

TERRORISM, TOURISM and the End of HOSPITALITY in the 'WEST'

MAXIMILIANO E. KORSTANJE

Terrorism, Tourism and the End of Hospitality in the 'West'

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palgrave
macmillan

Maximiliano E. Korstanje
University of Palermo
Buenos Aires, Capital Federal, Argentina

ISBN 978-3-319-52251-7 ISBN 978-3-319-52252-4 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-52252-4

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017941705

Cover Image © goldhafen / Getty Images
Cover Design: Oscar Spigolon

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature
The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgements

I would wish to thank my family (Maria Rosa Troncoso, my wife and Olivia, Benjamin and Ciro, my children) for all the received love and patience which were the necessary oxygen for me to perform this work.

Contents

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

On 11 September 2001 the United States suffered one of the bloodiest terrorist attacks in history, when four civil aircraft were directed against civilian and military targets as weapons. Though the United States received much support from international allies of the calibre of Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom and France, it is no less true is that George W. Bush's administration opened the gates of hell after it led the invasion of Iraq (Kaplan and Cristol 2003). Though Bush and his 'radcons' (radical conservatives) were widely criticized for taking such a unilateral decision, the fact is that few studies trace the origin of the current crisis of refugees in Syria and the Middle East back to 9/11. As Sageman (2014) observes, one of the main limitations of terrorism research rests not only in its evident stagnation, resulting from the speculative nature of its approaches, but is a consequence of the gap created between academia and media. In consonance with Sageman, Luke Howie (2012) asserts that the mass media is the haunt of 'pseudo-experts' who devote their time to anticipating the next terrorist attack, or simply giving their opinion in the latest edition of the *New York Times* or *Washington Post*.

As social scientists we might be thought unable to speak of terrorism unless we infiltrate a terrorist cell, paying attention to our key-informants' life-stories. If we succeeded in this enterprise, surely we would be pressed – if not tortured – by police and intelligence officials to share our information. Any reluctance in giving security forces further information about our ethnographies would identify us as 'enemies of the state', 'collaborators

M.E. Korstanje, *Terrorism, Tourism and the End of Hospitality in the 'West'*, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-52252-4_1

with terrorists' or 'traitors'. Let us cite one excerpt where Allen Feldman reflects on the double dialectics of the state, to demonize (in this case terrorism) what should be sanitized, or 'eradicated'.

> *In Northern Ireland violence is covertly performed by clandestine organizations and thus characterized by invisible web of causations. The public construction of a suspected terrorist by the state, through the performance of arrest and subsequent political assassination, creates a personifying imaginary of the origin of violence and disorder. Arrest envisions the terrorist in order to process this juridical object through various system of expulsion and erasure that include breaking the suspect under interrogation, imprisonment, and covert assassination* (Feldman 1991: 109)

Howie and Feldman agree that the best channel for our objectivity seems to be exploring the effects of terrorism on our daily lives. After all, what the global audience believes of the Muslim world is far from being accurate: it is historically constructed by the articulation of different stereotypes, allegories, discourses and traits. It is illuminating to classify the romantic reaction to the Muslim community as well as the signs of racism and intolerance as direct consequences of the already-existing climate of terror that lay-people experience in contemporary societies (Werbner 2005; Schryock 2010). The rise of Islamophobia bespeaks of us as a society and of our limitations in understanding the Otherness which functions as a mirror of what is internally repressed. This means that the fear of strangers derives from our repressed image projected on to an external object (Skoll 2016). The formation and subsequent maturation of collective fears corresponds to 'the repressed self-image'. To offer a clear example: after 9/11 many social scientists and journalists predicted that the United States was in imminent danger of attack by weapons of mass destruction. Not only has this never occurred to date, but it has also nourished dormant anxieties that resulted from the lack of public repentance for Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the collective memory, psychoanalysis has shown, fears express invisible forces underlying in our inner world. Each generation loudly replicates the libidinal attachment to the world of ancestors which provides an ever-fresh guideline to resolve the problems of the present (Faimberg 2005; Fromm 2012). Hence, this book reviews not only the aftermath of 9/11 in capitalist culture, but also deepens discussion of how terrorism is affecting the touchstone of Western civilization: *hospitality*.

It must be emphasized that this project, which has taken many years of my life, is the product of a profound reflection, a deciphering of the interconnection of terrorism and leisure. It is vital to lay out precisely what the main concern of this theoretical approach is. One of the things that impelled me to write in a language which is not my own was the need to reach a global audience. Latin America experienced the devastating effects of political violence and terrorism through the 1970s. Even today there are residual traces of terrorism in the region's politics. Great changes happen without previous notice: Latin Americans sacrificed their democratic institutions to achieve a more secure society. Red scare overwhelmed a weak checks-and-balances system in nations driven by the pressing need to tackle serious economic problems (Timmermann 2014; Korstanje 2015a; Feierstein 2014). Political scientists in English-speaking countries boasted of more democratic institutions. Though this is partially true, both cause and effect of long political stability, what they ignore is that terrorism may spring up and flourish in prosperous economies and democracies from one moment to another. What is clear is that terrorism erodes the basis of democracy, tightening institutional reactions to the rise of populist discourses. However, there are some significant differences between classic and modern terrorism which merit close attention. Basically, if terrorist cells in the 1970s targeted important politicians like presidents, government ministers or chief police officers, after 9/11 Islamic terrorism appeared to declare a 'jihad' against the tourism and hospitality industries. Many policy-makers and analysts in tourism fields were concerned about the advance of terrorism over the preceding decades (Pizam and Fleisher 2002; Fisher 2003; Tarlow 2014; Mansfeld and Pizam 2006). Tourism experts and fieldworkers acknowledged that terrorism ought to be regarded as a looming *threat* for the industry, but instead of providing a clear diagnosis of the problem, they endorsed and supported an academic platform oriented to risk management. Underpinned by the belief that tourism serves as a peace-builder that would reinforce democracies in the Middle East, specialists paid attention to the effects of terrorism in leisure spots instead of deepening their analysis of its causes. More interested in orchestrating mitigation programmes to strengthen security at international destinations or diminish the negative effects of potential terrorist actions, tourism-related researchers glossed over the historical intersection of leisure and terrorism.

The present book intends to fill this gap, reminding its readers not only how the notion of Otherness was drawn in Western social

imaginations, but detailing how anarchism mined the ideological core of capitalism. To put it bluntly, terrorism is modern tourism by other means.

The second chapter analyses how the European intelligentsia imagined the world beyond its borders. While Europe set out to colonize the world, a strange paternalism paved the ways for indexing the new 'non-Western Other', as an inferior 'entity' in need of protection. This opened the door to a paradoxical situation: while military force conquered the world by means of the orchestration of bloody clashes, social science adopted a romantic plan to discipline 'rebels' by non-violent policies. One of the features that defined Western ethnocentrism was to a sentiment of paternalism, in which the 'cultural difference' consolidated by the scientific project produced what David Riesman called the 'Other-oriented gaze'. The Other who does not look like me is treated as a good, though inferior, savage. As a result of this, European expansion coincided with great technological advances that were capitalized by literature and novel industries to flourish as never before. At this juncture, the gap between periphery and center, which had been fostered during the colonization process, widened as European nations adopted capitalism as their economic system.

The third chapter discusses critically the concept of civility. Confronting the Hobbesian thesis and the call for a sense of security, we understand the nation-state to have been legitimated by the law-making process that dissociated the needs of individuality from a third object. Leviathan not only monopolized force to maintain a climate of order and civil security, but educated its populace to accept the impossibility of exercising violence. While the sense of state power was imposed, the varied experiences of the citizenry divided ethnicities that shared the same tradition into two contrasting, occasionally contending, sides. As a disposition of power, the creation of borders (acknowledging the Foucaldian perspective) was of paramount importance in the production of a national sense of well-being. While industrialism emancipated medieval peasants from their attachment to the soil, urbanization impacted heavily on social scaffolding through its slums and ghettos. Against this backdrop, the new concept of civility erected a barrier between the modern city and the external world.

The fourth chapter, on the rise of the nation-state and free transit, outlines the conquest of the Americas as a key event in the expansion of capitalism. Following Anthony Pagden's thesis, we describe how the discourse of hospitality was politically modulated to validate the idea that aboriginals were subhumans. In part, this was because Spain colonized

South America in the same way that Rome did Europe, but what is important to discuss is the extent to which hospitality played a vital role subordinating indigenous to European archetypes at the time when it was endorsing the legitimacy of Spain's dominance over this New World. In so doing, not only did hospitality participate in the ideological discourse of the nation-state, but free transit became the oxygen of the West.

Cosmopolitanism has its risks, and the fifth chapter is vital in understanding the common thread of the argument in this discussion for two main reasons. Throughout the nineteenth century a powerful force of migrants arrived in the Americas, fulfilling the need for new workers in United States, Brazil and Argentina. The passage from the middle ages to industrialism impoverished thousands of peasants, and this irreversible trend led many people to migrate in quest of better opportunities. Within the cohort of European migrants, a few anarchists advocated radical violence not only against political authority but also against capital owners. While governments struggled to deport them, a more subtle group set about organizing trade unions. A newly emerging workforce was ideologically trained by anarchists coming from Italy, Russia and Germany. At the same time, nation-states experienced the arrival of better working conditions, paving the path for the rise of modern tourism and mobility. Terrorism was expelled beyond the state's frontiers. This introduces two important assumptions that are examined and developed in the book. The first is the assertion that without terrorism, modern tourism would never have come to exist. The second is that modern tourism is an 'inoculated' (if not disciplined) form of anarchist terrorism.

Chapter six focuses on the current interplay between tourism and terrorism insofar as violence is now directed against anonymous civilians. Most recent terrorist attacks have taken place at leisure-spots: malls, beaches, night clubs, promenades or other tourist destinations. Notably, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, at the time leader of ISIS, declared 'jihad' against modern tourism. If the sense of mobility was historically manipulated for European nations to show their supremacy over the non-Western world, now terrorism seems to apply a similar concept against the most important centres of consumption of the West. Doubtless, the sentiment of panic each time these leisure-spots are hit is tripled by the coverage of the mass media. This supports the observation made by Howie (2012) and M. Eid (2014) in their seminal books: oddly, the mass media serves as the conduit for terrorists to disseminate their message. It is important not to lose sight of the fact that terrorists do not want a lot of people dying; rather, they

want a lot of people watching! In this chapter we coin the term *'Thana-capitalism'* to denote a new stage of production in late capitalism, where the Other's death has become the main commodity that mediates dealings between citizens (consumers) and their institutions.

The seventh chapter centres on how psychological fear is stimulated not only to discipline the workforce internally, but also by constructing what Jean Baudrillard dubbed 'the culture of disaster'. In consonance with this polemical, but still solid, argument, we emphasize the need to break the vicious circle comprising journalism, which seeks to disseminate and amplify news and opinion about terrorism to maintain and increase sales and profits, and terrorist cells, which need mass publicity for their acts and threats. In these times of Thana-Capitalism, one of the paradoxes is that though the mass audience considers acts and threats of terrorism disturbing it cannot stop consuming news about them. Symbolically, this happens because Others' suffering reinforces the supremacy of self, which remains untouched by the cruelty of terrorists. Others' deaths remind us not only how special we are, but also that we are chosen to be part of an exclusive class – *death-seekers.*

Last but not least, the eighth chapter examines how the crystallization of Thana-Capitalism affected the tourism industry changing the ways the unfamiliar, the Other, is contemplated and scrutinized. Needless to say, anthropology plays a leading role in providing new theories to understand 'cosmopolitanism', and the position of this globally dangerous Other in Europe. Engaging directly with Derrida and other scholars, this section focuses on how hospitality is dying. The end of hospitality represents a serious challenge to Europe simply because it was 'the alma matter' of rationality and social trust. Over time, terrorism targets 'the exemplary center of consumption' to extort resources, attention, counter-violence from developed nation-states. Technologies of surveillance deployed at borderlands are strengthened. In the years to come, philosophical discourse will not attend to the discursive rivalry between conditioned or unconditioned hospitality; instead the following question will dominate: What is the correct treatment for strangers?

In context of uncertainty, the Occident echoes the metaphor of the medical gaze, which seeks out the pathogen or the affected organ in a drive to restore corporeal balance. If nothing can be done, the affected organ is ultimately extirpated in order for the body to be saved. In other words, everything and anything should be done in the name of life, no matter how intrusive the action may be. Applied to the case of terrorism,

the same belief demands that the Muslim community runs serious risks of being martyrized in the name of security. A radicalized image of Otherness, constructed by West over centuries but potentiated by fear, contributes to what we have dubbed '*the end of hospitality*'.

After the financial crash in New York that changed the economic geography of the world, analysts began to discuss the extent to which the old dichotomy between centre and periphery is experiencing a new re-feudalization, similar to the early Middle Ages after the Roman Empire's collapse or the Great Powers coalescing into blocs. Far from experiencing centrifugal forces, these blocs will be united into one. Pursuant to this hypothesis, we pose the dilemma of risk, as it has been studied by social scientists, as an ideological discourse consistent with the permeation of the market into the nation-state. Secondly, risk serves as a conduit to move resources, which would otherwise stagnate, so that the elite centralizes and solidifies 'extractive institutions' to enhance economic performance. Though former centuries witnessed a stage of decentralization, where scattered nations struggled with each other to prevail, two world wars and the onset of the twenty-first century brought another reality. The war of all against all predicated by Hobbes set the pace for the war of few blocs contending to gain a supreme authority over the rest. The theory of globalization is reluctant to explain how the world tends to a centralization of resources and violence. Here we come across a paradox: if the twentieth century witnessed many states making war to forge their own identity (as was the case in Europe and the United States who participated in two total wars), within the state a sentiment of nationhood persisted against all counter-reactions. Citizens not only accepted and embraced a common history and heritage, but also suspended internal violence against their brothers. Over time, the boundaries of states were made porous, adopting globalization as the dominant doctrine. States made more and more pacts, associations and alliances to protect their citizens, but paradoxically, this process created an internal point of conflict as never before. The economies of post-liberal societies show some limitations in their ability to regulate internal riots and conflicts. Beyond mass consumption, which is always reserved toan exemplary centre, the periphery witnesses the predatory practices of empires maximizing their exploitation. The policies of extraction followed by neoliberal states are accompanied by the discourse of 'competence'. As in *Big Brother* or *Hunger Games*, the neo-capitalist state stimulates extreme competition where social Darwinism reigns. As a result of these policies the conditions of life and

work of workforces become ever more precarious. In the capitalist system the few regulate the life of the whole. Those who participate in this game do not know that there will be only one winner, so they are overconfident in their own skills and possibilities. Undoubtedly, this is the illusory discourse of capitalism that keeps the workforce under control. Although states decline to make external war to resolve disputes, internally people are pitted against their neighbours. This seems to be exactly the ground on which terrorism operates.

CHAPTER 2

The Other in Western Civilization

Introduction

Over recent years, scholars have entered substantial criticisms of the notion of multiculturalism, which, adjoined to globalization, obscures more than it clarifies (Omi and Winant 2014; Tzanelli 2007, 2013a, 2013b, 2014a). As academic concept, 'multiculturalism' is not only very hard to grasp, but poses the West with the dilemma of how to react in the presence of 'Others' (Meskimmon 2011). The process of identity is constituted in opposition to an alter-ego. The recent refugee crisis in Europe, and the rise of extreme left-wing reactions suggests that long Europe still faces serious difficulties in engaging in a genuine dialogue with Otherness (Winant 2006; Macedo and Gounari 2015; Korstanje 2015a, 2016). One of the key events that motivated the writing of this book was the sad death of Aylan Kurdi the Syrian boy drowned and washed ashore on the coast of Turkey. This event not only shocked me, as the father of three children, but even caused me 'vicarious trauma' – the feeling of another's experiences, the imagining of the death of my own children. Here, two assumptions are pertinent. At first glance, Aylan and his family seem not to be the only victims affected by terrorism and the rise of ISIS in the Middle East. Thousands of children and young people find themselves between the devil and the deep blue sea, where escaping to Europe is the only solution. Upon arrival in Europe they are jailed and delivered to refugee camps. Secondly, though after Aylan's death Europe conceded generous quotas for exiles and refugees, ISIS

M.E. Korstanje, *Terrorism, Tourism and the End of Hospitality in the 'West'*, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-52252-4_2

took advantage of this to stoke anxiety about potential terrorist attacks on European soil. This ethical insight illuminates not only the intersection of terrorism with hospitality, but also the ways that 'the war on terror' is undermining the tenets of democracy (Skoll 2007, 2008; Altheide 2006, 2007). David Altheide (2009) drew attention to the possibility of the mass media's obsession about terrorism producing a culture of terror intended to demonize the Other thus assisting the privileged class to protect its interests. However, further discussion is needed on how this meaning of Otherness has been constructed in Europe and borrowed by the United States. While Europe developed a paternalist conception of the noble savage, which placated the consciences of the men behind the expansion of imperial powers, America was influenced by a Protestant ideology that saw the external world as a frightening place to live. Dangerous in its conception, the Other for Protestants was a threat which had to be defeated (Korstanje 2015b, 2015c).

In such a context, it is necessary to discuss to what extent Otherness was preconceived by Europeans, as well as the stereotypes, prejudices and idealized images around the stereotype of noble savage (Bosworth, Bowling and Lee 2008). The present section not only discusses the reasons behind Europe's efforts to colonize the world but the sociocultural background of the European proclamation of supremacy over the rest of the world. The perverse core of European ethnocentrism rests on the paternalism of its comprehenion ofcultural difference, associated with the rise and consolidation of science. European ethnocentrism paradoxically accelerated what David Riesman dubbed 'the Other-oriented' gaze. This is the moment of great technological breakthrough and the flourishing of romantic novels, literature and anthropology that engaged with a peripheral wonderland that was waiting to be domesticated. At this stage, the material asymmetries between centre and periphery were increasing as Europe adopted capitalism as its central socioeconomic project.

In this introductory chapter, we interrogate the sense of Otherness which was constructed over many years by European Nations, and which led to modern terrorism, or at least to inscrutable forms of imperialism in the nineteenth century. The logic of rationality, at this stage, was a distinguishing feature of Western civilization (though as some voices claim, the concept of Western as a homogenized entity should be reconsidered). Eric Wolf (2010) has cnvincingly demonstrated that Europe consolidated a vision of commonness precisely in the rich variety of ethnicities, customs and cultures that inhabited the continent. Certainly,

the present chapter does not lose sight of the fact that capitalism introduced not only a new sense of competence which was unknown to medieval man, but also accelerated the rupture between the self and the environment. This has been extensively analysed by Tim Ingold and other reputable scholars.

Competence and Capitalism

Economy has perennially occupied an important role in the configuration of the European social imagination, but it was after the turn of the century, through the 1920s and 1930s, that economists as a professional class began to intervene directly in daily life. Economists not only came to be considered 'public intellectuals', but also as erudite writers who could predict the future of society. Through the interwar period, economists filled the gap left by philosophers in the way that they drew and applied necessary lessons from and to the turbulence of economic shocks and market crises. Economists were persuaders who moulded the consciousness of lay-citizens and, of course, helped to shape their relations with state and capitalist authorities. Each crisis that caused a tremor in the system of production provoked the upsurge of new explanations, which were organized in a theoretical corpus. From Adam Smith to Keynes, even Marx, economists did their best to explain the limitations of capitalism and its discrepancies with the process of accumulation (Howson 2013; Goodwin 2013). Quite aside from this, the diverse groups of economists went far to emphasize Keynesian theories in periods of depression, as in the 1930s, but focused on monetary emission issues in the context of stagflation through the 1970s. As intellectuals, what economists unfortunately introduced was the instrumentalization of the Other as the mainstream cultural value of contemporary society. Henceforth, instrumental reason and competence were inextricably intertwined.

As Peter Boettke and Liya Palagashvili (2013) confirmed, the founding parents of economy realized that humankind shared two contrasting tendencies: one, as Hobbesians contend, is oriented to pillage and plunder, whereas the Other, in consonance with Lockeans, and, indeed, Adam Smith,- exhibits a strong inclination towards exchange and cooperation. The fact is that either of these propensities may be activated, depending on the guiding rules and spirit of the times. From its inception, economics has been a discipline that has advocated mechanisms of enforcement to maximize social cooperation, suppressing the predatory nature of humans. In

so doing, economists introduced the concept of '*private property*' as an institutional foundation of a sanitized version of capitalism.

Adam Smith was a pioneer, an authorative voice who started to question why labour played a vital role in configuring the economic landscapes of nations. *The Wealth of Nations* is not merely a central text of economics; it alludes to the reasons *why* monopolies are formed. The 'invisible hand' that regulates the circuits of production and consumption lays down the pathway for the advance of the lobbying classes, privileged elites that dispose of the instrument to deepen exploitation (Smith 2005). Although the question of poverty was the main concern of many economists, Karl Marx envisaged the grim future of modern life as nobody before him. Interested the political nature of economy, Marx originally found that commodity exchange confronts workers with capital owners. Unlike medieval times, where peasants worked to survive, in capitalism workers are expropriated from their labour by the introduction of wages. In a nutshell, *capital owners* not only hold a privileged position because they enhance their profits without working, but they monopolize their wealth at the costs of workforce. Given the problem in these terms, Marx was strongly convinced that the fetish of commodity was the key feature of asymmetries found in capitalism (Marx 1975; Marx and Engels 1983). His main contribution to the study of capitalism consists in his assertion that as the stages of production increase, the conflict between classes intensifies.

The problem of competence lies at the conceptual core of capitalism, though not all scholars agree with Marx in its negative effects on democracy. This seems to be the case for Acemoglu and Robinson, who question why some nations are rich while others succumb to poverty. From a different angle than their colleagues, they hold the polemical thesis that those cultures that encourage the growth of 'extractive institutions' are prone to form monopolies that not only impede free competence among stakeholders but also fail to create democratic institutions for development. This suggests that *democracy and prosperity* are inextricably intertwined. They reconsider the explanations of power asymmetries as centre–periphery post-Marxian approaches. Basically,

> *The political institutions of a society are a key determinant of the outcome of the game. They are the rules that govern incentive in politics. They determine how the government is chosen and which part of the government has the right to do what. Political institutions determine who has power in society and to what ends the power can be used* (Acemoglu and Robinson 2013: 79-80)

Once social researchers interrogate the historical background and evolution of a specific society, they have to engage with its institutions, which helps to understand how the studied nation adapted to its environment. This explains why Argentina has failed to achieve a maturate stage of development while South Korea has made considerable steps towards joining the elite world economies over the past ten or so years. It is important to note that protecting internal markets inhibited development, whereas those nations like England or the United States where a sense of free competence prevailed, climbed to the top of the economic pyramid. Development is not a goal, but a consequence of a state of reasoning that only is feasible through the application of democracy and stable institutions. Following Acemoglu and Robinson, one might speculate that 'political centralization' contributed to the creation of powerful elites and monopolies that prevented a further redistribution of yielded wealth. Though both authors attempt to shed light on the original question as formulated above, their argument rests on shaky foundations for two reasons.: As Korstanje observed, Acemoglu and Robinson put the cart before the horse in proposing that the main cultural values of Western civilization should be universally applied to all cultures in one-sided way. Not only that, they work with economic indicators which are inapplicable to aboriginal tribal organizations, but they conclude that the best way forward for the rest of the world is emulating the ideals of *American society*. Their biased and romantic viewpoint of democracy, as well as some problems in their handling of statistics, reveals serious problems in failing to avoid ethnocentric generalizations (Korstanje 2015a, 2015b, 2015c). Besides, it is easy to forget the role of the dominant economic power in ransacking the world during the colonial period. As Robert L Heilbroner (1999) remarked, capitalism not only derived implicitly from the conquest of Americas, but also from an all-encompassing paternalist view of the Other, who presented as an object to possess.

> *An aspect of political change that was revolutionizing Europe was the encouragement of foreign adventures and explorations. In the thirteen century, the Brothers Polo went as unprotected merchants on their daring journeys into the lands of great Khan; in the fifteenth century Columbus sailed for what he hoped would be the same destination under the royal auspices of Isabella* (Heilbroner 1999: 34)

For Heilbronner, if humanism wreaked havoc in the core of religion and the faith of believers, introducing skepticism as the mediator between people and their institutions, no less true was it that scientific curiosity instilled

substantial changes in consciousness that sooner or later legitimated the capitalist enterprise. However, this new project ignores a moral dilemma which had been unknown to peasants: if some minorities (capital owners) grow daily richer, how will this elite control the situation in a world where the rest grow each day poorer. Philosophically speaking, economists devote considerable resources to explaining how poor people should remain in such a miserable condition while the rest of society is content. This is the main point of entry in the ideological discourse of capitalism that social scientists should address inyears to come. Capitalism encompasses internally the force of competence as a self-centred regulator which impedes any real betterment of the condition of workers or fairer distribution of wealth. It is hypothesized that the genesis of instrumentalism was the lesson some Marxian economists left behind and the reasons why communism failed to make this world a better place (Hobsbawm 1995). From the perspective of Bernard Bailyin, a senior historian, who devoted his life to expand the current understanding of US history, there was an historical dichotomy at the heart of the British Empire – how the 'Other' was portrayed. While at the periphery the British Empire oppressed its colonies, showing a high degree of cruelty and authoritarian spirit, in the centre it forged democratic institutions and freedom. As a result of this, English-speaking countries developed a dissociated policy for coping with Otherness. While the United States stood aloof from one-sided disposition in international affairs, its founding parents struggled to create independent branches of government playing a checks-and-balances game (Bailyn 1968). However, this does not mean that in other aspects capitalism did not put up substantial obstacles to political and social progress.

Phil Ryan (1995) discusses critically to what extent the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua pursued a programme to enhance the lives of peasants and citizens, but at the same time faced serious obstacles in dealing with private market. Basically, one of the aspects that defines capitalism, besides commodity-exchange circles, seems to be associated with the logic of competence. While Marxism appealed to Latin Americans as a means of enhancing the role of the state as an institution to protect citizens from the liberal market, no less true was that some discrepancies and ambiguities led Sandinista Nicaragua to a new more profound market and stock crisis. As Ryan contends,

> *One final theme is the leadership's vision of the just society that was to emerge in Nicaragua in the long term. The just society was seen as one without class exploitation* (Ryan 1995: 40).

By creating an ever-increasing egalitarian atmosphere which is necessary to avoid exploitation, not only should the rivalry among classes be annulled but leaders should ignite a new stage to de-commoditize workers.

David S Landes, emeritus professor at Harvard University, argues that one of the most troubling aspects of capitalism seems to be its tolerance of, indeed promotion of, inequality, which is reinforced by an inter-class rivalry. In his book *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations,* he dissects the cultural roots of material asymmetries that characterize rich and poor countries. While over recent decades technology has often been used to extend life-expectancy in rich cultures, in the periphery many people cannot meet their basic needs. As he puts it, the world should be divided into three categories; a) those that devote financial resources to keep their weight down; b) those where people struggle to eat and survive; and c) those where people have no certainty when the next meal will come. At the extremes, this gap is not only is being enlarged today, in some cases its growth is accelerating, aggravating the political stability of many governments. Landes formulates an interesting question: Why are some countries rich while others are poor?

After reviewing the ebbs and flows of some classic theories, he comes to the view that poverty not only derives from the productive system, but from a much deeper cultural background. Basically, the rise and expansion of capitalism took place in Europe, rather than some other similarly structured polity such as China for three reasons, identified as follows:

- Neither geography nor climate were key factors in the development of capitalist economies. Rather, Judeo-Christian tradition introduced the sense of 'property right' as an independent institution in regard to political power. Unlike China, where the state directly intervened in holdings of private wealth, Europe in the Middle Ages had higher levels of fragmentation, which helped in the attainment of internal competence among non-noble individuals. This was a vital not only for the birth but also the consolidation of capitalism. Political decentralization of the state facilitated invention and creativity in Europe.
- Gender relations – the relations of men and women to each other and to production. Europeans were tolerant of the role of women as organizers of private homes, while in other cultures they occupied a marginalized role in society. This paved the way for the exploitation of women and children during industrialization.

- The Judeo-Christian subordination of nature to man. This explains why the liberal market first and, later, Protestant culture flourished in medieval Europe.

These points resonate with the view of the power of Otherness as a *social construal*, which opened the door for domination, and at the same time *hospitality*. European powers developed a fascination and curiosity for the Other, which was not replicated in Asia. An additional element added to the demands of the free market was the need for competence as a new form of relation.

The Construction of Otherness

As Landes observed, one of the paradoxes of the colonial state was the degree of exploitation exerted towards the periphery at the same time as states acting as guardians of the system of exploitation. Steeped in a much deeper cultural system, states issued loans to private explorers while applying their own military forces to ensure the return to the centre of gold, silver and other precious metals. The rise of colonization opened the door to Europeans' eagerness, and their sense of the Other served as an ideological justification, as legitimation of their interests.

In response to this, David Riesman presented an innovative and groundbreaking thesis. In his book, *The Lonely Crowd,* he anticipated sociologists of the epoch, establishing the intersection of imperialism with leisure consumption. To understand history, we have not only to delve into the means of production; we must exploreexplore commonalities and differences of ancient civilizations. In his erudite review, Riesman acknowledges that cultures (no matter the historical period) can be grouped in three clear types: a) Tradition-directed; b) Inner-directed; and c) Other-directed. Since the types do not follow a linear evolutionary direction, they can be found in different times and cultures. Riesman asserts that the evolution from one type to another is ever-circular, while the goods exchange process seems to be associated with 'the discovery and conquest of remote lands'. At some point, curiosity about the Other is undermined by the need to expand hegemony to other territories. Given the problem in these terms, Riesman declares that the 'tradition-oriented character' crystalizes in those societies where law-making comes from the legitimacy of those who belong to founding kinships. Of course, those warriors who descend from founding parents not only are worthy of controlling the fate of tribe; they can be

enthroned in the chiefdom. For these sorts of organizations, history is far from being important since everything happens in an timeless cosmology. A clear example of these societies dates back to the Middle Ages. The rise and expansion of Protestantism not only introduced a new cosmology into the ways people contemplated the Church, but imposed a radical criticism on biblical truths. Protestantism inspired an 'inner-oriented character' that was characterized by the development of personal skills and technological breakthroughs. As Riesman puts it, though Protestant logic was important for the adoption of the capitalist spirit, it also sets the pace for a new Other-directed character, which has persisted. The Other-directed character cultivated an interest in 'other lands', customs, cultures and everything that sounded different to conventional habits. Unlike the other two, this emergent character was determined by the needs of expanding trade as a form of relations with Others. At the time, discoveries legitimated an economy of conquest that disposessed natives. Internally, this climate developed a friendly spirit that enabled the advent of cosmopolitanism, but externally represented higher costs (Riesman 2001). Riesman recognizes that our passions for travel, discovery, literature and Other life-styles all come from the passage from inner- to Other-oriented traits.

Quite aside from this, some important assumptions about capitalism should be inspected. British Anthropologist Tim Ingold maintains convincingly that capitalism was more than an economic project; it introduced a new way of perceiving the surrounding environment and, of course, Otherness. His theory is based on a conceptual division between hunter-gatherers, and modern man. While the former developed a perception of the environment engaged with other animals, capitalism promoted an autonomous cosmology, which he names 'dwelling perspective', which produced a radical rupture between man, the administrator of the universe, and the rest of creation. Though aboriginals often made travels to visit relatives, friends and other neighboring tribes they perceived the landscape as a continuum without the need to use maps. Natives are embedded into a 'relational perspective' not only with their environment, but with the Other. For many years, social scientists regarded Western reason as universal, applicable to all times and cultures, ignoring the fact that 'dwelling perspective' dates to a mere 400 years ago. Though Ingold was originally concerned about the current problems of climate change, some of his insights are very pertinent to this discussion. Hunter-gatherers far from needing a 'surplus' to organize their societies, live with what they extract from the environment, in the same way that they lack of the

concept of 'foresight' – the tendency to understand the present through the future. As Ingold said:

> *The hunter consumes the meat, but the soul of the animal is released to be reclothed with flesh. Hunting here, as with many northern peoples, is conceived as a rite of regeneration: consumption follows killing as birth follows intercourse, and both acts are integral to the reproductive cycles, respectively, of animals and humans* (Ingold 2000: 67)

One of the limitations of modern conservation campaigns in highly developed nations is the unquestionable and deep impossibility of understanding humankind as integrated in the natural world. In reservations and ecological parks the presence of humans fundamentally prohibited; attempts by the West to reduce global pollution are dismal failures. There are severalreasons for these failings, but two are of paramount importance. The culture of capitalism, which is centred on the dwelling perspective, has certainly prompted an image of man separated from nature. The autonomy of 'white man' with respect to natural creation depends upon his status as a being invested by God to dominate the Others, to retain total control of his destiny. To some extent, this concept is not new: it started, surely, with the adoption of 'pastoralism' as the predominant lifestyle of the Occident. Indeed, the herdsman is the only one allowed make life-or-death decisions over the herd; he must protected his animals from external threats. Ingold acknowledges that the dwelling perspective represents a philosophical stance from which the universe is never contemplated as a continuation but as something that can be destroyed to be reconstructed anew. If hunters-gatherers build their homes in trees, maximizing their use of material delivered to them by the natural environment, the dwelling perspective goes in the opposite direction. Modern men 'live in an architecturally modified environment' (p 179) inhabiting houses which are constructed as spaces separated from environment.

> *With village architecture nature has to a degree been covered or transformed, so that what immediately confronts people is not a natural environment, but an environment of their own making, the cultural. If hunter-gatherers build as part of their adaptation to the given conditions of the natural environment, villagers adapt to the condition of an environment that is already built* (p. 180).

The dwelling perspective not only alters human relations with the environment, but inclines to destruction as the prerequisite of a new state of

production. The use of existing technology facilitates the organization of territory, producing a gap with Others at the same time as space is sanitized upon construction. The concept of discipline consists in normalizing those who are presented as deviants, such as travellers, foreigners or anything that defies or contradicts the status quo. The dwelling perspective not only reminds us that the efficiency of techniques hinges on the human possibility of intervening in the environment to find and eradicate risks, to ensure the common well-being. As Ingold puts it, one of the paradoxes of capitalism is that the sense of collectivity is based an extreme competence and solipsism. This idea is presented in one of his newer books, *Being Alive*:

> *We have already seen how the practices of destination-oriented travel encouraged the belief that knowledge is integrated not along paths of pedestrian movement but through the accumulation of observations taken from successive points of rest. Thus we tend to imagine that things are perceived from a stationary platform, as if we were sitting on a chair with our legs and feet out of action. To perceive a thing from different angles, it is supposed that we might turn it around in our hands, or perform an equivalent computational operation in our minds. But in real life, for the most part, we do not perceive things from a single vantage point, but rather by walking around them* (Ingold 2011 p. 45)

Needless to say, the modern concept of landscape corresponds to a set of widely used disciplinary efforts, beliefs and allegories imposing a protocol of rules to make the world a predictable space. This is the reason why science plays a vital role in the construction of the Other and 'the sense of space' that humans inhabit. In other terms, the success of capitalism is rooted in the creation and imposition of dichotomies like us vs. them, leisure vs. work, civilization vs. barbarism and so forth. In this respect, Ingold is correct when says that capitalism introduced the dwelling perspective in order for alien entities to be symbolically disciplined.

This background helps us understand how a social construct lies beyond the objectivity of science, originally delineated to forge domination of an uncivilized periphery to foster the elite's interests. In one of her seminal books, Sandra Harding confesses that the sense of a sacred science limits human rationality to the values of Western societies, and at the same time ideologically legitimates the superiority of white lords over other ethnicities. The efficacy of science to prosper, passing the threshold of time, lies in its so-called postulated *objectivity*. Many feminist groups called

attention to science as an ideological support for social stratification, while scientists seem not to be motivated by enhancing well-being but only in gaining further profits. In addition, Harding agrees with Ingold, science formulated models to explain the world which were historically based on an objective diagnosis of things, but since nobody was fit to question the objectivity of science it introduced the separation between observed and observers as a sacred value – impartiality. As a formidable instrument of hegemony, science (and of course Darwinism) asserted the supremacy of Anglo-Saxons over other 'races', 'ethnicities' and non-Western cultures, paving the way for Eurocentrism (Harding 1986)

> *The fundamental Euro-American separation of the self from nature and other people results in the objectifying of both. The presence of empty perceptual space surrounding the self and separating it from everything else extracts the self from its natural and social surroundings and locates all forces in the universe concerned to further self's interests inside the circles of empty perceptual space* (Harding 1986: 168).

Not surprisingly, Westerners developed a conceptualization of self as separate from others, in so doing, they introduced wonders from the advance of science which were conducive to extending life expectancies, further technological revolution in leisure travel and many other benefits, but all these achievements were made possible by posing a 'logic of domination' that closed the borders to all those who do not share the same commonalities, feelings and expectations. The meaning of nation-state, as never before, appealed to the sacred law of hospitality not to give further assistance to strangers, but to discipline them, to know more about the risks and threats looming just out there. *Otherness* is incorporated into European law by means of a ritual purification where knowledge not only facilitates colonial administration, imparting the necessary information to anticipate local tactics, but also forges a false paternalism that crystallizes in the scientific project.

Geoffrey Skoll suggests that social theory emphasizes history in the dialectics of agencies and society, to the extent that this relation endows significance on 'social ethos'. This means not only that we are unable to understand society without agency; also, agents play a vital role in configuring the essence of society. As Skoll observed, philosophers believed that beyond society, the concept of agent has little meaning at the same time as society is fragmented when humans withdraw their loyalty to their

authorities. His book *Dialectics in Social Thought: The Present Crisis* encompasses a philosophical interrogation of the value-laden concept of dialectics, which cemented the expansion of science in Western civilization. What this masterful work discusses is the functionality of both elements to delineate their respective importance for what we might call 'the system'. In terms of capitalism the rich need the low-status worker in much the same way that the latter need capital-owners. To overcome the surfacing conflicts these dialectics engender, Skoll suggests, following Simmel, that the social order is based on a triadic structure. The process of negotiation between two or more pillars alludes to the existence of a third, where the dialectical relationship is resolved through the action of synthesis. The second chapter, therefore, discusses not only the legacy of the dialectic in social sciences, but to what extent the social is itself rooted in the workings of the dialectic. Skoll proposes that social thought as a text sheds light on the world by employing Hegel's dialectic, simply because the concept of the social is dialectical in its nature. Two key thinkers who realized this were Freud and Marx, who devoted considerable time and effort to elucidating the invisible ties that keep society united and connect the individual to the wider group. From different viewpoints, both acknowledged the 'reification of reason' as the primary goal of social scaffolding. Though they lived in different times – Freud emphasized neurotic self-deception, while Marx focused on the mystification of political economy – both outlined ways in which the individual is made by social relations and is thus a kind of trans-individual, to use the term coined by the French thinker, Gilbert Simondon. As in society, the constitution of the self relies on the reification of rules, drives and market relations. In the same way that the notion of super-ego in Freudian theory is impossible for lay-persons to grasp, capital functions mediating between workers and their institutions eludes easy comprehension. The elite made a decisive step in introducing dialectics into social thought because in that way the cultural sources of capital reproduction are never questioned (Skoll 2014).

As stated, Skoll explains that the social fact is based on the dialectic from its inception. With great erudition, the radical development through this book reveals two interesting concerns. First and foremost, the dialectics of triadic thought is applied to 'social understanding' in all schools of social thought, from pragmatism to nihilism. Secondly, the modern social order based on dialectics generated the monopoly of meaning of capitalism opposing two modes of thinking. At bottom, social sciences delineated the original adoption of the capitalist

worldview which exploits agency to the extent that it produces a crisis or irreversible stage of collapse.

Each crisis evinces the chief contradictions proper of capitalism but in almost all cases the functionality of the market still remains indisputable, inscrutable, to human mind. If we think of neoliberalism as a cultural project it is important not to lose sight of the fact that it represents a specific epistemology, defended by a global network of technocrats or experts who, though far from predicting its next events, do their best to speak in the name of market. This is precisely the ideological success of capitalism over other forms of organization. While capitalism crystallized as a matured project economists become public intellectuals, allotted the right to intervene in the governance of nations (Mirowski and Nik-Khah 2013). The financial and market crisis in 2008 was forecast by R. G Rajan (2011) who recognized that the dilemma of accumulation seems to be the main problem of capitalism. Once risk is undervalued as a necessary pre-condition for further profits, it is not surprising that financial crashes should occur. They should not be regarded as glitches, but as necessary fault lines of the system. Besides, the recent populist policies in the United States that weakened the system of commitments and payments led directly to a terrible crisis.

In next section we shall discuss not only the role of science in drawing the 'non-white Other', but also the expansion of colonialism, influenced by anthropology which was decisive at the time in delineating the borders of contemporary cultural landscapes.

Travels, Science and Cultural Landscapes

From times immemorial human beings have gone to unknown lands moved by ego-orientations or ideals of greatness (Spence and Stam 1983; Cleall 2012; del Moral 2013). Though there are some discrepancies respecting the main goals of colonial powers and the triggers of their enterprises, what is clear is that Europe developed an uncanny sentiment of curiosity which was kept dormant in other empires like China or Japan (Landes 1998). For some scholars, who come from Marxism, colonialism centred on the need to dispossess Others, introducing a dependency between rich and poor nations. This view of centre–periphery relations was based on the logic of exploitation and discontent (Lee 1971; Berman 1984; McMichael 2016). However, other voices drew attention to the real reasons why Europeans colonized Asia and Africa: the demands of status and self-prestige – cultural

(not material) goals (Said 1979). Not only British literature asserted the supremacy of civilized ideals of empire over natives, but also 'social Darwinism' paved the way for the upsurge of a new consciousness that placed European nations far from the dark times of Middle Ages. Basically, Europeans sought the role of lords of the World, and of course their ability to travel was the sign that validated their 'superiority' (Korstanje 2015b). From that moment on, mobility and imperialism were inextricably intertwined. This is a deep-seated issue which will be explored in later chapters.

