

PALGRAVE SERIES IN AFRICAN BORDERLANDS STUDIES

EurAfrican Borders and Migration Management

**Political Cultures,
Contested Spaces,
and Ordinary Lives**

EDITED BY

**PAOLO GAIBAZZI, ALICE BELLAGAMBA,
AND STEPHAN DÜNNWALD**



Palgrave Series in African Borderlands Studies

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Editors

EurAfrican Borders and Migration Management

Political Cultures, Contested Spaces,
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*To the multitude of men and women who dedicate their lives to breaking
down barriers between people*

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PART I

Framing EurAfrican Borders

Introduction: An Afro-Europeanist Perspective on EurAfrican Borders

Paolo Gaibazzi, Alice Bellagamba, and Stephan Dünwald

This collection of essays is about borders and migrants between Africa and Europe, and the implications of their interaction. We began working at it in the aftermath of the 2010–2011 Arab Spring, when an outpouring of people from Tunisia and Libya to southern Europe through the Sicilian Channel was bringing undocumented boat migration back onto the Europe Union’s political agenda, after a period of relative calm in the Mediterranean. Since then, the wind of change that originated in the heat of the revolutionary moment has eventually morphed into chronic conflict in some countries, in particular in Libya and Syria, causing streams of people to sail to Europe, often facing great hazards to their lives. Four years on, as we approach the end of this project in the Fall of 2015, the old continent is undergoing what many describe as the most serious refugee crisis since World War II, with human tragedies that have been broadcast

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the world over. At a closer look, however, it is clear that this is not simply a refugee or migrant crisis, an exodus propelled by conflict and other critical situations in Europe's neighborhood and beyond, with people sailing or walking up to Europe's southern (and eastern) gates. It is also a border story and a border crisis (cf. Vaughan-Williams 2015). European borders indeed contribute to both the dynamic and the drama of these movements. They deny the travelers normal and safer ways of entry to Europe; at the same time, by portraying their sea crossings as 'illegal', border policies frame these movements as inherently exceptional, thereby co-producing the very crisis that states are then called upon to manage. Yet while this semi-permanent crisis proves advantageous to some players (Raeymakers 2014a, pp. 165–66), the game is tricky and not entirely within Europe's control. To the south of the Mediterranean, the Arab Spring toppled the long-standing regimes of Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. As these regimes collapsed, so too—either temporarily or more permanently—did the gatekeeping arrangements that Europe had negotiated with them in order to contain (and readmit) migrants en route to Europe. A breach thus opened not simply in the solid barrier encircling Europe, but in a wider, complex apparatus that the EU and its member states had constructed over the previous decade beyond its territorial boundaries in order to govern flows of migrants and asylum seekers from Africa.

In other words, the current crisis reveals how much of Europe's southern border is already in Africa. Since the early 2000s, while thousands of African migrants have traveled north through desert, sea and air (with regular flights), the European border has traveled southward, bringing with it a crowd of civilians, militaries and experts as well as specific interests and demands, funds and technological equipment, hopes and worldviews. The border has appeared in a multitude of places, forms and uniforms, in bilateral agreements and NGO programs, in consulates and migrant camps, in joint police operations and activist campaigns. While the Mediterranean has become the main stage for the current play and tragedy between borders and migrants, this volume seeks to open a window on the present and historical backstage of these phenomena. It casts light on the processes that have made and unmade Europe's southern border as an African reality, and on the many African and European actors that operate in the border zone, both in front of and behind the scenes. It brings insights into how they variously imagine, construct, cross or contest borders, and situates their encounters in the light of the history of uneven exchanges between Africa and Europe.

AFRICA AND EUROPE'S EXTERNALIZED MANAGEMENT OF BORDERS AND MIGRATIONS

The European Union is essentially founded on a double principle of inclusion and exclusion. Its approach to mobility shows this well: while most of the Union, through the Schengen area, has become a space for freedom of movement across national boundaries, entry from the outside is highly regulated, especially with respect to citizens of poor countries.¹ Cross-border flows in and out of the EU are overwhelmingly about trade, capital, labor, transport, tourism and other valuable assets. Yet the importance and public visibility of immigration is viewed in the most ambivalent way, with migration policies becoming increasingly wedded to a security approach wherein the undocumented migrant represents a major threat. From the 1990s, and especially after the events of 9/11, the securitizing of external borders has become one of main missions of the European Union, thus earning it the infamous label of 'Fortress Europe'. Fences and walls around Europe have grown higher (Pallister-Wilkins, Chap. 3, this volume), and border control has become equipped with sophisticated technology ranging from satellite surveillance to biometric identification.

Single member states have done much of this work of securitization, but the Union has progressively become a central arena for policy-making on migration and related initiatives. The EU has, for instance, introduced a unified Schengen visa system to sort prospective travelers to Europe, and specifically to filter out from legal flows those subjects perceived to overstay their visas—which despite the iconic status of clandestine border crossings constitutes the main source of irregular immigration (Zampagni, Chap. 7, this volume). Consular officials have been further equipped with a database called the Visa Information System (VIS), which allows them to share data on applicants. The harmonization of visa procedures is but one piece in a wider constellation which, by the mid-2000s, the EU branded as an Integrated Border Management (IBM) approach, whose aim is to coordinate administrative mechanisms, police forces and other institutions concerned with border management (Carrera 2007). In 2004, the EU thus created Frontex, an agency tasked with promoting, coordinating and

¹No attempt is made here to detail all the steps in the formation of the EU and its external border and immigration policy, a topic discussed by a vast amount of scholarly work (see among others: Bigo and Guild 2005; van Munster 2009; Boswell and Geddes 2011; Feldman 2011).

developing European border management.² Mostly known to the public only, if at all, for its operations borrowing names from European mythology (Hera, Poseidon, Triton, etc.), Frontex is essentially military in form, though it invests much in its modern, corporate outlook and style by promoting knowledge production and using a language replete with risk management concepts familiar to corporate business and policymaking circles (Feldman 2011, pp. 87–89; Andersson 2014, pp. 73–80).

Starting from the 2000s, a novel approach has inspired the EU migration and border management. Generally known as ‘externalization’, this approach conceives of borders not simply as ‘the territorial limit of the [supra-]state but [as] the management practices directed at “where the migrant is”’ (Cobarrubias et al. 2014, p. 19). This is again especially evident with respect to undocumented migration, whereby Europe has, so to speak, offshored border work in order to follow migrants upstream along their routes. The goal of externalization is to intercept migrants before they approach Europe in order to deter and prevent their crossings (and applications for asylum). Thus, navy and coastal guards plough international waters in the Mediterranean and Atlantic, going as far as West African shores (Hallaire, Chap. 10, this volume); manned and unmanned planes monitor movements, in some cases flying deep into the interior of Africa (Carrera 2007; Guild and Carrera 2013). Recent years have indeed witnessed greater emphasis on intelligence at European borders and beyond.³ Finally, in response to critics of this militaristic approach to security, the EU and single member states have been keen to show a humanitarian face, for example, by framing, or marketing, sea operations as missions to save and rescue lives imperiled by hazardous crossings and shrewd traffickers (Walters 2011; Cuttitta 2015).

Third countries play a vital role in Europe’s externalized border management. Since 2005, the Global Approach to Migration (and Mobility) (GAMM) has provided the EU with a framework to cooperate with countries of origin and transit on migration issues (Dünnwald, Chap. 4, this volume). The EU has accordingly ‘mainstreamed’ its migration priorities in its foreign policy with Africa, for instance, through the so-called

² Definition adapted from the Frontex website (<http://frontex.europa.eu>; accessed 5 October 2015).

³ The most important and widely discussed project in this direction is EUROSUR, whose main infrastructure is based on a network of national coordination centers (NCCs) sharing intelligence to improve ‘situational awareness’ and ‘reaction capability’ at borders (Rijpma and Vermeulen 2015).

Rabat Process and, more recently, the Khartoum Process, which established inter-state regional platforms among countries of origin, transit and destination along the north-west and north-east African irregular migration routes to Europe. A number of policy instruments and bi- or multi-lateral frameworks either operationalize or complement such frameworks, among which is featured the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (Pallister-Wilkins, Chap. 3, this volume; Gabrielli 2012; Casas-Cortés et al. 2013; Cross 2013, ch. 5–8; Kabbanji 2013). Essentially, these programs encourage third countries to introduce preemptive measures to deter or prevent their citizens from traveling (illegally) to Europe, and/or other nationals from doing so by transiting through their countries. In exchange, the EU holds out various promises of greater regional integration, development aid, trade facilitation, foreign investment, legal migration schemes and other advantages. Single member states also carry out, or even broker, such cooperation initiatives, and conduct a sizeable amount of the diplomatic work, especially with regard to bilateral agreements (Morone, Chap. 6, this volume).

A number of border-related initiatives have thus sprung up across Northern Africa and, increasingly, south of the Sahara. Frontex coordinates joint sea patrols of European and African police forces in the Mediterranean and along the Atlantic coast of north-west Africa (Hallaire, Chap. 10, this volume). Detention camps for migrants and asylum seekers have been constructed with European support in North and sub-Saharan African countries (Lemberg-Pedersen, Chap. 2, this volume), and re-admission procedures for deported migrants and voluntary repatriates are by now operative with many African countries (Lecadet, Chap. 5, this volume). The EU additionally supports soft power initiatives, such as public campaigns and civil society initiatives, which tackle undocumented migration (Bouilly 2008; Mescoli 2013). The global approach to migration provides a more comprehensive approach to migration that arguably goes beyond mere repression and dissuasion, and instead promotes mobility schemes for skilled migrants as well as development projects for tackling the root causes of African emigration (Dünnwald, Chap. 4, this volume).

The border apparatus that the Union and its member states have constructed around and beyond Europe is certainly impressive. Yet this has by no means been a straightforward and coherent process. In the first place, it rests on uncertain legal foundations and divergent political agendas, particularly between member states and the European Commission, but

also between the member states themselves (Del Sarto and Steindler 2015). The 2015 border crisis clearly exposed many of these soft spots. In March 2015, the European Commission (2015) launched the European Agenda on Migration, envisaging reforms and innovations, and once again calling for greater coordination and ‘burden sharing’ among member states in the management of external borders and asylum cases.⁴ However, only a few months later, as arrivals on Mediterranean shores intensified, disunity and free riding reigned across the Union. The crisis exposed the blatant diversity not only in administrative capacity and social and cultural attitudes to immigration and asylum, but also in political rhetoric and action. European governments adopted a number of quick-fix solutions, variously opening or closing their national borders. In the process, they broke apart the EU’s integrated asylum system, only reaching consensus on redistribution mechanisms after lengthy, difficult negotiations.

The lack of consensus rippled back and forth between European capitals and external frontiers. For instance, when in November 2014, Frontex’s Triton Operation took over from Italy’s Mare Nostrum ‘Search and Rescue’ (SAR) operation in the Sicilian Channel, there was already an omen of problems to come. Uncertainty surrounded member states’ commitment to Triton, which in any case had a more limited geographical scope and arguably downplayed the save and rescue component in favor of deterrence. Instead, over the following months, migrants kept crossing and dying at sea. In April 2015, a shocking tragedy off the coast of Libya in which 900 migrants lost their lives forced European governments to respond. Triton’s area was enlarged, and a muscular action (EU Navfor Med) against northern African trafficking networks was announced, only to be partly crippled by the UN Security Council, which denied it access to Libyan waters. During the period of EU-wide summits and media attention on the migrant question, some European states sent in their navy’s ships to save and rescue migrant boats, though not necessarily as part of a coordinated mission. Yet by the following July, the Mediterranean had reverted to being a hemorrhaging border⁵ (Raeymaekers 2014a).

⁴As some observers have commented, the Agenda is a continuation of the same approach and fails to recognize some of the structural problems in the EU management of migration, such as the link between irregular crossings and the restrictions on legal channels of immigration and asylum in countries of origin and transit (Dimitriadi 2015; Guild et al. 2015).

⁵Prof. Flavio Vassallo Paleologo’s blog ‘Diritti e Frontiere’ offers a detailed chronicle of these events (<http://dirittiefrontiere.blogspot.de>; last accessed 12 November 2015).

There are further puzzling questions about Europe's external border management. As Ruben Andersson (2014) has shown, the business of bordering Europe is founded on poignant paradoxes, even absurdities, particularly with respect to undocumented migration. Although the latter remains a numerically limited phenomenon, a large industry has developed around it, indeed contributing to fabricating the very object it seeks to eliminate: the 'illegal migrant'. It is a lucrative industry for some, especially for the security agencies and companies that have constructed Europe's high-tech border. Others occupy less profitable positions and yet often play a no less important role. Thus, while Spain and Frontex claim credit for the successful securitization of the Strait of Gibraltar and the Atlantic route to the Canary Islands thanks to sophisticated radar surveillance and groundbreaking sea operations, Andersson shows that much of the border work has been actually carried out through low-tech means and by African states, police forces and partners.

Albeit less visible to the public, EU policymakers are acutely aware of the vital importance of these external relations. Indeed, the EU has once more bet on a global approach to migration and externalized border management to solve the current crisis (cf. Lemberg-Pedersen; Morone, Chaps. 2 and 6, this volume). As we write, the EU and African states have just met (11–12 November 2015) at a summit held in La Valletta, Malta, to discuss African migration to Europe. The EU has committed itself to creating an Emergency Trust Fund to finance development, skilled migration schemes and other initiatives addressing structural causes of African emigration (European Council 2015). Yet their negotiations were concerned also, if not primarily, with cooperation with African governments on containment measures.⁶ Of course, African states have their strategic interests in this and similar initiatives. This being said, a number of chapters in this volume demonstrate that the exportation of border management from Europe to Africa is far from being a linear and smooth process.

Clearly there is not, or not solely, more fragmentation, instability and opacity along Europe's southern border than Europe would want to see and show. Rather, precisely because of the scattered nature of externalized

⁶The summit also aimed to revamp the Khartoum Process, amidst critiques that European support will be channelled to oppressive regimes, such as that of Eritrea, a prominent refugee-producing country. Other contested measures include the hosting of African police officers in its migrant centers in order to facilitate identification and repatriation of fellow nationals.

border management, understanding what it is and does necessarily implies close scrutiny of what happens on the ground, and in particular in Africa, where so many trajectories begin. So this represents the starting point of *EurAfrican Borders and Migration Management*. Its objective is to offer insights into how, where and by whom Europe's borders are extended into Africa, thereby showing how externalization is an African story as much as a European one.

POLITICAL CULTURES OF EURAFRICAN BORDERS

As it is a process emanating from Europe, scholars have primarily studied the externalization of Europe's borders from 'inside out', that is, as seen in the migrant-receiving context and the external dimensions of the Union's policy. There is nevertheless a growing body of scholarship documenting the African ramifications of Europe's border, particularly in the area of international relations.⁷ Detailed empirical studies conducted in Africa have been mainly concerned with migration and transit, shedding light on the spatial and social dynamics taking place in the Saharan and coastal regions crossed by migrants en route to Europe (Marfaing and Wippel 2004; Bredeloup and Pliez 2005; Choplin 2008; Bensaâd 2009; Brachet 2009; Lucht 2012; McDougall and Scheele 2012; Streiff-Fenart and Kabwe-Segatti 2012). This focus on migration has, however, partly eclipsed other analytical possibilities, such as investigating the very nature of borders as constructed and experienced in and by Africa. Unfortunately, compared with their Europeanist colleagues, few African borderlands scholars have either joined the ongoing debates on externalization or shown an interest in the shifting nature of borders along and across the African edges of Europe (e.g. Brambilla 2010, 2014; Raeymaekers 2014b).

The main objective of this volume is to investigate how Europe's external borders have also become African borders, indeed EurAfrican ones. It should be mentioned here that 'EurAfrican' is a loaded term. The French term *Eurafrique* gained some currency in the 1920s, espe-

⁷A number of monographs and collective publications discuss EU initiatives in the Mediterranean, some of which place borders and migration management in a wider regional and historical perspective (e.g. Fabre and Cassia 2007; Bechev and Nicolaidis 2009; Walton-Roberts and Hennebray 2013; Rinelli 2015). Scholarship on Saharan and sub-Saharan areas is less comprehensive but nevertheless features a number of significant case studies (e.g. Choplin 2010; Cross 2013; Kabbanji 2013; Pina-Delgado 2013; Andersson 2014; Ciabarrì 2014).

cially in France, Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. In France and Italy in particular, it connoted a pan-Europeanist, expansionist project in the Mediterranean space mainly driven by economic and demographic prospects (Whiteman 2012). ‘EurAfrican’ has a different meaning for us; yet we deliberately employ this term also to recall the legacy of asymmetric relationships and (imperial) imaginations informing in complex ways the current border and migration management strategies in the Euro-African space (Hansen and Jonsson 2011). Europe’s externalization of border and migration management toward Africa writes a new chapter in a long history of intertwined and concomitantly unequal trajectories between the two continents, ones marked by exchanges and mutual appropriation and fascination, as well as by stark power inequalities, colonial domination, exploitation and racial discrimination. Indeed, what we seek to draw attention to is the ‘entangled history of uneven modernities’ (Randeria 2006), which is reflected by externalization as soon as this is viewed from Africa’s perspective. The trajectories are uneven but still entangled. Even in the heyday of colonialism, Africa and Africans were not passive spectators in the background, but rather shaped its course, and often ran the colonial enterprise on Europeans’ behalf by virtue of more or less indirect modes of rule (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991; Cooper 2005). As we further detail below, the very history of colonial borders in Africa exemplifies this well and may offer a valuable source for analyzing the plurality of forces at play in contemporary border regimes.

As a number of chapters in this volume document, the construction of Europe’s southern border reflects colonial histories in a concrete sense. Pallister-Wilkins, for instance, describes how the transformation and fortification of Ceuta and Melilla into EU borders is layered and shaped by the specific imperial history of these Spanish enclaves. In Mali and Libya, the colonial past linked with France and Italy respectively erupts into interstate initiatives on migration management, both as political rhetoric and as a factor shaping the quality of cooperation (Dünnwald; Morone, Chaps. 4 and 6, this volume). European border agents may, in turn, draw on well-worn repertoires of Eurocentric stereotypes, some of which are reminiscent of the European empires’ civilizing mission, in order to justify their security concerns vis-à-vis prospective African travelers (Alpes, Chap. 8, this volume).

This is not to argue that the encounter between European borders and African realities necessarily reverberates with imperialism and colonial history. Spain’s lack of a colonial legacy in West Africa has been, for example,

a reason for the relatively positive acceptance of its initiatives in the region (Dünnwald; Hallaire, Chaps. 4 and 10, this volume). Nor is it to disregard elements of novelty. Moments of radical transformation such as the Arab Spring reveal new possibilities of interaction between Europe and Africa that may ignore the past, and even purposefully predicate a break with it (Gaibazzi, Chap. 8, this volume). Nevertheless, African contexts matter: the diffusion of European borders in Africa is not taking place in a vacuum, but in specific historical, socio-political, economic and cultural realities that shape its architecture, efficacy and experiential qualities. At the very least, therefore, using the term ‘EurAfrican’ (with a capital ‘A’) is a strategy to tease out the asymmetric, relational nature of border-making between Europe and Africa and shed light on the encounters that make and unmake the African edges of Europe.

We are particularly interested in the political cultures developing through these encounters between Europe and Africa. We may think of Europe’s external borders as a frontier, not simply extending seamlessly into Africa, but also creating zones of contact in which bordering practices are experimented with. So Andersson (2014, pp. 83–84) interprets Spain’s strategy in the mid-2000s to reach out and engage West African institutions in order to secure its inner maritime borders, as a form of externalized cooperation, which Frontex subsequently appropriated and adopted as its standard operative model (i.e. a border practice developed at the periphery becoming a model at the center). Here we are reminded of a seminal essay in border studies, namely Frederik Turner’s (1920) *The Frontier in American History*, in which the frontier is not solely a remote, marginal place, but a constitutive element of what he called the American ‘national character’. It is true that Turner’s image of a ‘tidal frontier’ as a mobile front encroaching into uncharted territory, making ‘first contact’ with unknown realities, may reiterate a one-sided, even Eurocentric, view. As noted, the space in which EurAfrican borders emerge is already made up of contacts and exchanges. In *The African Frontier*, a foundational text in African borderlands studies, Igor Kopytoff (1987a) diverts attention from this notion of frontier. He speaks instead of an ‘internal frontier’ that appears in the interstitial spaces between precolonial African political formations. Here, individuals and groups settled, either to escape the control of existing power centers or to extend their outreaches (Kopytoff 1987b). People who occupied the frontier carried with them the political culture of their center and thus contributed to its reproduction. Both Turner and Kopytoff are useful for thinking about EurAfrican borders in

terms of a double frontier. The front spreading out from Europe creates zones of contact and friction in an African landscape which is, in turn, the byproduct of a long history of unequal exchanges. The state officials, international organizations, NGOs, migrants and other actors that meet and operate in these contact zones carry new elements as well as building on already existing dynamics to govern movement, or if they are migrants, to overcome containment. EurAfrican borders are, in sum, frontiers of both novelty and bricolage (cf. Raeymaekers 2009, p. 57).

We are less interested in offering yet another conceptualization of externalization than in delineating the conceptual contours of this volume. Both Turner and Kopytoff have used the concept of the frontier to show that the political cultures developing at the margins are co-substantial with those of the centers. From different disciplinary angles, our contributors similarly seek to pin down how EurAfrican border regimes broker the transformation and reproduction of the principles of political ordering. They are interested in the ways in which the actors involved imagine, construct, appropriate, avoid and contest these processes, and in the kinds of collective and individual subjectivities that emerge from them.

TOWARD AN AFRO-EUROPEANIST PERSPECTIVE

Studying the political cultures of EurAfrican borders raises an important epistemological and intellectual challenge. While the specter of *Eurafrique* may haunt the European project of externalization, it also survives in more insidious forms, for instance in the very idea that the two continents are distinct geographical, demographic, cultural, moral and—consequently for scholars—analytical units (Mudimbe 1988). Keye Whiteman (2012, p. 3) has suggested the term ‘Afro-Europa’ to ‘provide a more balanced concept ... an equal partnership of mutual interests’ between Africa and the EU than a number of state-led initiatives that are sinisterly reminiscent of the *Eurafrique* notion. Building on this suggestion, this volume is a first step towards what we might call an Afro-Europeanist perspective on EurAfrican borders which, by revealing the latter’s entangled nature, complicates a centric epistemology (Euro- as well as Afro-), and strives instead for a more nuanced viewpoint, or multiplicity of viewpoints. It admittedly remains a first step: developing a full-blown Afro-Europeanist perspective is beyond the scope of this project. Yet this challenge has in many ways given birth to our editorial partnership and accompanied it ever since. Alice Bellagamba has brought to the project her long-standing concern with historical

legacies in Africa and between Africa and the wider world, as well as with the implications of collaboration across disciplines and area studies. In a similar vein, Paolo Gaibazzi originally reached out to Europeanist scholarship to better understand how European border policies impacted on the Gambian migrant-sending places in which he conducted fieldwork. In his contribution to this volume, he further crosses regional and scholarly boundaries in order to engage Italian activists and their knowledge production about borders, and investigate how this is shaped by their encounter with post-revolutionary Tunisia. By contrast, Stephan Dünwald, whose research and work mainly pertain to asylum seekers in Germany, tracks European migration management policies back to Bamako, a key hub of West African migration to Europe. In this chapter, he demonstrates how Europe's externalizing impulse becomes tangled, and partly neutralized, in the institutional legacy of the Malian capital and state. In so arguing, he closes the circle among the three of us, further highlighting the mutual benefits of Afro-Europeanist synergies.

This volume additionally aims to create a platform for Afro-Europeanist dialogue. For this reason, Martin Lemberg-Pedersen's chapter is paired with this introduction in Part I of this volume. He provides a broad overview of EurAfrican border dynamics and the conceptual frameworks put forward especially by Europeanist scholars to understand them. The author critically addresses debates on sovereignty and biopolitics, and adapts concepts such as borderscape (Rajaram and Grundy-Warr 2007) to describe the multiple scales and dynamics engendered by bordering processes. He then tests their analytical purchase on Libya's detention camps for migrants and on what he calls 'border-induced mobility'—forced movement engendered by the very externalization of migration control. Finally, in the remainder of this introduction, we selectively draw attention to the body of African borderlands scholarship, suggesting possible points of convergence and exchange with Europeanist scholarship that might deepen insights into EurAfrican borders.

PLACES, ACTORS, LIVES

Places, actors and lives are the three keywords we have selected in order to explore the political cultures of EurAfrican borders and to organize the chapters thematically. Space is clearly a central, if elusive, dimension of EurAfrican borders. Wrenching borders out of territorial lines and setting them on the move, the process of externalization comprises numerous deterritorialized techniques of political ordering, whose morphology and

geography change according to the perspectives and variables being considered (see Lemberg-Pedersen, Chap. 2, this volume). The case studies featured in this volume reflect this geographical breadth, ranging from Dakar as the westernmost point to the Sinai desert as the easternmost one, and from Cameroon in the south to Italy in the north. More puzzlingly even, especially for African borderlands scholars, ‘border zone’ can mean anything from bounded spaces such as fenced enclaves and consulates to unbounded ones like deserts and seas. Drawing a comprehensive geography and typology of EurAfrican border spaces is clearly beyond our scope. Rather, while we acknowledge that some border processes may be utterly deterritorialized, Part II dwells on particular sites of spatial production and contestation of EurAfrican political cultures (Johnson and Jones 2014). These sites are not simply stages in which specific actors converge to work out border dynamics. They are instead the byproduct of stratified patterns of mobility, power relations and institutional structures that can enable or restrain the movement of people as well as the initiatives to manage it.

We felt that a focus on actors is key to capturing the plurality of agencies at work in border sites. EurAfrican borders are more than a tug of war between European states and African migrants. As hinted, the multilateral, decentralized and contested nature of border and migration governance in the EurAfrican space diversifies the actors involved. Part III of this volume gives a glimpse of this multiplicity of border agencies and the plurality of their border perspectives. The chapters in this part seek to unravel the political cultures, the visions, dispositions and *modus operandi* brought to, and emerging in, EurAfrican encounters.

Finally, EurAfrican borders are for many a question of life and death. Propelled by a search for a dignified livelihood, escape from oppression and social death, or simply a spirit of adventure, migrants’ mobility undoubtedly speaks of the possibilities in life. In turn, predicated on a ‘follow the migrant’ approach, externalization necessarily reaches out to migrants and their bodies, by variously surveilling, containing, removing and saving them; or simply by letting them die. But border regimes are also productive (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013); they create figures and subjects (e.g. the ‘illegal immigrant’), which then become lived-in realities. Part IV of this volume shows how this politics of life takes shape within specific socio-cultural contexts and biographies, thereby assuming a distinctive EurAfrican character. It does so by giving voice to ordinary African migrants, whose experiences often reveal the dramatic effects of the bordering practices that haunt them, even after they have set foot in Europe, while at same time showing moments of contestation of border politics.

Places

Since the 1970s, scholars of Africa have investigated the spatial logics of African societies and their implications for the political history of Africa (Kopytoff 1987a; Howard and Shain 2005; Engel and Nugent 2010). Pioneering studies on African borders have shown that what often appear as straight lines between nation-states on the political map of Africa are in fact complex sites of interaction. Here different actors negotiate sovereignty and legitimacy on the ground, a process that has extended into the postcolonial period (Asiwaju 1985; Herbst 1989; Nugent and Asiwaju 1996; Mbembé and Rendall 2000; Zeller 2010; Miescher 2012; Miles 2014). Colonial demarcations of borders and postcolonial border management have often presented different understandings of how space and movement across them should be ordered and practiced, both by local populations and by actors operating across vast areas (Flynn 1997; Chalfin 2001; Dobler 2008). This history of African borderlands hints at the importance of precolonial, colonial and postcolonial modes of governance for contemporary EurAfrican border regimes, which we have already commented on. But they also hint at recurrent questions about place-making, about the different sources of power and the social interactions that enable certain sites to operate as borders or prevent them from doing so. How do specific locations become EurAfrican borders? How do externally imposed or induced spatial regimes adapt to and transform existing geopolitical orders, and create new ones?

Although African borderlands scholars may recognize parallels in EurAfrican border-making, they may be less familiar with border places not conventionally associated with borderlines and borderlands. As Polly Pallister-Wilkins's chapter on the fences around Ceuta and Melilla—Spanish enclaves on Moroccan territory—makes clear, even familiar boundaries assume different functions and meanings in the thrust of contemporary re-orderings of space, sovereignty and population. The author shows that EurAfrican border regimes continue to make use of territorially fixed boundaries and exploit their enduring imperial history and geopolitical functions, specifically by transforming the fences around Ceuta and Melilla into ever higher and more securitized barriers, not merely between Spain and Morocco, but also between Europe and Africa. At the same time, the fixity of these fences belies the instability and contradictory nature of bordering processes in the neoliberal present. In Ceuta and Melilla, the fences embody a tension between free flow and closure, and between

security and humanitarianism, which becomes evident in their differential permeability vis-à-vis different political subjects, such as African migrants, Europeans and local residents. These fences have thus become the stage—or as Pallister-Wilkins suggests, the producer—of resistant action, carried out most notably by pro-migrants' rights European protesters.

As the EU's attempts to regulate movement proceed southward along migratory routes, new border sites emerge further away from entry points such as Ceuta and Melilla. Stephan Dünnwald's chapter describes European plans for making Bamako, Mali's capital city, a 'border place' to monitor and govern irregular migration to Europe. Far from any actual international boundary, Bamako is nonetheless a hub for West Africans seeking to migrate in both official and clandestine ways, and for those who are deported back from Europe and Northern Africa. As such, Bamako has attracted EU and EU member states' initiatives and officials, as well as international organizations, wishing to cooperate with the Malian state and non-state institutions on projects of migration management. But the Malian capital is also a fraught place, whose density and history shape the course of these initiatives. Dünnwald shows in a compelling way how the process of turning Bamako into a border becomes entangled in, and sometimes jeopardized by, Mali's colonial and postcolonial legacies of administrative procedures and international relations, including previous frameworks for migration-related cooperation and aid with European countries.

The last chapter of Part II, by Clara Lecadet, complements Dünnwald's by looking at migrants' place-making engendered by the southward moving EurAfrican border in Mali. Lecadet describes three precarious settlements or *ghettos* set up in different parts of Mali by West and Central African migrants expelled from Algeria. Deportation is an increasingly central practice in the architecture of Europe's management of undocumented immigration, one that has moreover become externalized to Northern African states like Algeria as the EU has placed mounting pressure on them to stem the flow of sub-Saharan (allegedly) en route to Europe (Andrijasevic 2010). In addition, some deportees are re-integrated into an industry of humanitarian assistance for deportees in transit countries that often operates conjointly with European authorities (see also Lijnders, Chap. 11, this volume). Though the *ghettos* interact at times with associations of deportees and other institutionalized actors, they mostly thrive at the margins of formal circuits and address deportees' concerns in different ways. These settlements or neighborhoods organize survival in

situations of discrimination and abandonment, but also recreate collective life and shelter people on the move (back to their country or northward again). An interesting aspect of some *ghettos* is that its members organize themselves according to national membership and political organization, for instance by labeling the leading figures of national communities as ‘presidents’ and ‘ministers’. This brings us full circle back to Kopytoff, for one could describe *ghettos* and similar formations that, as shown by Lecadet, can be found all along the EurAfrican border zone, as interstitial places existing between multiple governing agencies, and yet partly reproducing their political culture.

Actors

Sites of border-making reveal not only the coexistence of different strategies of spatial ordering, but also a plethora of actors operating on the ground. By virtue of the EU’s integrated, multilateral governance of borders, for instance, a number of ‘stakeholders’ (governmental offices, police forces, security experts and companies, international organizations and local and international NGOs) operate in the border zone between Africa and Europe. On this terrain, research on EurAfrican borders potentially meets an extensive body of scholarship, analyzing the transformations of governance in postcolonial and neoliberal Africa, which has provided insights into the multiplication of regulatory agencies in Africa. Over the past two decades, particular African borderlands exposed to conflict, power-sharing or privatization have become crowded with numerous institutional and non-institutional actors (nation-states, UN forces, charitable organizations, multinational companies, security agencies, NGOs, rebels, warlords, criminal networks, etc.). This has stimulated border scholars to investigate the ways in which different actors share or contend power over territory, sovereignty, assets and/or people (Roitman 2005; Chalfin 2010; Hüsken and Klute 2010; Korf and Raeymaekers 2013; Seymour 2013; Raeymaekers 2014c). African borderlands are, indeed, sites of fraught social interaction (Coplan 2012). In a similar spirit, this volume as a whole evidences the significant heterogeneity of players and agendas meeting/clashing in the EurAfrican border zone. The chapters in Part III are assigned, however, a more specific task, namely to show how particular actors imagine, construe and resist EurAfrican borders in specific African contexts.

Dovetailing with Lemberg-Pedersen's chapter, Antonio Morone's case study elucidates the Libyan state view on the EU initiatives in the country. He focuses in particular on the historic Treaty of Friendship signed by Italy and Libya in 2008, which, not unlike other bilateral agreements in Northern Africa, reflects both European pressures to create gatekeepers and buffer zones, and the Libyan government's tactical use of its position or image as a transit country to extract economic and political benefits from its European counterparts. However, Morone goes a step further to show how the treaty stemmed from a broader migration and colonial question in Libya's political history. More than being simply a transit country, Libya has in fact been and still is a migrant destination for numerous sub-Saharan and Northern African workers, something that both shaped and was shaped by the Gaddafi regime's pan-Africanist agenda. It is in view of this wider picture that Gaddafi managed to play the migration card on different negotiation tables, and to handle the security concerns of Italy and Europe as a resource for both domestic and international politics. It appears that the capitulation of Gaddafi in 2011 did not immediately broker significant changes to this situation, and actually resulted in further safety hazards for the sub-Saharan migrants living in the country, who were already bearing the brunt of high-level diplomatic negotiations on security issues.

While European states seek to devolve containment and repressive tasks to their African partners, they also retain direct control over migratory flows. As aforementioned, a centerpiece in external border management is the unified Schengen visa system, which shifts a substantial portion of border work onto the shoulders of European consular agents working in Africa. Two chapters in Part III describe the work, views and moral concerns of consular officers operating the Schengen visa system in particular African countries. Francesca Zampagni investigates the political and administrative structure of the Visa Office of the Italian Consulate in Dakar, Senegal. The office is responsible for Senegal and some of the neighboring countries, which according to Schengen directives are placed on a 'blacklist' for scoring a high 'migratory risk': the danger that short-term visa holders might overstay their allocated time and thus become irregular immigrants in Europe. Through a number of procedures, the consular agents thus aim to establish the veracity of the documents supplied by the applicants, and through specific interview techniques, they seek to detect the 'real intentions' of their travel. Part of the task involves seeking to interpret and control the local context, for example, by employing

Senegalese personnel and liaising with Dakar offices issuing specific documents for the visa application to detect frauds.

Concerns with fraud and security also recur vividly in Maybritt J. Alpes' chapter on the French consulate in Cameroon. In addition to the actual sovereign power of consular officers, Alpes highlights their performance of statehood, a theme that once again cuts across European and African borderlands research (Coplan 2012; Cuttitta 2014). French state officials construct themselves as the defenders of the French nation against what they perceive as Cameroonian women's cunning and illicit attempts to be granted Schengen visas by marrying French men. Even though statistics actually show that visa applications for family reunions are often successful, the consular officers over-communicate their security concerns by posting texts about alleged frauds in the premises of the consulate and through their interview style with the applicants. As Eurocentric notions of conjugal love and reciprocity shape in profound ways their understanding of legitimate matrimonial unions, patrolling the border between France and Cameroon is staged as a moral and cultural mission and ultimately as a form of othering (van Houtum and van Naerssen 2002). Cameroonian concerns over 'security' pivot, by contrast, on ensuring subsistence and well-being in the face of a deteriorating national economy, concerns which result in different understandings of what a legitimate, viable marital relationship is.

Moving the focus of attention away from state actors, the last chapter in Part III focuses on activists and their anti-border politics. Paolo Gaibazzi follows Italian activists who, in the aftermath of a cycle of mass protests in 2010–2011 in Southern Europe and Northern Africa, liaised with Tunisian activists of the Jasmine Revolution, thereby giving rise to Euro-Mediterranean events, networks and common struggles. The Italian activists brought to these meetings their experiences accumulated during years of struggle against European borders and in favor of freedom of movement. Although border issues partly failed to strike a chord with the Tunisian activists, the chapter shows how their anti-border political culture enabled their convergence toward other points. In the activists' view, these convergences would pave the way to 'exodus', that is, the possibility of creating alternative, egalitarian social formations and direct democracy across the Mediterranean. The chapter concludes that, while EurAfrican border governance may be steeply vertical in nature, border regimes should not be viewed as a direct, unmediated emanation of sovereign power, against which resistance appears merely in the form of dialectical reaction. Rather, by means of their totalizing intent, EurAfrican borders reveal, and in a way induce, the partial autonomy of certain actors in the making or unmaking of border regimes.

Lives

If actors and sites of EurAfrican borders emerge as a response to human mobility, then movement is an essential element of human life. Part IV of this volume teases out the broader existential and experiential qualities of moving in and through EurAfrican borders. African borderlands scholars have accounted for the multiple ways in which seemingly artificial and exogenous borders have been woven into the social and cultural fabric of borderland populations (e.g. Flynn 1997; Brambilla 2007; Impey 2007). However, whereas ‘identity’ has been a major analytical framework in this scholarship, recent studies of certain border techniques (e.g. camps, biometric surveillance) in Europe and elsewhere have also drawn attention to the ways in which borders affect the very form and substance of human existence (de Genova 2002; Amoore 2006; Vaughan-Williams 2009; cf. Agamben 1995; Foucault 2007). The person becomes, in other words, the site and conduit of border politics (or resistance). The chapters in Part IV accordingly unveil the experiences of violence and freedom, adventure and abjection, submission and rebellion, which render EurAfrican borders graspable as a subjective, biopolitical reality and a form of embodied consciousness.

That the stakes of EurAfrican border-making directly impinge on the conditions that make life livable emerges clearly in Juliette Hallaire’s chapter on Senegalese fishermen and their mobile livelihoods. Taking advantage of their sailing skills, in 2005–2006 some of these fishermen took to smuggling West African migrants to the Canary Islands, triggering in turn a rapid, muscular response by Spain and Frontex. In this crucial moment for the expansion of the European frontier toward the sea and shores of north-west Africa, European authorities framed migration narrowly as either a security threat or a humanitarian emergency, and consequently viewed fishermen as human traffickers. By contrast, Hallaire makes it clear that fishermen’s involvement in this sea route is a response to the dispossession of their means of subsistence. The Senegalese government drove fishermen out of business by granting fishing rights along the Senegalese coast to foreign fishing companies, including European ones. This incidentally reminds us that, as Lemberg-Pedersen (Chap. 2, this volume) also points out, economic interests and actors behind security issues are part and parcel of the EurAfrican border industry. It was because they were faced with resource depletion and competition that fishermen enlarged the scale of their maritime mobility and eventually diversified their activities by sailing to the Canary Islands. While fishermen’s journeys defied attempts at transforming the sea into an extensive border zone, they

primarily viewed their mobility as an act of protest against Senegalese politicians, who disregarded their plight and subsequently proceeded to sign a repatriation agreement with Spain.

It is in borders and through borders that the sovereign state's power lies, not simply to include or exclude but also to apprehend, confine and even annihilate border-crossers (Vaughan-Williams 2009; Ferrer-Gallardo and van Houtum 2014). One may contend that a politically convenient outcome of the externalization of EU border and migration management has been precisely to shift what Laurie Lijnders calls a 'frontier of violence' away from Europe's doorstep (and hence from public attention) and to move it to no-man's land (Mountz and Loyd 2014). In her chapter, Lijnders describes the experiences of Eritrean asylum seekers hoping to reach Europe but detoured to Israel via the Sinai desert, owing primarily to the EU's blockage of the Mediterranean Sea in the late 2000s. In the Sinai desert, virtually all migrants are kidnapped and tortured by Bedouin traffickers seeking to extort a ransom from them and their relatives back home. Those who survive and manage to arrive at the Israeli border might be shot on sight or thrown back to Egypt. This outsourced violence on the external fringes of the EurAfrican border zone not only becomes visible in migrants' body scars, but is also internalized as traumatic memories of near-death, which some attempt to bury within themselves in order to live on.

As Laura Menin points out in the last chapter of the volume, such frontiers of violence have also turned inward, stalking Africans as they cross borders into Europe. In a sort of mirror effect, in fact, Europe's fight against 'illegal' immigration has resulted in increasingly restrictive conditions of permanence for undocumented migrants already living in European countries. By following the trajectory of a young man from Morocco to Italy, Menin shows how the progressive deterioration of his legal status affects his sense of self. While 'illegality' is structural to Italy's informal economy, 'illegal' migrants such as the protagonist of Menin's chapter experience it as a descent into ever more precarious forms of economic, social and personal life from which it becomes increasingly difficult to move out. However, the so-called 'scam amnesty' (2010) through which many undocumented immigrants had hoped to regain rights of stay, eventually caused this widespread and yet personalized existential condition to assume a collective form of consciousness, prompting this man and some of his companions to participate in a protest movement and thus to emerge from invisibility.

* * *

In sum, this volume follows the threads that constitute the fabric of EurAfrican borders across a wide physical, institutional and existential space, from utter domination to rebellion, from containment to escape. At stake in this process are the very foundations of state sovereignty and international relations, not simply in the formal, legal sense, but also as revealed by the political visions, anxieties and moral orientations through which state and non-state actors understand the mission of borders to be, and implement it on both African and European soil. At stake are also, clearly, the livelihoods, dignity and very survival of those inhabiting, crossing or opposing the various sites in which borders are erected. In the Epilogue of this volume, David Coplan reminds us that these are issues of great public relevance and political urgency. Reading Europe's 2015 refugee/border crisis through the lens of the present collection of essays, he identifies recurrent questions and contradictions characterizing Europe's and Africa's approaches to borders and mobility. As the EU's new solutions for re-securing its external borders looks unsurprisingly similar to old ones with respect to externalization, Coplan notes that, together with the EurAfrican dynamics that produce them, these questions and contradictions are likely to stay with us for some time to come.

Often harsh and conflicting, sometimes lethal, the interactions between different actors and interest groups do not necessarily constitute, however, two distinct camps, let alone ones identifiable with Africa and Europe, respectively. Rather, *EurAfrican Borders* offers more nuanced views on the convergences, ruptures, contradictions and possibilities of the entangled political cultures emerging and unfolding on the ground. It is also on this ground that this volume means to foster greater contact between different scholarly traditions. Coplan indeed invites both the authors and the readers of this volume to push this challenge a step forward. The potentials of decentering the analytical gaze on Europe's southern border may lead us beyond comparison and exchange. As he remarks, (African) peripheries have historically been sites of creativity of and experimentation with techniques of government that have been subsequently exported elsewhere, and imported back in the metropolises. As such, these are not simply interesting observatories for empirical research, but also sites of conceptual reflection for considering, specifically, what borders are and do.

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Effective Protection or Effective Combat? EU Border Control and North Africa

Martin Lemberg-Pedersen

On October 9, 2013, the voice of the President of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, faltered for a moment, as he paused to finish his comment on the tragedy, which had just taken place. Moments earlier the President of the European Commission, the Italian Minister of the Interior, Enrico Letta, and Justice Home Affairs Commissioner, Cecilia Malmström, had been screamed at by angry people, who accused them of having blood on their hands. The location was the small Italian island of Lampedusa, located around 100 km from Tunisia, 176 km from Sicily and 600 km from Libya. The reason for the outrage was that a boat loaded with migrants had capsized, whereby close to 400 people, many women and children, had drowned in the sea. Witnessing the drowning of migrants is by no account rare for the people on Lampedusa, or for people in the Mediterranean in general, as more than 25,000 people have died at the European borders between 1993–2015. The scale of the incident was, tragically, not a rarity either, and in the time to come, it was even to get much worse. Thus, during the span of only one week in April 2015, more than 1200 migrants lost their lives as two boats capsized en route between Libya and Italy. There was, however, something new back in 2013, and perhaps this helped explain why Barroso, Letta and Cecilia Malmström had travelled

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to Lampedusa. This time, the Italian authorities had pulled most of the drowned migrants out of the sea and placed them in rows and rows of coffins, so that all, including the media, could see the fatal consequences of the EurAfrican border control regime. The adults were put in big coffins, while the children were placed in smaller ones. Stretched out in front of the European politicians lines of hundreds of coffins filled the hangar, which had hastily been converted into a massive morgue for those whose dream of entering Europe had ended in such tragedy. The ensuing media coverage of the Lampedusa tragedy was massive, and in some ways, the 2013 Lampedusa tragedy would serve as a game changer for the functionality of the EurAfrican borders, prompting the launch of the Italian Mare Nostrum search and rescue operation. Across Europe, populations, NGOs and a few politicians, increasingly demanded alternatives to these massive humanitarian costs. Since then, the urgency of this demand has only increased.

There are many ways of inquiring into European border control, but this chapter examines the development of EurAfrican borders by focusing in particular on the external dimension of European Union (EU) border control as it is manifested towards North Africa.¹ It asks whether it is possible to identify a systemic rationality that guides the construction and enforcement of European border control systems and how we can conceptualize it. At the outset I introduce a dominant mode of analysing border control, common in public discourses, namely the closed system perspective. This is then juxtaposed to what I claim is a more promising conceptual framework, namely that of borderscapes, which serves to highlight the dynamic, relational and multilocal character of European border control. This is then elaborated via a critical gaze at several attempts to define how European states have attempted to externalize migration control to other countries in terms of supranational policy drives, ripple and mimicry effects. This then facilitates a more nuanced understanding of externalization. Since border control reterritorializes geographic spaces according to the mobility of the people through them, it follows that the EU's border control, and with it also aspects of the union's asylum policy, have both biopolitical and geopolitical implications. Accordingly, the chapter invokes the works of Foucault and Agamben in an attempt to identify the political economy underpinning the EU's mobility regime of free and forced flows. This perspective also allows for useful spatial interpretations of the relations between cartographic representation of the phenomenon

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of migration and the sovereign power involved in producing knowledge about migration and border control.

By analysing the European efforts to reconstruct its borderscapes through the externalization of detention camps to Libya, I argue that focusing only on sovereign power and the production of free circulation for some, and forced flows of others, risk bypassing other political, technocratic and public–private dynamics. The chapter focuses in particular on the intergovernmental and supranational negotiations of a Northwestern Triade of EU states, namely the Netherlands, the UK and Denmark, alongside Germany and Italy, which facilitated the rise of Libya as a host state for preemptive European control of asylum seekers. These dynamics are crucial when seeking a comprehensive understanding of how the EurAfrican dynamics of border control are characterized by the export of control to regions like Libya or Egypt. This, in turn, has prompted two parallel developments reinforcing one another: On the one hand, it has led to the closure of legal escape routes from Africa and the Middle East, which in turn has created the unprecedented rise of a smuggling industry operating often fatal alternative routes. On the other hand, European border control and its ‘combat against smugglers’ has emerged as a massively lucrative market for the European arms industry, both in terms of contracts to guard the EU’s external borders and in terms of the export of weapons and control systems to North African states.

Finally, the chapter suggests that while many forced migration researchers have tended to view border control as a reaction to the movement of already-displaced people, externalization is in fact a cause of transnational displacement and forced migration in itself. I label this specific kind of forced migration brought about by EU border control ‘border-induced displacement’, since this allow us to appraise both the functionality of the EurAfrican border regime and the humanitarian consequences characterizing this kind of displacement. Perhaps we can then provide some tentative answers to those asking how the tragedy at Lampedusa could have happened.

BORDERS, CLOSED SYSTEMS AND BORDERSCAPES

While European border control has gained much attention in European debates during the last 20 years, most analyses and public discussions have analysed its aspects through what can be termed a ‘closed system perspective’. This views borders as a bounded territorial property of individual nation-states (Agnew 1994) or, in the case of the EU, supranational entities.

Such a perspective, then, relies on methodological nationalism (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002) by starting from the assumption that states exist over time, replete with a fixed territory, demarcated by borders, and functioning as the guarantors of rights and communal identity within these borders. At the EU level, policy documents are thus arguing that the union amounts to an ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ (AFSJ), the external borders of which are the domain of the Frontex Agency. However, this perspective on European states and the union’s external borders relies heavily on a set of idealized realist geopolitical assumptions, forming an epistemic and scholarly dogma that reduces states to territorial containers of peoples, societies and sovereign powers. As such, this common view on borders reifies the perspective of states (or the EU) and omits the multifaceted and contested dynamics influencing European border control.

The methodological nationalism of the closed systems perspective of borders is common in International Relations (IR) theory. Furthermore, it has been facilitated by the rise of a neonationalistic political imagination in Europe and the accelerating EU integration during the last 20 years. Nonetheless, it also faces several problems: Firstly, when it comes to European states, such a methodology insists on viewing a range of sub-, inter- and transnational phenomena through the prism of the nation-states. This however means that the methodology is blinded when it comes to such dynamics as domestic networks of power, transnational mobility and international political mobilization. Secondly, its reductionism becomes even more compromised when considering the methodology’s application upon African and Middle Eastern state borders, such as those of Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Iraq and Syria. In these cases, the construction of their territorial borders was the result of arbitrary colonial border drawing made by European powers. Consequently, this variant of methodological nationalism was, and still is, incapable of reflecting the nomadic, clan and other societal dynamics, characterizing the populations and societies colonized.

Thirdly, this representation implies that people who move irregularly across borders must necessarily be understood as exceptions from a normal and established state of affairs. Migrants are, in other words, effectively transformed into dis- and misplaced existences, which then sanctions states to deploy exceptional practices of border control in order to correct such tendencies and re-insert migrants into the national order of bounded states. The closed system perspective, then, makes unproblematic a host of controversial border enforcement practices, such as interception, detention and deportation, the humanitarian consequences of which have been increasingly obvious during the 2000s.

Through its assumption of borders—and their associated control—as fixed and uncontroversial entities, the closed systems perspective also fails to appraise the various actors, interests and processes, which together compose border control. To counter this tendency, I follow work in the fields of critical geopolitics and border studies, which in recent years have sought to deconstruct the dominant European political imagination concerning the limits of states and their conduct of border control (O Thuathail 1996, 1999; van Houtum and van Naerssen 2002; Vaughan-Williams 2009).

One conceptual framework with potential for such deconstruction is that of borderscapes (Rajaram and Grundy-Warr 2007a). Towards the end of the 2000s, the borderscapes framework emerged within border studies as an increasingly distinct approach to examine the complexity of border landscapes. Rajaram and Grundy-Warr conceptualize this approach in a way that underscores the dynamic and relational processes of border politics, and as such show an affinity with Appadurai's (1996) notion of cultural—scapes as fluid and differentiated flows occurring in processes of globalization.

In general, borderscapes signify multifaceted socio-geographic landscapes of power, which produce structures and cover over 'hidden geographies' of excluded and marginalized groups (Rajaram and Grundy-Warr 2007b). Contrary to what is claimed by the closed systems perspective, borders are, according to this framework, always undergoing (re)construction, in the sense that they are dynamic. As such, this links the approach the notion of 'bordering' (van Houtum and van Naerssen 2002), a verbalization of the border concept, which serves to highlight the active process characterizing borders, in line with 'the processual turn', in border studies, while at the same time underscoring the conceptual poverty of the static 'border' concept, we find in traditional IR perspectives.

The borderscapes framework also offers new attention to the fact that borders, and the processes, which constitute and re-constitute them, are also sites of multiple interventions from multiple actors. This focus on multiple actors is particularly useful, as it allows us to maintain the move away from methodological nationalism, by deconstructing borders to reveal that they are not only produced by unifying national actors, but crucially also by a host of other, and sometimes conflicting, actors, like ministries, bureaucratic networks or courts as well as by non-national actors, supranational entities like the EU, international NGOs or global military and security industrial companies (Lemberg-Pedersen 2013). Such actors, networks and processes, and their interactions, also fall outside the narrow gaze of methodological nationalism.

A further strength of the borderscapes framework is its potential to bring into focus the epistemic dimension of borders by identifying how knowledge about borders is constructed, disseminated and, sometimes, revised, according to various interests. In other words, the framework allows us to recognize how, on the epistemic level, borderscapes are sites where diverse and rivalling conceptualizations converge. Actors like the European Commission, member states, the military and security industry, Frontex and those African countries neighbouring the EU all seek to influence border practices through discursive and cartographic production of border knowledge. These competing knowledge regimes frame public and political debates about border control to a significant degree and some of them are more powerful and influential than others in shaping public knowledge about borders. Mediatized discourses, and the actors behind them, thus have a massive influence on the fundamental premises through which the EurAfrican borders and their control are being understood and discussed.

Chiara Brambilla (2015) argues that the borderscape approach injects new critical potential into the three dimensions of inquiry, which have traditionally featured in border studies, namely the epistemological, ontological and methodological aspects of borders. Here, she says, the borderscapes approach fosters a ‘multi-sited’ epistemology, capable of transcending the traditional binary inside/outside dichotomy featuring in the closed system model. Related with this, the borderscapes approach highlights how borders can be both multiplied and stratified in several places due to their relational character. This too undermines the methodological nationalism of the closed systems model. Finally, when it comes to its methodological lenses, the epistemological and ontological aspects of the borderscapes framework mean that it allows for lived experiences to gain descriptive relevance alongside the more traditional conceptual and institutional perspectives. This too, of course, counters the hegemony of methodological nationalist narratives. As such, the conceptual flexibility of the borderscapes framework is useful when trying to understand the development of the EurAfrican border control, which occurred during the 2000s.

THE EXTERNAL DIMENSION OF THE EUROPEAN BORDERSCAPES

During the 2000s, the concept of externalization has been invoked as a description of how European states have begun to export aspects of border control outside their territory in order to preempt immigration flows, asylum applications and the stay of irregular migrants on EU territory.

If we turn to the EU's administrative and political institutions, externalization is defined in terms of the 'external dimension' of the Union's migration and asylum policy. For instance, the EU's Global Approach to Migration (2005) describes this transnational policy drive in the following manner:

Migration cannot be managed by the EU alone. Finding ways to address the challenges and make the most of the benefits brought by migration requires dialogue and partnerships with non-EU countries. The Global Approach to migration is, since 2005, the EU's framework for dialogue and cooperation with non-EU countries of origin, transit and destination. It enables migration and asylum issues to be addressed in a comprehensive way. (Department of Migration and Home Affairs 2013)

The EU's discourses seem to oscillate between two framings of the pre-emptive rationale behind its transnational border control. Representative of this oscillation is how the Danish EU Presidency of 2012 framed EU externalization as 'contributing to better the fundamental rights of irregular migrants and those in need of international protection'. At the same time, however, the Danish Presidency also invoked an analogy likening migrants to the mounting water pressure of rivers, by saying that the union must be 'working upstream in countries of origin and transit', since this will 'help stem the flow of illegal migration and secondary movement to the EU' (Danish Ministry of Justice 2012).

While the EU itself views these discourses as complementary, critics can point to the tension between the Union's perceived need to, on the one hand, 'control' and 'combat' illegal immigration, and, on the other hand, the focus granted to the 'fundamental rights' of migrants (*Ibid*; Huysmans 2006). Obviously, recognizing vulnerable individuals with urgent and legitimate protection needs becomes difficult when border policies are motivated by interests in 'stemming flows' of migrants, while at the same time not differentiating between their specific conditions and needs.

Depending on the geographic location and migration dynamics, the material infrastructure of EU border control, then, transcends European territory by creating, respectively, non-arrival policies (Gibney 2006) or non-exit policies. The development of these transnational control policies is observable from the late 1970s and onwards, as European states began to pursue and implement a range of policies designed to prevent migrants from arriving on European territory. These included visa policies, pre-screening practices, readmission agreements and the concept of 'safe third countries'. These policies have the effect of barring access

to European asylum systems, because the 1951 Refugee Convention grants migrants the right to apply for asylum when they are on the territory of a state. In a sense, then, European externalization is a form of asylum policy in that it *extraterritorially negates* migrants' access to European asylum procedures. As such, these early trends of externalization initiated a development whereby, for the vast majority of migrants, legal channels of mobility were closed down. Parallel to these policy developments, and providing a prism through which we can understand the dual discourses of the Danish Presidency, a conceptual slide is observable in the European discourses on migration from the 1970s and onwards: The political salience of 'the refugee' has gradually been overtaken by that of 'the asylum seeker', which has by now paved way for the 'illegal migrant'.

The policy drive for European externalization was reinforced in the 1990s when European states began to expand their readmission agreements with third countries (Cassarino 2010); the 'safe third country' concept was integrated into EU legislation and carrier sanctions introduced at EU level, which imposed substantial fines on transportation companies facilitating asylum seekers' arrival to Europe. In the 2000s, externalization entered a new phase when the Frontex Agency was established in 2004 and European states began to fund migrant control in North Africa, often framed as preparation for the export of asylum processing and protection programmes to migrants' regions of origin (e.g. Commission of the European Communities 2005a, p. 1).

During the 2000s, scholars began to analyse the externalization policies more in depth and the Union's own definition of externalization policies was challenged in various ways. Boswell (2003, p. 613) distinguishes between preventive externalization, purportedly addressing the root causes behind refugee flows, and the export of classical migration control to other countries. Balzacq (2009, pp. 2–3) instead sees externalization as a continuum of instances where one actor through international negotiations may gain 'remote control' over the border control of other actors, which, in turn, can lead to extraterritorial migration control. Gammeltoft-Hansen (2011, p. 2) defines such control as a general trend in many states 'to extend the reach of migration control to destinations outside its territory and to employ agents other than the state's own authorities'.

