

Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research

Jane D. McLeod
Edward J. Lawler
Michael Schwalbe *Editors*

Handbook of the Social Psychology of Inequality

 Springer

Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research

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Editors

Handbook of the Social Psychology of Inequality

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Editors

Jane D. McLeod
Department of Sociology
Indiana University
Bloomington, Indiana
USA

Michael Schwalbe
Department of Sociology and
Anthropology
North Carolina State University
Raleigh, North Carolina
USA

Edward J. Lawler
Department of Sociology
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York
USA

ISSN 1389-6903

ISBN 978-94-017-9001-7

ISBN 978-94-017-9002-4 (eBook)

DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-9002-4

Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg New York London

Library of Congress Control Number: 2014950075

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Printed on acid-free paper

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Preface

In 2009, Shelley Correll organized a session on “Social Psychology: Processes Underlying Stratification” for the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association. The panelists were Cecilia Ridgeway, Larry Bobo, Devah Pager, and Jane McLeod. Inspired by the presentations, Howard Kaplan approached Jane McLeod immediately after the session about the possibility of editing a handbook on the social psychology of stratification as part of the *Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research* series. Flattered by the invitation, but a bit daunted by the task, Jane asked for time to think it over. The timing was not good, and Jane was concerned that scholars from traditions other than her own would not accord her legitimacy. Howard addressed her first concern by offering her an extended timeline for production of the volume. Jane addressed her second concern by asking Michael Schwalbe and Ed Lawler to join her as editors—her first, and very best, decision.

Our shared vision for the volume is to provide a comprehensive overview of social psychological research on inequality for graduate student and professional audiences. The volume draws from all of the major theoretical traditions in sociological social psychology. By so doing, it demonstrates the breadth and depth of what social psychology has to offer to the study of inequality. At the same time, it testifies to the common concerns that unite sociological social psychologists. Although we often think of scholars from the group processes, symbolic interactionist, and social structure and personality orientations as holding fundamentally different assumptions about the social world, we see more connection than division in the chapters of this volume. Sociological social psychologists share a common interest in analyzing how, why, and under what conditions people come to be seen as different and, as a consequence, to be given unequal access to valued societal resources. Each chapter of the volume offers unique insight into how interpersonal interactions, shared cultural beliefs, constructed meanings, and material resources contribute to inequality. As a whole, the chapters confirm that inequality is a result not only of overt conflict, competition, repression, and exploitation, but also of subtle (and sometimes unconscious processes) of exclusion, othering, and devaluation.

Much of the credit for this volume goes to the chapter authors. We gave them a formidable task. In addition to preparing a basic review of their topic, we asked them: to address the unique contributions of sociological social psychology to their area; when relevant, to discuss the historical roots of social psychological concepts and theories in classic sociological writings; to consider the complementary and conflicting insights that derive from different social psychological traditions in sociology; and to identify critical

questions that have not been answered and that have the potential to advance the field, especially those that arise from missed opportunities for conversation across subfields of social psychology or between social psychology and mainstream sociology. We are deeply grateful that the authors undertook the task with care and thought. Their commitment to the project, their willingness to share outlines and chapters with each other, and their goodwill in responding to suggestions for revisions were essential to the volume's success. For all of this, we thank them.

Jane wishes to thank Michael Schwalbe and Ed Lawler for joining her in this project. She had not met either of them before asking them to serve as co-editors and did not expect them to say yes. That they did so speaks to their collegiality as well as to their comfort with risk and uncertainty! She also thanks Jim House for introducing her to the field of sociological social psychology many years ago, her colleagues in the Department of Sociology at Indiana University for their consistent and constant support, and the Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences for providing the financial support that allowed her to hire Jennifer Caputo as editorial assistant. Jennifer managed the flow of manuscripts on and off the editors' desks, and did all of the tedious work of copyediting, formatting, and the like. These printed pages would not exist without her contributions. Finally, Jane thanks her family—Steve Krahnke, Sophie Krahnke, and Nell Krahnke—for stepping in at home so that she could stay late at the office.

Finally, none of this would have been possible without Howard Kaplan's forethought and leadership. Although he is no longer with us, the vibrancy and generosity of his intellectual spirit live on in this volume.

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Contributors

Miriam J. Abelson Department of Women, Gender, and Sexuality Studies, Portland State University, Portland, OR, USA

Boróka Bó Department of Sociology, University of California San Francisco, San Francisco, CA, USA

Lawrence D. Bobo Department of Sociology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA

Kri Burkander College of Education and Department of Sociology, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, USA

Peter L. Callero Department of Sociology, Western Oregon University, Monmouth, OR, USA

Jennifer Caputo Department of Sociology, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, USA

Karen S. Cook Department of Sociology, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA

Dale Dannefer Department of Sociology, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH, USA

Nancy DiTomaso Rutgers Business School—Newark and New Brunswick, Fanwood, NJ, USA

Christy Erving Department of Sociology, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, USA

Lynn Falletta Mandel School of Applied Social Sciences, Begun Center for Violence Prevention Research and Education, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH, USA

Steven Foy Department of Sociology and Anthropology, The University of Texas-Pan American, Edinburg, TX, USA

Robert Freeland Department of Sociology, Duke University, Durham, NC, USA

Noah E. Friedkin Department of Sociology, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA, USA

Maria S. Grigoryeva Department of Sociology, University of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA

Mark L. Hatzenbuehler Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University, New York City, NY, USA

Karen A. Hegtvedt Department of Sociology, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, USA

Jocelyn A. Hollander Department of Sociology, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR, USA

Judith A. Howard College of Arts & Sciences, University of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA

Matthew O. Hunt Department of Sociology, Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA

Deena Isom Department of Sociology, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, USA

Guillermina Jasso Department of Sociology, New York University, New York, NY, USA

Justina Judy College of Education and Department of Sociology, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, USA

Will Kalkhoff Department of Sociology, Kent State University, Kent, OH, USA

Amy Kroska Department of Sociology, University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK, USA

Edward J. Lawler Department of Sociology, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA

Bruce G. Link Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University, New York City, NY, USA

Kathryn J. Lively Department of Sociology, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, USA

Ross L. Matsueda Department of Sociology, University of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA

Heather McLaughlin Department of Sociology, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, OK, USA

Jane D. McLeod Department of Sociology, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, USA

Andrew Miles Department of Sociology, Duke University, Durham, NC, USA

Melissa A. Milkie Department of Sociology, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA

Stefanie Mollborn Department of Sociology, University of Colorado Boulder, Boulder, CO, USA

Jeylan T. Mortimer Department of Sociology, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, USA

Sandra Nakagawa Department of Sociology, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA

Jamie Oslawski-Lopez Department of Sociology, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, USA

Peter B. Owens Department of Sociology, University of California, Irvine, CA, USA

Rochelle Parks-Yancy Jesse H. Jones School of Business, Texas Southern University, Houston, TX, USA

Jo C. Phelan Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University, New York City, NY, USA

Brian Powell Department of Sociology, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, USA

Lincoln Quillian Department of Sociology, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, USA

Rashawn Ray Department of Sociology, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA

Daniel G. Renfrow Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Wells College, Aurora, NY, USA

Cecilia L. Ridgeway Department of Sociology, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA

Kimberly B. Rogers Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Mount Holyoke College, South Hadley, MA, USA

Frank L. Samson Department of Sociology, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL, USA

Barbara Schneider College of Education and Department of Sociology, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, USA

Douglas Schrock Department of Sociology, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, USA

Michael Schwalbe Department of Sociology and Anthropology, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC, USA

Heather Shay Department of Sociology and Anthropology, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC, USA

Lynn Smith-Lovin Department of Sociology, Duke University, Durham, NC, USA

David A. Snow Department of Sociology, University of California, Irvine, CA, USA

J. Edward Sumerau Department of Sociology, University of Tampa, Tampa, FL, USA

Shane Thye Department of Sociology, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC, USA

Koji Ueno Department of Sociology, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, USA

Henry A. Walker Department of Sociology, University of Arizona,
Tucson, AZ, USA

Catharine H. Warner Maryland Institute for Minority Achievement and
Urban Education, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA

Amy C. Wilkins Department of Sociology, University of Colorado
Boulder, Boulder, CO, USA

Introduction

Jane D. McLeod, Michael Schwalbe and
Edward J. Lawler

Questions about the causes and consequences of inequality are fundamental to the discipline of sociology. Most sociological analyses contribute in some way to our understanding of what inequality is, how it is produced and reproduced, and how it affects individuals, groups, and societies. Sociologists study inequality in many and diverse contexts—between nations, between groups within nations, between individuals within groups, and so on. We draw from a wide variety of theoretical and methodological perspectives, each of which offers unique insights into the complex processes through which social hierarchies are created and maintained.

In this volume, we take stock of sociological social psychology's contributions to this effort. Social psychology occupies a central position in the study of inequality inasmuch as it provides essential tools for analyzing the connections between large-scale structures of inequality and individual feelings, thoughts, and behaviors. Yet social psychological contributions often go un-

recognized in the broader discipline. Although the lack of recognition may reflect widespread acceptance of social psychological insights (a la Fine's [1993] "sad demise, mysterious disappearance, and glorious triumph of symbolic interactionism"), we believe that something important is lost when these insights are detached from social psychology. It thus happens that sociological social psychology loses status within the discipline and scholars who do not identify with social psychology present incomplete, and sometimes inaccurate, accounts of process.

Social Psychology and the Study of Inequality

We begin our inquiry into what sociological social psychology contributes to the study of inequality by asking two parallel questions: How well is social psychology represented in sociological research on inequality? and How well are sociological theories and concepts represented in social psychological research on inequality? To answer the first question, we performed a content analysis of articles on inequality that were published in *American Sociological Review* and *American Journal of Sociology* from 2001 to 2012. We chose these two journals because they are widely considered the top mainstream journals in sociology and because they reach the widest audience. If social psychology were well-represented in sociological research on inequal-

J. D. McLeod (✉)
Department of Sociology, Indiana University,
Ballantine Hall 744, 1020 E. Kirkwood Avenue,
Bloomington, IN 47405, USA
e-mail: jmcleod@indiana.edu

M. Schwalbe
Department of Sociology and Anthropology, North
Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC 27695-8107,
USA

E. J. Lawler
Department of Sociology, Cornell University,
309 Ives Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853-7601, USA

Table 1 Representation of social psychological concepts in articles on inequality: 2001–2012

Journal	Explicit	Implicit	None	Total articles on inequality	Articles omitted from analysis	Total articles in journal
<i>American Sociological Review</i>	112 (43.6%)	80 (31.1%)	65 (25.3%)	257	16	493
<i>American Journal of Sociology</i>	90 (47.1%)	54 (28.3%)	47 (24.6%)	191	8	412
Total	202	134	112	448	24	905

Percentages calculated in the rows

ity, we would expect it to be well-represented in these journals.

We selected articles for analysis that were centrally concerned with the distribution of material and nonmaterial resources, the processes that produce and reproduce unequal distributions of these resources, or the implications of unequal distributions for individual or societal outcomes. To identify relevant articles, we searched for the following terms in abstracts, titles, and keywords: inequality, stratification, race, gender, class, socioeconomic status. We identified 173 articles for review from the *American Sociological Review* and 199 from *American Journal of Sociology*. We then read each article to determine its central focus and eliminated articles that were not strictly about inequality. On this basis, we eliminated 24 articles from the analysis (16 for *American Sociological Review*, 8 for *American Journal of Sociology*).

We used a simple coding scheme. For each article, we asked whether the authors used social psychological theories and concepts and, if so, whether the authors acknowledged relevant social psychological work. The resultant codes were: no social psychology, implicit social psychology (social psychological ideas represented without acknowledgment), explicit social psychology (social psychological ideas represented with acknowledgment). Three examples from 2001 clarify the coding scheme. McCall's (2001) article on racial wage inequality in metropolitan labor markets was coded as having no social psychological content. In the article, McCall considered industrial restructuring, immigration, black population concentration, and the "new"

economy. Although discrimination was mentioned in passing, it was not discussed in depth nor its role in wage inequality elaborated. Budig and England's (2001) study of the motherhood wage penalty was coded as having implicit social psychological content. The authors presented discrimination and status (social psychological concepts) as explanations for the wage penalty but made no reference to relevant social psychological research (e.g., Ridgeway's research). Cunningham's (2001) article on parental influences on the gendered division of housework was coded as explicitly social psychological because the author presented socialization, gender role attitudes, and perceived equity as explanations, and referenced relevant social psychological research.

Table 1 summarizes our analysis. (A complete list of articles and codes is available from the authors, including the list of articles that were omitted.) The second row presents results for *American Sociological Review*. Of 257 articles concerned with inequality, 43.6% referenced social psychology explicitly, 31.1% referenced social psychology implicitly, and 25.3% did not reference social psychology. Of those articles that did not reference social psychology, 39 of 65, or 60%, focused on super-individual units of analysis (e.g., neighborhoods, regions, nations) for which social psychological theories may be less relevant. Of those articles that did reference social psychology in some way, 58.3% (112/192) did so explicitly and 41.7% (80/192) did so implicitly. Results for *American Journal of Sociology* were similar, as seen in the third row, with a slightly higher representation of explicit social psychological content.

These results support three conclusions. First, most articles concerned with inequality invoke social psychological concepts. This suggests that social psychological ideas are widely accepted by the sociological mainstream. Second, despite the pervasiveness of social psychological concepts in contemporary scholarship on inequality, coverage of the concepts is often disconnected from the relevant social psychological literatures. This suggests that social psychology, as a subfield of sociology, is under-recognized in scholarship on inequality. Third, a sizable minority of articles on inequality do not reference social psychology at all. Although a high percentage of these articles focused on nations, firms, or other super-individual units, a surprisingly high percentage (33%) focused on individuals—a unit of analysis where we might expect social psychology to be well-represented. In short, social psychological concepts are visible in contemporary scholarship on inequality, but not as visible as they could be.

To answer our second question—how well are sociological theories and concepts related to inequality represented in social psychological research?—we conducted a parallel analysis of articles in *Social Psychology Quarterly* from 2001 to 2012. Here, too, we identified relevant articles by searching for the following terms in abstracts, titles, and keywords: inequality, stratification, race, gender, class, socioeconomic status. We eliminated from the analysis Cooley-Mead award addresses as well as the brief “Openings” articles that Gary Alan Fine introduced under his editorship. This search returned 99 articles. We then read each article and eliminated nine articles that were not strictly about inequality, leaving us with 90 articles to code. For each article, we asked whether the authors referred to mainstream sociological theories and concepts and, if so, whether the references indicated serious engagement. The resultant codes were: no reference to mainstream sociological work, brief reference (theories and concepts represented without serious engagement), and serious engagement with the concepts or theories (i.e., the concepts or theories shaped the analysis and the results were discussed with reference to them).

Of the 90 articles in our analysis, 58, or 64.4%, seriously engaged with mainstream sociological theories and concepts, 29, or 32.2%, referred to mainstream sociological theories and concepts, and 3, or 3.3%, did not reference mainstream sociological work at all. These results suggest that sociological social psychologists engage more seriously with sociological theories and concepts related to inequality than the reverse, although there is still room for improvement. As Hunt and colleagues (forthcoming) note in their analysis of the representation of race in sociological social psychology, “social psychologists are complicit” in “sociology’s general failure to acknowledge and capitalize on social psychological scholarship.”

In this volume, we aim to bridge sociology and sociological social psychology by encouraging deeper engagement with general questions of inequality among social psychologists and by highlighting the contributions of social psychology to research on the nature of inequality and the processes through which inequality is produced and sustained.

Goals and Organization of this Handbook

We organized the *Handbook* into five major sections that move progressively from basic social psychological concepts through contemporary theories and concepts on how and why inequality persists, the application of those theories and concepts to understanding inequality in specific life domains, inequality along specific dimensions, and research on the consequences of inequality.

We took an inclusive approach to selecting topics and authors. Some topics fit squarely within the consensual definition of sociological social psychology (e.g., self and identity, socialization), others do not (e.g., power, social networks and social capital). Similarly, some authors identify primarily as social psychologists and others do not. Indeed, several of our invitations were met with claims that the authors did not know enough about social psychology to contribute meaning-

fully to the *Handbook*. (You will see that they do.) We could debate why social psychology has been constructed in such narrow terms within sociology. We do not pursue that debate here but, instead, focus on what social psychology contributes to the study of inequality.

Orienting Perspectives and Concepts

The first section of the *Handbook* introduces major social psychological concepts that are relevant to the study of inequality, including status, power, stigma, justice, and intersectionality. Each chapter in this section traces the early roots of the concepts in sociology, discusses how they relate to the study of inequality, and describes major empirical approaches to analyzing them. As a group, these chapters highlight the social psychological underpinnings of classic sociology theory, and assert the centrality of sociological social psychology to contemporary scholarship on inequality.

Status and power, two of the orienting concepts, can be traced to the very origins of the discipline of sociology. Weber's writings on status underpin contemporary scholarship on status differences between and within groups, as well as early social psychological research on small groups (Ridgeway & Nakagawa). Weber's writings on the effects of economic change on power and resource inequality presaged contemporary research on social exchange, and Marx's work on power as it relates to control over the means of production resonates with contemporary concern with network location and power (Thye and Kalkhoff). The concept of justice has even earlier origins, traceable at least to Aristotle's conceptualization of different types of justice (e.g., particular justice, distributive justice; Hegtvedt and Isom). Although stigma and intersectionality entered the social science lexicon more recently, they connect to classic social psychological concern with the nature of difference.

The classic roots of contemporary social psychology run through the chapters in later sections as well. For example, Cook's chapter on social capital locates the origins of contem-

porary scholarship in Durkheim's discussion of anomie, Marx's writings on class revolution, and Simmel's work on the structure of interpersonal relationships. Hunt's chapter on ideology begins with Marx's writings on ideology, class, and consciousness and Weber's writings on the role of ideologies in legitimizing social arrangements. Walker's chapter on legitimacy draws extensively on Weber's analysis of legitimized rule-governed systems. Foy and colleagues trace interest in the emotional consequences of inequality back to Marx's writings on alienation, Weber's and Durkheim's writings on the role of emotions in religious movements, and Simmel's discussion of emotional expression in interactions. These, and other chapters, make plain the classic sociological roots of contemporary social psychological scholarship.

The deep roots of social psychological concepts imply that social psychology has much to contribute to mainstream sociological research on inequality. Evaluations of competence, relations of exchange and dependency, perceptions of fairness, the marking of others as different, the construction of inferiority, and the complex nature of identities have been referenced in virtually every American Sociological Association presidential address in recent memory (e.g., Glenn 2011; Collins 2010; Piven 2008 are but three notable examples), although not often with reference to the relevant social psychological writings. Through their in-depth treatment of these orienting concepts, these chapters speak directly to fundamental concerns of our discipline, and lay the foundation for the sections that follow.

Creating, Reproducing, and Resisting Inequality

The second section of the *Handbook* covers general social psychological processes through which inequality is created, reproduced, and resisted in interpersonal interaction. In keeping with the complex nature of inequality, this section covers a range of topics and theories, drawing from diverse social psychological traditions and, at the same time, building connections

among those traditions. All of the chapters incorporate relevant empirical results, but some (e.g., Friedkin, Walker) are more heavily oriented toward formal theory. These chapters, in particular, illustrate the precision in explanation that group processes research and formal modeling offer sociological research on inequality.

By their nature, social psychological theories direct us to place interpersonal interaction at the center of analysis. The building blocks of inequality—status (Ridgeway and Nakagawa), power (Thye and Kalkhoff), justice perceptions (Hegtvedt and Isom), and social categories (Link, Phelan, and Hatzenbuehler; Howard and Renfrow)—are fundamentally social psychological phenomena that are produced through interpersonal interaction. Research from diverse social psychological traditions, but especially from symbolic interactionism and group processes studies, demonstrates that social categories, status, and power are defined in the context of interpersonal and small group interactions, and are reinforced by the same.

Interpersonal interactions are embedded in social networks that give them form and content (Cook). Wilkins and colleagues note that homophily in social networks discourages the social comparisons that might otherwise lead subordinates to challenge the status quo. Cook analyzes the social network origins of access to material and cultural resources, connecting research on exchange networks to research on social capital (see also Thye and Kalkhoff). Coming from a more formal theoretical tradition, Friedkin elaborates how networks of interaction, attitudes, and accorded influences shape interpersonal influence processes and the development and maintenance of social justice cultures. Both the informal social controls that are supported by such cultures, and the potential of emergent cultures to encourage social change, place them squarely in the center of inequality studies.

The content of interpersonal interaction matters as well. Wilkins, Molborn, and Bó present a comprehensive overview of the construction and perpetuation of difference. Drawing on research from psychological and sociological traditions, they describe how social categories are

constructed in interaction as people try to make sense of the world. When categories become socially meaningful, they trigger stereotypes and biases that produce and reproduce inequality. Interactional challenges to inequality are possible, but are discouraged by interactional practices that reward subordinates who play by the “rules of the game” (as when women “trade” attractiveness for protection by powerful men).

Moreover, people learn to coordinate ordinary, everyday interaction in ways that reproduce existing inequalities. Dramaturgical research attends to the interactional rules and procedural forms that are used to create meaning (Schwalbe and Shay). When people fail to follow rules, for example, by failing to display gender normative behaviors, they may be held accountable (i.e., asked to provide an account) for their deviance and sanctioned. Thus, accountability protects those of higher status from challenges by those of lower status by threatening the construction of creditable selves (see chapters by Kroska and Lively, Oslawski-Lopez, and Powell for additional discussion of “doing gender”). Interactional rules for talk have received sustained attention from social psychologists (Hollander and Abelson). Turn-taking, rates of participation, and the frequency of affirming or challenging responses all contribute to the reproduction of dominance. For example, dominant interactional partners can effectively silence subordinates by failing to respond to conversational overtures.

Emotions play a central role in all of these processes. Category labels, category memberships, and categorical identities are imbued with evocative power that heightens their personal relevance (Wilkins et al.). Affect control theory provides a formal account of how affective meanings associated with social categories (e.g., that employees are less good, less potent, and less lively than managers) shape interpersonal interactions so as to reinforce those meanings (Foy et al.). According to this account, events that generate impressions that are inconsistent with those meanings (e.g., an employee confronts a manager) generate restorative actions (e.g., the manager puts the employee “back in his place”) that reproduce status hierarchies. But emotions contribute to

inequality in other ways as well. Anger, disgust, anxiety, and other negative emotions shape behavior toward the stigmatized person (Lin, Phelan, and Hatzenbuehler). Powerful emotions, such as anger, signal high status and, when consistent with identity expectations, can be used to claim value and reinforce dominant status positions. Emotion management practices alleviate anger in response to injustice (as when wives develop justifications for their inequitable contributions to household work), thereby making subordination more tolerable and diminishing resistance. There are emotional risks of challenging status hierarchies (Schwalbe and Shay); for example, negative emotional responses to subordination, such as anger expressed by a Black man, may confirm stereotypes and reinforce stereotypes (Link et al.; Foy et al.). Yet the motivation to create a creditable self and generate positive self-feelings can drive social change (Schwalbe and Shay).

As this last point suggests, the processes that produce and reproduce inequality also implicate the self. The social categories that define hierarchical relations are the basis for identities, defined by differential value and power, which in turn shape feelings of mastery and self-esteem (Callero). Yet self-processes can also support resistance. People may actively work to change the meanings (e.g., value, power) of social categories with which they are identified, or they may claim membership in more valued categories (Wilkins et al.). People engage in stigma management to avoid negative interactional sanctions, as when women athletes feminize their self-presentations to avoid being viewed as overly masculine (Schwalbe and Shay) or people with mental illness withdraw from relationships (Link et al.). Importantly, as Callero notes, systems of inequality and selves maintain a dialectical relationship: “Relationships of inequality emerge from self and identity processes, but these structures also work back to enable and constrain human persons.”

Implicit in much that we have discussed, and explicit in Mortimer and McLaughlin’s chapter, is the central role that socialization plays in producing and reproducing inequality. Whether formal or informal, vertical, horizontal, or recip-

rocal, in anticipation of or during the occupancy of social roles, socialization processes reproduce judgments of the relative value and power of social groups and convey knowledge about how to succeed within societal constraints. Through socialization, we learn how to feel, what to think, and how to behave—in short, how to “participate in social life.” Inasmuch as social competence requires an understanding of social hierarchies and our locations within them, socialization processes are fundamental to social inequality. (See Foy et al. for a discussion of the socialization of feeling rules and emotional displays.)

Underlying all of these processes are belief structures that support (and sometimes challenge) dominant groups. Ideologies regarding individualism and egalitarianism, racial ideologies, and political ideology importantly influence social policy attitudes, formal and informal political behaviors, and emotional experiences (Hunt). As Hunt notes, however, “ideological legitimation is neither automatic nor inevitable.” Walker carries this point forward in his multiple-source, multiple-object theory of legitimacy, which considers the conditions under which legitimacy is established. According to Walker’s theory, new regimes (“rule-governed system of positions, relations between positions and position-specific acts”) acquire legitimacy when they are consonant with already-legitimized norms, beliefs, or practices, when their subjective elements come to be defined as objective fact, when they appeal to general rather than specific interests, and when they are collectively acknowledged as valid. Using this theory, Walker analyzes why an “equal results” affirmative action regime has been unable to replace the “equal opportunity” regime and the implications for the reproduction of inequality.

Contexts of Inequality

Chapters in the third section review social psychological research on how inequality is created and reproduced in specific institutional and interactional contexts, covering research from different traditions in sociological social psychology

and drawing on the concepts introduced in earlier chapters. Of special interest in these chapters are the unique contributions of social psychology to advancing general sociological understandings of how inequality “comes to life” in diverse contexts. Here, in especially vivid form, we see how social psychology has and has not been incorporated into mainstream sociological research and what sociology stands to gain from greater attention to social psychological concepts and theories.

One major conclusion we take from this section is that place matters for how inequality is produced and reproduced. As the context defined most closely by interpersonal relationships, families are thought to contribute to the production and reproduction of inequality through virtually every process discussed in the previous section (Lively et al.). In the case of the unequal household division of labor alone, scholars have sought explanation in theories of “doing gender,” status construction, affect control, identity, and equity. In contrast, studies of schools, work, and neighborhoods emphasize a different set of processes, and more often without explicit reference to social psychology (Schneider, Judy, and Burkander). Studies of schools as contexts for inequality look to identity, parental involvement, student engagement, and teacher expectations to explain gaps in achievement. In the domain of work, studies of personnel practices draw on the concepts of status, social identities, and cognitive biases, but studies of job satisfaction and organizational commitment are less strongly connected to social psychology (DiTomaso and Parks-Yancy). Studies of neighborhoods focus on local norms, network exclusion, and social control as processes through which neighborhood disadvantage produces individual disadvantages (Quillian). Research on non-family contexts also gives careful attention to the processes through which people are sorted into those contexts, including how knowledge and resources affect parents’ abilities to choose schools, and how racial attitudes influence neighborhood preferences and neighborhood stereotyping (see also Samson and Bobo). Sorting processes often implicate the

family, thereby demonstrating the inherent connections among these distinct contexts.

Dimensions of Inequality

The chapters in the fourth section support a similar conclusion: how inequality is produced depends on the dimension under consideration. These chapters cover research on specific differentiating characteristics that serve as the basis for hierarchical social relations, giving special attention to what is unique about how each characteristic becomes a basis of inequality. Each set of authors identifies belief systems or ideologies that support specific forms of inequality—e.g., ethnoracial attitudes for race (Samson and Bobo), individualism for social class (Milkie et al.), heteronormativity for sexualities (Schrock et al.), and the naturalization of the life course for age-based inequality (Falletta and Dannefer)—as well as the processes through which these ideologies are enacted and perpetuated within specific contexts. For example, Kroska reviews research on how toddlers are taught gender appropriate behavior in preschool and by parents. Milkie and colleagues describe how parenting practices differentially prepare children from different social class backgrounds for educational and occupational success. Schrock and colleagues identify public discrimination against lesbian, gay, and bisexual people as one process through which heteronormativity is enacted. Drawing on formal theoretical propositions, Jasso presents hypotheses regarding the influence of the relative importance of status, justice, and power in societies on the social distance between natives and immigrants.

Although the chapters emphasize different specific processes, what is equally clear is the central importance of generic processes to the production and reproduction of inequality. By generic processes, we mean processes that transcend specific interactional settings (Schwalbe et al. 2000)—othering, boundary maintenance, negative social comparisons, stigmatization, network exclusion, and the like. Although discussed more explicitly in some lines of research than

others, these processes apply across all dimensions of inequality, linking them to each other and to fundamentally social psychological concerns.

The chapters in this section are also linked by the authors' recognition that the experiences of disadvantaged groups vary depending on their other group memberships. Although the authors agree about the value of taking an intersectional approach, the paucity of relevant research limits their reviews. We see this as an important next step for social psychological research on inequality. Per Schrock and colleagues, "incorporating an intersectional sensibility may enable social psychologists to better illustrate how various axes of inequality are similar, different, and linked."

Outcomes of Inequality

The final section of the *Handbook* includes chapters that discuss the consequences of inequality for individuals and societies. Because the outcomes of inequality are of interest to scholars from many different backgrounds, these chapters are especially critical to establishing the broad reach of social psychological theories and concepts.

Inequality imposes heavy costs on those who are disadvantaged. Several chapters in earlier sections highlight the negative emotional consequences of inequality (Foy et al.), stigmatization (Link and colleagues), and perceived injustice (Hegtvædt and Isom) as well as the potential damage that social disadvantage does to the self (Callero; Milkie et al.). The chapters in this final section emphasize two specific negative outcomes—criminal involvement and poor health—both of which have been linked to emotions and self. Matsueda and Grigoryeva develop a theory of criminal involvement that links inequality to criminal involvement through participation in groups (e.g., peer networks, neighborhoods) that are either organized in favor of crime or organized against crime. Participation in groups produces identities, preferences, and habits that either promote or discourage criminal behavior; these behaviors, in turn, reinforce group norms. McLeod and colleagues review research on six key factors that have been proposed to explain health

inequalities—stress exposures, environmental exposures, psychological dispositions, social relations, health behaviors, and health care interactions—as well as social comparison processes. Both chapters demonstrate that inequality affects feelings, beliefs, and behaviors for reasons other than simply material deprivation, and point to the importance of interpersonal interactions, identities, and symbolic meanings in these processes.

While much social psychological research emphasizes the costs of inequality, chapters in this section also acknowledge the potential for change, resistance, and mobilization. This potential comes through most clearly in Snow and Owens's chapter on social movements. Through framing processes, identity work, and the development of participatory incentives, experiences of inequality are constructed as injustices and actors are mobilized to seek redress. Although we often associate these processes with progressive movements, Snow and Owens caution that the same processes are used by right-wing and reactionary movements. McLeod and colleagues also show complexities in the relationship between inequality and health, with social support, salutary identities, and positive social comparisons serving to mitigate the health-damaging effects of social disadvantage.

Although each section of the *Handbook* approaches the social psychology of inequality from a different vantage point, they are linked by four common themes that highlight the unique contributions of sociological social psychology: the implicit nature of the processes that support inequality; the centrality of meaning in these processes; the shaping of human agency by culture and social organization; and the ability of social psychology to connect levels of analysis.

Cross-Cutting Themes in the Social Psychology of Inequality

Implicit Processes

While inequality often arises and is reproduced through deliberate, conscious oppressive action, it is also supported by unconscious, implicit processes. Sociological social psychology offers

a variety of tools for analyzing these processes. For example, status construction theory provides an account of how social differences become associated with perceived competence and worth in repeated encounters and, in turn, lead to shared status beliefs that become self-perpetuating (Ridgeway and Nakagawa). Theories of social cognition locate the origins of social categories in people's needs to make sense of the world and coordinate behavior (Wilkins et al.). Dramaturgy (Schwalbe and Shay) emphasizes tacit normative and procedural rules of interpersonal interaction that reinforce inequality. Exchange theory (Thye and Kalkhoff) directs us to consider how structured relational dependencies influence power and the distribution of resources, independent of the conscious exercise of power. Although different in their assumptions, these diverse traditions are united in the belief that the production and reproduction of inequality depend on processes that exist outside of conscious awareness. The implicit nature of inequality echoes through the *Handbook*, in research on language, interpersonal influence, socialization, self, emotions, and ideologies, among other processes.

The implicit nature of inequality processes helps us understand how people in disadvantaged positions can inadvertently contribute to their own oppression. As Snow and Owens note, experiences of inequality do not necessarily mobilize grievances; people must come to see inequalities as unjust before they will seek redress (see also Hegtvedt and Isom; Hunt). Widely held beliefs about the relative status of social groups bind dominants and subordinates, as do ideologies that attribute disadvantage to individual failure (Ridgeway and Nakagawa; Hunt). While these beliefs can be learned, they are also reinforced in interaction. People may fear sanctioning by powerful authorities or social ostracism for rejecting dominant ideologies (Hegtvedt and Isom). In this way, subordinates learn not to challenge the existing order.

Other processes also encourage subordinated groups to participate in the perpetuation of difference (Wilkins et al.). Hegtvedt and Isom note that perceptions of relative deprivation depend on social comparison processes that are shaped, in

turn, by social proximity and information availability. Homophily of social networks masks inequalities between groups (Wilkins et al.) and discourages negative social comparisons (Milkie et al.). Emotion management strategies make subordination more tolerable and, thereby, discourage dissent (Foy et al.). Subordinated groups may find validation for their devalued identities by accepting stigma and internalizing negative stereotypes (Callero; Foy et al.). More generally, subordinated groups are rewarded in interaction for "playing their part" (Schwalbe and Shay). Beliefs about inequality and the behaviors that reinforce them are learned through deliberate socialization (as when middle-class parents encourage activities that promote cognitive and social development) but also through direct experience (as when children learn to disengage from school when they encounter unfamiliar expectations; Mortimer and McLaughlin). The insidious nature of these processes contributes to the intransigency of inequality.

Meanings

Inequality depends on the recognition of difference. The definitions of social categories and the meanings those categories are assigned arise from and reinforce political and economic hierarchies. Many chapters in this volume draw from Mead's insight that meaning is not inherent in objects, persons, or situations; rather, meanings are constructed by social actors engaged in interaction (see also Blumer 1969). Because meanings are socially constructed, they are subject to change, as individual and collective actors jockey for relative advantage. By implication, the status order needs to be reaffirmed continually through the construction of difference and supporting ideologies. As Hunt states, although force and material incentives can be used to perpetuate inequality, ideologies are an "efficient means of promoting social stability."

Not all human differences have social significance. Wilkins and colleagues assert that the differences that matter most involve observable characteristics that have consequences for basic

social functions, such as reproduction and the production and consumption of goods. Theories of stigma posit that differences have greater significance (i.e., are more likely to trigger stigma) when they cannot be concealed, are irreversible, disrupt interpersonal interactions, trigger disgust, and induce fear (Link et al.). In both accounts, differences are constructed as meaningful through historical processes that justify them with reference to ideologies of superiority/inferiority and resource inequalities. Through these processes, differences come to be seen as natural and, therefore, valid.

The meanings of life conditions are negotiated as well. Objective circumstances and subjective perceptions do not always correspond (Hegtvædt and Isom; Hunt; Lively et al.; Snow and Owens). Men and women do not always perceive unequal divisions of labor as unjust (Kroska; Lively et al.). As a result, people who are disadvantaged do not always seek redress (DiTomaso and Parks-Yancy; Snow and Owens). At the same time, the negotiated character of meaning implies that the reconstruction of meaning can be a source of resistance. Workers can personalize the workplace to assert their humanity (Callero). Activists can challenge stratification ideologies, destabilizing society and encouraging demands for change (Hunt).

Inequality operates through self-meanings as well as the meanings ascribed to others. In Callero's words, "the meanings and social practices that frame and define interaction are expressed in terms of social identities, and many categories of identity are the product of inequality processes." Salient meanings for inequality include value (respect, prestige, honor) and power (authority, control), both of which communicate relative social standing. In short, through the process of meaning construction, selves are constituted in ways that reproduce social structures. In that way, meaning connects larger social structures and ideologies to the self.

The Shaping of Human Agency

People actively participate in the creation and reproduction of inequality, but not under conditions

of their own choosing. These conditions shape the values, attitudes, beliefs, self-conceptions, and feelings that form the basis for how people create, experience, and reproduce inequalities. This is not to say that social structures are merely constraining; they are simultaneously enabling, providing us with the tools—language, theories, conventional ways of doing things together, material resources—that make effective social action possible. Human agency, in other words, is always given form and direction by culture and social organization. Social psychology is the discipline that gives the greatest attention to the processes through which this shaping of human agency occurs.

These processes are most visible in the chapters devoted to specific dimensions of inequality and the contexts in which inequality is produced and reproduced. Here we can trace how cultural ideologies regarding motherhood contribute to gender wage inequality (Lively et al.); how heteronormative high school cultures diminish the academic performance of sexual minority students (Schrock et al.); how cultural ideals of manhood shape dominance behavior (Schwalbe and Shay); and how individualism disadvantages people who do not have the resources or information that facilitate good choices (Milkie et al.). Here, too, we see how the availability of resources shapes parents' abilities to support their children's academic and social development (Milkie et al.), how residing in disadvantaged neighborhoods reduces the probability of high school graduation (Quillian), and how racial hierarchies support discriminatory actions that create racial inequalities (Bobo and Samson).

These serve as powerful examples of the ways in which social hierarchies and cultural ideologies channel human agency. The differential opportunity structures and meaning systems that derive from unequal social arrangements reinforce inequality, discourage challenges to the social order, and produce dramatic variations in life chances. Although this volume provides evidence for the creative efforts of disadvantaged persons and groups to improve their lives, it also reminds us not to lose sight of the limits to those efforts. Social psychological theories facilitate

analysis of people's efforts to make sense of their worlds and to act efficaciously in the face of constraint.

Linking Levels of Analysis

The final theme that links the chapters in this volume follows from the previous section. In mainstream sociological parlance, social psychological research links macro, meso, and micro levels of analysis. The multi-level nature of social psychological research runs through all of the chapters, from Ridgeway and Nakagawa's assertion that "status is a *multilevel*, actor-group relation" to Snow and Owens assertion that social movements are "some of the primary bearers, and sometimes even creators, of knowledge and understanding about social inequality." Social psychological processes connect structural and cultural systems, local contexts, and individual experience.

Because of its multi-level nature, research on inequality integrates the "three faces of social psychology" (House 1977), now most accurately defined as symbolic interactionism, group processes research, and social structure and personality. Perhaps more explicitly than the other faces, the social structure and personality tradition directs us to identify the specific large-scale social arrangements of interest, and the specific proximate social contexts through which they operate, but it is symbolic interactionism and group processes research that provide the conceptual tools with which to analyze what happens within those contexts. Harkening back to House (1977), by focusing on their common

interests in status, power, and difference, social psychologists can work collectively to develop a comprehensive and compelling account of inequality. This account is grounded not just in material arrangements, not just in conscious acts, and not just in overt conflict, but in the subtle, insidious processes through which actors work together to construct a stratified world.

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Orienting Perspectives and Concepts

The chapters in this section introduce major social psychological concepts that are relevant to the study of inequality, including status, power, stigma, injustice, and intersectionality. Some of the concepts (status, power) have their roots in classic works of sociology—Durkheim, Marx, Weber, Simmel—or philosophy (injustice). Others (stigma, intersectionality) have more contemporary origins. All reverberate through the contemporary sociological literature. As a group, the chapters cover a wide range of social

psychological theories, including expectation states, social exchange, equity, labeling, and social categorization. They draw on research reflecting the three main approaches to sociological social psychology—group processes, symbolic interaction, and social structure and personality—as well as from psychological social psychology. Readers of the section will see how social psychology speaks to the fundamental concerns of sociology, making central contributions to the study of inequality.

Introduction

When people discuss inequalities in contemporary societies, they easily grasp how these can be created by differences in the possession of resources, like money, or positions of power, like the one a boss might have over an employee. But how are significant inequalities produced by status—differences in esteem and respect? Status is a ubiquitous and ever present form of inequality in all human societies (Fiske 2010). Yet it is often so taken for granted that people don't explicitly consider how much it matters. As we shall see, status has multiple, sometimes subtle but accumulatively powerful effects on who is listened to, who is taken seriously, and who ends up in advantaged versus disadvantaged positions in society. What then is status? How does it work? Why do people care about it and what are its consequences for unequal life chances in complex societies? These are the questions this chapter will address.

Status can be defined as a social ranking of individuals, groups, or objects as superior or inferior according to a shared standard of social value. As a ranking, it is an inherently comparative relation of higher or lower status associated with one person, group, or object, compared to others. Status is revealed in the esteem, honor,

respect, and deference accorded to the person, group, or object in comparison to others.

Several aspects of this definition are worth unpacking. Note, first, that status involves actors at one level who are nested within an encompassing group that shares a socially defined standard of value. Thus, status is a *multilevel*, actor-group relation that necessarily implicates social psychological processes linking individuals to groups. Second, note that a person's (or group's) status is revealed through and dependent on the evaluations and actions of *others* toward them. Status cannot be possessed like material goods (cf. Goffman 1956). Rather, status is like a reputation that a person can take action to claim, but that must be granted through others' responses to that claim. Finally, note that status is at root a *socio-cultural* process rather than a material one. It is based in cultural beliefs that members of the encompassing group presume they share both about standards of value (what counts) and the relative rank of actors according to those standards (who is considered better at what counts).

The cultural, rather than directly material nature of status inequality may account for why people find status inequality harder to grasp immediately than they do wealth or power. Moreover, once status develops, it often co-occurs with wealth and power, making it difficult to identify pure status processes in day to day life (Magee and Galinsky 2008). This does not mean, however, that people do not care about status. Status is a form of inequality that is rooted in people's sense of the comparative value in which they are

C. L. Ridgeway (✉) · S. Nakagawa
Department of Sociology, Stanford University, 450 Serra
Mall-Bldg. 120, Stanford, CA 94035-2047, USA
e-mail: ridgeway@stanford.edu

held by the groups that matter for them. To the extent that people know that they need others and care about what others think of them, they end up caring about status, whether they wish to or not. Teenagers seek “respect” on the streets, but so do students in the classroom or CEOs in the boardroom. For this reason, status inequalities have potent implications for the self—for how people perceive themselves and feel towards others (Callero, this volume).

As our definition indicates, in addition to individuals, status involves evaluative rankings between groups in a community or society. For example, status differences in contemporary US society can be observed between men and women, whites and nonwhites, professionals and laborers, and elite and non-elite business firms. Status can also involve evaluative rankings among objects or products, such as BMW versus Chevrolet automobiles or Godiva versus Hershey chocolates. Most fundamentally, however, status is a hierarchical relationship among individuals. As we shall see, the shared cultural *status beliefs* that rank groups do so by ascribing more of “what counts” to the people that belong to one group (men, whites, professionals, elite firms) than those that belong to another group (women, people of color, laborers, non-elite firms). Similarly, objects acquire status value by their association with people and groups of high or low status. For these reasons, we will focus on interpersonal status hierarchies—that is, a hierarchy of esteem among individuals in a group based on who is perceived as “better at what counts”—as the core of status processes more generally. Interpersonal status processes are also most relevant to the social psychological focus of this chapter.

An important quality of interpersonal status hierarchies is that they function not just as a form of inequality among individuals, but also as a means by which people organize themselves together to achieve collective, shared goals which they value, but cannot achieve on their own. It is no accident that status processes arise most sharply when people are interdependent in regard to shared purpose or goal (Bales 1950; Berger et al. 1974). Achieving positive rather than negative outcomes on a valued goal leads people back to questions about who can contribute more or less to the goal and

how to coordinate their joint contributions into a shared effort. These questions in turn foster evaluative rankings among them and give rise to the status hierarchy. Thus an interpersonal status hierarchy is not just a form of invidious comparison among individuals. It is also an organization for “productive exchange” to create an outcome whose benefits (or losses) will be shared among them and have consequences for the group as a whole, not merely for the individual (Haley et al. 2011). It may be that interpersonal status hierarchies are so ubiquitous partly because people are so frequently interdependent with others to achieve what they want and need.

In addition to being important in their own right, interpersonal status processes mediate people’s access to other significant aspects of inequality—resources and power. Interpersonal status process taking place, for instance, in a job interview or the classroom, direct people towards or away from organizational positions of power and resources. Furthermore, as we will discover, how individuals fare in interpersonal status processes is powerfully shaped by the status of the social groups (e.g., gender, race, occupation) to which they belong. Thus, status between individuals within a group and status between groups in a society are reciprocally linked in a multilevel process.

This reciprocal link has its own important implications for inequality. To the extent that status beliefs about the groups to which individuals belong similarly shape interpersonal status hierarchies across multiple contexts, these multiple interpersonal hierarchies will help reproduce the larger patterns of inequality between the groups. And, on the other side, the repeated enactment of differences in status, influence, and deference between individuals from different groups helps sustain the cultural beliefs that create status differences between the groups by giving those beliefs the appearance of plausibility and social validity. Interpersonal status processes, then, play a significant role not only in the life outcomes of individuals but in maintaining long standing structures of inequality based on status valued social distinctions such as gender, race, occupation, and class background (Bobo 1999; Chan and Goldthorpe 2007; Ridgeway 2011; Ridgeway and Fisk 2012; Weeden 2002).

History

The modern study of social status begins with Max Weber (1968) who famously pointed out that status is a form of inequality in complex societies that is distinct from, although related to, power and wealth. In contrast to wealth or access to powerful positions in the dominant institutions of society, status, he argued was enacted through inclusive networks of people (status groups) who share elite cultural practices and use those practices to maintain social closure against those from less elite groups. He observed that groups in society commonly gain wealth or power first and then over time develop the cultural distinctiveness of status. Weber argued that after status is acquired, it gives the high status person a new type of social advantage over those that have just as much money or power, but lack the social status. Thus, status can solidify power and wealth advantages as well as give the appearance that those advantages are legitimate because of the superior nature of the high status group (Tilly 1998). Weber's work provides a foundation for understanding the "between-groups" aspect of status inequality as well as how status inequality is intertwined with inequality based on wealth and power. His focus on status groups and the processes of gaining and maintaining status through association with high status others and peers is carried out in contemporary work on status among business firms (Podolny 2005), social closure among occupations (Weeden 2002), and class and status (Chan and Goldthorpe 2007).

The study of interpersonal status hierarchies, the "within-groups" aspect of status, has more recent roots in mid-twentieth century sociological investigations of "small groups." Early on, Whyte's (1943) ethnographic account of a street corner gang powerfully demonstrated how everyday behavior in the gang was organized according a status hierarchy in which, among other things, group members implicitly and explicitly pressured one another to keep their performances at shared group activities in line with their status in the group. Bales' (1950, 1970) classic studies of small, socially homogeneous, and initially leaderless decision-making groups followed soon after. These studies demonstrated

that inequalities in interaction developed quickly among group members, stabilized, and then guided subsequent group interactions. One member typically emerged who talked considerably more than the others, and the more a person talked in the group, the more likely the person was to be rated as having the best ideas and doing more to guide and influence the group (Bales 1970). If inequalities in participation, evaluations, and influence develop so rapidly even in unstructured groups of social equals, Bales (1950) argued that status hierarchies are likely to emerge in any goal-oriented group.

About this same time, Goffman (1956), from a different but not inconsistent perspective, offered an insightful account of how the implicit rules by which we organize everyday social interaction include "status rituals" enacted through displays of deference and demeanor towards those who are socially defined in the setting as more or less esteemed. Goffman's emphasis on the coordination of interaction through a "working consensus" that actors use as a basis for acting (whether or not they endorse it) presaged current work that we will review on status and coordination.

Finally, another well known study of this era provided the first clear demonstration of the *status generalization* process. This is the process by which the status of the groups to which individuals belong in the larger society shape the influence and status they attain in a local interpersonal group. Strodbeck et al. (1957) studied mock juries and found that jury members' occupational status and gender predicted how active and influential they became, how competent they were rated by the others, and their likelihood of being chosen foreman of the jury.

These early studies provided powerful descriptive evidence that status hierarchies develop quickly in goal-oriented interpersonal groups and form a significant component of everyday interaction; that they consist of inequalities among the members in esteem, influence, evaluation, and participation; that they guide behavior once they emerge; and that they are shaped by outside status differences the members bring with them into the group. The question that remained to be answered, however, was to explain *how* these status hierarchies emerge and shape behavior in the

group. Joseph Berger, Bernard Cohen, and Morris Zelditch, who had been graduate students at Harvard at the time of Bales' studies, formulated *expectation states theory* in an effort to answer this explanatory question (Berger et al. 1974, 1977; Berger and Webster 2006). Over the following decades, this theory developed into the dominant and empirically best supported sociological account of interpersonal status processes. For that reason, we will review it in some detail in this chapter.

In more recent years, however, other social psychological approaches to status have developed as well and become influential in the research literature. In psychology, the importance of cultural stereotypes in creating bias and discrimination against people from some groups led Susan Fiske and colleagues (2002) to investigate the content of stereotypes for a wide range of social groups in the contemporary U. S. They found that status and warmth were fundamental dimensions of group stereotypes and that status was directly associated with beliefs about differences in competence. We will consider ramifications of this research as well. Finally, as we shall see, a range of scholars in sociology and organizational behavior have recently reached beyond classic approaches to reconsider how interpersonal status hierarchies develop and organize behavior in a broad range of contexts.

Expectation States Theory

Basic Approach

Expectations states theory is a distinctive theory of interpersonal status in that it is formulated in terms of a formal, logical structure of assumptions and propositions and has been developed through experimental tests of its predictions (Berger et al. 1974, 1977; Berger and Webster 2006; Correll and Ridgeway 2003). It explicitly limits its scope to situations in which actors are *task oriented* in they are addressing a task for which there are better or worse outcomes and *collectively oriented* in that they believe they must take each other's contributions into account in order to succeed at

the task. Thus, the theory applies to a wide range of interpersonal contexts, including work groups, study groups, committees, juries, a family planning a vacation, and friends planning a party. But it does not apply to purely social interaction such as might occur at that party. The theory is highly relevant to inequality processes, however, because goal-oriented interactions nested within work, education, or health institutions mediate people's access to significant life outcomes such as income, positions of authority, social prestige, or health.

The theory argues that status hierarchies develop out of a classic interactional process described by symbolic interactionists (Stryker and Vryan 2003). This is the process of trying to figure out how others will behave in order to decide how to behave one's self. Under circumstances in which actors are focused on a collective task, the theory posits, this process causes actors to develop implicit, often unconscious anticipations of how useful each person's contributions to the task will be compared to their own and others in the group. These rank-ordered *performance expectations* for self and others in the group then shape the actors' task-oriented behavior towards one another in a self-fulfilling manner, as expectations have been shown to do (Miller and Turnbull 1986). Thus, for instance, the lower the performance expectation one actor forms for herself compared to another, the more likely she is to hesitate and wait for the other to speak up first. When the other does speak up, the more likely she is to positively evaluate the task suggestion the other makes. And when disagreements develop, the more likely she is to back off from her own arguments and change to agree with the other, granting the other influence over her. In this way, then, the theory argues that rank-ordered performance expectations shape members' task-oriented behaviors to be more or less deferential or assertive, causing a status hierarchy of participation, evaluation, and influence to emerge among them. While performance expectations help actors coordinate behavior, it is easy to see how their self-fulfilling nature can quickly give way to increasingly large inequalities between individuals.

Performance Expectations or Dominance?

Note that expectation states theory's account of the emergence of status hierarchies through self-other performance expectations suggests a more or less cooperative process by which such expectations elicit assertion and deference. It is worth a brief digression to consider whether this is plausible. An alternative possibility is that the appearance of cooperation in the interest of achieving shared goals actually masks a competitive *dominance* struggle in which members seek, through the social signals they display, to intimidate others into granting them influence and control over the group (Mazur 1985; Schwalbe and Shay, this volume). After all, while members have an interest in deferring to those who seem more competent in order to maximize success at the goal, they also have a more egoistic interest in maximizing their own status, attention, and influence in the group.

To resolve these issues, Ridgeway and Diekema (1989) pointed out that it is useful to consider not just what members want for themselves in the group, but how they want others to behave as well. Whatever actors want for themselves, they want *others* to defer on the basis of perceived ability to contribute to the task in order to maximize the group's success and the rewards that result. As actors pressure others to defer on the basis of performance expectations, however, they will in turn be pressured by those others to defer on that basis themselves. In this way, actors create implicit norms that pressure them to "cooperatively" defer to one another on the basis of expected task performance. Experimental tests of these arguments showed that efforts to claim status and influence through direct dominance rather than the appearance of task competence elicited sanctions and failed (Ridgeway 1987; Ridgeway and Diekema 1989). More recently, Anderson and Kilduff (2009) similarly found that the association between the personality trait of dominance and status in groups is mediated by the dominant person's efforts to appear competent.¹ These studies support expectation states theory's basic account of status as influence and

deference that arises from self-other performance expectations. As they do so, however, they also highlight the collective, implicitly normative processes through which interpersonal status hierarchies develop.

Sources of Performance Expectations

Since, by expectation states theory's account, interpersonal status hierarchies emerge from and are governed by the implicit performance expectations group members form for one another in task-oriented settings, the theory naturally turns to specifying the social factors that shape performance expectations. Expectation states research has delineated three broad classes of factors: (1) *status characteristics*, which are socially significant characteristics of individuals that carry status value in the surrounding society; (2) *behavioral interchange patterns* among the actors, and (3) *social rewards* that actors possess. In five basic assumptions or propositions, the theory describes how the status information in such factors becomes salient for actors in a situation, shapes their implicit performance expectations, and drives their task-oriented behaviors (Berger and Webster 2006). We will describe these assumptions as we review research on status characteristics and then turn to behavioral interchange patterns and rewards.

Status Characteristics

In the *status generalization* process, the status of the groups to which individuals belong, such as their gender, race, or occupation, shapes the esteem with which they are treated in interpersonal contexts, whether their ideas are heard, and whether they become influential. This fundamental status process not only affects the life chances of the individuals involved, but also reproduces larger structures of inequality between groups in society. Status characteristics theory, which is a subtheory of expectation states, developed to explain how status generalization occurs (Berger et al. 1972a, 1977; Berger and Webster 2006; Webster and Foschi 1988). Not surprisingly, given the importance of the problem, these

are the arguments for which expectation states theory is best known.

Status characteristics are attributes on which people differ, such as those that signal their membership in important groups like gender or race, but other attributes too, like computer expertise. What makes these attributes *status characteristics*, however, is that there are widely held beliefs in the culture (status beliefs) that associate greater worthiness and competence with one category of the attribute (e.g., men, whites, computer experts) than another (women, people of color, computer novices) (Berger et al. 1977; Correll and Ridgeway 2003). That cultural beliefs about status are closely linked to assumptions about differences in competence is supported by Fiske and colleagues' research on the stereotypes of status-ranked groups in society (Cuddy et al. 2007; Fiske 2011; Fiske et al. 2002). According to expectation states theory, then, whether or not a given social difference acts as a status characteristic for a community of people depends on whether they hold and believe others hold status beliefs about that difference. As a result, new status characteristics can emerge in a society and old ones can fade in significance.

Status characteristics can be diffuse or specific depending on the nature of the competence associations they imply. *Specific* status characteristics, like computer expertise or athletic ability, carry expectations for competence and performance in a specific range of task contexts. Important social distinctions like gender, race, education or occupation, however, are *diffuse* status characteristics that carry not only expectations for specific types of expertise, but also expectations for general competence at "most things," especially those tasks that "count most" in society. Diffuse status characteristics potentially affect performance expectations over a very wide range of tasks and contexts.

The theory links status characteristics to actors' self-other performance expectations and subsequent influence and deference through its five basic assumptions. Together, these assumptions offer a *situationally* specific account of how status characteristics shape emergent status hierarchies in one type of social context compared to

another. The first assumption states that, to affect performance expectations, a status characteristic must become *salient* for actors in the situation, either because they differ on it (e.g., gender in a mixed sex group) or because the characteristic is culturally linked to the situational goal (e.g., a gender typed task). There are some situations, then, when people are aware of their status valued characteristic (e.g., gender in a group of women with a gender neutral task), but it does not become a salient basis for status hierarchies among them.

Once salient, however, the second, *burden-of-proof* assumption states that the competence associations of actors' status characteristics will shape performance expectations for them unless some information in the situation explicitly blocks this from happening. Status characteristics that are salient but logically irrelevant to the task or goal in the situation will nevertheless implicitly shape actors' expectations for others' performance compared to their own. On a mixed sex jury, for instance, gender will create expectation advantages for men's performance over that of otherwise similar women even if the case at hand is unrelated to gender. It is through this burden-of-proof process that race, age, education, gender, and other diffuse status characteristics have modest but pervasive effects on the status and influence actors attain across a wide range of social contexts.

The third *sequencing* assumption specifies what happens over time if some actors leave and others join the group or new status information is introduced. The basic point is that the expectations from the prior encounter carry over to the new one and shape the treatment of the new person or new information. Thus, if a woman performs very well on a mixed sex work team and then is replaced by another woman, the team's expectations for the new woman will be a little higher than they would have been otherwise because of the team's experience with the previous woman. Expectation states researchers have used this effect to intervene against the status generalization process, although the effects of these status interventions weaken over time unless repeated (Markovsky et al. 1984; Pugh and Wahrman 1983).

Since people are inherently multiattributed, it is common for multiple status characteristics to be salient in a given situation, along, possibly, with other status information such as that based on social rewards (e.g., pay differences). According to the fourth, *aggregation* assumption, people combine the positive and negative performance implications of all salient status information, each weighted by its relevance to the task, to form an aggregate performance expectation for each person in the situation compared to self and others. This is a slightly simplified statement of the theory's precise aggregation formula (see Berger et al. 1977; Correll and Ridgeway 2003). An important implication of this assumption is that status characteristics that are culturally considered more relevant to a task setting have a more powerful impact on performance expectations in those settings compared to less relevant status characteristics. Thus an African-American female physician working with a white male patient will be more advantaged over the patient by her occupation than she will be disadvantaged by race and gender. But she still will nevertheless be less advantaged over that white male patient than a comparable white female or white male physician would be. Furthermore, status characteristics that advantage an actor in one goal-oriented setting can disadvantage the actor in another. As a result, even powerful diffuse status characteristics such as race or gender do not have uniform effects across settings. Their effects depend on their salience in the setting and their positive or negative relevance to the task.

The theory's fifth assumption, *translation*, describes how aggregated self-other performance expectations translate to assertive versus deferential task behaviors in the situation. The higher (lower) the aggregate performance expectations held for one actor, compared to another, the greater that actor's expectation (dis)advantage over the other. The greater an actor's expectation advantage over another, the more likely she is to receive opportunities to contribute to the task, to make task contributions, to receive positive evaluations for those contributions, and to become influential over others in the group. Thus differences between actors in participation, evaluation, and influence, and assertive versus deferential

verbal and nonverbal behavior more generally, are assumed to be a direct function of the differential performance expectations held for them.

A variety of research supports expectation states theory's account of how status generalization occurs in goal-oriented interpersonal contexts. Driskell and Mullen's (1990) meta-analysis of studies examining diffuse (educational attainment, race, gender, military rank) and specific (pretest scores) status characteristics found support for the theory's basic claim that status characteristics affect deference and influence behaviors indirectly through the performance expectations group members form for each other rather than directly. Experiments also show that simple knowledge of an interactional partner's status characteristics relative to their own is sufficient to affect actors' willingness to accept influence from that partner in task decisions (for educational attainment, Moore 1968; age, Freese and Cohen 1973; race, Webster and Driskell 1978; gender, Pugh and Wahrman 1983; specific abilities Wagner and Berger 1982; Webster 1977). Supporting the burden-of-proof argument, this occurs even when the status characteristic is not initially task relevant (e.g., Pugh and Wahrman 1983; Webster and Driskell 1978) as well as when it is. These studies confirm that status characteristics shape interpersonal status via performance expectations and cannot be accounted for by possible correlated differences between actors in behavioral assertiveness or nonverbal style. Rather, differences in verbal and nonverbal assertiveness are largely driven by differences in performance expectations (which are shaped in turn by status characteristics), as the theory argues (Dovidio et al. 1988; Ridgeway et al. 1985). Finally, studies confirm that people form influence hierarchies as though they were combining positive and negative status information as the aggregation assumption states, with task relevant status characteristics having a stronger impact than non-relevant characteristics (Berger et al. 1992; Wagner and Berger 1982; Webster and Driskell 1978).

As this review suggests, status characteristics theory has been used to account for the interpersonal effects of a wide range of status characteristics. However, the theory has been applied

most extensively to gender in an effort to explain gender differences in interpersonal behavior, evaluations of performances, attribution of ability, influence, and leadership, all of which have consequences for gender inequality (Kroska, this volume; Ridgeway 2001, 2011; Ridgeway and Correll 2004; Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin 1999; Wagner and Berger 1997). The theory predicts a systematic pattern of gender status biases in task-oriented settings. In mixed sex, gender neutral task contexts, men will be modestly advantaged over similar women; this advantage will be stronger in masculine-typed contexts. In feminine-typed contexts, women will have a modest advantage over men in expected performance (but not authority, as we will see later). Reviews of the extensive research literature on gender, interaction, performance and evaluation, and influence, including many meta-analyses, show strong support for this pattern of effects (Ridgeway 2001 2011, pp. 56–91; Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin 1999). Further applications of these arguments suggest that gender status effects, acting in sites of economic and social innovation, play a role in perpetuating gender inequality in a changing society (Ridgeway 2011).

As a direction for future research, it would be useful to see a similarly extensive application of status characteristics theory to the effects of race on interactional status, influence and interaction. While race effects have been documented within the theory (Goar and Sell 2005; Webster and Driskell 1978) much more should be done. It would be valuable, for instance, to examine the intersectional question of whether race and gender combine as the theory predicts.

Behavioral Interchange Patterns

As important as they are, status characteristics are not the only factor that shapes performance expectations in goal-oriented settings. As Bales (1970) documented early on, status hierarchies develop rapidly and reliably even among peers. Furthermore, even in groups in which some members differ in salient status characteristics, there are some members who do not. How do differences in performance expectations develop among social peers?

The theory argues that patterns of behavioral interchange among group members can themselves create differences in performance expectations (Berger et al. 1974; Fisek et al. 1991). In task-oriented groups, a common sort of behavioral interchange consists of one member initiating a task suggestion (e.g., “here’s an idea...” or “maybe we could do this”) and another (or multiple others) reacting positively (“that’s a good point”) or negatively (“I don’t know about that”), effectively accepting or rejecting the first member’s influence attempt. Studies show that North American cultural schemas of status relations associate more assertive behaviors, including such influence attempts, with higher status (Conway et al. 1996) and a variety of evidence suggests that more assertive behaviors give an impression of greater confidence and competence (Fiske 2010, pp. 946–947). In a similar vein, expectation states theory argues that if two actors fall into a pattern in which one initiates task suggestions and the other agrees with those suggestions and this repeats, this cycle constitutes what the theory labels a status related *behavioral interchange pattern*. As this behavioral pattern repeats, at some point it will become salient for both the actors and others in the group. When it does, it will evoke cultural schemas of leader-follower behavior which, in turn, will evoke assumptions about greater or lesser task ability and lead to differentiated performance expectations for the two actors (Fisek et al. 1991).

The theory argues that for actors who are peers, behavioral interchange patterns form the basis of the status positions they develop. When actors differ in status characteristics, however, those differences drive their assertive and deferential behavior (cf. Ridgeway et al. 1985) so that their behavioral interchange patterns typically correspond to their status characteristic advantages or disadvantages and, thus, have little added effect on their relative status positions. Of course, when actors’ assertive or deferential behaviors are, for whatever reason, clearly inconsistent with their status characteristics, this behavior can potentially modify their status differences. This can be complicated, however, because, as we shall see later, assertive or deferential behavior that is

inconsistent with an actor's status characteristics can sometimes be perceived as illegitimate and evoke negative reactions from others. A test of this argument about how behavioral interchange patterns independently shape performance expectations found general support for it (Webster and Rashotte 2010). Behavioral interchange patterns demonstrate the pervasiveness of interpersonal status inequality even among initially equal interaction partners.

Social Rewards

Status hierarchies typically distribute rewards the group controls, both material and symbolic (e.g., a corner office), to their members in proportion to their status in the group, as early studies showed (Homans 1961). Expectation states theory accounts for this by arguing that performance expectations give rise to corresponding expectations for rewards in the group (Berger et al. 1985). The theory argues that what makes something a "reward" for status purposes is that its possession is socially valued by group members. Thus a material resource like money is a reward for status purposes not only because it can buy something but also because people value having it. For the same reason, people also value more symbolic goods such an office that is seen as better than other offices.

Expectation states theory's most interesting argument about rewards is that, because performance and reward expectations are interdependent, the allocation of more rewards to some members instead of others can independently create performance expectations and, thus, status differences. Reward allocations can also modify existing status differences. Thus, as several studies show, pay differences or differences in other rewards lead to corresponding differences in presumptions about who is more capable and deserving of esteem and status (Cook 1975; Harrod 1980; Stewart and Moore 1992), implicitly legitimating the material difference. Another implication of this reward expectation argument is that when a status characteristic is salient, those disadvantaged by it will have a lower sense of entitlement to rewards than those advantaged by it. Studies of gender and sense of entitlement sup-

port this argument (Bylsma and Major 1992; Jost 1997). While we have seen how status inequality is produced through interaction, the work on social rewards demonstrates how the mutually reinforcing relationship between status and social rewards can maintain inequalities while also making them appear more legitimate.

Other Developments in Expectation States Research

In addition to the basic account of performance expectations and status hierarchies, expectation states researchers have addressed several other status related problems that have implications for social inequality among individuals in groups. Some of these further developments document additional affects of status characteristics, specifically, on actual task performance, on double standards for judging ability from task performance, and on power. Other developments examine techniques for intervening against status generalization and the power of "second order" expectations. We briefly review each of these below.

Shaping Actual Performance

When a status characteristic is salient in a situation, its effects on performance expectations not only create self-fulfilling effects on evaluations of a person's performance, they have also been shown by expectation states researchers to affect the actual quality of a person's *performance* itself. Lovaglia and colleagues (1998), for instance, found that study participants' status characteristic advantages or disadvantages in a situation affected how well they performed on an IQ test. The extensive psychological research on stereotype threat documents what is essentially the same effect (Steele 1997; Steele and Aronson 1995).

Stereotype threat refers to the anxiety or fear an individual experiences at the possibility of confirming negative stereotypes about a group to which she belongs. Typically these negative stereotypes are beliefs about the group's relative competence. Stereotypes about a group's compe-

tence, as research shows, are closely related to beliefs about the group's status in society (Fiske et al. 2002) and, thus, are what expectation status researchers label "status beliefs." For example, African Americans may fear doing poorly on a test because doing so would confirm stereotypes that they are less intelligent. Previous work has shown that when minority students simply mark their race before beginning an exam, or when they are told that a test measures their ability, they suffer performance deficits relative to non-minority members and control condition subjects (Steele 1997). Research has demonstrated stereotype threat effects for several status disadvantaged groups including minorities and low SES individuals and also for women in math (Croizet and Claire 1998; Steele 1997). Importantly, these effects persist even if the individual does not believe in the relevant stereotype, suggesting the importance of widely held cultural beliefs in shaping individual action.

Double Standards

In another important discovery, Foschi (1996, 2000) documented that status characteristics have the further effect of creating *double standards* for judging ability from a performance of a given quality. Thus, when a person who is disadvantaged by her status characteristics performs well in a situation, others, and even she herself, may implicitly think, "prove it again" before assuming she actually has high ability. The status advantaged are not held to such high standards. Studies have documented such double standard effects for both race and gender (Biernat and Kobrynowicz 1997; Foschi 1996) and Correll (2001) has shown that double standards bias women's self assessments at male-typed tasks. Biased attributions of ability from performance have significant consequences for inequality because they affect outcomes such as who is hired and promoted, how much they are paid and what the person herself pursues.

Legitimacy

Status characteristics have also been shown to affect the *legitimacy* of high ranking members of a status hierarchy (Berger et al. 1998; Ridgeway and Berger 1986; Ridgeway et al. 1994; Walker,

this volume). Legitimacy allows high ranking members to go beyond influence and persuasion to exercise directive authority in the group and receive compliance. Thus it is central to the relationship between status and power in groups, is intimately involved in leadership, and it affects the stability of interpersonal hierarchies (Walker and Zelditch 1993; Weber 1968). Expectation states research has shown that, other factors equal, high status members backed by advantages in diffuse status characteristics are treated with greater legitimacy than more strictly "meritocratic" high status members who have proven skills but lack status characteristic advantages (Ridgeway et al. 1994). The argument is that, because people expect those with advantaged states of diffuse status characteristics to be in higher status positions, when this happens in their group, they more readily treat it as "right" (Berger et al. 1998). This argument is similar in some ways to Jost and Banaji's (1994, Jost et al. 2004) system justification theory in psychology. An implication is that status atypical group leaders, such as a woman or an African American, will be treated with less deference and compliance than an equivalent, more typical male or white leader would. It is also consistent with recent research on "backlash" to highly assertive women. This research demonstrates that backlash is prompted by the sense that women's highly assertive behavior is "not right" given the gender status hierarchy (Rudman et al. 2012).

Power

Status characteristics not only affect legitimacy, they affect *power* in social exchange as recent studies have shown (Thye 2000; Thye and Kalkoff, this volume; Thye et al. 2006). Thye (2000) has demonstrated that when an actor is advantaged by status characteristics, that status advantage spreads to the resources the actor controls, so that others will pay more for those resources just because of their added status value. Thye (2000) showed this by giving participants in an exchange experiment an initial supply of poker chips of equal point value, but the chips given to those with status characteristic advantages, while of equal value, were of a different color. In the bargaining that ensued, participants

offered more points to acquire chips of the color initially given to higher status actors despite the fact that the chips were not actually worth more. The *spread of status value* from high (or low) status actors and groups to the objects (or other actors and groups) associated with them is a fundamental process in status relations which affects the associations and resources people seek as well as avoid (Berger et al. 1972b; Podolny 2005; Weber 1968). Status characteristics shape power, then, both by affecting the value of the resources actors control as well as by shaping the influence they wield over others (Thye et al. 2006).

Interventions Against Status Generalization

Given the wide ranging and often unjust effects status characteristics have on influence, respect, power, and rewards, it is not surprising that expectation states researchers have also used the theory to devise *interventions against status generalization*. One obvious possibility would be to manipulate behavioral interchange patterns by encouraging actors with disadvantaging status characteristics to speak up more assertively. However, due to the legitimacy processes just discussed, this does not always work because assertive behavior from an apparently “undeserving” low status actor can elicit resistance (Cohen and Roper 1972; Rudman et al. 2012). Research has shown two ways around this. The most direct technique is for some powerful authority or evaluator to modify not only the performance expectations the low status person holds for himself, but also those the high status actors hold for him by introducing new specific status information (skills, accomplishments, test scores) that advantages the low status actor over the high status actor (Cohen and Lotan 1997; Wagner et al. 1986). Cohen and Lotan (1997) adapted this approach to equalize interaction among socially heterogeneous students in the classroom. In a second technique, the status disadvantaged person assuages others’ resistance to their more assertive behavior by combining it with expressions of cooperative rather than self-interested concerns in the group. Studies of women attempting to gain influence in mixed sex groups confirm the effec-

tiveness of this technique, although note that it requires the lower status person to be “nice” as well as competent to gain standing in the group (Carli et al. 1995; Ridgeway 1982; Schackelford et al. 1996).

Second Order Expectations

A final development in expectation states research brings us back to the questions we began with about how status hierarchies emerge from rank-ordered performance expectations through an apparently cooperative but implicitly normative process. In addition to the performance expectations actors personally form for themselves compared to another (first order expectations), Moore (1985) pointed out that actors are also likely to form expectations about how the *other* ranks the two of them, called *second order expectations*. People tend to overestimate the extent to which others view things in the same way they do. As a result, actors’ first order and second order expectations typically align (Troyer and Younts 1997). But what happens when, for whatever reason, an actor has a clear sense that others rank her expected performance capacity differently than she does herself? Research shows that when second order expectations about what the other expects conflict with an actor’s own first order expectations, it is these second order expectations that most powerfully shape the actor’s deference and assertive influence behaviors (Kalkoff et al. 2011; Troyer and Younts 1997; Webster and Whitmeyer 1999).

As Troyer and Younts (1997) point out, drawing on Goffman (1967), the problem of anticipating how others will react in order to know how to act in turn gives power to the implicit “working consensus” in the situation that is represented by “what others expect” (i.e., second order expectations). In support of this argument, Anderson et al. (2012) experimentally demonstrated that second order rather than first order expectations are in fact what drives actors’ apparently cooperative deference to those expected to be more competent than them at the shared task. When study participants knew that they had scored lower than others on a pretest of ability at the group task, but this information was private so that others did not share it,

the participants continued to express a preference for high status and influence. Only when the participants knew others in the group knew this information as well did they voluntarily defer to the higher scoring others. The study of second order expectations opens up our understanding of the processes by which group members, in the process of forming shared status hierarchies, coordinate their behaviors through an implicit normative consensus represented by what actors expect that *others expect* and, therefore, what others will support or sanction. This theme of status and coordination is further developed in several recent strands of status research both within and outside of expectation states theory.

Status Construction Theory

Given the widespread and powerful effects of status characteristics on virtually all aspects of evaluation, influence, and power among individuals, it is reasonable to ask how cultural status beliefs develop about social differences in the first place and how they become widely shared in a population. Status beliefs are distinctive in that people from different groups (e.g., different sexes, different ethnic groups, different occupations, different religions) must form *shared* beliefs that “most people” would see those in one category of the group difference as more status worthy and generally more competent than those in another category of that difference. Thus, status beliefs involve more than simple favoritism for one’s own group (“we are different and my group is better”) which is a common reaction to different others (Tajfel and Turner 1986). For status beliefs to form, not only must one group (say, men for the social difference of sex) believe that they are “better” but the other group (i.e., women) must also come to accept, as a matter of social reality, that their own group is not seen as better, at least by “most others,” but rather, viewed as less esteemed and less competent than another group (men). How could such shared status beliefs form?

Status construction theory argues that one way this happens is through the goal-oriented encounters that take place between people from socially

different groups in the course of their daily experience (Ridgeway 1991; Ridgeway et al. 2009). As we have seen, interpersonal hierarchies of influence and esteem tend to develop quickly in goal-oriented encounters and, so, are likely to develop in these encounters between actors from different groups as well. The theory argues that if something about the circumstances of these encounters gives those from one group a systematic advantage over those from another group in appearing competent and becoming influential in the encounters, then these encounters will foster shared status beliefs about the social difference favoring the advantaged group.

A variety of circumstances, such as greater wealth or control over valued information or technology, could give those from one group an advantage in seeming competent and gaining influence in their encounters with those in another group. But influence hierarchies, even when shaped by such “biasing” factors, tend to develop through small behaviors that are rarely obvious to the participants. Because the source of the influence hierarchy between them is implicit, but their social difference is highly salient to them, the theory argues that participants in these encounters will associate their social difference with the differences between them in apparent competence and esteem. In this way, they begin to form a status belief about the social difference. When future encounters with those from the other group repeat the same association between apparent competence and influence and the social difference, the status beliefs come to seem socially valid to the actors. Eventually, even those in the group the beliefs disadvantage are forced to accept, as a matter of social reality, that “most people” would see the typical member of other the group as more esteemed and competent than those from their own group. Through this process, shared status beliefs develop in which people from both the advantaged and the disadvantaged groups come to agree that the advantaged group is viewed by society as “better.”

Recall that Weber (1968) suggested that social groups in society (say, a new immigrant group or a new occupation) typically gain wealth first and then only over time become high status. Initial tests of status construction theory followed

Weber's (1968) suggestion by examining whether, if people from one group gained, on average, greater material resources than those from another group, that would systematically bias performance expectations and influence in their encounters and lead to widely shared status beliefs favoring the resource advantaged group. Experiments created a group difference between participants by giving them a test of "personal response style" that classified them into two types and paying those from one type group more than those from the other type. After only two encounters in which pay differences led to influence differences between participants who differed in type group, the participants formed clear status beliefs about the response style difference (Ridgeway et al. 1998). Further experiments demonstrated that *any* factor (e.g., superior technology, information), not just material resources, that gave members of one group a systematic influence advantage over those from another group in their encounters would lead to status beliefs about the difference (Ridgeway and Erickson 2000; Webster and Hysom 1998). Berger and Fisek (2006) argue as well that when actors from one group are advantaged in diffuse status characteristics, the status value of those characteristics will spread to the group difference, creating status beliefs about it.

Status beliefs are beliefs about what "most people" think, not just expectations about what the specific others in a local encounter think (second order expectations). For this reason, Ridgeway and Correll (2006) call status beliefs *third order* beliefs. They argue that people in encounters infer third order status beliefs from the apparent *consensus* among the specific others in local encounters. In a given encounter, this consensus is represented by the apparently uncontested influence hierarchy that the participants enact between people from one category of a social difference compared to another, say between men and women. When the association between influence and the social difference (in this example, sex) repeats in subsequent encounters, the local consensus about the esteem and competence difference between men and women seems even broader. The need to make sense of

this apparent consensus and coordinate with others beyond the local group causes participants to assume that "most people" would also associate men and women with differences in esteem and competence, creating a "third order" status belief. An experiment confirmed that when the apparent consensus about the association between a social difference and apparent competence in the situation was challenged by a participant, status beliefs did not emerge even though they did when there was no such challenge (Ridgeway and Correll 2006). Thus status beliefs are formed from and rest upon the appearance of social consensus about a link between a social difference and esteem and competence. The appearance of consensus gives that link social validity.

Once people form status beliefs about a social difference, other studies show that they treat others according to those beliefs in subsequent encounters and, by casting those others as high or low status in the encounter, effectively "teach" the status beliefs to those others (Ridgeway et al. 2009; Ridgeway and Erickson 2000). In this way people spread their status beliefs through their social encounters. Through the diffusion process that results, status beliefs formed in encounters can spread to be widely held in a population, as computer simulations confirm (Ridgeway and Balkwell 1997). Status construction theory predicts that the stronger the association between the social difference and the biasing factor (e.g., wealth) and the higher the rate of encounters between people from different categories of the social difference, the more likely this diffusion process is to produce widely held status beliefs about the social difference. Using cross-cultural data, Brashears (2008) reports support for these predictions of the theory about the conditions of association between social groups that are more and less likely to foster widely held status beliefs.

New Directions

As we have seen, several decades of expectation states research have provided a logically rigorous and empirically well-documented account of status processes that fall within the theory's specifi-

cally defined scope conditions. In recent years, however, new directions in status research have developed that expand the frame drawn around status processes by asking further questions that fall outside the traditional domain of expectation states theory. Some of these new approaches go back to basic questions about interpersonal status hierarchies and productive exchange, others look at status process in larger, more diffuse networks and communities, and still others ask how status shapes individual emotions and perceptions. A final approach examines how status processes mediate inequality in the workplace.

Expanding the Frame on Basic Questions

As we have seen, the conditions that create interpersonal status hierarchies—interdependence in regard to a shared, valued goal—create basic organizational problems. One is to coordinate the actions and contributions of individual group members into a collective goal effort. Another is to manage the inherent conflict this creates for members between maximizing shared group interests in goal success (perhaps by deferring to another) and maximizing self interests in personal status, power, or rewards. The expectation states account of status hierarchies implicitly addresses these problems through shared, rank-order performance expectations. These expectations have the effect of coordinating task efforts while also binding self interests to group interests by encouraging actors to compete to offer the most valuable contributions to the task effort in order to gain personal status and rewards. Yet the expectation states tradition has not directly and explicitly taken these problems on. Recently, however, status researchers outside the expectation states tradition have done so. Their results expand and deepen our picture of the collective and implicitly normative processes through which status hierarchies coordinate behavior and manage tensions between group and self interests.

We saw earlier that second order performance expectations, what actors assume other

group members expect for self compared to another, most powerfully drive deference behavior (Anderson et al. 2012; Troyer and Younts 1997). Deference behavior, of course, is the key to the coordination problem as well as to the problem of constraining self-interest for the sake of group interest. A study by Anderson and colleagues (2006) clarifies how second order performance expectations have their effects on deference. In an examination of actual, on-going interpersonal work groups, the researchers showed that people were quite accurate in assessing how others viewed their status standing in the group. They had good reason to be accurate. When people overestimated their standing in the group (self-enhancers) they tended to be less liked and accepted in the group. Thus people were sanctioned for not “knowing their place” (Anderson et al. 2006). This study illustrates how closely attuned people are to the implicitly normative process that constrains deference and coordinates individual actions into a collective effort.

Other recent research has examined status processes in situations that exacerbate the group-self interest conflict inherent in collective, goal-oriented efforts. Collective action problems involve situations in which people would benefit from contributions to a shared group good (e.g., efforts toward a valued goal that would benefit all) but contributions are costly to the individual and risky because if others do not join in, the shared group good may not be obtained. In such situations, studies by Willer (2009) and Hardy and van Vugt (2006) have shown that group members award status (esteem and influence) to those who demonstrate *group orientation* by making contributions to the group goal despite personal cost. Willer (2009) found that group-orientation was more important for status in such situations than a member’s apparent task skill.

As has long been argued, there is in fact a risk inherent in productive exchange of granting status and influence to someone who, although highly skilled, cannot be trusted to use that influence in the group’s shared interest (Ridgeway 1982). By examining situations in which this risk of self over group interest is exacerbated, Willer’s (2009) study demonstrates that, in granting status,

groups weigh not only task competence but motivation to use that competence to help the group. How does this fit with the view (and evidence) of status based on performance expectations? One possible answer is that group-motivation is actually an implicit part of performance expectations themselves, understood as an anticipation of the likely *usefulness* of one member's task contributions compared to another's. Research supports the idea that performance expectations involve not merely expectations of task ability but also *effort* to apply that ability to the group goal (Correll et al. 2007; Ridgeway and Correll 2004). Group-motivation, and the willingness to pay the cost (but also earn the rewards) of putting effort into the group may be part of what people assess when they implicitly judge the expected performance of one actor compared to another and award status accordingly.

Status Beyond the Immediate Group

Other strands of recent research have looked for status processes in more diffuse networks or communities of people such as open source programmers or online music markets. These contexts go beyond the traditional, scope defined, interpersonal groups that are the focus of expectation states theory in ways that help us understand the actual range of status processes. In these communities, actors still share a valued goal (creating good programs, finding good music) and know that the consequences of their own efforts to achieve these goals depend on the reactions of others. Thus the actors in these settings are still task and collectively oriented, but the interaction among them is often indirect, as in a market, and they may not all know each other personally.

Revealingly, these studies show that status processes not only emerge, but have powerful effects in coordinating and organizing people's actions in these more complex and diffuse contexts. Clark et al. (2006) show that when some actors are publically evaluated as "better" at the goal activities, this bestowal of status enhances their prominence and likelihood of being copied above and beyond their actual "quality." High status actors or objects become a shared focus

of attention [i.e., a Schelling (1960) focal point] that people copy partly because they expect that others will copy it so that they must take that into account in their own behavior (Correll et al. 2012). In an experimental online music market, Salganik and Watts (2008) show that when a piece of music is labeled as popular, it has self fulfilling effects on others' consumption of the music independent of the "quality" of the music. Stewart (2005) demonstrates that software programmers in an online community evaluate each other's reputations through publically available "peer certificates" that reinforce one another and act as status characteristics. In another study of open source programmers, Simcoe and Waguespack (2011) found that attaching the name of a high status programmer to a programming suggestion increased its likelihood of acceptance through a classic status process. The prominence of the high status name increased attention to the suggestion, which increased feedback, which allowed the programmer to improve quality, which further increased the chances of acceptance of the suggestion for publication.

These studies show that while goal orientation and collective interdependence with regard to goal attainment may be necessary for status processes to emerge, direct interpersonal relations are not. Furthermore, these studies highlight how status evaluations act as public signals that members of the community use to coordinate their own actions with others in an effort to manage their interdependence in the situation and achieve better outcomes. Whether coordination through status evaluations actually leads to better outcomes for them or the community, of course, is another question, one that raises the issue of status and "quality" which we consider next.

Status and "Quality"

Expectation states theory treats the evaluation of "quality," that is, assessments of who or what can best contribute to positive goal outcomes, as thoroughly socially constructed because status has self-fulfilling effects not only on evaluations but also on contributions and actual performance (Correll and Ridgeway 2003). Other status re-

searchers, however, have asked how actors who have an interest in maximizing goal attainment and, therefore, are merit oriented could be misled for long by non-merit based status evaluations (e.g., Gould 2002; Podolny 2005). Why wouldn't "real" quality break through? As Gould (2002) and others (Lynn et al. 2009; Podolny 2005) have shown, part of the reason is that people, in making their own evaluations of the "quality" of a given choice, rely on status information as a guide to others' prior evaluations of the quality of that choice. Considering others' evaluations is not irrational in itself but it allows errors to creep into the process that are not checked but rather, endogenously perpetuated. Examinations of this process, however, show that the more "off" these errors are from true quality, the more likely it is the status system based on them will eventually collapse (Lynn et al. 2009; Salganik and Watts 2008).

Recent research, however, suggests that this "socially endogenous" errors process is not the only process that maintains status hierarchies independent of "quality." Recall that actors not only use public status evaluations to make their own judgments about quality, they also use status information to coordinate with others whose reactions to their choices will be consequential to them (e.g., Clark et al. 2006). Widely shared status beliefs (e.g., public status evaluations) are, as we saw earlier, beliefs about what "most people" believe about quality. Correll et al. (2012) argue that even when actors personally judge a lower status option to be high quality, they have reason to choose the higher status option, even if they at first thought it was not as good, in order to better coordinate their choice with others in the situation whose reactions will be consequential for them. Correll et al. (2012) offer experimental evidence that actors use status information, independent of actual quality or prior personal judgments of quality, to align their choices (and often their own final quality assessments as well) with others with whom they are interdependent. For reasons of coordination with others then, as well as status biased quality assessments, status hierarchies show considerable stability and insulation from challenge on the basis of "actual" quality.

Status, Emotions, and Legitimizing Ideologies

Since status involves the rank-ordered esteem in which a person is held in the group as well as the extent to which she is allowed to exercise influence over or expected to defer to others, it necessarily evokes emotions among those involved (Foy et al., this volume; see Fiske 2011; Ridgeway 2006 for reviews). Research suggests that the characteristic pattern of emotions evoked by status differs slightly depending on whether the person is in a classic, goal-oriented, interpersonal status hierarchy or is responding to the status of self and other in less interdependent, collectively oriented circumstances. In interpersonal status hierarchies, high status actors are expected to be agentic and competent and experience emotions compatible with that (Ridgeway and Johnson 1990). In a vignette study, Tiedens et al. (2000) showed that people expect high status actors to feel pride when things go well and anger towards others when problems develop. Low status actors, in contrast, are expected to feel appreciation for others for positive outcomes and more self-blaming feelings like sadness and guilt when things go badly. Lovaglia and Houser (1996) similarly find evidence that high status positions are more "compatible" with the experience of positive self-focused emotions while low status positions elicit more negative self emotions. It seems clear that, in comparison to low status people, high status people experience more elicitors of positive emotion (attention, agreements from others, positive evaluations) and fewer elicitors of negative emotions (e.g., disagreements) but are freer to respond with anger to those negative events they do experience (Conway et al. 1996; Kemper 1990; Ridgeway and Johnson 1990). Note that this suggests that low status members experience more negative emotions, but are constrained from *displaying* negative, angry emotions towards other members by the status hierarchy and its legitimating assumptions about who is more task competent.

In contexts in which people are not bound together by a collective task, evidence marshaled by Fiske (2011) suggests that constraints on ex-

pressions of negative emotions are relaxed and status differences become more openly divisive between people. Even without the need to address a shared goal, people attend to each other's established status characteristics (gender, race, education, class, and so on), Fiske argues, as part of the process of anticipating how to relate to the other. People implicitly judge, "friend or foe?" and "does the other have the capacity to carry out her intentions?" as indicated by relative status which implies competence (Cuddy et al. 2007; Fiske 2011). Out of this social comparison, higher status people, when outside the normative constraints of productive exchange with the other, exhibit scorn for lower status people, often expressed as a dismissive lack of interest in or respect for them. On the other side of the comparison, lower status people feel envy for the higher status, an emotion that involves elements of hurt and anger at what is experienced as an unfair threat to a deserving self (Fiske 2011, pp. 12–16). This research suggests that everyday encounters between people from status differentiated social groups in society will carry an undercurrent of negative, divisive emotions which may accumulate and affect the self over time.

Research by Major and colleagues suggests, however, that the consequences of the negative emotions created by status comparisons depends to some extent on whether individuals endorse ideologies, such as a belief in meritocracy and individual mobility, that legitimize the status differences between social groups (Hunt, this volume; Major et al. 2002; Schmader et al. 2001). While people are motivated to protect the esteem of themselves and their in-groups, they also have powerful needs to believe in a just world, as research on *system justification* has shown (Jost and Banaji 1994; Jost et al. 2004). Not surprisingly, people from high status groups more strongly endorse legitimating ideologies than those from low status groups (Major and Schmader 2001). But ironically, individuals from low status groups who do believe in individual mobility are less likely to perceive discrimination (which is associated with negative emotions) and, possibly because of that, sometimes are better able to achieve (Major et al. 2002).

Status Processes that Mediate Inequality in the Workplace and Elsewhere

The promise to show how larger structures of social inequality are carried out through interpersonal relations has been a major part of the appeal of research on status. Several decades of research on the status generalization process have provided a valuable model of the status processes involved. Only more recently, however, has the knowledge gained about status generalization been systematically applied to the institutional contexts, such as educational, employment, or health organizations, that mediate people's access to the outcomes by which we judge social inequality: income, positions of power and prestige, and personal health. Much of this focuses on how status beliefs about gender reproduce gender inequality (see Ridgeway 2011 for a review) but there has been some attention to class-based status processes as well (e.g., Lutfey and Freese 2005).

A well known institutional factor in gender inequality, for instance, is the relative lack of women in the math-based science and technology fields that are associated with well paying, high status jobs. Part of the problem, argued Correll (2001), is that math is a male-typed task in the U.S., which causes girls to self-assess their ability at math as lower than boys do from the same actual performance. Self-assessments of ability, in turn, affect girls' and boys' career aspirations. Using longitudinal data on a representative sample of high schoolers, Correll (2001) documents such gender status biased self assessments in math ability and shows that they predict students' persistence in math and science fields. In a follow-up experiment, Correll (2004) showed that such biased self assessments are the result of double standards for judging ability activated by gender status beliefs, as expectations states theory would argue.

Another factor that affects gender inequality in the workforce is women's status as mothers of dependent children. Budig and England (2001) documented a "wage penalty for motherhood" of about 5% per child for employed women. To

explain this, Ridgeway and Correll (2004) posited that motherhood is a status characteristic, in addition to gender, that negatively affects the expected effort component of workplace performance expectations. Supporting this argument, Correll et al. (2007) demonstrated that simply adding evidence of parenthood to a job applicant resume reduced a woman's (but not a man's) perceived hireability, appropriate wages, and suitability for promotion in an experiment. In an associated audit study, it reduced the likelihood that real employers would call the woman back for an interview. Other researchers have examined how gender status processes affect women's promotions in the professions (Gorman 2006) and shape the processes by which gender inequality is recreated in innovative work settings such as high-tech start-ups (Ridgeway 2011).

Recent research has begun to investigate how social class also acts as a status characteristic that biases interpersonal outcomes in consequential institutional contexts (see Fiske and Markus 2012; Milkie et al., this volume). Lutfey and Freese (2005), for instance, suggested that status-based assumptions that doctors make about the competence of working class versus middle class patients are a mediating factor in the well-known association between social inequality and health. In a qualitative study of routine clinic visits, they showed that doctors, following such competence assumptions, tended to prescribe simpler, but slightly less effective treatments to working class diabetes patients.

Studies of interpersonal status processes that take place in consequential institutional contexts hold the potential to make major contributions to the study of social inequality among individuals and social groups. While there have been a number of such studies in regard to gender, there have been few studies of this sort based on the equally important status distinctions of race and class. Further research in this area would be highly valuable.

Conclusion

As this review has shown, status is a form of social inequality that is virtually everywhere in our daily lives and deeply consequential for the life outcomes we attain. And yet it is oddly overlooked as a significant determinant of social inequality. Perhaps this is due to the subtlety and complexity of status dynamics. As we have seen, status inequality is an inherently multilevel process that reciprocally interconnects the rank-ordered relations between groups in society with the rank-ordered relationships between individuals within groups. Furthermore, although status is closely linked to power and wealth in social relations, it is itself primarily a sociocultural process rooted in the shared beliefs of groups and societies. Finally, although inherently multilevel, many of the most consequential aspects of status inequality are carried out through implicit social psychological processes at the interpersonal level that are often unnoticed at the time by those who participate in them.

The seeming ubiquity of status inequalities may arise from the fact that status evaluations and status hierarchies develop out of people's efforts to coordinate their actions into a collective attempt to achieve valued goals. In the process, whether inadvertently or not, these efforts produce shared, rank-ordered cultural evaluations of who (which individuals, which groups?) is more competent, more useful, more valued to the group, and therefore, more esteemed and respected. For the individual, being evaluated by the group as less able, important, and socially valuable than others goes to the heart of the experience of inequality. And yet, the fact that these invidious status rankings arise from and are intertwined with people's efforts to manage their interdependence with others to achieve shared goals gives these rankings powerful, self-fulfilling effects. In interpersonal contexts, status-based performance expectations powerfully shape who speaks up or hesitates, who is listened to or ignored, whose suggestions are praised, who performs better or worse, who becomes influential, and who is evaluated as having high ability. Furthermore, as we have seen, the status-based performance

expectations that are formed for individuals are themselves powerfully shaped by the status of the social groups to which they belong in society—their gender, race, occupation, education, class background, and age.

If we take these self-fulfilling effects of status evaluations and place them within the interpersonal relations that occur in educational, employment, and health institutions, we can begin to appreciate how consequential status processes are for social inequality (see Schneider, Judy and Burkander; DiTomaso and Oaks-Yancy; McLeod, Erving and Caputo, this volume). These are the institutions, after all, through which people gain access to significant life outcomes by which we judge inequality, like health, wealth, power, and prestige. For individuals, the subtle, sometimes modest effects of status biases in a given encounter repeat over multiple encounters in the classroom, in the doctor's office, in job interviews, in work groups, in performance evaluations, in promotion decisions, and accumulate to direct them towards better or worse outcomes over their life course. For groups, these same repeating processes systematically smooth the way for the members of higher status groups while erecting barely seen barriers that hold back those from lower status groups, continually reproducing the status inequality between the groups and causing it to align with group differences in wealth, power, and health. For society as a whole, these reproducing effects of interpersonal status processes stabilize and legitimate material and power inequalities among groups and individuals by giving them the appearance of reflecting differences in competence and merit. Clearly, then, we cannot understand and will not be able to effectively counter social inequality, either at the individual or societal level, without taking into account the role status processes play in creating and sustaining it.

Notes

1. Research on social dominance theory has shown that individuals vary not just in their preferences for personal dominance, but also in their

general belief in and preference for hierarchies between social groups such as between races or the sexes (Sidanius and Pratto 1999; Sidanius et al. 2001). Individuals high in social dominance orientation more strongly endorse beliefs that some groups in society are inherently better than others so that social hierarchy is inevitable and they react more negatively to challenges to established group hierarchies. People from more status advantaged social groups in society are more likely to be high in social dominance orientation than are those from less advantaged groups (Sidanius and Pratto 1999). Thus, individuals may attempt to assert status in interpersonal settings to assert the status of their social group as well as themselves. However, Anderson and Kilduff's (2009) findings suggest that whatever their motivation, assertions of status generally must give the appearance of competence to be successful.

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Theoretical Perspectives on Power and Resource Inequality

2

Shane Thye and Will Kalkhoff

Introduction

Sociological questions about the nature of power and resource inequality are as old as the discipline itself. Inspired by the rise of the industrial revolution and the widespread expansion of the colonial empires in Europe, early thinkers in sociology grappled with “big picture” questions of how modernization, cultural expansion, and mass production would influence gradients of power and resource inequality across the globe (Marx [1867] 1967; Weber [1918] 1968). Since then, sociological analyses have become more finely focused and refined. In what follows we examine sociological conceptions of power and resource inequality with the primary intention to overview the main perspectives within social psychology on these topics. We begin by generally defining the phenomenon of interest and covering some of the thematic threads woven throughout this literature. In each section we review both historical conceptions of power and more contemporary theories of power and inequality that have emerged within the last half century. Overall, this chapter is organized by how various theorists

conceptualize and theorize power and resource inequality as interrelated phenomena.

Defining Power: Various Views

In writing this chapter one of the first roadblocks we encountered was how to define “power” and “resource inequality.” In the broadest sense power refers to the ability to create or have some impact on the world, and resources refer to anything of value. Arguably, most if not all of sociology can be seen as addressing some facet of power and resource inequality. To get a handle on this vast sociological terrain, we decided to begin reviewing the literature to see how others have defined these terms, and we discovered that they are sometimes closely linked. First, power and resource inequality are inherently relational phenomena. To say that one has power or an unequal share of resources is to imply that one has an advantage over or beyond another entity. Theories of power and inequality, as such, tend to focus on relational qualities (i.e., how resources flow through power relations or networks, how definitions or meanings are constructed and controlled across relations and over time). In terms of relational qualities, power historically has been defined in terms of either *control* or *benefit* (see Willer 1999 for a good discussion). Weber defines power in terms of control. For Weber, power is “the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance”

S. Thye (✉)
Department of Sociology, University of South Carolina,
Columbia, SC 29208, USA
e-mail: srthye@sc.edu

W. Kalkhoff
Department of Sociology, Kent State University,
PO Box 5190, Kent, OH 44242-0001, USA

([1918] 1968, p. 53). Lukes echoes Weber in that “A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B’s interests” (1974, p. 37). Many other social theorists, including French and Raven (1968), Wrong (1979), Dahrendorf (1959) and Dahl (1957) link power to some form of agency or control. Power in this sense implies, but does not require, resource inequality. Other theorists link power more directly to resource inequality or benefit. Hobbes ([1651] 1985) asserted that power is “a man’s present means to any future goods.” Thus, the acquisition of goods (i.e., resources) is a function of power, and thus power and resource inequality are inextricably related. Many modern theorists have continued in this tradition. For instance, in contemporary social exchange theory power is (i) a *structural capacity* linked to exclusion or dependence, or (ii) a *concrete event* in which one individual benefits at the expense of another. Modern theorists refer to the former as *structural power* or *power potential*, and the latter as *power use* or *power exercise*. Although the terms are sometimes conflated, power is theoretically distinct from other relational concepts such as *influence* (which is voluntarily accepted), *force* (wherein the target has no choice but to comply), and *authority* (which involves a request from a legitimate social position). French and Raven (1968) recognized these distinctions over 4 decades ago and they remain useful today (Zelditch 1992).

Although there are many ways to dissect the literature on power and resource inequality we see four broad themes that traverse the social psychological landscape. We explore and elaborate each of these themes, in turn, in the sections that follow. First, perhaps the most prevalent idea in this literature is that power has the capacity to divide, create differential benefits, or be an exploitative force in social relationships. Here power is presumed to be the causal agent that produces resource inequality (but see Berger et al. 1985 for the converse argument). This theme appears in the conflict approaches of Marx where power and resource inequality reside with those who control the means of production, in Dahrendorf’s (1959) thesis that class-based power resides with those who control and define authority, and in the many

network approaches that seek to predict resource inequality from the power associated with network location. The second theme emphasizes the human capacity to create, control, and reproduce symbolic meanings in establishing power relations. This perspective focuses on the capacity for powerful people to symbolically define situations in ways that foster and maintain resource inequality. A key issue in this tradition is to determine how symbolic interpretations at the micro level interact with or are affected by larger macro-structural constraints. The third theme stands in direct opposition to the first and is perhaps the most counter-intuitive. This line of inquiry documents how power can create solidarity, unity, and cohesion among individuals (Bacharach and Lawler 1980, 1981; Durkheim 1915). The fundamental insight is that power can be a positive force that brings individuals together around a common task or activity, and as a result, creates positive emotional experiences, a sense of solidarity or cohesion, and increases long term commitment. The final theme we cover represents more of an ontological approach than a unified and coherent body of theory and research. Many researchers over the past half century have sought to document how power processes connect with or produce a variety of other social psychological phenomena such as status distinctions (Lovaglia 1994; Thye 2000), emotional reactions (Lawler 2001), perceptions (Simpson and Borch 2005), and perceived legitimacy (Della Fave 1980). We provide a select review of these areas focusing on the more contemporary findings.

The Differentiating Aspects of Power

Given the focus of this volume our emphasis will obviously be on the social psychological mechanisms that undergird power and resource inequality. At the same time, to provide a comprehensive and more balanced approach we seek to anchor our review in the broader sociological landscape. Social psychologists have a diverse set of opinions regarding how power processes are transformed into resource inequality (see also Hunt’s chapter on ideology in this volume). One

basic question that inevitably comes up is how power and resource inequalities are maintained over time. Why is it that those exploited by power and resource divisions do not leave the relation or revolt in an effort to restore equality? Numerous social psychological mechanisms have been postulated to support the temporal stability of power and resource inequality. For instance, Marx postulated that a sense of false consciousness—the idea that those exploited are unaware of their exploitation or lack of upward mobility—creates a kind of panacea for those who are lower in power. Della Fave (1980) theoretically illustrates that individuals who occupy powerful positions in social networks can be seen as more deserving of their resource accumulations, and thus their power exercise comes to be seen as legitimate. Stolte (1983) tests and finds support for Della Fave's assessment. More recently, Sutphin and Simpson (2009) argue and present experimental data suggesting that resource inequality is seen as legitimate when self-evaluations are congruent with resource levels (see Walker, this volume). Over time a variety of other mechanisms including status, emotions, cohesion, trust and reciprocity are theorized to emerge and to some extent stabilize power relations (see Berger et al. 1998; Lawler and Yoon 1996; Molm 2003a, b). We review these other correlates in a later section of this chapter.

Exchange Theories of Power and Resource Inequality

Perhaps the most formal and well-tested theories of power and resource inequality can be found in the social exchange tradition. Contemporary exchange theories of power and resource inequality can be traced to the early work of Homans (1958), Blau (1964), Coleman (1963), and Dahl (1957). Adapting ideas from behaviorism and operant psychology, Homans and Blau emphasized the behavioral underpinnings of power and exchange. In particular, a number of assertions characterize this overall approach, including the ideas that (i) rewards determine the probability of an action, (ii) stimulus-response connections

generalize to other *similar* stimuli, (iii) more valued actions are more likely to be performed, and (iv) the more often a person receives a reward, the more satiated the person becomes. Early scholars adopted a strategy of theory building that entails a kind of psychological reductionism predicated on the idea that psychological propositions are the most general in form, and thus, social relations are best studied in behaviorist terms.

Based on the exchange framework, Thibaut and Kelley (1959) offered what was perhaps the first formal theory of power and resource inequality. They assert that individuals evaluate their current relationship against some standard, or comparison level (CL). The theory claims that actors assess the attractiveness of a relationship by comparing their focal relationship to the benefits expected from other relations (CL_{ALT}). The power of actor A over B is defined in terms of benefit: power is "A's" ability to affect the quality of outcomes attained by "B." The theory suggests two ways by which this may occur. *Fate control* exists when actor A affects actor B's outcome by changing her/his own behavior, independent of B's action. For example, if irrespective of what B does, B receives \$ 10 when A chooses behavior 1, and \$ 20 when A chooses behavior 2, then A has fate control over B. *Behavior control* exists when the rewards obtained by B are a function of both A and B's behavior. To illustrate, when A can make rewards obtained by B contingent on B's actions (A dictates that behavior 1 by B yields \$ 20 for B, while behavior 2 by B yields \$ 40 for B), then A can control the behavior of B. In retrospect, this theory is notable as it is one of the first to highlight the importance of relational interdependence among agents.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Richard Emerson (1972a, b), along with several of his students, developed a theory of power that had a major influence on scholarship relating power and resource inequality (Cook and Emerson 1978; Stolte and Emerson 1977). His *power dependence theory* is an extension of the earlier work of Homans, Blau, and others in the behavioral tradition. At the time, most prior work on power in exchange and rational choice theory applied to dyads. Emerson cast power processes in

broader terms. His fundamental insight was that dyads do not exist in a vacuum. Rather, dyads are most often embedded in some sort of social network. Thus, in analyzing a dyad, he asserted that one must consider how dyads are connected to other dyads—that is, the larger network in which any focal dyad is embedded. Emerson theorized two kinds of connections among dyads. A *negative connection* exists when interaction in one dyad reduces interaction in another (e.g., dating one partner normally reduces other dating relations). A *positive connection* exists when interaction in one dyad promotes interaction in another (e.g., exchange with a dean normally entails exchange with her or his assistant). The attention to dyadic connectedness gave Emerson's theorizing a decidedly structural theme; his were essentially network-embedded dyads. Emerson's fundamental insight shifted the focus of theory and research over the next several decades.

The original power dependence theory conceptualizes two actors, A and B, who possess commodities x and y , respectively. Power dependence theory asserts that the power of A over B (P_{AB}) is a function of the dependence of B on A (D_{BA}), such that $P_{AB} = D_{BA}$. Dependence, in turn, is a function of two key factors: the availability of alternative exchange relations and the extent to which the actors value those relations. To illustrate, imagine a computer manufacturer (A) who must purchase specialized parts from a supply dealer (B). When computer parts are not widely available from other suppliers, but there are many computer manufacturers who need parts, then due to limited availability of parts the computer manufacturer (A) is more dependent on the supplier (B), or $D_{AB} > D_{BA}$. When the computer builder values parts more than the supplier values customers, then A is again more dependent on B ($D_{AB} > D_{BA}$). In both cases the theory predicts B has power over A.

Emerson's original power dependence theory has given rise to numerous other lines of work on power and resource inequality. For instance, Molm (1988, 1990) has used the power dependence framework to explicate differences in reward-based power (i.e., when A's power resided in B's dependence on A) and punishment-based

power (i.e., power based in A's decision to punish B or not). She finds that punishment-based power is exercised less frequently than reward-based power because it entails potential costs (Molm 1997a). Along these same lines, Lawler (1992) has developed a theory of power that includes both dependence-based power and punitive-based power. This work shows how structures of interdependence can promote either punitive or conciliatory bargaining tactics. Bargaining tactics, in turn, are theorized to mediate power exercise in negotiations. Both lines of work extend the basic power dependence framework and affirm the importance of dependence in the overall production of power and resource inequality.

Owing to its behavioral roots, Emerson's (1972a, b) power dependence theory relies heavily on the principle of satiation to predict how resource inequalities emerge. Moving from the dyad to the simplest network structure of two "connected" dyads, consider the following simple 3-branch network, A_1-B-A_2 . Assume that in this simple market B can exchange with one A or the other, but not both. Both Stolte and Emerson (1977) and Cook and Emerson (1978) found that in this network, B earns significantly more resources than A. Both results are consistent with Emerson's satiation model in that B is exchanging more frequently, and therefore is satiated more quickly. By definition, as satiation occurs B should demand more of the resources to continue exchange. At the same time some exchange theorists questioned whether or not satiation is the principle driving power use.

Willer and associates have asserted that exclusion, not satiation, is the basis for network-based power. Brennan (1981) conducted what turned out to be a critical test between "satiation" and "exclusion" as the basis of power in the 3-branch structure. In that test, B could exchange *independently* with each of the As on each round. (i.e., the central actor could exchange with both connected partners at every opportunity). In terms of satiation, this means the central actor has more opportunity to earn money compared to the peripheral actors, and thus should be satiated more quickly. If the central actor is satiated with the acquisition of money, then money should be

come less valued to the central actor over time (again, by definition). As such, the peripheral actors would need to offer more money to complete each subsequent exchange. However, when this test was actually conducted, power for the central actor did not emerge, as As and Bs exchanged at even rates over the course of the study. However, when only one exchange was allowed per round, B had a significant amount of power and earned more resources than either A. The comparison between these two simple conditions suggests that exclusion, not satiation, is the mechanism driving power and resource inequality in networks of exchange. In conditions where the peripheral As are excluded because one or the other (but not both) may exchange with B, there emerges a classical bidding war among the As. As each peripheral essentially tries to outbid the other by offering more and more profit to the central actor, the central actor enjoys increasing levels of resources. Thus, exclusion appears to be the mechanism driving power. The significance of this is not to suggest dependence is unimportant (as those who can be excluded are still more dependent), but rather to illustrate that it is the properties of structures that create power, not the underlying behavioral principles. With respect to the exchange of money (which may or may not produce satiation) the lesson is that the ability to exclude others from profit places one in a powerful position.

The idea that exclusion drives power is the centerpiece of Willer's *Elementary Theory*, which is ultimately based on the classical understandings of power and resource inequality found in Marx and Weber (Willer 1999). Elementary theory anchors power in the ability for some actors to *exclude* others from valued goods. The theory identifies three kinds of social relations, defined by the kinds of sanctions found in each. A *sanction* is any action transmitted from one individual and received by another. *Exchange* occurs when A and B mutually transmit positive sanctions (e.g., I buy the wings, you buy the beer). *Coercion* occurs when a negative sanction is transmitted for a positive sanction (e.g., as when a thief threatens bodily harm for your wallet). *Conflict* occurs when A and B each transmit negative sanctions (e.g., when soldiers in foxholes throw grenades at one another).

In addition to these three types of sanctions, elementary theory identifies three kinds of power structures. *Strong power* structures are those that only contain only two kinds of positions: high-power positions that can never be excluded and low-power positions, one of which must always be excluded. The classic example is the 3-person dating network in which B can date one A, but not both (A_1-B-A_2). B is powerful because B is always guaranteed a date on any particular night, while one A must be excluded. Strong power networks promote extreme levels of resource inequality. In experimental tests, where participants must negotiate the division of 24 points on each relation, both simulation and empirical data find that resource inequalities emerge where B earns nearly all of the profit (Markovsky et al. 1988). *Equal power* networks contain only one set of structurally identical positions, such as dyads or triangles. Positions in equal power networks are said to be structurally isomorphic. In *weak power* networks no position must be excluded, but some positions can be excluded. The simplest weak power structure is the 4-actor line ($A-B-C-D$). Note that if B and C exchange, A and D are excluded. Studies find that this produces a slight power advantage for the positions that need not be excluded (B and C in this case).

At the heart of elementary theory is a resistance model that takes into consideration (i) the maximum profit one could earn from exchange, (ii) the profit one would earn if no exchange is completed, and (iii) the offer that is currently on the table. An actor i 's resistance to exchange is defined using the following equation:

$$R_i = \frac{P_i \text{ max} - P_i}{P_i - P_i \text{ con}}$$

$P_i \text{ max}$ represents i 's best hope or maximum profit from the exchange, P_i represents the payoff if the offer on the table is accepted, and $P_i \text{ con}$ represents the payoff when exchange is not complete. The numerator captures how far away the current offer (i.e., the offer being considered) is from one's best hope. The denominator represents the benefit of consummating exchange relative to no exchange at all. The model assumes

that actors balance these motives when negotiating exchange. The theory predicts that when two actors, i and j , exchange, they do so at the point of equi-resistance. That is, exchange is predicted when the resistance is mutually balanced for i and j such that

$$R_i = \frac{P_i \text{ max} - P_i}{P_i - P_i \text{ con}} = \frac{P_j \text{ max} - P_j}{P_j - P_j \text{ con}} = R_j$$

Overall, elementary theory has been tested in a variety of contexts and using a variety of different experimental protocols. To date, it is perhaps the best overall predictor of power and resource inequality in social networks (see especially Skvoretz and Willer 1991, 1993; Willer 1999).

Sparked by Emerson's network-oriented view, much theoretical activity in the 1980s and early 1990s was devoted to the following question: How does the shape of any given social network affect power and the division of resources when the occupants negotiate exchanges with one another? Competing mathematical indices were offered from equidependence theory (Cook and Yamagishi 1992), game theory (Bienenstock and Bonacich 1992), utility theory (Friedkin 1992), identity theory (Burke 1997) and network exchange theory (Markovsky et al. 1988). Each index or measure of power offers unique predictions for power exercise based on the shape of the network and rules of exchange (see Skvoretz and Willer 1993 or van de Rijt and van Assen 2008 for comparisons and tests of various measures). In 1992, an entire issue of *Social Networks* was devoted to comparing and contrasting these approaches. In retrospect, the significance of this competition was to promote rapid theory growth, increased formalization, and aid in the discovery of new phenomena.

Overall, the above branches of social psychology have much to say about the connections between power and resource inequality. Work in the power dependence tradition points to relational interdependencies as the basis of resource inequality. Simply stated, those who have greater access to valued goods or themselves possess highly valued goods have power over those who do not. From this perspective, to have power is

to use power, and this itself produces resource inequality. Elementary theory tells us that oftentimes those dyadic interdependencies are functions of the capacity for the network to produce the exclusion. The resistance model implies that the material conditions around us (what is my best hope or maximal profit in this relation versus what happens if I fail to make an exchange) determines your level of power in relations. Like power dependence theory, the presumption is that those who have power will use it, and again, this is the basis for resource inequality. Further, if one can quantify those best hopes and worst fears, the resistance model makes precise, ratio-level predictions for exchange outcomes and resource inequalities. The next section focuses not on material conditions and dependence, but on the meanings and interpretations associated with power and resource inequality.

The Symbolic Aspects of Power

As within the social exchange tradition, there has been considerable debate among symbolic interactionists concerning the nature of power and its relation to resource inequality. In addition, symbolic interactionists have been at pains to deal with criticisms that crescendoed in the 70s and questioned whether the perspective has the means to say anything useful about power beyond the immediate situation, thereby (allegedly) posing a serious challenge to its sociological relevance (Meltzer et al. 1975; see also Coser 1975 and Worsley 1974). Yet a number of theoretical and empirical advances, reviewed below, explicitly or implicitly call the challenge itself into question, pointing out that its bases reflect misrepresentations and the fact that work rooted in the interactionist tradition can (and has) been used to further our understanding of power and resource inequality. Moreover, whether these approaches are situated squarely within the interactionist tradition or whether they offer unique syntheses that incorporate concepts and theoretical views from other perspectives, what these theories have that other theories of power and resource inequality mostly lack is patently interactionist. The

foundational ideas are that (i) power is an ongoing and collectively *negotiated* social process, and (ii) power rests largely on the ability to define the situation and establish shared definitions of reality. That is to say, this tradition emphasizes that power cannot be understood without taking meanings into account. Yet, as clarified below, interactionist approaches to power and resource inequality also share some points of focus with other approaches that we review. To the extent that this fact is more widely recognized and appreciated, the cross fertilization of approaches through simultaneous attention to both structure and process, however conceived, promises a more refined understanding of power and resource inequality in small groups and larger organizational institutions.

Whatever the specific approach taken, interactionist examinations of questions surrounding power and resource inequality all agree, either explicitly or implicitly, that the longstanding critique of an astructural bias (Meltzer et al. 1975) inherent in the interactionist perspective is false, at least partially so. In other words, symbolic interactionism (SI) does *not* fail to deal adequately with the opportunities and constraints of social structure. To show why, symbolic interactionists provide a variety of analyses of power and resource inequality, and support them with much empirical work and original evidence (reviewed below). While in agreement in their response to the (unfounded) critique of astructural bias, interactionist approaches disagree on what issues should be addressed in analyses of power and resource inequality, how these issues might be most fruitfully examined, and how future theoretical and empirical research ought to proceed. For the most part, points of overt or implied debate concern two broad issues: (i) the most productive way to conceive the link between power at the local level and extra-local inequalities—including whether making a conceptual distinction between “micro” and “macro” is even analytically desirable; and, (ii) the concept of power itself—namely whether past interactionist work already supplies a clear and useful concept of power, or whether the concept must be fleshed out. In addition, some interactionist approaches

to understanding power and resource inequality draw explicit attention to the fact that power as a process of negotiation can be both divisive *as well as* integrating. This unique insight, as we shall see, stands as one obvious and important point of overlap between interactionist treatments of power and resource inequality and those tied to other theories within social psychology.

Linking Power and Resource Inequality

In his description of “New Directions Within Symbolic Interactionism,” Musolf (1992) summarized and synthesized a decade-and-a-half of what he took to be SI’s best efforts to address the once accurate criticism of astructural bias. Such efforts involve the articulation of links between what the perspective knows best (negotiated communication processes at the micro level) and what it formerly had, in Musolf’s view, all but neglected (community structures at the macro level). According to Musolf, the direction that SI had taken retained its traditional focus on negotiated meaning, human agency, and indeterminism, while incorporating a new focus on structural constraints; i.e., a “macrosociological concern with conflict, power, institutions, and ideology” (p. 173). In doing so, SI had begun to evolve a view of power as a process involving human agency, struggle, and resistance playing out within the broader terrain of institutions, structural inequalities such as gender and race, and cultural ideology. The result, in Musolf’s view, was a realigned SI that had much to say about how macrosociological inequalities are reproduced and sometimes resisted and changed through their repeated local negotiation in everyday life. Properly understood, SI conceives of social attributes such as gender, race, and class as structural categories that impose overarching constraints on everyday interaction in terms of the ability to influence the construction of shared definitions of reality. This contributes to the reproduction of inequality in micro relations but also, in terms of agency, provides the larger context within which the less powerful struggle against resource disadvantage by attempting to

negotiate the meanings of structural categories and attendant situational realities. As Musolf (1992) argues, for example, Hammond's (1980) research shows how female medical students, in order to level the playing field and increase their chances of success, have had to invoke special "vocabularies of motive" during interaction with male peers to redefine the situation and counteract the enviroing belief that females, *because* they are female, do not have what it takes to be doctors. Thus for SI, power and its relation to resource inequality (e.g., attaining the degree required to have a rewarding career in medicine) involves a dynamic interplay of *both* processual *and* structural forces and should be analyzed as such. So, if the criticism of a structural bias were once true, it no longer applied so obviously at the time of Musolf's (1992) review. That said, Musolf concedes that SI could still do more to elucidate the interplay of structural constraint and meaning negotiation as the thrust of its developing contribution to a multi-level understanding of power inequalities.

More recently, Dennis and Martin (2005) offered another argument against the alleged criticism that SI is "unable to adequately conceptualize 'macro' phenomena such as social structure, patterns of inequality and power" (p. 191). However, whereas Musolf had argued that the criticism was *originally* on target and had only been overcome through a concerted theoretical and empirical response, Dennis and Martin (2005) argue that SI has *never* neglected matters of power, resource inequality, and social structure, but rather it has addressed them on its own idiographic terms—terms that "reflect the fundamental premises of...its pragmatist tradition" (p. 196). When it comes to studies of deviance and education, for instance, Dennis and Martin describe how interactionists have examined power relationships and their uncertain, contingent, and unanticipated consequences in "real-life settings," showing the myriad ways in which meanings delivered from larger "cultural patterns and institutional constraints" are actively negotiated by individuals *in situ*, and all without reifying concepts such as power and structure in the mode of sociology proper (p. 201). Thus

while interactionist studies of deviance, education, and other social phenomena may well have "deepened macrosociological analyses of power and inequality," asking interactionists to do even more to shore up mainstream sociology is antithetical to the perspective's role as a "*coherent theoretical alternative* to those [mainstream] approaches [original emphasis]" (p. 204). In short, Dennis and Martin prescription for SI's role in conceptualizing and analyzing power and resource inequality is this: "[E]nduring differentials in the *capacity* [emphasis added] of some people to do things to others...must be understood as the outcomes, over time, of social processes—often quite prosaic—which ultimately produce patterns of decisive advantages and disadvantages, often involving the accumulation (or loss) of significant resources—money, land, military might, prestige, and so on" (p. 208). These processes and highly variable, situationally negotiated capacities, they argue, cannot be described with universals and cannot be abstracted from their moment-to-moment creation, and so trying to fit SI into the current of mainstream sociology or social psychology (e.g., Musolf's effort) is a sell-out that betrays the perspective's theoretical and philosophical foundations of Mead's pragmatism.

In yet another interactionist approach to analyzing power and inequality, Schwalbe and colleagues (2000) agree with Dennis and Martin (2005) on two key points: (i) inequalities cannot be understood apart from the face-to-face processes of negotiation that (re)produce them; and, (ii) from the standpoint of SI, it does not make sense to try and link micro action to macro structure in the usual sense. However, Schwalbe et al. (2000) offer a unique take on the micro-macro issue that is quite distinct from the resolutely anti-nomothetic neopragmatism underlying Dennis and Martin's reading of SI. In short, Schwalbe et al. (2000) argue that "the problem is not one of linking action to structure, but one of linking action *across times and places* [emphasis added]" (p. 439). Theoretically, the problem is resolved by focusing on how action and the negotiation of meaning in a local setting is linked to the actions or anticipated actions of people outside the setting

based on their resources. Thus the structural force that guides or constrains action in a local setting is actors' sense of what others outside the setting will do, or *could do*, to define the situation given their resources. When it comes to conceptualizing and analyzing power and resource inequality, then, "the key analytic question is not about resources [per se] or their distribution, but about how resources are *used* [original emphasis], in any given time and place, to create and reproduce patterns of action and experience," including inequality (p. 440). But unlike Dennis and Martin, Schwalbe and colleagues do not view such use of resources as beyond any sort of "bird's eye" comparison across time and place, but instead see four "generic processes" at the heart of the reproduction of inequality across settings: othering, subordinate adaptation, boundary maintenance, and emotion management. While we will not go into the details of these processes here, the point is that Schwalbe and his colleagues, in our view, offer something of a meta-theoretical compromise that stresses the contingencies of interaction and meaning negotiation in local settings but also the usefulness of identifying universal processes that capture interaction. Such an approach facilitates the development of general sociological knowledge (Cohen 1989), and in so doing helps make sense of the body of interactionist research by revealing "the common analytic ground of qualitative studies of disparate settings and groups" (Schwalbe et al. 2000, p. 421).

Unlike Schwalbe et al. (2000) and Dennis and Martin (2005), other contemporary theorists bring us full circle to Musolf's (1992) approach insofar as they have not seen it fit to reject differentiation among theoretical explanations in terms of the scale of analysis. For example, Hallett (2007, p. 148) provides a "meso-level account of the interactional-institutional link" in application to power processes within an educational institution. In this account, Hallett cleverly integrates Goffman's micro-social analysis of the "interaction order" with Bourdieu's institutional-level analysis of symbolic power, capitalizing on the strengths of each, and in such a way that overcomes the limitations of both the former (i.e., too heavy a focus on the "here-and-now") as well as the latter

(i.e., over-determined structuralism). The result is a distinctive "negotiated order" synthesis that explains how micro interactions involving deference and demeanor are "enabled and constrained by institutional pressures, local contexts, and features of the immediate situation" (p. 149). In short, economic capital, cultural capital, and social capital are all resources existing in "social space" that shape specific patterns of deference and demeanor in micro-interactional settings.

Conceptualizing Power

Despite their differences on the micro-macro issue, the interactionist approaches to power and resource inequality reviewed above are unified in their view of society as a "negotiated order." However, one of the drawbacks of this orienting strategy, generally speaking, is that it is limited by a rather poor conceptualization of power (Hall 1997; Hallett 2007). Hallett (2007) addresses this issue head on, and in fact, the overarching goal of his integration of Bourdieu's arguments and Goffman's interactionism is to provide a clear, usable conceptualization of symbolic power with broad application. In line with Lukes' (1974) analysis of the consequences of take-for-granted background meanings, "power is *symbolic* [original emphasis], it involves control over the meanings and definitions that provide a guide for action" (Hallett 2007, p. 166). Despite their differences in articulating the link between structural and processual contingencies of power and resource inequality, Hallett's definition clarifies SI's unique contribution to the study of power and resource inequality: SI is *the* perspective that treats symbolic meanings and definitions and their consequences for action most seriously.

Years earlier, Luckenbill (1979) was among the first to raise the spectre of the conceptualization issue by arguing that interactionism "lacks a coherent conception of power" (p. 97). To that point, he argues that interactionists had either failed to define the concept in their work despite its central importance, or they had borrowed an existing atomistic conception of power (usually from psychology) that was not consistent with the basic assumptions

of SI. In an effort to correct this problem, Luckenbill offered a precisely defined concept of power that he argued is consistent with the interactionist perspective. Specifically, he argued that in order to line up with SI, “power should be defined as a particular relation which develops and changes over the course of joint action, not simply as some attribute or capacity which people acquire and use against others” (p. 98). Stated differently, power is a *collective transaction* that occurs between actors in a *relational unit* who *jointly coordinate* their actions toward a *common objective*. One of the main strengths of this conceptualization, according to Luckenbill, is the fact that its key terms are abstract. Accordingly, the framework can be used just as easily at the largest level (international power) as it can be at the smallest level (interpersonal power), thus showing its utility in providing an answer to the micro-macro issue as well. However, Luckenbill pointed out that processes at higher levels are likely to involve additional complexities. For example, “... the larger the transaction [i.e., representatives of political states compared to individuals representing their own interests], the more extensive the decision-making processes of the source and target” (p. 109). The insights that Luckenbill (1979) offers along these lines may have important implications for perspectives on power and resource inequality beyond interactionism, especially the structural social psychological approaches reviewed earlier in this chapter given they are characteristically multi-level in their foci (Lawler et al. 1993). To illustrate, Luckenbill’s (1979) claim suggests that, in Emerson’s (1992a, b) terms, when total mutual dependence is high we should expect to see more careful deliberation, increased cognitive activity, and longer transaction times. Congruently, Luckenbill sees his conceptual framework as particularly promising where the emphasis is on understanding how power as a “joint act” unfolds (p. 110).

From Power to Cohesion

Among interactionist and even other approaches, Luckenbill’s conceptual framework stands out in emphasizing that power and resource unequal-

ity can be seen as involving more than conflict processes and zero-sum outcomes. In his view, individuals can also use their resources to foster integration in social relations. In fact, it is rather surprising that more interactionist approaches to understanding the nature of power and resources have not focused more on the integrating, order producing aspects of power, especially given that SI has “traditionally emphasized the harmonious side of social life” (Luckenbill 1979, p. 97).

There are other notable exceptions besides Luckenbill, however. Hallett (2003) states that one of the “virtues” of his theory of symbolic power and organizational culture is that it has “the capacity to explain conflict *and* integration [emphasis added]” (p. 129). He predicts, for example, that the likelihood of integration (as opposed to conflict) among those with greater and lesser power to define the situation increases as the number of “audiences” in the social setting decreases—in essence, as heterogeneity is reduced. There is an interesting link between this strain of SI research and a body of work in network theory. While not widely recognized as an interactionist theory, Friedkin’s social influence network theory (e.g., Friedkin 1998, this volume; Friedkin and Johnsen 1990, 1999, 2011) provides a multi-level account of how, for example, the “centrality” of a person’s position in a larger social system (i.e., a person’s power and control of resources, such as information and skills) enters into the macro process by which patterns of agreements emerge in the system as well as the interactional process by which more and less powerful persons “mutually adjust” to one another’s attitudes and cognitively integrate conflicting viewpoints” (Kalkhoff et al. 2010). Building upon SI’s focus on the importance of the process by which shared understandings come about in complexly differentiated social systems, an important implication of the theory is that the content of shared norms in groups, subgroups, and larger organizational forms “must be consistent with the social stratification (or more general pattern of inequality) of interpersonal influences” (Friedkin 2001, p. 167). Attention to the cooperative aspects of power in work that draws on the basic principles of SI is the bridge

to theoretical formulations in social psychology that highlight the role of “mutual dependence” and integrating emotional processes in explanations of power and resource inequality. We now turn to these topics.

The Cooperative Aspects of Power

Whereas our review to this point illustrates how power can be an exploitative differentiating phenomenon, as Friedkin (2001) and strands of symbolic interactionism suggest, power processes also have the capacity to unite, coalesce, and bring individuals together through structures of mutual dependence. Recall that power in the network tradition is defined as a structural capacity linked to dependence or exclusion, and this is distinct from force wherein the target has no choice but to comply. The fundamental insight from this line of work is that power relations that entail high mutual dependence (i.e., in which people need one another) can unleash emotions and perceptions that bring people together around common tasks or activities. In the early 1980s, Bacharach and Lawler theorized the distinction between relative power and total power (Bacharach and Lawler 1980, 1981; see also Emerson 1972b, p. 63). *Relative power* entails a zero-sum notion of power that captures one individual’s power vis-à-vis another person’s power. It is defined as the difference between A’s dependence on B, versus B’s dependence on A. Generally speaking, most of the work in contemporary exchange theory, the social networks arena, symbolic interaction, and organizational theory is directed at understanding relative power differences. *Total power* is defined as the sum of each actor’s power (see Bacharach and Lawler 1981; Molm 1987). Total power is essentially “mutual dependence” in Emerson’s (1972a, b) terms, which he conceived of as the structural foundation for social cohesion. In relations where total power is high, individuals are more dependent on one another for valued goods compared to relations where total power is low. The overall implication is that greater total power generates more commitment behavior, in part because there is more at stake and individuals need


one another to produce benefit. Thus, there is a direct theoretical link between power and the production of commitment. Next we briefly flesh out the alternative mechanisms through which the two are connected.

Commitment is broadly defined as the strength of an attachment to another social unit such as a group, organization, or community (Kanter 1968, 1972). In the abstract, commitment represents a person-to-group bond that is distinct from inter-personal bonds. Parsons (1951) suggested that person-to-group attachments could involve instrumental (i.e., utilitarian), affective (i.e., emotional), or normative (i.e., legitimated) bonds and saw these as an important foundation for social order. Kanter (1968, 1972) echoes these distinctions in her discussion of commitment as continuance, cohesion, and control. Important for our purposes, both Parsons (1951) and Kanter (1968, 1972) recognize the instrumental and affective foundations for commitment.

The traditional exchange-theory explanation views power linked to commitment via instrumental conditions, in particular, uncertainty reduction. The argument is that commitment develops because repeated exchanges foster a sense of predictability in the situation (Emerson 1981; Kollock 1994). Consider a watch manufacturer who repeatedly buys parts from a supply dealer. Given a series of successful transactions, the two should come to learn more about one another, develop a common set of procedures or expectations for the exchange, and perhaps learn to trust one another given a history of successful encounters. These represent “benefits” in an uncertain market of power relations where the properties of alternative partners are unknown or unknowable (Kollock 1994, 1999).

An alternative (though not competing) linking of power and commitment is found in the theory of relational cohesion (Lawler et al. 2000; Lawler and Yoon 1996, 1998). The theory of relational cohesion explicitly links conditions of power (interdependence) to relational outcomes (cohesion and commitment) through the emotions produced by social exchange. Dependence here is defined as the extent to which one actor can provide another with valued outcomes, and

Fig. 2.1 The theory of relational cohesion



vice versa. The theory employs the concepts of relative power as well as total power, as defined above (Emerson 1972b; Lawler 1992). Emotions are conceptualized in terms of pleasure/satisfaction and interest/excitement. Relational cohesion is defined as a perception of the relation itself as coming together or becoming more unified. Commitment is measured behaviorally. In the past, measures of commitment have included (i) staying in the relation given an alternative, (ii) giving small, token unilateral gifts as a symbolic gesture of the relationship, and (iii) cooperating under conditions of risk or malfeasance (i.e., cooperating in a social dilemma). The theory is shown in Fig. 2.1.

The theory presumes that actors are motivated to exchange so they can produce benefits not otherwise attainable. The theory also recognizes, however, that actors have the ability to experience, interpret, and reproduce *emotional reactions* to exchange outcomes. The orienting idea is that the very act of exchange represents joint social activity characterized by problems of coordination and uncertainty. As such, when exchange is successful, actors should experience positive emotional reactions; when exchange is unsuccessful, actors should experience negative emotional reactions. At the heart of the theory, then, is an endogenous process that links conditions of power (dependence or interdependence) to behavioral outcomes (commitment) through positive emotions. This process is conceived as a sequence of moments or steps that must occur for commitment to emerge. That is, repeated exchanges generate positive emotions that, in turn, produce perceptions of relational cohesion. Equal power conditions are predicted to produce more commitment because equal power produces more frequent exchange, thereby unleashing the first step in the endogenous causal chain. This emotional/affective explanation is complementary to

the traditional exchange theory account of stability and commitment that centers on how repeated exchange produces uncertainty-reduction (e.g., Kollock 1994). Relational cohesion theory asserts that repeated exchange not only reduces the uncertainties, but it also produces positive emotions that enhance relational cohesion and make the relational tie expressive. Over the years a number of empirical tests have found consistent support for the theory (Lawler et al. 2000, 2006, 2008; Lawler and Yoon 1996, 1998; Thye et al. 2011, Thye et al. 2002; Yoon and Thye 2002). In summary, the theory of relational cohesion provides an account for how power-dependence relations can produce positive emotions and commitment when mutual dependence is high and there are no relative power differences. Power is linked through resource inequality via dependence, and the message is despite power and resource inequalities positive emotions and commitment can nonetheless emerge.

Recent studies in social neuroscience further confirm the fundamental roles of emotions (as opposed to cognitions) and cohesion in contexts where resources are exchanged. Sanfey et al. (2003) used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to explore the neural substrates of cognitive versus emotional processes involved in decision-making during an exchange task. In response to unfair offers from “power hungry” (simulated) human partners, brains scans showed activation in three areas: the *insula* (an area associated with emotions such as anger and disgust), the *dorsolateral prefrontal cortex* (associated with deliberate cognitive processes such as goal maintenance), and the *anterior cingulate cortex* (associated with conflict monitoring). However, activation of cognitive centers during unfair offers was *not* associated with subsequent behavior (i.e., whether participants accepted/rejected offers). Only activation in the emotional centers

(i.e., the insula) was associated with offer acceptance/rejection. The study suggests that in comparison with cognitive considerations, emotions play a more vibrant role in determining responses to power-related actions during the exchange of resources.

A second line of exchange research in social neuroscience examines a phenomenon known as inter-brain synchronization. *Inter-brain synchronization* occurs when brain wave activity across multiple individuals becomes “phase locked,” which is sometimes even visually detectable to some extent when raw electroencephalogram (EEG) signals for electrode pairs across two individuals begin to “dance” in harmony as if being driven by a single person (Condon and Ogston 1966). It is well-known across a number of disciplines that “synchronization,” generally speaking, is an elemental characteristic of human interaction and bonding—one that is present from the earliest moments of life (Condon and Sander 1974) and takes many rich and varied forms (see Kalkhoff et al. 2011).

In terms of resource exchange, Yun et al. (2008) conducted a study in which 13 pairs of participants sat face-to-face and played one single trial followed by 10 sequential trials of the Ultimatum Game, an exchange task in which two players (a proposer and a responder) explicitly negotiate how to divide up a given sum of money. If the responder accepts the proposer’s offer, the sum is split accordingly; if the responder rejects the proposer’s offer, both receive nothing. In terms of relational cohesion theory, actors in the Ultimatum Game are equally dependent (i.e., have equal relative power) because neither receives anything if they fail to reach agreement, and total power is fixed as the amount split does not vary. Yet from a traditional exchange-theoretic perspective, the rational strategies in the game are for the proposer to exert power and offer the smallest possible amount (e.g., \$1 if dollars are the smallest divisible unit) and for the responder to acquiesce and accept that minimal offer. Yet typically this is not what happens. Meta-analysis reveals that proposers avoid being so greedy and tend to offer what they believe to be *fair* (about 40%),

no matter what size the “pie” (Oosterbeek et al. 2003). Shedding light on this interesting fact, EEG results from the Yun et al. (2008) study showed that higher frequency (beta and gamma) oscillations across the exchange partners’ fronto-central electrode sites were closely related to the social interaction and exhibited the greatest synchronization. Viewed through the lens of RCT, this makes sense because it is well known that beta band activity correlates with attentional focus (Sanei and Chambers 2007), while gamma band activity has been linked to emotions (Muller et al. 1999; Keil et al. 2001). Between-brain synchronization in these bands may be seen as a reflection of common attentional foci and moods. The significance of this research, in relation to this volume, is to illustrate how power dynamics played out in the Ultimatum Game produce common attentional foci and synchronized (positive) emotional reactions during the exchange of resources, even in a context where the potential for self-driven behavior looms large. The larger implication is that there may be deep biological processes that support positive emotions and commitment even in the context of power and resource inequality.

Power, Resources and Other Social Psychological Processes

The concept of power has been widely studied, and there are many literatures in psychology and sociology showing that power is correlated with a variety of phenomena. Here we review how power and resource inequality relate to other social psychological processes and connect to other social phenomena. Because in many empirical contexts power and resource accumulation is associated with status, honor, or prestige, there has been substantial work examining the relations among power, status, and resource inequality (see also Ridgeway and Nakagawa, this volume). We begin with work that links power, status, and resource inequality, and then we move to recent evidence linking power and perception.

Status, Power and Resource Inequality

Probably because the two often co-vary in every day social relations, there have been multiple efforts to describe the relations between power and status. Kemper and Collins (1990) assert that power and status are central and independent dimensions of social interaction. Kemper (2011) goes even further, asserting that status and power are the central constructs that drive ritual interaction and guide the emotions that link each of us to socially relevant reference groups. Other work examines the relationship between status, power, and resource inequality. For Weber and Homans, power that is used consistently over time is predicted to produce status. Lovaglia (1994) was perhaps the first contemporary theorist to formally link status, power, and resource inequality. He asserts that there are conditions under which those with power are also afforded high status. The idea is that when powerful people exercise power and amass resources, others may (correctly or not) presume that they are also highly competent. Expectations of competence, in turn, are one of the fundamental determinants of status, honor, or prestige (Berger et al. 1977). Thus, power confers status. Yet if those who are disadvantaged by the power differential (i) experience negative emotional reactions to power use, or (ii) have knowledge that the basis for power is either random or structural in nature (i.e., not based on talent or ability), then the relation between power and status is predicted to be attenuated. Lovaglia (1995) tests and finds partial support for these ideas.

Other work sees the converse effect—i.e., that status itself can directly produce power and resource inequality (see also Ridgeway and Nakagawa, this volume). The status value theory of power (Thye 1999, 2000; Thye et al. 2006) explains how status characteristics like race, age, and gender affect the perceived status value of resources, and subsequently, the development of power and resource inequality in exchange relations. The theory applies to relations in which actors (i) are differentiated by multiple salient status characteristics, (ii) have accurate knowledge regarding the status characteristics of each

exchange partner, (iii) exchange nominally distinct resources with one another, that are (iv) relevant to the status of each actor. One example would include a setting in which an African-American woman seeks to buy a car from a white male car dealer.

The status value theory of power can be expressed as a series of three logically linked assumptions. The first assumption of the theory claims that the status value associated with actors' characteristics will spread to exchangeable resources (Berger et al. 1972; Berger and Fisek 2006; Thye 2000). For example, a set of golf clubs once owned by former President John F. Kennedy sold for many thousands of dollars when they went to auction. The theory suggests that clubs are highly valued for two reasons. First, President Kennedy is one of the most prestigious of all U.S. presidents, and the activity of golfing is highly relevant to the presidency. In one controlled test, participants in a laboratory study could exchange their own blue poker chips for (i) purple poker chips held by a higher status partner, or (ii) orange poker chips held by a lower status partner (Thye 2000). The results show that participants tried harder to acquire the purple chips, assumed they were generally more important than orange chips, and were willing to accept less money to get them. Importantly, these effects were observed even though all participants were fully aware that orange and purple chips both gave exactly the same payoff at the end of the study. In short, the status of the individual seems to affect the value of things related to that individual. More generally, the results indicate that status characteristics alter the perceived status value of resources.

The second assumption claims that actors who control status-valued resources have a power advantage over those who control less valued resources. Virtually all exchange theories agree that individuals who possess highly valuable goods can extract higher prices for those goods (i.e., as when drug dealers benefit from the sale of narcotics in areas where they dominate the market) (Blau 1964; Burke 1997; Cook and Yamagishi 1992; Emerson 1972a, b; Homans 1958; Molm 1987, 1997b; Thibault and Kelley 1959;

Willer 1999). Even so, value as a determinant of power has been largely unexamined in the exchange tradition. Most exchange theorists simply “fix” the monetary value of goods by holding the payoff constant for each resource unit (Bonacich and Friedkin 1998; Willer 1999). At issue for the status value theory is whether status characteristics incrementally inflate or deflate the perceived value of items held by higher and lower status individuals (Heckathorn 1983a, b). To determine if the value of an object is inflating or deflating, Thye (2000) began by assigning equal monetary value to all resources. These resources are then made relevant to status characteristics, which, according to assumption one above, should increase or decrease their perceived status value.

The final assumption links structural power potential to behavior, stating that actors who have a power advantage receive more resources relative to those who do not. A long history of research indicates that actors in powerful locations do in fact receive favorable exchange rates and thus earn more resources (Willer and Anderson 1981; Cook et al. 1983; Markovsky et al. 1988; Lawler 1992). Thye (1999, 2000; Thye et al. 2006) has shown that status-advantaged actors also receive more resources. In a series of laboratory experiments, the highest status participant received the greatest share of profit from exchange in both dyads and triangles. Thye (2000) reports that in a status-differentiated dyad, the high status member earned 19.05 of 30 points representing significant power use. The same pattern occurred in a status-differentiated triangle (H, L, L) where each person could negotiate with both others. A third experiment demonstrated that status effects countervail “weak power” in the simplest weak power structure, the 4-line ($A_1-B_1-B_2-A_2$). The central Bs who normally earn slightly more than the peripheral As were believed by the As to be low status; at the same time the As, who are structurally disadvantaged, were believed by the Bs to be high status. That is, the status assignments opposed structural power. The results indicate that “weak power” differences were virtually eliminated; the A-B exchanges were near equality. Overall, the evidence suggests higher status actors earn more in exchange.

Later investigations found a second mechanism linking status to power and resource inequality. Thye et al. (2006) develop a theory of status influence to show how this occurs. That theory asserts that salient status characteristics activate performance expectations in exchange relations, and in turn, those performance expectations affect the beliefs and aspirations of status differentiated exchange partners. There are two corresponding mechanisms. The first is that higher status others should have greater aspirations in the exchange (i.e., expect to earn more). The second is that higher status others should be more influential when they communicate with low status others. Thye et al. (2006) investigated two simple dyadic structures that manipulate the status of the occupants. In each dyad, the goal is to negotiate the division of 25 points when one person has a standing outside offer worth 10 points in the event no agreement is made. The status assignments (H=High, L=Low) in those dyads were as follows: H—25—L—10 and L—25—H—10. It is important to note that the peripheral actor had no knowledge of the standing outside offer, but before each exchange round, the central actor could send a message to the partner indicating, “My outside offer is X,” where X is an amount chosen by the central participant. The results indicate two significant trends. First, focusing only on the centrally located participants, high status individuals inflate the communicated size of the actual outside offer while low status actors deflate that value (11.32 versus 9.83, respectively). In short, high status actors lie about the size of the outside offer in a self-serving manner whereas low status actors self-deprecate. Second, communications from high status individuals had greater influence than those from low status individuals, and this translated into a resource advantage for those with high status (14.62 points versus 13.10). In symbolic interactionist terms, higher status others in centrally powerful locations had a greater ability to *define the situation*, determine how actors value items, and in turn, use that local definition to impart power in the immediate situation. Overall, this provides a complementary pathway through which status differences reproduce gradients of power and resource inequality.

The implication is that status itself *is* a resource that actors can use to create and maintain resource inequality. The fact that status is a valued resource explains, for example, why individuals may be willing to exchange money for temporary status recognition (Huberman et al. 2004).

Perception, Power and Resource Inequality

Finally, there is one additional topic that has received broad attention from psychologists and sociologists in recent years. At issue is how power affects perspective taking or the ability to imagine the emotions, motivations, and perspectives of others. The importance of this issue is relevant to a variety of theoretical traditions. An exchange theorist might ask if powerful individuals can sympathize with or imagine the frustration or shame experienced by those excluded from interaction. The symbolic interactionist might question if powerful people have trouble engaging in imaginative rehearsal, role-taking, or viewing the interaction from the perspective of a generalized other (Franks 1976). In both cases the implication is that power presents challenges to interaction, renders tasks of coordination more arduous, and generally hinders perspective taking and empathy.

Recent evidence suggests that indeed, power reduces the ability to take other individuals' perspectives. In a series of recent experiments, Galinsky et al. (2006) asked undergraduate subjects to think of a personal incident in which they had power over another person. They are then asked to draw the letter "E" on their forehead with a non-permanent marker as quickly as possible. One way to do this is to draw the E as if you are reading it yourself, which produces a backward E for any external viewer. The other option is to draw the E from the perspective of the observer, which then yields a backward E from your own perspective. The results indicate subjects primed with power are almost three times as likely to draw the E in a self-oriented direction, suggesting that power limits the ability to take the perspective of another. Follow up studies by

Galinsky and associates (2006) indicate that high power individuals are more likely than lower power individuals to (i) focus more heavily on their own vantage point and not take into consideration that others lack information they possess, and (ii) misunderstand the emotional expressions of others and thus have a more difficult time experiencing empathy. On the whole, this line of research suggests that power impacts the ability to understand how other individuals see, think, and feel.

In a similar line of work, Simpson, Markovsky, and Steketee (2011) argue that low-power actors, in general, have more accurate perceptions of the social ties that exist in groups because lacking power leads to more effortful and deliberate (and less automatic) social cognition. Results from an experiment confirmed the argument put forth by Simpson et al. (2011) linking low power to more accurate social (network) perceptions. This finding is important because those who have accurate perceptions about networks are regarded by others as more powerful in a social setting (Krackhardt 1990). Thus the motivation to *form* accurate perceptions of social networks may be an important, even deliberate, means by which initially low-power actors attempt to "reign-in structurally determined power processes" (Simpson et al. 2011, p. 166). The recent work of Galinsky and Simpson along with their colleagues reflects a more general trend in exchange and networks research from structural themes to more agentic ones in explanations of power and resource inequality and related phenomena. We discuss the broader significance of this trend in the following section.

Conclusion

The theories of power and resource inequality reviewed here are as varied and diverse as the sociologists who produce them. As with all theories in science, sociological theories of power and resource inequality are lenses through which to view the world. All theories systematically sharpen and focus in on certain phenomena while excluding others. Exchange theoretic accounts

focus on the interdependences that link dyadic encounters (Emerson 1972b) and the capacity for structures to produce exclusion (Willer 1999). Much of the theoretical and empirical activity in the exchange tradition over the past two decades has focused on precision; that is, the ability to predict exactly how much resource inequality will emerge in any given structure. That theories in this tradition are capable of predicting ratio-level outcomes, often with accuracy to within a few tenths of a point, is a testament to how far our knowledge of power and resource inequality has evolved since the founding fathers of the discipline began to think systematically about power and resource inequality (see Willer and Emanuelson 2008 for a test of ten distinct theories). The emphasis has been squarely on structure and resource differences that emerge over time, and the capacity to predict the latter from the former.

Symbolic accounts of power emphasize the micro aspects of power, negotiation, definition of the situation, and the interplay of social context and social interaction. Power is seen as a dynamic and ever-changing property that evolves in context and cannot be simply reduced to social structure. Despite some disagreement, we see a sort of consensus that has emerged in the past decades. With issues of a structural bias somewhat laid to rest, there has been movement from more idiosyncratic to more systematic accounts of power. Schwalbe et al. (2000), Hallet (2007) and their predecessor Luckenbill (1979) in particular seem to have struck a balance between the overly myopic “nothing is predictable” stance and the overly tolerant “it is simply a matter of structure” position. Power based on symbolic interaction has become increasingly understood in terms of the opportunities and constraints presented by context, institutional pressures, and other forces that set the stage for social interaction. In this sense, those who study the symbolic aspects of power have moved a bit closer to the intellectual traditions of exchange and rational choice theorists.

Other theorists focus on the positive phenomena that can sometimes emerge from power relations. There has been much agreement that certain exchange structures produce dynamics that bring people together around common

tasks and activities (Lawler and Yoon 1996; Molm et al. 2006, 2007). This has been the case in both the exchange and symbolic interactionist approaches examined here. In the exchange tradition it has been long understood that high mutual dependence can produce interactions laden with positive emotions, and these emotions have the capacity to produce trust, cohesion, solidarity and commitment behavior. Power as such is construed as a positive force in social interaction. The finding that power and positive emotions can produce phenomena like solidarity or organizational commitment has been demonstrated in both laboratory experiments (Lawler et al. 2008; Lawler and Yoon 1996) and in the field (Yoon and Thye 2000). More recently, the emphasis in this arena has shifted from the link between power relations and commitment to other forms of social interaction. For instance, recent studies have asked how altering the basic forms of exchange affect the link between power and resource inequality (Lawler et al. 2008; Molm et al. 2003a, b). In examining variation across fundamental forms of exchange (i.e., negotiate, reciprocal productive, and generalized) studies in this tradition have become more “interactionist” in flavor.

Across the social psychological traditions we see many common themes and points of overlap. All social psychological accounts of power and resource inequality deal, at least implicitly, with the tension between *structure* and *agency*. This contrast is most evident in the symbolic account of power and resource inequality. For symbolic interactionists social structure has been conceptualized as institutional norms or pressures, contextual constraints on interaction, extant inequalities produced by institutions such as race and gender, and larger cultural ideology. Agency is the human capacity to define meanings and situations and to create and reproduce patterns of action and experiences through negotiated communication at the micro level (Musolf 1992). The primary issue has been to incorporate structure into theories that focus heavily on agency. For exchange and rational choice theorists, structures are presented in relational terms—as networks of opportunities and constraints that impact the pattern of social

interaction. Historically, exchange theories afford much less room for agency as structures are conceived as more predetermined and less fluid. Network structures are typically theorized as more static and less variable (see Willer and Willer 2000 for an exception that explores dynamic social networks). However, in contemporary work there is much more room for emotion, trust, risk management, and other perceptual and cognitive processes. In short, exchange theories have become more focused in recent years on the concept of human agency in structures (see Cook et al. 2009 for an example). This shift moves the concerns of exchange theorists much closer to those of symbolic interactionists and mirrors the SI trend that has moved, some would argue, from agency to structure. In this sense we see a sort of intellectual convergence taking place across these very diverse traditions.

In this chapter we, as most sociologists do, assume that power produces resource inequality. At the same time we note that the converse can sometimes occur (i.e., resource inequality may also produce power). At the macro-level, resource dependence theory suggests that organizations that control resources have a basis of power over those who are dependent on those resources (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). At the micro-level, reward expectations theory (Berger et al. 1985) suggests that those who possess high levels of rewards are expected to be more competent, and thus have more power and influence. Surprisingly, there has been very little social psychological work on the manner in which resources *produce* power, despite the old adage, “You gotta have money to make money.” In the future we suggest that investigators may examine more carefully the link from resource inequality to power. Borrowing from resource dependence theory, we hypothesize that resource inequality may impact power through levels of dependence. Consider the difference between a resource rich boat owner and a resource poor boat owner. One can imagine that a rich captain may need to sell the boat less than a poor one. In this sense, having access to resources may reduce dependence and increase power in the parlance of exchange theory. Framed somewhat differently, having access

to resources may allow the former boat owner to better define the situation and frame meanings in the context of the negotiations. Thus, the symbolic aspects of the interaction may also be affected by the level of held resources. Both hypotheses deserve future investigation.

We began this chapter by pointing out that one of the first roadblocks we encountered was how to define “power” and “resource inequality.” As our work on the chapter unfolded, the larger roadblock we encountered was to see the various social psychological perspectives on power and resource inequality in a fresh light—to see the larger unifying picture reflected in what appeared to be very diverse perspectives at first blush. Indeed, research on power and resource inequality within social psychology can itself be conceived in terms of the various perspectives and theories we use to study these central topics. If scientists in these traditions continue to “take the role” of other perspectives, this will surely accelerate the erosion of intellectual divides and increase a sense of mutual dependence. To illustrate, structural theories of network power (e.g., power dependence theory, elementary theory, the status value theory of power) emphasize the importance of how people perceive the value of goods to be exchanged. Symbolic interactionists focus precisely on how powerful individuals control the definition of value in social relations. And while there is little or no cross-fertilization across these areas, there should be. Besides making for a more pleasant and sociable experience at the annual meetings, multi-perspective approaches to power and resource inequality and other kinds of integrative efforts will undoubtedly pay great dividends when it comes to advancing social psychological theory, methods, and application.

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Bruce G. Link, Jo C. Phelan and Mark L. Hatzenbuehler

Over the past 50 years, “stigma” has become an extraordinarily widely used concept. Before the publication of Goffman’s book, *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity* (1963) the term was used in the social sciences to mean something quite close to its current meaning, but was used only infrequently. A Google Scholar search for the period 1900–1960 returns numerous scientific articles using the word “stigma,” but the vast majority of these refer to botany (the receptive apex of the pistil of a flower) or biology (a small mark, spot, or pore) rather than to social scientific meanings of the term. In sharp contrast, a Google Scholar search of the concept in the current era reveals the dominance of the social scientific meaning and its application to a vast array of stigmatizing circumstances. One indicator of the large increase in interest is the number of published articles with the word “stigma” in the title or abstract. In 1980 the number stood at 19 for Medline and 14 for Psych Info, but rose dramatically by the end of the century to 114 for Medline and 161 for Psych Info in 1999 (Link and Phelan 2001). Incredibly, by 2010 the numbers were more than five times as high as in 1999: 758 for Medline and 851 for Psych Info. Our aim is to engage this enormously successful concept, describe it, and gauge its relevance for understanding the production and reproduction of inequality.

B. G. Link (✉) · J. C. Phelan · M. L. Hatzenbuehler
Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University,
722 West 168th Street, Room 1609, New York City,
NY 10032, USA
e-mail: BGL1@Columbia.edu

Origins—Goffman and the Labeling Debate

In the mid-1950s, Erving Goffman was a research fellow at the Laboratory for Social and Environmental Studies at the National Institute of Mental Health. The unit was headed at the time by sociologist John Clausen, and it was during this period that Goffman did his ethnographic work at Saint Elizabeth’s Hospital that led to his influential book, *Asylums* (1961). Stigma was on the minds of the small but enormously generative group at the Laboratory for Social and Environmental Studies, especially in the context of qualitative studies they were undertaking concerning wives of men who were hospitalized for mental illness. Whereas the term “stigma” was not in wide use in the social sciences at the time, one exception was a paper from this group authored by Charlotte Green Schwartz (1956) entitled “The Stigma of Mental Illness.” She indicated that stigma had “two connotations: first, that in the minds of others the person is set apart—that is different from the so-called normal person; second that he is set apart by a ‘mark’ which is felt to be ‘disgraceful,’ or even ‘immoral,’ by which he can be judged to be ‘inferior.’” (Schwartz 1956, p. 7). Exposed to these ideas and drawing on his ethnography in Saint Elizabeth’s hospital, Goffman (1963) produced his highly influential introduction to the stigma concept. Goffman’s description was comprehensive, and it is difficult to find any current rendering of the concept that is not presaged in his 1963 treatise. It is in this work that perhaps the most influential definition of the concept was provided: “an attribute that is deeply

discrediting” and that reduces the bearer “from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one” (Goffman 1963, p. 3).

Subsequent to its introduction, stigma played a central role in the so-called labeling debate that emerged during the 1960s. Scheff (1966) constructed a formal labeling theory of mental illness that pinned the origin of stable mental illness on societal reactions including stigmatization. The essence of his theory is captured in the following quote:

In a crisis, when the deviance of an individual becomes a public issue, the traditional stereotype of insanity becomes the guiding imagery for action, both for those reacting to the deviant and, at times, for the deviant himself. When societal agents and persons around the deviant react to him uniformly in terms of the stereotypes of insanity, his amorphous and unstructured rule-breaking tends to crystallize in conformity to these expectations, thus becoming similar to behavior of other deviants classified as mentally ill and stable over time. The process of becoming uniform and stable is completed when the traditional imagery becomes a part of the deviant’s orientation for guiding his own behavior. (Scheff 1966, p. 82)

The theory is called “labeling” theory because of the centrality it gave to the social definition of deviant behaviors (see Matsueda and Grigoryeva, this volume). As one of the originators of labeling theory put it, “The deviant is one to whom that label has been successfully applied; deviant behavior is behavior that people so label” (Becker 1963, p. 9). The debate concerning the role of labeling in mental illness involved both informal labeling processes (e.g. spouses’ labeling of their partners) and official labeling through treatment contact (e.g. psychiatric hospitalization). In Scheff’s theory, the act of labeling was strongly influenced by the social characteristics of both the labelers and the person being labeled, and by the social situation in which their interactions occurred. He asserted that labeling was driven as much by these social factors as it was by anything that might be called the symptoms of mental illness. Moreover, according to Scheff, once a person is labeled, powerful social forces come into play to encourage a stable pattern of “mental illness.” Stigma was a central process in this theory as it “punished” people who sought

to shed the identity of mental illness and return to normal social roles, interactions and identities.

Critics of the theory, especially Walter Gove, took sharp issue with Scheff’s characterization of the labeling process. Gove argued that labels are applied far less capriciously and with many fewer pernicious consequences than the labeling theory claims (Gove 1975). In Gove’s view, research supported the idea that if people with mental illnesses are rejected, it is because of responses to their symptomatic behavior rather than because of any label they received. Moreover, he argued that labeling is not an important cause of further deviant behavior. “The available evidence,” Gove concluded, “indicates that deviant labels are primarily a consequence of deviant behavior and that deviant labels are not a prime cause of deviant careers” (Gove 1975, p. 296). For some period between the late 1970s and early 1980s, professional opinion swayed in favor of the critics of labeling theory. Certainly the dominant view during that time was that stigma associated with mental illness was relatively inconsequential. For example, when a group of expert stigma researchers was summoned to the National Institute of Mental Health in 1980 to review evidence about the issue, the term “stigma” was intentionally omitted from the title of the proceedings. Apparently, the argument that behaviors rather than labels are the prime determinants of social rejection was so forcefully articulated that the editors of the proceedings decided that stigma was not an appropriate designation when “one is referring to negative attitudes induced by manifestations of psychiatric illness” (Rabkin 1984, p. 327). It was within this context that so-called “modified labeling theory” emerged in response to the then dominant anti-labeling, stigma-dismissing stance.

“Modified labeling theory” derived insights from the original labeling theory but stepped away from the claim that labeling and stigma are direct causes of mental illness (Link 1982, 1987; Link et al. 1989). Instead, the theory postulated a process in which official labeling through treatment contact and the stigma that accompanies such labeling jeopardizes the life circumstances of people with mental illnesses by harming their employment chances, social networks, and

self-esteem. By creating disadvantage in these domains and others like them, people who have experienced mental illness labels are placed at greater risk of the prolongation or reoccurrence of mental illnesses. The modified labeling theory also provided an explanation for the way in which labeling and stigma might produce these effects and how key concepts and measures could be used in testing the explanation with empirical evidence.

But these developments in the sociology of mental illness were far from the only developments spurring an explosion of research about stigma. Although it is impossible to quantify precisely, the onset of the AIDS epidemic appears to have played a major role in bringing stigma to the fore because of its potential role in the progression of the epidemic (Herek 2007). The same is true with respect to the obesity epidemic and the role of weight stigma in that epidemic (Carr and Friedman 2005). Moreover, social movements aimed at reducing stigma, such as the gay rights movement, have used the language of stigma to address the circumstances they confront. And while the anti-smoking movement may not have intended it, the stigma of smoking has become a prominent feature in the current era (Stuber et al. 2008). Moreover, once created and disseminated, stigma concepts have become useful to people experiencing a long, long list of circumstances ranging from the stigma of incarceration to the stigma of incontinence. Stigma concepts have provided a way to capture what is experienced and to specify how people are affected by those experiences. But what are the concepts that have been so useful? To provide some accounting, we offer answers to the following questions: What is stigma? How do stigmatizing circumstances differ one from the other? Why do people stigmatize? How does stigma produce inequality? And how do people seek to resist stigma?

What Is Stigma?

In the literature on stigma, the term has been used to describe what seem to be quite different concepts. It has been used to refer to the “mark” or

“label,” the linking of the label to negative stereotypes, or to the propensity to exclude or otherwise discriminate against the designated person. Even Goffman’s (1963) famous essay includes several different, albeit very instructive, definitions. As a consequence of this variation, there has been confusion as to what the term stigma means. Moreover, an intense distaste for the concept emerged in some circles for at least two reasons. First, it was argued that the stigma concept identifies the “attribute” or a “mark” as residing in the person—something the person possesses. The very reasonable objection to this conceptualization was that it took for granted the process of affixing labels and did not interrogate the social processes that led to such labeling (Fine and Asch 1988). In particular, far too little attention had been focused on why social audiences seem to select certain characteristics for social salience from a vast range of possible characteristics that might have been identified instead. Second, it was argued that too much emphasis in the literature on stigma had been placed on cognitive processes of category formation and stereotyping, and too little on the broad and very prominent fact of discrimination and the influence that such discrimination has on the distribution of life chances (Oliver 1992).

In light of this confusion and controversy, Link and Phelan (2001) put forward a conceptualization of stigma that recognized the overlap in meaning between concepts like stigma, labeling, stereotyping and discrimination. As described below, this conceptualization defines stigma as the co-occurrence of interrelated components of labeling, stereotyping, separating, emotional reactions, status loss and discrimination. The approach also responds to the criticism that the stigma concept locates the “mark” or “attribute” in the person by making it clear that such “marks” (or “labels” as designated by Link and Phelan) are selected for prominence by social processes from among many possible human traits that might have been selected. Finally by incorporating discrimination into the concept, and by focusing on the importance of social, economic and political power in the production of stigma, the definition responded to the criticism that the stigma concept

was too narrowly focused on cognitive processes. In keeping with these considerations, Link and Phelan conceptualized stigma as follows:

In our conceptualization, stigma exists when the following interrelated components converge. In the first component, people distinguish and label human differences. In the second, dominant cultural beliefs link labeled persons to undesirable characteristics—to negative stereotypes. In the third, labeled persons are placed in distinct categories so as to accomplish some degree of separation of "us" from "them." In the fourth, labeled persons experience status loss and discrimination that lead to unequal outcomes. Stigmatization is entirely contingent on access to social, economic and political power that allows the identification of differentness, the construction of stereotypes, the separation of labeled persons into distinct categories and the full execution of disapproval, rejection, exclusion and discrimination. Thus we apply the term stigma when elements of labeling, stereotyping, separation, status loss and discrimination co-occur in a power situation that allows them to unfold. (Link and Phelan 2001, p. 367)

A detailed exposition of each of these components is available elsewhere (Link and Phelan 2001); here we provide a brief description of each so as to convey the scope of stigma processes involved. The components are presented in an order that helps communicate the stigma concept we seek to elucidate. The order is not meant to suggest that the first one listed occurs first, the second, second and so on. Instead, there are likely strong feedback loops between the components that achieve a mutual influence between components (Link and Phelan 2001).

Distinguishing and Labeling Differences The vast majority of human differences, e.g., big toe length, vegetable preferences, or favorite kind of pet are not considered to be socially relevant across many circumstances. However, some differences, such as skin color and sexual preferences, are currently awarded a high degree of social salience. Both the selection of salient characteristics and their labeling are social achievements that must occur for stigma to be realized. In many situations this social selection of human characteristics is so apparently obvious as to be taken for granted: there are blind people and sighted people, black people and white people,

people with one leg and people with two. It is more apparent when people are befuddled as to how to categorize someone, as occurs when a child is born with ambiguous sex and people need to decide whether to assign male or female to the infant. But whether taken for granted or not, such social selection must occur for stigma to emerge.

Associating Differences with Negative Attributes In this component, the labeled difference is linked to negative stereotypes. Examples are the stereotype of laziness and intellectual inferiority applied to African Americans, the dangerousness and incompetence of people with mental illnesses, and the gluttony of people who are obese. A label can be linked to many stereotypes or to just a few and, as our examples suggest, the content of the stereotype can be different for different labels (lazy, dangerous, incompetent or gluttonous). The link between a label and a stereotype can vary in strength, conferring more or less certainty that the labeled person has the attribute in question and should be treated in accordance with that possibility. However, in the Link and Phelan definition, for stigma to exist there must be some linking of a label to a stereotype.

Separating "Us" from "Them" A third aspect involves a separation of "us" from "them." Central to early and nearly all definitions of stigma (e.g. Jones et al. 1984; Schwartz 1956), this component is also reflected in more recent writings by social psychologists under the rubric of "othering" (Schwalbe et al. 2000). Examples can be found with respect to certain ethnic or national groups (Morone 1997), people with mental illness, or people with a different sexual orientation who may be considered fundamentally different kinds of people from "us." The degree of separation can vary from milder instances of separation to an extreme in which the "them" are seen as not really human. The designation of a "them" that can be treated differently and worse (often much worse) than "us" has supported, for example, the exploitation of African Americans in the era of slavery and the arrogation of Indian lands.

Emotional Responses The Link and Phelan (2001) conceptualization of stigma was subsequently expanded to include emotional responses. Link et al. (2004) noted that, from the vantage point of a stigmatizer, emotions of anger, disgust, anxiety, pity and fear are possible. These emotions are important first because they can be detected by persons who are stigmatized, thereby making a stigmatizer's response salient to them. Second, emotional responses may shape subsequent behavior toward the stigmatized person or group through processes identified by attribution theory (Dovidio et al. 2002; Frable et al. 1990; Weiner et al. 1988). From the vantage point of the person who is stigmatized, emotions of embarrassment, shame, fear, alienation or anger are possible. Emotions are important for inequality because they strongly communicate "up and normal" and "down and different" through subtle cues that lie below overt and obvious forms of behavior (see Foy et al., this volume).

Status Loss and Discrimination When people are labeled, set apart and linked to undesirable characteristics, a rationale is constructed for devaluing, rejecting and excluding them. When devaluation, discrimination and exclusion are widespread, a persistent pattern of unequal social relationships arises that creates social structures of disadvantage. Once in place these structural arrangements (segregation, exclusion, downward occupational placement) feed back to reinvigorate the labels, stereotypes, setting apart and emotional reactions that disadvantage stigmatized groups.

The Dependence of Stigma on Power Differences Between Groups Link and Phelan's (2001) conceptualization introduced the idea that the definition of stigma must include the observation that stigma is entirely dependent on social, cultural, economic and political power. Lower-power groups (e.g., psychiatric patients) may label, stereotype and separate themselves from higher-power groups (e.g., psychiatrists) by perhaps labeling the psychiatrists "pill pushers," stereotyping them as "cold" and "indifferent," and seeing them as a separate group that is distinct from

"us." But in these cases, stigma as we define it does not exist, because the potentially stigmatizing group (the psychiatric patients) does not have the social, cultural, economic and political power to imbue its cognitions (labels and stereotypes) with serious discriminatory consequences. The psychiatrists are not severely damaged by the patients' views of them. Stigma is dependent on power.

The forgoing conceptualization provides a definition of stigma in a set of interrelated processes and specifies some conditions that must be present for stigma to occur. As such, these processes represent building blocks that can help us understand how stigma produces inequality. But, while the concepts provide some purchase on what the essence of stigma is—what we must observe to declare that a group is a stigmatized group—they are not particularly adept at helping us understand how stigmatizing circumstances differ from each other. As we probe for the specifics about how stigma leads to inequality, we should have concepts that usefully differentiate between stigmatizing circumstances.

How Do Stigmatizing Circumstances Differ from each Other?

In *Social Stigma: The Psychology of Marked Relationships*, Jones et al. (1984) developed a set of concepts that are especially useful for understanding how stigmatizing circumstances differ. They conceptualize six dimensions—concealability, course, disruptiveness, aesthetic qualities, origin, and peril—that can be used to characterize a particular stigmatizing circumstance and to assess how it differs from other such circumstances.

Concealability refers to how apparent or detectable a characteristic is to other people. Some stigmatizing circumstances like mental illnesses or prison incarceration are concealable (at least to some degree) whereas others such as facial disfigurement and limb loss are not. People who have the option to conceal must decide whether and to whom to disclose their stigmatized status, how much information to disclose, and what the timing of any disclosure should be. For example,

a dating situation for a person who has been hospitalized for mental illness or incarcerated for burglary would likely raise many issues regarding concealment of this history. People may also have to concern themselves with circumstances in which their history might be revealed by a clumsy confidant or through records as might happen if a local pharmacist or general-practice physician notices a prescription for an antipsychotic medication. People who cannot conceal are often burdened by the need to anticipate and manage adeptly the reactions of others (Goffman 1963; Pachankis 2007).

Course refers to the extent to which the stigmatizing circumstance is believed to be reversible. For example, short stature, Down syndrome, and having one leg instead of two are not reversible, whereas with modern medical interventions, a cleft palate, warts, and diarrhea usually are. Addictions (smoking, heroin), serious mental illness and criminality lie somewhere in between these poles and are subject to some degree of contestation with respect to this dimension of stigma. To the extent that the course cannot be reversed, the label and associated stereotypes are likely to stick as in the assertion “once a schizophrenic always a schizophrenic.”

Stigmatizing circumstances can also be differentiated from one another by *disruptiveness*, which is the extent to which such a circumstance strains and adds to the difficulty of interpersonal interactions. For example, people who are in the presence of someone with an extreme facial disfigurement such as a cleft palate may feel uncomfortable and become acutely aware of where their gaze is focused. If a concealable condition is successfully hidden, disruptiveness can be avoided. In general, disruptiveness is probably strongly linked to people’s expectations about the way things “should be.” When these expectations are challenged, smooth interaction becomes difficult.

Aesthetics refers to the extent to which different marks elicit an instinctive and affective reaction of disgust. Cleft palate, facial scarring, severe psoriasis or the lesions of leprosy are considered unaesthetic, whereas other stigmatized circumstances are much less so. While the most obvious examples are physical expressions, the

aesthetics dimension can also be relevant to situations that involve situations such as pedophilia or the smell of some homeless people.

Origin refers to how the stigmatizing circumstance came into being and especially the extent to which the stigmatized person’s behavior may have caused the condition. Some circumstances such as short stature and birth defects are thought to be entirely out of the person’s control, whereas others such as substance abuse and obesity are not. According to attribution theory (Weiner et al. 1988) more blame, anger and punishment are directed to persons whose stigmatized circumstance is deemed to be under his or her control. In the area of the mental illnesses, strong public education efforts have aimed at advancing a biomedical perspective on the origins of mental illnesses by emphasizing genetic and other biological causes of such disorders. Interestingly, while this effort appears to have some positive consequences with respect to aspects of stigma related to origins, the effort also makes the course aspect more salient. When a condition is described as genetic in origin, people see it as more firmly fixed within the person, part of their essential make up that cannot be reversed (Phelan 2005).

Peril refers to the extent to which the condition induces fear or perceived threat in others. People with mental illnesses, substance abuse, or a criminal history may be feared if their history of these conditions is revealed whereas people of short stature and Down syndrome are much less likely to be viewed as dangerous. When it is present, the dimension of peril is a major contributor to people’s desire for social distance from an individual who bears a label that confers fear or danger (Link et al. 1999; Pescosolido et al. 2010; Phelan et al. 2000).

The Jones et al. conceptualization is useful for understanding stigma-generated inequality because it helps identify the specific circumstances that may lead to devaluation, exclusion or rejection. For any selected stigmatizing circumstance one can consider whether it is (1) concealable, (2) reversible, (3) disruptive, (4) aesthetically challenging, (5) under the person’s control, or (6) perilous in some way. The resulting profile can then sensitize the analyst to the ways in which

these aspects of stigma are related to inequality. So far, our exploration of stigma has provided concepts that seek to identify the essence of stigma—what must be present for stigma to exist (Link and Phelan 2001) and how stigmatizing circumstances might differ one from the other (Jones et al. 1984). What remains unexplored is the question of why people stigmatize.

Why Do People Stigmatize?

Phelan et al. (2008) propose three ends that people can attain through stigma-related processes: (1) exploitation/ domination or *keeping people down*; (2) enforcement of social norms or *keeping people in*; and (3) avoidance of disease or *keeping people away*.

Exploitation and Domination Wealth, power, and high social status can be attained when one group dominates or exploits another. Ideologies involving stigmatization develop to legitimate and perpetuate these inequalities with the group designated as the one to be kept down being deemed to be inferior in terms of intelligence, character, competence and the basic human qualities of worthiness, and value (Phelan et al. 2008). Classic examples are the racial stigmatization of African Americans beginning in the era of slavery, the Europeans' colonization of countries around the globe, and U.S. whites' expropriation of the lands of American Indians (Feagin 2009). Thus one reason people might stigmatize others is to create an inequality that benefits them.

Enforcement of Social Norms People construct systems of written and unwritten rules governing everything from how business deals can be conducted to what constitutes an impolite intrusion on another's privacy. Some degree of investment in norms like these develops; people come to count on them and to be disturbed when they are violated. Failure to comply with these norms is often cast in terms of the flawed morality or character of the transgressor (Goffman 1963; Morone 1997), and stigma processes are deployed as a corrective mechanism. One way that stigma

is useful, then, is that it imparts a stiff cost, in the form of social disapproval that makes subsequent transgressions less likely. If the transgressor responds by conforming, he or she may be allowed to re-join the in-group, achieving what Braithwaite (1989) termed "reintegrative shaming." In this use of stigma, people are *kept in* by influencing the behavior of the norm violator. A related use is that the people around the norm violator are *kept in* by learning the boundaries of acceptable behavior and by observing what happens to someone who goes beyond those boundaries (Erikson 1966). In this instance stigma creates the capacity to extrude and to assign vastly lower status to people who violate cherished social norms. The resulting inequality reinforces dominant norms and reduces the power of those who would violate those norms.

Avoidance of Disease Many illnesses and disabilities (e.g. psoriasis, dwarfism, limb loss) do not seem to be stigmatized in order to exploit or dominate or in order to directly control behavior and enforce norms. Kurzban and Leary (2001) provide another explanation for stigma in these circumstances by arguing that there are evolutionary pressures to avoid members of one's species who may spread disease. They focus on parasites, noting that infection can lead to "deviations from the organism's normal (healthy) phenotype" (Kurzban and Leary 2001, p. 197) such as asymmetry, marks, lesions and discoloration; coughing, sneezing and excretion of fluids; and behavioral anomalies due to damage to muscle-control systems. In this way, the advantage of avoiding disease might have led to a distaste for deviations from the way humans are supposed to look or carry themselves (Kurzban and Leary 2001). Thus, a broad band of deviations might lead to a visceral response of disgust and a strong desire to keep the person carrying such a deviation away.

The key point to be taken from Phelan et al.'s (2008) conceptualization is that whether it is to keep people down, in, or away, there are motives or interests lying beneath the exercise of stigma. With clear motivations identified, we might expect people to use stigma processes to achieve

the ends they desire. In what follows we explore four generic ways in which stigma processes produce persistent, socially patterned inequality.

How Does Stigma Produce Inequality?

We conceptualize four broad mechanisms of discrimination as part of the stigma process: direct person-to-person discrimination, discrimination that operates through the stigmatized individual, interactional discrimination and structural discrimination.

Direct Person-to-Person Discrimination What usually comes to mind when thinking about discrimination is the classic model of individual prejudice and discrimination, in which Person A discriminates against Person B based on Person A's prejudicial attitudes or stereotypes connected to a label applied to Person B (Allport 1954). We know that this kind of discrimination has occurred when, in the context of an audit study, it becomes apparent that an African American couple was steered away from housing in a white-dominated neighborhood or a person with a history of hospitalization for mental illness was denied access to an apartment (Page 1977), or when an anti-gay epithet is used in the perpetration of hate crime. This rather straightforward process occurs with considerable regularity, although it may often be hidden from the discriminated-against person; one rarely forthrightly learns why one is turned down for a job, an apartment or a date. We believe, however, that this relatively straightforward process represents the tip of the discrimination iceberg. Much discrimination is hidden in its manifestation if not in its consequences, and is often "misrecognized"—that is, it occurs without full awareness (Bourdieu 1990), as several of the examples we provide below demonstrate.

Discrimination that Operates Through the Stigmatized Individual Another form of discrimination is both subtle in its manifestation and insidious in its consequences because it operates through stigmatized individuals themselves (Freidl et al. 2003; Prince and Prince 2002). One

cannot pinpoint a specific perpetrator of the discrimination. A classic example in the area of racism is the concept of stereotype threat (Steele and Aronson 1995). According to this idea, people know about the stereotypes that might be applied to them—African Americans know that they are linked to stereotypes of violence and intellectual inferiority, gays know that others believe them to be flamboyant and pedophilia risks, and people with mental illnesses know they are seen as unpredictable and incompetent. Steele and Aronson (1995) reveal the power such stereotypes have for the performance of people affected by them. They indicate that the stereotype becomes a threat because one might be evaluated in accordance with the stereotype or might confirm the stereotype through one's behavior. The threat can harm performance in two ways. First, if the threat is activated in a situation in which one has to perform, the emotional reaction to the threat can cause under-performance on the task at hand. Second, if the threat is repeatedly experienced it can lead to disidentification with the domain—one concludes that one is not good at these tasks and as a result devalues the importance of such tasks. In a now classic study, Steele and Aronson showed that, controlling for SAT scores prior to the imposition of experimental conditions, African Americans perform worse than whites when students are randomly assigned to believe that the test measures intellectual ability. In contrast, when students are randomly assigned to a condition in which the test is explicitly presented as one that is not diagnostic of intellectual ability, African American students perform on par with white students. Following this classic set of studies, a program of research has developed showing that stereotype threat has robust consequences for performance.

A second example of discrimination processes that operate through the individual is modified labeling theory (introduced briefly above) (Link 1982, 1987; Link et al. 1989, 1987). According to this theory, people are exposed to common, ambient stereotypes about mental illness as part of their socialization. People form expectations as to whether most people will reject an individual with mental illness as a friend, employee,

neighbor, or intimate partner and whether most people will devalue a person with mental illness as less trustworthy, intelligent, and competent. For people who never develop a serious mental illness or enter a psychiatric hospital, these beliefs are of little personal consequence. They are an innocuous set of beliefs about a status one personally does not have. But for a person who develops a serious mental illness, the possibility of devaluation and discrimination becomes personally relevant. If one believes that others will devalue and reject people with mental illness, one must now fear that this rejection will apply personally. The person may wonder, "Will others look down on me, reject me, simply because I have been identified as having a mental illness?" An immediate consequence might be for the person to feel a loss of self-regard at having accrued a status that he/she knows others devalue. Then, to the extent that it becomes a part of a person's worldview, that perception can have serious negative consequences. Expecting and fearing rejection, people who have been hospitalized for mental illness may act less confidently and more defensively, or they may simply avoid a potentially threatening contact altogether. The result may be strained and uncomfortable social interactions with potential stigmatizers (Farina et al. 1968), more constricted social networks (Link et al. 1989), a compromised quality of life (Rosenfield 1997), low self-esteem (Livingston and Boyd 2010; Wright et al. 2000), depressive symptoms (Link et al. 1997), unemployment, and income loss (Link 1982, 1987).

Interactional Discrimination A third type of discrimination emerges in the back and forth between individuals in social interaction. The idea is that people bring to interactions expectations or schemas relating to characteristics that are made salient in an interaction. A person interacting with someone who carries a stigmatized status may behave differently, with hesitance, uncertainty, superiority or even excessive kindness. The person with the stigmatized status reacts, responding perhaps with less self-assurance or warmth, causing the interaction partner to dislike him/her. The end result is an emergent

property of the interaction which if repeated over multiple circumstances leaves the person with the stigmatized status excluded—an outsider. It differs from what we have described as direct person-to-person discrimination in two ways. The first is that in interactional discrimination the stigmatized person takes part in the discrimination—it is not something that is just done to him/her. The second is that in direct person-to-person discrimination the discriminatory intent is obvious or can become so (as in an audit study), whereas in interactional discrimination this is not the case. A classic study that brings this form of discrimination to light was an experimental study conducted by Sibicky and Dovidio (1986) that randomly assigned mixed-sex pairs to one of two conditions. In one condition, a "perceiver" was led to believe that a "target" was recruited from the psychotherapy clinic at the college. In the other condition, the perceiver was led to believe that the individual was a fellow student in introductory psychology. In fact, the target was always recruited from the class. The results showed that, in their interactions with therapy targets, perceivers were less open, secure, sensitive, and sincere, and that the behavior of the labeled targets was adversely affected as well, even though they had no knowledge of the experimental manipulation. Thus, expectations associated with psychological therapy color subsequent interactions, actually calling out behaviors that confirm those expectations. (See Ridgeway and Nakagawa, this volume, for a related discussion of expectation states theory.)

Investigations like the one by Sibicky and Dovidio have been relatively rare in the study of mental illness stigma, and more inquiry in this domain is needed. One interesting development in this regard is work by Lucas and Phelan (2012) that uses the interaction paradigm and integrates paradigms from the status-characteristics-theory tradition in sociology (Berger et al. 1972) with work in psychology on the sources of stigma in interaction processes to investigate whether and to what extent a mental illness label reduces influence in interactions and engenders behavioral social distance. Consistent with the notion of "misrecognition," studies of interactional discrimination reveal

that substantial differences in social influence and social distance can occur even when it is difficult for participants to specify a discriminatory event that produced the unequal outcome.

Structural Discrimination Finally, structural discrimination occurs when social policy, laws or other institutional practices disadvantage stigmatized groups cumulatively over time. The idea of structural discrimination has its origins in the related concept of institutional racism (Hamilton and Carmichael 1967) but broadens that concept to include other groups that have experienced a historical legacy of disadvantage. Structural discrimination that disadvantages blacks is operative for example when employers (more often white) rely on personal recommendations of colleagues and acquaintances (who are usually also white and thus more likely to recommend a white candidate) for hiring decisions. With respect to sexual minorities, Hatzenbuehler has shown that rates of anxiety, depression, and substance disorders, as well as health care utilization, are powerfully shaped by exposure to state-level policies (e.g., hate-crime laws and employment-discrimination acts) and political conflicts regarding same-sex marriage (Hatzenbuehler et al. 2009, 2010, 2012). Along the same lines, Hatzenbuehler (2011) also examined the influence of stigmatizing social environments on the prevalence of suicide attempts among LGB youth. Results showed that the risk of suicide attempts was 20% higher among LGB youth living in areas with high structural stigma (e.g., fewer schools with Gay-Straight Alliances and anti-bullying policies, lower density of same-sex couples), compared to those in low-stigma areas. With respect to mental illnesses, prominent examples of structural stigma reside in the policies of many health insurance companies that provide less coverage for psychiatric illnesses than they do for physical ones (Schulze and Angermeyer 2003, Gleid and Frank 2008) or laws restricting the civil rights of people with mental illnesses (Corrigan et al. 2004). Structural discrimination need not involve direct or intentional discrimination by individuals in the immediate context (Corrigan et al. 2004); it can result from a practice or policy that

is the residue of past intentional discrimination. For example, if a history of not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) reactions has influenced the location of board-and-care homes over time so that they are situated in disorganized sections of the city where rates of crime, violence, pollution, and infectious disease are high, then people with serious mental illness are more likely to be exposed to these noxious circumstances as a consequence. Again, although the unequal outcomes resulting from structural discrimination—unequal coverage for mental and physical health problems or undesirable location of board-and-care homes—may be readily apparent, the fact that these outcomes represent discrimination is only obvious upon reflection and analysis.

The forgoing discussion indicates that stigma-related processes can lead to inequality in multiple ways—directly from one person to another, through the stigmatized person, in interactional contexts and through ambient social structural circumstances. In most circumstances that fall within this broad rubric, the exercise of stigma is not immediately apparent but is instead misrecognized such that the interest of the stigmatizer is effectively hidden. This is particularly advantageous to stigmatizers because they do not need to declare their interest nor defend its accomplishment. In light of this reasoning, we conclude that stigma confers a broadly serviceable set of processes that results in massive social inequalities.

How Do People Seek to Resist Stigma?

Given that, as described above, people can be disadvantaged by stigma in multiple ways, one question that arises is whether and to what extent stigmatized people can act to mitigate or overcome such disadvantage. Certainly we would expect people to take steps to cope with any adversity, and as such it becomes important to understand what they try to do and how effective it is. On the one hand we can imagine that a few simple coping efforts might block the effects of stigma or sharply reduce stigma's capacity to induce disadvantage. On the other hand we can imagine that at least some coping efforts are

ineffectual or actually end up contributing to the disadvantaged outcomes that stigmatized people experience. We consider both individually-based coping efforts and group-based resistance.

Individually-Based Stigma Coping Responses The idea that people who are stigmatized actively respond to their situation has been a central element of theories about stigma ever since the concept emerged as a critical social scientific idea in the 1960s. It is, for example, a key component of classic labeling theory's concept of "secondary deviance" as something brought on by "defense, attack, or adaptation" to the overt or covert problems produced by societal reactions to "primary deviance" (Lemert 1967, p. 17). And of course, Goffman's (1963) essay is all about the active "management" of stigma both by those who are the object of stigma and by those who do the stigmatizing. This active response to stigma is carried forward by Link et al. (1989, 1991, 2002) in the empirical elaboration of modified labeling theory through the conceptualization and measurement of stigma coping. In earlier work, coping orientations of "secrecy" (concealing labeling information), "education" (providing information to counter stereotypes), and "withdrawal" (avoiding potentially rejecting situations) were measured and assessed (Link et al. 1989, 1991) followed by the addition of coping orientations of "challenging" and "distancing" (Link et al. 2002). Challenging is the active confrontation of stigmatizing behavior. For example, one might challenge by pointing out stigmatizing behavior when it occurs and by indicating that one disagrees with the content of stigmatizing statements or disapproves of stigmatizing behaviors. Distancing is a cognitive separation of the potentially stigmatized person from the stigmatized group. In distancing, one dodges the stereotype that others might apply or that one might apply to oneself by essentially saying—"I am not like them!" "Your stereotypes of them are misapplied to me."

But if both classic and modified labeling theories have emphasized the active response of the stigmatized, what are the consequences of these efforts according to these research traditions? Are individually-based efforts to cope or resist

effective? The concept of secondary deviance suggests not—at least not always. The responses of "defense, attack or adaptation" by the stigmatized induce additional "secondary" deviance that further sets the person apart (Lemert 1967). And, when Link et al. (1991) assessed the coping orientations of secrecy, education and withdrawal, they found no evidence that these approaches buffered people with mental illnesses from untoward consequences, but did find some evidence that these orientations actually exacerbated negative consequences. They conclude that individual coping orientations are unlikely to be effective because they do not deal with the fundamental problem of deeply embedded cultural conceptions and stereotypes. According to Link et al. (1991), the best solutions are ones that change societal conceptions or involve the collective action of people with mental illnesses that change power differentials.

More recently, Thoits (2011) developed new concepts and theory suggesting the possibility of "stigma resistance" at the individual level, particularly as it might protect the self-esteem of people with mental illnesses. Thoits points to what she calls a moderate association between perceived or experienced stigma and self-esteem, and infers that a less than perfect association means that some people effectively counteract the effects of stigma on self-esteem. Thoits identifies two forms of resistance that overlap to some extent with Link et al.'s concept of challenging and distancing: "deflecting, impeding or refusing to yield to the penetration of a harmful force or influence" and "challenging, confronting, or fighting a harmful force or influence" (Thoits 2011, p. 11). In "deflecting," a person responds to mental illness and associated stereotypes by concluding "that's not me," "that is only a small unimportant part of me," or that the designation "mentally ill" does not apply to me because my problems are something different than mental illness. According to Thoits (2011, p. 14), deflecting strategies offer the possibility to "dramatically reduce, if not eliminate, potential threats to self-regard." "Challenging" as described by Thoits (2011) differs from deflecting in that it involves an effort to change

other people's beliefs or behaviors. A person can challenge by (1) behaving in ways that contradict stereotypes, (2) educating others to move them away from stereotyped views, (3) confronting people who express prejudicial sentiments and behave in discriminatory ways, or (4) engaging in advocacy and activism.

Whether, to what extent and under what conditions stigma resistance can protect self-regard or other potential consequences of stigma is an empirical question that has not been fully resolved. Our conjecture is that individually-based efforts will generally fail. We base this in part on Link et al.'s (1991) study suggesting that at least three individually-based coping approaches (secrecy, withdrawal and education) were not effective in reducing distress or counteracting negative consequences for employment for people with mental illnesses. Additionally, although there is something alluring about the idea that the stigmatized can fight back or cognitively manipulate their orientation to stigmatizing circumstances, one must keep in mind that stigmatizers are actively pursuing their own interests at the same time. To the extent that stigmatizers have an interest in keeping people, down, in or away, we can expect them to counter the efforts of stigmatized groups to resist with the exercise of power. Foucault's famous aphorism "Where there is power there is resistance" can be turned around to read "where there is resistance there is power." Agency is operative for both the stigmatized and the stigmatizer, and it is likely that the ultimate outcome will depend on the relative power of the two groups. This leads to our pessimism about individually-based coping or resistance—the actions of single individuals are very unlikely to change the power difference between stigmatized and stigmatizing groups.

Group-Based Resistance: Social Movements We are much more optimistic about the long-term effectiveness of group-based resistance (see Snow and Owens, this volume). One reason is that we can point to some social movements that have been at least partially successful, such as the civil rights movement and the gay and les-

bian liberation movement. Another reason is that sustained collective action over long periods of time affects a mechanism we believe is critical to the successful production of stigma—it alters the balance of power between stigmatizing and stigmatized groups, thereby altering the capacity of the stigmatizing group to exert their desire to keep people down, in or away. In the long run it may even change the stigmatizers' inclination to keep people down, in or away. This is not to say that collective social action proceeds in a linear fashion toward success. Instead, collective action proceeds in fits and starts, sometimes gaining ground, sometimes losing it and sometimes failing altogether. But social movements usually aim to directly resist the power of the stigmatizing groups, thereby seeking changes that can be sustained over time. Interestingly, research has shown just how important social psychological processes are in such social movements (Jasper 2011). For example, social movements of stigmatized groups often seek a shift in identity from shame to pride, set in place interaction rituals that sustain commitment, and manipulate "moral shocks" to recruit new members and keep old ones engaged (Jasper 2011).

In sum, social psychological processes are critical to understanding stigma resistance, and both individually-based and group-based resistance should be studied from a social psychological perspective. What we expect is that individually-based efforts will be less effective in resisting stigma than group-based social movements and that this will be especially true if one adopts a long-term perspective.

The Scope of Inequality Consequences Associated with Stigma

In previous sections, we noted how several of the mechanisms through which stigma operates are hidden or misrecognized. So, too, has the full power of stigma as a significant source of social inequalities been overlooked and under-recognized in the extant literature. One of the principal reasons for this obfuscation is that most research

Table 3.1 Current approaches to studying stigma and inequalities

Stigma circumstance	Housing	Employment/ income	Education	Social relationships	Behavioral/psy- chological stress responses	Health care access
Mental illness	X					
Sexual orientation		X				
Obesity				X		
HIV/AIDS			X			
Disability					X	
Minority race/ethnicity						X

Table 3.2 Stigma affects multiple life domains across multiple stigmatized groups

Stigma circumstance	Housing	Employment/ income	Education	Social relationships	Behavioral/psy- chological stress responses	Health care access
Mental illness	X	X	X	X	X	X
Sexual orientation	X	X		X	X	X
Obesity		X	X	X	X	X
HIV/AIDS	X	X	X	X	X	X
Disability	X	X	X	X	X	X
Minority race/ethnicity	X	X	X	X	X	X

proceeds by examining the stigma associated with only one circumstance (e.g., AIDS, mental illness, obesity, sexual preference) and only one outcome (e.g., earnings, self-esteem, housing, social interactions) at a time (See Table 3.1). Using this approach, researchers often find an effect of stigma on the outcome under consideration. However, many factors other than stigma also influence the outcome. This can lead to the erroneous conclusion that stigma, although it may contribute to social inequalities, has relatively modest effects compared to other factors.

In contrast, a very different picture emerges when we adopt a broader view of the role that stigma processes may play in generating a wide array of social inequalities. In a recent review of the literature, Hatzenbuehler et al. (2013) examined multiple stigmatized statuses together with multiple stigma-related outcomes, and found that stigma disrupts multiple life domains for members of multiple stigmatized groups. In this paper, the authors chose six stigmatized statuses/characteristics that were the focus of recent quantitative (i.e., meta-analytic) and qualitative reviews and examined the range of outcomes with which

these statuses/characteristics were associated. Table 3.2 depicts the results (the “X” in the table denotes when a review paper documented that stigma influenced a particular outcome, for example, diminished employment or impaired coping behaviors).

The results of this review highlighted two very important points with respect to stigma as a source of inequality. First, when trying to understand the impact of stigma for a particular circumstance, it is important to keep in mind that it can affect many life chances, not just one. Thus, a full accounting must consider the overall effect of stigma on a multitude of outcomes. Second, in studying a particular outcome, such as employment, many stigmatizing circumstances may be involved. A full assessment of the impact of stigma on such an outcome must therefore take into account that many stigmatizing circumstances may contribute to that outcome and not just the one selected for a particular study. Given the pervasiveness of stigma, its disruption of multiple life domains (e.g., resources, social relationships, and coping behaviors), and its corrosive impact on the health of populations, Hatzenbuehler

et al. (2013) concluded that stigma should be considered alongside the other major organizing concepts for research on social determinants of health and other inequalities.

Conclusion

Prior to the publication of Goffman's essay in 1963, the use of the term "stigma" was uncommon in the social science literature. Over the past 50 years the concept has experienced enormous success both within the social sciences and the broader domain of general public discourse. Whereas Goffman's essay comprehensively captured the broad terrain of stigma, subsequent research has codified its components so that in the current era we have concepts that help us understand what stigma is (Link and Phelan 2001), how stigmatizing circumstances differ one from the other (Jones et al. 1986), why people stigmatize (Phelan et al. 2008), how stigma is involved in the production of inequality (Hatzenbuehler et al. 2013), and how people seek to cope with or resist the stigma others seek to confer (Link et al. 1991, 2002; Thoits 2011).

With respect to this volume's emphasis on social psychology and inequality, our chapter and its coverage of current concepts of stigma make two essential points. First, social psychological processes are critical components of every aspect of stigma we have identified—what stigma is, how stigmatizing circumstances differ, why people stigmatize, how stigma creates inequality and how people seek to cope or resist. While research underlies all of these concepts, they remain much more of a road map for future research than anything like a completed picture or account. They are useful tools that can be applied in future studies. Second, stigma is a powerful source of human inequality—substantially larger than many have conceived it to be. Our review provides conceptual tools to identify what stigma is and how it can be deployed to achieve the desired ends of stigmatizers. Then when we further note that these concepts apply to a broad band of stigmatized circumstances and to multiple domains in which inequality can be expressed we

see that, writ large, stigma can be considered a major source of inequality.

There are two ways that social science research in general and social psychology in particular can address the role stigma plays in the production of social inequality. The first is through the development of a language of stigma that allows people to identify the precise processes that disadvantage them. Whereas 50 years ago the word was used only infrequently, now a broad band of groups can use the general terms and concepts associated with stigma to describe their life experience. And, in many instances, people can point to research that confers some validity to those concepts and thus to their expression of discomfort or anger at being stigmatized by others. The more thorough, precise and convincing social-science research on stigma becomes, the more useful its concepts are in this way. The second affects the capacity of stigmatizers to achieve ends surreptitiously. When social science research uncovers stigmatizers' interests in keeping people down, in or away and shows precisely how such aims are achieved, the processes involved become more apparent and more difficult or embarrassing to pull off. Difficult because, once exposed, the underlying logic justifying the stigma may be weak—embarrassing because, once revealed, the less than noble interests driving the motivation to stigmatize are revealed for others to see. Such revelations of motives and actions are, of course, no panacea, as processes are replaceable and new hidden ones can take the place of older exposed ones (Hatzenbuehler et al. 2013). Still, careful scrutiny of these processes is likely to render them less effective, essentially reducing the power of those who would stigmatize by making their interests and efforts apparent. Of course neither an effective language of stigma nor a thorough uncovering of stigma processes will address stigma-related inequality on its own. Our framework identifies key drivers of stigma-generated inequality in (1) the motivation to stigmatize and (2) the power to effectively act on that motivation. It follows that the reduction of stigma-generated inequality ultimately rests in either eliminating the motivation to stigmatize or the power to carry it off.

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Karen A. Hegtvedt and Deena Isom

Introduction

Like many parents, Wanda and Darryl in the comic *Baby Blues* make concerted attempts to ensure that equality, and by implication fairness, characterize their approach to raising their offspring.¹ Unfortunately, their children Zoey and Hammie do not always see it that way. Rather, cries of “It’s not fair” ring throughout the household. For example, those cries emerge when Wanda serves pieces of birthday cake carefully cut to be of equal size and with equal amounts of frosting, and Hammie whines that “it’s not fair” that Zoey’s piece has the vowels and he has none. In another strip, Hammie comments to Zoey, “You look mad, what’s wrong?” Zoey replies, “Mom wouldn’t buy me anything at the store.” And, while Hammie does not think that is so bad, when Zoey informs him that she also did not buy him anything, he complains, “NO FAIR!!” Although Wanda tries to divide treats equally and to treat her children equally, their emotional and perceptual assessments indicate otherwise, highlighting one of the fundamental aspects about the

relationship between equality and justice: the two are not always equivalent.

Philosophers and social scientists offer equality as a central principle of justice (e.g., Deutsch 1975; Leventhal et al. 1980; Solomon and Murphy 2000). Yet as their arguments detail and empirical studies show, equality constitutes justice only under specific conditions. Moreover, people focus on different elements of equality, even within a single situation. What is equal may refer to something about a distribution of outcomes (as in the case of the cake pieces), decision-making procedures, or the treatment of individuals (as signified by Wanda’s decision not to buy either child anything). The *Baby Blues* examples highlight the correspondence (or lack of it) between equality and justice at the individual level, while newspaper headings about healthcare benefits, decisions to close schools, CEO income levels, or the tax burden of the middle class compared to the “1 percent” draw attention to that relationship at the group level. Indeed, people cast social inequalities—based on differences between groups in terms of gender, race, or class—implicitly, if not explicitly, as matters of justice.

To address how inequality is a matter of justice requires consideration of the different types and the levels of equality/justice and associated processes. Justice scholars examine three types: distributive, procedural, and interactional (see e.g., Colquitt et al. 2001; Jost and Kay 2010). They address justice at the micro-level of individual or interpersonal processes as well as the macro-level, focused on group differences (Brickman

¹ See *Baby Blues* at <http://www.babyblues.com/>. “Cake” strip published 7-20-2007 and “shopping” strip 1-27-2011.

K. A. Hegtvedt (✉) · D. Isom
Department of Sociology, Emory University,
Atlanta, GA 30322, USA
e-mail: khegtve@emory.edu

et al. 1981). Most social psychological justice research focuses on the micro-level, yet the two levels connect. The aggregation of micro-level outcomes or procedures may or may not ensure macro-level justice (see Jasso 1983). And, philosophical prescriptions of the “just society” lay the basis for social psychological conceptualizations of justice that inform “what people believe” about their lot compared to another person, members of their social group, or society at large. Such beliefs ultimately have implications for the maintenance of the status quo—existing arrangements of outcomes, decision-making procedures, and interaction rules—or for social change.

Most approaches to justice—regardless of the type or level—recognize a key distinction between objective circumstances and subjective assessments. The former represent what can be based in fact and are likely to be judged similarly across all individuals using the same metric. Whether a set of outcomes, like incomes, or procedures, such as access to a particular resource, are equal may be objectively determined. Thus equality or inequality between people or social groups might reflect that which is objective. In contrast, whether the same equal outcomes or procedures are fair is a matter of subjective assessment. Indeed, few dispute the cliché that “justice is in the eye of the beholder” (see e.g., Choi 2008; Hegtvedt 2006; Molm et al. 2003), meaning that although individuals may be guided by shared justice principles, ultimately their assessments reflect individual, interpersonal, and contextual factors, as filtered by cognitive processes. Thus, it is no wonder that Hammie and Zoey have different perceptions of whether their mother’s distribution of cake slices is fair, despite equality in size and frosting, or that CEOs contend that their compensation is fair even though rank and file members of the same organization might judge their pay as exorbitant and unfair. Importantly, justice assessments “mediate between objective circumstances and people’s reactions to particular events or issues,” (Tyler et al. 1997, p. 6).

Given the subjective nature of justice, it is misleading to claim simply that equality is just and inequality is unjust. Rather, to grasp the rela-

tionship between inequality and justice requires responses to three questions. First, when are inequalities perceived to be just or unjust? Clearly, in western societies, inequalities in income are expected and often justified as fair. Likewise, in dyadic relationships, people endure inequalities in, for example, the division of household labor. The social psychology literature on justice identifies factors influencing when inequalities are judged as fair. Second, how do people respond to unfair inequalities? Responses may be both at the individual and collective levels, the latter having implications for justice in society. And, third, why do people fail to redress unfair inequalities? Even though inequality is not always perceived to be unfair, when it is, the expectation is that people will do something to rectify the situation, to right the wrong of injustice. Yet as both history and empirical studies show, such responses may fail to emerge owing to countervailing beliefs and justifications, inhibiting situational or structural circumstances, and legitimation processes that uphold the status quo.

Below we first present a conceptual overview of equality and justice from select philosophical roots and from social psychology. We then identify theoretical work, generated by both sociologists and psychologists, related to each of these fundamental questions. Although disciplinary roots lay different initial pathways, many empirical studies draw from both traditions. Thus, for each of the fundamental questions, we highlight empirical work that specifically bears upon the linkage between equality and justice.² In doing so, when appropriate we consider both micro and macro issues. Our conclusion focuses on themes regarding structures and processes of inequality/injustice relevant to future research.

² Although, in sections on empirical work, we circumscribe our review to studies pertaining to the relationship between equality and justice, there is a great deal of additional work on justice. We use some of these studies to support theoretical tenets described in the sections on sociological and psychological approaches. Existing overviews of the justice literature include: Colquitt et al. 2000; Cook and Hegtvedt 1983; Fischer and Skitka 2006; Hegtvedt 2006; Hegtvedt and Cook 2001; Jost and Kay 2010; Tomblöm 1992; Tyler et al. 1997.

Conceptualizing Justice and Equality: Philosophical and Social Psychological Roots

Philosophers have debated “what is justice” for at least two millennium; social psychologists joined the fray in only the last 100 years. Some, but not all, parts of those discussions address the correspondence between justice and equality. We highlight elements of that correspondence first from its philosophical roots and then from social psychology. The approaches vary in a fundamental way. While philosophers analyze justice as an essential virtue and offer prescriptions of the “just society,” social psychologists focus on issues confronting people in relationships and social groups and practical problems within a society. Nonetheless, philosophers’ abstract conceptualizations underpin, directly or indirectly, social psychological theoretical and empirical investigations of justice and equality.

Philosophical Roots of Justice and Equality

In Solomon and Murphy’s (2000) outline of the trajectory of philosophical ponderings on justice, they identify Aristotle as the first to link justice with equality. Aristotle distinguishes a “particular justice” (in comparison to a general concept of justice as lawful) as representing “fair and equal,” with a focus on distributions and transactions. With regard to distributions, he suggests “that equals deserve equal but unequals deserve unequal, in proportion to their merit,” (Solomon and Murphy 2000, p. 35). His notion of distributive justice is, more accurately, one of proportionality stemming from differences in merit, rather than one of equality of outcomes, and thus is akin to social psychological notions of equity. With regard to transactions or what he terms “rectificatory justice,” he argues that the law treats two people as equals if they have committed the same crime and, if a person has harmed another creating an inequality, some attempt (by a judge) should be made to restore equality. Such writings hint at issues of procedural justice and,

more generally, third party responses to injustice. Importantly, to determine distributive justice requires comparisons of levels of merit and concomitant outcomes while rectificatory justice involves comparisons of harm-inducing actions. Such comparisons are fundamental to social psychological approaches to perceptions injustice.

Aristotle essentially suggests that an unequal distribution (owing to differences in merit) is just. Later social contractarian philosophers, such as Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, likewise wrangle with how equality and inequality can be simultaneously considered just. They contend that the state or “society” establishes rules that specify types of equality. For instance, in the United States, the Declaration of Independence explicitly affirms that “all men are created equal,” constitutional amendments imply “equal rights,” regardless of property, race, gender, or ethnicity for U.S. citizens, and other legal dictates pave the way for notions of “equality of opportunity” (e.g., Title IX prohibits sex-based exclusion from participation in educational programs or activities receiving federal assistance). Presumably, such equality ensures a sense of community and harmony, much like social psychological research reveals.

Yet, social contractarians also flag the relationship between the legitimacy of the state (or decision-makers more generally) and justice. They note that a legitimate state may invoke laws presumed to constitute justice but that allow for deviations from equality. While people may be equal in their humanity, they differ in terms of their needs, talents, merit, or contributions and, in some situations, such differentiation is arguably just, as Aristotle implies. To the extent that a state promotes free market principles, talent and contributions merit higher rewards, making outcome inequality normative, though rationalized by the purported existence of equal opportunity to enter the market (Solomon and Murphy 2000). Thus, even though the social contract underlying the just society produces a legitimized state, rules for decision-making or distribution may not always result in equality.

Indeed, other philosophers point out that rules stemming from processes involving the free mar-

ket (Adam Smith) or utilitarianism (John Stuart Mill), or that reflect emphasis on individual liberty and private ownership (e.g., Hume, Nozick) create legitimated inequalities. Of course, others such as Kant, Hegel, and Marx critique that emphasis. Marx in particular eschews capitalism as a source of inequalities. In doing so, he underscores how the wealthy and powerful set the rules that allow for the exploitation of others. To combat inequality, he calls for revolution and the development of a classless society—a declaration that rings of egalitarianism. His dictate of “from each according to their abilities, to each according to their needs,” however, suggests a principle distinct from egalitarianism *per se*.

Rawls (1971) offers a theory of justice that attempts to “find a proper ordering between equality and liberty with a particular concern for the needs of the least advantaged in society” (Solomon and Murphy 2000, p. 6). Rawls proposes that rational decision-makers in the “original position” (without knowledge of their own characteristics yet in recognition of common humanity) behind a “veil of ignorance” (which inhibits strategizing about social arrangements beneficial to oneself) will opt for principles that require equal liberty for all and allow the least advantaged in society to benefit. Even if inequalities emerge, those worse off will not suffer. Thus, Rawls’s theory echoes what is implicit in Aristotle’s approach: that both elements of equality and inequality may be just. Moving beyond Aristotle’s prescriptions, Rawls also demonstrates how rational decision-making can produce a contract that makes assurances of a “floor” of benefits, despite inequalities in resources. In so doing, he also promotes impartiality in decision-making, a key element to social psychological procedural justice approaches.

Although forceful, these arguments about constituting a just society typically presume a shared understanding of benefits, burdens, merit, actions, and the like. Walzer (1983) challenges this presumed consensus, arguing instead that the benefits or burdens constituting the focus of any distribution have social meaning. As a consequence, justice principles must be sensitive to meanings arising from the situations in which they are embedded, which may constitute dif-

ferent “spheres of justice.” Such a philosophical position parallels social psychological work on determining when a particular distribution, procedural, or treatment rule is just.

Thus, in many ways, social psychological approaches reflect the issues debated by Western philosophers who laid the ground work for understanding when equality and inequality are just and unjust, between individuals and across social groups. Focused on the interpersonal level, social psychological work grapples with perceptions of particular rules as just, responses to the violation of those rules, and consideration of the impact of ideological and legitimacy processes on those perceptions and responses to injustice.

Social Psychological Approaches to Justice with Considerations of Equality

Social psychological approaches generally represent a state of affairs as just when an observed distribution, procedure, or interaction meets the expectations set up by relevant and shared rules (see Cohen 1982; Hegtveld and Markovsky 1995; Jasso 1980). Distributive justice pertains to the allocation of benefits and burdens in social groups, ranging from the dyad to the nation state, whereas procedural justice focuses on decision-making practices that shape such allocations or provide the pathway to some action. Interactional justice is more narrowly focused on the interpersonal treatment of individuals within groups. Social psychologists have offered rules to capture each type of justice.

Distributive justice principles include equality, equity, and needs (Deutsch 1975), which may apply at both the individual or group level. Equality dictates the same absolute level of outcomes for all “actors,” whether an individual or a social group. Though philosophers allude to justice of this sort, most, as noted above, fail to advocate equal outcomes as a requirement for a just society. Equity, in contrast, corresponds to the Aristotelian notion of “equality.” Adams (1965) specifically characterizes equity as equality between the outcomes/inputs ratios of two actors (i.e., $O_A/I_A = O_B/I_B$), where outcomes represent

received benefits or burdens and inputs include contributions or relevant individual characteristics such as experience, education, status, or the like that entitle recipients to benefits or obligate them to burdens. Such a principle ensures that equals receive equal outcomes, and unequals receive unequal ones. And a needs based principle suggests that outcome levels depend upon actors' needs for the particular benefits. Of course, those with equal needs would receive equal outcomes.

An array of procedural principles ensure preservation of "basic rights, liberties, and entitlements of individuals and groups" governing various forms of decision-making (Jost and Kay 2010, p. 1122). Leventhal et al. (1980) offer six such rules: (1) consistency of procedures across actors and time; (2) representativeness of the participants to a decision; (3) bias suppression; (4) information accuracy; (5) correctability (being able to change bad decisions); and (6) ethicality of standards. A few of these principles are arguably relevant to issues of equality. Consistency and bias suppression (effectively, the Rawlsian ideal of impartiality) hint at equality in terms of gathering information for decisions and applying decisions in the same manner across all relevant actors. Similarly, representativeness or "voice" suggests equality of opportunity to contribute information to a decision. Application of these three principles has implications for how people perceive that they are treated by others, authorities in particular.

Interactional justice (Bies 2001) specifically refers to the dignified and respectful treatment of people, involving truthfulness, honesty, and the provision of rationale for decisions (i.e., justification). Tyler and Lind (1992) also promote neutrality as a key to what they call the interpersonal dimension of procedural justice. Akin to decision-making bias suppression or impartiality, they argue that neutrality engenders equal treatment of all parties. In addition, they suggest that an authority's trust in subordinates or subordinates' beliefs in an authority's trustworthiness ensures fair treatment in the immediate situation and in the future.

Although different elements of each of the three types of justice resonate with various con-

ceptions of equality, not all inequalities constitute injustice. Theoretical arguments pertaining to how people perceive injustice and how they respond to it help to indicate *when* objective inequalities are unjust. In addition, just as philosophers offer the social contract as a means to legitimate certain inequalities as just, social psychologists analyze factors that affect the nature of people's responses to various types of injustice or inhibit those responses.

Perceiving Inequalities as (Un)Just

Both philosophical arguments and distributive, procedural, and interactional justice rules indicate that "equality" is only one among many, though other principles imply types of equality. To assess when individuals perceive inequalities as just or unjust depends on responses to two questions: (1) which rule is salient in a given situation? and (2) how do people determine the meanings of the elements (e.g., benefits, burdens, contributions, social processes) implied by the salient rule? These meanings underlie whether people perceive the actual situation to correspond to or violate expectations based on the justice principle.

The first question hints at what Walzer (1983) suggests with regard to the spheres of justice and the impact of community in defining those spheres. Relatedly, social psychological justice scholars in the 1970s frequently debated the question of "which rule?" (e.g., Deutsch 1975; Leventhal et al. 1980). Leventhal et al. (1980) offer an expectancy-value model suggesting that people develop hierarchies of distribution and procedural preferences stemming from their expectancies about which rule is most likely to lead to the achievement of their goals (including combinations of fairness, self-interest, obedience to authority, expedience, and the like). Their model stems from work demonstrating that individuals, especially those who do not directly benefit in the situation (i.e., impartial third parties), believe that justice emerges with the pairing of the following situational goals and distribution rules: productivity and equity; social harmony and equality; and social welfare

and needs. Emphasis on productivity and equity compared to harmony and equality also captures cultural differences in beliefs about which distribution principles constitute justice (see Morris and Leung 2000).

Such a debate over rules did not unfold in discussions of procedural (e.g., Lind and Tyler 1988) and interactional justice (Bies 2001; Bies and Moag 1986). Instead, attention focused on the centrality of particular procedural rules as exerting the greatest impact on justice judgments. Lind and Tyler (1988) identify consistency and representativeness, especially as activated by giving “voice” to the opinions of the individuals affected by the decision, as central to third parties’ evaluations of procedural justice. Likewise, respect is fundamental to assessments of interactional justice (see Miller 2001).

Identifying salient justice principles provides a basis for responding to the second question about how people interpret the correspondence between the actual situation and expectations based on the given principle. Below we review sociologically-oriented justice evaluation perspectives that largely focus on distributive justice and psychologically-oriented frameworks pertaining to multiple forms of justice. These approaches, coupled with empirical work, raise key considerations for understanding how people perceive justice, even if outcomes, procedures, or treatments represent inequalities.

Sociological Approaches

The contributions of sociologists to the understanding of justice and, by implication, its relationship to issues of equality and inequality stem from unexpected empirical observations as well as explicit theoretical developments. In some cases, justice concerns emerge secondary to understanding other processes pertaining to human interaction.

Stouffer and his colleagues’ study of soldiers’ adjustment to life in the United States army (Stouffer et al. 1949) offered an early glimpse of how individuals assess the fairness of their outcomes, despite the lack of any specified distri-

bution principle. When asked about their satisfaction with the army’s promotion system, what mattered for respondents was how they stood compared to soldiers around them, not the level or rate of their promotions themselves. Emphasis rested on the comparison group, not the rewards in the larger system. As a consequence, even if by objective standards individuals had done well, they could feel dissatisfied owing to receiving a lower level of rewards than others in their comparison group. Stouffer called this phenomenon “relative deprivation.”

Sociologists elaborated on the comparison processes that underlie individuals’ feelings of being relatively deprived. Davis (1959) theoretically distinguishes the subjective feeling of deprivation resulting from comparisons within one’s own group and feelings of subordination or superiority when comparisons are made with other groups. Runciman (1966) offered a pivotal distinction between individual-level or egoistic comparisons, which pertain to one’s own experiences, and group-level or fraternal comparisons, which encompass the experiences of one’s group. Williams (1975), one of the coauthors of the American soldier study, followed up on Runciman’s distinction by proposing the consequences of different types of comparisons, with egoistic comparisons propelling individual responses and fraternal shaping collective responses. Moreover, he distinguished among different forms of deprivation based on receiving less than what: (1) one desires; (2) one expects; and (3) is socially mandated. The third form, he argues, constitutes injustice. And he is among the first to identify the key issue of the factors, such as salience, social proximity, and information availability, affecting comparison choice.

Work by psychologically-oriented scholars built upon these early insights. Crosby (1976, 1982) identifies conditions under which egoistic comparisons have the greatest impact and applies relative deprivation to understanding when working women are and are not likely to feel relatively deprived. And by focusing on fraternal or intergroup comparisons, Pettigrew and his colleagues clarify dynamics of intergroup prejudice (see Pettigrew 2002; Pettigrew et al. 2008).

The comparisons that form the core of relative deprivation approaches focus on outcome levels between individuals or between groups. Individual or group characteristics that may affect outcome levels are not explicitly highlighted. Rather, relative deprivation emerges when, in effect, “people like me” receive different and higher levels of rewards or, borrowing from Aristotle, when “equals are treated unequally.” To diminish arousal of feelings of deprivation, presumed equals should receive equal rewards. Such a premise, however, begs the question: what constitutes “equality” among potential recipients?

Social exchange approaches (Blau 1964; Homans 1961/1974; see Thye and Kalkhoff this volume) consider not merely outcome equivalency, but also what individuals bring to a situation that entitles them to the outcomes. In social exchange, an individual gives up or contributes something to another person, who provides something in return. At the core of Homans’s approach is the notion of rationality: people pursue exchanges that produce the most value and are most likely to be achieved. Both Blau and Homans aim to move from elementary forms of interaction, largely focusing on direct exchanges, to larger social units.³ They contend that following norms of fairness (Blau 1964) or the rule of distributive justice (Homans 1961/1974) lends stability to emergent structures. Blau further states that as a social norm “fairness...prescribes just treatment as a moral principle” (p. 157) and as such has implications for how people who are unaffected directly by a distribution might respond to others who enact unfair treatment. Blau essentially adopts Homans’s definition of distributive justice and elaboration of unfair exchanges for group social dynamics.

Homans’s rule of distributive justice specifies that what a person gets from exchange (i.e., the reward) is in line with what is given in ex-

change (i.e., contributions in the situation, like hours worked or objects produced, and investments linked to the person, which are ascribed [gender, race] or achieved, such as job seniority or education). He states this rule more formally as $P_1/P_2 = R_1/R_2$, where P refers to the two people engaged in exchange and R captures the level of each person’s rewards. Thus, like Aristotle, Homans asserts an equality of proportions, not absolute rewards. Homans (1974), however, cautions that acceptance of a rule of distributive justice does not ensure agreement on a fair distribution of outcomes: “Even if [people] concede that the reward should be proportional to investment and contribution, they may still differ in their views of what legitimately constitutes investment, contribution, and reward, and how persons and groups are to be ranked on these dimensions” (p. 250). Here, Homans indicates a rule of fairness that calls attention to interpersonal comparisons between at least two people and recognizes the likelihood that individual cognition about rewards, contributions, and investments play a major role in perceptions of justice. Although he does not elaborate on the role of such cognitions, his claim exemplifies the challenge of determining the meaning of the elements of the salient rule and resonates with Walzer’s concern about spheres of justice.

Although Homans claims that his rule of distributive justice also dictates status congruence (though not all status congruence instances are justice issues), his exchange emphasis typically involves interpreting rewards and contributions in terms of their quantifiable, economic value (e.g., hours work for pay received). In contrast, Berger et al. (1972) view inputs (contributions, investments) and outcomes (rewards) in terms of status value. Consistency between the status value of a person’s social characteristics and his or her received rewards signifies justice in their formulation. Determining such consistency involves activation of referential structures representing “socially validated beliefs that describe how the states of valued characteristics that individuals possess are associated with differences in reward levels” (Berger et al. 1983, p. 133). The structures focus on categorical characteristics

³ While Blau and Homan focus largely on direct exchange, Molm (2006) outlines other forms of exchange. She contrasts direct negotiated and reciprocal exchanges as well as indirect forms of generalized and productive exchanges. Most of the work on justice, however, focuses on negotiated or reciprocal exchange.

(e.g., age, race, gender), ability levels for specified tasks, or performance-outcome relationships and denote generalized standards providing the basis for situation specific reward expectations. Justice assessments involve comparing one's own characteristics and concomitant outcomes with those expected based on the referential structure.

Thus, equality implicit in the status value approach is between a person's immediate situation and that stemming from the referential structure. When the status value of individuals' contributions vary, the status value of their outcomes is likely to be unequal yet just. In this way, the status value and exchange approaches are similar. They vary, however, in terms of the comparisons providing meaning to the justice evaluation. Törnblom (1977) attempts to bridge this difference by combining the exchange-oriented person-to-person comparisons and the status value referential comparisons into a typology of likely justice assessments.

Such a typology of comparisons may be inherent in what Jasso (1980, 2002) constructs as a key component of her approach to distributive justice. She argues that a justice evaluation (JE) results from comparing the (logged) ratio of one's actual share to the just share or $JE = \ln(\text{actual share/just share})$. The conceptualization of the just share captures beliefs reflecting cultural values, group-level influences, and comparisons stemming either from the situation or referential structures. The mathematical formula allows for a range of departures from perfect justice, applicable at the individual and group levels. Markovsky (1985) offers additional refinements that result in the idea of "justice indifference," which allows for a range of outcomes or outcomes/input ratios that fail to evoke claims of either justice or of injustice.

In these sociological formulations, equality pertains not to outcomes per se, but to sameness with comparison others or structures. Such social comparisons are fundamental to whether individuals perceive an actual distribution to be just. Comparisons provide a basis for determining the social meaning of actual (distribution) situations. Homans (1974) hints at the role of cognitive as-

sessments of components (e.g., contributions, investments, rewards) of a justice evaluation—that likewise affects social meanings. Psychological approaches extend this last feature and also introduce notions of procedural and interactional justice.

Psychological Approaches

Three influences have shaped psychological work on justice. First, the social exchange perspective underlies the work of Adams (1965) and Walster and colleagues (Walster et al. 1978) working in the area of distributive justice and early formulations of procedural justice (Thibaut and Walker 1975). Second, social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1986) provides the basis for emphasizing non-instrumental elements of procedural justice as represented in the group value model (Lind and Tyler 1988). In turn, key tenets of the group value model inspire approaches pertaining to the treatment of individuals and groups. And third, issues of cognitive processing characterize two more expansive approaches (Folger and Cropanzano 1998, 2001; van den Bos 2005), which cross-cut types of justice.

Adams (1965) and Walster et al. (1978) define justice as equity, with equality resting in the equivalency of the proportion of outcomes to inputs for two actors (i.e., the exchange partner or "other" constitutes a local comparison). They assume that individuals attempt to maximize their outcomes in the context of a collectively accepted notion of equity. The main thrust of these theorists, however, is on reactions to perceived inequity, detailed in the next section.

Initial attempts to formulate procedural justice processes similarly reflected emphasis on maximizing outcomes. Thibaut and Walker (1975) argue that individuals seek control over the dispute resolution process as a means to achieve desired, equitable outcomes. In contrast, Lind and Tyler (1988) emphasize the importance of procedures in signaling an individual's value to his or her group. Decision-making procedures involving consistency and "voice" inherently draw attention to the equality of those affected by the

decision and ensure that they feel important to the group. Extensions of the group value model (Tyler and Blader 2003; Tyler and Lind 1992) go beyond decision-making rules and instead focus on interpersonal elements of procedural justice that convey information regarding a group member's worth, status, and social acceptance. As such, these approaches dovetail with principles of interactional justice (Bies 2001).⁴

In addition to identifying potential motivations underlying justice perceptions, including concerns with self-interest (e.g., maximizing outcomes) and social standing, psychological perspectives also unpack elements of the process by which evaluations emerge. Van den Bos (2005) suggests conditions of uncertainty characterize situations in which people make justice judgments. To cope with the uncertainty, individuals seek informational cues in the situation to direct their evaluations. In some cases, such cues may activate mental shortcuts or heuristics (see Fiske and Taylor 2013; Moskowitz 2005) as the basis of their inferences as a means to simplify fairness assessments. For example, in the absence of comparison information on outcomes, people rely on the fairness of procedures to evaluate distributions (i.e., the "fair process effect").

Besides drawing on informational cues and employing cognitive heuristics to aid in constructing fairness evaluations, Folger and Cropanzano (1998, 2001) argue that individuals employ both deliberate and automatic cognitive assessments in the form of "if only" or counter-factual statements about a decision-maker or injustice perpetrator's behavior to shape the justice evaluation. Such statements figuratively "undo" an event by imagining it otherwise, and in so doing intensify the perception of injustice (regardless of type). To the extent that these cognitive assessments activate an attribution process directed at determining the cause for an injustice, they provide the

basis of locating blame. When individuals perceive external factors, rather than internal ones, as responsible for inputs, outcomes, decisions, or treatment, they are more likely to discount them as relevant in justice assessments (see Cohen 1982; van den Bos et al. 1999).

An additional part of this cognitive processing includes determination of what Deutsch (1985) identifies as the "scope of justice," referring to a perceiver's conception of the community to which the justice rules apply. The justice scope activates moral inclusion, which mandates fair resource allocations to community members and consideration of sacrifices to ensure the well-being of the social unit, and moral exclusion, which relegates a person or group outside of the perceiver's community and, as a consequence, undeserving of fairness, resources, or sacrifices (Opotow 1995). Such categorization justifies acts of exploitation and degrading treatment that by a broader, more encompassing justice reach would constitute unfair distributions, decisions, and treatment. The issue of the scope of justice is highly relevant to justice evaluations in intergroup conflict situations and may provide a basis for failing to respond to unfair inequalities.

The psychologically-rooted justice perspectives explicate three issues hinted at by the sociologically-oriented approaches. First, by including multiple forms of justice, they make explicit motivations underlying judgments. Although the pursuit of outcomes and the pursuit of social standing are consistent with Homans's emphasis on rationality underlying evaluations (see Hegtvædt 2006), by highlighting social outcomes for self and possibly for other(s), the psychological theories augment the motivational arena for justice evaluations. Second, consideration of the scope of justice circumscribes the context of justice judgments, which has implications for the availability and appropriateness of social comparisons central to sociological approaches. And, third, psychological approaches hone in on the cognitive processes by which individuals arrive at justice evaluations. Generally, the cognitive processing of contextual information—including that derived from social comparisons—coupled with underlying motivations, shapes the mean-

⁴ Jost and Kay (2010) discuss the debate regarding distinctions between the interpersonal elements of procedural and interactional justice. As these authors note: "... meta-analytic evidence reveals that procedural and interactional justice concerns are indeed correlated and partially overlapping, but they do predict somewhat different behavioral responses" (p. 1144).

ing of elements of an actual situation of distribution, decision-making, or treatment and thus the perceived equivalency of the actual situation to that expected based on relevant justice principles. Empirical work links contextual factors to justice perceptions through their impact on motivations, managing uncertainty, or creating meaning.

Empirical Work: Perceptions of Equality, Evaluations of Justice

The theoretical approaches to justice indicate that equality takes many explicit and implicit forms: equal outcomes, equality in proportions of outcomes to inputs, equal representation in a decision, equal treatment, and the like. The widely accepted justice principle of equity, which captures equality in terms of proportions of outcomes to contributions across actors, essentially dictates that inequality in absolute outcomes is fair (except when contributions are equal). Even given an accepted principle, individuals' motivations, social comparisons, and cognitive processing of situational characteristics affect how they evaluate whether outcomes, decision-making, or treatment are consistent with the justice rule. Both sociologists and psychologists conduct micro-level investigations focusing on all three types of justice pertinent to different types of equality. In contrast, at the macro-level, the largely sociological research on evaluations of income inequalities explicitly considers the equality of outcomes. Our intent is to note recent empirical work that delves into issues of justice and equality per se.⁵

Micro-Level Studies Studies of perceptions of justice/equality in small groups often highlight situational factors affecting underlying motivational, cognitive, and comparison processes. We begin by focusing on research pertaining to

notions of equality embedded in distributive justice and then expand to the fairness of "equality" in procedures and treatment.

As noted above, Leventhal et al. (1980) summarize early distributive justice work documenting that the situational goal of enhancing group harmony leads to evaluations of equal outcomes as fair. People also consider such outcomes as just in the absence of any knowledge about recipients (Messick 1993). When information about recipients' contributions or status differences increases, the question becomes: when do fair allocations shift from being equal to being equitable? Using a vignette survey to capture the effects of different types of situational information, Hysom and Fişek (2011) provide evidence for an equity-equality equilibrium model showing that third party evaluators' judgments about pay fairness are dynamic, based on situational information, not simply individual differences or cultural values. Their study results suggest that as emphases on instrumental factors such as productivity, status differentiation, and task competency increase, individuals lean toward equity-based justice whereas when socio-emotive concerns are prominent, evaluators shift toward equality.

Although Hysom and Fişek (2011) find no differences between their American and Turkish study participants, scholars have previously argued that equality is more likely to define justice in more collectivist societies whereas equity is likely to be a guiding principle in individualistic societies. Findings with regard to this proposition are mixed (see Fadil et al. 2005; Fischer and Smith 2003; Morris and Leung 2000), and indicate greater complexity in the relationship between culture and just distribution rules. Drawing on social resource theory (Foa and Foa 1974), Otto et al. (2011) argue that the nature of the benefits at issue—whether material or symbolic—coupled with the emphasis on each type within a given society may affect claims for the justice of a given rule. Results from their surveys of Canadian and German students indicate that with regard to monetary rewards, Canadians rate an equity rule as more just than Germans, whose evaluations favored equality. In contrast, Canadians compared to Germans judge equality as more

⁵ In addition to reviews of justice work noted in footnote 2, other summaries address underlying justice processes: motivations (e.g., Gillespie and Greenberg 2005), social comparisons (e.g., Greenberg et al. 2007; Markovsky 1985; Riederer et al. 2009), and cognitive processing (e.g., Gilliland and Paddock 2005; Janssen et al. 2011; van den Bos et al. 1999).

just for the distribution of the symbolic benefit of praise. Consideration of the nature of the resource being distributed appears to help sort cultural differences in the fairness of equality and equity and resonates with the larger philosophical issue of the social meaning of benefits and burdens weighed in justice evaluations (Walzer 1983).

Research on fairness in the division of household labor demonstrates how meanings matter in justice evaluations. Given the concern for social relationships in a family, equality—specifically gender equality—characterizes scholarly discussions of household labor. Classic work by Hochschild (1988) on the “second shift” epitomizes inequality in the division of household labor. The working women she interviewed typically did far more in the home than their spouses, yet many conceptualized that inequality as fair by altering the meanings of elements of household labor or changing the focus of their comparison. For example, Nancy Holt categorized the tasks needed to maintain the upstairs (all the living space) as equivalent with those relevant to the downstairs (the garage). When she took care of the upstairs and her spouse kept up the downstairs, then she evaluated their division as equal and fair. Other women would suspend comparing their spouses’ household contributions to their own level but instead contrast them to that of their fathers or other men in general. In so doing, they often could claim that their spouses did more than other men and thus, even if the household division of labor was unequal, they could rationalize the inequality as fair. Thus selective cognitions and comparisons created social meanings that allowed for the emergence of evaluations of fairness despite objective inequality in the household division of labor. (see Lively et al., this volume).

Quantitative studies likewise demonstrate that perceived fairness of the division of household labor depends upon individuals’ beliefs, which affect the nature of the social comparisons and thus the social meanings underlying evaluations. Greenstein (1996) shows that women holding traditional gender role ideologies compare themselves to other women whose household labor is similar and thus perceive little injustice. In con-

trast, women with non-traditional or egalitarian gender role ideologies compare themselves to men (their husbands in particular) and thus conclude that the inequalities are unfair.

Greenstein (2009) elevates the comparison referent by assessing the impact of nation-level gender equity on women’s evaluations of the fairness of household labor divisions. In countries identified with strong gender equity, women are likely to perceive increasing levels of inequality as unfair whereas the extent of inequality has little impact on fairness judgments in countries with weak gender equity. Beyond consideration of comparison type, Dixon and Wetherell (2004) suggest examination of “everyday discursive practices in the home...through which couples define their contributions ...and negotiate ideological dilemmas about gender, entitlement, and fair shares” (p. 167). Doing so unpacks cognitive and interactional dynamics underlying perceptions of what is and is not equal, what should and should not be equal.

These distributive justice studies indicate how situational and individual-level factors affect actors’ and perceivers’ interpretations of outcomes and the fairness of unequal outcomes. The social meanings derived from underlying cognitive and comparison processes provide a basis for judging inequalities as fair. Research on the household division of labor plainly illustrates this issue while at the same time signaling how distributive justice evaluations connect macro-level contextual factors to micro-level dynamics.

In contrast to the complex relationship between equality and justice with regard to outcomes, greater compatibility emerges in the correspondence between egalitarian notions and fair procedures and interpersonal treatment. Huo (2002) assesses how much study participants willingly extended material resources, procedural protections, and respectful treatment to members of another group. She found that people allocated similar levels of relational and, to some extent, procedural resources to both an organization that confirmed their group identity and one that challenged it. In contrast, levels of material resources tended to reflect identity-based discrimination. Such results echo the “inclusiveness” of catego-

rizing others in terms of their humanity with regard to procedural and interactional rules, but the “exclusiveness” of categorization when it comes to material outcomes (see Wenzel, 2000 on how categorization shapes the meaning of justice principles and their implementation).

Lind and Tyler (1988) provide evidence that people in general perceive equal treatment as fair, even if they stand to gain from inequality. They argue that such treatment conveys that a person is a valued member of a group. Individuals specifically promote equal representation as fair at the interpersonal level. Such representation grows more difficult at the group level, when groups may be of different size. Azzi and Jost (1997) show that although minority and majority groups differ in their evaluations of majority voting procedures and equal versus proportional representation for groups, they both agree that procedures to ensure mutual control are fair.

At the micro-level, with regard to procedural and interactional justice, the meaning of some of the rules themselves coupled with cultural beliefs about humanity ensures the prominence of equality. With regard to distributive justice, the fairness of equal outcomes is circumscribed by certain conditions and types of resources. Conditions amenable to casting equity as just lead to objectively unequal outcomes. Indeed, Jasso (1983) illustrates how individual-level “fair” outcome distribution principles may produce to unequal overall distributions, which may or may not be deemed unfair.

Macro-Level Studies Generally, macro-level studies examine perceptions of income inequalities in the United States and other countries.⁶ Whether people judge those inequalities as fair depends upon their structural positions and

beliefs, which shape the meanings they construct about elements relevant to the distribution. While most of this work focuses on distributive justice, some touches upon other types of justice in evaluations of equal opportunity policies.

Regarding distributions, many studies confirm that people in western societies consider economic inequality as just, owing to adherence to the principle of equity with its emphasis on compensation according to merit, contributions, and the like (e.g., Huber and Form 1973; Kluegel and Smith 1986; Roth 2006; Svallfors 1997). Even in Chile, a country of high income inequality, Castillo (2011) finds that people with more individualistic justice ideologies tolerate larger earnings gaps whereas those who profess more egalitarian beliefs support smaller gaps.

