JVI, EDI, and WBI attempt to socialise individuals into accepting new policy norms, potentially leading to epistemic change. Institutional structures can be altered, but such adjustments may not be permanent or enduring. By altering the mindsets of individuals through the 'micro-processes of socialisation such as mimicking, social influence, and persuasion' (Broome 2010: 622), however, new normative assumptions and approaches can be habitualised and naturalised in the minds of decision-makers; new norms come to be viewed as common sense and become embedded as the 'correct way' to achieve outcomes.

Broome (2010: 612) regards international training organisations socialising individuals as potentially leading to epistemic change. The EDI and WBI similarly exercise the function of attempting to both establish new epistemic communities and reinforce existing communities of practice by drawing new actors into the fold. Haas (1992: 3) defines an epistemic community as 'a network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area'. Building upon this definition, an epistemic community, if said to exist, requires four characteristics (Haas 1992: 3). First, a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a value-based rationale for the social action of community members. Second, shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and which then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible policy actions and desired outcomes. Third, shared notions of validity—that is, intersubjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise. And, fourth, a common policy enterprise—that is, a set of common practices associated with a set of problems to which their professional competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence.

The term 'epistemic community' is therefore used by Haas and Broome to describe a 'thought collective', or 'a sociological group with a common style of thinking' (Haas 1992: 3). Importantly, however, this chapter does not attempt to identify whether such communities exist amongst World Bank staff. To illustrate, the WBI provides training to both member country participants and World Bank personnel. The WBI, however, 'is much more oriented to client than to Bank staff learning' (King 2002: 319), with staff comprising only a very small percentage of participants. For this reason, the chapter does not engage with the internal dynamics and debates present within the World Bank. Following the idea of the 'art of paradigm maintenance' introduced by Wade (1996) and furthered by Broad (2006) (whereby a central institutional message emerges from the World Bank via staff selection, internal review processes, the strict editing of official documents, and the discouragement of dissonant discourse), the chapter acknowledges the agency of staff members—and the ensuing internal conflicts over direction, methods, and goals—but focuses on the relational dynamics involved in the finished products delivered to member country participants.

Arguing that the EDI and WBI attempt to build epistemic communities is not simply a theoretical convenience. There is evidence that both institutes see themselves as pursuing that goal. As an unnamed EDI workshop coordinator remarked before a seminar audience in June 1995 (cited in Goldman 2005: 1),

> The purpose of this training seminar is to try to create an epistemic community in Africa so that you can have more power with your governments when negotiating for institutional reform. You won't feel alone. We'll help you set up networks and share information. You will be able to say to your bosses: "Hey, but that's how they're doing it next door, and look how successful they are." We are prepared to offer you support … And when you return home after this workshop, we would like you to initiate your own training workshops … This way we can change decision-making in your countries.

International training institutes therefore do not 'exercise a direct influence on the process of policy change,' but promote 'ideational change across all levels of national policymaking' (Broome 2010: 616). As the World Bank's teaching and learning arm, the EDI and WBI move beyond drawing attention to normative issues and seek to build communities of like-minded decision-makers.

## Economic Development Institute

> The EDI is 'where officials and economists from the Bank's Third World member countries are indoctrinated with the Bank's version of sound economics.' (Payer 1982: 123)

The EDI was launched in 1955 as a training college for senior government officials. It was formed under President Black on a 2-year trial basis. From the outset, it tackled economic growth techniques, strengthened state intervention in development planning, and taught participants how to prepare effective development programs; the 'Bank's experience with problems of economic development has convinced it that the greatest obstacles are not financial but a lack of experience in planning, administration, and management' (IBRD 1955: 24). By the time

Woods succeeded Black in 1963, the EDI had become the World Bank's 'chief instrument' (IBRD 1963: 9) in the delivery of development planning skills, and, by 1973, had 'become one of the most important of the Bank's activities in the field of technical assistance' (World Bank 1974: 59), an accomplishment given that many staffers saw it as a 'gamble' in the early 1950s.

The Institute began its first 6-month course in January 1956. Enrolled were 14 government officials from as many countries. Located in Washington, DC, it ran as small seminars and its curriculum—divided into 140 meetings—included modules on the meaning and measurement of development, the economic aspects of development, and development planning and organisation (EDI 1976: 21). Importantly, it tasked itself with entrenching norms in its participants. The first two EDI Directors—Professor Alexander Cairncross of Glasgow University and Michael Hoffman of the New York Times—recognised its potential normative influence. Cairncross (1985: 8) recalls that 'we wanted to start by taking [participants] through the whole intellectual process of thinking about what they meant by development, what was involved in it, [and] how you knew whether you were developing' and Hoffman (1961: 29) comments that

> the management of the Bank feels that its part of the Bank's function to do as much as it can to help member governments train the kind of people they need in managing the kinds of affairs the Bank is concerned about. In short, the management feels very strongly the importance of trying to educate, train, if you like – this is the more proper term in this connection – people who will have responsible positions in public service.

The EDI did not just teach people about development, it socialised them to accept particular norms. And it came to engage with prominent development decision-makers. As Cairncross observed in the late 1970s, EDI graduates 'more or less ran' South Korea and, in Pakistan, there were 'a great many ex-EDI men who quite consciously were pulling together and having an influence on development' (cited in Berger and Beeson 1998: 493).

The pedagogical approach of the EDI was firmly practical in nature, both in content and delivery. Its courses were oriented towards group discussion, experience pooling, and translating what was learnt into practice:

> To acquaint participants with economic methods and practices in the United States, visits were organised to financial, industrial, commercial, and agricultural institutions; and extended field trips in Mexico and Southern Italy have afforded an opportunity for intensive examination of development problems and programs on a national or regional scale. (World Bank 1960: 81)

Building on this, Alexander Stevenson (1985: 7), who worked for the Institute from 1974 to 1982, recalls that the EDI was mainly concerned with 'practical' problems: 'what everyone wanted to see on a field trip would be the Tennessee Valley Authority. People did think of development in terms of civil engineering'. Temenos and McCann (2013: 349) regard such practical field trips as 'policy tourism', a 'relational, power-laden practice: the tours on which visiting delegations are taken and the places they visit are carefully regulated by their organisers; thus, the knowledge generated through this practice is relationally produced and packaged'. Throughout its history, the Institute used case examples, field trips, and practical 'how to' sessions to socialise participants in how development should be understood and approached. It provided routinised knowledge, or knowledge products 'that are no longer new, whose design has been worked through over a period of time' (Chioda 2013: 5), making possible direct and rapid translation into practice.