A prime example of such extraterritorialization in the EurAfrican context is the Frontex Agency, tasked with patrolling the EU's external borders. Many

of its operations, such as HERA II and III in 2006–2007 took place in, and reterritorialized, Euro-African borderscapes. Thus, the HERA operations targeted boat migrants seeking to reach the Canary Islands from north-west African shores, where they would be able to apply for asylum in Spain. To counter this movement Frontex deployed Spanish helicopters, naval vessels from Italy, Portugal and Spain and aircrafts from Finland and Italy in the territorial waters of Senegal, Cape Verde and Mauritania. Moreover, two surveillance aircrafts from Italy and Finland were flown deep into African territory to monitor migration routes through the deserts. Along the lines suggested by Balzacq (2009), the HERA operations were made possible via negotiations with Senegal, Cape Verde and Mauritania, where Spain played a leading role. Exposed to the full political-economic power of the EU, the three West African countries had little choice but granting the Union ‘remote control’ over their territories, leading to extraterritorial patrolling.

When it comes to the question of how the border policies of European countries are exported beyond Europe, scholars have suggested that this is characterized by the dynamics of a ‘ripple effect’ (Lavenex and Wagner 2007), while others talk of a ‘mimicry effect’ (Gammeltoft-Hansen 2011, p. 236). Justifying these concepts, they have pointed to expansions of the border control in EU’s neighbouring regions like the construction of high-tech fences in the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla (Pallister-Wilkins, Chap. 3, this volume), the Moroccan chain deportations of irregular migrants, or, in the case of Mauritania, the remodelling of an empty school building into a detention centre by the Spanish Guardia Civil (CEAR 2008). The claim is then that whether we talk of ripple or mimicry effects, powerful EU states have conditioned less powerful states to boost and expand their border control, with pervasive effects for the plight of migrants as well as the countries instrumentalized as ‘buffer zones’ in this manner.

The conditioning of less powerful states can occur in various ways. Sandra Lavenex and Emek Ucarer (2004, pp. 420–1, 435) have argued that the supranational integration of European countries’ immigration policies has resulted in four modes of EU border policy transfer to host countries. These are (i) host countries copying EU policies; (ii) host countries adapting to unintended ‘externalities’ of European policies; (iii) host countries acting according to their own self-interest. Finally (iv) even if it is not the best interest of the host countries, European pressure exercised

through trade policies, fisheries agreements, negotiations on development aid, or the so-called Mobility Partnerships may also condition states to accord with EU priorities on migration control anyway (Betts and Milner 2007, pp. 1–2). The linking of different policy domains can therefore effectively condition reluctant third countries to align with the Union's asylum policies and its overall priorities of migration control. However, such issue linkage may also create gaps the other way round, so that third countries seek to apply pressure to the EU. For instance, North African states like Morocco and Gaddafi's Libya often countered the EU pressure to contain migration flows by increasing their own financial demands during negotiations, correctly perceiving their own crucial roles in the transnational EU control regime. Similarly, the 2015 EU-Turkish deal has immediately after its launch been accompanied by further financial and political demands from Erdogan couched in thinly veiled threats of increased migration pressure.

However, while talk of policy transfer, ripple and mimicry effects certainly add to the discussions of EU externalization, it is still necessary to nuance the analysis further. For one thing, Lavenex, Wagner and Ucarer conceptualize both policy transfer and ripple effects specifically in terms of the intended or unintended consequences of increased EU integration. Yet, the focus on EU as a supranational actor means that they bypass important features of externalization. Firstly, they do not address externalization dynamics between individual states, nor that the transfer of control priorities occurs not only between EU and non-EU states but also between EU states. Thus, throughout the 2000s, Greece emerged as a prime buffer zone for migrants en route to north-western EU states, as well as a dumping zone for Dublin deportations, that is, deportations sanctioned by the EU's Dublin Regulation and its rule of First Country of Arrival, effectuated by the powerful EU states. Another Frontex operation illustrates this, namely the Frontex Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABIT) deployed at the Greek-Turkish Evros border in 2010, and later extended into the Frontex Poseidon Land operation from 2011. The RABIT deployment included more than 200 guest officers from 26 member states, but also technical equipment, such as a helicopter, buses, patrol cars, thermo vision vans and office units. RABIT was accompanied by an increased Greek effort to patrol the border, through the deployment of over 1000 Greek police officers from all over the country, under the SHIELD operation, which has taken place from 2012. As such, the RABIT and SHIELD operations demonstrate how externalization efforts and ripple effects also occur between EU states.

Secondly, a supranational analytical focus omits how policies of individual member states, like Italy and Spain, have also conditioned policy shifts in other states, like Libya and vice versa. Indeed, as Cassarino (2010) notes, the EU has experienced great difficulties in closing Union-wide readmission agreements, which is why the vast majority of readmission agreements have thus far been intergovernmental and not supranational. Thirdly, Lavenex, Wagner and Ucarer do not address how externalization has affected relations between non-EU states. But EU neighbours, like Morocco, Libya and Turkey, have, in recent years, signed several readmission agreements with a range of so-called ‘source countries’ of European-bound migration. Yet, while Turkey’s drive for such agreements seems akin to the mimicry effect mentioned by Gammeltoft-Hansen, it is worth noting that not all states hosting externalization measures implement the same policies. Thus, Morocco and Libya have conducted many deportations of sub-Saharan Africans, while other countries, like Mauritania, have been unsuccessful in attempts to introduce biometric data collection for the same group of migrants. As explained above, different countries respond differently to EU pressure and issue linkages during negotiations due to varying political-economic contexts, interests and postcolonial trajectories. It is therefore not possible to generalize the kind of impact that EU priorities have on all neighbouring states as a one-size-fits-all, because local situations, regional power balances and varying interests in coming to terms with the EU influence (cf. Chap. 1 in this volume). Nonetheless, all neighbouring states have voiced concerns and implemented policies countering the perceived risk that they could end up as dumping zones for EU-bound or EU-deported migrants.

A fourth, and final, refinement of the EU’s externalized borderscapes concerns the use of the underdetermined concept of ‘host states’. Here, it is necessary to recognize the existence of different actors, with different aims, within states choosing to align themselves to European priorities. Thus, while it is certainly the case that states like Morocco, Libya or Egypt were not passive actors, who concluded migration control deals with EU states against their own will, it is important to note that the state actors responsible for these deals are not the populations of these countries, but most often educated, wealthy and political elites, often having held power for a considerable time. In other words, talking of ‘host states’ *per simpliciter* risks resurrecting the analytical phantom of methodological nationalism and to disregard the repression and democratic deficiencies existing in several of the states that EU cooperates with concerning externalized

border control. A more accurate assessment of the ripple effect caused by European externalization, therefore, requires that we distinguish between different scales of state agency, different geopolitical power balances and the localized policies preceding and following resulting the European border control priorities. This should prompt us to assess the policies of, say, Turkey, Libya and Cape Verde, from within their own contexts.

Comprising the preceding discussion, we can therefore define EU externalization as the multifaceted processes whereby EU member states, or the Union as a supranational actor, complement policies to control migration across their territorial borders with initiatives aimed at realizing such control outside their territories. The externalization affix, then, signifies the process whereby some states utilize their political and economic power to initiate the extraterritorial export of their migration control priorities, while other states, more or less willingly, accept to host such measures. Accordingly, the practice of border externalization is but one manifestation of an increasingly decentralized and transnational political system, which functions through both bilateral and common European processes simultaneously.

The multiple policy tools used to further the externalization agenda shows how European states have increasingly sought to decouple the policing of migrants from the European states' territorial boundaries (Nick Vaughan-Williams 2009, p. 28). As such, externalization can be seen as forms of bio- and geopolitics, which effectively reterritorializes the borderscapes of both EU and non-EU states and governs those people moving through them.

THE EURAFRICAN BORDERSCAPES AS GEO- AND BIOPOLITICAL INTERVENTIONS

The concept of borderscapes offers a novel perspective on externalization, capable of appraising that European border control is not a static, geographical phenomenon, but dynamic, and comprises a variety of actors with political and economic power and a number of technological practices. Part and parcel of these dynamics is also the fact that borderscapes are shaped and understood through the production of knowledge. Viewed as a mechanism of social regulation, EU border externalization then orders and re-orders the movement of people on third country territory via such practices as surveillance, interception, detention and deportations. Properly nuanced, the analytics of borderscapes is then

useful to problematize the EurAfrican borders as contested and dynamic spatio-political phenomena influenced by certain political interests, discursive knowledge production and technological regimes. The intersection between border knowledge and border technology also opens up for analyses considering the geopolitical and biopolitical components of borderscapes.

Biopolitics can be defined as the instrumentalization of biological processes according to political interests, and biopolitical analyses therefore enquire into the ‘microphysics of power’ manifesting governmental power. Thus, while a geopolitical perspective asks ‘why’ and ‘where’ power is manifested in certain ways, a biopolitical perspective asks ‘how’ this power is realized. This brings to the foreground the many concrete instruments and practices through which the macro-perspective of geo-power is pursued. Accordingly, scholars have attempted to deconstruct the technological regimes behind European border and migration control (cf. Balzacq 2009) building on the theorizing of biopolitical governmentality done by Michel Foucault.

According to Foucault (2007, 2008), governmentality is a distinct political economy whereby power is delegated and decentralized in order to facilitate the free circulation of people and goods. Both the EU’s Schengen Area, with its free movement of EU citizens and goods between Union Member States and control of non-EU citizens, and externalization, which delegates control capacities to other countries or private companies can be analysed through a governmentality approach. The political economy of governmentality is not one of absolutely free movement but functions instead through the regulation of individual freedom vis-à-vis the overall utility gained through these circulations (Foucault 2008, pp. 42–3). According to its own logic, the ideal of free circulation of flows therefore requires the preemption, through security apparatuses, of other, risky, flows. From its inception in 1985, the Schengen Convention, too, has been premised on a link between the free movement of people and compensatory ‘flanking measures’ safeguarding the internal European space against perceived threatening and risky flows (van Munster 2009). Events such as Frontex operations, deportations, Libyan detention camps and the increasing militarization of both the internal and the external EU borderscapes therefore open the door to this ‘dark side of bio-politics’ (Dean 2002, p. 41). They show that the liberal differentiation of free from forced flows can have both concrete and violent consequences (cf. Lijnders, Chap. 11, this volume).

Another biopolitical model, which casts further light on these dynamics of exclusion, is that of Giorgio Agamben (Agamben 1995, 1998, 2005). Unlike Foucault's sub-legal analyses of power, Agamben premises his biopolitics on states' juridico-institutional sovereignty in an attempt to call into question the fundamental categories of the nation-state (Agamben 1998, pp. 9, 134). Agamben defines sovereign power through its capacity to declare a state of exception whereby some human existences are banned or excluded from societal status and thus the protection of states (Agamben 1998, p. 181). The process whereby some are included in lawful communities is thus simultaneously the 'outlawing' (or placement beyond the realm of law) of others. According to Agamben, this exclusion is tantamount to the biopolitical production of a 'bare life', which continues to be subsumed sovereign power. In what is termed 'inclusive exclusions', sovereign power is, via the state of exception, expanded to include those very existences that it excludes (Agamben 1998, pp. 104–11). As border control is a prime example of sovereign power, Claudio Minca (2007) has expanded on what he perceives as the 'eminently spatial' dimensions of Agamben's biopolitics.

Agamben finds the most paradigmatic example of this governance-through-exception in the technology of the camp. Generally understood, the camp is 'the space that is opened when the state of exception begins to become the rule' (Agamben 1998, pp. 168–9; see also Minca 2007, p. 15). This Agambenian conceptualization of the camp is very broad as it places together in the same category different technologies as Nazi extermination camps, colonial camps, refugee camps or detention camps for asylum seekers. However, it also offers a critical perspective to the underlying rationale, which to different degrees can be said to characterize these different policies of social regulation. Since border control consigns migrants to exist in detention camps, or zones of exception, on the fringes of European communities, the technology of social control that is the camp can be seen as incarnating the bare life placed in inclusive exclusions (Agamben 1995, 1998).

At this point, however, Minca (2007, p. 83) has attentively pointed out that the very existence of a rule, or norm, 'must necessarily be spatialised' in order to allow for both its repeated enforcement as well as the exceptions, which together define it. Focusing on this spatial dimension of border externalization allow us to appraise the logic of exception that links together the judicial-institutional and spatial dimensions of EurAfrican borderscapes through the extraterritorial, and thus preemptive, interception

and detention of migrants in North Africa. Before migrants arrive on European territory, European states circumvent their own ratified and implemented legal responsibilities to grant migrants on their territory access to asylum procedures. When migrants travel the deserts of Libya or Algeria, trying to avoid EU-funded border patrols or Italian-supplied surveillance drones, the pooled sovereign power behind EU externalization leaves them in an indeterminate status of bare life. The protection and procedural safeguards that an arrival on European territory would otherwise legally guarantee is preemptively withdrawn, and the migrants resigned to an indeterminate status of bare life.

But an Agambenian analysis of such sovereign enforcement will go further: Just as the bare life of such migrants exists in an indeterminate relation to the law, so does the sovereign power of border control that creates such a state of exception. Through the new trend of externalizing migration control, and the intricate layers of sovereignty that it involves, the EU states are effectively both manifesting and transcending the boundaries and applicability of the law. Existing both inside and beyond the law, they operate in, and actively seek out, what Agamben (2005, p. 31) calls ‘legal lagunae’—areas where the law does not yet apply.

Following Minca (2007, p. 83), then, we can say that governance-through-exception is not only a judicial-institutional practice, but ‘requires a concrete space’ to be realized. According to Minca, this is accomplished via the production of geographic ‘knowledge compromised with power’. The paradigmatic example of such compromised knowledge is the closed systems perspective, which divides the world into an ‘organic’ system of nation-states with fixed borders, each reifying the geopolitics of sovereign power of the others (*Ibid*, pp. 86–7). Another case in point is how knowledge of ‘militant geographies’ (*Ibid*, p. 90) is used by politicians and mass media to justify state-sanctioned interventions, such as the recent wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Libya and Syria. The cartographic representation of the securitized EurAfrican border control is yet another example. Minca’s critical gaze on knowledge compromised with power is therefore one way in which we can detail the epistemic dimension of borderscapes and the disputes, which characterize them. His spatial analyses, moreover, shines light on a path which, parallel to that of biopolitics, can ‘open the door’ to the foundational ‘outside’ of state sovereignty, revealing the metaphysics of geopolitical power in action (*Ibid*).

Frontex produces a vast amount of maps of the EU’s borderscapes, which are used to explain and justify the Agency’s operations. These

maps depict numerous migration routes, which criss-cross the territories of North African states, Turkey, Greece and Eastern European states, and then infiltrate the European borders. However, as all maps, they are selective in their representations. Firstly, because the Agency's cartographic representations fail to convey how around 90% of the world's refugees are mobile within their regions of origin, the majority being displaced in their countries. Secondly, the cartographic knowledge disseminated by Frontex does not accurately depict the degree of European involvement in boosting the control infrastructures in countries of origin or transit. Nor do they describe how the control itself produces hazardous mobility conditions for migrants. In other words, the maps do not encompass those existences for which the protection of lawful communities has been withdrawn, such as stateless people, internally displaced persons and refugees (cf. Lijnders; Lecadet, Chaps. 5 and 11, this volume). Left out of the maps is the borders' violence and control that both cause and manage migrants' forced mobility, or in short, shapes migrants' lives utterly exposed to the enforcement of power. All that remains in Frontex's cartographies are porous EurAfrican borders and undifferentiated arrows of 'illegal migrants' penetrating them. Parallel to the EurAfrican border control's judicial-institutional exclusions, the Union's geographic representations of externalization also place migrants in an inclusive exclusion. Using Minca's spatial lens, we can say that this happens because migratory movement outside European territory is recorded as beyond the law by a 'sovereign cartographer' (Minca 2007, p. 89), who, through its gaze, excludes itself from cartographically representing its own production of bare life.

To be turned into bare life is an inherently vulnerable condition. According to Agamben (1998, p. 170), 'Only because the camp constitute a space of exception in the sense we have examined—in which not only is law completely suspended but fact and law completely confused—is everything in the camps truly possible.' Yet, the regime of detention camps for asylum seekers is but one of the many spaces where the European border system creates bare life. The massive surveillance and targeting of mobility in the Aegean Sea, the Mediterranean Sea and the Sahara desert are also producing vulnerable existences exposed to the pure enforcement of sovereign power. Agambenian biopolitics and Minca's spatial reading of it lends itself to theorizing the consequences that externalization has on migrants as relations of inclusive exclusions imposed through landscapes of power. Agamben's analysis of border control has received much attention, but it has also been criticized on several counts, including geographic

scope, conceptualizations, removing agency from refugees and the discipline of political theology itself (Lemke 2005; Brown 2010; Lemberg-Pedersen 2012). However, as a thorough discussion of these points merit more space than is possible here, our inquiry will now return to the more concrete dimensions of the EurAfrican borderscapes.

TRACING THE LIBYAN CAMPS

The development of EU's external dimension in the 2000s was a complex process involving different EU actors and divergent member states agendas. A way of illustrating the geo- and biopolitical components of borderscapes is to analyse in more detail a prominent case of this EurAfrican bordering process, namely the export of detention camps to the Libyan Gaddafi regime, which before its fall, occupied an absolutely central role in the EurAfrican border system. The fact that Gaddafi no longer controls the state apparatus has meant certain changes in the border system of Libya. However, as militias have entered into the power vacuum left by Gaddafi and his supporters, the situation for migrants has by several accounts worsened (Morone, Chap. 6, this volume). The kind of human trade previously conducted between smugglers, police and military during the Gaddafi regime seems now to be more decentralized and is taking place between multiple militias. At the same time, the idea of externalized camps outside the EU once more resurfaced in 2015, by some seen as counterbalancing the Commission's proposal redistribution of 160,000 asylum seekers between member states. It is therefore both timely and important to examine the history and previous humanitarian consequences of this idea.

The idea of exporting detention beyond European territory was first voiced in the UN Third Committee in 1986. Here, the Danish Schlüter government (Danish Proposal 1986) urged 'the mobilization of the collective political will of the international community to seek long-term and equitable solution' to refugees lacking protection. The solution was to be based on increased aid, 'burden sharing' and the creation of UN-run 'processing centers' outside Europe (*Ibid*, p. 8). Besides providing protection for migrants, the Danish Proposal noted, such camps would also have the added value that all asylum seekers on European territory could be administratively deported to such camps for asylum processing. Although a decision on the Danish Proposal was deferred by the UN Third Committee, its core idea remained within the European political imagination and

resurfaced (although unsuccessfully so) in 1993 when the Dutch State Secretary for Justice, Aad Kostoo, restated the idea during a speech at the Fifth Conference of European Ministers Responsible for Migration Affairs (Noll 2003, pp. 311–12).

When the Danish Fogh government, backed by the nationalist-populist Danish People's Party (DPP), assumed the EU Presidency in July 2002, the idea experienced another renaissance. The Danish Foreign Secretary, Per Stig Møller, thus labelled EU cooperation with Libya on the control of irregular migration 'not only desirable but essential' (2463rd Council Meeting 2002, pp. 5–6).

Together with its Dutch and British counterparts, the Danish government then formed an influential Northwestern Triade, which lobbied hard to make the externalization of camps an official EU policy. In 2003, the Blair government in the UK published its 'New Vision for Refugees', also known as the New Asylum Paradigm (UK New Vision 2003), which envisioned externalized UN-run camps in Eastern Europe and North Africa, now labelled 'Regional Protection Areas' (RPAs). While the core idea remained that these European-funded camps could replace asylum processing within Europe and thus facilitate the administrative deportation of all asylum seekers from European territory, the UK New Vision focused even more on European security concerns than its Danish predecessor to the point of contemplating military intervention to prevent refugee flows (*Ibid.*, pp. 26, 2–3, 9).

The authors of the New Vision were aware that the proposed scheme of administrative deportations would pose great problems vis-à-vis European states' legal obligations under the Refugee Convention's article 33(1) and the European Convention on Human Rights' article 3 not least because of the deplorable human rights conditions in the regions under consideration. This, however, did not prompt any reconsideration. Rather, the authors viewed these problems as indicating that it could be necessary for European states to withdraw from key articles of these protectionary tools:

We would need to change the extra territorial nature of Article 3 (ECHR) if we want to reduce our asylum obligations. Article 3 is the only article of ECHR, which applies to actions that occur outside the territory of the State. If we only had to concern ourselves with torture, inhuman and degrading treatment that happens in the UK, we could remove anyone off the territory without obligation. Coupled with a withdrawal from the Geneva Convention refoulement should be possible and the notion of an asylum seeker in the UK should die. (UK Government 2003, p. 9)

Although the UK New Vision was also rejected after great controversy at the Thessaloniki Council later in 2003, the EU's official policy began to change after this time. During a July 2004 Council meeting, the German minister of the interior, Otto Schily, had lobbied for his own version of externalized camps and its components were eventually formulated in a September 2005 document called 'Effective Protection for Refugees, Effective Combat against Illegal Migration' (German Ministry of Interior 2005). It gained the support of Schily's Italian counterpart, Guiseppe Pisanu, and the Italian JHA Commissioner, Rocco Buttiglione, and eventually also from the Northwestern Triade.

The Schily Proposal appropriated the Northwestern Triade's idea of externalized camps operated by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), but focused more on systematizing extraterritorial EU deportations as a way to combat illegal immigration (German Ministry of Interior 2005, pp. 1, 5). Thus, it envisioned that not only spontaneous asylum seekers on European territory but also boat migrants intercepted in international waters could be administratively deported to North African camps, now labelled 'EU reception centers' (Hansen 2007). Moreover, it singled out Libya as a promising host country (*Ibid*, pp. 3, 6). Well aware that Libya was actually opposed to signing the Refugee Convention, the Schily Proposal settled for the vague formulation that states hosting the camps ought 'principally' to be signatories to the Refugee Convention or at least act in accordance with it (*Ibid*, p. 4). Crucially, it also rejected the Northwestern Triade's idea of extraterritorial asylum processing in the camps and instead limited their function to conducting pre-screening programmes and offering temporary working permits (*Ibid*, p. 4). As such, the Schily Proposal reinforced the strengthened focus on internal European security of the New Vision, accounting for a significant drive in the recent reterritorialization of the EurAfrican borders.

The EU Commission responded by sending a Technical Mission to Libya, in order to assess the country's viability as a host for externalization. The Mission found that Italy was already funding large detention facilities in Kufra, Sebha and Ghat, as well as deportation flights. Alongside Malta, Italy had also supplied equipment, such as GPS technology and 1000 body bags to the Libyan authorities (Commission of the European Communities 2005b, pp. 59–60). The Commission claimed that the Libyan detention conditions were 'difficult but relatively acceptable in the light of the overall general context' (*Ibid*, p. 34) and approved of the country's planned

increase of border control officers from 3500 to 42,000. It also stressed that the Union should increase its support to the Libyan border authorities (*Ibid*, p. 47), thus reinforcing the securitization of migration through Libya. At the same time, witness accounts from migrants claiming that the Libyan border system had caused the deaths of thousands of migrants circulated in European media. The Council reacted to the Mission Report with the cryptic formulation that ‘any cooperation with Libya can only be limited in scope and take place on a technical ad hoc basis’ (Council of the European Union 2005, p. 18). This formulation opened for comprehensive cooperation on control between Libya and European actors.² In line with the Mission Report, and despite the fatal implications, financial EU instruments, such as the Aeneas Programme (EuropeAid 2006) was put to use in Libya, funding various control projects to which Schily commented that his vision of externalization had ‘now become concrete policy’.³

In October 2010, the Commission reported that the JHA Commissioner, Cecilia Malmström, and the Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy Commissioner, Stefan Füle, had held ‘constructive talks’ with Libyan representatives in Tripoli and had agreed to pay Libya a further €60 million for border management, organizing migration flows, fight smuggling and trafficking and to treat and protect refugees according to international standards (see also Commission of the European Communities 2010). These events following the Schily Proposal illustrate how Libya, through bilateral cooperation with Italy, and massive EU funds, had situated itself as an integral part of the EU’s transnational border system.

Despite the EU’s massive funding of asylum and migration facilities in non-EU states, the outcome of the externalization drive had thus become that legal responsibility for asylum claims ended up with states hosting external control measures, such as Libya, which did not recognize the Refugee Convention. Accordingly, what had initially been framed as humanitarian processing centres for asylum seekers wanting to go to Europe had ended up as EurAfrican detention camps and deportation measures for undocumented migrants barred from Europe.


Observing the efforts to externalize camps to Libya as they took place on the common European, bilateral and technocratic levels illustrate how

²A second EU Technical Mission led by Frontex was also sent to Libya in 2007, all but reiterating the need for more collaboration with the Gaddafi regime.

³Zusammenarbeit mit Libyen gegen Einwanderung wird konkret; Neue Zürcher Zeitung 03.06.2005.

political processes and various actors can intervene and influence the reconstruction of borderscapes. The Libyan borderscapes underwent a massive change and the biopower of the country's border control changed accordingly. In 2009, Human Rights Watch assessed Libyan camp conditions as ranging from 'negligent to brutal' (Human Rights Watch 2009, p. 74) and according to an anonymous diplomatic source the duration of migrants' arbitrary detention in Libya varied 'from a few weeks to 20 years' (*Ibid.*). A common border practice was the trafficking of migrants through the deserts. This trafficking gained systematic proportions and, according to witness accounts, involved the Libyan police and military, operating in conjunction with smugglers to a degree where migrants could not distinguish by whom they had been detained, transported or deported. This border system circulated tens of thousands of migrants, including women and children, across the vast Libyan deserts, between official and smugglers' detention facilities. The migrants spent days standing upright in trucks and containers, with little or no food, being forced to urinate and defecate as they stood (Del Grande 2009; Human Rights Watch 2009, p. 71).

Map 2.1 illustrates how the Libyan system of forced flows seemed to function under Gaddafi. The main flows were from facilities in the North, especially in Tripoli, to the compounds in the South, especially a number of camps in Kufra. The camps in Tripoli and on the northern coastline functioned as the original accumulation of migrants intercepted both by the Italian–Libyan push back cooperation (see Morone, Chap. 6, this volume), as well as those entering the country from the South. From the North, migrants were placed in containers and sent on day-long transports across the desert regions. After arriving at the camps of Sebha or Kufra, they were either deported or dumped in the desert. Many people died after such desert dumpings, but others who survived told of being picked up by smugglers, who then re-inserted them into the circulatory grid of detention, bribery, forced labour and abuse by the police, the military or smugglers all over again. Illustrating the massive scale of this postcolonial mobility system, an International Organization for Migration (IOM) Fact Finding Mission dispatched in the fall of 2011, as the military uprising against Gaddafi gained pace, discovered 3000–4000 stranded migrants in a camp structure in Kufra, with no access to running water, sanitation, electricity or security. The IOM estimated that at the height of its function, this particular camp structure had contained more than 15,000 migrants, mainly from Chad and Sudan (IOM 2011). While



Map 2.1 The Libyan production of border-induced displacement 2004–2010. Map by the Author (*Sources:* IOM 2011; Amnesty 2010; Human Rights Watch 2009; JRS 2009; EU Technical Missions 2004, 2007, globaldetentionproject.org)

the Libyan–Italian borderscapes are admittedly an extreme instance, it is nonetheless important to realize that such circulatory grids outside the EU heartland territory formed a central part of the EurAfrican borderscapes constructed in the 2000s and onwards.

After the fall of the Gaddafi regime in 2011, European attempts were made to strike similar deals with the new government. These attempts were, however, ultimately unfruitful as the Libyan society descended into internal strife, and two competing governments emerged. Unlike the times of the Gaddafi era, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombardment of Gaddafi had now produced a situation where the EU no longer had any sovereign counterpart with which externalization agreements

could be made. Seeking to remedy this, an EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) was dispatched to Tripoli. The aim was to train military personnel, border guards and paramilitias to resume the control regime left by the Gaddafi regime, but the mission quickly dissolved due to security concerns and the lack of Libyan negotiation partners (EUObserver 18.11.2013). It is against this backdrop that the 2015 proposals for, respectively, externalized camps and the launch of the Navfor Med naval operation (later renamed Operation Sophia) against Libyan smugglers must be seen. Yet, EU politicians are sidestepping questions about which humanitarian consequences these policies will have, even though the case of externalized camps already provides ample precedents of grim character.

Take for instance the witness account of Fethawi, an Eritrean migrant, from 2009. Her account shows how this European-driven transformation of the Libyan border system can epitomize the inclusive exclusion of a bare life subsumed the fatal enforcement of sovereign power:

We left the dead people behind. The truck driver gave us a ride and dropped us near Kufra. Soldiers stopped us. Those with money paid them bribes, but those without money, including me, were beaten. Three soldiers beat me with their weapons. They searched me for money, my mobile phone. They took one of the Somali men. They demanded money from him, and when he didn't pay, they put him on the ground and beat him with the metal crowbar from the car. I saw this. I was afraid for my life. His head was bleeding. They hit him on his ribs. We took him with us. We had to carry him because he couldn't walk. We took him to Ajdabiya and left him there. They beat me, but I can't complain because the Somali guy was so much worse off than me. (Human Rights Watch 2009, p. 63)

Beatings with crowbars, bribery and the torture and murders occurring in the Libyan borderscapes speak of a system where migrants have no rights and are at the mercy of the Libyan authorities. We can say that the sovereign power of border control and the existences of migrants manifested in the Libya border control exist, respectively, beyond and below the law.

The preceding sections illustrate certain difficulties with Agambenian biopolitical analyses. Conceptualizing migrants as instances of bare life is problematic because it reifies the desire of states to reduce migrants to passive existences. It reiterates, so to speak, the 'wet dream' of states of having sovereign omnipotence corresponding to their territorial boundaries. Yet, even when migrants are exposed to exploitation and abuse in camps they

are not only passive existences to be moulded in the hands of EurAfrican authorities. Instead, they employ various forms of negotiation within the borderscapes, such as bribing of border guards, irregular work and being employed by smugglers to sail migrants across seas or by protesting their conditions (Lucht 2011). Consequently, they are agents with capacity to act in order to better their lives. Here, Agamben's notion of bare life is unable to distinguish between the different conditions migrants experience in different countries. Put differently, his generalized perspective on the dynamics of sovereign power has difficulties taking into account how geopolitics can be localized (Dahlman and Ó Thuathail 2005), and thus how the power relation between actors of authority and migrants plays out differently in different contexts. Conceptually speaking, their existence should therefore instead be seen as placed on a biopolitical continuum of inclusive exclusions where the degree of vulnerability depends on the degree of force applied to their mobility.

Another problem for Agambenian analyses is that invoking essentializing concepts, such as sovereign decisionism and states of exception in order to account for the emergence of control structures in Libya, can bypass the webs of power and resistance, which influence borderscapes. They therefore risk reaffirming states' claims to be able to draw a clear line between norm and exception (Bigo 2007, pp. 4, 12). Yet, as the processes behind the European externalization of detention camp and control structures to Libya exemplify, borderscapes comprise multiple actors, technologies and political interests and therefore undergo reconfigurations reflecting the shifting political paradigms guiding their rationalities.

Together, then, attention paid to how geo- and biopolitical rationalities of governance, and the political actors negotiating policy outcomes, has influenced the EurAfrican borderscapes, help nuance our understanding of the externalization agenda's development. Moreover, it sheds more concrete light on the kind of vulnerable existences, or bare life, which migrants experience in the EU borderscapes. The question is then, whether these analyses facilitate a new understanding of the rationality guiding mobility within the EurAfrican borderscapes.

CONCLUSION

Critics of European border control have often invoked the image of 'Fortress Europe' to criticize the borders' inhuman consequences for migrants, but how does this imagery accord with the EurAfrican borderscapes sketched in

the above? While the image does respond critically to the dominant closed system perspective responsible for the knowledge production of both member states and the Union's own self-understanding as an AFSJ, it nonetheless fails to capture the mobility regime constructed *within* the highly controlled EurAfrican borderscapes.

Put differently, the concept of forced migration is often used to highlight that many migrants encountering the EurAfrican control regime have legitimate reasons to flee, even if these are not captured by the 1951 Refugee Convention's narrow interpretation of refugeehood. The convention defines as refugees with an entitlement to asylum those individuals who flee from individual persecution. However, people escaping droughts, floods, mass bombing of their cities or collapsed states are not individually persecuted. Accordingly, scholars of forced migration have focused on the fact that mass displacement of people may also happen due to indiscriminate conflicts or disasters (Betts 2009, pp. 4–10). On this view, then, European states may or may not be causing forced migration through, say, fishing policies, debt policies or military interventions, but the border control they impose is only a response to the forced migration (Betts 2009, pp. 13–14; Hallaire, Chap. 10, this volume).

For all its worth, this forced migration framework faces a problem when it comes to analysing the consequences of the EurAfrican border activities. In the case of externalization, it conceptualizes forced migration as a phenomenon *external* to the transnational EurAfrican border control regime. This is paralleled by the cartographic production of the Frontex Agency, in that this also, through the very act of representation, excludes itself as a causal agent impacting migratory flows. Countering this obvious and unrivalled trend, Map 2.1 inverts this logic through a cartographic representation of the Libyan border system's production of forced flows.

The case of Libya illustrates that, in fact, immense sovereign power is projected into maintaining the engineered regionalism of migration flows in the EurAfrican borderscapes. Accordingly, the conventional understanding of forced migration bypasses the fact that these decentralized borderscapes *in themselves* produce severely restricted kinds of mobility. The conventional understanding of forced migration does not include states' deflection and transfer of migrants between each other, as a cause of forced migration. Jef Huysmans (2006, p. 95) has observed that the functionality of border control within the European states is not the cancellation of mobility, but rather the differentiated channelling of different flows:

Modern states use more sophisticated technologies that channel people through particular procedures that determine both specific conditions of entrance for different categories of people and the modalities of their free movement once are inside the territory of the EU.

Huysmans, however, does not consider how this channelling is realized on the fringes of and beyond European territory. This is unsatisfactory since the EU border system, particularly in the case of externalization and its 'ripple effects', seems also to impose a regime of differentiated channelling of migrants outside Europe. We can label this particular kind of forced migration as *border-induced displacement* (Lemberg-Pedersen 2012), and it has become a characterizing feature of the EurAfrican borderscapes. The case of Libya illustrates how migrants reaching European territory through these regions have most often been intercepted numerous times and have thus been moving in and out of relations of inclusive exclusion. EU border control should therefore be understood not only as a response to forced migration caused by other factors like conflict-induced displacement, development-induced displacement or environment-induced displacement but also as a cause of displacement and forced migration in itself.

At the conceptual level, the difference between original and border-induced forced migration is one between first-order and second-order displacements. A first-order displacement occurs due to natural disasters, economic collapses, civil wars, foreign occupations or forced resettlement leading to the forced migration of people. However, when these same people are intercepted, detained or deported in instances of border control, they enter another realm of displacement. Only this time, it is a state-sanctioned regime displacing migrants, inducing the inclusive exclusions of the EurAfrican borderscape functioning simultaneously in both the geopolitical and biopolitical realm. On this view, border-induced displacement is not equivalent to the original reasons forcing people to migrate, but instead functions as a second-order displacement imposed upon already-displaced people. This may be reinforced by states' interests in barring access of refugees to their territorium, and their facilitation of migrants' swift transit to other states (Lemberg-Pedersen 2011). The massive flows of especially Syrian refugees witnessed in Europe from the summer 2015 and onwards illustrate how border-induced displacement has become a systemic feature of the European borderscapes. The

humanitarian conditions of border-induced displacement vary: Migrants in the EU borderscapes are transferred between control elements, but the more external the border system, such as the Libyan one, the more they risk entering a state of quasi-permanent displacement. While conditions in 2015 also turned poor and neglective in Hungary, this was less so in countries like Germany and Sweden, who nonetheless had to erect tent camps in order to accommodate the increasing volume of displaced persons reaching their territories.

Unlike the walls of a Fortress Europe, the inclusive exclusions in the postcolonial EurAfrican borderscapes do not preempt migration by halting it at fixed control points. While some countries may construct fences, this only serves to worsen humanitarian conditions of those attempting to climb it, or deflects migration flows to new routes. Instead, the EurAfrican borderscapes transform migration into that different kind of mobility, which is border-induced displacement. On this view, we can perceive migrants as being serialized, that is, turned into sequences of forced flows, which are then stored in buffer zones or transmitted across a networked, transnational border system (see also De Genova and Peutz 2010). Accordingly, the European borderscapes can be seen as relying on the construction of a decentralized control system, which places migrants in various inclusive exclusions designed to contain and circulate them. The production of these sequences of forced corporeal movement depends on other sequences, or flows, of funds, personnel, equipment and information. For instance, in 2008, Italy and Libya signed a so-called Friendship Treaty, whereby Italian private security and military companies gained favourable export conditions, for delivering border control and surveillance technology to the Gaddafi regime (Gazzini 2009; Morone, Chap. 6, this volume). The political obstacles for this kind of export had already been paved by the successful Italian lobbyism demanding the removal of the arms embargo against Libya, which was cancelled in 2004 (Lemberg-Pedersen 2013). Thus, in the externalized EurAfrican borderscapes, these are hosted more or less willingly by EU's neighbouring states, depending on the political-economic power projected into negotiations and processes of issue linkages.

Seeing EU's externalized border control as relying on a networked series of elements rather than specific walls, camps or patrol boats, highlights its transnational dynamics, and the dominant way in which the Union has attempted to address the postcolonial reversal of migration flows. But as

the EU's neighbouring regions have descended into instability, notably through no small part of European countries themselves, the displacement dynamics of the border system is now becoming visible within the otherwise unrestricted Schengen space. This in turn poses immediate and fundamental questions that fit uncomfortably with Europe's self-understanding as an anti-racist and humanitarian power securing human rights. Understanding the control dimension of the EurAfrican border-scapes as a series of elements guided by the logic of sequential production of forced flows may therefore help capturing the dynamic and interrelated functionality of externalized control. Moreover, it helps us understand the scale of the humanitarian implications likely to occur should Europe once more choose to venture down this path of EurAfrican border control of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees.

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PART II

Places

The Tensions of the Ceuta and Melilla Border Fences

Polly Pallister-Wilkins

The Mediterranean region has been constructed as a borderland through a range of spatially disaggregated practices intended to intervene on mobile bodies and shifting attention away from the traditionally conceived borderline (Andersen et al. 2002). Scholars have been busy mapping the complex ways that the European Union (EU), states and private actors have worked to construct the Mediterranean region as a European or ‘EUropean’ borderland (Bialasiewicz 2012). However, it is argued that the European borderland in the Mediterranean and the attendant borderwork that has produced it is very difficult to grasp. This is due to the ‘the EU’s borderwork proceeding through a fluid assemblage of functions mechanisms, and actors; a series of loose institutional arrangements that are seen as necessary’ (Bialasiewicz 2012, p. 844). The difficulty in grasping the borderland and the work that produces it is in part due to the virtual nature of such bordering practices underpinned as they are by no single institution and no single set of actors that can be identified as the bordering ‘State’ (Bigo 2001, 2005; Bigo and Tsoukala 2008; Bigo et al. 2009).

The spatially disaggregated borderland that exists between Europe and Africa—across Europe, the Mediterranean, North and West Africa and the Atlantic Ocean—is in part the result of ‘virtual’ borderwork. However, border and bordering practices are still visible in more specified and localized

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sites and carried out by identifiable and locatable actors such as border guards (Pallister-Wilkins 2015a). This chapter focuses on one such site and a set of practices that enable us to grasp in some small way ‘the peculiar nature of the beast’ (Sidaway 2006): the border fences enclosing the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in northern Morocco. By focusing on the everyday lived realities of the fences and importantly the communities they seek to divide, I contextualize and question the separation functions of fence building. I argue that a study of the Ceuta and Melilla fences focuses our attention back on the boundary as a way of ‘policing the interior through policing the exterior’ (Pallister-Wilkins 2015b) while at the same time facilitating ‘a whole range of legal and illegal activities for which the border is the *raison d’être*’ (O’Dowd 2003, p. 25).

Ceuta and Melilla are cities located on the African continent bordered by Morocco and the sea. Ceuta is situated to the south of the Straits of Gibraltar while Melilla further to the east faces the Alboran Sea and the wider Mediterranean. Both cities are the historical products of Spanish conquest and their fortified nature can be traced back through this history. A range of fortifications were built over time to deter the rival Portuguese and the surrounding, non-European, non-Christian population. Their history as Spanish cities is intimately related to European and Spanish imperialism in the African continent as Spain and Portugal grappled to control trade in the Western Mediterranean and West Africa. As Spanish cities built in the context of imperial competition and expansion, Ceuta and Melilla have over the centuries developed elaborate technologies ensuring consolidation and continuation of Spanish territorial control that have enclosed their populations from outsiders and defended the cities from attack. The Spanish government with funding in part from the EU began building the current fences around Ceuta in 1996 and Melilla in 1993. The fence around Ceuta is 8.2 km long and the one around Melilla, 10.5 km. Since 1993, the fences have been steadily upgraded in response to increased movements of people and socio-political pressures following a number of deaths. As Ceuta and Melilla are located on the northerly migration routes from Sub-Saharan Africa into Europe, the cities are produced as key sites in the wider EurAfrican borderland.

Much of the classical work on walls and fences understands them as defensive fortifications and territorial boundary markers, echoing larger assumptions in political science and international relations concerned with the relationship between state, sovereignty, territory and violence. By focusing on the lived realities of the fences in practice, I maintain that the fences are products and thus representations of the tensions between

flows and blockages that are inherent in the act of bordering (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013). These tensions, that have characterized the production of borders over time and continue to play a role in the production of borders today, are reflected in the various encounters experienced by the Spanish inhabitants of the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla; the Moroccan day labourers who drive the political economy of the cities; the migrants who see the cities as a gateway to a Europe that promises opportunities and safety unavailable elsewhere; and the political activists who see Ceuta and Melilla and their fences as symbols of ‘Fortress Europe’.

The fences are constantly evolving projects, architectures of continuities and changes in spatial forms of control. They are not static architectures but are continually shaped and challenged by the forces and communities they manage. As such, this chapter hopes to hint at the complex political sociologies and spatial scales—local, national and international—regulated and represented by the fences while being sensitive to the fact that the full ‘Technicolor’ multiplicity and complexity of the fences cannot be addressed due to both practical and paradigmatic constraints. The focus on ‘tensions’ recognizes the role borders play in rendering visible many of the contradictions in the territorial state project and the subsequent divide between inside and outside. The focus on tensions is also a way of highlighting the empirical reality of the fences to capture what they are and what they do as socio-technical devices (Pallister-Wilkins 2015c).

This chapter starts with a discussion of the emerging theoretical literature that addresses walls and fences in both historical and contemporary settings. I then move on to examine the fences within their historical and geopolitical context and discuss the tensions between security and humanitarianism that have been progressively reflected in their architecture. I continue with an examination of the communities that encounter the fences in Ceuta and Melilla and follow this with a discussion of how the fences are producers of and sites of resistance.

CONCEPTUALIZING AND CONTEXTUALIZING WALLS AND FENCES

In principle, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 was meant to herald an end to the process of separation through fencing and walling. Since then, however, 28 new border walls/fences totalling 5700 km have been built around the world as a quick-fix solution to a host of perceived threats. The most famous of these is perhaps the Security Fence/Separation Barrier/Apartheid Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories the construction

of which Israel started in 2003. The USA, on its side, spent and keeps spending billions of dollars on the fences that guard the southern border with Mexico while Greece has fenced its 10.2 km land border with Turkey, and Hungary has most recently fenced its border with both Serbia and Croatia. Elsewhere settlements like Nicosia are cut into two by a barrier and walls set communities apart in Northern Ireland.

Walls and fences have principally been studied as defensive fortifications and territorial boundary markers, building on larger studies into the processes of human territoriality. Earlier research has shown that like borders, walls and fences produce exclusivity through processes of enclosure, while more recent discussions have sought to understand them in light of the new threats brought about by neoliberal globalization (Andreas and Snyder 2000; Brown 2010) and in the context of the War on Terror (Jones 2012). In addition, walls and fences have been seen as tools for blocking and slowing down flows of people and goods in response to an increasing mobility relating to advances in technology (der Derian 1990; Virilio 1983). Wendy Brown has recently argued that the promulgation of walls and fences in differing parts of the world is a result of the supposed crisis of state sovereignty. If neoliberal globalization reduces state sovereignty, walls and fences are an easy way to ensure its continuity in spite of the fact that, according to Brown, such sovereignty is somehow illusory:

Most walls continue to draw on the idea of nation-state sovereignty for their legitimacy *and* serve performatively to shore up nation-state sovereignty even as these barriers do not always conform to borders between nation-states and are themselves sometimes monuments to the fading strength or importance of nation-state sovereignty. (Brown 2010, p. 32)

Brown argues that the building of walls and fences has two rationales. They provide the state with the easy legitimacy of sovereign border control and act as barriers against 'postnational, transnational or subnational forces that do not align neatly with states' or their territorial boundaries. Other walls and fences may appear as national boundary markers, but are actually driven by what she terms 'postnational investments in barriers to global immigration' (Brown 2010, p. 32). According to Brown, the fences of Ceuta and Melilla fall into this latter category. I suggest instead that they can be understood in relation to all the three aspects: as a sovereign investment by the Spanish state, as barriers against 'postnational, transnational or subnational' forces and as a 'postnational investment' to prevent migration,

with the postnational in this case referring to the EU and its other member states. As already discussed, fence construction began in Ceuta and Melilla in the 1990s but fortifications have surrounded the cities since their colonization by the Spanish in the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries, respectively. Thus, the fortifications of Ceuta and Melilla have always represented a sovereign investment by the Spanish state over the centuries. The walls and fences are a material attempt to spatially inscribe Spanish sovereign claims in Spain's ongoing dispute with Morocco over sovereignty of the enclaves. The fences then cannot be seen as simply postnational investments, but rather as a continuation of Spanish claims to disputed spaces using walls and fences as a way of determining territorial control. The technology of the fences might have changed over time but the functional logics have remained more or less the same from when the first walls were built to enclose and defend the earliest Spanish forts.

Many of the current studies on walls and fences see them in historical isolation (see Jones 2012; Rosière and Jones 2012). Others, while they may pay credence to the historical processes that lie behind them, suggest a radical break in the types of polity that walls and fences represent at different historical junctures by focusing exclusively on what they are meant to keep out (Brown 2010). Brown as much as Reece Jones (2012) has linked the current growth in fence and wall building to wider trends in securitization that have dominated post-Cold War security practices. Jones in particular has focused on fence building in the context of the post-9/11 terrorist threat. These are the 'postnational, transnational or subnational forces' that Brown refers to or the 'migrant-terrorist' (Adamson 2006) that has usurped the state as the primary threat to the security of states and more importantly their populations in the age of neoliberal globalization. Thus, the walls and fences of today or what have been termed 'teichopolitics' by Stephane Rosière and Reese Jones are designed to restrict and regulate international migration (Rosière and Jones 2012). These analyses, while being welcome studies of wall building today, offer temporally limited understandings of the logics of fence building, restricting analysis to the present period. As I have argued in the case of the Middle East, walls and fences have been used across wide temporal periods and a range of spatial scales for the governing of populations (Pallister-Wilkins 2015b).

This lack of historical reflexivity in relation to border studies more generally has been criticized as leading to 'epochal thinking' that makes exaggerated claims as to the novelty of current border changes (O'Dowd 2010). Much of the contemporary work on walls and fences echoes

wider debates in border studies (see Johnson et al. 2011) and thus walls and fences today are thought to either suggest contemporary border changes—walling against a globalization that challenges and erodes state borders—or to refer back to earlier periods when walling was used by Medieval city-states as a way of delimiting and defending the space of the city (see, e.g. Beck 2005; Beck and Grande 2007; Brown 2010). What these approaches fail to consider are the continuities and changes over time in the construction of borders and in the political sociologies that they represent. Some recent border studies have highlighted the selective permeability of borders, referencing a border's 'simultaneous bridging and barrier functions' (O'Dowd 2003, p. 25). Such an argument reaches back to the co-constitutive relationship between flows and blockages, suggesting that there can be no need to block if it were not for movement.

The idea of borders as selectively permeable, as simultaneously containing and exercising both bridging and barrier functions abstractly refers to the tension between defence and trade that have characterized the developments of borders over time. In recognition of this and some of the contemporary realities of borders today, especially in the European context, the selective permeability of borders is referenced in multiple ways. By calling attention to the bridging functions of borders (O'Dowd 2003, p. 25) or by referring to borders as 'asymmetric membranes' that enable the free flow of certain goods and people while restricting the movements of others (Hedetoft 2003, p. 152). This dual function of borders has been likened to a 'firewall' where borders work to regulate the connection between the local and the international and where the firewall 'aspires to reconcile high levels of circulation, transmission and movement with high levels of security' (Walters 2006, p. 152). The culmination of these forces that reference the tension between security and trade in the selective permeability of the border is further expanded upon by Henk van Houtum and Roos Pijpers in describing contemporary European borders as a 'gated community' (2007) while more recently van Houtum has called attention to what he sees as an emerging apartheid regime in border control based on processes of racial profiling (2010). These works highlight the extent to which border-selective permeability is contingent on a range of factors concerned with economic and racial hierarchies. This selective permeability further restricts the privileges, such as economic and physical security, that easy access across/through selectively permeable borders

provides in accordance with economic and racial hierarchies, thus working to entrench these hierarchical divisions further.

It is within this theoretical framework that the Ceuta and Melilla fences should be understood. Such an approach challenges the obvious assumptions about the roles of walls and fences as related to blockading and defence and suggests a more complex political sociology at play at the border of which walls and fences are an integral part. In his work on ‘borderwork’, Chris Rumford (2008) has drawn attention to the multiple actors and everyday practices involved in the production and reproduction of borders. As such, borderwork provides the basis to understand the tensions created, facilitated and governed by the Ceuta and Melilla fences. By contextualizing the role of walls and fences within wider bordering practices and social, political and economic forces, it invites us to consider the specificities of particular sites and experiences in the construction of the EurAfrican borderland over time.

FENCING CEUTA AND MELILLA

The Ceuta and Melilla fences are at the interface between the practices of migration control within and an externalized migration control without, most prominently in North Africa. The recent events of the Arab Revolutions have highlighted the role of many North African states in the practices of European border control and thus it is increasingly clear that for many the borders of Europe start in the deserts of Algeria or the prisons of Libya (Andrijasevic 2010; Bialasiewicz 2012; Paoletti 2010). Ceuta and Melilla fences—in part—fall into this logic. As Europe, in Africa, they are part of a European border control that is seeping ever southwards. For example, the Moroccan government has received 200 million EUR since 2004 under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) for use in security-related areas. Under this Partnership Instrument, 40 million EUR was allocated for the specific purpose of strengthening border controls with the funding agreement being renewed in 2007 (Planes-Boissac et al. 2010, p. 61). Some of this money has been used to turn the sand barrier designed in the 1980s to stop the tanks of the Western Saharan Polisario into a high-tech migration control tool in a move that highlights the shifting nature of border control from traditional defence to policing as argued by Peter Andreas and Richard Price (2001).

Even as the Spanish government began construction of barbed wire fences around Ceuta and Melilla in the 1990s, these fences were found to serve little defensive purpose, as they were too easy to breach. During the period between 1993 and 2005, when the fences were fortified to their current standard, the fences were upgraded in a piecemeal fashion costing many tens of millions of euros. The 3-m-high fences were replaced with 6-m-high barbed wire fencing. The fences have been equipped with the latest in high-tech gadgetry to deter and monitor attempts to breach the border. Watchtowers, infrared cameras, motion and noise detectors allow the Spanish authorities to ‘secure’ their border from in front of a monitor. However, roads that allow for militarized border patrols also flank the fences, and the border guards on both sides, Spanish and Moroccan, are equipped with weaponry. Thus, migrants are treated to the latest high-tech surveillance and control methods in addition to age-old violent methods of defence, such as fortifications, employed in Ceuta and Melilla for centuries.

Spain argues that the new high-tech fortified fences are not only more secure—and this is indisputable as the building of these fences has seen migratory routes shift first into the Atlantic and later eastwards around the southern and eastern edge of the Mediterranean—but more humane. They thus fall into the category of ‘moral technologies’ (Ophir 2005) and build on the increase in humanitarian considerations in border control practices and other forms of governing undesirable populations (see Agier 2011; Fassin 2012). The Spanish government argues that the new fences were built after continued images of bloodied migrants scaling the fences and being shot were shown on European TV night after night. Moreover, such practices unsurprisingly resulted in migrant deaths, the exact number of which is not clear and there is some confusion between 11 and 14, with *Der Spiegel* recently putting the number at 14 (Peters 2011). Deaths and bloody images are surely no good for Spain’s (or the EU’s) liberal democratic identity and so there has been a shift towards technologies that can control without harming or at least technologies that commit the least of all possible harm (Weizman 2011) in accordance with wider humanitarian trends in European migration and border control as detailed by scholars such as Didier Fassin (2012).

These humanitarian concerns in border control can be witnessed in the removal of barbed wire from the two 6-m-high fences around Melilla and the installation between the fences of a tripod-like rope structure that is meant to be more ‘humane’. In reality, it acts like a spider web trapping the migrants within it. However, what happens to those migrants

who manage to scale the first fence undetected by the motion and noise detectors and the infrared cameras only to be caught in the spider web of ‘humane’ ropes is not clear. Migrants caught in this rope trap are technically in Spain as the fences are built within Spanish territory, as they cannot be constructed within Morocco. Once the migrants are within Spanish territory, they must be afforded a number of rights under Spanish and European legal conventions even if Spain and Morocco have a migrant exchange agreement. If a migrant having entered the enclaves claims refugee status, European laws state that their case must be heard and they cannot be expelled. Thus, better that the fence is impenetrable at all costs making the humane rope trap seem like a humanitarian spectacle designed to assuage civil society concerns. This subsequent need to stop any form of penetration shifts the burden onto the Moroccan authorities, a burden for which the EU provides funding but also a relationship with clear hierarchical and postcolonial power differentials.

This high-tech fortification of the fences has cost in excess of 30 million EUR, the majority of which came from the EU—75 per cent of the cost in the case of the Ceuta fence (Alscher 2005, p. 11) and 66 per cent of the cost in the case of Melilla (Gold 2000, p. 130). Thus, the fences are both products of national polices and supranational institutions with a materiality that renders visible the norms of separation and the specific border control practices of both Spain and the wider EU. They are therefore part of wider practices that are aimed at consolidating the external borders of the EU; externalizing border control in third country partner states; and shifting border control from the traditional sphere of defence to policing subnational and transnational threats such as migration and using the latest technological advancements—biometrics, databases, surveillance—that increasingly turns into history the traditional cross-border as an encounter between peoples (see Jeandesboz 2011). The high-tech, highly fortified fences of Ceuta and Melilla by utilizing much of the latest in security technologies in part reduce the border encounter between migrant and border guard to a collection of pixels or the glow of infrared heat on the screen of a monitor or the lens of a pair of goggles (see Andersson 2012, p. 9).

SPACES OF TENSION

The Ceuta and Melilla fences and the spaces they enclose are products of and producers of tensions across spatial scales from the international to the local. Firstly, I begin with the idea that the fences designed to separate

Africa from Europe end up focusing attention on this separation; this focus in turn raises questions about the values and practices Europe as a whole promotes such as those concerned with freedom of movement. Secondly, and in contradiction to the closed nature of Ceuta and Melilla, I argue that the fences have a selective permeability that allows for the regulated flow of goods and people (Pallister-Wilkins 2015b). Thirdly, it is claimed by the Spanish authorities that the fences are designed to be humanitarian technologies; however, I argue this humanitarianism is nonetheless spatio-temporally limited to the fences themselves and fails to take account of migrant experiences across a range of spatial scales. Finally, the fences do not solve the perceived ‘problem’ of migration and the attendant security and economic concerns present in popular European narratives therein. Instead, they transfer and disperse the responsibility amongst the Moroccan authorities and shift migratory routes around the Mediterranean and into the Atlantic.

Peter Gold (2000, pp. 1–2) has argued that Ceuta and Melilla in themselves are contradictory spaces. They are geographically located in the world’s poorest continent but belong to the richest trading bloc in the world. Moreover, they are physically in Africa but the majority of their residents are full European citizens. Being the only land border with Africa, the two enclosed cities have become the focus of academic enquiry for those interested in the construction and politics of borders. Moreover, Ceuta and Melilla have attracted the attention of scholars interested in the migration control practices of the EU as well as those interested in policies of externalization and the politics of migration (see, e.g. Berg and Ehin 2006; de Genova 2002; Gold 2000; Walters 2004, 2006). Both the two cities and the fences also make them the focus of socio-political activism by those concerned with the inequalities between Africa and the EU, issues of migration, its control and the socio-politics of borders and the state itself. Differently situated actors have a different view of Ceuta and Melilla and their border fences. For citizens, the fences are spaces of protection, while for Moroccan workers they must be crossed in the context of employment. Smugglers see the fences as an opportunity, border guards as their place of work, migrants as a sanctuary and place of material well-being from which they are often excluded. The fences are also spaces of separation that ensure Spanish territorial claims and inscribe the legal and bureaucratic sovereignty of Europe in the African continent. If the Ceuta and Melilla fences have the obvious function of defending and blocking the feared ‘deluge’ of migrants, the reality is that they stop the movement

of only some categories of people (Pallister-Wilkins 2015b). This selective permeability governs many people's interaction with the fences on a daily basis. For example, Moroccan citizens of the adjacent provinces of Tetouan and Nador are able to apply for a *visado multiple limitado* (limited multiple visa) that allows them to enter and exit the fenced enclaves daily for a period of one year. However, these visas do not allow for entry to the rest of Spain or Europe and are only available to those who can prove they are residents of the provinces of Tetouan and Nador, while the economic benefits of being granted such access lead to many Moroccans forging their proof of residence in Tetouan or Nador.