People, however, are often not fully aware of the extent of inequality in income or wealth distribution (e.g., Kenworthy and McCall 2008; Norton and Ariely 2011; Osberg and Smeeding 2006). And while some may desire a “more equal” distribution of wealth (Norton and Ariely 2011), attitudes are polarized on whether and how to achieve it (Osberg and Smeeding 2006). Data from the World Values Survey documents that there is an “increasing taste or tolerance for inequality in the general population across [western] nations,” especially those that already have higher levels of income inequality (Crutchfield and Pettinicchio 2009, p. 134).

Like in micro-level studies, actual evaluations of the fairness of income inequalities often depend upon individual and contextual factors. An individual’s position in the economic sphere affects evaluations such that the disadvantaged, compared to the advantaged, tend to hold egalitarian ideas of economic justice and to evaluate income inequalities as unfair (e.g., Castillo 2011; Kelley and Evans 1993; Robinson and Bell 1978). And, survey evidence suggests that White Americans are less committed to equality of various sorts than Americans of color (Hochschild 2006). Beliefs about how individuals should be compensated also affect evaluations of overall distributions. Simpson and Kaminiski (2005) show that endorsement of individual-level equal-

⁶ Osberg and Smeeding (2006) provide a discussion of different interpretations of aggregate income inequalities and ways to measure it. Their detailed analysis, comparing American attitudes toward economic inequality to those prevalent in other countries, suggests that Americans largely are not “exceptional” in their evaluations of inequality.

ity norms correlates with viewing aggregated inequalities as unjust. Although their sample of union members and managers espoused similar support for equality as a micro-level compensation rule, managers advocate more strongly than workers for equity in compensation.

Studies emerging from the International Social Justice Project, fielded in 1991 and 1996, provide a glimpse of patterns across countries, including many former central and eastern European communist states (see Kluegel et al. 1995). Using those data, Jasso (2000) indicates that “felt injustice appears to be substantially more sensitive to poverty and scarcity than to inequality” (2000, p. 113). Comparing the two waves of data for five post-communist countries and West Germany, Verwiebe and Wegener (2000) conclude that the nature of the transformation from communist to capitalistic society initially affected beliefs about the justice of inequality, but by 1996, the pattern of beliefs largely reflects the impact of individual social position rather than transformative factors. Thus, like results in Robinson and Bell’s (1978) study, advantaged individuals tend to tolerate income inequalities. Such findings dovetail with those of Stephenson (2000) who demonstrates a parallel in the rise of inequalities in Estonia and Russia with increases in individualistic explanations for wealth and poverty.

Davis and Robinson (2006) examine similar issues of economic justice in seven Muslim countries. While they found that individuals with high education or income (along, surprisingly, with the unemployed) were less supportive of progressive, equality-oriented economic reforms, they establish that Islamic orthodoxy (especially in countries with lower standards of living) corresponds to support for such reforms. Junisbai (2010) also confirms the link between religious orthodoxy and egalitarianism in Kazakhstan, with its growing economy, and Kyrgyzstan, with its stagnating economy. Yet the pattern of effects of individual level factors on egalitarian beliefs is more complicated. In thriving Kazakhstan, those who are in their prime working years are less supportive of egalitarianism than are older people, regardless of education or income. Those who expect to get ahead

in the future, however, are less likely to support redistributive policies. In struggling Kyrgyzstan, in contrast, people with higher education or greater incomes are less likely to support egalitarianism, perhaps as a means to hold on to their economic security.

These patterns draw attention to how dramatic social changes or significant differences in socio-political or cultural beliefs between countries stimulate differences in the extent to which outcome equality is perceived as fair. Plus, espousal of egalitarian beliefs does not directly translate into support for government policies pertaining to taxation, redistribution, or support for the poor (e.g., Bartels 2005; Kluegel and Smith 1986). Hochschild (2006) notes that more people of color are likely to support social welfare policies than are whites. In contrast, other work shows that support for policies aimed at reducing inequality may not counter beliefs in merit as a basis for earnings, even if merit-based distributions are unequal (Lewin-Epstein et al. 2003). Essentially, people’s perceptions of the fairness of income inequalities may only be loosely coupled with their public policy preferences (Norton and Ariely 2011).

As with the micro-level studies, evaluations of macro-level outcome inequalities depend upon “who” the evaluator is. Individuals’ structural positions and beliefs shape assessments of income inequalities, typically through micro-level processes regarding motivations, cognitions and biases, and social comparisons. Thus, analysis of evaluations of income inequality provides an opportunity to link micro-macro processes. The socio-political context in which individuals are embedded affect their own opportunities, income levels, and, ultimately, their assessments (much like arguments about social structure and personality might suggest). In turn, as elaborated below, those assessments may legitimize micro-level rules that shape the inequalities and the structure of the resulting aggregate inequality. Thus individuals potentially influence the socio-political context in terms of the distribution policies they support. As a consequence, responses to macro-level inequalities may be more muted than objective inequalities suggest.

Responding to Unfair Inequalities

Just as fairness perceptions pertain to distributions and dynamics at micro and macro levels, responses likewise involve one individual, a few individuals, or larger groups. Compared to individual responses, which focus largely on injustice about one's own condition, collective responses entail additional challenges pertaining to effort coordination and resources (see Snow and Owens, this volume). Although theories largely presume that individuals and groups will seek to rectify injustice by restoring outcome equality, ratio equivalencies, or consistency with the dictates of a particular justice rule, observable responses may not emerge.

Sociological approaches emphasize reactions to distributive injustice—inequality regarding the lack of equivalence in outcome to input ratios or failure to achieve outcomes at a level commensurate with those of comparison others. Sociologists consider both individual and collective responses. Psychological approaches typically emphasize individual reactions but include responses to different types of injustice.

Sociological Approaches

Early perspectives on responses to distributive injustice focused on the individual level. Homans (1961/1974) spells out emotional responses. Those who experience distributive justice should feel satisfied whereas the emotions of others who experience distributive injustice reflect whether they are the victim or beneficiary of the injustice. Individuals who receive less than expected—so called victims—are likely to “feel some degree of anger and display some aggressive behavior toward the source or beneficiary of the injustice” (Homans 1974, p. 257). In contrast, beneficiaries of injustice whose outcomes are higher than expected may gloat, rationalizing good fortune, or experience guilt, especially if the individual's gain is at another's loss and thus the beneficiary fears reprisal from the injustice victim. Homans additionally notes that the experience and concomitant emotional and behavioral response to

injustice depend upon the nature of the social comparisons that individuals invoke as well as their attributions of responsibility for their own and their comparison's outcome levels.

Likewise, Markovsky (1985) emphasizes underlying comparisons in his approach. Following Jasso (1980), he links individual-level distributive justice assessments to group-level consequences. The formal comparison unit may pertain to another individual, one's own group, another aggregate, or a general referential structure. The underlying mathematical formulation suggests that the greater the incongruence between an individual's own reward experience and that expected based on a comparison, the more likely individuals will engage in justice restoring behaviors. The relevant comparison depends upon the strength of one's identification with his or her group. With weak group identification, injustice responses are likely to stem from individual-level incongruence whereas with strong group identification responses reflect group-level incongruence. Markovsky thus pairs both comparison and identity concerns.

Early relative deprivation work also hints at such a pairing. That work illustrates how rising reward expectations coupled with a sharp decline in actual gratifications trigger collective unrest (Davies 1962; Gurr 1970). In effect, these perspectives suggest that collective feelings of relative deprivation result in moral outrage, which stimulates actions to alter the perceived unjust distribution (see Tyler and Smith 1998). Recently, political sociologists have rediscovered the role of powerful emotions in social protest (see Goodwin et al. 2001). Yet, as others illustrate, felt injustice is only one factor that may result in collective action aimed at changing the status quo. For example, Moore (1978) argues that suffering injustice alone is insufficient to stimulate large-scale revolts; individuals must also believe in the possibility of a less unjust social system and recognize the need to coordinate actions. Tilly (1978) further argues that revolutions require not merely shared interests but also control over resources, organization, and opportunities to act. Resource mobilization relies on different types of networks and organizational structures that trans-

form the seeds of collective action into social movements that may redress unjust inequalities (see Davis et al. 2005).

Sociological approaches clearly highlight emotions, social comparisons, and factors providing the basis for movement beyond individual responses toward collective responses to distributive injustice. Psychologists likewise emphasize emotional responses, but also provide more detailed types of individual-level responses and responses to different types of injustice.

Psychological Approaches

As noted above, Adams (1965) and Walster et al. (1978) offer explanations to why people respond to inequity. Their basic framework has been extended to other forms of perceived injustice, albeit with responses distinct from those focused on outcome distributions (see Conlon et al. 2005). And, Skarlicki and Kulik's (2005) complementary approach showing how third parties (those not directly affected by a distribution, decision, or treatment) respond to injustice highlights a potentially central process for generating collective responses.

Adams (1965) and Walster et al. (1978) adopt versions of three key premises. First, they argue that people who perceive injustice are likely to experience unpleasant sensations of distress and tension (akin to the negative emotions that Homans (1974) suggests). Second, they propose that distress motivates individuals to restore justice for oneself or others to eliminate the tension. And third, following from the rationality assumption inherent in exchange approaches, they presume that people will pursue the least costly means to redress injustice. The goal is to restore either a psychological sense of justice or to change the situation to achieve actual justice (Walster et al. 1978). Adams (1965) specifies changes in cognitions about one's own or a partner's inputs or outcomes as well as opting for a different comparison other as means to psychologically restore justice. Behavioral responses to change the situation involve: (1) altering own inputs; (2) altering own outcomes; and (3) leaving

the situation. The many variations on these core responses depend upon the nature of the injustice (see Jost and Kay 2010; Tyler et al. 1997).

Complaints suffice as a general behavioral response to all types of injustice. Responses to procedural and interactional justice typically focus on organizational contexts (see Conlon et al. 2005; Tyler et al. 1997). And even though approaches to these sorts of justice do not stem explicitly from a premise of rationality, van den Bos et al. (2001) argue that people nonetheless cognitively assess the material and social costs and benefits associated with possible reactions. Such assessment includes ways for individuals to re-establish feelings of self worth and ensure that they feel valued by the group or authority (Tyler and Lind 1992). Psychological responses may include changes in the levels of trust in or perceived legitimacy of an authority. Behavioral responses often reflect forms of noncompliance (such as counterproductive work behavior) or pertain to requests for changes in procedures, structures, or policies. Bembenek et al. (2007) suggest that the targets of responses to interactional injustice are usually individual authorities whereas those to procedural injustice may also be the organization itself. Moreover, they indicate that in some instances, regardless of type of injustice, victims will not merely attempt to restore justice, but may also retaliate against the perpetrator.

In addition to responses, shaped by motivations, cognitions, and situational factors, to one's own injustice, individuals alone or with others may respond to injustices that they observe others to suffer. Skarlicki and Kulik (2005) propose that while injustices observed by "third parties" produce weaker emotions than personal ones, by noting what happens to others, people learn how they may be treated or rewarded and may assist in rectifying others' injustices. Even without control over outcomes or procedures, observers can act as agents for injustice sufferers without raising the specter of material self-interests. Emotions felt toward other group members nurture the perceptions and responses of injustice observers (Blader et al. 2010). Ultimately, changes that third parties effect in their response to others' injustice may benefit many in the long run.

Psychological approaches reiterate the centrality of motivations and cognitive processing to understand responses to any type of injustice. They share with sociological perspectives on distributive justice a key emphasis on emotions, but extend it to all types of injustice. And, although psychological perspectives tend to focus on individual responses, the recent foray into consideration of third party responses provides a means to bring people together to recognize the injustices of others and pave the pathway for collective responses. Empirical work crosses disciplinary boundaries in considering how comparisons, cognitions, and contextual factors shape responses to personal injustices and those suffered by others.

Empirical Work: Responses to Injustice, to Inequality

Much social psychological work, largely by psychologists, has focused on responses to distributive, procedural, and interactional injustice. Like research on perceptions of justice and equality, studies only implicitly address inequality by focusing on the redress of perceived inequalities in absolute outcomes, ratios of outcomes to inputs, representation to decision-making, treatment, and the like. Typically, study designs allow consideration of a particular form of response, rather than the array of potential responses suggested by the theories.

Both sociological and psychological theoretical arguments posit that once individuals perceive injustice, they may respond emotionally, cognitively, and behaviorally. Presumably, emotional responses mediate between injustice perception and behavioral response. Yet, it may be that the emotional experience of injustice precedes the subjective assessment, especially when the distribution, procedure, or treatment violates moral standards (Folger et al. 2005; Scher and Heise 1993). Cognitive processing of situational information leading to the injustice assessment and shaping behavioral responses sometimes overlaps with actual cognitive responses. We briefly summarize patterns of responses to injustice and then more specifically review studies fo-

cused specifically on inequality at both the micro and macro levels.

Micro-Level Studies Research largely supports the pattern of emotional responses that Homans (1974) outlines for the equitably rewarded and those inequitably disadvantaged (e.g., Hegtvedt 1990; Jost et al. 2008; Sprecher 1992). The pattern is less consistent for those who benefit from inequitable outcomes; guilt feelings emerge only when inequitable advantage results at the expense of another person or from violation of a moral standard (Hegtvedt and Killian 1999; Peters et al. 2004). Procedural (e.g., Krehbiel and Cropanzano 2000; Tyler and Blader 2003; Weiss et al. 1999) and interactional injustice (e.g., Barclay et al. 2005; Mikula et al. 1998) also stimulate negative emotions. Activation of the self amplifies emotional responses to unfair procedures and outcomes (van den Bos et al. 2011). Evidence also confirms the theoretical presumption that anger mediates the relationship between perceived fairness and retaliatory acts or power-seeking (e.g., Barclay et al. 2005; Foster and Rusbult 1999). And, with multiple types of injustice, interactional and procedural injustices exert greater impact than distributive injustice on emotions, owing in part to the salience of the perpetrator and thus the likelihood of perceived intent (Bembenek et al. 2007).

Indeed, as Homans (1974) suggests, the nature of causal and responsibility attributions for an injustice affect perceptions of and responses to injustice (Kidd and Utne 1978; Mikula 2003). Barclay et al. (2005) show that the more people blame a perpetrator of injustice, the greater the likelihood of negative emotions like anger and hostility. Recognition of the intent of a perpetrator enhances desire for revenge whereas external attributions for the perpetrator's behavior decrease that desire (Okimoto and Wenzel 2011). In general, external attributions for inequity attenuate behavioral responses (e.g., Hegtvedt et al. 1993).

Complementing cognitive processing, social comparisons also shape people's responses. Markovsky (1985) compares "worker" (individual-level) and "office" (group-level) complaints

about pay. Incongruence between pay and comparison-based expectations, especially among disadvantaged workers, increases total complaints. And activation of group identity increases office compared to individual complaints. Similarly, group comparisons stimulate collective action to redress deprivation (e.g., Dubé and Guimond 1986; Kessler and Mummendey 2001).

Early studies provide support for Adams's (1965) predictions of changes in workers' inputs or outcomes in response to inequity (see reviews Cook and Hegtvéd 1983; Törnblom 1992). Similarly, many conditions elicit behavioral responses to perceived procedural and interactional justice (see reviews e.g., Colquitt et al. 2001; Jost and Kay 2010; Tyler et al. 1997). Conlon et al. (2005) identify studies that demonstrate how different forms of justice enhance performance and compliance in organizations, as well as solidify relationships. In contrast, other investigations show that injustices tend to increase withdrawal behaviors and counterproductive work behavior (e.g., theft, white collar crimes, rule infractions, abuse of other workers).

Despite the plethora of research on responses to injustice, little specifically addresses responses to inequality per se. Stouten et al. (2005, 2006, 2009), however, have examined reactions to violations of the equality principle in social dilemma situations. They argue that equality of contributions is a guiding principle in social dilemmas, which involves interdependent individuals for whom short term interests contrast with the long-term interests of providing a public good for the group. Stouten et al. (2005) show that individuals with a pro-social value orientation respond with more negative emotional responses to unequal contributions than do those with a social orientation reflecting self interest. They attribute this pattern to greater emphasis on fairness and well-being of others among the "pro-socials" whereas "pro-selfs" tend to support equality as an efficiency principle rather than a fairness one.

Stouten and colleagues (2006) also examine how external explanations for violating the equal contributions rule in a social dilemma reduce negative emotions and retributive behaviors, especially among "high trusters," people who have

faith in the honesty of proffered explanations. Yet, if others believe that the violator intended a less than equal contribution, responses grow more negative. Behavioral intolerance of the violation of equality, demonstrated by lowering of one's own contribution, only occurs, however, when group members interact again with the violator, not with the entire group (Stouten et al. 2009). When interacting with the group, people contribute their equal shares to avoid harming others, even if doing so also benefits the violator. This series of studies shows how individual characteristics, cognitive processing, and situational factors converge to shape responses to inequality in social dilemmas (see Stouten et al. 2007).

Like the explanations examined in the Stouten et al. studies, investigations of the household division of labor highlight the role that justifications for inequality play in reducing responses to injustice. In a qualitative study, van Hooff (2011) extends Hochschild's (1988) work, by focusing specifically on couples' responses to inequality in household chores. She shows that, even though couples aspire to an equal division of household labor, equality rarely emerges and yet couples are not discomfited by the situation. Rather, husbands and wives justify the inequality—in effect, a form of a cognitive response—by arguing that women are more competent at household chores and that the division of chores corresponds to the hours each partner works outside of the home. In a quantitative study, Siegel (1992) shows a similar pattern among men who either deny or justify the inequality. And even though the women in the study refused to justify the inequality, they coped with it at an individual level in a manner that served their own self interests. These responses to inequality in household chores allow maintenance of relationships, demonstrating when inequality justifications secure social harmony.

Macro-Level Studies Like responses at the micro-level, research on responses to income or other aggregate benefit inequalities also taps into how individual and situational factors affect emotional, cognitive, and behavioral responses. Mallett and Swim (2007) focus on whether groups that benefit from inequalities feel guilty.

Guilt increases when members perceive their group responsible for the inequality and few justifications for the resource differences exist. In other words, group-based guilt is stronger when inequalities cannot be rationalized away. While no study links group-based guilt to collective responses, Beaton and Deveau (2005) show that such actions are more likely when ingroup identity is strong, advantaged group members note the relative deprivation suffered by others, and resources can be mobilized for the action.

Altering income inequalities requires significant mobilization of resources in the form of redistributive social policies. Yet justification of inequalities occurs owing, in part, to belief in the procedural principle of equal opportunity (Tyler 2011) or strong “belief in a just world”—that people deserve outcomes because of who they are or what they did (Lerner 1980). Malahy et al. (2009) show that increases in income disparities over the years correlate with stronger just world beliefs, even taking into account individual income and political ideology. Hunt (this volume) identifies other beliefs that also justify income inequalities.

Research, however, does demonstrate that those who possess liberal political ideologies are more likely to support redistributive policies (e.g., Beckman and Zheng 2007) (although greater inequality does not consistently stimulate a stronger desire for generosity in redistributive policy (Kenworthy and McCall 2008)). Yet the relationship between liberalism and redistribution in response to income inequality depends upon situational factors. Finseraas (2010) shows that the income inequality and left leaning politics relationship is weaker when a country’s politics are polarized on non-economic policy dimensions, such as differences over moral issues.

Contextual factors also matters in response to other forms of macro-level inequality. Pittman (2008) demonstrates how societal and peer-group norms impact individuals’ willingness to take on social justice actions to disrupt various types of inequality. To the extent that norms promote changes, individuals are more likely to engage collectively. Such norms, in effect, legitimize the actions. Iyer and Ryan (2009) also tap into

the impact of legitimizing beliefs on women’s and men’s responses to gender discrimination—a form of unequal treatment—in the workplace. Shaped by the interests of their own groups, women were more likely to express intentions to join collective actions if they appraised the discrimination as illegitimate and felt angry about it. Men, on the other hand, had to perceive the inequality as pervasive and feel sympathy for the victims before indicating intention to respond to the inequality.

Together, these micro- and macro-level studies about responses to inequalities provide evidence of the key roles of affect and cognitive processing of situational information in order to respond. They also highlight how individual and structural factors may inhibit responses. Most of this research, however, focuses on personal injustices. And despite the growing body of research on third party evaluations of injustice, little work systematically examines coalitions between those disadvantaged and those advantaged by the same unequal distribution, process, or treatment. Indeed, when observers occupy more advantaged structural positions than injustice victims, their involvement provides a basis for mustering resources for a collective response.⁷ Yet, given their interests, it is not surprising that those advantaged by a distribution, procedure, or treatment do not take up the causes of the disadvantaged. It is, however, surprising that even the disadvantaged often fail to respond to injustice and in so doing maintain the status quo.

Inhibiting Responses to Unfair Inequalities

As described above, scholars have provided explanations of why people respond to injustice and have demonstrated that indeed, under many

⁷ For example, the fight for racial integration of schools (Brown v. The Board of Education) entailed efforts by lawyers and the Supreme Court—those who were advantaged by inequality in the distribution of educational resources and opportunities—who acted or exerted decision-making power to ameliorate a situation that sorely disadvantaged others.

circumstances, individuals take actions, alone or in conjunction with others, to redress perceived injustices pertaining to distributions, procedures, and treatment. Even though an equality principle does not always define justice, types of equality are implicit in many procedural and interaction rules, and even in the equity principle. Co-existing with evidence that people do respond to injustice are observations that inequalities (e.g., in pay, household chores, income, opportunities)—even those perceived to be unfair—continue to exist with little fomenting for change. Here we outline sociological and psychological perspectives that address how social processes and structures as well as individual beliefs and ideologies may inhibit responses to unfair inequalities.

Sociological Approaches

Sociological approaches to why people fail to respond to injustice focus largely on legitimacy processes (see chapters by Walker and by Ridgeway and Nakagawa, this volume). In general, legitimacy pertains to behaving in accordance with the norms, values, practices, or beliefs supported by a group (Johnson et al. 2006). As such, individual beliefs about a particular distribution or procedure are secondary to “what others think.”

Della Fave (1980, 1986) offers a theory to explain how stratified structures become legitimated even by the disadvantaged. He argues that an unequal distribution of resources impacts how individuals evaluate themselves. Drawing from work on status processes (Berger et al. 1972) and symbolic interaction (Mead 1934), he links self evaluations to the extent to which an individual possesses resources, and thus lands somewhere in the social class structure. Those with more resources come to have higher self evaluations while those with fewer resources have lower ones. Self evaluations, in turn, signal future deservingness of rewards. To maintain strong self-esteem, people with lower self evaluations attempt to play their subordinate daily roles well and in so doing essentially invest in subordination. He concludes that “acceptance of a stratified social order as reasonable, though distasteful, by

the disadvantaged is rooted in the very identities (selves) of the people involved” (Della Fave 1986, p. 494). If identities develop as Della Fave suggests, then disadvantaged individuals are unlikely to respond to unjust inequalities.

In contrast to Della Fave’s emphasis on identities, other sociologists extend Weber’s (1922/1968) ideas about legitimacy and its consequences. Collective processes of legitimacy (Dornbusch and Scott 1975; Zelditch and Walker 1984) focus on people’s sense of an obligation to comply with norms and requests from authorities even when their personal beliefs differ. A distribution, procedure, or behavior is legitimated when supported by group authorities who deem it appropriate and may employ formal sanctions to ensure compliance (authorization) or by peers who likewise approve of it and control informal sanctions (endorsement). Authorization and endorsement of a group structure that produces an unequal distribution of outcomes to group members reduces the likelihood of challenging the structure (see Zelditch 2006). In other words, people go along with unfair distributions if they perceive others to support them (see also Hegtvéd and Johnson 2000). Their acquiescence stems consciously or unconsciously from fears regarding the sanctions that powerful authorities might mete out for noncompliance and the social ostracism they may suffer if they fail to go along with the norms that their peers support.

The sociological perspectives of Della Fave and Zelditch and his colleagues imply that power or status differences within a group stimulate what gets legitimized and thus potentially limit responses to injustice. A subordinate may be more likely to rationalize or justify unfair outcomes rather than face sanctions. Moreover, people occupying disadvantaged positions have less access to knowledge and material resources needed to create a beneficial change and thus be challenged to mobilize resources necessary for collective responses. If the power or status advantaged have legitimized a particular arrangement of outcomes, rules dictating outcome distributions, the nature of group decision-making procedures, or even the rules of interaction, fear of sanctions for noncompliance may stymie con-

frontations designed to alter the status quo (see in this volume Thye and Kalkhoff on power; Ridge-way & Nakagawa on status). Ideologies may further reinforce these structural arrangements (see Hunt, this volume). Psychologists focus on individual-level beliefs, underlying these ideologies, to explain non-response.

Psychological Approaches

While sociologists examine collective sources of legitimacy and attempt to tie them to social structural factors, psychologists pursue two different approaches to the relationship between legitimacy and justice. One approach analyzes individual belief systems or cognitive processing resulting in minimizing perceptions of personal deprivation or discrimination (see Bobocel et al. 2010; Jost and Major 2001). Another approach highlights the role of procedural justice in justifying unfair outcome distributions (Tyler 2001, 2010).

As mentioned earlier, “belief in a just world” (BJW) means that people expect others to receive outcomes or treatment that they deserve and what they are observed to get reflects their level of deserving (Lerner 1980). As a consequence, both advantaged and disadvantaged people come to believe that they deserve their respective levels of outcomes. Observations of injustice victims who appear to have little responsibility for their negative outcomes threaten individuals’ just world beliefs by implying that a similar fate may befall them. People with a strong BJW separate from and derogate injustice victims as a means to guard against suffering in a similar way (see Hafer and Bégue 2005). Thus, BJW leads to tolerance and justification of unjust treatment of others (Olson and Hafer 2001). A strong BJW also allows for making internal attributions for one’s personal injustices, thereby attenuating negative emotions and accepting unfair lower outcomes (Hafer and Correy 1999). If people tolerate personal deprivation, they are less likely to help others who experience injustice (Olson and Hafer 2001).

Failure to perceive others’ injustices may also stem from Social Dominance Orientation (SDO)

(Sidanius and Pratto 1999). Characterized by a desire for in-group social dominance and superiority as well as a nonegalitarian approach to social systems, individuals with a strong SDO exhibit more prejudice and discrimination against out-groups, especially those representing disadvantaged minorities. Concomitantly, SDO correlates with conservative political views and less support for social policies aimed at ensuring forms of equality (Pratto et al. 1994). Indeed, advantaged and disadvantaged people with a strong SDO justify inequality by relying on arguments of merit and other “legitimizing” myths.

Such legitimizing myths may serve a “palliative function,” reducing threat and anxiety (Jost and Hunyady 2002). More specifically, systems justification theory (Jost and Banaji 1994; Jost et al. 2004) addresses what motivates people, consciously or unconsciously, to defend and justify existing social, economic, and political systems—even those that allow inequality and injustice. Although affected by situational circumstances (e.g., system threat) and personal dispositions (e.g., need for closure, openness to experience), the tendency toward system justification stems from desires for favorable evaluations of self, one’s group, and even the social order (Kay and Zanna 2009). The stronger the motivation to defend one’s social system, the more likely individuals endorse stereotypes that legitimize status differences among groups and thus increase support for conservative political ideologies and decrease negative affect regarding a status quo that may violate principles of justice (see Jost and Kay 2010). By justifying the system, then, there is no reason to respond to the injustice that it might create.

In contrast to emphasis on belief systems, Tyler (2001, 2011) draws attention to the procedures underlying the creation of unequal distributions. To the extent that procedures are fair, then people are more likely to conclude that the outcomes—even if unequal or unjust—are also fair. Using procedures heuristically to judge the fairness of outcomes constitutes the “fair process effect” (e.g., Tyler and Lind 1992; van den Bos 2005). In addition, Tyler (2001, 2006) argues that authorities’ use of fair procedures reflects posi-

tive social values of the group as well as the positive value of the individuals to the group, thereby enhancing their self-esteem. Authorities increase their own legitimacy to the extent that they provide group members with evidence that they are valued members of high status groups. Group members are more likely to comply with what legitimized authorities ask and to abide by what they decide, even if that means accepting lower outcomes. This approach to legitimacy also has macro-level implications.

Extending his argument to address why people hardly respond to income inequalities, Tyler (2011) contends that people tend to underestimate the extent of inequality and exaggerate market mechanisms that allow for social mobility through opportunities to which everyone has access. Such underestimation and exaggeration lead people to believe that market procedures are fair, thereby diminishing concern over outcome inequalities. Thus like the legitimizing myth of meritocracy, beliefs in the accuracy and fairness of the “American dream” that good character and hard work pays off reduce the likelihood that individuals will protest income inequalities.

More akin to the Weberian-inspired sociological approaches to legitimacy, Tyler’s argument highlights structural factors, dynamics among members of differentially positioned groups (i.e., authorities and subordinates), and explicit linkages between micro-level processes and macro-level implications. And, to some extent the psychological approaches emphasizing individual beliefs and procedural justice processes dovetail with Della Fave’s stress on the role of self-evaluation and protection of one’s standing. Together, the sociological and psychological perspectives draw attention to structural arrangements and concomitant social influences propelling ideologies and cognitive processing that inhibit behavioral responses to inequality.

Empirical Work: Inhibiting Responses to Injustice, to Inequality

Extensive research programs are associated with most of the theoretical arguments regarding pro-

cesses that inhibit responses to injustice or inequality. Support exists for the basic tenets of BJW, SDO, system justification theory, and the impact of fair procedures on evaluation of and responses to unfair outcome distributions (see Jost and Kay 2010 and above references). Additionally, Walker (this volume) highlights studies of the impact of collective sources of legitimacy on status quo maintenance. Thus below we describe only a few recent works on how individual beliefs and legitimacy processes stymie or thwart responses to injustice or inequality.

Although, theoretically, perceptions of injustice should stimulate responses to injustice, ironically, certain justice beliefs—BJW, specifically—typically inhibit such responses. A recent study, however, demonstrates how beliefs in collective political efficacy counteract the impact of BJW on justifying social inequality. Beierlein et al. (2011) show that when collective political efficacy is weak, the typical pattern emerges: BJW exacerbates the likelihood of justifying inequalities and suppresses socio-political participation. In contrast, when collective political efficacy is strong, BJW exerts little effect on inequality justifications and related behaviors. While BJW and political efficacy shape justification of inequality, those who most strongly justify inequality are less likely to take actions to restore justice.

Justification of inequality may reflect implicit or explicit biases about social groups. In a review of studies, Dasgupta (2004) argues that unconscious prejudice or stereotypes fuel discrimination and thus create inequalities. When socially disadvantaged individuals harbor implicit biases against their own social group, they may harm themselves and their group. Yet, awareness of implicit biases and attempts to control or offset them with consciously held beliefs provides a means to foil discriminatory behaviors and the creation of inequality.

Although the above studies indicate means to attenuate the impact of justifications for inequality, Kay et al. (2009) look at consequences of (experimentally) exacerbating justifications of the status quo. Results indicate that with such exacerbation, people saw inequalities in political power and gender demographics in organizations

as more desirable and reasonable, and public policies to ameliorate inequalities as less desirable. Plus, stronger justifications increased derogation of others who would act to alter the status quo. In effect, their manipulation further legitimized inequalities, which led to sanctioning those with contrasting beliefs.

Jost et al. (2012) take the impact of system justifying beliefs one step further, examining their impact on collective protest, including disruptive and non-disruptive actions, against implicit in-group inequalities (e.g., decision to bail out Wall Street, a teachers' strike). Evidence consistently demonstrates that system justification beliefs attenuate collective protest. Situational uncertainty (study 1) also reduces engagement in disruptive protest regardless of system justification beliefs; among low system justifiers, uncertainty also stymies non-disruptive protests. Exposure to stereotypes consistent with system justification beliefs (e.g., describing an individual as "poor but happy") decreases anger and the likelihood of disruptive (but not non-disruptive) protest (study 2). In contrast, exposure to "system rejection" decreases system justification and increases in-group identification, which in turn enhances both non-disruptive and disruptive protest (study 3). These studies demonstrate the potential to undermine collective protest by situationally invoking system justifying beliefs or to enhance such protest by invoking beliefs rejecting the system. Results, highlighting cognitive processes underlying protest, also draw attention to different antecedents to disruptive and non-disruptive actions.

While Jost et al. focus on disadvantaged in-group members, Sutphin and Simpson (2009) study the impact of variation in structural position. Consistent with Della Fave's (1980, 1986) claims that self evaluations associated with positions underlie legitimation of structural inequalities, they reveal that occupants of advantaged structural positions have more positive self evaluations than those of disadvantaged positions (see Callero, this volume). Then, they link self evaluation to assessments of fairness and legitimacy. Results partially confirm Della Fave's expectations. The advantaged who possessed high self evaluations judged the inequality as more

legitimate (but not more fair) than those with low self evaluations; the disadvantaged with low self evaluations indicated that the inequality was more fair (but not more legitimate) than those with high self evaluations. Thus, through fairness or legitimacy perceptions, consistency between position and self evaluation reins in attempts to redress inequalities by both the advantaged and disadvantaged.

Previous work in legitimacy (e.g., Thomas et al. 1986; see Walker, this volume) indicates that legitimation of a social structure reduces attempts to alter the structure, even though it creates outcome inequality. And while Mueller and Landsman's (2004) study falls short of examining reactions to injustice, they demonstrate that perceived collective legitimacy of reward procedures enhances perceptions of procedural justice, which in turn positively affect pay fairness evaluations (as expected by Tyler (2001) on the positive relationship between procedural and distributive justice), which logically should deter negative responses. Moreover, Tyler and colleagues explicitly show that perceived legitimacy of authorities, resulting from employment of fair procedures, increases rule adherence whether in a corporate setting (Tyler and Blader 2005) or law enforcement setting (Tyler et al. 2007).

Many factors, at both individual and group levels, may inhibit responses to perceived inequalities or injustices. Such inhibitions, essentially, allow reproduction of existing inequalities. Knowing *why* people are likely to fail to respond, however, provides a basis for establishing pathways to rectify injustice—at least under certain structural conditions.

Conclusion

As one of the orienting concepts for this volume, discussions of justice and equality emerge in foundational philosophical works as well as in classic and contemporary sociology and psychology. Not all justice rules promote equality per se, though many do so at least indirectly. To conclude, we reiterate themes emerging in response to the three fundamental questions, draw atten-

tion to issues cross-cutting those themes, and identify connections between justice research and inequalities across groups in society characterized by differences in gender, race, age, and the like that underlie concrete social problems.

Philosophical treatises on justice and equality provide abstract analyses that have clearly informed contemporary thinking. Aristotle's proportionality and Rawls' impartiality take various forms in defining distributive, procedural, and interactional justice. Enlightenment concepts of (state) legitimation underlie why people come to believe certain principles to be just, even if the principles lead to disadvantage. The philosophers' prescriptive arguments belie the messiness revealed in sociological and psychological studies of justice and injustice as perceived by people structurally positioned and socially situated in organizations, families, ethnic groups, etc. Scholars attempt to devise explanations regarding the patterns emerging (or expected to emerge) in the complexity of factors shaping perceptions and responses to injustice. And though explanations in sociology and psychology differentially emphasize the roles of motivations, beliefs, social comparisons, cognitive processing, identity concerns, affective experiences, and the like, ultimately, all are essential components to address the three fundamental questions.

First, these components combine to define the justice rule salient in the situation and to determine the nature of elements of the situation that instantiate the principle, thereby establishing whether an inequality is just or unjust. How this myriad of components come together as a subjective evaluation depends upon situational factors like the perceivers' structural positions, "moral communities," and information availability. No one theory addresses all components, but Skitka et al. (2010) offer a psychological "contingency" model that attempts to stitch together material, social, and moral motivations with situational elements. Second, these components play into individuals' assessments of strategies to rectify perceived injustice. Injustice victims or their advocates may singly or jointly pursue different response strategies, which carry potential social or material costs to an individual's own outcomes

or well-being or the status and resources of the group. Third, the costs and activation of existing inequality legitimizing beliefs, sanctions, or structural constraints may inhibit overt behavioral responses. As a consequence, existing distributions, procedures, or treatments remain unchallenged, and unlikely to change.

At the heart of both justice evaluations and responses is the process of making sense out of situations (van den Bos et al. 2001). Any sense making process relies upon an understanding of who the perceiver is, the context in which the perceiver is embedded, and how the two come together. While much of the literature noted above examines the "who" in terms of structural position or underlying beliefs, little of it explicitly invokes considerations of individual identity processes (see Burke and Stets 2009). Social identity processes (Tajfel and Turner 1986), however, emerge to a greater extent, especially with regard to procedural and interactional justice. Moreover, such processes help to identify the moral communities that are likely to be relevant to the perceiver. Further specification of combined individual and social level identity processes may augment our understanding of what elements of contextual information perceivers consider in assessing the relevant rule and relevant justice elements. In so doing, identity processes may help to eliminate various types of uncertainty.

Uncertainty, in its many guises, creates major challenges for determining what sort of equality is just and how to respond to unjust inequalities. Lack of information—about outcomes for self and others, procedures and reasons behind distributions, the people or communities to which a distribution, procedure, or treatment applies (i.e., the "scope of justice"), and characteristics of the situation—create uncertainty about what rules may constitute justice, what instantiates justice, and possible responses to perceived injustice. Information availability coupled with how it is perceived by individuals who invoke particular identities within a given context provides the basis for the creation of social meaning necessary for judgment and action.

Scholars recognize the importance of understanding how uncertainty impacts justice pro-

cesses. Van den Bos (2005), for example, directs attention to the impact of procedural information in the absence of information about outcomes for self and other and the comparisons necessary to determining distributive justice. Individuals use such information heuristically to judge outcome distributions. Indeed, the absence of information may lead perceivers, unconsciously, to invoke cognitive shortcuts (see Fiske and Taylor 2013) and existing beliefs as bases of evaluations of the situation, potentially creating inaccuracies. Such lack of information characterizes studies on perceptions of macro-level income inequalities that demonstrate that people are rarely aware of the extent of income inequality (e.g. Norton and Ariely 2011). Without adequate information on the structure of income inequality, people's assessments may rest with local comparisons or comparisons of groups they know well. While such comparisons are sufficient to judge the fairness of one's own outcomes, they fail as a means to address social justice per se and thus may attenuate the severity of injustice represented by the distribution.

And, while provision of information on how others evaluate a distribution, procedure, or treatment may eliminate some uncertainty and solidify people's own beliefs about and responses in justice situations, only limited scholarship to date investigates the influence of "what others think"—through legitimacy processes (e.g., Hegtvedt and Johnson 2000) or third party processes (e.g., Skarlicki and Kulik 2005). Importantly, third party evaluations reduce the impact of self-interests on evaluations of fairness and thus help to identify the sense of what is just for a group, for a moral community. In turn, establishment of consensus about a just distribution, procedure, or treatment may create a normative standard that constrains personal interests, much like the social contractarian philosophers would suggest. Future research needs to specify in more detail the cognitive and affective ways that people fill gaps in the information necessary to make justice evaluations as well as consideration of implicit or explicit social influence processes. More solidly situating the individual within a dynamic

group, moreover, may provide the basis for further exploring the micro-macro linkage inherent in justice and equality studies.

Although individuals make evaluations of inequality, they inevitably have consequences for macro-level phenomenon. The most obvious illustration of the micro-macro linkage, as noted earlier, occurs when individuals' equitable outcomes produce unequal aggregated distributions (Jasso 1983). Yet, as argued above, to the extent that those equitable rewards are justified by beliefs in meritocracy, macro-level inequalities are more likely to be tolerated. Observations of third parties and their role indicated above in creating justice standards is another means to link micro evaluations with macro consequences, with regard to both distributions and procedures. Additionally, active involvement of third parties in assessing and responding to perceived injustice—through coalitions and collective action—move evaluations beyond the individual. Importantly, third parties may occupy different structural positions than injustice victims. Bringing in the "advantaged" carries with it potential access to greater resources, which in turn may direct more substantive or structural change. To date, research has concentrated more heavily on individual victims of injustice. Consideration of the micro-macro linkage raises an array of directions for future scholarship that requires analysis of the dynamics of coalitions, especially between people and groups differentially positioned.

Social issues based on gender, race, age, etc. inequalities (see related chapters, this volume) revolve around differences between people and groups and how they interpret the implementation of justice rules. For example, advantaged groups justify outcome inequalities as a result of fair, equity-based compensation in the context of procedurally just equality of opportunity. In contrast, disadvantaged groups identify structural constraints suppressing the reality of opportunity equality and point to how aggregated income inequality fails to correspond with what would be expected if minority group members' contributions were valued at the same level as those

of majority group members. To the extent that racial or gender biases affect valuation of inputs and outcomes, the calculus of equity is faulty and the aggregated distribution inevitably misleading (see Jones 2006). In other words, while the typical reason for outcome inequality—meritocracy—ensures distributive justice, failure to use unbiased procedures in assessing merit results in social injustice associated with sexism, racism, and the like.

While sociologists have focused on the distributive fairness of income inequality, even across nations, psychologists have drawn attention to procedural and interactional justice issues. Yet as the example above illustrates, to understand the confluence of justice and equality concerns requires consideration of multiple types of justice and the multifaceted processes underlying them. Unfair procedures and treatment creep into analyses of social problems regarding inequality in access to health care, education, and criminal processing, but rarely do the explicit tools and empirical findings of justice researchers enter into these explanations.

Introduction of such tools in the analysis of social problems might open new avenues of research. In a similar vein, by moving from the abstract to the more concrete (to some extent as organizational justice researchers have done (see Greenberg and Colquitt 2005)) and grappling with the nuances of social problems, justice scholars may expand their understanding. There are, as indicated earlier in this section, more basic research questions to address with regard to justice and equality processes. Yet the details of actual cases of social inequalities may reveal patterns of intricacies to augment future theorizing. Justice evaluations, ultimately, are both a consequence of structural dynamics as well as, potentially, an antecedent, under particular conditions, of social change. Great philosophers, classic sociologists and psychologists, and Zoe and Hammie have recognized the value of justice in society. Transcending disciplinary and substantive area boundaries, the systematic study of justice informs the understanding of and means to grapple with inequality in society.

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Judith A. Howard and Daniel G. Renfrow

In this chapter we take up a concept that has become fundamental to understanding inequalities in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries: intersectionality. We begin by reflecting on why this concept has become foundational and devote considerable attention to its historical roots and to the various extant definitions. As our discussion emphasizes, multiple “intersectionalities” circulate within the academy. We identify four core tenets shared across most of these intersectional models. We then take up what is specific to social psychological perspectives on intersectionality and discuss how each of the key theoretical perspectives within social psychology addresses, deploys, or fails to take full advantage of this concept. We argue that social cognition, social exchange, and symbolic interaction each have much to gain from a more sustained engagement with intersectionality; synthesizing the intersectional framework’s theoretical insights and methodological contributions with these theories takes social psychological analyses of inequality beyond normative models limited to the experiences of unmarked, typically hegemonic, categories.

J. A. Howard (✉)
College of Arts & Sciences, University of Washington,
Box 353765, Seattle, WA 98195-3765, USA
e-mail: jhoward@uw.edu

D. G. Renfrow
Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Wells
College, 170 Main Street, Aurora, NY 13026, USA

Intersectionality in Practice: An Introductory Example

The election of Barack Obama as the 44th President of the United States was a defining moment in U.S. history, characterized as it has so often been as the first time an African American has been elected to the highest office of the country. This deep sense of historical achievement is based virtually entirely on Obama’s race; he is labeled as Black. His racial categorization is more complicated, however. His father was Kenyan and Black; his mother was American and White. He is described as Black because of a system—historically referred to as “the one drop rule”—that labels anyone as Black who has any hint of Black birth. He is, however, what the census now labels “mixed-race.” Another status characteristic that his media staff attempt to communicate is his social class. He often refers to coming from a modest socioeconomic background. The White House website notes that his grandmother “worked her way up from the secretarial pool to middle management at a bank.” It adds that Obama worked “his way through college with the help of scholarships and student loans.” Compared to many politicians, Obama does come from a modest class background. Yet Obama earned a law degree from Harvard and taught at the University of Chicago Law School, achievements that suggest a considerable degree of class advantage. Turning to a third major status characteristic, sex, Obama is clearly a male, with masculine gender. His masculinity is not a

macho type, though; some have characterized him as effeminate (professorial!). He is Black, but not fully Black. He is of a lower-middle class background, but his contemporary lifestyle suggests greater class advantages. He is male, but in a somewhat feminized way.

In other words, Barack Obama's historical significance reflects his membership in primary categories—race, class, gender; but it also reflects two forms of complexity. Category memberships are not as straightforward as they may seem, and categories intersect. The full import of this chapter in American history cannot be understood without relying on the principles of intersectionality. It is all of Obama's characteristics, together, that explain this moment. Importantly, these characteristics and their intersections have profound interactional consequences. Several stunning moments of what seem like profound disrespect, primarily from members of the U.S. Congress, have occurred. Congressman Joe Wilson called out to Obama during a speech: "You lie!" Speaker John Boehner demanded that Obama reschedule a speech on the economy because it conflicted with a scheduled Republican primary. What enabled such behaviors? Is it because Obama is Black? Is it because he tried to "reach across the aisle," instantiating his femininity? Is it because he is not (as) monied? It seems plausible that behaviors such as these, behaviors one would not expect to be directed toward a U.S. President, were made legible both to the actors and to some of the American public, through the complex combination of President Obama's status profile. We cannot understand this historical moment without using intersectional analyses.

Defining Intersectionality

To understand intersectionality, one must understand a core social psychological principle that lies at its heart: social categorization (see Wilkins et al., this volume). Social categorization follows from the principles of social cognition. Human cognitive capacities are limited. We cannot pay attention to all the stimuli around us; we cannot

use all available information in forming inferences; we cannot remember everything. In order to be able to manage the demands of everyday interaction, we have to be efficient, to use information selectively. Categorization is a key mechanism for streamlining information. We organize information into categories, reducing a larger number of items into a smaller set to attend to, to use, to remember. To the extent that one can assert generalities, it appears that categorization is a process fundamental to human action and interaction. However, costs accrue. Categorization is a reduction of information; information is set aside, potentially lost. Such information may turn out to be valuable in other contexts. Moreover, the categories themselves may become associated with information that is then applied to specific instances in which those associations are inaccurate. Thus, categorization can lead both to the loss of important information and to the use of incorrect information.

Further, categorization seems always to be accompanied by differential evaluation. That is, a given system of categorization could be neutral; the categories could be equally valued. In practice, this appears not to happen, at least not with socially significant categorizations. From the micro to the macro levels, some races, some genders, some socioeconomic positions, some sexualities, are highly valued; others are not. These differential values guide the differential allocation of both material and symbolic resources. Thus processes of categorization and differential evaluation provide ideological and structural foundations for social stratification. These dynamics become all the more complex when we consider together the multiple systems of human categorization, that is, their intersections.

Socio-political awareness of social categories, and hence, somewhat later, of intersectionality, deepened markedly during the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s. Social psychological research on gender, although present to some degree in earlier years, became prominent in the 1970s, presumably due to the broader societal influence of the second wave feminist movement. Social psychological research on race also intensified during the 1970s, associated with the civil

rights movement that began in the 1960s. Importantly, the nature of the research shifted as well, moving from an orientation on gender or racial difference to a focus on inequalities associated with these systems. Presumably the emphasis on inequalities is attributable in part to the ideologies that underlay these social movements.

Early Conceptualizations

The concept of intersectionality originated in nineteenth century articulations of the relationship between race and gender by anti-racism activists such as Anna Julia Cooper and Sojourner Truth (Harley 1978; Truth and Painter 1998). Shared concerns inform Du Bois' (1903) concept of double consciousness, which describes the dilemma of an identity as both American and Black, an intersection associated historically with negative consequences, but for which Du Bois foresaw the possibility of positive associations.

Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989, 1991, 1993), a critical race legal scholar, first explicitly named the concept of intersectionality when referring to the interweavings of multiple categories of oppression. Her emphasis on the interwoven nature of oppression was a direct response to the then-prevalent emphasis among feminist scholars on the primacy of gender oppression. In contrast, Crenshaw asserted the fundamental ways in which race and gender discrimination compound and complicate each other. She opened a space to recognize that various oppressions work together to produce a discrimination distinct from that based on either race or gender alone (Dhmoon 2011).

Working in the substantive arena of rape and domestic violence, Crenshaw (1991) identifies three forms of intersectionality: *structural intersectionality*, the ways in which the location of women of color in macro-level systems of race and gender qualitatively distinguishes their experiences of sexual violence from those of White women; *political intersectionality*, evident in the ways in which meso-level anti-sexist and anti-racist politics can erase the experiences of women of color; and *representational intersec-*

tionality, the cultural imagery of women of color, micro-level representations that often elide the intersection of race and gender.

The need to explain—and hopefully then to reduce—inequalities motivated the concept of intersectionality from the outset. In this sense, intersectionality is a core orienting concept for the social psychological study of social inequalities. It is important therefore to define what we mean by inequality, an idea fundamental both to intersectionality and to this volume. We suggest that inequality is less the issue for intersectional scholars than is injustice. Taking into account pre-existing differences in available resources, cultural histories, and/or degrees of need may mean that unequal allocations of resources or provisions of opportunities in particular instances will better forward social justice than will principles of equality. Crenshaw (1998, p. 285) phrases this eloquently: “treating different things the same can generate as much inequality as treating the same things differently.” Equal does not necessarily equate to just (see Hegtvedt and Isom, this volume). Recognition of intersectionality highlights that there are multiple statuses and systems scholars must address in proposing routes to justice.

As scholars applied the concept and historical circumstances unfolded, a number of variations have followed. Patricia Hill Collins uses the concept to refer to “particular forms of oppressions, for example, the intersections of race and gender, or of sexuality and nations” (2000, p. 18). In her early works she emphasizes how Black women develop worldviews, how Black feminist thought is generated and communicated. Collins' focus on knowledge production of cultural images and the circulation of this knowledge is clearly consistent with Crenshaw's notion of representational intersectionality. Collins conceives of intersectionality as micro-level, as expressed in interpersonal perceptions and biases, exchange behaviors and symbolic exchanges, cognitive expectations, and so forth, paralleled by interlocking processes among macro-level structures, instantiated in systems of race (white supremacy), gender (patriarchy) and other dimensions of inequality (capitalism). These multi-level systems

work together to shape oppressions, creating a “matrix of domination,” (1990, p. 238) the organization of intersections. Both Collins (2000) and Razack (1998) emphasize their interdependence; these systems literally secure one another. (See *Gender & Society* special issue on the contributions of Patricia Hill Collins, 2012, Vol. 26, p. 1.)

Deborah King (1988) (echoing Du Bois; see Jeffries and Ransford 1980) highlights the dimension of multiple jeopardy. By this she means the multiplicative, as opposed to additive, character of oppressions: “racism multiplied by sexism multiplied by classism” (p. 47). She argues that Black women, in particular, define and sustain a multiple consciousness essential to challenge the interstructure of these oppressions. Casting this in social psychological terms, social identities of race, of gender, of class position, are simultaneous and multiplicative. Critiques of the concept of multiple jeopardy caution that it can too readily be applied as additive rather than multiplicative (Epstein 1973; West and Fenstermaker 1995) and is in danger of essentializing identities (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1983; Yuval-Davis 2009) rather than seeing them always as contextually embedded.

Contemporary Conceptualizations

Since the original statement of intersectionality, a number of theoretical extensions and expansions have emerged, many of which forward (not always intentionally) the integration of sociological with social psychological approaches to understanding both intersections and inequalities. Part of the challenge in offering an overview of the concept of intersectionality is that the concept has become so foundational for feminist scholars in particular that the term has been characterized as a theoretical “buzzword” (Davis 2008) and “hot topic” (Saltzman Chafetz 1997), present everywhere, but whose meaning is so varied that it lacks precision and analytic bite. Similarly, Knapp (2005) asserts that the triad of race/class/gender is often mentioned without meaningfully addressing the concerns that generated this triad. Butler (1999) notes that this triad is often

followed by an “embarrassed etc.” which simultaneously acknowledges and then ignores other important identities and social locations. Yet, an intersectional analytic has not become anywhere near so foundational among social psychologists, so articulation of what it does and does not mean, and what it can and cannot do, does require specification.

We touch on a number of these contemporary conceptualizations below; we begin with what we see as four key tenets that are central to intersectionality. First, intersectionality is about the perspectives of people shaped by the multiplicity of categories to which they belong, some marginalized, some privileged. In its emphasis on perception and experience, intersectionality is of great relevance to social psychologists. Second, the different systems of inequality that come together are transformed in their intersections; intersectionality is more than the sum of its parts. Third, intersectionality is not simply a statistical phenomenon. The transformations of unidimensional systems of inequalities that are instantiated in intersections merge micro and macro levels of analysis. In this sense, intersectionality encourages—indeed, requires—that social psychologists attend to the sociological—structural, institutional, organizational—contexts in which the relevant actors live. Fourth, an intersectional analytic reveals the simultaneous experience of oppression and privilege, complicating the analysis of inequality. Scholars are divided on the question of whether intersectional analyses should focus on privilege; some worry that greater attention to privilege will lead to lesser attention to the experiences of marginalized individuals and thus undermine the emancipatory potential of intersectionality (Levine-Rasky 2011). We argue, however, that shining light explicitly on the privileges associated with certain social positions is important to furthering the goal of social justice.

These tenets are evident in several of the more recent articulations of intersectionality. Choo and Ferree (2010) offer a scheme for organizing intersectionalities that is based in part on levels of analysis. One approach focuses on inclusion of the experiences of multiply-marginalized people and groups, our first tenet. A second focuses on

intersectionality as an analytic interaction, a non-additive, transformative interactivity of effects—our second tenet. A third addresses institutional primacy, moving beyond sociological approaches that associate certain societal institutions primarily with one type of inequality or another, e.g., family with gender, then applying intersectional analysis to explain the “extra” or “secondary” contradictions for nondominant groups. This is one aspect of our third tenet.

Dhamoon’s (2011) schematic is similar; she distinguishes the identities of an individual(s) or social group that are marked as different (e.g., Black women), the categories of difference (e.g., race and gender), and the systems of domination (e.g., racism, patriarchy), but she adds an important fourth aspect, the processes of differentiation (e.g., racialization and gendering). She makes the important point that each emphasizes something different in our understanding of difference and power, that they do different analytic work. Translating Dhamoon’s model into social psychological terms, we see that she identifies personality/identity, social categories, structural systems, and in adding process, highlights the importance of interaction, representation, and social construction, as well as temporality.

One critical contribution of intersectionality is that it can illuminate how intersecting forms of domination produce locations of both oppression and privilege within a single actor or community (Zinn and Dill 1994; Dhamoon 2011), our fourth tenet noted above. Co-incidences of privilege and marginalization have been under-theorized, yet are likely ubiquitous in social life (e.g., our example of Barack Obama). Wadsworth (2011) offers an insightful analysis of such complexities in discussing California’s 2008 marriage protection ballot initiative, Proposition 8. She foregrounds the potential tension between simultaneously existing identities: in this empirical case, race and sexuality. A significant number of people of color whose views were otherwise on the political left voted to restrict marriage to opposite-sex couples. In attempting to explain this apparent contradiction, Wadsworth introduces the concept of *foundational intersectionality*, analyzing the historical development of the relationships

among these socially constructed categories. Wadsworth observes that people in subordinated positions (here, people of color) can “reflect and uphold certain privileges [here, heterosexuality] while simultaneously performing a location of innocence that masks other power relations from which they benefit,” (2011, p. 204). She notes: “As the nation’s first African American president was being elected, significant percentages of left-leaning people of color stepped to the political right on Proposition 8...” (2011, p. 201). (Indeed, President Obama came in for much criticism for his caution about undoing “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” and his then ambivalent position on gay marriage.) Wadsworth stresses that unitary category analysis cannot explain these political behaviors; foundational intersectionality is critical to understand the effects of these secondary marginalizations (Cohen 1999). Intersectional scholarship has tended to focus analyses primarily on the stigma of the marginalized and the power of the dominant, avoiding analysis of the operation of power within and between stigmatized communities.

Wadsworth’s stress on historical contexts of particular intersections is a telling reminder of the temporal dimension of categories and their intersections. This adds depth to a number of the other approaches to intersections we have reviewed thus far. So, for example, Choo and Ferree’s (2010) point that institutions may be associated with particular types of categories and inequalities can be extended by observing that such associations themselves may well experience historical change. The association of family with women and paid work with men, for example, has changed significantly in the past decades. Similarly, the institution of higher education, once associated primarily with male students, has become an institution populated more by women students than by men, a change that has aroused significant concern on the part of some (Jacobs 2002; Sax 2008; Vincent-Lancrin 2008). Another telling contemporary example is how the intensification of transnational flows complicates racial and ethnic profiles; Purkayastha (2010) notes that the presence of transnational lives, in which people live both within and beyond single nation-

states, makes it possible for them to be simultaneously racial majorities and minorities.

Locating Intersectionality in Social Psychological Concepts and Theories

In this section, we locate the concept of intersectionality explicitly in the language and theories of social psychology. The terms of intersectionality are closely related to social cognition, as we have discussed, most evident in the concept of social categories. Some of the core concepts of social exchange, particularly power and status, are theoretically related to intersectionality, but the empirical work in this tradition has not typically taken up the kinds of questions that intersectionality informs. Explicit connections could certainly be made with some subfields within social exchange, however, especially work on justice and equity. Symbolic interaction has tended to emphasize interactional rather than structural dimensions, but clearly illuminates some of the micro-level symbolic aspects of intersectionality through concepts such as social stigma.

Social Cognition

We have already introduced the key principles of social cognition, because the process of categorization and the operations of social categories are fundamental to intersectionality. The statuses associated with social categories, the indicators of the differential evaluations we have noted, and beliefs about status, inform the valence of intersections. Considering the processes of social cognition may shed new light on some aspects of intersectionality; three key processes are attention—how we direct our cognitive awareness; information processing—how we make a variety of judgments, from predictions to decisions to attributions; and memory—how we store and retrieve (or forget) information. Theories of attention may help explain what intersections are especially salient in certain social contexts; theories of information processing may help explain the kinds of judgments and inferences that follow

from intersectional identities and group memberships; and theories of memory may help explain the persistence of associations with particular intersecting categories and identities. Similarly, attention to intersectionality could clarify how categories are created and potentially transformed, as well as lead to an expansion of the repertoire of categories. Intersectionality suggests that the combined categories in any given situation become a new, distinct identity at the individual level and possible category at the group level. Interestingly, the implicit association test (IAT) (Greenwald et al. 1998), one of the most popular contemporary measures of associations among mental representations of concepts, continues to use uni-dimensional concepts, e.g., sample tests are sexuality (gay-straight); skin-tone (light skin-dark skin); disability (disabled-abled), despite the fact that the tool could easily be used to assess associations among multidimensional concepts. Intersectionality also highlights the affective valence of categories, an aspect of social cognition that could profit from greater attention (see Foy et al., this volume).

Social Exchange

Social exchange theory applies economic models to everyday decision making, postulating that interaction takes place when it is mutually rewarding to the parties involved. Interaction occurs because people depend on each other for valued resources. Power, conceptualized in this perspective as one actor's ability to achieve a favorable outcome when desired resources are finite, is a quality of a relationship (Emerson 1962; see Thye and Kalkhoff, this volume). This explicit attention to power could have led social exchange theorists to focus closely on inequalities associated with membership in social categories, as well as their intersections, but for the most part, this has not been the case. Most social exchange theorists do not address the influence of social categories, and where they do, they tend to focus on category differences, rather than on inequalities associated with category membership. More generally, exchange research assumes

a self-oriented motivation and does not often pursue the possibility of generosity; assumes that rationality, not emotion or affect, guides behavior; and tends to operationalize social positions and social contexts rather narrowly.

Particular exceptions exist within the social exchange literature, however, notably the considerable body of work on justice and the distribution of resources, and research on status. The literature on justice addresses perceptions about the allocation of resources. Defined this way, justice is subjective. A variety of possible principles guide resource allocation (e.g. equality, need, etc.). Where the justice literature touches more explicitly on perceptions of inequality is that membership in particular social categories affects the perceptions of which rules are fair and lead to just outcomes. People in advantaged or powerful positions are likely to perceive an unequal distribution as just, for example, while those in disadvantaged positions are more likely to feel it is unjust (Cook and Hegtvedt 1986; Molm 2006; Hegtvedt and Isom, this volume). The vast majority of exchange research is done in laboratory contexts, so the advantage and power created there are artificial. But studies conducted outside laboratory settings find parallel perceptions; people in lower social classes are less likely to perceive inequality to be fair (Robinson and Bell 1978). Kluegel and Smith (1986) report that Blacks are far more likely than Whites to doubt the fairness of the American stratification system. These are not intersectional analyses, but one can imagine that incorporating intersectionality would offer a profile of perceptions about justice that is both more complex and more accurate. For example, intersectional analyses of the perceptions of societal inequalities held by those among the rather vast population of the 99% of the 2012 Occupy movement would likely reveal many dimensions of social positions and statuses, rather than a monolithic group.

Expectation states theory, an offshoot of social exchange, could also connect to intersectionality, in theory if not in practice (Correll and Ridgeway 2003). This theory holds that individuals form performance expectations by assessing observable status characteristics and comparing among

group members (see Ridgeway and Nakagawa, this volume). Individuals look to status characteristics to evaluate their own and others' potential performances. Status characteristics are closely associated with membership in social categories. Numerous studies investigate sex category (Balkwell and Berger 1996; Foschi 1992) and the effects of other diffuse statuses on performance expectations (Cohen 1982; Foddy and Riches 2000; Webster and Driskell 1983; Webster et al. 1998). Taken as a whole, this line of research does illuminate one mechanism through which micro-interactions facilitate the performance of social inequalities. However, even these recent studies do not adopt an intersectional perspective, considering the real-world coinciding of various social positions. Intersectionality would enable more accurate predictions of the effects of expectations on behavior.

Symbolic Interaction

Fundamental to symbolic interaction is the meanings that social objects hold (Blumer 1969). Meaning emerges in interactions; interpretation is central to the processes through which meanings influence interactions (Snow 2001). Interpretation entails situational assessment, negotiations of meaning among actors, and agreement on lines of action. Negotiation, rather than individual action, is central to this interactionist perspective. The symbolic interactionist parallel to social identities is role-identities, identities generated through ties to others (McCall and Simmons 1978; Stryker 2002). In some strands of symbolic interaction, role-identities have an almost functionalist feel, but in others, particularly Goffman's (1959) dramaturgical analyses, emphasis is on the processes of identity construction and impression management (see Schwalbe and Shay, this volume).

One core symbolic interactionist concept, stigma, facilitates recognition of the affective depth of inequalities associated with intersections among identities (see Link et al., this volume). As defined by Erving Goffman (1963), stigma is disapproval of people on the basis of

characteristics that differentiate them from others in a particular group. Goffman thought of stigma as a process by which the reaction of others spoils an identity. For stigmatization to occur, systems of social, economic, and political power that identify difference, categorization, and the differential evaluation of those categories must exist (Garcia Bedolla 2007). What symbolic interaction adds to these cognitive components of stigma is recognition of the power of social interaction in creating and, in a sense, implementing the stigma. Garcia Bedolla notes that it would be useful to assess the relative stigmatization of multiple potential (or actual) group memberships. She asserts this would help promote understanding of the interrelations among identities and the relative degree of attachment individuals have to particular group identifications.

These symbolic interactionist principles are central to one relatively recent theoretical contribution that has been highly influential to work on the social construction of gender and of inequality: “doing gender.” West and Zimmerman (1987) borrow insights from phenomenology and from symbolic interaction to assert that gender is an accomplishment of everyday interaction. Individuals literally “do” gender through the ways they talk, how they dress, how they move, how they interact. Subsequent to West and Zimmerman’s original articulation of the concept, West and Fenstermaker extended this approach in their 1995 article “Doing Difference” by addressing the accomplishment of other key social categories, specifically race and class. Although this essay addresses multiple categories, the analysis is not intersectional; how these categories interlock is not a primary focus. “Doing Difference” was followed by a symposium of responses, many of them critical of what they perceived as an emphasis on difference as opposed to inequality (Collins et al. 1995). Among the key points of critique were the failure to focus on the interlocking relationships among systems of inequality, failure to take the specific historical circumstances and systems of power into account, failure to attend to the constraints that material power and institutions pose on processes of social construction, and the apparent failure to recognize that

perceptions depend on one’s location in social structures. Integrating an intersectional approach more fully into the “doing” perspective would clearly address many of these critiques; intersectionality is fundamentally about the interlocking systems of inequality, and is deeply attentive to systems of power and the differential allocation of both material and symbolic resources. Empirical work in this vein is beginning to take shape (see Utrata 2011; Warren 2009).

A more recent direction is to theorize the “undoing” of gender and other forms of inequalities (Deutsch 2007; Risman 2009; Sullivan 2004). A synthesis of these two lines of work would promote the broader social goals of intersectional analyses, helping to reduce societal inequalities and promote social justice.

How Intersectionality Advances the Social Psychology of Inequalities

The intersectional framework offers both conceptual and methodological contributions with the potential to advance the social psychology of inequalities. Foremost among these, the intersectional framework guards against three limitations within mainstream social psychology. First, the intersectional framework holds the potential to identify the social mechanisms that produce both social inequality and social change (Weber 2007). Acknowledging that differences associated with race, class, and gender exist is not the same as showing how power relations are co-constructed, maintained, and challenged (Anthias 2005). The intersectional framework is explanatory, not just descriptive; it takes social psychology beyond accounts—often ideographic descriptions—of individual motives to better understand what acts produce inequality, and which acts produce more equitable outcomes.

Second, the intersectional framework is mobile, not static; it takes social psychological analyses of inequality beyond examinations of social categories themselves (e.g., race) and recasts them as dynamic social processes (e.g., racialization) that link individuals to free standing systems (Hancock 2007; Ken 2008). Rather than

engage in a poststructuralist rejection of social categories, the intersectional framework insists that group membership matters in two very real ways: first, attributions of group membership (e.g., labeling processes) impact one's social position and how one appraises and finds meaning in this position, and second, group membership partly determines one's ability to claim and harness this position for political, cultural, or social change (Anthias 2005; Spivak 2008). Explicitly acknowledging that social categories are contextually embedded, relational, and contingent insulates social psychological research from reducing difference to the level of identity alone and from reifying social categories as the field has done in the past (Cole and Sabik 2009; Higginbotham 1997). Moreover, the intersectional lens explicitly acknowledges and explores variations within social categories, which destabilizes essentialist assumptions about these groups (Hurtado and Sinha 2008; Ramazanoğlu 2002). When deploying social categories, this approach analytically distinguishes between "social position," one's position in relation to social, economic, cultural, or political resources, from "social positioning," the way one articulates, understands, or harnesses these positions (Anthias 2005; Levine-Rasky 2011). Thus, the intersectional framework forces analyses to move beyond social psychology's historic fascination with "difference" as a set of static positions to interrogate the interrelated and mobile processes of social differentiation and differential evaluation.

Third, the intersectional framework guards against social psychology's tendency to give primacy to a single identity, group membership, or social system when providing an account for social inequality. Intersectional studies require that research move beyond "master" categories to consider the ways that "emergent" and hybrid categories produced in everyday interactions complicate social psychological processes (Fotopoulou 2012; Warner 2008). For example, Doan and Haider-Markel (2010) use the concept of *intersectional stereotyping* to describe the joint impact of sexual orientation and gender in shaping respondents' evaluations of gay and lesbian political candidates. Studies not informed

by intersectional sensitivities—those that fail to consider the multiple groups to which targets belong—miss the way cross-cutting positions act as resources in some contexts, but liabilities in others. Cross-cutting locations and systems produce qualitatively distinct patterns, which may not translate into quantitative variations. Thus, as we discuss in more detail later, attention to intersectionality requires more than testing for statistical interaction effects (see Methodologies and Challenges below).

The intersectional framework enriches the social psychology of inequality by allowing—no, insisting—that researchers employ a reflexivity that goes beyond "giving voice" to those whose experiences are often excluded in scholarship (Choo and Ferree 2010; Cole and Stewart 2012; Perry 2009). Intersectional studies position the researched as subjects and authorities in their own right. Moreover, the intersectional framework insists that researchers cast their scholarly gaze upon themselves to explicitly acknowledge the myriad ways in which the researcher and the research context impact the production of knowledge. For example, Bettie's (2003) ethnography of marginalized young women (e.g., smokers, cholas, "las chicas," skaters, and hicks) at Waretown High in California's Central Valley documents their struggle to find their place and a sense of authenticity through intra- and intergroup encounters and comparisons. While "giving voice" is an important intersectional goal in itself, Bettie's study goes beyond providing an account of *intersectional invisibility* (see also Purdie-Vaughns and Eibach 2008). Her commitment to an intersectional analysis requires Bettie to be explicitly self-reflexive. She is aware of and reminds the reader of her own subjectivity as a raced/classed/gendered sociologist to avoid providing what Bordo (1990) calls the "view from nowhere." Bettie's multiple social locations impact her ability to gain access to field sites, to establish rapport, and to understand and represent accurately what she observes (see also Wilkins 2008). Adopting intersectional methodologies offers social psychologists the ability to theorize and investigate social inequalities in ways that acknowledge and embrace the full

complexity of lived experience—including their own (Fine 2007; Hesse-Biber and Piatelli 2012; Weber 2007)—as well as making transparent the ways that intersections shape representation and the production and dissemination of knowledge (Collins 2000; Smith 2007). In short, the intersectional framework requires social psychologists be committed to producing “situated knowledge” (Haraway 1988).

Perhaps most important, the intersectional framework advances our understanding of the social psychological foundations of power. While much of the earlier theorizing focused primarily on oppression (see Early Conceptualizations above), more recent formulations emphasize the relational nature of power: privilege and oppression are co-constitutive (Steinbugler et al. 2006). Morris’ (2006) study of Matthews Middle School, where White students and teachers make up the numerical minority, for example, explicitly analyzes white privilege rather than allowing it to remain unmarked. Morris describes in rich detail multiple ways that constructions of middle-class whiteness shape the experiences of students of color—their attitudes toward and behaviors at school, as well as the school’s expectations for and responses toward them.

The intersectional framework advances the social psychology of privilege/oppression in a second way. Its attention to multiple social positions recognizes that cross-cutting social locations reinforce systems of domination and subordination, particularly in terms of resource allocation. Yet contradictory patterns sometimes occur. Given one’s specific cross-cutting social locations, the same individual may simultaneously experience advantage—whether material or symbolic—by some positions and disadvantage by others (Shields 2008). These “translocational positionalities” offer a fruitful site for social psychological explorations of both the dynamics of social stratification and social integration (Anthias 2005, p. 44) and hold the potential to uncover important contradictions and unintended consequences that may produce or deepen significant inequalities, even by well-meaning individuals or institutions (Morris 2006). This approach rejects uni-dimensional models of social inequal-

ity (Browne and Misra 2003). Consequently, the intersectional framework’s conceptualization of power challenges static or essentialist perspectives on social inequality, those Keating (2009) refers to as “status quo stories” that normalize difference and its effects.

The intersectional framework also holds the potential to inform enduring concerns within social psychology at large. Social psychology attempts to clarify the relationship between individuals and society, and thus, social psychologists devote considerable attention to the ways that individuals’ life experiences reflect both human agency and external social forces. Numerous studies attempt to integrate the two, yet most are unproductive because they give primacy to either agency or structure. The intersectional framework destabilizes the assumed and taken-for-granted social psychological binaries of individual/society and agency/structure by requiring scholars to conceptualize race, gender, and social class not only as identities but also as organizing principles of social systems (Perry 2009). As a result, intersectional analyses allow social psychologists to observe agency’s limits and social structure’s flexibility.

Similarly, the intersectional framework points to the utility of and need for theoretical synthesis within social psychology. Despite calls for integration from sociologists (Hollander and Howard 2000; House 1977) and psychologists (Ryff 1987), social psychology remains theoretically, methodologically, and institutionally fragmented. Although more than 30 years have passed since House’s impassioned call to abandon intellectual and institutional tradition to establish “new interfaces,” social psychology remains largely un-integrated. Recent intersectional studies offer a glimpse of hope. Moore’s (2008) mixed-methods study of Black lesbian stepfamilies, for example, finds that exchange models designed to explain power relations within heterosexual couples do not adequately account for these biological mothers’ higher levels of household work and increased decision making power. Moore argues that social meanings associated with particular social roles (i.e., mother) and identities (i.e., lesbian), and the meaning of the work itself com-

plicate these exchanges. Synthesizing social exchange with key principles from symbolic interaction to explain this particular experience brings each theory into conversation with the other to illuminate theoretical blind spots.

The ideological underpinnings of the intersectional framework—the commitment to social justice and improving the lives of those who live on society’s margins—dovetail with recent movement toward the development of a critical social psychology that traces power relations through the construction and application of social psychological knowledge, and aims for progressive social change (Cherry 1995; Fox et al. 2009; Ibáñez and Iñiguez Rueda 1997). The activist conscience of the intersectional framework enables scholars to develop “holistic, humane, and justice-oriented” understandings of social inequality (Perry 2009, p. 230). Thus, intersectionality not only produces knowledge to aid our understanding of social psychological phenomena, but also to identify strategies that can help produce a more promising future for individuals and their communities.

Methodologies and the Challenges of Doing Intersectional Research

We turn our attention now to how intersectional research is actually done. The methodological decisions that guide social psychological research are considerably more than technical issues. Harding (1987) distinguishes three elements: epistemology, method, and methodology. Epistemology is a theory about knowledge, about who can know what and under what circumstances knowledge is developed. Methods are techniques for gathering and analyzing “data.” Methodology delineates the implications of an epistemology for implementation of a particular method (Sprague 2005). The technical details are located in their social and political context. As we have noted, intersectionality emerged as a product of feminist and critical race theorists’ critiques of the neglect and misrepresentation of marginalized experiences within mainstream social science. While social psychologists (like so-

cial scientists more generally) have tended in the past to see their work as value-free, neutral, and objective, many intersectional scholars (and contemporary social psychologists) question whether objectivity is possible and/or desirable. In this section, we interrogate the social psychological literature in order to identify the methodological limitations of the past, clarify the challenges of the present, and speculate about the potential for the future.

By and large, social psychological (as well as sociological and psychological) research rarely deploys intersectionality, for reasons that are both conceptual and methodological. Luft and Ward (2009) offer an insightful analysis of several conceptual challenges. They are certainly relevant for, but not specific to, social psychologists. First, they note the tendency to emphasize some systems (especially gender and race) over others, and remind scholars of the importance of a truly intersectional historiography. Certain deeply significant categories, social class being a key example, are constrained in how they can be studied; although there is considerable sociological work on socioeconomic status, interactionist analyses are challenged by the normative silence about social class, at least in the U.S. Social class is noticed, but not discussed. Second, they stress that intersectionality is not limited to “multiple jeopardy” (King 1988). Intersectionality is more fluid, more about mutual constructions of identities and oppressions, not only a coexistence of several, simultaneous oppressions. This observation speaks to the importance of interactionist perspectives, of putting interaction into cognition and moving the study of exchange processes from the lab into real world situations. Acker (2008) states this challenge articulately: there is “a continuing problem with the analysis of intersectionality: how to escape thinking about race, class, gender, and sexuality as separate categories while, at the same time, recognizing that they have particular material, ideological and historical specificities” (citing Andersen 2005).

Third, and echoing Wadsworth, Luft and Ward (2009) highlight the importance of simultaneous analyses of both oppression and privilege. Fourth, they suggest that the most effective approach to

intersectionality is what they call “not yet/that’s not it.” In a sense, this is a profound recognition of the ways in which social context, societal circumstances, the current histories and the histories about to be created, mean that an understanding of intersectionality, and perhaps also of inequality, is always provisional. This assertion may well be discomfiting to social psychologists and social scientists more generally, but it is an approach that does avoid misidentification. A closely related point is that as intersectionality has acquired intellectual capital, it has also become vulnerable to appropriation, that is, to being used to forward ends that have little to do with intersectionality or with the understanding of inequalities. The language of intersectionality can be used to fend off charges of racism or sexism; intersectional goals can be claimed without using intersectional methods—so, for example, when ostensibly intersectional analyses slip back to the additive, centering one system, then looking at additions of others.

Looking at this from an institutional perspective, the use of intersectionality is analogous to the history of the use of diversity. The recognition of difference does not, in and of itself, change structural inequalities. This is a point on which we might critique Luft and Ward, in that the “not yet/that’s not it” conceptualization of intersectionality could imply that the moment for institutional change will itself never quite be at hand. In thinking through these challenges, though, Luft and Ward pose some excellent questions. We quote at some length: “Form and context, or the *how* and *why* and *for how long* of intersectionality, also matter. They draw attention to questions of motivation and ownership, but especially sustainability: Where did this effort come from and who is invested in it? Who owns it, funds it, and why? Does it address only the symptoms (poverty) or also the causes (economic policies) of intersectional problems?” (2009, p. 24) To echo this latter question in a social psychological arena, “Does it address only the symptoms (attitudes and stereotypes about poverty) or also their causes (the societal narratives about social class and its determinants)?” (2009, p. 24)

Luft’s (2009) experiences as an anti-racism activist point to a final challenge to incorporating intersectionality into social psychological practice: knowing when and where its deployment is and is not likely to produce social justice outcomes. Scholars continue to question whether intersections are ubiquitous or contingent and whether and when the intersectional framework is the most appropriate lens to deploy (Browne and Misra 2003). Luft (2009) argues that failure to attend to the unique logics underlying systems of gender and race can flatten opportunities for social change. For example, the much lauded “color-blindness” of the post-civil rights era has yielded new forms of subtle racism, which must, according to Luft, be dismantled with race-only rather than intersectional interventions, in order to force individuals to confront racial inequalities head on. Consequently, social psychologists, educators, and activists aiming for social justice outcomes must seriously consider the logics underlying specific systems of inequality to assess the framework’s usefulness in particular contexts, rather than deploying it indiscriminately.

Shields (2008) points to several methodological reasons for social psychologists’ neglect of intersectionality. First, social science favors parsimonious models over complex ones. The “best” models have the fewest variables and pathways; however, these models often gloss over the messiness of social life. Second, social scientists are deeply concerned with research controls, whether through statistical controls holding variables “constant” across cases, randomly assigning participants across experimental and control groups, or removing social processes from real-world contexts. Third, scholars often fail to measure and include “extraneous” variables. As a result, most research designs define intersectional processes as “noise” that must be eliminated or, at a minimum, reduced. When researchers include race, gender, and social class measures, they tend to conceptualize and operationalize each as “demographic variables” whose meanings are self-evident rather than contingent, temporary, and contextual. Last, most social psychological research is designed to identify differential outcomes across social groups or experimental

conditions. All too often, social psychologists interpret difference as explanation, failing to realize that difference is descriptive and not necessarily explanatory. Further, this emphasis on difference often overlooks the possibility of similarity. Each of these failures is associated with and exacerbated by quantitative methodologies' dominance (i.e., both normative and in frequency of use) within social psychology.

As these shortcomings illustrate, standard methods for "doing science" inhibit the development of a fully intersectional social psychology. That said, there are examples of quantitative studies of inequality that adopt a fully intersectional perspective. McCall (2001) conducted an extensive multi-group examination of gender, class, and racial inequalities across geographic/regional and economic configurations guided by what she calls *intercategorical complexity*, the adoption of existing analytical categories to document relationships of inequality among social groups and changing configurations of inequality along multiple, sometimes conflicting, dimensions.

McCall poses the critical question: can a categorical approach respect the demand for complexity? Such multi-group studies must analyze the intersections of the full set of dimensions of multiple categories and thus examine both advantage and disadvantage explicitly and simultaneously. She addresses the growing earnings inequality between the rich and the poor and between the college educated and the non-college educated (inequality that has deepened considerably in the decade since she published her study). Because gender inequality appeared to have declined in the same period, the new inequality was seen as afflicting White men. She examines the roots of several different dimensions of wage inequality—gender-based, educationally-based, racially-based, intersectional—and then synthesizes these as configurations of inequality in varied regional economies in the U.S.

McCall concludes that patterns of racial, gender, and class inequality vary across geographic, regional, and economic configurations; deindustrialized regions such as Detroit are ripe for comparable worth and affirmative action approaches to reducing earnings inequality, whereas in

postindustrial and immigrant-rich regions such as Dallas, more universal or non-gender specific strategies such as minimum wage campaigns would be more effective in reducing inequalities.

McCall's research is unusual in the care with which she deploys quantitative methods to identify the impacts of intersectional social positions. Intersectional scholars remain divided on the usefulness of quantitative methods for assessing intersectional processes. While factorial designs are useful in describing differential outcomes across primary and emergent categories (i.e., the "what"), these analyses do not always produce insight into intersectional processes (i.e., the "how" and "why"). Similarly, critics argue that multivariate analyses are not able to adequately provide an interactive model of race, gender, and social class because these identities/positions are confounded within individuals. Moreover, there is a danger of reducing an intersectional analysis to statistical interaction effects, which may assess quantitative impacts of race, gender, and social class but often miss qualitative impacts. These shortcomings do not point to inadequacies with statistical procedure itself, but rather, to scholars' lack of attention to intersectional processes in interpreting study results. Perhaps most important, using social categories primarily as independent variables (as distal rather than proximal causes) often prevents scholars from asking questions about the social contexts and systems of power that give rise to these social constructs.

These critiques lead Shields (2008) to conclude that "the theoretical compatibility and historic links between intersectionality theory and qualitative methods imply that the method and the theory are always already necessary to one another" (p. 306). Proponents of qualitative methodologies and methods argue they are better suited for intersectional analyses because they are less concerned with testing a priori hypotheses; they tend to be more flexible and can deal with unanticipated results; and further, they let informants provide information that they believe is significant, and they can isolate individual identities while also assessing their simultaneous impact. Cole (2009) and Covarrubias (2011) take the middle ground and argue that both quantitative

and qualitative approaches can be useful so long as researchers are careful in considering intersectional processes when interpreting their data. Warner (2008), however, cautions proponents of methodological integration to remember that these approaches may not be perfectly compatible given their divergent assumptions regarding the nature of reality and their stance on who can know what and how one does so (see Sprague 2005; for a critique of this argument, see Stewart and Cole 2007).

Mapping these critiques of quantitative and qualitative approaches onto the methodological preferences of the three primary social psychological perspectives suggests that symbolic interaction, which is more likely to rely on qualitative methods, is better suited methodologically to an intersectional perspective. Both social cognition and symbolic interaction, however, can and do draw on both quantitative and qualitative methods. Social exchange relies heavily on laboratory experimentation, and thus on quantitative methods, which could make inclusion of an intersectional perspective all the more challenging. We stress, though, that the issue is not so much method as it is how scholars in any of these traditions think about the social contexts and systems of power that shape cognition, exchange, and interaction.

Cole (2009) and Cole and Sabik (2009) offer three guiding questions for social psychologists who want to incorporate intersectional insights into their research: First: *Who is included within the social category under examination?* Second: *What role do power and inequality play?* Third: *Where are the similarities across social categories?*

Which categories we use and how we treat these categories within research designs (i.e., if and how they are collapsed) hold implications for both our findings and the interpretations of those findings. This question encourages scholars to address issues of invisibility, and the associated misrepresentation, marginalization, and disempowerment (Purdie-Vaughns and Eibach 2008). Explicitly asking “*who is included?*” helps to identify which groups have been overlooked and whose experiences have been misrepresented,

and to offer the opportunity to repair these misrepresentations. For example, in an early study of attributions about victims of sexual assault, Howard (1984) deliberately included male victims, a group of possible victims of sexual assault that had been completely ignored. She found that female victims were held more accountable than male victims when the assault occurred when they were hitchhiking, and women were blamed more in terms of stable personality traits, whereas men were blamed more for behaviors. In a study we describe in greater detail below, Moore (2008) examines lesbian stepfamilies and discovers power dynamics that differ markedly from those in heterosexual middle-class couples. Asking who is included also leads to consideration of who is the appropriate comparison group, in order to guard against referencing dominant group norms as benchmarks. At a minimum, Warner (2008) adds, researchers should explicitly provide rationales about *why* they made particular decisions, rather than just reporting *what* they did.

Answers to the question about who is included have implications for each stage of the research process. They transform sampling by enabling us to consider neglected groups. They transform our manipulations and the measures that operationalize constructs by enabling us to consider them from the perspective of the group being studied. As a result, research is more likely to produce a nuanced understanding of understudied groups that can lead to the generation of altogether new hypotheses. Moreover, researchers may gain insight into the ways that one category impacts another or uncover social interventions that may provide benefits across groups.

What role do power and inequality play? Considering the role that inequality plays in social processes impacts the generation of hypotheses and the interpretation of results. Hypotheses must attend to the social and historical contexts in which inequalities are produced and sustained. Differences must then be interpreted with awareness that groups occupy both unique and complex structural positions. In a study of perceptions of attractiveness described in further detail below, Goff et al. (2008) explore how

intersections of race and gender effectively erase Black women. Experimentally manipulating targets' skin color, the researchers find that Black women are miscategorized as effectively *being* Black men, particularly when their skin color is dark. Their focus on intersections and inequalities reveals perceptual processes that underlie privileges of Whites and men, and oppression of Black women. Focus on inequality also encourages social psychologists to consider causes that are "upstream" (i.e., external social forces), not only "downstream" (i.e., internal to the individual) (Weber and Parra-Medina 2003). Thus, attention to inequalities facilitates a better understanding of the mechanisms through which difference operates and holds the potential to identify useful interventions. Movement in this direction may offer an effective response to sociological criticism that social psychological research is "reductionist" and "trivial" (Sprague 2005).

Where are the similarities across social categories? As we have noted, social psychological research often relies on hypothesis testing, which emphasizes differences between groups. A focus on similarities discourages an overly deterministic view of identity. Moreover, attention to this question has the potential to transform each stage of the research process. Social psychological researchers may pursue exploratory research rather than test a priori hypotheses. Samples may include diverse groups that are connected through shared social locations vis-à-vis power structures. Social categories may be conceptualized and operationalized as individual and group practices rather than as stable individual characteristics. As one general example, a prevailing cultural conception of people with various forms of disability treats them as distinct from "able-bodied" and/or "able-minded" individuals. Yet, we are reminded all the time of commonalities. Pregnant women can need more room to get in and out of a car; older people shopping with a cart (and youth with skate boards) are appreciative of curb cuts; office workers with carpal tunnel syndrome need to take frequent work breaks. Perhaps the greatest potential for methodological transformation lies with analysis and interpretation, if researchers do not allow group differences to overshadow

similarities across groups and differences within groups.

Identifying points of commonality also dissuades dialogues about "whose oppression is worse" (Moraga and Anzaldúa 1981) or what Martinez (1993) calls "oppression Olympics." Most significantly, it makes room for groups to forge coalitions and partnerships, which can be an essential element for the development of social policy aimed at reducing societal inequalities.

Choo and Ferree (2010) offer a number of recommendations for constructive use of intersectionality, moving forward. They argue for approaching intersectionality as relational rather than locational; as transforming the processes affecting the mainstream as well as identifying select intersections for "special cases" (see also Berger and Guidroz 2009). They recommend that scholars adopt an even more complex view of intersectionality, focusing on feedback loops among processes at multiple levels that create interactions among them, as inherent parts of how they are constituted (see also Winker and Degele 2011). This echoes a message often asserted by social psychologists: the complexity of social institutions is obscured when macrostructures of inequality are separated from the microstructures of the social construction of meaning. Indeed, this could be viewed as a 2010 restatement of Jim House's legendary "three faces of social psychology" essay, arguing as did House (1977) for stronger interfaces among these strands. As we stressed above in articulating the third key tenet of intersectionality, this approach requires examination of interlocking oppressions from macro to micro levels.

Implementing these recommendations is a tall order. Comparative data are necessary as a first step, but they are not necessarily sensitive to context. Methodological advances have identified interaction-centered analytic strategies appropriate both to quantitative (from exploratory data analysis to hierarchical linear modeling) and qualitative (multi-sited ethnographies, multi-level coding programs) methods. Statistical programs, such as Mplus, permit researchers to conduct multiple group analyses (e.g., Harnois

2009). Mixed method strategies can enable high quality simultaneous qualitative and quantitative analyses (Griffin and Museus 2011), although as we have noted above, their divergent assumptions about the nature of reality suggest an underlying incompatibility.

Another major challenge lies with the statistical techniques currently available to social scientists. Statistical power is inversely related to the number of factors included within a model; thus, the number of identities or social statuses that researchers can bring into their analysis is limited. More common today, however, are claims that the data necessary for intersectional analyses simply are not available. Scholars assert that while an intersectional approach is desirable, we must reserve these analyses for when adequate data become available (e.g., Shields 2002, p. 25).

That day may be close at hand. One promising development is the explosion of attention to what is being called the age of “Big Data” (Hardy 2012; Lohr 2012a). Trends in technology are generating dramatically more data at rates that are unprecedented. A flood of digital data is rising from many sources including the Web, biological and industrial sensors, and of particular importance to social psychologists, video, email, and social network communications. Computer tools for gleaning knowledge from this vast trove of unstructured data are increasingly making possible analyses at a scope heretofore unimagined. In March 2012 the U.S. federal government announced a major research initiative in big data computing, an initiative that includes agencies such as NSF and NIH, both of which fund a good deal of social psychological research (Lohr 2012b). Advances in this arena may well enable analyses of a complexity that will facilitate far more nuanced research on intersectionalities. We should add a word of caution, however. The exponential increase in digital data is generated in part by an intensifying culture of surveillance; the age of Big Data could generate new types of inequalities.

More fully incorporating insights from intersectionality into social psychology does not require scholars to abandon traditional methods. What is central, however, is that social psycholo-

gists reconsider the meaning and the consequences of social categories and reevaluate the strengths and weaknesses of their methodological choices. Significant change will require the efforts of researchers across the quantitative/qualitative divide. Shields (2008) frames intersectionality as “an invitation to move beyond one’s own research comfort zone” (p. 309). We agree.

Empirical Examples

Thus far, we have defined intersectionality, connected it explicitly with other orienting concepts and theoretical traditions within social psychology, and discussed intersectionality as a form of methodology. We now turn to three streams of scholarship within the social psychology of inequalities that we treat as extended case studies to illustrate the ways that this framework can enrich social cognition, social exchange, and symbolic interaction respectively. In keeping with the theme of this *Handbook*, we have selected studies from research agendas that we believe showcase the usefulness of the intersectional framework in clarifying our social psychological understanding of the creation, contexts, dimensions, and outcomes of social inequalities. These scholars’ careful attention to intersectional theoretical insights and methodological concerns takes each of these analyses beyond normative models based on hegemonic categories. Despite limitations—and in some cases only marginal applications of the intersectional framework—each piece makes strides toward a critical social psychology guided by the goal of social justice.

Social Cognition: Compound Categories and “Seeing Race”

For the past 100 years, anti-racism and feminist scholars and activists have posed the question “Ain’t I a woman?” to critique the concept of “global sisterhood,” which assumes that all women—by virtue of being women—share a common experience (Mohanty 1988; Spelman

1988). Originally posed by Sojourner Truth in 1851, this enduring question acknowledges the unique dilemma experienced by women of color, who through their dual membership in two societally significant and marginalized groups, frequently find themselves confronted by competing interests (Truth and Painter 1998). Being women has meant that they are excluded from race-based social movements; being Black has meant that they are excluded from gender-based social movements. The effect of equating womanhood with whiteness and blackness with manhood is the erasure of Black womanhood. How does incorporating the intersectional framework advance our understanding of the processes of person perception in particular and social cognition in general?

Goff et al. (2008) explore these questions in a pair of experiments assessing the accuracy of respondents' initial impressions and higher order judgments (i.e., attractiveness) of White and Black male and female targets, as represented through visual stimuli (e.g., images of faces or videos depicting body movement) where skin tone was digitally manipulated to vary from light to dark within and across target type. Intercategory comparisons (McCall 2005) reveal three patterns, which together clarify the way intersections of race and gender contribute to the erasure of Black womanhood. First, respondents made more errors when categorizing Black women *as women* than when identifying the sex of all other groups. Second, respondents rated Black men and women as more masculine than their White counterparts. Moreover, respondents viewed racially stereotypical Black targets (e.g., darker skin) as more masculine than less stereotypical targets. Third, respondents rated Black women as less attractive in proportion to their perceived masculinity. Taken together, these results suggest that how respondents "see race" shapes how they "see gender." As Goff et al. (2008) conclude: "Rather than being seen as *similar* to men, Black women were miscategorized as *being* men—which may constitute an altogether different form of social comparison. Instead of escaping the gendered harms that women frequently en-

sure, Black women may face unique harms that can effectively erase their womanhood" (p. 402).

Adopting the intersectional framework complicates existing theories of person perception, which theorize the ways that our initial categorization of another person influences which details we attend to and the judgments we make about this person. Person perception is a function of the way information is cognitively organized and interactively applied. Previous studies treat race and gender—both central to forming impressions, because all people are assumed to have an identifiable race and gender and because both are thought to be quickly and accurately ascertained in an encounter—as singular, discrete "base categories" into which we sort others and upon which we construct higher order judgments. The literature has concentrated on assessing the accuracy with which we categorize individuals, specifying the sequence of events in this process, mapping these processes onto areas of the brain, and connecting impressions to real-life outcomes. Findings from Goff et al. (2008), however, suggest that respondents treat race and gender as intersectional or "compound" categories rather than as discrete base categories. Moreover, their deployment of measures for racial stereotypicality elicits meaningful empirical variation within social categories and therefore destabilizes the assumption of a singular Black woman experience. Additional research is needed to specify which other compound categories shape person perception, to clarify when and under what conditions intersectional versus singular base categories matter, and to explore how one's level of familiarity with particular groups may enhance or inhibit these processes (see also Groom et al. 2005).

The "seeing race" literature advances social cognition by clarifying how intersections complicate social categorization (e.g., Eberhardt et al. 2004, 2006). First, results confirm prior cognition research: cognitive structures organize information about race and gender into group level schemas; however, the co-constitutive nature of race and gender produce intersectional subtypes (see Deaux 1995; Stangor et al. 1992; Thomas et al. 2004). Building on this observation, the study finds that particular configurations (i.e.,

subtypes) carry normative expectations about which groups are likely to overlap. Pairings consistent with social expectations facilitate categorization (e.g., blackness and manhood, or whiteness and womanhood), while contradictions (e.g., blackness and womanhood) complicate social categorization. The streamlining of social cognition through the use of intersectional subtypes comes at a cost: miscategorization. Second, the study clarifies the way race/gender intersections influence cognitive processes such as attention. In this study, skin tone provides a highly salient indicator for race, and thus race guides further cognitive processing, including the way individuals “see gender.” Third, this study contributes to our understanding of the cognitive foundations of “doing difference” (West and Fenstermaker 1995). This analysis of intersectional cognitive structures and processes—those conflating racial stereotypicality and masculinity—suggests that race and gender are better conceptualized as social productions rather than as biological givens. Such intersectional cognitive structures and processes hold implications for real-world outcomes. Future work must identify which contexts facilitate or interrupt intersectional cognitive processes.

Social Exchange: Egalitarianism in Invisible Families

Intimate relationships are often arenas in which one partner exercises power and control over another. Social exchange theory’s explicit attention to power makes it particularly well-suited for exploring the micro-foundations of inequalities in this context. Moreover, its conceptualization of power as a relationship makes it consistent with the intersectional framework. However, the exchange literature’s failure to decenter the experiences of White, middle-class families—those social psychology (and sociology) generally uses as its benchmark—renders diverse families invisible. Even the few extant studies of power relations within lesbian households, for example, tend to focus narrowly on White, educated, middle-class feminists with a commitment to an

egalitarian ideology rooted in second wave feminism. Consequently, we know little about power relations within multiply marginalized families. Is a commitment to egalitarian ideology a defining feature of lesbian households, or are there variations within the lesbian experience? Moreover, do studies assess ideological preference or actual practice? Are observed patterns artifacts of exchange researchers’ over-reliance on quantitative methodologies? Moore’s (2008, 2009, 2011) intersectional research qualifies our understanding of exchange processes by providing insights from otherwise “invisible” Black lesbian families.

Moore (2008) triangulates survey data with interview data from 32 lesbian stepfamilies in which at least one partner self-identified as Black and in which a partner brought one or more children into the relationship. She uncovers three patterns regarding power relations. First, although both partners view one another as co-providers and survey data suggest they express verbal support for an egalitarian division of household labor, actual practice does not reflect these expectations. Interviews reveal that biological mothers place more importance on economic independence than on an egalitarianism conceptualized through the equal distribution of household chores; in practice, these Black lesbian mothers give priority to self-sufficiency and autonomy (Moore 2009).

Second, the role of “mother” exerts considerable influence in structuring power relations within these families. The children within lesbian families often come from prior relationships, usually heterosexual relationships. Moore suggests that the temporal primacy of the mother’s identity as a mother as well as her biological tie to the child(ren) have a significant impact on the amount and type of household work she does. Many women identified as “mothers” before they identified as “lesbians.” Thus, the mother identity is more salient and central to their sense of self. By doing more of the household chores, biological mothers simultaneously gain influence over decisions that impact the children and engage in work that provides evidence that they are “good mothers.” These responsibilities give biological

mothers more power within the relationship. The biological mothers within these families willingly take on more household duties; a more powerful partner does not assign this work to them as we might expect to see in heterosexual families.

Third, the presentation of a gendered self is linked to the types of household tasks that partners do. Despite the absence of men in these relationships, gender still matters. Biological mothers and their partners can find themselves in a conundrum. Both partners expect to share the provider role. Yet considerable stigma is associated with same-sex unions, increasing incentives to do gender in traditional ways. Through the type and amount of work that these women contribute, they are able to prove to others and themselves that they are appropriately gendered, good mothers. As biological mothers claim responsibility for household management and childcare, their partners have less access to power and the ability to do gender. Unfortunately, a biological mother's efforts at being a "good mother" by assuming authority over household management and childcare may position the biological mother between the children and her partner. Investigating these power relations within lesbian families with adopted children would be a useful next step, enabling examination of these dynamics in families in which neither partner is the biological parent.

The importance of Moore's work extends well beyond intersectionality's call to give voice to experiences that are largely ignored. Her research suggests that power relations within Black lesbian stepfamilies do not emerge because of earnings differentials but rather through trade-offs that biological mothers make in order to have more say in decisions connected to their children's well-being. For these mothers, these are the decisions that matter. Moore's point is clear: social psychological accounts must go beyond specifying the type and amount of household chores that partners do. The meaning associated with household tasks, identity processes, and social expectations associated with roles are central in understanding power relations within intimate relationships. On these points, Moore's findings hint at the potential for social exchange theory to

benefit from more fully incorporating symbolic interactionist insights. Her work also illustrates how an intersectional analysis can deepen points of connection across the three prevailing social psychological theories. Moreover, her mixed-methods approach finds that straightforward interpretations of quantitative data may be misleading. Through her focus on intersections of race, gender, and sexual orientation, Moore provides a nuanced and intersectional view of the power dynamics in intimate relationships, which extends social exchange theory's reach beyond an understanding of resource differentials, partner dependence, and the transferability of resources to new exchange relationships to more fully consider the way social meanings profoundly impact how social actors define and enact power.

Symbolic Interaction: Reproducing and Resisting Identities

Divergent approaches within the symbolic interactionist tradition tend to emphasize either the structures of identity or the processes of identity construction. The latter explores strategies that individuals employ to manage others' impressions, highlighting the dramatic, performative nature of everyday encounters (Schwalbe et al., this volume). An assumption of human agency underlies key concepts of negotiation and impression management. Unfortunately, the lion's share of theoretical and empirical work concentrates on the management of a single spoiled identity. Can incorporating the intersectional framework enrich our understanding of privilege (and oppression)? How do intersections complicate identity processes—particularly those aimed at resistance?

Analyzing data from 80 interviews and participant observation in clubs, malls, and online forums, Wilkins (2008) documents three distinct strategies for "doing" whiteness in a northeastern college community. Although they appear to share little in common, each emerges from the same dilemma: the standards for teenage "coolness" reside outside of the White, middle-class mainstream. As an unmarked category, whiteness

appears cultureless and, other than an association with conformity and “goodness,” without identifiable content. By contrast, a nonwhite position provides marginalized teens with a salient identity, a strong moral position because of historical and political context, and associations with “badness” and (sometimes) coolness. Complicating matters further for White teens, self-presentation that produces a sense of cool among peers in the present is strikingly different from the “geekiness” required for material success as an adult in the future. Consequently, normative whiteness and the temporality of cool fuel a search for “badges of dignity” (p. 11). Goth, Puerto Rican wannabe, and evangelical Christian develop as individual and collective oppositional identities. Each provides White teens with membership within a peer group organized around shared cultural tastes and a sense of moral superiority.

Goths reject mainstream fashion and style in favor of the dark—in both literal and figurative senses—in order to shock White, middle-class peers and adults. Puerto Rican wannabes are White, middle-class women who date Black or Puerto Rican men, speak Spanish, and “propel their own white bodies into [B]lack and Puerto Rican cool” (p. 251). Highly-stylized self-presentation permits these groups to cross into racial and class marginality for the sake of being cool. By contrast, evangelical Christians narrow the parameters of middle-class whiteness and opt out of coolness in favor of goodness. Each of these identity projects trades on the teens’ middle-class standing and a certain degree of impermanency. Class standing enables goth teens, for example, to acquire the expensive accoutrement necessary for their “oppositional” performance. Moreover, numerous markers of goth identity (e.g., clothing, hair color, make-up, piercings, etc.) are impermanent, offering these young people the ability to blend in and out of the mainstream during the course of their everyday lives. With time, many goths age out completely. While the immediate costs associated with goth can be substantial, the long-term costs can be minimal as teens’ future middle-class position remains secure.

Wilkins’ examination of sexual practice uncovers an unspoken truth: a gender double stan-

dard circulates within all three groups. Goths experiment with polyamory and bisexuality; each serves as a marker for “cool” because they buck mainstream values. Yet, this freedom of sexual choice favors men. They stand to gain more intra-group credibility because their bisexual encounters challenge a hegemonic, straight masculinity, and such acts could be offensive to outsiders’ sensibilities. The boundaries of femininity are more flexible. Furthermore, goth men are able to deploy the groups’ shared discourse positioning polyamory as an “enlightened” approach to explore their sexual desires without regard for those of their girlfriend(s). Although goth women appear to share this freedom through fashion and sexual experimentation, their acceptance as goth requires such displays. For them, sexiness is compulsory. Puerto Rican wannabes’ overt sexuality provides men of color with potential sexual partners and White men with “fallen women” to save. These stigmatized women serve as foils for the identity projects of men and women of multiple races. Evangelical Christians abstain from sex; yet once again, males are more highly rewarded for their declarations of abstinence than are females because of cultural expectations that associate traditional masculinity with sexual prowess and conquest. These identity projects require considerable boundary work guided by intersections of race, gender, social class, and sexuality. Often these teens transgress one identity boundary in order to stabilize another (see also Bettie 2003; Renfrow 2004).

Attention to intersections allows Wilkins to make numerous contributions to our understanding of identity processes. First, the narratives she offers suggest that gender, race, and social class not only produce “invisible competencies” and a naturalized way of seeing and operating in the social world, but each is also a strategic performance—an act of social positioning—teens use to either claim or disavow group memberships (Wilkins 2012a, b). Through their acts of passing, Puerto Rican wannabes, for example, transgress racial and class boundaries and raise questions about how “authentic” group membership is defined. Wilkins’ approach destabilizes categories themselves, suggesting they are often less abso-

lute and more contentious than we assume. Second, Wilkins' focus on boundaries is significant because she finds that they not only delineate one group from another, but boundaries also internally stratify groups. Moreover, the boundaries themselves are local, contingent, and temporary. Third, these White teens occupy "translocational positions" such that their borderwork reproduces their long-term advantage while permitting small acts of resistance by moving in and out of marginality as necessary to navigate social interactions in the present.

All three lines of research advance recurrent themes in the extant scholarship on the social psychology of inequalities. Synthesizing intersectionality's theoretical insights and methodological considerations with social cognition, social exchange, and symbolic interaction takes analyses of social inequalities beyond models limited to normative experiences. Social cognition attends to the structures and processes of thought and to the links between cognitive structures, cognitive processes, and behavioral outcomes such as discrimination. Goff, Thomas, and Jackson find that the way we "see race" has implications for the way we "see gender." Social exchange theory examines the conditions under which individuals make choices about allocations of resources. Moore finds that power within Black lesbian stepfamilies does not look like power in other types of relationships. Symbolic interactionism examines the ways that meanings are negotiated and at times resisted through interaction. Wilkins' examination of race/gender/class identity projects among White, middle-class teens finds that multiple, intersecting social locations offers them the flexibility to fashion their performances in ways that feel authentic and to make connections with others without forgoing the advantages of white privilege. These contributions and insights would not have been possible without the intersectional framework.

Conclusion

Throughout this chapter, we have argued that the intersectional framework offers us as social psychologists the potential to capture the com-

plexity of social life and the social inequalities embedded within it, to clarify the proximate factors producing injustices, and to work toward social change. The many examples we have discussed rely on processes of social categorization, which lead us to treat race, gender, and social class categories as if they were stable, mutually exclusive, and exhaustive. These assumptions, however, belie a central aspect of the Obama example with which we began this chapter. Although often self-defined (whitehouse.gov) and defined by others (Nagourney 2008) as African American—perhaps because of the legacy of the "one drop" rule—Obama does not easily fit into the prevailing racial classification scheme. Competing claims that he is "too Black" or "not Black enough" point to the insufficiencies of such rigid social categories in the twenty-first century context. This extended example allows us to draw attention to the challenges facing intersectionality and other social psychological perspectives that rely on processes of categorization. In concluding this chapter we consider how major contemporary shifts in systems of social categorization may affect social psychologists' conceptions of categorization, and the effects of these shifts on the future social psychology of inequalities.

According to demographers, Obama's biography mirrors recent trends within the U.S. U.S. Census data indicate that the rate of racial/ethnic intermarriage has risen from .7% of all married couples in 1970 (Lee and Edmonston 2005) to an all-time high of 8.4% in 2010 (Wang 2012). Following these trends, one in 40 Americans now self-identifies as multiracial; estimates project that this ratio will reach one in five by 2050 (Bean and Lee 2002). Along with these changes in domestic racial composition, Lee and Bean (2004) report that immigrants and their children currently make up 23% of the population. Over the past 30 years, a majority (85%) of these "legal" immigrants came from Asia, Latin America, or the Caribbean. Immigrants from Europe and Canada—although the largest group historically—are now the numerical minority (12%). By the year 2050, Latina/os and Asians will make up approximately one-third of the U.S. population. As these demographic trends continue, social psychology

(and sociological racial analyses more generally) will be forced to move beyond its historic focus on the Black-White divide.

Research has only begun to investigate how these demographic shifts are influencing social psychological processes. One strand focuses on individuals from racially-mixed families and finds these multi-racial individuals have considerable variation and flexibility in their racial identities. Rockquemore and Brunson's (2007) typology for biracial identities includes four distinct patterns: a *singular identity* as exclusively White or Black, a *border identity* that lies between existing categories, a *protean identity* that varies depending on social context, and a *transcendent identity* that is raceless. These varied racial identities destabilize the concept of race as individuals' sense of self and social context interact to blur or erode the boundaries between existing racial categories or to propose new ones or even the absence of racial identity altogether. Findings such as these raise fundamental questions about the usefulness of race as an orienting concept within social psychology (see also Harris and Sim 2002; Nobles 2000; Saperstein and Penner 2012). As social psychologists interrogate the concept of race in the historical context of significant shifts, we must consider: Who defines race and for what purpose? When and where is race operative? How does race and its use—inside and outside of the academy—enhance or reduce societal inequalities?

Similarly, recent scholarship traces the destabilization of the distinct but interrelated concepts of gender and sex. Sociologists conceptualize gender as a multi-tiered system—individual, interactional, and institutional—that sorts women and men into two categories, female and male, and uses these categories to create and then to justify the unequal allocation of rewards and resources (Risman 1998, 2004). Most people in our society think of sex as dichotomous and unchangeable. Sexual classification, therefore, appears straightforward: biological characteristics, such as reproductive organs and chromosomes, distinguish males and females. However, these assumptions are not always correct. *Intersexed* individuals have sex chromosomes, internal or-

gans, genitals, and/or secondary characteristics that are both male and female (Fausto-Sterling 2000; Money and Erhardt 1972). Estimated at 2% of all live births (Blackless et al. 2000; Fausto-Sterling 2000), intersexed individuals defy classification into a simplistic sexual binary.

Transsexuals pose another challenge for sexual classification. These individuals surgically and/or hormonally alter their bodies so that they appear to be a sex different from that as which they were born. Because transsexuals have the genetic structure of one sex, but the body type and gendered appearance of another, they are not easily classified as female or male. Classification is further complicated by the fact that transitions take multiple forms and can take years to complete, and that individuals may never fully transition. Consequently, transsexuals often view themselves as occupying an emergent or hybrid category (Dozier 2005; Halberstam 1998). The cultural resilience of the dichotomous construction of sex means that others tend to categorize them as “really” one sex or the other. At a minimum, individuals who live as male at one point of their life and as female at another—whether through a sex change of his/her choosing or whether through medically prescribed “corrective” surgery—disturb assumptions regarding the “natural” correspondence between sex and gender (Halberstam 1998; Namaste 1996; Prosser 1998; Schrock et al., this volume).

Recent scholarship also highlights the destabilization of the related concept of *sexual orientation*, or the match between one's sex and the sex of one's (desired or actual) sexual partners. This unsettles assumptions that sexual orientation is dichotomous (Rust 2000) and demonstrates instead fluidity in desire, practice, and identity over the life course (Diamond 2008)—fluidity that also includes the possibility of asexuality (Bogaert 2012). Out of the need for language to describe these and other diverse experiences, *transgender* has emerged as an umbrella concept widely used to describe individuals who “cross over, cut across, move between or otherwise queer social constructed sex/gender boundaries” (Stryker 1994, p. 251). These identities and experiences become all the more complex as they

intersect with race, class, and other statuses (de Vries 2012).

While race, gender, and other statuses are more malleable than previously considered, social class categories appear more rigid than we have assumed. Many Americans accept the ideological position that social mobility is possible—that is, anyone can “pull themselves up by their bootstraps” if they simply try hard enough. However, empirical studies report that one’s class position is determined as much by current and historical family circumstances, structural barriers, and discrimination as by individual ability or effort (Domhoff 2009; Feagin and McKinney 2003; Lareau and Conley 2008; Massey 2007). Consequently, McNamee and Miller (2009) refer to the assumption of social mobility embedded within the American Dream as the “myth of meritocracy.” Social psychologists have traditionally considered race and gender to be ascribed statuses (i.e., relatively fixed characteristics of individuals), while class has been considered an achieved status (i.e., relatively flexible). Taken together, these streams of literature are leading social psychologists to reconsider previously held assumptions about the ascribed and achieved nature of these social categories. If race and gender remain socially significant as the twenty-first century unfolds, it will be because people continue to believe that they matter. As the apparent clarity, social meaning, and material correlates of these categories change, race and gender may become less relevant (see Bobo and Sampson, this volume, for a contrasting view of the future relevance of race). In this sense, they will shift from being ascribed to being achieved. Social class, by contrast, is in many ways ascribed. Although individuals may have flexibility in constructing class identities, material and structural realities continue to shape lives in ways that are not fully controllable by perception and symbolic meaning alone.

Given these challenges, what is the future for intersectionality as a foundational framework within the social psychology of inequalities? Race, gender, sexuality, and social class are all core concepts whose stability and immutability have been increasingly challenged. Will intersec-

tionality disappear? We argue that intersectionality will not disappear until categorization itself, and the unequal allocation of resources that accompanies it, disappears. As we have noted, social categories evolve and the meanings associated with each continue to change; yet, processes of categorization continue to shape social life. Given that resources are most often finite, we expect social inequalities to persist because of processes of social differentiation and differential evaluation. Which statuses will emerge as the most important in the twenty-first century remains to be seen. The way social psychologists choose to use the concept of intersectionality may be neutral, descriptive, or deeply politicized. While each approach can make important contributions, we encourage social psychologists to continue to pursue intersectional theory, method, and practice that not only advances our understanding of social inequalities, but that strives to interrupt the social psychological foundations of these systems of inequality.

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Part II

Creating, Reproducing, and Resisting Inequality

The chapters in this section analyze social psychological processes through which inequality is created, reproduced, and resisted. Because inequality depends on categorical distinctions, the section opens with an overview of the historical, interactional, and individual processes through which difference is constructed. The chapters that follow extend that overview by digging deeper into how these processes operate. Most chapters incorporate work from two or more traditions in

sociological social psychology, although a few (dramaturgy, interpersonal influence, ideologies, legitimacy) are, by design, more focused. Two chapters (social capital, interpersonal influence) give special attention to the role of social networks in the reproduction of inequality. Together, the chapters demonstrate the analytical power of social psychological theories and concepts in the study of inequality.

Amy C. Wilkins, Stefanie Mollborn and Boróka Bó

In this chapter, we discuss the construction of social differences. There are many ways in which people are visibly different from each other. We have natural or constructed variations in our physical appearance, such as the color of our skin (a natural variation that we can alter through ultraviolet exposure), the straightness of our teeth (a natural variation that is often cosmetically corrected among wealthier people), or the style of our clothing (which is not part of our body and is therefore entirely constructed, although wealthier people have more clothing choice than others). We also have personal characteristics besides our appearance that can signal our difference from other people, such as the language(s) that we speak and our manner of eating (which can send messages about our culture of origin or our social class). We can create observable differences where none existed before by choosing to exhibit verbal and nonverbal dominance behaviors, such as maintaining eye contact and interrupting others (Dovidio et al. 1988; West 1984). High-status

dominance behaviors suggest to others that we should have more influence in an interaction, and thus confirms status.

Some observable differences among individuals, like eye color or shoe size, have little social meaning in our society. Many other differences send subtle cues about a person's group membership that may not even register consciously in the mind of other people observing them, but that add up to a judgment about which social categories that person belongs to. Tooth straightness, the style of clothing and jewelry, language, and table manners are all subtle cues of social class, a major category of social difference in the United States and in most other cultures. Bourdieu (1984) considers such visual markers of class, which can facilitate upward class mobility, to be aspects of "embodied cultural capital." These differences can lead us to classify people as "insiders" and "outsiders" (Merton 1972), leading to a "symbolic boundary" (Lamont and Molnar 2002).

A very few of these differences end up taking on even weightier social meanings. Researchers in social cognition have found that societies tend to have a small number of social categories, called "primary categories" or "primary frames" (Fiske and Taylor 1991; Ridgeway 2011), that people use to categorize others instantaneously. In the United States, these primary categories are age, race, and gender (Brewer 1988; Schneider 2004). Primary categories tend to be linked to clear visual or social cues that make group members easy to identify (Fiske and Taylor 1991).

A. C. Wilkins (✉) · S. Mollborn
Department of Sociology, University of
Colorado Boulder, Ketchum 205A, UCB 327, Boulder,
CO 80309, USA
e-mail: amy.wilkins@colorado.edu

B. Bó
Department of Sociology, University of California
San Francisco, 3333 California St., San Francisco,
CA 94143, USA

Whenever we meet a new person, we immediately and unconsciously categorize them according to these three types of social difference and begin to treat them accordingly. If we cannot categorize a person we meet, interaction is disrupted and feels difficult (Wisecup et al. 2005). Once social differences are entrenched, people tend to essentialize them as biologically based rather than socially constructed (Mahalingam 2007). Jayaratne et al. (2006) found that white Americans who essentialized racial differences as genetically based had greater prejudice against Blacks, but when they essentialized sexual orientation as genetic, they had less prejudice against gay and lesbian populations. This shows how even our interpretations of biological difference are socially constructed.

Social differences have far-reaching implications for society. Social categories affect individuals' sense of themselves, social interaction, societal structures, and cultural ideals. In this chapter, we discuss how and why social differences arise, how people learn these differences and maintain them by "doing difference" in interaction, and how people can work to transcend social differences. Readers can refer to other chapters for more information on some specific aspects of our discussion, such as the Ridgeway and Nakagawa chapter for social statuses, and the Howard and Renfrow chapter for intersections among social categories. One goal of this chapter is to create conversations across disciplinary lines. Thus, we bring together work from experimental social psychology, group processes, symbolic interactionism, and broader inequalities scholarship.

Creating Difference

Why People Construct Group Differences

Coordinating Behavior Why do people construct group differences at all? One explanation is that in order to interact with other people in an efficient way, we must coordinate our behavior (Brewer 1997; Ridgeway 2011). Imagine that you are walking down a narrow sidewalk and you

meet someone going in the opposite direction. If the two of you do not coordinate your behavior, you may end up crashing into each other or stopping completely to figure out a way around each other. In this example and many others, *shared cultural knowledge* about how you are supposed to behave in a certain situation can facilitate smooth interaction (Chwe 2001; Goffman 1967). In the sidewalk example, the cultural (and sometimes legal) rule in the United States that you walk or drive on the right side makes most interactions of this type run smoothly. This cultural knowledge is often unconscious; indeed, many traffic injuries in left-driving London result from tourists from right-driving nations who unconsciously look first to the left instead of the right for oncoming cars when crossing a street (DfT 2001).

Humans' need to coordinate their behavior through shared cultural knowledge is one factor that can eventually lead to the construction of group differences. People create and use differences when seeking to make sense of others with whom they are interacting (Bettenhausen and Murnighan 1985; Ridgeway 2006). Psychologists call this interpersonal sense-making process "social cognition" (Fiske and Taylor 1991). We categorize people to understand who they are and how we are similar to or different from them so that we can know how to synchronize our interaction (Ridgeway 2011). This need to define others in interaction gives rise to social categorization. The automatic bias that accompanies social categorization (Fiske 2002; see more discussion below) gives people access to stereotypes, which provide culturally-specific resources for dealing with others. Relying on stereotypes to smooth interaction is particularly appealing in cognitively demanding situations, but stereotypes tend to be a poor substitute for information about the specific individual with whom a person is interacting.

Becoming a Socially Meaningful Difference Although it is clear that only some of the many differences between humans have significant social meaning, it is harder to understand why some matter but not others. Several types of

socially meaningful differences are likely to exist in most human societies, such as gender, age, kinship, and resource differences (which translate into social class). Eisenstadt and Giesen (1995) call the construction of collective identities based on these types of social categories “primordiality.” Even small hunter-gatherer groups include people of different genders, families, and ages, and there are usually some differences in the resources available to people or families within a society. In many languages, it is impossible even to talk about or to another person without knowing their gender and sometimes their age (such as saying “you” in French as *tu* for children and *vous* for older people). All of these social categories have important consequences for group members’ life situations in terms of reproduction, production and consumption of goods, and/or sexuality. As such, observable differences are particularly amenable to becoming socially meaningful differences for organizing behavior and identities within a group (Ridgeway 2011).

Other kinds of important social differences, such as race, ethnicity, religion, and nativity, are very meaningful in some societies but are not likely to be present in every society or social group. They may also be harder to observe based on a person’s appearance. For example, constructions of race in the United States are not based on a clear set of biological characteristics, as people with similar skin color or facial features can be classified as belonging to different races (Freeman et al. 2011). This means that race is not an easily identifiable difference upon which to base such a socially meaningful set of categories in our society.

Then why is race socially important in some societies but not others? A historical understanding is key for answering this question, as it is for understanding many socially meaningful differences. For hundreds of years in the United States, people of African descent were subject to lifelong slavery, while people from other parts of the world were not. Smedley (2011) argues that race cemented a folk idea about human differences to justify the system of slavery. During this time, race organized the distribution of resources, production and consumption of goods, and sys-

tems of marriage and reproduction. This legacy of racial difference lives on after the abolition of slavery.

How Hierarchically Ordered Social Differences Arise

Like other social categories, racial categories emerge and change in response to shifting political, economic, and social conditions (DaCosta 2007; Nagel 1996; Omi and Winant 1986). One example of the emergence of a hierarchically ordered social difference comes from Sweden, although others are easily found, such as the ongoing construction of the pan-ethnic terms “Hispanic” or “Latino” as racial categories in the United States (Snipp 2003). In some ethnically and racially more homogenous societies such as Sweden, race has not traditionally been as fundamental for organizing social interaction (Bochner and Ohsako 1977), perhaps because it is not a prevalent basis for rapid differentiation. But race has become salient over time with changing social contexts. For hundreds of years Sweden was a fairly homogenous society, but recent decades have seen waves of immigration from areas such as Asia, the Middle East, and South America, with Asian immigrants surpassing all other immigrant groups (Martiniello and Rath 2010). Today, the percentage of Swedish residents who are foreign-born, at 11% (Statistics Sweden 1997, 2000), is similar to that of the United States (Grieco et al. 2012).

Initially, social difference between the burgeoning group of “new” Swedes and the “old” Swedes was constructed along ethnic or nativity lines. Ultraconservative political groups pushed to keep Sweden as the domain of ethnic Swedes. More recently, though, the idea of race has been imported into Swedish culture as an additional social boundary related to immigration. For example, the term “whites” (*vita*) has entered the journalistic lexicon. With the introduction of racial difference, all “new Swedes” are not part of the same category: Immigrants of European descent are grouped with ethnic Swedes, while immigrants from the rest of the world are construct-

ed as a doubly different social “other” in terms of both ethnicity and race. A third distinction not discussed further here is religion, with a boundary drawn between Muslims and others and a contentious debate over banning visible symbols of Islam such as headscarves, veils, and minarets.

This example shows how a new difference within a society can be constructed as socially meaningful during historical moments when the difference is becoming more prevalent. It also highlights the global diffusion of ideas (Meyer and Strang 1994; Smedley 2011; Soysal 1994), including *ideas about which social differences should matter most*. Swedish culture has borrowed racial terminology and distinctions from other societies, such as the United States, in which race has important meaning as a social difference. In the absence of racial delineations of individuals in societies with which Swedes have considerable contact (for example, much of the television content is U.S.-generated), Swedes might have used some other type of difference to create a social boundary as the composition of its society changed.

The Role of Resources in Creating Social Difference Another key issue that is likely at work in this example is a struggle over limited societal resources. For example, Runciman (1966) articulated how resource deprivation compared to another social group can lead to “fraternalistic relative deprivation,” which can heighten group boundaries through mechanisms like racial discrimination. Intergroup competition for limited resources can similarly lead to stronger social differences between groups (Blumer 1958). Ridgeway and colleagues’ status construction theory (see the Ridgeway and Nakagawa chapter) has focused on how hierarchically ordered social differences emerge from the unequal distribution of resources in groups of people who are mutually dependent on each other to achieve common goals. Ridgeway (1991) found that when a group difference has been identified and when there are systematic differences in the groups’ levels of material resources, status beliefs about these groups arise and spread in a population (Ridgeway and Balkwell 1997). Status beliefs are con-

sensually held beliefs that judge members of one group as more competent and influential than members of another group. Expectation states theorists have found that these implicit assumptions inform social interaction and give rise to further inequalities (Berger et al. 1974; Correll and Ridgeway 2003).

It does not take long for a resource difference between groups to translate into shared status beliefs. In experiments, after only two interactions with someone from another group, participants reported that “most people” would consider those with the higher-resource (and thus higher-status) personal response style to be more competent and powerful than those from the lower-resource group. This even held true when participants were told that they had the lower-status personal response style, meaning that they formed status beliefs that disadvantaged people like themselves (Ridgeway et al. 1998). Jost and Banaji (1994) attribute this willingness of lower-status people to uphold a status order that disadvantages them to “system-justification”—a motivation to keep social arrangements the way they are. It is not only resource differences that can lead to the formation of consensual status beliefs, but also other inequalities between groups such as differences in the potential for physical coercion, or in information or technologies (Ridgeway 2011).

Once shared status beliefs are established, they become inextricably linked to social differences and shape interaction. As soon as a person categorizes another as a member of a group about which a status belief is held, that person’s mind will be unconsciously primed with cultural stereotypes about the status distinction (Banaji and Hardin 1996; Blair and Banaji 1996). These stereotypes subsequently lead to performance expectations in interaction, affecting the person’s behavior, attitudes, and evaluations of others (Berger et al. 1974).

How Much Emerging Differences Matter in a Society Researchers have worked to identify the conditions under which societies will be more versus less unequal based on social differences. Evidence from modern-day hunter-gatherer societies

suggests that social inequalities are less severe in societies with “high-risk environments, ... strong mutual dependencies and lack of surplus to distribute to others” (Wiessner 2002, p. 236). Many larger societies in today’s world would not fit this description. Henrich and Boyd have created models suggesting that social stratification is greater in societies characterized by: “(1) greater surplus production, (2) more equitable divisions of the surplus among specialists, (3) greater cultural isolation among subpopulations within a society, and (4) more weight given to economic success by cultural learners” (2008, p. 715). These characteristics do describe many larger societies today, some of which experience high degrees of social inequality based on difference.

Linked to these categorizations of societies is the issue of the distribution of information and resources through social ties. Sociologists have long recognized that information and other resources flow through network ties (Cook, this volume; Emerson 1962; Granovetter 1974). Social capital, defined by Lin (2000) as the resources that a person has access to through his/her social network location, is constrained by group membership in segregated social networks. Wiessner’s (2002) and Henrich and Boyd’s (2008) work suggests that societies with more resources that flow through more segregated social ties will have greater social inequalities based on difference. When people in different social categories have highly segregated social networks, the lack of resource and information flow between groups can lead to inequality (Bourdieu 1977; Mark 1998; Wilson 1987). Social exchange theory (Cook and Rice 2006) adds a further insight, that one’s *structural location* in a social network and not just *belonging* to the network drives the resources available to a person. People who have a higher number of willing exchange partners will have greater power and access to resources within a social network, especially if those exchange partners have a lot of resources or if others have limited access to those partners (Emerson 1962; McFayden and Cannella 2004). So not all group members are equal when networks are segregated by social categories.

Social Differences and Inequalities: The Chicken and the Egg It can be hard to distinguish between socially meaningful *differences* and social *inequalities* (Wiessner 2002), especially because both can be linked to bias. But evidence has found that once the former arises, it often turns into the latter. When we classify people into different groups, we begin to think about those groups in an evaluative way and think of our own group as inherently “better” (Hogg 2003; Tajfel and Turner 1986). This bias will lead us to distribute resources more generously toward in-group members (Tajfel and Turner 1986), leading to differences in individuals’ available social capital (Adler and Kwon 2002). Thus, social identities have real consequences for the distribution of resources in society, which then feeds back into status differences between groups (see the Ridgeway and Nakagawa chapter).

Our discussion thus far has implicitly illustrated a bidirectional relationship between social difference and social inequality. It is easy to come up with examples in which *perceived differences lead to inequalities*. For example, especially in a society like the United States that does not provide paid parental leave, biological differences between the sexes in pregnancy, childbirth, and breastfeeding may create gender inequalities in the labor market and in the household division of labor. But frequently and perhaps more importantly, as Kimmel (2000) has noted, *inequalities lead to perceived differences*. This direction of the relationship between difference and inequality can be harder to think about, but several examples discussed in this chapter highlight how it works. First, the social inequalities of slavery in the United States gave rise to the use of race as a “primary frame” for categorizing people in our society. Second, a steep increase in immigration from non-European countries has been followed by the entry of racial categorization into the Swedish language. In both cases, existing social inequalities led people to create or redefine difference. This emphasizes the fluidity and contested nature of difference.

Why People Participate in Difference

The Legitimacy of Emerging Social Differences Who creates social differences? In the Swedish example, did immigrants of color who perceived a social boundary between themselves and European-origin immigrants begin to vocalize a racial distinction? Or did the dominant, ethnically Swedish group create this delineation to legitimate their advantages over less powerful groups? When status differences are created and widely accepted, there is general consensus about them among all categories. Even lower-status group members agree that people like them have less competence and power than people in the higher-status group (Berger et al. 1985; Ridgeway and Berger 1986; Ridgeway and Correll 2006). But emergent social hierarchies are often contested, both when they form and after they are entrenched (Phoenix 1998). In such a situation, the status order has not yet gained legitimacy (Johnson et al. 2006).

Why People Participate If differences are not essential but constructed by people, and if they are implicated in the unequal distribution of resources, why do people participate in perpetuating them? It is, perhaps, less difficult to think about the reasons why people in higher-status categories want to perpetuate difference. For those people, ideas about difference support their privileged access to resources and status. For dominants, a reduction in inequality results in an inaccurate perception that subordinated groups are receiving a disproportionate share of resources (Blumer 1958; Wellman 1997). Because people experience difference as a group position, adjustments to that position *feel* like a loss. The benefits of being connected to a higher-status group need not be material, but can also be psychological. Roediger (1991) describes the “wages of whiteness” as the psychological benefit of being included in a high status group. In lieu of increased income, working-class whites are paid the “wage” of feeling superior.

But why do subordinates, too, perpetuate difference? Because categories come to feel natural, people view category membership as inevitable,

normal, and right. And because category membership is the foundation of social legibility and interaction, people work to be seen as credible members of the social categories to which they are assigned. For example, a person cannot get the credentials required for social participation—such as a birth certificate or a driver’s license—without identifying themselves as a member of a gendered category—a woman or a man. Members of subordinated groups also participate in difference because they underestimate how much they are disadvantaged by it. Here we discuss four processes that encourage subordinate buy-in. Each minimizes perceptions of inequality.

First, the organization of networks and common processes of evaluation mask inequalities between groups. The clustering of categorically similar people into similar network positions suppresses cross-categorical evaluations of options and resources. Because people tend to compare themselves to similarly situated others, women typically compare themselves to other women, rather than to men, and are thus less likely to see their situation as unfair (Burt 1982; see chapter by Hegtvedt and Isom). In her analysis of emotion work and labor divisions in marriages, Hochschild (1989) found that husbands and wives use a mechanism she calls the “going rate” to evaluate the fairness of their arrangements. Because the average wife is expected to do more domestic labor than the average husband, husbands are more likely to be critical of their wives’ contributions even when wives do more than their share. Emotional practices support these processes. These emotion strategies make subordination more tolerable by enabling subordinates to not see, and not feel angry about, conditions of inequality (see Schwalbe et al. 2000, Fields et al. 2006, and Foy et al. in this volume for reviews). In Hochschild’s work (1989), above, wives do emotion work to uphold “family myths” in which they view their domestic division of labor as “equal” or “fair” even when it is not. Black college men engage in strategies of emotional restraint that allow them to *not* see everyday racism, and to view their white peers as innocent and friendly (Wilkins 2012a). These strategies make inequality more tolerable by masking it.

Second, sometimes members of subordinated groups buy into negative images of their group as well as their damaging connotations, and thus see inequality as justifiable (Schwalbe et al. 2000). Pyke (2010) notes that sociologists have shunned the concept of internalized racism out of fear that the subordinated will be held responsible for their own oppression, but, she argues, internalized racism (or sexism, etc.) is an outcome of the dynamic of hegemony in which dominant groups determine what is socially valuable, and reward performances that comply with its expectations. Internalized racism is not just experienced by the individual but is embedded in collective social practice. When Asian Americans call co-ethnics with heavy accents “FOBs” (Fresh off the Boat), they perpetuate dominant norms about assimilation and confirm stereotypes about Asian Americans (Pyke 2010). Schwalbe et al. (2000) describe these practices as “defensive othering.” Defensive othering occurs when people claim to be exceptions to group stereotypes, saying, essentially, there may be others who are like this but I am different. Defensive othering makes subordination more tolerable while sustaining its terms.

Third, subordinated groups are compensated for their lower status position through stereotypes assigning them areas of specialization (Ridgeway 2011): Women are more nurturing. Asians are better at math. Black people are better athletes. These areas of specialization allow subordinated groups to claim small areas of expertise. At the same time, however, these stereotypes mask the work members of these groups put into developing competency in these “specialties.” Women’s care work is poorly compensated because it is seen as unskilled (MacDonald 2010). Black athletes are not seen as hard working but as having an unfair advantage over white athletes (Azzarito and Harrison 2008).

Fourth, subordinates can gain additional compensation through “patriarchal (or “hegemonic”) bargains,” in which they manipulate the rules of difference in a way that purchases them some advantage. By agreeing to play by the contextually specific “rules of the game” that disadvantage women, individual women gain patronage or pro-

tection, which in turn enhances their life options (Kandiyoti 1988). For example, sorority women emphasize their heterosexual attractiveness (dye their hair blonde, diet, tan, etc.) in exchange for the status that heterosexual attention from powerful men confers (Hamilton 2007). Such bargains are not always available in the same ways, however. For example, not all women are able to achieve the “blonde” look preferred for participation in the Greek scene described above. Instead, upper middle-class women “trade” on their class privilege to secure the patronage of class privileged men. As Hurtado (1989) notes, while white women may be “seduced” into participating in patriarchy through romantic or familial relationships with powerful men, women of color are “rejected” by these same men. Women of color have not been offered the white women’s “bargain” of patriarchal protection, but instead have been further victimized by white men (Crenshaw 1991). But women of color, too, often support men’s patriarchal prerogatives as a means of resisting the racism experienced by men of color (Collins 2004).

Thus, people participate in difference for a range of reasons: because they are rewarded for doing so, because they misapprehend the implications of difference for inequality, and because they can manipulate the system to maximize their rewards. Not everyone is as well situated to benefit from these processes, and some people do not want the rewards on offer. As we discuss in the last section of the chapter, these complexities create openings for people to challenge categories of difference.

How Group Differences are Learned

Teaching New Social Differences An important question in understanding the spread of social differences and inequalities is how they are taught to people who are unfamiliar with these social boundaries. Children, whom we discuss in detail later, learn social difference in order to develop as culturally competent members of a society. But adults also learn new forms of difference through interactions with others. Status

construction theory suggests that once people have learned a status distinction between groups, they should “teach” it to others in new interactions. Ridgeway et al. (2009) found that after just two encounters with a new type of social distinction that was linked to differential influence in interaction, male study participants “taught” it to new partners by treating these new partners differentially according to their social status based on this new distinction. For men, this difference in treatment of a partner in a new interaction was comparable to their treatment of a partner who differed from them in terms of education, an established status characteristic in our society. So status beliefs can form and spread rapidly, with men leading the way in the spread of these beliefs.

What Happens When Someone Learns a Social Difference When a person is taught that there is a difference between groups, three types of category-based bias tend to result (Fiske 1998): *discrimination* (behavioral bias), *prejudice* (emotional bias), and *stereotyping* (cognitive bias). Bias can be further divided into conscious and unconscious forms. In contrast to the consideration of specific information about an individual, category-based responses introduce a greater likelihood of error in making judgments about that person (Fiske and Neuberg 1990). Stereotypes are fluid and influenced by context (Haslam et al. 1992). They are also shaped by social hierarchies: More powerful people are more likely to stereotype the people they interact with because they pay less close attention to other people (Fiske 1993). Thus, powerful people perpetuate stereotypes, which tend to advantage their own group.

Rather than being intentionally malicious, most intergroup bias is “automatic, unconscious, and unintentional” (Fiske 2002, p. 123). This means that even among people who do not consciously seek to distinguish among groups, automatic stereotypes from a lifetime of socialization in a culture that recognizes a social difference are likely to affect their behavior. Someone who seeks to be consciously “color-blind” can still display racist behavior because of the effects of

unconscious bias. Unconscious stereotypes can activate the amygdala, which is the brain’s center of anxiety and fear (Fiske 2002). The good news is that automatic bias can be overridden in specific circumstances by people who are aware of and motivated to overcome their bias. Being committed to treating people as unique individuals rather than members of a group can prevent the amygdala from reacting (Wheeler and Fiske 2005), suggesting that people who are sufficiently motivated can exercise considerable control over their unconscious biases. However, it is also important to acknowledge the real consequences of conscious, extreme bias. This kind of “hot” bias, which tends to target more than one outgroup at a time, is linked to harmful aggression (Fiske 2002).

Doing Difference: How We Construct Difference at the Individual and Interpersonal Levels

In this section, we articulate processes through which people become different. Although formal structures can encode inequalities and ensure their survival, everyday social psychological processes also perpetuate differences in societies. We first examine the social processes that make hierarchical categories of difference seem natural, normal, and inevitable, and then we examine how people come to see themselves as members of these categories. We look at the socialization of children into categories of children, the production and reproduction of categorical difference in everyday interactions, and the centrality of identities in anchoring our connection to categories of difference.

Ideologies support the idea that difference is natural. Religion played a central role in naturalizing difference throughout the mid-eighteenth century and retains cultural power in some spaces, but in the United States, biology has emerged as an important means of justifying difference (Lancaster 2003; Lorber 1994). Indeed, science has constructed contemporary categories of difference. The fields of phrenology and sociobiology created differences of race, sex, sexuality,

and class (e.g., Somerville 2000). Biology divides groups into clear, non-overlapping categories, and also interprets, explains, justifies, and enforces the content of those categories. Biology continues to sustain and justify explanations for gender and sexuality (Schilt 2011). For example, contemporary scientific endeavors to identify biological differences between heterosexuals and homosexuals—such as the claim that lesbians might have different finger length ratios than heterosexual women (Williams et al. 2000)—follow a similar logic of naturalization through biology.

Racial difference works differently. Today, Americans use biology to explain racial difference but culture to explain racial inequality. Science and scientific racism has been used to justify and explain both racial difference and racial inequality. For example, phrenology “discovered” that Black people had smaller brains and larger genitals, and thus were naturally suited for low status work, violent and criminally inclined, and unable to control their sexuality. However, after the Civil Rights movement, biological arguments for racial *inequality* lost favor, replaced by cultural justifications that blamed persistent African-American disadvantage on their “pathological” behavior. Cultural explanations hold Black (and Latino/a) people, in particular, responsible for their continued disadvantage, contending that persistent racial inequalities are best explained through cultural differences between groups. Cultural explanations contend that Blacks (and sometimes, economically disadvantaged Latinos) have failed to get ahead because of their “pathological” cultural behavior, including sexual irresponsibility, “emasculating” Black women, and laziness. The presumed explanatory power of culture makes sense in a society in which members of the dominant group tend to assume that racial obstacles to progress have been replaced by a “laissez-faire” market that rewards merit (Bobo et al. 1997; Steinberg 2011). Different from biology, cultural explanations coexist with expressed commitment to equality, but they also portray inequality as inevitable. (It is worth noting, however, the resurgence of biological models of racial difference, especially via such presumably neutral biomedical projects as the map-

ping of the human genome and the heightened attention to gene-environment interaction even among sociologists).

Thus, religion, biology and culture all offer explanations for social differences that support naturalization. Naturalization, then, is not rooted in a single ideology but is instead supported by a range of shifting, sometimes overlapping ideologies. Moreover, naturalization is compatible with diverse political orientations. It can coexist with both overt racism and a commitment to racial equality; with overt sexism and with radical feminist claims that women make unique moral contributions; with the pathologization of homosexuality as a mental disorder, and with LGBT claims to equal treatment on the grounds that, in pop superstar Lady Gaga’s culturally powerful words, homosexuals were “born this way.” Because naturalization coexists with, and is supported by, a range of moral and political positions, it is a particularly pernicious component in the perpetuation of difference.

In contrast to naturalized ideas of difference, the notion that difference is socially constructed—that categories of difference are not essential but are created out of macro and micro processes—now dominates academic understandings of core forms of difference like gender and race. However, these subfields have not equally elaborated the mechanisms through which difference is perpetuated at the individual and interpersonal levels. Perhaps owing to the influence of queer theory, the most scholarship has been developed in the area of gender, with some growing attention to the role of membership in intersecting categories in shaping these processes (see the Howard and Renfrow chapter). Social psychological models of the construction of race and class, in contrast, are less well developed. Indeed, it is likely that these categories of difference do not always work in the same ways. Relationships of intimacy and kinship, for example, bring women and men into close, constant contact, while race and class differentiation have been abetted by patterns of segregation in which people from different race and class poles seldom interact. Nonetheless, we seek here to bridge the different foci, languages, and ways of

thinking in these related subfields to provide a comprehensive framework for scholars interested in understanding how difference is perpetuated in everyday life.

Doing Difference by Constructing Difference as Natural

Constructing Naturalized Difference Social scientists argue that our naturalized beliefs about difference are socially constructed. Popular beliefs attribute differences of gender, race, and sexuality to biology—chromosomes, hormones, reproductive systems, musculature—and sometimes to some ambiguous “natural” essence assumed to be associated with different categories of people. But while social scientists recognize that bodies are different in some ways, those differences do not adequately explain the level of differentiation or inequality in society (Bem 1993; Connell 1995; Lorber 1994). Not only are biological differences within categories greater than differences between them (Epstein 1990; Gould 1996; Gossett 1997; Lorber 1994), but “natural” differences are often human-made. In the United States, the social custom and legal practice of “hypodescent” assigned children of mixed-African heritage to the subordinated racial group, creating them as “colored” (Lopez 1996). Doctors create sex categories by assigning babies born with ambiguous genitalia to one category or another (Kessler 1998). Some contemporary parents (and their doctor co-conspirators) attempt to delay the onset of early puberty in their daughters by giving them supplements aimed at suppressing hormones. By manipulating their daughters’ biology, they seek to create “normal” girls (Weil 2012). Thus, people actively manipulate biology and the meaning of biology in order to create the perception of unambiguous difference. They explain away these interventions by claiming to be fixing “mistakes.” Bodies that violate categorical rules are labeled unnatural and rendered “natural” through surgery or legal classification. To be “natural,” then, is to clearly fit existing categories of difference.

Naturalization Schemas Naturalization creates cultural schemas—patterned ways of viewing the social world that organize our perceptions of social life (Sewell 1992). Cultural schemas of naturalization focus attention on information that confirms our ideas about difference, and ignore information that does not. People use social signifiers to make assumptions about the bodies underneath (Garfinkel 1967). For example, people use facial hair as a kind of “cultural genital” to categorize a person as male regardless of conflicting or ambiguous bodies (such as breasts or large hips) (Dozier 2005; Kessler and McKenna 1978). Thus, people use what Sacks (1972) calls the “if-can” rule—“if people *can be seen* as members of relevant categories, *then categorize them that way*” (West and Zimmerman 1987, p. 133)—to confirm the idea that people belong in one category or another.

Different types of social categorization can influence each other, however, complicating processes of categorization. For example, Freeman et al. (2011) found that visible markers of socioeconomic status influenced the categorizations of people into racial groups. People wearing low-status attire were more likely to be categorized as Black, and those wearing high-status clothing were more often identified as white. The influence of these socioeconomic markers on racial identification was particularly great when a person’s facial appearance made their race ambiguous. Thus, category assignments often rely on biographical or contextual details as well as bodies. Saperstein and Penner (2010) found that people who had been incarcerated in the United States were more likely to identify as Black and be perceived as Black and less likely to identify as or be perceived as white, regardless of their racial categorization in the past. When we place people into social categories, “categorization involves the match between the object in need of categorization and a stored ‘image’” representing that category (Richeson and Trawalter 2005, p. 518). Because most Americans have an unconscious bias, or “stored image,” associating Black race with badness (Burston et al. 1995), a person they know to be a convicted criminal will seem like a better match for the Black category during

their social categorization process (Saperstein and Penner 2010).

We give cognitive attention to or “see” the differences *between* categories rather than the differences within them, even though differences *within* sex category are much more significant than differences *between* them (Fausto-Sterling 2000; Lorber 1994; Messner 2000). For example, many parents draw attention to small differences in the behaviors of girls and boys and attribute them to gender. They do not see or emphasize cross-gender similarities in children’s behavior (Messner 1992). Moreover, adults *interpret* the same behavior differently, depending on how they categorize the child. Teachers interpret (and punish) classroom behavior differently depending on the race of the child; both black and white adults interpret white boys who act out (by talking out of turn or chewing gum in class) as “boys being boys,” but interpret Black boys who engage in the same behavior as “willfully bad” (Ferguson 2000). Psychologists have documented the power of these confirmation biases in shaping responses to information; people filter information in such a way that it confirms their understanding of the world, ignoring discrepant information (Nickerson 1998).

Structural Factors Facilitating Naturalization The organization of space and bodies contributes to these ways of seeing. Workplaces in which (mostly) women occupy lower-status jobs and (mostly) men occupy higher-status jobs reinforce the status belief that men are more competent than women (Acker 1990). The gender segregation of bathrooms naturalizes the idea that women’s and men’s bodies are fundamentally different. Lining up children by gender teaches children (and teachers) that gender is a salient form of categorization (Thorne 1993). In ostensibly integrated schools, “internal segregation” via race and class tracking of students into separate, hierarchically organized classrooms, perpetuates the association of Blacks and Latinas/os with academic failure and whites and Asians with academic success (Bettie 2003; Staiger 2004; Tyson 2011). As these examples show, these processes do not just enable us to “see”

difference but also link difference to hierarchical status and worth.

Visibility and Invisibility Some practices naturalize by making alternatives invisible. Mothers naturalize heterosexuality for their children by failing to show them examples of same-gender romance, sustaining the invisibility of homosexuality (Martin 2009). Schools naturalize heterosexuality through rituals such as prom king and queen (Pascoe 2007) or father-daughter/mother-son (but never father-son) dances. Some practices, however, naturalize by marking subordinate categories, leaving dominant categories *unmarked*. In these cases, the visibility of the subordinate category reinforces its difference, sustaining the perception that the dominant category is *normal*. For example, well-meaning multicultural events in which schools “celebrate” non-white (or, sometimes, white ethnic) cultural heritages, but not white American ones, render whiteness “normal” by leaving it un-marked and invisible (Perry 2002). In this case, invisibility sustains categorical dominance. Unmarked categories are subject to less social scrutiny. Members of unmarked groups have greater latitude in their behavior, which is assumed to be either individual or a generic characteristic of humanity, rather than signifying something specific about the group (Brekhus 1998). Thus, white people do not worry that their bad behavior will be interpreted as confirmation that all white people are bad. At the same time, individual achievement, not whiteness, is used to explain their success.

Processes of visibility and invisibility do not work the same way for each category of difference. We repetitively name gender categories, referring to people as boys and girls, men and women, and referring to items and behaviors as “girl” or “boy” toys or colors or activities. In the United States, in contrast, we avoid naming class, or name it implicitly. People are told to act like a lady or a man, but not, generally, to act like a rich person; instead, they learn that things are tasteless or tacky, classy or cheap. Moreover, in contemporary American society, class distinctions are often “hidden” under racial distinctions: Black is equated with poor, white is equated with

wealth (or the middle class), and so forth (Ortner 1998).

Sustaining Naturalization Ideologies, cultural schemas, spatial and institutional organization, and rituals all structure whom we encounter, how we view them when we encounter them, and how we explain the differences we perceive, perpetuating our view of difference as essential and innate. Through naturalization, humans come to understand differences to be normal, immutable, and reasonable—and often, just—explanations for social inequality. By making difference moral, processes of naturalization make it more difficult for people to fight for change; change becomes associated with perversion and immorality. Naturalization conveys the idea that things have *always been like this*, and should therefore be sustained. Naturalization also provides a powerful incentive for people to participate in difference. If categories of difference are naturalized, then failing to conform to them renders a person not only unnatural or abnormal but also possibly culturally unintelligible.

Doing Difference in Interpersonal Interaction

Theories of Doing Difference in Interaction We have discussed how people learn social differences and how they are taught to think about them as natural. But difference is more than that: Once people have learned differences, they actively construct them in social interaction. Feminist and queer theorists, who have led the way in thinking about interactional constructions of social difference, have critiqued child socialization and sex role models as too static. They argue that gender (and other categories of difference) are constituted by, and constitutive of, power, and that categories of difference are dynamic and fluid, changing across time, space, and situation. Not only are there multiple ways to be a woman or a man (and so forth), but socially competent people need to adjust their performances to accommodate shifting contexts. These critiques have pushed scholars to conceptualize difference as

both a *performance* and an *ongoing* construction, one achieved in interaction. In these formulations, people do not just learn how to be women or men, Black or white, rich or poor, but actively produce and reproduce these categories in everyday life. In this sense, difference is something people *do*, rather than something they *are* (West and Fenstermaker 1993; West and Zimmerman 1995). Today, many gender scholars have moved toward an integrative, multilevel theoretical model in which difference is perpetuated through: (1) *individual* processes in which people develop gendered, raced, and classed selves; (2) *interactive* processes in which people negotiate emergent and flexible categorical expectations, and (3) *institutional* processes, which allocate resources and meaning in particular spaces (Connell 2002; England and Browne 1992; Lorber 1994; Messner 2000; Risman 2004).

Individual Processes A rich body of literature has documented the processes through which adults, other children, and the media socialize children into cultural understandings of difference, which subsequently become bases for both identities and unconscious biases (Mortimer and McLaughlin, this volume). Psychologists Maccoby and Jacklin (1974) identify three processes through which children learn to be girls or boys: *imitation*, *praise and discouragement*, and *self-socialization*. From birth (or earlier, with the increasing availability of information on fetal sex), parents treat girls and boys differently, dressing them differently, buying them different toys, encouraging different activities, and interacting with them differently (Thorne 1993). These cues prompt children to behave in ways that align with category membership, while toys and clothing enable and suppress different cognitive and embodied habits. For example, skirts (especially combined with the exhortation to be modest) teach girls to move in more economical ways and to be constantly aware of the audience's gaze. Preschools gender children's bodies through a "hidden curriculum" which teaches girls and boys to use their bodies differently. Admonished for using loud voices or talking out of turn, girls become quieter and more deferential

(Martin 1998). By creating bodies that move and act differently, these practices make adult gendered bodies seem natural (Kroska, this volume).

Lareau (2011) demonstrates how parents transmit social class to their children. For example, by coaching their children to advocate for themselves with adults, upper middle-class parents impart an upper middle-class way of being in the world to their children. Their children, in turn, convey their class location through their sense of entitlement (Milkie et al., this volume). Race scholars have documented the ways adults teach Black children the restraint and deference required of Black adults in interactions with whites (Ferguson 2000; Froyum 2010; Tyson 2003), although they have focused less on the ways children learn to embody these differences. Thus, socialization does not just happen in homes but in schools and other institutions.

Children do not just passively receive messages about difference, however. Instead, children use adult messages about difference as cultural building blocks with which they construct and reconstruct their own social realities. Children, as young as preschool age, manipulate gender, race, and class categories, using them to negotiate and give meaning to their social worlds (Aydt and Corsaro 2003; Eder et al. 1997; Ferguson 2000; Maccoby 1988; Thorne 1993; Van Ausdale and Feagin 1996). Peer cultures create spaces in which children develop their own social categories and hierarchies independent of adult efforts at socialization (Adler et al. 1992). By enforcing gender and other categorical difference in variable ways, children create novel ways to do difference (Aydt and Corsaro 2003). Children's agency in negotiating these categories points to the limitations of pure socialization as explanations for the persistence of difference.

Interaction Children do not just internalize role expectations. They also learn to create identities in interaction. Part of what children learn is how to categorize themselves and others by associating particular identities with different categories.

Through repeated embodied interactions, people come to experience themselves as members of categories—as boys or girls, for example (Kros-

ka, this volume). This happens not just through the acquisition of specific embodied habits but also through naming and evaluating those habits. As people and their behaviors are described as “girls” and “boys,” “girly” or “sissy,” told to “man up” or that “big boys” don’t cry, they associate bodies and performances with categories of difference. These processes also teach them that categorical membership requires both confirmation and repudiation: that is, one becomes a boy by both performing masculinity and rejecting femininity (Butler 1993). Butler (1990) argues that what this repetition creates is the *illusion* of gender as a stable dichotomous category. In saying, “he’s all boy,” people ascribe gender to a child, but they also *perpetuate* gender itself: the idea that there is something that can be accurately described as “all boy” and that people can identify what it is. The illusion of gender, in turn, perpetuates the notion that biological sex (female and male) itself corresponds with real and meaningful differences (Lorber 1994). This process both commits people to participating in difference, and further naturalizes it.

Habitus Bourdieu’s (1984) concept of *habitus* provides a related understanding of how people come to embody social class in such a way that it feels, appears, and *becomes* real. *Habitus* refers to the sedimented habits of movement, sensibilities, dispositions, and taste that correspond with social class location. Because “practical mastery operates beneath the level of consciousness and discourse” (Wacquant 2009, p. 142), social class *habitus* feels innate. As people grow up in a particular class milieu, everyday experiences foster a way of being in the world that comes to feel natural and taken-for-granted, and is consequently difficult to change. These processes elide the origins of habits or cultural schemas, attributing them instead to essential disposition—his good (or bad) taste, her educational aptitude (or inaptitude).

Accountability in Performances of Difference It is tempting to focus only on the embodiment and performance of difference, to see how a boy learns to take up space, and to interpret that as his

successful internalization and creation of a masculine self. But for Butler (1990), gender is discursive: it is the name given to the performance. For West and Zimmerman (1987) and West and Fenstermaker (1995), too, difference itself is an “emergent feature of social situations” (1987, p. 126). Difference does not precede interaction but instead is created as interactions are named and evaluated. They argue that because categories of difference like gender, race, and class are “omnirelevant,” we cannot avoid categorical expectations. Instead, we are compelled to participate because others hold us accountable to them. *Accountability* refers to the fact that our behavior is always subject to evaluation by others, who ask (often implicitly): is this how a man (or a woman and so forth) should behave under these circumstances? Accountability does not mean that people always conform to category expectations, but rather that they are always “at risk” of such assessment. Thus, if a person is violating categorical expectations, s/he will still be evaluated through the lens of existing social categories. To critique a behavior for not being ladylike is not to suggest that a social actor is *not* in the category woman but rather to perpetuate ideas about appropriate gendered behavior; thus, the assessment of even categorically discrepant behavior *perpetuates* difference (Schwalbe and Shay, this volume).

Pascoe’s (2007) ethnography of high school boys illustrates this process. Pascoe shows how boys “do” masculinity by holding each other accountable to behavior that violates masculine expectations. White boys use the label “fag” and Black boys use the label “white” to similarly police the boundaries of appropriate masculine behavior. Importantly, the recipients of these labels do not adopt identities as “fags” or “white.” Instead, the “abject” label compels them to bring their behavior into line with gendered expectations, while it also constitutes the meaning of white and Black masculine behavior.

Institutions Processes of evaluation also reinforce categorical differences by differentially allocating resources. For example, institutions evaluate and differentially reward class perfor-

mances. Lareau (2003) argues that educators perceive children with upper middle-class cultural capital as intelligent, and reinforce their educational advantages through teacher attention and support, and by placing them on college preparatory educational tracks. The same process of assessment compounds the disadvantages of lower class children, whose habitus is perceived as a sign of inferior educational aptitude and parental apathy. In her follow up a decade later, Lareau (2011) finds that upper middle class children are much more educationally and professionally successful. Thus, the performance of difference works together with the assessment of difference to reproduce inequalities.

Flexibility in Doing Difference Interactionist theories account for both stability and change in categories of difference. Performances of difference are not isolated but are patterned, occurring repeatedly across time and space. The repetition of similar performative acts and iterations gives rise to durable structures of difference, contributing to the impression that categories of difference are natural and normal. Yet, the flexibility and potential for novelty built into these interactions means that change can, and does, happen, a point we take up in the next section. When people encounter new conditions, meanings, or groups of people, they can and do shift their performances of difference. In Pascoe’s study, high school theater offered a space in which boys could do masculinity in more flexible ways. Masculinities scholars emphasize that there are not different *kinds* of men, but rather that masculinity is constituted differently in different spaces (Schrock and Schwalbe 2009). When people encounter new conditions and meanings, they may draw on different strategies of action. The theatre example emphasizes the context-specificity of the interactional processes that perpetuate difference.

Structural and Cultural Constraints on Doing Difference Context is not the only thing that matters. The *kind* of difference matters too. Race scholars argue that theories that emphasize agency underestimate both the structural condi-

tions that support racial inequality, and constraint in the negotiation of racial difference (Andersen 2005; Collins et al. 1995; Thorne 1995). Performances of categorical differences are limited by cultural ideas about what members of categories are like (Bettie 2003). Collins (2004) argues that an increasingly global media circulates an increasingly narrow set of “controlling images” about Black men and women. Black college men are expected to conform to the controlling image of the “thug” despite their discomfort with it (Ford 2011). The power of this image limits their ability to create an alternative Black masculinity. Vasquez (2010) finds that both gender and phenotype condition the volition of racial classification among Mexican-Americans: In her study, men and darker-skinned people were more strongly racialized than women (and in different ways). Thus, the ways in which people can “do” difference are variously constrained by interactive expectations.

Race scholars identify the centrality of “racial commonsense” in organizing perceptions and accounts of people’s motivations and actions. Garfinkel (1956, p. 185) defines commonsense knowledge as “socially sanctioned grounds of inference and action that people use in everyday life, and which they assume that other members of the group use in the same way.” In keeping with Garfinkel’s definition, racial commonsense refers to broad understandings about race that are so taken for granted as to be invisible, and thus unquestioned, by members of society. Critical race scholars note that racial commonsense has been used historically to adjudicate claims to category membership in ways that allow whites to hoard access to rights and resources. Courts use a number of criteria to apply racial commonsense, including phenotype, associations (who the litigant spends time with), and comportment. Lower court, and some Supreme Court, decisions have been based on the “common sense” that race is something “‘any white man’ should know when he saw it”. Thus, racial commonsense creates racial categories by interpreting performances as signs of race. Racial commonsense also provides the interpretive foundation for accounting for social action, in

which people are assumed to have acted in particular ways because they are Black or white or Mexican or Asian. People also use racial commonsense to “categorize the categorizer” (Sacks 1995); people put others into racial categories to determine their “perspective” in interaction. Thus, even if race is irrelevant to a person’s motivations for action, *others* will assume racial motivations and use race to interpret actions or interactions. This process increases the difficulty of challenging the logic of racial categorization (Whitehead 2009).

Summary In sum, this varied literature shows how people become different by learning to embody categorical difference, and to discern and name particular characteristics as signs of difference. These processes do not just happen in childhood, but are repetitive, both recurring and shifting across contexts. Because performances of difference are interactive, they are contingent on outsiders’ evaluations. Outsiders adjudicate categorical performances, assign different meaning and resources to different performances, and impose more stringent limits on performative options for some kinds of difference. These processes, in turn, harness particular bodies to categories of difference. In the next section, we examine how identities and identity work further commit people to categorical differences.

Constructing Difference Through Identities

Perceiving Socially Constructed Difference as Reality Gender and other forms of difference may be socially constructed, but they are powerful illusions. Among the most powerful forms of resistance to constructionist arguments is the claim that people know gender (or race or another category of difference) is *real* because they experience it as such. People participate in categories of difference because those categories seem natural, normal, or “right.” Category membership takes on emotional salience, and feels *real*. Categories of difference, especially naturalized ones, anchor identities and provide sources of meaning

and community. Modern American understandings of identity as “real,” coherent, and unchanging (Irvine 1999; Mason-Schrock 1996) stabilize categories of difference that are seen as central to who we are. These identities provide guidance to people as they map out courses of action, give meaning to experience and feelings, and make connections with other people. Moreover, as Lacy (2007) argues, difference can be a source of pleasure. In her ethnography of the Black upper middle class, participants sought connections with co-ethnics, in part, because they enjoyed being Black.

Marking Boundaries People create identities through processes of social connection and disconnection. People actively mark difference by drawing *symbolic boundaries* to distinguish between people like us and people like them. Symbolic boundaries are “conceptual distinctions made by social actors...that separate people into groups and generate feelings of similarity and group membership” (Lamont and Molnar 2000, p. 28). Boundary work is the process of defining the content and the people on both sides of those boundaries. Thus, people claim identities not just by confirming category membership but also by repudiating the *other* category. Category content is defined in explicit and implicit opposition to other categories: to be a man is to not be a woman, to be middle class is to not be poor, and so forth. Boys reject girls and femininity (Pascoe 2007). Upper middle class Blacks reject behaviors associated with the “ghetto” (Lacy 2007). Boundaries demarcate both category membership—*who* is like us—and category meaning—*what* people like us are like, and are thus a central means of creating and cementing difference. For example, Barth (1969) showed how processes of boundary marking created ethnic groups out of people who shared interests but had disparate practices, languages, and histories. By marking and rejecting the outside, people construct themselves as a group. Nagel (2003) argues that gendered sexuality is central to ethnic boundary marking processes: Rules about with whom group members can be intimate communicate group boundaries, while claims about sexual comportment distin-

guish groups and position them hierarchically (Das Gupta 1997; Elliott 2010; Le Espiritu 2001; Wilkins 2004).

Constraints on Identities Interactionist studies of identity construction have emphasized people’s agency in creating identities more than the constraints they experience. People *can* create new identities, but several features of identities contribute to the illusion of categorical consistency. First, people typically construct autobiographical accounts that emphasize identity continuity rather than change. For example, in support groups, transsexuals become skilled at aligning their biographies to conform to notions of natural difference: As they participate in these groups, transsexuals learn to tell stories that emphasize a continuous (and thus presumably essential) sense of gender dis-ease. Stories about childhoods spent participating in cross-gender behavior naturalize and legitimize the desire to transition across sex (or gender) categories as adults. This storytelling not only naturalizes categorical membership to outsiders, but it also does to the people telling the stories about themselves (Mason-Schrock 1996).

Second, people often draw on existing templates for ideas about authenticity. Wilkins (2012b) shows how Black college women use controlling images to create collective gendered racial identities in the face of large differences in background, experiences, and understandings about Blackness. By learning and telling a shared story about interracial relationships, Black college women claim and develop shared dispositions and interests. The stories they tell confirm the cultural image of Black women as strong and outspoken, even when many women are uncomfortable with speaking out or find the image burdensome. This example illustrates how identity processes can perpetuate difference: in the absence of both diverse models of Black womanhood and shared experiences, college women rely on a controlling image as a template for fashioning “authentic” gender and race identities. Because the controlling image of the strong Black woman is double-edged—a source of pride and a source of stigma—it is perhaps a more viable template for authenticity than other, more unam-

biguously negative images might have been. As women tell shared stories, they align their interests with other Black women, drawing boundaries against both Black men and white women. People embrace these images even when they disadvantage them. For many Black women, the idea that Black women *should* be strong encourages them to shoulder unbearable levels of responsibility, while preventing them from accessing mental health support despite high rates of depression (Beauboeuf-Lafontant 2009).

Third, to achieve the respect and dignity that comes with being seen as “real” members of social categories, people participate in behaviors that confirm stereotypes and disadvantage them. Schrock and Schwalbe (2009) describe exaggerated performances of masculinity by race or class disadvantaged men as “compensatory manhood acts.” By emphasizing “masculine” traits of aggression, emotional invulnerability, or promiscuity, race and class disadvantaged men compensate for their exclusion from more socially valued masculine resources (such as economic success). In turn, however, they reinforce their class difference by participating in behaviors at odds with middle class categorization. Similarly, members of subordinated groups may develop alternative “badges of dignity”—criteria for success that they can meet (Bettie 2003; Sennett and Cobb 1972). By revaluing marks of difference, these processes reinforce difference as a source of meaning and identity.

Fourth, boundary marking often polices non-conformity, enforcing compliance to categorical expectations. But boundary work does not need to enforce norms to sustain categories. Instead, the flexibility of the boundary work process allows categories to absorb challenges without collapsing. Hennen (2008) examines the way subcultures of gay men align themselves with masculinity despite their violation of one of its central tenets: heterosexuality. For example, the “bear” subculture redefines the boundaries between masculinity and femininity, defining their own identities as masculine by emphasizing their hairy bodies, and distinguishing them from the feminine through disdain for effeminate gay men. Rather than challenging the dominance of

masculinity, these gay men do boundary work to sustain their connection to masculine power.

Thus, identity processes imbue difference with meaning, give people a felt-connection to difference, and reconfigure difference to make it fit more comfortably. People do not just embrace their own identities, they also distinguish themselves from other identities. Boundaries draw and enforce distinctions between groups, policing difference by compelling people to disassociate from the abject category. Identity work allows people to reconfigure individual or group identities, but the emphasis on authenticity often stabilizes categorical difference. Moreover, not all people have the same latitude in creating new identities. In the next section, we turn attention to the *destabilization* of difference, examining individual and group challenges to categories of difference.

Transcending Difference

Difference is remarkably stable, and yet change does happen. A quick reading of history confirms that the meaning and experience of gender, race, and sexuality are significantly different than they were 200, 100, 40, or even 20 years ago. In part, these changes are due to social movements, as well as to structural or technological developments, such as the birth control pill, which made possible the separation of reproduction from sexual intercourse, opening up new heterosexual possibilities for women. But these factors do not, alone, explain how meaning changes in everyday life for everyday people. In this section, we examine some of the ways people attempt to transcend difference by challenging the meaning or boundaries of social categorization.

As noted above, the performative dimensions of difference itself contain the seeds of transformation. Because people “do” difference in each interaction, drawing on available cultural resources, interactions have the possibility of change. Indeed, difference contains fractures and instabilities that foment resistance and change, perhaps especially for people in subordinated categories. While people are adept at making

subordination more comfortable, these strategies do not always work. Moreover, even for people in dominant groups, category expectations can be stifling, unrewarding, or at odds with lived experience, pushing people to work toward transcending categories or expanding the meaning of category membership (Wilkins 2008). Intersectionality—the experience of overlapping categories of difference—creates experiences and contradictions that lead people to experience categories of difference in inconsistent ways, and may possibly fracture their commitment to some categories of difference. People who occupy “borderlands” may experience cultural, social, or spatial marginalization that pushes them to resist categories of difference, or to see these categories differently (Anzaldúa 1999). And as people encounter new conditions, meanings, and kinds of people, their ideas about difference may change or expand (e.g., Rosenfeld 2009).

People and groups challenge difference in a number of ways. Some cross categories or resist their particular categorization. Others challenge the meaning of difference, either expanding the expectations associated with a category and/or attempting to reshuffle a category’s location in moral or social hierarchies. Still others attempt to burst apart categories altogether, sometimes by creating new categories that challenge the boundaries of existing categories of difference. We exemplify each process below, attending especially to the conditions and cultural resources associated with efforts to transcend difference.

Crossing Categories

Groups Crossing Categories History provides a number of examples of people and groups who have challenged their location in categories of racial difference. European-descent Jews, Irish Americans, and the Mississippi Chinese (Loewen 1971; Roediger 1991; Saks 1999) all transformed their racial categorization by making claims to whiteness. For both the Chinese and the Irish, transcending racial categorization entailed aligning themselves with whites and distancing themselves from Blacks. By adopting

compartment associated with (even if not always practiced by) white people, these groups made bids for their right to be included in the dominant group. For example, the Mississippi Chinese created social ties with white society by using white first names for their children. Both groups also aligned themselves socially with whites by eschewing intimacy—sexual, familial, and often economic—with Blacks, and ostracizing group members who maintained intimate ties with Black people. The Chinese strategy was somewhat different from the Irish, because the Chinese carved out a distinct space for themselves as a third racial category in the biracial society of the Mississippi Delta, while the Irish were eventually folded into the white group. While Chinese groceries often served the local Black population, the Irish worked actively to suppress Black labor participation, joining the Democratic Party in an effort to carve out an economic niche for themselves in a class stratified labor market (Ignatiev 1995). Thus, the Irish became white by distancing themselves from the dire poverty associated with Blacks. Similarly, Saks (1999) argues that Jewish entrance into the middle class, largely as recipients of GI Bill benefits, facilitated their transition into the racially dominant category. In these cases, class resources enabled racial transformation.

Individuals Crossing Categories Individuals transcend categories as well. Light-skinned African-Americans have sometimes “passed” as white in an effort gain the privileges of whiteness. Poor and working class people occasionally cross into the middle class. In both cases, people who cross categories give up prior social ties and habits; category crossing thus comes with significant personal costs (e.g., Kaufman 2003). Winddance Twine (1997) finds that suburban African-descent girls raised by white mothers transcend their categorization as Black by achieving “race-neutral” identities. For these girls, class again abets race-neutrality. The girls were able to see themselves, and be seen, as racially neutral because they have similar consumption practices as their suburban peers. These girls, however, were not able to sustain race neutral-

ity during adolescence, when they were rejected as possible heterosexual partners by the white boys in their communities. The transition to college further marked them as Black. In college, they chose Black boyfriends to align themselves with Blacks. Wilkins (2012b) finds that monoracial middle class suburban Black girls similarly experience race-neutral identities in high school; these identities are facilitated by participation in middle class activities such as violin and tennis, and by close friendships with white girls. Like the women in Winddance Twine's study, they became marked as Black in college, primarily because of white students' practices of exclusion and overt racism.

Limits on Crossing Categories These different examples underscore the importance of class and sexuality in facilitating efforts to transcend racial categories. They also illustrate the ways phenotype can limit efforts to choose and remake categorization. As we argued earlier, performances of difference are constrained by others' expectations about how people should behave. Both category insiders and category outsiders can enforce these expectations. In the example above, white students limited Black women's identity options, but Black people can also police Black authenticity. Nicknames like "oreo" and "whitewashed" communicate perceptions that Black people should behave in particular sorts of ways. Both class and sexuality are again at stake in examples like these. Aimed often at middle class or class-mobile Blacks, or at Black people who are involved in romantic relationships with whites, this kind of boundary work sustains the "isomorphism" of race and class (Ortner 1998).

These examples involve people or groups who attempt to move "up" the racial hierarchy, challenging their lower categorization. Puerto Rican Wannabes, young white women who adopt elements of hip hop culture, provide an example of people who attempt to cross *out* of whiteness, moving into a more socially devalued racial category. While it is easy to understand why people might want to cross into a more valued category—to access more status and resources—it is often difficult to understand why people seek

to move into a less valued category. Indeed, for many of their peers, Wannabes raise just these sorts of questions (Wilkins 2004, 2008). People are often motivated to cross categories when they experience their existing categorization as unrewarding or constraining. In this way, Puerto Rican Wannabes are not so different from the Mississippi Chinese. Both groups wanted to rid themselves of constraints associated with their current categorization. For the Chinese, being classified with Black people had social and economic costs. For the Wannabes, white girlhood entails limiting emotional and sexual expectations. They imagine that Puerto Rican femininity, in contrast, opens up new behavioral possibilities. The case of the Wannabes illustrates that people are not always motivated to transcend categories by conventional forms of status.

The experiences of transmen and transwomen provide further evidence of the different ways outsiders interpret efforts to transcend high-and-low-status categories. Transmen often experience successful integration into workplaces while transwomen experience marginalization (Schilt 2011). While the desire to access masculine privilege makes sense to people, the desire to become a woman (the devalued category) does not. Hence, people are more intolerant of transwomen. Similarly, parents police the boundaries of masculinity much more than femininity, indulging daughters' desires to be tomboys but resisting boys' interest in practices associated with femininity (Kane 2006). Schilt (2011) argues that the specific institutional logic of the workplace, which values masculinity, facilitates the acceptance of transmen. Transmen do not fare as well in other spaces. Thus, the ability to transcend categories is not only conditioned by the meanings attached to those categories but also by the interaction of those meanings with context.

Transforming Meaning

A second, perhaps more common, way that people attempt to transcend difference is by transforming the meaning attached to their category. After slavery, African American organizations,

such as the Black Baptist Church, worked tirelessly to challenge the association of Blackness with disrepute. Just as groups like the Mississippi Chinese challenged their racial classification by adopting white standards, so too did African Americans claim respectability by aligning their comportment with white values. Black respectability was not aimed at challenging racial categorization but at transforming its meaning and therefore qualifying Blacks for better treatment (Higginbotham 1993; White 2001). African American strategies of respectability have been less successful, however, than the efforts of other groups to align themselves with whites; controlling images of Black men and women continue to mark them as racially other (Collins 1991, 2004).

Gendered Strategies for Transforming Meaning Ethnic/racial communities' efforts to challenge racial stereotypes often focus on girls and women. Seen as the upholders of morality and tradition, women are expected to restrain their behavior to prove the moral superiority of the ethnic group (Das Gupta 1997). Strategies of respectability, described above, often targeted women's behavior more than men's. Filipino/a families also control their daughters' behavior more than their son's. Girls' sexual restraint is aimed at not only preserving the family but also at reshuffling ethnic hierarchies: Filipinas contrast Filipina's behavior favorably to that of white girls (Le Espiritu 2001).

Small groups of men have transformed masculinity to include values of caring, community and intimacy (Heath 2003; Schwalbe 1996; Wilkins 2009). Gay fathers have challenged the meaning of fatherhood beyond paternity and breadwinning to include direct care for children. To do this, they had to overcome their own assumptions that gay people cannot be parents and that men are less adept at parenting (Berkowitz 2011; Stacey 2006). Berkowitz (2011), however, argues that gay fathers often draw on feminine metaphors—"maternal instincts," "biological clocks," and "soccer moms"—to make sense of their behavior. In this way, they anchor their unconventional practices to conventional gendered meanings.

Intersectionality and Transforming Meaning Intersecting categories of difference facilitate and constrain efforts to transcend meaning (Howard and Renfrow, this volume). Members of higher-status categories, and higher-status members within categories, have more authority to police the boundaries of category membership, and more latitude to engage in categorically discrepant behaviors and challenge the acceptable boundaries of category comportment (McGuffey and Rich 1999). For example, high-status boys are able to exhibit more emotional vulnerability than low-status boys (Pascoe 2003). Multiple forms of status can anchor one's identity, enabling people to challenge category expectations without jeopardizing category membership. Membership in a low-status category, in contrast, can make one's simultaneous membership in a high-status category more tenuous: class- or race-subordinated men have fewer paths to masculinity than high-status men, and are thus often compelled to "compensate" for these other forms of subordination by emphasizing "masculine" invulnerability (Bourgois 1995; Ezzell 2012). In this case, boys and men work to hold onto masculine "respect" in the face of race and class disrespect. In some cases, however, members of subordinated categories may also feel they have less to lose from violating category expectations (Wilkins 2008).

Moreover, intersectionality can *simultaneously* facilitate and constrain efforts to challenge category meanings. For example, elite mothers are simultaneously better positioned to pursue careers in male-dominated fields (and to challenge expectations that mothers should be solely devoted to their children), while the demands of their husbands' elite careers and the specific upper middle class expectations of intensive mothering compel them to abandon those careers and commit to children-focused mothering (Blair-Loy 2003; Stone 2008). Class resources facilitate the challenge to conventional feminine behavior, while concerns about sustaining class status also undercut these challenges. Thus, location in intersectional categories conditions efforts to remake category expectations.

McGuffey (2005, 2008) documents another limit on these kinds of category challenges. He

argues that people may respond to disruptions in heteronormative gender relations—moments when things do not go according to expectations, such as when women become breadwinners—through *gender reaffirmation*. Families reaffirm gender by shoring up conventional gender categories for both mothers and sons. Searching for somewhere to place culpability, family members blame unconventional gender behavior (mothers working, boys who are too “soft”), and respond by “reaffirming” the importance of (conventional ideas about) gender. McGuffey’s work reveals that when things go wrong, people may reverse challenges to category expectations.

Other forms of marginality may lead, too, to the reinscription of categories of difference. Lesbian and gay families may combat marginalization by reifying biological definitions of family (which include racial sameness) or be emphasizing conventional gender socialization (Mamo 2007; Ryan and Berkowitz 2009). White women involved with men of color may, similarly, counteract their racial violations by emphasizing their conformity to norms of feminine heterosexual restraint (Wilkins 2004).

Challenging Categorization

Finally, some people and groups attempt to transcend difference by challenging existing categorization—by questioning whether a given social difference should exist at all. The multiracial movement is one such example. This movement has, in many places, successfully challenged the cultural and legal practice of assigning people to only one racial category, effectively challenging the boundaries between discrete racial groups. One of its successes was placing a multiracial option on the 2000 Census (DaCosta 2007). These challenges are not interpretively straightforward, however. Traditional race scholarship has long treated intermarriage and multiraciality as signs of eroding racial borders (D’Souza 1995; Lieberson and Waters 1988; Park 1950), but other work questions that characterization, finding that multiracial families themselves can reproduce racial hierarchies (Sue forthcoming), and that participa-

tion in an interracial partnership does not always displace patterns of color-blindness (Winddance Twine 1996). Bernstein and De la Cruz (2009) argue that the Hapa movement—activism in support of mixed race identities, particularly among people of partial Asian descent—simultaneously deconstructs monoracial identity categories and constructs new categories of multiraciality. While this process necessarily erects new boundaries of difference, it does so by destabilizing old ways of thinking about racial classification.

Challenging Difference by Challenging Inequality

The efforts to transcend categories described above emerge largely out of individual or group discomfort with their location in categories of difference. But, to many scholars, the key problem with difference is its foundational role in organizing and sustaining inequality. In other words, some people hope to eradicate difference altogether rather than challenging the existence of a *particular* social difference. As Risman (2004, p. 431) writes, “the creation of difference is the very foundation on which inequality rests.” Scholars, however, do not all agree on how best to eliminate the inequalities associated with difference.

Decategorization Some feminist scholars see decategorization as a necessary precondition for social justice. Lorber (2005) advocates “degendering” and suggests we begin by eliminating gender categories from forms and everyday language. For example, we could use the ungendered language of “spouse” instead of the gendered, power-laden terms “husband” and “wife.” Deutsch (2007) argues for an empirical agenda aimed at uncovering moments when gender is “undone” rather than “done.” Under what conditions, she asks, might gender be irrelevant or subverted? Risman (2009) suggests that one way gender is “done” by scholars is through the tendency to name things “alternative” masculinities and femininities, rather than recognizing the ways in which practices and interactions chal-

lenge category meanings. Similarly, some race scholars have celebrated decategorization in Latin American race relations, arguing that the absence of legal racial classifications supports a society in which race is less relevant to the organization of life chances (e.g., Tannenbaum 1992).

Critiques of Decategorization Other scholars are less sanguine about the possibilities of undoing categories. In her study of race in Mexico, Sue (2009, forthcoming) finds that a national ideology of color-blindness and racial inclusiveness, combined with policies that do not racially categorize, does not eradicate the use of race or color as an everyday mark of difference, or the differential allocation of resources based on these markers. For example, Mexicans frequently use color to single out or make fun of individuals. They also seek out light-skinned partners, give preference to lighter-skinned family members, and use color to discriminate in the labor market. In the United States, too, color-blindness works hand in hand with racial commonsense to sustain difference in the absence of direct racial labeling. In her study of debates about sex education in a southern school district, Fields (2005) finds that stakeholders use phrases like “children having children” to evoke the racialized, gendered difference of Black and Latina girls without ever naming them as such. By juxtaposing these “at risk” girls against the norm of (white girls’) “childhood innocence,” well meaning advocates mark and perpetuate raced, gendered difference. The case of race reveals the limits of thin strategies of decategorization, even when supported by government policy.

Organizational studies also suggest that strategies aimed at not naming categories may backfire. Workplace policies aimed at overcoming inequalities associated with difference through merit-based evaluation systems increase, rather than reduce, inequality in rewards, advantaging men over women. Castilla and Benard (2010) argue that meritocratic organizational cultures that officially disregard social differences actually *introduce* unconscious ascriptive bias based on social difference into the evaluation process. They do this, they suggest, because when people

believe they are committed to fairness, they do not work as hard to reduce the effects of bias on their cognitive processes. Ethnographic work supports this finding, showing that moral identities anchored in a commitment to gender equity facilitate the ability to not see persistent practices of inequality (Kleinman 1996). Conversely, when people are aware that their evaluations may be affected by bias, they work harder to overcome that bias, often in ways that favor lower status groups (Castilla and Benard 2010). Thus, moral commitments to decategorization can actually trigger unconscious bias.

Weakening the Link Between Categorization and Inequality Ridgeway and Correll (2000, pp. 110–111) argue for a different “vision of utopian change.” They argue that “sex categorization in everyday behavior is unlikely to be eliminated.” However, they suggest that the inequality associated with categorization could be reduced by reorganizing social situations so that women are in positions of greater competence relative to men. The regular interaction of women and men in situations in which women have greater competence could reduce competency biases against women, limiting some of the links between gender and inequality. They advocate structural changes that would allocate more resources to women.

Some social psychological research on education supports the idea that inequality can be reduced by changing the conditions under which groups encounter each other. For example, under some conditions, contact between groups can foster more egalitarian relationships. In schools, internal segregation magnifies friendship segregation, since students are most likely to befriend students with whom they share classes. Contact theory (Allport 1954) suggests, however, that organizing interracial contact in ways that facilitate cooperative interdependence can reduce difference. For example, racially integrated extracurricula bring racially diverse students together to work on a common goal, increasing their dependence on each other and decreasing status inequalities between groups. These strategies work best when explicitly endorsed by school authori-

ties (Moody 2001). Thus, it is not just the number of cross-racial contacts that matter but also the status conditions under which cross-racial contact is made. The more vertically organized a school's status hierarchy is, the less likely that cross-racial friendships will occur. Moreover, more heterogeneous schools, especially those in which there are more than two racial groups, better support interracial friendships. Moody (2001) suggests that the presence of at least three ethnic/racial groups reduces the potential for "us/them" dynamics to occur. Moreover, members of other ethnic groups can provide "bridges" between groups with greater degrees of social distance. Emergent research has begun to examine the ways the dynamics of interracial contact are also complicated by gender; boys, for example, are more likely to participate in interracial extracurricular activities like sports (Barajas and Pierce 2001; Holland 2012; Wilkins 2012b).

If it is not just contact that matters, but contact in which status hierarchies are reduced, then the organization of integrated classrooms is important. Aronson and colleagues (Aronson and Patnoe 1997) have developed a learning model that they call the "jigsaw classroom" based on their extensive research on small group dynamics. Unlike Moody's focus on interracial friendships, the jigsaw classroom is aimed at decreasing difference by improving the academic performance of racially disadvantaged students, but it operates on similar social psychological principles. First, it divides the classroom into small groups, assigning each member of the group one part of a collective task. Second, it evaluates each member of the group based on their mastery of the overall task. Rather than rewarding competition, this structure rewards students for cooperation. To do well, each student must not only contribute but must also value the cooperation of other students. This technique increases self-esteem, learning, and the degree to which group members like each other. Cohen's program for Complex Instruction (1999) also seeks to increase learning through classroom strategies of small group interaction and cooperation. In Complex Instruction, group members take responsibility for different tasks requiring different abilities. This way of break-

ing up tasks allows for a more expansive view of ability, and for diversely able students to succeed. Complex Instruction also monitors group dynamics, to ascertain social and intellectual status problems that reduce the participation of some students. Targeted interventions are aimed at encouraging such students to recognize their own contributions by creating expansive definitions of ability.

Cohen (e.g., Cohen et al. 2012) finds that interventions aimed at getting students of color to understand and actively counter stereotype threat boost their academic achievement. Stereotype threat refers to the psychological process whereby "identity contingencies"—situations in which a person is treated in accordance with an identity category—cause people to underperform in a manner consistent with stereotype (Steele 1997). Stereotype threat explains black students' underperformance on standardized testing (Steele and Aronson 1995), and women's underperformance on math testing (Spencer et al. 1999). Cohen found that when students write a single essay on why a group stereotype does not apply to them, it protects them against the negative effects of stereotype threat for several years. His research suggests both the protective effects of defensive othering and the utility of social justice strategies that entail naming categories, recognizing the problems associated with them, and deliberately countering them.

Conclusion

The social psychology of inequality is, by definition, concerned with the mechanisms that underlie persistent inequality, and with spaces, people, and strategies that might undermine or at least chip away at inequality. As we have shown, difference is foundational to social inequality. Although many kinds of difference exist, some forms of difference take on greater significance in the organization of social life, assigning people to categorical roles, status positions, and spaces. This categorization facilitates social interaction by providing people with clues about how to treat other people. Yet categorization also under-

girds social inequalities. Categorical differences result in uneven allocations of resources, opportunities, and status, while inequalities themselves give rise to, and perpetuate, differences between people. Inequalities scholars have often focused on the macro processes that give rise to particular configurations of difference, but difference is also created and recreated in everyday life, as people learn to be different and to assign categorical membership to other people. Because difference is often internalized and embodied as a core aspect of self, people often experience difference as natural rather than constructed. Moreover, categorical difference is a source of *meaning*, used by people to fashion identities and to forge meaningful connections with other people. Thus, people often willingly participate in difference, even when it disadvantages them.

These processes stabilize difference, and yet categorical differences are also subject to change. First, the processes whereby people learn to embody categories of difference and create difference in everyday interactions leave room for improvisation that can change meanings over time. Second, people sometimes actively resist categorization, attempting to crossover into other boundaries, or to alter the meaning of the category they are in. Not everyone is able to transcend difference, however. People's efforts are constrained by the interactive process itself, which depends on the interpretations of the audience. Indeed, flexibility and volition about categorical location and meaning itself seems to be a resource associated with being a member of a higher status category. Moreover, efforts to remake difference often perpetuate other forms of difference. These dynamics raise difficult questions about the best ways to reduce inequalities. While some scholars have called for the eradication of difference, others argue that the redistribution of resources and (crucially) status is a more viable path to greater equality. In part, the path one chooses depends on whether one emphasizes the role of difference in creating inequality, or the role of inequality in creating difference.

We have contended that more cross-pollination across literatures would enrich understandings of how and when differences are sustained,

and how and when they might be challenged. We also believe that a focus on the relationships between categories of difference has the potential to add traction to knowledge about the perpetuation and transcendence of difference. One way to think about relationships between categories is to document similarities and differences in their operation. How and when does race operate differently from gender, for example? Comparisons across cases offer one potential avenue for addressing this question. Another is to focus on the intersections among categories. While gender scholars have long pushed for the importance of the intersectional paradigm, arguing that gender, race, class, and sexuality are mutually constituted and thus cannot be analytically disentangled, a focus on intersectional identities alone only provides partial answers to questions about difference. Focusing instead on how shifts in categories of difference impact other categories of difference would shed light on how categories of difference are not just parallel but work together to stabilize (or destabilize) inequalities. Finally, we advocate a more sustained focus on age as a site of difference that intersects in complex ways with other categories of difference (See Falletta and Dannefer, this volume). Age is one of the most basic ways in which people are sorted into categories. Yet, perhaps because people move across age groups, it has been taken less seriously as a site of difference with implications for understanding inequalities not just between generations but also between other categories of difference. These questions can best be addressed, we feel, by coordination across fields of social psychology.

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Michael Schwalbe and Heather Shay

The term “dramaturgy” evokes the metaphor of life as theater. It is not surprising, then, that the dramaturgical perspective in social psychology is often reduced to the idea that interaction involves the use of dramatic techniques—much like those used by stage actors—to manage impressions (Baumeister 1982). If this is all there were to dramaturgy, it would be of marginal value to social psychology. In fact, by the end of his best known work, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (1959), Erving Goffman, dramaturgy’s touchstone theorist, arrived at precisely this conclusion, referring to the theatrical metaphor as mere scaffolding for erecting a new theory of interaction.¹

¹ At the end of *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*, Goffman (1959, p. 254) says that his use of the theatrical metaphor was “in part a rhetoric and a maneuver.” He goes on to say, “And so here the language and mask of the stage will be dropped. Scaffolds, after all, are to build other things with, and should be erected with an eye to taking them down. This report is not concerned with aspects of theater that creep into everyday life. It is concerned with the structure of social encounters—the structure of those entities in social life that come into being whenever persons enter one another’s immediate physical presence.” Goffman later described himself as doing structural social psychology and admitted that he didn’t take the term “dramaturgy” all that seriously (see Verhoeven 1993,

Erving Goffman’s key insight into human social behavior was not that life is like theater—the metaphor predates him by at least two thousand years—but that the orderliness of everyday life depends on tacit understandings of normative rules and the use of standard procedural forms. As Goffman put it near the end of his life, “The workings of the interaction order can easily be viewed as the consequences of systems of enabling conventions, in the sense of the ground rules for a game, the provisions of a traffic code, or the rules of syntax of a language” (1983, p. 5). Goffman’s method was to document the ritual bits of interactive behavior that make up everyday life and to show how they constitute a system of conventions used to coordinate action and make it meaningful. He saw what he was doing not as literary interpretation but as structural social psychology (see Verhoeven 1993, p. 322).

Dramaturgy is often placed under the rubric of symbolic interactionism. There is indeed a connection: a common intellectual ancestry in the work of G. H. Mead, Georg Simmel, Everett Hughes, and others of the Chicago School; and overlapping concerns: the self, emotion, and the creation of meaning in face-to-face interaction. There is also, however, a difference. While symbolic interactionism calls our attention to meanings, dramaturgy calls our attention to the rules

M. Schwalbe (✉) · H. Shay
Department of Sociology and Anthropology, North
Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC 27695–8107, USA
e-mail: michael_schwalbe@ncsu.edu

pp. 320–322; see also Goffman 1981a). Nonetheless, it is the term by which the social-psychological perspective we discuss in this chapter has come to be known.

and procedural forms that are drawn upon to create those meanings. By way of linguistic analogy, symbolic interactionism studies what people say, while dramaturgy studies not only what people say but also the rules—both normative and procedural—that enable the saying of meaningful things. Hence the affinity between dramaturgy and ethnomethodology.²

As a practical matter, however, most social psychologists who embrace the dramaturgical perspective focus their attention on impression management or, in more contemporary terms, identity work. The analytic questions most commonly asked in this tradition are about how people signify qualities and identities in interaction, and about the consequences that follow from these situated acts of self-signification. These consequences might include, for example, maintenance of emotional equilibrium, maintenance of relationships, and maintenance of organizations. Dramaturgy's concerns thus include but go beyond the techniques individuals use to signify identities and manage impressions.

Given dramaturgy's focus on expressive behavior, it would seem that, when it comes to understanding inequality, the perspective is best suited to analyzing dominance in face-to-face interaction. And indeed it is useful for this purpose. But the cognitive presuppositions and interactional rules with which dramaturgy is also concerned transcend situations. Ideas about categories of persons—for example, male, female, black, white, gay, heterosexual, married, unmar-

ried, employed, unemployed—and their unequal social value are part of the cultural equipment actors bring to encounters. When this cultural equipment is used to coordinate situated action, categories of Others and status hierarchies are legitimated (implicitly) and reproduced (inadvertently). Dramaturgy can thus yield insight into the microcosmological foundations of macro-level inequalities.

Situated action is also what maintains the organizations that allocate societal resources. In fact, organizations can be seen as consisting of multiple situations replayed in routinized ways by networked actors. The power of individual actors, as well as the power hierarchy itself in an organization, depend on who can, by virtue of proper expressive behavior, elicit deference from whom. Situated action, in other words, typically has extra-situational consequences, some of which include the reproduction of material and symbolic inequalities. Here again dramaturgy can be useful for understanding how large-scale inequalities depend on what is accomplished through expressive behavior in concrete situations.

In this chapter, we will expand on these arguments. We begin by clarifying the dramaturgical conception of rules and enabling conventions. We then discuss how dramaturgy views the self as both a dramatic and a structural effect, showing how this view of the self is useful for understanding the reproduction of inequality. We then consider how the concept of accountability, associated with both dramaturgy and ethnomethodology, gives us further insight into how unequal social relations are held in place. We also consider the processes of resistance illuminated by dramaturgy: identity work aimed at countering stigma; the creation of oppositional subcultures and identity projects; strategic disruptions of the interaction order; and the use of narrative self-presentations to advance oppositional social movements.

Finally, we will suggest how insights from post-Goffman sources can enhance the power of the dramaturgical perspective to make sense of how inequalities are created and reproduced. These insights include recognition of how bodies

² There is a long-running debate about the relationship between ethnomethodology and dramaturgy. The *affinity* we refer to in the text concerns the common concern for understanding social life as accomplished through the use of rules and standard procedural forms. Ethnomethodology nowadays is primarily focused on identifying such forms and procedures as they are evident, often in seemingly microscopic ways, in conversation. Dramaturgy, per Goffman, tends to focus on larger ritual forms, without the close scrutiny of language characteristic of ethnomethodological conversation analysis. Another key difference is that the self, which is of considerable importance in dramaturgy, is largely ignored by ethnomethodologists (but see Malone 1977). For discussions of the overlaps and tensions between the two perspectives, see Manning (1992, pp. 23–25), Rawls (1987, 1989), Sharrock (1999), and Smith (2003).

function as peremptory signifiers; how expressive habitus sustains practices of exclusion; and how nets of accountability make self-signification consequential beyond immediate situations. Much recent work that uses dramaturgy to examine the reproduction of inequality has focused on gender (e.g., West and Zimmerman 1987; Fenstermaker and West 2002), and we will do likewise. But we will also consider how, with some theoretical updating, dramaturgy can be used to examine the reproduction of racial and economic inequalities. We hope to show that dramaturgy is a still growing perspective within social psychology, one well suited to analyzing the interactional basis of inequality.

Rules and Enabling Conventions

The dramaturgical concept of rules is often misunderstood. Part of the problem is that the concept of rules in dramaturgy is muddled by folk notions of rules as explicit prescriptions and prohibitions—in the manner of religious commandments, organizational policies, or a list of do’s and don’t’s on a classroom wall. In dramaturgy, what is meant by “rules” is different. To explain, it is helpful to distinguish between *normative* and *procedural* rules.

Normative rules are shared ideas about the behaviors considered right and proper—taking actor, audience, and situation into account. Knowledge of such rules is usually more tacit than discursive (though such rules can be codified in books of etiquette). We often know, at a gut level, that an action is right or wrong, appropriate or inappropriate, without being able to say precisely why. But dramaturgy does not say that social life is orderly because people are programmed to follow rules or abide by norms. Social life is orderly, dramaturgy says, in part because rules are used to make behavior meaningful—that is, expressive in intended ways (Brissett and Edgley 1991). If rules were not used in this way, acts would lose their meaning and joint action would break down.

So, for example, one *should* take the proffered hand of a new acquaintance, use honorific

forms of address with status superiors, inquire (with apparent sincerity) about a friend’s health, apologize for being late, not stare at strangers too long in public, not belch during a funeral service. These are all well-understood normative rules in U.S. culture. They do not compel behavior but rather make it meaningful. To extend one’s hand for a shake expresses respect; to shake the proffered hand expresses respect in return; to fail to shake it, *which is a choice one could make*, expresses disrespect. Using normative rules in this way is crucial for communicating feelings and attitudes that are otherwise invisible, and for keeping interaction flowing smoothly by minimizing the risk of emotional disruption.

Procedural rules are what might be called “how-to” rules. To know, for example, how to join a line, how to greet a friend, how to order a meal in a restaurant, how to run a meeting, how to end a conversation, how to formulate an apology, how to ask for an extension on a deadline, or how to play a game is to know procedural rules. Again, this knowledge is usually tacit, like the knowledge of grammar that enables us to combine words into meaningful sentences. Procedural rules can thus be understood as undergirding basic social competence—the ability to make sense to others and with others, and to get things done with others. Generally speaking, procedural rules are drawn upon to make interaction predictable, whereas normative rules are drawn upon to make action expressive of intentions and character.

It is shared knowledge of normative and procedural rules, including knowledge of how to flexibly apply them in situationally appropriate ways, that makes regularized interaction possible. By applying this shared knowledge we create “standard procedural forms” or ritualized bits of interactive behavior. Much of everyday life is built up out of such forms—used habitually in most cases (Goffman 1983, p. 6), consciously and strategically in others (Goffman 1969). To use what is considered the correct form in a given situation is to be credited with social competence and good character. To use the wrong form is to risk being seen as socially incompetent or offensive.

In the dramaturgical view, rules and procedural forms constitute a system of “enabling conventions.” These conventions, items in the proverbial cultural tool kit, make possible meaningful joint action—cooperative, conflictual, or whatever. Just as it is impossible to play a game without rules, or construct sensible utterances without grammar, or navigate busy streets without traffic laws, it is impossible to carry on social life without analogous symbolic resources that can be drawn upon to organize and coordinate action. It should also be understood that, in the dramaturgical view, rules and procedural forms do not simply constrain human agency; rather, they enable it and shape its expression.³ For more on the matter of rules, as conceived by Goffman and other dramaturgists, see Manning (1992, pp. 72–93, 165, 2000).

If dramaturgical social psychology can be said to have an analytic mission, it is to document the rules and enabling conventions that social actors use to construct and interpret expressive behavior, and thereby engage in patterned joint action. The mission can also be said to include showing how rules and enabling conventions are generated, used, and modified, and also examining the consequences that follow. Our purpose here is to consider how the rules and enabling conventions that underlie the interaction order are implicated in creating, reproducing, and resisting inequalities. To draw out the value of dramaturgy for this purpose, it is necessary to consider another distinguishing feature of the perspective: its view of the self.

³ If we think of human agency as expressed through acts that are intentional, goal-directed, and intelligible to others, then the necessity of shared rules for enabling and shaping agency should be clear. This is much the same view of how rules enable and shape agency as developed in Giddens’s theory of structuration, a view that owes much to Wittgenstein and Goffman (see Giddens 1979, pp. 80–81, 1984). The further point can be made that by drawing upon rules to formulate intelligible, effective action, we condition ourselves and make ourselves what we are.

The Dramaturgical View of the Self

A key difference between symbolic interactionism and dramaturgy is reflected in the latter’s conception of the self. Symbolic interactionist social psychology, deriving mainly from the work of William James, George H. Mead, John Dewey, and Charles Horton Cooley, has conceived of the self as patterns of perception and thought (the self as knower), an inner dialogue (the self as process), a set of meanings attached to the self as an object (the self-concept), or some combination thereof (Callero, this volume). In these formulations, the self, though socially shaped, is internal to the individual. The dramaturgical view is radically different. In this view, the self is not a psychological entity or process but an imputation of essential character that is generated collaboratively in scenes of face-to-face interaction.

Near the end of *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*, Goffman offers this summary of the dramaturgical view of the self:

In this report the performed self was seen as some kind of image, usually creditable, which the individual on stage and in character effectively attempts to induce others to hold in regard to him. While this image is entertained concerning the individual, so that a self is imputed to him, this self itself does not derive from its possessor, but from the whole scene of his action, being generated by that attribute of local events which renders them interpretable by witnesses. A correctly staged and performed scene leads the audience to impute a self to a performed character, but this imputation—this self—is a product of the scene that comes off, and not a cause of it. The self, then, as a performed character, is not an organic thing that has a specific location, whose fundamental fate is to be born, to mature, and to die; it is a dramatic effect arising diffusely from a scene that is presented, and the characteristic issue, the crucial concern, is whether it will be credited or discredited. (Goffman 1959, p. 252)

The self is thus defined as a *virtual* reality, a reality *in effect*. Moreover, the self is created not simply by individual performances but by how those performances—consisting of numerous bits of signifying behavior—are interpreted as *expressive* by an audience in a particular situation. Selves, in this view, are not brought to situations; they are created in and by situations.

While this view of the self diverges from that of symbolic interactionism, it nonetheless retains a concern for the creation of meanings in interaction. Dramaturgy is especially concerned with the meanings that attach to individuals, meanings that are created by situated expressive behavior and the interpretation thereof. These are meanings that matter—the selves imputed to individuals being the basis on which individuals are treated. Whether one is respected or reviled, accepted or rejected, jailed or set free, depends on impressions created in interaction. Dramaturgy seeks to understand how these impressions are created through situated action that (a) draws upon shared cultural equipment and (b) is enabled and constrained by social organization.

The latter point bears emphasizing because it reminds us that the dramaturgical self is not only a fleeting dramatic effect but also a relatively stable structural effect (Gonos 1977; Schwalbe 2013). It is a structural effect in four senses: the expressive behavior through which selves are created requires rules and conventions that transcend situations; selves are attributed to individuals based in part on the roles they play in routinized activity systems; selves are attributed to individuals based in part on membership in broad social categories; and for action to be taken as indicative of character it must be seen as volitional, which requires a sphere of autonomy within an institutional framework. The situationally imputed self thus depends on extra-situational features of culture and social organization.

Self, Identity, and Inequality in Dramaturgical Perspective

A *credible* self is one that is seen as worthy of the full measure of respect, or social value, normally accorded to persons in a given social position. “Social position” here refers to category membership (e.g., white, male, American) and role in a routinized activity system (e.g., professor, truck driver, nurse). As noted above, the selves attributed to individuals depend not just on expressive skill but on the social categories and roles with which they are associated. To the ex-

tent that these categories and roles are unequally valued, so too are the selves attributed to the individuals who occupy them. Status hierarchies matter, in other words, for the kinds of selves people can create in an encounter (Wilkins et al., this volume).

Dramaturgical analysis suggests why such hierarchies often go unchallenged. As Ann Branaman has argued, the rules that underlie the interaction order *and the use of those rules to protect emotionally-charged self-images* have a conservatizing effect:

To avoid the embarrassment or humiliation of having one’s projection of self rejected by others, or to “maintain face,” individuals are advised to present themselves in a way that others will be prepared to accept. Typically, this means that individuals are compelled to present themselves as persons of a level of worthiness compatible with the visible or discoverable status characteristics they are said to possess. (Branaman 2003, p. 93)

The implication, as Branaman goes on to point out, is that existing hierarchies tend to be preserved because the basic rules of interaction—*do not invite embarrassment by claiming unsupported social value for one’s self; respect the social value claimed by others*—protect those of higher status from challenge by those of lower status. Such challenges are generally avoided because they risk damage to the feelings attached to the self-images of both the strong and the weak.

Morally-valenced interaction rules (i.e., normative rules) have a conservatizing effect in another way. To the extent that these are rules upon which everyone relies to signify credible, moral selves, they are not easily given up. Without them, one would be at a loss to know how to signify to others that one is a well-demeaned, respectable person. Thus even when interaction rules compel submission to hierarchies of dubious legitimacy, those rules may continue to be embraced because they enable sensible self-presentations that elicit a modicum of respect and avoid offending powerful others. As a result, hierarchy itself is preserved.

By highlighting the importance of emotion and the self, dramaturgy helps makes sense of the reproductive force of normative structures. As noted earlier, it is not simply that people “fol-

low rules.” Rather, rules are *used*—drawn upon as shared symbolic resources—to facilitate interaction in ways that protect the powerful feelings attached to self-images (Goffman 1959, p. 243, 1961a, p. 23, 67, 1961b, pp. 103–104, 1967, p. 6, 31, 43). Without this protection, the emotional risks of interaction would be overwhelming. Minimizing these risks has the inadvertent consequence, however, of reproducing a social order in which some categories of persons, and some selves, are more highly valued than others. One price we pay for emotional safety in face-to-face interaction is thus the reproduction of larger-scale inequality.

Though it might seem obvious, it is perhaps worth noting why category membership is so important. As suggested above, this is in part because categories of persons are unequally valued, implying an unequal distribution of respect. But there is more at stake than emotional rewards. Category membership can have material consequences when access to jobs, exercise of political rights, or protection under the law depends on the racial, ethnic, sex, or gender category to which a person belongs. As Tilly (2005) argues, opportunity hoarding, as a way in which inequalities are entrenched, depends on some people establishing membership in privileged groups and categories, while denying membership to others (see also Massey 2007). We should not take for granted, however, that there exist, for example, such people as “heterosexual white males.” Dramaturgy reminds us that reproducing such a category, establishing legitimate membership in it, and benefiting from that membership require a great deal of identity work.

The link between identity work and inequality is clearly evident in formal organizations. Signifying a categorical identity may be crucial for getting hired and for gaining access to internal networks. Advancement may then depend, in addition, on the imputations of character elicited through strategic and habitual acts of self-signification. This is a matter of creating the impression that one has the right character, the “right stuff,” to perform well and to effectively represent the organization at higher levels. Robert Jackall’s (1988) *Moral Mazes*, a study of high-

level corporate managers, offers a classic illustration. Upward mobility in the corporate hierarchy, Jackall shows, depends on cultivating an *image* of being dedicated, trustworthy, morally flexible, and loyal to one’s boss. Competence matters, but image matters more. If there is a general principle operating here, it is that deriving rewards from organizations—where others control the distribution of these rewards—depends on signifying both categorical identities and a kind of self.

In *Asylums*, which might be considered an early application of dramaturgy to organizational analysis, Goffman argues that inmates are stripped of their “identity kits”—the fashion props, volitional behaviors, respectful forms of address—normally relied upon to create the impression of possessing a creditable self (Goffman 1961a, pp. 20–23, 1967, p. 92). Inmates thus become non-persons, or less-than-full persons. While mental asylums are extreme cases, Goffman’s analysis can be generalized to other settings. To be denied autonomy and control in any workplace is to be denied the opportunity for volitional behavior—that is, behavior that can be read as expressive of a self. To be constrained in this way is to have one’s possibilities for self-creation limited (Rogers 1980).

In his essay “Role Distance,” Goffman (1961b, pp. 85–152) makes the point that roles in routinized activity systems are understood to imply the possession of a kind of self. To play the role of surgeon, to use one of Goffman’s examples, is to elicit the attribution of being smart, exacting, serious, demanding. This is a cultural stereotype, to be sure. But it is also a consequence of how the activity system called “surgery” is organized. To the extent that any activity system is organized such that some roles require great skill and knowledge, and others little, there will be a corresponding distribution of admirable selves. To be confined to a menial role is thus another way to have one’s possibilities for creating a self circumscribed.

When attributions of competence, morality, or both are compromised by cultural stereotypes, we can speak of stigma. To be stigmatized is to suffer the devaluation of one’s self, in the eyes of a particular audience, because of how some

behavior or biographical fact (real or imagined) is interpreted. Depending on who is stigmatizing whom, the result may be more than fleeting psychic discomfort. Stigma is often the basis for exclusion from jobs, from legal protections, and from networks through which social rewards are distributed (see Link et al., this volume). How some groups gain the power to stigmatize others is a matter for historical study (e.g., Oliver 1990). What dramaturgy can help us see is how stigmatization, as a process enacted in everyday life, serves to perpetuate unequal structural arrangements.

The flip side to stigma is the creation of powerful virtual selves. This refers to the dramaturgical work done by elites to elicit attributions of strength, competence, wisdom, morality, or, perhaps, ruthless amorality (Schwalbe et al. 2000, pp. 424–425). The purpose of such dramaturgical work, which is often done by use of mass media and public relations firms, is to secure allegiance or, at least, compliance. When it succeeds—when political and economic elites create the impression that their power and privileges are rightful rewards for their superiority—the status quo is legitimated and preserved (see Hunt, this volume). It is possible, however, for the status quo to be upset if the dramaturgical fronts of elites are shattered. To prevent this, to hide venality and incompetence, elites try to protect their backstage areas from public view.

The dramaturgical perspective thus suggests several ways of seeing how the self is implicated in the reproduction of inequality. To the extent that impressions are managed to protect the powerful feelings attached to self-images, status hierarchies are protected as well. We stay in our places, in other words, because to do otherwise is to risk emotional damage. This in turn suggests how normative structure—the system of morally-valenced rules drawn upon to coordinate interaction and create credible selves—tends to reproduce political and economic arrangements. Just as status hierarchies are maintained when people stay in their places, so too are authority relations in organizations and, on a larger scale, capitalist relations of production.

Dramaturgy also suggests that the systematic discrediting of selves—stigmatization—is part of how inequality is reproduced. This can take the form of devaluing whole categories of people as a way of legitimating exclusion or exploitation. It can also take the form of discrediting those who challenge inequality. If dissidents can be stigmatized as irrational, chronically malcontented, or mentally ill, their challenges need not be taken seriously. Similarly, challenges to inequality can be forestalled by the identity work of elites. By creating impressions of competence and morality, by creating intimidating or charismatic selves, those who benefit from existing inequalities can often secure the obedience or allegiance of those whom they subjugate. The creation of virtual selves is thus a central dynamic in the creation of both symbolic and material inequalities.

Accountability

The concept of accountability is usually associated with ethnomethodology. Unfortunately, the concept has been largely confined there, and so its more general sociological value has not been fully appreciated. What “accountability” refers to is the condition of being potentially subject to a demand to explain or justify one’s behavior—in light of what an audience considers proper, given one’s social identity and the situation in which the behavior occurs (Heritage 1984). This might seem pedestrian, yet it is key to seeing how normative rules shape interaction in ways that perpetuate inequality. Perhaps the best example, drawn from dramaturgical analysis over the last thirty years, is gender (see Kroska, this volume).

Integrating ideas from ethnomethodology (Garfinkel 1967; Kessler and McKenna 1978) and dramaturgy (Goffman 1977, 1979), West and Zimmerman (1987) have argued that gender is not a quality that inheres in male and female persons. Rather, it is an interactional accomplishment that requires ongoing signifying behavior. Our way of putting it is to say that “doing gender” involves signifying membership in sex categories (female, male) and gender categories (women, men), and also signifying a gendered (feminine, masculine)

self. These acts of signification are normatively governed and highly ritualized, and are in fact all that we see when we imagine that we see gender in the world around us. What we see, in other words, are patterns of expressive behavior, on the basis of which we attribute different kinds of selves to humans in the categories “female,” “male,” “boys,” “girls,” “women,” and “men.”⁴

The problem, of course, is that the categories in question are not merely different but unequal—the categories “males” and “men” generally being more highly valued than “females” and “women.” This is not the place to catalog the type and magnitude of the gender inequalities that exist in the world today (see Berg 2009; Douglas 2010). The key point is that these inequalities depend on the acts of self-signification through which individuals claim membership in gender categories, and thereby keep these unequal categories alive in collective imagination. It is no mystery why those who can successfully claim membership in privileged categories (males/men) would want to preserve these arrangements. But what are the interactional dynamics that produce near universal acquiescence, even among those who are disadvantaged?

Part of the answer has to do with accountability. As West and Zimmerman (1987) argue, we are always potentially accountable for our gender enactments. If our claimed gender identity, or some aspect of our gender display, is not consistent with an audience’s expectations, we can be called to account for it. This doesn’t necessarily mean

being asked for an explanation (though it might). It could mean simply being seen as strange, even if nothing is said. Harsher reactions—being seen as immoral or insane—are also possible. Deviant gender display can thus diminish the social value of the self attributed to an individual. Depending on the magnitude of the deviation and how it is interpreted, it might prove impossible to coordinate action with others. Gender deviants might be avoided or excluded entirely.

Failing to do gender properly can thus have noxious emotional consequences—humiliation, embarrassment, shame—and material ones arising from exclusion, exploitation, or physical abuse. The *foreknowledge* that our gender enactments are always subject to evaluation, and that failing to meet an audience’s expectations can have high costs, tends to compel conformity. Audience expectations vary, of course; what is deviant in one place is normal or laudable in another. Nonetheless, gender remains, in all cultures wherein one finds creatures called women and men, “omnirelevant,” meaning that there is no exemption from accountability for enacting it in some fashion, even if fashions vary.

Although we have stressed the importance of establishing category membership in interaction, we should note that West and Zimmerman (1987) do not say that gender enactment is simply a matter of claiming to be male or female, a man or a woman, or signifying a masculine *or* feminine self. Nor do we. Such enactments are always a mix of ritual and improvisation, always adapted to situations, and, when it comes to signifying a gendered self, often ambiguous. In fact, a key insight of West and Zimmerman’s perspective is that gender enactments are fluid rather than fixed. The perspective also reminds us to take intersectionality seriously, in that gender enactments are always inflected by the class, race, ethnic, and sexual identities of actors and audiences, even if these identities are only presumed or inferred (see Howard and Renfrow, this volume).

It follows, however, that if people are always potentially accountable for signifying an appropriately gendered self, there will be, in every situation, evidence from which to infer that selves are indeed gendered; that is, there will be

⁴ A similar view of gender as ritualized performance can be found in Judith Butler (1990), whose writings are better known in literary studies, cultural studies, and women’s studies. A key difference between Butler and Goffman is that whereas Butler sees the “gendered subject” as existing only as a matter of performance, Goffman does not collapse the human individual into the virtual self created by expressive behavior (cf. Brickell 2005). The individual, in Goffman’s social psychology, is a symbol-using biological unit in which has been instilled habits of thought, feeling, and behavior, and a unique set of memories (Schwalbe 1993). As we argue in the text, the habits instilled as a result of an individual’s assignment to sex and gender categories constitute a *gender habitus* rooted in the body (McCall 1992). In this sense, gender includes not just doing, but also the being that is shaped by doing.

evidence from which to infer that males/men and females/women are essentially different types of human beings (Goffman 1977, 1979). Learned styles of expressive behavior thus become—upon forgetting that they are learned styles of expressive behavior—evidence that women and men are *naturally* different, an idea that can then be invoked to explain gender inequality. It is not so much that we believe in the reality of gender because it is plain to see, but rather, as Lorber (1994) puts it, we see gender because we believe in its reality. The illusion is sustained because we also hold each other accountable for fashioning self-presentations based on belief in the reality of gender.

The concept of accountability helps us to see how tacit interactional rules give rise to tangible consequences. Widely shared ideas about what is proper, about which procedural forms should be used when and with whom, are guides for action—symbolic resources that enable smooth and emotionally safe interaction. These rules, as noted earlier, transform behaviors into acts that can be interpreted as expressions of what is otherwise invisible: values, attitudes, beliefs, memories, and selves. If what is expressed violates audience expectations, there may be a subtle or overt demand for an account. This is a crucial moment in an encounter, because how such a demand is signaled, perceived, and handled determines whether the normative breach is repaired and whether the selves created are creditable or not (Orbuch 1997).

We have used gender as an example to discuss accountability, suggesting that situationally improper gender displays may elicit subtle or overt demands for an account. Gender is a complex case because accountability applies to sex-category membership (we are expected to identify and be identifiable as male or female); to gender-category membership (we are expected to identify and be identifiable as men or women); and to character (we are expected to construct masculine or feminine selves in accord with gender-category membership). Failing to embrace this system of unequally valued categories and attributes—failing to *use* it to construct selves in everyday life—can lead to stigma, discrimination, and exclusion.

Accountability is thus crucial for understanding how gender inequality, and inequalities related to gender, are reproduced interactionally.

In principle, we can be held accountable for behaving in accord with the normative expectations attached to any social category. Such expectations might be more or less clear and taken more or less seriously depending on the situation and the category in question. Nonetheless, every category, by definition, implies a set of expectations about the identifying signs its occupants should display or be able to display. It is possible, then, to be held accountable for properly signifying identities linked to racial, ethnic, economic, sexual, national, religious, or other systems of inequality. To violate these expectations is to court interactional trouble. To meet them is to inadvertently help reproduce the system.

Systems of inequality, however, consist of more than unequally valued categorical identities. Such systems also consist of institutionalized relationships among types of social actors. In reference to gender, we can say that the societal *gender order* consists of more than situated gender enactment (Connell 2002). This is why it is not correct to say that being held accountable for signifying categorical identities is all that holds male supremacy, white supremacy, or capitalism in place (see, e.g., West and Fenstermaker (1995); but see also Fenstermaker and West (2002, pp. 205–216)). Accountability indeed helps to perpetuate social categories, status hierarchies, and group boundaries—all of which are essential to upholding large-scale systems of inequality. But there is more to the process than what happens in face-to-face encounters. There is also the regularized coordination of action across situations, time, and space.

So, to be clear: dramaturgy does not hold that capitalism, for instance, consists of nothing but the situational display of economic identities—capitalist, manager, supervisor, employee, etc. As a system, capitalism cannot be understood simply as a matter of identity work. Systems must be understood in systemic terms, which means looking at formal legal relationships among classes, organizations, and groups. It also means looking at how groups coordinate action, across time and

space, to hoard opportunities, control resources, and define reality. The same principle applies to gender, race, and sexuality. These, too, require analysis as systems, not just encounters. Yet it is also clear that systems exist only because of what happens in interaction (Schwalbe et al. 2000). What is therefore necessary is a way to link encounters to systems. As we will propose later, an expanded concept of accountability fits this theoretical bill.

For now, we can summarize by saying that accountability has cognitive, affective, and interactional aspects (cf. Hollander 2013). The cognitive aspect concerns shared understandings about how category membership can and should be signified; the affective concerns the anticipated or actual emotional costs of being called to account, given the importance of a particular audience and the identity at stake; and the interactional concerns how accountability is signaled, perceived, and handled in encounters. We have suggested that the emotional and material costs of being called to account are often avoided by choosing to conform, even if this choice ultimately perpetuates a larger system of inequality. If the risk of non-conformity is taken nonetheless, the result may be devaluation, exclusion, or incarceration.

Resistance

The dramaturgical perspective illuminates key processes whereby inequality is reproduced. It can also be useful, therefore, for understanding how inequality is resisted. As Goffman (1967, pp. 85–86) observed, to know how to handle a sacred object respectfully is also to know how to desecrate it. Analogously, to know how to use the rules underlying the interaction order to reproduce the status quo is to know how to use those rules to disrupt it, or at least symbolically challenge it. The four processes of resistance we will consider are identity work aimed at countering stigma; the creation of oppositional cultures and identity projects; strategic disruptions of the interaction order; and the use of narrative self-presentations in social movements.

Countering Stigma

Resistance to inequality can take the form of trying to repair or revalue a discredited or stigmatized self. Attempts to counter stigma and revalue the self can be undertaken by individuals in isolated encounters, or they can be undertaken collectively by members of stigmatized groups who want to improve their public image. Both processes have been studied extensively (for reviews, see Link and Phelan 2001; Major and O'Brien 2005; Link et al., this volume). A dramaturgical approach focuses on resources and identity-work strategies. Snow and Anderson (1987), for example, found that homeless men salvaged feelings of self-worth by distancing themselves from other homeless people, portraying themselves as resourceful free spirits, and telling self-aggrandizing stories. Suffering social devaluation because of their economic plight, the men used the main resource available to them—talk—to construct selves worthy of respect.

Resistance can also arise when people are held accountable for signifying membership in unequal social categories. Here again gender provides examples. Women who fail to do gender properly may be compelled to engage in compensatory stigma management, as Trautner and Collett (2010) observed among female college students who strip; as Ezzell (2009) observed among women who play rugby; and as Lafferty and McKay (2004) observed among women who box. The women in these cases feminized their self-presentations to deflect stigma and thereby avoid or attenuate negative sanctions (for a different kind of example, see Riessman 2000). The paradox is that while rejecting some of the usual strictures of patriarchy, the women's *compensatory* identity work implicitly affirmed conventional beliefs about masculinity, femininity, and proper gender display.

Marginalized men often use gender as a resource for resisting local inequalities. Lyser (2003) describes the case of male mental patients disempowered by a hospital's control regime. The men reacted by using sexist and homophobic language, asymmetrical touch, and rough play to signify masculinity. Ezzell (2012) describes

similar behavior in a residential drug treatment program. Male residents were denied opportunities to signify manhood through control, physical prowess, or heterosexual conquest, and so they engaged in “compensatory manhood acts” that took the form of aggressive verbal confrontations in unguided group therapy sessions. Henson and Rogers (2001) report similar patterns of compensatory masculinity display among male clerical temp workers. In these cases, the meanings undergirding one system of inequality—gender—are used to resist another. Machoisism in revolutionary movements and social change organizations is another form of the same phenomenon (see, e.g., Brown 1993).

Individual identity work in face-to-face interaction can be an effective counter to social devaluation. By using the rules underlying the interaction order to display good demeanor, members of stigmatized groups can sometimes elicit respectful attention and signify creditable selves. Yet dramaturgy complicates our view of what constitutes successful resistance. While good demeanor might elicit polite responses in an encounter with members of dominant groups, it does not alter the larger status hierarchy within which the encounter occurs; the categories that limit the creditability of different kinds of selves remain intact.⁵ Moreover, as suggested above, resistance that succeeds situationally can, by affirming conventional ideologies and normative rules, have the paradoxical effect of reinforcing inequality.

There is also the possibility of forgoing good demeanor entirely. When social devaluation means there is no chance of creating a creditable self, one response is to engage in compensatory acts of self-expression that signify contempt for one’s oppressors. Often these are acts by frustrat-

ed and angry individuals who use interactional rules to profane objects that are usually treated as sacred: the selves of others. In such instances, inequality and stigma are resisted by “rejection of one’s rejectors” (Goffman 1961a, p. 315, citing McCorkle and Korn 1954). While this may be psychologically rewarding, it tends to affirm the dominant group’s view that the stigmatized get what they deserve.

As we have discussed here, inequality can be resisted through individual acts of identity work that counter stigma and signify creditable selves. We have also suggested that this kind of identity work can be situationally successful while offering little or no challenge to the normative structure that favors dominant groups. There is also the possibility, however, of collective identity work that more seriously challenges the dominant culture. For example, when the acts that express contempt for a dominant group and its values take on shared, stable meanings among the oppressed, we can speak of the emergence of an oppositional culture. As with individual identity work, dramaturgy can give us insight into how this form of resistance operates and the potential it holds for farther-reaching social change.

Oppositional Cultures and Identity Projects

By an “oppositional culture” we mean a subculture that emerges among the stigmatized or marginalized, a culture in which the values of the dominant culture are rejected or expressed in ways that flout dominant-group conventions. What oppositional cultures provide are alternative status hierarchies and alternative ways to signify creditable selves (see, e.g., Bourgois 1991; MacLeod 2009; Anderson 1999; Fordham 1996; Ogbu 2003; Green 2011). For example, a prison record, usually discrediting in mainstream culture, becomes a badge of honor in a criminal subculture, or doing badly in school becomes a mark of coolness in youth subculture. Oppositional cultures also typically express contempt for the dominant culture as a way of mitigating the sting of its expressed or implied judgments.

⁵ In *Stigma*, Goffman (1963, p. 25, 121) refers to deviants who take the “good-adjustment line.” This is an adaptation to subordinate status that takes the form of accepting one’s stigma and its associated limitations, muting one’s anger about real or apparent injustices, and displaying an upbeat demeanor. This form of adaptation poses no threat to the prevailing hierarchies that allow one group to define itself as normal and other groups as less-creditable deviants.

Acts of resistance that occur within an oppositional culture benefit from an affirming community. Throwing feces at one's jailers is an individual act of profanation; it expresses contempt for the selves of oppressive others; it is not an act that draws on the enduring values of a community to express one's own worth. Acts of profanation are also typically aimed at representative members of a dominant group. But once an oppositional culture emerges, a peer audience becomes more important. Oppositional cultures thus provide new resources for self-signification and new audiences that can be favorably impressed by virtuoso use of those resources (Schwalbe and Mason-Schrock 1996). A dominant group may still be profaned, but this becomes the subtext rather than the surface text created by expressive behavior.

We take the term "identity project" from Wilkins (2008). The term refers to efforts to construct an identity that can be the basis for achieving feelings of belonging, specialness, coolness, and self-worth. Wilkins offers three ethnographic case studies: goths, evangelical college students, and Puerto Rican wannabes. For reasons related to race, class, gender, age, and/or sexuality, members of each group felt marginalized, devalued, or boringly ordinary. Wilkins shows how becoming a goth, an evangelical Christian, or a Puerto Rican wannabe was a reaction to these existential problems. While these identity projects often had an oppositional quality, they were (in our view) too compartmentalized to constitute genuine oppositional cultures.⁶ Many of Wilkins's middle-class white goths, for example, cultivated goth style only when they were with other goths, and many left the subculture as they aged beyond young adulthood.

⁶ Others have used the term "oppositional culture" to refer to what we see as compartmentalized identity projects. See, for examples, Schockley (2005), Lowney (1995), Haenfler (2004). There is no doubt that these projects are collective and involve shared ideas, values, and practices. In this sense, they are clearly subcultural. Without arguing the point too strongly, we simply wish to distinguish between the more encompassing, more enduring oppositional cultures of oppressed minority groups, and the fleeting cultural experiments of privileged youth.

Both oppositional cultures and identity projects arise from desires to create self-images that evoke and sustain positive feelings. Both are responses to the experience of being devalued or marginalized, and in this sense can be seen as forms of resistance to inequality. What dramaturgy reveals here is how self-related emotion can drive social change. What dramaturgy also suggests is how, as with efforts to counter stigma, resistance can have paradoxical effects. For example, creating a creditable self within an oppositional culture can diminish an individual's chances for upward mobility. Likewise, some identity projects, if they are not compartmentalized, carry the risk of exclusion from mainstream networks and rewards.

Of course, not all identity projects are resistant or progressive; some are conservative, even reactionary. For example, efforts to revalue white identity among working-class white males, though arising in part from class inequality, nonetheless embrace and seek to reinforce white supremacy (Ferber 1999). A less extreme example is the mythopoetic men's movement of the early 1990s. The middle-class white men who populated this movement felt stung by feminist criticism that cast them as oppressive patriarchs, and thus sought to reconstruct "man" as a moral identity (Schwalbe 1996). In the process, the men drew upon and reinforced imagery and ideology that was indeed patriarchal and masculinist, despite their denials of sexist intent.

In considering what kind of identity-related action is truly resistant, it is worth distinguishing between oppositional cultures, identity projects, and cultures of solidarity. Oppositional cultures and identity projects, as we see them, are mainly about symbolic resistance (Klapp 1969; Melucci 1989). They offer therapeutic benefit in the form of self-esteem and may challenge mainstream ideas of what is right and good, but they do not amount to collective efforts to alter the institutions that maintain political and economic inequalities. Oppositional cultures and identity projects might thus be said to be more separatist than confrontational.

Cultures of solidarity, in contrast, are explicitly aimed at social change. We take the term

from Fantasia (1988), who offers ethnographic accounts of the emergence of three cultures of solidarity in the context of labor struggles. These cultures of solidarity entailed creating new relationships, networks, and organizations as part of the process of fighting for social and economic justice. The connection to the analysis we offer here is that the impetus for the emergence of these cultures was, in part, the threat to identities that were of central importance to workers (e.g., “breadwinner,” “caregiver,” “productive citizen”). Cultures of solidarity were efforts to protect these identities not merely by holding the status quo in place, but by creating new, more egalitarian economic and political arrangements (see also Schwalbe 2008).

The dramaturgical perspective is useful for seeing how threats to the positive feelings derived from cherished self-images can spur resistance to inequality. Resistance, as we have suggested, can take the form of creating subcultures to support counter-hegemonic, or at least non-mainstream, values, thus creating alternative ways to signify creditable selves. Resistance can likewise manifest in the form of compartmentalized identity projects. Just how much change in the dominant culture these forms of resistance create is an open question; both oppositional cultures and identity projects produce contradictory effects and seem to be easily co-opted. Cultures of solidarity, as Fantasia’s case studies illustrate, can also rise and fall. They do, however, hold the potential for going beyond symbolic resistance to the creation of arrangements that can support new kinds of selves.

Strategic Disruptions of the Interaction Order

Acts of profanation are disruptions of the interaction order, but they are typically undertaken by individuals in isolated encounters, and they mainly express frustration and despair at being denied full personhood. The kind of strategic disruptions we are concerned with here have a more public and political character. These are disruptions that aim to break the patterns of deference

that hold inequalities in place. As noted earlier, interactional rules that enable status unequals to interact without embarrassment have the effect of protecting not only selves but also the hierarchy in which selves are lodged. Challenging such hierarchies requires, by definition, disruption.

Strategic disruptions often take the form of acts that violate expectations for showing deference, and may thus carry considerable emotional force. Heckling a speaker is a common example. Throwing shoes at a speaker—a powerful sign of contempt in Arab culture—is another possibility, as many Westerners learned when an Iraqi journalist threw shoes at former U.S. president George W. Bush during a press conference in 2008. Such disruptions may indeed express individual frustration, but by our definition they have larger political goals: to undermine the moral legitimacy of elites, to challenge the definitions of reality purveyed by elites, and to induce others to contravene the norm of politeness and express their anger. This is why effective disruptions must be public; covert expressions of contempt are unlikely to have much upshot.

Hierarchy on any scale can be challenged by strategic disruption. Hierarchies of authority in families, workplaces, and governments depend on asymmetrical patterns of deference. As long as these patterns persist, so does the legitimacy of the authority structure, and so does the possibility of exploitation by those in power. When exploitation becomes an undeniable reality, to refuse to show deference—to refuse to participate in the symbolic valuing of some selves over others—can be a step toward liberation. It is of course in the interest of elites to define such acts as instances of rudeness, incivility, or maladjustment, rather than as political acts.

Because they threaten the interactional rules on which both the powerful and weak depend for protection of feelings attached to self-images, strategic disruptions can backfire. As suggested, elites may succeed in defining resistant acts as evidence not of legitimate grievances but of maladjustment, perhaps even mental illness. Disrupters are thus vulnerable to being discredited. Even those who would benefit from eradicating exploitative authority relations might reject disruption

as a resistance strategy because it threatens the positive feelings that derive from being seen, by themselves and others, as well-mannered. There may also be a legitimate fear of being targeted for punishment if one does not show respect for prevailing hierarchies.

Non-violent resistance works by using the interaction order to delegitimize oppressive arrangements and the elites who try to preserve those arrangements. When officially-approved violence is used against those who disrupt social order through peaceful non-cooperation or civil disobedience, it is elites who appear to violate normative rules for respecting persons and bodily integrity. The classic example in the U.S. is the civil rights movement. Images of well-dressed, polite black protesters being hosed, beaten by police, and bitten by dogs helped to turn public sentiment against the enforcers of Jim Crow laws. Interpretations of the images varied (see Berger 2011), but many whites, especially in the North, were moved to express sympathy for blacks whose respect-worthy behavior was met with brutality (Morris 1993, p. 630). In this case, a violation of normative rules of interaction helped to generate the public sentiment without which the Kennedy administration might not have intervened to protect protesters and extend civil rights for blacks.

The legitimacy of elite dominance depends on maintaining images of competence and morality. This is a collective dramaturgical front that constructs powerful, respectable virtual selves. Sometimes this front can be shattered by information that exposes elites as inept, corrupt, venal (Welsh 1991; Young 1993). Humor can also be used to the same effect (Paolucci and Richardson 2006). Here we have pointed to the emotional force of public acts that express a refusal to credit the selves of elites in the ways they would like to be credited. Heckling, throwing shoes, mockery, and other acts of public profanation are possibilities. To this list we would add political art—visual, literary, musical—that punctures inequality-sustaining illusions.

Self-Narratives in Social Movements

The self-salvaging tales told by the homeless men in Snow and Anderson's (1987) study are examples of self-narratives, or what we might call identity work in the form of storytelling. It seems clear that this is a generic phenomenon, and that a great deal of self-presentation in everyday life takes narrative form (Holstein and Gubrium 2000; Loseke 2007). When we tell a story about ourselves, we implicitly invite others to impute character to us based on a set of purported historical facts: this is what happened; this is what I felt; this is what I did; this is what others did; this is how it all turned out. Self-presentation in this form is powerful because it creates the impression that character is being truthfully revealed rather than artfully fabricated.

In the context of social movements, self-narratives do more than construct individual selves as dramatic effects. Self-narratives are used to build trust and solidarity; to create collective identity; to elicit empathy and support from allies and policy makers; to recruit new members; to claim a new political identity; and to build movement frames (Hunt and Benford 1994; Polletta 2006; Polletta et al. 2011).⁷ Self-narratives may be more effective for promoting social change than other discursive forms, such as arguments, because of their matter-of-fact description of states of affairs, their basis in seemingly indisputable personal experience, their vividness and memorability, and their emotional force.

The dramaturgical principle here is that constructing a self requires symbolically evoking a world that is confronted, experienced, and

⁷ In the social movements literature, what we are calling "self-narratives" have been called *personal stories* to distinguish them from *movement narratives* (see Snow and Owens, this volume). The latter are stories told by participants about the movement itself, its values, aims, efforts, successes, failures, and so on (Benford 2002). The self-narratives of participants and movement narratives can be closely intertwined, the former often incorporating elements of the latter. Our concern here is with how self-narratives in the context of social movements are used to construct dissident selves and to resist the inequalities that are defined as problematic by the movement. An interesting example is provided by Gongaware (2012).

reacted to by a volitional actor. In social movement narratives, the world evoked is often one in which good people suffer unjustly and, when the situation becomes unbearable, fight back (Benford and Hunt 1992; Snow and Owens, this volume). A movement frame—a definition of the situation and a warrant for changing it through collective action—can thus be embedded in a self-narrative, and perhaps thereby shielded from refutation (Crawley and Broad 2004; Krauss 1993). The effectiveness of self-narratives as disguised framing devices is further enhanced by the interactional rule that other people’s personal stories, when apparently told in good faith, deserve respectful attention.

Like other forms of resistance, self-narratives can have paradoxical effects. As Polletta (1998, 2006) argues, the political impact of stories depends on who is telling what kind of story to whom, when, and under what conditions. Stories can indeed elicit empathy and support for those seeking change. But they can also be dismissed as *mere* stories—that is, as self-serving accounts with no basis in fact. Stories can also evoke counter-stories, as when stories of being thwarted by discrimination are met with stories about women or people of color who persevered, without complaint, and achieved success. As dramaturgy reminds us, the consequences of expressive behavior arise not from that behavior alone, but from the impression it creates in the minds of those who witness it. The problem with stories, then, is that they are inherently ambiguous and always open to counter-interpretation by conservative or reactionary audiences.