Readers should think hard about the proposition that European markets craved and sought frenetically a new work-force and lands for their expanding industry, replicating what Marx dubbed 'the fetishism of surplus'. In parallel with this, sciences did their best to legitimate the rights of Europeans to conduct plunder and conquest. Turner-Bushnell and Greene (2002) dissect the imperial representations of the periphery as ongoing spaces of negotiation, legitimacy and authority, where Europeans not only wove a net of alliances but sometimes prohibited colonies trading with each other. European centres retained the right to impose one-sided relations with colonial natives which were often very hard to modify or break. But if trade was significant for colonial powers to forge a centre of legitimacy, it was also the case that other nations vied to impose their own trade on the New World. The conquest of the Americas opened the door to an untrammeled competition for local resources as never before, but what is most important, colonialization was articulating an 'ecumene', which allowed a central power to operate a 'sphere of influence', an immediate area where European traders, explorers and travellers interacted with the oppressed aboriginals.

> '*The ecumene was a zone of mastery, the immediate area over which an urban settlement of European origin asserted political and economic control. In Spanish America, an ecumene usually consisted of a European settlement and a hinterland of native provinces. Several ecumenes grouped around, and in supporting the colonial center they formed a colonial core, or core region'* (Bushnell 2002: 18)

Here, two texts are of paramount importance to discuss further the role of literature in the process of colonialism. *Imperial Eyes*, by Marie Louise Pratt, still remains a seminal book. In it she laments the role of literature in the configuration of an imperial map that not only subordinated the colonised world but implanted a classification as a means of understanding

ethnic difference. In consonance with this, Pratt (2007) explores the rise of modern science and the concern to classify as the two major events that accelerated the times of conquest. Due to Carl Linnaeus's concerns to develop a conceptual model to classify botanical species, Europeans envisaged their travels as a source of information to validate their scientific hypotheses. In this viewpoint, Pratt adheres to the thesis that the imperial discourse formed in Europe would have never been possible without the figure of the uncivilized Other. In 1735 Linnaeus published his book *Systema Naturae* in which he listed and described many biological species, tabulated so that readers could obtain an all-encompassing view of Botany. This classificatory system exerted a substantial influence on the first travels and expeditions where scientists often accompanied businessman and military forces who, in parallel, evaluated the situation from another point of view, probably in quest of profit-maximization. Travel literature and the evolution of the novel as well as travel itself were of paramount importance in creating an archetype of Europeaness. The conflicting encounters flourished in zones of contact where a real process of acculturation surfaced. The ideology of dominators, as Adam in Paradise, marked Others, while it kept itself unmarked – that is, the standard by which Others are judged (Pratt 2007). The contributions of Pratt to our study are of paramount importance because she shows how sometimes, scientific concerns, which are often obscured by the veil of objectivity, replicate the interests of politics.

No less true was that anthropology and ethnology (as well as other social sciences) involuntarily accompanied the interests of colonial order in different senses. In this respect, from its onset, anthropology devoted considerable time trying to understand the role of Otherness, which served as a mirror to comprehend Western civilization. This non-Western Other not only reflected part of our repressed customs, but also helped in expanding the contemporary understanding of Europe, giving a good opportunity to boast of European superiority (Korstanje 2012). The sentiment of paternalism nourished a discourse in which natives not only should be protected, but their customs, relics and lore should be gathered before they disappeared under the advance of industrialism.

As the previous backdrop, one of the founding parents of anthropology, B. Malinowski, emphasized the importance of 'being there', for social scientists to capture the life of aborigines as well as validating through fieldwork observations and speculations about people's behaviour (Malinowski 1994). Though ethnography was used by colonial officers

to understand natives, it opened the door towards a new understanding of anthropological thinking that defied the encyclopedic paradigm (Geertz 1994). Since non-white cultures were expected to disappear as a consequence of the advance of industrialism, the first ethnographers were ideologically indoctrinated to collect as much ethnographic material as they could. Myths, stories, artefacts and other material and immaterial items were discovered, documented and delivered to the most important museums and universities of the first world (Jones 1993). As mechanisms of ideology that marked white supremacy, museums offered a canonical representation of pastime that was enrooted into a romantic gaze of aboriginal life. This axiom of submission has accompanied us up to the present (Korstanje 2012).

As Louise Pratt outlined, the colonial project not only expanded the ever-widening horizons of science but also facilitated imperial powers subordination of other cultures into a rigid cultural matrix, which was forged in Europe by and for Europeans (Pratt 2007). To cut a long story short, literature and travel writing encouraged imperial values everywhere, paving the way for the advance of an ideological colonization that strengthened the bond between the centre and periphery. In this way, literature offered visualizations and symbolic landscapes where the colonial order was sustained by the moral supremacy of Western culture. The subordinated role of aboriginal life, compared to that of Europe, was one among many other rhetorical devices to create a sentiment of superiority in white writers throughout the colonial world.

Modern tourism scholars have studied the stereotypes of colonialism (Mansfield 2008; Caton and Santos 2008). The second important text for our argument is *Traversing Paris* by Charlie Mansfield (2008) who brilliantly seeks the re-definition of travel writing as a genre of literature by means of descriptions of the narratives, projections, expectations, and experiences of travellers. This French custom, initiated by the erudition of Denis Diderot (1713–1784), revealed the potentialities of a journey to decode the convergence between autobiography and social conjuncture. The episteme for travels elevates the agency of travellers who reify the same observed reality. The tension between objectivity and subjectivity certainly reveals complexities in travel writing as a scientific genre. The body of a travel writer is necessarily circumscribed by specific time and place, which blurs the boundaries between the lived time of journey and the text. Examining the contributions of the reactionary royalist and founder of romanticism in France, François-René, de Chateaubriand

(1768-1848), Mansfield finds that texts work similarly to a souvenir, because, like a souvenir, they are strongly associated with the identity of tourists. As a souvenir is linked to a wider sentiment of nostalgia, Mansfield leads readers to an under-explored argument: the souvenir works as a mechanism of return, transforming the physical distance into emotional proximity. Travel writing comprises a creative praxis by closing the hermeneutical circle between those events we experience on a daily basis and the individual emotional background, and thereby becomes an episteme in the Foucauldian sense. Mansfield's argument leads to the three elements of discovery travels which are rooted in modern science: a) the need to monitor the world to ensure Western control; b) intellectual appropriation that interprets events to generate knowledge; and c) support for the capitalist mode of production. All these elements are replicated and renegotiated in discovery travels even today.

Ewa Mazierska (2013) explores the epistemology of past travels to criticize contemporary social fabric. She reviews scholarly literature that points to tourism as a hedonistic industry, but she notes, as in cinema or many other products of the culture industry, there are many ways of exploring visited spaces. The role of travellers and their proximity to the Other is of utmost importance in judging whether tourism is good or bad for society. What is important is not whether the traveller is a tourist or a migrant, but how that travel initiates the process of discovery. She acknowledges that while some doors are open, like tourism and leisure travels, others are inevitably closed. The past not only facilitates a break in today's ideological discourse, but unravels it into the complexity of nationhood (Mazierska 2013: 123). Science and literature, from their inception through their process of evolution, were formed in a vicious circle, which consisted in accepting the belief that Europe was the most civilized, mature and evolved form in comparison to non-Western tribes. Taking their cue from economists, nineteenth-century philosophers strongly believed that trade was a key factor of law-making, which was necessary to embrace civilization. Undoubtedly, this suggests that the lack of interaction with metropolitan powers, or commerce, is the reason why non-Western cultures failed to develop solid institutions to regulate day-to-day life. Though the concept of security was originally rooted in European ethnocentrism, what distinguished it from other ethnocentric discourses was rationality. In fact, European philosophers questioned to what extent the periphery would enjoy the benefits of European culture if it

accepted trade and civilization. For these voices, evolution was contemplated as the unilineal career marked by the actions of the economy, where yielded wealth marked the difference between civilized and uncivilized nations. Of course, in the hands of anthropology and ethnology, a new sentiment of paternalism surfaced. The advance of industrialism would wreak havoc in the 'primitive cultures', therefore European nations were morally obliged to collect those relics and customs and document how natives lived. The need for classification, combined with curiosity, were two important pillars of colonialism.

Problems Around the Notion of Rational West

The concept of the West is very difficult to define in view of the different ethnic groups that have historically coexisted in peace. One of the limitations at the time of referring to the West seems to be what do we understand by 'West'?

An interesting discussion led by Christopher Browning (2007) enumerates a set of problems historians often face in dealing with the West. Basically, it seems as though the concept of the West has been forged in opposition to other civilizations (Jews, Muslims, Soviets and so forth). While we often believe that the core of Roman or Greek Civilization remains in the West, we have reached a biased sense of Republicanism (this point will be in-depth reviewed in the chapters to come). Associated with the cultural West we find a political West, which endorsed and supported the United States in the Cold War, but now moves in a more independent way. Still, it is important not to lose sight that Brexit shows serious discord between European nations; basic themes which should be, but are not, coordinated. For the author, the West should be considered as an allegory, as a discourse which is framed against a non-Western world. What is more than interesting to discuss is why in the American lexicon the word West is disappearing? Is the concept of the West becoming marginal?

At this point in the discussion, the meaning of the West which is politically elaborated is far from being real, beyond the power of ideology. The history of Europe, as Ingold puts it, has been formed in recognition of an (internal) self, which contraposes to (an external) Other. The literature of margins is of paramount importance in recovering the lost image of Europe.

The rise and expansion of modern capitalism has attracted many academicians by its generated effects. However, little attention has been paid

to the role of colonialism in this process (Bauman 1998; Korstanje 2015c). The question of poverty was replicated in order for the status quo to maintain its hegemony. Today the financial global elite visit exotic archeological ruins, while thousands of migrants are disciplined in their arrival to Europe. The term 'disciplined' here denotes how the overseas migrant workforce that arrived in America in the late nineteenth century was subjected to strict patterns of re-education and control. Cultural values such as self-determination, development and freedom were conceptual platforms for the expansion of modern capitalism.

In his book *Development and Social Change*, Phillip McMichael (2016) describes fluctuations in the theory of development over time. This global, all-encompassing view allows readers not only to understand North–South dependency, but also the role played by 'development' in the process. The author sets out his argument in ten brilliant chapters in which he shows erudition and familiarity with the issue. His thesis is that Europe, by the introduction of colonialism, established an ideological background for legitimizing the submissions of overseas colonies. The exploitation of non-European 'Others' was pervasive. Aborigines soon realized the double moral standards of colonial order. Cruelty, submission and violence were applied in the colonies, while democracy prevailed as a system of government in the core. This eventually inspired the process of decolonization, where thousands of peripheral voices claimed to access the same rights – 'the democracy of their white lords'. McMichael explains that imperial powers acceded to the theory of 'development' to maintain the dependency between center and periphery. The end of the Second World War and the efforts of Truman's administration led the United States to implement a wide-ranging credit system to save the world from communism. This programme mushroomed to become development theory. As a mega-project, development was coined in the 1940s and lasted to the 1970s. It not only created a food dependency but also accelerated slum dwelling and poverty in peripheral countries. In order to remake the old division of labor, imperial powers induced 'Third Word' states to accept international loans, which were used to industrialize their economies. At the time, underdeveloping nations adopted capital-intense methods in agriculture, ruining the condition of small farmers, who migrated to urban areas. The metropolitan powers exported industrialized products. The effects of development on Africa were unfortunate. The old boundaries of ethnicities that the first colonial powers found were never honored once world war was concluded. Many human groups were forced to live together within fabricated limits of new nation states. This resulted in ethnic cleansing, conflicts and

warfare that obscured the original ends of IMF and World Bank financial aid programmes. Undoubtedly, the inconsistencies of the World Bank's administering of development-related programmes provoked nationalist reactions in non-aligned countries. To restore order, a new supermarket revolution surfaced: *globalization*.

McMichael argues convincingly that globalization succeeded in expanding thanks to the lack of protective barriers in the Third World, where capital investors were welcomed. This, in consequence, provoked two alarming situations. An increase in unemployment and the decline of unionization in the North was accompanied by the arrival of international business corporations seduced by the low cost of labour in the South. The doctrine of 'free enterprise' was presented as a ladder in the evolutionary process. Each state should adopt a specialized role in a wider 'world factory' where some provide raw materials and others elaborated products. This trend, which characterizes the 1990s, created a new asymmetry between skilled (located in the First World) and under-skilled human resources (situated in the periphery). The recession produced by oil embargoes pressed the First World to lend a massive influx of money to the Third World, but now it is carefully controlled by two organisations, GATT and WTO. Both curtailed the protective measure of local economies by consolidating a new model combining reduced public capacity with the needs of governance. If nationalism showed the importance of the nation-state in protecting the citizen from the market's arbitrariness, now neoliberalism focuses on the incapacity of public administration to regulate the economy.

Conclusion

Moved by questions of status or by an imperialist view, European nations strove to annex new lands and peoples, dispossessing natives from their rights to land. Colonialism was certainly accompanied by subtler dispositions of ideology like literature, science and ethnology. From different angles, these disciplines imposed their essentialized view on 'the native'. This 'non-Western' Other was disciplined by the internalization of its own 'inferiority' to white power, at the time that science developed an interest in the Other that led to the expansion of mobility and tourism in the twentieth century. Though the need to assisting these savage Others was founded on European ethnocentrism from its onset, it accompanies today the ways that developed societies comprehend the world beyond their borders. This chapter discussed to what extent Europe expanded its

hegemony by the creation of 'difference' in homogenized groups. We traced the origin and evolution of nation-states. It is impossible to dissociate the evolution of capitalism from Europeaness and for this reason in this chapter we have placed important voices of economics under the critical lens of scrutiny. Though there is no consensus, it seems as though the discovery and subsequent conquest of the Americas, pivoted in the formation of a specific culture that ushered Europe into the bubble of capitalism. In Chapter 3, we shall review the classic concept of civility and law-making. From Hobbes on, the concept of law-making was strongly associated with the needs of creating a third object (dialectics) which is in charge of monopolizing force and violence. The same conception of law and violence which historically accompanied the Occident, paved a path for the creation of borderlands. Based on the legacy of French philosophy, we shall dissect in this chapter the roots of national being and the evolution of security. While industrialism emancipated medieval peasants from their attachment to the soil, a great process of urbanization produced slums and ghettos in urban areas. Against this backdrop that a new concept of civility erected a barrier between the city and the external world.

CHAPTER 3

The Concept of Civility and Law

Introduction

We cannot start a book about terrorism without an in-depth discussion on the formation of law, civility and the philosophical concerns that stem from the sovereignty of the state. At first glance terrorists not only represent a negative image of their own societies but they frequently deride lay-citizens, who are considered the 'prey' of a cold and alienating system, heartless automata who merely consume and pay taxes. Though such a radicalized sentiment is not shared by all terrorist groups, the fact is that most citizens adhere daily to values that provoke a strong sentiment of hatred in terrorist cells. The psychological literature suggests that terrorists sublimate their frustrations through vicarious violence, a type of retaliation where they direct their hate against 'innocent citizens' who stand outside the original conflict. Of course, terrorists may feel that their compatriots are insensible to the miseries that their country faces. McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) studied the process of radicalization that leads some personalities towards terrorism; in their view of the radicalized mind, everything starts with an 'original' but abstract injustice that can only be redeemed by violence. Terrorists are, in some ways, excluded from elections, driven to be clandestine. Unlike what some pragmatists believe, this suggests that terrorism and democracy are inevitably entwined (Piazza 2008). A violence reaction may occur when the involved groups are debarred from civic life or expelled from

M.E. Korstanje, *Terrorism, Tourism and the End of Hospitality in the 'West'*, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-52252-4_3

the democratic system. This raises an interesting question, why do terrorists feel like strangers in their own home?

To understand this matter better, the present chapter explores not only the genesis of individuals' loyalties to the state, but also what Anna Stilz dubbed '*the liberal reasoning*'. It is indisputable that philosophers have seriously examined the factors that contribute to a united society. From Hobbes to Levi-Strauss, thinkers have theorized on the power of the state to keep its citizens under control, as well as the necessary conditions for the upsurge of discontent and civil riot. To what extent may we blame citizens of the United States or the United Kingdom for their compliance in the *war on terror* that their governments conduct abroad? Is an election or vote an endorsement for genocidal administrations or a way of making democracy? If Russia and France carry out airstrikes on Aleppo causing thousands of deaths, are their citizens responsible for these acts?

Here, however, things become complicated, because sometimes passivity or a decision not to intervene in humanitarian disasters can be catalogued as an act of genocide, as Samantha Power convincingly documented. America remained insensitive to many genocides and ethnic cleansings yet decided to act forcefully in others – those where its interests were in jeopardy. Therefore, the question arises, can we claim that 9/11 was a blowback of US foreign policy?

Western citizens are educated to be good citizens, which means being loyal to their government, working, paying taxes, taking their children to school and voting if necessary. Stilz (2009) explains why taking our political and economic obligations seriously leads us to adopt our role as citizens. Without any speculation or preconceived opinion, it is necessary for us to deal with the problem of security, as well as the notion of civility which unearths the dilemma of unjust laws. Equally importantly, we have to decipher the connection between terrorism, politics and the nation-state. In so doing, the Hobbesian theory of state will be subjected to the lens of scrutiny. The doctrine of security stresses that citizens who desire security must not only surrender some of their rights in favour of a stronger Leviathan, but, following Rousseau, to achieve pleasure-maximization must also embrace ignorance. In this debate, alienation and fear are two sides of the same coin. A great many pseudo-experts or analysts appear on TV news broadcasts talking about the terror instilled by terrorists, but have nothing to say about how terror really works. To fill this gap, the present chapter aims to describe not only the way fear has been theorized

over time, but also discuss critically how fear persists in the core of the nation-state, as Hobbes envisaged.

Tourism and Globalization

With the benefit of hindsight one might be persuaded that modern tourism has affected the composition of many cultures. Tourism has historically worked as a peace-keeper; however it has also accelerated some unexpected conflicts among local groups. Thorstein Veblen (2009), in his study of the leisure classes, considered that societies are constituted of many classes, though over time they will tend to divide into two contrasting groups: the leisure class relies on 'conspicuous consumption', which uses ostentation and emulation to legitimate the privileges of the elite; then there is the 'techno-productive' class, which produces the real wealth of society. Such a distinction has accompanied many economic theories and, of course, the sociology of mobility should pay homage to Veblen. Though Veblen was never interested in tourism or mobility as themes, he envisaged how the elite devote resources to producing a 'culture' of simulacrum (spectacle) in order to affirm its own status and benefits. This theory resonated with French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, who presented an interesting theory on the sociology of consumption and leisure. Bourdieu's books are numerous, he was a prolific writer. But for our purpose it is interesting to discuss his main argument in *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*. He claims that cultural consumption varies by capital and the professional role, both assigned by the formation of classes. To some extent, the sense of class is significant not only in explaining how people see the world, but also in setting the conditions of existence. Unlike other sociologists, Bourdieu certainly understood taste as a social consequence of economic production, which is structured in a cultural matrix that he called 'habitus'. The upper classes hold further capital that can be expressed by their monopoly of the education system. Likewise, the position of citizens within the system depends on their accumulated social capital, as well as the developed sense of distinction, where one class is pitted against the others. The history of classes shows how competence and division consolidated the formation of the modern state through two important mechanisms, *economy* and *law-making*. From its onset, tourism combined Veblen's 'conspicuous consumption' with the needs of distinction, which means *exemplarity* and *exclusion*. The psychology of tourism amalgamates an

original fear of 'unknown situations' or landscapes with the desire for novelty, or finding new sensations (George, Inbakaran and Poyyamoli 2010). In this respect, the history of the main tourist destinations shows that one of the great challenges for policy-makers is to forge a relaxed and secure environment. Originally, aristocracy spent their summer days in villages that were orchestrated as loci of socialization for those who were part of the group and excluded the lower-classes (Pastoriza 2010).

As we shall see in the rest of this book, the process of industrialization and the influence of workers' unions in pressing capital owners for social benefits not only extended the patterns of consumption to other groups, but also paved the way for the technological changes necessary for standardizing tourism worldwide. Package holidays helped people to pay for their holiday, allowing them to travel to new destinations. Encounters between hosts and guests could be troublesome, showing understanding in some cases, but resentment and hostility in others (MacCannell 1992; Brunt and Courtney 1999; Edensor 2001; Hottola 2004; Maoz 2006; Korstanje, Tzanelli and Clayton 2014). Undoubtedly the theory of mobility conceptualizes a cultural clash, which was originally motivated by the industries of leisure, but even today its effects remain unexplored.

Indeed, a wave of scholars who have produced a radical critique of postmodernism and globalization has risen over recent years. Some of these voices have formulated a radical criticism of the rise and advance of postmodernism (Bauman 1998; Sennett 2011). As David Harvey (1989) puts it, the condition of postmodernity is given by the acceleration of movement which leads to a stage of fragmentation. Since the means of production were decentralized during the oil embargo in 1973, the West has appealed to the segmentation of the market as a method of keeping their industries working. In postmodernity what is important is not production, but the empowerment of signs, allegories and narratives that engage consumers with commodities (Lash and Urry 1993). The tourist gaze plays an interesting role by commoditizing Otherness according to selfish desires. Therefore, ethics should be seriously taken into consideration by policy-makers responsible for the formation of organic images of tourist destinations (MacCannell 1992).

What is very important is the extent to which the tourist gaze, following John Urry's term, reinforces a much deeper cultural matrix that precedes the productive system. In this vein, Urry argues convincingly that 'gazing' represents a valid indicator of capitalist expansion. Westerners have developed an ocular-centric culture which makes gazing at external objects not

only an instrument of visual control, but a scientific platform to explain the world. Social scientists, even researchers, are accustomed to validating their hypotheses by watching others and their behaviour. It is not an accident that the legitimacy of the nation-state, adjoined to the medical gaze, paved the way for the rise and acceleration of the tourist gaze. We visit beautiful destinations in order to get an authentic experience, natives are controlled by our gaze, transmitting what we are looking for, but subject to our previous cognitive maps (Urry 2002a, 2002b).

As the previous argument suggested, sociology has historically questioned the role of gazing as an alienating practice rooted in the discourses of colonialism (Korstanje 2012). However, some recent studies recognize gazing as a fertile ground for tourism research. Social researchers carry out ethnographies by examining the plots of films (Tzanelli 2004; Buchmann, Moore and Fischer 2010) and marketers can do the same, discussing to what extent these plots are conducive to tourism consumption (Beeton 2010). Korstanje and Tarlow (2012) and Korstanje and Olsen (2011) have explored the connection between ethnocentrism and movies, focusing on the way plots mark Others by silences instead of via an ideological message. Basically, movies provide audiences with a simple, common explanation of how they should think about things. Since this ideological message has an explicit core, less has been said on the encrypted message, which, though hidden, resonates further in society. While many tourists are seeking authenticity, they are unable to understand what they look for.

Last but not least, Dean MacCannell (1976) discussed authenticity not only as an impossibility, but as a guiding force, or totem. Starting from the premise that aboriginals organize their societies according to a centralized power, a sacred icon where all frustrations are sublimated (totem), the same happens in urban secularized society with tourism. Oppressed and exploited by capital owners, rather than co-ordinating efforts to fight against them, workers turn to leisure consumption in order to suppress their day-to-day frustrations. Tourism exhibits the contrast of escape (from the rules) but, at the same time, acceptance of the mainstream cultural values of society. In MacCannell's view, tourism is the totem by other means. However, risks arise because the voice of others is subordinated not only to what consumers want but also to a supra-narrative which validates the status quo. This is the reason why tourism reproduces staged authenticity as a mediator between sightseers and their institutions. While tourists pay sums of money to witness what should be defined as 'authentic', the needs of

fabricating such an experience results in the opposite: staged authenticity (MacCannell 1973, 1976, 1984, 1992, 2001, 2011).

However, though MacCannell never clarified whether he viewed tourism as a force of alienation or not, interesting intersections with gazing as well as the philosophy of authenticity remain unexamined. This research goes in that direction to fill the gap. Korstanje and George (2014) have provided substantial criticism of the adoption of authenticity, reminding scholars to rethink the roots of authenticity beyond the paradigms inside which they are working today. The questioning of authenticity dates back many centuries in fields of philosophy. Ancient philosophers developed a negative connotation for authenticity simply because they believed that once a person is obsessed with 'authenticity' madness emerges. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Marxists used the term 'authenticity' to explain all material asymmetries produced by capitalism. Instead of focusing on authenticity in objective terms, Marxism demonized authenticity as a prolongation of false consciousness which was conducive to the power of ideology. Of course, what this suggests is that modern tourism exploits the 'need to be there', which engages with the current gears of mobility. Without this lemma, neither globalization nor gazing would exist. Another problem lies in the fact that what one culture considers, or validates, as authentic can be shrugged off in others. Yves Michaud (2013) in his recent book, *Le nouveau luxe: Expériences, arrogance, authenticité*, alerts us to the possibility that new luxuries open the door to pathological forms of consumption. He understands 'authenticity' as an attempt to gain a 'unique experience' during holidays, which isolates the subject with respect to others who have not been lucky enough to experience the same situation. Since the logic of luxury and consumption has substantially changed, we need new lenses to understand these emergent forms of luxuries. The opportunity to feel a solipsist sensation that can be provided by tourism, or any other 'experiential luxury', affects social ties.

It is becoming clear that hostility towards First World tourists may very well come from older psychological resentment produced by the condition of exclusion in local communities (Somnez 1998; Scheyvens and Momsen 2008; Yaya 2009). However, though illustrative, the theory of resentment fails to explain why poor peasants in the Middle East not only develop a positive image of contingents of international tourists but do not exhibit cultural discrepancies with their life-styles (Korstanje and Clayton 2012; Tarlow 2014).

Despite recent advances in the study of terrorism and its effects on the tourism industry, less attention has been given to the role played by fear as it is coined in Western social imaginary. To our ends, this obscures the discussion on why terrorism is today considered the main threat. To expand our current understanding of this matter, we have to construct an all-encompassing theory of fear, which is the oxymoron of terrorism.

Democracy and the Sense of Liberty

French sociologist Robert Castel (1933–2013) made considerable steps in the study of capitalism and the structuration of fears. The unresolved issues in Hobbes are dealt with by Castel, who presents an all-encompassing model to explain the evolution and social functions of fear, a point which merits rediscovery. Humans, ontologically speaking, seek protection from threats to their own existence. This 'space of cohesion' rests on the articulation of trust as mediator between peoples and their institutions. When this trust declines, Castel adds, social conflict threatens society. From pre-industrial to post-industrial societies, the organization of labour suffered different radical changes. As such, risk is not a problem, but an unavoidable consequence coming up with a much deeper dynamic: *social fragmentation*. In the Middle Ages, relations were marked by stable institutions such as kinship, or blood, social cohesion and religion, which all acted as shelters to keep peasants safe from external threats. Paradoxically, living conditions were worse than today, but people went through life thinking social change was not a possibility. In the fourteenth century, the Black Death substantially altered Europe's demographic map, decimating a whole portion of the active workforce. As a result, there was an evident asymmetry between supply and demand in the labour market, which paved the way for the emergence of liberty as a precondition to bourgeois thinking. In search of better conditions, thousands of poor peasants moved into European cities. At this stage, the inception of mobility was not only characterized by the rise of capitalism, but globalization. An historical review suggests that the feudal state aimed to discipline the new workforce without success. The relationship between master and apprentice was emptied and, ultimately, the gap was filled by capital owners. Castel contends that the notion of liberty started to be used to legitimate the circulation of capital in the different spheres of bourgeois society. From that moment on, liberalism introduced the notion of mobility and liberty, with the purpose of stimulating free circulation and liberal

trade (Castel 1997). Castel says that the perception of uncertainty and risk connotes the sense of a lost paradise, an idealized age where labour was at least stable. When the economy is liberalized and the condition of the workforce made precarious, further perceived risks arise. Castel presents an interesting explanation, the perceived climate of unsafeness does not correspond with real threats to society, but with the quest for association (Castel 2006). To put this slightly differently, risk perception is conducive to the formation of social cohesion, which is necessary to prevent the collapse of society (Castel 2006). The progressive decline of industrialism accelerated not only the decline of the welfare state through the 1970s, but endangered the ever-changing conditions of work in contemporary societies. The new conditions of globalization required 'innovative workers' to take contracts without trade unions' intervention (Castel 2010). Castel's main hypothesis is that postmodernism opened the doors for a climate of uncertainty whilst weakening inter-class relations. The previous climate of security that society experienced has not only disappeared but has set the pace for the advance of the liberal market. Since the state is unfitted to the regulation of the complexity of the new emergent forces, the market has filled the gap, mediating between citizens and politics as never before (Castel 2006).

One of Castel's last contributions was the compilation *Individuación, Precariedad, Inseguridad*, published in 2014. He confirms the urgent need to fight against global risks. In so doing, policy-makers should abandon populist discourses, or the 'precautionary principle', instead seeking out the real causes of risk. While technological breakthroughs have made life more predictable, they have also furthered the decline of the welfare state. Lay-citizens not only feel more vulnerable because of the rise and expansion of a decentralized market, but liberalism has failed to ensure a zone of comfort for workers. Today, as well as the failures of the nation-state to protect the basic rights of its citizens, one might reflect that rank and file workers cannot find a stable job.

The same point has been articulated by Peter Taylor-Gooby (2004). It seems easy to explain why poverty exists in capitalist societies; the welfare state has disappeared at the same time as technology has been used to expand production horizons. Here, two clarifications should be made. On one hand, the adoption of ultramodern technology buttressed profits for capital-owners but at the same time reduced the number of people necessary for production. Meanwhile, life expectancy has notably increased, producing a serious asymmetry between aging retirees and an economically active

population. Henceforth, the nation-state has become unable to improve working conditions for its citizens.

Finally, U. Beck (1992) made a correct diagnosis when he toyed with the idea that risk acts as a mediator in an economic system where citizens are vulnerable from external dangers. If Chernobyl proves anything it is that the technology that was designed to make the world safer and wealthier has not only failed but, paradoxically, has formed an unjust and unpredictable landscape. In this vein, Korstanje and Skoll (2012) describe the intersection of risk in the basis of production. For these analysts, risk works as a fetish that diverts attention away from the real problem of capitalism, the gap between haves and have-nots. Risk not only operates in a near-but-unreal future but – like taboos in 'aboriginal cultures' – fetishes promote illusions to allow a much wider state of surveillance. Their model also includes the paradox of climate change: while lay-citizens are more and more concerned about the effects of climate change, they do nothing to alter it. Korstanje and Skoll write,

> *The discourse of global warming facilitates the aristocracies to monopolize control over oil reserves. The danger produced by the massification of cars elevates the price of oil which falls under the control of status quo. When the situation of oil in the Middle East is critical, the system places more cars on the street. This apparently irrational policy is aimed at legitimatizing the existent forms of production based on hydrocarbons. There is no paradox unless we assume risk is a question of perception. Risk does not entail a social shift but replicates the present means of production in certain societies. The privileged groups make from risk a disciplinary mechanism to legitimate their practices. Here the ecological discourse engenders a pervasive message: on one hand, it encourages the use of cars and consumption of oil, a non-renewable resource, to monopolize the control of reserves, but at the same time alludes to ecological risk to promote a change that never occurs.* (Skoll and Korstanje 2012; 18)

Likewise, risk or fear anticipates a staged climate of conscience where those privileged classes that make decisions avoid their responsibilities whereas the lower classes face the consequences. Meanwhile, the public is seduced into thinking that the solution is down of all us, each individual should be a key-player in his/her own future. When risks are fabricated and disseminated, the decision-making process is concentrated in few hands. However, this represents a deep-seated issue which will be discussed in later chapters.

Loyalty to the Nation-State

Anna Stilz (2009) proposes an interesting model for understanding how the concept of liberty interacts with nationhood. She says that nationality plays a leading role in explaining why one is subject to certain laws but is excluded from others. For example, Canadians are governed by Canadian laws, but only when they stay on their soil, if they travel abroad new patterns of behaviour need to be recalculated. In the same way, Argentinians when touring in Montreal should temporarily abandon their daily obligations in Argentina to accept new laws within a new territorial domain. It appears, Stilz adds, that something more than a specific relationship is needed when one invokes the rights of nationality, people are bound to the territory where they reside or are born. The precise point that liberalism has not yet debated, at least with any precision, is what happens when the local rules that we are obliged to accept are unjust. At this point, the principle of redistributive justice not only fails, but also becomes counter-productive. If citizens are morally obliged to obey a new emerging dictator (for example, Hitler or Stalin), how do they behave? Are they responsible for the political crimes of their new regime or simply companions of any unmoral acts?

To resolve this dilemma, liberal thought claims that the concept of civil obligation, which assumes residents should abide by prevailing laws, does not suffice. We also have moral obligations, which are externally designed and have a universal nature, meaning they apply to all people. Of course, at first glance this defies the concept of nationhood, but, as Stilz writes,

> *If the mere existence of separate states is not sufficient to justify our having civic obligations, then what could justify those obligations? Liberals have traditionally looked to extra-institutional principles to ground our obligations. If institutional schemes can be justified with respect to such principles – principles such as respect for freedom and equality of person – then perhaps we can be shown to have a moral obligation to support and uphold them* (Stilz 2009: 6)

The above excerpt is vital not only to understanding Stilz's critique of liberal thinking, but also the emerging challenges posed by globalization and cosmopolitanism to the theory of hospitality, which is the main topic we will discuss in this book. Still further, we must start from the premise that liberals conceive nation-states as taken for granted, because they represent the only valid precondition for democracy and liberty. Following this reasoning, in recent years a new theory has emerged that alternates part of

nationalism with the ideological core of liberalism: Liberal-Nationalism. The studies – forming this theory – suppose that nations are formed by two different but complementary parts. First, and most important, states are ethically legitimized as the guardians of a shared tradition, which confers obligations and rights to lay-citizens. Sharing a nationality, or at least a residency, should inspire loyalty to the state (not government). Secondly, the sense of the same cultural background should provide the necessary reciprocity and trust for democracy to spark and flourish. Because of this, universal values such as freedom, reason and liberty are used to give legitimacy to a political unit, the nation-state, in a way that not only grounds individual decisions, but also tries to delineate the boundaries for a theory of justice. This is a big problem, Stilz recognizes, which needs to be tackled by social scientists. Cultural nationhood allows the constitution of individual identity once the sense of freedom is framed. In this way, lay-citizens make choices under a so-called climate of liberty which rests on familiarity. When we grow up in a cultural background, it confers credibility to us because we adopt a strong moral force that articulates the sense of belonging (identity) with the belief in the opportunity to vote for our representatives (democracy) (Stilz 2009).

As previously stated, Stilz's main thesis is that defending the view of some cosmopolitan theorists that people acquire equal rights and freedom upon birth, no matter what their nation-state, culture or language, is wrong for two significant reasons. Equal conditions (egalitarianism) are universal and should not be applicable to states, which are entities designed to monopolize force, but only to individuals. Furthermore, if individual freedom mediates between citizens and their institutions, as liberals originally claimed, then states are an important element in the political scaffolding. Stilz holds the view that conditions of equal freedom should be stipulated by states, which sounds polemical, but also that citizens are not morally obliged to obey laws which are issued by undemocratic states. Here is the problem, how should we delineate what is a democratic state and what is not?

In addition, it is not an accident that Western political scientists see the nation-state as a global entity, applicable to all forms and organization. However, the fact is that nationhood and state are social constructs that are widely legitimated by modern capitalism. The success of the nation-state rests not only on the possibility of introducing freedom as a mediator between civility and fear, but in what Stilz called *'freedom as impudence'*. Kantian and other liberal thinkers emphasize the role of freedom as interlinked with autonomy. To be free as independent, a person should make

decisions or dispose of their rights without intervention by others. The act of possessing rights and goods was a clear token, which, associated with independence, composes the human natural right to freedom. In that way, it is not accident that Americans adopted an obsessive attachment not only to protect but accumulate private property (Stilz 2009).

In a seminal book, *They Thought they were Free*, M Mayer (2013) outlines a brilliant explanation of Nazi Germany and Hitler's discourses about liberty. Taking his cue from his own travels to German, author narrates the resulted experiences during his lodge, giving interesting insights how widely-spread Nazism indoctrinated the minds of citizens. Hitler restored the lost national self-esteem after Germany's recovery insofar he was success in manipulating allegorically the sense of liberty by the introduction of ancient Norse Sagas and others elements of lore. The degree of comfort given to Germans was sufficient for Hitler to impose a new regime where dissidence was gradually annulated. The Other whatever it founds was labelled as an enemy of the nation, the Fuhrer, or as an obstacle towards the greatness Germany deserved. This sort of mechanistic spirit, which was adjoined to a romantic view of nation-state, paved the pathways for embracing closed-forms of politics that finally ushered Germany into misery and destruction.

It is unnecessary to go so far, Toby James professor at University of East Anglia (UK) places the current system of elections under the critical lens of scrutiny. Dotted with rich information in legal procedures and administrative steps in elections, he cautions that elite manipulates often the rules of the democratic game in its favour. Whether democracy seems to install a false dichotomy respecting to who really governs, changes in election administration are monopolized by professional politicians many of them appertaining of the same class. Though we have voting as a sacred-rule James adheres to citizens are unfamiliar of the silenced operational changes governments conduct to keep the power. His analysis is based on the study cases of the United States, Ireland and the United Kingdom.

> *Elite interest in and action on electron administration is influenced by the electoral system, party system, and constitutional control over procedures.... The elite's strategy on election administration is influenced by the reform process of other electoral institutions* (James 2012: 20)

What this study reflects is that elections result can be manipulated in an explicit way, by fraud, or implicitly restricting or broadening the rights of

some minorities to vote. At its discretion, elite manipulates election-process to conserve their privilege position in regards to pressing groups, or other parties. Even in democracy, we should not leave behind that such a party in the presidency has all resources of state to protect its interests, the necessary information gathered from polls, security-agencies, or even security forces. The partisan battles to turn the results of elections is an important aspect of American democracy, though some historians do not want to discuss to what extent election administrations was never as objective as they preclude (James 2012).

Other interesting project that illustrates on the theme is *Fear: The History of a Political Idea,* by Corin Robin. In consonance with the sentiment of fear, American citizens experienced after 9/11, Robin acknowledges that the history of fear is not new in the Occident, even many different fears have been politically manipulated to impose policies otherwise would be neglected. Basically, fears quicken the perception of external events, declining the reason respecting to them. What is important to discuss is how fears are not invented in order for workforce to direct their loyalty to authorities. It is necessary to think, thus, of a 'political fear' that poses a new object of politics in observance. But this raises a more than pungent question, what is fear?

At a closer look, society seems to be structured and formed around many individual fears that thousands of citizens face daily such as unemployment, local crime, and so forth. These fears not only revolve within the cognitive system of those who perceive them, but also allow society to keep united. However, as Robn alerted, there is a 'more dangerous' type of political fear which is carefully designed to undermine the tenets of democracy, which means the individual dissidence. For the sake of clarity, Robin goes not to say that,

> *Understanding fears as we do -as a collective response to non-political threats, as the polity's means of moral and spiritual regeneration – or responding solely to foreign objects of fear, we ignore or downplay these everyday forms of fear, which reinforce a repressive social order, constraint freedom, and create or perpetuate inequality* (Robin 2004: 23)

To set an example to illustrate how fear works; modern politicians appeal to fear not only to enhance their credibility even to gain elections. The clash between Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton that captivated the attention of the world is far from concerns Americans. Either candidates

shows low levels of acceptance, but people are pressed to elect. In fact, Trump and Clinton abuse from the discourse of fear to impose their own programs. While Hillary emulates a worry dating back to 9/11 to manipulate information that may very well place the United States in jeopardy, Donald did the same emulating the archetype of a dictator as never the United States witnessed. This archetype of racism, as well as the imposition of a one-sided view that threatens the Republican Spirit was skilfully exploited by Clinton's advisors. To sum up, the fear of tyranny as it was imagined by founding parents of the United States, coupled with the fear of terrorism, recently triggered by 9/11. Against at odds, the fear to strangers and terrorism imposed to the original concerns of democrats (Republicanism). In an recently-edited book, Korstanje (2016) calls the attention on the likelihood terrorism accelerated not only the decomposition of industrial cities, augmenting the fear to aliens, but also the rise and introduction of 'populist leaders' whose policies obscure more than clarify.

In this respect, international analysts like Cass Sunstein outlines the needs of discussing what are the factors for people to be frightened. Rather, in some conditions, Sunstein realizes, people feel safe when serious risks are next to take place. Doubtless, the process of cognition rests on individual impressions or traits, which not always adjust to reality. In this respect, Sunstein examines the role played by rationality in the process of dread and its consequent relationship with democracy. From his viewpoint, through a democracy, or at least in a deliberative democracy, the debate predominates over other forms of deliberation to decrease somewhat involuntary errors. This is the point that distinguishes a deliberative democracy from a demagogic populism. In other words, the state of a disaster that involves a community might be prevented or partly mitigated whenever the issues that impinge on the public life are previously discussed, debated and forecasted. This belief would explain the reasons as to why democratic societies have more instruments to face disasters than totalitarian or authoritarian ones. Whereas the latter does not provide their citizens with the necessary steps to evaluate the pre-existing risks, the former invests a considerable amount of capital in the process of mitigation and preparedness for natural catastrophes. As a bad option for state, the precautionary principle echoes a populist logic of some pressure groups that lack of an all-comprehensive view of the problem. As a result of this, while state devote attention to mitigate some risks, other more dangerous surface. This happens because analysts have no clear the limitations of 'precautionary principle'. This doctrine, which is based on pre-emptive precaution, often subverts the

normal process stipulated by law in order for facing potential threatening events that never take room. Following this, sometimes the precautionary principle gave rise to the risks, which originally it attempts to mitigate (Sunstein 2005). Emotions are connected with the system of perception insofar they produces a probability neglect. Lay-people overestimate some risks by their potential effects, though they show lower probability of concretion. There is a current inflation of risks that distorts public audience because of two main components, *(a) the availability heuristic* and *(b) probability neglect*.