These visas, allowing exclusive entry to some Moroccans, are designed to facilitate the economy of the enclaves that are historically tied to a far greater extent to Morocco than to Spain and to allow for the easy flow of consumer goods, especially foodstuffs such as fruits and vegetables, into the cities. Ceuta and Melilla provide jobs to thousands of Moroccans. It is estimated for example that somewhere in the region of 20,000–30,000 Moroccans cross into Ceuta every day. They cross to work in town, often in unregulated jobs that can pay as little 10 EUR a day. In addition, others cross because Ceuta and Melilla are de facto tax-free zones and thus certain products are cheaper than their Moroccan alternatives. Yet, there are historical differences between the two cities in their relationships with Spain and Morocco. When in 2010 the Moroccans boycotted the enclaves to protest against the racism of Spanish border guards, only the vegetable stalls and fish markets of Melilla were bare (Peters 2011). Melilla is entirely dependent on its Moroccan hinterland for the provision of goods, while Ceuta maintains closer ties to the Spanish mainland due in part to its greater geographical proximity. The boycotts nonetheless highlighted the reliance of the urban metropolis on its hinterland for the provision of resources and the trading function of borders alongside that of defence, while contextually flagging up the historical and geographical specificities of Ceuta and Melilla. The fences therefore regulate the tensions between security and trade, blockage and movement, and govern the mobility of people thanks to a visa system that categorizes them as either citizen and resident or non-citizen but legal and requires the production of larger bureaucracies of governance.

The selective permeability of the fences and their attendant bureaucracies regulating cross-border movement produces and facilitates both racial and economic hierarchies based on the status differences between the categories of Spanish and European, and of Moroccan and migrant

(de Genova 2002; van Houtum 2010). Both the bountiful supply of cheap but not resident labour and their role as tax-free commercial centres ensure the relative economic well-being of Ceuta and Melilla. The selective permeability of the fences also facilitate illicit cross-border practices like the trafficking of cannabis resin from Morocco to Spain (UNODC 2011) and other forms of smuggling, termed *comercio atípico* (atypical trade), carried out on the most part by female *porteadores* (porters) as women are considered less likely to be searched by border guards. Once the selective permeability of the Ceuta and Melilla fences becomes clear, the classical arguments for the blockading functions of walls and fences are complicated. Walls and fences then turn out to be material tools of political control that help to govern the socio-political economies of the spaces they enclose through their concomitant crossings, openings, doors and gates (Pallister-Wilkins 2015b).

The Ceuta and Melilla fences as tools of political control also contain, as we have seen, specific technologies articulating a focus on humanitarian values. The high-tech accoutrements and spider web rope traps of Ceuta and Melilla are the results of the growth of humanitarian concerns in the governing of populations (Agier 2011; Fassin 2012) and border policing specifically (Pallister-Wilkins 2015a). They bring to light the tension between humanitarian concerns and more traditional policing concerns in border control between the protection of life and the protection of territory (Pallister-Wilkins 2015a), and echo Michel Agier's (2011) conceptualization of refugee camps designed to manage undesirable populations and Eyal Weizman's (2011) discussion of Israeli technologies used to control the occupied population of Gaza. While their technology may allow for the humanitarian treatment of migrants in their immediate encounter with the fence, the Ceuta and Melilla fences provide no clue as to the forms of violence and 'inhumanity' many of these migrants have left behind, working instead to spatio-temporally limit the humanitarian moment (Jeandesboz and Pallister-Wilkins 2014). In limiting the idea of humanitarianism to the encounter with the fence itself and with the border control officers who construct their work in humanitarian terms, the fences reduce the notion of the humane to people's relationship with the technologies and agents of migration control while ignoring wider forces of political agency and socio-economic justice. Additionally, the fences, while stopping migratory flows at their location, result in migrants seeking alternative routes across the Mediterranean that pose significant danger. Meanwhile, the responsibility to control this movement falls increasingly

on the Moroccan authorities that face the additional task of preventing migrants from reaching the fences at all. Funded by the ENPI, this policing work integrates Morocco into the EU's external systems of migration management and border control, meanwhile fostering an economy built around border control and other security-related practices between the EU and its member states on the one hand and partner states to the south and east on the other.

For all their high-tech gadgetry and the attendant visa system restricting regular movement through the border crossings, the Ceuta and Melilla fences have one major weakness: they only stop migrants attempting to enter from land. The two coastal cities rely on the Moroccan authorities to prevent migration from the surrounding coastline. In the summer of 2011, increasing numbers of migrants started to reach Ceuta and Melilla either by boat or by swimming. This increase in migrant numbers (approximately 400), as has been suggested, was the result of a reduction in Moroccan police in the borderland as the Moroccan government deployed this manpower elsewhere in response to large demonstrations over a new referendum on the Moroccan constitution (El Pais 2011) in the wider context of the revolutions across the Arab world.

RESISTANCE TO THE FENCES

Over a decade ago, Rob Walker (2002, p. 22) argued for the re-politicization of borders as sites of struggle. This call for a re-politicization of the border draws on his earlier argument that borders themselves are the products of material, human struggles that are too often airbrushed out when looking at the 'clean lines of political cartography and the codifications of international law' (Walker 1990, p. 159). The border is a human political construct and yet often within international relations scholarship the experience of the human is left out of discussions around the history, meanings and practices of borders, while as O'Dowd (2010) has recently maintained within border studies itself. Here the historicity of borders as constructs and spaces of continuity and change has often been overlooked. Looking at the contestations produced by borders helps us to more accurately ascertain their productive nature (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013).

The materiality and locatability of the Ceuta and Melilla fences help to focus attention on the tensions inherent within bordering and on the inequalities between those whose movement is enabled by the fences and those whose movement is denied. The fences thus become symbols of

and sites for socio-political actions against European border practices and the racial and economic hierarchies produced (Walters 2006). Their role is similar to that of the Separation Wall built by Israeli in the occupied West Bank that has acted to concentrate anti-occupation activism of Palestinians, Israelis and international activists (Pallister-Wilkins 2011). As much as the resistance to the Separation Wall is both concentrated at the site of the Wall itself and has spurred the wider anti-occupation movement in Palestine, Israel and the rest of the world, the action generated by the Ceuta and Melilla fences is diverse both geographically and politically. It is both localized at the fences through migrant/activist/NGO encounters and dispersed throughout Europe and North Africa through the work of activist groups/networks, campaign organizations and NGOs calling attention to and demanding an end to Fortress Europe. These struggles cannot be represented or analysed as a single response, yet they facilitated by the visibility and materiality of the fences as material representatives of a complex set of European border practices that are often difficult to grasp.

Following the high-tech fortification of the fences around the two enclaves, some in Spain and Europe began to refer to them as ‘walls of shame’ (Peters 2011), while activist networks argued that ‘Ceuta and Melilla visualize and symbolize the brutality of the European border regime against flight and migration’ (Anonymous 2010). The resistance generated by the fences takes many forms and is understandable through a variety of theoretical and conceptual approaches. Traditional understanding of civil society and social movements (della Porta et al. 2006; della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Diani and McAdam 2003) helps highlight the role and work of various NGOs—including the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN), GADEM (Groupe Antiraciste d’Accompagnement et de Défense des Étrangers et Migrants) in Morocco and Migreurop in the EU (to name just a few)—in the collection and dissemination of information, the raising of awareness and the lobbying of stakeholders. These NGOs along with other networks and bloggers also help to conceptually frame the problems of the fences, and thus any subsequent action.

Some of the NGOs and migrants rights groups that seek to work with politicians at both member state and European level present the fences as a human or migrants’ rights issue. Others, such as, the NoBorders network, frame their resistance within their opposition to territorial borders, their demands for freedom of movement as a fundamental right and their wider rejection of the territorial state system, in a vein that echoes much of the

Israeli resistance to the Separation Wall built as it is on anarchist practices that reject the state as a form of political organization and governance (see Pallister-Wilkins 2008, 2011). Migrants themselves, who encounter the material reality, violence and the ‘terror of territorialization’ (Hindess 2006) that the fences embody, engage in acts of resistance with European activists often joining such initiatives to show their solidarity. As diverse as the resistance to the fences may be, the result is that it brings people together, transnationally, across the borders that the fences materially represent and attempt (unsuccessfully) to enforce.

Just as many of the other interactions that take place at the fences are reliant on the fences and the border itself (O’Dowd 2003, p. 25), the resistance to the Ceuta and Melilla fences is both a product of and a producer of the border and engaged therefore in a form of borderwork. The Ceuta and Melilla fences and the borders they represent are produced by diverse groups of people—residents, workers, smugglers, migrants and civil society—through their daily interactions with them. Even the political activists across Europe and North Africa are engaged in a sort of borderwork or alter borderwork that along with the actions of others—already discussed—helps to construct the border itself. Here the activism around the fortified nature of Ceuta and Melilla by a range of spatially disaggregated political activists re-enforces the borders around the two cities while strengthening the representation of Ceuta and Melilla as regional ‘European’ borders.

CONCLUSION

The Ceuta and Melilla border fences are the products, the producers and the regulators of the tensions between blockage and flow that characterize the process of bordering. This argument challenges the mainstream, traditional ideas within political science and international relations of walls and fences as defensive technologies alone. Instead, I have suggested that by studying how fences regulate flows and by examining the everyday practices of communities whose lives are shaped and in some instances facilitated by the fences, the multiple functions of fences, as both defensive barriers and as additional tools of varied forms of political control, becomes visible. As barriers, the Ceuta and Melilla fences demarcate clearly the border between Spain, Europe and Africa, and remind us of the importance of borders as lines of separation. However, the study of the border fences and their impact on the communities of Ceuta and Melilla and northern

Morocco as much as the analysis of their role in migration-related activism across Europe make the Ceuta and Melilla case exemplary of the concomitant existence and appreciation of both the borderline and the borderland. Examining the Ceuta and Melilla fences and their role in regulating the borderline, we are able to locate and grasp ‘the peculiar nature of the beast’ that is the EurAfrican borderland. It reminds us that this borderland, while spatially disaggregated, is also produced in specific sites and specific locations through everyday practices and suggests that while borders can be increasingly thought of as being ‘everywhere’, they are also somewhere. It asks us to be mindful of the continued relevance of the borderline and the territorial violence it produces while at the same time placing that line within a network of socio-spatial relations that form the borderland. Without a concomitant understanding of this wider borderland, the borderlines of Ceuta and Melilla become difficult to fully grasp. Meanwhile, understanding the imbrication of the borderline with the borderland enables us to fully comprehend the selectively permeable nature of the fences and the differential inclusion of the borders that they represent.

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Bamako, Outpost of the European Border Regime?

Stephan Dünnwald

FLOWS, BORDERS, PLACES

Addressing the EurAfrican border means tackling an imbalance. On one side, we have a powerful union of member states investing sophisticated high technology and manpower into the defense of their outer borders, steep hierarchies and chains of commands from high-level political and administrative meetings down to Frontex and national police officers. A whole machinery of border enforcement is being assembled behind intelligent fences on navy boats and on African shores (see Lemberg-Pedersen, Chap. 2, this volume). On the other side, there are the African nation states, characterized by weak governments, a lack of opportunities and underdeveloped state structures and youth who are willing to take high risks in order to seek perspectives abroad. The frequent call for measures such as the installation of internment camps for migrants in African countries reflects, despite posing a plethora of questions from state sovereignty to human rights, the imbalance between a powerful European Union (EU) and African states and societies who are not expected to show strong resistance to European plans.

The inclusion of African states into the management of migration and thus the externalization of European migration policies to Africa is, at least since the EU's 'Global Approach to Migration' (European Commission

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2005), the common basis of European politics regarding Africa. Given the imbalance of wealth and power, one could think that this process might go swiftly and smoothly. However, the integration of the Malian government after 2005 into an externalized migration management concept following European interests remains uncertain.

Migration movements are often represented either in 2018 flow-speak⁷ (Bude and Dürrschmidt 2010) and route maps (ICMPD 2013) or in individual, experienced-based accounts, linked either to certain places (Choplin and Lombard 2008) or to routes (Schapendonk 2012; Koshravi 2007). In this chapter,¹ I argue that if we want to understand the implementation of bordering measures, we have to come closer to the processes and persons by which measures are implemented, and to see how specific measures are realized in a given (African) situational context and the practices and logics at work in specific localities at particular times. It is only then that we can grasp, in the sense of an ethnographic analysis of border regimes (Hess and Kasperek 2010), the building of borders, or the emergence of a border place. This results out of the interaction of various forces under the conditionality of a specific place, its options and limitations. This does not exclude or delegitimize ‘flow’ views or ‘routes’ approaches, as they provide overviews useful for migrants, border guards, or scientists.

Rather, I want to stress the importance of place in the sense of Arturo Escobar (2001) who relates the concept of place to the struggles of social movements, or Marc Augé (1992), who sees a place as furnished with symbolic meaning sedimented in history. Meaning is generated in the ensemble of practices enacted by actors that shape a given place. What makes a site a place are then the cumulative, historical practices and the ways the memories of these practices shape future practices. This notion of place is a necessary starting point in order to understand the dynamics of bordering. Therefore, it is crucial to see African border towns as being molded by colonial legacies, economical interests, cultural memories, local or transnational movements and power relations, all of which impact the dynamics that characterize these towns. The notion of EurAfrican borders intends to reveal these dynamics shaped by recent as well as longstanding power relations between African and European actors (see Chap. 1, this volume).

In my research, I analyze Bamako as such a place: a hub for migration as both a starting and returning point, and as a site of diplomatic interventions in the field of migration management. This chapter argues that both processes

¹This contribution is based on repeated ethnographic fieldwork in Bamako and Mali during the years 2006–2011.

are linked to each other via the social and historical fields of migration and bordering dynamics of the place, Bamako. Taking this notion of place as a starting point, this chapter does not present a description leading toward a categorization of, for example, Sahelian border towns within a EurAfrican border regime. Rather, I want to draw attention to the dynamics of bordering processes that shape an array of African capitals, where different African as well as European actors try to establish, change or perpetuate bordering practices. Quite similarly, EU attempts to externalize migration controls to Africa worked out very differently in Dakar (Krämer 2014), Nouakchott or Nouadhibou (Choplin and Lombard 2008). My goal here is to portray some specificities of the dynamics that shape Bamako as a border town.

However, it is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide an overview of all migration movements and diverse migration traditions, or all activities in the field of migration management in Mali.² Rather, my intention is to draw some more general lines. First, I will sketch out some developments within migration from and through Mali, and then will depict some major attempts to manage this migration, focusing on the French, Spanish and EU engagement in Bamako and the efforts to come to terms with Malian authorities and the NGO sector. My objective is to give a balanced snapshot of what it means to try to implement migration management in Bamako.

WHAT MAKES BAMAKO A BORDER PLACE?

Why do I address Bamako, the Malian capital, as a border place? Bamako is situated in the southern part of the country, on the river Niger, far from the borders to neighboring countries. Landlocked, poor and dusty, at first glance nothing would suggest that Bamako has any crucial role to play in greater geostrategic activities. Nonetheless, Bamako became an experimental ground for an increasing number of institutions and organizations concerned with the management of West African migration. In the framework of the European ‘Global Approach to Migration’ (European Commission 2006), Mali is a country of origin and transit. Bamako is a crossroad of different ‘routes’ for ‘irregular’ migrants. This makes Bamako a target for the ‘routes’ approach developed by Frontex and related institutions which are aiming at gathering intelligence on migration routes and at controlling them. Bamako thus is simultaneously a migration hub and a place for attempts to manage migration.

² Mali has rich and ethnically and locally diverse traditions of migration. For an impression, see, for example, Cissé and Daum (2009), Dougnon (2012), Hampshire (2002), Konaté (2010), and Whitehouse (2012).

In Bamako, the border is not constituted by the irregular migrant, who is, after all, a European invention and result of European intervention in Africa.³ In the crowded streets, regularity or irregularity is not discernible. Nobody can tell from someone's appearance if a person is coming from villages or smaller towns in Mali, is looking for a temporary job during the dry season, or if they are from some country closer or farther away, or if they are a refugee or a resident.⁴ In a number of places—the most famous is Raida close to the central market, but there are many others in different quarters of Bamako—men, Malians as well as others, gather and wait for someone in need for skilled or unskilled hands.

Equally important, there are no controls targeting migrants in the streets of Bamako. There are police controls within the city (mostly at night), and there are controls for people leaving or entering the town. However, being an alien is not a distinguishing criterion (except that in some instances, fines for not having proper papers might be higher), and the notion of 'irregular' or 'illegal' migration still does not make sense in everyday life in Bamako. When friends meet on a rooftop at night, it is plausible to meet men and women from Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal or Burkina Faso, some of whom will always have plans to improve their lives through migration. Or you might join a heated debate about the Malian government having failed to provide employment options for graduates at a place where traditional beer is brewed and consumed. There is the engineer from Abidjan who was on his way north, heading for Europe, but then had to return and is currently on salary at one of the mushrooming private secondary schools in Bamako. The director, he told, was impressed by his good French. He will stay until he has gathered enough money to head north again. The men listening appreciated the story. For these young people, migration toward Europe is often a dream, and sometimes an option. Nationality does not count much between Mali and its neighboring states, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) allows the free circulation of people.

³ See Bensâad (2008) and Dembele (2010).

⁴ I am aware that I am simplifying the situation, blurring cultural, social and linguistic differences. Nonetheless, it seems to be within the framework of Mali being a multi-ethnic state and Bamako being an urban space that differences are played down. Among the many strangers at Bamako the distinction between West Africans, linked more closely through joking relationships and a (partly) shared religion, and Central Africans can be relevant in some circumstances, as it is giving access to different social networks and forums.

Heading for Europe, though, requires money. What makes Bamako a border place is that people assemble their travel requirements, tickets, visa or passports here in order to move forward. Procedures and prices are well known to locals as well as to migrants. Still, the most important distinguishing criterion is money, and money (together with status, relatives in Europe, etc.) decides which way a traveler might afford to take. The most comfortable way to Europe is to go by plane with a valid passport and visa. If you have family or business in Europe and meet some further requirements, such as a well-filled bank account, you might obtain a tourist or business visa. Others try the restricted options of family reunification or a student visa. As filing the application at Bamako alone costs at least 80 Euros, this way is difficult for less affluent people, even if they meet other requirements. Rejections are frequent and often arbitrary, and people do not receive an explanation why their application failed (Cimade 2010). This makes it a long, difficult and uncertain process to gather necessary papers and preconditions for the next application. Cutting short the procedures is possible. Buying a false 'true' Schengen-visa is expensive, about 6000 Euros, according to some informants (see also Cimade 2010, p. 63). Forged visas are said to be less costly, but carry higher risks of being detected, apprehended, and returned. Facilitators, called *coaxers* or *passeurs*, can be met close to the embassies, and many people know someone who knows someone else in the business.

The airport Bamako-Senou is the only 'real' border at Bamako. My passport and ticket were checked from the airport entrance to the gate not fewer than six times, and before entering the plane all passengers had to have their hand luggage and papers checked once again at an open desk between the departure building and plane. A French liaison officer, who also runs a well-frequented bar in town, represents Frontex and the EU at the airport, trying to improve controls and to observe the flows. All this does not constitute an absolute barrier, but effectively excludes the less affluent. Accompanied by someone with a VIP card (in my case, a member of the Malian parliament) you easily pass at least five of the six controls without even displaying a ticket. Moreover, in 2010, the whole team of airport border police was replaced because of corruption.⁵ Hence, there is a formal and functioning control system in place, and the expenses to circumvent it keep deviance low.

⁵ Personal communication Mahamadou Keita, AME 11.10.2011.

Choosing the land route, then, is the only alternative for those without the necessary economic and socio-political capital to secure a visa. In this case, different prices are available depending on the amount of risk and speed. Malians could, based on a bilateral agreement between Mali and Mauritania, go legally up to the Moroccan border. This makes Malian citizenship attractive for other nationals. Requirements are minimal; a birth certificate is enough to apply for a true passport, and often enough even this is not necessary. In 2011, I was told the story that an administration official had an accident with her *Jakarta* (as the affordable Chinese motorbikes are called), and when her handbag hit the tarmac, dozens of blank passports slipped across the street. This accident prompted a debate on corruption and immigration, which was closely connected to the need to protect Malian nationality and to the RAVEC program.⁶ Even if you arranged a transfer from Bamako directly to the boat on the Mediterranean or Atlantic shore, going north overland is difficult. It might include hiding and waiting for weeks in the open desert, often with only small quantities of water or food, until the sufficient number of passengers gather, or until the right person is in charge at the border crossing point. Mali experienced a slow but constant rise of migration toward Europe during the 1990s and early 2000s, most migrants rather heading for Spain or Italy than for the ‘traditional’ destination of France. Increasingly, this migration also had starting points in regions in Mali where migration to Europe was not common. The majority of men I talked to after their journey expressed that they had not imagined it would be so hard. After all, migrants often enough end up at the shore, blocked in Nouadhibou, Tanger or Tripoli and while trying to raise money for the next attempt to cross the sea, they might end up settling and stay instead of going further. Many among them are apprehended and returned.

The Way Back

A good deal of the young men heading north thus return, often involuntarily, sometimes after having spent their ‘best years’ abroad. Apart from successful migrants, the past two decades in Bamako saw thousands arriv-

⁶RAVEC (Recensement Administratif à Vocation d’État Civil) means the attempt to cover the whole Malian population, migrants included, with biometrical screening. The ambitious measure targets some weak points in civil administration, among them the easy access to Malian passports for non-Malian Africans. Most Malians were in favor of the program, as it was seen as a big step toward a more modern Mali, though Linares (2009, p. 35) was told that some family heads hid their young boys in order not to hamper future migration plans.

ing after being deported either from Mauritania or Algeria via land borders, or being repatriated by plane from Libya, Morocco, Spain or France (to name just the most frequent departing countries). Deportees on the overland routes are just dropped in the desert, at Tinza Waten and Kidal, the border crossings from Algeria, or Gogui, which is the respective town close to the Mali–Mauritania border (see Lecadet, Chap. 5, this volume). Deportees get little if any assistance at these places and most of them make their way to Bamako. In addition to Malians, Bamako is the point of arrival for a relevant number of other Africans who are also deported via the land borders.

At Bamako, all these deportees have something in common; indecisively, they brood over going north again or returning home, or going elsewhere instead. It is not the wish to go abroad to look for fortune which keeps migrants in limbo, but the fear and shame of returning to the family with empty hands. Many of these returnees are in distress; they do not feel welcomed by their family and struggle to find a daily meal, competing for small jobs with internal migrants and the unemployed youth of Bamako. Returnees coming from Central African countries may get assistance by ARACEM, an association founded by deportees from Cameroon and the Congo offering food, shelter and medical care. Malians will be offered the same at the Association of Malian Deportees (AME). After a couple of days, they have to leave these shelters and are on their own again. Some keep in contact, but more often, they vanish one by one in the crowds of Bamako streets. Public discourse on migration in Mali is still linked to the successful migrant, the rich returnee who is the pride of his family, showing off his wealth with an expensive wedding and constructing a pretentious villa on the outskirts of Bamako. The reality is less splendid, but the stories of failed migrants are muted by the attention their more successful companions attract.

DOING BORDER: POLICIES, BUREAUCRACIES AND THE *SOCIÉTÉ CIVILE*

Bamako became a place not only for the transit and return of migrants, but for activities targeting these flows. Bamako, among other West African cities, became a focal point for European and international organizations dealing with migration issues, trying to establish knowledge resources about migration, to distribute information and further integrate African societies into the fight against the formerly unknown figure of the ‘illegal migrant’.

The past ten years constituted the period when Bamako developed as a town marked by these bordering activities, but tracing the processes of bordering and doing border means to go back at least to the 1990s. In the early 1990s, France developed an assistance scheme to assist development efforts of Malian (and other) migrants and migrant associations in France, a program since 2002 called *codéveloppement*. Gradually this assistance became linked to both the idea of stopping migrants from leaving and to giving incentives for irregular migrants to return home. An office of the OFII, *Office français de l'immigration et de l'intégration* (the name changed over time), was established in Bamako, assisting return migrants and their projects. This program, positive descriptions of politicians notwithstanding, never worked well, nor did it show the intended effects on a broader scale, which was partly due to exactly the closeness which it had to the efforts of managing migration and the unfolding fight against irregular migrants, the *sans papiers*, in France (Linares 2009; Daum 2005).

In 1996, when the *sans papiers* occupying the church of St. Bernard in Paris were arrested and deported, once in Bamako some of them joined other deportees who were mostly from African countries like Angola, and formed the Association Malienne des Expulsés, AME. Their main aims were to help members to reintegrate, and to support other deportees through social assistance and political activities. Without proper financing, the organization remained small and did not evolve. The membership eventually grew over time, as deportees were frequently arriving at Bamako, but the AME did not have much to offer, and pressing problems prevented most of the deportees from joining a self-organization and engaging in political activism.

The 2005 Incidents of Ceuta and Melilla as Turning Points

Over the years, Bamako has seen a constant flux of returnees, but it was not until October 2005 that these processes accelerated and structures of migration management began to evolve. Following mass attempts of sub-Saharan migrants to overcome the fences of the Spanish Exclaves Ceuta and Melilla, within one week in October, more than 400 deportees from Morocco arrived at Bamako airport. A public debate about what was actually happening began.

Already some years earlier, Mali had developed a governmental branch to address the Malian diaspora and assist migrants abroad. However, these

structures, mainly the Ministry for Malians Abroad and African Integration (MMEIA) and its technical branch, the *Délégation Générale des Maliens de l'Extérieur* (DGME), do not have much influence and effect on either migrant communities or emigration. The same is true for the HCME, the High Council for Malians Abroad, which was founded to be the umbrella organization for Malian migrants associations. Although close to the state, it suffers from inadequate financial support and quarrels over leadership (see Whitehouse 2012, pp. 155ff, for a more detailed account).

The rather poor performance and detached standing of state institutions became clear when, at the massive arrival of forced returnees from Morocco in 2005, the DGME and other branches of the state, such as the *Protection Civile*, remained passive, and did not assist the returnees. It was civil society, especially Aminata Draman Traoré, a central figure in the anti-globalization struggle, who offered shelter and food to the returnees, organized the collection of their testimonies, and coordinated, together with the AME, ARACEM and other groups, public hearings and a protest movement. This protest movement, linked closely to the history of the Malian–French relationship and the broader context of Africa in times of globalization, further developed when in Spring 2006 the World Social Forum being held in Bamako attracted a high number of activists and organizations from Africa, Europe and elsewhere. Migration and deportation was a central theme in this forum, displayed in migrants' testimonies and theater sketches. Malian associations used the stage to link up with (mostly French) human rights associations, transnationalizing their protest against deportation, and against European efforts to block migrants. Out of these events and activities, a number of returnee associations arose, and AME and ARACEM managed to get stable funding by the French Protestant Church-based CIMADE, the German NGOs *Medico International* and *Pro Asyl*, and thus rapidly extended and transnationalized their work and visibility.

The 2005 incidents of Ceuta and Melilla, and the broad media coverage of Africans climbing fences or being the target of raids in the surrounding forests, urged the European member states and Union to agree on a set of combined measures. Following an informal meeting of the European Council at Hampton Court in October 2005, the measures were aimed particularly at African states of transit and origin. The European Commission designed a comprehensive approach of how to deal with the threat of irregular migration, which then emerged as Europe's

Global Approach to Migration (GAM) (European Commission 2006).⁷ This GAM focused in first instance on a dialogue with countries of transit and origin. Integrating the governments of these countries into a generalized migration and border management was the central message. This process can be traced back at least to the EU Council meeting at Tampere, Finland, in 1999 (Petrucci and Kalambry 2012); however, after Ceuta and Melilla conferences and consultations between African and European politicians succeeded at an accelerated pace. Rabat and its Action Plan, then the summits in Tripoli in 2006, Madrid and Lisbon (2007) and Paris (2008) are among the landmarks of a new African–European process of converging migration policies, surrounded by a swarm of informal meetings of the upper echelon police, border guards and government officials.

In the externalization of the European migration management, which in the language of the European Commission's (2005, p. 5) Global Approach translates as 'approaches on migration to optimize the benefits of migration for all partners in a spirit of partnership', African countries should take part in Europe's fight against irregular migration. Though this task is embedded in a more comprehensive approach, tackling irregular migration clearly occupies center stage. While the EU identified the concentration of migratory routes as promising in stopping irregular migration from Africa, another more general focus is combating the root causes of migration through development measures, and to strengthen the positive effects of migration through channeling remittances and assisting returnees. The last pillar then is the promise of opening routes for legal migration.

This model unfolded most powerfully in the coastal states, especially in the Maghreb countries and Senegal. From the perspective of Bamako, the expulsion of migrants from Maghreb countries confronted Mali with rising backflows of failed migrants. Furthermore, the successful integration of Maghreb countries into the fight against irregular migration from sub-Saharan Africa created a *cordon sanitaire* protecting Europe's southern borders. This notwithstanding, as a regional hub of migration to and from Europe, and as a strategic place within GAM, Bamako remained a key site for European migration management. In Mali, Europe has been less successful than in the Maghreb. This seems to relate to the social, economic and political position of Mali in West Africa, but also to the tradition of migration in Mali as well as to the postcolonial stance that Mali takes toward France and Europe.

⁷The GAM had been reconfirmed and extended to the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility in 2011, see European Commission (2011).

MANAGING MIGRATION IN BAMAKO

Against a background of a complex mobility of persons, mainly circulating within West Africa, but also heading north toward the Maghreb and Europe, Bamako is home to a broad alliance of political and security forces trying to prevent exactly this *flux migratoire* going north. This alliance comprises the EU, together with some single member states standing out as prime new or old destination countries, like France, Italy and Spain. International organizations like the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and UN bodies like UNHCR, UNDP or ILO are also in this alliance. The common denominator among such actors is an understanding of the aforementioned migratory movements as irregular or illegal, because it is lacking authorization from distant destination countries. As indicated above, migration in West Africa is not illegal or irregular; what is illegal about this migration is that it (in some cases) takes the Maghreb or Europe as destination, which only then, with the attempt of irregular border crossing, makes the migration illegal.

At least since the EU agreed on a GAM, not only the fight against irregular migration, but also the fostering of return migration for development is among the pillars sustaining this cooperation in Africa. Sometimes (especially in critical accounts on EU migration policy) the focus is put on the measures driven by EU or member states' efforts to control and reduce irregular migration in West Africa (Casas, Cobarrubias and Pickles 2010, CIMADE 2010). Implementing migration management outside the EU, however, meant to collaborate with third countries, such as Mali, and to convince the respective government and authorities that such collaboration is useful, necessary, and potentially beneficial for the African partner. Thus bordering practices not only target control measures, readmission agreements or co-development projects, but also comprise efforts to establish a new approach to migration at the level of the government, civil society and the population as a whole. This shifts the focus from the mere policy to the bargaining over these policies and to the responses of Malian authorities and civil society.

The 'Calebasse Bambara'

On a day in November 2011, I had an appointment with Boubacar (name changed) early in the morning on the Koulouba, the hill above Bamako where scattered buildings hosting different governmental

agencies surround the President's palace. Boubacar is an official at the DGME. Boubacar greeted me heartily. Then we entered his office, where two elderly men were sitting at their desks. Greeting procedures took some minutes, but—for my experience with Mali—Boubacar focused on the reason of my visit, which was conducting an interview with him on Malian migration policy. I started my recording device, and posed the first general question about migration as an issue in the Malian government. I immediately regretted this, as Boubacar took it as an invitation to give me a broad and lengthy overview about the important role migration in Mali plays. Carefully, I tried to redirect the conversation more toward government views on European efforts to manage migration, and Boubacar gave me an official account about the negative impacts of irregular migration and mutual benefits of migration for sending and receiving countries. After about half an hour, I stopped my recorder, inwardly disappointed about a morning spoiled by mere cants, and started a more informal conversation. I told Boubacar that I was working mostly on migrants deported back from Europe and Maghreb countries, and the atmosphere suddenly changed, losing its official tone and becoming more friendly. We exchanged comments on our disapproval of the effects of EU migration policy in Mali, and especially the frequent deportations, and Boubacar praised the Malian president for not signing the French readmission agreement. While Boubacar turned to his computer for documents that could be of interest for me, one of his colleagues asked me to give advice on a file sent by Spanish authorities regarding a marriage certificate needed for regulation. After a while, Boubacar asked me to join him searching his computer for files, and finally we came up with two or three reports and minutes of meetings. When Boubacar led me out of the building, he started telling me about a project in his home village for which he applied for funding at a German agency. The project was about constructing a wall around the local school, with quite an exaggerated budget. I pocketed the draft and promised to contact the agency to see if I could accelerate the process, and left.

At first, I was annoyed, then puzzled, and increasingly interested in the encounter with this high Malian official from the DGME. Boubacar disposed of the only computer in his department, and apparently, he could not master it well. This sheds light on the capacity of this institution, which is meant to give technical support to the MMEIA. It would appear that the Malian institutions meant to organize and intensify the

relationship to the diaspora and to establish some sort of migration policy are more symbolic than efficient, functioning more on a discursive than on a practical level. Equally interesting was the switch in our relationship. While Boubacar was very formal in the beginning, the conversation shifted when the men in the office realized that I was not among the apologists of European migration policies and had local ties to migrant organizations. It might be over interpreting this turn by saying Boubacar was more honest afterwards; rather, this example shows the ability of Malian officials to adapt an argumentation quickly to different audiences.

The 'development' project in Boubacar's village hints to the obligations a Malian official has to deal with. As one of the few holding a salaried position in the government, Boubacar's social status relates to what he is able to do for his family and village, and how he can translate his position in the government into concrete outcomes. As favors like these cannot be paid out of a salary, the quest for additional money accompanies the everyday life of the bureaucratic elite. Furthermore, Boubacar is obliged to see if he can pull strings to introduce members from his family, or friends, into employment within his department, thus not only fulfilling his obligations, but also building up a network of allies he might need in the future. Boubacar's relation to me follows the model, which one of my interlocutors (Malian, but raised in Côte d'Ivoire) uses to call the *calebasse Bambara*,⁸ the way social relations dominate Malian attitudes and practices. Sometime this way is adverse to efficiency and functionality. Boubacar offering some documents to me and then asking for assistance in an application could have been a smooth way of introducing reciprocal relations of mutual benefit. Asking me for a favor is one of the many nuances of *petit corruption*, as Olivier de Sardan puts it (1996, p. 104), which is working in the logic of *cadeau*, or gift. If you contact a person with specific knowledge, as for instance a *marabout* (religious specialist), or with a function, like a village elder, you are expected to bring a small gift, often kola nuts, as a sign of respect and offer. Today, this tradition in a way generalized as an everyday practice in bureaucracy. It inextricably connects tradition with different forms of minor or major corruption, thus blurring the boundaries of legitimacy and legality. Boubacar stayed on the safe side on this occasion, although he perfectly knew that this way of

⁸ *Calebasse* here means skull, or head, and *Bambara* designates not the lingua franca of Mali, but rather the specific culture.

linking his public role and private interests should be better talked about outside the office.

Boubacar's switch in attitude toward me and migration matters may illuminate some of the difficulties that accompany consultations and talks between European administrations and Malian authorities. Mali's position regarding European activities to extend migration management to West Africa can be described as a dual one. On the one hand, Europe, France and, during the period 2006–2012, Spain are major donors of development assistance and economic partners. Since 2006, cooperation in migration issues emerged as a condition to sustain this flow of money, and even to attract additional funding.⁹ On the other hand, Mali is one of the main integrating forces within the West African Economic Community ECOWAS, which includes free circulation of citizens. Mali depends to a certain degree on highly skilled external labor force, mostly from Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire, and as almost a quarter of the Malian population is residing in mostly West African countries, Mali's interest in investing in migration control is limited, as neighbors could impose similar measures on Malian citizens. Furthermore, migrants in France exert not only economic power (through remittances and business investments), but constitute a force that can exert substantial social and political pressure as well. When it came to the signature of a readmission agreement, demonstrations both in Paris and in Bamako largely influencing public opinion could be seen as one of the major reasons why the then Malian President Amadou Toumani Touré eventually refrained from concluding the treaty (Soukouna 2011). Thus, a double interest exists as does a double discourse on migration and migration management, as the example of Boubacar shows. This exemplifies the position of the Malian government. Furthermore, though the Malian government is prone to corruption, corruption is also embedded in complex social relations and rules. Politics in Mali is guided by the principle of balancing the interests of different social groups tied together more by interethnic relations than democratic principles. This adds to the unpredictability of the outcome of negotiations on socially sensitive matters like migration and migration control.

⁹ Aminata Traoré for instance stated, when asked why Mali agreed to the CIGEM, that "unfortunately, for the Malian government "a bad project is more valuable than no project at all" (*pour l'Etat malien malheureusement "un mauvais projet vaut mieux que pas de projet du tout"*) (cited in Herrou 2008).

France and Spain as Main Actors in Migration Management

Both France and Spain, as EU member states most affected by immigration from West Africa, have long tried to influence the Malian policies regarding migration management. France, as the former colonial power, is seen as a central actor in Mali and the *ennemi* targeted by migrant and human rights organizations. While up to the mid-1970s Malian nationals did not even need a visa for entering France, immigration regulations have become increasingly restrictive. The fight against irregular migrants, the *sans papiers*, and deportations accelerated during the 1990s. After the 2005 Ceuta and Melilla incidents, France intensified its efforts to conclude readmission agreements with major West African states, including Mali.¹⁰ However, while almost all surrounding states gave in and accepted readmission, Mali resisted. The first attempt by Nicolas Sarkozy failed in 2003 (Panapress 2003), followed by longish negotiations. The Malian government wanted France to agree upon a fixed number of 5000 regularizations per year in return for signing the readmission agreement. With this procedure, the estimated 20,000 Malians (a number established from the RAVEC census) in irregular situations would gain residence in France during a four-year period. France initially offered only a number of 1500, and insisted on a case-by-case examination, which seemed to be exactly the procedure France was already following (Soukouna 2011, p. 56). Though France increased its offer a bit, after a number of attempts in late 2009 the consultations eventually failed. Minister of Integration Brice Hortefeux, who had visited Bamako personally, had to leave without Mali's agreement.

For Mali, this failure had a number of negative impacts. First of all, France stopped the *codéveloppement* assistance, and official development assistance decreased from 2008 to 2009 from 60 to 53 million Euros. Furthermore, France declared the whole Malian territory a zone threatened by terrorism, with immediate negative effects on tourism and travel of French citizens to Mali in general (Soukouna 2011, p. 59ff). On the street level, and also in the government agencies (as Boubacar's statements exemplify), the refusal to sign the readmission treaty was broadly welcomed, as a sign of support for (all) Malians abroad and a symbol of resistance toward the French and European interests in migration control.

¹⁰Readmission, that is, the readmission of own nationals and third country nationals, is one of the central features of migration management, as it is precondition for the effective removal of unwanted immigrants.

Spain arrived in Bamako only in 2006 with the opening of an embassy in the framework of the Plan África initiative to combat irregular migration and intensify development assistance addressing the root causes of migration (Government of Spain 2006). Spain concluded a number of almost identical agreements with West African governments, the so-called Second Generation Agreements, which are in line with the European policy of the Global Approach, and have a focus on readmission. While readmission is clearly defined in an annexed document, legal migration is formulated in vague terms and is always dependent on the labor market situation in Spain (Serón et al. 2011, p. 35). With Mali, Spain signed a similar agreement, including the acceptance of up to 800 legal temporary migrants annually (Doumbia 2012).

I first met Manuel, who acted as the counselor for migration matters at the Spanish embassy, at a conference where Malian projects, financed by the EU–UNDP initiative *migration4development*, were presented in 2009. He sat next to a sumptuously dressed Malian lady, Madame Sy Cotiary Bah, from the DGME. After the presentation, he told me that he is a counselor attached to the office of Madame Sy. Before coming to Bamako, he had been working in the office for foreigners in Madrid. For about a year, he had been living in Bamako with his teenage son. He seemed bewildered and not familiar with Mali, and expressed a sense of adventure as well as frustration regarding everyday life in Bamako. Some weeks later, we had an official appointment at the Spanish embassy, where I conducted an interview on Spanish activities in migration management in Bamako. Though the conversation was friendly, Manuel was close-lipped about Spanish engagement in Mali. For about one and a half hours, I tried to get information about these activities, but Manuel firmly resisted, and hardly confirmed the information I already had. Repeatedly Manuel declared that Spain only assists Malian authorities in developing a proper migration policy and Spanish activities were strictly confined to counseling and assistance only when asked for by the Malian government.

The whole interview indicates how reluctant Spanish officials are to reveal information about their activities. Manuel's communication strategy may be read in two ways with respect to two different audiences: the first audience is the public of Spain. Here, the Plan África, in line with the European Global Approach, addresses Spanish efforts in development rather than restrictive migration matters. In past years, a broader public as well as a number of publications critically targeted the Plan África for its lack of attention to human rights and its failure regarding development

activities (Romero 2008; Martinez Bermejo and Rivero Rodriguez 2008). A critical awareness had arisen which Manuel seemed not to want to provoke. The second audience is Malian society and authorities. Here, Manuel avoids representing Spain in the framework of imperial or neo-liberal intervention in Africa that imposes migration constraints on Mali. Instead, he depicts Spain as a modest partner that only assists Mali in its own efforts to come to terms with migration issues.

This tactic is definitely among the factors which explain why Spain, as far as concluding readmission agreements with West African governments are concerned, has been more successful than France. Adepoju has also suggested that Spain's negotiations in Africa regarding migration control were more efficient because Spain did not have the burden of colonial ties with West African states (Adepoju et al. 2009). This is significant if we review the complex and ambiguous relationship between France and Mali, especially regarding migratory issues (Quiminal 2012). Malian migrants arrived in greater numbers in Spain only during the late 1990s, and thus there are no long-lasting transnational relations or established Malian migrant communities. Malian media or social society never targeted Spain individually for deportations as they did with France. Protests against expulsions from Ceuta and Melilla were addressed against the EU rather than against Spain in particular, and charter deportations from Spain were hardly noticed at all. Furthermore, while the French government cut co-development funds substantially in 2009, Spain more than doubled its development assistance for Mali in the context of readmission negotiations (Cimade 2009, p. 9; Serón et al. 2011, p. 44).

Harmonization: The Role of the European Union

William Walters (2002, p. 568ff) sees different strategies at work within the context of EU border management. To give room for national interests in the sensitive sphere of national borders, the EU mostly 'harmonizes' national policies, sets common standards, assists cooperation between member states through working groups on different administrative levels, and via common tools like the Schengen Information System (SIS) or the Frontex agency.

EU's efforts, as described in the GAM, were not very successful in Mali. Rather, the situation in Bamako is marked by a multitude of different activities that lack harmonization. While in European policies with coastal states usually one EU member state represents European interests

(e.g. Spain in the cases of Mauritania and Senegal or Italy in the case of Libya), no such dominant state is visible in Bamako. Though France has a privileged position toward its former colony, a relation further strengthened by the active and organized presence of Malian migrants in France, French policies do not dominate migration control, or, to put it differently, there is no successful French-led migration management implemented in Mali. Instead, in Bamako the European influence on bordering processes is at best represented by the Centre for Information and Migration Management (CIGEM).

CIGEM was decided upon in 2007 as a direct outcome of the Rabat EU–Africa summit. It was financed by the European Commission under the 9th European Development Fund with ten million Euros for the first three years. Right from the beginning, CIGEM was sketched out as a pilot project, being the model for similar offices in West Africa, and was actively supported by Spain and France. They signed the founding document with a representative of the ECOWAS, the EU and Mali. Though financed by the EU, and equipped with some European employees, CIGEM is a joint EU–Malian project, headed by a Malian director, and closely linked to the Malian MMEIA. Initially the head of the EU Directorate for Development, Louis Michel, promoted the idea that CIGEM served as a labor agency in Africa, channeling Malian workers temporarily toward European labor markets (see Berger 2007). The first setback for CIGEM already occurred before the official opening in October 2008, as this idea of an employment office was quickly dropped by several EU member states, which saw their national sovereignty over labor markets questioned. The remaining tasks of CIGEM include informing potential migrants about legal migration and the dangers of irregular migration, and giving both migration aspirants and returnees information about training and labor options in Mali. Finally, CIGEM assists the Malian government in formulating a national migration policy.¹¹

Deprived of its most attractive task, CIGEM has tried best to manage the remaining functions, hampered by the necessity to collaborate with Malian organizations and institutions. This became most obvious in the attempt to place aspiring migrants and returnees in the Malian markets

¹¹I leave out some further activities of CIGEM, for example, the TOKTEN program which had been shifted from UNDP to CIGEM, as they are less relevant for the argument of this chapter. For a more comprehensive account of CIGEM activities, see Funakawa (2009) and Böwing (2012).

for vocational training and employment, which should have been done via governmental agencies, but that rarely was (Funakawa 2009, p. 44ff). There are many reasons for a poor record in this realm, ranging from (aspiring) migrants who are not interested in vocational training in Mali, to the almost non-existent formal labor market in Mali, and the poor performance of Malian offices regarding labor market integration and trainings.

Thus, it is not astonishing that besides providing daily counseling for migrants, CIGEM concentrated on the tasks to structure the landscape of actors working in the field of migration. This was mainly achieved through a number of different working groups that assemble migrants, deportee associations, government officials and the international actors, French and Spanish counselors, development actors, the IOM and the ILO, the Malian office of the International Labour Organization (ILO). As the IOM and the ILO also have their round tables and working groups, the number of meetings is considerable. The efficiency of these circles is limited at best. Alexander Kapirovsy, the head of IOM at Bamako stated that the countless working groups and reunions consume too much time. The same actors meet in different networks and the same matters are repeated without any visible progress.¹²

However, CIGEM has ambiguous outcomes. CIGEM spent a part of its budget to get migrant associations on the CIGEM payroll. The activities were information campaigns against irregular migration and assistance for deportees arriving in Bamako or at the Malian borders. For each call, CIGEM chose ten associations, and paid them 10,000 Euros each. Right after the call for assistance for deportees in 2009, the number of listed associations rose considerably, and for the next call already more than 100 associations were competing for funding.¹³ The intended side effect of the call, which was to encourage migrant associations to do the kind of work that CIGEM does and to assist them with a kick-off financial assistance, had been realized only partially. Only a minority of associations could stabilize its activities after CIGEM assistance ran out. They found funding from other donors, while others sank back into inconsequential obscurity.

CIGEM was not the only organization using migrant associations for these activities. The IOM in Bamako had carried out dissuasion campaigns and had run return assistance schemes, and the governmental MMEIA had financed associations both for campaigns about irregular migration as

¹² Interview with Alexander Kapirovsy, Bamako, 18 November 2010.

¹³ Information provided by Ousmane Diarra, AME, Bamako, November 2010.

well as for reintegration of deportees (Böwing 2012). If we take all these activities into account, at least three different organizations were carrying out similar operations. Instead of promoting the coordination of these organizations and tasks, the CIGEM seems to be just one more actor in the arena. The more competitive character of these activities is exemplified by the French and EU policy regarding *codéveloppement*. When France stopped its co-development scheme, reacting to Mali's refusal to sign the readmission treaty, CIGEM took over and continued the program. This lack of consistency between EU and French policies shows that the CIGEM is less EU-controlled than commentators think, and instead follows a line which is negotiated between the EU and Malian authorities.

Equally significant for the role of CIGEM is that when it came to the (until now only) recruitment of circular migrants (initiated by the Spanish regional Government of the Canary Islands), it was not the CIGEM which got involved, but the ILO office at Bamako. The 29 migrants recruited went for a four-month period to work in agriculture. The business workshop provided by ILO after their return proved to be only partially successful, as it was in French, and the fact that only a small part of the 26 returned migrants (three were offered temporary residence permits in Spain) knew French was only discovered during the workshop. A second workshop in Bamanankan (Bambara), Mali's main lingua franca, had been planned, but, as far as I know, never been realized.

Aminata Draman Traoré seems to be right in her judgment, given on the occasion of the CIGEM opening, when she said: 'In my opinion, this center brings the wrong answers to existing problems. Mali is in a difficult situation, characterized by unemployment and despair among young people. Building another center in Mali will not solve anything. There is no shortage of information structures in this country. In my opinion, this center is nothing else than the externalization of Europe's borders' (cited in Herrou 2008; my translation).

FACETS OF BORDERING

Reviewing European efforts to establish border management in Bamako between 2006 and 2012, it is astonishing that the outcome is so meager. The description of European activities could be extended, for instance by mentioning the equipping of 17 Malian border posts financed by Spain, or a number of Spanish co-development activities, but the result would not change the overall picture. As far as I can understand from my informants,

it is very questionable that the Spanish money for border enforcement ever arrived at border posts, and the process of crossing Malian borders is still much the same as before (see Mechlinski 2010, for a vivid account).

The situation in Bamako is different from the cases of Libya under the Gadhafi regime or Mauritania (cf. Lemberg-Perdersen; Morone, Chaps. 2 and 6, this volume). There is no clear European will to invest heavily into the integration of Mali into an externalized European border management system. No member state stands out taking the lead; instead, French and Spanish officials seem to handle the subject without much empathy. The EU itself did not seem to invest a lot into the process; once CIGEM was established, it was more or less neglected. Greater investment schemes (as in Italian–Libyan treaties) or a significant rise in development assistance (as in the case of Spain and Mauritania) did not accompany migration agreements. As migration control works out in the coastal states, already strongly diminishing the influx of irregular migrants, the pressure to come to terms with the Malian government is low.

On the Malian side, we can detect a number of reasons why Europe did not fully succeed. Among these reasons is the ambiguous relationship to France, characterized by a counter-hegemonic position toward France on the part of significant sectors of Malian society. Mali is a country of origin and transit, closely embedded in the West African subregion, and adheres to the imposition of control measures. While Arab countries could target ‘black’ immigrants as intruders, thus rising tensions within their own population (Dünnwald 2014), in Mali, this is neither possible nor on anyone’s agenda. Setting up control measures, sending back potential transit migrants at Malian borders, or detaining migrants would clearly be contrary to the integrative Malian overall policy in the region, and perhaps would foster similar reactions toward Malian migrants in neighboring countries. In addition, the strong Malian diaspora in France has a significant influence on migration politics and is not reluctant to interfere in Mali’s foreign affairs.

Establishing an effective European system of migration management in Mali thus will remain a challenging task, and, apart from practical political interests, is complicated by Malian self-conceptions of being a society with a strong tradition of welcoming and hosting strangers. And finally, taking into account the low capacity and complex interests of Malian authorities, as demonstrated by Boubacar, it will need more than counselors to bring about a change in Malian governmental institutions.

Managing migration flows thus will continue to be a difficult task in Bamako. Bamako, in the sense of a place of cultural and postcolonial

memory, contours the processes of bordering. Recent European efforts to stem migration from Africa will have to deal with specific localities and the social and governmental interests that structure African societies. In the wake of stronger immigration from Africa in 2015, CIGEM reopened early in the year after a period of inactivity following my fieldwork in Mali, but European negotiations seem to prioritize Niger rather than Mali. This might be a result from the experience in Mali, and the hope that the authoritarian regime in Niger is easier to convince to establish migration controls (e.g. Agence France-Presse Niamey 2015).

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Deportation Ghettos in Mali: Expelled Migrants Between State Exclusion and Self-Organization

Clara Lecadet

FROM EXPULSION TO THE GHETTO

The expulsion of foreigners is a powerful, symbolic means of tracing the shape and limits of citizenship and nation. As Daniel Kanstroom (2010) and Mae Ngai (2005) have shown in relation to American history, the expulsion of foreigners has been a central element in defining the limits of citizenship and in the construction and reinforcement of the prerogatives of the federal government. The evolution of the European project seems to follow the same pattern, since recent developments in European politics have promoted the notion of sending back undocumented immigrants as part of a shared framework for a common migration policy (Favell 2000; Guiraudon 2010). The main meaning and purpose of expulsion is thus to be found in the delimitation and differentiation of political space and entities in a national and/or federal sense. Kanstroom (2010) uses the expression ‘extended border control’ to refer to this wide and diffuse political function, since the use of expulsion goes beyond basic border control. Expulsion is in fact rooted in

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a series of distinctions that make up the nation: defining what is inside and outside state sovereignty and differentiating foreigners from nationals.

As Kanstroom (2012) remarks, however, hand in hand with these political distinctions go social rejection and separation. In the USA, expulsion policy, with its stated aim of maintaining state control of territorial borders, in reality hides a process of social selection aimed in particular at foreigners, residing legally or illegally in the country, who have committed an offence and who are thus the immediate target of expulsion measures. The fundamental legitimacy of the American expulsion system is to be found in the criminalization of immigrants, which reinforces the social and racial inequalities already at work in American society.

However, the process of social differentiation caused by deportation is not only at work within the countries where deportations are taking place. It appears as a major element when trying to consider the general consequences of deportation (Peutz 2006, 2010). The deportation aftermath (Kanstroom 2012) has legal, political and social dimensions (Drotbohm 2011, 2012) that are mostly unexplored. The effects produced by expulsion in terms of both political exclusion and social marginalization are incalculable. Liz Fekete (2005) shows the risk and the danger of some expulsions, which expose migrants to reprisals by the state or repercussions in terms of social and family relationships in their country of origin: being expelled can lead to death, she explains, using a series of examples which show sharply how the individual is crushed by a dehumanizing system. Among the diverse effects of expulsion across the globe (de Genova and Peutz 2010), are family separation, bad treatment to which expelled migrants are exposed during and after their expulsion, and also the establishment in certain countries, such as the Azores, Guatemala and Ecuador, of agencies supposed to facilitate reintegration (Kanstroom 2012). As initiatives in favor of integration for expelled migrants remain scarce, exclusion and marginalization increasingly mark the post-deportation stage.

The setting up of ghettos in Mali by expelled sub-Saharan migrants, which this chapter addresses,¹ is an example of the collective social and political reconstruction, which characterizes the post-expulsion stage. The settlement of ghettos corresponds to the locations where deportations, either by air or by road, take place. In the capital city Bamako, the Magnambougou ghetto included migrants returned overland after

¹This fieldwork was carried out for my PhD thesis entitled *The moving tide of expelled migrants. Centres of displacement, collective mobilisation and the risks experienced by expelled migrants in Mali* (EHESS, 2011). Its aim was to offer a general description of places, networks and associations formed by expelled migrants after deportation.

being expelled from neighboring countries such as Mauritania, Libya and Algeria. At the border zone between Algeria and Mali, in the area of Tinzwaten, as well as in the cities of Kidal and Gao in Northern Mali, migrants expelled from Algeria were either in transit or settled for long periods. Expellees organized themselves on the basis of nationality within areas which they called ghettos and which served not only as refuge and shelter but also as a base for arranging their onward travel. The emergence of ghettos seems to have arisen out of two demands, social and political, following the expulsion of foreigners by individual countries.

Ghettos are the social translation of the banishment inherent in expulsion, the social form of its political dimension (Lecadet 2014b). They testify to fellowship and to the internalization, by the group and by the individuals within it, of their excluded status. At the same time, they bear the stamp of an underlying criticism of state powers as regards this status, because the historical and symbolic resonance of the term 'ghetto' includes a ferment of claims and collective protest (Becker-Ho 2014; Lecadet 2012, 2014a). It speaks, in simple terms, almost a universal language, articulating the experience of rejection and of the exclusion inherent in expulsion. It describes marginalization at the border or in the towns, which line the post-expulsion routes in Kidal, Gao and Bamako and where migrants stop temporarily or are stuck after their expulsion. It also tells the possibility of a collective life after expulsion, of a form of autonomy in exclusion and separation. It speaks of a form of self-help and minimal solidarity in expulsion and testifies to the fact that after expulsion something remains, persists and resists, something which cannot simply be reduced to the prospective return of the migrants to their point of departure envisioned by deportation policies.

Expelled migrants' choice of the term 'ghetto' to describe their living areas consequently points to socio-political understandings of expulsion. My aim in this chapter is to examine, on the basis of three ghettos set up by migrants in respectively Tinzwaten, Gao and Bamako after their expulsion from Algeria, three essential meanings and functions of ghettos in relation to expulsion. As expulsion from Algeria largely reflects European pressures on Northern African states to prevent African migrants from reaching Southern Europe, the chapter also contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the spatial reconfigurations induced, though not entirely determined, by the externalization of European borders into Africa. It equally highlights the role of African contexts and migrants in forging particular political cultures in response to such border regimes. At Tinzwaten on the northern border of Mali, where the Algerian police abandoned the expelled migrants, the ghettos were places of both refuge

and survival, emblematic of state selection and exclusion, and places where migrants reaffirmed national affiliations. In Gao, the most important town in Northern Mali, 600 km from the Algerian border and 1,200 km from the capital Bamako, the ghettos—which were home to migrants *en route* to Algeria and to others who had been expelled from that country once or even several times—seemed to be intermediary places within a largely mobile structure. Finally, Bamako ghetto corresponded to the more classically accepted meaning of the term as a place of urban marginalization, housing migrants who have no way of moving on after their expulsion. The configuration and function of these three ghettos are partially overlapping: taken all together as they spread out from the borders of Mali and Algeria, they show ghettos as being part of a paradoxical dynamic of abandonment and survival, of isolation and fellowship, of stagnation and mobility.

TINZAWATEN: THE BORDER GHETTO

Deportation is an ancient phenomenon inherent in the social and political structure of the African continent, but it seems to have taken on a new momentum with the externalization of European borders, which since 2000 has been increasing the pressure on the Maghreb countries to limit the flow of migrants trying to reach Europe. The Tamanrasset-Tinzawaten axis has been functioning as a gathering place for undocumented migrants of various nationalities arrested in Algeria, and to a lesser extent in Morocco and Libya, and who are soon to be deported. The Algerian state put in place measures for expelling foreigners overland from Tamanrasset, in the south of Algeria, to Tinzawaten, a village located on the border between Algeria and Mali, from 1990 up to the outbreak of war in Mali in 2012, which marked a decrease in expulsions to this area. The result was the establishment of new places, corresponding to the geopolitical areas defined by the expulsion process but which were also self-organizing centers where destitute and abandoned migrants set up the conditions necessary for survival.