Resisting inequality always entails some form of self-reconstruction—to counter stigma in mainstream culture; to claim status in an oppositional community or group; to justify disruption of an oppressive social order; and/or to build social movements. The *reproduction* of inequality requires using interactional rules to maintain a social order in which selves are unequally valued. *Resisting* inequality uses the same rules to signify rejection of that order, in part or full, and to incite rebellions, large and small. In either case, dramaturgy highlights the importance of feelings attached to self-images and to the in-

teractional rules used to manage those feelings. When social arrangements injure those feelings beyond endurance, resistance may escalate from situational repair to structural overhaul.

Theoretical Extensions

A man of a thousand concepts, Goffman casts a shadow over all discussions of dramaturgical theory. That has certainly been the case in this chapter. It would be a mistake, however, to see Goffman as offering the last word. There is in fact a large body of post-Goffman theorizing in the dramaturgical tradition, a tradition that continues to evolve (Jacobsen 2010; Edgley 2013). Here we want to propose several theoretical extensions that can enhance dramaturgy’s utility for understanding inequality as a cause and consequence of what happens in face-to-face interaction. These extensions also have bearing on the more general sociological issue of how to theorize the relationship between agency and structure.

The Body as a Peremptory Signifier

Speaking of selves as crafted dramatic effects exaggerates the extent to which these effects are consciously, strategically, and successfully produced. As Goffman (1959, pp. 2–3) noted, self-presentations consist of information *given* and information *given off*, the latter being impossible to fully control. We give information when we make explicit claims about who and what we are. We give off information by how we speak, how we move, and how we appear. The self that we would like an audience to impute to us based on the information we give might not be the self imputed to us based on the information we give off. Dramaturgy reminds us that the selves we create in interaction are only partially known to us.

The information given off by appearance depends of course on clothing. But it also depends, and may depend more profoundly, on less-ephemeral, “natural” features of the body: skin tone, skin texture, hair texture, hair location,

height, weight, and shape. Conventional readings of these features are used to locate individuals in racial, gender, and age categories. Goffman was well aware that the body functioned as a “sign vehicle” in these ways (1966, p. 33, 1983, p. 14). A useful extension of this idea is to recognize that the body is a special kind of signifier, one that is ever-present and affects the meaning of all acts of self-signification.

It is the body’s presence in face-to-face interaction, its visual primacy, its constancy, and its ability to affect the meaning of other acts of self-signification that make it a peremptory signifier (Schwalbe and Mason-Schrock 1996, p. 140). The case of transgender people who visibly modify their bodies illustrates the use of the body’s semiotic power to elicit attributions of desired gender-category membership. By altering the body’s appearance through the use of hormones and/or surgery, a biological male can succeed in being publicly identified as a woman (Dozier 2005). And vice versa for biological females. However, a body that is clearly perceived as female or male because of its size, shape, hairiness, or musculature is likely to undermine, or at least make problematic, the claim to a discrepant (by conventional standards) gender identity—despite mastery of other acts of gender signification (Mason-Schrock 1996; Gagne et al. 1997; de Vries 2012).

This is not to say that the body as a sign trumps all others, but that it inflects the meaning of all others. Another illustration comes from expectation states research. In experimental task situations, members of high-status categories, such as whites and males, tend to be credited with greater competence and with making more valuable contributions to group efforts (for an overview, see Ridgeway 2010). In dramaturgical terms, we would say that these halo effects arise because bodily features are read as signs of character, and because these same signs affect the meanings given to subsequent actions. This is in fact the experience reported by many of the female-to-male transsexuals studied by Schilt (2006). When perceived as men, these biological females found that their efforts in the workplace

were, seemingly for no other reason, more valued (see also Williams 1995; Martin 2003).

Just as the body can elicit advantageous attributions of character, it can be the basis for stigmatization (see, e.g., Puhl and Heuer 2009 on obesity stigma). We noted earlier that this can mean being targeted for exclusion or exploitation. If so, inequality is reproduced in an obvious way. Recognizing how the body functions as a peremptory signifier suggests a less obvious process. If attributions of competence based on bodily features can boost confidence and “bring out the best in a person,” skepticism about competence, conveyed through subtle cues, can undermine confidence, induce self-consciousness and defensiveness, make interaction awkward, and lead to sub-optimal performance. In other words, when an audience reads bodily features as discrediting, if only in so far as raising small doubts about competence, a process leading to a self-fulfilling prophecy can arise (Snyder 2001; cf. Goffman 1963, p. 14). When this leads to exclusion from networks and denial of opportunities for mobility, inequality is reproduced.

While the body is ever-present as a sign, its power as a sign is often overlooked. As an analytic perspective, dramaturgy can “bring the body back in,” so to speak. Dramaturgy has long recognized the importance of how the body is clothed and decorated (Goffman 1959; Finkelstein 1991; Davis 1992; Scott 2010). Here we have sought to highlight the importance of bodily features that signify category membership and in turn affect character attribution and the outcomes of interaction. Our suggestion has been that by treating the body as a peremptory signifier—one over which individuals may have little control, save for its adornment—we can expose some of the otherwise invisible processes through which situated action reproduces inter-group inequalities.

Expressive Habitus

The body’s power to elicit imputations of character puts one kind of limit on expressive agency. Another limit arises from the ingraining of habits formed in response to the social worlds in which

individuals are raised. These are habits of perception, feeling, and action—inculcated by shared social conditions—that constitute what Bourdieu (1977) called a *habitus*. A habitus is evident in speech, movement, dress, and the other elements of style that constitute an individual's personal front. When we casually refer to a person as carrying the marks of his or her class background, we are usually referring to class habitus.

Again the distinction between information given and given off is crucial. To say, "I'm from the South" is to give information about one's place of origin. To speak with a southern accent is to give off information. While accents can be altered, they tend to be ingrained during early childhood. Speech habits—pronunciation, vocabulary, sentence structure, idioms—are thus rooted in particular social worlds and are taken as signs of a person's ethnic, regional, and class background. They are also a basis on which selves are imputed (Schiffrin 2006). We would thus point to speech habits, ones normally not under conscious control, as elements of an "embodied expressive style" (Hallett 2007, p. 153), or what we are calling *expressive habitus*.

Bourdieu was less concerned with habitus as an aspect of individual identity than with how the class system is reproduced. His argument is that a working-class habitus is poor equipment for interacting confidently, comfortably, and effectively in middle-class and upper-middle-class social worlds. A working-class habitus thus tends to keep those who possess it from moving into more privileged classes. Likewise, class habitus is how those in privileged classes recognize each other and recognize the Others who are to be kept out.

In forwarding the idea of an expressive habitus, we mean to suggest that this process of reproduction depends on self-signifying behaviors that are (a) inculcated in early childhood; (b) adaptive in some environments and not others; (c) deeply ingrained and not normally reflected upon; and (d) the basis for imputing selves that are seen as "out of place" upon straying too far from their worlds of origin. The idea of expressive habitus may be especially useful for understanding how inequality is reproduced invisibly. Bourdieu (1984) made this point with regard to

cultural capital. Those who are excluded because they don't have the kind of cultural capital valued in a group or class to which they aspire, are often oblivious to the basis for their exclusion. Our point is similar: to the extent that expressive habitus operates beneath conscious awareness—often for both actors and audiences—exclusion that reproduces inequality can seem to occur without malicious intent, or without intent at all.

Bodies, as discussed in the previous section, signify by virtue of their size, shape, and color. Here we have pointed to the socially patterned conditioning of bodies at the levels of neural pathways and muscle memory, a conditioning that engenders an expressive habitus. We have used examples linked to speech subcultures and to class. Gender is another example. One reason that gender seems so natural and uncalculated is that the gendered selves we construct are in large part consequences of expressive habitus. When males put on "manhood acts" (Schrock and Schwalbe 2009; Vaccaro et al. 2011), signify creditable masculine selves, and thereby claim membership in the gender category "men," many elements of the act are so deeply ingrained that the act seems like no act at all.

Dramaturgy helps us see how the body's potential as a self-making tool is both realized and limited by its social trajectory. The concept of expressive habitus reminds us that much of the behavior on which attributions of character are based is not normally reflected upon, not strategic, not easily changed, entirely authentic, and yet thoroughly social, arising from the conditions of life shared by members of economic classes, racial and ethnic groups, sex categories, and so on. This conception also speaks to the role of agency in the process of social reproduction. While habitus is not normally reflected upon, it *can* be (Bourdieu 2001; Messner 2000). Much of our self-signifying behavior may indeed be instilled in us by conditions outside our awareness or control, but we retain the capacity to become aware of that behavior, alter it, and create new selves.

Nets of Accountability

Dramaturgy is usually thought of as a social psychology of situations. Its utility for analyzing larger systems of inequality is thus generally seen as limited. But if systems are understood as sustainable only because of what happens in situations, then dramaturgy (or some social psychology of interaction) is essential for analyzing the reproduction of systemic inequality.⁸ What classical dramaturgy lacks, however, is a way to think about how situations are linked such that large-scale patterns of social action—what we otherwise call “systems”—are maintained. An expanded notion of accountability can fill this theoretical gap.

As discussed earlier, accountability refers to the condition of being potentially subject to the demand to explain or justify one’s behavior. The importance of accountability within a situation is clear: the course of any encounter depends on who is potentially accountable to whom for what, and on the actual demands that are made and accounts that are given (Scott and Lyman 1968; Orbuch 1997; Cook 2006; Hollander 2013). But it is also clear, though often forgotten, that situations do not exist in a vacuum. The actors whose assemblage constitutes a “situation” are always enmeshed in a network of relationships that extend beyond the situation (Hall 1997). This means that accountability also potentially extends beyond the situation. The concept of *nets of accountability* is useful for appreciating how these extended

accountability relationships bear on the reproduction of systemic inequality (Schwalbe 2000, 2005, 2008).

To take a familiar example first, imagine a student refusing to do a required assignment. A teacher might try to hold the student accountable as a *student*, saying that anyone worthy of the identity “student” ought to relish the assignment as a learning opportunity. This form of situated accountability demand implicitly invokes normative rules about how one ought to behave to be worthy of a socially valued identity. For this tack to work, both parties, teacher and student, must share understandings about the identity at risk, about its value, about its proper enactment, and about who can affirm it.

If the normative tack failed, the teacher could say, “What’s more, if you don’t do the assignment, you’ll fail the course and won’t graduate.” This form of accountability demand is different because it implicates other school officials (perhaps also parents and prospective employers). If these other actors do what they’re obliged to do, then the student will indeed fail and lose the anticipated rewards of acquiring a degree. Other actors, if they fail to play by the rules of the organization, could be held accountable and lose the main benefits and side bets riding on their continued employment. What is operating here, *across situations*, is a net of accountability that keeps everyone in line—everyone, that is, who cares about reaping the benefits that ride on continued participation in the activity system called “school.”

Consider another example: a wage worker, unhappy with his or her low rate of pay, walks off the job, shows up in the office of the company’s chief financial officer, and demands a raise. The CFO would no doubt be taken aback, reject the demand, and order the worker out. Why? Because of a net of accountability in which both the worker and the CFO are caught. This net is invoked *symbolically* when the CFO says to the worker, “You’re not supposed to be here. If you don’t leave now, I’ll call security and have you removed, and then you’ll be fired.” If the worker did not comply, the CFO could *activate* the net by communicating with others outside the situation.

⁸ To say that understanding how a system of inequality is reproduced requires attention to what happens in face-to-face interaction is not to say that such a system can be *explained* by analysis limited to the interactional level. Even the most sophisticated discernment of the rules and procedural forms that guide interaction in a capitalist society will not delineate capitalist relations of production, let alone explain how those relations came to be. However, if one wishes to know how those relations of production are sustained over time, it is necessary to understand what it is that people do together, and how they do it, in a great many spatially-distributed situations. As argued in the text, exploitive social arrangements persist on any scale only because of asymmetrical patterns of deference. Dramaturgy can give us insight into why these patterns are hard to change, and into what it would take to change them (cf. Giddens 1987, pp. 138–139).

If we say that the chief financial officer's actions "make sense" in this example, it is because we understand that to violate the usual rules of procedure and give the worker a raise would put at risk the material and emotional benefits that ride on the CFO keeping his or her job. We understand, in other words, the net of accountability within which the executive acts. In Goffman's terms, we might say that knowledge of the operative, or invocable, net of accountability exists as a shared cognitive presupposition; all parties tacitly know that such a net exists, and behave accordingly. Rules might nonetheless be broken, but under ordinary circumstances the costs of violation will be prohibitive. What is thus preserved are not just the jobs of a worker and an executive. When workers everywhere are held accountable as workers, and executives everywhere are held accountable as executives, capitalism itself is preserved.⁹

In these examples, actors assess situations, present fronts, take lines, exchange demands and accounts, and thereby create selves in an encounter. But the selves they can create and the lines of action they can take depend on rule-governed relationships that encompass the encounter. All parties are compelled to do certain things and not others by the accountability demands that could come from others who make up a spatially-distributed activity system, in one case called "school" and in the other case called "the corporation" or "the capitalist economy." As our examples suggest, nets of accountability are often symbolically invoked in a first attempt to put people back in line. If this fails, nets of accountability can be activated by communicating with others outside a situation. It is this communication that forms the strands of the net.

⁹ Our example greatly simplifies the situation. It is not only workers and managers who are caught in the net of accountability that sustains capitalist relations of production. The net includes workers, managers, shareholders, regulators, bankers, merchants, legislators, police, judges, social workers, neighbors, partners/spouses, relatives, children, and others. Our point is that to understand how and why actors do what they do to keep the system going, it is necessary to consider how actors are subject to multiple, inescapable accountability demands.

In sum, we can say that mutual awareness of how nets of accountability can be activated enables and constrains actors' situated behavior. Who can confidently demand deference from whom, who can claim the prerogatives of higher social value, who can safely express contempt for whom, and who can make demands of whom depend not just on shared norms but on the larger pattern of relationships, often legally codified, within which every encounter is embedded. These extra-situational relationships are invisible structural presences in every encounter. The concept of nets of accountability makes these presences visible, reminding us that encounters always draw upon and reproduce far more than is implied by the usual notion of a face-to-face encounter.

Affinities with Other Perspectives

In their introduction to *Life as Theater*, Brissett and Edgley (1991, pp. 23–26) note that dramaturgy does not offer a formal theory of human behavior. Rather, they say, dramaturgy aims to describe the orderliness of interaction and how this orderliness is accomplished by drawing on ritual forms, tacit rules, and other elements of symbolic culture to fashion intelligible expressive behavior. Because it is more descriptive than explanatory, Brissett and Edgley go on to say, dramaturgy is compatible with multiple perspectives in social psychology. We agree. On the other hand, the affinities are stronger in some cases than in others. Here we want to suggest how these affinities between dramaturgy and other perspectives can be used to enhance social psychological understandings of how inequality is reproduced and resisted.

In discussing the body as a signifier, we suggested that the cognitive biases documented by expectation-states research are consequences of how bodies are read as signs of character, and how the body, as a peremptory signifier, affects the way other expressive behaviors are interpreted. Others have noted this connection between dramaturgy and the expectation-states perspective (see, e.g., Branaman 2003, pp. 112–115). The connection could be exploited further by at-

tention to the forms of self-signification—bodily, gestural, verbal—that activate cognitive biases (cf. Berger et al. 1986 on *status cues*). Bodies matter, as per our earlier argument, for locating individuals in social categories. But as analysts of non-verbal behavior suggest (see, e.g., Henley 1986 Rashotte 2002; Waskul and van der Riet 2002), other cues, often so subtle as to pass beneath conscious awareness, can affirm or contradict the status claims made by the body. Expectation states research that is more alert to expressive behavior might identify these cues and their relationship to patterns of cognitive bias. One analytic task would be to show how elements of an expressive habitus create haloed selves for some and degraded selves for others.

To speak of expressive behavior as activating cognitive biases suggests an affinity between dramaturgy and social cognition. Elements of behavior are expressive only because there exist cognitive schemas that render them perceivable and interpretable. Dramaturgy largely takes these schemas for granted as part of the shared cultural equipment acquired by members of a community. But of course they need not be taken for granted; they can be subject to analysis in their own right, as in studies of “person perception” (Rosch 1978; Babcock 1989; Friedman and Waggoner 2010). The typical approach in studies of social cognition is, however, not very social; what goes on in people’s heads is often detached from what goes on between people.

A merging of dramaturgy and social cognition would offer a more genuinely social approach. One possibility is to look at how cognitive schemas, especially those related to person perception, are activated, negotiated, and modified interactively. It seems reasonable to suppose that part of what self-signifying behavior does, with varying degrees of intentionality, is to signify the schema through which one wishes one’s subsequent expressive behavior to be viewed. It also seems reasonable to suppose that one actor’s proffered schema, or attempt to activate a particular schema, could be rejected by others, necessitating negotiation. This is in fact close to what Goffman (1974) describes in terms of fram-

ing and the negotiation of frames (see Baptista 2003; Tannen 1993, 2009).

What is still needed, however, for the purpose of understanding the reproduction of inequality, is analysis of the political content of cognitive schemas. Ways of perceiving and interpreting the world—and especially ways of perceiving and interpreting people—are never politically neutral; they always incorporate premises that reflect relations of domination and subordination. This is one reason why the same act performed by a member of a dominant group and by a member of a subordinated group can be read so differently. Thus any rapprochement between dramaturgy and social cognition must include consideration of the ideological elements of cognitive schemas. To understand why it is harder for some people than others to establish creditable selves, even when behaving in similar ways, the politics of knowledge structures must be taken into account.

Despite its unconventional conception of the self as a dramatic effect, dramaturgy retains a strong affinity with other social psychologies of the self. In dramaturgy, the self is not an inner dialogue, but there is room for the notion of a “theater of the mind.” In this imaginary theater, actors rehearse and monitor their self-presentations, with consequences for the performances that are visible to external audiences. One link to inequality is that obsessive self-monitoring, or “high dramaturgical awareness,” can plague members of subordinate groups when interacting with members of dominant groups (Snyder 1987). As we suggested earlier, such extreme self-consciousness can lead to awkward interaction and sub-optimal performance. Here again there is potential for analytic gain by taking into account not just the back stage but the inner stage.

And while dramaturgy does not foreground the self-concept, neither does it ignore the self-concept. Goffman repeatedly said that expressive behavior serves to protect the strong feelings attached to self-images; that expressive behavior is fashioned to uphold valued self-conceptions; and that resistant behavior is often sparked by threats to valued self-conceptions (Goffman 1961a, p. 55, 189, 1967, pp. 50–51). These ideas have been embraced and expanded upon by other

social psychologists of the self (Turner 1968; Gecas 1982; Callero 2003; Callero, this volume). So while dramaturgy offers a different view of what the self *is*—an image created by expressive behavior in situated interaction, rather than a psychological process or entity—this view is not incompatible with other approaches to the self-concept.

Another idea shared by dramaturgy and other social psychologies of the self is that the desire to protect self-feelings can have a conservative effect. Status hierarchies are upheld, we argued earlier, when people try to avoid humiliation, shame, and embarrassment by claiming no more social value for themselves than the prevailing hierarchy allots. Parallel arguments suggest that unequal social relations are stabilized by desires to protect identities based on those relations (Swann 1983; Burke et al. 2007) and on desires to derive self-efficacy from activities in subordinate roles (Gecas and Schwalbe 1983). But while there is an important overlapping idea here—the importance of self-conceptions—dramaturgy directs our attention outward, away from psychological dynamics. What dramaturgy helps us see is that the situational defense of self-images is a crucial part of the process whereby culture, social organization, and all the inequalities they entail are reproduced.

As Rosenberg (1981) argued, the self is a powerful social force in its own right. As we also argued earlier, resistance is often sparked by conditions that threaten the valued self-images/self-conceptions of members of subordinated groups. Goffman (1961a) examined this phenomenon in mental asylums, but the same principle can be applied to collective action on larger scales, as for example when macroeconomic policies cause unemployment and thereby threaten the cherished identities of millions of people. Such conditions are ripe for the emergence of mass resistance (Calhoun 1983). Dramaturgy again directs our attention to how people try to use and, if necessary, change existing normative rules to create creditable selves. Mainstream social psychologies of the self-concept can help us understand what is at stake for individuals. Dramaturgy can help us

understand how people respond, individually and collectively, to threats to valued self-conceptions.

There are overlaps and affinities between dramaturgy and still other social-psychological perspectives. At the outset of this chapter we noted the overlaps with symbolic interactionism and ethnomethodology (cf. Rawls 1987, 1989). Overlaps with semiotics (MacCannell 1976; Perinbanayagam 1991), sociolinguistics (Goffman 1981b; Rampton 2009; Tannen 2009; Harrison 2011), and sociology of emotions (Hochschild 1983; Vaccaro et al. 2011; Foy et al. this volume) also have been noted. To the extent that work undertaken from these perspectives focuses on the reproduction of inequality, or resistance to inequality, dramaturgy has something to offer. Dramaturgy's strengths, as we've emphasized, lie in showing how self-signification and self-creation are implicated in the reproduction of inequality, and how the use of rules and standard procedural forms can inadvertently, and often invisibly, help to perpetuate inequality.

Dramaturgy's theoretical openness also means that it can benefit from developments in other areas of social psychology. For example, in this chapter we have used concepts that are central to other social-psychological analyses of inequality: categorization, othering, status, power, stigma, stereotypes, legitimation, and ideology. Refining these concepts can help sharpen the dramaturgical perspective. Theoretical development through this kind of assimilation is to be hoped for. Even more important, however, is the sharpening that comes from studies of the social world—studies of who does what to whom, with whom, how, under what conditions, such that inequality is created, reproduced, and resisted.

Conclusion

We began by discussing the importance dramaturgy places on rules and enabling conventions, which are tacitly known and drawn upon—like the rules of a game, or the grammatical rules of a language—to make interaction orderly, predictable, and meaningful. We then discussed the dramaturgical view of the self as both a dramatic ef-

fect and a structural effect. The self is a dramatic effect in that it is an imputation based on interpretation of expressive behavior. It is a structural effect in two senses: expressive behavior and its interpretation depend on shared cultural equipment (cognitive presuppositions, tacit knowledge of rules, mastery of ritual forms); and on where individuals are located in activity systems. This view of the self is useful, we argued, for understanding how inequalities in status, income, wealth, political rights, and life chances are reproduced by situated action. Dramaturgy reminds us, we might say, that if *equality* depends on all actors in a situation being able to create a fully creditable self, *inequality* depends on making this impossible for some people to do.

We used the concept of accountability to suggest how the unequal arrangements that allow only some people to create creditable selves are held in place. To be accountable is to be potentially subject to the demand to explain or justify one's actions, especially those that are seen as expressive of membership in social categories. We used the familiar example of gender, noting that gender inequalities are held in place in part because people hold each other accountable for "doing gender properly"—that is, for signifying maleness or femaleness, signifying embrace of the identity "man" or "woman," and signifying a masculine or feminine self. To the extent that these binary categories remain unequally valued in Western society—and unequally valued to the benefit of males/men—to be held accountable for doing gender properly is to be held accountable for doing one's part in reproducing the vestiges of patriarchy.

We also noted that the same process of reproduction can operate whenever people hold each other accountable for signifying membership in social categories to which are attached unequal rights and privileges. Dramaturgy, though not offering a complex theory of psychodynamics, suggests that what makes individuals responsive to accountability demands—and thus tied to systems of inequality—is a desire to protect the positive feelings derived from the self-images created in interaction. Dramaturgy thus provides a way to see how emotions, especially emotions linked

to the self, are implicated in the reproduction of inequality. Even as the rules and procedures underlying the interaction order are drawn upon to make situated interaction smooth, predictable, and emotionally safe, larger structural inequalities are being reproduced.

By showing how inequality is reproduced, dramaturgy simultaneously shows how it can be resisted. We considered four forms this resistance takes: identity work to counter stigma; the creation of oppositional cultures and identity projects; strategic disruptions of the interaction order; and self-narratives in social movements. We also distinguished between resistance that is largely individual and symbolic, and resistance that becomes collective and aims for institutional change. Situated, self-expressive action remains crucial in both cases, because such action drives the creation of new meanings, new definitions of reality, and new relationships. As an analytic perspective, dramaturgy directs our attention to the study of how these processes unfold. It also suggests, again, the importance of emotions attached to self-images, in that dramaturgy leads us to expect resistance when current social arrangements make it impossible to sustain the self-images on which subordinates rely to maintain a modicum of self-respect.

Several theoretical extensions were proposed to enhance dramaturgy's utility for analyzing the reproduction of inequality. We proposed that the body can be seen as a peremptory signifier, one that locates individuals in unequally-valued social categories and also inflects the meaning of other acts of self-signification. The natural features of bodies thus give off information that is used to maintain relations of domination and subordination. We also proposed that individuals give off information in the form of an expressive habitus that is again used to impute character and to mark boundaries for inclusion and exclusion. By calling attention to the consequentiality of expressive habitus, dramaturgy makes visible a process of social reproduction that normally operates beneath conscious awareness. Finally, as a way to overcome the problem of situationalism, we discussed the concept of nets of accountability, a concept that helps us see how situations are

linked in ways that ultimately reproduce the exploitive social systems of which they are parts.

While dramaturgy is often seen as a marginal perspective in social psychology, it is in fact closely aligned, or alignable, with other social-psychological perspectives. Dramaturgy gives center stage, so to speak, to *how* people use rules, procedural forms, and signs to maintain the orderliness of everyday life. We suggested that this analytic mission can be aided by insights from other social-psychological traditions, especially those concerned with social cognition, halo effects, unconscious cognitive biases, and the self-concept. We would also suggest that the contribution can run in the other direction. With its focus on what happens in face-to-face interaction, dramaturgy offers a way to see more precisely how social cognition, unconscious cognitive biases, and the self-concept *matter* for what happens between people.

As a broad characterization, what makes a social psychology sociological is a concern for understanding how what happens between people is enabled and constrained by the larger social world within which people encounter each other. And whatever their in-built analytic concerns might be, social psychologies can also be used in more or less sociological ways. Dramaturgy, we would contend, is a distinctly sociological social psychology, with its concerns for symbolic culture—rules, values, category schemes, rituals, language—and for social organization—activity systems, institutions, and inter-situational networks. It also lends itself, as we have tried to show, to tackling big sociological problems—the maintenance of social order, the reproduction of inequality, the nature of resistance and change—by cutting them down to the size of encounters in which selves are credited or profaned.

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Jocelyn A. Hollander and Miriam J. Abelson

Language and talk are central to social life, and thus to the creation and reproduction of inequality, as well as resistance to it. Language is the medium for categorizing people into social groups and for creating stereotypes attached to those groups. Talk is how people share status beliefs, apply stigma, and exchange power and resources. Through talk, people exercise dominance, perform deference, and resist oppression. Though language and talk are not the only means for doing these things, they play a central role in the construction and deconstruction of inequality.

It is curious, then, that many social psychologists have neglected the role of language and talk in inequality processes. For example, although talk is the conduit for many social exchanges, the experimental methodology used in much exchange research virtually removes talk from the interaction (see Thye and Kalkhoff, this volume). Talk is also fundamental to the development of status structures in small groups, but most research in this vein fails to mention the central role of verbal communication in these processes (see Ridgeway and Nakagawa, this volume). With few exceptions, little social psychological

theory and research has paid explicit attention to language and talk.

In this chapter, we review the existing social psychological research on language and talk across multiple disciplines (including sociology, psychology, linguistics, and communication). Language and talk are related to inequality in three distinct ways. First, people's talk is an indicator of inequality, a way that differences in status and power become visible to observers. Second, people use language to disguise their efforts to create or reduce inequality, such as through the use of humor and other "depoliticizing" strategies (Ng and Bradac 1993). Finally, talk is a way that inequality is "done" or accomplished in social interaction. Our review below covers each of these approaches. In particular, we focus on research that addresses three major questions: How is inequality visible in language and talk? How do language and talk create and sustain inequalities? And how do people respond to inequality—whether to resist it, negotiate it, or manage it—through language and talk? As will become clear, some social psychological traditions have had much more to say about these questions than others.

We begin by discussing the intellectual roots of this research, which entails a discussion of the multiple theoretical perspectives on language and talk. We then review the current literature, organizing our discussion by the type of process under consideration. We begin with the most micro: words and other elementary elements of talk. We then discuss utterances, or verbal moves made by an individual abstracted from the con-

J. A. Hollander (✉) · M. J. Abelson
Department of Sociology, University of Oregon,
Eugene, OR 97403, USA
e-mail: jocelynh@uoregon.edu

M. J. Abelson
Department of Women, Gender, and Sexuality Studies,
Portland State University
Portland, OR 97207, USA

text in which they are embedded. We turn next to that social context, examining how inequality is created and maintained in the course of social interaction (i.e., talk among more than one person). Finally, we examine discourse, or the shared cultural narratives that inform, but exist above the level of, the individual interaction. Of course, these distinctions are purely analytical. In everyday life, these various processes are intertwined; for example, utterances never exist without some social context, and discourse could not exist without the words and interactions that comprise it. We conclude with a critical evaluation of the field.

Intellectual Roots and Theoretical Perspectives

Traditional Psychological Approaches to Language

Much of social psychology fails to problematize talk and language, seeing it simply as a vehicle for displaying underlying cognitive states (Wiggins and Potter 2008). For example, paper-and-pencil scales are deeply reliant on language; participants respond to questions about their internal states (e.g., thoughts, attitudes, or emotions) using words and sentences, and psychologists implicitly assume that language is simply a vehicle for conveying those states to the analyst. This approach uses the “encoding/decoding paradigm” (Krauss and Chiu 1998, p. 43), also called the “conduit metaphor” (Reddy 1979), which conceptualizes language as a code that transmits meaning to others, who decode it to reveal the speaker’s intended meaning. This approach, though still dominant, has been troubled by recent theory and research. Context, for example, can affect the meaning of an utterance; the same statement can mean very different things to different people, and speakers take this knowledge into account when generating talk and when evaluating the meaning of a message (e.g., Grice 1969; Krauss 1987).

An alternative approach to cognitivism is the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (also known as the Whorfian or the linguistic relativity hypothesis), which

postulates that the language a person speaks affects how that person thinks (Whorf 1956). This hypothesis was the subject of extensive criticism in the 1970s and 1980s but has recently received renewed attention (e.g., Boroditsky 2011; Gumperz and Levinson 1996). In this view, language is not simply a vehicle for transmitting information or sentiment about inequality, but may actually play a role in the creation (or eradication) of inequality (Mueller 1973).

Symbolic Interactionism

Symbolic interactionists have, from the beginning, been concerned with language and talk. Mead (1934) argued that people use *significant symbols* to communicate; one person emits the symbol (a vocal gesture), which elicits the same response in the listener. (The link to the conduit metaphor is clear here.) Words are the most important significant symbols: “Words make all other symbols possible. Acts, objects, and other words exist and have meaning only because they have been and can be described through the use of words” (Ritzer 1996, pp. 211–212).

Also important for contemporary social psychological discussions of language, Mead emphasized the importance of perspective taking. To develop a fully human self, people must learn to take the role of other people with whom they interact. Words and utterances have multiple meanings, and so in order to communicate effectively, people must be able to take the role of their interlocutors to anticipate how they might respond to their behavior (see also Cooley 1902).

Speech Act Theory

An important root for much contemporary social psychological research on language is speech act theory (Austin 1962; Searle 1969), which grew out of work in the philosophy of language (especially Wittgenstein 1958). Austin argued that language is not simply a vehicle for communicating information; people use language to accomplish particular actions, or, as the title of

his 1962 book summarizes, to “do things with words.” A classic example is the statement “I do” in a wedding ceremony; these words do not simply state an opinion or report an event but actually create a new social relationship between two people (and indeed, two families). From this perspective, inequality is not simply expressed by language, but can be accomplished through the act of speaking.

Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis

Ethnomethodology (Garfinkel 1967) is concerned with the “folk methods” of everyday life; that is, people’s organized, everyday practices that collectively constitute social life and accomplish social organization. Ethnomethodologists have studied a wide range of institutional settings and everyday practices, but two strands of research are particularly relevant for our purposes.

The first involves the practices that accomplish gender and other social statuses. This work grows out of Garfinkel’s (1967) study of Agnes, a young transgender woman who had been categorized male at birth but who, at age sixteen, began to feel and dress like a girl. Agnes had to learn to act like a woman in order to be perceived (and to perceive herself) as one; Garfinkel argued that Agnes’ process of learning to be a woman illuminates the taken-for-granted practices that all women (and all men) must learn in order to become, in a sociological sense, a woman or a man. This line of reasoning was taken up by Candace West and Don Zimmerman, who developed a theory of “doing gender” (West and Zimmerman 1987), also influenced by Goffman’s (1976) concept of “gender display.” West, together with Sarah Fenstermaker (2002, 1995), later extended this theory to other social statuses, especially race and class. Although it does not focus explicitly on language, the theory relies heavily on Heritage’s (1984) notion of accounts, which brings language squarely into the picture.

The second (and occasionally overlapping) strand of research is conversation analysis (CA).

CA focuses on naturalistic talk (or “talk-in-interaction”) in specific, concrete social contexts. Through fine-grained, inductive analysis of empirical examples of conversation, conversation analysts examine how conversation is organized and how talk accomplishes social action. Like speech act theory, CA argues that “the everyday actions we take for granted, particularly when conversation runs off smoothly, are accomplishments, collaboratively achieved by all parties in a conversation” (Wilkinson and Kitzinger 2008, p. 56). For our purposes, CA demonstrates both how inequality is *visible* in talk and how talk-in-interaction is a way of *doing* inequality. Some writers have argued that CA’s focus on the micro details of conversation precludes attention to issues of power and inequality (e.g., Billig 1999; Lakoff 2008; Wetherell 1998). Kitzinger contends, however, that this attention to the details of interaction make CA “a useful technique for understanding how, in our ordinary, mundane interactions, we produce the social order we inhabit—in other words, how we ‘do’ power and powerlessness, oppression and resistance” (Kitzinger 2000, p. 174).

Discourse Analysis

Discourse analysis denotes a diverse set of approaches to the study of language and text. Several types of discourse analysis are especially important to an analysis of inequality. Foucauldian discourse analysis (Arribas-Ayllon and Walkerdine 2008) is distinguished by its attention to historical inquiry (i.e., ‘genealogy’), power, and the process of subjectification. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) focuses on power relations within societies and on the production of domination through the discourses of elites (van Dijk 1993). CDA conceptualizes cognition as the key macro-micro link between discourse and inequality. The main processes through which dominance is produced and maintained are justification and legitimation. This is most centrally accomplished through the twin processes of positive self-presentation and negative other presentation. Van Dijk refers to this as “the ‘ideological square’

model by which ‘our’ positive actions and ‘their’ negative actions are emphasized on the one hand, and ‘our’ negative actions and ‘their’ positive actions are hedged, mitigated or excluded on the other” (Amer 2009, p. 10).

Discursive Psychology

Discursive psychology (Edwards 1997; Potter 1996) is a relatively new development within psychology. Like conversation analysis, it focuses on empirical instances of naturalistic speech and analyzes them as social action. Like CA, discursive psychology sees talk as situated in particular conversational, institutional, and rhetorical contexts. (Note that to discursive psychologists “discourse” means simply talk or text; we use “discourse” in a narrower way in this chapter.)

Discursive psychology critiques traditional psychological ideas about language. For example, conventional attitudes research relies heavily on forced choice attitude scales. But discursive psychology finds that the same speaker may evaluate the same object quite differently in different social contexts. Further, people offer evaluations, and more generally, construct descriptions of the world around them, for particular ends (Edwards and Potter 1992). Thus a discursive psychologist sees “attitudes” as “situated practices of evaluation or assessment” (Wiggins and Potter 2008, p. 76), not as transparent indicators of internal cognitive states.

Summary

As this discussion makes clear, approaches to language vary widely. Some see language as a means of communicating information, while others conceptualize it as a tool for accomplishing social action. Some prioritize social context, while others analyze language abstracted from its rhetorical and social contexts. What these various approaches have in common, however, is the recognition that language and talk are fundamental tools of social interaction and organization. In the remainder of this chapter, we summarize

the research to date on the relationship between language, talk, and inequality. We begin with the most elementary building blocks of talk: those elements of language that are components of individual utterances.

Elements of Talk

Language Choice

The very choice of which language to speak may both signal and reproduce inequality (Heller 1995). This is especially true in situations of asymmetrical power and where the parties speak different languages or with different fluencies. For example, Barrett’s (2006) analysis of interactions in a Texas restaurant found that Anglo managers typically used English, mixed with elements of “Mock Spanish,” to communicate with their Spanish-speaking employees. When miscommunications occurred, managers blamed employees rather than questioning their own language practices, thus exacerbating the inequality between managers and workers. More generally, Roth-Gordon (2011) argues that language choices are “critical to asserting one’s whiteness and one’s status as a legal citizen, to justifying access to rights and resources, and to publicly professing patriotic loyalty and national belonging” (p. 214). Roth-Gordon cites examples of bilingual Spanish speakers who have been suspended from school or fired from their jobs for speaking Spanish, and of judges who offer Latino defendants the option of English classes as an alternative to jail time; both these practices clearly reinforce linguistic hierarchies. Choice of language can also be a way of resisting inequality. In Barrett’s research, for example, Latino restaurant workers used Spanish to communicate with each other as a sign of solidarity and resistance to managers’ domination.

Accent and Linguistic Style

Speakers’ voices convey information about their sex, regional origin, sexual orientation, and social class (e.g., Ellis 1967; Gaudio 1994; Labov

1966). Others can use these qualities of voice as the basis for discrimination and inequality. Research across a variety of fields has demonstrated discrimination based on accent (e.g., Mallinson and Brewster 2005; Roberts et al. 1992; Ryan and Carranza 1975). Suspects are judged as more guilty, for example, when they speak in nonstandard accents (Dixon et al. 2002). In general, “standard accents are rated more positively than nonstandard accents, especially on traits associated with competence or status (e.g., intelligence or literacy). For this reason, accent use may systematically (dis)advantage speakers in institutional contexts such as job interviews, medical consultations, and classrooms” (Dixon et al. 2002, p. 162; see also Callan et al. 1983; Giles and Powlsland 1975).

Speakers’ age is also apparent in their speech, and a large literature has found that listeners judge older-sounding speakers to be incompetent and dependent in a variety of ways (e.g., Giles et al. 1993). In response, younger people often use “baby talk” or other kinds of patronizing speech with older people, a pattern that can damage older people’s self-esteem and well-being, reduce opportunities for interaction, and increase dependence (Reid and Ng 1999; Ryan et al. 1995). Listeners may also discriminate on the basis of perceptions of social class or ethnicity (Giles and Powlsland 1975; Sebastian and Ryan 1985; Smedley and Bayton 1978).

Speech styles are not simply the basis for unequal treatment; they may themselves limit what speakers can say—and, perhaps, think. Bernstein (1971) proposed the existence of two distinct speech styles: an “elaborated” language code, which allows for generalization and abstract reasoning, and a “restricted” code, which focuses on concrete description, relies on shared background and context, and discourages analysis and generalization. These codes derive from individuals’ socialization experiences and environments, and are linked to class backgrounds. Bernstein suggests that those who are limited to a restricted code are less likely to succeed in the educational system. Mueller (1973) argues that these codes reinforce existing social inequalities by limiting the ability of restricted code speak-

ers to analyze and understand the effects of social structure on their own circumstances. These contentions, however, are not without controversy (e.g., Labov 1972).

Speakers may also choose to use a linguistic style associated with a social group to achieve a particular end. Kiesling (2001a), for example, found that white fraternity members used Black linguistic styles in specific situations, such as during confrontations or when boasting of physical power. These men “thus draw on a cultural model of race in which White men dominate a more privileged intellectual/rational hierarchy and Black men dominate a less privileged physical/emotional hierarchy” (p. 103). Kiesling argues that this linguistic appropriation reaffirms race-based inequality. Shankar (2008) examines the use of different linguistic styles by South Asian immigrant teenagers in Silicon Valley. Some use standard English, which positions them as a “model minority,” aligned with whiteness. Others, in contrast, use a stylized “FOB” (“Fresh Off the Boat”) style, combining Punjabi, hip-hop and California slang, and Desi-accented English, that aligns them with other immigrant teenagers; this strategy may provide short-term power but can be a source of long-term material and social inequality.

A great deal of research across disciplines concerns the existence and consequences of different male and female speech styles or “registers.” In a ground-breaking book, Lakoff (1975) claimed that women use a female speech register that includes expressive intonation, tag questions (e.g., “That’s a beautiful painting, isn’t it?”), empty adjectives (“adorable” or “sweet”), weak expletives (“oh dear” instead of “damn”), rising intonation when making declarative statements, and hedges (“kinda”). According to Lakoff, this female register “submerges a women’s personal identity, by denying her the means of expressing herself strongly, on the one hand, and encouraging expressions that suggest triviality in subject matter and uncertainty about it... The ultimate effect of these discrepancies is that women are systematically denied access to power, on the grounds that they are not capable of holding it as demonstrated by their linguistic behavior”

(1975, p. 7). Subsequent research has found little empirical support for many of the differences postulated by this early research (see McHugh and Hambaugh 2010). Although “powerless” speech styles (O’Barr and Atkins 1980) do result in lower perceptions of competence and status (see Ng and Bradac 1993), women’s and men’s speech are much more similar than they are different (Crawford 2001), and many differences are caused more by situation, social role, topic, power, and the expectations of others than by gender (Carli 1990). It has also become clear that linguistic features do not have a unitary meaning. Tag questions, for example, can indicate uncertainty, invite participation, or soften a criticism (Holmes 1992). The main message of Lakoff’s work remains, however: linguistic style reflects and reinforces social inequalities.

Word Choice

The words a speaker (or writer) chooses to use also contribute to inequality. Words are never neutral; speakers and writers may choose from a variety of ways of expressing a single idea, and the words they choose reveal the stances they take toward that idea. In a fascinating recent piece of research, Gaucher et al. (2011) found, first, that job advertisements frequently employ gendered wording (i.e., words associated with gender stereotypes, such as *challenge* or *lead*), and second, that even very subtle differences in wording affected participants’ perceptions of the jobs. Specifically, “masculine wording in job advertisements leads to less anticipated belongingness and job interest among women” (p. 119), even though no participant in their research consciously noticed the gendered language in the advertisements they read. The authors argue that this pattern may contribute to gender inequality, especially in male-dominated fields. In a related study, Madera et al. (2009; see also Schmader et al. 2007) found patterns of gendered language in letters of recommendation for faculty positions in psychology. Letter-writers described women as less agentic and more communal than men. These patterns have real-world

consequences: candidates with letters describing more communal traits were rated as less hireable than candidates whose letters emphasized agentic characteristics.

Because word choice is so consequential, a great deal of political struggle focuses on how people, events, and experiences will be described. Naming a social problem makes it visible, as with the feminist naming of date rape, sexual harassment, and domestic violence in the 1970s. Similarly, “the ability to choose a name for one’s own group, rather than being named by others (e.g., lesbian—not female homosexual; African American—not Negro) is empowering, and, when others gradually adopt the name, their use conveys social respect” (Smith et al. 2010, p. 362).

Verb choices can be especially consequential. Verbs vary in their degree of concreteness; concrete verbs (e.g., *to punch*) attribute responsibility for behavior to situations, whereas abstract verbs (e.g., *to be aggressive*) suggest that people’s enduring dispositions are responsible. Choices of verb forms tend to be self-serving; people tend to use concrete verbs (implying situational causes) when talking about themselves, about undesirable behaviors of ingroup members, or about desirable behaviors of outgroup members, but use abstract verbs (implying dispositional causes) when talking about undesirable behaviors of outgroup members or desirable behaviors of ingroup members (Guerin 1994; Maass et al. 1989). These verb choices perpetuate inequality: research by Wigboldus et al. (2000), among others, has found that those who hear or read abstract descriptions of an outgroup’s negative behavior are more likely to develop stereotyped views of the outgroup. The authors note that these kinds of “subtle linguistic strategies may lead to undetected or undetectable forms of discrimination in everyday life... This research opens new avenues toward not only understanding how cultural stereotypes are maintained but also explaining why they are so difficult to change” (p. 17).

Finally, verb voice can also reinforce inequality. Research on news reporting of sexual violence finds, for example, that reporters often use passive verbs to describe violence against women

(e.g., “a woman was raped,” rather than “a man raped a woman”), and this construction may lead readers to perceive the perpetrator as less responsible and the victim as less harmed; they also may become more accepting of rape myths and of violence toward women (Henley et al. 1995). These patterns facilitate violence against women, a major element of gender inequality.

Categories

The process of categorization, or the sorting of people and experiences into groups, is another mechanism of inequality dependent on language (Hollander and Gordon 2006; Tajfel 1978). Although categories can be value-neutral, they rarely are, and categorization is one way that inequality is sustained. Sacks (1972) argued that “social categories provide a means for storing and organizing common-sense cultural knowledge. As a consequence, the sheer mentioning of a category can marshal common-sense knowledge about that category, and can thereby stand as an adequate account for social action” (Whitehead and Lerner 2009, p. 615). For example, using a racial descriptor to refer to a person suggests that race helps explain that person’s behavior.

In an influential article, Holstein and Miller (1990) argue that categorization is not simply descriptive but is an interpretive practice that “unobtrusively advises others in how they should understand persons, circumstances, and behaviors under consideration” (p. 107). Their extended example is the term “victim,” which they describe as a “procedure for deflecting responsibility, assigning causes, specifying responses and remedies, and accounting for failure.” (p. 108) It may also be a procedure for creating inequality; as they argue, “the essence of being a ‘victim’ resides in a person’s perceived lack of control over the harm that he or she has experienced. Thus, to ‘victimize’ someone instructs others to understand the person as a rather *passive*, indeed *helpless*, recipient of injury and injustice... In a sense, ‘victimizing’ a person ‘dis-ables’ that person to the extent that victim status appropriates one’s

personal identity as a competent efficacious actor” (p. 119).

Categories create boundaries and mark particular groups as non-normative. Van Ausdale and Feagin (1996), for example, examine the talk of preschool-aged children and find that even very young children understand racial categories and use them fluently in conversation by, for example, labeling themselves black or white, using racial epithets, or using non-English words to include or exclude others. In Messner et al.’s analysis of televised sports (1993), women were ubiquitously marked as other through the use of categories (e.g., “the *Women’s Final Four*”), terms of reference (e.g., “girls” vs. (male) “players”), and even team names (the “*Lady Vols*”). These practices, they write, construct and legitimize gender and racial hierarchy. A similar phenomenon exists with regard to race: according to Whitehead and Lerner, there is a “*practical asymmetry* between different racial categories in talk-in-interaction, with a taken-for-granted category (e.g., ‘white’) routinely remaining unexpressed (even when relevant), while other race categories are overtly mentioned” (2009, p. 614). This asymmetry means that whiteness “is produced as ‘invisible,’ taken-for-granted, or neutral, and forms the normative background against which other racial categories are viewed” (2009, p. 616; see also Du Bois 1989).

Terms of Address and Reference

Terms of address and reference further serve to create and maintain interpersonal and intergroup inequality. For instance, honorifics indicate hierarchy and social distance; one might call children, secretaries, or service workers by their first names, but physicians by the title “Doctor.” These honorifics also mark age, social class, and, often, gender (Lakoff 1975; Miller and Swift 1976; Spender 1980), and are a clear linguistic indicator of status inequality. In many languages, though not English, second person pronouns serve a similar function of indicating status and social distance (Brown et al. 1960; see also Krauss and Chiu 1998). Not using normative terms of address, in contrast, can be an attempt

to resist power. Unless one is an intimate, for example, addressing the President by his first name sends a message of disdain.

The use of first and last names can similarly convey status differences. Messner et al.'s research on the language of televised sports (1993) found that commentators tended to refer to women and Black men by their first names, but White men by their last names; this practice, combined with other gendered language, "tends to (often subtly) re-construct gender and racial hierarchies" (p. 133). In a more enduring sense, the practice of exclusive patrilineal surnaming perpetuates male privilege, produces the "symbolic annihilation" (Kleinman 2002, p. 302) of women and their families of origin, and reinforces gendered ideologies of female self-sacrifice (Nugent 2010).

A great deal has been written on the use of "masculine generics," i.e., the use of "he," "mankind," or "guys" to refer to both males and females. Kleinman (2002) argues that these generics are an "indicator—and more importantly, a *reinforcer*—of a system in which "man" in the abstract and men in the flesh are privileged over women" (p. 300, italics in original). Social psychological research has provided support for this contention (e.g., Briere and Lanktree 1983; Moulton et al. 1978; Ng 1990; Wilson and Ng 1988), although other research suggests that contextual factors may also be important (Banaji and Hardin 1996; Cole et al. 1983). Other ways of referring to gender groups may also convey information about the speaker's regard for that group. For example, referring to adult women as "girls" may be infantilizing (Kleinman 2002), while referring to them as "ladies," "chicks," or "hos" conveys very different information (see Messner et al. 1993). Adult men are far less frequently referred to as "boys," which is also less likely to be used in a sexual or disparaging way (Baker 2010). Similar differences exist with regard to other social groups; consider, for example, the different implications of the words "disabled," "crippled," or "differently abled."

Epithets convey negative information about an individual and his or her social group and reinforce group inequalities (Mullen 2001; Stokoe and Edwards 2007). Referring to men as

"women" or "girls," for example, challenges their masculinity while affirming the speaker's own gender competence (Padavic 1991). Similarly, boys' use of the term "gay" as an insult both denigrates the target's sexuality (and gender) and reinforces inequality based on sexual orientation (Davies 2003; Pascoe 2007). Both children and adults employ the label "baby" to belittle young children's immature behaviors (Cahill 1986), reinforcing hierarchies of age.

Even seemingly innocuous terms of reference can help to construct inequality. Kitzinger (2005a, b) explores the way speakers' use of family reference terms (e.g., "my husband") during ordinary conversation reproduces the idea that families are "naturally" comprised of a heterosexual couple and their biological children, thus "reproduc[ing] a world that socially excludes or marginalizes non-heterosexuals" (p. 496). Ollilainen and Calasanti (2007) make a similar point: the use of the metaphor of family in a workplace maintained the salience of gender, reinforced gender categorization, made certain tasks seem natural for women, and reproduced gender power relations.

In sum, then, each of these basic elements of talk contributes to the construction and maintenance of inequality; they may also be used to resist it. These elements may be quite subtle, such as the choice of verb or the terms used to refer to others. Yet these seemingly small details can have significant consequences. Consider, for example, the reduced hireability produced by the use of communal, rather than agentic, traits in letters of recommendation (Madera et al. 2009), or the increased likelihood of guilty verdicts when suspects speak with nonstandard accents (Dixon et al. 2002). These small linguistic elements, often operating below the level of consciousness, can be powerful forces of inequality.

Utterances

A second type of talk is the *utterance*, which we define as a single speaker's conversational turn at talk. Utterances can range from single words (or even parts of words or verbal gestures such

as grunts) to long speeches, but the key defining element is that they are produced by a single individual and are preceded and followed by silence or another speaker's turn. Utterances build on the elements of talk described above; for example, one could use a laudatory or derogatory reference term in constructing an utterance, and could express that utterance in a particular linguistic style. Of course, utterances occur in conversational, situational, and structural contexts, but much social psychological research focuses only on the utterances themselves, without full attention to the context or to responses from other interactants.

Statements

The simplest type of utterance is a statement or claim about the world. These can straightforwardly be used to create inequality between individuals or social groups. For example, Baxter and Wallace (2009) found that the white, male construction workers they studied made denigrating claims about Polish and Romanian workers, typecasting entire nationalities as criminals and implicitly positioning the speakers relative to these other groups.

Explanations

Explanations are a more complex type of utterance. Explanations specify causality: why did a particular phenomenon occur (or not occur)? People's explanations about the causes of individual or group traits and actions both reveal and reinforce inequality. For example, parents observing a soccer event attributed girls' and boys' divergent behavior to innate sex differences rather than to socially constructed gender expectations or the institutional structure of the organization (Messner 2000). Similarly, Padavic (1991) describes how male coworkers attributed a female coalhandler's success to other workers, negatively affecting the woman's job performance and tenure and reinforcing gender inequality in the occupation.

Evaluations

Everyday talk is filled with the evaluation of people, things, behaviors, and events. These evaluations can help maintain—or contest—inequalities. For example, young boys are frequently censured by adults (especially fathers) if their behavior violates gender expectations, such as playing with dolls or preferring pink clothing (Kane 2006; Messner 2000); this gender policing encourages boys and men to “reject and devalue... symbols of female identity” (Cahill 1989, p. 290). Sports coaches valorize aggression among male athletes, while simultaneously condemning nonaggressive play as feminine and thus devalued (Fine 1987; Messner 2000; Schrock and Schwalbe 2009). In other arenas, boys, and especially poor boys of color, learn to denigrate academics; this contributes to gender, racial, and class hierarchies (Ferguson 2000; Fordham and Ogbu 1986; Willis 1981).

Even positive evaluations can help construct inequalities. For instance, boys express sexual desire for girls and women as a way of signifying both masculinity and heterosexuality (Fine 1987; Padavic 1991; Pascoe 2007; Schrock and Schwalbe 2009; Thorne 1993); this practice confirms their own position in hierarchies of gender and sexuality. As Schrock and Schwalbe note, “Sexualizing women serves not only to signify heterosexuality and mark the boundary between gender groups, but it also protects males from homophobic abuse by their peers” (p. 285). Further, it can serve to challenge women's authority (Quinn 2002), reinforcing men's power and privilege.

Stories

Stories permeate social life. As Hiles and Cermak argue, “Narrative plays a crucial role in almost every human activity. Narratives dominate human discourse, and are foundational to the cultural processes that organize and structure human action and experience. They offer a sense-making process that is fundamental to understanding human reality” (2008, p. 149).

Stories convey meaning by communicating a structured sequence of past events (Gubrium and Holstein 1997; Polletta et al. 2011), and frame those events to encourage a particular interpretation of a situation. Although stories are interactively constructed and institutionally regulated (Goodwin 1984; Gubrium and Holstein 1997; Polletta et al. 2011), social psychologists have tended to treat them as individual performances or texts available for analysis; thus, we discuss them in this section, while keeping in mind their interactional and institutional character.

Stories help create and develop group identities. Wortham et al. (2011), for instance, analyzed narratives about “payday muggings” told by members of different racial and ethnic groups, and found that individuals used these narratives to construct racial hierarchies. When Mexicans told these stories, they cast African Americans as violent, predatory, and inferior to Mexicans. Whites’ stories described Blacks in similar ways, but also racialized Mexicans as passive and fearful. When African Americans told these stories, in contrast, perpetrators were described as a small group of Blacks, thus resisting the characterization of an entire racial group as violent. (See also Gerteis 2002 and Smith 2007 on the construction of ethnic and class identity and Plummer 1995 on the construction of sexual identity.)

Stories also help maintain group inequalities. Ochs and Taylor (1995) observed family dinner-time storytelling; they noted that mothers tended to initiate stories (or encouraged children to initiate them), while fathers responded evaluatively, creating a “father knows best” dynamic that confirmed gender asymmetry in the family (note that Wagner (2010) reports somewhat different patterns in lesbian families, and suggests that future analyses should focus on power, rather than gender). Men’s stories of sexual exploits can create both solidarity (e.g., Padavic 1991) and hierarchy (Davies 2003) among men, as well as men’s dominance over women. Bonilla-Silva et al. (2004) analyze the stories whites use to maintain a sense of self as color-blind; these stories simultaneously help to reproduce existing racial hierarchies. Stories can also be used to resist inequality. Snow and Anderson (1987) describe how

homeless men use storytelling to assert a positive self-identity in the face of social stigma; other researchers report similar strategies among black teenage mothers on welfare (Horowitz 1995) and HIV-positive gay men (Sandstrom 1990).

Stories do not exist in a vacuum; the context and timing of telling and the characteristics of the tellers influence both what is told and how the stories are received. Shared cultural narratives (see the Discourse section below) infuse individual stories, and cultural and institutional norms limit the stories that can be told. Finally, the outcomes of storytelling are variable. In general, those with more resources are more able to ensure that their stories are heard (Berger and Luckman 1967), and stories that fit with “deeply held ideological values” are more likely to be heard, remembered, and repeated (Polletta et al. 2011, p. 119). As Bonilla-Silva et al. write, “Storytelling most often reproduces power relations, as the specific stories we tell tend to reinforce the social order” (2004, p. 556).

Forecasting

Unlike stories, which recount past events, forecasts construct possible futures. Forecasts include a variety of related acts, including predicting, warning, wishing, threatening, requesting, proposing, expecting, and advising. Padavic, for example, describes how her supervisor at a power plant issued a series of “dire warnings” about what might happen to her in her male-dominated job:

He described in detail how dangerous the plant was (“If your long hair gets caught in a gear...”). He reassured me that if I were in an accident he would take me to the “emergency room and wait there so you don’t get scared.”... By treating me as if I were a stereotypically feminine woman—afraid of big machinery and liable to be clumsy around it or unable to control it—he succeeded in some respects in turning me into a feminine woman afraid of big machinery, which had not been a prominent component of my identity before. (Padavic 1991, p. 286)

These warnings cast the author as a weak and fearful woman, while claiming competence—as

well as the power to define the situation—for himself, thus establishing inequality between them. In a very different context, Messner reports that a boys' soccer coach warned his team that, "If you don't watch out, I'm going to get the Barbie Girls [the name of an all-girls team] here to play against you!" (Messner 2000, p. 779). While apparently in jest, this warning nonetheless had the quite serious effect of devaluing girls' athletic abilities and reaffirming boys' dominance.

Humor

Humor is a powerful tool for creating and contesting inequality because the frame of playfulness allows actors to conceal their use of power (Ducharme 1994; Fine 1984; Shifman and Katz 2005). Humor is a "depoliticizing" strategy: "To depoliticize an influence message is to camouflage it as something else; in doing so, communicators render their influence attempts more palatable to the target of influence and at the same time lessen their own accountability" (Ng and Bradac 1993, p. 7). For example, humor allows speakers to assert normative ideas about gender and sexual orientation (e.g., Eder 1995; Hollander 1998; Padavic 1991; Thorne 1993), both instructing others in what is expected of them and calling them to account for transgression. Conefrey (1997), in an analysis of the climate for women in a life sciences lab, found that senior group members' dominance strategies were often couched "in kidding terms and with jokes," which allowed those members to protect themselves from the consequences of domination. Similarly, jokes about rape (Pascoe 2007) reaffirm male dominance while preserving deniability; speakers can always claim that they were "just kidding" and thus avoid the interactional consequences of exerting power. Joking can also be used to resist authority, as in Collinson's (1992) analysis of men in low-status jobs (see also Crawford 2001); here, too, speakers can insulate themselves from the consequences of resistance using the mantle of humor. Humor is thus a low-risk strategy both for asserting power and for contesting inequality.

Other Dominance Strategies

Finally, a variety of other types of utterances also serve to create or resist inequality. Issuing directives claims dominance, whether explicitly or implicitly (Brown and Levinson 1987; Conefrey 1997; Kiesling 2001b). Threats of violence, abandonment, and other potential harms serve to assert power (Ortiz 2006), as do other forms of sexual, homophobic, and class-based harassment (Anderson and Snow 2001; Kissling 1991; Pascoe 2007; Swim et al. 2001). More indirectly, speakers can use a range of influence strategies (Ng and Bradac 1993) such as casting others in particular roles and masking their efforts to exercise power. These kinds of strategies have not yet been fully explored in the social psychological literature, but are promising avenues for investigating the construction of inequality.

Interaction

Words and utterances used by an individual speaker contribute to the construction of inequality, but it is necessary to examine interaction to fully understand how inequality is created and sustained. Utterances can have multiple meanings; it is only through interaction that their meaning is made clear (Goodwin 1995; Speer and Potter 2000). This process of meaning construction is collaborative, occurring through the sequential, contingent contributions of multiple actors in a particular context (Couch 1989; Hollander and Gordon 2006; Mead 1934).

Moreover, it is through interaction that it becomes clear how people "do things with words"—i.e., work toward interactional goals through talk. At times inequality may be the goal of this social action, as when one speaker interrupts another in a play for conversational dominance. At other times, inequality may be a byproduct of striving for other interactional goals, as with the civic groups studied by Eliasoph (1999). In one group she observed, participants used racist and sexist talk as a means of asserting their independence from societal norms; in another, group members avoided talking about racial inequality in order to

avoid discord and preserve their ideals of American civic participation. Viewing talk through the lens of interaction foregrounds how people use language and talk to accomplish social action.

Social psychologists have examined talk in interaction in several different ways. Conversation analysts have focused on the organization of talk, analyzing features such as turn-taking, topic control, and interruptions. Others have looked at the substantive content of talk—for example, how different responses to utterances foster inequality. Finally, ethnomethodologists and others have examined the outcomes of interaction, such as how “doing” gender, race, and class contribute to the maintenance of inequality among social groups.

The Infrastructure of Interaction: The Organization of Talk

We begin with the question of who participates (and how much) in conversation. Gender has been the focus of much research in this vein. Early work found that men participated more than women, and attributed that difference to divergent socialization experiences or gender “cultures” (Maltz and Borker 2008; Tannen 1990). Others argued that male dominance, not sex difference, was the cause of these patterns (e.g., Fishman 1978; Lakoff 1975; Zimmerman and West 1975). Subsequent empirical work (e.g., Conefrey 1997; Johnson 1994; Kollock et al. 1985; O’Barr 1982) demonstrated that authority and power matter more than sex; subordinates of either sex are likely to talk less. Topic also matters. Dovidio et al. (1988) found that men talked more when the topic was stereotypically “masculine” and women talked more when it was “feminine”; when the topic was neutral, however, men talked more. It is important to note that most studies finding conversational inequality between women and men have been conducted with white, middle-class participants; studies that include African American participants, for example, have found much less male dominance (Filardo 1996; Henley 1995).

More recently, researchers have developed a more nuanced understanding of participation rates (Leaper and Ayres 2007). The context of talk matters: Holmes (1992) finds that in formal contexts (e.g., classes or TV discussions), men make more frequent contributions and talk longer than women. In marital conversations, in contrast, women talk more than men (DeFrancisco 1991). Talking time alone does not tell the whole story, however. DeFrancisco interpreted this difference not as dominance but as women’s doing more of the conversational work (see also Fishman 1978). Bergvall and Remlinger (1996) found that, although women spoke proportionally more than men in the classrooms they examined, male students actually dominated the conversation, asserting personal power through humor and other divergent turns and resisting women’s attempts at self-assertion. The authors conclude that a quantitative assessment of talking time cannot adequately summarize differences in participation: “simply taking long or frequent turns does not establish *power* or *domination of the floor*” (p. 470).

Research on the relationship between participation rates and other dimensions of inequality has been much less frequent. In one analysis of social class, Streib (2011) found that upper middle class preschoolers talked more than their working class counterparts and felt more entitled to speak to teachers; this difference in participation rates effectively silenced the working class children and enabled the more privileged children to direct classroom play while further developing their speaking skills (see also Lareau 2003). This linguistic ability is thus an embodied form of cultural capital that gives upper middle class children long-term educational advantages (Bourdieu 1986). With class, as with gender, those with greater social power demonstrate greater conversational dominance, reinforcing existing inequalities.

Another focus of research has been turn-taking, which conversation analysts have identified as the infrastructure of conversation. Violations of turn-taking rules, such as interruptions, indicate a disruption of the conversational order. Zimmerman and West’s early work (1975)

found that men interrupted women much more frequently than the reverse, and interpreted this finding as evidence of gender inequality (see also Lakoff 1975). Subsequent research has been more equivocal, with some studies supporting (e.g., DeFrancisco 1991; Shaw 2000) and others disputing (Carli 1990; James and Clarke 1993; Smith-Lovin and Brody 1989) this pattern. More recently, it has become clear that interruptions can have very different meanings in conversation: some may reflect attempts at conversational dominance, but others may indicate conversational support, as with good friends who finish each other's sentences (Bilous and Krauss 1988; Roger et al. 1988). Power is still important, however: subordinates use more supportive interruptions (Johnson 1994) and fewer controlling interruptions (Menz and Al-Roubaie 2008), though Menz and Al-Roubaie also found that among both subordinates and superiors, women produced more supportive interruptions than men. Streib (2011) also found a pattern of more interruptions among upper middle class preschoolers, though these were not analyzed by type.

Topic shifts can be moments when inequality is expressed (Goodwin 2002). As Okamoto and Smith-Lovin write, "transitions between topics of conversation are accomplished in a systematic, structured way, and... social status can affect whose topics are developed and whose are lost" (2001, p. 852). Early research found that women make more topic initiations than men (Fishman 1978; West and Garcia 1988) but are less likely to see their topics succeed (DeFrancisco 1991; Fishman 1978). Okamoto and Smith-Lovin, in contrast, found no effect of gender in task-oriented groups. Rather, they argue that "topic shifts may be structured less by a relatively weak status characteristic like gender and may be more affected by endogenous processes through which people develop expectations for each other's competence within the context of the group" (2001, p. 870), though it seems likely that the context of talk is also consequential. Speakers who participate little in a group's discussion are more likely to lose topics; topic loss can indicate low status, while proposing new topics marks a speaker as high status, and can be a means of

dominating group discussion (Conefrey 1997). More broadly, shifts between speakers reflect both conversational rules and status differentiation (Gibson 2003; see also Goffman 1983).

Another indicator of conversational inequality is the asking of questions. Questions serve multiple functions: they can support or challenge the previous speaker or can be a means of taking the floor. In an analysis of discussions following formal seminar presentations, Holmes (1992) found that men asked proportionally more questions than women, and were much more likely to ask antagonistic (rather than supportive) questions. Questions, in other words, were a means of asserting conversational dominance.

Being the recipient of a question invites a participant into a discussion and is also an indicator of perceived cognitive and interactional competence (Heritage 1984). In an analysis of videotaped medical encounters focused on children, Stivers and Majid (2007) found that physicians frequently directed questions about a child's experience to the parent, implying that the child was not competent to answer. Physicians asked fewer questions of Black children than of children of other races, and fewer questions of Black and Latino children from lower socioeconomic backgrounds than of children from more privileged class backgrounds. Moreover, older children were more likely than younger children to have questions directed toward them, supporting the contention that questioning indicates perceived competence. Stivers and Majid argue that these subtle patterns are consequential because the implicit assessments of competence produced through questioning behavior can become self-fulfilling prophecies. Questioning is thus "an interactional mechanism through which members of different racial and socioeconomic groups are marginalized" (2007, pp. 434–435).

Finally, violating the typical organization of talk can be a bid for power. In a fascinating analysis of interaction on city streets, Duneier and Molotch (1999) use conversation analysis to examine encounters in which Black street men harass middle-class white women. They find that the men violate normative conversational conventions, persisting in trying to initiate conversa-

tions even when the women's responses clearly indicate that they do not wish to participate, and ignoring the women's attempts to close the conversation. Duneier and Molotch term these patterns "interactional vandalism" because they are strategic efforts to damage the taken-for-granted rules underlying everyday interaction (see also Kitzinger 2000). Although seemingly trivial, these interactions undermine fundamental assumptions of conversational collaboration and are thus deeply troubling to those who experience them. As Molotch and Boden argue, manipulating the "tacit procedures and architecture of talk" is a means of "accomplishing power in face-to-face interaction, power which is thereby potentially reproduced within and across interactions. Such recurring patterns of power *are* the social structure" (Molotch and Boden 1985, p. 285).

Interactional Response

Another vein of research focuses not on the organizational infrastructure of conversation but on the substance of the sequential contributions that comprise interaction. How do listeners respond to a speaker's utterance? As Eliasoph writes, people create "contexts for speech that make some kinds of expression easier than others, some 'moves' easier to accomplish than others" (1999, p. 480). The content of these responses can also be an indicator of, and a means of creating, inequality.

In their analysis of processes of social construction in talk, Hollander and Gordon (2006) identify three basic patterns of response that follow a speaker's initial utterance. First, listeners can support an initial utterance by affirming or extending it. Collaborative talk is a form of such support, as when multiple people work together to tell a single story (Eder 1988; Gergen and Gergen 1984; Mason-Schrock 1996). Baxter and Wallace's (2009) analysis of UK builders' talk provides an example of this process; the men's collaborative conversation created solidarity among the workers while simultaneously denigrating other groups of men (based on social class or immigration status, among other factors) and excluding women (see also Cameron 1997).

Perhaps more frequent in the creation of inequality is the second form of response, challenge. Others can discredit a speaker's utterance, either by contesting it directly or by offering a competing proposal. Challenges can also be more subtle. Jokes, laughter, and humor may challenge an utterance by trivializing it (see Hollander 2002). Subtle challenges can also take place through reframing, where the respondent gives an utterance a very different meaning than the original speaker intended (Hollander 2002; Hollander and Gordon 2006). Regardless of the method, challenges "call into question a speaker's competence to properly evaluate the phenomenon being assessed" (Goodwin and Goodwin 1987, p. 42). Challenge is thus an assertion of dominance, situating the speaker, but not the target of the challenge, as competent. But challenges may themselves be challenged; as Hollander and Gordon argue, "disagreement is an interactional process" (2006, p. 201; see also Maynard 1985), and the outcome of a disagreement depends not only on conversational processes but on the participants' statuses both inside and outside the conversation.

A third category of response is simply a failure to reply to the initial utterance at all. Non-response can be inadvertent: the listener may not have heard what was said, or may not have understood that a response was appropriate. But in other cases, failure to respond is itself a meaningful response. For example, "speakers may avoid taking up and dealing with what they perfectly well know is accomplished or implicated by prior talk so as to influence the direction of talk toward some desired objective" (Heritage 1984, p. 260). In some cases, non-response may be a way of challenging what a previous speaker said (Drew 1992; Hollander 2002; Roth 1998) or resisting an attempt at domination (Goodwin 2002). As Fishman argued, "Every remark or turn at speaking should be seen as an *attempt* to interact... Some attempts succeed; others fail. For an attempt to succeed, the other party must be willing to do further interactional work. That other person has the power to turn an attempt into a conversation or to stop it dead" (1978, p. 399). DeFrancisco (1991), in an analysis of heterosexual married couples' everyday conversations, concluded that

men frequently failed to respond to women's conversational attempts. Because of men's silence, women had to work harder to maintain interaction and were often effectively silenced as a result; the men thus succeeded in controlling the couple's conversations.

The Outcomes of Interaction

A very different strain of research focuses on how people "do" gender, race, class, and other dimensions of social hierarchy through interaction; these interactions both create inequality on a micro level and reinforce macro-level structures of inequality. Like conversation analysis, this "doing inequality" approach derives from ethnomethodology. Unlike CA, however, most work in this vein does not focus on the detailed minutiae of conversation (though these two strains of research are fully compatible, and some authors do take a conversation analytic approach (e.g., West and Fenstermaker 2002)). Rather, most work in this vein examines interaction writ large, including, but not generally focusing on, talk.

Perhaps the best known work in this vein is West and Zimmerman's groundbreaking article "Doing Gender" (1987). Gender, these authors argue, is not a characteristic of individuals but is something they must constantly accomplish through interaction. The central motor for this process is the concept of accountability: "To be successful, marking or displaying gender must be finely fitted to situations and modified or transformed as the occasion demands. Doing gender consists of managing such occasions so that, whatever the particulars, the outcome is seen and seeable in context as gender-appropriate or, as the case may be, gender-inappropriate, that is, *accountable*" (West and Zimmerman 1987, p. 135). The notion of accountability derives from Heritage's (1984) work on *accounts*, descriptions that "name, characterize, formulate, explain, excuse, excoriate, or merely take notice of some circumstance or activity and thus place it within some social framework" (West and Zimmerman 1987, p. 137). People do gender because they know that others will form accounts of their behavior,

comparing it to normative gender expectations for the situation. These accounts may be private or publicly communicated, but in either case, they are deeply consequential for individuals' interaction and identity (see Hollander 2013 for a fuller discussion of the concept of accountability). Accounts, of course, are based in language, and so the processes of accountability and doing gender rely on language and talk. The outcome of these processes is inequality, both between and within gender categories.

West and Fenstermaker (1995) subsequently argued that the "doing gender" framework applies equally to other social statuses such as race and social class. Their claims were met with considerable skepticism (see Collins et al. 1995), but other social psychologists have taken up this line of argument in a fruitful way. Speer and Potter (2000), for example, discuss the way that speakers' concerns for accountability and identity lead them to manage talk that could be perceived as heterosexist. Yodanis (2006) observed women's conversation in a coffee shop in a small town in the U.S. Northeast. The women differentiated themselves through talk, categorizing themselves and each other, commenting on each others' behavior, and discussing their community work and children in ways that created and re-created social class distinctions through an ongoing struggle to gain status relative to others. These everyday negotiations of hierarchy, she argues, are important for understanding class inequality.

Discourse

Discourse is a term used by many scholars in many fields with varied meanings (Parker 1990). For our purposes, discourses are patterns of language that reflect taken-for-granted understandings of the social world, as well as their underlying ideologies. Individuals draw on these meta-stories (Bonilla-Silva et al. 2004) when communicating in all types of arenas. They serve as the everyday, commonsense background of communication and are key to the meaning making that happens at the individual level. Discourses, then, reflect

the sets of shared meanings and cognitive structures that individuals employ to understand the world around them (van Dijk 1990). Discourses exist above the level of the individual and beyond any particular interaction or set of interactions, and are an important way that inequality is reproduced in both individual and institutional arenas (see Hunt, this volume).

Here we discuss the use of discourse in three settings: everyday settings, institutions, and media. There is clearly overlap between our discussion of discourse here and topics covered in the preceding sections of this chapter. Our focus here, however, is on discourse and discursive strategies as *shared* cultural resources, rather than on the *individual* moves practiced in particular interactions, although of course the latter both draw on and reaffirm the former. Discourse provides the key micro-macro link between individual and group uses of language and talk and the production and maintenance of inequality at the institutional level.

As we noted at the beginning of this chapter, the most robust and influential approach to discourse in social psychology, in terms of understanding inequalities, is Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). Though our discussion in this section is not limited to research in the CDA tradition, much of the research on the discursive production and maintenance of inequality in social psychology draws on similar analytic strategies.

Everyday Discourse

In both content and linguistic strategy, speakers draw on cultural discourses to create and maintain inequalities in everyday settings. For example, individuals may engage discourses of heterosexism, racism and ethnic hatred, anti-immigrant sentiment, and class as they make meaning in their everyday interactions. A common feature of many of these discourses is that they often discourage the explicit naming or discussion of inequalities, contending that social divisions and inequalities are a thing of the past. Discourses that reproduce inequalities in the late twentieth

and early twenty-first centuries are distinct for the multiple ways that accusations of prejudice and direct reference to structural inequalities are taboo or consistently denied (Bonilla-Silva et al. 2004; van Dijk 1993). This is most prominent in the “happy talk” that frequently accompanies contemporary discussions about diversity and multiculturalism. For example, everyday discourse about race usually frames diversity as good, yet relies on a white normative perspective that avoids consideration of structural inequality (Bell and Hartmann 2007). This discourse allows speakers to present racial minorities in a negative light while maintaining the speaker’s positive self-presentation as non-racist (Bonilla-Silva et al. 2004).

This peculiar “race talk” is not limited to the U.S. context. This everyday discourse allows speakers to discuss racialized topics or take racialized stances on issues yet deny racist intent or consequences. Using this discourse constructs the speaker, usually a member of the dominant group, as tolerant, reasonable, and objective, while constructing the marginalized outgroup as deserving their place in the social order due to their own intrinsic characteristics (Tileaga 2005). This discourse reflects the commonplace idea that discussion of racism in the present or naming a particular stance as racist is taboo. For example, it becomes possible for those who advocate limiting immigration for non-white asylum seekers to be protected against accusations of racism, since it would be seen as an unfair and immoderate accusation (Goodman and Burke 2010). Even extreme ethnic prejudice against a group such as the Romanies in Romania is couched in a way that offers a moral rejection of prejudice and ethnic hatred (Tileaga 2005).

Recent research suggests that although everyday discourses of class tend to avoid explicit discussion of class inequality, they allow more explicit talk than do racial discourses (Mallinson and Brewster 2005). College students in the U.S., for example, draw on discursive repertoires of class in complicated and contradictory ways. Stuber found that, “working and upper-middle-class individuals alike talked about social class in ways that alternately acknowledged and rejected

the significance of social class” (2006, p. 311). Working class students were more conscious of their own class position, while upper-middle class students tended to have a blind spot for their own class position. This suggests that class stratification is buttressed by these everyday discourses of class and the ways that they obscure the workings of power. Indeed, Lawler (2005) finds that a perceived decline in the importance of class among middle class whites in the U.S. is paired with an everyday discourse of disgust towards working class whites.

The dominant contemporary everyday discourse of gender reflects an essentialist understanding of men and women as fundamentally different and explains gender inequality as an outcome of this natural difference (Crawford 2001). In fact, these inequalities are constructed and maintained through everyday talk. For example, Coates (2003) talks about a pervasive “orientation to hegemonic masculinity” in the everyday conversations of men in her research and argues that this dominant discourse of appropriate masculinity constrains men’s talk. As Cameron (1997) notes, this everyday discourse often draws on discussion and denigration of gay men to construct normative masculinity. Although this discourse is pervasive and contributes to unequal power for women and less dominant men, it does not emerge in exactly the same way in all places and with all people. Context is important: men sometimes transgressed norms, but were more likely to do so in interaction with one other man rather than in larger groups. In fact, Coates notes that her interviews with men did not elicit the more extreme talk reported by male researchers, suggesting that context and audience matter for how speakers discursively construct manhood and masculinity. Multiple discourses can co-exist; in Brazil, for example, Junge (2011) found three different discourses of sexuality (machismo, medio-scientific, and the new language of sexuality), depending on the speakers’ self defined style of masculinity and their relationship to the object of discussion. As we will demonstrate in the next section, institutional context also affects the deployment of discourses.

Though research on everyday discourses tends to focus on one system of inequality such as race or gender, these social categories interact with each other (see Howard and Renfrow, this volume), and so everyday discourses of race, gender, sexuality, and class intersect. For example, the German women Rathzel (1997) studied did not just share commonsense understandings of Turks versus Germans, but their talk reflected more specific separate shared understandings of German women, German men, Turkish women, and Turkish men; these ideas were shaped by discourses about class as well. The intersections of gender, race, and sexuality in Espiritu’s (2001) work on Filipino immigrants in the U.S. reveal that Filipinos engage an everyday discourse that indicates their belief in Filipinos’ sexual moral authority, compared with white American women’s supposed promiscuous sexuality. Employing this discourse is a strategy to resist racial, ethnic, and anti-immigrant oppression, yet in reality it operates to restrict Filipinas’ mobility and sexuality since this moral burden falls on women to uphold. Finally, Brown (1997) found that class and gender intersect in working class girls’ discourses that discredit both the feasibility and desirability of idealized middle-class femininity. Research on everyday discourse shows how biases are reflected and justified through patterns of language and talk, both reproducing and resisting multiple axes of inequality.

Institutional Discourse

Institutions, such as schools, churches, and workplaces, have their own discourses, often created through written policy and based on the structural features of the institution. These discourses limit what is possible for individuals to say in particular contexts or encourage particular patterns of language use. For example, Adams et al.’s (2010) research on discourses of masculinity among football (American soccer) players demonstrates the power of the institution to perpetuate particular discourses. Within the sport, coaches employed masculinist discourses to push players to perform athletically. Coaches engaged both “masculinity

establishing” discourses, to construct football as a man’s game and detail the characteristics and behaviors appropriate for the men playing the game, and “masculinity challenging” discourses, to compel individual behavior that matched those ideals. Though players also engaged these sexist and homophobic discourses while in this institutional context, they did not draw on them when in other contexts (e.g., having dinner with friends). Institutions, therefore, have their own discursive imperatives which can perpetuate inequality even in the absence of individual bias.

Similarly, Eliasoph (1999) found that members of voluntary civic organizations employed different racial discourses in front stage and back stage settings; the content of these discourses varied by organization. In a country western dancing club, members built community by engaging in explicitly racist discourses, while a PTA-like group maintained solidarity through using race-avoidant discourse. Yet, interestingly, members of both groups were willing to engage anti-racist discourse in back stage settings. In both groups, however, these discursive patterns led to the exclusion of people of color: in the dancing club they experienced overt racist discourse, and in the PTA-like group their concerns and needs related to racist incidents were ignored. Both discursive contexts, in other words, perpetuated race-based inequality even though individual participants privately expressed anti-racist beliefs.

Other research provides additional examples of how institutional discourses support inequality. Moon’s (2005) comparative study of two Protestant congregations in the US Midwest (one liberal and one conservative) found that the debates about homosexuality in both churches invoked “narratives of pain” that shaped the feeling rules of the particular context. Although this pain had different sources (sinning, in the conservative church, and societal inequalities, in the liberal church), this discourse reflected an understanding of gay and lesbian people as less than fully adult and as objects of pity, thus maintaining inequality by reproducing heterosexual dominance. In another example, Fine and Addelston (1996) found that gender discourses of “sameness” and “difference” were employed in very different

ways at two schools, yet both perpetuated gender inequality. At the Citadel (an all-male military school), discourses of gender difference were used institutionally to deny access to women, while sameness among men was promoted by the institution even as it concealed pervasive racism against Black cadets. In contrast, the University of Pennsylvania Law school promoted an ideal of equal access, yet because of a lack of institutional reform, women were less successful and tended to obtain less lucrative positions relative to their male peers. In both cases, the failures of those from marginalized groups became personal failures in the discourse of “sameness,” rather than a structural failing of the institution. Though the mechanisms differed, gender inequality was produced in both contexts through the discursive behavior of institutional actors.

Institutional discourses affect local level processes as well as the talk of individual actors. Dick (2011) studied the origins and perpetuation of the pervasive discourse that conflates “Mexican immigrants” and “illegal alien” in the contemporary United States. Dick found that an anti-immigrant ordinance in a small Pennsylvania town drew on language from federal policy, transmitting the racialized and stigmatizing discourse about Latino immigrants from the national to local level. Thus, national discourses may affect inequality at the local level through social institutions. Of course, resistance is always possible, even within powerful institutions. For example, teachers’ talk in schools draws on national discourses of gender, but also contains the possibility of resistance, as teachers can use their authority to alter or challenge dominant discourses (Nyström 2009). On the whole, however, institutional discourses are powerful forces in the construction and maintenance of inequality.

Media

Media play a key role in our common understandings of the world around us (Lunt and Livingstone 2001), and are thus a crucial site for understanding the perpetuation of discourses that reflect and reproduce inequality. Early audience

effects research was based on the conduit model of communication (sender-message-receiver) that emerged from social psychology in the mid twentieth century. More recently, this model has been replaced with more complex understandings of media that allow for varying interpretations by audiences while maintaining a focus on the ideological power wielded by media owners. Thus, much contemporary research on media focuses on hegemonic relations in line with cultural studies (e.g., Stuart Hall). Here we examine some of the specific ways that discourses of inequality are employed in media and how particular elements and genres are used to buttress ideological positions.

News journalism, with its air of objectivity, is a particularly fertile arena for discourses of inequality. Overall, news journalism tends to engage in positive presentation of dominant groups and negative presentation of subordinated social groups and portrays zero-sum conflict between the needs of the two groups. For example, Teo (2000) found systematic “us versus them” attitudes toward Vietnamese people in news reports on a Vietnamese gang written by whites in two Australian newspapers. Flowerdew et al. (2002) found similar patterns of anti-migrant representation of Chinese mainlanders in the Hong Kong press, even though the elite and marginalized groups are of the same racial and ethnic background. More generally, media reflect and create stereotypes, such as constructions of all Asians as violent drug dealers and criminals (Teo 2000) or Orientalist depictions of Palestinians in best-selling Western literature (Van Teeffelen 1994). Of course, silence too produces inequality and can lead to erasure of a group’s experiences and concerns in the public arena, such as when an ethnic group is hardly mentioned in news media at all (Pietikäinen 2003).

Journalists and other newsmakers use headlines and leads to draw attention to what they see as most important in a story. In Finnish news accounts of the Sami, an indigenous Arctic and sub-Arctic people, headlines focused on legal changes and legislation rather than on the Sami culture that the legislation was designed to protect; this pattern served to reinforce the dominant group’s

rather than the subordinated group’s perspective (Pietikäinen 2003). Headlines in Teo’s (2000) study represented Vietnamese gang members as violent and unlawful on the one hand and emphasized the perspective of the police on the other, furthering the ingroup/outgroup dynamic by stereotyping all Asians as violent. Thus, headlines constitute media discourse that reflects and reproduces on a broad scale common-sense understandings of racial inequality.

Quotation patterns and referents further contribute to the establishment of this ingroup/outgroup dichotomy. Quoting a source gives that source an air of legitimacy, and quotes tend to be drawn from members of the dominant group even in articles about subordinated groups. Terms of address and referents, as noted in the Elements of Talk section above, reflect and reproduce inequality. When subordinated groups are not described by their preferred group name (Pietikäinen 2003), or when different referents are used to describe crimes against dominant and subordinated groups, the dominant perspective is reinforced while the marginalized perspective is denigrated. For example, referents to violence against gays and lesbians are less specific than those for heterosexuals (e.g., “crime” versus “beating”), evoking less empathy among readers towards the victimized group (Henley et al. 2002). These referents, like other elements of discourse, both reflect and reinforce existing social inequalities.

Conclusions

This review of the social psychological research on language, talk, and inequality only skims the surface of the tremendous volume of empirical work that has been produced over the last three decades. In this concluding section, we briefly evaluate this body of research, noting areas that have been well explored and those that remain relatively uncharted terrain. We conclude with suggestions for future research.

We begin by noting that social psychologists have developed a broad catalogue of strategies for how language and talk create, maintain, and

sometimes challenge inequality. We return here to the three relationships between language and inequality we noted at the beginning of this chapter. As demonstrated by our review above, language can be an indicator of inequality; for example, language style and participation rates reflect speakers' social status, and honorifics and terms of reference can indicate hierarchy and mark some groups as other. Language is also a strategy for masking people's efforts to create or mitigate inequality. Headlines, for instance, emphasize certain interpretations and silence others, and humor can conceal speakers' use of power, while verb choices can indirectly communicate beliefs about social groups and categories. Finally, talk is a way that inequality is accomplished in interaction; it is one of the things that people "do with words," for example through the use of masculine generics or gendered language in hiring, "color-blind" race talk that makes recognition of inequality taboo, or stories that create hierarchical understandings of social groups. We have, then, a wide-ranging view of the various ways that inequality is manifested in talk, and how talk functions to maintain inequality.

That said, social psychology's attention to various types of inequality has been uneven. Scholars have paid considerable attention to gender inequality, spurred initially by the feminist focus on sexist language and sex differences in language use that developed in the 1970s. Race and ethnicity have also received considerable attention, especially from work in critical discourse analysis. Other dimensions of inequality, however, have been little explored, or explored only in limited arenas. Age inequality, for example, has received attention from communications scholars, but much less from sociologists.

We also note that there has been little synthesis or comparison across dimensions of inequality; those studying age inequality, for example, seem to have little conversation with those who focus on gender or race. Relatedly, we found virtually no attention to intersectionality (Howard and Renfrow, this volume). Nearly every example of empirical research we read for this chapter focused on only one dimension of inequality; the exceptions were so rare that they were cause for

celebration as we reviewed the literature. Further, many research conclusions are based on only one group (e.g., white women) though their conclusions are often presented as though they generalize to a much wider group (e.g., all women). There is also little attention to how language and talk are related to inequalities within, as well as between, social groups.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, we saw little integration across theoretical perspectives and, in some cases, disciplines. Many current theories, for instance, examine how people accomplish action through talk. While scholars in each theoretical tradition acknowledge the shared intellectual roots of this idea, there has been much less cross-fertilization across different variants than one might expect.

We also saw uneven signs of serious attention to social structure, as either the root cause or the outcome of micro processes of inequality. Work on inequality, by its very nature, tends to pay more attention to social structure than social psychological work on other topics, and some areas of research on language (some variants of discourse analysis, for example) do foreground social structure. Yet in other areas of research there is the tendency to ignore the realities of structured relations of power and examine differences, rather than inequalities, among groups. This tendency was particularly evident in early research on gender and language, which examined differences between women's and men's speech as evidence first of deficit and then as cultural difference. More recent work has examined these differences as evidence of power and dominance, yet work on difference continues. We also note that there has been far more work on differences between groups than on similarities among them, even when, as with research on gender and language, the evidence points to overall similarity (Crawford 2001; Hollander et al. 2011; Leaper and Ayres 2007).

Finally, we found substantially more attention to the creation and maintenance of inequality than to resistance and change. To understand inequality, we must analyze both power and resistance: "not only how dominant groups and institutions attempt to impose particular... meanings, but also

how subordinate groups contest dominant conceptions and construct alternative meanings” (Glenn 1999, p. 14). Without examining these processes, we have little hope of understanding how systems of inequality can change. Social psychological research on language and talk is well poised to address this important topic; the work on inequality that we have reviewed here provides a rich foundation for further research on the reproduction—and, perhaps, the reduction—of inequality.

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Social Capital and Inequality: The Significance of Social Connections

9

Karen S. Cook

Introduction

Social theorists have long been concerned with how connections between people bring about outcomes that could not have been achieved solely on the basis of individual agency or overarching structural forces. The consequences of these connections and their role in social life have occupied center stage in many of the classics in sociology as well as in much of the contemporary work on social networks and on what has been labeled *social capital* in recent decades. Among the classics, Durkheim's (1951) discussion of anomie, Marx's (1867) treatise on class revolution and Simmel's (1922) work on coalitions all suggest ways in which connections between people, or their absence, have significant causal impact on both individuals and society. The attention paid in the social sciences to the differential impact of these social connections has increased as both the scale and pace of network connectedness have grown exponentially. In this chapter I explore in some detail the network bases of the social inequality often generated by the differential access to connections and the resources they provide.

The author would like to thank Sarah Harkness for her contributions to the conceptualization of this chapter.

K. S. Cook (✉)
Department of Sociology, Stanford University, Stanford,
CA 94305, USA
e-mail: kcook@stanford.edu

Of the classic theorists, Simmel's (1922) work stands out for its explicit focus on the structure of social connections. For example, he famously notes the pervasiveness of triads in networks of interpersonal ties, and how they differ fundamentally from dyads, making possible alliances that alter the landscape of collective life. As Schaff (2000, p. 260) suggests: "Some of Simmel's most insightful studies are found in these investigations of the formal, abstract properties of, say, the 'eternal triad' in human relationships, the unusual dynamics of the conspiratorial clique, or the positive functions of intense conflict for group solidarity." Beyond the structure of social ties, Simmel views larger groups as creating greater possibilities for interaction and thus for collective action. This view was challenged much later by well-known economist Mancur Olson (1965[1971]), who argued that the larger the group, the less likely was collective action given the potential for individuals to free-ride on the efforts of others, unless there are selective incentives for participation that mitigate free-riding. Despite differing predictions about effects, both theorists focused on group size as a key variable in the explanation of collective action (or inaction), as did many other social theorists from the classic period to the modern era.

In Simmel's early work we also find the seeds of modern *social network* analysis subsequently made salient in Moreno's writings (1934) on "sociometry," the original title of *Social Psychology Quarterly*. Moreno is, in fact, viewed as one of the "fathers" of social network analysis, a field

that has expanded rapidly since the 1970s. In addition to this important contribution to modern social science, Simmel's work echoes some of the themes found in Durkheim's major treatise on alienation with his emphasis on the nature of the deep interconnections between the individual and society, although there were significant philosophical differences between the two theorists.

Durkheim, for example, viewed society as existing apart from the individuals that compose it and believed society was not reducible to biological or psychological factors. He emphasized "social facts" as central to sociological explanation and as the core of macro-sociological analysis. For Durkheim society exists *sui generis*, as an observable object and reified whole. For Simmel society was simply a name for connected individuals interacting with one another, even in more complex forms of association such as organizations or states. Society was not to be viewed as separate from its human agents seen as "social animals."¹ Thus, in contrast to Durkheim, Simmel focused primarily on the micro-level of analysis, basing his sociological contributions on the study of society as an association of "free" or autonomous individuals whose interactions in dyads, triads and small groups are the bedrock of macro-level institutions and social structures. This key notion was later expressed by some of the major social psychologists of the twentieth century, including exchange theorists such as Homans (1958, 1961[1974]), Blau (1964) and Emerson (1972, 1976), as well as symbolic interactionists such as Blumer (1969[1986]) and Stryker (1980[2003]; Stryker and Statham 1985). These more current theorists also differed in significant ways in their orientation to micro-level processes and their linkages to macro-social forces.

This brief commentary provides only partial evidence of the broad-ranging concern in the social sciences with the structure and power of social groups and the awareness of their significance in society. Even though the specific topics of interest have changed over time, the investiga-

tion of the nature of social connections and their consequences remains central to social psychology. In fact, many of the major contributions to the study of social networks and the significance of groups in society have come from sociological social psychology. I begin this chapter with a discussion of the origins of social connections and the networks they form before examining some of the consequences of such ties in various contexts. A key focus is access to social capital under varying circumstances. In particular, I examine the nature of the structural inequalities that create differential access to social, cultural and material resources and their implications for the reproduction of social inequality.

The Formation of Network Connections

In sociological social psychology the formation of connections between actors is addressed in a number of long-standing theoretical traditions. Such connections are also central to the conceptualization of "social capital," made popular in the writings of Robert Putnam (1995, 1996, 2000), among others. Since social connections are the basis of networks and groups it is important to understand the underlying reasons they form and why they matter. While a number of theories exist in social psychology concerning the significance of social bonds, I examine the links between theories of social exchange which specify why and how social connections matter, and network conceptions of homophily which identify a key process that determines who connects with whom. These mechanisms, in my view, help explain how social inequality is produced and often reproduced over time.

Interdependence

In exchange theory tie formation is primarily viewed as a mechanism for obtaining valued resources—social and material. For Peter Blau, one of the best-known exchange theorists, exchange relations between individuals are typically generated by the recognition of *interdependence*—the

¹ For more discussion of the differences between Simmel's approach to society and Durkheim's see Schaff (2011).

need to engage in exchange with one another to obtain resources or services of value. In economic exchanges these interactions typically take the form of brief encounters (often one-time interactions) in which needed or desired goods, resources or services are exchanged either directly through barter or indirectly through the use of a generalized medium of exchange, such as money or credit. These exchanges may be negotiated or simply carried out on the basis of a fixed price for specific services or items of value and they are the core feature of markets. In social exchanges in which money is much less commonly involved, resources or services of value are exchanged by actors often indirectly through acts of reciprocal or generalized exchange and the objects or units of exchange are typically harder to value. A classic example is the exchange between employees of approval or status for assistance in a work environment, an example made famous by Blau (1964). In an organizational context access to those with resources of value (such as information) is often limited by the existence of hierarchy and the associated inequality not only in access, but also in power and influence. Connections between individuals clearly form, however, for reasons beyond those that involve the specific need for valued goods and services and the transactions these interactions entail.

Homophily

Ties also form on the basis of *homophily*, one of the key principles identified in the social network literature as the basis for connection. Beyond the value of what can be obtained by connecting with others, is the simple value of the connection itself. Homophily refers to “sameness,” to the fact that two actors are similar on a key dimension of salience (Blau 1977; McPherson et al. 2001). Similarity may be based on gender, age, race or ethnicity, social class, organizational position, or on an important activity such as a sport, music taste, hobby or other shared interest. We frequently turn to those who are like us for information that helps us perform well in a particular domain or for an assessment of how we are doing in a specific realm of activity we care about. This

process can result in peer influence (Friedkin 1998; Friedkin and Johnsen 2011) or it can lead to comparison processes that allow us to evaluate ourselves as well as others (Festinger 1950). These network ties thus yield a variety of important outcomes, including eventual exchanges and the relevant access to resources of value.

While much of the literature on networks assumes uni-dimensional homophily, some of the research on networks (DiMaggio and Garip 2012; Marsden 1988, 1990) examines multi-dimensional homogeneity. The more dimensions we share in common the greater our homophily and thus the likelihood of forming a connection for certain purposes. As McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook (2001) put it succinctly, “similarity breeds connection,” or to quote DiMaggio and Garip (2012, p. 103): “Homophily is ubiquitous.” Greater degrees of similarity and overlapping ties (multiplex rather than simplex) often result in stronger connections (Fischer 1982). And, frequently such connections are the source of social support as well as other resources and services of value, typically referred to as “social capital.” There is also evidence to suggest that intergroup inequality in the distribution of this form of capital is generated by the combination of network effects and homophily (see DiMaggio and Garip 2012).

Organizational Embeddedness

In a recent empirical effort to explain where network ties come from and how they emerge, Mario Small (2009) develops what he refers to as the “organizational embeddedness perspective on social capital.” In a well-known case study he identifies specifically how the organizations he studied (daycare centers in New York City that varied in location and clientele) fostered connections between parents by using strategies that also increased their commitment to and connection with the organizations providing care for their children. Small reveals not only how the interpersonal ties that develop between the adults who utilize the daycare centers are key to access social support and help with childcare after-hours, but also how such relations are embedded in networks of interorganizational ties that

serve as additional links to resources of value, such as those provided by social work and employment agencies, as well as organizations that provide mental health services and dental care. What is unique about this study is the multi-level perspective on the formation of network ties. In the general literature on networks few empirical studies address how ties actually form, examining primarily the effects of structured access to resources, rather than the mechanisms that produce the structures that emerge between individuals and the organizations in which they are embedded.²

Networks and Social Capital

Ties between individuals within or between groups have consequences in many domains and the networks they form have been viewed as a key dimension of social capital. In one of the first uses of the term, Bourdieu (1986) defines *social capital* broadly as the actual and potential resources that stem from more or less stable relationships. In his words: “the profits which accrue from membership in a group are the basis of the solidarity which makes them possible” (1986, p. 249). Subsequent theorists have emphasized not only the resources that stem from group membership but also those that flow from the networks in which actors are embedded. Differential access to such resources is one of the most enduring features of social inequality and a key reason for its reproduction across time and space.

Conceptions of Social Capital

Well-known political theorist Robert Putnam defined *social capital* as the features of social organization, such as “*networks, norms and trust*

² Even though exchange theory identifies a specific rationale for tie formation (resource interdependence), few experimental studies in this research tradition investigate the actual creation of ties, focusing more often on the effects of specific network configurations of ties on power use, commitment and trust. One exception is Kollock (1994).

that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (1993, p. 35). Sociologist James Coleman (1988) used the phrase *social capital* in much the same way to refer to networks and norms that support solidarity and generalized reciprocity. In particular Coleman argued that dense closed networks offer the benefit of mutual monitoring and the capacity for sanctioning based on commonly held norms. This is especially the case in small communities (see also Cook and Hardin 2001) and closed social networks with membership barriers often focused on social factors such as social class, gender, race, age or some other category that can serve as a signal of belonging to the in-group or, conversely, the out-group.

James Coleman (1988) argued that social capital is significant since, like other forms of capital, it makes the achievement of certain ends possible. In one of his classic examples, Coleman notes that farmers who extensively borrow and lend tools have a kind of social capital that extends the amount of work they can accomplish beyond what they could accomplish using the separate equipment they own and operate, referred to as their physical capital. This form of *generalized exchange*,³ referred to by Coleman as a type of social capital, generates solutions to collective action problems in small farming communities (as one example of the phenomenon). Two key factors are relevant in this context: (1) the networks that link individuals and families in ways that allow the sharing of resources and tasks of value,⁴ and (2) the community-based norms of exchange, fairness and interpersonal trust that facilitate collective action (see also Ostrom 1990).

³ The type of generalized exchange referred to by Coleman is group-generalized exchange in which each actor contributes to the production of a collective good that is enjoyed by all. Another form of generalized exchange is network or chain-generalized exchange in which actors provide resources of value to one another but not to the specific person they received aid from, perpetuating a circle of giving (see subsequent discussion of forms of exchange in this chapter).

⁴ Currently the sharing of tasks and resources occurs on the Internet as well as in social networks of family and friends. What is now referred to as the “sharing economy” allows for generalized exchange among those who are typically strangers.

In this particular example Coleman's (1988, 1990) application of the term social capital extends beyond networks to include norms, fairness and trust, in the same way that Putnam uses the concept, as an umbrella term that encompasses a number of conceptually distinct phenomena.

Networks and the Provision of Social Capital

To avoid conceptual confusion in this chapter (and to limit scope) I will narrow the definition and use the term *social capital* primarily to refer to access to resources that can be obtained through *network ties* to other individuals or to groups and associations (see also Portes and Landolt 1996). Here I agree with Lin (2000), who conceptualizes social capital as the quantity and/or quality of resources that an actor (individual or aggregate) can access through its location in a social network or, more simply, as embedded resources in social networks. I will treat norms and trust as distinct from social capital, though clearly there are important connections between these concepts to be explored. The general literature on social capital, however, typically conflates these concepts.

In terms of significant social ties, the individuals we connect with can be mere acquaintances, even strangers, or they can be close friends and kin. In addition, the ties can be formal, determined by our roles and positions in society, or they can be informal, connections we form as a result of chance meetings or through more remote connections to friends of friends. These social connections can be job or school-based or derived from other sources of affiliation determined by political, religious or purely social interests. They can provide social support, financial support, and/or access to information, transportation or even medical advice. And, it is important to note that many of these connections are currently being mediated through online networks or social media (e.g., Facebook, LinkedIn, etc.) and involve an ever-expanding domain of activity including task and resource sharing (e.g., Lyft, Uber, TaskRabbit, CrowdSource,

etc.) as well as new modes of connection. Centola (2011), for example, investigates the online networks and discussion groups that form to support people coping with particular medical issues (e.g. obesity, diabetes, etc.). Networks of those connected online to provide social support to one another show improvements in treatment compliance and positive behavioral change when compared to those without such community support (even though it is purely computer-mediated interaction). It has long been known in the medical literature that access to social support generally enhances recovery and sometimes serves as a preventive factor (Ell 1984). What is less well-known, however, is precisely under which circumstances these results obtain and why some benefit more than others.

Social Capital and Human Capital

Key debates in the expansive social science literature on social capital and its effects focus not only on what is meant by the term, but also on how it is distinguished from other forms of capital (physical and human capital). I review some of these debates before focusing on the fundamental ways in which access to social capital structures inequality. With respect to primary distinctions, Portes (1998) argues that we should clarify the boundary between *social capital*, which is an aspect of interpersonal relations (networks and trust), and what economists refer to as individual *human capital*, which includes education, skills, job training, as well as gender, age or race, among other things that are often related to these factors. Gender-based discrimination, for instance, leads to the channeling of job opportunities and limitations in skill-based training determined by gendered conceptions of appropriateness, thus restricting the potential accumulation of human capital for certain categories of actors (e.g., women in male-dominated fields). *Human capital* is distinguished by the fact that it typically transfers with the individual from place to place and results from an investment often of time and money, for example, in one's skills and education, or it is derived from privileged positions in

society that grant access to unique opportunities and the relevant resources to build such human capital. In this sense inequality in access to social capital has consequences for the distribution of human capital in society.

For Portes and Landolt (1996), *social capital*, in contrast to human capital, is the capacity of individuals “to command scarce resources by virtue of their membership in *networks*, or broader social structures,” as the examples cited above suggest. It is contextually embedded, and unlike human capital, not easily transported from setting to setting. The connections may be unique to the setting in which they were formed. Social networks that exist in work settings, for example, are often limited to those who belong to the same organization and thus access to the resources provided through these connections is restricted. Leaving the organization (i.e. business, law firm, or job) often entails formally cutting ties to former co-workers and colleagues. The networks that are built up over time in many organizational settings that actually allow managers and employees to get things done without much bureaucratic interference, for instance, tend to be local and represent a type of investment that often generates employee commitment and loyalty to the organization simply because it can not be replicated very quickly in another setting. Thus, in terms of social capital, the phrase “you can’t take it with you” is frequently apt.

Social relationships, most often embedded in networks of connected actors, can become the basis for obtaining access to economic resources through exchange processes, as well as cultural capital providing contacts with arbiters of taste (i.e., embodied cultural capital) and access to organizations or institutions that provide valued credentials and rewards (i.e., institutionalized cultural capital). For this reason differential access has significant consequences both for individuals and for society. Educational institutions in most countries, for example, are the purveyors of knowledge credentials that grant or deny access to certain occupations and professions (Meyer and Rowan 1977) and, in some societies, to positions of power often through entry into politics or elite circles. Network ties can also be

used in various realms to support corruption and channel political influence, sometimes for negative purposes, to those who are “insiders” in the network of those who wield influence (see the work of Diego Gambetta (1993, 2009) on the Mafia, for example). As Portes (1998, p. 18) argues, “Mafia families, prostitution and gambling rings, and youth gangs offer so many examples of how embeddedness in social structures can be turned to less than socially desirable ends.” Many focus on the positive consequences of social capital, but it can also lock individuals, young or old, into closed networks that restrict freedom, limit options, and cement existing structures of inequality.

Networks, Norms and Trust

In my view (and that of Nan Lin, as well as Portes and Landolt), networks that link actors—often in relations of exchange and reciprocity—are the primary sources of social capital and the resources needed for varied purposes, even though, as I have noted, Putnam and others define social capital as including networks, norms and trust. I treat these concepts as distinct primarily for conceptual clarity (Cook 2005). While both Putnam and Coleman include communal norms in their discussions of social capital, such norms are most effective only in small groups or relatively closed communities, in part because monitoring and sanctioning can more easily occur (as noted by Coleman 1988; as well as Cook and Hardin 2001). Norms are less effective in larger, typically open networks because they cannot be easily enforced. It is not easy to monitor behavior in networks since the relations are distributed and those in one part of a network may have no idea what is happening in another part of the network. In such a context brokers of information gain power (Marsden 1987) since they can control the flow of key resources, including knowledge of distributed activities (see also Burt 1992, 2005, 2010), even gossip (Burt and Knez 1995). And, information in this context is power—a key dimension of inequality (Thye and Kalkhoff, this volume).

In the network context, trust can also be viewed as distinct from social capital as we define it, and this facilitates both theoretical and empirical work by reducing the overlap in meaning among these key concepts. It also facilitates investigation of the associations between norms and trust, or networks and trust, for example. Trust becomes important in a networked society, as noted, because monitoring and sanctioning cannot be accomplished easily. In a network, trust between parties may form but likely only if they gain information that allows them to assess the other's trustworthiness either through direct experience or through reputational information that flows through the network. Such mutual trust can arise either because both parties care about maintaining the relationship into the future or because they care about maintaining their reputations with respect to one another or to significant others (Cook et al. 2005).

Extensive investments in building reputation systems are typically made in networks in which the risk of failed trust is high such as, for example, when individuals share highly personal information or engage in network mediated exchange or the sharing of objects and services of significant value. In general, trust, when it does exist, allows us to take the risks involved in cooperating with others and therefore to enter into a wider range of social and/or economic relations (see also Matthew Jackson's 2008 work on social and economic networks). Trust fosters connection, and it is the formation of these connections that offer us social capital—ties to those who can provide us with information, resources or the services we might need. But, as Portes and Landolt (1996) point out in their highly cited article, it is important to avoid tautology in arguments about social capital by separating the networks and their characteristics (e.g. density, reach and size, etc.) from the actual resources they provide, either material or symbolic. This is another source of conceptual confusion in the ever-expanding literature on social capital.

Networks are significant not only because they may provide valued resources for the individuals they connect, but also because they can produce externalities that benefit society at a more macro-

level, and this has been a key part of Putnam's argument about the value of social capital, which I have not yet emphasized. Putnam (1995, 2000) refers to "rich networks of organized reciprocity and civic solidarity" as being at the core of civil society. Putnam claims that these networks of social ties, and the societal norms they sometimes induce, can provide the basis for effective government and economic development (Putnam 2000, p. 3), a claim that is partially explored in some depth in the work of Frances Fukuyama (1995) on social trust and its effects at the societal level in five different countries (the United States, China, Italy, Japan and Germany). Networks of civic engagement provide not only ties that link individuals and groups in the society, but they also foster norms of generalized reciprocity (and trust), creating what Putnam refers to as a "favor bank." Efficiency is generated by this reliance on reciprocity, the trust it generates, and the social networks that provide access to information and resources.

Here Putnam's approach to social capital, including networks, norms **and** trust, begins to obfuscate the underlying social processes. Trust and norms, as we have suggested, are best treated as distinct from the networks that provide resources of value to individuals or groups. One can view the networks that link individuals as having collective consequences beyond the provision of resources of value (or social capital). Norms can arise to facilitate civic engagement and trust can evolve between actors connected in social networks, making possible reciprocal acts of generosity and the sharing of tasks. These facts support Putnam's claims regarding their role in fostering civil society, but these processes can occur independent of the provision of resources of value to individuals whose networks grant or deny them access.

Reciprocity Norms—Maintaining Access to Social Capital

Reciprocity norms typically govern the acquisition of social capital within networks of exchange and many connections that form between individuals are lasting as a result. Without *reciprocity* the ebb and flow of resources derived

from network ties would cease in the long run since few would engage in exchanges in which there is no eventual return. Important features of the exchange processes, which govern the flow of resources in these networks, include uncertainty regarding the timing of the return for the resources received in the exchange, the relative worth of the resources given and received and the attendant fairness evaluations of the exchanges that occur (Molm 2003, 2010). Perceptions of inequity deter further contributions of resources and may lead over time to termination of the ties between actors in which unfair exchange occurs (e.g., Hegtvedt et al. 1993; Molm et al. 2003). This is one key reason why connections break, altering the network in which the ties are embedded.

The ties that form and the obligations that emerge as a result of reciprocity constrain as well as sustain the exchange of resources (or social capital) within the network (Molm 2003; Molm et al. 2007). While reciprocity is a key dimension of exchange, it can take several forms. It can entail either direct or indirect reciprocity and result in either restricted or generalized exchange. Ekeh (1974), for example, distinguishes between restricted dyadic exchange and several forms of generalized exchange: group-focused generalized exchange and network generalized exchange (see also Yamagishi and Cook 1993). In group-focused generalized exchange individuals contribute to the group while receiving resources of value in return as individuals. This form of exchange is fundamental to many of the situations in which individuals join forces to produce collective or public goods (assuming they can overcome the free-rider problem) with the potential to ameliorate inequality.

A clear example of group-focused generalized exchange is micro-finance lending groups (e.g. those supported by the Grameen Bank) or rotating credit associations (Anthony 2005; Light 1984) in which group members take turns benefiting one individual at a time from the loans they need to start a small enterprise. The individuals return funds to the group by repaying their loans, perpetuating the cycle of giving to one another collectively. A byproduct is often the rise of mutual trust as the fulfillment of reciprocal obligations

fosters commitment to the collectivity. But the primary outcome is access to critical resources from generalized exchange that the participants would not otherwise be able to obtain. In some circumstances it is precisely this access to such resources that provides new opportunities and serves to mitigate the existing inequalities.

Network generalized exchange is more like the classic Kula ring exchange described by Malinowski (1922) in which individuals linked in a chain provide resources of value to the person they are connected to, but they receive goods or services from a different individual connected to them in the chain (see also Bearman 1997). Network generalized exchange is more fragile, subject to the failure of any single actor to honor reciprocity. Similar distinctions between modes of exchange have been made in the classic work on exchange by Blau, Homans and Emerson, as well as in more recent work by exchange theorists within sociology including Cook, Molm, Lawler and their collaborators. Differences in modes of generalized exchange have implications for the distribution of the valued outcomes of the exchange process and for the cohesion or social solidarity among those involved. This tradition of research within sociological social psychology provides some insights into the mechanisms that support Putnam's claims about social cohesion and the foundations of civil society, linking exchange conceptions of interaction with the provision of social capital and its consequences for collectivities.

Importantly, Emerson (1972) also distinguishes *productive exchange* from other types of exchange. He treats it as a distinct form of exchange in which the individuals involved make unique contributions to the production of something (or a service) of value. The rewards from that activity are thus *collectively* produced and the benefits returned to those who contribute in much the same way as portrayed in Ekeh's group-focused generalized exchange. But for Emerson productive exchange involves the production of something of value that the parties to the exchange typically could not have produced on their own. His favorite example was of a game of tennis, in which each actor plays a part to produce a tennis match that neither could produce for their enjoyment

alone. Productive exchange also includes a collective action problem, but it differs from the type of free-riding issue posed in group-generalized exchange. It is more closely connected to simple coordination difficulties (Hardin 1982). Solving such coordination problems is often central to the creation of productive activities that have joint value and thus serve as a form of social capital or resource to be obtained in networks that promote productive exchange.

In either productive exchange or in group-focused generalized exchange the sharing of resources with others may also result in recognition that is actually independent of the value of the specific contributions involved. Such recognition may involve being rewarded with increased status and influence. In chain-generalized exchange in which there is no group per se, only a chain-linked network, such a result is much less likely. This raises two possibilities. First, in the group-focused generalized exchange settings and in the productive exchange situations the dyad or group itself may become the focus of connection and the basis for solidarity. Lawler and Yoon (1996) and Lawler et al. (2000, 2008, 2009) have explored these possible outcomes in their work on relational cohesion and group solidarity.

Second, the possibility of group-based rewards of status and influence in exchange for contributions to the collective good, over and above what the individual receives in return, has been identified as one mechanism by which group-oriented pro-social action is motivated and bounded solidarity emerges (Cheshire 2007; Willer 2009). Research of this type offers a clearer sense of the mechanisms that produce social capital and the social cohesion Putnam claims develops under specific circumstances, providing the basis for norms of reciprocity and a more civil society. In the next sections of this chapter I investigate the specific determinants of differential access to social capital (obtained through various types of exchange) and the consequences of this differential access for individuals and society in a number of domains. I conclude with commentary on the conditions that typically result in the reproduction (and sometimes the amelioration) of various forms of inequality.

Differential Access to Social Capital: The Basis of Network Inequality

As I have argued, there are many reasons why networks form, but once formed they may become the major source of social capital (valued affiliations and resources of value) for the actors involved and differential access may lead to network inequality. Key questions related to network inequality include what factors determine the accessibility of resources (i.e. social capital), what are the effects of the nature of the network on the flow of resources (who has access to social capital and how much), and what are the consequences at the individual (i.e. limits to access) and collective levels (e.g. cohesion and solidarity).

With respect to network determinants of access, the exchange network tradition identifies a number of factors that affect the distribution of exchange outcomes in a network of connected exchange relations. These factors include the nature of the connections (positive or negative, see Cook and Emerson 1978; Cook et al. 1983; Molm and Cook 1995), the structure of the wider network in which the exchange relations are embedded (Molm et al. 2012), as well as the degree of dependence of the actors on the resources available (or not) from those within the network. In addition, the actual position one occupies and how it is connected directly or indirectly to other actors (individual or corporate) matters. An actor can be central or peripheral in the network, connected to many or to few others, or act as a key link or bridge between those who need resources (or services) from each other. These findings are summarized in detail in a number of review articles (e.g., Yamagishi et al. 1988; Cook and Cheshire 2006, 2013; Molm and Cook 1995).

Structural Holes and Bridges

In addition to exchange network theory, in the general work on networks a number of scholars focus on the network determinants of access to resources (i.e. social capital). Ron Burt (1995), for example, argues that ties that link individuals

across groups or organizations that might not otherwise be connected serve as *bridges* to unique sources of information and resources that may provide those who serve as “brokers” greater status as well as the power to wield more influence. They occupy what Burt calls “structural holes,” which places them in a unique structural location that grants advantages to them if they can serve as brokers. The transmission of valued information and resources (i.e. social capital) across this bridging tie generates power and influence, which those who do not occupy structural holes typically cannot benefit from. Granovetter’s (1973, 1974) work demonstrates that “weak” ties are more likely to serve as bridges between separate networks. Connections that link those who would not otherwise be connected across a void or “hole” in the network structure provide the broker (the one who bridges the divide) with an advantage. Buskens and van de Rijt (2008), however, find that it is hard to maintain such a structural advantage in the long run if everyone in the network adopts the strategy of exploiting structural “holes.”

In a more recent volume focusing on “neighbor networks” Burt (2010) finds that extended ties or connections beyond one’s direct (one-step) ties may be less influential than the existing empirical work has implied. Burt asks the question: does access to my neighbor’s neighbors serve the same function as a bridging tie? That is, how much additional influence can be obtained from linkages that extend beyond those who are directly connected? In the organizations he studies he finds that more connections are not necessarily better, which has implications for the analysis of the networks that provide social capital. In fact, in these organizations he finds virtually no “spillover” in terms of the effects of the more distant ties to which one is connected. He emphasizes instead the significance of human capital and the ties that result from those who want access to or association with you, which may be linked to human capital as much as to one’s network position, though the two may be confounded. He concludes that: “social capital seems to be a phenomenon that is personal and local (2010, p. 114).” For this reason what matters most are

actually close or strong ties, and less the weak ties emphasized by Granovetter in the study of job search processes (and many other topics examined by subsequent researchers that document the “strength of weak ties”). In this case Burt finds support for the value of strong ties in much the same way as previous investigators (e.g., Lin 2000; Quillian, this volume) who enjoined the debate over when ties of various intensities matter and in what ways.

Strong and Weak Ties

Strong ties typically connect people who are more similar or who have close relationships that often form their “core” network. And, the fact that we are more likely to associate with those who are similar, as noted above, means that we are often not exposed to those whose ideas differ from ours, or who have different values and attitudes (see Hampton [2011] on the function of bridging ties and network diversity on democratic engagement, for example). Homophily and the associated lack of heterogeneity in our core networks limits our access to sources of information that might enhance our understanding of particular problems or processes that might even facilitate innovation.⁵ This is one reason why bridging ties across structural holes may work as Burt suggests, providing brokers with non-redundant information. But the fact remains that we are not only more likely to connect with those who are similar to us, we are also more likely to develop stronger positive bonds of affiliation or “strong” ties (Granovetter 1974) with similar others, which has its drawbacks.

Ties connecting us with those who are quite different from ourselves, on the other hand, are often “weak” ties rather than strong ties. Such ties may be important for the transmission of in-

⁵ “Homophily limits people’s social worlds in a way that has powerful implications for the information they receive, the attitudes they form, and the interactions they experience.” (McPherson et al. 2001) “Heterophily” is the term used in the network literature to refer to connections between those who are different.

formation, influence or the resources we might not otherwise obtain, as Granovetter's (1974) well-known study of job-seeking illustrates. His findings clearly suggest that jobs are often obtained through weak ties and not strong ties, in part because connections that are strong typically produce more redundant information. A friend of a friend's acquaintance (a weak tie), for example, may know of job or career opportunities that your friend does not. Your friend is the link that is a component of your "social capital." Interestingly, early results in this tradition of research suggested that those with fewer resources, who are more disadvantaged, were most likely to use network ties to obtain information about jobs. But, often these processes in the end simply reproduce existing social structures and thus the inequality embedded within them (Lin 1999a, b). Strong ties come with resources not typically obtained from those to whom we have weaker ties, even if we occasionally receive useful information from our weaker ties such as news of a job opening or position of interest in addition to new and innovative ideas.

Domain-Specific Network Ties

Networks offer access to critical resources in a variety of domains. Mario Small (2009), for example, examines the type of networks that form on the basis of more specialized relationships that arise to meet specific needs, such as the need for assistance with daycare or obtaining information about preschools or after school care. He examines the use of ties that form as a result of joint engagement in activities related to parenting—ties that form, for example, through connections to the same daycare facility. The ties formed on the basis of the common need for assistance with childcare often served as bridges to other forms of social capital including social and material support, as well as information about jobs and assistance with after school care in a pinch. Small refers to such ties as *domain-specific* ties (or social capital) that lie somewhere in between strong and weak ties.

What is important about this work is the recognition of the organizational and institutional embeddedness of the social ties that emerge in a relatively unique setting. Developing a new conceptualization of the "weak strong tie" or "compartmental intimates," Small (2009) provides the important beginnings of a theory of network inequality. His primary focus is poor neighborhoods (i.e. those that fall below the national poverty level) in contrast to more affluent neighborhoods. In such places parents' access to the resources of importance in their daily lives is highly mediated by the organizations they come to rely on and the networks they form with others they meet when dropping off or picking up their children. This is the social capital they need to make their lives manageable in the context of heavy and often conflicting work and family obligations.

What is useful about this empirical work is that it identifies the specific mechanisms through which social capital is created (how it forms) and what the consequences are for those who do and do not have access to it. Small refers to his work as providing a "meso-level" approach to social inequality, an approach missing in much of the literature on social capital. Building on the social capital framework, in particular the network perspective on social capital, his work provides insights into "regularities in how people interact, obtain information, trust others, respond to obligations, acquire supportive services and secure everyday material goods" (2009, p. 191) and, perhaps most importantly, how organizational networks mediate structural inequalities. The network links that are important in this world are not just those formed at the level of individuals, but also between the organizations that matter such as those that offer employment, welfare, social and health services, including access to housing, food and medical care. It is important to realize that networks that provide social capital for those they connect can exist at several levels of analysis. Their overlap (or isolation) is an important feature of the networks involved that has consequences for the nature of the distribution of services and resources of value, in particular, the degree of inequality of access. This perspective

also offers insights into how inequality of access might be mitigated, as well as how it is reproduced.

Other studies in various domains of activity suggest that network ties provide a wide variety of social and material support, and access to such ties is differentially distributed. It is not only information that is typically shared across networks (such as information about job openings or available slots in a childcare center). Networks of social support may even provide the actual financial resources those in need of affordable healthcare can access to give them the childcare or funds for transportation that make it possible for them to obtain treatment. Lack of financial resources or the capacity to pay for transportation or assistance with family responsibilities is often cited as one of the primary barriers to receiving health care in a timely fashion (Mollborn et al. 2005). Such factors are also barriers cited by those unable to access other valuable resources, for example participation in literacy programs (Lesgold and Welch-Ross 2012) or adult education and the workplace training programs essential to mobility. It is clear that inequality of access has consequences that extend beyond the individuals involved.

The Consequences of Network Inequality

Networks structure access and access to social capital is linked (perhaps causally) to variation in important life outcomes, revealing the significance of such factors for the study of inequality and its reproduction. Social capital has been linked to outcomes as diverse as health status, intellectual development, academic performance, employment opportunities, occupational attainment, entrepreneurial success or failure, and even juvenile delinquency, among other things (e.g. DiMaggio and Garip 2012; Flap and Volker 2013). In fact, isolation from the mediated world of access to the resources provided through networks is increasingly a major source of disadvantage. It is not only the digital divide that separates us, it is the extent to which we have connections of any type to the individuals and organizations

that matter in ways that increase or decrease our life chances. And, these connections have implications not only for us as individuals, but also at the collective level for the communities in which we live and work.

Lin (1999a, 2000) articulates at least two major reasons for differential life outcomes, especially for those who are disadvantaged. First is the fact that disadvantaged actors tend to cluster in similar positions and thus have a limited variety of resources on hand including less influence and information—exacerbated by restricted networks of exchange. The second reason, based on the principle of homophily—one key basis for connection—is that these actors are typically drawn into relations with similar others, who may also have limited access to resources if they are disadvantaged as well. Both of these factors result in restricted access to the resources, which might serve to increase their life chances. It is heterogeneity of resources and the variation in their quality that characterize what Lin refers to as “resource-rich” networks, one of the main protective factors for those who are advantaged. Here we see clearly the deep association between networks and inequality.

Importantly, as noted above, networks do tend to be patterned by homophily (such as by race, ethnicity, age, sometimes gender, occupation and/or social class, among other characteristics of the actors involved, see Lin 2000; McPherson et al. 2001). Because those in certain social categories are more disadvantaged than others in many contexts, the flow or exchange of social capital and the associated benefits is inherently unequal. Perhaps even some of the negative consequences of social capital are less severe for advantaged groups and their social networks (see Portes and Landolt 1996). In addition, as Small’s (2009) recent research indicates, advantage is structured, typically mediated through personal and organizational connections. Ties formed in various contexts (e.g., in daycare centers or hair salons) provide linkages or bridges to needed resources. Limited access to such resources is a major source of inequality. The parents Small interviewed cited casual contact with other parents dropping off their kids as one way they gained valuable information which led to subsequent

opportunities for employment or other valued resources. These contacts linked them directly or indirectly with other individuals or organizations that provided assistance.

Network closure may limit access to the resources that matter,⁶ especially if those who are disadvantaged within the network face barriers to engagement with those outside the network who might serve as bridges to opportunity. The examples Portes and Landolt (1996) discuss include immigrant enclaves and urban ghettos in which networks are closed and outside ties restricted such that those on the inside have little or no access to the resources that might lead to a new job in a new place or the potential for advancement. Disadvantage can certainly arise as a result of this restricted opportunity as much as it does from limited human capital. Nee and Sanders (2001), for example, provide evidence of the detrimental features of closed ethnic enclaves, the same enclaves that are cited by many as providing critical resources (e.g. Waldinger 1986 etc.). Immigrants are frequently drawn into networks to gain support upon arrival in a new city or rural locale and sometimes given jobs by members of their receiving network, often composed of relatives or others they know more remotely who arrived earlier from their country of origin. Jobs may be found in specific sectors such as in agriculture or textile industries. Contacts help provide work and often the requisite training to gain the resources needed to survive (and sometimes thrive) in a new country. However, when these newly minted immigrants end up indebted to those who receive them, they may find themselves locked into situations from which it is hard to exit, and this reality may restrict them from moving to opportunity.

⁶ Of course, if those within the confines of the closed network are primarily advantaged closure may provide protection against exploitation or intrusion, a fact we see revealed in the many gated communities that emerge in various locations around the world that erect barriers and limit access of those on the “outside” to those on the “inside.” While physical barriers can limit access, in a networked world that extends beyond national borders it becomes much more difficult to erect such barriers or create effective restrictions to access that cannot be breached.

Access to Jobs and Related Opportunities

Within sociology, beginning with the work of Mark Granovetter on job search, there has been a long tradition of research examining the networks that surround getting jobs and achieving success in the world of occupations and professions. Besides simply using networks in ways articulated in this voluminous literature to gain entry into the job market (e.g. Marsden and Gorman 2001), networks, both formal and informal, affect all aspects of the careers of those in the workplace (but see Mouw 2003). For example, as Nan Lin reports (2000b, p. 790) a study by Volker and Flap (1999) found in the former Democratic German Republic that “the occupational prestige of the contact person had strong and significant effects on the prestige of both the first job and the current job for men and women.” Lin goes on to point out that a number of studies find no significant differences between men and women in job outcomes in some countries (e.g. China). But a key factor he identifies is that limited access to social capital (the types of ties men often have access to) for women is compensated for by stronger links to kin. Lin (2000a, p. 17) finds that “through kin ties, some Chinese women were able to overcome their capital deficit and gain better economic returns.” In other contexts gender inequalities clearly persist in the realm of access to jobs for various reasons (e.g. McDonald and Elder 2006).

Lin (2000) focuses on differentiating the sources of any disadvantage that may be faced by those in different groups (i.e. women versus men, or whites versus blacks) in the society. And, as DiMaggio and Garip (2012) demonstrate, group differences are only part of the story. Network effects add to the inequalities that emerge in access to resources. Differences, Lin argues, may emerge in different ways—either in differentiated investments in one group over another over time by parents and others (e.g., male children) or in differentiated returns to investment, as when the same accomplishment, academic degree or task competence is valued more when obtained by one group over another (e.g., in men versus women, or blacks versus whites). They

may also emerge due to restricted networks and the resource limitations that result. These differences are key to understanding the mechanisms involved, which allow us to know more about the nature of the interventions and related policies that might mitigate the negative effects of lack of access to the relevant human and social capital (or resources derived from network connections) that would change the outcomes, especially for the disadvantaged.

Social Capital and Children's Outcomes

It has been demonstrated that inequality in access to various resources, often network mediated, has consequences for the educational and occupational attainment of individuals, but some of this effect may be a carryover from earlier deprivation that began in childhood. A number of social scientists including economists, sociologists, psychologists and anthropologists have investigated different paths to adulthood in various cultures using a variety of methods. However, fewer have focused on the specific mechanisms behind childhood effects of access to networks and resources (social capital)—or the lack of it—that may alter the course of development and thus eventual status attainment.

An exception is the work of Janseens et al. (2004), who look at the impact of a child's parental networks and access to information on women's empowerment programs. The resources provided to households facilitated female education, a primary determinant of subsequent adult outcomes for the children with access to such programs, especially in developing countries like India. Involvement in these empowerment programs, they demonstrate, has important "spillover" effects on other activities that improve child outcomes, including immunization against diseases like tuberculosis and diphtheria (in India), as well as increased trust and engagement in collective action at the community level that improve the local infrastructure. There are many examples of this type, demonstrating that parents' networks and access to information and resources have a major impact on childhood development,

academic success and engagement, as well as basic health practices. It has been argued that a major contributor to social inequality is lack of access to the types of social capital that inoculate children against the worst effects of poverty, in particular in the domains of education, health and welfare (Furstenberg and Hughes 1995; Jack and Jordan 1999). These factors also contribute directly to the intergenerational reproduction of inequality.

In addition to parental resources, schools matter for children's outcomes, but how much? In a very recent study, Dufur et al. (2013) investigate the relative effects of social capital from these two contexts on the outcomes of children. In particular they compare the extent to which children benefit in terms of their academic achievement from social capital that derives from their families and their schools, attempting to examine more closely the differential impact of access to such resources (see also Parcel and Dufur 2001). Using data from the National Longitudinal Study of Educational Outcomes they find that family resources have a stronger effect than does access to social capital provided by schools. In particular, they find that stronger bonds between parents and children and greater parental involvement in the child's academic life have a stronger effect than school factors such as high morale among teachers and a positive learning environment. They conclude by examining the implications of their findings not only for future research on achievement but also, more broadly, for studies of inequality and its reproduction (or amelioration; see also Schneider et al., this volume). Social capital has complex effects not only because the literature mixes networks, norms and trust, but also because the effects vary by level of analysis.

Social Capital and Health Outcomes

Low levels of social capital (including trust) can have deleterious effects at both the individual and collective levels. House et al. (1988) find evidence that the networks that provide access to resources are often key to whether or not people

get sick, recover or even die (see also Smith and Christakis 2008). While there is some support for the positive effects of individual social capital on health, Rocco and Suhrcke (2012) find that this effect only holds if the community in which the individual lives has sufficiently high social capital, limiting the possibility of intervention at the individual level. Other findings similarly suggest that while networks may produce information concerning health practices and even where to obtain care that is useful to everyone, levels of trust in physicians and the healthcare system itself appear to be linked to the use of healthcare more strongly among advantaged and white people than among minorities, the uninsured and the poor (Mollborn et al. 2005). Those with trust in the system and in their physicians are more likely to be white and advantaged, most likely with good reason. As Cook and Stepanikova (2007) note paradoxically, “policy interventions to increase social capital, unless carefully tailored to address the needs of the more vulnerable populations, may therefore increase the health advantages of the privileged and leave the disadvantaged farther behind.” It is hard to fix such a complex system so as to benefit specifically those who need it most, as we know from many private and public efforts—both successful and unsuccessful—to alter the structure of the delivery of healthcare and its underlying incentives.

In the arena of healthcare, social capital seems to have limited power to close the existing health and health care gaps along class, race and sometimes gender lines. While networks may create opportunities for access to better care as well as contribute to the higher quality of care when obtained, more complex issues related to actual human capital and persistent inequalities in access to proper nutrition, education, and income over a life time may be the “hard realities” behind unequal access and unequal outcomes in the healthcare domain that we must come to terms with, not to mention persistent and stark differences in basic health, morbidity and mortality (Cook and Stepanikova 2007; Freese and Lutfey 2011; Pampel et al. 2010).

Community-Level Consequences

A number of studies have attempted to understand the independent effects of social capital at the individual and community levels. The collective consequences of access to social capital (or the lack of it) were a big part of Putnam’s agenda, if not his primary focus. These effects have been examined in a number of domains. With respect to crime rates, for example, Buonanno et al. (2009) find that in Italy both associational ties and strong civic and altruistic norms actually reduce crime, controlling for a number of factors that are related to alternative causes of crime. The policy implications of their findings include suggestions that the promotion of civic norms and associational life has the potential to contribute to crime reduction. These investigators look at data on property crimes in various regions in Italy in their effort to examine the link between social capital and crime, attempting to separately identify the effects of the different dimensions of social capital (i.e. networks, norms and trust), which is important.

What is not clear in this general area of research is the nature of the specific mechanisms through which community level factors such as rates of engagement in associations or levels of pro-social behavior (e.g., blood donation) affect the propensity for criminal activities in the region of interest. Other research at the community level has similarly focused on the nature of the effects of regional factors on specific categories of positive and negative behaviors (e.g., civic participation, voting, volunteering, criminal activity, disorganization, and mistrust, etc.), sometimes blending the study of networks, norms and trust, making it hard to determine separate causal effects.

Focusing on mechanisms, Sampson et al. (1997) suggest that the alienation, distrust and economic dependency generated by concentrated disadvantage reduce collective efficacy in such communities, which limits the effectiveness of the social capital that might exist in the form of personal network ties (Quillian, this volume). Disadvantaged neighborhoods breed mistrust

and a strong sense of disorder over time, as well as the failure of mechanisms of social control that are linked to residential instability (Sampson and Graif 2009, p. 7). It is the persistence of disadvantage and the factors associated with it (e.g., lack of social control, disorganization and social exclusion) that often leads to durable structures of inequality. Social network ties that provide opportunities for mobility or allow residents to access resources that alter their circumstances provide the social capital needed to improve the situation, either individually or collectively, and to avoid what Sampson and Morenoff (2006) call the trap resulting from concentrated poverty. But the durability of these traps is daunting.

Sampson and Graif (2009, p. 8) argue that the “more connected key actors are with multiple local leaders, the more likely the whole local network and eventually the community is to be characterized by higher trust.” In this circumstance they find that community level factors are associated with community trust levels, both of which are fairly stable and strongly linked negatively to poverty (high poverty is correlated over time with low trust and a lack of collective efficacy). And, in the Chicago area where their research was conducted, these high poverty, low trust neighborhoods are clustered, creating larger “traps” characterized by high risk and significant vulnerability for those who live there. In fact, they conclude that these poverty traps and the attendant resource deprivation are quite stable at the neighborhood level despite migration in and out of the area over time, yielding low levels of trust in leaders as well as residents (or what is referred to by Hardin (1993) as “learned mistrust,” which can be passed from generation to generation). Breaking out of such traps has proven to be almost an intractable problem.

Social Capital: Good and Bad Outcomes

Before concluding this section it is important to note that there seems to be a bias (perhaps unconscious) in the social capital literature reflecting the general orientation to social capital as leading to positive outcomes for individuals and

communities. Social capital is viewed by many as a genuine social good. But, as Putnam reminds us (2000, p. 8), “Social capital can be put to bad purposes.” Networks may have definite boundaries and can become closed (Cook et al. 2004) especially to outsiders. Closure, while it sometimes benefits those within the boundaries, may also lead to exploitation and limitations in contacts with those on the outside who might offer opportunity or resources necessary for mobility. It also restricts access to outsiders. Closure may lead to the emergence of norms that limit access to the resources that connections to others can provide, and distrust of those on the “outside” may evolve, further limiting opportunity. Here we see that closure has effects not only on norms and trust, but also has clear implications for access to social capital (as mediated through networks).

The potential uses of the resources (or social capital) obtained from social connections, however, can be quite negative as in the case of corporations like Enron or organizations that support corruption (e.g., the Mafia), and even the terrorist networks familiar to everyone especially since 9/11. Or in the words of Portes and Landolt (1996): “Nothing about social capital assures us that it will be put to good purposes.” As they note, it can be used to provide support for individual and community benefit or to block or obstruct activities that would benefit them. Even the social inequalities that result from differential access can be exacerbated when it comes to the negative outcomes that can arise as a result of access to (or the lack of access to) social capital. It is important to acknowledge this potential since it provides a corrective to some of the more normative claims sometimes too glibly made in the context of discussions of communal associations, civil society, and social capital.

Concluding Comments: The Reproduction of Inequality

A major dimension of inequality in society is the extent of access to social capital, to connections that matter. Social capital can provide direct and/or indirect access to resources that are

immediately useful as well as adding to one's long-term value by providing opportunities to increase one's human capital such as education, training or prestige. Disadvantaged groups in society are thus not only disadvantaged by their lack of human capital, but also by their lack of access to social capital—the kind of linkages that open doors and provide stepping stones to increases in both human and social capital. What we do not have is a roadmap—a clear empirical sense of what mechanisms lead to such increases in access to the relevant resources and opportunities to move up the ladder of success, despite over two decades of prolific research on the topic. In particular, we do not have a sense of exactly what works under what conditions to alter the life outcomes of those that inhabit our poorest communities or what are too often called poverty “traps.” We have more failed policy experiments and interventions than we have successes (e.g., Wilson 1987, 1996).

The potential role of social capital in reproducing the fundamental conditions of inequality is often overlooked in this broad-ranging research tradition in which many of its proponents seem to have adapted to rose-colored glasses (but see Flap 1991; DiMaggio and Garip 2012). And, as we have noted, social capital especially in the form of access to the resources embedded in social networks and social associations can lead to actions that have greater negative than positive impacts. In a study conducted in Tanzania, Cleaver (2005) illustrates exactly how collective action can be risky for the poorest people. Social relationships, he argues, can constrain as often as they enable—as those who have sounded a note of caution with respect to the Panglossian view of social capital have indicated. Cleaver (2005, p. 893) concludes with the admonition, reflective of Flap's (1991) much earlier claim, that the “very embeddedness of institutions in social life and cultural norms can reproduce the existing relations of inequality and marginalization.”

Similarly, in related research, Beall (2001) argues that social capital in the form of access to the resources available from networks and community-level organizations does not in and of itself promote pro-poor governance. Much

more is required. In addition, there is no real guidebook on how to navigate social networks to extract more resources (or social capital) for the most disadvantaged social groups. If our hopes have been pinned on the rapid expansion of the knowledge economy locally as well as globally, we have only to remind ourselves of the existing “digital divide” that exacerbates rather than ameliorates unequal access.

Several key dimensions of the problem are clear. There are deeply engrained and institutionalized sources of inequality that persist from generation to generation. In part this is what is referred to when the phrase “poverty trap” is used in the social sciences. In neighborhoods populated mainly by those below the poverty line collective efficacy is low (Sampson et al. 1997), trust in one another does not exist especially in high crime areas, and access to resources of all types is limited. The basics of life are spare, even food, especially healthy food, is less available from markets or farms. One mechanism identified by Small (2009) that mitigates some of the worst effects of unequal access in poor neighborhoods is the nature of the organizational embeddedness of those in need. Organizational connections, he argues, can confer advantages. He provides evidence that connections to organizations which broker needed resources, especially in poor neighborhoods, provide a buffer against some of the most negative effects of poverty. In fact, in his study daycare centers in poor neighborhoods were better connected than those in non-poor neighborhoods.⁷ This research offers some hope that access to organizationally induced ties may provide a more workable source of interventions to provide social capital to those in need. Similarly, Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004) argue that targeting resources to specific clusters and

⁷ Small (2009, p. 171) notes that, “Net of poverty level of the center, centers located in high-poverty neighborhoods had 25% more referral ties and 44% more collaborative ties than did centers located elsewhere.” This research clearly implies that moving to “better” neighborhoods is not always the best solution to access to social capital for those who are poor. In this case study ties to resource-rich organizations maintained by daycare centers granted parents access to the resources they needed most.

neighborhoods where the poor reside may help to create the necessary social change (see also commentary in DiMaggio and Garip 2012).

More recently, Putnam (2007) and many others who have followed his lead have documented the extent to which those areas in which there is less ethnic homogeneity exhibit lower trust and less access to the types of network embedded resources that flow when others are assumed to be more trustworthy. According to Putnam (2007): “New evidence from the United States suggests that in ethnically diverse neighborhoods residents of all races tend to ‘hunker down.’ Trust (even of one’s own race) is lower, altruism and community cooperation rarer and friends fewer.” This is especially problematic, Putnam argues, because of the trend toward a rise in immigration in many countries and the attendant increase in ethnic diversity, which his research indicates leads to lower levels of social cooperation and solidarity, at least in the near term. “In the long run, however,” he reminds us, the most successful immigrant societies have “overcome such fragmentation by creating crosscutting forms of social solidarity and more encompassing identities.” The specific mechanisms that facilitate this process have yet to be fully identified. What is clear is that the links between these processes and others specified in many of the most significant traditions of research in sociological social psychology have yet to be fully developed. In particular what is known as “identity theory” in sociology (Callero, this volume) provides insights into the ways in which individuals view themselves and how those they are connected to serve to reinforce existing identity commitments. Such conceptions are fundamental to our understanding of inclusion, exclusion and changes in identification that result from group affiliations.

Many other connections can be made between the growing and somewhat distinct traditions of research on social capital, social inequality and the major lines of work in sociological social psychology. My review of the work that has been done on social capital (primarily networks that provide access to resources of value) and its links to social inequality provides a basis, I hope, not only for the further theoretical integration but

also for more sound policy that may ameliorate the most negative consequences of lack of access to what is broadly referred to as social capital. Given that inequality is persistent and in many corners of the planet increasing at a relatively rapid pace, understanding the roots of inequality, how it is reproduced, and the factors that might mitigate its most negative consequences is very important. This volume contributes significantly to this task.

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Noah E. Friedkin

Introduction

The public sphere of visible local events and issues has dramatically enlarged as transportation and communication technologies have facilitated the dissemination of information. Cooley (1902, 1927) linked such enlargement with an increasing demand for social justice that is not restricted to matters of criminal behavior, and that generally penetrates into social life as a superordinate evaluative dimension of all action. Here I take an “issue of social justice” to be any matter concerned with the appropriate (that is, equitable, fair or just) treatment of particular persons or groups who are either the source (S) or target (T) of an $S \rightarrow T$ action. Actions that may trigger social justice issues include cases in which a father has murdered the rapist of his daughter, an employer has paid females less than males for the same work, and a selection committee has rejected a candidate for a position on the basis of religion. Given an $S \rightarrow T$ action (i.e., the event is undisputed), the social justice issue is the appropriate *reaction* to the $S \rightarrow T$ action. Such issues may involve disputes regarding whether the action was justified, its definition and meaning, and what punitive or compensatory responses, if any, are called for. The implications of ubiquitous

conversations about issues of social justice include changes in the social justice cultures of communities.

A variegated body of law and tradition provides a context for all social justice issues as defined above, e.g., the Book of Leviticus. These laws and traditions reflect the importance that individuals accord to issues of social justice. The meme of social justice as embodied by the Greek Goddess of Justice, with her sword and balance scale, supports an enormous apparatus of civic and religious law and their enforcement. But issues of and sensibilities to social justice are broader and deeper than any codification of the appropriate and inappropriate treatments of particular actions. Codifications do not eliminate diverse initial positions on the appropriate responses to particular actions. Such diversity makes social justice an issue in a large domain of actions, and precludes the construction of interpersonal influence systems that may modify and explain individuals’ emergent orientations to particular objects and positions on issues. Observed $S \rightarrow T$ actions and social justice issues are special cases of objects and issues—among many other types of objects and issues—on which individuals may have cognitive orientations that are affected by an interpersonal influence system composed of other individuals who are attending to the same object or issue. Evolving attitudes toward particular classes of $S \rightarrow T$ actions are components of the living (i.e., present) social justice culture of a community.

N. E. Friedkin (✉)
Department of Sociology, University of California,
Santa Barbara, CA 93107, USA
e-mail: friedkin@soc.ucsb.edu


Because of the ongoing enlargement of the set of visible local events, issues of social justice are increasingly included in the domain of “common objects” of interest and arousal for collectivities of individuals. These collectivities include the source, target, and direct observers, if any, of the $S \rightarrow T$ action, plus other individuals residing within and outside the locality of the action who have become aware of it. A particular $S \rightarrow T$ action becomes a “common object” of an interpersonal influence process on an issue of social justice when a group of individuals (e.g., a jury, panel of judges, religious congregation, committee of an organization, or informal coalescence of aroused individuals) display their positions on the appropriate treatment of the particular persons or groups who are either the source or target of an $S \rightarrow T$ action. Interpersonal influences allow emergent patterns of individuals’ issue-related feelings, thoughts, and actions. The most dramatic emergence involves changes of orientations that reduce an initial chaotic array of orientations on an issue to a settled consensus, or to two opposing factions. A jury is a familiar setting in which such emergence occurs on issues of social justice, but there are many other formal and informal settings in which local systems of interpersonal influence operate to transform individuals’ positions on social justice issues that are not yet or perhaps never will be brought to a court of law.

This chapter is concerned with the social process of interpersonal influence that may alter individuals’ positions on particular issues of social justice, and the implications of interpersonal influences unfolding in social network structures. I assume a reader who is acquainted with the classic lines of work on social influence covered in undergraduate survey courses on social psychology. A substantial amount of research has been conducted on bases and antecedents of interpersonal influence relations, i.e., relations in which individuals’ attitudes or behaviors toward an object are affected by the displayed attitudes or behaviors of one or more other individuals toward the same object. A less familiar terrain is the research frontier on social influence that begins with a network of interpersonal influences on a

specific issue and addresses the implications of interpersonal influences unfolding in the network structure. For sociologists, this research frontier on interpersonal influence systems is theoretically significant in its formal elaboration of the agenda of the symbolic interaction tradition (Blumer 1969; Cooley 1902, 1927; Mead 1934). The premises of this tradition are that (1) individuals’ actions toward particular objects depend on their cognitive orientations towards these objects, (2) individuals’ cognitive orientations towards particular objects are affected by interpersonal interactions that allow their orientations to be influenced by the orientations of others, and (3) individuals are active enablers and synthesizers, as opposed to passive recipients, of interpersonal influences. I employ somewhat different language to describe these premises than does the classical literature (Blumer 1969) because, as stated above, they have a maintained and increasing force in the modern advancement of work on interpersonal influence systems.

In the research frontier on social influence networks, investigation of the origins of network structures may be put aside in order to focus on the implications of an interaction process of interpersonal influence unfolding in network structures. We may start with the construct of *realized* relations of interpersonal influences, for the pairs of individuals in a collection of individuals who are oriented toward a common object, such as the $S \rightarrow T$ action of a social justice issue. We also may start with individuals’ independent *initial* evaluative orientations to the $S \rightarrow T$ action, which by definition are unaffected by other individuals’ responses to the action, and put aside the antecedents of these initial orientations. In the research frontier on interpersonal influences in network structures, individuals’ initial responses to objects are subject to modifications via interpersonal influences, and we are more interested in these modifications than in the origins of individuals’ initial responses. It should be evident that we cannot take the direct antecedents of individuals’ initial positions on a social justice issue as the direct antecedents of their settled positions when interpersonal influences disrupt the direct linkages of antecedent conditions and individu-

Fig. 10.1 The digraph formalization of an influence network



als' cognitive positions on the issue. As an interpersonal influence process unfolds in a network structure, consensus may be formed, the average orientation toward the action may become more extreme, individuals' orientations may coalesce into two opposing factions, or individuals' orientations may change without crystallizing into a faction structure.

The reader is likely to be familiar with the idea of a social network (see Cook, this volume) and comfortable with a modest abstraction in which directed lines (\rightarrow) may indicate interpersonal influence relations. But I do not expect that the reader has any detailed understanding of how those researching attitude and opinion dynamics define a social influence network, define a social influence process on individuals' attitudes towards objects, and derive the implications of the process unfolding in the network. The literature on these matters perforce relies on mathematical formalization. The mathematics is the theory, or the model, of the influence process in a network. The goal of this chapter is to provide a broadly useful and minimally technical introduction to the general features of the work that is being conducted on this frontier. The chapter consists of three major sections dealing with influence network structures, interpersonal influence processes, and derivable implications of interpersonal influence processes unfolding in influence network structures.

I cannot avoid presenting some mathematics, where mathematics is needed to precisely describe the theory. Active lines of work on this frontier include contributions from investigators in both the social and natural sciences (e.g., Acemoglu and Ozdaglar 2011; Deffuant et al. 2000; Friedkin and Johnsen 2011; Hegselmann

and Krause 2002). I concentrate the exegesis on one approach—social influence network theory (Friedkin 1998; Friedkin and Johnsen 1999, 2011). This approach has a long heritage in social psychology (Anderson 1981; French 1956; Harary 1959) and conceptual linkages to various lines of sociological work (Friedkin 2001, 2010, 2011; Friedkin and Johnsen 2003, 2011). In the large domain of proposed models of opinion dynamics in networks, Friedkin and Johnsen's standard applied model (a special case of their social influence network theory) is parsimonious in its assumptions and constructs (one equation suffices to define the model), and distinctive with respect to empirical support (gathered in both laboratory and field settings) for its predictions (Friedkin 1999; Childress and Friedkin 2012; Friedkin and Johnsen 2011).

The Influence Network Construct

It is useful to start with a familiar network construct. Figure 10.1 displays a structure (D) of nine nodes and twelve directed lines. In graph theory, a branch of mathematics, this structure is a digraph, i.e., a directed graph.¹ Digraphs correspond to how we usually describe social networks.

Let each line ($i \rightarrow j$) in Fig. 10.1 indicate that i directly influences j on a common issue. The $i \rightarrow j$ line is a path of length 1. Longer paths indicate the existence of indirect influence, e.g., 4 has indirect influence on 6 based on the path

¹ Figure 10.1 appears in Harary et al. (1965), a book that many investigators in field of social networks have found valuable.

$4 \rightarrow 5 \rightarrow 6$ of length 2, and 1 has indirect influence on 4 based on the path $1 \rightarrow 2 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow 4$ of length 3. The network consists of three *strong components* $\{S_1, S_2, S_3\}$. Each such component is a maximal subset of individuals in which, for every (u,v) pair of the component's members, there exists at least one path from u to v , and at least one path from v to u in D . In the *condensation* of this digraph, with respect to its strong components, the $S_i \rightarrow S_j$ lines indicate the existence of at least one direct influence relation from any member of S_i to any member of S_j . From the condensation it is evident that there are flows of influence from the members of S_1 to S_2 and from the members of S_3 to S_2 , but no flows of influence from any member of S_1 to any member of S_3 , or vice versa, and no flows of influence from any member of S_2 to any member of S_1 or S_3 .

The influence structure of Fig. 10.1 has clear implications with respect to constraints on opportunities for direct and indirect influence, but the reader should see that we are gnawing on a bone with little meat on it. Because every individual is influenced by at least one other individual, we can see that all members of this network are open to interpersonal influence, but the displayed structure does not indicate the extent to which each individual is open or closed to interpersonal influence. Six of the nine individuals are influenced directly by one other individual, but depending on the extent to which an individual is open or closed to interpersonal influence, the strength of these interpersonal influences will vary. We also see that individuals 5, 6 and 7 are influenced directly by two other individuals, but there is no indication of their relative influences. The digraph formalization is an important but weak specification of an influence network, with respect to the amount of information that it conveys.

The literature on interpersonal influence networks presents a remarkable interdisciplinary convergence to a more informative definition of an interpersonal influence network than the digraph formalization illustrated in Fig. 10.1. This more informative definition is introduced in Fig. 10.2. The focal (largest) node in Fig. 10.2 has a particular self-weight $0 \leq w_{ii} \leq 1$, which

corresponds to the extent to which the individual is open or closed to interpersonal influence on a specific issue. An individual who is not completely closed to interpersonal influence on the issue accords some positive weight to one or more others, and the particular weight that individual i accords to another individual j is $0 \leq w_{ij} \leq 1$ ($i \neq j$). The focal node distributes weights to self and particular others, and these accorded weights sum to 1. We represent a positive accorded weight as a valued directed line $i \xrightarrow{w_{ij}} j$ for the instances of $w_{ij} > 0$, keeping in mind that each such line implies that j has a direct influence on i . Note that in Fig. 10.2, the focal node is also accorded weights by particular others. Some of these others may be individuals to whom the focal node has accorded weight.

We may represent all of the accorded weights among n individuals as a $n \times n$ matrix, $\mathbf{W} = [w_{ij}]$, also shown in Fig. 10.2. Each row of \mathbf{W} describes the weights that are accorded by a particular individual. Each column of \mathbf{W} describes the weights that are accorded to a particular individual. The row values $\{w_{i1}, w_{i2}, \dots, w_{in}\}$ for each i are the direct relative weights accorded by i to the displayed positions on an issue of each member $j = 1, \dots, n$ of the network. A subset of these weights will be 0 when individual i is unaware of the orientation of individual j , and others will be 0 when individual i completely discounts the orientation of individual j . The diagonal values $\{w_{11}, w_{22}, \dots, w_{nn}\}$ of the matrix are individuals' self-weights. If $w_{ii} = 1$, then the individual is completely closed to interpersonal influence,

$$\sum_{j \neq i}^n w_{ij} = 0.$$


If $w_{ii} = 0$, then the individual is completely open to interpersonal influence,

$$\sum_{j \neq i}^n w_{ij} = 1.$$

The importance of this Fig. 10.2 formalization is indicated by the consequence of a loss of confidence in it: if confidence in it were substantially eroded, then a large number of models of influence in networks would be set aside.

Fig. 10.2 The situation of each individual in the group’s matrix of direct accorded influences

$$W = \begin{bmatrix} w_{11} & w_{12} & \cdots & w_{1n} \\ w_{21} & w_{22} & \cdots & w_{2n} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ w_{n1} & w_{n2} & \cdots & w_{nn} \end{bmatrix}$$



The matrix W allows for an infinite set of corresponding network structures. This flexible architecture is necessary. In the absence of extreme conditioning, the theoretical expectation is a set of individuals who not only vary in their extents of openness vs. closure to interpersonal influence, but also vary in their allocations of influence to particular others. Such individual differences are non-ignorable and are based on numerous individual, relational, and contextual variables that affect individuals’ openness to interpersonal influence and their allocations of weights to the orientations of other persons. Interpersonal influences involve “embodied” orientations, i.e., orientations toward an object that are displayed by particular individuals, and perforce are confounded with diverse features of the individuals who are conveying their orientations, and diverse features of the

interpersonal relationships involved. Moreover, the reception of the content of other individuals’ displayed orientations is confounded with the observers’ characteristics and association of diverse memories and meanings to the language, tonality, and gestures involved in the displays. As a consequence, the basis of a direct influence relation, in which an individual accords some weight to another individual’s orientation, is complex, and simplifying homogeneity assumptions about the values of these weights are suspect.

In addition, note the theoretically important shift of perspective from Fig. 10.1’s display of who-influences-whom to Fig. 10.2’s display of who-accords-influence-to-whom. The latter is the more fundamental definition of influence relations. Interpersonal influence is an accorded relation of the individual mind. Mead comes close

to this postulate when he states that “He had in him all the attitudes of others, calling for a certain response; that was the ‘me’ of that situation, and his response is the ‘I’ ” (1934, p. 176). Barnard comes close to this postulate in his analysis of authority relations when he states,

Authority is the character of a communication (order) in a formal organization by virtue of which it is accepted by a contributor to or “member” of the organization as governing the action he contributes; that is, as governing or determining what he does or is not to do so far as the organization is concerned.... If a directive communication is accepted by one to whom it is addressed, its authority for him is confirmed or established. Disobedience of such a communication is a denial of its authority for him. Therefore, under this definition the decision as to whether an order has authority or not lies with the persons to whom it is addressed, and does not reside in “persons of authority” or those who issue these orders. (Barnard 1968 [1938], p. 163)

The individual attends to all the attitudes of others to which he or she is aware and allocates a particular weight (including zero weight) to each of these attitudes. Interpersonal influence is a finite distributed resource of the mind.

This social psychological approach emphasizes that interpersonal influence networks are *social cognition structures* that are assembled by individuals’ allocations of weights to their own and other individuals’ orientations toward specific objects. In their classic typology of bases of social power, French and Raven (1959) are careful in defining the bases as grounded on the perceptions of the individuals who might be influenced; for example, *i*’s perception of *j*’s expertise. More generally, classical literature on bases of interpersonal influence supports the meta-analytic conclusion that individuals’ allocations of weight to self and particular others may be affected by numerous contextual, relational, and individual level conditions. An individual’s allocation of weights to his or her own and other individuals’ orientations toward a specific object is the individual’s response to the combination of all relevant conditions. The collective assemblage of these allocations of

accorded weights is an influence network as it exists at particular time, with respect to a particular object of orientation.

The influence network, assembled on a specific issue of social justice, is composed of individuals who are active in displaying their attitudes on the issue. The variation of these individuals’ initial positions on the issue may be modest or substantial. Attitude change can occur only if individuals are according influence to other individuals who are displaying different attitudes than themselves on the issue. Interpersonal influences on attitudes are ubiquitous because individuals frequently do accord influence to others (e.g., authorities, experts, and friends) who hold different, more extreme, or more moderate positions on an issue than themselves. Diverse cultures of social justice are formed when local systems of interpersonal influence, which enable and maintain agreements on social justice issues, are based on different social structures. Distinctive social structures are defined by individuals’ arrays of initial responses to $S \rightarrow T$ actions and their influence networks. Some influence networks may privilege particular responses because of the perceived power bases (expertise, authority, charisma) of the individuals who are displaying particular responses.

The Mechanism of Interpersonal Influence

The implications of an influence network are ambiguous in the absence of a theory of the influence process that unfolds in the network. Investigators in the field of attitude and opinion dynamics have proposed and examined the implications of a number different influence process models (e.g., Friedkin and Johnsen 2011; Groeber et al. 2014; Hegselmann and Krause 2002). Each of these models specifies some mechanism of interpersonal influence, that is the cognitive algebra by which individuals synthesize their own and other positions on an issue, and some temporal sequencing of the interpersonal influences that are occurring among individuals.

The Cognitive Algebra of Convex Combinations

Rational calculation, logical reasoning, mathematical deduction, and scientific methods of empirical inquiry remain the bulwark against ill-considered action, but they do not describe how individuals usually respond to issues and objects. With advancements in cognitive science, it has become increasingly evident that the mind, i.e., the human brain, automatically attends to and synthesizes available information with heuristic mechanisms, and that what constitutes “information” includes everything that is available to its sensory faculties. A corollary of this remarkable capacity of the mind is that embodied information, i.e., the displayed orientations of other individuals toward a particular object, is confounded with all available information associated with its embodiment in the particular individuals who are displaying their orientations. Such confounding, which may be reduced in experimental designs that present only abstract objects to subjects, is a social fact which contextualizes much of the information that individuals receive and presents a challenge to the exercise of pure logic and reasoning.

A manifestation of the evaluative activity of the mind is its automatic heuristic attitudinal responses to any perceived object, which are positive or negative cognitive orientations of particular intensity (Bargh 1997; Bargh and Ferguson 2000; Bargh et al. 1992; Zajonc 1980, 1998). The accumulating evidence on the automaticity of attitudes is consonant with the startling findings of Osgood et al. (1957, 1975) on the cross-cultural existence of a three-dimensional cognitive space in which individuals immediately locate the objects they encounter on the dimensions of evaluation (good-bad), potency (strong-weak), and activity (active-passive). Kahneman (2003, p. 701) remarks that

The evidence, both behavioral (Bargh 1997; Zajonc 1998) and neurophysiological (see, e.g., LeDoux 2000), is consistent with the idea that the assessment of whether objects are good (and should be approached) or bad (and should be avoided) is carried out quickly and efficiently by specialized

neural circuitry. Several authors have commented on the influence of this primordial evaluative system (here included in System 1) on the attitudes and preferences that people adopt consciously and deliberately (Epstein 2003; Kahneman et al. 1999; Slovic et al. 2002; Wilson 2000; Zajonc 1998).²

The available evidence also suggests that heuristically generated evaluative orientations are quickly translated by the mind into a variety of other forms of displayed attitudes and evaluations, e.g., subjective probabilities, rank orders, and monetary allocation preferences (Kahneman and Ritov 1994; Lowenstein et al. 2001; Slovic et al. 2002).

The associative systems of the mind (self-schema) that generate these attitudinal orientations are the normative foundations of individuals' initial responses to objects. But the internal normative systems of individuals may differ in their evaluations of appropriate (good) and inappropriate (bad) emotions, thoughts, and behaviors. The minds of different individuals may and often do generate different initial responses to the same objects. In the absence of extreme forms of conditioning, which are sometimes involved in the socialization and training of individuals in families, military units, therapeutic settings, and cults, the baseline expectation is diversity and variation, i.e., heterogeneous automatic initial attitudinal orientations (individual differences of sign and intensity) toward the same object in any collection of individuals. An allowance for such heterogeneity of initial attitudinal responses, as opposed to an assumption of initial consensus or even near consensus, may be taken as a postulate and point of departure for a theory of interpersonal influence. We cannot construct a general theory of interpersonal influence on the assumption that interpersonal influence is a conformity process that brings deviant individuals into compliance with shared norms that are the extant pre-

² Kahneman distinguishes two systems, 1 and 2, and locates the “hard work” of logic and reasoning in System 2. A simple example of System 2 activity is a countdown by sevens from 100.

vailing orientations of other individuals to particular objects.

Evaluative orientations to an object are immediate, and so are responses to the displayed orientations of other individuals toward the same object. The informational value of the displayed orientations of other individuals is determined automatically by the individual who observes the display(s). With respect to a common object, if an individual i observes the displayed orientation of one other individual j to the object, then i 's automatic heuristic response is an allocation of weights to his or her own orientation and the orientation of j , and the synthesis of these orientations. If an individual observes the displayed orientation of two or more other individuals to the object, then the individual's automatic heuristic response is an allocation of weights to his or her own orientation and the displayed orientations of the others, and the synthesis of these orientations. Some such synthesis must occur when an individual's orientation to an object is modified by the displayed orientations of other individuals toward the same object.

Intellective issues (i.e., problems with correct and incorrect positions) are typically dealt with by the same automatic heuristic mechanism. As the biases of individuals' responses to such issues have been elaborated, the assumption of ubiquitous rational actors has become increasingly suspect (Kahneman 2011; Kahneman et al. 1982). With the accumulating findings of the cognitive revolution in social psychology, indicating ubiquitous heuristic mechanisms, it has become increasingly anomalous to assume logical reasoning and rational calculation as the main mechanisms of interpersonal influence. Although the slow hard work of logical reasoning and rational calculation may be done by some individuals, on some occasions in which such work is aroused, the quick work of an automatic heuristic mechanism appears to be more a more generally accurate basis on which to construct models of influence in networks.

A formalization of the process of interpersonal influence involves a postulated heuristic mechanism by which individuals cognitively synthesize orientations of others toward an object, in-

cluding their own orientation, during the temporal process of interpersonal influence. A prevalent assumption is that the synthesis is a *convex combination*. In general, for a finite number of positions x_1, x_2, \dots, x_m in a real vector space, a convex combination of these positions is defined as any position $w_1x_1 + w_2x_2 + \dots + w_mx_m$, where $w_k \geq 0$ for $k = 1, \dots, m$ and $w_1 + w_2 + \dots + w_m = 1$. Clearly, the assumption of a cognitive algebra that is a convex combination is consistent with the prevalent specification of the influence network construct described in the previous section.

If the developing cognitive science on automaticity and heuristics applies to the objects entailed in social justice issues, then individuals' attitudes on justice issues are more often automatic responses to the objects involved in the issue than deliberative responses, and the mechanism that may alter these attitudes is more often a quick heuristic convex combination of displayed attitudes than a slow rational calculation or logical analysis of their relative merits. While formal authorities and legal procedures are engaged in their work on the issue, local interpersonal influence systems include formal authorities, legal process, and their outcomes as objects of evaluative orientation, along with other issue-related objects. Hence, when this formal work is completed, the social justice issue may not be settled in the minds of the individuals who have been aroused by the issue. In general, justice is never done and there is, instead, an evolving living culture of justice that is manifested in individuals' present attitudinal responses to $S \rightarrow T$ actions.

Group Dynamics

In the classic and simplest case, the convex combination is constrained to current orientations, and all individuals are simultaneously synthesizing their own and others' displayed orientations. The seminal work on attitude and opinion dynamics (French 1956; Harary 1959; DeGroot 1974) is just such a mechanism,

$$y_i^{(t)} = \sum_{j=1}^n w_{ij} y_j^{(t-1)} \quad (i = 1, \dots, n; t = 1, 2, \dots),$$

where $y_j^{(t)}$ is the time t orientation of individual j , which may be any number in an interval of the real number line, $0 \leq w_{ij} \leq 1$ for all i and j , and $w_{i1} + w_{i2} + \dots + w_{in} = 1$ for all i . The classic French–Harary–DeGroot mechanism is memoryless with respect to all orientations that were previously held. In particular, individuals accord no continuing direct weight to their initial orientations and, by implication, they accord no continuing direct weight to any condition (circumstance, experience, norm, interest) that affected their initial orientations. The self-weights, $w_{11}, w_{22}, \dots, w_{nn}$, that are involved in this mechanism are the direct weights that individuals accord to their current positions on an issue. This mechanism will generate consensus depending on the social structure in which it unfolds; e.g., consensus will be generated in most “strongly connected” influence networks where at least one path exists from u to v , and from v to u , for all $u \neq v$ members of the network. Figure 10.1 is not a strongly connected network.

In Friedkin and Johnsen (1999, 2011), the French–Harary–DeGroot mechanism is subsumed as a special case of a more general formalization, which allows influenced patterns of settled agreements and disagreements in a broader domain of structural conditions. In this generalization, individuals’ initial orientations toward an object may have an enduring salience:

$$y_i^{(t)} = a_{ii} \sum_{j=1}^n w_{ij} y_j^{(t-1)} + (1 - a_{ii}) y_i^{(0)} \quad (i = 1, \dots, n; t = 1, 2, \dots),$$

where $a_{ii} = 1 - w_{ii}$ for all i . Note that

$$a_{ii} \sum_{j=1}^n w_{ij} + 1 - a_{ii} = 1$$

and that a_{ii} describes the extent to which an individual is closed to interpersonal influence and attached to the initial orientation, or open to interpersonal influence and unattached to the initial orientation. Again, the influence network is a collective social cognition construct assembled by the n individuals’ accord of weights to themselves and particular others.

Other models of attitude and opinion dynamics have been proposed. Most incorporate the assumption of an individual-level information integration mechanism that is a convex combination of available information. The literature includes models of interpersonal influences on qualitative positions (Sznajd-Weron and Sznajd 2000; Watts and Dodds 2007), models in which the influence network is not a stationary construct (Hegselmann and Krause 2002), models that allow stochastic sequences of interpersonal influences (Deffuant et al. 2000), and models that entertain Bayesian mechanisms of belief updating (Acemoglu and Ozdaglar 2011). In the midst of the accelerating stream of proposed formalizations, it is easy to lose sight of the central unresolved problem of the field—the achievement of a normal science that advances work on empirically validated formalizations of the systems of interpersonal influence that are affecting individuals’ cognitive orientations to objects. Progress on this problem requires models that are researchable, and that have been researched. To date, remarkably few models have been researched in detail and, in particular, with respect to the accuracy of their predicted changes of individuals’ positions on specific issues. Below, I show how such predictions are obtained in the framework of Friedkin and Johnsen’s formalization.

Interpersonal influences on issues of justice generate attitudes that are convex combinations of individuals’ initial attitudes. Thus, local systems of interpersonal influence are conservative and non-chaotic in preserving an initial consensus and in constraining emergent attitudes to the range of individuals’ displayed initial attitudes. If all initial attitudes to the $S \rightarrow T$ action are negative (positive), then all emergent attitudes will be negative (positive), and they cannot be more negative (positive) than the most extreme initial attitude. With an enlargement of the public sphere of visible local responses to issues of social justice, the displayed attitudes of individuals who are located outside the locale of the $S \rightarrow T$ action may be accorded influence by individuals who are located near the action. Thus, social justice attitudes on specific issues, and a local

culture of social justice, may be modified with suitable changes of social structure, i.e., changes of the array of displayed initial attitudes and/or changes of the influence network. The approach for addressing the implications of particular social structures is now presented.

The Derivation of Implications

A key sociological postulate is the existence of social constructions that cannot be reduced to and understood as aggregations of independent individual attitudes or behaviors. With respect to individuals' positions on social justice issues, which have been affected by an interpersonal influence process unfolding in a network structure, the interdependency of individuals' social justice orientations is palpable. However, when network structures are involved, it is not obvious what the particular destinations are for individuals' transforming orientations. As individuals modify their orientations, each individual may be located in a changing landscape of influential orientations, and repetitive responses to these changing displayed orientations enable complex indirect influences.

Figure 10.3 illustrates the dynamics for the Friedkin-Johnsen influence mechanism unfolding in the D structure of Fig. 10.1. Recall from Fig. 10.1 that the four members of component S_2 are being influenced by the three members of S_1 and by the two members of S_3 . I have set up a scenario in which the initial attitudes of S_1 and S_3 are polarized extremes, and the initial attitudes of S_2 are more moderate. I also have set up a particular structure of accorded weights. The influence process generates changes of positions, which are traced in Fig. 10.3, in which three of the four moderates of S_2 alter their positions toward the positive positions of S_1 and the remaining moderate alters position toward the negative positions of S_3 . For the same array of initial attitudes and a different structure of accorded weights, the same process (here, the Friedkin-Johnsen standard process) may generate markedly different temporal dynamics. For the same structure of accorded weights and different array

of initial attitudes, the same process may generate markedly different temporal dynamics. The particular dynamics depend on the social structure and social process, where the relevant issue-specific social structure is defined by the influence network corresponding to \mathbf{W} and the individuals' initial positions on the issue,

$$\mathbf{y}^{(0)} = \begin{bmatrix} y_1^{(0)} & y_2^{(0)} & \dots & y_n^{(0)} \end{bmatrix}.$$

The elementary unit of interpersonal influence is a direct influence relation $i \xrightarrow{w_{ij} > 0} j$ for an ordered pair of individuals (i, j) in which individual j 's displayed emotional, attitudinal, or behavioral orientation toward a particular object is accorded positive weight by i . The more complex unit of interpersonal influence is a *total* influence relation for each ordered pair of individuals (i, j) in which individual j 's orientation has influenced i 's orientation on the basis of the direct and indirect flows of influence in a network. The Friedkin-Johnsen formalization allows solutions for time t influences that are the total (direct and indirect) contributions of other network members' initial positions to the determination of individuals' time t positions. When the influence process presents equilibrium, as it does in the case illustrated in Fig. 10.3, the model presents a control matrix,

$$\mathbf{V} = \begin{bmatrix} v_{11} & v_{12} & \dots & v_{1n} \\ v_{21} & v_{22} & \dots & v_{2n} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ v_{n1} & v_{n2} & \dots & v_{nn} \end{bmatrix},$$

in which $0 \leq v_{ij} \leq 1$ for all i and j , and

$$\sum_{j=1}^n v_{ij} = 1$$

for all i , that describes the total influences of each group member's initial issue position on a group member's settled position on an issue,

$$y_i^{(\infty)} = \sum_{j=1}^n v_{ij} y_j^{(0)},$$

for all i . For example, in Fig. 10.3, individual 7's moderate initial position (-15) is transformed by

Initial positions $\mathbf{y}^{(0)}$:

90 85 70 15 20 -10 -15 -95 -80

Direct influences \mathbf{W} :

0.990	0.000	0.010	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
0.800	0.200	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
0.000	0.500	0.500	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
0.000	0.000	0.950	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.050	0.000	0.000	0.000
0.000	0.000	0.000	0.750	0.250	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.900	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.100	0.000
0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.150	0.000	0.000	0.850	0.000
0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.990	0.010
0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000	0.000

Total influences $\mathbf{V} = (\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{AW})^{-1}(\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{A})$ with $\mathbf{A} = \text{diag}(1 - w_{11}, \dots, 1 - w_{mm})$:

1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
0.762	0.238	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
0.254	0.079	0.667	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
0.242	0.076	0.636	0.000	0.002	0.000	0.000	0.043	0.000	0.000
0.168	0.052	0.441	0.000	0.309	0.000	0.000	0.030	0.000	0.000
0.151	0.047	0.396	0.000	0.278	0.000	0.000	0.127	0.000	0.000
0.023	0.007	0.059	0.000	0.042	0.000	0.000	0.869	0.000	0.000
0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000	0.000
0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000	0.000

Settled positions $\mathbf{y}^{(\infty)} = \mathbf{V}\mathbf{y}^{(0)}$:

89.999 88.808 76.269 68.710 53.722 38.850 -74.922 -95.000 -95.000

Temporal changes:




Fig. 10.3 Illustration of Friedkin-Johnsen opinion dynamics

the process into the more extreme position (-75) by the disproportionate total *indirect* influence of an intransigent extremist, individual 8, in

$$y_7^{(\infty)} = \sum_{j=1}^9 v_{7j} y_j^{(0)} = -75$$

$$(v_{78} = 0.869, y_8^{(0)} = -95)$$

Thus, the matrix \mathbf{V} of Fig. 10.3 describes the relative power of each network member in determining the cognitive destinations of other members, with respect to their orientations toward a specific object.³

Discussion

The classical approach to social influence focused on the bases of interpersonal influence relations, including conditions affecting individuals' openness or closure to influence. This classical approach has generated a large literature. Recent work has advanced the development of dynamic models of attitude and opinion formation in which the bases of influence among group members are mixed and interpersonal influences unfold in network structures. As lines of research on groups have been abandoned by psychologists, and their work has increasingly become concentrated on cognition, work on group dynamics and social networks has been maintained and dramatically advanced by investigators located in other disciplines of the social and natural sciences. In this renaissance of work on social groups, which takes structures of interpersonal relations as core constructs, the investigation of bases of interpersonal influence now appears within a broader framework of interest in conditions and social processes that affect the structure of social networks.

In this chapter, I have described how systems of interpersonal influence may affect individuals' attitudinal orientations toward objects. The social structures of such systems are defined by two constructs: the array of individuals' initial attitudinal orientations toward a common object, and their network of accorded influences. All conditions that affect this social structure may be moved into the background for an analysis of a system's implications. Particular social structures, as defined above, have particular implications that may be analyzed case by case. The effects of families on their children, schools on their students, workplaces on their employees, neighborhoods on their residents, and small towns, cities and nations on their citizens depend on the attitudes of the particular individuals involved in these social units toward objects and their assembled networks of accorded influences. Although many objects in individuals' environments are not novel, they are often importantly particularized by features that trigger heterogeneous initial responses among those who are attending to them. Independent individual agency, not structural constraint, is central to the perspective of this chapter. Such agency is manifested in the heterogeneity of individuals' displayed initial attitudinal responses to objects, and in the heterogeneity of individuals' accorded influences to their own and others' displayed orientations to objects.

A special case of an influence system is one in which interpersonal influence processes unfolding in networks operate to maintain widely shared norms and reinforce the internalization of these norms as constraints on individuals' displayed emotions, attitudes, and behaviors toward objects. Parsons (1951, 1971) and others have assumed the existence of a social order of pervasive agreements and concordant behaviors that legitimizes social controls, which dampen and correct deviance from the normative consensus of the society in which individuals and social groups are situated. Such "well ordered" social systems have existed in the past, and do so now. In these systems, normatively constrained interpersonal influence relations (e.g., regularized patterns of deference) are manifested in all interpersonal

³ The analysis presented in Fig. 10.3 is for a one-dimensional cognitive orientation toward a specific object, which may be an evaluative position on whether justice would be served by a particular response to an $S \rightarrow T$ action. More complexly defined multi-dimensional issues also may be analyzed. See Friedkin and Johnsen (2011).

interactions, and social influence is reduced to instances of conformity or disobedience. We see the postulate of such a social system whenever it is asserted that local interpersonal influence systems serve to “reproduce” a normative consensus that covers a large domain of displayed emotions, attitudes, and behaviors, and that is often detailed and unambiguous in its applications to what are appropriate and inappropriate individual orientations in various circumstances.

In the absence of an extreme conditioning of individuals’ initial responses to objects, issues of social justice become foci of arousal and unresolved tension. At any given time, a massive set of social justice issues exists based on $S \rightarrow T$ actions in the locales of particular interpersonal relationships, families, schools, workplaces, neighborhoods, small towns, and cities. The visibility of some of these social justice issues may expand in scope as they arouse the concern and interest of larger numbers of persons. The occurrence of diverse displayed social justice positions on specific actions is a context in which broader (more or less coherent) religious, philosophical, and ideological paradigms of conduct are addressed, and the emergent orientations on specific actions, are markers of small and large movements toward or away from particular paradigms. The interpersonal work that gives rise to accommodations and agreements on social justice issues may be viewed as one of the primary engines of cultural change. The drama of this engagement with social justice issues is not restricted to the courts or governments of societies. The penetrating social controls that attend to matters of social justice are mostly informal interpersonal influences buttressed by local activism. Social control includes the interpersonal work that continually constructs and modifies a disarrayed patchwork of ad hoc local agreements and accommodations that are formed among persons within groups who disagree on issues (Janowitz 1975). Although formal social controls via legislation and litigation are important instruments of social change, informal social controls exercised in local areas of interaction may have more penetrating fundamental effects on the culture of social justice.

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Theoretical and Substantive Approaches to Socialization and Inequality in Social Psychology

11

Jeylan T. Mortimer and Heather McLaughlin

Introduction

Interests in socialization and inequality have been central to the field of sociology since its beginnings. Escalating concentration of income and wealth in modern Western societies in recent decades makes it increasingly important to understand the social psychological dynamics that produce inequalities, that help to maintain them, and that contribute to their erosion. Socialization, a ubiquitous phenomenon with strong implications for inequality, can be approached in many ways. For the collectivity, socialization enables perpetuation of the group in the face of changing membership and new circumstances. From the vantage of the individual, socialization involves learning to participate in social life. Lutfey and Mortimer (2003, p. 183) define socialization as “the process by which individuals acquire social competence by learning the norms, values, beliefs, attitudes, language characteristics, and roles appropriate to their social groups.” One might ask, how do the various activities, incentives, qualities of relationships, or interactions between socializers and socializees promote

effective socialization? The socialization process can occur through direct tuition, as in a classroom situation or a mother praising her child for acting kindly; through the application of positive and negative sanctions, such as approval, grades or detention; or through day-to-day encounters with social situations and circumstances, including highly stratified resources and opportunities. Socialization may be a vertical process (e.g., from parents or teachers to children), one that is reciprocal (e.g., at the same time children socialize their parents or teachers), or horizontal (e.g., siblings or classmates socializing one another). It may occur prior to incumbency in a new social role, for example, the anticipatory socialization that occurs in a medical school; or after full incumbency of a new role, as a doctor in a medical clinic. Socialization processes have a multiplicity of outcomes (values, identities, skills, world views, self-concepts, etc.).

In this chapter, we review literature that examines socialization as a process and in terms of outcomes. We first examine classic and contemporary theoretical approaches to socialization with relevance to the production, maintenance, and reduction of inequalities. Three prominent strands of social psychological theorizing help to elucidate these processes: symbolic interactionism, social structure and personality, and life course theories. We then consider both processes and outcomes of socialization to inequality in family, educational, and work settings. While these three institutional contexts have received the most systematic empirical attention from

J. T. Mortimer (✉)

Department of Sociology, University of Minnesota, 1014 Social Sciences Building, 267-19th Avenue South, Minneapolis, MN 55455, USA
e-mail: mortj002@umn.edu

H. McLaughlin

Department of Sociology, Oklahoma State University, 469 Murray Hall, Stillwater, OK 74078-4062, USA
e-mail: heather.mclaughlin@okstate.edu

social psychologists, we also examine another context of socialization to inequality that has received little attention to date: how participation in sport contributes to, and in some circumstances, erodes inequalities based on gender, race, and social class.

Symbolic Interactionism

Classic Roots: Basic Concepts Relevant to Socialization and Inequality

William James, Charles Horton Cooley, and George Herbert Mead, who came to be known as the founders of symbolic interactionism, set forth foundational concepts basic to social psychological theorizing, emphasizing the importance of the self, habit, problematic situations, and the construction of meaning through social interaction. Their work has continuing relevance to our understanding of the ways that inequality is created, reproduced, and resisted through socialization processes.

William James (1892) introduced the idea that rather than being a simple, unitary phenomenon, the self is complex and multifaceted. Charles Horton Cooley's (1902) conceptualization of the looking glass self delved into the micro-processes of self-understanding, how the self comes to be constructed through socialization processes involving significant others. Like peering into a mirror, individuals observe how others are responding to them, understand how these others judge them, and form evaluations about themselves accordingly—reacting with varying degrees of pride or shame. James' and Cooley's recognition that self-perceptions are grounded in the social world paved the way for modern recognition that hierarchies of advantage and disadvantage are reflected in the self, as others "look down," "look across," or "look up" to oneself. Importantly for Cooley, however, the individual is not merely a passive recipient, or victim, of others' reflected appraisals. Unlike a simple reflection in a mirror, the person instead has the capacity and motivation to influence others' perceptions and evaluations. Herein lies the

genesis of one form of potential resistance to the microdynamics of socialization to inequality.

William James (1892) laid additional groundwork for the conceptualization of self-esteem as rooted in the individual's placement in social hierarchies. James understood that individual self-evaluations reflect what he called individual "successes" as well as "pretensions." The very notion of success often implies inequality vis-à-vis others, as to be more or less successful references acquisition of socially-valued traits, roles and status positions, material possessions, and other outcomes relative to other actors. However, James recognized that not all people will aspire to such socially-valued goals to the same degree. This insight gives rise to the recognition that people occupying lower positions in social status hierarchies can learn, through processes of socialization, to protect themselves from negative self-evaluations by reducing their pretensions and by setting goals that devalue or reduce the importance of particular rewards. Similarly, contemporary theorists emphasize self-protective processes in the face of disadvantaged placement in obdurate social strata, e.g., Stryker's (1980) analysis of the hierarchy of identities.

George Herbert Mead's (1931) concepts of the "I" and the "me" further elaborate James' and Cooley's conceptualizations of how the reflexive or perceiving self, as the I, has the capacity to view the me, or the seen, objective self. The "I" implies an active, creative proponent of the self in relation to the social world; the "me" is the self as seen by the "I." The "me" incorporates the residue of countless interactions occurring in the process of socialization; the evaluations of significant others, and, in mature stages of development, the normative prescriptions, assumptions, and evaluations of membership and reference groups, and finally, the society at large. According to Mead (1931, p. 194), the development of the self is a quintessential process of socialization: "It is as he takes the attitude of the other that the individual is able to realize himself as a self."

Mead understood that organizational features of the social world—unity, integration, and harmony, on the one hand, or fragmentation, disorganization, and especially, for our purposes,

hierarchy, on the other—will come to be reflected in the self, as the individual goes through the “play stage,” gains more accurate understanding of the “rules of the game,” and eventually incorporates the “generalized other” into the self. Through these stages of socialization, individuals gain increasing understanding of the society and their place within it. Whereas Mead did not emphasize common biases, disadvantages, and inequalities inherent in the “rules of the game,” one important implication of his theoretical formulation is clear: inequality, like other features of social organization, is reflected in the very constitution of the self. Moreover, his conceptualization of “the act” implies that when disadvantaged actors confront problematic situations, they will attempt to engage in active strategies, in interaction with others, to ameliorate their circumstances and improve their positions.

A key contribution to the understanding of inequality is Mead’s insight that meaning is not inherent in objects, persons, or situations; instead, evaluation of all these phenomena arises through mutual collective definitions of social actors engaging in social acts and interactions. Of course, in view of the obdurate differences in resources and opportunities, inequality cannot be considered entirely a matter of social definition. However, individuals, groups, places, clothing, activities, and attributes of all kind may be assigned relative value and desirability, and these understandings are transmitted through socialization processes. But because such evaluations are socially constructed, they are ever subject to change, as individual and collective actors jockey for relative advantage. In accord with Mead’s conceptualization of meaning as emergent and malleable, the status order needs continual affirmation, largely through processes of socialization, to be maintained; otherwise it becomes subject to negotiation, erosion and potential upheaval.

Contemporary Approaches

Contemporary symbolic interactionists build on the foundations of these classic thinkers by elaborating the strategic tactics through which social

actors establish and maintain status hierarchies that are favorable to themselves. Contemporary scholars of this genre have been more directly concerned with inequalities than the classic writers, as they focus on distinct processes through which inequality is created and sustained. They highlight central dynamics of socialization and acceptance, or resistance, to inequality. For symbolic interactionists, the focus is on microprocesses of socialization consisting of interactions among group participants that lead to the emergence, affirmation, or change of status or reputation within the group.

Building on James’, Cooley’s, and Mead’s notions of self-reflexivity, parallels in the structures of self and social organization, and the individual’s active engagement with problematic situations to protect self-interest, mid-twentieth century symbolic interactionists delineated strategic learned tactics that individuals use to protect and enhance their relative positions and advantages vis-à-vis others in interactive situations. John Dewey (1922) and C. Wright Mills (1940) recognized that actors used group-specific “vocabularies of motive,” to obtain favorable reactions from others, protecting and enhancing their identities. They conceived language as not merely a conduit for the passage of information, or a means to communicate prior intentions; for them, it is most significantly a tool for self-enhancement and protection. In the process of socialization, individuals learn the motive vocabularies that are acceptable in their cultures through the sanctions applied by others (Dewey 1922). For example, a child learns that in order to avoid negative appraisals (e.g., as greedy or selfish in the service of individual needs), certain actions must be taken, or appearances made, to evoke more positive appellations or motives (e.g., as considerate or helpful).

Scott and Lyman (1968) describe “accounts” as vocabularies of motive offered by actors to defuse negative reactions to unexpected behavior, or that which has violated social prescriptions. The actor, in order to preserve favorable definitions and positions vis-à-vis interacting partners, must defend his/her actions and identities. Various “excuses” and “justifications,” learned

through socialization processes, constitute “socially approved vocabularies that neutralize an act or its consequences when one or both are called into question” (1968, p. 51). Hewitt and Stokes (1975) noted that such “aligning actions” or “disclaimers” (e.g., hedges) are often offered in advance to preserve positive reflected appraisals and identities when contemplated action may be construed by others as unexpected or disruptive, thus threatening an actor’s favored social position. Favorable social identities and hierarchical positions must be continuously negotiated and defended in the course of social interaction, through the use of language appropriate to the actor’s speech community.

Symbolic interactionists continue to address the lingual strategies that work to maintain or challenge social hierarchies. Subordinate groups may accommodate to their positions, thus maintaining existing inequalities, by the use of disempowering language implying uncertainty or lack of firm commitment to views that may be subject to challenge by superordinates. For example, O’Barr (2000) draws attention to women’s use of phrases like “I think...” and “you know,” question-like intonation at the ends of declarative sentences, and polite forms (sir, please), all of which function to maintain patriarchy (see Hollander and Abelson, this volume).

All of these conceptualizations assume the existence of potential conflict, competition, and maneuvering for favorable status, and the consequent social inequalities thereby produced. Because the strategic use of language and constructions of the meaning of social situations enable actors to produce and maintain unequal power relationships, differences in interactional skills are of great importance. Effective interaction strategies and vocabularies of motive must be learned through processes of socialization.

Erving Goffman (1959) posited that the predominant concern of social actors is to maintain a favorable presentation of self, assuring positive appraisals from interaction partners and the advantages that come with them. Goffman’s dramaturgical model (1959) depicts social actors as on a “stage,” with front stage regions reserved for performances that promote favorable

presentations of self; back stage regions, out of sight of viewers, enable actors to prepare for such performances. Goffman recognized that actors in higher status positions in social hierarchies have more resources, as well as privacy backstage, to orchestrate successful performances; those of lesser position will be highly disadvantaged in doing so.

According to Goffman, identity must be “situated,” that is, affirmed and accepted by co-interactants, in order to be preserved and protected (Weinstein and Deutschberger 1963). His study of *Asylums* (1961) depicted the mental hospital as a status hierarchy with doctors, nurses, and other medical personnel in control, and with patients subject to their directives. In line with James’, Mead’s, and Cooley’s understanding of the social construction of the self, Goffman noted that the patients’ assumption of their clearly subordinate status position was accompanied by severe assaults to their self-conceptions of worth (see also Garfinkel’s 1956 depiction of “degradation ceremonies”). Goffman carefully described the manner in which the mental institution socialized patients to accept their new roles and damaged identities. As old roles and identities were stripped away, and prior biographies reinterpreted to highlight evidence of pathology, the self was degraded and mortified.

Still, in keeping with Mead’s emphasis on creativity and proactive engagement in problematic situations, Goffman observed that those who were so mortified by their interactions with the hospital staff did what they could to promote alternative and more favorable self-definitions when interacting with fellow patients. Here, patients used “sad tales” emphasizing their extreme misfortunes, as well as other excuses and justifications (Scott and Lyman 1968) to explain their circumstances. These attempts to preserve their moral worth, by defining the self in more favorable ways, achieved various degrees of success, as their peers, who were simultaneously engaged in similar processes of attempted self-enhancement, often remained skeptical. Some asylum residents, who would be considered most successfully socialized from the vantage of the hospital staff, succumbed to “conversion,”

accepting the reflected appraisals of the medical staff and becoming perfect inmates. Others distanced themselves from their surroundings (exhibiting “situational withdrawal”) or took on an oppositional inmate identity and culture, refusing to cooperate with the staff.

Goffman’s *Stigma* (1963) and his essay on “Embarrassment and Social Organization” (1956) further elaborate the “management of spoiled identity,” which can be conceptualized as a kind of resistance to the hospital’s socialization processes (see Link et al., this volume). Self-protection, in the company of unequals or peers, is highly complex and precarious, since the very structure of social organization (like the self), and its constituent inequalities, are dependent on the maintenance of “face” and the accomplishment of successfully “situated” identities. Each actor is confronted with the same potential dangers in interacting with another: each may not accept the identity claims, the assertions, or activities of the other. In the absence of mutual acceptance, status hierarchies and the entire organization that supports them may break down.

Much of symbolic interactionists’ work implies lateral socialization—subordinate actors of relatively equal status socialize one another, sometimes in opposition to the norms or intentions of the superordinate socializers, e.g., parents or teachers. For example, Becker (1953) described how youth socialize one another to become competent marijuana users. Becker et al. (1961) noticed that much of the socialization that occurs in medical school involves medical students socializing one another, figuring out what needs to be done just to pass their courses; undergraduate students similarly attach great importance to “making the grade,” as maintaining requisite grade point averages provides access to status-enhancing groups and activities, e.g., membership in sororities and fraternities or athletic teams (Becker et al. 1968).

For symbolic interactionists, an important determinant of social position in a group hierarchy, which largely determines the capacity to act as a socializing agent, is the ability to contribute to the group’s goals and enhance its collective reputation. Thus, higher social status accrues to

the more adept baseball players (Fine 1979); to teenage debaters who avoid boring and simple points in favor of more esoteric and “collegiate” arguments, likely to be evaluated more highly by judges (Fine 2004); and to graduate students who obtain grants and publish in scientific journals (Ferrales and Fine 2006). In attempting to understand the origins of small group “idiocultures,” Fine’s (1979) study of Little League Baseball players revealed that cultural elements were more likely to be created and perpetuated, through processes of socialization, if they were supportive of the status hierarchy of a group. For example, nicknames had positive or negative connotations in accord with recipients’ social status; popular hairstyles and clothing mimicked high status members who were the better players; rules and practices (e.g., designating who would be allowed to coach, who had to go for refreshments) likewise favored those of higher status (see also Fine 1987). High status members have the prerogative to make fun of others, reaffirming the status order, but lower status members learn that this playful activity cannot be reciprocated (Fine and De Soucey 2005; see also, Whyte 1955). Furthermore, status positions in the context of fantasy games reflect social position in the outside world (Fine 1983).

Kinney (1993) examined social inequality and identity as adolescents jockeyed to join “the leading crowd” in middle school and later adapted to a more complex and accommodative status structure in the high school. New socialization processes in the high school led to the transformation of identity. That is, those who previously assumed the low-status identity of “nerd” in middle school were able to affiliate with new groups in the more complex and diversified high school, thereby coming to see themselves as “normal.”

Social Structure and Personality

Proponents of the social structure and personality perspective complement symbolic interactionists’ emphases on dyadic action and small group dynamics. For them, structural dimensions of society stratify the contexts in which socialization

takes place. As a result, the placement of actors and groups in larger structures of social class, status, and power is reflected in diverse manifestations of inequality that are most often sustained, but sometimes challenged, by socialization processes.

Classic Roots

Classic theories in the social structure and personality tradition conceptualized socialization as a “top down” process through which societies perpetuate themselves and reproduce the structural inequalities within them via socializing institutions and practices, especially in families, schools and workplaces. Classic scholars in this tradition drew inspiration from cultural anthropologists, who focused on basic lines of stratification in simple preliterate societies, and the perpetuation of such status formations through generations. Ralph Linton (1942) highlighted sex and age as universal status markers determining, for the most part, roles, functions and social rank for which individuals must be prepared through socialization, starting at very early ages.

The culture and personality perspective (see House 1981, for a comprehensive review) identified parallels between distinctive cultural motifs and child-rearing practices as sources of “national character” (Benedict 1938; Mead 1928). Critics, however, pointed to a degree of circularity (e.g., culture produces child-rearing and child-rearing produces culture) in these explanations and expressed concern that such analyses oversimplified a much more complex reality. Uniform models of socialization did not do justice to the differentiation in norms, values, and attitudes by social class, occupation, ethnicity, religion, and other lines of demarcation characteristic of modern societies. The emergent social structure and personality perspective was particularly sensitive to these differences and their implications for socialization and individual development. For example, Inkeles and Smith (1974) showed how structural features of modernizing societies (e.g., the hierarchical structure of the factory, the educational system, rapid communications, etc.)

produced distinctively “modern” personalities (e.g., more attuned to the importance of time, more trusting of outsiders beyond their immediate families and communities, and more accepting of change) and common status structures.

Contemporary SSP Approaches

Contemporary structural social psychologists examine socialization in stratified social contexts, especially in the family, school, and workplace. A pervasive assumption is that social hierarchy and inequality, like other dimensions of social structure, must be maintained by socialization processes. Talcott Parsons (1951), in his analysis of the social system, placed the family and school, as central socializing institutions, in the “pattern maintenance” sector, whose function was to preserve underlying societal value orientations and social norms. House (1977) alleged that to fully understand the social psychological impacts of social location, scholars must attend to its central structural components or dimensions, the proximal experiences of individual actors, and their psychological interpretations and reactions to those experiences. This conceptual framework has guided contemporary social psychologists in the structure and personality tradition in their attempts to understand socialization to inequality.

Perhaps partly as legacy from its distant origins in the “culture and personality” scholarly tradition, persistent debates about the socialization processes through which inequality is maintained pervade the literature. Some structurally-oriented social psychologists argue that socialization to inequality sometimes occurs through the individual’s direct participation and experiences in unequal structural contexts, rather than by instruction or tuition by parents, teachers, or other socializers (Kohn and Schooler 1969, 1983). These structuralists do not deny that socialization occurs through instruction or interpersonal communication; their contribution is to identify correspondence between direct experiences and socialization outcomes that can come about in the absence of deliberate socialization attempts on the part of socializers.

The controversy between those who offer more structurally-based analyses and those more committed to culturally-based theories of causation continues in debates about poverty. Moynihan's famous (infamous?) report (Office of Planning and Research, US Department of Labor 1965) attributed the perpetuation of poverty across generations to distinctive attitudes, values, and orientations of the poor to disempowering cultural traditions that had their origins in slavery.¹ Deficiencies in work motivation and efficacy, a sense of fatalism, and proneness to self-defeating addictions were attributed to distinctive psychological orientations and values transmitted through processes of socialization in the black family and community. The contrasting "structure of poverty" thesis alleged that poverty can be fully explained by immediate obstacles and impediments that are persistent in the everyday lives of black Americans (e.g., lack of job opportunities in urban ghettos [Wilson 1987], racial discrimination in housing and mortgage lending, racial profiling, resource-poor schools, etc.). According to this latter point of view, amelioration of these structural conditions will yield strong behavioral changes in the black population, strengthening the black family and fostering increases in self-confidence and behaviors that promote stable work careers.

Though highly critical of the "culture of poverty" thesis, many scholars are reluctant to abandon the idea that culture plays a role in reproducing inequality (e.g., Patterson 2000). While Moynihan and others implied a single, unified ghetto culture, intragroup differences in cultural practices and attitudes are often larger than intergroup differences (Lamont and Small 2008). Lamont and Small (2008) call for a more expansive view of culture, arguing that culture, broadly conceived, may interact with structure to (re)produce poverty and racial inequality. In mak-

ing their case for more heterogeneous views of the relationship between culture and poverty, the authors posit that "cultural practices may shape responses to poverty, cultural repertoires may be limited by poverty, cultural frames may be expanded by neighborhood poverty, cultural narratives may change irrespective of poverty, and so on" (p. 91).

We turn now to consideration of three major contexts of socialization to inequality that are the focus of structural analyses: the family, school and workplace. Following House's (1977) principles, scholars in the social structure and personality tradition aim to answer the following questions: How are these institutional contexts stratified? What are the major structural components that affect socialization processes within them? How do these dimensions impinge on individual actors and the relationships between socializers and socializees? And finally, how do individuals react to their proximal experiences? What are the outcomes of socialization that occur in these settings?

Socialization in the Family

Children first experience socialization to inequality in the context of their families (Gecas 1981). Research highlights the role of families in socializing, among other things, political (e.g., McDewitt and Chaffee 2002) and religious views (e.g., Martin et al. 2003), as well as ideas about ethnicity/race (e.g., Brown et al. 2006) and gender (Raffaelli and Ontai 2004). While space limitations preclude us from comprehensively engaging all of these topics, one area that warrants special attention is the role of families in reproducing social class.

Children whose families occupy different positions in the social class hierarchy have distinct socialization experiences related to their parents' beliefs, values, expectations, and world views. Lareau's (2003) interviews with parents and ethnographic observations of families that varied by social class and race (black and white) indicated that middle and working class/poor parents have quite different philosophies of child-rearing.

¹ While the culture of poverty argument is most frequently associated with black families, proponents have applied this theoretical orientation to other minority groups as well. In fact, the term was coined by Oscar Lewis (1959) in his ethnographic account of families living in a Mexico City slum.

Middle-class parents' "concerted cultivation" approach was expressed by frequent reading to young children, encouraging them in school, and intervening with teachers when their children had difficulty. These parents encouraged educational and extracurricular activities that they believed promoted their children's cognitive and social development, and were quite vigilant in organizing educational and growth-inducing experiences during the summers and other vacation times. Their children's daily rounds were filled with lessons, sports activities, and other scheduled events organized and led by adults. This socialization regime left relatively little room for peer-generated games and other activities or for visiting extended family members, who often did not live nearby. The "concerted cultivation" approach required that parents talk with children, reasoning with them and exploring their opinions. Parents thus encouraged their young children to have, and to express, their ideas and preferences and to assert their views proactively when dealing with adult authorities (like teachers and doctors).

Working class parents, in contrast, appeared to adhere to a quite different socialization regime that emphasized "natural growth." They spent less time talking to their children, and were more directive in their discipline. Parents tried to protect their children from harm but left them, for the most part, to their own devices. Children had more free time to spend as they wished, and spent more time than their middle class peers playing with siblings, "hanging out" with their friends in the neighborhood, joining peers in spontaneous games, and mingling with cousins and other relatives in extended family activities. Working class parents (and their children) were more likely than those in the middle class to be deferential, wary, and sometimes distrustful of authority figures. Parents and children alike viewed educators as their social superiors, and parents were more distant from their children's schools than their middle class counterparts.

Whereas Lareau (2003) points out that each socialization regime has advantages and disadvantages, each has distinct implications for academic performance and social class reproduction. Middle-class parents' child-rearing

practices are geared to foster cognitive growth, language development and school achievement, as well as confidence and organizational know-how. In fact, Entwisle et al. (2003) find evidence that the activities associated with the "concerted cultivation" regime enhance children's cognitive growth. In their Baltimore study, the children from higher socioeconomic status families continued to gain in cognitive ability during the summers, when they were out of school, while those of lower socioeconomic background remained stable or stagnated, falling behind. Middle class children in Lareau's study came to feel that they were special and that adults should devote their time and energy to promoting them and enhancing their activities. Their sense of entitlement—to have preferences and to think through their positions and choices—could promote more effective action in the face of threats to their goals, including those relevant to socioeconomic attainment.

The "natural growth" regime practiced by working class families, in contrast, provided fewer activities to promote cognitive abilities and fewer learning opportunities. While this approach may foster the development of interpersonal skills for interacting with peers and family solidarity, it may be less likely to provide children with cognitive growth or know-how in negotiating bureaucratic obstacles. According to Lareau (2003), instead of proactive coping with authorities and other organizational challenges, working class and poor children were more likely to develop a sense of constraint and powerlessness.

It must be remembered, however, that some families in disadvantaged circumstances resist the pressures toward social class reproduction, producing strong resiliency in their children. Furstenberg et al. (1999) have identified socializing experiences that contribute to the "success" of adolescents in economically depressed urban centers, in spite of their families' limited material resources. In their study of teenagers and their families in urban Philadelphia, adolescent success was defined by staying in school, being socially involved, and avoiding delinquency. Interestingly, the parents of successful children sought out the same enriching activities that Lareau found among middle-class children. Such

activities were often connected to school or church, or were located outside their immediate vicinities (such as in more affluent relatives' neighborhoods). These parents were proactive in searching for activities that would contribute to their children's development, by exposing them to new experiences (such as family vacations). Despite limited resources, they invested what money they could in their children, for example, by sending them to Catholic schools or saving for college. They encouraged their children to try harder in school, while being careful to avoid making them feel like failures for not initially succeeding. The parents apparently were able to strike an appropriate balance between supporting and monitoring their children, on the one hand, and giving them sufficient autonomy and independence, appropriate to their increasing age and maturity, on the other. Children became aware of all that their parents were doing for them and often felt "indebted" to them. In Furstenberg et al.' study (1999), successful working-class and poor parents thus embraced the orientations and behaviors more characteristic of middle class families.

In contrast, the parents of unsuccessful children were more likely to be passive and socially isolated. They lacked "know-how" and emotional well-being, and knew little about their children's friends and activities. Some attempted to disengage from their "problem children," shifting responsibility for the problems to the children themselves with a sense of frustration and anger. Children thereby became isolated, alienated, and antagonistic.

Research directed to understanding how inequality impinges on socialization in the family focuses on parenting practices (e.g., typical of "concerted cultivation" or "natural growth"). Class-differentiated parenting practices imply differences in the attributes that parents feel are important to instill in their children and in their conceptualizations of what constitutes success. The more advantaged parents in Lareau's (2003) study were preparing their children to succeed in school and equip themselves with the cognitive skills and credentials to succeed in middle class occupations. Working class and poor parents may

likewise want their children to go to college and to succeed in the occupational world, but they often emphasize traits in their children which only foster social class reproduction (see the discussion of Kohn and Schooler's work below). In economically depressed communities, like the one studied by Furstenberg et al. (1999), the likelihood of achieving success, as conventionally defined, may be so low that parents and other socializers shift their frames of reference away from standard indicators of success (like achieving high grades or going to college) to emphasize traits considered to be both desirable and achievable, such as having a good character and sense of responsibility, being spiritual or religious, helping others, and contributing to family cohesion (see also Burton et al. 1996).

Theoretical Approaches to Socialization in the Family

In a major program of research spanning several decades, Elder, Conger, and their colleagues (Conger et al. 1993, 1994, 1999; Elder 1973; Elder and Conger 2000) have attempted to identify the effects of economic deprivation on children. In a comprehensive review of this work, Conger and Dogan (2007) put forth three theories of social class and socialization in families: the family stress model (FSM), the extended investment model (EIM), and an integrated model that includes both selection and socialization processes. According to the FSM, economic hardship creates economic pressure on parents (unmet material needs, difficulty paying bills, etc.), which, in turn, leads to parental emotional distress and conflict between parents. Parental distress and conflict jeopardize healthy parenting practices (e.g., promote harshness and inconsistency, reduce nurturance and affection), which have the most proximal effects on child and adolescent adjustment (e.g., as indicated by cognitive ability, academic success, social competence, and internalizing and externalizing behavioral problems). In contrast, the EIM focuses on the advantages accruing to more resourceful families. More highly educated parents, those with higher occupational status, and families with more economic resources are more likely to utilize effective

child-rearing practices (e.g., use of reasoning instead of punishment as disciplinary methods, warmth and communication in interactions with children), promote higher aspirations in their children, and invest time and money in their children (via reading, tutors, learning experiences). Parental goals and practices are thought to mediate all the effects of the socioeconomic variables on child/adolescent competence and success.

Eccles' model of parents' influence on children's achievement (2007) incorporates elements of both FSM and EIM. Consistent with the FSM, the family's socioemotional style is thought to be diminished by parental stressors associated with low socioeconomic status (e.g., living in a high risk neighborhood, financial difficulties), reducing the kinds of support children need to succeed academically. With reference to parental investments, Eccles highlights the effects of parental beliefs, including perceptions of the child's abilities and interests, and expectations of the child's success, on specific parental behaviors (e.g., involvement in the child's schoolwork, provision of books and other educational materials in the home, encouragement of sports, music and other activities, etc.). These, in turn, affect children's achievement-relevant beliefs. For example, parents' beliefs about their children's math-related abilities influence the children's confidence in their own abilities. A large body of research (Eccles 2007; Conger and Dogan 2007) supports each of these complementary models of socialization to inequality.

A plausible alternative to the FSM and EIM models of causation is the selection model (Conger and Dogan 2007), which posits that enduring parental personality and behavioral characteristics drive all the phenomena under consideration—parental socioeconomic attainment, parental goals and child-rearing practices, and child outcomes—rendering the associations between parental socioeconomic standing and child outcomes spurious (Mayer 1997). In support of such selection processes, longitudinal studies have demonstrated links between child and/or adolescent attributes and adult socioeconomic attainments (for example, Lee and Mortimer 2009; McLeod and Kaiser 2004; Schoon

et al. 2002). In posing an integrated model combining elements of each theory (FSM, EIM, and selection), Conger and Dogen (2007) call for more longitudinal and multigenerational research to evaluate the consequences of parents' psychological and behavioral attributes in childhood and adolescence (beliefs, values, academic achievement, cognitive ability, etc.) for their adult socioeconomic status. It is necessary to assess whether the impacts of socioeconomic status indicators on family stress, parental investments, and through these socialization experiences in the family, on child outcomes, hold in more stringent analyses with controls for prior parental attributes. For example, if even when parental characteristics measured much earlier in life were controlled, adult socioeconomic characteristics still predicted the quality of parenting and parental investments in children, and parental child-rearing practices still predicted child cognitive and behavioral outcomes, more confidence could be placed in the FSM and EIM models of causation.² Instead of being viewed as opposing incompatible theories, both social selection and social causation must be taken into account to fully understand the processes through which inequality is reproduced in families.

Socialization of Non-Cognitive Traits

Much of the research in this area focuses on parental influences on children's cognitive ability and academic performance, as these are highly predictive of educational attainment and are key to future occupational and income trajectories. However, the intergenerational transmission of what economists call non-cognitive traits, sometimes called socio-behavioral outcomes, may have considerable importance for social class reproduction. There is evidence that occupational values are subject to successes and failures in the labor market (Johnson and Mortimer 2012), and that parents' positions in the labor force are reflected in children's orientations toward work.

² Of course, unobserved heterogeneity could still cause spuriousness even in highly stringent models incorporating many previously measured parental personality and behavioral characteristics

Parental occupations influence children's intrinsic and extrinsic work values (Mortimer and Kumka 1982; Ryu and Mortimer 1996). Adolescents' feelings of closeness to, and degree of communication with, their parents appear to be quite important in facilitating such value transfer (Mortimer 1975, 1976; Ryu and Mortimer 1996). Moreover, the occupational values of adolescents and young adults are clearly linked to their subsequent socioeconomic attainments, as well as the quality of their work (Mortimer and Lorence 1979; Johnson and Mortimer 2011). As a result, correspondence between parents' and children's work values and preferences, produced through processes of socialization, are likely to be reflected in the intergenerational reproduction of inequality.

Similar parallels could be made for other adolescent non-cognitive traits, like self-esteem, locus of control, and economic self-efficacy, which predict later achievements (Heckman et al. 2006; Lee and Mortimer 2009). Without understanding the socialization processes through which both cognitive skills and non-cognitive advantages are transmitted, the key "proximal conditions" and psychological processes (two of House's three key principles of SSP analysis) mediating the intergenerational reproduction of inequality remain elusive.

Cross-National Research

Increasing inequality in Western societies during the past several decades has motivated a series of coordinated cross-national studies³ (Ermisch et al. 2012a) that address socioeconomic differences in child cognitive and non-cognitive skills (i.e., achievement-relevant motivations, interpersonal skills, problem behavior, etc.) across countries. The investigators also were interested in whether cognitive disparities widen or narrow as children grow older, the consequences of these disparities for intergenerational mobility, and the variation across countries in mobility-relevant

processes. The findings elucidate the linkages between societal inequality and intergenerational social class mobility; the mediating variables, associated both with parental socioeconomic location and child outcomes, which may account for the reproduction of class position across generations; and the social policies that support low- and middle-income families (publicly financed universal prenatal and child care, child allowances, tax credits, etc.), which may lessen the connections between social origins and destinations and create greater equality of opportunity. The investigators find considerable variation in society-wide inequality, a decline in intergenerational mobility as societal inequality increases, and evidence that child cognitive skills mediate the associations between origins and destination statuses (socio-behavioral attributes were found to be less closely related to parental education (Ermisch et al. 2012b; Duncan et al. 2012) and therefore function as weaker potential mediators). Though subcultural bias can threaten accurate assessment of cognitive skills (Miller-Jones 1989) and jeopardize comparability in cross-national studies, this research reveals clear connections between socioeconomic origins and child traits that may foster or limit intergenerational socioeconomic attainment.

Among the 10 countries studied, the United States was found to be the most unequal, the country with the least intergenerational mobility, and the one with the strongest links between parental educational attainment and child cognitive outcomes. Interestingly, despite its similarity to the United States in its degree of income inequality, Canada exhibited weaker cognitive disparities among young children (Bradbury et al. 2012) and a weaker association between fathers' and sons' incomes (Ermisch et al. 2012c), suggesting that national differences in public health care, parental leave, child allowances, etc., serve to mitigate the advantages that highly educated and affluent parents bestow upon their children. In fact, because "parental SES gradients in the United States are the most steep among all ten countries for almost every outcome...the country with the least intergenerational mobility and the least equal opportunity for children to advance is

³ This collaborative utilizes 29 data sets across 10 countries: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States.

the United States” (Ermisch et al. 2012c, p. 18). Moreover, the achievement gap between the rich and the poor in the United States has been increasing over time, now surpassing inequalities by race (Reardon 2011).

This research is important in documenting, across many societies, the cognitive and behavioral advantages that social class origin confers upon children, manifested at a very early age (as young as 3 to 5), even before they start school. While the authors suggest that cognitive and behavioral disparities are explained by both “nature,” or genetically transmitted endowments, and “nurture,” or the environments created by parents who have different motivations, anxieties, aspirations and hopes for their children, in this project these intervening links are not addressed empirically. The investigators suggest, however, that parents may help children to succeed in school not only by exposing them to environments (e.g., by reading to them, having books in the home, and sending them to preschools) that promote reading readiness, math concepts, and other cognitive skills, but also by encouraging them to be courteous and well-behaved, pro-social, and focused, traits that facilitate their adjustment to school and subsequent cognitive growth (Ermisch et al. 2012c). These are the socialization practices that need to be addressed by comparative social psychologists in the future, drawing on models like those proposed by Eccles (2007) and Conger and Dogan (2007). For example, in countries like France, with universal day care from the age of 3 and relatively high intergenerational mobility, are parental aspirations for their children and their behavioral practices more homogeneous, that is, less strongly linked to their socioeconomic positions, than parental aspirations and child-rearing practices in societies without policies that level the playing field?

Socialization in the School

The equality of opportunity credo looks to the school as a major vehicle to promote success and attainment, irrespective of social origin. According to the ideology of equal opportunity, the

school is an institution that treats all children equally regardless of their social class, race, and ethnicity, rewarding children on the basis of their academic performance (Dreeben 1968). However, at least since Bowles and Gintis (1976), sociologists of social structure and personality have recognized the important role of the school in maintaining societal inequalities, as schools in wealthier school districts have more resources, more highly qualified teachers, and more active parental involvement (Schneider et al., this volume). In American schools, children are subject to invidious comparisons that commence in the very first grade, as children are assigned, based on their teachers’ assessments of their ability, to reading groups (Entwisle et al. 2003). Self-esteem and self-concepts of ability emerge early on and are subsequently reinforced as students’ group assignments and academic performance records are transferred from one teacher to the next. Students may quickly absorb the negative assessments of teachers, as demonstrated long ago by Rosenthal and Jacobson’s (1966) classic studies of the effects of teacher expectations (for children labeled as “slow learners” and those labeled as “gifted”) on students’ achievements over the course of a year. Such self-assessments may rival grades in their importance for subsequent academic effort and attainment.

Eccles (2007) has proposed an integrated theoretical model to understand achievement-related choices and performance, with major relevance to understanding schools’ role in the maintenance, or mitigation, of inequality. According to Eccles’ “expectancy-value model of achievement choices,” individuals estimate the difficulty of various achievement-related tasks and become more or less self-confident of their abilities to master them. Their level of self-confidence and the value of the task (determined by its intrinsic interest, relation to short- and long-range goals, cost, and relevance to self-concept and identity) will influence their expectations of success, which, in turn, affect their achievement-related choices and performances. If persons of lower status receive reflected appraisals from teachers, parents, or others, suggesting that their abilities are lacking and that they are unlikely to succeed,

these will affect their own sense of efficacy and increase the likelihood that they will withdraw, rather than embrace, achievement-related tasks.

Eccles has applied this model to gender and ethnic differences in achievement-related behaviors, including occupational choices (Eccles 1993, 1994; Eccles et al. 1998; Jussim et al. 1996; Wigfield et al. 2004). Racial/ethnic discrimination in classrooms and academic track assignment is found to diminish academic performance. In addition, research on stereotype threat shows that when the salience of one's gender or ethnic group membership is heightened by various cues, individuals are more likely to behave in accord with the stereotype. For example, Asian American females achieve higher scores on math tests when their ethnicity is salient, and lower scores when the salience of their gender is heightened (Ambady et al. 2001).

More general societal stereotypes—such as assumptions about girls' proclivity toward math and science courses or the academic abilities of African American students—often influence academic success, as group members choose between disengaging with the relevant task or activity or risk facing judgment by others (Steele 1997). Girls who continue in math, for example, "might have to buck the low expectations of teachers, family, and societal gender roles in which math is seen as unfeminine as well as anticipate spending her entire professional life in a male-dominated world" (1997, p. 613). The gender gap in collegiate math/science course taking suggests that many girls instead opt to dismiss math or science courses as irrelevant or unimportant to their own identity, leaving girls to feel inadequate in this domain. This, in turn, may affect their occupational or economic attainment, as these fields are often associated with higher pay and prestige.

Research also points to the significance of gender socialization in instruction, as women and girls are more likely to excel and continue in math and science courses when taught by a female professor (Carrell et al. 2010) or when lessons include counter-stereotypical images of female scientists (Good et al. 2010). As female images and role models are uncommon in these

fields, girls often internalize stereotypes that boys are "naturally" more successful in these areas.

Although Coleman et al.'s (1966) classic *Equality of Educational Opportunity* found that inequalities within schools were far more important for individual achievement than inequality between them, continuing disparities between schools have prompted both scholars and policymakers to try to identify "good schools" and "bad schools" in attempts to promote more effective education and equality of opportunity. Whereas the *No Child Left Behind* initiative focuses on elementary and secondary schools, recent research, as noted above, indicates that social class disparities in cognitive skills arise much earlier, and continue, sometimes increasing (Entwisle et al. 2003) as children progress through school. Such research has stimulated great interest in interventions that occur prior to school entry. In France, for example, the age of preschool enrollment in cohorts born between the 1950s and 1970s is found to predict grade repetition, secondary school test scores, educational attainment, and wages, especially among children from more disadvantaged backgrounds (Dumas and LeFranc 2012).⁴

In her empirical study of preschools, Karin Martin (1998) similarly highlights how gender inequality is socialized at early ages. Martin finds evidence of a hidden school curriculum that genders everyday movement, comportment, and use of physical space. Through interactions with teachers, parents, and other children, physical differences between boys and girls are made to appear and feel natural, which is then continuously reinforced throughout adolescence and adulthood (see also Kroska, this volume). Not only did parents dress girls in more uncomfortable and restricting clothing, but teachers further restricted girls' movement in the classroom. Formal behavior, such as raising one's hand, sitting correctly, and covering one's nose and mouth when coughing or sneezing, were enforced much more frequently among girls. Boys, on the other hand, were often allowed, and even encouraged,

⁴ Similar patterns are found for age of day care enrollment in Denmark (Bingley and Westergaard-Nielsen 2012).

to engage in relaxed behaviors, such as crawling on the floor, yelling, and running in the classroom. Moreover, girls were told to control their voices by being quiet(er) or ‘nicer’ about three times more often than boys, despite the fact that boys’ play was frequently much louder.

Research on early childhood socialization often views socialization as something that is done *by* adults or institutions *to* children. In recent years, however, research in this area has been increasingly attentive to the agency of children, who are active participants in this process (Corsaro and Fingerson 2003; Thorne 1994). In her analysis of elementary school children, for example, Thorne (1994) highlights the role that children themselves (as well as adults) play in constructing gender, and that “collective practices—forming lines, choosing seats, teasing, gossiping, seeking access to or avoiding particular activities—animate the process” (p. 157). Adolescents and young adults also socialize each other in fostering gendered norms and expectations associated with sexuality. Pointing to a sexual double-standard, Tanenbaum (2008) finds evidence of a stigmatizing effect of sexuality for girls, who must maintain a ‘good’ reputation to avoid the label of ‘slut’ (even while dealing with pressure to engage in sexual activity from peers). At the same time that girls associate sexuality with danger and shame, boys often positively associate sexuality with masculinity and adulthood.

It should be noted that the analytic separation of family and school is not entirely warranted, as parents affect their children’s educational experiences in many ways. For example, when universal publicly funded day care and preschool facilities are not available, as in the United States, and when private facilities vary in quality, the more affluent families tend to send their children to the higher quality, more costly alternatives, giving their children additional advantage. More educated and affluent families in the United States also move to “higher quality” neighborhoods that have better schools due to the local real estate financing mechanism. They can hire tutors and more effectively help their children with homework. And in countries that have early school tracking, parents can have considerable impact

on their children’s placement, and continuance, in upper tracks (Mortimer and Krueger 2000; Magnuson et al. 2012; Bratti et al. 2012).

Still, education may sometimes mitigate the effects of social class origin, for example, via the provision of special educational programs for gifted children based solely on their academic potential (e.g., Hunter College High School in New York), through programs designed to diminish racial segregation (e.g., magnet schools), and through altered school financing that is less dependent on the local property tax base. Ermisch et al. (2012c) conclude that “the reason we do not find strong evidence of widening disparities [in cognitive skills] as children age may be that in most countries education policy does to some extent reduce (or at least not increase) SES disadvantages throughout school” (p. 18).

Socialization in the Workplace

Because work is a central determinant of social status, access to resources, and lifestyles in contemporary societies, socialization in the workplace has major relevance for inequality (DiTomaso and Parks-Yancy, this volume). There are two major approaches to socialization at work. The first focuses on distinct occupations or work settings; the second on dimensions of work that cross-cut occupations, enabling more wide-ranging investigations that compare workers across groups. In the first perspective, it is recognized that occupations, as well as the particular contexts in which they are practiced, have differential prestige and often provide the opportunity for intragenerational mobility as workers climb career ladders. Through the process of socialization, occupational incumbents learn to recognize the “pecking order” of organizations and positions that may be potentially available, or closed off, to them. Thus, teachers learn that it is more prestigious, and often more rewarding, to teach in schools in middle class suburbs than in the inner city (Becker 1952) and make career moves accordingly. Physicists learn the differential ranking of higher educational settings (elite research universities, state universities, and liberal

arts colleges), which influence their own sense of worth and satisfaction (Hermanowicz 2009). Starting with their experiences as graduate students, and continuing through their post-doctoral appointments and early careers, the physicists were socialized to understand that “achievement in research above all else” would enhance their careers and assure their achievement of tenure (p. 83). Their aspirations gradually calibrated to match the resources, opportunities, and constraints available to them in their institutions.

Rosabeth Kanter (1977) in her now classic, *Men and Women of the Corporation*, took a strong structural approach to socialization, arguing that access to resources and opportunities for advancement were far more important than any presumably gender-based cultures and socialization processes for understanding gender differences in work effort and commitment, and women’s subordinate locations in corporate firms. For example, because women, for the most part in secretarial jobs, had little in the way of advancement prospects or intrinsically-rewarding work, they had no incentive to spend long hours on the job or limit their small diversions from work activities (e.g., small celebrations of co-workers’ birthdays). Men, in contrast, who occupied internal job ladders leading to higher positions within the firm, had many organizational resources, including access to “higher-ups” that enabled them to accomplish their work goals. According to Kanter, it was no wonder, then, that men showed higher levels of dedication to their work and more perseverant application to their tasks. These gender-specific adaptations to the highly gender-based organizational hierarchy could thus be easily explained without recourse to tuition-based processes (e.g., higher-level managers urging those at lower levels to be “good workers” or to work long hours).

The second approach to understanding work-based socialization, cross-cutting the entire range of occupations in the workforce, is exemplified by Kohn and Schooler’s (1969, 1973, 1983) path-breaking studies. Their long-term program of research has revealed the pervasive impacts of work experience on dimensions of personality, what they call “psychological functioning,”

which have considerable relevance for the intragenerational and intergenerational perpetuation of inequality. Similar to Kanter, Kohn and Schooler contend that certain conditions of work, what they call “the structural imperatives of the job,” are so important as to socialize workers quite directly. Kohn and Schooler proffered a “learning-generalization model” as a means to understand the development of workers’ values and other psychological orientations. According to this model, workers learn what attributes and behaviors help them to effectively perform their jobs, and they develop attitudes and values accordingly. Most important for Kohn and Schooler are opportunities for self-directed thought and action in the workplace, as indicated by (1) the substantive complexity of work tasks in relation to data, people, and things, that is, how complicated the work is (a simple people-oriented task, for example, involves signaling as in routing traffic; a more complex one would involve advising or counseling); (2) the extent of variety or routinization of the work (i.e., does the worker do the same tasks repeatedly, or does the worker perform different tasks in the course of a work day); and, (3) the level of close supervision (i.e., whether a worker is given discretion over what to do or told exactly what needs to be done). Kohn and Schooler’s (1969) initial empirical research, based on a large nationally-representative panel of men, revealed social class differences across a wide range of dimensions of psychological functioning, including intellectual flexibility, trust in others, intrinsic work values, and self-confidence. These social class differences in psychological functioning were largely explained by the structural imperatives of jobs. The authors reasoned that workers of higher occupational standing had to exercise self-direction in planning their own work and that of subordinates, in responding to difficult and complex tasks, and in supervising others’ work. Those in lower positions, in contrast, had to be attentive to following through on the directives given by others. The higher self-esteem, more responsible moral standards, greater trust in others, and greater openness to change displayed by higher status (and more self-directed) men were thus attributed to

recurrent job demands and structures (Kohn and Schooler 1969).

Whereas Kohn and Schooler's earlier research was cross-sectional, a follow-up study 10 years later produced more definitive longitudinal evidence that substantively complex work fostered increasing intellectual flexibility among men (Kohn and Schooler 1973, 1983). Further empirical support for their "learning-generalization" model was obtained from their subsequent studies of employed women, women homemakers who did more or less complex housework, and workers across national contexts, including Poland, the Ukraine, and Japan (see Miller 1988 for a review). Interestingly, children's work in school, which involved greater or lesser complexity, was also reflected in their self-directed orientations. (In general, Kohn and Schooler (1983) found that educational attainment rivaled occupational self-direction in its impacts on psychological functioning. However, their main focus was on the structural imperatives of the job.)

Of relevance to an understanding of socialization to inequality in the family, Kohn (1969) found evidence that self-directed work fostered child-rearing values that could enhance intergenerational social class reproduction. That is, men whose jobs required them to take on substantively complex tasks, do non-routine work, and that involved less supervisory control valued a constellation of traits in their children that indicated a capacity to address the same kinds of occupational realities. Those who had greater self-direction on the job emphasized internal standards of behavior; they wanted their children to be responsible and considerate, and to have good judgment (among other traits). Those who experienced less self-direction at work were more likely to consider obedience, good manners, and other conforming behavior as highly important. If such class- and job-specific socialization were effective, children might be prepared to assume the very same kinds of occupational positions as their fathers, a result that would contribute to social class reproduction.

Many scholars have been inspired by Kohn and Schooler's research to assess the consequences of work for socialization and psycho-

logical development (Gecas and Schwalbe 1983; Schwalbe 1986). Consistent with the growing skill demands of the workforce, Alwin (1989) demonstrated that self-directed values became more prominent in the U. S. population in the years since Kohn and Schooler's studies (1964–1974). Mortimer and Lorence (1979) showed that experiences of autonomy and extrinsic rewards (income) at work affirmed and reinforced corresponding values. Lorence and Mortimer (1985) found evidence that work experiences have stronger effects on younger than older workers. Mortimer and her colleagues also extended Kohn and Schooler's model to the work experience of adolescents, finding that workplace learning opportunities—a reasonable proxy for substantive complexity—were associated with the development of occupational reward values. Moreover, jobs that affirmed adolescents' competence on the job increased their sense of self-efficacy (Mortimer et al. 1996; Mortimer and Finch 1996; Mortimer 2003), while stressors at work diminished a sense of efficacy and self-esteem, and heightened depressed mood. However, those who reported stressors at work during adolescence were found to be more resilient when facing the same stressors four years after leaving high school, suggesting that the earlier challenges heightened coping skills, promoting future adaptation (Mortimer and Staff 2004).

Life Course Approaches

Brim and Wheeler (1966) anticipated future life course formulations by specifying the differences between socialization occurring during childhood and adulthood. According to their analysis, during childhood socializees learn basic values, motivations, and moral prescriptions, mainly in family and school contexts; in adulthood, socialization is more role-specific, occurring in a wide variety of settings and promoting more specific knowledge and behavioral adaptations appropriate to the assumption of new adult roles. Adults, who have greater discretion over the socialization contexts they are subject to, assume a more active role in the socialization process. Moreover, adults are

more often subject to resocialization when their behavior is considered inadequate or deviant.

Building on the social structure and personality tradition, life course approaches insert a temporal dimension into conceptualizations of socialization, considering its long-term consequences across the life span (e.g., the social psychology of status attainment); differences in the willingness of socializees to learn from socializers depending on their prior experiences, concomitant roles, and future expectations; and variation in socializers' expectations and socializing behaviors based on their anticipation of future socialization outcomes. Lutfey and Mortimer's (2003) insistence that socializees' individual biographies have major impact on the effectiveness of socialization has major relevance to an understanding of socialization and inequality. Historically increasing diversity in life course trajectories, due largely to structural inequalities, calls into question conceptualizations of socialization that presume uniform exposures, or reactions, to socialization attempts across the life span.

A life course approach draws attention to differences in socializees' capacities to visualize and understand the requirements for future roles depending on their prior life experiences. The concept of "possible selves" (Markus and Nurius 1986) captures the forward-looking, temporal dimension of the self, as people think about their future potentials. When "possible selves" are clearly visualized, encompassing the actual knowledge and skills necessary to enact desired future social roles, plans are likely to become more detailed and accurate. "Possible selves" may thus motivate goal-oriented behavior, as individuals attempt to achieve positive selves and avoid negative ones. It should be noted that the development of "possible selves" may be seriously compromised in lower socioeconomic groups. For example, if teens do not have adult role models who are functioning effectively in the labor market and have little access to part-time work themselves (Mortimer 2003), they may not be able to develop an accurate or realistic "possible self" as a full-time adult worker.

Continuing differentiation in socially-recognized age categories (e.g., differentiating ado-

lescents and emerging adults) creates new age-specific, and often hierarchically organized, roles and behavioral expectations that render prior adaptations inappropriate and therefore require new socialization (Mortimer and Moen 2012). Uncertainty and confusion often result. For example, according to Fine (2004, p. 16), adolescent life "is characterized by oscillation between a maturity of purpose and an indulgent immaturity." He points out that adolescents draw on repertoires of behavior of both adults and children and, in their attempts to socialize their charges, adults condemn child-like behavior and "precocious" adult behavior alike as "poor judgment," while applauding that which connotes "maturity." Adolescents are praised for their adult-like accomplishments (like excelling in academics, sports, debating, and other adult-supervised extracurricular activities), but chastised for taking on less strongly approved adult-like behaviors (like smoking, drinking, and sexual activity). Much the same could be said of older youth, in so-called "emerging adulthood," who waver between independence and dependence, adult-like and adolescent-like behaviors (Massoglia and Uggen 2010), and receive concomitant sanctions by socializers and others. In both cases, young persons' display of appropriate "adult-like" attributes could have major implications for socializers' judgments of them, with consequences for future attainment and mobility. For example, failing to display appropriate age-graded educational and work commitments could jeopardize grades in school and letters of recommendation.

As the transition to adulthood has become longer and more individualized (Shanahan 2000), contemporary youth move more frequently than in prior cohorts between "pre-adult" and "adult" roles and circumstances (e.g., living as "children" with their parents, living independently in their own residences, and then moving back to their family homes after encountering obstacles such as unemployment). In doing so, young adults often oscillate between positions of varying status and evaluation (e.g., a twenty-five year old living with parents would likely be considered less desirable than a person of the same age living independently), and often experience diffi-

culty returning to the more “adolescent-like” student role after holding responsible full-time occupational positions. Little socialization prepares youth for such ambiguous or “in-between” states.

Whereas most gradually relinquish “child-like” or “adolescent-like” orientations and behaviors as they move toward adulthood, highly disadvantaged youth face a different set of expectations and constraints that makes this transition more problematic and complicated. When parents are unable to care for their children because of a lack of adequate economic resources, physical or mental disabilities, or other difficulties, children may prematurely take on adult roles. Burton et al. (1996) describe children as young as 7 or 8 taking care of younger siblings, and when they are old enough to obtain paid work, helping to support their families. Such children are socialized to act like an adult at home (if they don’t watch their siblings then dire consequences may follow), but they are still expected to behave like children at school (obey their teachers). According to Lutfey and Mortimer (2003, p. 195), “...being a novice in one socialization context while having senior status in a concurrent one may impact...actors’ compliance with socializers and their capacity to fulfill socializers’ expectations.” The children’s dual responsibilities often meant that they could not meet teachers’ requirements (to come to school regularly and on time, do homework assignments, etc.).

A life course approach sensitizes the analyst to diversity in age-graded social roles, which may be evaluated quite unequally, as well as the high degree of heterogeneity and unpredictability in life experience. Pre-adult socialization in families and schools tends to prepare the person for the more normative, statistically frequent, and desired roles and circumstances. For example, lesbian and gay adolescents’ socialization before “coming out” is geared to expectations of normative heterosexuality and traditional gender roles, which provide little preparation for their future life experiences in same-sex families (Preves and Mortimer 2013). Nor is there preparation for increasingly prevalent “non-normative” lifestyles, such as permanent singlehood, single parenthood, or child-free adulthood. Particularly in the

United States (but not in countries with “dual track” secondary school systems), the “college for all” philosophy fosters curricula as well as more informal socialization geared to matriculation and performance in higher educational institutions. Schooling provides less preparation for those who will move directly from high school into the labor force.

Typically, people receive less prior socialization to enable them to prepare for negative life events and conditions, such as unemployment, poverty, divorce, widowhood, disability, infertility, or chronic illness, than for positive events and more typical circumstances (Lutfey and Mortimer 2003; Preves and Mortimer 2013). However, socialization for negative life outcomes may be to some extent class-based; for example, parents with unstable work histories could provide models of how to deal, more or less effectively, with unemployment. To the extent that negative conditions and events are concentrated in lower socioeconomic groups (not all are, as chronic illness strikes almost all people who live to highly advanced ages), the absence of effective anticipatory socialization may foster further hardships.

Attempts to resocialize persons who are judged to have been inadequately socialized or who violate the law take place in a wide variety of rehabilitative and correctional institutions. These programs face the challenge of overriding the residue of prior, seemingly ineffective, socialization. As Lutfey and Mortimer (2003, p. 192) point out, a life course approach draws attention to prior experiences that may enhance or disrupt socialization attempts: “...rather than seeing socializees as passive recipients of socialization, attention to biographical differences calls attention to how past experiences may act synergistically with socialization in the present.” Though this applies to a greater or lesser degree for all socialization (e.g., processes and outcomes may be different for “traditional” and “non-traditional” college students), it is especially relevant for major attempts at resocialization. Importantly, resocialization is often mandated or coerced (e.g., a person may participate in Alcoholics Anonymous because this treatment has been ordered by a judge following a DWI conviction). The lack

of internal motivation to participate would likely limit the effectiveness of such programs. Though controversies abound about whether adult prisons or even juvenile facilities should be “rehabilitative” or “punitive” (Cullen and Wright 2002), programs that enable inmates to acquire basic academic and social skills, vocational training, and GEDs or higher educational degrees are forms of resocialization that could facilitate reintegration into society following release.