While the availability of heuristics refers to the mental disposition for reminding similar events that have lower probabilities of materialization, probability neglect exaggerates or undermines the real probabilities of risk to take place in the daily life. Either mechanism works together, by paving the ways for embracing an atmosphere where citizens believe 'securitization' must be granted by state, over other democratic values. However, to what an extent, we are sure these demands are objective, and were scientifically studied. History is fraught of examples where governments simply collapsed by accepting biased and irrational citizen's demands. Dorner's experiment, precisely, demonstrates how lay people and even experts make daily decisions that virtually lead to extreme and irreversible states of emergencies. Decision making process appears not to be circumscribed to rationale neither an all-encompassed view (Sunstein 2003). To understand the effects of terrorism, we inevitably have to delve into the nature of fear.

Towards a Theory of Fear

It is noteworthy that each age, culture and society constructed its particular fears that were articulated in consonance to its environmental adaptation. While some cultures demonized disasters as the token of God Rage, westerns seem to develop a strange aversion to death. Even, as Anthony Giddens puts it, the same phenomenon acquired different names according to the time. This point particularly prevents the multidisciplinary research because the conceptualization of fear was unfortunately approached by many disciplines in various periods of time. In ancient Greece, philosophers referred to fear as 'a reaction to the effects or imminence of war'. Instead, this did not apply for 'existentialists' who replaced the concept of 'fear' for 'angst'. The same happens in contemporary society when probabilists coined the term 'risk' to help decision-makers to evaluate programs to make society safer (Giddens 2013). This

suggests that each generation reserves a proper meaning and definition of fear as well as the frightening object.

Truthfully, Aristotle was one of classic philosophers worried by the fear and its effects in the world of habits. He suggests that human acts are miscarried not only by excess but by lack. The excess of fear (panic) become man in coward, while the lack of any fear may lead him to lose the life. At some extent, unless dully regulated, courage is prone to insanity. This point was carried on by Thomas Hobbes, who grown in a climate of extreme violence and conflict; even he experienced a cruel civil war accompanied by political instability in his medieval England. Following Aristotle, Hobbes, understands the excess of bravery ushers people into unhelpful pride. In his book, *Leviathan or the Matter, Forme and Power of Common Wealth Ecclesiastical and Civil*, he takes the metaphor of the biblical monster Leviathan to symbolize the state. Since in the state of nature, men follow a materialist drive, trying to disposing from the other's properties, it surfaces a paradoxical situation when others wish what I have. To put in other terms, two contrasting feelings coexist in the state of nature, which should be concealed in favour of a third one, Leviathan, which will prevent the war of all against all. The fear of death is in Hobbesian development, not only the foundation of the social contract, but also remains enrooted in the core of society (Hobbes 1985). Leo Strauss has carefully reviewed this conceptualization of death alerting that Hobbes was a pioneer for his epoch deciphering the entanglement of civility. What he observed was that while fear of death is an impediment for pleasure-maximization, the self develops certain aversion to those threatening objects or persons that represent a barrier for ego enhancement. The trust deposited in social institution, in this way, depends upon the abilities of state to resolve day-to-day problems (Strauss 1963). In Hegel, the question of fear associates to a dialectics where the desire of domination prevails. Each conscience is constituted according to the 'Otherness', other opposing conscience that will seek to protect its own interests. At the time, the conflict is resolved by mediation of fear, submission arise between slaves and its master. For Hegel, the fear should be defined as a derived consequence of politics, often linked to the needs of coexistence (Hegel 1994). In contrast to Hobbes and Hegel, Baruch de Spinoza dangled the possibility that fear as a negative instrument of politics, not necessary would be the necessary precondition for overcoming the state of nature. In addition, emotions play a leading role conducing human behaviour and of course, the sense of insecurity should be

avoided. In this difficult context, state should intervene constraining the hostility inherited in human nature, by adopting law-making as a rapid solution to uncertainness.

Though medieval thinkers were worried by the political manipulation of fear, there was no other as Erich Fromm who dedicated his live to understand how politics and fear converge. As a persecuted politician, Fromm escaped to the United States from Nazi Germany and once there developed an anti-totalitarian argument which resisted the proof of time. Not only oriented to exert a radical criticism on the cultural background that facilitated the upsurge of Adolf Hitler, but also to the consumption society in the United States and Stalinism in Russia, Fromm offered a fertile ground to produce an coherent framework for future generations to understand fear. As this backdrop, Fromm argues convincingly that peers rejection, discrimination and isolation becomes in one of the most frightening aspects of life for lay-people. Religion and nationalism are two key factors that resolve anxiety, in a society where man debates between the love for life and destruction. What Fromm advocates to the hypothesis some insecure personalities abandon their liberty endorsing their support to totalitarian regimes. This applies for Germans with Hitler, Russians with Stalin or Americans – likely today with Trump. Fromm opens the doors towards a new interpretation of fear, which is formed by three elements, a) renunciation to freedom, b) the eagerness for further power, and c) the fear of isolation. This not only explains why totalitarian systems mimicked and flourished through democratic institutions, but also he contributed to the construction of what Adorno called 'the authoritarian personality'. His stance is that the manipulation of fear comes from authoritarian tendencies democracies should elide (Fromm 2012, 1994). In this vein, Novel in Literature Wole Soyinka notes that there exists a connection between power and freedom. The decadence still visible in democracy allied with the decline of human rights results in an atmosphere of anxiety which only can be broken by ethnic tolerance and recognition of human dignity. Today, Soyinka's essays lead readers through the complex world of current politics revealing Soyinka's own experience in Africa and his sense of social issues. The whole provides an understanding of terrorism-related issues. Soyinka examines qualitatively to what extent people feel more fear in spite of technical and material advances in recent decades. The preface argues that the world cannot escape social instability when perpetrators of crimes can sell their stories to the media. Latin America and Africa have experienced this state of

affairs for many years. Generally, the 70's and 80's are characterized by the advent of bloody dictatorships that silenced their dissenting voices by violence and removal of dignity. This provided the springboard for the post-9/11 events that are shocking the United States and Europe.

In this respect, Soyinka claims that 9/11 did not surprise him. From that moment onwards, international public opinion (even in Africa) experienced a new climate of fear, in spite of the previous experiences of political terror. Soyinka believes the world has faced extreme situations of panic before 9/11 ranging from Nazism and the Second World War to nuclear weapon testing. One of the aspects of global power that facilitates this feeling of uncertainty seems to be the lack of a visible rivalry once the USSR collapsed. The politic terror promulgated by states diminishes the dignity of enemies. These practices are rooted inside a territory but paved the way for a new form of terrorism which ended in the World Trade Center attacks. It is incorrect to see 9/11 as the beginning of a new fear but as the latest demonstration of the power of an empire over the rest of the world. Mass communications, though, transformed our ways of perceiving terrorism even if it did not alter the conditions that facilitate the new state of war. Unlike classical totalitarian states which are constructed by means of material asymmetries, the quasi-states construct their legitimacy by denouncing the injustices of the World. Quasi-states are not only terrorist cells but also mega-corporations which work in complicity producing weapons for one side or the other. Making profit of human suffering is a primary aspect that characterizes these quasi-states. The uncertainty these corporations engender denies the minimum codes of war by emphasizing the inexistence of boundaries and responsibilities. Once rectitude has been substituted by the right to exercise power, pathways towards a moral superiority are frustrated. Unlike the disaster of the Napalm-bombing of non-combatants by the United States in Vietnam, this new war-on-terror is characterized by targeting innocents as a primary option. In opposition to conventional wars, war-on-terror expands fear under the following two assumptions: a) hits can take place anywhere and anytime, and, b) there is no limits on brutality non-combatants. Wars depend on the capacity to control others based on the principle of power. Governments often need the material resources of their neighbours. Where the expropriation method of capitalist trade fails, war finds success. One might speculate that war should be understood as an extension of economic production. The role played by fear in late modernity is rooted in a desire for domination that has nothing to do with religiosity or even to religious fundamentalism, which in recent years has become

synonymous with cruelty. Cornelius Castoriadis (2006) outlined that the real democracy, as it was practiced in the Athenian World, succumbed after the Peloponnesian War when Athens was surrendered to Sparta. The procedures of democracy in Ancient Athens have nothing to do with elections, since the King has a mandate for life, which was inaccessible for lay-citizens. However, any citizens can invoke to an assembly to use the resource of *demos,* which opens a review of law though sanctioned by Senate would affect the interest of anyone. Democracy has the spirit that anyone, no matter their status can be alter the laws if unjust. However, as Korstanje in earlier studies observed, modern democracy is far from allowing the intromission of citizens in the procedures for laws to be passed. There is gap between representatives and citizens that seems to be fulfilled by business corporations. This represents a new type of democracy, we have to recategorize as 'Anglo-Democracy' (Korstanje 2013, 2015a). For the sake of clarity, democracy and capitalism are inevitably entwined.

In English-speaking countries, social scientists understand democracy as a sign of civilization that leads towards progress and achievement; to put this slightly in different terms, a privilege self-achieved status that distinguish Anglo-Saxons them the rest of the world. Based on the needs of exceptionality, it is interesting to see how Anglo-readers have adopted democracy as a success project which ideologically should be exported to other nations. Though one might speculate this ideological discourse is proper of working middle classes, no less true is that it can be traced to erudite texts or even into the roots of Academia. This is the example of the book *Working through the Past,* edited by Teri Caraway, Maria Lorena Cook and Stephen Crowley. In ten fascinating chapters, editors explore the intersections of authoritarian legacies and unionization process. Discussing to what extent social scientists are able to speak of 'authoritarian legacies' editors understand that institutional relations are forged and determined by the type of democracy which is practiced. Those unions that developed in times of totalitarian governments are prone to develop anxious relations with central administrations. The dependency of unions to professional politicians is given by the lack of autonomy which is only feasible in democratic societies. One of the most troubling aspects of unions in contexts of totalitarian governments lies in the restrictions imposed to negotiate with capital-owners. On one hand, authoritarian government did their best to prevent unions taking direct participation in politics. On another, in other cases they endorsed to control unions, in a paternalist way. As in Communist nations, trade unions were intervened

by government and controlled in a way that prevented their autonomy. On the introductory chapter, editors explore the ebbs and flows of authoritarian legacies to form ideologies that today limit the power of workers. Teri Caraway in Chapter 2 discusses the influence of Suharto regime in Indonesia and its negative effects over unions to affiliate the whole portion of workforce. The fact is that political parties are not interested in endorsing to trade unions and vice-versa. This dissociation is conducive for status quo which is formed during the Suharto Regime not to lose their legitimacy.

Labour leaders constructed a strong network with unions that prevented strikes in order for securing governance. Like in many cases during the book, authors emphasize on the limitations of authoritarian regime to accept strikes as well as their overt rejection to adopt worker's benefits as in capitalist societies. Fifth, sixth and seventh chapters deal with the role of unions in communist countries as Poland, Russia and Yugoslavia. Unlike other countries as Argentina or Brazil which kept stronger unions in spite of their authoritarian past, communism has largely co-opted the union leaders in order to diminish any political opposition. These types of state-backed labour policies were of paramount importance to configure powerless unions, restricted to impose their view to governments. Last but not least, the remaining chapters allude to the Spanish World in Latin America, a region of the world that suffered many bloodshed coups that imposed fear in lay-citizen to take part of politics. In whatever the case may be, this book offers a fertile ground to expand the current understanding how labour is organized by the pressure of undemocratic regimes. Though it is organized in a clear way, and gives ten path-breaking chapters, the main argument rests on shaky foundations. The editors believe that democracy seems to be the best of possible worlds. It is a truism that the prosperity of the United States rested in its capacity to create fluid dialogue with trade unions, and a dynamic economy where competence baulked 'extractive institutions', as in other authoritarian countries. As Korstanje (2015a) amply showed in his recent book *A Difficult World,* democracy is far from being the panacea we have been told. In fact, there is a clear correlation between democratic countries and capitalism but it does not correspond with a good sign.

The theory of democracy that signals the United States as the most democratic of nations, not only rests on shaky foundations but it likely ignores the past of oppression Black Americans suffered, adjoined to the fact that four constitutional presidents were finally killed besides many

syndical and activist leaders. Proponents of democracy have some myopia to differentiate industrial relations from terrorism and of course this is the caveat from where we begin. Though some suspects were rapidly arrested, there are a lot of conspiracy theories that indicate Secret Services complotted against those politicians who defy the status quo. At some extent, unionization, mobility and leisure activities is terrorism by other means.

Mobilities are Terrorism by Other Means

Terrorism seems to be the organization of strikes by other means. To understand better this, readers should go directly to the nineteenth century when the United States was populated by millions of European migrants. This incipient workforce was subject to much deprivation and pain. The benefits given by state and corporate capital-owners to unions were a desperate attempt to discipline terrorism. This will be explained better in the chapters to come. The industrial revolution and industrial capitalism were prerequisite for workers to think in terms of collective organizations. The American Federation of Labor was founded in 1886. One of the main strengths was the power of negotiation with the owners of capital. James Joll explains that at first anarchists were depicted as dangerous by the ruling class press and the politicians who did their bidding in Gilded Age America. The United States government waged chronic war against unions beginning at the end of the Civil War And continuing until the New Deal of Franklin Roosevelt in the 1930s. The first syndicalists that defied the state were labeled as terrorists. These workers professed a nonnegotiable fight for oppressed classes, which have been relegated by the capitalist aristocracies (Joll 1979). At the end of the Second World War the American ruling class achieved a double capitulation domestically and abroad. The famous Marshall Plan worked as a catalyst to undermine the ever-growing worker demands in Europe, while the CIA consorted with gangsters and former Nazis and Fascists to subvert and terrorize workers, their unions, and their political parties (Hogan 1989; Ganser 2005; Kurku 1997). At the same time, legislation such as the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act restricted the political activities of unions and blunted workers' only weapon against exploitation the strike. The problem of communism seems not to be the anti-capitalism values it represents, but its potential effects on workers, a threatening influence that would jeopardize the American economy. Paradoxically, the mass-migration produced by the industrialization of Europe gained a considerable attraction for new-born countries such as Argentina, United

States and Australia that, in the division of labour, served as supplier or raw commodities. In the United States, these new in-comers not only brought strange customs but also what American elite considered 'radical ideologies' as communism, socialism and anarchism. This type of anarchism was pretty different than the original established in the country from its foundation. Instead of accepting the liberty as the main value, it appealed to foster the 'collective struggle' for the well-being of a majority. Individualism was not an option for European anarchism. In the same token, James Joll argues convincingly that its roots may be traced to the works of Godwin, Blanc, Proudhon and Bakunin. Their criticism against the state and the hegemony of law paved the way for the advent of a new movement, which postulated the egalitarian nature of human beings. One of the most troubling aspects of states is that many groups are subjugated under its unique power – its monopoly of force. By reducing government to only small units, formed by families, the anarchists thought the problem of asymmetries would be resolved. Joll adds that anarchism came from the advance of capitalism and industrial organization. Centred on the premise that production should be based on the work, and not loans, countries as Russia, Germany, and Italy witnessed the upsurge of a new movement that takes from worker's discontents its own strength. Because of the violence wide-spread at the streets as well as the attacks on important politicians and police in the United States, these new anarchists, far from being accepted by American thinking, were marked as 'terrorists'. These acts, deemed terrorism, served the state by giving a rationale to ban anarchist activity. Although the workers adopted the discourses of anarchists to make sense of their struggles against capital holders, states labelled strikers as anarchists bent on destroying public order. Eventually states recognized unions as legitimate, but not in the United States until the 1935 Wagner Act. In parallel, a second wave of activists opted for organizing 'unionization' in America, cementing the possibility to create what specialists call 'anarcho-syndicalism'.

Joll goes on to acknowledge that,

> *The anarchists, too, were divided among themselves; some were anarcho-syndicalists and placed their hope of revolution in the action of the workers union which would take over the factories. Others were communist anarchists and disciples of Kropotkin, who saw social revolution coming about through the formation of local communes which would then join in a federation* (Joll 1979, 166).

In Europe, both anarchism and communism fought together to defeat monarchy, but their interests contrasted in the United States. Certainly, anarchists found a new source for their ideas endure. By about 1920, America was facing an industrial stage, accelerated by the mass migrations from Europe initiated in the preceding century. The anarchist ideology met a new basis for their claims, beyond the acts of terrorists. Even though the first strikes were bloody and violent, with the passing of years anarcho-syndicalists were legally accepted in societies which not only needed the masses to work, but also sublimated their protests into reified forms of negotiation that for better or worse accelerated the reproduction of capital. Their formerly attributed terrorism was commoditized into negotiations and legally circumscribed strikes. Trade unions, by the support of anarchists, won not only fewer working hours, but also vacation pays and many other benefits. However, the most important achievement was the legal right to strike. At the time, the state vested in the monopoly of force, expulsed terrorist groups its main ideological core was accepted to serve as the cornerstone of capitalism. If we contend that 'modern tourism' emerged at this early stage as a result of what unions did manage to achieve for workers, then we must accept terrorism played a crucial role in such process. Let us remind readers that modern tourism surfaced by the combination of two contrasting tendencies: the technological advance that shortened the points of connection, invention of new machines, and the wage benefits or working hour reduction, proposed by syndicalists. In this respect, modern tourism would not be possible without the direct intervention of the first anarchists, most of them labeled as terrorists. This means that tourism (or mobilities) is terrorism by other means. Whether first terrorists who launched to terrorism were disciplined by the state, their forms of violence were mutated to another more symbolic way of protests, the strike. Capitalism owes much to trade unions, more than thought. Whatever the case may be, tourism has extended to the globe (Naisbitt 1995), as the well-being of industrial societies have advanced. The evolution of tourism, as a mass industry, came from a combination of economic factors, much encouraged by worker unions, such as working hour reduction and a rise in the wages. However, the history of tourism ignores the burden industrialism and technological advances brought by workers. Anarchism not only flourished in industrial contexts, exploiting worker resentment of owners, but also improved their working conditions. Once workers abandoned the violence and activism, they were awarded with leisure and other luxuries consumptions. To the extent that a strike is

considered a legal mechanism to present certain claims, while terrorist attacks are discouraged, seems to be a matter that specialists do not examine properly. A closer view reveals that there are similar processes in both, a strike and terrorism. As the vaccine is the inoculated virus to strengthen the body's immune system, strikes are process of dissent and discord that mitigate the negative effects of conflict. After all, strikes are merely the collective effects of workers withholding their labour. There is nothing violent or threatening about them, except to those who depend on other people's work to sustain themselves – i.e., the owners of capital. In their struggle with workers, the ruling class uses as one if its weapons the construal of strikes as taking consumers as hostages. Whenever passengers are stranded at an airport or train stations because of problems between owners and unions, the sense of urgency facilitate the things for stronger ones. Businesses and terrorism organizations are not concerned about the vulnerability or needs of passengers. The latter one are manipulated as means for achieving certain goals. In a world designed to create and satisfy psychological desires, consumers as holders of money, are of paramount importance for the stability of system. The threat that represents the consumers and the derived economic loses are enough to dissuade owners from the workers' claims. In these types of processes, typified by law, the state not only takes intervention mediating between both actors but also is in charge of leading negotiations.

Although this matter has not received sufficient attention in scholarship, strike and terrorist attacks had four commonalities,

a) They need for surprise effects to cause damage in the government.
b) The other, weaker, is hosted following an instrumental or mean-as-goal logic.
c) The insensibility to the 'other' suffering.
d) Negotiations imposed by means of extortion.

What do feel international tourists when they are stranded at airport because of a sudden strike?. It is safe to say that tourism is the maiden of Empires, so, first-world travelers may be targets of attacks when they are abroad, as the current literature suggests. More often, tourists and the tourism industries act as logistical agents in deploying capital exploitation and imperial control. When tourists suffer harm, so-called terrorists (dissidents) get the blame. At a first glance, tourists are 'workers' who earned

their money enabling a pact to a third person (owner). Their power of consumption situates them as privileged actors of tourist system. They are target not only to strikes, at homeland, but also of terrorist attacks abroad. This explains why terrorist attacks are mainly targeted against innocent tourists and travellers or even planned against leisure-spots including tourist destinations and means of transport.

CHAPTER 4

The Rise of the Nation-State and Free Transit

Introduction

For some reason, academics have a strong fascination for topics associated to heritage and history which serve as instruments not only to forge the national-being, but also of ideology. While some events are rememorized (even exacerbated to pathological levels) others are selectively ignored (Guidotti Hernandez 2011). As Nicole Guidotti Hernandez (2011) noted, the sense of heritage exhibits a biased image of past, which sometimes even is far from historical facts. No less true is that the rise and expansion of globalization allowed a rapid change where cultures, peoples and institutions are commoditized to be sold to an international demand of tourists (Prats 1998; Santana 1998; Timothy and Olsen 2006). Dean MacCannell, the famous American anthropologist, claimed that tourism not only revitalizes the psychological frustrations suffered during working days, but works as a vehicle of escapement from humdrum routine, where cultural expressions may be very well consumed (MacCannell 1973, 1976, 1984, 2011; Tzanelli 2013a, 2013b, 2014a, 2014b). At a first glance, tourists emulates a new role playing to be what in their real lives, they are not. The same applies on the concept of heritage. Since the message transmitted by heritage and history lies in current interpretations of events that took place in other contexts, there is a serious risk not only politicians mould history to present interests (eyes) but also in incorporating heritage into an innovative industry of cultural exploitation in which case it may serve for poverty relief in local communities (Richards 1996; Richards and

M.E. Korstanje, *Terrorism, Tourism and the End of Hospitality in the 'West'*, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-52252-4_4

Wilson 2006). This represents a striking challenge for historians and policy makers, because if heritage is constructed according to the demand, its content turns unauthentic. It is unfortunate that this point certainly was unexplored by academicians and scholars. It opens the doors for a much deeper paradox. While heritage helps strengthening the national-ethos, revitalizing the confidence of lay-citizens in their institutions, such an identity is based on a sense of spectacle that never converges with facts. The formulation of an theory where national borders were constructed under the sense of selective memory was originally coined by Nicole Guidotti Hernandez in her book *Unspeakable Violence*. In this seminal text, she takes her cue from the contribution of Michel Foucault, respecting disciplinary power, as well as focusing on the discourses of nation-state 'civilizing' certain ethnicities. When the agent defies the logic of exploitation exerted by elite, the use of discipline not only corrects the 'problem' but also protects the interests of privileged-classes. To physical violence, which is legally monopolized by the state, there is another subtler form dubbed as 'unspeakable violence'. In this respect, there exists an epistemic violence which rests on allegorical tergiversations in the ways history is drawn, negotiated and assimilated. In this vein, the sense of heritage and its intersection with modern mobility and tourism only is possible by the expansion of a late-capitalism, which is oriented to commoditize the otherness. In this chapter we shall discuss the ideological core of the nation-state, at the time the idea of us vs. them is formed. The selection of the nation-state respecting to what aspects of life becomes heritage or not, depends on the ability of elite to monopolize the means of production of society. Still furthermore, to understand the expansion of Capitalism, not surprisingly the conquest of Americas should be placed under the critical lens of scrutiny.

In such a direction, we shall explore the use and abuses of the idea of hospitality which was ideologically used to dispossess aborigines from their original lands. The scholastic school of Salamanca, which envisaged the impossibility of some ethnicities to offer hospitality to Spanish discoverers, claimed the aboriginals' inhumanity paving the pathways for their possessions to be factually expropriated. Today, at the time the figure of indigenous is romantized to be consumed by first world tourists, we forget that the Conquest of Americas was ideologically legitimized by the Western view of Hospitality and free transit. At some extent, it is important to note that ancient and modern hospitality does not seem different institutions, nor to what extent the

dichotomy between commercial and non-commercial hospitality is helpful in our argument. Tourism offers a type of balanced hospitality where the sides are subject to money but no less true is that such a symbolic exchange rests on the ancient law of hospitality. For this, it is safe to say the industry of hospitality and anthropological hospitality are inextricably intertwined.

Preliminary Discussion

Though we think that hospitality is a modern industry that offers lodge to millions of tourists, a type of leisure-related activity oriented to strengthen the cosmopolitan spirit and tolerance with the other (Brotherton 1999; Gillespie and Morrison 2001; Lugosi 2006; O'Gorman 2009; Teng 2011), we often lose the sight that hospitality is more than a commercial activity; rather it represents an ancient and all-encompassing institution. Some scholars argue mistakenly that hospitality should be differentiated in two contrasting terms, commercial and non-commercial hospitality (Lugosi 2007, 2008; Teng 2011; O'Gorman 2009; Lashley 2008; Gibson 2016). While the former signals to the economic relations between hosts and guests to exchange services -in this case money by lodge- the latter corresponds with an anthropological trend embedded with gift-exchange process. Despite this can be illustrative in these terms, nothing more far than reality than this conception. Lynch et al (2011) group the different theories on hospitality in two main families. One on hand, the specialized literature adopted a view that defines hospitality as an instrument of control. This family of theories alludes to the politics of hospitality as well as the conception of neo-Marxian arguments. On another, we come across with a set of theories that define hospitality as a gift-exchange process. In recent times, some critical voices called the attention to the material asymmetries between have and have-nots, respecting to their rights to move from one to another geographical point at their discretion. We must confess that the question of mobility and hospitality not only are intertwined, but also are not ensured in egalitarian conditions. While some first world tourists use their wealth to visit the different wonders of this world, thousands of refugees, exiles and working migrants are repelled from the borders of the nation-state (Virilio 2012; Bauman 1998; Tzanelli and Yar 2009; Eagleton 2011; Bianchi and Stephenson 2014; MacCannell 2011; Urry 2007; Korstanje and Clayton 2012).

As it has been earlier noted, hospitality keeps a strong political hallmark. In the age of Biopolitics, the exemplary centre exhibits not only the power of master, but also the vulnerability of guest. Any displacement within hospitality is a like a travel to death, towards here-after where Gods or spirits will guide our path (Korstanje and Skoll 2014). In this respect, Paloma Balbín Chamorro (2006) has deciphered the complex world of hospitality, using etymology as a valid instrument. The term comes from Latin *Hospitium* which derived in two legal terms, *ius hospitii and ius civitatis*. A close reading suggests that Humbert was not correct, when said that strangers received *hospitium* to be protected during their sojourn, Chamorro adds. In fact, the word *hospes* was applied to inter-tribal reciprocities that facilitated the economic good exchange. In this vein, Korstanje (2010) highlights that the roots of hospitality should be found in the 'indo-Arian' formula, *hostis+pet*. Although, there was a direct connection between *hostis and the figure of enemy,* the hospitium was practiced in friendly contexts. The meaning of *hostis* was applied to connote 'equilibrium' and balance among human passions. Furthermore, starting from the premise that *pet* means 'master', hospes+pet should be understood as '*master of host*'. As hospitality was a liminoid space the unexpected conflict lurked around every corner reminding that hospitality and hostility share the same etymological origin.

No less true is that empires consolidate their hegemony in two drastic different directions. On one hand, we have the classic discourse that proclaims the superiority of few over others. In these terms, hospitality is limited not only to the authority of masters but persists in the roots of law. What exactly Derrida called 'restricted hospitality' was widely discussed in academician circles, but without any result. This begs the point respecting to an unconditional hospitality,

There is another type of hospitality that never asks anything in return. Is this a sign of supremacy or a simple attempt to connect with others in egalitarian conditions?

Marshall Sahlins was one of the pioneers in continuing with Marcel Mauss' concerns. Centred on other factors as kinship, power, rank and geographical distance, Sahlins elaborated a new typology of reciprocity that may be explained as follows,

As a dyadic swamp, reciprocity (like solidarity) is subject to a rite of redistribution of goods that marks the roots of social bondage. While produced objects are necessary for economic subsistence, the monopoly

of surplus (wealth) confers status to holders. Following Sahlins' model three types of reciprocity should be noted,

- *Generalized reciprocity* is marked by no needs of return for one or both parties. These transactions not only are centred on vagueness in the obligation to reciprocate, but in a clear asymmetry of rank between sides.
- *Balanced Reciprocity* signals to an equivalent exchange of goods or values among parties. An example of this subtype whenever a tourist pays for a room at hotel.
- *Negative reciprocity* is characterized by the interest of parties to maximize their profits no matter than the Other. Clear examples of this are theft, or barter. The self receives or takes a good which never is returned with impunity.

Not surprisingly, Sahlins did the correct thing to announce the status and rank play crucial roles to create a 'generalized reciprocity'. Only the lords of city are allowed to offer an 'unconditional hospitality' without reciprocity (Sahlins 1963, 1965, 1972). Since the 'Other' is a little thing, nothing is asked to be returned to the master. This generalized way of reciprocity covers not only an act of paternalism but of imperialism. A more subtle discourse that characterizes the upsurge and zenith of empires relates to the fact, that Otherness is under-valorized, to be assisted without exception and at any situation. The expansion for trade needs to use the allegory of human rights to connect emotionally with other territories. History witnessed how empires literally appealed to humanitarian reasons to save the 'condemned', the savage souls from their hell. Beyond the attempts to help others, lays the logic of exploitation and domination. This begs a more than interesting question, why we should help Others who have nothing to do with us?

Jacques Derrida goes on to admit that unconditioned hospitality not only is an illusory ideal, which will never take places in real world, but in his exposé he reminds that we are constituted by these strange others. Likely, his legacy rests on three important assumptions. At a first glance, the process of ethno-genesis, which is oriented to forge 'a sentiment of us', requests from a counterpart, we can name as 'them'. Such a social construe alludes to the process of 'differentiation' imposing the border as a symbolic mark, between in and out. Those who look like-us are placed in, while the others who look differently are expulsed out. Additionally,

Derrida understands that though democracies pivot in drawing more tolerable cultures, the fact is that they have serious limitations. Maturated democracy which leads towards wealthier societies not only is far from giving a condescending climate with strangers, but also they devote considerable efforts to deport exiles and people which are considered as 'undesired-guests'. This opens the doors for a paradoxical situation because to a major or minor degree, hospitality seems to be conducive to status quo. Derrida's misconception on unconditional hospitality triggered the critique of Ana Paula Penchaszadeh, a young Argentinian philosopher, who in her recent book *Politica y Hospitalidad* (*Politics and Hospitality*) objects part of already-existent literature on hospitality. Taking her cue from the contributions of Jacques Derrida, she contends that there is an asymmetrical distance between host and guest, which is fulfilled by the introduction of different political discourse. Likely Derrida was in the incorrect side at proclaiming the ends of politics, since in Western imaginary the other plays a subordinated role. We must understand that the act of bringing hospitality consists in an act of tolerance, but it should be framed in the interaction with other political agents. There is nothing like the a-political relation between the host and its guests. The cultural matrix that characterized the life in Western societies takes from gift-exchange the necessary platform to form a 'social bondage'. This process is coupled to another second element, which is very important, the cultural identity. Without identity not only we are unsure of what we are but indeed the social trust necessary for hospitality declines. The rise of the nation-state was originally related to an attempt to homogenize the alien element. It is hard to discuss hospitality without contemplating the notion of sovereignty, because the otherness is a deriving construe of law-making. In a certain soil, legal jurisprudence, which is issued and granted by the nation-state, posits a guiding-rule to organize institutions, separating the self from the otherness. Once the principle of sovereignty applies, hospitality redeems a 'sacrificial meaning' to reconstruct a more secure sense of the alien(s). In fact, it is safe to say, following the biomedical metaphor, that hospitality regulates an original tension between what controllable and incontrollable is. This begs a more than interesting ethical point respecting to the repetitive failures of international organizations to protect the security of refugees and exiles worldwide. Penchaszadeh holds the thesis that hospitality is determined by the combination of five items: language, gift-exchange, sovereignty, representation of death and democracy. Whether Derrida over-emphasized on the

tolerance as the borderlands of hospitality, she understands that hospitality goes in the opposite direction than tolerance. Starting from the premise that the self is enrooted into a certain territory, citizens are constituted according to the figure of 'Others', who are not citizens but are tolerated. By exercising their power, nation-states allude to tolerance to encourage the gift-exchange system. In fact, Derrida made a radical critique to post-modern society and its principle of property, which undermines the possibilities for peoples to embrace the 'unconditional hospitality'. This leads us to a second question, may hospitality be conceived beyond the politics?, is democracy part of the problem or the solution?

Like Derrida, Penchaszadeh develops the same romantic discourse around democracy which obscures more than it clarifies. Though she distinguishes the role of hospitality as forming nation-hood, she leaves behind the fact that democracy is part of the same capitalism she overtly attacks.

Democracy and its (unmet) Promises

The limitations of Derrida at time of exploring democracy go unnoticed by a whole portion of academicians and specialized literature. He presents an idealized image of democracy, which does not adjust to real facts. In this respect, Derrida insists that the effects of politics turn paradoxical, in view of the risks of naturalizing the exemplary centre, where strangers want to enter. In the threshold of time, the nation-state reproduces a space of exception, an idealized exemplary city that not only confers identity to the inhabitants, but also 'uncertainness'. In that way, the unconditional hospitality turns closed. It is tempting to say that capitalism is prone to create a global oligarchy within democracy to gain further legitimacy respecting to an ever-frustrated workforce. Democracy allows a further inclusion weakening the restricted hospitality to a more unconditional mode, Derrida adds. The meaning of democracy exhibits not only the gift-exchange process where hospitality evolves, but paves the ways for the rise of less intolerant viewpoints respecting to Xenos. Is Derrida placing democracy as a part of the solution to current refugee crisis?

As C. Castoriadis brilliantly observed, democracy has not been a Greek legacy, but an ancient institutional resource coming from Athens. Over centuries democracy was practiced by Athenians in a way the rest of Greece resisted. After the Peloponnesian War, the real nature of democracy was lost for-ever. Unlike modern democracy, ancient Greeks understood if

everyone has right to all, anyone has nothing. Although the authority of the King was never questioned, Ancient Greece developed a political resource (*demos*) for lay-citizens to convoke an assembly if a law was unjust. With the advent of modern industrial revolution not only the social ties were undermined, but a new way of interpreting democracy arises. Democracy is institutionalized as a form of government at the same time capitalism emerges. This is the concept created by the British Empire, which has dubbed by Korstanje as 'Anglo-democracy'. In perspective, it paves the ways for a new configuration of power, where 'self-determination' sets the pace to 'republicanism', or 'voting'. As a result of this, Anglo-democracy instilled 'the concept of freedom' as a platform to stimulate the consumption. The paradox lies in the fact this temporal freedom was not associated to the politic fields, since the lay-citizen is not legally empowered by derogating the law passed by Anglo-democracy. The liberties given to peoples were inextricably intertwined to 'desire' and 'consumption'. In the Anglo democracy, any subject governs through its representatives and through the constituent assembly. This creates a gap between citizenry and social institutions, which is filled by economic financial corporations. At the time, the global sense of mobility is posed to favor the market citizens are really restricted in the politics. The disciplinary mechanism of surveillance prevents the social change. The ideology of capitalism has successfully expanded and accepted by populations thanks to two major assumptions, which are embraced by Jacques Derrida.

First and foremost, many scholars believe that the state is a counterforce that balances the interests of the market. Citizens may find a shelter in the policies of the nation-state. Historians of capitalism not only have widely criticized this belief, presenting evidence that the nation-state surfaced to facilitate the expansion of capitalism, but also focused on social inequality was a constant on human history. Neither hospitality is a reified form of democracy, nor is inequality effaced from earth by democracy. In other times, there were serious political asymmetries enrooted in the authority of the King, his territory and the duty of citizens. In order to weaken social bondage, post-modernity has posed a new axiom, which suggests that '*The massive*' (this means what comes to all) is based on the spirit of democracy. Far from being a convincing explanation, this belief ignores the criticism verted on the doctrine of sum-zero society. Within a frame-time, citizens shall choose their governments as consumers get a product. Nonetheless, the workforce and its unions (in the struggle against international capital) lacks 'from the demos' as a resource to

protect the weaker agents. In this conjuncture, Derrida precludes not only the roots of democracy but hospitality.

Ethnology and Anthropology have collected an interesting conceptual framework to understand hospitality as a rite of passage, or as a pact, where 'strangers' are well-treated to ask for the protection to Gods, once death. The same treatment strangers receive Gods will harm or protect the human beings. Natural disasters, famine, plagues and other calamities were considered 'a just punishment' when the community attacked the right of aliens. For whole part of cultures, the concept of evil and tragedy stems from the violation of hospitality-guiding rule (Korstanje and Olsen 2011; Korstanje and Tarlow 2012; Korstanje 2010). It is not accident to surmise in societies where Gods are dead, or in human groups where the process of secularization invaded all spheres of society, the unconditional meaning of hospitality is unnecessary for modern politics.

The conception of Derrida on hospitality not only is far from reflecting its historical evolution, but also is prefigured according to what his own stereotypes. Anyway, some interesting questions arise. The host's laws are certainly granted if the newcomers are subject to the right, which is always conditional. Without identity, or property, the guest becomes in 'a parasite'. No need to say, Derrida was adamantly criticized because he leaves little evidence how 'absolute hospitality' may take room. Kevin O'Gorman (2009) explains that deconstructionism was rejected by professional philosophy during long time. The concept of 'unconditional hospitality' as an impossibility since always strangers are conceived with a lower degree of violence.

Last but not least, in this hot-debate other important opinion was left by J. Rawls and his individualist conception of politics. With the benefits of hindsight, he found that though Durkheimians looked for finding alternative solutions to the problem of 'collective action', less attention was given to 'individualism', and its intersection with the 'reasonable law'. Rawls sets a proposition where he explains why some nations are rich while others turned poor. Liberalism has serious limitations to imagine 'charity' when it remains beyond the individual right to property. The theory of reasonable law rests on the belief that people sacrifice their appetite for war and ambitions to achieve wider forms of political, economics, and social cooperation. Therefore, trade and negotiations are of paramount importance to balance the international relationships. Of course, Rawls is criticized simply because after Auschwitz the notion of 'retributive justice'

seems to be a simplistic utopia, if not a joke, an allegory almost impossible to articulate. His response to these allegations is not convincing. Rawls echoes Kant's doctrine of international law that only a liberal society may lead human beings to a sustainable state of well-being. Any person may be pressed to help others without violating its autonomy. Therefore, peoples must assist *other peoples* living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just descent political regime (Rawls 1999). The theory of hospitality still remains unfit to resolve what happens when assistance should be done over dictatorship regimes or explaining ethically why strangers should be helped. In this respect, serious doubts are done respecting to how hospitality can be political tergiversated, but this will be discussed later in next.

Memory, Construction and Selection

Most likely, Michel Foucault pivoted in the social analysis of modern capitalism and the role of archeology as the discipline that may discover what is earthed. Having rights and wrongs, Foucault fleshed out a prolific set of works and books, which merit discussion; however, limitations in space and time mean that only two will be reviewed: *Society must be Defended* and *Security, Territory and Population*. Though by his complexity, Foucault requires a glossary to gain readability, we shall try to explain their developments with clarity and detail. His obsession to dissect what philosophers call 'the truth' is one of aspects that defines Foucault's legacy. Doubtless, there is an 'economy of truth' whose main goals are to form the institutions to exercise power. The sense of truth, far from being objective, is always subject to the upsurge and convergence of many forces, their interests, and the voice of those groups that monopolized the means of production in societal order. Under the lens of ruling elite, history is fabricated and disseminated to the other involving classes. In this respect, the disciplinary mechanism of elite consists in giving further credibility to what people call 'history'. While a discipline sheds light on some points of knowledge other counter-factual discipline is covered until it is unearthed from the dust of oblivion (Foucault 2003, 2007, 2013). Knowledge not only advances by the articulation of many dispersing 'genealogies' but all them dialogue with a hegemonic centre. As an expression of power-will, science (as history) disciplines other convergent voices within a cultural matrix, which is conducive to economic exploitation (or regulation of risk).

As this argument given, Foucault understands that the Science should be defined as a will-power, whereas intellectuals are the guards of such an order. The nation-state alludes to softer forms of indoctrination reserving its right to force in some occasions. The code of ethics indoctrinates social thinking in view of what can be or not done. Following this explanation, Foucault adds, the roots of modern nation-states come from Roman jurisprudence because it endorsed to the credibility in the trial as a rational process where the concept of truth is discovered. Like scientists, judges are prone to discover what happened, reconstructing the evidence according to what suspected does not overtly confess. Those who defy the hegemony of law are physically isolated from the population. Though pragmatists envisaged society as a sum of wills, dovetailed with a contract, Foucault sees the power as a circular concept that structures the self.

To put this in bluntly, Foucault acknowledges that persons are not power-holders rather they surface from the power-exercising. Whenever the rule or the original contract of society is breached, some disciplinary mechanisms activate in order for deviation to be corrected. In view of that, there is an economy of truth, which regulates not only the circulation of goods and commodities, but the notion of risk where economy evolves. While the meaning of security tends to deal with the principle of contingency woke up by decisions made by Status Quo, the system of discipline emanates from the needs to belonging. The disciplinary mechanisms of the state are oriented at forging a sense of us, pressing individual citizens to take part of an all-encompassing system (Foucault 2003, 2007, 2013).