Migrants described Tinzawaten as an infernal, unbearable place in almost proverbial pronouncements. Many said ‘Tinzawaten is 7 kilometers of hell’, which presents it as, paradoxically, a place of death, a place of inhumanity and struggle, yet where life goes on and is organized. This has resonances of the description of the border given by Etienne Balibar,

for whom this is a lifeless area, but one which by necessity ends up being inhabited by the people who cross it:

For a poor man from a poor country, the border tends to be something else: not only is it an obstacle that is very difficult to cross, it is also a place which one continually comes up against, one which, at the mercy of expulsions and family gatherings, one crosses and re-crosses, and where finally one *ends up*. It is an extraordinarily glutinous spacio-temporal *zone*, a place for ‘almost living’—a waiting-room for life, a non-life. The psychoanalyst André Green wrote somewhere that it is difficult enough to live *on* a border, but that this is nothing to actually *being* oneself a border. He meant this in the sense of the pull of multiple identities, migrant identities, but one must also look at the material basis of this (Balibar 2007, p. 529).

The geographical location of Tinzawaten in the middle of the Sahara, the lack of resources and the absence of infrastructure, could be the most eloquent of metaphors for a world partially removed from the rules that govern normal social life, removed from the habits, the duration and the stability of established communities. In an unknown, inhospitable place without resources and as a matter of urgency, migrants are forced to organize some kind of ‘community’. Every element of this singular situation seems to lead to a withdrawal from the politics that normally bases the life of an individual within a permanent community: the absence of any legal dimension in the expulsion process from Tamanrasset, the fact that the expelled migrants are left ‘in the middle of nowhere’, in a no man’s land between the two borders, the frequent confiscation of the legal documents proving identity. Yet, despite this, something is in fact immediately re-formed. Tinzawaten is where immediate re-socialization takes place, however dramatic the circumstances, because national identity is a decisive criterion in regrouping and an essential factor in the solidarity to be found in this little island of abandoned houses, formed into ghettos, with each one allocated to a separate nationality.

From the end of the 1990s, Tamanrasset-Tinzawaten was the principal route of regular expulsions in the Saharan region, in terms of both its use by the Algerian police for convoys of expelled migrants, and the number of convoys that made the trip. A convoy was made up of between 3 and 7 lorries, each transporting about 40 people, mainly men. When the Tuareg rebellion in the 1990s led to increased control by the central Malian state over the region between Gao and the border with Algeria, the former

police commissioner in Kidal, a small town about 350 km to the south of the Algerian-Malian border, took the initiative of registering, from 2000 onwards, all foreigners passing through the town, thereby listing more than 2000 expelled migrants arriving in this zone each year. In the context of a political crisis such as the war in Libya in 2011, the return of massive numbers of foreign Africans fleeing Libya meant that this figure increased considerably. With the outbreak of the war in Mali in 2012, the expulsions from Algeria seem to have decreased, but this made the situation of foreigners on Algerian soil even more difficult because of overpopulation in detention centers there. Mali has never objected to the arrival on its territory of migrants expelled overland from other countries such as Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco or Libya, whatever their nationality. Among these migrants were not only Malians, of course, but also people from Ghana, Gambia, Liberia, Cameroon, Nigeria, Senegal, Guinea, Burkina Faso and Niger among other nationalities.

Once expelled, these groups formed national micro-communities in a little island of ruined houses separated from Algeria by a dried up *wadi* (valley or riverbed). The terminology used by the migrants to describe this zone may seem surprising, as there were ‘presidents’, ‘ministers’ and also ‘coups’ and ‘civil wars’; in short, all the functions and tensions to be found in traditional political societies. In the various ghettos—Cameroonian, Nigerian, Liberian, Malian—organizations linked to their nationality supported the migrant groups. On this autonomous site, migrants reappropriated the regulations, functions and protocol of their various countries. Rapidly and in simplified form, each national community established regulations loaded with specific political, historical and cultural references.

The term ‘ghetto’ suggests not only isolation, exclusion and destitution, but also the reconstruction of a collective life based on nationality. In the ghettos, conflicts are resolved collectively within the national micro-communities led by chiefs, generals, ministers and presidents. Each ghetto mimics a power structure, whether it is chiefdom, government, or the army. This mimicry carries with it an equal degree of subversion and irony in relation to the situation of extreme abandonment in which the migrants have been left. These national groupings thus have a social dimension and political significance. Nationality is not here the prerogative of a state, or a simple marker for the individual, rather it is the process of recomposition itself and the reorganization of individuals at the time of their expulsion. This moment, when the migrants have often lost everything, is also the time for spontaneously reappropriating political norms and rebuilding a form of civilian life. The strong national link makes up for the absence of

institutional support. Moreover, this phenomenon operates beyond the border zone, as will be seen in the organization of the Cameroonians in Gao and Bamako.

In ghettos as in other organized groups, a whole terminology is in fact set up, redirecting and subverting the names, norms and functions of institutional politics. For instance, the term chosen by Liberians to describe their organization following their sporadic expulsion from Algeria, seems emblematic of the invention and use by expelled migrants of a frontier vocabulary (see Introduction). The International Brothers Association Network or Interban was created in 2006 by Liberian migrants with the aim of facing up to the most dramatic consequences of their expulsion from Algeria. Their organization was born out of this banishment and was defined by it, to the extent that the contraction of the organization's name, which the Liberians used among themselves in the desert or during their expulsion, played on the double meaning of banishment and solidarity. Interban is the family created in banishment, which emerged from expulsion and which affirms its unity in segregation by restating their national link. This terminological creativity is thus emblematic of the fellowship that allows migrants to face up to the highly dramatic consequences of the limitations set on their mobility.

In sum, ghettos became a symbol of the rejection and selection operated at the border, but also of the self-organization of the migrants in the face of expulsion. Left entirely alone, exhausted, some of them ill, these men who were abandoned in the desert were very likely to die. Lifeless corpses were regularly found in the desert; digging a grave was too much for the others who would have exhausted their remaining strength in the effort. The consolidation of the national link became the only means of facing up to the most dramatic consequences of expulsion in this zone. From the year 2000 onwards, the ghettos took shape. The Nigerians in particular invested a great deal in their ghetto, which was inhabited and organized as a destination for those expelled from Algeria, as a sort of base or platform for those passing through on their way there, and an opportunity for those already expelled to set off again. In this way, the ghetto aimed to overcome the limitations of expulsion by strengthening the conditions for group organization and promoting mobility. These national micro-communities were ephemeral, filled up and emptied, formed and broken up, subject to arrivals and departures. When a ghetto emptied, the register was entrusted to the leader of another ghetto who would hand it over to the migrants of the relevant nationality when the next convoy arrived. These micro-communities were indicative of the migrants' self-organization in the very place of their rejection and their most tragic

relegation. At this time and in this place following expulsion, networks were organized on a regional scale. The migrants themselves occupied a central position in the provision of aid and of the means of survival for those arriving and for those returning home, but also, more discretely, for those preparing to set off again to Algeria.

From the moment of expulsion, a micro-economy of mobility was thus put in place. By organizing the convoys of those who, despite their expulsion, wanted to return to Algeria, the leaders of the ghettos and their assistants usually earned a free trip for themselves. Those wanting to return to Algeria could thus settle in the Tinzawaten ghettos for periods of up to several months at a time. Despite the almost constant renewal of its members through the various convoys arriving from Algeria, the organization of each ghetto remained the same. Individuals chose to stay or to set off again according to the material, physical and moral resources they had left when they were expelled. There were other elements influencing this choice: a fortnightly mission was set up by the Malian Red Cross between 2009 and 2011, collecting around 50 migrants each time and taking them to the migrant center in Gao where they were helped to return to their country of origin; the migrants also knew on their arrival at Tinzawaten that in Kidal, Gao and Bamako there were places where they could be temporarily housed (Lecadet 2010). The permanence of the ghettos in Tinzawaten and Gao shows, however, that human movement outstrips to a certain extent political constraints and tries to bypass them.

The political structure of the Tinzawaten ghettos, therefore, supported their strategies for survival and for facilitating new movement, new migrations denied to them by the expulsion process. The Gao ghettos followed this same pattern. Secret, discrete places, not readily accessible, the ghettos set up by migrants seemed in fact to have a function that ran counter to the aid initiatives such as the Red Cross' that began to be set up for migrants in Northern Mali and in Bamako from 2009 onwards, with the aim of assisting their return to their country of origin. The attempt to manage mobility through institutionalized expulsion policies, as well as by the various mechanisms promoting the return of foreigners to their country of origin, is constantly tested on the ground by the ineradicable desire for autonomy that is evident in the journeys undertaken by migrants and in the places in which they choose to live, individually and collectively. The organization of border ghettos is partly aimed at thwarting these attempts at expulsion and marginalization by re-creating forms of autonomy and potential mobility.

GAO: THE INTERMEDIATE GHETTO

Because they were established at the very point of expulsion from Algeria, the Tinzawaten ghettos were an extreme kind of ghetto, places that felt the effects of mass expulsion and autonomous reorganization. It was in this preliminary situation that the ghetto took on its most pronounced political expression. While the migrant ghettos near the border reproduced and redirected the vocabulary and practices of politics, the other kinds of ghetto, which lined the route of migrants after their expulsion into Mali, took on more of a domestic flavor as regards the choice of place and their internal organization. Mahamet Timera (2009) uses the description of a migrant house in Morocco to show their importance as an intermediary space where different personalities and different strata of society meet, each with their separate motives for migration. In this respect, the organization of the Gao ghettos in the phase following expulsion showed many similarities with the temporary migrant houses in Morocco.

Like all the places where migrants regroup and which are marginal to establishments offering institutional support, the ghettos played a central but relatively unnoticed role in the overall movement of people and the attempts to set off again after expulsion. They were places for living and also *negotiating places* in which post-expulsion departures were set up and where people stayed briefly before setting off again. As in Tinzawaten, national identity continued to be a determining criterion in the reorganization of expelled migrants in the various parts of Northern Mali and in Bamako. Even so, the ghettos in Gao or Bamako took on neither the symbols of state nor titles nor political and/or military functions in their organization. The Gao ghettos were closed, private places, in privately owned houses rented or lent to migrants by their Malian owners who had links with people 'passers'.

From this point of view, the ghetto seems more like a stage on a journey, but it is also an intermediary place in an overall mobility economy linking the migrants, the people 'passers' and the house owners. A 'fixer' would often pay rent on a house to its Malian owner. In exchange, the migrants would have to organize their transport through him. He received a commission on the trips made by Tamashek drivers. This mobility economy ran counter to the aims of institutionalized reception centers, which promoted the return of migrants to their countries of origin. French NGOs such as Secours Catholique or the Catholic Committee against Hunger and for Development (CCFD) gave financial support through

migrant associations in Gao and Bamako to destitute expelled migrants, but only for travel to their country of origin. Inside the ghettos, by contrast, the migrants were free to choose their destination. The migrant center, which operated in Gao between 2009 and 2011, was an institutional space where migrants were welcomed, but the rigorous protocol, the very limited time they were allowed to stay and the financing of their return home all amounted to a very limited offer in relation to the aspirations of the migrants themselves. The mobility economy, which operated underground in the ghettos, ran counter to institutional, humanitarian policies, which saw expulsion and returning home as synonymous and focused on financing the return of migrants to their country of origin.

In Gao, the limits placed on the movement of expelled migrants by the Malian Red Cross and the migrant center caused bad feelings in the Cameroonian ghetto toward the NGOs and migration policies. Situated near the Tizi-Mizi Hotel, where American soldiers from the military base in Gao were billeted, the Cameroonian ghetto was in a house separated from the road by a low wall and with a large interior courtyard like all traditional Malian houses. The rules of the house were posted on the front door. Rules of this kind and this need for organizing the group were to be found in all the places where migrants gathered after expulsion. In spite of the fact that it presented itself as an autonomous community, the ghetto was also a place where transactions took place between the migrants and a ‘fixer’ who paid all of the rent: the residents of the ghetto were tied to the Malian owner by an agreement covering the transport needs of the group. Housing was closely linked to transport. The Cameroonian ghetto in Gao, like others in the town, was built on this exchange of transport and housing: the expelled migrants did not pay for the places they stayed in, the profits being made by both the people ‘passers’ and the owners of the houses through commission on the price of transport. On the other hand, the owner seemed to have no rights over the organization of the migrants inside the house. The organization and sharing of domestic tasks and the principles of communal life were the business of the migrants alone.

BAMAKO: THE URBAN GHETTO

The reappropriation of the terminology of segregation through the use of the word ‘ghetto’ extends expulsion well beyond the event itself. Informal post-expulsion communities can be seen as a by-product of expulsion methods, in the sense that these methods encourage the formation of new

groups and sort individuals into the political categories, which led to their expulsion. These people, weighed down by the failure of their adventure and set apart by what is often the impossibility of return, use the ghettos as a way of reformulating their situation, which continues therefore to have a political significance.

The spaces occupied by migrants after their expulsion extended well beyond the border zone and its surrounding area, and recreated small islands of exclusion and ghettoization far beyond what might be considered the end point of their expulsion. Once they had left Tinzawaten, many migrants hoped to get to Bamako, a crossroads town where various forms of solidarity are in operation. Some benefited from the help that is offered there by local communities of their own nationality through the tontine system.² Thus, since the year 2000, Bamako has gained various sites where expelled migrants from different Central African countries take refuge and regroup. While many migrants lived in a state of complete abandonment around the Sogoniko bus station, forced to sleep in the street when the shame of returning home was too great, others had grouped together in a relatively permanent way, creating a place which for a long time was known as the Magnambougou ghetto. This ghetto in fact moved on through various houses each time that its inhabitants were no longer able to pay the rent. The ghetto was therefore as much a physical place—a location—as a network of cooperating people, a space of social interaction that rooted itself according to circumstances. Around 2003, the migrants finally set themselves up in a rented property until they were removed from it in October 2009. This event coincided with the beginning of a complete institutionalization of the reception process, contributing to a change in the kind of places where they could take shelter after their expulsion. More than a place specifically given over to expelled migrants, the Magnambougou ghetto was actually a crossroads for the mainly Cameroonian travelers who were heading north and for those who were forced to return from Algeria. Although it was essentially set up as a staging post, some migrants remained there for several months if not years. As an emblematic site, on the one hand testifying to the capacity for self-organization of non-Malian migrants expelled from Algeria, and on the other becoming a place of abandonment and poverty, this ghetto

²The tontine is a system for raising capital, and in Sub-Saharan Africa it is generally supported by associations or groups of people who pay contributions that can be used to provide assistance to deported compatriots.

demonstrated various social situations experienced after their expulsion by a number of migrants in transit, mainly from Cameroon or Central Africa.

The role played by migrant centers in the Maghreb and in Europe is well known. Abdelmalek Sayad (2006) showed how, in the 1950s, they provided good accommodation for poor immigrants in France. Claiming and reappropriating the term ‘ghetto’ for places which allowed migrants to gather together and organize their daily lives after expulsion, seemed to suggest the opposite: a sort of negative version from the point of view of language and image. Nonetheless, the function of the ghetto partly overlaps that of the migrant center, by offering at the very least shelter and a meeting place. But these ghettos are also places where migrants become stalled, blocked and destitute. The use of the term symbolizes the break which expulsion represents in the migratory journey. It is the opposite of ‘adventure’, the word used in African stories and songs to refer to departures. It is certainly the case that expulsion does not entail the same consequence for each individual or group, but even so the choice of the word ‘ghetto’ seems to testify to the failure and relegation brought about by expulsion. Expulsion redraws for migrants the horizon of the ghetto, a term which expresses both the harshness of the living conditions that follow expulsion and the difficulty of returning when there has been no departure in any real sense. It also redraws the reality of a ghetto which here corresponds more to a place where people gather together to cope with desperation and survival.

At the heart of the Magnambougou ghetto, there was a very high level of collective awareness which, in February 2008, had led the migrants to decide as a group to close the area to all visitors from outside the ghetto: on various occasions, many of the inhabitants of the ghetto attended discussion days on migration policies organized after 2007 by the Malian Expelled Migrants Association,³ to listen to speeches by Roméo Ntamag, president of the Association of Central African Migrants Expelled in Mali,⁴ and to see the sketch written and performed by members of the ghetto

³This association, founded in Bamako in 1996 by Ousmane Diarra, played a pioneer role in the self-organization of expelled migrants in Mali and in the emergence of protest movements against, and political criticism of, the policies and practices of the expulsion of undocumented foreigners from western countries and within Africa.

⁴This association, set up in Bamako in 2006 by Roméo Ntamag and Patrice Boukar, had the specific aim of representing non-Malian migrants expelled into Mali. In particular, it allowed the attention of various associations to be focused on the inhabitants of the Magnambougou ghetto and it was responsible for the opening of an institutionalized recep-

specifically for such events. Their common experience of expulsion seemed to be a determining factor in the formation of this group, illustrating failure and the dead-end that returning home represented. In this context the reappropriation of the term ‘ghetto’ testified to the fact that expulsion meant social segregation, but in the context of demonstrations organized by the various associations and of public discussion days, the term also became a strong symbol of the post-expulsion experience and helped to bring this experience out into the open. From this point of view, the term ‘ghetto’ moved on from the fellowship of a self-organizing community to receive recognition by locally based associations and by the international NGOs involved in aid to expelled migrants.

Initially conceived as transit camps for migrants before they returned home, ghettoes such as Magnambougou owed their paradoxical existence to their being permanently temporary. The inhabitants mostly remained blocked there, with the distinctive feature of having been expelled from a country that was not their own: at the heart of the precariousness and marginalization that expulsion creates they found themselves in a situation of even greater social rejection and relegation than that experienced by Malian ‘nationals’. Unlike the Tinzawaten ghettoes, the Magnambougou ghetto was not one that had been created by the migrants themselves, in the sense that it existed in a classic urban context and operated through rental agreements. Nor was it, like the Cameroonian ghetto in Gao, a place which in its very organization presupposed close links with people ‘passers’.

It functioned, however, with the same respect for rules and the same proto-administrative habits which prevailed in the other ghettoes further to the north. The inhabitants paid a monthly rent of 10,000 CFA francs per room, with some of them occasionally sleeping in corridors or on terraces. The dilapidated building had 14 rooms. The (adult) inhabitants of each room which could run to as many as 17, shared the cost. The ghetto mainly lived on credit, and with rent arrears about which the manager, described as a drunkard, was very understanding. Every new arrival paid a *ghetto fee* which varied between 2500 and 5000 CFA francs and which was an entry payment allowing the group to buy cleaning products and other daily needs: mops, buckets, matting, saucepans, and so on. Those who had no money on arrival were allowed a little more time to pay. The

tion center for expelled migrants in Bamako in 2009, a center that was supported by the NGOs Medico International and Médecins du Monde.

payment of the ghetto fee implied acceptance of the admission regulations, recorded and posted in a written set of rules: these stipulated that every adult should take his or her turn on the cleaning rota, and also set out disciplinary rules that had to be observed in the communal house, and which included in particular a ban on fighting and stealing, and called for respect for elders and so on.

The rules which this micro-society set up seemed to conform to the paradoxical definition of a ghetto (Bauman 2006, pp. 148–49) as a place of shelter aimed at providing for the daily needs of its inhabitants, while also being a place that was set apart, segregated. On a very small scale, this place reproduced the social conditions of poverty and social relegation of the ghettoized areas in large cities, with the people within it being confronted daily by the difficulty of feeding themselves and paying the rent. Promiscuity and other problems presented by different standards of hygiene were also a source of tension. The ghetto thus appeared to be a pocket of extreme insecurity and privation within the town, noted for the political and social situation of its members. Relations with neighbors were characterized not only by mistrust, but also by exchanges and demonstrations of solidarity, such as the friendly shopkeeper who regularly donated sacks of rice, or the locals who shared their meals with the migrants. But apart from problems over food and rent, it was destitution and the difficulties inherent in the situation of an expelled migrant in a foreign land, which often led to a crisis when a migrant died. In this sort of critical moment, the Association of Central African Migrants (ARACEM) would try to mobilize the association's network in order to find the necessary solution to the problem of repatriating or burying in Mali the person who had died; and when 20 or so migrants from the ghetto were imprisoned for theft in 2008, AME and ARACEM led a joint delegation to the Bamako prison to visit the prisoners and bring them sacks of rice bought, thanks to financial support from the Swiss NGO Helvetas.

The ghetto got its identity and memory from these shared tragedies and experiences. The people whom I met in February 2009 had ambivalent feelings toward the ghetto which they wanted to leave—'We really need to get out of the situation that we're in', one of them said to me—but which at the same time they did not want to forget: 'We have to be able to tell others about what we've experienced [...] When you get to the end of the tunnel you forget a lot of things. You can't remember on your own.' Some wrote their story down, kept a personal diary and their words were stamped with a mixture of pain and pride. In contrast to the misery

of their living conditions in the ghetto, those whom I met spoke of hoping for change, for an improvement in their own situation and that of the group as a whole. Together the inhabitants of the ghetto and the members of ARACEM set up a hair-dressing salon called 'Hope'.

THE GHETTO, AN ENCLAVE IN A COMPLEX GEOGRAPHY OF EXPULSION AND MOBILITY

In the Euro-African border zone, expulsion traces a specific geography of the routes and places where migrants gather and pass through, where groups form and then scatter. If in this chapter I have laid particular stress on the ghetto as a major socio-political reality in order to understand the effects of the expulsions in Mali, the coexistence of centers for expelled migrants, the centers for those *en route* to Algeria and the ghettos, reveals the complexity of these patterns of mobility and shelter. On the border between Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea, in the Cameroonian town of Kye-Ossi, or in the town of Kidal in Northern Mali, expelled migrants stay in centers, which are a step nearer to institutionalization and recognition by public authorities than the ghettos, and are generally managed by a third party, typically a migrant living in the town to which he has been expelled and where he organizes housing and subsistence for newly arrived expelled migrants. In 2009, various associations based in Bamako (Association Malienne des Expulsés, Association Retour Travail et Dignité, Association des Refoulés d'Afrique Centrale au Mali, Association Tounkan Tè Danbé Don) had set up reception centers for expelled migrants in Bamako and other regions.

While expulsion policies mean that being sent back to countries of origin is the unavoidable result for immigrants, the diversity of these places seems by contrast to demonstrate the existence of different kinds of mobility after expulsion; if some, exhausted and having lost everything, try to go back home, others extend their stay in the area to which they were expelled, in the hope of setting off once again. From this point of view, the existence of ghettos reveals that a fellowship is born within migration which in addition to its role in facing up to the most dramatic consequences of expulsion, sets up the collective as a response to exclusion by the state. The ghettos are part of these migratory journeys and are formed, in different places and modalities, by the pressure of expulsion. They are to be found not only in Tinzawaten, Gao and Bamako, but also in Arlit and Agadez in Niger (Brachet 2009) and certainly in countless

other places in Africa and elsewhere along migration routes, and they show the capacity for social and political organization in the context of uncertainty, destitution and abandonment.

The ghettos and centers set up in the post-expulsion period are part of a wider structure of places for those on the move. They must be seen alongside other ghettos, other centers in which migrants organize themselves in Algeria, for example, or in Morocco, and also in the numerous towns which line the routes of this traffic, intra-African and/or heading for Europe (Daniel 2008; Pian 2008). They find an echo in the jungles and ghettos set up by migrants in Europe at key border crossings (Calais, Patras) (Ager and Prestianni 2011). A homology of form, based on grouping by nationality, the appointment of a leader with responsibility for daily life and for transport, a sense of hierarchy and collective conflict resolution, all link these different places in Europe and Africa—ghettos, centers, jungles. The proliferation of ghettos and other places of shelter created along their way by immigrants and expelled migrants illustrates the fellowship, the forms of self-help and self-organization that arise out of the political pressures placed on the movement of people by individual states and the attempt to overcome these. They show how social and political life is recreated in the experience of crossing borders. Even in a minimal and mostly lowly form, these places show that the strengthening of borders induces strategies of subversion and avoidance. Borders and the sites along them make visible the naked confrontation between state politics and the collective desire for mobility.

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PART III

Actors

Policies, Practices, and Representations
Regarding Sub-Saharan Migrants
in Libya: From the Partnership with Italy
to the Post-Qadhafi Era

Antonio M. Morone

Since the mid-1990s, Libya has been at centre stage in relation to the rising levels of migration from sub-Saharan Africa towards European borders. By representing it as a country of transit rather than a country of destination, Muammar Qadhafi's regime emphasized Libya's key role in controlling regional South–North migration; the principal aim was to use the notion of transit migration and the attached security issues as leverage to obtain the lifting of international sanctions, followed by Libyan readmission to the international community. In exchange, Qadhafi's Libya became Italy's main partner within the Mediterranean region in its policy of externalizing and securing European Union (EU) borders. This policy had its maximum impact in the years immediately after the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Partnership, and Cooperation between the Republic of Italy and the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya on 30 August 2008. In spite of the

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representation of Libya as a country of transit, ‘data shows that most migrants remain[ed] in the country’ and had no intention of risking a crossing of the Mediterranean Sea in order to reach Europe (Paoletti and Pastore 2010, p. 11). Sub-Saharan migrants in Libya thus became the subjects of decision-making processes whose outcomes were determined by external pressures and international interests. After the Libyan-Italian Treaty of 2008, the strategy was to push African migrants intercepted in the Mediterranean back towards the Libyan coast. This ‘push-back’ policy, as it has been called, erected an invisible but insuperable barrier in the middle of the Mediterranean Sea, which historically had been an area of intense and multi-layered interaction between Europe and Africa. As a result, policies in Libya favoured increased exploitation, detention, and deportation to the migrants’ detriment.

This chapter argues firstly that history is not a neutral background, but can influence current policies and relationships. Not only did the partnership between Italy and Libya on migration represent a very substantial case of border externalization which provoked ‘displacement and forced migration in itself’ (Lemberg-Pedersen, Chap. 2 this volume), but it also became clear that this externalization was not a one-sided process and had its own African dimension, in this case mostly Libyan. The uniqueness of colonial and post-colonial relations between Italy and Libya provided both parties with important leverage when bargaining for their own interests. Secondly, the chapter points out that despite the political and social changes produced by the 2011 uprising and the subsequent civil war, policies and practices relating to sub-Saharan migrants in Libya maintained a close continuity with the past. The conflict provoked a general and serious deterioration in the conditions of residence in Libya of these migrants, who were exposed to violence, imprisonment, and killing. The peaks of the civil war in 2011 and the period from mid-2014 until the time of writing (November 2015) have coincided with two large migration crises and the departure of thousands of refugees from the country. Furthermore, the fall of Qadhafi indirectly caused the collapse of the system for externalizing and securing EU borders. The new Libyan authorities and Italian governments have in fact shown a revival of reciprocal interest in restoring externalization and security policies for control of the flow of migrants, although Italy’s bargaining position has weakened in consequence of regime change in Libya. Not only have Italy and Libya worked on recovering control of the EurAfrican borders, but they have planned the further externalization of these borders southwards and have tried

to obtain greater EU involvement in this. Continuity has related not only to Libyan and Italian cooperation on migration but also to the migrants, who are still travelling to Libya for a wide range of reasons and mainly to seek work. Thirdly, the chapter concludes that while the smuggling of migrants has of course been increasing rapidly, the findings discussed below show that post-Qadhafi Libya is on the whole still more a country of destination than one of transit.

A HISTORY OF MIGRATION

Throughout the course of the Libyan Socialist Revolution, migration policies were constantly and closely connected with Colonel Qadhafi's exercise of power and his foreign policy. In 1969, the first year of the Revolution, Qadhafi demanded true social emancipation and a clean break with the post-colonial order: 'the primary [revolutionary] objective was to abolish Western rule and the final traces of colonialism, which were the military bases and property owned by Italians', as well as the financial interests of the last few Italian settlers and their descendants (Calchi Novati 2008, p. 376). Challenging the fact that a substantial proportion of national resources, state agencies, and specialist services were still in the hands of Italians, Qadhafi's revolution 'established [a] strong anticolonial and anti-white minority regime' which led to the traumatic expulsion of the entire Italian community in 1970 (Ahmida 2005, p. 85).

Post-independence immigration evoked the painful memory of Italian colonization, but was at the same time a structural necessity for the Libyan economy in response to the expulsion of the Italians. The breaking of neo-colonial relations represented an essential process of self-legitimation for the new Libyan leadership, but the gap created by the departure of Italian specialists, white-collar workers and businessmen encouraged the immigration across the years of highly skilled workers from other Arab countries, particularly Egypt and Syria, and even from Europe. This gap grew due to the legacy of Italian colonialism, because education had been neglected in the context of colonial society and many Libyans had been restricted to a primary education. Following national independence in 1951, the perpetuation of their subaltern socio-economic position made Libyans either general workers or only the subordinates of Italian owners. After the expulsion of the Italians, Qadhafi's pan-Arab policy saw him call for a wider Arab contribution to Libyan development: Arab brothers should relocate to Libya, a country that was relatively under-populated and, thanks to oil revenues, richer than its neighbours. In 1973 the number of foreign workers in Libya increased to 8.7 per cent of

the total active population, with the proportion rising to 11.2 per cent by 1984 (Sofrani and Jwan 2008, p. 12). Although Libya had turned to Arab manpower, the technical and entrepreneurial skills of the Italian community were never completely replaced due to an ineffective educational system that provided a primary and vocational education for all Libyans, but either could not afford or disregard investment in higher education.

From the 1980s the war with neighbouring Chad, rising international isolation, the US bombing of Tripoli in 1986, and the international sanctions established in 1988 for the alleged links between the Libyan regime and international terrorism all contributed to a negative trend in immigration. The Libyan government adopted restrictive legislation for foreign workers, setting specific limits to private property rights, and commercial or entrepreneurial licences. Immigration triggered increasing social conflict, leading the Qadhafi regime to take draconian actions. In February 1995 more than 30,000 Palestinian refugees were expelled, and in the following September thousands of Egyptian and Sudanese workers were forced to leave the country. These actions indicated the deterioration of Qadhafi's Pan-Arab policy and heralded a shift in Libyan foreign policy towards a broader Pan-African approach: Africa 'became a makeshift solution in response to the unfortunate outcome of the offers to Arab brothers' (Calchi Novati 2008, p. 389). In 1998, Qadhafi promoted the establishment of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States with the objective of achieving the free movement of people, capital, and goods between its member states and the rights of establishment for their citizens. Thanks to this open-door policy, the oil-rich Libyan economy increasingly attracted migrant workers from sub-Saharan countries.

In 2002, the new African Union was established at the international conference of Durban (South Africa), thanks not least to considerable Libyan diplomatic groundwork and political support. In the same year, Qadhafi celebrated the launch of his 'Libyan Development Plan using African Manpower' (Pliez 2004, p. 145). After the international embargo against Qadhafi's regime ended in 2003, Libya entered a new era characterized by high economic growth and reforms introducing privatization, but 'without any essential political change' until the regime fell in 2011 (Varvelli 2010, p. 4). Political parties and civil or human rights organizations were still banned due to 'hard line elements within the regime who oppose[d] any sort of change that might move Libya away from the highly centralized *Jamahiriyah* system' (Pargeter 2006, p. 224). In this context immigration became an important instrument to support economic expansion and internal consensus, and a useful scapegoat to address social protest: Qadhafi's regime had pragmatically exploited 'an anti-migration rhetoric which attached to sub-Saharan foreigners the guilt for all contemporary Libya's problems' (Pastore 2008,

p. 4). According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) statistical abstracts, foreigners who legally resided in the country accounted for 6.5 per cent of the total population, estimated at between 6 and 7 million people (Sofrani and Jwan 2008, p. 12). The proportion rapidly increased to 10.4 per cent by 2010, of which 35.5 per cent were women and 0.5 per cent political refugees (United Nations 2010). During the 2000s, Libya underwent ‘a “feminisation” of migration that is often connected with a “feminisation” of poverty’ (Gouws 2010, p. 170), while the very low numbers of people awarded refugee status bore little relation to estimates of those actually entitled to this. In brief, Libya was ‘approaching the most significant European countries of immigration in terms of the ratio of migrants to total population’ (Pastore and Trinchieri 2008, p. 24). Irregular migrants in the country before the Libyan civil war were estimated to number between 1 and 2 million, mostly living in the major cities of Tripoli and Benghazi on the coast and Sheba and Cufra in the interior. Irregular migrants were often sub-Saharan African nationals coming from Sudan, Chad, Niger, Mali, Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia; the notable exception to this picture were the Egyptian migrants, by far the largest foreign community in Libya, and Tunisians.

Although irregular migrants were participating in large numbers in economic activity, both formal and more often informal, the Libyan decision to turn to sub-Saharan workers ‘worsened the existing tensions in Libyan society’ (Vandewalle 2006, p. 188). Youth unemployment was one symptom of this and in 2010 stood at 30 per cent in Cyrenaica and 20 per cent across the country as a whole, one of the highest rates among the states in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region (Varvelli 2010, p. 3). Public discourse on immigration in Libya took on the rhetoric of securitization, influencing practices. For many Libyans irregular immigration was ‘the biggest concern after terrorism’ (Obeidi 2004, p. 13). Immigrants were alleged to be ‘stealing work’ from Libyan nationals, were associated with rising criminality, and were seen as a medium for the spread of new diseases such as HIV. From the mid-1980s, ‘the presence of a large number of migrant workers signified a deep distance among Libyans from manual labor [... and] a deep-rooted identification of blacks with the notion of labor force’ (Dunton 1988, pp. 157–8). Moreover, the mass urbanization process, which involved thousands of Libyan nationals, increased concern about the possibility of social coexistence. Between the 1950s and the present, the population of Libya’s capital rose from just thousands to 1.5 million residents: 2 million if we include Tripoli’s hinterland. This represents a quarter of the total Libyan population. The tensions between the city’s more established residents and newcomers from the rural areas of

Tripolitania combined with the divisions between nationals and foreign migrants. Discrimination and racism towards migrants is closely linked to their blackness, despite the African origin of many Libyans. The general perception that many ordinary Libyans had of sub-Saharan migrants was thus characterized by an increasing fear of the supposed africanization of Libyan Arab society.

Sub-Saharan migrants were confined to the lowest strata of society and have thus easily become the target of social unrest, as illustrated by the well-known case of the Zawia massacre. A few kilometres west of Tripoli, the city of Zawia is its latest urban offshoot and part of the capital's hinterland. In recent years, it has become an important focal point for migration, adding the newest sub-Saharan migrants to the earlier Arab-Berber migration from the Jabal Nafusah. In October 2000, Zawia was shaken by a massacre of sub-Saharan migrants: at least 50 Africans were killed, with some observers claiming that the number of deaths reached 500. Whatever the actual number, the massacre became 'an infamous event and revealed a general and profound intolerance' (Pastore 2008, p. 3). Having failed to prevent this, the Libyan authorities decided to expel 6000 Ghanaian and Nigerian nationals, despite protests from the Economic Community of West African States. The sad events in Zawia illustrated the Libyan authorities' tendency to neglect any policy to protect migrants, and a growing contradiction between the 'open door' policy of the government and the hostility towards sub-Saharan migrants of ordinary Libyans.

SUB-SAHARAN MIGRANTS IN QADHAFI'S LIBYA

The majority of sub-Saharan migrants in Libya before the 2011 war were seeking work; the main push factors in their home countries being the consequences of phenomena such as weak institutional systems, political instability, and widespread corruption. Departures from many sub-Saharan countries towards Libya were fuelled by '[r]apid growth in the cohort of young potential migrants, population pressure on the resource base, and poor economic performance' (Hatton and Williamson 2003, p. 483). With specific reference to West Africa, from the 1980 and 1990s onwards countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, and Côte d'Ivoire not only began to lose their status as attractive regional destinations, but also gradually became countries of emigration themselves. In other areas, for example, the Horn of Africa and the former Sudan, labour migration changed into forced migration due to war, political persecution, or ecological disaster.

The person who leaves their country represents the hope as well as collective investment of those who stay at home; the journey is an economic endeavour for the entire extended family, which hopes to benefit from the remittances. Labour migration is thus intended to be both an individual and a familial process of financial and professional enrichment. Forced migration, by contrast, can be regarded as an escape from authoritarian regimes. In both cases, the migrant's return home is a perpetual but not easily realized hope. Should someone return to their home country without having either refunded the cost of migratory travel or made a substantial contribution to the extended family budget through remittances, the outcome may be their frustration and social marginalization. In the case of forced migration, return can constitute a risk to the migrant's life. For these reasons, the IOM's initiatives in support of 'voluntary repatriations' have frequently failed in Libya: a one-off contribution of between 300 and 400 euros and a free flight were often not enough to persuade many sub-Saharan migrants to return home.¹

The plan to migrate to Libya, or through Libya to Italy and Europe, could often change after departure from the home country. The migration pattern has enormous variations: some people with an academic or vocational education can arrive in Tripoli committed to working to 'save enough money to open a shop in their home country'²; others arrive in Libya specifically intending to cross the Mediterranean in search of a better life in Europe, but then may decide to change their plans and stay in Libya because 'the fear of setting off in an inflatable boat is too much'.³ These migrants are aware that many Africans have lost their lives in similar attempts to reach Europe. Minds might also be changed by other factors such as 'the fear of being forced to become a prostitute in Italy', as had happened to many friends of one Nigerian interviewee; she decided to stay in Tripoli, even though 'Libyans are not good men because they mistreat African people'.⁴

For many sub-Saharan migrants, interactions with Libyans were limited to workplaces and working hours, while their socializing was confined to relationships with other migrants. The membership of the *umma* that many sub-Saharan migrants shared with Libyan citizens seemed to

¹ Group interview with African migrants conducted by the author, Tripoli, 17 October 2008.

² Interview with Mohamed, Tripoli, 4 October 2008.

³ Interview with Ahmed, Tripoli, 20 November 2009.

⁴ Interview with Blassy, Tripoli, 17 November 2009.

be irrelevant in preventing the phenomena of social marginalization and racial discrimination against them. Libyan attitudes were still affected by memories of the past, when ‘blackness of skin/African origin was virtually synonymous in the Arab world with both the notion and the word “slave” (*abid*)’ (Hunwick 2002, p. xix). The slave trade had been formally abolished in Tripoli in 1853, ‘but it continued covertly in the Ottoman province until the mid-1890s’ (Anderson 1984, p. 333), while ‘as late as 1910 slaves were still being shipped out of Benghazi’ (Hunwick 2002, p. xx). An understanding of Libyan society as not only post-colonial but also post-slavery can help to explain the widespread racist attitudes of many Libyans towards black-skinned migrants. To quote Abubaker, a Muslim from Mali, ‘what makes the difference for Libyans is the money, not Islam’.⁵ The worst living conditions in Qadhafi’s Libya, on the other hand, were experienced by African migrants who were not Muslim, and especially women. To escape daily discrimination and harassment Christian women pragmatically adopted the laws of Islam, for example, covering their heads with a veil.⁶ Relatively acceptable conditions could be attained by those migrants who were taken on by international enterprises, which provided better working conditions that in many cases were also compatible with European standards.⁷

With some exceptions, sub-Saharan migration to Qadhafi’s Libya was generally characterized by illegality, social discrimination, and labour exploitation. Under Libyan law illegal immigration was, and still is, a crime punishable by imprisonment for between three months and three years, and an additional fine of between 50 and 100 euros. Libyan jail conditions were entirely inadequate, with no interest in respecting the minimum requirements of human rights legislation. Prisoners, particularly the women, were abused. Police corruption fuelled a vicious circle: migrants had to pay a bribe to be released from jail or to not be arrested, and thereby entered increasing debt and thus had greater need for work. Human Rights Watch reported multiple violations of human rights in Libya, including ‘the use of torture to extract a confession’ (2006, p. 2). Moreover, Libya had never ratified the 1951 United Nations ‘Convention relating to the Status of Refugees’, nor its additional Protocol of 1967, in spite of the Qadhafi regime’s self-description as ‘a secure paradise for those

⁵ Interview with Abubaker, Tripoli, 4 December 2009.

⁶ Interview with Blassy, Tripoli, 17 November 2009.

⁷ Interview with Ali, Tripoli, 23 November 2009.

who fight against oppression and for their freedom', as expressed in Article 22 of Libya's Law no. 20 of 1991. The leader of the Libyan Revolution codified his personal understanding of human rights when he launched the Green Charter of Human Rights in 1988, although the conception of human rights in this document was in fact skewed 'because [it] did not recognize the concept of citizenship' (Baldinetti 2009, p. 232). The racism and social marginalization that characterized the stay of many sub-Saharan migrants in Libya certainly contradicted the general intentions of the 'Third International Theory', heralded in Qadhafi's Green Book as an 'international ideology' oriented towards the Arab world and Africa.

Qadhafi explained his perspective on the issue of sub-Saharan migrants' rights in person during his historic first visit to Italy. Meeting students, academic staff, and journalists at a crowded public discussion at Rome's La Sapienza University on 11 June 2009, the Leader of the Libyan Revolution's response to questions about the protection of sub-Saharan asylum seekers in Libya was as follows:

Africans are people who look for food and shelter [...]. They are poor and starved people, but they do not engage in politics, political parties or elections. None of these things are known in Africa. [...] If a million Africans came here [Italy] saying they were all political refugees, would you [Italians] welcome everybody? And then if another ten million came, and then ten million more, you would certainly welcome them all. If you really were to welcome everybody, it would definitely be a great idea.⁸

This response by Qadhafi, who was also at that point the President of the African Union, was highly provocative; it denied any recognition of the potential refugee status of sub-Saharan migrants and challenged Europe to demonstrate its own democratic attitude and take the migratory burden upon itself. Qadhafi was indeed collaborating with the European quest for the externalization and security of EU borders and migration control, but he was not willing to take on the political implications of the protection of sub-Saharan migrants' human rights as well. Qadhafi's regime therefore systematically refused to start a process of reforming Libyan law to meet international legal standards on the protection of refugees. Qadhafi knew very well that any step towards the transformation of Libya into a 'safe'

⁸ Recording, transcription, and translation by the author, Rome, 11 June 2009.

host country, under international pressure, would reduce his bargaining power with Western countries.

THE EXTERNALIZATION OF EU BORDERS AND RELATIONS BETWEEN LIBYA AND ITALY

Sub-Saharan migrants in Libya proved useful to Qadhafi's plans for at least three reasons. They supplied cheap labour that would undertake a range of tasks that Libyans, for varying reasons, considered unsuitable; they offered a convenient distraction from internal dissatisfaction with the regime; and finally, 'collaboration over the control of migrants [offered] a lever for pushing Europe into legitimizing Qadhafi's regime', and lifting the international sanctions against Libya (Pastore and Trinchieri 2008, p. 33). From the late 1990s onwards, Italy increasingly sought control of irregular migration across the Mediterranean through closer cooperation with Arab countries along the southern Mediterranean coastline, and particularly with Libya. The strategy was to externalize EU border control in order to prevent migrants from landing on Italian shores. The instruments ranged from international cooperation on security and police matters, to readmission agreements, to joint patrolling operations, and the construction of detention centres for migrants in the 'host' country. International cooperation and readmission agreements were features of Italian relations with Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia; collaboration reached particular heights in Italian relations with Libya, however, with the enforced return there of all migrants intercepted offshore and the opening of transit centres on Libyan territory for hosting them.

In 2003, Italy signed a secret agreement with Libya that allowed Italian police officers to operate in the country and created the conditions for opening transit centres for migrants. On 29 December 2007 protocols were signed in Tripoli by the Libyan authorities and the then Italian Minister for Home Affairs Giuliano Amato, on behalf of Prime Minister Romano Prodi, with the objectives of allowing shared patrolling of the Libyan coastline and encouraging reforms in Libya that would restrict irregular migration. In the same year, the Libyan government in fact imposed an income tax on all migrants which added to their obligation to pay for labour insurance and temporary identity documents. Making a notable exception for nationals from Maghreb countries, the regime reintroduced the obligation to obtain an entry visa for all African nationals, including citizens of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States

(Perrin 2011, p. 291). The outcome was that many foreign workers either left the country, as was the case for 35,000 Egyptians, or continued their stay but on an illegal basis (el-Sayed 2007). In a very short time, thousands of migrants who were living and working in Libya became irregular; it is easy to see how this process of irregularization created a mass of irregular sub-Saharan migrants which conveniently related to Italian concerns about irregular migrants in transit towards Europe, and provided Qadhafi's regime, at no real cost, with its principal leverage in bargaining with Italy.

The climax of cooperation between Libya and Italy on migration came on 30 August 2008, when the Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi and Muammar Qadhafi signed the 'Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation' in Benghazi. This agreement represented a 'historic change' (Ronzitti 2009, p. 3) because it ostensibly closed 'the painful chapter of past hurt suffered by Libyans during Italian colonial rule',⁹ and launched a complex partnership between the two countries. Berlusconi's apologies for past colonial domination were, however, secondary to Italian and Libyan economic and strategic interests. The treaty was presented 'as the most binding, if not the first, among international treaties which admitted European guilt in relation to the colonial past', but in reality it was 'an insincere treaty' because it calculatedly established a praiseworthy public front in order to gloss over the governments' underlying reciprocal interests (Labanca 2011, p. 42). Once Berlusconi was back in Italy he was the first to say that the treaty, termed 'historic' for turning over the page on the colonial past, secured above all 'fewer illegal migrants and more gas as well as oil' on the Italian side (Di Caro 2008). The new partnership envisaged very broad cooperation across many sectors (cultural, scientific, economic, industrial, energy, and defence), but significantly its first realization was in the area of irregular migration and cooperation on anti-terrorism. Article 19 of the treaty allowed for the final implementation of the 2007 protocols and the launch of 'push-back' operations.

After the 2008 agreement, the collective or individual deportation to Libya of migrants who disembarked on Italian land was replaced by pushing all migrants intercepted offshore by the joint patrolling naval units back to Libyan shores. Official Italian Home Affairs reports described the new push-back strategy as an 'advanced form of international cooperation

⁹ Preamble of the Italy-Libya treaty approved by the Italian parliament with Law 7/09 of 6 February 2009, *Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica*, XL, 18 February 2009.

against illegal migration and human trafficking’ ([Ministero dell’Interno n.d.](#), p. 17). This policy demonstrated the attempt to ‘relocate the EU’s external border from southern Italy beyond the Libyan coastline into Libyan territory’ (Andrijasevic 2006, p. 123). According to official Italian records, push-back operations towards Libya in 2009 involved 834 people, creating a deterrent effect. Departures from the Libyan coastline decreased by almost 90 per cent compared to the previous year; illegal migrants landing on Italian shores numbered 31,281 in 2008, but only 3185 in 2009 ([Ministero dell’Interno n.d.](#), p. 27). This so-called ‘success’ for the Berlusconi government was in reality a very questionable result, as the collaboration with Libya did not allow migrants’ rights to be protected: they were deported to a third country where they were jailed while awaiting further deportation.

The effect of the push-back strategy was circumvention of the ‘non-refoulement’ clause in the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951, leading to ‘neo-refoulement, that is, the return of asylum seekers and other migrants to transit countries or regions of origin before they reach the sovereign territory in which they could make claim’ (Hyndman and Mountz 2008, p. 250). In response to a push-back operation in August 2009 affecting more than 70 Eritreans and Somalis travelling across the Mediterranean, Laura Boldrini, then spokesperson for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Italy and later to become President of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, lamented that the ‘push-back strategy seems in reality to be a form of penalization for people seeking asylum’ (cited in Viviano 2009). Less than a year later, in April 2010, the Council of Europe ‘urges the Italian authorities to substantially review forthwith the current practice of intercepting migrants at sea ... [ensuring safeguards] guaranteeing respect for the principle of non-refoulement’ (Council of Europe 2010). Overall, the Italian international position was judged to have been ‘negatively affected by the lack of transparency in cooperation with Libya on migration, to the point of either questioning or reversing some of its policies, [while] the same cannot be said for the latter’ (Paoletti 2009, p. 17). Finally, Qadhafi’s decision on 8 June 2010 to close down the UNHCR headquarters in Tripoli negated the key Italian argument that the push-back strategy did not harm migrants’ rights because the UNHCR in fact had an office in Tripoli and were operating in Libya for their protection.

Qadhafi’s foreign policy was extremely effective in ‘manipulating pre-existing Italian and European fears of “otherness” to maximum

advantage, and for the renegotiation of Italian and European relations with Libya on a fundamental basis (Paoletti 2009, p. 20). European perceptions of the migrant threat to national identity are still linked with the ‘identity-related obsession’ of European colonialism with constructing the ‘otherness’ of subjects (Remotti 2010). If others represent a threat, their disappearance is desirable; this can be achieved either by their assimilation or, conversely, by pushing them away. The push-back strategy implied an Italian unwillingness to acknowledge migrants themselves, as well as their rights, and emphasized supposed cultural differences rather than discussing similarities and affinities. The leverage Italy was using to obtain cooperation on migration with other Arab countries, including Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, mostly related to economic and technical aid, in addition to the acknowledgement of some extra quotas for legal immigration to the most collaborative countries. These instruments were not appropriate for relatively rich Libya, which had its own international cooperation programme and emigration rate to Italy is close to zero; in this case, Italy brought into play the political capital constituted by the legacy of colonial history and the special relationship between the two countries. Italian apologies for colonialism provided a convenient counterweight to Qadhafi’s attempt to definitively overturn the (neo)colonial order and transform the power relations between Italy and Libya, determining the agenda in the arena of migration and the establishment of EurAfrican borders.

CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN POST-QADHAFI LIBYA (2011–2014)

The wave of Arab uprisings that began in Tunisia in December 2010 rapidly spread to many countries and overthrew more than one autocratic ruler. The regime changes that took place in the MENA region originated from widely shared conditions of ‘poverty, social exclusion, and corruption’ (Naguib 2011, p. 383) which in the Libyan case combined with the particular institutional layout of the Libyan Jamahiriya, the way that oil revenue was distributed, and the complete absence of political parties. While the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings challenged the regimes in their political centres, in Libya the rebellion started in periphery far from the centre of Qadhafi’s power: Benghazi in Cyrenaica and Zintan in the Nafusa Mountains, in Western Tripolitania. The insurgency rapidly led to the collapse of the Libyan national army, so that the Libyan uprising became

a civil war. In order to give the upper hand to the anti-Qadhafi forces, international intervention under the diplomatic banner of the United Nations (UN) and the military command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was essential. This followed UN Resolution 1973, approved by the UN Security Council on 17 March 2011, which allowed a no-fly zone over the country to be imposed and authorized the use of 'all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Jamahiriya, including Benghazi'.¹⁰ In reality, NATO operations went beyond the official UN objective of protecting civilians and on 20 October 2011 achieved the real goal of the international mobilization when Qadhafi was captured and killed in Sirte. The end of international intervention on 31 October worsened rather than resolved the Libyan crisis, in that interregional conflict over the control of state resources and institutions between Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan escalated into sub-regional factionalism between different groups and their armed militias. The civil war thus never ended, and in the summer of 2014 entered a new phase of heightened conflict and institutional fragmentation. An alliance of convenience linked Zintan, General Khalifa Haftar in Cyrenaica, and the former government in exile in the city of Tobruq, on the border with Egypt. After more than a year of heavy fighting, during the autumn 2015 the forces of Zintan and General Haftar were discussing a very fragile peace agreement with their opponents, the forces of Fajr Libiya who were controlling Tripoli and had their headquarters in Misrata.

The turbulence of the civil war deeply affected both the influx of sub-Saharan migrants to Libya and their conditions. The peaks of the conflict, in 2011 and then from mid-2014 until the time of writing (November 2015), were matched by two migratory crises that involved hundreds of thousands of migrants fleeing from Libya. At this point, with the second crisis still in progress, it is more realistic to examine the events of 2011, which created 'one of the largest migration crises in modern history [... with] significant implications for the neighbouring region and beyond' (Sheean 2012, p. 5). According to UNHCR files, in May 2011 refugees arriving from Libya in neighbouring countries totalled some 750,000 people (UNHCR 2011b). The migrants who crossed Libyan borders to escape the war were either returnees to their countries of origin (Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria, Chad, and Niger), third-country nationals (mostly sub-Saharan), or Libyan civilians. Sub-Saharan Africans were one of the largest groups

¹⁰Article 4, Security Council Resolution 1973, 17 March 2011.

of migrant workers affected by the Libya crisis, ‘totalling approximately 420,000 returnees [... which] placed an additional strain on impoverished host communities’ (United Nations 2012, p. 6). The consequent dramatic fall in worker remittances will, at least in the short term, have increased poverty in the whole Sahel region and the wider Arab world, where ‘oil-producing countries, such as Libya, were amongst the few remaining destinations for migrant workers’ (Abdelfattah, 2011, p. 13).

A small proportion of the sub-Saharan workers in Libya, 3.9 per cent of the total number of people fleeing the country (Sheean 2012, p. 15), crossed the Mediterranean Sea and reached Malta or most often Italy. In many other cases, Qadhafi’s regime took action to have sub-Saharan nationals put on boats and sent to Italy specifically ‘to unleash an unprecedented wave of illegal immigration into Europe’, in order to threaten the European countries involved in the NATO coalition (Hewitt 2011). The then Italian Foreign Minister, Franco Frattini, launched a warning on 23 February 2011 in relation to between 200,000 and 300,000 migrants from sub-Saharan Africa who were trying to reach Italian shores (Arachi 2011). According to official figures from the Italian Ministry of Home Affairs, between 13 April 2011 and 28 December 2012, the period of the ‘Emergenza Nord Africa’ (‘North Africa Emergency’), only 28,000 migrants arrived from Libya seeking refuge in Italy, and a very similar number arrived from Tunisia (Ministero dell’Interno 2013). In the medium term, the crisis for the migrants had a relatively low impact on Italy when compared to the effect of migrants arriving from Libya in other African countries. However, the shift from minimal numbers arriving on Italian shores during the last few years of the Qadhafi era to a growing number of landings was enough to resurrect Italian concerns regarding the issue of irregular migrants and how to restrict their sea crossings. These were of course facilitated by the falling cost of passages using inflatable boats, resulting from the collapse of the joint monitoring system previously operated by the Italian and Libyan authorities. Another important factor, which helps to explain the increase in migrant smuggling across EurAfrican borders was the liberation of many smugglers from the Libyan prisons where they had been held after Qadhafi’s signature of the treaty with Italy in 2008. From 2012, smugglers were clearly able to get their business back and operate with greater ease than before.

Previous to 2011, uprising relations between Italy and Libya had been characterized by the exchange of international recognition, from the former, for control of migration flow, by the latter, and this continues to

be the case even after the regime change in Libya. In reality, Italian hesitations over joining the international coalition can be related to the fact that the war threatened both Italy's strategic control of its Mediterranean border and its economic interests in Libya. The war made control of the Mediterranean border ineffective, and the Italian government was consequently the first to suspend its 2008 treaty with Libya, abandoning the declaration of friendship and forgetting the apologies for colonial crimes. At a public meeting on 26 February 2011, the Italian Minister of Defence Ignazio La Russa explained that 'the most important section of the treaty for us [Italians] was control of the coastline', in order to prevent irregular migration, and therefore that the treaty's suspension 'could not be otherwise' if the Libyan government could no longer guarantee this control (Pelosi 2011). On 19 April 2011 Mustafa Abdel Jalil, at that point chairman of the Libyan Transitional National Council (TNC), and making his first official visit to Rome, tried to address Italian concerns by reassuring his Italian counterpart about the potential 'joint operation to close our borders to the influx' of irregular migrants, because '40 per cent of crimes in Libya are committed by sub-Saharan migrants in transit towards Europe'. Moreover, Jalil concluded his statement with a direct and unfavourable comparison between the Libyan and Italian situations: '[i]n the future we will not welcome those people, because we possibly suffer more than you [Italians] because of their presence; we have more economic difficulties than you in welcoming migrants' (Ministero degli Esteri 2011). In just a few words, the TNC chairman managed to repeat Libya's self-representation as a country of passage, confirm the continuity with the previous policy, or at least its intention, and reinforce the stereotype of migrants as responsible for Libya's most challenging social problems.

After Qadhafi's defeat, the main obstacle for Italy in rebuilding the system of externalization and security of EU borders was not the change in its relationship, now with the new Libyan political leadership, but Libya's recurrent instability. During her first visit to Tripoli, on 21 January 2012, the Italian Minister for Home Affairs Annamaria Cancellieri signed a joint memorandum with her Libyan counterpart on resumption of the main collaborative activities regarding migration: the training of Libyan police and coastguard services, the construction of an infrastructure aimed at halting the flow of migrants, and the strengthening of joint border control (International Federation for Human Rights 2012, p. 36). It was an event external to relations between Italy and Libya that in fact modified Italian plans to regain firm control over EurAfrican borders, and led to the Italian government giving up their very controversial

form of border control during the most recent period. On 20 June 2012, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Giulio Terzi declared that ‘the offshore push-back actions have ceased to be on the agenda of the government’ led by Mario Monti (ANSAméd 2012). The change in Italy’s agenda did not result from a political reconsideration within its government, but was the unavoidable consequence of the judgement that the European Court of Human Rights issued in relation to Italian disregard for migrants’ rights during the push-back operations in the Mediterranean (European Court of Human Rights, 2012). However, abandonment of the push-back strategy did not mean a broader relinquishing of the externalization and securing of borders. Indeed, Italy then deployed every other measure possible to control the growing flow of migrants, not only from Libya’s coast across the Mediterranean Sea but also from the Saharan and sub-Saharan region south of the country.