Significantly, the Institute did not simply enhance the World Bank's 'ability to provide training for officials from developing countries … [but it] also provided the Bank with a window on the academic work being done in development economics' (Galambos and Milobsky 1995: 170–171). This was important for it allowed the World Bank to comment on the field of economic research, affording it the opportunity to interact with academia and other institutions in the study of economic development, something which the IBRD and IDA had limited contact with during the 1950s and 1960s (Hoffman 1961: 8). The EDI thus created a bridge, affording the World Bank the capacity to contribute intellectually to the development discourse.

Over its 4 decade history, three main features defined the toolkits used by the EDI in attempting individual-level socialisation. These were the adoption of a training-the-trainers approach, the building of global collaborative partnerships, and the integration of neoliberal ideas and practices from the 1980s onwards.

The training-the-trainers approach became a cornerstone of the EDI during the McNamara presidency. The new approach meant that EDI courses became increasingly aligned towards providing participants with the skills necessary to teach others in their governments what they learnt and to organise their own training programs pursuant to EDI curricula. The adoption of the new approach resulted from an increased demand for its courses; the EDI did not have the resources to enrol all applicants. To illustrate, while 1000 people completed the Institute's courses between 1956 and 1969, this number had increased to 5000 by 1976. Via the training-the-trainers approach, courses delivered in Washington, DC, could educate a small group of people, while those unable to enrol could later be taught by EDI graduates. The approach emerged as a way of balancing limited resources with increasing applicant numbers. As a result, by 1977, 'in a number of countries, EDI now supplies little or no teaching support, but does maintain contact with the local institutions through periodic visits of EDI staff, who advise on curriculum design and teaching materials' (World Bank 1977: 80). Such activities culminated in 1996 with 600 trainers being trained in that year, who in turn reached out to an additional 20,000 people. Adopting a multiplier approach, the Institute promoted norm acceptance by both attempting to socialise enrolled participants and providing graduates the skills necessary to socialise others in their governments. As Broome (2010: 617) contends, international training organisations 'play a crucial role in [the] process of shifting policymakers' "habits of mind" through rapidly enlarging the pool of highly training officials' familiar with and accepting of new development policy norms.

The building of global collaborative partnerships buttressed the adoption of the training-the-trainers approach. The adoption of the new approach coincided with EDI courses being increasingly delivered outside of the USA. This reinforced the new approach as the 'overseas courses' (as the EDI called them) were designed to operate autonomously of its Washington courses, while maintaining EDI curricula. This was a natural extension of its training-the-trainers approach, as participants in countries outside of the USA were taught the skills required to run courses themselves. This led a rapid increase in the number of overseas courses. To provide a few examples (World Bank 1974: 59; 1978: 92), consider the following:

> 1969: a four-week project evaluation course conducted in Guyana for English-speaking countries in the Caribbean, sponsored by the Government of Guyana and the University of Guyana and an eight-week project analysis course for English-speaking African countries, supported by the Institute for Economic Development and Planning in Dakar, Senegal, and the Institute for Development Studies at the University of Collogo in Nairobi, Kenya.

1973: an agricultural course run in partnership with the Government of Paraguay, a Bangkok-based development banking course run with the Asian Institute for Economic Development and Planning, and a Bombay-based regional development banking course run with the Bank Training College for the Reserve Bank of India.

1974: an industrial project preparation course run with the Centre for International Studies at the University of Belgrade in Serbia and an agricultural course run with the Iraqi Ministry of Planning.

1976: agricultural and agro-industrial courses run with the African Development Bank, Economic Commission for Africa, and African Institute for Economic Development and Planning.

1978: a transportation course run with the Egyptian Transport Authority.

While the number of Washington-based courses remained static—11 in 1974 and nine in 1982, the number of overseas courses grew from nine in 1974 to 55 in 1982. The annual number of participants enrolled in the overseas courses rose from 200 to 1300 during this period. The Institute not only distributed course notes, training materials, and exercises to national governments and universities (some 41,000 items were distributed in 1981 alone), but the overseas courses were designed as collaborative ventures. Immediately prior to the establishment of the WBI in 1999, the EDI worked in partnership with over 150 organisations.

The Social Policy Reform in Transition Economies (SPRITE) training program illustrates the scope of EDI's collaborative endeavours. Founded in 1993 and receiving financial support from several bilateral donors, including the governments of Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, and South Korea, it provided training and institutional support to government officials in former Soviet economies. Operating initially in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, and the Russian Federation in 1995 before expanding to include Belarus, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Mongolia in 1996, SPRITE delivered senior policy seminars, training-the-trainers courses, and 'consensus building' plans on pension reform, health and employment policy, and social assistance. Articles, textbooks, and other materials were also provided as part of 'awareness-building campaigns'. To illustrate the number of participants, 660 students and 4600 civil servants received training in Ukraine in 1997. As Martens et al. (1998: iii) comment, the SPRITE program

> was designed to provide instruments for analysing the social situation and to build a common approach towards policy reform. SPRITE has a multisector focus, covering such areas as pension reform, health policy, employment policy, social assistance, and poverty reduction. The specific objectives are defined as: enhancing the knowledge and experience of key actors in the social policy reform process; building broad political consensus for reform through improved and broadened dialogue among key actors in policy reform within transition economies; and, developing national training capacity to enhance knowledge and facilitate dialogue.

Following the targeted outcomes of persuading participants that a lack of reform and not reform itself led to high societal costs and that the role of government should be to operate within the limits of a market economy, thereby arguing the alleged necessity of neoliberal reforms, SPRITE followed a 'rolling out knowledge' approach starting with the training program, which offered training to government officials, who would in turn disseminate information to journalists, entrepreneurs, academics, and parliamentarians, who would then distribute ideas to civil society (Martens et al. 1998: 9–13). Within the broader context of EDI activities (most notably the training-the-trainers approach), the development of global collaborative partnerships served as a means through which the EDI attempted to establish communities of like-minded individuals endowed with the practical skills necessary to teach others curricula designed by the Institute.