While this essay highlights the family, school, and workplace, those contexts that have been given greatest attention by structurally-oriented social psychologists, they are not the only institutional contexts in which socialization takes place. For example, religion has been recognized as a source of support, structure, and conventional values that promote school achievement (Regnerus 2003). Moreover, religion is an institution with special relevance to the perpetuation of, as well as resistance to, inequality. While Marx (1844) considered organized religion “the opiate of the masses” and Parsons (1951) placed religion firmly in the “pattern maintenance” sector, religion has the potential to mobilize its adherents to protest against unequal social arrangements. Historically, black churches have long legitimized resistance to racial oppression and discrimination from antebellum slavery up through the civil rights movement to the present (Billingsley 1999). Individuals are also socialized through their participation in many community contexts, such as volunteer organizations, political parties, social movements, and neighborhood associations. The last section of this review draws attention to one context that has been given rather little attention in the literature, but is increasingly affecting the lives of young people: socialization occurring in sports settings.

Sport as an Emerging Context of Socialization to Inequality

Opportunities for sport participation have expanded greatly in recent years; federal legislation mandating gender equality in the provision of athletic opportunities has expanded sports

programs throughout the educational system and greatly increased girls’ access. Though a subject of much speculation, the implications of this expansion for socialization to inequality have received little systematic theoretical or empirical attention.

Youth sport organizations, such as Little League Baseball and Pop Warner Football, have become staples of American communities, with roughly 41 million youth participating in agency-sponsored sports programs (Ewing and Seefeldt 2002). Socialization in sport settings is often described in a structural, “top down” framework, in which socializers (e.g., parents, coaches, schools, and youth sport organizations) teach youth to (1) live healthy, active lifestyles; (2) be engaged citizens in their communities; and, (3) learn shared values such as team work, competitiveness, and fair play. For example, Little League Baseball prides itself in fostering “citizenship, discipline, teamwork and physical well-being. By espousing the virtues of character, courage and loyalty, the Little League Baseball and Softball program is designed to develop superior citizens rather than superior athletes” (Little League 2010). Beyond youth, Chambliss’ (1989) analysis of Olympic swimmers illustrates how discipline and excellence are socialized through sport. Highlighting the “mundanity of excellence,” Chambliss argues that “excellence is accomplished through the doing of actions, ordinary in themselves, performed consistently and carefully, habitualized, compounded together, added up over time” (1989, p. 85).

In addition to inculcating shared values, sport may also socialize participants (and fans) to accept hierarchies of winners and losers. Typically, the purpose of sporting contests is to identify a winner, and youth must learn to cope with success and failure. Moreover, sport leagues are often organized so that a single team or individual is crowned the champion at the end of a sport season, meaning that the overwhelming majority of participants are “losers” (McEwin and Dickinson 1996). As Siegenthaler and Gonzalez (1997) note, this emphasis on winning may become so strong that coaches may “lose sight of the importance of participation. They can convince themselves that

8- and 9-year-olds want to post a winning record no matter what the sacrifice in personal playing time or fun” (p. 302). At the professional and elite sport levels—such as the National Football League or Professional Golf Association—this message is even more apparent: those who excel at their sport and win are rewarded with money and fame (e.g., lucrative contracts, media attention, and product endorsements).⁵

Emphasis on winning at all costs provides a socialization context that likely diminishes intrinsic motivation and promotes attrition among youth participants (McEwin and Dickinson 1996), as well as encourages the use of performance enhancing drugs, violent behavior, and other attempts to gain unfair advantage over an opponent. This mentality has led many to ask whether the ends justify the means. For example, recent attention to the long-term effects of concussions (e.g., DeKosky et al. 2010) has left many parents questioning whether their young children should participate in sports such as football or ice hockey. In his controversial book, *No Contest: The Case Against Competition*, Alfie Kohn (1986) extends this critique even further, arguing that there are no real winners—in sport, work, and other social institutions—when competition and winning are prioritized above all else.

These socialization processes, for better or worse, extend far beyond participants, as sport affects all individuals, from players’ siblings and friends who spend time with participants, fans and spectators who support their favorite teams, to other intersecting institutions (e.g., media or schools). In addition to top-down socialization, sport is a source of lateral socialization. As Fine (1979) illustrates in his ethnographic account of Little League Baseball players, sports participants, particularly high status team members, play a significant role in socializing their peers

to the culture of the game. Moreover, status as a sport participant, athlete, or jock often leads to positive appraisals of the self and by others. This is particularly true for boys, whose sport participation is more strongly linked to popularity or social status within schools and peer networks than among girls (Coleman 1961; Chase and Dummer 1992). In their ethnographic study of middle school culture, Eder et al. (1995) find that boys’ sport participation is associated with greater status among peers, while cheerleading—or being friends with cheerleaders—and physical attractiveness were associated with girls’ social status.

Social class reproduction also occurs in sport. More advantaged youth have greater access to sport, which often requires substantial time and money (Bourdieu 1978). Considerable variation exists between sports as well, as certain sports require expensive equipment (e.g., ice hockey) and/or access to practice and game facilities (e.g., golf). Pierre Bourdieu (1978) highlights the role of class habitus and cultural taste in contributing to the distribution of sporting practices across social classes, arguing that sports (such as basketball, football, or boxing) that emphasize “strength, endurance, the propensity to violence, the spirit of ‘sacrifice’, docility and submission to collective discipline, the absolute antithesis of the ‘role distance’ implied in bourgeois roles” (p. 837) are more often embraced by the working class and dismissed by the bourgeoisie in favor of more prestigious and exclusive sports (e.g., golf).

In addition to social class, other dimensions of inequality are learned and reproduced through this stratified social institution. Critical sport scholars refer to sport as “contested terrain,” highlighting the dynamic relationship between sport and race (Hartmann 2000) as well as sport and gender (Messner 1988). The overrepresentation of black athletes in professional sports such as basketball or football leads many to conclude that sport has risen above the racism ubiquitous in the workplace and other institutions, and hence is “colorblind” (Leonard 2004). Indeed, sport is often seen as a source of upward mobility among inner-city minority youth, through which participants can achieve money, fame, and, most importantly, positive appraisals from others. Critical

⁵ However, other factors, such as race, gender, and sexual orientation, also influence whether an athlete receives media praise or scrutiny. For example, some sport scholars (e.g., Griffin 1998; Kane and Lenskyj 1998) argue that female athletes who can be portrayed as “heterosexy,” or the wholesome girl next door, receive disproportionately more media attention as compared with other female athletes.

race scholars, however, continue to challenge this myth of colorblindness in sport, pointing to common instances of race discrimination and intolerance.

Viewing sport as colorblind ignores the absence of minority groups other than African Americans within high paying sports, as well as the lack of racial diversity in coaching and management. Moreover, black athletes are overrepresented in *certain* sports and in *specific* positions or roles (Frey and Eitzen 1991). Racial stereotypes structure the positions assigned to players, with black athletes often overrepresented in periphery positions (e.g., wide receiver) and underrepresented in central positions (e.g., quarterback); they often must be standout players in order to occupy a position at all (Frey and Eitzen 1991; Washington and Karen 2001). Consistent with expectation states theory (Correll and Ridgeway 2003; Ridgeway and Nakagawa, this volume), racial identity is linked to assumptions about intelligence, speed, and physicality. Racial stereotypes are often evoked regarding black athletes' natural abilities, while white athletes are depicted as hardworking and intelligent. Such disparate treatment of black and white athletes, under the deceptive cover of colorblind ideology, socializes participants and fans to internalize and accept racial stereotypes, reinforcing unequal power relationships.

Sport also serves as a site for the socialization of gender. Through participation in sports—both athletes and fans—boys are socialized into a masculine society, and patriarchal arrangements are reified through this gendered institution. Anderson (2008) highlights the role of sport in reproducing sexist, misogynistic, and anti-feminine attitudes among men, pointing to socialization processes to explain how 'orthodox masculinity' is reproduced. Such socialization starts at a young age, reinforced by the early segregation of boys and girls. Through "sport typing", girls and boys are funneled into gender-appropriate activities, such as figure skating or cheerleading for girls and football or ice hockey for boys (Hargreaves 2007; Kane and Snyder 1989). While boys' sports are viewed as the standard form, girls' sports are often seen as inferior and trivial.

The practice of gender marking draws attention to women's sports as different. Messner et al.'s (1993) analysis of NCAA final four basketball coverage showed that men's games were never gender marked, while audiences were reminded that they were watching *women's* basketball on average 25.7 times per game.

Even within a particular sport, participants perform gender in ways that socialize conventional expectations. By selectively embracing or avoiding particular activities, men and women do gender in ways that masculinize cheerleading for men and feminize it for women. Grindstaff and West (2006) argue that while the feminine sport of cheerleading is a safe outlet for women's athleticism, male cheerleaders feel the need to prove their masculinity by lifting weights and avoiding feminine behaviors (e.g., smiling, bouncing, or shaking pom-poms). Similarly, Ezzell (2009) finds that female collegiate rugby players cast themselves as the exception to "butch lesbian" stereotypes associated with the sport, ultimately reinforcing dominant heterosexist ideology by creating an alternative "heterosexy-fit" identity.

While sport often perpetuates gender inequality, it is also a site of resistance to patriarchal gender arrangements (Garrett 2004; Theberge 1981). Sport is contested terrain because women challenge notions, internalized via socialization in sports, of what women can and should do with their bodies. Many female sport participants embrace their more muscular and powerful bodies, abandoning narrow conceptions of beauty and femininity (e.g., Chase 2006; Scott-Dixon 2008). As Roth and Basow articulate, "If women stop being weak, the basis for the traditional definition of sexuality collapses" (2004, p. 256).

Sport participation has been linked to both positive and negative socialization outcomes, leading sport scholars to debate whether the benefits of sport outweigh the costs, questioning whether sport builds *character* or *characters*. Sport participation is associated with both physical and mental health, including increased physical fitness (Pate et al. 2000), a reduced risk of cardiovascular disease, diabetes, and cancer (Warburton et al. 2006), higher self-esteem (Daniels and Leaper 2006; Findlay and Bowker 2009),

and lower odds of suicide (Sabo et al. 2005). On the other hand, socialization in the context of sport may also put girls and women at risk of developing negative body perceptions. Crissey and Honea (2006) found that girls in stereotypically feminine sports (e.g., cheerleading/dance, tennis, volleyball, and swimming) were more likely than non-participants to feel overweight and engage in weight loss strategies, reinforcing heteronormative assumptions about femininity. Baum (2006) found a higher rate of eating disorders—for both boys and girls—in aesthetic sports (e.g., figure skating), sports in which low body fat is advantageous (e.g., girl's gymnastics), and sports that require participants to “make weight” (e.g., wrestling).

Educational aspirations may also be socialized in sport settings. Contrary to the “dumb jock” stereotype, the weight of evidence (see Hartmann 2008) suggests that participants, on average, perform better academically than their peers (Hawkins and Mulkey 2005; Troutman and Dufur 2007). Still, there is important variation in education-related outcomes based on sport type and intensity. Eitle and Eitle (2002) find that participation in basketball and football is unrelated to grades but is associated with *lower* standardized achievement scores. Playing other sports (e.g., baseball, soccer, swimming, and track) is associated with higher grades among white students and lower grades among black students.

Far less attention has been given to the possibility that sports provide exposure to socialization processes (e.g., surrounding competition, teamwork and cooperation) that promote economic attainment. Some studies suggest that participants in high school sports earned more money during young adulthood (Long and Caudill 1991; Picou et al. 1985), but earning differentials are often dependent on race or sex. Long and Caudill (1991) find no income premium for female collegiate sport participants, although male participants benefited from a 4% earnings boost. Eide and Ronan (2001) found, after statistical controls, that black males were the only subgroup of sport participants to report higher earnings.

The effect of sport participation on girls' and women's earnings remains poorly understood, as

the bulk of research focuses on men (e.g., Barron et al. 2000; Ewing 2007; Shulman and Bowen 2000). Studies that do include women are often outdated, considering differences in earnings for the small proportion of girls who participated in sports prior to the passage of Title IX in 1974 (e.g., Long and Caudill 1991; Picou et al. 1985). Since that time, considerable change has occurred in both sport and work, as females are participating in both institutions at unprecedented rates.

McLaughlin (2013) examines the relationship between gender, high school sport participation, and young adult earnings using data from the longitudinal Youth Development Study, which recruited a panel of ninth graders in 1988, more than a decade after the passage of Title IX. She finds that sport participation is associated with increased earnings during young adulthood for both male and female participants. Educational attainment largely mediates this relationship, as sports participants are much more likely to attend, and graduate from, college. Both contact sports (e.g., basketball, football, and ice hockey) and non-contact sports (e.g., swimming, volleyball, or gymnastics) are associated with higher earnings among females. For males, however, non-contact sport participation—as compared with no sport participation—is not significantly associated with increased earnings, suggesting that both sex and sport context may affect the type of socialization that occurs.

Conclusion

This chapter has considered three prominent theoretical approaches to socialization and inequality: symbolic interactionism, social structure and personality, and life course perspectives. Each draws attention to distinct dimensions and outcomes of socialization. The classic symbolic interactionists—James, Cooley, and Mead—provided a basic conceptual foundation and contributed the important insight that the self-concept, through processes of socialization, becomes responsive to others' evaluations and reflective of the organization, including its hierarchical aspects, of the society at large. Contemporary

symbolic interactionists have examined the strategies actors use to favorably position themselves vis-à-vis others, including use of the back stage in the presentation of self (Goffman 1959) and lingual tactics to ensure favorable reactions from others and to decrease the likelihood of diminished status and negative sanctions (Hewitt and Stokes 1975; Scott and Lyman 1968). Goffman was particularly sensitive to the socialization processes through which actors higher in status hierarchies maintained their positions and degraded subordinates. Fine (1983, 1987, 2004) highlights status processes in diverse contemporary contexts, including Little League Baseball, high school debate teams, and multi-player fantasy games.

While the symbolic interactionists were mainly concerned with the generation of meaning and development of the self through face-to-face interactions, structural social psychologists also assume self-reflexivity, motivations to protect and enhance the self, and thereby to resist self-damaging reflected appraisals. However, their attention is largely focused on social structural inequalities that affect the processes and outcomes of socialization. Following House (1977), they attempt to identify the components of hierarchical organization, the proximal factors that impinge most closely on the individual, and the person's reactions to those experiences. As we have seen, there is mounting evidence that social class affects parental beliefs and goals for their children, their child-rearing practices, and that these class-differentiated socialization practices influence children's developing self-concepts of ability, self-confidence and expectations of success, as well as their achievement-relevant behavior (Conger and Dogan 2007; Eccles 1993, 2007; Lareau 2003). Structurally-oriented social psychology draws attention to cross-national differences that affect institutional structures (pre-schools, tax codes, family supports), which can promote or diminish intergenerational social class reproduction (Ermish et al. 2012a).

Studies of socialization are increasingly informed by a life course perspective that extends consideration to socializees' biographies, and notes that individuals will be differentially re-

sponsive to socialization attempts depending on their prior experiences. The life course perspective sensitizes the investigator to the diverse trajectories of experiences that bring people to similar eventual socialization contexts, and the implications of these differences for their receptivity to socialization and the likelihood of success. Similarly, the life course perspective draws attention to the fact that new age-graded social roles often require new socialization, or even re-socialization, as old ways of thinking and behaving become outmoded (consistent with Mead's understanding of the act), and must be replaced by more adaptive behavioral adjustments. A life course approach to socialization to inequality draws our attention to the strong implications of early events for subsequent attainments, which can be most readily understood in longitudinal context.

This review demonstrates that socialization processes, especially relevant to the maintenance of inequality and social class reproduction, occur in multiple societal institutions. Admittedly, our review of theoretical and substantive approaches to socialization to inequality is selective and far from comprehensive. Additional social psychological approaches could have been featured. For example, we do not consider exchange and group dynamics approaches that draw insights from both structural and interactional perspectives. To engage in exchange processes (related to power, balancing, etc.), actors must gauge their own and others' resources to achieve their goals (e.g., Cook and Rice 2003). According to expectations states theory (e.g., Correll and Ridgeway 2003), actors observe one another's status characteristics (both relevant and irrelevant to ongoing tasks) and create inequality in groups via the expression and interpretation of status cues, including both verbal and nonverbal behavior. Assumptions about status and competence must be learned through socialization; and these expectations change with experience.

Moreover, many empirical studies in each highlighted theoretical tradition might have been selected; the ones that are discussed should be considered illustrative. While socialization to inequality is pervasive across the society at large,

we have given only limited attention to distinct socialization processes that may characterize particular groups, defined by age, gender, and race/ethnicity, which could be the bases of entire chapters in themselves (see, for example, Preves and Mortimer 2013; Leaper and Friedman 2007; Hughes et al. 2006). Nonetheless, our consideration of three major theoretical perspectives and four important contexts of socialization to inequality—the traditional contexts of family, school, and workplace, and the emergent context of sport—covers substantial ground, highlights major findings in a wide-ranging literature, and indicates fruitful questions for further research.

While considerable progress has been made, we would like to highlight some directions for future research that may be particularly fruitful. We would like to see more comparative research on the socialization processes that generate differential opportunity and intergenerational mobility across countries. For example, do social policies that lessen economic inequalities foster family dynamics that encourage children's achievement motivation and behaviors that, in turn, promote attainment?

In the educational arena, what school interventions foster interactional dynamics in classrooms—between teachers and students and among students themselves—that promote cohesion, mutual acceptance, and tolerance among children with advantaged and disadvantaged social origins? As sports programs are extended to include both sexes, are there ways of structuring them so as to more equally benefit boys and girls? The vast majority of existing research focuses on socialization processes for participants in organized youth sports. More research should explore sport participation that occurs in other contexts, such as the use of sport and physical activity as rehabilitation from drug use and/or crime (Crabbe 2000). Future research should also examine the meaning and role of sport in (re)socializing participants during adulthood and later life (Dionigi 2006).

Another recently emergent context of socialization deserves systematic attention, the virtual world of the internet. Children and youth's

participation in social media (Facebook, Twitter, etc.) has become almost universal in a relatively short period of time. While considerable concern has been expressed about the consequences of this experience for social development (are youth foregoing opportunities for “real” face-to-face interactions and relationships?) and safety (do they expose themselves to sexual predators?), the implications of on-line social interactions for the development of human, social, and cultural capital and, in consequence, future inequality, are little understood.

It is apparent that more social psychological research has been directed to understanding the maintenance, or intergenerational reproduction, of inequality than resistance to inequality. This is an important question about socialization to inequality. Such inquiry would be consistent with symbolic interactionists' pervasive assumption that individuals in problematic situations (including disadvantaged placement in social hierarchies) will strive to protect their self-concepts, promote positive reflective appraisals, and attempt to creatively solve problems and improve their circumstances through the use of various strategic interactional tactics. On the structural side, whereas the social movements literature considers the motivations for joining social movements, including reduction of social injustices that accompany inequality, and the experiences that motivate continued participation over time (Broadbent 2005; DeMartini 1983; McAdam 1988; Rohlinger and Snow 2003; Snow and Owens, this volume), more attention needs to be directed to the specific experiences in families, schools, workplaces, and other socialization contexts that promote a critical stance and rejection of the seemingly inevitable character of existing inequalities. With rare exception (see, for example, Hughes et al. 2006; Diemer et al. 2006, 2008), little attention has been directed to the socialization practices in families, schools, and other institutional settings that teach racial and ethnic minority children to be aware of discrimination, to protect their sense of worth in the face of negative appraisals, and to effectively resist and to change the unequal social order.

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Peter L. Callero

Among sociologists who study inequality there is a good deal of agreement on the broad conceptual and analytical parameters of the field. Social inequality is typically conceptualized as a relatively durable pattern of institutions and social relationships in which valued resources are distributed unevenly across social groups and social categories. Consistent with this definition, empirical analyses generally focus on (1) the processes by which resources obtain value; (2) the rules for allocating resources; and (3) the mechanisms linking individuals to resources (Grusky 2007). It is worth noting, however, that most theory and research in this tradition explores the causes and consequences of inequality without explicitly theorizing the self or identity (e.g., Neckerman and Torche 2007; see Hunt 2003 for a similar conclusion). Surprisingly, this is the case even for a large segment of social psychological research where the dynamics of social interaction are of central concern and the “mechanisms linking individuals to resources” are a primary focus (Hollander and Howard 2000). Given that significant advances in our understanding of social inequality have been achieved without explicitly theorizing the self, it is reasonable to ask if a more formal and deliberate incorporation of self-processes is even necessary. Might self and identity be tangential or peripheral to the production and reproduction of inequality?

There are at least three basic arguments in support of a more intentional examination of self and identity in the study of social inequality. I briefly summarize these arguments before developing them more fully in the review and analysis that follows. First, some sociologists study inequality because the uneven distribution of resources in society is assumed to be harmful to human dignity. While this reason is rarely explicit, there is a widely shared presumption that actual persons are injured both physically and psychologically by systems of inequality. To be sure, the question of human dignity is more commonly problematized in some theoretical traditions than others. Critical Theory and Marxist traditions, for example, are unequivocal in their advocacy of equality and concern for the preservation of human dignity (cf., Agger 1991; Wright 2010), and most feminist traditions also begin with the position that equality and dignity of persons is preferred over inequality and indignity (cf., DeVault 1996). But even in traditions that are more positivistic in orientation, strict ethical standards for conducting research are in place to protect human dignity, and most sociologists display a formal professional commitment to protocols that avoid the exploitation of human subjects. In other words, the stratification of people in society is widely assumed to be morally and ethically distinct from the layering of sedimentary rock, the stratification of basal cells, or the dominance hierarchy in a wolf pack. Thus, the self matters because it emerges from persons, and persons have a common interest in preserving human dignity

P. L. Callero (✉)
Department of Sociology, Western Oregon University
Monmouth, OR 97361, USA
e-mail: callerp@wou.edu

and advancing the values of equality, justice and solidarity.

The second argument in support of a more intentional examination of self and identity in the analysis of inequality is that the meanings and social practices that frame and define interaction are expressed in terms of social identities, and many categories of identity are the product of inequality processes. This means that social inequality cannot be adequately or fully addressed without considering the meanings of value and power attached to person labels. Man and woman, black and white, gay and straight, employee and owner, are not simply categories of difference, they are the symbolic means for doing inequality (see Wilkins et al., this volume).

Third, the self matters in the study of inequality because it operates as a social process, or mechanism, that converts social interaction into higher order patterns of resource distribution. The self is more than an outcome variable that happens to be correlated with inequality; it is instrumental in the generation, reproduction, and alteration of the social structures that sustain inequality.

The following review and analysis of self, identity, and inequality is organized around these three arguments. In the first section, I clarify the conceptual boundaries that define person, self and identity, emphasizing the particular importance of personhood in the study of inequality. In the second section, I examine identity as a product of inequality at three different levels of analysis (person, interaction, and culture), and review research on value and power as dimensions of identity meaning. In the final section I continue to differentiate among three levels of analysis as I explore the self as a process in the production of inequality.

Person, Self, Identity, and Inequality

Person, self, and identity are interdependent concepts with a rich, complex, and sometimes messy intellectual heritage. Clarifying the boundaries among the three overlapping concepts is a neces-

sary first step toward a more coherent explanation of their contribution to the study of inequality.

For most social psychologists, the concept of “person” is synonymous with “human being” or “individual” and is typically viewed as the corporal slate upon which self and identity are written. But this narrow view of personhood in relation to self and identity misses a key dimension of social life. According to Cahill (1998, p. 131) a proper sociology of the person is one that focuses on “the publically visible beings of intersubjective experience,” as well as the cultural interpretations of what it means to be a person in different societies. This emphasis actually has a long history in sociology and anthropology dating back to the work of Durkheim and Mauss (cf., Carrithers et al. 1985). Durkheim ([1915] 1965, pp. 305–306), for example, saw personhood as a collective representation of the individual; a social fact that reflects a shared understanding of what it means to be a human being in a particular time and place. Under this conceptualization, the definition of person is conditioned by the dominant folk psychology of the culture. Thus, the assumption that persons are unique, self-reliant individuals may be characteristic of modern, western representations, but it is not a definition consistent with representations of persons in pre-modern, nonwestern societies.

Goffman extended the Durkheimian approach to personhood by investigating the interactional process by which the specific cultural representation of a person is socially produced. Indeed, Goffman’s *interaction order* is primarily concerned with the collaborative manufacturing of persons. As Cahill (1998, p. 139) points out, for Goffman “the public person is not made in the image of a unique self; rather, an interpretive picture of a unique self is made in the image of the public person.” This is a distinction that is not always appreciated by social psychologists, and it is a limitation that is due in part to Goffman’s own inconsistent use of the terms individual, person, self and identity. Nevertheless, Goffman (1959, p. 253) was clear in asserting that the corporal body is simply a peg on which the socially manufactured person is to be temporarily hung. Social identities, on the other hand, are the means

of categorizing persons in terms considered appropriate and consistent with the shared assumption of what is required to be a person.

Still, it would be a mistake to take Goffman's peg analogy too far. It is one thing to recognize historical and cultural variation in the production of persons, and quite another to conclude that there are no essential qualities of human persons beyond physiology. As Smith (2010, pp. 277–314) has recently stressed with regard to the question of personhood, we must be careful not to confuse “how things happen” from “what things are.” The cultural beliefs about what constitutes a person, and the means of socially manufacturing the social category of person, are certainly a core concern of sociological social psychology, but the socially constructed category of person is not independent of the objective nature of what it means to be human. For Smith (2010, pp. 25–89), therefore, a conceptualization of personhood should also recognize that human capacities for consciousness and self-reflection are emergent from physical bodies that serve as the center of subjective experience and the hub of a coherent structure. Persons are inescapably social and subject to the power of social forces, but as human persons we are also agents who are (at least partly) responsible for causing our own actions. In this sense, a person is both a socially constructed category *and* an acting organism with uniquely human capacities. Self and identity are two uniquely human capacities that emerge from persons.

For social psychologists working in the tradition of symbolic interactionism, *self* refers to the unique potential of persons to engage in symbolic interaction, to take the perspective of other, and to produce a self-conscious object—an object to itself. Following Mead (1934, p. 140), the self is evident in the process of “responding to oneself as another responds to it, taking part in one's own conversation with others, being aware of what one is saying and using that awareness of what one is saying to determine what one is going to say thereafter.” *Identity*, on the other hand, is a product, or outcome of the self-society relationship. Identities are the socially constructed categories that are used to establish

meaningful understandings of persons—both self and other. As such, identities are not universal, but reflect particular historical and situational circumstances (Wiley 1994, pp. 1–3). Sociologists have employed a variety of different terms when referencing identity categories (e.g., label, role, status), have identified a range of different types of identities (e.g., personal, dispositional, situational, institutional), and have invented useful typologies for making conceptual distinctions among these categories (e.g., MacKinnon and Heise 2010). All of these schemes, however, share the core idea that identities are socially contingent constructions that depend upon the self-processes of persons engaged in symbolic interaction (e.g., Howard 2000). Linking personhood to the concepts of self and identity is particularly important for the study of inequality for two reasons. First, it reminds us that self and identity are ultimately embodied. Persons are biological systems, integrated into the natural world and subject to the laws of nature. It is the practical action of human bodies that gives rise to self and identity, and it is the practical activities of physical survival—finding ways to eat, shelter, procreate, and avoid harm—that develop into social structures of inequality. Thus, the material and corporeal reality of persons in community with one another is basic to both the emergence of self and the emergence of inequality. When material resources necessary for survival are unavailable, or are unevenly distributed—scarce for some and hoarded or controlled by others—there are physical and psychological consequences for actual persons.

The second reason for developing a conception of personhood is that it connects self and identity to the problem of human dignity. This is evident in both Goffman's strong constructionist definition of persons, as well as Smith's critical realist position. Take, for instance, the following statement from Goffman (1959, p. 13):

(W)hen an individual projects a definition of the situation and thereby makes an implicit claim to be a person of a particular kind, he automatically exerts a moral demand upon others, obliging them to value and treat him in the manner that persons of his kind have a right to expect.

Here we see Goffman's assertion that establishing the dignity of persons is both a negotiated outcome of social interaction, and a fundamental prerequisite of interaction itself. Under ideal conditions, the joint production of personhood is mutually supportive and balanced. However, control of the means of person production is rarely shared equally among participants, and certain structural arrangements—prisons, mental hospitals, slavery, patriarchy—make it difficult for some individuals to claim personhood and experience dignity. For his part, Goffman was not concerned with the question of whether prisoners, mental patients, slaves, and women, are in fact persons deserving of dignity. Like many sociologists, he avoided questions of ontology—even though such assumptions are implicit in his work.

Smith (2010, p. 435), however, believes it is important to directly address the issue because:

Dignity inheres in the emergent constitution of human personhood, including in the personhood of people who are ignorant of or deny its reality. It is inalienable. It cannot be thought or wished away. It cannot be sold or negated by legal judgment. Dignity exists as a real and ineliminable dimension of human persons, just as liquidity does of water and growth and reproduction do of living organisms.

For Smith, dignity is not a social construction or cultural invention. It is an objective, ontologically real attribute of all human persons. When humans treat others as though they are things and refuse to recognize inherent personhood, dignity is denied. The assumption, therefore, is that personhood is not a matter of degree or a matter of capacity; those who are illiterate, have less ability to reason, or have limitations of sight, hearing or mobility, are still persons and still have dignity (for a related argument see Hodson 2001, pp. 3–21).

This particular conceptualization of persons as dignified, inviolable, and equal has an elective affinity with basic principles of democracy and ideal democratic institutions (Callero 2003; Habermas 1987; Wiley 1994, p. 11). Voting, citizenship, human rights of privacy, life, and liberty begin with an assumption of persons *sui generis*. Similarly, a deliberative democracy requires

symbolic interaction, reason, and empathy—characteristic features of a pragmatic self (Talisso 2005). In contrast, reductionist theories of self, characteristic of postmodernism and much of psychology, struggle to justify democracy and equality on moral grounds. Mead and Dewey voiced a similar critique of reductionist theories from an earlier era and argued “German Idealism served to legitimate monarchy, aristocracy, and serfdom” (Wiley 1994, p. 227). Early American pragmatists battled against social Darwinists, eugenicists, and other biological determinists who used science and specious theories of personhood to justify racial segregation, the subordination of women, and the medical exploitation of physically disabled persons. Clarifying the relationship between person, self and identity is therefore a necessary step in understanding inequality.

Identity as a Product of Inequality

The whole (society) is prior to the part (individual), not the part to the whole; and the part is explained in terms of the whole, not the whole in terms of the part or parts. (George Herbert Mead 1934, pp. 7–8)

For Mead, the self is explained in terms of society, suggesting that the systemic patterns of social inequality observable in society can be used to explain identity. Common sense alone gives credence to this assertion. We experience inequality in and through categories, labels, and classifications that define individuals, groups and collectives, where rewards and resources are predictably and unevenly distributed. Identity categories such as gender, race, and class matter to sociologists because they are profoundly and unmistakably linked to social structures where the ownership and control of labor, land, machines, financial capital, communication media, and other material and symbolic resources are systematically stratified.¹

¹ Difference and inequality are, of course, distinct ideas and we should not assume that classification necessarily produces inequality. However, classification is not neutral and experimental evidence suggests that nominal group

Table 12.1 Identity meanings and forms of inequality at three levels of analysis

Level of analysis	Identity meanings		Forms of inequality
Culture	Value	Power	
	Respect and prestige associated with a generalized identity category	Authority and control associated with a generalized identity category	Patterns of unequal resource distribution defined by cultural status hierarchies; access to cultural capital
Interaction	Situated deference	Situated dominance	Asymmetrical patterns of engagement evident in face-to-face encounters
Person	Self-esteem	Self-efficacy	Poor physical and psychological health; limits on autonomy and freedom

Table 12.1 presents an organizing framework for reviewing research on identity and social inequality at three different levels of analysis: culture, interaction and person.² While these three levels present a clear analytical distinction, they are not independent of each other. *Persons* are defined by identity categories, particular definitions of self and other are negotiated at the level of *interaction*, and a generalized meaning for an identity category is shared at the level of *culture*. On the other hand, the generalized cultural meaning associated with an identity category is reproduced and altered by persons engaged in face-to-face interaction.

Here I use the term identity to refer to all categories of social location that may be employed in the definition of self and other. The intention is to capture the full range of sociological approaches to identity and all possible ways in which identity expresses inequality. This includes traditional sociological categories associated with structural locations, group affiliations, and types of social relationships (e.g., class position, occupation, nationality, geography, religion, marital status, sexuality), categories linked to physical attributes (e.g., age, race, disability, sex, size), category labels that are more localized and defined by a

person's biography, skill, ability or individual characteristics (e.g., test scores, athletic prowess, criminal history), as well as dispositional categories referencing personality, stereotypes, or slang classifications (e.g., angry, extrovert, motherly, wimp). To the extent that a category label can be used to identify, classify, or indicate a person as a certain type, it has the potential to be used in the production and reproduction of inequality. As Table 12.1 indicates, the manner in which identity categories are linked to inequality takes a different form depending on the level of analysis. For this reason, the review of theory and research that follows is organized in terms of culture, interaction, and person.

The Level of Culture

Identities have meaning, and the meaning of any identity can be recognized, accepted, and documented at several different levels of analysis. At the cultural level, where language and common social practices are sustained, the meaning of an identity is abstract and generalized. What it means to be a man or woman, black or white, gay or straight, rich or poor, is part of a common lexicon, a cultural tool kit, and a recognizable status hierarchy (Heise 2007; MacKinnon and Heise 2010). Identity meanings at this level of generality have more or less settled over time, remain relatively durable, and are difficult to transform. Yet, the boundaries between identity meanings are never completely permanent or inflexible; they are usually intersecting, sometimes contested, and always open to the possibility of change over time.

membership (a nascent group identity) may be sufficient in itself to generate bias in favor of the self and prejudice against an other (Tajfel and Turner 1979). This reminds us that the self-process involves not only the symbolic representation, categorization, and naming of self, it also includes the same processes in the direction of other.

² For similar sociologically oriented reviews of scholarship on self and identity that have employed organizing schemes based on levels of analysis see Owens (2010) and Jenkins (2008).

The culturally settled meanings associated with an identity category can vary from a core set of generalized references to a highly specific and particular collection of relatively unique responses. But at both ends of this spectrum we can find theory and empirical evidence indicating that meanings are organized along a limited number of dimensions. Osgood et al. (1975), for example, have found three dominant dimensions of meaning (evaluation, potency, and activity) across more than twenty distinct cultural communities. *Evaluation* refers to meanings that offer an appraisal or assessment of an object, person, or event, as being either positive or negative. *Potency* captures meanings that refer to variation in strength or power, while *Activity* references meanings associated with levels of energy or relative liveliness.

Under Affect Control Theory (Robinson and Smith-Lovin 2006; Heise 2007; MacKinnon and Heise 2010; see also Foy et al., this volume), the same three dimensions of meaning have been used to produce “cultural dictionaries” for a range of identities. According to the theory, the culturally shared affective meanings associated with identity categories are experienced as *sentiments* that serve as a generalized standard for assessing the more particular affective meanings of situated interaction. Thus, Langford and MacKinnon (2000) found that meanings associated with male and female identities seem to reflect two different status hierarchies, such that men are seen as more productive and powerful (higher on potency), and women are viewed as more caring and positive (higher on evaluation), while the *activity* dimension was found to be less different. In a broader sociological context this is not a surprising result given that *evaluation* and *potency* are analogous to *value* and *power*; two concepts that have a long and diverse history in the study of inequality (e.g., Castells 2010; Newman 2007; Sennett 2003; Thye 2000; Weber 1946). Indeed, it is safe to say that in the case of social inequality, the two most important meanings for any identity are those associated with value and power. For this reason, Table 12.1 limits the meanings associated with an identity to these two dimensions.

At the cultural level, the *value* of an identity is typically associated with differing levels of respect, prestige and honor. We see this, for example, in the unequal value historically associated with the categories of “heterosexual” and “homosexual”. Persons defined as “gay” or “lesbian” often receive less respect than persons categorized as “straight”. The *power* of an identity, on the other hand, is defined by different levels of authority and control. In the United States, for example, the racial category of white has historically been associated with more power than the racial category of “black.” In general, to be defined as white means greater authority and control in comparison to persons defined as black. While value and power are highly correlated, these two dimensions of meaning are sufficiently distinct to warrant separate analysis. For example, we can think of identities defined by occupational categories with different levels of prestige. Thus, when considered in the abstract (i.e., action and context is unspecified), the identities of teacher and farmer receive relatively high ratings in surveys of occupational prestige and are consistently ranked above the identities of banker and politician in this regard (e.g., Nakao and Treas 1994). On the other hand, banker and politician are under most conditions viewed as being more powerful and controlling.

Here it is important to emphasize the distinction between power as a dimension of meaning, and power as the actual accomplishment of dominance and control. (For a review of different sociological understandings of power, see Thye and Kalkhoff in this volume). As Table 12.1 suggests, the meaning of an identity (powerful to powerless), has implications for the actual control of valued resources; persons who hold powerful identities will be more likely to control and dominate. But an identity category has a degree of independence separate from any particular person. Institutional roles such as President, General, or CEO, are recognized as “existing” in an organization even when the position is vacant. Individual occupants of the position might display different styles of control and may even redefine the meaning of the position, but this does not erase the fact that there are clear institutional and cul-

tural limits as to how the position is defined. The same is also true for less formal identity categories such as gender or race, where the meaning of an identity category can limit or enhance opportunities for exercising power. In this sense, identities are resources, or tools, for doing inequality. Power is not completely symbolic, but power has a symbolic component associated with identity categories. For this reason, it is important to recognize power as both a dimension of meaning associated with an identity category, as well as the accomplishment of control and domination.

Where do the generalized and relatively durable cultural meanings of power and value originate? For most identity categories the answer to this question is buried under layers of history, but Tilly (2005) offers a plausible theory. He suggests that when two different groups of people encounter each other for the first time, they each create labels to mark and identify the other and establish symbolic group boundaries. But these identity categories are simply indicators of difference and do not necessarily cause inequality. Inequality is produced when repeated transactions across group boundaries regularly advantage one side and at the same time reaffirm the identity boundary. In transactions of exploitation, for example, members of one side of the boundary enlist effort from members of the other side to secure a scarce resource, but fail to deliver in return the full value of the other group's effort. The exploiters then use part of the surplus value to produce symbolic markers and material conditions that reinforce the original boundary. Think for example of the boundary between workers and owners of a factory. With the wealth generated by the factory, owners and managers can invest in expensive suits, office buildings, security guards, media messaging, and political relationships that serve to highlight the difference between the two groups, and at the same time mark one as more valued and powerful than the other.

Within social psychology, status construction theory has produced a more localized and interactional theory of how nominal categorical differences between people are converted into differences of status (value). Using a cumulative program of empirical investigations (mostly lab-

oratory experiments), researchers have demonstrated that the structural conditions under which people encounter one another can shape beliefs associated with the value of different identity categories (Ridgeway and Nakagawa, this volume). In addition, when locally produced beliefs are carried into other situations, they may be diffused and become widely held cultural beliefs (Ridgeway and Erickson 2000). When this happens, status beliefs serve to reproduce inequality through processes that affirm the relative value of different identity categories. The end result is the establishment of status hierarchies and a form of cultural capital linked to identity (Johnson et al. 2006).

To be sure, the development of cultural meaning systems is a dynamic process that is framed by the higher-level constraints of macro-level social structures associated with the institutions and practices of a political economy, including legacies of colonial rule, forced enslavement, patriarchy, and the accumulation and concentration of capital by multinational corporations. But within these larger social arrangements the value and power of identity categories is learned, shared, defended, challenged, and altered in face-to-face encounters among people in identifiable social settings. This is identity at the level of interaction.

The Level of Interaction

At the level of interaction, the value of an identity is experienced in terms of the relative amount of deference granted to a particular actor in a face-to-face encounter. Power on the other hand is experienced in the relative ability of one actor to exert dominance over others in specific situations. Both identity meanings contribute to the establishment of an asymmetrical relationship where the holder of the less powerful and less valued identity is more likely to be ignored, intimidated, dismissed, and at the same time will be expected to produce an interactive demeanor that is obsequious, reverential, and submissive.

Specific examples of inequality at the level of interaction are well documented and diverse

(Anderson and Snow 2001; Link and Phelan 2001; Major and O'Brien 2005). Derber (2000) shows, for instance, that the amount of attention someone receives in a social setting is a reflection of the relative power and value of their situated identity. Similarly, Snow and Anderson (1993) demonstrate in their study of the homeless that life on the street is associated with a type of social invisibility, where recognition is often in the form of negative attention from a disgusted or angry passerby. Identities with less value and power are also associated with more queuing and waiting (Schwartz 1975), greater emotional labor (Hochschild 1983), an increased likelihood of interruption (Smith-Lovin and Brody 1989), as well as intimidation and threats of violence (Anderson 1999).

The markers of identity, and the cultural meanings associated with identity categories, serve as an initial framework for locating and negotiating the relative power and value of self and other, but the context of the social encounter narrows the field of likely interpretive outcomes. Think of, for example, the different cultural meanings associated with the identity categories of heart surgeon and prison guard. At the generalized level of cultural meanings, the identity of a prison guard is associated with less value and power than the occupational identity of a heart surgeon. But if a heart surgeon is serving time inside a state penitentiary, the prison guard is more likely to enact dominance and achieve deference from the inmate, even if the heart surgeon identity is made salient. Here we can see that the resources associated with a particular setting are key to establishing how value and power are performed. And when the setting is lodged within a more encompassing institutional context, there may be more constraints on the culturally shared meaning of an identity (e.g., Gubrion 1997).

To be sure, the interaction level includes more than the identification of the relative value and power of identity categories. It is also the level at which identity categories are created, negotiated and reproduced. Goffman's dramaturgical approach, for example, draws our attention to an interaction order that includes the rules and normative procedures that actors use to create authentic

identity impressions—both valued and devalued, powerful and powerless. In other words, while the interaction level is the place where the meanings of identity are experienced, it is also where we find the “rules and procedural forms” that are used to sustain value and power in the doing of deference and dominance (Schwalbe and Shay in this volume).

The Person Level

The person level identified in Table 12.1 encapsulates the universal symbolic capacities for reflexivity and role taking that are uniquely human. Analysis at this level focuses on the more or less durable identities that are carried by persons across situations and help structure the meanings, motivations, and dispositions of individual actors. Here we find the identity categories associated with a person's social biography, affiliations with different groups and institutions, and the unique intersections of categories such as race, class, gender, and sexuality (Howard and Renfrow in this volume). It is at the level of the person that the relatively enduring consequences of inequality are both inscribed and scarred onto actual bodies and minds with real, visible consequences for an individual's physical and mental health (Thoits 2010). Thus, persons from lower class positions are generally sicker and stay sick longer than people in higher-class positions. And at all levels of class, African-Americans will on average experience worse health than whites, and women will experience higher rates of depression than men (McLeod et al., this volume).

In terms of identity meanings, most research at the person level examines the relative value of an identity as represented in the concept of self-esteem. Here self-esteem is typically defined as an overall assessment of worth, merit, or value—a continuum that ranges from positive valuations of the self to negative valuations of the self. A number of studies have found evidence that devalued identities are associated lower self-esteem, but the magnitude of the correlations are generally weak and findings are not entirely consistent (Wells 2001). While the lion's

share of this research focuses on a generalized self-evaluation (global self-esteem), researchers also recognize that self-esteem can be specific to particular dimensions or aspects of the self (specific self-esteem). For example, in one especially influential study, researchers found that global self-esteem had a relatively stronger relationship with psychological well-being, but specific self-esteem was a better predictor of actual behavior. Moreover, this same study also found that the relationship between specific “academic self-esteem” and global self-esteem was a function of how highly academic performance was personally valued (Rosenberg et al. 1995).

Still, it would be inaccurate to claim that a simple linear relationship exists between social inequality and self-esteem. Instead, reviews of this literature have concluded that the link between self-esteem and inequality is contingent on dimensions of measurement (Wells 2001), context (Crocker and Major 1989), life stage (Orth et al. 2010), as well as variation in historical and cultural discourse (Hewitt 2009). Given that the self is nested within both an interaction system and a cultural system, the fact that we find evidence supporting a conditional relationship between person-specific self-esteem and macro indicators of inequality is not surprising. And given that self-esteem is concerned with only one dimension of meaning, it is not surprising that the magnitudes of these same correlations are relatively weak.

The relative power of an identity at the person level is most commonly associated with the concept of self-efficacy. As originally formulated by Bandura (1977), self-efficacy refers to beliefs about one’s ability to execute a particular course of action. Put more generally, self-efficacy is an assessment of one’s level of competence, effectiveness, control, and agency—traits that are synonymous with powerful identities. Like self-esteem, self-efficacy is typically conceptualized as an overall personal assessment, generalized trait, or disposition, but researchers examine domain specific assessments of self-efficacy as well (Gecas 1989; Schunk and Pajares 2009). Also similar to the literature on self-esteem, research on self-efficacy has concluded that indi-

vidual variation is a function of social context, institutional setting, as well as background identities such as gender and ethnicity (Usher and Pajares 2008). In other words, self-efficacy is not simply a personality trait, but rather a type of self-assessment that is very much tied to one’s social location. One study (Boardman and Robert 2000), for example, found that low levels of self-efficacy were associated with high levels of neighborhood unemployment even after controlling for individual level measures of socio-economic status.

We can say that social inequality has been internalized when individual assessments of value (self-esteem) and power (self-efficacy) become part of a person’s self-definition. Understanding the structural conditions under which this occurs has been the focus of a tradition of research categorized under the rubric of social structure and personality (McLeod and Lively 2003). Although not explicitly concerned with the self or identity meanings, this body of research has produced persuasive evidence that objective social circumstances can transfer conditions of inequality to the person with detrimental consequences for self and identity.

The most compelling research in this regard has examined the consequences of managerial control, routinization of labor, and limited autonomy at the work site. Kohn and Schooler (1969, 1983) and their colleagues (Kohn and Slomczynski 1990), for example, have shown how value and power in the workplace (one’s relationship to the means of production) has enduring consequences for particular types of psychological functioning (e.g., self-confidence and intellectual flexibility). This research tradition provides strong evidence that objective conditions of inequality in the workplace not only have negative effects on the self, but also have emotional repercussions that harm the dynamics of family interaction (DiTomaso and Parks-Yancy, this volume; Menaghan 1991). In addition, these adjustments and alterations of identity toward a less valued and less efficacious self may be transmitted across generations as children “inherit” less powerful and valuable forms of cultural capital from their parents (Lareau 2003). Additional research,

more specifically focused on the development of self-definitions, also finds evidence that autonomy in the workplace is associated with higher esteem and higher efficacy for individual workers (Gecas and Seff 1989; Staples et al. 1984).

Still, we need to keep in mind that value and power have a degree of independence, and under certain conditions may be unrelated or may be shaped by different identities. For example, some research has found that while there appears to be little difference between blacks and whites in the U.S. in terms of self-esteem, blacks tend to report lower levels of self-efficacy. Hughes and Demo's (1989) analyses suggest that although esteem and efficacy are positively correlated, they are the outcomes of different social processes. In a national survey of African Americans they found that religion, family, and friends were the most important predictors of self-esteem, while self-efficacy was more highly dependent on age, gender and socioeconomic status.

In sum, research on the relationship between identity and inequality can be understood as an examination of value and power at three distinct but interdependent levels of analysis. At the level of culture, inequality is reflected in differing amounts of value and power associated with generalized identity categories. This is most evident in patterns of resource distribution defined by status hierarchies that are often widely accepted as natural or just. At the level of interaction, inequality is experienced in face-to-face relationships where identity signifiers initiate asymmetrical relations of deference and dominance, resulting in patterns of positive and negative attention, fear and intimidation, and an interactive demeanor that is either poised or insecure. At the level of the person, value and power are internalized in the form of self-esteem and self-efficacy. These effects accumulate over the life course and are often associated with poor physical and psychological well-being.

Thus far I have primarily focused on identity as a product of inequality and as the consequence of a larger social system. But the self is also a social force and an instrument in the production and alteration of inequality. This is the self as a social process or mechanism.

The Self as a Social Process

A common assertion among so-called postmodern theorists is that the self is merely an effect or product of social practices, and that it has no objective reality outside of historically specific systems of discourse (e.g., Denzin 1992; Foucault 1988; Gergen 1991). In contrast, sociologists grounded in the tradition of American pragmatism and symbolic interactionism argue that the self emerges from cognitive capacities and social relationships to become a real, objective, and causal force in society. In this way, the self is said to be a subject and an object, a social product and a social force (Callero 2003; Owens 2003; Rosenberg 1979; Weigart and Gecas 2003). The distinction is important for the study of social inequality. When the agentic self is dismissed as a linguistic epiphenomenon, or as an artifact of discourse, it is difficult to theorize individual and collective resistance to systems of inequality (Best 1994; Collins 1997). As noted earlier, identities may be historically, culturally and situationally specific, but self-reflection is universal. Understood in this way we can appreciate the self as a social mechanism (Gross 2009; Smith 2010), or a set of relatively fixed processes—mostly unobservable—that convert social interaction into higher order patterns of equality and inequality.

Recognizing the self as a social process guards against the temptation of reducing the self to a simple predictor or outcome variable. This is increasingly the direction of some scholars (mostly psychologists), who have contributed to a catalog of self-dimensions that share much with personality theory (e.g., Swann et al. 2007). When treated as a variable, the self loses part of its complexity, explanatory power, and sociological significance. As Smith (2010, p. 289) notes, "Variables do not make things happen in the world. Human persons do." And the self is the primary mechanism by which persons make things happen—both good and bad. This is not to say that the self is at all times and places operating as a social force, or that the self is the only social process in operation. Rather, under particular circumstances the self will operate as an instrument in the production of certain observ-

Table 12.2 Reproduction and resistance at three levels of analysis

Level of analysis	Self as process in the production of inequality	
Culture	Reproduction	Resistance
	Power and value for generalized identity categories accepted as legitimate	Social movement identity mobilization; contesting cultural meanings; boundary work
Interaction	Maintenance of an interaction order; covering, passing, affect control	Autonomous meaning systems; strategic disruptions; infrapolitics
Person	Self-verification; identity control	Identity salience; identity as resource

able outcomes. Social inequality is one such outcome, and for this reason a complete explanation of the production, reproduction, and alteration of social inequality requires a theory of the self as a social process.

Table 12.2 presents a basic framework for examining the self as a social process at three levels of analysis. Here the focus is limited to either reproduction or resistance in the production of inequality. This is not a hard boundary; theories focusing on reproduction do not deny the possibility of resistance, and processes that explain resistance assume a high degree of social reproduction. Nevertheless, these same self-processes are distinct enough to justify a categorical separation.

Generally speaking, the self contributes to reproduction when stocks of habits (social practices, modes of response) go unchallenged as solutions for prior problematic situations. These solution patterns continue in the form of tradition, momentum, and unchallenged assumptions until exposed by new problematic encounters (Joas 1996, p. 126–144). Resistance is the visible response of individuals and groups struggling to resolve perceived problems of inequality. This can be evident, for example, in the street demonstrations of a political revolution or a brief objection and apology sequence between two actors.

To say that the self is a process or mechanism through which problem situations are encountered, interpreted, and collectively resolved, does not mean that inequality is essentially symbolic or that solutions to problematic events are always just and equitable. We must not forget that reproduction of inequality is often accomplished with brute force, torture, killing and imprisonment, and is frequently associated with intimidation, threats, and fear. Similarly, collective solutions are not necessarily just, and are often enabled by

the control of material resources in the form of land, money, and weapons. As a consequence, the resolution of a problem will regularly favor those with more power. For example, the exploitation of workers in an office or factory might become problematic and lead to the formation of a labor union and collective bargaining. A new contract may improve benefits and working conditions—offering a temporary solution—but in the end, the managers and owners are still in control and continue to operate with more power.

Individuals, groups and institutions that are advantaged by the unequal distribution of value and power of particular identities have an interest in regulating and reinforcing systems of inequality, while those who are disadvantaged by the process have an interest in altering or erasing the meanings associated with the identity. Consistent with the organizing framework presented in Table 12.2, I will review research on reproduction and resistance at three different levels of analysis.

The Level of Culture

Reproduction at the level of culture occurs when the value and power of an identity category is processed by the self as natural, legitimate, or just. When inequality is either invisible, passed off as acceptable, or dismissed as an inconsequential difference, there is no pressure on persons to examine the meaning of an established identity category. Thus, when women and ethnic minorities are portrayed in film, television, and print as subservient and weak, and when these images go unchallenged, inequality is reproduced at the level of culture (Bullock et al. 2001). As Barker (2005, p. 503) notes, “Issues of cultural representation are political because intrinsically they are bound

up with questions of power through the inevitable process of selection and organization that are part of the representational process. The power of representation lies in its enabling some kinds of knowledge to exist while excluding other ways of seeing.”

Lamont’s (2000) research reminds us, however, that reproduction is not a simple process of the powerful demeaning the powerless. In her study of workingmen she found that devalued meanings for identity categories are often reproduced within boundaries of the same oppressed class, and between boundaries of race, in a manner that prevents class solidarity. As a consequence “Workers often judge members of other groups to be deficient in respect to the criteria they value most” (p. 241). This discovery complements tests of social identity theory that find that actors experience positive self-esteem by conforming to their own group identity, while denigrating outsiders (cf., Scheepers et al. 2009). To the extent that this self-process leads to intergroup stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination, it can reproduce already existing identity meanings associated with group membership (Riesch 2010). As a consequence, the cultural hegemony of various identity categories is not experienced as problematic. Instead, the injurious meanings and negative cultural representations associated with identity categories go unchallenged. The end result is the reproduction of inequality within the cultural system. Indeed, one could argue that under conditions of reproduction at this level, the self as a mechanism is not immediately engaged.

However, resistance at the level of culture is always on the horizon because reproduction cannot be maintained indefinitely under conditions of inequality. Persons who are categorized under a relatively powerless or devalued identity will eventually object to the inherent indignity and seek to alter their circumstance. Following Gramsci’s (1971) classic distinction between “war of position” and “war of maneuver,” some acts of resistance may be focused on altering the meanings of the identity categories (position), while others may be focused on altering the distribution of resources and the coercive powers that serve to legitimate the meanings (maneuver).

But as Nagel’s (1995) analysis of Native American identity shows, the material and symbolic are intertwined. Collective acts of resistance are necessary to change the meanings of generalized identity categories, and collective identities are central to the mobilization of oppositional groups and oppositional social movements (Melucci 1996; Polleta and Jasper 2001). For resistance to succeed at this level, a collective identity must be politicized (Klandermans and de Weerd 2000; Snow and Owens, this volume; Taylor and Whittier 1992), and this means that the self must begin to process new identity meanings.

An evolving and particularly promising line of research on resistance to inequality can be found in the examination of symbolic boundaries as applied to identity categories (Lamont 1992; Lamont and Molnár 2002). In the case of collective identity, *boundary work* refers to the strategies and practices used to contest the cultural meanings of an identity (Owens et al. 2010). This includes moves to deconstruct boundaries as well as attempts to reinforce boundaries so as to mobilize on the basis of identity. For example, by redefining the meaning of “queer,” activists have sought to construct a more inclusive social movement of people with a wide range of sexualities. In this instance, resistance is not simply a political struggle for equal rights under the law, but also a cultural struggle to establish new meanings and new identities (Bernstein 2005, p. 26; Rimmerman 2002). On the other hand, some lesbian feminist communities have sought to reinforce oppositional gender categories and establish a privileged idealization of female as a way to challenge misogyny embedded in traditional identity meanings. Such a strategy can serve to enhance collective consciousness, but as Taylor and Whittier (1999, p. 178) conclude, it can also promote “a kind of cultural endogamy, that, paradoxically, erects boundaries within the challenging group, dividing it on the basis of race, class, age religion, ethnicity, and other factors,” a complication that may produce unintended consequences. Gamson (1998), for example, found that the representation of gay people in television served to legitimate middle-class gay people

while simultaneously invalidating meanings associated with poor and working-class gays.³

The Level of Interaction

Individuals cannot control the meanings of value and power in isolation; the value and power of an identity is an interactional accomplishment (e.g., Speer 2012). Some interaction work will reproduce inequality and some will contribute to resistance and the revision of identity meanings—both personally and culturally. In both instances we find evidence of the self operating as a social process or mechanism.

Reproduction of identity inequality at the level of interaction has received the lion's share of attention. Thus, Goffman's catalog of self-based strategies associated with the concept of identity work is principally focused on methods that reproduce the status quo. When actors work to avoid confrontation, seek validation for a devalued identity status, and participate in an interaction exchange that preserves the interaction order, they are indirectly reproducing social inequality. Here we find a self that surrenders to the dominant order and seeks to conceal oppositional or discrepant identity categories so as to avoid confrontation. This is evident, for example, when an actor strategically controls markers of a devalued identity. Goffman (1963) highlights two such self-processes in his analysis of stigma. *Passing* refers to the tactic of concealing or obliterating stigma signs, as when a member of a devalued ethnic group changes his or her last name or speaks with an intentional accent. *Covering*, on the other hand, refers to tactics used to keep obvious stigmatized identities from looming large, as when a blind person wears dark glasses for the sake of the sighted. Both strategies suggest a self that is aware of an interaction order, and is will-

ing to cede ground to those with more value and power so as to avoid additional stigmatization (see Link et al., this volume).

To achieve a creditable self, to avoid being discredited, actors must not violate the structure of the social encounter. "The key factor in this structure is the maintenance of a single definition of the situation, this definition having to be expressed, and this expression sustained in the face of a multitude of potential disruptions" (Goffman 1959, p. 254). Preserving the structural requirements of the interaction order is often a collective priority. Indeed, Goffman argues that a temporary loss of face and the embarrassment that it engenders has a social function wherein identity is sacrificed for the moment in the name of the larger principles of system reproduction: "Social structure gains elasticity; the individual merely loses composure" (Goffman 1967, p. 112).

Cultural meanings for an identity category establish a set of generalized expectations that initiate identity work at the level of interaction. How these expectations shape behavior has been the concern of several perspectives, including labeling theory (e.g., Becker 1963), status construction theory (e.g., Ridgeway 2006), role theory (e.g., Biddle 1986), and several versions of symbolic interactionism (e.g., Stryker 1980). A particularly relevant program of research in this latter tradition is Affect Control Theory (ACT). Affect Control Theory provides a formal model of the self as a mechanism at the level of interaction. This theory is principally concerned with explaining (1) how meanings at the cultural level are used to produce predictable patterns of interaction; and (2) how innovative solutions are produced when deviations from cultural meanings occur at the level of interaction (Robinson and Smith-Lovin 2006). ACT begins with the assumption that *sentiments* (generalized affective responses) attached to identity categories are used in the generation of *transient impressions* (situated meanings). Actors are motivated to maintain consistency between sentiments and impressions. If a discrepancy between sentiments and impressions occurs (deflections), the self will actively work to regain consistency of meanings, and in the event that deflections become too large, and attempts

³ But resistance is not limited to a rejection of devalued meanings or the mobilization of identity groups, it can also be found in strategies to expose the invisible advantage of traditionally valued identity categories, as in the case of scholarship designed to highlight the privilege of whiteness (e.g., Rothenberg 2012).

at realignment or readjustment are unsuccessful (i.e., the control system fails), conflict emerges and actors will attempt to redefine the situation, or in more extreme cases seek out different settings in an attempt to restore sentiments.

Compare, for example, the generalized meanings that are attached to the identities of “employer” and “employee”. In the context of a specific workplace, these sentiments should generate transient impressions consistent with the expectation that an employer will be more highly valued and should have more power than the employee. At the work site, for instance, it might be assumed that employers will “hire” and “direct”, while employees will “work” and “follow”, but in another context, say at the employee’s home, a different set of transient impressions would likely prevail. To the extent that sentiments and impressions of employer and employee match, situated behavior can be expected to reproduce the asymmetry of the relationship. When employers or employees deviate from these contextualized expectations, however, readjustments will occur. This might be a minor realignment of personal impressions (“overly demanding employer” or “insubordinate employee”), but it could also lead to a more collective readjustment that results in a structural alteration of the workplace or the generation of new generalized sentiments at the level of culture.

In general terms, ACT simply predicts expected behavior, and in this sense it is not an innovative approach to the study of inequality. On the other hand, it does offer a parsimonious cybernetic model that has the potential to account for both the reproduction of value and power, as well as the circumstances that may lead to resistance and change when these meanings result in repeated deflections. Promising lines of research in this direction have explored ACT in relation to gay-lesbian identities (Smith-Lovin and Douglass 1992), social movement solidarity (Britt and Heise 2000), and equity in marital relationships (Lively et al. 2010). At this point, however, most empirical research has focused on the prediction of emotional reactions and the relationship between identities and emotions; an explicit focus on the relationship between social inequal-

ity at the levels of both culture and interaction is mostly absent.

When inequalities at the level of interaction are opposed, resistance can be either individual or collective; in both instances the self is activated as a social process. Disrupting entrenched systems of inequality is difficult, especially if a single person initiates change. A lone objection to the presumed definition of the situation may temporarily disrupt interaction, or succeed in distancing an actor from a negatively valued identity, but individual strategies do not alter the interaction order. In fact, evidence suggests that identity refusal (negotiating a Not-Me) may actually serve to reinforce hegemonic definitions through an implicit acknowledgement and acceptance of the meanings associated with a less valued and less powerful identity (Killian and Johnson 2006; Pyke and Johnson 2003). Schwalbe et al. (2000) call this interactive process *defensive othering* because it involves accepting the devalued identity meanings in others, while at the same time working to distance the same meanings from one’s own identity.

For the most part, individual resistance to an identity meaning cannot succeed without the support of a team of allies. When collective resistance does occur at the level of interaction, it typically involves cooperation among persons who are similarly situated and who experience common deprivations and indignities. An extensive body of ethnographic research on exploitation in the workplace has documented the interpersonal strategies and tactics workers use to oppose and defy management control. Although this body of work is not explicitly concerned with the self as a social process or social force, the intervening operation of the self can be inferred. Hodson (2001), for example, shows that when basic human dignity is denied in the workplace through abuse and manipulation by managers, workers actively and cooperatively engage in four types of defiance: resistance, citizenship, the creation of independent meaning systems, and the development of social relations at work. As used by Hodson, *resistance* encompasses destructive acts, sabotage, and theft, as well as foot-dragging and the withdrawal of cooperation. *Citizenship* refers

to actions that are intended to enhance self-worth despite the indignities of the immediate context. These are enterprising activities that serve as alternative sources of pride—doing a job well, perfecting a skill – and are largely independent of the formal demands of power. *Autonomous meaning systems* also emerge among workers who seek value, purpose, and control within an overarching system of supervision and management. This can involve personal rituals or the display of symbols that represent life outside of the workplace. Examples include engaging in games during lunch break, joking with coworkers, or personalizing a workspace by exhibiting family photos, sport memorabilia or hobby emblems. Finally, fundamental to all of these strategies is *coworker relations*—where collective identity is formed separate from management. Here informal ties and patterns of mutual assistance can develop into unofficial workplace roles and identities. When group values and leadership positions emerge from coworker relations, a united opposition to oppressive conditions is possible.

Other ethnographic studies have documented similar acts of collective resistance in schools (e.g., MacLeod 2009; Willis 1977) and neighborhoods (e.g., Anderson 1999; Harding 2010). In all of these accounts we find rich descriptions of situated resistance that often occurs behind the backs of the powerful, inside commanding institutional structures, and against the interests of state and market forces. This is a type of *infrapolitics* where opposition is often subtle and intentionally obscure (Scott 1990). As a result, evidence of structural change occurring as a consequence of these acts is difficult to locate. To be effective, strategic disruptions of the interaction order must be public (Schwalbe and Shay, this volume). In this way, refusal has an audience, solidarity has the potential to germinate, and sympathetic supporters gain confidence. When successful, disruptions that were once defined as personal affronts are redefined as threats to an established system of power. This is not power in the narrow sense of politics, but power embedded in structures of meaning. Altering political systems through revolutionary action can occur

quickly, but changes to an interaction order are usually gradual and more difficult to achieve.

One reason it is difficult to change an interaction order is that every encounter engages multiple identities that interact in complex ways. For example, workplace resistance involves more than one's work identity; ethnicity overlaps with religion; neighborhoods intersect with class; and gender lies behind all of these. Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin (1999, p. 193) make this point in their analysis of the gender system when they note: "the interactional conduct of gender is always enmeshed in other identities and activities. It cannot be observed in a pure, unentangled form. Gender is a background identity that modifies other identities that are often more salient in the setting than it is." This suggests that a more complete understanding of the operation of the self at the level of interaction requires an examination of the self as a process or mechanism in its own right.

The Person Level

At the person level, the focus is on the internal structures and processes of identity construction. These are the cognitive processes and mechanisms associated with symbolic interaction. In the case of social inequality, most theory and research at this level tends to emphasize processes that contribute to reproduction. Considerably less attention has been paid to self-based processes associated with social change and struggles against inequality. I will first review models of reproduction at the person level before discussing corresponding explanations of resistance.

A common understanding of the self is that it is a reflexive process of adjustment and regulation. We see this, for example in Mead's description of the I and Me as separate parts or phases of a unified process. By taking the attitudes of others, an organized social *Me* emerges, and the self reacts to this phase of the self as an *I*. Taken together, the reflexive process allows for conscious, socially adjusted action, as well as novel, unpredictable, and creative experience. Contemporary elaborations of Mead's basic framework have main-

tained the emphasis on the self as a regulating mechanism. The most influential elaborations of the self as a mechanism emphasize processes and motives that result in self-consistency, congruity, and/or balance (Turner 2006, pp. 368–370). As a consequence, these models are well positioned to explain the reproduction of inequality.

For example, Burke and Stets' (2009; Stets 2006) identity control theory postulates a cybernetic model in which actors are motivated to verify an identity standard—the relatively stable self-meanings associated with a particular identity category.⁴ If feedback from reflected appraisals in a particular situation is inconsistent with the identity standard, actors will engage in action so that their perceptions are congruent with the standards. When an identity is verified in a situation, persons experience positive emotions, and when identity verification fails, negative emotions are produced. Taken together, the control process leans toward stability and reproduction of existing self-meanings and the dominant structural arrangements associated with these meanings. Identities with less value and power have a limited capacity for independence and will be subject to greater control. We see this, for example, in a study of newly married couples that found that spouses with less powerful and valued identities outside of marriage (less education, lower prestige occupation) were more likely to have their self-meanings influenced by a higher-status spouse. On the other hand, spouses with higher-status identities reported self-meanings relatively independent of their lower status spouse (Cast et al. 1999).

A similar specification of the self as a mechanism of reproduction is represented in self-verification theory (Swann 1983). The argument here is that people seek confirmation of already

established self-views, including social identities, because of a preference for a coherent, orderly, stable and predictable social experience. As a result, individuals will choose to interact with others who see them as they see themselves, even under instances when the meaning of self is negative (Kwang and Swann 2010; Swann 1996). For example, Swann et al. (2002) found that college students with negative self-views were generally unsatisfied with roommates that provided positive appraisals. The inconsistency between self-perception and others' feedback motivated students to seek alternative living arrangements. And in cases where ending the relationship is not possible, the evidence indicates that people will seek to withdraw psychologically by limiting their emotional engagement and expressions of commitment (Swann et al. 1994).

Both identity control theory and self-verification theory offer models of the self as a mechanism that facilitates consistency, predictability, and reproduction of the status quo. However, neither theory precludes the self from contributing to acts of collective resistance, and there is some evidence that the self-verification process can actually function to promote social change. Pinel and Swann (2000), for example, argue that under certain conditions the self-verification process can motivate the decision to become active in a social movement. This is particularly true for social movement identities that are consistent with already established self-views. McAdam and Paulsen's (1993) study of the 1964 Mississippi Freedom Summer Project illustrates this latter point. They found that success in recruiting participants depended on (1) the occurrence of a specific recruiting attempt; (2) a successful blending of movement and identity; (3) support from persons tied to the identity; and (4) the lack of a strong opposition from persons associated with other salient identities. In other words, under certain conditions, social change movements may advance *because* the self operates in a manner that seems to privilege consistency and equilibrium (see Snow and Owens, this volume).

But the McAdam and Paulsen study is also noteworthy because it highlights the relevance of *identity salience* as a self-process in *resistance*

⁴ A subtle but important difference between Identity Control Theory and Affect Control Theory is found in the reference level for the control system. Affect Control Theory focuses on balance within the interaction system, and assumes a motivation to maintain expected meanings for the contextualized actions of self and other. Identity Control theory, on the other hand, focuses more exclusively on the individual and the motivation to maintain consistent meanings within the self-system.

movements. The idea here is that identities are organized in terms of a cognitive salience hierarchy where personal commitments are prioritized. Social movement success depends on activists with salient movement identities. This operation of the self has been described in different terms by a range of self theorists (McCall and Simmons 1978; Rosenberg 1979; Stryker 1980; Turner 1978), and although there are key differences in conceptualization, there is compelling empirical evidence supporting the basic idea that the likelihood of an identity being invoked in a particular situation depends in part on its relative position in an internal hierarchy of all identities (Callero 1985; Hoelter 1983; Stryker and Serpe 1982). The more salient a social movement identity is, the more likely it will be invoked, and the more likely it will guide action. McAdam and Paulsen found that a highly salient movement identity, combined with strong social support for activism in other identity networks, was a key predictor of participation in the Freedom Summer project. In other words, when identities are politicized and become salient within the self-structure, they serve as resources for resistance.

Recognizing the operation of a salience structure and the influence of salient identities is important to explaining movement participation, but it does not address the more fundamental question of how social movement identities become salient in the first place. While a salience hierarchy is a relatively stable and enduring structure, it may be altered over time as new identities are formed, social networks change, and new opportunities arise. Indirect evidence from studies of non-movement identities points to positive social ties, reoccurring actions tied to the identity, and intense relationships, as factors associated with identity salience (Callero 1985; Nuttbrock and Freudiger 1991; Stryker and Serpe 1982). However, forces initiated at a higher level of analysis also condition the development of a salient social movement identity. Economic booms and busts, war, disease epidemics, demographic shifts, migration patterns, governmental policy changes, environmental disruptions, all have the potential to alter social relationships and simultaneously impact the salience hierarchies of multiple actors

who are similarly situated. This is what Klander-mans and de Weerd (2000) found in a panel study of Dutch farmers who engaged in protests over a change in agricultural policy during the mid-1990s. Their findings show that over time the relationship between protest participation and group identification increased, a finding that they interpreted as evidence of the growing salience and political relevance of the farmer identity.

In sum, a salience hierarchy is a type of self-process that structures action and reflects social relationships. When outside forces threaten the relative value or power of an identity, relationships change, hierarchies are restructured, and behavior is adjusted. It is helpful here to think of identities as resources that enable action and therefore have the potential to enable resistance to structures of inequality. Sometimes the resistance is long-term and widespread, resulting in enduring changes for both self and society (e.g., Tilly 2004). Other times, however, the protest may be small, narrow, and quickly extinguished by powerful forces of the status quo (e.g., Callero 1995). While contemporary elaborations of Mead's theory of self have tended to emphasize the manner in which self-processes serve as regulating mechanisms, we should not forget Mead's corresponding assertion that novelty, change, and the emergence of new structures, is a fundamental characteristic of the social process.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have argued for a more intentional, extensive, and integrated examination of self and identity processes as they relate to social inequality. While multiple avenues of research at different levels of analysis point to the significance of self and identity in the production, reproduction, and alteration of social inequality, this body of work is not well integrated. Thinking across different levels of analysis has the potential to offer new understandings of social inequality and a more complex description of how the unequal distribution of material resources is accomplished, maintained, and altered. This is especially true for analyses of resistance and posi-

tive social change where theory and research are less developed.

It has become somewhat of a sociological truism to assert that structures of inequality are the consequence of human interaction, and that interaction is constrained by structures of inequality. But this basic principle should not be interpreted to mean that all structures of inequality are *reducible* to interaction. To understand this subtle but important feature of the micro-macro link requires an appreciation of the philosophical notion of emergence—an idea central to Mead's theory of the self (cf. Mead 1932, 1934), and one that has more recently been developed by a number of contemporary sociological theorists (see especially, Porpora 1993; Sawyer 2001, 2002; Smith 2010). By emergence I mean a dialectical process whereby lower-level structures give rise to higher-level structures, and higher-level structures constrain the same lower-level structures from which they emerged. We can say, for example, that macro patterns of inequality (e.g., class divisions, institutional racism, relations of patriarchy) *emerge* from symbolic interaction and depend on persons with selves and identities. But, at the same time, these larger social structures (patterns of social relationships) possess a level of reality and coercive power over and above selves, identities, and the rules of interaction. To this point, Porpora (1993, p. 220) provides a relevant example:

Rules of allocation may make workers dependent on capitalists for jobs, but the dependency itself is neither a behavior nor a rule. There are no rules saying that workers are to depend on capitalists for their livelihood. Such dependency is a relationship. This relationship, to be sure, is a consequence of rules of allocation, but it is a consequence that itself has consequences. It enables the capitalist to coerce the worker into submitting to (among other things) the rules of authorization that obtain at the job site.

To be sure, the dependency relationship identified above can be categorized, known, and experienced through the identity categories of worker and capitalist. We can also assume that the relationship emerged from symbolic interaction, and that meanings associated with these two identities are tentative and negotiable. But this

does not detract from the coercive efficacy of the relationship itself. The principle of emergence offers one way of recognizing different levels of social reality without being forced into a false choice between macro and micro explanations.

Consistent with the basic notion of emergence, I have argued here that identities emerge from selves, and selves emerge from persons. This means that identities have a level of independence over and above selves—even though identity categories cannot exist without the capacity for selfhood. This also means that the self has a level of independence over and above personhood—even though selfhood requires the corporal capacities of human persons. The same principle is at work when lower-level processes of self and identity assist in converting interaction into higher-order structures of equality and inequality. Relationships of inequality emerge from self and identity processes, but these structures also work back to enable and constrain human persons. Again, recognizing the principle of emergence can facilitate an integration of macro and micro accounts of inequality.

Human persons are like other living organisms in that they must navigate a material world to secure resources necessary for survival. And like other living organisms, this quest will usually produce patterns of stratification and relations of dominance. But the primary argument of this chapter has been that social inequality in human societies is unique in that it emerges from our capacity for symbolic interaction. Evidence presented in this chapter suggests that the rules for allocating resources, the processes through which resources obtain value, and the mechanisms linking individuals to resources, involve selves and identities at several levels of analysis. This does not mean that self and identity are always and everywhere actively engaged in the reproduction of inequality. Indeed, one of the objectives of a social psychology of inequality should be to explain when, and how, lower level processes of interaction contribute to the emergence of higher-level structures of inequality. More macro oriented researchers, on the other hand, should not dismiss the symbolic processes associated with self and identity, for it is through

the creative and problem-solving capacities of the self that calcified social relationships are dissolved, and entrenched structures of inequality are disrupted.

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Emotions and Affect as Source, Outcome and Resistance to Inequality

13

Steven Foy, Robert Freeland, Andrew Miles, Kimberly
B. Rogers and Lynn Smith-Lovin

Introduction

Social scientists who study inequality usually focus on the material resources controlled by actors within a social system. Their theories are often structural, both because inequality is inherently relational and because it is these relational, observable elements that allow us to explain inequality (and perhaps to change it). But we *care* about these research questions because we think that inequality influences people's well-being. If the myth of the happy slave were true, we might care less that some are masters while others are enslaved. But, as the research reviewed in this chapter shows, there is no truth to that myth. People in low-resource positions experience more negative, less efficacious, less engaged emotional states. These emotional states are incorporated in a variety of ways into their sense of self and their personality, creating longer-term patterns

that are transmitted through socialization in families. Patterns of inequality become enshrined in cultural meanings, which allow them to be translated efficiently to new generations and regenerated through the enactment of these meanings in new social interactions.

Although seldom considered as a distinct topic, affect and emotion occupied a central place in the work of theorists who first discussed sociology's unique relational view of inequality: Marx, Weber, Durkheim and Simmel. Marx (1888/1983, see especially pp. 156–178) saw emotional life as formed by social structures, particularly class position. Material arrangements led to alienation and disenchantment in the laboring classes. Conversely, emotions (through religious fervor and personal alienation) could support a repressive class structure (Marx (1852/1983, pp. 287–323).

Hochschild's (1975, 1979, 1983) discussion of the commodity value placed on emotion management in service occupations grew directly from this Marxist tradition. One of the most influential books in the development of a sociology of emotions, *The Managed Heart* (Hochschild 1983), was a qualitative investigation of the work of flight attendants which built on both Goffman and Marx to illustrate how employers required their employees to do "emotion work." The flight attendants had to control their own emotional reactions to negative interactions with customers, and work to elicit favorable emotional reactions from others as a part of their labor. Since the publication of *The Managed Heart*, emotion

L. Smith-Lovin (✉) · R. Freeland · A. Miles
Department of Sociology, Duke University, 417 Chapel
Drive, Box 90088, Durham, NC 27708-0088, USA
e-mail: smithlov@soc.duke.edu

S. Foy
Department of Sociology and Anthropology,
The University of Texas-Pan American,
1201 W. University Drive, Edinburg, TX 78539, USA

K. B. Rogers
Department of Sociology and Anthropology,
Mount Holyoke College, 50 College St,
South Hadley, MA 01075, USA

work has been documented in hundreds of occupations. In most, laborers are required to display positive emotion; in some (e.g., bill collectors), workers manipulate the negative emotions of others in order to gain compliance.

Weber (Gerth and Mills 1946) and Durkheim (1895/1964) both focus on religion and emotion as powerful forces for the maintenance and change of stratification systems. Weber's analysis of capitalism is based on the emotional responses of individuals to the Protestant religious ideology. Once capitalism is in place, Weber argued that rational bureaucracy required emotional management to isolate emotional response to private rather than formal institutional spheres. Weber also analyzed charismatic leadership as an emotion-driven social force in direct opposition to bureaucratic forms of mobilization. Thus emotion can either be managed by established social structures, or used to resist them.

Durkheim stressed the experience of religious ecstasy as a social fact rather than a private experience. He analyzed emotional responses as societal constructions that reaffirmed the moral sentiments of the group. Such emotional experiences had a strong coercive element in Durkheim's view. Individuals were not free to resist such emotional forces, since they were obligatory for group membership (Durkheim 1895/1964, p. 5; see discussion in Fisher and Chon 1989). Collins' (1975, 1990) theories of the emotion ritual build directly on Weber's and especially Durkheim's ideas about how social forces can be unleashed by rituals. Rituals generate emotional energy that can reaffirm the leadership positions of some, and the followership of others.

Unlike Marx, Weber and Durkheim, who dealt with the macro-structural sources and effects of emotional response, Simmel (1924, 1950) emphasized the micro-structures of social interaction. Simmel's (1924, p. 357) emphasis on emotional expression in interactions as a bridge to knowledge of another person leads directly to Goffman's (1963) analyses of stigma. Much of the modern theory in structural symbolic interactionism (the core of this chapter's discussion) relies on Simmel's ideas.

Since these early thinkers, theory has continued to probe the place of affect and emotion in

the creation of, maintenance of, and resistance to inequality. Much of this research has a chicken-and-egg quality, as these processes are intimately intertwined. Inequality is generated by cultural affective meanings at the interactional level, and those interactions serve (in the aggregate) to maintain stratification systems. Self-identities and emotional responses acquired during these culturally patterned interactions reinforce the hierarchy. They limit actors' abilities in interaction, and they influence the perception of contributions, rewards for those contributions, and legitimacy of different types of control. Most of all, they make disadvantaged people feel less good, efficacious, and engaged than those in more privileged positions (see Callero, this volume). On the other hand, emotional reactions to unequal interactions can lead to resistance and change (see Snow and Owens, this volume). In our discussion here, we necessarily create a linear picture of a dynamic, interconnected process that links cultural affective meanings, individual identities, and the emotional and behavioral responses that they evoke.

We begin by discussing how culturally shared affective meanings act as a *source of unequal interactions*. Major theories—including affect control theory, status characteristics theory, and the stereotype content model—suggest that our cultural evaluation of different types of people lead to responses that seriously impact those people's well-being. We begin the chapter with a review of these cultural meanings and the way that they guide unequal behavior toward others. Stigmatized or valued identities can also be internalized over time to create self-defeating or adaptive behavior in interaction. We review work in identity theory and stigma that details these processes at the individual level.

Inequality in social interactions also has *emotional consequences*. Social positions lead to structural emotions (emotions created by occupying and maintaining the meanings of a social status/identity). The fact that our identities and their maintenance lead to a systematic pattern of emotional states is one of the strongest links between inequality and emotion. The strong patterning here also allows us to infer many things about identity from emotional response, leading

to a feedback mechanism between emotion and inequality.

This discussion leads us to a broader consideration of how emotions result from different forms of inequality. The ability to control interactions, exchanges and other life events has profound implications for one's happiness and stress levels. We review work in identity theory, exchange theory, the social structure/personality tradition, and the stress model to establish this linkage. We also discuss the ways in which status-linked affective meanings are created by interactions.

While all of the above create a self-reinforcing system of cultural meanings, behaviors and emotional responses, there are routes through which emotion and affect can *contribute to social change*. In our final section, we explore how emotional responses in small groups can dampen status-based inequalities, how affective commitments can create coalitions to shift patterns of power in exchange, and how emotional processes can support social movements in resisting entrenched powers. Finally, we discuss how subcultures can develop their own sets of affective meanings that allow them to maintain positive emotions despite structural disadvantages in a larger society.

Affect and Emotion as a Source of Inequality

Affective reactions to socially constructed categories have important implications for how we respond to people. These responses directly affect group members' material outcomes, their quality of life, and their emotional well-being. When we avoid meeting the gaze of a homeless person, smile at an attractive upper-middle class child, or defer to a businessman in a well-tailored suit, we are interacting in ways that maintain and reinforce cultural meanings about how good, powerful, and dynamic these people are. These interactions may not evoke much thought or even feeling, but they are nonetheless rooted in affect; acting in culturally consistent ways simply feels natural. Here we review three prominent theories of how cultural meanings influence behavior toward social groups—*affect control theory*, *status*

characteristics theory, and the *stereotype content model*. We describe how the self-identities created by these interactions can generate inequality. We then discuss a larger array of work that shows how stereotypes affect the behavior of stigmatized people and their connections to other groups.

Affect Control Theory: The Maintenance of Cultural Meaning as a Source of Inequality

Emotions occupy two important positions in *affect control theory*, both of which have implications for inequality. First, cultural meanings associated with social categories are encoded affectively, and are the mechanisms through which inequality is translated into interpersonal behavior in social situations. People seek to maintain cultural meanings in interaction, leading to the reproduction of inequalities in the larger stratification system. Second, emotions arise through social interaction, which can lead to unequal affective experiences.

Affect control theory is based upon the proposition that social concepts and events can be characterized by the affective responses they elicit. The theory uses three parsimonious and cross-culturally universal dimensions in the measurement of these affective responses: evaluation, potency, and activity (Osgood et al. 1957, 1975). Ratings of evaluation denote goodness versus badness, ratings of potency denote power versus powerlessness, and ratings of activity represent liveliness versus inactivity. Combined, the three dimensions summarize important information about a variety of elements key to interpretations of social events (e.g., identities, behaviors, emotions, and settings). Moreover, they are associated with the relative evaluation, power, and agency of social groups. These elements of social classification importantly shape emotional experience and behavioral choice (Heise 1999; Kemper 1978; Kemper and Collins 1990).¹

¹ All affective profiles in this chapter are from the *affect control theory* internet web site (<http://www.indiana.edu/~socpsy/ACT/>), accessed December 26, 2012.

Ratings on the three dimensions, known as cultural sentiments, reflect widely-shared affective responses to symbols within a culture (Heise 1979, 2007, 2010). Broad consensus in these sentiments attached to social identities, behaviors, and emotions allows people to communicate effectively. Research has demonstrated stability in sentiments for institutionalized identities (e.g., kinship roles or occupational role-identities) across a variety of important social dimensions (age, race, socioeconomic status, region, nation) and over time (Heise 2010).

Cultural sentiments are important for the development of inequality for two reasons. First, people are evaluated more positively when they occupy positive identities, when they engage in nice, weak, and quiet behaviors, and when they interact with higher versus lower status others. Thus, being in a negative identity—or even interacting with someone who occupies such an identity—can tarnish one’s reputation. Such labeling is itself stratifying in the sense that reputations are important to people. Moreover, it can also lead to social disparities as actors in positive identities avoid interacting with those occupying negative identities, thereby creating network ties that exclude entire classes of people (Robinson 1996).

Second, cultural sentiments shape the affective impressions we develop in social interaction (Heise 1979, 2007)—whether we are helpful or punitive. Thus stable cultural meanings regarding types of people and types of actions importantly shape our impressions of them in events.

The key component of affect control theory with regard to explaining inequality is the control principle. Symbolic interactionists have long argued that people are fundamentally motivated to maintain shared meanings regarding cultural symbols. Similarly, affect control theory posits a cybernetic process that functions to maintain a correspondence between internalized cultural sentiments and transient, situational impressions, minimizing the expenditure of conscious effort and cognitive resources in event processing (Heise 1979, 2007; MacKinnon 1994). Cultural sentiments provide a reference standard (like the temperature setting on a thermostat), while transient impressions fluctuate with event context (like the ambient temperature in a room).

Discrepancies between the two instigate a control process, wherein corrective action is taken to maintain stability in the system (such as heating or cooling the room).

When events generate impressions that are fairly confirmatory of cultural sentiments for actor, behavior, and object-person (e.g., the manager directs the employee), actors and objects will continue to engage in behaviors and experience emotions characteristic of their identities.² When impressions do not confirm these sentiments, however (e.g., the employee confronts the manager; the homeless person rescues the child), expectations are violated and restorative measures become necessary. People either generate new actions that “put people back in their places”—thereby directly reinforcing the social order—or develop new understandings of the situation that maintain the original affective sentiments (usually by re-labeling the behavior, see Nelson 2006).³

² Social events are represented by a sentence-like grammar, wherein an actor (A) behaves in a certain way (B) toward an object-person (O). For example, consider the following event: the mother cuddles the baby. This ABO grammar is translated into a mathematical representation of each element using ratings of evaluation, potency, and activity. Shifts in meaning resulting from events are then modeled using regression equations, within which predicted impressions of the actor are the result of combined sentiments toward the actor, that actor’s behavior, and the object of the behavior. Impression change equations also contain a number of multiplicative effects, representing interactions between sentiments toward actors, behaviors, and objects in predicting event-related impressions.

³ When the impressions generated by an interaction do not confirm sentiments for the actor, behavior, and object involved, deflection is generated. Conceptually, deflection is the discrepancy between generalized cultural sentiments and event-contextualized impressions. Mathematically, deflection is operationalized as the squared Euclidean distance between these sentiments and impressions on evaluation, potency, and activity. As it is extremely uncommon for an event to perfectly confirm sentiments or any behavior to perfectly restore them, all interactions produce some amount of deflection. Having a quantitative measure of deflection makes it possible for researchers to gain insight into many important features (and consequences) of impression change. Impression change equations can be modified, not only to calculate the extent to which a given social event confirms cultural sentiments, but also to determine the reaction to that event which will optimally minimize deflection and maintain

Oddly, because affect control theory assumes that people seek to maintain meaning, this leads to the counter-intuitive prediction that even people with negative or stigmatized identities will operate to reproduce the system of inequality that disadvantages them. They will act in ways that confirm their negative identities rather than pursue self-enhancing interactions that might elicit more positive feelings. This prediction was confirmed by Robinson and Smith-Lovin (1992), who found that people with low self-esteem preferred the company of a critic to someone who said flattering things. The research participants also thought the evaluation of the critic more accurate, even though the criticism made them feel bad (Callero this volume).

This control mechanism generates overall stability in the system, allowing for ease of communication between members of a culture. However, it also implies that pre-existing inequality in the system—generated by structural advantage and enshrined in cultural affective sentiments—will be re-enacted in interpersonal interactions and enforced by people's tendency to maintain sentiments by generating actions to counter any changes. Affect control theory provides for individual agency, allowing for actors' creativity in a wide variety of situational circumstances, but postulates that agency will mostly be used to restore existing hierarchies, rather than break free of cultural forms.

While affect control theory is distinctive in its explanation of how cultural sentiments get transformed into interactional inequality, it shares important characteristics with two other theories: status characteristics theory (discussed in this volume by Ridgeway and Nakagawa) and the stereotype content model (Fiske et. al 2002; Fiske 2011). Although both status characteristics theory and the stereotype content model couch their arguments in cognitive terms, these cognitive assessments have an affective element that allows them to relate closely to the dynamics described by affect control theory. We discuss the

connections to both of these models before turning to the issue of emotional response to inequality in interaction.

Status Characteristics Theory: Status Evaluations as a Source of Inequality

As described in Ridgeway and Nakagawa (this volume), status matters most when the relative evaluation of others is translated into interpersonal interaction. Status characteristics theory, the most comprehensive treatment of these processes, is focused on an exchange mechanism. Members of a task group who are trying to accomplish some goal for mutual reward make an assessment of who could contribute the most to group success. Those who have higher expectations for task performance are allocated more opportunities for action, more positive evaluations, and more interactional rights of various kinds, in exchange for their (presumed) higher-quality contributions to the common task (Berger et al. 1974; for a comprehensive review, see Correll and Ridgeway 2003).

The assessment of expectations for task performance is usually couched in cognitive terms, as *beliefs* about task abilities. However, there are two features of status characteristics research that suggest that affect as well as cognitive reactions may be evoked by status inequality. First, the theory is increasingly applied (and empirically supported) outside of its scope conditions (e.g., Cast et al. 1999; Stets 1997; Stets and Burke 1996). When the two scope conditions of collective task orientation and collective task reward are not present, the logic of the exchange mechanism (of deference for task contributions) is not relevant to the situation. Therefore, cognitive assessments about expectations for performance may not be driving the impact of status characteristics in these cases. Instead, affective meaning of status characteristics could be shaping interaction through the impact of cultural beliefs about status. Second, there is an empirical relationship between the performance expectations that represent the core theoretical construct in status characteristics theory and the fundamental affective sentiments that are the core construct in affect

sentiments. In this way, actors' and objects' predicted reactions to social events can be generated, representing the set of possible behaviors that would best confirm sentiments for a particular role relationship.

control theory. Work by MacKinnon and Langford (1994) and Rogalin et al. (2007) established a relationship between the statuses of occupations and their evaluation and potency. Building on this tradition, more recent work by Dippong and Kalkoff (2012) demonstrated that evaluation, potency, and activity are strongly related to performance expectations, both in a survey of impressions formed from pictures of women in different occupations, and from an experimental study that meets status characteristics scope conditions. Evaluation was most closely related to performance expectations. However, potency became more central after a task interaction, indicating that it was more closely associated with the enactment of status in a hierarchically organized task group.

This recent evidence suggests that the cognitive assessments of status characteristics theory and the affective meanings of affect control theory are closely interrelated. As Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin (1994, p. 236) pointed out, both affect control theory and status characteristics theory “have focused on cultural meaning as the mechanism through which material structures are translated into micro-interaction. It is these cultural meanings (status expectations or affective characterizations) that individuals ... carry into situations and use to generate actions.” This common reliance on cultural meanings, and the close empirical relationship between status-based performance expectations and affective identity meanings, suggests that status and affect may operate in parallel in everyday interaction. More to the point, status and its affective meaning work to create, maintain, and possibly challenge social structural arrangements.

As we will see below, this connection to affective cultural meanings also characterizes another major theory of how cultural knowledge shapes unequal behavior toward categories of people, the stereotype content model. Here, too, cognitive assessments carry affective reactions that shape behavior and emotional response.

The Stereotype Content Model

The stereotype content model proposes that culturally shared stereotypes arise from the social structural relationships between groups, shaping intergroup behaviors and emotional responses (Fiske et al. 2002, Fiske 2011). Building upon theories of person perception and social cognition (e.g., Fiske and Taylor 2008), the stereotype content model suggests that people make judgments of others along two dimensions: warmth and competence. These judgments reflect routinized, cognitive appraisals of social groups, which are widely shared within a given culture. These appraisals are shaped by assessments of others’ intentions and ability to act upon those intentions (Cuddy et al. 2008). They signal a group’s social status and competition for valued resources (Fiske et al. 2002). A wide variety of stereotypes can be explained based on these two dimensions, including stereotypes for gender, racial, and national groups (Cuddy et al. 2009; Eckes 2002; Lee and Fiske 2006).

Like status characteristics theory, the stereotype content model is based in cognitive calculations of exchange and self-interest rather than in affective meanings. However, several scholars note the close correspondence between the warmth/competence dimensions and the evaluation/potency/activity dimensions used by affect control theory (Kervyn et al. 2013; Rogers et al. 2013). The exact nature of the correspondence is still debated, but the emerging picture suggests that the two representations share a great deal of information. In particular, Kervyn et al. (2013) argue that a rotation of evaluation, potency and activity map onto warmth and competence, while Rogers et al. (2013) argue that warmth corresponds roughly to evaluation, competence to potency, and that activity is needed as a third dimension to differentiate some negatively evaluated emotions. It may therefore be reasonable to conclude, as we did for status characteristics, that stereotypes are cultural affective meanings that help produce behaviors that reinforce existing social structures.

Some group stereotypes are consistently positive or negative on both dimensions. For exam-

ple, admiration stereotypes (warm, competent; e.g., the middle-class) signal that a group is both liked and respected, while contemptuous stereotypes (cold, incompetent; e.g., the homeless) indicate that a group is both disliked and disrespected. Many groups, however, carry mixed stereotypes, which justify their relative success or failure. Paternalistic stereotypes (warm, incompetent; e.g., the elderly) signify that a group has no intent or capability to do harm, while envious stereotypes (cold, competent; e.g., the rich) indicate that a group has both the intent and capability to do harm.

The Behavior from Intergroup Affect and Stereotypes (BIAS) map makes the connections between emotion and inequality in the stereotype content model clear (Cuddy et al. 2007, 2008). Stereotype researchers have proposed that cognitions about social groups (stereotype content) elicit expectations about intergroup affect (emotional prejudice) and behavior (action readiness for discrimination, cf. Zajonc 1998). Judgments of a group's warmth predict active behaviors (e.g., help, attack) while judgments of competence predict passive ones (e.g., associate, exclude); negative versus positive evaluation on these dimensions predicts whether interpersonal behavior will be harmful or facilitatory. Emotions mediate the effect of stereotypes on behavior and are therefore an important proximal influence by which stereotypes are translated into action. Thus, patterns of intergroup emotion and behavior (i.e., prejudice and discrimination) reinforce the social structure (Cuddy et al. 2008).

Much of the work on stereotypes and behavior addresses stigmatization processes. Stigma refers to devalued attributes, often associated with particular social groups or categories. Stereotypes need not be stigmatizing—as when Asians are thought to be intelligent and hard working—but often they are. In many cases, stereotypes can be seen as cognitive and affective shortcuts that link marginalized social groups with (often stigmatizing) attributes (see Link, Phelan, and Hatzenbeuhler, this volume).

As the stereotype content model's BIAS map describes, emotion serves as a key mechanism underlying the connection between cultural

stigmatization and inequality. At one level, this occurs because of the emotions experienced by those holding stigmatizing stereotypes of others. Stigmatizing is often a visceral process characterized by “pure, unadulterated, original, unmanaged, and unambivalently negative feelings toward members of a devalued group” (Crandall and Eshleman 2003, p. 422). Stigmatizers frequently view those whose differences have been labeled as undesirable with anger, irritation, anxiety, pity, or fear (Link et al. 2004).⁴ Such negative emotions may both promote and provide a rationalization for the stereotypes underpinning stigmatization, such as when fear of an out-group leads to belief that members of that out-group are more aggressive (Mackie et al. 1996; Vanman and Miller 1993).⁵ Moreover, a handful of studies indicate that emotional responses represent a stronger predictor of discriminatory behavior than cognitively-held stereotypes themselves (Jussim et al. 1995; Stangor et al. 1991).

Negative emotions may also underlie attributions of blame and subsequent negative action. Attribution theory suggests that, impacted by negative emotions, stigmatizers may rely on bases of stigma as justification for blaming targets for their perceived role in negative events (Link et al. 2004; Weiner 1982). For example, one might blame members of an out-group for offenses against one's own group. This can result in dehumanization of the out-group (Fiske 1998). Indeed, Fiske and Taylor (2008) show that groups perceived as being in the “cold” and “incompetent” quadrant of the BIAS map elicit brain activity more similar to the processing of objects than of people, indicating dehumanization of those so labeled. Similarly, evidence suggests that people more readily associate

⁴ Anger and pity are particularly common emotions when the basis of stigmatization is viewed as controllable (Corrigan 2000).

⁵ Negative emotions may also arise, however, even in response to positive stereotypes, particularly when a successful out-group is seen as posing a competitive threat to one's future success; in one study, non-Asian students told that Asian students were more ambitious and hard-working experienced more negative emotions about Asian students (Maddux et al. 2008).

members of their in-group with secondary emotions (such as anxiety or distress) and members of out-groups with primary emotions (such as anger or fear) than the reverse. Given that secondary emotions are generally viewed as specific to humans while primary emotions are not, this differential emotional response may suggest further dehumanization of out-group members (Leyens et al. 2000). By increasing reliance on culturally learned stereotypes, negative emotions may contribute to in-group/out-group thinking that fuels negative or exclusionary action toward the stigmatized, reinforcing establishing social boundaries (Stephan and Stephan 1985).

Negative emotional states experienced by the stigmatizer are often associated with negative actions toward the out-group, but this is not always the case. For example, evidence suggests that sadness is not associated with increased stereotyping (Bodenhausen et al. 2000). However, this is counterbalanced by the fact that some positive feelings can encourage ready acceptance of generally held knowledge. This tendency can result in greater reliance on more simplistic, possibly stigmatizing stereotypes of out-group members (Bodenhausen et al. 2000).

Beyond influencing stigmatizers' reactions to out-group members, emotions can also alter stigmatized people's actual performance outcomes. Awareness of personally relevant stereotypes pertinent to present task performance can create anxiety that undercuts one's ability to succeed—a phenomenon known as stereotype threat (Beilock and Ramirez 2011). Stereotype threat has been demonstrated using stereotypes concerning a number of sociodemographic characteristics, including race (e.g., Deaux et al. 2007; Gonzales et al. 2002; Mayer and Hanges 2003), gender (O'Brien and Crandall 2003; Quinn and Spencer 2001), and socioeconomic status (Croizet and Claire 1998; Spencer and Castano 2007). Emotion has been proposed as one of the key mechanisms driving the stereotype threat process. Efforts to contain negative emotions through self-regulation may deplete one of the resources necessary to fully perform cognitively and lessen attention to the task at

hand (Johns et al. 2008; Schmader et al. 2008). Trying to actively avoid an emotional response can often result in a rebound effect when feelings re-intrude (Miller and Kaiser 2001). Unequal performance then may lead to unequal outcomes. This is particularly problematic when stereotypes impede performance in socially and economically crucial domains such as at school or work.

When stereotype threat interferes with tasks important to the stigmatized, then they may respond aggressively. Inzlicht and Kang (2010) conducted an experiment involving female participants aware of the stereotype that women are less successful at math than men. Participants were given low marks on a math test and negative comments (regardless of their individual performances) and then engaged in a competitive task wearing headphones during which they were able to administer blasts of white noise to their partner's headphones. Caring more about math was associated with more frequent decisions to send a partner white noise blasts. Such behavior could provide substantiation for further blame and disparate treatment of the stigmatized.

Most of the above discussion is centered on culturally shared affective meanings in the form of stigmas and other stereotypes, and their impact on behaviors that lead to unequal outcomes. But the literature on stigma makes clear that some cultural meanings are internalized and applied to the self, leading to additional deleterious effects on those in disadvantaged conditions. We now turn to one of the major theories in sociological social psychology that describes these internalized self-identity meanings and how they affect interpersonal behavior. Stryker (1980/2000, 2008) developed identity theory to describe how social structures were internalized into self-structures. Burke and Stets (2009) further developed identity theory with a treatment of self-identity meanings and a control mechanism similar to affect control theory. The relationship between these internalized self-identities, the resources necessary to maintain them, and the emotions that result are key to understanding inequality.

Internalized Self-Identity Meanings as a Source of Inequality

The central feature of control system theories of identity is that actors compare identity meanings to behaviors of self and others in a situation. Actions are expected, intended, and performed to maintain consistency with the reference meanings. Burke (1991, 2004) argued that although some dimensions of meaning can be applied across situations and cultures, the relevant dimensions could vary greatly across role sets embedded within different institutional domains (Burke and Cast 1997; Burke and Stets 1999; Reitzes and Burke 1980). Thus, identity theory (Burke and Stets 2009) focuses on meaning at an individual level, unlike affect control theory, which focuses on trans-situational, universal dimensions of affective meaning at a cultural level.⁶

In affect control theory, fundamental affective sentiments are relatively fixed and culturally shared; behavior is the primary method of resolving deviations from cultural meanings. In identity theory, one's past experience, current interpersonal environment and repeated identity-disconfirmations can shift self-identity meanings and the ordering of identities within the salience hierarchy. For example, Burke and Cast (1997) document how the birth of a child changes the meanings married couples held for themselves as husbands and wives, and more generally what it means to be masculine or feminine. A common result is growing inequality between spouses.

Still, like affect control theory, identity theory recognizes the importance of structural role positions. Individuals occupying powerful role identities such as *dictator* or *executive* will seek identity verification by executing behaviors consistent with their dominant positions. Likewise, the theory argues that actors occupying less powerful positions such as *garbage collectors* or *assistants*

will actively seek to maintain their subordinate identity standard.

In identity theory, emotions reflect the degree of congruence between the identity standard and input meanings. The valence and intensity of the emotion depends on the degree of the discrepancy. Positive emotions occur when input meanings are congruent with standard meanings, so that people experience satisfaction and greater self-esteem (Cast and Burke 2002), even when they are confirming disadvantaged, low status identities. Negative emotions reflect incongruence between input and reference meanings. Depending on the situation people may feel distress, anxiety (Burke 1991), jealousy (Ellestad and Stets 1998), or even depression (Burke and Stets 1999). This suggests that acts that are inconsistent with the prevailing stratification structure usually lead to non-verification and negative emotions. This emotional state induces low-status actors to end resistance and return to behaviors more consistent with their subordinate positions. In short, meanings embedded in the identity standard lead to self-stratifying behavior. Since people develop self-meanings from structural roles and group memberships, and then act to maintain those meanings, identity theory generally predicts that interpersonal interaction will support inequalities in the social order.

Inferring Identity and Status from Emotional Responses

Emotions can play yet another role in stratification processes. While affective meanings (in affect control theory and status characteristics theory) and experienced emotions (in the stereotype content model and identity theory) motivate behaviors that reinforce the prevailing social order, emotional displays by others provide information used to make inferences about an actor's identity and status. These attributions can lead to behaviors that can generate or perpetuate inequity. They help to "define the situation."

The key idea here is that through socialization people learn to associate social positions with characteristic emotional displays. They

⁶ The constant nature of affect control theory's dimensional structure is what allows its formal mathematical expression. All elements of a situation can be mapped into the same three-dimensional affective space, and operated on mathematically.

develop *feeling rules* that dictate cultural norms surrounding how, when and to what extent emotions should be expressed (Clark 1997; Hochschild 1979, 1983). For example, Pollak and Thoits (1989) documented how preschool-aged children in a therapeutic nursery were taught by their adult caretakers to identify their feelings, identify which emotions were appropriate for the situation, and how to modify their behaviors and emotional displays. Deviations from feeling rules provide information that can be used to infer social position, or to judge whether others occupying roles are behaving appropriately. Thoits (1985, 1990) argues that *emotional deviance*, the experience or display of emotions that differ from cultural expectations, plays an important role in the recognition and labeling of mental illness. For example, if a co-worker repeatedly displays intense rage or prolonged anger from a minor workplace slight, this over-reaction may be seen as a sign of mental illness. Emotional deviance may not only be used to attribute mental illness to others, but unsuccessful attempts at emotion management can lead individuals to self-label as mentally ill (Thoits 1985). Clearly, since mental illness carries considerable stigma in our society, these labels (by self and others) can have serious consequences for inequality in interaction.

Tsoudis and Smith-Lovin (1998) used mock jury trials to show an even more dramatic form of unequal treatment caused by emotional display. They documented how feeling rules affect the sentencing of criminals. Study participants viewed perpetrators expressing remorse as occupying normal, positive identities. These inferences then affected the recommended sentences, with judgments favoring those conforming to expected displays of emotions. Specifically, perpetrators who displayed remorse received lighter penalties. Normative emotional displays by the victim, on the other hand, led to harsher punishments for the perpetrator. A victim's negative emotion indicated that the perpetrator had caused serious harm to a person in a normal, positive identity.

Similarly, Tiedens and colleagues examined how emotions were used to make inferences about an actor's status position. Tiedens et al.

(2000) argued that high-status role-occupants are expected to have greater power and will exhibit emotions consistent with their level of dominance, such as anger. Conversely, low-status actors should display emotions consistent with deference and submissiveness, such as shame. The researchers first documented that people stereotypically believed that after positive outcomes, high-status actors should feel more pride while low-status actors should feel more appreciation. In negative situations, high-status actors should feel more anger while low-status actors should feel more sadness or guilt. Tiedens and colleagues then demonstrated how people used these stereotypes to infer that actors displaying anger or pride were higher-status while those displaying appreciation were thought to be lower-status. Tiedens (2001a) found that job candidates who expressed anger were viewed as more competent and assigned higher status and salary compared to job candidates who expressed sadness. Sinaceur and Tiedens (2006) found that, in some cases, expressions of anger could be used in negotiations because they implied that the actor occupied a position of power. These emotional displays served to support a dominant status position. Tiedens (2001b) found that aggressive people tended to make more hostile inferences, leading to more aggressive interactions and emotions in future interactions, leading to even more anger thus creating a cycle that reinforces their dominant behavior patterns. Robinson and Smith-Lovin (1999) also found that when actors displayed powerful emotions such as happiness and anger, people viewed their identities as more powerful.

But displaying anger or aggression in a low-status position is not an easy path to overcome inequality. When actors express emotions consistent with identity expectations, they are better liked and attributed more positive traits. Power et al. (2011) found that when emotional displays were not consistent with identity expectations, this elicited strong negative reactions. In their study, participants were shown a series of charity ads depicting poor, female actors conveying either anger or shame. When the beneficiary of the ad was seen to express anger, study partici-

pants responded with anger. When asked whether the charity should use an emotional or neutral appeal, participants responded favorably to emotional ads only when the beneficiary expressed the shame consistent with their stigmatized roles. Thus the emotional reactions of participants reinforced the correctness of stratified roles in their minds.

Conclusions About Affective Meaning, Emotion and the Generation of Inequality

We have examined several ways in which affective meanings and emotional responses can generate inequality. First, cultural affective information about categories of people can shape our interaction patterns with them. Affect control theory and status characteristics theory show how the meanings associated with identities (including status characteristics) can create self-fulfilling prophecies as people act to maintain a hierarchical structure and the meanings it creates in a culture. Identity theory and related work on stigma and stereotype threat discuss how people incorporate inequality into their self-structure. Once that happens, people may behave in ways that perpetuate their own disadvantage. The existence of feeling rules means that emotional displays provide information about others, which in turn can be used to form judgments and generate emotional responses. These reactions, can then lead to behaviors that reinforce the reigning social order, such as deference to those perceived as high status, or offering lower rewards to those seen as low-status. So, the mechanisms through which affect and emotion create and perpetuate inequality are many and powerful. We now turn to the other side of the same coin: how inequality can create different patterns of emotional response and mental distress. The next section will document more completely the extent to which inequality takes an emotional toll on those who are disadvantaged.

Emotional Consequences of Inequality

As we note in the introduction, one of the reasons that unequal material resources are important to social scientists is that they influence people's sense of happiness, efficacy and engagement. Social stratification influences emotional outcomes through a number of mechanisms. We begin our discussion with an examination of how social positions lead to the experience of typical, structurally induced emotions through identity verification processes, maintenance of cultural meanings about social positions, and the social interactions that are typically experienced in social roles. We then move on to a discussion of how emotional disparities are created by other social processes, including status processes in small groups, social exchange, justice evaluations, and stigmatization. We conclude by examining work on emotions from the social structure and personality tradition and from the stress model of mental illness.

Structural Emotions as a Source of Inequality in Positive Affect

Theories including Kemper's (1978) power-status theory and affect control theory (Heise 1979, 2007) argue that identities have characteristic emotions which are tied to their positions within the social structure. Thus those in higher-status and -power positions will experience positive, potent, enlivening emotions when their identities are verified, while those in lower-expectation positions will experience negative, inefficacious, deadening emotions. For example, *winner*s may feel pride or joy when they are being winners, while *loser*s may feel sadness or depression when they are losing, even if both identities are equally confirmed.

Kemper's interactional theory (Kemper 1978; Kemper and Collins 1990) and power-status theory (Kemper 2006) suggest that emotions result from social interactions that are defined by the two relational dimensions of power and status. Power is defined by the ability to compel the involuntary compliance of others in the face of opposition through coercion or threat of coercion,

while status entails the ability to elicit the voluntary compliance of others through deference and acceptance (Kemper and Collins 1990). Emotional experiences are determined by an individual's relative position on these two dimensions, changes in those positions, and expectations for gains or losses in power and status.

Kemper (1987) argues that primary emotions (fear, anger, depression, and satisfaction) are physiologically grounded and therefore universal across cultures, while secondary emotions (guilt, pride, and shame) are learned through socialization. Structural emotions are those that correspond to stable power-status relationships. When an actor is in a stable relationship as a parent, spouse or supervisor, he or she will experience characteristic emotions that accompany his or her higher status position, such as satisfaction. Research by Lovaglia and Houser (1996) confirms that high-status members do feel greater happiness and satisfaction compared to low-status members. Those who occupy negative, lower status identities routinely experience depressed or angry emotions, depending on whether they attribute the negative interactions that sustain their identities to themselves or others. Simon and Nath (2004) analyze the General Social Survey emotion module, and show support for Kemper's (and other structural theories') predictions. While they focus especially on gender, Simon and Nath find that respondents who are male, higher income, higher education and older all show higher reports of positive emotions and lower reports of negative emotions (when compared with women, lower income, lower education and younger respondents, respectively). Thus, there appears to be a very general pattern in these nationally-representative data that those who are in advantaged social positions experience more positive and fewer negative emotional experiences. Supporting identity theories, there is also a consistent pattern of statistical interactions, indicating that household income and work experiences influence men's emotional outcomes more, while marital experiences and the presence of children in the home influence women's emotions more (Simon and Nath 2004; see a more complete review in Simon, forthcom-

ing). This pattern seems to indicate that structural positions that are more normatively central to one's sense of self have more impact on emotional outcomes.

Of course, interactions can sometimes change an actor's relative power and status. Kemper (1978) calls emotions resulting from these changes consequent emotions. Gains in power and status generally produce positive emotions while losses produce negative emotions. When people gain power and status they experience satisfaction and security. When status is lost, actors may feel embarrassment or anger, while a loss of power produces fear or anxiety. As in identity theory, the nature of the emotion is influenced by attribution. When individuals blame themselves for the loss of status they experience shame, embarrassment, or even sadness and depression if the loss is great. If they blame others for the status loss then they will feel anger.

Affect control theory also suggests that emotions are shaped by structural positions and the specifics of interaction situations. As noted, identities are associated with fundamental sentiments that vary based on their position in the social structure (Heise 2007; Smith-Lovin and Heise 1988). In any given situation, however, these fundamental sentiments are adjusted by immediate (situated) impressions. Concretely, affect control theory posits that the specific emotional response will be approximately twice the difference between the situated impression and fundamental affective sentiment ($\text{Emotion} = 2 * \text{Situated Impression} - \text{Fundamental Sentiment}$) (for the exact formula and its derivation, see Averett and Heise (1987)). Thus, when situations are unremarkable, situated impressions are close to the fundamental sentiments, and felt emotions are dominated by those sentiments.

Affect control theory ties emotions to interaction situations, which means that stable interactions—such as those occurring within institutionalized domains like work, school, or family—will most likely serve to confirm the identities of situated actors, allowing them to feel the structural emotions associated with their positions. For example, the identities of *mother* or *friend* are characterized by high evaluation and will typi-

cally feel nice or happy, and powerful identities like *champion* will feel a sense of empowerment. Conversely, those occupying stigmatized identities low in evaluation and potency will experience negative, inefficacious emotions. A *novice*, for example, is likely to feel somewhat muted, awe-struck and inept. Stratified identities therefore lead to stratified emotional experiences.

Resources as a Determinant of Emotion

As discussed above, social inequality leads to emotional stratification by providing some individuals more positive, potent and lively identities to confirm. But identity theory (Burke and Stets 2009) also posits that actors vary in their opportunities to verify identities. Recall that according to identity theory, identity confirmation leads to positive emotion, while disconfirmation—in either a positive or a negative direction—leads to negative emotion (Burke and Stets 2009; Stets 2005). Therefore, under this theoretical view equality in emotional experiences is tied to equality in opportunities for verification. Unequal social arrangements can influence the verification process by unevenly distributing resources that allow actors to control social situations. Burke and Stets (2009, p. 99) describe resources as “anything that supports individuals and the interaction of individuals.” They give the example of a business meeting. In such a setting, resources include the room in which the meeting takes place, the projector, the clock, or less concretely, the social norms governing who gets to speak and when.

Resources are important because they allow persons to verify their identities. Two studies showed that persons with higher resources, operationalized as higher education and/or a better job, were better able to maintain their identities compared to those with fewer resources (Cast et al. 1999; Stets and Harrod 2004). Control of resources is tied to status, and identity theorists argue that higher status individuals typically have more resources and therefore a greater ability to control interactions and achieve identity verification. Results from several studies are consistent

with this claim. Stets and Harrod (2004) found that those with high status characteristics (education, male, white) were better able to verify their identities, and Stets and Cast (2007) showed that resources and identity verification mutually reinforce one another, although effect sizes were quite small. Taken together, these studies indicate that social advantage translates into emotional advantage by allowing individuals to verify their identities.

Burke and Stets (2009) also argue that having more identities creates more opportunities for self-verification, and hence can promote self-esteem. Thoits (2003) agrees, although she argues that this effect only holds for identities willingly adopted, and not for those accepted based on a sense of obligation. For our purposes, the key point is that the ability to accumulate identities—particularly voluntary identities—is tied to one’s position in the social structure. Those working long hours to make ends meet likely do not have the same discretionary time to devote to voluntary organizations, developing self-defining hobbies, and so forth, whereas those with secure employment may have the time and resources to do so. The major implication with regard to social inequality is largely the same: those who have the resources to accumulate identities have more opportunities for self-confirmation and positive affect, while those without such resources do not.

An earlier cybernetic theory of social interaction, developed by Shibutani (1961, 1968), offered interesting ideas about the dynamics of identity maintenance and emotion. Consistent with identity theory and affect control theory, Shibutani believed that humans interact with their environments in a cybernetic fashion in an attempt to confirm their self-concepts, with self-verification leading to positive emotions, and non-verification leading to negative emotions (Shibutani 1961, 1968; Turner 2005). Unlike the two later theories, however, Shibutani argued that non-confirmation can become a self-reinforcing process. This pattern occurs when people repress the negative emotions that arise from non-confirmation, thereby severing the conscious links between these feelings and their origin. This, in

turn, can lead to increased levels of undirected negative affect, biased perceptions of the social environment, and pathology, all of which disrupt a person's ability to function normally in social situations (Shibutani 1961; Turner 2005). In this way, inequities in identity verification brought about by status and resource differentials might lead to chronic stratification in emotional outcomes.

Emotional Outcomes of Status in Group Processes

Task-oriented groups appear in many places in society—including professional settings—as part of various forms of civic engagement, and even in many families where two or more adults must jointly make decisions. Expectations states theory (EST) has explored how status structures develop in task-oriented groups and can lead to stratified emotional outcomes (Ridgeway and Johnson 1990; Ridgeway and Nakagawa, this volume). Members of collectively oriented groups contribute suggestions towards accomplishing group objectives, and other members either agree or disagree with these recommendations. Agreement leads to positive emotional reactions because it confirms a person's sense of competence (Kemper 1987; Ridgeway and Johnson 1990), while disagreement leads to negative affect because it inhibits a person from demonstrating competence (Berkowitz 1978; Kemper 1987).

Status arrangements in the group shape who feels which emotions by determining performance expectations (see the discussion of status characteristics theory above). High status actors are expected to contribute more, and so these members are more likely to attribute disagreements to others, generating feelings of annoyance or anger. Low status actors are more likely to attribute the disagreement to themselves—that is, as a result of the inappropriateness of their suggestion—and so will feel shame or depression (Ridgeway and Johnson 1990). In this way, the types of negative emotions generated differ across status structures, with high-status actors

more likely to feel powerful rather than submissive emotions (e.g., annoyance rather than shame).

A study by Tiedens et al. (2000) indicates that people generate emotional expectations consistent with this explanation. Tiedens et al. found that after reading a vignette about two actors encountering a negative situation, the students in their sample expected high status actors to be angry, and low status actors to feel sad or guilty. Pierce (1995) demonstrated similar emotional stratification in legal professions, reporting that male lawyers (high status) regularly expressed anger while female paralegals (low status) were expected to remain calm and supportive. Relatedly, Lovaglia and Houser (1996) experimentally showed that high status is associated with positive emotion, and low status with negative emotion. Taken together, this evidence supports the claim that emotional experiences are stratified along status lines.

Emotional Responses to Unequal Exchange Processes

Researchers have also tied emotions to social exchange processes. Social exchange is any type of interaction where actors transmit socially-valued resources, such as time, money, or esteem. Work using social exchange theories over the last decade and a half has shown how emotions can be generated by both the exchange act, and by the outcomes of exchanges. Two attributes of exchange processes have implications for emotions: exchange frequency and exchange structure. According to the theory of relational cohesion, equal-power actors that depend on one another exchange *frequently*, which in turn generates positive emotions that lead to a sense of cohesion and ultimately commitment in exchange behaviors (Lawler and Yoon 1996). Several experimental studies have shown that frequent exchange is tied to positive affect, consistent with this theory (Lawler et al. 2008; Lawler and Yoon 1996; Thye et al. 2011).

A different line of work has shown that the structure of exchanges produces different percep-

tions of fairness, which can contribute to positive and negative affect (e.g., Hegtvedt 1990; Stets 2003). According to Molm et al. (2003), people who negotiate exchange terms perceive greater unfairness in their exchange partners than those who engage in reciprocal exchange, presumably because negotiation processes highlight points of conflict, differences, and self-interest. A series of experiments found support for these claims, revealing that those engaging in reciprocal exchange perceived greater fairness than those engaging in negotiated exchange, even when those exchanges favored their exchange partners (Molm et al. 2003), and that perceived conflict mediated the exchange form-fairness relationship (Molm et al. 2006). Similarly, exchanges that are freely chosen (i.e., actors have other possible exchange partners) generate more positive affect than exchanges that are constrained. Presumably, this is because these “structurally enabled” exchanges generate a sense of control, which in turn produces positive emotion. Consistent with this claim, an experiment by Lawler et al. (2006) showed that those participating in unconstrained exchanges felt greater interest, excitement, pleasure, and satisfaction, and had a higher perception of control than those in “induced exchanges.”

Social exchange theorists have also tied emotions to the outcomes of exchange processes (Thye and Kalkhoff this volume). A major work along these lines is Lawler’s affect theory of social exchange (Lawler 2001). In brief, this theory states that people feel good if they participate in an exchange that they view as successful, and bad if they perceive the exchange as unsuccessful. These feelings are experienced as global emotions, or affect that has an ambiguous source. Actors can also experience emotions towards specific actors or objects through a process of attribution. Positive affect attributed to the self leads to a sense of pride, and towards others generates gratitude. Self-attributed negative emotion produces shame, while other-directed negative feeling leads to anger. Different exchange structures lead to different attributional tendencies, with structures that make it difficult to separate the effects of individual effort and that facilitate

shared responsibility leading to more attributions to the group or social unit rather than to individual exchange partners. Stratification in emotional outcomes is reduced to the extent that actors attribute their global emotions to the group—all group members feel pride and gratitude, and the self-serving bias in attributing negative emotions is reduced.

Little research has directly examined the affect theory of social exchange, and what evidence exists is mixed. Initial evidence comes from an experiment conducted by Lawler et al. (2008) in which participants were assigned to different exchange structures, and their global and specific emotions measured. Consistent with the theory, results indicate that those in generalized exchange conditions (where benefits to an actor are indirect) experienced the least general positive affect, gratitude toward others, and pride in self, and the most anger at others and personal shame. These trends were reversed for those in productive exchange arrangements (where people create a collective good and directly receive benefits from it), with persons in reciprocal and negotiated arrangements falling in between the two extremes. A similar experiment by Molm et al. (2007) produced contrasting results. In this study, researchers compared emotional outcomes from generalized, negotiated, and reciprocal exchange, and found that those engaged in generalized exchange had the *highest* levels of positive affect towards their exchange partners. While it is clear that additional work is required before drawing conclusions about how exchange outcomes produce emotions, current evidence indicates that a genuine connection exists—that is, exchange outcomes are tied to emotional responses.

Research on social exchange and emotions, then, suggests that emotions are tied to frequency of exchange, the structure of exchange, the outcome of exchanges, and attributions regarding outcomes. Those who have a structurally advantageous position get more of these positive exchange outcomes, and experience positive emotions because of it. In this way, social exchange can lead to a stratification of emotional outcomes.

Justice and Emotions

Exchange structures are deeply implicated in questions of justice. This is because justice situations almost always involve unequal power arrangements in which one party depends on another for some type of benefit. Such arrangements can be found between governments and citizens, employers and workers, parents and children, and so forth. Scholars have distinguished between two types of justice: procedural and distributive. Procedural justice refers to fairness in the process used to dispense rewards, while distributive justice is the fairness of the distribution of rewards themselves (the outcome of the process). Although research on justice and emotions has drawn on a variety of theories including the group-value model, the personal outcomes model, the psychological contract model, identity theory, equity theory, social interactional theory, and distributive justice theories (Clay-Warner et al. 2005; Hegtvedt 1990; Hegtvedt and Killian 1999; Lively et al. 2010; Stets 2003), the overall picture that emerges is quite simple: perceptions of justice lead to positive emotion, while perceptions of injustice produce negative emotion (Hegtvedt and Isom, this volume).

A great deal of research has examined the emotions produced by perceived injustices to the self. An early vignette study by Hegtvedt (1990) found that students playing the role of a typist felt emotional distress when they were paid below the “going rate.” A laboratory experiment by Stets (2003) demonstrated that under-rewarded students felt fewer positive emotions (satisfied, grateful, deserving) and more negative emotions (anger, resentment, disgust). Several other studies have similarly shown that perceptions of injustice to the self are tied to negative emotions, and justice to positive emotions (Clay-Warner et al. 2005; Hegtvedt and Killian 1999; Lively et al. 2010).

Some evidence suggests that negative emotions in unjust situations may be moderated by personal characteristics. Hegtvedt et al. (2008) found that resentment over extra work due to companies’ family-friendly policies was lower among white workers, and among those who

reported more liberal gender-role attitudes or higher education. Similarly, emotional reactions may depend on one’s relative power position. Hegtvedt (1990) found that actors in advantaged power positions felt more deserving when rewards were equitable, while equitable outcomes prompted gratitude among those in disadvantaged positions. Taken together, findings suggest that emotions will be unequally distributed to the extent that social groups disproportionately perceive themselves as being unfairly treated, and as long as they systematically differ in education and access to advantaged social positions.

Scholars have also examined the feelings produced by over-reward. Some work suggests that people feel more gratitude and satisfaction when they receive more than their fair share of benefits (Hegtvedt 1990; Stets 2003). However, these studies tend to be impersonal and abstract, with participants either interacting with others with whom they are not familiar or imagining their responses to hypothetical justice situations. In contrast, a survey study by Lively et al. (2010) indicates that the over-benefitting might have a negative effect when it is at the expense of an important other, such as a spouse. In particular, participants who felt that their household divisions of labor were unfair to their spouses reported more negative emotions such as distress, fear, and self-reproach, and fewer positive emotions such as tranquility. In the same vein, some evidence suggests that those in advantaged social positions may feel guilt over the benefits they enjoy that others do not (Montada 1998).

Researchers have also studied how procedural and distributive justice can lead to different emotions. Hegtvedt and Killian (1999) showed that perceptions of procedural justice were tied to lower negative affect, lower depression over pay outcomes, and increases in pleasure. Distributive justice had a different effect. Perceptions of fairness to the self reduced negative affect over one’s own pay and increased pay satisfaction, and perceptions of fairness to others reduced guilt over one’s own pay. Similarly, Clay-Warner et al. (2005) found that perceptions of procedural justice better predicted job satisfaction than did perceptions of distributive justice. Practically, this

suggests that social structures that provide equal access to legitimate procedures (procedural justice) may reduce stratification in emotional outcomes more than those that redistribute resources (distributive justice).

A body of work has also addressed how people respond to injustices done to others. For example, Hegtvedt et al. (2008) found that observers of procedural injustice against another felt anger and low levels of satisfaction with the outcome, but were unlikely to express negative feelings when the source of the injustice was widely viewed as legitimate. This may indicate reluctance on the part of individuals to resist inequitable social arrangements if they are widely supported/legitimated, which could perpetuate cycles of injustice and the negative feelings they produce. On a more positive note, Hegtvedt and Killian (1999) demonstrated that students who perceived that others were treated fairly reported less guilt over their own pay outcomes.

In a recent review, Hegtvedt and Scheurman (2010) argued that justice studies could be enhanced by considering research on moral emotions. Moral emotions occur when people perceive that moral standards have been violated. Notably, moral standards are not just personal preferences, but are felt to apply more widely, perhaps even universally (e.g., the notion of universal human rights). Consequently, violations of moral norms are likely felt not as attacks on personal self-interest (c.f., Montada 1998), but as disruptions of meanings that are much larger than the self. Several studies have demonstrated that perceptions of injustice against others leads to moral outrage, which has been variously defined as a combination of anger, disgust, and/or distress (Hegtvedt and Scheurman 2010; Jost et al. 2008; Skitka et al. 2008; Skitka and Mullen 2002). This research suggests the intriguing possibility that moral processes mediate the relationship between perceptions of injustice to others and negative emotions. Whether operating through morality or other mechanisms, however, the demonstrated link between perceptions of injustice to others and affect indicates that social structural arrangements can contribute to nega-

tive emotions to the extent that they violate (possibly moral) norms of equality.

Emotional Outcomes of Stigmatization

As mentioned in the first part of this review, holding stereotypical cultural meanings can lead people to treat others in ways that reinforce the social structure, reproducing inequality through external pressure. These behaviors can have powerful emotional consequences for those experiencing them; those subject to stigmatization may experience shame, embarrassment, fear, alienation, or anger (Gill and Andreychik 2006; Link et al. 2004; Link, Phelan, & Hatzenbuehler this volume). Emotional expression—perhaps in response to unequal outcomes—may even fuel additional stereotypes that reinforce stigmatization (Miller and Kaiser 2001). Consider, for example, the impact of the stereotypes about the emotionality of black women. Harlow (2003) describes how black professors in general report more challenges to their intellectual authority than do white professors, but black female professors specifically point to the stereotype of the “angry black woman” and perceptions of them as having “attitude” as reasons for student negativity toward them. As a result, some reported engaging in emotional labor to avoid being perceived as mean or cold.

Certain emotions that have been tied to stigmatization, such as alienation, in turn, predict further stratified emotional outcomes by increasing depression and diminishing self-esteem (Ritsher and Phelan 2004). Emotional responses like alienation, then, may provide a conduit between stigmatization and diminished self-esteem (Crandall and Biernat 1990; Crocker et al. 1993; Heatherton et al. 2000). Self-esteem is associated with a number of outcomes that perpetuate inequality. Aside from differences in mental and physical health, adults who suffered from low self-esteem in adolescence also experience worse economic prospects and higher levels of criminality than adults with high self-esteem as adolescents (Trzesniewski et al. 2006). Although many stigmatized persons are able sustain high

self-esteem and happiness regardless of their ill treatment (Camp et al. 2002; Crocker and Major 1989), not all stigmatized persons have the resilience to maintain their self-esteem in the face of negative attributions.

In addition to influencing emotions from the outside in, stigmatization can also impact inequality by operating from the inside out, by undermining the mental states, performance expectations, and performance outcomes of the stigmatized. Indeed, much of the power underpinning the stigma process lies in the extent to which external attributions are internalized by the stigmatized. Scholars have noted, for instance, that much of the shame, embarrassment, anger, and other emotion experienced by the stigmatized may be self-directed (Gill and Andreychik 2006; Link et al. 2004). This process might begin early in life; evidence suggests that people become aware of cultural stereotypes attendant to stigmatized social categories by the age of 10 (Major and O'Brien 2005). Once these stereotypes are internalized, the process by which the stigmatized are marked "typically has devastating consequences for emotions" (Jones et al. 1984, p. 4).

Turner (2007) used the concepts of repression and transmutation from psychoanalytic theory to argue that the negative emotions experienced by members of stigmatized groups can be repressed when no behavioral response is available. In fact, he suggested that the control theories of self and identity reviewed above may be applicable to only the more low-intensity emotions that create incongruity in our gestalt of everyday institutional behaviors. Turner thought that when powerful self-relevant emotions are generated by serious stigma, mistreatment or norm violation, the shame is more likely to be handled by pushing the emotions below the level of consciousness. There, the emotions are likely to be intensified, transmuted into anger, and re-attributed to other targets. Thus, Turner argued that the repression of negative emotions like shame can lead to extremely strong anger and loathing of other targets. This intensification and transmutation, in combination with strong, positive local networks among the stigmatized and disadvantaged, can lead to extreme vengeance and violence against

scapegoats (who are often not the actual sources of the original mistreatment). Repeated guilt from norm violation can also be repressed and transmuted, but it is more likely to be transformed into diffuse anxiety.

One of the most interesting features of Turner's psychoanalytic additions to symbolic interactionist thought is the fact that he described how these emotional dynamics can lead to intergenerational emotional transfers. The experience of being stigmatized or mistreated (especially as a group or category) can lead to repressed emotions. When shame transmutes into anger, and gets attributed to new objects, hatred between groups can be passed down through generations. Inequality can therefore lead to intense emotions and extreme violence which may appear unconnected to its original structural sources. Somewhat more prosaically, socialization practices or normative structures that cause persistent guilt can lead to persistent anxiety when repressed, creating national or categorical "personalities" from the relationship between social structure and personality (linked by repression and transmutation).

Social Structure and Personality

More generally, social structure and personality (SSP) describes an orienting framework rather than a theoretical position. The main contention of this framework is that macro-level social structures influence the feelings, attitudes, and behaviors of people at the micro-level by shaping the proximal conditions of their lives (McLeod and Lively 2003). While some scholars intentionally associate themselves with this tradition, many others conduct research consistent with its guiding principle without recognizing the connection. Arguably, this work can be included under the auspices of SSP, and that is the approach taken here. Unlike many of the theories discussed to this point, SSP research rarely focuses on emotions. However, many of the micro-level constructs examined (sometimes unhelpfully lumped together under the heading of "personality") are actually emotional states or other affective con-

structs closely related to emotions. This section provides a selection of SSP work that illustrates this connection.

A number of studies have shown that occupational conditions can directly influence affective states including job satisfaction, anxiety, and self-esteem. In particular, Kohn and Schooler (1973) showed that higher levels of substantive job complexity lead to higher job satisfaction and self-esteem, but also to higher anxiety. Similarly, Kohn et al. (2002) demonstrated that unemployed individuals in Poland and Ukraine experience more distress than the employed, due in part to the greater economic adversity they face.

Additional work has tied social structural positions to micro-level traits that have consequences for emotions. Ross and Mirowsky (2002) argued that persistent exposure to gender structures over the life course can lower women's sense of control. Sense of control, in turn, is inversely related to other low-potency states like depression (e.g., Pearlin et al. 1981). Kohn and colleagues (Kohn et al. 2002; Kohn and Schooler 1973) have shown that occupational positions can influence intellectual flexibility, which is defined as depth of thought and thinking ability across a variety of cognitive tasks. Intellectual flexibility is conceptually similar to two other constructs that have been tied to emotional outcomes: cognitive flexibility and coping flexibility. Palm and Follette (2011) argue that cognitive flexibility allows a person to think of alternatives, see possibilities, and avoid rigid behavioral rules, all of which can prevent negative affect. Consistent with this claim, they found that survivors of interpersonal victimization with higher levels of cognitive flexibility had lower PTSD and depression. Similarly, Mellor et al. (2003) found that cognitive flexibility was correlated with self-esteem, optimism, and positive affect, and Hill (2008) linked it to more relationship satisfaction. Coping flexibility is the extent to which people adjust their coping strategies across situations, and has been tied to lower levels of negative affect (Fresco et al. 2006), lower distress following breast cancer surgery (Roussi et al. 2007), and better global functioning in a sample of schizophrenics

and depressed persons (Silverman and Peterson 1993).

A fruitful application of a social structure and personality approach is the sociological study of stress, though stress researchers often do not explicitly link their work to that perspective (for an exception, see Pearlin 1989). Substantial research has been directed towards understanding the sources and consequences of stress. From a social psychological perspective, a key finding is that psychosocial resources mediate or moderate many of the effects of stressors on emotional outcomes such as depression or anxiety. Stressors can reduce resources such as one's sense of personal control (mastery) and thereby exert an indirect negative effect on mental health (Pearlin and Bierman 2012; Thoits 2010)—in social structure and personality terms, the proximal conditions of one's life (stressors) can shape personality (mastery). However, resources can also play a moderating role, such that stress effects tend to be less harmful for those with higher levels of social support, greater coping capacities, and a higher sense of mastery (Pearlin and Bierman 2012).

Stress researchers have shown that both stressors and resources are unequally distributed across social positions (Pearlin and Bierman 2012; Thoits 2010). Those in socially disadvantaged positions such as females, young adults, racial-minority groups, divorced and widowed persons, and the poor face more chronic stressors, and minority groups face the additional challenge of stress from discrimination (Thoits 2010). Social positions also play a role in allocating resources, with disadvantaged groups having fewer resources (Thoits 2010). For example, aging or persistent disadvantage can lead to lower feelings of control (Ross and Mirowsky 2002). Again, these findings can be recast in social structure and personality terms—social positions (structure) lead to systematic differences in exposure to stressors and access to resources (proximal conditions), which then lead to personal affective outcomes like depression, mental distress, and feelings of inefficacy.

Given the unequal distribution of stressors and resources, it is not surprising that those occupying disadvantaged or less normative social

categories generally have worse mental health (Pearlin and Bierman 2012; Thoits 2010). For example, those with low levels of education, income, or occupational prestige have high levels of psychological distress, as do those who are separated, divorced, or widowed. There are exceptions to this general pattern, however, for women have comparable rates of mental health challenges to men (although they differ in type), and blacks and Hispanics have equal or lower rates of psychological distress (Thoits 2010). Still, the general picture is one of social structure shaping differences in exposure to stressors and resources, which in turn lead to disparities in emotional outcomes (see McLeod, Erving & Caputo, this volume).

Taken together, research using a social structure and personality framework demonstrates that social location structures the emotional landscape, with those in more advantageous positions experiencing more positive affect, at times through the mediating role of constructs such as sense of personal control or intellectual flexibility.

The Unhappy Slave: Conclusions About how Inequality Shapes Emotion

The research reviewed in this section ranges across a wide array of theoretical traditions and methodologies. It includes identity theories, structural theories, macro-micro linkages between personality and social structure, the stress model of mental health, exchange theory and even influences from psychoanalytic theory. Studies use experiments, surveys, qualitative observation, and reports of clinical work. They all agree. Occupying disadvantaged positions increases the chances that one will experience negative emotions and mental distress. The only nuances come in the details: shame or guilt, depression or anger, resilience or dissolution. These nuances are important for the theories that are mentioned here. But the overall picture is clear: interacting in identities that are negatively evaluated and impotent creates negative emotional outcomes. Occupying disadvantaged structural positions

leaves one without the resources to accomplish things in interaction that are valued, and results in negative, inefficacious feelings about self and anger toward others. The question is how these stable patterns can ever be overcome.

Emotional Mechanisms that Resist Inequality

Each of the sections above illustrates the durability of systems of inequality. Structural inequalities generate cultural affective meanings that import disadvantage into interpersonal interactions. Emotional responses make labeling and stereotyping a visceral part of social life. Internalization of these identity meanings and stereotypes causes emotional pain and suboptimal performances. Exposure to the low rewards, injustice and stress of disadvantaged positions leads to mental distress and a sense of inefficacy. These distressing conclusions should not surprise us: if stratification structures were easy to change, there would be much more flux in social systems than we see. Inequality has many self-perpetuating features.

However, there are times and places where things do change. Emotions can shift status and power differences in both subtle and dramatic ways. Below we review some of these mechanisms for change. We first discuss the interactional mechanisms that can dampen participation inequalities in small task groups. We then review more general phenomena by which identity selection and subcultures can protect the self from disadvantage. Finally, we discuss mechanisms with the potential to create societal-level transformations—social movements and cultural change.

Emotional Responses as “Dampeners” of Inequality

When groups attempt to coordinate their activity in pursuit of a collective goal, inequalities of participation necessarily occur. Expectations states theory and status characteristics theory both developed as an attempt to understand this process.

Since the early work by Bales and his colleagues, researchers have noted that these inequalities can create negative feelings that threaten to undermine the task performance of groups (Bales 1958; Bales and Slater 1955). Bales proposed that this structural problem facing task groups might lead to role differentiation, such that two separate leaders are likely to emerge: one responsible for task leadership and one for socio-emotional leadership, the former garnering negative affect and the latter positive. While task leaders endure the disagreement and tension necessary to work toward a collective goal, socio-emotional leaders maintain group solidarity in the face of inequality.

However, characteristics of the group such as size, task orientation, and leader legitimacy affect the need for and likelihood of role differentiation. For example, Verba (1961) proposed that established leaders do not need to maintain their legitimacy through constant contributions to the task, while higher rates of participation are necessary for emergent leaders. Thus, emergent leaders are likely to be a source of disagreement and inequality and a target of negative affect, as their behavior alienates other group members (Burke 1967). Kemper (1984) elaborated on these themes in his social interactional theory of emotions. He suggested that emotions affect structural stability by affecting group solidarity. He characterized positive emotions including love, joy and caring as *integrating* because they facilitate strong social bonds as group members are motivated to continue the associations that produced these emotions. In contrast, negative emotions including anger, resentment and fear are *differentiating*, leading to distancing between group members.

These emotional reactions to participation in task groups may reduce inequality by motivating individuals to work harder. Lovaglia and Houser (1996; Houser and Lovaglia 2002) have made the most explicit links between emotional responses to status inequality and a decrease in that inequality. In a series of four experiments in the status characteristics tradition, they demonstrate that high status in a task groups leads to positive emotions and low status leads to negative emotions. More importantly, they demonstrate that the

positive feelings of high status lead those group members to be more receptive and encouraging of the lower status members. Conversely, the negative emotions experienced by the low status members when their attempted contributions are thwarted tend to make them more resistant to influence. Therefore, the emotional responses of group members to the power and prestige order created by performance expectations tend to dampen those behavioral inequalities that create the emotional reactions. As noted above, this phenomenon is especially likely to occur when the inequality structure is less legitimate or just emerging—when emotional responses are strongest, especially among the disadvantaged.

Therefore, we see that the negative emotions of the disadvantaged can have positive results in reducing inequality. Envy, generally considered a negative emotion, can take constructive forms. When envy is benign (i.e., reflecting admiration toward a target) rather than hostile (i.e., characterized by anger over what is seen as undeserved success on the part of others), it can inspire one to work towards improving his or her position (van de Ven et al. 2009). However, for benign envy to inspire self-improvement, self-improvement must be seen as achievable (van de Ven et al. 2011). In a less pro-social manner, envy can also decrease the psychological costs associated with deception, catalyzing more frequent utilization of this resource to improve one's position.

Similar processes occur in identity negotiation. In examining marriage partners, Stets (1997) found that low-status partners did not have lower self-worth and frequently engaged in negative behaviors in an attempt to actively manage the emotional response of the high-status actor and help define themselves in the marriage. Swann (2005) argues that identity negotiation, the act of forging agreements between actors and targets about the identities of interaction actors, is a dynamic process as actors and target actively seek to influence each other. The conceptualization of agentic actors capable of directive action suggests that internalization of negative identities may not be as prominent as identity theory suggests (Smith-Lovin and Robinson 2006).

Agency in Identity Enactment

As noted above, modern structural symbolic interactionist theories of identity typically use a control system structure that emphasizes the maintenance of both cultural and self-identity meanings. Yet if identities are largely determined by structural positions, and high-status actors are better able to create opportunities and define the situation in their favor, how is resistance to inequality and change possible? Burke and Stets (2009) point out that the meanings of the identity standard are not fixed (although they change slowly) and the arrangement of multiple identities within the salience hierarchy provides opportunities for identity conflict, reconciliation and ultimately change. They outline four sources of change: changes in the situation, identity conflicts, conflicts between behaviors, and the identity standard and mutual verification.

Changes to the situation can come from a vast array of sources including divorce, loss of a job, death of a loved one, or even accidents. Burke and Cast (1997) document how, in response to the birth of a child, newlyweds shifted from perceiving themselves as husbands and wives to fathers and mothers. Burke and Stets (2009) argue that even large scale structural changes such as Irish immigration in the nineteenth century, Chinese immigration during the gold rush, and the immigration laws that followed altered what it meant to be a member of these groups.

Because the self consists of multiple identities, conflicts may produce stress that must be reconciled. For example, a woman may find that her wife and worker identities conflict. When conflict occurs, identity theory posits that the identity standard for both identities will gradually shift towards each other to achieve a compromise position where behaviors can verify both identities at the same time. Smith-Lovin (2007) makes a similar argument in the cultural domain: when more women occupy high status positions, this simultaneous occupation of multiple categories creates pressure for a cultural change in the affective meaning of the category “woman.” These arguments imply that structural changes in one domain—such as increased female employment

in the workplace—can have implications for gendered identity standards across a broad range of institutional domains.

Another avenue for flexibility lies in modifying the social network surrounding an individual. Serpe and Stryker (1987) argue that the content and salience ordering of the self is dependent on the nature of one’s role relationships, and by altering these relationships people are able to produce change in the self. By modifications to hairstyle and dress and through selective affiliation (associating with the right people), actors are able to actively shape the situation and whom they interact with. Merolla et al. (2012) add that, within large social structures such as schools or work, face-to-face interactions often occur within small, more proximate social structures such as clubs or work teams. By choosing to participate in these proximate structures, actors are able to quickly modify the situation, their network affiliates, and the nature of their interactions while still bounded within the larger social structure. The nature of a person’s social network not only affects the likelihood of verification (and with it positive emotion) but has also been found to affect the intensity of emotions. Stets and Tsuchida (2001) compared the emotional responses between the social identity of family member and role identity of worker, and found people were more deeply affected by non-verification of their social identity. They argue that the strong and intimate bonds with family members influenced the salience of social identities, and found that people who did not receive support from their family experienced more intense anger, but non-verification from co-workers, although less intense, lasted longer.

The label of “mentally ill” and the stigma attached has been associated with self-devaluation, social isolation and low self-esteem, but Thoits (2011b) argues that the effect is often less pronounced than expected because some labeled individuals resist stigma and stereotyping. Individuals were found to employ two strategies to guard against the stigma of mental illness: challenging (confronting or fighting harmful forces) and deflecting (refusing to yield or accept these influences). Self-labeling may be beneficial be-

cause these resistance strategies require individuals to understand that stigmatized identity labels may be applied to them and how the cultural meanings attached to these identities might potentially affect them (Cast et al. 1999).

MacKinnon and Heise (2010) have offered a new affect control theory of the self that adds to these insights about personal movement through institutional domains. They argue that when individuals fail to maintain meanings for identities in one institutional domain, they will be motivated to move into other interactional settings in which their actions (and the actions of others toward them) will restore fundamental self-sentiments. By creating a higher order level of the control system, this framework meshes the agency of the actor, the menu of opportunities created by structures (often unequal, of course), and the cultural meanings associated with the social positions available. Importantly, however, even those in disadvantaged social positions are likely to have some flexibility in the identities they assume, suggesting that they have tools for manipulating the emotions that they feel.

Emotions as Motivation in Social Movements

As we discussed above, being stereotyped and stigmatized is a painful experience. Shame is a social emotion, elicited when we imagine ourselves from another's point of view (Scheff 1990). Shame and pride are not only distinct in valence and arousal, but in the approaches to sociality they engender. There are mutually reinforcing ties between shame and isolation, and between pride and public behavior. Shame is the result of social exclusion, but also leads to social withdrawal. Pride, on the other hand, both leads to and results from public displays of accomplishment. Thus, transforming shameful identities into identities that elicit pride can prove challenging. However, participation in social movements can provide members of stigmatized groups with the means of transformation.

Using the gay rights movement as an illustration, Britt and Heise (2000) demonstrate that

group pride can be attained through a series of emotional segues (Lively and Heise 2004), whereby group members transition through intermediate emotions to alter the affective experiences associated with group membership. Although the gay population in the US has historically been shamed and experienced isolation as a result of the low visibility of group members, social movement organizations first shifted that shame to fear of prejudice and discrimination by publicizing stories about violent hate crimes against group members. This fear was turned into anger through messages that focused on injustice and righteous indignation. Both of these transitions increased the activation of group members' negative emotions. Anger was then transformed into pride, a positive and active emotion, through participation in public demonstrations. This final step was facilitated by several co-occurring processes: (1) through collective organizations' efforts at raising money, mobilizing labor, and garnering specialized assistance from experts (e.g., Freeman 1979; McCarthy and Zald 1977), (2) through network influences, which lend legitimacy to social movements, and aid in transitioning from collective attitude to collective action, and (3) through emotional contagion, in the draw of others' pride during public demonstrations. Thus, emotions are sources, goals, means, and products of social movements (see Jasper 1998, 2011). Indeed, collective action to address inequality may not be possible without the airing of negative emotions among potential change agents (Miller and Kaiser 2001; Snow and Owens this volume).

Meaning Subcultures as Protection Against Mainstream Stigma

Stigmatization necessarily entails negative emotional experiences, which powerless individuals often internalize through ongoing participation in mainstream culture. Social movements provide members of devalued groups with a specialized social context within which their group membership can take on a new and more positive meaning. In a similar way, groups that experience stigma within a given societal culture often develop

or join meaning subcultures, within which sets of identities and behaviors important to the self (but devalued in mainstream society) can take on a new and more positive meaning. Subcultures are also an important source of resolution for role conflict, when two identities salient to the self carry distinct and opposing cultural meanings (Schwalbe and Shay this volume).

Smith-Lovin and Douglass (1992) offer an example of such meaning subcultures through a study of gay congregants at a Christian church. Religious rituals typically allow congregants the opportunity to enact positive, powerful identities and experience positive emotions through worship. However, as mainstream cultural meanings for homosexuality- and spirituality-related identities come into conflict, it can be challenging for gay congregants to experience the socio-emotional benefits of worship in a traditional setting. By creating a subculture within which salient identities and behaviors (relating to both sexuality and spirituality) are viewed in a positive and powerful light, role conflict is alleviated, allowing positive expectations to be established, positive interactions to be built, and positive emotional experiences to be fostered. Active transformations of identity meanings are also instrumental in shifting patterns of behavioral and emotional experience in support groups for the loss of a spouse through death or divorce (Francis 1997) and recovery groups like Alcoholics Anonymous (Thomassen 2002).

Heise (1998) linked emotions to both subcultures and social movements by discussing how emotional responses can signal similarity. They noted that actors can recognize others who see the social world in the same way (i.e., who hold the same fundamental sentiments for important categories of people and actions) by seeing shared emotional responses to signal events. When we see people displaying angst or joy at an election outcome, we have a good sense of where they stand politically (and how much we share with them, based on our own reactions). Emotional responses can therefore be used to judge membership in subcultures and potential for social movement activation. As reactions (and

the meanings they convey) spread, cultures can gradually change.

Conclusions

Inequality is stable and material. Emotions are fleeting and sometimes intensely personal. How can these two very different domains be so closely intertwined? First, we acknowledge that much of emotional reaction is focused on the social world. Scherer et al. (1986) reported in one of the first major surveys of emotional life that the great majority of strong emotions reported were in response to social events. Two of the core works that began the modern sociology of emotions (Hochschild 1983; Kemper 1978) dealt explicitly with hierarchy and inequality. Our emotional lives (and the sociological study of them) have always been intertwined with inequality.

In this chapter, we have elaborated three major themes linking the affective/emotional domain and inequality. First, we noted that the structural, material, cognitive aspects of society that make up the core of inequality get represented in affective meanings that allow those concrete features of advantage and disadvantage to be transported into even the most mundane interpersonal encounter. These meanings organize every new group into which we enter, every new encounter with a new alter. They communicate easily through emotional expressions, and allow simple cognitive assessments to take on moral, visceral motivation to help or harm. They create self-fulfilling prophecies that make the advantaged actors perform well and the disadvantaged self-inflict damage.

Second, we recognized the emotional toll that this inequality takes on its occupants. The concept of structural emotions represents the core finding that those who occupy disadvantaged social positions suffer for it emotionally. Theories that focus more on self-identity and agency note that resources and voluntary identity occupancy allow for identity verification, positive emotion, and good mental health. Occupying disadvantaged social positions leads to poorer performance through many mechanisms: stress,

stereotype threat, identity maintenance, negative attributions, and so on.

Finally, we struck a more positive note. If inequality can be overcome, this social change is likely to have an emotional origin. The source of change may result from demographic shifts in the categories of people who occupy social positions (e.g., more women on the Supreme Court or a President with African-American heritage), leading to gradual shifts in the affective meaning of categories. Or it may come from the resistance of those who are not getting to participate much in an ordinary task group at work. Or it may come from the recognition that someone else is “like you” when they respond to the same event with the same emotional expression, leading to a social movement, the creation of a protective subculture, or a new institutional form.

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Matthew O. Hunt

It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness. (Marx 1859)

A simple automatic economic determinism of social opinion is, psychologically, pure fiction. (Kornhauser 1939)

A system of stratification needs to be justified because valued rewards are always in short supply and many persons get few indeed. People will tolerate a system of great inequality if they define it as just and fair. (Huber and Form 1973)

Theories of stratification would be augmented importantly by knowing which individuals judge equality or inequality to be just, why they do so, and where they are located in the social structure. (Robinson and Bell 1978)

The power of an ideology to explain and justify discrepancies between the current social order and some alternative not only maintains support for the status quo, but also serves for its adherents the palliative function of alleviating dissonance or discomfort associated with the awareness of systematic injustice or inequality. (Jost et al. 2009)

Introduction

Opening Remarks

This chapter covers uses of the concept of “ideology” in social psychological studies of social inequalities. Collectively, the five epigraphs I list above summarize much of what follows. Marx (1859), of course, highlights the quintessentially sociological stance on human subjectivity—i.e., its rootedness in social practices. And, if our social being determines our consciousness, ideology, as a component of culture,

represents a key source of the *content* of that consciousness (House 1981). Some 80 years after Marx, Kornhauser (1939) warned against over-simplified models of social opinion, stressing that persons’ world-views are more than mere reflections of economic interests; we must also be attentive to the ways in which psychological factors shape our subjective responses to intergroup relations, social inequality, and the ideologies governing these phenomena (McLeod and Lively 2003). Decades later, Huber and Form (1973) and Robinson and Bell (1978) highlighted two key issues in the social psychology of inequality: (1) the role of ideology in the maintenance of social stratification (i.e., legitimation), and (2) the importance of explicating the relationship between people’s locations in structures of inequality and their subjective (e.g., justice-based) responses to such inequali-

M. O. Hunt (✉)
Department of Sociology, Northeastern University, 523
Holmes Hall, Boston, MA 02115, USA
e-mail: m.hunt@neu.edu

ties. And, most recently, Jost et al. (2009) provide a window into an emerging political-psychological perspective that speaks directly to Kornhauser (1939) in its emphasis on incorporating explicitly psychological phenomena into our models of ideological processes.

Collectively, the insights captured in these quotations highlight the potentially complementary nature of sociological (stressing social structure and culture) and psychological (stressing intra-personal dynamics) approaches to social psychology—thus offering fertile ground for greater interchange between the “two social psychologies” (House 1977; Stryker 1977) in further developing our understandings of the interplay between inequality, ideology, and the person. While work from a variety of theoretical and methodological orientations can be brought to bear on the central concerns of this chapter, my reading of the literatures in social stratification, social psychology, and political psychology suggests that the social structure and personality (SSP) theoretical framework from sociological social psychology (House 1981; McLeod and Lively 2003) may be uniquely suited to the development of a truly multi-level social psychology of ideological processes (more on this below). As such, and given the methodological tendencies of the SSP frame (House 1977), I focus *primary* (though by no means exclusive) attention on survey-based research in this chapter. This does not mean that various qualitative, experimental, and other non-survey-based methods are inherently less attuned to the questions engaged herein; quite the opposite, and I have endeavored to point the interested reader in appropriate directions at various junctures.

Definitional Diversity

Ideology is widely referenced in the social sciences, though a considerable diversity of meanings accompanies the term. Review of some leading book-length introductions to the subject quickly reveals its complexity and contested nature. McLellan (1986) calls ideology, “the most elusive concept in the whole of social science”

(p. 1). Eagleton (1991) writes, “Nobody has yet come up with a single adequate definition of ideology” (p. 1). And, van Dijk (1998) asserts that, “Ideology has been dealt with in literally thousands of books and articles, but (as many other authors also conclude) its definition is as elusive and confused as ever” (p. vii).

This state of affairs is attributable, in part, to historical and discipline-based variation in understandings and uses of the term.¹ However, narrowing our focus to “the most thoughtful and/or influential definitions circulating within the social sciences in the postwar decades” (Gerring 1997, p. 957) reveals some still very-contested terrain. In Gerring’s (1997) words:

One is struck not only by the cumulative number of different attributes that writers find essential, but by their more than occasional contradictions. To some, ideology is dogmatic, while to others it carries connotations of political sophistication; to some it refers to dominant modes of thought, and to others it refers primarily to those most alienated by the status quo (e.g., revolutionary movements and parties). To some it is based on concrete interests of a social class, while to others it is characterized by an absence of economic self-interest. One could continue, but the point is already apparent: not only is ideology far-flung, it also encompasses a good many definitional traits which are directly at odds with one another. (p. 957)

¹ Eighteenth century Enlightenment philosopher Antoine Destutt de Tracy was the first to use the term ideology to describe a “science of ideas” most closely related to today’s sociology of knowledge (Jost et al. 2008). Later, two broadly different usages of the term—one critical and one more value-neutral—emerged with (and following) the work of Marx and Engels (1845). The critical stance frames ideology primarily as an agent of mystification and obfuscation—i.e., as sets of ideas generating false consciousness, and designed to mask exploitation in social relations. Contemporary usages in this vein can be found in Marxist and Feminist sociologies, as well as in selected research programs within political psychology—e.g., system justification theory and social dominance theory (Jost and Sidanius 2004). That said, most social scientific research over the past half-century has used more value-neutral conceptions of ideology to describe relatively abstract systems of beliefs, values, and attitudes that organize and constrain thought (Knight 2006). For useful discussions of the critical/value-neutral distinction, see Jost (2006) and Jost et al. (2008).

Full consideration of this conceptual and definitional diversity is beyond the scope of the current chapter. Instead, my goal is to review some of the key ways that social psychologists have used (and defined) the concept of ideology in studies of social inequalities, and to suggest some potentially fruitful avenues for future work in this domain. In keeping with the focus of the current volume, I emphasize research by sociologists, though adequate treatment of the subject requires discussion of work in political science and psychology given the concept's long history of use in the former (Converse 1964; Knight 2006; Lane 1962), and the relatively recent resurgence of interest in the latter (Jost 2006; Jost et al. 2008; Jost and Major 2001; Sidanius and Pratto 1999).

Place in the Current Volume

The concept of ideology is importantly and inextricably linked to the other topics comprising the current volume. As other chapters demonstrate, social categories such as race (Samson and Bobo), SES/social class (Milkie, Warner and Ray), and gender (Kroska) are distinct but overlapping—and intersecting (Howard and Renfrow)—constructs that correspond to systematic differences in status (Ridgeway and Nakagawa), power (Thye and Kalkhoff) and control over societal resources. Ideologies are central to how such inequalities are rendered just and equitable (Hegtvedt and Isom) in the minds of actors, as well as to how such inequalities may be challenged and resisted. Ideologies become part of persons' subjective worlds via socialization (Mortimer and McLaughlin) in key contexts such as family (Lively, Oslawski-Lopez and Powell), schools (Schneider, Judy and Burkholder), work (DiTomaso), and neighborhood (Quillian), and in so doing, structure individuals' stereotypes, self-concepts (Callero) and attitudes toward intergroup relations and inequality itself. As such, ideologies can enhance or undermine the legitimacy (Walker) of structured inequalities, and in so doing either contribute to the reproduction of inequality, or to its challenge in the form of collective action (Snow and Owens) for social

change. Thus, consideration of ideologies is critically important to two of the central tasks of a sociologically-grounded social psychology: (1) to explicate the role of socially-shared belief systems in the maintenance (and challenge) of stratified social orders, and (2) to show how persons' locations in social structures shape their adherence to ideologies that support or undermine the status quo.

I have organized this chapter as follows: First, I explore some ways that ideology has (and has not) been incorporated into research by sociological social psychologists and stratification scholars via an examination of several key sourcebooks published in these subfields over the past several decades. I then provide some theoretical background on the relationship between ideology and social stratification (e.g., legitimation), as well as on relevant theoretical perspectives from sociological social psychology (e.g., social structure and personality) that highlight the importance of specifying the relationships between social structure, culture, and the person. Building on this foundation, the heart of this chapter involves discussion of (1) the nature of ideologies as organized *belief-systems*, (2) implications of such for the *intrapersonal* organization of thought, and (3) selected *antecedents* of and *consequences* of individual-level patterns of ideological belief-adherence. I conclude with some suggestions for *future research*, including identifying ways that psychological and sociological approaches represent complementary and potentially fruitful sites for collaborative efforts in advancing our understanding of the relationship between inequality, ideology, and the person.²

² The study of ideology entails considerable epistemological debate amongst scholars across, and within, fields of study. Space limitations and the focus of the current volume preclude detailed exploration of these primarily philosophical matters. That said, Huber and Form's (1973) *Income and Ideology* (especially Ch. 3), provides a useful treatment of epistemological issues within the sociological study of ideology, including the implications of what Geertz (1964, p. 48) has called Mannheim's Paradox—i.e., the notion that, "if all knowledge is socially determined, then valid scientific knowledge is not possible... If every attempt at knowing is a function of one's place in society, relativism is inescapable...The doctrine of

Background

Uses in Past Sourcebooks

To provide an empirical baseline for discussing the place of ideology in the social psychology of inequality, I begin by examining how the concept has (and has not) been used in key sourcebooks from sociological social psychology and social stratification published over the past several decades. These sourcebooks serve both as important reference materials for scholars, and as seminal texts in the training and education of graduate students. As such, their contents reflect and reinforce dominant conceptions of “what’s important” within each of these sociological subfields. I searched for the word ideology (and ideologies) in the tables of contents and indices of three key sourcebooks in each subfield. For sociological social psychology, I examined: Rosenberg and Turner’s *Social Psychology: Sociological Perspectives* (1981), Cook, Fine, and House’s *Sociological Perspectives on Social Psychology* (1995), and Delamater’s *Handbook of Social Psychology* (2003) (which is part of a *Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research* series). For social stratification, I examined: Bendix and Lipset’s *Class, Status, and Power: Social Stratification in Comparative Perspective* (1966), Grusky’s *Social Stratification: Class, Race, and Gender in Sociological Perspective* (2001), and Manza and Sauder’s *Inequality and Society: Social Science Perspectives on Social Stratification* (2009).

relativism implies that sociology cannot be a science. Ultimately, it implies that *science* is not possible” (pp. 45–46 italics added). Huber and Form’s (1973) position on this matter, with which I concur, is that:

Students of society can do a number of things to improve the study of ideology. While such study may be socially influenced by forces acting on the scientist, those influences do not necessarily determine the outcome of the analysis. It is possible to reduce the ideological element in social science research even if it cannot be completely eliminated at the present stage of development of the discipline. To abandon the attempt at scientific analysis is to invite capture by any and every interest. (p. 61, italics added)

The Rosenberg and Turner volume contains no chapter title including the word ideology (nor ideologies), but does contain five index listings. The index mentions correspond to chapters on: “Collective Behavior: Social Movements” (“the mobilizing function of ideology,” “the interplay between networks and ideology,” and ideology as a “symbolic resource”); “Mass Communications and Public Opinion” (ideology in “mass media”); and “The Sociology of Sentiments and Emotion” (“ideological and evaluative beliefs”). The Cook, Fine, and House volume also lacks a chapter with the term ideology (or ideologies) in the title; however, unlike its predecessor, the Cook, Fine and House text does not contain any index mentions of those terms. Finally, in contrast to the two earlier sourcebooks, the Delamater volume contains a chapter with ideologies in the title (specifically: “Ideologies, Values, Attitudes, and Behavior”), as well as six index mentions—all of which correspond to this same chapter.³

A comparable analysis of the social stratification sourcebooks revealed the following: The Bendix and Lipset volume contains no chapter with the term ideology (nor ideologies) in the title, nor any index mentions. The same is true the Grusky volume, at least with respect to chapter titles (and major section headings). However, the Grusky text does have a subsection on “Theories of Class,” that includes an excerpt from Marx and Engels’ *The German Ideology* (labeled “Ideology and Class”). In addition, there are two index mentions under ideology in the Grusky volume—one for the Marx and Engels excerpt just mentioned, and one for a section of the volume titled “Social Mobility in Industrial Society” that contains a subsection on “Ideological Equalitarianism” (p. 316). Finally, the Manza and Sauder volume contains no chapters with ideology in the title, nor any index mentions. However, as with the Grusky volume, the Manza and Sauder

³ This anecdotal evidence of increased attention over the years—in the form of a chapter authored by a team of psychologists in the most recent social psychology sourcebook I examined—*may* reflect the resurgence of interest in ideology within the field of psychology over the past 15 years (Jost et al. 2008, 2009).

text includes a section on Karl Marx's writings containing an excerpt from Marx and Engels' *The German Ideology* (p. 76).

While there is no absolute standard from which to judge consideration of a concept, it seems fair to label the treatment of ideology in these six sourcebooks as sparse—at least as measured by chapter titles and discussion considered worthy of index mentions. To be sure, there are mentions of ideology and kindred constructs elsewhere in these volumes (though the fact that index mentions of ideology are so few remains noteworthy). For example, the Bendix and Lipset volume includes mention of the Horatio Alger “rags to riches” myth (p. 501), the Grusky volume makes reference to “collectivistic liberalism” (p. 216) and the American “achievement ideology” (p. 210), and the Manza and Sauder volume contains a chapter on the “psychology of social stratification” (pp. 385–396). In addition, there are discussions of related constructs in the social psychology sourcebooks, including chapters on “attitudes and behavior” (in the Rosenberg and Turner volume), and both “attitudes, beliefs, and behavior” and “justice and injustice” in the Cook, Fine and House volume.

In light of the sparse treatment of ideology, I also considered the possibility that the term itself—given its definitional eclecticism (Gerring 1997)—might have been eschewed in favor of related constructs. To explore this possibility (at least partially), I examined the six sourcebooks for mentions of the term “values” to further determine the extent to which the research summarized in the volumes engaged such matters. While not truly comparable, given that ideologies and values are generally understood to correspond to different levels of abstraction (i.e., ideologies as higher-order systems *comprise* elements such as values—see below, and Maio et al. 2003), this examination revealed two index mentions in the Rosenberg and Turner volume, four in the Cook, Fine, and House volume, and 11 in the Delamater volume (in the latter case, all deriving from the chapter on “Ideologies, Values, Attitudes, and Behavior” already mentioned). Regarding the Bendix and Lipset volume, there were no index mentions of values per se, though

there were 10 mentions under the heading “value systems.” There were also no index mentions under values in the Grusky text (though there were three for the term *value*—e.g., “Karl Marx on” and “of laboring power”—which, of course, represent something different than values as an aspect of cultural belief-systems). Finally, there were no index mentions of values in the Manza and Sauder volume.

Overall, this analysis suggests that—within the subfield of social stratification—processes involving culture and the role of subjectivities in maintaining inequality appear decidedly secondary in importance to more macro-structural and organizational issues.⁴ To paraphrase Kluegel and Smith (1981), the classic stratification question of “who gets what and why?” (Lenski 1966, p. viii) appears to trump the more socio-cultural and social psychological concern with explicating “what people *believe about* who gets what and why?” (p. 30, italics added). Within sociological social psychology, the relative neglect of the topic of ideology may reflect longer-standing issues within the field regarding inquiries into issues of power and inequality (Maines 1977), with some important exceptions, of course (see, for example, Hollander and Howard (2000) for a useful review)—some of which are highlighted in what follows.

Distinguishing “Ideology” from Related Constructs

As mentioned at the outset, this chapter cannot cover, much less resolve, the considerable definitional eclecticism characterizing the concept of “ideology” (though for an impressive attempt, see Gerring 1997). Rather, I concur with Jost et al. (2009) who, at the outset of their recent review of research on political ideology, note: “Many scholars address the definitional challenge by listing the plethora of definitions that exist in the

⁴ However, see Hodson and Busseri (2012) and Norton and Ariely (2011) for recent examples of exceptions to this generalization. I thank the editors for these suggestions.

literature, in the hopes that the target can be discerned from the pattern of firing... Because space is precious, we eschew this strategy, tempting though it is” (p. 309). That said, clarity dictates the necessity of distinguishing ideology from some closely related constructs. For instance, terms such as ideologies, values, and attitudes are often used interchangeably—sometimes within a given study; they are also commonly used without explicit definition. Maio et al. (2003) provide a useful corrective; for these authors, attitudes represent “tendencies to evaluate an object positively or negatively,” values refer to “abstract ideals that function as important guiding principles,” and ideologies are “*systems of attitudes and values that are organized around an abstract theme*” (Maio et al. 2003, p. 284, italics added).⁵

As is suggested by these definitions, attitudes, values, and ideologies differ in their *levels of abstraction*, with attitudes typically having the most concrete referents, and ideologies representing the most abstract of the three (i.e., as systems of thought comprised of the other two lower-order phenomena). To borrow an example from Maio et al. (2003), “a liberal *ideology* may encompass the *values* of freedom and helpfulness, together with unfavorable *attitudes* toward censorship and reduced social spending” (p. 284, italics added). And, while the causal ordering among attitudes, values, and ideologies is theoretically bi-directional, research has generally focused on how higher-order phenomena (e.g., ideologies) shape lower-order ones (e.g., attitudes). In their words:

This direction of influence is particularly interesting because it would involve a mechanism wherein even small changes in the most abstract ideologies and values lead to numerous changes in related, lower-level attitudes. The mechanism can be illustrated by considering the effects of changing the extent to which people value equality. If people begin to attach less importance to this value, they might change their attitudes toward a variety of issues, ranging from affirmative action to immigration quotas to attitudes toward equal rights organizations. This potential breadth of effects makes ideologies and values powerful constructs. (p. 284)

⁵ For more background on the subject of “values” see: Inglehart (1971, 1997), Rokeach (1973), Schwartz (1992), Lipset (1979), Free and Cantril (1968), and McClosky and Zaller (1984).

Most research on ideology within the fields of psychology and political science has been on political ideology—i.e., a left vs. right (or, in the U.S., liberal vs. conservative) axis summarizing persons’ positions regarding support for inequality (vs. equality) and system-stability/tradition (vs. change) (Jost et al. 2009; Knight 2006). That said, scholars in these fields have identified other ideological continua, including: multiculturalism vs. colorblindness (Wolsko et al. 2000), individualism vs. communalism (Katz and Hass 1988), and individualism vs. collectivism (Triandis 1995). Psychological research on such constructs focuses on individual differences, and in some instances, cross-cultural comparisons (Triandis 1995); however, connections to the creation and maintenance of systems of structural inequality are relatively underdeveloped (but see: Jost et al. 2009; Jost and Major 2001; Sidanius and Pratto 1999). In contrast, sociologists emphasize linkages between ideology and inequality, both in the sense of explicating the role of ideologies (as part of culture) in legitimating social arrangements, and in terms of the relationship between persons’ locations in structures of inequality and their (individual-level) patterns of belief adherence. I turn next to more detailed consideration of these two key foci of sociological work.

Ideology and the Legitimation of Inequality

Stratification systems are perpetuated through a variety of mechanisms (Kerbo 1983; Sidanius and Pratto 1999). While *force* is sometimes a factor, scholars generally agree that the “fear of force” solution to the problem of order is generally inefficient, particularly over longer periods of time, and in the face of widespread opposition. *Material* incentives are another mechanism by which societies maintain support for the status quo. For example, Piven and Cloward (1971) show how public assistance (e.g., unemployment insurance) has historically been expanded by governments as a social control mechanism during periods of social unrest among subordinate strata, and retracted during periods of relative quiescence.

However, as with force, material incentives are generally understood to have serious limitations, including the possibility of non-elites “deciding that their obedience is bought too cheaply” (Kerbo 1983, p. 374), as well as when incentives become limited by factors beyond the control of elites (e.g., during an economic depression).

Given these limitations, social theorists generally agree that the more efficient means of promoting social stability involves ideology, defined as “a comprehensive set of related statements which explain and justify social arrangements” (Huber and Form 1973). That is, regardless of other mechanisms at play, all stratified societies develop a *system of ideas* for “convincing non-elites that inequality is morally right, and that those most advantaged are justified in giving orders and receiving a greater proportion of valued goods and services” (Kerbo 1983, p. 374).

For Huber and Form (1973), an ideology is dominant when it “represents the views of those groups which have the most of what there is to get” (p. 15), and operates most smoothly when the status quo is taken-for-granted in a “what ought to be, is, and what is, ought to be” fashion (Form and Rytina 1969). This general consent-generating mechanism has been variously described as reflecting the successful imposition of an elite-manufactured political formula (Mosca 1939), ideological hegemony (Gramsci 1971), and legitimation (Della Fave 1980). Indeed, the role of legitimation in maintaining systems of social stratification is acknowledged by social theorists of all theoretical persuasions; what varies is the *evaluation* of that state of affairs—i.e., what is functional normative integration for Durkheim represents false consciousness for Marx (Della Fave 1980).

That said, ideological legitimation is neither automatic nor inevitable. Societal instability and demands for change can accompany the “delegitimation” of stratification (Della Fave 1980)—i.e., the situation wherein ideologies justifying the status quo become questioned or invalidated by various strata, classes, or groups.⁶ As Huber

and Form (1973) note, counter-ideologies may arise “when significant strata or segments of society devalue normative and existential tenets of the dominant ideology” (p. 14). Historical examples of such delegitimation include the 1930’s Great Depression era in the United States when a system-blaming outlook became popular in the face of the massive structural unemployment of able-bodied workers (Piven and Cloward 1971); during the 1960’s, when significant portions of historically-disadvantaged groups (e.g., African-Americans, women) began to question the validity of dominant, individualistic modes of explaining stratification (Morris 1984; Omi and Winant 1994); and, most recently, in the form of emergent popular movements on both the political Right (e.g. Tea Party) and Left (e.g., Occupy) in the wake of the 2008 economic collapse and ensuing recession.⁷

Social Structure, Culture, and the Person

Beyond explicating the role of ideology in system-maintenance processes such as legitimation, sociologists have long been interested in explicating how individuals’ ideological orientations vary by their location in social structures. Sociological interest in such issues is traceable to Marx’s (1845, 1859) writings on ideology, class, and consciousness. Among Marx’s contributions was explicitly theorizing the relationship between class location, ideology, and political consciousness in a way that rendered such socially shared ideas sociologically important and politically meaningful. In this same vein, Weber was concerned with understanding the role of

particular leader; a particular regime; a system of political economy; and, stratification itself. De-legitimation is less likely at ever-higher levels of abstraction—i.e., a leader or even an entire government may be forced out of power without fundamentally challenging the political economy, let alone stratification itself.

⁷ The 2008 economic crisis may represent a classic “precipitating event” which released latent discontent following decades of growing inequality and declining social mobility.

⁶ Della Fave (1980) argues that legitimation can function with respect to any of four different system levels: a par-

religious (and other) ideologies in legitimating social arrangements. For instance, Weber's writings on the role of theodicies—belief systems that explain and rationalize inequality and suffering (by providing answers to the seeming paradox of observable evil alongside the belief in a loving God)—are especially relevant to the issues at hand (Weber 1921, 1922). Building on these intellectual foundations, Mannheim is perhaps most often associated with the notion that people's knowledge (e.g., ideas, values, beliefs) is a function of their positions in societies. In his most well-known work, *Ideology and Utopia*, Mannheim (1936) distinguishes between ideologies, defined as the sets of ideas or myths justifying the political domination of existing governments, and utopias, which refer to the counter-ideologies containing future states envisioned by revolutionary thinkers.

This intellectual legacy survives in the social structure and personality (SSP) framework within sociological social psychology—also variously termed psychological sociology (House 1977), social structure and the individual (McLeod and Lively 2003), and social structure and attitudes (Kiecolt 1988) research. Such research is most centrally concerned with explicating linkages between characteristics of larger social systems and those of persons. To facilitate such investigations, House (1981) outlines three analytical principles to guide SSP research: (1) the *components* principle, holding that we must first understand relevant aspects (components) of the social system of interest, (2) the *proximity* principle, holding that we must specify relevant proximate social relationships and experiences through which macro-social forces impinge on the person, and (3) the *psychological* principle, holding that we must understand individual psychology if we are to fully explain how macro and more proximate social factors are processed by, and come to shape, the person. In House's words, we must “understand the nature of social structure (really social systems) and of personality (really individual psychology), and of linkages between them (especially micro-social interaction and small group processes)” (House 1977, p. 541).

House's (1981) views of the relationship between social structure, culture, and the person—from a chapter McLeod (2008) credits with defining “a new subfield of sociological social psychology” (p. 228)—are worth quoting at length:

A social system...is a set of persons and social positions or roles that possess both a culture and a social structure. A culture is a set of cognitive and evaluative beliefs—beliefs about what is or what ought to be—that are shared by the members of a social system and transmitted to new members. A social structure is a persisting and bounded pattern of social relationships (or pattern of behavioral interaction) among the units (that is persons or positions) in a social system. Culture and social structure are closely related—shared values and beliefs shape the definition of social positions and the relations between them (that is, the social structure) whereas the nature of actual social relationships, even if these are primarily responses to physical or biological imperatives, influences our values and beliefs. The correspondence between the two is, however, never perfect. We need to distinguish, therefore, both theoretically and empirically, between what members of a social system *collectively believe*, and what they *collectively do*. Culture and social structure are generated and maintained by somewhat different forces and they influence individuals in somewhat different ways. (p. 543, underlining added)⁸

Thus, for House (1981), the upstream sources of individuals' ideological orientations are both social structural and cultural—i.e., they stem from

⁸ Interestingly, House's definition of culture (particularly the phrase “beliefs about what is or what ought to be”) closely resembles some prevailing definitions of ideology. For instance, Huber and Form (1973) assert that “in contemporary industrial societies, an ideology is the rhetoric of a population concerning the way institutions *actually function* and the way they *ought to function* (p. 60, italics added). Similarly, political psychologists Jost et al. (2009) write, ideologies seek to “describe or interpret the world *as it is*—by making assertions or assumptions about human nature, historical events, present realities, and future possibilities—and to envision the world *as it should be*, specifying acceptable means of attaining social, economic, and political ideals” (p. 309, italics added). What these share with House's definition of culture (and with each other), is explicit reference to what Huber and Form (1973) call the *existential* and *normative* tenets of ideology—i.e. references to both “what is” (a description of things) and “what should be” (a value-based, evaluative stance).

our locations within systems of social relations, and from our exposure and adherence to larger systems of beliefs and values.

While House (1981) takes pains to differentiate structural from cultural explanations (at least as ideal types, in the interest of better specifying each), he ultimately acknowledges their complementary nature in writing, “most relationships between macro-social phenomena and individual personality or behavior *involve both kinds of effects*” (p. 547, italics added). The notion that structural and cultural forces are closely intertwined is echoed by McLeod and Lively (2003) in their more recent review of SSP work, in which they assert that, “it may be more difficult to distinguish cultural and structural effects in practice than in theory” (p. 83). They cite the issue of racial inequality as an example:

Systems of stratification depend on mutually reinforcing structures and ideologies that are not easily disentangled. Racial inequality, for example, has been conceptualized as a system that subjugates some population groups to others based on the identification of presumed physical differences and the association of those differences with ideologies of inferiority and superiority. (p. 82)

I return to the basic logic of the SSP theoretical frame below, in discussing (1) the compatibility of sociological and political-psychological models of belief adherence, and (2) suggestions for future work in this regard. Next, however, I discuss what past research in sociology, psychology, and political science tells us about (1) the nature of ideological belief-systems, (2) the intra-personal organization of thought, and (3) sources of variation in adherence to, and selected consequences of, ideological beliefs.

Ideologies as “Logical” Systems

Definitions of ideology (ideologies) offered above include: “systems of attitudes and values that are organized around an abstract theme” (Maio et al. 2003), and, “a comprehensive set of related statements which explain and justify social arrangements” (Huber and Form 1973). Such definitions highlight the notion of ideolo-

gies as logically organized systems or sets of beliefs. Several examples of ideologies as logical syllogisms have been offered within the sociological study of inequality.

Individualism and Egalitarianism

One of the most often cited examples of an ideological belief-system is Huber and Form’s (1973) dominant ideology thesis, which holds that social stratification in the United States is legitimated via an ideology organized around three key values: equality, success, and democracy. For Huber and Form (1973) the basic logic of dominant ideological thinking about inequality is as follows: (1) people tend to believe that *equality* exists in the form of equal chances (i.e., the belief that opportunity is widely available); therefore, (2) ones’ *success* or position in society is seen as a function of effort, ability, or other individual-level traits (as opposed to social-structural forces); and, (3) because people believe that the United States is a *democracy* characterized by a pluralistic and open political system, they also believe that societal injustices are quickly rooted out through popular participation in government (thus rendering remaining inequalities legitimate). In the words of Huber and Form (1973), people who adhere to the dominant ideology of American stratification believe that:

Because educational opportunity is equal, and because everything depends on how hard a person works, the system is fair to everyone. Should the rewards become unfairly distributed, the system could be adjusted and improved because every man has a vote in a political system devoted to protecting individual achievement. Therefore, individuals get the rewards they earn and people get the government they deserve. (p. 4)

Thus, for Huber and Form (1973), the dominant ideology operates by first structuring beliefs regarding the availability of opportunity, which, in turn, shape downstream perceptions concerning the causes of inequality and the fairness of resulting social hierarchies.

While Huber and Form’s (1973) argument has found much empirical support (Feagin 1975;

Kinder 1983; Kluegel and Smith 1986; McClosky and Zaller 1984; Nilson 1981), other approaches to conceptualizing stratification ideology exist. For instance, Della Fave (1974) outlines the logical structure of a belief-system focusing not on ideological supports for inequality, but on the logical foundations of *egalitarianism*—i.e., support for economic *equality* and related notions of distributive justice. For Della Fave (1974), support for economic equality rests on five (inter-related) sub-beliefs: (1) a feeling of deprivation, (2) use of “system-blame” attributions (for that deprivation), (3) a belief that social justice requires equality, (4) a belief that equality is possible (i.e., human nature will allow it, even in complex societies), and (5) a belief that transforming society to a more equal one is a realistic and worthy goal. Importantly, Della Fave’s (1974) conceptualization of this ideology of egalitarianism presupposes specific stances *across* the five sub-beliefs comprising it (meaning, opportunities for derailing the *truly* egalitarian stance exist at various steps in its development). For example, given a sense of deprivation, one could attribute that state of affairs either to the system (externally) or to the self (internally). The requisite system-blame attribution could then lead to divergent demands, depending on one’s view of social justice (e.g., mobility for one’s own group versus the establishment of equality). And, subsequent calls for equality could have varying consequences depending on related beliefs about human nature and the feasibility of such change.⁹

⁹ Kluegel and Smith (1986), in their seminal study of stratification ideology, echo many of the emphases of both Huber and Form (1973) and Della Fave (1974)—particularly the notion that Americans’ thinking about inequality is shaped by both a dominant (hegemonic) ideology of individualism, and by various (more egalitarian) system-challenging alternatives. One implication of this (explored in greater detail below) is that most Americans’ thinking about inequality involves a *combination* of hegemonic and system-challenging belief-elements.

Racial Ideology—From Jim Crow to Laissez-Faire

While this chapter has (thus far) emphasized primarily political and economic matters, ideologies govern all forms of social inequality—including those based on race/ethnicity, gender, and sexual orientation.¹⁰ For example, over the past half-century, the United States has witnessed a shift in dominant modes of explaining racial inequality (Schuman et al. 1997) involving the gradual replacement of ideologies stressing the supposed biological inferiority of African-Americans with lines of thought emphasizing blacks’ supposed *cultural* shortcomings as the favored explanation of their continued disadvantage (Hunt 2007; Krysan 2000). This shift entails movement from so-called traditional, old-fashioned, or Jim Crow racial ideologies (linked to overt forms of racial discrimination) to new and novel forms of racial prejudice governing more subtle forms of discrimination, with the latter variously termed symbolic racism (Sears 1988), modern racism (McConahay 1986), racial resentment (Kinder and Sanders 1996), and, in its most sociological guises: *laissez-faire* (Bobo et al. 1997) and color-blind (Bonilla-Silva 2006) racism.

Bobo et al.’s (1997) conceptualization of this “kinder, gentler, anti-black ideology” (p. 15), links the cultural turn in dominant racial ideologies to large-scale changes in the social and economic structure of the United States. Specifically, the decline of Jim Crow in the South, alongside industrialization (and eventual deindustrialization) outside of that region, fundamentally altered (1) the distribution of the African-

¹⁰ Space restrictions preclude discussion of such ideologies in detail. But, see Davis and Greenstein (2009) for a recent review of research on gender ideology, emphasizing the notion of separate spheres for men and women vis-à-vis paid work and family responsibilities. See also Kane’s important work on beliefs about gender inequality (1992, 1995), and Jackman’s (1994) important treatment of inter-group ideologies governing gender, race, and class-based inequality. Finally, regarding ideological beliefs about the etiology of sexual orientation and support for related public policies (e.g., gay marriage, etc.), see: Wood and Bartkowski 2004; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2008; Powell et al. 2010.

American population in the United States (e.g., via the Great Migration), (2) the nature of race relations, and (3) dominant modes of thought providing legitimation to emergent patterns of racial inequality. Where Jim Crow ideology once reinforced the legal (i.e., state-sanctioned) segregation of whites and blacks, Laissez-Faire ideology explicitly *absolves* the state of any responsibility for the continued subordination of African-Americans despite its roots in the United States' peculiar legacy of slavery and segregation (O'Connell 2012; Oliver and Shapiro 1995).

Correspondingly, a new logic governs contemporary discourses regarding racial inequality. Most (white) Americans believe that the Civil Rights Movement "did its work" in the form of establishing the formal legal equality of blacks (Kluegel 1985). This position leads "logically" to the assumption that persisting racial inequalities (pursuant to the establishment of legal equality) must be the outgrowth of fair competition. As such, most (white) Americans appear willing to tolerate as much race-based inequality as ostensibly "free markets" produce, following the supposition that those inequalities must stem from differences in the behavior or capabilities that free actors bring to the "competition." To paraphrase Kluegel (1985) on public support for race-based social policies to combat racial inequality: "if there isn't a problem, you don't need a solution"—i.e., government involvement in elevating the status of black Americans will inevitably be seen as illegitimate if one adheres to the presumption of equal chances lying at the heart of various new racism discourses.

Bonilla-Silva's (2006) color-blind racism argument offers a similar approach to understanding the changing nature of race relations and corresponding shifts in dominant modes of public discourse regarding racial inequality. Like Bobo et al. (1997), Bonilla-Silva (2006) roots his discussion of racial ideology within a larger structural analysis of American society. Specifically, for Bonilla-Silva (2006), the "post-civil rights era" in the United States has produced a color-blind turn in race relations. In the absence of legal reinforcements of racial segregation and inequality (e.g., Jim Crow), the United States'

long-standing and unequal racial structure is perpetuated and legitimated via an ideology that *denies the very relevance* of race in social relations, thus reinforcing notions of meritocratic individualism while systematically de-legitimizing more structurally-oriented discourses of racial oppression.¹¹

Political Ideology

As a final example, research in psychology and political science has generally focused on political ideology—understood as the degree to which persons' political attitudes and beliefs correspond to an underlying left/right (or liberal/conservative) dimension. While many descriptions of this dimension have been offered, Jost et al. (2009) suggest that it represents, most basically, where people fall in relation to two key issues: (1) support for vs. resistance of *social change* (versus tradition) and (2) the acceptance or rejection of *social inequality* (Jost et al. 2003). While much debate exists regarding the extent to which average citizens' thinking is ideological in nature (more on this below), Jost et al. (2009) defend their use of the term, citing evidence such as (1) the relatively strong predictive validity of persons' ideological self-placements on their voting intentions (Jost 2006), and (2) cross-national

¹¹ For Bonilla-Silva (2006), colorblind ideology accomplishes this goal via four key frames that are commonly invoked by white Americans in their reasoning and language regarding race: abstract liberalism, naturalization, cultural racism, and the minimization of racism. *Abstract liberalism* reflects long-standing, individualistic strains of American political culture (Hartz 1955) that render group-based claims and grievances beyond the bounds of legitimate political discourse. *Naturalization* refers to persons' tendencies to frame the status quo as the natural outgrowth of benign human preferences (e.g., racial residential segregation as the outcome of "neutral ethnocentrism" on the part racial minorities and majorities alike, rather than an outgrowth of active discrimination against minorities). *Cultural racism* refers to the above-mentioned tendency to explain racial inequality with reference to the cultural "deficiencies" of minorities (e.g., lack of will power to succeed), while the *minimization of racism* refers to the above-mentioned denials regarding the role of discrimination and/or other structural sources of black disadvantage.

research showing that people systematically and reliably associate the political Right with terms such as conservative, order, capitalism, individualism, and nationalism, and the political Left with terms such as progressive, system change, equality, protest, and socialism (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990).

The Intra-personal Organization of Thought

Social and behavioral scientists agree that ideologies govern the intra-personal organization of thought, though considerable disagreement exists over both (1) what constitutes ideological thinking, and (2) the extent to which the thinking of ordinary citizens (as opposed to elites or opinion-leaders) should be framed as ideological. In his seminal paper, “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics,” Philip Converse (1964) advanced the notion that the political thinking of average citizens in the U.S. is decidedly non-ideological—i.e., unsystematic and lacking any discernible organization by higher-order principles such as the liberal/conservative axis. Feldman and Zaller (1992) describe this position as follows: “the central idea is that of *constraint*, namely, the capacity of one political idea to control or ‘constrain’ another. Thus, if people both (1) embrace a general principle such as economic individualism and (2) derive specific policies from this value, their more specific ideas are constrained by *ideological principle*” (p. 270, italics added). Following this logic, seemingly unrelated or random combinations of socio-political attitudes (e.g., value orientations that are inconsistent with more specific policy stances) represent political orientations that are unconstrained by ideological principle.

Converse (1964) argued that only a small minority of U.S. citizens (approximately 10% of the population he termed elites based on their relative education, political knowledge, and sophistication), might reasonably be thought of as having constrained (i.e., ideological) belief systems. However, other scholars (e.g., Hochschild 1981; Lane 1962) have reached quite different conclu-

sions regarding both the reasoning capacities of average citizens and the nature of their beliefs. Where Converse (1964) sees disorganization, inconsistency, and low political sophistication, Hochschild (1981) argues for the existence of a considered *ambivalence*, stemming from average Americans’ attempts to reconcile underlying value conflicts in the political culture (e.g., notions of freedom and economic inequality alongside competing emphases on equality and social welfare). While this Converse vs. Lane/Hochschild debate is a longstanding and oft-cited one in the field of political science, Feldman and Zaller (1992) suggest both sides make valid insights. They write:

Nearly all Americans have absorbed the principal elements of their political culture, and as Hochschild in particular has shown, they are highly sensitive to its characteristic fault lines. Yet, they are relatively non-ideological in that most do not reconcile these tensions in ways that would lead to the development of consistent liberal or conservative ideologies. (p. 272, italics added)¹²

This image of an un-reconciled combination of seemingly inconsistent belief elements is central to contemporary sociological work on ideologies within the social psychology of inequality. For instance, a central theme of Kluegel and Smith’s (1986) seminal study of Americans’ stratification beliefs (i.e., Americans’ views of “what is, and what ought to be”) highlights the competing cul-

¹² This, of course, assumes *Converse’s* definition of ideology, which has its share of critics. Jost (2006, p. 653) reviews several alternative viewpoints, including that of sociologist C. Wright Mills (1960/1968) who wrote, “It is a kindergarten fact that any political reflection that is of possible political significance is *ideological*: in its terms policies, institutions, men of power are criticized or approved” (p. 130). Further, to the extent that many Americans do not fit Converse’s model of the ideologue, Feldman (1988) advocates a focus on core beliefs and values (e.g., support for notions such as equality of opportunity and capitalist free enterprise) as important sources of structure, consistency, and organization in Americans’ political attitudes. As Feldman notes, “political evaluations may be based, in part, on the extent to which policies and actions are consistent or inconsistent with certain important beliefs and values. Viewed this way, people do not need to be ideologues in order to evaluate politics on the basis of beliefs and values.” (p. 418)

tural forces shaping Americans' thinking about inequality (and related social policies).¹³ On the one hand, Kluegel and Smith (1986) echo Huber and Form (1973) in arguing for the potent effects of a stable, dominant ideology emphasizing the availability of opportunity and corresponding individualistic accounts of success and failure. However, Kluegel and Smith (1986) also stress the existence of system-challenging alternatives—summarized under the heading of social liberalism—that compete with the dominant ideology in focusing on the unequal distribution of opportunity (particularly by race and gender) and corresponding needs for social policies to create greater opportunity and equality.

The result of these competing ideological strains is that most Americans *combine* elements of these competing ideological currents in their thinking about inequality (Hunt 1996, 2007; Kluegel and Smith 1986; Kluegel et al. 2000; Lee et al. 1990). This position is consistent with Hochschild's (1981) ambivalence thesis, and contrasts with the assumption that people take an either-or approach to thinking about inequality. That is, in past research, ideologies, value-systems, and belief-systems were assumed to exist in opposing pairs—e.g., right vs. left, individualism vs. structuralism—apparently reflecting a basic cognitive tendency.¹⁴ Such imagery survives in cognitive consistency theories (Abelson et al. 1968) holding that (1) socio-political beliefs can be scaled along a single dimension (e.g., liberal-conservative axis), and (2) inconsistency is an unpleasant state that creates a motivational drive toward resolution and consistency (Kluegel and Smith 1986, p. 15). However, much research over the past 3 decades shows that these dichotomies are not always warranted (Kluegel and

Smith 1986; Lee et al. 1990)—a position consistent with the principle of cognitive efficiency, holding that persons can, and often do, combine seemingly inconsistent belief types rather than viewing them as alternatives in the quest to resolve or reduce dissonance (Kluegel and Smith 1986). With regard to ideological beliefs about inequality, Kluegel and Smith (1986) put the matter bluntly: “individual and structural explanations are not alternatives” (p. 17).

Mann (1970) links this image of individual-level inconsistency to the very stability of stratified social orders in arguing that, rather than resting on a consensus over basic system-legitimizing values such as individualism, the social cohesion of liberal democracies rests on the *lack* of such consensus—particularly among the working class and disadvantaged minority groups. That is, for Mann, societal stability and the lack of acute group-based conflict are rooted in the *inconsistency* of the belief systems (e.g., some individualistic and system-challenging beliefs) of potentially recalcitrant groups. Bobo (1991) reaches a similar conclusion in demonstrating the existence of a potent social responsibility strain in American culture that relatively disadvantaged groups are especially likely to draw upon to counter economic individualism.¹⁵

Others have found similar evidence of dualities in studies of public opinion in the U.S. and abroad. For instance, using data from a range of countries (including both Western liberal democratic and Eastern European post-communist states), Kluegel et al. (2000) advance a “split-consciousness” perspective stressing the ideologically mixed nature of most persons' thinking on inequality. Drawing on Gramsci's (1971) theories of hegemony and contradictory consciousness, Kluegel et al. (2000) argue that the popular think-

¹³ Kluegel and Smith (1986), in Chap. 2 of their pioneering work, review a wide range of social psychological research providing the foundations of their perspective on how Americans think about inequality. I refer the reader to that chapter in the original, rather than trying to reiterate its many important points and insights.

¹⁴ Such reasoning can be traced to thinkers such as Levi-Strauss (1966) who hold that such “bipolar” dichotomies are the result of oppositional human thought processes rooted in the structure of the mind.

¹⁵ As such, Bobo (1991) argues against what he characterizes as the “consensus on individualism” position of most accounts of American public opinion (which treat individualism as a true “dominant ideology.” Instead, he argues, individualism retains its appearance as a hegemonic value in the larger society *not* because of the lack of alternatives, but rather because of the lack of political influence and low status of persons most committed to egalitarian beliefs.

ing is simultaneously shaped by dominant ideological currents (which reflect dominant-class interests—e.g., individualism, equity norms) *and* by ideas that stem from the lived experiences and practical realities of the lives of ordinary citizens in stratified societies (e.g., structuralism, equality norms) (see also: Cheal 1979; Sallach 1974). Along these same lines, Hunt (1996) observed that respondents in a 1993 survey of southern Californians considered both individualistic *and* structuralist explanations of poverty to be important, and this “dual consciousness” of factors generating poverty was more pronounced among blacks and Latinos (compared to whites).¹⁶ Hughes and Tuch (1999) later generalized this observation of greater minority dual consciousness to Asian-Americans. And, most recently, Hunt (2007) observed that blacks and Hispanics were more likely than whites to adopt so-called mixed modes of explanation for black/white inequality that combine individualistic and structuralist elements.

Building on the foregoing discussion, I turn next to consideration of factors that shape (antecedents), and are shaped by (consequences), individual-level patterns of ideological beliefs.

Antecedents and Consequences

What Factors Shape Ideological Belief-Adherence?

Sociologists have emphasized three primary issues in their explanations of “what people

believe about who gets what, and why?” (Kluegel and Smith 1981): (1) a dominant ideology of individualism (thought to affect the thinking of nearly all Americans), (2) alternative belief-systems that challenge the logic of the dominant ideology (and which are adhered to more variously depending on historical factors and people’s stratification-related experiences), and (3) persons’ social statuses (e.g., race, SES, gender) which—as indices of differential access to power and resources (i.e., material interests)—shape their orientations toward the status quo and various imagined alternatives (Kluegel and Smith 1986).

Evidence of Americans’ widespread adherence to a stable, hegemonic ideology of individualism is consistent with various consensus models in sociology, which hold that cross-class ideological agreement on issues such as why inequality exists is an important element in the stability of stratified social orders (Abercrombie et al. 1990; Della Fave 1980). Such perspectives include American structural-functionalism (Parsons 1951), as well as selected European neo-Marxist theories (especially those focusing culture, consciousness, and the subjective side of the Marxian dialectic—e.g., Ritzer 1983).¹⁷ Research demonstrating (1) broad-based support in the U.S. for the view that opportunity is widely available (Kluegel and Smith 1981), (2) the dominance of individualistic (over structurally-oriented) accounts of why poverty and wealth exist (Feagin 1975; Kluegel and Smith 1986), and (3) the fact that most disadvantaged persons

¹⁶ This greater minority dual consciousness was interpreted in line with Mann’s (1970) observation that relatively disadvantaged groups are more likely to combine seemingly inconsistent beliefs. Also considered was the possibility that individualistic and structuralist explanations may both be more salient to ethno-racial minorities given their greater average geographic and social proximity to the poor. The exposure-based geographic hypothesis found support in a study by Merolla et al. (2011), who observed a positive association between persons’ geographic proximity to concentrated disadvantage (measured at the zip-code level) and the dual consciousness belief pattern (measured at the individual-level). These authors suggest that living in closer proximity to poverty may reinforce both sides of the deserving/undeserving poor dichotomy in American public opinion (Gans 1995).

¹⁷ Such neo-Marxian work includes (1) the Critical Theorists (Habermas 1970; Horkheimer 1972; Marcuse 1964), who turned to an analysis of culture in an effort to preserve Marxist theory in the face of the predictive failures that hallmark the twentieth century (Zaret 1992), and (2) the so-called Hegelian Marxists such as Gramsci (1971) who, drawing primarily on Marx’s earlier philosophical writings, contributed concepts such as “hegemony” to our understanding of the role of culture as a barrier to revolutionary social change. Such forces are believed to operate by dominating or colonizing the consciousness of potentially recalcitrant groups (Habermas 1987) in a way that renders even the *desire* for radical social change unlikely. Thus, whereas functionalists view societal consensus as healthy, natural, and productive of social integration, Marxists view this consensus as the result of exploitation, coercion, and the exercise of ruling-class power creating a barrier to emancipation and progressive social change.

fail to challenge their subordination (Hochschild 1981; Kerbo 1983), provides empirical support for such viewpoints.

That said, there is no shortage of evidence that potent, system-challenging alternatives to individualism exist (Bobo 1991; Kluegel and Smith 1986). As such, and in line with basic conflict theory (Collins 1975) and traditional Marxist assumptions (Marx and Engels 1845), sociologists have explored how structurally-rooted conflicts of interest create across-strata disagreements regarding the desirability of the status quo and its alternatives. Most research in this vein supports the interest-based logic of what Robinson and Bell (1978) call an *underdog thesis*—i.e., the position that “individuals who objectively benefit from the stratification system in comparison with others are more likely to judge its inequalities to be just” (p. 128). In other words, the delegitimation of inequality is expected to be more advanced among objectively disadvantaged strata (e.g., race/ethnic minorities, persons with lower SES, women).¹⁸ Consistent with this stance, Huber and Form (1973) demonstrate that persons most favored by unequal distributions of rewards were the most likely to support ideologies that justify social inequality. And, Robinson and Bell (1978) observed that subordinate strata did *not* view inequality as legitimate, and instead were more likely than more advantaged strata to favor principles of equality (over equity). Similar results have been observed in other studies (Centers 1949; Form and Rytina 1969; Feagin 1975; Kluegel and Smith 1986).¹⁹

¹⁸ Huber and Form (1973) argue similarly that, since ideologies exist to legitimate unequal social arrangements which benefit some groups more than others, those in the dominant strata, following simple self-interest, are expected to evaluate the status quo as more legitimate than will subordinate strata. In their words, “those who profit most from the system are most likely to believe that both the normative and empirical statements in the dominant ideology are true” (p. 10).

¹⁹ Kluegel and Smith (1986) devote separate chapters to explanations of economic outcomes (e.g., attributions for wealth and poverty) and related issues of distributive justice (e.g., beliefs about the justice of inequality in principle and about whether the current distribution of rewards—such as the income received by persons in different occupations—is fair). Summarizing their observa-

While the logic of the underdog thesis seems intuitively obvious, it does not always hold. That is, we know that members of lower-status groups (in seeming contradiction to their material interests) are also capable of supporting the systems that keep them disadvantaged at equal or even higher rates than their more advantaged counterparts (Lane 1962; Sennett and Cobb 1972).²⁰ For instance, Lewis (1978) argues that a highly individualistic “culture of inequality” moves Americans living just above the poverty line (e.g., members of the working class) to stress individual failings when describing the poor (see also Wilkins, Mollborn, and Bó, this volume). This maneuver highlights working class persons’ *relative* socioeconomic successes vis-à-vis the poor, creating moral and psychological distance where social and/or geographic proximity is present. Similarly, Lane (1959) has argued for the

tions from these chapters, Kluegel and Smith (1986) note a paradox: “On the one hand, most Americans believe that as individuals the wealthy have merited their positions through superior talent and effort. On the other hand, most Americans also believe that the average incomes from the occupations that the wealthy typically hold are too high in proportion to their contributions to society” (p. 121). Kluegel and Smith note that such findings confirm a key hypothesis of prior work (e.g., Alves and Rossi 1978; Jasso and Rossi 1977; Rainwater 1974) that “many Americans would prefer a more restricted range of incomes in the ideal than currently exists” (p. 122). More recent studies extend the examination of Americans’ beliefs about distributive justice to cross-national settings (Kelley and Evans 1993; Osberg and Smeeding 2006).

²⁰ Along these lines, an “enlightenment” thesis associated with the effects of education holds that higher levels of education increase social liberalism by exposing persons to more accurate information about intergroup relations and inequalities (Hyman and Wright 1979; Kluegel and Smith 1986; Robinson and Bell 1978). However, Mary Jackman (e.g., Jackman and Muha 1984) has challenged this assessment, arguing that education is, first and foremost, a component of SES and, as such, the primary *effect* of higher levels of education is the maintenance of privilege. Specifically, Jackman’s “ideological refinement” perspective holds that education socializes persons into the use of socially liberal, politically correct language that masks underlying prejudice toward the disadvantage and a calculated defense of group-interests. Seen this way, the effects of education are primarily conservative in their implications, as they foster a surface-level liberalism on matters of (general) principle while at the same time *reducing support for redistributive policies designed to actually reduce inequality*.

existence of a “fear of equality” among working Americans—i.e., an ideological investment in existing economic *inequality*—since living close to the poor (in the sense of limited income, resources, and threat of failing into poverty) produces a need for psychological distance in the service of self-esteem maintenance. Moral superiority is reaffirmed through an emphasis on dominant ideological accounts of success and failure. Anderson (1990) documents a similar class-based ideological conflict/patterning among African-Americans:

By many employed and law-abiding blacks who live in the inner city, members of the underclass are viewed, and treated, as convenient objects of scorn, fear, and embarrassment. In this way the underclass serves as an important social yardstick that allows working class blacks to compare themselves favorably with others they judge to be worse off, a social category stigmatized within the community. (p. 66)

Each of these authors emphasizes the tendency of employed strata *residing immediately above the poor* to blame those in poverty to satisfy a need for psychological distance, and to legitimate their own limited successes. Thus, the materially based interest (in a more egalitarian society) that is shared by working class and poor persons gets derailed by ideological and psychological forces.²¹ These findings of relative conservatism among objectively disadvantaged strata (e.g., the working classes under capitalism) demonstrate clear limitations of the interest-based logic of the underdog thesis. They do, however, resonate with some recent work from political psychology that focuses on motivational and personality-based dynamics underlying support for system-justifying and hierarchy-enhancing ideologies (Jost et al. 2009; Sidanius and Pratto 1999).

An example of such work is Sidanius and Pratto’s (1999) Social Dominance Theory (SDT). Echoing House’s (1981) argument that a truly

integrated, multi-level social psychology must have a well-developed model of intra-personal processes, Sidanius and Pratto (1999) contend that neither sociology nor social psychology has offered an adequate theory of social inequality (p. 4). They write:

Heavy emphasis on social structural relations and aggregate data analyses has meant that sociological analyses do not address psychological phenomena in psychological terms—such as motivation and prejudice—or recognize the fact that there are still important and stable individual differences between people, even people who share the same sociological characteristics (e.g., social class, occupation, gender). (p. 4)

As a corrective, Sidanius and Pratto (1999) synthesize work from social psychology, political sociology, political science, and evolutionary psychology in an attempt to understand the “grammar” of social power that they argue underlies the generation and maintenance of group-based social hierarchy in all societies.²² The result is “neither strictly a psychological nor a sociological theory” (p. 31), but, instead, an attempt to connect psychological insights on personality and attitudes with our knowledge of organizations, institutions, and social structure more generally.²³

While such points resonate squarely with central themes of social structure and personality research, in the end, the SDT model is a primarily

²² Specifically, SDT draws most closely from: authoritarian personality theory (Adorno et al. 1950), Rokeach’s (1973) two-value theory of political beliefs; Blumer’s (1958) group position theory; Marxist and neoclassical elite theories (Michels 1911/1962; Mosca 1896/1939; Pareto 1901/1979); social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1986), evolutionary psychology (Reynolds, Falger and Vine 1987), and results from a variety of political attitude and public opinion research (Sidanius and Pratto 1999, p. 31).

²³ Sidanius and Pratto (1999) offer a thorough review of the literature in their Ch. 1, which covers Psychological theories (i.e., Frustration-Aggression, Authoritarian Personality Uncertainty/Anxiety models), Value and Value Conflict models (e.g., social-cognitive approaches to stereotyping), Social Psychological theories (e.g., socialization/social learning; modern racism; realistic group conflict; social identity theory), Social structural/elite theories (e.g., group position; Marxism; Neo-Classical Elite), and Evolutionary Theory (pp. 3–30).

²¹ See Kluegel and Smith (1981, pp. 37–38) for further discussion of various “blockage theses”—i.e., ideologically-based barriers to the formation of full class consciousness (in the traditional Marxian sense) among working class persons.

psychological one as it rests heavily on a personality construct—Social Dominance Orientation (SDO)—defined as the “degree to which individuals desire and support group-based social hierarchy and the domination of ‘inferior’ groups by ‘superior’ ones (p. 48). On the primacy of SDO, Sidanius and Pratto (1999) write, “it is the social implications for intergroup relations that ideologies have, rather than their specific contents, that we believe orient people toward those ideologies in ways *compatible with their SDO levels*” (p. 84, italics added). Importantly, however, while SDO levels represent the *foundation* of persons’ orientations toward social hierarchies, the relationship between SDO and support for social inequality is mediated by ideologies, or what they term legitimizing myths (LMs). For Sidanius and Pratto (1999) such LMs consist of “attitudes, values, beliefs, stereotypes, and ideologies that provide moral and intellectual justification for the social practices that distribute social value within the social system” (p. 45). Such LMs differ by functional type depending on whether it justifies inequality or equality; the former are termed *hierarchy-enhancing* (HE) and the latter, *hierarchy-attenuating* (HA) legitimizing myths (p. 46).²⁴ SDT thus views human social systems as subject to the counter-balancing influences (p. 38) of a variety of HE and HA forces (including LMs)—a point reminiscent of the legitimization/delegitimation dualism (Della Fave 1980) regarding system-maintenance outlined previously.

A second perspective emphasizing the intrapersonal foundations of ideological belief-adherence is offered by Jost et al. (2008, 2009), who

stress the role of motivational factors (e.g., need-satisfaction) in determining persons’ locations on the left/right axis. Jost et al. (2009) note that historically, political science and psychology have offered two broadly different explanations of persons’ ideological beliefs (whose compatibility may have been overlooked in the past). Specifically, political science has traditionally offered so-called *top-down* explanations, pointing to an elite-sponsored discourse or superstructure as the source of persons’ ideological orientations (Jost et al. 2009). That is, political science emphasizes the ways in which “political attitudes and beliefs are organized into coherent structures by political elites for consumption by the public” (Feldman 1988, p. 417).²⁵ In contrast, psychologists have emphasized various *bottom-up* explanations, stressing the cognitive and motivational processes thought to underlie ideological self-placement. Jost et al. (2009) discuss three types of motives—epistemic, existential, and relational—which correspond to needs for certainty, security, and solidarity, respectively.²⁶

To demonstrate the complementarity of top-down (elite superstructure) and bottom-up (motivational substructure) perspectives, Jost et al. (2009) utilize the notion of *elective affinity* (Gerth and Mills 1948; Goethe 1809; Weber 1904). Elective affinity refers to the fit between ideas (or belief systems) and interests (the needs of persons). In this sense, “people can be said to choose ideas, but there is also an important and reciprocal sense in which *ideas choose people*” (Jost et al. 2009, p. 308, italics added). Thus, Jost et al. (2009) invoke both sociological and psychological phenomena—i.e., “forces of mutual

²⁴ LMs are further differentiated by their *potency*, which refers to the “degree to which it will help promote, maintain, or overthrow a given group-based hierarchy” (p. 46). Potency is itself a function of several factors, including: *mediational strength*, which refers to the degree to which it serves as an important link between persons’ SDO levels and their support for hierarchy-enhancing (HE) or hierarchy-attenuating (HA) social policies. Other aspects of potency include *consensuality* (the degree to which relevant ideologies are broadly shared), *embeddedness* (the degree to which an LM is strongly anchored in other dimensions of a culture), and, *certainty* (the degree to which an LM appears to have “moral, religious, or scientific” truth) (p. 46–47).

²⁵ For more on how political elites (e.g., elected officials, party leaders, media representatives) accomplish this “communication process,” see Jost et al. (2009, p. 315–317).

²⁶ Needs for certainty (e.g., cognitive closure) and security (e.g., terror management) are both associated with conservative/right-wing issue positions (Greenberg et al. 1997; Jost et al. 2003), while socialization by parents, peers, and reference groups (Jennings and Niemi 1981; Jost et al. 2008), as well as motives for social identification and affiliation (Fiske 2004), influence the nexus between needs for solidary and ideological self-placement.

attraction that exist between the structure and contents of belief systems and the underlying needs and motives of individuals and groups who subscribe to them” (p. 308). However, as with Sidanius and Pratto’s SDT, Jost et al.’s model is psychological at its core given its assumptions about motivation and need-satisfaction as the foundational and functional *basis* of persons’ ideological worldviews.

What are the Consequences of Ideological Belief-Adherence?

Selected consequences of ideologies have, of course, already been invoked in the form of (1) the discussion of ideologies as aspects of culture (House 1981) that play a central role in the maintenance and stability of stratified social orders (Della Fave 1980; Kerbo 1983), and (2) in terms of the implications of ideology for the individual-level organization of thought (Converse 1964; Hochschild 1981; Kluegel and Smith 1986). Building on those insights, I turn next to a more detailed examination of selected social, political, and personal consequences of ideological-belief adherence. While models developed by sociologists and psychologists differ in terms of key foci and assumptions, they share an underlying concern with understanding the behavioral and attitudinal consequences of individuals’ beliefs.

Sociologists, for example, have examined the implications of stratification ideology for (1) political behavior in both informal (social movement participation) and formal (voting behavior) guises, and (2) non-political phenomena such as persons’ emotional lives (Kluegel and Smith 1981, 1986). Regarding the latter, Kluegel and Smith (1986) demonstrate the implications of persons’ ideological beliefs about inequality for their experience of positive and negative affect (interpreted as an index of life satisfaction).²⁷ The

main conclusion of this line of inquiry emphasizes the positive benefits of perceived personal (internal) control, *regardless of persons’ actual life outcomes*. In Kluegel and Smith’s (1986) words,

If the results of these analyses can be summarized in one sentence, it would be that the belief in internal control, part of the dominant ideology, is adaptive for an individual’s personal life....The objective accuracy of beliefs in pure individualism may well be questioned; such accuracy, however, may be more often the concern of social scientists than of the person in the street. Psychological control—even if not always accompanied by real control of one’s important life outcomes—seems to have positive consequences. These consequences, in turn, may be important in motivating people to maintain a belief in the dominant ideology as a whole in the face of other beliefs and attitudes that may seem to challenge it. (p. 286, italics in original)

This notion of the psychologically adaptive and functional nature of system-legitimizing beliefs is, of course, reminiscent of key insights from political-psychology (more on this below), as well as of psychological constructs such as the “belief in a just world” (Hunt 2000; Lerner 1980). That said, most work by sociologists has focused on the relationship between persons’ ideological beliefs about inequality (e.g., poverty, wealth) and their support for redistributive social policies.

Perhaps the most well-developed model of policy attitudes in sociological social psychology is provided by Kluegel and Smith (1986). These authors posit a causal model wherein *socio-demographic* variables shape *general beliefs and affect*, which, in turn, shape more-specific *perceptions* and, ultimately, *policy attitudes* (see Diagram 1, p. 147). The category of general beliefs and affect includes factors such as dominant ideology beliefs and intergroup affect—thought to shape more specific perceptions and attitudes following the reasoning that more general (higher-order) phenomena are established earlier in

²⁷ Another important line of inquiry on the relationship between ideologies and emotions is found in Hochschild (1979, 1990). As she notes, “rules for managing feeling are implicit in any ideological stance; they are the ‘bottom side’ of ideology” (1979, p. 556). Her “emotion manage-

ment” perspective thus acts as a corrective to the tendency of scholarship to construe ideology as a “flatly cognitive framework, lacking systematic implications for how we manage feelings, or, indeed, for how we feel” (1979, p. 566). See also Schwalbe et al. (2000, p. 434–439) on the nexus between emotion management and the reproduction of inequality.

life and are less subject to change (Sears 1975). The presumption that perceptions of phenomena such as poverty or discrimination causally precede more-concrete policy attitudes rests on the assumption that “perceptions of the existing state of affairs serve as the justification for policies intended to change things” (p. 148).

Following this general line of reasoning, sociologists have modeled the effects of persons’ ideological worldviews on an array of social policy attitudes (often examining the effects of ideology alongside those of self-interest as indexed by social structural variables such as SES). Such research shows that beliefs that are consistent with the dominant ideology (e.g., individualistic attributions for inequality) decrease support for redistributive policies, while beliefs that challenge the dominant ideology (e.g., structuralist attributions) increase support for such initiatives (Bobo and Kluegel 1993; Feagin 1975; Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989; Hughes and Tuch 1999; Hunt 2007; Kluegel and Smith 1988; Robinson and Bell 1978).

In contrast to the social structural and cultural emphases of sociological models, political psychologists (as we have seen) place primary emphasis on personality and motivational factors as determinants of persons’ ideological orientations (e.g., location on the left/right axis) which, in turn, are believed to shape various politically-relevant outcomes. Such outcomes include: (1) evaluations of political issues, parties, candidates, (2) intergroup attitudes, and (3) processes of system-justification (Jost et al. 2009— see, especially, their Figure on p. 319).²⁸ Regarding the latter, for example, System Justification Theory (SJT; Jost et al. 2004) holds that people are motivated to rationalize the status quo—a tendency facilitated both by split-second judgments (e.g., prejudice, stereotyping) and by more stable patterns of ideological adherence that imbue the

status quo with legitimacy. That is, SJT research suggests that humans have a built-in tendency to “make a ‘virtue of necessity’ by accepting and even celebrating features of the status quo; from this perspective, system-justification motivation appears to give conservatism a psychological head-start over its more critical rivals” (Jost et al. 2009, p. 327).

While differences in the model assumptions of the sociological and political-psychological approaches examined thus far should not be downplayed, I turn next to some thoughts on future directions for the social psychological study of ideologies, including suggestions for where greater cross-disciplinary collaboration between sociologists and psychologists might occur.

Concluding Thoughts

As we have seen, the social structure and personality (SSP) tradition in sociological social psychology stresses the importance of explicating links between society and the person by attending to relevant phenomena at the larger social structural, interpersonal, and psychological levels of analysis (House 1981; McLeod and Lively 2003). Sociological research on phenomena such as stratification beliefs (Huber and Form 1973; Kluegel and Smith 1986) is clearly strongest on House’s components principle—i.e., specifying relevant aspects of the larger social structure (e.g., socio-demographic variables) and culture (dominant and system-challenging ideologies) that shape persons’ world-views. Correspondingly, research on political ideology by political psychologists is clearly strongest in terms of House’s psychological principle, given its focus on the intra-personal underpinnings of persons’ ideological orientations.

Given these disciplinary-based differences in approach, one might reasonably ask: which is correct? The answer is, of course: neither and both. Neither, in the sense that disciplines (and the theoretical frameworks that comprise them) are not correct or incorrect as much as they are valuable or not in producing intellectually useful questions that focus our attention on relevant

²⁸ Evaluations of issues, parties and candidates include political behavior such as voting (e.g., Left-wing identification leads to greater support for liberal candidates, etc.), as well as value orientations and justice judgments such as including attributions for inequalities (p. 324). Intergroup attitudes include stereotypes, prejudice, and intolerance toward a host of out-groups (p. 325).

empirical phenomena. At the same time, both are correct in the sense that each focuses on *some* relevant aspects of empirical reality, while necessarily leaving other important factors out. That is to say, all disciplines and frameworks make assumptions about what is most important to attend to, which in turn focus our attention and shape the nature of what we see.

Sociology is, of course, most interested in the nature of human societies and the social forces impacting persons' lives, interests, and personalities. As such, the sociologists' starting point is *supra-individual* (i.e., with societies themselves and/or the "interaction order"—see, e.g., Goffman 1983), and the social psychological endeavor *within* sociology invokes "the individual" in only a secondary manner—i.e., as something that is *itself* a social product (Rosenberg 1981) of larger structural, organizational, and cultural influences. From this perspective, the sources of individuals' ideological beliefs are fundamentally *social* in nature, having to do with larger cultural currents (e.g., a dominant ideology) and persons' locations' in social structures (e.g., class position). This, of course, does not mean that intra-personal phenomena are unimportant; they are *simply not emphasized* by the sociological approach—making those phenomena *precisely* the ones for which interdisciplinary interchange (e.g., with psychologists) would be most fruitful.

In the same sense that sociological work lacks an adequate psychology, research in political psychology is relatively underdeveloped sociologically. To be sure, some models in political psychology consider supra-individual phenomena, but such considerations tend to be limited, and are generally cultural in nature (e.g., studies of the American "political ethos" as a source of individual-level value-adherence). As such, they represent limited understandings of the sorts of macro-social factors that are necessary in any truly comprehensive, multi-level social psychology (House 1981; Kohn 1989; McLeod and Lively 2003). Presently, the key sociological question—i.e., how the intra-personal phenomena focused on by psychologists may *themselves* be influenced by social structure (and culture)—is rarely, if ever, invoked. This is so, in part, be-

cause the very nature of the sociological question runs against key assumptions of psychologists regarding the nature and sources of personality (e.g., in-born temperament, dispositions, etc.).

That said, despite some difficult-to-resolve disciplinary and epistemological differences, greater interchange between the "two social psychologies" (e.g., House 1977; Stryker 1977) would be useful in advancing present understandings of the relationship between inequalities and ideologies. Research on social dominance theory provides a case in point: SDT's strengths include a theoretically sophisticated and empirically testable model of the relationship between personality (SDO), ideology (LMs) and support for policies that support (or challenge) group-based social hierarches.²⁹ What is missing, however, is a well-developed model of the antecedents of SDO *itself*. While Sidanius and Pratto (1999) do mention several sources of variation in SDO (e.g., group membership and identification, background and socialization factors (e.g., education, religion), in-born temperamental dispositions and personalities, and gender), they acknowledge that the area has not been "thoroughly researched" (p. 49). As such, a fruitful avenue for future work would be to investigate in greater detail, how SDO is *itself* distributed in the social structure.³⁰

Similarly, on the sociological side, we have seen the limitations of models based purely on social structural location as an index of material

²⁹ Sidanius and Pratto (1999) highlight some of their contributions, as follows: "While the ideas of Marx, Gramsci, Pareto, Mosca, and Moscovici all suggest that ideology justifies group dominance, these ideas provide us with no empirical standard for testing whether any given ideology actually does so in any given situation....The notion of mediation provides us with a relatively crisp empirical standard by which to judge whether a given ideology or belief is functioning as an LM. Namely, a given belief, attitude, opinion, or attribution can be classified as an LM if and only if it is found to have a mediational relationship between the desire for group-based social dominance on the one hand and support for HE and HA social policy on the other hand" (p. 48).

³⁰ For an example of such an approach to understanding how another widely used construct in psychology—the "belief in a just world" (Lerner 1980)—is distributed in the social structure, see Hunt (2000).

interests—i.e., the logic of the underdog thesis does not always hold when modeling the relationship between social location and ideological worldviews (see, e.g., Lane 1959). Accordingly, sociological research on ideological beliefs would benefit from greater consideration of insights from political psychology, and from social psychological research on the self-concept (Hunt 2003). Regarding the former, approaches such as Sidanius and Pratto's (1999) SDT that view group oppression as a "cooperative game" in which people "actively participate in their own subordination" (p. 43) seem especially applicable. Such models help explain how laypersons rationalize inequality, in part by engaging in processes of system-justification following needs for certainty, security, and solidarity (Jost et al. 2009). Failure to consider such phenomena may inadvertently perpetuate sociology's "over-socialized" conception of the person (Wrong 1961).³¹

Regarding the self-concept, Della Fave (1980, 1986,) argues that self-evaluation (understood, in this context, as the perception of one's own ability to influence the larger socio-political environment) is central to the process by which stratified social orders are legitimated. Della Fave argues that the congruence between persons' objective (e.g., control over "primary resources") and subjective (self-evaluations) statuses shapes ideological orientations (e.g., beliefs about distributive justice) in a manner supportive of the status quo.³² Kluegel and Smith (1986) and Hunt

(1996, 2001) have also demonstrated the utility of incorporating self-concept measures into our models of ideological belief-adherence. For instance, Kluegel and Smith (1986) observe a pattern of "attributional consistency" between persons' self-attributions (i.e., explanations of their own socioeconomic outcomes) and their ideological accounts of societal inequalities (e.g., explanations of poverty); specifically, "internal" self-explanations aligned with individualistic accounts of poverty, while "external" self-attributions aligned with structuralist ones. Hunt (1996) observed these same associations for white respondents, but found reversals of those patterns among African-American and Latinos (suggesting the need to better-incorporate race/ethnicity into our models of social psychological processes; see, e.g., Hunt et al. 2000).³³

Finally, it is worth noting that the sociological and psychological lines of research I have emphasized in this chapter are all relatively weak with respect to House's (1981) proximity principle—i.e., the need to specify the interpersonal mechanisms linking larger socio-cultural phenomena and the person.^{34,35} Such interactional processes

predictive failures likely stem from inadequate measures of self-evaluation as he outlines the construct in his work (i.e., scales measuring "self-esteem" do not adequately capture the perception of one's own ability to control the larger socio-political environment).

³³ Hunt (2001) has also demonstrated how two other aspects other aspects of persons' self-concepts—self-esteem and personal mastery—shape ideological accounts of poverty (with self-esteem observed to be more consequential for adherence to individualistic beliefs, and mastery more closely-aligned with system-blaming, structuralist outlooks).

³⁴ While beyond the scope of this chapter, the project of developing a truly comprehensive, multi-level account of ideological processes would require specification the organizational bases from which ideologies are propagated and resisted—i.e., the roles played by schools (Bourdieu and Passeron 1977; MacLeod 2009), the media (Gilens 1999), churches (Emerson and Smith 2000) and other institutions. While not on ideology per se, Kohn's (1969) and Kohn and Schooler's (1983) research specifying the role of *occupational conditions* linking persons social class locations and their psychological orientations is exemplary in this regard.

³⁵ To their credit, Jost et al. (2009) attempt to make *certain* such linkages via the concept of elective affinities,

³¹ These points are also reminiscent of key tenets of the "negotiated order" perspective within symbolic interactionism (Strauss 1978; Maines 1977)—a point I return to in the final section of this chapter. I thank the editors for this insight.

³² More specifically, Della Fave argues that advantaged and disadvantaged actors alike tend to see advantaged actors' abilities (e.g., to control the larger environment) and societal "contributions" as greater. This results in (1) higher self-evaluations for the advantaged and (2) a societal consensus on the legitimacy of existing reward-levels (i.e., objectively disadvantaged persons with low self-evaluations are especially unlikely to challenge to the status quo). While empirical support for Della Fave's theory has been mixed (e.g., both Stolte (1983) and Shepelak (1987) failed to substantiate the expectation that disadvantaged actors would tend to see their reward levels as deserved), Della Fave (1986) argues some of these

are, of course, the traditional purview of symbolic interactionist and (experimentally-based) group-processes research in sociological social psychology. Regarding the former, Schwalbe et al. (2000) remind us that—beyond understanding the “measurable extent, degree, and consequences” of inequality—it is no less important to specify the “interactive processes through which inequalities are created and reproduced in concrete settings” (p. 419). Toward this end, Schwalbe et al. (2000) utilize a sample of qualitative studies to derive a “sensitizing theory” of such processes. In so doing, they identify four key mechanisms—othering, subordinate adaptation, boundary-maintenance, and emotion management—which, collectively, remind us that if we wish to truly *explain* inequality, we must attend to the (interpersonal) channels through which it is created and re-created in daily life (p. 420).³⁶

Regarding group-processes work, experimentally-based research by Ridgeway and colleagues (Ridgeway 2006; Ridgeway and Correll 2006) also provides valuable insights into how social hierarchies are produced and reproduced via social interaction. For instance, status construction theory (Ridgeway 2000) holds that actors bring “status beliefs” (e.g., race and gender stereotypes; differential expectations of competence) to social situations that reflect social inequalities from the larger society. These status beliefs, in turn, structure social interaction in ways that tend to produce, and *reproduce*, the very social hierarchies that the (original) status beliefs reflect. Given the strength of this line of work in specifying the *interactional processes*

undergirding the production and reproduction of inequality, better integrating its central insights (along with those of interactionist approaches) with both (1) the *upstream* focus of most stratification ideology research, and (2) the *downstream* strengths of political psychology would greatly advance the project of building a truly multi-level social psychology of ideological processes. Jost and Major’s (2001) recent multidisciplinary effort on the “psychology of legitimacy”—which includes key works by sociologists (Jackman 2001; Ridgeway 2001; Zelditch 2001)—is an important contribution toward this end.

Building on such efforts, research should seek to further specify how interactional processes uncovered by micro-sociologists (Ridgeway 2000; Schwalbe et al. 2000) vary across social structural, institutional, and organizational contexts. In addition, research should seek to uncover how personality constructs such as SDO (Sidanius and Pratto 1999) and the motivational dynamics of system-justification (Jost et al. 2004) impact those same interactional dynamics. Such knowledge would provide critically important contributions to the project of building a multi-level social psychology of ideological processes (as well as further illuminating our understanding of how inequality is produced and reproduced more generally). Considering the multi-level and integrative focus of SSP work (House 1981), alongside the stated interest of political psychology to connect “the worlds of individual personality and attitudes with the domains of institutional behavior and social structure” (Sidanius and Pratto 1999, p. 31), the opportunities for interchange among the various existing faces of social psychology (House 1977) appear considerable indeed.

though their conception of House’s components principle is largely limited to the notion of an elite-sponsored (cultural) super-structure, and their conception of the proximity principle is not well-developed.

³⁶ In specifying such, Schwalbe et al. (2000) draw heavily on the “negotiated order” perspective, which they summarize as critical of “the tendency to reify organizations, institutions, and systems, arguing that these social entities must be understood as recurrent patterns of joint action. We take from this the implication that the reproduction of inequality, even when it appears thoroughly institutionalized, *ultimately depends on face-to-face interaction*, which therefore must be studied as part of understanding the reproduction of inequality” (p. 420, italics added).

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Henry A. Walker

Introduction

Man was born free, and everywhere he is in chains. Many a one believes himself the master of others, and yet he is a greater slave than they. How has this change come about? I do not know. What can make it legitimate?" (Rousseau, *The Social Contract* [1762] 1964, p. 7)

October 12, 2008 was just another autumn day in Toledo, Ohio. And then it wasn't. On that afternoon, Senator Barack H. Obama, II, the Democratic Party's presidential candidate was campaigning in a Toledo neighborhood. A resident, Samuel J. Wurzelbacher, was tossing a football with his young son. No one knew that the stage was set for a historic conversation.

The conversation began innocently enough when the senator asked Wurzelbacher, "What's your name?" Mr. Wurzelbacher answered "Joe" and immediately began telling Mr. Obama his concerns about the senator's tax proposals. Joe, a plumber, said that he planned to buy a plumbing business and remarked that the senator's tax plan would "tax me more" as his income rose.¹ The senator used examples to explain how his plan would have affected Joe's past earnings and

how it would affect his future earnings. Senator Obama explained that he wanted to cut taxes for "those most in need" and pay for the cuts by raising the taxes of those who earned higher incomes. Joe responded by asking if Senator Obama would support a flat (income) tax. At one point in his extended response, Senator Obama justified his plan by saying, "I think when you spread the wealth around it's good for everybody." (See the Appendix for a verbatim transcript of the discussion published by the *Tampa Bay Times*, October 19, 2008.)

The brief exchange between Senator, now President, Obama and "Joe the Plumber" was captured on video and transmitted around the world. Joe became an instant celebrity and, fueled by his newly-gained celebrity, ran for Congress during the 2012 election cycle. He was defeated by a fifteen-term incumbent.

The video recording of the exchange could be titled "A Snapshot of Inequality." President Obama and Samuel Wurzelbacher differ on several dimensions including race, education, occupation, and income. Their discussion reflects long-observed inequalities in interaction between persons of high and low status. High status persons like Senator Obama typically dominate interactions with those of lower status (Bales 1950). Senator Obama used nine times as many words as Joe the Plumber (1027 vs. 114) in their short exchange. Importantly, their discussion centered on income inequality and what, if anything, government ought to do about it. Identity theorists (e.g., Tajfel 1982, and see Callero in this

¹ Senator Obama and Wurzelbacher's discussion rests on the premise that the proposed business would earn more than Joe's current individual income.

H. A. Walker (✉)
Department of Sociology, University of Arizona, Tucson,
AZ 85721-0027, USA
e-mail: hawalker@email.arizona.edu

volume) claim that both men's positions on the issue of income inequality are products, in part, of their standings on the dimensions of inequality identified above.

Rousseau would have been interested in the subject of the Obama-Wurzelbacher exchange. He contemplated the ubiquity of inequality and its legitimation 250 years ago. His writings (Rousseau [1755] 1964, [1762] 1964) considered the roles that individuals, groups and governments take in establishing and legitimizing social inequality and stable social orders. Rousseau's questions were not new. They have intrigued critical thinkers for more than twenty-five centuries (cf. Aristotle ([353 BC] 1943, [350 BC] 1908; Plato [390 BC] 1941; Thucydides [431 BC] 1934).

Inequality and its legitimation are the subjects of this chapter but legitimacy processes are given more attention than either inequality or the legitimacy of inequality. I organize the remainder of the chapter as follows: The next section discusses systematic inequality and the problem of order and sets the stage for a discussion of legitimation as an order-creating and order-maintaining process. The third section examines legitimacy and legitimacy processes. It also includes the most detailed statement to date of the multiple-source, multiple-object theory of legitimacy (Dornbusch and Scott 1975; Zelditch and Walker 2003). The fourth section applies Legitimacy Theory to contemporary affirmative action policies and procedures. The application shows how legitimacy processes affect the creation, reproduction and maintenance of orderly systems of hierarchical inequality. It also shows how legitimation crises can arise when social orders compete for legitimacy. The final section offers conclusions and suggestions for future research.

Inequality and Legitimacy

Inequality and legitimacy are important topics in several social sciences including anthropology, political science, sociology and social psychology. Yet, there is no consensus on definitions of the terms. Many social scientists use the terms

“difference,” “inequality,” and “stratification” interchangeably, as I have done in the opening paragraphs of this chapter. Many writers leave the terms undefined and the reader is left to infer their meanings from the context. From this point forward, I will try to use the terms systematically. I will mean by *differences* dissimilar attributes of people or groups, the things they own or possess, and the behaviors they enact. I will reserve the terms *inequality* and *stratification* for ranked differences. Finally, I will use “legitimacy” to refer to an element of social reality that is consistent with laws or rules. This working definition will be expanded and elaborated below.

Inequality is multidimensional. Individuals and groups differ on a variety of dimensions but some differences garner more attention from social scientists than others. Social scientists give special consideration to differences that connote superiority and inferiority (Parsons 1940). They have also devised several ways of classifying differences. Rousseau ([1755] 1964) identified two types of inequality—*natural* and *moral* inequality. Parsons ([1953] 1964, p. 389), writing two centuries after Rousseau, identified *qualities*, *performances* and *possessions* as three dimension on which individuals and groups are ranked. There is some overlap in their categories.

Rousseau meant by natural inequalities biological or physical differences that are established by nature and exist independently of an individual's social relationships. Examples include unranked, categorical characteristics like sex, eye color and skin color.² Using the terminology introduced above, such distinctions are classified as differences. Other natural inequalities include differences on ordered dimensions like age or height. Moral inequalities are ranked differences that are established by convention or

² Color can be measured quantitatively and skin color exhibits a tremendous range from very dark to very light or almost no pigmentation. Skin color is used as a primary marker of race or ethnicity in many societies but most classification schemes use poorly-defined categories (e.g., black, brown, white, etc.). Importantly, pigmentation varies so greatly *within* race and ethnic groups that it is essentially useless as an identifier (Jablonski 2004).

as a consequence of social relations (e.g., wealth, social prestige and power).