To prevent migrants from crossing the southern Libyan border, the Italian Ministry of Home Affairs funded the ‘Sahara-Med’ programme, ‘another IOM project designed to “prevent, detect and manage irregular migration flows”’ across Sahelian and Saharan borders (Amnesty International 2013, p. 7). In addition, Italian involvement in Mali from 2011 was ostensibly intended to train the country’s police and increase security, but had the hidden objective of improving the effectiveness of border control in a major transit country (García Andrade 2014, p. 53). EurAfrican borders are currently undergoing further externalization southwards, and in this process, Italian diplomacy has played a leading role while increasingly coinciding with the efforts of European diplomacy. The most recent and revealing event was the launch in November 2014 of the EU–Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative, also known as the ‘Khartoum Process’. This links the 28 EU member states and the most important countries of origin and transit along the route from Eastern Africa (Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Tunisia) held to be one of the main access channels for irregular migrants between the Horn of Africa and Europe. According to the final declaration signed in Rome on 28 November 2014, a key objective is ‘improving national capacity building in the field of migration management’ (Rome Declaration 2014). The strategy for achieving this was very similar to the established cooperation on migration in the Mediterranean region and consisted mainly of exchanges of economic and technical aid, as well as international political recognition from the EU in exchange for border controls and limitations on the free movement of migrants by the African countries.

To address the rising flow of migration across the Mediterranean region, Italy employed a military system for the monitoring, early interception, and rescue of offshore migrants. ‘Operation Mare Nostrum’ began on 18 October 2013 in the wake of the great international sorrow caused by the drowning of more than 380 people off the island of Lampedusa on 3 October 2013. While this operation had a clear humanitarian mandate, the objectives of control and security were never denied, so that the main difference between Mare Nostrum and previous offshore operations was the quantity of staff and resources allocated rather than its mission tasks: ‘[t]he operations undertaken were no more humanitarian than the previous operations of patrolling the Sicily Channel’ (Cuttitta 2015, p. 36). Italy had never given up its readmission policies, and thus the ultimate plan was to deport to Africa the migrants who were rescued offshore if they were not asylum seekers. Italian attempts to make EurAfrican borders secure were complemented by increasing EU involvement in the Mediterranean region. In 2013, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the EU (FRONTEX) launched the ‘Eurosur’ system of border control along the entire southern European boundary; from 1 November 2014, FRONTEX was also leading Operation Triton, which gradually replaced Operation Mare Nostrum. Consequently, the control of EurAfrican borders was more and more Europeanized after 1 January 2015.

With the externalization of EU borders further southwards and the gradual resumption of offshore operations in the Mediterranean, Libya’s role was still pivotal to the Italian and EU migration agenda. After the signing of Cancellieri’s memorandum the Libyan authorities increased their efforts to resurrect the previous system for controlling migrants on their territory, and in particular to regain control of the so-called holding centres, in effect prisons for migrants. According to my interview with a high-ranking police officer in Khums, 110 km east of Tripoli, in late 2012 the Libyan authorities opened a detention camp outside that city. Migrants were transferred from Khums to their home countries by ground transport and then in early 2013 even by plane: ‘the efforts to find illegal migrants and pursue their repatriation depended on the funds available’, which could apparently materialize even from international aid, or be made available due to pressure from foreign partners.¹¹ According to

¹¹Anonymous interview, 20 April 2014. The officer was discussing Khums and Gasr Garabulli, two major departure sites on the eastern Tripolitanian coast.

Amnesty International (2013, p. 6), between May 2012 and April 2013 nearly 25,000 people were deported; they may have been left near Qatrun, towards the southern Libyan border with Niger. Furthermore, according to data published in the Libyan press and credited to the Libyan Ministry of Home Affairs, in 2013 the Libyan authorities spent 23 million Libyan dinars (around 15 million euros) in order 'to host' more than 36,000 migrants in different facilities in Libya and then 'to repatriate' them.¹² Also in 2013, the EU opened a civilian mission in Libya (the EU Border Assistance Mission) to work with the Libyan authorities on controlling irregular migration. These authorities had in addition signed agreements on border security and control in 2012 with Algeria, Chad, Niger, and Sudan; officially, the purpose was to combat the smuggling of weapons and military equipment, but it is obvious that the very same system for border control could be used to control irregular migration (MPC 2013, p.7). However, the escalation of the Libyan conflict from the summer of 2014 frustrated both foreign and Libyan attempts to make borders secure and to control or prevent irregular migration into Libya.

SUB-SAHARAN MIGRANTS IN POST-QADHAFI LIBYA

While thousands of foreigners either lawfully or irregularly resident in Libya left the country during the civil war, there were others who decided or were obliged to stay, as well as those who continued to migrate into Libya even during and after the NATO military campaign. Contrary to perceptions, rather than being a country of transit Libya is still a country of destination for many migrants who consider it a good place to find employment. The continuities both in sub-Saharan migration towards Libya and in Libyan policies on migration control are represented at the Gharyan camp, a facility located a few kilometres west of the militia check-point outside the city of Gharyan, in the Nafusa Mountains on the route that connects Sabha to Tripoli. The route leading to the Gharyan uplands is a strategic point for controlling the flow of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa towards the Mediterranean coastline; the study of such detention camp dynamics is therefore important as they represent a broader pattern. The building of the current camp was funded by Italy and initiated as a result of the July 2003 agreement between Italy and Libya over the construction of centres in Libya, with the general purpose of regulating

¹²Nu'as al-Daraji, *Bawaba al-Wasat*, 13 May 2014. www.alwasat.ly/ar/news/libya/17716

migrant movements (Paoletti 2011, p. 141). Despite its intended role as a transit camp where migrants from sub-Saharan Africa could be temporarily detained pending their deportation, in 2009, the Gharyan complex became a centre for police training due to claims by the Libyan authorities that ‘the walls surrounding the camps were not high enough [...] to contain migrants. [...] [T]he camps were not appropriate for migrants, since they were low-quality pre-fabricated structures’ (Paoletti 2011, p. 142). What had been a police training centre was then occupied by Gharyan militias soon after the liberation of the city on 12 August 2011.¹³ During the early months of the civil war when, according to the UNHCR, ‘violence was being specifically targeted towards the large groups of foreigners in the country, including refugees and asylum-seekers’ (UNHCR 2011a), the Gharyan base became a detention camp. According to the head of the Gharyan camp, all black-skinned Africans who had been intercepted were jailed because they were viewed as ‘mercenaries, regardless; it was only later that some of them had their condition recognized and were treated simply as illegal migrants, while other prisoners were transferred abroad’.¹⁴

On my first visit, on 18 October 2012, some 850 people, including women and children, and mostly from Western Africa and West Sahelian countries, were being detained in the Gharyan camp. On my second visit, on 13 June 2013, there were 321 detainees in total, particularly from Eritrea (91), Somalia (56), Mali (55), and Egypt (44), but there were no women: I was told that they had been transferred to Surman detention camp on the Libyan coast, where, according to Amnesty International, some of them ‘had been strip-searched by male officers. A Nigerian woman [...] was beaten with a water pipe, made to stand on one leg and flogged on her foot when she got tired and lowered her leg’ (Livewire 2013). On my last visit, on 17 April 2014, the camp contained about 500 detainees, but it was not possible to obtain detailed statistics regarding their nationality.¹⁵ When I first visited, the director of the camp welcomed me, and allowed me to interview prisoners and take photographs without any restriction. I was able to talk to people from both West Africa and the Horn of Africa (mostly from Ghana, Nigeria, and Eritrea). When I

¹³Interview with ‘Imad ‘Ali Seghar, Gharyan detention camp, 18 October 2012. ‘Imad ‘Ali Seghar was in charge of the camp.

¹⁴Interview with ‘Imad ‘Ali Seghar, as above.

¹⁵The statistical data were given to me directly by the heads of security at the camp, who were different people each time.

visited the second time, I was allowed to conduct interviews with some Somalis and Malians under close supervision by the guards, who prevented me from taking photographs. On my third visit, I was only able to conduct a short interview with the head of camp security and not permitted to enter without a formal permit from the Libyan Department for Combating Irregular Migration (DCIM), under the Ministry for Home Affairs; the camp had in fact been formally handed over to DCIM by the Gharyan militia in April 2013. The trajectory of camp management style clearly illustrates the movement towards recovery by the Libyan authorities of the control of irregular migration, discussed above. According to the International Federation for Human Rights, detention camps similar to that in Gharyan have been documented in Benghazi, Zawiya, Sabha, Misrata, and Tripoli (International Federation for Human Rights 2012). Defined as ‘holding centres’ by the Libyan authorities, these institutions were in reality places where foreign nationals ‘were held unlawfully in prison-like conditions indefinitely for “migration-related offences” pending deportation’ (Amnesty International 2013, p. 5).

Some prisoners I interviewed reported being jailed after attempting to cross the Mediterranean, but contrary to expectations many others said that they had been detained while living and working within Libya. Moreover, several prisoners said that they had suddenly been arrested after living and working legally in Libya for some time, or even for many years, simply because during the war any black-skinned person represented either a threat or a potential source of income for his custodian. This was the case for two men, a Ghanaian who had worked in Tripoli as a building contractor from 2012 and a Nigerian who had been a sacristan at the Anglican Church in central Tripoli from 2007: they were both jailed despite having valid residence permits that were evidently no longer enough to protect sub-Saharan migrant workers from arbitrary arrest.¹⁶ In post-Qadhafi Libya, without any doubt migrants became part of a wider and more complex bargaining process between various local and central players. With no robust legal framework to protect migrants in custody, their exploitation by illicit means soared, and their only way of leaving prison was by payment of a bribe; the alternatives were continuing detention or deportation abroad. According to interviews recorded in Piedmont (Italy) on 26 March 2014 with some Eritreans who had been

¹⁶Anonymous interview, Gharyan detention camp, 13 June 2013. The Ghanaian was born in Accra, the Nigerian in Lagos.

held in the Gharyan camp before crossing the Mediterranean, they paid 1200 US dollars to an Eritrean intermediary for their escape from the camp: this sum was reported to me as additional to the 1700 US dollars paid to the smuggler who arranged their transit from the Horn of Africa to Libya and another 1200 US dollars for crossing the Mediterranean.¹⁷ Very similar figures were given to me on my second visit to the Gharyan camp by a Somali prisoner, who told me he had paid 1000 US dollars to be freed from a similar camp where he had been held previously.¹⁸ In spite of Article 10 of the 2011 Constitutional Declaration, in which the state guarantees the right to asylum under the law, the new Libya has clearly failed to transfer that principle into policies and good practice.

Living conditions inside the camp were apparently unchanged between my first and second visits. Migrants were detained in very hot sheet-metal containers, where the air conditioning was switched off and the internal toilets had no running water. The prisoners slept on the floor and had no shoes, possibly to prevent them from escaping, while the metal grille door was only unlocked to allow the collective meals that consisted just of overcooked rice. No regular medical assistance was provided. The only two containers with beds and mattresses were occupied by women, several of whom were pregnant. Several detainees interviewed told of being beaten with a stick on the soles of their feet through the door grille of their container. Although major abuses or violence were not reported to me, other accounts indicate that they cannot be excluded (FITH, 2012). A Somali prisoner whom I interviewed in June 2013 reported that prisoners were involved in bonded labour practices: Libyan civilians who lived near the camp could employ the prisoners as agricultural or domestic workers and bricklayers.¹⁹ For the guards, placing the prisoners in work outside the camp was a means of exploiting the migrants before they acquire their freedom or were transferred to another establishment; from the prisoners'

¹⁷ Interview with Kaffa, Vercelli, 26 March 2014. Kaffa, together with other Eritreans and Somalis, had been rescued by the Italian navy off the Libyan shore three days earlier. After receiving first aid in Sicily, Kaffa and other Eritrean friends were being hosted in Vercelli, Piedmont. Four other Eritreans with Kaffa confirmed that they had been held in the Gharyan camp and had had to pay the same amount to be freed.

¹⁸ Interview with Abdullahi, Gharyan detention camp, 13 June 2013. Abdullahi was born in Mogadishu and arrived in Libya in December 2012. Before being jailed in May 2013 in the Gharyan camp, he had been imprisoned in two other detention camps.

¹⁹ Interview with Abdullahi, Gharyan, 13 June 2013.

perspective, this presented an opportunity to escape from constant surveillance by the camp watchman.

The biggest surprise came in the responses by prisoners on my first and second visits when they were asked what they wanted to do once out of the camp. Several told me they would return to their home country, but many said they wanted the opportunity to stay in Libya and work there. This is consistent with other accounts of migrants who entered Libya looking for a job, despite being aware of the dangers related to the war and the country's insecurity. Similar conclusions were indicated by the analysis published by the Danish Refugee Council, based on sub-Saharan migrants who were interviewed in Tripoli and Sabha in 2013: among the 1000 people interviewed, the most common reason for migration was the intention 'to find work and improve their livelihoods in Libya', and once they were there the long-term plan of about half the respondents was to stay (DRC 2014, p. 19). Less than half the respondents (301 people) said that they wanted to return to their home country, and relatively few (158) that they wished to continue to Europe. This data confirms 'the common misperception, held by many Libyan authorities and external actors, [...] that for all migrants Libya is a temporary stop en route to Europe' (DRC 2014, p. 20).

In conclusion, the contrast between the reality of Libya as a destination country and the representation of Libya as a transit country is still in operation in continuity with the Qadhafi era, and is still shaping the reciprocal expectations of both the Libyan authorities and their Italian or European counterparts. In broader terms, the case of migration in post-Qadhafi Libya confirms the previous trend in shaping the EurAfrican borders rather than putting them in doubt.

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The Making of the Schengen Regime: Visa Filtering at the Italian Consulate in Senegal

Francesca Zampagni

Borders have long been associated with the military defense of the national territory as well as privileged sites of commercial regulation. But today, it is more evident their role as spaces and instruments to police of a variety of actors, objects and processes whose common denominator is their ‘mobility’, or more specifically, the forms of social and political insecurity that have become discursively attached to human mobility (Andreas and Synder 2000). While the migration knowledge-producing machine is running at maximum speed, high restrictions occurring in reality through different forms of borders and the (in)accessibility of movement are often overlooked.

In a wide historical perspective, states have always sought to monopolize the legitimate means of circulation inside their territory and at their borders, which are the tangible manifestation of the system of interstate relationships built in 1648 by the Peace of Westphalia (Neumayer 2006; Salter 2003; Torpey 1998). The (unauthorized) movement of individuals across national boundaries represents a challenge to the principle of sovereignty, which requires a degree of territorial closure. Since its beginning, the control of movement has been linked to social processes of labeling and categorization of people on the move (van Houtum and van Naerssen 2002; Weber and Bowling 2008). Class, and more specifically poverty, has

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long been associated with problematic mobility, and it has been central to the process of sorting the deserving from the undeserving and the welcome from the unwelcome. Over time the profiling of people who move has been increasingly institutionalized. To explore the institutionalization and the mechanisms of social sorting in granting the access to foreign spaces, I choose visas as a strategic site of investigation.

The initial sense of the term 'visa' was as an endorsement of a travel document by a state official, in order to signify that they have 'seen' the document, in a context where the forms of travel document varied widely (Torpey 1998). Gradually, visa requirements came to acquire a second function: no longer mere endorsements, but rather a form of permission. The international visa regime was further developed in the 1930s, because of refugee flows associated with Nazi's Germany policies, which led potential destination states to use visa restrictions. Then, in the postwar era, visa requirements became commonplace within immigration control regimes (Neumayer 2006). Currently, European governments refuse to be satisfied by the information issued via passports by the authorities of countries that they deem 'risky' and they prefer to rely on their consulates to identify would-be travelers in their home country, and to control their credentials before departure in order to prevent those likely to become a security risk from entering their territory.

As far as the European Union (EU) is concerned, since the 1990s, 'visa filtering' has acquired a pivotal role in the management of external frontiers, particularly south of the Mediterranean. The origins of the Schengen visa system dates back to the 1980s, when the member states established intergovernmental cooperation on justice and home affairs. This cooperation was prompted by a desire to strengthen security, particularly in the light of a perceived increase in cross-border crime and migration inflows, which were deemed to require a strong and coordinated response. Then, the conclusion of the Schengen Agreement in 1985 with the abolition of intra-member state border controls was the basis of the creation of a common external border control system. Citizens of a number of countries outside the Schengen area are since then subjected to visa requirements, which constitutes the common Schengen policy on short-term visas (valid for a period up to three months). At the time of writing, there were 30 countries on the 'white list' (visa exempted) and 135 countries on the 'black' one. The lists themselves do not discriminate directly on the basis of the GDP of the countries whose nationals do or do not have to obtain visas. However, the white list almost exclusively contains rich countries,

while the black list is an indication of the traditional prejudices of the EU member states in respect of race and religion, including almost all countries the majority of whose population is either black or Muslim (Guild 2001; van Houtum 2010). Most African countries are thus ‘black listed’ as countries whose citizens require a visa to enter the Schengen area.

By examining consular administrative practices surrounding Schengen visas, this chapter seeks to understand how Schengen states exercise control over the transnational flows of people on the basis of an alleged ‘migratory risk’ (as it is phrased in the Visa Code¹) and how these flows are being regulated and constrained. The aim of the study is not to account for the success or failures of the Schengen visa policy, but rather to achieve a better understanding of the institutional and routine bureaucratic mechanisms that lie behind it. Virtually nothing is known about the practices that prospective travelers have to face to travel with proper documents toward the countries of Europe which operate under the Schengen system. Thus, this study does not consider an abstract nor purely juridical level, but it is located in a specific administrative site and social context: the Italian Consulate in Dakar, Senegal. The chapter focuses on the consulate as a key institution in charge of issuing visas to prospective travelers, and thus of filtering them, for the Schengen area (see also Chap. 8 by Alpes, this volume).

I suggest thinking of consulates as ‘dis-located borders’ (Riccio and Brambilla 2010) deployed for identification and selection of the categories of people who could or could not travel to the EU. Central to this argument is an understanding that borders are no longer conceivable in terms of the wall metaphor (Andreas and Synder 2000; Brown 2010) but rather as highly perforated regimes, where the filtering process is designed to encourage mobility, in the sense of ‘selected travelers’, and to curb migration, in the sense of ‘poor on the move’. As van Houtum and van Naerssen (2002) point out, semantically, the word ‘borders’ unjustly assumes that places are fixed in space and time, and should rather be understood in terms of ‘bordering’. According to manifold scholars (among others Guild 2001; Rigo 2005), there are persons for whom effective borders have moved to the territory of countries outside the EU through the application of visa requirements and carriers sanctions. Moreno Lax (2008) terms this mechanism of control as ‘passive interception’ to distinguish it from the active practices of interdiction of entry. From such a perspective, borders perform diverse functions according to the side from which they are crossed.

¹European Council and Parliament Regulation 810/2009/EC.

My objective in this chapter is twofold. On the one hand, I try to identify and analyze the ruling apparatus organized around the distinctive function of visas; on the other hand, relying on fieldwork conducted in the Italian Consulate in Dakar, I describe the different phases of the visa process, thereby providing some insights into how the visa regime actually works in a hotspot of the EurAfrican border through everyday administrative practice of consular officials. It is worth to distinguish the different roles of the Embassy and the Consulate, where the former is responsible for representing the country abroad and handling major diplomatic issues, while the latter is the administrative branch of the country abroad and it is in charge of administrative and judicial issues for citizens abroad as well as visas for foreigners. In Dakar, the Italian Embassy and Consulate are located in the same building.

The Italian Embassy in Dakar is an emblematic hotspot of the EurAfrican frontier. Even though visa norms and procedures directly emanate from Schengen Europe, the visa regime as applied in its consular practices draws on contextual elements proper of the country in which it operates—African in this case—thus constituting an instance of what we might call a EurAfrican border formation (see Introduction). The actual making of the Schengen visa system stems mainly from the migratory situation of the country subjected to visa requirements and the institutional context in which the Consulate is embedded (Schengen rules as well as national policies and administrative approach). Both these elements shape the visa filtering, and even extend selectivity beyond the consulate through formal and informal practices. Senegalese migration to Italy is well established and numerically significant; Senegalese nationals featuring as one of the main migrant groups from Sub-Saharan Africa in Italy. On 1 January 2010, shortly before I began my fieldwork, the Senegalese regularly staying in Italy amounted to 71,000 (the 16th foreign country in terms of resident population), against 53,941 in 2005² (Istat 2010). For the EU, Senegal and the rest of West Africa are poor countries bearing a high risk of undocumented migration.

Thanks to an internship at the Italian Embassy in Dakar from January to April 2010, followed by another month of fieldwork in 2011, I had the opportunity to work also at the Consulate and to observe all the

² Always underestimated by official statistics that do not take into account undocumented migrants, the Senegalese presence has a regular and, a not small, irregular component (Lencioni 2008).

procedures at the Visa Office. In this way, I gained an insight into the profiling strategies and value judgments applied by consular agents whose objective is primarily to detect ‘risky subjects’ likely to overstay the short-term visa they apply for and thus reside in Italy without proper documents. I gathered data from a range of sources but participant observation and relatively informal conversations were my main methods of collecting information. In addition, I also queued outside the Consulate, hanging around in ‘waiting places’ such as street cafés and copy centers, as well as in the waiting area of the Consulate. These direct observations were complemented by two extensive interviews with key informants occupying central positions in the power structure of the Consulate: the Prime Chancellor and the Head of the Visa Office of the Italian Consulate in Dakar.

APPLYING FOR A VISA AT THE ITALIAN CONSULATE IN DAKAR

The Consulate of Italy in Senegal is responsible for seven countries in the West African region: Cape Verde, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal. While consular services are available to all the countries in this group, Senegal accounts for the largest number of visa applications, followed by Cape Verde and Guinea. In Cape Verde, Mali and Guinea Bissau honorary consuls also receive applications and partially examine them. Moreover, according to article 8 of the Visa Code, Italy has representation agreements with France for Guinea and Mali, and with Spain in Mauritania. This means that France and Spain respectively receive and examine applications for Italy as the main destination, and they issue Schengen visas, without consulting with Italian authorities. Nevertheless, the Italian Consulate is the only authority with responsibility for the examination of national visas.

The Consulate of Italy in Dakar is in the same building as the Embassy, in the city center (*Plateau*). Because of its geographical position, the Senegalese capital is difficult to reach from other regions, especially from the south of the country (the Casamance region). It is not easy to pass through The Gambia, because of border controls, and the alternatives are to reach Dakar by sea which is expensive and uncertain, or by land which is a very long trip. Moreover, the *Plateau* is really far from popular neighborhoods and the *car rapides*, the cheapest common transports, do not enter this part of the city. The displacement very often entails a stop of few days in Dakar with some relatives (Fig. 7.1).

the Visa Office concerning new procedures; a list of translators suggested by the Embassy with phone and mail contacts. For many people, these are the first indications relating to the procedure they will have to follow, it is here where most learn that access to the front office is possible only by appointment, and that there is no possibility to enter in order to seek information.

Arranging the Appointment: An Outsourced Service

In 2001, the appointment service was outsourced to a private company. The outsourcing to Africatel has led to a 25% increase of appointments at the Italian Embassy in Dakar. The company manages and organizes a regular flow of people to the offices. Thereby the costs of service fall entirely on the customer. The Consulate obtains a saving in terms of both staff and offices, which can be given over to other needs. Obviously, this service becomes a cost for customers who have to buy a prepaid telephone card at the bank windows of Ecobank, at the price of 5200 Francs CFA (7.5 Euros) for 12 minutes of conversation with the call center which is a premium price enormously higher than the price of a local call at the standard rate. However, often two or three appointments can be booked with one card.

Appointments are given a few weeks ahead (from one to six) for family reunification and few days after the date of request for the rest of visas.³ On average, there are 800 appointments per month, 60 per day shared among three counters. Applicants are called to attend the office in the morning at 8, 9, 10 or 11 o'clock. Nevertheless, according to the Visa Code, EU member states shall maintain the possibility for all applicants to lodge their applications directly at their consulates (art. 17 par. 5). This is actually left as a last resort but the real accessibility of consulates is generally too difficult compared to services provided by external agencies in terms of geographical location, opening hours and the booking of appointments. Therefore, the applicant is dissuaded from addressing the request of appointment directly to the Consulate. According to the Embassy's website, the Visa Office receives applicants only on an appointment arranged by the Africatel call center which is available 24/7. There is the possibility of contacting the office through mail, but this channel

³More recently, in 2015, it has taken up to three weeks to be able to get an answer from the call center, since the line is always busy.

of access is for the exclusive use of international organizations (United Nation, UN; International Labour Organization, ILO; etc.), institutions, bona fide and well-known applicants.

Supporting Documents

The Visa Code introduces detailed rules as to the documents which the visa applicant must submit (art. 10). The applicant must appear in person and the following must be presented: an application form, as set out in Annex I of the Visa Code; a valid travel document; a photograph; ‘supporting documents’ as set out in consulates’ forms and travel medical insurance. The Code clarifies what ‘supporting documents’ means and sets out a non-exhaustive list in Annex II. Consulates may waive one or more of the document requirements in the case of applicants ‘known to them for their integrity and reliability’ (art. 14 par. 6). Each Consulate can also discretionally require additional documents that confirm the purpose and conditions of the planned trip and provide guarantees regarding return and any means of subsistence.

Three main conditions are to be verified through supporting documents: the purpose of the trip; means of subsistence (in general and to cover the trip) and the intention to leave. The Italian Consulate in Dakar demands a long list of documents, varying according to the required visa, in order to assess these elements and their truthfulness. According to EU guidelines, the third point (intention to leave) should be assessed with the flight booking and previously issued visas, but according to my field-work experience, I acknowledged the fundamental role of the interview in assessing the ‘migration risk’ (see below).

Moreover, the long list of supporting documents is due to the high incidence of the production of false documents in countries of competence (The Gambia and Guinea in particular). These documents are called ‘artificial false’ by consular officials because although they are authenticated by the Senegalese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, they are clearly false, with stamps half copied, not straight collages of pages or other blatant mistakes.

Taking the case of the tourist visa, the followings are required: an invitation (using the Embassy form) accompanied by a copy of the identity card of the inviting person or the confirmation of the hotel booking (with cost per night); the work contract of the applicant in Senegal (duly authenticated by the appropriate office); the registration certificate of the employer to the Registry of Commerce; the last three pay-slips; the IPRES

(*Institut de prévoyance retraite du Sénégal*) card; a bank statement (the required sum of 270 Euros for five days, plus the cost of the hotel) or *chèque voyage* or *polizza fidejussoria* (an Italian bank document for financial guarantee, provided by the inviting person in Italy); return flight booking with confirmed dates (receipts of the travel agency are not accepted) and health insurance valid for the Schengen area with a minimum coverage of 30,000 Euros.

All the required documents concerning the job are essential in order to demonstrate the possession of means of subsistence and the disinterest in migrating to Italy. The authentication of the work contract and the registration certificate of the employer are compulsory to avoid frauds, because contracts are frequently drawn up for friends or relatives to facilitate the issuing of a visa. Moreover, official documents must be translated, authenticated by the Senegalese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and legalized by the Italian Embassy. Each of these steps has a cost charged to the applicant.

All typologies of visas require a health insurance, thus many companies offer special packages for this specific request of visa applicants. Close to the Italian Embassy there is Salama Assurance; following are their prices: 13,000 CFA for 15 days, 21,000 CFA for a month and 55,000 CFA for three months. An informant, working as informal mediator outside the Embassy, told me that ‘last minute insurances are always made there. You can ask to a broker to buy it for you. You give him for example 40,000 CFA for a product that costs 30,000’.

Timing the Queue

After having put together the required dossier and having fixed the appointment, applicants have to lodge their form at the Visa Office. The majority of applicants arrive around 8 a.m. There is a lot of bustle in the streets around the Embassy at that time: coffee street vendors with their trolleys, sellers of top-up cards, but above all many people thronged around the *télécentre* (copy center) (Fig. 7.2).

Because of the lack of information, the complex procedure and the applicants’ lack of skills in facing the bureaucracy, ‘professional’ intermediaries have a wide margin of action. The Embassy is a distant institution considered to be hostile and mediators are welcome helpers. In Senegal, they are called *démarcheurs*, those who find their job in helping applicants dealing with the dossier.

Three actors characterize applicants’ experience on entering the Consulate: *démarcheurs*, security guards and the *carabinière*. During my



Fig. 7.2 Copy center in front of the Italian Embassy in Dakar, Senegal (Photo by the author)

observation at the Visa Office, I acknowledged that manifold forms were filled with the same calligraphy. The answers to my question about who had filled them out on their behalf were all the same: ‘Someone outside... I was not sure whether I am able to fill it in correctly/I can’t write’.

Simple information and some help to fill in the forms or to purchase documents are available outside the Embassy in Dakar. As an example, the price asked for filling out the form ranges from 1000 to 3000 CFA. I., *démarcheur*, who has worked in front of the Italian Embassy for ten years, states:

If you know the steps it’s easy, but if you don’t it’s difficult. I have contacts with a lot of Senegalese in Italy, they call me for the *nulla osta*, they put me in contact with their wives and I explain to them what is required. I fix the appointment and I deal with all the steps. I help them even with *nulla osta* for work visas. I wrote them what they are supposed to have and I tell them to bring required documents to me.

The owner of a copy and translation center close to the Embassy underlines the central role of intermediaries in dealing with applicants:

The translation of a civil act, one page, costs around 3–5,000 CFA, but if *démarcheurs* bring them [the documents] you have to lower the price. They

bring you most of the work. I owe my earnings to them, but they gain more. You can take advantage of individuals, but not of *démarcheurs*. However, the most expensive price is the one of the Embassy. A legalization is around 15,000 CFA. And for diplomas, it is really expensive.

After having waited in the street, applicants slowly enter the courtyard of the Embassy. There is a waiting area outside the Visa Office, under a tent. The time of entries is managed by security guards from Sagam, a local security company. Two or three guards are always in the box at the entrance. They have the list of appointments, and they call applicants from the street, letting them enter the courtyard. These tasks allow security guards to have a wide discretionary power over applicants and in general, their involvement in the favors and rewards' circuits is not unusual. During a conversation, one of the Sagam guard states that

the security has no statute, we do not have delegates. The fifteen [guards] we had have been fired. And if we complain they fire you without any problems, we cannot say anything. We have very few contributions to the IPRES, we will not have pensions. We work many hours, I come at 5 in the morning and I get out at 7 p.m. and we earn a little. Just enough for transport and food. 90,000 CFA per month: I pay 30,000 for the rent of the room where I live with my girlfriend. In thirteen years of work I should be able to buy a house...but I can not even save anything. The problem is the outsourcing, if we were employed directly by the Embassy we would be better paid, but for them the externalization to Sagam is convenient.

An Italian *carabiniere* (a member of the militarized branch of the police force) is placed at the entrance of the Embassy and checks on the regular entries and on any suspect movement. As I observe, the *carabiniere* actually does front office activities, such as coming in the Visa Office with documents and passports, asking questions and giving information. He is not competent in the field of consular practices but his role is to keep order in the waiting area, thus he acts as a sort of filter between applicants and the Visa Office. 'The Italian uniform makes Senegalese feel uncomfortable. Local guards can be bribed anyway', argues the Prime Chancellor, who further states that

they [Sagam guards, *démarcheurs* and the *carabiniere*] act as a front-front office. The *carabiniere* is in charge of the security of the post. The definition of security entails control on access as well as public order, in front of and inside the Embassy. Thus, it is a practice to use the *carabiniere* to verify the

ordered entrance of the queue, according to rules and without illegal traffics out of the Embassy. In order to do that there are Sagam guards as well (...) to verify that who enter has the right appointment, how it was fixed. (...) The carabinieri must control that neither Sagam employees nor anyone else is involved in illegal traffics.

To conclude, obstacles at the entry of the Visa Office allow the development of filters as well as informality zones. During my fieldwork outside of the Embassy, while informally talking with applicants or manifold people dealing with small businesses connected to visa (copy centers, translators, etc.), I became, with a shifting of roles, the potential source of information instead of the one looking for it.

THE EXAMINATION PHASE AND THE ROLE OF OFFICIALS

The Visa Office at the Italian Embassy in Dakar has three front offices, two of them for all types of visas and the other one reserved for family reunification. The applicant must be alone at the counter, and the presence of accompanying people is not usually accepted, unless the applicant is unable to deal with the interview.

Interview and Note Taking

Dossier, passport and the fee of 39,360 CFA (60 Euros, not refundable in case of refusal) are delivered to the official on the other side of the counter. The language is usually French. If someone does not speak French, the officials shift to Wolof (the most widely spoken language in Senegal).

First of all the official checks the dossier, in order to verify the admissibility of the application (art. 19 Visa Code), and this entails a check for the presence of the application form, travel document and photograph. At the Italian Embassy in Dakar, the 'good practice' of a quick check on the entire dossier has been adopted in order to avoid unnecessary work on dossiers which would be later refused. The check includes the supporting documents, and the official can suggest to the applicants that they complete the dossier with other documents or that they do not lodge it at all. Anyway, the official cannot refuse to accept the dossier for scrutiny and the applicant does have the right to lodge it.

An application file in the L-Vis (Visa Information System) is created. The applicant is then questioned in order to verify his/her 'reliability'. S/

he is required to explain exactly what s/he is going to do in Italy, previous working experiences, contacts with hosts, their own family situation—marriage and sons are not certain to prevent migration, but they are a factor in ‘assessing the risk’. Even the age of applicants is considered in the assessment, an official told me that ‘young people are more of a risk’. Moreover, it is taken into account whether or not they have previously obtained Schengen visas. Some extracts from my research notes as regards interviews for tourist visas as follow. In brackets, the sex and the year of birth, then official’s questions and remarks, while applicant’s words are in italic:

(M, 1984)

What is your job? *Artist.*

That is? In which group? Since when? Have you travelled with the group? What do you have as professional documents? (He brings out flyers and a brochure of the group, pictures of concerts...) Have you a contract? *No, I work on a fee basis.*

Where do you play in Dakar? And if you leave for 3 months how do you deal with the group? *We are many people, no problem...*

Did you get any other visas with us? Why do you want to go to Italy? Work or tourism? But you are not going with the group? So is it for personal reason? Have you got a personal bank account? *No, fideiussione [polizza fidejussoria as financial guarantee].*

He has the invitation of a friend. Who is she? What does she do? *Swimming trainer.*

He has the wrong invitation letter, there is a new one, she has to fill it and to send it back. Leaving the 8th is not possible. You have to postpone the flight. The 7th is holiday. It would be better to leave the 10th or the 11th. He has a refusal from France. Why? *I don’t know.*

We will ask to France.

(F, 1984)

What do you do? *I study, I’m not working yet. I have a diploma in accounting.*

Why do you want to go to Italy? Why did you choose it? Two months is a long time. Have you any economic guarantees? Who is in charge of you? Are you married? Aren’t you going there to seek a job? *I’m going to refresh my ideas...*

You do nothing here... who can tell me you are coming back? Did you read the list of required documents for a tourist visa? *Yes.*

I just wanted to be sure she read the list. Then I won’t ask her anything more, it will be a refusal. We are not asking to complete the dossier anymore, applicants must collect information before.

Officials are focused on the reasons for going to Italy and a blurred answer is not accepted. Simply going on holiday or ‘refreshing ideas’ is not possible if you do not have enough money according to the fixed amounts per day.

During or just after the interview, the official notes down, in the margin of the form, the assessments based on the answers of the applicant. Some extracts from my fieldwork notes reporting officials’ impressions written in the margin of the forms as follow. In brackets, the sex, the year of birth, the occupation and the type of visa requested, followed by annotations of the official:

(F 1981, student, business visa) She declares she has completed her university studies and she is going to visit her cousin, she has a *fideiussione*. Risky. She does not give guarantees of return to the country of origin.

(M 1981, technician, tourism visa) He has a refusal by us 6 months ago. He cannot really explain his job and he declares an intention to go to a training session while asking for a tourism visa. Not coherent. Risky.

(F 1987, hairdresser, tourism visa) She got to know the person inviting her via the internet by, sending a picture. High migration risk. She can’t explain who Madame G. is (payments on her account).

(F 1980, trader, tourism visa) She declares to have been invited by a friend of a friend... not reliable.

‘Risky’, ‘not reliable’, ‘not coherent’ are the terms most used for unconvincing people who will probably get a refusal. Judgments on the person’s intentions stem from the interview, which is why, according to both my interviewees, it has a central function. The Head of the Visa Office states that

the assessment at the counter adds that element which enables [officials] to understand. Because the interview enables us to get to grips with some things, sometimes the applicant mentions elements that make the difference. For example: the interviewee asks for a tourist visa but from the interview it emerges that s/he has family in Italy, wife and children or husband and children. Then it is clear s/he could have a different purpose for the trip from the one of tourism required, for example. Thus, the interviewer tries to understand the real purpose of the trip, which has to be coherent with the documentation in the application, and at the same time to understand if the person is reliable or not. Someone who is not looking in your eyes sometimes has something to hide. Someone who does not even know the trip purpose has something to hide, someone who does not know his own bank account, how much money he has, and so on. Thus, the interview is very important.

In the words of the Prime Chancellor, the counter allows for flexibility in the assessment, it enables officials not only to rely solely on set criteria and document checks but also to assess each case individually:

If the person is able to produce evidence, which according to us reduce the migration risk in a way we might not have foreseen, it helps us and the applicant. That is why the counter is fundamental, because there we ask questions, the person can say something we did not even think to ask for, and at the end we will have a zero migration risk.

Assessing the Migratory Risk

The evaluation of the dossier is at the discretion of the permanent staff (two officials at the Embassy in Dakar) who considers any comments noted down by officials at the front office. All documents and economic guarantees are checked, including salary amount and retirement contributions. Bank accounts are sometimes verified by calling the bank directly, since they do not seem authentic or there is something not clear in the movements of money on the account. The head of the office states: ‘Over the years we learned to understand Senegalese bureaucracy’—‘you act as a policeman, which is not my job, I am an administrative official’. The consulate’s approach of checking applicants’ official documents stems from the fact that they acknowledge a large portion of counterfeit documents or ‘artificial false’, as I discussed above. Thus, officials are often policing the truthfulness of documents, although their job should be simply to collect them.

However, the main issue at stake in the decision-making process for Schengen visas is the assessment of the intention to leave the territory of the EU member state and to go back to the country of origin at the expiration of the visa: the ‘migratory risk’. In 2008, the EU Commission listed some factors that could be used to determine which travelers could be determined as ‘low risk’. A traveler was seen as *bona fide* when s/he travels frequently to the Schengen area for legitimate reasons (for instance, business), has a reliable travel history (respect of the conditions for the length of stay), has proof of sufficient means of subsistence, and holds a biometric passport (European Council COM/2008/69, p. 6). According to the Head of the Visa Office in Dakar:

This is a country with a very high migration risk, we know it. We know it because there are a lot of citizens of countries of our competence who are irregularly staying in Italy, Senegalese in particular. We know it through our experience in the field of visas, because we see what kind of documentation

is presented with visa applications, we see which and how many people do not show up if they are asked to return as part of our control procedure (...) thus one of the main criteria of assessing the Schengen visa is that one [the migratory risk].

And as an example of ‘migratory risk’, the interviewee argues:

Take the case of a wife with a baby who wants to go on holiday to visit her husband living in Italy. It is clear she is at risk. You can say ‘why is she not using the family reunification?’. But it is comprehensible to assume that she and the baby are going to visit the husband abroad, why not? I would do the same, if I had a husband abroad, I would visit him for 15 or 20 days during the summer. Legitimate, isn’t it? Very legitimate. Then they did not come back. If this was another country, another world, you would grant this visa extremely easily. Here you do it with thousands of perplexities. Your decision stems from the interview, you ask to your colleague ‘what do you think?’ You issue it. And then she does not come back. You may have refused the visa to the one who would have come back. This is frustrating, the effort and the difficulty of really understanding, because you cannot enter into the heads of people, you have to make an evaluation sometimes with few elements, because you cannot even go into greater depth.

An instrument used by embassies to predict the migratory risk is the lists of people to be signaled because they travel with someone who did not come back, or have any other known reasons for being ‘risky’. I call these *mala fide* lists. At the Embassy in Dakar lists of football clubs, *marabouts*, and people acting as *passeurs* are maintained by the Visa Office. Footballers as well as other athletes, artists, students and unemployed people are categories considered as ‘risky flows’, not-trusted travelers, those who will not come back. Using past experiences and idealized characteristics, a mechanism of profiling takes place to predict a person’s likely behavior (Gammeltoft-Hansen 2006). With regard to artists, for example, the Head of the office states:

Here an event is enough for... any event. Think about *Terramadre* [an international fair taking place in Italy] for example. Famous event. Every two years this event takes place, around two thousand people, we are asked for a lot of visas. Do you think they will come back? No, but everybody knows, everybody knows that these people do not come back. Last year I tried to track these returns, but it is impossible, amazing. As you try to get guarantees... people run away. These events are the best opportunities

to join groups and run away. We have the problem of groups of artists... this is a beautiful attempt ever. Of course we hardly ever issue visas to these people, we try to be as strict as possible, but how many people try! Now the Senegalese community in Italy is big, so contacts are not an issue.

Finally, during my fieldwork at the counter I came to acknowledge the ‘phenomena of footballers’. Managers of Italian sports clubs go to Senegal to look for young talents, and then they want them to go to Italy for a test. These footballers are obviously ‘suspected’ since they are very young (14–18 years old) and often without economic guarantees. The Head of the office argues:

We tried to put up resistance [against visas to young footballers]. The resistance, however, cannot be pursued beyond a certain limit. Sports clubs are powerful, they reach high levels and the resistance then becomes hard. I must say that for a guy to get an engagement with a club means to really change his life. The problem is that we are not always sure that they [football clubs] will take care of them. For this reason, we try to do continuous monitoring, to understand which is the serious club, the one that made them come back, but to keep up with all this becomes an infinite work that we cannot do. By now, who has gone, has gone; who has not returned, has not returned. Then of course next year I will not give visas to this or that club anymore because they did not bring the boys back, but in the meantime how many have flown [to Italy]? This is our problem: we are here to curb something, but in fact, we curb very little.

The Role of Officials

The general rule provides that employees of the Visa Office must be Schengen citizens, assuming that this will limit any corruption. However, it is in fact, more practical for consulates to have officials who speak local languages. Therefore, there are often exceptions to the rule, usually with the recruitment of staff with a good knowledge of Italian, people who have dual nationality or who have studied in Italy, as is the case with the Italian Consulate in Dakar. As regards the training, it is directly ‘on the job’, as stated by the Prime Chancellor:

The experience of the official at the counter is fundamental, the knowledge of the country and of the economic, juridical and cultural system. His mental flexibility is also fundamental, in the sense of understanding if the person is lying or telling the truth from what s/he says, how s/he says it,

from counterchecks that only a person who knows the country can ask. Annotations during and after the interview are proof of this. We encourage people to write down what they really think, there is no responsibility from their part for what they write, those are their impressions so they can be wrong. This will not entail any consequences, the important thing is to have them [annotations] because the person who will evaluate the application is not the same person who receives the dossier, so s/he must be helped, s/he has to know things s/he did not see, from someone who has ten years of experience in the country, while perhaps the person who will assess the application being an official of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is at that Embassy for one, two or three years... it's not the same thing. Then the official who is evaluating it can ask the colleague at the counter to clarify what s/he wrote, to understand why.

Thus, such an official is considered as a sort of insider in the local context who can give useful insights on applicants' intentions. The decision-making process starts with their impressions at the counter, and it ends with the decision of the Head of the office with regard to the issuing of the visa or not, as stated by the Prime Chancellor:

It is never a mechanical process. We cannot say 'bring this document, it is fine', 'you have all the documents, you have the visa/you have not all the documents, you will not have the visa', because sometimes documents are false, there a lot of them, so even if someone has every required document they are not reliable, thus he will not have the visa. Perhaps someone does not have a document but the dossier and the interview are convincing so the visa is issued, thus it is really an evaluation, linked to the discretion of whoever is in charge of it.

In concrete terms, officials draw up their evaluation according to their impression at the counter as well as applicant's answers, and the Head of the office in charge for the decision usually recognizes the aforementioned 'suggestions', hardly questioning them.

Control on Return and Refusals

After the evaluation, in a case where the visa is issued but there are doubts about the applicant's reliability, the Visa Office can impose the 'control at return'. It is basically a request to invite the applicant to present him/herself at the Embassy at return from the trip. This mechanism is not

envisaged by Schengen law, and is a bureaucratic response to an internal dispatch distributed to Consulates by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2005. The same procedure is actually followed by numerous consulates in African countries. When the control at return is required by the Italian Embassy in Dakar, three copies of a letter are to be signed by the applicant and a small piece of paper with the stamp of the Embassy bearing the text 'Present yourself at the Embassy within the ten days after your return' is pinned on the passport. The Embassy has to report to the police headquarters (*questure*) of the province of destination the (supposed) nonreturn of the traveler.

Examples of officials' annotations on the visa form in cases of request of control at return show us the typologies of suspicion toward various types of people. My annotations of applicants' details (male/female; year of birth; job) are included in the brackets, and are followed by the annotations of the official at the counter. The comments of the Head of the Visa Office who decides for the visa are included after the arrow symbol:

(F 1980, Guinea C, secretary) She declares to go to Italy for the time when her nephew's wife is due to give birth. She declares to be a secretary, married, with a daughter. She has no intention of staying in Italy. Obligation to present herself.

(F 1982, Mauritania, tour operator) Tour operator in a camping facility. Girlfriend of a seasonal worker (the host). She is going on holiday since the camping facility is closed during the summer. First USV [Uniform Schengen Visa], with an obligation to present herself.

(M 1987, trader) Trader who would like to visit his brother in Bologna. Invited by his sister-in-law. The purpose of the trip is not very clear.

(M 1987) Young disciple who will go with the teacher, a religious leader. Very young. At risk!! First usv. → If he does not come back, the *marabout*⁴ is on the black list.

(M 1995) Young footballer going to Italy for a second test. However still control at return.

(M 1968) Music player working with a famous singer. Charged to the singer. Obligation to present himself.

(M 1995) Young footballer going to Italy for a one month test → Let's try.

(F 1982, tailor) Invited by a friend met here in Senegal. Sufficient requirements. Control at return.

⁴The *marabout* is a Muslim religious teacher and leader.

(M 1990) He plays in the club ... since 3 years ago. To be assessed → OK because the host seems to have understood.

(M 1994) Young footballer in a club in Thiès. Going to Italy for a test. His father is sick, the mother did present herself here → The club has already behaved in a serious way. Control at return.

(F 1979, hairdresser) First usv. She declares herself to be the cousin of the host's husband. Hairdresser with a low revenue. Profile at risk. The host assures the return, declaring she has already invited her mother-in-law who came back and also another sister-in-law. To be assessed with control at return → She shows up at the counter with the host, we trust her—with verification.

As regards denials, since 2010, the Visa Code has required the justification and notification of refusals for all visas with a standard form, according to the 'entry conditions' provided by article 5 of the Schengen Borders Code,⁵ and with a final part concerning the appeal according to national law.

In the application form, a list of multiple choice boxes states that a visa is refused if the applicant (1) presents a false travel document; (2) gives no justification for the purpose and conditions of the intended stay; (3) provides no proof of sufficient means of subsistence for the duration of the stay nor for the return to his/her country of origin/residence; (4) has already exhausted the three months of the current six-month period; (5) has been issued an alert in the Schengen Information System for the purpose of refusing entry; (6) is considered to be a threat to the public policy, internal security or public health of one of the EU member states; (7) provides no proof of travel medical insurance, if applicable and (8) presents supporting documents or statements whose authenticity or reliability is doubtful.

The text associated with the last box (9) corresponds exactly to the normative transposition of the notion of migratory risk: 'Your intention to leave the territory of the member states before the expiry of the visa could not be ascertained'. Thus, a refusal is always possible, even though the application is complete.

Applicants usually try to ask for explanations, but officials answer by reading the refusal letter, which actually does not explain so much. Next to some evident and objective motivations (1, 4, 7), the refusal could also be founded on manifold vague and porous reasoning. According to my

⁵ European Council and Parliament Regulation 562/2006/EC.

fieldwork observation, cases eight and nine are the most used, often combined. In the words of the Head of the Visa Office:

There is not enough time to give them explanations at the counter and we actually do not even want to ... because in this country the fact of giving explanations is sometimes as to 'fill the gap' and to allow them to prepare ad hoc documentation, which sometimes is a fake. I say it above all because when we give a refusal we give it to people that have brought unreliable documentation and those people who insist, they do it sometimes for trying to find the possibility to add that document, even fake, that could allow them to have the visa. Because of that we try to avoid this close approach ... because refusals are often caused by that.

CONCLUSION

The lack (or complexity) of information about visa application steps, coupled with the scarce presence of embassies and consulates on the territories of states, led to the development of large informality zones and the use of official intermediaries (outsourcing). As to the informal market, services offered by *démarcheurs* or other intermediaries (translators, copy centers, security guards, *carabinieri*, etc.) actually fill the gap left by embassies. They act as a 'front-front office', as argued by one of my interviewees above, and constitute on the one hand a support for applicants in dealing with practices, but on the other hand, there is a human and economic cost on users, increasing time for collecting information and the final price of the visa application. Moreover, this long chain of steps also impacts on the filtering process of applicants which reaches its finalization with the interview at the visa counter of the Embassy.

Investigating behind documents and statements on a quest for 'the truth' seems to be the aim of the interview. According to both my observations and interviewees, there is an informal knowledge developed through experience and shared views among diplomats and officials, a 'practical knowledge' which is called upon in order to deal with the daily work in the local context (Infantino 2010; Infantino and Rea 2012; Triandafyllidou 2003).

As far as I observed, the Consulate places emphasis on a few elements such as age and marital status of the applicant, employment and economic requirements, previous Schengen visas obtained and the reliability of the host. But the most important issue is the economic requirement, without which it is impossible to get a visa. As a consequence, access

to mobility becomes harder for artists, students, young and unmarried people, but also for tourists not rich enough and therefore suspected of having economic reasons to enter Europe. Under the Schengen regime, suspicion is the default approach since it is the visa process itself which is based on assessments and subjective impressions, relying on blurred profiles to classify who is reliable and who is risky. Thus, there is a risk of bias and discrimination based on social extraction, gender, age, origin (both in terms of country and milieu, e.g. urban/rural) and all the other elements which come into play in the very precise moment of the interview.

Since the Visa Office has to assess the *intention* of the applicant to leave the Schengen territory, it is clear that theirs is a *prediction* of possible scenarios, within the limit of possible knowledge. Bigo (2002) uses the effective expression of *futur antérieur*, which literally means a grammar of the ‘past future’. In this perspective, visa officers are supposed to anticipate the future of a visa applicant from her/his identity and supporting documents, and thus judge whether the applicant’s stated purpose for traveling is genuine or not. But the genuineness of border-crossing purposes is not something that could be conveyed accurately by any story-telling documents, and it is not even something that is knowable with any degree of certainty, since it pertains to the sphere of intentionality. Here the most critical issue of visa procedures arises. Prospective travelers are produced, selected and sorted out according to criteria which are most often unknown or ambiguous to them, using assumptions based on what they have not yet done, and may never do but which nevertheless are held in the mind of the controller.

The other side of the coin of the Schengen visa regime is the nonreciprocity of visa requirements. There is currently no visa for Europeans in Senegal. There is no visa for The Gambia, Mauritania, Cape Vert, Guinea and Mali. And the list goes on. For centuries, Europeans have taken for granted that it is their right to visit foreign territories, without asking permission. This continues until the present day. Do we find it normal that Africans need visas to enter Europe as well as we think it is our natural right to travel abroad? The irony is that while Europeans talk in belligerent terms of ‘combating illegal migration’ from Africa by patrolling coasts and delocalizing border control, Europeans can move to and settle in Africa with relative ease and nobody asks them the reason and intentions of their stay. In this sense, to investigate Embassies and visas is a contribution to make ‘visible’ bordering practices that are usually hidden behind walls of bureaucracy.

As a conclusion, the present research is an attempt to highlight the micro level of visa operations, often seen as ‘non-political’ or ‘low-political’ (Wang 2004), and to re-politicize the experience of individuals involved in visa practices. As far as I could investigate in the Italian Consulate in Senegal, it is rather naive to consider the Schengen visa only as an administrative step, and it is fundamental to acknowledge its political use, the political experience of every visa applicant, going through an assessment of his/her personal situation, and of his/her economic possibilities, and in particular of the ‘*intention* to leave the country’. The EurAfrican border performs diverse permeability according to the side from which it is crossed and Schengen consulates play a significant role in shaping it, actually limiting the movement of people on suspicion of hiding a risk of irregular migration for the Schengen area.

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Marriage at the Embassy: Securing the EurAfrican Border in Cameroon

Maybritt Jill Alpes

In 2009, at the French Embassy in Yaoundé in Cameroon, two printouts of e-mails hung on the walls of the little cubicle in which the consulate officers worked. In one of the e-mails, an elderly and sick French man, who was married to a Cameroonian woman in France, wrote to the consulate to denounce the fraud in which his wife was involved.

I only needed a wife, not a forger-ess. [...] We only live off social benefits because she never wanted to work and is sending half of all benefits down to her mother. [...] The children and I can only watch the disaster. Thank you for your understanding and for protecting and helping me. Thank you.¹

The man added that because he was ill with Parkinson's disease, he was not in a position to be in charge of the paperwork himself. The message is clear: Cameroonian wives are selfish, lazy and greedy. While vulnerable French men want love and children, Cameroonian women are involved with 'fraud' or are 'fake' themselves.

When observing for a few weeks the work of the French consulate office in Yaoundé, I was struck by the tone used when talking about marriage

¹Trying to feminize the acting of committing fraud, the man is here inventing a new word. With *faussiere*, he is referring to a person who commits fraud.

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migration. It was articulated as a security issue and, more strikingly, the security threat was located with Cameroonian spouses and women. When questioning consulate staff at the Embassy that the cases of these e-mail posters surely represented extreme situations, I was told that such narratives are much more common than I would think. The fact that these e-mails were pinned on the wall conveyed the inherent assumption within the regulatory dynamics of the state's governance of marriage migration. The strongest suspicions upheld against applicants referred to marriage, fraud and money. Consulate staff condemned Internet marriages and suspected women involved in these to be materialistic and selfish. The presence of even just a few of those e-mails within the office space of the consulate workers constituted justification for the rationale of consulate work—a regular reminder of the security issues at stake.

Through an analysis of how the French consulate in Cameroon deals with marriage related visa applications, this chapter seeks to contribute to our understanding of how border security plays out in state practices on the ground. In recent years, European nation states have increasingly sought to externalize immigration control and border security (Gammeltoft 2011). Discussions on the EuroAfrican border zone often localize borders in North African locations. Consequently, much attention is paid to undocumented crossings (Andersson 2014; Stock 2015). Most irregular migration, however, occurs through legal border crossings. Borders operate through capillary power dynamics (Walters 2006) and the effects of border regimes are thus tangible to populations with mobile ambitions far beyond the physical manifestation of border posts and border guards (Gaibazzi 2014). Embassies and visa procedures have become ever more important sites for the securing of the EuroAfrican border (see Chap. 7 by Zampagni, this volume). Along with Francesca Zampagni (Chap. 7, this volume), this chapter takes embassies as delocalized borders where visa procedures constitute practices and performances of bordering (Bigo and Guild 2005; Salter 2006). Through visa interviews and related regulatory procedures, consular staff both create and secure the border.

The chapter does not treat the implementation of visa policies as impartial procedures, but instead seeks to trace out the socio-cultural norms of relatedness and ethical expectations that are implicit in visa application procedures for marriage migration. With its focus on consulate officers' affective politics of security, the chapter takes the French consulate as a paradigmatic case study of security concerns that emerge in state dynamics of regulation vis-à-vis Cameroonian marriage migrants. With 'marriage visas,' I refer to visas for family reunions. After a discussion of how marriage migration is framed and represented by consulate staff, I will dive into the constructions of security at the French consulate.

The chapter asks what marriage visa interviews can tell us about the regulatory logics that underlie the state's construction of security and security threats. The interviews that this chapter analyses are of very limited importance for actual immigration decisions, but instead serve a symbolic function. They elicit confessions from applicants and reiterate the normativity of kinship and gender roles that the French state wishes to impose. The interviews and e-mails posted on the walls are thus to be understood as performing, rather than implementing, the border (spectacle).

Viewed from this perspective, border practices assume a specific EurAfrican character (see Chap. 1 in this volume), in that they reproduce Euro-centric, hegemonic imaginations of subjective and affective propriety in specific African contexts. Consular officers, in contrast to colonial officials, may no longer frame their work as a civilizing mission, and are rather interested in protecting their nation from intrusion and contamination. Yet, a political culture seems to pervade their security concerns which projects Cameroonian affective norms as deviant and inferior.

The research is based on one and a half years of fieldwork with aspiring migrant women and their families in Cameroon between 2007 and 2013.² In particular, the chapter draws on two weeks of participant observation at the French consulate in Yaoundé, Cameroon. I had been able to access to the French consulate partly because of accidental chains of contacts and partly because trust was easily granted to a researcher who had graduated from the same school as most French diplomatic staff. During fieldwork, I observed eight marriage interviews. The interviews were held within the main administrative building of the Embassy and the officer in charge of marriage interviews was a 50-year-old woman who belonged to the diplomatic corps of the embassy. Interviews for non-immigration visas, by contrast, are conducted mostly by locally employed French staff in a reception space at the entrance of the Embassy.

MARRIAGE MIGRATION AND THE SECURITIZATION OF THE BORDER

In the last decade, politicians and policy makers have increasingly framed migration as an issue of security (Nyers 2003, p. 1069; Spire 2008, p. 16). Secure borders have thus emerged as an important policy issue.