In Latin America, nation-states monopolized a cruel exploitation not only over the bodies of natives, but other ethnicities producing paradoxically a melting-pot, where the white lord situated on the top of pyramid. While Spanish subordinated aborigines to their law, even going beyond the close interaction with natives, Anglo-Saxons erected a symbolic war between British Settlers and aborigines. However, it is safe to say though originally the ways of conquest in Latin America differed from the Anglo-World, the United States and Canada, the fact is that both appealed to a romantic image of the aboriginals as noble savage which today is commoditized by tourism. J. Comaroff and J. Comaroff (2009) explain that policy makers should take care with the different tensions and cleavages prompted by modern tourism. At the time some groups which were historically debarred from the benefits of capitalism saw in cultural tourism a fertile ground to enhance their living conditions; the nation-state

imposed heavier taxes. This results in the upsurge of dormant conflicts, tensions even genocides and ethnic cleansings. Equally important, recently Korstanje called the attention on the risks to use the allegorical discourses of heritage and hospitality to discipline the others. Even, the role of aborigines within what specialists name 'cultural tourism', far from representing the interests of locals, are externally designed by Americans and Europeans. The 'tourist experience' seems to be previously determined by aspects of European ethnocentrism where the others are constructed according to the proper needs of exemplarity. To put this in other terms, tourists often travel towards spaces of extreme poverty and misery as slums or ghettos because they are altruists or enthusiastic with helping others; instead, the main interests of these contingents is appreciating the others' suffering to remind themselves how special they are, how important their authorities are, or even the leading role of democracy and liberal trade. In this vein, Korstanje adds, tourists reconcile their own frustration consuming others' pain and of course in that way they remind how special they are, how fair democracy is, even they exaggerate the benefits of capitalism as the best of possible worlds (Korstanje 2010, 2012, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c). The problem lies in how slum-tourism replicates the mainstream cultural values that fagocitated the material asymmetries of contemporary society today. At some extent, this conception is not news, since it rests on the 'genealogy of the nation-state', which will be in next discussed.

Hospitality, Conquest and Humankind

Why our nation-states emphasize heritage and mobility as two positive values which lead to more tolerable cultures? Is globalization part of the problem or the solution? Is tourism creating more open minds?

To respond all these questions with accuracy, we have to launch to explore the ancient world of *hospitality* which differed notably from the modern connotations. Today's popular-parlance associates the term hospitality to the industry of leisure and tourism where one may pay for holidays in a far-away destination (Norval 2004). However, in the times of Caius Julius Caesar or ancient Germans hospitality denoted 'a pact of protection' woven by tribes before an external attack. As declared in earlier sections, the sense of hospitality derives from Indo-Aryan principle of 'free-transit', originally coined by nomads and itinerant tribes. In the Americas in the fifteenth century, this principle was politically manipulated

by Spanish philosophers to proclaim aborigines were sub-humans, cementing the possibility of any revision in the way military forces conducted the conquest. Hence never hospitality was that ethical pact signaled by ethicist philosophers as Immanuel Kant who envisaged that hospitality serves to deter conflict and warfare, nor Spanish armies were hatred-demons as some historians preclude. History witnessed how Spain, likely emulating the spirit of Rome, took possession of the new world following an absolutist logic where the other was typified in the binomial friend or foe. From the original discovery, Americas surrendered in almost 30 years only (little time), which means that Spanish viatores (travellers) found a lot of allies and human groups already exploited by preexisting Empires as Aztecs, Incas and so forth. Many aborigines served as guides for newcomers because in that way, they eluded the oppression of other aboriginal groups. Therefore, since Spain arrived to Americas in Middle Age, the economic form imposed to aboriginals was hard-work, slavery and a repressive dynamic where gold and silver were found. Rather, in other zones as Virreinato del Rio de la Plata, the Catholic Church indoctrinated the aboriginals' minds. In consequence, two contrasting dynamics coexisted in Americas. On one hand a military-code which developed 'extractive institutions' by the introduction of surveillance and other disciplinary mechanisms. On another, religious evangelization paved the ways for the advent of a new consciousness which was conducive to the economic exploitation of European Lords (Korstanje 2006). Nonetheless, this does not resolve the following question, how Spain could claim its rights on Americas, a continent even far from Catholic Faith?

As professor Anthony Pagden observed, this point was highlighted by emergent philosophers in France and England, two new powers that rivalled with Spain. After all, to what extent is the Treaty of Tordesillas valid in the Americas when natives do not share the faith of the Pope?

Epistemologically speaking, hospitality comes as an intertribal pact, from the fifth century in Europe, though the same institutions can be traced in ancient cultures in Africa or Asia. The needs of protection before external threats not only was the goals of hospitality but it allowed good and person exchanges in time of peace. But if hospitality was common for many cultures, the same cannot be said for 'the principle of free transit', which laid the foundations of nation-state. In an impressive book entitled *Lords of all the World,* Anthony Pagden discussed to what extent the ideals of European chivalry, associated to the spirit of Rome influenced in the formation of imperialisms. Though in different ways, the archetype of

Roman Empires was adopted not only by Spain but France and England. In contrast to the doctrine of Spain to evangelize the aboriginals, France and England focused on the needs of transforming the land as a criterion of possession. Those peoples, who can better the land, keep the right to possess it. Quite aside from this, Spanish theories on a supposed link between Americas and Rome turned less credible. The untrammelled discussion within the circles of philosophy respecting to the rights of Spain in America was far to be closed. In fact, why the Pope disposed from these territories in favor of Spain and Portugal? However, news about the hostility of some natives to be hospitable with strangers, fitted like a glove for imperial interests. The Neothomist school of Salamanca declared (after years of hot-debate) that if aboriginals were unfit to offer 'hospitality' to Spanish travellers, violating the principle of Free Transit, they were not holder of universal right, in which case, they should be framed as sub-humans (Pagden 1995). Disposed of any right to claim for the violations of their rights, aborigines were violently usurped and relegated to infertile lands. No need to say Pagden's contribution to our argument is manifold. On one hand, it shows the power of ideology and the discursive mechanism used to confer meaning to events. What we understand about the world is far from being objective, or subjective as some scholars think, it derived from the structuration of allegories which are historically determined by elite. On another, we come clear hospitality can be a double-edge sword, which can be politically tergiversated to expand the domination. We must remind that the violence exerted by the nation-state during centuries is ideologically legitimated by the pressure of thought, where arts, science even literature have played an exemplary role.

Starting from the premise that the functionality of hospitality depends on *protection*, it is not surprisingly to admit that hospitality and hostility come from the same epistemological root. Well might one speculate that hospitality and hostility are inevitably entwined, but as Ramos and Loscertales evinced, Celts and many other ancient tribes used two meanings for hospitality. The sacred-law of hospitality was granted to all strangers who in transit need from food, shelter or assistance of any kind. The religious aspect of hospitality not only had a moral element, but indicated that aliens were God-messengers, who should be well-treated. If not, God would dispose of disasters, famine and mass-death for those who violated their mandate. The politic side of hospitality alluded to a pact between two or more sides, to coordinate efforts to achieve common alliances (Ramos and Loscertales 1948). From its inception, hospitality was based on the

needs of nuancing the negative effects of war, but at the same time, it becomes in a good and fluid expression of liberalism and peace-keeping (Rivero 1993). Through the middle of the twentieth century, Alvaro D' Ors analysed the meaning of the term, *hospitium* in Iberia to validate his earlier assumptions. The main reason behind ancient tribes celebrated *hospitium* was related to the needs of self-preservation in a moment of Europe where emergent empires wished to expand their borders. This suggests that hospitality offers a decentralized form of power, but it combines religiosity with politics (d'Ors 1960). Anthropologist M. Gygax (2007) examines in-depth the Hellenic World considering that hospitality demonstrates the credibility of Maussian gift-exchange theory. Since any pact requests reciprocity, Gygax adheres to the thesis that the breach of the law of hospitality denotes reparation with the risk the affected side takes its right to dominate the offender. This is vital to understand why Spanish philosophers were seduced by the chronicles of travellers that witnessed the hostility of natives. From that moment on, the nation-state in the Modern World, even in Europe, consolidated its hegemony under the principle of free transit, mobility and tourism.

As the previous argument given, Spanish feuds in Americas emulated the logic of Roman Empire, echoing its civilizing ideals, where free transit and travels played crucial roles. Whether travelling was a universal right enrooted in the heart of all men, exploratory trips situated as the moral duty of officials, governors, and authorities in the new World. It is important to discuss that the process of conquest, no matter its nature, needs not only from physical violence but from an ideological facet, where the 'subsumed others' are interpelated by the gaze of masters. This is the reason why all discovered lands, which are finally disposed are renamed (as baptized) with hosting language. New dwellers or colonists should rename all their discovered cities. If the city of York was semantically associated to England, Americans opted to call New York in the same way, current Mexico was originally baptized as Nueva España (New Spain). As Mircea Eliade brilliantly noted, the act of conquest not only needs from movement, an original trip of discovery, where the forces of nature are finally disciplined, but from the power of language, and the grammar which interrogates the other. This happens because the real possession and language are inextricably intertwined (Eliade 2005).

To cut the long story short, the Kingdom of Spain consolidated the conquest by the semantical tergiversation of hospitality in the academic circles. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, travellers were

encouraged to draw topographic inventories with the end of expanding the frontiers of the Kingdom. Formal questionnaires were used by travellers in order to document the populations, their customs and habits. The rise of the book as a mechanism to document (discipline) the non-Western others was an instrument of colonization, at the same time, it fostered the invention of archive as the deposit of a cultural memory, politically constructed to explain the world. While any archive supposes a material space where documents are stocked, no less true is that it offers a symbolic nature strictly attached to the concept of nation-hood (Altuna 2000). Over the centuries to come, this trend was used by the nation-state to reinforce its legitimacy over the territory, culture and of course workforce. Still furthermore, explorers and travellers found in hospitals and Shrines all them regulated by Catholic Church, a haven to rest. The Catholic Church monopolized the profits of 10% of carried goods each one of these travellers had (tithe or diezmo). As a result of this, the notion of hospitality introduced in the contours of the nation-state was framed to a religious sense of the other. The thesis held in this book is that there is a clear relation between the expropriation of territory (conquest), ritual sacredness (sacrifice) and the rest (renovation) in which case, they remain in the core of the nation-state and capitalism. In next section, we shall review to what extent, the act of travelling became in a question of governance for politicians and lay-citizens.

Travelling, Gazing at the Borders of Politics

Since the conquest of Americas opened the doors for the rise of the modern state, as well as law-making, the needs of travelling was associated to a question of public concern. The borders of civilization should be expanded, and in so doing, travelling was the best a lay-citizen can do. It is important to acknowledge that the credibility of the state rests on its capacity to determine what should be considered 'mobile' or not. To put this in other terms, the landscape of national being was drawn according to the combination of disciplinary instrument aimed at controlling the bodies of natives, but at the same time, to produce knowledge about them. If aboriginals represented a real threat for colonial eye, writers, through novels and literature, were key players in the maintenance of the symbolic barrier between civilization and barbarianism. Writing captivity emerged as a literary genre oriented to express the encounter between European colonists and indigenous peoples. Since many travelling Europeans were temporarily

hosted by natives, their testimonies, stories and books were of higher interest for European audiences. Still the genre of writing captivity developed a repulsive rejection for aboriginal world, since it represented shaky loyalties to colonial order. But here a subtle difference should be made. While the Spanish peninsular novelist contemplated captivity as an abomination produced by the infection of inferior culture, Portuguese writers see it as a necessary bridge between two worlds, which was conducive to colonial conquest. Even, captivity-related books not only provided with robust information on how indigenous lives, but also of their tactics for war. In this respect, the literature of travel that surfaced during the nineteenth century resulting from captivity writing and the conquest of the Americas (Voigt 2009). As Lisa Voigt suggests, this validates a connection of hospitality to travels with the nation-state, in the inception of capitalism. The study of captivity offers an interesting source for understanding how the production of knowledge moulded the sense of Otherness and a Westernized identity which was adopted by nation-states. The practices of captivity attest to the use of violence that marked the intersection of Western world, in a new unknown landscape. Therefore, Voigt explains, captive's cross-cultural experience denotes a much deeper desire for 'eye-witnessing' for new cultures and lands which were ambitioned by Western discoverers.

> *Indeed, an examination of the role of captivity, not in fomenting opposition, but in producing and circulating knowledge and authority complicates narratives of the emergence of national as well as creole identities in the early modern period. Captives' experience and expertise were valorized across national borders, however greatly prevailing imperial ideologies may appear to differ… furthermore, captivity contributed to the sharing of knowledge – whether through coercion or cooperation- across national, religious and linguistic boundaries* (Voigt 2009: 25).

The space of the indigenous as victim of the conquest, Voigt adheres, is subordinated as indigenous as savior or cold-blood murderer of the European victims. The literature of captivity, undoubtedly, legitimized a culture of conquest that facilitated the internalization of Western values in aboriginal cultures.

The contemporary nation-state embraced a 'restricted hospitality', paraphrasing Derrida (2005), as its main cultural value not only to discipline internal and external agents, but to validate the legitimacy of bureaucratic

administration. Such legitimacy is determined by the liberty, even mobilities of privileged-classes to travel inside and outside the territory, whereas other classes are doomed to be immobile. The supremacy of some is given by the restrictions the rest suffers (Bauman 1998).

For the sake of clarity, let's stop in in Jacques Derrida who in his book *On Hospitality*, argued that hospitality should be understood in combination with language. Centring his analysis in the conception of Plato, who considered that the roots of hospitality activates before the presence of 'xenos' or Foreigner. For Plato as well for Derrida this 'foreigner' interpelates the reign of dogmatism asking for something. Those who do not share with us the same language are strangers, but this does not mean they should be seen as 'enemies'. As this backdrop, Derrida insists in the fact that the 'other' reminds our own prejudices. If Plato refers to foreigners as outsiders, Parmenides advocates to the universal values of language, which does not recognizes individualities. No matter than the difference, the languages tends to universality. The same discussion applies in Derrida's mind for hospitality. We obtain a 'restricted hospitality' when as guest we offers a counter-gift in return, while those who lack of any patrimony as refugees, exiles or migrants are jailed and deported. This suggests that the sense of restricted hospitality is pitted against 'unconditioned hospitality'. In regards to this latter concept, Derrida says, within politics, unconditional hospitality still is a utopia. Hospitality is offered, or not offered, to a foreigner and his personal properties. Under the same context, we understand the world from questions of knowledge and experiences that others bring to us. The stranger splits our world into two parts. It is often assumed that our identity is born in the heart our family, city or nation; however for Derrida this is not possible since our identity is formed by the inception of 'others.' Semantically speaking, hospitality has commonalities with the question which can be hosted (like the guest). In some occasions, the question can be very well welcomed but in others rejected. Following the example of language, hospitality keeps a discretionary acceptance of the otherness. In order to be understood, the foreigner is pressed to adopt a new language, which is unknown to him, and of course it seems to be one he usually does not speak or write. This violent interrogation divides the world in two sides. In the same, hospitality should be granted always if the strangers can be easily identified. To be more exact, anonymity lies excluded from hospitality because nobody offers lodging to a person who is not recognized, at least through the name. Following the same point of view, Derrida affirms that this is the strict difference between foreigners

and others. It remains to be seen whether migration and tourism are under the same category. Therefore, two types of hospitality surface accordingly: *the absolute* and *conditioned*. In this sense, 'the absolute hospitality demands the host to open the proper home not only to foreigners but also to anonymous travellers who are unknown to me. This way, I am obliged to let them to enter but to ask reciprocity.' (Derrida 2001, 2005; Derrida, and Dufourmantelle 2000)

In order to resume the discussion, a couple of conditions are needed to make hospitality possible: what is your name?, and where do you come from? As a consequence, Derrida is convinced that the rights of the foreigner are within hospitality itself. If a foreigner arrives at a country, he is immediately subjected to the host laws even when they would be unknown to him. Each foreigner is constructed from the host country's 'ethos.' Based on Hegel's explanation, the Right is determined by the family, the bourgeoisie society, and the state; these limits create a liaison between hospitality and hostility. At first instance, hospitality means certain protection, whereas hostility refers to the violence directed to *xenos* (those who do not belong to our group).

Over recent decades philosophers agreed that the theory of unconditioned hospitality, as it is formulated by Derrida, rests on an impossible dilemma because it connotes the disappearance of the same state. Equally important, two states are compromised to protect the citizen of the other part as a sign of will-gesture and reciprocity, in which case the pact of hospitality is crystalized. Those citizens of other states that have nothing to offer or lack of patrimony are fugitive of the law (Innerarity 2001; Bonilla 2007). Not surprisingly, the security of tourists abroad should be ensured by the hosting state, when a tourist is killed or attacked, the tourist-delivering state asks for further explanation from the host-state (Sangrà and Carles 2000; Ferràs 2008; Korstanje 2008; Penchaszadeh 2014). Following this reasoning, Julia Kristeva (1991) is not wrong when she says that hospitality has a dark side whether host take advantage of its privilege position to attack the rights of guest. It is safe to say that different cultures used the meaning of evil as the lack of hospitality. From myths as Helen of Troy to modern horror movies, villains are characterized by attacking innocent tourists but for doing so, they are seduced by beauty girls or captivated by means of different banquets (Korstanje and Olsen 2011; Korstanje and Tarlow 2012). During the formation of nation-states those nomad groups that challenged the preexisting status quo were labelled as dangerous, insurrects, or even a threat that placed the

social peace in jeopardy. Silenced by the imposition of a fabricated memory, these groups would gradually exterminated by the advance of capital-owners. In those parts where the other resisted or presented a strong resistance, the discourse of sub-humanization did the rest. During centuries, the doctrine of free transit and the belief in hospitality were two ideological allegories that accompanied the evolution of nationhood. Modern capitalism rests on three key pillars, the nation-state, literature and heritage.

Unspeakable Violence

The title of this section corresponds to a seminal book *Unspeakable Violence*, by cultural analyst N. Guidotti Hernandez (2011). By focusing on the United States–Mexico border Guidotti-Hernández draws out attention to the space where two different patterns of colonization collide [England in North America and Spain to the south]. This valuable book assesses six terms which have been used to label respective ethnicities. 'Chicano' was coined to denote the Mexican-Americans who were politically active in struggling to improve the rights of Latin American migrants. 'Indian' refers to the natives (aboriginals) of North America. 'Indigenous' and 'Indigena' are employed in different contexts. The former refers to all Mexican Indians while the latter connotes an ancient root to the first people of the Americas. 'Latino/a' arose in the twentieth century to represent people of Latin America. 'Mestiza/o' applies on a mixed ethnicity between Spanish, Indian or African.

Given this conceptual backdrop, Guidotti-Hernández explains that the racialized violence exerted against Mexicans, which is based on stereotyped discourses, works as an instrument of indoctrination conducive to maintaining the status quo. For example: In 1885 a Mexican women (Juanita) was lynched in Downietown, California. This tragedy, like many other examined by the author, is taken as the epicentre of a much broader discussion about how violence and nationalism converge. Guidotti-Hernandez argues convincingly that the tourist magazines which advertise the Downietown tour are not only being superfluous in respect to the reasons behind this awful crime, but also serve to continue to legitimize this gendered act of violence. It is an example of how tourism and death may be commoditized and sold in spectacular narratives which visitors consume. Represented as a trivialization of reality, such climate of violence is determined by an earlier racial hierarchy. In view of this, she

acknowledges that 'racial positioning, gender and class alliances were fragile and shifted according to need and economic conditions' (p. 3). Throughout borderlands, these types of violence appeal to an idealized foundation of 'national being' that perpetuates the racial asymmetries.

It is difficult to reduce a project of the excellence of *Unspeakable Violence* in a brief review as its 375 pages provide an all-encompassing perspective on multiculturalism in its many guises. For the purposes of a brief review I point to three main arguments in the book:

1. Nation states are formed under process of differentiation and its economic re-organization of territory. Far from being a site of frank dialogue, stability, and understanding, the United States–Mexico border shows a legacy of territorial disputes and conflict. At the same time, nation-states administrate racism and sexism to control their citizens, who under some circumstances may defy the economic conditions that sustain the class hierarchy. A much broader selective memory narrates some events or exaggerates certain aspects of politics while silencing others. Following this argument, it is important not to lose sight of the idea that borders are spaces of multiple identities that need violence to exist; in so doing, when multiracial communities enact violence on each other they serve to perpetuate both their own cultural values and amnesia. This book not only presents an innovative thesis respecting to the role played by selected-memory in silencing violence, but also contrasts sharply to the old belief that portrays Anglos and Chicano under the lens of master/slave game.
2. Race is a concept in which elites play a key role in its construction and negotiation. Racial mixture often is used as the basis of disenabling the emancipation of ethnicities. This belief runs the risk of presenting the Mestizo or Chicano as part of nature, when really they are legacies of a colonial order. In view of this, any movement of resistance is remapped and re configured according to new more acceptable values rooted in the culture of the masters. For example, one could experience certain nostalgia for those aborigines who had lost their lands, but what the aboriginal evokes remains a concept politically determined white-power. The centre of hegemony, like ideology, works by the control what it means to be an 'authentic' Indian, Chicano or Mestizo. To varying degrees scholars and intellectuals have historically contributed to this system of labelling.

3. When one uses the word, mestizo, two contrasting economic structures collide: colonial order vs. nation-state. Mexico idyllically recognizes its influence from aboriginal legacy, but the fact is that today many aborigines are struggling against their state in order for their rights to be respected. Although the Anglo/Mexican binary has brought the attention of politicians, activists, and journalists in recent years, there are other particularly troubling relationships unresolved between Indians and the Mexican state that are largely ignored. The Aztec (lo indio) past is being selected to denote greatness, power and intervention, even by side of the state over other indigenous groups. Calling on the imperial heritage of the Aztecs to illuminate contemporary Mexico the Government reserves the monopoly of force against Uncle Sam but also to other ethnicities within its boundaries.

In sum, this book reminds not only how allegories are constructed, manipulated and disseminated in order for lay-citizens to accept policies otherwise would be rejected, but there is a sort of 'selective memory', which apply a subtle but not for that less efficient violence over internal agents.

As stated, Spain and England opted different pathways in their tactics of conquest and this of course produced a gap between Anglo-Saxons and Latin Americans. Professor Jose Luis de Imaz (1984) sheds light on the cosmology of Spanish discoverers who colonized following the example left by Roman Empire while Anglo-Saxons appealed to negotiations to dispossess aboriginal lands. The former developed an authoritarian spirit that produced some cleavages internally between the oligarchy and the internal agent, but the latter excluded natives from the main matrix of production. As a result of this, Latin America evolved into a melting pot of different ethnicities all of them orchestrated in a racial pyramid where the Spanish lord situated on the top. Unlike Anglos, as Centeno puts it, Latin American elites failed to develop the fiscal discipline necessary to achieve a mature development. In contrast to Acemoglu and Robinson who think this happened because of political stability in Latin American economies, Centeno (2002) understands that the lack of fiscal efficiency was given by avoiding the two total wars where other states participated. In sharp contrast to Europe which rivaled against other neighbouring states, devoting considerable human resources and capital, Latin America aristocracies kept concern of the internal enemy instead. Natives and the creole culture were the two main points elite took into consideration in the formation of politics.

Conclusion

Readers who wished to review this chapter will find an in-depth exploration of the concept of hospitality, which was historically enrooted in the ideological core of the nation-state, as the preconditions for the Conquest of Americas. Though this chapter focused on the historic side of hospitality, it served to expand the difficult connection between the politics and heritage. We have adamantly discussed to what extent the nation-state may exercise 'an unspeakable and subtle violence', that produces an ideological indoctrination for citizens. Still further, we have adopted a romantic view of hospitality, after Derrida's account, as a platform of understanding, when really it functions as a political instrument of discipline. Whatever the case may be, hospitality not only was the symbolic touchstone of Western civilization, it alluded to expand the borderlands of Empires in a way that other civilizations never saw. Today, the notion of free transit and mobilities allows the production and dissemination of goods, in modern capitalism when trade unions are in disconformity with the state or capital owners, they will appeal to damage the production, or stop the dissemination, of produced commodities. In doing so, the strike plays a vital role not only affecting the production system but defying the principle of free transit. It is not an accident that social discontent and claims by the workforce are often re-channeled to baulk the mobility of a society.

CHAPTER 5

The Problem of Terrorism

Introduction

Specialists and pundits in terrorism fields emphasized on the effects of violence in leisure-industries as one of the main threats of Occident for the years to come. Echoing their concerns, in this chapter, we shall develop a contrasting thesis, which signals to the fact, tourism and mobility are terrorism by other means. Fundamentally, spectacle and exploitation underlies tourism and terrorism. It begins with a brief review of the history of anarchism, its relationship with trade unions and terrorists, and the notion of Johann Most and his propaganda of the deed who did not hesitate to advocate killing children and women at restaurants. When terrorists today employ their tactics of terror, at the bottom, they have learned from the lessons of the state. Understanding, not demonizing, the nature of terrorism is a good way to understanding the contemporary political landscape. Workers, but not terrorists, are legalized by. As Michel Foucault (2003) put it, discipline is an instrument of power by means of which events are stripped of their negative effects. Like a vaccine, threats are socially domesticated by discipline. What beyond the boundaries may be demonized may be accepted in the daily life if it is disciplined.

What is Terrorism?

Ernesto Lopez (2005), who had dedicated his life to the study of terrorism, is today one of the most skilled researchers in Argentina. In his book,

M.E. Korstanje, *Terrorism, Tourism and the End of Hospitality in the 'West'*, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-52252-4_5

originally published in Spanish *Escritos sobre Terrorismo* (*Writing on Terrorism*), he places the term *Jihad* under the lens of scrutiny. One of the most troubling aspects of the Qu'ran lies in the lack of a centralized authority, which indicates how the teachings of Prophet Mohammad should be interpreted. Unlike the Catholic Church, where the Pope embodies the role of a 'great patriarch', in Islam each Imam centralizes his own codification about how the Qu'ran should be deciphered. Lopez emphasizes that the Qu'ran is inevitably entwined to politics, since there is no dissociation between the state and religion as in Western nations. What Mohammad has predicted takes sense in the *Tarwhid,* which means the necessary integration of politics with peoples' daily life. Once established in Arabic Peninsula, Islam provided to Arabs an 'all-encompassing' cosmology of the World. In this context, we have to understand the term *jihad* has nothing to do with violence. Instead, *jihad* was misunderstood by West in the threshold of time. This word signals to an eternal spiritual struggle for the quest of excellence, for oneself, for the community and for the other. Finally, the *umma* represents the state where all believers live in peace and harmony. Not surprisingly, each time Arabs perceive the threatening presence of external powers, which place the Umma in jeopardy; they called the *jihad* as a form of union for all Muslims. Takfirs, are all those Muslims who provide some type of assistance to foreign intruders.

One might speculate that Islam can be deemed as a conservative response to the advance of dominant-powers. This begs an interesting question, ¿who would be such a power? Of course, the wide range of interpretations of these beliefs is plausible to be manipulated for some groups whose private interests have nothing to do with religion. The attacks of Soviet Union to Afghanistan enabled these defensive beliefs in order to call all Muslims-warriors to the jihad in order for invaders to be repelled.

Of course, the Soviet Union's invasion not only jeopardized what the Muslim world knows as *the Umma* but also emulated the need for a broader defensive strategy to be articulated. A hit of this calibre waked up the Muslim world from a longer slumber. Thousands and thousands of youths were conformed in a list at time they were recruited to be part of this holly-war. This list has been net that encompassed all these potential warriors was the ancestor of Al-Qaeda. Afterwards the collapse of Soviet Union, Al-Qaeda and Afghanistan witnessed how United States negotiated with different neighbours lucrative contracts to improve their monopoly of oil and gas in the region. A couple of decades later the financial and military assistance of the

United States to Afghanis, Bin-Laden claimed overtly that – a former ally - the Qu'ranUnited States become perverted its own heart because of pride and arrogance. This was one of the primary triggers for an outbreak of violence against American targets in Middle East.

In recognition to this, everybody is familiar how Bin Laden utilized the advances in technology and the commercial airplanes against civil targets in the World Trade Center attacks. The cultural issues which gave basis on Al-Qaeda's onset, is brilliantly addressed by Professor Lopez who confirms that there is a point of convergence between Muslim Terrorism and Saint Inquisition in Middle Age. Both were politic-based measures aimed to correct the behaviour of deviants in terms of faith. Nonetheless one should keep in mind whilst the Spanish inquisition has been definitely buried, the concept of Jihad is being contextually evoked ever and ever again as a doctrinal background to legitimate current political claims inside the Muslim World and beyond.

With this conception in mind, some analysts suggest that the industry of tourism when it is acting in Middle East may be seen as a form of offence against Islam. However, further studies showed the opposite. Not only has Islam not fleshed out a hostile reaction to modern tourism but also there is nothing like cultural or religious incompatibilities between Islam and Christianity (Jafari and Scott 2014). Noel Scott and Jafar Jafari (2010) clarify that Muslim nations adopted modern tourism (Muslim Tourism) within their own cultural patterns. The *Hajj* not only is one of the largest pilgrimages of the Muslim world, but also reproduces an authentic experience for thousands of believers. There is no reason to think tourism as a secular activity in the modern world would resonate negatively in any Muslim community. While travelling, Muslims are in observance of all religious mandates, as well as the requirements of their religion.

This begs one of the leading questions of this book, why are travelling Westerners chosen as targets of hostility in the Middle East?

To respond this question, we have to delve into the anthropological roots of tourism as a rite of passage, which revitalizes in the subject all his or her suffered frustrations during working days (MacCannell 1976). While moving physically beyond the security of home, lay-citizens not only renovate their compromise with nationhood, and the cultural background of the West, but alternate their role playing to be 'another person'. This cathartic experience is of paramount importance for society to be desegregated (Korstanje and Busby 2010). At a first blush, terrorists plan

their attacks on these types of 'exemplary centres' because it produces further tremor and terror to society. In this reasoning, terrorism should be defined as 'a dialectics of hate' in which case either part are enmeshed in a climate of violence and conflict. Neither the monopoly of states nor attempts of some insurgents to pose their message, terrorism should be discussed in an all-comprehending way. Quite aside from religion, which is ideologically tergiversated to serve to terrorist goals, terrorists justify their actions against innocent or vulnerable targets focusing on their own self-victimization. As Piazza puts it, neither poverty nor totalitarian regimes, terrorists allude to their own cosmology which validates why violence is deployed as a form of politics. What one may understand is that political atomization plays a leading role in delineating the contours of terrorism. Those countries dotted of weaker partidocracia are more vulnerable to terrorism, when some group or ethnicity is pushed to operate clandestinely than consolidated political parties.

As this background, the advance of psychology to draw the personalities of terrorist would be helpful for continuing our discussion. We have to obtain two contrasting profiles, *offenders and terrorists*. While the former refers to a 'disorganized deviant behaviour oriented to narcissism in quest of fast gratifications, the latter sacrifices the proper life for a superior cause. Terrorists often adopt their violent crimes as a form of reaction to a mythical (an invalidated) injustice, which took place long time ago. Their goals was to struggle against abstract enemies as '*Westernization*', '*rationality*' *or* '*the corruption*' rechanneling their internal hate towards a much deeper victimization process. The process of radicalization happens, as Moskalenko and McCauley (2009) studied, because candidates are located in small groups geographically isolated from the rest of society. Per these psychologists, radicalization exists as 'a system' of beliefs which are products of romantic interpretation of history or it results from bad personal experiences that fed up a dormant sentiment of disappointment. Once accepted, candidates in their smaller groups are indoctrinated avoiding any individual dissidence. Any critical spirit would be rapidly suffocated by their comrades at arms. As Phillip Zimbardo tested, behaviour is a very concept to grasp and predict; however, what is clear is that good persons behave badly if they are immersed in groups that ponder crime while bad people can be reeducated if the founding cultural values are changed. Zimbardo places the concept of free-will under the critical lens of scrutiny. In his updated version of the book, The Lucifer Effects, Phillip Zimbardo shows how good people can

torture or do appalling things to others. We are prone to imagine we are special to balance our day to day frustrations and psychological deprivations. This not only enhances our ego, but develops an attachment to rules. Although we live as though respecting the law, behaviour changes according to new leaderships. The moral limitations of what we can or not do, depends on the rules of in-groups, not our decisions. Good peoples inserted in the incorrect groups can act the same as their peers. To understand evil-doers we have to distance ourselves from the classic definitions where they are defined as agents who rationally opt to behave bad, harming others without any type of remorse (Zimbardo 2007). This suggests, doubtless, that terrorism has been framed by a Westernized cultural background imposed to some Arab populations while colonization process or internalized once privilege-class Muslims arrived to Europe to attend University. In this token, Korstanje (2015a) called the attention on the inter-link of capitalism and terrorism, inasmuch as the violence derives from the sense of extortion, which is the touchtone of negotiations. However, this is a much deep-seated issue which merits to be discussed in next chapters.

How Violent is this World?

Though the problem of violence was on the agenda of founding parents of sociology, this point was reassumed by Steven Pinker in his book *The Better Angels of our Nature*. Per his exposé, violence has plummeted because of the combination of Western values, free trade, adjoined very well to humanist values as democracy and cosmopolitanism. Centred on a titanic recompilation of sources, he continues Norbert Elias's concern about civilizing process. Pinker sets forward hard evidence to validate the hypothesis that violence and conflict is declining in the world. At some extent, he continues with the debate carried on by Norbert Elias and his notion of civilization. Like Elias, Pinker acknowledges that there are some flashpoints which may be corrected, but in comparison with other centuries (even in the middle ages) this epoch seems to be a most peaceful episode in humanity's existence. Two major assumptions are of vital importance for us in this review. Firsts and foremost, civilizations expand their hegemony by the impositions of discourses. These narratives are aimed at silencing or embellishing bloody past-time events in forms of heroic epics. Our heroes not only were cruel persons who have killed thousands of other warriors, but also struggled in appalling battlefront

to impose their interests. This is the first point of entry in this hot-debate because we tend to think current times are more violent than earlier ones, but exactly historical evidence suggests the opposite. Secondly, sometimes statistics are analysed following a much deeper emotional logic that distorts the outcome. It is not far-fetched to assert that the twentieth century was a bloody century since two world wars took place but, Pinker adds, humankind has witnessed other genocides and slaughters in earlier centuries. This raises a more than trivial question, why is violence declining?

Descent governments are reasonable democratic because free trade and marketed-oriented programmes are aimed at cultivating the respect for individuality, the person and ethical differences of this world. Far from the diagnosis of violence decline, most certainly the main limitations of his insight consists in the incapacity of seeing violence as a human source of production, an instrument of identity, which is enrooted in the cosmology of nation-state. The inter-state hostility that characterized medieval politics has been reversed to an extreme competence between citizens. We have posed the idea, in our book *A Difficult World* (2015) that violence has been reduced (or transformed in terrorism) not only because the borders of nations are being eroded by globalization, but also because capitalism became in a hegemonic project. For better understanding, we may cite the plots in *Hunger Games* where a centre exploits the periphery in a way that violence is not allowed as a reciprocal form of relation. In this futurist movie, participants are dominant of their consciousness because they remain unfamiliar with the real probabilities of failure. These competences, like the liberal market, are based on the premise of social Darwinism that claims 'the survival of strongest', which means that the glory of only one equals the failure of all the rest. Participants not only over-value their own skills, but are confident of their strengths.

The stimulation of competition in the labour market, emulated by entertainment industry, resulted in two interesting dynamics. On one hand, the industrial order faced what Robert Castel dubbed 'the rise of uncertainty'. The vulnerability of rank-and-file workers associated to the decline of welfare state facilitated the capital-owners to increase their profits and wealth, at the time, risk was adopted as a new value for modern workers. As Richard Sennett (2011) observed, the idea of risk implies that workers are co-managing their own fate, they not only are responsible by their decisions, but it avoids elite from their responsibility to create the conditions for a fairer wealth distribution. This gives capital further freedom to move worldwide. Paradoxically, on another hand, we, in terms of

realism, are safer than other earlier cruel times, though audiences are bombarded by abstract risks. In this context, democracy is the legal and ideological platform that facilitates the expansion of late-capitalism. What Pinker should consider is that aboriginal cultures disappeared when Spanish Colonizers banned their rights to yield the war. Sometimes, the reduction of violence is not a good sign, above all when it is accompanied with oppression.

Terrorism and 9/11

The events of 9/11 prompted many countries to adopt policies to reinforce security, especially at their borders. Terrorism affected many industrial activities in the United States and beyond. Some specialists focused on the connection between terrorism and international trade (Barro 1991; Pollins 1989; Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003; Phillips 2008). Those countries which had previous problems with terrorism, such as England or Spain, aligned immediately with the United States in a global war against what they called 'the axis of evil' (Altheide 2009; Bassi 2010). The governments posed terrorism as the great challenge of the next millennium. Terrorism became a buzz word that inspired movie makers, editorials, journalists, and the culture industries. A clear definition of 'terrorism' seems in order, but it turns out not so easy to formulate one. Robertson (2002) defined terrorism as the primary security threat for the West in the twenty-first century. Upon review, Pedahzur (Pedahzur et al. 2003) found 22 different definitions used by the US government alone. A. Schmid found 109 scholarly definitions in his 1983 study. Certain common aspects among most definitions include violence, force, politics, fear, terror, threat, psychological effects, victims, and extortion. Causes for terrorism are even more diverse. Some neo-conservative scholars point to the weak role of the United States as a superpower in the world. For them, a solution would be to conduct top-down preemptive strikes by the United States in other countries. They point to hate against the West encouraged by Muslims.(Fukuyama 1989; Huntington 1993, 1997; Kristol and Kagan 1996; Vargas-Llosa 2002; Rashid 2002; Kepel 2002; Fritting and Kang 2006; Keohane and Zeckhauser 2003; Sunstein 2003, 2005; Pojman 2006). Other scholars argue that 9/11 presented the opportunity for some privileged groups to manipulate the citizenry's fear to create a new kind of internal indoctrination (Altheide 2006, 2009; Sontag 2002; Holloway and Pelaez 2002; Zizek 2002; Bernstein 2005;

Baudrillard 1995a, 1995b, 2006; Kellner 2005; Gray 2007; Smaw 2008; Fluri 2009; Robin 2004; Wolin 2010; Skoll and Korstanje 2013; Korstanje 2013). Luke Howie (2009) describes how cultural entertainment industries have depicted a pejorative and dangerous image onto Islam that affected thousands of citizens and opened a network of discriminatory practices. At a first glance, Goldblatt and Hu (2005) define terrorism as the illegal use of force or violence against persons or their properties in order to intimidate their government, the citizenship or any other segment of society.

Jeff McMahan (2007) contends that nation-states reproduce some limonoid spaces to exploit violence as wars, battlefront while in others cases it is strictly prohibited. This is the case of criminality and terrorism. One of the codes in wars consists in dividing what are or not combatants. Though there is a moral permission to kill only when the act is legally limited to certain conditions and context. He verbatim writes that

> *To the best of my knowledge, it has been the dominant view in all cultures at all times that is not only permissible but even good, honorable and heroic to participate in war, even when the war is unjust* (McMahan 2007: 6).

Therefore, terrorism frames within jurists call 'illegal violence'. Though at a closer look such a modest definition has many problems. Some privileged groups in democracies exert similar or greater violence against others with downright impunity. Furthermore, R. Bernstein (2005) argues that democracy is more than a ritual accomplished every four years but a style of life.

G Borradori (2013) documents interesting interviews on Habermas and Derrida regarding terrorism. While the former expressed his opinion that terrorism is determined by a glitch in the communicative process, the latter adopts a contrasting thesis that it exhibits a type of auto-immune syndrome that crystalizes the end of capitalism. In this vein, G. Skoll (2007) agrees with Zizek that terrorism works as a virus going from one to other hosts to infect an unprepared victim. A. Schmid contends that

> *the terrorist victimization is often perceived by the terrorist as a sacrifice. The sacrifice can consist of attaching innocent people from the adversary's camp or of a terrorist blowing himself or herself up in the midst of a group of guilty enemies. In that case, he sees himself as a martyr. The dimension of martyrdom links it to the activity that some scholars see as the most fundamental form of religiosity: the sacrifice* (Schmid 2004, p. 210).

As previous backdrop, L. Howie (2012) acknowledges the fact is that the world and economies have changed forever since 9/11, which makes prediction untenable. Given the obsession for security in United States, Howie's research shows how years change the interviewees' viewpoints. There is complicity between terrorists, politicians, and journalism. Howie's (2012) book examines the limitations of extant conceptual frameworks, and, parallel with other studies as in the work of Baudrillard and Zizek, connects the theories of terrorism with late modernity. Howie adds that terrorism should be defined as more than a political technique or strategy to dissuade states from asserting certain claims, terrorism is stronger in the witness's terror. Howie goes on to say that,

> '*Terrorism works this way for witness. If there was one way to describe the outcomes of the research that I have conducted for this book, I would say that terrorism causes people to feel terror. Terror is the name we give to the uncertainty we feel in the feel of global violence in some of the world's most populous cities. If Terrorism does not cause terror, then it is not terrorism* (Howie 2012: 12*)*.