In an evaluation of SPRITE, Martens et al. (1998: 51) conclude that, based on interviews and questionnaires conducted with a few hundred course participants, the training program led 'to awareness of social policy reform and to consensus building' in former Soviet economies. While their evaluation focuses on technical aspects of the program, Martens et al. (1998: 51) note two issues of importance to relational dynamics. First, it was most effective at affecting policy change in situations where government officials, NGOs, and journalists (the latter of which wrote a number of pieces on SPRITE) were co-opted to positively relate the program to colleagues and decision-makers. Second, and building on the first issue, close collaboration with participants was valuable, including actions to allow participants to design and adopt training instruments, which the EDI labelled 'a neutral way of disseminating important policy signals without imposing specific policy approaches'. Both points demonstrate the relational dynamics involved in catalysing policy reform.

The integration of neoliberal ideas into EDI curricula began in the 1980s, which trailed the ideological turn of the World Bank towards market fundamentalism under President Clausen. The Institute shifted its focus from project management (the norm during the 1960s and 1970s) towards economic management and sectoral economic policy analysis (Mills 1989). This followed the recommendations of a Task Force charged with revising the EDI's mandate in line with more 'market-friendly' policy-oriented curricula (World Bank 1983: 13). 'Economic and Sector Management' became an oft-repeated topic heading, a euphemism for the Washington Consensus. Project Management courses fell in number (from 43 in 1983 to nine in 1988), while Economic and Sector Management courses increased significantly (from 15 in 1984 to 41 in 1988). New courses were added each year, and English, French, and Spanish language courses came to converge on debt and financial adjustment, trade liberalisation, capital markets and private sector development, and public financial planning and analysis training (World Bank 1988: 73–74); textbook approaches to implementing neoliberal policy reform. The Institute also launched 1-week policy seminars on macroeconomics, began workshops evaluating the benefits of decentralisation, and doubled the annual number of training-the-trainers seminars. The collapse of the Soviet Union, which led to a swift increase in its annual participant intake from 3000 in 1992 to 4900 in 1994, strengthened its neoliberal resolve through participant requests to target economic liberalisation, financial reform, privatisation, hyperinflation, and other challenges facing the former Soviet bloc in its market transition (World Bank 1994: 156–157). EDI courses became a means through which to entrench neoliberal ideas and practices in member country participants. As Broome (2010: 618) argues,

> through providing an intermediate avenue to further facilitate the diffusion of global policy norms to national policy communities, this process also contributes to the constant production and reproduction of neoliberal economic governance frameworks as a universally valid technology of political and bureaucratic authority.

This was evident in that the majority of EDI teaching activities during the 1980s and 1990s were senior policy seminars (lasting from one to 5 days and designed for top-level government policymakers and officials), ensuring the attempted neoliberal socialisation of an elite cadre of development decision-makers.

To illustrate the integration of neoliberal ideas, consider a series of five senior policy seminars on structural adjustment for Sub-Saharan Africa held in 1987 (Lusaka I and II in Zambia and Abidjan I in Côte D'Ivoire) and 1988 (Victoria Falls in Zimbabwe and Abidjan II in Côte D'Ivoire). Attended by senior ministers and technical advisors from 27 countries, the main issues raised were that stabilisation and adjustment need to be balanced alongside the protection of vulnerable groups, stronger market mechanisms need to be introduced to incentivise growth, and protectionist policies need to be removed. Given the well documented tension between African countries and World Bank structural adjustment programs (Harrison 2004: 17), with many countries in the region not sharing 'the Bank's "religious belief in liberalisation as a panacea"' (Mills 1989: 14), the EDI attempted to remove the stigma through workshops. In the words of a seminar moderator (cited in Mills 1989: 2),

> There is a need to analyse the advantages and the disadvantages of structural adjustment policies from the point of view of gainers and losers … [The] Bank has a tendency … to see more clearly the positive (economic) aspects of reform and to minimise the social and political risks. Structural adjustment, however, has fast become more and more complex, not just in its formulation, but also in its implementation. While the Bank can suggest various policies and instruments, there are many areas where the Bank lacks competence: knowledge of the culture of individual societies [and] how to motivate individuals and groups.

In consequence, an EDI report published on the senior policy seminars concludes that 'to be sustainable, an adjustment program must be nationally designed and/or designed to fit local conditions' (Mills 1989: vii), with the EDI as potentially influential in—to use the language of norm localisation—framing and grafting foreign norms on neoliberal adjustment into domestic contexts through tailored training programs. This was clear when seminar participants advocated measures to develop 'consensus-building around reform programs,' due to consensus on liberalisation and exchange rate adjustment being 'elusive in all seminars'; '*Support for reform programs starts at the design rather than at the implementation stage. That is why all interested parties must be consulted at the design stage to build ownership of the program*' (Mills 1989: 14 and 23 original emphasis). While seminar discussions on structural adjustment were first met with scepticism, the seminars ended with participants conceding that some variation of neoliberal policy reform could have positive results, provided that they took into consideration domestic contexts.

The above three features defining the EDI between the 1950s and 1990s reveal its attempts to socialise participants into accepting and following its normative assumptions and building like-minded communities of government officials involved in development decision-making. The efficacy of the Institute, in this way, was affected by both technical factors and relational dynamics. Most reviews of the EDI emphasise the technical qualities required of training programs, including short- and long-term objectives, funding data acquisition, and recommendation assessments (Taschereau 1998: 56). The importance of relational dynamics, however, is not overlooked, with commentaries noting the need to build transparent procedures between EDI staff and participants, paying attention to the selection and mix of attendees, and emphasising the use of visual, computer-based simulations, and power-point presentations to the effective presentation and packaging of course curricula (Colinet and Marra 2000: 47–48). Taschereau (1998: 57) also remarks that

> Formulating useful recommendations is not just a matter of clarity. It is also a matter of empathy with decision-makers. As the saying puts it: "Don't judge a person until you've walked a mile in his shoes." Through collaborative impact evaluation, evaluators get a good sense of the complexities of the institutional development processes into which the training programs may feed and of the context in which decision-makers operate.

Similarly, Leeuw and van Gils (1997: 89 and 95) conclude the importance of the 'publication of proceedings, integrity pledges, and special workshops to win support and commitment of certain pivotal groups, such as parliamentarians,' noting that successful workshops, seminars, and other activities make use 'of already existing specific and coherent groups,' thus more capably locating and training sympathetic interlocutors.