Writing a century before Comte ([1865] 1957) coined the term “sociology,” Rousseau also recognized that the two “species of inequality” are often connected. As an example, groups use a congeries of initially unranked natural characteristics (e.g., skin color and hair texture) to create race categories that are ranked hierarchically (i.e., converted to moral inequalities).³

Parsons classified characteristics like sex and height as qualities. They are attributes of individuals or groups and include unranked physical differences (i.e., natural inequalities) as well as clusters of physical characteristics that groups have chosen to rank hierarchically (i.e., natural characteristics that are redefined to establish moral inequalities). Among other qualities, President Obama and Joe the Plumber are differentiated on the socially constructed characteristic of race.⁴

Performances are features of a person’s behavior. Scores on the Scholastic Achievement Test and academic degrees are performances that reflect intellectual skill and achievement. President Obama is a university graduate with multiple degrees whereas there is no record of Samuel Wurzelbacher earning a post-secondary degree. Social conventions also assign superior and inferior rank to possessions (i.e., objects that individuals possess or control). Possessions can be ranked according to their use and symbolic values. A 2012 Lamborghini Aventador and my aging Toyota can be used for transportation. However, the symbolic or status value of the former is much greater than that of the latter. President Obama’s wealth and the material possessions that accompany it are well-documented. One can presume that Wurzelbacher’s possessions reflect his more modest economic means.

³ The social construction of hierarchical rankings on categorical and ordinal differences like height, skin color or sex is discussed below and in other chapters in this volume. (See chapters by, Ridgeway and Nakagawa, and Wilkins, Mollborn, and Bó.)

⁴ In keeping with the subject matter of this volume, it is more accurate to claim that the two men have different racial identities.

Parsons ([1953] 1964, p. 390) recognized that rankings on one dimension can spread to or affect rankings on other dimensions. Individuals use rankings on performances or possessions to attribute qualities (characteristics) to individuals who enact performances or control possessions. Conversely, they use individuals’ qualities to make inferences about their performances and the things they possess. Parsons’ observation has important implications for the social psychology of inequality, which is concerned with the relationship between group level inequality and individual inequalities.

Inequality is also a multilevel phenomenon; it is found at every level of social organization. The range of social units that exhibit inequality and the number of dimensions on which it occurs are impressive. But there is more. In integrated social systems, inequality at one level of social organization can affect—and typically does affect—inequality at other levels.

Finally, inequality is a source of tensions and conflicts that threaten social stability (Tajfel 1982). Plato ([390 BC] 1941) asserted that inequality “causes hatred and war” with good cause. Those who occupy the lower stations in life are motivated to improve their positions. But inequality is a relationship. Any action that improves a person’s position improves it *relative to* some other person or group. In that regard, a person’s mobility or prospective mobility may be considered a threat to some other’s position (Blumer 1958). Conversely, threats to the status quo motivate higher ranking individuals to take actions that reinforce their higher standing.

The interests that motivate those who have lower social standing generate a second conflict of interest. On one hand, they have an interest in trying to improve their standing without regard to the consequences for their similarly placed peers. On the other hand, they can join with peers to take collective action that has the potential to improve conditions for all. The opposition of collective and individual interests is a classic social dilemma (Borch and Willer 2006; Dawes 1980; see Snow and Owens, this volume, for more on collective action).

Legitimacy processes influence the choices that lower ranking and higher ranking people make. Legitimized systems of inequality are more stable than those that lack legitimacy. Lower ranking actors who act independently to improve their situations can strengthen inequality systems and their legitimacy if they compete with their low ranking peers (Walker and Willer 2007). The threat of collective action weakens the status quo's legitimacy and potentially destabilizes systems of inequality. In opposition, high status actors are motivated to take actions that legitimize systems of inequality that lack it and to reinforce the legitimacy of stable systems. The next section includes a discussion of legitimacy processes and introduces theory that explains how social orders are legitimized and how legitimized social systems affect the behavior of groups, individuals, and individuals in groups.

Legitimacy Processes and Legitimacy Theory

Legitimacy: The condition of being in accordance with law or principle (The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, 1971, Oxford University Press).

Contemporary legitimacy research spans a broad range of topics. At the microsocial level, researchers study the connections between legitimacy processes and the differentiation of task and socioemotional leadership in small groups (Burke 1967), and the stability of hierarchically organized group structures (Ridgeway and Berger 1986; Ridgeway and Walker 1995; Walker and Zelditch 1993). Organizational researchers analyze relationships between legitimacy and the diffusion of organizational forms (Meyer and Rowan 1977), rates of organization foundings (Hannan and Freeman 1989) and the effectiveness of formal authority (Barnard 1938; Dornbusch and Scott 1975; Walker 2004). Macrolevel researchers link variations in legitimacy to the decline of political regimes and societies (Smelser 1963) and to the emergence of social movements that establish new political systems

(McCarthy and Zald 1977). The extensive attention given to legitimacy and legitimacy processes reflects the topic's importance to general understandings of a broad spectrum of social life.⁵

The founders of modern social science established legitimacy as an important component of social life although not all of them used the term. Marx and Engels ([1845] 1939) identified legitimacy as a mechanism that permits the powerful to suppress opposition to their hegemony and to control the less powerful. Durkheim ([1893] 1933) discussed the importance of rules—and of consensus on their meaning—to the creation and maintenance of society as we know and experience it. Weber ([1918] 1968) described three bases of legitimacy and the importance of legitimacy processes to the establishment and stabilization of inequalities of power and domination at the macro-social and organizational levels.

Despite centuries of research and writing on the subject, legitimacy is not always clearly defined. Some contemporary social scientists offer nominal definitions that describe legitimacy as a state of being; Troyer (2011) defines legitimacy as a “state of appropriateness.” Others define legitimacy to mean legal or quasi-legal as in the definition that opens this section (cf. Hechter 2009; Zelditch 2001). Theorists and researchers want precisely defined concepts that can be used for theory building or translated into variables that can be used for hypothesis testing. Many definitions of legitimacy are not useful for those purposes. Some researchers sidestep problems of definition and discuss factors that cause or strengthen legitimacy (Della Fave 1980; Matheson 1987; Younts 2008). Finally, some theorists

⁵ Distinctions drawn between macrosociological, organizational and microsociological conceptions of legitimacy are generally matters of emphasis rather than fundamental substantive differences. As an example, group processes researchers predict high levels of behavioral consistency among members of groups for which a majority acknowledges the legitimacy of rules that apply to their actions. Students of political processes make similar predictions although they may focus on cross-societal comparisons of the relationship between social stability and aggregated (e.g., national) acknowledgment of the legitimacy of constitutional provisions.

describe legitimacy according to its purposes or functions.

Legitimacy can serve *normative*, *evaluative* and *instrumental* functions. Normative theorists (e.g., Horne 2009) characterize rule-governed social forms as legitimate if the rules are lawful in either the formal, legal sense or in the uncodified, normative sense. That is, a social object or process is legitimate if it is governed by rules and the rules are a basis for sanctions (or of social support for sanctions) in the event of deviation.

Jackson (1965) identifies *behavioral* and *evaluative* components of norms. At the behavioral level, norms establish definitions of situations and proscribe or prescribe classes of structures, processes, behaviors and actors that constitute a situation. For example, specific configurations of actors and roles carry the label “kindergarten class.” Rules that describe the relationship between a basis for rewards (e.g., number of hours worked) and expected rewards (expected pay) are “distribution rules” (Cook 1975).

Legitimized rule-governed systems also establish evaluative criteria. They describe socially approved or disapproved elements of social life within an identifiable range or scope.⁶ As an example, wage inequality is legitimized (i.e., approved and rewarded) in modern market economies.

Finally, rules serve instrumental functions. Modern industrial societies use the principle of meritocracy to justify substantial income and occupational inequality. The justification is consistent with Davis and Moore’s (1945) theory of stratification which asserts that occupations get different rewards because wage inequality ensures that important positions have an adequate supply of labor. Their theory implies that any society that rewards occupations equally will have

difficulty filling roles that are crucial to the society’s survival.

Legitimacy: Basic Ideas

Neither the failure of some writers to define legitimacy nor the absence of an unambiguous definition is surprising. Legitimacy has been described as a phenomenon, an epiphenomenon, a process, and as a process *and* an end state that joins subjective perceptions to objective reality. One goal of the discussion that follows is to reduce uncertainty about the meaning of the term.

Weber’s ([1918] 1968, p. 31) conception of legitimacy is arguably the most important and influential. Weber reasoned that rational actors enact behaviors out of self-interest or because they are commonly practiced (i.e., customary). He also observed that some behaviors are enacted because they are prescribed by legitimized rule-governed systems (i.e., “orders”). Weber classified orders as legitimate if they are *valid* (i.e., establish obligations) or if they model *desirable and appropriate* action (i.e., describe exemplary behavior). The twin meanings established an ambiguity that generated two broad streams of legitimacy research.⁷

The first research program centers on valid social relations and the second on beliefs about the desirability or appropriateness of social relationships. Theory and research that focus on valid social arrangements emphasize the emergence and validation (i.e., justification) of rules that govern social forms, and constitute or define meaningful action. In turn, valid orders create a sense of obligation for individuals and groups that are governed by them. Investigators in this branch of legitimacy research are also concerned

⁶ Cancian (1975) classifies norms as *ranking norms*, *membership norms* and *reality assumptions* on the basis of their range. Ranking norms are standards used to differentially evaluate actions or individuals. Membership norms are rules that define the desirable attributes and actions of members of rule-governed groups. Reality assumptions are rules or standards that describe desirable characteristics of situations, roles or identities.

⁷ The language of Roth and Wittich’s popular translation of Weber ([1918] 1968) illustrates the conflation. “Action, especially social action which involves a social relationship, may be guided by the *belief* [emphasis added] in the existence of a legitimate order. The probability that action will actually be so governed will be called the ‘validity’ (*Geltung*) of the order in question.” ([1918] 1968, p. 31). See also Henderson and Parsons’ earlier but very similar translation (Weber [1918] 1964, p. 126).

with the behavioral consequences of valid standards and with identifying factors that maintain or undermine the validation of rules, social structures and actions. This research is concentrated in the macro-sociological and organizational literatures (Walker 2004) and has been undertaken from functionalist, conflict and instrumentalist theoretical perspectives (Hechter 2009; Zelditch 2001). Lipset's (1959, 1963) description of the processes through which governments can achieve legitimacy is a classic example of research in this branch.

The second stream of theory and research treats legitimacy as an evaluation that individuals make of social forms and actions within them. Research in this branch is concerned with whether individuals recognize (or acknowledge) the validity of social forms that define and govern meaningful action, whether they evaluate such systems as desirable models of social structure and process, and how the acknowledgement of valid systems and evaluations of their desirability affect behavior. Cook's (1975) classic experiment on equity processes is an exemplar of research in this branch. Social theorists argue that the principle of proportionality (Glazer 1975; Homans 1974) is a taken for granted (i.e., valid or legitimate) element of contemporary western societies. Cook argued that individuals acknowledge (validate) and accept (i.e., internalize) distribution rules like the principle of proportionality as standards of fairness. She gave subjects (Ss) in an experiment responsibility for dividing pay between themselves and work team peers. Cook tested hypotheses that are implied by the principle of proportionality, although her article does not describe it. Nor did she describe the principle to her Ss or tell them to use it to allocate earnings. Yet, Ss' allocation of pay was consistent with her hypotheses and implications of the principle of proportionality. Her theory implies that legitimized system-level principles of equality, inequality and equity affect individuals' conceptions of fairness and, subsequently, their behavior.

The research traditions just described emphasize different elements of legitimacy processes and, for a substantial period, developments in the two traditions proceeded independently. Some

writers offered important statements on legitimacy without making reference to Weber, (cf. Kelman 1958; Burke 1967, 1968; Della Fave 1980; but see Della Fave 1986). However, like those who make explicit reference to Weber, their work usually centers on either valid social orders or individual acknowledgment of and assessment of the desirability of valid orders, but not both. Consequently, research left unanswered questions about the connection between Weber's conception of legitimacy as validity and the conception of legitimacy as the belief that rules and the orders to which they apply are models of desirable social structures and actions within them. The problem was resolved by Dornbusch and Scott (1975), who developed a theory of legitimacy that unified the macrosocial and microsocial approaches to the study of legitimacy.

The Dornbusch-Scott Theory of Legitimacy⁸

Contemporary legitimacy theory has at least three explanatory foci. It is concerned with (1) how legitimacy is created or established, (2) how legitimacy is reinforced and sustained, and (3) how legitimized orders affect individual and group behavior. The Dornbusch-Scott (1975) theory of legitimacy and Zelditch and Walker's (2003; Walker 2004) extension of it reflect recent developments at the frontiers of legitimacy research. What is known as the multiple-source, multiple-object theory of legitimacy (hereafter Legitimacy Theory or LT) builds on Weber's earlier work and responds to several issues: (1) What is entailed by Weber's concept of "legitimate order?" (2) How are the ideas of legitimacy as validity and legitimacy as evaluations of models of action related? (3) How and under what conditions is legitimacy established? (4) How does legitimacy affect behavior? Dornbusch and Scott resolved questions about the dual meaning of legitimacy and the processes through which legitimacy affects behavior. Zelditch and Walker addressed

⁸ This section draws on arguments introduced by Zelditch and Walker (2003) and Walker (2004, 2005).

the meaning of order and the conditions under which legitimacy is established.

Legitimacy Theory and its Extension

Weber's definition of legitimate order conflates the ideas of legitimacy as a state of being that evokes a sense of obligation and legitimacy as any individual's evaluation of an order's desirability or suitability as a model of social organization. Dornbusch and Scott separated the concepts and described the mechanisms through which each legitimizes power and affects the stability and effectiveness of organizations. The Dornbusch-Scott theory applies to formal organizations with at least three hierarchical levels of influence and power. They define validity as the condition that exists when norms, values, beliefs and procedures are elements of reality that govern the actions of individuals and subgroups. Validity creates a sense of obligation for group members. Dornbusch and Scott introduced the term *propriety* to describe any individual's acceptance (i.e., positive evaluation) and support of rules, norms, values, beliefs and procedures as desirable models of action—the way things ought to be (Homans 1974).

Validity is a system-level characteristic, an attribute of social structures, roles within structures, and situated action. Claims to validity can be justified on the grounds of tradition, charisma and natural or rational law (Weber [1918] 1968).⁹ Valid social forms constitute or define social reality and compliance or consistency with them is obligatory. Group members obey valid rules because they acknowledge that the rules prescribe “the way things are done” rather than for fear of sanctions. The distinction is crucial for determining whether legitimacy or power (i.e., threat of sanctions) motivates action. The demarcation cri-

teria are stated simply but distinguishing the two bases of action empirically is methodologically challenging. The U. S. Constitution is an example of a valid set of rules that describe a governmental system and its operating principles. Similarly, normative and legal definitions of the family establish standards of behavior for family members and individuals, and for groups that interact with families as social units.¹⁰ Deviations from valid standards like the Constitution or the norms governing family life invite negative sanctions.

Propriety is an individual-level orientation to social structures, the rules that govern them, and actions within them. Propriety is an attitude about or evaluation of the desirability of system elements as models of social life. Returning to an earlier example, Barack Obama's statement to Joe the Plumber expressed an attitude about the principle of progressive taxation (i.e., tax rates that vary positively with incomes). The Senator's statement reflected a cognition—or state of mind—that has affective (evaluative) and conative (i.e., a predisposition to act) components. As a guiding principle of federal income tax policy, progressive taxation is also valid (i.e., legal, collectively acknowledged and constitutively legitimate). The validity of tax policy influences individual evaluations of its propriety.

Validity and propriety are primary sources of legitimacy that are reinforced by *authorization* and *endorsement*. Authorized social orders have the positive evaluation and support of high status actors. Support implies approval, backing for the application of sanctions against those who contravene valid standards, and a willingness to provide resources that can be used as sanctions. Social orders are endorsed if they are positively evaluated and supported by the masses, for example, line and staff employees or other *lower participants* in work organizations (Etzioni 1961).

⁹ Stryker's (1990, 1994) writings about government agencies and social policy suggest that consideration should be given to science as a fourth basis of legitimation. Alternatively, modern scientific and legal practices are intertwined and legitimation-by-science can be considered a special case of rational-legal justification.

¹⁰ Laws and norms change and transitions from one set of rules to another are often troublesome and fraught with difficulty. As an example, consider changing definitions of the family (e.g., the inclusion of same-sex couples and their children or polygamous relationships) and controversies about their legality and legitimacy.

Validity establishes a social system as an element of objective reality (i.e., the way things are). Propriety, as an evaluation of a system's desirability, reflects an individual's sense of the way things ought to be. An individual's *acknowledgment* of a valid system can influence her evaluation of its propriety but validity and propriety are independent dimensions. An example illustrates their independence.

The USA Patriot Act (2001) is a valid law. Its validity was reinforced initially by authorization (i.e., support of President Bush the younger, Attorney General Ashcroft, Congress which passed the bill and the federal courts). It was also endorsed by a public that expressed support for a wide range of anti-terrorism measures immediately after the attacks of September 11, 2001. However, there was also opposition to the law from its inception. It is unclear how much popular support the law has at this writing but many Americans oppose it. They do not attribute propriety to it.¹¹ The example also gives an overview of how various elements of the theory (e.g., validity, authorization, endorsement, propriety) work together. What follows is a formal presentation of Legitimacy Theory, as revised by Zelditch and Walker, beginning with its antecedents, the conditions necessary for its application.

Antecedents of Legitimacy

Legitimacy is an order-creating and order-maintaining phenomenon. Legitimacy is established and maintained by several sources of support including cultural systems, institutions and individuals. Zelditch and Walker's (2003; Walker 2004) revision of the Dornbusch-Scott theory relaxes the theory's scope to include systems with fewer than three levels of hierarchy. The revised theory applies to multiple objects including acts, persons, roles and role relations. Those changes extend the theory's range to politics and political actors and to other social relations like families

and neighborhood bridge clubs. The revised theory also addresses the ambiguity in Weber's use of the term "order" and introduces several new terms.

In English, "order" can mean either a system (as in social order), or a command or directive. Zelditch and Walker (2003) introduced the term *regime* to capture the idea of a social order or system of social relations. They borrow the term from political science and political sociology (see Keohane and Nye 1977) but invest it with a different meaning. They use the common terms "action" or "behavior" to convey the idea of an order as a command or directive in the definitions and theoretical assumptions below.

Definition 1: (*Regime*). A regime, R, is a rule-governed system of positions, relations between positions and position-specific acts.

A fully-specified regime includes rules that describe criteria for role occupancy, acceptable role enactment, interaction among roles and so on. A regime is a blueprint that becomes a functioning social system when individuals or groups are added. Regimes exist at the macro (e.g., the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and micro levels (e.g., nuclear families or local chapters of sororities).

Regimes are rule-defined but legitimacy is not inherent to them. Many rule-governed systems are neither acknowledged nor accepted as legitimate and do not possess normative force. As an example, ideologies are ideational systems and some of them describe ideal-typical regimes, like the dictatorship of the proletariat (Marx [1875] 2001, p. 4). Ideal-typical systems may not exist and those that are established may never be validated. As non-valid systems, they lack the motive force of validated regimes.¹² (See Hunt in this volume for a discussion of ideologies and inequality.)

¹¹ Measuring support for the law is difficult because expressions of support vary substantially with the wording of survey questions (Best and McDermott 2007).

¹² Ideologies certainly have motive force at the individual level because they can gain propriety. Groups of individuals who attribute propriety to ideologies can form movements, one goal of which may be to establish elements of those ideologies as valid regimes (e.g., a dictatorship of the proletariat).

Legitimized regimes establish standards, violations of which can be sanctioned. Weber ([1918] 1968) argued that every regime wants to establish its legitimacy and that is as true of families as it is of newly formed organizations (Hannan and Freeman 1989; Meyer and Rowan 1977). Regimes can achieve objective and subjective legitimacy (i.e., validity and propriety respectively). Formally,

Definition 2: (*Valid Regime*). A regime, R , is valid if its constitutive values, beliefs and rules are collectively acknowledged to apply to and to create binding obligations for elements and units of R .

Definition 3: (*Valid Element*). An element, e , in R is valid if members of a collectivity acknowledge that e is consistent with rules that define or govern R and constitutive elements of R .

Definition 4: (*Regime Propriety*). A regime, R , possesses propriety for any individual, i , if i positively evaluates its constitutive values, beliefs and rules.

Definition 5: (*Element Propriety*). An element, e , in R possesses propriety for any individual, i , if i positively evaluates e .

Definition 6: (*Authorized Regime*). A regime, R , its elements and the rules that govern it are authorized if high-status actors positively evaluate and support it.

Definition 7: (*Endorsed Regime*). A regime, R , its elements and the rules that govern it are endorsed if lower-status actors positively evaluate and support it.

Authorization and endorsement imply active support (e.g., expressions of willingness to provide or actually providing resources that are used as sanctions). However, both phenomena are examples of an old aphorism: “If you are not part of the solution you are part of the problem.” Quiescence, or the *absence* of active opposition, implies authorization or endorsement. The failure of leaders to take action that combats race discrimination fosters the perception that they support the practice. Similarly, the absence of mass opposition to differences in U. S. government treatment of illegal aliens from Cuba and those from Haiti or Mexico, sustains the perception that the masses endorse unequal standards of treatment.

The Multiple-Objects, Multiple-Sources Theory

The Zelditch-Walker revision of the theory includes two additional ideas, *acknowledged legitimizing element* (ALE) and *regime legitimizing formula* (RLF).¹³

Definition 8: (*Acknowledged Legitimizing Element*). An element, e , (e.g., a norm, value, belief, practice or procedure), in a regime, R , is an acknowledged legitimizing element (ALE), if collectivity members acknowledge e as valid and applicable to elements of R .

Definition 9: (*Regime-Legitimizing Formula*). A formula is a regime-legitimizing formula (RLF) for a regime, R , or for some element of R , if ALEs imply it either logically or empirically and, in turn, the formula logically or empirically implies R 's legitimacy.

Zelditch and Walker (2003) begin their revision of the Dornbusch-Scott theory by specifying four conditions under which regime legitimizing formulas link acknowledged legitimizing elements to regimes that lack legitimacy or whose legitimacy is contested. The four conditions are stated formally in the first argument of Legitimacy Theory, the *Basic Legitimation Assumption*:

Assumption 1: (*Basic Legitimation Assumption*). For any regime, R , whose legitimacy is undefined or contested, the undefined or contested elements of R (e_R) acquire validity if and only if:

Condition 1: (*Consonance*). The nature, conditions and consequences of R and its elements are consonant with any acknowledged legitimizing element to which a regime legitimizing formula appeals.

Condition 2: (*Objectification*). Any acknowledged legitimizing element to which a regime legitimizing formula appeals is treated as a matter of objective fact.

¹³ Zelditch and Walker (2003; Walker 2004, 2005) use the term “accepted legitimizing element” in earlier writings. The meaning of “accepted” is ambiguous; acceptance can imply that group members positively evaluate an element. However, if the idea refers to validity, “acknowledge” is a more reasonable term. Actors can acknowledge that an element or regime exists and that it governs their actions without positively evaluating it.

Condition 3: (*Impartiality*). Any benefit of R to which a regime legitimizing formula appeals is either in the group's interest or, if the appeal is to self-interest, it can be made universal.¹⁴

Condition 4: (*Consensus*). Group consensus acknowledges that elements to which a regime legitimizing formula appeals to legitimize R are valid (i.e., they are ALEs).

Consonance

The Basic Legitimation Assumption asserts that validity cannot be achieved unless a regime legitimizing formula (RLF) links a non-legitimate regime to consonant elements of acknowledged legitimizing elements (ALES). Lipset (1959, 1963) argued that new political regimes can acquire legitimacy if they are consonant with legitimized regimes. However, a particular social form may be consonant with non-legitimate regimes in one situation and discordant in others. As an example, Rothstein (2009) argues that holding democratic elections is not sufficient to establish the legitimacy of new political regimes. Electoral democracies have proved successful and are taken for granted in the West. However, Western-style elections and the ideology that underlies them are not consonant with extant or traditional political systems in many corners of the globe. The initial experiences of Western interests that installed electoral democracies in early twenty-first century Iraq, Afghanistan and other Middle Eastern countries support the claim. In the main, those governments have not achieved legitimacy.

Objectification

Objectification is a second condition necessary to establish legitimacy. Every individual becomes conscious of her surroundings which are, to begin, nothing more or less than data for

the five senses. Actors may assign meanings to their perceptions but those meanings are purely subjective and can serve no social purpose until they are transformed into something real. Signs or symbols assist in making the subjective real (i.e., objectifying the subjective) and in making it available to others. Berger and Luckmann (1966, p. 92 ff.) define legitimation as the process through which objectification of the subjective is justified.

President Obama's statement to Joe the Plumber is a subjective assessment of a policy, but the policy of progressive taxation is legitimate (i.e., valid). It has been legitimized by, among other claims, invoking Jesus's principle that "from those to whom much is given much is required." The teachings of Jesus, a charismatic figure, are acknowledged legitimizing elements that can be connected to consonant opinions by regime legitimizing formulas. As a result, what began as opinion becomes a legitimized matter of fact.

Impartiality


Impartiality is a third condition for Assumption 1. Acknowledged legitimizing elements and the regimes to which they are applied must appeal to general rather than specific interests (i.e., they must be unbiased). Elements that appeal to specific interests must be shown to be universally beneficial if they are to achieve legitimacy.

Consensus

Ancient philosophers described the importance of consensus as early as the fourth century BC (Aristotle [353 BC] 1943). Its role is most central in consensus theories of legitimacy (Lipset 1959; Parsons 1958; Rousseau [1762] 1964) but consensus is an important component of all legitimacy theories. Conflict theorists (Engels [1884] 2001; Marx and Engels [1845] 1939) identify the role that consensus takes in the resolution of conflict and the emergence of stability. Weber ([1918] 1968) integrated consensus and conflict

¹⁴ The legitimation assumption surveys the world from the point of view of members of a focal system. Any interests to which it refers are perceived rather than "real" interests.

Fig. 15.1 Graphic representation of the basic legitimization assumption



arguments but consensus remains an important consideration in his theory.

Condition 4 asserts that the elements on which a contested regime stakes its claims to legitimacy must be collectively acknowledged as valid. Proponents of the USA Patriot Act (2001) claimed that the Act was legitimate under provisions of the U. S. Constitution (an ALE). A majority of U. S. citizens acknowledge the validity of rational legal authority. A shaman who claimed legitimacy for the Patriot Act because a groundhog saw its shadow on the day the bill was introduced would be treated with skepticism.¹⁵ Consensus is necessary to establish legitimacy but consensual validation is also necessary to sustain it. Legitimized regimes cannot maintain stability or motive force if the collectivity questions or rejects the bases of their claims to legitimacy.¹⁶

Figure 15.1 describes the process through which a non-legitimate regime acquires legitimacy. Let R be the first version of a progressive federal income tax. The U. S. Constitution expressly forbade imposition of direct federal taxes and in the early 1890s there was substantial opposition to creating an income tax. Nevertheless, Congress proposed and passed the 16th Amendment. A key question for the new regime was: “Will the new regime achieve legitimacy?” R’s initial claim to legitimacy was anchored in its consonance with the legislative branch’s authority to amend the Constitution (i.e., an ALE). However, the Basic Legitimation Assumption claims that the new regime could not achieve legitimacy unless, and until, it satisfied the four conditions described above. The inherent bias of its progressive character (i.e., unequal tax rates) was justified by appealing to the benefits an income tax would provide for the country (i.e., unequal treatment of individual incomes was trumped by an appeal to universal or common interests). The amendment gained consensus—three quarters of the states acknowledged its validity by ratifying it. Finally, the justification was objectified and upheld by subsequent court decisions.

¹⁵ Signs and conjurer’s visions *are* valid knowledge in some societies and, as such, are perfectly acceptable bases of legitimacy.

¹⁶ See Zelditch and Walker 2003 and Walker 2004 for evidence of the importance of consensus, impartiality, objectification, and consonance to the establishment and maintenance of legitimacy.

Figure 15.1 illustrates the process through which regimes are legitimized. Acknowledged legitimizing elements are valid by definition. However, a sizable proportion of group members must attribute propriety to the logic or arguments of a regime legitimizing formula in order for the legitimacy of ALEs to spread to regimes that lack legitimacy. Individuals and groups that create regimes *de novo* often invent logics that justify their legitimacy. As an example, black Africans and English subjects arrived in the English North American colonies simultaneously.

A burgeoning agrarian capitalist economy was supported initially by European and African indentured servants. The conversion of black labor to slave labor and “the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of black skins” (Marx [1867] 1967, Vol. 1, p. 715) came later. The transformation was completed in the last half of the seventeenth century when legitimizing ideologies (e.g., that black Africans were sub-humans) were accepted as justification for the enslavement of blacks (Fields 1990). The legitimizing ideologies were also used to justify other practices that differentiated slaves from free persons.

Acknowledged legitimizing elements are often drawn from outside a given system’s boundaries. For example, state and federal laws establish requirements that every putative corporation must meet before it can be given the legal designation “corporation.” The requirements are ALEs and company officers can point to them as evidence of their company’s status as a legitimate business. Of course, some companies create many of the formal trappings of legitimate corporations without establishing every feature necessary to attain full and complete legitimacy. After they are identified as, for example, “dummy corporations,” their ill-gotten legitimacy quickly dissipates.

Regime-legitimizing formulas are translation devices. They include statements that spell out the logic of a regime’s claims to legitimacy. A regime-legitimizing formula generates statements like the following: If e (e.g., an amendment to the Constitution) is an instance of an acknowledged legitimizing element, e is legitimate. Regime le-

gitimizing formulas connect ALEs to elements of regimes that lack legitimacy (e.g., a system of chattel slavery) thereby making it increasingly likely that the regimes will achieve legitimacy. The *spread of legitimacy* can also strengthen the legitimacy of regimes whose legitimacy is questioned. Just as important, legitimacy can spread among elements within regimes. It can be transferred from role occupants to social roles. Weber ([1918] 1968) describes the transfer of charisma from charismatic individuals to the offices they hold (office charisma) and, subsequently, to their successors.

Legitimacy as validity is not an all or nothing phenomenon (Walker et al. 2002). A regime or any of its elements can achieve gradations of legitimacy. A regime’s legitimacy is weakened if any of the four conditions is satisfied only minimally or reversed. A judge who issues biased rulings will lose legitimacy by violating the principle of impartiality. She may also lose the support of other players in the judicial system which further undermines her legitimacy.

The Basic Legitimation Assumption describes the legitimization of regimes or the reinforcement of regimes for which legitimacy is contested. Zelditch and Walker integrate the Basic Legitimation Assumption with Dornbusch and Scott’s theory to complete the revised Legitimacy Theory. The revised and extended theory applies to large and small systems and describes the processes through which authorization and endorsement reinforce validity, and how validity shapes and constrains the behavior of individuals and groups. Figure 15.2 is a graphic representation of the theory.

Consider a rule-defined regime, R , a hierarchical system of unequal wages like that in the contemporary United States. Assume that R satisfies the principles of Assumption 1 (i.e., R is valid). Legitimacy Theory claims that for any behavior governed by a legitimized regime, the likelihood that it will be enacted varies positively with its consistency with R . R ’s validity affects behavior through a complex process that begins with its positive effects on authorization and endorsement. In turn, authorization and endorsement also reinforce R ’s validity as the double-headed




Fig. 15.2 Valid regimes, propriety and behavioral effects of legitimacy

arrows on Fig. 15.2 imply. Authorization and endorsement imply that high status actors and the masses will support the use of sanctions against those who fail to comply with R (e.g., those who propose or enact policies that allocate wages on the basis of need rather than performance). LT also implies that authorization and endorsement are positively associated. Formally,

Assumption 2.1: (*Authorization of Regimes*): Authorization of R or elements of R is a positive function of R's validity.

Assumption 2.2: Authorization of R or elements of R is a positive function of the endorsement of R.

Assumption 3.1: (*Endorsement of Regimes*): Endorsement of R or elements of R is a positive function of R's validity.

Assumption 3.2: Endorsement of R or elements of R is a positive function of the authorization of R.

Assumptions 1 through 3.2 describe legitimacy processes at the group level. The remaining assumptions describe individual level processes. R's validity and its authorization and endorsement are presumed to affect individuals' behavior directly and indirectly through their effects on individuals' attributions of propriety to the wage

structure as Fig. 15.2 shows. Individuals who attribute propriety to R will enact behaviors that support income inequality and resist policies and procedures designed to flatten the income distribution.

Assumption 4: For any actor, i , i 's attribution of propriety to R or elements of R is a positive function of R's validity.

Assumption 5: For any actor, i , i 's attribution of propriety to R or elements of R is a positive function of the authorization of R.

Assumption 6: For any actor, i , i 's attribution of propriety to R or elements of R is a positive function of the endorsement of R.

Assumption 7: For any behavior, b , that is an element of R, the likelihood that an actor, i , enacts b is a positive function of b 's propriety.

Assumptions 4–7 complete Legitimacy Theory. Dornbusch and Scott (1975) describe studies that support the original formulation and Walker and Zelditch (1993; Zelditch and Walker 1998, 2003) describe experimental findings that support the revised theory including the Basic Legitimation Assumption (Zelditch and Walker 2003). Legitimacy Theory is applied to the issue of affirmative action in the next section. The application shows how specific affirmative action

procedures have been legitimized. Additionally, looking at affirmative action policies through the lens of Legitimacy Theory sheds light on disputes between proponents and opponents of particular affirmative action policies—disputes that have raged for the better part of a half century.

Affirmative Action: Applying Legitimacy Theory

Theories are nets cast to catch what we call ‘the world:’ to rationalize, to explain and to master it. We endeavour to make the mesh ever finer and finer. (Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* [1934] 1959, p. 59)

Many consider Weber the father of modern legitimacy studies. Elaborations and extensions of his ideas center on processes that legitimize power and domination and the effects of that legitimization. Dornbusch and Scott (1975) and Zelditch and Walker (2003; Walker 2004) extend the theory’s scope and draw on the full complexity of Weber’s approach. However, complexity often masks subtleties of process. The discussion that follows applies Legitimacy Theory to a specific issue in the social psychology of inequality—affirmative action procedures as they are implemented in the contemporary United States. The application demonstrates the full range and power of Legitimacy Theory.

Affirmative Action

Affirmative action is an important issue in the political and social lives of many of the world’s people (Sowell 2004). Various policies and procedures have been implemented under that rubric as partial remedies for race, ethnic and gender inequality. Affirmative action policies have sparked heated debates in the United States and abroad. Legitimacy Theory is applied to affirmative action policies to show how regimes are legitimized (or not). The application demonstrates that legitimacy is important for creating and maintaining orderly societies, that regimes can

compete for legitimacy, and that regime competition can generate rancorous conflict.

The earliest affirmative action programs implemented in the United States centered on, but were not exclusive to, black-white race inequality. A majority of American blacks were held as chattel from the middle to late seventeenth century through the end of the American Civil War (1861–1865). A century later, black Americans were still on the bottom rungs of almost every ladder of social and economic well-being. The disparate positions of black and white Americans set the stage for the modern period of affirmative action.

Proponents and critics of contemporary affirmative action often trace its history to President L. B. Johnson’s Executive Order 11246 (September 24, 1965). However, it was President Kennedy’s Executive Order 10925 (March 6, 1961) that introduced the term into the modern lexicon. Post-Civil War institutions like the Freedmen’s Bureau and Reconstruction were precursors of modern race-based affirmative action (Franklin 1994). President F. D. Roosevelt’s Executive Order 8802 (June 25, 1941) issued during World War II was an important milestone that presaged the orders issued by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. President Roosevelt’s order read, in part, “...there shall be no discrimination in the employment of workers in defense industries [or government] because of race, creed, color, or national origin...”¹⁷

President Roosevelt’s directive expanded the list of protected classes to creed, color and national origin in addition to race. Current law includes the categories of religion and sex. Recent controversies, including pending legal challenges, center on the transformation of affirmative action policies designed to combat inequality into policies that sustain or establish inequality. The ensuing debate offers insight into the complexity of legitimacy processes.

¹⁷ The bracketed phrase was penciled in on the original typescript.

Affirmative Action: Creating and Legitimizing Equal Opportunity

The country Lyndon B. Johnson inherited after the assassination of President Kennedy was marked by stark race inequalities. To be sure, black Americans had made substantial progress following their general emancipation at the conclusion of the American Civil War. However, race prejudice and discrimination were widely practiced in the mid-1960s, and, in some corners of the country, they were the law of the land. Against that backdrop, and following President Kennedy's lead, President Johnson issued Executive Order 11246.¹⁸ The order established equal opportunity and non-discrimination as official government policy. The policy shift was driven by the idea that equality of opportunity was the key to achieving social and economic parity for Americans who had been targets of discriminatory treatment. Johnson's order stated:

It is the policy of the Government of the United States to provide equal opportunity in Federal employment for all qualified persons, to prohibit discrimination in employment because of race, creed, color, or national origin, and to promote the full realization of equal employment opportunity....

President Johnson's order described a new civil rights regime. Call it the Equal Opportunity Regime. The order stated clearly that any policies created or implied by the Equal Opportunity Regime could be enforced by the coercive power of the federal system (e.g., by fining or incarcerating violators). But coercion requires increased government funding for monitoring and for punishing those who are found to have

violated the regime's stipulations. Legitimate regimes experience lower costs on both dimensions. A legitimized Equal Opportunity Regime is optimal for the government and for individuals the regime was designed to benefit. Did the Equal Opportunity Regime achieve legitimacy? The simple answer is "yes."

President Johnson's order authorized equal opportunity *and* delegitimized federal employment discrimination on any of the four dimensions the order enumerated. In layman's terms, the order made discrimination in federal hiring illegal. The President's authority to issue and enforce the order was legitimized by Article II of the United States Constitution which enumerates executive branch powers. That is, the order's validity was established by a regime legitimizing formula that connected the Constitution (an ALE) to the extension of executive authority to establish new federal policy. The newly legitimized regime was translated quickly into concrete behavior as government agencies and subcontractors created mechanisms to ensure equality of opportunity.

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 affirmed and reinforced President Johnson's directive to create equal opportunity. The Civil Rights Law also extended the federal government's reach well beyond employment issues. The law's language, when coupled with the many contracts between the federal system and state and local agencies, ensured that equal opportunity mandates and policies were adopted quickly by state and local governments. President Johnson's order, the Civil Rights Law, and a plethora of state and local equal opportunity statutes are all forms of authorization that were important for establishing the regime's validity.

Congressional action is also an expression of consensual validation and endorsement (i.e., the will of the people) in a republican form of government. Additionally, the regime is impartial (i.e., it applies universally), it is a matter of objective fact, and it is consonant with founding documents (e.g., the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution).¹⁹ But, authorization (by members

¹⁸ Kennedy and Johnson's orders are considered major milestones in U. S. civil rights law because they extended anti-discrimination law to the general population. However, focusing on their actions should not be interpreted as neglect of the contributions of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower who served between Roosevelt and Kennedy. Both made important contributions to an emerging anti-discrimination regime. President Truman issued an executive order that required integration of the U. S. armed forces and Eisenhower used an executive order to ensure implementation of the policy Truman authorized.

¹⁹ The old regime defined a system of race *inequality* that permitted and, in some cases required, race discrimi-

of Congress) and endorsement were not unanimous. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was opposed by 30% of both House and Senate members. A sizable minority of people polled during that period, 30–40%, opposed various proposals to create race equality. In the language of LT, 30–40% of the population generally failed to attribute propriety to a policy of strict nondiscrimination. Yet, the Equal Opportunity Regime satisfied the four conditions that the basic legitimization assumption requires to establish legitimacy as validity.

Legitimacy Theory implies that validity affects authorization, endorsement and propriety positively. As such, propriety and endorsement (aggregated propriety) should increase with time. The empirical record is consistent with the implications of LT. The American National Election Study (ANES 2010) has regularly asked Americans to give their opinion of the following statement:

Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed.

Almost 9 of 10 respondents (88.3%) to 10 surveys conducted between 1984 and 2008 expressed agreement or strong agreement with the statement. Blacks are more likely than whites to attribute propriety to equal opportunity (93.9% v. 86.8% respectively) but the differences are not large. Indeed, a review of public opinion polling on this question might lead an uninformed but objective observer to question the veracity of any informant who claims that affirmative action is a controversial issue in twenty-first century America. A Legitimacy Theory analysis suggests why modern affirmative action has been a volatile issue for 5 decades.

nation. It was also considered consonant with the same documents. The beliefs and writings of numerous segregationists as well as landmark decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court (e.g., *Dred Scott v. Sandford* (1857) and *Plessy v. Ferguson* (1896)) “established” and legitimized the secondary status of blacks and other classes of U. S. residents. However, after *Brown v. (Topeka) Board of Education*, race discrimination was rendered inconsistent with the founding documents and the old regime’s legitimacy was increasingly contested.

Affirmative Action: Recreating and Legitimizing Inequality

The Equal Opportunity Regime generated policies and procedures (i.e., concrete behavior) that were designed to create equal opportunity. However, those policies were slowly replaced with policies designed to produce equal results. Policies intended to produce equality of results can be considered products of a second regime. Label it the Equal Results Regime. The shift from an emphasis on equal opportunity to an emphasis on equal results began during the final years of the Johnson administration. The pace of change accelerated during the Nixon administration and the transition was essentially complete by the time President Nixon resigned the presidency in 1974.²⁰

The shift to an equal results regime brought with it a change in focus from individuals to groups. The change brought terms like “statistical discrimination” and “disparate impact” to public discussions of affirmative action and to *tests of fairness* (Skrentny 1996; Sowell 1995). Injustice under the Equal Opportunity Regime required a determination that individuals did not have equal opportunities.²¹ Injustice under the Equal Results Regime required only evidence of statistical discrimination or disparate impact. Under such standards, an employer whose labor force is 30% female or an educational institution whose student body is 5% black are under suspicion of discrimination if women and blacks comprise 50+% and 20% respectively of the surrounding community. Sowell (1995), Skrentny (1996) and numerous other writers have addressed the logic of such policies.

²⁰ See Glazer (1975) for a thorough discussion of this issue.

²¹ President Kennedy created the Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity the forerunner of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). On a personal note, in early 1962, a local branch of the state employment service asked me to apply for a job that blacks had previously been denied the opportunity to fill. The opportunity to apply for and eventually to fill the position, were a direct result of the intervention of local civil rights organizations and local application of President Kennedy’s order.

Policies that are designed to create equality of result without taking inputs (e.g., motivation or skill) into account often use preferential treatment to make progress toward that goal. One consequence of implementing policies consistent with the Equal Results Regime has been a long and acrimonious competition with the Equal Opportunity Regime. Each regime tries to achieve or to maintain legitimacy. The two regimes share some acknowledged legitimizing elements but differ on others. Each justifies its claim to legitimacy in the morality of western philosophical tradition (e.g., Locke [1690] 1982; Rousseau [1755] 1964, [1762] 1964), the U. S. Constitution, presidential authority, state and federal courts, and the will of the people (i.e., endorsement) as it is expressed through members of Congress and state and local legislative bodies.

Unlike the Equal Opportunity Regime, the Equal Results Regime fails to satisfy the four conditions necessary to establish its validity. The regime lacks consensus, is biased, and it is inconsistent with U. S. law and the founding documents that underlie that law. Consider its standing on the consensus criterion. Proponents of equal results policies are far outnumbered by their opponents who acknowledge their existence but fail to endorse them. The General Social Survey (Smith et al., 2012; hereafter GSS) is a nationally representative survey that has been conducted since 1972. Survey researchers asked the following question nineteen times between 1975 and 2010:

Some people think that (blacks/negroes [sic]/African-Americans) have been discriminated against for so long that the government has a special obligation to help improve their living standards; they are at point 1. Others believe that the government should not be giving special treatment to (blacks/negroes/African-Americans); they are at point 5. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you made up your mind on this?

Respondents to the GSS reject the Equal Results Regime overwhelmingly. On average, 18.6% of respondents to 19 surveys support the government's use of special treatment to improve the economic situation of black Americans. Approximately thirty percent (29.7%) expressed

uncertainty having some agreement with both positions but almost half (48.7%) oppose such action. The lack of support is shown in stark relief after equivocal responses are eliminated and analysis is restricted to black and white respondents. Only 25.9% support preferential treatment whereas 69.8% of respondents are opposed.

Responses are divided sharply by race on this critical issue. Overall, 13.4% of whites and 51.6% of black respondents support this form of affirmative action. Among white respondents who gave unequivocal answers, 18.3% support giving black Americans special help to improve their economic condition. Conversely, nearly three quarters of black respondents (74.2%) who gave unequivocal responses support government economic assistance to blacks. Policies that overwhelmingly lack consensus signal a *legitimation crisis* (Habermas 1975, p. 46).²²

Attempts to legitimize preferential treatment face additional obstacles. Preferential policies like those required by the Equal Results Regime violate the impartiality criterion; they are biased by definition. Consider the case of *Grutter v. Bollinger* decided by the U. S. Supreme Court in 2003. Barbara Grutter filed suit against the University of Michigan Law School after she was denied admission. Grutter alleged that her 14th Amendment right to equal protection under the law was violated by a policy that gave preference to blacks and members of some other ethnic groups. The Court, with Justice O'Connor writing for the majority, upheld the law school's policy but acknowledged the policy's race bias.

O'Connor agreed that the Fourteenth Amendment was a bulwark *against* discrimination. Nev-

²² These data illustrate the often confusing relationship between consensus and endorsement. The data reflect a failure of endorsement rather than a lack of consensual acknowledgement of the regime. Respondents acknowledge (i.e., take notice of) policies that reflect the Equal Results Regime and orient their actions to it. In that sense, the policies are *institutionalized* consistent with Parsons' (1964) use of the term or Mauss' (1975) description of the institutionalization phase of social movements. Uncovering motives for compliance is the only true test of the regime's validity. Compliance out of a sense of obligation follows from legitimacy (validity) whereas compliance to gain rewards or avoid sanctions does not.

ertheless, she concluded that discrimination was permitted in the interest of promoting diversity (*Grutter v. Bollinger* 2003). Put simply, the Court ruled that race discrimination (i.e., procedural bias) is permissible if it provides benefits to the university (i.e., greater “diversity”). The Court’s majority claimed that, in some instances, policies that serve the interests of special groups (or individuals) actually have universal benefits. The claim is built on the idea that groups or institutions that are characterized by greater heterogeneity (diversity) are “better off” than those with less heterogeneity.²³

Justice O’Connor’s justification of race discrimination was intended to remedy violations of the impartiality and consonance criteria. It does so by trying to make discrimination consonant—not with the law and founding documents—but with the goal of achieving diversity and putative benefits of heterogeneity. Evidence suggests that the tactic has not achieved its goal. As described above, the Equal Results Regime lacks consensus. Its legitimation crisis persists.

A Summary and Some Concluding Remarks

Inequality is found at all levels of social organization from dyads to the community of nations. Inequalities invite social comparison and status generalization processes (Ridgeway and Nakagawa, this volume). Some inequalities, like power inequalities that lead high power actors to exploit low power actors, can trigger conflicts that disrupt social order (Plato [390 BC] 1941). Power

²³ The claim that heterogeneity is beneficial is more general than it appears on its face. The University of Michigan and its law school are not the only “beneficiaries” of invidious discrimination under the logic of the Grutter decision. So too are its majority and minority students whose learning is enhanced by greater “diversity.” President Obama’s claim that progressive taxation benefits all expresses a similar view. Elsewhere, I (Walker 1999) have described how theory—including Legitimacy Theory—implies that such policies have long-term disadvantages for members of minority groups and for race relations more generally. Occasionally, the popular press takes a similar position (cf. Henninger 2012).

exercise ensures that individuals who have less ability, lower status and less power get fewer rewards and pay relatively greater costs than those of higher rank. Perceptible inequality can activate a multi-stage process that requires those on the lower and upper rungs of ladders of inequality to decide several questions as follows:²⁴

1. Is systematic inequality a problem? If not the process ends. If yes,
2. Are there alternatives to systematic inequality? The process ends if there are no alternatives to consider. If there are viable alternatives, objectives and policies, then
3. Should a method or strategy for achieving alternatives be pursued? A “no” response terminates the process. A positive decision triggers,
4. Action designed to achieve alternatives formulated or chosen at stages 2 and 3.

Low status actors must decide if systematic inequality is a problem. For example, the average black worker earns less than her white counterpart. There are several alternatives available if she considers the black-white difference a problem. She can (1) do nothing, (2) take action to get her pay raised, or (3) lobby for an equal opportunity or equal results regime. After identifying these possible courses of action, she, or a group of blacks and their supporters, can identify or devise tactics or methods for achieving various alternatives. However, identifying strategies will be of little use if either individuals or groups decide not to act. Legitimacy processes shape the decision frame at every stage of the decision making process.

The legitimacy of inequality, not the fact of objective inequality, influences conceptions of what is fair, unjust and actionable (see Hegtvold and Isom, this volume). Legitimacy processes also influence perceptions of available alternatives, perceptions of the viability of alternatives and of the likelihood that a given alternative will produce a desired outcome. Imagine a world in which race prejudice and discrimination have been abolished. Race differences in the distribu-

²⁴ The process described here is a slight revision of the policy process described by Zelditch et al. (1983). See their Fig. 1 for a graphic representation.

tion of individuals to occupations, wages, and promotions are possible if whites have fewer job skills, lower levels of education, and weaker occupational motives than blacks. Under these conditions, black workers, as a group, have substantial occupational advantages. However, black and white *individuals* with similar skills, education and motives ought to experience equal outcomes. The ensuing inequality of groups would be of no consequence to white workers in a world governed by a legitimized Equal Opportunity Regime. It would be a matter of grave concern if they inhabit an alternate world governed by a legitimized Equal Results Regime.

High power actors are faced with similar decisions although it is possible that their decisions may be reactive more often than proactive. That is, the behavior or anticipated behavior of low power actors rather than systematic inequality may trigger decision processes for high power actors. The history of recent American race relations offers examples. Systematic black-white inequality as a result of race prejudice and discrimination was the status quo during the 1950s and early 1960s. Conditions were changing rapidly but race inequality had been a fact of American life for three centuries. Undoubtedly, those conditions troubled some whites just as some of their predecessors had opposed the enslavement of blacks in colonial America. Many joined blacks and others to abolish black-white inequality and it cost some of them their lives. However, many whites who opposed black-white equality did nothing to preserve the status quo until action was taken to dismantle it. White Citizens' Councils and the Ku Klux Klan were very active across the South during the late 1950s and 1960s. The first Citizens' Council was organized *after*, and as a reaction to, the *Brown v. (Topeka) Board of Education* (1954) decision (Klarman 2005). Similarly, the Klan was organized after the Civil War had ended, slaves had been freed, and Reconstruction had begun.

Legitimacy processes operate simultaneously at the collective and individual levels. Legitimacy as validity is constitutive of regimes and establishes obligations for group members to conform to the rules, beliefs and standards of conduct that

define and govern regimes. Legitimacy as propriety is evaluative. Individuals either approve or disapprove regimes; those who approve conform to valid standards and those who disapprove either deviate or require monitoring to assure that they do not disrupt social order.

The multiple-source, multiple-object Legitimacy Theory (Dornbusch and Scott 1975; Walker 2004; Zelditch and Walker 2003) extends legitimacy theories beyond their initial focus on relations of dominance, power and authority. LT is a comprehensive theory that explains how regimes are legitimized, how legitimacy processes establish and maintain the stability of regimes, and how legitimacy processes motivate regime change. There is extensive empirical support for LT but there is more to be done.

Legitimacy is, in one sense, an epiphenomenon. It is found only in the company of other phenomena. Legitimacy is not a cause of the phenomena or systems that achieve it. However, legitimacy processes have profound effects on social structures and processes associated with phenomena that achieve legitimacy. To claim that a phenomenon or regime, like race inequality, is legitimized is to claim that it is a matter of objective fact that has achieved, at least, minimal consensual acknowledgement and is consonant with acknowledged legitimizing elements and other legitimized elements of a given situation.

The much simplified application of Legitimacy Theory to affirmative action policies and procedures shows that legitimacy processes have important and powerful effects on very complex matters. Side-by-side comparison of the Equal Opportunity and Equal Results regimes shows how powerful figures can put regimes in place without securing their legitimacy. The Equal Results Regime is an example. The regime violates the consensus, impartiality, and consonance criteria of the basic legitimation assumption. Despite more than 5 decades of implementation, a number of judicial rulings that support it, and litigious, vocal proponents, the Equal Results Regime has made only partial gains in its bid for legitimacy. Events following the *Grutter* decision are illustrative.

The Supreme Court ruled for lead plaintiff, Jennifer Gratz, and against the University of Michigan in a separate challenge to its undergraduate admissions affirmative action policy (*Gratz v. Bollinger* 2003). The Court published the *Gratz* and *Grutter* decisions simultaneously. In that sense, *Grutter* was only a partial victory. Despite the Court's positive ruling, *Grutter* lacked endorsement whereas public sentiment supported *Gratz*. The split decision on the Equal Results Regime motivated Ward Connerly, a California civil rights activist, Jennifer Gratz, and others to support a Michigan referendum barring special treatment. The referendum passed by a 58–42% majority in 2006. The new law appeared to be consonant with the Fourteenth Amendment, it espoused impartiality and, as law, it claimed constitutive legitimacy (i.e., validity). It was supported by a majority of Michigan voters but it could not claim unanimous endorsement. Its “absolute legitimacy” was not established.

The battle to save and legitimize the Equal Results Regime continues in state and federal courts. On November 15, 2012 a federal appeals court ruled the Michigan law unconstitutional. Questions about the legitimacy of the Equal Results Regime that supports race-based *inequality* will be decided once again by the Supreme Court. Eight justices will decide a similar case involving undergraduate admissions (*Fisher v. University of Texas* 2011) during the Court's 2012–2013 session.²⁵ However, as the examination of this issue shows, if the Court's decision authorizes the Equal Results Regime it is unlikely to resolve the matter. The Equal Results Regime still violates the impartiality and consonance criteria of the Basic Legitimation Assumption and, without a more effective reeducation program (i.e., propaganda); the regime is unlikely to gain high levels of endorsement.

A Legitimacy Theory analysis of the Equal Results Regime shows how policies like those it initiates can create systematic inequality and reinforce existing inequalities. Returning to the *Grutter* decision, a majority on the Supreme Court authorized a policy of preferential admis-

sions. The Court used the goal of race and ethnic heterogeneity to justify its decision. However, the Court's decision is an implicit admission that many members of the *affected classes* would be denied admission under the standards applied to the general population. That admission communicates to the public-at-large that those who are helped need help. That is, their *inputs* (preparation, skills, abilities, etc.) are insufficient to secure admission. Moreover, the emphasis on group remedies increases the likelihood that others perceive their deficiencies as characteristics of the group rather than of individual members. Put simply, the policies, and administrative, legislative, and judicial support of them, create or reinforce race inequality through the activation of attribution, status generalization, social identity, and legitimacy processes (Walker 1999).

Looking at affirmative action policies through the lens of Legitimacy Theory also shows how authority figures can establish regimes that quickly achieve legitimacy. The Equal Opportunity Regime is an important example. The regime garners high levels of endorsement, motivates impartial policies, and is consonant with a variety of acknowledged legitimizing elements. Absent fundamental changes in the attitudes of U. S. citizens, the regime will ultimately prevail. As Justice O'Connor wrote in her defense of the Equal Results Regime “race conscious admissions policies *must* be limited in time... Enshrining a *permanent justification* for racial preferences would offend this fundamental equal protection principle [emphasis added].”

A Legitimacy Theory analysis of affirmative action regimes also reveals the complexity of phenomena that are often presented as “simple” choices. Moreover, analyses of this sort suggest how Legitimacy Theory can be used more fruitfully than it has been to date. President Obama and Joe the Plumber are both concerned about what is a fair or equitable system of taxation. To ask, “What is fair?” is an elliptical question that cannot be answered properly without recourse to legitimacy processes and Legitimacy Theory. What is fair for people who are governed by *and* attribute propriety to a legitimized Equal Opportunity Regime is clear. It is equally clear what is

²⁵ Justice Kagan, an Obama appointee, has recused herself from the case.

considered fair by those who are governed by and attribute propriety to a legitimized Equal Results Regime. Yet, answering a “What is fair?” question for those living under either regime fails to resolve the issue of which regime is fair—or the most fair. And that is the paradox of inequality and its legitimation.

Researchers often describe inequality as a social evil. Other researchers characterize inequality as a social benefit. Rarely is there unanimous endorsement of either position. The lack of unanimous agreement sows the seeds of legitimacy crises. Legitimacy processes shape and determine group reactions to what is constitutively legitimate (i.e., valid). Collectively-validated regimes also shape individuals’ attributions of propriety to those regimes. In turn, true to the tenets of social psychology, the aggregated attributions of individual group members (i.e., endorsement) partially determine what is collectively validated.

The extended scope of Legitimacy Theory suggests broad avenues of future research. The revised theory permits analysis of debates about important issues like affirmative action or tax policy as well as mundane issues concerning appropriate behavior at work or in other social settings. Elsewhere I argue (Simpson and Walker 2002; Walker 1999, 2004) that issues like these should be treated as instances of regimes that are either legitimized or seeking legitimacy. Legitimacy Theory implies that legitimizing inequality contributes to the stability of systems of inequality. Alternatively, legitimizing *equality* encourages delegitimizing and dismantling systems of invidious inequality. Consequently, common behaviors that reflect, reduce or sustain systematic inequalities are grist for the mill that is the multiple-source, multiple-object theory of legitimacy. The implications of this last statement are far reaching.

A majority of global disputes are questions not only of inequality of one sort or other but of the legitimacy of regimes that are supported by protagonists in those disputes. What is a fair allocation of territory in the Middle East? What role should government take, if any, in reducing inequalities among races, ethnic groups, or individuals? What role should developed countries

take in reducing inequalities among countries of the world? Should they promote democracy, give economic assistance or take a *laissez faire* approach? Should debates over U. S. tax policy be limited to more (President Obama) or less (Joe the Plumber) progressive taxation? Or should the debate be expanded to include alternatives to progressive taxation (e.g., flat income tax rates or taxes on consumption)? These questions center on regimes and their legitimation. But applications of Legitimacy Theory to practical matters can be extended beyond examination of competing regimes.

Legitimacy Theory can be applied to questions of tactics like some of those in the preceding paragraph just as McCarthy and Zald’s (1977) theory of resource mobilization implies. Proponents of a given regime can use Legitimacy Theory to decide which tactics are most effective in their campaigns to maintain or to achieve regime legitimacy. On one hand, proponents of the Equal Opportunity Regime in the U. S. ought to resist educational programs that tout the virtues of Marx’s dictum of “from each according to his abilities to each according to his needs” if they wish to sustain endorsement—and legitimacy—of their favored regime. The slogan is antithetical to their approach and their goals. On the other hand, proponents of an Equal Results Regime should also avoid references to Marx and fellow travelers as they try to build consensus for the regime. “Marxism,” “communism,” and “socialism” have negative connotations for many Americans (i.e., they lack propriety).

Similarly, those who promote an ever more progressive tax system should probably continue to cite the teachings of Jesus and suppress the origin of the quotation: “A government that robs Peter to pay Paul can always count on the support of Paul.” Today, many identify the slogan with the conservative President Ronald Reagan, a sworn enemy of politically liberal principles. As long as the slogan is attributed to him and treated as an enemy’s attack on a favored policy, it can remain an object of derision and ridicule.²⁶

²⁶ Derision and ridicule have proved to be useful tactics in political contests. Their use is encouraged and legiti-

However, the conservative population's disdain for progressive taxation might be enhanced, liberal ardor for it might be dashed, and the future of progressive tax policy endangered, if the slogan was properly traced to Shaw (1944) one of the founders of Fabian socialism (Shaw 1889). The aphorism shows how elements that are invoked as acknowledged legitimizing elements can serve multiple purposes depending on which regime legitimizing formula is used to link them to which concrete ends. The Constitution and Declaration of Independence serve very different ends when they are employed in the service of the Equal Opportunity and Equal Results regimes.

This chapter ends by revising slightly and repeating a claim made earlier. Common and uncommon behaviors that increase, reflect, reduce or sustain systematic inequalities are grist for the mill that is Legitimacy Theory.

Appendix

This appendix is a verbatim transcript (*Tampa Bay Times* 2008) of an interchange between Senator Barack H. Obama, II, the 2008 Democratic Party presidential nominee, and Samuel J. Wurzelbacher a resident of Toledo, Ohio. The interchange took place on October 12, 2008 as Senator Obama took a walking tour of a Toledo neighborhood.

Senator Barack H. Obama, II, (BHO): What's your name?

Samuel J. Wurzelbacher (SJW): My name's Joe Wurzelbacher.

BHO: Good to see you, Joe.

SJW: I'm getting ready to buy a company that makes about \$ 250,000 . . . \$ 270–280,000 a year.

BHO: All right.

SJW: Your new tax plan's gonna tax me more, isn't it?

BHO: Well, here's what's gonna happen. If you're a small business which you would qualify as, first of all, you'd get a 50% tax credit, so you get a cut on taxes for your health care costs. So

you would actually get a tax cut on that front. If your revenue is above \$ 250,000, then from \$ 250,000 down, your taxes are gonna stay the same. It is true that for . . . say, from \$ 250,000 up, from \$ 250,000 to 300,000 or so . . .

SJW: Well, here's my question . . .

BHO: I just want to answer your question. So, for that additional amount, you'd go from 36 to 39%, which is what it was under Bill Clinton. And the reason we're doing that is because 95% of small businesses make less than \$ 250,000 so what I want to do is give them a tax cut. I want to give all these folks who are bus drivers, teachers, auto workers who make less . . . I want to give them a tax cut and so what we're doing is, we are saying that folks who make more than \$ 250,000 that that marginal amount above \$ 250,000, they're gonna be taxed at a 39 instead of a 36% rate.

SJW: Well, the reason why I ask you about the American Dream I mean, I work hard. I'm a plumber, I work 10–12 hours a day . . .

BHO: Absolutely.

SJW: . . . and I'm, you know, buying this company and I'm gonna continue to work that way. Now, if I buy another truck and adding something else to it and, you know, build the company, you know, I'm getting taxed more and more while fulfilling the American Dream.

BHO: Well, here's a way of thinking about it. How long have you been a plumber? How long have you been working?

SJW: 15 years.

BHO: Okay. So, over the last 15 years, when you weren't making \$ 250,000, you would have been getting a tax cut from me. So you'd actually have more money, which means you would have saved more, which means that you would have gotten to the point where you could build your small business quicker than under the current tax code. So there are two ways of looking at it. I mean, one way of looking at it is, now that you've become more successful . . .

SJW: Through hard work.

BHO: Y through hard work, you don't want to be taxed as much.

SJW: Exactly.

BHO: Which I understand. But another way of looking at it is, 95% of folks who are making less

mized in some circles by the fifth rule of power tactics put forward in Alinsky's (1971, p. 128) handbook for community organizers: "Ridicule is man's most potent weapon."

than \$ 250,000, they may be working hard, too, but they're being taxed at a higher rate than they would be under mine. So what I'm doing is . . . you know, put yourself back 10 years ago when you were only making whatever . . . \$ 60,000 or \$ 70,000. Under my tax plan, you would be keeping more of your paycheck, you'd be spending lower taxes, which means that you would have saved and gotten to the point where you are faster. Now, look, nobody likes high taxes, right? Of course not. But what's happened is that we end up . . . we've cut taxes a lot for folks like me who make a lot more than \$ 250,000. We haven't given a break to folks who make less and, as a consequence, the average wage and income for just ordinary folks, the vast majority of Americans, has actually gone down over the last 8 years. So all I want to do is . . . I've got a tax cut. The only thing that changes is, I'm going to cut taxes a little bit more for the folks who are most in need, and for the 5% of the folks who are doing very well, even though they've been working hard . . . and I understand that; I appreciate that . . . I just want to make sure that they're paying a little bit more in order to pay for those other tax cuts. Now, I respect your disagreement, but I just want you to be clear. It's not that I want to punish your success. I just want to make sure that everybody who is behind you, that they've got a chance at success, too.

SJW: It seems like you'd be welcome to a flat tax then.

BHO: You know, I would be open to it except for . . . here's the problem with the flat tax. If you actually put a flat tax together, you'd probably . . . in order for it to work and replace all the revenue that we've got, you'd probably end up having to make it like about a 40% sales tax. I mean, the value added, making it up. Now, some people say 23 or 25, but, in truth, when you add up all the revenue that would need to be raised, you'd have to slap on a whole bunch of sales taxes on it. And I do believe that for folks like me who are, you know, have worked hard but, frankly, also been lucky, I don't mind paying just a little bit more than the waitress who I just met over there, who's . . . things are slow and she can barely make the rent. Because my attitude is that if the economy's good for folks from the bottom up,

it's gonna be good for everybody. If you've got a plumbing business, you're gonna be better off if you've got a whole bunch of customers who can afford to hire you. And right now, everybody's so pinched that business is bad for everybody. And I think when you spread the wealth around, it's good for everybody. But, listen, I respect what you do and I respect your question. And even if I don't get your vote, I'm still gonna be working hard on your behalf 'cause I want to make sure . . . small businesses are what creates jobs in this country and I want to encourage it. All right. (applause) One other thing I didn't mention. For small-business people, I'm gonna eliminate the capital gains tax, so what it means is if your business succeeds and let's say you take it from a \$ 250,000 business to a \$ 500,000 business, that capital gains that you get, we're not gonna tax you on it 'cause I want you to grow more so you're actually going . . . you may end up . . . I'd have to look at your particular business but you might end up paying lower taxes under my plan and my approach than under John McCain's plan. I can't guarantee that 'cause I'd have to take a look at your business.

SJW: Okay, I understand that.

BHO: All right. Thanks for the question, though. I appreciate it. Okay, guys, I gotta get out here. I've gotta go prepare for this debate. But that was pretty good timing. Thanks. (Last modified: Oct 23, 2008 07:11 PM)

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Part III

Contexts of Inequality

The chapters in this section examine how inequality is created and reproduced in specific institutional and interactional contexts. Authors were asked to draw on various traditions in sociological social psychology and to use the concepts discussed earlier in this volume. We see here that research on different contexts has emphasized different processes. For example, studies of the unequal division of household labor have used theories of “doing gender,” status construction,

affect control, and equity. In contrast, studies of schools have looked to identity, parental involvement, student engagement, and teacher expectations as explanations for achievement gaps. Despite these differences, together the chapters in this section highlight the unique contributions of social psychology to advancing general sociological understandings of how inequality “comes to life” in diverse institutional and interactional contexts.

Unequal but Together: Inequality Within and Between Families

16

Kathryn J. Lively, Jamie Oslawski-Lopez and
Brian Powell

Introduction

When it comes to fulfilling individual and societal needs, families are important. Families are important from the perspective of individuals, for whom these primary relationships can provide intimacy, support and social integration (Durkheim [1897] 1977; Cooley 1909). Families serve indispensable cultural and material functions—for example, by transferring cultural knowledge from generation to generation and distributing necessary material goods to family members (Bourdieu 1977; Parsons and Bales [1956]2007). Families also are important as a social institution, as well as in their inextricable link to other social institutions—the state, schools, and workplaces, to name a few (Bianchi and Milkie 2010; Burgess and Locke 1945; Kohn 1969; Schneider and Coleman 1993). Clearly, families are important both to individuals and to society more broadly.

Families, however, are also implicated in the production and reproduction of inequality. Scholars using a variety of theoretical lenses have discussed the ways in which families can confer advantages or disadvantages that become

difficult to erase (Becker 1980; Bourdieu 1977; Coleman 1988; Featherman and Hauser 1978). Although the literature on this topic—in particular, scholarship focusing on the status attainment models (Blau and Duncan 1967; Featherman and Hauser 1978), various theories of social and cultural capital (Bourdieu 1977; Coleman 1988; Lareau 2003), and rational choice and human capital theories (Becker 1964; Becker and Tomes 1976)—often emphasizes differences between families, within-family inequality also has been studied. In this chapter, we discuss both between-familial and within-familial inequality by focusing on four topics:

1. The very definition of family (between-family inequality)
2. Parent-sibling relations
3. The household division of labor
4. The treatment of mothers vs. others in labor force

Our discussion of these areas of family inequality obviously is not intended to be a fully comprehensive review. Indeed, the literature on family inequality covers an array of topics that could not be sufficiently summarized in a review chapter. Instead, we illustrate promising areas of family and inequality research that are or can be informed by various social psychological perspectives.

Our review of family and inequality research suggests that much of the work on family inequality implicitly uses social psychological understandings without recognizing this reliance. We suggest that families, as the primary basis for

B. Powell (✉) · J. Oslawski-Lopez
Department of Sociology, Indiana University, 1020 E.
Kirkwood Ave., Bloomington, IN 47405, USA
e-mail: powell@indiana.edu

K. J. Lively
Department of Sociology, Dartmouth College, 6104
Silsby, Hanover, NH 03755, USA

social organization and for the reproduction of inequalities, provide an ideal test of many social psychological concepts. Therefore, our selection of topics in this chapter offers illustrations of explicit integration of social psychology, family and inequality scholarship. The reader should be reminded that these areas are used as exemplars and, of course, are necessarily only a sample of the areas in which social psychology, family, and stratification research has begun to, or should begin to, merge.

Definitions of Family

Social Scientific Conceptualizations of Family

Although often overlooked, family can be viewed as a site of inequality in its very definition. Recent research on families suggests that inequality exists in the conceptualization of who counts as a family. Among social scientists, there are multiple perspectives on what is meant by “family.” Some scholars have promoted structural definitions of the family that focus primarily on living arrangements (Murdock 1949). These definitions—coined by Smith (1993) as the Standard North American Family (SNAF)—usually privilege marriage, the presence of children, and heterosexual relationships (and traditional gender roles), while either excluding other living arrangements as families or devaluing them as incomplete or lesser families.

Other scholars deemphasize structure in their definitions of family and promote a more interactionist approach that focuses on interactions and relationships among family members (Burgess 1926; Waller 1938). For example, Burgess conceptualized family as a “unity of interacting personalities” and contended that “the actual unity of family life has its existence not in any legal conception, nor in any formal contract, but in the interaction of its members” (1926, p. 3). Recently, however, others have leaned toward a social constructionist definition of family that problematizes the idea of a monolithic family—or “the family”—and redirects our attention to

situational meanings rather than any particular structural form, as described by Holstein and Gubrium (1999):

Traditional approaches typically assume that the [emphasis in the original] family... exist[s] as part of everyday reality in some objective condition... Research typically attempts to describe and explain what goes on in and around the family unit... The constructionist approach, in contrast, considers family to be an idea or configuration of meanings, thus problematizing its experiential reality (Holstein and Gubrium 1999, p. 5).

A constructionist approach to family definitions that emphasizes meaning-making can take two forms: one that looks into what people define as their own family and one that explores what they define as family in general (Trost 1990). To date, more attention has been directed to the former, with much of this writing describing the experiences of marginalized groups—such as African Americans’ more encompassing definitions that include fictive kin and same-sex couples’ efforts to construct and make authentic their identity as family (Carrington 1995; Hill 1999; Moore 2011; Weston 1997). Until recently, scholarly treatments of the latter were mostly confined to limited college student surveys of the parameters that Americans set when defining family in general (Ford et al. 1996; Weigel 2008; but see Trost (1990) for a discussion of familial definitions in Sweden).

Public Definitions of Family

Both sets of definitions have widespread implications for individuals’ everyday lives, but we believe that the broader definition—i.e., what people define as family in general—is especially important at both the private and public level (see also Cherlin 2004), particularly if one is interested in inequality between different family forms or living arrangements. William I. Thomas and Dorothy S. Thomas famously noted “if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences” (Thomas and Thomas 1928, p. 572). Extrapolating from the Thomas Theorem, if people define certain living arrangements

as “real” families, then they are real in their consequences. Whether or not a particular living arrangement is seen as family can affect something as mundane as eligibility for a family discount at local swimming pool or something as serious as one’s access to legal rights and obligations (e.g., being able to legally marry, adopt children, or seek benefits such as health insurance for a partner or spouse). Although the legal definition of family may dictate such benefits, public opinion often is a key factor that drives social change and policy change (Brooks and Manza 1997). In other words, if we want a glimpse into current and future disparate treatments of various living arrangements—many of which are seen as family by their members—we need to consider what others, both domestically and abroad, characterize as family, regardless of how they define their own families.

Recent research by Powell et al. (2010) offers a glimpse into how Americans construct their definitions of family. Using survey data collected at two time points (2003 and 2006), Powell et al. asked a national sample of adults to consider 11 different living arrangements (e.g., “a husband and wife living together with one or more of their children,” “two women living together as a couple who have no children”) and to indicate whether they “consider this group of people to be a family.” The living arrangements included married heterosexual couples (with children, without children), cohabiting heterosexual couples (with children, without children), cohabiting lesbian and gay couples (with children, without children), single-father and single-mother households, and roommates.^{1, 2}

The authors find that Americans generally fall into one of three broad categories in their definitions of family: exclusionists, moderates, and inclusionists. As suggested by the label, exclu-

sionists express the most restrictive definition, which strongly privileges heterosexual, married families—especially those that include children. Their acceptance of other family forms is more limited and more conditional: for example, single-parent households are included in their definition of family, but primarily because exclusionists give these households “the benefit of the doubt” by assuming that single-parenthood was involuntary (e.g., via widowhood). Exclusionists display more ambivalence toward cohabiting heterosexual couples with children as a family, but are firmly opposed to counting cohabiting heterosexual couples without children, as well as all same-sex couples, in their definition of family.

At the other end of spectrum, inclusionists express a very broad definition of family—typically accepting, or embracing, each living arrangement (other than roommates) as family. Whereas exclusionists focus on traditional structure, along with legal and religious imprimaturs of family status, when defining family, inclusionists emphasize function and meaning. If the living arrangement functions, or acts, as a family—e.g., providing instrumental and expressive support—then inclusionists willingly include these living arrangements as family. Similarly, they also recognize groups as family if the members of living arrangement see themselves as committed and define themselves as such. In other words, for exclusionists, structure (and tradition) trumps function, while for inclusionists, function (and love) trumps structure.

Moderates, arguably the most intriguing of the three groups, position themselves somewhere in the middle. If exclusionists are closed and inclusionists are open in their conceptualization of family, the best word to describe moderates is ajar. Their definition of family includes all living arrangements that involve a child—including same-sex families with children. In fact, they are slightly more likely to count same-sex families with children as family than married heterosexual couples without children. That said, moderates also tend to view legally married heterosexual couples—even those without children—as family. In their view, children and/or legal marriage equate into family because both signify a level of

¹ Because the 2003 survey was conducted before same-sex couples were allowed to legally marry anywhere in the U. S., the authors did not ask about married same-sex couples, although in a later survey (2010), this living arrangement was included.

² Because such a small percentage of respondents considered roommates as family, Powell et al. only briefly refer to this living arrangement in their book.

commitment that is critical to family status. For moderates, then, commitment, which can be conveyed via structure or function, trumps all else.

Changes in Public Definitions of Family: Social Psychological Explanations

Social psychologists and social scientists studying public opinion typically observe slow—more accurately, glacial—changes in social attitudes. The case of public definitions of family offers a compelling exception. In a relatively short period, the proportion of exclusionists declined sharply as the proportion of moderates and inclusionists increased. In 2003, exclusionists constituted almost half of Americans and easily outnumbered either moderates or inclusionists. By 2010, however, exclusionists represented just one third; in fact, Americans were equally distributed among exclusionists, moderates, and inclusionists (Powell et al. 2010; Powell 2012).

It often is difficult to explain change—let alone rapid change—in social attitudes, especially regarding inequality. We get analytical leverage in understanding these changes, however, if we rely on insights from social psychology. This remarkable change can be attributed to multiple factors, several of them linked closely to social psychological principles: cohort replacement; increased contact with gay men, lesbians, and their families; and changing attributional explanations of sexuality.

Cohort Replacement The generational difference in views about family is stark, so stark that the more conservative and closed views of adults over the age of 65 are a mirror image to the more liberal and open views of adults under the age of 30. As life course scholars note, it is not easy to distinguish aging or life course effects from cohort effects (Alwin and McCammon 2003; Mannheim [1928] 1952). Powell et al. (2010) offer several reasons to conclude that most of the effect is a cohort, or generational, effect—reasons that are consistent with other scholarship that points to the lifelong stability of certain beliefs that take shape in adolescence and young

adulthood (Alwin and Krosnick 1991; Mannheim [1928] 1952). If so, then part of the change in the public's definitions of family is due to new, more liberal cohorts reaching adulthood.

Increased Contact One of the most influential contributions to social psychology is the contact hypothesis, introduced by psychologist Gordon Allport (1954). The idea is simple: under appropriate conditions, increased intergroup contact can reduce prejudice toward and discrimination against minority group members. Until recently, this hypothesis has been applied mostly to interracial and interethnic relationships (Dovidio et al. 2004; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006; but see Bramel 2004). Recent scholarly efforts, however, confirm that this hypothesis also can be used to understand variations in prejudice and discrimination against gay men and lesbians (Herek 1998; Herek and Capitano 1996; Lewis 2011). These studies corroborate a strong positive relationship between contact with gay men and lesbians and progressive views regarding same-sex issues, a relationship that has been documented to be causal (Lewis 2011). Since interpersonal contact with gay men and lesbians—or more accurately, awareness that one's friends and relatives are gay—increased greatly between since 2003, this increase may have translated into a more expansive definition of family among the American public.

The powerful effect of contact, however, might not require direct contact. Schiappa et al. (2005), for example, suggest that mass-mediated parasocial interaction (e.g., “knowing” a gay fictional character from a television show such as *Glee* or *Modern Family* or an openly gay media figure such as Anderson Cooper or Ellen DeGeneres) can wield similarly strong positive reactions to those triggered by direct interpersonal contact. Given the ubiquity of media in many people's lives, the increasing visibility of gay men and lesbians in television, film, music, and other media, in effect, means greater mediated contact with gay men and lesbians and, according to the parasocial contact hypothesis, may be at least partially responsible for the move to greater inclusion in definitions of family.

Changing Attributions and Etiological Beliefs

How one defines family and whom one counts and does not count in the definition of family are intertwined with, and arguably shaped by, other attitudes and ideologies, some of which also have changed very quickly in the past decade. Chief among these are beliefs about the causes of sexuality. Since Heider's work on attribution theory (1944, 1958), social psychologists have appreciated that people's causal explanations of behavior have implications for their view of and treatment of others. Heider focused on two dimensions of causality: locus (individual or external) and stability (stable or unstable). Weiner (1979, 1985) added a third dimension: controllability (controllable or not controllable).

These dimensions, and especially the third dimension of controllability, are particularly relevant to our understanding of people's views of stigmatized and marginalized groups. For example, if sexuality is believed to be learned or a choice and, therefore, something that can be unlearned or rejected, then gay men and lesbians can be seen as responsible for their "sexual preference." If, however, sexuality is believed to be inherent to the person—due to genetics or "God's will," for example—and consequently something that is not controllable, then gay men and lesbians cannot be seen as accountable for their "sexual orientation" (Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2008; Wilkins, Mollborn, & Bó this volume). Applying this chain of logic to definitions of family, Powell et al. (2010) find that Americans who see sexuality as innate and due to such factors that are beyond individuals' control are more likely to subscribe to an inclusive definition of family than are Americans who see sexuality as a choice and controllable.³ Moreover, they, along with others, document a notable rise in the per-

centage of Americans who see sexuality as innate and a corresponding decrease in the percentage who view sexuality as a choice (Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2008). These changing attributional beliefs may be a key factor behind the movement toward greater acceptance of nontraditional family forms.

It might be tempting to add another candidate—changes in people's attitudes regarding gender—to the list of factors behind changes in Americans' views of family. The evidence is very clear that those who take a more expansive view regarding gender typically take a more expansive view regarding sexuality and family as well (Britton 1990; Herek 1998; Loftus 2001; Whitley 2001). However, the evidence that there have been marked changes in views regarding gender in the past decade or two is mixed at best. Cotter et al. (2011), for example, find that after a precipitous rise in gender egalitarian attitudes from the 1970s to the mid-1990s, Americans' attitudes since then appear to have reached a plateau. As we discuss later in this chapter, the trend toward gender egalitarianism in the division of domestic labor within the home also appears to have slowed down. The irony, then, of the trend toward growing inclusivity in the definition of family is that these definitions currently are linked to people's ideas about gender and consequently, gender inequality. However, attitudes about families appear to be liberalizing more rapidly than gender attitudes, suggesting that the link between definitions of family and gender attitudes may be weakened or even ultimately severed. Still, the very fact that gender attitudes have not liberalized as quickly or as consistently as some scholars have predicted (Brewster and Padavic 2000; Brooks and Bolzendahl 2004; Thornton and Freedman 1979) should serve as a cautionary lesson to those who unequivocally predict that Americans' movement to a more open definition of family will be rapid and undeviating.

Although the above discussion focuses on same-sex families and the social psychological underpinnings of public definitions and views of these families, other "atypical" families—especially those that deviate from the Standard North American Family—may face similar challenges.

³ Whether or not this relationship will continue, however, is unclear. Interestingly, among young adults, the question of controllability is not as closely linked to views regarding inclusivity. Or to put it another way, it does not appear to matter as much for young adults whether sexuality is due to factors beyond individuals' control. The absence of a relationship may be due to young adults being less likely than their older counterparts to see homosexuality as a stigma.

Adoptive families, for example, lack the “blood ties” that are seen by some—especially those who hold a more restrictive definition of family—as a requisite for being a “real” or “authentic” family (Fisher 2003; Hamilton et al. 2007). Biracial families may encounter similar struggles in the face of racial discrimination (Cheng and Powell 2007; Foreman and Nance 1999). Social psychological approaches may help us better understand how the public responds to these and other devalued or even invisible families (Moore 2011) and how these families, in turn, respond to the public’s reactions.

Inequality and Siblings: The Case of Parental Investments in Children and Children’s Investments in Parents

As described in the previous section, children often are seen as a prerequisite for family status. It therefore is not surprising that many scholars—especially those interested in the role that families play in the reproduction of inequality—have directed their attention to the relationship between parents and children, as well as the relationship between siblings (Becker 1964; Blau and Duncan 1967; Kohn 1969; Lareau 2003; Schneider and Coleman 1993). Scholars using a range of theoretical lenses have documented ways in which families can facilitate or impede children’s success in school and beyond.

For example, the status attainment paradigm—one of the most influential sociological approaches to stratification, especially in the late twentieth century—posits that differences in children’s educational outcomes and other status outcomes are attributable in large measure to interfamilial differences in parental educational attainment and, relatedly, to differences in parental encouragement, educational aspirations, and educational expectations for their children (Blau and Duncan 1967; Sewell et al. 1969). Similarly, cultural capital, social capital, and human capital theories underscore the importance of resources—interactional, social, intellectual, economic, and cultural—that parents often purposefully “invest” in their children (Becker 1964; Becker

and Tomes 1976; Bourdieu 1977; Coleman 1988; Lareau 2003). As demonstrated by a long tradition of social scientific literature, parents see these resources as offering lifelong advantages to children. Parental investments, then, are pivotal means by which families “sponsor the next generation” (Steelman and Powell 1991) and by which familial advantages and disadvantages are passed on (see also Mortimer & McLaughlin; Milkie, Warner, & Ray; and Schneider, Judy & Burkander, this volume).

Whether and how to invest in one’s children are fundamentally social psychological questions. Some of the aforementioned theories explicitly acknowledge their social psychological underpinnings, while others do not. The status attainment paradigm—often referred to as the Wisconsin model of status attainment—falls into the former category. It directly references social psychological ideas—e.g., the influence of significant others—and recognizes the powerful influences of attitudes, expectations, and aspirations of parents (as well as of friends and teachers) on youths (Blau and Duncan 1967; Featherman and Hauser 1978; Sewell et al. 1969). Cultural capital theories mostly fall into the latter category. Although echoing the seminal social psychological work of Kohn (1969), for example, Lareau’s influential scholarship on parenting (2003) likely is seen by most readers as more driven by cultural sociology than by social psychology. Indeed, it is not entirely clear that most readers would even recognize the social psychological mechanisms behind the parental strategies reported by Lareau.

Sibling Structure and Parental Investments

Status attainment models—along with other theories of intergenerational transmission of advantages and disadvantages—call attention to the influence that family structure has on the willingness of parents to “invest” in their children as well as the form of the investment. Scholars have studied the implications of living in “intact” two-parent households, as well as in cohabiting, single-parent, biracial, adoptive, and multigen-

erational households, among others (Cheng and Powell 2007; Hamilton et al. 2007; McLanahan 2000; Smock 2000). At the same time, scholarly attention has been directed to another parameter of family structure, sibling configuration—also referred to as sibling constellation. Siblings are accorded differential status within families, which may impact their relationships with each other and with their parents, as well as the resources that are made available to them. Among the components of the sibling structure that may shape children's status are birth order, differences in age between siblings (age-spacing, also known as sibling density), number of children in the household (sibling size, also referred to as sibship size), and the relative number of boys and girls (sex composition) (Conley 2005; Steelman and Powell 1996). The effects of sibling structure speak to both intrafamilial inequality and interfamilial inequality: being treated differently because of one's ordinal position is an example of intrafamilial inequality while being treated differently because of the size of the sibling group is an example of interfamilial inequality.

The interest in sibling configuration goes back at least to the 1800s with Galton's (1874) pronouncement of the superiority of the eldest born child and Dumont's ([1890] 2012) law of social capillarity, which asserted that the resources necessary for social mobility were constrained in larger families. The study of sibship structure—and more broadly family structure—also should resonate with social psychologists studying group processes. After all, going as far back to Simmel (1950), who posited the size of a group shaped the stability of the group and the extent to which group members felt connected to the group, social psychologists have considered how group composition shapes the behavior of the group and group members.

Simmel's work on the impact of group size and configuration on social interaction most closely parallels the contemporary family scholarship on sibship size. But where Simmel acknowledged some potential advantages of larger groups for individuals, most family scholarship—especially on the life chances of youths—suggests that “bigger is not better” (Downey 1995). In fact,

one of the most consistent patterns documented in scholarship on families and education is that the larger the sibship, the lower the educational achievement and attainment of youths (Conley 2005; Downey 1995). This pattern holds whether we look at educational expectations, educational aspirations, performance on standardized tests, grades in school, high school graduation rates, college matriculation, or college graduation rates.

Several explanations have been given for this pattern, some that explicitly reference social psychology. Among these is the confluence theory, which was introduced by psychological social psychologists Zajonc and Markus (1975). According to this theory, the intellectual milieu in which a child is raised is critical to his/her academic development. The confluence model (i.e., the mathematical expression of the theory) estimates the intellectual climate as “some function of the absolute intellectual level of its members” (p. 277). Intellectual level, as envisaged by Zajonc and Markus, is not age adjusted, however. As a result, a newborn child, by definition, will decrease the intellectual milieu of the household, as will each additional child arriving in the household (except under conditions in which children are widely spaced in age). Extending the logic of this model, we would conclude that children from larger families should fare worse than those from smaller ones and that eldest born children typically should fare better than younger born ones (because the eldest born was exposed to the most adult-like environment when s/he was born and before his/her siblings were born). Extending this logic even further, one might reach the conclusion that only born children should be the most advantaged because the intellectual milieu of the household will not be contaminated by the addition of a sibling. That said, Zajonc and Markus note that this advantage does not typically appear. Instead, they amend the confluence theory by proposing a tutoring advantage in which siblings also gain intellectually by tutoring their younger siblings. The absence of a young sibling, then, offsets any advantage that the first born might otherwise have—and according to Zajonc and Markus, offers yet another reason to

believe that the youngest born child will be further disadvantaged.

If we see intellectual environment as a form of parental resource, then the confluence theory can be at least partially subsumed under a more broad—and currently, more accepted—explanation: the resource dilution model. This theory starts with the assumption that many parental resources—e.g., parental time, economics resources—are necessarily finite. Moreover, each additional child in the family provides additional competition for these resources, thereby limiting the resources that each child can receive. To the extent that these resources are implicated in future success (e.g., parental financial support for a youth's college education), then all else being equal, children from larger families will be disadvantaged compared to their counterparts from smaller families.

Interestingly, the ideas behind the resource dilution model may resonate with scholars who take an evolutionary or evolutionary psychological approach to family dynamics. Evolutionary psychologists suggest that the competition for resources is ultimately related to notions of “fitness”—that is, the ability to pass on one's genes (Sulloway 1996). According to this reasoning, parental resources invested in one's siblings decrease an individual's own fitness, thereby reducing one's reproductive potential. At the same time, however, because biological siblings share some common genetic heritage, parental resources to siblings may increase inclusive fitness—that is, passing on one's genes via the reproductive potential of biological relatives. The tension between fitness and inclusive fitness, then, may also explain the seemingly contradictory presence of intense sibling rivalry and equally powerful sibling closeness.

Other explanations, however, challenge the assumptions of the resource dilution and confluence models. Some scholars, for example, suggest that the putative effect of sibship size—and more broadly sibling configuration—is spurious. That is, the effect is seen by these critics as attributable to some other factor, such as parental predispositions (which jointly shape the number of children that parents have and the amount of

resources that parents allot to children) and socioeconomic background (Guo and VanWey 1999; but see Conley and Glauber 2006).

As noted above, the number of siblings is just one component of sibling configuration. Birth order often receives considerable attention not only by scholars but also by the public. The idea that ordinal position is an important status that differentiates siblings is an intuitively appealing one—especially because as Rodgers and Rowe (1994) note: “Everyone has a birth order, and it is easy to observe and talk about” (pp. 208–209). Indeed, individuals likely are more attuned to the variation—and inequality—within a family (e.g., birth order) than to the variation—and inequality—across families (e.g., sibship size). Some evidence of birth order effects exists: for example, that firstborn children are recipients of greater parental time, energy, and regulation than are their younger siblings, while laterborn children are recipients of greater economic resources than are their older siblings (see Steelman et al. 2002 for a more detailed summary of birth order effects). In addition, evolutionary psychologists such as Sulloway (1996) confidently assert that birth order squarely positions youths into certain familial roles that, in turn, have long lasting effects on their personality, creativity, and conservatism. Although the evidence in support of these and other claims about birth order—as well as about sex composition—is not in as solid ground as the evidence regarding sibling size effects, the potential importance of these effects offers exciting possibilities to social psychologists interested in group processes and in inequality.

Children's Investments in Parents

The discussion above emphasizes a top-down approach to parent-child relations, in which parents invest in and potentially shape the future of their children. But children can affect their parents as well. This pattern is perhaps most notable when parents become senior citizens (Milkie et al. 2008).

With increasing longevity, the U.S population is aging. The U. S. Census Bureau (2009) projects

that the population of Americans 65 or older will grow from 38 million in 2010 to 84 million by 2050. This increase likely will be accompanied by an increase in young and middle-age adults' investments—e.g., economic, caretaking—in their elderly parents. Many adults may become caught in the “sandwich generation” that is responsible for providing care and other resources to both children and aging family members (Soldo 1996). Being truly “sandwiched” between intensive elder care and intensive childcare is rare, though. Jacobs and Gerson (2004) estimate this figure as only five percent of women in the labor force, although they project that the size of this group will continue to grow as the age of childbearing rises. A more common situation is being sandwiched between adult children and aging parents (Fingerman et al. 2010).

Most scholarship on the sandwich generation does not incorporate social psychology, although the topic certainly can be seen from a social psychological vantage point. Nearly all literature on the topic points to sex differences in care work of the elderly (Fingerman et al. 2010; Jacobs and Gerson 2004). Further, aging adults themselves express a preference for particular caregivers, highlighting inequalities between parents and children. Aging mothers are more likely to name female children with whom they shared similar values, lived close by, and who had provided them with prior support as their preferred caregiver (Suitor and Pillemer 2006). Birth order plays a role in parental favoritism; mothers were most likely to say they were emotionally close to their last-born children and most likely to say that they would ask their first-born children for help with personal issues (Suitor and Pillemer 2007). The gendered nature of elder care parallels the gendered nature of the household division of labor—a topic that we now turn to.

Inequality Among Intimates: The Case of the Household Division of Labor

A great deal of research discusses inequalities within generations and among intimate partners. This section considers an especially salient area

of intra-family inequality: the division of labor in the home. It reviews the scholarship on this topic and considers various explanations for inequality in housework, care work, and emotion work between spouses and partners before turning to the emotional, mental, and other implications of these inequalities. We also discuss the “doing gender” perspective before turning our attention to the utility of more formal social psychological theories—in particular, theories of identity, expectation states, affect control, and social exchange. We contend that these more formal social psychological theories, which often were developed and elaborated upon in tightly controlled experimental settings, may be especially useful when explaining inequality in naturally occurring groups—in this case, families. These theories also aid scholars in considering a variety of family forms—for example, by extending the discussion to inequality within same-sex partnerships (see also Kroska, this volume).

Inequality Between Heterosexual Spouses and Partners

A consistent theme in research examining inequality between heterosexual spouses and partners is that intimate relationships are far from equal. Among husbands and wives, for example, research documents gendered inequalities in housework, care work, and emotion work, with women bearing the brunt of the various types of labor (Bittman et al. 2003; Brennan et al. 2001; Hochschild 1989, 1997; Lee 2005; Raley et al. 2012).

Scholarship examining the lives of heterosexual spouses and partners does, indeed, reveal a consistent pattern of gender inequality in time spent on unpaid labor, free time, and multitasking. Despite recent convergence in women's and men's time use on paid and unpaid labor, for example, research suggests that women continue to perform more than an equal share of household labor and childcare. Sayer (2005) shows that despite men's recent increases in time spent cooking, cleaning, and caring for children and women's recent decreases in time spent cooking and

cleaning (while maintaining similar amounts of time use on childcare between 1965 and 1998), women are still performing more than twice the amount of housework and childcare as men. The tandem of women's increased time spent in paid labor and their continued commitments to unpaid labor translates into women experiencing a free-time deficit: they report 30 minutes less free time per day than do men (Sayer 2005).

Inequality between spouses also takes the form of multitasking. As compared to fathers, mothers spend 10 additional hours each week multitasking, especially while engaging in housework and childcare. This increase in multitasking leads to an increase in negative emotions like stress, depression, and work-family conflict (Offer and Schneider 2011). Despite some cross-national variation, the unequal division of housework and childcare is documented across all countries (Craig and Mullen 2011; Fuwa 2004; Geist and Cohen 2011; Hook 2010).

“Doing Gender” as a Social Psychological Explanation for Inequality between Intimate Partners

Not surprisingly, given the focus on gender in the literature on inequality between cross-sex spouses and partners, the “doing gender” (West and Zimmerman 1987) perspective has been used widely to explain the persistence of inequality. This perspective is rooted in social psychology. Specifically, it is an extension of dramaturgy (Goffman 1959) and ethnomethodology (Garfinkel 1967) and shares many tenets with symbolic interactionism (Blumer 1969) and other social psychological approaches interested in interaction—much of which is symbolic and socially constructed. The “doing gender” perspective posits that individuals perform gender for real or imagined others to whom they are accountable (see Schwalbe & Shay, this volume, for a detailed treatment of accountability). This threat of accountability leads many individuals to enact gender in culturally normative ways because accountability increases the interactional costs of performing non-normative versions of gender

(West and Zimmerman 1987). Accountability relates to scholarship on the household division of labor, in that individuals can either do or resist household labor in their performance of normative gender roles. Women who resist doing housework may be held accountable, whereas men who resist housework may not be held accountable—a point that also illuminates the power relations embedded within normative gender roles.

Some empirical evidence offers support for the claim that spouses and partners may use housework to “do gender.” For example, in a study of Australian and American men and women's contributions to housework and income, Bittman et al. (2003) find three patterns that support the idea that doing or resisting housework may be a strategy to perform gender. First, both Australian and American women perform more household labor than do men at all levels of women's earnings. Second, women are able to reduce their contributions to housework in both countries with the bargaining power from their income, but men's contributions are resistant to change. Finally, Australian women who earn more income than their husbands actually increase their housework. Bittman et al. (2003) attribute this pattern to the atypicality of women being primary breadwinners in Australia. They conclude that “gender trumps money in the baseline amount of housework women do and also when traditional housework behavior seems needed to compensate ‘gender deviance’ in economic provision” (210).⁴ These patterns are consistent with the proposition that women “do gender” with housework and that housework is one way in which gender is produced in everyday interaction.⁵

⁴ Similarly, Schneider (2011, 2012) finds a curvilinear relationship between women's earnings and time spent on household labor—when women earn more than their partners, they compensate by doing more housework, not less.

⁵ The “doing gender” perspective also has been invoked to understand how different tasks themselves are gendered. For example, women report spending over twice as much time as their husbands on meals, cleaning, daily childcare, and everyday shopping (Sayer 2005). Men's and women's contributions to household labor are more similar on measures of teaching/playing with children, and male/shared tasks (“outdoor chores, repairs, and household paperwork”) (Sayer 2005, p. 290). Further,

Despite the popularity of the “doing gender” perspective, others have noted several theoretical considerations that are left unattended. At the micro level, the perspective has been criticized for presenting an overly determined subject (Connell 2009; Deutsch 2007; Risman 2009). Other than possible sanctions from real or imagined others, for example, the question of why individuals choose to enact a particular version of gender is left unanswered. It is also important to ask why individuals—especially those who underbenefit—would remain in such arrangements. At a macro level, the “doing gender” perspective generally does not address the origination of normative conceptions of femininity and masculinity. In addition, why inequality is so persistent among spouses and partners cannot be addressed using this perspective alone. Finally, the perspective applies most easily, and elegantly, to cross-sex couples. Although “doing gender” theorists might suggest that same-sex couples “do gender” by developing traditional masculine and feminine roles regardless of their biological sex, we believe that scholars’ emphasis on cross-sex families and overreliance on “doing gender”—especially in light of other more formal social psychological theories focusing on identity, status, power, and agency—may potentially obscure more fundamental social psychological dynamics that are useful in explicating inequality across a variety of family forms.

Insights from Theories of Identity Exchange, Affect Control and Status Expectation States

The study of inequality between spouses and partners is one area where incorporating additional social psychological insights may prove useful, as “doing gender” is but one perspective from a larger class of social psychological theories well

suited to study inequality at home. We contend that more formal social psychological theories of identity, social exchange, affect control, and expectation states can further inform the study of inequality between spouses and partners through their foci on identity salience, rational choice, affective sentiments, framing, and behavioral expectations. Because these theories are described in detail elsewhere in this volume, we provide a brief description of each.

Identity Theory The application of social psychological theories of identity into family scholarship can help explain why individuals choose to enact particular roles and behaviors, which may or may not be gendered. Among these approaches is identity theory (Stryker and Burke 2000; Callero this volume). According to Stryker and Burke, individuals embody multiple social identities; however, not all social identities are as salient, or important, as others. More salient identities and their associated roles are more likely to be expressed than less salient identities. Notably, individuals tend to engage in role behaviors—including emotional expressions—that are consistent with their most salient identities, often to the point of seeking out situations, or social networks, in which these salient identities can be realized.

While some family related identities (e.g. “mother” or “father”) may be gendered, others (e.g., caretaker) are less so.⁶ Future research examining inequality between spouses and partners situated at the level of interaction may benefit from exploring not only the ways in which normative gender displays are produced, but also how individuals’ identities—particularly their most salient identities—facilitate, or undermine, these productions. Additionally, to the degree that identities must be recognized socially, it may also be useful to consider more closely which types of

Schneider (2012) finds that men who work in traditionally female careers and women who work in traditionally male careers compensate for their gender deviance at work by engaging in more traditionally gendered household tasks at home.

⁶ Although men (i.e., fathers) could choose to enact behaviors associated with mothering, very few would actually claim the identity of mother (but see Callero 1994). Moreover, even if a man claimed the identity of mother, it is unlikely that he would receive support for that identity among his immediate social networks.

identities are available to men and women within the home and under what circumstances.

Linking Stryker and Burke's (2000) identity theory to Ridgeway's (2011) social psychological analysis of the persistence of gender inequality, we can extend our understanding of why individuals choose to perform gendered identities. Ridgeway (2011) argues that gender is widely used as a primary frame for categorization in social relations, far beyond gender's immediate applicability to sex and reproductive issues. Simply put, gender defines one's self and expectations of the other. Through framing, social interactions are coordinated and individuals have a basic way to relate to one another. The use of gender as a primary frame is pervasive because all individuals, to some degree, have a stake in the current gender system as gender is a central way individuals define themselves and relate to others, similar to the observation made by West and Zimmerman (1987). In this regard, gender is a salient identity.

Although gender works as a primary frame across a variety of settings, it may be especially salient within the home. Indeed, in a non-ironic play on words, Ridgeway (2011) cites the family as the "home of gender as a cultural frame" (151). Thus, within the home in particular, cultural schemas about men's and women's proper roles within the family powerfully shape behaviors and expectations for the division of family labor, leading women and men to generally conform to caretaking and provider roles, respectively.

The notion that gender acts as a salient, primary identity suggests that it is actually the *salience* of gender as an organizing identity that drives individuals to perform gender in their day-to-day lives. Such an insight gets at the question of why individuals choose to perform gender in particular ways. It also allows for the possibility of change—a possibility that has been realized at least in part with some recent convergence in men and women's contributions to childcare. This convergence is consistent with claims that the identity of caretaker is becoming more salient among men and that the roles associated with the identity of father may be changing (Sayer 2005). Locating and investigating these types of

changes is one possibility for future research—for example, social scientists can investigate if, and in what capacity, gender is coming undone (Deutsch 2007). They can also attempt to identify the circumstances under which gender or other gendered identities are likely to become salient for both women and men and how these preferences contribute to continued inequalities in family life.

Exchange Theory At its most basic, social exchange theory seeks to explain social change and stability as a process of negotiated exchanges between parties (Cook and Emerson 1978; Homans [1961] 1974). Social exchange theory posits that all human relationships—including those within the family—are formed and maintained by the use of a subjective cost-benefit analysis and the comparison of alternatives. This theory can help explain why individuals remain in relationships characterized by inequality and may be especially helpful in understanding the behavior of those who appear to be underbenefiting.

Building on the theory's core assumption that individuals are profit seeking and motivated predominantly by their own self-interest, exchange theory predicts that individuals who believe that the costs outweigh the benefits are more likely to exit the offending relationship—especially if and when they perceive a better option (which, in some cases, may involve being alone or finding a relationship with a better cost-benefit ratio). Social exchange theorists refer to these perceived choices as one's comparative level of alternatives (CLAs). It is important to note that the CLAs—much like assessments of cost-benefit ratio—are subjective: that is, one person's "better" option may seem like a nightmare to someone else and an individual's evaluation of CLAs may change over time as well as across contexts.

With its emphasis on costs and rewards (or benefits) and the individual's ability to make self-serving choices, this perspective suggests individuals may accept (and actively reify) normative inequality in their intimate relationships if they see their exchange as fair, if not positive, and beneficial relative to the costs of their efforts. The benefits associated with doing more

than one's fair share around the house, for example, could include but certainly not be limited to financial support, stability, and the security of being in a committed, long term relationship or marriage (Hochschild 1989).

Affect Control Theory Affect control theory may be particularly useful for exploring the conditions under which normative ideas about masculinity and femininity—and relatedly, views about household division of labor—originate. Offering one possible explanation for the origin of normative gender beliefs, Ridgeway (2006) posited that the expectations that individuals hold about self and others may stem from culturally shared fundamental dimensions of affective meaning attached to social identities, behaviors, and personal attributes. Drawing on insights from affect control theory (Heise 2007), Ridgeway proposed that status beliefs *may* depend largely on how good or bad, powerful or impotent, and active or inactive someone is perceived to be. Generally speaking, before any individual interaction occurs, men are affectively viewed as not quite as nice or active as women, but considerably more powerful. Individuals create interactions (or, to use Heise's terminology, "events"), be they at home or at work, to confirm these beliefs.

Affect control theory assumes that affective sentiments are shared within and, to a certain degree, across cultures (see Foy et al., this volume). Recent studies, however, have shown that there are differences at both the cultural (Smith 2002; Smith et al. 1994) and sub-cultural level (Smith-Lovin and Douglass 1992). Moreover, Kroska's (2001) analyses of married and cohabitating couples also revealed considerable sex differences in the relative goodness, powerfulness, and activation of certain household chores, including the provision of basic childcare and financial support.

Notably, many of the social roles that actors occupy within families are gendered, and these gendered meanings are evident in differential Evaluation-Potency-Activation scores.⁷ For in-

stance, based on data collected from college students in 2002–2004, the EPA values for "Mother" and "Father" suggest that as a culture, we expect mothers to be similarly nice, fairly less powerful, and fairly more active than fathers. Using Interact, the computer simulation program based on Affect Control Theory, it is possible to predict the types of behaviors that are most likely to confirm the identities of the actors (one in the role of the "actor" and one in the role of the "object").⁸ In terms of identity confirming behavior, especially those behaviors directed towards children, fathers are expected to cuddle, massage, caress, hug, forgive, smile at, sympathize with, embrace, listen to, counsel, and protect a child, whereas mothers are expected to cuddle, massage, embrace, hug, forgive, listen to, sympathize with, smile at, caress, make up with, wink at, console, soothe, counsel, hold, compromise with, dine with, reward, protect, reassure, and mother. Note that not only does the order of the expected behaviors differ for fathers and mothers, but mothers have a much *longer* list of expected behaviors, including behaviors such as make up with and compromise with, which reflect their lower power compared to that of fathers.

Expectation States Theory One of the enduring observations of human life is that when people come together to accomplish a task or shared goal, whether it is putting together an airtight jury case or raising a child, a social hierarchy soon emerges among the participants in which some have more social esteem and influence in the situation than others (Bales 1950; Lonner 1980; Ridgeway 2006). To date, sociological explanations of such phenomena turn to expectation states theory, which currently is the most systematic and empirically well-documented theory of status processes in groups (Berger et al.

erful or impotent (P) and how active or inactive (A) an identity, behavior, attribute, emotion, or setting is deemed to be within a particular culture. These values range from -4 to 4.

⁷ Evaluation-Potency-Activation scores (also referred to as EPA values) refer to how good or bad (E), how pow-

⁸ For more information about how Interact works, see Heise (2007) or go to <http://www.indiana.edu/~socpsy/ACT/interact.htm>.

1974, 1977; Correll and Ridgeway 2003; Wagner and Berger 2002; Ridgeway & Nakagawa this volume).

Expectation states theory is based on the concept of status beliefs. Through repeated interactions among group members, individuals tend to reify status beliefs. For example, gender status beliefs attribute greater competence and social status to men than to women, just as they attribute greater emotional range and better skill at caretaking and nurturing to women than men (Ridgeway 2001).

Status beliefs can eventually give rise to a hierarchy of power and authority. In the case of inequality in the home, the dominant group can demand more emotion work/emotional labor/domestic labor from the subordinate group and, at the same time, withhold emotion work/emotional labor from subordinates and avoid the demands for domestic labor either from their partners or any other third parties (such as a child or an aging parent). This may explain why, regarding inequities in the household division of labor, men are better able to demand the positive emotions of women and to get by with performing less care work and less domestic labor in the home.

The construction and reification of status beliefs typically appear consensual, if not cooperative (Ridgeway 2001). In other words, both the perceived higher and lower status groups take part in their formation, as well as their propagation (also see Lively 2000). Indeed, Lively et al.'s (2010) recent study of emotional responses to perceived inequity in the household division of labor reveals that while men were more likely to experience anger and rage when faced with doing what they perceived to be as *more* than their fair share of the household division of labor, women were significantly more likely to feel guilt and shame when they feel like they are doing *less* than their fair share. These findings suggest that women may do more than their fair share of domestic labor not only to manage their male partner's feelings of anger and rage, but also their own feelings of shame and embarrassment.

To the extent that both men and women internalize and cooperatively enact beliefs about gender, the prescriptive element of status beliefs

leads women to act in ways that are commensurate with the status belief—even to the degree that it undermines their own power and status. Thus, these expectations lead women to voluntarily take on more than their fair share of household labor and caretaking, and men let them, despite the negative consequences of living with persistent inequality for both parties (Hochschild 1989; Lively et al. 2008, 2010).

Inequality Between Same-Sex Couples

The inclusion of expectation states theory in family and inequality research would also aid in the goal of understanding a variety of family forms. According to this theory, an individual's behavioral and status differences not only are determined by his/her gender, but are also a function of the aggregate expectation of all identities relevant to a given task (Ridgeway 2001).⁹ Expectation states theory, therefore, may be particularly useful for studying inequality in same-sex couples, as well as other understudied populations including working class families and families of color, because it is designed to consider multiple characteristics simultaneously, instead of focusing entirely or primarily on gender as a one-dimensional, normative performance. Greater attention to same-sex couples and other understudied family forms is important theoretically. For example, the fact that similar inequalities in domestic labor have been documented among same-sex partners (Moore 2008; Pfeffer 2010) raises important questions about the conditions under which gender-based arguments are applicable.

⁹ Small group experiments have frequently shown that in the absence of task-related information, individuals with higher diffuse status characteristics tend to emerge as leaders, and that the contributions from individuals with lower status characteristics tend to be ignored, refuted, or co-opted by higher status others. Further, in mixed-sex task groups, men tend to emerge as the instrumental or task leaders, whereas women are more likely to emerge as the social leaders and to exhibit more socio-emotional support and other "helping" behaviors (Ridgeway and Johnson 1990).

Indeed, scholarship on same-sex households further informs our understanding of inequality between spouses and partners. As an illustration, Kollock et al.'s (1985) research on power and conversational behavior among cross-sex and same-sex partners in intimate relationships suggests that both gender and power function to create specific conversational patterns. Among cross-sex partners, the more powerful partner talks more and is more likely to interrupt, while the less powerful partner is more likely to back channel and use tag questions (Hollander & Abelson this volume). It is often the case that cross-sex partnerships exhibit traditional divisions of power (that is, dominant male partners pair with more submissive female partners), which often leads scholars to attribute these patterns of conversational behavior strictly to gender inequality. Male and female same-sex couples show similar patterns relative to power and conversational behavior as cross-sex partners: notably, in the absence of sex differences, more powerful same-sex partners talk more and interrupt more frequently (Kollock et al. 1985).¹⁰ The persistence of inequality in conversational behavior within same-sex partnerships suggests that scholars studying intimate relationships would do well to further consider the linkage between gender and power—particularly, the extent to which gender and power are intertwined with yet distinct from each other.

These inequalities extend to the household division of labor. Research on black, lesbian partnerships, for example, suggests that inequality in the household division of labor also emerges among same-sex parents, with biological mothers taking on increased housework in exchange for more authority within the relationship relative to childrearing and finances (Moore 2008,

2011). That is, for some women completing more household labor may be an individual strategy to maintain power and authority within the family (Moore 2008; Sayer 2005). One reason we continue to see patterns of inequality within intimate partnerships may be the relative lack of cultural scripts for negotiating more egalitarian divisions of labor, making establishing more equal patterns difficult—even within less traditional family forms (Pfeffer 2010). Although same-sex households should seemingly be free of gendered inequalities, this body of scholarship suggests that the institution of family itself may be built on powerful cultural scripts that differentiate levels of power and authority between partners. Indeed, research suggests that although many young adults would like to create egalitarian family lives, they question the likelihood of a truly equal division of paid and unpaid labor with a spouse or partner (Gerson 2010).

To summarize, the “doing gender” perspective has been widely cited to explain why women continue to do more around the house than do their male partners, despite their increasing participation in the labor force and, in some cases, their promotion to primary breadwinner. Despite the elegance of the perspective, turning our attention to other more formal social psychological theories of identity, exchange, affect and status enables us to better address individuals' choices, the development of normative concepts about gender, and the persistence of inequality among spouses and partners. This turn may also help broaden the discussion of inequality within families to include all families, not just heterosexual ones.

Socio-Emotional Consequences of Inequality between Spouses and between Partners

The discussion above emphasizes the utility of social psychological theories in explaining the presence of inequality in the household division of labor. In this section, we highlight three social psychological theories—equity theory, social interactional theory of emotion, and affect control

¹⁰ There are some exceptions. For example, in contrast to less powerful women in cross-sex relationships, less powerful men in same-sex partnerships do not frequently back channel or use tag questions. Being a less powerful partner in a same-sex male relationship may be uncomfortable. Picking up on this discomfort, the more powerful partner in same-sex male relationships will back channel, ask questions, and use tag questions to draw the less powerful partner into the interaction (Kollock et al. 1985).

theory—that have also proved useful in better understanding the affective consequences of this inequality. Inequality undoubtedly can result in behavioral consequences (e.g., terminating the relationship, role negotiations among partners). That being said, most social psychological studies of inequality in the home have focused on the socio-emotional costs of inequality—or, more specifically, perceived inequity. A core social psychological principle is that the perception of equity (or, more to the point, inequity), even more so than the obdurate reality of the situation, causes difficulties within intimate relations.

The social psychological theory most often used to investigate and to describe the socio-emotional responses to perceived inequity in the home is equity theory (Homans [1961] 1974). At its simplest, equity theory (Adams 1965; Austin 1977; Austin and Walster 1974; Hegtvedt and Markovsky 1995; Homans [1961] 1974; Walster et al. 1978) posits that when individuals perceive an inequity (to themselves or to others in a given interaction), they will suffer emotional distress (see Hegtvedt & Isom, this volume). Despite equity theory's initial focus on undifferentiated distress, some theorists acknowledged the need to distinguish between various types of distress and to consider a wider range of day-to-day feelings. Homans ([1961] 1974), for example, differentiates between anger and guilt (also see Hegtvedt 1990; Krehbiel and Cropanzano 2000; Mikula et al. 1998). Others emphasize the need to explore the relationship between equity and positive emotions, including excitement, satisfaction, contentment, joy and respect (Oliver et al. 2004; Sprecher 1986; Stets 2003; Weiss and Suckow 1999). Notably, equity theorists' attention to a range of emotions resonates with more general calls within sociology to explore more fully the variety of ways in which day-to-day feelings govern human behavior (Goodwin et al. 2001; Lawler and Thye 1999; Lively and Heise 2004; Massey 2002).

Instead of focusing on emotions more broadly, however, family scholars—who were at the forefront of studying equity issues at home—emphasized depression. Notably, these studies found nearly universal support for the basic tenet of eq-

uity theory: that is, actors (most often wives) who perceive inequity in the household division of labor experience significantly higher rates of depression than do those who perceive the division of labor in their households as fair (Glass and Fujimoto 1994; Lennon and Rosenfield 1994; Sanchez and Kane 1996). Adding an additional layer of complexity through the inclusion of insights from exchange theory, Lennon and Rosenfield (1994) found that the association between perceived inequity and depression was significantly stronger for those wives who also perceived few options—that is, wives who lacked sufficient resources to either renegotiate or leave the relationship entirely.

These studies, however, tell only part of the tale since they tend to: (1) focus almost exclusively on women's responses to inequity in the home and overlook the responses of men, (2) fail to adequately distinguish between the effects of underbenefiting (i.e., doing more than one's fair share) and overbenefiting (i.e., doing less than one's fair share), and (3) ignore everyday emotions. Lively et al.'s (2010) analysis of two nationally representative data sets of married or cohabiting adults partially corrects for these gaps. They find that both women and men experienced more negative emotions and fewer positive emotions when they perceived an inequity in the household division of labor. Both underbenefiting and overbenefiting affected these emotions—although underbenefiting was more implicated in feelings of anger and rage, while overbenefiting was more strongly linked to feelings of fear and self-reproach. Although both men and women responded to inequity, some gender differences materialized. Underbenefiting appeared to affect men more profoundly than it affected women. Men were more likely than women to experience feelings of anger and rage when they thought that they were doing *more* than their fair share. In contrast, women were more likely than their male partners to experience feelings of self-reproach and fear when they perceived that they were doing *less* than their fair share.

These findings are consistent, to a certain degree, with equity theory, which predicts that individuals—regardless of sex—will experience

greater distress when experiencing an inequity, in either direction. The findings dovetail with Homans' recommendation to distinguish between types of distress. These results are also consistent with Theodore Kemper's (1978) social interactional theory of emotion, a social psychological theory of emotional experience. Kemper's theory posits that individuals are likely to experience anger and other similar emotions when they perceive an injustice to themselves in the course of a social encounter that happens through no fault of their own. Importantly, this theory also predicts that when an actor causes an injustice to another—especially a well-liked other—s/he is more likely to experience guilt, shame, or some other form of self-reproach.

While both equity theory (Homans [1961] 1974) and the social interactional theory of emotion (Kemper 1978) explain the basic patterns of socioemotional responses to perceived inequity in the home, they are less successful in addressing the differential effect for men and women. In order to explain the sex differences, Lively et al. turned to affect control theory (Heise 2007).

As noted earlier, affect control theory assumes that individuals create events to confirm their fundamental affective sentiments about themselves, others, behaviors, settings, and events. When situated events disconfirm one's fundamental sentiments regarding self, others, or a setting, a sense of unlikelihood (also known as "deflection") is expected to occur, which is often experienced as an emotion. The exact emotion that is experienced is dependent not only on the degree of unlikelihood, but also on the direction of the identity disconfirmation.

Using the theory's computer simulation program, *Interact*, Lively et al. (2010) generated testable hypotheses by running a series of simulations derived from data collected from males and females separately, and found that husbands who perceive themselves as underbenefited—or feel exploited, cheated, shortchanged, or overworked—in the home are likely to experience sadness, fear, and anger. In contrast, wives who see themselves as underbenefiting at the hands of their husbands are expected to experience no emotion. *Interact* also predicted that husbands

who see themselves as overbenefiting in the home at the expense of their wife will experience fear, whereas wives who perceive themselves as overbenefiting at the expense of their husband are predicted to experience fear coupled with anger. These two sets of predictions are consistent with Lively, Steelman, and Powell's finding that men are more emotionally reactive to experiences of underbenefiting, whereas women are more emotionally reactive to experiences of overbenefiting. Of note, *Interact* also predicted the specific emotions that were more likely to be experienced by one sex compared to the other in a given set of circumstances.

The theories described above not only enable us to understand the emotional consequences of inequality in the home, but also may help us make sense of a recent, highly publicized study of the implications of the household division of labor for sexual behavior among married couples. Kornich et al. (2012) find that men's increased participation in household labor—especially in tasks deemed feminine (e.g., cleaning)—reduces sexual activity within intimate couples. They contend that these patterns are consistent with a cultural script argument that traditional gender scripts are linked to increased sexual attraction and that departures from these scripts should lessen sexual desire and, in turn, sexual activity. They also suggest that these patterns are at odds with predictions from exchange theory that women would exchange sex for men's greater involvement in household labor.

The authors' incorporation of exchange theory, among other theories, is precisely the type of explicit engagement of social psychological theory that we believe is warranted. That being said, we find it puzzling that they chose exchange theory as the foil to more general cultural explanations given the utility of equity theory in explaining the relationship between household division of labor and negative socio-emotional outcomes (which may or may not impact sexual activity). Indeed, a good number of the studies detailing the costs of household inequity reveal that the impact of perceptions of inequity in the household is much greater than the impact of reports of hours of

housework.¹¹ In looking ahead, we believe that greater empirical attention to notions of equity—in conjunction with exchange theory and other social psychological and cultural theories—will give scholars great analytical leverage in assessing the implications of household inequality for an array of outcomes.

Inequality in Response to Family Roles: The Case of the Motherhood Penalty

In this final section, we briefly consider inequality that exists outside the family unit—more specifically, inequalities in external reaction to family roles. Although there are many possible ways to investigate this topic, we limit our discussion to one well-studied, and highly publicized, phenomenon: the motherhood wage penalty. Here, we discuss the state of family and inequality research on the motherhood wage penalty, examine areas where merging social psychological insights into the existing literature on family and inequality would be useful, and then turn to research that has already incorporated social psychology.

The Motherhood Penalty

Research suggests that individuals who hold family roles as mothers or fathers are treated differently in the workplace. An outcome of this differential treatment—the motherhood wage penalty—has received a great deal of attention from social scientists. The wage penalty for mothers

has been estimated at about five percent for the first child, with higher penalties for subsequent children (Budig and England 2001).¹²

The literature on the motherhood wage penalty—and, more broadly, gender differences in wages—often tests the human capital perspective. According to this perspective, married women are still primarily responsible for housework and childcare and, as a result, they will devote less effort to paid labor and be less productive (Becker 1985). Further, married women may be likely to choose less intensive, “mother-friendly” occupations that pay less than more demanding careers (Becker 1985; Budig and England 2001). Finally, due to childcare demands, mothers may spend a portion of their working years out of the labor force or employed in part-time positions, losing experience and seniority along the way (Budig and England 2001; Waldfogel 1997). It is estimated that about one-third to one-half of the motherhood penalty can be explained with human capital variables like job experience, seniority, and part-time employment (Budig and England 2001). The remaining portion of the motherhood penalty is likely due to loss of productivity or discrimination against women by employers (Budig and England 2001).

Although the human capital perspective is an economic theory, at its root are social psychological concerns—namely, those related to individuals’ constrained yet calculated choices. The perspective’s reliance on social psychological concepts is largely implicit, making this an area where future research can work to merge social psychological insights with family inequality perspectives (Kroska this volume). For example, even if women “choose” less intensive careers or devote energy to work, these choices may still be rooted in status-based inequality (Berger et al. 1972). Indeed, some women “opt out” of work and choose roles such as stay-at-home mothers because of inflexible workplaces which make care work difficult and spouses who resist or are unable to cut back on their own work hours (Cha 2010; Hochschild 1989; Stone 2007). Clearly,

¹¹ Although Kornrich et al. (2012) attempt to account for structural or opportunity variables that may affect individuals’ desire of access to sex, it is not clear that the authors have comprehensively explored other possibilities that may explain the patterns that they find. For example, although they include a control for self-reported health in some of their multivariate models, they are less successful in accounting for both partner’s overall health and other out-of-the-ordinary situations that might encourage men to do the lion’s share of the work. Given the rarity of men doing more than an equal share of the household labor, it is worth investigating the situation of those men who do.

¹² In stark contrast to mothers, however, fathers appear to earn a wage premium (Correll et al. 2007).

even women who may have some choice in their decision to work or not work also face structural constraints that limit the number of truly available options.

Insights from Social Psychological Perspectives on Status and Roles, Status Characteristics, and Normative Discrimination

Where the human capital perspective is lacking—specifically in its ability to disentangle the impact of discrimination from women’s career choices and childcare demands—social psychological perspectives on the motherhood wage penalty offer additional explanatory power, especially as it relates to understanding discrimination faced by mothers in the workplace. Below we discuss three social psychological lenses that are used to study the motherhood wage penalty: statuses and roles, status characteristics theory, and normative discrimination.

Statuses and Roles Social psychological understandings of how roles attached to motherhood conflict with those attached to working lend insight into the motherhood wage penalty (see Goode 1960 for a discussion of role strain). For example, cultural understandings of motherhood present rights and obligations that are at odds with those of ideal workers. To be a good mother, women must be willing to prioritize their children and families above all other demands and always be available (Hays 1996).¹³ The cultural ideals of motherhood may be more fiction than fact: a majority of women, even those with young children, are now employed (Jacobs and Gerson 2004). Still, the cultural ideals of motherhood are powerful in that the roles attached to this status clash with the roles of an ideal worker. Ideal workers, similar to ideal mothers, should be fully committed to their jobs, always available to work,

and free of reproductive and family responsibilities (Acker 1990; Williams 2000). The incompatibility of motherhood—at least as culturally represented—with ideal worker roles makes motherhood a salient status in the workplace, and in some cases may convert motherhood into a status characteristic (Mandel and Semyonov 2005).

Status Characteristics Theory The second social psychological lens looking at the motherhood penalty for wages extends the focus on status to examine how the salience of motherhood at work converts status difference into a status characteristic (Ridgeway 2011; Ridgeway and Correll 2004; Ridgeway et al. 2009). Status characteristics theory stems from expectation state theory, which posits that categorical distinctions become status characteristics when one status (i.e., non-mothers) are viewed as more competent than another status (i.e., mothers). Research suggests that mothers do face less favorable evaluations in the workplace, lending credence to the notion that motherhood itself is a status characteristic (see Corse 1990; Cuddy et al. 2004; Fuegen et al. 2004; Halpert et al. 1993).

Less favorable evaluations may lead to status-based discrimination. As previously discussed, many researchers using human capital theory hypothesized that some portion of the motherhood penalty for wages was due to discrimination, but these scholars were unable to sort out the effect of discrimination from other unmeasured characteristics. This is where social psychological work on the motherhood wage penalty has been especially informative. For instance, Correll et al.’s (2007) recent research suggests that mothers face status-based discrimination in the workplace. In a lab experiment, the researchers showed participants information about a company looking to hire someone to fill a marketing position, followed by two applicant files—one parent and one nonparent.¹⁴ Compared to women without chil-

¹³ In contrast, cultural ideas of fatherhood do not cast men in this all-or-nothing role, especially because fathers can fulfill their parenting responsibilities primarily in their role as breadwinners (Ridgeway 2011).

¹⁴ To test the applicability of their findings in a real-world setting, Correll et al. (2007) conducted a second audit study. Here, the researchers sent out resumes similar to those used in the laboratory experiment to employers seeking similarly qualified applicants, monitoring the

dren, mothers were rated as less competent and committed, held to higher standards of punctuality and ability, seen as deserving lower starting salaries, rated as less promotable, less likely to be recommended for management, and less frequently recommended for hire. Consistent with the notion that motherhood is a status characteristic, Correll et al. (2007) find that evaluations of competence and commitment partially mediate the effect of motherhood on recommendations regarding hiring, salary, and promotion. That is, part of the reason mothers fare less well in the workplace is because they are believed to be less competent and committed to work, or in other words, mothers face status based discrimination (Correll et al. 2007).

Normative Discrimination If the effects of status based discrimination stem from lower evaluations of competence and commitment, how do mothers who have proven their competence and commitment to work fare in the workplace? In another exemplar of social psychological research on the motherhood penalty for wages, Benard and Correll (2010) take up this question by asking participants to assess two job applications for a marketing position. One job application was moderately ambiguous: that is, the resume was indicative of promise, but did not include a performance review. The second job application was low in ambiguity by including a resume and performance review that signaled success.

As expected, the researchers found that the moderate ambiguity condition replicated earlier work on the motherhood wage penalty and status based discrimination. However, in the low ambiguity condition, male and female participants did not rate mothers lower on measures of competence or commitment, suggesting that low ambiguity tends to ameliorate status-based discrimination. But in its place a new mechanism, normative discrimination, took hold—particu-

larly among female participants. That is, women rated mothers as less likable and less warm than fathers. They also held mothers to higher standards and were less likely to recommend them for promotion, hiring, and suggested lower starting salaries. These findings provide partial support for the hypothesis that even in scenarios where women prove their competence and commitment, the motherhood penalty persists through normative discrimination (Benard and Correll 2010).

These findings point to the utility of using a social psychological lens in studying inequality linked to family roles—in this case, the motherhood wage penalty. Much of the literature on the motherhood wage penalty utilizes the human capital perspective, an economic theory that implicitly relies on social psychological understandings of individual choice and constraint. Although scholarship from the human capital tradition provides valuable insight into the motherhood wage penalty, it also falls short when it comes to accounting for discrimination. Research that explicitly stems from the social psychological tradition—studies examining statuses and roles, status-based discrimination, and normative discrimination—is able to fill some of the gap in our understanding of the motherhood wage penalty. As this case clearly demonstrates, the study of families and inequality has much to gain from a marriage to social psychology, and vice versa.

Conclusion

Over the last decade, several important contributions have been made when insights from social psychologists, family scholars and social stratification scholars have been merged. In this chapter, we reviewed four topics in family and inequality research where this has been the case: what counts and does not count as a family, inequality between siblings and generations, the precursors and consequences of household division of labor, and the influence of family roles (in particular, the maternal role) within the context of institutions external to family life (in this case, the workplace). This chapter was not intended to be a comprehensive review. Indeed, our goal

number of callbacks they received for each applicant. They found that mothers were less than half as likely as non-mothers to receive a call back from a job application. Further, fathers received slightly more callbacks than non-fathers, although this difference was not significant.

was much more modest. For each of the topics highlighted here, we reviewed exemplars of family scholarship that explicitly brought social psychology to bear on issues of inequality between and within families and also introduced a variety of formal social psychological theories that have the potential to inform our understanding of family inequality.

Although the idea that family scholarship can be further informed by social psychological insight and, in turn, that social psychology would benefit from focusing more on families is really quite simple, it bears repeating. All too often family scholars have relied on social psychological insights without fully recognizing or acknowledging the contributions of social psychology. For instance, although Powell and associates' study of the social definition of the family has embedded in it several core, if not classic, social psychological assumptions, it is not clear that family scholars would recognize that who counts as family is fundamentally a social psychological question. Nor is it clear that they would recognize that many explanations for the remarkably quick changes toward a more inclusive definition of family are rooted in social psychological processes such as attribution, framing, and intergroup contact.

The failure to see certain fundamental questions (or answers) regarding family inequality as inherently social psychological is not limited to the issue of who counts as family. Many family scholars document the unequal nature of family life—especially in the household division of labor. However, it is often the case that the social psychological underpinnings of this form of inequality go unnoticed even though one of the most commonly invoked perspective used to explain inequality among intimate partners, the “doing gender” perspective, is rooted in ethnomethodology and, thus, symbolic interaction. In this instance, we argue that “doing gender,” while already popular among those who study family inequality, can be strengthened through the careful and explicit introduction of other more formal theories within social psychology—among them, identity theory, affect control theory, and status characteristics theory. Because many of the more

formal social psychological theories were developed in part as a corrective to the fluidity of classic symbolic interaction (Blumer 1969), it is not surprising that they could also stand to address many criticisms leveled at the “doing gender” perspective.

It is not our intent to say that family scholars or sociologists more generally ignore social psychological insights. Indeed, as we hope we have shown, social psychology is implicit throughout the study of family inequality, as well as within the larger discipline. It is our intention, however, to encourage scholars who study inequality within families to (1) recognize their typically implicit reliance on social psychological insights and (2) engage fully with a range of social psychological theories.

In addition to identifying multiple theoretical perspectives that have the potential to enhance each area of family inequality discussed in this chapter, we also highlight a number of multimethodological approaches to the same (as in the case of Powell et al., whose study relied on in-depth interviews and survey methods; Lively et al., whose work relied on survey methods and computer simulations; or Correll and colleagues' work that relied on survey methods and experiments). Although our primary purpose was to identify where various formal theories within social psychology and family scholarship may easily co-exist, we also suggest that a multimethod approach may be well suited for answering questions related to family inequality. While we recognize the inherent difficulties of adopting a multi-methodological—or, for that matter, a multi-theoretical—approach, we nonetheless encourage scholars to align their questions with others who are making similar inquiries, albeit using different theoretical and methodological perspectives. One of the strengths of social psychology is that it incorporates multiple theoretical perspectives, many of which stem from symbolic interaction, and draws routinely from a variety of complementary methods, ranging from surveys to computer simulations.

In keeping with what we see as the strength of both multi-theoretical and methodological work, we showcase the scholarship of Correll and as-

sociates, who, more effectively than many of the more formal social psychologists, combine seemingly disparate methodologies to show how core social psychological principles associated with status characteristics affect inequalities at the interface between work and family. We believe this research provides a useful model for those scholars who are truly committed to recognizing and exploring how social psychological processes contribute to and sustain family inequality.

Beyond our call to more explicitly integrate family and inequality research with social psychology, our review of the literature suggests further considerations to strengthen family and inequality research. Specifically, researchers can, and arguably should, attend more fully to cross-cultural variation, diversity of family forms, and the interaction of familial roles with other institutional roles.

Our review of the literature reveals a need for more cross-cultural research on social psychology, family, and inequality. Although some scholarship on the household division of labor suggests that perceptions of who does what around the house vary by nation-state, especially between those countries characterized by traditional and egalitarian ideals, much of the existing social psychological work on family inequality is limited to the U.S. (Lively et al. 2009). Moreover, to the degree that affective sentiments likely differ in traditional cultures and egalitarian cultures (Heise 2007) and to the extent that these affective sentiments have important implications for individuals' behaviors, emotions, expectations, and the ways they see themselves as others, scholars must necessarily broaden their scope in order to better understand the ways in which inequality operates both within and between families around the globe.

Similarly, most of the research on family inequality remains stubbornly focused on the Standard North American Family (SNAF), which typically involves a heterosexual couple with one or more children. Although these families are often riddled with inequality, the presence of heterosexual husbands and wives makes explanations that rely solely on gender convenient. However, studies of gay and lesbian headed families

reveal that power and status distinctions occur within families even when the basic organizing principle of sex is held constant, a finding that is not inconsistent with a number of social psychological theories that take power and status, as opposed to gender, as their starting point. Thus, we contend that future researchers need to look to deeper issues of status and power within intimate relationships, which, admittedly, tend to operate in tandem with sex and gender. It is our belief that increased attention to alternate family forms, as well as scholarship that focuses on families in other cultures, may shed important and long overdue insights on the ways in which social psychological processes surrounding power and status operate both within and between different family forms. Although we have just barely scratched the surface in our treatment of recent scholarship on inequality and families, it is clear that there are numerous points where conversation and collaboration are available to social psychologists and family scholars who are invested in understanding how systems of social inequality operate in the private domain. Thus, it is perplexing as to why there has not been as much cross-fertilization of ideas from social psychologists and family scholars as we believe there should be.

While we may seem overly concerned by this seeming chasm between social psychologists and family scholars, it is worth noting that less than ten percent of American Sociological Association social psychology section members also belong to the family section—and an even smaller percent of members of the family section belong to the social psychology section.¹⁵ These figures are particularly surprising, given that the social psychology section enjoys significantly more membership overlap with such sections as emotions, mental health, theory, culture, crime, sex and gender, education, race-gender-class, and mathematical sociology. This number may be even more surprising when one looks at the eight sections with which the family section shares most of its members: sex and gender, population,

¹⁵ Information regarding section membership was provided by the American Sociological Association (personal communication, February 19, 2013).

aging, children and youth, race-gender-class, inequality-poverty, organizations-occupations-work, and medical sociology. As these numbers reveal, the divide between family scholars and social psychologists is so deep that they only share two common co-memberships: sex and gender and race-gender-class.¹⁶

This type of documented insularity may result in family scholars having so little contact with social psychologists that they are less likely to recognize the social psychological underpinnings of their scholarship. However, and somewhat even more troubling from our perspective, it may reflect the seeming irrelevance of social psychology to questions of family inequality. That being said, the problem of insularity is a two-way street. It also applies to scholars who identify primarily as social psychologists, especially those studying the formal theories described in this chapter, who often do so in laboratories with subjects comprised disproportionately of undergraduate students. All too often the scholarship on these theories appears to give little or no consideration to whether the conditions under which certain social psychological tenets play out among intimates—especially in family settings.

We believe this is a missed opportunity, despite previous calls for social psychologists to direct more of their attention to families. Indeed, in some regards, families constitute a perfect group in which to analyze social psychological processes. Unlike classic experimental settings, where the majority of formal social psychological theories are developed, the family is comprised of long term, emotionally laden relationships among intimates, which makes them ideal for understanding human behavior (Steelman and Powell 1996). It also enables social psychologists to assess whether patterns found among non-intimates (e.g., those in experimental settings) can extend to intimates (Lively et al. 2010).

Finally, we hope that social psychologists and family scholars alike will begin to take more seriously the question of what constitutes family and how these different forms might simultaneously problematize, and potentially elucidate, existing social psychological accounts pertaining to social inequality within the home—if not inequality more generally. In this chapter, we have discussed primarily the need to consider same-sex couples/families as well as cross-sex couples/families in our investigations of family inequality. But there are other families that come together across many different lines of social demarcation—among these, by race, ethnicity, age, generation, and religion. If both family scholars and social psychologists were to broaden their focus, they would necessarily broaden their explanations as well. Not only would such a strategy lead to a more inclusive social psychology, but it would lead to a more nuanced understanding of how inequality operates in our most intimate of institutions.

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¹⁶ Even the overlap with these two sections may reflect less the perceived commonalities of interests of the family section and social psychology section and instead may merely reflect the relatively large size of the sex and gender and race-gender-class sections.

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Barbara Schneider, Justina Judy and Kri Burkander

Introduction

Schools—which most remember as housing the cognitive and social context of salient childhood and adolescent memories—have a historical pedigree that precedes the formation of the U.S. (Butts and Cremin 1953). Since early colonial times, schools, in conjunction with religious institutions, were established to educate young people in the religious values of the communities in which they lived (Cremin 1970). The metamorphosis of colonial schools from religious institutions initially designed to keep the faith to sustaining the ideals of the republic and stimulating economic growth was later accompanied by an unfolding series of federal and state laws that expanded the educational opportunities for all students (Tyack 1974). Several scholars argue that this societal view of education has increasingly shifted education from a public good to an individualized commodity in which economically and socially advantaged parents make investments to achieve financial success and social

mobility for their children (Labaree 2010; McGhee Hassrick and Schneider 2009). This view on the relationship of education to individualized economic wealth is supported by recent research suggesting that the achievement gap between poor performing and more successful students is attributable to disparities in parent economic resources (Reardon 2011). This and other similar analyses indicate that the promise of public education for reducing social inequalities is likely to continue to be fraught with problems, regardless of present school reform efforts (Stiglitz 2012).

The question of what role schools can reasonably be expected to play in overcoming social inequalities remains open. While scores of reforms have worked to promote equality of educational opportunity for students of all backgrounds, academic gaps persist between White and minority students, and between students from high- and low-SES households. While there are models of schools that purport to close achievement gaps between students (for example see Whitehurst and Croft 2010; www.KIPP.org), these models tend to require large per pupil investments and time commitments on behalf of the faculty, parents, and students (Dobbie and Fryer 2011; Rothstein et al. 2009). Some have argued that these models do not appear to be sustainable, nor do they typically exist within the structure of traditional public schools (Ravitch 2010). It appears that present educational reforms without additional supports from families and communities and major interventions by government will be insufficient to reduce educational inequality.

With the assistance of Lucas Woolums. This work was supported in part by a Pre-Doctoral Training Grant from the Institute of Education Sciences, U.S. Department of Education (Award # R305B090011) to Michigan State University.

B. Schneider (✉) · J. Judy · K. Burkander
College of Education and Department of Sociology,
Michigan State University, 620 Farm Lane, Room 516,
East Lansing, MI 48824, USA
e-mail: bschneid@msu.edu

This chapter discusses the individual, social and psychological benefits of schools for different groups of students—focusing on inequalities among racial and ethnic groups of students and students from low- and high-income families. This chapter is organized into five sections that address how inequalities have been institutionalized through various educational reforms over time and what promises policy can offer for the future. Part one provides a historical account, demonstrating the different ways in which inequality has manifested itself in the goals and curricular offerings in public schools, and highlighting which groups have been ignored and the cognitive and social repercussions such exclusions promote. Part two builds on the historical analysis, discussing how more recent policies aimed at addressing inequality have created new challenges for families and teachers as they attempt to construct environments that promote educational success and personal satisfaction. Part three examines how peer groups and extracurricular activities can provide sources of emotional support, especially for disadvantaged students. Part four draws attention to the sustaining effects inequality of opportunity has on postsecondary access, persistence, and attainment, recognizing that the challenges of educational attainment are a combination of cognitive skills and social and psychological factors, such as realistic goals, commitment, and strategic plans. The chapter concludes by summarizing the role that schools have held and are playing in addressing inequalities in achievement and social/psychological well-being.

Historical Perspectives on Inequality

It has been argued that the first major commitment to public education was the common school movement in the late 1700s and early nineteenth century. Brint (1998) claims that while the conventional historical rendition places the common school movement at the time of the American Revolution, public schools existed as early as the mid-1600s, serving mainly the poor. These early public schools fell into disuse with most young

people opting to learn a trade through apprenticeship programs (Grubb and Lazerson 2009). Schools that offered training in more advanced subjects for more prestigious occupations largely required fees and often relied on private tutors. Thus, even from the very beginnings of public education there were multiple paths to an occupation, and those with family resources were more likely to have access to different, broader, and socially privileged schooling experiences.

Although advocated by the general public, it was not until the 1830s and 1840s that a more comprehensive movement for a common school education took hold. Originating in New England and the Mid-Atlantic States, the common school movement quickly spread westward and to the south (Brint 1998). Conceived of as a mechanism primarily to create a strong culture of civic commitment, the idea of providing opportunities for individual social mobility was a secondary objective (De Marrais and LeCompte 1999; Labaree 1997, 2010). The issue of investing in education for future economic returns did not gain significant traction until the next major school reform effort—compulsory education—which underscored the importance of acquiring human capital for returns on earnings, health, and social benefits.

Recovering from the Civil War, the U.S. entered a period of major industrial expansion. By the late 1800s, the impact of burgeoning factories and a growing service economy created a demand for more clerical and managerial jobs that required literacy and numeracy skills. This demand was met by families from rural areas and recent immigrants who moved into industrialized urban areas seeking employment. It was not unusual to find everyone in a household working. By the 1900s, children as young as 9 years old were employed in mines, factories, agriculture, home industries, and on the streets as newsboys, messengers, and peddlers. The working conditions of children were deplorable and some states began mandating legislation to limit child labor, but it took some time before such legislation was implemented throughout the U.S. Some factories in northern cities moved south to avoid anti-child work regulations, and it was not until the middle

of the twentieth century that the minimum age of employment and hours of work for children were regulated by federal law. The formation of the National Child Labor Committee in 1904 helped regulate the working conditions of children and bring public attention to the importance of schooling. By the early 1900s, 33 states had compulsory school attendance laws which required students from ages six through 16 to stay in school. The remaining seventeen states took longer to enact such legislation, the latest being Alaska in 1929 (National Center for Education Statistics [NCES] 2004).

By the turn of the twentieth century educational reformers were for the most part in conflict over what other types of educational opportunities children not in the labor force should have. The seeds of this conflict began in the late 1800s when a group of distinguished principals and professors, the U.S. Commissioner of Education, and the president of Harvard University came together to issue the *Report of the Committee of Ten*, which endorsed the idea that the high school curriculum should be similar in length and content for all students, whether or not they were planning on attending college (National Education Association 1894). Their vision was a classical education curriculum which emphasized Greek, Latin, English, and History. These curricular recommendations were greeted with considerable controversy, which to a large extent formed re-occurring positional debates on the goals of public education. Perhaps best articulated by John Dewey (1900), who viewed education not just as academic achievement but an experience through which individuals learned about citizenship, sportsmanship, leadership and social responsibility, the Report of the Committee of Ten affirmed and embraced the idea of a liberal education for everyone.

Those in opposition to the Committee of Ten recommendation argued that most students would not be attending college and were likely to have left school early (either in violation of or in accordance with designated compulsory state education laws) or to have begun working in a job immediately after graduating from secondary school. These individuals maintained that the

role of the high school was to provide these students with the knowledge and skills they needed for their future jobs. This focus on the utilitarian function of high schools was conveyed in the next major education report, *The Cardinal Principles of Secondary Education*. This document, written in 1918 by another group of educators—a greater number of whom were school administrators—called for an expanded and differentiated curriculum that would more effectively educate a new and diverse population, many of whom would be entering the workforce after high school graduation (Mirel 2006).

This rationale for a differentiated curriculum was also evident in the sociological literature in the 1920s. European schools had adopted laws for compulsory schooling and, most noteworthy, a highly structured system for differentiating students' schooling careers on the basis of economic and social class distinctions (Kerckhoff 2001). However, several European sociologists at the time argued that schools should be able to identify promising and gifted students regardless of familial background characteristics, and provide them access to courses and experiences available to those from more advantaged backgrounds (Sorokin 1963[1927]). Sorokin was one of the scholars who viewed schools as a societal institution, such as the military, government, and religious bodies that channeled individuals into positions of economic and political power based on their ability and educational accomplishments. He underscored how social mobility is constrained by a sorting process, arguing that where and when one gets sorted, placed, or pushed would have differential effects and consequences on individual lives. Schools could not provide equal opportunities for everyone because they used tests and grades to differentiate students from one another and confer social status to those who succeed (Dreeben 1994; Schneider 2003). This pressure for a more open educational system that sorted students by achievement and ability rather than economics and social class was largely ignored administratively and, some would argue, continues to be the case in many public school systems.

The educational reformers of the early 1900s envisioned a school system that could be socially

efficient. While championing local access, different students had diverse curricular experiences within the same school, which culminated in dissimilar outcomes. The high school design of the 1920s, which persisted through the 1950s, was basically an experience that focused on schooling for an occupation that required literacy and numeracy skills along with courses in wood shop, typing and shorthand, car repair, and book-keeping; all of which were to meet the increasing labor demand for blue collar workers and those in mid-level marketing, accounting, and secretarial positions. The educational experiences of those in tracks slated for the labor market received a far less academically demanding educational experience than those in the college preparatory tracks. Only a small number of students were slated for postsecondary experiences, and despite the intentions of middle class parents to break into the professional sector, these positions were relatively limited and often held for alumni and restricted based on religious quotas which were firmly upheld (Karabel 2005).

Sustaining Effects of the Cardinal Principles and the Origins of Progressive Education

It is hard to overlook the profound influence the Cardinal Principles had on the school curriculum for over a 30 year period. Many of the innovative curricular reforms reinforced the expansion of vocational education, often at the expense of academic subjects (Ravitch 1983). Describing most of the curriculum reforms in this period, Ravitch (1983) notes:

The common features [of the progressive curriculum] were: centering the curriculum around basic areas of human activity, instead of traditional subject matter; incorporating subject matter only insofar as it was useful in everyday situations; stressing functional values, such as behavior, attitudes, skills, and know-how, rather than bookish or abstract knowledge; reorienting studies to the immediate needs and interest of students; using community resources; introducing nontraditional materials (for example, audiovisual equipment or magazines) and nontraditional activities (for example panel discussions, dramatizations, and

work projects) in addition to or instead of direct instruction and textbooks (p. 63).

Not without critics, this progressive period in education, with its emphasis on life skills and de-emphasis on academic knowledge, spread throughout the curriculum, including state testing protocols. For example, by 1948 the New York State Regents' fourth year language examination had disappeared, and knowledge of all history other than U.S. was diminished to a small portion of a multiple choice exam called American History and World Backgrounds. Teachers who failed to follow the progressive doctrines were fired and practices were put in place to monitor the adherence of the life skills curriculum in the classroom.

It is not surprising that progressive education finally hit rock bottom with two major events: the Supreme Court decision that mandated the desegregation of U.S. schools and the launching of the Soviet space satellite. Progressive education was already on the wane in the early 1950s as multiple critics worried about a U.S. citizenry that was unfamiliar with global issues, ill-prepared for changing technology, and with an uncritical view of the downside of reaching consensus on predetermined outcomes. Progressive education was, as Ravitch explains, a program for below-average students in a time when mathematics, science, English, and history were considered essential for an educated American populace.

By the 1950s, the typical American high school placed its students into different curricular tracks (or levels), including: a college preparatory program; a general education program; a commercial program; and a vocational program. In addition to these comprehensive schools, there were vocational schools or technical centers that offered work-related experiences for students who planned on entering the labor force directly after high school. These vocational high schools have been on the decline and today fewer than 5% of high schools can be considered vocational schools (NCES 2012). Even as higher education became more valued, college was the pathway for only middle- and upper-class families (Trow 1973). Even as late as the 1980s, the majority of high school graduates entered the labor market after completing only secondary school.

Separate and Unequal

At about the same time, the idea that equality of educational access should include African Americans began to take hold, and by the 1950s a number of cases challenging the right of states to segregate their schools were working through the court system, finally reaching the Supreme Court in *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka*. In 1953, Oliver Brown and twelve other parents brought suit with the NAACP to challenge a Kansas law that permitted school segregation, which was subsequently appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. Earlier attempts to change the law in the thirties and forties had been undermanned and underfinanced, but the 1944 release of Gunnar Myrdal's *An American Dilemma* had a major impact. Myrdal showed that southern states were spending twice as much to educate White children as Black, four times as much for school facilities, paid White teachers nearly 30% more, and offered no transportation services to bring Black children to and from school. The disparity was even greater at the postsecondary level where the difference in state spending was more than sixteen to one for White colleges in contrast to those that were Black. The unanimous decision in *Brown v. Board* (1954), written by Chief Justice Warren, was influenced not only by the changing racial climate, but also by the culmination of new social science research indicating that African-Americans were not biologically inferior to Whites and that segregation was indeed harmful to African-American children (Wong and Nicotera 2004). Chief Justice Warren wrote, "... in the field of public education, the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal" (*Brown v. Board of Education*, 347 U.S. 483, (1954)).

Local responses to the ruling differed along regional lines. In the South, states' rights advocates challenged the ruling, seeking legal delay as well as employing local strategies designed to circumvent the law. Prince Edward County in Virginia closed its public education system for 4 years, educating its children in private schools to avoid desegregation. The federal government interceded several times, including: in 1957, the deploy-

ment of federal troops to Little Rock, Arkansas to enroll Black students at Central High School; in 1962, when federal marshals accompanied James Meredith to the University of Mississippi; and in 1963 when President Kennedy mobilized the National Guard to enforce integration at the University of Alabama (Church and Sedlak 1976). In the North, school segregation actually increased after *Brown*, mostly due to *de facto* segregation based on housing patterns. By the early 1970s, school segregation in the South was the lowest of any region in the country, while segregation in the North remained fairly unchanged (Coleman 1975). Although *Brown* declared separate educational facilities for Whites and Blacks to be a violation of the fourteenth amendment of the constitution and effectively ended *de jure* school segregation, informal or *de facto* segregation persisted (Orfield 1983).

The struggle for equal educational opportunities for Black students continued. It was not until the signing of the Civil Rights Act into law in 1964 by President Lyndon Johnson that the law began to have a significant effect. It is important to recognize the importance of *Brown*, as Halberstam (1993) writes, "it not only legally ended segregation, it deprived segregationist practices of their moral legitimacy as well...the moment that separated the old order from the new and helped create the tumultuous era just arriving" (p. 423).

Civil Rights Act

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 included provisions for a survey within two years of its enactment to ascertain the extent to which students were denied equal educational opportunities on the basis of their race, color, religion or national origin in public educational institutions throughout the country. Sociologist James Coleman was asked by the Assistant Commissioner of Education and Director of the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) to direct this study, titled the Equality of Educational Opportunity Study (later commonly referred to as the Coleman Report). It was widely assumed that inequity of educational

resources was at the heart of the disparities in academic performance observed between Blacks and Whites. Coleman and his colleagues found that traditionally measured school inputs did not strongly impact student achievement (Coleman et. al 1966). This challenged the notion that simply providing more resources to poor Black schools would make them better (re-analyses of these data reached the same conclusion, see Moynihan and Mosteller 1972). Making all schools “equal” was not enough to guarantee equal access to educational opportunity. Instead, Coleman and his colleagues found that the racial and socioeconomic composition of the student body had the greatest impact on student achievement, results that persist through today. Results also showed that African American students in segregated, Black-majority schools performed more poorly than those in desegregated schools with White majorities, prompting a national movement to desegregate the public school system (Hallinan 1988). Indeed, this shifted the rhetoric from challenging separate facilities for Blacks and Whites to working toward “affirmative integration” in the schools, largely through busing children from one school to another to achieve racial balance (Orfield 1978).

Reflecting on this report, Coleman wrote that because the work was administratively driven—by the government rather than a research study—the social system of the school and how children were affected by it were largely ignored. The study did not examine how the schooling experiences for Black and White children varied in the school contexts in which they were situated. The study did not start with a conception of the school as a social system, which meant that one could not learn how the norms of that system were able to influence the students’ investments of effort both in academics and in their social lives (Schneider 2000). This issue of norms and their relationship to equality of opportunity needs to be underscored. In his seminal work, *Foundations of Social Theory* (1990), Coleman argues that for a norm of equal opportunity to emerge it must first be the case that individuals can easily imagine themselves as able to exchange positions with anyone else affected by the norm. Second,

this exchange can only exist in a democracy which allows each individual the opportunity to attain similar positions—not on the basis of heredity, status, or wealth. Third, if such a norm were in place it would improve the work of the collective. This suggests that individual norms of equal opportunity are dependent on communal norms. This is fundamentally the argument that the Committee of Ten gave for the value of educating all children for the good of the Republic. Today, however, ideas about what is good for society and what is good for “my children” are often at odds, and the disparities in economic wealth have made issues of exchange and opportunity exclusionary.

The second major change of the 1960s was the massive extension of higher education. During the 1960s, higher education institutions grew along with the amount of federal aid available to students with limited parent resources. All of this led to a school system where middle class parents expected their children, regardless of gender, to attend college. Despite prevailing beliefs about the importance of education for social mobility and the valuing of academic performance, several scholars undertook a series of studies designed to illuminate the links between family origin and social mobility. Research conducted by Blau and Duncan (1978) found positive associations between fathers’ and sons’ employment and educational outcomes. A father’s occupation influenced not only his son’s education but also his first job even when differences in schooling and early career experience were taken into account.

While the Blau-Duncan model focused on understanding the structure of intergenerational occupational status transmission, other scholars sought to identify the influence of social psychological variables on educational attainment. Sewell and Hauser (1980) followed up on this idea and used data from a sample of male Wisconsin high school graduates in 1957 to model the impact of aspirations, influence of peers and others, educational quality, as well as mental ability on educational and occupational attainment. They were able to demonstrate that socioeconomic status (measured by father’s income, father’s or mother’s education, and father’s oc-

cupation) was a key mediator of educational attainment. Even when holding academic ability constant, students from higher socioeconomic backgrounds were predicted to have significantly greater postsecondary educational attainment. These findings were in part explained by social psychological factors. Using increasingly sophisticated models, other researchers have attempted to confirm the relevance of social psychological factors in the status attainment process. Results show that the interrelationships among family and other social contexts, including the characteristics of schools (especially high schools), norms, achievement values, and other contextual factors affect performance and the transition to postsecondary education attainment (Alexander et al. 2007; Entwisle et al. 2005; Phillips 2011). That being said, the economic and social context of the family remains the major determinant in education performance and attainment.

A Lingerin Nation at Risk

After a major emphasis on increasing performance in science and mathematics in the 1950s, the next significant reform did not occur until the 1980s with the release of *A Nation at Risk* by the National Commission on Excellence in Education (U.S. Department of Education 1983). The Commission described a plan for reforming elementary and secondary education that placed major emphasis on increasing the number of academic courses required for graduation from high school. The impetus for this report was twofold: (1) the poor test performance of U.S. students compared to other students internationally; and (2) a series of studies on the curriculum, the most notable of which described U.S. high schools as shopping malls, where students could select their courses from a broad menu of choices, resulting in a meaningless education (Powell et al. 1985).

Following the release of *A Nation at Risk*, nearly every state had increased the number of required courses for high school graduation, particularly in science and mathematics. This movement to increase the number of academic courses required for graduation continues to

be a major policy initiative advocated by many states. The recommendations in *A Nation at Risk* led to debates surrounding Goals 2000: Educate America Act of 1994, one of the rationales for the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB), the agenda for the National Educational Summit on High Schools 2005, and the focus of the National Standards Movement of 2012. Since 1998, transcript studies show that high school graduates have been taking more advanced courses in math and science (Adelman 2006) and the number of advanced placement courses and tests have also increased (College Board 2012).

Research on the effects of more rigorous course-taking shows a strong relationship with increased achievement and postsecondary attendance (Attewell and Domina 2008; Riegle-Crumb 2006). However, these effects appear to operate primarily through social class rather than race or ethnicity, a finding that also occurs in the elementary and secondary test score literature (see Reardon 2011). The magnitude of the effect of economic disparities on the achievement gap has grown substantially more than that of race and ethnicity. But what is of importance here is that Blacks and Hispanics are disproportionately represented in the lower levels of socioeconomic status, which implies that Blacks and Hispanics of low SES are less likely to face a rigorous curriculum that would provide them with increased opportunities for improved achievement, postsecondary attendance, and better jobs.

No Child Left Behind

The 1990s was a time of standards and comprehensive school reform which for the most part laid the groundwork for The No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act, a reinvention of its predecessor Goals 2000, with more defined measures of performance, sanctions for schools, and a renewed emphasis on scientifically based research evaluations (see Schneider and Kessler 2007). NCLB holds schools accountable for their students' levels of achievement or proficiency by allowing each state to define its own levels of performance, including guidelines for

how proficiency is measured (No Child Left Behind [NCLB] 2002). The law acknowledges that there are unequal school environments, and similarly that some students also confront non-school environments that may be impeding their performance. For these students, the bar is set at making adequate yearly progress. More recently states have been allowed to submit applications for waivers. Allowing states to apply for waivers acknowledges the importance of relying on changes in students' academic performance without assessing the punitive consequences of the law, such as school closings, which could be detrimental not only to the students, but also to their parents who may have to seek different schools for their children and school staff who may have to seek new places of employment.

Education and English Language Learners

Another example of the recycling of curricular reforms in the U.S. has been the programs the government has instituted for distinctive linguistic communities of Native Americans, Hispanics, and immigrants. While allowing a rather permissive approach, distinct linguistic communities were able to maintain their languages through schools and churches (Ovando 2003). This pattern continued until the early part of the twentieth century when the tide turned towards increasing pressure for monolingualism, particularly in response to the First World War. By 1923, 34 states had passed legislation requiring English-only instruction in public schools (Ovando 2003). This restrictive period lasted until the late 1950s and 1960s, during which time several events converged to change the tone of bilingual policy in the U.S. The launch of Sputnik prompted concerns related to our nation's educational performance that led to the National Defense Education Act of 1958 (which aimed to strengthen foreign language education as well as education in the math and sciences), the 1965 Immigration Act (which revoked earlier immigration quotas and facilitated increased immigration from Asia and Latin America), and the Bilingual Education Act

of 1968 (that provided additional supports to those students whose primary language was not English, Ovando (2003)). While not without its critics, this last Act was viewed as an important first step in improving achievement for non-English-speaking students (San Miguel 2004).

The 1970s provided several key legislative victories for bilingual education. The first was the landmark case of *Lau vs. Nichols* (1974), which held that equal treatment for English-speaking and non-English-speaking students did not constitute equal educational opportunity and therefore violated those students' civil rights. This case prompted the passage of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, affirming the *Lau* decision and extending its jurisdiction to all public schools. By 1978, all schools had to provide a bilingual education program for their non-English speaking students.

However, because implementation was not consistent across the schools, few evaluations were able to demonstrate the positive effects of bilingual education policy. This inconsistency left bilingual education vulnerable to critics and increased concerns regarding the permissiveness of the Bilingual Education Act. Increasing conservatism supported by the White House in the 1980s gave voice to the view that bilingual education was not helping non-English speaking students gain skills in English but simply enabled them to maintain their native language. This was seen as anti-American and a disservice to these students (Ovando 2003). Bilingual education was blamed for the poor performance of non-native English speakers due to their dependence on their "home language," despite evidence to the contrary. Bilingual education proponents continued to advocate for transitional bilingual programs as a best practice, while opponents promoted "English-only" immersion programs to speed up language acquisition.

During the 1990s and 2000s the debate continued, and although research demonstrated the importance of quality bilingual education programs to support the achievement of language-minority students, the Bilingual Education Act was repealed in 2001 with the passage of No Child Left Behind. Title III of NCLB officially

replaced bilingual education with an English-only policy and emphasized accountability through annual assessment. The issue of bilingual education, inextricably linked with cultural identity and social class, has never been fully separated from immigration policy, which continues to be a political issue. As some states increasingly push for more extreme immigration policy, language-minority students in those states are subject to increasingly harsh treatment that devalues the importance of bilingual education and reverts back to a more monolingual approach. (See Jasso, this volume, for a complementary discussion of immigration as it relates to inequality.)

Summary

The history of schooling in the U.S. illustrates the competing tensions between education for everyone—where all students receive the same type of education—in contrast to school systems that sort students on the basis of ability. Some would argue that sorting on the basis of racial, ethnic, economic, and social classes groups students into different curricular pathways that profoundly change life trajectories. While early educators envisioned a system where everyone would have access to a challenging cognitive experience, this idea was slowly eroded by efforts to make the subject matter more relevant to everyone, often at the expense of a watered down curriculum that diminished in some respects the value and importance of education for future economic success. The tension of who receives a good education remains a serious question, because even with desegregation laws, groups of students remain segregated in inferior schools. But it is not just minority groups that find themselves left out of the American quest for economic success; immigrants and multilingual speakers also find it difficult to be part of mainstream educational culture. Even as the U.S. tries to improve its educational system, the visages of our educational past recreate themselves in the school culture, teachers, and families of today's students as they struggle with attaining educational success, often at the

expense of their own goals and emotional well-being.

Variations in Educational Opportunities: Schools, Families, and Teachers

Schools are positioned as institutions where students of diverse ethnic, socioeconomic, and cultural backgrounds not only learn academic content but are also socialized into the values of U.S. society (see Mortimer & McLaughlin, this volume). School characteristics, such as the diversity of students, composition of teachers and staff, and overall culture within the school, influence the educational experiences of students. While schools often attempt to provide an equal academic experience for all students, the structure and organization of schools (e.g., course offerings and how students are placed in courses) can amplify inequalities among students and lead to unequal academic achievement (Lee and Bryk 1989) as well as personal and social development (Ryan and Deci 2000).

School Composition and Culture

Most students attend public elementary and secondary schools; the number of students in private independent and religious schools is about 10% of the total student population (NCES 2012). Approximately 1.5 million, or 2.9%, of the student population in grades kindergarten through 12 are homeschooled, the majority of whom are White and live in two-parent families. Home schooling has continued to increase, with parents reporting that they are choosing to home school because of moral issues and the quality of public education (NCES 2012).

Many families today, who once were restricted to attending the public school in their residential catchment area, can select the type of school their children attend. In addition to their traditional neighborhood public schools, some school districts offer residents (depending on certain regulations) options for enrolling their children

in schools of choice, including charters and magnets (and in a few districts allow private school enrollment with a voucher or some other type of waiver or transfer credit subsidy). Attendance in these types of schools, especially charters and magnets, is restricted by enrollment capacities, lottery practices, and/or admission criteria.

Charter schools—the most highly publicized choice option—were more recently created to provide a higher quality education to students in a particular school district while closing low-performing schools in that same district. Approximately 5% of public school students are in charter schools, most at the elementary level.¹ About a third of the charter school population serves students in areas where over 75% of the total school population is eligible for free and reduced lunch (NCES 2012). Charters were established as an alternative to regular schools, especially for urban low-income and minority youth. Even so, the research on its benefits is quite mixed, and in the aggregate, charter schools perform about the same as traditional public schools (Peltason and Raymond 2013). However, Booker et al. (2011) show that students who attended elementary charter schools were more likely to attend charter secondary schools, and those who attended charter secondary schools were more likely to attend college. One of the problems with charter school research has been the methodological difficulty with disentangling the effects of the schools from the unobservable characteristics of the parents and their children who attend them. Nonetheless, much like the earlier public and private school research of the 1980s (Bryk et al. 1993; Coleman and Hoffer 1987), the research documenting the effects of charters cannot be entirely dismissed, even recognizing problems of selection, location, and admission procedures (e.g., lotteries; see Toma and Zimmer 2011).

Many traditional public elementary and secondary urban schools remain racially and ethnically segregated, and these schools are also likely

to be populated by low-income students, despite years of forced bussing and attempts at desegregation (Orfield and Boger 2005). These segregated schools serve minority and low-income students in urban as well as some suburban and rural areas. Much like their predecessors—segregated schools of the 1960s—the segregated schools of today tend to have less qualified teachers, weaker academic climates, higher incidences of school violence, and fewer students expecting to attend and matriculating to postsecondary institutions (Braddock and Eitle 2003; Lee and Burkham 2002; Pachon and Federman 2005).²

Even school districts that were desegregated under court order have *de facto* re-segregated their student bodies by assigning Blacks to lower academic tracks (Mickelson 2001, 2006). Students entering these low-income and racially segregated schools are often given a less demanding curriculum, are more likely to have been retained in grade, and are placed in special education programs at a higher rate (Farkas 2003). It has been estimated that nearly half of all Black students and nearly 50% of Hispanic students attend high schools where the majority of ninth graders fail to receive a high school diploma (Balfanz and Legters 2004). Even with high educational ambitions, the social context of these institutions—including high teacher and student mobility, issues of safety, and neighborhood conditions—contributes to the development of maladaptive norms (Crosnoe 2005).

Income disparities are also associated with segregated schools including those in rural areas where the majority of students may be White, predominately immigrant, or racial and ethnic minorities. Issues of wealth disparity persist in the U.S. as Stiglitz (2012) shows; the rich are getting richer, and the gap between them and the middle- and lower-income is widening. Analyzing several different national longitudinal datasets over a 60 year period, Reardon (2011) finds that family income is becoming almost as power-

¹ Whites comprise the largest group of the charter student population (37%) followed by Blacks (30%), then Hispanics (26%), Asians (4%), and Alaskan Natives (1%) (See, NCES 2012).

² In several cities, urban re-development has displaced poor and minority students from public housing into suburban areas or in some rural areas (see Tate 2012).

ful a predictor of student academic performance as parent education has been.

Examining several longitudinal datasets, Altonji and Mansfield (2011) show that a child from a poor household is two to four times more likely than a child in an affluent one to attend elementary and secondary schools in which their classmates have low skills and behavioral problems. Stiglitz also finds that poor students who succeed academically are less likely to graduate from college than more wealthy students who do not do as well in school. Even for middle class families, racial segregation continues to persist with higher rates of poverty, crime, and less resources for middle class African American families compared to middle class White neighborhoods (Pattillo-McCoy 1999).

While the income story is compelling and cause for concern, racial and ethnic issues remain a source of academic, social, and psychological educational inequality (Borman and Dowling 2006; Harris 2006). Fryer and Levitt (2004, 2006), also using the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study, Kindergarten Cohort (ECLS-K), find that the Black-White achievement gap widens as children move through school. Black children with similar background characteristics to Whites enter kindergarten with higher reading scores than Whites, but this advantage progressively declines through the grades, with Black reading scores falling below those of Whites by third grade. Examining the achievement gap between Whites and Blacks, Hedges and Nowell (1999) find that while the gap has narrowed over the past 30 years, the rate at which it has been moving is decidedly slow. Hedges and Nowell estimate that for the Black-White achievement gap difference to disappear it would take about six decades in reading and slightly over a century in mathematics. With respect to Hispanics, Duncan and Magnuson (2011) find that while initial achievement gaps with Whites do not increase, by fifth grade Hispanics lag about a standard deviation behind their White counterparts. Compared to Whites and Blacks, Hispanics also continue to have higher dropout rates and lower degree completion rates (NCES 2012).

Part of the explanation for gaps in achievement has been traced to social and psychological factors (Weiner 1986).³ While a number of studies have been conducted with minority groups, some more recent research shows that many immigrants and English Language Learners (ELLs) feel disenfranchised and marginalized while in school. There has been a renewed emphasis on identity issues, especially among some first and second generation ELLs. Findings suggest that for some of these students their ethnic identity is often stronger than their national identity (Phinney et al. 2001). Some have argued that when students maintain close familial or ethnic ties schools may be perceived as an institution that threatens to minimize their ethnic identity. Compounding these issues of identity development, several studies have found that some Hispanic students report experiencing discriminatory treatment in school, leading some to believe that they were wrongly disciplined or discouraged from succeeding in school (Edwards and Romero 2008; Fisher et al. 2000). Experiences of discrimination can exacerbate stress and place additional emotional burdens on adolescents, which can negatively influence their academic motivation, grades, engagement, and outcomes such as dropping out of school (Alfaro et al. 2009; DeGarmo and Martinez 2006; Ream and Rumberger 2008).

Recognizing the importance of understanding the social and cultural contexts that influence adolescent cognitive and social development, several new studies underscore the distinctive challenges facing immigrants and ELLs in particular (Benner and Graham 2011; Callahan et al. 2010; Chao and Otsuki-Clutter 2011). Research on immigrant students is challenging because enrollment data do not accurately account for students who may be undocumented and/or who never enrolled in U.S. schools

³ There have been a number of new social-psychological interventions in education, suggesting that they can be tools that target important psychological processes in school complementing but not replacing traditional academic reforms. (For a review of some of these interventions and their limitations see Yeager and Walton 2011)

(Tienda and Haskins 2011). There are no formal counts on the number of ELLs who are undocumented, partially because U.S. schools are not required to ask this information and are prohibited from passing this information to immigration authorities. Given that these are students whose parents are likely to be foreign born or are foreign born themselves, one could reasonably suspect that a significant proportion of those designated as ELL are also undocumented students.

One of the few studies of undocumented secondary students was recently undertaken by Gonzales (2011). Conducting extensive interviews with 150 undocumented first generation young adult Latinos in Southern California, he finds that these students confront the issue of being unable to proceed along the conventional pattern of assimilation into mainstream U.S. life—most notably postsecondary education. Under the law, undocumented students have the legal right to schooling from pre-kindergarten to twelfth grade. Gonzales (2011) shows that at age 16, most of these students come to realize that critical life experiences related to their transition to adulthood, such as getting a job, obtaining a driver's license, and applying for college, are not open to them because of their legal status. The educational trajectories and life experiences of these students, who often lack strong ties with supportive adults who can help them navigate the complex educational system, are limited, and their options for a successful transition into adulthood are greatly reduced.

Schools can be places that encourage students to succeed and ease developmental transitions from kindergarten through post-secondary school. For many students, especially those who are minority and low-income, however, the school culture can undermine the students' sense of belonging, identity, and motivation to succeed. Some of the problems of schools are the consequence of racial and income segregation that has created self-contained entities where a negative culture reinforces itself through a clientele that has little opportunity for exiting the current system. Families and teachers are drawn into these cultures and often find themselves thwarted from

establishing an environment that is supportive and encouraging, where the academic, social and emotional interests of the students are a first priority (See Bryk and Schneider 2002 on this point).

Family Influences

Parents with different economic, social and educational resources tend to engage in different types of activities with their children and the school (see Milkie et al. this volume). The research on parent involvement in school, along traditional lines of volunteering, tends not to have a strong relationship with achievement. However, expectations and education-related activities in the home can be a major source of motivation for helping students succeed in school (Lee and Bowen 2006). By and large, it is how parents interact with their children and how that affirms school-related goals that help to promote academic performance and well-being.

Durham et al. (2007) demonstrate that the oral language development of kindergarten students is mediated by parental education, which later predicts children's future achievement and educational attainment. Students from lower income families with less developed language skills face multiple challenges in school (Brooks-Gunn & Markman 2005; Phillips 2011). These inequities in language development appear to be sustained and reinforced by parent actions. For example, Lareau's (2011) research found that parents from higher social classes created different language opportunities for their children than parents from lower social economic classes. When parents from middle-income families gave their children directions they were often accompanied by an explanation or rationale. Lareau argues that as a result, these middle-income students were better able to ask questions, make presentations or summarize at a more proficient level compared to students from low-income families.

Lareau (1987, 2000) further asserts that middle-class parents are better able to participate in their children's education in ways that schools value, due to their own educational background

and economic resources. In contrast, working-class parents often felt separated from their children's schooling, believing that teachers are largely responsible for the children's education, which results in them being less involved than higher-class parents. This classed pattern of parental involvement is also reflected in teachers' assessments of parental involvement and typically follows racial and class lines. Bodovski and Farkas (2008) tested Lareau's theory of concerted cultivation—the role parents play by organizing activities that foster the cognitive and social development of their children—as a mediator of the positive effect of parental SES on children's school achievement. Similar to Lareau, they found that parental education and income was positively and strongly associated with concerted cultivation. In addition, they found that concerted cultivation is positively associated with both student achievement and teacher-reported language and literacy skills.

Similar social class differences in the ways that parents interact with their children's schools have been found in other empirical studies. Examining the social interactions between both low income and middle class parents and their children's teachers, McGhee Hassrick and Schneider (2009) find that middle class parents often supervise and monitor their children's teachers to ensure that their academic needs are met. Lower class parents, on the other hand, tend to give considerable discretionary power to the teachers to act in the best interests of their children. This individualistic orientation of the middle-class can also be seen among immigrant parents (Kim and Schneider 2005) and parents in some private schools (Morgan and Sorenson 1999) who seek information and resources outside of their immediate embedded social networks for the advancement of their children.

These types of actions on the part of middle class parents are understandable, but they are in contrast to the more collective humanistic liberal orientation that some have suggested is needed in a democratic society (Labaree 1997). Rather, these middle class parents are quite instrumental in securing resources and opportunities for their

own children (Lareau 2011). The individualistic actions of middle-class parents are likely to intensify as the economic gap increases, resources become scarcer, and the opportunity pathways into more elite schools ranging from preschool through college become more competitive (see Alon 2010 on this point).

Student and Teacher Interactions

How teachers interact with their students has been shown to be significantly related to students' social functioning, behavior problems, engagement in learning, and academic achievement.⁴ Teachers who are emotionally and socially competent can provide an environment that promotes motivation, reduces conflict, encourages cooperation, and fosters respectful and positive communication (Jennings and Greenberg 2009). The research on student-teacher interactions is extensive. We limit our focus to two key roles teachers can play in encouraging student engagement (see Christenson et al. 2012) and reducing stereotypic threat (Appel and Kronberger 2012). Both of these teacher functions have been proven to be supportive of learning, especially for low income and minority students.

It is clearly understood that teachers can strongly influence how students engage in learning. Research has found that low interest, low skills and lack of challenging subject matter content all contribute to lower engagement and overall attachment to school (Wang and Eccles 2012). These feelings can be mediated by the nature of instruction which has been shown to influence motivation and engagement by enhancing classroom opportunities for undertaking interesting and relevant learning tasks (Deci and Ryan 2002). Positive instruction can also increase students' sense of identity, performance, and commitment to future goals (Eccles 2009). But instruction cannot account for all differences in student engagement. Engagement is also af-

⁴ For a recent review of the importance of teacher interactions with their students and their effects on engagement and achievement see Roorda et al. (2011).

affected by individual characteristics including gender, race/ethnicity, and socioeconomic status (Finn and Cox 1992; Lee and Smith 1995); recognizing individual differences and predilections to learning, one important task for teachers is to modify the classroom environment to one that is academically challenging so authentic learning experiences can occur for all students (DiBianca 2000; Newmann 1992; Shernoff 2001; Shernoff et al. 2003; Skinner and Belmont 1993). This is particularly important for helping students at risk of school failure and for whom familial, community and school resources may inhibit interest in education and development of academic skills (Finn and Zimmer 2012).

Teacher expectations—that is, holding high educational expectations for all students—are a fundamental component of student engagement (Brophy and Good 1970).⁵ Despite the research indicating that high teacher expectations are critical for academic success, teacher expectations have been shown to be related to the differential treatment of students and student outcomes (Hattie 2009). Teacher expectations appear to be more negatively perceived by Black and Hispanic students, who are also more likely than Whites to report that their teachers do not listen to what they have to say and that they feel discriminated against in school and in other settings (Van Houtte 2010). Dweck (2006) argues that teachers who believe that intelligence is malleable are more likely to employ pedagogical skills that promote a “growth-mindset;” that is, they encourage students to take on challenges, work hard, confront their academic weaknesses and work on them. In classes where teachers praise students for their efforts, the students are more likely to recognize that attempts at learning are sometimes unsuccessful and be more amenable to working hard to achieve them. In contrast, teachers with a more “fixed mindset” are more likely to praise students’ intelligence, creating a false confidence and resistance to tackling new problems and ideas.

⁵ The Brophy and Good article is a classic in the teacher expectation literature, the first to show that teachers’ different expectations for students correspond to students’ behaviors.

Student engagement in learning is also affected by emotional and social developmental factors, which if problematic can be mediated by teachers being more responsive to student behaviors and cues (Pianta et al. 2012). These social and emotional developmental factors can have a strong influence on how teachers interact with their students and structure the learning environment.⁶ Beginning with preschool and primary grades, Morgan et al. (2012) found that young children with poor reading skills often had felt anger, anxiety, sadness, and social isolation—which influences their self-efficacy and self-esteem towards learning. Teachers can offer emotional support and improved classroom organization, which may help mediate such subjective states. These same types of teacher supports can also be applied through middle school into high school, showing positive effects on learning (Allen et al. 2011; Luckner and Pianta 2011). By adolescence, different emotional issues surface, such as increasing feelings of stress, self-consciousness, and loneliness in school, while feelings of belonging to school decline as students age. There is also a general decreased interest in school and an increase in extrinsic motivation—such as working for grades, tests, and attending college, and, not surprisingly, an increase in test anxiety (Eccles and Roeser 2010, 2011). Research indicates that how teachers address these feelings affects adolescents’ motivation and persistence well on to postsecondary school (Eccles 2004).

The social and emotional needs of low-income and minority students are often overlooked. Harris (2011) finds that by the time low-income and minority students are in high school, they are burdened by the cumulative effects of socioeconomic and health disadvantages, which may have inhibited the development of academic skills and resulted in a widening achievement gap and low-

⁶ Recently a number of school-based social and emotional learning programs have been implemented in kindergarten through 12th grade. The impetus for many of these programs is that such interventions can contribute to the healthy development of children. A meta-analysis of 213 such programs reveals that they significantly improve students’ skills, attitudes, and behaviors (see Durlak et al. 2011).

ering of teacher expectations. Students who are exposed to negative expectations may experience stereotype threat, which refers to anxiety that results from the risk of confirming a negative stereotype about one's identity (Steele and Aronson 1995). Steele and Aronson (1995) argue that students who are constantly exposed to negative perceptions about their ability or behavior underperform. Several studies have found that stereotype threat also operates among gender and other ethnic groups (Gonzales et al. 2002; Spencer et al. 1999; Wei 2012).⁷

Teachers' abilities to motivate and engage students and their awareness of the potential for stereotypic perceptions depend in part on their own confidence in what they are doing. Confidence may be especially low in high risk schools, thereby compounding the challenges students face. For example, research shows that teachers' sense of efficacy is lower in schools that enroll large proportions of poor and minority children (Juvonen 2007). Teachers' abilities to compensate for students' economic, social and achievement disadvantages is limited despite an overriding perception by the general public that schools can reduce inequality in achievement. This perception places the teachers of low-performing students, especially those in disadvantaged school communities, in a particularly vulnerable position as the obstacles to improving achievement are complexly profound if not insurmountable.

Using data from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study of 1998–1999, Downey et al. (2008) argue that achievement-based evaluation is biased against schools that serve predominately disadvantaged students. They conclude that teachers and administrators in such institutions are likely to become frustrated, reduce their effort, and seek

other jobs.⁸ Research on low-performing schools indeed shows that teachers in such environments are dissatisfied with their jobs and that attrition in these types of schools is high (Clodfelter et al. 2009). However, it is not clear whether this is because of mandated teacher evaluations or due to demands to increase the performance of students who start school with low test scores and/or reside in households and neighborhoods with limited social and economic resources—all of which are likely to influence their achievement gains.

This pressure on disadvantaged schools is exacerbated by the difficulty in attracting and retaining highly effective teachers in classrooms where they are often needed the most. Instead, less qualified and more inexperienced teachers are more likely to be found in low-performing schools (Boyd et al. 2005; Lankford et al. 2002). What is needed in these low-income and high-minority schools is to hire and retain teachers who hold high expectations for their students and engage them in learning activities that increase their achievement and well-being.

Peer Groups and Social Identity

Research on the influence of peers can be traced to Coleman's (1961) classic book, *Adolescent Society*. Coleman demonstrates that the academic performance of students was associated with norms and status conferred on particular cliques identified as the "leading crowd." Today, with high schools much larger in size and more diverse in their student populations, the ability to identify a leading crowd—a group to emulate, and hold in high esteem—is more complicated.

The National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (ADD Health) data, a rich comprehensive longitudinal study of middle and high school students with extensive social network

⁷ The literature on stereotypic gender effects continues to grow in part as a response to the relatively small number of women in certain fields such as physics and engineering. More recently, scholars have focused on how schools are disadvantaging males (DiPrete and Buchmann 2013). It is clear that the belief structures of teachers, peer groups, and others affect students' self-efficacy. With the current reversal of attention to male performance, it is critical that we recognize that stereotypic behaviors can work on all people and are likely to be context specific.

⁸ They argue for an impact analysis rather than merely measuring test score performance from one year to the next. Their definition of an impact analysis is measuring the rate at which students learn in school and the rate at which they would learn if they were never enrolled in school by subtracting the students' summer learning rate from the students' school-year learning rate.

information, have allowed researchers to look at individual experiences within their peer networks and link them to the larger school peer group cultures. One of the most important peer group studies using the ADD Health data shows that the classes students take have the strongest influences on students' identity formation, short- and long-term goals and aspirations, course selections, and participation in extracurricular activities through the relationships students form within their classes and their local peer social positions (Frank et al. 2008). These local positions account for nearly half of females' course-taking behaviors in mathematics and 35% of those for males. Such local positions also have sustaining effects; being a member of a group of students who take college preparatory-level mathematics courses early in high school increases the likelihood that students will take more college preparatory-level courses through their high school careers. This trend is particularly robust for females scoring below the group mean in their first mathematics courses; females taking lower level classes tend to persist in such classes.

The Frank et al. study (2008) and subsequent work of this team (Crosnoe et al. 2008; Riegle-Crumb et al. 2006), all of which used high school course transcript data, show that school structural conditions—that is, the courses students take—constitute a peer social context which affects motivation, engagement, and performance. They demonstrate that peer group structures are influenced not just by individual predilections but by the characteristics of the social context one inhabits. In other words, peer groups do not spring up serendipitously but rather are to some extent products of institutional structures. This suggests that schools could take a more aggressive role in changing the local positions of students through course assignments which may alter friendships and also improve academic achievement and other possible outcomes.

Other research examines the development of racial identity and its influence on the social, psychological, and academic experiences of students, particularly why Blacks are less likely to succeed than Whites in school (see Harris 2011

for a discussion of these). One theory that has had considerable influence was developed by John Ogbu (1978), a cultural anthropologist, who posited that because Black students are likely to be part of an involuntary minority population in the U.S., they have developed attitudes that are oppositional to schooling. Black youth who show an interest in school are sanctioned by their Black peers and labeled as acting "White." This idea of acting White has been supported by some academics as a component of social identity theory, relating low student school engagement to other low engagement behaviors found among some working-class students (Kelly 2008). While Ogbu's ideas may have found some traction in the 1980s and 1990s, today they are largely held in disrepute (Ainsworth-Darnell and Downey 1998; Cook and Ludwig 1998; Harris and Robinson 2007; Lee 1994).

The most convincing and comprehensive challenge to Ogbu has been recently undertaken by Harris (2011) in his book, *Kids Don't Want to Fail*. Analyzing several national and international longitudinal data sets, he finds that: (1) Black parents, despite experiencing more discrimination than their White counterparts, believe in the value of education, make investments in it, and these actions are positively related to their children's academic orientation; (2) Black youth, even though recognizing the barriers they are likely to encounter, attribute greater value to education than Whites, and this is the case for both genders; (3) Blacks who score either the same or greater on preschool measures than Whites are more likely to be academically engaged and more likely to aspire to postsecondary school; and (4) Black youth do not experience greater social costs for their achievement than Whites, and feel no connection to other Blacks who are less academically invested in school.

In combination with the works of others (Akom 2003; Carter 2005; Horvat and Lewis 2003; O'Connor 1999; Tyson et al. 2005), Harris' results show that despite perceiving more racial barriers than Whites, Blacks believe in the achievement ideology. The problem with Ogbu's theory, as Harris (2011) explains, is that it has been popularized in the media, and more impor-

tantly, supported by teachers. For example, analyzing a national dataset, Lucas (2008) finds that teachers are more likely to believe that Blacks prefer failure to upward mobility and lack the initiative to “pull themselves out of poverty.” Similar results are found by Downey and Pribesh’s (2004) analysis of a national longitudinal study of adolescents in secondary schools and by Diamond et al. (2004) in an ethnographic study of elementary schools.

Harris concludes his book by recommending that educators shift their focus from the culture of academic resistance as an explanation for the Black-White achievement gap and instead turn to providing some type of intervention before children enter school. Research shows that half of the Black-White gap in school resources can be attributed to their socioeconomic characteristics (Duncan and Magnuson 2005). Black children are more likely, relative to Whites, to live in single family households, have fewer economic resources, reside in poor communities with limited social services, have parents with lower levels of education, and have fewer educational resources in the home, all of which provide children with fewer opportunities to learn (Duncan and Brooks-Gunn 1997; Massey and Denton 1993; Tate 2012; Wilson 1996). Further support regarding the importance of early educational interventions can be found in a study conducted by Magnuson et al. (2007), which analyzed the national ECLS-K. Results show that prekindergarten attendance rates among disadvantaged students are associated with larger and longer positive academic gains in first grade. Moreover, if classes were held in a public school there were no adverse effects on performance or behavioral problems.

Bullying and School Safety

Two major factors related to the social climate of school life that have garnered considerable attention in the media and research community are bullying and feeling unsafe at school. Researchers have shown that students reporting incidences of bullying and other forms of vic-

timization (such as being attacked physically or having something stolen) are more likely to show decreases in levels of psychological adjustment, school engagement, and academic achievement (Graham and Bellmore 2007). Rates of bullying are higher in schools with large student populations and high proportions of students in low-income households (Gregory et al. 2010). One of the policy responses to school safety has been Zero Tolerance, low-threshold suspensions, and in some instances remanding cases to the civil courts (Arum et al. 2003). Research on Zero Tolerance-type policies has shown higher rates of suspension, especially among minorities and low-income students, rather than more positive behavioral outcomes. If Zero Tolerance policies are not working, this raises serious questions about what actions can be taken to improve the school climate. Recently, the American Psychological Association’s (APA) Zero Tolerance Task Force (2008) recommended general school climate interventions that create closer connections between students and their teachers, increase ties among the schools, families, and communities, and take more positive steps for working with students with behavioral problems.

The APA’s recommendations align with work by Espelage and Swearer (2004, 2010) that underscores the importance of studying bullying from a social-ecological framework. What seems to matter most are cohesive interpersonal relationships among students and teachers, families, and community members. As in the case of academic performance, high teacher expectations for all students, encouraging a seriousness regarding behavioral performance, and an emphasis on feeling a sense of belonging to the school community are all related to reductions in bullying (Pepler et al. 2008; Richard et al. 2012). The importance here is the interactions between the teacher and the students, and the students with each other. Peer group characteristics also appear to play a part, with students who have more positive, higher-quality relationships with friends reporting less victimization than students with high social status friends and lower-quality relationships. High achieving students in predominantly low achieving high schools also ap-

pear to be more at risk of bullying than those in higher-achieving schools (Richard et al. 2012). What these findings seem to suggest is that institutionalized structural conditions that heighten the importance of achievement when coupled with positive relationships not only influence academic outcomes (as Frank et al. (2008) show) but social behaviors as well.

Another issue that schools have been increasingly concerned with is assuring the safety and well-being of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) youth. Studies show that LGBT youth are at higher risk of mental and physical health issues than heterosexual-identified youth, including harassment and bullying, suicidal ideation, and substance misuse (King et al. 2008; Schrock et al. this volume). Males in certain types of schools, including those in rural areas, seem especially at risk of exposure to victimization. Secondary schools in particular are working to provide more inclusionary policies, educating staff on sexual diversity issues and creating safer environments for all students.

Extracurricular Participation and the Importance of Summer

Extracurricular programs (including sports, art, and band) have all found themselves to be part of public school district budget cuts, with many districts adopting either pay-to-play policies or relying on community subsidies through volunteer giving to keep their programs alive. The elimination of these programs is problematic, as Eccles and Roeser (2011) discuss in their review on schools as developmental contexts of adolescence. Extracurricular programs: (1) provide opportunities to do good things with one's time instead of engaging in risky behaviors; (2) offer opportunities to learn positive social skills, pro-social values and attitudes; (3) encourage the formation of friendships and other social networks; and (4) increase school performance, school attachment and engagement, and educational aspirations (also see Eccles et al. 2003). There also is some evidence that participation in service learning in schools is linked to higher participation in the political process, volunteer activities,

and better physical and mental health (NRC/IOM 2004).

While many scholars debate the effectiveness of schools in addressing inequality between students, the work of Baltimore's Beginning School Study suggests that schools are having a compensatory effect for low-income and minority students. While it is largely accepted that these students enter school academically and socially behind their higher-income White peers (Lee and Burkham 2002), Alexander et al. (2001, 2007) explore the role that summers play in mediating the achievement of low-income and minority students. They find that although achievement for both low- and high-SES students is comparable during the school year, significant gaps emerge during the summer from which low-SES students never fully recover. In fact, Alexander et al. (2001) suggest that the achievement gap observed between White and Black students may be substantially accounted for by the cumulative effect of the summer learning loss. They suggest that the most powerful response to the achievement gap is targeted, high quality summer programming for low-SES students.

Consistent in the literature is the importance of spending time either in extracurricular activities or in the summer on academic and other social skills. However, it is poor and minority students who are less likely to be able to access these opportunities. Summer programs, sports, arts, and music have unfortunately made their way to the cutting table. In California, some middle class parents are supplementing school budgets with donations to keep such programs in public schools from severe budget cuts. Recognizing the importance of these programs, it would seem that special efforts should be made to sustain these programs in locations where community resources are limited.

College for Everyone

The expansion of higher education during the 1950s and 1960s and the more recent increases in the numbers of community colleges has been, as Grubb and Lazerson (2005) state, "nothing short of astounding," with the most growth oc-

curing within the public sector. The postsecondary institutions of today have for the most part moved to “vocalized” institutions, which students attend for the purposes of obtaining a credential (Arum and Roksa 2011; Brint 2002). This transformation of liberal arts colleges to occupational degree institutions has been criticized on the grounds that most students can complete a degree by accumulating courses that are not necessarily connected to a meaningful educational experience, and that the experience itself is less rigorous and results in low levels of academic knowledge as measured by performance tests (Arum and Roksa 2011). While there is a consensus regarding the wage benefits of a college education (Goldin and Katz 2008), there is some concern regarding which individuals have access to certain types of institutions, as well as increased stratification among various types of colleges, such as 2-year college or proprietary schools.

Research on which groups are more likely to access postsecondary institutions shows that low-income and minority students are less likely than students from more advantaged families to attend postsecondary institutions. Although almost all ninth grade students, regardless of their SES, race or ethnicity expect to attend college, nearly a third of these students will never realize their ambitions. NCES reports that between 1975 and 2010, the immediate college going rates of high school completers from low-income families trailed those from high-income families by 30 percentage points (NCES 2012). Moreover, even among students in middle-income families, their immediate college enrollment rates were 15 percentage points lower than the rate of their peers in high-income families (NCES 2012). In contrast to the income differentials, racial and ethnic differences in enrollment between 2003 and 2010 remained consistent with the exception of Asians, who were higher than Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics. The well-known gender story continues to be one of rising female college-going rates in both 2- and 4-year colleges between 1975 and 2010. College may be everyone’s dream, but the dream remains unrealized for many students who lack economic and social resources.

Research shows that low-income and minority students and their parents disproportionately lack access to information regarding the college preparation process (Ellwood and Kane 2000; Schneider and Stevenson 1999). Limited access to information, especially information regarding financial aid, appears to partially explain college attendance trends for low-income and minority students (Roderick et al. 2011; Rosenbaum 2011). Analyzing the nationally representative sample of high school seniors in the Educational Longitudinal Survey of 2002, Engberg and Wolniak (2010) show that socioeconomic status is associated with college enrollment, taking into account whether a student chooses to attend a 2-or 4-year institution. While socioeconomic status was positively associated with attending college, students reporting concerns about college affordability were less likely to attend a 4-year college. Moreover, academic performance and having family and friends who encourage college enrollment are also related to college attendance, suggesting the importance of influential social networks (Cook, this volume). Several programs in high schools have been implemented to help students make the transition into college: assisting students in selecting colleges aligned with interests, deepening knowledge and skills in college preparatory courses, identifying opportunities for financial aid, and completing college admission forms including applications for housing and part-time employment (e.g., work/study).

The “college for everyone” slogan is becoming more of a reality than a mantra cited by counselors, who were once attacked for only giving the college message to middle-and high-income students. Teachers are now evaluated on their ability to increase the college-going rates of students in their schools, and parents across all income brackets perceive (as do their children) that job prospects without a postsecondary degree are limited. Two important changes have occurred in the last decade that have accompanied the college ambition dream and increased the pool of potential postsecondary applicants. First, between 1990 and 2010, high school dropout rates declined for Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics (Asian dropout

rates are the lowest). Based on the Current Population Survey, the dropout rate declined from 12% in 1990 to 7% in 2010 (NCES 2012). Second, the rate of on-time graduation with a regular diploma for public high schools in 2008–2009 (based on ninth graders 4 years earlier) was 75.5%, or just over 3 million students (NCES 2012).

Despite the high rates of graduation, not all of the 3 million will attend college, and even some of those who are accepted will fail to matriculate in the fall after graduating. Indeed, while most high school students express the intention to pursue a Bachelor's degree, students often do not have the ability to align their life expectations with educational and occupational ambitions. Many students have very high ambitions, yet fail to achieve them for many reasons including feelings of isolation or alienation, weak parental and teacher support, or misinformation throughout the transition from high school to postsecondary school or job placements (Schneider and Stevenson 1999). Several additional studies have shown that minority students or students from low-income families lack adequate preparation in academic subjects, which influences their ability to perform well on college admission tests, and that they do not have access to information on what high school courses, grades, and activities are required to be a competitive college applicant (McDonough 1997; Riegle-Crumb 2006; Riegle-Crumb and Grodsky 2010).

In addition to these barriers, the cost of college has risen dramatically. The number of slots at the best universities has remained somewhat constant while the number of college-eligible students has risen, creating increased competition at most 4-year schools. Two-year schools have become the answer for many lower-SES and lower-ability students, but low rates of successful transfer and multiple years spent in remedial education stymie these students' Bachelor degree ambitions. Many low-income, minority, and first generation college students who have the academic qualifications to attend a selective 4-year institution choose instead to attend a less-selective school, a 2-year school, and in some cases decide not to enroll. This phenomenon, known as "under-matching," is prevalent among those demographic groups (Roderick et al. 2011),

many of whom are also located in rural areas (Smith et al. 2012).

Under-matched students are less likely than their peers to complete their degree on time, and more likely to dropout (Bowen et al. 2009). These students face multiple threats to their successful navigation of the transition to postsecondary education, including practical matters such as the lack of information about college options and the need to work while in school, as well as psychosocial barriers including the fear of failure, resistance to leaving home, and lower academic self-esteem (Pascarella and Terenzini 2005; Saenz et al. 2007). Other obstacles include the lack of financial aid knowledge among these students (Terenzini et al. 1996), the complexity of the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) (Dynarski and Scott-Clayton 2006), and increasing college attrition, especially among low-income, minority, and first-generation students (Bowen et al. 2009).

Financial and social resources have become the ticket to success for many high-SES students, as they clamor for college preparation courses, buy tutors to excel in advanced-level courses, and build a high school resume of extracurricular activities that brings new meaning to being well-rounded (McDonough 1997, 2005). Here is perhaps where the individualized competitive actions of parents are the most obvious. The conversation of what to do about the college crisis focuses on debt defaults and sources of financial aid—but what about the number of slots and the opportunities that so many students are being denied? We pose this question not to diminish the importance of excellence and meritorious accomplishments and its rewards, but to highlight that without more attention to the social inequities in the K-12 school system, the U.S. will remain unable to draw upon a wider and deeper talent pool.

With Competing Goals, Can Schools Overcome Social Inequalities?

The competing goals of education have provided the foundation upon which decades of reforms have attempted to build. Investing in education leads to increases in the knowledge and skill

development of students, thereby improving their human capital. At the same time, schools are tasked with providing an equal educational opportunity to a student population which is growing in size and diversity with regard to background characteristics such as race/ethnicity, native language and SES, as well as ability. Schools are charged with educating an increasingly diverse group of students and being held to increasingly rigorous and uniform standards of educational performance.

Public schools, funded by local tax dollars, vary in quality according to the income base of their neighborhoods. Neighborhood income and mobility dynamics therefore have a great influence on the characteristics of the student populations in these schools. Indeed, income segregation by neighborhood has increased dramatically since 1970, primarily due to the isolation of affluent households (Reardon and Bischoff 2010). At the same time, racial segregation has increased since the 1980s (Orfield and Boger 2005). This income and racial segregation means that low-income neighborhood schools are concentrated with poor and minority students. These students are more likely than their higher-income peers to have weaker academic and attention skills and more problematic behaviors (Duncan and Magnuson 2011).

The experiences of low-income students in schools today are characterized by lower expectations, less information, and fewer opportunities for advancement. Most of these can be directly tied to resources—the resources of parents who are making investments that most families will be unable to rival. If income disparity continues to grow at this rate, the educational divide is also only likely to widen. Efforts are underway to shift reform back to individuals, but it is hard to imagine that parents in poverty-stricken neighborhoods with vastly constrained resources and few options will be able to change their local schools or move to a better environment for their children. That our nation needs better-prepared citizens has been shown by economists, but it is not clear whether that responsibility for making the investments required to improve the nation's human capital should remain largely with individual families—where the playing field is not only uneven, but some groups are not even given entrance into the league.

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The Social Psychology of Inequality at Work: Individual, Group, and Organizational Dimensions

18

Nancy DiTomaso and Rochelle Parks-Yancy

The Social Psychology of Inequality at Work: Individual, Group, and Organizational Processes and Outcomes

Because work and employment are so important to the identity, well-being, and life outcomes for people around the world, there is a broad and persistent research literature on many aspects of the social psychology of work. Most of this literature, however, is not from a critical perspective, but rather explores how the characteristics of work and working affect worker attitudes and behavior, work performance, and the relationships between workers and the companies for which they work. Even so, one could summarize the primary findings from this literature as indicating that those in more favorable work situations (access to employment and challenging work, higher incomes and rewards, and higher status) have more positive psychological attitudes and outlooks and better mental and physical health. The opposite, of course, is also evident. Those with less favorable work situations (unemployment or intermittent employment, more routine,

mindless and unpleasant work, lower incomes and rewards, and lower status) have less positive psychological attitudes and outcomes and worse mental and physical health.

The importance of work to self-identity and well-being affects attitudes, values, and cultural norms, as well as access to power and resources. Most research on the social psychology of work has examined in great detail workers' attitudes and responses to working conditions, the rewards of working, the relationships among people in the workplace, and the psychological engagement of workers with the work that they do and the organizations in which they work. Most of this literature has tried to identify the conditions and the nature of the relationships that will most improve and predict positive psychological responses to work, but a critical analysis of this literature raises questions about whether the nature of the economic system and the role of workers within it may preclude healthy responses to work and working (Schwalbe 1986). We begin this chapter with a look at the research on structural and psychological inequality among workers, and we give attention to the extra challenges that exist for workers who earn lower incomes, have less predictable access to employment, and are less valued by employers and the society at large. Later in the chapter, we specifically consider the issue of alienation, which has been the concept most widely used to discuss the negative aspects of the social psychology of work, especially for low income workers. We also review some of the key themes in the literature on worker attitudes,

N. DiTomaso (✉)

Rutgers Business School—Newark and New Brunswick,
143 South Martine Avenue, Fanwood, NJ 07023, USA
e-mail: ditomaso@business.rutgers.edu

R. Parks-Yancy

Jesse H. Jones School of Business, Texas Southern Uni-
versity, Houston, TX, USA

especially job satisfaction and organizational commitment, and endeavor to show the consistency between this literature and the earlier literature on alienation and the links to inequality. Finally, we discuss underemployment and unemployment and their effects on workers. This chapter provides a critical lens with which to understand the literature on inequality among workers and the effects of inequality on psychological outcomes and well-being.

Inequality, Unemployment and the Special Challenges of Low Wage and Marginal Workers

Given that those in more favorable economic circumstances have more favorable attitudes and outlooks, a fundamental research question in this field has been to determine whether the reasons for inequality among workers have to do with worker characteristics or with the structure of opportunities that are available to them. We know that both influence life outcomes: workers come to the labor force with different levels of preparation and investment in their own human capital (i.e., education and experience), but they also differ in terms of the resources available to them to develop human capital and the opportunities to which they have had access so that they can develop it. Inequality can be maintained by both structural and psychological dynamics. The structural inequality that exists between groups, defined for example by race/ethnicity, gender, or class, contributes to differences in the development of human and cultural capital and in the adoption of values and psychological outlooks (Kohn 1976; Lamont 1999; Lareau 2003; Massey 2007). These then influence both the macro level of group inequality and the micro level of individual capacity to act and to gain rewards.

The Structure of Inequality Class inequality has not only persisted in the United States, but has grown in magnitude in the last several decades (Atkinson et al. 2011; McCall 2013; Saez 2013). In the most recent period, inequality has been driven by income differences as well

as by wealth, and has been affected by changes in institutions, technology, and public policy that have undermined worker protections and wages (Saez 2013). Racial/ethnic and gender inequality in the labor force are also still quite prevalent (Stainback and Tomaskovic-Devey 2012). Using data from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission from 1966–2005, Stainback and Tomaskovic-Devey (2009, 2012) found that, in the private sector, white males are still overrepresented in managerial roles and are more likely to manage men (of all races) than they are to manage women. The data also show that women (particularly white women) are more likely to manage other women, and racial minorities are likely to manage other racial minorities (Elliott and Smith 2004; Smith 2002).

Studies of authority and mobility within organizations (i.e., who gets access to good jobs with higher pay) have consistently found gender and racial/ethnic inequality across studies, time, and even country (Jacobs 1992; Kluegel 1978; McGuire and Reskin 1993; Reskin and Ross 1992; Smith 2002; Wright et al. 1995). Even when women and minorities hold positions of authority, they do so at lower levels of organizations. Furthermore, they receive lower returns for their positions than white men (Kluegel 1978; Reskin and Ross 1992). There is some evidence as well that women (and minorities) are given leadership positions that have a greater risk of failure. This phenomenon has been called the “glass cliff” (Ryan and Haslam 2007). The greater social resources available to whites and men contribute to their greater access to good jobs, to higher salaries, and to greater responsibility and authority in the workplace than is often available to non-whites and women (Brass 1985; Massey 2007; Smith 2005).

Although Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawed discrimination in employment and a series of presidential executive orders have mandated federal contractors to take positive, i.e., affirmative, action to reduce discrimination, such policies have not ended workplace inequality. Anti-discrimination legislation has been circumscribed by increasingly narrowed definitions of discrimination as intentional and exclusion-

ary actions against minorities or women, while affirmative action policies have typically had weak enforcement mechanisms. Such policies have also been controversial, especially when they have been used to expand opportunities for employment rather than being used only to expand the pool of applicants (Bergmann 1996; Crosby et al. 2006; DiTomaso et al. 2011; Kelly and Dobbin 1998; Reskin 1998; Skrentny 1996). Despite studies that have consistently found little evidence that whites have lost out on jobs because of affirmative action, whites continue to be strongly opposed to affirmative action policies because of fear that whites are disadvantaged because of them (DiTomaso 2013; Pierce 2012; Pincus 2003).

In the array of public policy issues that are intended to address inequality in the labor force, affirmative action tends to generate the greatest divide in the attitudes of whites and blacks (Kinder and Sanders 1996), and such policies have been a constant target of right wing groups that have endeavored to turn the country back from the liberal policies enacted during the 1960s. Holzer and Neumark (2000) carefully analyzed the effects of affirmative action in employment and found, in general, that such policies have increased the willingness of employers to consider, hire, and train minority and women candidates, without sacrificing performance. (See Walker, this volume, for a complementary analysis of the legitimacy of alternative affirmative action regimes.)

Individuals as part of groups have differential access to resources that enable the attainment of valued positions and the reproduction of advantage and opportunity. Whites and men frequently draw on their greater access to and career returns from social capital resources to gain access to good jobs and career advantages (Cook, this volume; DiTomaso 2013; Parks-Yancy et al. 2006; Royster 2003). Social contacts are often available from families, neighborhoods, and work colleagues. While whites generally downplay the importance of connections and inside advantages, such social resources are, in fact, important in their life outcomes. DiTomaso (2013) found, for example, that seventy percent of the time, social capital played a role in the jobs whites found

(whether by way of information, influence, or opportunity). Social capital is often used by groups to hoard opportunities for members of their own group, thereby creating barriers for others to gain access to desirable jobs (Tilly 1998; Waldinger 1997; Weber 1968). McDonald et al. (2009) similarly found that white men gained more job leads through routine conversations than did women or minorities. In contrast, while African-Americans and other minorities also endeavor to use social capital to help them obtain education or employment, they often have less access to social capital than do whites (Elliott 1999; Ibarra 1995; Parks-Yancy 2010; Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993)

The Social Psychology of Workplace Inequality

At the micro level, both status construction theory and social identity theory provide explanations for intergroup inequality. Status construction theory is really a macro-micro-macro theory that argues that the association of categorical differences with the distribution of resources creates status expectations and a power and influence hierarchy that contribute to those with higher status being thought of as more competent and worthy (Ridgeway 1991; Ridgeway et al. 1998; Ridgeway and Erickson 2000). The status hierarchy then becomes generally accepted within the society and can further contribute to differences in power and wealth accumulation and to enduring inequality (DiTomaso et al. 2007a; Tilly 1998). At the group level, whites and men have more influence and are more likely to be perceived as leaders (Hogg 2001; Rosette et al. 2008; Thye 2000). Not only are whites and men assumed by the society at large to be more competent than non-whites and women, but they also assess themselves as more competent and worthy. They are more self-confident, show more aggression than inhibition, and feel entitled to both rewards and acclaim (Fiske 2001; Keltner et al. 2003).

Inequality in intergroup relations is also explained by social identity theory, which has generally found that people act favorably toward members of their own group (the in-group) while withholding favor toward others (the out-group) (Brewer 1979; Brewer and Gardner 1996;

Callero, this volume; Tajfel 1981). Categorical distinctions between groups lead to a perception of us versus them and contribute to the automatic development of stereotypes and attributions that lead to both allocation and evaluation decisions about rewards (such as jobs, promotions and training opportunities, for example) that favor the in-group. These patterns have been found in “minimal group studies” even when no real groups exist, but instead have been given arbitrary labels (such as Group A and Group B). In such studies, there is no interaction among group members and no history or context to the group differences that are perceived. Yet stereotypes still emerge and differences in cognition, affect, and behavior toward the groups follow.

Such intergroup dynamics are even more likely when there are historical patterns of inequality between identifiable groups, such as for whites and men who are both dominant in status hierarchies. That is, the salience of categorical distinctions among groups are influenced even more so by the larger social structure and the relations of power, status, and numbers among groups (DiTomaso et al. 2007a). While there may be a tendency for each group to prefer people who are similar to their own members (Tajfel 1981), once a normative prototype emerges of a dominant group that is associated with competence and worth, then a general tendency emerges for all groups to give preference to the normative in-group and to think of their members as more competent and offer them the “benefit of the doubt” (DiTomaso et al. 2007b; Pettigrew 1979). Extensive empirical research has demonstrated the existence of unconscious or implicit bias that favors groups that are normatively dominant in the society (i.e., whites and men), because of the unconscious or implicit cognitive association of membership in a given social group with positive or negative evaluations (Banaji et al. 1993; Greenwald et al. 2009; Jost et al. 2009).

The advantages of whites and men in the workplace extend to a range of positive outcomes, including positive performance assessments and work-related rewards, such as promotions, salary increases, specialized training opportunities and access to important projects

(Tomaskovic-Devey and Skaggs 2002). Because whites and men are considered competent, and thereby as better performers, they tend to be compensated and rewarded more for their perceived value to the organization (Wright and Boswell 2002). Whites and men are favored in the performance evaluation process in their jobs, in part, because they are more likely to fit the subconscious prototype of competence held broadly in the society (Devos and Banaji 2005; DiTomaso et al. 2007b; Hogg 2001; Rosette et al. 2008). For the same reason, whites and men are often given the benefit of the doubt with regard to their competency and are more often than minorities or women hired on promise rather than performance (Pettigrew 1979).

When managers conduct performance evaluations, they have discretion with regard to the amount of pay increases awarded. Blacks and white women usually receive lower pay raises over time than white men, even when they perform similarly. This inequity is compounded by human resource managers who then approve these raises, thus providing an organizational seal of approval to pay disparities for comparable levels of performance (Castilla 2008). At the same time, when African-Americans and white women have negative performance evaluations, they are financially penalized more so than white men, even when white men also perform badly. Further, because women and non-white minorities are often tokens in managerial jobs, their job performance and behaviors at work are scrutinized to a higher degree than their white or male counterparts, and they are held to differential standards regarding work and even in the latitude with which they express their feelings (Bell and Nkomo 2001; Feagin and Sikes 1994; Harlow 2003; Wingfield 2010).

Cognitive biases that favor the normative in-group (i.e., whites and men) have substantial impact on decisions at the workplace. Bielby (2007, p. 61) includes among the personnel decisions that can be affected by unconscious biases: hiring, job assignment, promotion selections, performance assessment, and compensation. Such cognitive biases between one group and another are overlearned (in that they are generated and

reinforced from multiple sources), habitual, and automatic, as well as being unconscious (Bielby 2007). Similarly, Jost et al. (2009, pp. 47–48) review several specific research studies that show consequential behavioral effects from the existence of implicit bias, including decisions about who gets interviewed for a job; hiring decisions; use of verbal slurs, social exclusion, physical harm, greater occupational stress and higher turnover intentions; and decisions about budget cuts. Jost et al. (2009) also found effects of implicit bias in studies that simulated the shooting of black versus white suspects by the police, treatment recommendations by doctors for heart patients, voting preferences, reactivity to alcohol cues, thoughts of suicide, and even pedophilia (those convicted of pedophilia were found to have implicit associations between children and sex).

Low Status Groups and the Reproduction of Workplace Inequality System justification theory (Jost and Banaji 1994; Jost et al. 2004) argues that there is a strong incentive for lower status (and less powerful) groups to view higher status groups favorably and to support them rather than challenge the status quo (Hunt, this volume). Jost and Banaji argue that because it is costly for low status groups to challenge the system, they infrequently do so (Jackman 1994). In other words, low status groups often justify the system of inequality and come to believe that people get what they deserve. On this point, system justification theory is consistent with status construction theory regarding the acceptance by low status groups of the existing status hierarchy (Ridgeway 1991; Ridgeway and Nakagawa, this volume). Status hierarchies may also be reinforced by institutional arrangements and their effects on cognition. For example, research on social dominance orientation (SDO) finds that those in hierarchy enhancing positions (such as police officers) are likely to exhibit greater social dominance orientation than those in hierarchy attenuating positions (such as social workers) (Sidanius et al. 1994; Sidanius and Pratto 1999; Sidanius et al. 1996). The functioning of social dominance as a legitimating myth (from the

language of Sidanius and Pratto) contributes to reproducing inequality in the society as a whole and also at the workplace.

Thus, lower status or subordinate groups may not necessarily act with favor toward their own group members, but instead they may favor the “out-group” (i.e., high status groups). Therefore, although similarity-attraction theory claims that people find those who are like themselves to be more attractive and that people will be drawn to and will give preference to those who are most like themselves (Byrne 1971), Chatman and O’Reilly (2004) argued that access to power may trump homophilic tendencies. For example, they found that women in same gender work groups wanted to be in groups with some men, possibly because men were perceived as having more status and, therefore, access to power. Men, in contrast, were happy to stay in groups with mostly men. Tsui et al. (1992) also found that white men had higher turnover intentions when in groups that were not majority male. Women were less likely to want to leave a male dominated group than men wanted to leave a female dominated group. Similarly, DiTomaso et al. (1995) found that women in science and engineering preferred to be in groups that included at least some men, although they preferred majority female groups because they felt the group atmosphere more adverse in majority male groups. Nonwhite immigrants, however, preferred to be in groups that were majority white rather than in groups that were majority immigrant. The assumption, again, is that even lower status groups see benefits from being associated with higher status groups, both in terms of performance and in terms of morale.

Tajfel and Turner (1986) argued that those in low status positions are likely to choose different strategies to deal with their low status, depending on whether they consider status differences to be legitimate (at either the individual or the group level) and stable and whether they perceive the boundaries between groups to be permeable. Lower status group members may seek to associate with or become one of the higher status group members if they believe that the boundaries between groups are permeable and their individual status illegitimate (Ellemers 1990;

Ellemers 2001; Ellemers et al. 1997; Major et al. 1998; Sidanius 1993; Tajfel and Turner 1986). Lower status group members who do not believe that group boundaries are permeable may instead choose a social creativity strategy by highlighting aspects of themselves that shift the evaluative criteria to something on which they will be more favored, for example, athleticism or moral integrity (Kreiner et al. 2006; Lamont 1999; Major et al. 1998). If lower status group members believe that the status differences between groups are illegitimate and unstable, however, they may undertake a social competition strategy with regard to the dominant or normative group to try to change the distribution of resources or the rules of the game. With a series of collaborators, Ellemers et al. (1990, 1997; Ellemers 2001) has tested various aspects of the Tajfel and Turner (1986) framework regarding the actions of lower status group members, and has found consistent support for the conditions under which each strategy by low status groups might be pursued. Because jobs primarily define status within our society, competition between groups especially takes place in the competition for jobs, and therefore, it is a key element in the dynamics of workplace inequality.

Both at the workplace and in the society at large, there is a need to maintain the legitimacy of long-term inequality among groups. In the workplace, when people are evaluated for job performance or with regard to promotions and raises, the normative in-group may receive favoritism without derogation of the out-group, unless the out-group poses a competitive threat to redistribute resources away from the dominant group (Brewer 1998; DiTomaso et al. 2007b; Fiske et al. 2002). Thus, attitudes toward the normative in-group may be favorable and reinforcing, while those toward out-groups may be indifferent or ambivalent more than discriminatory (Fiske et al. 2002; Sachdev and Bourhis 1991).

Alienation

Perhaps the concept that has received the most attention with regard to the responses of lower status—especially working class—members of

society within the sociology of work is alienation (Schwalbe 1986; Seeman 1959), drawn both from Marxist theory about the response of workers to a capitalist system and from the longer philosophical traditions that influenced Marx and others. Most discussions define alienation in terms of loss or separation from some essential state for which humans are destined when conditions are favorable and unconstrained. Schwalbe (1986, p. 11, 13), however, defines it as failure rather than as separation, arguing that the capitalist labor process prevents workers from fully developing their capabilities. Research inspired by Marxist theory usually discusses alienation (or separation) of workers from the products of their labor, from fellow workers, from the process of production, and from themselves (species being).

Sociologists became especially interested in the concept of alienation as the use of automation in production grew in the post-World War II period. Some argued that automation reduced the skill level needed to produce goods and services (Edwards 1979; Glenn and Feldberg 1977; Wallace and Kalleberg 1982), and there was also fear that automated production would reduce the demand for blue collar workers in the labor force (Braverman 1974; Noble 1984). Toward the end of the 1950s, there were major policy concerns about the impact of automation on the level of employment, and associated with this growing concern, there were studies of the effects of changes in the nature of work processes on the well-being of workers. Through the social movements of the 1960s, attention was drawn as well to the concept of political alienation and disaffection with society. These concerns were coincident with a renewed interest in Marxist theory, sparked in part by new translations of Marx's early writings. During this period, the members of what came to be known as the Frankfurt school (e.g., Theodor Adorno, Erich Fromm, Jurgen Habermas, and Herbert Marcuse, among others) were also increasingly influential on American sociology, as was the development of "critical theory," which raised questions about new ways to think about human development.

Discussion of the concept of alienation in U.S. sociology often stalled on efforts to define the

dimensions or components of the concept. Melvin Seaman (1959, 1975, 1983), who wrote extensively about the meaning and significance of alienation, defined it in terms of several dimensions: powerlessness, meaninglessness, normlessness, self-estrangement, and social isolation (or cultural estrangement). He cautioned those who thought of alienation as a unitary concept, expecting that the various components of alienation would clump together. Instead, he talked about different types of alienation that might emerge in response to different types of circumstances and perhaps at different times in history.

Fischer (1976) is one of many who made an effort to clarify the meaning of alienation, which he argued has followed “false leads” in the derivation from the work of Marx. Fischer (1976, p. 43) said that to avoid such misdirection, researchers should instead pursue the ideas previously developed by Hegel and Feuerbach, and in doing so, he ultimately defined alienation as: “the state in which the actor fails to perceive a positive interdependence between himself and social relationships or other objectifications.” Fischer (1976, pp. 43–44) argued that this definition makes alienation empirically useful, unique from related concepts, consistent both with the philosophical roots of the concept and with the best of the empirical work done on alienation, and further, that one can derive meaningful hypotheses from this definition. Fischer (1976, pp. 44–46) also argued, that a philosophically grounded and proper conceptualization of alienation would include concepts such as powerlessness, social isolation, value isolation, political alienation, and work alienation, but not concepts such as normlessness and anomie.

In a challenge to the Marxist notion of alienation, Kohn and Schooler (1973, p. 116) noted in their extensive research on the impact of work on workers that occupational self-direction, which they defined as closeness of supervision, routinization, and substantive complexity in work:

...has the most potent and most widespread effects of all the occupational conditions we have examined. In terms of psychological effects, the central fact of occupational life today is not ownership of the means of production; nor is it status, income,

or interpersonal relationships. Instead, it is the opportunity to use initiative, thought, and independent judgment in one’s work—to direct one’s own occupational activities.

In a follow-up study of men in the U.S. civilian labor force, Kohn (1976) tested two hypotheses derived from his reading of Marx, namely, the impacts on alienation of control over the product of one’s labor versus control over the process of one’s labor. Kohn concluded that control over the product of labor did not have much effect on alienation, because there was little effect on alienation of being an owner versus a worker, nor of working in a profit-making versus a government or non-profit organization. Kohn (1976, p. 127) did find, however, that control over the process of work affected alienation, as he concluded: “Occupational experiences that limit workers’ opportunities to exercise self-direction in their work are conducive to feelings of powerlessness, to self-estrangement, and even to normlessness.”

Although from the philosophical tradition alienation could affect anyone, it has been most analyzed with regard to lower status workers, especially members of the working class. Marxist theory contains the assumption that the capitalist system, by its very structure, creates alienating conditions for members of the working class (defined by Marx as those who do not own the means of production and who are subjected to working situations where they lack self-direction). Yet Marxist theory also assumes that the working class will lead the movement for social change and transformation because of their reaction and resistance to the adverse conditions of work and the experience of exploitation. These dual assumptions seem to work against each other. If workers are structurally alienated by their roles within a capitalist system, it raises questions about how workers will overcome alienation and lead social transformation. While Marx argued that alienation is a form of “false consciousness” in which workers do not know their true interests because of their failure to recognize the power of their own labor and the creativity that they could develop, others have questioned the meaning of alienation for workers who seem relatively satisfied with their life situations and who

seem more oriented toward social mobility than social change, to put it in the Tajfel and Turner framework (1986). This controversy contributes to the unsettledness in the conceptualization and empirical analysis of alienation, as well as to the confused use of the term and the multiple ways in which it has often been discussed. Similar issues have emerged in the study of other concepts within the social psychology of work as well: can researchers take for granted what workers tell them about their level of contentment or satisfaction, or should they infer that there are adverse psychological effects to adverse physical conditions?

This contrast is addressed by Erikson (1986, p. 6), who argued in his 1985 American Sociological Association address:

There are those who argue that one ought to be able to determine when a person is alienated by taking a look at the objective conditions in which she works. The worker exposed to estranging conditions is alienated almost by definition, no matter what she says she thinks or even what she thinks she thinks.... That view, whatever else one might say about it, has the effect of closing off sociological investigation rather than the effect of inviting it. Alienation, in order to make empirical sense, has to reside somewhere in or around the persons who are said to experience it.

Erikson further argued that there is tension between those who want to define alienation structurally without regard to the meaning workers give to their own circumstances and those who want to define alienation using the results, for example, of survey methodologies in which, among other things, workers are queried about characteristics like job satisfaction.

Erikson (1986, p. 7) concluded that a meaningful concept of alienation needs to be both about work and the extra-work conditions of workers. As he noted:

We have to assume... that alienated work leaves some sort of mark on the persons affected by it... We also have to assume... that the persons so marked are not usually the ones best equipped to understand what has happened to them. Indeed, it is one of Marx's major contributions to our thinking that lack of insight into one's true condition is *itself* a consequence of alienation. [Italics in the original]

Schwalbe (1986, p. 3) endeavors to resolve this tension within Marxist theory by combining Marx with the work of George Herbert Mead to develop a "Marxian/Meadian theory of social structure and personality." Schwalbe (1986, p. 1, 26) argued that definitions of alienation as powerlessness, meaninglessness, normlessness, and so on, as Seeman and others suggested (Fischer 1976; Kohn 1976; Seeman 1959), constitute a conceptual "mess" and are "not theoretically relevant." Overall, Schwalbe (1986, pp. 14–15) rejected studies of alienation that focus primarily on the psychological attitudes or feelings of workers without incorporating an analysis of how the capitalist labor process affects the ability of workers to develop themselves, which he defined as the cognitive consequences of alienated labor. Schwalbe (1986, p. 26) explained his objection to the familiar studies of alienation as follows:

... alienated labor is an objective, publicly-observable phenomenon having to do with producers' lack of control over their labor. In mainstream American sociology, especially following publication of Melvin Seeman's influential article in 1959, 'alienation' has referred to a grab bag of unpleasant subjective feeling-states (powerlessness, normlessness, meaninglessness, and so on). Thus in contrast to the Marxist perspective, alienation in mainstream sociology is largely a psychological malaise experienced by maladjusted workers.

That is, Schwalbe (1986, p. 15) argued that the typical sociological studies of alienation "reduce alienation to having a bad attitude toward work."

Schwalbe (1986, p. 3) viewed his own analysis, instead, as providing a more in-depth description of the link between social structure and social psychology by including two components: drawing from Marx, he examined how capitalism gives rise to specific types of work experiences for different workers, and then drawing from Mead, he examined how those work experiences affect people psychologically. Schwalbe (1986, pp. 16–18) followed Marx in differentiating the "sphere of necessity," which is work that needs to be done to make the material life in any society possible, and the "sphere of freedom," which is work that is beyond necessity and enables workers to express their creativity and hu-

manity. Schwalbe further distinguished the state of “alienated labor” from what he calls “natural labor,” a condition that he believes is closer to the goal of the human condition. More specifically, Schwalbe (1986, p. 52) defined natural labor as: “... labor that expresses and satisfies an individual’s own impulses, that demands use of human capacities for imagining, role taking, and problem solving, that results in a creative advance of nature—a more satisfying and better life-sustaining relationship between humans and their environments.” In his explication of natural, as contrasted with alienated, labor, Schwalbe argued (1986, p. 52) that, “it would seem reasonable to suppose these experiences might have consequences for an individual’s worldview, cognitive development, psychological functioning, and feelings about work.”

Schwalbe further argued (1986, p. 159) that understanding how different experiences of work affect the capacities of workers to respond in creative and life-sustaining ways leads to the goal of abolishing labor within the sphere of necessity. In his analysis, Schwalbe (1986, p. 60) endeavored to show that neither class position nor occupation directly affect psychological responses, but rather that they set the conditions for the types of activities or experiences in which workers can engage, and then those activities or experiences contribute to psychological responses and affective feeling states. To investigate these activities or experiences requires, according to Schwalbe (1986, pp. 60–61), an understanding both of what people actually do at work and the meanings that they attach to their work activities, and these cannot be inferred from efforts to relate various objective conditions of work with survey responses about worker attitudes. Thus, in contrast to the research of Seeman, Kohn, and others, Schwalbe believes that it is necessary to study the actual experiences of workers on the job, rather than abstracting such experiences, for example, in the use of survey methodologies that do not allow for more textured understandings of workplace conditions and the responses of workers to them. Schwalbe further argued (1986, pp. 158–59) that the task of social science is to help workers understand “an optimal form of labor to strive for,”

and in doing so, to contribute to the transformation of both work and workers, so that there is a reduction or sharing of work within the sphere of necessity and an increase in work within the sphere of freedom, as well as in the capacity of workers to engage in “aesthetic experience.” Schwalbe (1986, pp. 168–71) cautioned, however, that there must also be a moral dimension to the collective goals that enable workers to experience natural, rather than alienated, labor. Unless work activities are deemed to contribute to the “creative advance of nature,” i.e., to improving the life conditions for all workers, then in his view, the goals of transformation cannot be said to have been achieved.

Worker Responses to Working Conditions or Lack of Work

Given concern with alienation, disaffection, and the assumption that the dehumanizing effects of the capitalist work system will lead to damaged souls, there has been a great deal of attention within the study of work and workers toward determining what factors most contribute to positive responses from workers, and because of that, to productive outcomes for the companies for which they work. The research on worker attitudes is voluminous and constitutes the bulk of the research on the social psychology of work. In much of this research, there is the same kind of tension that exists in the studies of alienation, namely, that the responses that workers give to surveys do not always seem consistent with what is expected, given the circumstances in which they work. We see that tension in the research on life satisfaction and happiness, job satisfaction, and organizational commitment reviewed in this section. We also address some of the research that finds negative consequences and responses from workers, including self-destructive behavior or negative health outcomes. Of necessity, we can review only a small portion of the relevant research on these issues; our focus is primarily on the most recent research.

Despite the obvious link to concern with alienation and disaffection of workers when working

conditions are not meaningful or rewarding, this stream of research does not, for the most part, take a critical perspective. Instead, much of it is motivated by the explicit interest in finding the factors that contribute to worker productivity and performance, taking the perspective of the employer or the organization more than that of the worker. The fact that this research is so voluminous seems to be a testament to the overwhelming interest in such questions and to the ready availability of employers and workers who are willing to cooperate to help answer such concerns.

Life Satisfaction and Happiness The assumption that both working conditions and personal well-being will affect how workers respond is borne out by relatively new research on life satisfaction and happiness. This research has been primarily undertaken by economists who have examined the relationship between various measures of life satisfaction or happiness with economic trends, such as income or employment patterns. Blanchflower and Oswald have together done a series of studies (2005, 2008, 2009, 2011) that measure happiness and well-being across time and country. In a summary of findings across a number of studies, they find (Blanchflower and Oswald 2011, p. 19):

Currently, a number of patterns... have been replicated persuasively in the data of large numbers of nations. Happy people are disproportionately the young and old (not the middle-aged), rich, educated, married, employed, healthy, exercisers with diets rich in fruit and vegetables, and slim. Happy countries are disproportionately rich, educated, democratic, trusting, and low-unemployment.

Blanchflower and Oswald further find (2011, p. 16) “a powerful link between job insecurity and low well-being.” These findings are consistent with research done across countries (Deaton 2008). Despite these consistent findings across studies, there are also inconsistencies that have not been fully explained. For example, Blanchflower and Oswald, among many others (Clark et al. 2008; Di Tella and MacCulloch 2006; Schnittker 2008), have tried to explain what is called the Easterlin paradox after early work on the nature of happiness and economic well-being

(1974, 1995, 2001, 2005) found that despite a positive correlation between income and happiness at the individual level, measures of happiness do not increase when incomes rise at the national level. Most explanations for the Easterlin paradox conclude that it is relative income that leads to greater happiness more than absolute income (Clark et al. 2008). But, research has found that people would rather live in rich than poor neighborhoods, even if they would be relatively better off if they lived among people who were poorer than they are (Firebaugh and Schroeder 2009). Other research on happiness and income at the macro level has found that aggregate happiness increases when the economy is doing well and declines during times of recessions (Di Tella et al. 2003). Further research has also found that people are happier when inflation and unemployment are low (Di Tella et al. 2001).

It is not only economic factors, of course, that affect happiness and life satisfaction. Diener and Seligman (2004, p. 1) argue that in relatively wealthy societies that social relationships and enjoyment at work are more important than economic factors:

Desirable outcomes, even economic ones, are often caused by well-being rather than the other way around. People high in well-being later earn higher incomes and perform better at work than people who report low well-being. Happy workers are better organizational citizens, meaning that they help other people at work in various ways. Furthermore, people high in well-being seem to have better social relationships than people low in well-being. For example, they are more likely to get married, stay married, and have rewarding marriages. Finally, well-being is related to health and longevity, although pathways linking these variables are far from fully understood. Thus, well-being not only is valuable because it feels good, but also is valuable because it has beneficial consequences.

Others have also found that marriage is an important indicator of happiness, and that trends in marriage help explain why happiness has not increased even when incomes have increased (Schnittker 2008).

Job Satisfaction In addition to research on life satisfaction, there has been even more exten-

sive research on job satisfaction, with the findings suggesting that the two usually go together. Despite many critical analyses that point to the dehumanizing aspects of work, to the way that work may interfere with meaningful relationships and healthy families, and to concerns about deskilling and the growing precarity of working, most research on job satisfaction has found that workers tend to say they are satisfied (Bartel 1981; Gruenberg 1980; Petty et al. 1984). Some have argued that this is a concept, like alienation, where the claims of injury or hurt should be evident in what workers themselves think, while others contend that workers are simply trying to put on a good front in otherwise difficult situations, and that they are not really as satisfied as they claim to be. But, like the general research on life satisfaction and happiness, job satisfaction seems to be linked to favorable work situations.

Although there has been a growing interest in how personality or dispositional characteristics may affect work attitudes, including job satisfaction (Dormann and Zapf 2001; Heller et al. 2002; Staw and Cohen-Charash 2005; Williamson et al. 2005), most of the research on job satisfaction has examined work characteristics, relationships among workers and their supervisors, and rewards like income or benefits as the main factors contributing to job satisfaction. For example, Bender, et al. (2005, p. 486) summarize the main findings with regard to job satisfaction as follows:

Job satisfaction increases with earnings and decreases with hours. Job satisfaction is lower for the more highly educated and for those working in larger firms. Those with health insurance and those with a pension report higher job satisfaction. There is a suggestion that tenure and age tend to follow a U-shaped pattern.

In a study of both U.S. and German workers, Hamermesh (2001) found that job satisfaction varied with changes in the income distribution, but that the effects did not last over time. He argued that the findings suggest that if income inequality increases, lower wage workers are likely to have higher turnover rates, which could, in turn, affect how much employers of low wage workers are willing to invest in skill development for their

workers. In another angle on the relationship between pay and satisfaction, a recent article found that workers were also more satisfied when their coworkers were better paid, presumably because it signals that their own future earnings might increase (Clark et al. 2009).

Other factors have been found to affect job satisfaction as well. For example, Bender and Sloane (1998) found in a study of British workers that while unionized workers tend to be less satisfied than non-unionized workers, the negative effect of union membership on satisfaction disappears if one controls for industrial relations climate. A number of studies have found that various kinds of social support on the job can increase job satisfaction, with satisfaction being higher when there is more teamwork (Griffin et al. 2001), emotional support from coworkers (Haley-Lock 2007), and supervisory support (Hagedoorn et al. 1999). Some research has also found that extra-work characteristics, specifically a happy marriage, contribute to job satisfaction (Rogers and May 2003), and although the effects may be mutual, the effect of marriage on job satisfaction is greater than the reverse.

There have also been a number of studies that have found gender and racial/ethnic differences in job satisfaction, net of various kinds of work characteristics. Wharton et al. (2000), for example, found that across a number of university departments that whites are generally more satisfied, and nonwhites and men less satisfied. That women tend to be more satisfied at work than men has been found in many studies, and in fact, has been posed as a paradox or puzzle that needs further explanation. Although pay tends to be positively correlated with satisfaction, women tend to be lower paid than men and yet are consistently shown to be more satisfied, even after controlling for many of the factors that usually affect satisfaction (Bender et al. 2005). These researchers argue that women value flexibility so that they can accommodate family demands more than men do, and that once flexibility is controlled, that the sex differences in satisfaction disappear, at least in female dominated workplaces.

Others who have tried to explain these results have pointed to differences in the job attributes

that men and women value. Specifically, Clark (1997) found that women are more likely to value social relations at work, while men are more likely to value remuneration. In a meta-analysis of job satisfaction and gender, Konrad et al. (2000) found that men consider earnings and responsibility to be more important than do women, while women consider having good co-workers, a good supervisor, and a significant task to be more important than men do. Booth and Van Ours (2008) also found that women are satisfied with part time work, while men are not.

In addition to the gender and racial/ethnic differences at the individual level with regard to job satisfaction, some research has found contextual effects of gender and race/ethnicity. Wharton et al. (2000), for example, found that both race and gender heterogeneity in departments was associated with lower levels of satisfaction among employees. These results are consistent with other work that has found that men prefer to be in groups with other men, and women prefer to be in groups with other women (DiTomaso et al. 1995; Tsui et al. 1992).¹

Even across countries, there is a link between economic well-being and satisfaction at the level of the job, but the factors that contribute to job satisfaction are not uniform across countries. Indeed, there is a great deal of variation across countries with regard to what constitutes job satisfaction. Using data from the World Values Survey (Inglehart 1997), Huang and Van de Vliert (2003, p. 172) found substantial differences across countries, especially with regard to the effects of intrinsic versus extrinsic job characteristics:

...whereas the link between intrinsic job characteristics and job satisfaction varied significantly from country to country, the positive relationship between extrinsic job characteristics and job satisfaction remained more or less the same across

the 49 countries. Furthermore... cross-national variation in the link between intrinsic job characteristics and job satisfaction can be explained by national wealth, national social security, cultural individualism, and cultural power distance. The relationship between intrinsic job characteristics and job satisfaction is stronger in richer countries, higher social security countries, more individualistic countries, and countries with a smaller power distance culture.