² Because of my general focus on the departure projects of migrant women in the overarching research project, this chapter does not attempt to compare the place of marriage for men and women in Cameroon.

Through the externalization of migration control, border security increasingly implies preventing migrants from arriving to places of immigration. Consequently, security concerns are heavily reflected in visa processing.

In 2007, there were about 1000 visa applications at the French consulate in Cameroon for family reunion—this figure also includes visas for children rejoining their parents in France. Of these 1000 visa applications, 730 were granted. Most spouses in Cameroon that applied to join their partners abroad were women. While more than two-thirds of all family reunion visas are granted, officers placed emphasis on the applications that according to them had to be turned down. The focus of consular staff is not on the number of legitimate and accepted visas, but instead there is recurrent talk of ‘fraud’ and the accusations of marriages of convenience. What the images, posters and public statements at the French Embassy portrayed is *de facto* not in alignment with the everyday dynamics of actual functioning of the consulate service.

Nicholas de Genova (2002, pp. 436–39) suggests that state officials perform spectacles of border enforcement. Such ‘border spectacles’ render visible the illegality of migrants, but not the law that in fact produces it. The legal production of illegality thus becomes naturalized and no longer seems to require further exploration. Scholars have elaborated on the performative aspect of border security in an immigration context (de Genova 2002; Cuttitta 2014). Yet, states engage in ‘border spectacles’ already when dealing with people who seek rights to move to places of emigration. As a consequence, the securitization of border regimes—and thus not the marriage migration itself—merits critical investigation (Neal 2009).

Didier Bigo characterizes the securitization of border regimes in terms of a ‘governmentality of unease’. In his critique, the contemporary mode of regulation of migration has led to the development of profiling techniques and related technologies that help to determine who is to be surveyed, questioned, detained or removed from the territory of receiving nation states (Bigo 2002, p. 82). These technologies and techniques of governance in turn reinforce the framing of migration as a security issue.

A study of the very process of securitization can denaturalize contemporary common places on migration and security (de Haas 2008) and open up new possibilities for framing border security. In opposition to state-driven understandings of security, Des Gasper and Thanh-Dam Truong advocate for the human security framework as a helpful analytical framework through which to study migration. The human security framework

supports human rights concerns, manages to go beyond the Westphalian framework that considers states as the main actors and categories of analysis, and finally, also allows space for the importance of communities, families and identities in the constitution of security (Gasper and Thanh-Dam 2010, p. 14). This chapter takes security as a starting point of analysis, yet leaves open its supposed meaning and relationship to migration.

Where the threat to security is located depends heavily on the standpoint from which the analysis is conducted. From the perspective of Cameroonian women, the security threat is posed by a situation where more and more men in Cameroon are no longer in a position to live up to the expectations and responsibilities of marriage (Goheen 1996). Unable to afford the costs of bridewealth, many men are obliged to stay single and women have to turn to other strategies to fulfill expectations of marriage as an avenue for a better and safer life. Being able to go abroad can replace a bridewealth payment (Johnson-Hanks 2007). In this sense, marriage with both Cameroonians and foreigners abroad has become a new means to achieve old objectives, above all for Cameroonian women.

We see here how Cameroonian women's security concerns end up, through attempts at marriage migration, at the French consulate, where other security concerns apply. Most commonly, border security refers to the security of the national welfare state (Spire 2008, p. 52) and its citizens that need to be protected from criminals, terrorists and other intruders (e.g. Graham 2000, pp. 186–87). This reflects a statist way of understanding the security and migration nexus. Yet, when we change perspective and analyse border regimes from the perspective of bi-national couples, we see how the increasing policing of intimacy actually intensifies distinctions between the very citizens whose security it supposedly protects (Neveu-Kringelbach 2013). Border regimes produce 'good' and 'failed' citizens (Anderson 2013). The overt focus on state notions of security through the prism of the nation overshadows actual effects of border regimes. When discussing the securitization of borders, it is thus important to render explicit whose security issues are at stake, from what threat security needs to be protected and for what ends security ought to be achieved (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007, pp. 13–21).

In sum, in relation to marriage visa interviews at the French Embassy in Yaoundé, consular staff and visa applicants both ask themselves a set of security-related questions. Consulate staff rationalize their work through a narrative of wanting to ensure the safety of their own citizens, as well as the body of the nation. Regulatory dynamics are driven by fears and

accusations that visa applicants might be committing fraud—often with respect to the welfare state for their selfish personal purposes. At the same time, Internet-mediated marriages, marriages with foreigners and marriages with Cameroonians abroad are ways for Cameroonian women to achieve security through social and geographical mobility. As the Cameroonian state does not provide the welfare provisions that Cameroonians aspire towards, families have to function as security nets for its respective members. The consequence of the structural adjustment programs initiated by the IMF in the late 1980s and early 1990s still endure and families thus often try to secure welfare through cross-border strategies. Due to the devaluation of the CFA in 1994, the real value of salaries—when they were indeed paid out—was reduced by two-thirds. Education became still less of a guarantee for social status. Geographical mobility in Cameroon has thus become synonymous with social mobility and human security for the entire family.

MARRIAGE INTERVIEWS: SECURING BORDERS THROUGH SUSPICIONS OF FRAUD

Within the general literature on human trafficking, the phenomenon of ‘mail order brides’ is often referred to as a specific subtype or form of ‘human trafficking’ (Constable 2003). This imaginary of marriage migration in the Cameroonian context very much contrasts with the narrative of mail-order brides in Asia where women are the defenceless victims of brutal American or European men. In Yaoundé, the eager search by consulate officers for fraud within marriage migration aims to protect vulnerable French men from Cameroonian women who are only interested in money. In the Cameroon context, French men are the victims of (Internet-mediated) marriages and Cameroonian women are said to lure French men with their beauty into disastrous marriages.

These representations have emerged in a period where marriage migration and family reunification are one of the few remaining legal avenues for transcontinental migration to France (Cole 2014). Since March 2007, all women seeking to migrate as the spouses of French citizens need to pass an interview at the Embassy of their country of origin. As a matter of principle, consulate staff is obliged to issue immigration visas to the spouses of its citizens. Even if staff suspects fraud, they can mostly only delay the visa application procedure, refuse to recognize the marriage as valid or not issue a certificate that is necessary for couples that still intend

to marry in Cameroon. Marriage visa interviews serve to verify the legality of birth certificates and marriage certificates, as well as the intentions of the foreign spouse.

Not all women who come for their appointment at the Embassy are aware that they have to pass an interview. The interviews are designed to check for lies and inconsistencies within and between the narrative and the documents and the data that are already stored on the applicants within the computer system from prior visa application processes. During the interview, the officers would test all data for internal coherency, as well as compare information from the interview with computer data that might have been entered upon a prior visa application of the aspiring Cameroonian spouse.

In what follows, I concentrate on the case of one woman in particular. I had never met Claire before the interview, nor did I see her again afterwards. All that I know of her case stems from the moment of the interview itself. The focus of the analysis will be on the communication dynamics between officer and visa applicant, rather than on the marriage and migration trajectory of Claire herself.

Once Claire was seated, the consulate officers asked question after question and noted down all of Claire's answers into the computer file. 'When and how did you meet?' 'Where?' 'Did he write to you first or you?' 'How did it go?' 'When did you start talking on the phone?' 'Was the website geared towards French men or could a Cameroonian man also have responded to your add?'. From the answers that Claire gave throughout the interview, I gathered that Claire had put her profile on a dating website (called www.chichou.com) with the explicit purpose of getting married. After two months of online correspondence, Claire started to talk over the phone with her fiancé. Two years later, they decided to get married. Claire is in her 30s. Her fiancé is in his 40s and already has one child from a former marriage. The couple had not yet met in person.

'Are you sure it's the man of your life?' 'Who talked first about marriage?' 'If it does not work out, will you come back to Cameroon? What will you do if it does not work out?' After a short pause, Claire delivered the answer that the officer in front of her was expecting: 'I will go back home.' The officer nodded contently, wrote down the answers and continued to check further details. 'What is your future husband's address?... Telephone number? ...Job? ...Salary?' Claire laughed in a shy manner. The officer said that it is normal to know the salary of your future husband. Claire thus overcame her inhibition and told us that it was 1906

Euros and 33 cents. The officer gave me a side-look. She later explained that the woman in question ‘ha[d] prepared well for her interview.’

The encounters between the consulate officer and the Cameroonian women were fundamentally pre-structured and predetermined through the interview questions and its inherent assumptions. Yet, the only point where Claire’s marriage and migration project was at risk was when the officer asked her about her prior travel projects. She had never travelled before in her life. ‘Have you ever asked for a visa before?’ asked the officer. The first reply of the woman was to deny this. The officer looked at her computer screen and asked again. ‘No? Are you sure? This is a crucial question.’ After a little bit more insistence on the part of the officer, the woman changed her response. She ‘admitted’ to having asked for a visa with the French Consulate in 2002. At that time, she tried to go for training with an NGO, but the visa had been denied. ‘We are here to arrange this marriage. Be honest with me and I will be honest with you’, the officer explained and continued to compare the new information with data on the computer from prior visa applications. The officer was checking for ‘lies’. There was no ‘lie’ in that file and thus this prior application did not block Claire in her current procedure.

The question catalogue continued. After having gone through Claire’s employment history and the couple’s marriage plans, future life prospects were examined. ‘What will you do with your child in Cameroon?’ ‘If you want to have children in France, where will you keep them?’ ‘Have you already spoken with the mother of your future husband on the phone?’ During a prior marriage interview with a French male citizen resident in Cameroon, the officer had excused herself for having to ask certain questions. In this prior case, the couple was living together and the woman was expecting a child. The French husband was present during the interview. Upon seeing the stomach of the woman, the officer had exclaimed: ‘That says it all!’ Childbirth automatically validated the supposed love that motivated and founded the marital union.

At the end of the interview with Claire, the officer printed out the interview material and asked for a signature. As Claire got up, she asked her first question. The consulate officer did not immediately understand Claire’s question, but it eventually emerged that her fiancé would soon be coming to Cameroon. Claire had scheduled this appointment in the hope of being able to get married when he visited her. The consulate officer was taken by surprise. ‘You did not tell me everything!’ she exclaimed in an annoyed tone.

Thirty minutes of intense questioning had not allowed for space for Claire to express and explain herself. The time had been structured by the consulate officer's questions and she had not anticipated the fiancé of this woman to be so committed to the marriage to have already booked a flight. While the officer was visibly beginning to look at the matter in a much more positive light, she explained that there is little she can do to speed up the legalization processes of the documents of the Cameroonian fiancé. Yet she had a warmer and friendlier voice. A first layer of suspicion had been eliminated.

Implicit assumptions on love set the tone of marriage interviews in consulates. While the marriage interview tested love by gathering information on the past and future plans of the couple and their level of familiarity with each other, it is *de facto* relatively rare that the data is actually used for visa decisions. During the marriage interviews, consulate staff routinely gather a lot of data on rather intimate details of the couple's relationship that would only be of use in the highly unlikely scenario that a *certificat de capacité de mariage* would actually be denied. The extended efforts put into recording large amounts of rather intimate information ought to be seen as part of the production of a spectacle. The interview is a technology designed not to simply yield information, but to produce confessions and moral compliance.

Constant accusations of fraud further serve to legitimize certain versions of marriage and to delegitimize others. During the entire interview, Claire was under suspicion for being Cameroonian and having a vested interest and loyalties with her own family of origin. Emphasis on prior and parallel loyalties on the part of the Cameroonian female spouse is deemed as selfish. Yet, in the case of a marital failure or breakup, she was also expected to return 'home' to Cameroon. During the interview, Claire thus needed to convince the officer in front of her both that she is and that she is not attached to her family of origin in Cameroon.

MARRIAGE VISA INTERVIEWS: POLICING THE BORDERS THROUGH LOVE AND FAMILY NORMS

Legal frameworks express and impose gendered norms (Brown 2007) and specific family conceptions (van Walsum 2011). Love here can serve both as a challenge to sovereignty as well as a project of immobility (d'Aoust 2014). In the case of marriage migration from Cameroon, the notion of disinterested love is partly constructed through accusations of fraud from

which French male citizens and state welfare must be protected. As the supposed ideal type of disinterested love is never made explicit by state officials, all marriages to white spouses become directly associated with fraud. This becomes evident in some of the e-mail posters that are visible in the consulate. In the midst of his divorce, for example, a French husband wrote in an e-mail posted on the walls of the consulate:

My life has been destroyed by these women without any faith or scruples that only wish to enter France for reasons of nationality to then send back the money of their white husband to Yaoundé. [...] I have been the victim of extortions from the staircase of the airplane right through to my return. I've paid my worthless marriage certificate with two bottles of Whisky and 50,000 CFA' (roughly 80 Euros).³

Based on one particular case, all Cameroonian women in this e-mail poster were portrayed as self-interested and manipulative, and thus implicitly contrasted to supposedly love-driven and vulnerable French citizens. All that Cameroonian women were said to want is citizenship, driving licences, benefits from the French state and the capacity to bring over family members.

A well-organized network in France (with its centre in Paris) informs your beautiful Cameroonian ladies about any possible welfare benefits. Without scruple or love, they know more about social benefits than the French. One goal only: to send as much money as possible to Africa.⁴

In this e-mail, responsibilities and obligations towards families of origin were dressed up as greed.⁵ Appalled by such interest-driven behaviour, the French man, who was in the midst of his divorce, discredits his former wife of any form of love and emotion and concludes his mail

³'Ma vie est détruite pour ces femmes sans foi ni loi qui ne souhaitent que rentrer en France pour la nationalité et envoyer tout l'argent de leur 'blanc' à Yaoundé. J'ai été racketté de l'escalier de l'avion jusqu'au retour. J'ai payé mes actes de mariage 'bidon' contre deux bouteilles de Whisky et 50,000 Francs CFA.'

⁴'Un réseau fort bien organisé en France, (le noyau dur à Paris) renseigne vos belles Camerounaises sur toutes les prestations disponibles. Sans scrupule et sans amour, elles en savent plus que les français en terme d'allocations. Un seul but: envoyer le plus d'argent possible en Afrique.'

⁵Interestingly, the commodification process is supposed to operate exactly opposite to the discourse of mail-order brides.

The ‘white sweetheart’ is but a commodity—just as the conceived and nationalized children of course. They don’t stop at anything. Beware that a wife who is not found suitable in Cameroon is immediately and without explanation sent back and divorced; thus imagine how information on French social protection is received!! In France it’s a divorce without end. They don’t mind to have sex during three or five years pretending to be in love!!!⁶

Since the love of his wife was fake, the statement of this former husband implies that the marriage had never been truly consumed. Only sex with true love intentions validates a marriage. He labelled his marriage as a *marriage blanc*, that is, a marriage that is not consumed and thus not authentic. He called his marriage invalid because the supposed ideal type of totally disinterested love did not drive it. In this light, the types of social regulations applicable within the legal system in France to cases of divorce seem exaggerated and unnecessary to the author of the e-mail. The French husband called for a greater convergence between the authority of husband and that of the state.

In the context of the French consulate, love is also the narrative that renders invisible the interests of the French state. Only those women are allowed into the body of French citizens who convincingly disavow prior loyalties to their family of origin and thus promise to become good and safe citizens by submitting—in the name of love—their own sense of initiative and autonomy to their new husband in France.

Laws reflected gender values of given states and societies in the past, too. After 1961, for example, Cameroonians that wanted to travel were required by the newly independent government to apply for exit visas. The decree n 62-DF-23 of 17 January 1962 instituted the federal passport and introduced other forms of regulation for the emigration of Cameroonians from the territory of the Federal Republic of Cameroon. So as to obtain an exit visa, Cameroonians leaving the country needed, for example, to pay 50,000 CFA to the Cameroon Treasury. This money was to ‘guarantee’ the ‘repatriation’ of the person asking for the exit visa. To obtain a passport it was required to be in possession of a birth certificate, a certification

⁶‘Le ‘chéri blanc’ n’est qu’une marchandise, tout comme les enfants conçus et nationalisés bien sûr. Elles ne reculent devant rien. Sachez qu’une femme qui ne convient pas, au Cameroun, est répudiée sur le champ sans explication, alors imaginez l’information sur la protection sociale française!! En France c’est un divorce interminable. Et elles s’en fichent de coucher pendant trois ou cinque ans en faisant semblant d’être amoureuse!!!’

of nationality and a tax certificate. Married women who applied for these exit visas furthermore required the written authorization of their husbands and a copy of their marriage certificate (Tb (1954) 4 Buea).⁷

In the context of contemporary marriage migration, it becomes important to critically analyse which particular set of family norms is assumed and promoted by both consulate officers and family members of aspiring migrant women. Marriage can never be the union of two individuals only, regardless of the cultural and geographical context. Consular officers' need to securitize French citizenship leaves out of the picture that marriages among Cameroonians also have to struggle through important issues of conflicting loyalties between families of origin and families of procreation. It is also within these struggles over multiple understandings of family norms and womanhood that diverging, as well as converging, security agendas express themselves.

CONCLUSION

At the French consulate, e-mail posters located the threats to citizenship boundaries with the selfishness and fake intentions of Cameroonian women. French consular officers identified with the core message of these e-mails and considered them as justifications for their work. Their regulatory dynamics are driven by fears and accusations that visa applicants and their family members might be committing fraud for their own egoistic purposes. Through these accusations, state authorities locate the security threat with visa applicants and aspiring spouses.

Following de Genova's argument on the legal production of illegality, this chapter has explored the bureaucratic production of fraud and selfishness. In other words, rather than taking at face value the location of the security problem with the visa applicants, I have analysed the very process that constructs these visa applicants as fraudulent and selfish. What has emerged from this analysis is that regulatory dynamics at the French consulate office reveal normative assumptions on legitimate marital unions and family loyalties. It is by seeking to impose these that consular officers construct visa applicants in general and aspiring female spouses in particular as supposedly 'fraudulent' and 'selfish'.

The notions of national well-being and citizenship that are supposed to be secured through the border practices analysed in this chapter are not

⁷Those travellers with official orders of mission, administrative agents or people in possession of a return ticket were exempted from this regulation.

gender neutral. The fraudulent and selfish subject in the case of marriage migration from Cameroon is female. The security rhetoric at embassies furthermore relies on cultural notions of relatedness (such as conjugal love and conduct, economic exchange and kinship obligations) that can both diverge and converge with the notions held by women and the regulatory logics of Cameroonian families. In this sense, the chapter is situated not simply 'at the border' but also at the frontier between different understandings of relatedness, gender, security and welfare.

Consular officers seek to secure the EurAfrican border by amongst others framing the loyalties of Cameroonian spouses lying with their families of origin as egoistic and greedy. Yet what is marked in French e-mail posters as acts of selfishness constitutes the primary duty of a daughter towards her family of origin in Cameroon. To understand security dynamics in marriage migration, the role and place of money in courtship and marriage practices, and that of travel documents in trajectories of marriage migration, needs to be considered also from the perspective of young Cameroonian women. As I argued, these multiple perspectives of security issues at stake in marriage migration are not independent from each other. The regulatory requirements of states can come to reconstitute kinship systems (Piot 2010, pp. 79–83), just as kinship norms evolve and push the boundaries of border regimes (Spijkerboer 2013). The EurAfrican border is thus not only the site of multiple notions of security, but also of their respective transformation.

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Frontiers of Exodus: Activists, Border Regimes and Euro-Mediterranean Encounters After the Arab Spring

Paolo Gaibazzi

On 11 April 2011, during a short trip to my home region in the province of Parma (Northern Italy), I visited Casa Cantoniera, a *centro sociale* (social center) near the city center.¹ It was Monday night, the day scheduled for the weekly meetings of the main political collective in the *centro*. As I stepped out of my car and walked toward the main building, I noticed about 30 people sitting around a table—two to three times the number of people who had usually been attending such meetings less than a year earlier. Many of the new faces were, I reckoned, students in their early 20s who had joined the collective in the course of the mass protests raging across Italy in the Fall of the previous year. This was not the only novelty. Three *compagni* (comrades) had come back from Tunisia a few hours earlier. They had been on a ‘Caravan’ organized by Ya Basta!, the main pro-Zapatista organization in Italy, at which Casa Cantoniera hosted the Parma

¹ *Centri Sociali* (social centers) are a distinctive feature of radical movements (especially of the left, but also of the right) in Italy. These are usually abandoned state owned buildings occupied by activists in order to organize self-managed political, social, cultural and recreational activities (Adinolfi 1994; Ruggiero 2000).

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branch. In the audience, all eyes were glued to Domenico, Luca and Luigi, who reported on their meetings with Tunisian activists in Tunis, and their visit to the refugee camps on the border with Libya, where the Caravan (around 30–40 people from all over Italy) delivered medical aid. ‘The situation is very fluid’, chipped in Luca, talking about the Tunisian political scenario: loosely organized political groups which were mushrooming all over the place, each offering a different vision on the future of the country. Among other issues, the increasing presence of Islamist groups and the consequent clashes with other groups were making the situation even more volatile. The three activists nevertheless stressed that there was room to ‘build something together with some of the activists we met [during the Caravan]’. A month later, a Euro-Mediterranean meeting was in fact organized in Rome, summoning social movements taking part in the wave of protests that swept across especially Southern Europe and North Africa in particular, in 2010–11. At the beginning of July 2011, another such meeting was called in center-south Tunisia. This time, I took a flight and joined the group of Italian activists heading for the meeting.

By chronicling the emergence of Euro-Mediterranean meetings and related initiatives, this chapter traces the imaginations and practices ‘from below’ that shaped the Mediterranean as a fluid space for social struggles in the period following the Arab Spring and contemporaneous European protest movements.² Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution and the Arab Spring more generally have inspired a cycle of struggles across the world, among others the Indignado movement in Spain and the Occupy movements in the USA and beyond. After the uprising,³ Tunisia certainly became a popular destination for political groups and nongovernmental organizations wishing to meet the revolutionaries. This chapter captures this fascination with the Arab Spring, but especially aims to document the reverse process by which Italian antagonists brought along their political culture to Tunisia. I focus on a specific section of the Italian radical left-libertarian movement, activists and *centri sociali* like Casa Cantoniera linked to one another through networks and numerous initiatives, the most inclusive of which has been

² Support from the Germany’s Federal Ministry for Education and Research (funding code 01UG0713) partly made this publication possible, the author is nevertheless responsible for its content.

³ Tunisian activists whom I met used the word *zaura* (Arabic: قروث) and translated it into French as either *révolte* or *revolution*. I use ‘uprising’ or ‘revolt’ rather than revolution because for many Tunisian interlocutors the true ‘revolution’ did not end on 14 January 2011, when Ben Ali fled the country, but continued as a project aiming at the full transformation of the country.

the Global Project area (from the web portal globalproject.info). This is, roughly speaking, the outgrowth of the *Disobbedienti* ('the disobedients') and other Zapatista-inspired groups like Ya Basta!, collectives that animated the alter-globalist movement in Italy and beyond in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Becucci 2003; Apostoli Cappello 2009). I will show that pro-migrant and anti-border activism, one of the central struggles in the Global Project area, played a crucial role in creating Euro-Mediterranean encounters. During these exchanges, the Italian activists spoke of the contestation of the Mediterranean borders as being integral to the emergence of an alternative social space, even a new political subjectivity, to construct a dignified future that could stand against oppressive regimes of political and economic governance. The chapter shows how the Euro-Mediterranean encounters shaped and were shaped by Global Project activists' notion of a biopolitical continuum between, on the one hand, resistive border politics, and on the other hand, emergent, cross-Mediterranean social questions centered on youth, precariousness and direct democracy.

The emergence of Euro-Mediterranean social movements and imaginaries raises pertinent questions about EurAfrican border actors. The Mediterranean Sea has become one of the most significant fronts of what EUrope presents as a fight against irregular migration from Africa (Raeymaekers 2014). Securing the Mediterranean route has implied mobilizing a vast amount of resources and personnel, the most visible sight of which is the military-cum-humanitarian operations on the high seas. This borderization of the Mediterranean has caused much ink to flow among researchers, who have found in the writings of Michel Foucault (2007) and Giorgio Agamben (1995) a valuable source for analyzing and conceptualizing the novel forms with which EUrope exercises sovereignty over migrants' lives and governs their mobilities prior to, during and subsequent to their crossing (see Chap. 2, Lemberg-Pedersen, this volume). Yet, although border politics does assume vertical and abrupt forms excessively rigid conceptualizations of governmentality and biopolitics pivoting on sovereign power and institutional viewpoints risk overlooking the often inchoate and fragmented nature of European policies (Walters 2015). Border regimes tend to be constituted through the interplay of different actors, and rather than being a device scrupulously planned from above, they frequently take shape through cumulative responses to contingent circumstances, crisis and contestation on the ground (Hess and Kasparek 2010; Mezzadra and Neilson 2013, Chap. 6; Kasparek et al. 2014).⁴ The

⁴This does not mean that border regimes are less violent or consequential than we think; inconsistencies might actually aggravate their potentially deadly effects.

Arab Spring illustrates this point well. The mass of Tunisians and other Africans arriving in Italy after the Jasmine Revolution and the outbreak of Libya's civil war revealed the inherent potential of migratory movements to exceed and destabilize borders—specifically Europe's arrangements with Ben Ali's regime—thus forcing both European and Tunisian governments to reorganize their containment strategies (Tazzioli 2014). In a similar vein, I describe actors proceeding in the opposite direction, from Italy to Tunisia, in the same period, who actively took part in the contestation of EurAfrican border regimes. What is more, I show how border political cultures cultivated within the EurAfrican zone itself played a crucial role in tracing novel frontiers of political imagination and encounter across the bordered Mediterranean.

For movements like Global Project, which are active participants in the debate and knowledge production about biopolitics, the *problématique* is not centered on sovereign power per se, but on understanding how power works in order to oppose it and create spaces of autonomy from it. In the closing pages of the first volume of *Das Kapital*, Karl Marx (2010 [1867], pp. 537–41) writes about the American frontier (in the nineteenth century) as a space that subtracted the workforce from the yoke of capitalist exploitation. Workers—mostly European immigrants—would often leave employers and factories in the East in order to head to the West and become independent farmers. In so doing, they followed the opposite trajectory of the European peasants forced out of the land by the industrial revolution. Further elaborating on Marx's remarks on this peculiar relation between space, labor and capital, Paolo Virno (2002, pp. 177–82, 2005)—a philosopher close to the Global Project area—describes the American frontier as an 'exercise in exodus', that is, vocabularies and practices that are not merely reactive to power but also constitutive of alternative socio-political formations.⁵ Unlike the American frontier, the EurAfrican frontier is not external to hegemony but internal, for there is no outside to the latter frontier (cf. Hardt and Negri 2000; Chap. 1, this volume). Yet, like the American frontier, the EurAfrican border zone is a biopolitical 'frontier' in Virno's sense, insofar as the power of transnational governance is at its starkest here and concomitantly fraught with the potential of subtracting

⁵The term 'exodus' has, of course, had a wider currency in political thought and radical movement since the 1960s (Walzer 1985). It is worth pointing out that, in less often cited works, Agamben himself has written along these lines (e.g., Agamben 1990).

life and creative work from domination.⁶ Although the specific Euro-Mediterranean movements I describe in this chapter have been relatively short-lived and have not significantly disrupted the ongoing militarization of the Mediterranean, they are significant as exercises in exodus because they represent germinal moments in which consolidated discursive and institutional crystallizations of power are disrupted and new potentialities are not as yet captured and constrained by a successive configuration of governance. Such experiments do not have a definite teleology, nor do they presuppose a coherent vision of political transformation (e.g., the revolution); they do nonetheless constitute a horizon of the possible that can inspire, in this case, new vocabularies for understanding border dynamics and the political order underpinning them.

What I describe in this chapter is a frontier of knowledge production as much as one of political activism. Far from reproducing static ideological views and political repertoires, social movements simultaneously elaborate knowledge and experiment with practices concerning the reality they wish to transform (Casas-Cortés et al. 2008). In actual fact, the questions and agenda I pursued during my trips to Tunisia emerged from my double role as a researcher and as an activist long involved in the collectives I describe here. Distilling allegedly external influences from my research results would miss the simple point that this research, like the Euro-Mediterranean meetings themselves, came into being by inquiring (*inchiestando*) into a ‘fluid reality’ through political engagement as well as through actual documentation, shared analyses and theoretical reflections.

GLOBAL PROJECT AND TUNISIA: POLITICAL IMAGINARIES IN THE MAKING

Prior to the Tunisian uprising, Global Project activism vis-à-vis northern Africa was mainly centered on contesting borders, detention camps and illegalization processes on Italian soil. Political work also focused on immigrants with or without permits and on asylum seekers facing a host of problems in Italy, such as housing and legal assistance. The example of

⁶Some scholars and activists have used broadly similar conceptual tools (Mezzadra 2001; Papadopoulos et al. 2008) to interpret cross-border migration, especially migration across European borders.

Casa Cantoniera is, in this respect, instructive. This *centro sociale* was born in 2003 from the occupation of an abandoned building formerly used by the Province of Parma as a depot and accommodation for road workers. The four-flat building was made available for four Tunisian families who had not found suitable and economical accommodation through Parma's housing market. The adjacent warehouse was gradually transformed into a *centro sociale*, hosting diverse political groups of which the most active was the Comitato Antirazzista and Ya Basta! Eventually, Ya Basta! spawned a collective of mainly university students called Studenti Precari Autorganizzati in Movimento (SPAM), which progressively became the main political voice in Casa Cantoniera. Together with the activists, some of the Tunisian migrants became involved in the committees that self-managed various occupied buildings in Parma, including Casa Cantoniera.

In spite of this close cooperation with the Tunisians, however, Tunisia's political situation was never a major issue for the activists of Casa Cantoniera until the Arab Spring. Lack of political opportunities for mobilization, rather than blindness to international politics, were the main reason behind this lack of political engagement. For example, in keeping with the Zapatista spirit, Ya Basta! had, over the years, activated projects in support of groups fighting oppression and neoliberalism in Argentina, Brazil, Palestine and Kurdistan. The Ya Basta! branch in Parma, together with other activists, had often participated in the events promoted by the Kurdish refugees living in the city. Some attempts were made with Tunisian migrants as well. A *compagna* at Casa Cantoniera once told me that she had tried, among acquainted Tunisians, to sound out the possibility of joint initiatives; she was put off by the migrants' lack of interest and their fear of repercussions. During a conversation, an inhabitant of Casa Cantoniera warned me that Ben Ali's secret services were active in the diaspora as well and had solid relations with the Italian police. He cited the example of a political dissident living in Parma who was returned by the Italian police to the Tunisian authorities; in the meantime, his family in Tunisia had suffered from retaliations.

The Tunisian revolution marked a watershed in political imaginaries. The revolt coincided with the peak of mass demonstrations in Italy, culminating with what has become known as the 'tumult' (*tumulto*), an anti-government protest in Rome (14 December 2010) in which there was widespread active resistance against the authorities (Illuminati and Rispoli 2011). Moved to take action, in January 2011, some of the Tunisian inhabitants of occupied buildings in Parma, assisted by Casa Cantoniera,

organized a demonstration in support of the protesters and against the Ben Ali regime.

Unlike the Indignados and Occupy movements in 2011, Euro-Mediterranean imaginaries and encounters were not, however, simply triggered by the Arab Spring. I would like to highlight at least two characteristics of the Global Project movement, including Casa Cantoniera, which informed the convergence between social movements across the Mediterranean, further analyzed below. Radical movements and *centri sociali* more generally are not single-issue organizations, but fluid conglomerations of groups working on oft-shifting political agendas dictated by current events, as well as on longer-term projects whose nature depends on the vocation of their active members and on local specificities (Ruggiero 2000). The same activists who participate, say, in actions against detention centers for migrants are usually the same ones who promote alternative food producers' markets or protest against housing policies, university reforms and austerity measures. In addition, the movement does posit participation and collective action as a foundational element of its alternative biopolitics. This is a deliberate political choice once again reinforced by Zapatism, one which has become particularly important in the post-Disobbedienti transition, when activists had become open to 'contamination' (*contaminazione*), often working on more localized initiatives, compared to the alter-globalist phase, together with groups not necessarily aligned to a project of radical transformation of the wider society.⁷ This also reflects the movement's partial playing down of ideological positions as the basis of cooperation and struggle.

Notwithstanding this focus on praxis, the movement has produced much political analysis and theory. Various intellectuals belong to, or collaborate closely with, the movement, until recently perhaps the most notable example being Antonio Negri. His work has been widely read in the movement; in particular, Hardt and Negri's (2000) elaboration of Foucault's concept of biopower has provided activists with a language to talk about forms and techniques of government based on the regulation of not only bodily functions but also other (inter)subjective faculties (affection, creativity, knowledge, etc.) which feature prominently in contemporary forms of capitalist valorization of labor. In 2010–11, terms like *biopotere* and *biopolitico* were frequently heard in meetings and ordinary

⁷This has been a leitmotiv in all Global Meetings (annual or ad hoc summits among Global Project groups) since 2003.

conversations with activists, and as we shall see, this broad view of what constitutes the terrain of political struggle informed the activists' perception of commonalities across the Mediterranean.

‘ANOTHER BREACH IN THE WALL’: THE ‘UNITED FOR FREEDOM’ CARAVAN

The ‘United for Freedom’ Caravan organized by Ya Basta! in April 2011 was both an outgrowth of border-related activism and an attempt to reach out to the Tunisian revolutionaries. Some Ya Basta! activists had been in Tunis for some time before the Caravan took off in order to make preparations and hold preliminary meetings with compatible interlocutors. They eventually decided to respond to an international call for assistance launched by the Red Crescent, in particular for medical aid for the refugee camps set up at the border with Libya—where in the meantime the uprising had led to civil war (see Morone, Chap. 6, this volume). The capacity for self-organization of the Tunisian civil society was highlighted in the call for the Caravan and contrasted with the Tunisian refugee crisis staged by the Italian government on the island of Lampedusa in early 2011. In response to this crisis, the Global Project activists had established an observatory and information point under the banner of Welcome, a campaign begun in 2010 against border security and, in particular, opposing pushback operations in Italian sea ports. Underlining the ‘continuity with the Welcome campaign’, the call for the Caravan stressed that

Finding oneself in a refugee camp at the borders of Libya is not an accident: it is part of the war that consumes lives and hopes. Lampedusa is equally part of this war, an island transformed into an open-air prison [for migrants]. This is a war of porous borders which already began through the Italy-Libya ‘friendship’ agreements, with the imprisonment, killing and deportation of thousands of migrants. The very same humanitarian reasons that sponsor the bombing [of Libya] speak the same language as that of the war against the refugees and the boats that cross the Mediterranean. (Ya Basta! 2011)⁸

This passage is paradigmatic of the Global Project activists’ discourse on borders and migration. Far from being viewed in isolation, away from other struggles, the repressive nature of Europe’s war against ‘illegal’ migrants is on the contrary connected to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s humanitarian war in Libya, and more generally, to the clamp-

⁸ On the Libyan-Italian partnership, see Morone (Chap. 6, this volume).

down on other freedoms, such as the repression of political dissidence in Italy. In the view of many activists, restrictions on the freedom of movement and the punitive measures vis-à-vis migrants en route to Europe further epitomize a politics of life that denies human dignity and produces an illegalized, exploitable workforce. The work of Giorgio Agamben (1995), and in particular his notions of bare life and the camp as a *nomos* of the present, has indeed had an influence on the movement and has provided it with a language for framing the dehumanizing effect of border regimes. Fences, walls, barriers and other iconic border sites are recurrent in the videos and still images produced by the activists. Activists have in general a strong sense of the deterritorialized and biopolitical nature of current border regimes.

In addition to public statements, activists articulate their discourse on borders and migration through political practice. The Disobbedienti and the Global Project area are perhaps best known for protests and acts of civil disobedience carried out on the European Union (EU)'s southern border industry, in Italy. These include temporary occupation of the headquarters of companies providing services (air carriers for deportations, catering for detention camps, etc.); dismantling migrant identification camps that are under construction; or making incursions into them, sometimes enabling some inmates to flee.

Although the call framed the Caravan within an existing discourse, perhaps for the first time in the history of the Global Project movement, the activists link the struggle against European to the potential construction of political subjectivities across the Mediterranean. The call emphasizes that one of the goals of the Caravan is 'to meet the protagonists of the revolution'. An even more explicit message in this direction came from UniCommon, an activist network of the Global Project area whose main political focus was the university as a site for the production of knowledge and reproduction of a precarious workforce for an advanced, knowledge-based capitalist economy (Unicommon 2011a). UniCommon, of which Casa Cantoniera via SPAM was a node, was one of the main protagonists of the student protests in 2010–11. In joining the Ya Basta! Caravan, UniCommon launched a 'March to Tunis', in order to follow the 'the wind of the south':

We are students, precarious [workers], unemployed, a young generation that is too skilled for a job... We are the 'generation without future' of a Europe in crisis that we don't like and we want to change. We are students [from] Rome and London who have taken [to] the streets to reclaim a better future.

In these months we have learned a lot from what is happen[ing] in Tunisia and Egypt, events that we have followed with attention, curiosity and apprehension. The struggles of Maghreb and Mashreq have inspired us because we have identified ourselves in the slogan of a young generation and its high expectations, which are too high for the future that corrupt regimes and government[s] in crisis want to offer us. In these months we have learned that the struggle of Tunisi [Tunis] and Egypt are our struggles! For this reason we want to go to Tunisi, to meet the protagonist[s] of the revolt and build up together a new and different Europe, that is able to go [onto] the other side of the Mediterranean Sea: *a new space full of projects and common struggles*.

Inventing a new geography breaking the borders, setting up new directions, discovering new traces [sic]: the students of the UniCommon network will be in Tunisia starting from 7 April 2011 together with the project United for Freedom, a caravan that will go to [the] Libya border in order to help [those] who are escaping from bombs and mercenaries, to shout ‘no war’: humanitarian war or not. (Unicommon 2011b, emphasis added)

UniCommon’s text clearly draws a biopolitical linkage between the struggle against border regimes and the struggle against the precariousness that consumes the young generations north and south of the Mediterranean. In the context of global recession, austerity measures and high rates of youth unemployment had been a crucial trigger for both the Arab Spring and the students’ and precarious workers’ protests in the Mediterranean (Honwana 2013). Since the 1990s, flexible, precarious work (*precarariato*) has similarly been a major social issue in Italy, one that in the view of many ordinary people affects not only work and economic possibilities but also the sense of self and one’s possibilities in life (Molé 2010). Precarious work has certainly become a major site of socio-political activism in Italy (cf. Brancaccio 2005). Since 2008, in the wake of the mass protests against budget cuts and privatization in the higher education system, the discourse of precariousness was extended to the university as a central site for reproducing a qualified workforce in advanced, knowledge-based capitalist societies (Raparelli 2009; Roggero 2011). The problem of precariousness and inter- and postgraduation un(der)employment was (and is) particularly poignant among the younger generations, who shouldered the worst effects of the economic crisis. In the text, we find reference to the idea of ‘lacking’ a future, or being ‘denied’ it, or having it ‘stolen’ from one. This has been a powerful, transnational mobilizing message. The text (which was circulated in both an Italian and an English version) targeted other

student movements across Europe. Tellingly, among the groups that later participated in Euro-Mediterranean meetings was Juventud Sin Futuro (Youth without a future), one of the protagonists of the Indignados movement (2011) in Spain. Viewed along similar lines, the call represents the Arab Spring as a movement that redefines not only national spaces but also wider geopolitical areas. Thus, in her final report from Tunisia on behalf of UniCommon, Vanessa Bilancetti reiterated that the Caravan aimed to ‘make breaches in the wall of the Mediterranean [Sea]’ and to construct a ‘bridge across [it]’ in order to meet Tunisian men and women who took to the streets to fight for ‘freedom, democracy, rights’ (Bilancetti 2011).

While in Tunis, the participants of the Caravan/March attended meetings with students at one university, with trade unionists (especially from the Tunisian General Labor Union, UGTT), and other collectives in other parts of the capital. As the activists from Parma reported, the meetings were anything but formal. Most of the *compagni* returned home with a sense of the complexity, if not confusion (surely exacerbated by linguistic barriers), at the composite, heterogeneous attendance in these public meetings. In open-mic assemblies, multiple views came to the fore, and the Italian activists too were subjected to questioning with regard to their orientations and agendas. Despite the difficulty in reading the Tunisian situation, however, once Mediterranean barriers were breached, the search for interlocutors produced some results. Activists from UniCommon eventually established relationships with students and related organizations like the UDC (Union Diplômés Chômeurs—Union of Unemployed Graduates), an offshoot of UGTT and a leading youth organization in the rural and urban areas during the uprising.

EURO-MEDITERRANEAN HORIZONS: THE SEARCH FOR ‘CONSTITUENT STRUGGLES’

One month after the Caravan, UniCommon organized a meeting in Rome called ‘The Revolt of a Generation: Euro-Mediterranean happening on education, welfare and new political practices’. The program of the two-day happening included a seminar on the first day and a workshop open to the public on the second day. Some 11 international speakers were invited to the seminar, 5 of whom were from Tunisia alone. Only the Tunisians acted as ‘spokespersons’ for the Arab Spring at the meeting; they were all people whom UniCommon activists had met during the Caravan/March.

The other internationals were spokespersons for collectives and movements that had contributed to protests and struggles in 2010–11, in the UK, Spain and Austria.

The titles of the workshops on the second day clearly reflect some of the main themes that animated movement and protest politics in Italy during the 2010–11 season (and earlier) in Europe and in the Mediterranean space in general:

- (1) Conflictual knowledge: from Europe to the Mediterranean area
- (2) Education, welfare and precariousness
- (3) Labor, income and democracy against the crisis

While the first two workshops focused on ongoing University-related struggles, the third workshop should be viewed in the light of the attempt to coordinate students' and workers' movements in Italy. Indeed, the program featured the presence of Maurizio Landini of FIOM-CGIL, one of the main labor unions of the heavy industry sector, and members of the UGTT, a labor union in Tunisia opposed to the Ben Ali regime. The first workshop in particular signals the attempt not only to 'make breaches in the wall of the Mediterranean' but also to try and construct alternative networks and identify 'constituent struggles' (*conflitti costituenti*) of political spaces and subjectivities. That is, exodus.

This agenda was even more prominent at the next Euro-Mediterranean Meeting—called 'Towards new horizons'—held on 2–4 July, in Regueb, Central Tunisia. The event was organized by UDC and coordinated by one of the speakers at the meeting in Rome. Unfortunately, due to the timing (university exam time) and several other logistical difficulties, most of the international participants could not attend the meeting. The conference started with only four Italian activists, including myself. I came as a researcher-activist from Casa Cantoniera/Ya Basta!, while the other delegates belonged to the UniCommon network: two (David and Giorgio) came from Pisa, and Giansandro came from Rome. Of the four of us, only Giansandro and I had previously met, in Parma, where he was invited to talk about the Welcome campaign in Lampedusa. He was the only one to have participated in the Caravan. A spokesperson from Juventud Sin Futuro (Spain) arrived on the second day. Five other Spaniards from two different organizations (two from Tunis Spanish revolution and three

from ASSI—Accion Social Sindical Internacionalista⁹) arrived and sat in the audience on the second day, and eventually were given a chance to contribute to the debate. Overall, the meeting was an Italo-Tunisian meeting, with translations between Arabic and Italian provided by Fabio, an Italian resident from Tunis who had done some reporting for global-project.info and Ya Basta!. It took the form of a two-day seminar with no specific overarching theme, except for the objective of shedding light on postrevolutionary Tunisia and Regueb, and on ways of constructing a ‘civil society’ and alliances across the Mediterranean.

Regueb is a town of 10,000 inhabitants, about 30 km from Sidi Bousid, the ‘epicenter’ of the Jasmine Revolution. Priding itself on its long history of political activism and resistance, Regueb was also one of the main theaters of the uprising. ‘Regueb contributed five martyrs to the revolution’, we were told upon our arrival, five demonstrators killed by the police when the latter opened fire on the protesters on 9 January 2011. Since the end of the revolution, the political and social aesthetics of the town had significantly changed. The events and messages of the revolution were painted on the walls of the town alongside the faces of the martyrs. The House of Culture, which had been taken over by the associations of Regueb taking part in the revolt, hosted a small museum of the uprising with objects (weaponry used by the police and by the protesters) and photographs. This was also the venue for the Euro-Mediterranean Meeting. A banner hanging from the speakers’ table portrayed the martyrs and the phrase ‘Toujours avec nos martyres’ (always with our martyrs).

The Meeting was held at a time when, according to most of our interlocutors, not only Italian activists but also most Tunisians were grappling with a fluid political situation. Some citizens feared that the mushrooming of parties and ‘civil society’ organizations would fragment the unitary spirit of the uprising, while some of the youths who set up the revolt feared that canny politicians would hijack their revolution. As some of the young men and women belonging to UDC-Regueb put it, looking for ‘new horizons’ in order to continue the ‘revolution’ meant for them looking for ways to

⁹Tunis Spanish revolution was created by a group of Spaniards living in Tunis trying to link the Indignados movement and the Tunisian movement. ASSI is a leftist, internationalist collective. The three activists were touring Tunisia and its movements, and learned about the Regueb meeting from the Unicommon mailing list.

both influence the process and ensure the autonomy of organizations like their own. Although one might argue that the Euro-Mediterranean meeting was partly imported as a prepackaged discourse from the outside, the Reguebien organizers clearly saw it as an opportunity to create meaningful horizontal linkages with activists in the Euro-Mediterranean zone who were struggling for the same objectives. The objectives of the uprising as discussed in the meeting were not only the liberation from oppressive regimes but also the deeper social questions that affected Reguebiens, Tunisians and Europeans alike. A number of citizens who spoke at the meeting reiterated the call for autonomy and for creating alternative forms of political organization outside the state.

The UDC members highlighted the theme of unemployed youth as a central thread of the Euro-Mediterranean encounter.¹⁰ For the organizers, the meeting had the ambitious aim of being a step toward the construction of a ‘Euro-Mediterranean union of impoverished classes and marginalized militants, in this case the qualified [educated] and non-qualified unemployed, the students, and the temporary workers’ (UDC Regueb 2011).¹¹ While some of the other participants cautioned about such an ambition, the focus on youth, work, welfare and the economic crisis chimed with the analysis and the agenda put forth by the Rome meeting and those of the international guests attending the Regueb conference. Lucia, the spokesperson of Juventud Sin Futuro, explained that her collective originated in a generational crisis in which youth are ‘without housing, without a job, without a pension, and therefore without fear [of rising up]’. Given also that it was the defining element of the UDC-UniCommon ‘alliance’, the theme of youth, work and welfare was not surprisingly a common refrain during the meeting.

The discourse of migration and borders was, in contrast, of secondary importance in this meeting. As we were informed, in contrast to the coast and the south of Tunisia, the region of Regueb was not a prominent area for sending migrants to Europe. While youth unemployment was a major issue, and some of the unemployed Reguebiens left for the cities, few actually thought of emigrating to Europe. Emigration featured frequently

¹⁰Mondher, A., Opening Speech at the Regueb Euro-Mediterranean Meeting, 2 July 2011.

¹¹The language used in the brochure is influenced by Marxist readings of the Tunisian political economy. A number of UDC affiliates were active in the Communist party (POCT) and shared its analytical language.

in the national news, but the locals seemed more concerned about the region's marginalization in the central state's developmental policies, which were centered on cities and the coast. Accordingly, only a few speakers and commentators from the audience made explicit reference to migration and borders. Some did nonetheless comment on the Janus-faced European policies which, on the one hand, require Tunisia to be open to Europe's company delocalization, capital flows and manufactured products, while, on the other hand, closing Europe's gates to Tunisian migrants.

Compared to the Tunisians, the Italian activists over-communicated the element of borders and migration. All the contributions from our group began with encouraging social movements to 'establish a bridge between the two sides of the Mediterranean', as Giansandro's introductory speech made clear. He added that

On both sides of the Mediterranean, many things are changing. Many political geographies in which we had been led to trust are being redefined. Our states and our governments have made us used to thinking of the Mediterranean as a barrier, a border for dividing us. But the youth in the revolts in Tunisia, in Italy, in Spain, in Egypt, in Syria, [and] in France are telling us that there are other ways of living together, of working together, of creating a society with more [civil] rights and social justice, and of making the Mediterranean a tool of communication between different populations [...] [T]herefore we think that meetings like this one are very important for getting to know each other, and to understand the common battles we can fight together.

Giorgio, David and I also made reference to Giansandro's idea of an open, constituent Mediterranean in our speeches. Since this politicization of borders was largely unsolicited by the organizers and by the audience, I see it as a clear example of the ways in which ongoing knowledge-practices of the Italian movement vis-à-vis borders characterize the imagination of an incipient Euro-Mediterranean frontier of social conflicts and movements that do not necessarily focus on migration.

Our presence in the meeting and in Regueb also bespoke the movement's political praxis of linking with 'others'. On the eve of the meeting, the failure of many invited speakers to attend meant that the program had to be amended. We were thus asked to state our affiliation and the content of our speech. Most of us thought we had come to attend the meeting only, but given the situation, we readily complied with the request. In a wonderful exemplification of the fluidity of affiliations within the move-

ment, we briefly convened and agreed to speak on behalf of four different organizations. Only Giorgio spoke on behalf of UniCommon; David presented Eigenlab (Pisa), a high-tech and telecommunication self-production workshop in which he was involved; Giansandro presented Infomigrante, a legal service and civil rights observatory for migrants based in Esc Atelier (the main *centro sociale* of UniCommon in Rome) and acted as a spokesperson for the Italian delegation as a whole; and I spoke on behalf of Ya Basta!. While this setup reflected somehow our 'real' affiliations, the selection was also influenced by our understanding of what our Tunisian audience would find most interesting about our movement. The content of our speeches, which we briefly discussed among ourselves, was somehow tailored to suit this aim. For example, I gave a general introduction on self-organization, starting from the Zapatista experience in Chiapas, to then focus on the Italian *centri sociali*. We reckoned the experience of media activism would interest the audience both because of the element of the social media in the revolution and because there had been talks in previous meetings about consolidating an Internet platform for activists at the local and trans-Mediterranean level. Likewise, given the link between Tunisia and the Lampedusa situation, it was also felt that 'our' views and actions on the migration/border questions had to be made clear.

This should be seen not as an imposition of political views on the current Euro-Mediterranean situation, but rather as an attempt at constructing a bridge or initiating a dialogue with Tunisian interlocutors on the basis of shared struggles and not merely shared visions. As I argued above, ideological orientations are important in the movement but fetishization is deliberately avoided, for it prevents dialogue. What was chiefly reported in our speeches was 'how we did it' and 'what we do' stories of movements, campaigns and *centri sociali* in an attempt to 'share experiences and learn from each other', as we often remarked in on- and off-stage conversations. This communication strategy was not agreed in advance, nor did it correspond to a 'international relations policy' of either UniCommon or Ya Basta!; rather, I would argue it was the manifestation of a *modus operandi* developed especially in the 2000s by large sections of the Global Project movement, one that hinges on overcoming bounded identities and relaxing ideological differences by emphasizing collective action and horizontal networking between 'constituent struggles'.

In this regard, I noticed that our expectations were not entirely matched by the Tunisian counterparts. For a number of Tunisian speakers, the meeting rather took the form of a conference, and some of the organizers

proposed more macro-scale, political-economic analyses of Tunisia's social questions, sometimes ending with programmatic statements about the future of the country. In addition, like many current and former UGTT members, a number of the Tunisian speakers were clearly influenced by Marxist political thought. References to Mao Tse Tung, Lenin and other Marxist thinkers of the twentieth century abounded in these analyses—names and analytical terms that sometimes made my fellow activists shift uncomfortably in their seats as reminders of a phase and discourse of the Italian Left (namely, the Communist Party and other Marxist-Leninist movements) from which the movement had long distanced itself. At no point during or after the meeting, however, did we perceive this emphasis as foreclosing our attempt to construct linkages and common struggles with the Tunisians. Our focus was, conversely, on 'experience'. During one conversation, for example, Giorgio and I remarked on the lack of detail on how various groups organize, take decisions and are mobilized. We craved more information on precisely 'how they did it', and resorted to chatting with activists during more informal occasions to find out more about the revolutionary movement in Regueb and, in particular, on the town's experience of self-organization at the municipal and societal level. It must be said that thanks to the superb hospitality of the UDC and other Reguebiens, there was no paucity of social occasions at which exchanges and questions could be asked.

Regueb was the last Euro-Mediterranean meeting of its kind. On the Global Project portal, attention to Tunisian initiatives by UDC and other 'partners' inevitably faded during the summer of 2011. Conversely, behind the scenes, cooperation along the Italo-Tunisian axis became more solid, even formalized. Some Ya Basta! activists, together with two Italian NGOs and partner organizations in Sidi Bousid and Regueb (including UDC), secured funding for media-based projects (media centers, training programs in new media technologies and a community radio) from an EU framework for democracy building in post-Arab Spring contexts. That would-be exercises of exodus took the form of institutionalized international cooperation within the purview of the EU's new geopolitical agenda (which included border security) in such a blatant way certainly did not escape the notice of the activists. They viewed this contradictory development not as an end in itself, and even less as an attempt at cooptation by the constituted power. Rather, they framed the media projects as attempts at maintaining and consolidating cooperation between social movements in Italy and in Tunisia, and eventually creating capacity at the local level in

Tunisia. Over time, it was envisaged, these media projects could turn into spaces for independent media and political activism.

This point was explicitly made and reiterated during the 2013 Caravan organized by Ya Basta! in Tunisia, which I also joined. Taking place on the occasion of the World Social Forum (March 2013), the Caravan—which gathered around 60 activists—was also aimed at the *compagni* of the *centri sociali*, in order for them to have an opportunity to meet the Tunisian activists and, in the spirit of the Caravan, to get to know—or better, to assimilate as their own—the projects and potentials of the Ya Basta! projects in Tunisia. The second part of the tour took place in Sidi Bousid, Regueb and nearby localities. The activists of the Caravan produced an enormous corpus of documents, reports and video and audio interviews, all of which were uploaded onto the Global Project portal; a booklet of the Caravan was also subsequently produced. While the 2011 Caravan was pathfinding, the 2013 one confirmed the fact that, as the spokespersons remarked during the organizational assemblies of the Caravan, the geopolitical focus for Ya Basta! and many *centri sociali* was moving from Latin America to Northern Africa. In fact, it was announced that an explorative Caravan to Morocco would take place the following autumn.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

It would be unwise to conclude by offering predictions about the future of what have been fluid and shifting frontiers of radical politics. Rather, in this chapter, I have offered reflections on the knowledge production and the practical know-how which informed the making of such a frontier in a period (2010–11) of turbulent changes. The Global Project activists did not ‘naturally’ proceed to link up with their Tunisian interlocutors on account of commonalities of vision, nor did they simply follow the ‘wind of the south’ blowing a spirit of revolution. Even if the Arab Spring undoubtedly inspired political activism worldwide, Italo-Tunisian connections were also the product of the movement’s political culture centered on migration and borders. Articulated through texts published on websites, speeches at meetings and actual interaction, this border culture made Euro-Mediterranean activism intelligible as an act of simultaneous deconstruction and construction. Overcoming the ‘wall’, breaking down barriers and fighting against the deterritorialized technologies of Europe’s southern border did not constitute mere borderless rhetoric. The trials and prosecutions weighing on numerous activists who took

part in actions against the border industry in Italy are a reminder of the consequentiality of such discourses, and of the extent to which the Italian state seeks to repress them. While central in itself, the ongoing struggle against border regimes at the southern edges of Europe laid the foundations of common or networked struggles over youth, employment, welfare and democracy issues across the Mediterranean. The ‘internal’ configuration of the movement, the fluid circulation of people and themes across the Global Project, partly enabled its extension to Tunisia.

What I have described in this chapter is a vital political space within the current Mediterranean border regime. I have adopted the term ‘frontier’ to describe both the political nature and the emergent character of this space. The Euro-Mediterranean meetings, initiatives, networks and lexica are a frontier not in the sense of a front encroaching into uncharted territory, but in the sense of an internal frontier. Following Laclau and Mouffe (2001), we can view this frontier as the (biopolitical) limit of power (or to be more precise, of hegemonic articulation). But there is more: the alternative imaginary and relationality of the EurAfrican space I have delineated in this chapter show us that the frontier is not simply a contested political space and agent—which is true of most border regimes—but also a constitutive one. That is to say, the EurAfrican frontier is not merely a space where power is trying to become fully constituted, thereby generating resistance; it is a space of constituent struggles, of resistance as much as of flight or exodus. I have thus tried to capture the germinal phase of this frontier making and to highlight both its conservative and transformative force in terms of political culture. While, as I have argued, the Italian activists—the frontierspersons—carried to Tunisia a political culture cultivated in years of border activism, they remained opened to socio-political experimentation, to engage in what I called, following Virno (2002), an exercise in exodus.

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PART IV

Lives

Maritime Migration from Senegal to Spain: Fishermen's Experiences

Juliette Hallaire

West African migrants started to take irregular migration routes to reach Europe when European visa procedures were strengthened in the 1990s (Carling 2007b; De Haas 2008). The creation of passages to Europe further adjusted to Europe's rapidly evolving system of border controls employed to tackle such irregular migration flows. In what follows, I analyse West African maritime routes, specifically from Senegal to the Canary Islands, that emerged as a direct response to the externalization of European borders (Andersson 2014; Carling 2007; Carling and Hernández-Carretero 2011; de Haas 2007). Unauthorized boat migration from Mauritanian and Senegalese beaches intensified in the mid 2000s as it was easier to escape border controls than further north, in places such as the Strait of Gibraltar or Ceuta and Melilla (Pallister-Wilkins, Chap. 3, this volume). In 2006, Spain signed bilateral immigration control agreements with Mauritania and Senegal in order to control and prevent migrants from setting sail. These agreements consequently allowed a move of European border controls further south outside European territorial borders (Audebert and Robin 2009; Carling 2007; Carling and Hernández-Carretero 2011; de Haas 2007). By giving third countries the responsibility to assist Europe in the management of irregular migration flows, these agreements clearly

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participated in the further externalization of European borders. Frontex—the European Union (EU) external border management agency—became involved in border operations at sea and ashore. This was a clear manifestation of the transformation of the meaning and locations of European borders that has been widely questioned in the literature. Borders can no longer be understood as the limits of national territories (Vaughan-Williams 2008; Walker 2000). They are both inside and outside the European territory, which makes their actual location more difficult to pin down. In this context, Senegalese fishermen deployed their routes to the Canary Islands according to the constant moving of European borders.