## World Bank Institute

> 'The economy of the 21st century is knowledge-based. Both the rates of economic growth and its quality will depend on access to, and application of, knowledge. Reducing poverty will take more than investments in physical capital. It will require building human capital by sharing knowledge and experience. Therefore, building client countries' own capacity for

> development is critical and the World Bank's advisory services, knowledge sharing, and learning programs all contribute to this goal. WBI plays a key role in contributing to the achievement of the Bank's knowledge strategy for helping clients take advantage of the global knowledge economy,' World Bank Managing Director Dr Mamphela Ramphele. (cited in WBI 2001b: 8)

President Wolfensohn unveiled the WBI in March 1999. A reformatted version of the EDI built on and expanded its predecessor's legacy. It arose as a consequence of the Strategic Compact. Outlined by Wolfensohn in 1996, the Compact sought to rejuvenate the institution's waning public image, turning away from a 'conditionality bank' and becoming a 'Knowledge Bank' (Gilbert et al. 1999: F612–F615; King 2002: 319–320). Wolfensohn saw the Knowledge Bank paradigm as altering the persona of the institution via networking and pooling experience, pioneering new partnerships and utilising new communications technologies, and extending the role of the EDI to produce development knowledge as a global public good (Wolfensohn 1996: 14–15). WBI's launch served as a means through which to reinforce the Knowledge Bank approach, going further than the EDI (which was largely isolated from the World Bank financial and technical assistance) in attempting to integrate its activities within the operations of the World Bank. As former WBI Vice President Vinod Thomas remarks (cited in WBI 2005: 33),

> In its transformation from EDI to WBI, the Institute's most defining change was to go from the provider of particular training courses to becoming the arm of the World Bank for facilitating learning and capacity building in countries. The new name signified the effort to make the Institute a more integral part of the Bank, leveraging everything else the Bank does.

While maintaining its predecessor's pedagogy and continuing to foster individual-level epistemic change (or, at the very least, promote 'knowledge networks and communities of practice' (WBI 2000: 7)), the WBI introduced new features and, in so doing, distanced itself from the EDI.

Since 1999, the WBI has stressed the importance of creating, applying, and disseminating knowledge on economic management, private sector growth, market creation, corporate responsibility, good governance, human development, poverty alleviation, and sustainability. Its broad curriculum has been pursued through internal partnerships—with the World Bank Development Research Group, GDN, and Development Gateway—and external collaborations with bilateral donors, private sector affiliates, and international institutions. The rationales underpinning its activities have been to connect people through knowledge on how-to-reform, help people gain greater autonomy over their own development, and use distance learning technologies to interact with the widest audience. As Vinod Thomas saw it, its goal was to ensure that 'all people are able to take part in shaping their futures and in determining the quality of their lives' (cited in WBI 2000: 4). Under the tag 'Learning for Development', the Institute repeatedly claimed to offer public goods through the design of 'customised programs that create opportunities for development stakeholders to acquire, share, and apply global and local knowledge and experiences' (WBI 2008: ii). While an honest endeavour, there are valid concerns over whether it is concerned with 'learning for development' or 'development for learning'. With its emphasis on individual-level socialisation and the establishment of communities of practice, is it enabling learning for development (by building the capacity of participants to pursue development on their own) or development for learning (by persuading participants to regard World Bank policy norms as the only valid options to pursue)?

Three features define the tools used by the WBI in attempting individual-level socialisation. These are an expansion of its target audience and an open collaborative approach, a clearer and more formalised strategic agenda, and a turn towards online engagement. The new features expand the potential impact of the WBI beyond that which was possible under the activities of its predecessor.

The WBI expanded its target audience and adopted an open collaborative approach. Moving beyond solely engaging with government officials, it encouraged the enrolment of a broader actor range. And, in contrast to its predecessor, its contact with these actors has been pursued through an 'open knowledge' approach, whereby the WBI projects itself as a catalyst for development, offering tools, methods, and online platforms to enable participants to pursue development on their own terms, rather than being shadowed by the Institute (WBI 2015b). Contending that capacity development cannot be 'unilaterally defined, imposed, or coerced', 'simple or fragmented', 'exclusive', 'short-term', or 'predefined', it argues that its approach is 'country driven and defined', 'long-term', and 'collaborative' (WBI 2003: 15). Noting the importance of relationships to improving capacity, the WBI (2003: 16) concludes that 'country ownership is key. Because capacity enhancement requires sustained effort over time and across sectors, because it involves networks of people, institutions, and resources within and across countries, its achievement is almost always beyond the scope of any single organisation'. In this way, the WBI cultivates an impression that its courses, tools, and platforms do not instruct people on how to develop, but offers them the means to develop on their own; a more nuanced and persuasive pedagogical approach compared to the courses of the EDI.

Expanding its target audience beyond government officials, participants involved in WBI courses include policymakers, bureaucrats, parliamentarians, academics, journalists, private sector personnel, civil society groups, and students. Such a diverse participant base reinforced the principles of the Strategic Compact. As Wolfensohn notes, 'I see WBI weaving a global web of strategic alliances to promote a multidirectional exchange of indigenous and global knowledge' (cited in WBI 2002: 3). From the outset, the Knowledge Bank approach and WBI were connected via the framing and grafting of new foreign norms with local norms. As a result, the annual number of participants in WBI learning activities increased, from 30,000 participants involved in 500 activities in 2000 to 110,000 people involved in 1016 activities in 2005. Of the total number of participants enrolled in 2008, the breakdown was government officials (50%), private sector personnel (20%), educators (16%), NGOs (10%), and international organisations (4%) (WBI 2008: 11). As former WBI Vice President Frannie Léautier (2007: 24) remarks, the WBI 'has worked traditionally with what we call "non-traditional audiences of the World Bank"—working with civil society, working with NGOs, working with women's group and communities, working with parliamentarians and the media—because for many years the Bank was restricted to working with the government and the ministries'. In addition, Stiglitz (2000: 36) remarks that 'in one [WBI] program, local institutes arranged for government officials, law makers, and business people from an African country to learn directly and horizontally from a nearby East Asian country that had faced similar economic and ethnic problems not too long ago—all of which was undoubtedly more effective than seminars based on codified case studies taken as blueprints'. By broadening its target audience, it not only increased the reach of its learning activities but also built its capacity to directly socialise people in the private sector and civil society into accepting and following its development norms. Nonetheless, the WBI remained focused on identifying and training sympathetic interlocutors: 'The success of this knowledge exchange initiative depends on having the right kinds of people involved. Consider those who *can* and *will* initiate and manage the changes needed to reach the capacity development objectives' (WBI 2016: 8 original emphasis).