The authors note that the findings confirm the combined socio-cultural perspective outlined by Inglehart (1997), rather than giving primary effect either to socio-economic factors or to cultural ones. Huang and Van de Vliert (2003, p. 172) also find that of the socio-economic factors they explored, a strong social safety net has a stronger effect on job satisfaction than national wealth, and that with respect to cultural factors, low power distance has a greater effect on job satisfaction than cultural individualism.

It is somewhat puzzling that job satisfaction continues to hold such attraction for researchers and that the findings continue to unfold through a myriad of studies on multi-levels and multi-dimensions of the concept. Given that most workers are found to be relatively satisfied with their jobs, with the usual patterns fairly consistent across studies, most research is based on small variations in satisfaction on the margins. Yet, the concept still receives a lot of attention in the social psychology of work, and to some extent, the interest in it is even expanding, as more researchers have come to agree with Hamermesh's claim (2001, p. 2) that: "... job satisfaction is the resultant of the worker's weighting in his/her own mind of all the job's aspects. It can be viewed as a single metric that allows the worker to compare the current job to other labor-market opportunities." In many ways, the studies of job satisfaction are similar to those on alienation, in that it seems that most workers should respond negatively when they do not. Such research seems to underline the question of whether it is the workers who are wrong because of how they respond, whether they do not know their own interests, or perhaps that the theories are wrong about what should or would constitute favorable working conditions for workers.

¹ Most of the effects that we have reviewed are of general job satisfaction, which incorporates a number of different components (including satisfaction with work, with co-workers, with supervision, and with the company, among other things). Although there are many articles that differentiate which specific characteristics affect which components of job satisfaction, it is beyond the scope of this review to address that level of specificity.

Organizational Commitment Perhaps because of underlying assumptions that work might be alienating, perceived as exploitative, or otherwise less than engaging, there has been an extensive amount of research on how to induce from workers more positive responses to both work and specifically to their employers. Studies of organizational commitment fall into this category. Such studies have often been done in parallel with or in relation to those on job satisfaction, although research on job satisfaction has continued unabated, whereas research on organizational commitment seems to be less ubiquitous. Both of these concepts, however, are exactly the type of research that those adopting a more critical lens have often found to serve the interests of employers more than that of employees. Critical theorists assume that efforts to increase organizational commitment constitute manipulation of workers by employers who do not otherwise have the interests of the workers at heart. Further, like the studies of alienation and job satisfaction, it seems that workers often appear to have emotional commitments and loyalty to their employers in circumstances that researchers might think would be alienating or aversive. Thus, research on organizational commitment also poses a challenge, especially for critical theories of organization.

Much of the research on organizational commitment has focused on the issues of measurement and clarification of the meaning of the concept. In addition, there is extensive research that endeavors to identify the antecedents, correlates, and consequences of the concept (Meyer et al. 2002). Perhaps the most widely recognized and accepted conceptualization of organizational commitment is Allen and Meyer's (1990a) Three-Component model, which outlines three distinct components of organizational commitment: affective, normative, and continuance commitment. Affective commitment is conceptualized as an emotional tie to the organization. Normative commitment is defined as a sense of obligation to the organization. Continuance commitment is a measure of the strength of intention to stay in the organization, especially given an assessment of what it would cost to leave.

In a subsequent meta-analysis of research using the various dimensions of the three-component model, Meyer et al. (2002) found that all three components are related to job satisfaction, job involvement, and occupational commitment, with affective commitment having a strong and positive relationship to these related concepts, normative commitment having a similarly positive but more moderate relationship, and continuance commitment having a negative or neutral relationship. All three components of organizational commitment have a negative relationship to behavioral outcomes such as turnover, but affective commitment has the strongest relationship, normative commitment has a similar but more modest relationship, and continuance commitment has the weakest relationship. Meyer et al. (2002) also found that the relationships among these measures of attachment to the job were consistent in studies both in North America and in other parts of the world, although the findings were stronger in the North American studies.

In related work, Allen and Meyer (1990b) and Ashforth and Saks (1996) both found that formal socialization programs within companies contribute to stronger subsequent organizational commitment and less likelihood for the employees to engage in what has been termed "role innovation" (or deviation from the expected enactment of the organizational role). Several researchers have found that social support or networks among employees will increase organizational commitment and satisfaction (Kim and Rhee 2010; Morrison 2002), but Grant et al. (2008) go one step further and find as well that employee support programs not only enable employees to receive support, but also facilitate their giving support back to the organization. Mueller and Lawler (1999) found, however, that the level of commitment depended on the proximity of the organizational unit to the individual in organizations with nested organizational units. Similarly, Hunt and Morgan (1994) found that organizational commitment mediates the relationship between the specific commitment of the individual and organizational outcomes.

Given the interest in the concept of commitment to the organization, there have been contin-

ued efforts to ferret out the meaning of this concept by suggesting alternative ways of conceptualizing how individuals are related to or engaged with their organizations. Mitchell et al. (2001) developed and tested a model of what they call job embeddedness to define the relationship of employees to others in the organization, and found that it had explanatory power for such measures as intentions to quit, over and above the effects of job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and so on. Van Dyne and Pierce (2004) argued that what they called psychological ownership of the organization also explained organizational self-esteem and organizational citizenship behavior over and above any effects of job satisfaction or organization commitment. Levy and Williams (1998) developed a concept called perceived system knowledge, and found that those who measured higher on this concept had greater job satisfaction and stronger organizational commitment. More recently, various researchers have been interested in exploring the depth of emotional or psychological engagement by drawing on Weber's concept of calling and applying it to understanding occupations, organizations, or careers (Hall and Chandler 2005; Wrzesniewski et al. 1997).

All in all, studies of psychological attitudes in the workplace have continued to play a prominent role in the research on workers and organizations. Like most of the analyses of workers' attitudes, the intent of studies of organizational commitment is to find levers that will encourage positive responses from workers toward their employers and the work they do. All such studies try to strengthen emotional connections between workers and their employers. The volume of research on topics such as organizational commitment can suggest an implicit assumption that work can be perceived as drudgery or exploitation and that the employer-employee relationship might be problematic if companies do not attend to worker needs and preferences. At the same time, such studies underline the concern that workers may not act with good will toward the companies for which they work or that they may deviate from the expectations of employers. It is because such research is shaped by the

wish to influence worker behavior on behalf of employers and to increase performance and productivity that critical theorists have tended to be suspicious of research on workers' attitudes. Most such studies concern themselves with the affect or value preferences of workers as predictors of behavioral outcomes, such as performance or turnover. The kind of larger historical or societal issues about the role of workers in the economy, the form of economic relationships, and the distribution of rewards between workers and employers are usually not incorporated into the discussion of these issues, but rather are mostly taken for granted.

Worlds of Pain There is substantial research that suggests that rather than exhibiting low satisfaction or commitment to a job that lower status workers may simply turn their frustration or disfavor inward and engage in self destructive behavior, such as alcoholism or drug abuse. Either as a cause or an effect, lower status workers may also develop a weak or intermittent attachment to the labor force. Rubin (1976) describes the lives of the working class as "worlds of pain" (Gorman 2000; Weis 2004). Among other things, those with lower economic status may experience feelings of relative deprivation leading to more stress, poor health behaviors, and as a result, greater mortality risk (Neckerman and Torche 2007). They are also more subject to disorganization in their neighborhoods, including more crime (Kelly 2000).

Even though workers in jobs with low status may have negative psychological responses, there is even greater likelihood of negative responses for those who have inadequate work or no work at all. Underemployment leads to low job satisfaction (Maynard et al. 2006), while unemployment has been shown to contribute to depression and other forms of poor mental health (Clark and Oswald 1994; Dooley et al. 2000). Having had a job in which one was relatively satisfied does not lessen the negative effects of unemployment should it occur (Wanberg et al. 1999). Temporary work has similar negative effects (Booth et al. 2002), as does part time work, unless the worker is not interested in a full time job. Further, threats

of layoffs or job insecurity (such as when the increase in the numbers of immigrants contributes to more competition for jobs) lead to lower satisfaction (Blanchflower and Shadforth 2009; Davy et al. 1997) and less commitment to the employer (Brockner et al. 2004), as well as to overall lesser happiness. Although some companies see it as a solution to economic challenges, Cascio (1993) found that downsizing rarely leads to the projected positive effects and almost always leads to negative effects on workers, unless it is accompanied by a change in the organizational design and the opportunities that workers have for meaningful engagement. African Americans are even more vulnerable to the adverse effects of layoffs, because the bases for their layoffs are less predictable than for whites (Wilson and McBrier 2005). Thus, having a job with some security is consequential for the well-being of workers, in addition to the conditions that they may face when employed and on the job. Those who suffer long term unemployment or find jobs that do not provide support for themselves and their families are not likely to be as concerned about job satisfaction or commitment to the organization as about simply surviving and meeting basic needs.

Conclusions

In this paper we have endeavored to review issues relevant to the social psychology of work from a critical perspective, and thereby, have included a discussion of both structural and relational characteristics that affect the well-being of workers at different levels of analysis. In the review, we have concentrated more on the work that has been published in the last two decades. We have drawn from research in psychology, sociology, economics, and management. As such, we have included a discussion of status differences among workers and have given special attention to the circumstances of lower status workers and the challenges that exist for them with regard to social identity and dignity in work. In our analyses, we have also looked explicitly at the effects of race/ethnicity and gender on the findings with regard to worker social psychology, because these cat-

egorical differences are still important in terms of the opportunities available and the rewards likely for workers in different contexts. In our summary of the literature, we have addressed the inequality that exists among and between workers with regard to the social resources that affect access to opportunity and the capacity to develop the skills and abilities to compete for jobs as well as perform them. Our review included a discussion of power and authority at work as well as the attitudinal and value differences among workers. We also have a brief discussion of policies such as affirmative action and equal opportunity legislation.

Our review considered the growing interest in macro-micro-macro theories such as status construction theory and the new dimensions of social identity theory. Such theories link the structure of inequality among groups to the allocation and evaluation decisions that group members make with regard to those who are like them or thought to differ from them. We also considered the effects of social dominance orientation and system justification theory. Across the studies of the social psychology of intergroup relations, we have also considered stereotype content theory as well as cognitive processes in intergroup relations. In our discussion of these processes, we consider the specific organizational practices and the outcomes of intergroup relations. We consider as well the recent research that suggests limits to the effects of similarity-attraction theory and to homophilic tendencies.

We give special attention to the research and analysis of alienation, especially of lower status workers. The long history and theoretical importance of this concept makes it an important part of a critical theory of the social psychology of work. In this discussion, we call attention to the conflict that has existed within research on workers and work with respect to whether alienation should be thought of as a structural characteristic or as an attitudinal one. The concept of alienation is especially important in this discussion, because it calls attention to the question of whether workers can know and accurately report on their own psychological condition or responses. Whether workers are the best judge of their own state of

being is a critical one in the overall project of understanding the social psychology of work. Raising such questions also suggests that there is an anthropological dimension to the study of work and workers, in terms of whether an etic or emic perspective is most justified and credible. Further, given the policy concerns around the discussion of the concept of alienation, it again suggests that to consider social psychology, one has to link it to the structure of intergroup relations and to the distribution of resources and opportunities. Thus, the social psychology of work has political dimensions, as well as economic and sociological ones.

Finally, we briefly review some of the more traditional themes in the social psychology of work, namely studies of job satisfaction and organizational commitment, along with more recent studies of life satisfaction and happiness, noting that in this research as well there is a tension about whether the expectations of how working conditions should affect attitudes are consistent with what workers themselves report. In this discussion, we consider some of the variations that have been found cross-culturally with regard to the application and meaning of some of the favored theories of what workers are likely to experience and what they are likely to value. Such work suggests that while there are some similarities across countries in terms of what factors are likely to influence what types of responses from workers, that the context and culture matter as well, especially with regard to the economic resources, political system, and normative or moral frameworks within which people live and work. It is within the context of these larger systems that we can understand the research and the eagerness with which it has been pursued on topics such as job satisfaction and organizational commitment. Linking such concepts from the workplace to the society as a whole helps suggest broader questions that need to be addressed in subsequent studies of work and workers. In examining such linkages, it becomes clear as well that both the macro and the micro are influential in terms of the outcomes for workers, whether it is the influence of having a happy marriage or being employed in a secure job in a country with others

who have similar opportunity and prospects for growth within their social groups and within their communities.

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Lincoln Quillian

Introduction

The publication of William Julius Wilson's *The Truly Disadvantaged* in 1987 catapulted concerns about neighborhoods to the forefront of the study of poverty and inequality. Wilson hypothesized that the effects of growing up in neighborhoods of concentrated poverty were key factors contributing to persistent poverty in America and high rates of social problems, such as violence and low school achievement. Although strongly grounded in the empirical research available when it was written, Wilson's book was mostly a set of theoretical hypotheses. Its publication galvanized empirical researchers, resulting in a wide range of effort focused on testing, disputing, and refining its many ideas. Among the prominent works in response to Wilson were Massey and Denton's book, *American Apartheid* (1993); the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's Moving to Opportunity experiment (Orr et al. 2003); and more recently, Robert J. Sampson's book, *Great American City* (2012).

Wilson's hypotheses about the importance of neighborhoods in maintaining urban poverty included hypotheses about both social psychological and non-psychological mechanisms through which neighborhoods affect their residents. Initial empirical work focused on demographic,

economic, and educational outcomes and looked for total effects of neighborhoods rather than specific mechanisms. Social psychological mechanisms were suggested as one of several mechanisms of neighborhood effects. In later research, social psychological outcomes and mechanisms have often been important.

The surge in interest in neighborhoods following Wilson's book also helped reinvigorate several related literatures, including studies of neighborhoods and crime and racial residential segregation. Research in these areas has long incorporated social psychological ideas, a tradition that continues and has even accelerated in recent research.

In this chapter, I begin by discussing the role of neighborhoods and space in classic sociological theory, especially as it was thought to affect mental life. Second, I discuss the more recent research literature on the effects of neighborhoods that developed in response to Wilson. In the third section, I examine the role of social psychological processes in racial segregation and in creating disadvantage for nonwhite neighborhoods.

Classical Theories

The Effects of Urbanism

A central concern of much classical social theory was to understand social changes accompanying the industrial revolution. A major transformation in industrialization was increased migration from

L. Quillian (✉)
Department of Sociology, Northwestern University,
1810 Chicago Avenue, Evanston, IL 60208, USA
e-mail: l-quillian@northwestern.edu

rural to urban areas and the growth of cities. The effects of urban living, including psychological effects, were a focus of many discussions of modernization and urbanization in classical social theory.

Tonnies' *Community and Society* (1963; originally published as *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* in 1887) provided an influential early discussion of the consequences of the transformation of society from rural to urban. Tonnies saw life in small communities as characterized by strong personal ties among family members and neighbors, intimate personal knowledge of others in the community, shared values, and common religion. In this community form (*Gemeinschaft*), norms were held by consensus, and deviance was rare. By contrast, Tonnies saw life in large cities as based in fleeting exchanges with strangers and relations among persons guided by formal contracts and laws. This society form (or *Gesellschaft*) increased together with commerce or trade. Tonnies thought that the development of *Gesellschaft* accompanied growing individualism and self-interest. But he was also concerned that social solidarity was weaker in modern urban societies than in rural communities, a concern that would be central to much early urban sociology.

While Tonnies' focus was on the development of two ideal types—rural/agrarian and urban/industrial—Emile Durkheim raised similar themes in a theoretical framework closer to cause-and-effect. The major “cause” in Durkheim's case was the increasing division of labor in society. Durkheim believed that in traditional rural society, social solidarity that regulated and constrained individual behavior was based in similarities of tasks, experiences, and personal backgrounds. This mechanical solidarity tended to strongly bind individuals with the collective (Durkheim 1984). In contrast, in more modern societies, individuals performed distinct and separate tasks—labor was divided—and more diverse populations were in contact with one another. In modern societies, social cohesion was rooted in the complementarity of tasks and interdependencies among persons. This solidarity was based in common interdependence between specialized parts: in Durkheim's

language “organic,” with individuals distinct but interdependent in their roles, just as parts of an organism are distinct but interdependent.

While Durkheim consistently emphasized the importance of social solidarity for society to function correctly, he also thought that some degree of deviance was a normal part of all societies. This perspective was best developed in his discussions of crime and punishment. Durkheim described crime and its response in punishment as fulfilling an important social function of strengthening solidarity and the collective conscience by illustrating boundaries to acceptable behaviors and reaffirming the authority of the norms of the group through punishing offenders. Under mechanical solidarity, punishment was accompanied by policing through penal law; violations were viewed as against the entire collective and accompanied by harsh criminal penalties. By contrast, in a modern society of organic solidarity, violations were more often focused on restitution between individual parties, often through civil law procedures (Durkheim 1982, 1984).

Durkheim suggested that both organic solidarity and mechanical solidarity could effectively regulate individual behaviors to conform to collective goals. Yet he also was concerned that under conditions of rapid social change, solidarity could break down, with pathological consequences. He believed that rapid economic change, such as economic depression or rapid expansion, could produce a situation in which interdependent parts of organic society could not be efficiently coordinated. The result was an anomic division of labor, which led to a sort of normlessness that could produce social problems, such as suicide (Durkheim 1965).

Although Durkheim's approach consistently focused on the group, even treating individuals as an epiphenomenon, his work contained a submerged social psychological theory in positing the negative effects of weak solidarity on individuals. For Durkheim, apparently individualistic problems such as suicide had their origins in problems of group coordination and regulation; thus, individuals' psychological lives were powerfully tied to the group.

Among early theorists of urban-rural contrasts, Simmel most explicitly developed the implications of modern urban society for individual psychology, especially in his essay "The Metropolis and Mental Life" (1971[1903]). Simmel began with the observation that in urban settings, individuals had more frequent interactions with strangers and experienced a wider range of stimuli than in rural settings. Simmel believed that because of this awareness of a greater social world and their habituation to a high level of social stimulation, urban dwellers tended to develop a detached perspective and a blasé outlook. Finally, Simmel noted that in modern urban societies, money became a common denominator of transactions, and time was standardized and measured and became a basic factor coordinating human activity. Simmel believed that, as a result of these factors, urban dwellers reduced many interactions with and evaluations of others to business purposes and exchange-value, in contrast to rural society, in which relations were grounded in long-standing personal relationships. The result was the development of an intellectual understanding of social life and a matter-of-fact attitude. Finally, Simmel believed that the diversity of people with whom urbanites interacted opened the possibility of greater freedom of expression without the limitations of disapproval from a closed, homogeneous group of peers. Because of this, urban dwellers developed greater individuality and potentially possessed greater freedom in loosened conformity to the group.

Later, Chicago sociologist Louis Wirth built on these earlier works to develop a seminal account of differences between urban and rural life. His "Urbanism as a Way of Life" (1938) remains a basic starting point for modern discussions of the effects of urbanism. Wirth more clearly separated modern life from urban life in his discussion than Simmel or Tonnies. Wirth defined the urban as a large settlement of high population density and considerable social heterogeneity. His discussion combined structural ideas about urban life that were often similar to Durkheim, but with a social psychological model along the lines of Simmel (Fischer 1972).

Wirth discussed the effects of urban space through increased size, density, and social heterogeneity. Large size and density tended to produce an increase in the differentiation and specialization of tasks and roles, bringing about an increase in the division of labor. Large numbers of people in close proximity also produced increasing segregation of population groupings according to ethnicity, economic status, and other bases, with the result that distinct neighborhoods developed. Likewise, individual interactions in larger areas more often were limited to a single purpose or role that an individual fulfilled. This contributed to a series of psychological consequences along the lines Simmel suggested: increasingly depersonalized interactions, increasing rationality, and increased tolerance for unconventionality, but also increased individual insecurity. Increasing population size and heterogeneity led to an increasing importance of explicit rules and laws in the place of consensually held norms of rural life; political processes also tended to work through formal organizations. Finally, Wirth believed that the possibilities for collective action were increased in urban settings, which were conducive to the formation of crowds (for detailed discussions, see Fischer 1972; Karp et al. 1977).

These classical theories were developed primarily to understand the consequences of urbanization, often together with the effects of the industrial revolution. The result was a set of insightful theories and ideal types. With varying degrees of specificity and development, these theories incorporated implicit or explicit social psychological models of the effects of urban environments on individual cognition, personality, and disposition.

Distinguishing Types of Urban Neighborhoods

While the classical theorists focused most on the contrast between urban and rural, Chicago school theorists developed ideas about internal differentiation of areas within cities and began to explore potential consequences for residents of these areas. Park (1936) and Burgess (1925)

proposed that as a result of competition among businesses and persons for space, the market, and migration into the city, cities formed numerous functioning “natural areas” with distinct characteristics. As Park (1926) described, cities developed as an elaboration of the market. Thus, Park saw the central business district of the city as representing the highest form and center of urban life. With the central business district at the center, groups tended to be sorted into distinct areas around it; Park called these “natural areas.” Examples of natural areas included the central shopping district, the slum, and the financial district (Park 1936, p. 8). Burgess (1925) developed a complementary set of ideas about natural areas in his concentric zone model, in which the central business district was at the center of the city, surrounded by distinct areas organized as concentric zones. These zones included the “zone of transition,” which included a diverse and often run-down set of businesses and residences; the workingmen’s houses; middle-class residences; and the commuter zone. Natural areas in these terms represented types of neighborhoods that characterized distinct urban spaces.

A key concern for Park was how the form of urban living was linked to the control of individual behavior by the group (Park and Burgess 1921). Like the European theorists, Park thought that in cities, secondary forms of social control were substituted for primary groups. In the new social order, laws largely replaced customs, newspapers and mass media replaced primary group word-of-mouth, and interests replaced sentiments. Park shared the concern of European theorists that in modern urban society, the social regulation of individual behavior was less effective. Park’s concern was illustrated (and likely partly developed) by his colleagues Thomas and Znaniecki and their early study, *The Polish Peasant* (1984[1918]). *The Polish Peasant* argued that the dramatic social changes experienced by rural Polish immigrants to urban Chicago led to a breakdown of the traditional norms and rules that functioned in rural Polish society, with a resulting loss of social control and increased crime and deviance.

While Park developed the idea of natural areas of cities, his reflections on urban effects on

people focused more on the effects of urban life on society overall. Aware of Park and Burgess’s ideas about natural areas in cities, however, students and followers of Park detailed the differences between areas of cities and the effects of these areas on individuals. They noted that social problems varied in prevalence across different areas of cities and developed ideas about factors producing these differences. These ideas emerged in part through a series of case studies on urban districts and the groups living there, such as Zorbaugh’s (1976[1929]) description of Chicago’s rooming-house district and Cressey’s (2008[1932]) discussion of immigrants to Chicago and their visits to the “taxi dance hall.”

Even more important in developing ideas about causal relationships between natural areas, urban pathologies, and ways of life were early statistical and geographic studies of social problems. These studies directly influenced modern sociological theories. Particularly influential on modern criminology were Shaw’s (1929) *Delinquency Areas* and Shaw and McKay’s *Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas* (1942). Shaw and McKay studied the geographic distribution of delinquency across Chicago, relating it to area characteristics. They found that criminal behavior decreased with distance from the central business district. They argued that delinquency was more common in neighborhoods characterized by “social disorganization,” which was the inability of a community to realize common values and maintain social control. They identified low economic status, ethnic heterogeneity, and residential instability as neighborhood characteristics linked to delinquency and, by implication of the theory, to social disorganization.

Social disorganization theory quickly received criticism on the grounds that neighborhoods described as “disorganized” were actually organized, albeit perhaps differently from other neighborhoods (see in particular, Whyte 1993[1943]). Nevertheless, without the term “disorganization” and reformulated somewhat for these critiques, much of Shaw and McKay’s social disorganization theory is strongly present in modern criminological accounts of neighborhood influences on crime, as discussed below.

Also notable in considering links between community characteristics and individual outcomes was Faris and Dunham's *Mental Disorders in Urban Areas* (1965[1939]). Faris and Dunham believed that the most disorganized communities tended to have higher rates of personal isolation and low communication, which they posited to explain variation in rates of mental illness across neighborhoods. They found higher rates of mental illness closer to the center of the city, which they took to be the more disorganized urban zones (following the Park and Burgess concentric zone model of the city). They also found that low neighborhood socioeconomic status was a key predictor of high rates of mental disorder.

In the context of a comprehensive study of black Chicago, Drake and Cayton's *Black Metropolis* (1945) included discussions about levels of poverty and disease across Chicago neighborhoods. By mapping problems across the city, they focused attention on a theme that would later become very important in American sociology: the racialized structure of disadvantage in American cities.

Criticisms and Correctives of Classic Works: Political Economy, Selection, and the Subcultural Theories of Urbanism

Ecological, "natural area" approaches in classical and human ecology theories omitted almost any discussion of politics or political power in urban development and the effects of urban areas, and more broadly, lacked much consideration of how deliberate decisions influenced urban environments. These omissions became the focus of subsequent work on urban political economy theories in urban sociology, which derive inspiration especially from Marxist theories and from studies of urban governance and local elites. Scholars, including Hunter (1953), Logan and Molotch (1987), and Feagin (1988) provided accounts in this tradition. Rather than "natural" processes, these theories emphasized the role of government decisions, local elites, and business interests in forming urban space. In these theories, local

elites and business interests had disproportionate effects on the shape of urban areas through their powerful influence on development and redevelopment through zoning, regulation, and public financing. In these accounts, racial and economic segregation were in part a result of political decisions and processes that represented the desires of whites and the affluent to maintain geographic distance from nonwhites and the poor.

Urban political economic theories were a needed corrective to omissions of the classic theorists and human ecology paradigm. They added important processes crucial for understanding how urban areas come to be as they are, and corrected the idea that city form represented purely natural processes beyond deliberate control. Yet this work did not really undercut the social processes that were the focus of urban ecologists; instead, it demonstrated that their theories were quite incomplete. Many of the basic social processes explored by human ecology remained an active research tradition that would lay the groundwork for the explosion of interest in "neighborhood effects," as discussed later.

On methodology, discussions of Faris and Dunham's *Mental Disorders in Urban Areas* (1965[1939]) in the 1960s pointed out that their results could be taken to support selection into neighborhoods based on mental health, rather than a causal effect of neighborhoods on mental disorders. That is, their results could be explained by the possibility that the mentally ill tended to become lower class and move into "disorganized" neighborhoods, rather than disorganized neighborhoods causing mental illness (see March et al. 2008 for a discussion). These discussions presented early and explicit empirical recognition of the problem of selection in establishing the effects of neighborhoods, which would become a key methodological issue in later studies.

The early focus on the consequences of urbanism in contrast to ruralism would continue to attract attention in sociology and psychology. Milgram (1970) elaborated on many of Simmel's earlier ideas, focusing in particular on "information overload" in urban environments. Significant empirical literature in the 1960s and 1970s examined the proposition that urban

dwellers were more tolerant of others not like themselves than rural residents (see Karp et al. 1976, Chap. 5, and Fischer 1995 for reviews). Influential in sociology was also a revised theory of urbanism proposed by Fischer (1975), whose “subcultural” theory emphasized the many rich subcultures of urban areas as a key distinguishing characteristic of urban life. City size allowed for greater numbers of distinct subcultures because they had enough participants to gain “critical mass” and thus form viable, recognizable subcultural groups; such groups borrowed ideas and symbols from other subcultures, thus further contributing to the formation and maintenance of urban subcultures. Fischer’s revised theory represents probably the most sophisticated theory of what distinguishes urban life from small town and rural life. For the most part, research supports Fischer’s revised account of urban life (see Fischer 1995 for a review).

The concerns of urban ecologists continue to be important in modern urban sociology and social psychology. But the strong focus on urban versus rural differences and the urban way of life has declined in importance. In its place, there has been considerable interest in how different types of neighborhoods influence individual lives, and how those neighborhoods come to be as they are. Social disorganization theory remains highly influential in modern criminology, with the leading theories on neighborhoods and crime incorporating many of its key elements.

Neighborhood Effects Research

The 1970s and 1980s saw increasing rates of urban crime and growing concerns about urban problems. Some prognosticators predicted the end of modern cities, except perhaps as slums. It seemed to many observers that the future of American residence was the suburbs.

The most influential sociological analysis of growing urban problems was W. J. Wilson’s *The Truly Disadvantaged* (1987). Wilson posited that neighborhood conditions were a crucial factor contributing to the perpetuation of poverty in America and problems related to poverty, such

as crime. Wilson began from the hypothesis that urban deindustrialization reduced the number of jobs with lower educational requirements in urban areas, with deleterious consequences for many blue-collar, inner-city neighborhoods and their residents. Combined with other social changes that magnified and added to the deleterious effects of deindustrialization, like changes in family structure, Wilson believed that deindustrialization started a downward spiral for many working-class, black neighborhoods into poverty, crime, and population loss.

Particularly influential among the factors that Wilson believed contributed to the effects of deindustrialization on neighborhoods was the notion of “concentration effects.” Wilson hypothesized the concentration of the most disadvantaged segments of the urban population in a few neighborhoods resulted in their social isolation from the middle class and contributed to the exacerbation of social problems. The result was that residents of neighborhoods of concentrated poverty experienced very high levels of social problems, and these neighborhoods themselves became an important force in perpetuating poverty for their residents. In later work, Wilson (1996) emphasized the neighborhood concentration of joblessness rather than poverty as a key process, although jobless neighborhoods usually were also high-poverty neighborhoods. Broadly, his work suggested that neighborhoods were a crucial source of inequality in America.

Wilson suggested at least three mechanisms through which residence in a poor, jobless neighborhood contributed to current and future poverty and joblessness. First, he suggested that these neighborhoods lacked employed role models, and that the lack of exposure to employed role models contributed to habits and cultural orientations that made it more difficult to find work. Second, he suggested that jobless residents lacked contact with employed persons who could give them information and possibly be influential in helping them find employment. Third, he suggested that a lack of two-parent households in poor neighborhoods meant that local youth were less well-monitored, which contributed to higher rates of neighborhood crime and delinquency.

Wilson's work cited many sources and incorporated many ideas from the Chicago school of sociology. "Concentration effects" has similarities to discussions by the early ecologists about the effects of distinct natural areas within cities. Wilson included discussions of social disorganization borrowed directly from early ecologists, although he developed "concentration effects" and the social isolation of residents of poor neighborhoods as key concepts, rather than social disorganization.

The emphasis on neighborhoods as a source of social problems was further reinforced by the most prominent reply to many of Wilson's ideas, Massey and Denton's *American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass* (1993). Massey and Denton agreed with most of Wilson's hypotheses, but suggested Wilson omitted the important role of racial segregation. Massey and Denton argued that racial segregation played a crucial role in forming high-poverty neighborhoods by separating more affluent racial groups (whites) from less affluent groups (blacks, Latinos). But Massey and Denton largely agreed with Wilson's ideas about concentration effects of poverty in neighborhoods.

These works galvanized empirical researchers to better understand the impact of neighborhood environments on inequality and social problems. The results of these studies created some literatures and contributed to several others. A literature that developed very rapidly focused on the long-term impact of neighborhoods on the children who grew up in them, and is what is most often meant by the "neighborhood effects" literature.

The most recent major work in this tradition is Robert Sampson's *Great American City: Chicago and the Enduring Neighborhood Effect* (2012). Sampson focuses on neighborhood effects on crime, the character of neighborhood life, and neighborhood migration, rather than long-term developmental effects of neighborhoods. The book makes heavy use of social psychological concepts applied at a neighborhood level, especially in emphasizing the importance of intersubjectively shared perceptions among neighborhood residents in accounting for neigh-

borhood differences. Sampson measures collective perceptions and beliefs by combining survey responses from multiple respondents in each neighborhood. Among the shared perceptions Sampson considers are perceived neighborhood disorder, collective efficacy, and moral and legal cynicism. Sampson argues that these shared perceptions form an invisible set of neighborhood characteristics that are critical for understanding differences among neighborhoods in terms of disorder, crime, and persistent poverty. I discuss collective efficacy and perceived disorder in the sections on crime and neighborhood stereotypes below.

Much of the research on neighborhood effects, especially in the first wave of reactions to Wilson, focused on the long-term effects of neighborhood of residence in childhood and adolescence on outcomes measured in young adulthood. This research was primarily demographic, although some of the possible (but not directly measured) mechanisms of these effects were social-psychological. Later studies increasingly included measures of mental states. A parallel literature in criminology focused on neighborhood influences on crime, often incorporating ideas about social psychological processes at the neighborhood level. Initially, I discuss in greater detail proposed mechanisms of neighborhood effects, then neighborhood effects on child development, neighborhood effects on crime rates, and finally, neighborhood effects on individual psychology and mental states.

Basic Considerations in Neighborhood Effects Research

Defining Neighborhoods and Their Characteristics

A difficult question in studies of neighborhood effects is the proper definition of "neighborhood." The large majority of studies use geographic definitions, taking small, defined areas within boundaries determined by analysts or government officials as neighborhoods. By far, the most common definition used in studies of the

U.S. are census tracts, small areas drawn by the Census Bureau to contain on average about 4,000 persons and to account for social and geographic boundaries (e.g., major streets). A small number of other studies have used different definitions. For instance, some studies use zip code areas instead of census tracts, which are significantly larger. The extensive analyses by Sampson et al. (1997) and Sampson (2012) aggregate a number of census tracts together based on local knowledge to produce neighborhood-like areas that they call “neighborhood clusters.”

Other possible definitions include social or subjective definitions of neighborhoods. Social definitions might, for instance, base a neighborhood definition on the geographic extent of each individual’s social network. This definition, however, blurs the line between a local social network and what is usually meant by neighborhood, which is geographic in most usage and theory. There are also significant data challenges in matching available data from the census or other sources to a social network area. While there are a few studies of neighbor networks, and these are sometimes proposed as a way to define “community” (e.g., Wellman and Leighton 1979), no studies define neighborhoods based on measures of individual social networks in a local area.

Subjective definitions might define neighborhoods based on individuals’ perceptions of their own neighborhood. Lee and Campbell (1997) and Coulton et al. (2001) investigated individuals’ perceptions of their own neighborhoods. These studies found a predominance of geographic definitions and moderate agreement among persons on neighborhood names but tremendous variability in definitions of the boundaries of neighborhoods. Using subjective definitions in practice leads to the problem of reconciling these often quite different definitions of perceived local neighborhood boundaries. A second problem is that it may be difficult or impossible to aggregate data on population characteristics to areas that precisely match subjective definitions.

For the purposes of neighborhood effects studies, a geographic approach has many advantages. What we mean by a “neighborhood effect” is usually that the affluence level of the

few blocks around which an individual grows up matters for life chances, social problems, and related outcomes. The correct level of aggregation is a more difficult question, although studies using various levels of aggregation from a few blocks up to a zip code produce results that are generally consistent.

Recently, a geographic approach to defining neighborhood areas using continuous space has received new emphasis and use. For each point in space, the local neighborhood (sometimes called the “local environment”) is based on the characteristics of areas surrounding the focal point, with the characteristic of a point in space a weighted average of surrounding areas, with the weights inversely proportional to distance (Reardon and O’Sullivan 2004), perhaps with a zero weight beyond a certain distance. This approach requires significantly more calculation and spatially-referenced data, but it promises to provide a representation of the local small-area (“neighborhood”) environment that better represents the spatial area significant for residents’ lives than broader definitions of neighborhoods. Reardon et al. (2008) and Lee et al. (2008) explore patterns of segregation at multiple spatial scales using these measures. One difficult issue in this literature is identifying a correct spatial decay function, which ideally is grounded in substantive knowledge of the phenomenon to be examined.

A related question is whether neighborhood characteristics should be based on subjective or objective measures. Objective measures are measures of neighborhood characteristics grounded in samples or complete population enumeration to determine a characteristic, often using data from the U.S. Census or American Community Survey. Subjective measures are grounded in survey questions asking respondents to evaluate a characteristic of their neighborhood, for instance, “what is the percentage of black residents in your neighborhood?” Subjective evaluations of neighborhood conditions represent individual perceptions, which may deviate significantly from actual conditions when an objective quality of neighborhoods is measured (see Section, “Neighborhood Stereotyping” of this chapter

for discussion of how crime evaluations often differ from actual crime rates). For theories in which objective conditions are thought to be the key causal force, objective measures are better; the same is true when subjective measures are thought to be key. For most classic neighborhood effects concerns, objective measures are probably preferable because it is usually hypothesized that actual neighborhood conditions are the key causal force, and not perceptions of those conditions.

Direct Neighborhood Effects and Indirect Effects Through Related Contexts

An important additional distinction in neighborhood effects lies between effects of neighborhoods that are a direct result of neighborhood social processes and those effects that result from non-neighborhood social contexts whose composition and nature are strongly determined by the local neighborhood. Location of residence often serves as an anchor that determines membership in a series of related contexts: school, church, and local clubs and organizations.

For youth, schools are an especially important local context. Most students in the United States are assigned a school based on residence in a neighborhood-based catchment area, which often includes students from their own neighborhood and perhaps also nearby neighborhoods. As a result, the racial and economic background of the students in their local school is driven in large part by the racial and economic composition of the local neighborhood and other nearby areas. Bennett (2011) provides an analysis that suggests most apparent neighborhood effects on verbal test scores are eliminated when school composition is controlled.

In other words, the total effect of neighborhood includes both direct and indirect (through related contexts) outcomes. Any study that shows the effects of neighborhood racial or economic composition on schooling outcomes without somehow controlling for school characteristics is likely capturing effects of neighborhood composition that work through the composition of the local school. That is not a problem, and for some purposes is desirable, but we need to keep

in mind that neighborhood effects often capture the influence of correlated contexts.

A further distinction in neighborhood effects is between long-term effects of neighborhoods, most often developmental effects on youth who grow up in a neighborhood, and short-term effects, which often operate regardless of length of residence. Studies of long-term outcomes often posit mechanisms tied to socialization as key determinants of neighborhood effects, corresponding to the large literature that has focused on long-term impacts of growing up in a poor neighborhood. By contrast, studies that focus on short-term effects reflect processes that are activated by presence on residence regardless of duration, such as crime or employment. The data needed to study each type of neighborhood effect is different, and in practice, they have often been studied in somewhat separate literatures.

Neighborhood Effects on Youth Development and Transitions to Adulthood

The empirical response to Wilson's "concentration effects" became known as the "neighborhood effects" literature. The initial studies used observational data from panel studies. They examined how young-adult outcomes, such as high school graduation, were related to the affluence of the neighborhood a child was raised in, controlling for family background.

The resulting literature developed quickly; there were dozens of studies by the mid-1990s and have been hundreds in total since then (for reviews, see Chen et al. 2011; Duncan and Raudenbush 1999; Jencks and Mayer 1990; recent empirical studies include Crowder and South 2011; Sharkey and Elwert 2011; Wodtke et al. 2011). These studies generally found that children growing up in poorer neighborhoods were more likely to drop out of school, have a pre-marital birth, and earn less money as adults than children who grow up in more affluent neighborhoods. However, these estimated effects are usually significantly smaller than the effects of family background. A recent study by Wodtke et al. (2011)

showed especially large effects of neighborhood disadvantage on high school graduation. Their larger estimates likely resulted because they employed novel methods that allowed them to incorporate effects of neighborhoods that work through time-varying family characteristics. For instance, if residence in a high-poverty environment at a prior time causes lower family income, and this then decreases the chances of children graduating high school, this is captured by their methods as part of the neighborhood effect.¹

Despite these findings, many more methodologically oriented social scientists remain unconvinced because of the possibility that some or all of the neighborhood effects these studies found may actually be capturing selection into contexts related to individual characteristics rather than an actual effect of context on persons (Duncan and Raudenbush 1999; Hauser 1970; Ludwig et al. 2008; Tienda 1991). For instance, families who live in more affluent neighborhoods might also tend to have greater wealth, a characteristic that is rarely measured and included as a control. If family wealth is an important requirement for future outcomes, failure to control for wealth might then make it seem that there is a “neighborhood” effect when there is not. Similar possibilities exist for other uncontrolled characteristics.

A distinct approach, less subject to this problem of selection, has focused on families in residential mobility programs moving out of public housing. Early work of this sort examined families from Chicago public housing who moved into white, low-poverty neighborhoods as part of the settlement of *Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority* (1969), a racial discrimination court

case. *Gautreaux* families who moved to white, low-poverty suburban environments had major improvements in economic self-sufficiency and school achievement compared to families who moved but stayed in the city (Popkin et al. 1993; Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum 2000).

Encouraged by the powerful effects of the changed neighborhood environment found by the *Gautreaux* quasi-experiment, the U.S. Congress funded a true experiment on the effects of residential mobility (Briggs et al. 2010). The Moving to Opportunity experiment (MTO) enabled low income families residing in distressed public housing in several cities to receive a voucher to pay for housing on the private market. Some families who received vouchers were required to move to low-poverty census tracts, and MTO provided assistance and counseling to aid with these moves (the “treatment” group). The control groups received housing vouchers and could move to any tract (the “control” group). Families were followed to examine the effects of their moves. Assignment to the treatment and control groups was random.

The Moving to Opportunity study found no consistent benefits of low-poverty neighborhood residence on school achievement or employment. Rather, the benefits of a low-poverty environment were found on mental health, physical health, and feelings of safety (Briggs et al. 2010; Katz et al. 2007; Ludwig et al. 2012; Orr et al. 2003). Many researchers were surprised by the weak effects on school achievement and employment. I return to the effects on health and feelings of safety in my discussion of social psychological outcomes below.

Some scholars have interpreted the lack of effects in the experimental group as indicating no neighborhood effects on these outcomes, but features of the design of MTO mean it cannot support such a broad claim. One reason the results do not address neighborhood effects in general is that MTO involved only low-income, nonwhite families residing initially in distressed public housing. This subgroup was too specialized to generalize broadly about the effects of neighborhoods (Clampet-Lundquist and Massey 2008; Sampson 2008). In addition, the MTO families

¹ As Wodtke et al. (2011) point out, their estimates also are based on a long panel of neighborhood residence, and suggest that measures that average over several years of residence may also account for their stronger findings. However, earlier empirical studies often incorporated multi-year measures of residence, such as Brooks-Gunn et al. (1993), and usually reported that this did not much alter estimates of neighborhood effects. This suggests that their procedures that incorporated neighborhood effects through family characteristics were the factor leading to their especially large estimates of neighborhood effects.

tended to move only short distances from their original residences, even those families in the experimental group. Thus, they experienced only small changes in the social contexts often linked to residence, such as schools and labor markets (Sampson 2008, 2012), even if they did switch neighborhoods, as narrowly conceived. For instance, students in the MTO experimental group moved to schools with only slightly higher test scores than the controls (both groups attended schools with low test scores by national standards). This occurred because students in experimental-group families moved to nearby tracts that met the experimental conditions, but were often close to other high-poverty tracts. By contrast, families in the earlier Gatreux-based moves experienced large changes in school and supra-neighborhood environments.

While the MTO study was a good analysis of the effects of the MTO program, its usefulness in understanding neighborhood effects in general is limited.² Thus, non-experimental studies and Gatreux results discussed earlier, despite their limitations, arguably provide the best estimates overall of neighborhood effects.

Theories of Neighborhood Effects

What are the mechanisms of neighborhood effects? The theoretical literature suggests a number of plausible mechanisms. The empirical literature, however, provides quite limited information about which effects are operating. Facing the already difficult challenges of convincingly demonstrating and measuring total neighborhood effects, relatively few empirical studies have also tackled the question of mechanisms. Probably the biggest difficulty in examining mechanisms is the lack of necessary data for many mechanisms. For instance, measures of neighborhood culture

and norms, treatment of local residents by the police, and social control are not straightforward nor available in the most often used sources of neighborhood data.

An influential early discussion of neighborhood effects by Jencks and Mayer (1990) included a typology of neighborhood-effect theories, focusing on the long-term effects of growing up in a poor neighborhood. Their first theory emphasized peer behaviors as a source of like-begets-like among neighborhood youth. Jencks and Mayer called these “contagion models.” If young women responded to a peer’s pregnancy by becoming more likely to become pregnant themselves, this would be consistent with this type of mechanism. A second model emphasized the role of adult neighborhood residents on youth, which Jencks and Mayer called “collective socialization models.” Wilson’s idea about the importance of employed adult role models, for instance, falls into this category of explanation. Finally, what Jencks and Mayer called “institutional models” were those in which adults outside the neighborhood were important for outcomes of neighborhood youth. Effects of teachers or police that youth of a neighborhood came in contact with, for instance, fit within institutional models. This typology helped to clarify some different mechanisms tied to separate groups of neighborhood residents that could influence the long-term effects of neighborhoods.

Below, I discuss four leading explanations as to why neighborhoods may have effects on life chances and quality of life. These is clearly not an exhaustive list of theories, but these four are among the most commonly invoked to explain why neighborhoods of residence have powerful effects on individual lives.

Neighborhood Effects Via Local Culture or Norms

One of Wilson’s most controversial claims was that concentrated poverty and joblessness produced an environment in which residents were less likely to seek work and form habits conducive to work. In particular, Wilson suggested that a lack of employed middle-class role models reduced knowledge and repertoires that were

² Clampet-Lundquist and Massey (2008) argued that the results of MTO were further compromised by the fact that many participants did not comply with the experimental conditions and moved back to poor neighborhoods rather quickly, although Ludwig et al. (2008) argue that this did not bias intent-to-treat estimates from the MTO experiments.

important in facilitating youth access and success in the labor market. In his more recent work, Wilson (2009) explicitly argued that culture influences how poor persons respond to structural conditions. Other scholars at times have also discussed culture as a potential source of behaviors in inner-city neighborhoods that contribute to persistent poverty. Anderson (1999), for instance, suggested an alternative value system among youth in poor neighborhoods that contributes to high rates of teenage childbearing.

Some criticized Wilson and others who employed cultural models to understand poverty as adopting a “culture of poverty” model that blamed the victim (see Ryan 1976) and underemphasized the role of structural factors (Gans 1995; Steinberg 2001). Those making this argument combined criticisms for lack of data directly supporting cultural arguments with a rejection of cultural theories on the grounds that they might be used to support pejorative labels that further stigmatized the poor. That is, they suggested that in positing that beliefs held by the poor might contribute to their own poverty, these critics were “blaming” the poor for their own poverty, and this played into the hands of those seeking relatively punitive measures to manage poverty. Others defending these theories suggested that while structural factors like deindustrialization were clearly important, the cultural meanings actors gave played a role in the reproduction of poverty and were an important part of the reality of American poverty that cannot be ignored (Small et al. 2010).

In a strong form, a cultural theory would suggest that residents of poor neighborhoods have a culture very different from residents of less poor neighborhoods, and that it may even invert the traditional cultural orientation toward work and family. Few sociologists defend the strong form of the theory, and it has received significant empirical criticism. Studies using both survey research methods and ethnographic methods show that typically, lower income families strongly endorse the value of work, education, and traditional family structures (Carter 2005; Goldenberg et al. 2001; Solorzano 1992; Young 2004). Yet observers also point to instances of apparently oppositional identities and cultural frames

adopted in poorer neighborhoods (e.g., Anderson 1990, 1999; Hannerz 1969), perhaps supporting a weaker form of this theory.

One well-reasoned attempt to reconsider this debate is Harding’s (2007) analysis of poor neighborhoods as having a greater heterogeneity of cultural models. Adopting ideas about heterogeneity and differences in value systems in disadvantaged neighborhoods from the observations of Hannerz (1969) and some of Shaw and McKay’s work (1969[1942]), Harding argued that culture in poor neighborhoods involves a heavy dose of middle-class cultural values, but re-interpreted and selectively invoked to account for a structure of blocked opportunities. As a result, poor neighborhoods have a greater diversity of acceptable lifestyles and models with respect to work, school, and family life. Most residents of poor neighborhoods, he suggested, held mostly cultural attitudes about work and family that are consistent with the mainstream, but a substantial minority held alternative values or at least invoked alternative schemas of understanding in some situations. By contrast, in middle-class neighborhoods, mainstream cultural models among youth were closer to hegemonic. Harding argued that this heterogeneity meant that youth had a wider variety of cultural scripts to choose from in making decisions about premarital sex and school continuation. This heterogeneity of scripts contributed to a higher prevalence of pre-marital childbearing or dropping out of high school.

Using survey responses from adolescents in different neighborhoods, Harding (2007) found that adolescents more often believed premarital sex to be acceptable early in a relationship in disadvantaged neighborhoods than in advantaged neighborhoods—although the majority of youth in both places viewed later sex as more appropriate. He also found residence in neighborhoods with this heterogeneity, as well as acceptance of early premarital sex, was linked to a greater probability of adolescent sexual activity. In a later article, Harding (2010) reported that boys in poor neighborhoods were more likely to be exposed to alternative cultural models through interactions with older peers. He argued that, in poorer neighborhoods, adolescents had more interaction with

older peers in part because these ties provided protection from neighborhood violence, and this contributed to greater heterogeneity in the cultural frames employed among youth.

Neighborhoods and Exclusion from Job Networks

A second argument raised by W. J. Wilson was that the concentration of poverty and unemployment in a few neighborhoods reduced access of residents to job networks. Taking “social isolation” in terms of social networks, the argument is that residents of high-poverty neighborhoods tend to have fewer personal contacts with employed or middle-income persons, and that these contacts are important resources in gaining employment (see Cook, this volume).

A number of assumptions are needed for this theory to operate. For low-income residents of economically mixed neighborhoods, social ties need to form between employed or higher-income and unemployed or lower-income neighbors, and these ties need to act as conduits of high-quality job information or influence with employers. In addition, this assumes that a social network with more high-income persons in it is an advantage in the labor market. This might occur because employed or middle-income persons are more likely to have information about job openings or better quality jobs than low-income persons might, or to have influence through their employers helpful in securing these jobs.

Studies of personal contacts and job finding in general have found it difficult to establish a clear advantage of a larger social network for job-finding. The most comprehensive review of recent evidence finds little clear evidence that personal contacts lead to better job outcomes than other methods of job search (Mouw 2003, 2006). Contacts are very widely used in job searches, but most studies have not found that persons using contacts have shorter unemployment spells or higher starting wages than persons using other methods of search. These studies, however, are not fully conclusive: it may be that past studies have not measured the property of network contacts that matter well enough (e.g., hiring influence of the contact), or it could be that

networks are especially important for low-wage work and their effectiveness is lost in broader studies. Exclusion from job networks remains a plausible explanation as a contributing factor to high unemployment in poor neighborhoods, but more empirical evidence is needed to evaluate its importance.

The Political Economy of Place

The political economy of place theory suggests that high-poverty neighborhoods suffer because they are less effective in making claims on government and other resources outside the neighborhood than neighborhoods with more affluent residents. This could be because higher income residents are more inclined to exert influence on politicians or bureaucrats or because they are more effective when they do so. In either case, the net result may be that high-income neighborhoods receive superior government services, like better schools or police protection, or better services from private or semi-private local entities, such as better street cleaning from a neighborhood improvement association. These services may then become part of a “neighborhood effect” on adults or youth if they alter neighborhood conditions.

Little research directly examines this entire theory from neighborhood conditions to outcome, although research does support parts of this explanation of certain neighborhood effects. For instance, several accounts suggest inadequate and ineffective police response in some very poor neighborhoods, to the point that in some cases, poor neighborhoods have little effective police presence (e.g., Anderson 1999; Venkatesh 2000). The role of this factor in increasing crime rates in poor neighborhoods is not precisely estimated by these studies, although it seems certain to contribute. With respect to schools, several studies find that high-poverty schools tend to be less effective educationally (Rumberger and Palardy 2005), suggesting that impoverished school populations are a mechanism of neighborhood effects on academic achievement.

On the other hand, Small (2009) argues that services of non-profits oriented toward the poor are actually concentrated in poor neighborhoods,

suggesting a concentration effect to the benefit of the poor. Small suggests that the presence of support from nonprofits in poor neighborhoods may counteract other negative effects of concentrated poverty, accounting for some of the null findings about neighborhood effects in the MTO study.

Social Control and Violence

Concern about crime and violence in poor neighborhoods is a constant fact that tends to strongly influence neighborhood life. In the MTO study, participants overwhelmingly rated the crime problem in their local neighborhood as the main reason they wanted to move to a better neighborhood (Orr et al. 2003).

Several recent studies suggest that high rates of violent crime and concern about violent crime are key reasons for some neighborhood effects tied to neighborhood poverty. For instance, Sharkey (2010) showed that a recent homicide in a neighborhood was associated with a drop in test scores for neighborhood youth. As discussed further below, the literature on mental health effects finds that violence is a major reason neighborhood poverty is linked to greater depression and lower happiness.

Neighborhood Effects on Crime

In contrast to the long-term developmental effects that are the focus of neighborhood effects studies, many leading theories in criminology posit that neighborhood environments have powerful, immediate influences on crime rates (see Matsueda and Grigoryeva, this volume). These theories are the successors to the classical social disorganization theory of crime and employ several ideas from this tradition. They also incorporate many ideas from social psychology.

The most direct descendant of social disorder theory is the famous “broken windows” theory developed by Kelling and Wilson (1982). In part based on the social psychological experiments of Zimbardo (1969) on community clues that encourage vandalism, Wilson and Kelling proposed that signs of visible disorder in a neighborhood created a perception to others that “anything

goes,” and this perception encouraged further crime. The events that signaled disorder included both physical signs, such as broken windows and graffiti, and social signs, such as people hanging out on street corners or intoxicated in public. The broken windows theory was that these signals that “no one cared” then contributed to further crimes, including more serious crimes. In other words, the theory posited a causal relation between minor vandalism and quality-of-life crimes like public rowdiness or noise and serious crime.

The broken windows theory was influential on police practice, leading police departments to devote resources to policing minor misdemeanors. But little social science evidence supported the broken windows theory. One study that was widely cited to support the theory was a study of New York crime trends by Kelling and Souza (2001). They analyzed data on crime trends among police precincts in New York City and related this to arrests made for minor misdemeanors, a major emphasis of broken windows policing practices. Their analysis found that districts with more misdemeanor arrests experienced larger declines in their major crime rates, suggesting a causal association.

A re-analysis by Harcourt and Ludwig (2006) of the same data used by Kelling and Souza, however, instead suggested that districts with the highest crime rates received more broken-windows policing, and naturally experienced the greatest drops in crime as crime dropped throughout the city in ensuing years. They argued that this reversion to the mean crime level, rather than any causal effect of broken windows policing, likely explained Kelling and Souza’s results. They further analyzed data from the Moving to Opportunity experiment, and found that persons who moved to lower-disorder communities were not less likely to commit crimes, contrary to the predictions of the broken-windows theory of policing.

A second important test of the broken windows theory was conducted by Sampson and Raudenbusch (1999), who video recorded the appearance of streets in many Chicago neighborhoods and coded indicators of visible disorder. They

then examined how these appearances predicted actual crime events. Their result: no association between measures of visible disorder and crime, with demographics and other neighborhood-level factors controlled.

A different theory of the role of neighborhoods in crime is the theory of “collective efficacy” developed by Robert Sampson et al. (see Morenoff et al. 2001; Sampson 2012 Chap. 7; Sampson et al. 1997). Collective efficacy is a property of neighborhoods that reflects the combination of social cohesion among residents and shared expectations that residents will intervene to maintain social order. Social cohesion is conceived of as trust, mutual knowledge (including personal networks), and shared values among residents; efficacy is the expectation of residents that neighbors will take action in the face of threats to the social order. Such actions might include intervening directly to confront disorderly individuals, calling the police, or contacting other neighbors for help. Sampson thus hypothesized that social solidarity contributes to crime control, but neighborhoods with dense social networks and other measures of solidarity may not be sufficient; there also needs to be a clear expectation among residents that disorderly situations will be handled by the neighborhood, which Sampson refers to as efficacy. Sampson hypothesized that neighborhoods high on both dimensions are better able to activate mechanisms of informal social control, and these are a key to reducing crime rates.

The theory of collective efficacy includes sophisticated versions of several ideas that are intellectual legacies of social disorganization theory. While discarding the term “disorganization,” collective efficacy theory maintains the emphasis from disorganization theory on the importance of neighborhood social control based on informal actions by residents to reduce neighborhood crime.

Sampson has tested the theory using data from his major Chicago study, the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods (PHDCN). The PHDCN measured collective efficacy through questions asked of respondents in a number of Chicago neighborhoods about their ties to other residents and their expectations about

how other residents would behave in response to “disorderly” neighborhood events. Sampson’s collective efficacy measure is the combination of scales measuring informal social control and social cohesion and trust. The informal social control measure is based on survey questions that ask if neighbors could be counted on to intervene if “(i) children were skipping school and hanging out on a street corner; (ii) children were spray-painting graffiti on a local building; (iii) children were showing disrespect for an adult; (iv) a fight broke out in front of their house; and (v) the fire station in front of their house were faced with budget cuts.” The social cohesion and trust measure is based on questions that ask respondents their level of agreement with statements that “people around here are willing to help their neighbors,” “this is a close-knit neighborhood,” “people in this neighborhood can be trusted,” “people in this neighborhood generally don’t get along with each other,” and “people in this neighborhood do not share the same values” (the last two statements were reverse coded in forming the scale). These two subscales are combined and aggregated over the neighborhood to form an overall measure of neighborhood collective efficacy.

Sampson et al. (1997) found that Chicago neighborhoods with high collective efficacy had significantly lower rates of crime than those with low collective efficacy, holding demographic and other crime predictors constant. Sampson (2012, Chap. 7) reported that collective efficacy appeared to predict crime in both Chicago and Stockholm, showing the robustness of the concept in cities with very different levels of crime. More recently, neighborhood collective efficacy has also been applied to understanding neighborhood variability in other outcomes (e.g., on suicide attempts, Maimon et al. 2010).

From a more critical perspective, it remains possible in empirical tests of the theory to argue that crime events might cause collective efficacy, rather than the other way around. Serious crime events in the recent past and fear of retribution from neighborhood criminals might reduce collective efficacy rather than result from it. The complexity of the measurement of collective

efficacy and the many plausible influences on it raise other possible interpretations of its association with crime and other outcomes. Nevertheless, much evidence suggests an important role for neighbors in informing police and controlling local space in explaining neighborhood crime variation.

Research on neighborhoods and crime has made significant use of concepts from social psychology, but modified and applied them at the neighborhood level, such as the idea of “efficacy” in collective efficacy. A basic argument of these theories is that cohesion tied with collective beliefs of neighbors are important causes of neighborhood crime rates.

Neighborhood Impacts on Mental Life and Health

While the initial generation of neighborhood effects studies focused on the effects of neighborhood conditions on objective outcomes, such as employment, high school completion, and premarital births, the second generation of studies focused on subjective outcomes: depression, anxiety, and happiness. In general, these studies have found that neighborhood environment has a stronger impact on subjective outcomes than on objective ones. Recent studies are consistent with the claim that the neighborhood of residence can have important effects on individual mood and subjective well-being.

Initial studies were grounded in observational data. These studies found that residence in a neighborhood with low income or high rates of poverty was associated with higher levels of depression (Ross 2000), mistrust (Ross et al. 2001), anxiety (Hill et al. 2005), and mental health problems (e.g., Gapen et al. 2011 on post-traumatic stress disorder). Moreover, many of these studies found evidence linking these problems to concern about neighborhood crime. Several studies incorporated a measure of perceived neighborhood social disorder—the perceived magnitude of neighborhood problems such as crime, vandalism, noise, and rowdy individuals on the street—in their analyses. Most of the effects of neighborhood

poverty were accounted for by their association with high levels of perceived neighborhood disorder, thus suggesting that stress or anxiety associated with high disorderliness and crime were the major reasons poorer neighborhoods tended to be associated with worse mental health.

These findings were supported by results from the Moving to Opportunity experiment. In contrast to the negative or mixed MTO results on economic and educational outcomes, MTO found that the experimental group that was given vouchers to move to lower-poverty neighborhoods experienced declines in depression and increases in subjective ratings of happiness relative to the control group (Leventhal and Brooks-Gunn 2003; Ludwig et al. 2008). The depression reductions for the experimental group were similar in magnitude to treatment effects found in trials of the most effective anti-depressant medicines. Subjective ratings of happiness showed increases with a one-standard deviation change in neighborhood poverty associated with a \$ 13,000 increase in income, which is especially notable given that the sample’s average income was only \$ 20,000 (Ludwig et al. 2012). In other words, MTO found powerful increases in subjective well-being with the move to lower-poverty neighborhoods, despite limits in changes to the broader neighborhood context.

Several studies have also found that impoverished neighborhood environments were associated with worse physical health (Browning and Cagney 2002; Wen et al. 2003). There were likely several mechanisms contributing to this effect, but studies pointed to stress resulting from higher average crime rates as an important one (Hill et al. 2005; Ross et al. 2001). High-poverty neighborhoods tended to have higher crime rates and disorder, which produced sufficient continued stress contributing to both negative long-term mental and physical health among their residents.

There is a large literature on neighborhood effects on health (see McLeod et al., this volume). Like the neighborhood effects literature in general, most studies estimate effects without testing mechanisms. Some studies have examined mechanisms empirically, and some of these mechanisms are social psychological, with many

suggesting that stress caused by the local environment as a key factor. For recent reviews of the neighborhoods and health literature, see Robert et al. (2010) or Browning et al. (2011).

In summary, a consistent finding of this literature is a substantial negative effect of impoverished environments on individuals' subjective well-being and rates of clinical depression. The primary reason for this appears to be the high rates of violent crime and disorder in poorer neighborhoods, which create significant stress. Evidence further suggests that poor neighborhoods are associated with worse physical health, in some part through the mechanism of increased individual psychological stress tied to neighborhood crime.

Social-Psychological Processes in Neighborhood Formation

The final studies considered here switch the dependent and independent variables from those considered to this point in order to examine the role of social psychological processes in neighborhood formation. This literature has especially emphasized neighborhood perceptions and the mental processes behind neighborhood mobility decisions.

Neighborhood Preferences

Despite a slow drift downwards, American metropolitan areas remain highly residentially segregated on the basis of race (Logan and Stults 2011). There are multiple reasons for this, including preferences to live with own-race neighbors, preferences to avoid other-race neighbors, racial discrimination in housing markets, and racial inequality combined with neighborhood housing price differentials.

Many social-psychologically oriented sociologists have used survey methods to examine attitudes toward the racial composition of their actual or hypothetical residential neighborhood. One widely used approach has been to ask respondents about their preferences for race-of-neighbors using survey cards showing neighbor-

hoods with diagrams indicating different racial compositions (Farley et al. 1978, 1994). Respondents are then asked to indicate which neighborhoods they would be willing to move into, or which neighborhoods they most prefer. Several variations on these questions and procedures have been used in the literature. For instance, Charles (2006) asked respondents to fill in their ideal neighborhood racial composition using a card with multiple houses on which the race or ethnicity of the family in it could be indicated.

Fairly consistently across studies, black respondents indicate they prefer racially mixed neighborhoods, often expressing preference for a 50% black/50% nonblack combination. Whites respond that they prefer neighborhoods that are less than 30% non-white. Hispanics and Asians express preferences for high diversity. Whites have the strongest own-race preferences, but this preference has weakened over time.

While the survey card method is effective at describing these preferences, it does not establish what underlies them. One issue scholars have attempted to sort out is the role of own-group preference—so called “neutral ethnocentrism”—from preference for avoidance of other racial or ethnic group members. Bobo and Zubrinsky (1996) and Charles (2006) used survey questions asking about perceptions of other groups as predictors of preferred neighborhood racial composition to help sort out these possibilities. They found that ratings of other race and ethnic groups are more strongly predictive of neighborhood racial composition preferences than are ratings of one's own group, suggesting a greater role for avoidance of other groups than a desire to be with one's own group.

A second subject that has been studied extensively is the extent to which preferences to avoid other groups might be capturing non-racial differences linked to race, like neighborhood affluence level or crime rates, rather than reflecting prejudices or incorrect stereotypes. Because white neighborhoods on average are more affluent and have lower crime rates, this might be reflected in preferences that appear grounded in race, but are actually grounded in these correlated non-racial conditions (Harris 1999).

To distinguish race from correlated conditions race may be capturing, studies have employed survey methods that attempt to hold class background or neighborhood conditions constant while respondents evaluate potential neighborhoods. An early use of this approach was Schuman and Bobo (1988), who compared responses to survey questions asking if a respondent would mind a black neighbor with a question asking if the respondent would mind a black neighbor “with the same income and education” as the respondent. They found only a little change in responses when the phrase equating income and education was added.

More recent studies have expanded this approach. Emerson et al. (2001) used a factorial design, describing a hypothetical neighborhood with quality of schools, property values, and crime levels at levels assigned by the investigators, and then asked respondents to rate the neighborhood’s desirability or the likelihood they would buy a house in a neighborhood. They found that white preferences for white neighborhoods remained nearly as strong holding constant related conditions, suggesting that race effects are not primarily capturing related, non-racial conditions.

Krysan et al. (2009) took this method a step toward greater realism by asking respondents to rate neighborhoods based on short videos rather than verbal vignettes. The video showed a hypothetical neighborhood and asked respondents to rate its desirability as a place to live. The videos had been created to alter the race of “residents” without changing other aspects of the neighborhood, and also to alter the apparent economic class level of the neighborhood. They found race effects on desirability for white respondents that were no weaker when economic class level of the neighborhood was controlled (class level had an independent effect, but its control did not weaken race effects).

While vignette and survey experiment studies have the strengths of experimental design, a weakness of these types of studies is their unreality in approximating the actual conditions of neighborhood choice. Both verbal and video vignettes are significantly different in several

respects than choosing an actual place to live; quick survey presentations probably do not fully represent the feelings and thoughts respondents would have in visiting actual neighborhoods, and issues like price are not usually realistically presented. Pager and Quillian (2005) found that discrimination in an audit study of employment is not well approximated by a hiring survey vignette asked of the same businesses, perhaps because the thoughts and feelings evoked in a survey vignette are different from those evoked in an actual hiring situation. Similar problems may apply to textual or video vignettes of potential neighborhoods.

Other studies have tried to separate race of neighborhood and correlated conditions, such as class composition, by analyzing data on housing prices (Harris 1999) or mobility data on movement through neighborhoods of different types (Crowder and South 2008; Quillian 2002). These studies typically regress the outcome (housing price or probability of moving out of the residential neighborhood) on predictors that include measures of racial composition and other neighborhood conditions. The results of these studies vary somewhat. Mobility studies have generally found strong persisting race effects even under controls, while housing price studies have sometimes found that race of neighborhood has no effect when other conditions are controlled. However, these studies are subject to the typical limits of observational studies, and often have a sparse set of control variables for correlated neighborhood conditions, usually with covariates limited to those available from the U.S. Census.

The debate about the role of race as opposed to correlated conditions continues to be an active one. Studies based on stated preferences on surveys generally find race has direct effects on neighborhood evaluations that cannot be accounted for by correlated non-racial neighborhood conditions. By contrast, some analyses of housing prices suggest much of what appears to be a race-of-neighborhood effect may be acting as a proxy for other conditions. Migration data does not speak to this question as directly, but does suggest powerful white avoidance of minority neighborhoods.

Neighborhood Stereotyping

The nature of white preferences to avoid non-white neighbors has been best explored in the literature on neighborhood stereotyping (Ellen 2000). Studies of neighborhood stereotyping have largely focused on race because it is the characteristic of neighborhoods that is most clearly linked to well-known stereotypes, and most neighborhoods are clearly racially typed. Also contributing to this emphasis are ethnographies like Anderson's *Streetwise* (1990), which finds that many whites perceive blacks in the local neighborhood as signs of a potential crime problem, although he argued that some "street-wise" whites are better able to sort out non-race cues associated with risk of crime victimization, and thus rely less exclusively on race cues.

Studies using survey assessments have found evidence of the importance of stereotypes for neighborhood racial composition preferences. Farley et al. (1994), Bobo and Zubrinsky (1996), and Charles (2006) find that stereotype ratings based on survey question are predictive of preferred neighborhood racial composition. These studies have the limits of survey measures, as discussed in the previous section, but they support a connection of stereotypes and neighborhood evaluations linked to segregation.

Other studies have tried to precisely understand how neighborhood perceptions may be influenced by stereotyping processes. Several early studies related perceptions of neighborhoods based on surveys to measures of demographic composition from census data to examine demographic predictors of neighborhood perceptions. For instance, studies found strong demographic correlations between perceptions of neighborhood crime problems and the racial composition of neighborhoods (O'Brien and Lang 1986; St. John and Bates 1990; St. John and Herald-Moore 1995). The major limit of these studies was they necessarily could not distinguish between perception and reality because they lacked measures that corresponded to the actual phenomenon under study. While an association between share black and a measure of neighborhood crime might reflect a biased, stereotypical perception,

it could also reflect the reality that black neighborhoods have social conditions on other dimensions (e.g., higher poverty rates) that result in higher crime rates on average.

A handful of studies have examined neighborhood perceptions linked to crime using procedures that allow them to control for actual conditions. Quillian and Pager (2001) proposed that stereotypes linking race and crime make individuals perceive blacker neighborhoods as more dangerous, regardless of the actual crime rate. They examined the predictors of residents' perceptions about the severity of their own neighborhood's crime problem on several surveys, controlling for multiple measures of actual neighborhood crime. They found that share black in the neighborhood was associated with the perception of the local neighborhood as having a more severe crime problem, even holding constant multiple measures of crime events in the local neighborhood area. This pattern holds only for white perceivers, however, which is consistent with a model of stereotypes held differentially across racial groups.

In a follow-up study, Quillian and Pager (2010) proposed that risks were amplified by cues in the social environment consistent with well-known stereotypes, while non-stereotype-consistent cues were under-used or ignored, a process they called "stereotype amplification." Using survey data that asked individuals to assess the risks of future negative events, including crime events, and that also assessed the rate at which actual victimization for this sample occurred, they showed that white respondents overestimated the risk of crime victimization more when they lived in blacker zip codes, and ignored economic factors systematically linked to actual crime risks. The result was that whites in blacker zip codes more highly overestimated their personal risk of victimization than persons in other contexts.

Similar in its conclusions was a study by Sampson and Raudenbusch (2004) that found that higher share black was associated with greater perceived disorder, even controlling for measures of disorder based on neighborhood videotaping. Sampson and Raudenbusch, however, found that this process of neighborhood stereotyping held about equally for black and white perceivers.

These studies found that black neighborhoods were perceived as having more serious crime problems and problems of disorder than white neighborhoods with identical rates of crime or disorder. These results supported a model of stereotypes linked to race in forming biased neighborhood perceptions. Notably, these biases held for residents about their own neighborhoods and would likely be even stronger for casual visitors considering a neighborhood as a place to live.

Neighborhood stereotyping contributes to processes of neighborhood sorting that maintain racial segregation across neighborhoods: whites avoid black neighborhoods in part because they perceive them to be more crime-prone and disorderly than they actually are. More affluent black neighborhoods are especially disadvantaged by this process, because the correlated condition of economic level is usually not correctly accounted for in perceptions. Furthermore, black neighborhoods are disadvantaged by decisions by businesses or wealthier individuals who choose to avoid black neighborhoods on the basis of incorrect perceptions about local crime rates.

Conclusion

Twenty-five years since W. J. Wilson's *The Truly Disadvantaged* launched a thousand studies on the effects of neighborhoods, research on neighborhoods has taken a social psychological turn. This turn has included increased findings on the impact of neighborhood on mental well-being, increasing incorporation of social psychological concepts and processes in theories of neighborhood crime, and recognition of the role of the social-psychological process of neighborhood stereotyping in understanding continuing racial segregation. These studies are recent developments in the long-standing concern in sociology about how urban life and types of neighborhoods are linked to mental life.

Studies of neighborhood effects have found that neighborhood conditions have a powerful influence on individual psychology and psychological well-being. In fact, evidence suggests that neighborhoods have stronger effects on mental

states than on most demographic or educational outcomes. Concern about neighborhood crime appears to play an especially key role in neighborhood effects on psychological well-being. Individuals living in neighborhoods with serious crime problems suffer significant psychological consequences, including higher rates of depression and anxiety and lower self-reported happiness. They also report worse physical health, and evidence suggests that higher stress is a key reason for their poorer physical health.

Similarly, social psychological processes play important parts in the leading theories of crime. Neighborhoods in which individuals trust their neighbors to take action in the face of threats to the social order—neighborhoods high in “collective efficacy”—have significantly lower crime rates. Sampson's (2012) recent work has placed neighborhood collective beliefs as central to understanding both neighborhood effects and neighborhood stability over time.

Finally, a growing literature in sociology has found strong evidence for an important role of neighborhood stereotypes in neighborhood evaluations that disadvantage black neighborhoods and perpetuate racial segregation. Evidence suggests stereotypes about black neighborhoods lead to exaggeration in perception of neighborhood crime and disorder problems.

Despite the growing incorporation of insights about social psychological processes in understanding neighborhoods, we are only at the beginning of understanding the strong links between neighborhood context and individual mental life. A more detailed model relating neighborhood conditions to choices youth make between investing in school as opposed to spending time with peers or other activities, for instance, remains to be developed and tested. Research has helped examine how race structures perceptions of neighborhoods through connections to stereotypes about social groups, yet we have less information about how other aspects of the appearance of an area or its residents structure neighborhood perceptions. The reciprocal influences between social psychology and community life represent important processes that are critical to a better understanding of both psychological

development in social context and neighborhood formation.

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Part IV

Dimensions of Inequality

Inequality is created, reproduced, and resisted in different ways along different dimensions of concern. The chapters in this section focus on what is unique about gender, race/ethnicity, social class, immigrant status, and age as axes of inequality. What becomes clear in these chapters is that, despite differences in detail, generic processes contribute to the production and reproduction of inequality along all these dimensions. The term “generic processes” comes from the work of Schwalbe et al. (2000) and refers to processes

that “occur in multiple contexts wherein social actors face similar or analogous problems.” The generic processes examined in these chapters include identity work, othering, boundary maintenance, negative social comparisons, justice evaluations, stereotyping, and network exclusion, among others. Although discussed more explicitly in some lines of research than others, these processes apply across all dimensions of inequality, linking them to each other and to basic social psychological concerns.

Amy Kroska

Despite progress toward gender equality in several areas, gender inequality persists in the United States and throughout the world, and it persists across multiple institutions: education, employment, family, politics, and law. Despite a vast literature documenting these inequalities, questions remain about how they are created and maintained. Social psychology is uniquely positioned to explain those processes. The discipline includes a rich body of theories, including several multi-level theories, which give analysts the ideal tools for illuminating the production and reproduction of inequality across multiple contexts. I begin this chapter by briefly reviewing evidence of gender inequality, focusing on the United States. I then summarize social psychological theories that can be used to explain this inequality, highlighting the theoretical claims, findings, and limitations central to each account. I conclude with a discussion of the areas that warrant further attention.

Gender Inequality in the United States

Although women today receive a larger share of post-secondary degrees than men in the U.S., women are far less likely than men to receive de-

grees in the typically lucrative areas of science, math, and engineering (SME). The gap is especially pronounced in engineering and computer and information science, where women receive only 18% of the bachelor degrees in both fields (National Center for Education Statistics 2011). This educational segregation creates similar forms of segregation in the labor market, where women are a minority in most SME sub-fields (Charles and Grusky 2004; England 2010). Women are also under-represented in managerial positions, occupying only 35%–48% of these positions overall (Cohen et al. 2009) and a considerably smaller portion of the top-level managerial positions. For example, in 2012 women held only 3.8% of the Fortune 500 CEO positions and only 4% of the Fortune 1,000 CEO positions (Catalyst 2012). Similar gender gaps exist for positions of political leadership. In 2012, women held only 16.8% of the seats in the U.S. Congress and only 23.3% of the statewide elective executive offices (CAWP 2012).

Women also earn less than men. In 2011, women's earnings were 77% of men's among full-time year-round workers ages 15 and over (U. S. Census Bureau 2012), a gap that is only a few percentage points smaller than it was in the mid-1990s when the decline in the gap began to slow substantially (Blau and Kahn 2006; U.S. Census Bureau 2012). Gaps persist within age and educational categories as well. For example, in 2011, women's earnings were 74% of men's among full-time year-round workers 25 and over with a bachelor's degree (U.S. Census Bureau

I thank Rob Clark and Sarah Harkness for very helpful feedback.

A. Kroska (✉)
Department of Sociology, University of Oklahoma,
Kaufman Hall 331, Norman, OK 73019, USA
e-mail: amykroska@ou.edu

2012). Although the wage gap within the same job in the same firm is negligible today, the wage gap between workers in female-dominated jobs and those in similarly skilled male-dominated jobs remains substantial (Charles and Grusky 2004; Petersen and Morgan 1995). The gap is also more pronounced for parents: the motherhood penalty (e.g., Glauber 2007) and the fatherhood wage premium (e.g., Hodges and Budig 2010) create a sizable wage gap between fathers and mothers, particularly among parents in female-dominated (Glauber 2012) and low wage jobs (Budig and Hodges 2010).

Gender inequities persist in the family as well (see Lively et al., this volume). Wives and mothers still do a larger share of the housework, child care (Bianchi et al. 2012), and elder care (Henz 2010; Sarkisian and Gerstel 2004) and a smaller share of the paid labor (Milkie et al. 2009). Working mothers are more likely than working fathers to restrict their paid work effort due to family responsibilities (Maume 2006), to miss work when child care arrangements fail (Maume 2008), and to disrupt sleep to care for another household member, usually a child (Burgard 2011). Mothers are also more likely than fathers to quit their job when their spouse works 50 or more hours a week (Cha 2010). Men, husbands, and fathers additionally have more free time than their female counterparts (Mattingly and Bianchi 2003; Sayer 2005).

Several indicators of health and well-being also favor men (see McLeod et al., this volume). Men have lower rates of depression (Rosenfield and Mouzon 2012), higher self-reported health (Schnittker 2007), and a greater sense of personal control (e.g., Ross and Mirowsky 2002; Ross and Wright 1998) and self-potency (Kroska 2002). Women are also more likely to be sexually harassed at work (McLaughlin et al. 2012) and are more likely to be assaulted by their partner or spouse (United States Department of Justice 2011). In sum, women are disadvantaged across many and diverse institutional and interactional settings in ways that warrant a systematic explanation.

In the remainder of this chapter, I review social psychological theories that can explain these

gender inequalities. I begin the theoretical section with socialization theories, given their early use as an explanation for gender inequality. Next I review two perspectives that emerged largely in reaction to the socialization account: the structural perspective and the doing gender perspective. I then discuss five more well-developed social psychological theories, which I have grouped into two broad categories: those that account for gender inequality with network attributes (identity theory and network theory) and those that trace the inequality to cultural beliefs and meanings attached to social categories (expectation states theories, affect control theories, and identity control theory). I conclude with a discussion of two areas that warrant further attention: multi-level accounts and intersectionality.

Early Perspectives

Symbolic Interactionist and Social Learning Perspectives on Socialization

The socialization perspective emerged as an early alternative to biological accounts of gender inequality, and it remains important today (see Mortimer and McLaughlin, this volume). Research in this area is important in its own right—revealing gender-differentiated treatment, interactions, and learning throughout the life course—but it also underpins most other theoretical accounts: most social psychological theories either presume a socialized actor knowledgeable about gender norms in the culture or make the acquisition of cultural information about gender an explicit part of the theory.

The sociological work on gender socialization is largely, though not exclusively (e.g., Kreager 2007), qualitative and focuses on illuminating socialization processes that occur during social interaction. These studies generally provide a loose theoretical framework that relies on the social learning and symbolic interactionist principle that individuals tend to repeat behaviors that elicit rewards (e.g., a smile, praise, encouragement) and avoid behaviors that elicit punishments (e.g., a frown, a reprimand, discouragement, teasing)

for themselves or similar others. Several of these studies also highlight the way that social structure (e.g., sex-segregated sports teams) and culture (e.g., sex-segregated clothing, messages in parenting books or teen magazines) shape these processes and communicate cultural information about gender norms to both children and parents (e.g., Messner 2000; Milkie 1999). Several recent studies also examine the role of networks in the socialization process (e.g., Frank et al. 2008). Although these studies investigate questions similar to those examined by interactionist and social learning researchers, I review them later in the network theory section.

Preschool. Many gender socialization studies focus on the preschool period. These studies, which are based on interviews with parents (Kane 2006) and observations and interviews at day care centers (e.g., Cahill 1989; Martin 1998) and sporting events (Messner 2000), describe how toddlers are taught through interactions with others—both adults and other children—about gender appropriate behavior. Martin (1998) offers a unique perspective by focusing on how caretakers shape children's bodily comportment in ways that accord with cultural expectations of femininity and masculinity. She identifies striking differences in the way that preschool teachers interact with and treat girls and boys: Preschool teachers are more likely to discourage girls than boys from engaging in relaxed behaviors (e.g., crawling on the floor, lying down, running) and are more likely to encourage girls than boys to engage in formal behavior (e.g., raising hand, covering nose and mouth when coughing or sneezing). They are also more likely to instruct girls to control their voices by asking them to be quiet or to repeat a request in a quieter, "nicer" voice. Their physical interactions with boys are also more likely to involve disciplinary or restraining actions, a pattern that, Martin suggests, may lead boys to associate physical interaction with struggle and anger. As older children acquire these gender-differentiated ways of moving, they contribute to the socialization process by providing models for younger, same-sex children to follow. The outcome of these learning processes—gender differences in bodily movement among very young children—

contributes to the impression that gender differences in bodily comportment are innate (see also Wilkins et al. this volume).

Studies of gender socialization during the infant and toddler years also highlight the pivotal role of clothing. As Cahill (1989) observed, parents use sartorial symbols (clothing style, clothing color, and hair style) to publically and silently declare their child's sex-class identity, cues that foster a child's sex-classed self-identity and shape others' interactions with the child. Girls' clothing—dresses and tights—create structural constraints that restrict their movement, encouraging less rambunctious play (Cahill 1989; Martin 1998). Pretend dress-up clothing also plays a role in socialization processes as caretakers and peers encourage gender-typical dress and demeanor (e.g., "You're all girl aren't you S--? You're so sweet") and discourage cross-dressing, particularly with older toddlers and boys (Cahill 1989, p. 288; Kane 2006; Martin 1998). In these interactional experiences, children learn the asymmetry in tolerance for gender deviations and, with that, the asymmetry in status associated with each type of gendered display. As Thorne (1993, p. 111) notes, "the label 'sissy' suggests that a boy has ventured too far into the contaminating 'feminine,' while 'tomboys' are girls who can claim some of the positive qualities associated with the 'masculine.'" These interactional experiences appear to be consequential, given the decline in pretend cross-dressing as children age and the participation of older children in its sanctioning (Cahill 1989; Martin 1998), patterns that suggest the children have been "recruited" into the intergenerational transmission of gender norms (Cahill 1986).

Despite these trends, Martin's (2005) content analysis of the child care and parenting literature suggests a slight increase in the acceptability of gender-neutral parenting practices that are not perceived to threaten a child's heterosexuality. Kane's (2006) in-depth interviews with the parents of toddlers also reveal a surprising level of self-reported comfort at the prospect of cross-sex play. Kane asked these parents how they do or would respond to various types of child behavior. Although most of the parents of toddler

boys (23/31) responded negatively to the prospect of their sons playing with what they perceived as highly feminine toys, such as Barbie, skirts, tights, pink or frilling clothing, or nail polish, two-thirds (21/31) were comfortable with them playing with toys tied to family and caring activities, such as dolls, doll houses, kitchen centers, and/or tea sets. In addition, although a few parents of toddler daughters expressed discomfort at the prospect of their daughter playing with traditionally masculine toys, no parent gave only negative responses to this scenario. Thus, although gender socialization processes remain powerful, parents today appear less concerned than in the past with steering their sons away from nurturant behaviors and skills.

Grade school and high school. A wealth of qualitative studies document socialization processes among older children. These studies are based on observations and interviews with children and adults in elementary, middle, and high schools and at extra-curricular and sporting events, and they focus primarily on socialization processes among the children, showing how children themselves use the rewards of popularity (Adler and Adler 1998; Adler et al. 1992) and the punishment of teasing, insults, and homophobic and feminine name calling (Eder 1991; Ferguson 2000; McGuffey and Rich 1999; Pascoe 2007; Simon et al. 1992) to communicate peer group gender norms. They also document the power of gossip to develop, clarify, and communicate norms (Simon et al. 1992) and moral boundaries (Fine 1986). Some of the studies also highlight the role of organizational social structure (e.g., gender segregated play areas, the absence of female coaches in children's sports teams) and culture (e.g., beauty images in the media) to convey normative information about gender (e.g., Kessler et al. 1985; Messner 2009; Milkie 1999; Thorne 1993).

These studies offer a fairly consistent picture of the types of behaviors, skills, and attributes that are rewarded by children, parents, teachers, coaches, organizational structures, and cultural media: boys are especially likely to be rewarded for athletic prowess (Adler et al. 1992; Eder

and Parker 1987; Kreager 2007; Messner 2009), toughness and emotional stoicism (Eder and Parker 1987; McGuffey and Rich 1999; Messner 2009), aggressiveness and competitiveness (Eder and Parker 1987; Kreager 2007; McGuffey and Rich 1999; Messner 2009; Pascoe 2007), disregard for authority (Ferguson 2000; Kessler et al. 1985), moderate academic skills (neither extremely good nor extremely poor) (Adler et al. 1992), sexual aggression and prowess (Adler et al. 1992; Ferguson 2000; Pascoe 2007), and sexual permissiveness (Kreager and Staff 2009), while girls are more likely to be rewarded for an attractive appearance (Adler et al. 1992; Eder and Parker 1987; Milkie 1999), a communal orientation (Thorne 1993), a romantic interest in boys (Simon et al. 1992), parents' high socioeconomic status and laissez-faire oversight (e.g., freedom to stay out late) (Adler et al. 1992), academic success (Kessler et al. 1985), and sexual non-permissiveness (Kreager and Staff 2009). Children are also punished for failing to display these skills and attributes, with boys being especially vulnerable to teasing and insults for behaviors categorized as feminine or not heterosexual (e.g., Ferguson 2000; McGuffey and Rich 1999; Pascoe 2007).

Limitations

The social learning and symbolic interactionist framework on socialization provides an important explanation for differences in behavioral tendencies: females' greater tendency to behave deferentially and communally and males' greater tendency to behave aggressively, competitively, and assertively. Yet, these general tendencies offer limited predictive power. Women's and men's behavior varies considerably across situations, suggesting that situationally specific factors are important predictors of when and if these differences and inequalities will emerge. And situational pressures themselves also vary across institutional, organizational, and cultural settings. Thus, more variables—both situational and structural—are needed to more effectively explain when and how gender inequalities unfold in a situation.

Structural Perspective

Structural theories of gender inequality emerged, in part, to address limitations in both biological and socialization accounts for gender inequity. According to the structural account (Epstein 1988; Kanter 1977), gender inequalities do not emerge from biology or socialization but are instead rooted in women's weaker position in organizational and institutional structures: women are more likely than men to occupy positions with little institutional power and few opportunities for advancement (Epstein 1988; Kanter 1977), and when they do occupy positions of authority, their under-representation in such positions—that is, their token status—creates a dynamic that disadvantages them (Kanter 1977). Thus, from this perspective, men behave in more domineering and less expressive ways, reach more prestigious occupational positions, accumulate more wealth and status, and do less housework and child care, because they are more likely than women to occupy positions of power and are less likely than women to be a numerical minority in the workplace, the government, the courts, and the family.

Kanter (1977) provided an early articulation of these ideas in a pathbreaking account of the corporate world. Drawing on 5 years of ethnographic research in a multinational corporation, she concluded that gender differences were an outgrowth of structural inequalities. She found, for example, that women do not seek out low-level, dead-end secretarial positions because they possess the nurturant and loyal personalities needed for these positions; instead, they develop those traits because those positions, which are often their only employment option, reward and foster them and provide little opportunity for advancement. If males were placed in the same dead-end jobs, she concluded, they would develop similar traits and personalities. She also found that the few women who reached high-end positions were less likely to succeed than similarly situated men, because their token status skewed the way others perceived them: it increased their visibility, made their differences from the majority (men)

more noticeable, and increased others' tendency to view them through a prism of stereotypes. As a minority, women were also less likely than men to receive beneficial mentorship and networking experiences. Indeed, many of Kanter's networking insights are compatible with current network perspectives discussed later in the chapter.

Epstein (1988) contributed to the structural perspective by amassing a large number of studies showing that what appear to be gender differences are, in fact, "deceptive differences" that grow out of women's weaker structural position and the concomitant ideologies that support the structural order. She summarizes studies that document the structural barriers that women face in numerous realms: the workplace, politics, the courts, the family, and social interaction. Within the workplace, for example, she highlights the role of discrimination in hiring, wages, and task assignment, mistreatment by coworkers and clients, exclusion from informal networks, and limited access to mentoring in male-dominated fields.

The structural account gains support from experiments on exchange, leadership, and conversation dynamics that show that women and men behave similarly when given equal levels of power and/or authority (e.g., Johnson 1993, 1994; Molm and Hedley 1992; Walker et al. 1996). Johnson's (1994) examination of behavior in a formal task group is illustrative. In this study, participants were randomly assigned to the position of manager or employee in one of four types of three-person groups: female or male manager with two female employees or two male employees. The manager's higher formal authority was created by giving him or her higher pay, a nicer office, more complex decision-making tasks, access to information not given to the employees, and instructions to direct and inspect the performance of the employees. Consistent with a structural perspective, being in the managerial position affected numerous verbal behaviors: the managers talked more and made fewer interruptions, overlaps, back channels (e.g., "mmm hmmm"), and qualifiers (e.g., "I mean, I don't know") than the subordinates. Gender, by contrast, had no

effect on verbal behaviors. Gender and the sex composition of the group did, however, affect non-verbal behaviors in a complex way: men smiled more frequently than women in mix-sex groups, women smiled more frequently than men in same-sex groups, and women laughed more frequently in general. Together, Johnson's (1994) findings suggest that position has a stronger effect than gender on verbal behaviors, whereas gender has a stronger effect than position on non-verbal behaviors.

Research growing out of the social structure and individual perspective also supports this approach, showing that gender inequities in feelings of control (Cassidy and Davies 2003; Ross and Mirowsky 1992, 2002; Ross and Wright 1998) and anger (Ross and Van Willigen 1996), self-reported health (Schnittker 2007), attributions for success (Fox and Ferri 1992), care work (e.g., Sarkisian and Gerstel 2004), housework (e.g., Bianchi et al. 2000; Kroska 2004), pay (e.g., Bobbitt-Zeher 2007; Prokos and Padavic 2005), and the ability to leave a severely violent partner (Anderson 2007) can be traced, in part, to women's weaker structural position in the workplace and family and to gender gaps in human capital, such as education, work experience, and field of study. Sarkisian and Gerstel's (1994) research on the gender gap in parental care is illustrative. They show that the gender gap in time assisting parents, with daughters spending more time assisting than sons, becomes nonsignificant when controlling for employment status. And gender differences in parental care among the employed become nonsignificant when controlling for wages and self-employment, with men's higher wages and higher rates of self-employment reducing their time helping their parents. The research on feelings of control is also illustrative of this area. These studies show that the gender gap in feelings of control declines or becomes nonsignificant when controlling for education, income, and employment status. And, among the employed, the gap closes when controlling for job autonomy, job authority, earnings, control over employment schedule, and domestic workload (e.g., Ross and Mirowsky 1992, 2002; Ross and Wright 1998).

Limitations

The structural theory of gender inequality offers a corrective to biological and socialization explanations, but it, nonetheless, has limitations. Some limitations are empirical. First, gender gaps in a host of outcomes, including the wage gap (e.g., Bobbitt-Zeher 2007; Prokos and Padavic 2005), housework contributions (e.g., Hall et al. 1995; Kroska 2004), attributions for success (e.g., Fox and Ferri 1992), and non-verbal behavior (e.g., Johnson 1994), frequently remain even after controlling for a range of structural factors. Thus, equalizing structural conditions (at least as measured in many studies) reduces but often does not eliminate gender inequities. Second, investigations of Kanter's hypotheses regarding the consequences of token status suggest that token status alone does not produce these negative outcomes. Instead, it is token status in combination with being female; men who are tokens do not face the same obstacles that women face and in some settings are even promoted at a faster rate than women (Budig 2002; Williams 1992), although more recent studies suggest the escalator pattern may have diminished (Snyder and Green 2008).

Other limitations are theoretical. First, the perspective offers little insight into the origin of the gender inequities in structural position: why are women consistently in less powerful positions? The perspective also does not fully explicate the micro-level processes that link structural position with gender-differentiated outcomes. The mechanism may be a learning process wherein structural positions expose individuals to varied socializing experiences that, in essence, teach individuals to adopt certain attitudes and behaviors. Or, it may be an interest-based mechanism wherein different structural positions create different interest structures, thereby motivating the development of different attitudes, behaviors, and risk preferences (Halaby 2003). The distinction is important, in part because the two mechanisms have different long-term implications: in the socialization approach, the experiences in the structural position have a lasting effect on attitudes and behaviors, whereas in the interest-based approach, the attitudes and behaviors change as the individual's position changes. Finally, although cultural

factors, such as stereotyped expectations (Kanter 1977, p. 230–237), ideologies, cultural norms, and cultural categories (Epstein 1988), are embedded in the structural theories, the relationship between structural and cultural forces is not clear. For example, little attention is given to the ways that structural inequalities create cultural beliefs (e.g., gender status beliefs and gender stereotypes) that then contribute to gender inequities independent of structural forces, processes that are more fully developed in other social psychological theories, such as status construction theory (Ridgeway 1991). Nor does the structural theory fully specify if or how cultural beliefs accentuate the effects of tokenism, patterns that have been suggested in other investigations (e.g., Roth 2004; Williams 1992).

Doing Gender Perspective

In the 1970s and 1980s, analysts continued to critique the socialization approach for portraying gender as a static attribute that is learned early in life and carried forward (Ferree and Hess 1987; Lopata and Thorne 1978; Stacey and Thorne 1985). As with the structural perspective, the doing gender perspective emerged as an effort to address this limitation, but rather than focusing on the effects of structural position, doing gender theorists focused on the effects of situational pressures. Hence, doing gender theorists highlight the ways that situational and interactional (rather than internal or structural) forces compel individuals to behave in ways that match the gendered expectations for the situation. As West and Zimmerman (1987, p. 126) note, “when we view gender as an accomplishment, an achieved property of situational conduct, our attention shifts from matters internal to the individual and focuses on interactional and, ultimately, institutional arenas.” According to this perspective (also known as the “gender perspective”), gender is “the activity of managing situated conduct in light of normative conceptions of attitudes and activities appropriate for one’s sex category” (West and Zimmerman 1987, p. 127), an activity that is done to avoid being “judged immoral

and incompetent as men and women” (Risman 1998, p. 6). Thus, situational factors are, in essence, the independent variables, and the correspondence between behavior and gender norms is the dependent variable. Although this approach is most closely tied to West, Zimmerman, and Fenstermaker (Berk 1985; Fenstermaker et al. 1991; West and Fenstermaker 1995; West and Zimmerman 1987, 2009), it is rooted in earlier social constructionist and ethnomethodological work (e.g., Garfinkel 1967; Goffman 1977; Kessler and McKenna 1978; Schwalbe and Shay this volume).

The idea that situational pressures compel individuals to behave in gender-normative ways has been very popular. In fact, West and Zimmerman’s 1987 piece is the most cited article in *Gender & Society*’s history. Yet, most of the empirical assessments of this perspective have been qualitative and do not, therefore, systematically assess the effect of situational features on gender-normative behavior. Instead, researchers use qualitative techniques to identify features of a situation (e.g., perceptions of others’ expectations, organizational rules) that appear to contribute to individuals’ tendency to behave in gender-normative ways. These investigations have focused on a range of domains, including parenting (e.g., McMahon 1995), family meal preparation (DeVault 1991), table waiting (Hall 1993), and celebrating in gender-segregated sports settings (Messner 2000). Other doing gender researchers use qualitative methods to identify behaviors, such as family meal preparation (DeVault 1991) or displays of homophobia (Hamilton 2007; Pascoe 2007), that individuals use to create gender-normative displays.

Some doing gender studies are quantitative, however, particularly in the study of housework. A few of the housework studies examine the way that household arrangements affect housework time and, by implication, the pressure to do gender. For example, South and Spitze (1994) examined the gender gap in housework time across six living arrangements (e.g., cohabiting, married, divorced) and found the largest gap in co-residential heterosexual marriages, suggesting that it is the living arrangement that creates the

strongest pressure to display gender through gender-normative housework behavior. In a follow-up study using two waves of panel data, Gupta (1999) established the temporal ordering of these processes, thereby establishing the *causal* effect of co-residential heterosexual marriages on housework time. Other housework researchers use the doing gender perspective to account for the significance of gender as a predictor of housework time when other factors, such as earnings, education, and paid work hours, are controlled (e.g., Hall et al. 1995; Kroska 2004). They argue that if controls for structural factors fail to eliminate a gender difference in housework time, then the unexplained gender difference must be due to (unmeasured) situational pressures to display gender through housework.

The doing gender perspective has also been popular as an explanation for behavior that appears aimed at rectifying gender deviance, compensatory behaviors often termed “deviance neutralization.” Drawing on the doing gender perspective, researchers hypothesize that if individuals are gender deviant in one area, they will feel compelled to display gender in an extreme way in another area. In the study of housework, this framework has been used to interpret the slightly non-linear relationship between spouses’ relative earnings and their housework time, with husbands who are economically dependent on their wives doing slightly less housework than less dependent husbands (Bittman et al. 2003; Brines 1994; Greenstein 2000) and wives who are the primary breadwinners doing slightly more housework than wives who earn a smaller proportion of the couples’ earnings (Greenstein 2000; Schneider 2010) (but see Gupta 2007; Gupta and Ash 2008; Sullivan 2011). The framework has also been used to interpret a range of other patterns: the positive relationship between gender-atypical occupations and gender-normative housework contributions (doing “men’s” or “women’s” chores) (Schneider 2012), the positive relationship between wives’ higher economic status and husbands’ spousal battery (Anderson 1997; Macmillan and Gartner 1999), the heightened use of gender-typical behavior among transsexuals with ambiguous sex characteristics (Dozier 2005), and

spouses’ tendency to characterize the husband’s earnings and employment as more valuable than the wife’s even when the wife’s earnings and/or occupational clout are comparable to or exceed the husband’s (Kroska 2008; Tichenor 1999).

Limitations

Despite—or perhaps because of—its popularity and influence, the doing gender perspective has been the focus of considerable debate and critique. In fact, *Gender & Society* provided a symposium in 2009 to debate these ideas 22 years after West and Zimmerman’s original publication. They also provided a symposium in 1995 to debate West and Fenstermaker’s (1995) closely related “doing difference” approach. Although they vary, the most frequent critique is that the perspective fails to fully articulate the multi-level nature of gender as constituted in social structure, social interaction, and the individual (e.g., Martin 2004; Risman 1998; Schwalbe 2000). For example, Schwalbe (2000) observes that it is not clear in the doing gender perspective how to link accountability processes—that is, the social pressures to behave in gender-normative ways—in one context to larger features of social organization. He notes that individuals hold others accountable for gender-normative displays, because others are holding them accountable; therefore, it is important to consider the full “net of accountability” to understand the structural force behind any one event in which individuals are held accountable for doing gender. Some who advance the structure critique propose extending it by conceptualizing gender as a process that occurs at multiple levels (e.g., Acker 1992; Messner 2000; Ridgeway and Correll 2004), and some even suggest conceptualizing gender *as* a social structure (Risman 1998, 2004) or social institution (Lorber 1994; Martin 2004).

The perspective has other limitations as well. It offers no guidelines regarding when the pressures for gender-normative behavior will vary (Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin 1999) and hence when individuals will be most likely to do gender (Deutsch 2007). It also conceptualizes gender with the binary male/female categories, an approach that some see as inconsistent with

empirical evidence and feminist values (e.g., Schilt 2010, p. 174). Critics have also identified shortcomings in efforts to evaluate the perspective, noting that researchers typically rely on their own cultural knowledge rather than measurement processes to operationalize the dependent variable, that is, the correspondence between individuals' behavior and the situational gender norms (Kroska 1997).

These three broad perspectives—symbolic interactionist and social learning approaches to socialization, structural theory, and doing gender theory—offer broad and often loose claims regarding social behavior. In the next five sections, I outline social psychological theories that advance more specific propositions and also offer insights into the origins of gender inequality. I begin with two theories that emphasize the predictive power of network location: identity theory and network theory. I then review three theories that share a focus on the predictive power of the cultural beliefs and meanings tied to gendered social categories: expectation states theory, affect control theory, and identity control theory.

Network-Based Theories

Identity Theory

Identity theory (Stryker 1968, 1980, 1989; Stryker and Serpe 1994) is a type of structural theory that focuses on the behavioral consequences of network location as reflected in the number and emotional depth of an individual's relationships. According to the theory, extensive and intensive identity commitment increase the salience and centrality of an identity, which, in turn, increase the probability of behavioral enactment of the identity. Both types of identity commitment are defined as the relational costs to losing an identity, although each taps a different type of loss: extensiveness refers to the number of relationships that would be lost, while intensiveness refers to the emotional depth of the relationships that would be lost. Identity salience is defined as the probability of the identity being invoked relative to the individual's other identities, while iden-

tity centrality reflects an identity's importance relative to the individual's other identities. Thus, from an identity theory perspective, gender inequalities grow out of gender differences in the number and emotional depth of social relationships developed through identity occupancy. For example, if socialization processes steer females into developing deeper and more numerous relationships in the parent identity than males (indicating that females have higher commitment to the parent identity than do males), women's parent identity salience and centrality should be higher than men's, which, in turn, should lead women to enact the identity more frequently than men. Similar predictions could be made for employment identities for males. The perspective could also be used to explain gender inequality in educational and occupational pursuits: females may find it easier to develop friendships in female-dominated college classes (e.g., education, nursing) than in other types of classes, which should strengthen the centrality and salience of those classroom identities relative to others, patterns that, in turn, should predict more frequent enactment of those educational and occupational identities.

Lee's (2002, 2005) examination of gendered social networks illustrates the potential of this perspective for understanding occupational segregation. Lee (2002) examined changes in science, math, and engineering (SME) identities among adolescents participating in a science summer camp. He found notable gender differences in the relationships among the identity theory variables across three waves of panel data: SME identity commitments developed during the summer program had a stronger effect on girls' than boys' SME identity salience, centrality, and enactment; SME identity enactments affected boys' later SME identity centrality, while girls' did not; and boys' home-based SME identity commitment and identity centrality were more stable across time than girls'. Lee concluded from these patterns that girls' stronger tendency to form new relationships led them to change their self-meanings at a higher rate than boys. Lee (2005) then investigated that hypothesis in a second study that examined a wider range of identities.

He found, as hypothesized, that girls were more inclined to create new relationships during summer camp, which, in turn, created more change in identity salience, centrality, and enactments for a wide range of identities. Lee's (2002, 2005) findings correspond to findings from recent network studies that show that high school girls are more responsive than high school boys to norms in their social and academic circles regarding math and science class selection (Frank et al. 2008), particularly the academic norms in their same-sex friendships (Riegle-Crumb et al. 2006). Together, these findings—Lee's identity theory studies and the recent network studies—suggest that differential socialization may lead girls to be more influenced than boys by social network norms, which may help account for girls' tendency to opt out of male-dominated math and science classes in high school, decisions that ultimately reduce their representation in SME fields. These findings underscore the value of using network-based variables to understand identity formation and gender stratification, although it is not clear from these studies that gender differences in the number or depth of identity-based relationships (that is, extensive and intensive identity commitment) created the gender-differentiated outcomes.

Limitations

Identity theory provided an early account for how gender differences in network structure shape behavior. And given the growing evidence of the importance of social relationships for educational and occupational pursuits, the theory may be especially useful for understanding gender segregation in labor markets. Yet, the theory is limited in its ability to explain some forms of gender inequality because it explains the frequency and not the form of role enactment; that is, it can account for variation in the likelihood of enacting a role but not what that enactment will entail. This is particularly limiting for roles with gender-differentiated categories (e.g., spouse, parent, sibling) and concomitant gender-differentiated role meanings and expectations. For example, the male spouse identity (husband) is lower in evaluation (Francis and Heise 2006; Kroska 2001), and carries a stronger expectation for breadwinning

(Simon 1995) than the corresponding female spouse identity (wife). Therefore, gender differences in the style of spouse identity enactments are created, in part, by differences in the cultural meanings (and hence expectations) attached to these identities, differences that cannot be easily explained by gender differences in identity commitment, salience, or centrality. Thus, given its focus on the frequency of role enactment, identity theory may be best suited for explaining gender differences in role enactments for identities that do not have (explicit) gender-specific cultural categories (e.g., engineer, friend, manager, student).

The theory also may underestimate the effect of institutional and situational factors in role choice. As MacKinnon and Heise (2010, p. 172) observe, although Stryker's (1968) early statement on identity theory noted that situational factors (e.g., work setting, home setting) may affect the salience of an identity, this observation has not been formally included in the theory; consequently, identity salience is conceptualized in the theory as a trans-situational trait, despite evidence that situational factors affect which identity individuals invoke.

Other limitations are rooted in the empirical assessments of the theory: despite its potential for illuminating social processes, few studies have fully examined its propositions. For example, no study to date has measured the salience hierarchy of respondents' full repertoire of identities, which, as MacKinnon and Heise (2010, p. 102) conclude, is likely to be in the 700–800 range. Instead, researchers typically use proxy measures of identity salience by asking respondents to report the likelihood that they will mention a particular identity when first meeting someone in various situations (Lee 2002) or the likelihood that they will mention identity-based activities when first meeting someone (Stryker and Serpe 1994). Similar limitations exist for measures of identity centrality.

Recently, however, several researchers have drawn on network theory concepts and measures to expand and strengthen the conceptualization and measurement of identity theory concepts (McFarland and Pals 2005; Walker 2011). Walk-

er (2011), for example, uses a new measure of identity salience wherein respondents are asked to generate a list of self-identities relevant to a social group and then rank order them in terms of how they think people in the network think of them. He also adds a concept to the perspective: the network embeddedness of identity-based alters—those who know an individual through a given identity. He shows that the embeddedness of identity-based alters in a personal network is positively related to the salience of that identity. Such developments offer promise for strengthening the explanatory power of the theory.

Network Theory

From a network perspective, inequality, including gender inequality, can be traced to inequalities in the information, opportunities, and resources in individuals' networks (Burt 1992; Granovetter 1973; Smith-Lovin and McPherson 1993b). Thus, network theory shares with the structural perspective a focus on the explanatory power of structural position, but, as with identity theory, it narrows that focus to one type of structural position: network position. Unlike identity theorists, however, network theorists conceptualize networks with a range of attributes that go beyond the number and affective strength of identity-based ties, and they investigate a range of outcomes beyond identity enactment

According to network theory, gender differences in networks begin in childhood and build over time. Smith-Lovin and McPherson (1993b) provide an account of this process that focuses on gender homophily and gender differences in the resolution of friendship problems. According to their account, children's networks begin to become gender-differentiated due to gender homophily among children's play groups, a tendency that may be an outgrowth of gender socialization or a more fundamental gender difference in maturation or activity levels. Either way, gender differences in play style are hypothesized to make it more pleasurable for children to play with other children of the same sex. Gender differences in the information flows to these gender-segregated

circles then create gender-differentiated experiences within the circles. Information flows are different because homophilous tendencies lead adults to spend more time with children of the same sex, with fathers talking to sons about traditionally masculine topics (e.g., cars, football) and mothers talking to daughters about traditionally feminine topics (e.g., fashion, domestic tasks). Gender differences in the way children resolve friendship conflicts also emerge, producing gender differences in the size and heterogeneity of the networks. For example, girls are more likely than boys to resolve intransitive ties (A likes B and B likes C but A does not like C) by dropping a friendship, while boys are more likely to resolve them by adding a friendship (Eder and Hallinan 1978). This difference leads girls to develop smaller, more homogeneous cliques than boys. Smith-Lovin and McPherson (1993b) also propose that these early network differences are later accentuated by women's greater involvement in childrearing, an experience that reduces women's—but not men's—employment related ties (Campbell 1988), network size, network contact frequency (Munch et al. 1997), and occupationally prestigious ties (Song 2012).

In line with the implications of that account, numerous studies suggest that women's network position puts them at a disadvantage in status attainment efforts. For example, white men receive more unsolicited information about job openings through their social networks than do white or Hispanic women, and the gender difference among whites remains significant even when controlling for social capital and a range of other job and socio-demographic characteristics (McDonald et al. 2009). Women also have more females in their networks (Munch et al. 1997), including their job lead networks (Huffman and Torres 2002; McDonald et al. 2009), a pattern that affects the quality of their job leads: among women, the proportion of females in a job lead network is negatively related to the quality of the leads (operationalized by salary); among men, this relationship is nonsignificant (Huffman and Torres 2002). Women's network position within the workplace also puts them at a disadvantage. As discussed early, Kanter (1977) provided an

early account of these dynamics, and more recent studies have elaborated on her conclusions (e.g., Elliott and Smith 2004; Roth 2004). Gorman shows, for example, that women's disadvantage in hiring (Gorman 2005) and promotion decisions (Gorman 2006) in law firms declines as the proportion of female employees, particularly female partners, in the firm increases. Similarly, Cohen and Huffman (2007) show that women's pay disadvantage declines as the proportion of female managers, particularly high-status managers, in a firm increases.

Smith-Lovin and McPherson (1993a) also explain how gender differences in networks may account for women's greater tendency to behave in sensitive, communal, and non-competitive ways: Women's networks include more family ties and fewer employment ties than do men's (Moore 1990). Family ties tend to be multiplex (i.e., involving multiple role relationships, such as sister, babysitter, and friend), whereas employment ties tend to be simplex (i.e., involving a single role relationship), and multiplex ties require more sensitivity and a stronger emotional connection than simplex ties. Therefore, women's more sensitive, communal, and less competitive demeanor may be an outgrowth of their greater embeddedness in multiplex relationships. However, recent findings suggests that today women's and men's networks include an equal proportion of family ties (McPherson et al. 2006), suggesting that this account offers less explanatory power today than in the past.

As noted earlier, several recent studies have documented the importance of social networks for course selection among high school students, particularly high school girls. Riegle-Crumb and her colleagues (2006) show that same-sex friends' grades have a positive effect on girls' tendency to enroll in physics, advanced math, and advanced English and that having predominantly female friends accentuates this effect for physics and advanced math enrollment and has an independent positive effect on advanced math enrollment. Among boys, by contrast, same-sex friends' grades have no effect on advanced class enrollments, and having predominantly same-sex friends reduces rather than increases enrollment

in physics and advanced math classes. Frank et al. (2008) provide related findings, but they conceptualize social circles as local positions, which are clusters of students who take courses that differentiate them from others. They find that advancement in math classes among the girls in a girl's local position and among the girls in her school increase her own tendency to make such an advancement. This pattern does not hold true among boys: math class advancement among the boys in a boy's local position and in his school are unrelated to his own math class advancement. Together these findings suggest the power of social networks to illuminate career decisions and, ultimately, occupational sex segregation.

Limitations

Network theory offers a parsimonious explanation for a wide range of gender inequities. But as with structural theory, it has empirical and theoretical limitations. First, gender gaps in some outcomes remain even after controlling for both network and sociodemographic factors. For example, McDonald et al. (2009) found that white men received significantly more unsolicited job leads than white women even after controlling for both network characteristics and sociodemographic attributes. Therefore, given the network measures and data currently available, it may not be possible to fully account for gender inequalities with network variables alone. Lacking total information on networks, it will be valuable to continue to supplement network models with other types of variables that may reflect the consequences of earlier network location. Second, the mechanism through which networks affect individuals is not specified. As noted for the structural theory, the mechanism could be a learning or socialization process, wherein network experiences shape values and behaviors, and/or an interest-based process, wherein network positions shape individuals' interest structure and hence their behavior. Finally, more systematic merging of the network theory with culturally-based theories, such as expectation states theory or affect control theory, may also be useful. Indeed, the findings from several recent network studies suggest the value of merging network proposi-

tions with insights from expectation states theory (Gorman 2006; Huffman and Torres 2002; Roth 2004).

Culturally-Based Theories

Expectation States Theory

Structural theories fail to explain the emergence of gender inequities in situations where women and men hold equal levels of structural power or authority. Expectation states theory (EST), by contrast, can account for those patterns by showing how cultural beliefs that accord men higher status than women create a gender hierarchy even when women and men occupy the same structural position (Ridgeway and Nakagawa this volume). EST includes multiple theories, so I review three that are frequently applied to gender inequalities: status characteristics theory, multiple standards theory, and status construction theory. I conclude by reviewing the gender framing perspective, which integrates these theories with other social psychological findings and applies them to gender inequality.

Status characteristics theory

Status characteristics theory (Berger et al. 1966, 1972, 1974) is the focal theory from which other expectation states theories have largely emerged. According to status characteristics theory, when individuals in a group work together on a valued task, status characteristics that differentiate them or are relevant to the task affect their expectations about how they and others will perform on the task. Those in the high status group (e.g., male) are expected to perform better than those in the low status group (e.g., female). Although these performance expectations are not always within individuals' awareness, individuals in both the advantaged and the disadvantaged group adopt them. Consequently, the performance expectations function as self-fulfilling prophecies. Individuals in the disadvantaged group, sensing that they may have less to contribute than those of the advantaged group, participate less frequently and defer to those in the advantaged group more frequently,

while those in the advantaged group, sensing that they may have more to offer, participate more frequently and defer less frequently. The differential perceptions also shape the way performances are evaluated: individuals perceive the performance of the advantaged group as more valuable than that of the disadvantaged group, even when these performances are identical. Thus, when status characteristics are activated in problem-solving groups, the actors with the more valued status characteristics become behaviorally dominant: they are granted more opportunities to speak, they participate more frequently, their performances are evaluated more positively, and they are more influential in decision making about solving the problem. The power and prestige hierarchy and expectation hierarchy are mutually reinforcing and stable over time (Berger and Conner 1974).

Status characteristics theory has been used to explain a range of gender inequities in task groups, including gender inequities in influence, participation, performance evaluation, and non-verbal dominance; these patterns are evident in early studies (e.g., Meeker and Weitzel-O'Neill 1977; Pugh and Wahrman 1983) and more recent studies (e.g., Lucas 2003; but see Foschi and Lapointe 2002), although the patterns may not hold up among individuals who are older than 50 (Hopcroft 2006). In mixed-sex groups, men are advantaged on gender-neutral tasks and tasks culturally linked to masculinity, while women are slightly advantaged on tasks linked to femininity. In addition, women in leadership positions are more likely to face resistance (Heilman and Parks-Stamm 2007) and less likely to be influential (Lucas 2003), although the influence disadvantage does not emerge in task groups that occur in settings that endorse women as leaders (Lucas 2003); thus, institutionalizing women as leaders may be a mechanism for addressing some forms of gender stratification in the workplace. Women can also mitigate their influence disadvantage by emphasizing group goals rather than their individual goals (Ridgeway 1982; Shackelford et al. 1996), although this approach requires women to behave in communal ways and may, ironically, perpetuate the stereotype that women lack the ambition needed to be effective leaders.

Multiple standards theory

Multiple standards theory (Foschi 1989, 1996, 2000) elaborates on the status characteristic theory proposition that low status actors, such as females, are held to higher standards when they and others assess their ability. According to the theory, when low status actors perform well, their performance is viewed with skepticism, because they were not expected to perform well; consequently, their good performances are less likely to be viewed as indicative of their ability than the same performance by a high status actor. Double standards that disadvantage women have been documented in a range of settings (Foddy and Smithson 1999; Foschi 2000), although recent studies suggest that the effect is weaker among female evaluators. Foschi et al. (1994) show, for example, that men hold female job applicants to a higher standard than male job applicants, but women do not. Other trends suggest that the explicit use of double standards is less common today than in the past. For example, white adults in the 1970s reported “just” earnings for men that were higher than “just” earnings for women (Jasso and Webster 1997), but such a gender gap was not evident in data collected from college students in the 1990s (Jasso and Webster 1999).

Although the explicit use of double standards may be less common today than in the past, recent workplace studies suggest that double standards are implicitly used in promotion and salary decisions. Using personnel data collected from a large service organization, Castilla (2008) shows that although women are hired at the same salary level as men, women are nonetheless held to higher performance standards for raises: men’s salaries increase at a faster rate than women’s net of performance ratings. Gorman and Kmec (2005) provide related evidence, showing that women in both the U.S. and Britain report having to work harder than men even when a wide range of job characteristics and family responsibility factors are controlled. The large number of controls in these models suggests that the difference is due to the use of higher standards for female employees rather than to differences between the women and the men.

Correll (2001, 2004) applied multiple standards theory and other EST insights to questions related to occupational sex segregation. In both studies, she hypothesized that gender status beliefs create gender-differentiated standards for attributing mathematical performance to ability and that these biased self-assessments help account for gender gaps in occupational choice. Using a national probability sample of high school and college students, she shows that males’ assessment of their own math competence is higher than females’, even when controlling for math grades and test scores (Correll 2001). This pattern did not emerge for verbal competence, suggesting that the math results are a function of gender status beliefs rather than males’ general tendency to overestimate their ability. Math grades and test scores also had a larger effect on females’ self-assessments, suggesting that cultural beliefs about gender allow males to develop and maintain a positive self-assessment in math with less objectively positive feedback. Correll’s findings also suggest that math self-assessments are consequential, because students’ positive self-assessment in math increased their tendency to enroll in a high school calculus course and to choose a college major in the science, mathematics, and engineering field.

Although Correll’s survey results are powerful, they do not definitively show that cultural beliefs created men’s heightened math self-assessments, since an unmeasured feature of math ability—some component not captured in grades and tests—could have created men’s higher self-assessments. Correll (2004) addressed this limitation in a laboratory experiment in which she manipulated the gender beliefs associated with a visual task. In one condition, subjects were shown evidence that males have more ability at the task (the male-advantaged condition), and in the other, they were shown evidence that there are no gender differences in task ability (gender dissociated condition). After exposure to this information, subjects were asked to complete two rounds of twenty trials of the visual tasks. After each round, all subjects were given the same performance feedback. In the gender dissociated condition, no gender differences in self-assessments

were observed, but in the male-advantaged condition, men assessed their ability more positively than did women, a pattern that held across three different indicators of self-assessment. These self-assessments also appeared consequential, because they predicted subjects' reported inclination to pursue an occupational field related to the task. Together these studies show that gender beliefs about ability—even beliefs created in a laboratory—foster biased self-assessments, shaping occupational pursuits in ways that contribute to occupational sex segregation.

Status construction theory

Although status characteristics theory overcomes a limitation of structural theory—its inability to explain the emergence of gender inequity in settings of structural equality—it nonetheless cannot explain how nominal characteristics become status characteristics. However, that issue is addressed in status construction theory (e.g., Berger and Fişek 2006; Ridgeway 1991; Ridgeway et al. 1998; Webster and Hysom 1998). According to this theory, if one group has a small advantage over the other in becoming influential, the processes of social interaction and diffusion can transform a nominal difference between that group and the others (e.g., a gender difference) into a status characteristic. For example, because resources tend to function as status cues in goal oriented interactions (e.g., Stewart and Moore 1992), if historical circumstances give one group, such as men, a slight resource advantage, individuals will be more likely to experience and observe goal oriented interactions wherein men (rather than women) are dominant in the group's status hierarchy. Because the origin of the dominance is often unclear and the nominal characteristic (male) is obvious, individuals will begin to associate the nominal characteristic with high status, creating the belief that men are generally higher status and more competent. The diffusion process is likely to accelerate as those who acquire the belief begin to act on it—even in settings where women and men are resource or power equals—exposing others to experiences that promote the development of this belief. Status hierarchies are especially influential in the socialization process

when they appear to be consensual or legitimated by an authoritative body or figure. If, however, others question the hierarchies, they are less influential in the development of a corresponding status belief (Ridgeway and Correll 2006).

Status construction theory has been supported by several laboratory experiments showing that the theory provides an accurate account for how a status-free characteristic can be transformed into a value-laden characteristic (e.g., Ridgeway et al. 1998; Ridgeway and Correll 2006). Brashears (2008) also investigated the theory using cross-national survey data, focusing specifically on the construction of gender as a status characteristic. Given the desirability of authority positions, he hypothesized that the proportion of female supervisors in a country would have a positive effect on the status of females in that country. He then examined this hypothesis, using individuals' propensity to identify a female as a best friend as the indication of female status, an operationalization rooted in studies showing that individuals seek associations with high status others. Consistent with his status construction theory predictions, the proportion of female supervisors in a country was positively related to country members' tendency to select a female as a best friend, a pattern that held when controlling for gender and other demographic factors related to network structure.

Gender framing perspective

The gender framing perspective is an integration of EST and other social psychological research that provides a multi-level explanation for the persistence of gender inequality in the modern world (Ridgeway 1997, 2011; Ridgeway and Correll 2004). According to this perspective, individuals' continual use of gender as a primary frame for organizing social interaction activates gender status beliefs in most work and domestic settings. Gender status beliefs implicitly shape perceptions and behavior in ways that produce gender inequality even in settings where the systems do not—at least initially—advantage men. These interactions produce inequality directly, as EST research shows, but they also do so indirectly by contributing to the development of organizational policies and social structures

that advantage men over women. Furthermore, because changes in gender beliefs tend to lag behind changes in the distribution of resources and power, individuals tend to use these beliefs to coordinate behavior even when resource distribution systems are gender egalitarian. This tendency then reintroduces gender inequality into practices and policies. In this way, the system is self-sustaining, because both the institutions and the social interactions reinforce the gender status beliefs and because the social interactions tend to introduce inequality into an institution even when the structures of the institution do not disadvantage women.

This perspective can explain many patterns in the gender literature: employers' gender biased decision-making during hiring and promotion processes, the emergence and maintenance of workplace practices and policies that disadvantage women, gender differences in individuals' feelings about their own suitability for gender-typed jobs, and heterosexual couples' economically inefficient divisions of domestic work (Ridgeway 2011). It can also explain how gender inequality emerges in sites of innovation—that is, settings outside established social institutions—such as biotechnology and information technology start-up firms (Ridgeway 2011). More generally, the perspective helps explain how gender inequality persists in the U.S. despite countervailing forces that disrupt men's resource advantage, such as laws prohibiting gender discrimination and the pursuit of economic efficiency.

Limitations

Together the expectation states theories provide a multi-level model that offers a clear articulation of the link between culture and structure. Nonetheless, it has limitations. First, EST relies solely on a one-dimensional construct—status—to explain gender inequality, neglecting other dimensions of meaning associated with gender: evaluation (Kroska 2001, 2002; Langford and MacKinnon 2000), or warmth (Fiske et al. 2002), and activity (Kroska 2001, 2002). As Wood and Ridgeway (2010) note, EST's exclusive focus on status limits the range of phenomena it can explain. The neglect of the evaluation dimension

limits the theory's ability to explain women's more positive socioemotional behavior (Langford and MacKinnon 2000; Ridgeway 2011, p. 85–88) and the backlash and other social sanctions applied to women whose demeanor is considered insufficiently positive or warm (see reviews in Heilman and Parks-Stamm 2007; Rudman and Phelan 2007). Similarly, the neglect of the activity dimension limits the theory's ability to explain gender differences in lively behavior and the role this may play in gender inequality.

Second, the scope conditions of EST have—at least historically—limited the application of these ideas to collectively oriented task groups. Although these groups (e.g., work groups, planning groups, juries) are pervasive, they do not encompass all elements of social life, leaving many realms of social life outside the range of the theory. In recent years, however, researchers have begun to loosen EST's scope conditions and evaluate its propositions in a broader range of situations. These studies show that EST ideas can help account for gender inequities in hiring, promotions, and wages for parents (Correll et al. 2007) and, as noted above, in self-assessments of ability in traditionally male fields, such as science (Correll 2001, 2004) and entrepreneurship (Thébaud 2010a). It will be valuable to see continued work along these lines. It will also be useful to see EST predictions tested in more diverse types of task groups. Today, most EST experiments are done in very small (2–3 person) task groups that include only computer-based confederates; researchers rarely attempt testing these propositions on task groups that are larger or include human confederates. Yet, such investigations are needed to understand the dynamics of gender stratification processes in larger groups and to examine EST propositions in face-to-face interactions.

Affect Control Theory

While expectation states theory elucidates the emergence and maintenance of gender inequality in problem-solving groups, affect control theory illuminates the emergence and maintenance of

gender inequality in social interactions more generally. And unlike EST, affect control theory (ACT) uses three dimensions (evaluation, potency, and activity) to characterize gendered social categories. From an ACT perspective, gender inequality is rooted in the differences in the cultural meanings tied to gendered identities (e.g., girl vs. boy, woman vs. man, wife vs. husband) and to females' and males' self-identities (e.g., myself). ACT encompasses two separate but interlocking theories: the original affect control theory (Heise 1979, 2007, 2013; MacKinnon 1994; Smith-Lovin and Heise 1988) and the affect control theory of selves (Heise 2007; MacKinnon and Heise 2010). I discuss each below.

Affect control theory

ACT begins with the premise that cognitions about all social concepts—identities, behaviors, settings—have a relatively fixed affective connotation. These fundamental sentiments vary along the three universal dimensions of meaning identified by Osgood et al. (1975) in their cross-cultural research: evaluation (good vs. bad), potency (powerful vs. weak), and activity (active vs. inactive). Using the semantic differential scale, affect control theorists have collected evaluation-potency-activity (EPA) profiles for thousands of concepts in several cultures. ACT's main proposition is that individuals create and perceive events in ways that maintain these preexisting impressions of themselves, their interactants, and other elements of the situation. Affect control theorists use empirically-derived impression formation equations to predict the way interactions affect observers' impressions of actors, objects, and behaviors.

According to ACT, individuals try to confirm the fundamental sentiments tied to their definition of the situation, but they are not always successful: sometimes an interaction makes some element of the situation seem more or less good, potent, or active than expected. This non-confirmation is quantified in ACT with a deflection score, with high deflection scores indicating that an event seems unlikely or uncanny (Heise and MacKinnon 1988). An event that seems unlikely is expected to motivate individuals in the event

to behave in ways that bring the transient impressions (the momentary impressions created by the event) into line with the fundamental sentiments. If that is not possible, they are expected to revise the way they understand the event by redefining the behavior or attributing a modifier or even a new, institutionally appropriate identity to the actor or object. ACT's impression formation equations are contained in *Interact*, a computer program that simulates social interaction using ACT principles.¹ The program generates ACT predictions regarding social interaction, emotions, and trait and identity attributions.

From an ACT perspective, gender inequalities emerge from gender-differentiated role meanings. Female role identities (e.g., girl, woman, wife, female student) are generally higher in evaluation, lower in power, and a bit higher in activity than the male counterparts (boy, man, husband, male student) (Kroska 2001; Langford and MacKinnon 2000). These gender-differentiated role meanings are learned through socialization processes, including the acquisition of language (Hollander and Abelson, this volume; MacKinnon and Heise 2010), caretakers' explicit socialization (Smith-Lovin and Robinson 1992, p. 134, 138–139), and exposure to routinized behavioral sequences (Heise 1979, p. 140; Smith-Lovin and Douglass 1992). Once the role meanings are acquired, individuals affirm them through their behavior and perceptions: females behave in nicer, less powerful, and more lively ways than males, and others treat and perceive females and males in ways that further affirm these gender differences. Together, these processes steer males into more powerful and less nurturant positions in social interaction and within organizations and contribute to the creation of institutional practices that reinforce the fundamental sentiments driving the inequality.

Smith-Lovin and Robinson (1992) provided an early illustration of how the higher potency and lower evaluation tied to male role identities can create gender inequality in interruptions in conversation. Using *Interact*, they simulated

¹ *Interact* can be accessed here: <http://www.indiana.edu/~socpsy/ACT/interact.htm>.

conversations in student dyads to develop ACT predictions regarding interruptions. The simulations showed that ACT predicts that students (both female and male) will be more likely to interrupt a female student than a male student who dominates conversation and that male students will be more likely than female students to do the interrupting, regardless of the gender of the conversationally dominant student. They then evaluated those hypotheses using data from conversations within 29 six-person groups, and the results largely confirmed the predictions.

I drew on ACT to illuminate patterns in the housework literature, showing that the potency differences in gendered family identities—with male identities rated higher than the female counterparts—can help explain gender inequality in family work divisions (Kroska 1997). ACT impression formation effects show that actors can affirm a potent identity, in part, by engaging in behaviors that are powerful and, if the recipient is good (as all family identities are), behaviors that are nice. Breadwinner activities, such as support and protect, are nicer and more potent than housework and child care activities, suggesting that housework and child care are more identity affirming for wives than husbands and that breadwinner behaviors are more identity affirming for husbands than wives. Impression formation effects also show that individuals can retain their potency most effectively as an object of action if the received actions are nice, weak, and lively. These effects further suggest that a husband can sustain his image of heightened potency if his wife serves him through domestic work (nice, gentle, and sometimes lively behavior) and that a wife will sustain her image of lower potency if her husband financially supports her (strong, quiet acts). Together these results suggest that differences in the potency attached to gendered family roles help explain gender inequities in contributions to unpaid and paid work in the family.

A recent extension of ACT can also be used to explain men's conversational dominance in groups larger than the dyad (Heise 2013). This extension shares the main ACT proposition that individuals work to affirm the fundamental

sentiments tied to elements of a situation, but it also proposes that when individuals are interacting in groups, the individual who is most likely to speak next is the individual whose transient identity has deviated the most from the fundamental sentiments associated with his or her situational identity. Thus, according to ACT, men are more likely than females to dominate in group settings because they are more likely than females to experience deflection when they are not talking; that is, males' higher potency identities are less likely to be affirmed through the passive behavior of listening. These turn-taking propositions can be simulated with *GroupSimulator*, a computer program that simulates ACT predictions for interpersonal behaviors, affective tensions, and emotions in groups ranging in size from three to 25.²

Heise (2013) evaluated this extension of ACT by comparing the theory's predictions to patterns in Strodbeck and Mann's (1956) mock jury data—data collected in the mid-1950s from subjects selected from Chicago jury pools. These mock jurors listened to a tape recording of a trial and deliberated to reach a judgment. The deliberations were recorded, transcribed, and coded using Bales's Interaction Process Analysis (IPA). Strodbeck and Mann's report summarizes the gender differences in the distributions of IPA actions and in the frequency of participation for 127 jurors. Heise used *GroupSimulator* with 1978 U.S. EPA profiles (to approximate the 1950s sentiments) to model turn-taking in this type of group. The simulation results strongly correlate with the jury data ($r=0.91-0.92$), providing substantial support for the theory and accurately predicting male jurors' higher rate of participation. *GroupSimulator* offers a powerful tool for generating predictions about gender inequality in group settings, including large groups, and as Heise's (2013) study demonstrates, these predictions can be evaluated with the IPA coding system. Future work testing *GroupSimulator* predictions against predictions derived from EST would be especially valuable.

² *GroupSimulator* can be accessed here: <http://www.indiana.edu/~socpsy/ACT/interact.htm>.

More generally, ACT provides a multi-level model that links cultural meanings to behavior. It also suggests how the enactment of roles reinforces fundamental sentiments, thereby reproducing culture. In addition, because the measures are not culturally specific—all elements of the situation are operationalized with the universal dimensions of meanings—the theory can be applied cross-culturally, a process that involves gathering data on fundamental sentiments and impression formation in the other cultures. Indeed, ACT researchers have done just that for several countries, including Canada, China, Japan, and Germany. In this way, the theory provides both conceptual and methodological tools for addressing calls to examine multi-level processes in the creation of gender inequality (McCall 2005).

Affect control theory of selves

Although ACT explains how gender inequality emerges from gender-differentiated role meanings, it does not explain how individuals choose identities to enact, an important step in the gender stratification process. However, that question is addressed in the affect control theory of selves (ACTS) (Heise 2007; MacKinnon and Heise 2010), an extension of ACT that specifies the interrelationships among self, identities, and social institutions. According to ACTS, individuals seek to enact identities with sentiments as close as possible to their fundamental self-sentiments—the evaluation, potency, and activity associated with “myself as I really am” or “I myself.” Thus, fundamental self-sentiments are trans-situational self-meanings that influence identity selection. Identity enactments that are similar to the self-sentiments create a sense of self-actualization, while non-confirming identity enactments—those with EPA meanings that differ from the self-sentiments—create a sense of inauthenticity. As with role meanings, female self-sentiments are higher in evaluation and activity and lower in potency than male self-sentiments (Kroska 2002; Lee 1998), suggesting that females are motivated to enact identities that are, in general, nicer, less powerful, and more active than the identities that males are motivated to enact.

Yet, self-actualization is not the only factor hypothesized to affect identity selection: the individual’s position within the society’s institutional structure and alter-casting by influential others also affect this process. Structural constraints (e.g., the need for employment) may force individuals to regularly enact identities that are inconsistent with their self-sentiments. Likewise, dominant others may impose identities upon an individual. Consequently, external factors—structural demands and others’ behavior—sometimes force individuals to adopt inauthentic identities. According to ACTS, when this happens, individuals will try to correct those feelings of inauthenticity by later enacting another identity that differs from the self-sentiments in the opposite direction. In this way, individuals can actualize their self-sentiments cumulatively; although neither identity is independently confirmatory, the two together confirm self-sentiments. These ACTS processes are modeled using a cybernetic and mathematical model similar to the one underlying ACT (Heise 2007, Chapter 16).

Heise (2007, p. 74) provides a simple example of these processes: If a middle-class Canadian male takes a job as a musician, the identity of musician is unlikely to be powerful and active enough to actualize his self-sentiments; consequently, his time at work will create a sense of inauthenticity. But, he can correct this feeling by adopting other identities during his time away from work that are more powerful and active than his self-sentiments. He may, for example, enact an athlete identity during his non-work time, an identity that is likely to be higher in potency and activity than his self-sentiments. Although neither the musician nor the athlete identity independently actualizes his self-sentiments, the combination of the two do.

Institutional setting is also hypothesized to affect identity selection. As individuals move from one institution to another (e.g., from home to work), the new institutional setting changes the range of identities that can be invoked. Thus, ACTS shares with identity theory the idea that identities are ordered in a salience hierarchy shaped by the identities’ importance to a person’s self-meaning. But, unlike identity theory, ACTS

proposes that an identity's placement in the hierarchy is also determined by situational factors: the identity's potential for redeeming situational identities that fail to actualize fundamental self-sentiments and the identity's suitability for the institutional setting.

MacKinnon and Heise (2010, Chapter 6) provide several tests of ACTS propositions. They show, for example, that the distances between college students' self-sentiments and their EPA ratings of 58 identities are negatively and significantly correlated with the students' rating of how much those identities describe them. Using data estimated from published records, they also show that sociopaths' self-sentiments predict the types of identities sociopaths typically adopt. In addition, they use computer simulations to show in concrete terms how a given self-sentiment can be expressed through different identities in various institutions. These simulations and analyses suggest that ACTS offers a powerful tool for predicting gender differences in identity adoption.

ACTS provides a parsimonious framework for understanding gender differences in career and educational aspirations (e.g., Charles and Bradley 2009; Correll 2001, 2004; Lee 1998), part of the supply-side explanation for occupational sex segregation. For example, Lee (1998) found that the closer an adolescent's self-sentiments were to the EPA of a science identity (e.g., biologist, physicist) the stronger the student's interest in becoming that type of scientist. And because these adolescents—students participating in summer science camps—had most of the typical gender-differentiated self-sentiments (the females saw themselves as nicer, more active, more cooperative, softer, and more emotional than the males saw themselves), the types of science identities they were interested in pursuing were similarly differentiated. These self-other comparisons led girls to express greater interest than boys in becoming a physician, a biologist, or a psychologist and led boys to express greater interest than girls in becoming a mathematician, a physicist, or an engineer. These findings coincide with ACTS predictions and provide at least a partial explanation for the persistence of occupational sex segregation.

Limitations

Together, ACT and ACTS provide a multi-level model that outlines the interconnections among social institutions, roles, and selves. Yet, theoretical and empirical questions remain. The theory does not have a mechanism for determining which element of a situation will be redefined when individuals cannot reduce deflection with behavior. Nelson (2006) showed that behaviors are the element most likely to be redefined when individuals read about an event in the news, but little other empirical work has examined this issue. I hypothesized that if individuals are actors in the situation, strong identity commitment will reduce the tendency to change the self-identity (Kroska 1997), but this hypothesis has not been investigated. And even if identity commitment proves useful for predicting the likelihood of such changes, additional propositions are needed to anticipate which of the non-self-identity elements (e.g., behavior, object) will be redefined when the self-identity is not redefined. It may also be useful to incorporate ACTS insights into such investigations. For example, the affective distance between an identity and the individual's self-sentiments may affect the individual's readiness to use identity redefinition to deal with deflection.

Despite the potential of affect control theory to account for gender stratification, few studies have specifically applied this perspective to these questions. In many ways, the development of theoretical and methodological tools in the theories has progressed more quickly than the applications and assessments. Future work evaluating the theories' predictions regarding gender stratification is needed. And, as the field increasingly moves toward multi-level models, it will be especially useful to investigate the ACTS propositions regarding the interplay between individuals and institutions.

Identity Control Theory

As with ACT, identity control theory (Burke 1991, 2006; Burke and Stets 2009; Stets 2005) models behavior using a cybernetic control

system. According to identity control theory (ICT), individuals work to keep their perceptions of their self-meanings in a situation (the input) consistent with their identity standard—the self-meaning that individuals hold for themselves in a role. When they perceive a mismatch between the two, they feel distress, which motivates them to change their behavior (the output) in a way that creates a match between future input and the identity standard. Thus, from an ICT perspective, gender inequality results from gender differences in identity standards—standards that emerge from cultural norms and personal experience.

Although both ACT and ICT propose a control model focused on the predictive power of cultural meanings, the two theories differ in several ways. Unlike ACT, ICT predicts that individuals work to control only the meanings attached to their own identities; they are not expected to explicitly work to maintain the meanings attached to other elements of the situation. ICT's behavior predictions are also not derived from impression formation equations; instead, they are developed with a variety of techniques. Some researchers draw on other studies to predict what types of behaviors will affirm an identity (e.g., Stets 1995; Stets and Burke 1996) or reduce a discrepancy between the input and the identity standard (e.g., Stets and Burke 2005). Others derive predictions empirically as the behavior that will reduce the residual from a regression of behavior meanings on the identity standard (Riley and Burke 1995) or reduce the error in a similar type of structural equation model (Burke 2006). ICT also assumes that individuals develop somewhat unique identity standards for each of their role-identities, meanings that develop through cultural socialization and unique personal experiences. This feature of the theory puts it closer to a processual (and less structural) symbolic interactionist model of role meanings than either ACT or identity theory, which both assume more consensus in the meaning of cultural roles. Finally, unlike ACT, the dimensions of meaning that capture identity standards are not established a priori but are, instead, determined through preliminary research that is conducted before control process propositions are evaluated.

In ICT, the gender identity standard is framed as a master identity that modifies the meanings attached to role identities, such as spouse and parent (Burke and Cast 1997; Stets and Burke 1996). And ICT researchers have determined that the relevant dimension of meaning for this identity is the femininity-masculinity continuum, a dimension they usually measure with the Personal Attributes Questionnaire (PAQ) (Spence and Helmreich 1978) (e.g., Burke 2006; Stets 1995), a scale that includes items such as: never cries/cries very easily; very competitive/not at all competitive; not at all aware of the feelings of others/very aware of the feelings of others.

ICT can help account for gender differences in dominance, because men tend to have more masculine gender and spouse identity standards, and masculine identity standards are associated with dominant behavior. For example, Stets (1995) showed that female college students have a more feminine gender identity standard than male college students and that a feminine gender identity is negatively related to the reported tendency to control one's dating partner. ICT has also been used to explain gender inequality in housework contributions. For example, Burke (2006) used three waves of panel data to show that the femininity of a gender identity (measured with PAQ) increases the femininity in the spouse identity standard (i.e., feeling that one should do traditionally feminine domestic chores and should not perform breadwinning activities), which, in turn, increases the femininity in the spousal role performance (i.e., performing feminine domestic chores and not performing breadwinning acts). He also found that discrepancies between the femininity of the spousal identity standard and the femininity of spousal role performance move the spouse identity and the role performance in a direction that reduces the discrepancy.

Limitations

Identity control theory's use of personalized identity scores for each individual offers researchers a more processual symbolic interactionist model of role meanings than provided by IT and ACT. The theory also provides a model for exploring the factors that create change in these per-

sonalized self-meanings (Burke and Stets 2009, p. 180–186). Yet, the theory has limitations. The use of different dimensions of meaning for each identity domain limits researchers' ability to compare findings across settings. As Smith-Lovin and Robinson (2006, p. 170) note when comparing ICT to ACT, ICT "applies a more detailed measurement approach that picks up more local and nuanced aspects of meaning, but loses the power of moving across institutions and cultures freely and of having a common metric with which to build a mathematical model." ICT's detailed measurement approach also presents practical challenges since researchers must conduct preliminary research to determine what dimensions of meaning can be used to characterize an identity before conducting research to evaluate the theory's propositions. Although the relevant dimension for gender identity standards appears established, researchers would still have to conduct preliminary research on identity standard dimensions if they wished to examine the way that gender identities moderate the character of other types of identities for which the dimension of meanings are unknown (e.g., worker, friend, politician).

Conclusions and Future Directions

As this review suggests, social psychological theories offer interrelated perspectives on the processes behind the construction of gender stratification. The symbolic interactionist and social learning theories highlight the critical processes of cultural learning that occur throughout the life course. Indeed, the other theories I reviewed either presume a culturally socialized actor, familiar with the behavioral expectations and cultural meanings associated with gender, or make learning processes an explicit part of the model (network theory and status construction theory). Yet, socialization processes alone offer limited predictive power. Thus, the structural and doing gender perspectives provide a corrective to a pure socialization model by highlighting the way that structural position and interactional pressures contribute to gender inequality. Network theory and identity theory provide more specific types

of structural theories that highlight the role of gender-differentiated networks in the dissemination of information and values, thereby producing gender-differentiated selves (identity theory) and gender-stratified opportunities, experiences, and interests (network theory). Expectation states theories delineate the origin and consequences of gender inequality in problem solving groups: status characteristic theory shows how gender status beliefs produce male-dominated task groups, multiple standards theory shows how gender status beliefs create double standards for the attribution of ability, and status construction theory shows how a small structural inequity can lay the groundwork for the construction of the status beliefs that drive these inequities. The gender framing perspective links EST to other insights, showing how the slow pace of belief change leads to the use of gender status beliefs even in settings of structural equality and how gender status beliefs and male-dominated interactions contribute to the development of organizational policies and practices that contribute to gender inequality. The two affect control theories offer similar insights. ACTS shows how gender differences in fundamental self-sentiments—males' lower evaluation, higher potency, and lower activity—motivate the adoption of identities that are similarly differentiated by gender, while ACT shows how the enactment of those identities produces gender-differentiated behavior, with men behaving in more domineering and less sensitive, cooperative, and nurturant ways. The theories also show how stable cultural sentiments produce role behaviors and institutional practices, which, in turn, reinforce the fundamental sentiments underlying the gender inequalities. Identity control theory offers related insights, showing how gendered identity standards motivate males to behave in more aggressive and less sensitive ways than females.

Although the social psychological theories of gender stratification are well-developed and growing, I nonetheless see two areas that warrant further attention: multi-level models and intersectionality. While multi-level research has begun, particularly with cross-organizational research (e.g., Cohen and Huffman 2007; Gorman

2005), fewer researchers have attempted cross-cultural studies (but see Brashears 2008; Thébaud 2010b). Given that gender status beliefs (central to EST) and affective meanings (central to ACT) are likely to be shared within the same culture, the dearth of cross-cultural studies limits our ability to fully examine the multi-level nature of these processes. Of course, cross-cultural studies present empirical and theoretical challenges, but the standardized and cross-culturally meaningful measures within several social psychological theories (e.g., proportion of stays in EST, EPA profiles in ACT) make cross-cultural studies feasible. ACT also has tools for generating cross-cultural hypotheses. ACT researchers have collected EPA profiles for thousands of concepts in several countries. These profiles and the country-specific ACT impression formation effect equations are all stored in *Interact*, providing ample opportunities to generate empirically-grounded hypotheses regarding the way that cultural context affects social interaction and, in turn, gender inequality. *GroupSimulator* can also be used to generate cross-cultural hypotheses regarding the dynamics in large groups. Researchers can import EPA profiles from multiple countries and contrast group dynamics across countries. Of course, researchers can also collect their own EPA data from subcultures or countries not represented in the *Interact* dictionary to explore other types of cross-cultural comparison.

Social psychologists can also contribute to work on intersectionality (see Howard and Renfrow, this volume). Several analysts have noted that the theoretical and empirical developments in the area of intersectionality are somewhat limited (e.g., Choo and Ferree 2010; Leicht 2008). Yet, all of the theoretical models I reviewed could be used to develop intersectionality hypotheses. And, in fact, some have already been used to address such questions, even if the research is not labeled as such. EST researchers investigate intersectionality through studies that cross multiple diffuse status characteristics. This research shows that multiple status characteristics are combined through the principle of organized sets (Berger et al. 1977, 1992). According to this principle, individuals combine positive

and negative status information within separate subsets. An attenuation effect shapes the way the information is combined within the subsets such that the more status information already in a subset, the less the effect of additional status information. The strengths of positive and negative subsets are then summed to create the individual's aggregated expectations for self and other, which then shapes behavior. In a pivotal test of this principle, Berger et al. (1992) pitted hypotheses derived from this principle against hypotheses derived from three competing combining principles, offering solid evidence in support of the organized sets principle. This principle provides a guide to examining the consequences of multiple forms of inequality in other areas if researchers loosen the theory's scope conditions and explore its applicability to a wider range of settings.

ACT models intersectionality through amalgamated identities, work that began in the 1980s (Averett and Heise 1988) and continues today (Heise 2007). These findings are accessible to researchers through *Interact*. For example, the modifiers "black" and "white" or "poor" and "rich" can be crossed with "woman" and "man" in the recent U.S. dictionary in *Interact*. These amalgamated identities can be used to generate empirically-based hypotheses regarding the way that others are likely to treat individuals occupying these identities, how the actors themselves are likely to behave, and the kinds of emotions they are likely to feel across various situations. Such empirically-based hypotheses are especially valuable given the challenges to generating hypotheses about intersecting lines of inequality (McCall 2005). Despite its potential, however, analysts have yet to use *Interact* in such a way. Given that ACT propositions are empirically-based, it would be reasonable to start work in this area by simply conducting multiple simulations to generate broad empirically-based hypotheses. If the EPA profiles for the modifiers, identities, or behaviors of interest are not available in the relevant dictionary, the data can be collected (in multiple languages) using the computer program, *Surveyor* (Heise 2010). Those EPA profiles can then be imported into *Interact*.

In summary, social psychology's theoretical insights provide a way to integrate and explain many of the complex processes behind gender inequality. The early perspectives emphasized the role of socialization, structural position, and interactional pressures, while more recent theories piece these components together into more systematic, often multi-level, predictions. While the theories offer crucial insights into the stratification process, they can nonetheless be strengthened with multi-level investigations and with examinations of the intersection of gender inequality with other forms of inequality. These types of investigations are possible if social psychologists fully utilize their theoretical and methodological tools. ACT's computer simulation programs provide ways to model complex social interactions within the U.S. and in other countries, illuminating the way that culture shapes social interaction in dyads and in larger groups, while EST's standardized measures of influence allow researchers to precisely identify the influence of multiple types of inequality, thereby strengthening models of intersectionality. Future studies that capitalize on this potential provide a promising avenue for expanding the explanatory power of our theories of gender inequality.

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Frank L. Samson and Lawrence D. Bobo

Introduction

Sociologists ordinarily assume that social structure drives the content of individual level values, attitudes, beliefs, and ultimately, behavior. In some classic models this posture reaches a point of essentially denying the sociological relevance of any micro-level processes. In contrast, psychologists (and to a degree, economists) operate with theoretical models that give primacy to individual level perception, cognition, motivation, and choice. Within the domain of studies of ethno-racial relations, each of these positions has modern advocates. From the sociologically deterministic vantage point Edna Bonacich trumpets the “deeper’ level of reality” exposed by class analytics (1980, p. 9), while Omi and Winant (1994, p. 59) focus on “racialized social structure.” Others, while not so completely rejecting micro-level analyses, nonetheless call for primary attention to so-called “structural racism” (e.g., Bonilla-Silva

(1997)). Within psychology we have seen an explosion of work on implicit attitudes or unconscious racism that more than ever centers attention on the internal psychological functioning of the individual. We argue here that, in general, a committed social psychological posture that examines both how societal level factors and processes shape individual experiences and outlooks and how the distribution of individual attitudes, beliefs, and values, in turn, influence others and the larger social environment provides the fullest leverage on understanding the dynamics of race. Specifically we argue in this chapter that ethno-racial attitudes, beliefs, and identities play a fundamental constitutive role in the experience, re-production, and process of change in larger societal patterns of ethno-racial inequality and relations.

Some basic conceptual anchoring of *attitude*, *race*, and *ethnicity* is necessary. By *attitude*, we refer to “a favorable or unfavorable evaluation of an object” (Schuman et al. 1997, p. 1). *Race* typically involves socially constructed perceptions of phenotypic differences, variation in skin color and tone, hair texture, eye shape and other facial features while *ethnicity* refers to variations in language, attire, aspects of self-presentation, and other cultural behaviors. Ethno-racial attitudes thus reflect a variety of race and ethnicity associated objects: racial and ethnic groups and their attributes, features and assessments of relations between such groups, intergroup contact, and public policies pertinent to either race or ethnicity. Ethno-racial attitudes are built up and constituted in environments structured to correspond to

Frank L. Samson was supported in part by funding from the National Science Foundation awarded to the University of Miami (Award No.: 0820128) during the writing of this chapter.

F. L. Samson (✉)
Department of Sociology, University of Miami, 5202
University Drive, 120D Merrick Building, Coral
Gables, FL 33146, USA
e-mail: flsamson@miami.edu

L. D. Bobo
Department of Sociology, Harvard University
33 Kirkland Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA

socially constructed and recognized ethno-racial markers or designations (Omi and Winant 1994; See and Wilson 1988).

With only a limited amount of space to review a wide range of scholarship on the social psychology of racial inequality, this chapter focuses on just three key areas. First, we summarize trends reflecting important changes in ethno-racial attitudes. Next, we briefly review major contemporary theoretical approaches in the social psychology of racial prejudice, including a theory capturing the current tenor and behavioral implications of modern ethno-racial attitudes, labeled aversive racism. Lastly, we address how ethno-racial attitudes affect processes of labor market inequality, residential segregation, and politics and public policy.

Changing Ethno-Racial Attitudes

Sociologists have systematically studied change in ethno-racial attitudes since at least the 1950s (Hyman and Sheatsley 1956). Critical baseline surveys were conducted in the early 1940s and then replicated in subsequent national surveys. University of Chicago scholars famously reported these studies in a series of *Scientific American* articles (Garth et al. 1978; Greeley and Sheatsley 1971; Hyman and Sheatsley 1964, 1956). A more expansive review and integration of available sources was undertaken by Howard Schuman and colleagues in the book, *Racial Attitudes in America: Trends and Interpretations* (Schuman et al. 1985) and later broadened conceptually and extensively updated (Schuman et al. 1997).

Most of this work has focused on the attitudes of white Americans towards blacks. One recent extensive summary of the General Social Survey stressed the following key patterns (Bobo et al. 2012). First, surveys point to a large positive normative transformation in ethno-racial attitudes. Since the 1970s, white attitudes have shown a clear and steady decline in support for school segregation, the right to segregate neighborhoods, laws allowing homeowner discrimination in selling a house, and laws banning interracial marriage.

Second, whites prefer to maintain their social distance from non-white minorities. While white support for school segregation has assuredly declined, white respondents' objection to sending their children to a school with black children increases as the proportion of blacks increases. As will be discussed in greater depth later, white attitude towards residential segregation parallels these school segregation findings. As a third measure of social distance, while white opposition to interracial marriage has declined overall, whites still prefer Hispanic/Asian marriage partners for one of their family members and in 2008, about one-fourth of whites surveyed were still opposed or strongly opposed to a family member marrying a black person.

Third, white support for inequality ameliorating policies and government intervention is limited and has remained so for decades. White attitude regarding the denial of government's special obligation to improve blacks' living standard after such lengthy discrimination has hovered between 50 and 60% from the mid-1970s through 2008. Forty percent of whites in 1990 felt it was somewhat likely that affirmative action would hurt whites' job or promotion prospects, a perspective that half of whites expressed in 2008. However, while income-targeted policy interventions are more popular than race-targeted ones, substantial percentages of whites still supported black-targeted programs such as early childhood education and college scholarships. Approximately 90% of whites opposed preferential hiring or promotion for blacks, a percentage that has not budged since 1994 when the question was first asked.

Fourth, racial stereotypes have become less categorical and more gradational, departing from earlier assumptions of absolute biological differences towards more qualified, group-based comparisons on stereotypical traits. The belief that blacks are inherently less intelligent than whites has declined. While 40% of whites in 2008 believed that blacks tend to be lazier than whites, this percentage has dropped from over 60% in 1990. More whites express belief in blacks' relative lack of industriousness than the belief that blacks tend to be less intelligent. Relatedly, ex-

planations for black-white socioeconomic inequality have also shifted towards more culturally rooted attributions (i.e., need to work harder), rather than the belief that blacks have less inborn ability. Lack of motivation or willpower has been either the first or second preferred rationale for black-white socioeconomic inequality since 1977, compared to lack of education (which surpassed motivation in the early 1990s), inborn ability or discrimination.

We should note it is important not to infer from these results that biological thinking has disappeared from how white Americans think about race more broadly. Sociologist Ann Morning has rightly cautioned that processes of “racial conceptualization”—how people frame the very notion of race itself—continues to exhibit strong biological overtones. These overtones are reinforced by some trends in science, particularly the limited spread of the constructivist view of race endorsed in the social sciences and perhaps more importantly the growth of genomic science in biology and related fields (Morning 2011; Phelan et al. 2013).

Finally, the emotional aspects of whites’ interracial attitudes are important to recognize. Whites continue to hold African Americans at an emotional distance. Less than 10% of whites felt both admiration and sympathy for blacks in 1994, while over 70% of whites felt closer to whites than blacks in 2008, up from just under 60% in 1996. Moreover, whites view blacks as undeserving of “special treatment,” reflecting a collective racial resentment towards African Americans (see section on Racial Resentment). Over 75% of white Americans since 1994 through 2008 agree that blacks should work their way up without special favors.

African American attitudes have changed as well, as three patterns have emerged. First, black explanations for racial inequality are less likely to refer to structural or discrimination-based factors, declining from over three-quarters of blacks in the late 1980s to about 60% by 2008. Second, such explanations increasingly reflect motivational and cultural justifications with 44% of blacks offering lack of motivation as the reason

for black-white socioeconomic inequality. Finally, black support for some types of government intervention has declined. Since 1994 when less than 40% of blacks opposed preferential hiring and promotion for blacks, recent survey data indicates that a majority of blacks (~55%) oppose such preferences.

Finally, racial apathy appears to be on the rise (Forman 2004). In 1976, one out of ten young whites expressed no concern that minorities may get unfair treatment, which almost doubles to 18% by 2000. Surveys of white adults also appear to express racial apathy. Compared to either support or opposition, national survey data indicates an increase in the percentage of white respondents from 1964 to the mid-1990s and 2000 who expressed “no interest” in federal intervention for fair treatment in jobs, federal intervention for school desegregation, and government support for the right of black people to go to any restaurant or hotel they can afford. These changing attitudes, along with the tripling in percentage of respondents, from 5% (1977) to 15% (2004), who reject all four justifications (motivational, educational, in-born ability, discrimination) for black-white socioeconomic inequality (Hunt 2007), seem to suggest that a substantial proportion of the white population is indifferent to the challenges facing African Americans (see also Forman and Lewis (2006)).

A full accounting of ethno-racial attitudes across a range of topics, from general racial principles, feelings of social distance, perceptions about government, policy, and racial inequality, to perceived group traits and the emotions that groups trigger, gives sociologists traction for interpreting and predicting behaviors and social interactions. As social psychologists studying social inequality, these attitudes are of paramount importance, as they represent effects, indicators, and crucial components of a long-standing object of social psychological inquiry: racial prejudice. We describe some of the leading contemporary approaches to prejudice in the next section after first detailing conceptual foundations for *prejudice*, *stereotypes*, and *racism*.

Theories of Prejudice

Among social psychologists and other social scientists, Gordon Allport's definition of *prejudice* is perhaps best known: "Ethnic prejudice is an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization" (Allport 1954[1979], p. 9). There are two important components of this definition: an affective or feeling component and a cognitive component (Pettigrew 1980).

Emotional hostility is a central element of classical notions of prejudice. The negative affect can include aggression, disdain, fear, resentment, distrust, a lack of sympathy, and anger, as well as coldness typically measured by feeling thermometers in psychological studies. Historians of racial discrimination have noted the importance of this racial animus: "Prejudice can be defined as an attitude of generalized hostility or aggression against a group of human beings who are thought to have some undesirable characteristics in common. It manifests itself in such ethnic stereotypes as the lazy Negro, the drunken Indian, the unscrupulous Jew, or the unruly Irishman" (Fredrickson and Knobel 1980, pp. 30–31).

The cognitive component can involve stereotypes, or "cognitive structures that contain the perceiver's knowledge, beliefs, and expectations about a human group" (Hamilton and Troler 1986, p. 133). Persons acquire, process, and selectively organize information into larger categories to help them anticipate, make sense of, and react to a world full of stimuli. This process often involves oversimplifications in light of limited cognitive resources. Stereotypes thus act as cognitive shortcuts, allowing individuals to expect likely characteristics or behaviors of a person categorized as a member of a larger group, based on average information associated with that group. Social scientists today consider stereotypes as basic features of human cognition, without necessarily carrying any negative connotations.

Prejudice scholars argue that stereotypes become problematic when such perceptions, particularly negative ones, are inaccurate due in part to overgeneralizations; if they become resistant to new information; or are applied in a categorical manner (Katz 1991). Thus, sociologists have

stated: "Prejudice refers to the attitudinal dimension of intergroup relations, to the process of stereotyping and aversion that may persist even in the face of countervailing evidence" (See and Wilson 1988, p. 227).

Specifying the individual-level operations of prejudice allows us to arrive at a conceptual delineation between *prejudice* and *racism*. *Racism* involves supra-individual cultural and societal factors, as the following sociological view on racism stresses: "Racism is a more complex belief system [than prejudice] that prescribes and legitimates a minority group's or an out-groups subordination by claiming that the group is either biogenetically or culturally inferior... there are two components to racism that are not present in prejudice: an ideology that justifies social avoidance and domination by reference to the 'unalterable' characteristics of particular groups and a set of norms that prescribes differential treatment for these groups. Whereas prejudice is an attitude held by an individual, racism is an ideology of exploitation and is therefore equated with a society's culture" (See and Wilson 1988, p. 227). Such a definition allows sociologists to avoid hazardous, casual and stigmatizing applications of the term, as well as avoid using the term *racism* or *racist* solely to describe individual-level antipathies. This definition affords scholars greater conceptual clarity as it pertains to distinct levels of analysis. (See also Hunt, this volume.)

Having already catalogued changes in racial attitudes leading up to more recent times, including stereotypes and affect as key components of prejudice, we now turn to contemporary formulations of racial prejudice, beginning with sociocultural models.

Sociocultural Models

In many respects the core way of thinking about ethno-racial attitudes, the sociocultural approach to prejudice acquisition emphasizes social learning. It achieved its most influential elaboration in the work of Allport (Allport 1954[1979]) and later interpreters (Katz 1991; Pettigrew 1980). Individuals develop attitudes towards ethno-ra-

cial groups as they are socialized to adopt or conform to the values of a particular cultural context through family, peers, schools, religion, media, etc. They may also have direct contact with members of particular racial or ethnic groups, who then serve as an initial source of information. From the sociocultural perspective, if age (cohort), education, and region of origin affect prejudice it is because they indicate the particular historical (e.g., pre-Civil Rights) and cultural context within which an individual has been socialized. This sociocultural mechanism is an important distinction from, for instance, a social structural approach that might situate prejudice development in the arrangement of group statuses and perceived competition for resources (see section on Group Position Theory), or a personality model that focuses on either authoritarian proclivities, of either the earlier Freudian variety (Adorno et al. 1950) or more recent non-Freudian sort (Altemeyer 1998), or an individual orientation to group dominance (Sidanius and Pratto 1999). We review two sociocultural models here: racial resentment and aversive racism.

Racial Resentment

The sociocultural model most familiar to sociologists is the theory of symbolic racism (Sears 1988), also referred to in the ethno-racial attitudes literature as modern racism (McConahay 1982) and racial resentment (Kinder and Sanders 1996), the last stated less provocatively and with greater theoretical and conceptual precision.¹ Racial resentment theory first arose as an attempt to understand seemingly paradoxical trends in white public opinion in the United States. White ethno-racial attitudes since the early 1960s had notably and extensively improved, indicating that whites were progressively embracing the principles of racial equality and integration across a variety of domains: education, neigh-

borhoods, employment, and interracial marriage. Old-fashioned or Jim Crow racism, characterized by beliefs in blacks' biological inferiority, interracial social distance, and support for legal discrimination and segregation, was on the decline. Contemporaneously, white support for many programs and policies to address extant racial inequalities (e.g., affirmative action, school busing, etc.) stagnated or declined, indicating a gap between what whites supported in principle and the policies they endorsed to realize such egalitarian value commitments. Though some pockets of white America still espoused old-fashioned racist attitudes, scholars argued that a new, "symbolic" racism had arisen and become more politically influential than the older Jim Crow variety.

Racial resentment scholars argued that this new racism involved a blend of anti-black affect and the belief that blacks violate traditional American values such as hard work, individualism, self-reliance, obedience, discipline, punctuality, and delayed gratification (Kinder and Sears 1981; Sears 1988; Sears et al. 1979). Racial resentment was seen as independent of realistic threat or self-interest; one might be opposed to particular attitudinal objects (e.g., affirmative action, Harlem, a black political candidate, etc.) that symbolized the groups (e.g., blacks) who invoked negative emotions developed through pre-adult socialization, even if one was not in a situation where such attitudinal objects posed a risk. The "symbol" in symbolic racism also denoted its antagonistic basis in perceived violations of abstract moral values. In sum, individually located, socialized prejudice could intrude into political contests and contestations and produce real political outcomes.

Racial resentment scholars reinvigorated research on new forms of negative ethno-racial attitudes. Their work was critical in identifying key elements of contemporary discourse on race and politics: resentment to perceived special favors to minorities, resentment to demands being made by minorities, and the denial that racial discrimination remained influential well into the post-Civil Rights era. Recent studies have expanded the application of racial resentment theory to understand presidential candidate choice, voter

¹ "Racial resentment" as a concept/theory label is more concrete, closer to the face validity content of what the measures tap, and lack the intrinsic vagueness and controversy aroused by the "symbolic racism" label; see also discussion of collective racial resentments (Bobo et al. 2012, pp. 65–70).

turnout, health care policy, and crime-related attitudes (see review in Racialized Politics section below). Given the range of outcomes to which it is related, scholars expect it will likely continue to shed light on the social psychology of racial inequality for years to come (Tuch and Hughes 2011).

Aversive Racism

Aversive racism theory represents another sociocultural approach to the principle-implementation gap that situates whites within a conflict between open endorsements of racial egalitarianism on the one hand and black antipathy on the other, the latter existing often implicitly or at an unconscious level (see section on Implicit Attitudes and Bias below). Theorists of aversive racism argue that the affective component of these negative attitudes can be characterized as avoidance rather than open hostility, centered around “discomfort, anxiety, or fear” rather than “hotter” reactions (Pearson et al. 2009, p. 317). As with other sociocultural approaches, negative attitudes towards blacks are thought to be a product of socialization. According to the theory, despite antipathy toward blacks, aversive racists desire to uphold their non-prejudiced self-conception. Thus, in contrast to other racists, aversive racists may discriminate in some instances and may not do so in others because of their conflicting impulses. Specifically, they are more likely to engage in discriminatory behavior when racially egalitarian normative expectations are ambiguous or plausible non-racial justifications for behavior are readily available.

Researchers primarily employ experimental methods to more precisely specify and test the theoretical conditions necessary for discrimination to occur. Using samples of white college students, experimenters documented the influence of aversive racism on hypothetical selection decisions involving employment (Dovidio and Gaertner 2000) and college admissions (Hodson et al. 2002). In each scenario, participants did not discriminate against the black applicant with strong qualifications. However, when candidates possessed ambiguous qualifications, the white participants recommended the white candidate

for employment significantly more often than the black candidate. Similarly, highly prejudiced white participants, as measured by Brigham’s Attitudes Towards Blacks scale (Brigham 1993), recommended the white candidate for college admission more often than the black candidate. Moving beyond the black-white binary, aversive racists in Canada similarly discriminated against Asian candidates for employment compared to a white applicant, pointing to the generalizability of aversive racism beyond the U.S. national context (Son Hing et al. 2008).

Subsequent studies have also documented aversive racism’s impact on jury decision-making in a legal context (Pearson et al. 2007). Aversive racism researchers in a laboratory setting found that explicit prejudice was linked to white participants’ assessment of a black defendant’s guilt in hypothetical robbery, assault, and murder cases (Dovidio et al. 1997). In a later study, Pearson et al. (2007) not only confirmed the influential role played by prejudice in white attitudes towards crime punishment, they also uncovered the subtle ways in which prejudice affected punitive attitudes under one context but not another. White endorsement for a more severe penalty was related to their levels of explicit prejudice towards blacks when given a non-racial justification for harsher punishment, consistent with aversive racism’s predictions. Yet in the absence of a non-racial justification to draw upon, white participants’ prescribed length of prison sentence was not directly related to anti-black prejudice. Racial prejudice did indeed matter for whites’ support for punitive responses to crime, but some whites required recourse to a non-racial rationale for such attitudes to prove consequential. These findings may help us understand the high rates of black male incarceration in the United States—so high that some now argue that imprisonment represents a new stage in the life course of young low-skilled black males (Pettit and Western 2004; Western 2007). The punitive tenor of criminal justice policies, linked explicitly to racial prejudice (Bobo and Johnson 2004), has contributed to the black male prison boom.

One clear advantage of the aversive racism framework lies in its ability to propose interven-

tions. The largely experimental approach to specifying the psychological (cognitive and affective) and social (contextual) mechanisms through which aversive racism operates provides clues about how one might disrupt the attitude to behavior pathway. One proposed intervention lies in drawing upon the cognitive implications of in-group/out-group identification to propose a common, superordinate in-group identity that reduces bias between groups (Dovidio et al. 2004; Gaertner et al. 1993, 1996; West et al. 2009a). Activating a common in-group identity that linked white participants to “all citizens of the United States, regardless of race, religion or status” led to an increase in feelings of injustice after watching a video clip about anti-black racial bias (Dovidio et al. 2004). These feelings in turn mediated a decrease in prejudice towards blacks and other ethno-racial minorities (Latin Americans and Asian Americans). In a study conducted among college roommates, students who perceived a high level of commonality with their cross-race roommate experienced no significant decline in their friendship over time, compared to the significant declines in friendship expressed by cross-race roommates who perceived a low level of commonality between them (West et al. 2009a).

While the identification of possible interventions is a welcome development, are such interventions likely to have a strong and lasting impact on larger patterns of social inequality? From a sociological standpoint, the prospects look mixed. The lessons from aversive racism point to the possibility of positive change at the level of micro, social interactions. A decrease in racial bias in selection and other decision-making processes by egalitarian-minded individuals would no doubt represent some narrowing of the racial gap in the domains of employment, education, and criminal justice. They might also reduce biases in access to housing, credit, and some consumer goods.

Challenging social inequality in various institutional domains will also require significant macro-level responses, the likelihood of which still remains tied to the social psychological dynamics of ethno-racial attitudes and racialized politics (Sears et al. 2000). A crucial consider-

ation in these dynamics is that prejudice is entrenched and developed *within* the competitive structure of U.S. politics itself, rooted in part in ethno-racial group competition and a sense of group position (Bobo and Tuan 2006). This theoretical distinction is an important one, as it departs from sociocultural perspectives that view prejudice as *exogenous* to politics and the social organization of group statuses, power, and interests. A clearer understanding of the operations of ethno-racial group threat is the topic to which we now turn.

Social Structure Model: Group Position Theory

In general, sociologists have favored accounts of group relations and ethno-racial attitudes that recognize how durable group inequalities also create group interests that then align with socially constructed groups and identities. This tradition received very influential articulation in the work of Herbert Blumer and subsequent interpreters (Wellman 1977; Bobo 1999; Bobo and Tuan 2006)

Taking direct aim at theories that located racial prejudice inside individuals by focusing on individuals' feelings, Blumer proposed an alternative, sociologically-centered theory of racial prejudice in his now classic essay on “race prejudice as a sense of group position” (Blumer 1958). Blumer argued that racial prejudice was fundamentally about racial group relations, and must be understood in the collective process through which racial groups define themselves and other racial groups in relation to each other. The sense of group position involves an idea about the appropriate relative status between groups, but is not limited solely to such a vertical positioning, as it can entail boundaries of inclusion/exclusion.

Among members of the dominant group, race prejudice can be characterized by four feelings. First, there is a feeling of group superiority. Second, there is a feeling that a subordinate group is inherently different, which serves as the basis for attempts to exclude the subordinate other. Third, racial prejudice involves a feeling of entitlement,

or proprietary claim to resources, opportunities, authority, and prestige. Fourth, members of the dominant group feel threatened by the belief that a subordinate group wishes to encroach on those entitlements. This last makes group position theory, in part, a theory about perceived group interests and threat.

Crucially, against sociologists and others who might reduce the sense of group position to objective relations or positions between groups, Blumer highlights both the subjective and normative dimensions of the sense of group position: "it stands for "what ought to be" rather than for "what is." It is a sense of where the two racial groups *belong*" (1958, p. 5, emphasis original). As a collective sense, individual members of the dominant group will have to wrestle with the group's sense of dominant position if the individual wishes to behave contrary to that sense, facing possible sanction in the exercise of individual agency. That is because the sense of group position originates not within individuals but is collectively held.

Lastly, Blumer emphasizes that the sense of group position is a historical product. It is shaped by the structure of opportunities, the size of populations, the distribution of knowledge and skills, and the behaviors and communications between key figures and group leaders. As these and other social factors shift, so too does the sense of group position, again marking this sociological theory's distinctiveness from theoretical approaches that depict racial prejudice as an individual-level factor.

Blumer's sociological social psychological approach to racial prejudice provided a new lens to view questions about the paradox in white public opinion: rising commitment to racial equality and integration, stagnant or declining support for social programs and policies to redress inequality. Drawing on Blumer's insights, Bobo analyzed attitudes towards school busing and employed the same measures previously used by racial resentment researchers (Bobo 1983). However, Bobo recognized that the racial resentment measures involved collective dimensions of group conflict, which problematized racial resentment theory's assertion that such attitudes reflected simply in-

dividuals' socialized negative affect devoid of group interest-based concerns. Bobo discovered that the racial resentment measures loaded on multiple latent factors, one of which could easily be discerned as reflecting a "civil rights push" or "black political push," dimensions that evoked Blumer's perceived group interests and conflict. These perceived group conflict factors, previously aggregated along with other factors in a "racial intolerance" scale representing symbolic politics in earlier research (Sears et al. 1979), predicted white opposition to school busing. Resentments expressed and captured by racial resentment and symbolic politics researchers were not simply atomistic feelings of animosity; they were also political appraisals about which groups should have entitled claim and access to scarce and desired status, rewards, and opportunities as Blumer had claimed.

Bobo argued that Blumer's group position theory provided a more powerful and comprehensive framework for the study of racial prejudice (Bobo 1999). Blumer had articulated an expansive theory, one capable of explaining affect/emotions previously the province of individual-oriented prejudice approaches, while simultaneously remaining attuned to both social structure and identity-based processes. Furthermore, sociologists could now also draw on the importance of history to articulate a sense of group position that could account for not only the sense of group position among dominant group members but also a sense of racial alienation among subordinate group members (Bobo 1999; Bobo and Hutchings 1996). This attention to the historically variant experiences across dominant group and subordinate group members also allows space for the recognition that ethno-racial groups might explain racial inequality using different attributions (Hunt 2007), differences based on group-specific historical experiences with societal discrimination and institutional discrimination (Fox 2012; Fox and Guglielmo 2012).

Group position theory's emphasis on perceived group threat also helped identify important variations in both support for principles of racial equality/integration and opposition to social programs and policies. If perceived group

threats were important, one would expect greater support for compensatory programs/policies that promote opportunity over preferential policies perceived to impinge upon group interests, a hypothesis confirmed by public opinion data (Bobo 2001; Bobo and Kluegel 1993). Thus, the lackadaisical support previously found on the implementation side of white ethno-racial attitudes may actually hide greater openness to particular opportunity-enhancing policies and programs: both a more hopeful and empirically-verifiable conclusion.

With Blumer's group position theory, the social scientific attention to realistic group conflict, group numbers, and group threat also took on greater complexity (Bobo 1999). First, a fully elaborated group position theory recognized that not only did objective factors, such as the measured size of an out-group population, matter but subjective or perceived size and threat mattered as well. Second, the economic resources of a group mattered; subordinate groups with greater resources but lower numbers such as Asians may be perceived as more threatening. Third, social domain mattered; whites perceived lower levels of threat from blacks over housing. Finally, history and intensity of conflict mattered; blacks perceived Asians as greater threats than Latinos, despite larger numbers of Latinos in the population. More recent studies on group size and group threat incorporated insights about subjective perceptions of group size and ethno-racial group differences in a multiethnic social context, a literature we review next.

Group Size and Group Threat

While the last decade of the twentieth century produced important studies capturing the impact of group size and group threat on ethno-racial attitudes and inequality (Fossett and Kiecolt 1989; Quillian 1995, 1996; Taylor 1998), the first decade of the twenty first century generated additional studies that are critical for a number of reasons. First, we believe that despite signs of relatively slow black population growth in the years ahead, the "black image in the white mind," borrowing from the late historian George Fredrickson, still holds a special place in the social psy-

chology of social inequality (Fredrickson 1971). US Census projections predict that the black population nationwide is unlikely to exceed 13% by 2050, making earlier studies on group size focused almost exclusively on the black-white divide seem less relevant (Ortman and Guarneri 2009). However, while black population shares may remain stable at the national level, local black population shares are expected to fluctuate greatly. Demographers have identified substantial migration within the United States that is significantly altering black population percentages at the metropolitan level, with Atlanta, Dallas, and Houston undergoing the largest gains between 2000 and 2010 (Frey 2011). Second, the projected share of non-white groups is growing and will continue to grow considerably, serving as a new source of perceived and realistic group threat. By 2050, Hispanics are projected to comprise 30% of the U.S. population, up from 16% in 2010. The Asian population will approach 8% in 2050 from less than 5% in 2010. The infant population in the United States has already passed a demographic tipping point, with the majority of the U.S. population aged 1 or younger now hailing from non-white ethno-racial groups (U.S. Census Bureau 2012). In light of these significant demographic changes that will one day supplant the non-Hispanic white population as the numerical majority in the United States, it is worthwhile to reflect upon advances in the study of group size and threat produced over the last decade to anticipate how some might react to these demographic changes.

Over the last decade, research on group size and group threat have largely focused on two general themes. First, scholars have tried to tease out the relationship between perceptions of group size and objective group size. Various individual and structural factors were taken into account to explain discrepancies between the actual size of ethno-racial groups compared to their perceived size, with white population numbers typically under-estimated and non-white populations over-estimated. Relatedly, social scientists also sought to identify the reference points or boundaries (e.g., neighborhood, metropolitan area, county, nation, etc.) that informed perceptions about

group size. Second, investigators proposed and assessed alternative explanations for racialized group and policy attitudes that had previously been accounted for by a group threat framework. Among the approaches considered were additional contextual features besides group size, and contact theory.

A first thematic set of studies sought to clarify ambiguity in, and explain the disjuncture between, people's perceptions of the size of particular ethno-racial groups and the actual size of these populations. Glaser (2003) argued that prior studies on group threat did not clearly set the boundaries within which people were expected to consider: first, the size of group populations, and second, the rewards or opportunities affected by group size. To more clearly delineate these boundaries, Glaser employed survey-based experiments that measured white opposition to proportional apportionment of congressional representatives based on indicated state proportions of blacks, and proportional allotment of city government jobs and city minority set-aside contracts based on indicated black proportions at the city level. Gallagher (2003) used qualitative methods (focus groups, interviews, and open-ended surveys) to identify whites' explanations for their racial innumeracy, or the numerical misperception of ethno-racial group size relative to actual group size. Alba, Rumbaut, and Marotz (2005) argued for an analytical distinction between what they define as "innumeracy" (limitation in the ability to translate a perception into numerical terms) and the perception of group size itself. They circumvented challenges related to innumeracy by using a ratio of estimated black and Hispanic populations to the estimated white population as a better indicator of perceived ethno-racial group sizes and perceived threat, rather than estimations of absolute numerical group sizes alone. Finally, Wong (2007) explored the linkages between perceived and actual local ethno-racial group sizes on the one hand and perceived national group sizes on the other. Wong found that perceptions of local group size are better predictors of individuals' estimations of national group sizes than actual local group sizes.

Results from this first thematic set of studies have implications for the social psychology of group threat and its relationship to social inequality. Glaser (2003) found that setting boundaries and specifying group sizes confirm earlier research on the effects of group threat. Increases in the black share of a state's population decreased the percentage of non-black respondents supporting the redrawing of district lines to guarantee racially proportional apportionment of congressional seats. Similarly, experimentally increasing the black share of a city's population decreased the percentage of non-blacks supporting racially proportional apportionment of city government jobs. Glaser also found that white opposition is not entrenched solely in in-group/out-group distinctions, as the percentage of respondents supportive of proportional allotments in congressional seats was substantially smaller when proportions are based upon racial distinctions (i.e., black population) rather than geographic ones (i.e., rural population). Moreover, percentage of support did not vary significantly as a function of the percentage of the rural population specified on the survey ballots. Gallagher (2003) found that whites over-estimate the number of blacks because of perceived over-representation of blacks in the media (e.g., news coverage of crime, and sports broadcasts), perceived excessive black political demands, and Census reports about the decreasing proportion of whites in the U.S. population. Gallagher proposed that whites might equate larger nonwhite population sizes with unobstructed access to resources, obviating calls for the amelioration of racial inequality. Alba, Rumbaut, and Marotz (2005) found that their ratio-based measure of perceived threat was positively related to whites' restrictive positions on immigration, stereotypical views of blacks and Hispanics as violent, and beliefs that blacks shouldn't push too hard and that whites are hurt by affirmative action. Lastly, Wong (2007) suggested that because perceptions of local ethno-racial group sizes predict estimations of national ethno-racial group sizes more than actual local group sizes themselves, thereby foregrounding social psychological processes, the influence of perceptions of local group size may trump the in-

fluence of actual group size on outcomes such as racial or political attitudes as well.

A second set of studies sought to propose and test alternative explanations for ethno-racial attitudes that had previously been tied to group threat. Oliver and Mendelberg (2000) tested the group threat hypothesis using contextual measures such as objective group threat (measured as % black at zip code and metropolitan levels) against neighborhood socioeconomic status (measured as % college educated at the zip code level). They found support for the effect of objective contextual racial threat on white attitudes toward neighborhood integration and federal government intervention on behalf of black employment, but not university affirmative action. However, they found no support for the effect of objective contextual threat on white racial dispositions (racial resentment, negative stereotypes, anti-Semitism, and authoritarianism), while finding consistent effects of neighborhood educational status on these dispositions, qualifying the explanatory reach of objective threat. Dixon and Rosenbaum (2004) and Dixon (2006) tackled the problem of resolving the ambiguous effect of proximity to ethno-racial out-groups on negative group stereotypes, i.e., did proximity facilitate the positive influence of contact or the negative influence of group threat? Using multilevel models, they found that objective group threat (% black) was positively related to whites' anti-black stereotypes but % Hispanic had no relationship to anti-Hispanic stereotypes (Dixon and Rosenbaum 2004). They also found that contacts with blacks in schools and workplaces were related to decreases in whites' anti-black stereotypes, while similar decreases in anti-Hispanic stereotypes were associated with Hispanic contact in communities, and to a lesser extent, also in schools. In a similar study, Dixon (2006) confirmed the effects of % black on anti-black stereotypes, but found an opposite effect of % Asian on anti-Asian stereotypes. Dixon also discovered that knowing and feeling close to a black, Hispanic, or Asian was associated with decreases in negative stereotypes for each group respectively. Contrary to suggestions by Wong (2007), whites' estimations of black, Hispanic, or Asian group

size at the local level were unrelated to their attendant group's stereotypes.

The social psychological implications of this second set of studies on group threat, ethno-racial attitudes and social inequality are mixed. While Oliver and Mendelberg (2000) reported that some of their findings contradict the "material" (or objective) threat hypothesis, their analysis did not evaluate perceived group threat. Their measure of "symbolic racism" contained items that could tap into a dimension of perceived group threat, including an item about attitudes towards "spokesmen for minorities who are complaining that blacks are being discriminated against." This item resembled an item used to operationalize perceived group threat in an earlier study assessing the relationship between racial resentment and white opposition to busing (Bobo 1983). Since their racism scale was consistently significant across models predicting white support for neighborhood integration and affirmative action, the threat hypothesis in one form, perceived group threat, might still retain some utility when measures other than objective group size are employed. Moreover, their use of OLS regression without apparent adjustments for clustering raises some concern about the non-independence of the error terms; a more recent study using hierarchical models did not confirm some of their key findings on neighborhood socioeconomic status (McDermott 2011).

The appraisals of contact theory versus group threat (actual group size) likely contributed the most among these studies to our understanding of the social contexts of inequality. Dixon and Rosenbaum (2004) proposed that desegregation and affirmative action policies at schools and the workplace could make meaningful inroads on decreasing whites' anti-black stereotypes. Likewise, similar policies targeted at neighborhoods and schools might attenuate whites' anti-Hispanic stereotypes. Beyond identifying the interactive settings in which beneficial interracial contact takes place, Dixon (2006) pointed to the possible upsides of interracial contact that promotes whites' feelings of closeness with non-whites, which can also temper whites' negative stereotypes about non-white groups.

Two studies involving ethno-racial group size within the last decade did not necessarily utilize group size to operationalize group threat. Fox (2004) took percent black and percent Hispanic at the state and county levels as indicators of diverse ethno-racial contexts, adopting OLS regression with robust standard errors to evaluate their effects on white support for welfare. Her results indicated that white support for welfare took into account not only whites' stereotypes about black work ethic, but also whites' stereotypes about Hispanics' work ethic. Surprisingly, the effect of beliefs about Hispanics' work ethic on white support for welfare differed immensely based upon the contextual effects of black group size and Hispanic group size. McDermott (2011) deployed multilevel modeling to examine the direct and indirect effects of race and socioeconomic status, measured at different levels, on a variety of ethno-racial attitudes expressed by whites, blacks, Hispanics, and Asians. McDermott found that the anti-black stereotypes of black respondents increased in conjunction with increases in the black percentage in a neighborhood, a finding McDermott also finds operating for the percentage of Asians living in a neighborhood and its effects on Asian respondents' anti-Asian stereotypes. In regards to attitudes about training programs for blacks, support across all respondents increased as the percentage of blacks at the neighborhood level increased. However, black support for affirmative action programs, which was already higher than white support for such programs, diminished as the share of blacks at the neighborhood level rose, a result Glaser (2003) also found when using experimentally varied survey ballots on black respondents. These results all point to the need for additional social psychological research on racial and policy attitudes in a multiracial social context to further clarify the precise mechanisms.

Several studies published over the first decade of the twenty first century improved our understanding of ethno-racial group size and group threat, and ultimately their effects on ethno-racial relations, attitudes, and social inequality. Measures involving the local black population size, be they objective or perceived, continue to large-

ly uphold the theory that more blacks represents more threat and less egalitarian outlooks and politics. The black image still haunts the white mind of the twenty first century. Some research has also drawn our attention to the meaning of group size in a multiracial social context, where white attitudes may be influenced by the complex interaction between the population sizes of multiple groups. Other research has shown that respondents of different ethno-racial backgrounds react to variations in ethno-racial group contexts in different ways. This points to the importance of understanding a particular group's subjective sense of its own status, power, and resources and its relationship to other groups: all of which can vary in complex ways not easily captured by classifying such groups as dominant or subordinate. Recent studies on the lived experience of whiteness among working class whites (McDermott 2006), factors related to the strength of white identity (Croll 2007), on how high-achieving Asians can recast whiteness as lower status (Jiménez and Horowitz 2013), emphasize this complexity. In sum, sociological social psychological research indicates that the sweeping demographic changes currently occurring in the United States will continue to influence social inequality, despite projections that the share of the black population will remain stable for years to come.

Having outlined sociocultural and social structural models for the study of racial prejudice, we now turn our attention to another relatively recent entry. This account draws largely upon methodological innovations in cognitive psychology, creatively adapted to the study of implicit racial bias.

The Cognitive Turn: Implicit Attitudes and Bias

Developments in cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience point to significant ways in which attitudes influence perception below the level of conscious awareness, embedding patterns of association and bias that affect what we see and how we are likely to behave, but not without some real measure of controversy over

the meaning of and appropriate generalizations from these findings. Psychologists have proposed that implicit cognition, which involves an introspectively unidentified or inaccurately identified construct that nevertheless influences a range of individual responses, can illuminate research on ethno-racial attitudes and stereotypes (Greenwald and Banaji 1995). Unlike an explicit attitude or stereotype, which can be measured through introspective self-report, an implicit or unconscious attitude or stereotype requires indirect measures, often involving tasks that implicate categorization processes. While a wide variety of implicit measures and ways of measuring them exist (Fazio and Olson 2003), some complexities in the meaning and interpretation of many of the measures and results need to be borne in mind. We address these complexities by first describing one method of measuring implicit attitudes, the Implicit Association Test.

The Implicit Association Test (IAT), a popular method of measuring implicit attitudes often used in studies of aversive racism, represents a promising methodological innovation for researching the social psychology of racial inequality. The IAT captures response latencies (or time differentials in a timed task) reflecting the ease or difficulty of classifying items into category/attribute pairs, pairs hypothesized to converge or diverge in the minds of individuals. Individuals should find it easier to classify an item (e.g., rose, roach) under a category/attribute pairing that resonates with an individual's cultural perspective (e.g., flower/good or insect/bad) than one that does not (e.g., flower/bad or insect/good). Applied to the study of racial bias, the IAT measures the difficulty of classifying items when black/good and white/bad are paired, compared to when white/good and black/bad are paired. The absence of a time lag between category pairs that are theoretical matches versus theoretical mismatches would indicate the absence of cognitive bias. Since the response latency score only partially correlates with a handful of explicit racial attitude indicators and loads on separate constructs when factor analyzed (Lane et al. 2007), IAT proponents argue that the method captures an underlying construct unmeasured by explicit ethno-racial

attitudes. However, along with the leading proponents of the IAT, we emphasize that the IAT and its measurement of an, as yet, un-described underlying racial construct do not signify a theoretical departure from the longstanding study of racial bias. Rather, the IAT may help us more precisely discern and better specify the nature of racial group stereotypes and attitudes.

While an important and innovative approach, we argue as sociologists that such measures cannot replace careful study of the terms of explicit social discourse and interaction, nor fully answer more basic questions about how attitudes and beliefs interact with larger socio-political processes and institutions to shape the broader social patterning of group inequality. Ambiguity surrounding the explicit-implicit divide has drawn questions from a number of quarters. Arkes and Tetlock (2004) proposed alternative interpretations of reaction time scores as either reflections of cultural rather than personal bias, indicative of different types of negative affect besides antipathy (guilt, shame, embarrassment, etc. as opposed to bigotry or hostility), or simply outcomes predicted by the probabilistic cognitive exercise of rationality. The higher predictive validity observed for the IAT relative to explicit attitudinal measures, and for that matter, the occasionally low levels of correlation between IAT scores and explicit attitudinal scores, may reflect the use of a truncated set of explicit ethno-racial attitudes rather than an absolute distinction between observable and unobservable constructs (see also Blanton and Jaccard (2008)). To be sure, we do not argue that there cannot be some measure of an underlying, unidentified construct or constructs that relates to a variety of racial inequality outcomes.

While IAT proponents do not recommend prioritizing implicit measures or replacing explicit measures with implicit ones, it is important to warn against critics of explicit measures who might go too far in overemphasizing a core argument marshaled on behalf of implicit attitudes: concerns about self presentation (Nosek 2005). This line of reasoning concerns us for two reasons. First, survey respondents continue to give what many people believe to be socially undesirable responses including manifestly racially

prejudiced opinions (Bobo and Tuan 2006; Wilson 1997). These responses in turn continue to co-vary with a range of race-related outcomes such as policy attitudes, ethno-racial neighborhood composition preferences, hiring preferences, etc. Second, concern about social desirability casts a pall over the authenticity of individuals' responses, which, taken to an extreme, may cause some researchers to disregard whether individuals may actually want to be less racially biased. As IAT proponent Nosek (2005, p. 566) noted, self-presentation "can be genuine" and can emerge in other socially consequential behaviors and outcomes.

The authenticity of unbiased self-presentation is critical for social interaction, particularly because unconscious expressions of negative attitudes can hinder congenial interracial relations. Researchers hypothesized and confirmed a link between white participants' implicit attitudes and their nonverbal behaviors signifying distance, disrespect, and tension (less visual contact and increased rates of blinking) towards a black interviewer (Dovidio et al. 1997). A subsequent study confirmed the relationship between white participants' implicit attitudes and white observers' ratings of the participants' nonverbal friendliness; moreover, the same study revealed that black confederate evaluation of the friendliness of the white participant was associated with these nonverbal cues rather than verbal behavior (Dovidio et al. 2002). Goff, Steele and Davies (2008) warned that racial distancing need not derive from racial prejudice, but might reflect white participant anxiety about appearing racist, thereby confirming an undesirable white group stereotype as stereotype threat can affect IAT scores as well (Frantz et al. 2004). Assessments of the friendliness of interracial others is important given different attributions, expectations, and goals that individuals bring to explain inaction and anxiety pertaining to interracial interactions (Bergsieker et al. 2010; Richeson and Shelton 2007; Shelton and Richeson 2005, 2006; Shelton et al. 2005a; Trawalter et al. 2009; West et al. 2009b).

While individuals may be initially unaware of their biases, overt acknowledgment that unconscious bias may lead to discriminatory behavior

can serve as an intervention against such biases. A study testing the link between physicians' implicit attitudes and their recommendations for blood clot treatment to a black or white patient presenting heart attack symptoms found that physicians aware of the study's purpose were more likely to recommend the treatment for black patients as their implicit bias increased (Green et al. 2007). This unanticipated finding reversed the black disadvantage in treatment found among physicians scoring high on implicit bias that were unaware of the study's purpose. This finding that a beneficial outcome positively correlates with implicit bias also corresponds with research on the irony of more engaged interracial interaction among high IAT scoring whites (Shelton et al. 2005b), and high IAT scoring whites' behavioral overcorrection towards stigmatized outgroups under challenging conditions (Mendes and Kosslov 2013).

To this point, we have charted changes in racial attitudes, mapped out four of the most prominent contemporary approaches to understanding contemporary racial prejudice and bias, and reviewed recent studies related to these various research agendas. We now turn our attention to specific domains of ethno-racial inequality that are in part produced or constrained by the social psychology of racial prejudice. We do not attempt a comprehensive summary of all relevant social domains or studies, but instead focus on a few key research questions, topics, and methodologies, including recent innovations.

Domains of Ethno-Racial Inequality

While larger patterns of ethno-racial inequality, particularly those embedded in institutions, will likely require a forceful political and policy-based approach to significantly alter ethno-racial inequalities in labor markets (Wilson 1997), housing markets (Massey and Denton 1993), wealth distribution (Oliver and Shapiro 1997), educational settings (Darling-Hammond 2004), mass incarceration (Western 2007), and health care (Williams and Rucker 2000), social scientists must nevertheless continue to track the

micro-level dynamics that produce these macro configurations of inequality. These inequalities have been exacerbated even further by monumental debt, job loss, and home foreclosures from the “Great Recession” (Grusky et al. 2011), possibly requiring comprehensive anti-poverty policy and serious re-investments in education, health care, and factors impacting neighborhood cohesion (Sampson 2012; Wilson 2010). We focus our attention now on the labor market and the housing market, two major domains of social life where evidence of substantial structural racial inequality remains, and end with a brief look at possible social psychological factors impacting the domain from which the most effective macro-level interventions are likely to arise, that is, the political arena.

Labor Market Inequality

Consider first the labor market. We know that African Americans in particular face significantly higher rates of unemployment, longer spells of unemployment and job search, as well as a greater likelihood of falling into persistent joblessness than their white counterparts (Bobo 2011; Harris 2010; Katz et al. 2005).

There is also growing evidence that negative racial stereotypes still play a powerful role in shaping labor market experiences and outcomes. Evidence for this claim takes several forms. For example, Kirschenman and Neckerman (1991) in their now classic qualitative interview study of Chicago employers found that employers described their black and Hispanic employees using negative stereotypes, despite what would seem to be social desirability pressures to appear race neutral. Employers questioned their black workers’ work ethic, education level, and leadership skills. Some employers in sales and customer service mentioned their customers’ racial prejudices as justification for bias in hiring that favored white employees. Other employers for clerical jobs referenced blacks’ appearance (e.g., hairstyle) and speech patterns (“street talk”) as detracting from a professional image. A few employers for low-skilled blue collar or service

jobs recited stereotypes of blacks as unreliable and lazy, and therefore ill suited for a job sector where dependability and work ethic were seen as paramount. Employers did appreciate heterogeneity within the black community and recognized “good” black employees who did not conform to negative stereotypes. In such situations, however, employers screened for markers they attributed to inner-city culture.

While still retaining analytical focus on structural changes in the U.S. urban economy and many poor blacks’ rootedness in social networks, households, and neighborhood contexts that are not conducive to employability, William Julius Wilson recognized that employers nevertheless took into account racial considerations in their hiring practices (Wilson 1997). Drawing on the same employer survey as Kirschenman and Neckerman, Wilson found that 74% of surveyed employers related negative views of blacks, including assumptions about their dishonesty, welfare dependency, poor family values, tardiness, etc. Such views cut across racial lines as both black and white employers expressed these negative evaluations of inner-city blacks. Wilson also found a gendered component, with black males more than females bearing the brunt of the negative attitudes. However, black women did not escape questions about their childcare and family responsibilities, including the assumption that black women desired too many children to sustain employment. A few employers openly disclosed that racial prejudice affected the hiring process, while most engaged in selective recruitment. The latter chose to search for their ideal high quality candidates by avoiding placing job ads in metropolitan or particular ethnic and urban neighborhood newspapers and purposefully shunning recruitment at inner-city schools or government-run programs. In the ethnographic portion of the study, Wilson summarized findings among a smaller sample of inner-city residents, documenting blacks’ feelings of having experienced discrimination and exploitation. Such feelings underlie some inner-city black men’s hostility to jobs they characterized as being less remunerative relative to the wages earned by non-blacks, and entailing the most arduous tasks, a finding

confirmed in more recent research on job channeling (see Pager et al. (2009) below).

In addition to in-depth interviews, multivariate analyses of large sample surveys indicate that employers' perceptions of the ethno-racial makeup of their customers relate to the likelihood of hiring blacks (Holzer and Ihlanfeldt 1998). Utilizing employer surveys from Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, and Los Angeles, the researchers found that employers' perceptions of the proportion of their customers of a particular ethno-racial background (and by implication those customers' preferences for employees of a particular ethno-racial background) was linked to the hiring of a black worker as the most recently hired worker. The perceived ethno-racial proportion of their customers had the strongest negative effect on the hiring of blacks into jobs with direct customer contact versus jobs without customer contact, and hiring blacks into sales jobs compared to blue collar jobs and other white-collar and service jobs, even though skill requirements may have been higher for the latter. As the researchers note, these effects are linked not to the actual ethno-racial makeup of a firm's clientele, but rather employers' *perceived* ethno-racial makeup of their customer base.

Employer surveys are important not only because of the critical role that hiring authority confers to employers in regards to nonwhites' job prospects, but also because of survey data's ability to address social scientific predictions about labor market and workplace competition as the fundamental cause of ethno-racial antagonism. A structural, sociological perspective on racial and ethnic conflict that privileges class location (Bonacich 1972, 1980) might predict that business owners and supervisors would be less likely to report negative stereotypes than non-managerial workers, given the relative lack of workplace power that places the latter in economic competition with job-seeking blacks. Bobo, Johnson, and Suh (2000) found that negative stereotyping of blacks did not differ significantly by workplace power; business owners, supervisors, and non-managerial workers alike tended to rate blacks more negatively than whites on stereotype measures. Bipolar trait rating items for intelligence,

preference for welfare, ease of getting along with, and English speaking proficiency were used to measure stereotypes, including a scale averaging all four items. Like the stereotypes held by workers without workplace power, owners and supervisors' black stereotypes were related to political ideology, after controlling for socio-demographic factors, region, and religious factors. That a political orientation which cuts across differences in workplace authority significantly relates to stereotyping further supports the idea that racial stereotypes are not reducible solely to class location.

More recent studies have drawn upon experimental methods to identify racial bias in employers' actual hiring decision-making, corroborating the negative stereotypes that employers self reported during in-depth interviews and large sample surveys. A study of the low wage labor market in New York City utilized a field experiment, or audit study, to document employer bias in the hiring process (Pager et al. 2009). Researchers sent trained white, black and Latino testers matched on a range of characteristics (e.g., verbal ability, eye contact, talkativeness, physical attractiveness) to apply for 340 entry-level jobs. White and Latino applicants received more second interview call-backs or job offers than black applicants, despite possessing equivalent qualifications (education, job experience, and neighborhood residence) and applying for the exact same job opening. A second team of testers revealed that black and Latino applicants without a criminal record fared about as well as a white applicant recently released from prison after a drug felony conviction, confirming findings from an earlier audit study in Milwaukee, Wisconsin on race and criminal stigma (Pager 2003). Being black or Latino (with a clean record) held the same level of social psychological stigma to employers as a white felon's criminal record.

Qualitative analysis of testers' field notes also revealed that minority applicants were more likely to be excluded from the applicant pool outright, with very little, if any, chance to communicate their job suitability. When given a chance to convey their qualifications, the minority testers—sometimes only the black tester, sometimes both

black and Latino testers—faced higher standards of resume evaluation than the white tester despite equivalent experience and credentials (see also Biernat and Kobrynowicz (1997)). What proved to be job-denying resume deficiencies for the black and/or Latino applicant did not hinder their white confederate. Lastly, the study revealed that black and Latino applicants were more likely to be “channeled” or steered toward jobs that employed greater manual labor, less customer contact, or less authority than the job initially sought by the applicant. A few white testers experienced channeling in the opposite or “upward” direction: greater customer contact, less manual labor, or entailing supervisory or managerial skills. Social psychology underlies multiple factors that influence labor market prospects: from employers’ beliefs about applicants identified with particular racial groups, the types of jobs into which applicants were channeled, the shifting standard of evaluation faced by differently racialized testers, to the stigma equivalence between being a minority on the one hand and being a convicted and recently imprisoned felon on the other.

The race associated with an applicant’s name on a resume can influence the applicant’s job prospects (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004). Again utilizing a field experiment, researchers sent almost 5000 resumes responding to over 1300 job postings in the Chicago and Boston region, primarily changing the name on the resume from a typically white-sounding name, e.g., “Emily Walsh or Greg Baker,” to a typically black-sounding name, e.g., “Lakisha Washington or Jamal Jones.” Resumes with white-sounding names were 50% more likely to receive a callback response than resumes bearing black-sounding names. The researchers also looked at the effects of resume quality, subjectively classifying resumes into low and high quality resumes based on features such as skills, gaps in employment, job experience, etc. To ensure that high-quality resumes could be differentiated from low-quality ones, researchers also added some subset of a number of additional characteristics: summer or in-school employment, additional computer skills, volunteer experience, certifications, foreign languages, honors, and military experience.

Resumes with white-sounding names received a higher call back percentage in response to high-quality resumes (10.79%) than low-quality resumes (8.5%), a statistically significant difference. On the other hand, resumes with black-sounding names received statistically equivalent percentages of callbacks: 6.7% for high-quality resumes and 6.2% for low-quality resumes. Increasing the subjective quality of one’s resume did not produce the same reward across racial categories.

King et al. (2006) replicated and extended Bertrand and Mullainathan’s results for white and black associated resumes by using a multiethnic collection of resumes, adding resumes with Asian and Hispanic sounding names. They recruited 160 participants at a downtown metropolitan pedestrian area and an airport to evaluate the resumes. Results indicated that Asian Americans’ resumes were more highly rated than resumes with either black or Hispanic-sounding names. The data also revealed that occupational stereotypes, or the perceived suitability of applicants for either high status (e.g., physician, chemist, engineer, judge) or low status jobs (custodian, construction worker, repairman, etc.) mediated the relationship between race and resume evaluations.

This brief review of the literature pertaining to the social psychology of labor market racial inequality make clear three key points. First, employers express awareness of a variety of racial considerations that impact employee search, screening, and suitability for specific jobs. Second, contrary to social desirability expectations, employers willingly and openly express negative racial stereotypes about both workers and prospective applicants during face-to-face interviews. Such negative attitudes spanned multiple locations across the United States. Third, methodological innovations in the study of race-based labor market inequality, in particular the use of experimental manipulations, reveal exact points in the hiring process at which employers or hiring managers’ beliefs about racial groups can lead to racial inequality in labor market outcomes. Race affected initial acknowledgement about job availability, actual hiring decisions, and subse-

quent job placement. Even fielding a better resume yielded racially differentiated returns. As our main argument asserts, the social psychology of ethno-racial attitudes and identities is a fundamental component of larger structural patterns of race-based inequalities in the labor market.

Racial Residential Segregation

Racial residential segregation has been referred to as the “linchpin” of modern racial inequality (Pettigrew 1979). Where individuals and groups reside has consequences for broad neighborhood quality. This includes such considerations as the quality of schools, safety and likelihood of exposure to violence and criminal victimization, level and quality of public services, and even proximity to serious environmental risks and hazardous conditions. Patterns of racial residential segregation intensified over much of the early part of the twentieth century (Massey and Denton 1993). Most major metropolitan areas and a very large fraction of the black population could be classified as living in “hypersegregated” circumstances where black and white places of residence were highly separated along at least four of five major indicators of residential dispersal. Despite some modest decline in recent decades, especially in smaller and newer metropolitan areas of the southwest and west, the black-white dissimilarity index remains high and has yet to approach the lower but still sizable dissimilarity index for whites-Hispanics. Black isolation has substantially decreased, though largely due to the influx of Hispanics and Asians into black neighborhoods, and black exposure to whites has remained fairly static over the last three decades (Logan 2013; Rugh and Massey 2013). Declarations of “the end of the segregated century” (Glaeser and Vigdor 2012) may be premature.

An extensive body of research has tried to assess the degree to which ethno-racial attitudes play a part in the maintenance (or break-down) of racial residential segregation. Four general themes of inquiry have primarily occupied this line of social psychological research. First, do neighborhood racial composition preferences

vary by race and how are these compositional preferences related to attitudes about willingness to join or exit a particular neighborhood? Second, what is the association between neighborhood racial preferences and indicators of racial prejudice (e.g., negative stereotypes, out-group aversion and social distance, perceived group competition, etc.), particularly in a multiethnic society? Third, how heavily do other race-related social psychological factors (e.g., ethnocentrism) weigh vis-à-vis racial prejudice? Finally, is race primarily a proxy for a variety of socioeconomic or neighborhood considerations (e.g., perceptions of property value changes, neighborhood disorder) or are there important social psychological dimensions of race-based evaluation that also pertain? Work in this domain has also grown in complexity and methodological sophistication.

With data from the 1976 Detroit Area Study, Farley and Schuman introduced a major innovative showcard methodology for assessing neighborhood racial composition preferences (Farley et al. 1978). Prior studies often used general or imprecise survey items querying, for instance, whether it would make a difference for whites if a Negro moved into your block, or if blacks preferred segregated or mixed neighborhoods (Pettigrew 1973). The researchers used five showcards depicting the neighborhood composition based on three rows of five houses, with the respondent’s house situated in the middle. For black respondents, the five showcards ranged across the following compositions: an all black neighborhood, four houses occupied by whites, seven white houses (or just under half white), twelve houses, and an all white neighborhood. For white respondents, the five showcards depicted: an all white neighborhood, one black family moving into the neighborhood, three black families in the neighborhood, five black houses (one-third), and eight black houses (just over half the houses occupied by blacks). Showcard pre-tests indicated almost no whites preferred neighborhoods with higher black concentrations. The Detroit Area Study data revealed that as the number of black homes depicted in a hypothetical neighborhood rose white respondents expressed growing discomfort, rated the neighborhood as one they

would not move into, and if already there, would consider moving out. On the other hand, 82% of blacks preferred mixed (~50% white) neighborhoods as their first or second choices, contradicting the hypothesis that blacks preferred to live amongst themselves and not with whites. The least desirable neighborhood among whites approximated the racial composition of the most desirable neighborhood among blacks.

That neighborhood racial composition affected neighborhood discomfort and willingness to enter and exit a neighborhood does not mean such attitudes are static. Farley et al. (1994) revisited the 1976 Detroit study using data collected in 1992, which showed that whites' neighborhood racial composition preferences reflected an increased tolerance for integration. Among blacks, neighborhood attractiveness varied little over the corresponding time period, with the most notable changes reflecting a declining desire among blacks to live in neighborhoods where almost all or all the neighbors were white. Black respondents still held racially mixed neighborhoods in the highest regard, with levels of racial integration that white respondents in 1976 and 1992 found to be the least attractive. Open-ended follow up questions, in particular regarding blacks' desire to live in an all-black neighborhood, divulged a possible explanation for blacks' reluctance to live in mostly white or all white neighborhoods: fear of white prejudice.

Farley et al. (1994) also tested two other possible factors linked to neighborhood attractiveness among whites: a perceived gap in socioeconomic status (difference scores between whites and blacks on perceptions as rich or poor) and group stereotypes (black/white difference scores on bipolar trait measures tapping perceived intelligence, preference for welfare dependency, difficulty of getting along with a particular group, and English speaking proficiency). The perceived gap in socioeconomic status between groups is another frequently cited source of opposition to residential segregation, with decline in property maintenance, unstable employment, and crime attributed to relatively poorer status. They found no effect of perceived socioeconomic gap on the three dependent outcomes: whites' discomfort

with black neighbors, an index of willingness to exit a neighborhood based on the neighborhood's black composition, and reluctance to move into a mixed neighborhood. The data did reveal that negative black stereotypes were related to these three residential attitudes, with white discomfort, inclination towards white flight, and white reluctance to enter integrated neighborhoods all increasing as the black-white difference score indicated greater endorsement of negative black stereotypes.

Some research suggests that own-race preferences are an important factor producing racially segregated neighborhoods (Clark 1992). According to this perspective, multiple groups' preference for living among members of their same race can jointly determine observed patterns of residential segregation. Some claim that blacks' desire to self-segregate is a main factor in contemporary racial residential segregation (Thernstrom and Thernstrom 1997). Bobo and Zubrinsky (1996) directly test the in-group preference hypothesis by using feeling thermometer scores to operationalize ethnocentrism or positive in-group affect. For the most part, in-group affect was linked to residential integration attitudes primarily for white respondents, and only in reference to black and Asian neighbors; higher levels of white in-group affect related to lower support for living in neighborhoods where half the residents were black or Asian. In-group affect related to integration attitudes for only one other group: black respondents in relation to half Hispanic neighborhoods. However in that case, the relationship contradicted the in-group preference hypothesis; higher in-group affect among blacks decreased opposition to residential integration with Hispanics. Additional studies employing quantitative analysis of open-ended survey responses did not provide strong, if any, support for a relationship between ethnocentrism and neighborhood racial composition, in part because of the relative absence of ethnocentric justifications relative to other concerns (Krysan 2002; Krysan and Farley 2002).

Out-group affect predicted residential integration attitudes more consistently than in-group affect. Bobo and Zubrinsky's multiethnic data

revealed that two indicators of racial prejudice (out-group affective hostility and the in-group/out-group affective difference scores) explained more variation in the willingness to live in a neighborhood composed of 50% of an ethno-racial out-group (whites, blacks, Latinos or Asians) than in-group affect. Models containing out-group affect generally explained as much or more of the variation in blacks, Hispanics, and Asians' attitudes than the affective difference score. However, the difference score models explained the most variation for whites, leading Bobo and Zubrinsky to surmise that the maintenance of social status difference for whites is a more powerful predictor of residential integration attitudes than either ethnocentrism or out-group animus alone. The multiethnic data also confirmed earlier findings on the almost statistical irrelevance of perceived group differences in socioeconomic status across all groups, as well as the robust relevance of negative group stereotypes, particularly for white respondents (Farley et al. 1994). In sum, racial prejudice was more often directly linked to residential racial integration attitudes than in-group affective preference, and only among whites was both out-group animus and in-group preference broadly related to opposition to living in substantially integrated neighborhoods.

Prior investigations provided limited footing on preferences for living among multiple out-groups simultaneously, typically due to the use of forced-choice measures. To provide additional information and decrease pressure for respondents reacting to pre-specified questions, the show card methodology underwent two important modifications with the Los Angeles subsample of the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality project (Charles 2000). First, respondents were presented with blank showcards and were asked to construct their own "ideal" neighborhoods by filling in their own ethno-racial neighbor preferences. Second, respondents were allowed to also indicate Latino and Asian neighbors, in addition to white and black neighbors. This moved the showcard methodology beyond both two-group comparisons and research focused on the black-white dichotomy, as a multiethnic society

increasingly characterizes many major metropolitan areas.

Results from the multiethnic neighborhood showcards yielded news both sanguine and somber. Optimistically, most people created integrated neighborhoods, indicating extensive openness to residential integration. However, blacks were universally the most stigmatized out-group. Almost one in five white respondents constructed ideal neighborhoods with no black neighbors. Almost one-third of Latinos respondents and two out of five Asian respondents constructed ideal neighborhoods that excluded black neighbors, with important variations by nativity; foreign-born Latinos and Asians expressed greater distaste for living among blacks. Whites also expressed the greatest preference for exclusively same-race neighbors. Eleven percent of whites constructed ideal neighborhoods that contained only same-race neighbors, compared to 2.8% of blacks, 6.6% of Latinos, and 7% of Asians. Ideal neighborhoods also indicated that all groups preferred substantial in-group representation, with whites as the most desirable out-group neighbor among minority respondents.

Multiethnic neighborhood showcards also allowed explorations of factors influencing the extent of same-race preferences as well as the influence on neighbor preferences of an additional racial prejudice factor: perceived racial group competition. The data revealed that a composite scale of perceived out-group job and political competition inversely predicted white preference for out-group neighbors and positively predicted same-race neighbor preferences. These results were net of racial stereotypes (intelligence, welfare dependency, English proficiency, drug and gang involvement) and social distance (assessments of difficulty of groups to get along with) that were again found to be significant for whites' neighborhood attitudes (Charles 2006). The data thus revealed that a third psychological indicator of racial prejudice (perceived group threat) independently predicted whites' neighbor preferences (see also Timberlake (2000)).

Furthermore, the multiethnic neighborhood showcards expanded our understanding of non-whites' neighborhood preferences. Racial stereo-

types and social distancing, and group threat to a lesser extent, proved significant for blacks' out-group and same-race neighbor preferences. Also, in-group attachment (a sense of common fate with same-race others) did have a moderate influence on blacks' same-race preferences (Thernstrom and Thernstrom 1997). Latinos' negative stereotypes of Whites and Asians decreased their preference for either group as neighbors, while black stereotypes had no relationship to black neighbor preference. Social distance was an important factor across all out-group and same-group neighbor preferences for Latinos. The various out-group attitudes did not affect Asians' same-race neighbor preferences. On the other hand, social distancing predicted Asians' out-group neighbor preferences, and stereotyping was associated with only black and Latino neighbor preferences. Racial group threat had no effect on either Latino or Asians' neighbor preferences. All minority groups were less likely to prefer white neighbors if they believed whites tended to discriminate against other racial-ethnic groups. In sum, across all groups, whites and non-white minorities, racial prejudice factors were linked to neighbor preferences.

There are those who argue, however, that racial prejudice is not as prominent a factor in the maintenance of racial residential segregation as earlier studies might suggest. Harris (1999, 2001) proposed that race acts as a proxy for non-race-related factors: property values, poverty, crime, etc. Certainly, open-ended responses indicate that perceptions of declining property values and crime are among the most cited reasons whites give for their willingness to move from a neighborhood as the number of black neighbors increases (Farley et al. 1994). However, critics of the showcard methodology maintained that when respondents reacted to showcards indicating a neighborhood's racial composition, race served as a proxy for these other race-neutral apprehensions. Using data from the 1990–1993 Chicago Area Study, Harris (2001) found that perceptions about three neighborhood characteristics—crime, deterioration, and quality of public school education—predict white and black respondents' neighborhood satisfaction, reducing the initial significant effect of percent black in the respon-

dents' zip code to statistical non-significance. Because controlling for these non-racial neighborhood evaluations wiped out the negative relationship between neighborhood satisfaction and objective indicators of percent black in the larger zip code area, Harris argued that respondents' negative reaction to racial composition at the zip code level is primarily a negative reaction to underlying non-racial considerations manifested through the proxy of race. However, Harris did not control for either ethno-racial group stereotypes or affective ratings to assess whether these social psychological factors played a role as well, nor was there discussion about the extent to which the relevant neighborhood characteristics themselves were related to racial factors.

For instance, we know that perceptions of neighborhood crime and disorder are in fact linked to racial factors, net of the actual, objectively measured crime, disorder, and social class of a neighborhood. Quillian and Pager (2001) found that a census tract's percentage of young, black men (age 12–29) in Chicago and Seattle and percent black in Baltimore predicted perceptions of neighborhood crime, controlling for official reported crime rates, victimization rates, and percent poor at the neighborhood level. Likewise, Sampson and Raudenbush (2004) utilized systematic social observation to collect data on objective neighborhood disorder. Researchers sent a sports utility vehicle moving three to five miles an hour into almost 500 block groups, from which both trained observers and video cameras recorded physical disorder (e.g., cigarettes, garbage, empty beer bottles, graffiti, condoms, abandoned cars, etc.), social disorder (i.e., loitering, alcohol consumption, intoxication, fighting, prostitution, drug sales), and physical decay (e.g., boarded up houses, abandoned commercial buildings, etc.). They found that not only did objective indicators of physical disorder, social disorder, and physical decay predict perceptions of neighborhood disorder, but controlling for percent of families living in poverty, percent black, and percent Latino eliminated the association between perceived disorder and observed physical disorder, and substantially reduced perceived disorder's association with objective social disorder.

der and physical decay, the former by a half. As with perceptions of neighborhood crime, perceptions of neighborhood disorder involve crucial race-related dimensions. Though perceptions of neighborhood crime and deterioration matter for whites' evaluations of neighborhood desirability (Harris 2001), both Quillian and Pager (2001) and Sampson and Raudenbush (2004) concluded that racial stereotypes are central to understanding both of these *prima facie* race-neutral attitudes. Racial stereotypes therefore cannot be summarily ruled out.

Another methodological innovation embedded videos in a self-administered computer-assisted survey, allowing researchers to revisit the race vs. class debate while controlling for class-related neighborhood characteristics (Krysan et al. 2009). Respondents viewed four to five short videos of neighborhoods, 27–44 seconds in length, which depicted one of five social class levels (lower working class, upper working class, unblemished middle class, blemished middle class, and upper middle class), based on factors such as property size, house maintenance, and neighborhood upkeep. Furthermore three of the five videos depicted different racial compositions (all white, all black, mixed white/black) based on the race of actors hired to engage in the same, routine activities for a given neighborhood social class level. Researchers randomly assigned respondents to view different neighborhood racial compositions, and utilized a within-subjects hierarchical linear model to estimate the effects on neighborhood desirability of a neighborhood's racial composition net of neighborhood social class, with both entered as level one predictors. Results revealed that whites rated the all white neighborhood as more desirable than the mixed neighborhood and the all black neighborhood as least desirable, effects independent of the influence of perceived neighborhood social class on neighborhood desirability.

Also, Krysan et al. (2009) found that the effect of racial composition on whites' assessments of neighborhood desirability varied based on a range of social psychological indicators. Both negative stereotypes about blacks (black/white difference scores on intelligence, welfare preference, crime/

gang involvement, and quality of children supervision) and stereotypes about blacks' negative impact on property values further reduced whites' desire for living in a black neighborhood. Positive in-group affect increased whites' desirability for the all-white neighborhood, as earlier studies found, but also exacerbated aversion to black and racially mixed neighborhoods. Neighborhood racial composition also affected black respondents' neighborhood assessments, with mixed race neighborhoods perceived as most desirable and all white neighborhoods as least desirable. However, none of the social psychological factors—perceptions of racial discrimination (job, police, neighborhood, and housing market), in-group identity (sense of linked fate and closeness in feelings and thoughts to other in-group members), and in-group affect (black/white difference score on warmth towards group)—interacted with the effect that racial composition had on blacks' assessments of neighborhood desirability. In short, social psychological factors relate to how the racial composition of a neighborhood affects a neighborhood's desirability for whites, net of the perceived social class of the neighborhood, while the same cannot be said for blacks.

While most of the foregoing research addressed the connection between group attitudes and neighborhood preferences, social psychology has been implicated in housing discrimination via the sound of a voice. One study on language and social psychology indicated that among 421 listeners to speakers of Standard American English, African American Vernacular English, and Chicano English, listeners correctly associated multiple speakers of Standard American English with European American identity between 81 and 92% of the time, different speakers of African American Vernacular English with African American identity between 77 and 97% of the time, and different speakers of Chicano English with Hispanic American identity between 79 and 91% of the time (Purnell et al. 1999). On the basis of such high accuracy in associating dialect to ethnic identity, sociologists conducted a phone audit study of Philadelphia's rental housing market exploring whether variations in black-sounding versus white-sounding phone inquiries

would relate to various housing access outcomes (Fischer and Massey 2004; Massey and Lundy 2001). The data revealed that speakers of a black-associated linguistic style were less likely than speakers of a white-associated linguistic style to speak to a rental agent (as opposed to leaving a voice mail), less likely to be informed that a unit was available, less likely to be given access to a unit, more likely to have fees requested, and more likely to receive a credit record inquiry. Another study found that racially identifiable voices also led to differential treatment during home insurance policy inquiries (Squires and Chadwick 2006). Just as the name on a resume triggered perceptions of the racial identity of a job applicant and led to discriminatory labor market outcomes, so too did the voice heard on a telephone suggest the perceived ethnic identity of a rental housing seeker that led to housing discrimination.

Rigorous, complex, and innovative studies on social psychology and neighborhood-related attitudes very clearly confirm that ethno-racial attitudes are implicated in the dynamics of racial residential segregation. While concerns about social class level of a neighborhood and declining property value are indeed important factors in evaluations of neighborhood desirability, race operates as more than a proxy for such considerations. Study after study reveals the independent effects that negative racial stereotypes and indicators of racial animus have on whites' neighborhood preferences, net of social class factors, while the effect of same-group preference on neighborhood attitudes, across all racial groups, is modest at best. Multiple studies attuned to the multiethnic landscape also point to a clear racial hierarchy in race-of-neighbor preferences, with blacks universally viewed as the least desirable neighbor and whites the most desirable. Finally, research exploring how social psychological mechanisms affect neighborhood attitudes across ethno-racial groups indicates that such processes differ between groups; social psychological processes that explain residential attitudes for one group may not apply to other groups (Hunt et al. 2000)

Racialized Politics

To round out our brief survey of the social psychology of ethno-racial attitudes and social inequality, we now turn to a critical domain of social life that weighs directly and quite heavily on many of the issues we've discussed so far: the domain of politics. A sizeable inter-disciplinary literature now exists on the debate about whether racial prejudice, in some form, influences U.S. politics (Hutchings and Valentino 2004; Krysan 2000). This review will assess what we know about the influence of ethno-racial identities and attitudes on partisanship, voting, explicitly ethno-racial policy issues (i.e., school busing, affirmative action, immigration, bilingualism), and implicitly racial policy issues (e.g., welfare, crime and criminal justice).

In this section, we will attempt to address three questions. Do negative ethno-racial attitudes and outlooks heavily influence politics? If so, what is the nature of such negative outlooks, how should we measure them, and what sorts of outcomes do they affect? If not, how should we understand what appears and is often interpreted as racialized political controversy? Given the vast amount of literature that can be classified under the general heading "ethno-racial attitudes and politics," and the extensive treatment already done in the book, *Racialized Politics: The Debate about Racism in America* (Sears et al. 2000), we focus our attention on one of the theoretical frameworks introduced earlier: racial resentment.

Racial resentment has successfully predicted a number of electoral and other political outcomes over the course of over three decades of research. In one of the earliest tests of racial resentment, researchers asked if direct personal racial threat or racial resentment would better predict preference for a white mayoral candidate over a black mayoral candidate. Researchers found that racial resentment was a better predictor of white preference for voting against the black candidate than direct racial threat. The influence of racial resentment on voter preference did not wane even for those less vulnerable to direct racial threat (Kinder and Sears 1981). Racial resentment was also a better predictor than self-interest for whites'

opposition to busing for school desegregation (Sears and Allen 1984), and opposition to affirmative action (Jacobson 1985). In a more recent test, Matsueda and Drakulich (2009) found that controlling for both racial resentment and negative black stereotypes accounted for the negative influence of both Republican identification and conservative ideology on support for affirmative action, though the relationship between conservative ideology and racial resentment has long been a point of contention (Sniderman and Tetlock 1986; Tarman and Sears 2005). Racial resentment also predicted 2008 presidential support for McCain over Obama (Ford et al. 2010; Pasek et al. 2009), and either choosing not to vote or voting for a nonmajor party candidate in 2008 versus voting for Obama (Pasek et al. 2009).

Racial resentment has also been tested on political attitudes beyond the black/white divide. Huddy and Sears (1995) found that an indicator of new prejudice against Hispanics (disagreeing that Hispanics' financial situation would improve with a chance at a good education) predicted opposition to bilingual education. They found that negative averaged ratings towards Mexican-Americans, Cubans, and Puerto Ricans on an affect thermometer scale also predicted opposition to bilingual education. Finally, endorsement of racial resentment targeted towards immigrants (e.g. immigrants are too demanding in push for equal rights, immigrants should work their way up without special favors) predicted opposition to a number of pro-immigration policies: allowing increased legal immigration, granting immigrants eligibility for government assistance as soon as they arrive, and illegal immigrant entitlement to work permits, citizenship for their American-born children, and same costs for public university attendance as other students (Berg 2013).

Finally, racial resentment is also related to a number of attitudes that are not explicitly race-related. Individualism, economic self-interest, and three racial resentment items predicted support for food stamps spending, an attitude towards welfare (Gilens 1995). Racial resentment also predicted opposition to health care policy (Henderson and Hillygus 2011; Tesler 2012), and crime-related concepts such as support for the

death penalty and other punitive sanctions (Bobo and Johnson 2004; Buckler et al. 2009; Matsueda and Drakulich 2009), crime spending (Matsueda and Drakulich 2009) and progressive punishment policies (Buckler et al. 2009). Racial resentment also predicted a racially-tinged, criminal justice-associated behavior, the likelihood that Louisiana registered voters closely followed news about protests regarding a racially-charged court case (Goidel et al. 2011).

Racial resentment has undergone a number of operationalized incarnations over the years. While Henry and Sears (2002) endorse the eight item Symbolic Racism 2000 (SR2K) scale, we list instead the six item set Kinder and Sanders (1996) offered to measure racial resentment, some of which are identical to SR2K items.

- Irish, Italian, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.
- Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve.
- Government officials usually pay less attention to a request or complaint from a Black person than from a white person.
- Most Blacks who receive money from welfare programs could get along without it if they tried.
- It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Blacks would only try harder, they could be just as well off as Whites.
- Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class.

These items taken together reflect the two core dimensions of racial resentment: anti-black animus and blacks' perceived violations of traditional American values. Scholars have also argued for updated items that more explicitly measure racial resentment (Wilson and Davis 2011).

One of the biggest challenges to racial resentment theory has come from those who argue that commitment to race-neutral values and principles provides an alternative interpretational lens for understanding what would appear to be racially prejudiced political attitudes (Sniderman and

Carmines 1997; Sniderman and Piazza 1993). Such values include political conservatism (Feldman and Huddy 2005; Sniderman and Tetlock 1986), individualism (Feldman 1988; Sniderman and Hagen 1985), and fairness and egalitarianism (Peterson 1994; Sniderman and Carmines 1997). Some have found that principled objections not only reflect race-neutral values but are also manifestations of group dominance (Federico and Sidanius 2002). While some analysts engage in contentious arguments about theoretical primacy, a multi-causal framework that acknowledges the important role played by both race-neutral values and group-related factors is warranted (Bobo and Tuan 2006).

Space limitations do not permit us to review other social psychological frameworks relevant to the domain of race and politics. These include the aforementioned model of group position theory, and other theoretical approaches such as social dominance (Pratto et al. 1994; Sidanius 1993; Sidanius and Pratto 1999), paternalism theory (Jackman 1994), stratification beliefs (Kluegel and Smith 1983, 1986; Tuch and Hughes 1996), linked fate (Dawson 1994) and racialization (Gilens 1999; Tesler 2012; see Hunt, this volume). Ethno-racial attitudes and identities also play a major role in the political sociology of collective action, from the “cognitive liberation” of ethno-racial identities (McAdam 1982) to the emotional pull and “frame lifting” exhortations of African American church leaders involved in civil rights struggle (Morris 2000; see Snow and Owens, this volume). All these approaches testify to the enduring connection between ethno-racial attitudes, politics, and social inequality.

Conclusion

The social psychological study of ethno-racial attitudes constitutes one of *the* quintessential illustrations of sociological processes, insofar as ethno-racial attitudes are deeply implicated in the operation, reproduction, and transformation of society at every level of analysis. From the micro-level processes of cognitive categorization and affective and behavioral aversion, to macro-level

patterns of labor market sorting and residential segregation, to either the unfettering or shackling of possibilities via the election of political leaders and the policy constraints and opportunities placed upon them, ethno-racial attitudes structure and are in turn structured by the complex and oft-times contradictory impulses expressed through historical and contemporary forces and the practice of individual and collective agency. Despite our predilection for sociological analyses, we believe most of the studies we reviewed indicate that the social psychological investigation of ethno-racial attitudes and social inequality is a truly interdisciplinary affair, spanning sociology, psychology, political science, economics, anthropology, linguistics, and health-related disciplines as well (Krieger 1999; Major et al. 2013; Schnitker and McLeod 2005; Williams et al. 2003). These social psychological processes are too complex, too variegated, too profoundly entwined in the fabric of social life to be the province of any disciplinary silo. The goal of a United States where ethno-racial factors no longer limit any individuals’ life chances is indeed a distant one, but the malleability and change observed in ethno-racial attitudes over the last half-century suggest that at the very least, it is not an impossible one.

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Current Theorizing and Future Directions in the Social Psychology of Social Class Inequalities

22

Melissa A. Milkie, Catharine H. Warner and Rashawn Ray

An American child of the twenty-first century, Thomas, age 8, is learning French, has a green belt in karate, recently won the elementary school chess tournament (besting a fifth-grader) and plays tennis, among other developing talents. He is asked his opinion about many of his daily experiences, and is very comfortable and adept at joking with and requesting help or favor from nearby adults, including an author of this chapter. Through and through, at a tender age, he is a typical middle-class, or perhaps upper middle-class child, although he won't know how deeply the economic standing and resources he was privileged to be born into smooth the interactions that matter for him, as institutions like school, medical worlds, and eventually work celebrate and reward his language, style, skills and talents. A few weeks over, another 8-year-old child, Michael, enjoys school, playing with his cousins, and watching TV, and is signed up for swim lessons at the YMCA.

We thank Shanna Brewton-Tiayon, Kathleen Denny and Joanna Pepin for comments and research and editorial assistance.

M. A. Milkie (✉) · R. Ray
Department of Sociology, University of Maryland,
2112 Art-Sociology Bldg., College Park,
MD 20742, USA
e-mail: mmilkie@umd.edu

C. H. Warner
Maryland Institute for Minority Achievement and Urban
Education, University of Maryland, 0108AA Cole Student
Activities Building, College Park, MD 20742, USA

He is rarely directly asked his opinion, but rather, is told what to do by his parents. In school, a few middle-class children walk up to the teacher's desk and make requests that Michael overhears; however, he feels awkward leaving his seat or expressing himself during work time (Calarco 2011). Though social class is central to their current and future experiences, the children and their families do not see class easily in everyday interaction. Indeed, class is so powerful because it often operates subtly (Breen and Jonsson 2005; Kusserow 2012; Lareau 2003; Lubrano 2004).

Ironically, when class *is* visible in American society, it is often in relation to tales of mobility and achievement (Collins 2009). Another child, a girl born years ago, started out with very few economic resources—her single mother was a maid and the family lived in a boarding house at times—and would be considered by most to be lower-class or, at best, working-class as a child. And yet the life story of Oprah Winfrey, who has amassed more than \$2 billion through her businesses, is one that Americans can hold out as strong evidence of the meritocracy—that working hard enough and making the right choices, anyone can make it to a high status, well paid position, regardless of one's class origins. The example of Winfrey and that of other highly visible class “crossovers” in politics, business, and entertainment legitimates the strong ideological casts of equal opportunity, individualism, and the meritocracy, reinforcing Americans' beliefs about the ease of achieving class mobility, even as the probabilities of attaining great upward mobility

are quite low (Collins 2009). This cultural cloak is critical to understanding social psychological aspects of social class inequalities, because it is layered through interactions, selves and institutions.

This chapter outlines how social psychological processes are critical to a deep understanding of social class reproduction. We first discuss definitions of social class and argue that class is an especially powerful and pernicious form of inequality. Then we move forward to the main part of the chapter to ask what exactly happens within the three “I” levels: I) interactions, II) individual selves, and III) structuring institutions and ideology? Social psychological theorizing and research at each level (or “I”) contributes to systematically understanding how social class inequality “works” as it is produced, reproduced, and sometimes contested in interactional contexts, structured through institutions and ideology, and embedded deeply in our selves.

What Do We Mean by Social Class?

With Markus and Fiske (2012, p. 10), we define class as “an ongoing system of social distinction that is created and maintained through implicit and explicit patterns of social interaction.” This is a great definition because of its emphasis on social reproduction through interaction, whereby individuals come to understand their “place” in social institutions and their selves in relation to others. Furthermore, the distinctions that are created are marked on individuals, who are often labeled along a class continuum. Analysts use the terms “social class” and “socioeconomic status” as well as the shorthand SES in a variety of ways for theoretical and empirical purposes. As we review theorizing and research on social class by social psychologists, we use these terms in a very broad way.

For some scholars, the term “social class” is tied to classic theoretical traditions, whereas for others, it is used synonymously with socioeconomic status (SES). Social class has both “objective” and “subjective” dimensions (Hout 2008; Hunt and Ray 2012; Jackman and Jackman 1983; Vanneman and Cannon 1987). The objective dimension focuses on how individuals “make a living” (i.e., their occupations and employment

relations), their academic credentials (i.e., education levels) and how well they are remunerated within labor markets (i.e., how much money they make) (Hunt and Ray 2012). Subjective dimensions of class status refer to self-labels reflecting individuals’ own perceptions of their placement in the social class hierarchy. This subjective dimension of social class is often conceptualized as a specific set of class labels or levels that Americans easily identify with: lower, working, middle, or upper class (Hout 2008). In addition to self-labels, individuals may also have tastes and preferences for particular forms of cultural consumption, such as art, music, and language that serve as subjective class markers (Bourdieu 1984). In this sense, the subjective dimension addresses how individuals derive meaning from SES and social class hierarchies and how they present themselves to others as members of a particular class (or perhaps even as “classless”).

Often, there is agreement between subjective and objective class placements. Centers’ (1949) classic work with 1,200 white men found that more than 70% of the men with professional jobs identified themselves as middle-class, whereas about 70% of manual workers identified as working class. In the twenty-first century, Hout’s (2008) research produced similar results. He found that three-fourths of individuals with a bachelor’s degree or higher and nearly three-fourths of those with professional, non-manual jobs identify as middle- or upper- class. Using panel data from 1956–1976 from the University of Michigan Survey Research Center, Cannon (1980) examines the relationship between social structural changes over time and changes in the responses to social class identification. She found that historical changes in whether individuals identify as middle- or working-class reflect increases or decreases in education, occupational prestige, and income. Cannon (1980) also asserted that people take into account their social class standing relative to others. As a result, she concludes that individuals do not have a single immutable perception of their position in the social class hierarchy, but instead think about their socioeconomic status in addition to how their living standards compare to others.