This chapter explores the mobility of the Senegalese fishermen who became would-be migrants and actively participated in irregular sea migration from Senegal to Europe mainly from 2000 to 2008. Drawing on field interviews with fishermen who attempted to reach Europe by sea,¹ the analysis follows their routes between their local fishing places and the Spanish archipelago. Irregular maritime migration to Europe was one among several mobility strategies which were developed by the Senegalese fishermen in order to compensate for the declining profits made from fishing activities. Although this chapter mainly focuses on the irregular maritime journeys to Europe organized in the mid-2000s from Senegal, I also illustrate how fishermen are part of a broader sea migration system which has been developed by some Senegalese fishermen all around West African coasts since the beginning of the 1980s (Failler and Binet 2010).

The chapter looks both at the motivations and the experiences of Senegalese fishermen through an increasingly borderized ocean space. What these experiences reflect, however, is not simply a confrontation between fishermen and European border authorities. Fishermen's experiences reflect a more complex, EurAfrican reality of border making and migration management. Through these experiences, we first learn that the fishermen responded to an opportunity of migration to Europe as much as to a deep-seated crisis of the fishing sector. Second, rather than the EU and Frontex, the fishermen mostly held the Senegalese government responsible both for their attempted journeys and for their repatriation and consequent migratory failure. Finally, fishermen's mobility can be seen as a way of regaining sovereignty over spaces (the sea) and livelihoods from which they have been excluded.

¹Qualitative interviews were carried out in Senegal (Dakar, Saint-Louis and Kayar) in 2007, 2011 and 2012 with fishermen who either illegally reached Europe via the Canary Islands and had been repatriated to Senegal or attempted to make the journey but turned back to Senegal because of the unfavourable weather conditions or because they got arrested in high sea.

The chapter first broadly introduces the fishing sector in Senegal; then discusses the origins of boat migration from Senegal to Spain. Thirdly, it examines the different ways fishermen 'lost' control over the sea space and finally explores their migration experiences at sea and in the Canary Islands.

SENEGALESE FISHERMEN AND THE SEA

The small-scale Senegalese fishing sector is organized around different categories of fishermen. Senegalese coastal areas are ethnically organized into three main fishing communities. Guet Ndarian fishermen have settled around Saint-Louis in the northern area of Senegal. Known as the 'nomads of the sea', they have reputed navigation skills and are able to travel long distances throughout the Atlantic, often crossing international maritime borders or interacting with more sedentary fishermen in the course of their migration. They share similar cultural characteristics with the Lebou community which settled in the Cape Verdean peninsula and the Grande Côte and with the Nyominkas in the southern coastal area (*la Petite Côte*) (Mercier and Balandier 1952; Sall 2007). The specific maritime movement of the Senegalese fishermen has been theorized by Marie-Christine Cormier-Salem (1995). Fishermen operate according to two kinds of maritime areas determined by the geographical distribution of fishing resources: The first one is a territorialized space which is dominated and organized by the '*paysans-pêcheurs*' (Cormier-Salem 1995, p. 53) or 'peasant-fishermen'. This space corresponds to coastal, estuary and closed areas and is opposed to the open oceanic spaces, which cannot be controlled as they are 'spaces to be conquered and whose limits are always pushed away but never fixed yet' (Cormier-Salem 1995, p. 53). 'Sailor-fishermen' or '*marins-pêcheurs*' belong to this second kind of space. Thus, Cormier-Salem suggests the notion of '*parcours*' or 'route' to characterize the mobility of the sailor-fishermen, which would be opposed to the notion of '*terroir*' or 'territory' used to describe the activity of the peasant-fishermen. The idea of a route both efficiently captures the unpredictability of the sailor-fishermen's movement, which is adjusted to the mobility of the fish resources, and characterizes their will to discover new horizons. When local fishermen choose to become migrant fishermen, they become sailor-fishermen and exclusively live on, from and with the sea.

Also, fishermen specialize in one type of fishing depending on their financial possibility, professional opportunities and family's traditional preferences: Around their coastal area, on the maritime delimited 'land',

either they fish demersal² species using mostly lines and dormant nets or they fish pelagic species using nets. Those who leave for long sea trips fish demersal species as they are far more valuable than the pelagic ones.

Today this organization of the small-scale fisheries is more and more shaken by the sectoral and environmental crisis. As fish resources in Senegalese waters, especially demersal species, are under critical conditions, local communities' food security is strongly threatened (FAO 2010; Alder and Sumaila 2004; SSNC 2009). Indeed, over 650,000 jobs are directly or indirectly related to the fishing activity in Senegal, and on average, each Senegalese individual eats 27 kg of fish a year³ (FAO 2010). As a result of this crisis, many peasant-fishermen have become sailor-fishermen since the beginning of the 1980s: They have been extending their mobility far beyond international maritime borders, navigating further north in Mauritania and southward to Guinea Bissau, Guinea Conakry and Sierra Leone, and, in the mid-2000s, up to the Canary Islands.

BECOMING MIGRANTS AND THE DEBATES AROUND THE ORIGINS OF BOAT MIGRATION FROM SENEGAL

In the beginning of the 2000s, sea migration to the Canary Islands became an interesting opportunity as, on the one hand, the organization of the journey appeared to be much more profitable than fishing and, on the other hand, for the successful migrants, it would provide long-term job opportunities in Europe (Nyamnjoh 2010). There is still some debate on the reasons that led to boat migration in Senegal. Sall and Morand (2008) situate the first departures from Senegal in 2002 and argue that the sailors were at first smugglers—and not artisanal fishers—who proposed to the migrants to cross the ocean from Saint-Louis beaches, in the extreme north of Senegal, as a result of the strengthening of sea controls in Morocco and Mauritania. However, narratives gathered on the field instead involve fishermen as the first instigators of these routes as they were already using their wooden canoes to reach remote places, navigating on a well-known environment for days and relying on traditional skills.

²Demersal species are found in deep waters. One of the most common in Senegal is the grouper (*thiof* in Wolof or *merou* in French) and is now facing extinction. Its scarce catches are more and more destined for export as local communities cannot afford to buy it, although it used to be a central element of Senegalese everyday food habits.

³The world average is around 17 kg.

Also, one has to bear in mind that although fishermen were mostly filling these boats, not all the would-be migrants were fishermen, nor were they necessarily Senegalese citizens.

Sall and Morand (2008) locate the origin of the maritime migration from Senegal to Europe in the dynamism of the fishing sector rather than in its decline. For them, this dynamism is reflected through the exponential growth of the fishing sector since the 1950s: Senegal now counts 20,000 artisanal boats, six times more than in the middle of the twentieth century.⁴ The fishing sector benefited from the support of the state in the 1970s for the development of the purse seine, motors and other technologies, becoming an attractive sector providing full employment for a number of unskilled workers.⁵ Sall and Morand further argue that the Senegalese economy therefore turned towards the sea which made coastal areas a step for temporary settlement and short-term enrichment before migrating to Europe. Furthermore, international fishing migrations, the use of new technologies and the development of navigation skills are other signs of this dynamism: They constituted a favourable background for boat migration to the Canary Islands, providing highly qualified captains to drive the boats throughout the Atlantic.

Finally, Sall and Morand (2008, p. 33) note that official statistics did not show a decrease in catches regarding the small-scale fishing sector at the national level but rather indicated a stagnation with a total of 361,000 tons of fish in 2007. On this point, however, my field observations suggest that this stagnation of catches was not significant in the evolution of Senegalese fishing activities: Fish caught in foreign waters and sold in the national market is not taken into account into national statistics, whereas a growing number of fishermen have been organizing long fishing trips from Senegal to Guinea Bissau and Conakry since the 1980s, leaving their now overcrowded national waters (Failler and Binet 2010).

Another voice in the debate that goes counter to Sall and Morand's hypothesis is that of Henrietta Nyamnjoh (2010), according to whom the sectoral crisis and lack of state involvement were mainly responsible for Senegalese fishermen's migration to Europe. Nevertheless, because different kinds of fishermen were involved in boat migration from Senegal to Spain, these arguments are not mutually exclusive. The

⁴ And field notes, Dakar, 2011 and 2012.

⁵ Especially for the peasants coming from internal areas in Senegal and fleeing the drought (Nguyen-Van-Chi-Bonnardel 1969).

role fishermen played in the development of the migration routes to the Canary Islands greatly varied according to their socio-economic position and specific geographies of the sea spaces. The organization of boat migration benefited from the dynamism of the fishing sector through the involvement of highly skilled fishermen. Most of them had been navigating along the coast of West Africa for years and had been able to quickly adjust their activities according to the evolution of the fishing sector. Their familiarity with the maritime environment enabled them to consider these long sea trips and gave them a major role in the development of the West African irregular migration routes to the Canary Islands. By contrast, the local fishermen who embarked in these boats and paid for the trips were suffering from a lack of perspective and resources. They mainly took part in these journeys in order to compensate for the decline in the profits made from fishing activities. These willing migrants were daily fish workers, net fishers or local-scale line-fishers who were suffering from the fishing crisis on an everyday basis and were unable to earn a decent living from fishing. In other words, the highly skilled captains who were sailing the boats were reminiscent of the figure of the sailor-fishermen identified by Cormier-Salem (1995), whereas the peasant-fishermen would fill a great part of these boats, being less active than the captains. Though the socio-economic conditions differed for each of these actors, both categories of fishers shared the similar objectives of settling in Europe, finding a job and sending remittances to their families.

Let me provide an example. In 2012, Ibrahima⁶ was a young Dakar-born boat owner and captain fisherman who had been organizing fishing expeditions to Guinea (Conakry) since 2001. In these remote waters, he and his crew line-fished high-value demersal species, such as grouper and sea bream, and sold them on the Senegalese market. In 2006, following the example of his four brothers, he recruited 75 people and hired four captains to assist him in navigating to the Canary Islands. Apart from the captains, they all paid 400,000 francs (600 USD) to Ibrahima. They went up to Morocco, but as they were fleeing a violent storm, the crew decided to come back to Senegalese waters, where they were arrested by the Senegalese navy and tried in Senegal for having smuggled migrants. Ibrahima claims that before organizing this trip, he was satisfied with his financial situation, attesting that he was able to save up to 11 million francs

⁶All the names have been changed to maintain the anonymity.

a year thanks to what he was earning from fishing abroad.⁷ Being at the same time a fisherman, a smuggler and a migrant, Ibrahima's ambiguous role complicates our understanding of boat migration from Senegal. His example blurs the limits between the distinct categories generally identified in literature.

These long and risky sea journeys also became a last chance for would-be Senegalese migrants whose migration fantasies had been influenced by the abundant narratives of their expatriated compatriots. Senegal is known as a traditional sending and receiving country both in terms of south-south and south-north migration (Fall 2003; Tall 2002). Senegalese people have developed national and international migration strategies for decades, relying on remittances sent by members of their community and organizing their migration projects on existing networks (See, e.g. Bava 2005; Bredeloup and Pliez 2005; Fall 2003; Fouquet 2008; Riccio 2008; Tall 2002). The opportunities for legal migration to Europe have been considerably reduced since the 1990s due to restrictive immigration policies, thus encouraging Senegalese migrants to follow alternative paths. As mentioned, West African migrants started using irregular migration routes to reach Europe when European visa procedures were strengthened in the 1990s (de Haas 2008).

SEA GOVERNANCE, RESOURCE SCARCITY AND MOBILITY

Since each Senegalese citizen can freely fish, sea spaces and access to resources have traditionally been regulated by fishermen communities. However, this is being put into question as the decline in fish stocks is leading the Senegalese state to increasingly impose its regulation over the fishing sector. Besides, artisanal fishermen have to coexist with a growing number of Senegalese and foreign industrial trawlers.

Since independence in 1960, the Senegalese government has progressively imposed a regulation policy in order to better control sea resources, increasingly basing its policy on a participative model (Kebe and Deme 2000). The successive laws and decrees introduced by the state have mainly targeted the preservation of the resources through the creation of protected marine areas, artificial reefs for species reproduction and aquaculture development (MEM 2007). In parallel, access to the sea has been getting more limited through a licence and fishing

⁷Field interview, Dakar, March 2012.

permit policy whose principal aim is to protect oceanic resources without jeopardizing the traditional Senegalese fishing activities. Still, the fishing community is very sceptical about the effective application of this participative management that challenges the traditional organization of fishermen who have always taken for granted their free access to the sea (Le Roux and Noël 2007). Fishermen see their access to resources as being more threatened by its regulation than by scarcity of fish: This can be interpreted as a 'loss' of control over the resource produced by the intervention of the state.

Furthermore, fishermen have been critical of the new constraints imposed on them, pointing to the 'illegitimate' exploitation of the fishing resources by foreign industrial trawlers who had been sold generous licences by the government (Le Roux and Noël 2007). Until March 2012 and the election of Macky Sall to the Presidency of the Republic, the former ministry for maritime affairs had been regularly accused of selling illicit fishing licences to foreign fleets. These agreements caused great concern among the Senegalese professional fishing organizations such as the CNPA, FENAGIE (small-scale fishers) and GAIPES (Senegalese industrial fishers). Among other examples, they loudly protested together when in March 2011, 20 agreements with private Russian and Chinese companies were thought to have been signed by the government without consultation of the small-scale and national industrial fishing sector (IPS 2011).

Moreover, the number of fishing agreements signed by the European Commission and African countries (including Senegal) increased in the 1980s (Catanzano and Rey Valette 2002). These agreements had enabled Europe to develop its fishing capacity in external maritime places in exchange for a financial counterpart given to the signatories. They were largely criticized because European fish catches constituted a considerable loss of resource for local fisheries. Scientists documented a serious fishing crisis (Gascuel et al. 2002) for which European fleets were partly held responsible (Kohnert 2007). These formal agreements were not renewed with Senegal in 2006 because of the serious condition of fish resources (SSNC 2009). However, since then a number of European-based companies have settled in Senegal as joint ventures. They are officially Senegalese, count as Senegalese fishing companies, and at the same time are an opportunity for European fleets to informally fish in Senegalese waters and reserve their catches for export to the European market.

LOSING CONTROL AT SEA AND ON THE LAND

In field interviews, fishermen reported that they were feeling excluded from the management of the resource on which their livelihood depends.⁸ State regulation was perceived as a constraint that obstructs the relationship they have to natural resources and becomes a necessary condition for the access to this resource (Chauveau 2000). With the fishing crisis and the resulting growing competition at sea, fishermen felt they were progressively losing control not only over resources and sea spaces but also at the level of their community. As a result, they started to change the meaning and function of their local mobility (Adey 2010) by using it as a migration strategy on a greater scale: Maritime migration to Europe became a way to regain this sovereignty in the way that it gives the opportunity for a decent earning (Hallaire and McKay 2014).

With the implementation of the national fishing code in 1998, the Senegalese fishing area has been divided into two parts which extend between the coastline and 12 nautical miles offshore (MPTM 1998). Broadly, the first six nautical miles are exclusively dedicated to small-scale fisheries, whereas industrial fishing boats are allowed to fish only between the 6th and the 12th miles. Small-scale fishermen are allowed to fish in the latter area where they increasingly compete with national and foreign trawlers. They very often complain about illegal incursions of trawlers in their protected area, denouncing an increasing number of fish nets damaged by trawlers. Fishermen leave their dormant nets overnight around the six-mile limit and come back in the morning to get their catches out. They often cannot find their nets as they have been pulled out by trawlers. In discussions with fishermen, the state is held responsible for these conflicts. They denounce the fishing agreements which have made possible the large number of trawlers in their fishing areas. Modou's statement clearly shows how little control fishermen have over their maritime working space and resource access and how this dispossession encouraged them to consider a migration project in Europe:

We didn't like fishing anymore. The youth were fed up with fishing, what they earned wasn't enough. Fuel prices were increasingly rising. And still, the fishing agreements, with the trawlers, it bothers us a lot. You know here in Africa, there is bad governance. With the Minister of fisheries, last March... there are problems all the time with the trawlers. There had been

⁸ 2011 and 2012

big trawlers that came 3 km away from the coastline and they were fishing in big quantities, they damaged the fishing nets.⁹

Furthermore, this loss of control generated by the fishing crisis was felt among coastal communities as the resulting decrease in income had weakened fishermen's role in their family. Cheikh is a middle-aged fisherman from Dakar. He tried to go to Europe but the hull of the boat cracked when they were 200 km away from Teneriffe. The crew finally decided to land in Nouhadibou and from there Cheikh went back to Dakar. He explains why he took the decision to leave:

It's been 25 years that I have been going to the sea and I've got nothing. We don't have means. Nobody can help me, my family believes in me; they depend on me. If I go to Europe, what I will earn, I will send it. At the moment, the sea provides me with 3000 Francs [4.5 EUR] a day, sometimes nothing. I come back, I have nothing, my family waits and I still have nothing. I meet with my friends, they help me a bit but I am ashamed. What is good for me is to fight to earn a living.¹⁰

His responses show how trapped he is between the sea on which he cannot count anymore to survive and his family who relies heavily on him. He is not able to fulfil his responsibilities and sees his migration to Europe as an opportunity to get a better control over his life. This statement echoes what was generally heard in interviews with migrants who often said they wanted to go to Europe 'to become someone'. The sea is not 'working' anymore, fishermen are losing control on the resource and as a consequence, their role is being weakened among their families. Migrating becomes synonymous with a positive fight leading to a better life.

LEAVING SENEGAL: STRATEGIES AND BORDER EXPERIENCES

Fishermen have developed navigation strategies to avoid border controls at sea. Rather than confronting patrols, they avoided them by taking detours and doing their best to remain invisible. Their perilous departures from Senegalese beaches evoked a silent protest towards the Senegalese state.

Between 2001 and 2010, more than 90,000 undocumented migrants reached the coasts of the Canary Islands (Ministerio del Interior 2011).

⁹ Field interview, Kayar, June 2011.

¹⁰ Field Interview, Dakar, 2007.

The majority of them were Senegalese and many of them were repatriated. Statistics are very imprecise on the topic as they do not take into account the large number of migrants who left the Senegalese coast and decided to turn around and go back to Senegal after a few days because of the bad weather conditions. Also, while these trips were first organized by teams of experienced fishermen, the success of this migration route had led a number of land-based smugglers to hire captains to drive the boats. Experienced fishermen generally did not insist on leaving if the weather conditions were too risky, whereas the hired captains were often accused of 'forcing' the trip despite storms or technical problems occurring on the boat. As explained by Alassane, a migrant-fisherman who took part in a boat trip to Europe in 2006:

I was in Saint-Louis, and a friend of mine who had a boat ready to go to Spain asked me to help him. We were 70 people on the boat and there were ten captains, I was the only one from Yoff. There are people who take advantage and earn money from these trips whereas they don't know anything about the sea, but they take advantage [of people like us], they stay in Senegal and pocket the money. Those of Saint Louis, it's different, they know the sea very well. They don't risk their life, if there is a storm they come back. The others force and it is a catastrophe.¹¹

Boats first left from Saint-Louis, on the northern coast of Senegal. Departure places progressively moved further south as controls were being strengthened: They then left from Kayar, Dakar, Mbour, the Gambia and finally from Casamance. The further south they left, the longer—and thus riskier—the journey was. Another migrant, Ousmane, a fisherman from Dakar, went down to Zinguinchor in the southern region of Casamance from where he left in September 2006. With another 171 people onboard, they spent 11 days at sea. On average, boats were carrying 50–100 people in very rough conditions. In this case, the risk was much higher as they had to cross a far greater distance to reach the Canaries. Ousmane had a mechanical problem and people had to leave the boat not far away from the archipelago. They were found by the Spanish navy who brought them to the Spanish island of El Hierro where they spent several weeks in camps before being repatriated.

Boats secretly left the coasts at night and were aware of the Senegalese police patrols schedules. Captains managed to take routes to the Canary

¹¹ Field Interview, Kayar, 2012.

Islands that were far enough from the coasts so that they could stay invisible: They would first head west and once in international waters, they could more easily escape controls and reach the Spanish archipelago.¹² Also, their motorized wooden canoes were not easily detectable by radar and satellite systems. Departures were organized in secret and took place in what Nyamnjoh called ‘margins’ (Nyamnjoh 2010). These marginal places were constantly moving and adjusting to border controls. They were a clear expression of the struggle fishermen had developed against a system that was marginalizing them more and more everyday:

The margins thus have come to be synonymous with revolt and resistance—revolting against their exclusion and lack of government’s support for the fish sector and tightening the issuance of visa by Europe, and to a resistance against the culture that preaches communal life as opposed to individual lifestyle. Concomitantly, the margins provide a soft spot for such resistance to unfold (Nyamnjoh 2010, p. 51).

More than resistance, the statement of Mamadou, another returned migrant-fisherman, clearly gives to the mobility of the fishermen the meaning of protest. He put forward his frustration and the way fishermen were determined in finding new ways to leave:

If we can, we will leave again. We are not listened to. Fishermen will leave again. They are those who will go there again. They will find other means. If we have opportunities here, we won’t leave.¹³

These strategies are strengthened by the ‘powers’ of marabouts. In Senegal, marabouts are Islamic specialists wielding esoteric powers to serve various services to their customers. They have had central roles in the spiritual preparation of the sea trip to Europe. Because staying invisible has been a recurrent strategy in the deployment of illegal migration routes, fishermen recurrently called out to the spiritual skills of local marabouts to prepare the boats (Hallaire and McKay 2014): Marabouts made sacrifices and said prayers to ward off ill fate. Some migrants stated that thanks to the many talismans located in several parts of the boat, they could become ‘invisible’ and escape police checks.¹⁴ Sophie Bava stresses the complex relation link-

¹²Field Interviews, Dakar, 2007.

¹³Field interview with Mamadou, Yoff, Dakar, June 2007.

¹⁴Field interviews, with returned migrants in Yoff, Dakar, 2007.

ing spirituality, migration, and the influence of the marabout on his *taalibé's* (disciple's) mobility: "The marabout works as "a material and religious comprehensive insurance" (Salem, 1981) helping his *taalibé* by providing them with Baraka [blessing]" (Bava 2003, p. 161). Fishermen have always had recourse to such protections before putting out to sea; these practices are anchored in their habits (Mercier and Balandier 1952). For the mystic work performed, marabouts in charge of those pirogues easily earned one million West African francs (CFA) francs (over 1500 EUR), an appreciable share of the comprehensive budget of the trip.

Thus, along these migration routes to Europe, mobility strategies relied on the combination of spirituality, practical knowledge and experience at sea. Migrant-fishermen were empowered by the prayers, advice and mystic objects provided by their spiritual leaders. Their mobility was animated by their protest against the weak action of the Senegalese state, finding in this migration opportunity a promising future. At the same time, these meaningful movements at sea challenged the organization of the European border.

THE BORDER FUNCTION OF THE OCEAN

Maritime migration to the Canary Islands echoes some of the questions recently raised by geographers of the sea. As identified by Philip Steinberg (2001), the ocean is a challenging space for the conventional organization of societies. It acts as a marginal space where borders are disputed, where fixity is sought and where movement is arrested by border practices. On the routes of the fishermen, the ocean takes the meaning of a frontier through their constant efforts to push spatial limits away and access more resources. When fishermen decided to convert themselves into 'smugglers' and to use their boats in order to carry African migrants to the Canary Islands, the ocean itself has been changed into a wide border space giving access to Europe.

In Senegal, people often phrased irregular migration as 'Barça or Barsakh' which could be translated as 'Barcelona or the Beyond' (Bouilly 2008). This expression combines the spiritual and cultural value of the migration journey and gives the ocean the function of a pathway either to Europe (Barça or Barcelona) or to the Beyond. In contrast, the ocean becomes the space where Europe can affirm itself by externalizing its border control and immigration policy. The deployment of Frontex starting from 2006 illustrates this phenomenon, as its maritime border patrols can

be seen as a system of ‘mobile checkpoints’ positioning itself across the sea. Senegal has seen its border control capacity reinforced by the Frontex mechanisms and took part in the fight against illegal migration by developing its control over its coastal waters (Carrera 2007). The ocean then becomes the space where these distinct meanings and border functions are juxtaposed.

EXPERIENCING CAMPS AND REPATRIATION PROCEDURES

When they reached the Canary coastline after having spent one week at sea, fishermen all felt relieved. Instead of trying to hide themselves and looking for a convenient place to secretly land, they openly looked for assistance. They were expecting to eat and sleep and had the feeling the worst was over. They became visible due to the media coverage and the number of images shown of these boat people taken in by the Spanish authorities. Abdoulaye embarked with a group of fishermen from Kayar in September 2006. The journey went well and they safely arrived in the Canary Islands:

When we were getting closer to the Island, we didn’t know how and where to shore. We saw an old man in a small boat. Our captain could speak Spanish. The guy said to him ‘I wait, I will call the Red Cross’ and 20 minutes later, a boat of the Spanish Guards and the Red Cross came and told us to follow them. When we arrived in the port, they tied our pirogue, they got into it. There were two big tents of the Red Cross and policemen everywhere. I didn’t want to throw my papers. [...].¹⁵

When they arrived in the Spanish waters, migrants were taken in by either the local authorities or the Spanish Red Cross. However, after some identification process and official procedures, they were sent to camps where their case would be sorted within the following 40 days. After agreements had been signed between Senegal and Spain in September 2006, they were systematically repatriated. Nevertheless, although they were aware of their likely repatriation, they believed there was still a chance to be accepted in Europe; that fate would decide for them.

Migrants found themselves in a temporary closed space where they had suddenly been imprisoned without any information and after having first been received as victims. In the camps, they reported they ‘were treated

¹⁵ Field interview with Abdoulaye, Kayar, June 2011

like slaves' or 'dogs'. Most respondents stated that after almost 40 days in camps, they still did not know whether they would be released in Spain or sent back to Senegal. They occasionally found out they were being deported back to Senegal, only when boarding the plane, handcuffed and surrounded by two policemen, or in the worst case, when landing in Dakar. Abdoulaye reports:

We stayed in the camps until the 18th of October, two days before our repatriation. We were not allowed to get out. On the 19th, very early, they took us out of the cell, we were 100 people in the cells. They made us line up. My brother was in the opposite cell. I wanted to be with him but I was behind in the row. They tied our hands with nylon thread. We were brought to the airport and two rows of policemen were facing the stairs. There, I knew. If we were separated, I knew we were leaving. We were divided into two groups: One for Malaga and the other for Madrid, but just before we left, we heard we were going back home. Each of us got into the plane with a policeman. After 20 minutes of flight, they cut our thread. Before we arrived, the captain announced we were about to land in Saint-Louis. Then each of us received 50 Euros from the Spanish government.¹⁶

The camp plays the role of a border as this is where the regulation process has stopped their trajectory. According to Simon Turner's analysis of a refugee camp in North-Western Tanzania, 'apart from being a place of "no longer", the camp is also a place of "not yet"' (Turner 2005, p. 333). What migrants only know is that they are going to stay in the camp for 40 days. This space is 'suspended' and holds them for a determined period of time, after a rough sea trip and before a possible life in Europe. Their imminent repatriation to Senegal is kept secret until the last moment by the authorities in order to maintain order and security and avoid any protests. The camp embodies here an external surveillance structure in which information and movements are carefully controlled. A border, as a producer of space, can be understood as 'a permanent "state of exception"' (Salter 2006). The migrants' lack of awareness of migration rules makes them vulnerable and exposes them to possible abuses within the strictly organized camp structure. Their criminalization allows a certain treatment and gives the camp authorities a legitimacy to exercise power in the name of security. Being criminalized for having transgressed the law, the migrants represent a threat to security. Keeping them uninformed in order

¹⁶Field interview with Abdoulaye, Kayar, June 2011.

to minimize the threat they represent becomes a legitimate strategy to justify these practices.

When Senegal signed readmission agreements with Spain in 2006, other West African countries had still not accepted the repatriation of their citizens who had illegally migrated to the Canary Islands. Senegalese migrants therefore did not understand why they were sent back to Senegal, whereas migrants from other nationalities could eventually go to Spain. Moussa, a returned migrant met in Kayar in 2011, explained they were told by the Spanish police:

During these 40 days, you can be free and go to the Spanish territory. But if during these 40 days, your president, your government needs you, you will return to Senegal. [In fact, to be more exact, it is not ‘during’ forty days, but rather ‘after’].¹⁷

Many like Moussa viewed their repatriation as a decision that came from the Senegalese state. This interpretation was reinforced by the presence of Senegalese policemen who were sent to the Canary Islands in order to identify their compatriots in case they pretended they were not Senegalese. While migrants had crossed the sea and felt relieved to safely reach the Spanish shore, they faced the disillusion of their arrest and suddenly lost all control of their personal situation, future and expectations. Their repatriation was perceived by many of them as a failure, which was morally and physically ‘too hard to handle’.¹⁸ They felt dispossessed of their own future and betrayed by their own government, and could hardly imagine how they would be able to face their family, who counted on them. What is striking in fishermen’s narratives is the way they apprehend the Senegalese state’s practices with their own feelings and emotions. Their personal interpretation translates into a lack of comprehension and a distance towards Senegal’s state decisions.

RETURNEE ORGANIZATIONS

One last observable place where fishermen experienced the EurAfrican border is back in Senegal. Returned migrants created organizations in the most affected parts of the country and tried to form a national network.

¹⁷Field interview with Moussa, Kayar, June 2011

¹⁸Field interview with Moussa, Kayar, June 2011

In the fishing village of Kayar, almost 500 migrants registered with the local returnee organization. When he came back from the Canary Islands, Moussa did not want to go back to fishing and decided to take part in the local returnee organization. He proposed to create the alternative projects of selling cosmetics in his village. However, most of the migrants, mainly poorly educated, had no choice other than going back to their fishing activity. For instance Modou, quoted above, had to borrow fishing gear from his uncle and went back to sea. He benefited from navigation training in Saint-Louis through an international NGO program. Returnees often said how ashamed they were when being brought back to Senegal: Not of having illegally crossed the border but rather of having failed in their migration projects and of being unable to satisfy their family's expectations and financial investments. Some of the returnees became seriously depressed and traumatized by these forced returns and were sometimes unable to speak for months. Anik Pian (2006, p. 88) stresses how the repatriation of the Senegalese migrants was often perceived as a 'rupture' in their life and their migration projects: Returned migrants had been both psychologically and physically marked and needed time to rebuild themselves. Returnee organizations embody migrant-fishermen's border experiences by perpetuating the border effect and the European experience back in Senegalese villages. At the same time, they give temporary social recognition and psychological support. Furthermore, the inability of the Senegalese government to propose alternatives after these massive repatriation movements encouraged the returned migrants to create these independent organizations (Marx 2008). The status of migrants changed as these organizations gave them the visibility and legitimacy they had lost during the repatriation process or camp experiences. These organizations were also a reaction to the weak state response on their arrival.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has explored the role of the fishing crisis in the specific pattern of undocumented maritime migration from Senegal to Europe in the mid-2000s, questioning the effective role of the fishermen in its organization. Admittedly, this mobility pattern resulted from the fishing crisis, and local fishermen saw in this migration an opportunity for better livelihoods. However, the reputed dynamism of the Senegalese fishing sector favoured boat migration to Europe, enabling experienced captains to drive the boats through the Atlantic, and thus avoiding controls at sea.

What emerges from fishermen's experiences of border crossing is not simply a tale of African migrants versus European borders. Sea migration brings forth a more complex, EurAfrican border situation. Boat migration and the vicinity of the Atlantic Ocean also emerged from a constellation of political and economic factors in Senegal that contributed to expand fishermen's maritime mobility and frame this as a reaction to the Senegalese state.

Fishermen's mobility is first confronted with state regulation on the scale of their fishing places. The fishing crisis leads them to increasingly experience state regulation processes which fishermen tried to avoid with expanded mobility. Their mobility, which increases day after day, says something negative about the condition of the fish resource but also about their relationship to the maritime environment. First unproductive, this mobility is a sign of a lack of resource, but also of the lack of control fishermen are experiencing over the exploitation of the resource. They see the action of the state as well as growing competition with industrial trawlers as constraints obstructing their mobility and access to resource. Moreover, as a result, their status among their community has been weakened. Therefore, maritime migration to Europe appeared to be an opportunity which they thought would enable them to regain the sovereignty they had lost over time on the sea space.

Finally, this study brings to light some specific ambiguities making more complex the understanding of boat migration from Senegal to Spain: Smugglers could be at the same time fishermen, would-be migrants and returnees. The way identities were blurred says a lot about how this phenomenon was perceived by Senegalese people in general: At the beginning, illegal departures by boats were clearly less criminalized, this migration strategy was perceived as a last chance to Europe and the courage of the would-be migrants greatly celebrated. Therefore, the fishermen who first organized these illegal, perilous journeys were not identified as 'smugglers' in their communities but rather as brave would-be migrants, willing to sacrifice themselves for their families. Being a returnee in Senegal was, in contrast, perceived as a shameful moral failure which would-be migrants could hardly stand, rather than as a condemnable act for having broken the law.

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Reshaping ‘Frontiers of Violence’
from Europe to the Middle East: Abduction,
Human Trafficking and Death Along
the Horn of Africa Migration Route to Israel

Laurie Lijnders

A DESERT HELL

Kifle’s body is covered in scars, the remnants of ten months’ severe torture, extortion and captivity in the Northern Sinai desert in Egypt by a group of Bedouin human traffickers. As Kifle, an asylum seeker from Eritrea, lifts his t-shirt the scars of lashes on his back become discernible. The shackles with which he was chained for ten months left marks around his wrists and ankles. His tormenters burned hot plastic on his upper body leaving incomprehensible mutilations. Kifle was imprisoned in an underground cell with fellow asylum seekers, refugees and migrants from Eritrea, Ethiopia and Sudan. He was deprived of food and water. His eyes were covered with a piece of old cloth. He spent most of his captivity in darkness. Kifle is visibly malnourished and exhausted. In 2012, several weeks prior to our conversation at the Open Clinic, run by Physicians for

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Human Rights-Israel in Tel Aviv, Kifle was carried across the Northern Sinai border into Israel by his fellow captives as he was unable to walk himself. He was detained in Saharonim detention facility in the Negev desert. After several weeks, he was moved by Israeli authorities to a public park in the south of Tel Aviv. The father of five never imagined he would reach Israel. He crossed the border into Sudan after fleeing indefinite military service, seeking safety and asylum. He was abducted along the Eritrea–Sudan border by members of the Rashaida ethnic group, while making his way to Shagarab refugee camp, and sold to human traffickers belonging to a Bedouin group in the Sudan–Egypt borderlands, who took him to the Northern Sinai desert. The 39-year-old man was tortured and extorted until his wife in Eritrea managed to collect 26,000 USD, the ransom money demanded for his release, from family members in Eritrea and the diaspora community. Other captives were forced to pay up to 50,000 USD for their release (van Reizen et al. 2012, p. 39). Kifle recalls his experiences of imprisonment, physical abuse and extortion:

I was beaten in order to be a lesson for others. I was among four people who were hanged by their hands. We were hanged for ten days for the new arrivals to see what they [the Bedouin human traffickers] would do to them if they did not pay. Two people that were hanged alongside me died. My hands were almost to be separated. We were tortured while we were hanging from the ceiling. For ten days in a row I hanged there, no sleep, no food. When we were beaten the torturers took drugs and went to sleep. The people who were imprisoned with me lifted me while the torturers were sleeping so that I could take a rest. We were tied up with iron. The chain was tied out of the roof so that they could not be opened or I could be released. The tips of my feet were near to the ground. The two that were hanged with me were too young to bear all the hardship, I was a soldier so I was able to survive the torture.

Kifle's testimony is emblematic of the story of Eritrean migrants,¹ whom I refer to as asylum seekers throughout this chapter, reflecting Israeli policy to refuse refugee status.² Since 2009, increasing numbers of asylum seekers,

¹This article was initially written in 2012 and updated in October 2015 to reflect the situation at the time of publishing.

²The state of Israel and government officials use the term 'infiltrator' to refer to individuals who irregularly cross the Egypt–Israel border, even if they are seeking safety and protection. Throughout the chapter, the term 'asylum seekers' will be used. Until the end of 2013, Eritreans in Israel were unable to access the Refugee Status Determination (RSD) procedure but instead fell under a collective non-removal policy. Since the RSD procedure is open for

mainly from Eritrea and Sudan, arriving in Israel have reported falling into the hands of transnational human trafficking networks operating in Eritrea, Sudan, Ethiopia and Egypt, with collaborators in Israel and the diaspora. Over the past years, the smuggling route developed into a system, one of its kind, where refugees are kidnapped, tortured and extorted. Asylum seekers experience and bear witness to different forms of physical, emotional and sexual violence, such as punching, slapping, kicking and whipping, and (gang) rape of women and men. Survivors also testify about various methods of torture, including burial in the sand, electric shocks, hanging by one's hands and legs, burning with hot iron bars, and prolonged exposure to the sun (Amnesty International 2011a, 2013; Physicians for Human Rights 2010; Hotline for Refugees and Migrants 2011, 2012; van Reisen et al. 2012; Lijnders and Robinson 2013). It is estimated that from 2009 to 2013 between 25,000 and 30,000 people were held captive in the Sinai desert by human traffickers, for periods of up to a year, in exchange for tens of thousands of dollars in ransom, while physical and sexual abuse was employed to expedite the payment process. The same report estimates that between 5000 and 10,000 people lost their lives in this course. The total value of the ransom money demanded by human trafficking groups is estimated to be 600 million USD (van Reisen et al. 2013, pp. 64–65).

Irregular movement places asylum seekers in vulnerable situations and exposes them to exploitation, abuse, physical and/or sexual violence, detention, slavery and even loss of life. In this chapter, I show how perspectives on violence, death and lived experience shed new light on border dynamics in the EurAfrican border zone. The structures of power bringing violence upon the bodies of Eritrean asylum seekers en route to Israel cannot be understood without reference to the externalization of EU border and migration control. The Sinai emerged as a significant route used by Eritrean asylum seekers and refugees especially from 2007 as a consequence of route closure to Europe through Libya (see Lemberg-Pedersen; Morone, Chaps. 2 and 6, this volume). Along with migration management, I will therefore

Eritrean asylum seekers only four Eritreans were recognized as refugees. Overall, the Israeli recognition rate for refugees in Israel is less than 0.20 percent. The global recognition rate of Eritrean asylum seekers worldwide is nearly 90 percent. Many Eritreans who arrived in Israel were recognized as refugees in Ethiopia and/or Sudan. However, an increasing number of Eritreans avoid the refugee camps and make their way directly to urban areas or continue to Israel or Libya via Ethiopia and Sudan without applying for asylum. As a result, Eritreans have different statuses in the countries they pass along the migration route to Israel. I do acknowledge that, among those seeking asylum in Israel, there are people whose claims might not fall under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.

show how the violent nature of the EurAfrican border is externalized, off-shored, and outsourced to out-of-the-way, less visible areas and actors. The biopolitical nature of the EurAfrican bordering, and of other bordering practices, emerges clearly in the narratives of Eritrean asylum seekers in which the boundary between life and death is so present and vivid.

In this chapter, I focus on the ‘lived experiences’ of violent border crossings by Eritrean asylum seekers during their flight from the Horn of Africa to the Middle East. By *body politic*, I mean the regulation, surveillance and control of asylum seekers by both state and non-state actors. *Body politic* turns the human body into a tool or weapon of subjugation through direct subjection, resistance, power and control (Tsing 2005, p. 7). I explain how violence is experienced through the body; how power relations are revealed through experiences with various structures of power that control borders and borderlands. In their narratives, Eritrean asylum seekers define borders not merely as geographical lines on a map, or physical borders and fences to be crossed, but also including actors and policies which define the border. Examples include the Eritrean military’s ‘shoot to kill policy’, complicit Eritrean and Sudanese law enforcement officials on the Eritrea–Sudan border, people smugglers, human traffickers and their accomplices, Egyptian border guards shootings and Israel Defense Forces (IDF) forcibly returning asylum seekers to Egypt.

Unstable governance in countries along the migration route, combined with the vast and empty borderlands of Eastern Sudan’s desert and the lawlessness in the Sinai desert, allowed for a human trafficking network to develop and flourish. People smuggling and human trafficking businesses have been long-standing in both the Eritrea–Ethiopia–Sudan and the Egypt–Israel borderlands. Trade in goods, people and movement across borders has taken place over the past decades with the complicity of local authorities. In countries and regions of transit, such as Sudan and Egypt, asylum seekers and refugees are most bereft of state protection and therefore vulnerable to crime, exploitation, injury and death (cf. Coutin 2005, p. 196).

Kifle was transferred to the Northern Sinai desert through a well-organized network of human traffickers. He was held captive near the Egypt–Israel border. Prior to his flight, Kifle had served for over a decade in the Eritrean military, until he escaped the authoritarian regime, the forced and indefinite conscription. Eritrea is located in the Horn of Africa, bordered on the east by the Red Sea, by Sudan on the west, Ethiopia to the south and Djibouti to the east. A single party state, Eritrea is headed by the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), led by Isaias Afewerki since the country’s independence in 1993. The country is known for grave violations of human rights: forced labor, religious and political

persecution, disappearance of citizens, arbitrary detention and the use of torture by the authoritarian regime. War and conflict with neighboring countries have been used as justification to keep the society, and more particularly the youth, militarized. Eritrean law states that able-bodied adults between the ages of 18–40 must perform 18 months of national service. However, a government act, known as Warsai-Yikeaalo program, passed in 2002 extended national service indefinitely. The overwhelming majority of Eritreans asylum seekers in neighboring countries are either draft evaders or military and national service deserters.

The dictatorial regime in Eritrea pushes thousands of Eritrean youngsters and their families across the border into Ethiopia and Sudan every month. Thousands continue their journey from refugee camps in both countries either voluntarily—by agreement or involuntarily—after being abducted. While Eritreans prior to 2009 would make agreements with people smugglers to enter into Israel, between 2009 and 2013 there has been a remarkable increase in abductions and many asylum seekers have become victims of human trafficking for the purpose of extortion.

Abductions are reported to have taken place from within Eritrea, in the borderlands of Eritrea–Ethiopia–Sudan, from Shagarab refugee camp, urban areas and farm fields in Sudan. Rivaling trafficking gangs and people have also actively sold asylum seekers through people smugglers, law enforcement officials and Eritrean brokers. Ransom payment is collected in different parts of the world and transferred through either Western Union or paid in cash by acquaintances to collaborators in Europe, Israel, Egypt, Sudan and Eritrea. Since the war for independence between Eritrea and Ethiopia, Eritreans have been fleeing Eritrea and have established extensive diaspora communities in Europe, the USA and Canada. Eritreans in the diaspora often contribute to the money demanded for a release from Sinai camps and those without connections abroad often see their families forced to beg for money or sell their belongings such as jewelry, property and livestock for their release (Lijnders and Robinson 2013, p. 144).

The Sinai desert is frequently referred to as a 'desert hell', a 'human prison for African migrants', a 'place of death', a 'burial ground for Eritreans' and the 'killing fields of Sinai'. These metaphors are used to describe the torture, rape and death that occur and emerge clearly from asylum seekers' stories of violence along the migration route. Asylum seekers narrate close-to-death experiences, their brutal reduction to bare existence through torture and (gang) rape of both women and men and their encounters with death as they moved out of the 'burial ground of Eritreans' to be imprisoned again, this time in Israel. In Israel, they go through another process of dehumanization through stringent policies

that infringe upon their basic rights. While some asylum seekers in Israel want to bring testimony to what they went through, others ‘bury’ such experiences inside themselves—killing the past within in order to live on.

The narratives on which I base my analysis were collected during ethnographic fieldwork in Tel Aviv between February and May 2011, January and October 2012, and December 2012 and March 2013. Since early 2011, I have interviewed over 400 survivors of human trafficking, abduction and torture on the migration route from the Horn of Africa. The narratives, often violent in content, focus on the multiple experiences with irregular border crossings and the diverse structures of power which Eritrean asylum seekers encounter on their journey to Israel. Both during the period of my fieldwork from February to May 2011, and upon my return to Israel in the following year, I volunteered in the Open Clinic of Physicians for Human Rights-Israel (PHR-Israel) and was part of a team that conducted interviews with new patients about their journey through the Sinai desert into Israel.³ Each month around 700 people visited the clinic. The majority of the patients were asylum seekers from Eritrea, Sudan and South Sudan excluded from social welfare services, including any access to government-provided healthcare. The narratives in this chapter are a combination of interviews conducted in the clinic, as well as conversations and observations outside the context of the clinic. I attended numerous demonstrations, meetings, gatherings and church services and observed how everyday life is lived in Tel Aviv.⁴

FRONTIERS OF VIOLENCE CONCEPTUALIZED

The borderlands of Eastern Sudan and the Northern Sinai desert crossed by Eritreans have become landscapes or frontiers of violence. In these spaces, power structures are constructed and negotiated in the shifting terrain between regularity and irregularity; and interactions of insecurity, violence, lawlessness and death.

Human traffickers and their collaborators in the borderlands imprison Eritreans in compounds where they inflict torture to extort money. Frontiers of violence are deregulated because they ‘arise in the interstitial spaces made by collaborations among legitimate and illegitimate partners’

³The interviews in the Open Clinic are conducted according to a targeted set of questions developed with an expert in trauma and rehabilitation.

⁴Parts of this chapter have been published by the author in the *Oxford Monitor of Forced Migration*: Lijnders, L., 2012. Torture Experienced, Expressed and Remembered by Eritrean Asylum Seekers in Israel. *Oxford Monitor of Forced Migration*, 2(1), pp. 64–76.

such as border guards, members of borderland ethnic groups and human traffickers (cf. Tsing 2005, p. 27). They are created in irregular agreements between the official and the officious. Throughout the journey, asylum seekers irregularly moving between the Horn of Africa and the Middle East cross frontiers that stretch from Eritrea to Israel and involve international, national and local connections. Not only are they geographical in character, they are a physical and emotional experience. Frontiers of violence do not stay behind as national boundaries are crossed; experiences of violence influence the self, the personal and the collective, and are carried on in living memory and subconscious trauma.

The violence experienced by people traversing this part of the world is a consequence of wider changes in the geopolitics of migration. As the European Union externalizes border controls *and* refugee management, it also outsources the violence of migration repression to transit states and informal authorities of regulation, such as human trafficking networks operating in Eastern Sudan and the Northern Sinai desert. The construction of border barriers along and beyond the Mediterranean, as well as the rigid regulation of migratory flows, left people with few opportunities other than to subject themselves to violence and even death along the route to Israel. When the migration route to Europe practically closed between 2008 and 2013, asylum seekers and refugees from Eritrea in Sudan, Ethiopia and Libya looked for other routes and destinations. The development of this new route from Libya and Sudan can be explained by the Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation signed on 30 August 2008, between Libya and Italy which among other issues called for intensifying cooperation in combating irregular immigration; strengthening the border control system for Libyan land borders; tightening control of its territorial waters and accepting disembarkation on its soil of individuals intercepted at sea by Italian vessels (see Morone, Chap. 6, this volume).

Israel was one such route out of Libya via Egypt's Northern Sinai desert. The first victims of extortion and torture in the Sinai desert are said to be Eritrean asylum seekers traveling from Libya to Israel. The majority of the asylum seekers, refugees and migrants held in the Sinai were Eritreans (95 percent) along with Ethiopians and Sudanese (van Reisen et al. 2012, p. 1). Human traffickers and other actors involved in the smuggling and trafficking networks abused the vulnerability of irregular travelers. If the migration route to Europe would not have been closed, asylum seekers and refugees would not have had to change their routes and destinations, and these frontiers of violence might not have developed as fewer refugees would have sought asylum in Israel.

VIOLENT FRONTIERS

Even before crossing into neighboring countries, Eritreans fleeing their country, become irregular travelers. The authoritarian regime in Eritrea applies a ‘shoot-to-kill’ policy at the border, anyone fleeing across the border—either on their own or with a smuggler—risks being killed. Eritrea, a country of strict surveillance has many formal and informal checkpoints and strict border management mechanisms in place. Those caught deserting the country face imprisonment, torture and death.

After escaping from Eritrea, each country of transit: Ethiopia, Sudan, Egypt or Israel is entered and exited irregularly. Eastern Sudan is often the starting point for the smuggling and trafficking routes into the Northern Sinai desert and Israel. The Sudanese government forcibly returns ‘irregular entrants’ to Eritrea and allows for no freedom of movement inside the country due to a strict encampment policy. Asylum seekers and refugees therefore resort to people smugglers, who take them from the refugee camps to urban areas or across borders to escape the dire situation in East Sudan camps. In addition to restrictive government policies, asylum seekers and refugees risk being captured and sold by local border ethnic groups as well as by Sudanese authorities such as police, military and national security, and being abducted by human traffickers belonging to the Rashaida group involved in the trafficking in persons for the purpose of extortion. Since mid-2011, more and more asylum seekers testified being transferred against their will to the Sinai desert, and in mid-2012, increasing numbers testified they were abducted from the surroundings of Shagarab refugee camp in Eastern Sudan. Survivors testified they were then sold between different groups of human traffickers until they reached the Northern Sinai desert. Asylum seekers who consented with people smugglers might still be deceived upon arrival in the Sinai after having paid the agreed upon price ranging between 3000 and 4000 USD. In this case, after payment, instead of being brought to the border, asylum seekers and refugees are sold to a human trafficker, in most cases related to the person they are sold by.

It is important to notice that not all members of the Rashaida and Bedouin ethnic groups are involved in the abductions and human trafficking of Eritrean asylum seekers and refugees. It is believed that both in Eastern Sudan and the Northern Sinai desert, a handful of members belonging to several clans within these ethnic groups are at the head of these criminal networks. The Rashaida are a collection of ethnic groups

living in Eritrea and Eastern Sudan. The Rashaida migrated to the Horn of Africa in the nineteenth century from different Gulf States. Traditionally, nomadic people involved in regional camel trade, for the last two decades, and they have deeply involved themselves in the smuggling of goods back and forth between Sudan and Eritrea, and from the Gulf states. Since 2009, they have been a key player in the abductions and trafficking of new arrivals entering Eastern Sudan through the border with Eritrea, selling them off to Bedouins along the Sudan–Egypt border. The Bedouins live both on the Egyptian and Israel side of the Northern Sinai border. Egyptian Bedouins have a long history of smuggling goods, including weapons, cars and women intended for prostitution across the border (Lijnders and Robinson 2013). Eritrean asylum seekers and refugees travel in overcrowded pickup trucks, water tanks and boats. They experience and witness suffocation, starvation, accidents and death along these arduous journeys.

For decades, the Egypt–Israel border has been a disputed frontier that is defined by violence, war, terrorism and illegal businesses. A security fence constructed between 2011 and 2013 now demarcates the Israel–Egypt border. This constitutes the next obstacle along the frontier of violence. Egyptian border guards patrol the border operated an unofficial ‘shoot-to-kill’ policy. Disappearances of Eritrean asylum seekers and refugees on the Egyptian side of the border have become increasingly common. Many have been detained in trafficking compounds in the lawless Northern Sinai. Once released, they may be sold to another trafficking network or caught, wounded or killed by the Egyptian border patrol.

With the completion of a security fence along the Israel–Egypt border, very few asylum seekers are attempting to reach Israel and only a handful of people have managed to cross the security fence. In the past, asylum seekers who reached Israel have been forcibly returned to Egypt by the IDF—or imprisoned in Israel. The IDF has not only reintroduced the illegal policy of *refoulement* but also entered Egypt, detained individuals pursuing asylum in Israel and handed them over to the Egyptian authorities (Lijnders 2012).

The Israeli treatment of asylum seekers has been transformed since 2013 from a policy of deterrence to one focused around indefinite detention and forcible returns. Due to its geographic proximity to Africa, asylum seekers have been arriving in Israel since mid-2000. In 2005, asylum seekers from Sudan began crossing the Egypt–Israel border. Since 2007, the number has increased every year and at times several thousands of

asylum seekers crossed the border each month. In 2007, Eritrean asylum seekers started to make their way to Israel from Sudan. At the end of 2009, Eritrean asylum seekers arriving to Israel via Libya grew in number and so did the number of Eritreans arriving via Sudan to Israel. It is estimated that around 37,000 Eritreans and 14,000 Sudanese entered the country irregularly before Israel's security fence had sealed off its border with Egypt in December 2012.

Asylum seekers entering Israel via its southern border with Egypt are considered irregular entrants and designated as 'infiltrators', the official legal category reserved to those entering the country through a non-authorized border point. Before June 2012, on arrival in Israel, those seeking asylum were issued with a deportation order. From the border, asylum seekers were transferred by the IDF to a military base then to a detention facility, normally Saharonim, where they were brought before a judge. While they were in detention, the Ministry of Interior would carry out a brief identity check.

Individuals from Eritrea who arrived before June 2012 were covered by a policy of non-removal. A renewable 2(A)(5) license enabled nationals of Eritrea to reside temporarily in Israel. This 2(A)(5) license gives holders no legal or social rights. The sentence 'This temporary license does not constitute a work permit' appears on the license and bars asylum seekers from working legally. The state's verbal commitment to non-enforcement created a black market for employment. The deportation order remained in force but the license holder was released from detention on condition that he or she cooperated with deportation proceedings when they became possible. Those covered by the policy of non-removal were not permitted to access the Refugee Status Determination (RSD) process. As most asylum seekers in Israel (over 80 percent) have come from Eritrea or Sudan, the result is that the vast majority of refugees in Israel have been, *de facto*, denied access to its asylum system and to recognition of their status as refugees (Lijnders 2013, pp. 12–13). In 2013, Israel started to allow Eritreans and Sudanese to lodge asylum claims in significant numbers. Between 2013 and 2015, none of the Sudanese asylum seekers have been granted refugee status and only four Eritreans have received a positive answer to their claim. Globally, 83 percent of Eritreans and 67 percent of Sudanese going through asylum screening are accepted as refugees (Human Rights Watch 2015).

In January 2012, a new Anti Infiltration Law was passed by the Knesset, the Israeli Parliament, detaining asylum seekers who irregularly crossed into Israel via the Sinai border (i.e. those who have not faced *refoulement*)

for three or more years without charges or access to legal representation. The Anti Infiltration Law has been amended in 2013, 2014 and 2015 after human rights organizations successfully challenged the legality of the law in the High Court. Even though the court ruled the law unconstitutional twice and rejected parts of the latest amendment, the state of Israel followed each of these rulings up with new, often more coercive policy changes. Asylum seekers were first held in Saharonim detention facility and after the 2013 amendment in a purposely built Holot open internment camp, across the road from the previous. The State of Israel openly stated they are enforcing a policy of doing everything possible to 'make their lives miserable' and to encourage Eritreans and Sudanese to leave the country 'voluntarily' (Human Rights Watch 2014). Holot is operated by the Israel's prison service. Under the 2013 amendment, Eritreans and Sudanese were required to report three times a day and to be in the center at night and would be interned until they could be deported, the situation in their home countries improves or they are coerced into leaving. In the past two years, over 9000 African asylum seekers have left Israel (Hotline for Refugees and Migrants, 2015). The state focuses its detention policies on asylum seekers who had been in Israel for several years by summoning them to report to Holot when they came to renew their temporary stay permit at the Ministry of Interior or otherwise face detention in Saharonim. The 2014 amendment saw a change to a daily roll call a day and a minimum internment of 20 months. Although the 2015 court ruling reduced the time of internment from 20 months to 1 year and saw the release of over 1000 asylum seekers who had been detained in Holot since the 2012 amendment, asylum seekers living in the cities are continuing to be summoned to Holot and so the physical void left by those who will be released leave will be filled by others.

The state of Israel extended its frontiers of violence, in processes echoing the externalization of Europe's borders, with the completion of the security fence along the border with Egypt and policies of coerced return. In 2015, the State of Israel announced the construction of a barrier along the Israel–Jordan border to keep out refugees from Syria.⁵ Asylum seekers and

⁵In September 2015, following calls to take in Syrian refugees by Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian president and Israeli opposition leader Isaac Herzog, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced the start of construction of a security fence along Israel's border with Jordan. The announced barrier will be a continuation of a 240 km security fence along the Egypt–Israel border.

refugees from the Horn of Africa are left again to search for new routes and destinations. The completion of the security fence externalized the border into Egypt: Eritrean asylum seekers, many of whom are survivors of abductions and human trafficking, are now unable to enter the country. Many asylum seekers have been arrested by Egyptian border guards and imprisoned in Sinai's police stations and prison centers. Others made their way to Cairo and those who survived the human trafficking cycle have been living in fear of repercussions by their captors, who are in the same country and in some cases continue to harass the survivors. The policy of coerced return, on the other hand, externalized Israel's frontier of violence to either countries of origin in the Horn of Africa, Eritrea and Sudan, where returnees face imprisonment, torture and death at the hand of repressive governments, or to third countries such as Uganda, Rwanda and Kenya from where many returned asylum seekers seek to reach Europe via Libya.

NARRATIONS OF DEATH

30117. 3/0763. 3/1234. 3/0716. 160205. 3/0983. 30813. 30254. 30120. 31607. 30419. 3/0750.