Alongside the increased target audience and number of activities provided, the duration of courses shortened. While the EDI began by delivering 6-month intensive courses, which came to include week- and month-long courses, the WBI largely provides shorter learning activities, including one-day and weekend seminars. While shorter time periods enables an increased number of learning activities per year, it can result in diminished returns. WBI courses have been criticised by some participants as too short and lacking hands-on work. A six country survey conducted by the World Bank IEG (2008: 24) affirms this view: the course was interesting (93% of participants agreed), the lecturers were of good quality (91% agreed), the course covered the right amount of topics for the amount of time allotted (53% agreed), and the course devoted significant time to practical exercises and projects (53% agreed). Participant numbers may have increased due to shortened course durations, but it had the consequence of lowering the impact of the learning experience for participants, thereby potentially undermining WBI's capacity to socialise individuals.

The Institute adopted a clearer and more formalised strategic agenda compared to its predecessor. While the agenda of the EDI was ad hoc (its 1985–1989 5-year plan simply articulated the need to increase policy-related training, design new courses, and improve the quality of training-the-trainers seminars), the WBI established six strategic directions and 14 thematic programs that created a consistent and coherent curricula of course materials. The six strategic directions were the poorest countries, post-conflict and fragile states, middle-income countries, global public goods, the Arab World, and knowledge and learning.

Building upon the above strategic directions, the thematic programs of the Institute included (WBI 2008: 57–59): *Business, competitiveness, and development*: case studies and network dialogue emphasising the private sector as a 'crucial partner in development,' with job creation programs run in Iran, Morocco, and Lebanon, and corporate social responsibility tools distributed in the Mercosur region of Latin America. *Climate change, environment, and natural resources*: policy seminars and courses studying the linkages between the economy, ecosystems, and society, with China and Vietnam receiving natural resource management programs. *Education*: face-to-face and distance learning methods designed to highlight the importance of education for productivity, competitiveness, and growth, with post-conflict states being targeted to facilitate the renewal of school programs. *Financial sector*: regional and global workshops and teleconferences focused on building healthy and diversified financial systems and adapting best practices, with aspiring EU countries receiving financial policy guidance and the Central Bank of Bangladesh being trained on policy analysis techniques. *Governance and anti-corruption*: direct action programs and seminars sharing experiences and practices on responsible and accountable government, with Liberia receiving leadership workshops on the national budgetary process and digital radio technology being used to run anti-corruption programs in Kenya. *Health and AIDS*: courses and programs on building national institutional capacity in order to design, implement, and sustain national health programs, with Brazil receiving courses designed to build sub-national service capacity. *Investment climate capacity enhancement*: regional and national courses focused on formulating and implementing investment policies, with sustainable business and market creation programs being taught in Cameroon and Malawi. *Knowledge for development*: services and policy forums conceived to help countries access and use knowledge and innovation to strengthen regional and global competitiveness, with e-government programs run in Argentina. *Poverty and growth programs*: tailored courses and local training centres designed to evaluate the relationships between growth and poverty strategies. *Public-private partnerships in infrastructure*: country-specific experiences and good practices prioritising public-private relationships in infrastructure, with Russia receiving policy advice on sub-national infrastructure partnerships. *Social protection*: team-based learning initiatives analysing the impact of social safety nets, labour market policies, and pension reform on vulnerable groups. *Trade*: face-to-face and online programs focused on policies and institutions to take advantage of international trade agreements and negotiations, with Ghana and Ethiopia receiving post-2008 GFC seminars tackling debates on export competitiveness connecting policymakers and academics. *Urban and local government*: seminars and workshops for city officials and national and regional government officials on households, commerce, and industry, with India receiving urban management certification programs. *Water*: knowledge partnerships and distance learning programs targeting the improvement of water supplies and water resource management institutions.

To outline how the strategic directions and thematic programs worked in practice, consider the following three teaching programs than ran in 2014 and 2015: '>Leadership' (WBI 2015c), 'Business, Competitiveness, and Development' (WBI 2015a), and 'Strengthening Responsible Business Ethics' (WBI 2015d).

>Leadership (read: 'greater than leadership') was a program designed to improve the leadership capacity of 'change agents', with leadership defined as 'a process through which reform teams seek to comprehend and influence behaviours, mindsets, and values of various stakeholders' (WBI 2015c). The program trained participants to influence others to accept their approach to development. With a team-based curriculum, the program was organised into a five-and-a-half day intensive leadership skills course and an 11-month 'laboratory' phase to allow participants to apply their new skills through a learning-by-doing process. >Leadership was divided into several integrated modules examining constraints to coalition building, technical skills training, innovative solution discovery, and persuasion, participation, and negotiation techniques; a return of the EDI's training-the-trainers approach.

Business, Competitiveness, and Development and Strengthening Responsible Business Ethics were similar programs that addressed the roles of the public and private sectors in fostering sustainable, responsible, and accountable development practices (WBI 2015a, b). The two programs engaged participants from multinational and national companies, small- and medium-sized enterprises, business associations, civil society organisations, government agencies, and academia, revealing a broad target audience. Via tailored training programs (both face-to-face and online), multi-stakeholder partnerships, corporate strategy and policy development, and research publications, the two programs focused on inclusive and sustainable business (targeting increased opportunities for poorer populations), the role of the private sector in fighting corruption, and executive development courses (in-depth programs offering insights into fighting poverty and delivering profits). The programs were indicative of the post-Washington Consensus.

A range of internal studies conducted by the World Bank and WBI reveal lessons emerging throughout the 2000s. The dominant lesson that emerged was that successful training is contingent on participants having the requisite material and technical capacities, incentives, responsibilities, and power in their countries (World Bank IEG 2008: 36). While the WBI found that greater coordination and collaboration were decisive factors in shaping participant understandings, as well as tailoring courses to align with CASs and country-specific capacity-building needs (Khattri 2003: 31–32; WBI 2009: 3–4; 2001a: 31), the overall efficacy of the WBI was influenced by factors outside of the WBI's relationship with participants. Participants surveyed after completing courses reiterated the importance of their workplace environment (World Bank IEG 2008: 36): 'After the course, we were asked to write a proposal for possible assistance (small grant) but to date nothing has come … If they didn't promise, I wouldn't be bothered. I had big plans but no funds to back it up' (*WBI Debate to Action: Building Capacity in Nigerian Youth Organisations, Nigeria*); 'I could not apply new knowledge in my current work mostly because material and technical capacities of our organisation are rather limited' (*Social Provision for Families Below the Poverty Line, Azerbaijan*); and, 'The decisions are not up to me. As much as I would like to apply social responsibility, it's the higher ranks who make the decisions. I can place my little grain of rice but I need more support than I have in order to bring about bigger changes' (*WBI Corporate Social Responsibility, Mexico*).