Whether class is thought to be a subjective account or representative of a position in the economic system (and institutions that feed into that such as education) is a matter of considerable debate, as is the extent to which class is a continuum or distinct social groupings (Conley 2008). As Conley (2008) argues, at some point conceptual arguments become like trying to sweep sand into little piles; winds of change will soon make them irrelevant, as changes in the economy such as the 24/7 service sector, globalization and technological innovations render complex arguments and models of what social class is fruitless. Rather, Conley suggests, we should use concepts of social hierarchy like income and prestige that make a difference in our analyses, and that resonate with what people themselves mean by class (Conley 2008; Payne and Grew 2005), such as an identity as “working class” or “well-off.” Self-categorizations matter to social psychologists because they indicate how individuals identify themselves, behave, perceive others, and are treated in social interactions.

The research and theories we discuss in this chapter focus on class processes and labels, including objective measures of social class such as education level, as well as terms people use when thinking of and talking about who they are and how they fit into the social class hierarchy. In this chapter, we refer broadly to social class categories of upper-, middle-, working and lower-classes as we discuss class inequalities. These categories may be defined in relation to subjective or objective conditions within interactions and contexts. We recognize that the use of these categorizations encourages bifurcations along class lines and essentialist notions, and discourages the understanding of class as a process, yet we nevertheless refer to these broad categories as convenient conceptual devices (Markus and Fiske 2012).

The Powers of Social Class

Class differentiation is a unique and powerful form of inequality in at least two critical ways. First, other key dimensions of inequality centered

on race, ethnicity, immigrant status, gender and age often work *through* and *with* social class differentiation. In other words, even as individuals compete for scarce resources, other key statuses, such as gender or ethnicity, may alter their ability to shape successful outcomes in schools, jobs, and other institutions. Subordinates in the gender or ethnic hierarchy suffer in ways that are linked to their economic well-being. Girls are more likely than boys to face barriers to ambitions surrounding math and science, for example, which diminish the likelihood that they will enter certain high-paying, prestigious future occupations (Blickenstaff 2005; Johnson 2007). Blacks face subtle discrimination in schools, which has repercussions for everyday stressors and self-evaluations, but also may influence placements in classrooms and deflate performance on critical tests that lead to more prestigious university education or types of majors (Condrón 2009; Farkas 2003). Each of these other pernicious forms of inequality ends up with consequences for class mobility, underscoring the fundamental place of social class.

Second, the power of social class within interaction is often unrecognized due to its subtlety; indeed, it is often downplayed (Bettie 2003). In part, this is due to the fact that some of the most important processes that produce and reproduce class inequality are hidden from view of subordinates (Schwalbe et al. 2000), and in part, because we lack sophisticated language to discuss class processes. Without being able to see, name, or feel social class differentiation clearly, it is difficult to recognize and combat inequalities. One result is that often “something” does not “fit” or “feel right” in cross-class interactions, and those with less status are excluded or devalued, but that “something” may not be easily identifiable (Bettie 2003; Rivera 2012). Bettie’s (2003) ethnography *Women without Class* illustrates how girls saw many painful class differences between groups as (falsely) based in ethnic differences or peer cultures, such as choices to be “preps” or “hicks,” because those were the concepts and dimensions of distinction with which they were more familiar. Without clear language to talk and

think about class differences and inequalities, the girls could not “see” their power. Thus, the power of class and class reproduction is obscured and inequality more readily perpetuated.

In the next section, we discuss how social class is maintained and reproduced through *interaction* processes, specifically the processes of othering, boundary maintenance and bordering, social network formation and exclusion, and emotion management. We discuss interaction first because like many social psychologists, especially those in the symbolic interactionist tradition, we believe the negotiation of order through meaning creation with others is central to the individual level of selves and the “societal” level of structuring institutions and ideology. The second section of the chapter focuses on the *individual*, where we explore the creation of classed selves (including identities, self-evaluations, and self-presentations) through processes of social comparisons and reflected appraisals. We conclude with a discussion of structuring contexts, including a) *institutions*, where we address class inequalities in families as they bridge to the crucial contexts of schools and work, and b) *ideology*, whereby we argue for the far structuring reach of the cloak of “cherished” cultural myths. After discussing social class inequalities at the three “I’s,” we discuss intersectionality and the need for scholars of social class to be aware of the complexity of intersecting oppressions and privileges in their theorizing and analyses (Howard and Renfrow, this volume).

Interactions: Distinctions and Devaluation

Here we discuss social class as created and reinforced through several, often interconnected interaction processes: othering, boundary work, bordering, network formation and emotion management (Wilkins et al., this volume; Foy et al., this volume). Each contributes to our understanding of the centrality of interaction for class reproduction, in which those with more resources are able to maintain or increase social esteem, health, wealth and capital.

Othering

Othering is a form of collective identity work in which those with higher status create definitions that identify other groups as inferior and sustain those definitions in social interactions. In oppressive othering, higher status persons use informal (and sometimes formal) training to present themselves as highly competent and trustworthy, and through their wealth and connections to networks of powerful others, sustain their images as more worthy than different others (Schwalbe et al. 2000). The wealthy might use services to bolster their image and engage in facework with similar others to maintain illusions of mastery (Schwalbe et al. 2000).

“Defensive othering”—or responding to oppressive definitions imposed by the higher-status group—may occur among subordinates. Working-class individuals might present themselves as the exception to a definition that says they are less committed, creative, or hardworking than their middle-class counterparts. Although this creates self-dignity, it comes at the cost of reifying the dominant definition as “true”—i.e., I am one of them, but not quite like “them” (Schwalbe et al. 2000). In these social definitions, not only is talk about one’s own and other groups scripted in ways that perpetuate definitions that favor the more powerful, but emotions are influenced as well.

Oppressive othering of those in poverty may be especially consequential for social justice because if such individuals are viewed as “different” and “inferior” by those in the middle- and upper-classes, there will be little incentive to help them (Krumer-Nevo and Benjamin 2010). In especially unequal societies, “othering” of the poor by those in power such as conservative politicians and researchers can be particularly consequential. Krumer-Nevo and Benjamin (2010) identify conservative narratives as focused on the cultural characteristics of the poor—a group in moral question based on ideas about their economic inactivity, “illegitimacy,” and crime. These narratives are important because the fault is argued to lie with poor individuals rather than in social structures. Although many may hold

structuralist understandings about the poor (Hunt 2004; Nenga 2011), these structuralist views do *not* necessarily reduce “othering.” This is because a contradictory and powerful individualistic view about how people attain wealth—such as by “working hard”—operates at the same time (Hunt 2004), holding up the moral worth of those who have “made it.” Even if middle- and upper-class people consider those in poverty to be affected by structural forces, there may still be an underlying devaluation; to break out, the poor could theoretically work harder (like the rich ostensibly have done).

Boundary Maintenance and Bordering

Similar to othering, boundary maintenance refers to the processes that create and sustain differences across groups in order to keep greater resources at the dominant group’s disposal. Boundaries can be symbolic or geographic, and they are often constructed through institutional means (e.g., schools, workplaces, governments) (Schwalbe et al. 2000). Schwalbe (2008) notes that boundaries can be created through symbolic processes in which shared expectations hold group members accountable for enacting specific behaviors, or risk repercussions from the group. Shirley (2010, p. 57) explores boundary work among rural, white southerners and finds that in an effort to maintain an ideal type of whiteness, upper-class whites use the term “redneck” to mark other groups as belonging to a “‘lesser’ category of whiteness”—in other words, as whites of lower-class status. Activities and behaviors are defined in such a way that those lacking the appropriate cultural codes or objective economic status are relegated to a lesser status (Shirley 2010).

Boundaries are also created and maintained by institutions in ways that privilege those with the most resources, especially through the emphasis on middle-class cultural capital and the control of access to elites; these processes maintain the division of the world of the “haves” from those of lesser status (Schwalbe et al. 2000). Cultural capital creates symbolic boundaries grounded in

class status based on the possession of particular institutional knowledge used to establish ties and earn institutional trust from others with similar cultural codes. Cucchiara and Horvat (2009) note that the boundary work of middle-class parents at an urban elementary school called Grant not only draws on their own capital but further divides the community by class, perpetuating privilege for their own children. Through their school involvement, middle-class families work to establish a boundary between Grant and ostensibly worse inner city schools, hoping to serve as an “ad” to attract other middle-class families. The families support a new computer lab and several additional improvements to lend the school “curb appeal” for middle-class families, but with little consideration of generating additional benefits to low-income families at the school or across the district (Cucchiara and Horvat 2009).

The related concept of “bordering,” or boundary work done in geographic space, is central to understanding the social psychology of social class reproduction (Lamont and Molnar 2002). Bordering sets boundaries in space by separating “us” and “them,” where “people like us” are more likely to feel welcome, included or “at home” (Van Houtum and Van Naerssen 2002), perhaps in very subtle ways. Spatial “bordering” which recreates the limited interactions across “us” and “them” is especially prevalent in the United States where segregation by class is common, and middle-class families flock to “good” school districts which contain few poor and black children (Hochschild and Scovronick 2003; Schneider and Buckley 2002; see also Quillian, this volume).

Social Networks: Exclusions and Control of Resources

Another interactional process linked to class is the formation of social networks and the resources that networks provide to participants. Social networks are broadly defined in social psychology as inclusion and exclusion in the social relations of group members. Social networks are the interpersonal relations that bridge social structural

conditions and individual lives. Here, we discuss how social class structures social network formation and the resources available through social networks (see also Cook, this volume).

First, social class often determines network membership and exclusion. Homophily is a key organizing process for social networks: individuals create relationships with similar others (Cook, this volume; Lin 2000; McPherson et al. 2001). Social class often defines common interests with which to establish relationships through marriage, community organizations, neighborhoods, and schools (Horvat et al. 2003; Schwartz and Mare 2005). Individuals also form network ties based on their immediate social environments; because environments are class-based, so too are the interactions that yield relationships (Rivera et al. 2010). Not only is our physical, social environment often determined by class status, but social class similarities also encourage the formation of social connections among those who interact frequently. Though sharing a dormitory or floor greatly increases the odds of interaction among college students (Marmaros and Sacerdote 2006), students' social class background structures their friendships and comfort level or "fit" at college, and can result in long-term class differences in access to resources and connections (Stuber 2011). For example, Stuber (2011, p. 46) describes Melanie, a working-class student accepted to an elite private college, who felt shock at fellow students' inability even to do their own laundry once reporting to campus. Despite loving the campus, Melanie experienced alienation and depression around her privileged peers, professors, and academic work—emotions that can influence working-class students' persistence at college and the social capital with which they graduate (Stuber 2011).

Second, the resources and support that individuals receive from interactions within their social network are largely dependent on class ties. Social network members provide emotional support that improves well-being or buffers existing strains, protecting individuals from the negative effects of life challenges (Cohen and Wells 1985). In addition, participation in advantaged social networks can lead to higher levels of occupational prestige,

job attainment, or advancement (Burt 2004; Rivera et al. 2010; Song 2011; see Lin 1999 for a review). Class-based networks can lead to improved information exchange, but the "quality" of the information received through social networks is connected to the social class characteristics of participants and sometimes the class composition of the larger institutional setting, such as a school, child care facility, or place of work. Professional and managerial workers are more likely to hear of job openings through acquaintances in social networks; similarly, individuals are most likely to benefit from social networks that connect to high status individuals (Granovetter 1983). For example, Stanton-Salazar and Dornbusch (1995) find that Mexican-American adolescents are most likely to experience social mobility through bilingual ability and the formation of ties with middle-class "institutional agents" who are able to help them navigate the school environment.

The extent to which social networks carry costs or benefits for participants may depend in part on the class composition of the network. Networks, especially dense, homogenous networks, may exercise too much social control over participants, limiting personal freedom, reducing access to mainstream social networks, or stifling success (Portes 1998; Young 2004). Wilson's (1987) seminal work discusses the negative effects of the concentration of joblessness, violence, and disenfranchisement in urban neighborhoods, where these low-income neighborhood networks experience social isolation from working- and middle-class influence.

Another cost associated with social networks may occur as a result of social mobility. As individuals move to a new class status and develop class-based interests or a new class identity, this upward mobility may cause them to sever ties with old networks, resulting in a personal feeling of being caught between two class statuses. Lubrano (2004) reveals challenges that working-class individuals face in network interactions as a result of upward mobility. As they shift from working-class identities to middle-class behaviors, they face "discomfort" as they lose common ground with the families and friends of their

youth. Indeed, Lubrano notes that “in this country, we speak grandly of this metamorphosis, never stopping to consider that for many class travelers with passports stamped for new territory, the trip is nothing less than a bridge burning” (2004, p. 48). The adoption of a new class identity often arrives with significant loss to former social networks.

Emotion Management

Another process implicated in social class inequalities is emotion management through discourse regulation and control of subjectivity (Schwalbe et al. 2000; see Foy et al., this volume). Emotion management may occur in a work setting as paid labor (Hochschild 1983). For example, college students trained to sell textbooks over the summer undergo “emotional socialization” as they learn to use self-narratives to cope with negative experiences on the job (Schweingruber and Berns 2005). Such training also contributes to emotional capital where, as a result of individual background or socialization, some (i.e., middle-class individuals) may be more likely to possess the necessary emotional skills for particular types of employment (Cahill 1999). Such emotional capital can be used to advance in one’s occupation, but a lack of certain types of emotional capital can also thwart efforts for advancement (Cahill 1999).

Among those of lower social class, managing emotions becomes part of their subjectivity—a way to increase subordination and deference (Schwalbe et al. 2000). Froyum (2010) found that staff members at a low-income after-school program tried to have children sympathize with them, distance themselves from “dysfunctionality,” stifle “attitude,” and so on. This was ostensibly to build emotional capital and manage emotions in order to counteract racism; however, along the way it also built deference and reinforced class and racial inequalities.

Emotions are linked to mistrust, and emotions often help perpetuate a system where class is prominent and powerful but unacknowledged. When a working-class person feels slighted and

hurt by assumptions made by middle-class age-mates—for example, as when the roommate of a relatively disadvantaged Princeton University undergraduate assumed he would chip in for items they purchased—mistrust and unease ensue on both sides (see Fiske et al. 2012). Mistrust continues because the language available to understand the communication errors is not rooted in class-based styles and words, but in personal affronts.

In sum, an array of interrelated processes occurring at the interactional level support social class inequality: processes of othering, boundary maintenance and bordering, network formation, and emotional management. These interactions have consequences for individual selves, and occur in central spheres or institutions, reproducing social class differentiation and inequality. Although much scholarship focuses on how inequalities are reproduced, some interactions counter tendencies to class reproduction. Examining “successful” cross-class interactions in future research can be especially productive to learn what conditions foster positive feelings about the self and other, individuating the other, and cooperating (DiMaggio 2012).

Individual Selves: Identities, Self-Evaluations and Self-Presentations

In this section, we discuss selves as they are implicated in the production and reproduction of social class through interaction. We first discuss thoughts about who one is, or social class *identities*; next, we discuss self-feelings or *evaluations* linked to class (esteem, mattering and mastery). And finally, we discuss behavior and *self-presentations* as part of class status. Two processes of self-formation (social comparisons and reflected appraisals) are discussed across these aspects of the self. These self-processes are important in terms of how interactions based in othering, bordering, and network exclusion become manifest in individual selves.

Social comparison theory argues that individuals engage in an act of comparing themselves to others for the purpose of evaluating their own

status and abilities (Festinger 1954). In the context of social class, individuals not only take into account their own income, education, occupation, and wealth, but also their neighborhood location as well as evaluations of friends, coworkers, and extended family members to determine how their living standards compare to others. Perceptions of one's living standards compared to others form the basis for constructing class-based identity, evaluations and self-presentations (Hout 2008; Urciuoli 1993).

Reflected appraisal processes also shape class identities and class-based evaluations, affecting individual outcomes such as self-esteem. What we believe that other people think of who we are and what we have achieved matters greatly for how we think and feel about ourselves (Rosenberg 1986). To the extent that others see us as worthy of our attainments, we will feel worthy. To the extent that others stigmatize our standing, we will feel unworthy. An interesting component of reflected appraisals and social class status is that the invisibility of class in our self-presentations, discussed above, makes it difficult to attribute how others view us to our class status and resources. If working-class individuals "sense" that others view them negatively, but do not understand that the evaluation is rooted in class-based styles of talk, bodily performance or expectations, they may be less able to see themselves as (an oppressed) classed individual in a classed system (Bettie 2003).

Othring, boundary work, and exclusion processes set the stage for the kind of self work described here. In other words, when these processes occur, individuals are also measuring their identities and worth based on the views they see others have of them (reflected appraisals) and how they compare with these others (social comparisons) in these oppressive and defensive interactions.

Social Class Identification

Identity formation is an ongoing process, shaped across many different institutional contexts, and often the nature of identity work changes as

people shift contexts. Social class identification refers to how individuals subjectively understand their social class position (Centers 1949; Davis and Robinson 1998; Hout 2008; Hunt and Ray 2012; Jackman and Jackman 1983). Social class identities have importance for how individuals act, who they think they align with personally and politically, and perhaps more importantly, who they think they are *not* like. Class identities are linked to conceptions of the self, presentations of the self, and perceptions of others (Callero, this volume).

The strength and salience of class identity, as well as the meaning it holds, are each key components of the identity process. The comparisons people use to classify their "selves" in economic or class terms are complex. Individuals are not simply using their SES and the SES of others to make these comparisons. Rather, individuals draw upon social class cues from the current interaction as well as collective memories from previous social interactions to make judgments about how to interact and feel, as well as what characteristics of their identities to present in particular social settings. Urciuoli (1993) explores how Puerto Rican New Yorkers construct alternative representations of their social class position. In addition to SES, her participants include race, gender, social networks, and place in their evaluations of social class location. In this regard, social class is viewed as a "system of oppositions" as individuals compare and locate themselves in relation to others. For example, Lamont (2000) states that Ben, a stably employed blue-collar worker, defines his self-worth through pride in his work, and his success through moral behavior. For Ben and other blue-collar workers in the study, staying out of fights, being a good father, and not being "wormy" are all traits he views as part of his personal identity rather than part of his class status (Lamont 2000, pp. 19–20). Often, social class identification is created in opposition to other possibilities and may be highly dependent on the extent to which individuals actually *see and feel* class (Stuber 2006).

Social class identification may change as subjective or objective conditions shift. Here we may think about the struggle that college students

who are transitioning from working-class backgrounds to middle-class lifestyles may encounter when asked about their social class identification. These college students struggle to reconcile their former selves with their current selves (or “possible” or “probable” selves; see Conley 2008) as they compare their upbringing with their current educational pursuits and social interactions. Wright (1996, p. 709) acknowledges that objective measures gauging self-perceptions of social class have modest explanatory power, but by including other “class linked variables” (such as comparisons with family members, friends, and neighbors, the class make-up of social networks, or unemployment experiences), we may be able to better measure social class identities. In other words, the comparisons that individuals make between themselves and others matter for assessing the social psychological impact of social class location.

The consequences of negative social comparisons include institutional alienation, feelings of stigma, and lower self-esteem. Individuals may engage in substantial facework to achieve the subjective class identity they imagine for themselves in interaction, hoping to avoid potential poor outcomes. These issues are discussed in the next section.

Self-Evaluations: Esteem, Mastery, and Possible Selves

A discussion of *self-feelings* or *evaluations* is critical for understanding social psychological processes of class reproduction, (see also Callero, this volume). Social class matters for self-feelings: esteem, mastery, and for younger people especially, “possible selves” (and as we point out, to “probable selves” or the “fallback position”). Each of these forms of self-feelings will be discussed below.

Rosenberg and Pearlin (1978) argue that the self-esteem of adults is shaped in part by social comparisons based in social class status, but that this is less true for adolescents and children. In some ways, adults confront more obvious, “in their face” comparisons at the workplace, where

“lowly” janitors walk by executives, or cashiers process designer clothing purchases for the well-off, providing adults with frequent opportunities to evaluate themselves relative to better off others. Children’s environments may be more homogeneous, with schools and neighborhoods comprising more of their social worlds, allowing for fewer comparison opportunities and thus fewer opportunities to have their self-esteem affected by feeling “more than” or “less than” others (Rosenberg and Pearlin 1978). However with the pervasiveness of television and the advent of social media, children may be exposed to greater varieties of class contexts, and social class may have become more relevant for younger Americans’ self-esteem and other self-feelings in recent years. Even young children can feel the stigma of being poor, and children’s consumption of material goods may be divisive even as they attempt to connect with other children (Pugh 2009).

The loss of self-esteem or feelings of alienation from dominant class groups can have negative consequences in institutional settings. Even the middle-class can feel “othered,” stigmatized, or devalued when in elite settings (Johnson et al. 2011). Johnson et al. (2011) argue that those from relatively low SES backgrounds, even if they are fairly high absolutely, may possess a stigmatized identity that requires managing concerns about marginality. Knowing that one’s class background is different (and lesser) than her peers is a psychological burden that could make a woman at an elite university question her ability to fit in, keep up, and so on. Even among those with high motivation but less preparation, upwardly mobile working-class students may experience rejection within cross-class social relationships and feel diminishing trust in institutions, such that motivation to achieve personal goals is compromised in a self-fulfilling fashion (Mendoza-Denton et al. 2002; Stuber 2011). Moreover, when disadvantaged socioeconomic status is made salient, stereotype threat—the belief that one is being judged based on social categories—may ensue, creating worse performance on tests (Spencer and Castano 2007; Steele 2011) and thus worse self-evaluations in turn.

Beyond class-based esteem, other self concepts are linked to how powerful one feels as a unique individual in society and the actions one takes in connection to the future. In many studies, those in higher social class positions report more mastery, or the belief that one is in control of one's future (Mirowsky and Ross 2007; Pearlin 1999). Mastery is quite important both in fending off problems before they arise, and in believing one is able to solve life's difficulties (Thoits 1999). The life events that require action and the steps individuals take to overcome obstacles differ across class statuses, and some steps that yield improved results for one class status may not have the same effects at another class location. For example, Dwyer et al. (2011) find that an increase in debt (credit card or education) has stronger positive effects among youth in the lower income quartile, as this represents an investment in their future; the positive effects of debt diminish as social class increases.

A final component of the self concept that is critical to social class reproduction is "possible selves"—identities based in the kinds of people we want to become or do not want to become—as motivational for future action (Markus and Nurius 1986). Although possible selves represent a desired state, they need to be grounded in a concrete reality. Those dreaming of becoming a doctor are going to be able to do so much more easily when people very close to them have enacted all aspects of the role, including taking the right high school courses, attending college with a pre-med major, going to medical school and obtaining their own practice. In other words, unless an occupational "possible self" can be practically envisioned with oneself enacting the role, then it won't become an "envisioned self" or one that we are very likely to become. With its informational and experiential resources, the envisioned self of doctor will not just be motivated but also *practiced* and thus much more likely to become a reality. Indeed Conley (2008) argues that what is often missing in sociologists' assessments of transmittal of class advantage is the "envisioning" process, whereby social roles that youth aspire to become demystified—i.e., they go from being possible selves to probable selves.

Although doctors (as well as lawyers, high-level business or political positions, and other high status jobs) are desirable selves for most youth in all social classes, those in higher classes have closer connections to doctors and, thus, can actually envision the process of obtaining and doing such a job and becoming such a person. They will get there more readily because that possible self has been de-mystified by close others.

A story demonstrating the interplay among institutional and ideological structures, interactions, and individuals is instructive. A "defining moment" may occur from the perspective of individuals who recall situations that changed their view of the classed world, or their place in it. For example, Collins (2009) discusses how as a working-class African-American senior in high school, she was asked by her teacher to speak about the meaning of the U.S. flag at special event held at Independence Hall in Philadelphia. A burgeoning sense of oppression based on witnessing those in her family who had worked hard their whole lives but remained poor made its way into Collins' essay, which also discussed the democratic ideals of this symbol. A powerful moment occurred when her teacher previewed and slashed her essay with red ink, providing a clear lesson in the public sentiment that "should" surround symbols of opportunity and putting her in her "place." In the end, Collins told the teacher she could not give the speech they wanted, and Collins' articulation of race and class inequalities as part of the American experience was silenced. Indeed, she was silenced—and perhaps affected in terms of esteem, mastery, and a vision of who she could be.

Presentation of Classed Selves

Self-presentations of class identities are critical to understanding the production and reproduction of inequalities. People "do" class by signaling their class locations to others. Much presentation of class occurs "naturally" through language and skills imparted at a young age. Clothing, posture, eye contact, and conversational distance can instantaneously mark someone's social location

(DiMaggio 2012). Indeed, people can identify the class rank of others quite readily by observing how they mark social spaces and by physical movements, and individuals signal status through verbal styles, engagement or lack thereof in the setting, and demands from or deference to others (Kraus et al. 2012; see Schwalbe and Shay this volume).

There is also intentionality in how people use objects and words to portray class identities. Clothing is one important way that individuals show they belong to a particular class, as certain designer labels or types of jeans, for example, signal to others that one belongs to a group. “Professionals” need “professional” clothing; working-class people may wear uniforms or more casual clothing on the job for practical or personal reasons. People may also purposefully signal social class to gain advantage or portray deference to others through the use of language or gestures (see Hollander and Abelson, this volume). For example, a patient may indicate his occupational status of lawyer to a doctor during a visit, seeking to impress his importance upon the doctor and believing that this will get him better care.

Alternatively, individuals may present as classless. Middle-class individuals may attempt to show that they are not necessarily any different from working-class individuals by choosing to wear wrinkled or cut-up clothing (see Jimenez 2010 for a discussion of how this behavior relates to ethnic identities). In this case, “classless” has two connotations. One implies that individuals are of the same class, and another that individuals aim to present themselves in an ambiguous manner. Although research focuses on the ways that people signal their social class or associations with certain class categories, little scholarship explores how people purposely try to avoid class affiliations. If class is less of a salient identity to those with more privilege (Stuber 2006), appearing “classless” may be a way to maintain resources while denying that having those resources is linked to withholding and excluding those of lower classes from networks.

In sum, self processes of social comparisons and reflected appraisals help people learn about how they fit within the social hierarchy and how

they feel and think about their position. Besides assisting with their subjective identifications as being of a certain social class and their projections of that identity in interaction, through social comparisons and reflected appraisals people evaluate themselves along class lines to assess how good and worthy they are, how much control they have, and to envision the selves they might become in the future. These self processes occur within everyday interactions, many of which take place within their own people’s class contexts, but also those that emerge in cross-class interaction. It is possible that some positive cross-class interactions occur, allowing for the development of dignity and cooperation (DiMaggio 2012) and contributing to a reduction of inequalities (Lareau and Calacro 2012), a possibility which further research should explore.

Structuring Institutions and Ideology

Interactions are especially critical for future pathways and future selves when they occur within key institutions. For example, a single conversation with a doctor may determine the course of treatment and likelihood of recovery (see McLeod et al., this volume). A parent’s insistence that a child be moved to a new track in school may or may not be met with success. And of course job interviews are obvious defining moments for individuals, with outcomes leading to one pathway versus another. Ridgeway and Fisk (2012) discuss class and status dynamics at critical points in the life course—those interactions that are “gateways” to life-altering opportunities, such as “choices” surrounding college and experiences at job interviews. They provide a story about two men with identical resumes and college careers who each interview for a banking job; the interview occurs at a French restaurant. The young man with working-class origins, (imagine Michael now grown), has difficulty pronouncing the dinner items and wears an inexpensive ill-fitting suit, whereas the middle-class man bonds over tennis with the interviewer and speaks perfect French. The middle-class young man (a grown up Thomas, perhaps) is seen as

the superior candidate—a better “fit”—because of the benign but consequential “errors” of the working-class man, and is provided a job offer. The working-class man, upon learning of his fate, begins to believe he would not enjoy working with those “stuffed shirts” anyway (Ridgeway and Fisk 2012, p. 132; Rivera 2012). This section discusses prominent theorizing on social class in the third, structuring level of the three I’s: institutions and ideology.

Structuring Institutions

Here we incorporate the social structure and personality perspective, which elucidates the connections between macro context and individual emotion, psychology, and character. Key components of this perspective draw attention to connections between larger social and institutional inequalities and the ways in which such limited class-based opportunities affect daily experiences and individual characteristics (House 1981; McLeod and Lively 2003). House (1981) presents three principles that comprise the social structure and personality perspective: the components principle, the proximity principle, and the psychological principle. These principles emphasize the ways in which this perspective relies on social relationships and interactions rather than simply illustrating the effects of social structure and culture alone (McLeod and Lively 2003). The proximity principle is often “the site of all the action,” illustrating the connections between social structure and individual agency through interactional processes (McLeod and Lively 2003). Many interactional processes have been addressed in the previous section; in this section we focus on how institutional contexts bridge and connect class structures to social psychological outcomes for individuals. Using Bourdieu’s theoretical conceptualizations, social institutions provide the “field” upon which games are played; social institutions house many of the interactions presented above, structuring the nature of the interaction.

We emphasize three fundamental and often overlapping contexts in which many of the

interactional processes discussed may occur: family, school, and work. These three social institutions are virtually unavoidable in daily social life, and provide the context for the qualities for success that matter the most. They are centrally implicated in the reproduction of class inequalities.

Family as Institutional Context

A baby is born into a family, and immersed in that family’s linguistic codes and cultural capital, competencies that are developed and carried with that child for a very long period. Bernstein (1974) outlines the importance of linguistic codes and shows how the social networks and the organization of space in working-class versus middle-class households lead to different linguistic competencies. Working-class individuals speak in “restricted codes” reflecting their close networks of others and the relative lack of flexibility in their homes and in their worlds. The middle-class are privy to the restricted code but in addition speak in an “elaborated code” in which the speech is more abstract, less tied to context and more complex. Those in middle-class contexts also have homes with more flexible, open space, which contributes to the elaboration of meanings in different contexts. Institutions such as schools and workplaces favor the middle-class cognitive and linguistic orientations. As we discuss later, the production of knowledge within schools through curriculum and socialization privileges the high status codes, mirroring social and structural inequalities (Apple 1990).

The concepts of habitus and cultural capital identified by Bourdieu ([1984] 2002) explain how family socialization matters for children as they grow up and move into education and work settings (see Mortimer et al., this volume). For Bourdieu, habitus represents the styles, dispositions, and preferences that cohere along class lines. Habitus, a “practice-unifying and practice-generating principle,” creates differences between status groups and unifies the class in which one is a member (Bourdieu 2002, p. 101). Parental habitus plays a central role in the generation of cultural capital, or knowledge of the dominant group’s cultural signals (speech codes, parameters of interaction, music, and tastes), which is

used for processes of social exclusion (Lamont and Lareau 1988). Concerted cultivation represents “aspects of the habitus” of the middle-class families Lareau (2003, p. 276) observes, in which parents push children to become skilled in and familiar with topics and activities that are considered honorable, as well as ways of speaking “properly” to adults (DiMaggio 2012) within institutions (Lareau 2003). Children similar to Thomas, described earlier, have an expansive array of words and ways to work into adult conversations to tailor situations according to their desires.

The “field” in which cultural capital is displayed matters (Bourdieu 2002; Carter 2003; Erickson 1996; Horvat 2003). That is, within each context, unique forms of cultural capital may be selected, and cultural capital may have varying levels of importance over other forms of capital depending on a particular context (Bourdieu 2002). For example, Lareau and Weininger (2008) note that middle class families possess certain types of cultural capital that assist children in gaining admittance to college. These parents have knowledge of the application process, how to secure recommendations, and familiarity with the skills important to admissions professionals. While tremendously important for college applications, this cultural capital is less useful for middle class families navigating neighborhood associations, social clubs, retirement and investment planning, or managing personal debt. Although knowledge of college applications aids progress on the road to achievement, successful practices in other fields must also be learned to maintain advantages in a highly competitive society.

Linguistic and cultural capital, differentiated by the class one is born into, continue to matter throughout the life course (DiMaggio 2012). Indeed, to the extent that our classed selves—that is, our habitus, language, ways of expressing ourselves, views about agency, and so on—are “socialized into” us, we carry with us our early experiences even as we cross class boundaries in everyday interactions or occasionally more permanently through occupational attainments or cross-class relationships that take us away from

parents’ (and thus our early) class statuses (Lubrano 2004; Wheaton and Clarke 2003). Class reproduction occurs, however, in part because these building blocks are implicated in the central institutions of education and work through the early life course. As Michael, described above, grows older, he carries building blocks that do not fit squarely into the institutional molds as readily as those of Thomas.

Parenting practices are shaped by social structural conditions, and numerous studies offer a convincing picture of the central role of social class in shaping the values and behaviors parents strive to instill in their children. Based in their own work histories, parents prepare their children for success through the use of language, structured activities, rewards and discipline, and values of autonomy or conformity (Bernstein 1974; Hart and Risley 1995; Kohn and Schooler 1983; Kohn and Slomczynski 1990; Lareau 2003; Weininger and Lareau 2009). Styles and language, values and actions with children adhere along class lines. Middle-class parents engage in “concerted cultivation” to ensure success in the class hierarchy, including immersing children in the art of negotiation, questioning institutional authority, and embracing self-direction (Kohn and Schooler 1983; Lareau 2003). In contrast, working-class parents may speak less frequently to children, encourage obedience rather than entitlement, and promote more independent play (Hart and Risley 1995; Kohn and Schooler 1983; Kohn and Slomczynski 1990; Lareau 2003). Chin and Phillips (2004) find that although working-class parents want to cultivate children’s talents, they often lack the money, information, and opportunities to assemble the intricate arrangements of middle- and upper-class families. These researchers question the extent to which differences in childrearing practices represent cultural class preferences or whether class differences are largely the result of unequal resources.

While social class is important, the extent to which social class influences childrearing practices and children’s values and behaviors is complicated by overlapping racial/ethnic statuses (e.g., Cheadle and Amato 2011; Rosier and Corsaro 1993). Social class does not operate alone,

but rather in conjunction with other family characteristics, both those related to social statuses and those associated with the social psychological context like the family “emotional tenor” (Hitlin 2006, p. 28; Taylor et al. 2004).

School as Institutional Context

There are several ways in which the educational system creates or fails to remedy social class inequalities (Milkie and Warner 2011), and the values and skills emphasized in the educational system favor the dominant groups in society, resulting in low levels of intergenerational social mobility (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990; Bowles and Gintis 1976, 2002; Delpit 2006; Heath 1983; see Schneider et al., this volume). Even in the earliest forms of schooling, working-class children are counted out. For example, there are persistent SES inequalities in student reading group placement, even in first grade. First grade teachers are more likely to place low SES students in lower-skill reading groups, with this inequality mediated by teachers’ evaluations of students’ learning ability and standardized test scores (Condrón 2007). Thus, class status, but also teachers’ perceptions of students’ social and behavioral skills (highly correlated with class status) within the school context, shape reading group rankings. Status structures opportunities for educational achievement, the odds of college attendance, occupational status, and intergenerational mobility (Blau and Duncan 1967; Bowles and Gintis 1976, 2002; Hauser et al. 1983; Oakes 1985).

Perspectives on the social reproduction of inequality within the educational setting do not always fully incorporate social psychological theories inasmuch as they fail to pinpoint social interactions between a child’s structural status and children’s individual selves that act as mechanisms for the reproduction of social inequality (Schneider et al., this volume). For example, Oakes’ (1985) illustration of tracking in the educational system documents the role of teacher-student interactions in shaping future achievement, while Bowles and Gintis (1976) highlight how the structure of the educational system (based on punctuality, authority, and power differentials) uses class differences in individual

personality and educational values to capitalist advantage. Further research could identify the ways in which interactions based on learning styles, personality (introvert or extrovert), and physical comportment in the school setting shape class-based inequalities in the classroom. What classroom performances and identities are valued in the educational system and how do we understand these behaviors in relation to class-based inequalities? Examining othering and boundary work by teachers, parents and neighbors in socioeconomically diverse school settings can go a long way toward elucidating the multiple ways contexts matter for interactional processes.

The Wisconsin model of achievement offered one of the first perspectives linking social mobility to class-based social psychological characteristics. The Wisconsin model traces a pathway from SES to occupational attainment, highlighting individual personality, ability, and aspirations as mechanisms for understanding the effects of social status (Kerckhoff 1995; Sewell and Hauser 1975). According to the model, rather than social structure alone determining occupational or educational outcomes, individual agency (in the form of ability and aspirations) also shapes outcomes (Sewell and Hauser 1980). The Wisconsin model is not as effective in explaining attainment processes across other social statuses like gender or race, though subsequent research has worked to better explain these differences by incorporating different structural mechanisms through school, family, or individual contexts (e.g., see Kerckhoff 1995 for a discussion).

MacLeod (2009) identifies individual aspirations in the educational setting as a key link between social structure and social mobility. Students do not fail in school because they *expect* to fail, but rather because they cannot envision an outcome that links school achievement to a better life. Limited opportunities shape individual aspirations, and adolescents in economically disadvantaged settings may see little payoff to high aspirations given their low odds of success. Even those with high aspirations may not be able to carry them very far given limited resources (MacLeod 2009). This is because of a lack of opportunity to practically envision their ideals in a

clear enough manner so that their dreams can become a reality (Conley 2008).

Educational progress is determined not only by the social class (and other) characteristics of students but also by the characteristics of students' schools. Track placements and school poverty levels also structure children's success in school over time, creating individual skill sets that shape future options (Alexander et al. 1997). Khan (2011) highlights the creation of a "new elite" through private secondary education, where privileged students consume information on key ideas that are applicable across classes. These elite private schools socialize students to cross class boundaries with enough information (extending far beyond high-brow cultural knowledge) to be comfortable in multiple settings. Class hierarchies remain invisible because success is attributed to individual work and achievement within an advantaged school setting.

While privileged, wealthy students may "find their place" at elite institutions, the efforts needed by other, less privileged students to find comfort in advantaged school settings may be extensive. Even the "best" school may not offer uniform advantages to all its students. Crosnoe (2009) highlights the negative effects of attending middle- and upper-class schools on low-income students' ratings of social integration and self-worth. While integration into high socioeconomic status schools may offer low-income students academic gains on average, there are social and academic losses as well, including feelings of isolation and being assigned to lower level courses compared to higher income peers (Crosnoe 2009). Often, the school setting can have significant effects on how interactions come to define individual senses of self. We can imagine that as Michael progresses through a middle-class school, he may encounter exclusion based on not having the correct building blocks of social and linguistic capital, and he may view himself, as the institution might, as having lesser value and potential.

Class relationships within the educational context are complicated by other social statuses. Race/ethnicity is importantly linked to levels of academic engagement and attainment, and researchers highlight the importance of racial/ethnic dif-

ferences in understanding how children's knowledge of cultural codes and social networks create educational inequalities (e.g., Carter 2005; Ferguson 2000; Ogbu 2003; Stanton-Salazar 2001; Tyson et al. 2005). Intersectional approaches can increase understanding of interactions within educational institutions, particularly through an exploration of the ways in which socialization of values and behaviors in the family are viewed in the classroom setting across racial/ethnic, class, and gender identities. Calarco (2011) finds that middle-class children like Thomas are better able to ask teachers for help in the classroom, often interrupting class activities in the process. This behavior serves students well, and an intersectional lens on the role of other statuses in the classroom would inform us on other persistent inequalities, such as the black-white achievement gap, and how this links to class-based inequalities.

Middle- and upper-class parents try as much as possible to customize educational experiences for each child, believing that institutions should be shaped to the child's needs rather than the child being shaped to the needs of the community or the classroom (Lawrence-Lightfoot 2003). Parents with more resources engage in what we call "status safeguarding" (Milkie and Warner, *forthcoming*) to ensure the best education for their offspring. This can involve anything from asking for less (or more) homework, a special place to sit in the classroom, or a reputable teacher for the next year, to pulling a child into a private school (in which the parents' demands must be met more directly due to the tuition paid). "Status safeguarding" is embedded in the social institutions of family and schools and may be especially consequential for children who have difficulties, or even the potential for difficulties. When the potential consequences of problems grow greater—when the (future) status of the child is threatened—such as when a middle-class child has academic difficulties, as Lareau (2003) and others have shown, mothers will attempt to intervene in educational institutions to ensure that the child maintains an acceptable level of academic achievement. In addition to switching a child to a different teacher or to a private school to ensure status continuity, promoting school success

may entail pursuing a diagnosis (for example, of ADHD), gaining accommodations for the child at school, and/or medicating him for being restless in the classroom.

In addition to academic safeguarding, status safeguarding can occur through many avenues, including emotional ones, i.e., actively protecting children's happiness at school in order to secure long-term academic success (Warner 2010). It may occur through talent safeguarding; for a middle-class child taking piano lessons, when difficulties arise, such as an instrumental music teacher that does not make the child happy, the mother can switch to another, more expensive teacher. This form of status safeguarding ensures her child will have music "credentials" one way or another. A working-class child, however, may not have access to instruments until an older age, perhaps through a school music program, and if the teacher is not effective, the child's musical development will be stalled because the parent has limited access to provide alternative lessons to the child.

For parents in a competitive, individualistic society with few safety nets, the interaction processes that reproduce inequalities take on a future orientation as parents "other" and police boundaries about who their child should be with, and in what organizations. Status safeguarding points to why middle-class parents intervene in myriad ways, and suggests the interventions can come through many means, including removing a child from a negative peer group, changing the schooling environment, and more. Working-class parents may attempt to safeguard and/or enhance the status of children, including sending a troubled teen to live with relatives who have better neighborhood or school contexts, but will have more difficulties achieving this. The concept of status safeguarding should generate future research because it points to how as children grow, continual safeguarding in the form of anticipating and solving problems that might derail success (however narrowly defined that success might be, such as attending a certain university), is necessary. Questions about how fathers and especially mothers narrate these rescues, and how these vary not only by class, but also by region,

gender, race and age of the child (through young adulthood), are important to address through future research.

Work as Institutional Context

Family and school contexts are often understood to "prepare" children for their occupational role in society. Through social reproduction, children's habitus, cultural capital, and early socialization experiences shape their success in institutions dominated by middle-class values and preferences (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990; Bowles and Gintis 1976, 2002; Willis 1977). Work conditions are the institutional connection between social class structures and individual values and behaviors (Kohn and Schooler 1983) and other key outcomes.

Changing macroeconomic work structures represent a growth in contingent and temporary jobs often accompanied by job insecurity and difficult work conditions (Kalleberg 2009). "Good" and "bad" jobs characterize this new labor market, where access to rewarding and stable work environments is less common and increasingly difficult for working-class individuals to obtain. The daily burden of persistent job insecurity, relatively common among the working-class and poor, can lead to poor health and depressive symptoms (Burgard et al. 2009). Social structural explanations of well-being in the labor market often focus on broad economic change and labor market segmentation by race, gender, and class (Tausig 2013).

Some research has focused on the alienation that can result from conditions at work, extending Marx's analysis of control over the product of labor and the labor process (Kohn 1977; see DiTomaso, this volume). Kohn (1977) highlights the effects of a routinized labor process devoid of self-direction on feelings of powerlessness, self-estrangement, and normlessness. Hochschild (1983) notes the ways in which the emotional labor performed in the workplace as part of occupational requirements can have lasting effects on an individual's sense of self. For example, bill collectors are obligated to present an unconcerned and argumentative attitude, often needing to belittle others' class standing when the collector

might, in fact, identify with the debtor's predicament (Hochschild 1983). The emotional labor required by occupations can vary significantly across class statuses. While Hochschild (1983) discusses the need for working-class, blue collar employees to suppress emotions (e.g., happiness or sadness), she highlights middle-class tendencies to overemphasize the importance of emotions in the work place (e.g., learning to "love" your job).

The emotion labor and management by service workers is a key part of reproducing inequality, with the lower-status workers more subject to the unpaid "labor" of regulating their emotions in the service of clients or customers (Hochschild 1983; Schwalbe et al. 2000). Parrenas (2000) notes the way in which middle-class mothers require the emotional labor of poor or working-class (often migrant) child care providers, but questions how well these care providers are allowed to care for their own children. Given the recent explosion in the service sector economy, future research should further explore intersections in the performance of emotional labor and occupational conditions. As the structure of the economy changes, low wage labor may become increasingly associated with high levels of emotion work. Domestic labor, particularly child care, is one example of how class and gender statuses produce particular forms of emotional labor.

Finally, class-linked labor conditions also affect health and the nature of daily interactions with intimate partners. Presser (2005) notes that working during evening, weekend, or alternating hours on fixed shifts, common among the working-class, can have negative effects on health, marital relationships, and happiness due to lack of time with spouses, sleep deprivation, and service labor. At the same time, high status workers may have work that "never ends" due to blurred boundaries with family, which creates overload and distress (Schieman et al. 2009).

In summary, the social structure and personal-ity perspective links institutional context to individual values and behaviors, emphasizing the constraints and privilege that shape development.

We emphasize socialization in the family as a pathway to the creation of class-based capital, values and selves. Later, school and then occupational conditions reinforce class-based behaviors based in early experience—with working-class youth less likely to "fit" with demands of institutional positions in classrooms and workplaces that are highly rewarded. Social class plays a significant role in terms of how parents socialize children, the contexts in which socialization occurs, how teachers and schools perceive children's skills, and how workers operate and feel about themselves in the context of the work they perform.

Structuring Ideological Systems and the "Achievement" of Social Class Statuses

Ideologies, or schemas, play a significant role in empowering or constraining individual action (Sewell 1992) by shaping the rules that govern institutional contexts. An understanding of the duality of social structure also demands attention to the fact that not only do structures define practices, but cultural practices build structures (Sewell 1992). The interactions discussed above are shaped by hierarchies of rules within institutions, but these interactions also create and define the rules that shape institutions and ideologies. Thus, a key structuring context in conjunction with interactions and institutions is the powerful cultural forces surrounding social class that are central to the national ideological context of the U.S. and some other developed countries (Hunt, this volume). The ideological layers of the meritocracy, where any person is seen as having the opportunity to succeed, and those not born to riches can still "pull themselves up" if they are strong or good enough, keep social class status as perhaps the most insidious of all forms of inequality. Indeed, widely touted examples, such as former president Bill Clinton—who began life in relative hardship with a single mother and later an abusive stepfather, but who ended up wealthy and in arguably the most high status position in the world—stand as hard evidence of the

possibility of class mobility, but simultaneously reaffirm the ideology that keeps knowledge about the low *probability* of mobility hidden. Thus, in some ways, class differentiation processes are subversive, particularly in cultures and contexts such as the United States in which there is a huge gap in the resources of the very poor and the very rich, combined with strong ideologies of meritocracy that emphasize how everyone has equal opportunity and thus the rich are deserving of their fortunes.

Cultural beliefs and practices, here discussed in terms of beliefs *about* and *linked to* social class status (rather than as different practices and values among those with more versus fewer economic resources), are critical to consider in assessing how social class processes “work” in interaction. Reinforcing layers of ideology surround our understanding of *how* people attain their educational level, wealth and occupational status. Markus and Fiske (2012) identify but do not elaborate upon six “pervasive cultural ideas” in their important recent edited volume *Facing Social Class*. These ideals or myths that support and structure inequality include individualism, independence, “the American Dream,” equal opportunity, the meritocracy, and classlessness. Often, the meanings of these concepts overlap in interaction; as Americans strive to break down notions of aristocracy and inheritance, they reify values that are nearly impossible to attain in a highly stratified society. These myths create tension, much of it unnamed or unrecognized because of our very poor vocabulary for naming class differences and inequality (Bettie 2003). Markus and Fiske note that these are long standing “cherished” systems of belief that are central to institutions and the individual experience of social class. We discuss some of these ideals here.

In the U.S., the celebration of the individual forces a limited ability to “see” structural and cultural layers of constraint on people. Individualism means that people are much less aware of structured pathways and how resources in childhood shape one’s life chances. Americans are repeatedly provided with mantras of individualism, such as (1) the importance of “making choices” (Stephens et al. 2012), (2) that one is

an “independent” agent, and (3) that “being oneself” is a high moral value. In “It’s Your Choice: How the Middle Class Model of Independence Disadvantages Working-Class Americans,” Stephens et al. (2012) identify a social class divide in which middle-class people are advantaged through believing themselves to be more authentic and more moral than working-class individuals. They argue that mainstream America is built around the idea of an individual being a sole agent making “choices”—this idea is considered to be the “best” or “right” way to operate. The emphasis on individual choice creates hidden disadvantages for working-class Americans. Models of agency, they argue, are part of people’s understanding but also embroidered into the fabric of American institutions (Khan 2011; Stephens et al. 2012). They cite the example of colleges that suggest that students not rely on others to make choices, which may work well for middle-class students socialized in choice and in bending institutions to their needs (Lareau 2003), whereas in working-class contexts, the normative model is to depend upon others and adjust to fit in with their expectations—to be “interdependent.” Without clear structured guidelines, working-class students may find themselves adrift in a “foreign” culture.

The emphasis on individual choice also disadvantages people who do not have access to the resources on which good choices depend. The health care system, for example, provides people with myriad choices with which to navigate doctors, treatments and so on, but this presumes a great deal of ability to seek and digest medical information. Some school systems offer parents choices among programs, but middle-class parents are much more likely to be able to research and navigate and draw upon the resources of others to decide among schools or programs best for their child. In Stephens et al.’s (2012) research, a working-class parent finds the number of school choices for her child to be overwhelming. She is told it is her choice based on what is best for her daughter when seeking help from the school system, and is stymied. In the end, the lack of control over her work schedule and transportation difficulties made it critical to “choose” the

closest school, not the best one for her daughter, even though it is her desire to get the girl into an academically rigorous classroom (Stephens et al. 2012). Not only are there differences in resources here, but also in middle- and working-class mothers' abilities to navigate through a maze of "opportunities" with the cultural tools that make it clear how to weigh the choices against each other.

The meaning of individualism varies by class. Kusserow (2012) identifies "soft" individualism, tied to the middle-class, as emphasizing "the cultivation and expression of unique and personal feelings, thoughts, ideas and preferences." "Hard" individualism, more exemplary of the working-class, focuses on "self-reliance, perseverance, determination, protectiveness, street smarts, stoicism, and toughness" (Kusserow 2012, p. 195). The individualisms are fluid, and people draw from these no matter what their class status, but still they reflect the material and social worlds of different classes. The soft individualism that middle-class parents favor fits beautifully with school rules, practices and procedures that encourage sharing ideas and feelings and being creative. In contrast, working-class "hard" individualism is a more difficult fit with institutional expectations and, as a result, disadvantages working-class children. For example, Kusserow found that working-class preschoolers in Queens pulled aside for hitting were puzzled and confused when asked to explain why they were hitting and how they felt about it; they did not recognize the teacher's words (e.g., "why do you want to hit Johnny?" "how do you feel when someone hits you?") as discipline and so were more likely to repeat the behaviors teachers deemed undesirable. Moreover, Kusserow (2012) describes interviewing a group of working-class parents at the preschool, in which they do not take her questions about discipline and their children's feelings seriously, because they are having such an enjoyable time entertaining each other during the session. They have a deep appreciation for other parents' comments that in essence "put down" the soft individualisms of the teacher, school, and researcher. For example, when the researcher asked what the parents were most

proud of in their children, one father said "when he shuts his mouth" to the approving laughter of the entire group, while the teacher, exasperated that they weren't being sensitive about their children, tried to get the parents back "on track" with the researcher. The hard individualism of the working-class parents may put them at odds with teachers and institutions, further perpetuating the othering of working-class children.

Individualism and independence allegedly allow one to singularly focus on achieving, on one's own, the American Dream of "success." Individualisms run through the many texts and conversations within our culture, such that, in an insidious way, the rhetorics become "common sense" and those with more resources feel entitled and those with less may believe that they need to try harder. A middle-class person such as Thomas, is seen as having played by the rules and worked hard to "achieve" the American Dream; a working-class man Michael, is thought to deserve his lower lot because, after all, he simply must not have been good enough or tried hard enough. Through all of this, the structural barriers in schools, neighborhoods, and workplaces are unacknowledged and not discussed. Hochschild and Scovronick (2003) note the extent to which the American Dream has hampered policy solutions aimed at improving educational inequality. While schools are intended to place everyone on even footing, people often wish to provide their own children with advantage, particularly, where children are seen to be competing for the few privileged spots in a highly-tiered meritocratic system. Barriers arise when the success of a few is threatened by improvements for the majority (Hochschild and Scovronick 2003).

Other belief systems are critical to the reproduction of class inequality. As Markus and Fiske (2012) suggest, the belief that "everyone is middle-class" means that those occupying lower statuses are viewed as deviant (and blameworthy). The approximately 70% of Americans who do not graduate from college, or those who do not have a certain level of material goods, or a high status occupation become viewed as undesirably different. Similar to the rhetoric about a color blind society, the belief that we live in a classless

society, where everyone is middle-class can have far reaching effects, whether or not all people “buy into” it.

In sum, several key ideological strands about class converge to produce a strong cultural web that maintains inequalities within the class system. Although there are breaks with cultural assumptions, such as the 2011 Occupy Wall Street movement’s mantra that not everyone is middle-class, and that the “one percent” hold power over the vast majority through non-ethical means, the strength of these ideologies cannot be underestimated.

Intersectionality and Social Class

In this chapter, we cite the powerful influence of social class on multiple levels. Yet social class is not the only category of difference that structures identity, opportunities, and life chances. Other differentiating characteristics, such as race and gender, matter a great deal. Indeed, there has been much work on how race (Du Bois 1899; Jackman and Jackman 1973, 1983; Landry and Marsh 2011; Marsh et al. 2007; Pattillo 2005; Robinson 2000;) and gender (Baxter 1994; Davis and Robinson 1988, 1998; Miller et al. 1979; Sorensen 1994; Wright et al. 1995) influence social class. These scholars identify the ways in which gender and race also influence social class identities, boundaries, and cleavages.

Given the complicated nature of social interactions and the various mechanisms that structure agency, behavior, and personality, the concept of intersectionality offers one approach to addressing the combined implications of an individual’s social statuses on her life chances (see Howard and Renfrow, this volume). For our purposes, it is less important to separate the effects of social class from other status identities, but rather to recognize the central importance of social class in shaping individual outcomes and structural limitations in conjunction with other social statuses. For each of the three “I’s”, we highlight ways in which an intersectional approach might contribute to our findings on the central importance of social class.

In interactions, social class is often one of the least visible social statuses, especially in comparison to gender or race/ethnicity. An intersectional approach recognizes the simultaneity of social locations (King 1988; Zinn and Dill 1996). Social class is just one component of the “matrix of domination” that shapes everyday interactions (Collins 2000). Given that perceptions of social class can be largely subjective, and often considered “invisible” or unacknowledged, the fact that this status is recognized in conjunction with an individual’s race/ethnicity, sexuality, and gender is important to understanding the processes that shape inequality in interaction. Context is important. For example, for a child in uniform in a public elementary school, class status may not be her most obvious marker. If a child is one of five minority children in a majority white school, race/ethnicity is going to define some interactions, but social class may be the less visible marker that creates access to the school, influences test scores, and shapes teachers’ impressions of the student’s learning ability. While we emphasize the power relations that occur in relation to class standing across multiple levels of interaction and contexts, we also recognize that this class standing is interpreted simultaneously with other, powerful statuses individuals carry with them.

The ways in which social class plays out in context will vary according to the institutional setting. Scholars should try to address the questions posed by Schwalbe et al. (2000, p. 443) for a particular social context: “How do people create and reproduce inequalities here, and what if anything do race, class and gender have to do with it?” How class plays out will vary according to race, gender, nativity, sexuality, and other salient social identities. In an intersectional approach, Choo and Ferree (2010) conceptualize variation in intersectional relationships across social contexts, urging attention to both the subjective nature of identities *and* the ways in which context structures the content of social interaction. For example, who one “is”—in a way that supersedes class alone—links to how one feels about herself and her achievements in school. Thus, scholars must look beyond classed identities to those based upon multiple status indica-

tors. For example, Archer et al. (2007) found that working-class urban girls learned to value themselves through practices and identities of “speaking their minds” in order to resist symbolic violence of being both lower social class and female. In schools, this positioning and resistance made them feel worthy as working-class girls, at the same time, paradoxically, it made them feel like unworthy students in the school system. They came to regret their conflict with schooling as it came closer to graduation time, and attempted to be seen as “good” in the system’s eye (Archer et al. 2007). But by then, it was too late and their academic work was not salvageable.

Finally, social justice is a critical component of an intersectional perspective, and justice may be best understood on an individual level. Specifically, a sense of self can be largely dependent on perceptions of social justice in relation to class status (and other status identities). Intersectional research emphasizes not only the importance of power and privilege in interpreting social status inequalities, but also the opportunity to create social justice. Political activism and an individual’s lived experiences are a central aspect of intersectionality. This emphasis on the importance of justice contributes to our understanding of a classed self in relation to other identities. For example, participation in social movements can move an individual from feelings of stigmatization and shame to feelings of pride and empowerment (Britt and Heise 2000; Thoits 1990). The process of social grouping and the creation of solidarity intersect with other status identities to yield individual outcomes. This application of social justice as a goal can be seen from a class perspective in the Occupy Wall Street movement. Individuals find support in knowing that they are not alone in experiences of alienation, debt, and inability to access social mobility. Solidarity in an effort to achieve justice provides individuals with pride in their social position; in this case, as *not* being a member of the elite one percent. As we develop the theoretical tenets that connect social psychology and social class inequalities, the literature would benefit from further incorporation of opportunities to pursue social justice. The creation of group solidarity, particularly along class lines,

relies on key concepts like identity, social support, and sense of self. Social justice could also be a central tenet in such analyses.

Future Directions in the Social Psychology of Class Inequalities: Gaps and Opportunities

Social class is a critical differentiating characteristic of individuals that they carry with them—through ideas about who they are, through styles of speaking, walking, and evaluating, and through signals that are extremely subtle—that becomes a central piece of interactions. These interactions become especially critical as children and youth move from families and neighborhoods to schools and work. From early on, Thomas’ ways of interacting with those in key institutions such as schools, community organizations, and medical worlds, are probably a better fit than Michael’s. Assuming that they have similar abilities and motivation, achieving a high status profession and attendant income is going to be a more arduous process for Michael as he and Thomas traverse through school, and will perhaps become an increasingly distant possibility as he grows into young adulthood. As Michael is othered and pushed by middle-class people into spaces (both physically and symbolically) defined as inferior, and is devalued morally, he may incorporate this feedback into his self-worth and future self. Institutions and ideologies value practices that were less common in his early life, and he may find himself uncomfortable or feeling out of place when requesting recommendations from teachers, during job interviews, or in projects at work. Here, as he comes up short in his achievements through social forces, social class inequalities are put most starkly in relief.

As we have reviewed here, social class is a powerful differentiating characteristic that is tied to highly unequal distributions of esteem, material goods, health and well-being (Eaton et al. 2001; McLeod 2013). Other differentiating characteristics are also very important, of course, and intersect in intricate ways with social class. To the extent that class status in childhood is linked

to obtaining health, wealth and happiness later in life, and that other disadvantaged statuses such as minority race or being female are associated with a greater likelihood of staying or become subordinate in wealth, income, and occupational status, class statuses are a crucial differentiating characteristic and should be a more obvious focus of attention for social psychologists assessing inequalities as we move further into the twenty-first century.

Four foci can push forward the social psychological examination of social class inequalities. The first is examining cross-class interactions in which the reproduction of inequalities is stalled, or there are “breaks” in the current system of rigid class hierarchies. Points when class ideologies come into question explicitly or when institutions or groups move against inequality—such as when school systems remove formal tracking measures—are important areas for study. Lareau and Calarco (2012) show how a socioeconomically diverse school allowed for inter-class interactions in which middle-class mothers explained the complex implicit rules of the school administration in careful detail to working-class mothers in order to help them attain the best situations for their children. One could imagine additional examples across geographic boundaries, such as in cases of neighborhood gentrification and increased cross-class interactions in public spaces. The nature of these interactions, the presence of tension and common ground, are ripe for research on changing visions of openness and hierarchy in American and other countries’ systems.

Second, examining interaction processes in one institutional context, schooling, is especially useful for assessing the reproduction of class status across generations. The safeguarding of children against an increasingly competitive class hierarchy is a process that is worthy of more attention, as it occurs from infancy through adulthood, often by mothers, and within schools and community contexts. The ways in which class status comes to define successful interactions is also of central interest. For example, in understanding parenting logic, for one working-class parent the services and therapies a disabled child receives through the school system may be a

welcome relief and the start of greater opportunities. For a middle-class parent, however, such services may be viewed as inadequate to preparing the child for his/her future. The classed meanings and behaviors that parents assign to success within institutional and interactional settings have significant implications. Related to this, we see great promise in examining “gateway” interactions and the status safeguarding interactions parents attempt in schools and beyond. Examining at which junctures in the curricular and extracurricular activities and interactions of youth parents intervene to provide safety nets through processes of othering, boundary making, and so on, represents a fruitful avenue for future research. Additional pairings of geographic access, school quality, and the influence of habitus and childrearing logics would inform our understanding of class mobility and trajectories. Similarly, research examining intraclass interactions could help us determine how inequality operates to maintain status hierarchies among group members who are perceived as similar.

Third, the power of cultural ideology—of esteemed values woven into institutions of American society—should be evaluated to better understand the ways that individuals come to create networks, institutional power, and individual understandings of self. Khan (2011) reveals the ease with which children of privilege at an elite secondary school operate in the world, while at the same time these adolescents use a discourse of hard work and effort to describe their place. Privileged students are aware of ideals for an increasingly “open” society, and use language of effort and work rather than inheritance or entitlement to describe their success; students who do not engage in this discourse are frequently policed by social class elders and peers (Khan 2011). How are people’s creations of boundaries and othering linked to individualism and to the ideas of the meritocracy, for example? This symbolic coating holds promise as an operating system that makes class less visible even as it makes the reproduction of class inequalities continue more smoothly.

Finally, social change is a critical force influencing class relations and identities. To the ex-

tent that demographic or technological changes alter the ways of thinking about or doing class in interactions or institutions, researchers will have new questions to examine. Do changes in immigration make class identities more or less visible? How does this vary by region? Do online college courses negate difficulties that working-class students might have in salvaging a strong sense of self and motivation to pursue their goals? Do social media create new opportunities to envision and practice selves that were not possible to do in prior eras, bypassing some of the class presentation problems present in face-to-face interactions? What happens to college graduates' senses of self or self-presentations when they cannot obtain employment during prolonged economic recessions? These kinds of questions suggest that the ongoing negotiation of class within institutions will be an important arena for insights on inequalities in times of rapid social changes and point to the importance of historical specificity in research more generally.

Social and structural changes necessitate adaptive skills as individuals adjust to new circumstances. Given the fluidity of identity formation processes, it becomes important to understand how social class advantages facilitate the adoption of new identities. Some social situations may require individuals to switch identities and de-emphasize or privilege class status. Such code switching is documented among children of color as they navigate school and neighborhood (Carter 2005). How do identity processes associated with race/ethnicity or gender inform class inequalities? Social class identification may change across the life course as individuals experience upward or downward mobility. What are the implications of such changing identifications for interactions (especially boundary work and othering), institutional inequalities, and self evaluations?

Although there is a great amount of recent, insightful research within social psychology on the processes that maintain social class differentiation and inequality, continued synthesis across domains and levels of analysis is important as the field grows. We expect that the research we have

highlighted and synthesized here has added to the lively conversation on social class inequalities.

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Guillermina Jasso

Everything that rises must converge.
Teilhard de Chardin, 1950

Introduction

Immigration and inequality are inextricably intertwined. Inequality is an important determinant of immigration, and immigration in turn generates powerful inequalities. The Romans had a saying, *Ubi bene, ibi patria* (Where one is well off, there is one's country), and thus unequal life chances and unequal well-being in the origin country may prompt some to leave, as may unequal aspirations. Once the migration process begins, new inequalities arise, as restrictions on exit or entry, family dynamics, and visa allocation systems join to produce unequal life chances among migrants, adding to the inequalities between migrants and those still in the origin country and between migrants and those in the destination country.

The rise and fall of all these inequalities associated with immigration is imprinted with deep sociobehavioral forces, which social psychology illuminates. The study of immigration and inequality is not usually considered “social psychological.” Yet social psychology can make unique contributions to the advancement of knowledge about them. It provides general conceptual tools

which can illuminate not only the inner workings of immigration and inequality but also their deep connections and affinities with phenomena and processes in farflung domains. As Merton (1957, pp. 278–280) put it:

[O]vertly distinctive forms of behavior... may... be only different expressions of similar processes under different conditions.... However these may differ in detail, they are not necessarily unconnected forms of behavior ‘belonging’... to the jurisdictions of the sociology of military life, race and ethnic relations, social mobility, delinquency (or ‘social disorganization’), educational sociology, political sociology and the sociology of revolution.

Accordingly, this chapter explores the social psychology of immigration and inequality. The existence of literatures on both the general principles elucidated in social psychology and the phenomena of immigration and inequality suggests two possible directions for our work, each with a different starting point. The first begins with basic sociobehavioral theory, using it as a general guide and, in particular, deriving its testable implications for immigration and inequality. The second starts with immigration and inequality and seeks to understand their major processes—in the case of immigration, for example, selection, assimilation, and impacts on those left behind in the origin country and on natives of the destination country.

G. Jasso (✉)
Department of Sociology, New York University,
295 Lafayette Street, 4th Floor, New York,
NY, 10012-9605, USA
e-mail: gj1@nyu.edu

Basic theory embeds the terms of the title of this chapter. Sociobehavioral processes (deeply social-psychological at heart) generate three basic outcomes (status, justice, and power) from personal quantitative characteristics (like beauty and wealth) with given magnitudes of inequality within subgroups formed by the categories of personal qualitative characteristics (like nativity, ethnicity, citizenship, and immigration authorization). Basic theory connects the three basic outcomes to other processes like identity and happiness, and its assumptions yield implications for all domains of behavior, including such critical elements of immigration literature as emigration, social distance, discrimination, segregation, profiling, and assimilation.¹

Meanwhile, the second approach starts with immigration phenomena—the decision to leave one country for another; government barriers or inducements to exit and entry; impacts of and on all the children of migration, immigrant children and children born in the destination country as well as children left behind or sent back—but quickly notices personal quantitative characteristics and their inequality as well as the reference groups and identity of basic theory. Quickly it becomes apparent that immigration law generates powerful inequalities—such as inequality within the sibship, which may include legal immigrants, unauthorized immigrants, and native-born citizens of the destination country—and that, conversely, other processes—such as the immigration of highly accomplished blacks and the predilection of native-born U.S. citizens to marry spouses darker than themselves—may help eradicate some of the inequalities.

At this stage of development in social science, it would not be too surprising to find only

a few explicit connections between the two approaches. Researchers jump into the field and chart the surrounding territory, but the jumping points may be far apart. Thus, uncharted territory may remain between the snatches of knowledge. But, as will be seen, the connections between the two approaches are already abundant, suggesting rather less uncharted territory.²

In this chapter we adopt the strategy of working from both ends, a strategy which may help consolidate knowledge and unify the discipline, thus promoting scholarly advance (Turner 2001). We know already that the literature on basic theory goes far enough to touch the literature on immigration and inequality. And we are confident that someday, with the growth of knowledge, the two approaches will converge. For now, our goal is modest—extend the periphery around each approach. As will be seen, both approaches increase knowledge, not least by pointing to theoretical and empirical lacunae as well as data deficiencies. Each approach nurtures and spurs the other—basic theory by challenging empiricalists to test the theoretical predictions, inductive exploration by challenging theorists to incorporate new terms (such as rights) and to derive new predictions.

The Basic Theory Approach to Understanding the Social Psychology of Immigration and Inequality

Brief Overview of Basic Theory

Basic sociobehavioral theory begins with three sets of elements: (1) personal quantitative characteristics; (2) personal qualitative characteristics; and (3) primordial sociobehavioral outcomes.

¹ The gold standard is the Newtonian hypothetico-deductive theory, whose assumptions are “genuine guesses about the structure of the world” (Popper 1963, p. 245), whose predictions display the “marvellous deductive unfolding” of the theory (Popper 1963, p. 221), and whose fruitfulness is evident in the “derivations far afield from its original domain,” which “permit an increasingly broad and diversified basis for testing the theory” (Danto 1967, pp. 299–300)—exactly in the spirit of Merton’s words above.

² What we are here calling two approaches are sometimes regarded as sequential stages in the development of a scientific discipline—in the classic formulation by Koopmans (1947), the “Kepler stage” of discovering “empirical regularities” and the “Newton stage” of discovering “fundamental laws.” Knowledge gained with the guiding hand of theory is more robust and reliable than knowledge obtained from “measurement without theory” (Koopmans 1947) or “inference without theory” (Wolpin 2013).

The three combine to provide a foundational relation: Primordial sociobehavioral outcomes (PSOs) are generated by personal quantitative characteristics within groups formed by personal qualitative characteristics.

Personal quantitative characteristics are characteristics of which there can be more or less, or on which a person may rank higher or lower. The first kind—of which there can be more or less—is called *cardinal*; examples are wealth, land, and head of cattle. The second kind—on which a person may rank higher or lower—is called *ordinal*; examples include, beauty, intelligence, and athletic skill.

Personal quantitative characteristics are called *goods* if more is preferred to less and *bads* if less is preferred to more. To illustrate, for most people, wealth is a good and taxes are a bad. For simplicity, this chapter focuses on goods. However, extension to bads is straightforward.

Personal qualitative characteristics are unorderable, categorical personal characteristics. They may be dichotomous—like gender—or polytomous—like race, ethnicity, or religious affiliation. Personal qualitative characteristics give rise to groups and subgroups, with these groups and subgroups defined by the category of a personal qualitative characteristic. For example, the group “residents of the United States” is defined in terms of a category of the personal qualitative characteristic, “place of residence.”

As would be expected, personal quantitative characteristics are at the core of inequality. Social science seeks to measure and document inequality, as well as explore the determinants and consequences of inequality, in wages, income, wealth, and other material possessions. One of the two main types of inequality focuses on the magnitude of inequality in a personal quantitative characteristic (Jasso and Kotz 2008). This type of inequality is often called *personal inequality* or *overall inequality*. But look carefully. It would be impossible to study this type of inequality without specifying the group within which inequality is to be studied. This group could be “residents of the United States” or “residents of Illinois” or “members of a social club”—all personal qualitative characteristics or categories thereof.

Thus, the simple operation of measuring personal inequality—for example, calculating the Gini coefficient or one of the Theil coefficients—requires both a personal quantitative characteristic and a personal qualitative characteristic.³

Further, study of the second main type of inequality, inequality between subgroups (called *subgroup inequality*)—exemplified by the gender wage gap and the race wage gap—also requires both a personal quantitative characteristic and a personal qualitative characteristic. In this case, the personal qualitative characteristic provides the subgroups in the measure of subgroup inequality.

In the study of immigration and inequality, personal quantitative characteristics provide the “subject” of the inequality and personal qualitative characteristics provide the “locus” of the inequality. Personal inequality is studied within a category of an immigration-focused personal qualitative characteristic, and subgroup inequality is studied between two categories of an immigration-focused personal qualitative characteristic. These immigration-focused personal qualitative characteristics include nativity, citizenship, place of residence, type of visa, mother tongue, and many others.

Personal quantitative characteristics and personal qualitative characteristics are thus basic, not only to social science but also, and deeply, to the topic of this chapter—immigration and inequality. The foundational idea—that there are two kinds of personal characteristics, quantitative and qualitative, and that they differ in their social operation—was pioneered by Blau (1974).

What about the PSOs? As made explicit by Homans (1974, p. 231), the sociological tradition posits three *primordial sociobehavioral outcomes*—justice, status, and power. These outcomes are universally desired and deeply social. They bring happiness, and they set in motion a train of behavioral and social consequences for

³ The Gini and the two Theil measures are among the set of classical measures of overall inequality. Others include the Atkinson measures and Pearson’s coefficient of variation. For brief introduction to these measures and their formulas, see Jasso and Kotz (2008, pp. 37–41).

many and disparate domains (which will become visible in the predictions). As already noted, all three are generated by personal quantitative characteristics within groups formed by personal qualitative characteristics. For example, status may be produced by wealth within the population of a city, or by tennis-playing skill within the membership of a country club, or by horsemanship within a military regiment. All three PSOs have a greater richness than is highlighted in the slice of basic theory outlined here (see the chapters in the *Handbook* section on “orienting concepts” for further detail).

Associated with each of the three PSOs is a distinctive mechanism and, in particular, a distinctive rate of change. Status and power arise as functions of a personal quantitative characteristic X ; justice and the other comparison processes (like self-esteem) arise from the comparison of an actual magnitude of X to a magnitude envisioned, desired, or thought just, denoted X^* . Thus, in the basic equations for status and power, there is only one argument, X (or its relative rank), but in the basic equation for justice and the other comparison processes, there are two arguments, X and X^* .⁴

What kinds of mechanisms connect the X s and the PSOs? It is well known that all the PSOs can be generated by the same quantitative characteristic; for example, beauty and wealth generate status, and they generate power, and they generate the comparison outcomes like self-esteem and the sense of justice. If all three PSOs are functions of the same quantitative characteristics, the

question arises: What distinguishes them? Or are justice, status, and power merely different names for the same outcome? If, following Homans and a multitude of social scientists, we accept, at least provisionally, the possibility that the three PSOs are indeed distinct outcomes, then the challenge is to find the distinguishing feature. A strong contender is the rate of change.

In nature there are three rates of change—increasing, decreasing, and constant—and thus a natural and immediate conjecture is that the three PSOs each have a distinctive rate of change, and thus the task is to match the three rates of change to the three PSOs. Figure 23.1 provides illustration of the three rates of change in relations in which the PSO increases as X increases. For convenience, X is represented by a relative rank, assuming values from zero to one. But the graphs could as easily be drawn with cardinal magnitudes of X , and all the theoretical development below incorporates both magnitudes and relative ranks of X .

Which sociobehavioral outcome increases at an increasing rate? And which at a decreasing rate? And which at a constant rate?

The sociological literature, in work dating to the late 1970s, suggests that status increases at an increasing rate (Goode 1978; Sørensen 1979) and the comparison outcomes at a decreasing rate (Jasso 1978; Wagner and Berger 1985). Because the literature does not provide a functional form for the relation between the X s and power (Webster 2006), the unification proposed by Jasso (2008) suggests that if power is indeed a basic and distinct sociobehavioral outcome—and not merely a synonym for justice or status—then it must vary at a constant rate with the personal quantitative characteristics.

To elaborate briefly, the convexity property of status is evident in the research on frequency of participation in small-group discussions developed by Bales (1951), Stephan (1952), and Stephan and Mishler (1952), as well as in the range of social situations analyzed by Goode (1978). Meanwhile, the justice and comparison literature notes that the negative second derivative is necessary and sufficient for the properties of deficiency aversion and loss aversion, which are considered essential in a justice evaluation

⁴ The term “comparison” is used to denote outcomes generated by comparing an actual amount of X to a just or expected amount of X (the X^* version). The outcome depends on both X and X^* . This comparison operation is sometimes confused with the operation of locating self or other within a hierarchy, which may require noticing other people’s amounts of X to discern the focal individual’s relative rank. But this latter operation yields only one variable—the relative rank—and this one variable generates the sociobehavioral outcome. The key to avoiding confusion is to ask how many independent variables are in the function generating the outcome. As noted, justice and the other comparison processes are generated by two variables, X and X^* , but status and power are generated by only a single variable, X .




Fig. 23.1 Illustration of three possible rates of change in an increasing function

function (Jasso 1978; Wagner and Berger 1985, p. 719) and in comparison processes more generally (Jasso 1990).

Of course, many functional forms display the increasing or decreasing rate of change proposed for status and comparison, respectively. The sociological literature goes beyond the rate of change and suggests specific functional forms for the status and comparison PSOs. For status, Sørensen (1979) proposed the following function, a function which embeds Goode's (1978) convexity condition:

$$S = \ln\left(\frac{1}{1 - r_x}\right), \quad (23.1)$$

where S denotes status, X as before denotes the valued good (i.e., the valued attribute or possession), and r denotes the relative rank on the valued good. Although the valued good can be cardinal or ordinal, the status function notices only its relative rank.

In the case of comparison processes, Jasso (1978, 1990) proposed the following function:

$$Z = \theta \ln\left(\frac{X}{X^*}\right), \quad (23.2)$$

where Z denotes any of the comparison outcomes, such as self-esteem or the justice evaluation, X is as above the valued attribute or possession (called in this literature the actual reward), X^* denotes the reward thought just or appropriate (called the just reward), and θ is the signature constant whose sign indicates whether the reward is viewed as a good or a bad and whose absolute value denotes expressiveness. When the actual reward equals the just reward, the outcome is zero (called the point of perfect justice); when the actual reward exceeds the just reward, the outcome is positive (representing overreward), and when the actual reward is less than the just reward, the outcome is negative (representing underreward). Besides satisfying deficiency aversion and loss

aversion, this function is also the only function which satisfies two additional conditions, scale invariance and additivity. By additivity, the effect of X on Z is independent of the magnitude of X^* , and the effect of X^* on Z is independent of the magnitude of X . Scale invariance ensures that the outcome Z will be the same regardless of the units in which the reward is measured, say, different currencies or different denominations.⁵

If we provisionally accept the reasoning in the literature and if power is a sociobehavioral force in its own right, different from either justice or status, then we may posit a linear function:

$$P = a + bX, \quad (23.3)$$

where P denotes power and a and b are the intercept and slope, respectively. In the special case in which the intercept is zero and the slope is one, the function reduces to an identity function.

Power and the comparison processes are also generated by ordinal characteristics, such as beauty and skills of all kinds, or by the relative rank on a cardinal good. When the PSO is status or when the valued goods are ordinal (or the ordinal aspect of cardinal goods), personal qualitative characteristics provide the group or population within which the relative ranks are measured. As well, in the justice case, when the comparison referent is a summary characteristic of a distribution (such as the arithmetic mean, geometric mean, or median), personal qualitative characteristics provide the group or population within which the referent is measured. For example, those groups may be specified as a category of gender, nativity, citizenship, religion, or other qualitative characteristic.

The three primordial sociobehavioral outcomes (status, power, justice) are thought to generate identity, emotion, and a wide range of behavioral and social phenomena. As well, building on Rayo and Becker (2007), the three PSOs are

thought to operate as “carriers of happiness.” In brief, during intervals when a particular PSO is active, it produces identity and generates happiness. Of course, happiness may also be generated by non-social phenomena, such as a beautiful sunset or the fruit of a tree.

Thus, an identity is a three-element bundle, consisting of the PSO, the quantitative characteristic, and the qualitative characteristic—for example, status-wealth-classroom or power-intelligence-dormitory. Persons may be thought of as collections of identities (Stryker and Burke 2000); they come to be characterized by their configuration of elements in the identities, termed *personality* in the unification proposed by Jasso (2008). Similarly, societies are collections of persons; they come to be characterized by their configuration of elements in their members’ identities, termed *culture* in the unification proposed by Jasso (2008). Examples of personality in this technical theoretical sense are the status-obsessed, beauty-fixated, and gender-conscious; examples of culture include jock culture, materialistic culture, and racist culture.

Finally, because status notices only relative ranks while justice and power respond to both amounts and relative ranks, there are five types of societies, each characterized by the dominant PSO and the dominant type of personal quantitative characteristic (cardinal or ordinal). Using the term “materialistic” as a convenient shorthand for a society that values amounts of cardinal characteristics, the five types of societies may be called justice-materialistic, justice-nonmaterialistic, status, power-materialistic, and power-nonmaterialistic. Given that the PSOs generate happiness, this is a modern expression of Plato’s idea that there are five types of societies, corresponding to five ways that people seek after happiness (Jasso 2008).

Inequality in the Basic Theory Approach

As seen above, the three basic elements in the basic theory approach are PSOs, personal quantitative characteristics, and personal qualitative characteristics. These elements will jointly yield

⁵ The expressiveness part of the signature constant θ plays an important part in empirical work but can be safely ignored in much theoretical work. The framing part of the signature constant is always important, but can safely be set as positive, given that results for bads are readily established from results on goods. Accordingly, in the rest of this chapter, the signature constant is fixed at +1.

many testable predictions. Inequality plays a part in both the elements themselves and in the deduced predictions. The following sections examine both the inequality immediately visible in the elements and the inequality arising in the predictions.

Inequality in the Elements of Basic Theory

To begin, recall that in general there are two types of inequality, inequality between persons—personal inequality, such as income inequality—and inequality between subgroups—subgroup inequality, such as the gender income gap (Jasso and Kotz 2008). As already discussed, because personal qualitative characteristics lead to subgroups, both types of inequality arise in basic theory. But that is not all. Because basic theory contains both personal quantitative characteristics X and the PSOs they generate, both personal and subgroup inequality are visible in both the X s and PSOs, leading to four forms of inequality. The four forms of inequality are produced by the crossclassification of two dimensions: (1) whether the focal inequality pertains to persons or subgroups; and (2) whether it pertains to the quantitative characteristic X or to the PSO generated by X . The four forms are each given a three-term label, with “inequality” the third term, modified by “personal” or “subgroup” in the first term and “ X ” or “PSO” in the second term.

Personal quantitative characteristics and personal inequality—personal X inequality. Each personal quantitative characteristic in an identity or PSO bundle, such as wealth in the status-wealth-classroom bundle, has a magnitude of inequality. Inequality in the cardinal goods may be measured by the Gini coefficient or the Theil coefficients, and so on. Inequality in ordinal goods also has a magnitude, but this magnitude is fixed across goods. For example, the value of the Gini coefficient for any distribution of relative ranks is always equal to one-third.

PSOs and personal inequality—personal PSO inequality. Meanwhile, inequality in the PSO also has its own magnitude. If the PSO is

a positive variable, inequality can be measured by any of the usual measures (like the Gini). Two of the three sociobehavioral outcomes—status and power—can be represented by positive numbers alone. But justice spans negative as well as positive values (Eq. (23.2)), and the power PSO can also assume negative values, depending on the sign of the intercept and the exact configuration of the elements in the power PSO function (Eq. (23.3)). Accordingly, while status and sometimes power are amenable to inequality measurement using all the usual inequality measures, for measuring inequality in the justice and other comparison PSOs, as well as in some power PSOs, we rely on the variance and the Gini’s mean difference (GMD), measures which are applicable to variables that span both negative and positive numbers. Contrasts based on the variance and the GMD are straightforward when the distributions have the same arithmetic mean.

Personal quantitative characteristics, personal qualitative characteristics, and subgroup inequality—subgroup X inequality (or subgroup X gap). Both personal inequality and subgroup inequality focus on a quantitative characteristic X . However, as seen above, while in personal inequality the focal units are persons, in subgroup inequality the focal units are subgroups. Subgroup inequality thus refers to the discrepancy between the distribution (most often the average or other measure of central tendency) of X across two subgroups of a group or population. The qualitative characteristic in basic theory provides the subgroups. Examples of subgroup inequality include the race wage gap and the gender wage gap.

PSOs, personal qualitative characteristics, and subgroup inequality—subgroup PSO inequality (or subgroup PSO gap). In the same way, subgroup inequality also refers to the discrepancy between summary measures of the PSO across two subgroups. Subgroup PSO inequality is usually represented by the difference between the average of the PSO in the two subgroups.

* * *

Table 23.1 depicts the crossclassification producing the four forms of inequality and provides as an example a matched set consisting of

Table 23.1 Four forms of inequality: example of matched set of personal *X* inequality, personal PSO inequality, subgroup *X* inequality, and subgroup PSO inequality

	Inequality in <i>X</i>	Inequality in PSO
Personal Inequality	wage inequality	status inequality
Subgroup Inequality	nativity wage gap	nativity status gap

In this example of a matched set of the four forms of inequality, the personal quantitative characteristic is the wage, the personal qualitative characteristic is nativity, and the primordial sociobehavioral outcome (PSO) is status

personal wage inequality, nativity wage gap, personal status inequality, and nativity status gap. In this case, the personal qualitative characteristic is nativity, defined as a binary variable with two categories, born in the United States and born elsewhere.

Other possible personal qualitative characteristics in the immigration field would include citizenship (also possibly specified as binary—citizen and noncitizen), broad type of visa (permanent, temporary, none), detailed type of visa (family, employment, etc.), authorization (with authorized and unauthorized the two categories of interest).

When the PSO is justice, there is a further relation involving inequality in the core of the theory—the arithmetic mean of the PSO, called the Justice Index, varies as a function of personal *X* inequality. As *X* inequality increases, the Justice Index decreases, going deeper into the region of unjust underreward.

Social Distance and Inequality

Above we noted that the PSO generates an identity; we shall now call it the Personal Identity. For example, if status is the PSO, the individual’s status score, as calculated by Eq. (23.1), becomes the Personal Identity. The Personal Identities aggregate to form the Subgroup Identity—defined

as the average of the Personal Identities in a subgroup—and the Group Identity—defined as the average of the Personal Identities in the group. To represent the overall social distance between two subgroups we use the absolute difference or gap between two Subgroup Identities. For example, if status is the PSO, the social distance between two subgroups is given by the absolute difference between the two subgroups’ average status scores.⁶

Behaviorally, the social distance application of basic theory assumes that each person thinks and acts as a member of the subgroup. Relations between a native-born and a foreign-born person, for example, are represented by the absolute difference between the Native-Born Identity (the average of the Personal Identities in the native-born subgroup) and the Foreign-Born Identity (the average of the Personal Identities in the foreign-born subgroup).⁷ In this model the social distance captures everything relevant to the interaction between two persons from different

⁶ “The terms “Personal Identity,” “Subgroup Identity,” and “Group Identity” provide a convenient shorthand for “individual’s PSO score,” “subgroup average PSO score,” and “group average PSO score” (Jasso 2008). Because there are many social science terms that include “identity” in them, this chapter follows the convention of capitalizing the three terms used here, to indicate the special meaning attached to them.

⁷ Mathematically, this is an application of the classic Newtonian idea that mass accumulates at a point.

subgroups. Of course, this model may be unduly restrictive, and below we relax this restriction.⁸

In the simplest case there are two subgroups. Prominent historical examples include: men and women; blacks and whites; Christians and Jews; Catholics and Protestants; immigrants and natives; citizens and noncitizens; persons with permanent visas and persons with temporary visas; authorized and unauthorized foreign-born. If the Subgroup Identities differ—or, equivalently, if there is a nonzero gap between them—then it is natural to speak of the advantaged and disadvantaged subgroups or, synonymously, the top and bottom subgroups. In the contemporary United States, for example, foreign-born are disadvantaged relative to native-born, as are noncitizens relative to citizens and unauthorized foreign-born relative to authorized foreign-born.

An important feature, long recognized in sociology, pertains to the proportion in each subgroup. The proportionate composition—for example, 20-80 or 50-50—is called the *subgroup split*. In the context of unequal subgroups, the subgroup split is represented by the proportion in the bottom subgroup and denoted p . To illustrate, data from the Census Bureau, based on American Community Survey 1-year estimates, indicate that in 2011, among all foreign-born in the United States, the percent noncitizen was 55.1%. Those same data indicate that the percent foreign-born among all residents was 13%. If the quantitative characteristic is English language skill, and if English language skill is greater among citizen foreign-born than among noncitizen foreign-born and greater among native-born than among foreign-born, then when the group is the foreign-born, the proportion in the bottom subgroup p is 0.55, and when the group is everyone, p is 0.13.

Like everything in basic theory, social distance can be analyzed *a priori*, without seeing a single piece of data. Theoretical analysis proceeds by studying a set of special cases, including, importantly, extreme cases which serve to establish the boundaries of the process.

A useful extreme case to analyze is the case of nonoverlapping subgroups. Of course, nonoverlapping subgroups exist in the real world—for example, in some groups the highest-paid woman earns less than the lowest-paid man; or, as in some wage schedules, the highest-paid native is paid less than the lowest-paid foreigner. But the real value of analyzing nonoverlapping subgroups comes not from their real-world instances but from the theoretical bounds that emerge.

For theoretical analysis of models and problems involving groups and subgroups, there is no more helpful tool than classical probability distributions. Theoretical analysis using probability distributions begins with selection of a set of modeling distributions for the quantitative characteristic X . A useful set includes distributions with different combinations of lower and upper bounds, such as distributions with and without a safety net and distributions with and without a maximum amount of X . Here we use three two-parameter continuous distributions whose properties are well-known—the lognormal, Pareto, and power-function. Together this set includes some desired combinations. The Pareto combines a safety net with no maximum. The lognormal lacks an upper bound, like the Pareto, but, unlike the Pareto, it has no safety net. The power-function has a maximum but no safety net.

A further useful feature of this set is that the power-function includes as a special case the continuous uniform which represents a distribution of relative ranks. Thus, the same analysis that establishes results for quantitative X s also provides results for justice-nonmaterialistic and power-nonmaterialistic groups.

Perhaps an even more important feature of this set of three modeling distributions is that one of the two parameters governs all measures of inequality (Jasso and Kotz 2008). Thus, in a theoretical analysis of inequality using probability distributions it is not necessary to examine several measures of inequality, as all are monotonic functions of this one parameter, called the general inequality parameter.⁹

⁸ Note that when the subgroup PSO inequality (Section on “Inequality in the Elements of Basic Theory”) is represented by the absolute difference between the average PSO in the two subgroups, it equals the social distance.

⁹ Formulas and graphs for these distributions are provided in Jasso and Kotz (2008, pp. 36–37). For further

Table 23.2 Effect of proportion in disadvantaged subgroup on social distance

<i>X</i> Variate	Primordial Sociobehavioral Outcome		
	Justice	Status	Power
A. Ordinal <i>X</i>			
Rectangular	Negative	Positive	None
B. Cardinal <i>X</i>			
Lognormal	Nonmonotonic	Positive	Positive
Pareto	Positive	Positive	Positive
Power-Function	Negative	Positive	Negative

X denotes the personal quantitative characteristic which generates the PSO. The two subgroups are nonoverlapping in the valued good (and in the PSO)

Accordingly, theoretical analysis of social distance using these three distributions not only provides information about how social distance behaves across societies with and without safety nets, with or without maximum incomes, etc., but also it yields predictions concerning the effect of personal *X* inequality on social distance.

The main initial results of theoretical analysis of social distance are: First, the effect of the proportion in the bottom subgroup on social distance may be increasing, decreasing, or nonmonotonic, depending on the distributional form of the personal quantitative characteristic *X* and the particular PSO. Second, when *X* is a cardinal good, like income or wealth, and people value amounts of it, social distance always increases, as inequality in *X* increases. Table 23.2 summarizes these results. Figure 23.2 provides visual illustration, separately for ordinal goods and cardinal goods

distributed as lognormal, Pareto, and power-function.

Thus, in two of the five types of societies—the justice-materialistic and the power-materialistic—economic inequality matters for social distance between subgroups.¹⁰

To illustrate, suppose that the substantive question of interest focuses on the income gap between native-born and foreign-born. Suppose further that the two subgroups are nonoverlapping. We saw above that the percent foreign-born

properties, see Johnson et al. (1994, 1995) and Kleiber and Kotz (2003).

¹⁰ Jasso and Kotz (2008) establish that as personal *X* inequality increases, subgroup *X* inequality increases. The social distance results summarized here further establish that as personal *X* inequality increases, subgroup PSO inequality also increases, but only if people care about material goods and the dominant PSO is justice or power. For example, if *X* is wealth and the PSO is self-esteem, as personal wealth inequality increases, so do both subgroup wealth inequality and subgroup self-esteem inequality. However, if status is the PSO, as personal wealth inequality increases, so does subgroup wealth inequality but not subgroup status inequality.




Fig. 23.2 Social distance in justice, status, and power societies, with differing configurations of valued goods and goods’ distributional forms, by subgroup split p . The letters J , S , and P denote the justice, status, and power

societies, respectively. In the three cardinal-good societies, the greater the inequality in the good’s distribution, the greater the social distance (and the higher the vertical placement of the curve)

in 2011 was approximately 13%. Then, looking at Table 23.2 and Fig. 23.2, we see that the predicted social distance between native-born and foreign-born is rather low in all combinations of PSO and income distribution except when the PSO is justice and the distribution is lognormal or power-function. Moreover, we see, also from Table 23.2 and Fig. 23.2, that if the percent foreign-born increases (but does not reach 50%), social distance between them and the native-born will increase in all combinations of PSO and income distribution except combinations in which justice is paired with an ordinal, lognormal, or power-function distribution or power is paired with an ordinal or power-function distribution.

Note that many more predictions can be gleaned from Table 23.2 and Fig. 23.2. For example, we can contrast the social distance between natives and foreigners, on the one hand, with the social distance between noncitizen foreign-born and citizen foreign-born, on the other. To illustrate, among a people for whom status matters,

the social distance between citizen and noncitizen foreign-born will be greater than the social distance between native-born and foreign-born, but the opposite holds among a people for whom self-esteem matters—unless the income distribution is Pareto (see how the J curves decrease in all plots in Fig. 23.2 except the ones in panel C).

The social distance model has two related weaknesses. First, its starting premise is the strong assumption that individuals already think and act as members of subgroups. Second, it does not provide a mechanism for the propensity to think and act as a subgroup member. A new model, introduced in the Section on “Prejudice, Discrimination, and Inequality” below, eliminates both weaknesses; it not only removes the assumption that persons act as subgroup members but also it provides a mechanism for subgroup attachment. But first we briefly examine profiling, which, like social distance, ignores all of a person’s characteristics except the focal qualitative characteristic.

Profiling and Inequality

Social distance pertains to the gulf between two subgroups—such as between native-born and foreign-born. It is based on the two Subgroup Identities. More generally, there exists a universal temptation to ignore personal quantitative characteristics and focus on the more readily observable personal qualitative characteristics. Suppose that an observer ignores the X distribution and the PSO distribution and notices only the Subgroup Identity. One would say such a person is ignoring the uniqueness of individuals and focusing only on their subgroup origins. One would say such a person is profiling or discriminating.

There is even a form of discrimination which masquerades as altruism but is nonetheless real discrimination. A recent newspaper article laments the dearth of minority characters in the reading books used in elementary schools in the United States, suggesting that children may not identify with characters of different ethnicities (Rich 2012). A third-grade teacher in a school with Hispanic children says she would like to see more Hispanic characters in the reading books so that she can say to a child, “This book reminds me of you.” The teacher is ignoring everything that is unique about the child, in fact discriminating and noticing only the child’s ethnicity. The child has been profiled, and the teacher is unable to say, “Pippi Longstocking reminds me of you,” or “Peter Rabbit reminds me of you.” The teacher associates none of the special traits of the characters—Charlotte A. Cavatica or Fern Arable or Wilbur—with the child; the teacher is in effect blind to the child’s personal quantitative characteristics and to all but one personal qualitative characteristic.

This wolf-in-sheep’s-clothing profiling occurs not only with respect to ethnicity but also with respect to all the immigration-focused personal qualitative characteristics. Even the most altruistic find it difficult to transcend the gaping personal qualitative characteristic. Ascribing to the child of unauthorized foreign-born the intellect or sentiments of a third-generation child proves taxing.

Though the simple model in this section cannot explain the propensity to profile, it yields predictions for the intensity of profiling. As in the social distance application, the proportion in the disadvantaged subgroup affects the intensity of profiling, but the direction of the effect depends on the combination of dominant PSO and valued good (Table 23.2, Fig. 23.2). Further, it also follows from the relation established in Jasso and Kotz (2008) that in two of the five possible societies—the justice-materialistic and the power-materialistic—as personal X inequality increases, profiling increases. In those societies, as personal inequality increases—as it has been increasing in the United States—profiling of foreign-born, noncitizen foreign-born, and unauthorized foreign-born increases.

Prejudice, Discrimination, and Inequality

What determines the propensity to think and act as a member of a subgroup and to see others purely as members of subgroups? The Personal Identity and the Subgroup Identity introduced above and used to explore social distance (Section on “Social Distance and Inequality”) and profiling (Section on “Profiling and Inequality”) are the building blocks for a new model that addresses this question. The new model relaxes the restriction that persons both behave as members of subgroups and perceive others as members of subgroups, and provides a mechanism for generating subgroup attachment. The new model gives persons a choice between the Personal Identity and the Subgroup Identity. As will be seen, in this more elaborate model, some persons will choose to attach to the Personal Identity, while others will choose to attach to the Subgroup Identity. Accordingly, it is no longer the case that all members of a subgroup have exactly the same attitude toward members of the other subgroup or that both subgroups have the same attitude toward each other. A major question will be, as before, the part played by inequality.

To formulate this new model, suppose that persons seek to enhance their identity by maximizing




Fig. 23.3 Selfistas and subgroupistas in four hypothetical groups, where status is the dominant PSO but the pre-existing subgroup splits differ

their PSO score. Equivalently, given that the PSO also generates happiness, suppose that persons seek to maximize their happiness. Then they will compare the Personal Identity with the Subgroup Identity. If Personal Identity is higher than Subgroup Identity, they will ignore their subgroup and attach to the idea of themselves and others as individuals, blind to their own and other's subgroup origins. But if Personal Identity is lower than Subgroup Identity, they will attach to the subgroup and ignore their Personal Identity, finding the happiness they seek within their subgroup.

In a group with two subgroups, this identity enhancing process will yield three new subgroups—persons from Subgroup A who attach to A, persons from Subgroup B who attach to B, and persons from both Subgroups who attach to self. Persons in the first two of the new subgroups are called Subgroupistas, persons in the third are called Selfistas.

Notice how operation of the PSO mechanism yields new subgroups that cross-cut the original subgroups. Whenever this happens, the original subgroups—the subgroups formed by categories of personal qualitative characteristics—are called *pre-existing subgroups*, and the subgroups generated by operation of the PSO and the identity enhancement process are called *emergent subgroups*.

To illustrate, Fig. 23.3 provides graphs of the status PSO in four hypothetical groups, each with two pre-existing subgroups such that the pre-existing subgroups are nonoverlapping in status (and in whatever personal quantitative characteristic generated status). The four groups differ in the subgroup split, that is, the proportions in the two pre-existing subgroups, ranging from a group in which the bottom pre-existing subgroup has 25% of the population and the top pre-existing subgroup has 75% to a group in which the

bottom pre-existing subgroup has 75% of the population and the top pre-existing subgroup has 25%. A vertical line divides the two pre-existing subgroups. The curve in each plot depicts Personal Identity—i.e., each individual's own status score. The long horizontal line represents the average status for the whole group, and the two smaller horizontal lines represent the average status for the two pre-existing subgroups, that is, the Subgroup Identity. The intersection of the status curve and the Subgroup Identity marks the point at which Personal Identity equals Subgroup Identity. Regardless of the subgroup split, each pre-existing subgroup has both Selfistas (the subset to the right of the intersection) and Subgroupistas (the subset to the left of the intersection). Thus, it is always the case that the richest or most beautiful or most accomplished in each pre-existing subgroup will be Selfistas, while the poorest or least beautiful or least accomplished will be Subgroupistas. This in turn suggests that the “best and the brightest” in each pre-existing subgroup cannot be trusted with important work for the pre-existing subgroups.

The subgroup split also affects other important outcomes, such as the proportion Selfistas overall, the proportion Selfistas within pre-existing subgroups, and the pre-existing subgroup composition of the emergent Selfistas and Subgroupistas. These outcomes are also dependent on the dominant PSO and on the valued good. If justice or power is the active PSO, the proportions Selfista, for example, may differ from those shown in Fig. 23.3.

The process just described is driven by individuals' desire to enhance their identity, to maximize their happiness. A parallel process involves the perceptions of others. Look again at Fig. 23.3. Suppose now that, as discussed in the Section on “Profiling and Inequality”, an observer ignores the status curve and notices only each subgroup's average status—the horizontal line representing the Subgroup Identity. The observer is profiling or discriminating. There are winners and losers from discrimination. Individuals whose own accomplishment is below the average for the pre-existing subgroup benefit from discrimination, while individuals whose own accomplishment

exceeds the pre-existing subgroup average, lose from discrimination. This result leads to predictions concerning the intensity of profiling and support and opposition for anti-discrimination measures.

What about inequality? Theoretical analysis of this model using the three classical distributions yields the result that none of the quantities studied to date—including the proportion from each pre-existing subgroup in each emergent subgroup, the proportion from each pre-existing subgroup in each emergent subgroup, the proportions Selfistas and Subgroupistas—depend on inequality in the distribution of X . In all analyses to date, this is the only case where personal X inequality has no effect. Recall, for example, that personal X inequality exacerbates social distance and profiling (section on “Social Distance and Inequality” and “Profiling and Inequality”). And other theoretical analyses, far removed from immigration, also show the effects of inequality (for example, in the propensity to join religious orders). But the new model discussed in this Section shows itself oblivious to personal X inequality. Future work will reveal whether this is a rare occurrence or only rare in the range of theoretical applications analyzed to date.

Immigration and Inequality in the Predictions of Basic Theory

The preceding sections show that application of the basic theory to immigration and inequality is supremely natural—because two of the three basic elements at the core of the basic theory are immediately and directly linked to immigration and inequality. Inequality is a feature of the distributions of personal quantitative characteristics; and immigration produces prime examples of personal qualitative characteristics (such as nativity, origin country, citizenship, type of visa, language).

Accordingly, we know that for every qualitative characteristic, there are several immigration applications. From the Section on “Inequality in the Elements of Basic Theory” and Table 23.1, we know that, corresponding to each X and to

each immigration-based qualitative characteristic, there will be new measures of subgroup X inequality and subgroup PSO inequality—such as the nativity wage gap and the nativity status gap.

Similarly, from the Sections on “Social Distance and Inequality” and “Profiling and Inequality” we know that social distance and profiling phenomena arise in immigration versions, the relevant social distance now being the distance between natives and immigrants or between citizens and noncitizens or between legal immigrants and unauthorized immigrants, and so on. Further, from the Section on “Prejudice, Discrimination, and Inequality”, we expect a structure of emergent Selfistas and Subgroupistas. Accordingly, the basic theory reaches immigration and potentially yields testable predictions for a wide variety of immigration and inequality phenomena.

As in all basic theory, the predictions span multiple and disparate domains. In the immigration application, the predictions will touch all the major phenomena, such as assimilation and conflict between natives and immigrants. One set of predictions already in the literature pertains to the propensity to leave a country. Building on basic ideas found in Aristotle (*Politics*, Book 4) and extensions by Blau (1964), we may reason that the propensity to migrate is stronger among the lower and upper classes than among the middle classes, the latter regarded since Aristotle as the backbone of society or, in Blau’s words, the “solid core.” Assigning an arcsecant form to the relation between the individual’s magnitude of X and the propensity to migrate and analyzing this relation in the three distributional families introduced above—the lognormal, Pareto, and power-function—yields the prediction that in a justice-materialistic society the proportion with a positive propensity to emigrate is an increasing function of X inequality (Jasso 2003).

Illustration of the Basic Theory Approach to Analyzing Immigration and Inequality

To begin, consider a population that includes both natives and immigrants. For purposes of

this illustration, suppose they all value wealth and they all seek to maximize status. Each person is accorded status based on wealth, following the function in Eq. (23.1). Of course, as in the Section on “Social Distance and Inequality”, a real theoretical analysis would analyze all the combinations of PSOs, valued goods, and their distributional form in order to establish the bounds on the topic of interest.

Suppose further that there is complete disjuncture between natives and immigrants on wealth; the poorest native is richer than the richest immigrant. Accordingly, the graphs in Fig. 23.3 provide visual illustration of the native-immigrant subgroup structure, the status hierarchy, and the location of the emergent Selfistas and Subgroupistas. Look at panel A. Twenty-five percent of the population is in the immigrant subgroup, which occupies the leftmost region, and 75% is in the native subgroup. As noted above, the horizontal lines indicate the Subgroup Identities (in this case, the average status in the pre-existing subgroup). Everyone seeks to maximize their Identity, and thus those whose own personal status score is less than the subgroup average attach to the subgroup while those whose own personal status exceeds the subgroup average become Selfistas.

Thus, there will be three emergent subgroups: (1) immigrants who are Subgroupistas; (2) natives who are Subgroupistas; and (3) natives and immigrants who are Selfistas. As discussed above, the Selfistas are drawn from among the higher-ranking within each of the two pre-existing subgroups.

This parsimonious model can be used to understand a wide range of phenomena. Consider residential segregation, for example. The Subgroupistas will want to live in segregated neighborhoods, the native neighborhoods and the Immigrant neighborhoods. The Selfistas, meanwhile, will be oblivious to nativity and live together in a mixed immigrant-native neighborhood. The immigrant Selfistas will learn English and assimilate in ways large and small; the immigrant Subgroupistas will be slow to adopt English or native customs and practices. Given that Selfistas are more advantaged than Subgroupis-

Table 23.3 Proportions immigrant segregationist, immigrant integrationist, native segregationist, and native integrationist, by proportion immigrant in the population: Status society

Proportion immigrant	Immigrants		Natives	
	Segregationist	Integrationist	Segregationist	Integrationist
A	B	C	D	E
0.05	0.0251	0.0249	0.600	0.349
0.10	0.0504	0.0496	0.569	0.331
0.15	0.0760	0.0740	0.537	0.313
0.20	0.102	0.0981	0.506	0.294
0.25	0.128	0.122	0.474	0.276
0.30	0.154	0.146	0.442	0.258
0.35	0.181	0.169	0.411	0.239
0.40	0.208	0.192	0.379	0.221
0.45	0.236	0.214	0.348	0.202
0.50	0.264	0.236	0.316	0.184
0.55	0.293	0.257	0.284	0.166
0.60	0.322	0.278	0.253	0.147
0.632	0.342	0.290	0.233	0.135
0.65	0.353	0.298	0.221	0.129
0.70	0.384	0.316	0.190	0.110
0.75	0.416	0.334	0.158	0.0920
0.80	0.450	0.350	0.126	0.0736
0.85	0.486	0.364	0.0948	0.0552
0.90	0.525	0.375	0.0632	0.0368
0.95	0.569	0.381	0.0316	0.0184

The proportions in each row sum to 1

tas, basic theory thus predicts that the more advantaged immigrants will be quicker to assimilate than the less advantaged.

A useful feature of basic theory is that it yields quantitative predictions. Table 23.3 reports the proportions in each of four subsets—immigrant segregationist, native segregationist, immigrant integrationist, and native integrationist—by proportion immigrant in the society. These four quantities sum to one and are the basic building-blocks for all other quantities of substantive interest. For example, summing the native and immigrant integrationists yields the proportion preferring a mixed neighborhood; and the ratio of immigrant integrationists to all immigrants gives the proportion integrationist among immigrants. For ease in such algebraic manipulation, each column in Table 23.3 is assigned a letter label.

Table 23.4 presents the corresponding proportions segregationist and integrationist within the native and immigrant subgroups. Several results are immediate. First, the proportions segrega-

tionist and integrationist among immigrants vary with the proportion immigrant, but they are constant among natives. Second, among immigrants, the proportion integrationist declines as the proportion immigrant increases (and, of course, the proportion segregationist increases). Third, the proportion integrationist among immigrants is always larger than the proportion integrationist among natives.

Table 23.5 presents a distillation of the major results, including both the predicted proportions in the immigrant, native, and mixed neighborhoods and also the proportions native and immigrant in the mixed neighborhoods. As shown in Table 23.5 and in Fig. 23.4, the proportion in Immigrant neighborhoods increases with the proportion immigrant, and the proportion in Native neighborhoods decreases with the proportion immigrant, but the proportion in mixed neighborhoods is nonmonotonic by proportion immigrant, increasing until immigrants are about 63% of the population, and thereafter declining.

Table 23.4 Proportions of immigrant and native subgroups who are segregationist and integrationist, by proportion immigrant in the population: Status society

Proportion immigrant	Immigrants		Natives	
	Segregationist	Integrationist	Segregationist	Integrationist
A	B/A	C/A	D/(1-A)	E/(1-A)
0.05	0.502	0.498	0.632	0.368
0.10	0.504	0.496	0.632	0.368
0.15	0.507	0.493	0.632	0.368
0.20	0.509	0.491	0.632	0.368
0.25	0.512	0.488	0.632	0.368
0.30	0.515	0.485	0.632	0.368
0.35	0.518	0.482	0.632	0.368
0.40	0.521	0.479	0.632	0.368
0.45	0.525	0.475	0.632	0.368
0.50	0.528	0.472	0.632	0.368
0.55	0.533	0.467	0.632	0.368
0.60	0.537	0.463	0.632	0.368
0.632	0.540	0.460	0.632	0.368
0.65	0.542	0.458	0.632	0.368
0.70	0.548	0.452	0.632	0.368
0.75	0.555	0.445	0.632	0.368
0.80	0.562	0.438	0.632	0.368
0.85	0.572	0.428	0.632	0.368
0.90	0.583	0.417	0.632	0.368
0.95	0.599	0.401	0.632	0.368

The proportions within each subgroup sum to 1. Within the native and immigrant subgroups, the proportion integrationist is always less than half. The proportion integrationist in the Immigrant subgroup always exceeds that in the Native subgroup

Figure 23.4 also shows that the proportion of the population living in mixed neighborhoods never reaches half. However, it exceeds the proportions in immigrant and native neighborhoods when the proportion immigrant in the population is between approximately 0.36 and 0.76.

Focusing on mixed neighborhoods, the proportions immigrant and native vary monotonically with proportion immigrant in the population (Table 23.5). As shown in Fig. 23.5, the proportion immigrant in mixed neighborhoods increases, and the proportion native decreases. Mixed neighborhoods have a 50-50 composition of immigrants and natives when the proportion immigrant in the population is between 0.435 and 0.436.

These results show how basic theory generates preferences for residing in immigrant, native, and mixed neighborhoods and how the ensuing relative size of these neighborhoods and of the racial composition of mixed neighborhoods vary with

the proportion immigrant in the overall population. The exact numerical predictions, however, are only for a status society. The predicted preferences will differ substantially in a justice or power society and, within these, by whether the valued good is cardinal or ordinal and, if cardinal, its distributional form.¹¹

¹¹ As further analyses accumulate, exact numerical predictions will become available for justice and power societies. Jasso (2008, pp. 427–430) provides an initial glimpse, suggesting that a justice-materialistic society in which the valued good is Pareto-distributed will resemble a status society, that a justice-nonmaterialistic society and a justice-materialistic society in which the valued good is power-function-distributed will be identical and the mirror image of a status society, and that a justice-materialistic society in which the valued good is lognormally-distributed will have equal numbers of Selfistas and Subgroupistas. These symmetries and asymmetries are rooted in fundamental features of the probability distributions of the valued goods.

Table 23.5 Summary of predicted residential segregation—proportions segregated immigrants, segregated natives, and integrated, with proportion immigrant and native among the integrated, by proportion immigrant in the population: Status society

Proportion immigrant	Segregationist		Integrationist		
	Immigrants	Natives	Total	Proportion immigrant	Proportion native
A	B	D	C+E	$C/(C+E)$	$E/(C+E)$
0.05	0.0251	0.600	0.374	0.0665	0.934
0.10	0.0504	0.569	0.381	0.130	0.870
0.15	0.0760	0.537	0.387	0.191	0.809
0.20	0.102	0.506	0.392	0.250	0.750
0.25	0.128	0.474	0.398	0.307	0.693
0.30	0.154	0.442	0.403	0.361	0.639
0.35	0.181	0.411	0.408	0.414	0.586
0.40	0.208	0.379	0.412	0.465	0.535
0.45	0.236	0.348	0.416	0.514	0.486
0.50	0.264	0.316	0.420	0.562	0.438
0.55	0.293	0.284	0.423	0.608	0.392
0.60	0.322	0.253	0.425	0.654	0.346
0.632	0.342	0.233	0.425	0.680	0.320
0.65	0.353	0.221	0.426	0.698	0.302
0.70	0.384	0.190	0.427	0.741	0.259
0.75	0.416	0.158	0.426	0.784	0.216
0.80	0.450	0.126	0.424	0.826	0.174
0.85	0.486	0.0948	0.419	0.868	0.132
0.90	0.525	0.0632	0.412	0.911	0.0894
0.95	0.569	0.0316	0.399	0.954	0.0461

The proportions segregationist Immigrants, segregationist Natives, and integrationist in each row sum to 1. Within the integrationists, the proportions Immigrant and Native in each row sum to 1




Fig. 23.4 Immigrant, native, and mixed neighborhoods in a status society, by subgroup split p . For each magnitude of the subgroup split (or proportion Immigrant), the proportions in immigrant, native, and mixed neighborhoods sum to one




Fig. 23.5 Proportions immigrant and native in mixed neighborhood in status society, by subgroup split p

But basic theory does much more. Earlier we noted that this more elaborate model would provide the mechanism for attachment to subgroup that lies at the heart of the social distance and

profiling models. Now we can see that among natives, it is Subgroupistas who will become profilers. And among both natives and immigrants, it is Subgroupistas who will think and act solely

as natives or immigrants in skirmishes with each other and who will agitate for the total subgroup attachment of the social distance model.

Continuing, basic theory predicts strains within the native subgroup and the immigrant subgroup, the Selfistas and Subgroupistas struggling to control the soul of their pre-existing subgroup. How intense will profiling and hostilities based on social distance be? Looking at Fig. 23.2, we see that if the society remains a status society, social distance and profiling will be modest at ordinary proportions of immigrants. As shown in Fig. 23.2, in a status society social distance increases with the proportion immigrant. Thus, such phenomena will be at their lowest. However, if the dominant PSO changes, everything could change, as shown in Fig. 23.2.

Finally, note that we have ignored interindividual variation in the difference between the Personal Identity and the Subgroup Identity. Obviously the attachment to self or subgroup may be more intense for some and less intense for others. Look at Fig. 23.3. These differences vary widely. Compare, for example, in panel A the differences within the migrant group, which are quite small, to the differences within the native group, which are quite large. Explicit analysis of this feature may shed light on many further behaviors—people in segregated neighborhoods going to mixed libraries, people in mixed neighborhoods eating in each other's homes, etc.

The Inductive Approach to Understanding the Social Psychology of Immigration and Inequality

Immigration is fundamentally about inequality. It arises from inequality (whether from too much or too little inequality), it operates via a system of inequality, it affects inequality (whether reducing it or increasing it). It could be said that almost every question in the study of immigration involves inequality in a nontrivial way.¹²

¹² The reverse is also increasingly the case. It could be said that it is impossible to study social stratification without studying migration (Jasso 2011).

In this section we review the framework for studying immigration, a framework which addresses the selection, adaptation, and impacts of immigrants, together with the adaptation and impacts of their children, and which has developed in a series of contributions by diverse scholars (see, for example, Alba and Nee 2003; Bean and Stevens 2003; Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990; Massey et al. 1993; Portes and Rumbaut 2006). And we discuss some of the major inequality questions embedded in immigration. Do the questions also involve social psychology? If one believes that social psychology is at the heart of all things social, then the answer is a resounding Yes. For simplicity and concreteness, all examples pertain to foreign-born persons in the United States, but the general phenomena transcend any particular pair of origin and destination countries.

Four Central Questions in the Study of International Migration

The study of immigration begins with four central questions:

1. What are the migrant's characteristics and behavior at entry?
2. How do the migrant's characteristics and behavior change with time in the destination country?
3. What are the characteristics and behavior of the children of immigrants?
4. What are the impacts on the origin and destination countries?

The first question—the *selection question*—encompasses questions about the forces of selectivity, including self-selection as well as legal inducements and restrictions at both exit and entry and family dynamics. The second question—the *assimilation question*—pertains to the migrant's trajectory after immigration, including the extent and pace of adaptation as well as the decision to leave the destination country, either to return to the origin country or to go on to another destination. The third question—often called the *second-generation question*—covers everything that pertains to the children involved in their own or their parents' migration. Finally, the fourth ques-

Table 23.6 English fluency, schooling, and earnings: ACS 2010. (Source: U.S. Census Bureau. (2011))

Legal status	Basic socioeconomic characteristics				
	English Fluency %	Schooling		Earnings	
		Age 5+	Age 25+ <12	16+	FT Year Round Dollars
All native-born	98.1	11.0	28.4	49,262	37,198
All foreign-born	48.4	31.7	27.0	35,567	31,161
Not a U.S. citizen	38.4	41.0	21.5	27,987	23,929
Legal permanent residents who have not become citizens	—	—	—	—	—
Legal temporary residents	—	—	—	—	—
Unauthorized	—	—	—	—	—
U.S. citizen	61.2	21.6	33.1	46,853	37,557

Data based on 1-year estimates from the American Community Survey, compiled by Migration Information Source. English fluency combines the proportion who speak English only and the proportion who though also speaking another language report speaking English “very well”

tion—the *impacts question*—seeks to assess the myriad effects of immigration on both origin and destination countries and their residents.

Inequality plays a part in every question. Consider the first question, the selection question. A person in a relatively low-inequality country may want to move to a relatively high-inequality country in order to increase the chances of attaining a large income. Conversely, a person in a relatively high-inequality country may want to move to a relatively low-inequality country in order to reduce the personal sting of relative deprivation or to enjoy the higher social harmony. Meanwhile, governments develop policies on exit and entry that both notice and engender inequalities of various kinds. And the family dynamics which stand between the desire to migrate and the actual migration are basically about inequalities within the family. It is but a step from Mincer’s (1978) original conception in which family dynamics produce tied movers and stayers to an expanded view in which both family and government dynamics produce tied movers and stayers and both family and government dynamics are linked to inequalities.

Some Basics About Immigration and Inequality

Almost without exception, countries distinguish between native-born and foreign-born and/or between citizens and noncitizens. The cross-classification of the two dimensions yields three

meaningful groups, which in order of rights are: native-born citizens, foreign-born citizens, foreign-born noncitizens. These three groups enable two inequality contrasts—between native-born and foreign-born; and between foreign-born citizens and foreign-born noncitizens. Foreign-born noncitizens are an enormously heterogeneous group, including persons who have been admitted to legal permanent residence (LPR) and thus have the coveted green card, persons with legal temporary visas, and unauthorized persons.

Table 23.6 reports the most recent information available on three basic characteristics—English fluency, schooling, and earnings—among native-born and foreign-born, including the citizen and noncitizen subsets of the foreign-born. This information is based on the 1-year estimates for 2010, provided as part of the American Community Survey (ACS) of 2011. The ACS is an annual, nationally representative survey of residents of the United States, conducted by the Census Bureau (and replacing the long form of the decennial Census). Comparable information is not available for U.S. residents in the subsets of the noncitizen foreign-born population—for example, among LPRs or the unauthorized.¹³

¹³ This is a major data deficiency which immigration researchers are striving to address. The New Immigrant Survey provides the requisite information for selected annual cohorts of new legal permanent residents (including their entire visa history, which may include spells with temporary visas or in an unauthorized status). But there is currently no similarly detailed information for a representa-

The English fluency measure includes both respondents who speak only English and respondents who, though also speaking another language, report that they speak English “very well.” It is not surprising that the native-born have the highest percent who are fluent in English—98.1%—or that foreign-born citizens have a greater percentage fluent in English than foreign-born noncitizens—61.2 versus 38.4%—especially given that becoming a citizen requires knowledge of English (for most applicants). The nativity English fluency gap is thus 0.493 (48.4 divided by 98.1), and the citizenship English fluency gap among foreign-born is 0.627.

It has long been known that the schooling distribution among foreign-born is bimodal, with fatter tails than that among the native-born. Put differently, the proportions with very low schooling and very high schooling are greater among foreign-born than among native-born (Jasso et al. 2000). The recent data in Table 23.6 show that the bimodality persists. While less than 11% of the native born have not completed high school, 31.7% of the foreign-born lack a high school diploma. At the other end of the distribution, however, the proportions with at least a college education are almost the same—28.4 and 27% among native- and foreign-born, respectively. Moreover, other evidence indicates that restricting attention to ultra high schooling yields a larger percentage among foreign-born; for example, data from the Current Population Survey indicate that in 1996 the proportion with 17 or more years of schooling was 7.7% among native-born and 13.3% among recent-entrant foreign-born (Jasso et al. 2000). Turning to the contrast between citizens and noncitizens within the foreign-born population, the proportion with less than a high school education is almost twice as high among noncitizens than among citizens—41 versus 21.6%—while the proportion with at least a college education is half again as large among citizens than among noncitizens—33.1 versus 21.5%.

tive sample of the population of resident foreign-born. For further information on the New Immigrant Survey and to download public-use data and associated documentation, please see <http://nis.princeton.edu>.

The ACS data on the earnings of full-time year-round workers (Table 23.6) yield several earnings gaps. The nativity earnings gap, defined as the ratio of average earnings among foreign-born to average earnings among native-born, is 0.722 among men and 0.838 among women. The citizenship earnings gap among foreign-born, defined as the ratio of average earnings among foreign-born noncitizens to average earnings among foreign-born citizens, is 0.597 among men and 0.637 among women. Thus, the nativity earnings gaps are smaller than the foreign-born citizenship earnings gaps, and both gaps are smaller among women than among men. It would be extremely useful to calculate refined versions of these gaps, restricting attention, for example, to legal permanent residents or to all legal residents. Such data, however, do not exist. The only data with detail on legal status are in the New Immigrant Survey, and those data pertain only to particular entry cohorts and not to all foreign-born residents of the United States.

The differences between citizen and noncitizen foreign-born signal both differences in human capital and legal status at entry and differences in time spent in the United States and in the rate of growth of human capital. It is illuminating that the gap in earnings between native-born and citizen foreign-born is small among men—\$ 49,262 versus \$ 46,853 for native-born and citizen foreign-born, respectively—while among women the gap slightly favors the citizen foreign-born—\$ 37,198 versus \$ 37,557 for native-born and citizen foreign-born, respectively. Clearly, women who are legal immigrants, who become citizens, and who work full-time year-round have higher earnings on average than their native-born counterparts.

The earnings figures in Table 23.6 also enable calculation of classical gender gaps. As shown, within every nativity/citizenship group, women earn less on average than men, but the gaps differ considerably. The largest gender earnings gap is among the native-born: 0.755. Among citizen foreign-born, the gap is 0.802, and among noncitizen foreign-born, the gap is 0.855, the narrowest of all the gender earnings gaps. These results echo the results reported in Jasso et al. (2000), namely, the gender gaps are smaller among

foreign-born than among native-born, and even smaller among groups with unauthorized or previously unauthorized immigrants.

That countries distinguish among the three groups highlighted above—native-born, foreign-born citizens, and foreign-born noncitizens—is not surprising. What may be surprising is the intricate set of distinctions within the foreign-born groups, discussed below.

Rights Almost imperceptibly, a new personal quantitative characteristic has entered the discussion. Exploration of immigration does not proceed far without confronting the matter of civil rights. Again almost without exception, countries grant civil rights differentially across the three groups and within the two foreign-born groups, especially the group of noncitizen foreign-born.

Building a bridge to basic theory, we note that rights are an ordinal good, and that it will be possible to rank people along the rights continuum, albeit generating large subsets with tied ranks. Once each person has an associated rank, all the quantities of basic theory can be generated and all analyses of basic theory carried out. Thus, a society in which rights is the valued good can be of three types, depending on the PSO—status society, justice-nonmaterialistic society, or power-nonmaterialistic society. Each person acquires a Personal Identity, each subgroup a Subgroup Identity, and the population as a whole a Group Identity. The social distance between each pair of subgroups can be calculated, as can all the quantities pertaining to Selfistas and Subgroupistas. From a purely theoretical perspective, it is exciting to notice a new good—rights, in this case—ripe for theoretical analysis.

Inequality Across Foreign-Born in the United States

To begin to lay out the vast landscape of immigration and inequality pertaining to foreign-born, we begin with the major types of foreign-born in the United States. As shown in Table 23.6, the foreign-born include persons admitted for legal permanent residence, LPRs who have become

citizens of the United States, legal temporary migrants, and unauthorized persons. Rights vary enormously across these four major types. While LPRs may engage in any occupation except those reserved for citizens (such as most civil service occupations at all levels of government, except, notably, teachers of foreign languages), and foreign-born citizens may engage in any occupation except President and Vice-President of the United States, only some legal temporary migrants may work and then only with substantial restrictions. Meanwhile, unauthorized persons may not work or live in the United States. It would be a useful exercise to detail the rights of all the categories of legal temporary migrants. For example, even in categories which permit employment for the person qualifying for the visa (the “principal”), some categories do not permit employment for the principal’s spouse. To illustrate, the F-1 visa for an academic student permits employment subject to certain restrictions, but the F-2 visa for the spouse of an F-1 student does not under any circumstances permit employment. Thus, there are substantial spousal inequalities generated by U.S. law among its guests.

How many foreign-born are in the United States, and how many are in each of the four major types? To answer this question, Table 23.7 draws on the best available estimates developed by the Census Bureau (a unit of the U.S. Department of Commerce [DOC]) and the Office of Immigration Statistics (a unit of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security [DHS]). To establish correspondence between the DOC and DHS figures, Table 23.7 reports figures for the first of January of 2011 (the most recent DOC figures, based on 1-year estimates from the American Community Survey, are for mid-2011, and though they are used to calculate the January 1st figure, are not reported in Table 23.7). As shown, at the start of 2011, there were more than 40 million foreign-born persons in the United States; the Census Bureau estimates that approximately 55.7% were not citizens while 44.3% had become citizens. Census data do not distinguish among the three major types of noncitizen foreign-born. DHS, on the other hand, not only distinguishes among them but also provides annual estimates

Table 23.7 Foreign-born population in the United States, by Legal Status: 1 January 2011. (Sources: Hoefler, M., Rytina, N., & Baker, B.C. (2012); Rytina, N. (2012); U.S. Census Bureau. (2011); U.S. Census Bureau. (2012))

Legal status	DHS Office of Immigration Statistics 1 January 2011		DOC Census Bureau Average 2010–2011
	Published	Implied	Published
All foreign-born	–	–	40,166,857
Not a U.S. citizen		GT 26,480,000	22,358,720
Legal permanent residents who have not become citizens	13,070,000	–	–
Legal temporary residents (omits RAPs)	1,900,000	–	–
Unauthorized	11,510,000	–	–
U.S. citizen	–	–	17,808,137

Both the legal temporary residents and the unauthorized include persons who are on the track to legal permanent residence (LPR) and persons aspiring to LPR as well as persons who are not interested in LPR. The implied DHS estimate of noncitizen foreign-born is a lower bound because the component with legal temporary residents omits refugees, asylees, and parolees (RAPs). The DOC estimate of foreign-born who have become citizens is based on a question about naturalization; foreign-born who acquire citizenship in other ways (chiefly by “deriving” it from their parents) may or may not be included

of their size. Combining estimates from different sources is always challenging, and, as shown in Table 23.7, the DHS estimated total of noncitizen foreign-born (more than 26,480,000) is over four million larger than the corresponding Census estimate (22,358,720). In terms of rights, the largest differences are first, across the four types of foreign-born, and second, within the legal temporary residents, as discussed above.¹⁴

Of course, as will be more fully discussed in the next section, a key dimension of immigration and inequality pertains to the confluence of all the types of migrants within a single family.

Inequality Among Legal Permanent Residents of the United States

In this section, we focus on the selection processes for LPRs. Under current law, the United States admits about a million persons a year to legal permanent residence, granting them the fabled “green card”—the paper evidence of LPR (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service 2012). Because more persons would like to immigrate than the U.S. permits, the law provides an elaborate system of visa allocation. Persons who are the immediate relatives of U.S. citizens (“immediate relatives” defined as the spouses, parents, and minor children of adult U.S. citizens) are granted numerically unlimited visas. Other relatives (such as siblings or over-21 children of U.S. citizens) as well as persons qualifying by dint of employment are eligible for numerically limited visas, and with them their spouses and minor children. Overall, there are more than 4 million persons approved and waiting in line for the approximately 366,000 family and employment visas granted annually (U.S. Department of State 2012). Because countries differ in population size and visa demand, persons from four countries face longer waits than persons from the rest of the world: China, India, Mexico, and Philippines

¹⁴ The numerical discrepancy across the estimates developed by the Census Bureau and the Office of Immigration Statistics—a feature of estimates for all years for which the underlying data are available (viz., 2007–2011)—merits further analysis, but such analysis lies outside the scope of the present chapter. One may speculate whether one or more of the Census figures is an underestimate and whether one or more of the DHS figures is an overestimate. Note that it is not unusual for estimates to differ across estimating agency; for example, estimates of the world’s total population prepared by the Census Bureau differ from estimates prepared by the United Nations (Roberts 2011).

(U.S. Department of State, *Visa Bulletin*). While there is no queue in some visa categories (such as the highest level of employment visa), the queue ranges to over 23 years for prospective immigrants from the Philippines waiting in the sibling of U.S. citizen category.

LPR visas are also available on humanitarian grounds (to refugees, asylees, and parolees), and to legalize certain subsets of unauthorized immigrants (for example, those who qualify under the registry provisions). As well, the Diversity Visa Program grants 50,000 visas annually to persons from countries which have been underrepresented in recent immigration flows (defined as countries whose nationals received fewer than 50,000 LPR visas in the previous 5 years). Eligibility requirements include a high school degree or equivalent, or 2 years' work experience (within the preceding 5 years) in an occupation requiring 2 years of training or experience; selection is by lottery and visas are available for the winners and their spouses and minor children. During the most recent lottery, there were over 7.9 million applicants (representing almost 12.6 million prospective immigrants, including spouses and minor children).

Almost all prospective family immigrants and most employment immigrants require a sponsor. The sponsor is the relative or employer who renders the prospective immigrant eligible for a visa and who starts the application process. In almost all family cases and in some employment cases, the sponsor must also sign a contractually binding affidavit of support to accept financial responsibility for the immigrant. The sponsor must have enough income and/or assets to maintain his/her own household plus the sponsored immigrants at 125% of the Federal Poverty Guidelines. For example, as tabulated in DHS Form I-864P, "2013 HHS Poverty Guidelines for Affidavit of Support," in 2013 a sponsor with a spouse and two children who sponsors a sibling with a spouse and two children (for a total number of 8 persons) would require \$ 49,537 in income and/or assets (more if living in Alaska or Hawaii). If the sponsor and the immigrant do not have enough resources, a third person may be brought in to act

as "joint sponsor." Finally, if there are not enough resources to cover all the prospective immigrants in a family, some are removed from the application and they do not receive green cards. In the example above, if the resources meet but do not exceed the \$ 49,537 and the sponsored sibling has three children, one child must be removed from the application.

Consider now some of the inequalities that the U.S. visa allocation system engenders. First, the immigrant becomes indebted to the sponsor. The immigrant-sponsor pair may be husband and wife, or parent and adult child, or two siblings, or employer and worker. Each of these pairings will have a distinctive social psychology, but it seems a safe bet that, except possibly when the employer is a large firm or organization (such as a university), the sponsor-immigrant relation creates a deep inequality. This is an inequality reminiscent of the era of indentured servants. One person is beholden to another. The particular consequences will depend on the tie between sponsor and immigrant, being perhaps especially damaging in the case of spouses, for whom a certain equality has been thought since Aristotle to be necessary for love.

Second, if there is a joint sponsor in the case, the same inequalities that arise between sponsor and immigrant may arise. However, because the tie between joint sponsor and immigrant differs from the tie between sponsor and immigrant, the consequences will also differ. In particular, the joint sponsor is not likely to be married to the immigrant.

Third, if some family members cannot receive a green card, new inequalities arise. For example, if a prospective green card recipient has a spouse and three children but the resources recorded on the affidavit of support can only cover four persons, then one of the children will be removed from the green card application. The siblings become unequal. Two have green cards, one does not. The child without a green card may be left in the origin country with relatives or may be brought to the United States to live without documents. Either way, the child will not have access to the same opportunities as the siblings—at least

until the parents accumulate resources and sponsor the child. This process will be fraught, in part because the parents will not be eligible to naturalize for at least 3 years (usually 5), and thus the child must join the queue (of approximately 3 years) for a numerically limited visa.¹⁵

U.S. law generates still further inequalities. The law stipulates that if an immigrant becomes a naturalized citizen, any children who have green cards and are under 18 acquire citizenship automatically (called “derivative citizenship”). Depending on the ages of the children at the time of immigration, it may happen that the younger children acquire citizenship effortlessly while the older siblings may have to wait until they themselves apply for naturalization, when they will have to take an examination on U.S. history and civics.

Moreover, if a child must be left without a green card (due to the financial requirements sketched above), the parents may take into account the citizenship rules when they select which child to exclude from the application. The reader may wish to formulate hypothetical scenarios.

As a simple example, consider a foreign-born married couple in which one of the spouses is to receive a green card as the adult married child of a U.S. citizen. The couple has two sons, age 9 and 13, but there are resources for only one child. Further, one of the parents will naturalize in 6 years (becoming eligible at 5 years and allowing 1 year for processing). In this case, the parents have two options. The first option is to keep the 9-year-old on the application and remove the 13-year-old. The 9-year-old becomes a citizen automatically at age 15 when the parent naturalizes. The 13-year-old will be brought in 3 years, and will become eligible to naturalize at age 21. The second option is to keep the 13-year-old on the application and remove the 9-year-old. The 9-year-old will be brought in 3 years, and becomes a citizen automatically at age 15 (exactly as under the first option). The 13-year-old becomes eligible to naturalize at 18. At first blush,

the second option appears superior. However, there may be child-specific circumstances that would make life especially difficult for one of the children were they to be in the care of relatives abroad or illegally in the United States. Regardless, under both options new inequalities spring up in the sibship. For 3 years, one will have a green card, the other not. One will derive citizenship automatically, the other must go through the naturalization process. For at least 3 years, one will be a citizen, the other not.

There may be still further inequalities in store for the sibship. Suppose that the parents have a third child. This new child is born in the United States, eligible to become President of the country, surrounded by English from birth. This child—part of the fabled second generation—may have many more advantages than the two older siblings.

Finally, there are many inequalities across the visa categories by which foreign-born attain legal permanent residence, as well as differences by processing venue. New LPRs differ in the intensity of their self-selection; they differ in English fluency, schooling, previous illegal experience, and other characteristics and behavior; and they differ in the experience of the process by which they attained LPR, some waiting for many years, some having their documents lost in government offices and suffering emotional hardships. To illustrate, recent research on a probability sample of new green card recipients in 2003 (the New Immigrant Survey cohort of 2003) indicates that immigrants who adjust to LPR in the United States have higher rates of lost documents than immigrants processed overseas; spouses of U.S. citizens have the shortest processing times (1.1–3.6 years, on average) and siblings of U.S. citizens have the longest processing times (10.4–14.8 years, on average); spouses of foreign-born U.S. citizens have longer processing times than spouses of native-born U.S. citizens (Jasso 2011). Similarly, rates of English fluency range from lows of 16.3 and 10.6% among male and female spouses of LPRs to 78.6 and 80.7% among male and female employment principals. Years of schooling completed range from a low

¹⁵ See Desravines (2013) for a personal account of some of these processes.

of 6.93 years among mothers of adult U.S. citizens to 15.7 among male employment principals.

Immigration and Social Status

Above we noted that the foreign-born person who qualifies for a visa is called the principal; in many visa categories, visas are available not only for the principal but also for the principal's spouse and minor children (for example, in the numerically limited family and employment categories and in the lottery category). There appears to be a "visa mystique" such that being the principal is regarded as conferring a certain prestige. There is anecdotal evidence that green card holders like to think—and like for others to think—that they are the principals. Data from the New Immigrant Survey cohort of 2003 confirm a predilection for nonprincipals to say they are principals (Jasso 2011). That research also found that men are more likely than women to say they are principals, whether or not they are.

Immigration and Inequality by Race or Color

There are signs that immigration may be working to eradicate racial inequality and color inequality in the United States. This section examines two of those signs, first, the flow of accomplished blacks from Africa made possible by the Diversity Visa Program, and, second, the apparent propensity of native-born Americans to marry foreigners who are darker than themselves.

Immigration, Lottery Visas, and Racial Inequality

The history of the lottery visas has an interesting link to race. In the 1970s, as it was becoming clear that the family reunification provisions of the 1965 Immigration Act engendered increased flows of relatives of previous immigrants, a new concern arose in policymaking circles. For

persons in countries without a foothold in the immigration stream, there would be little possibility of immigrating to the United States. For example, documents of the U.S. Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, whose final report was issued in 1981, convey a sense of urgency about opening a new channel for "independent" immigration, and the oral tradition suggests that at least part of the concern involved the small numbers of black immigrants from Africa (Jasso 2011). A number of procedures for selecting immigrants in the envisioned open immigration channel were discussed, including an ill-fated point system. Eventually, the Immigration Act of 1990 established the Diversity Visa Program, making available new visas for blacks and others from Africa as well as others underrepresented in recent immigration. Note that there was no scarcity of black immigrants from the Caribbean; the dearth was of black immigrants from Africa.

Assessing the race-ethnic composition of cohorts of new legal immigrants—and the success of the diversity lottery program—was not possible before the New Immigrant Survey, because the United States stopped collecting the race of visa applicants in 1961. The New Immigrant Survey includes information on both race and visa category, and thus (1) enables, for the first time since 1961, description of the race-ethnic composition of an immigrant cohort and (2) enables assessment of the race effects of the lottery visa program.¹⁶

An overall increase in the black immigrant flow would be due not only to the lottery visas but also to family reunification involving blacks from the Caribbean. The combination of these two mechanisms increased the proportion black

¹⁶ The United States has a historic commitment of over half a century to eradicate discrimination on racial grounds. It is over 50 years since President John F. Kennedy issued the groundbreaking Executive Order 10925 prohibiting discrimination on the basis of "race, creed, color, or national origin" (6 March 1961) and soon thereafter signed the Equal Pay Act (10 June 1963), extending to gender the protection against discrimination. The new spirit quickly reached the field of immigration, and Congress passed Public Law 87–301 (enacted 26 September 1961), which eliminated the requirement that visa applicants provide their race.

among new immigrants from 3.04% in 1961 to 11.2% in the New Immigrant Survey cohort of 2003 (Jasso 2011, p. 1317).

As expected, the Diversity Visa Program opened the door to black immigrants from Africa. While almost 40% of the new black immigrants from Africa in the 2003 cohort have lottery visas, less than one-half of one percent of the new black immigrants from the Caribbean do so. Conversely, while over a third of the Caribbean-born black immigrants have family-based numerically limited visas, only 4% of the Africa-born do so. Overall, 32.1% of diversity visa principals are blacks, and almost all are from Africa—31.9%.

The New Immigrant Survey data on the 2003 cohort indicate that the Africa-born black immigrants are substantially more accomplished than the Caribbean-born. There are two reasons why this is not unexpected. The first is that the diversity subset of the Africa-born are likely to be pioneer immigrants—the first in their “line” to immigrate to the United States—while relatives are by definition not pioneer immigrants, and pioneer immigrants are expected to have a more intense drive and desire to migrate. Second, the Africa-born come from much farther away than the Caribbean-born, and distance is known to affect self-selection—the greater the distance, the greater the drive and desire to migrate.

Not surprisingly, then, among black immigrants in the New Immigrant Survey cohort of 2003 (Jasso 2011, pp. 1319–1322), those born in Africa are substantially more accomplished than those born in the Caribbean—average schooling completed almost 2 years higher; greater English fluency (76 versus 65%), though fewer spoke English only in childhood (5 versus 47%); and fewer with a history of living illegally in the United States (16 versus 41%). Similarly, black immigrants from Africa appear to be more attached to the United States, with 78% saying they intend to remain versus 71% among the Caribbean-born.

The general outlines of the story are becoming clear: (1) the Diversity Visa Program has

been making it possible for blacks from Africa to acquire legal permanent residence in the United States; and (2) Africa-born black immigrants are highly accomplished. Thus, one can speculate that when a certain critical mass is reached—with black immigrants from Africa bolstering the already substantial achievements of American blacks and blacks from the Caribbean, the inherited stereotypes linking race and accomplishment will crumble. In terms of basic theory, this would be a watershed moment. When the Subgroup Identities of blacks and whites become equal—viz., when the underlying valued goods yield equal averages for the PSO—the theoretical social distance between the subgroups will be zero. There would no longer be a disadvantaged subgroup and an advantaged subgroup or, equivalently, a bottom subgroup and a top subgroup.

Further, the New Immigrant Survey also assessed skin color among immigrants who were interviewed in person or seen by an interviewer.¹⁷ In the 2003 cohort of new immigrants, the darkest are among the most accomplished. If these trends continue, then the infusion of accomplished blacks will help shatter the foundation for a stratification system based on skin color (Jasso 2011, p. 1322).

Skin Color in Marriages Between Native-Born Americans and Foreign-Born Spouses

Approximately a third of all new adult legal immigrants acquire legal permanent residence as the

¹⁷ The New Immigrant Survey measured respondent skin color using a scale designed by Douglas S. Massey and Jennifer A. Martin, based on an idea originally developed by Massey et al. (2003). The scale is an 11-point scale, ranging from zero to 10, with zero representing albinism (the total absence of color) and 10 representing the darkest possible skin. The ten shades of skin color corresponding to the points 1–10 on the NIS Skin Color Scale are depicted in a chart, with each point represented by a hand, of identical form, but differing in color. The NIS Skin Color Scale is for use by interviewers, who “memorize” the scale, so that respondents never see the chart. [A copy of the Scale appears in the appendix.]

spouse of a U.S. citizen (one of the “immediate relative” categories introduced above). Currently, about half the U.S. citizen sponsors of spouses are native-born. The proportion native-born among the sponsors appears to have decreased, from 80% in 1985 to 59% in 1996 to 47% in 2003 (Jasso and Rosenzweig 2006, p. 354; Jasso 2011, p. 1323).

It is natural to ask whether and how these marriages affect the American diversity climate. To address this question, we examine skin color differences among the spouses. Within all human groups or populations, men are slightly darker than women (van den Berghe and Frost 1986; Jablonski 2004; Jablonski and Chaplin 2000). Accordingly, if like marries like, the men should be slightly darker. The findings, however, indicate that native-born American men marry women darker than themselves and native-born American women marry men substantially darker than themselves (Jasso 2011). Thus, there is an unambiguous nativity effect. Among U.S. citizens who marry foreign-born, it is native-born U.S. citizens who are reaching out to marry darker. Interestingly, the propensity for native-born American women to marry darker is highest among women born in 1965—the height of the civil rights movement in the United States.

The finding that native-born American women marry darker is robust to a variety of checks. It is noteworthy that the current American President’s native-born white mother was in the vanguard, marrying a black from Africa.

Parents, Children, and Inequality

The third central question in the study of immigration focuses on children and how they fare as the migration process unfolds. In general, there are four distinct sets of children of migration, obtained by crossclassifying the children’s country of birth and country of residence: (1) foreign-born children residing in the destination country; (2) native-born children residing in the destination

country; (3) foreign-born children residing in the origin country; and (4) native-born children residing in the origin country (Jasso 2011). Within each set, there are two subsets, those living with their parents and those living apart from their parents in divided families. For children living in the United States, an important indicator is their fluency in English. In this section we examine two aspects of the children’s English fluency among foreign-born and native-born children living in the United States with their parents—whether patterns of attaining English fluency are similar for parents and children and the effects of nativity and parental illegal experience.

The broad outlines of adult English acquisition have been known for a long time (e.g., Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990), and the New Immigrant Survey provides additional detail (Jasso 2011). Men are more likely to be fluent than women; employment-based immigrants are more likely to be fluent than (consanguineal) family or humanitarian immigrants; immigrants from countries where English is a common language (such as India or the Philippines) are more likely to be fluent; immigrants with no previous illegal experience are more likely to be fluent.

How about the children? The New Immigrant Survey interviewed up to two children age 8–12 residing with an adult immigrant (Jasso 2011, pp. 1328–1332). Here we focus on biological children of the main sampled immigrants. The measure of English fluency was a behavioral measure with two properties: (1) the child chose to be interviewed in English; and (2) the child completed the entire interview exclusively in English. The first result is that the percent fluent in English is substantially higher among the children than among their parents—68 versus 26%. For the children’s top three parental birth countries, the differentials are dramatic: Mexico, 67.2 versus 6.55%; El Salvador, 70.1 versus 10.1%; Guatemala, 71.7 versus 11.3%.

Multiple-regression results indicate that children do not reproduce the adult patterns of English fluency. The children display no gender

effect, no parental visa effect, and no effect of the English environment in the parental origin country. There appears to be a strong leveling across generation; children are more similar to each other than the adults are to one another.

The children do, however, display two important effects. First, there is a positive nativity effect. Children born in the United States are more likely to be fluent in English than children brought before the age of four. Second, children whose parent(s) had previous illegal experience are more likely to be fluent in English. We may speculate about the mechanisms underlying the second effect. One possibility is that children have seen the hardships endured by their parents and are compensating. Another possibility is that children of illegals have had practice translating and interpreting for their parents (Valdés 2003). Under either mechanism, the children appear on track to do better than their parents and better than expected.

Concluding Note

Immigration and inequality are inextricably intertwined. This chapter showed that though immigration and inequality are not usually considered “social psychological” in nature, they are indeed

deeply social psychological, and thus the principles and tools of social psychology can profitably be used to increase knowledge about them. Accordingly, this chapter explored the social psychology of immigration and inequality, adopting the strategy of following both the basic theory approach and the inductive approach. Though much territory remains uncharted, we have seen the two approaches touch, increasing confidence that someday, with the growth of knowledge, they will converge. Basic theory yields a wealth of testable predictions for the relations between natives and immigrants and between different types of immigrants, including predictions for emigration, social distance, discrimination, segregation, profiling, and assimilation. Inductive exploration yields a wealth of testable propositions, including propositions about types of migrants, the effects of U.S. immigration law on sibship inequality, and the black immigrants and native U.S. citizens who may help eradicate racial and color inequality. Both approaches increase knowledge, not least by pointing to theoretical and empirical lacunae as well as data deficiencies. Each approach nurtures and spurs the other—basic theory by challenging empiricalists to test the theoretical predictions, inductive exploration by challenging theorists to incorporate new terms (such as rights) and to derive new predictions.

Appendix. Scale of Skin Color Darkness

Scale of Skin Color Darkness



1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

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Lynn Falletta and Dale Dannefer

Introduction

Like virtually all other age-correlated phenomena, the relation of inequality and age can be considered from at least three analytically distinct perspectives—(a) cross-sectional characterizations of *differences* between age strata at a given point in time, (b) longitudinal depictions of age-related *changes* as individuals and cohorts move through the life course, and (c) as a component of culture—encompassing pervasively shared assumptions about age which are the basis of popular understanding, the institutionalization of age in policy and practice, and scientific views of aging, and other age-related artifacts of culture. Such accounts comprise a regulatory feature of social life, and they also have an ideological significance. Although each of these analytical perspectives is characterized by its own logic and

by distinct intellectual problems, they are inter-related, and they are often confounded. Thus, a first task will be to clarify the scope of each of them, before turning to the specific question of the relation of age and inequality.

Evident even to casual observers are the cross-sectional differences *between* age groups or strata that are observable at any given point in time. The age structure of society can be depicted as a chart such as Fig. 24.1, which shows the population of the United States by five-year age strata for men and women at four different historical periods. Examining intra-age differences in the population is the most straightforward and immediately accessible way of characterizing age differences in any age-related phenomenon, including aspects of inequality. Such “age-difference” analyses require measures only at a single point in time, and then a comparison of age strata with one another. For example, Fig. 24.1 presents the gender composition of age strata in the USA at four different points in time. From Fig. 24.1 it can be seen that women increasingly outnumber men with advancing age, and that this pattern became more pronounced over the twentieth century. As we will see, such comparisons are of obvious relevance for thinking about policies related to resource distribution and inequality, and they have multiple theoretical intersections with social-psychological processes.

The assumption that trajectories of individual aging can be inferred from age differences observed in a population at a single point in time has been a longstanding tendency in scientific as

The authors wish to thank Jielu Lin and Danielle Bernat for research assistance in preparation of this chapter

L. Falletta (✉)
Mandel School of Applied Social Sciences,
Begun Center for Violence Prevention Research
and Education, Case Western Reserve University,
11402 Bellflower Road, Cleveland,
OH 44106-7167, USA
e-mail: lmg14@case.edu

D. Dannefer
Department of Sociology, Case Western
Reserve University, 10900 Euclid Ave.,
Cleveland, OH 44106-7124, USA

Fig. 24.1 Age Structure of the United States 2010 (Numbers in Millions). (MacArthur Foundation Research Network on an Aging Society 2009)



well as popular thought. It likely influenced some of the first discussions of differences in status over the life course, such as Rowntree's (1901) classic depiction of the flow of resources (and indeed the inequality of resources) over each individual's life course:

The life of a labourer is marked by five alternating periods of want and comparative plenty. During early childhood... he will probably be in poverty... there then follows a period during which he is earning money and living under his parents' roof... This period of prosperity may continue after marriage until he has two or three children when poverty will overtake him. This period of poverty will last perhaps for ten years until the first child is fourteen years old and begins to earn wages... the man enjoys another period of prosperity only to sink back again into poverty when his children have married and left him, and he himself is too old to work (Rowntree 1901, quoted in Glennerster et al. 2004, p. 24).

The inclination to generalize about aging from what can be observed from age differences at a single point in time is a pervasive temptation. However, it is now well understood that cross-sectional comparisons cannot provide a reliable picture of the actual trajectory of individual lives—of the developmental or other age-related *changes* that individuals and cohorts undergo as they move through the life course.

Beginning in the 1960s, social and behavioral scientists studying age began to demonstrate that when individuals are followed over time, many aspects of the way that they develop or change as they move through the life course may look quite different from cross-sectional age differences. This general insight was central to the launching of several major theoretical approaches within the space of a few years—the life-span perspective in psychology (e.g., Baltes 1968, 1979), and in sociology, cohort analysis and the age stratification perspective (e.g., Riley 1973; Riley et al. 1972; Ryder 1965) as well as the life course perspective (Cain 1964; Elder 1974, 1975). This set of intellectual developments redefined age as not merely a matter of time-based individual development and change, but as referencing a range of phenomena that are socially constituted (Baars 1991; Dannefer 1984).

From the beginning, much of the empirical work in these traditions has dealt with psychological characteristics. For example, it was shown that the negative relation between age and cognitive performance widely reported in cross-sectional studies of adults was reduced and in some cases reversed, when the performance of the same individuals was tracked over time (Schaie 1965; see also Alwin and Hofer 2008; Alwin and




Fig. 24.2 Aging and Social Change: A Schematic View. (Source: Adapted from Riley and Riley 1989)

McCammon 1999; Schaie 2005; Schaie and Willis 2002). Elder's work on the life course (1974, 1998) demonstrated that mental, social and physical age-related outcomes in later life could look quite different based on the socially and historically situated character of early experience. Other scholars showed that developmental and life-course patterns in characteristics such as attitudes also could look quite different when tracing the change over time rather than focusing on age differences that appear in cross-sectional comparisons (Baltes 1968; Alwin et al. 1992).

Such findings made clear that to interpret cross-sectional data as representing actual patterns of change over the life course is to risk a *life-course fallacy* (Riley 1973; Riley et al. 1972). Thus, when any given characteristic (including inequality) is considered from a *life-course* perspective, we recognize that each discrete birth cohort has come to the point of observation on its own "developmental trajectory" with its own experiential history, as illustrated in Fig. 24.2. Slicing through the layers of temporally unique cohort development at a single point in time yields a static, cross-sectional picture of age-strata differences, such as the one presented in Fig. 24.1. It is a static "freeze-frame" depiction of multiple cohorts of individuals born at different times who at any given point in time are of different ages, and who have also experienced different childhoods and lived through different slices of history and social circumstances and change—experiences that uniquely shape each cohort's experience, and that also affect individuals' and cohorts' processes of aging.

Thus, a founding principle of the sociology and social psychology of age is that understanding any phenomenon in relation to aging requires knowledge not only of the cross-sectional *age differences* visible at any given point in time, but also of the *biographical experiences of actual individuals* as they age and move through the life course.

We will begin with a discussion of inequality between age strata, before turning to the dynamic dimension of *life-course changes* in inequality and its social-psychological aspects, in Sects. II and III respectively. Finally, in Sect. IV we consider the relevance of the cultural and ideological significance of age to the social psychology of inequality. Some recent work in the sociology of age and the life course has pointed to the utility of both popular and scientific narratives of aging in *naturalizing* many age-related processes, such as the social organization of opportunities both between and within age groups (Dannefer 1999; Dannefer and Kelley-Moore 2009). A pervasive, long-term trend in advanced industrial societies has been the institutionalization of the life course into "three boxes" of education, work, and retirement. This image of the life course has become pervasive as part of a popular understanding of aging, and has both stimulated and been reinforced by social policies in areas ranging from education and child-care to retirement and elder care. Such societal trends have been popularized and universalized by stage theories of adulthood and the life course (e.g., Gutmann 1987; Levinson 1994), encouraging a view that age-related sequencing is both natural and inevitable (Dannefer 1999), and that aging is a normative rather than a heterogeneous and inequality-generating process within each cohort. The tripartite life course results in unequal learning, employment, and leisure opportunities both across age strata and within each cohort as it moves through its collective life course.

Social-Psychological Aspects of Inequality Between Age Strata

Age differences concern the inequality that exists between age strata at any given point in time. Like race, class, or gender, age "locates"




Fig. 24.3 Inequality in Income per Adult Equivalents by Age Group: Current Population Surveys, 1964 and 1987. (Source: Adapted from Table 9 in Easterlin et al. 1993)

individuals within the social structure. Obviously, the distribution of resources across age categories or strata is a significant aspect of social reality at any given point in time. Numerous relevant indicators of a society's social and economic well-being are predicated on the distribution of resources across age strata, often with significant policy implications. For example, the old-age dependency ratio (the ratio of the number of people aged 65 and older to the number of people of working age 15 to 64) is based on the relative population size of different age strata at a given point in time. Projections of old-age dependency made on this basis are a primary fulcrum of debates concerning age-graded benefits in the public policy arena, concerning, e.g., the tweaking of contribution and benefit formulas to ensure Social Security's continued solvency, or the impact of corporate pension fund bankruptcies.

Beyond the question of inequality *between* age strata, it is also important to consider the question of the relative degree of inequality to be found *within* an age stratum, relative to other strata. Such comparisons quickly show that intra-age inequality varies by age. For example, Fig. 24.3 presents an analysis of age-specific income inequality for two observation periods, indicating the persistent tendency for inequality to be higher among older people (adapted from Easterlin et al. 1993). While sound historical trend data on old age or other age-specific inequality are scarce, it is clear that many social developments exogenous to the regime of life-course mobility and stratification have an impact on long-term trends of

age-based inequality. For example, twentieth century advances in technological developments and in economic productivity allowed for expanded pension systems in both the public and private sectors in the USA and elsewhere. The reductions in late-life inequality from 1964 to 1987 visible in Fig. 24.3 can be interpreted to reflect these developments, yet it is also clear that they have not eliminated the relatively high inequality of the older age strata. Although such public and private policies have contributed to reductions in poverty in old age (Pampel 1981; Vincent 1995; United States Bureau of the Census 2012), both inequality and poverty remain relatively high in later life.

Of course, characterizations based on an overall average inevitably mask significant variation in income trajectories. Overall, improvements in the circumstances of older people belie not only male-female differences but also ethnic differences that extend over the life course. Older women are twice as likely to live in poverty as older men (Choudhury and Leonesio 1997), and women's risk of old-age poverty is now increasing (O'Rand et al. 2010). The risk for poverty is highest among older, minority women who live alone. For example, more than two out of every five older Hispanic women who live alone live in poverty. (Administration on Aging 2011).

Although much of the work on inequality and poverty has focused on the economic domain, some of the most enduring forms of inter-age inequality are in the domain of social capital. Ageism that leads to discrimination and exclusion from social networks and employment opportunities results in disproportionate allocation of social capital between cohorts. One important way this is manifested is in perceptions and attitudes, which inform appraisals of one's own and others' status. Perceptions and attitudes have been shown to embody age-related prejudice and often highly subtle forms of ageism. For example, research using "implicit" measures (e.g., word associations involving typically "young" and "old" names) as well as direct measures of attitudes toward older adults consistently indicate a preference for youth over age (Nosek et al. 2002). The general finding of negative perceptions and attitudes toward older people has

been widely replicated. A meta-analysis of attitudes towards older and younger adults found negative attitudes toward older compared to younger adults across multiple domains, including age-related stereotypes (e.g., older people are hard of hearing), attractiveness and competence (Kite et al. 2005). Those who hold such stereotypical views include professionals who work with older adults, including physicians (Reyes-Ortiz 1997), psychologists (Gatz and Pearson 1988), and therapists (Garfinkel 1975) who may see their older patients as untreatable and depressing. In this way, ageism that manifests in negative perceptions of older adults may result in them receiving less care for a range of physical and mental health problems (NAMI 2009; Ory et al. 2003). Negative stereotypes may also result in age-differentiated treatment plans that disadvantage older persons and reinforce or accelerate tendencies to age-related decline.

Such negative attitudes are reflected in a wide array of social practices, which may range from hiring discrimination to the nuances of everyday conversation. Stereotypes of the aged in the media, for example, as having problems with new technology may result in a belief among hiring managers that older people aren't able to perform in today's economy, leading to age discrimination in the workforce (Sergeant 2011). Experimental studies using matched pairs of younger and older job seekers with fictitious backgrounds have suggested the presence of age discrimination in hiring for jobs in multiple fields, including sales and management (Bendick et al. 1999), wait staff, and "jobs for new graduates" (Riach and Rich 2006, 2007). Using a measure of "net discrimination" (Riach and Rich 2002), age discrimination was experienced by 29 % of English and 58% of French workers who worked as wait staff, 31 % who worked in sales and management positions, and 60 % by "recent graduates." Even employed older workers face age discrimination in the workplace; based on the Displaced Workers Survey conducted by the United States Bureau of the Census, the proportion of older workers who experience job displacement is greater than for the youngest workers (Schmitt 2004).

One can readily hypothesize that such discrimination has both economic and psychosocial consequences. An extensive literature suggests that job loss has adverse effects on physical health (Gallo et al. 2000; Price et al. 2002), mental health, including, e.g., increased levels of depression (e.g., Burgard et al. 2007; Gallo et al. 2006; Kessler et al. 1989), personal control, and role and emotional functioning (Price et al. 2002; DiTomaso and Parks-Yancy this volume). Job displacement among older workers may be economically damaging, especially for those workers who need to work, because they will have less time to make up the income lost due to the disruption and because they may have a harder time finding another job due to age discrimination. Clearly, ageism that results in an inability to secure employment and increased likelihood of job loss compared to younger workers has implications for the equitable distribution of social capital across age strata.

Negative perceptions of the old by the young can also result in changes in communication style by younger people that in turn influence how an older person communicates (Hollander and Abelson this volume). A study of videotaped interactions between pairs of older and younger adults uncovered a tendency among younger people to overaccommodate in their interactions with older adults. Presumably assuming that older people have impaired hearing and cognitive functioning, the younger people spoke slowly, in a loud voice, and used oversimplified sentences (Coupland et al. 1991 in Giles et al. 1994). Patronizing interactions even led participants who were overaccommodated to appear and act "older" compared to controls, which the authors termed "instant aging" (Giles et al. 1994, p. 142). As these authors note, such interactions also reflect power relations in which the younger participant undermines the dignity of the older participant. Such interactions, to the extent that they result in older adults adopting the characteristics perceived by younger adults or in diminishing their sense of power and control, can create further distance between cohorts in the ability and willingness to participate in everyday interactions.

Unlike other familiar sources of bias such as those based in skin color or gender, age is a source of bias and status inequality for which popular concern with political correctness is virtually nonexistent, as a sampling of late-night television comedy will quickly reveal. The pervasiveness of negative views of aging and the resultant stigmatization of older people may contribute to the depressive symptoms and low morale that are often present in older people. For example, older adults with comorbid physical illness or limited functioning are at particularly high risk for depression, and Americans 65 and older are disproportionately likely to die of suicide (NIMH 2007). Results have been mixed in terms of the relationship between age and depression. A Norwegian study (Stordal et al. 2003) found a linear rise in depression with age, while a Canadian study found the opposite (Wade and Cairney 1997). In an analysis of two cross sectional surveys completed in the United States, Mirowsky and Ross (1992) found a u-shaped relationship between age and depression, with adults ages 80 and older having the highest levels of depression and adults at middle age having the lowest levels. Given the pervasive societal focus on being active and productive, it is not surprising that depression is also related to physical health problems and perceived loss of personal control. Some of the positive correlation with age is likely attributable to a cohort effect, and specifically to the lower levels of education among older cohorts (Mirowsky and Ross 1992). Yet depression in older adults often goes untreated because it is assumed to be a normal part of aging (NAMI 2009).

The cultural tendency to equate youth and beauty presents a problem for older adults that may create or exacerbate these mental health difficulties. For example, fashion magazines continue almost exclusively to portray younger models, with older women being nearly invisible (Lewis et al. 2011). Older women's body image is important to self-esteem (Baker and Gringart 2009), yet when they look at these magazines and other portrayals of beauty they see only young faces and bodies.

The age structure of inequality at a given point in time is an important dimension of society, and

it informs both popular and scientific understandings of aging and social policy discussions. Since everyone—laypersons, policymakers and social scientists alike—has lifelong impressionistic “knowledge” of age differences, the plausibility of culturally pervasive “folk theories” of aging as an inevitable process of diminishment (“falling apart”, “time to be put out to pasture”) to explain age differences often seems compelling, even when such differences may be partially or entirely accounted for by, e.g., cohort differences in educational levels, early life experience or ageism. Thus, as a static description of the circumstances of multiple cohorts at a single point in time, cross-sectional age differences can explain nothing about actual processes of aging and cohort flow that produce such observed age differences.

Efforts at providing systematic and empirically grounded explanations for observed cross-sectional patterns of age-related inequalities are provided both by the *life-course approach*, which examines individual patterns over time, and by the analysis of *age as a component of culture*, which encompasses the social construction of the meaning of age as it is inscribed both in institutional regimes and in cultural narratives, both popular and scientific. These two perspectives are the subjects of the next two sections respectively.

Social-Psychological Aspects of Inequality Over the Life Course

The life-course perspective provides a second, analytically distinct perspective from which to examine age-related inequalities. These include both *individual* and *collective* life-course patterns and processes. The analysis of collective life-course patterns is especially relevant to problems of inequality, since inequality as a concept implies a population or collective unit of analysis. Yet a consideration of social-psychological aspects of inequalities within individuals' lives, as each individual moves through the life course, also warrants consideration, and we first consider this topic.




Fig. 24.4 Changes in Incomes over the Life Cycle. (Source: Rigg and Sefton 2006)

Inequalities Experienced Biographically

From a life-course perspective, a first topic concerns differences in status and resources that are encountered by each individual as he/she moves through the life course. Unlike other ascribed characteristics such as sex and ethnicity, an individual's age regularly and inexorably changes. Such changes are associated with changes in economic and social status, and thus reflect inequalities within an individual life course.

Rowntree's (1901; Breusch and Mitchell 2003) concept of the *economic life course*, described above, represented a pioneering effort to characterize economic change and inequality as a life course process of fluctuating economic fortunes. A recent empirical analysis (Rigg and Sefton 2006) similarly depicts a trajectory of relative income over the life course. As can be seen in Fig. 24.4, one's place in the income hierarchy is seen as changing with age, and as increasing until some point in midlife when it plateaus, then beginning a marked downward course in one's 50s. Despite some similarities, the picture offered by Rigg and Sefton contains some notable differences from Rowntree's speculation, likely reflecting changes in the age structure of

resources. Poverty in later life has been reduced by the allocation of societal resources to public and private pension systems that have created the institutionalization of retirement (Pampel 1981; Kohli 1986, 2007), and the continued development of modern economies across the twentieth century has likely mitigated some of the midlife fluctuations Rowntree proposed. Notwithstanding such differences, these two depictions of the "economic life course" share in common the point that systematic and predetermined fluctuations in resource acquisition occur over the life course, and that they broadly follow a biographical pattern of growth in early adulthood, followed by some possibly fluctuating prosperity in midlife and then by decline in later life.

Such economic changes—both improvements in the early life course and the decrements occurring later—are interlinked with changes in social status based on age itself, often reinforced by age-graded social policies, (e.g., mandatory retirement) and also by normative and other expectations that send messages to older people that they should retire or otherwise disengage. Thus, older adults who retire may experience a loss of power and control as well as income as they exit the workforce (Ross and Drentea 1998). This




Fig. 24.5 Cycle of Induced Incompetence. (Source: Bengtson 1973)

transition has the potential to become a broad axis of social exclusion, as it defines a clearly demarcated role change with major status implications in terms of power, social capital and resources. Synergistically reinforcing such age-related changes are the broadly shared perceptions of age and ageism—topics to which we return below.

Major life-course transitions such as retirement or widowhood bring changes not only in role and status, but also in social and material resources, and in many cases, in identity. Thus, these transitions have multiple social-psychological concomitants, including stigmatization and negative self-appraisal. One social-psychological model of how this may often operate with advancing age is offered by Vern Bengtson's now-classic *Cycle of Induced Incompetence* (Fig. 24.5). Bengtson (1973) describes a process of typifying and labeling others that becomes internalized by individuals via the "Social Breakdown Syndrome." Older adults have often experienced role loss due to the social organization of old age. At the same time, reference groups and norms about what value their activities hold become vague or absent, leaving them susceptible to labeling as useless because they are no longer

considered productive in a society that bases individual worth on output.

Several distinct processes are evident in Bengtson's social breakdown syndrome, including labeling, stigmatization and internalization. Labeling theory, rooted in symbolic interactionism, is concerned with how an individual or group is defined as conforming or deviating from societal norms. Stigmatization occurs when individuals possess certain characteristics that discredit them (Goffman 1963; Link et al. this volume). Internalization occurs when an individual accepts labels and expectations assigned by others, and begins to act accordingly, similar to the idea of the self-fulfilling prophecy (Merton 1968). Once they retire, older adults no longer conform to the social norm dictating productivity in the labor market. Being defined as "useless" or "out to pasture" constitutes a discrediting of status which, if internalized, can become part of one's identity, be damaging to well-being, and result in further withdrawal from social interaction and activity.

In sum, aging through the life course can be characterized as a process of encountering multiple changes and inequalities in one's own role

and status. Such status changes often have implications for identity (Callero this volume). When such changes are associated with becoming established in society through, e.g., career advancement or becoming a parent, the identity implications may barely be noticed. When role changes bring a loss of status, as is often the case later in the life course, they frequently become a source of identity issues, and they also set in motion micro-interactional dynamics that pose further threats and challenges to identity. While significant heterogeneity exists in adjustment to retirement (Wang 2007; Pinquart and Schindler 2007), adjustment and identity issues are particularly important to individuals with high work-role salience, and to those who are forced to retire earlier than expected or due to poor health; these patterns differ between men and women (Quick and Moen 1998). A diverse range of individual and interactional factors influence both the decision to retire and adjustment afterwards, leaving room for substantial divergence in well-being outcomes post-retirement.

Aging as Increasing Intracohort Inequality: Cumulative Dis/Advantage Over the Life Course

Thus far, the discussion of the relation of age and inequality has tended to focus on the individual as the unit of analysis. A major recent emphasis of life course research has complemented this traditional emphasis by focusing on the *intersection* of age and inequality *within* each cohort, as its members move through the life course. This approach takes the cohort as the unit of analysis, and examines patterns of intracohort stratification and inequality over the life course. Examining the distribution of resources within cohorts calls into question the widespread and implicit assumption that it is safe to treat individuals of the same age or cohort membership as a homogeneous and undifferentiated subpopulation.

From this *intracohort* perspective, inequality is conceptualized as itself a *property of the cohort*, and as a characteristic that changes systematically over each cohort's collective life course. Since inequality is by definition a population or

collective characteristic, this focus entails a shift from looking at the distribution of resources *between* age groups to differences in the age-specific distribution of resources *within* a cohort, as it moves through its collective life course.

Interest in such analysis has been spurred by the discovery of the tendency for inequality to increase among cohort members (i.e., among age peers) over the collective life course of the cohort. This tendency is considered to represent a life course process of *cumulative dis/advantage*. Cumulative dis/advantage has been defined as "...the systemic tendency for interindividual divergence in a given characteristic (e.g., money, health or status) with the passage of time" (Dannefer 2003, p. 327). Although processes of cumulative dis/advantage can be observed for many characteristics, it has been most widely documented for income inequality. For example, Fig. 24.6 displays trajectories of family income inequality across seven cohorts, demonstrating its increase across the life course for each cohort (Dannefer and Sell 1988). The only exception occurs for the 1923–1932 cohort, during the decade 1957–1967, when they were in their 30–40s—arguably reflecting the impact of the GI Bill. A demonstration of the same tendency using longitudinal data is presented in Fig. 24.7, based on data from the National Longitudinal Study of Older Men (Crystal and Waehrer 1996). In this study, Crystal and Waehrer report a pattern of increasing income inequality with age, and they demonstrate that essentially the same pattern is found if one looks only at sample members who are still surviving at the end of the data collection period, or if one includes all members of the sample. Thus, their analysis addresses the issue of selective mortality which is generally believed to cause an underreporting of the actual tendencies toward increasing inequality, since mortality disproportionately removes those at the low end of the socioeconomic distribution, reflecting the socioeconomic gradient in health (Link and Phelan 1995; Marmot 2004).

Others have demonstrated the implications of such increases in resource inequality for the divergence in physical and mental health over the life course. For example, Ross and Wu (1996) showed that as cohorts move through the life course, educational subgroups diverge linearly

Fig. 24.6 Theil's Measure of Inequality for Families by Age of Head in Seven Birth Cohorts (Observation Periods 1947, 1957, 1967, 1977). (Source: Dannefer and Sell 1988 (adapted from Treas, n.d.))





Fig. 24.7 Gini Coefficient by Age and Cohorts Among Survivors. (Source: Adapted from Crystal and Waeherer 1996)

with respect to the frequency of depressive symptoms, with those having most education least at risk for depressive symptoms. O’Rand and Hamil-Luker (2005) found that illness and disadvantage experienced in childhood increase the risk of heart attack in later life compared to those who do not experience such adversities. Childhood experiences placed children on differential trajectories for later life health problems. Shuey and Wilson (2008) discovered a disparity in health for Blacks and Whites that increases with age, and for both Blacks and Whites cumulative dis/advantage processes produced divergent health trajectories by income and wealth. Such patterns appear generally robust, yet they are also often nuanced and complex. For example, education does not have the same positive effect on health for Blacks as it does for Whites.

The resilient tendency for social processes in everyday life to amplify inequality among cohort members as they age appears to be a quite general feature of social life, and it has been the basis for a proliferating literature on cumulative dis/advantage within the sociology of age and the life course in the USA (Crystal 2003; Dannefer 1987, 2003; O’Rand 1996; Pallas and Jennings 2009); and internationally (Burton-Jeangros and Widmer 2009; Daatland 2003).

Social Structural Explanations for Intracohort Inequality

Processes of intracohort stratification and exclusion may be especially evident in late modern societies, which rely upon chronological age as a normative and legal basis of social organization. Many roles are age-graded, which means that age is a legal or normative eligibility criterion for access to roles and resources. As a result, access to desirable age-graded roles (such as lucrative jobs or admission to elite universities or even to “fast tracks” in elementary school or earlier) is often highly competitive. The intra-age role allocation process thereby guarantees age-based stratification and exclusion within each cohort. As cohort members move through the life course, the effects of such stratification at a given point in time tend to be amplified.

The life-course amplification of such stratifying processes can be seen at multiple levels of social analysis—within people-processing organizations such as schools (Lucas and Goode 2001; Rosenbaum 1978; Schneider et al. this volume), work organizations (e.g., Hermanowicz 2009; Kanter 1993; Rosenbaum 1984) and even nursing homes (Dannefer et al. 2008; Shura et al. 2011), at the overall population level (e.g., Crystal and Waehrer 1996; Dannefer 2003; Dannefer and Sell 1988), and in cross-national comparisons (e.g., Daatland 2003; Hoffman 2009).

Micro-Interactional Explanations for Intracohort Inequality

Yet, as we have suggested in multiple prior contexts (Dannefer and Falletta 2007; Dannefer and Siders 2013), the most fundamental level at which such processes operate in social life is the micro-level of face-to-face interaction. Such basic processes of inequality production have their origins in basic processes of typification—making distinctions among other individuals with whom one interacts, whether on the basis of social familiarity, on some readily visible attribute such as sex, skin color, or approximate age, or on religion or other culturally anchored characteristics. Whatever its basis, the resultant distinctions often become the basis of social inclusion/exclusion (Wilkins et al. this volume).

In an age-graded society, processes of inclusion/exclusion often operate within age strata. Whether one is included or excluded typically entails differential access to resources and power, and thus it comprises a quite basic social-psychological tendency toward the production of inequality.

This appears to be a basic tendency of social interaction that is generally operative in virtually all social situations. It clearly operates in the domains of schooling and work, where the allocation of individuals within existing opportunity structures relies in part on the dynamics of micro-interaction. The role of subtle, everyday interaction in reproducing familiar channels of social stratification may have long-term, life-course consequences. For example, the labels attached to kindergarten children may be passed

along as part of teachers' knowledge through the years of elementary schooling and beyond (e.g., Holstein and Gubrium 2000; Rubie-Davies 2009). Despite formal systems that overtly rely on universalistic and meritocratic standards, impressions derived from informal interaction can be decisive, and operate in many kinds of social settings.

The mechanisms of evaluation and social allocation that are integral to the educational systems of virtually all late modern societies form an obvious example of inclusion/exclusion. At every level of education, elite programs and schools reject a large share of applicants and create a sense of inclusion and entitlement among "we precious few" who are included, and who by their "in-group" status are launched onto an educational and social trajectory whose advantages become amplified with the passage of time. Similar structural processes operate in a wide variety of social contexts, including professional schools, and military and corporate career mobility regimes. Allocation to privileged positions typically reflects something other than the pure merit of individual candidates, because the number of qualified candidates exceeds by a wide margin the number of available positions. Yet a consequence of such macro-dynamics is to organize the dynamics of micro-interaction in a way that will create a sense of belonging or exclusion, and which typically becomes more established and habituated with the passage of time. The stratification thereby created among age peers thus becomes part of taken-for-granted "knowledge" of everyday life, and becomes amplified over time, as the rewards of the unequal opportunities offered by the distribution of placements open to age peers tend to increase in their divergence with the passage of time, a tendency that is reflected in Figs. 24.6 and 24.7. Here we see the macro-level patterning of cumulative dis/advantage, which also has multiple experiential dimensions.

The cumulative dis/advantage of latent perceptions of ascribed factors such as gender and race also figure into the organization of opportunities with life-course consequences. For example, the tendency for men to occupy the

highest echelons of management in corporate settings provides an illustration of how a pattern of in-group favoritism results in gender inequality in the workforce. Kanter (1993) describes a system in which men have inhabited top positions historically and tend to trust and therefore hire and promote others who are like them—other men—to perform in high stakes positions. Because of such *homosocial reproduction* (Kanter 1993, p. 48), women find it very difficult to break into the circles necessary to gain these positions, regardless of their skills and experience. Such everyday processes have a special connection to age. Since the passage of time also entails aging, this means that differences amplified over time may lead to increases in inequality among age peers over time. In the workplace, barriers faced by women, including homosocial reproduction, result in income inequality within the workplace at a given point in time, and over time they lead, in part, to the disparate pensions men and women can expect in retirement (GAO 2012). Again, such cases demonstrate how processes of perception and discrimination in microinteraction channel phenomenon of cumulative dis/advantage along existing lines of discrimination.

Social Mechanisms to Counteract Tendencies Toward Intracohort Inequality

Evidence of the generality and power of tendencies toward increasing inequality is evident in the fact that many societies have inbuilt mechanisms for redistribution of resources to mitigate the age-amplified effects of cumulative dis/advantage. Such mechanisms are a central policy element of all modern welfare states, and have ameliorated the amplification of such tendencies with age (Hoffman 2009; Pampel 1981). Many societies also have developed special programs to ameliorate the adverse effects of the standard opportunity structure on young people from disadvantaged backgrounds. In the USA, such programs include Head Start to assist low-income children ages birth to 5 years with school readiness (United States Department of Health and Human Services 2013), recent initiatives to start college accounts for kindergarteners (Johnston 2012), and the Upward Bound program which

prepares low income high school students for college (United States Department of Education 2012).

Processes designed to mitigate or compensate for the effects of cumulative dis/advantage can also be seen in small and indigenous societies. For example, the potlatch—involving a redistribution of the resources accumulated by the wealthiest citizens—has been a longstanding feature of many First Nations peoples of the American and Canadian Northwest (Ruby and Brown 1988). While redistributive, such practices often have a strong normative and status component. For example, in small-scale societies where all members share some degree of acquaintanceship, the affluent members on the giving end of the potlatch receive social capital for the appearance of generosity, and would lose status were they not to participate in this redistributive ritual.

Despite such ameliorative efforts, the underlying social processes that generate inequality continue to operate, with powerful effect. The *socioeconomic gradient*, referenced above, describes the general effects of such economic status and inequality on health (Adler et al. 1994; Bassuk et al. 2002; Marmot 2004; McLeod et al. this volume).

Underlying the general description of tendencies toward cumulative dis/advantage is a range of subtle, social-psychological processes. The relevance of age to such processes increases as societies have become more structurally age-graded, and as a result, “age-conscious” (Chudacoff 1989). To return to the corporate settings, we are probably at the beginning of thinking about the nuanced effects of age.

As an example of one provocative line of research, consider Lawrence’s (1987) study of workers’ perception of their own age as compared with that of their co-workers at the same rank. She demonstrated that workers erroneously perceived their rank peers as younger and thus, by inference, that they themselves were “behind schedule” with respect to career mobility.

Such self-blaming comparisons may have their origin in context—in the “normality of mobility” that characterizes corporate cultures (Kanter 1993). At the same time, basic psychological

processes may also have a role in the creation of unequal outcomes. Psychological mechanisms, including responsivity and adaptivity, resilience, compensation, engagement, avoiding inappropriate or damaging comparisons with others, feelings of helplessness/hopelessness, and critical consciousness and action are applicable to subjective well-being (Prilleltensky 2012). Prilleltensky argues that these different psychosocial mechanisms mediate well-being dependent upon the level of distributive and procedural justice and fairness present across personal, interpersonal, organizational, and communal levels of analysis. Depending on the level or condition of justice, different psychosocial mechanisms mediate well-being. For example, under optimal conditions of justice, avoiding comparisons to others leads to thriving, while under persistent conditions of injustice, upward comparison, or comparison to others with relatively more resources leads to suffering. In such situations, the linkage between personal resources (e.g., sense of control) and health outcomes may be especially robust (e.g., Marmot 2004).

The Life Course as Ideology: The Naturalization of Age and Social Legitimation

The third meaning of the life course is of a quite different order. It focuses not on age-related individual outcomes, but rather on the cultural significance of age as a social construct. It examines, e.g., the location of beliefs about age in the larger cultural narrative, their regulatory function as a central aspect of social systems, and their ideological significance (Hunt this volume). It is now well understood that “age consciousness” is not a universal feature of human experience, but has emerged as a principle of social organization in the last two centuries (Chudacoff 1989). This pervasive trend has been driven by factors such as the expansion of mass education (and with it, the age-grading of schooling), governmental record-keeping made more urgent by population growth and increased mobility, and other aspects of population management sought by nation-states

(Achenbaum 1979). In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, age grading in mass public education had become institutionalized in most modern nation-states (Chudacoff 1989; Kett 1977). Germany pioneered a national retirement policy before the turn of the twentieth century. Other nations followed, including the USA with the passage of the Social Security Act in 1935. Across societies, such changes provided the foundation of the institutionalization of the life course (Kohli 1986, 2007) and the historical development of the “three boxes of life” (schooling, work and retirement). It also facilitated the development of more finely calibrated gradations of age segregation as a general societal attribute (Hagestad and Uhlenberg 2006; Riley et al. 1994).

These tendencies can be recognized in “stages” of life that are now uncritically taken for granted. In the nineteenth-century USA, the advent of mass education as well as other cultural developments (such as changes in the traditional roles of women and clergy [see, e.g., Cott 1977]) created new intellectual challenges related to understanding childhood and youth, leading to the novel establishment of *adolescence* as a suddenly discovered, yet supposedly “natural”, stage of human development (Hall 1904; Kett 1977). A few decades later, after the establishment of the Social Security program and the institutionalization of retirement, the same was done for later life. In 1961, Cumming and Henry proposed that *disengagement* from social roles and relationships constituted a natural and inevitable stage of “old age,” a theory that has been controversial and criticized on multiple dimensions. Hochschild (1975) criticized the theory on logical and methodological grounds as being unfalsifiable, as suffering from the “omnibus variable problem” in which the key variables—age and disengagement—encompass multiple unique phenomena, and as failing to capture the aging individual’s own perceptions of aging and readiness to disengage. Other critiques focused on the presumption that decline among aging individuals was inevitable, providing evidence that older adults continue to grow and develop, and can be as productive, or more so, than younger people (Lynott and Lynott 1996). Yet disengagement theory has

been highly influential, and continues to find new forms of incarnation (see, e.g., Carstensen 2006; Guttman 1987). And a few decades later, when issues of midlife job security, career development and mental health captured the popular imagination, a flurry of theories of adult development were suddenly developed, often with explicit and emphatic assertions about the universality within the human species of the life stages based on samples of a few dozen midlife adults who were interviewed in the 1970s (Levinson 1978; see also Cain 1979; Dannefer 1984). The academic versions of such theories were accompanied by trade books, some of which rapidly became best-sellers (e.g., Gould 1978; Levinson 1978; Sheehy 1976), indicating the breadth of societal interest in what presumed human development experts were saying about adulthood.

In each of these cases—childhood/adolescence, old age/retirement, and midlife—psychologists, educators and others announced universal age-related stages of life that captured the popular imagination while offering reductionist, individual-level accounts of socially produced contradictions and anxieties for persons of various ages. In each case, these accounts were based on slender strands of evidence and also upon an implicit reliance on an organismic model of development, which would serve to justify the assumption that the universal features of aging over the life course could be derived from studies of locally available contemporary individuals, and which had the effect of rendering invisible the role of social context in producing the observed anxieties and contradictions.

As we have earlier noted, a sociological analysis of such cultural narratives suggests that they all can be seen as serving an ideological function in support of existing social arrangements, which include unequal access to social as well as material resources for those of different ages. Age itself comprises a social resource sustained as such in part by such ideological pronouncements of its value and based on a socially imposed evaluation. The age-specific life circumstances and roles typically described in dominant cultural narratives are those called for by the institutional matrix of the modern state

and of rational-bureaucratic institutions, from kindergarten through end-of-life care. By declaring that these arrangements reflect human nature, social institutions are thus *naturalized* in human consciousness. Thus, the discontents of institutionalized life stage development become obscured. “Adolescent crises” and “Midlife angst” reduce to “private troubles” the “public issues” of the rigidly defined “normality” assumptions characterizing social institutions. For example, such normality assumptions may typify the regimentation of age-graded educational institutions, the contradictions of hierarchical corporate structures that normalize upward mobility and then create pyramidal roadblocks to it (see Dannefer et al. 2008; Hermanowicz 2009; Kanter 1993; Lawrence 1987) and the personal “adjustment” issues attending normative or mandatory retirement (as is the case in many European societies). Concepts like “adjustment” and “adaptation” inherently imply that social structures are fixed and immutable and, perhaps because of that, are also legitimate. From this perspective, it is in the individual’s interest to find a way within him/herself to conform to it. In this way, declarations of “normal stage development” have the potential to obscure the social sources of a range of personal discontents as individuals move through the life course.

Thus, psychological and developmental theories of age-related change provide a *naturalized* view of the life course that legitimates existing arrangements. Because this naturalized view places heavy emphasis on individual aging, it also deflects attention from intra-age inequality. Moreover, if intra-age inequality is noticed, there is a tendency to attribute the accumulation of advantage or disadvantage to differences in individual talent or effort. Thus, John Clausen (1993) argued that divergence in life-course trajectories and stratification in life course outcome of the sample from Berkeley studies he followed into their sixth decade was due to personality differences. He regarded *planful competence* as a stable personality characteristic that would set one on a promising life path, with little attention either to its antecedents in class-differentiated family or educational experiences, or in how this

characteristic interacted with social structures over the intervening decades of living.

By returning the explanatory focus to the individual level, naturalization also helps obscure questions of inequality of every form: Age-based inequalities that are justified in part by ideas such as disengagement theory, and the tendency toward increasing inequality among age peers, cumulative dis/advantage, is justified by personality or perhaps other individual-level differences.

Naturalization fosters a “TINA” (There is No Alternative) mindset (Schwalbe 2008) which, when internalized by individuals, can be a mechanism that supports the reproduction of inequality. When TINA is combined with the “blame the victim” tendencies of an overly individualistic “success-and-failure” narrative of public discourse, the results can ensure the invisibility of often-destructive social arrangements and practices that may help account for the observed problems at the individual level, while amplifying the adverse effects on mental as well as physical health.

Concluding Comment: Looking Ahead

Age-related inequality can be considered 1) by comparing age strata at a given point in time, 2) by examining trajectories of inequality over the life course, and 3) by analyzing the significance of age as a cultural and ideological construction. We first considered inter-age inequality as a contemporaneous social phenomenon by examining differences in age strata at a given point in time. Although inequality and poverty of older people has been mitigated with the advent of public and private pension and health insurance systems, inequality among older people is still relatively high, and especially among older women, poverty remains high. It seems clear that age-related stereotypes and discrimination persist, and may contribute both to the persistence of poverty and inequality in old age, and to the tendencies toward depression and other issues of mental health and quality of life facing older people, apart from physical challenges they face.

Second, from a life-course perspective, inequality has both individual and collective manifestations. At the individual level, inequality of resources is something individuals tend to encounter within their own biographical experience as they move through the life course, owing in part to the age-structuring of economic opportunities and resources.

At the collective level, inequality tends to increase within each successive cohort as it moves through its collective life course. Sociologists have argued that this phenomenon results in substantial part from sociogenic processes of cumulative dis/advantage. Both inequality between age strata and the amplification of inequality over the life course of each successive cohort have social-psychological dimensions that are produced and sustained through processes operating at the microinteractional level. We have suggested that however macro-level one's analysis, the genesis of the processes that lead to macro-level inequalities occur in everyday life experience. Despite the foundational significance of micro-interactional processes for the production of these outcomes, little systematic attention and little research effort has been devoted to the social psychology of the several aspects of the age-inequality relation that we have identified and discussed in this paper. The social-psychological aspects of age inequality are thus a promising area for further development of research, whether it concerns the analysis of how ageism is internalized and sustained in everyday-life interactions, or the micro-interactional origins of cumulative dis/advantage in, e.g., institutionally-imposed stratification of same-age employees or of students in the same class, as they are differentially labeled, subtly but often powerfully as primed for failure or success.

Third, we reviewed the significance of age as a cultural construct. Through social practices such as age discrimination, stigmatization and other forms of ageism, age is a characteristic that is pervasively understood as laden with evaluative meaning. At the same time, in domains of social policy and social science as well as popular culture, the tendency to focus on the explanatory power of individual attributes such as age has led to a deflection of attention away from the ways

in which age is socially constituted, and from the processes of socioeconomic stratification which interact to justify age-based inequalities and to produce increasing inequality among age peers—in mental as well as physical health and in life-style and quality of life—as they move through the life course.

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Douglas Schrock, J. Edward Sumerau and Koji Ueno

Over the past 65 years, understandings of sexuality have gone through a kind of revolutionary change. Interrogating sexual variation is no longer confined to a clinical paradigm of psychopathologies. Sexualities are now generally understood as socially constructed, historically contingent, and embedded in a hierarchy reinforced by political, organizational, interactional, and cultural processes. Sociological social psychology has played a demonstrable—although often forgotten—role in this transformation.

Reflecting a trend in the social sciences more generally, there has been an explosion of sociological studies of sexuality over the past few decades. For example, of the 3,818 journal articles that came up in our search of LGBT keywords (including homosexual and homosexuality) in the sociology area of the database *Web of Knowledge*, a majority have been published in the last decade, 83% have been published since 1990, and more were published in 2011 alone than at any time before 1980. Although most contemporary research implicitly draws on our concepts and approaches, it rarely engages sociological so-

cial psychology in substantive ways. Although an optimist might view this as a triumph reflecting the assimilation of our ideas (see e.g., Fine 1993), we view it as limiting both sexuality scholarship and social psychology.

This fragmentation can be seen in textbooks and academic journals, which arguably perpetuate the problem. Because our standard undergraduate textbooks and handbooks of social psychology too often neglect the topic, budding sexuality scholars may search for what they perceive as more welcoming subfields. Marginalizing sexuality in such texts may also be linked to its relative scarcity in our flagship journal, *Social Psychology Quarterly*. Such underrepresentation may very well reflect authors choosing to submit their papers elsewhere more than it does editorial policy. Contemporary scholars now have a growing number of journals specializing in sex research to submit their work, and these journals typically emphasize empirical contributions more than theory (Weis 1998). In addition, most sexuality articles in mainstream sociological outlets appear in journals such as *Gender & Society*, *Social Problems*, *Sociological Perspectives*, and *Sociological Quarterly* (ASA Committee on the Status of GLBT Persons in Sociology 2009), which generally do not hold authors accountable for their knowledge of or contribution to sociological social psychology.

We believe that making room for sexuality in our work will enable us to more justifiably embrace the label sociological social psychologists. Although sexual behavior generally happens be-

We thank the editors for their helpful comments and Brian Knop for editorial suggestions and bibliographic work.

D. Schrock (✉) · K. Ueno
Department of Sociology, Florida State University, 511
Bellamy Building, Tallahassee, FL 32306-2270, USA
e-mail: dschrock@fsu.edu

J. E. Sumerau
Department of Sociology, University of Tampa, 401
Kennedy Blvd, Box Q, Tampa, FL 33606, USA

hind closed doors, sexual identities are personally salient and thus shape our choices, interactions, and life course. Furthermore, like gender, race, class, and age, sexual identities are socially salient; they shape how we are treated in both subtle and overt ways. Such treatment, in turn, shapes our subjective experience and social opportunities. It may be true that one can more easily conceal membership as a sexual minority than statuses based on socially defined bodily insignia such as skin color. However, although strategic concealment—if successful—may offer some protection, it can entail unintended personal, emotional, and social costs. Social psychological explorations into sexual inequalities must thus be sensitive to how sexuality is similar to, different than, and intertwined with other forms of oppression. Coming to terms with sexuality in our research—whether based on survey, experimental, or ethnographic methods—has the potential to enrich sociological social psychology.

Because most sexuality scholarship uses but does not generally incorporate or attempt to spell out implications for social psychology, we will not restrict our review to the explicitly social psychological. Instead, we will attempt to link key themes in existing sexuality research with the social psychology of inequality. Here we have chosen to focus on the experiences of and attitudes towards sexual minorities within and in relation to different social contexts, including family, school, work, religion, public life, and health care. We focus on the aforementioned contexts with the hope that deepening social psychologists' understanding of the diversity of sexuality research will spark some questions that are more grounded in and focused on building our own analytic traditions.

We direct attention to studies that most clearly speak to social psychological approaches to inequality. From interactionist traditions, we understand that ethnographers can unpack how meaning, emotion, and interactional processes reproduce and challenge inequality (e.g., Anderson and Snow 2001; Fields et al. 2006; Schwalbe et al. 2000). We also bring with us an understanding of the social structure and personality perspective, which has examined how one's position in

hierarchies such as race, class, and gender shape subjectivity (Hughes and Demo 1989; Rosenberg and Pearlin 1976; Schwalbe and Staples 1991). Sociological social psychology's group processes tradition, based on formal theorizing and experimental methods, has provided insight into the causes and consequences of interactional inequalities (Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin 1999)—although this tradition is least represented in sexuality research (but see Johnson 1995; Webster et al. 1998). Furthermore, following other social psychologists (see, e.g., Howard and Renfrow in this handbook; Wilkins 2012), we bring sensitivity to how sexual inequalities are entwined with systems of race, class, gender, and age.

Because we focus on inequalities based on sexual identities rather than sexuality per se, we adopt the notion of heteronormativity as an organizing frame through which to view the research we review. Coined in 1991 by Warner, heteronormativity generally refers to a discourse or ideology that defines heterosexuality and traditional gendered presentations as culturally ideal and normal. Heteronormativity thus symbolically marginalizes all other sexual variations as well as non-traditional doings of gender. The links between sexism and heteronormativity have deep historical roots going back to the medical construction of the category 'homosexuality,' which in the U.S. involved defining gender deviance as evidence of "sexual inversion" (Greenberg 1988). It is a "loose coupling," however, as reproducing or challenging one does not necessarily equate with doing the same to the other.¹

¹ On the one hand, homophobia can be "a weapon of sexism" (Pharr 1988); people often use anti-LGBT slurs, for example, to target those who deviate from patriarchal norms. Sexism, in turn, can be a weapon against the sexually marginalized as is the case with patriarchal definitions of manhood and womanhood as exclusively heterosexual. On the other hand, reproducing or challenging women's oppression (e.g., heterosexual men engaging in domestic violence or the women's movement working against it) does not necessarily reproduce or challenge the oppression of sexual minorities. Similarly, reproducing or challenging inequality between sexual minorities and others (e.g., working for or against LGBT marriage rights) does not necessarily reproduce or challenge male dominance in the same way.

Although postmodernists initially dominated discussions of heteronormativity, sociologists are increasingly bringing the concept into their empirical research. Contemporary sociological research has shown, for example, that heteronormativity can be examined as part of interactional processes, socialization, organizations, and so on (see, e.g., Kitzinger 2005; Martin 2009; McQueeney 2009). Social psychologists who understand that sexuality constitutes a system of inequality similarly have many opportunities to further develop empirically-grounded knowledge of heteronormativity. As should be clear from our review, heteronormativity influences our lives from birth to death by shaping our private thoughts and feelings as well our relationships and the organizations we inhabit. Social psychologists can employ our well established and developing approaches to provide unique insights into how heteronormativity operates and is reproduced, which can contribute to more general sociological and public discourse. Such research would also provide opportunities to move social psychology forward, as was the case with classic scholarship, which developed many insights that became central in the conceptualization of heteronormativity.

Social Psychology in Classic Sexuality Research

Before discussing contemporary research that examines specific institutional and interactional contexts of sexual inequality, we review how early sexuality research addressed social psychology and how subsequent developments marginalized it. We first discuss research in the interactionist tradition that taught us how sexual identities are socially constructed, stigmatized, and sometimes disconnected from sexual behavior. We then address how classic research reflecting the social structure and personality tradition countered dominant perceptions of sexual minorities as mentally ill. Next we examine early experimental work that sparked interest in understanding attitudes toward gays and lesbians. We then show how feminist and postmodernist

perspectives as well as AIDS research became less engaged with social psychology. Although these early scholars did not address heteronormativity per se, in hindsight their research provides insight into its processes. We end by discussing the development of the concept of heteronormativity and how it is becoming a mainstream if not dominant frame among sociologists interrogating sexual inequalities.

Building on Kinsey (1948, 1953), who taught us that sexual behavior, desires, and identities could be distinct, early sociological research focused on the process of non-heterosexual identity construction in the heteronormative society. Sociologists Leznoff and Westley (1956) examined how members of homosexual groups in Chicago socially validated their sexual selves and mitigated psychological distress derived from living as criminalized people. Goffman (1963) wrote that sexual minorities often strategically manage a discrediting stigma imposed on them by others (see Link et al., this volume). Garfinkel's (1967) study of the transsexual Agnes emphasized the taken-for-granted production of gender identity, which hinges on the power of social accountability and the cultural prescription of the gender binary (i. e., the assumption that humans are, from birth, naturally and socially always either male or female). Using interactionist understandings of identity, Humphreys (1970) examined the rituals and social organization of men's restroom sexual encounters, showed how many of the men were married to women, and declared that the only "harmful effects [stemmed from] police activity." Working within and developing interactionist approaches, these and other early works (see, e.g., McCaghy and Skipper 1969; Plummer 1975; Reiss 1961; Weinberg and Williams 1975) suggested that sexual and gender identity and behaviors were more fluid than previously thought. This work also suggests that heteronormativity operates via interactional, cultural, and state regulatory processes.

Resonating more with social structure and personality traditions, other research employed questionnaires and survey methods to, for example, test formal propositions surrounding sexual identities, attitudes, mental health, and behaviors.

An important precursor was the psychologist Hooker's (1957) study in which she gave the results of a sample of unidentified gay and straight men's personality tests to clinical evaluators (including two who created the tests) and found that clinicians could not tell the groups of men apart, subverting justifications of homosexuality as mental illness. Additional research employed questionnaires and found, for example, that gay men did not necessarily possess more psychological problems than a comparison group of straight men (Weinberg and Williams 1974).² Although contemporary research with more sophisticated sampling procedures offers some contradictory findings (as we detail below), this classic work established survey methods for studying sexuality and mental health. More broadly, it demonstrated how social psychology can counter heteronormativity embedded in dominant cultural, organizational, legal, and psychiatric discourses that frame LGBT people as inherently pathological and in need of psychiatric regulation, incarceration and prosecution, and organizationally-mandated invisibility.

After a coalition of activists and members of the American Psychiatric Association applied enough pressure to have homosexuality redefined as not in-and-of-itself a mental illness (Kutchins and Kirk 1997), some social psychologists strategically turned their attention to those who, in some circles, might be called pathologically heteronormative. Early research on college students found that the most prejudiced were also more sexually conservative with regard to heterosexual practices, held more stereotypical gender beliefs, and suffered more guilt over their own sexual feelings (Dunbar et al. 1973). Echoing contemporary findings concerning heterosexual people's attitudes regarding homosexual behavior (see, e.g. Herek et al. 2005), some early studies also found that heterosexual men were more likely to hold anti-homosexual views than

women (Glassner and Owen 1976) and that those who were more politically conservative and religious and had less educated parents were often more heterosexual, racist, and sexist (Henley and Pincus 1978). Early experimental research found that interacting with a self-presented-as-gay confederate lessened latter-secured measures of sexual prejudice (Pagtolunan and Clair 1986). This early work was primarily initiated by psychological social psychologists, and they have developed it into an impressive industry of study that rarely enters contemporary sociologists' social psychological discourse. Classic as well as contemporary work on attitudes shows who supports heteronormativity and how they might change, complementing the LGBT movement's focus on reframing prejudiced others as more problematic than the targeted.

Gagnon and Simon's 1973 book *Sexual Conduct*, which pulls together the preceding decade of their collaborative work, was arguably the most significant blow to biological and Freudian approaches to sexuality, and they used and developed sociological social psychology in the process. Trained at Chicago, they combined symbolic interactionism's emphasis on language, meaning, and the reflexive self with Kenneth Burke's dramaturgy to develop the concepts of sexual scripts: discursive repertoires that defined the who, what, where, and how of sexuality. Instead of seeing sexual "drives" as biologically-based and needing to be socially controlled, they argued that all sexual interactions, feelings, and identities were experienced and filtered through socially constructed scripts people are socialized to adopt. They focused on the "interpersonal scripts," which people use to navigate sexual interactions, and "intrapsychic scripts," which people use in their internal dialogs. Later they developed the notion of "cultural scenarios," or culturally dominant sexual scripts, to better account for intersubjectivity (Simon and Gagnon 1986). Writing about sexual minorities, they derided sexologists' focus on etiology or the alleged causes of homosexuality, arguing that it was the "least rewarding of all questions" (Gagnon and Simon 1973, p. 132). By eviscerating essentialism, Gagnon and Simon helped negate

² Other early survey research that resonated broadly with a social structure and personality approach include Williams and Weinberg's (1971) analysis of gay men discharged from the military and Akers et al.' (1974) analysis of prisoners and same-sex sexual behavior.

a key meme of heteronormativity—the myth that LGBT people are biologically abnormal.

Although sociological interest in sexual scripts has increased in recent years—more articles have addressed the topic since 2007 than in all previous years—Gagnon and Simon and social psychology more generally were largely neglected in sexual scholarship as it dramatically expanded in the 1980s and 1990s. Their constructionist stance did not resonate with some in the gay liberation movement who, no longer defined as mentally ill, believed that a version of essentialism (e.g., “we were born this way”) might discursively protect them from increasingly organized and vehement evangelicals who painted homosexuality as a sinful lifestyle choice that should be altered with holy, or therapeutic, intervention. In addition, many influential feminist theorists beginning to address sexuality preferred psychoanalytic approaches, took issue with Gagnon and Simon’s antiquated gender language, and viewed them—as well as symbolic interactionism more generally—as unable to address social structure and power (Jackson and Scott 2010). For example, McIntosh (1968), who thought Gagnon and Simon went too far with their constructionism, nonetheless argued homosexuality was not a “condition,” but a role that was historically constructed, culturally variable, and embedded in a system of social control. Rich (1980) termed that system “compulsory heterosexuality,” which she argued not only othered non-heterosexuals and channeled people toward heterosexuality, but also facilitated women’s dependence on men and thus male dominance. Thus while moving further away from sociological social psychology per se, second wave feminists developed an approach that resonates with Warner’s notion of heteronormativity.

The early 1980’s saw the emergence of a practical, deadly, and immediate crisis in the form of AIDS. Outside of academia, this brought many lesbians and feminists who had previously distanced themselves from gay men to work with them in creating support networks and an egalitarian and militant activist community (Gould 2009). Inside academia, the crisis and resulting federal funding for AIDS research led many re-

searchers without a background in or a desire to contribute to critical theories of sexuality to turn their attention to the issue, which fostered an industry of relatively atheoretical empirical research (Irvine 2003). This research industry’s focus on strict empiricism also led to a distancing from social psychology.

At the same time as AIDS research blossomed, many sexuality scholars moved even further from away from social psychology after the publication of Foucault’s (1978) *History of Sexuality*, which analyzed institutional discourses of sexuality as constituting power. As Seidman (2009) points out, Foucault’s basic approach was adopted and altered by feminist theorists who viewed Rich’s structural approach as not leaving room for agency, resistance, and sexual variations that do not center on the gender of preferred sexual partners. Rubin (1984) notably argued that sexuality was not just what people did with their bodies but it constituted a kind of status hierarchy system in which a “charmed circle” of sexual acts are deemed appropriate and all others are subordinated. Others, including Butler (1989) who argued that sex and gender were “performances” that could be subverted through, for example, drag and transsexuality, were particularly influential in developing what is now called queer theory.

Although postmodernism made important strides in developing our understanding of sexuality as a system of inequality, it generally misappropriated or ignored key social psychological understandings, which arguably helped them abandon the empirical world (see Schwalbe 1993). By detaching discourse from and privileging it over humans who—we assume—not only signify, but also have selves, emotions, bodies, and agency that play a role in actual interactional encounters that unfold under real material circumstances and have social and personal consequences, believers in Blumer’s (1969) “obdurate reality” are, essentially, cast as possessing false consciousness. From this perspective, there is little need for social psychology as it is merely another discourse falsely claiming a foothold on the “truth.”

On the other hand, queer theorists importantly brought us the concept of heteronormativity, which is key to the approach we take here. As mentioned earlier, heteronormativity refers to an assumption that heterosexuality and traditional gendered performances and identification as culturally ideal and normal—all others are subordinated (Warner 1991). A focus on power and inequality are thus central to this conception, and it leaves room for understanding both agency and variations in heteronormativity across time and social contexts. In many ways, we see the roots of this formulation in early sexuality research and theorizing grounded in sociological social psychology, which also emphasized agency, stigma, power, language, and, more generally, social constructionism (see Hollander and Abelson; Link et al.; Thye and Kalkoff; Wilkins et al., this volume).

However, as postmodernism came to dominate theoretically engaged sexuality scholarship, sociological social psychology became neglected (but see Plummer 1995 for a notable exception). The dangers here, which are evident in much sexualities research, include: (1) inconsistently using key social psychological concepts in ways that convolute analyses (such as implying ‘identity’ is the self-concept, an interactional construction, and a social representation as if these are all the same thing); and (2) reinventing or neglecting social psychological concepts that could help make sense of the phenomena under investigation (such as “discovering” that when sexual minorities imagine others judging them it shapes their feelings [see Cooley 1902, the “looking glass self”]); and (3) missing leads embedded in social psychological research that could move sexuality scholarship in new directions (such as how the salience of sexual identity may shape a plethora of attitudes, emotions, and behaviors). More generally, as Plummer (2010) suggests when discussing symbolic interactionism, social psychology may be able to provide a unifying language to the relatively fragmented contemporary study of sexuality.

As a “sensitizing concept” (Blumer 1969) that places sexual inequalities at its center and allows for an examination of subjectivity, interaction,

culture, and organizations and institutions, we believe that incorporating an understanding of heteronormativity into sociological social psychology is a particularly promising path. Sociologists of gender and sexuality, most notably, have increasingly published empirical research—in mainstream general and specialty journals—about, for example, heteronormativity in families (Martin 2009, Solebello and Elliott 2011), schools (Myers and Raymond 2010; Ripley et al. 2012), culture (Martin and Kazyak 2009), religious organizations (McQueeney 2009; Sumerau 2012), health and aging (Rosenfeld 2009), and everyday life (Kitzinger 2005; Nielsen et al. 2000). Such work importantly shows that heteronormativity need not be confined to postmodern theorizing; it can be used and developed by sociologists grounded in the empirical world.

With a few notable exceptions, including Berkowitz’s (2011) development of a symbolic interactionist approach to heteronormativity, researchers bringing heteronormativity into contemporary sociological discourse have tended to neglect explicitly engaging with the traditions of sociological social psychology. We, however, believe that bringing sociological social psychology to bear on this phenomenon may allow social psychologists to once again play a key role in sexuality scholarship. In our following overview of contemporary research on family, education, work, religion, public life, and health, we will highlight sociological social psychological lessons about heteronormativity. We hope that doing so will encourage others to further develop our understandings of sexual inequalities and social psychology.

Family

“The family” is a battleground in the larger culture, as it is in the lives of many sexual minorities (see Lively et al., this volume). In this section, we first examine research that reveals how definitions of and attitudes toward LGBT families have changed over time and are linked to other axes of inequality. We then explore how heterosexism is reproduced in heterosexually-headed families,

how this shapes LGBT people's experiences, and how some families try to become more accepting when a member comes out of the closet. Finally, we review research on how LGBT people create their own families, experience familial conflict, and become parents and raise children. In doing so, we focus attention on what this research reveals about how heteronormativity is reproduced and challenged.

Social psychological research demonstrates how heteronormative attitudes reflect historically fluid "social representations" (see Moscovici 1984) of "the family." Powell et al. (2010), for example, found that randomly sampled respondents' definitions of what "counted" as family had a significant impact on their attitudes toward extending legal rights and protections to sexual minorities. People who held inclusionist definitions centered on the quality of relationships and those who defined the family as the presence of children were significantly more likely than those who restrict family definitions to religiously and state-sanctioned matrimony to support sex-same couples possessing rights to adopt, marry, and pass on partner benefits. They also found that in just a 3-year span, from 2003 to 2006, the percentage of the sample holding inclusionist views rose from 25 to 32%, and the percentage of the sample holding exclusionist definitions of the family fell from 45 to 38%. Consistently, 2006 and 2008 GSS data also shows increased support for gay and lesbian marriage rights and benefits.

Additional research has unearthed how heteronormative attitudes toward same-sex marriage are linked to other aspects of inequality, including race, gender, age, class, and politics. Brumbaugh et al. (2008) found that men, non-whites, and older people are less likely to approve of legalizing same-sex marriage than women, whites, and younger people, and that parents who had never lived with partners outside marriage or cohabitation were strongly oppositional. McVeigh and Diaz (2009) found that people from communities that emphasized traditional familial structures and patriarchal gender ideologies and had higher levels of residential instability and high crime rates were more likely to vote to ban same-sex marriage. Further, Heath (2009) found that as

pressure for marriage equality intensified, many politicians responded by implementing heteronormative legislation (e.g., the Defense of Marriage Act) and some hosted government-sanctioned marriage workshops intended to foster heteronormative family life. Overall, attitudinal survey research has helped sociological social psychologists better understand how widely heteronormative attitudes are shared, how they are linked to our definitions of social institutions and intersections of race, class, and gender, and how they can change over time.

Research has also taught us how heteronormativity is reproduced in and transmitted to children in family contexts. (see Kroska, this volume) Examining sexual meanings parents convey during leisure activities, for example, Martin (2009) found that mothers often convey heteronormative assumptions when talking to their children and presuppose their children's heterosexuality. Further, Kane (2006) showed that parents, especially heterosexual fathers, police gender non-conformity in their boys (but less so for girls), such as wearing pink or playing with dolls, because of the fear of them becoming gay. Similarly, McGuffey (2008) found that fathers of boys sexually abused by adult men worked to shut down their sons' emotional expression due to fears of developing homosexuality. Solebello and Elliot (2011) revealed that fathers actively attempt to channel sons' alleged sexual drives toward heterosexuality, but are less vehement about controlling daughters, who are believed to have more passive sexual natures. In addition to these informal lessons from parents, when children engage in leisure activities, such as watching TV or videos marketed to them, they learn that heterosexual love is ideal and magical and that male characters express sexual desire in part by sexually objectifying females (Martin and Kazyak 2009). Similar, though not identical, findings are seen in analyses of children's books (see, e.g., McCabe et al. 2011). Overall, such research shows how heteronormativity in familial contexts is often intertwined with sexism. Whether through parent-child interactions or media consumption, family socialization involves the privileging and con-

ditioning of traditionally gendered heterosexual selves.

Considering the aforementioned research, it should not be surprising that LGBT children and adults, often have difficulties with their families of origin. For example, family members sometimes verbally abuse children whose non-heterosexual orientation is known, and closeted children often live constant fear of discovery and judgment (D'Augelli et al. 2005). Sexual minorities also face resistance when coming out to family members, experience implicit and explicit threats, and are forced to continually re-articulate and justify their sexual identity (Adams 2011). Further, African-American lesbian girls (Miller 2011), lesbian women with children (Almack 2007, 2008), bisexual women and men (McLean 2007), and lesbian women and gay men planning commitment ceremonies (Smart 2007) similarly experience tension and emotional turmoil over making strategic choices surrounding the presentation of their sexual selves. Echoing Plummer's (2010) work, these studies reveal the importance of critically examining how heteronormativity impacts LGBT people's familial dilemmas, identities, and emotions.

Another line of research helps us understand how heteronormativity persists even when parents of sexual minorities attempt to become more accepting when their children come out. In her ethnographic study of one such group, for example, Fields (2001) found that parents attending support groups worked to redefine their gay and lesbian children as well as their identities as parents as morally worthy. While partially subverting the privileging of heterosexuality, Fields points out that their identity work—or the process whereby these people, individually and collectively, gave meaning to themselves and others (Schwalbe and Mason-Schrock 1996)—involved constructing their children as better than other, presumably more deviant, sexual minorities. For example, they claimed their sons were traditionally masculine and daughters traditionally feminine. These actions inadvertently reproduced heteronormative distinctions. In a similar fashion, Broad et al. (2004) revealed how similar parent

support groups managed stigma by reproducing heteronormative conceptualizations of “real” family values (see also Broad 2002). These studies show the continued value of ethnographic approaches, which reveal that even when identity construction appears to subvert familial heteronormativity, parents may use and thus reproduce this ideology in attempts to construct moral selves and mitigate shame.

Research on sexual minorities shows how they may resist heteronormativity by creating their own romantically-based families, which can counter the dominant assumption that families are exclusively heterosexual. Survey research has documented an increasing trend whereby LGBT couples are forming committed, long-term romantic relationships (Biblarz and Savci 2010; Powell et al. 2010). Utilizing GSS data from 1988 to 2002, for example, Butler (2005) found that cultural and structural changes in the U.S. facilitated rising numbers of openly-identified lesbian and gay partnerships, and that women were forming same-sex partnerships at a greater rate than men. Research on gay and lesbian families has also found many similarities with heterosexual families. For example, gay and heterosexual men experience similar fidelity struggles over the life course (Green 2006), and same-sex partnerships are not significantly different than opposite-sex relationships in terms of their stability (Kurdek 1998). In addition, lesbians and gay men report similar levels of relationship satisfaction when compared to their heterosexual counterparts (Patterson 2000). And, like heterosexual families, race, class, and gender shape the privileges and disadvantages of same-sex families (Browne 2011).

However, like heterosexual couples, gay and lesbian relationships may involve asymmetrical interactional processes that create what experimental social psychologists might call power and prestige orders (see e.g., Berger and Fiske 1970). Similar to straight relationships, interpersonal hierarchies within LGBT relationships are rooted in conflicts about extended families, financial decisions, parenting strategies, and job demands, or differences stemming from

racial, religious, cultural, and economic backgrounds (see Patterson 2000). Kurdeck (1994), for example, found that both non-heterosexual and heterosexual couples typically fought over power, politics, personal flaws, distrust, and distance—emotional or physical—between partners. However, larger sexual inequalities are also a source of tension for same-sex couples, as they deal with the effects of sexual marginalization (Kurdek and Schmidt 1987) and differences surrounding coming out to others (James and Murphy 1998). Such conflicts may escalate to violence, which like in heterosexual relationships is gendered and correlated with other issues. For example, urban gay men with substance abuse issues are more likely to enact and experience domestic violence than other sexual minorities (McCarry et al. 2008). Gay relationship violence in some ways mirrors the cycle of violence in heterosexual couples, as researchers have found that it is characterized by dependence, jealousy, and control (McCarry et al. 2008). Victims' fear often prevents them from expressing emotional and sexual desires (Heintz and Melendez 2006). Research on relationships points to the importance of unpacking how power works in gay and lesbian families, as well as how heteronormativity in other contexts shapes this process.

Studies on cognitive, emotional, and negotiated processes highlight how heteronormativity constrains lesbians' and gay men's decisions and attempts to become families with children. For example, Berkowitz and Marsiglio (2007) found that while gay fathers' decisions to become parents in some ways were similar to those of straight men, they also wrestled to make sense of how they would handle the risk of being stigmatized as "the gay pedophile," the possible bullying that their children might experience, and the discrimination they themselves would likely experience in the adoption process. Researchers have indeed found that adoption agencies negatively compare same-sex couples to "idealized" opposite-sex couples (Connolly 2002) and that same-sex couples face higher standards than heterosexuals and heterosexist remarks from service providers (Ross et al. 2008). Organizational heteronormativity has also limited lesbian

women's opportunities to claim donated sperm (Riggs 2008). Consequently, some women seek donation outside medical clinics, which fosters additional psychological distress (Nordqvist 2011) and struggles regarding how to define known donors and their future roles (Haines and Weiner 2000). Despite such obstacles, sexual minorities have increasingly brought children into their lives, and in doing so they are countering dominant heteronormative definitions of the family in important ways (e.g., Ryan and Berkowitz 2009).

Research on sexual minorities' parenthood illustrates how heteronormativity may be challenged or unintentionally reproduced. Drawing on their own experiences in heteronormative contexts, for example, lesbian parents may strategically teach their children how to handle bullying and adopt egalitarian values (Nixon 2011). While some lesbian couples create egalitarian families, others create inequitable divisions of household labor and childcare that mirror patriarchal traditions (Sullivan 1996). Further, some lesbian women may inadvertently reproduce gendered ideals of motherhood by, for example, devaluing household and care work and establishing inequitable divisions of labor within the home (Dalton and Bielby 2000). In fact, such stereotypes may shape their identities, role expectations, and parental negotiations (Padavic and Butterfield 2011).

Importantly, the rise of visibly gay and lesbian families has also fostered cultural debates as well as empirical research about childhood development in a heteronormative society. At the cultural level, sexual minority families are often stigmatized due to commonly held assumptions that girls learn best from mothers and that boys require the guidance and teaching of male role models (see, e.g., Powell et al. 2010). Bos et al. (2012) first investigated adolescents raised with and without male role models in lesbian families, and their analysis showed that the two groups achieved comparable scores in psychological, social, behavioral, emotional and gender role trait development.

Cultural bias can lead even the most methodologically flawed and debunked studies about the

alleged problems of children of gay and lesbian families (e.g., Regnerus 2012) to generate considerable media attention. More rigorous studies consistently show that children of lesbian and gay parents are no different than children of heterosexual parents in terms of psychological development, but are generally ignored (e.g., American Psychological Association 2005; Goldberg 2010; Perrin and Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on Psychosocial Aspects of Child, Family, Health 2002). Research also shows that it is the quality of parenting, not the sexual identity of parents, that predicts successful child development, and that children may benefit in some ways from same-sex parental arrangements (see also Biblarz and Stacey 2010; Stacey and Biblarz 2001). Overall, as a recent longitudinal study of adolescents (Bos et al. 2012) reveals, most research demonstrates that the heteronormative discourse about “harmed children” in sexual minority families is more myth than empirical reality.

Education

Educational contexts provide lessons in not only the “three Rs,” but also the reproduction and sometimes the challenging of heteronormativity. In this section, we will first address heteronormativity in the official curriculum as well as peer culture. We will then address research on how school life affects adolescent sexual minorities’ emotional life and academic success. In addition, we examine research that shows how LGBT youth may ameliorate negative consequences by collaborating with heterosexual allies and supportive others. And finally, we examine studies of college to show how heteronormativity shapes heterosexuals’ identity work, the construction of safe spaces, and academic success.

Researchers have revealed the importance of educational settings in the reproduction and challenging of sexual inequalities. Examining educational policies, lesson plans, and legislative decisions in high schools in North Carolina, for example, Fields (2008) found that the legal promotion of abstinence-only sex education policies resulted in the deletion of sexual minorities

from lessons about sexual behavior, health, and, more generally, marriage. Using ethnographic methods, Fields further revealed an implicit heteronormative curriculum in which teachers and administrators ostracized sexual minorities, reinforced traditional gender hierarchies, and marginalized students of color.

Fieldwork in other schools has also revealed that students are involved in reproducing heteronormative school cultures, which often overlaps with reproducing sexism. For example, heterosexual girls use a variety of conversational methods, including gossip and teasing, to construct and police heterosexual feeling rules about romantic love (Simon et al. 1992). In addition, heterosexual boys claim positions of power by mobilizing a “fag discourse,” creating a hostile environment for sexual minorities and non-gender conforming students, and denigrating things deemed womanly or feminine (Pascoe 2007; Smith 1998). Consistently, survey research on sexual minority students sampled from community outreach and the internet has found that heterosexist harassment is common: about 85% report being verbally harassed and 40% report being physically harassed because of their sexual identities (GLSEN 2009).

The social structure and personality approach helps us examine how heteronormative high school cultures impact students’ psychological states. For example, studies based on the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (“Add Health”) reported that sexual minority students, especially boys, perform more poorly than other students in terms of grade point average, passing courses, and behavioral adjustment (Pearson et al. 2007; Russell et al. 2001). The impact of heteronormative school cultures was more clearly demonstrated in another Add Health study that compared school performances across schools (Wilkinson and Pearson 2009). This study found that sexual minority students’ academic disadvantages are greater in schools with a strong heteronormative climate—nonurban schools and schools where students emphasize religion and football culture. Another Add Health study shows that the timing of same-sex sexual development impacts educational attainment (Ueno et al. 2013b). For example, women

who report their first same-sex sexual experience in young adulthood attain lower levels of education than those who report their first experience in adolescence and those without such experiences (Ueno 2010c).

Sexual minority youth, however, may counter some of the negative psychological effects of heteronormativity through forging friendships. Sexual minority youth do not necessarily have fewer friends than other groups, and having more of them lessens the psychological damage resulting from conflicts with peers and parents (Ueno 2005). Friendships with heterosexuals, however, are gendered: straight girls are more likely than straight boys to befriend sexual minorities (Ueno 2010a). Further, some evidence suggests that sexual minority youth experience segregation between straight and sexual minority friends in their networks (Ueno et al. 2012), in part because they choose to remain closeted or downplay their sexual orientation in heteronormative school contexts and turn to community organizations to meet other sexual minorities (Herdt and Boxer 1993; Wright and Perry 2006).

Although often facing opposition (Berbrier and Pruett 2006), high school students have increasingly formed Straight-Gay Alliances, organizations in which sexual minority students can meet each other as well as accepting straight students (see, e.g., Miceli 2005). Research has found that sexual minorities attending schools with these organizations are, when compared to those without them, less likely to be bullied or to attempt suicide (Goodenow et al. 2006) and less likely to abuse alcohol and report psychological distress (Heck et al. 2011). Overall, such research suggests that although sexual minority students face significant problems in heteronormative school contexts, many create friendships and organizations that lessen negative effects.

Studies of higher education reveal that heteronormativity is both reproduced and challenged on campus. For many LGBT youth, going to college provides geographical distance from unsupportive families, more anonymity and more active LGBT groups that enable them to feel connected and authentic (see Renn's 2010 review). Yeung et al. (2000, 2006), for example, examined

how some gay college men create fraternities that on the one hand foster self-acceptance and promote social acceptance of gay students, but also tend to adopt normative gender presentations to "fit in" with their heterosexual counterparts. Some evidence suggests that college students are becoming more accepting of sexual minorities. Comparing the experiences of openly gay athletes on sports teams in 2000 and 2010, for example, Anderson (2011) found that athletes in the later cohort experienced less heterosexism and more vocal support from teammates and coaches. LGBT student organizations are increasingly moving from a confrontational politics to one that emphasizes social activities and symbolic assimilation (Ghaziani 2011), which may offer important support but also unintentionally leave larger heteronormative structures safe.

Research on heterosexual students illustrates how heteronormativity affects not only the identities of people who resist but also those who conform. Outside of safe spaces, research has found that heteronormativity is central to how heterosexual students construct identity. Research findings include that Black men define themselves in opposition to stereotypes of effeminate gay men (Ford 2011) and women rugby players denigrate lesbian athletes (Ezzell 2009). Heteronormative culture can also, ironically, involve the co-option of gay and lesbian styles and behaviors. For example, Hamilton (2007) shows that while some straight college women in dorm settings othered lesbian women's inability and lack of desire to attract male erotic attention, they publicly engaged in same-sex erotic activity in order to attract heterosexual men's attention. Heteronormativity can shape academic work as well, whether it is reflected in heterosexual students' distancing from sexual minorities in their assignments (De Welde 2003) or their exaggerations of the frequency of LGBT content in the courses of openly gay professors (Ripley et al. 2012). Overall, such work shows constructing collegiate heterosexual selves is intertwined with constructing "others."

Supporting the idea that sexual minorities in college may be relatively insulated from the worst effects of heteronormativity, however, research finds that they are more likely than het-

erosexual students to graduate. For example, the GSS and the National Health and Social Life Survey both show that adults who report same-sex contact hold higher educational degrees than others (Laumann et al. 1994; Turner et al. 2005). Census studies report similar results using the gender of resident partner as a measure of sexual orientation (Baumle et al. 2009; Black et al. 2000). These results may be interpreted in a few different ways. For example, sexual minorities may seek to overcome anticipated discrimination in the labor market by earning high credentials (Hewitt 1995). It is also possible that education promotes positive views on same-sex sexuality (Ohlander et al. 2005), which may reduce institutional constraints on same-sex behaviors or increase its reporting on surveys. A recent study shows that this tendency for higher educational attainment is more pronounced among gay men who report delayed sexual development (first same-sex experience in young adulthood as opposed to adolescence), perhaps because it reflects stronger commitment to the conventional society, which generally facilitates the educational attainment process (Ueno et al. 2013b).

Work

Examining work contexts sheds additional light on how heteronormativity is linked to other axes of inequality. In this section, we first examine how sexual identities interact with gender to shape occupational segregation and earnings. Second, we address research on hiring, discrimination, and firing that suggests sexual minorities disproportionately face troubles at work. We also address interpersonal dynamics at work, the differently gendered consequences for transwomen and transmen, and how race and class shape sex work.

Studies of occupational segregation highlight how heteronormativity creates social distance between sexual minorities and heterosexuals. The GSS shows that when compared to heterosexual women, sexual minority women are overrepresented in craft, operative, and service occupations and underrepresented in managerial,

professional, technical, administrative support, and sales occupations (Badgett and King 1997; Blandford 2003). Sexual minority men are overrepresented in professional, technical, administrative support, and sales occupations and underrepresented in managerial, craft, and manufacturing occupations. Studies based on census data show similar results (see e.g., Antecol et al. 2008; Baumle et al. 2009). A recent young adult study shows that sexual minorities and heterosexuals are segregated even at the occupational title level (Ueno 2013a).

Research on earnings demonstrates how heteronormativity creates disparities in economic resources. Studies based on 1990's GSS data (Berg and Lien 2002; also see Badgett 1995; Black et al. 2000; Blandford 2003) and 1990 Census data (Allegretto and Arthur 2001; Clain and Leppel 2001; Klawitter and Flatt 1998) have revealed that, relative to their heterosexual counterparts, sexual minority women have about a 30% earnings premium and sexual minority men have a 22% penalty. Analysis of multiple waves of GSS data and 2000 Census data suggests the gaps may be shrinking to some extent (Antecol et al. 2008; Baumle et al. 2009; Daneshvary et al. 2007; Jepsen 2007). Scholars have attributed these differences in occupational placement, status, and earnings to several factors including discrimination (Badgett and King 1997), sexual minorities' occupational choices based on perceived "gay friendliness" (Berger 1982; Harry and DeVall 1978; Hewitt 1995), and having occupational plans less restrained by traditional gender specialization (Berg and Lien 2002; Black et al. 2000).

Research on hiring and firing finds that one's status as a sexual minority hinders success, showing that organizational heteronormativity operates through organizational leaders' and authorities' decision-making. In one of the most rigorous studies to date, Tilcsik (2011) sent two almost identical resumes with male names to over 1,700 job openings and found that listing one's experience as a treasurer of the "Gay and Lesbian Alliance," when compared to listing being the treasurer of the "Progressive and Socialist Alliance," decreased the chances of being

asked for an interview by 40% (11.5% for “socialist” men vs. 7.2% for “gay” men). Although we have not found equivalent studies comparing presumably lesbian and straight women in the U.S., a similarly designed study examining this question in Austria found that of the over 600 clerical jobs applied for, lesbian applicants were called back about 12–13% points less often than straight women (Weichselbaumer 2003).

The stereotyped gendered character of organizations and jobs (see, e.g., Acker 1990) and the presumed gendered deviance of sexual minorities may help explain these patterns. Although it is unclear in Weichselbaumer’s (2003) aforementioned study whether the mismatch between the stereotypically feminine “nature” of clerical work and stereotypically masculine “nature” of lesbians played a role, Tilcsik’s (2011) aforementioned study suggests that it may. He found that call-back discrimination of the presumed-to-be gay men was most severe in stereotypically masculine occupations, suggesting that a perceived mismatch between stereotypically gendered jobs and sexual minorities may play a role in such discrimination. Tilcsik also points to the importance of social context because jobs located in conservative Midwestern and Southern states and in places without laws against LGBT discrimination most often passed over presumably gay candidates. Heteronormativity at work may thus vary according to how organizations are locally gendered as well as the larger political climate.

Studies based on self-reports provide further evidence of how heteronormativity operates through labor market discrimination. For example, one survey study found that about one-third of LGBT people report experiencing occupational discrimination based on sexual identities (Ragins et al. 2003). Furthermore, a study based on Harvard’s Midlife Development in the U.S. survey found that sexual minorities are more than four times as likely as heterosexuals to have been fired from jobs (Mays and Cochran 2001). These findings may indicate employers’ intentional discrimination, but they also resonate with experimental social psychologists’ findings that, relative to heterosexuals, sexual minority status operates as a “diffuse status characteristic”

and reduces performance expectations (Johnson 1995; Webster et al. 1998; see also Ridgeway and Nakagawa, this volume).

Studies addressing the interpersonal dynamics in work contexts give us additional insight into how heteronormativity operates via social interaction. Comparing confederates applying in person for service jobs who wore a “Texan and Proud” or “Gay and Proud” cap, Hebl et al. (2002) found that the potential employers treat the presumed gay applicants more negatively (spending less time with them, having less eye contact, and acting more standoffish, nervous, and hostile). Qualitative research has shown that sexual minorities in the corporate world (Wood 1994), law enforcement (Miller et al. 2003), and academia (Taylor and Raeburn 1995), for example, often face such interpersonal problems. Even in explicitly “gay friendly” workplaces, out sexual minorities can be targeted with harassment and stereotyping, creating additional dilemmas surrounding self-presentation (Guiffre et al. 2008). Survey research suggests that being out at work can lead to more job satisfaction, but it can also cause workers to experience more job-related anxiety (Griffith and Hebl 2002). In her comparison of sexual minority teachers in California and Texas, Connell’s (2012) research shows that California teachers used statewide anti-discrimination laws as interactional resources to shut down and thus limit insults and slights. Overall, research highlights the usefulness of integrating analyses of workplace processes, policy and political context, and psychological consequences.

Much less is known about transsexuals at work, but studies suggest that heteronormativity can, if they pass, benefit women who become men (but not vice versa), although this may be racialized. Gagne et al. (1997) suggest that trying to transition from one sex category to another at work can lead to being harassed or fired and that transsexuals often seek employment elsewhere when they transition, settling for lower-paid work. Qualitative research on the experiences of those who have already transitioned suggests that transmen (women who become men) are given more respect by coworkers and bosses than they had as women, and those transitioning from men

to women have more difficulty than they used to, although status as a racial minority can make things worse (Schilt 2006; Schilt and Connell 2007). Some recent survey research on 114 transsexuals finds that transmen receive more positive reactions from coworkers than transwomen and that coming out at work for both increases job satisfaction, lessens anxiety, and bolsters commitment (Law et al. 2011). Studies of transsexuals at work thus can provide insight into the workings of male privilege and remind us how it is racialized.

Alongside mainstream occupational contexts, researchers have also examined issues of inequality in sex work. Following Bernstein (2007), these studies situate sex work within multiple systems of economic, gendered, sexual, and racial consumerism, and seek to understand how sexual minorities manage the occupational dilemmas and dynamics of sexual marketplaces. In a quantitative analysis utilizing online data from male escort websites, for example, Logan (2010) found that white skin brought a premium. Socio-economic class is key as well, as is found in the trend of well-off gay men “renting” lower class sex workers—often referred to as Chavs or Rent Boys—in order to experience temporary relief from normative depictions of polished, tasteful, and sophisticated homosexual manhood (Brewis and Jack 2010; Ozbay 2010). Such work suggests that even though same-sex sex work has become more technologically sophisticated than it used to be, class inequality remains as key now as it was when Reiss (1961) wrote his classic article on “queers and peers.”

Religion

Religious organizations and leaders often give heteronormativity a gloss of morality, helping to justify and perpetuate sexuality-based injustice. While notable exceptions have emerged in the past 50 years, many religions implicitly and explicitly reinforce heteronormative attitudes through their operations within and beyond churches (Barton 2012). In this section, we first discuss studies of mainstream religious discourse

on sexual minorities and how religiosity is linked to prejudice. We then address research on how LGBT people work to integrate their sexual and religious identities. We end by reviewing how heteronormativity is both challenged and sometimes reproduced in ethnographic studies of LGBT churches.

Social psychologically speaking, one way to think about religion is as a discourse that, if adopted or used at strategic moments, can shape subjectivity (Sharp 2010). Like many discourses, spokespeople may use or alter it to define who is in and out, which may shape their own as well as believers’ and subordinates’ emotions. Some religious leaders prescribe spiritual care to fix those “afflicted” with such “deeply ingrained sexual disorders” as same-sex attraction (Comstock 1996; see also Wilcox 2001). In the 1980’s, for example, leaders in the Catholic Church defined homosexuality as an “objective disorder,” and characterized same-sex genital contact as “intrinsically disordered” (Yip 1997a). The U.S. Presbyterian Church changed its constitution to bar non-heterosexuals from positions of authority (Burgess 1999). At the more local level, religious leaders may denigrate sexual minorities via official statements and debates in which they selectively appeal to religious ideals (Djupe et al. 2006) and the “best interests” of their organizations (Olson and Cadge 2002), and stoking fear of the alleged sexual outsiders (Cadge and Wildeman 2008). Such othering can foster sympathy or righteousness as well, thereby demarcating a status hierarchy (see Clark 1987).

Quantitative research suggests that one process through which heteronormativity is reproduced involves internalizing its ideology via adopting popular currents of Christianity. Experimental research has shown, for example, that religious people are less likely to offer help to sexual minorities in distress (Mak and Tsang 2008), and that Christian fundamentalism is the strongest predictor of prejudice toward gay men (Rowatt et al. 2006). If controlling for right-wing authoritarianism, Christian values are linked to positive attitudes toward sexual minorities as people, although negativity remains in relation to same-sex acts and “lifestyles” (Ford et al. 2009).

Similarly, survey research consistently shows that hostility toward sexual minorities is stronger among people who have high levels of religiosity (Adamczyk and Pitt 2009; Mavor and Gallois 2008), Christian belief (Laythe et al. 2001, 2002), Biblical fundamentalism (Sherkat et al. 2011), and conservative Protestantism (Burdette et al. 2005). Although some religious organizations have tried to become more welcoming (see, e.g., Adler 2012; Moon 2004), these studies make clear that religion is often key in reproducing heteronormative attitudes.