The cemetery in Hatzor (Israel) hosts the bodies of African asylum seekers who lost their lives during their escape to Israel. Dozens of graves only bear a number and sometimes a date. Some of the graves are marked 'Anonymous Sudanese' and there is a grave that reads 'Anonymous Infiltrator'. The human beings—reduced to a number—died an anonymous death. The bullets of the guns of Egyptian border guards ended their, often young, lives. A barbed wire fence separates Egypt from Israel. The 240-km-long border is a demilitarized zone. A ripped blouse entangled in the fence is a reminder of one such crossing. Every few meters an Egyptian border guard patrols. Watch towers protrude above the dry and desolate landscape. Over the past years, an estimated 4000 victims of human trafficking have gone missing along the migration route, many of whom are believed to have been killed (van Reisen et al. 2012).

Eritrean asylum seekers held captive in the Sinai desert do not have the power to decide over life and death. They are bound by networks of control, and power structures composed of human traffickers, governments, law enforcement officials and armies that govern the borderlands of Eritrea, Sudan, Ethiopia, Egypt and Israel. Death is an excruciating element of the journey, one that includes hunger, thirst, starvation, violence,

torture or bullets. There is a general sense in the community that everyone has either lost someone or a part of themselves in this journey.

Many asylum seekers and refugees convey the fear and presence of death during their journey. Death was something most Eritrean asylum seekers expected. For many of the people I spoke with, death was part of their journey and the imagination of death accompanied them during their escapes (cf. Beneduce 2008, p. 511). Some feared death, some ignored death and others ignored the fear of death. For many, bereavement became part of life: 'We got used to the stories of death. Death became part of our life. We simply bury the dead persons and move on. We try our best not to remember'.⁶

Almost all Eritrean asylum seekers in Israel witnessed the death of one or more of their fellow travelers either by starvation, suffocation, torture or murder by the human traffickers or the Egyptian border patrol. When the human traffickers realize that a captive is unable to pay, the prisoner becomes useless in their eyes, which often leads to the death. The death of fellow prisoners serves as an ominous warning for others; if you are not able to pay the ransom this is your destiny too. Fellow prisoners have been killed in front of others. One man recounts how he and other men were forced to bury the body of a person who was killed. Often, bodies are not buried but left in the desert; the dead bodies in the desert increase the fear and pain of others travelers.

In certain situations, death can also become something people desire, as Eritrean journalist and human rights activist Meron Estefanos explains in her account of captives in the Sinai desert:

This time we cannot bear the sufferings we are facing and we are in a position to prefer death to life. Death is not simple to get it here, only the lucky ones get it. We have no means to take our lives as both our hands and legs are in chains (Estefanos 2011).

Estefanos shows that there exists a thin line between life and death in situations where one loses the power over one's body. The wish to survive and bear witness can turn into a desire to lose life so that one does not have to endure the torture. The body becomes a site of loss and social vulnerability:

⁶Interview with an Eritrean refugee, Tel Aviv, 21 April 2011.

Each of us is constituted politically in part by virtue of the social vulnerability of our bodies—as a site of desire and physical vulnerability, as a site of a publicity at once assertive and exposed. Loss and vulnerability seem to follow from our being socially constituted bodies, attached to others, at risk of losing those attachments, exposed to others, at risk of violence by virtue of that exposure (Butler 2004, p. 20).

Death in the Sinai desert, whether unexpected or desired, is experienced both as the total dominance of the human traffickers and as loss of sovereignty by the captives. The social vulnerability of Eritrean refugees is neither publically acknowledged nor experienced by the human traffickers as loss. Being held captive and experiencing death in the Sinai desert demonstrates the antithetical dynamic between ‘body autonomy’ and ‘discounted, preyed on and sometimes mutilated and killed bodies’ (Scheper-Hughes 2004, p. 175).

The graveyard in Israel, the mass graves in the Sinai desert and the body bags in the mortuary in El Arish (the capital and largest city of the Egyptian governorate of North Sinai) stand as evidence of the ultimate display of power, in the decision to kill or let live. Achille Mbembe elaborates on the meaning of the body in relation to power: He asks: ‘What place is given to life, death, and the human body and how are they inscribed in the order of power?’ (Mbembe 2003, p. 12). Whereas Mbembe asks the question in a context of war, Roberto Beneduce (2008, p. 516) ‘struggles’ with a similar question that he localizes in the context of national borders, globalized as well as transnational expressions of migration. Didier Fassin perceives the body as ‘the ultimate place on which the mark of power is imprinted’. He sees the body as an ‘instrument’ that is used to display and to demonstrate power (Fassin 2005, p. 5). Mbembe (2003, p. 11) assumes that ‘the ultimate expression of sovereignty resides, to a large extent, in the power and the capacity to dictate who may live and who must die’. He argues: ‘To exercise sovereignty is to exercise control over morality and to define life as the deployment and manifestation of power’ (Mbembe 2003, p. 12). Mbembe (2000) puts forward the body as an arena of oppression and resistance. It is particularly in these contested power structures that the frontiers of violence are experienced.

The graves in the corner of the cemetery and the dead bodies in the Sahara and the Sinai desert represent untold stories of years spent in motion, passages through the desert and the various reasons for individuals to leave everything behind in a search for protection and safety in Israel. The graves and mutilated bodies are a way in which violence appears visible beyond

narration or through alternative idioms. Death is the ultimate expression of the frontier of violence. Graves serve as an alternative testimony and symbolize the anonymous, silent witnesses of the 'shoot-to-kill' policy at the Egypt–Israel border. They testify to the torture taking place in the Sinai desert, and demonstrate the body politic of exclusion. Although the bodies are silenced, the graves speak. The graves are a symbol of the anonymous, silenced witnesses of power structures encountered during the journey. The anonymous bodies in the graveyard in Israel—as well as the unburied bodies in the Sinai desert—bear witness to the journey and the clandestine crossing of borders. The deaths confess of a world politic of exclusion, of human rights violations and of arduous journeys.

NARRATIONS OF NEAR DEATH: 'I HAVE COME BACK FROM DEATH'

We were burned. I was electrified. My back is burned. The Bedouin guards tortured us because we said that we could not pay these 40,000 USD. They told us that if we did not pay they would kill us. My hands are swollen from the repeated beatings. They were beating us every minute, it took time for our families to pay the money, the beatings continued. I found it very difficult because I have no one abroad or in Israel. They were beating me, torturing me with electricity because I did not have money to pay for the telephone cards to call my family. I never went out. I never saw the sun for ten months. I was beaten on my head. They tried to give us drugs to smoke, but we refused. I was whipped, I have lashes all over my back. I was burned with plastic on my back. I have burn wounds all over my arm. My fingers are swollen, my nails are black because of the repeated beatings. Five people died of the 29 people that stayed with me, they were all boys. I was the last one to leave. In the other part I think that there are people who are still left behind. There were new people brought every time.

Kifle's emphasis on death can be understood in light of the constant confrontation with the end of lives during the journey. Several Eritreans metaphorically considered their experiences in, and release from, the 'desert hell', as 'stepping out of a grave'. Kifle, after narrating his experiences in the hands of the human traffickers, metaphorically stated:

I have returned from death. I never thought I would come out alive. I was considered dead by my fellow captives and my family at home. I stepped out of a grave.

Kifle's family in Eritrea had already given up on him and mourned his death. Kifle himself had given up on life. Through his almost biblical metaphor, which resembles a form of resurrection, Kifle creates an alternative idiom through which he gives meaning to the experiences of torture and through which he can somehow distance himself from the experiences in the extortion compound. Those held captive may experience a sense of 'having lived two lives' (Becker et al. 2000, p. 321), such as Kifle who after surviving horrific torture and near death felt as if he lived one life before the release from the extortion compound and one after his arrival in Israel.

Kifle, like many fellow Eritrean asylum seekers in Israel, suffered multiple violent disruptions in his young life that continue to impact on his being in the world. He has to deal with difficult experiences of having lived under an authoritarian regime, escape, flight, torture, violence, life as a captive and the uncertainty of life in Israel. The lack of freedom in his country and the situations he experienced, both in the Sinai desert and during his escape, confront him with a feeling of discontinuity. The uncertainty of life in Israel influences the way he remembers and creates hope for the future. However, under certain circumstances, such as the struggles in his life in Israel, this attempt is negated by the magnitude of the memories engendered by these violent disruptions (cf. Das et al. 2001).

BURYING THE PAST: 'MY BODY IS A GRAVE'

Where Kifle feels as if he stepped out of a grave when released by the human traffickers, Adhanom—another Eritrean asylum seeker—associates his body with a grave. He buries his past in his body which he compares to a grave: 'My body is a grave, I buried my memories somewhere deep down and I know that if I am going to open the door again, it will take me at least six months to close it again'. The bodily metaphor of a grave creates some continuity between past, present and future. Becker et al. (2000, p. 340) argue that bodily experiences of the past are fused together with the present in 'endlessly complex ways and memory legitimizes the sense of self'. Memory can illuminate present suffering and connect it to the past.

Adhanom's body is a site of conflicted memories that 'confine the need to remember' and the 'desire to forget' (Becker et al. 2000, p. 340). Adhanom's comparison of his body with a grave does not only show the fragility of memory, but also the complexity of the notion of forgetting

(cf. Cohen 1994, p. XIII). Through his body, Adhanom reflects on past, present and future. Through embodied memories, he strives to create new meaning for his life as an asylum seeker in Israel. Adhanom's sense of self is influenced by past experiences that are not easily eliminated. In remembering embodied experiences, Eritrean asylum seekers do not only struggle to make sense of past violence, but also of present suffering. The question becomes whether it is possible to re-contextualize narratives of devastation and generate new contexts through which everyday life may become feasible (cf. Das et al. 2001, p. 6). The relationship between what has been done to the body and the language in which the experience of torture is expressed, leads to an articulation of a new world. It is a world in which the strangeness revealed by death and its non-inhabitability can be transformed into a livable experience, in full awareness of a life that has to be lived in loss (cf. Das 2004, p. 327).

CONCLUSION

Violent events and death are not only 'stored' in narratives and 'archived' in language, but also in bodies. I have shown how memories of torture and death are incorporated into bodies, and focused on the ambiguous relationship between the body and expressions of violence and death in the borderlands of migration and life. In this respect, graves can be seen as a symbol of the anonymous, silenced witnesses of power structures encountered during the journey that represent the ultimate bodily frontier of violence: death. When there is no news about their whereabouts, family members in Eritrea and in exile mourn the dead without their bodies.

When death becomes part of a journey—both in the memory of those who bear witness, and in anonymous graves along the desert migration route—scarred, mutilated bodies become an alternative idiom through which experiences of violence and death are expressed. Because Eritrean asylum seekers are 'on intimate terms with death' in the extortion compounds, and during their journey, we find this confrontation with death in their narratives. The actual graves of 'anonymous infiltrators' symbolize the extreme limits of the journey. Through the narration of actual experiences of death and the use of metaphorical language, we may find meaning in, and an understanding of, the effects of violence on a person's life.

In the context of the EU's externalization of border management, the borderlands between the Horn of Africa and the Middle East have become

a place characterized by death and terror. The graves and mutilated bodies are a way in which violence appears visible beyond narration or alternative idioms. Death is the ultimate expression of frontiers of violence and, although the bodies are silenced, in a sense, the graves speak. The anonymous bodies in the graveyard in Israel—as well as the unburied bodies in the Sinai desert—bear witness to the journey and the clandestine crossing of borders.

Migration from the Horn of Africa to Israel coincided with the externalization of European border controls and an increasing authoritarian regime in Eritrea. Processes of externalization in the European borderlands instigated the creation of new migration routes to countries such as Israel, extended the EurAfrican borderlands and created new frontiers of violence and power. In response to a growing number of mixed migrants from various African countries—including asylum seekers and survivors of human trafficking—from irregularly entering the country, the State of Israel completed the construction of a security fence along the border in 2013, discontinuing the smuggling route. In response, the migration route to Europe opened up again, developing a new trafficking route along the Sudan–Libya migration route, shifting the phenomenon of abductions and torture for ransom of asylum seekers and refugees to Sudan and Libya.

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Suspended Lives: Undocumented Migrants’ Everyday Worlds and the Making of ‘Illegality’ Between Morocco and Italy

Laura Menin

In the post-9/11 world, concern for homeland security and border control has been high on the political agenda of contemporary nation-states (Amoore 2006; Coleman 2007). A growing anxiety about surveillance of both their external borders and their internal territory has led them to reinforce their policies for border control and to filter migration flows towards the European Union and the United States (Faist 2006; Newman 2006; van Houtum and Pijper 2007; de Genova 2007). Many scholars have drawn attention to the dramatic consequences of the establishment of EurAfrican border regimes and to the emergence of new geopolitical imaginations that have reconfigured the very notion of ‘border’ (for instance, van Houtum and van Naerssen 2002; van Houtum and Boedeltje 2009; Vaughan 2009; Wilson and Donnan 2012).

In this chapter, I explore the existential and embodied experience of border(ing) by focusing on the subjectivities and everyday life-worlds that emerge from the interplay of transnational border control and national migration policies in both Morocco and Italy. I combine the

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macro-structural analysis of EurAfrican border regimes with ethnographic research conducted in Morocco and Italy between 2008 and 2011.¹ In particular, I concentrate on the trials and tribulations of Abdelkrim, a young Moroccan man in his late 20s who migrated to Milan from the Tadla Plain, Central Morocco. This rural region at the foot of the Middle Atlas Mountains has developed intense transnational connections with Italy and Spain since the mid-1980s (Harrami and Mahdi 2006, 2008). On the other side of the Mediterranean Milan—the largest city in Northern Italy, with 18.6 per cent of the population made up of foreign immigrants (Caritas-Migrantes 2015)—is an important destination for migrants from the Tadla.

Abdelkrim's biography offers critical insights into the structural constraints, which, especially in the past decade, have produced lives suspended in the borderland, against the backdrop of the increased 'illegalization' of migration. Like many migrants who entered Italy legally, Abdelkrim slipped into 'illegality'² by overstaying his tourist visa, a condition in which he remained stuck for several years, while, at the same time, working in the underground economy. Recurrent amnesties have enabled many undocumented migrants in Italy to transit, and eventually emerge out of, 'illegality'. On the eve of the legal criminalization of migrants (2008–09), Abdelkrim applied to the 2009 amnesty to regularize his legal status but he remained, in fact, suspended in a bureaucratic and legal 'limbo' (Menjivar 2006). In 2010, he joined the Milan protests against the irregularities and the bureaucratic delays of what came to be known as the 'scam amnesty'. By shifting illegality from an individualized condition to a collective, politico-economic one, migrants reversed the Italian securitarian argument and denounced the enforced invisibility and exploitation that are the product, rather than the cause, of the increasing illegalization of migration in Italy.

¹ Ethnographic research conducted in Morocco (2008–10) and in Milan (October 2010–February 2011) was funded by the doctoral programme in the Anthropology of the Contemporary World, University of Milano-Bicocca. This chapter was completed, thanks to the support from the Zentrum Moderner Orient, the PRIN project 'State, Conflict, Plurality in Africa' and the Project 'Shadows of Slavery in West Africa and Beyond' (ERC Grant 313737). I am grateful to Paolo Gaibazzi, Stephen Dünwald and the anonymous reviewers who provided insightful comments on previous versions.

² It is worth noting that the notion of 'illegality', as it is referred to in relevant academic literature and public discourse, comprises two different conditions in Italy. Italian immigration law, indeed, differentiates between 'clandestine' immigrants (*immigrati clandestini*), who entered Italy without documents, and 'irregular' immigrants (*immigrati irregolari*) who fail to renew their documents when they expire.

Going beyond questions of the production of legal status, ethnographic attention to subjectivity and everyday life enables a grasp of the social and existential implications of the EurAfrican border regime and its 'inward' effects on national immigration policies. In this regard, Sarah Willen (2007, p. 10) has compellingly argued that, far from being simply a legal status or a socio-political condition, 'illegality' shapes particular modes of 'being-in-the-world' among undocumented migrants in Tel Aviv, Israel. This notion of 'illegality' captures important dimensions of the experiences of undocumented migrants in Europe, where a myriad of social practices and legal mechanisms have multiplied material and social boundaries beyond the geographical (dis)location of the EurAfrican borders and the fencing of the Mediterranean. Ethnographic research is, thus, indispensable to an understanding of how these ingrained dynamics—and the socio-cultural background of migrants, their aspirations, moral obligations and hopes—shape the processes of illegalization (see Chap. 1, this volume).

By describing Abdelkrim's life between family and societal expectations in Morocco and everyday setbacks in Italy, between exploitation and political mobilization, however, my aim is not only to illustrate the legal, social and existential implications of the contemporary management of global mobility. It is also to address a broader reflection on the limits posed to the understanding of the illegalization of migration itself by an approach to the EurAfrican border regime that looks only at its consequences (de Genova 2002, p. 419). As Nicholas de Genova (2002) has argued, by naturalizing 'illegal' migration, this approach fails to capture the systematic ways in which the nation-states use the law and the judicial systems not only to filter and deport 'illegal' and 'undesirable' people, but also to construct exploitable subjects and a flexible labour force. Similarly, Michael Kearney (2004, p. 133) has maintained that border(ing) involves dynamics of classification that, alongside the production of legal status and human types, defines the subjects' socio-economic, class positions. Inspired by these insights, I will turn the question around and interpret Abdelkrim's experience of the EurAfrican border regimes by reference to the process of the illegalization of migration. Abdelkrim's slippage into 'illegality' testifies to the extent to which becoming an 'illegal alien' in Italy can be the result both of the migration policies rhetorically legitimized in the name of legality and homeland security and, equally, of the system of exploitation that marks Italy's underground economy. While the external and internal bordering of Italy mirrors the establishment of the EurAfrican

border regimes, it materializes itself in the contradictory intertwining of restrictive immigration laws and weak internal control, the criminalization of ‘illegal’ migration and the widespread underground economy that requires the illegal employment of exploitable migrant workers (Triandafyllidou and Ambrosini 2011). Attention to the inconsistencies of the laws and of everyday legal practices further nuances and complicates the legal-political notion of, and the lived experience of, ‘illegality’ in Italy. They demonstrate the gradual expansion of the bureaucratic delays and legal uncertainties by which migrants’ lives and agency are constrained and the ways in which they navigate the inconsistencies of the Italian legal-political system. In a period of severe financial crisis and aggressive neoliberal economic policies, these entrenched dynamics have multiplied the material and social boundaries that push migrants to the margins of citizenship, while their legal limbo has become increasingly permanent and uncertain. At the same time, within the ‘grey areas’ of vulnerability and exclusion, new modes of political subjectivity and collective agency emerge, enabled by new modes of self-organization and sociability.

EUROMOROCCAN BORDER REGIMES

Since the emergence of modern nation-states in Europe, internal and transnational mobility has been considered a matter of ‘public order’ and ‘homeland security’ (Sassen 1999), but the current governance of global mobility within the EurAfrican border zone is a product of relatively recent historical and political phenomena. During the last three decades, the creation of the ‘Schengen area’ has transformed the bond between the EU member states and their territory, between citizenship and the governance of global mobility. With the abolition of the internal borders for EU citizens moving within the European Union, which paralleled the filtering of non-EU citizens at the external borders, different classes of citizens and citizenship have been brought into being (Zanfrini 2007, pp. 67–80). Especially in the aftermath of the terrorist attack on the Twin Towers in New York, the ‘security-migration nexus’ (Faist 2006) has become the rhetorical basis for transnational border control, detention and deportation, as well as for restricting migration policies. Containing, filtering, regulating and blocking the movement of people from Africa to Europe are the terms in which the national policies on migration have been reconfigured.

The EuroMoroccan border is a particularly interesting case by which to scrutinize these processes. In 1990, Italy introduced visa requirement and, in 1991, Spain ended the right of Moroccan citizens to enter Spain without a visa as a consequence of the 'Schengenization' of the Spanish-African border (Ferrer-Gallardo 2008). Frontiers have been dislocated, externalized and militarized beyond the national territories on the basis of bilateral agreements between Spain and Morocco. Furthermore, the European Union has also provided borders with information systems for detecting 'illegal' migration, thereby turning their territorial boundaries into 'digitized border zones' (Broeders 2007). For instance, Spain has established the SIVE (Integrated System of Exterior Surveillance), a sophisticated device to counter smugglers and clandestine migratory routes along the maritime Spanish-Moroccan borders (Carling 2007a, b; Ferrer-Gallardo 2008). In addition to SIVE, the European Union created FRONTEX in 2004 to combat 'illegal' migration through sophisticated technological devices for monitoring external borders and coordinated action with other institutional bodies.³

In turn, the intersections between Morocco's efforts to consolidate its bond with its diaspora in Europe and its partnership in military border control and the fight against illegal migration have displayed a certain ambivalence (Coslovi and Lahlou 2006). A significant 'inward' effect of the Spanish-Moroccan agreements is the introduction in 2003 of the new migration law in Morocco. Enacted in the aftermath of the 16 May 2003 terrorist attack in Casablanca, law 02/2003 restricted the criteria for legal entry and stay in Morocco and strengthened the sanctions against undocumented migrants who cross Morocco's frontiers 'illegally' and against smugglers.⁴ In doing so, Moroccan migration law has drawn a distinction between Moroccan migrants and sub-Saharan migrants in 'transit'.

Far from preventing undocumented migration from Morocco, transnational border control and restrictive national immigration laws have been paralleled by constant reconfigurations of the migratory routes. In other words, the securitization of the Mediterranean has not reduced the presence of undocumented immigrants, who continue to enter the

³ For further details, see <http://www.frontex.europa.eu> [Accessed 20 November 2015].

⁴ Migrants crossing the frontiers illegally risk being fined from 3,000 to 10,000 Dirham (about 300 to 1,000 Euros) and/or imprisoned for between 1 and 6 months (Art. 50), while smugglers risk being fined from 50,000 to 500,000 DH (about 5,000 to 50,000 Euros) and/or imprisoned for between 1 and 2 years (Art. 52).

European Union legally and overstay the duration of their travel document, tourist visa or job contract (Frontex 2010). Consequently, the European States' policies have turned 'inward' (Broeders 2007, p.78), promoting new forms of surveillance through digital and electronic systems on a large scale (such as the Schengen Information System, SIRENE, Eurodac database, Visa Information System) for controlling 'illegal' migrants inside the national territories. In addition to transnational internal and external border control, Italy, Greece and Spain have enacted restrictive immigration policy to further filter inward migration and discourage undocumented migrants from staying in the country (Triandafyllidou and Ambrosini 2011), as had already happened in other European countries in the past three decades.

The intertwining of transnational border controls and national immigration policies has had important consequences for both migrants and aspiring migrants moving from Morocco to Italy. Before exploring the tensions between the imaginations and the lived experiences of migration under EurAfrican border regimes, I will first focus on the process of the illegalization of migration in Italy and on the legal-political economies under which the boundaries between 'legal' and 'illegal' are contextually drawn.

IN THE SHADOW OF THE ITALIAN LAW

The history of migration policies in Italy is one of the progressive strengthening of internal and external border control in the light of the fencing of Europe. Far from being coherent and monolithic, though, the border regimes in Italy have seen slippages and ambiguities both between the law and everyday legal practices, and between conflicting political agendas and economic interests. In Italy, immigration policies have attempted to balance the economic need for migrant labour in the domestic, construction and services sectors with electoral interests and the pressure to fence Southern Europe (Salih 2003, p. 36). Alongside annual quotas (*decreto flussi*), which determine the number of incoming immigrants according to the needs of the labour market, the Italian government has periodically used amnesties to 'regularize' undocumented migrants. Since the 1990s, the use of the rhetoric of 'emergency' or 'invasion' about the growing presence of immigrants has fuelled feelings of social scaremongering and anxiety, which have been exacerbated to the point of outright hostility and xenophobia by some political forces, notably the Northern League

(dal Lago 2004). Despite all this, the labour of 'illegal' immigrants has become, in the shadow of Italy's immigration laws, a structural feature of the underground economy, which in Italy is deeply intertwined with the regular one (Baldwin-Edwards 1998; Ambrosini 1998). Undocumented migrants are particularly exposed to the exploitation and vulnerability common in many sectors of the informal economy. On the other hand, the availability of job opportunities in the underground economy, the relatively lax internal and external border checks and the mass regularizations of undocumented migrants have all contributed to making Italy a country where it was possible to live, work and earn money even without a residence permit (Reyneri 1998). Thanks to mass regularization, indeed, many migrants were able to move from the underground economy to the legal one, from an illegal status to a legal one. Some others stayed in their irregular jobs when it meant higher wages, even after obtaining the documents (Ambrosini 1998).

This situation changed with the introduction in 1998 of the Turco-Napolitano Law, which provided for the immediate deportation of people who had entered Italy illegally. It also established 'Temporary Detention Centres' (*Centri di Permanenza Temporanea*), where migrants are confined before receiving the decree of expulsion or being deported to one of the countries with which Italy has signed bilateral agreements on repatriation. Despite substantial overlaps between centre-left and centre-right immigration policies (Zincone 2006), between 2002 and 2009 Berlusconi's government enacted increasingly restrictive immigration policies, and in the political and public debates migration was addressed largely in terms of 'security' and 'legality'. In 2002, the Bossi-Fini Law (Law 89/2002), which regulates migrants' rights to enter and stay in Italy, required that migrants have a long-term work contract in order for them to have their residence permit renewed for a two-year period (*permesso di soggiorno*). An unlimited residence permit (*carta di soggiorno*) is obtainable only after six years of legal, certified and continuous stay in Italy. In the Italian labour market, where the problems of flexibility and precariousness have been severely exacerbated by the 2008 international financial crisis, making the residence permit dependent on the job contract has pushed many migrants into conditions of exploitation, illegality and deportability. More concretely, undocumented migrants cannot regularize their legal status without a regular job; in turn, documented migrants who lose their job before the expiration date of their residence permit and cannot find another regular job, or at least an employer willing to comply

with the requirements of the law, become ‘illegal migrants’ (*irregolari*). As such they are, to use de Genova and Peutz’s phrase (2010, p. 4), subject to *deportability*, the social, political and existential condition of (potentially) being deported any time: becoming a *deportable subject*. In theory, undocumented migrants who are to be expelled can be forcibly detained in the ‘Temporary Detention Centres’, which were replaced in 2008 by the ‘Identification and Expulsion Centres’ (*Centri di Identificazione ad Esplulsione*).⁵ In fact, the financial and logistical resources required for the repatriation of undocumented migrants are limited, so, after being released with a deportation order (*foglio di via*), many migrants continue to live and work in Italy.

In 2008, the everyday lives of undocumented migrants were turned upside down by their legal ‘criminalization’. This happened when Berlusconi’s government combined the implementation of the Bossi-Fini Law with the enactment of the so-called ‘security package’ (*pacchetto sicurezza*), introduced by the Law 125/24 in 2008 and implemented by the Law 94/15 in 2009, which defined ‘illegal’ entry and unauthorized stay in Italy as crimes punishable with deportation and a fine of between 5,000 and 10,000 Euros (Art. 10 bis). The introduction of the ‘security package’ was rhetorically legitimated by the imposition of a close association between immigration, legality and security issues. In order to prevent marriages undertaken in order to gain a visa, the ‘security package’ also established that the foreign or stateless spouse of an Italian citizen can obtain Italian citizenship only if and when she/he has resided legally in Italy for two years at the time of the marriage. In 2010–11, the only legal mechanisms whereby undocumented migrants could regularize themselves were (1) the immigration quotas and (2) the amnesty processes for those migrants already in Italy. In both cases, migrants had to either find an employer willing to employ them legally, or to informally ‘arrange’ or buy a job contract. Moreover, the ‘security package’ strengthened the territorial surveillance exercised by local authorities and the police and envisaged territorial surveillance by citizens’ associations.

⁵First established by the Turco-Napolitano Law for controlling and expelling undocumented migrants, the *Centri di Permanenza Temporanea* (CPT) were included in the *Testo Unico sull’Immigrazione* and modified by the Bossi-Fini Law (art.14). In 2008, the decree ‘Misure urgenti in material di sicurezza pubblica’ (92/2008), and then Law 125/2008, changed the CPT to *Centri di Idenificazione ad Esplulsione*, where the length of time undocumented migrants can be detained is 180 days (Law 94/2009).

Despite its aggressive rhetoric and restrictive measures, the government's struggle against 'illegal migration' did not target the employers of undocumented migrants, nor did it strengthen the control and inspections in those sectors where migrants are usually employed. In this regard, Maurizio Ambrosini and Anna Triadafilly (2011) have compellingly argued that the profound contradictions between excessively regulated labour markets and large informal economies and between strict external border control and weak internal controls, serve the needs of the labour market in a time of crisis. The criminalization of undocumented migrants, inefficient internal control and permissive attitudes towards the underground economy have all increased migrants' vulnerability vis-à-vis their employers who, indeed, have the power to decide whether and under what conditions to regularize them.

Abdelkrim's migration story took shape against the backdrop of this complex politico-economic scenario. His subjective and embodied experience of 'illegality' was deeply affected by the changes in the immigration laws and the labour market in Italy, but also by the effect on him of family and societal expectations in Morocco. By situating Abdelkrim's ups and downs in relation to both Morocco and Italy, I intend to draw attention to the complexity of his lived experience of border(ing).

SEARCHING FOR AN ADVENTURE

When I met Abdelkrim in Milan in October 2010, he was going through a difficult period in his life. He was full of conflicting feelings that were leading him to a state of despair. He thought of returning to Morocco because his stay in Italy had not helped him to improve his life: on the contrary, in his view, migration had turned him into a different person. Discussing the social and economic problems that motivate Moroccan young people to migrate to Southern Europe in search of better living conditions—such as the lack of development, unemployment, corruption and social injustice—Abdelkrim specified that initially he did not want to migrate. He emphasized, instead, that his family was not in economic need. Before migrating, he was studying at the university and working in a factory. In his spare time, he volunteered in a local cultural association and had a passion for art. 'I arrived in Italy with a lot of money,' he repeated several times to stress that his parents had supported him economically and that he had a moral debt towards them.

The story that Abdelkrim told me about his migratory experience was shaped by his difficult circumstances, and many aspects of his life before

and after migration remained unspoken. His narrative oscillated between two opposite images of migration. On the one hand, he described his departure as a ‘sudden event’ when, in 2004, his paternal uncle, who had already migrated to Milan, managed to find him a tourist visa. Within a few days, he had to take a quick decision with no time to ponder. ‘If only my brother had been there, he would have prevented me from leaving’, he regretted. On the other hand, he evoked the image of migration as an ‘adventure’ that he was looking forward to, even though things turned out to be different, as he explained: ‘I wanted an adventure, but there was no adventure at all!’ After his document expired, Abdelkrim was not able to find the job contract that would have enabled him to regularize his position and, consequently, to return home to visit his family. His migration to Italy, which was made possible by the concrete opportunity of obtaining a tourist visa, took shape against the backdrop of the imaginary and social practices that support both documented and undocumented mobility to Italy. The trope of migration as a risky and an exciting adventure (*mughamara*), by which Abdelkrim at times motivated his departure, is one important dimension of Moroccan youths’ narratives about the ‘outside world’ (*l-brra, l-kharij*) in the Tadla. Despite the uncertainties surrounding migration, the idea of ‘adventure’ implies that the risk is worth taking.

Since the mid-1980s, the Tadla Plain (Central Morocco) has become the Moroccan epicentre of the migratory trajectories of men and women to Italy and Spain (Jacquement 1995; Harrami and Mahdi 2006, 2008; de Haas 2007). The attraction of the idea of migration was planted in the Tadla Plain in the 1970s by the Beni Meskin, a group of cattle ranchers originating from Settat who had practiced transnational mobility to Italy outside institutional channels since the late 1960s (dal Lago 1994; Harrami and Mahdi 2006). Nouredine Harrami and Mohammed Mahdi (2006, p. 39) have pointed out: ‘The signs of wealth that these migrants, who had occupied the lowest level of the local social hierarchy, manifested on their return became regarded in the region as irrefutable proof of the existence of an *El Dorado* on the other side of the Mediterranean’ (my translation). Besides creating an imagination of Italy as a land of opportunities, the presence of the Beni Meskin in the Tadla favoured the circulation of information germane to the establishment of migratory chains. Under the Structural Adjustment Plan (1983–1993) and the crisis of the agricultural sector in the early 1980s, documented and undocumented migrations to Italy and Spain became an important phenomenon and con-

tinue to this day to be a critical dimension of young people's fantasies and everyday lives. Before the international financial crisis in 2008, transnational migration favoured economic dynamism in the Tadla, whose economy is mainly based on agriculture and the agribusiness industry, cattle and sheep breeding, commerce and handicraft. The migrants' remittances and their investment in land, construction, agriculture and local business have all contributed to the rapid growth of medium-sized towns in the Tadla. By turning farm workers into landowners and poor but ambitious youths into local businessmen, migration has also enabled new trajectories of social mobility and transformed the local social hierarchies.

The fashionable items, clothes and electronic devices that migrants bring home with them on their summer holidays (Salih 2003) and the second-hand European commodities available in the local weekly market are material reminders of the lure of the outside world. The display of these locally prized material symbols often fuels the desire for mobility in youths with low-class backgrounds, who claim: 'If you don't have money nobody respects you' or 'If you don't have a car, people don't even greet you in the streets'.⁶ Even though the experiences of and motivations for migrating are multiple and nuanced, many young people regard migration as offering the real possibility of 'building their own future', namely creating *darof*, the socio-economic conditions indispensable to taking up gendered duties and family responsibilities (Juntunen 2002, pp. 86–110). Since the 1990s, a growing number of women have migrated alone, but transnational migration is regarded mainly as a 'male affair'. Success and failure are measured against the ideals and expectations around masculinity, such as the ability to muddle through and face hardship, to earn the resources to invest in durable goods like land and the household and to become ready for marriage and domestic life (Juntunen 2002; Menin 2016, see also Osella and Osella 2000 on Kerala). While migration is often described as a means of fulfilling manhood and gendered responsibilities, some young people imagine migration as the opportunity to escape social demands and to lead a different lifestyle, to enjoy freedom and economic independence.

For Abdelkrim, migration represented the opportunity to travel and improve his life. As with many other Moroccan youths arriving in Italy, he soon worked out that making money easily and honestly, and then returning to Morocco and setting up a business, is harder than he expected. Apart from the closure of Europe and the 'illegalization' of undocumented

⁶Fieldnotes, May 2009.

migration, the global financial crisis has had important implications for current and aspiring migrants alike. The scarcity of job opportunities in Italy and Spain has further reduced Moroccan migrants' chances of finding the job contract required to enter those countries legally and to regularize their legal status when their documents expire. For Abdelkrim, migrating to Italy has been less the beginning of an adventure than a pathway towards enforced invisibility and an unpredictable endeavour to get out of his 'illegal life'. His fragmented testimony reveals the material and existential implications of the increased inward bordering taking place in Italy since the 'criminalization' of migrants has coincided with the international financial crisis.

CLANDESTINITY IN EVERYDAY LIFE IN MILAN

When Abdelkrim arrived in Italy in 2004, he stayed with the uncle who had helped him with his documents. Initially, he worked in his uncle's shop without receiving a proper salary. In Abdelkrim's view, his uncle exploited him and tried to hinder his desire to go to Northern Europe, where he believed he might have better opportunities to improve his life. In turn, his uncle, who regarded Abdelkrim as immature, would remind him that he himself had slept in a car when he first arrived in Italy, and that everything he had was the result of hardship and sacrifice. Abdelkrim's dependence on his uncle created tensions between them, and he eventually left his home and found other accommodation.

Abdelkrim told me that he had tried to set up a business with a Moroccan acquaintance, but that his legal status prevented him from carrying out his plans. When he left his uncle's home, he worked as a construction worker and did jobs *in nero* (without a regular contract) in order to make a living and to send money to his family in Morocco. At weekends and after work, he repaired satellite dishes, mobile phones and computers. He portrayed his everyday life in Italy as suspended and blocked. Comparing his life before and after migrating, he said that in Morocco he was respected by his family and friends for his wisdom and temperance, and that the experience of migration turned him into a different person. Since his legal status prevented him from doing any long-term planning, he often mulled over the past and on how things could have been different. For example, Abdelkrim regretted not having bought a job contract when the price was still affordable and Italian immigration law was less restrictive. Since his arrival in 2004, the political debate on immigration has become increas-

ingly connected to issues of security and legality, which, in turn, rhetorically legitimized restrictive measures and narrowed the legal criteria under which migrants could enter and stay. Moreover, the financial crisis has both increased the sense of competition between migrants, who agree to work for very low wages, and limited young Italians' chances of finding a regular job. When Abdelkrim could not find a job, he fell into a state of despair. 'I walk in the streets, I talk alone, like a fool,' he said. He preferred to work and busy himself despite the dangers of doing construction jobs without any health insurance and the feeling of being exploited, especially when he had to work on Saturday and Sunday. Nevertheless, working helped him to stay in the present without thinking too much about his situation, able to forget the expectations of the past and the uncertainties of the future.

Abdelkrim shared his predicament with his friend Rami, an undocumented Egyptian young man he had met in an association that provides migrants with free Italian language courses. They had since then become close friends: both were under pressure from their families to contribute financially and to return to marry, and they supported each other morally and materially in difficult times. Abdelkrim phoned his family in Morocco only once a month because his mother's questions about when he was going to visit Morocco made him feel depressed and humiliated. On the other hand, he knew that returning to Morocco without enough money to start a business and with little chance of finding a good job meant admitting failure to his family, who had supported his departure, and to his friends and acquaintances. Although he described his father as an educated and open-minded person, he also complained about his authoritarian personality. Conflicts between them often arose around his father's demands that he send remittances regularly. Moreover, Abdelkrim explained to me that the police had stopped him to check his documents, but without serious consequences. On a second arrest, however, he was brought to the Police Headquarters and received a deportation order (*foglio di via*) according to which he should have left Italy. Describing his experience of 'being stuck', he often told me: 'It's like being in prison'. With this image, Abdelkrim described the existential incarceration (see also Capello 2008) engendered by the impossibility both of returning to Morocco and of getting out of his 'illegal' status.

For Abdelkrim, Rami and many other undocumented migrants, the chance to regularize their legal status came in August 2009, when the Italian government enacted the amnesty (*Decreto legge per l'emersione*) targeting only migrants employed illegally in the domestic sector or as care-

givers for the elderly (*badanti*) for at least the previous three months. As it was the only way of escaping ‘illegality’, many migrant men and women who had lived and worked in Italy for years participated in the amnesty regardless of their actual jobs. In many cases, they paid between 2000 and 10,000 Euros to their real or fictitious employer in order to apply. This decree became known as the ‘scam amnesty’ (*sanatoria-truffa*) because many applicants could not be legalized due to bureaucratic irregularities, the limited amount of human resources assigned to dealing with almost 300,000 applications, the highly contested criteria established by the amnesty and the consequent court cases. Many applicants were cheated by fictive employers who applied for many people in order to make money but did not meet the criteria established by the 2009 Amnesty and gave them a false receipt. Finally yet importantly, many migrants turned out to be ineligible after the Manganelli decree (17 March 2010) restricted *a posteriori* the criteria for regularization, excluding those people who, like Abdelkrim, had been expelled twice. This complex situation turned Abdelkrim’s dream of getting out of his illegal condition into a nightmare of bureaucratic and existential uncertainty.

THE IMBONATI TOWER PROTEST IN MILAN

On 5 November 2010, I was strolling in Milan with Abdelkrim when he received a call from a friend. He explained that a group of migrants had climbed the Carlo Erba factory tower, a disused industrial chimney situated in Imbonati Street, to protest about the plight of those people who had applied to the 2009 amnesty but whose residence permit had not yet been issued. Supporters of the protesters, including migrants’ associations, Milanese citizens, trade unions, associations and NGOs, gathered at the base of the tower to supply food, water and clothes, and to help organize the protest (Riccio 2010). Abdelkrim wanted to join them.

A few weeks earlier, on 16 October 2010, another group of migrants had climbed and occupied a crane in a construction site in Brescia in order to make their protest heard. In both Milan and Brescia,⁷ the activists chose these forms of protest because their previous actions had been ignored by the local authorities. For around six months, the Milanese branch of the *Comitato Immigrati*, a national migrants’ association created in 2001, had tried to initiate a political dialogue with the local authorities on the issue of the ‘scam amnesty’. They had promoted a number of sit-ins in front of the

⁷For a thorough analysis of the migrants’ protests in Brescia and Milan, see also Carissimo (2011).

Prefecture, organized demonstrations and a general strike supported by independent trade unions, and requested three meetings with the prefect without any concrete result. Eventually, a group of migrants occupied the Imbonati Street tower to press the Italian government to issue the documents of those people whose applications to the 'scam amnesty' had been rejected or who had not yet received any response. By taking a stand against the crime of clandestinity introduced by the 'security package' (24/2009) and against the Manganelli decree, the protesters claimed the right to live and work lawfully in Italy. They wanted the Italian government to give 'an answer to our demand for the right to live a decent life, which includes being granted a residence permit' (Comitato Immigrati in Italia 2010).

In much of the Italian political and media debate, these protests were addressed as a 'public order' problem, considered by the local authorities to be illegal and unauthorized expressions of dissent. Against this the protesters⁸ called for a rethink of the tautological nexus between legality, migration and security. In their view, far from being a crime, being an illegal alien in Italy is the product of the Italian political-legal system. It is precisely the Bossi-Fini law, with the mechanism of 'contract of employment', that prevents people from regularizing their status. For instance, one leaflet published by the *Rete Immigrati Auto-organizzati*, an association that emerged in November 2009 from an internal split from the *Comitato Immigrati*, states:

This legislative gap produces a market of illegal workers at the mercy of recruiters of daily labourers (*caporali*) and brokers, who recruit their workforce in Loreto Square or at the gate of the Vegetable Market. It encourages tax evasion and the reduction of the safety rules at work, in addition to worsening everybody's working conditions (Comitato Immigrati Auto-organizzati 2011).

As the aforementioned statements make clear, the activists reversed the state's securitarian argument and claimed that 'illegality' in Italy is not the cause of the politics of the illegalization of migration, but rather its main product. Furthermore, the combination of laws restricting immigration, the economic situation and the specificities of the Italian underground economy had worked to reinforce the exploitability and vulnerability of

⁸While I focus here on the Via Imbonati protests in Milan, it is worth noting the actions of migrants in Rosarno in January 2010 who denounced the extreme conditions of exploitation and marginalization in which they were forced to live and work, see *Corriere della Sera* (2010). For a historical overview of the migrants' movement in Italy, see for instance: Basso and Perocco (2003).

migrants. The protesters' struggle also had long-term objectives such as obtaining residence permits for those workers who accuse their employer of exploitation and illegal employment, extending the duration of the residence permit for those who lose their job, a new law for migrants and refugees, the right to vote after five years of legal residence and the right to citizenship for children of migrants (Comitato Immigrati in Italia 2010).

There were protests by migrants' in Italy before these events (Basso and Perocco 2003, pp. 378–79), but the tightening of the immigration laws in order to discourage undocumented migrants' stay has multiplied the numbers of *sans papiers* who remain trapped in 'illegality'. By putting their bodies at the centre of their protests, the activists gave voice to the migrants' claims that had been addressed only in the rhetoric of legality and security. The eruption into public visibility of the migrants' previously invisible bodies became a powerful tool, which contributed to the opening up of a debate at the national level and of negotiations with the local authorities.

Discussing the undocumented migrants' protests, Didier Fassin (2011, p. 221) has noted: 'the body appears to be the ultimate resource they can mobilize to legitimize their social existence and obtain legal recognition.' In this sense, the Imbonati protest sheds light on the multiple obstacles that migrants have to face in their search for a dialogue with Italian officialdom. Migrants' protests in Milan and Brescia share similar political practices with workers' protests throughout Italy and reveal common politico-economic dimensions: from the mobilization of the workers of the Innse Press, an ancient Milanese factory, who occupied a crane in August 2009, to the occupation of rooftops by workers to protest against dismissals, delocalization and closure (Carissimo 2011).

Despite the practical and climatic difficulties, the group of migrants who climbed the Imbonati Street tower resisted for 27 days.⁹ In the aftermath of their protest, the *Comitato Immigrati* and the *Rete Immigrati Auto-Organizzati* continued to organize public events to keep the attention of the Italian public on this issue. Abdelkrim participated in the sit-in in Imbonati Street even though he was sceptical of the possibility that the Italian institutions would react promptly to their requests. Although he worried that the Manganelli decree would formally exclude him from

⁹On 15 November 2010, serious medical conditions led two activists to come down from the Imbonati Street Tower and they succeeded in vanishing. On 28 November 2010, another man was hospitalized and then released by the physician without the police being informed, which created controversy. Finally, on 2 December 2010, the remaining activists came down, a man of Argentine-Italian origin and an undocumented migrant; the latter was repatriated to Morocco despite the activists' protests.

eligibility for the 2009 Amnesty because he had received a deportation order, it was still possible that the migrants' protests could lead to a general amnesty. But the state of suspension in which Abdelkrim found himself after the migrants came down from the tower crumbled his hope of escaping his condition of illegality. In February 2010, many applicants, including Abdelkrim and his friend Rami, had still not received any response to their application to the 2009 Amnesty, and so were preparing the papers to apply to the immigration quotas for February 2011.

CONCLUSION

Undocumented migration into Italy continues to be depicted as an 'uncontrolled invasion', and framed as a matter of legality and security in media and political debates. Far from being a series of random, disorganized processes, however, the so-called 'illegal' migration is in fact a structural feature of the contemporary dynamics of global mobility. More precisely, it is the product of specific modalities of the governmental, political and judicial apparatuses that define the boundaries between 'legal' and 'illegal'. Groups and individuals, indeed, move along highly structured trajectories within legal, political and global economic systems, which define opportunities and constraints (Sassen 1999).

By tracing, in particular, Abdelkrim's trajectory from his birthplace in the Tadla Plain to Milan, I have tried to shed light on the ways in which his search for adventure progressively became a struggle to escape illegality and forced invisibility in the face of changes in the immigration laws and the labour market in Italy. Over the past decade, the contradictions between restrictive immigration laws and weak internal control and between the criminalization of 'illegal' migration and the employment of large numbers of migrants in the underground economy have significantly constrained migrants' agency and reduced the scale of their existence. Since being an 'illegal' migrant has become a crime in Italy, ordinary activities such as working, dwelling, travelling, protesting and imagining a better life have become 'illegal' acts. Far from stopping undocumented migrants entering and staying in the country, the long-term process of creating 'illegality' in Italy has resulted in expanding the legal limbo and in serving the interests of the underground economy: undocumented migrants remain in conditions of enforced vulnerability that guarantee the subordination of a flexible reserve of labour in a period of financial crisis (Triandafillidou and Ambrosini 2011). It was in this context that the condition of 'illegality' in which Abdelkrim found himself trapped came to shape important dimensions both of his life and of

his sense of self. Over the years, his stay in Italy has made all aspects of his life—economic, social and personal—progressively more precarious.

The image of Abdelkrim in his suspended and bordered life captures the material and existential implications of EurAfrican borders and its ‘inward’ effects. His biography, nevertheless, shows not only the connections between clandestine life and exploitation, but also between social exclusion and political mobilization. By joining the protests on Imbonati Street, Abdelkrim took his individual vulnerability into a network of relationships where new forms of subjectivity and political practices have taken shape. By claiming the right to live and work lawfully, Abdelkrim and the activists reversed the securitarian argument about the need for security and legality, and demonstrated that being an ‘illegal alien’ is not an ontological fact. On the contrary, they invite us to rethink the EurAfrican border regimes in the light of the illegalization of transnational migration. In doing so, they make visible the institutional processes of inclusion and exclusion through which certain types of human beings and power relations are brought into being.

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Epilogue

David B. Coplan

Not that long ago, the phrase ‘border between Europe and Africa’ would have evoked puzzlement. No more: that phrase is now universally understood to refer to the Mediterranean and the fearful realization by Europeans that its waters no longer protect ‘Fortress Europe’ from uncontrolled African immigration; that ‘the enemy is on the beach’. It was this reality that motivated the editors of this volume to convene a conference at the University of Pavia in 2011 to document and explore how European immigration policies and agencies on one side, and determined African migrants on the other, were dealing with their countervailing challenges. Specifically, participants sought to focus on the expansion and extension of EU border management into and beyond the Mediterranean to Africa itself, and on the resulting political, economic, and human entanglements.

Since 2011, and particularly in 2015, the efforts by European agents to manage or indeed to stem this African tide have been lost to view beneath the tsunami of migrant refugees arriving from the Middle East through the Levant and the western Balkans. This even though African migrants trafficked across the central and western Mediterranean in overcrowded and unseaworthy boats continue to drown in appalling numbers. Response to this undeniable crisis has been divided, disjointed, conflicted, inconsistent,

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contradictory, perhaps even schizophrenic, but also predictable. Those who simply condemn European leaders battered by the storm as it makes landfall have become part of the problem, not the solution. The ‘system’ in place was never designed for such a sudden multitude, and the crisis has exacerbated existing tensions within the EU, notably between richer and poorer members and along national, ethnic, and religious fault lines. As much at issue are the contradictions between European post-War values of liberal humanism that dictate that ‘genuine’ refugees be given asylum, while those ‘simply’ fleeing poverty can be screened for desirability and, if not desired, excluded.

Of course, the borders between these categories are blurred and poorly demarcated. This is starkly evident in 2015, as refugees/migrants are not simply fleeing the Middle East, southeastern Europe, and North Africa, but insisting en masse to migrate to Germany, Sweden, and other countries in North-Western Europe in particular. Now, it could be said that a ‘genuine’ (*genuine*) refugee simply flees for his life, not for economic opportunity or social welfare. As asylum seekers, they have no *a priori* formal right to work. Therefore, we see the effective abandonment of the ‘Dublin Regulation’, which legislates that a refugee to the Schengen countries must seek asylum in the country of entry into the zone. Clearly, these migrants are not simply fleeing; they aspire to a life in Europe beyond the confines of a refugee camp. Nothing makes this reality more striking than the migration not only through but from the western Balkans, as Albanians, Kosovars, and even Serbians now make up a significant proportion of asylum seekers.

Aspiring migrants from Africa south of the Arab world have a similar outlook. Like the Middle Eastern refugee migrants, they strategize, sacrifice, suffer, and die to reach Western Europe. But it seems that now Syrians or Iraqis can march or float to Europe and be accepted unscreened while Nigerians, Nigeriens, Somalis, or Congolese must be kept where they are. The European proclamation of some such countries as ‘safe’, and its emigrants therefore not entitled to asylum,¹ begs the question of for whom, in which areas, and under what conditions they are safe. As Laurie Lijnders (Chap. 11, this volume) documents in a remarkable and courageous piece of research, people from the horn of Africa fleeing to Israel feel unsafe enough to risk kidnapping, trafficking, and murder at the

¹There has been a polemic on Denmark’s attempt to declare Eritrea a safe country (the UK also adopting it in some cases), with some researchers raising serious objections. In addition, asylum seekers have no other way to ask for asylum than entering Europe. Since Europe’s externalization policy seeks precisely to prevent that, many are driven to take other routes (see Lijnders, this volume).

hands of those who lie in wait along the way. At the other end of the continuum running from lawlessness and criminality to bureaucratic obstruction and lawfare, European governments attempting to constrict the flow of African migrants toward Europe have created bottlenecks far from the Mediterranean borderlands themselves. This process of ‘externalization’ is the thread that sews the parts and chapters of this book together.

EurAfrican Borders and Migration Management looks at migration with reference to the EU’s externalized migration management and control of its southern borders. ‘EurAfrican Borders’ is less an overarching concept than an attempt to delineate a general purpose and an intellectual and epistemological space. Most accounts of the externalization of EU border and migration control focus on Europe, and only secondarily on its impact on sending countries. By contrast, the contributions in this volume highlight the African dimensions of externalization; how border policies promoted by the EU not only reach and penetrate Africa, but also how they become entangled (accommodated, modified, and contested) in African contexts and are shaped by the longer history of Euro-African relationships. Externalization takes place in socio-cultural and political contexts whose specificity is important to understand how externalization works. The volume, therefore, captures the mixed political culture that constitutes EurAfrican borders, and speaks to the visions, norms and notions, the practices and experiences, that reflect and shape the nature of borders in the Euro-African zone. In so doing, the editors seek to set the stage for a more sustained dialog between Europeanist and Africanist border scholarship, showing the possible points of encounter and dialog.

The empirical cases, on the other hand, highlight questions on the ground: How do given actors imagine, legitimize, and/or challenge bordering processes? How do they construe, resist, or subvert borders? What is the socio-cultural and political background of their actions? How do they adapt to the context in which they operate? How do specific locations become EurAfrican borders? How do externally (i.e. EU) imposed or induced border regimes adapt to, and transform, existing spatial orders? What frictions emerge in the process? What are the lived dimensions of EurAfrican bordering practices? How do subjects’ own history and background confer meaning on the border? How can we then grasp the EurAfrican border as a subjective and biopolitical reality?

As I wrote in my contribution to *A Companion to Border Studies*, border theory in Europe, Africa, and elsewhere has converged around more fluid, constructivist notions of borders as sites of social interaction where outcomes are more a product of the deployment of rhetorics of identity

and personal agency than of regulatory regimes (Coplan 2012, p. 512). But such a convergence must not lose touch with located communities and the place-specific concerns of real people, whether near or far from international borders. De-personalized theory must not ‘de-territorialize’ specific borderlands into a generalized metaphoric landscape, but account for their political economy in terms of real material and organizational conditions. So *EurAfrican Borders and Migration Management* tracks EurAfrican border crossers along local pathways, showing how ordinary people emerge from the shadows of transnational bureaucratic surveillance to reshape borders, whether on Europe’s immediate frontiers or deep in Africa itself, on their own terms (Truett 2006). Further, these cases demonstrate that no matter how intimidating border fortifications and controls, and no matter how consistent and rigid the regulations are supposed to be, border and consular formalities are still in some respect an encounter between persons. Precisely because officials need to reinforce their own *personal* authority among supplicants, they make representations and decisions in a contextual setting where anything from all things to hardly any things is considered.

At the dyadic end of such encounters between supplicant and gatekeeper, what gets considered is often a function of the enactment, effective or not, of scripts and routines that satisfy narrative expectations and categories of the interlocutors performing these representations of authority and control. The implications of the studies contained in this volume are that borders are as variable as the stories through which they are constructed, and we have to know not only the stories, but also who the storytellers are and what their common experiences have been. Borders are made as part of a process of telling and retelling the stories from which identities emerge. As times and places change, narrative plausibility varies in relation to such identities. There is something behind cognitive identity claims that determines their force (or weakness), their plausibility or their implausibility. So the contributors document the frantic and unremitting attempts by increasingly insecure states to reinforce their borders, indeed to ‘re-border’ themselves, in response to global flows of just about everyone and everything that threaten to de-border them at every turn (Coplan 2012, p. 516). Of course, the European Union cannot be held entirely at fault for what cosmopolitans and migrants’ advocates regard as an immensely damaging but still rear-guard reinforcement of border restrictions. International terrorism and transnational crime syndicates have made common-cause with the politics of fear and othering as well as

the realities of organizational and financial incapacity in providing credible justifications for performing state borders with draconian defensiveness. Against such justifications, which have their own domestic political utilities, the ‘reasonable’, internationalist and even economic arguments of more open-minded commentators, officials, business and political leaders have diminishing effect. At the mass, collective end of such encounters, the horrifying spectacle of wave-tossed, capsizing death boats and floating bodies, played out with dreadful repetition and predictability in the eye of the broadcast media, sink any relevance of personal encounters. In a grim but successful calculus, migrants have come to understand that mass storming of the EU’s southern borders will overwhelm legal, infra-structural, organizational, and anti-humanitarian defenses in a globalized tragedy of pity and terror. This reality also forms part the empirical basis of the larger argument for a north–south convergence of social theory made recently by Comaroff and Comaroff (2012) in their controversial study *Theory from the South: Or, How Euro-America is Evolving Toward Africa (The Radical Imagination)*. So, the Comaroffs observe:

Even at their most inarticulate, the unsettling presence of those others has always troubled imperial aspirations, demanding constant oversight....This was owed to the fact that efforts to impose imperial sovereignty occurred in places of partial visibility, places where working misunderstandings bred reciprocal fetishisms, unwritten agreements, unruly populations, and protean social arrangements, many of which were taken to require unusual techniques of control....The capitalist imperium to which the ‘global south’ is joined has no real exteriors, although it has many peripheries. Its exclusions and its margins, as critical theorists of various stripes have stressed, are a requisite condition for the growth of its centers” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2012, pp. 4–5, 11).

And in regard to border externalization, Ghana for example, as Brenda Chalfin (2010) shows, has become a ‘neoliberal pacesetter’ by ‘putting into play new regulatory techniques at a time when customs mandates are expanding everywhere in response to burgeoning transnational trade’ (Comaroff and Comaroff 2012, p. 15). ‘Ghana...functions in many respects as a laboratory for the testing out and...shaping of global modalities of governance,’ (Chalfin 2010, pp. 29–30). At Dar es Salaam airport recently, I could not conceal my mild surprise at electronic scanning for a biometric visa. ‘You should be used to this,’ admonished the Tanzanian officer, ‘you Americans brought this technology and installed it here.’

So has Africa at its borders become an encapsulation of the vectors and polarities of late capitalist modernity as a whole. In short, there is much south in the north, much north in the south, and more of both to come in the future (Comaroff and Comaroff 2012, p. 46). Having said that, it seems clear that externalization is here to stay for the foreseeable future, and not only from Europe, but Africa as well, as not only Germany but also South Africa toy counter-productively with the idea of disallowing dual citizenship. As Walters (2006, p. 187) has suggested: ‘Border control is like antivirus software, not just because it aspires to filter and secure its interior, but also because its fate is to toil in the shadow of the restless hacker.’ Whether nervous, insecure states or restless humanity will establish *de facto* sovereignty over transnational borders is a defining question of our times.

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