Most significantly, the evidence reveals that participants were more likely to commit to training programs if the training was embedded within a loan, as opposed to being offered by the WBI (World Bank IEG 2008: 39), a point that reveals that more weight is afforded by member countries to lending operations than to stand-alone training courses.

The WBI embraced the connectivity and interactivity granted by online engagement. From its inception, it utilised distance learning technologies. As former WBI Vice President Vinod Thomas considers, 'Through the expanding use of distance learning technologies, an extensive network of institutional partners, and electronic networks for knowledge sharing, WBI has an impact that reaches far beyond traditional classroom teaching' (cited in WBI 2001b: 3). Thomas (1999: 10) continues: 'The information available on the Internet makes the transmission of knowledge much easier and renders old knowledge obsolete'. Similarly, Léautier (2007: 21) notes that 'there are more SMS text messages to be exchanged today than there are people on the planet, so, again, you can't transfer ideas and knowledge just by talking to a few people'. While the Internet was used to a limited extent by the EDI to transmit course materials and discuss curricula over online networks (using video presentations, teleconferencing, Internet-based programs, and CD-ROMs to project its ideas and practices during the late 1990s, with such technological advancements leading to 7000 people being directly and 20,000 being indirectly involved within its learning activities in 1996 (World Bank 1996: 151)), the WBI went much further. In addition to research collaborations promoted through the GDN, Development Gateway, and African Virtual University (King 2002: 320–321; Wilks 2002: 330–331; Stone 2003: 43–61), the clearest illustration of its integration and synthesis of online platforms was the July 2011 launch of the World Bank e-Institute.

The e-Institute was a virtual learning classroom designed to overcome the budgetary and geographical constraints preventing people from enrolling in WBI courses by making participation possible from homes, offices, and classrooms. A global portal intended to allow 'self-motivated' individuals to learn about development, its vision was to 'reach out *directly* to policymakers, civil society organisations, media, parliaments, private sector, academic, and youth—the key "stakeholders for change"' (World Bank e-Institute 2015b original emphasis). Rather than working through intermediaries, and reflecting the broadened audience base of the WBI, the e-Institute sought to engage directly, and therefore attempt to socialise directly, the public and private sectors and civil society. Encouraging open access information, it focused on three areas: open knowledge (through structured learning and knowledge exchange), collaborative governance (by building multi-stakeholder coalitions), and innovative solutions (by developing new and innovative tools). It was driven by the goal of building knowledge networks and encouraging transparent government processes to pursue and implement innovative solutions to development problems, while also habitualising and naturalising development policy norms directly in member country participants.

Between 2011 and 2015, the breadth of the e-Institute's e-courses, e-communities (virtual learning spaces), webinars (interactive virtual meeting rooms), podcasts, blogs, videos, and multimedia toolkits was comprehensive. Participation in its learning activities was based on reviewing multimedia presentations and required readings, completing weekly exercises, connecting and participating in online forums, and completing end-of-course examinations. With the pedagogical principles of participatory and collaborative learning, multimedia interactivity, expert facilitation, case study explanations, and practical how-to-do approaches, it focused on financial and trade liberalisation, governance efficiency, social accountability, poverty alleviation, and energy and environmental protection—the post-Washington Consensus writ large. The e-Institute's online learning activities were thus oriented towards enabling participants to pursue development on their own, ostensibly offering the means for people to develop without need for direct oversight; a nuanced method for socialising individuals into following particular normative frameworks.

To illustrate the content and methodology of the e-Institute, consider 'Sustainable Urban Land Use Planning' (World Bank e-Institute 2015a). The e-course addressed the rapid demographic and spatial transformations facing urban areas over the coming decades. It aimed to 'ensure that participants have a functional and integrated understanding of the dynamics of urban land use; and demonstrate how to effectively utilise policies and planning instruments to manage urban growth and achieve sustainable, equitable, and efficient development outcomes'. An eight-hour-a-week seven-week course run twice a year, it was divided into several modules on sustainable urban growth, land use planning institutions, infrastructure, local economic development, social equity, and climate change. Each module involved tutor-guided online discussions, exercises on strategies, processes, and action plans, and self-administered tests, and it drew on peer networks, communities of practice, and case studies. Its target audience included urban practitioners, policymakers, and city managers, and it was delivered (like many e-Institute courses) free-of-charge. It epitomised the features defining WBI toolkits: a broadened target audience, an open collaborative approach, a formalised strategic agenda, and online engagement. The purpose of which was to deliver materials and methods to participants under the guise of allowing them to learn in an independent fashion; not instructing people on how to develop, but providing them tools to develop on their own. As such, the WBI did not coerce participants by telling them what to do. It claimed to simply provide them with persuasive options to take into consideration when formulating development plans. Unlike the coercive nature of loan conditionality, the WBI operated quietly in the background attempting to socialise, habitualise, and naturalise participants into accepting its development policy norms.

## Summary

Broome (2010: 611) concludes that

> international training organisations … do not wield coercive power and influence in the traditional sense that is often associated with the controversial role of global governance institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. Yet the professional training individuals receive matters greatly for how they construct causal interpretations of how economies work, as well as how they conceive economies ought to be organised.

The EDI and WBI have similarly served the unique intermediary role of attempting to persuade individuals to accept and follow select normative assumptions as common sense by socialising those norms through courses, seminars, and online resources. While they do not wield coercive instruments such as conditional loans, they serve the quieter and more background tasks of influencing the mindsets of individuals. They have not attempted to alter institutional structures in the same way as TACs or TALs, but instead have sought to train and socialise people to respond to development challenges by utilising what they have learnt. And the evidence reveals that relational dynamics greatly affect the receptivity of participants.