Studies of Christian sexual minorities often focus on how they integrate their seemingly incompatible Christian and sexual identities, which can challenge and reproduce heteronormativity. Lesbian (Mahaffy 1996), gay (Yip 1997a), and transgender (Schrock et al. 2004) Christians' identity work may involve, for example, reinterpreting scriptural prohibitions against homosexuality (for a review of psychological literature in this vein see Rodriguez 2010). Racially subordinated gay Christians have additional cultural meanings to contend with, as research on African-American (Pitt 2010) and Latino (Rodriguez and Ouellette 2000b) gay men has demonstrated. Sexual minorities may learn such strategies in support groups (Thumma 1991), inclusive congregations (Rodriguez and Ouellette 2000a), and newsletter narratives (Loseke and Cavendish 2001). Such work shapes not only self-definitions but also emotional experience (Moon 2004; Wolkomir 2006). While such work often challenges the pillar of heteronormativity that privileges heterosexuals, it often reinforces the pillar of gender differentiation.

Interactionist-oriented ethnographers have also shown how heteronormativity is reproduced and sometimes challenged on the ground floor of LGBT churches. For example, some alternative churches have been found to be inclusive places where members promote healing and social change (Leong 2006) and engage in and affirm counter-heteronormative embodiment through creating a culture that supports queering fashion, cultivating physical intimacy, and transgenering demeanor (Sumerau and Schrock 2011). In addition, research finds that some LGBT churches

counter heteronormativity by transforming public religious events into opportunities to renegotiate oppressive power dynamics (Valentine et al. 2010) and having leaders proselytize religious, racial, class, gender, and sexual egalitarianism (Sumerau *forthcoming*). On the other hand, LGBT centered or affirming churches may also reproduce heteronormative conceptions of manhood, monogamy, and motherhood (McQueeney 2009) and such sexism may lead to an exodus of women (Wilcox 2009). Ethnographers have also shown how the introduction of traditional male leaders may be the impetus to transform an LGBT church's organizational culture from an egalitarian to a more heteronormative one by reinforcing hegemonic manhood, the gender binary, and the subordination of women (Sumerau 2012). Overall, ethnographers of religion show that heteronormativity operates as a form of "joint action" (Blumer 1969) that is always in flux.

Public Life

Outside of formal institutions is what Lofland (1998) describes as the public realm or public life. Such spaces include streets, bars, parks and the like, in which people are often (but not always) strangers or known merely as presumed members of social groups. The anonymity afforded in such contexts, it seems, can embolden those who choose to police or enforce heteronormativity. In this section, we first address research on the extent and variation of public harassment and violence against sexual minorities. We then explore studies of perpetrators as well as the consequences for victims. Next we address how some sexual minorities may adapt to public difficulties through passing and emotion management. Finally, we briefly address the formation of alternative subcultural spaces, and how they can both challenge and reproduce heteronormativity.

Research on public life has shown how heteronormativity operates through what Feagin (1991) called "public discrimination" in his classic work on the interactional workings of racial dominance. One notable national survey using random sampling techniques (Mays and Cochran 2001),

for example, found that LGB people are significantly more likely than heterosexuals to be treated with less respect and courtesy, receive poorer service in restaurants and stores, called names or insulted, and threatened or harassed. They also found that women bore a disproportionate share of the anti-LGB public discrimination, with differences in poor service in stores and restaurants most striking (27.0% of L/B women vs. 4.2% G/B men). A study based on a national probability sample of LGB adults found that about 20% were criminally victimized (physically attacked or mugged) and that 50% had been verbally harassed based on their status as sexual minorities; gay men were significantly more likely than lesbians to report being physically attacked or robbed (Herek 2009).

Studies that use purposeful sampling of transgender populations find similar evidence of public discrimination. A non-random national survey of over 400 transgender people found that in their lifetimes, approximately 55% had been insulted, 23% had been followed, 20% assaulted without and 10% assaulted with a weapon, and 8% had been harassed and arrested by the police while on public streets (Lombardi et al. 2001). Doan's (2007) study of one urban area found that of 149 transmen and women surveyed, within the past year, 25% had been targeted with hostile comments and 18% had been physically harassed. Taken together, these and other studies on public discrimination of LGBT people—see especially Katz-Wise and Hyde's (2012) meta-analysis of 386 of them—shows that a key way heteronormativity is reproduced in everyday life involves aggressive facework.

It is also important to examine research on perpetrators of such acts because it helps to understand who most internalizes and polices heteronormativity. According to Comstock's (1991) extensive research, perpetrators of anti-gay violence are mostly male (94%) and under 28 years old (88%). They are often at an age in which they are overly concerned with proving their manhood, and thus are similar to the generally young white men perpetrating raced-based hate crimes (Kimmel 2007). One of the few studies based on in-depth interviews with perpetrators reveals that

gay bashing men felt that it provided “honor, status and power over dishonorable others” and was a means for “attaining a new manhood” (van der Meer 2003, p. 162). In a complementary fashion, psychologists have shown that men's (but not women's) anti-gay prejudice is linked to their gendered self-esteem (Falomir-Pichastor and Mugny 2009) and the bolstering of their heterosexual masculinity (Czrnaghi et al. 2011). Heteronormative policing in public may thus be a means through which young men work together to put on compensatory manhood acts (Schrock and Schwalbe 2009).

Research on LGBT victims demonstrates how such heteronormative micro-aggressions in turn shape their subjective life. For example, using diary methods to examine the everyday life and emotional well-being of LGB people, Swim et al. (2009) show that experiencing more everyday “heterosexist hassles” (e.g., exclusionary or hostile acts) is significantly associated with increases in “end of the day” anger and anxiety, and decreases in collective self esteem (their evaluation of the worth of LGB people as a group) and their personal identification with the LGB community. A survey study of over 2,200 LGB people in an urban city found that those who were victims of hate crimes were significantly more likely than the others to suffer from posttraumatic stress, depression, anxiety, anger, fear of crime, and a low sense of mastery (Herek et al. 1999). Such research shows how the public policing of heteronormativity “gets under the skin” (Taylor and Repetti 1997).

Public discrimination is a key reason many sexual minorities try to pass in public, which provides further insights into the workings of heteronormativity. Passing hinges on conforming to cultural standards of “doing gender” (West and Zimmerman 1987) for both gay men and lesbians as well as transmen and women. For gay men and lesbians, however, conforming involves keeping their desired identity private while for transsexuals it involves having their desired identity publicly affirmed (see, e.g., Gagne et al. 1997). For transsexuals, this may involve retraining, re-decorating, and reshaping the body to coincide with binary notions of gender, which in turn

shapes self-monitoring, feelings, and role-taking (Schrock et al. 2005). Because of the aforementioned risks, trying to pass can be emotionally tumultuous, leading newly-defined transsexual women, for example, to use cognitive (e.g., personal pep talks) and bodily strategies (e.g., deep breathing or smoking) to manage fear and shame, which if expressed could draw strangers' unwanted attention (Schrock et al. 2009). Such passing, however, can both challenge heteronormativity by subverting the assumption that one's medically assigned-at-birth sex category determines one's gendered presentation and identification while reproducing it by maintaining the link between gendered identification and self-presentation.

Due to the inequalities that LGBT people face, they have created semipublic "safe spaces," such as support groups, to work on self-acceptance and find relief from heteronormativity embedded throughout public life (see, e.g., Thumma 1991; Wolkomir 2006). Research on transgender support groups has shown, for example, how members engage in emotion work strategies that mitigate shame and fear while fostering authenticity, solidarity, and pride, which could prime them for social movement recruitment—though such work may symbolically reproduce sexual, classed, racial, and gendered hierarchies (Schrock et al. 2004). Through interactional rituals, such support groups can also teach transsexuals, for example, how to tell gendered stories of childhood, denial, and coming out that are deemed by community members and medical gatekeepers as authentically signifying transsexuality (Mason-Schrock 1996). Due in part to the public proliferation of sexual identities (Plummer 1995), transwomen's narrative construction may also involve linguistically "defetishizing" erotic crossdressing, "queering" straight sex, and "straightening" gay sex in order to distance them from male heterosexual, gay, or erotically-driven transvestite identities (Schrock and Reid 2006). In semipublic, sexual minorities may thus both cope with the subjective consequences of heteronormativity while selectively using part of its discourse to produce sexual selves.

Studies of semipublic subcultural establishments and organizations have revealed how subverting some dominant heteronormative assumptions may also reproduce meso-level hierarchies. Drawing on Goffman and Bourdieu, Green (2011) shows in his study of erotic hierarchies in an urban gay enclave that race, age, body type, personal style, and indicators of wealth shape one's status as desirable. He also shows how men use role-taking to assess their own position in the hierarchy, they work behind the scenes to maximize desirability by strategically working on their bodily fronts, and they interactionally reproduce such hierarchies with others in rituals involving deference, demeanor, and facework. Others (Johnson and Samdahl 2005) have found, for example, that on Lesbian Night at a usually male-dominated gay country western bar, male patrons marginalized women patrons, creating a gendered status order. These and similar studies (Hennen 2008; Weinberg and Williams 1975) show how subcultural attempts to create alternatives to heteronormativity's dominance in other social arenas may also include legitimating masculinist self-presentations and men's differentiation from and subordination of women. Of course, organizations in the community, especially overtly political ones, have members who attempt to organize themselves non-hierarchically and also fight against heteronormativity as well other intertwined systems of oppression. The point here is merely that sociological social psychological approaches might be able to help us better unpack how such processes work, and how subjectivity may be implicated in what happens before, during, and after the action occurs.

Health

In this section, we first review research suggesting how heteronormativity shapes medical practices. We then address how such heteronormativity colors cultural definitions of HIV/AIDS as well as related attitudes, and how this, in turn, shapes sexual minorities' identity work. We then examine health disparities between sexual minorities and heterosexuals, focusing on prevalence

and social psychological explanations. Finally, we address how heteronormativity shapes end-of-life care and the experiences of the bereaved.

Although medical practitioners often adopt interpersonal strategies in order to “de-sexualize” interactions with patients (Giuffre and Williams 2000; Smith and Kleinman 1989), they often interactionally reproduce heteronormativity. For example, LGBT youth in health clinics may face practitioners who ignore sexuality issues when treating them but “out” them to officials and family members (Travers and Schneider 1996). Further, non-birthing lesbian mothers are often forced to account for or explain their presence to medical staff, and nurses may deny them parental status (Goldberg et al. 2011). Researchers have also found that medical practitioners draw on heteronormative gender ideals to justify “sex testing” alleged transsexual athletes (Cavanagh and Sykes 2006) and surgically “correcting” infants with ambiguous genitalia (Roen 2008). Institutional heteronormativity thus may involve monitoring and regulating of the “cultural insignia” of sex (see Garfinkel 1967).

Research on HIV/AIDS illustrates how heteronormativity also shapes cultural and personal constructions of illness. As many have pointed out, public discourse on AIDS defines it as a gay men’s disease (see e.g., Esacove 2010). Such discourse leads many heterosexuals to falsely believe that uninfected men can sexually transmit HIV to each other (Herek et al. 2005). AIDS discourse is thus tied to the marginalization of gay men. Some gay men, in turn, view regular HIV testing as part of their “gay identity” (Coleman and Lohan 2009), signifying being responsible sexual beings (Lee and Sheon 2008) or “self love” (Malebranche et al. 2009). Further, if infected with the virus, gay men’s identity work may involve emphasizing fraternal bonds and masculine achievement (Lev and Tillinger 2010), a renewed sense of morality and responsibility (Davis 2008), and a sense of empowerment and mission to educate others (Sandstrom 1990). Thus, although the socially constructed meaning of AIDS often stigmatizes all gay men, the infected negate some of the stereotypes (i.e., irre-

sponsible and immoral) by emphasizing, in part, hegemonic manhood.

Studies of health disparities demonstrate to what extent and though what process heteronormativity creates inequalities in physical and mental well-being between sexual minorities and heterosexuals. According to Meyer’s (2003) meta-analysis, sexual minority adults are 2.3 times as likely as heterosexual adults to report having mood disorders such as major depression and anxiety, and they are 2.1 times as likely to report problems with substance abuse within the past year. Youth studies suggest that mental health disparities already exist in early life stages—sexual minority youth report significantly higher levels of depressive symptoms and drug use than do heterosexual youth (Hatzenbuehler et al. 2008; Russell et al. 2002). In order to understand such health disparities in a sociological way, it is important to engage sociological social psychology more fully.

One approach has been to incorporate work in the “stress process” tradition (Pearlin et al. 1981). Grounded in the social structure and personality perspective (McLeod and Lively 2007), this framework proposes that social structure creates individual and group variations in types of stressors, the level of stress exposure, the vulnerability to stress exposure, and the level of available resources to cope with stressors. Research in this vein has found that sexual minorities’ worse mental health is partly explained by their greater exposure to violence (Russell and Joyner 2001; Ueno 2010b), discrimination (Mays and Cochran 2001; Ueno 2010a), and, for sexual minority youth in particular, conflicts with peers and parents (Ueno 2005). Additional portions of the disparities in mental health can be attributed to sexual minorities’ depleted coping resources, including familial support and psychological resources such as mastery and self-esteem (Ueno 2010b). These studies suggest that heteronormative processes in various contexts have measurable psychological effects that arguably limit resistance, depending on how they are managed.

Some mechanisms that account for mental health disparities lie outside the stress framework, and they address sexual inequality in other

ways. For example, as shown in a study based on a community sample of Miami-Dade County, sexual minorities' higher levels of substance use is largely explained by their friends' substance use and permissive attitudes (Ueno 2010b). Although the cross-sectional study does not allow for causal interpretations, it is consistent with research documenting drug use among some patrons of gay bars and clubs (Green 2003; Kipke et al. 2007). These institutions have long served as the primary haven for sexual minorities to escape from discrimination in heteronormative social arenas and develop alternative support networks (Achilles 1967). In this sense, sexual minorities' higher substance use may be viewed as a collective strategy some use to manage the subjective consequences of social subordination. Such collective adaptations often unintentionally reproduce inequality (Schwalbe et al. 2000), and in this case it may also cut short or hinder the quality of life of the heteronormatively subordinated.

The last genre of research we will address in this section reveals how heteronormativity operates during end-of-life processes. Elderly sexual minorities may be forced to seek help from relatives who sometimes turn their backs quietly and sometimes respond with overt hostility (Brotman et al. 2003). Those who came to terms with their sexual identities before Stonewall often remain closeted to such relatives, adding to their emotional burdens (see Rosenfeld 2003). Many turn to "families of choice" (Weeks et al. 2001; Weston 1991) composed of present and former partners and friends in the community. Relatives and medical professionals may "disenfranchise" such families, however, not allowing them to make decisions regarding care and treatment (Almack et al. 2010). Because many sexual minorities live alone in their later years (Heaphy et al. 2003) and many lose connection to the LGBT community, it is not uncommon to face death in relative isolation (see, e.g. Brotman et al. 2003). Heteronormativity impacts bereaved partners as well, as they might be denied making sure the funeral wishes of the deceased are carried out, and are often refused family and bereavement leave or partners' social security benefits (Hash and

Netting 2007). Although the growth of community organizations for elderly LGBT people has allowed more to die with dignity and support in recent years, heteronormativity too often influences the death passage as much as it does life.

Future Directions

Sociological social psychology was central in transforming our understanding of sexuality as essentially social rather than rooted in biology or psychological deficiencies. As the study of sexuality expanded in the social sciences, however, social psychology became less explicitly relevant. Sexuality scholarship primarily consisted of relatively atheoretical empirical work or was framed in postmodern terms or as contributing to other specialty areas, such as gender or the family. As we have shown, however, much contemporary work resonates with or uses social psychological concepts and approaches.

The danger of losing sight of the sociological social psychological influence behind contemporary sexualities scholarship goes beyond neglecting to give credit to those who deserve it. Rather, it opens the door for misusing or misunderstanding social psychological concepts or approaches, reinventing the wheel, and, more generally, missing opportunities to further both sexuality scholarship and social psychology. As studies of sexuality increasingly examine various situated processes and subjective consequences, the field is becoming increasingly fragmented. Sometimes it is hard to figure out, for example, what studies of street harassment and mental health, sub-cultural hierarchies of desirability, and religious organizations and attitudes have in common. Using a sensitizing concept like heteronormativity that directs our attention to inequalities can be helpful, but explicit engagement with diverse yet complementary social psychological approaches may also be key to providing more coherence. Moving forward may be as simple as using other approaches to contextualize and make sense of particular findings, developing multi-methodological approaches, or more explicitly integrating social psychology and sexuality scholarship.

Further, social psychologists might be able to advance our understanding of sexual inequalities by working together rather than pursuing more narrowly defined projects. What might happen, for example, if social psychologists working from different traditions approached the same issue, such as discrimination at work? By conceptualizing sexual identity as a diffuse status, group processes researchers may be able to unpack how organizational context and composition shape the evaluation process. Those working from the social structure and personality approach may provide insight into how employers internalize heteronormative ideology, incorporating it into their self-concepts, and how this manifests during the evaluation process. Further, ethnographers may reveal the interactional processes through which employers foster hierarchies between heterosexual and sexual minority workers, how they account for heteronormative evaluations, and the role of emotional expression or repression in the process. Each perspective may be able to provide complementary insights, piecing together processes that together constitute a more complete picture of how heteronormativity operates.

Bringing together the study of sexual inequalities and social psychology can also enrich social psychology in numerous ways. Key theoretical advances in various social psychologies, including, for example, ethnomethodology and gender studies (e.g., Garfinkel 1967) and interactionist approaches to stigma (e.g., Plummer 1975) have developed while studying sexual minorities. As social psychologists bring diverse questions and conceptual tools to study sexuality, there is room for a multitude of conceptual innovations. In-depth analyses of sexual minorities may also have implications for the development of the social psychology of inequalities more generally. Because sexuality is intertwined with race, class, gender, age, and disability, incorporating an intersectional sensibility may enable social psychologists to better illustrate how various axes of inequality are similar, different, and linked (see Howard and Renfrow, this volume).

There are many ways in which social psychologists can use and build on our traditions as we move forward. For example, although ethnographers have continued to uncover various methods of sexual identity work in many contexts, comparative analyses may allow us to better understand generic processes occurring across settings and how they may be linked. Additionally, research often provides insights into the emotional lives of sexual minorities but usually avoids engaging sociological social psychology's perspectives on emotions. With its foci on status hierarchies and other relevant matters (e.g., identity, emotion, dependence, etc.), experimental research has the potential to unpack heteronormative processes in a rigorous fashion, yet it remains underutilized in sexuality research. Considering the structural and personal salience of sexual identities, work that substantively engages the social structure and personality paradigm, including identity theory and research on self-esteem, efficacy, mattering and the like must also play a stronger role as we move forward. Of course, we also need to have more data available that enables us to pursue all these fronts, which may require doing a better job avoiding heteronormative research designs.

Our hope is that 20 years from now those reviewing what sociological social psychology tells us about sexual inequalities will involve less discussion about how sexuality studies implicitly use or have implications for social psychology and more discussion about how social psychology explicitly engages in sexuality research. This would require more social psychologists to come out as interested in sexuality, which unfortunately still carries risks. Sexuality scholars continue to face challenges with regard to funding agencies (Kemptner 2008), political and cultural arenas (Stompler 2009), and departmental and university cultures and decision makers (Taylor and Raeburn 1995). Social psychologists may be able to help here as well, if we use our knowledge of the dynamics of heteronormativity to pragmatically intervene.

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Part V

Outcomes of Inequality

Inequality imposes a heavy burden on those who are disadvantaged, yet the potential for change, resistance, and mobilization remains. The chapters in this final section consider the processes through which inequality harms individuals and the conditions under which people are able to resist. Two chapters emphasize “social problems”—criminal involvement and poor health—that arise from inequality and contribute to its reproduction. A third chapter considers col-

lective efforts at redress and social change. All three chapters demonstrate that inequality affects feelings, beliefs, and behaviors for reasons other than simply material deprivation, pointing to the importance of interpersonal interactions, identities, and symbolic meanings in these processes. We see here the value of a social psychological perspective for understanding how and why inequality matters.

Social Movements and Social Inequality: Toward a More Balanced Assessment of the Relationship

26

David A. Snow and Peter B. Owens

Social movements and related phenomena, such as protest demonstrations and revolutions, are collective actions through which aggrieved collectivities give voice, both through their discursive claims and embodied actions, to various grievances and seek to affect some degree of individual, social, political, or cultural change related to those grievances. Social movements can vary considerably in terms of the kind and degree of change sought. Revolutionary movements, for example, usually seek broad-scale, socio-cultural change, whereas other movements may seek partial, less sweeping change in only a sector or institution of the social order. Whatever the kind and degree of change sought, however, it is arguable that perceived or actual inequalities of one kind or another are at play in the grievances that animate most movements and which they seek to ameliorate or eliminate.

When we think about the connection between social movements and inequality, however, our thoughts generally turn to movements skewed towards the political left, such as the Labor Movement, Civil Rights Movement, Women's Movement, the LGBT Movement, and the more recent Occupy Wall Street movement in the U.S. and the contemporaneous Indignados movement in Europe. This connection is understandable since many of these so-called progressive movements

have championed and sought to advance the interests and rights of various disadvantaged and underprivileged groups vis-a-vis other more privileged groups in terms of the most salient markers of inequality, namely income and wealth, social status, and power or the capacity to advance one's own interests in the face of countervailing interests. Indeed, this association of these markers of inequality and social movements with "the political left" is a longstanding one, dating back in sociological literature to at least the 1847/8 penning of Marx and Engels famed revolutionary pamphlet, *The Communist Manifesto* (1948).

While not denying the historical connection between movements seeking to ameliorate inequalities and the progressive or political left, we argue that the goals or objectives of most movements arrayed along the progressive/conservative continuum are linked, in some manner or another, to the issue of inequality. Although right-wing and reactionary movements, which often seek to construct or maintain systems of inequality, have tended to receive less attention in the social movement literature than progressive movements for the reason suggested,¹ we also argue that they display the same social psychological processes and mechanisms in relation to issues of inequality as those at work in the case

D. A. Snow (✉) · P. B. Owens
Department of Sociology, University of California, 3151
Social Science Plaza, Irvine, CA 92697-5100, USA
e-mail: dsnow@uci.edu

¹ But for notable exceptions, see Bell (1964), Blee (2002), Cunningham and Philips (2007), Lipset and Raab (1970), McVeigh (2009), Simi and Futrell (2010), and Van Dyke and Soule (2002). The more recent work has had more of a structural than a social psychological emphasis.

of progressive movements. Right-wing and reactionary movements may be more likely to pursue certain strategies of collective action in dealing with the groups they target as problematic,² but their operation and functioning are very much the same as progressive movements with respect to issues of inequality. Thus, we seek to explore social psychological processes and mechanisms

² To illustrate, we posit three basic strategies used historically by social movements seeking to address perceived (or desired) inequalities between their own adherents and supporters and their targeted antagonist groups. First, *eliminationist* strategies include either some form of territorial relocation or expulsion, as in the Cherokee “trail of tears” (Mann 2005) or physical liquidation of a group, such as in all genocides (Owens et al. 2013). The second general set of strategies for dealing with “troublesome groups” entails various efforts to remove the observable differences. These strategies include *conversion*, involving some form of reeducation or change in ideological orientation, *acculturation or assimilation*, or *amalgamation* via intermarriage. The third strategy sometimes pursued involves some form of *symbolic reconstruction* through which the collective sociocultural or physical differences remain, but they take on new meanings, usually involving some kind of transposition from the negative to the positive.

Using this basic strategic typology, progressive and conservative/reactionary movements can be grouped by their relative likelihood of using certain strategies relative to others to attain their purported goals. Symbolic reconstruction strategies may be pursued by either progressive or conservative/reactionary movements, as amply demonstrated in Berbrier’s (2002) comparative study of deaf, gay, and white supremacist activists, although they have probably been used more historically by progressive movements. Eliminationist strategies are perhaps most likely to be used by conservative or reactionary movements, particularly if sponsored by dominant groups, since the application of widespread coercion and/or violence tends to rely on the legitimating power of dominant institutions or belief systems for its application. However, this does not entirely preclude an exit or self-imposed removal strategy by progressive movements of repressed or dominated groups, such as the Back to Africa movement in early twentieth-century America. Finally, acculturation or assimilationist strategies, as well as any attempt at amalgamation, are likely to be vehemently opposed by conservative/reactionary movements. Although these strategies are often championed by progressive movements, particularly by their conscience constituents, they are also often resisted by the more radical flank of progressive movements, as exemplified by the Black Panther Party and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) as it evolved over time.

that fall along a broad continuum of social and political movements in relation to inequality.

Furthermore, we argue that matters of inequality are not only of interest to movements that seek structural and/or cultural change on the progressive/conservative spectrum, but they are also of relevance to the concerns of so-called identity movements and movements that seek to affect change at the individual level. Thus, in this chapter, we will identify and elaborate the various ways in which social movements and inequality are interconnected, but with a focus on the orientations towards different forms of social inequality that give rise to social movement activity, and the discursive and social psychological mechanisms and processes that facilitate such activity. We begin, however, by exploring in more detail the social movement/inequality nexus, elaborating the different types of inequality and their relationship to each other and to specific types of social movements. Throughout, we will draw selectively for illustrative purposes on empirical studies of social movements and related collective actions that illustrate and concretize our arguments.

Types of Inequality and Movements

Fundamentally, the operation and functioning of social movements with regards to social inequality can be organized by the type of inequality that movement actors seek to address. In locating and making claims about various kinds of social inequality, it has been argued that there is an injustice component to all social movement claims (see, for example, Gamson 1992; Moore 1978; Turner 1969), including those addressing issues of inequality. Although the topics of justice and injustice have generated considerable philosophical discussion (see Rawls 1999; Sandel 2009; Wolterstorff 2008), social movement scholars have generally linked injustice to specific kinds of action. Turner captures this approach with his distinction between conceiving of a problem as a misfortune versus an injustice, and the kind of action associated with each. “The victims of misfortune *petition* whoever has the

power to help them,” he argues, whereas “(t)he victims of injustice *demand* that their petition be granted.” Thus, “(t)he poor man appealing for alms is displaying his misfortune. The Poor People’s March in Washington to demand correction of their situation expressed a sense of injustice” (Turner 1969, p. 391, emphasis added). Accordingly, Turner concludes that “(a) significant social movement becomes possible when,” among other things, “there is a revision in the manner in which a substantial group of people look at” some troublesome condition, “seeing it no longer as a misfortune but as an injustice which is intolerable in society, and for which they demand as their right” that the condition be corrected (1969, p. 391).

Yet, even though social movement scholars regard conceptions of injustice as central to understanding the dynamics of movement emergence, they have paid too little attention to the different forms of justice and injustice and how these differences relate to movements concerned with inequality.

Distributional and Procedural Inequalities

Research and theorizing on the social psychology of justice and injustice is particularly helpful in getting a handle on the connection between inequality and movement mobilization. In their review of social psychological orientations towards justice and injustice, Hegtvedt and Markovsky (1995) define a sense of injustice, whether individually or collectively held, as a perceived discrepancy between the benefits received by an individual or group and the benefits they feel they deserve. The expectations that generate such perceptions include “normative rules governing distributions or the relevant procedures, perceptions, or cognitions about the situation, as well as comparisons to past experiences, to other individuals, or to reference groups” (Hegtvedt and Markovsky 1995, p. 257). Based on this conceptualization, they identify two primary forms of justice: *distributional justice*, which evaluates the fairness of the social distribution of valued

resources or benefits and burdens; and *procedural justice*, which focuses on the fairness of the processes undergirding resource or reward distribution (see Hegtvedt and Isom, this volume). Movements that seek to ameliorate systems of social inequality thus engage in “justice evaluations” of the fairness and desirability of existing distributional and procedural arrangements. Where they find such arrangements wanting, movements will tend to identify the associated inequalities as unacceptable or unjust, with collective action, through the organization and mobilization of social movement activity, as a potential response.

This distinction between distributional and procedural justice helps us to understand that individuals can feel relatively deprived and unhappy about their respective incomes or lifestyles in relation to others with whom they compare themselves, but yet do not feel deeply aggrieved because they regard the underlying procedures on which those differences are based as being reasonably fair or just. It is in large part because of this kind of calculus that the majority of people in Western societies have, at least at times in the past, considered the economic inequality they experience or see as fair or just (Kluegel and Smith 1986). And, by implication, it is why folks who are on the wrong end of some distributional scheme in terms of objective criteria do not always consider themselves deprived or mistreated. Another way of putting it is that the mobilizing potential of distributional differences is modified or muted by procedural considerations.

This is exactly what Bert Klandermans and his colleagues found in a study of grievance formation in South Africa between 1994 and 1998 (Klandermans et al. 2001). The apartheid policies of the pre-1994 government yielded a deeply segregated and divided society, but social movement protest among black South Africans was not as widespread or temporally persistent as one might expect given the profound differences in race-based inequalities. Clearly this was not due to the absence of grievances among black South Africans. The highly repressive measures of the South African government no doubt functioned to suppress the mobilizing potential of those

grievances, as political opportunity theorists would argue. However, the Klandermans study—based on structured, face-to-face interviews with a representative, stratified sample of between 2,220 and 2,286 South Africans, age 18 and over, conducted annually over the 5-year period 1994–1998—revealed that the material base of the grievances not only changed over time from predominately race-based to class-based, but that the effect of these objective, material conditions were modified by subjective assessments, such as assessments of procedural justice. Using trust in government and perceived influence on government as proxies for procedural justice, it was found that variation in these measures moderated the effect of living standard on grievance formation. In other words, objective conditions were less likely to be associated with grievance formation when respondents trusted government or felt that they had some measure of influence (Klandermans et al. 2001).

Identificatory Inequality

In light of such findings, we believe that distributive and procedural forms of justice and injustice provide a useful point of departure for exploring movement orientations towards social inequality. However, we also argue that the distributive/procedural distinction alone is not sufficiently comprehensive because it does not readily encompass the identity claims and work of movements seeking to change or buttress their constituent and/or antagonist identities. While some such movements may fall under the purview of so-called “identity movements” engaged in “identity politics” (see Bernstein and Taylor 2013), as with the gay and lesbian movements, it is also the case that many movements seeking to alter existing distributive or procedural arrangements are also deeply concerned about inequalities that are nested in patterns of identification and interaction (see Armstrong and Bernstein 2008).

We label this third type of inequality *identificatory inequality*, and define it as inequality that arises from the perceived fairness and quality of

interpersonal treatment by others in the course of everyday interactions (Anderson and Snow 2001; Mikula et al. 1990). This concept draws from parallel research on “interactional justice” in the organizations literature (e.g. Bies 2001; Bies and Moag 1986; Masterson et al. 2000), which focuses on experiences of individual interactions, apart from distributive and procedural criteria, as critical in constituting personal evaluations of fairness. However, we find the term “identificatory” to be more suitable since it directs attention to the ways in which the perceived quality and fairness of interpersonal interactions may be systematically influenced by an individual’s real or purported membership in a stigmatized group or category (Link et al., this volume). Accordingly, many social movements seek to symbolically reconstitute or realign the ways in which particular groups are located, perceived, and talked about, apart from distributive and procedural arrangements.

Interactional sources of inequality should be seen as conceptually distinct from distributive and procedural sources because a strictly distributive or procedural focus on inequality “misses much of the... real life implications of inequality for the everyday functioning and psychology of social actors” (Anderson and Snow 2001, p. 395). These everyday interactional experiences may include, for instance, individual and collective stereotyping and negative othering, attention deprivation, and the concentration of “negative attention” (Derber 1979). Behaviors and responses of individuals to such experiences, when viewed through an interactionist lens, are not merely reflective of the appraisals of others, but are also mediated by a variety of interpretive and creative processes (Goffman 1963; Strauss 1969). Generally, responses are oriented around the maintenance of a sense of dignity, self-worth, and honor in the face of such denigration, as has been empirically demonstrated (Einwohner 2003, 2006; Goffman 1961; Snow and Anderson 1987).

While a range of responsive strategies are available to individuals who experience stigmatization (see Anderson and Snow 2001, pp. 401–404; Goffman 1963), engaging in collective action through participation in social movements is

a particularly salient strategy because of its potential to generate “a sense of efficacy and positive regard at both the individual and collective levels” (Anderson and Snow 2001, p. 403). Because the day-to-day lived experiences of inequality constitute an important potential source of mobilizing grievances for collective actors, it is not surprising that many movements are oriented towards this third type of inequality. In fact, Ralph Turner prophesied this concern with identity and self-regard in 1969. Extending Mannheim’s historical approach articulated in *Utopia and Ideology* (1936), Turner (1969, pp. 391–395) argued that “major eras in history have differed in the dominant sense of injustice which underlay the major movements of the time and dictated the main direction of social change,” contending that both the liberal humanitarian and socialist conceptions of injustice have been exhausted and that “a new revision is in the making.” Foreshadowing aspects of new social movement theory (Buechler 1995; Kriesi et al. 1995; Laraña et al. 1994), Turner argued that the evolving new injustice concerned the yearning for a satisfactory sense of personal worth, dignity, and identity.

Interconnections Among Types of Inequality

It is critical to note that these three distinct forms of inequality are not mutually exclusive, and overlap to a considerable degree in individual and collective life. Derber (1979, pp. 41–42), for example, recognizes the deep affinity between distributional, procedural, and identificatory inequality when he argues that “one aspect of class hierarchy is that members of subordinate classes are regarded as less worthy of attention in relations with members of dominant classes and so are subjected to subtle but systematic face-to-face deprivations.” Such overlap is often reflected in social movement claims and actions that are oriented towards multiple types of inequality. For instance, the “size” or “fat acceptance” movement not only seeks to end patterns of institutional discrimination against individuals labeled as “obese” (procedural injustice), but also

to reframe medical and social discourse about the “obesity epidemic” by presenting fatness as a inevitable form of social diversity, rather than a preventable health risk (Saguy and Riley 2005; Sobal 1999). Similarly, the Black Power movement sought to implement a wide variety of radical distributional and procedural rearrangements in American society, but these goals were inseparable from efforts to reframe the collective self-perception of black Americans through a variety of cultural and aesthetic practices organized around the principle of “black is beautiful” (Van Deburg 1992; see also Carmichael and Hamilton 1967).

Movement actors often recognize the deep interconnections between various forms of inequality through their claims, such as the women’s movement’s famous dictum that “the personal is political” (Hanisch 1969), Malcolm X’s linkage between political and “psychological liberation” for black Americans (Van Deburg 1992, p. 5), or Frantz Fanon’s earlier discourse on the freedom of the Antilles “Negro” being contingent on the rejection of the “white masks” many adopted in order to camouflage and mute the distributional, procedural, and interactional inequalities they encountered daily (Fanon 1967). As such examples demonstrate, because structures of social inequality tend to include distributional, procedural, and identificatory elements, the engagement of movements with various types of inequalities often reflect their multifaceted nature.

Thus far we have highlighted the varying types of inequality that social movements either seek to alleviate, transform, or reinforce, and the availability of collective action as a potent means through which such goals may be attained. We have shown that social movements not only seek to change the ways in which benefits and resources are distributed and/or the procedures through which such distributions are made, but also the ways in which particular collective categories are identified and located within patterns of interpersonal interaction. Furthermore, while distributional, procedural, and identificatory inequality may be thought of as conceptually distinct in terms of their source and functioning, they often overlap considerably in the everyday experience

of social actors. This has impelled some movements, whether progressive, reactionary, or conservative, to wrangle with the complex and interconnected nature of inequality in everyday life. Whether focused on singular or interconnecting forms of inequality, movements must somehow transform individual and collective perceptions and experiences of inequality into mobilizing grievances in order for mobilization to become possible. The central mechanisms and processes that account for this transformation are discussed in the next section.

Inequality and Collective Mobilization: Contributing Mechanisms and Processes

Although the existence of one or more of the three aforementioned types of inequality can provide fertile ground for the development of shared collective grievances that can lead to social movement mobilization, the existence of inequality does not necessarily lead to the development of such grievances. Rather, it is only under specific circumstances that such grievances become mobilizing grievances that contribute to collective participation in social movements. Put succinctly, experiences of inequality do not automatically, or even predictably, congeal into mobilizing grievances, and such grievances are generally more widespread than collective participation in social movements that seeks to address them. Hence the question: what mechanisms and processes contribute to the transformation of experiences of inequality—whether distributional, procedural, or identificatory—into mobilizing grievances? In this section, then, we identify and discuss three interrelated discursive/social psychological processes that give rise to collective action through participation in social movements, and the relations of these mechanisms and processes to systems of inequality: framing processes, identity work associated with the construction, imputation, and avowal of collective identities, and the generation of participatory incentives.

Framing Processes

Frames are mental and social structures that enable individuals and groups to cognitively organize experiences and events so that they “hang together” in a relatively meaningful and interpretable fashion (Snow et al. 1986). Frames, in other words, are packages of interpretations about “what is going on” in a given social context. In its original usage, Goffman (1974, p. 21) referred to frames as “schemata of interpretation” that help individuals to “locate, perceive, identify, and label” occurrences within their lives. Within the collective action literature, the framing perspective has helped to draw attention to the “meaning work” engaged in by social movement participants. Viewed through this perspective, movements act not only as carriers and transmitters of extant beliefs and values, but “they are also actively engaged in the production of meaning for participants, antagonists, and observers” (Snow and Benford 1988, p. 198).

The meaning work involved in the construction and invocation of collective action frames relates to three core framing processes. First, movements must diagnose the existence of a social problem and make attributions of blame for its existence. Next, movements must suggest solutions to the problem, involving identification of strategies, tactics, and targets. Lastly, movements must provide some motivational rationale for participation. These processes comprise, respectively, the *diagnostic*, *prognostic*, and *motivational* aspects of collective action frames (Snow and Benford 1988, pp. 200–204). However, frames are rarely unanimous within a movement, and it is common that different factions within a movement family will vary with regard to their claims regarding diagnoses, prognoses, and motivations for collective mobilization (Benford 1993a). Movement-specific frames may also draw from broader “master frames” (Snow and Benford 1992; Swart 1995). Master frames function in a similar fashion as movement-specific frames, but are more broadly elaborated, generalized, and culturally resonant; thus, they become available as potential claims-making rhetorics for a variety of movements. In Snow and Benford’s (1992,

p. 138) terms, master frames act as a “grammar” through which many different movements can organize their own specific claims. A pertinent example is the legacy of the civil rights movement; its claim of equal rights for all regardless of ascribed characteristics has become a source of inspiration for innumerable movements throughout the world.

This meaning work is critical for understanding the relationship between social movements and inequality. As mentioned earlier, there is no one-to-one relationship between collective experiences of inequality, the development of shared grievances on the basis of such experiences, and participation in collective action because of these grievances. As Klandermans (1984) notes, social movement mobilization actually comprises two distinct components: consensus mobilization, where a social movement attempts to garner support for its interpretation of existing social conditions, and action mobilization, where such interpretations facilitate the development of collective action through a calling up of participants. These two aspects of mobilization relate directly to the three core aspects of framing processes. Many individuals tend to interpret experiences of inequality as relatively natural or “given” elements of social life; inequalities must thus be first and foremost constructed as a social problem or injustice for collective mobilization to become possible (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988; Spector and Kitsuse 1977). Once an inequality has been constructed as such and its source has been identified, it still requires a potential solution. And such solutions only give rise to corrective action through social movement mobilization once a salient call to action has been made. The meaning work involved in collective framing processes is thus critical in understanding how collective experiences of inequality are transformed into corrective action through social movement participation.

Gamson (1992) distinguishes between three components of collective action frames that extend from their diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational components: (1) a sense of injustice, (2) an element of identity, and (3) the role of agency. The sense of injustice and the construction of col-

lective identities are especially relevant in connecting the aforementioned “justice evaluations” with framing processes. As Klandermans (1997, p. 17) notes, a sense of injustice commonly arises from moral indignation concerning “illegitimate inequality”: “treatment of groups that is perceived as unfair” (see also Folger 1986; Major 1994). The adoption of an injustice frame is what distinguishes conventional experiences of inequality, characterized by relative acceptance and noncontroversial behavior, from those that elicit a contentious reaction. This is because “those acting in authority roles assume the right to define the penumbra of social expectations that surround the primary framework,” or “legitimizing frame,” of such experiences (Gamson et al. 1982, pp. 15, 123). Those who adopt an injustice frame challenge the accepted nature of this legitimizing frame by making it an object of contention (Gamson et al. 1982, p. 123; see also Turner and Killian 1972, pp. 259, 265; Moore 1978, p. 88).

However, an important aspect of whether or not an injustice frame is conducive to social movement participation is the abstractness or concreteness of the target of diagnostic framing: “When we see impersonal, abstract forces as responsible for our suffering, we are taught to accept what we cannot change and make the best of it... an injustice frame requires that motivated human actors carry some of the onus for bringing about harm and suffering” (Gamson 1992, p. 32). This is not to say that more abstract or structural forces do not play a role in successful injustice frames, but rather that concrete targets and abstract forces must be bridged together in some fashion (Gamson 1992, p. 33). This bridging is ultimately necessary for an injustice frame to counteract the impersonal “veiling of responsibility” attendant to many forms of systemic inequality (Sennett 1980).

In terms of the form of inequality that an injustice frame highlights or accents, it is likely that injustice frames that focus on certain types of inequality are more likely to resonate with individual and collective perceptions and experiences than others. For instance, American political discourse tends to legitimate efforts to alleviate inequality of procedural opportunities,

rather than inequality of outcomes through social redistribution of resources, with claims regarding identificatory inequalities sometimes seen as “making excuses” or playing into “identity politics,” as when challenging groups are sometimes charged with playing “the race card.” Under this widespread legitimating frame, all Americans are seen as deserving of the same procedural chances. Distributional inequalities are viewed often as a result of a lack of individual drive and effort, and claims of systemic discrimination or prejudice are sometimes seen as veiling this basic lack of proper motivation. Of course, the relative salience of such a widespread legitimating frame will often vary widely from one group to the next, opening up numerous possibilities to locate it as an object of contention. (See also Walker, this volume, on this point.)

The diagnostic attribution of blame or responsibility for an inequality leads directly to the identity component of collective action frames, since the construction of a “they” who is responsible also implies the existence of an opposing “we” who experiences this inequality. It is this construction of protagonist and antagonist “identity fields” that is most central in transforming an individual sense of injustice into a collectively mobilizing set of grievances that are shared by many people. Hunt et al. (1994, p. 191) note that “while diagnoses involve the imputation of motives and identities regarding antagonists or targets of change, motivational framing entails the social construction and avowal of motives and identities for protagonists. These shared motives and identities in turn serve as an impetus for collective action.” Protagonist and antagonist identities are directly related in the construction of a social movement’s identity field, since social movements often portray antagonist beliefs, values, and practices as being in direct conflict with their own (Hunt and Benford 2004; Morris 1992). Framing is thus highly interrelated with the construction and avowal of personal and collective identities, discussed in more detail below.

It is important to note that the socially constructed nature of collective action frames also indicates the socially constructed nature of per-

ceptions of inequality and injustice. From a constructionist perspective, perceived inequality does not exist apart from the comparison processes that create an apprehension of it (Folger 1986; Klandermans 1989; Major 1994), and the claims-making processes that construct injustice frames around these perceptions. Importantly, these processes do not preclude the usage of injustice frames by collectivities that are, objectively speaking, in positions of relative power and privilege with regards to distributional, procedural, or identificatory inequalities. It therefore follows that injustice frames are also utilized by conservative and reactionary movements that seek to either enforce existing systems of inequality, or construct new ones.

The paradox for some conservative or reactionary movements is that in order to either reinforce or construct systems of inequality, they often tend to portray themselves as *victims* of inequality and injustice. In constructing such claims, conservative and reactionary movements tend to exhibit equivalent framing processes toward purported systems of inequality as movements on the progressive end of the political spectrum, but transform and rework existing injustice frames in important ways. For example, Berbrier’s (1998, 2002) research on framing processes within contemporary new racist white supremacist (NRWS) rhetoric focuses on the ways in which movement adherents construct a coherent and resonant sense of themselves as victims of discrimination and inequality. Because open proclamations of racism and bigotry have become stigmatized within American political culture, the rhetorics of NRWS activists are primarily “intended to legitimate and destigmatize the movement” by claiming “that they are not racists, but rather merely people acting on behalf of an ethnic or minority group” (Berbrier 1998, p. 433).

Berbrier emphasizes two strategies that make such framings possible: equivalence and reversal. The equivalence strategy portrays whites as equivalent to ethnic minority groups by articulating and amplifying claimed commonalities, as when former Ku Klux Klansman David Duke

urged European Americans to “band together as a group the same way African Americans do, the same way as other minorities do” (Associated Press 2000). Since other ethnic groups have organized in collective action organizations, such as SNCC, La Raza Unida, and the Jewish Defense League, it is appropriate for whites to organize along similar lines. Hence, the National Association for the Advancement of White People. Thus, NRWS activists invoke a resonant “cultural pluralist master frame” that argues that ethnic and racial diversity and difference are invaluable assets to contemporary American social life (Berbrier 1998, p. 434). Whites, viewed as “just another minority,” are therefore as deserving of equal toleration and respect of mutual difference as all other ethnic and racial groups (Berbrier 2002).

Reversal follows from equivalence, and argues that because whites are one minority group among many, they are also equally susceptible to practices of discrimination and racism, as exhibited in Duke’s contention that European Americans face “massive discrimination” from the country’s rapidly growing population of minorities and that they will soon be “outnumbered and outvoted in (their) country” (Associated Press 2000). And sometimes, whites are portrayed as especially threatened or endangered as a “race,” as frequently articulated by White Power activists. Illustrative are the following comments of the lead singer of a British White Power band:

The white race deserves to survive and prosper as much as any other biological entity in this world, whether it is a type of polar bear or the panda or the thousands of other endangered species. To my mind the world’s most endangered species is our people. (Quoted in Corte and Edwards 2008, p. 8).

Thus, the fact that having “white pride” is not found to be culturally acceptable, whereas other forms of ethnic pride are, is seen as evidence of discrimination and intolerance against whites rather than an historical legacy of resistance to white supremacy and racist domination by non-whites.

In many ways, examples such as the above demonstrate the potentially strange career that highly resonant master frames may develop over

time. Continual generalization and elaboration of “minority rights” frames, for instance, has made them available to a wider range of movements as they diffuse across an increasing number of protest cycles (Berbrier 2002; Snow and Benford 1992). Increasingly decoupled from their initial historical reference point, they are more likely to be invoked in a more or less “blinded” and ahistorical fashion: frames initially constructed by oppressed groups to ameliorate or eliminate a system of inequality may be later collectively invoked by dominant groups to reinforce or maintain that same system, especially when the system of privilege and/or domination is perceived or imagined as being disrupted and threatened.

Of course, not all conservative and reactionary movements are required to invoke a victim status or cite evidence of discrimination in order to promote their movement goals. Rather, some extreme right-wing movements rely on frames of natural or inherited superiority to promote the rightness of their dominance in a hierarchical system, and the corollary injustice of attempts to overthrow or alter such arrangements. The most extreme example of such processes may be found during episodes of genocide and mass killing, such as the Nazi party’s framing of Aryan racial superiority as a justification for its murderous expansionism. Such frames of supremacy and dominance can have strong mobilizing effects.³ Hagan and Raymond-Richmond (2008), utilizing survey data from refugees in the Darfur region of Sudan, show that collective racial dehumanization acted as a critical mechanism in organizing the dynamics of violent victimization. Specifically, they demonstrate that the collective invocation of dehumanizing racial epithets by “Arab” Sudanese against “black” Darfurians as inherently inferior and servile created the necessary collective “spark” to trigger mass genocidal violence. These invocations drew from the Arab-supremacist ideologies that had been previously invoked by Sudanese state officials. Thus, militia

³ For a review of collective framing in the context of genocide and mass killings, see Owens et al. 2013.

leaders acted as “ethnic entrepreneurs” in utilizing official state ideologies of racial supremacy in their collective action frames.

From a social psychological perspective, frames of natural or inherited in-group superiority may be thought of as establishing “contrast conceptions” to collectively personify out-group members (Shibutani 1973). While individuals involved in collective conflicts tend to promote idealized self-conceptions as being motivated by their own positive values, “they tend to impute to their enemies the most foul motives... everything he does tends to be interpreted in the most unfavorable light” (Shibutani 1973, p. 226). When such contrast conceptions become highly elaborated and crystallized, they often result in the suspension of moral standards, “making possible brutality that would never be tolerated” outside of the conflict (Shibutani 1973, p. 228). Thus, frames of collective superiority or inferiority may contribute to a deteriorating political climate in which opposed collectivities live in partitioned realms where equal moral standards no longer apply. This removal of antagonists from the “universe of moral obligation” may be especially mobilizing for movements that seek to construct or enforce systems of radical inequality, justifying their domination of an inherently inferior “other” (Fein 1993; Gamson 1995).

From the above considerations, we can see that the ways in which social movement actors condense the “world out there” into a meaningful set of interpretations about “what is going on” is especially relevant to how systems of inequality eventually translate into collective mobilization. However, the meaning work involved in framing is not sufficient on its own to produce social movement mobilization around issues of inequality. What also must be achieved is the construction of a shared sense of “we-ness” or “one-ness” across the disparate range of people who are either affected by such inequality, or who are potentially invested in creating, reinforcing, or transforming it in some fashion. We thus turn to consideration of the processes associated with the construction and avowal of this shared sense of identity. (See also Callero, this volume.)

Collective Identity and Identity Work

The concept of collective identity is rooted in the principle that social interaction minimally requires that individuals and groups be situated and placed as social objects in some fashion. This then implies that interaction is minimally contingent on the “reciprocal attribution and avowal of identities” (Snow 2001, p. 2213).

The distinctiveness of collective identity in relation to social movements can be elucidated through an exposition of the identity concept,⁴ which can be broken down to three levels: personal, social, and collective. *Social identities* are the foundational or anchoring concept in that they are grounded in and derive from social roles, such as movement activist, student, or spouse, or broad social categories, such as gender, racial, ethnic, and national categories. This structural grounding is captured in the parallel concepts of “role identities” (Stryker 1980) and “categorical identities” (Calhoun 1997; Tajfel and Turner 1986). *Personal identities* are self-designations and self-attributions made by actors, and may differ from social designations or attributions according to the relative salience and affective valence of the social roles and categories individual actors are assigned or are presumed to play or hold. At the individual level, personal identities are especially likely to be asserted in social interaction when other imputed social identities are regarded as contradictory. This is especially likely when individuals are cast into social roles or identities that are insulting and demeaning, and they parry the imputed social identity by invoking an alternative identity, as illustrated by the homeless when they reject the category-imputation of bum by asserting, “I’m not a bum, I’ve just had a run of bad luck.”⁵

⁴ For a set of essays on the relationship between self, identity, and social movements, see Stryker et al. 2000.

⁵ For analysis of stigma management strategies and identity work among the homeless, see Anderson et al. (1994) and Snow and Anderson (1987).

When such juxtapositions of identities occur at the collective level, we are in the realm of collective identity and related identity work.

Collective Identity *Collective identities* have at their core a shared sense of “we-ness” or “oneness” that potentially supersedes both personal and social identities, and that is anchored in real or imagined shared attributes and experiences among a certain collectivity that distinguishes themselves from one or more real or imagined sets of “others” (Snow and McAdam 2000; Snow 2001; Taylor and Whittier 1992).

Collective identities can thus be distinguished from social and personal identities in several ways. First, collective identities may not necessarily be embedded in existing social identities, since they can arise dynamically in the context of emergent collective events. This is demonstrated, for instance, in Walder’s (2006) research on the emergence of Red Guard factionalism during China’s Cultural Revolution, showing that the conflictual identities that emerged among competing student factions were a product of differing interpretations of a shared situation, rather than structurally or ideologically inherent to the groups themselves. Specifically, choices made by different student activist groups in Beijing universities were strongly influenced by rapidly changing political contexts, rather than the activists’ positions and views in the political status quo prior to the Cultural Revolution. The changes were created by the swift introduction and withdrawal of state-sponsored “work teams,” which were intended to supervise the activities of student activist groups in different universities. The various actions of these work teams, which varied widely over time, and their rapid withdrawal by the state later on, introduced considerable ambiguity into how individual activists should negotiate their previous party allegiances and political positions. Walder shows that variation in these political contexts, and their interpretation by student activists, better accounts for the emergence of factional identities than the previous structural position or ideological beliefs of the student groups.

Second, collective identities may be associated with the cognition of a shared fate, threat, or cause that is animating and potentially mobilizing in emotional, cognitive, and even moral ways. This shared sense of being bound together collectively in some fashion thus aids in motivating individuals to act on behalf of the purported interests or needs of the group. Third, the emergence of collective identities generally implies that other social identities have subsided in relative salience or importance for an actor; the collective identity thus has primacy over other identities in terms of its own object of orientation and the character of social action that follows from it.

The dual importance of a perception of a collective threat or shared fate in generating a salient collective identity, and its salience relative to more specific social identities, is demonstrated in Okamoto’s (2003) study of pan-Asian American collective action between 1970 and 1998. Okamoto tests theories of ethnic labor market competition and cultural division of labor in relation to the generation of mobilizing ethnic grievances, but also extends them by specifying the conditions under which intra-group ethnic identities and boundaries may become more or less conducive to mobilization on the basis of a pan-ethnic (Asian) collective identity. Specifically, Okamoto finds that occupational segregation between Asians and outside groups increases the likelihood of pan-Asian mobilization, whereas segregation within different Asian ethnic groups decreased its likelihood by increasing the salience of more specific ethnic and national identities. Competition between Asian ethnic groups also decreased the likelihood of a pan-ethnic identity. But Asian Americans did not tend to mobilize around a panethnic identity to prevent relative gains by non-Asian groups, as competition theory would predict. Rather, pan-Asian mobilization occurred “in order to fight against the prejudice, discrimination, and violence directed at them,” showing that “the majority of pan-Asian events were... tied to a previous event that usually involved some form of prejudice or discrimination against Asian Americans” as a whole (Okamoto 2003, p. 834). Thus, processes that heightened the salience of pan-Asian identity

relative to more specific ethnic identities, as well as the shared perception of threat against Asians as a whole, made mobilization on the basis of a pan-ethnic Asian identity more likely to occur.

Examples such as those noted above also inform understanding of the fourth and fifth distinguishing characteristics of collective identities in relation to social and personal identities. Fourth, collective identities and personal identities share a necessary interconnection, in that the identity highlighted through a collective identity must be a salient aspect of an individual's sense of self (Gamson 1991). Thus, Okamoto (2003) finds that collective mobilization on the basis of a pan-Asian identity was most likely to occur when social conditions highlighted potential threats or challenges to Asians as a unified and collectively-bounded group, rather than challenges to specific Asian ethnicities or nationalities (see also Le Espiritu 1992). Lastly, collective identities are especially fluid and fleeting, more so than either social or personal identities, and can be altered in both their content and relative salience through emergent patterns of interaction, such as those between student groups and state work teams noted by Walder (2006) above.

Collective identities serve several important functions in motivating individuals to participate in collective action. First, they serve to create a sense of boundaries between the groups from which a social movement intends to draw participants and those it does not. As Taylor and Whittier (1992) demonstrate in their study of lesbian feminist communities, "For any subordinate group, the construction of a positive identity requires both a withdrawal from the structures and values of the dominant, oppressive society and the creation of new self-affirming values and structures" (p. 111; see also Hunt et al. 1994). We agree with this assertion, but also argue that such construction of collective identity boundaries also serves the interests of dominant groups who seek to maintain or create systems of inequality. In cases such as Hagan and Raymond-Richmond's (2008) study of genocidal mobilization in Darfur, the collective construction of contrast conceptions of "black" Sudanese groups as naturally inferior, and "Arab" Sudanese as naturally domi-

nant, serves to create both a potent antagonist identity and a powerful protagonist, in-group identity to mobilize around.

Second, there is the construction of a sense of shared consciousness among the groups involved in a social movement's claims-making activities. This imputed consciousness applies not only to those whom a social movement seeks to recruit or help in some fashion, but also the purported adversaries of a movement, as well as third parties. If "we" all feel a particular way, this corresponds to an equal sense of what "they" think, as well as what "everyone else" thinks. The consciousness claims involved in the construction of collective identities thus tend to invoke, either directly or indirectly, the full range of identity fields involved in social movement mobilization (Hunt et al. 1994; Taylor and Whittier 1992).

Lastly, collective identities serve to negotiate the meanings and symbols commonly associated with a particular identity in order to rework and reorganize these meanings in some fashion. While "stigma management" strategies have been utilized by movements associated with the oppressed and downtrodden (Anderson et al. 1994; Anderson and Snow 2001; Goffman 1963), they hold equally true for movements that seek to reinforce or maintain systems of inequality. As Berbrier (1998) notes, a critical objective of the transformation of new white supremacist rhetoric is to transform public perception of the movement as rooted in hatred, bigotry, and violence by reframing its activities in terms of love, pride, heritage-preservation, and victimization (see also Back 2002; Corte and Edwards 2008). This transformation is accomplished, in part, through the attempted symbolic reconstruction of collective "white identity" from dominant and privileged to one that is marked by biological, political, and cultural diminution.

Identity Work How, then, do an individual's own personal and social identities become linked with the constructed and avowed collective identity of a social movement? Here processes of identity work provide important insights. *Identity work* encompasses the range of activities individuals and groups engage in to give meaning to

themselves and others by selectively presenting or attributing and sustaining identities congruent with their interests (Schwalbe and Mason-Schrock 1996; Snow and Anderson 1997; Snow and McAdam 2000). The relationship between collective identity and identity work has most often been situated within symbolic interactionist and constructionist perspectives. While primordialist and structuralist approaches to collective identity posit a direct relationship between a shared sense of “we-ness” and some essentialist or categorical characteristics of actors, the core theme of the constructionist and interactionist approaches to collective identity is that such identities are a process rather than a property of actors (Cerulo 1997; Polletta and Jasper 2001; Snow 2001). Through this lens, “collective identities are seen as invented, created, reconstituted, or cobbled together rather than being biologically preordained or structurally or culturally determined” (Snow 2001, p. 2215). Collective identities, like frames, are open subjects of collective contestation and change over time.

Identity work in the context of social movements, then, refers to the range of activities through which the identities related to social movement mobilization are constructed, managed, and presented. As Einwohner (2013) notes, identity work in social movements has both an internal and external focus: “Internally, activists must construct and maintain a coherent collective identity that helps sustain individuals’ participation in the movement; externally, the task is to present the movement to opponents and third parties in a particular light in order to gain support and achieve goals.” This corresponds to the insight that collective action frames are generally directed towards three distinct “identity fields,” comprised of protagonists, antagonists, and audiences (Hunt et al. 1994). Included among the range of identity work activities are: (a) the construction and display of physical settings and props, as in the case of designing and displaying protest placards avowing and attributing contrasting identities; (b) the arrangement of appearance as exemplified by stylized clothing and bodily markings associated with a particular cause; (c) selective association with other indi-

viduals and groups as occurs in most movements but especially those skewed towards the ends of the left/right continuum; and (d) verbal constructions and assertions as when collectively vocalizing adversarial epithets during protest events. Implicit, then, in the construction and avowal of a movement’s sense of “us” is the construction and avowal of a “them” who is responsible and an audience who could potentially support either side.

With respect to movement orientations toward the three different forms of inequality noted above, what is critical for social movement mobilization is the linkage of an individual’s interpretation of existing social conditions as unequal, unjust, and potentially changeable with a shared sense that there are others in the world who feel the same way and who are willing to act on such interpretations. In other words, how do the personal and social identities of an individual who either experiences inequality or wishes to construct or reinforce inequality, and who views current social conditions as potentially changeable, become aligned with the sense that they are one among many?

This issue is primarily one of “identity correspondence,” defined as “the alignment or linkage of individual identities and action” (Snow and McAdam 2000). Such linkages tend to occur through processes of identity convergence, construction, or transformation. Convergence refers to the bridging of an existing social or personal identity with the professed identity of a particular movement. In convergence the crux is not the construction or alignment of a personal or social identity with a relevant movement identity, since such identities are already in place; rather, it is an issue of connecting or joining these pre-existing identities together in some fashion. Such recruitment processes may often invite individuals who seek to complement their own personal identities with groups whose perspectives and practices are consistent with their own. However, a more likely mechanism involves the appropriation of existing solidary networks by a social movement. Appropriation of such networks are a very effective means for achieving identity convergence, since members of the network already share common relations, lifestyles, or fates, and are thus

more likely to share a common identity (Snow and McAdam 2000, p. 48).

However, such instances of mass recruitment through existing networks depend on a shared extant identity within that network to achieve correspondence, and the “bloc” recruitment of individuals within an extant network, which does not commonly occur. More common, we suspect, are processes of identity construction, which denotes efforts to align the personal identities of potential participants with the professed identity of the movement, such that actors come to regard participation in the movement as consistent with their own interests and goals. Most often this involves some kind of adjustment in the personal identity of participants that makes their identity more closely parallel with the proposed or claimed identity of the movement. Such adjustments may take the form of identity amplification, in which a previously lower-order identity increases in salience in order to motivate participation and action; identity consolidation, in which two previously opposed or disjointed identities are joined together; and identity extension, through which the situational relevance and pervasiveness of an existing personal identity are broadened to the extent necessary to motivate participation in the movement.

Finally, processes associated with identity transformation may take the form of some kind of dramatic rupture in the continuity of a previous or current personal identity, such that a relatively novel sense of oneself is constructed. Such transformations are commonly referred to in the literature on conversion as “biographical reconstruction,” through which aspects of one’s past are cast aside, reordered, or redefined in accordance with the individual’s new universe of discourse and belief (Snow and Machalek 1984). As Blee (2002) notes in her examination of female recruitment into racist movements, such biographical reconstruction can often be framed as a quest by the individual for answers to fundamental social or personal issues, despite the fact that such issues may not become salient for the individual until *after* they become involved. Thus, “women for whom racist activism was an abrupt change in their past lives paint their backgrounds bleakly,

as inadequate or confusing,” while “those few for whom racist activism was life-long speak of their past more positively” (Blee 2002, p. 34).

However, such identity work processes are not always as tidy as the above implies, and are often complicated by several factors. First, as noted in the preceding section, individuals may experience and identify multiple salient forms of inequality (Howard and Renfrow, this volume). While some movements have been specifically oriented towards addressing such intersectional realities of inequality, more often movements have tended to highlight or focus on some forms of inequality and deemphasize or marginalize others. Because of this, movements also risk marginalizing potential participants whose beliefs and experiences have sensitized and oriented them towards multiple forms of inequality. This is demonstrated, for instance, in Roth’s (2004) study of the different paths to mobilization for Black, Chicana, and White feminist movements. Roth shows that rather than being one unified movement against male oppression, the Black, Chicana, and White movements constituted multiple *feminisms* that developed out of different parent movements (Civil Rights, Chicano, and New Left), and different locations in race and class hierarchies. These differing points of origin produced different levels of engagement with multiple forms of injustice. In particular, the Black and Chicana movements directly addressed the intersectionality of race, class, and gender injustice in their theorizing, drawing from their lived experiences and embodied knowledge (Roth 2004, pp. 11–13), whereas white feminists on the left remained relatively unconscious of issues of class and racial injustice (see also Buechler 1990).

Furthermore, the salience of these different forms of inequality can be differentially ranked within an individual’s own salience hierarchy (Stryker 1980), having multiple and conflicting impacts on an individual’s personal and collective sense of self. Such movement-participant dissonance can encourage complicated forms of identity work in which multiple identities and inequality claims must be resolved in some fashion for individual actors. To illustrate, consider Blee’s (2002) observation, in her study of women

in right-wing racist hate groups, that excessive emphasis on racialist issues tended to deemphasize the importance of women's issues within the hyper-masculine culture of the movement. As one male leader noted,

Any discussion of women's rights and feminism within the Movement usually ends abortively with the unchallenged assertion that the whole topic is an artificial one concocted by Jewish communist lesbians to further divide and weaken the White race.... Too many male racialists live in a dream world of their own fantasies when it comes to women. Home is the only place they should be, it is felt, and cooking dinner and having babies are the only things that they should be doing. (Blee 2002, p. 146).

Some women in such groups are often acutely aware of the gender inequalities present in the movement, and the lack of emphasis on gender issues within the movement often leads them to temper their involvement (Blee 2002, p. 153). This and other such examples are notable because they demonstrate that activists seeking to create or reinforce one type of inequality may also be oriented towards maintaining or obscuring another source or type of inequality.

However, such dissonance can also be resolved or muted through more nuanced forms of identity work. Robnett's (2005) findings on "identity justification work" demonstrate that social movement organizations "can maintain members who do not completely share the collective identity" of the group (p. 203). She finds that civil rights participants in SNCC who found their own senses of self only partially aligned with the identity of the movement employed three mechanisms to resolve this dissonance. First, individuals engaged in personal modifications of the movement's identity by extending it to include new meanings that were personally relevant, such as the extension of non-violence to include justifications for violence in self-defense. Second, individuals would amplify the relevant collective identity of the movement in order to find common cause with those who had differing views; black SNCC members who disagreed with the organization's egalitarian views on race tended to overcome this dissonance by acknowledging that SNCC addressed more general prob-

lems of inequality and injustice that were necessary for black people to overcome. Third, some individuals would amplify their sense of a more general activist identity, and overcome incongruence with the movement identity through argument that their participation was pragmatically necessary. In such cases, the individual activist reorders the salience of the movement identity so that their own personal identity as an efficacious activist takes precedence. These findings show that conflicted actors do not always engage in transformative identity work by rearranging their experiences and understandings in accordance with the movement identity. Rather, they may also rearrange and transform their own interpretation of the movement identity so that it better accords with their own personal understandings and biographical experiences.

In this section we have focused attention on what we call identificatory inequality and its association with social movements through the development of mobilizing collective identities via various identity work processes and mechanisms. Although conceptually distinct from distributional and procedural inequalities, in actuality they often overlap with identificatory inequalities, which are often rooted in and build on perceived or actual distributional and/or procedural inequities. But even with construction and congealing of a salient collective identity, that alone is seldom sufficient to guarantee participation.

Participatory Incentives

Few questions in the study of social movements have generated as much research as that concerning differential participation. That is, why do some people rather than others participate in social movements? This question is not as straightforward as it might appear, however, since there are actually three questions embedded in it: the first concerns whether one identifies or sympathizes with a movement and its goals. But shared grievances and objectives, or what Klandermans (1984) has called "consensus mobilization," does not ensure participation. It indicates only potential. Hence, the second question: what motivates

actual participation or what Klandermans calls “action mobilization?” In metaphorical terms, what moves one from the balcony to the barricades?

Additionally, we know that initial participation does not guarantee that one will remain committed, as Catherine Corrigan-Brown’s (2012) recent research makes clear. In an analysis of panel data from a national representative sample of U.S. high school seniors at four points in time (1965, 1973, 1982, and 1997), she found that while two-thirds participated in some social movement organization or activity in at least one of the four time periods, most did not participate across the four time periods: 29.5% participated in one time period, 18.9% in two time periods, 10.6% in three time periods, and only 6% in four time periods. Additionally, in a follow-up comparative case study of trajectories of participation in four movements (Catholic Workers, Concerned Women for America, United Farm Workers, and a NIMBY homeowner’s movement) that differed in terms of goals and organizational structure, Corrigan-Brown found that persistent participation was relatively infrequent among the 60 participants interviewed in-depth: 17% continued participation, in varying degrees, with the same movement; 25% disengaged from the initial movement and subsequently became involved in another movement; 13% disengaged from the initial movement but resumed participation at some later point in time; and 45% disengaged fully from movement participation. These studies together clearly problematize the issue of persistent participation. Hence, the third question: What accounts for ongoing or persistent participation?

The earlier discussions of framing processes and collective identity and identity work bear on the first two questions, as do previous discussions of chapters on the intersection of social movements and social psychology in earlier social psychology handbooks (see Rohlinger and Snow 2003; Snow and Oliver 1995; Zurcher and Snow 1981). Thus, we will focus on the second and third questions, but with an emphasis on the third—that is, what accounts for persistent participation.

From the vantage point of rational choice theory, the key to understanding both abbreviated and persistent participation is largely a matter of the presence or provision of incentives of two kinds. One is that the perceived benefits or gains from participation outweigh the perceived costs and risks. The other kind of incentive is linked to Mancur Olson’s (1965) “free rider” thesis, which holds that non-participation is highly rational when the desired benefit or goal is a “public good” that is available to everyone (it is indivisible and non-excludable) irrespective of whether they contribute to its attainment. Consider, for example, movements that seek to expand the procedural rights of underprivileged racial, ethnic, or gender movements with the objective of seeking legislation designed to assure that all members of the category are granted the same rights that the privileged take for granted. Certainly the movement activists would not be the sole beneficiaries of such legislation, since all same category members would benefit from a more equitable playing field with respect to fair employment practices or the prospect of voting, for example. This simple fact raises the question of why any single individual would participate in a movement aiming to secure public or collective goods, such as procedural rights. Why not just “free ride” on the efforts of others? Thus, social movement leaders and activists are confronted with the challenge of neutralizing the inclination to free ride and/or to provide additional rationales or motivation for participation.

There are various sorts of incentives or motivations that can be offered to individuals to increase the odds of both their initial and sustained participation. They cluster into three sets: selective, solidary, and moral. Each of these overlaps rather tidily with the three generic types of commitment Rosabeth Kanter (1972) identified and elaborated in her study of the survival viability of nineteenth century utopian communes. They include instrumental commitment, which is arguably generated by selective incentives; affective commitment, which can be construed as a byproduct of solidary incentives; and moral commitment, which corresponds with moral incentives. Kanter found, among other things, that

the more successful communes—those lasting 33 years or more—were those which successfully developed a greater number of commitment-building strategies and mechanisms.

Selective Incentives Selective incentives or benefits, unlike collective goods, are divisible and excludable in the sense that they benefit only those who contribute their time, energy, and/or resources to the cause.⁶ These incentives can be generated through a number of different processes. Some are clearly matching processes, as with the provision of tangible material inducements as a selective incentive for participation. Illustrative are the free meals and beverages that are sometimes given to those who attend a demonstration event at the end of a march, as has often been done to induce the homeless to participate in movement activities that address their plight (Cress and Snow 1996). Sometimes movements hand out t-shirts, baseball caps, buttons, and other such items, as well as sponsor or provide a forum for music. But these sorts of tangible things, aside from music, are far from being potent inducements, except perhaps in the case of the most economically marginalized citizens. There are, however, two alternative mechanisms for generating selective incentives.

Both of these alternative mechanisms are variants of motivational framing, which provides a “call to arms” or rationale for engaging in movement sponsored collective action that goes beyond the diagnostic and prognostic framing (Snow and Benford 1988). More concretely, motivational framing entails the construction of “vocabularies of motive” that provide prods to action by, among other things, amplifying reasons for participation that may override feared risks and the free rider problem. Benford (1993b) has identified and elaborated six sets of vocabularies of motive, two of which can be construed as types of selective incentives in that their receipt is contingent on participation. They include the promise of greater tangible benefits and status enhancement to those who engage in movement

practices and do so on an ongoing basis. The vocabulary of *greater tangible benefit* seems to be associated mainly with religious or utopian movements that promise physical, relational, spiritual, and even sometimes material benefits to those who engage in particular practices, such as chanting, praying, meditating, making sacrifices, and the like. The vocabulary of *status enhancement*, on the other hand, frames participation in terms of being among “the elect” or in the “vanguard of history,” a motivational framing practice that is fairly commonplace in both revolutionary political movements and in religious movements, and which is often linked to the idea of class or hierarchical transposition.

Illustrations of motivational framing in terms of the vocabulary of status enhancement are abundant in the narratives, songs and leader promises among movements of the oppressed and down-trodden. Perhaps the best known example of this vocabulary in the social movement literature is Marx and Engel’s designation of the proletariat as the vanguard of history. “Of all the classes that stand face to face with the bourgeoisie today,” they write in the *Manifesto*, “the proletariat alone is a really revolutionary class. The other classes decay and finally disappear in the face of Modern Industry; the proletariat is its special and essential product.” And then they conclude with this popularization of the pamphlet’s final sentences: “Workers of the World, Unite. You have nothing to lose but your chains!”—clearly a call to arms with special historic status accruing to those who join the cause.

Fast forwarding to the present, such appeals to status enhancement have also been evident in the case of Palestinian suicide bombers. Although reference is made to moral obligation, greater weight appears to be placed on the special rewards that await the suicide bomber or “martyr,” as he or she might be called in some parts of the Islamic world, because suicide is generally understood as being contrary to the teachings of Muhammad. Among the special rewards awaiting the martyr, much is made of “72 black-eyed virgins” that await them in heaven. But “more basic... is the omnibus promise of divine favor rewarding them for righteous deeds”

⁶ For an elaborated theoretical discussion of selective incentives, see Oliver (1980).

(Lelyveld 2001, p. 54). As noted by a member of Hamas involved in the recruitment and training of martyrs:

We focus attention on Paradise, on being in the presence of Allah, on meeting the Prophet Muhammad, on interceding for his loved ones so that they, too, can be saved from the agonies of Hell, on the houris, and on fighting the Israeli occupation and removing it from the Islamic trust that is Palestine. (Hassan 2001, p. 40).

In addition to the promise of divine rewards that accompany ascent to Paradise, there have been various earthly enticements, such as the enhancement of the martyr's former identity: their pictures have been plastered on public walls, their deaths announced in the press and media as weddings rather than as obituaries, their families have received visits from political officials and sometimes even given money, and they have been praised in mosques and at rallies (Lelyveld 2001; Wilkinson 2002). Motivational incentives for martyrdom appear to be multifaceted, involving both tangible and more ethereal selective incentives. Thus, such selective incentives provide tangible gratifications and rewards, whether in the hear-and-now or hereafter, for participation, both initial and persistent.

Solidary Incentives *Solidary incentives* are rooted in the affective and emotional attachments that make one feel part of a group or collectivity. As *solidary incentives* flow from group association and identification, they are somewhat selective as well. They are probably more compelling motivators than selective incentives because passionate identification with a movement's cause is far more likely to be based on affective ties to a group than on instrumental considerations. In other words, a sense of solidarity regarding distributional and procedural justice and injustice are the stuff that stirs the emotions and helps to forge the "iron in the soul" (Moore 1978). So how are solidaristic incentives embellished or generated? There are several mechanisms.

Certain *organizational forms or structures* can be generative of affective, solidaristic bonds. Research on a range of movements—including Communist movements, the Nazi movement of

the 1920s and '30s, the Black Power movement in the 1960s, and various religious movements—indicate that movement organizations in which members are linked together structurally in a segmented and reticulated, net-like fashion, are particularly generative of *solidary incentives* (Gerlach and Hine 1970; Snow 1987).⁷ Segmented, reticulated movement structures, whether centralized or decentralized, enmesh participants in a set of overlapping and interlocking relationships that can produce strong, reciprocal, interpersonal bonds that function to generate fairly powerful incentives to bond together and act collectively, thus committing members to each other and to more persistent participation.

Engagement in social movement protest events and activities may also generate *solidary incentives* by virtue of sharing a common experience together, as occurred in the many Labor movement gatherings, in the Civil Rights marches and sit-ins in the 1960s, and the various consciousness-raising gatherings and groups associated with the feminist movement of the 1960s and '70s. Intersecting with the actual doing of protest is the *spatial and social ecology* of the context in which the events and activities occur. As Dingxin Zhao observed in the case of the 1989 Beijing student movement students, the anti-authoritarian, pro-democracy protestors not only often marched together by school, class, and major, but also by dormitory room. However, they did this not just out of a sense of group solidarity but because the campus ecology and dormitory-based networks were the basis of mutual influence, persuasion, and even coercion among students (Zhao 2001, p. 249). So certain kinds of organizational arrangements and social ecological contexts may not only be generative of *solidary incentives*, but they can also sanction free riding by pressuring participation among those who may not feel especially connected to the movement or the cause.

⁷ The relevance of social networks and network analysis to social movements is not only operative at the organizational level but is also fundamental to understanding recruitment and particularly differential recruitment (e.g., Why do some individuals rather than others join some movements and not others?) See Diani (2004), Diani and McAdam (2003) and Snow et al. (1980).

One kind of activity that warrants special attention in relation to the generation of solidary incentives, and thus affective commitment, is *music*. Indeed, it is difficult to make sense of the Labor and Civil Rights movements in the U. S., and the White Power and Neo-Nazi movements in both the U.S. and Europe, without consideration of the role played by music and song. As Corte and Edwards (2008) demonstrate in their study of music in the white power movement, the importance of music for the creation of solidary incentives lies both in its ideological content and its polysemy. Music can package movement ideas and beliefs in a less programmatic form, leaving meanings open to multiple forms of interpretation. In the case of the white power movement, music works as a “stealth strategy” because it “veil[s] the explicit features of White Power ideology in encoded language or vague and ambiguous lyrics,” helping to appeal to a wider potential audience (Corte and Edwards 2008, p. 14; see also Eyerman and Jamison 1998, p. 46).

The polysemy of musical meaning also implies that the meaning work encouraged through interpretation of movement music is highly social and relational. As Roy (2010, p. 2) notes, “the effect of music on social movement activities and outcomes depends” mainly “on the social relationships within which it is embedded,” which “implies that music is fundamentally social.” Thus, “the social importance of music lies less” in the “inherent” meaning of a song and more in the ways that people communicate their impressions and thoughts about music to each other” (Roy 2010, p. 14). Certainly the reading of the biographies of protest singers such as Pete Seeger (e.g., Wilkinson 2009) lends considerable credence to Roy’s thesis that music in the context of social movements is a social relational enterprise. More generally, the polysemic and relational nature of musical meaning makes it a unique force for joining a multitude of individual and collective orientations towards a form of inequality undergirding a shared sense of belonging and purpose.

Moral Incentives Moral incentives derive from the principles and values that heighten one’s

sense of conviction, obligation and responsibility. Such principles and values are often viewed by participants as natural, inherent, or perhaps derived from some transcendental authority. Moral incentives can thus be thought of as the “spiritual” benefits of participation in collective action: the improved sense of oneself as an ethical agent who is “doing the right thing,” who has chosen to be on “the right side of history,” or even someone who is following divine providence. A number of studies support the position that a *shared sense of moral duty* is a powerful impetus for collective action (e.g. Benford 1993b; Jasper 1997; Kaplowitz and Fisher 1985; Turner 1981). Since moral incentives often derive from obedience to some “higher” set of principles than those embodied in existing social and political arrangements, engaging in collective action on the basis of shared principles of fairness or justice may be a particularly powerful means of creating a shared sense of collective efficacy and positive self-regard, especially among those who themselves experience inequality and injustice seen as immoral. A frequent corollary of the generation of moral incentives is the purported disincentives of *not* taking action: inaction is often reframed as tacit support for an unjust and immoral status quo, as in the claim that “you can’t be neutral on a moving train” (Zinn 1994).

Convincing potential recruits of the propriety of engaging in collective action, and the attendant impropriety of inaction, is thus a core element in the creation of moral incentives, as illustrated in Benford’s (1993b) study of recruitment to the nuclear disarmament movement. Benford illustrates how anti-nuclear activists utilize motivational frames that emphasize both shared moral responsibility for the “earth’s survival,” and the potential of each new recruit to create a moral tipping point towards general social awareness of the nuclear threat. This is exemplified in the parable of “The Hundredth Monkey”: “Your awareness is needed in saving the world from nuclear war.... You may furnish the added consciousness energy to create the shared awareness of the urgent necessity to rapidly achieve a nuclear free world” (quoted in Benford 1993b, p. 196). Anti-nuclear activists thus “seek to convince others

that they too are morally bound to do their part for the cause” (Benford 1993b, p. 206).

Methods of generating moral incentives will likely depend on the degree of formal or informal acceptance of the principles on which collective action is based. Moral principles are at work in almost all forms of collective action, especially movements that work to advance any form of rights. However, not all moral principles provide equally salient calls to action for all people. For instance, appeals on the basis of human rights, such as mobilization against torture, may be more broadly resonant to potential participants than appeals on the basis of non-human animal rights. Thus, movements that attempt to create moral incentives for action around less-accepted principles of injustice and inequality must often rely on more confrontational methods to recruit participants. One example is the generation of “moral shocks,” as Jasper and Poulsen (1995) show in their study of animal rights and anti-nuclear movement recruitment. Moral shocks utilize powerful symbols deployed by recruiters to create a deep sense of outrage regarding a previously unknown form of inequality or injustice, and the attendant necessity of taking corrective action. As one animal rights activist stated,

I had never thought about it much. . . . But I went by a table one day and saw these terrifying pictures. That’s what goes on inside our country’s best, most scientific labs? There was a tabby [cat] that looked just like mine, but instead of a skull it had some kind of electrodes planted in its head. I thought about that a little bit, right there on the street, and I brought home all their literature. I decided, that’s gotta stop. (Jasper and Poulsen 1995, p. 506).

As this quote shows, the creation of moral incentives for collective action often relies on an implicit encouragement of individuals to probe and challenge their own understandings and beliefs. Jasper (1997, p. 13) notes that “even when we disagree with their positions” regarding a system of inequality, activists who invoke moral rights or imperatives “frequently force us to reconsider our own [positions], to think up reasons and rationales, to decide if our intuitions are consonant with our basic values.” Thus, moral calls to action tend to encourage a weighing of the potential moral incentives of both action and inaction.

While much of the literature on moral incentives focuses on shared moral principles as a precondition for participation, such incentives may also be a *product* of collective action, helping to develop a stronger sense of commitment after initial participation. This point is illustrated in Munson’s (2008) study of individual paths to commitment in the pro-life movement. Using detailed interview and life-history data, Munson shows that while pro-life activists share a common conviction that abortion is fundamentally wrong, much of their other beliefs surrounding the issue are remarkably diverse. Importantly, many activists noted that they possessed no strong anti-abortion feelings prior to their involvement in the movement. Some were initially more pro-choice, such as one activist who stated that she “would have been one of those people that said, ‘I don’t think this is good but you can’t take a woman’s choice away’” (Munson 2008, p. 34). Many other activists noted that while they had initially believed that abortion was wrong, such convictions often remained superficial or abstract. It was only after initial involvement in the movement that their vague or ambivalent pro-life intuitions became strongly-held moral convictions.⁸

More important in explaining initial participation, Munson finds, are individual “turning points”: “liminal states” where individuals are making significant changes in the organization of their everyday lives (Munson 2008, pp. 55–59). These states, which might include the birth of a child or starting a college education, can make individuals not only more “biographically available” for participation through an opening-up of roles and responsibilities (McAdam 1986), but also more cognitively receptive to new beliefs or ideas. Such findings challenge the “common wisdom” that moral incentives always function as a precondition for collective action (Munson 2008). Rather, such incentives may also emerge as a product of participation, helping to organize initially vague justice evaluations into a set of strong moral convictions regarding a form of inequality.

⁸ For similar discussion of transformations of individual beliefs as a result of participation, see Blee (2002), Pierce and Converse (1990), and Polletta (2002).

Interconnections Among Types of Participatory Incentives

In this section, we have explored the issue of participatory incentives, focusing on three sets of incentives: selective, solidary, and moral. Each provides an answer to the free rider problem by supplying instrumental, affective, and normative incentives to not only contribute to the cause but to stick with it, and all three are relevant, in varying degrees, to persistent participation in movements on both the right and left. However, these participatory incentives are often interconnected, and thus often work in tandem. This interconnectedness among the various incentives is clearly illustrated in Nepstad's (2004) study of persistent participation in the Plowshares anti-nuclear movement. Using ethnographic and survey data, Nepstad found that activists remained committed to anti-militarist goals largely because of continued involvement in movement communities, such as activist retreats or volunteering at movement institutions. These communities served to both generate and sustain solidary and moral incentives to continue participation even when selective incentives declined. These communities functioned as "plausibility structures" (Berger 1969) that helped to convince activists that their beliefs and goals were both salient and worth the costs of continued participation, helping to alleviate movement "burnout" or pressures created by changing life circumstances. As one activist stated,

My family doesn't support me at all. I've also gone through hard times with church leaders [because of my Plowshares actions]. But I have a community that says, "You're not crazy. What you're doing is right." I have friends who are behind me 100 percent... You have to meet with like-minded activists. All of the long-haul activists have learned that. It simply isn't possible to continue working for peace without community. (Quoted in Nepstad 2004, p. 51).

Studies such as Nepstad's demonstrate important interconnections among different types of participatory incentives in linking and sustaining collective identities and beliefs regarding social injustices and inequalities within the context of social movement mobilization.

Conclusion

It should be clear, as we have argued, that almost all social movements are oriented, in one fashion or another, to systems of actual or perceived inequality that operate at various social levels. Progressive movements generally seek to alleviate sources of inequality, whereas conservative and reactionary movements seek to maintain, reinforce, or even construct new forms of inequality. While the bulk of scholarly attention has been devoted to the study of progressive movements, we feel it is important that further attention be directed to the study of conservative and reactionary movements regarding their engagement with different forms of inequality, as well as comparative study of movement orientations across the progressive/conservative spectrum. Such attention is warranted not only in light of evidence that contemporary progressive and conservative/reactionary movements overlap considerably in their framing strategies, with conservative movements often positioning themselves as victims of inequality (Berbrier 2002), but also in light of the potential for movement participants to hold *both* progressive and conservative positions in regards to different forms of inequality (e.g. Blee 2002). Understanding how efforts to create or maintain inequality draw from, intersect with, and potentially complicate efforts to alleviate inequality would provide important further insights into the social movement/inequality nexus.

Whatever their aims or goals, the grievances, beliefs, and motivations that mobilize individuals to engage in collective action on the basis of perceived inequality are never mechanistically derived from existing social conditions. Inequality does not exist apart from the comparison processes that create an apprehension of it and the claims-making and framing processes that construct injustice frames around these perceptions. Moreover, perceptions of inequality are much more widespread than the mobilizing grievances that impel individuals to engage in collective action. Because of this, collective actors must engage in various forms of meaning and identity work, and the generation of incentives for action, in order for social movement mobilization to become possible. These social-psychological

processes help to account for the imbalances between the presence of unequal social relations, perceptions of such arrangements as unequal and unjust, and social movement mobilization as a strategy of corrective action.

More generally, the claims-making and identity work of social movements of all forms have arguably acted as one of the primary vehicles through which knowledge and awareness of social inequality have been created and spread throughout history. As shown above, social movements often seek to change not only distributional or procedural arrangements, but also the ways in which people view and talk about themselves and others. Because of these varied and intersecting engagements with different forms of inequality, social movements often work not only towards political and structural change, but may also operate as emergent spaces in which new understandings and identities may be thought about, tested, and put into practice. Recognizing the varieties of social movement engagement with social inequality also means recognizing movements as some of the primary bearers, and sometimes even creators, of knowledge and understanding about social inequality.

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Ross L. Matsueda and Maria S. Grigoryeva

Introduction

Social inequality has long been theorized to be associated with crime. Over 50 years ago, Edwin Sutherland (1947) argued that crime rates are low in egalitarian, consensual societies and high in inequitable societies characterized by conflicting beliefs. It is likely that crime rates are high in inequitable societies because members of disadvantaged groups or classes have particularly high rates of offending. Within the United States, high rates of crime and violence are strongly associated with extremely disadvantaged inner-city urban areas, compared to affluent urban neighborhoods and rural areas. If inequality and disadvantage are associated with crime, what are the causal mechanisms that explain the association between inequality, disadvantage, and crime? How do these causal mechanisms vary across space (neighborhoods and communities) and time (across a person's life-span)? Given that serious criminals risk incarceration, what roles do

crime and incarceration play in the reproduction of social inequality?

This chapter explores these questions. It begins by addressing the question of the definition of crime, arguing that the powerful have more input into the content of criminal law, which is illustrated by the harsh penalties for street crimes typically committed by the less-powerful compared to the relatively soft penalties for white collar and corporate crimes. The chapter then draws on pragmatist social thought and criminological theory to provide an integrated social psychological explanation that helps explain how social inequality may produce high rates of crime. This perspective is then applied to explaining crime rates across neighborhoods and communities and explaining crime across the life course. The chapter ends with a discussion of the consequences of punishment of crime for reproducing social inequality in the United States.

We thank William T. Bielby and Aimée R. Dechter for helpful comments on an earlier draft. This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation (SES-0966662). Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.

R. L. Matsueda (✉) · M. S. Grigoryeva
Department of Sociology, University of Washington,
Box 353340, Seattle, WA 98195, USA
e-mail: matsueda@uw.edu

Inequality in the United States

Economic inequality in the United States is extremely high and has increased precipitously over the past 25 years (e.g., Neckerman and Torche 2007). Among the 30 industrialized nations belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), only Mexico and Russia—two nations considered still developing—display greater income inequality (Smeeding 2005). Of the remaining 28 OECD

countries, the U.S. has by far the highest income inequality. In the U.S., wages polarized during the late 1980s and then stabilized in the 1990s and 2000s. The unprecedented level of inequality can be traced to two trends: increases in wage inequality over the past four decades and the worsening position of the urban underclass in many American cities over the past 40 years.

Wage inequality increased during the 1980s due to four events: (1) Increases in returns to higher education interacted with increases in skill-biased technical change to create demand for highly-educated managers and white collar workers. (2) Unions declined, decreasing the bargaining power of employees, which explains as much as 30% of the growth in wage inequality when considering effects of union decline on both union and non-union pay (Western and Rosenfeld 2011). (3) The “treaty of Detroit” (1950–1970)—which legitimized collective bargaining, created a tripartite institutional framework between labor, industry, and government, and consequently stabilized wage inequality—gave way to the “Washington consensus” (1970–today)—which weakened labor unions, undermined the tripartite institutional framework, deregulated the financial industry, lowered taxes on non-labor and the highest income tax bracket, and stimulated unprecedented growth in the financial sector (Levy and Temin 2011). (4) The decline of the institutional framework and norms of the “Detroit treaty,” along with skill-biased technical changes, transformed top executive skills from firm-specific to generalized skills, freeing top executives to take bids from competing firms, all of which resulted in precipitous increases in executive compensation.

At the same time, within the inner-cities of major metropolitan areas in the U.S.—particularly in rustbelt cities—problems such as concentrated poverty, joblessness, out-of-wedlock births, crack-cocaine use, and violent crime—worsened. The concentrated problems of the urban underclass increased from 1970–1990. During the 1990s, however, with the economic boom, along with changes in public policy (such as expansion of the earned income credit, and changes in housing assistance) the problem of

the underclass diminished in magnitude (Jargowsky and Yang 2006). More recently, the Great Recession of the 2000s has reversed this trend, producing as much as a 25% increase in the number of poor places and the people who live in them. Additionally, the welfare reforms of the 1990s exacerbated the plight of the poor, although these effects were initially hidden by the economic boom only to be revealed later during the recession years. Moreover, class and racial segregation created high concentrations of poor minorities in inner cities as well as rural areas (Lichter et al. 2011). These trends, combined with trends in wage inequality, have resulted in extreme inequality in contemporary America. The remainder of this chapter examines mechanisms by which inequality produces crime.

Inequality and the Definition of Crime

In modern industrial societies, the content of criminal law, the administration of justice, and the infliction of punishment are, at least in part, the result of a political process in which the powerful have the greatest influence. Crime, then, is ultimately rooted in political-economic inequality in a profound way: political inequality shapes the very definition of what constitutes criminal behavior. This is not to deny that a broad consensus exists about serious crimes. Legal scholars make a useful distinction between *mala in se* crimes—those acts considered wrong in and of themselves—and *mala prohibita* crimes—those acts that are criminalized strictly by statutory law. *Mala in se* crimes entail violations of person or property, include most serious felonies, such as murder, arson, theft, burglary, and rape, and enjoy widespread consensus. Rooted in the oral tradition of common laws in Europe during the middle ages, *mala en se* laws were later adopted into U.S. penal codes. By contrast, *mala prohibita* crimes, such as traffic violations or tax laws, are justified not on the grounds of moral outrage, but rather as necessary for a regulated and orderly society. Such laws are typically passed by a legislature through a political process in

which a politically powerful group succeeds in mobilizing resources to realize their interests in the law—at times despite popular disagreement. Criminal law and public policy intended to address problems of social control originate in a confluence of political-economic interests, mass media depictions, and political framing (Beckett 1997; Garland 1990). Typically, class interests underlie such processes. Garland (1990, p. 117) has argued that to understand how class is translated into criminal law, one must “appreciate the ways in which particular interests are interwoven with general ones” such that protection of class interests is disguised as protection of universal interests.

The relationship between class interests, social inequality, and the definition and administration of law stands in sharp relief when considering crimes of corporations. Edwin Sutherland (1949) coined the term “white collar crime”—“crimes committed by persons of respectability and high status in the course of their occupation”—to draw attention to a class of *mala prohibita* offenses, largely ignored by criminologists and citizens alike. Sutherland showed that these offenses, committed by members of upper classes, are crimes just like those committed by lower classes, and differ only in the administrative procedures used in dealing with the offenders. Administered in criminal court, street crimes are punished with relatively harsh, stigmatizing sanctions, even when relatively small sums of money are involved—for example, in burglary cases. By contrast, white collar crimes are often administered in civil court or administrative hearings, and are usually punished with mild sanctions even when huge sums of money are involved—for example, in anti-trust cases. Sutherland argued that reasons for this discrepancy were twofold. First, unlike street crimes, in which an angry victim is aware of the pain, suffering, and loss caused by the crime, corporate crimes often lack such a clear victim. For example, victims of restraint of trade, Ponzi schemes, and misbranding of consumer goods are often unaware of their victimization and its cost. Second, in a free-market economy, corporate actors yield enormous wealth and political influence to use in nullifying regulations and combatting stigmatization.

Even if the public can be galvanized around the problem of corporate crime and clamor for stronger regulation and enforcement, there is evidence that large corporations will continue to enjoy lenient treatment by the courts and government. Judicial decision-makers increasingly rule that symbolic, rather than actual, adherence to the law by large corporations is sufficient, setting legal precedents for relaxed enforcement of actual compliance in the future (e.g., Edelman et al. 2011). The financial dependence of government officials on large corporations and wealthy donors may also pose difficulties in increased regulation of white collar crime. For example, the close relationship between legislators and the savings and loan industry—including large campaign donations—contributed to the slow response of Congress to regulate firms involved in the savings and loan crisis in the 1980’s (Calavita et al. 1997).

Despite Sutherland’s writings, with a few notable exceptions, criminologists have focused on crime in the streets rather than crime in the suites. Criminal violence has been defined as a public health problem, falling under the purview of research funding from the National Institutes of Health. Comparatively little research funding has targeted corporate and white collar crime. Consequently, a voluminous literature has accumulated on ordinary crimes. The remainder of this chapter will focus on this literature, seeking to develop a social psychological explanation of crime and apply it to research on inequality and street crimes. Nevertheless, we should remain mindful that, as labeling and group conflict theorists have shown, group interests and social inequality play an important role in the very definition of deviant and criminal conduct (e.g., Becker 1963; Turk 1976).

Inequality and Crime: An Integrated Social-Psychological Theory of Causal Mechanisms

In this section, we attempt to explain differences in criminal and deviant behavior, given the existing definitions of crime. To do so, we develop

an integrated social-psychological theory of the causal mechanisms by which structural forces, such as income inequality, produce crime and deviance. Our perspective draws principally from the writings of American Pragmatists, particularly G. H. Mead, Dewey, and W.I. Thomas.

The Influence of the Chicago School on Contemporary Criminological Theory

Pragmatist ideas underlie much of Chicago school sociology, which in turn, forms the basis of much classical criminological theory and research, including theories of social disorganization and cultural transmission, differential association, labeling, and even social control theory. These classical theories, however, lack an explicit social psychological theory of decision-making within situations. In this section we briefly show how many prominent criminological theories have their roots in the Chicago school and pragmatist ideas, but lack a fully-developed theory of cognition and decision-making.

Social Disorganization Theories Building on Park and Burgess's work on urbanization, Shaw and McKay (1969) mapped rates of juvenile delinquency by neighborhood and over time across the city of Chicago. From these maps they concluded that delinquency rates were highest in the center of the city in which residential areas were being invaded by industry; delinquency rates dropped monotonically as one moved from the center of the city to the periphery; these patterns remained stable over decades despite the complete ethnic turnover of the zone in transition. Shaw and McKay argued that city growth, especially business and industry invading residential neighborhoods, produces community social disorganization, the breakdown of social controls. More recently, researchers have specified the causal mechanisms—particularly informal social control—by which disorganization produces high rates of crime (e.g., Sampson and Groves 1989). Shaw and McKay also found evidence of interlocking networks of delinquent groups over time, and case study evidence that young delin-

quents learned delinquent traditions from older groups of offenders. They used the term cultural transmission to describe this intergenerational transmission of a delinquent tradition, a process later elaborated by learning theories.

Differential Association and Social Learning Theories Shaw and McKay's (1969) results suggested that delinquency was learned from other delinquents, echoing earlier findings on delinquency transmission in gangs (Thrasher 1927), as well as the learning of specialized skills and justifications of crimes through tutelage among professional thieves (Sutherland 1937). Formalizing these ideas into his social psychological theory of differential association, Sutherland (1947) posited that all crimes are learned through associations with others in a process of communication in intimate groups, which includes learning the techniques for crime as well as definitions favorable and unfavorable to crime. The latter derives from W.I. Thomas' concept of the definition of the situation: some define crime as inappropriate under any circumstance, while others may define crime as appropriate in certain situations. Such moral evaluations justify crime in circumscribed contexts. Sutherland also specified his concept of differential social organization to explain aggregate crime rates: the crime rate of a group or society is determined by the extent to which it is organized in favor of crime (e.g., cultural transmission) versus organized against crime (e.g., social organization). Criminologists later attempted to state differential association in terms of psychological learning theories, including Skinnerian principles of operant conditioning, and more recently, Akers' (1998) social learning theory, which builds on Bandura's (1986) learning theory to specify that crime is learned through associational learning, vicarious reinforcement, and modeling.

Labeling Theories Labeling theory can be traced to the writings of Tannenbaum (1938), who was strongly influenced by the ethnographic work of Thrasher and Shaw and McKay. Tannenbaum noted that at times a child's behavior, defined by the child as fun, excitement, and play, is defined

by the larger community as evil, bad, and irresponsible. Consequently, the child is labeled as a bad kid, or as a troublemaker, by the larger adult community and singled out for punishment or treatment. Repeated negative interactions between the youth and community may leave the child in the hands of the juvenile justice system, cut off from conventional society, stigmatized as a deviant, and thrown into association with similarly-stigmatized youth who may reinforce deviance and defiance. Thus, had the child's initial spontaneous acts been treated as a normal part of growing up, the child would not have taken the path toward a criminal career. In other words, the initial labeling process produced a self-fulfilling prophesy, in which the child ended up confirming the initial deviant label. Labeling theory was further developed by Lemert (1951) and Becker (1963), who each drew on symbolic interactionism to formalize the label as a definition of a situation, and distinguish between primary (initial acts of deviance) and secondary (deviance resulting from an initial label) deviance (see Link et al., this volume). More recently, Braithwaite (1989) has incorporated labeling theory into his theory of reintegrative shaming, arguing that societies should avoid the stigmatizing effect of severe sanctions, such as incarceration, in favor of public shaming followed by forgiveness and reintegration back into conventional society.

Social Control Theories Control theories relate to the Chicago school as an individual-level counterpart to the community-level concept of social disorganization. The most prominent control theories are associated with the work of Travis Hirschi (1969), who distinguished control theories from other criminological theories by two assumptions: the motivation to deviate is constant across persons, and therefore, not an explanatory variable; and delinquent peers have no causal effect on delinquency. Consequently, deviance is taken for granted—we all would if we dared—and conformity is left to be explained. Conformity, for Hirschi, is explained by individuals having strong bonds to conventional society, including strong attachments to others, commitments and involvements in conventional

lines of action, and strong moral beliefs. More recently, Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) specified a theory of low self-control, in which self-control, a stable trait that protects against crime, is inculcated in children by the age of culpability, usually age 7 or 8. Parents who closely monitor unwanted behavior in their children and express disapproval of that behavior build in high self-control in their children. High self-control, in turn, selects for positive social environments throughout life—such as educational attainment, pro-social peers, stable employment, and good marriages—and at the same time, allows individuals to control their deviant tendencies. By contrast, individuals with low self-control tend to be impulsive, present-oriented, and unskilled, are unable to control their deviant impulses and tend to select into negative environments, including dropping out of school, and having delinquent peers, unstable work lives, poor marriages, and high rates of divorce.

Each of these theories draws from elements of the Chicago school of sociology, and therefore, the philosophical tradition of pragmatism, but does not fully embrace pragmatist principles or specify a situational decision-making model of criminal behavior. In the next section, we elaborate on Matsueda (2006b) and specify such a model, drawing principally from the writings of social control by Mead (1934) and Dewey (1922).

Differential Social Organization

We follow Sutherland (1947) and use the concept of differential social organization to describe how macro-level structures and organization produce crime. Although social organization is implicated in crime, some forms of organization suppress, control, and regulate crime, whereas others foster crime, and still others may simultaneously suppress some crimes while fostering others. To simplify the concept of organization, we use the analytic categories organization against crime and organization in favor of crime, and posit that the crime rate of a group or society is a function of the relative strength of each (Sutherland

1947). Matsueda (2006a) has shown that, when viewed dynamically, differential social organization becomes a theory of collective action, which implicates access to resources, structural ties, and collective action frames as explanatory concepts. For an application to genocide in Darfur, see Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2009).

From this perspective, Shaw and McKay's concept of social disorganization reflects weak organization against crime, whereas cultural transmission reflects strong organization in favor of crime. Affluent neighborhoods with abundant resources, strong network ties, and collective efficacy are strongly organized against crime. By contrast, disadvantaged inner-city neighborhoods with few resources and a code of violence governing the streets are weakly organized against crime and strongly organized in favor of violence. We will discuss these examples in later sections, showing how differential neighborhood organization is produced by individual behavior. But first, we specify a theory of situated criminal decisions.

A Pragmatist Theory of Situated Criminal Decisions

One of the hallmarks of the Chicago School is a preoccupation with the problem of social control—how do organized and informal groups control the behavior of members? Mead (1934) emphasized the primacy of the group over the individual: selves, self-control, and cognition are all rooted in organized groups, and self-control and social control are identical processes merely viewed from different standpoints, the individual and the group, respectively. We begin with a situated interaction, in which crime is a potential outcome and to which participants bring their biographical histories, including habits, attitudes, and preferences. The interaction is structured by a goal, which is constantly negotiated, always tentative, and perpetually subject to change. Whereas utilitarian theories make the teleological assumption that ends are fixed and means are negotiated, pragmatist theories assume that in negotiating means, ends can

be modified and vice-versa (Dewey 1958; Joas 1996). In common institutionalized settings, in which situations remain unproblematic, goals are shared and behavior is both goal-directed and habitual. In the extreme case, little self-consciousness exists, reflection is minimal, and behavior consists of playing out pre-existing learned attitudes, scripts, and preferences. For example, professional pickpockets coordinate their roles—the “stall” provides a diversion, the “hook” takes the wallet from a pocket, and the “cleaner” disposes of its contents—to minimize the risk of getting caught (Sutherland 1937). After repeatedly conducting such coordination, the behaviors become habitual and virtually automatic, unless a problem arises.

When habitual behavior is interrupted—temporarily blocked by a physical or social object—the situation becomes problematic for the actor, who experiences an emotion (such as fear or disgust) and engages in a cognitive process to solve the problem. Cognition consists of an imaginative rehearsal, in which the actor takes the role of the other, and considers alternative lines of action (in the form of attitudes, which are predispositions to act) from the other's standpoint (Dewey 1922; Mead 1934). At this point, the self as an object arises: the self is imagined carrying out the alternate line of action, which elicits a response from the standpoint of others—either a positive evaluation, leading to overt behavior, or a negative evaluation, blocking the alternative (attitude) and eliciting another alternative (attitude) from the standpoint of others. Thus, cognition is a process of resolving, in the mind, conflicting attitudes and the selves to which they correspond. This process is analogous to a conversation of gestures—which signify attitudes—between self and other, but occurs in the mind, rather than in overt interaction (see Callero, this volume). Cognition continues until the problematic situation is resolved and habitual behavior will suffice, or the interaction simply fades.

In the example of pickpocketing, at times something unexpected disrupts the intended action—perhaps the victim realizes the wallet is being taken or a bystander intervenes on behalf of the victim. The situation becomes problematic

for the thieves who take the role of the group, and consider alternate lines of action, such as covering up the wallet, denying the theft, or threatening the victim and bystander. The last resort would be giving back the wallet to cool out the mark—a calculated response demonstrating street smarts or “larceny sense.”

Once the problematic situation is solved, the alternatives, evaluations of those alternatives, and other information used in cognitive processing are incorporated in a relatively enduring self through memory, available to be called up in the future to solve similar problematic situations (Mead 1934). When similar situations are repeatedly encountered, and are resolved in comparable ways, they become less problematic, and behavior increasingly habitual, as the individual learns to adapt to the environment. Eventually, initial attitudes cease to be blocked, cognition is unnecessary, and behavior becomes habitual, institutionalized, and driven by initial attitudes. For example, during the crack cocaine epidemic of the 1980s, many urban street gangs made a transition to drug dealing to capitalize on money-making opportunities (Blumstein 1995; Coughlin and Venkatesh 2003). During the transition, gang members develop novel relationships with local communities, including customers, suppliers, and other local residents—a process fraught with problematic situations, as members adapt to a new and uncertain environment. Eventually, those relationships become institutionalized and unproblematic, and behavior habitual.

This situational model implies that the outcome of interaction is more than the mere sum of the biographical histories of interactants, but also contains an emergent process resulting from individuals’ reconstruction of the present perceptual field using the past in anticipation of a future (Mead 1932). Nevertheless, situated interactions are rarely created anew from whole cloth, but rather are more or less patterned. The more institutionalized the setting, the less unique and more patterned the interaction. Most settings fall in between extremes of uniqueness and predictability, sharing an institutionalized component but also a novel aspect. The patterned component of interaction arises from the biographical histo-

ries of participants, of which the key components are preferences, information, identities, and reference groups.

Pragmatism and Rationality

Our model is consistent with a model of weak rationality (e.g., Hechter and Kanazawa 1997). It departs from a rational choice utility-maximization model of decision-making, which often treats preferences, beliefs, and tastes as a given, assumes actors have access to full information about the consequences of their behavior, and presumes that individuals can maximize expected utility subject to constraints (e.g., McCarthy 2002). Instead, we assume that preferences, which consist of attitudes, social identities, and habits are endogenous and important predictors of behavior. Furthermore, we assume that, because of limitations in information processing, individuals do not typically consider a full range of possible alternative choices or maximize utility. Instead, for pragmatists, the criterion for resolving a problematic situation—using the first alternative that comes to mind that is not blocked by the self as an object—is more consistent with a model of bounded or limited rationality. Rather than conducting an exhaustive search for full information and then maximizing utility, actors typically satisfice based on serial consideration of a few possible solutions. In rare instances of particularly vexing decisions, multiple conflicting responses may be called out, and long deliberations—which end up approximating a utility maximization model—may be needed to solve the problematic situation.

A key variable for bounded rationality is the distribution of information. Because of cognitive constraints on information processing, individuals have limited access to information about the consequences of behavior. A byproduct of a pragmatist theory of situated decision-making is a theory of learning, which derives from taking the role of the generalized other in cognition. Once the problematic situation is resolved, the solution, along with evaluations from the standpoint of the group, is retained as a part of the self. In

its simplest form, such learning takes on the form of updating: an individual updates their knowledge of the consequences of lines of action from the standpoint of others. Consistent with social learning theory, such learning occurs principally within social groups.

Moreover, once habits are formed, either through intuitive acts or conscious reflective decision-making, they serve as “standing decisions” for future similar situations. When standing decisions (habits) fail to suffice, problematic situations are often solved using simple shortcuts and rules of thumb, via social intuition (e.g., Simon 1957; Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Finally, we assume that the interplay between habit, social intuition, and controlled reasoning is modulated by social context. More elaborate decisions approximating utility maximization are a relatively rare and special case, in which simple solutions fail to suffice, and a more elaborate and time-consuming search for a solution is needed.

Reference Groups as the Source of Preferences, Information, and Identities

The self, then, arises in social interaction as an object, and thus is socially constituted (given meaning). For Mead (1964, p. 141), the self has a definite social structure, which derives from the organized groups in which the individual participates: “Inner consciousness is socially organized by the importation of the social organization of the outer world.” That structure consists of the “generalized other,” which encompasses the norms, rules, and expectations governing various positions and roles of the group. The process of taking the role of the generalized other is the most effective form of social control because organized groups and institutionalized norms enter individual behavior, and because moral questions can be considered by increasingly wide groups, thereby approaching a universal discourse. For Mead (1934), child development consists of learning to take the role of the generalized other.

The self is a multidimensional and complex concept. To simplify matters, we specify the structure of the self as consisting of three overlapping concepts: information, preferences, and identities. Information consists of knowledge relevant to a problematic situation, including alternative solutions, and the consequences—costs and benefits—of those alternatives. Preferences consist of habits, attitudes, and evaluations of alternatives. They are learned through interaction within reference groups through observational learning as well as social interaction. Attitudes, or predispositions to act, are crucial here, as they produce habitual behavior and, along with evaluations of alternatives, are the stuff making up the serial process of cognition: an attitude gives rise to another evaluative attitude from the standpoint of others, and so on. Attitudes derive from organized groups, principally through interactional learning.

Here, the proposition of differential association and social learning theories follows: criminal behaviors—including evaluations or attitudes favorable and unfavorable to crime—are learned in interaction in primary groups. Whereas learning theories specify that criminal behavior is strictly determined by such evaluations, we argue that evaluations of crime are used to solve problems in either a criminal or noncriminal ways, as the individual exercises agency by taking the role of the other, considering alternatives from the standpoint of others, and finding a solution that will resolve the problem. This process of role-taking implicates the self, as an object from the standpoint of others, as a key locus of control of criminal behavior. Although the self as an object arises in interaction to solve problematic situations, it contains an enduring or stable component, which is multidimensional, corresponding to the structure of organized groups in which the individual participates. That organization includes the complex interrelationships among roles, goals of the group, as well as expectations, norms, and sanctions governing those roles (see Matsueda 1992).

The stable component of the self is termed “role-identities” by symbolic interactionists to

emphasize that they correspond to a person's group roles, and consist of ways the person sees oneself from the standpoint of others (McCall and Simmons 1978; Stryker 1980). Identity theories hypothesize that individual behavior is linked to organized groups through the concepts of role-commitments and role-identities. Strong commitment to specific roles in an organized group increases the probability that the group will serve as a generalized other, and a source of social control in problematic situations. Commitment to roles is linked to the (stable) self through identities. For identity theorists, the self is a set of hierarchically organized role-identities. The stronger the commitment to the role, the more salient the corresponding role-identities, and the more likely they will inform habits, social intuition, and controlled cognitive processes (e.g., Stryker 1980). These identities are built up via social interaction: through repeated role-taking within organized groups, commitments to group roles are built up, corresponding identities are developed, and group-specific habits are formed. Over time, such role-identities solidify in prominence and increasingly guide both habitual and cognitive behavior. In the extreme, a "role person merger" may take place, in which one comes to identify so strongly with a role that one seeks to enact the role even when it may be inappropriate (Turner 1962).

Identities, then, link organized groups to criminal behavior. For example, a debt collector working for a loan shark habitually threatens customers who have defaulted on a loan in order to uphold his identity and a reputation as a tough guy not to be messed with. In general, because we participate in multiple groups that sometimes conflict—either internally within groups or externally across groups—the self, made up of information, attitudes, and identities, is multidimensional and at times in conflict. This conflict appears in social cognition, which is a serial process of resolving conflicting information, attitudes, and identities.

For example, Cressey (1953) found that embezzlers typically took positions of financial trust in good faith and viewed themselves as

upstanding businessmen. However, when confronted with an unshareable financial problem, such as a gambling or drug addiction, and realizing that the problem could be solved by violating the trust, they absconded with the money. They resolved their conflicting identities—as an upstanding businessman and an embezzler of funds—using vocabularies of motive or evaluative definitions of embezzlement, such as "I'm just borrowing the money." These embezzlers had strong bonds to conventional society, but confronted a problematic situation and used vocabularies of motive to neutralize the law (e.g., Matza 1964).

Cressey's (1953) study suggests two concepts external to role-taking that are important for explaining crime: the presence of a financial problem, and the opportunity to solve the problem with crime. We can generalize these concepts, drawing on recent criminological theory. First, general strain theory, based on Merton's (1957) structural theory of anomie, provides an individual-level theory of strain or aversive stimuli and criminal behavior (Agnew 1992). The argument made by Agnew is that those who experience aversive stimuli, such as flunking out of school, losing a job, or enduring a divorce, are more likely to engage in deviant behavior, unless they have strong social support networks to help them cope with the strain. From the standpoint of pragmatism, such strains block habitual behavior and produce problematic situations, which may be resolved with criminal behavior depending on the self and information, attitudes, and identities relevant to crime. Second, routine activities and opportunity theories of crime specify that crime occurs at the intersection of a motivated offender, suitable target (e.g., a victim), and absence of capable guardians (e.g., witnesses or police) (e.g. Cohen and Felson 1979). Thus, crime is constrained by the structure of objective opportunities. Of course, such opportunities are irrelevant if one does not perceive them as such, and often motivated offenders actively search for suitable targets in the absence of capable guardians. A pragmatist perspective can explain motivation, perception, and search.

Causal Mechanisms of Classical Criminological Theories as Special Cases

Because many classical criminological theories derive from the Chicago school of sociology, their causal mechanisms are consistent with our pragmatist perspective. We argue that, in many instances, they become special cases of a general pragmatist decision-making model. For example, social control theories emphasize that attachments and commitments to conventional roles—such as new roles in the transition to adulthood—reduce the likelihood of crime (e.g., Sampson and Laub 1993). But social control is exerted by criminogenic groups as well, and criminal behavior is likely a function of the two forms of group control on role-taking, cognition, and the formation of habits. Thus, Heimer and Matsueda (1994) termed this, “differential social control,” to emphasize the role of delinquent and conventional groups in determining behavior.

Differential association and social learning theories are special cases of learning information relevant to crime, which are used to solve problematic crime situations through role taking. This includes the requisite criminal skills and techniques, as well as evaluations of crime and the anticipated consequences of crime. Our model, however, also provides a situational decision-making mechanism that implicates criminal and conventional identities in the process of taking the role of the other. Labeling theory provides a set of hypotheses about how identities are shaped by interactions with adult society and the legal system. Thus, the hypothesis of deviance amplification, in which negative labeling by adult society and the juvenile justice system may stigmatize youth, produce secondary deviance, and create a self-fulfilling prophesy, is consistent with our perspective, which provides a decision-making model explaining how this process produces secondary deviance. As noted above, our perspective is consistent with a model of bounded rationality, in which decision makers are practical, often consider only two or three alternatives, rather than full information, and often use shortcuts or standing decisions, rather than utility maximization.

Inequality, Reference Groups, and Social Cognition

Our social-psychological model implies that organized or informal groups control individual behavior. Within a group, the key is whether, in the organization of roles, there are some roles in which criminal acts are either expected or tolerated. The organization of such roles will include information, attitudes, and identities conducive to criminal behavior. The nature of these roles is highly variable. For example, adolescent male peer groups may contain overwhelmingly conventional roles, but have a minor role for resorting to violence against outsiders only when an outsider threatens one of their members. By contrast, for many inner-city turf gangs, violence is a defining feature of the group, which contains role-expectations of violence for merely encroaching on the gang’s territory. In financial organizations, embezzlement typically results from an isolated individual solving a financial problem using rationalizations. Other financial organizations, such as Ponzi schemes, are organized explicitly to make money by defrauding investors.

Organized groups are embedded in a broader context of social structure, which constrains an individual’s participation in organized groups. A key element of social structure is social inequality, which fundamentally affects the social distance between groups (e.g., DiMaggio and Garip 2011). The greater the social distance between groups, the greater the divergence in communication networks, and therefore, the greater the divergence in information, attitudes, and identities. Such divergence is associated with disparate and at times conflicting information, attitudes, and identities, which, in turn, will be associated with disparate and conflicting behaviors. When divergences in communication networks become institutionalized—presumably because of enduring structural inequalities—cultural differences become more pronounced and subcultures develop.

As noted earlier, in most democratic societies, rich and politically powerful groups have the strongest influence on the process by which laws are passed and enforced. It follows that, generally speaking, the closer a group is to the political-

economic process producing and enforcing law, the more likely their preferences, interests, and objectives will be aligned with law. Furthermore, all else being equal, those groups will have the lowest crime rates on average, whereas those groups furthest away from the process producing and enforcing law will have the highest crime rates, on average. In societies in which there is a relatively permanent class of chronically poor, jobless, and disenfranchised, crime rates will be high, particularly among the disadvantaged but also other classes due to spillover effects.

Beyond the absolute level of disadvantage, crime rates may be a function of the absolute level of inequality in society. In relatively egalitarian societies, there is little potential for high crime rates: between-group communication is high, generalized others tend to overlap, and information, preferences, and identities tend to be homogeneous. In societies characterized by great social inequality, there is strong potential for high crime rates: between-group communication is low, generalized others tend to be provincial, and preferences tend to differ across groups. In the next sections, we explore the links between inequality and crime by examining crime rates across neighborhoods and communities, and examining crime across the life course.

Crime Across Neighborhoods and Communities

A Multi-Level Model of Differential Neighborhood Organization and Crime

We build on the earlier work of Sutherland (1947) and Matsueda (2006a) to specify differential neighborhood organization, in which organization against crime is the social system producing collective efficacy and informal social control, and organization in favor of crime is the social system producing the code of the street (see Matsueda 2013). Each of these social systems draws explicitly from the structural arguments of W.J. Wilson's underclass thesis of high rates of criminal violence in inner-city neighborhoods.

Inequality, Residential Segregation, and Extreme Disadvantage: The Urban Underclass

William Julius Wilson (1987) brought attention to the problem of a growing urban underclass in major American cities beginning in the 1970s, showing that rates of female-headed households, joblessness, poverty, crime, and violence had worsened by the 1980s. Wilson (1987) provided an explanation of the growing underclass, stressing broad historical transformations in the economy that disproportionately affected young black males in urban areas in the Midwest and Northeast. These transformations included the great migration of southern blacks to rustbelt cities (1910–1970) to take manufacturing jobs created by industrialization; deindustrialization, in which the economy shifted to a service economy during the recession of the 1970s (producing a spatial mismatch between jobs and skills); the historical legacy of racial discrimination, which persisted across generations; and the increase in the percentage of 14–24 year olds (the peak years for crime and out-of-wedlock births) among inner city blacks. The confluence of these social forces set the stage for the creation of an urban underclass in many large cities (see Quillian, this volume).

Why did the position of African-Americans worsen after the mid-sixties, when civil rights created new structural opportunities for blacks? Wilson argues that the loss of manufacturing jobs disproportionately affected urban young black males, creating high rates of joblessness in this group. At the same time, civil rights, affirmative action, and fair housing laws helped a significant number of black families move up the status ladder into the middle class. Like most upwardly-mobile Americans, once they reached the middle class, these families moved out of the inner-city into better (and thus, more white) neighborhoods with better schools, less crime, and higher property values. As a consequence, inner-city communities lost some of their best role models (Wilson 1987), and also lost valuable social capital, undermining local social cohesion and trust.

Social Disorganization, Social Capital, and Collective Efficacy

A resurgence of interest in social disorganization theory in the 1980s stimulated new research on crime rates across neighborhoods and communities (e.g., Bursik and Webb 1982; Sampson and Groves 1989), largely reaffirming the findings of Shaw and McKay (1969). Recently, Peterson and Krivo (2010) find that whites and racial-ethnic minorities live in divergent socioeconomic worlds generated by racialized social structures, which in turn produce socioeconomic differences and ultimately differences in crime rates.

Researchers have explored the neighborhood-level causal mechanisms by which local structural conditions produce crime (e.g., Sampson and Groves 1989). In a landmark paper, Sampson et al. (1997) combined Coleman's (1990) concept of social capital with Bandura's (1986) concept of collective efficacy to refine and elaborate on the causal mechanism of informal social control (see also Sampson 2012). In psychology, Bandura (1986, p. 391) is well-known for his concept of self-efficacy, which he defines as "people's judgments of their capabilities to organize and execute courses of action required to attain designated types of performances." For Bandura, net of an individual's skills and opportunities, individuals who perceive a high degree of personal efficacy will outperform those with little self-efficacy because they can act with persistence, overcome obstacles, and capitalize on narrow opportunities. Self-efficacy is learned through self-observations of performance, vicarious observations of others, making social comparisons, and the like. Group or collective efficacy, the counterpart to self-efficacy, consists of members' perceptions of the efficacy of the collectivity, and will "influence what people do as a group, how much effort they put into it, and their staying power when group efforts fail to produce results" (Bandura 1986, p. 449).

Sampson et al. (1997) applied the concept of collective efficacy to neighborhood action, tied it to Coleman's (1990) concept of social

capital, and borrowed operational indicators from previous neighborhood surveys of informal social control (e.g., Taylor 1996). Sampson et al. (1997, p. 918) treat collective efficacy as a task-specific property of neighborhoods—namely, "the capacity of residents to control group level processes and visible signs of disorder" which helps reduce "opportunities for interpersonal crime in a neighborhood." Collective efficacy is tied directly to the presence of neighborhood social capital: "it is the linkage of mutual trust and the willingness to intervene for the common good that defines the neighborhood context of collective efficacy" (1997, p. 919). We view collective efficacy as the entire process of moving from social capital to informal control and then to reduced rates of crime and incivility.

Collective efficacy theory, then, specifies a macro-to-macro link between neighborhood social capital, which consists of rates of reciprocated exchange (neighbors exchanging favors, information, and goods) as well as intergenerational closure in social networks (a child's parents know the parents of the child's friends), and neighborhood informal control of youth. Such social capital provides the resource potential for activating collective efficacy, which for the control of crime means intervening when crime or incivilities occur in the neighborhood. Sampson et al. (1997) find empirical support for this specification: neighborhood mean levels of reciprocated exchange and intergenerational closure are associated with neighborhood mean levels of collective efficacy (adjusted for composition effects), which in turn are associated with lower rates of crime. If we take the micro-macro problem seriously, an important question is, what role does the individual actor play?¹

¹ Sampson (2012) recently emphasizes the micro-macro transition with respect to residents selecting neighborhoods; here we show how neighborhood social capital and collective efficacy constitute a micro-macro transition.

From Social Capital to Informal Control: Positive Externalities, Norms, and Associations

Drawing from Matsueda (2013), we can specify the social psychological mechanisms by which social capital is built up and then translates into neighborhood collective efficacy through a micro-macro transition (e.g., Coleman 1990). We specify two neighborhood social systems, one that generates social capital (reciprocated exchange and intergenerational closure among neighbors), and a second that translates social capital into the capacity to solve problems collectively. We begin with the system generating social capital, and start with reciprocated exchange—the most elementary form of social capital. Residents exchange favors and information for instrumental reasons—borrowing tools to fix the plumbing, lending a hand to fix a car, helping to pull out a tree.

A neighborhood containing a high percentage of residents who each have preferences for being neighborly, identify with the neighborhood, and have incentives for exchanging favors and information, will be rich in social capital. The creation of neighborhood social capital also contains an emergent process in which, through social interaction, social capital builds on itself. Within a neighborhood, some key residents may become *aware* of the relationship between dense social ties and the ability of neighborhoods to solve shared problems collectively. That is, they may become aware of the public goods aspect of social capital. They may recognize that some residents are relatively isolated, and understand that if they were more involved, the neighborhood would be better off. Consequently, they gain an incentive to encourage those isolated residents to become involved, and urge their neighborhood friends to encourage isolates similarly. Over time, they may convert some neighbors with persuasion and rewards in the form of informal approval such as smiles, pats on the back, and kudos, while at the same time questioning, gossiping about, or even demeaning neighbors who remain isolated. The creation of norms of being neighborly, in turn, re-

inforces the neighborhood as a generalized other and the salience of the role-identity of being a good neighbor. In this way, neighborhood social capital may increase over and above the sum of effects of individual preferences and incentives to develop social ties.

The second social system translates social capital into purposive social action on behalf of the neighborhood. The accumulation of social capital in a neighborhood has a positive externality: it facilitates purposive action by residents. But how is this potential activated concretely? We begin with the problem of informal social control of youth. When youths engage in behavior deemed undesirable by the community, a resident can try to intervene by drawing attention to the behavior, speaking to the youth, or physically interceding. But intervening is costly not just in time and effort, but also because the youth may object, threaten, or fight back. If the undesirable behavior is costly to the resident—such as vandalizing the resident's property or victimizing the resident's family—the cost of intervening is likely outweighed by the potential return to acting. If the undesirable behavior is costly to a different resident, or only to the neighborhood at large—such as vandalizing a street light—the cost of intervening may be too steep for an individual to act in isolation. Therefore, a feature of collective efficacy would be the presence of mechanisms to reduce the costs of intervention by acting collectively. Efficient strategies might include jointly sanctioning in pairs, rotating monitoring among neighbors, and relying on stay-at-home parents and busybodies to monitor the neighborhood and exchange gossip about problem children. Each of these strategies is facilitated by social capital. For example, developing rotating monitoring, in which neighbors take turns overseeing and sanctioning, may require that all committed residents contribute their share of monitoring, and therefore, take the form of an assurance game. Here, in a two-person, repeated game, the key is developing trust of others because if players are trustworthy, each knows the other will contribute and they will attain the optimal equilibrium of mutual cooperation (Kollock 1998). Thus, neigh-

neighborhoods rich in reciprocated exchange will have built up the requisite trust to optimize such assurance games.

Another example is monitoring and sanctioning of neighborhood children, which is facilitated by intergenerational closure of social networks. If parents know the parents of their children's friends, they can coordinate their monitoring and sanctioning with other parents, presenting a united front, and sanctioning consistently (Coleman 1990). Some parents may get to know the parents of their children's friends as a byproduct of social activities; the resulting social capital can be used strategically for monitoring their children. Other parents may become aware of such effects and intentionally seek out the parents of their children's friends. Monitoring and sanctioning is facilitated by the dissemination of information—another form of social capital—relevant to controlling youth, including negative gossip about local problem youth. A strong gossip network can be crucial for neighborhood informal social control by providing information and reducing the costs of monitoring and sanctioning (Merry 1984).

Of course, some residents may realize that they can enjoy the fruits of neighborhood social capital—because it has a public goods aspect—and refrain from building social ties or monitoring youth. They have an incentive to free ride on the actions of others. To reduce the number of free riders, other residents might provide selective incentives, such as informal approval or disdain, and even coordinate sanctioning in pairs, which is facilitated by social ties between pair members (Olson 1971). An even more efficient way of eliciting compliance would be to create a norm—a general rule backed by collective sanctions—prescribing being “neighborly.” Such a norm requires building a working consensus over the value of being neighborly and monitoring youth, transferring control from individual residents to the neighborhood as a whole, and sanctioning violators. This working consensus, in turn, requires communication and social ties, and thus is facilitated by neighborhood social capital. In this way, forms of social capital (norms and sanctions) build on other forms (social ties). The use of informal social approval, which would be

less costly than the use of punishment, will be more effective in neighborhoods with greater social networks—particularly closed network structures (see Coleman 1990, p. 318)—allowing joint sanctioning. When interactions are repeated, residents care about their local reputations, and simple sanctions, such as kudos have value for recipients (Kollock 1998). Moreover, informal social approval has the potential of transforming monitoring and sanctioning into zealous behavior: here, enforcers would have a two-fold gain in benefits—the intrinsic reward of helping to reform and deter youth and the secondary reward of receiving social approval from other residents (Coleman 1990). Because of this multiplier effect, neighbors will respond by sanctioning each other with zeal, which in turn, reinforces residents to identify with the neighborhood, strengthens role-identities of being a good neighbor, and motivates them to intervene when local problems arise. In highly efficacious neighborhoods, such identities and corresponding norms are sufficiently strong that intervening in neighborhood problems becomes automatic.

Structural Disadvantage, Cultural Adaptation, and Inner-City Violence

We define culture narrowly as the symbolic meanings, interpretations, and norms attached to behavior, and argue that it constitutes a key component of neighborhood organization in favor of violence. Thrasher's (1927) ethnographic studies of gangs revealed a gang culture consisting of a universe of discourse including a gang code of conduct that exerts informal control over the group, and definitions of situations conducive to delinquency that go unchallenged. Shaw and McKay (1969) developed the concept of cultural transmission—in which a cohort of street youth pass on a delinquent tradition, consisting of delinquent values, norms, and pressures on younger cohorts—to help explain the persistence of inner city delinquency. Sutherland's (1937) study of professional theft showed that professional thieves viewed their theft as an occupation, valued street or larceny smarts, and lived by a crimi-

nal code, which proscribed ratting out a fellow thief, holding out on the group, or not splitting gains equally. Cloward and Ohlin (1960) argued that when legitimate opportunity structures are weak and illegitimate opportunity structures are strong, conventional role-identities lose salience, criminal role-identities gain salience, and subcultural adaptations, including criminal rackets and violence, are likely.

In her study of an inner-city Latino neighborhood, Horowitz (1983) identifies two distinct cultural codes. The instrumental code of the American Dream, organized around economic success, is espoused by community members, but conflicts with the reality of negative experiences in lower class schools and available jobs, each of which fail to link residents to the broader culture. The code of honor, organized around respect, manhood, and deference, is espoused by young men on the streets; violations of the code can lead to violence. The street identities of young men are shaped by their responses to insult, negotiations of threats to manhood, and ability to maintain honor. Latino youth must balance the instrumental code of the American Dream (which requires being “decent” from the standpoint of the larger community) against the honor code of the streets (which entails gaining status in ways often violent and illegal).

In his study of an inner-city African-American neighborhood in Philadelphia, Elijah Anderson (1999) provides perhaps the most vivid description of a cultural code of the street. Anderson argues that the “code of the street” is rooted in the local circumstances of ghetto poverty as described by Wilson’s underclass thesis: Structural conditions of concentrated poverty, joblessness, racial stigma, and drug use lead to alienation and a sense of hopelessness among young black males in the inner-city, which in turn, spawn an oppositional culture consisting of norms calling for violence. Structural disadvantages prevent young black inner-city males from gaining respect and esteem from school and work, which puts them at risk of embracing street culture. Negative interactions with the police—the most visible agents of conventional institutions—causes disadvantaged youth to distrust all institutions, particularly the

legal system, for addressing their local problems and disputes, increasing the likelihood that they will take the law into their own hands. Because structural disadvantage and police targeting disproportionately affects young men, resolutions to disputes emphasize hyper-masculinity, physical prowess, and violence.

The conjunction of these processes produces the “code of the street.” Distrustful of police, inner-city youth must rely on their own resources for addressing interpersonal problems. Lacking material resources, they have little recourse other than resorting to violence and aggression to resolve disputes. Violence becomes institutionalized within this social system on the streets, which serves the twin functions of resolving disputes and allocating status outside of conventional institutions. This system is governed by specific norms about violence, which comprise the code, the content of which echoes the findings of earlier subcultural theorists. The multiplicity of underlying norms gives the code multiple dimensions or domains of meaning.

The most fundamental norm is “never back down from a fight.” Backing down will not only result in a loss of street credibility and status, but will also increase the likelihood of being preyed upon in the future: Therefore, people often feel constrained not only to stand up and at least attempt to resist during an assault but also to “pay back”—to seek revenge—after a successful assault on their person. Revenge may include retaliating with a weapon or even getting relatives and friends involved. This process presupposes a norm of reciprocity, in which one is expected to respond in kind when disrespected by name-calling, challenges, assaults, etc. The norms of reciprocity and never backing down apply to peers, gangs, and family members. When a peer is threatened or assaulted, other group members must never run or “punk out.” The phrase “I got your back,” illustrates this norm of peers standing up for each other, which frees members to aggress against others with impunity. At times, status is allocated based on violent acts against outsiders in the neighborhood, such as members of other racial groups, which simultaneously increases the offender’s status as well as the neigh-

borhood's, as in the "defended communities" thesis (e.g., Suttles 1968). Thus, there is a fluid relationship between an individual and his group or crew.

Status on the street is achieved by developing a reputation as a "man," or "badass." Manhood is associated with being willing to express disrespect for other males—for example, by getting in their face, throwing the first punch, pulling the trigger, messing with their woman—and thereby risking retaliation. Katz (1988) argues that "badasses" demonstrate a "superiority of their being" by dominating and forcing their will on others, and showing that they "mean it." Lacking the requisite human, social, and cultural capital needed gain status and self-respect within conventional institutions, street youth find opportunities for gaining status on the streets by showing nerve, dominating others, and exacting revenge. Group status and the status of members are reflexively tied: not only does group status confer status on each member, but members' acts of courage and bravado provide additional status to the group.

Street youth recognize this status system and manipulate it instrumentally to increase their status, or "juice," by "campaigning for respect"—challenging or assaulting others, disrespecting others, or provoking others by stealing their material possessions or girlfriends. The proliferation of guns onto the streets has raised the stakes: guns not only provide a quick and often final resolution to a dispute, but also level the playing field, allowing less physical youth to compete for status if they are willing to "pull the trigger." Guns can instantly transform a minor dispute over a stare, bump, or swearword into a deadly act. Guns become a valued commodity, infused with symbols of toughness, power, and dominance, and thereby an indication of repute and esteem (see Matsueda et al. 2006).

The code regulates and organizes violence on the streets. As an institutional feature of street life, it produces a strong incentive to acquire knowledge of its tenets not only for "street" youth—whose identities are tied to the street—but "decent" youth—whose identities are tied to conventional roles—as well. Those familiar with

the code will know how to project a self-image as "not to be messed with," how to prevent confrontations by avoiding eye contact with others, how to talk one's way out of a dispute without violence or loss of respect. Naïve youth ignorant of the code will unwittingly invite confrontations, appear to be easy prey, and be unable to escape altercations unharmed. They risk victimization by violence. Thus, knowledge of the code serves a protective function for all youth, regardless of whether they participate in the street culture. It pays for decent youth to invest in the cultural capital of the street—"street efficacy" (Sharkey 2006)—to avoid hot spots and staging grounds, talk one's way out of a confrontation, and comport oneself as "not to be messed with." This implies that the "code of the street" is an objective property of the neighborhood, rather than merely a subjective property of the individuals inhabiting the neighborhood.

We can conceptualize this social system in terms of the micro-macro problem. Macro level processes produce an urban underclass in large cities of the U.S.—as discussed earlier—generating a concentration of impoverished and disadvantaged African-American youth in residentially segregated neighborhoods. A macro-level outcome is the innovation of the code of the street, a social system that allocates status based on physical prowess and produces high rates of inner-city street violence. We can specify the microfoundations of such a system. The macro-processes underlying the urban underclass produce a critical mass of disadvantaged youth cut off from the social status conferred by conventional institutions. For such youth, any alternate path to gaining status, respect, and a sense of self-worth is attractive. The presence of the code of the street provides such an alternative, enticing young men to invest in personal capital (physical prowess, nerve, and street smarts), social capital (being a member of a respected group), and cultural capital (knowing the tenets of the code) necessary for success on the street. They may campaign for respect, initially preying on easy foes to build up street credibility. For the social system of the street, the primordial mechanism for allocating status is the violent confrontation. Street confron-

tations are bilateral interactions that take on the character of a game of chicken: one youth insults another, and the other has a decision to save face and respond in kind or back down and risk losing street credibility. The confrontation is a zero-sum game, in which the winner—and the members of his group—gain status and the loser—and the members of his group—lose status. Losers have an incentive to retaliate against the winner to recover their status. These changes in status presuppose the existence of social networks on the street that transmit information about the confrontation and, in particular, information relevant to reputations. Each confrontation, change in status, and transmission of information about changes in status hierarchies reconstitutes the social system and reaffirms the norms making up the code of the street. Using network analysis of gang homicides in Chicago, Papachristos (2009) finds evidence of retaliation and social contagion in the institutionalized network of group conflict.

Violent behavior within the neighborhood is not merely an individual process in which a youth internalizes the code and thereby becomes motivated to attack others. There is also a contextual—in this case a neighborhood—effect due to the status system governed by the code. For example, an individual may not espouse the code, but in a neighborhood dominated by the code, be drawn into violence through confrontations by status enhancers. Even those who reject the code, and its prescription for violence as a way of resolving disputes, may still have difficulty turning the other cheek when challenged in public. Conversely, young males who are heavily invested in the code, who derive a sense of self from their street reputations, and whose very being is on the line during a street altercation, are at high risk of violence in a variety of situations. Place them on the streets governed by the code, and that risk escalates dramatically. Decent youth who reject the code, whose sense of self is not tied to the streets, and who prefer nonviolence are likely to avoid the street. Nevertheless, when placed in a staging ground they may have to resort to violence to save a modicum of face when other alternatives—such as trying to talk one's way out of the situation—fail. Whether the youth brings

a commitment to the code, a sense of self tied to the streets, or a violent predisposition depends on their biographical history, and in particular, the experiences that shaped their identities, preferences, and beliefs.

Normative systems such as the code of the street emerge from ideas in conventional culture surrounding a masculine identity. In the U.S., cultural stereotypes of being a man include being strong, displaying courage, enduring pain, demonstrating physical prowess, and never showing weakness (Anderson 1999; Messerschmidt 1993). At an early age, boys are rewarded for being aggressive. During adolescence, male hierarchies develop in which physical prowess—athleticism and fighting—are important dimensions. Boys challenge other boys in winner-take-all tournaments in which winners gain status and a reputation, while losers suffer a loss of status. Such status hierarchies exist on most playgrounds and recreation centers and allocate status to adolescent males at a time when they are between childhood dependency and adult roles. In the transition to adulthood, most young men develop alternative ways of attaining status and respect within conventional institutions—at school, on the job, in marriage, and in fatherhood. The status system based on physical prowess recedes in importance, only occasionally reappearing in rare confrontations. Backing down from a fight becomes a possibility because one's identity is derived less from status in hyper-masculine displays on the streets, and more from participating in conventional activities within traditional institutions. Conversely, street youth who have few opportunities to gain status in conventional realms, who live the code, and who have everything to lose, cannot conceive of backing down from a fight in public. With strong emotion and little deliberative cognition, they will respond with violence.

Crime Across the Life Course

Theories of self and identity can help explain not only criminal patterns that vary between individuals and groups, but also those that vary over time within individuals. Over the last two de-

cadecades social scientists have examined how crime varies across a person's life span, integrating life course theories with criminological theory. Life-course criminology represents the cumulative research efforts in sociology, criminology, and psychology to understand the patterns of onset, continuity, and desistance from crime over the course of an individual's lifetime, and to identify important structural and social-psychological correlates associated with trajectories of criminal participation (e.g., Laub and Sampson 2003; Sampson and Laub 1993).

Sampson and Laub (1993) made pioneering contributions to life course criminology by proposing that individual criminal propensities are not immutable, but can be redirected by the creation or disruption of an individual's ties to conventional society. Ties to pro-social people and organizations exert informal social control, constraining individuals to refrain from crime. The absence of such social ties can "free" individuals to engage in criminal behavior. Sampson and Laub (1993) posited that certain life events, termed "turning points," can disrupt and re-order deviant behavioral trajectories by bonding the previously deviant individual to pro-social situations and people. Turning points supply individuals with situations that reorganize their social network to include non-deviant members, allow for success and fulfillment in conventional arenas, and require investment of time and energy that competes with time and energy spent on deviant pursuits. Each of these processes increases the likelihood of desistance from crime. In particular, Sampson and Laub, and many others, have identified legitimate employment, military service, marriage, and childbearing as key turning points away from criminal behavior.

More recently, criminological life-course theories have been augmented by research on the social-psychological processes that undergird pathways to desistance. In their follow-up study, Laub and Sampson (2003) included individual agency and the interaction between the individual and the structure imposed by the "turning points," in their model of desistance over the life course. Recent work by Maruna (2001), and Giordano et al. (2007), among others, on the role of

self-identity and emotions in shaping desistance trajectories has expanded on a symbolic-interactionist perspective (Matsueda and Heimer 1997), and extended Sampson and Laub's theory. This new perspective emphasizes the role of specific meanings of life events, which may constitute additional mechanisms by which life events such as marriage or employment lead to desistance.

According to symbolic interactionism, a major causal mechanism by which life events produce desistance is a shift in self-identity. For an individual to perceive, create, and capitalize on structural opportunities to desist from crime, she must interpret those opportunities as feasible, positive, and desirable, and then create a new self-identity aligned with the new social roles (Giordano et al. 2002). Turning points provide opportunities for new role-identities and pro-social interactions with others that further reinforce the salience of new non-criminal roles (Giordano et al. 2007; Stets 2006). Thus, marriage may provide a supportive partner who sees the best in the spouse, as well as reorient everyday routines to be focused more on home life. Becoming a parent may isolate an individual from a life of parties, risky and law-breaking behavior, and delinquent peers who supported their criminal actions, and simultaneously provide a sense of pride in their new caretaker role (Edin and Kefalas 2005). In this way, emotions and role-taking that result from a life-course role-change mediate the effect of the role-change on desistance (Giordano et al. 2007). In sum, both the event and the interpretation of the event as desirable, accepted by others, and supportive of a conventional identity are necessary for desistance from criminal behavior. As we show below, inequality can affect both the exposure to turning points, and the ability to capitalize on turning points by interpreting them positively.

The following section highlights some research in life-course criminology, with an emphasis on the social-psychological underpinnings of the relationship between inequality and crime over the life-span. Drawing on writings of Matsueda and Heimer (1997) and Giordano et al. (2002, 2007), we specify a pragmatist theory of identity and role-taking as key mechanisms that explain how inequality produces patterns of

crime across the life span. We focus on how the interplay between social structure and self-identity along key age-graded transitions creates trajectories of criminal participation and desistance.

Patterns of Onset, Persistence, and Desistance

Life course criminologists find a consistent pattern of crime rates across the life span. Specifically, from the age of culpability (about age 7), crime begins at a low rate, increases precipitously until the peak years of about 15–25 (depending on the crime), and then falls slowly across the remaining years of age. The age-crime curve includes variation in age of onset, persistence, and desistance (see Moffitt 1993). Adolescent aggression, property offenses, and substance abuse are strongly positively associated with criminal behavior later in life (Farrington 1986). Indeed, the correlation between childhood and adult aggression appears as stable as that of IQ (e.g., Caspi et al. 1987; Farrington 1991), reaching as high as .63. Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) interpret this pattern as suggesting that crime is a stable, relatively unchanging trait to be explained with other stable, relatively unchanging traits. By contrast, Sampson and Laub (1993) interpret the pattern as suggesting that nearly two-thirds of the temporal change in delinquency is in need of explanation. On this point, Nagin and Paternoster (2000) point out that stability in delinquency can be decomposed into two elements: unobserved heterogeneity, which captures stable individual differences, versus state dependence, which captures the lagged effect of being in a state (e.g., delinquent) in one period on remaining in that state in the next period.

Research finds that aggression, fighting, and violence exhibit an S-shaped curve of onset, with the steepest increase between the ages of 12 and 14 (Farrington 1986). Property crime exhibits a slightly earlier age of onset than aggression, while the use of illicit drugs has a later age of onset, peaking in early adulthood (Kandel 1991). There is evidence that early onset of delinquent behavior is associated with more adult criminal

behavior (e.g., Krohn et al. 2001). Others argue that early onset is a symptom of other risk factors for delinquency (Nagin and Farrington 1992), rather than a direct cause of greater delinquent behavior (Moffitt 1993). Finally, although less research focuses on individuals who begin their criminal careers in adulthood, as much as half of adult offenders are adult-onset offenders (Eggleston and Laub 2002).

Criminal desistance is a process that is hard to define and measure, as individuals can exhibit multiple cycles of long periods of desistance followed by renewed criminal participation (Laub and Sampson 2003). Nevertheless, systematic studies of desistance over the life-course indicate that, upon reaching elderly status, virtually all individuals permanently desist from criminal behavior. Offenses that peak earliest—like property crime—also show a more precipitous decline than violence or drug and alcohol related crimes (Steffensmeier et al. 1989). Trends in desistance for young and middle-age adults are associated with the transition to adult roles, such as becoming employed, getting married, and having a child. For those who continue to offend until the twilight years, desistance is most certainly associated with a reduced capacity for the skills necessary for crime (Laub and Sampson 2003).

The ubiquity of the shape of the age-crime curve led Hirschi and Gottfredson (1983) to claim the basic shape is invariant across history, nations, and social groups. Others, however, have noted that this general trend may be composed of multiple distinct patterns of individual trajectories. Moffitt (1993) suggested that offenders fall into one of two groups: (1) adolescence-limited offenders, who engage in delinquency during the adolescent period only; and (2) life-course persistent offenders, who remain at risk of serious crime throughout the life span. She hypothesized that adolescence-limited offenders are normal youth who mimic the antisocial behavior of early-maturing offenders as a normal part of adjusting to adolescence. By contrast, life-course persistent offenders suffer from neurological deficits that make them at risk of crime across the lifespan, and select for criminogenic environments, increasing the risk of crime through

cumulative continuity. Researchers have used latent class trajectory models to search for distinct trajectory groups but have typically identified four to six distinct groups that only loosely approximate Moffitt's taxonomy (for a review, see Piquero 2008). This has led to a controversy in which some have argued that Moffitt's taxonomy is not empirically supported and that group-based trajectory models have yet to yield theoretically meaningful results (e.g., Sampson and Laub 2005). Others contend that group-based trajectory models provide important descriptive information about unobserved heterogeneity in offending (e.g., Nagin and Tremblay 2005). This controversy has not been settled definitively, although researchers are more cautious in applying and interpreting group-based trajectory models, and alternative statistical models are beginning to appear (e.g., Telesca et al. 2013).

The results of this descriptive research on the components of the age-crime curve, along with research on the life span, suggests that childhood, adolescence, and adulthood are important stages in which delinquency and crime vary over the life span. We discuss each in turn.

Childhood: Family, Parenting, and Anti-Social Behavior

During childhood, family relationships and parenting shape future trajectories of delinquency, and perhaps help mediate genetic predispositions to aggression (Guo et al. 2008). Parental disciplinary strategies that emphasize warmth, close supervision, and a child's psychological autonomy are associated with less delinquency in adolescence, which, in turn, is associated with less crime in adulthood (Gershoff 2002; Lamborn et al. 1991; Steinberg and Morris 2001). These parenting strategies—termed “authoritative parenting” by Baumrind (1967)—provide children with a key balance of support and structure, building an appreciation of consequences of independent action while building self-confidence through independent thinking (Gray and Steinberg 1999). Most research has emphasized the effects of parenting practices as exogenous pre-

dictors of child behavior. Parenting, however, is likely the result of a social interaction between parent and child, in which children play an important role by exercising agency (Scarr 1992). For example, parental monitoring entails not only how parents accomplish surveillance, but also how children manage information about their private behavior (Stattin and Kerr 2000). Parenting and child agency intertwine as children take on a range of roles in reaction to parental behavior. For example, children of criminal parents may identify with their parents, see themselves as caretakers of their parents, or intentionally create identities distinct from their parents (e.g., “I am not going to end up like my parent”) (Giordano 2010).

Such family effects may be structured by inequality. As noted earlier, inner-city disadvantaged African-American neighborhoods have high rates of female-headed households, in part due to high rates of male joblessness, drug use and incarceration. This may result in fewer opportunities to practice authoritative parenting and close monitoring of youth. Moreover, when disadvantage and non-intact family structures are spatially concentrated, opportunities for intergenerational closure—parents knowing the parents of their children's friends—are fewer. This can result in a multiplicative effect, as non-intact structures reduce opportunities for coordinated monitoring nonlinearly across the neighborhood (Sampson 1987).

Parenting and family relationships can perpetuate inequality by reproducing behavior consistent with existing social cleavages, such as race and gender. For example, differential parental socialization of males and females has been linked to formation of gendered identities, which leads to differences in behavioral outcomes such as crime (e.g., LaGrange and Silverman 1999; see Mortimer and McLaughlin, this volume). Parents traditionally assume that daughters are weak and in need of protection, and therefore monitor daughters more closely than sons (e.g., Svensson 2003). Meanwhile, because boys are assumed to be more troublesome, they are more likely to be labeled as bad kids or rule breakers (Bartusch and Matsueda 1996). These differential socializ-

ing signals are internalized by children, adopted as part of their gender identities, and may yield significant differences in behavior. For example, as a result of socialization, and possibly innate cognitive differences, girls tend to be more risk averse than boys and, therefore, less likely to engage in risky behaviors such as delinquency (e.g., Croson and Gneezy 2009).

Growing economic inequalities, including less support to low income women with dependent children and other welfare erosions, as well as deep residential inequalities discussed above, have contributed to a rise in the number of families with children that face concentrated and lasting socioeconomic disadvantage. Socioeconomic disadvantage is associated with family stress, strained relationships between parents and children, and harsh, uninvolved, and inconsistent parenting—all of which contribute to child behavioral problems (e.g., McLanahan and Percheski 2008). Children from families lacking resources such as residential stability, nutrition, and early and extra-curricular education are at greater risk of exhibiting delinquent and problem behavior (McLanahan and Percheski 2008). Economic stress faced by impoverished parents can directly affect children negatively (e.g., Mistry et al. 2009), a result predicted by general strain theory (Agnew 1992).

When cultural differences arise as a result of economic inequalities, intergenerational mobility is particularly difficult. Inequalities in parental employment can translate into differences in parenting, which in turn affect child outcomes. In his classic studies of class and authority, Kohn (1969) found that low SES jobs reward obedience to authority, and workers tend to generalize such experiences to their own parenting, stressing obedience and using coercive and physical discipline. In contrast, high SES jobs reward self-direction, and workers tend to use inductive discipline strategies, such as moral reasoning, to elicit self-direction in their children. Moreover, Heimer (1997) found that inductive parental discipline was class related, and was strongly predictive of future child violence and aggression. She found support for a cultural explanation of class, discipline, and violence: low SES youth

were likely to be punished harshly by parents, which increased the likelihood that they would learn codes of violence from their peers, which in turn, explained their future violent behavior.

Recently, Lareau (2002) used qualitative methods to identify some of the nuanced ways in which advantages enjoyed by middle class parents are passed down to their children. She found that middle class families are more adept and self-assured in managing and navigating conventional institutions, such as schools and health care organizations, which are important for their children's well-being. Middle class parents both exhibit and transmit to their children the confidence, verbal repertoire, and assertiveness needed for success in such institutions. Conversely, poor and working class families lack the requisite experience, skills, and background to navigate schools, health care systems, and legal systems, which leads to feelings of powerlessness, alienation, and distrust of professionals. As a result, children from poor and working class families may lack models of how to deal with bureaucratic institutions, may internalize family values and adopt identities at odds with the value systems of such institutions, and may distrust professionals who occupy positions of power in such organizations. This paucity of social and cultural capital can lead to difficulties in school and ultimately difficulties in the labor market, both of which are positively associated with adolescent and adult crime.

Adolescence: Schools, Peers, and Delinquency

As children make the transition to adolescence, they spend more time outside of the home at school and with peers. Parental influences diminish and give way to the influence of peers, neighborhoods, and schools. Parents still play a role in their children's lives, but that role is increasingly indirect via providing a framework for children to interpret experiences outside the home. Parents also provide resources that may affect their children's schooling, the neighborhoods to which they are exposed, and the peer groups with which they associate. Families, schools, and peers are

overlapping social contexts affecting adolescent delinquency.

Education has been termed the “the great equalizer” for its positive effects on wages and other social and health outcomes. There is extensive research showing that attachment to school and gains in education, particularly high school graduation, are associated with significant reductions in self-reported delinquency, arrest, and incarceration (e.g., Lochner and Moretti 2004). Nevertheless, to the extent that access to educational opportunities and success are influenced by a child’s socioeconomic background, schools can become a vehicle for increasing inequality. Furthermore, since 1980, returns to education have increased and, combined with skill-biased technical change, have resulted in greater wage inequality by levels of education.

Socioeconomic inequality can be exacerbated by several features of the educational system (Schneider et al., this volume). Disadvantaged students alienated from school fail to incorporate conventional school organization, expectations, and rules into their generalized other, leading to underinvestment in school and greater risk for crime and incarceration (e.g., Hirschi 1969). Willis (1977) outlines the process through which school becomes a central site for children from different socioeconomic backgrounds to begin forming class identities. Children from poor and working class backgrounds learn “oppositional” scripts from their parents and later their peers. These scripts consist of suspicion of authorities, insubordination and other acts of delinquency, and a view of school as unnecessary and its order illegitimate. Students reproduce these scripts by acting out, skipping school, disrespecting teachers, engaging in vandalism, and excluding conforming students from their social group (see also Lareau 2002). Teachers also enact scripts that strengthen the oppositional identities of the working class kids by belittling them, withholding knowledge from them, and approaching them as pathological and unable to benefit from teaching. Once children adopt identities in opposition to school and in alignment with working class scripts, they adjust their expectations and aspira-

tions for future life in a manner consistent with their class membership.

Schools that serve predominantly disadvantaged populations may also be providing children with a structure and curriculum less conducive to future success. Schools in low SES neighborhoods tend to compete poorly with affluent schools, exhibiting low retention rates and poor student performance on standardized tests (Arum 2000). Children from low SES families may experience additional resource-based barriers to education, such as being excluded from extracurricular school-based activities and programs to address learning disabilities (Lareau 2002). In sum, poor education, lack of continuity between school roles and home roles, and lack of immersion in school activities through barriers to extracurricular participation, may all contribute to a weak commitment to child’s identity as a student, causing them to underinvest in school. The law-abiding conventional organization of the school is not a part of the child’s generalized other. Students who get better grades, who do their homework, and who demonstrate strong commitment to their schools are less likely to be delinquent (e.g., Hirschi 1969). High school dropouts are particularly at risk of future criminality (Thornberry et al. 1985). Thus, although schools generally provide opportunities for students to develop the requisite skills for success in a conventional lifestyle, they also contain subtle mechanisms of reproducing inequality and generating crime and deviance.

One of the strongest and most consistent correlates of delinquency is membership in delinquent peer groups, although recent research using network data suggests that the association between self-reported delinquency and peer delinquency has been overestimated in the past due to a bias of over-reporting of similarities between own behavior and friends’ behavior (e.g. Haynie 2001). Control theorists suggest that the association between delinquent peers and delinquency is due to peer selection: low self-control causes delinquency, and also leads to befriending other peers with low self-control who are at risk of delinquency (e.g., Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990).

However, there is evidence that the association between delinquent peers and delinquency is not a result of selection of delinquent adolescents into peer groups with like others, but is a result of both selection and social influence (e.g., Haynie 2001; Matsueda and Anderson 1998). Specifically, delinquency is transmitted via social influence such as peer pressure, group status conferred to delinquents, and transmission of codes of violence from older youths to younger children (e.g., Warr 2002; Weerman 2011). Compared to other peer groups, delinquent groups tend to be neighborhood-based, rather than school centered (Kreager et al. 2011), a pattern of friendships particularly common for children from disadvantaged backgrounds. Increased residential inequality and segregation compound the effects of family disadvantage. Lack of resources (such as access to transportation) limits disadvantaged youths' ability to participate in extracurricular activities, or befriend peers who live in different neighborhoods (Harding 2009). Consequently, peer interactions of disadvantaged youths are limited to their neighborhoods of residence, which are more likely to have strong norms of violence, low rates of intergenerational closure, and weak informal social controls. This leads to an increase in the likelihood of befriending older peers, identifying strongly with the neighborhood, defending the neighborhood from incursions by outsiders (Harding 2009), and adopting neighborhood codes of violence (Anderson 1999). Here, selves may be dominated by a generalized other that is neighborhood oriented and prone to violent conflict resolution.

There is evidence that the effects of peers on delinquency declines with age, possibly because as they get older, individuals become increasingly immune from peer influences in their decision making, including decisions to commit criminal acts. Another view posits that as individuals age, peers from adolescence decrease in salience, as they are replaced by new influential others, such as spouses and colleagues (Warr 2002). Such changes in the salience of others are linked to age-graded role transitions that accompany adulthood.

Transition to Adulthood: Employment, Marriage, Parenthood

As youths age into adulthood, they encounter multiple age-graded role transitions, many of which are associated with desistance from crime, contributing to the long decline in the age-crime curve. One key transition, stable employment, is not only associated with desistance from crime (Sampson and Laub 1993), but also has a significant negative effect on adult-onset criminal behavior (Eggleston and Laub 2002). Stable employment provides networks of coworkers who are on average non-criminal, supplies a steady wage, and demands time and energy that otherwise might be used for illegal activities. The result is a reorganization of life away from crime and the development of a non-criminal identity embedded in non-criminal groups. Quality of employment matters: jobs in the secondary sector of the labor market tend to be sporadic, unskilled, low-wage, and high-stress jobs, which do little to dissuade low-skill workers from crime (e.g., Crutchfield 1989; Fagan and Freeman 1999). This effect of employment quality is supported by experimental evidence from the National Supported Work Demonstration Project, showing that secondary sector jobs had little effect on crime. The project randomly assigned chronically unemployed ex-offenders, drug addicts, and high school dropouts to a treatment consisting of jobs—mostly secondary-sector jobs—versus a control group. While there was some evidence of treatment heterogeneity, overall, the jobs made little difference in self-reported crime or arrest during the 27-month follow-up period (see Hollister et al. 1984).

Concentrated disadvantage at the neighborhood level, especially in those neighborhoods most gutted by mass incarceration (Rose and Clear 1998) reduces opportunities to obtain rewarding jobs that could become triggers for desistance, both due to paucity of proximal job openings, and the lack of employment-related social capital in resident networks. As concentrated disadvantage generates legal cynicism, codes of violence, and criminal behavior patterns in local

communities, social networks become dominated with information conducive to illegal activity.

In addition to work, other key life transitions include marriage and parenthood. Stable marriages, characterized by attachment, caring, and affection are associated with desistance from crime (Sampson and Laub 1993), but this effect is stronger for men than for women. A conventional spouse can provide a change in routine, and support necessary for adoption of a non-criminal identity. The roles associated with a transition to marriage may be especially salient due to the strong positive emotions that accompany the role-taking induced by marriage (Giordano et al. 2007). Research on marriage and desistance consistently finds that the quality of marriage matters—satisfying and stable marriages are associated with greater desistance (e.g., Laub et al. 1998).

The effect of marriage on desistance, however, may be conditioned by inequality, due to the links between inequality and both assortative mating processes and reductions of marriage quality due to experiences of extreme disadvantage. There is evidence that growth in inequality can be at least partially accounted by the increases in economic assortative mating (e.g. Breen and Salazar 2011). Studies also indicate that assortative mating extends to residential proximity, as well as criminal behavior (Knight 2011). Greater homophily in selection of marriage partners may mean that individuals who have problems with finances or criminal behavior, or who live in neighborhoods characterized by extreme disadvantage, are more likely to enter into partnerships with similarly disadvantaged others, which may undermine the positive effects of marriage. Experiences of severe financial strain have been linked to delay of marriage, marital strain, and divorce (Bradley and Corwyn 2002; McLanahan and Percheski 2008), all of which may undermine desistance. Finally, ex-felons are considered less desirable marriage partners and, therefore, will be less likely to experience the potential “turning point” of marriage (Western 2006).

While marriage has been linked to desistance in males, the role of becoming a parent has been linked to desistance in female offenders from disadvantaged neighborhoods (Kreager et al. 2010).

For disadvantaged women, the motherhood and caretaker role entails a concern for the future of the child, which is incompatible with continued illicit drug use and other illegal behaviors that could leave the child unattended, separated, or unsupported. Moreover, motherhood illustrates Giordano et al.’s (2002) concept of “hooks for change”: for disadvantaged women, having child can be a transformative event in their lives, giving their lives new meaning, and allowing them to adopt new identities as a caretaker, mother, and provider. That new identity is often accompanied by a change of reference group—away from friends and boyfriends who partake in the nightlife, consume recreational illicit drugs, and frequent situations conducive to crime, and toward other young mothers who share the concerns and feelings of being a new parent (see Anderson 1999; Edin and Kefalas 2005).

In sum, inequality, particularly the form of relative disadvantage generated by an expanding urban underclass, structures the timing and effects of age-graded transitions on criminal behavior within a person’s lifetime. Inequality affects crime both through reducing access to pro-social institutions, situations, and people, and also through conditioning responses to such pro-social opportunities. Moreover, life-course transitions build upon each other: Once a person commits crime as a result of initial disadvantage, they are likely to face disadvantage and reduced legitimate opportunities throughout their lives, making it harder to desist. Processes like these generate greater inequality in opportunities and behavior as people move through life. The next section details the consequences of incarceration for opportunity structures and inequality—a stark example of self-reinforcing process of cumulative disadvantage, inequality, and crime.

Consequences of Incarceration for Inequality

Over the last 40 years, the policy response to crime has shifted away from rehabilitation and diversion to more punitive measures emphasizing incarceration. Most criminologists agree that

mass incarceration by itself is an ineffective policy to combat crime. Nevertheless, with policies such as “three strikes,” mandatory minimum sentences, and the war on drugs, we have seen an unprecedented expansion of incarceration in recent years. Over the past three decades, the incarceration rate in the U.S. has increased by over 400%, up to 751 per 100,000 in 2006, the highest rate in the world since 2002 (Wakefield and Uggen 2010). The U.S. penal system has expanded to include 1% of its population, with an additional 2% constituted by parolees or those serving probation (Wakefield and Uggen 2010; Western 2006). Mass incarceration has disproportionately affected African-American men with little education. Only 3.2% of white men experienced incarceration by the ages of 30–34; the figure for African-American men is 22%. Over half of all black men without a high school degree experience incarceration by the ages of 30–34 (Pettit and Western 2004). Without question, differences in behavior account for much of the racial, educational, and gender differentials in incarceration (Daly and Tonry 1997; Pettit and Western 2004; Wakefield and Uggen 2010). Nevertheless, most social scientists would argue that behavioral differences alone are unlikely to account for all of the disparities (e.g., Western 2006). In particular, unequal targeting of criminal behavior perpetrated by disadvantaged and minority populations helps explain differences in arrest rates that remain after behavioral differences are taken into account (Tonry and Melewski 2008). Racial and gender bias in criminal justice processing have also been shown to modestly affect incarceration rate disparities. Research finds that, in the absence of complete information, judicial decision makers invoke stereotypical gendered and racial status characteristics when making calculations about an offender’s dangerousness and culpability (e.g., Steen et al. 2005). Being black is associated with expectations of increased dangerousness and culpability, while being female is associated with expectations of being a victim, and presenting less of a threat.

Regardless of their precise source, differences in incarceration rates translate into inequalities in opportunity, occupational mobility, and

well-being. Recent research on the effects of incarceration highlights why it is a particularly powerful institution of inequality: Once experienced, the effects of state punishment are pernicious and lasting, often permanently stifling the upward mobility of those with a criminal record, their families, and children. The acquisition of a criminal record has been shown to stigmatize individuals, reduce returns from legal employment, strip individuals of social rights even after the official punishment has been served, and make it harder to start and support families. The following sections describe some of the ways in which unequal contact with the system of formal punishment creates lasting inequalities in economic, health, and social outcomes. These continued penalties reduce opportunities for advancement, solidifying positions of disadvantage for those populations that disproportionately bear the brunt of mass incarceration.

A felony record typically reduces an individual’s employment and earnings potential—sometimes permanently. Ex-felons are less likely to be employed, and when employed, tend to be earn lower wages (Fagan and Freeman 1999; Western and Beckett 1999). To control for potentially confounding effects of differences in human capital between ex-felons and non-felons, Pager (2003) used a quasi-experimental audit study to test the effect of a criminal record on employment. She found that non-felons were twice as likely as ex-felons to get a callback after an interview. That effect was greater for black ex-felons (although not significantly so), suggesting that incarceration can increase inequality between groups, not just through disproportionate targeting of one group over the other, but also through differential effects on different groups.

Furthermore, a felony conviction revokes the right to be employed in several occupations, and can be grounds for denial of such welfare programs as subsidized housing and financial aid to mothers with children (Wakefield and Uggen 2010). This exacerbates the already precarious financial situation of most ex-felons. Legal debt, as well as the high interest rate that usually accompanies it, reduces income, overall solvency, and potential for wealth accumulation of ex-pris-

oners, who are often already economically marginalized (Harris et al. 2010). Thus, as personal wealth and employment opportunities diminish, ex-prisoners are trapped in positions of economic disadvantage, with bleak prospects for upward mobility.

In most states in the U.S., felony status results in a sometimes permanent loss of voting rights (Manza and Uggen 2006). The most straightforward implication of this penalty is that ex-felons, as a group, become less politically powerful, unable to elect political figures who would protect and serve their interests. To the extent that ex-felons are overly represented within certain sub-populations (being black or affiliating with the Democratic Party), felon disenfranchisement weakens the political power of such groups. Conversely, as prisons and correctional facilities have expanded as a result of the steep growth in incarceration, employees of correctional facilities come to constitute a large, organized, and influential group whose lobbying efforts have induced state legislatures to promote further penal expansion (Beckett 1997).

The negative consequences of punishment can have spillover effects on other social and health outcomes. Incarceration appears to reduce a person's marriageability as well as the ability to parent and support children effectively (Comfort 2007; Lopoo and Western 2005; Western 2006). By adversely affecting parenting and partnership, the experience of incarceration extends beyond the offender to family members who have committed no crimes (Comfort 2007). Foster and Hagan (2007) find that daughters of incarcerated fathers have heightened risk of physical abuse, sexual abuse, and homelessness, and that both sons and daughters have lower educational attainment and higher probabilities of contact with the juvenile and adult criminal justice system. Research using data from the Fragile Families Study, which allows for accurate measurement of the timing of parental incarceration, finds that father's incarceration results in a significant reduction of child financial support (Geller et al. 2009), and is predictive of greater levels of sons' aggression (Wildeman 2010).

In the U.S., several states terminate an inmate's parenting rights, as well as deny public housing and financial assistance to ex-offenders and their families (Uggen et al. 2006). As African Americans are at higher risk of contact with the criminal justice system, their families will on average experience greater net losses. Moreover, African Americans disproportionately live in states that have the harshest restrictions on provision of welfare to ex-offenders, which further reduces their ability to provide for their families after conviction (Soss et al. 2008). The narrowing gap between male and female rates of incarceration suggests that incarceration effects on children may become even more acute because women prisoners are more likely than their male counterparts to be primary care providers for dependent children (Kruttschnitt 2010).

Experiences of incarceration have also been shown to undermine physical and mental health. The disproportionate rate of incarceration for blacks versus whites has been linked to poor health outcomes among blacks when compared to whites (Massoglia 2008). The high prevalence of infectious diseases such as HIV, Hepatitis C, and tuberculosis in prisons may contribute to health problems of those who have experienced incarceration (Wakefield and Uggen 2010). Maximum security prisons and solitary confinement can be deleterious to prisoners' mental health. The stress and stigma of incarceration may contribute to poor health outcomes of individuals after release (Schnittker and John 2007). Moreover, the effects of incarceration on health may worsen as funding for drug rehabilitation programs has declined. Finally, the denial of welfare to many ex-prisoners (Soss et al. 2008; Uggen et al. 2006) may negatively affect their ability to maintain their health upon release.

High incarceration rates in disadvantaged neighborhoods result in large proportions of residents cycling in and out of prison, which disrupts the local community (e.g., Clear 2007). On the one hand, removing an offender who has victimized other residents, has been isolated from others, and has made few contributions to the community may have a positive effect on the com-

munity as a whole. On the other hand, despite having committed a crime, local offenders may also have been fathers, neighbors, friends, employees, and consumers, and thereby have been interwoven into the fabric of the local community. Their removal from the community through incarceration has the negative spillover effect of reducing social capital by eliminating social ties within the community's social network. Ironically, this reduction in social capital may be associated with reductions in informal social control, such as collective efficacy, which in turn is associated with higher rates of crime and incarceration. Thus, a community can get caught up in a pernicious feedback loop in which incarceration undermines social control, increasing crime and incarceration, and further undermining social controls. Furthermore, an influx of returning ex-prisoners into a disadvantaged community may disrupt local legal economies (shops and restaurants), reducing opportunity costs to crime, and may thereby increase the community's crime rate (e.g., Clear 2007).

In sum, the contemporary system of punishment in the U.S. appears to stigmatize offenders formally and informally upon release—and long after their official punishment is meted out. Whether it takes the form of a formal label of being unfit for employment, or an informal label of undesirable marriage partners, the long-term stigma experienced by ex-offenders serves to cut them off from full participation in conventional society. There is increasing evidence that these lasting labels are a result, in large part, of failures to re-integrate individuals into society after they have experienced state punishment. The work of Braithwaite (1989) on re-integrative shaming, along with emergent research on the role of parole and post-release processes (e.g., Visher and Travis 2003) shows that without re-integration of ex-offenders into society formal punishment may not only foster inequality, but may also induce future criminal participation. It is our hope that, in addition to continued efforts to understand the role of incarceration in systems of stratification, future research engages the issues of harm-reduction for those who have experienced incarceration.

Summary and Conclusions

In this chapter, we have explored the relationship between inequality and crime. Most research on inequality and crime focuses on macro-level concepts and estimates macro-level models using data on aggregate crime rates. To augment such models, we have tried to incorporate social psychological processes that provide a microfoundation for the macrorelationship between inequality and crime. Specifically, we presented an integrated multi-level social psychological theory of crime to identify both micro-foundations and specific causal mechanisms by which inequality may produce crime and deviance.

Our model, rooted in pragmatism, emphasizes how participation in organized groups—favoring or discouraging crime—produces identities, preferences, and habits that can be either promote or deter criminal behavior. Those behaviors, in turn, reinforce group processes. An example of organized groups discouraging crime appears when reciprocated exchange among neighbors produces collective efficacy, which in turn, helps control youth delinquency. An example of organized groups promoting crime appears when violent transactions on the street produce status hierarchies, violent norms, and social systems conducive to street violence.

Research reviewed here suggests that participation in organized groups, whether criminal or conventional, varies over the lifespan, and is linked to life-long patterns of criminal participation. Onset of and desistance from crime, then, can be seen as an age-graded result of membership in organized groups. Thus, age-graded transitions into and out of institutions—including the family, education, labor market, and prison system—alter trajectories of offending by affecting group participation. Such transitions are structured by social inequality, but also help reproduce inequality. This reproduction of inequality is clearly apparent when examining mass incarceration in the U.S., which, through its disproportionate effect on African-American males, has undermined labor market outcomes, political participation, family well-being, health status, and community well-being for a large segment of

the population. The result has been an exacerbation of inequality, and a preservation of inequality based on race.

Social inequality is implicated even more fundamentally in crime and incarceration. The content of criminal law, and therefore, the very definition of crime, is strongly influenced by class cleavages. People make choices about criminal behavior against the backdrop of unequal power, resources, and opportunities for upward mobility. The powerful classes tend to use their political, economic, and social clout to realize their interests in law, while disguising their class interests under the rubric of universal interests. Thus, criminal law, criminal behaviors, and punitive responses to crime are each produced in part by social inequality, and are each implicated in the reproduction of systems of social inequality.

Future research is needed to flesh out the social psychological underpinnings of inequality and crime. First, research on the complex ways in which individual action, whether toward facilitating crime or controlling crime, creates collective action and macro-level outcomes, is needed. Second, research on the concrete ways in which the legal system produces racial disparities in arrest, conviction, and incarceration is needed to go beyond what is essentially a black box. Third, research must turn to crime in the suites—white collar and corporate crimes—to gain a full understanding of inequality and the complete scope of criminal behavior.

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Jane D. McLeod, Christy Erving and Jennifer Caputo

In this chapter, we review social psychological research on health inequalities across the three central dimensions of stratification in the United States: socioeconomic position, race, and gender.¹ Much health research is motivated by the straightforward, and seemingly reasonable, assumption that social disadvantages produce health disadvantages. However, patterns of health inequality are not always consistent with this assumption. Women's health is not uniformly worse than men's despite their relative social disadvantage; the same is true in the comparison of racial minorities with majority whites. Even in the case of socioeconomic position, for which consistent health inequalities have been observed, the association varies by outcome and over the life course. These empirical complexities call for a rich and nuanced analysis that looks beyond the distribution of material resources to consider how group statuses affect interpersonal interactions and the emergent meanings of objective life circumstances.

¹ Research on health inequalities encompasses other dimensions of stratification such as immigrant status and sexual identity (Alegría et al. 2008; Cho et al. 2004; Saewyc 2011). Because the social psychological arguments that are invoked are similar, we emphasize these three key dimensions of stratification here.

J. D. McLeod (✉) · C. Erving · J. Caputo
Department of Sociology, Indiana University, Ballantine
Hall 744, 1020 E. Kirkwood Avenue, Bloomington,
IN 47405, USA
e-mail: jmcLeod@indiana.edu

Social psychological theories and concepts must be central to any such analysis. As a group, they draw attention to the processes that connect macro dimensions of inequality to psychological and bodily experiences. They direct us to consider how the structure and content of proximate environments influence the distribution of material resources, the nature and quality of interpersonal interactions, and the construction of symbolic meanings. These proximate processes set in motion physiological and emotional responses that are the ultimate determinants of physical and psychological well-being (Kiecolt-Glaser et al. 2002). Although others have made the point that proximate processes tell us how inequalities “get under the skin” (Taylor et al. 1997), their accounts emphasize categories of proximate environmental experiences (e.g., interpersonal relationships) rather than the social psychological processes those categories represent. We emphasize the latter, as it is these processes that tell us how, why, and under what circumstances social disadvantage diminishes physical and psychological well-being.

We begin with a brief description of health inequalities, followed by a review of key factors that have been proposed to explain them. We begin with factors associated with the stress process framework because they have dominated sociological research on health inequalities for many years: stress exposures, residential environments, psychological dispositions, and social relationships. We then turn to two other explanatory factors—health behaviors and health care

interactions—that draw from other frameworks. We close with a discussion of the role of social comparisons in health inequalities. For each factor, our central orienting question is: How can social psychological theories and concepts help us understand its role in health inequalities?²

Basic Patterns

Socioeconomic Position³

The basic findings in research on socioeconomic inequalities in physical health are well-established and seemingly robust to historical and geographic variation, at least in the western industrialized world. People who occupy lower socioeconomic positions as indexed by income, education, and occupational prestige have worse physical and mental health than people who occupy higher socioeconomic positions (see also Milkie et al., this volume). As a general rule, socioeconomic inequality in health holds across the full continuum—what is often referred to as the health gradient (Adler et al. 1994; Braveman et al. 2010). It is not just that people who are poor, who have not graduated from high school, and who work in unskilled positions have worse health than everyone else. Rather, people who occupy any given position on the socioeconomic scale have worse health than those in positions above and better health than those in positions below, with some leveling of the curve at the highest status levels (House and Williams 2000). People in lower socioeconomic positions

also are sicker and stay sick longer than people in higher socioeconomic positions (Herd et al. 2007), in part, because they are less likely to seek care and, when they do, receive lower quality care (Fiscella et al. 2000). At the most basic level, these patterns demonstrate that the effects of socioeconomic inequality on health are the result not only of the profound material deprivations experienced by people who occupy the very lowest status positions but also of symbolic processes through which people come to understand their place in the world.

This simple description of socioeconomic inequalities in health overlooks important variations across outcomes and over the life course. Health inequalities are larger for some health outcomes (e.g., heart disease mortality) than for others (e.g., hypertension; Dow and Rehkopf 2010), with no obvious explanation. Health inequalities also vary over the life course. For physical health, they are largest in infancy and midlife, and smaller in childhood, adolescence, young adulthood, and at older ages (Adler and Rehkopf 2008). The patterns for mental health are less consistent, although this may be a function of how socioeconomic position is measured. Schieman (2003) reported that worsening financial conditions are more strongly associated with anger in younger adults than in older adults (see also Mirowsky and Ross 2001). In contrast, the association of education with depression appears to grow stronger with age (Miech and Shanahan 2000), perhaps reflecting the association of education with chronicity of disorder (Miech et al. 2005).

² Our review is necessarily selective. Literally thousands of studies of health inequalities have been published just in the past decade, many of which offer some social psychological insight. To keep our review manageable, we focus primarily on studies that explicitly invoke social psychological theories and concepts. Even within this narrow group of studies, space limitations prevent us from including all relevant citations.

³ The terms “social class,” “socioeconomic status,” and “socioeconomic position” are defined and used in various ways by health researchers. Of the three, the term socioeconomic position is the broadest. We use it here to avoid an unnecessary and unproductive alliance between our arguments and any more specific conceptualization.

Race⁴

By virtually every indicator, U.S. blacks (or African Americans) have worse physical health than U.S. whites. Blacks report worse health on subjective measures such as self-rated health (Cum-

⁴ We follow Williams et al. (2010) in using race to refer to racial and ethnic categories, both because the boundaries between the two concepts are fuzzy and for the sake of parsimony.

mings and Jackson 2008), as well as on more objective measures such as counts of chronic health conditions (Hayward et al. 2000). Blacks experience earlier onset of major health problems than whites, their health problems are more severe, and their health declines more rapidly with age than the health of whites (Hertz et al. 2005; Kelley-Moore and Ferraro 2004; Shuey and Willson 2008). Although blacks have lower current and lifetime rates of major depression than whites (a finding that extends to other psychiatric disorders), their episodes last longer and are more severe (Williams et al. 2007). Racial differences in socioeconomic position contribute to racial inequalities in health but they do not fully explain them; at each socioeconomic level, blacks have worse health than whites (Williams 2005).

Studies of other minority groups complicate our understanding of whether and how social disadvantage produces poor health. Although Asian Americans are racial minorities in the U.S., they have better health than whites on average (Frisbie et al. 2001; Takeuchi et al. 2007). However, there is significant variation across Asian American groups that maps closely onto their socioeconomic profiles. Chinese, Japanese, and Filipino immigrants tend to be highly educated and experience better physical and mental health than U.S.-born Whites, whereas poorly-educated refugees from Southeast Asian nations such as Vietnam and Laos generally experience poorer physical health (Frisbie et al. 2001). Importantly, the health of Asian Americans declines with longer time of residence in the U.S. (Frisbie et al. 2001; Takeuchi et al. 2007), pointing to a role for meaning-based explanations.

Despite lower average socioeconomic position, Latinos have similar, and sometimes better, health profiles than whites, a pattern that is referred to as the “epidemiologic paradox” (Franzini et al. 2001; Markides and Coreil 1986). As for Asian Americans, Latino health declines with the length of time immigrants have spent in the United States (Alegría et al. 2007; Cho et al. 2004). Patterns of Latino health also vary with country of origin but not necessarily with socioeconomic position. For example, Cubans experience better health than Puerto Ricans (Alegría

et al. 2007), which is consistent with their relative socioeconomic positions, but Mexicans experience better health than Puerto Ricans, which is not. Although less well-studied, American Indians and Alaskan Natives have poor health relative to whites, with relatively high mortality rates for alcohol abuse, tuberculosis, diabetes, unintentional injuries, homicide, and suicide (Indian Health Service 2011).

Gender

With respect to physical health, women report poorer health and have higher rates of disability than men but they live longer (Read and Gorman 2011; Verbrugge 1985). Although this basic conclusion seems secure, life course research introduces complexity. For example, the male disadvantage in heart disease now appears to be smaller than previously thought (McKinlay 1996) and decreases at older ages (Verbrugge and Wingard 1987). Women’s disadvantage in self-rated health also declines with age, perhaps as men develop more life-threatening illnesses, but their disadvantage in functional disability increases (Gorman and Read 2006).

With respect to mental health, scholars have long documented higher rates of depression and higher levels of depressive symptoms in women as compared to men (Rosenfield 1999), leading to the conclusion that women have worse mental health. However, more recent evidence suggests that the differences may reflect gendered norms of emotional expression: women report more symptoms of internalizing distress while men report more symptoms of externalizing distress, such as alcohol and substance abuse (Rosenfield 1999).

Research across these three dimensions of inequality confirms that social disadvantages often, but not always, translate into health disadvantages. The associations of socioeconomic position and gender with health vary by outcome and over the life course. Some racial minority groups have poorer health than whites (e.g., Blacks) whereas others do not (e.g., Latinos). Social psychological theories help us understand these patterns by

identifying the processes through which social disadvantage produces health disadvantages, and the contingencies that govern them.

Explaining the Patterns

As House and Williams (2000) note, inequality influences health through many different pathways. Virtually all known behavioral, psychosocial, and environmental health risk factors vary across positions in systems of inequality (see also Lynch et al. 2000). Thus, the goal of health inequalities research is not to determine *whether* specific risk factors contribute but *why*. Two broad types of processes have been proposed: (1) those that involve the differential distribution of material deprivations and resources and (2) those that involve non-material or “psychosocial” factors. The former emphasize objective life conditions associated with lower status positions that place people at risk of poor health, such as exposure to health-damaging physical and social environments. The latter emphasize subjective experiences that arise at the intersection of the social and the psychological, often conceptualized as stress exposures, psychological dispositions, social relationships, and health behaviors.

Social psychology aligns naturally with the analysis of psychosocial factors. Yet, it would be a mistake to remove all consideration of material life conditions from social psychological inquiry. Material deprivation can affect health through social psychological processes, such as when economic deprivation affects the perceived level of financial stress. As well, psychosocial factors can have material implications, such as when the quality of social relationships affects access to other health-promoting resources (Kawachi et al. 2010). For these reasons, we set aside recent debate over the relative primacy of material and psychosocial factors in health inequalities (see Carpiano et al. 2008 for a review) in favor of a focus on the social psychological processes that link material realities to psychosocial factors. These processes occur in proximate environments that structure daily life and give life meaning.

We organize our review with reference to six major classes of explanatory factors that have been identified as most central in previous reviews (Adler and Stewart 2010; House and Williams 2000; Matthews et al. 2010): stress exposures; residential environments; psychological dispositions; social relations; health behaviors; and health care interactions. For each, we highlight the complementary contributions of material and subjective explanations. We then review research on social comparisons and health, which underlies interest in relative deprivation, equity, and illness interpretations. We begin with factors associated with the stress process because of their long dominance in health research and their especially close alliance with social psychology.

Stress Exposures

According to the stress-exposure explanation, people in socially disadvantaged positions experience poorer health because they are exposed to more stressors and have fewer resources (intrapersonal, interpersonal, and material) for coping with them (Schwartz and Meyer 2010; Thoits 2010). Chronic and intense stressors have been hypothesized to play an especially strong role in health inequalities (Turner et al. 1995). This explanation draws implicitly from the social structure and personality framework within sociological social psychology (House 1981; Williams 1990), which traces the effects of macrostructures and processes on individuals through the “smaller structures and patterns of intimate interpersonal interaction or communication” (House 1981; p. 540) that constitute people’s day-to-day lives. Most sociological research on stress measures objective stress exposures, such as job loss; in contrast, most psychological research measures “subjective” stress exposures by taking into account respondents’ perceptions of the stressfulness of the experience (e.g., severity, threat, and the like).

Studies have evaluated both general and specific forms of the stress exposure explanation. Tests of the general form use global measures of stress exposure—sums of life events, chronic

stressors, lifetime traumatic experiences, and/or of overall stress burden (Turner et al. 1995)—to evaluate whether stress exposures account for health inequalities. Results are mixed. People with low levels of income, education, and who work in less prestigious occupations experience a relatively high burden of chronic and severe stressors, but these stress exposures do not fully account for their poorer physical and mental health (see Matthews et al. 2010 for a review). The same holds for gender. For example, Denton et al. (2004) found that women's poorer general physical health is not explained by differences in their structural positions, lifestyle, or experiences of stress. Evidence for the role of stress exposures in racial inequalities in health appears more solid (Williams et al. 1997). Blacks and U.S.-born Latinos report higher levels of stress exposure than whites and foreign-born Latinos (Sternthal et al. 2010; see Hatch and Dohrenwend 2007 for a review) and the differences in stress exposure account for roughly half of the differences in self-rated health, chronic illnesses, and depressive symptoms (Sternthal et al. 2010).

Research on general stress exposures has been extended with life course concepts, especially the notion of cumulative exposures (Elder et al. 1996). Early life socioeconomic disadvantages appear to set into motion cascades of negative experiences with profound health consequences (McLeod and Almazan 2003; Wadsworth 1997). Low socioeconomic position during childhood is related to risk factors for the prevalence of adult disease (e.g. Lynch et al. 1997), mortality (Davey Smith et al. 1998; Hayward and Gorman 2004), self-rated health, and physical symptoms (Power et al. 1998), independent of adult life conditions (e.g., Kuh et al. 2002; although see Hayward and Gorman 2004). Childhood disadvantage also has been implicated in race differences in health among adults (Warner and Hayward 2006). For example, evidence supports Geronimus' "weathering hypothesis," which proposes that African Americans experience earlier health deterioration due to the cumulative impact of repeated experiences of social or economic adversity (Geronimus et al. 2006).

Together, these studies demonstrate that general stress exposure is one pathway through which social disadvantage increases the risk of poor health, especially for race. Research on specific stressors adds depth to this conclusion by pinpointing the stress exposures that are most closely linked to specific dimensions of inequality. This research investigates differences in stress exposure *across* social groups as well as the effects of specific stressors on health *within* social groups.

Specific Stressors: Socioeconomic Position. Economic experiences and work environments have received sustained attention in research on socioeconomic differences in health. People with low levels of income are at disproportionate risk of food insecurity and financial stress (e.g., Bickel et al. 1999; Broussard 2010). People with low levels of education encounter less favorable job conditions (Warren et al. 2004) and more financial difficulties (Stronks et al. 1998). The psychosocial work environment also varies across occupations in ways that matter for health. For example, jobs that involve a combination of high demands and low control are associated with increased risk of cardiovascular disease (Karasek and Theorell 1990), as are jobs that involve high effort and low reward (Theorell 2000). Economic and occupational stressors extend into other life domains, increasing family and marital conflict and, in turn, threatening health (e.g., Frone 2000; Grzywacz 2000).

While these results are consistent with the assumption that social disadvantage increases stress exposure, some research on socioeconomic position finds the opposite. Studies of the "stress of higher status" find that people in higher-status occupations report more work-family conflict, longer hours, and more work demands than people in lower-status occupations (Schieman et al. 2006). Similarly, people with high levels of education report greater exposure to daily stressors than people with low levels of education (Grzywacz et al. 2004). Additional results from the latter study suggest that the apparent disadvantage among people with high levels of education may be more illusory than real: although they report more stressors, the stressors they report are less

severe (based on both objective and subjective ratings) and less strongly associated with health (Grzywacz et al. 2004). More studies of stress exposure that take into account the qualities of events and how objective life conditions are interpreted may help resolve these inconsistencies (McLeod 2012).

Specific Stressors: Race. Studies of racial minority health emphasize discrimination as a specific stressor linked to poor health. In these studies, discrimination is conceptualized as a multi-level phenomenon, encompassing institutional discrimination, personal discrimination, and internalized racism (Williams and Mohammed 2009). In this section, we review research on personal discrimination because it aligns most closely with the stress exposure explanation. Institutional discrimination operates in part through race differences in socioeconomic position which, as noted, explain some but not all of racial health inequalities. Institutional discrimination is also evident in racial residential segregation (Takeuchi et al. 2010), a health risk that we discuss in the section that follows.

Measures of personal discrimination include major discriminatory acts (e.g., being denied a job because of one's race), day-to-day experiences of discrimination or micro-aggressions (e.g., being treated with disrespect; Sue et al. 2007), and anticipated experiences of discrimination or heightened vigilance. Individual discrimination is an important determinant of health among racial minorities. For example, among racial minority adults, experiences of major discrimination are associated with poorer self-rated health, higher blood pressure, cardiovascular disease, and psychological distress (see reviews by Harrell et al. 2003; Williams et al. 2003). Micro-aggressions are associated with both internalizing and externalizing emotions among Asian American adults (Wang et al. 2011) and with depressive and somatic symptoms among Latino and Asian American adolescents (Huynh 2012). Despite the strong association of personal discrimination with health within racial minority populations, discrimination does not consistently account for racial differences in physical and mental health (e.g., Kessler et al. 1999; Williams et al. 1997).

This is especially true in studies that measure discrimination with reports of "unfair treatment" because those reports do not differ by race (e.g., Kessler et al. 1999). Discrimination provides a stronger explanation in studies that ask respondents directly about racial discrimination (Krieger 2012). Thus, studies that use more refined measures that incorporate the perceived basis for the discrimination and the context in which it occurs may yield more consistent results.

Among racial minorities, perceptions of discrimination and the effects of discrimination on health appear to be contingent on identities and beliefs. African Americans whose racial identities are central to their sense of self and who believe that other groups hold negative attitudes toward African Americans report higher levels of perceived discrimination than other African Americans (Sellers et al. 2003, 2006). At the same time, the negative effects of discrimination on mental health are dampened by the belief that the public holds one's group in low regard (Sellers et al. 2006) and by having a strong racial identity (Mossakowski 2003; Sellers et al. 2003; although see Yip et al. 2008), although evidence for the latter is more mixed (Pascoe and Richman 2009).

Specific Stressors: Gender. Research on gender-specific stressors draws primarily from research on gendered social roles. This research has waned in recent years, perhaps because patterns of gender-based health inequality are less straightforward and because scholarship on gender has shifted away from a role-based conceptualization (Courtenay 2000). During the 1980s and 1990s, scholars established that women's disadvantaged positions in the family and labor market contributed to women's higher levels of distress and lower levels of self-rated health compared to men (e.g., Aneshensel et al. 1981; Ross and Bird 1994; Thoits 1986). Interestingly, these studies also pointed to men's potential vulnerability to changing gender roles in the family, and found that men whose wives work or earn more than them may have poorer mental health compared to those in households with a more traditional division of labor (Glass and Fujimoto 1994; Rosenfield 1992).

Subsequent research extended these basic findings with evidence that the meaning of social roles and, therefore, their stressfulness varies by gender. For example, Simon (1995) found that employment has different meanings for married male and female parents, with women feeling guilty about the time work may take away from their families and men seeing work as bolstering their family roles. This difference in role meanings contributes to women's greater distress. Similarly, women encounter more stress in association with parenthood because they continue to have greater responsibility for parenting activities such as finding childcare (Ross and Mirowsky 1988; Simon 1992). Gendered expectations for emotion work also produce gender differences in vulnerability to stress. For example, Kessler and McLeod (1984) found that women's greater psychological vulnerability to stressful life events lies in the events that occur to network members, which may reflect the expectation that women shoulder the burden of maintaining interpersonal relationships (although see Aneshensel et al. 1991).

Research on specific stressors extends research on general stressors by acknowledging that certain stressors may be more closely tied to some forms of inequality than to others. In that way, it offers a more nuanced conceptualization of proximate environments that brings stress research into conversation with more general social psychological concepts, such as social roles and discrimination. The most promising research has sought to incorporate subjective interpretations of stressors (i.e., perceived severity, perceived discrimination, the meanings of social roles), which strengthens the stress process framework's alliance with symbolic interactionism (McLeod 2012).

Residential Environments

Exposure to harmful residential environments is socially patterned to the disadvantage of people in lower socioeconomic positions and racial minorities. The poor and racial minorities are more likely to live near environmentally hazardous

facilities and are more likely to be exposed to environmental toxins and air pollutants (Brulle and Pellow 2006). Although direct evidence is scarce (Adler and Stewart 2010), these differential exposures seem likely to contribute to health inequalities. How much they contribute is uncertain as some evidence indicates that physical environments contribute only about 5% to premature mortality (McGinnis et al. 2002).

Sociological studies of health inequalities have devoted more attention to the social characteristics of residential environments than to their physical risks. Disadvantaged residential environments are often, although not always, conceptualized as stress exposures. Although their effects on health are amenable to social psychological explanation, social psychology is referenced only infrequently in this literature. (See Quillian, this volume for further discussion.)

Since the early 2000s, research on socioeconomic health inequalities has turned to the question of whether neighborhood-level socioeconomic disadvantage and residential segregation contribute to socioeconomic health inequalities (see Pickett and Pearl 2001, and Robert et al. 2010 for reviews). These neighborhood conditions are thought to affect health because they are associated with material living conditions (e.g., access to health care, exposure to violence, housing quality) as well as social environments (e.g., social cohesion, behavioral norms; Diez-Roux and Mair 2010). Neighborhood characteristics appear to have significant but modest associations with physical and mental health independent of individual-level socioeconomic position (Robert et al. 2010). However, they do not explain the associations of socioeconomic position with health. Instead, socioeconomic position interacts with neighborhood characteristics when predicting health outcomes. For example, stressful daily events have stronger effects on mood for women who live in neighborhoods that they regard as unsafe and in which residents do not engage in mutually supportive activities than for women who live in better neighborhoods (Caspi et al. 1987). More generally, living in deprived neighborhoods heightens the associations of

other stressors with physical and mental health (Cutrona et al. 2006).

As noted in the previous section, studies of racial health inequalities treat racial residential segregation as an indicator of institutional discrimination. Consistent with this conceptualization, neighborhood characteristics explain a significant proportion of the effects of race on hypertension, obesity, self-rated health, and other health-related outcomes (e.g., Cagney et al. 2005; Morenoff et al. 2007; Robert and Lee 2002). African Americans who live in segregated neighborhoods also have a much higher risk of mortality than African Americans who live in areas of low segregation in both childhood and adulthood (e.g., LaVeist 1993; Takeuchi et al. 2010). However, Mexican Americans and Asian Americans who live in segregated neighborhoods report better health than their counterparts who live in integrated neighborhoods (e.g., Gee 2002; Patel et al. 2003). Scholars speculate that, for some racial groups, residential segregation increases access to immigrant enclaves, ethnic social networks, and supportive social relations that promote, rather than damage, health (Takeuchi et al. 2010).

In sum, research supports the conclusion that the characteristics of areas of residence make only a modest contribution to explaining socioeconomic health inequalities. Residential characteristics contribute more to explaining racial health inequalities although the patterns are not straightforward. Research on the health-promoting features of segregated neighborhoods suggests that the quality of relationships within neighborhoods may matter more for health than their objective characteristics—a possibility that emphasizes the centrality of social psychology to research on the environmental determinants of health.

Psychological Dispositions

People's positions in systems of inequality influence not only their exposure to stress and harmful environments, but also their psychological dispositions. Research on stress evaluates differences in dispositions with reference to the concept of

coping. Studies of coping investigate the possibility that people in socially disadvantaged positions have fewer resources to cope with stressors, which renders them more vulnerable to health problems when stressors occur (Williams et al. 2010; see Thoits 1995 for a review). However, psychological dispositions are important for health beyond their role as coping resources, as we outline below.

Among psychological dispositions, two dimensions of the self-concept—self-esteem and mastery—have received most attention from sociologists (see Callero, this volume). Self-esteem refers to an overall evaluation of one's worth or value. The association of socioeconomic position with self-esteem increases with age, at least through mid-adulthood. In Rosenberg and Pearlin's (1978) foundational study, parents' occupational prestige was unrelated to self-esteem for young children (ages 8–11), weakly related to self-esteem for older adolescents, and strongly related to self-esteem for adults. The same age-graded pattern has been confirmed and extended in other studies, with evidence that the association begins to decline after age 60 (Twenge and Campbell 2002). Women also report lower self-esteem than men, with the difference emerging in late adolescence (Kling et al. 1999). In contrast, race differences in self-esteem are not consistent with the hypothesis that social disadvantage diminishes feelings of self-worth. Rather, African Americans report higher self-esteem than whites who, in turn, report higher self-esteem than Latinos and Asian Americans (Gray-Little and Hafdahl 2000; Twenge and Crocker 2002).⁵

Self-esteem is positively associated with self-reported health (McDonough 2000) and nega-

⁵ Several explanations have been proposed for the relatively high self-esteem observed among African Americans: that members of disadvantaged groups tend to compare themselves to similarly disadvantaged others; that they attribute failures or rejection to prejudice; that they devalue domains in which their group show relatively poor achievement; and that they hold positive group identities that protect self-esteem (see Twenge and Crocker 2002 for a review). However, why Latinos and Asian Americans report low self-esteem relative to whites and blacks, despite presumably having access to these same cognitive coping strategies, remains unclear.

tively associated with reports of illness (Antonucci and Jackson 1983). It predicts mortality prospectively (Forthofer et al. 2001) and is negatively associated with depressive symptoms and psychological distress (Pearlin et al. 1981). Self-esteem appears to promote health by fostering healthy social relationships and by encouraging healthy behaviors (McGee and Williams 2000; Stinson et al. 2008; although see Gerrard et al. 2000). Despite its promise as an explanation for socioeconomic and gender health inequalities, however, it does not explain them in statistical models (McDonough 2000; Schnittker 2004). Possibly, self-esteem is more important for explaining group differences in response to stress than for explaining health inequalities *per se*.

The second dimension of the self-concept, mastery, refers to the extent to which people perceive themselves as in control of forces that importantly affect their lives. Mastery is rooted in objective conditions of power and dependency that vary across social hierarchies. As noted in the section on stress, people who are in socially disadvantaged positions are disproportionately exposed to adversities that diminish control. High status also carries opportunities and positive life experiences that enhance sense of control through “social conditioning” (Weeden and Grusky 2005) and learning generalization (Kohn and Schooler 1983). As a result, people who occupy higher positions in social hierarchies have higher average levels of mastery (e.g., Pearlin et al. 1981; Ross and Mirowsky 1992). High mastery is associated with better physical and mental health, longevity, and fewer activity limitations (Kiecolt et al. 2009; McDonough 2000; Mirowsky and Ross 1989). Mastery contributes importantly to explaining differences in physical and mental health by socioeconomic status, gender, and race (e.g., Denton et al. 2004; Pudrovska et al. 2005; Ross and Mirowsky 1989; Turner et al. 2004). Mastery also moderates the effects of stressors on health, encourages healthy behaviors, and promotes recovery from illness (Pudrovska et al. 2005; Schwarzer and Fuchs 1995), suggesting its relevance to understanding group differences in vulnerability to stress.

Research in health psychology extends the study of psychological dispositions to encompass negative emotions, including depression, anxiety, hostility, and anger (see Foy et al., this volume). People who occupy socially-disadvantaged positions, whether based on socioeconomic position, race, or gender, report higher levels of negative emotions than people who occupy socially-advantaged positions. In turn, negative emotions have been linked to poor health in prior research, and especially to the risk of poor immunological functioning and cardiovascular disease (Kiecolt-Glaser et al. 2002; Matthews et al. 2010).

Psychological dispositions represent an additional pathway through which inequality affects health. Although often treated as coping resources by stress researchers, mastery and negative emotions also have direct effects on health that contribute to health inequalities. Their contribution demonstrates that the meanings associated with social disadvantage profoundly influence bodily functioning.

Social Relationships

Social relationships can promote positive health behaviors, facilitate social control against negative health behaviors, foster a sense of meaning and purpose in life, serve as standards for social comparison, and improve an array of physiological processes (Umberson and Montez 2010). At the same time, social relationships carry costs. They can be sources of stress as well as comfort, and they may encourage risk-taking behaviors, especially among youth (Mirowsky and Ross 2003; Ennett et al. 2006). Social relationships also convey values, and material and informational resources that matter for health. As Cook (this volume) notes, because people’s social networks tend to be populated by similar others (McPherson et al. 2001), social group memberships shape the social resources to which people have access and the values they hold.

Most sociological research on health conceptualizes social relationships with reference to the concepts of social support and social integration. Social support refers to “the functions performed

for the individual by significant others” (Thoits 1995; p. 64), including instrumental, informational, and/or emotional assistance. Social integration refers to the “overall level of involvement with informal social relationships,” including marriage and membership in formal organizations (Umberson and Montez 2010; p. S54).

Among dimensions of social support, perceived emotional support is most strongly associated with health. People who have intimate, confiding relationships with others, and who feel that they are loved and cared for, report better health and experience fewer damaging effects of stress (Thoits 2011). Access to social support is socially patterned, although not always to the disadvantage of lower status groups. People in lower socioeconomic positions report smaller confidant networks and lower levels of social support than people in higher socioeconomic positions (McPherson et al. 2006; Turner and Marino 1994). Similarly, blacks report smaller confidant networks than whites (McPherson et al. 2006) and lesser involvement in “balanced” exchanges of emotional support (exchanges in which both partners give and receive support; Sarkisian and Gerstel 2004). However, blacks also report more church-based support than whites (Krause 2002) and, especially for women, are more likely to be involved in giving and receiving practical support (e.g. household help, transportation help, child care; Sarkisian and Gerstel 2004). Indeed, in general, women report larger confidant networks than men and higher levels of support (McPherson et al. 2006; Turner and Marino 1994).

Perhaps because social disadvantage does not correlate neatly with social support, evidence suggests that social support does not explain health inequalities. Specifically, social support contributes little to explaining socioeconomic and race differences in depressive symptoms (Kiecolt et al. 2008), and it suppresses the association between gender and depression (Turner and Marino 1994). Instead, the limited existing evidence suggests that social support interacts with indicators of social disadvantage when predicting health (Matthews et al. 2010). For example, kin support significantly reduces the likelihood of

mental disorder for African Americans, but not for whites (Kiecolt et al. 2008).

Social integration is a second type of social resource of interest to stress researchers. It is typically measured by participation in major social roles, such as marriage or employment, membership in social organizations, such as churches or voluntary groups, or frequency of social interaction with friends and relatives. Each of these dimensions of social integration strongly predicts physical and mental health (Berkman and Syme 1979; see Berkman et al. 2000 for a review). For example, on average, married persons report better physical and mental health and have lower mortality rates than persons who are not married (e.g., Berkman and Syme 1979; Hughes and Waite 2009), and organizational and religious participation are associated with better health (e.g., Hummer et al. 1999; Piliavin and Siegl 2007).

Social integration varies with socioeconomic position and race in ways that suggest its potential as a mediator of health inequalities. People who occupy lower socioeconomic positions and racial minorities are less likely than people who occupy higher socioeconomic positions and whites to be married and employed (Martin 2006). They are also more likely to change residences frequently, and to live in communities characterized by social disorder and weak social bonds (Massey and Denton 1993; Wilson 1987). Blacks are less likely than whites to participate in voluntary social organizations, with the exception of churches and neighborhood organizations, although the race difference is declining in more recent cohorts (Miner and Tolnay 1998).

Yet, as was true for social support, social integration does not explain health inequalities. Studies of socioeconomic, race, and gender differences in health often control for social role occupancy (e.g., marital status, employment status), providing implicit evidence that social integration does not account for health inequalities. Gorman and Sivaganesan (2007) provide direct evidence in their finding that social integration—as measured by frequency of talking or interacting with friends, neighbors, and family, as well as by church participation—does not mediate socioeconomic disparities in self-rated health

and hypertension. Kiecolt et al. (2008) report that church attendance does not account for race differences in rates of mental disorder. Indeed, the African American health disadvantage would be even larger if not for high rates of religious participation (Oates and Goode 2013).

Instead, there is consistent evidence that social integration interacts with gender and race when predicting health. African Americans experience greater health benefits than whites from marriage (Liu and Umberson 2008) and religious participation (Krause 2002) but reap fewer health benefits from being employed (Farmer and Ferraro 2005) and volunteering (Hinterlong 2006). While marriage is beneficial for both genders, men accrue more health benefits from marriage than do women, a finding that has been attributed to women's control of their husbands' health behaviors (Berkman and Breslow 1983; Umberson 1992). Women also appear to derive fewer health benefits from employment than men (Pugliesi 1995; Thoits 1986), because the jobs they hold are less self-directed and lower-paying and because their employment is seen as threatening to family roles.

In sum, social support and social integration powerfully shape health but they do not consistently explain health inequalities. The contingent nature of their associations with health reveals limitations in the concepts themselves. As we noted at the beginning of this section, social relationships matter for reasons other than the support and behavioral control they provide (see Berkman 2000 and Umberson and Montez 2010 for a review).

For that reason, some health scholars have turned to analyzing social relations through the broader lens of social capital (see Cook, this volume). Some scholars follow Coleman's (1988) definition, which emphasizes trust, norms of reciprocity, and mutual aid "which act as resources for individuals and facilitate collective action" (Kawachi and Berkman 2000, p. 175). According to this definition, social capital encourages the sharing of material resources and information, the development of relationships involving obligation and reciprocation, and the cultivation of effective norms and sanctions (Coleman

1988). Other scholars prefer Bourdieu's (1985) definition, "the aggregate of actual or potential resources linked to possession of a durable network" (p. 248), because it opens opportunities to consider the negative side of social relations for health. Both conceptualizations link macro-social inequalities to health through patterned variation in the structure and content of social networks.

The most common application of social capital to health is in research on neighborhood disadvantage. Scholars in this area posit that social networks in disadvantaged neighborhoods are less cohesive and efficacious than networks in advantaged neighborhoods (Sampson et al. 2002). As a result, residents of disadvantaged neighborhoods are less able to engage in collective action (e.g., mobilizing to prevent a hospital closure), enforce positive norms (e.g., against underage drinking), provide mutual aid, and disseminate information (see Quillian, this volume).⁶ Advocates for a more Bourdieuan approach to social capital challenge the assumption that cohesive networks necessarily promote health and note that, depending on their composition and norms, cohesive networks can damage health (Carpiano 2007). Networks can enforce negative (e.g., drug use) as well as positive norms and networks with dense reciprocal exchange systems can impose excessive obligations that create stress for their members (Henley et al. 2005).

Empirical evidence for the association of neighborhood-level social capital with health varies by outcome. In these studies, social capi-

⁶ A related argument has been presented in research on income inequality. In a small sample of OECD countries, Wilkinson (1992) documented a negative correlation between income inequality and life expectancy that appeared to be independent of absolute levels of income. One explanation given for the association was that income inequality erodes social bonds and diminishes social cohesion. Research by Kawachi et al. is consistent with this explanation in that state-level income inequality is negatively associated with levels of trust, and levels of trust are strongly associated with age-adjusted mortality (e.g., Kawachi et al. 1997, 1999). However, the basic association has been challenged by studies that incorporate more comprehensive controls, fixed effects models, or multi-level models (e.g., Beckfield 2004; McLeod et al. 2004; Sturm and Gresenz 2002), calling the social cohesion argument into question.

tal is operationalized as perceived social cohesion, perceived trust, reciprocal exchanges between neighbors, and the like. These features of neighborhoods have consistently been found to predict lower levels of depression but the results for physical health are mixed (see Diez-Roux and Mair 2010 for a review). In addition, even the results for depression can be challenged because the studies rely on cross-sectional data and single-source data collection (i.e., data on outcomes and neighborhood characteristics are reported by the same person), which means that the possibility of non-random sorting of residents into residential areas cannot be eliminated. Thus, it is not clear whether causal claims for the role of neighborhood social capital in health are justified.

What is perhaps most surprising about research on social capital and health is its weak grounding in social psychological theory. Despite a strong intellectual connection between research on social capital and social psychological theories of exchange, the latter theories are virtually absent from research on health. Studies make little or no reference to research on how the structure of social networks affects the patterns and frequency of exchange, or on the development of relational cohesion in exchange networks (Thye and Kalkhoff, this volume). Instead, studies of social capital and health draw primarily from theories of social disorganization from criminology (e.g., Browning and Cagney 2002). Social psychological theories could be used to forge a connection between the Coleman and Bourdieuian branches of social capital research and to add precision to the general claim that social disadvantage diminishes social cohesion. (Others have offered comparable suggestions for research on social networks and social support; see Lin and Peek 1999).

Social disadvantage matters for health beyond its association with stressors and resources. We turn now to two additional explanatory factors: health behaviors and health care interactions.

Health Behaviors

Research both within and outside of sociology emphasizes the importance of health behaviors

as proximate causes of health inequalities. One reason that members of disadvantaged groups experience less favorable health outcomes is that they engage in less healthy behaviors. For example, persons with lower income and fewer years of education are more likely to smoke, be overweight, are less likely to exercise, and consume more alcoholic beverages than persons with higher socioeconomic position (see Adler and Stewart 2010 for a review). Scholars also find race differences in health behaviors, although the patterns are more complex and depend on the behavior and racial group examined. Dubowitz et al. (2011) found that whites consume more fruits and vegetables and are less likely to be sedentary than African and Mexican Americans, but are more likely to smoke than Mexican Americans. With respect to gender differences in health behaviors, women engage in more preventive and fewer risky behaviors compared to men, and men are more likely to drink and smoke, experience accidental injuries, eat less healthy foods, and are less likely to seek care for health problems (Denton et al. 2004; Read and Gorman 2011). However, men are also more likely than women to exercise (Read and Gorman 2011). Health behaviors appear to explain a modest, but significant, proportion of patterned variation in morbidity and mortality (Lantz et al. 1998), suggesting the importance of understanding their origins.

Most theories of health behaviors rely on value-expectancy models of behavior, i.e., that people will adopt health-protective behaviors if they anticipate the personal benefits from the behavior will outweigh the costs (see DiClemente et al. 2011 for an overview of health behavior theories). In essence, these theories posit that actors engage in a rational calculus when deciding whether to adopt and maintain specific health behaviors. Theories vary in how they conceptualize the factors that contribute to the calculus. The theory of planned behavior emphasizes attitudes toward health behaviors, perceived behavioral norms, perceived behavioral control, and behavioral intent (Ajzen and Madden 1986). The health behavior model emphasizes perceived threat of ill health (affected in turn by perceived severity of the condition and perceived vulnerability), the expected net gain of the behavior,

and the presence of cues to action (Rosenstock et al. 1988). Social cognitive theory emphasizes knowledge, perceived self-efficacy, outcome expectations, and goal formation (Bandura 2004). These differences aside, all health behavior theories are social psychological at their core inasmuch as they see health behaviors as arising from the interaction of person and environment.

Surprisingly, despite evidence that health behaviors are associated with social structural conditions, little research has evaluated how those conditions affect the proximate factors on which theories of health behavior focus: knowledge, attitudes, perceived norms, etc. (Glanz and Bishop 2010). We review three processes through which social disadvantage may influence health behaviors. These processes complement dominant theories of health behavior by highlighting their social psychological underpinnings.

Education as Socialization. Several theories of health behavior posit that behaviors are a function, in part, of information, motivation (shaped by attitudes and social norms), and perceived ability to enact the behavior successfully. Structurally-oriented theories of health inequalities, including the fundamental cause theory (Link and Phelan 1995) assert that people who occupy positions of social disadvantage engage in less healthy behaviors because they have less access to knowledge and information than their more advantaged counterparts (Link and Phelan 1995). In complement, as we discussed in the section on mastery, social disadvantage also erodes actual and perceived control over their life circumstances, thereby diminishing motivation and agency (see also the discussion of social ecological models of health behavior in DiClemente et al. 2011). Mirowsky and Ross (2005) assert that at root, knowledge, information-seeking, and agency have their origins in formal education, which is highly correlated with other forms of social disadvantage.

Education yields specific content knowledge, but it also encourages the development of general skills that can be applied to a range of life problems. In formal schooling, people learn how to think critically, to communicate, to analyze problems, and to implement plans.

As people move into higher levels of education, they encounter and master increasingly complex problems. As a result, they develop a sense of efficacy that prepares them for a wide range of life challenges. People who succeed in school also display habits and attitudes, such as commitment, trustworthiness, and motivation that allow them to tackle difficult circumstances with confidence.⁷ In Mirowsky and Ross's (2005) words, "(e)ducation encourages and helps individuals to assemble a set of habits and ways that are not necessarily related except as effective means toward health." (p. 7). Ample empirical evidence supports the strong role of education in shaping health behaviors (e.g., Ross and Wu 1995).

Although health behaviors are undoubtedly a function of knowledge and skills, they also have a habitual character that is under-recognized by theories of health behavior and which may be better explained with reference to socialization and identity processes, to which we now turn.

Informal Socialization. Traditional socialization theories are concerned with how people "acquire social competence by learning the norms, values, beliefs, attitudes, language characteristics, and roles appropriate to their social groups" (Lutfey and Mortimer 2003, p. 183). Socialization arguments are especially prominent in research on neighborhood characteristics and health. In his analysis of neighborhood decline and isolation, Wilson (1987) argued that residents of racially and economically segregated neighborhoods develop unique subcultures and tolerances for risky behavior. Following the concept of "collective socialization" (Mayer and Jencks 1989), disadvantaged neighborhoods may also lack positive role models, contributing to patterns of risky health behavior (Boardman et al. 2001). Consistent with these speculations, low neighborhood SES and social disorganization are associated with risky sexual

⁷ Although there is some debate over how much these habits and attitudes are products of success in formal educational settings, research on the role of non-cognitive traits in educational success demonstrates that teachers differentially reward students based on trustworthiness, dependability, and the like (Farkas 2003).

behaviors among adolescents (Ramirez-Valles et al. 1998), drug use among adults (Boardman et al. 2001), and less knowledge about health and fewer preventive health behaviors (Cubbin and Winkleby 2005). Scholars have also noted that norms about food consumption in some ethnic neighborhoods may contribute to more healthy dietary behaviors in these groups (Lee and Cubbin 2002).⁸

Traditional theories of socialization of health behaviors stress how people learn to conform to societal expectations (see Mortimer and McLaughlin, this volume). Contemporary theories of socialization have shifted emphasis to the negotiation, sharing, and creation of culture in interaction (see Corsaro and Fingerson 2003, for a review). These theories stress habitual, taken-for-granted routines that guide action and the use of cultural knowledge and skills to enact behavior (see Carpiano et al. 2008 for a review). Along these lines, Cockerham (2005) proposes a theory of health lifestyles that draws on Bourdieu (1984) to link social positions to socialization processes and life experiences that, together with objective life chances, shape dispositions to act, health practices, and health lifestyles. According to Cockerham's theory, group differences in health behaviors are a function not only of social learning but of habitual ways of acting that reflect what people perceive as possible in their given life circumstances. In an application of his theory, Cockerham et al. (2006) explained the heavy drinking among men in the former Soviet Union as a habitual behavior supported by strong cultural norms rather than as a function of distress.

⁸ Socialization arguments have been extended to understanding why immigrant health deteriorates with the length of time spent in the U.S. (Lara et al. 2005). The major theoretical framework that has been used to understand this observation is the negative acculturation hypothesis (also referred to as "unhealthy assimilation"). The negative acculturation hypothesis asserts that the health advantage of immigrants declines as they begin to acculturate to American society and adopt the unhealthy lifestyles of their U.S. counterparts (Hunt et al. 2004; Lara et al. 2005; Schwartz et al. 2010).

In sum, socialization theories emphasize the processes through which health behaviors are learned or become habitual within social groups. They remind us that health inequalities derive not only from differences in the material circumstances of life, but also from differences in values and meanings. The next set of theories to which we turn, on identity processes, move one step beyond to conceptualize health behaviors as expressions of valued identities.

Identity Processes. Identity theories shift emphasis away from learned knowledge and habits toward identity work as a key determinant of health behavior. In the most explicit application of identity theory to health, Oyserman et al. (2007) present an identity-based motivation model in which health behaviors, such as not smoking, exercising, or eating healthy food, are conceptualized as social identity infused habits. Their theory draws on social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1986) which proposes that people use social categories and attributes that describe groups to define themselves, and that these social identities motivate group comparisons and behaviors that favor groups to which they belong. Oyserman et al. apply the theory to understanding why people engage in specific health behaviors, such as eating the same kinds of things as others in their in-groups, and also why healthier behaviors are chosen more often by persons of higher status. In their words, "if groups compete over a self-defining characteristic, all things being equal, higher resource groups are likely to have an advantage in claiming valued characteristics as in-group identifying" (p. 1012). Consistent with that statement, their research revealed that socioeconomically disadvantaged college students viewed health promotion as a characteristic of the white, middle class and not as part of their in-group identity. It is not just that they believed themselves unable to afford or enact healthy behaviors, but that they did not see those behaviors as part of who they were (see also Cockerham 2005).

Similar arguments have been made for race and gender. Harvey and Afful (2011) examined the relationships among perceived racial typicality of health behaviors, the importance of the be-

haviors, engagement in the behaviors, and racial identity in a small sample of black Americans. They found that viewing a behavior as more or less typical of blacks was an important determinant of the degree to which the behavior was valued and practiced by respondents. Moreover, the association between racial typicality and engagement in health behaviors was stronger for respondents who endorsed racial identities and ideologies that emphasize the distinctiveness of blacks from other groups.

Through their relevance for health behaviors, racial identities may also help us understand the better health outcomes observed for socioeconomically disadvantaged minority groups. For example, research on Latino health suggests that the better health outcomes observed in some Latino groups are attributable, in part, to eating healthier food (Ayala et al. 2008). Food choices are one means of expressing ethnic identities, suggesting the potential of identities to explain patterns of health behaviors that favor disadvantaged groups (Devine et al. 1999).

Gender identities are also expressed through health-promoting or health-risky behaviors (Courtenay 2000). Cultural beliefs about masculinity suggest that men are the more powerful or robust sex. Following from this, men are more likely than women to engage in health risk-taking behaviors and are less likely to seek health care when they are ill (Addis and Mahalik 2003). Seeking help is consistent with portraying a feminine self but contradicts dominant constructions of the masculine self (Courtenay 2000; Nathanson 1977; Verbrugge 1985). Extending this basic insight further, men who endorse dominant norms of masculinity are less likely to adopt healthy behaviors and more likely to engage in risky behaviors than men who endorse less traditional norms (e.g., Eisler 1995; O'Neil et al. 1995). In other words, men express masculine identities by embracing risk, which ultimately damages health.

As a group, identity processes emphasize the role of identities as standards for behavior and as sources of meaning. According to studies in this area, normative health behaviors differ across

groups not only because of differences in shared values—the emphasis of socialization theories—but also because group members use health behaviors as a way to express valued identities.

Help-Seeking as a Specific Type of Health Behavior. As research on gender and health behavior highlights, help-seeking can be conceptualized as a health behavior subject to the same explanations outlined above. Whether or not people seek formal treatment for illness has implications for the severity and chronicity of disease. Early theories of help-seeking drew primarily from dominant theories of health behaviors to assert that people make decisions about whether or not to seek formal treatment based on their beliefs about treatment and actual/perceived access to care. According to these theories, if people who experience social disadvantage are less likely to seek treatment, it is because they are less informed about treatment, less likely to believe in its efficacy, and less able to access it (Andersen 1995).

While research supports these theories, they are limited in that they rely on the assumption that help-seeking decisions are made by individual, rational actors. Pescosolido (1992) rejects that assumption and proposes an alternative theory that grounds help-seeking decisions in social networks that give meaning to illness experiences. These networks—composed of family and friends, the broader community, the treatment system, and social service agencies (including churches, police, support groups)—serve as sources of information as well as of behavioral regulation (both formal and informal) that shape people's pathways of care. What members of the network know, how they define the problem, and how they evaluate the likely efficacy and appropriateness of alternative responses become important determinants of whether the person takes action, is coerced into care, or “muddles through” the illness episode (Pescosolido 2011). While the broad sweep of the theory has prevented a full empirical evaluation, its embedded claims offer ample opportunity for social psychological research.

Health Care Interactions

Inequities in clinical care contribute importantly to health inequalities (Starfield et al. 2012). While some of the inequities reflect differences in help-seeking and differential access to care, some reflect differences in quality of care received. As gatekeepers to medical treatments, health care providers have substantial control over the quality of care their patients receive. By implication, providers' beliefs about the competence and worth of their patients are important determinants of the quality of care they receive. Those beliefs can be understood as status processes: processes through which individuals, groups, or objects are ranked as superior or inferior according to a shared standard of social value (Ridgeway and Nakagawa, this volume)

One of the most consistent findings in research on health care is that people in lower socioeconomic positions and racial minorities receive lower quality care independent of income, insurance, and disease severity (Fiscella et al. 2000). In other words, it is not just that people in lower socioeconomic positions have less access to health care but also that the care they receive is of poorer quality. One explanation for the association of socioeconomic position and race with the quality of care is that physicians make differential attributions about patients' motivations and abilities based on their social characteristics (Franks and Fiscella 2002).

Consistent with this explanation, Lutfey and Freese (2005) found that physicians more often interpreted the noncompliance of diabetes patients from lower socioeconomic groups with reference to psychological attributes. There are many external reasons why lower status patients had a difficult time following a treatment regimen: it cost them more in time and money to get to appointments on a regular basis, they were less able to afford the test strips for glucometers so they were less able to tightly monitor their glucose levels, they had to fill their prescriptions at the hospital pharmacy which was not convenient and so they were more likely to let their prescriptions lapse. However, physicians tended to attribute the problems they had fol-

lowing regimens to lower motivation, lower cognitive ability, and lower ability to maintain a more complex (and also more effective) diabetes regimen. Although Lutfey and Freese did not present evidence on this point and are careful not to draw the inference, it seems likely that differential attributions of competence would affect physician recommendations for future regimen design.

Along the same lines, van Ryn and Burke (2000) observed that black cardiac rehabilitation patients were perceived less positively than white patients by their physicians: they were less likely to be rated as low risk for substance abuse and noncompliance, half as likely to be rated as desiring an active lifestyle, and were rated as less intelligent. In their review of relevant research, van Ryn et al. (2011) conclude that white clinicians hold negative implicit racial biases and explicit racial stereotypes that influence clinical decision-making. Comparable evidence is available for gender biases in clinical decision-making for certain conditions, such as coronary heart disease. In simulated medical encounters involving male and female patients with comparable presenting complaints, physicians were more certain of coronary heart disease diagnoses for men than women, asked men more questions about smoking, gave men more lifestyle advice, and prescribed men more medications (Arber et al. 2006; Lutfey et al. 2010).

Judgments of competence and worth also influence diagnostic decisions and the care that follows from them. For example, psychiatric researchers have established that psychiatrists over-diagnose schizophrenia in black men and under-diagnose depression and anxiety (see Neighbors 1997 for a review). Although the precise reasons for the over-diagnosis of schizophrenia have not been identified, it appears to reflect, in part, the tendency of clinicians to interpret certain specific symptoms (e.g., inappropriate affect) as signs of mental illness for blacks more than for whites (Neighbors et al. 2003).

In sum, research on patient-provider interactions illustrates the social psychological underpinnings of the differential distribution of material advantage. High quality medical care is a re-

source that people of higher status can claim but it is a resource that does not derive exclusively from material advantage. Inequality involves a hierarchy of status that parallels hierarchies of material advantage and that amplifies those advantages.

Social Comparisons

Status processes involve social comparisons that influence how people evaluate their relative worth and value. Research on health inequalities invokes other types of social comparisons, as well, as evident in research on relative social standing, equity, and illness interpretations.

Relative Social Standing. Research on relative social standing and health draws on the concept of relative deprivation. Relative deprivation refers to a discrepancy between what one expects to receive and what one obtains. In their research on psychosocial factors and health, Marmot et al. (1998) operationalized relative deprivation with a measure of “perceived inequality”: respondents’ perceptions that they were disadvantaged relative to others at home, in the family, at work, and in their neighborhoods. They found that perceptions of relative inequality contributed importantly to explaining socioeconomic inequalities in health, a finding that has been replicated in other studies (e.g., Eibner and Evans 2005; Pham-Kanter 2009). Although direct evidence is limited, relative deprivation is thought to affect health through its association with negative emotions such as anger, frustration, and hostility and the associations of those emotions with health-compromising behaviors and diminished physiological functioning (Kubzansky and Kawachi 2000).

Studies of subjective social status report similar results. In these studies, respondents are asked to place themselves on a ladder to indicate where they stand relative to others in their neighborhoods, communities, or countries. Like measures of relative deprivation, subjective status ratings contribute to explaining the association of objective social status with health (e.g., Adler et al. 2000; Ostrove et al. 2000); indeed, they are some-

times more strongly associated with health than are objective measures (e.g., Adler et al. 2000; Singh-Manoux et al. 2003). Low subjective status is associated with physiological indicators of stress and with negative emotions (Adler et al. 2000; Wright and Steptoe 2005), consistent with the hypothesis that the stresses inherent in low status positions account for their associations with poor health (Sapolsky 2005). Although well-studied with respect to socioeconomic position, the concept of relative social standing has received little attention in research on race and gender.

Equity and Justice. Theories of equity and justice emphasize the psychological outcomes of comparing one’s own inputs and outcomes to those of others and are most often referenced in research on mental health. Equity theory predicts that people will experience distress upon perceiving an inequity to themselves or others, that is, from either under-benefitting or over-benefitting (Hegtvæd and Isom, this volume; Homans [1961] 1974; Walster et al. 1978). According to equity theory, under-benefitting produces anger or resentment while over-benefitting produces guilt (Homans [1961] 1974; Stets 2003). Experimental studies generally support these predictions, although evidence is stronger for the effects of under-benefitting than over-benefitting (e.g., Austin and Walster 1974; Hegtvæd 1990). Inasmuch as people in lower status groups are more likely to under-benefit, they are more likely to experience negative emotions. Negative emotions, in turn, set into motion health-damaging physiological and psychological processes (Kiecolt-Glaser et al. 2002). For example, Simon and Lively (2010) found that women’s higher reports of depression were attributable to their higher reports of anger. The authors infer that the anger and rage resulting from perceived inequity lead to long-term mental health decrements.

Similar findings appear in survey studies of marital equity. Husbands and wives who perceive their relationships as equitable experience fewer depressive symptoms than those who perceive themselves as under-benefitting or over-benefitting (e.g., DeMaris et al. 2010; Lennon and Rosenfield 1994; Longmore and DeMaris

1997), although some studies report significant effects only for under-benefitting (Sprecher 2001; Voydanoff and Donnelly 1999). The association of marital equity with mental health varies with personal and social characteristics. It is stronger for women than for men (e.g., Glass and Fujimoto 1994), for women who affirm more egalitarian gender ideologies (Voydanoff and Donnelly 1999), for people who believe that marriage is a sacrament (DeMaris et al. 2010), and for people with lower self-esteem (Longmore and DeMaris 1997). The association also differs depending on the domain of life being considered, with women being more sensitive to inequities in housework and men being more sensitive to inequities involving paid work (Glass and Fujimoto 1994; Sprecher 2001). Research on the direct relationship between equity and physical health is less common, although the association of emotions with physical health (Kiecolt-Glaser et al. 2002) suggests the connection.

Research on social comparison processes demonstrates that positions in systems of inequality influence health in part through perceptions of relative deprivation, subjective social status, and equity. Basic social psychological research reveals that these perceptions do not follow automatically from objective life conditions but, rather, are contingent on social contexts and on the availability of alternative explanations for disadvantage. For example, among Latinos, the choice of reference groups differs depending on nativity, with foreign-born, Spanish-speaking Mexicans more likely to choose Mexicans in the U.S. as the reference group and U.S. born, English-speaking Mexicans more likely to choose people in the U.S. (including Anglos; Franzini and Fernandez-Esquer 2006). This research reminds us that members of disadvantaged groups may be able to maintain positive evaluations of their situations even in the face of objective disadvantage by selecting referent others who allow positive social comparisons and by adopting salutary interpretations for their life circumstances (Diener and Fujita 1997).

Illness Interpretations. Social comparisons are implicated in health inequalities in an even

more basic way, by shaping the definition and interpretation of physical and psychological experiences, and the manifestations of distress. In the most systematic treatment of the former, Angel and Thoits (1987) assert that people construct interpretations of their physical and emotional experiences through comparisons with referent others. Conditions that might be considered indicators of poor health in some groups may not be given any significance in others. Differences in perceptions of physical experiences across groups influence what we believe to be true about group differences in health by influencing expressions of illness, self-reports of health, and treatment-seeking, all of which become incorporated into health statistics. For example, in his early research on health in "Regionsville," Koos (1954) observed that, although lower back pain was quite common among lower-class women, they did not consider it a sign of disease; in comparison with other women they knew and in the context of their physically demanding lives, lower back pain was considered normal for those women and not worthy of mention in response to questions about health problems.

Referent comparisons also shape the physical and psychological manifestations of distress. Kleinman (1977) presented evidence that Chinese patients with mental disorders were more likely than U.S. patients to experience somatic symptoms; this same pattern has been observed among Chinese patients in the United States (Takeuchi et al. 2002). Kleinman attributed this pattern to the highly stigmatized nature of mental illness in Chinese culture. Physiological symptoms are viewed as acceptable expressions of distress whereas psychological symptoms are not. A variant of this argument has been advanced to explain the higher rates of major depression among whites as compared to blacks (and, correspondingly, the higher rates of physical health problems among blacks as compared to whites). Mental illness is highly stigmatized in U.S. black culture (Anglin et al. 2006; Neighbors 1985), which may encourage physical, rather than psychological, expressions of distress.

Arguments for the role of social comparisons in group differences in the experience and

expression of illness are an important corrective to the dominant assumption that observed group differences in mental and physical health are “real.” They remind us that observed inequalities in health are a function, in part, of group differences in the experience and expression of illness rather than of objective experiences of disease. Inasmuch as all illness experiences are filtered through cultural repertoires, all knowledge about group differences in health is socially constructed. When professionals become involved in the interpretation, the constructions become especially consequential. For example, McKinlay (1996) demonstrates that coronary heart disease (CHD) is under-diagnosed in women relative to men, also in part because physicians believe that women are less likely to experience CHD and are therefore less likely to consider CHD as a diagnosis when women present with cardiac symptoms. The “fact” that women experience less heart disease than men is perpetuated when the flawed diagnoses are incorporated into medical statistics. These statistics, in turn, feed back into the quality of care women receive through their influence on how research resources are distributed (i.e., more research on men’s CHD than on women’s), reinforcing health inequalities.⁹ As for the role of status processes in health care, the social construction of illness illustrates the social psychological bases of material disadvantage.

⁹ While McKinlay (1996) identifies a disease that is under-recognized in women, other scholars have highlighted the over-production of disease in women through the medicalization of normal reproductive functions (e.g., pregnancy, childbirth, menstruation, menopause). By treating common and ordinary aspects of women’s reproductive lives as disease, the medical profession constructs an understanding of women as “sicker” than men which, in turn, affects women’s personal interpretations of their reproductive lives and, presumably, their self-reports of health (Conrad and Barker 2010; Riska 2003). In short, professional understandings of disease influence personal interpretations and the care that people receive in ways that reinforce those understandings.

Conclusion

Health research identifies key pathways through which inequality influences health: stress, residential environments, psychological dispositions, social relations, health behaviors, and health care interactions. As a general rule, people who occupy disadvantaged social positions confront more stressful life conditions and do so with relatively few material, social, and psychological resources. Yet, a simple resource-based explanation is insufficient to explain observed patterns of health inequalities. Each of the pathways that we discussed implicates objective life conditions but also the meanings those conditions are given. For example, people who occupy disadvantaged social positions are exposed to more stressors, but the effects of those stressors depend on how they are interpreted (as in research on discrimination and health). Health behaviors are a function of knowledge and resources, but also of habits and identities. These processes occur in meso-level social contexts, including the workplace, families, neighborhoods, and social networks, which bridge macro-structures of inequality with bodily and psychological responses. These same contexts hold the seeds of resistance, in the form of social support, salutary identities, and social comparisons that yield positive meanings.

Social psychological research on health demonstrates the complementary contributions of research on material life conditions and subjective meanings, paralleling the more general complementarity of the social structure and personality framework and symbolic interactionism. Whereas the former encourages precise identification of the proximate experiences that explain health inequalities, the latter encourages analysis of the interactional processes that produces those experiences. A comprehensive analysis of health inequalities requires attention to both.

Meaning-based processes have unique potential to inform our understanding of unexpected health patterns. As noted early in our chapter, although socially disadvantaged groups often experience poorer health than socially advantaged groups, their health disadvantages are not uniform. As a general rule, health researchers

have devoted less attention to unexpected health patterns than to expected health inequalities. Our review illustrates that social relationships, identities, social comparisons, and the meanings to which they give rise have the potential to advance research on those unexpected patterns and, in the process, to reveal processes through which people resist the health-damaging effects of social disadvantage. More generally, social psychological theories emphasize the complexity of the processes through which inequality affects the structure and content of daily life, and the interactional and cognitive processes that modify its effects. While not denying the health relevance of material realities, these theories emphasize that inequality is a symbolic as well as distributional phenomenon and that the meanings associated with disadvantaged statuses can both amplify and mitigate their effects on health.

We believe that health researchers have yet to take advantage of the full potential of sociological social psychology to analyze health inequalities. One reason may be the absence of a comprehensive conceptual framework that integrates diverse social psychological traditions and highlights their unique and complementary contributions. Although many individual studies incorporate specific social psychological theories and concepts, few speak across traditions.

Any comprehensive social psychological framework must meet several challenges. It must account for objective conditions of social disadvantage as well as the discrepancy between those conditions and how they are perceived. It must account not only for group differences in health but also for heterogeneity within groups (Schwartz and Meyer 2010). It must also account for life course dynamics. Finally, a comprehensive social psychological framework for the study of health inequality must attend to how historical and social contexts shape proximate experiences of inequality. The specific structure and content of processes that produce health inequalities will vary by place and time, even though the basic processes remain intact (Link and Phelan 1995).

The construction of such a framework is a daunting challenge but a surmountable one. To succeed, health researchers will have to draw on

the full set of conceptual tools that social psychology has to offer regarding the structure and content of proximate environments, as well as how people construct meaning in interaction with others.

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