It is useful to distinguish between the object of terrorist acts and their targets. In this vein, the target refers to those whom terrorism is designed to influence, whereas the object is composed of its victims. In the case of asymmetric warfare, the terrorist actors usually want to influence organizational actors by victimizing members of the general populace (Skoll 2008). Beneath this proposition is that terrorism is psychological warfare whose strengths are the fear and intimidation. D. Black (2004) said that terrorism is a highly moralistic act intended to exert social influence. Terrorist attacks express grievances by aggression. D. Handelman complements this view, explaining that terrorists defend often themselves from a much broader violence, rooted in a supra-structure preceding their acts. As Ghandi said, 'Poverty is the worst kind of violence.' The self-destruction is at least an act of sacrifice, self-sacrifice for others. For Handelman (2013), terrorism is a result of late modernity, and consists in civilians killing other civilians beyond state control. In doing so, travellers are vulnerable simply because they are caught unwary when they fly from one point to other. The technology that characterized the West has been directed against it. If the previous form of mass violence went from one state to

another, terrorism seems to be in the opposed pole. It appeals to the fight of civilians, against other civilians.

Why do Terrorists Target Innocent Tourists?

One might speculate that tourists encourage peace, because they only want to know more of other cultures. They are not conquerors. Moved by curiosity, they provide fertile sources for international understanding. Terrorism and other forms of violence represent a serious threat to the hospitality and tourism industries. Several studies focused on the relationship of terrorism and tourism as well as the perceived risks of travellers regarding certain foreign destinations (Somnez 1998; Weber 1998; Domínguez, Burguette and Bernard 2003; Aziz 1995; Floyd and Pennington-Gray 2004; Kuto and Groves 2004; Essner 2003; Araña and León 2008; Bhattarai, Conway and Shrestha 2005; Goldblatt and Hu 2005; Tarlow 2003; Prideaux 2005; Yuan 2005). Tourism has been one of the industries most affected by terrorist acts. Terrorism determines the way travellers garner information and draw images of their destinations (Peattie, Clarke and Peattie 2005). Because of their unfamiliarity with the visited destination, travellers and tourists are often targets of diverse crimes. Some terror cells attack tourists with a double message. On one hand, they inflict a sentiment of panic in the public opinion of the victims' countries of origin. On the other, they undermine the citizenry's trust in the state. Of course, any destination combines risk aversion with risk attraction factors. As Lepp and Gibson (2008) put it, this industry seems to be circumscribed by two contrasting tendencies, the sensation or novelty seeking risk and risk aversion. A type of psychology of tourists plays a crucial role at time of determining the perception of risk. In addition, B. West (2008) considers the terrorist attacks in 2003 to Western tourists in Bali. They have been memorialized by the Australian Press as the archetype of heroism, comparing this event with 9/11. This means that collective memory and crises are inextricably intertwined in the national discourse. Postmodern nationalisms legitimize travel as a universal benefit to human kind which should be defended at any cost. Similarly, the narrative of terrorism emphasizes that enemies of democracy utilize foreign tourists precisely because of their vulnerability, as acts of cowardice.

In this respect, R. Bianchi (2007) argued that tourism revolves around risk perception, which acts as conducive to the interests of

some industrialized nations and to the detriment of the periphery. The ongoing state of insecurity created by the so-called 'terrorism' corresponds with a political logic of exclusion and discrimination against otherness. The bridge between tourists from the centre and migrant travellers from the periphery has been enlarged. Paradoxically, studies in risk perception themselves threaten the goal of security they encourage. To what extent does terrorism affect the tourism industry? J. M Castaño (2005) presents the arrival statistics from 2000 to 2003 in some cities that had been targets of terrorist attacks. Questioning the hypothesis that terrorism threatens tourism, he points out that cities as Mombasa, New York, Madrid, London, Bali, and Cairo experienced notable declines in tourism, but they recovered in few months. Terrorism may potentate tourism by means of Dark Tourism – i.e., terrorism tourism. Castaño argues that tourism as a process is reversible. No matter the original impact on public opinion, given some unspecified timeframe, what today generates scare, tomorrow will entice thousands of tourists.

Hotel chains and tourist attraction staff become targets of attacks because they symbolize the strength of an economic order that causes resentment and exclusion. If the West is named as the cause of all suffering, this diminishes the responsibilities of local Arab elites to give their support to colonial powers. Of course, Aziz is not wrong when says tourism is rooted in the logic of capitalism. These attacks may be labelled as forms of protests, to be re-read with a new and much broader lens. Grosspietsch (2005) says that under some conditions the acceptance of tourism in tourist receiving countries is troublesome. As a global industry, tourism not only creates a serious economic dependency between centre and periphery, but also paves the way for political instability. Terrorism may flourish in these types of landscapes. As in Aziz' argument, he says that tourism triggers terrorism, combining a bundle of negative effects on the socio-economic fabric. Although his discussion draws on observations from previous decades (Britton 1982), Grosspietsch provides a fresh conceptual framework to understand the issue. Terrorism does not affect tourism, nor is terrorism a result of economic resentment. Tourism is adopted by underdeveloped economies to enhance their production, excluding some ethnicities and producing resentment. But there are collateral damages. Tourism indeed gives further value to the extent that it changes social relationships. Scholars who said that tourism should be protected from terrorism are misdiagnosing the problem.

The Spectacle of Human Suffering: Dark Tourism

What are the similarities between terrorism and tourism? Wars wake up a much broader sentiment of nationalism. (Young-Sook 2006). The sacralization of certain sites after a terrorist attack or certain battles can be commoditized as sacred places. This aspect might be studied under the name of Dark Tourism (Miles 2002; Stone and Sharpley 2008; Smith 2010). If, to some degree, tourism tends to mitigate the effects of wars by converting the employed artifacts into sacred objects to be exposed in a showcase, in recent years sites related to horror, torture, tragedy, battles, and concentration camps have emerged as prime tourist destinations. They have enhanced human morbidity and sadism as primary forms of consumption. Dark tourism resulted from commoditization of two aspects: fear of death and the need to intellectualize contingency and uncertainty. While the human inclination to enjoy the spectacle of suffering and death has found expression across history, little is known in specialized literature about this uncanny fascination (Stone 2005). Reasons why visitors seek Dark Tourism as a form of entertainment are manifold: a) it can be considered as a reminiscence of the old fear of phantom during childhood (Dann 1998), b) or as a new way of intellectualizing the logic of death in West (Stone 2005), c) as a convergence of four basic emotions related to insecurity, superiority, humility and gratitude (Tarlow 2005), or even because of d) the advent of social fragmentation characteristic of late capitalism (Rojeck 1997).

In addition, Rodanthi Tzanelli, Professor at University of Leeds UK, contends that Dark Tourism enables a type of new solidarity among visitors, which is ritualized to connect with death. This seems to be part of a much wider gift-exchange that cements the emergence of a dark-economy. Today, we must consider that *consuming death* (as a type of heritage circulation) corresponds with an *ideology* in order for consumers to engage with life (Tzanelli 2016).

As already discussed in other chapters, Nicole Guidotti Hernandez (2011) signals the role played by selective memory not only by ignoring some historical facts, in contrast to the status quo, but to protect the founding values of nation states. Violence should be defined as a disciplinary effort to control the body. The concept of nation, integral to the political form, nation-state, is based on a biased and engineered history. The places where mass death has taken place are often commoditized to be sold in forms of tales or tour-guided spectacles (Guidotti-Hernandez 2011). At the same time, some groups are demonized, others are

sacralized. Any museum replicates a tale, fabricated and narrated according to the reigning political-economic interests – i.e., the ruling class. Starting from this premise, Korstanje and Clayton (2012) enumerate some commonalities between tourism and terrorism, previously ignored by specialized literature, such as a) the insensibility for the suffering of others, b) the curiosity for places of mass-death, and c) employment of mobile technology and tourist means of transport to perpetrate the attacks.

Dark Tourism has recently become in a buzz-word applied in several studies and papers. Although its original meaning is aimed at denoting curiosity for suffering and mass death, a lot of polemic has grown around this concept. For some scholars, Dark Tourism seems to be considered only a way of ritualizing and reminding people death, *memento mori*, an important mechanism of social cohesion, now commercialized by means of tourism and hospitality industries. For others, this phenomenon represents a type of repressed sadism, enrooted in the logic of capitalism and gazed-consumption. Why people are being captivated by disaster and suffering of others represents one of the most striking aspects of Dark Tourism. In recent years, valuable studies have focused on mass death as a form of cultural entertainment for the tourism and hospitality industries, little research has emphasized the anthropological roots of Dark Tourism or Thana-Tourism. More interested in analyzing the phenomenon from an industrial managerial perspective, that body of knowledge ignores the role played by the sacralization of death in the process of anthropomorphism that ultimately ends in exhibiting a place of staged authenticity. This raises the question of how to remind people of the suffering of others. There would be many forms of interpreting such suffering. One approach suggests that the degree of perceived suffering depends on the role of visitors. D. S. Miller (2008) herself experienced the pain of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans where she is a native. Combining interesting questions about the connection between disaster and tourism with self-ethnography, her development illustrates how the impacts of disasters in communities take a pervasive nature. On one hand it entices outsider tourists who only want to see what is happening but on the other, it calls for the assistance of a second type of tourists who are interested in helping to the obliterated community. If tourism industry does not want to help but to gaze, the glimpse into the harsh reality of New Orleans appeals to poverty and a historically unfair wealth distribution as problems silenced by authorities. Paradoxically, Miller acknowledges that tourism revitalizes the local economy in the process of recovery. To some extent,

the culture plays a pivotal role in the progress of giving sense to unfavorable events. The landscapes after a disaster should be reconfigured in order for survivors to adapt their expectations. Visiting sites where martyrs have died deserves attention for those who were not involved. Tours often are sold beyond the devastated zone by operators and mediators that ignore the reasons behind the event. Miller argues that her role as both a tourist and a native is not necessarily associated with the hedonistic gaze of conventional tourism. Tourism not only can be useful for New Orleans to recover the former landscape of the city, but also it hosts thousands of people who take pictures of the suffering of others. This contradiction paves the ways for misunderstanding. Her intriguing thesis is that tourism as such does not contribute to the spectacle of disaster, but the role of tourists. Ultimately, if poverty and racial problems generated the material asymmetries that facilitated the effects of Katrina are not placed under the lens of scrutiny, the disaster being repeated is only a question of time. With this perspective, Dark Tourism can be a part of resiliency or a simple discourse for replicating the logic of capital, or maybe both.

The importance of heritage sites in tourism literature has been overemphasized, or has been circumscribed to questions related to profits, management, and financial success. Hence Dark tourism invites responses to irresoluble questions. Why this happens? Could we have prevented a situation like this? Who is responsible for this?

Following this, P. Stone developed a new concept around darkness that refers to the spectrum of Dark Tourism. Some varying degrees of darkness come from seven types of dark sites ranging from darkest to lightest. One of the most interesting concepts of Stone's model seems to be associated with the level of attractiveness of certain places. Some sites are fraught with political ideology denoted by their location and authenticity. Based on death and suffering, these sites are historical, and provide tourists with a coherent framework for educational goals. Otherwise, there would be other types of sites created for remembering a certain event that has not taken place within the site of the memorial. These sorts of spaces are heritage-centric, and have less associated political ideology. In addition, Stone typifies seven diverse products rooted in the curiosity of death which transmit a set of different messages to society: a) dark fun factories (entertainment based on simulated suffering of others), b) dark exhibitions (learning opportunities), c) dark dungeons (penal codes and reinforcement of law), d) dark resting places (romantized sites of commemoration), e) dark Shrines (secondary or peripheral sites of remembrance for victims,

f) dark conflict sites (commoditization of battles and wars), and g) dark camps of genocide (sites where genocide has been practiced). Every typology of dark sites encompasses a specific discourse transmitted repeatedly to a wider range of tourists who manifest variety in their expectations. Following this Dark Tourism can be seen as the legacy of a thanatopic tradition whose roots cannot be yet determined with accuracy. Some scholars say the current fascination for death stems from Middle Ages and the habit of visiting graves and cemeteries during 18th and 19th centuries (Seaton 1996, 1999). Others analysts have dwelled on the role played by mass media as the prerequisite for creating tourist spots that concentrate on disasters and human catastrophes (Lennon and Foley 2000). For some scholars, Dark Tourism shows a strong dependency on identity and ethnic affiliation, as they confer a group sentiment of belonging and meaningful experience rooted in heritage and lore (Seaton 1996, 1999, 2000; Simone-Charteris and Boyd 2010; Dann and Seaton 2001; Conran 2002).

For the sake of clarity, Korstanje and Ivanov explain that tourism serves as an instrument of resiliency to digest the effects of tragedy, and to give a lesson to survivors. Although the message of disaster never is duly interpreted, which leads community to repeat the event, authors suggest Dark Tourism gives a meaning to what in fact is meaningless.

> *Present conceptual paper explores dark tourism as a sub-type of psychological resilience that helps the community understanding the nature of disasters that operates in the principle of contingency. Museums, battlefields, masterpieces of art, cemeteries, and other zones of disasters refer to events mythically constructed to fulfil economical needs. These sites are commoditised and broadcasted by mass media as mythical archetypes that reinforce the social bondage and cultural values of every society. The state of exemption and admiration these type of objects/places wake up are opposed to the adversities these heroes faced.* (Korstanje and Ivanov 2012: 56)

The concept of Dark Tourism as an expression of *human morbidity* is illustrative and path-breaking, but false in nature. As it was formulated, the problem depends not only the commoditization of spaces, but also with the organization of work that leads people to work to consume. To the psychological need to understand what is happening, the market offers its version. This seems to be exactly what Dark Tourism represents: a reification of capitalist logic by means of disasters. Tim Ingold (2000) says that capitalism

has successfully changed the paradigms of the Enlightenment. The capitalist eye forged the myth the leisure that ostensibly liberates the workforce from its oppression. Ingold explains that the ideological power of capitalism rested on its efficacy to control and mark goods and workers. The former are marked by the price of exchange, fixed at the market. The latter depends on its capacity to consume the fabricated merchandises. Workers move their resources to fabricate precisely the merchandise they will consume in their free time. Last but not least, N. Klein portrays a connection between consumption and disasters. From her perspective, capitalism survives by the combination of destruction for new construction. Disasters not only move a lot of resources which otherwise would be immobilized, but also introduce economic policies which would be rejected by lay people if the disaster would have never have taken place. The market responds to new climate events such as Katrina with new opportunities to expand businesses and profits (Klein 2007). The next section examines how the organization of work has solidified the monopoly of the nation-state of work force. Beyond its boundaries, any attack on the modes of production or any event that jeopardizes the material logic of production or consumption is called terrorism, while in homeland, if the resistance is legalized, it receives the name of a strike. Terrorists employ, as Howie put it, our own forms of movements, transport and touring not only to create fear, but also to impede the modern logic of consumption and production. One of the aspects that terrified Americans in 9/11 was not the attack as such, but that the affordable technological forms of transports were employed as weapons. Therefore, we think work should not escape of analysis in the terrorist literature. Once again, anyone who has faced the experience of being stranded at an airport because of workers' strikes will understand the similarities between terrorism and strikes. This does not mean that workers are terrorists, but on the contrary, capitalist states constructed the label of terrorism to discipline its internal economic life. Further, history is witness to how states erected their walls to protect the circulation of merchandise at a first stage. This poses serious problems of exploitation for workers, many of them influenced by anarchist ideologies, coined in Europe. By the actions on bodies, states closed a circle to impose a specific identity.

Terrorism in the Industrial System

Workers' history is fraught of violence, death and blood. Though these organizations are now widely recognized, or at least they are dissociated from terrorism, let's explain this not always was in this manner. On its

onset the capitalist system in the United States was based on a climate of extreme poverty and oppression for workers. Paradoxically, European mass-migration brought new ideologies coming from anarchism and socialism which not only questioned radically the gap between have and have-nots, but also the material asymmetries that characterized America. As James Joll explains, a new emergent group of anarchists were depicted as dangerous, terrorists, enemies of the state, not only but what they thought but by the violent tactic they disposed. The United States government waged continual war against unions, beginning at the end of the Civil War and continuing until the New Deal of Franklin Roosevelt in the 1930s. The first syndicalists to defy the state were labelled as terrorists. These workers professed a non-negotiable fight for oppressed classes, which had been relegated by capitalist aristocracies (Joll 1979).

No less true was that the end of the Second World War situates the ruling class (bourgeois) as the only winner in the midst of the mass-destruction that Europe suffered. This means that the famous Marshall Plan was ideologically used to head off Communism's face-to-face challenge to America, though at the time it was presented as the following of altruist aims. From the outset, the elite developed a strange fear of Communism, which was known as the 'Red-Scare' (Ganser 2005). After 1947 the Taft-Hartley Act banned many organizations and actions by trade unions, as well as most political incursion; the germ of communism and anarchism started to flourish in few but not less radical cells. For this reason, government devoted all their resources to the struggle against 'anarchism', which was labelled as one of the main threats that might very well place the American economy in jeopardy (Robin 2004; Skoll and Korstanje 2013). G. Skoll argues that the function of the state is to maintain the hierarchical status quo by exerting power and violence over populations. In times of low conflict, the legitimacy of the state rests on the market, which confers certain stability. In the context of relative chaos and disorder the state resorts to violence to re-establish the threatened order. Similarly, the market mediates among human beings by imposing a state of gratification in lieu of constraints, but the moment the control weakens, fear replaces gratification as motivator to legitimize the ruling order (Skoll 2007). The United States historically developed a Red Scare not because of the anti-capitalist values of communism, but primarily for its effects on workers. Communism was not just a reaction to the accumulation of capital by the bourgeoisie, but it also gave workers a consciousness, a discourse to guide their fight. The first anarchists and

communist migrants, surveilled and jailed by many states, contributed to the formation of workers' unions. States rejected the aliens but accepted and reorganized their ideas in a manner suitable to the long-term interests of capital and the ruling class. Capitalist societies domesticated the dangerous lessons of Marx in two different ways: by creating a wide sentiment of fear of communism and by re-organizing the discipline of workers to the capitalist state (Skoll and Korstanje 2013).

As the previous argument given, J. Joll (1979) acknowledges that the roots of anarchism comes from the texts of Godwin, Blanc, Proudhon and Bakunin, where the hegemony of the state, as it was designed by the Western jurisprudence, was seriously questioned. Their ideas postulated a new world where the ideals of egalitarianism would play a vital role in the configuration of workers and their institutions. The sense of an unique power, central administration, for these scholars was the main problem of modern nation-state. Some of their ideas were of paramount importance in forging a consciousness among worker in capitalist societies, but some of them were used by radical groups to perpetrate violent acts, a few of which led to bystanders' deaths and injuries. Others took the form of assassinations of ruling class leaders. These acts, deemed terrorism, served the state by giving a rationale to ban anarchist activity. Although the workers adopted the discourses of anarchists to make sense of their struggles against capital holders, states labelled strikers as anarchists bent on destroying public order. Eventually, states recognized unions as legitimate, but in the United States not until the 1935 Wagner Act. In Russia, some anarchists opted to conduct the revolution within trade unions, while others preferred to spend their time in forming local communes. Joll (1979: 166) goes on to admit that

> the anarchists, too, were divided among themselves; some were anarcho-syndicalists and placed their hope of revolution in the action of the workers union which would take over the factories. Others were communist anarchists and disciples of Kropotkin, who saw social revolution coming about through the formation of local communes which would then join in a federation.

While both struggled against the same enemy, finally Bolsheviks jailed anarchist leaders, who would be dangers to their new government. The anarchist guerrilla was exterminated after two years, but the same ideas were exported in America from 1880 onwards. Since the successive

failures of anarchism to consolidate as a political option in Russia, many of them immigrated to commodity-exporting nations such as the United States, Argentina, Australia and Brazil. Once there, they worked hard to oppose the central administrations, even bombing or attacking important police officers. Sooner or later, the elite devoted all their resources to eradicating this emerging terrorism, even deporting even deporting suspected of terrorism. The virulence of anarchism reaches its zenith when William McKinley, president of the United States, was killed by an anarchist activists during his presidency. Other, more subtle, groups found a fertile ground to avoid violence, which helped them to organize trade unions to present their claims to oppressive status quo. As stated, even though the first strikes were bloody and violent, with the passing of years anarcho-syndicalists were legally accepted in societies which not only needed the masses to work, but also sublimated their protests into reified forms of negotiation that for better or worse accelerated the reproduction of capital. Their formerly attributed terrorism was commoditized into negotiations and legally circumscribed strikes. The archetype of revolution, the general strike, was occasionally employed in the fight against bosses and capital owners. General strikes held by workers became the epicentre for future benefits to the work force. States exerted their disciplinary force to exterminate terrorist anarchists, who rejected joining the union-organized workers. In the First World War the CGT and workers did support the state. Finally, trade unions gained some interesting benefits as working hour reductions, better wages and other legal rights (as the right to strike), which facilitated not only the technological breakthrough in the field of transport, but also the modern holidays. From that moment on, leisure and tourism showed to serve as a mechanism of escapement in order for workers to endorse their loyalty to bourgeois nation-state. Though exterminated, the core of anarchism was adopted by the system, sublimated in a form of inoculated virus, the strike.

To the extent that a strike is considered a legal mechanism to present certain claims, while terrorist attacks are discouraged, seems to be a matter that specialists do not examine properly. A closer view reveals that there are similar processes in both, a strike and terrorism. As the vaccine is the inoculated virus to strengthen the body's immune system, strikes are process of dissent and discord that mitigate the negative effects of conflict. After all, strikes are merely the collective effects of workers withholding their labour. There is nothing violent or threatening about them, except

to those who depend on other people's work to sustain themselves – i.e., the owners of capital. In their struggle with workers, the ruling class uses as one if its weapons the construal of strikes as taking consumers as hostages. Whenever passengers are stranded at an airport or train stations because of problems between owners and unions, the sense of urgency facilitate the things for stronger ones. Businesses and terrorism organizations are not concerned about the vulnerability or needs of passengers. The latter one are manipulated as means for achieving certain goals. In a world designed to create and satisfy psychological desires, consumers as holders of money, are of paramount importance for the stability of system. The threat that represents the consumers and the derived economic loses are enough to dissuade owners from the worker's claims. In these types of processes, typified by law, the state not only intervenes, mediating between both actors, but also is in charge of leading negotiations. Nonetheless, if negotiations fail, the state uses its armed might to force workers back to their jobs. An early historical example is the great rail strike of 1877 when federal troops were withdrawn from the occupied former Confederacy to kill strikers, terrorizing the mass of rail workers to end the strike. In doing so, first anarchists opted for terrorist acts, until they were disciplined by states. Once done, their forms of violence were mutated to another more symbolic way of protests, the strike. Capitalism owes much to trade unions, more than thought. Whatever the case may be, tourism has extended to the globe (Naisbitt 1995), as the well-being of industrial societies have advanced. The evolution of tourism, as a mass industry, came from a combination of economic factors, much encouraged by trade unions, such as working hour reduction and a rise in the wages. However, the history of tourism ignores the burden industrialism and technological advances brought by workers. Anarchism not only flourished in industrial contexts, exploiting workers' resentment against owners, but also improved their working conditions. The Thomas Cook Agency has offered special services to travellers who suffer from alcoholism. There are prepaid all-inclusive vouchers for alcoholics who do not handle money (Korstanje 2015a, 2015b). Industrial societies pave the way for expanding trade in the world, in which tourism plays a crucial role, domestic workers are subject to conditions of exploitation. If anarchism introduced poverty relief in industrial societies, their virulent ideas were not accepted until they were changed to ways acceptable to the state and ruling class. From the ideals of bloody revolution, European societies passed to the working class organizations – unions and political parties.

This is the reason why we argue that tourism indirectly resulted from terrorism. Violence exerted by the anarchists was not enough to change the society, or at least its ways of productions, but their ideas not only inspired many artists, but also many syndicalist leaders (Joll 1979). The history of pioneers in anarchism shows us two relevant aspects. First and foremost, states create their boundaries as a barrier to protect their economies. What inside can be called strike, beyond is labelled as terrorist attacks. Secondly, terrorists, most of them educated in the best Western universities learned our tactics of negotiations, strategies of exploitation and projected to more violent forms of expression.

Conclusion

Today, tourists being stranded at airports due to union activity or even by a strike, seems not to be different to holidaymakers being targeted by terrorist cells in Middle East resorts. Terrorist attack and the strike share three significant commonalities, a) the key factor of being an instrument of extortion, b) the taking hostage of lay-citizens to pressure the state to accept their demands, c) indifference for the others' suffering.

At some extent, as we have discussed, tourism and terrorism are inextricably intertwined, which explains why modern leisure-spots are used for terrorist for their attacks. Although the degree of violence is minimized, more often, tourists and the tourism industries act as logistical agents in deploying capital exploitation and imperial control. When tourists suffer harm, so-called terrorists (dissidents) get the blame. At a first glance, tourists are 'workers' who earned their money enabling a pact to a third person (owner). Their power of consumption situates them as privileged actors of tourist system. They are target not only to strikes, at homeland, but also of terrorist attacks abroad. Nonetheless, if tourism has been expanded by the advance of industrialism, changed by the conditions of labour, first anarchists, whose acts of violence were not successful, envisaged the possibility of organizing the masses, to create worker associations. The original violence mutated to a more subtle form of struggle based on the similar characteristics, the need for hostages, media support, speculation and the appeal to surprise factor. These forms of negotiation were not only learned by terrorists, but also applied in their respective countries to civilian targets, often international tourists. Therefore, we strongly believe that terrorism as it is portrayed in the media is inextricably intertwined with tourism. Tourism is the disciplined expression of terrorism. For the sake of

clarity, it is necessary to remind what Foucault said respecting to 'the economy of risks'. As discussed in earlier chapters, Foucault adheres to the thesis that capitalism works successfully since it applies 'an economy of discipline', which consists in inoculating an external threat, which may collapse the society, into a regulated risk, which is no other thing that a mitigated-hazard. He poses the example of vaccine that results from the inoculation of a mortal virus. The same applies for terrorism, following our reasoning. Doubtless, as Althusser (1997) brilliantly observed that the ideological apparatuses of the state have the function to tell a biased story, about real facts, producing amnesia in the public opinion. In so doing, some events should be repressed from memory, and even demonized as staunch enemies of the collective. While we are frightening of terrorism, not only we ignore its intersection of industrial capitalism, but we decline our understanding of the issue. Far from being a result of religious intolerance, or a clash of civilization as Huntington precludes, terrorism derives from the process of instrumentalization of Western civilization.

Beyond the responsibilities of religion, terrorism justifies violent actions against vulnerable persons using discourses that lead toward self-victimization. In so doing, religion serves as an excuse but never as the real reason behind it. James Piazza (2008) commented that it is common terrorists groups once participated in democratic processes to some extent but were forced to go underground for many reasons. Political atomization conjoined to weaker partyocracies is one of the key factors that pave the way for the rise of terrorism. The focus placed by some scholars on poverty or psychological frustration does not explain at a macro-sociological level the influence of politics in the configuration of the necessary instability that sooner or later leads to terrorism. We may use psychology to delineate two contrasting profiles: offenders and terrorists. While the former signal a disordered, deviant behavior to social rules, the later one emulates a law-abiding attitude to the extent of sacrifice of their lives. Let's clarify first that criminals deny their crimes, but this happens because they belong or want to belong to society. The same does not apply to terrorists, who are rewarded by captivating the attention of society. Terrorists often adopt their reactions in view of a mythical struggle against injustice or some other broader targets such as 'Westernization,' Rationality,' or Mass Consumption. Rechanneling their hatred towards a much deeper process of victimization, the discourse of terrorism lacks from any rational basis. Nonetheless, once questioned, they vindicate their crimes by alluding to higher positive ideals such as freedom, the struggle against injustice, or the restoration of a lost

moral order. Far from being considered as evil-doers, they perceive themselves as 'disinterested' freedom fighters. In inculcating terrorists, terror groups employ a sentiment of radicalization, which was widely studied by McCauley and S. Moskalenko (2008, 2011) and Moskalenko and McCauley (2009). For these psychologists, radicalization corresponds with a system of beliefs which are products of history or certain bad personal experiences. However, terrorists are fewer than those who can share the same sentiment of disappointment, experts add. What is important is that this process of radicalization only prospers in small groups, where interactions with others seem to be reduced to the leaders' viewpoints. The smaller the group, the more there are possibilities to be efficiently indoctrinated. Any individual act of dissidence is rapidly suffocated by leaders and other comrades-in-arms. In parallel, candidates are recruited following personal contacts or by taking advantage of some connections between relatives. These like-minded cells have successfully enhanced an internal cohesion which is forged by the creation of an external moral hazard. Since a process like this is not built overnight, no less true is that the absence of law in some peripheral zones represents a fertile ground to the formation of terrorists whose candidates are recruited following peer self-esteem criteria, or social status has been validated by some social scientists such as Wood and Gannon (2013) who recently drew attention to the influence of peers to perform deviant behaviors or become offenders. Criminology has left behind the role played by social interaction in the formation of criminal minds, as well as the limitations environment present for some profiles. Those people who aim to please others are more sensible to acceptance by their peers than the rest. Behaviour follows the collective values of the group. Depending on what these values are, individuals can help or harm others (Zimbardo 2007). In his updated version of the book, *The Lucifer Effects*, Phillip Zimbardo shows how good people can torture or do appalling things to others. We are prone to imagine we are special to balance our day-to-day frustrations and psychological deprivations. This not only enhances our ego, but develops an attachment to rules. Although we live as though respecting the law, our behaviour changes according to new leaderships. The moral limitations of what we can or not do, depends on the rules of in-groups, not our decisions. Good people inserted in the incorrect groups can act the same as their new peers. To understand evil-doers we have to distance ourselves from the classic definitions where they are defined as agents who rationally opt to behave bad, harming others without any type of remorse. Our human nature is changed by the social

rules and contexts in which we move. From the Stanford prison experiments to Abu Ghraib, Zimbardo adds, it is confirmed empirically that people (far from being good or bad) are influenced by powerful situational forces. Once the Other is demonized, actions are ethically justified no matter how terrible they are (Zimbardo 2007). Although some crimes are demonized in view of their impact on victims, less attention is given to the role played by self-esteem and status in the formation of gangs. This raises a more than interesting question: is love the emotion liable for hurting others? With this in mind, Wilson, Bradford, and Lemanski (2013) observed that social interactions are of paramount importance to expand the current understanding of terrorism. Some groups develop a bad image of society, which can be crystallized into deviant behavior. At time of recruiting new candidates, people become engaged by emotional factors, such as friendship, the need to be accepted by peers, and even by recommendations of relatives or a girlfriend. Not only are many terrorists educated in Western societies, but also they are citizens of those societies they eventually attack. Anyone, given certain conditions, might adopt radical goals. As Korstanje (2015a) observed, terrorism and democracy seem to be inextricably intertwined. One of the pillars of terrorism is based not only on how much fear they can instill in populations, but also in the hope of extortion directed towards nation-state.

Is terrorism inextricably linked to the state? The question whether insurgents lack any representation in government or election system is one of the aspects that characterize terrorism. These cells not only have been excluded from democracy, but also from the parliamentary participation (Piazza 2008). This point of entry is very interesting since suggests that terrorism derived from democracy. Nor poverty neither psychological frustration are key factors that explain the radicalization of terrorists. Doubtless, they are political agents who have developed a radical mind respecting to outer world (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008). Additionally, the problem of mobility, tourism and the current system of transport, which needs from certain level of freedom to work, has been played a fertile ground for bombing or terrorist attacks over the last decades (Korstanje and Clayton 2012).

Michael Brown alerts that the agenda of security has changed for governments in this new century. We are witnessing specific problems which are not necessarily linked to classic warfare or clashes between states. We now face new 'threats' which are embedded within nation-states. Governments struggle not only to prevent non-military attacks, as the case of terrorism, but to regulate the media without affecting democratic rights.

CHAPTER 6

The Travel and Tourism Industry

Introduction

Throughout earlier sections we focused on the intersection of terrorism and tourism, as well as the influence of free transit doctrine for the formation of nation-state. What was evident is that terrorism has changed its tactics in the way terror is instilled in society. Some decades ago, terrorism selected celebrities and important personalities as Chief Executive officers (CEO), Police officers, Politicians or even celebrities as main targets of their attacks. Now, these targets set the pace to new crueler strategies, in part due to the indifference of public audience which resulted gradually from the process of desensitization by media exposition (Moten 2010; Howie 2010; Eid 2014) that direct an explicit violence against global tourists or travellers that triplicates the probability to maximize fear, at lower costs.

The same concern is discussed in the book *The Political Economy of Terrorism* where Enders and Sandler (2011) argue convincingly that modern terrorism looks the same goals than global businessmen, which means the maximization of their objectives to minimum costs. While bombing leisure-spots represent an act of cowardice, because innocent tourists are assassinated, what remains clear is that the media coverage disseminates rapidly the news to the entire world. Viewers understand that the same event may very well happen in their respective holidays, in which case, a climate of panic surfaces. At the same time, terrorist spend lower

M.E. Korstanje, *Terrorism, Tourism and the End of Hospitality in the 'West'*, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-52252-4_6

costs in their planning since the deaths of few members shock the global community. As Luke Howie (2010, 2012) brilliantly said, policy makers and specialist should understand that terrorists do not want a lot of people dead, they want a lot of people watching!.

On 17 November of 1997, news about the massacre of 62 people (most of them tourists) struck Western public opinion. This was one of the first incidents that had tourists as main target. The event was known as the Luxor Massacre. At that instance six gunmen killed 58 foreign visitors and four policemen in the Temple of Hatshepsut in Egypt. From that moment on, not only sociologists but also tourism-researchers understood the impossibility of so-called host–guest encounters. For some reasons, local communities manifested an overt hostility to Western tourists, a point which occupied the time of professional fieldworkers writing books, theses and articles for journals. The second major event was 9/11, where four civilian airplanes were directed against the World Trade Center in New York, and the department of defense at the Pentagon in Virginia. Whatever the case may be, the situation deteriorated when Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi declared jihad against 'tourism and modern hot-spots of consumption'. The concept of mobilities had been historically manipulated by Western powers to impose a one-way discourse which aimed to discipline the Other as inferior to European masters.

To put this in numbers, in 1984 Islamic terrorism only attacked the US embassy in Beirut, while further attacks were planned on synagogues, temples or the hijacking of planes for 1985. After 2001, the successive attacks on tourist resorts and complexes significantly increased in number. Not only were European countries like Spain and England touched, but also, recently, Paris, Brussels and Turkey have experienced blows in moments of patriotic celebration or in the context of relaxation. This global terror seems to point to spaces of leisure, consumption and tourism where the mechanisms of surveillances are slim.

For further clarification, the present chapter focuses not only in the problem of terrorism, but how and in what way it affected the entertainment industry. To expand our current understanding why audiences are captivated to watch news containing extreme violence or events that perturb viewers' sensibilities and do not let to watching them, it is important to develop our concept of 'Thana-Capitalism', developed in earlier approaches. This suggests a new facet of capitalism where the Other's suffering becomes the main commodity that mediates between institutions and citizens.

The Confrontational Other in Modern Culture

Given the discussion in these terms, Anna Stilz (2009) eloquently reminds that the sense of a legitimate state, whose laws should be obeyed and followed by citizens, should be based on two tenets. At a first blush, freedom is a key-factor to ensure distribute obligations, which are expressed in equal conditions for all citizens. Without freedom, those laws emanating from the state may be rejected. Though Stilz did not realize on this, we suppose that the liberal thinking paves the pathways for the rise of discontent, separatism or even terrorism because there are no clear what the boundaries of freedom seem to be. What one group considers as an intrusive act of government that attacks their rights others would be trumpeted as necessary for society's well-being. In respect to this caveat which remains present in Rousseau's argument, she clarifies,

> *Rousseau also imposes a fourth criterion on legitimacy: this is the criterion of sufficient trust or solidarity. Citizens in general must be disposed to manifest a concern with the freedom and well-being of all their compatriots, and not simply with a partial subset of the citizenry, if the law they produce are to be legitimate. If this condition can be met, suggest Rousseau, then one has reason to believe that the authority of the laws will guarantee one's freedom as independence to choose in the absence of domination* (Stilz 2009; 94)

This argument fits well with the viewpoint of many liberals who assume that solidarity only can be legitimated if democracy is accepted as a the main form of government. This suggests that an egalitarian state of justice can only be achieved within democracy, insofar we voluntarily submit ourselves to the democratic state. Secondly, the theory of freedom-as-independence, which is backed by Stilz, ignores democracy's status as a social construct, moulded in Europe during few centuries that has little to do with Hellenic democracy. As stated in other sections, understanding the loyalty of citizens to their state on the basis of two abstract allegories – democracy and freedom – suggests two important things. On one hand, the same cultural background that formed nation-state can be attacked to produce a gap with central administration. This is exactly what David Kelman dubbed 'counterfeits politics'. Secondly, no less true is that if the ideals on freedom, egalitarianism and democracy are politically constructed according to a state, as Stilz noted, serious risks of manipulation of these ideals emerge. This happens exactly with the theory of conspiracy,

populist leaders and terrorist groups emulate. Social scientist of all stripe examined the problems of ideology in politics, though they often consider 'the conspiracy theory' as a pathological reaction of politics. The nation-state is legitimated by an original silence that helps create two alternative poles: one official, the other unofficial. In modern times, it is as though 'conspiracy theory' not only invaded all spheres of societies, no matter the culture or language, but is aimed at deciphering an invisible and fabricated story, which cannot be empirically validated. This unofficial story works as 'an emptied gap', each leader fill at its discretion. Kelman holds the thesis that politics does not rest on an ideology which is previously determined by elite, as Marxian scholars preclude; rather politics is constituted through a negotiated narrative that secrets real facts. The success of this mechanism grounds in two contrasting sides, them and us, to pose confrontational relations. Starting from this premise, it is not accident that conspiracy narrative has a double-edged structure where the visible official story is being eroded by the secret one. More interesting is Kelman's explanation of social and political struggle as a game, rather than a top-down hierarchal line of power. Here, Kelman dangles that conspiracy seems not to be a symptom of crisis, but the necessary requisite for one discourse to set the pace for others. Politics, in his terms, can be defined as a state of emergency, because it only allows for a narrative of a community (us) which is threatened by the discourse of an enemy (them), which compromises the future of 'good politics' and idealized society. Not only does Kelman's project defy the argument of classical political theory by posing politics in connection with secrets, but opens the doors for a paradoxical situation. When a social and political system is reproduced, communities face a threatening event. This simply happens because 'politics occurs when one discourse is being undermined by other contrasting voice'.

Certainly, D. Ray Griffin argues that at least there are some serious doubts in the conspiracy theory that points out George Bush were directly involved in planning the terrorist attacks. In contrast to other left-wing colleagues, Griffin proposes an alternative view to reconsider the existent evidence around this case. If not the president, other top-ranked officials were committed in being informed that the United States would be target of terrorist attacks. This event, undoubtedly, became in a new Pearl Harbor that benefited many industries and interests, presenting a new international policy to take a total control of the world. Unfortunately, the US government prioritized its interests in other countries, like Middle East, rather than homeland safety (Ray-Griffin 2004). If the literature of

terrorism abounds, why only four authors are representative of the topic. On this question, terrorism refers to a dialectic relationship of hate with two identifiable actors, a state unable to prevent the next attack that often recurs to torture and human right violation, a group of insurgents who has been pushed for some reason to clandestine life. Terrorism is a dialectic relationship that involves both sides. At some extent, terrorism employs the technical advances of West and its mobile resource to give a striking message: nobody is safe from this moment on. Terrorism is the world of business by other means

Last but not least, Kelman's account suggests that the construction of politics produces higher levels uncertainty and disability at the same time, in which case the power can be renovated. Though ruling classes change, the rules by means these classes take power remain. Our thesis is contrary-wise to Kelman. We would argue that conspiracy closes the doors for questions about ideology. Starting from the belief that narratives of conspiracy, whatever their nature may be, explain a desire to keep the status quo, it is almost impossible for conspiracy to engineer a radical change. To illustrate, take the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York. The ideology fabricated and transmitted to the world says that the United States is a mega-political power, whose hegemony, after the Soviet bloc collapse, now reaches every part of the world. This American power, from its inception, attempted to expand egalitarian values and democracy to all countries to strengthen the well-being of their citizens. But if the United States is this benevolent all-seeing eye, why was 9/11 not prevented?

A tentative –conspiracy- theory answers what would be that American officials were unfamiliar with the possibilities of an attack happens. Here, the conspiracy theory represents the other pole of ideology. It fills in for the missing piece of the ideological position. Any conspiracy exhibits valid efforts to make controllable what is in nature uncontrollable. Whenever reality overrides the fiction, the theory of conspiracy responds to the questions that ideology keeps open. Accusations of conspiracy theories work as a mechanism to legitimate the official discourse, silencing those voices which may bring a radical shift to the system. Conspiracy theory functions as an epithet which plays an important part in ideology, not social or political theory. Likewise, in psychology, conspiracy and paranoia are not pathologies; rather, they are adaptive mechanisms of the frustrated ego to an intransigent environment. Conspiracy theories surface to explain the failures of the ego to reach life goals, and they can lead to the rejection of the 'reality principle'.