In consequence, the combined influence of the EDI and WBI as agents of policy transfer is fourfold. First, they operate without the need for participants to request a loan. While the standard life cycle of a World Bank loan may take up to several years from request to disbursement, participants of the e-Institute could enrol within 1 month's notice. This means that socialisation can occur far more rapidly. Second, they operate more persuasively than coercively. By and large, requests for World Bank loans occur out of some degree of desperation, for example the inability to receive private funding for development projects. In contrast, anecdotal evidence (for example blog posts on the WBI website) suggests that participants attend not out of desperation, but out of the desire to learn from the world's leading development institution; people attend because they want to, not because they need to. Third, they contribute to transnational policy networks. This is similar to a point noted by Broome in review of the JVI. The EDI and WBI engage with hundreds of national governments, universities, and other institutions. Such engagement contributes to the building of epistemic communities involved in the dissemination of development best practices. And, fourth, they use online resources to reach an incredibly large audience, both in terms of numbers and diversity. While only 14 senior government officials attended the first EDI course in 1956, some 110,000 people participated in WBI learning activities in 2005. The institutes have utilised technology to project their ideas and practices from the international to the domestic, thus expanding their influence to those who are unable to physically attend due to budgetary or geographical constraints.

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CHAPTER 8

# Development Transferred?

The World Bank has provided development assistance to its member countries for 70 years. In that time, it has lent close to one trillion dollars in loans and credits, has published libraries worth of books, policy briefs, and working papers on a litany of subjects, and has led the mainstream practice of international development assistance. While not the only multilateral development bank, with the UNDP, regional development banks, and newly established China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and BRICS-led New Development Bank (NDB) all exercising material and ideational power, the World Bank arguably remains—for better or worse—the most influential voice in the theory and practice of development in the twenty first century. Given that it engages coercively and persuasively with the poorest and most vulnerable and disenfranchised countries and peoples in the world, it must continue to be analysed, theorised, and understood. This book has attempted to offer new insights into this exhaustively critiqued development institution by (i) focusing upon its four pillars of technical assistance, an aspect of its activities that has often escaped review, and (ii) addressing the importance of the way it packages, presents, and transfers its ideas and practices to conferring legitimacy upon its evolving, contentious, and often contradictory development claims.

The book began from the assumption that 'development' is a social construct. If we ignore for a moment the academic literature on development and the multitude of intellectual positions arising from modernisation theory, dependency theory, gender-based analyses, and



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post-development approaches, we cannot find in the World Bank one common understanding of development throughout its history. From the Bretton Woods to the Washington Consensus to the post-Washington Consensus eras, the institution would have difficulty in recognising itself from decade to decade. The twelve Presidents who have led the institution, supported by Chief Economists, Vice Presidents, economists, analysts, loan officers, researchers, administrators, and miscellaneous personnel, as well as the external influence of its Boards of Governors and Executive Directors, repeatedly changed its mission. While since the 1980s it has pursued a broadly neoliberal, pro-free market, and pro-private sector view of development, there have been distinct changes in its approach, understandings, and methods. The significance of this is that 'development', as a social construction, does not in and of itself possess legitimacy. Tools, instruments, and actors are needed to imbibe this social construct with legitimacy, with this book arguing throughout its chapters that powerful forces granting and denying legitimacy are the political and social interactions—the relationships—between development advocate and development audience.

From the World Bank's history, technical assistance emerges as an incredibly influential tool used not only to move development policy norms but also to confer legitimacy upon them. While much of the academic literature analyses the coercive practices of SALs, SECALs, and DPLs, and other voices investigate the persuasive impact of online platforms and knowledge networks, this books finds the tension between coercion and consent important to the movement of ideas and practices from the international to the domestic. In observing the four pillars of World Bank technical assistance, the consistent lesson that emerges over seven decades is that legitimacy foremost derives from the relational dynamics between technical assistance provider and recipient.

International development assistance is fundamentally concerned with 'selling' ideas and practices to developing countries. While more conservative voices may claim that development assistance simply involves the provision of finance and material resources, this book maintains that it is about constructing discourse (Escobar 1998: 430–431); it is about building understandings of what it means to transition from one state of being to the next. In this way, the manner in which ideas and practices move from the international to the domestic are instrumentally linked to what development is. And, given that development is a social construct, it is necessary to understand the social processes involved in conferring legitimacy upon that social construction. While the technical soundness of policy advice is important (for it must be feasible, well designed, and contextually appropriate), development agencies would do well to invest more in understanding their dynamic relationships with their recipients.

In considering the movement of ideas and practices from the international to the domestic and in understanding the relational dynamics involved, this book drew upon the policy transfer and policy mobilities literatures. While the two frameworks contain ontological, epistemological, and methodological differences, they both contribute to comprehending the movement of policy.

The policy transfer literature, with its value-added being an inquiry into the 'role of institutional and administrative arrangements in mediating the exchange of policy ideas' (Bulmer et al. 2007: 189), asks several questions of its subject matter (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000: 7–9): Why do actors engage in policy transfer? Who are the key actors involved? What is transferred? From where are lessons drawn? What are the different degrees of transfer? What restricts or facilitates the transfer process? How is it related to policy 'success' or 'failure'?

Evidence in this book provides brief answers to these questions in relation to technical assistance. First, the World Bank and its member countries engage in technical assistance because financial assistance alone is incapable of 'making development happen'. Second, the key actors involved in the technical assistance process include the World Bank, other development institutions, national and sub-national governments, private corporations, and civil society groups. Third, technical assistance largely transfers the World Bank's conceptualisations of what constitutes economic, political, social, and environmental 'progress', often, though not always, aligned to country priorities. Fourth, lessons are drawn from the World Bank's experiences, recipient country experiences, and the experiences of socio-politically or geographically similar countries. Fifth, technical assistance demonstrates degrees of coercion and persuasion, depending upon the pillar of technical assistance observed and the way it is packaged, presented, and transferred. Sixth, recipient needs and desires and the level of World Bank engagement restrict and/or facilitate the policy transfer process. And, seventh, the nature of technical assistance itself affects the success or failure of technical assistance, with the dichotomy of 'hardware' and 'software' revealing this most keenly.

While these seven questions are useful in evaluating a 'black boxed' understanding of policy movement, the policy mobilities literature is persuasive in contending that there is something missing from the above questions and therefore something missing in the answers (McCann and Ward 2013: 6–8). This is an important point for consideration. While the questions underpinning policy transfer research are relevant to understanding the technical dimensions of policy movement, there are 'silences' (McCann 2011: 111). Oddly, the orthodox 'political science' model often overlooks the 'politics' of policy movement.