Therefore, one might speculate terrorists not only operate from the fertile ground that offers 'conspirational landscapes', but also have no familiarity or previous connection with their victims. They even, contrary to what Media shows, do not hate their victims. If this is correct, the thesis that Muslim terrorists attack Western tourists by resentment or retaliating all the frustration they feel, rests on shaky foundations. Even this represents an ethnocentric discourse aimed at considering capitalism and democracy as the best of feasible worlds, while the rest of the world remains as 'an uncivilized and dangerous place', which merits to be disciplined. This was exactly the case, documented by journalist Jacob Weisberg in his book *The Bush Tragedy*. A new class called as 'radcons', radical conservatives, disposed that the best course of action to prevent terrorism is pushing the boundaries of democracy to the rest of the world. In so doing, Bush's administration disposed to Iraq-led invasion to import just there the project of democracy. Needless to say this not only did not solve the problem, but also aggravated it once Hussein was killed. A new more virulent group ISIS, whose leaders were expelled from Al-Qaeda for the brutality of their acts, consolidated in Syria and Iraq. Other analysts agreed that 'the war on terror' accelerated a much deep moral decomposition, where critical thinking declined. Radcons not only imposed a climate of social Darwinism, where the strongest agents remained the right to survive, but broke the system of checks and balance in America. As Simon (2001) puts it, terrorism purported the same role played by local crime in Reagan's days. In Radcons' eyes, it allowed taking the importance of governance through terror to overcome the obstacles left by democracy and the autonomy of branches. Radcons do not consider negotiation as a sign of strengthen, but weakness. The imposition of force and direct intervention in autonomous countries derive from a long-dormant belief America is the cradle of chosen peoples, whose manifest destiny fits with imperialism, oddly, disciplining 'rogue states'. Robert Kagan, a realist analyst, laments Europe is more prone to Venus while America to Mars.

> *Europe is turning away from power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation. It is entering a post-historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Immanuel Kant's perpetual peace. Meanwhile United States remains mired in history in history, exercising power in an anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable, and where true security and the defense and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might.* (Kagan 2002: 4)

In an erudite edition comprising 37 chapters, Crocker, Hampson and All (2007) assert that the US-led invasions to Middle East have produced unexpected consequences for international relations, as well as the ways of seeing international politics. In this masterful work, specialists discuss the problem of violence and the array of possible reactions of the United States after the end of the Cold War. One of the main limitations of the United States to struggle against terrorism appears to be associated to its impossibility to operate on dirty-wars or small-scale skirmishes. With the Soviet Union out of the game, the United States has no clear focus to calibrate its military machine. Quite aside from this, what seems to be clear is how international terrorism selects civilian targets much of them linked to the world of tourism or leisure as an efficient instrument to produce political instability.

The Fear of Travelling Abroad

Anthropologically speaking, the habits of travelling are common sense to all cultures of the globe. Many theories have been developed thanks to the experiences and stories derived from these practices. In his book on America, François-René de Chateaubriand (1768-1848) says that there are two types of traveller: those who go by land and those who go by sea. Many discoveries that today shed light on our geographies, derived from travellers' courage to go beyond the boundaries of their respective civilizations (Chateaubriand 1944). One of the main problems in understanding the potential power of travel writing depends on the attention this genre receives from generation to generation. Travels activate social imaginaries which follow imperial interests, along with landscapes and cultural encounters. Rachel Irwin (2007) alludes to the encounter among ethnicities as a culture shock, which ranges from a stage of understanding to a profound crisis –honeymoon, crisis, recovery and adjustment. While tourists generally are embedded in a honeymoon phase, the native Other is imagined as a polite and gorgeous friend. Explorers, anthropologists, and aid-workers face another, more disappointing facet. A radical crisis of identity may take some months. When this arrives, the foreigner has serious problems in coping with natives. Depending on how this is resolved, the visitor will return to home or stay. The process of recovery consists in the assimilation of all information, customs, and practices to survive in this new society. After this stage, the adjustment will take place. Depending on how the guests are negotiating with natives, their

knowledge has further value for others. Tourists, for example are subject to peripheral and superficial encounters with natives while anthropologists produce another kind of knowledge.

In parallel, some specialists called attention to the sentiment of exemplarity forged historically in the core of the United States. Simon Coleman (2013) argues that American fundamentalist religious culture is linked to a much broader association between the religious and political order. Those orders, religious and political, are charged with reforming the world, and since it is a dangerous place, the sins of the world should be expiated by sacrifice, and renovated by means of grace and fear. Unlike Catholics, who sought salvation through charity, Anglo-Saxons preferred to embrace 'predestination' as the mediator between the man and his faith. Richard Hofstadter (1992) toyed with the idea that the rising sentiment of exemplarity in American thought was reinforced by the introduction of Social Darwinism, at the same time that the United States was becoming a colonial power in its own right in the late nineteenth century. The survival of the fittest associated with the virtue of race reinforced an America-centrism (Hofstadter 1992).

Hofstadter (1992) remarks that one of the primary aspects used to rationalize competition among entrepreneurs in the United States was the adoption of social Darwinism as espoused in works by such social theorists as William Graham Sumner and Herbert Spencer. Social Darwinism, unlike Darwin's own biological theory of natural selection and speciation, postulated two significant axioms which reinforced the sentiment of exceptionalism, which itself came from the Puritan tradition in New England (FitzGerald 1986). Social Darwinism was based on survival of fittest and social determinism. Hofstadter argues that the legitimacy of law to ensure the equality of all citizens was not sufficient to explain why some actors had success while others fail. As a supra-organism, social structure overrides the interpretation of law. To evolve to a higher stage, society should accept the struggle for survival as the primary cultural value.

In this view, social advance depends on the wealth one generation can pass to the next. Accordingly, 'primitive man, who long ago withdrew from the competitive struggle and ceased to accumulate capital goods, must pay with a backward and unenlightened way of life' (Hofstadter 1992: 58). Therefore, millionaires are not the result of greed, but natural selection. They have been selected by their strength, tested in their success in business and their abilities to adapt to the competitive environment.

Those who are not wealthy are simply less fit. A political consequence of this line of thought is that states should not promote charity as a governmental policy; if this happens they run the risks of general social decline. The society should be recycled allowing the big fish to eat the small fish.

In this respect, the same sentiment of exceptionalism that pushes Americans beyond the laws, leads them into panic when they are subject to external attacks. Americans believe that they are struggling against a mythical evilness, and in their sacred-mission they should pay a cost. Living with fear not only exhibits such a cost for being part of chosen peoples, but also emulates long-dormant anxieties.

The Theory of Non-Places Reconsidered

Over recent decades, the theory of non-places resonated in the academic circles and cultural studies worldwide. The term was originally coined by French Ethnologist Marc Augè who understands that the advance of modernity and mobility is undermining the basis of social trust and tradition. As this backdrop is given, Augé takes his cue from previous experience as long as his fieldworks in Africa, where he dangled the possibility to connect the relational perspective with the manner the meaning of soil are figured. If we define a place as a space of tradition, Auge adds, a non-place becomes in the opposite, a much broader trend towards nothingness. The French ethnologist realized that travellers – in particular, modern tourists - are hyper-mobile agents enshrouded in a veil of anonymity. Until travellers are checked out by the customs and migratory officers, they lack citizenship or identity; they are mere consumers who wander at the airport shopping malls. The idea is here that with the involvement of corporations in airport design such spaces are stripped off any association with the land in which they were built (Lloyd 2003). Even the identities of global tourists are only validated before boarding their flight (Augé 2008). The question of whether airports produce 'anonymity' is linked to the antinomy between remoteness and closeness, affecting even perceptions of the very subject of anthropology. Augé situates the origin of anthropology in the place of the other, which is an exotic, different place. Nowadays, however, the other is more like us and lives more like us. This means that the anthropological boundaries formed around notions of 'us versus them' dissipate or are being blurred (Augé 2001). For Augé, today the traditional foundations of Western epistemologies are challenged, because modern ethnologists have to re-evaluate the tools and methods by which

they study far-away others, who are more and more like us (Augé 1996). The problem Augé debates, which reappears in Johannes Fabian's *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object* (2014), suggests that anthropology consists in the eternal quest of new methods and objects to redraw the connection of self and time. The observation acquires a political resonance in our argument by homological means: just like anthropology but also modernity return to familiar spaces to avoid the presence of Otherness, so modern states (the guardians of identity, familiarity and sameness) track down and deport aliens because they do not belong to the community occupying a designated territory. Such exclusions are validated by those 'facts' and 'truths' (a-la Foucault) which are covered by the media, prior to their empirical verification. For this reason, 'fictionalization' played a crucial role in the expansion of hyper-modernity. From this point of view, identity is formed by the super-excess of the present, which leads to the destruction the past (Augé 1999). The saturation of sense by hyper-modernity has been determined by the technological advance in visual entertainment and transport. Augé advances here a critique of 'consequentialism,' a doctrine blurring the connection of causes and effects. Consequentialism imposes responsibilities on the subject without evaluating his or her environment. In Boundaries and Allegiances, Samuel Scheffler (2001) draws attention to how modernism has changed our moral conception of liberty and responsibility. Citizens have duties and rights, but their moral character is judged only by what they do, not what they may be prevented from doing. Consequentialism was endorsed by liberal philosophers as an educational step towards morphing individuals as citizens: regardless of their intentions, their acts are penalized by considering their consequences (Anta Felez 2013). Such problematic causal schematization leads for Augé to a decline of common sense perception but also its moral basis. In earlier works, Augé alludes to tourism as 'an impossible journey.' In the sites of leisure, the ego is separated from its territorial attachment to symbolic imaginaries where the id is sovereign. Not only do non-places facilitate the circulation of persons who are seen as commodities, they undermine the influence of past in the present, endorsing consequentialist rules. The sites of history and identity are being gradually obliterated by the machine of consumption, which is accelerated by hyper-modernity. Augé clarifies that the organization of space and the consequent constitution of places are spaces of togetherness, where social groups structure their practices (Augé 1996, 1997, 1999, 2002, 2001, 2008). Here is where a pungent question is pertinent, if airports represents

spaces of anonymity, as Augé stressed, why do terrorist cell perpetrate their attack at airports?

An ethnographic study conducted by Korstanje (2015a, 2015b, 2015c) at airports reveals contrasting findings. One the most important aspects of modern commercial flying is the variety of check-in rituals performed at different stages and carefully controlled by different institutions. Check-in rituals correspond to three significant facets. The first one begins when the traveller appears at airport to check in. At the desk, the airline will weigh the luggage and issue a ticket which may be presented at the final destination. The second stage is control by the migration office, customs and police. Each one emulates diverse cultural aspects of modern hypermobile society. Customs represents the control over the circulation of goods, which forms nation-states, migration office applies exclusively on the displacement of persons. States apply hospitality (the welcome principle) only to those who have identity and money to return. As Derrida and Dufourmantelle (2000) puts it, restricted hospitality only can be offered to those who can pay for it. The etymology of the term, check-in, results exclusivity in a control, which is successfully passed; it denotes 'being in' the circle of privileged persons. Rather, others that have no financial resources to consume in hypermobile capitalism, as migrants and blue-collar workers are subject to immobility and ignominy. Being controlled in this world exhibits a need to belong to an 'outstanding class.' In parallel, in the third facet, the police check that the 'incomer' is not a dangerous person, certifying that homeland security is not being compromised. The airport police may body-search for prohibited objects, alluding to what Jose Anta Felez denominated the disciplinary mechanism of control on tourists' bodies. These three institutions, migration, customs and police, work together to maintain the security of the nation-state. Airports work in this vein as ideological mechanisms of discipline and control so passengers embrace the cultural values of current societies. Far from being non-places, they are hot-spots of politics and authority that marks the boundaries of passenger's regulations. The otherness, which is ontologically unknown, is being scrutinized, disciplined through its passage by airport. If this newcomer fits all conditions to be accepted, a conditional hospitality is conferred. Stamping the passport is a mark that traveller brings up to the departure and a solid reason why Auge's diagnosis of airport is still mistaken. As archetypes of current society, airports embody the guiding values of society, which are expressed in the following axioms: trade (customs), security (police), and mobility-hospitality (migration office). All these cultural values seem to be esteemed by

modern politics. Airports are selected as target of terrorism not only because they represent places of discipline, where the Other is scrutinized, but also because through these spaces hospitality is offered or rejected. Those passengers who are symbolically validated to receive hospitality should be placed to different controls at airports. Attacking these spaces not only produces an extreme fear in society but also dissuades the state from accepting terrorists' claims. For that reason, the concept of non-place, as formulated by Marc Augé, should be seriously reconsidered. Another second aspect that needs to be discussed is the excessive attention given by Media to terrorism-related news.

Terror Goes Through the Screens

Australian researcher, Luke Howie (2012) says that terrorists do not want a lot of people dead, rather they want a lot of people watching. If we concluded that tourism is terrorism by other means, now we are in conditions to delve into the leading role of media disseminating terror.

In his book Terror on Screen (Terror on Screen (2010) Howie explores the role of witnessing as the key factor that explains why terrorism consolidated over the recent decades throughout the society of consumption. Howie alerts that 9/11 was a founding event which not only changed how security was conceived by analysts, but also pre-empted the figurations of risks. Howie goes on to say that,

> *The witness is a central figure of this book. I base my arguments in this book on the assumption that no witness terrorism is to be a victim of terrorism since, as Jenkins has argued, terrorist want a lot of people watching, not just a lot of people dead. Those who watch, those who bear witness, are the intended targets of terrorism* (Howie 2010: p 7).

Similarly-minded to celebrities, terrorists are in quest of attention, and everything what they do, is oriented to achieve such a goal. Mass-media reproduces not only a biased image of 9/11 but animates (paragraphing Baudrillard) a culture of simulacra. Introducing readers into a new theory to understand terrorism, Howie assesses that since terrorists pursue the same logic than celebrities no surprisingly, they need a climate of polarization where the logic of us and them prevails. In that way, the other is demonized or considered an enemy of the nation. Based on a rich qualitive research, Howie dissects the cultural background which facilitated 9/11, while discussing in detail the concepts of trauma-scape or theatre which were of

paramount importance to explain the culture of witnessing. It is necessary to recreate a new epistemology of terrorism, beyond the appearance of pseudo-experts who feed the ethnocentric discourse media reinforces.

We live in a culture of witnessing which evokes our own vulnerability as city dwellers, but in so doing, many racist practices emerge to point on Muslim collectives. Indeed, one of the main risks consists in 'islamophobia', or any other related chauvinist expression of racism. All lies in the same Pandora box. What remains evident is that without witness terrorism would never exist.

> *The spectacle of terrorism depends of the co-existence of witnesses, images of terrorism, and – in contemporary times- cities. 9/11 happened, it happened on 11 September 2001 in New York City, Washington DC and a field of Pennsylvania. The image, however, is not bound to this temporal and geographic logic. 9/11 was an atemporal event that can be understood in time and space in apparently unlimited coordinates of temporality and spatiality. It resides in the desert of the real of the contemporary city* (p. 60).

As never before, terrorism is mediated to affect not only involved neighbours but a vast range of audiences even situated in Australia, Argentina or everywhere else. This happens because the power of amplification is centred on the needs of taking the attention of public, for enhancing further profits. Commercial-oriented campaigns against terrorism are directed by 'pseudo-scholars' who speculate with terrorism only for gaining recognition in the broadcast air. For Howie, the culture of witnessing was constructed in a post 9/11 context, where American citizens wanted to learn why Muslims would have developed hostility against them. Howie unfolds an interesting point of view which is combined with higher-erudition on the legacy of Jean Baudrillard, and his theory of Simulacra. Citing the Matrix Saga, Howie sheds light on how 9/11 posed as a 'leading event' that obscured many other similar acts of terrorism in other peripheral cities. At some extent, we think that 9/11 was the first declaration of terrorism against our civilization, and not only this, we reply that they 'hate us' simply because we living in comfortable conditions dotted of technology and prosperity. Well, confirming this caveat, we are ignoring that the same strongholds of urban zones such as media communication, information, or transport system, is used for terrorism to instill fear. 9/11 represented point of rupture, a gap, between witnessing and a screen culture of terrorism. The culture of celebrities, as it was

studied by scholars concerned by Dark Tourism sites where visitors consume spaces of mass death, endorse notoriety not only to cities whipped by terrorism, but to survivors and even 'pseudo-academicians' whose opinions are on the head of journalist corporation. This uncanny obsession for witnessing created a new terrorism-as-celebrity culture:

> *Through 9/11, the Twin Towers and NYC have attained a renewed celebrity status. In a post 9/11 world, NYC and the Twin Towers share something in common with Paris Hilton, Brad Pitt and Britney Spears – people want to see them, people want to know about them, and when their image appear on television and in other media spaces it is difficult for witnesses to look away* (p. 70)

One of the main contributions of Howie to our argument consists in the suddenly-driven changes after 9/11 which altered politics in a post conserving society. He formulates the thesis that 'a terror voyeurism' (which coincides with our theory of Thana-Capitalism) ignited a serious shift in capitalism using fear as a mechanism of discipline to impose economic policies otherwise would be amply rejected.

Terror in Times of Thana-Capitalism

What are the commonalties of Dark Tourism and terrorism which meanwhile are stipulated in third chapter?, is Dark Tourism conducive to sadism? Why Dark Tourism revitalizes the damages suffered by terrorism? In what way does Dark Tourism affect the formation of a genuine memory of traumatic events?

In 1992 German sociologist, Ulrich Beck published *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*. Per his viewpoint, modernity sets the pace to a new stage of production, where risk played a vital role mediating between structure and agency. In retrospect, there was a founding event that marked the beginning of risk-society, the nuclear accident happened in Chernobyl, Ukraine. This was the first time Western nations witnessed not only how the planet can be eradicated, but also the inevitable emergence of a new paradox. While technology played a crucial role to make the life of people easier and safer, new global risks would place humankind in jeopardy as never before. In the society of risk, Beck and his colleagues said, the process of reflexibility allowed laypeople to reach further information respecting to their fathers' generations. As a result of this, in a world where citizens are equal before the risks, globalization contributed to produce closed-systems, which are oriented to

mass-consumption. This means that the risk-production is inverse proportional to the distribution of wealth. Privileged classes made the decision for risks others lower classes should face. Anthony Giddens, who does not need presentation, compliments Beck's thesis that reflexibility not only introduced a culture based on risk perception, but instilled a radical doubt changing the climate where people were moving. Underpinned the proposition in the Attachment theory, Giddens understands that social trust functions as a protective cocoon in the same way, care-tackers emotionally develop a secure base for children. Any potential failure that undermines the social trust will result in serious doubts in its adulthood, Giddens adds. All the advances and technological breakthroughs recently-adopted to maximize profits in contemporary societies paved the ways for the rise of new risks (like doubts) that affected the pre-existing sense of security. In that way, though Beck and Giddens deserve recognition by the accuracy of their developments, no less true is that capitalism is far from being such a world where all citizens are equal. Even, there are interesting studies that discuss the enlarging gap between rich and poor nations (Bauman 2007). This point was hotly discussed by Niklas Luhmann (1990) in his criticism to Beck and Giddens respecting to the diagnosis of capitalism. While risks are enrooted in the principle of 'contingency', which means that decision-maker has the possibility to avoid its immediate effects, dangers or threats are externally imposed to the subject, without anything to do. The precautionary platform, where Beck and Giddens are adjoined, misjudges this by endorsing working classes the responsibilities for events that are produced beyond their control. Luhmann adds, the groups that make decisions never face the risks. To set an example, while Airplane accidents are threats for passengers but a risks for the owner who had direct intervention of costs materials (Luhmann 1990). In this respect, Luhmann dangles the possibility that those groups who made the decision are not the same who feels the risks in its skin. Rather, lower-classes are convinced they are co-managers of global risks, in a way that elides the elite from its responsibilities. Although some critical voices held the thesis risk perception works as an ideological instrument in order to protect the interest of elite (Klein 2007; Bauman 2007; Korstanje 2015c, 2015d). What is inherent to the expansion of capitalism seems not to be risk, but the individualism that leads to a much broader climate of Darwinism. As Hobsbawm wrote,

> *In practice, the new society operated not by the wholesale destruction of all that had inherited from the old society, but by selectively adapting the heritage of the past to its own use. There is no sociological puzzle about the readiness of bourgeois*

> *society to introduce a radical individualism in economics… and to tear up all traditional social relations in the process* (Hobsbawm 1995: p. 16).

In his recent book, *A Difficult World* Korstanje (2015a) observed that capitalism should not be seen as a wonderland even though it was indeed successful in expanding to other landscapes and geographies. At a closer look, Capitalism is centred on what Hofstadter dubbed 'social Darwinism', a biological doctrine adapted to proclaim the supremacy of White race over others, and even the Anglo-Saxons over other cultures. As Darwin noted species adapt to environment to survive. Those who evince the better skills for this adaptation will rule over others who will perish (the survival of the fittest). Replicated this theory to social world, Galton (Darwin's nephew) in England and Graham Sumner in the United States proposed an innovative model. Those races whose strongholds have consolidated in their adaptation to environment have more probabilities to reach wealthier conditions than other races. Anglo-Saxons were ethnically and culturally superior to other groups since supposedly they evolved in more success economic organizations. The theory based on the survival of the fittest was replaced by '*the survival of strongest'*. The second element manipulated by capital-owners is risk. Even Beck only says a partial truth at time of describing risk society. The fact is that richer classes dangled the probabilities to buy further protection than more vulnerable lower classes. In this way, one might speculate that risk-society produces serious economic imbalances in workers who are endorsed to manage the external risks on their own. In recent times, however, a new type of capitalism up-surged: Thana-Capitalism.

If the society of risk rested on the logic of protection, Thana-Capitalism makes from others' death not only a criterion of entertainment, but also a sign of superiority for those who witnessing how others are martyrized. A clear example of this can be found in the obsession for global audience to consume terrorism-related news. Though these audiences are shocked and disrupted by the cruelty of terrorist tactics, they are subject to witness them. The term Thana-Capitalism comes from Greek *Thanatos,* which means 'death'. In our end, the attacks on World Trade Center (2001) marked the onset of Thana-Capitalism not only because death was commoditized to serve to the culture of spectacle, but also because the illusions of exegetes of risk society went forever.

On another hand, at the turn of the century, new segments of tourists started to visit spaces of mass mourning, death and obliteration. What these tourists looked not only defied the classic apollonian sense of

beautiness, but also the patterns of former holiday-makers. Over recent years, the suffering of others became to be the main attraction for many visitors and tourists insofar some spaces hit by terrorism were recycled to be showed 24 hours day. In this vein, it is important not to lose the sight that spaces as Ground-zero in New York, New Orleans which was devastated by Katrina or Auschwitz-Birkenau Museum, situated as top tourist destinations. The reasons why this happens were manifold. However, at a closer look, we realize that the concept of death is not only present in tourism practices, but in other institutions as well. The Darwinist allegory of the survival of strongest can be found as the main culture value of Thana-Capitalism in a way that is captivated by cultural entertainment industries and cinema. Films as Hunger Games portray an apocalyptic future where the elite govern with iron rule different colonies. A wealthy capitol which is geographically situated in Rocky Mountain serves as an exemplary centre, a hot-spot of consumption and hedonism where the spectacle prevails. The oppressed colonies are rushed to send their warriors who will struggle with others to death, in a bloody game that keeps people exciting. Although all participants work hard to enhance their skills, only one will reach the glory. The same can be observed in realities as Big Brother, where participants neglect the probabilities to fail simply because they over-valorize their own strongholds. This exactly seems to be what engages citizens to compete with others to survive, to show 'they are worth of survive'. In sum, the *sentiment of exceptionality* triggered by these types of ideological spectacles disorganizes the social trust. To understand better the modern prone for disasters, it is necessary to review how 'the psychology of survivors' works. As specialized literature suggests, in post disaster-context, victims show a disorganized behaviour because of their extreme loss. Anyway, besides the tragedy, they understand not all is lost. After all, God not only gave a new opportunity but also protected them from death. Despite the morbid landscape of mass-destruction, survivors fleshed out the idea they survived by their own virtues and skills. Just there where others have died, survivors have showed their temperament. Because of their intelligence, physical strength, or morality, survivors believe they have a sacred-mandate, originally associated with justice or revenge. In contexts of pain, reactions like these are natural and corresponded with the resilience process of a community, which means the possibilities of victims to overcome frustrations to recover from adversity. The problem lies in the time-frame this behaviour takes. This happens because unless dully regulated, the 'syndrome of post victims' may very

well leads to exacerbated sentiment of xenophobia, nationalism, or chauvinism. The idea of exceptionalism by means survivors sublimate their pain leads towards *a state of narcissism,* where they feel special, superior, more-civilized and outstanding respecting to Others (Korstanje 2015c, 2016). As Klein hinted, when the allegories of disasters are systematically reproduced in global audience, the effects are given to reproduce misery as a form of gratification for witnesses. Though this is used as instrument for ideology, by disciplining others, at the same time, the necessary trust for society to works is disorganized and re-channeled towards consumption. The new stage of Thana-Capitalism needs from disasters and trauma (even terrorism) to persist.

From a psychological angle, Thana-Capitalism offers death (of others) as a *Spectacle* not only revitalizes the daily frustrations, but enhances a harmed ego. Visiting spaces of disasters during holidays, or watching news on terrorist attacks at home, all represents part of the same issue: *the advent of new class death seekers.*

Furthermore, as fieldworkers we have developed a psychological profile after visiting several spaces of Dark Tourism in third and first worlds. At some extent, far from being a naïve activity, tourism exhibits the main values of society and her economic production. Therefore, observing closer how the patterns of holiday-makers as well as leisure practices evolved is a valid lens to understand much deeper social changes. Detractors of industrialism, as Hofstadter, ignite the discussion around social Darwinism. We are playing a game, which has fewer probabilities of success. In Thana-Capitalism we fell happy for the Others' failure. The competition fostered by the ideology of capitalism offers the salvation for few ones, at the expense of the rest. To realize the dream of joining the 'selected people', we accept the rules. Whenever one of our direct competitors fails, we feel an insane happiness. We clarify that a similar mechanism is activated during our visit to Dark Tourism sites: we do not strive to understand, we are just happy because we escaped death and have more chances to win the game of life. At some extent, we validate the idea that disasters do not affect cultures, rather, are cultures pre-determined by earlier disasters or traumatic events. Interesting evidence can be found in founding myths, as in the case of Noah where God disposes of an apocalyptic natural disaster for the construction of a new exemplary culture. At a first sight, Noah is the first survivor and the only chosen by God to continue with humankind on the earth. Doubtless, the force and influence of this myth in the

capitalist system is stronger than other cultures, simply because paves the way for the configuration of a sentiment of exemption where the destruction of all is based in the salvation of a few. Ideologically speaking, Noah's story leads to 'a process of social Darwinism', in which case capitalism was successfully reproduced worldwide. Besides there is an encrypted message in Noah's myth which should be deciphered, oddly, God perpetrates the '*first Genocide*' against humankind while Noah kept this in silence. Noah would alert humankind of God's plans but not only does he follow in constructing the ark (introducing the needs of selection for survival), but he is in compliance with God. Once the universal flood takes place, the world is divided in two, *victims and survivors* (in terms of Howie, witnesses). Henceforth, the culture of witnessing or gazing appears to legitimate the rules of a new order. Noah, who can be seen as the founding parent of this world, administered secrecy for the genocide to be perpetrated. In view of that, the universal flood reminds that all should die in order for the son of God to live forever. The same trend was reconfirmed by the Crucifixion of Christ, of course, the maximum spectacle of suffering and flagellation. One day, in a conference an Indian colleague asked me, what type of religion promotes the image of a God martyred on a Cross?

The thought struck me that Christ emulated the same problematic as Noah's Ark. The selective nature of capitalism to administer and commoditize death corresponded with an ideological message that validates status quo. Basically, as Korstanje (2016) observed, Christ's sacrifice showed amply not only the division between witnesses and victims, which was introduced by Noah, but the way that the allegory of death remains rooted in the Western core.

What is clear is that capitalism reflects an asymmetrical system where a privileged group amasses almost 80% of produced wealth while the rest is pressed to live with limited resources. As the previous backdrop, the culture of disaster within modern capitalism aims at disorganizing the social ties. In so doing, the derived narcissism is adopted as the main cultural value of society. The question whether capitalism expanded faster than analysts precluded correspond with two key factors: *the needs of being different and the needs of protection*. The society of risk sets the pace to a new capitalism, (thana-capitalism), where the presence of death allows changes otherwise would not be feasible. In days of Thana-Capitalism, the life is seen as a long trace where only one will be the winner. The death of others, which is present in media, journalism and TV programmes not only makes

us feel special because we are in contact after all, but also reminds us how special we are. This is the reason why disasters captivate global audiences. At the time, they perceive the disgrace in Others' news as reinforcing the supremacy of the West over other cultures. Secondly, leisure practices evolve as classic sun and sea tourism is changed to new forms where mass-disaster or mourning spaces are the main attraction. This new segment, known by some specialists as Thana-Tourism or Dark Tourism, recycles spaces of disasters or mass death to be visually commoditized to international consumers who need to be close to Other's death. If older leisure practices embraced an apollonian view of beauty that invited workers to spend time and money in paradise-like destinations, now we are witness of the rise of a new class: *death-seekers*. What would be more than interesting to discuss is the intersection of death and consumption and of course how in many senses, terrorism provides to Thana-Capitalism with the oxygen to form a spectacle of death, which is conducive to the sentiment of exemplarity, audience emulates. The world of Thana-Capitalism rests on the sentiment of exemplarity, but needs from 'competence' for participants to show their mastery or their skills. The others' death gives hopes to participants they are in trace. Therefore, in this world there is no cooperation but an extreme individualism. Precisely, this is the moot-point that characterizes the ideological core of Thana-Capitalism, where the needs in gazing for disasters with victimization coexist. To put this in brutally, this is a society that valorizes death over other social values.

Conclusion

To cut a long story short, Thana-Capitalism alludes to what Baudrillard has dubbed 'The Spectacle of Disaster', as the main criterion of attraction. Disasters provide Thana-Capitalism with the commodity to disorganize the social ties among workers in order to introduce an atmosphere of social Darwinism where all compete with all to survive. This can be observed not only in cultural entertainment industries but in other institutions as well, as a new trend in tourism to visit spaces of mass death and mourning. Far from pursuing educational aims, rather these sites are aesthetically designed to make feel visitors they are special. In a secular society where Gods have gone forever, life is imagined as a long race where only few are mythically empowered to win. The death of others represents a new opportunity to feel one is still in the trace. This confers an aura of superiority that leads individuals to narcissism. As a result of this, mistrust

paves the ways for the social tie decline. The psychological effects of Dark Tourism, disaster-cinema, newspapers covering tragic events, local crime or even programmes like *Assassination Discovery* or *Criminal Minds* are not pretty different to what a survivor experience in post-traumatic contexts. As explained, survivors (in the case of cinema watchers) feel that after all, Gods have protected them. It triggers a necessary sentiment of narcissism that helps to the process of resilience. Survivors understand that they gained superpowers which saved their lives. Unless emotions of these natures not to controlled, it may very well disorganize the existent social bondage because people start to develop a 'pathological state of Narcissism', where the so-called *chosen people* keep the right to interact with others primus inter-pares. This is exactly the manner in which *Thana-Capitalism* works, explaining our obsessions with disasters, and others' deaths. If the sense of protection marked the pace in the society of risk, now witnessing the Others' death (even Thana-Tourism) posed as the main cultural value of Thana-Capitalism.

In this chapter, we combined the advances of other disciplines as cultural studies to expand our current understanding of terrorism and the fields of emotions. Professor Luke Howie triggered a hot debate on the role of media in fostering 'a culture of witnessing', which not only was functional to terrorist goals but disseminated fear to other continents. The globalization of fear operates in a field that centres on what Baudrillard dubbed 'the spectacle of disaster'. While there is a vicious circle between spectorship who is obsessed to captivate by consuming violence on television and mass-media which covers these sort of news to boost their profits, a solution to the scourge of terrorism is far from being solved. Even we have proponed the thesis that 9/11 and the rise of ISIS facilitated the passage to a new stage in late-capitalism, we have already named as 'Thana-Capitalism'. As stated, the risk society as it was imagined by Beck and Giddens set the pace to Thana-Capitalism, a new organization where the consumption of others' death situates as the mainstream cultural value of society.

As we shall see in next \ter, the consolidation of *Thana-Capitalism* doubtless affected tourism industry, but changed the ways the other is conceived. Needless to say, anthropology should play a leading role in providing new theories to understand 'cosmopolitanism', and the position of this global dangerous other in Europe. Discussing directly with Derrida as well as other scholars, this section focuses on how hospitality is dying. The end of hospitality represents a serious challenge of Europe simply

because it was 'the alma matter' of its rationality and social trust. At time terrorism targets 'the exemplary centre of consumption' to extortionate the developed nation-states, the surveillance at borderlands is strengthened. In the years to come, the philosophical discourse will not be given by the dichotomy between conditioned or unconditioned hospitality, but rather, this raises a pungent question, what to do with strangers?

The main thesis held here is that Western civilization erected by means of medical gaze metaphor, which consists in extirpating the affected part, to save the body. If this is applied on the case of terrorism, the Muslim community runs serious risk of being demonized and martyrized in the name of security.

CHAPTER 7

The Globalization of Fear

Introduction

This chapter centres on the problem of violence and global order. As Sheller and Urry put it, the entire world appears to be on the move, as well as the scale of travelling quadruplicated over the recent decades. Theorist of mobilities have emphasized on the contradictions of capitalism, since while a lot of people is legally invested to travels others remains quiet (Sheller and Urry 2006). Though the industry of tourism seems to be resilient to terrorism (Buckley 2000; Castaño 2005; Sheldon and Dwyer 2010; Korstanje and Ivanov 2012), it is interesting to debate to what extent the process of globalization liberated the germ of fear, which was rooted in the Puritan spirit (Skoll 2016). As we have already explained, terrorism was originally disciplined by nation-state and its ideological core incorporated to the essential ethos of capitalism. Sublimated in a less virulent form, terrorism passed to be an inoculated virus that facilitated the adoption of leisure and tourism industries to entertain workers. While we feel that touring or travelling for relaxation corresponds to a universal right, it was conferred to trade unions in order to discipline the emergent but not for that less virulent anarchist cells. This means that the Hobbesian concerns were correct, the modern nation-state was build taking the psychological fear as the touchstone. While globalization is undermining the contours of nation-states, terrorism emerges. In view of that, the present chapter offers a fertile discussion respecting to the gradual changes is suffering tourism industry as well as how globalization

M.E. Korstanje, *Terrorism, Tourism and the End of Hospitality in the 'West'*, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-52252-4_7

expanded terrorism to developed-countries. In so doing, we have to analyse the elections in the United States, as well as how a candidate who offers 'anti-hospitality' is elected President of one of most important countries in the world. It is not accident that Donald Trump was influenced by a much deeper sociocultural background, decades before unearthed by Samuel Huntington. The fear that Trump manipulates is no other than the fear of 'aliens', which is characteristic of Anglo-Saxons. If Huntington was wrong, in this chapter we shall explain the reasons why he exaggerated, in his thesis of clash of civilizations, an old prejudice against Latin Americans and other ethnic groups. In this respect, readers should understand that racism should not be pointed out as the symptom but the effect of terrorism. The boundaries of Western nations not only are being closed to strangers, but nation-states are ceding to a much complex global fear, imposed by 'the spectacularization of terrorism', which is being manipulated by media to enhance their profits (Eid 2014).

The Archetype of Donald Trump

We cannot advance in a book regarding terrorism without discussing the recent election of Donald Trump and his discourse against illegal migration, as derived effects of international terrorism. Donald Trump's victory over Hillary Clinton not only lays bare the successive economic problems of the United States which remains unresolved after the global financial crisis of 2008 adjoined to the expansion of Islamic fundamentalism, but the struggle in the heart of a nation, which debates between two fears. Though we have no accurate evidence to suggest Trump is a racist, instead we may very well infer in the climate of 'white-supremacy' his victory wakes up. The terror of founding parents to the 'tyranny', a sentiment very well exploited by Clinton, juxtaposes with the fear of the otherness, embodied by Trump and his project to close the borders. Of course, Trump's ethnocentrism can be framed into what specialists know as 'principle of exemplarity', which is enrooted in the ideological core of America. Such a doctrine suggests that Americans form a special collective, dotted and chosen by God to conduct his divine plan in earth. In that way, one might speculate that Americans believe the law does not apply for them. As special men they remain outside the law. This legacy comes from Puritan Spirit which not only tainted the cultural tenets of the United States but played a vital role in configuring the ways politics is understood. Centred on a culture of 'achievement', Anglo-Saxons devote considerable

efforts in showing his supremacy in everything they perform, and of course, inadvertently this is a key factor that may very well lead them to dictatorship. To explain this better, lay-citizens see poverty not as a pre-condition to help others (as Catholics did), but as a burden that shows the incapacity to take part of a chosen people. Quite aside from this, two assumptions should be reconsidered. At a first glance, laws cannot the applied on those who feel special, but secondly and most important, such a need of exemplarity leads to be pending of the outsider's gaze. Uninterested by international affairs but at the same time, concerned by what the rest of the world think about them, Americans have fleshed out a pathological conception of the other, which is always a potential threat. In this context, if the fear to dictatorship was an originally worry for the fathers of Republic, the fear of strangers resonate with equal force in the social scaffolding of the nationhood. Combining the desire to *make great America Again,* with a long-dormant panic to aliens, Trump not only shocks the world, but also makes a significant dent on a society that is exhausted and intimidated by failed programmes of the welfare society, adjoined to the rise of unemployment across the country. While Clinton emulated a mythical conflagration to the monstrosity of tyranny, Trump stressed the failures and subsequent limitations of democrats to struggle against ISIS in Middle East. In this respect, what we have already discussed, terrorism not only seems to erode the basis of trust within Western civilization but instills fear to detonate the roots of hospitality, which is one of the tenets of capitalism. Let's remind that thanks to Indo-European hospitality nation-states colonized the world, imposing their sense of free-transit to expand trade and commerce, indexing agrarian economies in their projects, exploiting work-forces in order for elite to accumulate further profits. Being Argentinian or American is a social construal which appeals to the needs of belonging to a shared culture, in acceptance of preexisting laws. At the time, nation-state ensures 'private property', which is seen as the sign of 'freedom', an unknown culture of mobility sparked connecting cities, peoples and cultures that had not previous contact until modernity. When terrorists hit, like trade unions - they want to block the interconnection of goods and persons, in a system that rests on 'the culture of mobility and hospitality'. From its inception, America debated between breaching the psychological contract with Great Britain or adapting British institutions to flourish in the continent. While the United Kingdom, culturally speaking, developed an ambiguous rule to domesticate 'the colonial Other', no less true is that British Empire

exerted a radical coaction in its colonies, while cultivating democracy and liberty in its exemplary centre. The traumatic experience of Americans with the United Kingdom not only developed a culture of checks-and-balances, but also constructed a juridical architecture to avoid future totalitarianism. If Madison was concerned not to echo popular demands, to prevent the advance of populism, the Constitution cemented the possibility that an elite could take all. As Matt Grossman (2014) documented in his book *Artists of the Possible,* this had a two-pronged effect. The first consisted in a much deeper sentiment of 'indifference' in authorities for addressing popular claims, or any other quest coming from uneducated peoples, which was used for Trump in his speech. Since peoples never know exactly what they want, central administration is enthralled to apply reasoning in the formation of alliance and policies to grant the right of collectivity. Secondly, starting from the premise that freedom was the only cure against dictatorship, the stimulation to gather 'properties' was the only way to balk the rise of tyrannies. Doubtless, this forged a culture where the accumulation of wealth was the sacred-mandate, but at the same time, many other minorities were expelled as bit-players of a game, where rules are monopolized by a privilege-elite. Last but not least, it is interesting to decipher the discourse of American ethnocentrism which denotes while the United States was a success project, a melting-pot where various ethnicities coexist in peace, Americans should export their democracy to the world. However, the main dilemma in Trump's address is that the World rejects American democracy, and for that it should be disciplined. In its history, the United States oscillated from policies oriented to interventionism to isolationism; this is nothing new, but terrorism over recent years seemed to change the rules of the game. By killing 'innocent' travellers, tourists or businessmen terrorist cells are in quest of maximizing their costs, widening the effects of the original message. American popular parlance surmises whether terrorist attacks happen in leisure-spots, airports or tourist destinations, which means spaces of consumption, the same may occur anytime and anywhere. The efficiency of terrorism in managing media and communication rests in the damages or the size of population affected, but also in the visual impact generated over global portions of audience. As Howie noted, they (terrorists) do not look a lot of people dying, they need a lot of citizens watching. As never before, this wakes up a sentiment of terror which undermines the necessary trust for hospitality to be offered. For that reason, not only Trump wins elections with a discourse based on 'anti-hospitality', but also it reflects ISIS is

directing their attacks to erode hospitality in Western civilization. Once again, as explained in this book, West develops the sense of 'otherness' in view of a dichotomy, or in terms of Ingold a 'dwelling perspective', which creates a gap between us and them. The medical metaphor indicates that when an organ is affected likely by cancer and remains higher probabilities to affect other vital organs, the affected parts should be removed. Similarly-minded to this, Europeanism has developed a radical image of the other, who if dangerous should be extirpated to restore the equilibrium. The same applies to the intersection of terrorism and Islamophobia, a new trend oriented to demonize Muslim communities by their potential participation with terrorist cells, or simply by accepting the prejudice terrorism represents a 'clash of civilizations'.

Not only Trump manifested his public concern for Muslim immigration, he adamantly professed against 'Muslim immigration'. Following the San Bernardino shooting, he said in some of his rallies that he wanted to close immigration from Muslim countries whereas in other occasions he referred to 'the Muslim Problem'. Even, some voices criticized the election of ultranationalist Stephen Bannon as the exegete of racism to top White House position. Anyway, the polemic behind Trump's declarations are not new, part of them derives from what Senior Analysts write in their books. One of the exegetes of racism was undoubtedly Samuel Huntington. Though he apparently was oriented to produce an all-encompassing model to understand international affairs and democratic institutions, his legacy was widely enshrined by racist discourses, which were ignited after 9/11. To a greater or lesser degree, his concern on the advance of undemocratic waves would have in the United States, Huntington cemented an ethnocentric discourse on terrorism that led Edward Said (2001) to reply Huntington's thesis as 'the clash of ignorance' or Gilbert Achcar (2006) 'the clash of barbarisms'.