One of the shortcomings of the political science model is that it advances too 'neat' a dichotomy of voluntary transfer (whereby an actor makes a 'rational' choice to adopt all or parts of foreign policy norms) and direct or indirect coercive transfer (whereby agency is diminished and choice is removed). This intellectual view erodes the complexity of policy movement (McCann and Ward 2013: 6–8), particularly in regard to global governance. In addition, the orthodox model's questions presuppose that the moved policy is 'whole' and 'sound'. In regard to 'whole', policy norms are often considered to be pre-packaged and ready for delivery, while, in relation to 'sound', little time is spent on the role of recipient perception in granting legitimacy to policy. It is for these reasons that the policy mobilities literature offers a strong complementary position. The main contribution of the mobilities literature is thus that policy movement is a complex undertaking, involving multiple actors, inequalities of power, and relational dynamics (Peck 2011: 775). The mobilities literature offers a strong analytical framework through which to understand the socially constructed process of policy movement and the relational dynamics involved in policy movement.

Mason and Asher (1973: 331–332) conclude that

> Good advice is rare, and good advice that is listened to is even rarer. But the [World] Bank provides a powerful amplifier – the prospect of capital assistance to finance its recommendations. Because of this, Bank advice has at times been followed when advice that is just as good, or better, from agencies less affluent than the Bank has been ignored.

While Mason and Asher make a good point, that the financial capacity of the World Bank offers material support—both coercive and persuasive—to its ideas and practices, the evidence contained in this book illustrates that, while finance may provide a large 'bullhorn', it does not necessarily confer legitimacy. Although there is difficulty in establishing causal connections between transnational policy norms leading to domestic policy change

(Bulmer et al. 2007: 12), the four pillars of World Bank technical assistance reveal the centrality of relational dynamics to conferring legitimacy.

TACs are the most pervasive pillar of World Bank technical assistance. It is difficult to identify an IBRD loan or IDA credit that does not include components offering policy advice, training, and/or project planning. In analysing the institution's formative years, rural and urban poverty alleviation projects, SALs and SECALs, economies in transition and crisis, and DPLs, TACs evolved to adopt a more interventionist and policy-minded approach, turning from hardware to software. While success rates suffered as capacity building and institutional development initiatives became more widespread, the main lesson learnt from policy movement through TACs is that successful and unsuccessful transfer is dependent upon the recipient's perception of the larger lending operation. While holding the capacity to greatly influence recipient institutions given its pairing with financial assistance, TACs are shaped by the receptivity of recipient's to the larger lending operation.

Stand-alone projects, while at times part of a larger development assistance package, are not components of a specific loan or credit. This affects the nature of interaction with recipients. The relational dynamic changes as recipients have greater control over the stand-alone project in comparison with TACs. When considering technical assistance projects, TALs, NLTA, and RASs, two main lessons emerge. First, relational dynamics are relevant to the distance between the stand-alone project and a larger development assistance package. For example, TALs were affected by their connection to SALs and SECALs, with the recipient's perception of the adjustment program affecting their perception of the companion TAL. The packaging and presentation of TALs alongside SALs and SECALs shaped the perception of what the TAL represented. Second, in relation to NLTA and RASs, the more successful stand-alone projects were determined by the nature in which they were devised and implemented, with the more consensual, collaborative, and voluntary the process of policy movement through these projects often leading to greater recipient willingness to accept the transferred policy products.

Survey missions are the most difficult of the four technical assistance pillars to measure success and failure. Being a 'hands-off' and background type of technical assistance, developing causal connections between a survey mission and successful policy transfer is difficult. For this reason, it is better to understand survey missions as holding the capacity to build collective understandings—or communities of practice—on development problems as opposed to the capacity of TACs and stand-alone projects to alter institutional structures. General survey missions, country economic memoranda, CASs, ESW, and CPFs embody the socially constructed nature of development; survey missions are value-judgments posing as empirically based best practice. Who is chosen for a mission, what the mission surveys, and what is promoted and demoted in the survey report are all decisions that influence what the missions hope to achieve. The analysis of survey missions since 1949 reveals that in attempting to build epistemic communities and identify and groom sympathetic interlocutors, the relational dynamics of survey missions are just as important as those to TACs and stand-alone projects. The nature of the mission, how it is conducted, and how the recipient is involved all affects the receptivity of recipients to what is presented by the survey team.

Training institutes provide the most direct form of policy movement from the international to the domestic of the four technical assistance pillars. In observing the EDI, WBI, and World Bank e-Institute, evidence reveals attempts to not just alter institutional structures, but moreover the direct socialisation of participants into accepting and adopting particular ways of thinking. In this way, training institute success is premised upon their interaction and engagement with participants. While affording the greatest potential for embedding international policy norms in domestic contexts, training institutes are also the most limited of the four technical assistance pillars. They are the most limited because the success and failure of policy movement rests upon those individuals participating in the training institutes. The location of participants in domestic positions of power determines whether or not what is learnt can be translated into practice.

In consideration of the above, it is important to remember that this book does not make imaginative leaps when contending the significance of relational dynamics. As a largely archival study, the lessons learnt and conclusions drawn from dozens upon dozens of World Bank projects are all identified from within official documents. As early as the late 1940s, the nature of the relationship between the World Bank and its member countries was considered significant to successful lending operations. Yet, even with discussion of country-led and participatory development approaches, the World Bank continues to profess its ideas and practices are value-neutral, technocratic best practice. This may well be the case, but legitimacy is not conferred because the World Bank says so. Legitimacy comes from recipients saying so.

Although a case study of the World Bank, this book provides insights relevant to the activities of multilateral development banks and other global governance actors in the twenty first century. If we remain with development institutions, the UNDP, regional development banks, China-led AIIB, and BRICS-led NDB all provide technical assistance. The theoretical lens offered to the World Bank in this study could readily be applied to these other development institutions. Building upon what is taken from this study, it would be fascinating to analyse the importance of relational dynamics unique to the interactions between other institutions and their member countries. The ambition of this book is to provide a window into understanding the practical processes and social constructions relevant to transnational policy movement, with the hope to shine light on the complex relationships between global governance and state-based actors. This is a topical field of analysis, particularly given the protectionist trends undermining multilateral endeavours in the face of the UK's Brexit and the presidential appointment of Donald Trump.

In observing the role of relational dynamics in affording the greater acceptance of development policy norms, there is one potential positive ramification: since the end of the Second World War, the mainstream development discourse has privileged the knowledge and understandings of the developed world above the developing world. If relational dynamics were more strongly understood and accentuated, recognising the consequence of that engagement with other actors confers legitimacy, then perhaps the persistently hierarchical nature of development assistance may be brought further into question and more equitable partnerships between development institutions and developing countries may result.

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