Samuel Huntington and the Borders of Civilizations

Ethnocentrism should be interpreted as a tendency to ponder the own cultural values as superior to other viewpoints. What would be interesting in European ethnocentrism seems to be not only its prone to romantic movements, but also the combination of an uncanny 'paternalism' with the value-neutral objectivity of science. As explained in introductory chapters, the rule of colonial order was based on the advances of science that claimed the so-called superiority of White men over other cultures. At

some extent, American ethnocentrism as well, remained attached to 'the theory of development', as it was coined in European minds. The limitations of development to modernize the world were widely studied in Marxian circles and by post Marxist scholars worldwide (Esteva and Prakash 1998; Escobar 2011; McMichael 2016). The theory of development reinforced after Truman's discourse not only divided the world in two, developed and under-developed nations, but imposed the cultural background of developed-economies over other agrarian organizations. Democracy far from being the wonderland of liberty only can be explained in terms to the expansion of capitalism. For Huntington, as many other liberal colleagues, democracy draws the boundaries between political stability which is necessary for development, and chaos and barbarism. He toyed with the idea that there would be an inevitable 'clash of civilization' between West and Muslim World. For him, there are some incompatibilities in religion that leads towards an inter-civilization's conflict. In these terms, he writes that

> *In this new world the most pervasive, important and dangerous conflicts will not be between social classes, rich and poor, or other economically defined groups, but between people belonging to different cultural identities. Tribal wards and ethnic conflicts will occur within civilizations. Violence between states and groups from different civilizations, however, carries with it the potential for escalation as other states and groups from these civilizations rally to the support of their kin countries* (Huntington 1997: 28).

Since religion confers identity to in-groups, it situates as a fertile ground to social conflict. After the Second War and post Cold-War context, cultural identities shape, elaborate and disintegrate the ethnic cohesion as well as fabricate new targets for the direction of violence. We are witness of how the class of civilizations can encourage or erodes the scaffolding of societies. With this background in mind, our Harvard's professor surmises that countries with cultural compatibilities are prone to give cooperation each other while countries with cultural differences also should be ripe to the conflict. After the end of Soviet Union, world has been grouped in 7 parts which are civilization: Latin American, African, Islamic, Sinic, Hindu, Orthodox, Buddhist, and Japanese and of course West shaped by the United States, Australia and Western Europe. Our author considers that the success or failure of democracy as a supreme value depends on to major o lesser degree with the cultural structure of involving country. For instance, the spirit of

democracy in Middle East was unfeasible because the action of Islam as main religion. Taking his cues from Francis Fukuyama, Huntington says that after the end of history exhibits no other thing than the final success of democracy which is framed in Western civilization. Once Soviets collapsed and the cold war ended, the United States became embroiled in the triumph of liberal democracy in many of developed nations. However, there is no clear basis on where the concept of civilization in grounded in Huntington's development. In this respect, the idea of civilization integrates contrasting processes alternating integration and disintegration.

> *The idea of civilization was developed by eighteenth-century French thinkers as the opposite of the concept of barbarism. Civilized society differed from primitive society because it was settled, urban and literate. To be civilized was good, to be uncivilized was bad. The concept of civilization provided a standard by which to judge societies, and during the nineteenth century, Europeans devoted much intellectual, diplomatic and political energy to elaborating the criteria by which non-European societies might be judged sufficiently civilized to be accepted as members of European-dominated international system* (ibid.: 41)

Following this, the term civilization should be discussed as a way of cultural entity, which structures similar functions into day-to-day life, insofar bringing order for members to understand the external world. This suggests that the concept of civilization shares a specific cosmology that defines the ethical horizons. Though at this stage, Huntington abandons the idea of classic racists, that 'race' is the key factor that draws 'ethnic affiliation', he insists that Latin America should be considered a civilization separated from Western project. Latin America not only is the case that contradicts 'the original prediction that civilizations tend to clash (because the continent has never participated in total wars as Americans and Europeans have done), but also remains as the fuel for Huntington's radicalism'. How can we suppose race is a predictable variable to infer the clash of civilizations? After all, Latin America inherited from Spain and Portugal their respective legacies, which situate as pro-European zones. Once again, the concept of liberty plays a crucial role in order for him to understand Latin America was imbued in an authoritarian spirit that impeded the values of Western civilization sparked.

> *Latin America, however, has a distinct identity which differentiates it from the West. Although an offspring of European Civilization, Latin America has*

> *evolved along every different path from Europe and North America. It has had a corporatist, authoritarian culture, which Europe had to a much lesser degree and North America at all* (ibid., 46).

It remains to be seen whether how the ideals of liberty is present in many of politics literature in English speaking countries. The sense of liberty is posed as the reason of state, and in doing so it serves as an ideological instrument nobody questions. First of all, it very hard to affirm a culture can be authoritarian or democratic without any serious empirical-basis. Democracies can be so totalitarian as monarchies and vice-versa. Democracy only is based on a structuration of authority. Secondly, he erroneously assumes that Europe had a long Republican tradition while Latin America was certainly submerged in a set of anti-democratic riots or revolutions. That way, cultural preconditions of a country or a civilization would predispose individual or social personalities. Whether the United States is recognized to be a democratic society also an American is liberal while an Muslim or a Latin American seems to be authoritarian. On the other hand, concerns of Huntington regarding the invasion of a foreign language in the United States are unquestionable. Whereas the elite exert influence on populace with respect to certain fashionable tendencies, a foreign language marks the difference between aristocracies and rest of population.

> *Global communications are one of the most important contemporary manifestations of Western power. This Western hegemony, however, encourages populist politicians in non-western societies to denounce Western cultural imperialism and to rally their publics to preserve the survival and integrity of their indigenous culture. The extent to which global communications are dominates by the West is, thus, a major source of the resentment and hostility of non-Western peoples against the West* (ibid.: 59).

In this respect, nor Huntington clarifies why should civilizations be doomed to clash?

Though the concept of civilization is very hard to grasp, the idea both or more civilization should clash rests on shaky foundations, at the time one delves in the history of Abrahamic religions as Judaism, Catholicism and Islam. We shall continue with this discussion later.

Most certainly Huntington sheds light on the fact that those civilizations whose constitutive feats are not compatible have more probabilities

to be at odds. The project of globalization adjoined to 'multiculturalism' opens the doors to the consolidation of liberal-market but at the same time, there are serious risks ethnic conflicts and riots surface. Clash among civilizations are increased by the advance of tourism industry and global mobility.

> *There is the assumption that increased interaction among peoples – trade, investment, tourism, media, Electronic Communications generally- is generating a common World culture. Improvements in transportation and communication technology have indeed mate it easier and cheaper to move money, goods, people, knowledge, ideas, and images around the World. No doubt exists as to the increased international traffic in these items. Much doubt exists, however, as to the impact of this increased traffic. Does trade increase or decrease the likelihood of conflict?* (Huntington 1997: 67).

In consonant with European paternalism, we have described in introductory sections, Huntington precludes that the modernization of Occident bespeaks of the ever-changing interaction among countries during centuries facilitated the transference of technology and knowledge. This is the reason why Europe first and the United States later enthralled the world as two creative projects which today confront other civilizations. The second difference is related to the fact that modern societies are based on industry while traditional ones refer to agriculture as their mainstream industry. Societies characterized by agricultural activities centralize their authority along with the owner of soil. Government and social structure seem to be determined by the economy activities predominate in each society. Rather, industry is less dependent of natural environment and recurs to freewill to justify the channels wherein existent decision-makings and consumption are rechanneled. This means that industrial-based nations are more prone to accept democracy as the main rule of government, while agrarian organizations are doomed to totalitarianism. As he stresses, terrorism represents an inevitable threat for West resulted from the expansion of Westernization. While other non-Western nations adopt a fluid dialogue with the United States and accept the values of democracy, further probabilities Islam reacts.

> *In the early phases of change, Westernization thus promotes modernization. In the later phases, modernization promotes deWesternization and the resurgence of indigenous culture in two ways. At the societal level, modernization enhances the economic, military, and political power of the society as a whole and encourages the*

> *people of that society to have confidence in their culture and to become culturally assertive. At the individual level, modernization generates feelings of alienation and anomie as traditional bonds and social relations are broken and leads to crises of identity to which religion provides an answer* (Huntington 1997: 76).

One might see whether this speech is followed to the end, it is implicitly hypothesized that terrorism not only is a counter-force emerged from Westernization that jeopardizes the freedom and democracy but also it becomes in a social or psychological pathology caused by the resentment. Huntington's theory has many limitations to explain why the United States, a secular nation, preempted in a war against the axil of evilness, or simply takes mystical symbols to denote Islam. Last but not least, the concept of power in Huntington maintains certain resemblance with the Hobbesian passage from the state of nature to civilization. The paradox lies in the following situation. At the time, a non-Western society made the necessary endeavor for democratization a new risk is reactively reopened because dissidents rivals with democratic countries. Anti-Western activists are also in power by the same mechanism Western societies promote once democracy is embraced. That way, the propensity for colonial expansion has been surely their bankruptcy of European and West cultures (Huntington 1993, 1997). He manifests his idea that the United States should be considered as most democratic nation in the world, because it was historically-associated to the respect for civil rights.

> *Political stability and form of government are as was pointed out, two different variables. Yet they are also interrelated. Democracies are often unruly, but they are not often politically violent. In the modern world democratic systems tend to be less subject to civil violence than are nondemocratic system. Democratic governments use far less violence against their citizens than do authoritarian ones. Democracies also provide accepted channels for the expression of dissent and opposition within the system. Both government and opposition thus have fewer incentives to use violence against each other. Democracy also contributes to stability by providing regular opportunities for changing political leaders and changing political policies. In democracies, change rarely occurs dramatically overnight; it is almost always moderate and incremental. Democratic systems are much more immune to major revolutionary upheaval than authoritarian ones* (Huntington 1993: 29).

The above argument coincides with Trump's convictions that democratic nations are attacked by authoritarian states (rogue-states) because of

resentment and malice. Since Muslims are autocrat forms of organizations, not surprisingly, America would be a target of terrorism in the years to come. Of course, in the days Huntington writes the *Third Wave* and Clash of Civilization, 9/11 had not taken place. For some scholars, he envisaged the struggle against terrorism years before.

This one-sided argument ignores that the rivalry between Christianity and Islam has no previous roots in past, but it was triggered by the politics of Rome against 'Byzantine Empire'. As Graham Fuller puts it, what would happen if Islam would never exist?; probably nothing, because the conflict was brought by Rome not by cultural nor religious asymmetries but politics. Islam and Christianity have developed historic alliances during Middle Age to confront against Rome's eagerness (Fuller 2010). Fuller depicts a contrasting landscape than Huntington, the upsurge of tension with Islam are not given by religious issues, but political disruptions between Byzantine Empire and Rome.

> *Islam, as a new geopolitical force, inherited not only much of the anti-Rome views that grew over time within Byzantine Empire itself. While Byzantium drew its deepest identity from the belief that it was perpetuating the true tradition of the Roman Empire, it increasingly came to view the Western Church as a geopolitical rival whose power was ultimately as threatening to Byzantine power and identity as Islam itself* (Fuller 2010: 68).

As earlier stated, Fuller argues convincingly that the expansion of Islam in Middle East, far from the causes stipulated by Huntington, corresponds with a gap left by the tensions between different forces. From its inception, Islam never was at odds of Christianity; even if Islam would have never existed other religion would develop the same anti-Rome sentiment. This happens -Fuller adds- because of Western Roman Empire has acquired an imperialist stance through Middle Age.

The theory of mobilities and terrorism

Theorists of mobilities as Diken Bulent (2001, 2004), John Urry (2002a, 2002b) and Caren Kaplan (2006); have dedicated time and space in their respective approaches to the problem of terrorism. From different stripes, all them agree that terrorism operates in a wider global context where the main sources of mobilities proper of capitalism were transformed in weapons. Not only did 9/11 show how the airspace of the United States could

be attacked, but it also demonstrated the double-edged effects of globalization. In fact, one of the dichotomies of capitalism seems to be the mobility only is a right reserved for few privileged persons, while the rest of humankind is torn between the poverty and the articulation of surveillance technologies to deter mass-migration (Bauman 2011).

R. Bianchi and M Stephenson (2014) explore to what extent the origin of tourism, adjoined to the imperial interests reproduced a centre–periphery logic which was conducive not only to the formation of 'citizenship', but also 'terrorism'. Authors understand that neoliberalism rests on a great fallacy, which encourages mobilities and consumption as mechanism for peace-keeping. The existent technology not only is two-pronged approach. At the time the world is divided by those who have and have-nots, consuming turns in the most explicit signs of exclusion in liberal capitalism. Following this interesting viewpoint, Bianchi and Stephenson claims that while first world tourists are legally allowed to visit any place, thousands of refugees, migrants are daily prisoned and deported as 'undesired guests'. The same technology used in travels, is employed at airports and border posts to find irregularities in the person-exchange process. The concept of globalization as it was imagined corresponds with the formation of nationality and citizenry. From its inception, tourism helped to reinforce the polarization between 'us' and 'the others', which is proper of Western thought. They cite the example of the Cold-war (1970s) where the tourism industry not only drew the borders between Americanness and Communism but also introduced the need to take part as a prerequisite of citizenry. The fact is that globalization intersected in the local economies of underdeveloped nations, interrogating ideologically on the possibility of acquiring luxury goods, or better lifestyles, emulating the civic life of an exemplary centre that opened the doors to being visited by rich citizens from the periphery. While globalization seemed to homogenize elites in different nations across this world, it is no less true that the pauperized workforce witnessed their rights fading away. This provoked a climate of great tension, which was fulfilled with extreme ideologies. Terrorism and racial violence resulted from the material asymmetries produced and reproduced by global capitalism, Bianchi and Stephenson add. This raises a profoundly interesting question, what is the role of democracy in this unstable context?

Polemically, most will agree that the acts of violence against Western tourists evince the fallacies of the cosmopolitan discourse, inherited in the global project. Those attacks perpetrated against tourist destinations are a

proof, about the political nature of tourism industry, which regulates the mainstream cultural values of nation-states. The right of travel was not only rooted in the inception of the nation-state, but also in the evolution of citizenship. For more than 40 years, marketing and management (as disciplines) were aimed at commoditizing parts of culture to exploit workers beyond the nation-state's sovereignty. In what we consider the best section of the book (Chapter 4), authors said that Empires appealed to tourism to create an ideological discourse, where citizens accept the belief that for capitalism there are not ethnical or cultural boundaries. This supported not only the ideals of Kantian Peace, where hospitality played a leading role as conduit among nations, but also covered the voices of thousand marginal populations. The thesis that tourism democratized culture through the mid of twentieth century rests on shaky foundation for Bianchi and Stephenson. In this vein, these marginalized populations were a fertile ground for the germen of violence and hate, terrorism stimulated over recent decades. Tourism and terrorism share a crude sort of instrumentalism given by the exploitation of the others; a point which should be discussed in the specialized literature.

Although Bianchi and Stephenson shed light on the intersection of tourism and terrorism, precisely when scholars see terrorist as hatred-filled maniacs, or psychotics whose main goals is destroying Western civilization, which is seen as a place where liberty and respect is cultivated, they understand that terrorism results from tourism and globalization. Well, Bianchi and Stephenson do not explain why this happens, nor delves in the world of industrialism and anarchism to understand why tourism and terrorism are inextricably intertwined. We, through this book, have fulfilled this gap, accentuating on the Foucaultian sense of discipline to delineate the borders of nation-state. Most likely, we should begin to think that tourism is terrorism by other means.

In his recent book, Geoffrey Skoll (2016) discusses to what extent terrorism ignited a climate of terror, or such a sentiment of fear was already dormant in the culture of English speaking countries. Following Skoll's thesis, this old fear was released when globalization eroded the borders of nation-states. In this respect, the widespread belief that capitalist system enlarges the interclass asymmetries seems not to be new, since it was widely studied by Marxism over decades. The point anyway, Skoll introduces in the discussion is that experts should figure terrorism not as a result from poverty, but as a precondition for capitalism's expansion. Skoll suggests that the act of governing through terror was historically employed in the

United States by elites to produce mistrust in the population. From the onset, the United States was based on the belief that the world as a dangerous place to live. Over recent decades in the twentieth century, fear was used to enhance the legitimacy of the elite, sometimes oriented for the workforce to accept policies otherwise would be rejected. At the time, capital and the American Empire expanded to colonize new worlds, a much deeper sentiment of fear accompanied the politics. Therefore, it is safe to say we live in a world characterized by a 'global fear' which is functional to a particular way of making politics. One of the aspects facilitated the expansion of capitalism was the idea that citizens live in the best of the possible worlds. Beyond the boundaries of consuming society, of course, any change represents a threat for popular parlance, a barrier to overcome. In consonance with Bianchi and Stephenson, Skoll says that the capitalist system imposed a culture of fear not only to discipline to the wayward unions, but also dissimulate the exploitation of workers and the monopolization of yielded wealth in hands of elite (an aspect brilliantly studied by Marx on the monopolization of surplus value). Quite aside from this, each time workers confronted for obtaining further rights, fear emerged as a dissuasive mechanism of control. Two major instruments were used by privileged classes to keep the control, ideology and repression. While the latter appealed to surveillance to exert violence against the pathological agents, the latter one was enrooted in a process of fear-mongering that limited the negotiation of trade unions. After 9/11, total forms of control were established in private life subordinating individual rights to the collective well-being, which means a more secure society. Leisure industries were witness of obstructive methods of surveillance over lay citizens. It was unfortunate that this trend moves the United States in the direction of a fascist state. This is a very interesting introductory section where author combines his erudition pitting historical cases where governments used fear in their favor against the United States and its Anglo-allies in the war on terror. In the third chapter, Skoll discusses to what extent elite in America devoted its resources to forge a culture of fear which passed from communism towards terrorism. The organization of labour conjoined to profit maximization is two key factors behind the manipulation of fear. Though actors changed, the dynamic are the same. For the sake of clarity, we have to place the sense of identity and consumerism as social construes, under the critical lens of scrutiny. At the same time, the exegetes of capitalism introduced substantial changes in the means of producing, through the 1970s, an emergent project claimed the 'liberalization of

human relations'. The collapse of the Soviet Union not only elevated the United States to the position of a unique empire, but paved the path for the adoption of neoliberalism in the 1990s. However things went from bad to worse when, in its domain, the United States suffered the effects of terrorism on 11 September 2001. This 'blow-back' stems from an interventionist policy in Middle East, ideologically supported by 'radcons', but above all, by the formation of a globalized culture of fear, which was necessary for liberal elite to dominate the World (Skoll 2016). Last but not least, French philosopher Paul Virilio laments about the dictatorship of virtuality for two main reasons. On one hand, technology accelerated substantial changes in the fields of mobilities, imposing a new mechanism of discipline that generates 'commitment' in the same intensity than exclusion. To put this in other terms, the global citizenship is moulded by a set of stereotypes, stories and legends, which are previously determined by mass-media. The dictator of image inscribes into a culture of gazing where information is the main commodity to be exchanged. Everything lies there, in the communicative process. At once that travels have been accelerated in time and space, there are more leisure time, which is fulfilled by media's interventions. Lay-citizens do not question the fabricated image disseminated by media, they embrace a signification that is standardized according to what media dictates (Virilio 2010, 2012).

Terrorism and the Problem of Violence

On 17 March of 1992, a suicide bombing destroyed the building in Buenos Aires where Israel's embassy was located. This terrorist attack killed 29 civilians and wounded hundreds. In ulterior terms, on 18 July 1994 a new attack shocked public opinion when 85 citizens were assassinated. The AMIA (Asociacion Mutual Israelita Argentina) not only was under attack, but also the worst nightmares of Argentinian government turns very real. It was unfortunate that while Argentina suffered two major events respecting to terrorism, several opinion polls reveal that citizens in this Latin American country strongly believe terrorism is a problem of the United States. This can be explained in basis of the following axiom. While the United States appealed to a 'theatralization of terrorism', inflating the effects of 9/11 as an universal declaration of war against all democratic nations, Argentina was ushered into a climate of invisibilization where Jews targets were geographically resituated (Korstanje and Skoll 2012). Gilbert Achcar (2006) clarifies that there is a type of 'narcissist commiseration'

which leads peripheral countries to internalize as proper the suffering or events occurred in central ones. This process of solidarity has a double effect. On one hand, it opens the symbolic doorstep of empire for the periphery to feel closer, but at the same time, -on another- it hides similarly-happened events in other geographical points. The question of violence should be contemplated according to the narrative capacity of state to re-symbolize terrorism according to its interests. Throughout this section, we shall discuss four Seniors scholars who have meditated on the symbolism of violence, Marco Palacios invites to discuss the problem of terrorism in Colombia and its long-term consequences for democracy. In the same vein, Michael Taussig structures how the violence exerted in the bodies mediates to the production of specific narratives which precede a climate favorable for terrorism. Freddy Timmermann explains the experiences of torture planned and perpetrated by condor plan to undermine the actions of trade unions in democratic life in Chile and Argentina (Timmermann 2014). The climate of terror from where terrorism operates is gradually consolidated. Fear is manipulated to cause long-term effects in the society. For example, Timmermann adds, the repression suffered through the 1970s not only paralysed the civic life of Chileans but also softened the resistance of trade unions, which facilitated the arrival of neoliberalism in the 1990s. He acknowledges that,

> *In the neoliberal terror it is not possible to invalidate or control what produces uncertainty and pain, because the areas producing insecurity are not clearly perceived and their relationship with fear there is no production of sociopolitical, cultural, and religious sense at the local and global level, and also because those areas that are really perceived are difficult to modify, as spaces of citizenship are limited for that purpose* (Timmermann 2016: 167).

The US programme of torture has received a lot of criticism post-9/11 as has been extensively documented (Allhoff 2003; Moher 2003; Stritzke 2009; Jeffreys 2013). These techniques include sleep deprivation, waterboarding, stress position and so forth. Though these actions violate international covenants agreed to by the United States, where torture is defined as cruel and inhumane, no less true Bush's administration invoked the doctrine of security to impose policies otherwise would be neglected. J Hafetz claims that 'administration lawyers' replied, '*aggressive interrogations were characterized as necessary to protect the country from a future terrorist attack*' (Hafetz 2016: 51). This means that some rights are

automatically suspended whenever the public security is in danger. Some liberal voices as Michael Ignatieff (2013) understands that torture is a lesser evil, in some context, when terrorism threatens the homeland security. In those cases, he proposes democracy should play an active role controlling the limits of torture. The check and balance system, which is inherited to democratic life, prevents unilateral violations to human rights, only when torture is instrumentally administered, which means used to gather information for suspected terrorists. Instrumentality and rationale are two key factors that lead liberals to accept torture as taken for granted method of protection 'in the war on terror'. Torturers are not evil-doers, for their viewpoint, because not only they are doing their job but do not keep any animosity against tortured inmates. Typically, this is a form of violence that rests in two important pillars; a *pseudo-rationality* for the exercise of violence adjoined to the *need of protection*. Last but not least, Allen Feldman describes the roots of political terror in Northern Ireland combining a polished-style in his book *Formation of Violence* with a rich diagnosis derived from his valuable ethnographies.

The Pseudo-Leviathans in Colombia

International public opinion is divided on the role to be played by the United States in the global struggle against terrorism. (Revel 2003). For some scholars, the United States should take direct intervention in autonomous nations as Colombia, Iraq or elsewhere, with the end of granting democracy, while for others more critical voices terrorism seems to be stimulated by Central Intelligence Agency. In the middle of this mayhem, Marco Palacios shows an innovative argument that explains why Colombia failed historically to eradicate terrorism. Based on Gramscian legacy, Palacios argues convincingly that, like many Latin American elites, Colombian privilege class encouraged a legal system that excluded the hinterland. In consequence Colombia not only experienced a dualist structure, where the urban cities were juxtaposed to colonial latifundiums, but fleshed out a rivalry with uneducated peasants who never were accepted to the urban landscapes. Over centuries, military forces and security forces deployed resources to discipline 'the non-Western others'. Unlike the rest of Latin America, were militaries were conducting coups against civilians, in Colombia they were historically disposed to confront against terrorism. Lack of state intervention in these places enhanced the

power of the elite in the main towns of the rural hinterlands. The gravamen of financial taxes generated a continual state of emergency that resulted in a climate of resentment and exclusion. Problems in the administration of the finances also created serious imbalances in material wealth in the country. The situation in the main cities was not much different. Incipient discontent of trade unions became a concern for the elite. So as not to lose control, terrorism through violence became an instrument for disciplining the workforce. Unlike neighboring countries where military forces were dispatched to conduct coups against the civilians, in Colombia the government used terrorism.

With serious problems to consolidate as a full Leviathan, Colombia grew in basis on two contrasting circuits. The legal system included jurists, officialdom, and trade unions which represented the interests of rank-and-file workers. However, an emergent illegal World ethnically formed by illiterate peasants situated as an alter-ego to the civilizing mission. While Fidel Castro exported his romantic revolution to other Latin American countries, no less true is that the illustrated elite remains indifferent to farmers' claims. The conflict between cities and the rural hinterland was accelerated by the Cuban revolution and by the Cold War. Guidelines suggested by the United States to regulate internal conflict may have appealed to the state and aristocrats but insurgents were inspired by Cuba to carry on their anti-establishment activities. Palacios reminds us that guerrilla terrorists were implanted in those zones where the authority of government was weakest. If the anomie created by the government was initially in its best interests, subsequently this lack of involvement became a big problem.

During the 1980s and 1990s, the conflict did not decline but changed its face. The second event, the introduction of drug-trafficking in rural zones, gave financial resources to the Guerrilla movement from the 1990s onwards. Cocoa leaf growers in the Cocalero movement were forced to live on the edge of crime. This environment favored the interest of traffickers who established a bridge between the cities and the hinterland by supporting the old demand of the Cocaleros to gain access to land. In parallel with that, in 1989 the Columbian government criminalized a group of left-wing movements which were then forced to live a clandestine existence in the jungle. Among these were M-19, EPL and FARC. Their claims were directed against the government which was accused of being the cradle of neo-liberal policies.

With the benefits of hindsight, important steps in Colombian's peace were achieved when central administrations proposed a serious project to

include FARC within democratic system. However, the referendum was not accepted by population. Whatever the case may be, Palacios shows amply how the violence is exercised when claims cannot be addressed by the democratic project. As stated on several occasions, one of the aspects that determine modern terrorism seems to be associated to its global scope, which today is very difficult to localize. The logic of classic terrorist cells as ETA, FARC or even IRA set the pace to new abstract and violent forms of coercion. However, we feel the world would enrich so much from Latin American's experience with terrorism in past (Korstanje 2016). This is exactly the point of interest in Michael Taussig's approaches, which will be discussed in next.

Psychological fear in Michael Taussig

In this section we shall discuss the argument of Michael Taussig, the Australian anthropologist who theorized on the intersection of violence with terrorism in different opportunities. Though his most important work will not be discussed here, it is safe to assert that Taussig is concerned to study how colonialism reproduced a space of all-too-real and present terror accompanied by a healing process. To put this in bluntly, Taussig halts at the thesis that there is an urgent needs to the 'fiction of the real' which not only frame the perceived enviroment, but can be activated in times of conflict. This introductory belief is reinforced in one of his best-sellers book *The Nervous System* published in 1992 where he advances innovatively on the role of fear as a geographical border that alters day-to-day practices. In this token, Taussig acknowledges that observers should take a considerable distance from terror, if they want to understand how it works. While some developed and civilized nations are frightened by those unknown places inhabited by primitive cultures, there is a prophylactic cocoon that separates but accommodates the inequalities among humans, the *terror*.

His main thesis is that at the same time, nation-states exert violence over the bodies of their citizens while mass-media cements an ideological artifact to consolidating its emanated power. In view of this, the sense of terror and the construction of otherness are inevitably entwined. Based on Walter Benjamin's contributions, Taussig dissects the national discourse, to envisage, that the situation of oppressed people should be deciphered so that social scientists realize the state of exemption seems not to be a temporal deviation, but the emerging rule. Those leaders who appeal to

the state of exemption are aimed at posing a new rule, where life is seen in two contrasting poles. The psychological terror not only keeps these two sides united, but invests to authorities of credibility. As specialists in Latin American international politics and fieldworker in Peru and Colombia, Taussig retains some concerns on the fact that there a neglected bridge between politics and terror, even, we attend to universities which are real fortified ghettos, reserved by white middle class. In that way, the produced-knowledge conforms a body of ideas, hypothesis and speculations that are presented to lay-peoples as value-less explanation about why things happen. For Taussig urban cities exhibit the articulation of an ordered disorder to symbolize a state of emergency, where a disasters which are imminent never take place. In this respect, the state deploys different disciplinary discourses not only to instill terror in the contemporary society, but also reproduce a fictional landscape where the worst may happen, but never does. This leads us to think that a 'discourse of terror' operates under a sinister logic, where uncertainty plays a protagonist role mediating between the self and future. The conspiracy theory fulfills the gap enlarged by politics. Taussig, brilliantly, captivates a new cultural trend proper of late-capitalism, where consumers are pressed to internalize violence as a normal condition of existence. In consonance with others philosophers as Virilio or Baudrillard, Taussig alludes to a preexisting narrative of terror which is finally legitimated by 'the physical disappearance of dissidents' or what in Argentina was dubbed as 'los desaparecidos' (disappeared peoples). How this terror is formed?

To be more exact, such a terror though imposed produces a paradoxical situation because citizens accept the meaning of normality fabricated by the state, in order for them not to experience fear, but in so doing, they enter in the fields of panic. The quest for recovering the disappeared bodies does not rest in the needs of justice, or happiness for an emotive encounter, (because the disappeared is really dead), but in the needs of founding the borders of hospitality, which are based on the misfortune of Oedipus who is doomed to die abroad. While military-forces that see themselves as championing of Republic, are involved in crimes against humanity or war-crimes. This happens because of two main reasons. Terrorism introduces terror as a commodity to mediate between citizens and their institutions. At a closer look, military forces abhor the assassination of captives or prisoners but often they use these tactics as an artifact to paralyze the enemy. Taussig, with clarity, emphasizes the 'dirty wars' in the heart of Latin American states as an attempt to 'clean the centre',

reminding us that one of the assets of the dirty-war is secrecy. This is a type of clandestine conflict which is covered by authorities there is no formal prisoners, no crimes, only a great silence as a form of intimidation remains. The grounded memory, which is biased to protect the elite's interests, reproduces uncertainty, a cosmology of silence that is ultimately conducive to terror. In consonance with Taussig, Chilean historian Professor Freddy Timmermann dissects how Pinochet's policies during the 1970s and thereafter, not only undermined the basis of trade unions, but also paved the way for the arrival of neo-liberalism in the 1990s.

From torture to fear in Freddy Timmermann

Though Timmermann and Taussig's arguments share some commonalities, there are some interesting differences which we like to stress. On a first glance, he dangles the possibility to confront the psychological fear with the violent climate experiencing in Chile and Argentina from 1970 to 1980. Although the plans of Juntas differed, both shared the same disciplinary mechanisms to legalize their coups. As this argument is given, Pinochet and Videla expanded their authorities with basis of an *emptied self*, who resulted from the indifference for politics which was paradoxically accelerated by the imposed repression to workforce. The question whether in the roots of the bourgeoisie society, Timmermann adheres, remains an original Hobbesian fear which marks the evolution of all institutional forms. In basis with a rich platform of empirical evidence as some documents issued by RCM from 11 September of 1973 to the constitution's promulgation in 1980. In order to understand how the narrative of fear articulates substantial changes in daily habits, Timmermann says that we need to lay the grounds to gauge the discursive nature of violence intersects with fear. In Argentina and Chile, the emerged fear not only destroyed but also modified the social roots to politics. In sharp opposition to Taussig who delves into future as his main object of study, Timmerman traces back to the past. Traumatic experiences as it was happened in past, come to present in order to frame our decisions. The red-scare, which was originated in the core of military forces, was adjoined to Catholic fundamentalism that envisaged in Communism the mean threat of Western civilization, and the proper education of high-ranked officers who believed they were morally fit to intervene in politics if necessary. As Timmermann observes, the imposition of terror corresponds with a disciplinary instrument to take away citizens from politics, besides

being controlled the internal agency, which historically was a worry for aristocracies in Latin America (Timmermann 2014). This viewpoint coincides with Allen Feldman, who in a seminal book entitled *The Formation of Violence* said that

> *There is a need to interrogate the mythicizing reception of violence in order to trace the path by which ideological reading of violence engender the subject of the act and the extrinsic site of legitimation in a single movement.* (Feldman 1991: 3)

In the lines to come, we shall address the main limitations and strengths of Allen Feldman and his ethnographies in Northern Ireland. His main upshot is that violence, no matter than practiced or symbolized, attempts at colonizer the outsider margins of community, whereas the sense of identity or kinship structures 'central ordering apparatuses' internally.

The Formation of Violence (Northern Ireland)

Anthropologist Allen Feldman, who has been presented in earlier sections, pivoted with his fieldworks in Belfast, in a period where less was known of classic terrorism. Unlike the specialized literature which outlined terrorists as 'psychiatric patients', or psychopaths, Allen shows the opposite. The violence is gradually constructed according to the 'reproduction of antagonism', which is enrooted in the capitalist ethos. Far from what popular parlance surmises, the conflict between Catholics and Protestant in Northern Ireland comes from a dormant reciprocity, which is anthropologically given by the process of ethno-genesis. From both sides, Loyalists or Republicans articulated a spatial narrative that explained the origin of community, evincing shared borders between two neighborhoods. In the days of peace, no further problems arose; there was a dialogue and exchange of persons, but once the conflict surged violence served to keep the borders while identity gave a reason to belong. The violence not only is enmeshed in collective narratives that guide individual behaviour, but also is enrooted in the territory, which demarcates ethnic affiliations. Therefore, the self is always the 'artifact' of early-fabricated narratives that are posed through the different ideological apparatuses of the state.

> *The use of history to repress historicity is a central ideological mechanism in the political culture of Northern Ireland. And where this occurs, the recursive*

> *character of the historical is often expressed and always legitimated by geographical metaphors* (Feldman 1991: 18)

Following this reasoning, Feldman held the position that terrorism in Northern Ireland expressed the struggle of two factions, or the encounter of working-class citizens whose original discrepancy should be found in the relations of production. Doubtless, imperial logic engendered a culture of secrecy, where the margins transformed in fragile insulations. In fact, starting from the premise that secrecy results from the affirmation of a colonial identity, where the centre makes stronger, so the 'periphery' will construct its identity in basis of a confrontational dialectics with the Imperial Centre. Any cultural resistance calls for the production of fragments as a counter-action to imperial advance. In the development of his theory, Feldman introduces the term 'interface' to denote the topographical borders that confers ethnicity to inhabitants. In Allen's words, '*the interface is a special construct preeminently linked to the performance of violence*' (p. 28)

Once the 'other' advances to the extent of placing the community in danger, violence sparks as a valid instrument to keep the symbolic borders unaltered. To wit, though there is no doubt terrorism is associated to violence, today there is much to say about the influence of semiotics in the genesis of discursivity. Any violent act is preceded by a negotiated discourse that legitimating it keeps the distance between the self and alter. The origin of conflict is pre-determined by the role of both groups in the productive system, following Gramscian concerns, but what is more important is that it is routinized to the extent it is impossible to unpuzzle the reason of the war.

This point seems to be exactly what Marc Augé confirms in regards to 9/11 and the post-apocalyptic World depicted by media. He reflections beyond the cruelty of terrorists or the incredulity of lay-persons inasmuch after events, the World smiled because terrorists dare to accomplish what nobody could do before them. To understand his polemic thinking, one must delve in the dissociation between globalization, which means an economic network, and mega-polis (a term borrowed from Virilio) that denotes as an up-hill virtual city, erected over others cities. This exemplary centre gathers some few global citizens those though pertaining to Third World, takes part of Virtual city. Since some persons who failing to take part of virtual city are pressed to live in the contours of locals, not surprisingly the act of violence against the United States shows two

contrasting aspects of capitalism. A long-dormant resentment against the United States, coupled to the material inequalities of capitalist system. Though polemically Bush fits against Bin Laden, Augé said, both are part of a privilege class that rule the World. This does mean not only the clash of civilizations is a concept very hard to grasp, even it turns a fallacy, but also the capitalist system struggles as an autoimmune pathogen against itself (Augé 2002).

Feldman is in the correct side asserting that terrorism in Northern Ireland has the birth as a result of the disputes and discrepancies within the same productive system. While some citizens, geographically located were relegated (Catholics), others adopted a British lifestyle (Protestant). Far from being religiosity part of the problem, Feldman contends that the friction was originally ignited by the natural functioning of capitalism. Though he never accepts it overtly, Feldman toyed with the possibility terrorism would be rooted in the logic of capitalism. There would be a sanctuary–interface complex which corresponds with an ideological organization of violence. While the interface is articulated (like the barricade) to stop the other, the sanctuary is a sacred-place where violence is regulated. The sanctuary intends preserving the kinship, which is specially orchestrated, but at the same time, when such an ethnical order is altered, violence interpelates newcomers.

> *The sanctuary/interface complex was an ideological organization of the spatial dimension of human association and the spaces of violence. It attempted to preserve the subordination of violent enactment to the prerequisite of residence and kinship through the special confinement of violence. The sanctum was constituted by a space that was reserved for residence and kinship and by a complementary space, the barricade-interface continuum, reserved for the ideological and material reproduction of community through violence* (Feldman 1991: 36).

If the peace in the symbolic core demands further radicalization and militarization in the periphery no less true is that the physical violence is inherited to nation-state. While the kinship connotes the possibility for the group to keep the order, the reproduction of capitalism supposes the expansion of borders, and in that way, an inevitable conflict with 'the Other'. To here we in depth reviewed the roots of capitalism, advancing on the borders of nation states and their intersection with terrorism, but failed to explain further in what way, ISIS and Islamic terrorism affects

hospitality. This point exhibits a much deeper issue which will be discussed in next chapter.

Last but not least, Feldman explores not only the borders of violence, as an artifact of politics, but also the role of the state in stimulating a 'divide and rule' game. The study-case of Northern Ireland shows two important assumptions. Firstly, British Empire exploited preexisting channels of rivalry within Irish population to enhance its legitimacy. Though at a preliminary stage, the formation of paramilitaries coincided with the interests of the Northern Irish state, later it invoked the intervention of British government. The articulation of violence stems from the needs of reaching a sacrificial act (in terms of the spatial poles of entry and exit), to keep Irish peoples united.

Despite the rich information Feldman's ethnography gives, we have to limit our argument to the formation of violence, a necessary step to understand how terrorism works. Feldman divides what he calls the Irish 'hard-men' and 'gunmen'. While the former corresponds with pseudo-pugilists who fight with others for honour, the latter signals to those persons who have adopted an impersonal 'mechanisation of violence'. The question whether 'hard-men' were replaced by gunmen describes how gradually 'an impersonal manifestation of violence', which is proper of terrorism, prevails. A pure hard-man places his body in risk to fight with others at streets, he knows his enemy and of course violence operates within a frame of codes and rules. With the arrival of terrorism all these things are altered, and killers have no previous contact with their victims. The figure of the gun symbolizes the symbolic nature of terrorism, an articulation of extreme violence which depersonalizes the self (Feldman 1991).

CHAPTER 8

How Terrorism Changed the Ways of Interpreting Hospitality

Introduction

Horror movies reflect the social fears of particular societies in a particular time and context. Their emotional effects dispose the devices of the macabre or supernatural to connect with culture-bound primal fears. They have an ordinary social setting which gets disrupted by the invasion of a fearsome agent such as monsters or savage beasts. To some extent, horror movies signaled to an original violation of the sacred law of hospitality. In this vein, hospitality should be interpreted as a norm that functions to create and maintain a benign social environment. After 9/11 the nature of the threats in horror movies changed from either non-human nature or the supernatural to the social. In post 9/11 contexts, villains were no longer animals or monsters (as in the 1950s), but humans. Evildoers are lay-people who are decided to cause a mass-destruction attack anytime and anywhere. In this process of transformation humans, ordinary everyday people who look and act like us became the objects of horror (Korstanje and Olsen 2011; Korstanje and Tarlow 2012; Korstanje 2015b, 2015c, 2015d). Not only the present chapter discusses to what extent horror movies, as profitable industry, was altered by terrorism but also how plots engage with a global audience to construct 'a dangerous image of the other' exacerbating the dichotomy urban vs rural, us vs. them, which is proper of terrorism. One of the success of terrorism in American culture consisted in making to belief lay-people terrorists are camouflaged, living or looking-like us, in the same neighborhood,

M.E. Korstanje, *Terrorism, Tourism and the End of Hospitality in the 'West'*, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-52252-4_8

attending to the same spectacles or night-clubs. Though the state was founded in the idea that security should be granted for everyone, terrorism shows the opposite. The other who looks like me become in suspected terrorist. Doubtless, this weakened the trust, which is the necessary platform for hospitality and reciprocity.

Exploring Terrorism as an Object

The message of terrorism is strictly centred on a political nature, as A Schmid (2004) deemed. Per juridical tradition, terrorism is historically understood as 'a mala per se' (evil itself) in contraposition of local crime, which is esteemed as Mala Prohibita (punished evil-doing). Since terrorism exploits the vulnerability of actors who are not in the theater of operation, the innocence of the resulted victims leads terrorist to be catalogued as 'demons'. Its crippling nature is aggravated by a previous state of defencelessness of the victim. The message of terrorism aims at dissuading a stronger state to accept claims which were never met by democratic system. The false sense of urgency is vital to understand how terror functions (Schmid and Jongman 1988). Italian Philosopher Primavera Fisogni (2016) explores *The Caliphate as a Totalitarian State*. Per her viewpoint, the ideology of takfirs (traitors) offers a fertile ground for messianic expression of nationalism, which not only inspires radical interpretation of Islam but also nourished the discourse of Muslim Terrorism. With eloquent clarity, she sheds light on the division between ISIS and other types of Jihadisms as the precondition that explains ISIS' cruelty. Fisogni coins the term 'geography of terror' as opposing to Augé's definition of non-places. If the latter are spaces of anonymity as airports and hotels, the former signals to new localized spaces where victimhood is the postcard offered to the world. In fact, she adheres to the thesis that Islamic State neglects reality, returning to an idealized but staged-past which not only is completely false, but also violates the integrity of innocent people in the present. This is a tactic that helps ISIS' leaders to slide their ethical responsibilities for their crimes.

In his book *The System of Objects,* Jean Baudrillard argues that the objects and consumption are inextricably intertwined. His definition sounds a bit controversial in many senses. To clarify this, it is important to denote that objects and human beings are enmeshed with a broader system which is centred on the monopoly of sign. Consuming commodities signals to the configuration of disciplinary discourse to assign meaning to perceived

events. As commodities the significance of these events can be fabricated, annulated or exchanged according to the interests of market (Baudrillard 1995a: 224, 1995b). This theory paves the ways for embracing *the simulacra of objects*, which is enrooted into the needs of distinction and status. For those who are in, sharing certain values or meaning, other group remains out. To put this in bluntly, distinction reminds that the opposite discrimination is latent. Since objects are more than simple inorganic material, they confer to holders an aura of exemplarity which leads to narcissism. In late-capitalism, the system of production was subject to individual desires, to the extent that commodities are produced and exchanged according to their psychological needs or dependency marketing creates (Baudrillard 1997: 6). In parallel with Baudrillard, two post-Marxists John Holloway and Eloisa Pelaez agree that *terrorism* and the pejorative connotation around the term, leaves behind the fact that capitalism expanded in view of its extreme competence among workers. The two world wars showed that states never struggle by enhancing the quality of peoples, but for the monopoly of territory. War-fare among state represents a valid way to avoid the internal conflicts between capital owners and workforce. As a mechanism towards alienation and indoctrination, terrorism serves to status quo in two senses. On one hand, it draws a fictional threat to revitalize those aspects that affect social cohesion. On another, individual demands or claims are undermined by the excuse of a more supreme well-being. Not surprisingly, capitalist nation-state learned the lesson that crises can be accrued or overcame depending on how fear is handled (Holloway and Pelaez 2002). This raises the question why terror is used as an efficient instrument of deterrence?

To respond this point, K Baral argues convincingly that fear blurs the boundaries between reality and virtuality. By producing an excess of reality, terrorism claims for the importance of rule-respect. The Other demonization is conducive to accept the in-group rules. While nation-states appeal to rational technique to prevent the next attack (ignoring how disastrous the subsequent financial crisis of capitalism may be), terrorists focus on West's corruption claiming for a return to an idyllic time (Baral 2008).

In this respect, Baudrillard contends the film of S. Spielberg Minority Report synthesizes his thesis about the convergence of the future with present. In a time located in the future, human beings can recognize the crimes before they occur and of course neutralize criminals efficiently. The ethic question here lies in how a crime can be punished whenever it had never committed. A similar case follows with September 11 admits Baudrillard. Terrorism is legitimating in advance a set of policies related to

the geopolitical control of the World. Fear is paving the pathway towards a broader paranoia product of the multiplication of information and the hegemony of object-sign (Baudrillard 2006). In terms of Douglas Kellner

> *In Baudrillard's view, the 9/11 attacks represented the clash of triumphant globalization at war with itself and unfolded a fourth world war: the first put and end to European Supremacy and to the era of colonialism; the second put an end to Nazism; and the third to Communism. Each one brought us progressively closer to the single world order of today, which is now nearing its end, everywhere opposed, everywhere grappling with hostile forces. This is a war of fractal complexity, waged worldwide against rebellious singularities that, in the manner of antibodies, mount a resistance in every cell* (Kellner 2005: 3).

Paul Virilio, in this sense, warns about the dictatorship of virtuality as a new mechanism of generating commitment and exclusion. He agrees that by means of the imposition of stereotypes Mass-Media pressures to the citizenship. There is no possibility to refrain the advance of these corporations neither censoring their influence of people's behavior. The public opinion is shaped according to economic interests of informational chains. That way, disconnected events in any part of the world are often disseminated and go thru in few minutes to the eyes of viewers declining the human capacity to communicate with others. Distinction between what is or not real is linked to the possibilities of being-there, in the site of the otherness, triggers a much broader process of cooperation and cohesion. Sharing similar rules which are applied on a specific territory, the humans construct a symbolic archetype that we know as social imaginary. Rather, Mass-media and the dictatorship of visuality introduce a new signification to the image wherein the interpretations of images are dangerously standardized. No need to say, this jeopardizes the independence of citizens to comprehend their environment (Virilio 1996).

Of course, one might consider that politics and fear are inextricably interlinked. Social scientists stimulate a fertile discussion in the fields of politics and history, tracing how in other times elite appealed to fear to dissuade population their policies were correct and necessary. While the formation of external enemies enhances the internal cohesion, reducing inter-group conflicts, terror is still enrooted in the core of society. What terrorism opens, as Corey Robin adheres, seems to be a new living way that poses West against a dilemma, reducing the fear sacrificing the ideals of democracy or perish in the hands of terrorists. Placing this problem in

the way society is bereft between wall and blue sea, is not a good option. By the way, suicide is an acting of expiation where converge the essence of religion and power-will. Whether Western culture stimulate the control over the life and death, it would be not surprising terrorists sacrifice their one life to destroy the symbolic tenets of empire. This is exactly, the spirit of Terrorism Baudrillard pointed out. His legacy resonated in the arguments of many sociologists, who understood in one point the goals of terrorist and celebrities converge.

Terrorists as Celebrities

As Luke Howie observed, not only was generalized fear one of the main effects of terrorism in modern society, but it also denotes radical changes in the way we perceive otherness. In recent years, terrorism has shifted the way we construct monsters, leading cinema to frame sources of fear as ordinary citizens who are capable of the worst anytime (Howie 2010, 2012). Here we explore the hypothesis that horror movies, and closely related popular culture artefacts, have decentralised their objects of fear from the non-human to the human. Today, after 9/11, aliens as non-compatriots have become the model Other and the real enemy to defeat. In movies such as Jaws (Spielberg 1975), The Birds (Hitchcock 1963) or The Naked Jungle (Haskin 1954), humans are put in jeopardy by savage animals which can be defeated by the embodiment of human ingenuity–technology. In post 9/11 cinema, not only there are no happy ends, but the main threats are fellow humans who are hard to detect. The enemy is not just there, on the other side of the river or wall, they are among us, live as us, and could be one of our neighbours. This cinematic shift reprises that during the post Second World War Red Scare (Skoll and Korstanje 2013) when Hollywood movies identified the threat as Communists who blended in with the population of the United States and its allies. This same theme is replicated by current horror movie remakes like The Hills Have Eyes (Aja 2006), Hostel (2005), Texas Chainsaw Massacre or The Others (Amenábar 2001). These movies are all remakes of originals from earlier decades, which add torture-terror inspired the war on terror after the World Trade Centre attacks of 9/11. 9/11: the Archetype of Terrorism Western and non-Western nations had long been the terrain of terrorist attacks, but it was only after 9/11 that the cultural, economic, and strategic hegemony of the United States created the global archetype of terrorism – the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. So-called Ground-Zero, the site of the former World Trade

Centre in lower Manhattan became both symbol and icon for terrorism, as the work of radical Muslims. In contrast, the Madrid train bombing of 11 March 2004 was originally blamed on the Basque separatist group the ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna) to gain political advantaged in the upcoming national elections scheduled three days hence (Sabada 2008). Spanish authorities eventually fell in line under the US terror mythology, and identified Al Qaeda inspired Muslim fanatics. A few sceptics questioned the official story about 9/11 (Keohane and Zackhauser 2003; Griffin 2004), and some commenters saw 9/11 and the war on terror as a pretext for governments to restrict individual rights (Bellamy 2005, 2007; Ignatieff 2013). Nevertheless, the post 9/11 culture of fear was conducive to neo-liberal policies that enhanced the profits of elite and expansion of the US-led global empire rationalized by neo-conservatives (Skoll 2007, 2008; Altheide 2006). The climate of polarization, far from being diluted after the United States-led invasion to Middle East, multiplied in various spheres of society. Mahmoud Eid pointed to the mass media, arguing that the question whether 9/11 ignited the custom of consuming terror as a rentable commodity, cannot be answered without addressing the responsibility of journalism and mass media in covering attacks 24 hours day. This event opened the doors for a new epoch where terror and profits in television converged (Eid 2014). The United States used its position as global hegemon to engender a culture of fear. In the counties at the centre of the world capitalist system fear served to protect the status quo social order.

After 9/11 this culture of fear became globalized in conjunction with the American empire. The US-dominated culture industries, in cinema especially, shaped public consciousness in support of the empire. Culture construction aided and abetted securitization, which promised a safer world, and governments relied on both to protect (Korstanje 2015a; Skoll 2016). In fact, the securitization of global imperialism has really been pacification of segments of populations who posed a threat to the interests of capital owners (Skoll 2016). Among its other effects 9/11 caused a trauma in the means of transport that largely served the West and centre of capital. Never in history had civilian airplanes been used as weapons against the centre of world capitalism, the World Trade Center, and simultaneously against the centre of world militarism, the Pentagon.

The attacks of 9/11 could have undermined the credibility of the George Bush administration in Washington DC by showing how vulnerable the United States was. To counter this threat to its legitimacy, US President George W Bush declared a global war on terror, prosecuted

mainly by US military and intelligence apparatuses like the CIA, NSA, and NRO. What Bush failed to declare was the war on terror carried out by the culture industries. Those few, mainly marginal, figures who claimed that 9/11 served as a sort of Reichstag Fire to extend US world control were dismissed as conspiracy theorists. Throwing around accusations of conspiracy theory buttresses the power of the ruling class by affirming the managed messages from the media they own. Establishment social theorists and scholars have deemed conspiracy theory a pathology (Lipset and Raab 1978; Groh 1987; Hofman 1993), because according to them, it leads to what Hannah Arendt (2013) called a totalitarian mind. More recently, some scholars present conspiracy as a key factor of politics.

Conspiracy Theory

American analyst David Kelman (2012) argues that conspiracy beliefs are part of populism. Especially in Latin America and the United States, the efficacy of the ruling class depends on consolidating their hegemony by cutting reality in two. Secrecy in government rests on the legitimacy of silence which creates two alternative circuits, official and unofficial. The credibility of one story is linked to the secret that allows the discovering of the other. Conspiracy theories reveal plots for elites to keep the control of society. Any attempt to decipher the plot, validates the secrecy of politics. 'Politics is not based on an ideology decided in advance, but it is rather constituted through a specific type of narrative that is often called conspiracy theory. This type of theory is always a machination, that is, a narrative mechanism that secretes, as it were, ideological labels such as the right or the left.' (Kelman 2012, 8) According to Kelman, opposing the secret with the public and the official with the unofficial creates a dialectic in which every conspiracy narrative connotes a double structure: the visible story is continuously eroded by a secret one, like an infinite palimpsest. Kelman, a literary theorist who theorizes politics not through social and political analysis but through works of fiction, explains the political struggle as an unlimited game, rather than battle lines of power. Kelman says that conspiracy is a necessary condition for one discourse to dominate all others. Politics, in his terms, can be defined as an illusory state of emergency where the sense of community (we) is opposed to others who are the enemies (they). Conspiracy narratives are always rooted in a near future, which never materializes in reality. In this type of simulacra conspiracy produces a paradoxical situation. Of course, Kelman's approach to politics through

fiction just adds another layer of obfuscation. For example, the US government blamed Osama bin Laden for 9/11. They never offered any proof for the assertion, but did launch an attack on Afghanistan, presumably to capture him. Although he either died of pneumonia in December 2001 as reported by Pakistani news media (CLG 2011), or maybe kidney failure in 2003, US forces ravaged the country, and in fact continue to do so, before they claimed to have killed him on 2 May 2011, close to 10 years after 9/11. By the way, his ill health virtually precludes him as the so-called mastermind behind 9/11. The bin Laden saga should raise several questions. Why did the US government refuse to provide proof to the Taliban, which the United States recognized as the legitimate government of Afghanistan? Why did the United States attack and invade Afghanistan instead of using policing to apprehend him? Why did it take almost ten years to find bin Laden in an area (Afghanistan-Pakistan border region) where US forces and intelligence apparatuses along with those of its ally Pakistan control information? Why was the actual killing of bin Laden not recorded, although events immediately leading up to it were recorded? Why did US forces not return his body for forensic examination? Why did they secretly dump the body at sea? There are other questions, but the foregoing provides a good start. The fact that they remain unanswered, at least to any satisfactory degree, strongly suggests a US conspiracy and cover-up. The alleged excuse for invading Afghanistan, to get bin Laden, pales in comparison with another: the US government as the main executive branch of the global ruling class wanted to secure transport lines to the Caspian Sea area oil and gas deposits, and to occupy a geostrategic location with respect to China and Russia (Brisard and Daquié 2002).

In order for readers to expand their understanding of effects of terrorism in horror movies, we have to delve into the role of monstrosity as a symbolic background to denote societal fears. Though philosophy has advanced a lot in the study of monstrosity in legends and myth, less attention was given to the horror movies industry.

The Construction of Monstrosity

Philosophy of Horror Movies Corey Robin (2004) said that fear in politics produces a paralysis in society which inevitably endorses the legitimacy of the existing order. The invention of external enemies enhances the declining social cohesion, while at the same time it quells internal dissident voices. Threat ideology frames events so that they fall within an ethos

that endorses the current social structure by setting truth conditions. The ideology ensures changelessness, not by overt propaganda or censorship, but by setting how statements can be judged as either true or false (Buchmann, Moore and Fisher 2010). That is why pejorative Movies and similar cultural artefacts create momentary mini-worlds that invite audiences to participate in their stories. They invite a willing suspension of disbelief, and thereby create a strong pull of audience complicity in the imaginings they present. This is where their effectiveness lies. They round out the worlds that hegemonic discourses describe and explain. In that vein, the construction of horror plays a crucial role in ideological constructs that endorse authority. In his book, *The Philosophy of Horror*, Richard Fahy argues that one of the fascinations for horror movies rests on the fact danger is controlled by the audience. As a cultural entertainment it offers 'The anticipation of terror, the mixture of fear and exhilaration as events unfolded, the opportunity to confront the unpredictable and dangerous, the promise of relative safety . . . and the feeling of relief and regained control when it is over. We realize that the worst has been faced and it was not so bad after all. King calls this moment reintegration which he compares to the end of a roller coaster ride when one gets off unhurt' (Fahy 2010: 1-2). Fahy adds, horror not only calls to our attention suffering and death, but does it in a safe context. If the versatility of horror is given by the possibilities to repeat each story in different environment, this constant reproduction alludes to an allegory which merits being deciphered. Eli Roth, a director strongly influenced by 9/11 seems to be replicate the problem of torture and biological terrorism in works as Cabin Fever, 2002 (Fahy 2010) or Hostel, 2005 (Korstanje and Tarlow 2012; Korstanje and Olsen 2011). From its inception, human beings have questioned not only their nature, where or to where they go, but their adaptative skills respecting to other species. Horror movies depict the conjuncture of nature violence (Fahy 2010). Despite the human creation of culture serves as a protective cocoon, human evil cannot be abolished, and good people can fall victim to it (Korstanje 2015a). This rises a more than pungent question, what is evilness?

What is Evil?

In the Christian tradition, the archetype of evil is embodied in Lucifer, who depicted as a monster jeopardizes the 'salvation of humankind' in all possible forms. However, in other mythologies other personage fulfilled a

similarly-designed role. Slavoj Zizek notes that Christendom was an original sect that posed imperfection as a divine requisite for salvation. This, undoubtedly, opened the doors not only to a paradoxical situation, but introduced suffering in humankind as never before. While the promises or hopes in a better life fed up a desire for powerless, the sin was adopted as a regulator for cosmic order. In Zizekian studies, God did not create the universe to avoid evil, but needed evil to reinforce his sacrificial law. While Christ was being martyred on the cross, a culture of suffering was adopted on Earth to legitimate the capitalist system (Zizek 2003).

Furthermore, K. Mackendrick (2009) offers a fresh complementary argument in this discussion. The discourse of evil has elements which can be studied in conjunction or separately to understand its multi-faceted metamorphosis. The first and most important is impurity, in the sense given by Douglas, which confers the idea of repugnance to be avoided. The monstrosity, as the second factor, works as 'scapegoat' to regulate the uncertainty present in the system. Femininity, as well, is pitted against patriarchal order as a sign of corruption, for example, the witch.

British historian Margaret Deanesly (1976) recalls that witchcraft and sorcery were unacceptable heresies punished by death in the Middle Ages. Traffic with Satan, where witches invoked the presence of demons, was possible because of their vulnerability and pervasive nature. Women, for medieval theologians, were impatient creatures very prone to influence by the devil.

In her book, *Purity and Danger,* American anthropologist Mary Douglas develops a radical reading of Deuteronomy which not only opposes structuralism, but also sheds light on how myths should be interpreted. Douglas argues that the meaning of impurity plays a crucial role in the configuration of culture. By avoiding the damned-object or damned-subject, members of community affirm their identity protecting their ethos (home) from an external alter, which is symbolically constructed while the laws of god is accepted. Any taboo exhibits a much deeper sacred-fear in order for some resources as plants, animals to be reserved in case of famine or wars. This type of invested reservoir not only is of paramount importance for culture because it remains economically functional to the subsistence of society, but also reminds the dangerosity of evilness. Historian Carol Karlsen has documented the rise and advance of witchcraft as the necessary symbolization of a patriarchal order, which needed to correct economic glitches, which would be very well threatening for established order. She suggests that medieval peasants avoided any contact with those damned women because this was an

efficient rule to prevent disgraces, calamities, and cattle death, Karlsen adds. To expand the current understanding of this issue it is necessary to analyse the statistics Karlsen presents. Per her records and sources, 158 women were subject to trial in New England from 1620 to 1725. Within this group, 96 lacked brothers or sons (39%), while 62 had brothers and offspring. From all judged women, 25 were executed who had no offspring (76%) while only 8 (24%) had a stable family. The allegations against witches corresponded with 'infertile women' who not only had not left any offspring but were rich maidens who lacked sons. Recognizing this context, Karlsen toys with the idea that this occurred simply because the medieval society was based on a patriarchal organization, where inheritance granted to female children or women were considered as a glitch to solve. Although some poor women were executed as well, the process started with the imprisonment of accused women and dispossession of all their wealth. If they were rich, without sons, the possibility of being found guilty was higher. In perspective, the problem of witchcraft corresponds with a question of fertility and material inheritance. Furthermore, it is interesting to discuss the context where these allegations arise. In the whole of cases, trial started after a baby was found death at home, or the community faced harvest famines (Karlsen 1987).

Last but not least, As Emily Oster (2004) outlined, it is not surprising to see the connection of witch-trials and the decline of the economy in Europe, a decline accelerated by the discovery of the Americas. Used as scapegoats to balance the material asymmetries produced by patriarchal order, or problems in weather conditions, witches became targets to blame at the moment that the system of goods exchange (the market) failed. However, not all voices are in agreement with this theory. Jean Markale (2006) situates the archetype of demon into the politics field. Lucifer, as Prometheus and other great rebels, not only expresses the dialectic's resistance to the patriarchal elite, but paves the way for the community to regulate its frustrations and deprivations. Whenever things do not come out as planned, we need excuses to keep our faith intact.

In many ancient cultures, hospitality (as we have already seen) took a religious nature. Gods protected humans in hereafter in the same way, strangers were offered of hospitality while their travels. Otherwise, Gods dispose of natural disasters, disgraces or any other type of calamities. In the secularized world where Gods are dead, not only there is no reason to bring unconditional hospitality, but also it has been commoditized to be exchanged for money. Only first world tourists are legally enabled to move (within certain geographical circuits) if they can paid for such a right. In

this vein, if hospitality is only granted by God, demons or Evil-doers look to destroy the bridge with the otherness by stimulating a climate of anti-hospitality. If hospitality was related to what is unknown, as Spanish philosopher Daniel Inverarity (2001) says, Western nations should understand the double-edge of hospitality (which is compared to risk in Innerarity's text). The introduction of unknown guests reinforces the inter-class trust insofar as the sense of perceived insecurity increase. Nobody knows what are the interests of hosts nor guests, but both celebrate hospitality (as if) to revitalize their reciprocity. The fragility of a society inscribes into the degree of uncertainness, it may tolerate. The professional culture is trained to detect and mitigate risks, hazards and any other events which would place the social order in jeopardy, however Inverarity adds, the discipline of risk entails the loss of hospitality, because trust in the other declines. Using the metaphor of guests who appear at home anytime, emerging risks suddenly emerge contradicting all available protocols. This happens simply because risk and hospitality are inextricably intertwined in the same paradox, while more obsessive if society to be protected more exposed to external risks is.

Evil as the Lack of Hospitality

Horror movies draw on folk tales. Sometimes they do it directly, but more often it is indirect. Monsters of various sorts populate folktales – trolls, goblins, werewolves, witches, vampires and other kinds of undead the latter of which would include the modern Frankenstein monster. Folktales in the present usage refers to stories that have no particular authors but have circulated in various forms among populations define by semi-permeable cultural boundaries. This is most noticeable in geographically bounded areas like the Middle East, Scandinavia, sub-Saharan Africa, and North America where various mythical figures appear in slightly different versions among culture-defining narratives. Occasionally a set of folk tales takes on foundational significance for a much broader cultural tradition. Such is the case for Greek myths that serve as a foundation stone for Western culture. What are the commonalities of Greek ancient tragedy and horror movies? For example, what has Helen of Troy's abduction by Paris in common with the movie Hostel? In the Homeric version of the story, Helen is kidnapped by Paris while he and his brother, Hector, enjoyed the hospitality of Menelaus, Helen's husband and brother of Agamemnon, who then led the invasion of Troy to

re-capture Helen. In the Iliad's account, the question of hospitality arises at least twice: with Paris' violation of stealing his host's wife and the introduction of the Trojan horse into the walled city.

Terrorism Mythology and Contemporary Horror Terrorism as a hypostasized phenomenon was invented by Ronald Reagan's presidential campaign functionaries in 1980. They accused the sitting US president, Jimmy Carter, of giving in or being weak against terrorism. The accusation arguably won the presidency for Ronald Reagan in November. The terrorism industry came into its own during the US presidential election of 1980. It was then that it assisted Ronald Reagan to gain the presidency over the incumbent Jimmy Carter (Wills 2003). The terrorism industry manufactures, refines, and packages for distribution information, analysis, and opinion on a topic called 'terrorism.' The industry-created terrorism qualifies as a commodity. The industry continually manufactures it with adjustments and occasional model changes as dictated by the exigencies of the state and the ruling class. Terrorism in the twenty-first century is an ideological vehicle for the production of fear as a commodity. The ideological apparatuses of the empire manufacture the terrorism mythology by creating terror events. The terrorism industry uses reversal and decontextualization to make its product. It employs techniques of repetition, imagery, and condensation. (Skoll 2016, 135). Just as the terrorism industry has created the mythology of terrorism so the film industry creates movies. Of course the film industry's goal is profit whereas that of the terrorism industry is to further the interests of the state. Nonetheless, there is more overlap than it might first appear.

Increasingly since the Second World War, movies as commodities have sold state ideology with entertainment along a continuum of subtlety – some movies are more ideologically obvious than others. Horror movies seem remote, but partly because ours is an age of fear promoted by the mythology of terrorism, horror and terror mythology begin to converge. Greek myths follow into the more general category of folktales. Folktales originate as part of oral tradition, and therefore are hard to date. It is only when they are transcribed that they enter a place in history. In the case of the Greek myths, tradition names Homer as the first to record them in writing. But Homer's time, the eighth century BCE, was several hundred years removed from the Trojan wars which probably occurred in the eleventh century BCE. Homer's world saw the transition from tribal societies, the home of the heroes of the myths to the emergence of states controlling urban settlements – the city-states of classical Greece. His time also

expressed the transition from a culture rooted in Mythos, performance-based transmission of myths, to Logos (Havelock 1983), written myths, which also corresponded to the emergence of the state as the main political mechanism (Gouldner 1965). Moreover, the versions of the Greek myths we moderns rely on are derived from an even later period, the classical Greek age in the fourth century BCE, with poets such as Aeschylus, Euripides and Sophocles. They reflect the functional requirements of their times. Once recorded, however, another dimension of meaning is added, as their transcribers record them according to the social needs of their times. For example, the Grimm bothers recorded northern European folktales in the first part of the nineteenth century at the time of the rise of the bourgeoisie and industrial capitalism. Mary Shelley's Frankenstein comes from the same era, but Bram Stoker's Dracula is from the age of monopoly capitalism and neo-colonialism. Although the movies considered here are from the twenty-first century, their roots go back to pre-modern times. The movies are an amalgam of cultures, and their most recent accretion comes from the ideological needs of terror states, especially the United States and its closest Anglophone allies. Myths, fairy tales, and horror stories call for a willing suspension of disbelief in order to work their cultural magic, which relies on entertainment in the furtherance of enculturation and norm enforcement. Their didacticism is sugar coated. Imbricated social commentary is woven into the story and images, but in ways that are decontextualized as if to avoid censorship. The earlier commentary about blood sucking aristocrats illustrates the point, and so do some distinctions between vampires and werewolves. Vampires can only be killed by a wooden stake, a peasant's tool, but silver bullets kill werewolves. Werewolves are at the opposite end of the social scale; they are homeless rabble. Such criticisms of the social order are probably part of the original oral tradition, but the most recent elements appear in the recorded versions. Frankenstein's monster alludes to the dramatic and potentially uncontrollable forces unleashed by the early industrial revolution in the 1810s, and the aristocrat Dracula must contend with the triumphant bourgeoisie of the 1890s. When folktales become recorded stories, they are commodified in novels and movies among other forms. Like any commodity, social labour produces them, and a vehicle for the market is the terrorism mythology. Terrorism is the marketing of the fear commodity. Just like steel, cotton cloth, or electronically produced images are created by certain mechanisms of human work so is terrorism. The first, fundamental mechanism is reversal. At this crucial stage of the production process victims are converted to villains. Those who resist

the coercive violence of the empire meted out through state apparatuses are recreated as terrorists. Any organized resistance is made into terrorism. Moreover, this production process is progressive. The more certain people are victimized, the more they are depicted as terror threats.

An important part of the production of the terrorism mythology and each tale of terror is decontextualization. Representations serve to disconnect events from history and contemporary social phenomena. Repetition is one of the techniques employed in this mechanism as illustrated by the aforementioned repetition of a plane striking the World Trade Center on 9/11. The image becomes the event and explains it. Imagery is of course another technique in the repetition mechanism. Focusing attention on the World Trade Center towers helped sever the event from the hidden connection to the Saudis and that the CIA had created al Qaeda, including its name. Not everyone was mesmerized by the magic. Some saw through the misdirection, but it is not necessary to fool all the people all the time. The minority can always be dismissed as cranks and so-called conspiracy theorists. A third technique in the process of decontextualization is condensation. Condensation narrows consciousness to the event or episode. Only the violent incident, the search for perpetrators, the identification of terrorist organization are depicted and repeated. The war on terror, that global extension of imperial control, is condensed to incidents which are strung together only to present a myth of designated terrorists, which since 9/11 are mainly jihadists. Not surprisingly, the mythology of terrorism creates social divisiveness.

The Sacred Law of Hospitality in Jeopardy

In sum, if further attention is paid on the figure of rogue or villains we realize that all them has the same commonalities. Their victims are seduced by the sacred-law of hospitality by means of sex, or banquets. As dispositiffs of pleasure, Evildoers use hospitality to captivate the attention of their preys. Secondly, hospitality is suddenly suspended (emulating a perverse archetype) while guests are sleeping or eating. Evil-doers took their privilege position as hosts to harm, kidnap, or kill their guests. In almost all cases, the victims are innocent youth tourists or teenagers who escape from the routine of urban areas. Unlike the horror movies, some decades ago, where the villains were animals, in post 9/11 contexts the rogue are 'lay-persons' one never would suspect are psychopaths or even

suspect what are their real interests. As Korstanje and Tarlow (2012) observed,

> *Movies often play on central narratives, values, concerns and dilemmas of societies and give way to forms of thinking and feeling that can be of paramount importance to social research. Visual anthropology discovered many years ago the benefits of understanding complex socio-cultural discourses woven into films. Following this approach, this article explored the root of fear in both a pre- and post-'9/11' world and its collateral effects on what can be called the 'terror' movie industry. After close examination, one may argue that terrorism not only produced a sense of isolation to and from the world, but also engendered an increasing degree of civic anger* (Korstanje and Tarlow 2012 30).

Following these above remarks, the following points are very interesting to discuss. On a first glance, terrorism has enlarged some old rivalries between urban zones, situated in the northern cities as Chicago or New York with far away southern places as New Mexico, Texas or Arizona. Many of the horror movies plots are based on rural farms or places located in the 'dangerous south', which confronts an old dormant cleavage within America.

Additionally, victims are Americans, and in this case, 'being American' abroad represents a privilege that has costs. In this vein, American are over-valued over other nationalities (see for example in Hostel) or even are attacked to be 'the ambassador' of democracy. This fits exactly with the national discourse that says terrorists select 'American tourists' from resentment or hatred of democracy. Last but not least, like terrorists, evil-doers breach the sacred-law of hospitality to maximize their goals. This lack of hospitality not only determines the roots of evilness, but also nourishes a sentiment of panic which is conducive to create an 'hierarchal order' of global citizens. Throughout previous chapters, we have explained how terrorism affected the basis of hospitality in Western civilization, threatening not only the communication of the otherness, but also the necessary internal reciprocity. The rise and expansion of modern terrorism through media exposes not only global audiences to indescribable sentiment of fear, simply because anyone may be targeted of terrorists, but new rules to negotiate shared public space. Since its inception, hospitality played a vital role not only configuring the social institutions of Europe, and capitalism as well, but was used as a valid platform to

scrutinize the otherness. Today, terrorism affects the sense of hospitality eroding the basis of Europeaness. At some extent, the theory of place-making exhibits a valid response to those challenges Muslim community will face in the years to come. The right to live freely in a city is being reduced according to policies and measures which are made from what Geoffrey Skoll dubbed as 'the culture of fear'. This holds the belief that the tensions articulated by the advance of terrorism in urban landscapes may very well lead towards the end of hospitality.

CHAPTER 9

Conclusion: Hospitality in the New Millennium

Philosopher Richard Bernstein (2005) theorizes on the roots of evil across cultures and times. He inquires on the mystery of suffering which contrasts with the impotence of God. The question of evil only can be understood as a negation of good. Under totalitarian regimes, the extermination of corporate body is accompanied with destruction of individuality and spontaneity transforming human personality in a simple issue. The trial against Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem not only reminds us that ordinary people with banal interests can often commit appalling crimes, but also it shows that responsibility and premeditation are dissociated conceptualizations. It is unfortunate that history of the twentieth century bears witness to the emergence of other genocides, but it was not until September 11 that mass-media put their efforts into disseminating a 'face of evil', a depiction embodied in Osama Bin-Laden and Saddam Hussein as responsible for such a tragedy. Immediately, the world was simplified and cut in two: Muslim villains who pursued the ruin of the United States in opposition to American heroes who were hypothetically committed to fight against terror. The expression of war against terror is pretty deceitful inasmuch as 'the absolute binomials' corrodes the basis of democracy. Fears often are politically manipulated by officialdom as an effective instrument to deter the trade unions' claims, at the time, an external enemy revitalizes the cultural tendons of ethnocentrism (Bernstein 2005). The act of demonizing the other corresponds with the exercise of power, which contours the formation of citizenry (Feldman 1991). Either the state and

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terrorist cells legitimate their authorities through the incorporation of secrecy. While terrorists are invested with the privilege in knowing when the next attack will be, state appeals to clandestine and illegal torture to impose its hegemony over victims' subjectivities. Information is vital in the dispute between central administration and paramilitaries.

> *In the terrorist act, the bivalent weapon as the invested object of political agency establishes reversible exchanges between the agent of violence and the condition of stiff. As the consequence of contact with the weapon, defilement and violence are perceived as traversing manifold direction, encoding the intended victim, the original object of the terrorist act, or decoding the agent of violence, the weapon handler, by transforming this agent into a stiff* (Feldman 1991: 144).

This above noted excerpt seems to be the reason why in days of terrorism, the role of state intelligence is dually channeled to detect suspected activities in the city, articulating an extreme violence (torture) against prisoners' bodies to ensure further information. However, Feldman is skillfully trained to decipher the message of classic terrorism which changed drastically respecting to the emergence of Al-Qaeda or ISIS. In this vein, further investigation is needed. The recent attacks perpetrated at airports in Brussels and Turkey, or in leisure-places in France reveal how post 9/11 scenario has changed. As founding event 9/11 not only defied all pre-existing tactics, but placed tourism industry as the main protagonist. Following the tactics of management guidebooks, the blow to New York was carefully and successfully performed emulating the Western rationality. Neither a Muslim peasant nor a medieval man would be fit to organize this project, because both lacked from the logic of means-and-goals. In fact, further studies demonstrated that terrorists who participated in 9/11 were educated in prestige European universities, if not they gained a legal residence in the United States. This suggests that after all, terrorism operates within the walls of Empire. Modern terrorism is part of the same extortion trade unions suffer by the side of state and capital owners in a daily basis. As we have stated, a closer look assumes not only that tourism is a nuanced form of terrorism, but a strike and terrorist attack share certain commonalities.

As this argument given, we held the thesis that terrorism appeals to undermine the symbolic touchstone of Western civilization, *hospitality*. This book discussed critically the borders and problems of nation-state which expanded historically across the world by a political manipulation of

the discourse of hospitality. We start from the premise that any travel entails an encounter between hosts and guests. In order to reduce the anxieties of both sides, hospitality should be understood as an ancient inter-tribal pact oriented to scrutinize the otherness. It is necessary to remind the etymological origin of the term, Visa, which comes from Lat. Visum (seen). In fact, this is exactly the functionality of Visa that is disposed by state to see 'how are these strangers newcomers', what do they want?, and for what do they arrive to our home?

As native of the societies they attack, terrorists share the same language of their victims, but have no familiarity with them. This process of depersonalization and anonymity which is proper of urban life facilitated the things for terrorists. Once the blow consummated, anyway, popular parlance asks for authorities to tighten the borderlands. Aliens and strangers carry on their shoulders (as scape-goat platform) the fears of local population.

From its inception, Europe and the project of nation-state developed a strange sentiment of paternalism that subordinated non-Western culture to foster a system of production, which led towards capitalism. Once consolidated, the nation-state fleshed out a new emergent cosmology where the doctrine of 'free-transit' and mobilities played a crucial role. Hospitality was a key factor for European economies engage with new customs, lands and man-power. As a result of this, the ideals of Enlightenment not only prospered in Americas, but also in the rest of the world. The same concept of liberty which was characterized by British Empire juxtaposed to an extreme cruelty used to discipline the periphery. The question whether the rise of nation-state coincided with the advance of industrialism, resulted in the mass-migration of thousands peasants coming from the four corners of Europe. Paradoxically, if industrialism ruined their jobs, migrants opted as new homes the same countries that inundated with their commodities the European markets. The first anarchists in the United States not only were labelled as terrorists, they perpetrated an unknown climate of violence that shocked the US social imaginary. The nation-state deployed all its resource to struggle and eradicate these insurgent cells that placed the peace of the Republic in danger. Nonetheless, other subtler minds chose to organize trade unions to conduct a peaceful struggle against the state. Abandoning any expression of violence, anarcho-syndicalists achieved a lot of benefits which were functional to the formation and crystallization of mass-tourism. Although the specialized literature ignores this intersection, it is safe to say modern tourism is terrorism by other means.

In retrospect, the notion of free movement as a civilizing cultural-project paved the ways for the conquest of Americas, contributed to the rise of globalization. In the capitalist culture, the difference between have and have-nots are enlarged by the acceptance of globalization as a form of progress. While first-world tourists were legally able to visit the world, thousands of migrants were subject to countless controls and surveillance controls at the borderlands. Despite of the traction of globalization and tourism to connect dissimilar cultures into the same landscape promoting peace and understanding, which supposes the legitimacy of nation-state is undermined, terrorism surfaced. As Geoffrey Skoll reflected,

> *The import is that the greatest fear monger today is the American Empire. It generates massive fear throughout the world with its own military and economic power, and it broadcasts fear within its territories by its alerts against terrorist attacks, secret surveillance, infiltration, and so on* (Skoll 2007: 125).

Far from being a clash of cultures, civilization or religions, terrorism is a Western construction, disposed not only by the dialectics of hate, but also in the instrumentality of capitalism. Terrorists do not hate their victims, they only attack them as a means to achieve further goals. Over recent years, the involved actors are native-born of the same nation they confront. If 9/11 reminded how the first power of the World can be attacked using the means of transport, which were the bulwark of Western mobility, the attacks on France trumpets *the end of hospitality*. For this, a much deeper psychological fear emerges as an irreversible force that disorganizes the ever-changing social ties. Capitalist system operates from two contrasting elements, risk which denotes the capacity of capital owners to operate from future, and the financial interest which protects the capital. In view of this, modern system accumulates and handles complex nets of information, where uncertainty prevails. In the same way, as Baudrillard and Howie debated, capitalism works from future events (potentiality of risk), terrorist instills a message of terror, not for the effects of the attack, but for what is coming. Nobody knows who and where the next blow will take room. Modern terrorism not only places the authority of the state in shaky foundations, but disposes randomness as main instrument to achieve the goals. Targeting tourists implies the needs of disciplining the anonymity. A global audience witnesses how the same may happen in next holidays. In space of mass-consumption, not only controls are very hard to orchestrate, but contradicts the nature of leisure. As a temporal inversion

of rule and law, leisure jointly to hospitality represents two of the most important pillars of Western capitalism. In days of Thana-Capitalism, where the others' pain is commoditized, we have created a paradoxical situation, because the same public that is disgusted by the coverage of terrorism does not let to stop from consuming such news. As we have clarified in other sections, the dead of Aylan Kurdi not only inspired this book but helped us to reflection on the gray zone between terrorism and hospitality. Modern terrorism has precipitated the arrival of conspiracy theory which adopts the rule and divides logic as the main form of government. This is particularly very dangerous not only for democratic nations, but opens the doors for populist discourses, like Trump's one, that can reinforce a long-dormant beast. As explained, since Europe never developed a 'relational perspective' with the stranger (paragraphing Ingold), ethnic minorities run serious risk to be transformed in the new scape-goat channels of ethnocentrism. Emulating the medical-gaze that extirpates the affected organ to save the patient's life nation-states may very well attack the human rights of civilians in the name of security and order. This is an old lesson Latin Americans have learned long time ago. Terrorism inscribes in a logic of hate between insurgents, and the central administration. While the nation-state is blind to anticipate the next attack, it appeals to torture to gather information. However, these methods of interrogation are far from being efficient, since victims say anything in order for the torturer stops. What would be interesting to discuss in next approaches is the current methodological caveats of researchers specialized in terrorism. One of them consists in the semiotic nature of 9/11 which remains unchecked. 9/11 yesterday and Paris today bring the asymmetries between centre–periphery into the foreground reminding that while these events were commoditized to be understood as an attack against humankind, other similar events that happened in Buenos Aires, Bali and Cairo were covered in the dust of oblivion. Why did the American government strengthen the allegory of Ground-Zero in NY, whereas Atocha undermined the credibility of Aznar's administration?

Doubtless, nationalism and terrorism are inextricably intertwined. The message of terrorism is amplified and decoded by the media, captivating the audience but creating a vicious circle, which is very hard to break. Instead of dealing terrorism as 'an external evil force', our argument halts at discussing the cultural background of capitalism and nationhood that cemented a restricted sense of hospitality. Not surprisingly, the culture of terror accelerated by globalization posits a class in the peak of the pyramid

as a privilege group. Bauman and Lyon (2013) dissect the roots of post-modernism which tend to over valorize security over other cultural values. The untrammeled climate of securitization adopts 'surveillance' as a sign of status, endorsable only to those who can pay for that. In a society where the social ties sets the pace to consumption, buying artifacts of surveillance or insurances implies to take part of 'chosen peoples'. Such a sentiment bodes well with the ideological core of Thana-Capitalism which delineates the boundaries of social Darwinism where the survival of the strongest prevails. The others' death invests the ego of the necessary libidinal fuel not to be touched by death. Death seekers feel pleasure consuming others' death because in that rite, they reinforce a sentiment of supremacy over victims. Last but not least, we hold the thesis that mobilities and tourism emerged as a result of the disciplinary mechanism of the state to consolidate capitalism worldwide. Over recent decades, central economies have been the target of terrorist attacks perpetrated by native-born citizens. This reveals two important assumptions. On the one hand, terrorism operates from a symbolic epicentre which is reinforced by the action of the mass media. The recent blows in France and Belgium posit a real threat for the Occident to succumb to 'the Spectacle Of Terror'. Hospitality, as it was formulated in ancient Europe, is dying and this is happening not because of ISIS's cruelty, as public opinion seems to hold, but because of our obsession in gazing at others' deaths (witnessing). If ISIS's crimes had never been covered in the mass media, terrorism would fade away.

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M.E. Korstanje, *Terrorism, Tourism and the End of Hospitality in the 'West'*, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-52252-4